Note: This translation has been prepared by the Registry for internal purposes and has no official
character
15434
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA)
SECOND PHASE
QUESTION OF REPARATION
REPLIES AND FURTHER EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
VOLUME II
(Annexes 1.0.1-13.5)
26 October 2018
[Translation by the Registry]
LIST OF ANNEXES
Question 1
Annex 1.0.1 United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985,
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power
Annex 1.0.2 United Nations General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law
Annex 1.1 Victim identification forms for Beni
Annex 1.2 Victim identification forms for Butembo
Annex 1.3 Victim identification forms for Gemena
Annex 1.4 Victim identification forms for Ituri
Annex 1.5 Victim identification forms for Kisangani
Annex 1.5.1 Additional victim identification forms for Kisangani
Annex 1.6 Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Beni
Annex 1.7 Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Butembo
Annex 1.8 Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Gemena
Annex 1.9 Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Ituri
Annex 1.10 Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Kisangani
Annex 1.6.A Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Beni
Annex 1.7.A Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Butembo
Annex 1.8.A Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Gemena
Annex 1.9.A Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Ituri
Annex 1.10.A Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Kisangani
Annex 1.6.B Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Beni
Annex 1.7.B Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Butembo
Annex 1.8.B Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Gemena
Annex 1.9.B Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Ituri
- ii -
Annex 1.10.B Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Kisangani
Annex 1.6.C Assessment of property lost by victims in Beni
Annex 1.7.C Assessment of property lost by victims in Butembo
Annex 1.8.C Assessment of property lost by victims in Gemena
Annex 1.9.C Assessment of property lost by victims in Ituri
Annex 1.10.C Assessment of property lost by victims in Kisangani
Annex 1.6.D Summary assessment table of property lost in Beni
Annex 1.7.D Summary assessment table of property lost in Butembo
Annex 1.8.D Summary assessment table of property lost in Gemena
Annex 1.9.D Summary assessment table of property lost in Ituri
Annex 1.10.D Summary assessment table of property lost in Kisangani
Annex 1.6.E List of property lost in Beni, 1998-2003
Annex 1.7.E List of property lost in Butembo, 1998-2003
Annex 1.8.E List of property lost in Gemena, 1998-2003
Annex 1.9.E List of property lost in Ituri, 1998-2003
Annex 1.10.E List of property lost in Kisangani, 1998-2003
Annex 1.6.F Summary table of instances of property loss in Beni, 1998-2003
Annex 1.7.F Summary table of instances of property loss in Butembo, 1998-2003
Annex 1.8.F Summary table of instances of property loss in Gemena, 1998-2003
Annex 1.9.F Summary table of instances of property loss in Ituri, 1998-2003
Annex 1.10.F Summary table of instances of property loss in Kisangani, 1998-2003
Annex 1.11 Video containing victim statements and attesting to the atrocities committed by the
Ugandan army in Kisangani during the six-day war
Annex 1.12 Report on the events in Kisangani between August 1999 and May 2002
- iii -
Question 2
Annex 2.1 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the
Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 2010
(excerpts)
Annex 2.2 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-sixth Session, Report on the
situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by
the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with Commission on
Human Rights resolution 1999/56, document E/CN.4/2000/42, 18 January 2000
(excerpts)
Annex 2.3.A United Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002
Annex 2.3.B United Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, document S/2003/566, 27 May 2003
Annex 2.3.C United Nations Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2001/128, 12 February 2001 (excerpts)
Annex 2.4.A IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], Nairobi, 3 March 2000
Annex 2.4.B MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,
document S/2004/573, 16 July 2004
Annex 2.4.C Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood”. Ethnically Targeted Violence in
Northeastern DR Congo, Vol. 15, No. 11 (A), July 2003
Question 4
Annex 4.1.A Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre du Congo à Kisangani et les violations des
droits de l’homme du 2 août au 17 septembre 1998”, Kisangani, 18 September
1998
Annex 4.1.B Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés à Kisangani et le droit
international humanitaire”, 12 May 1999
Annex 4.1.C Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à
l’autodétermination du peuple congolais”, 31 August 1999
Annex 4.1.D Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des Alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au
10 juin 2000) et le droit à la paix”, 30 June 2000
Annex 4.2 Cost of repair of buildings in Ituri by BCeCo
Annex 4.3 Cost of repairs to buildings belonging to the Catholic church by BDOM,
Archdiocese of Kisangani
- iv -
Question 5
Annex 5.1 Map of mining concessions in the Congo, 30 June 1960
Annex 5.2 United Nations Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001
(excerpts)
Annex 5.3 United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/565, 22 May 2002
Annex 5.4 United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002
Annex 5.5 Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold. Democratic Republic of Congo,
April 2005 (excerpts)
Annex 5.6 International Alert, The Role of the Exploitation of Natural Resources in Fuelling
and Prolonging Crises in the Eastern DRC, January 2010
Annex 5.7 Partnership Africa Canada, All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the
Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals, May 2014
Annex 5.8 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
2001 (“Porter Commission”), Final Report, November 2002
Annex 5.9 Location of exclusive prospecting areas and concessions
Annex 5.10 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/357, 12 April 2001
Question 10
Annex 10.1 Judgment, Bulletin des arrêts de la Haute cour militaire — Sud Kivu
Annex 10.2 Avocats Sans Frontières, Recueil de décisions de justice et de notes de plaidoiries
en matière de crimes internationaux
Question 13
Annex 13.1 Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998
Annex 13.2 Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within the Rebel Alliances and
Factions in North-Eastern Congo. The Kisangani War, September 1999
Annex 13.3 Lotus Group, Conflict between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani, Kisangani,
May 2000
Annex 13.4 Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, July 2000
- v -
Annex 13.5 South Kivu Civil Society — Collective of South Kivu (DRC) Youth Organizations
and Associations (COJESKI), Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC —
large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
reaching fever pitch, Six-monthly report covering the period from 1 April to
30 September 1999, October 1999
___________
ANNEX 1.0.1
United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985, Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power
VI. Resoh1rions adopted on the repons or the Third Committee 213
--------------------
itation, even offenders who had been deemed dangerous al the time of the or
institutionalization can be conditionally released whenever feasible. Like
probation. such release may be conditional on the satisfactory fulfilment of
the requirements specified by the relevant authorities for a period of time
established in the decisioo, for eample relatina to .. ,ood behaviour" of the
offender, auendance in cCDmmunity programmes. residence in half-way
houses, etc.
In the case of offenders conditionally released from an institution, assist·
ance and supervision by a probation or other officer (particularly where
probation has not yet been adopted) should be provided and community
support should be encouraged.
29. Semi-institutional arrange=nts
29.1 Efforts shall be made 10 provide semi-institutional arrangements,
such as half-way houses. educational homes, day-time
trainina centres, and other such appropriate arrangements that
may 8$$iSI juveniles in their proper reintegration into society.
Commentary
The importance of care followina a period of instilulionaliz.ation should
not be underestimated. This rule emphasizes the necessity offormina a net
of semi-institutional arrangements.
This rule also emphasizes the need for a di verse range of facilities and
services designed 10 meet the different needs of young offenders re-entering
the community and 10 provide guidance and structural support as an
important step towards successful reintegration into society.
Part six. Ruurcll, Jr/4••1•1, ,olicy fo,,,,•l4tlo• ad Nl .. tio•
30. Research as a basis for planning. policy f,Jrmu/aftnn
and l!llaluation
30. I Efforts shall be made to organize and promote necessary
research as a basis for effective planning and policy formula·
lion.
3-0.2 Efforts shall be made to review and appraise periodically the
trends. problems and causes of juvenile delinquency and crime
as well as the varying particular needs of juveniles in custody.
30.3 Efforts shall be made 10 establish a regular evaluative research
mechanism built into the system of juvenile jus1icc administration
and to collect and analyse relevant data and information
for appropriate assessment and future improvement and reform
of the administration.
30.4 The delivery of 5ervices in juvenile justice administration shall
be systematically planned and implemented as an integral part
of national development efforts.
Comm,•nrary
The utilization of research as a basis for an informed juvenile justice pol·
icy is widely acknowledged as an important mechanism for keeping pra.ctices
abreast of advances in knowledge and the continuing development
and improvement of the jjuvenile justice system. The mutual feedback
between research and policy is especially important in juvenile justice.
With rapid and of\en drastic changes in the life-styles of the young and in
the forms and dimensions nf juvenile crime, the societal and justice
responses 10 juvenile crime and delinquency Quickly become outmoded
and inadequate.
Rule 30 thus establishes standards for integrating research into the process
of policy formulation and application in juvenile justice administration.
The rule draws particular attention to the need for regular review and
evaluation of existina programmes and measures and for planning within
the broader context of overall development objectives.
A constant appraisal of the needs of juveniles, as well as the trends and
problems of delinquency, is a prerequisite for improving the methods of
formulating appropriate policies and establishing adequate interven1ions,
at both formal and informal levels. In this con1ext. research by independent
persons and bodies should be facilitated by responsible agencies. and
it may be valuable 10 obtain and to take into account the views of juveniles
themselves. not only those who come into contact with the system.
The process of plannina must particularly emphasize a more effective
and equitable system for the delivery of necessary services- Towards that
end, there should be a comprehensive and regular assessment of the wide·
ranging. particular needs and problems of juveniles and an identification of
clear-cut priorities. In that coonection, there should also be a co-ordination
in the use of existing resources. including altema11vcs and community support
that would be suitable in setting up specific procedures designed to
implement and monitor established programmes
40/34. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power
The General Assemblr.
Recalling that the Sixth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders recommended
that the United Nations should continue its
present work on the development of guidelines and standards
regarding abuse of economic and political power,S6
Cognizant that millions of people throughout the world
suffer harm as a result of crime and the abuse of power and
that the rights of these victims have not been adequately
recognized,
Recognizing that the victims of crime and the victims of
abuse of power, and also frequently their families. witnesses
and others who aid them, are unjustly subjected to
loss. damage or injury and that they may, in addition, suffer
hardship when assisting in the prosecution of offenders,
I. Affirms the necessity of adopting national and international
measures in order to secure the universal and
effective recognition of, and respect for, the rights of victims
of crime and of abuse of power;
2. Stresses the need to promote progress by all States
in their efforts to that end. without prejudice to the rights
of suspects or offenders:
3. Adopts the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, annexed to the
present resolution, which is designed to assist Governments
and the international community in their efforts to
secure justice and assistance for victims of crime and victims
of abuse of power;
4. Calls upon Member States to take the necessary
steps to give effect to the provisions contained in the Declaration
and, in order to curtail victimization as referred to
hereinafter, endeavour:
(a) To implement social, health, including mental
health. educational, economic and specific crime prevention
policies to reduce victimization and encourage assistance
to victims in distress:
(b) To promote community efforts and public participation
in crime prevention;
(c) To review periodically their existing legislation and
practices in order to ensure responsiveness to changing circumstances,
and to enact and enforce legislation proscribing
1cts that violate in temationally recognized norms
relating to human rights. corporate conduct and other
abuses of power;
(d) To establish and strengthen the means of detecting,
prosecuting and sentencing those guilty of crimes;
(e) To promote disclosure of relevant information to
expose official and corporate conduct to public scrutiny.
and other ways of increasing responsiveness to public concerns;
(/J To promote the observance of codes of conduct and
ethical norms, in particular international standards, by
public servants, including law enforcement. correctional.
medical, social service and military personnel, as well as
the staff of economic enterprises;
(g) To prohibit practices and procedures conducive to
abuse, such as secret places of detention and incommunicado
detention;
(h) To co-operate with other States, through mutual
judicial and administrative assistance, in such matters as
the detection and pursuit of offenders, their extradition
and the seizure of their assets, to be used for restitution to
the victims;
5. Recommends that, at the international and regional
levels. all appropriate measures should be taken:
- 2 -
214
(a) To promote training activities designed to foster
adherence to United Nations standards and norms and to
curtail possible abuses;
(b) To sponsor collaborative action-research on ways
in which victimization can be reduced and victims aided,
and to promote information exchanges on the most effective
means of so doing;
(c) To render direct aid to requesting Governments
designed to help them curtail victimization and alleviate
the plight of victims;
(d) To develop ways and means of providing recourse
for victims where national channels may be insufficient;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to invite Member
States to report periodically to the General Assembly on
the implementation of the Declaration, as well as on measures
taken by them to this effect;
7. Also requests the Secretary-General to make use of
the opportunities, which all relevant bodies and organizations
within the United Nations system offer, to assist
Member States, whenever necessary, in improving ways
and means of protecting victims both at the national level
and through international co-operation;
8. Further requests the Secretary-General to promote
the objectives of the Declaration, in particular by ensuring
its widest possible dissemination;
9. Urges the specialized agencies and other entities and
bodies of the United Nations system, other relevant intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations and
the public to co-operate in the implementation of the provisions
of the Declaration.
ANNEX
96th plenary meeting
29 November 1985
Declantie• .C Buie Prioclpla of J•tlce ror VlcdaD
of Cri- and Abac o( Powff
A. Yid/.., of cri-
1. "'Victims·· means persons who. individually or collectively, have
suffered harm, including physical or mental injury. emotional sufferin&.
economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental ri&hts.
throuah acts or omissions that arc in violation of criminal laws operative
within Memba States. including those laws proscribin1 criminal abuse of
power.
2. A person may be considered a victim, under this Declaration,
rcprdless of whcthe1' the perpetrator is identi6ed, apprehended, pro.ailed
or oonvicted and rcprdless of the famihal relationship between the perpetrator
and the victim. The term "victim" also includes, where appropriate,
the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who
have sull'ered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent
victimization.
3. The provisions oontained herein shall be applicable to all, withou1
distin<:tion of any kind, such as race, colour, SCJl, a,c. lanaua,t. rcliJjon.
nationality, political or other opinion, cultural beliefs or practices. property,
birth or family status, ethnic or social oria,n. and disability.
Acuss 10 JUStic, and fair trtolmrnt
4. Victims should be trealed with compassion and respect for their dianity.
They are entitled 10 access to the mechanisms of justice and 10
prompt redress, as provided for by nation.al lcsislation, for the harm that
they have sulfe.
5. Judicial and administrative mechanisms should be established and
strcllJlhened where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress throuah
formal or informal procedures thal arc expeditious. fair, inexpensive and
accessible. Victims should be informed of their ri&hts in seeking redras
throu&h such mechanisms.
6. The responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the
needs of victims should be facilitated by:
(a) Informing victims of their role and the scope, timing and prOlf'CSS
of the proceedings and of the disposition of their cases, especially where
serious crimes are involved and where they have rrQurs1C'<I u1rh 1nrnrma
uon:
(b) Allowing the views and concerns of v1c11ms 10 t'lf pn•scn1ed an,I
considered at appropriate sta,es of the procecdin&s where lhrar personnl
interests are affected. without prejudice to the accused and cons1s1cn1 wtl h
1he relevant national cnminal justice sys1em.
(c) Providing proper assistance to victims throughout the 1,-gal pm,:·,·"
(d) Takina measures to minimize inconvenience to vicums. pro1t<1
1heir privacy, when necessary, and ensure their safety. as well as 1t>a1 nl
1heir families and witnesses on their behalf. f'rom intimidation and retah•
1ion:
(r) Avoiding unneocuary dday in the disposition of cases and 1h,· r,,.
cuiion of orders or decTees granting awards to victims.
7. Informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes. includina med1,
auon, arbitration and customary justice or inru,,enc>us practi<:e1. should ht·
utilized where appn)t)riate to facilitate conciliation and redress for >1c11m•
R,stitution
8. Off'enders or third parties responsible for lhetr lxhav1our shoulil
where appropriate. make fair restitution to victims. their fam1lie< •"
dependants. Such resit tution should include the rc1u.m of property or payment
for Ille harm or loss suffered, reimbursement of expenses incurred a,
a result of the victimization, the provision of servicn and the t'C$10ratu>n
of riahtl.
9. Governments should review their practices, rqulations and law!, 1,,
consider re11i1ution as an available sentencing option in criminal case!.. •
addition to other criminal sanctions.
10. In cases of suti.tantial harm 10 the environment. res111u11on. 1
ordered, should include, as far u possible, restoration of the environmcm.
reconstruction of the infrastructure, replacement of community facili1•··<
and reimbursement of the expenses of relocation, whenever such ha,•
results in the disloca11on of a community.
11. Where public officials or other qen11 actina m an official or qua,,
official capacity have violated national criminal laws. the victims should
receive t'C$litution f'rom the State wbo,e officials or qents were responsible
for the hann infticlcd. In caaes where the Government under whov
authority the victimii:ina act or omission occurred is no longer on eustenrc·
the State or Govemmmt successor in title should provide rcstituhon 10 thr
victims.
CompensaJion
I 2. When compensation is not fully available from 1he offender "'
other sources, States should endeavour to provide 6nanoal compensal"'"
10:
(a) v,cums who have sustained sisni6cant bodily 111Jury or 1mpa1rm1·1
of physical or mental health as a result of scnous a,mes:
(b) The family, in particular dependants of persons who have died or
become physically or mentally incapacitated as a mull of such vic11mi,
hon.
13. The establishment. stf'C11&thenin1 and expansion of nattonal fur •·
for compensation to victims tllould be encou!'la,ed. Where appropria1r
other funds may al,o be established for this purpolt. incllldina in 1ho
ca,es whe1'e the State of which the victim is a national is not in a pos,1ion
10 compe.nsate the v1c1im for the harm.
Auistancr
14. V1ctims should receive the nccessa,y material. medical. psycho,
cal and social ass1sunce 1hrou&h aovemmental, voluntary, commun1h
!)ue(I and indi,enous means.
15. Victims should be informed of the availabihty of health and S0<'1•I
services and other relevant assistance and be readily afforded aocess 1n
1hem.
16. Police. justice, health, social ,ervice and other personnel concerned
should receive trainina to scnsiti.ze them to the needs of vicums. and su1de
lines to en1un proper and prompt aid.
17. In providina .ervices and a.ssistance to victims, anention should bt
a,ven to tbOK who have special needs because of the nature of the harm
,nftictcd or because of factors such as thote menuoned in paragraph \
above.
B. nert- of..,, of ,o,
18. "Victims" means l)C11C)IIS who, individually or collect1vcly, hav
<uffered harm. including physical or mental injury, emotional suffnn
teonomic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental nht.
throuah acu or om,ssions that do 001 yet const11u1e violations or na11<•n•I
criminal laws bur or internationally =anized non,,, rela11ni 1,, hu"'"
nghts.
- 3 -
VI. Resolutions adopted on the reports of the Third Committtt 215
l 9. States should consider incorporating into the national law norms
proscribing abuses of power and providing remedies to victims of such
abuses. Jn particular. such remedies should include restitulion and/or compensation.
and necessary material. medical, psychological and social assislance
and suppon.
20. States should consider ncgo1iating multilateral international treaties
relating to victims, as defined in paragraph 18.
21. States should periodically review cxis1ing legislation and prac1ices
to ensure 1hc:ir responsiveness to changing cin:umstances. should enac1 and
enforce. if necessary. lcgisla1ion proscribing aclS that constitute serious
abuses of political or economic power, as well as promo1ing policies and
mechanisms for the prevcn tion of such acts. and should develop and make
readily available appropriate rights and remedies for victims of such aclS.
40/3S. Development of standards for the prevention
of juvenile delinquency
The General Assembly,
Recalling resolution 4 adopted by the Sixth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, held at Caracas from 25 August to
5 September 1980,61 in which the Congress called for the
elaboration of a set of standard minimum rules for the
administration of juvenile justice and for the care of
juveniles,
Noting that the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Admini.stration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing
Rules)76 recommended by the Seventh United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, held at Milan, Italy, from 26 August to 6 September
1985, are limited to the administration of juvenile
justice and the assurance of legal guarantees in respect of
young persons in conflict with the law,
Mindful of the need to develop national, regional and
international strategies for the prevention of delinquency
among the young,
Recognizing that the prevention of juvenile delinquency
includes measures for the protection of juveniles who are
abandoned, neglected, abused and in marginal circumstances
and, in general, those who are at social risk.
Recognizing further the existence of a large number of
young persons who are not in conflict with the law but who
are at social risk,
Acknowledging that one of the basic aims of the prevention
of juvenile delinquency is the provision of requisite
assistance and a range of opponunities to meet the varying
needs of the young, especially those who arc most likely to
commit crime or to be exposed to crime, and to serve as a
supportive framework to safeguard their proper development,
I. Takes note with appreciation of the work undertaken
by the United Nations regional institutes for the prevention
of crime and the treatment of offenders and the
regional commissions in the field of crime prevention;
2. Also takes note with appreciation of the working
paper prepared by the Secretariat on youth, crime and justice;
77
3. Endorses the recommendations contained in the
repon of the Interregional Preparatory Meeting for the
Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Beijing
from 14 to 18 May 1984;7'
4. Requests the Secretary-General and Member States
to take the necessary steps to establish joint programmes
in the field of juvenile justice and the prevention of juvenile
delinquency with the United Nations Social Defence
76 Resolurion 40133, annex.
77 NCONF.12117.
78NCONF.121/IPM/l, seer. II.
Research Institute, the United Nations regional institutes
for the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders,
the Arab Security Studies and Training Centre at Riyadh
and other national and regional institutes, and with the
assistance of regional commissions and national corre•
spondents, which would include the following activities:
(a) To study the situa·tion of juveniles at social risk and
to examine the relevant policies and practices of prevention
within the context of socio-economic development;
(b) To intensify eff'ons in training, research and advisory
services for the prevention of juvenile delinquency;
5. Invites Member States to adopt distinct measures
and systems appropriate to the interest of juveniles at
social risk;
6. Calls upon the Economic and Social Council to
request the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control,
with the assistance of the United Nations institutes for the
prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, the
regional commissions a·nd the specialized agencies, to
develop standards for the prevention of juvenile delinquency
which would assist Member States in formulating
and implementing specialized programmes and policies,
emphasizing assistance and care and the active involvement
of the community, and to report to the Eighth
United Nations Congress. on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders on the progress achieved in the
development of the proposed standards, for review and
final action;
7. Requests that the prevention of delinquency among
the young should be considered regularly by the Committee
on Crime Prevention and Control and that it should be
considered by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
under a separate agenda item;
8. Urges all relevant bodies within the United Nations
system to collaborate with the Secretary-General in taking
appropriate measures to ensure the implementation of the
present resolution.
96th plenary meeting
29 November 1985
40/36. Domestic violence
The General Assembly,
Recalling Economic and Social Council resolution I 984/
14 of 24 May 1984 on violence in the family,
Recalling also resolution 9 adopted by the Sixth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, in which the Congress. called for
the fair treatment of women by the criminal justice system,
61
Bearing in mind the recommendations made on the subject
of domestic violence by the World Conference to
Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United
Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and
Peace.79
Having regard to the Declaration on the Rights of the
Child,62 in particular principle 9 concerning the protection
of the child against exploitation, neglect and cruelty, and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, H
Mindful of the important role of the family in ensuring
the proper development of the young and their integration
79 Sec Rt!port ofrhe World Confirence to Review and Appraae thl! Achil!Vemenrs
of thf' United Na11ons De.:ade for Women: Equality. DeW'iopmeni a,ul
Peace. Nairobi. 15-26 July /98.< (United Nation• publicarion. Sa No
E.85.IV 10). chap. I, sect. A.
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ANNEX 1.0.2
United Nations General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 60/147
(BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY
AND REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW)
The issue of basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and
reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law was first raised in 1988 during the fortieth session of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in the
context of its basic mandate to make recommendations to the Commission on Human
Rights concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind relating to human
rights and fundamental freedoms. On 1 September 1988, the Sub-Commission adopted
resolution 1988/11 in which it decided to discuss the matter of compensation at its
forty-first session with a view to considering the possibility of developing some basic
principles and guidelines in this respect (see Report of the Sub-Commission,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/45).
At its forty-first session, the Sub-Commission adopted resolution 1989/13 of
31 August 1989, by which it decided to entrust Mr. Theo van Boven, as Special
Rapporteur, with the task of undertaking a study concerning the right to restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, with a view to exploring the possibility of developing some
basic principles and guidelines in this respect, and requested him to submit a
preliminary report on the matter for consideration by the Sub-Commission at its fortysecond
session (see Report of the Sub-Commission, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/58
(E/CN.4/1990/2). At its forty-sixth session, upon recommendation of the Subcommission,
the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 1990/35 of 2
March 1990, by which it recommended the Economic and Social Council to adopt a
resolution authorizing the Sub-Commission to entrust Mr. van Boven with the
abovementioned task and requesting the Secretary-General to provide him with all the
assistance needed for this task (see report of the Commission on Human Rights,
E/1990/22). The Economic and Social Council adopted resolution 1990/36 of 25 May
1990 to this effect.
At its forty-second session, the Sub-Commission considered the preliminary
report submitted by the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/10) and adopted
resolution 1990/6 of 30 August 1990, by which it requested the Special Rapporteur to
prepare a progress report for its forty-third session, taking into account comments
made in the discussion on the preliminary report, as well as the relevant work and
recommendations of the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control and relevant
decisions of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, and to undertake the necessary consultations with the United
Nations Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs (see Report of the
Sub-Commission, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/59 (E/CN.4/1991/2)).
The Special Rapporteur accordingly submitted his first progress report to the
Sub-Commission on 25 July 1991, for its forty-third session (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/7).
On 29 August 1991, the Sub-Commission adopted resolution 1991/25, by which it
requested the Special Rapporteur to continue his study and to submit a second progress
report containing additional information on and an analysis of relevant decisions and
views of international human rights organs, as well as of national law and practice to
the Sub-Commission, at its forty-fourth session, and a final report at its forty-fifth
session (see Report of the Sub-Commission, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/65 (E/CN.4/1992/2)).
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The Special Rapporteur submitted his second progress report to the Sub-
Commission on 29 July 1992, for its forty-fourth session (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/8). On
27 August 1992, the Sub-Commission adopted resolution 1992/32, by which it
requested the Special Rapporteur to continue his study and to submit to the Sub-
Commission, at its forty-fifth session, a final report which should include a set of
conclusions and recommendations aimed at developing basic principles and guidelines
with respect to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms (see Report of the Sub-
Commission, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/58 (E/CN.4/1993/2)).
The Special Rapporteur submitted his final report on 2 July 1993, at the fortyfifth
session of the Sub-Commission (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8). On 25 August 1993, the
Sub-Commission adopted resolution 1993/29, by which it decided to transmit the
study of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights. By the same
resolution, the Sub-Commission decided to examine further, at its forty-sixth session,
the proposed basic principles and guidelines included in the study and, for that
purpose, to establish, if necessary, a sessional working group at that session with a
view to adopting a body of such principles and guidelines, and it further requested the
Secretary-General to invite governments and competent intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations to submit their comments on the proposed basic principles
and guidelines (see Report of the Sub-Commission, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/45
(E/CN.4/1994/2) and Corr.1). At its fiftieth session, the Commission on Human Rights
adopted resolution 1994/35 of 4 March 1994, in which it expressed its appreciation for
the work of the Special Rapporteur and regarded the proposed basic principles and
guidelines as a useful basis for addressing the question of restitution, compensation
and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights. It therefore
recommended that the Sub-Commission take measures to examine the proposed basic
principles and guidelines with a view to making proposals thereon and report to the
Commission (see Report of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1994/132
(E/1994/24)).
At the forty-sixth session of the Sub-Commission, held from 1 to 26 August
1994 in Geneva, a Sessional Working Group on the Administration of Justice and the
Question of Compensation was established to examine further the proposed basic
principles and guidelines in accordance with resolution 1993/29 of the Sub-
Commission. On 26 August 1994, the Sub-Commission adopted resolution 1994/33,
by which, after noting the report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to Sub-
Commission resolution 1993/29 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/7 and Add.1) and the report of
the sessional working group (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/22), it decided to continue the
consideration of the proposed basic principles and guidelines at its forty-seventh
session (see Report of the Sub-Commission, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56). On 3 March
1995, the Commission on Human Rights, at its fifty-first session, adopted resolution
1995/34, in which it encouraged the Sub-Commission to continue to give
consideration to the proposed basic principles and guidelines, requested States to
provide information about relevant national legislation to the Secretary-General and
requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Commission on this subject
at its fifty-second session (Report of the Commission on Human Rights,
E/CN.4/1995/176 (E/1995/23)).
The Working Group continued its consideration of the proposed basic
principles and guidelines at the forty-seventh session of the Sub-Commission, which
was held in Geneva from 31 July to 25 August 1995. On 24 August 1995, the Sub-
Commission adopted decision 1995/117 (see Report of the Sub-Commission,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/51 (E/CN.4/1996/2)), by which it decided to request the Working
Group to continue the consideration of the proposed basic principles and guidelines,
with priority, at the next session and requested the former Special Rapporteur to
submit a revised set of proposed basic principles and guidelines, taking into account
the new comments received from States and intergovernmental and non-governmental
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2
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law
organizations (see Report of the Secretary-General E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/17 Add.1 and
Add.2) and the discussions on the matter in the Working Group (see Report of the
Working Group, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/16). On 19 April 1996, the Commission on
Human Rights, at its fifty-second session, adopted resolution 1996/35, by which,
taking note of the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the Commission in
compliance with its resolution 1995/34 (E/CN.4/1996/29), it requested States that had
not yet done so to submit information in accordance with that resolution, and requested
the Secretary-General to prepare an additional report, taking into account the
information provided by States (see Report of the Commission on Human Rights,
E/CN.4/1996/177 (E/1996/23)).
As requested by the Sub-Commission in its decision 1995/117 of 24 August
1995, the former Special Rapporteur submitted a revised text of the basic principles
and guidelines to the Sub-Commission at its forty-eighth session
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17). On 29 August 1996, the Sub-Commission adopted resolution
1996/28, by which it expressed its appreciation to the former Special Rapporteur and
decided to transmit the revised draft to the Commission on Human Rights, together
with its comments and the comments of the Working Group (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/16).
By the same resolution, the Sub-Commission requested the former Special Rapporteur
to prepare a note taking into account the comments and observations of the Working
Group and the Sub-Commission in order to facilitate the examination by the
Commission on Human Rights of the revised draft basic principles and guidelines (see
Report of the Sub-Commission, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/41 (E/CN.4/1997/2)).
On 13 January 1997, the former Special Rapporteur accordingly submitted a
note to the Sub-Commission, together with an adapted version of the draft revised
basic principles and guidelines (E/CN.4/1997/104, annex). On 11 April 1997, at its
fifty-third session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 1997/29, by
which it invited the Secretary-General to request all States to submit their views and
comments on the note and revised draft basic principles and guidelines and to prepare
a report setting out such views and comments (see Report of the Commission on
Human Rights, E/1997/23).
At its fifty-fourth session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted
resolution 1998/43 of 17 April 1998 by which it took note of the report of the
Secretary-General (E/CN.4/1998/34) submitted pursuant to the abovementioned
resolution and, with the approval of the Economic and Social Council (see Economic
and Social Council resolution 1998/256 of 30 July 1998), requested the Chairman of
the Commission to appoint an independent expert to prepare a revised version of the
basic principles and guidelines, taking into account the views of and comments
provided by States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and to
submit it to the Commission at its fifty-fifth session, with a view to its adoption by the
General Assembly. By the same resolution, the Commission continued to request the
Secretary-General to invite States that had not yet done so, as well as
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, to submit their views and
comments as soon as possible, and by no later than 31 October 1989, and to make that
information available to the independent expert (see Report of the Commission on
Human Rights, E/1998/23).
The independent expert appointed by the Commission on Human Rights, Mr.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, submitted his first report to the Commission in February 1999, at
its fifty-fifth session (E/CN.4./1999/65). On 26 April 1999, the Commission on
Human Rights adopted resolution 1999/33, by which it requested him to complete his
work and to submit to the Commission at its fifty-sixth session, in accordance with its
resolution 1998/43, a revised version of the basic principles and guidelines (see Report
of the Commission on Human Rights, E/1999/23).
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The independent expert submitted his final report to the Commission on
Human Rights (E/CN.4/2000/62) in January 2000, at its fifty-sixth session. On 20
April 2000, the Commission adopted resolution 2000/41, by which it requested the
Secretary-General to circulate to all Member States the draft text of the “Basic
principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”, annexed to the final
report of the independent expert, and to request that they send their comments thereon
to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The
Commission further requested the High Commissioner for Human Rights to hold a
consultative meeting for all interested States, intergovernmental organizations and
non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social
Council, in order to finalize the basic principles and guidelines on the basis of the
comments submitted, and to transmit to the Commission, at its fifty-seventh session,
the final outcome of this meeting (see Report of the Commission on Human Rights,
E/2000/23).
By note verbale of 31 August 2000, the Secretary-General invited all Member
States to submit their comments on the basic principles and guidelines. However, as at
20 November 2000, replies had been received from only six Member States (see
E/CN.4/2001/61). At its fifty-seventh session, the Commission on Human Rights
therefore adopted decision 2001/105 of 23 April 2001, by which it requested again the
High Commissioner for Human Rights to hold a consultative meeting in order to
finalize the basic principles and guidelines and to transmit the final outcome of the
consultative meeting to the Commission for consideration at its fifty-eighth session
(see Report of the Commission on Human Rights, E/2001/23). On 24 July 2001, the
Economic and Social Council adopted decision 2001/279, by which it endorsed the
decision of the Commission on Human Rights.
At its fifty-eighth session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted
resolution 2002/44 of 23 April 2002 by which it made an identical request (see Report
of the Commission on Human Rights, E/2002/23).
The requested consultative meeting on the draft Basic principles and
guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law took place on 30 September and 1
October 2002 in Geneva, and the report of the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mr. Alejandro
Salinas, was transmitted by the High Commissioner to the Commission on Human
Rights on 27 December 2002 (E/CN.4/2003/63). On 23 April 2003, at its fifty-ninth
session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 2003/34, by which it
requested the Chairman-Rapporteur of the consultative meeting, in consultation with
the independent experts, Messrs. van Boven and Bassiouni, to prepare a revised
version of the “Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation
for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”, taking
into account the opinions and comments of States and of intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations and the results of the consultative meeting. The
Commission further requested the High Commissioner for Human Rights to hold a
second consultative meeting, with a view to finalizing the basic principles and
guidelines, encouraged the Chairman-Rapporteur of the first consultative meeting to
conduct informal consultations with all interested parties, and requested the High
Commissioner for Human Rights to transmit to the Commission at its sixtieth session
the final outcome of the second consultative meeting (see Report of the Commission
on Human Rights, E/2003/23).
The second consultative meeting took place on 20, 21 and 23 October 2003 in
Geneva and the report of the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the consultative meeting
(E/CN.4/2004/57, annex) was transmitted by the High Commissioner for Human
Rights to the Commission on Human Rights, at its sixtieth session. On 19 April 2004,
the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 2004/34, by which it requested
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5
the Chairman-Rapporteur, in consultation with the independent experts, to prepare a
further revised version of the basic principles and guidelines. It further requested the
High Commissioner for Human Rights to hold a third consultative meeting and to
transmit to the Commission on Human Rights, at its sixty-first session, the outcome of
the consultative process (see Report of the Commission on Human Rights, E/2004/23).
On 22 July 2004, the Economic and Social Council adopted decision 2004/257, by
which it approved the request by the Commission on Human Rights to hold a third
consultative meeting.
At its sixty-first session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted
resolution 2005/35 of 19 April 2005 by which, welcoming the report of the Chairman-
Rapporteur of the third consultative meeting (E/CN.4/2005/59), it adopted the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law (see Report of the Commission on Human Rights,
E/2005/23). Upon recommendation of the Commission, the Economic and Social
Council adopted resolution 2005/30, by which it adopted the Basic Principles and
Guidelines and recommended their adoption to the General Assembly.
At the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, the Third Committee
discussed the text adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at four separate
meetings (see A/C.3/60/SR.22, 29, 37 and 39). On 28 October 2005, a joint draft
resolution (A/C.3/60/L.24) was submitted by Chile on behalf of forty-five delegations
to the Third Committee entitled “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” which was
adopted by the Committee on the same day. On 16 December 2005, upon
recommendation of the Third Committee (see Report of the Third Committee
A/60/509/Add.1), the General Assembly adopted resolution 60/147 (Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law) without a vote.
- 11 -
ANNEX 1.1
Victim identification forms for Beni
ANNEX 1.2
Victim identification forms for Butembo
ANNEX 1.3
Victim identification forms for Gemena
ANNEX 1.4
Victim identification forms for Ituri
ANNEX 1.5
Victim identification forms for Kisangani
ANNEX 1.5.1
Additional victim identification forms for Kisangani
[Annexes not translated]
___________
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ANNEX 1.6
Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Beni
ANNEX 1.7
Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Butembo
ANNEX 1.8
Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Gemena
ANNEX 1.9
Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Ituri
ANNEX 1.10
Assessment report of massacres (deaths) in Kisangani
[Annexes not translated]
[These Annexes provide data on the deaths said to have occurred in Beni, Butembo,
Gemena, Ituri and Kisangani and on the financial claims made in respect of those deaths. For each
location, a detailed list of the victims and their associated financial claims is provided.]
___________
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ANNEX 1.6.A
Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Beni
ANNEX 1.7.A
Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Butembo
ANNEX 1.8.A
Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Gemena
ANNEX 1.9.A
Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Ituri
ANNEX 1.10.A
Assessment report of flight into the forest by victims in Kisangani
[Annexes not translated]
[These Annexes provide data on the cases of flight into the forest said to have occurred from
Beni, Butembo, Gemena, Ituri and Kisangani and on the financial claims made in respect of those
flights. For each location, a detailed list of the victims and their associated financial claims is
provided.]
___________
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ANNEX 1.6.B
Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Beni
ANNEX 1.7.B
Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Butembo
ANNEX 1.8.B
Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Gemena
ANNEX 1.9.B
Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Ituri
ANNEX 1.10.B
Assessment of bodily harm to victims in Kisangani
[Annexes not translated]
[These Annexes provide data on the bodily harm said to have occurred in Beni, Butembo,
Gemena, Ituri and Kisangani and on the financial claims made in respect of that harm. For each
location, a detailed list of the victims and their associated financial claims is provided.]
___________
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ANNEX 1.6.C
Assessment of property lost by victims in Beni
ANNEX 1.7.C
Assessment of property lost by victims in Butembo
ANNEX 1.8.C
Assessment of property lost by victims in Gemena
ANNEX 1.9.C
Assessment of property lost by victims in Ituri
ANNEX 1.10.C
Assessment of property lost by victims in Kisangani
[Annexes not translated]
[These Annexes provide data on the loss of property said to have occurred in Beni, Butembo,
Gemena, Ituri and Kisangani and on the financial claims made in respect of those losses. For each
location, a detailed list of the victims, their losses and their associated financial claims is
provided.]
___________
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ANNEX 1.6.D
Summary assessment table of property lost in Beni
ANNEX 1.7.D
Summary assessment table of property lost in Butembo
ANNEX 1.8.D
Summary assessment table of property lost in Gemena
ANNEX 1.9.D
Summary assessment table of property lost in Ituri
ANNEX 1.10.D
Summary assessment table of property lost in Kisangani
[Annexes not translated]
[These Annexes provide data on the loss of property said to have occurred in Beni, Butembo,
Gemena, Ituri and Kisangani in the period from 1998 to 2003 and on the financial claims made in
respect of those losses. For each location, losses and their associated financial claims are shown
by site (in table and chart form).]
___________
- 17 -
ANNEX 1.6.E
List of property lost in Beni, 1998-2003
ANNEX 1.7.E
List of property lost in Butembo, 1998-2003
ANNEX 1.8.E
List of property lost in Gemena, 1998-2003
ANNEX 1.9.E
List of property lost in Ituri, 1998-2003
ANNEX 1.10.E
List of property lost in Kisangani, 1998-2003
[Annexes not translated]
[These Annexes provide data on the loss of property said to have occurred in Beni, Butembo,
Gemena, Ituri and Kisangani in the period from 1998 to 2003. For each location, the type and
quantity of property lost is shown in table form.]
___________
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ANNEX 1.6.F
Summary table of instances of property loss in Beni, 1998-2003
ANNEX 1.7.F
Summary table of instances of property loss in Butembo, 1998-2003
ANNEX 1.8.F
Summary table of instances of property loss in Gemena, 1998-2003
ANNEX 1.9.F
Summary table of instances of property loss in Ituri, 1998-2003
ANNEX 1.10.F
Summary table of instances of property loss in Kisangani, 1998-2003
[Annexes not translated]
[These Annexes provide data on instances of property loss said to have occurred in Beni,
Butembo, Gemena, Ituri and Kisangani in the period from 1998 to 2003. For each location,
instances are shown by site (in table and chart form).]
___________
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ANNEX 1.11
Video containing victim statements and attesting to the atrocities committed by the Ugandan
army in Kisangani during the six-day war
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 1.12
Report on the events in Kisangani between August 1999 and May 2002
[Annex not translated]
___________
- 20 -
ANNEX 2.1
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping
Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 2010
(Excerpts)
[Complete document available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/ DRC_
MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf]
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United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping
Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 2010
Pages 172-173
347. Following these incidents, the Mayi-Mayi restarted and intensified their attacks on
UPDF convoys between Beni and Butembo. In retaliation, the UPDF forces led operations against
villages suspected of sheltering Mayi-Mayi groups. UPDF soldiers often made disproportionate use
of force during these attacks, killing combatants and civilians indiscriminately.
On 1 November 2000, UPDF soldiers allegedly killed between seven and eleven people during
an attack on the population of the villages of Maboya and Loya, 16 kilometres north of the
town of Butembo. A few hours before the attack, four UPDF soldiers had been killed by
Vurondo Mayi-Mayi during an ambush close to the village of Maboya. During the afternoon,
UPDF soldiers apparently launched an indiscriminate attack on the inhabitants of both villages
and set 43 houses on fire. Some victims were shot and killed, whilst others were burned
alive532.
Page 173
348. On 8 November 2000, close to the village of Butuhe, 10 kilometres north of Butembo,
Vurondo Mayi-Mayi attacked a UPDF convoy that was escorting lorries transporting minerals.
On 9 November 2000, UPDF soldiers are alleged to have killed indiscriminately 36 people in
the village of Kikere, close to Butuhe, north of Butembo. The soldiers fired blindly on civilians
using rifles and rocket-launchers. Some civilians died as a result of being burned alive in their
homes. The soldiers also systematically killed domestic animals and destroyed civilian
property533.
349. In the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for several years with
complete impunity. They carried out summary executions of civilians, arbitrarily detained large
numbers of people and subjected them to torture and various other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatments. They also introduced a particularly cruel form of detention, putting the detainees in
holes dug two or three metres deep into the ground, where they were forced to live exposed to bad
weather, with no sanitation and on muddy ground.
In March 2000, UPDF soldiers allegedly killed four civilians and wounded several others in the
town of Beni during an operation to quell a demonstration. The victims had been protesting
against the murder of a woman, the arbitrary arrest of her husband and the pillaging of their
house, committed a few days earlier by UPDF soldiers534.
350. During the period under consideration, UPDF soldiers carried out several operations
against an armed group of Ugandan origin, the ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces–National
Army for the Liberation of Uganda535) based in the Ruwenzori massif in the Beni region. For their
part, ADF-NALU carried out attacks on villages in the Ruwenzori region, kidnapping numerous
civilians and pillaging their property. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the following
alleged incidents.
- 22 -
Pages 189-190
361. In August 1999, whilst international pressure on the leaders of the RCD-Goma to sign
the Lusaka Agreement596 was intensifying, the simmering crisis between Rwanda and Uganda for
the control of the RCD degenerated into open conflict in Kisangani. On the morning of 7 August,
APR and UDPF soldiers fought with heavy weapons for several hours without any civilians being
wounded. The situation calmed down again over the course of the following days. Tension
continued to build, nonetheless, and both sides strengthened their positions and brought large
numbers of weapons into the town. On the evening of 14 August, fighting again broke out between
the two armies at the airport and extended along the main roads and into the town centre.
From 14 to 17 August 1999, APR and UPDF soldiers are said to have used heavy weapons in
areas with a dense civilian population as they fought to gain control of the town of Kisangani.
The fighting allegedly caused the deaths of over 30 civilians and wounded over 100 of them.
The APR fired on both military targets and private homes belonging to civilians suspected of
supporting the Ugandans. Once the hostilities were over, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers
pillaged several places in Kisangani.597
362. After three days of fighting, Uganda and Rwanda signed a ceasefire agreement that
provided for Kisangani to be demilitarised and the headquarters of the pro-Ugandan branch of the
RCD, the RCD-Kisangani-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-K-ML) led by Wamba dia Wamba, to
be relocated to Bunia on 1 October 1999. During the months that followed, Orientale Province
found itself divided into a “Rwandan zone” under the control of the RCD-G and a “Ugandan zone”
dominated by the various movements supported by Kampala. In May 2000, however, tension
between the Ugandan and Rwandan armies again moved up a notch in Kisangani. The UPDF
strengthened its military positions to the north-east of the town and the APR reacted by bringing in
additional weapons.
On 5 May 2000, the APR and UPDF are said to have used heavy weapons in densely populated
areas, causing the deaths of over 24 civilians and wounding an unknown number of them.
Before the start of the hostilities, the Ugandan army had warned the population of the imminent
bombardments and had asked for the evacuation of several areas located close to their
targets598.
Page 190
363. On 12 May 2000, a team of United Nations military observers was sent to the area.
Under international mediation, the two parties adopted a demilitarisation plan for the town, which
they began to implement on 29 May. Fighting broke out again on 5 June, however, resulting in the
so-called “Six-Day War”.
The APR and UPDF fought each other in Kisangani from 5 to 10 June 2000. Both sides
reportedly embarked on indiscriminate attacks with heavy weapons, killing between 244 and
760 civilians according to some sources, wounding over 1,000 and causing thousands of people
to be displaced. The two armies also destroyed over 400 private homes and caused serious
damage to public and commercial properties, places of worship, including the Catholic
Cathedral of Notre-Dame, educational institutions and healthcare facilities, including hospitals.
The UPDF had taken steps to avoid civilian losses by ordering the evacuation of combat zones
before the start of hostilities and prohibiting access to three areas that were declared off-limits
to non-combatants. This restriction was, however, also extended to humanitarian workers, in
particular the ICRC, which was not able to get help to the wounded for several days599.
- 23 -
7. Ituri
364. In mid-August 1998, UPDF soldiers arrived in Ituri and quickly took control of the
district without encountering any real resistance. Like the rest of Orientale Province, Ituri was
placed under RCD administration. Following the movement’s split, in March 1999, into a
pro-Rwandan branch (RCD-Goma) and a pro-Ugandan branch (RCD-ML), Ituri was integrated into
the RCD-ML zone and administered from Kisangani. The key man on the ground in Ituri, however,
was the UPDF Chief of Staff, General Kazini. He applied a policy that supported autonomy for the
region in relation to the rest of Orientale Province and openly favoured the interests of the Hema
community, thus reviving former conflicts over land.
Page 191
365. The Hema-Gegere farmers600 who, a few years previously, had acquired new
concessions from the land registry in the Djugu region, took advantage of the new political
situation to enforce their rights. As the Lendu from the Walendu Pitsi601 community, who held the
customary rights to the land concerned, disputed the value of their title deeds, the Hema-Gegere
farmers appealed to the courts and had the Walendu Pitsi expelled from the concessions they
wanted. The latter refused to leave, however, and clashes broke out with the police officers who
had come to remove them. Several senior Lendu, including the leaders of the Walendu Pitsi and
Walendu Djatsi communities, were arrested for vandalism. In April 1999, the Hema-Gegere
concession-holders paid UPDF and APC soldiers to attack the Lendu villages located in the
disputed concessions602.
366. . . .
Between June and December 1999, UPDF and APC soldiers killed an unknown number of
Lendu civilians in villages in the Djugu region close to the concessions claimed by the
Hema-Gegere farmers. Villages in the Dz’na Buba, Linga, Jiba, Dhendo, Blukwa Mbi, Laudjo,
Laudedjo Gokpa, Nyalibati and Gbakulu groupements were particularly badly affected. Most
of the victims were Lendu but Hema were also killed during the attacks. Numerous victims
died when their village was set on fire or following heavy arms fire directed at their homes.
Some victims were shot dead at point-blank range605.
Page 192
Between June and December 1999, members of the Lendu militia killed several tens of
Hema-Gegere in the village of Libi from the Walendu Pitsi community and in the village of
Fataki from the Walendu Djatsi community. These attacks led to the displacement of almost all
the Hema-Gegere living in the Walendu Pitsi community606.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On 20 June 1999, members of the Hema militias and UPDF soldiers killed at least 25 people,
including several civilians, during an attack on the village of Dhendro, in the Walendu Pitsi
community, on the border with the Dhendro groupement608.
On 14 September 1999, members of the Lendu militias from the Walendu Pitsi community
used edged weapons to kill several hundred Hema-Gegere, including a majority of civilians,
during widespread attacks on locations in the Dhendro groupement in the Bahema-Nord
community. Members of the militias also pillaged and set fire to tens of villages. The victims
were buried in mass graves. According to several sources, the massacre took place in
- 24 -
retaliation for an attack committed on 20 June by members of the Hema militias in the village
of Dhendro609.
On 14 September 1999, during a night-time offensive on the village of Fataki, in the Walendu
Djatsi community, members of the Hema militias and Hema soldiers from the APC killed
several tens of civilians with edged weapons, including at least 15 minors and several women.
The assailants then buried the bodies themselves. Following the attack, all the Lendu left the
village and Fataki became a Hema bastion in the Walendu Djatsi community610.
367. During the months that followed, members of the Lendu militias tried to regain control
of Fataki on several occasions. For its part, the UPDF concentrated its troops on Fataki and Linga
and led several offensives against Lendu militia bases in Kpandroma and Rethy, in the Walendu
Djatsi community.
Page 193
368. During the period under consideration, the Lendu militias also attacked villages in the
Djugu region on the shores of Lake Albert, the majority of which were populated by Hema611.
In July 1999, members of the Lendu militias from the Buba group in the Walendu Pitsi
community allegedly killed over 100 Hema civilians in the fishing village of Musekere in the
Bahema-Nord community. Having encircled the village at dawn and forced six APC soldiers
there to flee, they massacred the population using machetes and other edged weapons. From
the start of the conflict, the Lendu leaders of the Buba groupement had threatened to attack the
inhabitants of Musekere on several occasions612.
369. . . .
On 1 December 1999, members of the Lendu militias confronted elements of the UPDF and
members of the Hema militias over control of the mining town of Bambou, in the Walendu
Djatsi community in the Djugu region. The fighting allegedly led to the deaths of over
200 members of the civilian population. Numerous victims were mutilated and the town looted.
Most of the victims’ bodies were thrown into the River Chari614.
370. . . .
Page 194
In January 2000, members of the Lendu militias from the Walendu Pitsi and Bahema-Nord
communities attacked people living in the Blukwa groupement, killing several hundreds of
Hema with edged weapons. The groupement had been the site of violent inter-ethnic
confrontations since September 1999. The attack in January took place after the departure of
APC troops, fleeing from the increasing violence617.
On 26 April 2000, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops attacked the Buba
groupement, in the Walendu Pitsi community, causing around 10 deaths, the majority of whom
were Lendu civilians618.
Between 27 August and 12 September 2000, members of the Hema militias from Mangala,
Ghele, Gele and Liko, sometimes acting with the support of the Hema APC soldiers, pillaged
- 25 -
and set fire to several villages in the Walendu Djatsi community including Mbau (27 August),
Glakpa and Gobi (28 August), Logai (29 August), the villages in the Dz’na groupement
(31 August) and Mayalibo (6-12 September)619.
Page 206
10. Équateur
381. In November 1998, a new rebellion, the Mouvement pour la libération du
Congo (MLC) began with support from Uganda. Led by Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, in the early
days the MLC had just one battalion consisting mainly of ex-FAZ soldiers supported by elements
of the UPDF. In a few months, however, the MLC army, the Armée de libération du Congo (ALC)
added numerous ex-FAZ to its ranks and took control of several urban areas in the north of
Équateur province. The town of Bumba fell on 17 November, the town of Lisala on 10 December,
the village of Businga, on the crossroads to the towns of Gemena and Gbadolite on 20 December,
the town of Gemena on 24 December and the village of Libenge, in the far west of the province, on
the border with the Central African Republic, on 4 January 1999. The FAC conducted very intense
air bombardments in December 1998 to block the advance of the ALC/UPDF. In this context, the
Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
On 22 December 1998, an FAC Antonov dropped 11 home-made bombs on the village of
Businga, killing five civilians. On 24 December, an FAC Antonov plane bombed the village a
second time, killing two civilians669.
Page 209
386. Taking advantage of the withdrawal of ANT troops and the arrival of reinforcements
from the recruitment and training camps, ALC/UPDF soldiers launched a second major offensive
in May 1999. In three months, ALC/UPDF troops regained control of the towns of Kateke
(27 April 1999), Businga (14 May 1999) and Gbadolite (3 July 1999).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
387. In June 1999, the ALC/UPDF troops took control of Bongandanga, a town south of
Lisala.
Pages 216-217
402. During the period under consideration, the Bas-Uélé district remained under the control
of ALC/UPDF soldiers. The latter allegedly committed serious violations against all those who
dared to dispute their authority or criticised their involvement in pillaging the natural resources of
the region. The case below is mentioned for illustrative purposes.
From 2001 to January 2003, elements of the ALC/UPDF apparently tortured and killed an
unknown number of civilians in the town of Buta. Most of the victims were held in muddy
holes in conditions likely to cause death through disease or exhaustion. After a human rights
activist had been tortured and held in one of the muddy holes by the soldiers, MONUC and
United Nations organisations sent out an investigative mission and had these prisons shut
down708.
- 26 -
Pages 218-219
B. Ituri
404. During the second half of 2000, the underlying conflict between the President of the
RCD-ML, Wamba dia Wamba and his two principal lieutenants, the Nande Mbusa Nyamwisi714
and the Hema John Tibasima715 broke out in public. Wamba dia Wamba had long criticised
Nyamwisi and Tibasima for trying to orchestrate the conflict between the Hema and Lendu
communities716 in order to establish a power base in the district and control the region’s natural
resources. In August, Wamba dia Wamba tried to regain control of the movement by dismissing
Nyamwisi and Tibasima from their posts, but they resisted and the number of incidents on the
ground between the different factions of the APC increased. After several unsuccessful attempts at
mediation by Uganda and a series of confrontations in the centre of Bunia, Wamba dia Wamba was
exiled to Kampala in December, leaving the leadership of the RCD-ML to Nyamwisi and
Tibasima.
405. In January 2001, Ituri saw a resurgence of violence in the Djugu area. Between January
and February, members of the Hema militias from Bogoro, generally accompanied by Hema
soldiers from the APC and UPDF soldiers, led indiscriminate attacks in the Walendu Tatsi
community, next to the Bahema-Nord community, killing an unknown number of civilians. In this
context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
On 4 January 2001, during a failed attack on Kpandroma, members of the Hema militias based
in Fataki killed at least 35 Lendu civilians in the Zabu groupement in the Walendu Pitsi
community, particularly in Aruda and Mola and the surrounding area717.
In early 2001, members of the Hema militias killed at least 16 people and kidnapped two
minors who have been since recorded as having disappeared in the Salimboko,
Poli-Masumbuku and Penyi groupements in the Walendu Tatsi community718.
Pages 219-220
Also in early 2001, members of the Lendu militias killed an unknown number of civilians,
including a majority of Hema and Alur in the villages alongside Lake Albert in the Bahema
Banywagi and Bahema-Nord communities719.
Between January and February 2001, UPDF soldiers attacked around 20 villages in the
Walendu Tatsi community, killing around 100 people, including various Lendu civilians.
During the attacks, the soldiers also committed rape, looted and caused an unknown number of
people to disappear. Most of the victims were killed in villages located near the Zumbe power
station, in the Bedu Ezekere groupement, where they had gathered under the protection of
members of the Lendu militias720.
On 3 February 2001, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops killed 105 people,
including numerous Lendu civilians, in the villages in the Bulo groupement in the Ndo Okebo
community in the Djugu region. The victims often came from the Walendu Pitsi community.
They had taken refuge in the Bulo groupement following recent attacks on their village721.
406. At the end of 2000, the conflict between the Hema and Lendu finally reached the Irumu
region. The UPDF soldiers lent their support to the local Hema communities and violent incidents
broke out on the ground.
- 27 -
Between 9 and 18 January 2001, members of the Hema militias allegedly killed around
60 people, including numerous Lendu and Ngiti civilians722, in the village of Kotoni, in the
Irumu region and the surrounding area723.
407. Following the bombardment of the Walendu Bindi community by a UPDF helicopter,
Ngiti militiamen, originally in conjunction with the Djugu Lendu from the Walendu Bindi
community, launched an attack on 19 January 2001 against UPDF positions at the airport in Bunia.
During the attack, Ngiti militiamen tried to destroy the helicopter the UPDF had used to bomb their
villages. The UPDF finally repelled the attack but at the cost of a significant loss of human life.
Page 220
On 19 January 2001, Hema militiamen and civilians allegedly killed between 200 and
250 civilians from the Lendu, Ngiti, Nande and Bira ethnic groups in the Mudzipela
neighbourhood in the town of Bunia. The victims, who included a large number of women and
children, were killed with machetes, spears or studded batons. Most of them were subjected to
mutilation. Some were decapitated and their heads carried through the town as trophies. The
Hema militiamen and civilians also systematically looted the victims’ property and set fire to
several houses. Shortly before the massacre, UPDF officers and senior members of the Hema
community in Bunia had held a meeting and called on Hema civilians to attack the Lendu
population.724
408. In order to restore calm to Ituri and avoid new splinter groups developing within the
RCD-ML, Uganda forced the RCD-ML and MLC to join forces within a new movement, the Front
de libération du Congo (FLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba725. On 6 February 2001, the FLC
organised consultations with the traditional chiefs in Ituri and on 17 February, the latter signed a
memorandum of agreement, providing in particular for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the
disarmament of the militiamen and the dismantling of the training camps726. During the months that
followed, the number of violations decreased significantly. Inter-community tension on the ground
nonetheless remained high and the militias continued to arm themselves. In this context, the
Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
On 26 April 2001, armed men killed six members of the ICRC during an attack on a
humanitarian convoy in the area around Fataki in the Walendu Djatsi community, in the Djugu
region. Local sources indicate that the attack is thought to have been perpetrated by Ugandan
soldiers and Hema militiamen. The attack was supposedly aimed at ending the presence of
humanitarian personnel in areas where the displaced Lendu had taken refuge. During the period
under consideration, numerous sources indicate that Hema militias and armed groups severely
hampered the work of humanitarian organisations in areas populated principally by Lendu727.
Pages 221-222
In 2001, Hema soldiers from the APC killed 40 Lendu, a majority of them civilians, including
women, children and elderly and disabled people, in the village of Gobu in the Bahema-Nord
community. The victims were taken to a ditch and shot. Their bodies were then thrown into the
ditch728.
In January 2002, UPDF troops and Hema militiamen opened fire on the population of the
village of Kobu in the Walendu Djatsi community in the Djugu region, killing 35 Lendu
civilians. As they entered the village, Ugandan soldiers killed four civilians in the marketplace,
including one disabled person. Almost all of the population fled and hid in the forest for nearly
- 28 -
two months. On their return to the village, the villagers found 35 decomposed bodies, which
they buried in various places. Those responsible for the massacre were trying to remove Lendu
populations from the Kobu area, close to the Kilomoto gold mines. Following the killing, the
population of Kobu sent a petition to Governor Lopondo, who visited the area shortly
afterwards accompanied by senior figures in the UPDF. Following the visit, UPDF soldiers left
the area729.
On 26 January 2002, members of the Hema militias killed around 100 Lendu in a forest a few
kilometres from Datule, in the Bahema-Sud community in the Irumu region. The victims had
been chased from the village of Datule the previous day by a UPC commander. They were
killed with machetes, spears and studded batons. A young girl of 13 was the only person to
survive the attack730.
On 28 January 2002, Hema militiamen killed and mutilated around 50 Lendu civilians in
Kasenyi in the Irumu region. Having been informed of the massacre that had taken place on
26 January, the victims had fled the village of Datule on 27 January in the hope of reaching the
Lendu villages in the Walendu Bindi community. They were hiding behind a police station
when they were surprised and killed731.
Between January and May 2002, Hema militiamen in the region forcibly recruited all the men
from the Alur ethnic group living in the village of Gobu in the Bahema-Nord community in the
Djugu region732.
Between February and April 2002, elements of the UPDF and Hema militiamen killed several
hundred Lendu civilians in the Walendu Bindi community in the Irumu region. They also
tortured and raped an unknown number of people. The villages of Aveba, Bukiringi, Nombe,
Kaswara, Djino, Kagaba, Biro, Kapalayi, Gety étang, Tsubina, Kinyamubaya, Karach, Bolomo,
Bachange, Tsede, Molangi, Tamara, Irura, Modiro, Mukiro and Anyange were all pillaged733.
Page 222
409. In February 2002, against a background of growing economic rivalry between Hema
and Nande businessmen and disagreements on the new strategic directions taken by the
Mouvement734, the Defence Minister of the RCD-ML, Thomas Lubanga, and the Hema soldiers of
the APC broke away from the RCD-ML to form a political and military Hema group, the Union des
patriotes congolais (UPC). In response, Mbusa Nyamwisi and Nande officers in the APC,
supported by certain members of the UPDF, reduced Hema influence in the district735, intensified
their cooperation with the FAC736 and encouraged members of the Lendu and Ngiti militias to join
forces in political military groups, namely the Front National Intégrationiste (FNI)737 and the
Forces de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI)738. During the course of 2002, these various armed
groups received significant supplies of weapons from Uganda and the Government in Kinshasa. In
this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
Starting on 21 May 2002 and during the course of the next six months, elements of the UPC
killed at least 46 civilians, most of them from the Bira ethnic group, in Walu in the
Ngombe-Nyama groupement, in the Irumu region. The militiamen also raped an unknown
number of women, looted and destroyed educational institutions and hospitals. These attacks
were supposedly intended as retaliation for the help given to the Lendu by the Bira during the
previous attacks against the Hema in the region739.
In May 2002, Lendu militiamen accompanied by civilians killed at least 80 people, mainly
Hema and Alur, in the village of Gobu in the Bahema-Nord community. The victims were
civilians or soldiers who were no longer able to fight. Most were summarily executed with
- 29 -
edged weapons. According to several witness statements, the Hema militiamen in the area had
fled before members of the Lendu militias arrived in the village740.
Pages 223-224
In early June 2002, elements of the UPDF and Hema militiamen indiscriminately killed
members of the Lendu militias and an unknown number of civilians in the Lendu villages in
the Walendu Pitsi community. By way of example, in June 2002, Hema militiamen and
elements of the UPDF killed at least 27 people in Buba741.
410. In June 2002, faced with the advance of Lendu militiamen into the Banyali-Kilo
community in the Djugu region, the local Security Council for the town of Mongwalu decided to
chase away or eliminate any Lendu living in the town. In this context, the Mapping Team
documented the following alleged incidents.
On 10 June 2002, elements of the UPC supported by local youths, systematically attacked the
houses of Lendu living in Mongwalu, killing around 20 civilians. The victims, who were
long-term residents of Mongwalu, were either shot dead or killed with studded batons742.
On 11 June 2002, in retaliation for a massacre carried out the day before, several hundred
Lendu from the villages of Kobu, Bambou and Kpandroma killed tens of civilians with edged
weapons, most of them from the Hema ethnic group, in the town of Mongwalu. The Hema left
Mongwalu following the massacre743.
411. In early August 2002, elements of the UPC, with support from UPDF troops, are
reported to have chased elements of the APC out of the town of Bunia. In this context, the Mapping
Team documented the following alleged incidents.
Between 7 and 10 August 2002, in Bunia, at least 300 civilians were killed on the basis of their
ethnic origin, most of them by UPC militiamen. Between 7 and 8 August, elements of the UPC
killed an unknown number of Bira, Lendu and Nande civilians during raids on the
neighbourhoods of Mudzipela, Bigo and Saio. Lendu and Ngiti militiamen responded by
killing an unknown number of Hema civilians in the districts of Mudzipela, Saio, Rwambuzi
and Simbiliabo. At the same time, Lendu and Ngiti militiamen killed 32 Hema civilians and
wounded and mutilated an unknown number of them at a farm in the village of Lengabo, a few
kilometres from Bunia. Between 9 and 11 August, elements of the UPDF and the UPC killed at
least 80 Lendu, Nande and Bira civilians at the Governor’s residence, at the hospital in Bigo
and at Bunia central prison. The bodies of the victims were then placed in mass graves744.
Page 224
412. Over the course of the following months, violent fighting broke out on several fronts,
between elements of the UPC and UPDF on the one hand, and those of the APC and FNI-FRPI on
the other. Both coalitions targeted civilian populations on the basis of their ethnic origins.
Numerous civilians from non-belligerent tribes were also massacred on the basis of their actual or
supposed support for one or other camp. Many of them were also victims of forced recruitment to
the various armed groups. The mining regions north of Bunia, control of which was seen as
strategic by the various groups involved, were the theatre for some particularly violent fighting.
- 30 -
413. On 9 August 2002, having had to leave Bunia quickly, Governor Lopondo, the APC
troops and Lendu and Ngiti militiamen745 established a base in Komanda for the purpose of
preparing the counter-offensive. The UPC, meanwhile, consolidated its positions south of Bunia in
order to prevent the counter-attack from elements of the APC and FNI-FRPI and to gain control of
the area’s mining resources. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged
incidents.
On 9 August 2002, elements of the APC and Lendu and Ngiti militiamen killed tens of
civilians, mostly Hema, in the town of Komanda and the surrounding villages in the
Basili-Basumu community, in the Irumu region. Guided by the Ngiti militiamen who had
infiltrated the village and by local youths, elements of the APC and members of the militias
moved from house to house, killing Hema civilians purely on the basis of their ethnic origin.
Most of the victims were killed with edged weapons. Some were tied up and then killed with
spears746.
From 14 to 19 August 2002, elements of the UPC killed over 50 civilians from different ethnic
groups during an attack on the village of Komanda. Most of the victims were shot or killed
with edged weapons when they fled Komanda for Beni. Many of the victims had left Bunia a
few days previously following the takeover of the town by the UPC and had taken refuge in
Komanda. The aim of the UPC attack was to avenge the massacre committed in Komanda on
9 August747.
Page 225
On 28 August 2002, Hema-Gegere militiamen associated with the UPC killed several tens of
“non-native” inhabitants748 in the gold-producing town of Mabanga in the Mambisa
community, in the Djugu region. The victims were killed either with machetes or with studded
batons. Sixteen of them were clubbed to death with planks of wood. The Hema-Gegere
militiamen associated the “non-natives” with Governor Lopondo and APC soldiers. Whilst the
Lendu militiamen were trying to take control of the region’s mines, the Hema-Gegere
militiamen feared that the “non-natives” were helping them. During previous fighting in
Mabanga, the Lendu militiamen had systematically killed Hema civilians but had spared the
“non-native” populations. After the massacre, UPDF troops intervened to provide cover for the
flight of the non-natives to Bunia749.
On 31 August 2002, elements of the UPC supported by Bira militiamen killed at least
14 civilians, including women and children, in several villages in Songolo in the Walendu
Bindi community, in the Irumu region. They also carried out acts of pillaging and widespread
destruction, setting fire to over 1,000 houses. Several victims were mutilated and killed in an
extremely cruel fashion. At least three women were impaled. Songolo was considered to be one
of the FRPI fiefdoms750.
Between 5 and 15 September 2002, elements of the FRPI and APC systematically massacred
over 1,000 Hema-Gegere and Bira civilians, including large numbers of children, in Nyakunde
and the surrounding villages in the Andisoma community, in the Irumu region. They also
carried out numerous acts of pillaging. The victims were killed purely on the basis of their
ethnic origin, mostly using arrows or edged weapons. Elements of the APC and FRPI had set
up road blocks so that no-one from the Hema or Bira ethnic groups was able to escape from
Nyakunde. FRPI militiamen sorted civilians and the soldiers there who were no longer able to
fight based on their ethnic origin in the Evangelical Medical Centre. They systematically killed
Hema and Bira and spared the members of other ethnic groups. Numerous victims were
detained in cruel, inhuman or degrading conditions for several days before they were finally
executed. Most of the massacres took place once the fighting with the UPC militiamen present
in Nyakunde had been over for several days751.
- 31 -
Pages 226-227
On 13 September 2002, elements of the FRPI from Gety killed around 150 people, including
numerous civilians, most of them Hema, in the lakeside groupement of Bandikado in the
Bahema–Sud community, in the Irumu region. They killed and mutilated an unknown number
of people in Nyamavi, for example. They also looted the villages before leaving the
groupement. These attacks also caused several thousand people to be displaced for several
years752.
On 11 October 2002, in the Djugu region, elements of the FNI from the Walendu Djatsi
community killed an unknown number of Alur, Hema, Bira and Nyali civilians in the mining
town of Nizi in the Mambisa community. They also killed 28 people and kidnapped 23 women
in the mining area of Kilomoto. During these attacks, the militiamen mutilated numerous
victims, carried out large-scale pillaging and set fire to numerous buildings, including the
community offices, schools and a hospital. The victims’ bodies were buried in nine mass
graves. According to witnesses, the FNI militiamen accused inhabitants of the town from all
ethnic groups of supporting the UPC753.
414. Between October and December 2002, confrontations between elements of the
FNI-FPRI and UPC had spread throughout the Irumu region. The UPC troops led major military
operations in the same region directed at the FRPI bases in the Walendu Bindi community and
Lendu enclaves in the Bahema-Sud community. The Bira farmers living in Pinga, in Songo in the
Irumu region were also attacked, with the UPC suspecting them of funding the FNI and FRPI. In
this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
Between 15 and 16 October 2002, UPC militiamen killed at least 180 people, including
civilians, in Zumbe in the Walendu Tatsi community. The militiamen also raped at least
50 women. Most of the victims were killed with machetes or spears. Some were shot dead.
Some survived but were badly mutilated. Having looted large amounts of property and stolen
1,500 head of cattle, the UPC troops set fire to the village, destroying more than 500 buildings,
including health centres and schools. Zumbe was an FRPI fiefdom754.
On 20 October 2002, elements of the UPC from Bunia and Bogoro killed at least 10 Lendu
civilians during attacks on several villages, including Nombe, Medhu, Pinga, Kagaba, Singo
and Songolo in the Walendu Bindi community, in the Irumu region. A Bira woman married to
a Lendu civilian was also killed. The militiamen systematically pillaged property and stole
cattle belonging to Lendu in the villages they attacked755.
Page 227
On 24 October 2002, elements of the UPC killed several dozen Lendu in the Walendu Bindi
community, particularly in the villages of Nombe, Kagaba, Lakabo, Lokpa, Medhu, Songolo,
Pinga, Androzo and Singo. Most of the victims were killed with edged weapons. The
militiamen also kidnapped more than 20 people, including women. They also stole some
1,450 head of cattle and burned at least 351 houses, including schools and health centres756.
On 5 November 2002, elements of the FRPI killed at least 14 civilians, including two women,
in the village of Saliboko in the Mobala community, in the Irumu region. They also pillaged
and set fire to the village. Most of the victims were Bira. They were attacked at night in their
houses. First they were tied up and then killed with machetes. Some civilians managed to
escape but were often severely mutilated. The militiamen were critical of the Bira in Saliboko
for having given shelter to displaced Hema. The village has not been rebuilt since757.
- 32 -
415. The signing of a peace agreement in September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda
offered new prospects for peace in Ituri. In addition to the withdrawal of UPDF troops from
Gbadolite and Beni, the agreement provided for the creation of a Peacekeeping Commission in Ituri
and the setting up of an Administration intérimaire de l’Ituri (AII) [Interim Administrative
Authority for Ituri] responsible for managing the district after the departure of the Ugandan
soldiers. On the ground, however, far from stabilising the region, the closer relationship between
Kinshasa and Kampala prompted new patterns of alliances that made the situation even more
volatile. As mentioned previously, in October 2002, the MLC army, the ALC, and its allies in the
RCD-N launched a major operation east of Orientale Province, called “Clean the blackboard”. This
operation aimed to destroy the APC once and for all, so as to deprive the Government in Kinshasa
of its ally in eastern Congo and get hold of the natural resources still under the control of the
RCD-ML before the transition period began. The UPC, which was also trying to crush the APC,
joined in with the operation.
416. On 12 October 2002, the ALC and its allies from the RCD-N entered the town of
Mambasa. On 29 October, however, they were forced to withdraw, before regaining control of the
town from the APC on 27 November. During the attacks, the ALC soldiers (MLC and RCD-N)
committed numerous atrocities directed at civilians.
Page 228
Between 12 and 29 October 2002, elements of the ALC and RCD-N taking part in the “Clean
the blackboard” operation allegedly killed at least 173 Nande and Pygmy civilians in Mambasa
and in the villages along the main road between Mambasa and Beni, particularly in Teturi,
Mwemba and Byakato, in the Mambasa region. The soldiers also carried out acts of
cannibalism, mutilated an unknown number of civilians, raped a large number of women and
children and committed widespread pillaging. The victims were killed purely on the basis of
their ethnic origin, with Nande and Pygmies accused of supporting the RCD-ML758.
417. Following their victory over the APC in Mambasa, elements of the ALC/RCD-N/UPC,
with the help of UPDF soldiers, launched a major military operation in order to take control of the
mining town of Mongwalu.
On 20 November 2002, during their attack on Mongwalu, elements of the ALC/RCD-N/UPC
are alleged to have killed at least 50 Lendu, including civilians and Lendu militiamen who
were no longer able to fight. Most of the victims were shot dead or killed with edged weapons.
Some were killed whilst they were hiding in a church. Some survived but were badly mutilated
and tortured759.
Page 230
421. On 6 March 2003, after the UPC had attacked the UPDF base in Ndele, a few
kilometres from Bunia, UPDF soldiers and elements of the FNI and FRPI set up a joint military
operation and regained control of the town of Bunia.
Page 231
On 6 March 2003, elements of the UPC and UPDF/FNI/FRPI fought each other with heavy
weapons in Bunia, reportedly killing between 17 and 52 civilians. After the withdrawal of UPC
troops from the town, elements of the FNI killed an unknown number of Hema civilians on the
- 33 -
basis of their ethnic origins. Elements of the UPDF/FNI/FRPI also looted and destroyed
numerous buildings, private homes and premises used by local and international NGOs.
UPDF soldiers sometimes intervened to ask elements of the FNI/FRPI to stop the atrocities and
leave the town769.
Pages 234-235
429. During the period under consideration, all the armed groups in Ituri (UPC, FNI, FRPI,
FAPC and PUSIC) are alleged to have recruited thousands of children along ethnic lines.
Between 2001 and 2003, thousands of Hema children recruited by the UPC had undergone
military training in the Mandro, Katoto and Bule camps. During the training, they were often
tortured, subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading acts and raped. In 2000, at least 163 of these
children were sent to Uganda to undergo military training at a UPDF camp in Kyankwanzi
before finally being repatriated to Ituri by UNICEF in February 2001. Between 2002 and 2003,
some children associated with the UPC were kidnapped and taken to Rwanda to undergo
military training in the APR camps. An unknown number of Lendu children were taken to
military training camps in North Kivu. Other communities were affected by the same
phenomenon, primarily the Alur, largely in the Mahagi region782.
Page 243
2. Beni and Lubero regions (Grand-Nord)
442. In the Beni and Lubero regions controlled by the RCD-ML, fighting continued between
the troops from the APC (the armed wing of the RCD-ML) and the UPDF on the one hand and the
various Mayi-Mayi groups on the other.
In 2001, elements of the APC allegedly killed at least five civilians and set fire to houses in the
village of Kiantsaba, 15 kilometres from Beni. APC soldiers and the Vurondo Mayi-Mayi had
long been in dispute over control of the village808.
443. From 2001, Mayi-Mayi groups and UPDF soldiers, sometimes supported by elements
of the APC, engaged in fierce fighting to gain control of the village of Irango, around 20 kilometres
from Beni.
In 2001, elements of the UPDF allegedly killed an unknown number of people in the village of
Irango. The victims had been accused of supporting the Mayi-Mayi. The soldiers also raped
numerous girls. During the attack, they set fire to and looted several houses809.
444. In the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for several years with
complete impunity. They summarily executed civilians, tortured and arbitrarily detained an
unknown number of people, several of them in muddy holes two or three metres deep.
Page 340
Mouvement national de libération du Congo (MLC)
697. The MLC’s army, the ALC, with the backing of the Ugandan Army, the UPDF,
allegedly also recruited children, primarily in Mbandaka, Équateur Province. In 2001, the MLC
admitted to having 1,800 CAAFAG within its ranks1272. The child soldiers were involved in
- 34 -
ALC offensives during which serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law were committed. This was particularly the case in the attacks carried out within the context of
the “Erasing the Board” operation1273.
___________
- 35 -
ANNEX 2.2
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-sixth Session, Report on the situation of
human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur,
Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1999/56, document E/CN.4/2000/42, 18 January 2000
(Excerpts)
UNITED
NATIONS E
Economic and Social
Council
Distr.
GENERAL
E/CN.4/2000/42
18 January 2000
ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH/FRENCH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-sixth session
Item 9 of the provisional agenda
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD
Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/56
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
Summary.................................................................................................................. 6
I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................... 1 - 12 9
A. Mandate and activities............................................................ 1 - 6 9
B. Joint mission to investigate allegations of massacres ............ 7 - 8 10
C. Reprisals against individuals who cooperated with the
United Nations........................................................................ 9 - 10 11
D. International human rights agreements and cooperation
with the United Nations.......................................................... 11 - 12 11
II. THE ARMED CONFLICT ........................................................... 13 - 30 12
GE.00-10229 (E)
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E/CN.4/2000/42
page 2
CONTENTS (continued)
Paragraphs Page
III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT.................................................... 31 - 47 17
A. In Government-controlled territory........................................ 31 - 41 17
B. In territory controlled by RCD and MLC............................... 42 - 47 19
IV. SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS............................................ 48 - 107 20
A. In the territory controlled by the Kinshasa Government........ 48 - 80 20
B. In the territory controlled by RCD and MLC......................... 81 - 107 28
V. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW ........................................................................................... 108 - 117 33
A. By the Kinshasa Government................................................. 108 - 111 33
B. By RCD and MLC forces....................................................... 112 - 117 33
VI. CONCLUSIONS........................................................................... 118 - 137 35
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................. 138 - 151 38
Annexes
Page
I. Previous resolutions and reports of the General Assembly and the
Commission on Human Rights ........................................................................ 41
II. Officials of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
with whom the Special Rapporteur met........................................................... 42
III. Officials of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie with whom
the Special Rapporteur met .............................................................................. 43
IV. Other institutions, churches, judges, public organizations, non-governmental
organizations and political parties met in territory controlled by the
Kinshasa authorities ......................................................................................... 44
V. Other institutions, churches, judges, public organizations, non-governmental
organizations and political parties met in territory controlled by the
authorities of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie..................... 46
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E/CN.4/2000/42
page 3
CONTENTS (continued)
Page
VI. Places visited by the Special Rapporteur ......................................................... 47
VII. International instruments to which the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is a party ............................................................................................... 48
VIII. Irregular armed groups directly or indirectly involved in the armed
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo .......................................... 49
IX. Armed conflicts developing in the territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo..................................................................................................... 50
X. Main peace initiatives undertaken by the international community since
the outbreak of the conflict .............................................................................. 51
XI. Ceasefire implementation timetable................................................................. 52
XII. Non-exhaustive list of human rights abuses committed in
Government-controlled territories and brought to the Special Rapporteur’s
attention............................................................................................................ 54
XIII. Non-exhaustive list of human rights abuses committed in territories
controlled by RCD and MLC and brought to the Special Rapporteur’s
attention............................................................................................................ 71
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E/CN.4/2000/42
page 19
38. One of the key provisions of the Lusaka Agreement is that “the inter-Congolese political
negotiations shall be under the aegis of a neutral facilitator to be agreed upon by the Congolese
parties” (art. III, para. 19) and that the facilitator should be appointed within 15 days of
signature. The dialogue itself was to be held within 45 to 90 days. All these deadlines passed
without any agreement being reached, even though the international community has put forward
eminent individuals with impeccable democratic credentials and acknowledged moral and
intellectual prestige, credibility and experience. The RCD and MLC leaders have rejected all the
names put forward, thereby delaying one of the key aspects of the Agreement. At a meeting of
the parties in Lusaka on 19 November, there was agreement in principle on Father Mateo Zuppi
and the former President of South Africa Nelson Mandela, but the Government continues to be
opposed to the appointment of the latter.
39. The Government has also been criticized for establishing People’s Power Committees
(CPPs) to replace the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL),
which brought Kabila to the Presidency. Their functions include organizing the people and
establishing policy in all aspects of national life. All inhabitants, at their respective levels
(neighbourhood, commune, town, city), are members. At their first congress, the President
defined the Committees as the new democracy. They are financed by the State and their
Executive Secretary is a former minister of President Kabila’s Government, Rafael Ghenda. The
population likens them to a single party and complains that sometimes its members have acted as
police informants to have opponents arrested. There have even been reports that its members
have taken part in the arrest of opponents and that they are inclined to interfere in the
administration of justice.5
40. Worse still, in a clearly provocative move against the civilian population, condemned by
the Special Rapporteur for the huge risk it carries for the civilian population, on 14 November,
the Government authorized the CPPs to carry weapons. For that purpose, it created the People’s
Self-Defence Force (FAP), a private militia with 50 members per neighbourhood who will be
given weapons to defend the homeland on the grounds that it is an extension of the army.
41. The army continues to have a very strong influence. According to reliable reports, there
are 13 security, military and police forces, apparently all authorized to make arrests. One
positive feature is the recent replacement of the former classification between commanders and
troops by the establishment of ranks - lieutenant-general, brigadier-general, colonel,
lieutenant-colonel, major, force commander and regional commander - which should prove
useful in determining responsibility and ending impunity. However, that progress is cancelled
out by the virtual incorporation into the army of the Mai-Mai and their criminal activities, which
invites a reaction from RCD.
B. In territory controlled by RCD and MLC
42. In the territory controlled by RCD, there is no party but it and another small party called
the Reformers’ Movement. In January, when confronted with the defection of its first president,
RCD held a general assembly that established an assembly and a collegial presidency consisting
of eight members as the only way of harmonizing its various civilian, military and Congolese
components and those perceived as foreign by the population. In March, the rift was
consolidated when its new president, Wamba dia Wamba, who is supported by Uganda, left for
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Kisangani and, later, Bunia. In May, supporters of the Rwanda-backed Goma faction clashed
with supporters of the Kisangani faction, leaving between three and eight people dead. In Goma,
the assembly established in January was dissolved in June and a further defection in October was
added to those in January and March, when the Katanga section rebelled against the majority,
which was perceived as foreign.
43. The worst confrontations occurred between 15 and 18 August, when Ugandan soldiers
clashed with Rwandan soldiers in Kisangani, resulting in the deaths of some 200 soldiers and 30
civilians, who, needless to say, were Congolese. The residence of the Congolese bishop Laurent
Monsengwo, who has been critical of the Rwandan presence in his homeland, was attacked by
the Rwandans. Other clashes between the factions have taken place in Beni, Butembo, Rutshuru
and other towns.
44. In order to deal with the civilian population, most of which is hostile to it, RCD has
established “self-defence groups”, trained by Rwandan soldiers. These groups have often been
accused of arresting or kidnapping individuals. State radio has called on people to join them.
The groups constitute a real paramilitary force, which has even been accused of the death of a
priest.
45. Various measures adopted by RCD have increased hostility towards it: the flight of
national wealth to Uganda and Rwanda; the introduction of a new flag for the region; the
declaration of the “twinning” of Kigali and the South Kivu region; and, lastly, the formation of a
so-called parliament (baraza), the members of which were appointed by the Governor of
South Kivu. In November, a dispute within RCD/Goma introduced a further factor, the intention
being to establish a sort of federal state in South Kivu, so as to be no longer dependent on Goma.
46. During his two visits to Goma and one to Bukavu, the Special Rapporteur was struck by
the prevailing climate of terror and humiliation in RCD-controlled territory.
47. The Special Rapporteur has not been able to obtain information on the political situation
in the territory controlled by MLC.
IV. SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. In the territory controlled by the Kinshasa Government (annex XII)
1. Right to life
Death penalty
48. In his oral presentation to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-fifth session, the
Special Rapporteur said that “in 1999, such sentences (by the Military Court) have not been
carried out, which indicates progress with regard to what I stated in the report”. That same
month, the practice of public executions was resumed and, during the year, a very large number
of people – particularly members of the former Armed Forces of Zaire (FAZ) or civilians found
guilty of armed robbery – were sentenced to death. Over 130 executions were reported, some for
such petty reasons as refusing to eat the food served up, which was considered a “military
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E/CN.4/2000/42
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war and for “ideological education”. Unfortunately, RCD, citing reasons of security, is not
prepared to participate in the pan-African conference on demobilization organized by Kinshasa
that is due to be held in the third week of December.
107. There are many street children owing to the death of their parents during the war or in the
massacres that have occurred in many villages. In South Kivu, 1,324 unaccompanied children
whose parents were killed in massacres in the region have been registered. At least 13 of these
survivors died as a result of neglect. It was reported that there are 400 children in Kisangani in
danger of dying from malnutrition and lack of medical care.
V. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A. By the Kinshasa Government
108. The principal violations of the law on armed conflicts by the forces of the Kinshasa
regime and their allies were as follows:
Attacks on the civilian population
109. Especially the bombing of Kisangani and pillaging in the city in January (17 dead); the
bombing of Zongo (120), Libenge (200), Goma (between 30 and 65 dead) and Uvira (3) in May;
and the atrocities perpetrated by Chadian soldiers in Bunga and Gemena. In addition, the
Zimbabwean army’s bombing of rebel-occupied towns claimed many victims.
Murders in the north-east
110. In Mobe, some 300 civilians were killed, apparently during an unsuccessful search for
rebels (second week of January 1999).
Sexual violence against women
111. While many general charges have been made, the most specific information relates to the
flight of FAC soldiers from Equateur at the beginning of the year, when, in addition to
committing robberies, they raped women.
B. By RCD and MLC forces
Attacks on the civilian population
112. The cruellest and most violent actions, committed without heed for the laws of war, were
attacks on the civilian population, as reprisals for acts committed by Mai-Mai in Chipaho and
Lemera (3 and 4 December 1998, around 70 dead); Makobola (end of 1998 and beginning
of 1999, up to 800 or more dead according to some sources); Burhale and Musinga
(12 January, 12 dead); Bashali (14 January, many Bahutu refugees killed); Lukweti, South Kivu
(25 February, 45 dead); Budaha, South Kivu (17 March); Walungu, Mwenga (19-21 March);
Mikondero (15 February, around 100 dead, including in the towns of Kyondo, Beni,
North Kivu); Kamituga (around 100 dead between 14 and 17 March, in the towns of Kutunda,
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Kenge, Lubila, Kabukungu); Budaha, Burhinyi, Ngweshe, Kigulube (31 May, around 90 dead,
according to the sources); Kibizi, Buyankiri (similar incidents throughout the year, of varying
intensity); Kasala (Katanga) (45 dead, many of them burned alive, on 28 July); Kalambi
(Menga, 30 September); Kahungwe (23 October, around 100 dead); Kashambi (61 dead,
on 31 October); Kalami (October); and Chifunze (South Kivu, over 60 dead). Many of these
massacres were carried out using machetes, knives or guns, and houses were usually set on fire
at the same time. RCD claims that these incidents were provoked by the Interahamwe or the
Mai-Mai, but these groups have no reason to commit massacres against the Congolese
population or Hutu refugees, who account for most of the victims. These incidents - like those in
Kasika (1998) and Makobola - were denied by RCD, before finally being acknowledged as
unfortunate mistakes. That is how they were described by both the Head of the Department of
Security and Information, Bizima Karaha, and the Head of the Department of Justice,
Institutional Reform and Human Rights, Jean Marie Emungu, in a report sent to the Governor of
South Kivu. A feature common to all these incidents is the attempt to cover up all traces
immediately. Ugandan troops carried out similar massacres in Beni on 14 November, with an
unconfirmed death toll of 60 civilians.8
113. The attacks on the defenceless civilian population during the dispute between Ugandan
and Rwandan soldiers in Kisangani in August, which claimed 30 civilian lives, and later attacks
on Beni and Rutshuru were also a violation of the rules of international humanitarian law.
Arson and destruction
114. In incidents mostly, though not always, unconnected to the massacres, RCD forces have
set fire to and destroyed many villages.
Deportations
115. Mai-Mai and other persons have been arrested during military operations and transported
to Rwanda and Uganda, where they usually disappear without a trace.
Mutilation
116. The Special Rapporteur received many reports of mutilation and, in at least one case, was
able to verify it. During his mission in February, he met an 18-year-old man, arrested along with
another young man by Rwandan soldiers in a village in South Kivu on suspicion of collaborating
with the Mai-Mai. The first man’s genitals were cut off completely and he was abandoned in the
jungle, from where he was later rescued, although he was left with irreparable physical damage.
His comrade died when his heart was torn out.
Rape of women as a means of warfare
117. The Special Rapporteur received reports of rapes of women in Kabamba, Katana, Lwege,
Karinsimbi and Kalehe. There were also reports of women being raped by Ugandan soldiers in
towns in Orientale province.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. The armed conflict
118. Since 2 August 1998, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been
living through a war started by a movement known as the Congolese Rally for Democracy
(RCD), which subsequently split in two and is supported by the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and
Burundi (countries the Security Council calls “uninvited”). A new rebel movement, the
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), was formed later on. Faced with this
situation, the Government of the Democratic Republic had to request help, in accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter, from the armies of five other countries: Zimbabwe, Chad, the Sudan,
Angola and Namibia. The presence of these armies, in addition to the involvement of various
militias, i.e. the Interahamwe, the Mai Mai, the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the Front
pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) and the Lord’s Resistance Army, has created a climate
of great insecurity. Conflicts which should be characterized as international are thus going on in
the country at the same time as others which are internal in nature. The parties have all
committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as murders and attacks on
the civilian population, including the rape of non-combatant women.
B. Violations of international humanitarian
law committed by Government forces
119. The most serious acts have been the bombing of civilian populations by the Congolese
Armed Forces and its Zimbabwean and Chadian allies (Kisangani, Gemena, Zongo, Libenge,
Goma, Bunga) and reprisals against the civilian population in Bunga and Gemena.
C. Violations of international humanitarian law committed
by the rebel forces allied with the uninvited countries
120. In reprisal for attacks on those the Congolese population calls “aggressors” and
“Rwandan soldiers”, RCD forces have retaliated by massacring defenceless civilian populations
with machetes, knives and guns, causing thousands of victims, most notoriously in Chipaho,
Lemera, Makobola, Burhale, Musinga, Bashali, Lukweti, Budaha, Walungu, Mwenga,
Mikondero, Kamituga, Budaha, Burhinyi, Ngweshe, Kigulube, Kibizi, Buyankiri, Kasala,
Kalambi, Kahungwe, Kashambi, Kalami and Chifunze.
D. Human rights violations attributed to the Kinshasa Government
121. The continued application of the death penalty, which President Kabila justifies by the
need to guarantee the population’s security, even though he describes himself as abolitionist; the
existence of a Military Court (COM) which does not guarantee the rights of the accused;
continuous attacks on the independent press (the arrest of journalists, raids on printers,
summonses, the use of Mobutu-era freedom-killing legislation); the systematic use of torture;
and the practice of enforced disappearance and summary executions appear to be the most
serious violations. On the positive side, the Minister of Human Rights has tried to make
improvements in some specific areas and a solution was found for “persons at risk” (those of
Tutsi appearance, who had to be protected to prevent reprisals by the population); a national
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human rights plan of action has been prepared with the participation of the main human rights
organizations; and, in November, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was
authorized to visit detention centres.
E. Human rights violations in RCD-controlled territory
122. The most striking thing in the territory occupied by the “rebel or aggressor” forces is the
prevailing atmosphere of terror and an increasingly stronger feeling of rejection of those in
power. The people of the area feel humiliated. The right to life is constantly being violated, but
so are all the public liberties, such as the right to freedom of association, assembly, expression
and opinion. There are no independent news media and the few that did exist, such as
Radio Maendeleo, were banned. Any dissent or opposition is presented as “attempted
genocide”. The deportation of prisoners to Rwanda and Uganda is a particularly serious matter.
It is also symptomatic that the latest RCD/Goma structural adjustment eliminated all public
human rights organizations. The one positive aspect is that the death penalty, which is provided
for by law, is not being applied.
F. The situation of human rights advocates
123. In the two parts into which the country is divided, the situation of human rights advocates
is particularly serious. The annexes contain several specific examples of violations of their
rights to freedom of association, expression and assembly, as well as of their rights to life,
physical integrity and liberty of person. In the opinion of President Kabila, NGOs should be
regarded as “political parties”. For the Governor of South Kivu, civil society is a grouping of
extremist political parties funded by the Kinshasa secret services.
G. The right to democracy in Government-controlled territory
124. An analysis of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/57 of 27 April 1999 on the
promotion of the right to democracy, whose existence the Special Rapporteur has supported in
all his reports since 1994, shows not only that this right does not exist in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, but that nothing has been done to guarantee it.
125. The rights to freedom of opinion and expression, thought, conscience and association and
assembly are being violated and only the right to freedom of religion may be considered to be
applicable. Political parties are banned (unless they are in conformity with a new law which
does not meet democratic requirements) and, in their place, People’s Power Committees (CPPs)
have been systematically set up with State funding and ideological support; they are no more
than an extension of the State itself for the implementation of its policies and they have also been
authorized to organize armed neighbourhood militias known as People’s Self-Defence Forces
(FAPs).
126. The human right to receive and impart information and ideas is being violated and is
subject to harsh penalties of arrest, trial (even by the Military Court), prohibition on leaving the
country and torture.
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127. The rule of law is applicable only to private individuals, not to the Head of State, who has
arrogated to himself the most absolute discretionary powers, in accordance with Decree-Law
No. 3 of 1997, which concentrates all executive and legislative powers and the majority of
judicial powers in his hands. There are no effective remedies for the protection of the
fundamental freedoms and security of citizens.
128. The right to vote has not been restored and nothing has come of any of the
announcements made, even before the attack of 2 August 1998 in the eastern part of the country.
129. The right to political participation on terms of equality has also not been restored.
According to the new law on political parties, only those which are authorized by the Ministry of
the Interior may take part in politics. In the “national debate” called for by the Government, only
the issues proposed by the President may be discussed.
130. The Government continues to have a stranglehold on government institutions. Even
ministers of State, judges, soldiers of all ranks and senior public officials have been sent to
prison, often without trial, thus showing that power is being exercised non-transparently, with
the most absolute impunity.
131. The Congolese people does not enjoy the right to choose its system of government and
the “national debate” proclaimed by the President is restricted to the issues he proposes.
132. The right of citizens to have access, on terms of equality, to public service is not
recognized.
H. The right to democracy under RCD
133. In RCD-controlled territory, there are no parties, no freedom of expression, information,
association, assembly or political participation and no right to vote. People do not even have the
right to criticize what they see as “foreign aggression and occupation”. Only RCD is authorized
and it is effectively a party-State. The population has endured terrible political humiliations,
such as the changing of the flag without consultation and the declaration of the “twinning” of the
Rwandan capital, Kigali, and the territory of South Kivu, which is even seeking autonomy for
itself.
I. The Lusaka Peace Agreement
134. Following many attempts at peace, the Lusaka Peace Agreement was signed on 10 July,
but signed by RCD only on 31 August. It contains both military and political agreements and
provides for observer participation by countries (Zambia) and organizations (OAU and the
United Nations). The Ceasefire Agreements have not been observed, since fighting and troop
mobilizations have continued, the militias have not been disarmed and the massacres have gone
on. Worse still, the parties have continued to use warlike language, in increasingly louder tones
every day, thereby undermining the participation of the so-called “international community”,
which, apart from civil society in the two parts of the territory, so far appears to be the only one
interested in the Agreement’s success. Since the date of signing, however, there have been no
major changes in territorial positions.
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E/CN.4/2000/42
page 38
135. The political commitments provided for in the Agreement have also not been
implemented: the facilitator for the Congolese components of the Agreement has not yet been
appointed and President Kabila’s Government refuses to hold an all-inclusive “national
dialogue” (inter-Congolese political negotiations) on the future of the country with the
participation of widely recognized political parties and civil society, preferring instead a
“national debate” limited to the issues it is prepared to discuss.
136. None of the agreements provided for in the Lusaka Agreement was implemented within
the time limits set and most of them have still not been implemented.
137. The joint mission to investigate violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law committed during the 1996-1997 war has still not been able to begin its activities, as the
Commission on Human Rights requested, because the required security measures have not been
taken.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Respect for the peace process
138. The parties involved must fully implement the Peace Agreement, both in its military
aspects (halt to warlike language; disarming of militias; withdrawal of all foreign troops, whether
invited or “uninvited”; respect for the inviolability of borders; a proper ceasefire; and security for
movements of United Nations and OAU observer and auxiliary staff; etc.) and in its political
aspects.
139. With regard to the political agreements, the appointment of a facilitator cannot continue
to be put off, especially as the Special Rapporteur found that there was broad consensus on the
San Egidio community, which meets all the requirements of recognized moral and intellectual
standing, credibility and experience provided for in the Agreement.
B. Democracy
140. The restoration of democracy is essential and urgent. To this end, the political parties
and NGOs organized in accordance with the law in force at the time of their establishment must
be respected and must take part in any serious process of reconciliation and democratization.
Democracy is built by peoples or by no one.
141. In the east, RCD must accept the fact that it is not popular with the Congolese people and
must allow organizations in which the people is represented to operate. It cannot continue seeing
every opponent as a perpetrator of genocide or as an instigator of ethnic hatred. It cannot go on
adopting measures which anger the population, such as the twinning of Kigali and South Kivu
and the change of flag.
142. Human rights, especially liberty of person and the freedoms of expression, opinion and
association, must be restored in the two parts into which the war has divided the territory, since
their enjoyment today seems more like a concession from the authorities than an enforceable
- 46 -
- 47 -
ANNEX 2.3.A
United Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/1005,
10 September 2002
United Nations S/2002/1005
Security Council Distr.: General
10 September 2002
Original: English
02-58220 (E) 110902
*0258220*
Special report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the
statement of the President of the Security Council of 15
August (S/PRST/2002/24), in which the Council
requested me to put forward recommendations on how
the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and,
through the Mission’s coordination, all relevant United
Nations agencies can assist the parties in the fulfilment
of their responsibilities to implement the Peace
Agreement between the Governments of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of
Rwanda on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops
from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the Dismantling of the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe Forces in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (S/2002/914, annex), signed in Pretoria on
30 July 2002.
2. The present report outlines the tasks associated
with the Pretoria Agreement and contains
recommendations on action that the United Nations
could take to assist the parties in its implementation. It
also contains an analysis of the Agreement between the
Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and the Republic of Uganda on the Withdrawal of
Ugandan Troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Cooperation and Normalization of Relations
between the Two Countries, signed by the States
concerned in Luanda on 6 September. In addition, the
report describes the situation in the north-eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo and sets forth
recommendations on action that the United Nations
could take in this regard.
3. Other developments since the issuance of my
eleventh report on MONUC (S/2002/621) will be
reflected in a further report, which will be submitted to
the Security Council in early October.
II. Provisions of the Agreements and
action taken to date
A. Pretoria Agreement
4. In Pretoria on 30 July 2002, the Heads of State of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda
signed the Peace Agreement on the withdrawal of
Rwandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the dismantling of the former Rwandan
Armed Forces (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe forces in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The President of
the Republic of South Africa and I signed the
Agreement as witnesses.
5. Key provisions of the Agreement relate to the
undertaking of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government to continue the process of “tracking down
and disarming” (S/2002/914, annex, para. 8.1) the
Interahamwe and ex-FAR within the territory under its
control. The Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government has also agreed to collaborate with
MONUC, the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and
“any other force constituted by the third party, to
assemble and disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe”
(ibid., para. 7) in the whole of the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government of
Rwanda, for its part, has committed itself to
withdrawing its troops from the Democratic Republic
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S/2002/1005
of the Congo “as soon as effective measures that
address its security concerns, in particular the
dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces,
have been agreed to” (ibid., para. 5). The Agreement
stipulates that Rwanda’s withdrawal should start
simultaneously with the implementation of these two
measures, both of which will be verified by MONUC,
JMC and the third party.
6. The third party — which is defined as “the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and South
Africa, in its dual capacity as Chairperson of the
African Union and as facilitator” (ibid., p. 4) — is
entrusted with a number of verification tasks, including
the verification of information to be provided by the
parties on the armed groups, and of the implementation
of effective measures in regard to their dismantling.
MONUC is specifically called on to immediately
complete its phase III deployment and to operationalize
and provide security at assembly points for ex-
FAR/Interahamwe elements, as well as to facilitate
their repatriation.
7. The Programme of Implementation of the Peace
Agreement (ibid., pp. 4-6) envisages a 90-day
timetable and includes the following elements:
(a) The establishment of a third-party
verification mechanism;
(b) The finalization of MONUC phase III
deployment;
(c) The establishment of assembly points for
ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements;
(d) The tracking down, disarming and
dismantling of those armed groups;
(e) Various monitoring and verification tasks;
(f) The complete withdrawal of Rwandan
troops from Democratic Republic of the Congo
territory.
Subsequently, the third party is to conduct the final
verification of the completion of the 90-day
Programme of Implementation and submit a report
within 30 days thereafter.
Action taken to date
8. Following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement,
the United Nations undertook consultations with the
Governments of South Africa, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and Rwanda in order to gain greater
insight into the background to the Agreement and to
seek the clarifications necessary for the Organization to
plan its role in support of the Agreement. Several
meetings were held with delegations from the three
countries during the week of 5 August 2002.
Additional clarifications were provided on 8 August at
the meeting that the Security Council held with the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of South Africa and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Special
Envoy of the President of Rwanda on the Great Lakes
region. On 6 August, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations provided the Security Council with a
preliminary analysis of the implications of the Pretoria
Agreement.
9. On 9 August, following consultations with a
South African Government delegation at United
Nations Headquarters, a joint communiqué was issued
in New York on the establishment of a secretariat of the
third-party verification mechanism. That communiqué
indicated the readiness of the United Nations and South
Africa to work closely together to oversee and verify
the implementation of the commitments made by both
signatories. The communiqué also announced that the
secretariat of the verification mechanism would
comprise the following personnel, to be assisted as
required by the necessary experts: for the United
Nations, my Deputy Special Representative for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Deputy
Force Commander of MONUC; and for South Africa,
the Security Adviser to the President, the Foreign
Affairs Adviser to the President, the Chief Director for
Central Africa of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and the Special Representative of the Department of
Defence.
10. Subsequently, the secretariat of the third-party
verification mechanism was established in Kinshasa. It
will also have a liaison group in Kigali. MONUC
intends to extend its fullest cooperation to the
verification mechanism by, inter alia, assisting in
carrying out the latter’s verification tasks. At the same
time, MONUC will continue to discharge the mandate
entrusted to it by the Security Council, in accordance
with its established chain of command and procedures.
The terms of reference for the verification mechanism
are in the process of being finalized.
11. The third-party verification mechanism held its
first meeting in Kinshasa on 21 August and discussed
its programme of work and rules of procedure. It also
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S/2002/1005
held initial meetings with the Governments of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda on 26
and 27 August to discuss the way forward and to
request that they appoint contact groups to serve as
their primary interlocutors vis-à-vis the verification
mechanism. The mechanism will determine in due
course specific modalities for the various verification
tasks envisaged in the Pretoria Agreement.
12. In the course of my recent visit to southern
Africa, I conducted extensive consultations with
regional leaders on the various practical modalities for
the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
13. Since the signing of the Agreement, the
Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Rwanda have maintained regular contacts to
discuss its implementation. The Government of
Rwanda has provided the third-party verification
mechanism with initial information on its plan for the
withdrawal of its troops from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, as well as information concerning the
Rwandan armed groups operating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, a preliminary
assessment of these documents has indicated that much
more information is required in these areas. The
verification mechanism, in the meantime, is also
awaiting the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government’s submission of information concerning
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements allegedly present in
the western Democratic Republic of the Congo,
including, in particular, information on the
whereabouts of their known leaders.
B. Luanda Agreement
14. On 6 September 2002, at Luanda, the Heads of
State of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
Republic of Uganda signed an Agreement on the
withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and cooperation and
normalization of relations between the two countries.
The Head of State of Angola signed the Agreement as a
witness.
15. Under the Agreement, the Government of Uganda
committed itself to the continued withdrawal of its
forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
accordance with a jointly agreed calendar. In particular,
the Ugandan troops are to immediately withdraw from
Gbadolite, Beni and their vicinities. Uganda also
reaffirmed its readiness to withdraw its troops from
Bunia following the establishment of an administrative
authority in Ituri. The agreement also stipulates that
Ugandan troops on the slopes of Mount Ruwenzori will
remain until the parties put in place “security
mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda’s security”,
including coordinated patrols along the common border
of the two countries.
16. With regard to the situation in Ituri, the two
parties have agreed to establish, with the assistance of
MONUC, a Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri
comprising representatives of the Governments of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda and
various leaders on the ground. According to the
implementation calendar annexed to the Agreement,
the Committee would be established within 20 days of
the signing of the Agreement. Following a decision on
a mechanism to maintain law and order in Ituri, an
administrative authority would be set up. Subsequently,
Uganda would develop a plan for withdrawal from
Bunia that would envisage the completion of the
withdrawal of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force
(UPDF) within 100 days.
17. Other provisions of the Agreement concern the
normalization of relations between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, including through
the restoration of the sovereignty of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, while Uganda’s security
concerns are also addressed; by refraining from all
types of military and logistical support to the armed
groups; by expediting the pacification of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo territories currently
under Ugandan control and the normalization of the
situation along the common border between the two
countries; through exchanges of intelligence on all
matters of security interest; by restoring full diplomatic
relations; and by re-establishing the Joint Ministerial
Commission for cooperation in various areas, including
defence, security, trade, investment, infrastructure,
transport, communications and cultural exchanges. The
parties also agreed to resolve any future differences
between them through dialogue and other peaceful
means.
18. At the time of the preparation of this report, the
Government of Uganda had withdrawn some 1,200
troops from Beni and 650 troops from Gbadolite since
late August. MONUC has observed the return of these
UPDF troops to Uganda. It is expected that the
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S/2002/1005
withdrawal of Ugandan troops from those locations
will be completed by the end of September.
III. Implementation challenges
A. Pretoria Agreement
19. The signing of the Pretoria Agreement has been
characterized by the parties and the facilitator as an
effort to overcome the main obstacles to the
implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
(S/1999/815, annex), namely, the lack of progress in
the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and in the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration of ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements
operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Hence, it provides a political framework within which
the main issues of concern could be addressed, thus
enabling the parties to resolve their long-standing
conflict.
20. It is in this context that the MONUC concept of
operations for phase III has been revised, as outlined in
section IV below, to reflect the adjustments necessary
to support the implementation of the Pretoria
Agreement, including the various verification tasks
envisaged for the third-party verification mechanism
and voluntary, progressive disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration of the armed groups in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, with an emphasis on the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe elements.
21. The key to operationalizing the Pretoria
Agreement will be the continued resolve of both parties
to work closely with each other — with the assistance
of the third party — in a climate of confidence. It is
only in this context that a number of continuing
differences — such as the divergence of views between
the two Governments on the number and locations of
the Rwandan armed groups and on the yet-to-bedefined
“effective measures” (S/2002/914, annex, para.
5) regarding the dismantling of the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe — can be overcome. It will also be
important for the parties to reach — as soon as
possible — a common understanding on their
obligations under the Agreement. President Mbeki’s
proposal of monthly, or at least regular, review
meetings at the Head of State level should therefore be
strongly supported, since such meetings would be an
essential instrument in maintaining the resolve of the
parties and ensuring that the process remains on track.
22. The continuing contacts between the parties since
the signing of the Pretoria Agreement are encouraging
signs of their commitment to the peace process. At the
same time, the reported intensification of military
activity on the ground and a recent exchange of public
accusations regarding non-compliance with the
Agreement may not be conducive to the prompt
implementation of the Agreement. While the cessation
of hostilities between the Governments of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda has
largely held along the disengagement line for some
time, it will be crucial for the parties to demonstrate
their commitment to the Pretoria Agreement by
ensuring that secure conditions are created both for
MONUC’s deployment and for the voluntary
disarmament of the armed groups. The parties will also
need to exert influence over those concerned to lay
down their arms and enter into a voluntary
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration process.
23. Although not directly linked to the Pretoria
Agreement, an overall political settlement among the
parties to the inter-Congolese dialogue is also a critical
element for ensuring its successful implementation. An
all-inclusive transitional Government should be in a
position to effectively extend its authority throughout
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, following the
withdrawal of foreign forces. Obviously, the ongoing
efforts of my Special Envoy, Mustapha Niasse, require
the strong support of all concerned, with a view to a
timely, all-inclusive agreement among the Congolese
parties on the transitional arrangements.
B. Luanda Agreement
24. The Agreement reached between the
Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda provides for the total withdrawal of the
latter’s troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the normalization of the relations between
the two countries. As regards Bunia, a key town in the
resource-rich Ituri region that was until recently a
political hub for the Rassemblement congolais pour la
démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCDK/
ML) in an acutely contested territory, Uganda’s
decision to withdraw its battalion from this area once
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S/2002/1005
an administrative authority has been established in Ituri
could have both positive and negative consequences.
25. As indicated in my previous reports to the
Security Council, Ituri has for decades been afflicted
by a series of violent clashes, particularly between the
Lendu, the Hema and their affiliated groups. It should
be noted, however, that the Lendu-Hema tension does
not represent a typical majority-minority conflict as
witnessed elsewhere. Since June 1999, the tension in
Ituri has reached an unprecedented level, with —
according to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government — up to 20,000 people having lost their
lives. Recently, in the whole of Ituri, which has a
population of 4.6 million, some 500,000 people were
newly displaced, with 60,000 displaced in Bunia alone.
The precarious security situation was vividly illustrated
by the assassination in April 2001 of six International
Committee of the Red Cross workers by unidentified
assailants some 30 kilometres from Bunia, which is
speculated to have been an effort to keep the eyes and
ears of the international community away from the
situation there.
26. The ongoing extreme violence is often attributed
to a lack of impartial administration; to the power
struggle between the leaders of the RCD-K/ML; to
rivalry between prominent business people over
economic interests; to perceived or real interference by
some UPDF elements on the ground; and to ongoing
efforts to build up ethnically based militias by various
sponsors who have different political, military and
economic motivations.
27. The total number of killings in Ituri in recent
weeks is impossible to ascertain. It is widely accepted
that in Bunia itself there have been hundreds, but as the
violence has increased and spread to villages as far as
90 kilometres from Bunia, figures provided by nongovernmental
organizations and other sources have
suggested that thousands may have died in August
alone, with tens of thousands displaced, although it has
not been possible to confirm these figures
independently. A recently well-supplied Hema/Gerere
militia group, the Union des patriotes congolais (UPC),
has reportedly captured important towns on the
Mahagi-Bunia-Beni axis, establishing its control of the
immediate environs of Bunia, thereby reducing the
RCD-K/ML power base. The Lendu and Hema
communities are now deeply suspicious of each other
and have entered a deadly cycle of revenge killings. In
recent months, individuals who have reportedly sought
to restore normalcy have received death threats, forcing
them to flee the area.
28. On 29 August, the Human Rights Minister of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Luaba Ntumba,
and his associates, were abducted by a group of UPC
militia members near the Bunia airport. The hostages
were released three days later in exchange for the
return to Bunia of nine associates of the UPC leader,
Thomas Lubanga, who was formerly an RCD-K/ML
leader in charge of the movement’s “defence portfolio”.
MONUC assisted in this situation by providing good
offices and appealing to all concerned to reach a
peaceful solution.
29. While any long-term solution must be based on
the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the area and
the introduction of a legitimate national authority that
will exercise impartially its civil administration
responsibility, it is unlikely that such an
administration — acceptable to all communities in
Bunia — can be effectively installed at short notice.
Despite a general perception that some UPDF troops
have not acted even-handedly, for the time being they
remain the only force in Bunia that can provide
security, albeit limited and localized. It should also be
noted that the situation in the north-east has been
further destabilized by a military offensive conducted
by RCD-National, reportedly backed by the
Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), towards
Isiro. RCD-National has reportedly advanced to within
200 kilometres of Bunia.
30. The need to address the deteriorating situation in
Bunia is critical not only for the implementation of the
Luanda Agreement, but also for the normalization of
security conditions in the north-east and the
furtherance of the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in general. The proposed
MONUC role in this regard is outlined in paragraphs
57-63 below.
IV. Role of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
in support of the Agreements
31. My ninth report to the Security Council
(S/2001/970) presented the initial plan of MONUC for
its phase III deployment, which indicated that the
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S/2002/1005
Mission would take a step-by-step approach to the
implementation of disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of the
armed groups while continuing with relevant phase II
tasks, in particular monitoring the disengagement of
the parties to new defensive positions, investigating
alleged ceasefire violations and observing the
withdrawal of foreign forces.
32. Over the past year, MONUC has made
considerable strides in its phase II activities, but also in
preparing for its phase III tasks, in particular by
deploying civilian and military personnel in Kindu and
Kisangani. In this regard, the preliminary information
gathered on the armed groups was provided to the
Security Council in the annex to my letter of 1 April
2002 (S/2002/341). However, in the absence of an
overall political agreement on disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration and without a cessation of hostilities in
the eastern parts of the country, the Mission has not
been able to achieve much with regard to disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration beyond providing assistance in response
to ad hoc requests for demobilization and repatriation
of combatants such as those assembled in Kamina and
Beni, and planning for the wider disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration operation.
33. The Pretoria and Luanda Agreements, which
support the principles laid down in the Lusaka
Agreement, now provide a concrete opportunity to
move forward with the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of armed
groups and the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan
forces.
A. Disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration
1. Principles involved in the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration of foreign armed groups
34. The main principles that will guide MONUC
involvement in the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign
armed groups are as follows:
(a) The Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Rwanda must provide all information they possess on
the locations, numbers, and weaponry of the armed
groups, to be verified by the third-party verification
mechanism;
(b) Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration activities will take place
in a permissive environment, which is to say, a
cessation of all hostilities is necessary;
(c) The disarmament, demobilization and
repatriation of armed groups will be undertaken on a
voluntary basis. MONUC will in no way attempt to
forcibly disarm combatants;
(d) The disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process will
also address the voluntary repatriation of both excombatants
and their family members. It is essential
that the countries in question provide guarantees that
ex-combatants and their dependants will be able to
return in conditions of safety and security. In this
respect, the necessary confidence-building measures,
including international monitoring and reintegration
assistance, will have to be put in place. Consideration
should also be given to members of “mixed families”
(such as Rwandan ex-combatants who have Congolese
wives);
(e) The question of ex-combatants who may not
wish to return to their home countries must be
addressed prior to the commencement of the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration exercise. MONUC and the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) will undertake further consultations with the
parties, as well as with other Governments, on the
identification of various durable solutions, including
asylum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
resettlement to third countries, for those people who
qualify as refugees and are unwilling to return to their
home countries;
(f) MONUC and UNHCR will seek to work
with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Rwanda, as well as with other countries
concerned, to ensure that those two Governments make
available to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
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S/2002/1005
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994 any persons sought by the Tribunal;
(g) In areas not under the control of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo Government,
MONUC will provide “point security” for the
disarmament and demobilization sites, but the local
authorities will continue to be responsible for
providing overall “umbrella security”. In areas
controlled by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the Government will be
expected to provide security at the disarmament and
demobilization sites;
(h) A clear understanding should be reached
with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Rwanda on their respective roles and
responsibilities, as well as those of MONUC, UNHCR
and other relevant United Nations agencies, with
regard to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants and
associated tasks.
2. Envisaged disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
arrangements
35. In areas controlled by the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, any ex-FAR or
Interahamwe members identified as operating
alongside the Congolese armed forces would remain in
their formations until they were, as was the case in
Kamina, disarmed by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo Government, where they would be screened,
demobilized and repatriated by MONUC. The
Congolese armed forces would be responsible for
maintaining security during the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration exercise. MONUC would not be required
to provide protection, beyond guard units necessary to
protect United Nations personnel and equipment.
Accordingly, it will be possible for MONUC to proceed
with the initial stages of disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration within its
current resources in the areas under Government
control as soon as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe are
identified.
36. In the east, disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration will
continue to present a major political, security and
logistical challenge. As noted in my previous reports,
the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo remains highly volatile. The general
environment of hostility and the lack of law and order
are likely to remain, even with a formal cessation of
hostilities. In this light, it is proposed that the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration process in the east would initially
commence in areas of relative security.
37. The proposed disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration plan
envisages that MONUC will simultaneously operate
two to four mobile reception centres for disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration at any given time. It is
estimated that a total of 10 to 12 mobile reception
centres could be created during the entire process.
These centres would be set up by MONUC in
partnership with UNHCR, the World Food Programme
(WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In addition
to the military presence of MONUC, including military
observers, a multidisciplinary civilian team would also
be attached to each centre.
38. Following consultations with United Nations
agencies, it has been agreed in principle that UNHCR
will assist in the reception and repatriation of excombatants’
dependants, who will be accommodated at
a separate camp. WFP will provide and distribute food,
UNICEF will assist with the child soldiers and WHO
will support the provision of medical services.
MONUC and the United Nations agencies will also
work in close partnership with non-governmental
organizations that may assist the process. In this
connection, specialized training in child protection and
gender issues will be provided to civilians and military
personnel who will be involved in the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration process.
39. According to preliminary estimates, it could take
about two months to establish one mobile centre, two
months to process the combatants and their dependants
there and one month to disassemble the camp. The total
caseload, including dependants, could be as high as
90,000. MONUC estimates that, with the assistance of
its implementation partners, it could repatriate up to
200 people per day from each reception centre and that
up to 7,000 people would be processed at each centre
over a two-month period, depending on location and
logistical conditions.
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40. The extensive use of the Mission’s public
information capacities will be essential in
disseminating information on the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration process. MONUC will step up the use of
Radio Okapi to broadcast information on Rwanda’s
policy on the issue of returning ex-combatants who
have already been repatriated, in order to further
encourage combatants to disarm and repatriate. In so
doing, it will continue to broadcast from already
established bases in Kindu and Kisangani and use its
three mobile FM radio transmitters.
B. Overall framework for
phase III activities
41. As envisaged in the Pretoria Agreement, the
third-party verification mechanism will verify the
information provided by the parties on armed groups.
Moreover, the verification mechanism will play a vital
role in overcoming any potential stumbling blocks in
the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement by
making a final determination on the measures taken
vis-à-vis the dismantling of armed groups. While
MONUC is a separate entity, it is expected to serve as
the main operational arm of the verification mechanism
in regard to its verification tasks. Other bodies, such as
the JMC, will be invited to participate in the activities
of the verification mechanism, as appropriate, pursuant
to the Pretoria Agreement.
42. The role of the third-party verification
mechanism in verifying the cessation of support to
armed groups will be particularly important, as this is
understood to be an essential element of the “effective
measures” aimed at dismantling the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe. To assist in this endeavour,
MONUC is expected to establish an observation
presence at key points on the alleged supply routes,
including at Ndjili airport and at Kamina and
Lubumbashi airfields. The verification mechanism will
also work with both the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Rwandan Governments to identify leaders
of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, with a view to
establishing their whereabouts and handing them over
to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (see
also para. 34 (f) above).
43. The structure of MONUC — both civilian and
military — would be adjusted in order to meet the
challenges that the Mission will face in the coming
phase. A joint coordination committee for
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration, of which the current disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration division will form the core, would be set
up directly under the responsibility of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General. The
coordination committee would include the various
components of MONUC and its principal partners —
UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United
Nations Development Programme.
44. Given the immense logistical challenges and the
need for effective coordination with the multitude of
players involved in the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration exercise, I
intend to appoint to MONUC a second Deputy Special
Representative to be responsible for operations and
management, including all support aspects of the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration programme. My first Deputy Special
Representative will, in addition to her other functions,
retain responsibility for political guidance on
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration. She will also, as noted in paragraph
9 above, be my senior representative in the third-party
verification mechanism.
45. A forward Mission headquarters, to be directed
by a senior civilian officer, will be established at
Kisangani, in order to coordinate MONUC activities in
the east and to spearhead disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration in this
region. The creation of such a forward Mission
headquarters will enable MONUC to shift the “centre
of gravity” of its activities gradually towards the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as the
Mission embarks on its phase III activities.
46. In the meantime, MONUC offices in Kampala
and Kigali will also be strengthened to support the
work of the Mission, especially in the implementation
of the Pretoria and Luanda Agreements, and to provide
better political liaison and analysis of developments in
Uganda and Rwanda. MONUC also expects to
establish a field presence in Lubumbashi.
47. International monitoring of the returning excombatants
and dependants in Rwanda is an essential
confidence-building measure. It is envisaged that
UNHCR will undertake its normal monitoring
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functions in relation to returning refugees. At the same
time, discussions are under way to identify the most
effective way to monitor ex-combatants who are
repatriated through “solidarity camps” before they are
returned to their communities of origin. The experience
in Kamina has demonstrated that confidence-building
measures are necessary to ensure that ex-combatants
can benefit from the security guarantees extended by
the Rwandan Government.
Concept of operations
48. In order to support the conduct of disarmament,
demobilization, and repatriation of foreign armed
groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
military component of MONUC will need to be
significantly strengthened by creating a forward force.
The forward force will comprise two robust task forces,
based in Kindu and Kisangani, as well as one reserve
battalion, riverine units and specialized enabling units
to enhance the Mission’s military logistics capacity.
49. Each task force will be an integrated (i.e.,
including command, combat and support elements) and
flexible force of approximately 1,700 troops with
in-built mobility, structured around a well-equipped
infantry battalion. It will also be supported by integral
utility (transport) aviation with a lift capability of 120
personnel, specialized logistics elements and two
military engineer units, each with a limited demining
and construction capability. Additionally, a single
armed helicopter unit will be deployed in the east to
support the forward force. While the two task forces
will maintain their primary bases in Kindu and
Kisangani, each one will have the capability to deploy
forward up to three company groups to mobile
disarmament and demobilization sites in the east.
50. The task forces will, inter alia, provide “point
security” at disarmament and demobilization sites for
the conduct of the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration process, support the engineering
preparation of disarmament and demobilization sites,
destroy weapons and munitions, and provide limited
demining capability.
51. A force reserve battalion, provided by a single
troop-contributing country, will comprise a
headquarters and four infantry companies. This reserve
battalion will be located at Kisangani and will provide
flexibility and the ability to meet unexpected
contingencies. It may also assist specialized civilian
and military teams with ad hoc disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration operations carried out in the west of the
country, as a prelude to the wider disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration operation.
52. It is proposed that airfield services be provided
by the military component, aimed at enabling MONUC
to quickly expand its disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration operations. These will include essential
capabilities in areas such as meteorology, air traffic
control, movement control and cargo-handling support
that are necessary to ensure flexible, safe and reliable
airfield operations.
53. The riverine units will be used to support the
reopening of the Congo River for commercial traffic
and the movement of United Nations transports, as well
as to facilitate MONUC monitoring in the area southeast
of Kisangani. Additional military observers are
also envisaged to staff the military component of the
forward Mission headquarters in Kisangani and to
support broader phase III tasks, including by assisting
in the screening of combatants in the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration exercise.
54. The current military deployment of MONUC
comprises approximately 640 military observers and
3,600 troops. To undertake the tasks described above in
the revised concept of operations, an additional 120
military observers and up to 4,340 troops will be
necessary, bringing the total authorized strength to
8,700 military personnel. The overall troop
requirement will be kept under close review, especially
with regard to tasks undertaken under the earlier phase
II deployment. As discussed in paragraph 48 above, the
new military requirements for the Mission include
essential military logistics capabilities. It should be
noted, however, that in the past it has been extremely
difficult for the United Nations to obtain such troops
from Member States. If they are not made available,
specialized civilian contracts will have to be sought.
Such contracts are usually very costly and may be very
slow to materialize.
C. Withdrawal of foreign troops
55. MONUC will continue to monitor the withdrawal
of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, which remains a key element of an overall
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settlement. The Mission has observed the recent
withdrawal of Ugandan troops from Beni and
Gbadolite and is also currently monitoring the
redeployment of Zimbabwean troops to assembly areas,
in preparation for their withdrawal from Democratic
Republic of the Congo territory. MONUC has recently
observed the repatriation of a number of Zimbabwe
Defence Forces troops from the area of Mbandaka and
Mbuji-Mayi. A MONUC military liaison officer is
present in Zimbabwe to monitor the arrival of
withdrawing Zimbabwean troops in the country.
56. MONUC will also be prepared to monitor the
withdrawal of Rwandan troops, the largest foreign
military presence in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, in accordance with Security Council resolution
1304 (2000) and subsequent resolutions. It is hoped
that the third-party verification mechanism will be able
to assist in this process. In the meantime, the initial
withdrawal plan provided by the Rwandan Government
lacks some specific information that is required,
including information on the numbers, equipment and
locations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) units
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as
their exit routes. A timetable for the withdrawal of
Rwandan troops should also be developed and
promptly submitted to the third-party verification
mechanism. Once the necessary information is made
available, MONUC will develop its own plan to
monitor the withdrawal of the RPA troops from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
D. Restoring security in the north-east
57. The currently explosive situation in Bunia calls
for intensified efforts by the parties and the
international community to defuse the tension and to
urgently inject a sense of normalcy. It is envisaged that
the response of MONUC will be twofold: promoting
accountability from the de facto authorities and
launching measures to build confidence between the
communities.
58. Given the prevailing volatile environment,
security responsibilities should continue to be
discharged by UPDF, in an impartial manner, until such
time as it can be replaced by a capable police force
representing a legitimate authority acceptable to the
communities in Ituri. In due course, once an agreement
on the installation of a new administration in Ituri is
reached, further consideration could be given to
MONUC providing police training and monitoring
assistance in this region. It is also important that
external players refrain from exploiting the precarious
situation in Ituri.
59. In view of the pervasive fear and mistrust that
characterize relations between the Lendu and the
Hema, it is essential that a dialogue between the two
groups, as well as with the wider community of Ituri be
initiated and maintained. In the past, the organization
of forums and round tables involving community
leaders and traditional chiefs has helped defuse
tensions. However, the lack of follow-up or the nonimplementation
of agreed measures has impeded the
furtherance of reconciliation efforts.
60. Pursuant to the Luanda Agreement, the
Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda are envisaged to establish a Joint
Pacification Committee on Ituri (see para. 16 above).
MONUC will work with the two Governments and
with key personalities on the ground on the proposed
initiative, with a view to assisting them in the search
for a solution to the troubling situation in Ituri.
61. In the meantime, MONUC intends to increase its
presence in Bunia, with a senior political adviser
leading the team there. The team will collect and
analyse information on trends that are likely to have an
effect on the security environment. To this end,
MONUC has already strengthened its office in the area
by dispatching a political officer, a civil affairs officer
and a humanitarian officer to Bunia. However,
sustaining a large MONUC civilian presence in Ituri
requires that all concerned urgently address the
security situation.
62. An important factor contributing to the highly
volatile environment in Ituri is the lack of access to
objective and impartial information, making the
population susceptible to manipulation and, sometimes,
incitement by those who want to destabilize the
situation. MONUC will do its best to intensify its
public information efforts in Bunia, and has already
made arrangements to install a Radio Okapi transmitter
there.
63. It is widely felt that a small number of leaders are
responsible for deliberately creating a confused
situation in the Ituri region, pitting one community
against another, to further their own interests. In order
to end the cycle of violence in an environment of
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impunity, these leaders should be held accountable for
their actions.
E. Civilian police aspects
64. It will be recalled that the idea of establishing a
civilian police component in MONUC was first
broached in my eighth report on MONUC
(S/2001/572), in the context of assisting local
authorities to enhance their capacity to maintain law
and order in areas from which foreign forces would
withdraw and disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration would take
place. Under resolution 1355 (2001) of 15 June 2001,
the Security Council approved the establishment of a
civilian police component in MONUC to conduct an
in-depth assessment of policing institutions, needs and
capabilities, and ultimately to prepare
recommendations for an eventually expanded MONUC
civilian police component. The task of the civilian
police component was to advise and assist the local
authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities to
ensure the security of the local population, particularly
in regard to the internal security situation following the
withdrawal of the foreign forces.
65. With the signing of the Pretoria and Luanda
Agreements, MONUC has been considering in more
concrete terms the type of assistance the Mission could
provide in areas from which RPA and UPDF troops
would withdraw. As the situation in these areas
becomes clearer in the coming months, I intend to
return to the Security Council with recommendations
regarding the assistance MONUC could provide in
relation to capacity-building for local internal security
mechanisms — including broader law and order issues,
such as human rights and the judiciary.
V. Observations and recommendations
66. The signing of two separate bilateral Agreements
between the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and the Governments of Rwanda and
Uganda is an extremely important development in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo peace process, and
could be a major step forward in the continuing efforts
to end a long-standing conflict. The highly
commendable initiatives of the Governments of South
Africa and Angola to introduce a new dynamic in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo peace process
deserve our strong support. It is important that the
parties on the ground now demonstrate their full
commitment to these Agreements through concrete and
decisive steps.
67. In this connection, the reports of intensified
military activities in the east are a source of major
concern. I call on the parties to do everything possible
to achieve an immediate ceasefire and to end all
support to the armed groups, as a sign of good will. I
also call on all concerned — in particular RCDNational,
supported by MLC, and RCD-K/ML — to
cease all military activities in the north-east. The gap
that still exists between the increasingly positive
diplomatic efforts and the deteriorating situation on the
ground must not be allowed to widen.
68. I am particularly concerned about the security
conditions in the Ituri region. The tensions between the
local communities have been aggravated by the
dynamics affecting the larger Democratic Republic of
the Congo conflict. I call on all concerned not to take
any action that might exacerbate existing tensions. The
developments in Ituri underscore the pressing need to
arrive at an all-inclusive agreement on a transitional
Government that could promptly extend its authority
effectively throughout the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
69. In the framework of the Luanda Agreement, I
urge the Governments of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Uganda to continue their consultations,
with a view to addressing the troubling situation in
Ituri and, in particular, ensuring that there is no
security vacuum in the region. In this connection, their
decision to establish a Joint Pacification Committee on
Ituri is a welcome development.
70. The efforts of humanitarian agencies to meet the
vast needs in that region and elsewhere in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo are vital.
Humanitarian agencies have recently established a task
force on the situation in Ituri in order to closely
monitor developments and to coordinate an effective
response. However, the needs are overwhelming and
cannot be met with current resources alone. I strongly
appeal to donors to provide generous funding to the
humanitarian agencies operating in the area. Their
work also requires adequate security arrangements, and
all parties in the Ituri region are urged to allow the
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humanitarian agencies full and complete access to all
those in need.
71. The Pretoria and Luanda Agreements have laid a
foundation for building a lasting peace in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. They address the
main aspects of the conflict by providing a framework
for the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration of foreign armed groups
and for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops.
The repatriation of UPDF from Beni and Gbadolite,
which paves the way for Uganda’s total withdrawal
from Democratic Republic of the Congo territory, is an
important step forward. While Zimbabwe is not a party
to the Pretoria Agreement or the Luanda Agreement,
the recent announcement of its intention to repatriate
its troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
is also a welcome step. I call on the Government of
Zimbabwe to work closely with MONUC to ensure that
its withdrawal is conducted in a transparent and orderly
manner. Rwanda should also demonstrate its
willingness to withdraw its troops from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, in accordance with relevant
Security Council resolutions.
72. There should be no doubt that the ability of
MONUC to implement its revised concept of
operations will depend on the full cooperation of the
parties, which includes the provision of all necessary
information; a full cessation of hostilities throughout
the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
in particular of the fighting between the nonsignatories
to the Lusaka Agreement and the
Rwandan/RCD-Goma forces; the cessation of support
from the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and its allies for ex-FAR/Interahamwe and
other armed groups; and the parties’ provision of
security, access and freedom of movement to MONUC.
73. It is my sincere hope that the obstacles that have
impeded the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement in the past will be overcome through the
third-party verification mechanism. MONUC will
extend its fullest cooperation to the verification
mechanism, and will report on the possible financial
implications.
74. The effective conduct of disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration of foreign armed groups will be
imperative for the settling of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo conflict. On the basis of lessons learned
in similar situations, the delays usually caused by a
shortage of funds provided on a voluntary basis must
be avoided. The international community cannot afford
to miss the opportunity offered by the Pretoria
Agreement to disarm, demobilize and repatriate foreign
armed groups — a goal that has been pursued for
several years now. It is therefore recommended that the
costs of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation
of members of armed groups be borne under the
assessed budget. At the same time, I intend to do
everything possible to encourage donors to mobilize
funds for this process on a voluntary basis, with a view
to reimbursing the assessed budget allocations. In
addition, any costs related to reintegration would
continue to be funded through voluntary contributions
to Governments and agencies concerned. I call on the
international community to support these efforts
generously, particularly through assistance to the
communities where the ex-combatants will resettle.
75. In this context, I would also like to recommend
an extension of quick-impact project funding for
MONUC, which is absolutely essential as the Mission
enters a new phase of its mandate and expands its
deployment and visibility. Such projects, while
representing a very small percentage of the Mission’s
overall budget, can go a long way in helping the
Mission to provide tangible benefits to the
communities where it is deployed and in winning the
support of the local population.
76. While it is clear that the implementation of the
Agreements will depend primarily on the political will
and determination of the parties to abide by their
commitments, much remains to be done by the
international community in assisting the parties to
implement their undertakings. In this regard, an
adjustment and reconfiguration of the MONUC
structure and deployment has been carefully considered
in order to determine how the Mission can most
effectively play its role in support of the peace process.
Consequently, it is proposed that MONUC shift the
emphasis of its activity eastward, enhance its
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration capacity and strengthen its presence
considerably, essentially through the deployment of
two task forces, as outlined in paragraphs 48 to 54
above.
77. Accordingly, I recommend that the authorized
military strength of MONUC be increased up to 8,700
all ranks, bearing in mind that the troop level will be
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kept under constant review as the process unfolds. In
anticipation of a Security Council decision and in order
to ensure an expeditious response by the United
Nations, I have instructed the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations to step up its efforts to
consult potential troop contributors. In this connection,
I particularly appeal to countries that have the
capability to provide specialized military units, such as
military aviation units, airfield services and engineers,
to contribute to MONUC.
78. I strongly urge the Congolese parties to reach an
all-inclusive agreement on a new political dispensation
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as soon as
possible. My Special Envoy, Mr. Niasse, will continue
to work closely with the Congolese leaders to reach
this very important goal. Any delay in achieving such a
political settlement could undermine the recent
momentum created by the Pretoria and Luanda
Agreements.
79. As noted in the Pretoria Agreement, the
resolution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
conflict is a process, not an event. Therefore, the
signing of the recent Agreements — while an important
step towards peace — is only the beginning of a
process, the progress of which will depend, first, on the
commitment of the parties and, second, on the decisive
support that the international community will be
willing to provide.
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ANNEX 2.3.B
United Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2003/566,
27 May 2003
United Nations S/2003/566
Security Council Distr.: General
27 May 2003
Original: English
03-35898 (E) 290503
*0335898*
Second special report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1417
(2002) of 14 June 2002, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) until 30 June 2003, and Council resolution 1468 (2003) of 20 March
2003, by which the Council, inter alia, expressed its support to the broad
orientations on the role of MONUC in support of the peace process set out in
paragraph 59 of my report of 21 February 2003 (S/2003/211), and expressed its
intention to consider my recommendations in this regard. This report also covers
major developments since my last report, until 14 May 2003.
II. Political and military developments
The Final Act of the inter-Congolese political negotiations
2. On 2 April 2003 in Sun City, South Africa, the participants in the inter-
Congolese dialogue signed the Final Act of the inter-Congolese political
negotiations that had started in October 2001, by which they formally endorsed a
package of agreements that constitute a comprehensive programme for the
restoration of peace and national sovereignty during a transition period of two years.
The agreements comprise the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed on 17 December 2002 in Pretoria,
the Transitional Constitution, the memorandum on military and security issues of 6
March 2003, and the 36 resolutions adopted by the inter-Congolese dialogue in Sun
City in March and April 2002. The signing of the Final Act marks a new and
important chapter in the process of national reconciliation and peace in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and indeed in the history of the African
continent.
Latest developments
3. Since the signing of the Final Act, the Congolese parties have taken a number
of important first steps towards the establishment of the Transitional Government.
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After promulgating the Transitional Constitution on 4 April, Joseph Kabila was
formally sworn in as President for the transitional period on 7 April. This was
followed by the promulgation of a decree granting amnesty for faits de guerre and
infractions politiques et d’opinion, and the abolition of the Cour d’ordre militaire
that had been widely criticized for disregarding basic international standards.
4. On 14 April, President Kabila convened in Kinshasa the first meeting of the
Follow-up Commission (Commission de Suivi) whose purpose is to prepare for the
installation of the new institutions. All of the members of the Commission attended
except the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), which
did not participate because of concerns about its security in Kinshasa, and the
political opposition, which had still not settled on its representatives. After extensive
discussions in Goma on 19 April, my Special Representative, Amos Namanga
Ngongi, developed a package of confidence-building measures — including
MONUC air transport and the deployment of MONUC troops within a limited
security zone in Kinshasa — which made possible the travel to Kinshasa of the
RCD-Goma delegation on 27 April. Upon his arrival in Kinshasa, the Secretary-
General of RCD-Goma publicly announced the end of the war and the lifting of
restrictions on the free movement of goods and people throughout the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
5. The second meeting of the Follow-up Commission on 29 April was attended
by its full membership. Two subcommittees were established, namely, the
Committee on Political and Security Affairs, chaired by the Secretary-General of
RCD-Goma, and the Committee on Logistics, chaired by the Secretary-General of
the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC). During its third meeting, on
3 May, the Commission set 23 May as the date for the swearing-in of the Vice-
Presidents, 28 May for the instalment of the Transitional Government, and 10 June
for the inauguration of the Senate and the National Assembly.
6. The meeting of Chiefs of Staff also reconvened on 3 May, with a view to
concluding the discussions begun in Pretoria on the structure of and distribution of
posts within the High Command of the integrated Congolese army. According to the
timetable adopted by the Follow-up Commission, the integrated High Command of
the new army is to be established by mid-May. Despite the negotiations that have
continued daily, the parties have not been able to make progress on this issue,
however, as they continue to insist on the previous positions. It is expected that the
Follow-up Commission will set a new deadline for the conclusion of the talks.
7. On 10 April, my Special Representative convened the first meeting of the
International Committee in Support of the Transition in Kinshasa, which has since
held regular meetings. The Committee comprises diplomatic representatives of the
permanent members of the Security Council as well as the Troika of the African
Union (Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia), Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon,
the African Union and the European Union. The Committee met President Kabila on
17 April, with a view to establishing close relations with the Follow-up
Commission. All parties agreed that the Congolese actors involved in the
Transitional Government should own and drive the peace process, the Committee
providing assistance and support.
8. Despite political progress at the national level, hostilities continued in the east,
in particular between Lendu-based and Hema-based militias in Ituri, and between
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RCD-Goma, Mai-Mai and other armed groups in the Kivus. These hostilities have
been marked by widespread and gross violations of human rights.
Situation in Ituri
9. MONUC multidisciplinary special investigation teams have confirmed that
massacres of both Lendu and Hema have been perpetrated in Ituri since February
2003. From 17 January to 6 March, in an attempt to take over full control of the Ituri
region, a militia group known as the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) engaged in
large-scale military operations in four localities, resulting in killings, destruction of
property and the displacement of a large number of people. Eyewitnesses stated that
around 330 civilians were killed in Bogoro, which was completely destroyed, and
reported 160 additional deaths in Mandro. In Drodro, there were killings on a scale
hitherto unknown in the area, hundreds of civilians being murdered in a series of
well-coordinated summary executions near the parish and 16 neighbouring
locations. Twenty mass graves have been identified by MONUC. MONUC, together
with forensic experts from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, dispatched a second investigative mission to this area, but its work
had to be cut short because of the deteriorating security conditions.
10. The humanitarian impact of the armed conflict for the 4.6 million inhabitants
of Ituri has been catastrophic. According to the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, between 500,000 and 600,000 internally displaced persons —
many of whom remain in hiding and cannot be accounted for — in addition to nearly
100,000 refugees from Uganda and the Sudan, are dispersed throughout the area.
Since the first major onslaught of violence in June 1999, the death toll has been
estimated at more than 60,000, and countless others have been left maimed or
severely mutilated. Of the estimated 400 health centres, 212 have been closed, and
not a single surgeon is present. It is estimated that 200 schools have been destroyed.
Moreover, the prevailing atmosphere of insecurity has obstructed the humanitarian
community’s access to sizeable areas of the region, effectively denying the provision
of aid to the most vulnerable populations.
11. On 6 March, Ugandan forces (UPDF) recaptured the town of Bunia, which had
been under the control of UPC since August 2002. Subsequently, the UPDF presence
in Ituri was significantly reinforced, and brought to the level of over 7,000 troops.
The Ugandan troops were deployed to all strategic locations in the region. Their
deployment did not stem the activities of armed militias, however. It should be
recalled that the root causes of the Ituri conflict, which relate to a power struggle
indigenous to the area over land and resources, have recently been exacerbated by
the protagonists of the wider conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As a
result of the proliferation of armed groups and their constantly shifting allegiances,
the situation in the region has become extremely volatile and unpredictable.
12. In view of rising tensions between Rwanda and Uganda over the increased
presence of the latter’s forces in the region, my Special Representative proposed a
trilateral meeting of the heads of State of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda and Uganda. The President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, hosted such a
summit on 9 April in Cape Town, South Africa, at which the Presidents confirmed
the timetable for Ugandan withdrawal from Ituri, beginning on 24 April and ending
on 14 May. This was followed up by a meeting of President Paul Kagame and
President Yoweri Museveni, hosted by the United Kingdom Government on 8 May.
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13. In an effort to broker a ceasefire on the ground, and establish a local political
process by which the conflict could be addressed peacefully, MONUC also
intensified its consultations with key players early in March. This led to the signing
on 18 March, of a ceasefire agreement by the Governments of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda and six armed groups (except for UPC, which
had lost virtually all of its territorial control), which paved the way for convening
the much-awaited Ituri Pacification Commission. The Ituri Pacification
Commission, comprising 177 delegates representing the main communities and
groups in Ituri, including some representatives of UPC, met at Bunia from 4 to
14 April under the leadership of MONUC. At the final plenary meeting, which was
attended by several Ambassadors of members of the Security Council, the delegates
agreed to set up an interim administration, consisting of a 32-member Special
Assembly, an 18-member Executive Organ, and three subcommissions — on
security and the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the re-establishment of
public services and the rule of law, and humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation.
These bodies commenced their work on 25 April. It has been determined that the
interim administration requires some $300,000 for the initial three months of
operation. The necessary funding has yet to be received, however. It is therefore
essential that adequate resources be provided to the administration as soon as
possible. MONUC continues to provide support to the Ituri Pacification Commission
by whatever means possible. The UPC leader also recently voiced his support for
the Commission, which was broadcast on Radio Okapi.
14. In order to provide security for an enhanced MONUC presence in Bunia aimed
at assisting the political process initiated by the Ituri Pacification Commission,
MONUC began deploying an Uruguayan guard contingent and its supporting
elements to Bunia on 23 April. To date, 720 troops have been deployed, of the
approximately 800 troops envisaged by the end of May. The tasks of the Uruguayan
guard contingent are limited, and include a presence at the Bunia airfield and
protection of United Nations personnel and facilities, as well as sites of meetings of
the Ituri Pacification Commission in Bunia. MONUC also increased the number and
strength of military observer teams in Ituri, which were deployed to Aru, Mahagi,
Mongwalu, Kaseyni, Kpandroma and Komanda, in addition to Bunia and Mambasa,
where MONUC had already established its presence. On 26 April at Komanda,
however, one military observer was killed and another wounded in a landmine
accident on a road that had previously been used by MONUC patrols. The team site
at Komanda has been evacuated for the time being because of the high volatility of
the situation and mine threats, but it will be reoccupied as soon as practicably
possible. Moreover, owing to the security threats received, teams at Mahagi,
Mongwalu, Kasenyi and Kpandroma are also being evacuated. They will be
reinstalled as soon as security conditions permit.
15. On 25 April, UPDF began withdrawing troops from Ituri. To date, MONUC
has observed the withdrawal of some 2,000 soldiers. Various supplies and equipment
were apparently left behind, however. UPDF completed their withdrawal from Bunia
on 6 May and plan to complete full withdrawal from Ituri by 19 May.
16. Immediately after the departure of UPDF from Bunia, Hema- and Lendu-based
militia groups sought to establish control over the town, resulting in violent clashes,
often near United Nations premises. The clashes were accompanied by widespread
looting, including of the premises of the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs. On 9 May, MONUC headquarters itself became a target of
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attack and its guards were forced to return fire to repel the aggressors. Such fighting
has panicked the population, several thousands of whom have sought refuge at the
United Nations facilities and at the airfield. On 25 April, the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo started to deploy elements of its national police,
including rapid intervention police, to Bunia. Concerns quickly emerged about their
lack of equipment, particularly vehicles, communications and resupply, unclear
command arrangements, precise role and relationship with the Ituri interim
administration. Nonetheless, MONUC conducted some joint patrols with the rapid
intervention police. When the violent clashes began, however, the 700-member
police force disintegrated as a unit.
17. On 7 May, my Special Representative met with President Kabila, who agreed
to take measures to enhance the leadership of the rapid intervention police and to
provide it with sufficient equipment. President Kabila agreed to work closely with
the local administration and accepted the responsibility for cantoning armed groups
and feeding them for a limited period. At a later meeting with my Special
Representative, on 10 May, President Kabila indicated his intention of deploying
FAC troops to Bunia to respond to the “emergency situation”. Preliminary reactions
from MLC and RCD-Goma indicated that they would support such a move if their
own police and armed forces were integrated into the force, while the local Hema
groups in Bunia have voiced their opposition to the FAC deployment. MONUC has
stressed to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo the need for
such a deployment to be effected in the context of the transitional process, and in
close coordination with all concerned.
North Kivu and South Kivu
18. Since my last report, RCD-Goma has continued to redeploy nearly all its
military force (11 out of 12 brigades) away from positions on the disengagement
line in order to conduct concurrent offensives in the Kivus and Maniema Province.
The main areas of conflict are:
• To the west and north of Goma, where RCD-Goma forces have attacked
northwards into the territory of RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération
(RCD-K/ML), apparently to establish control over the whole of North Kivu.
• To the north-east of Kindu, in the area of Kalima, where RCD-Goma forces
have been engaged with Mai-Mai and are advancing west towards Shabunda.
• To the west and south of Bukavu where, early in April, RCD-Goma eliminated
its former Mai-Mai ally — the Mudundu 40 group — from Walungu.
• Around Uvira, where RCD-Goma forces have been engaged with a
Banyamulenge militia led by Commandant Masunzu and Mai-Mai.
Fighting also broke out between the Mai-Mai and the RCD-Goma at Uvira in the
evening of 2 May, during which eight RCD-Goma soldiers were wounded. Though
fighting ceased by morning of 3 May, it erupted again on 5 May. While RCD-Goma
has claimed that it was trying to recapture territory lost upon the withdrawal of
Rwandan troops in the autumn of 2002, it has actually made advances well beyond
its former positions by encroaching on the area controlled by RCD-K/ML.
19. Consequently, the humanitarian situation in the Kivus has continued to
deteriorate. The latest RCD-Goma offensives have resulted in serious human rights
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violations and have triggered new waves of population displacement, forcing tens of
thousands of people to take refuge in the forest or nearby villages. The ongoing
fighting has disrupted the humanitarian community’s regular activities and rendered
it difficult to deliver assistance to the war-affected populations trapped between
opposing forces. After heavy fighting broke out in Bukavu on 6 April, some
humanitarian agencies were compelled to evacuate their non-essential staff and
suspend all activities. There have been widespread reports of rape, looting, armed
robberies and arbitrary executions by RCD-Goma troops, Interahamwe, ex-FAR
(Forces armées rwandaises), Mai-Mai and unidentified armed groups. To mobilize
assistance to the most vulnerable groups, MONUC conducted joint humanitarian
assessment missions with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
facilitated the delivery of emergency aid, and negotiated with local authorities on
issues of access in many instances.
Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
20. These persistent outbreaks of fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo have continued to hamper, disrupt and delay the operations of MONUC
to disarm, demobilize and repatriate foreign ex-combatants, the main focus of the
mission to date. MONUC has repatriated more than 1,500 Rwandans, including both
former combatants and their dependants, since October 2002, while, since the
beginning of the year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has repatriated 3,021 Rwandan refugees. Experience indicates
that the MONUC voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration programme can be completed successfully only in conditions of
reasonable security, and with the full cooperation of all parties concerned, including
the armed groups themselves. RCD-Goma has not offered its full cooperation, often
limiting the freedom of movement of MONUC personnel. The Mission’s Mai-Mai
interlocutors — who were thought to be useful as contacts with the Rwandan
combatants in hiding — proved to be unreliable, often demanding monetary
compensation for their cooperation.
21. Since the opening of the Lubero disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration reception centre in December 2002, MONUC has
conducted intensive discussions with representatives of the Rwandan combatants
and their dependants in the vicinity. MONUC estimates there are some 3,000 to
4,000 combatants and several thousand more dependants around Lubero. Although
the rank and file are thought to be ready to enter the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme, their hard-line leaders
continue to express misgivings, and have shown deep suspicion both of MONUC
and of the Government of Rwanda, often propagating their views in radio
programmes transmitted from abroad. Consequently, the leadership effectively
influenced the combatants not to take part in the programme. The Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, which made some progress towards dismantling
the leadership of ex-FAR/Interahamwe in accordance with its bilateral agreement
with Rwanda of 30 July 2002, has done little in this regard during the period under
review.
22. Nonetheless, through sustained personal contacts and a targeted public
information campaign, MONUC managed to persuade some representatives of the
combatants to agree to enter the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration process. Attempts were also made to persuade those
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States hosting some of the leaders of the movement to approach them with a view to
ending negative radio propaganda concerning the activities of MONUC relating to
the process. At the end of March, an initial group of some 200 to 300 combatants
and their dependants was gathering near Kasuo, in the vicinity of Lubero, preparing
to enter the reception centre. However, the group scattered into the forest when
RCD-Goma forces attacked and seized the nearby villages of Muhanga and
Bunyatenge. Although MONUC is continuing its efforts to contact the combatants’
representatives, the situation in the region remains insecure, and it has not been
possible to reassemble that group.
Reopening of the Congo River
23. Significant progress has been made in reopening the Congo River. Building on
the achievements of MONUC since July 2002, when regular river traffic was
established between Government and MLC areas, the first private commercial traffic
allowed by RCD-Goma arrived in Kisangani in February 2003. The entry into force
of the All-Inclusive Agreement and its provisions for full freedom of movement,
together with the statement made in Kinshasa on 27 April by the Secretary-General
of RCD-Goma on the lifting of remaining restrictions, offered new opportunities for
a complete reopening of the river. Early in May, MONUC facilitated a visit to
Kisangani and Goma by a 20-member senior commercial delegation from the
Fédération des Enterprises du Congo in Kinshasa to meet their local counterparts
and the RCD-Goma leadership. As a result of the mission, the RCD-Goma
authorities confirmed that they would accept commercial convoys to Kisangani
immediately. Until the Transitional Government is officially installed in Kinshasa,
the existing procedures for river transport will remain in place. A large commercial
convoy to Kisangani is expected to depart in 10 days. It was also agreed that a
business delegation to Kinshasa from key towns in the east (Kisangani, Goma and
Bukavu) would be organized in the coming weeks.
Adjustment of the deployment of the Mission
24. MONUC has reviewed its deployment strategy with a view to a comprehensive
readjustment of its structure, as appropriate, from that based on the Lusaka
Agreement to one that meets the needs of the changing political and military
situation. Two of the four MONUC coordination centres (Ilebo, Basankusu) are no
longer in operation and the guard units assigned to them have been reallocated to
other duties, including security arrangements in Kinshasa. The two remaining
coordination centres, Boende and Manono, will be closed in the next few months,
releasing the guards deployed there for reallocation to other priority areas. In view
of the All-Inclusive Agreement that has reunified the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, MONUC is also redeploying some 12 military observer
teams from defensive positions along the Kampala/Harare disengagement line to
more volatile areas in the east of the country. Consequently, by 30 August, MONUC
will have redeployed almost 100 military observers and more than 1,400 troops from
phase II to phase III functions. It is also closing 22 team sites in the western part of
the country.
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III. Implementing the transitional agreements
25. During the two- to three-year transitional period, the Transitional Government
will have to simultaneously address immediate challenges and long-term issues.
First and foremost, it will have to put in place the transitional institutions and ensure
their functioning. It will also have to lay the ground for the democratically elected
government that will be established at the end of the transition by preparing for
elections and drafting a new Constitution. At the same time, the Transitional
Government will have to address security and military matters and respond to the
population’s expectation of economic improvement.
The responsibility of the Congolese parties
26. It is clear that the successful implementation of the various agreements
reached in the course of the inter-Congolese dialogue depends directly on the
political will of the Congolese parties. Years of protracted conflict have left a legacy
of mistrust that has undermined international efforts to help the Congolese find
lasting solutions to their problems. For the transition to succeed, the Congolese
parties must, from the outset, provide strong signals of their intention to implement
the agreements they have signed.
27. In the coming weeks and months, the parties must observe a number of key
benchmarks to maintain momentum and demonstrate their commitment. These
include:
• The immediate cessation of hostilities, including cessation of inflammatory
rhetoric and propaganda
• The cessation of military support and supply to all armed groups
• The lifting of restrictions on the free movement of people and goods
throughout the country
• The liberalization of political activity in the areas under their control
• The dismantling of armed groups or their transformation into political parties
• The steps to establish the high command of the national armed forces and to
form the initial unit of the integrated police force.
28. At the same time, the neighbouring States have the important responsibility to
play a positive and constructive role, and assist the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in pursuing a path of peace and national reconciliation. They should respect
the provisions of the All-Inclusive Agreement and the decision of the Congolese
parties to establish a Transitional Government of national unity. Continuing
interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo can no
longer be tolerated. The legitimate security interests of neighbouring States should
be taken up with the Transitional Government through peaceful means.
IV. The role of the United Nations and the Mission
29. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1468 (2003), by which the
Council endorsed the preliminary vision of the role of MONUC during the
transition, as outlined in my thirteenth report (S/2003/211), there have been
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extensive consultations with the Congolese parties and international partners,
including consultations undertaken by a special planning team of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations sent to the country. As a result, a broad outline has
emerged of the role MONUC could play and the assistance it could provide for the
transitional period. Subject to the concurrence of the Security Council, the Mission’s
currently mandated priorities would be readjusted, and would consist of the
following elements: (a) to provide political support to the transition by assisting the
Congolese parties in the implementation of their commitments, leading to the
holding of elections, which will be one of the important elements in the Mission’s
exit strategy; (b) to contribute to local conflict resolution and the maintenance of
security in key areas of the country; (c) to continue with its mandated task of the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign
armed groups while contributing to the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of Congolese combatants; (d) to serve as a catalyst for the coordination
of international political and donor efforts concerning the core issues of the
transition; and (e) to contribute to confidence-building between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the neighbouring States. At the same time, ongoing
MONUC activities in vital areas such as human rights, humanitarian affairs, child
protection and gender affairs would continue.
A. Immediate priorities
30. In the coming weeks and months, the following immediate priorities require
the attention of MONUC: helping the parties to establish the Transitional
Government; contributing to the security arrangements in Kinshasa; assisting in
sustaining the peace and reconciliation initiatives in Ituri; contributing to local-level
conflict resolution; and continuing the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration of armed groups in the Kivus.
31. In order to assist in providing immediate support to the preparatory
mechanisms of the transition, a Transition Support Unit has been created within
MONUC from its existing resources to support my Special Representative in his
capacity as convener of the International Committee. The Unit will also monitor the
political process, liaise with the parties to the All-Inclusive Agreement and facilitate
coordination with other national and international actors. As the transition proceeds,
the capacity of MONUC will need to be strengthened accordingly, to include its
possible presence and facilitation in important provincial capitals.
32. At the same time, in view of the additional responsibilities envisaged for
MONUC, its leadership structure — both civilian and military — would need to be
considerably strengthened. To this end, the position of second Deputy Special
Representative has already been added, as have other important senior-level posts.
The military leadership structure is still in need of enhancement, specifically the
establishment of the forward mission headquarters in Kisangani to achieve the
appropriate span of command and control; given the size of the country, the
increased number of MONUC troops and the complexity of managing several
politically sensitive and risky military operations require that the Force Commander
and Deputy Force Commander positions be upgraded, and that a Forward Force
Commander post be created.
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Security arrangements in Kinshasa
33. In the All-Inclusive Agreement, the Congolese parties requested the assistance
of the international community in establishing a credible, confidence-building,
security system in the initial stages of the formation of the Transitional Government,
as some leaders of the transition do not feel confident that the existing structures can
provide sufficient security. In particular, under the Agreement, the parties requested
the assistance of the international community in providing a “neutral force” for the
purpose of general security, while the parties would also provide their own
bodyguards.
34. Given that the Congolese themselves are ultimately responsible for the security
of the leaders and the institutions, the role of the international community should be
limited to assisting them in crafting an effective and immediate means of dealing
with the security concerns. With regard to the parties’ request for the deployment of
a “neutral force”, it is considered that any international assistance provided by
military units or police should come under the command of MONUC to avoid the
presence of two separate peacekeeping missions operating in the same theatre under
separate chains of command.
35. With these considerations in mind, and on the basis of the threat assessment
conducted by MONUC and other international specialists, the following multilayered
confidence-building security system is being proposed:
(a) The existing Congolese police structures (national police, including rapid
intervention police, traffic police and territorial police units), which would continue
to carry out normal law and order functions in the city;
(b) The close protection corps, comprising personal bodyguards (who
operate under the control of an integrated central command) for a limited number of
political leaders, which would be reinforced by a newly formed integrated police
unit;
(c) A MONUC military contingent consisting of some 740 personnel.
The activities of the proposed security system should be coordinated through a Joint
Security Operations Centre, comprising senior-level representatives from all the
entities that would be discharging security tasks. Any elements of the Congolese
Armed Forces currently deployed in Kinshasa would be garrisoned, in accordance
with the agreement reached at the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff in Pretoria in
March 2003, and monitored by the military observers of MONUC.
36. It is crucial that the training of a newly formed integrated police unit of a
future Congolese integrated police force is pursued at the same time, having in mind
the need to make the unit operational within six months after the establishment of
the Transitional Government. At that time, the unit is expected to be ready to take
over the relevant security tasks from MONUC.
37. Before the formation of the Transitional Government, MONUC intends to use
its guard company already present in Kinshasa and to redeploy, from elsewhere in
the country, two guard units to the capital. These troops will be assisted by some 30
military police personnel, who will serve as an additional layer of confidence in a
specially designated security zone in the capital. The security zone will be limited to
the Ndjili airport, specified routes between the airport and the Gombe district, the
city centre and the Gombe district itself. MONUC guard units would reassure the
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parties with a visible presence in the security zone, both static positions and mobile
patrols and armed escorts. MONUC will also have a limited capability to extract
threatened persons from the zone. The United Nations activities in this regard will
be facilitated by MONUC civilian police officers, who will provide liaison and
technical advice to their Congolese interlocutors. In addition, MONUC civilian
police officers will advise, monitor and report on the conduct of the various
Congolese entities discharging security responsibilities. Such an arrangement is
based on the present security assessment and the expectation that the requirement
will last for six to nine months. While MONUC would be able to fulfil the
requirement for military resources for these tasks by redeploying elements within its
currently authorized strength, in the event that the threat level rises considerably or
persists longer than envisaged, there will be a requirement to augment the United
Nations presence by adding extra guard units and/or, possibly, formed police units.
38. To carry out the new tasks in support of security arrangements in Kinshasa
described in paragraphs 35 to 37 above, MONUC would require the following
civilian police personnel: 15 civilian police officers, including experts in
administration, planning, strategic management and coordination; 55 personnel to
serve as liaison officers, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to the Joint Security
Operations Centre, Congolese police elements and close protection arrangements;
and 34 officers to serve as security technical advisers to various Congolese police
and security entities as well as the MONUC military contingent charged with
security tasks in Kinshasa.
39. The modalities, mechanisms and funding for the creation and initiation of the
integrated police unit must be set up without delay. The Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and other parties, and eventually the Transitional
Government, are expected to provide offices for the Joint Security Operations
Centre as well as salaries, accommodation and equipment for the close protection
corps and the integrated police unit. The regular payment of salaries will be an
essential prerequisite for the entire security structure, which the Congolese parties
must address rapidly and as a matter of priority. At the same time, some bilateral
donors have shown commendable interest and are assessing the possibility of
training police personnel, providing a communications system in Kinshasa for the
new security structure and rehabilitating the training centres for the integrated police
unit.
Training of an integrated police unit
40. To quickly form and train the integrated police unit, the best option would be a
project to be undertaken by one or more bilateral donors, directly with the
Congolese, that would train and equip 1,200 officers for the unit within a period of
six months, refurbish the necessary training facilities and provide the
communications system to allow the unit to function within the overall Kinshasa
security mechanisms. The MONUC civilian police component, together with other
United Nations entities, could complement such efforts by providing training
assistance on international policing standards in various thematic areas, with a
special emphasis on the rule of law and fundamental rights. This option would
require six additional MONUC civilian police trainers/coordinators.
41. Should this option be unavailable within the required time limit, a second
option would be a combination of direct bilateral assistance to train and equip a
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group of 600 integrated police unit officers in Kinshasa, while MONUC would
support the training in Kisangani of another group of 600 officers, in a mentoring
programme involving Congolese trainers. This mixed training option would require
24 civilian police trainers/mentors. If neither of these options is quickly available,
the MONUC civilian police component would undertake the responsibility of
training the 1,200 integrated police unit officers, in Kinshasa and in Kisangani, in a
mentoring programme involving Congolese trainers. Forty-eight civilian police
trainers/mentors would be required for this option. Refurbishment of the training
centres, training equipment, further basic operational equipment and
communications would be required in all options. The views of bilateral donors are
urgently requested to determine the most viable option.
Reconfiguration of the civilian police component
42. In view of the new phase of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the MONUC civilian police component is being reconfigured. The
current pilot training programme in Kisangani will be suspended, in anticipation of
the formation of a future integrated police force. Instead, the focus of the civilian
police component will be as follows: (a) assisting in the security arrangements in
Kinshasa; (b) contributing to the training of an integrated police unit; and
(c) continuing the assessment and planning of its future role in key strategic areas,
such as Ituri and some locations in the Kivus. The following structure is envisaged:
headquarters staff, including the newly created Kinshasa sector (35), civilian police
advisers/liaison officers/monitors to assist the security arrangements in Kinshasa as
noted in paragraph 38 above (89); and regional planners/liaison officers to be
deployed to Bunia, Goma and Gbadolite (10). Hence, 134 police officers would be
needed, 34 more than the currently authorized strength, to meet the basic
requirements. From 6 to 48 additional officers will also be required, depending on
the training option for the unit to be followed (see paras. 40 and 41 above).
Peace initiative in Ituri
43. Ituri has become one of the most volatile and lawless areas in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (see paras. 9-17 above). At this time of hope for
comprehensive peace, Ituri continues to have the potential to derail progress made at
the national level. It should be noted that the prevailing volatility and ongoing
manipulation by various players, and the security risks from well armed, but unpaid,
rival militias and from other elements are considerable.
44. The Ituri Pacification Commission process, which was facilitated by MONUC,
offers a real chance of comprehensive peace and reconciliation in the area, which
must be followed up vigorously. The immediate challenge is to create the conditions
of security and confidence for members of the Commission and international
personnel present in the region to assist this fledging and still fragile process. While
the integration of Ituri within national government structures is the ultimate goal,
achieving this will require sustained and determined international and national
engagement.
45. To that end, and as security conditions permit, the overall MONUC presence in
Ituri would be considerably enhanced by the establishment of the Ituri Pacification
Commission Support Unit, which would be staffed by a United Nations multidisciplinary
team and provide comprehensive support to the Ituri interim
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administration. All MONUC substantive components (political affairs, human
rights, humanitarian affairs, child protection, public information and others) will be
represented in the Unit. In view of the need to assist the people of Ituri in setting up
temporary local administration — in anticipation of the extension of the authority of
the Transitional Government — United Nations civilian affairs officers would also
be deployed.
46. MONUC could also establish a small civilian police cell to begin planning
assistance, which could be provided by the international community either through
MONUC or bilaterally, in the formation of an integrated police element to be
introduced to Ituri. A strong human rights presence would also be essential to ensure
investigation of violations, to monitor and support the new human rights bodies and
to help the judiciary fight the culture of impunity. Military observer teams would
also be strengthened and deployed to monitor the withdrawal of UPDF troops, liaise
with armed groups and observe their activities, and monitor key population centres
and designated airstrips, where possible. That effort would be reinforced by the
Mission’s proactive public information programme, including the establishment of a
radio studio in Bunia, as well as conflict resolution projects using media tools. In
view of the massive proliferation of arms in the area, MONUC, in cooperation with
the subcommittee on armed groups of the Ituri Pacification Commission, may assist
the interim administration in developing a limited local disarmament initiative, for
which donor support will be required.
47. MONUC would also work closely with the humanitarian and development
community, which is designing a strategy for this long-inaccessible region.
Immediate needs include the delivery of emergency humanitarian relief to areas
affected by insecurity and fighting; assistance in housing repair in areas devastated
by the war; restoration of health and medical services and social support in areas
affected by recent massacres; income-generating activities such as road and
infrastructure repair to be conducted by the estimated 25,000 militia members and
other ex-combatants; assistance for the demobilization and reintegration of child
soldiers; and quick-impact projects in areas where United Nations personnel would
be deployed.
48. In order to provide protection to United Nations personnel and assets in
various locations in Ituri and to establish a framework of security in support of the
ongoing political process, it is assessed that, at a minimum, a brigade-size formation
consisting of three infantry battalions with appropriate support (logistics, utility
helicopters, engineering) and totalling up to 3,800 personnel would be necessary.
Even a force of that strength would not be able to provide comprehensive security
throughout Ituri or secure all major roads or the border with Uganda. In addition to
protecting United Nations personnel and assets and other vital installations in Bunia,
the brigade force will secure a United Nations logistical base at Bunia airfield and
the immediate environs of the town, support the United Nations military observer
teams in accessing the more remote areas, and provide limited support to
humanitarian operations in selected locations. By extending its operations beyond
Bunia, initially along an axis towards Djugu and Mahagi, the brigade force would
expand its security framework and, as the situation further permits, gradually reach
airfields, towns and other areas in Ituri.
49. The present deployment to Bunia of the Mission’s reserve battalion (supplied
by Uruguay) is a limited, interim and emergency measure to ensure that the
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momentum of the Ituri Pacification Commission peace process can be maintained in
the rapidly changing security situation in the area. The battalion will not be able to
extend its presence outside Bunia to other areas of Ituri. By the end of May, the total
strength of the Uruguayan contingent in Bunia will be close to 800, including the
logistic support elements and engineers. This force will clearly be well below the
minimum required to assume full security tasks in the town, and its deployment can
only be temporary, as it comes at the expense of sacrificing the fundamental
principle of maintaining a Mission reserve battalion for contingencies. The
Uruguayan contingent will be needed to reconstitute that reserve as soon as possible.
50. It should be noted that the Uruguayan deployment is the minimum that is
militarily acceptable to establish security for United Nations operations at the Bunia
airfield, protect United Nations personnel and resources at locations in Bunia,
support the Ituri Pacification Commission process and make necessary preparations
for the follow-on deployments, as well as logistic sustainment. Of the nearly 800
Uruguayans, just under 450 are infantry troops whose primary roles are to provide a
company reserve force to respond to contingencies in Bunia, 24 hours a day, to
provide point security at up to eight United Nations and Commission locations in
the town (including the airport entrance and sector headquarters), to guard military
engineers (who are charged with making necessary road repairs, demining and
building accommodations), to escort military observer teams in the vicinity of
Bunia, to occasionally patrol Bunia itself and, as may be required, to provide a local
escort for United Nations and humanitarian convoys within the town.
51. To provide anything beyond the current deployment in Bunia, and particularly
to address the problems in Ituri more widely, the minimum requirement will be a
brigade-size formation (Ituri Brigade Force). The Department of Peacekeeping
Operations is examining how such a force could be structured and identifying
potential contributors of the forces that could be assembled quickly to form the
proposed force. The most immediately available element is the 1,700 strong multifunctional
battalion group initially envisaged for Kisangani, which includes one
infantry battalion, supported by transport helicopters, engineers, airfield service
units, military police and an air medical evacuation team. Attack helicopter assets to
be deployed to support phase III MONUC operations would support the Ituri
Brigade Force as the main priority. Potential troop contributors for the initial
elements of the Force have already indicated preliminary concurrence with such a
deployment, and a reconnaissance mission was undertaken during the first two
weeks of May. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is also in touch with the
potential troop contributors regarding offers for the two additional infantry
battalions required to complete the force. These additional battalions (approximately
1,050 personnel each) will provide MONUC with the operational reach and
responsiveness that it needs to be successful in this remote and extremely volatile
region.
52. Once deployed, the battalion group must gradually assume the Bunia security
tasks currently performed by the Uruguayan contingent, which will eventually be
relieved and return to its normal duties. Even with a slightly enhanced ability to
provide security in the town, the capacity of MONUC to support monitoring
operations or respond to violence in the remote areas would remain very limited.
Only once the security situation in Bunia improves can MONUC begin to extend its
operations, primarily in the vicinity of Bunia. Only when the full Ituri Brigade Force
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is formed will MONUC have the ability to gradually expand its operations to
include a more comprehensive range of security framework tasks in Ituri.
53. The current lack of a sufficiently credible MONUC force in Ituri would likely
result in MONUC operations being confined to Bunia, and an increased level of risk
and the probability that the United Nations military presence would be exposed to
provocations. Inevitably, this raises the prospect that such a force may not be
sufficient to fulfil its limited objectives. This is a risk that will be present, in any
case, until such time as the brigade force is deployed and operationally effective, but
it is a risk that can be reduced considerably if all parties are aware that the initial
deployments are part of a realistic longer-term approach.
54. The duration of the limited military deployment of MONUC in Bunia and of
the larger military force proposed in paragraphs 48 to 53 will depend on how
quickly and successfully the political process in the area can achieve normalization
and reconciliation. It is hoped that a Congolese integrated police unit, once formed,
could gradually take over security responsibilities from the MONUC brigade force.
In view of the extremely volatile environment in the region, MONUC, together with
the United Nations Security Coordinator, has developed an evacuation plan which
covers both MONUC and United Nations agencies personnel. Non-governmental
organizations that have concluded memoranda of understanding with the Office of
the Security Coordinator would be included in the evacuation plan.
The Kivus and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration
55. Even in the face of numerous and competing priorities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the importance of the Kivus cannot be overlooked. Two
recent wars in the country began there, and the region remains a pivotal ingredient
of the overall peace process. The Kivus border three key eastern neighbours of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The conflicts
that have afflicted these neighbouring countries have had a direct impact on security
in border communities in the Kivus, be it as a result of refugee movements or the
cross-border activities of rebel groups fighting the Governments of their countries of
origin. The region has also grappled with issues of ethnicity, inequitable land
allocation and fighting over the control of natural resources. In this context,
MONUC intends to pursue a two-pronged approach: (a) continuing the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign
armed groups operating out of North Korea and South Kivu and (b) promoting local
peace and reconciliation mechanisms.
Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
56. As indicated above, MONUC activities related to disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration have recently been
obstructed by the operations of armed groups in the east. This notwithstanding, the
reception centre at Lubero, the transit points at Goma and Bukavu and a number of
austere temporary assembly areas will be maintained by the United Nations in
anticipation of the resumption of large-scale disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration in those areas, as circumstances permit.
At the same time, MONUC experience so far with this process has permitted a
further refinement of methods, an improvement in information-gathering and
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analysis techniques, enhanced collaboration with the Multi-Country Demobilization
and Reintegration Programme, led by the World Bank, and with concerned
specialized agencies and United Nations entities, such as UNICEF. For its part,
UNHCR will also continue to promote returns of Rwandan refugees to their country
by taking a more proactive approach to reaching pockets of Rwandan refugees
countrywide.
57. With the deployment of the first United Nations task force to the Kivus (the
main base being in Kindu), MONUC would be able to establish a United Nations
presence in vital locations — including those hitherto inaccessible to MONUC
military observers — and provide necessary support to disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration. The robust and mobile
nature of the task force — which will be equipped with armoured personnel carriers
and helicopters — will permit the simultaneous deployment of MONUC
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration teams to
some of the remote groups in the region. The mobility capabilities will also bring a
quick response capacity that has been lacking to date. This outreach approach will
be a joint effort of the various MONUC components, including vital military
support. Most importantly, it is hoped that this credible United Nations presence will
give the groups an increased level of confidence in the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme by offering protection from
harassment, as well as speedy movement to the resettlement camps across the
border.
Local peace and reconciliation mechanisms
58. While the establishment of the Transitional Government and the full
implementation of the All-Inclusive Agreement should eventually bring unification
and peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it is likely that localized
conflicts, particularly in the Kivus, will continue in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, a transitional period may be rather tumultuous and could generate
conflicts which, if uncontained, could destabilize the whole national process and
could even provide a pretext for external intervention. It is therefore necessary for
the international community to assist the Congolese people at the local level in
developing interim mechanisms for peace and reconciliation.
59. The situation in the east is currently characterized by a patchwork of primarily
local armed groups competing with each other and suspicious of one another’s
motives. The disintegrated governance structures, ethnic heterogeneity, economic
mismanagement and illegal exploitation of natural resources, tensions between
different generations of migrants and refugees, land disputes and proliferation of
weapons contribute to the instability in the region. There is a clear need to address
the root causes and trigger factors of existing conflicts, and to contain new ones.
The international community can play a vital supporting role in creating peaceful
solutions to local conflicts. To this end, MONUC has already produced policy
guidelines for its personnel based on the following approach: (a) crisis management
to address acute security concerns between different groups; (b) post-conflict
measures aimed at building confidence; and (c) conflict prevention initiatives to
avoid the recurrence of violence.
60. In pursuing that approach, MONUC would attempt to serve as a catalyst for
international support and assist the initiatives undertaken by local religious
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institutions, Congolese grass-roots organizations or international non-governmental
organizations with a proven track record. MONUC intends to pursue these activities
in the context of the transitional institutions that are being established under the All-
Inclusive Agreement, in particular those aimed at promoting reconciliation. The
Mission would work closely with the national transitional authorities and with its
United Nations partners, especially UNDP, which is developing a strategy for
rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery at the community level. In order to play
such a facilitating and mediating role, MONUC will enhance its civilian presence in
the Kivus.
61. Finally, mechanisms aimed at normalizing cross-border relations should be
developed. While this is among the priorities to be addressed by the Transitional
Government and with the neighbouring countries, preliminary initiatives could
begin on a pilot basis. Joint economic initiatives and cross-border community
projects could be considered, for example. When the new national armed forces are
formed, joint patrols — monitored by MONUC — could be undertaken with the
armed forces of the neighbouring countries in specified zones along the borders. In
due course, the Security Council will be provided with additional recommendations
about the expanded role of MONUC in the Kivus. These border issues should also
take centre stage in the envisaged international conference on peace and
development in the Great Lakes region.
Human rights and transitional justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
62. It remains clear that without strong national human rights protection structures
in place and an end to the widespread reign of impunity in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, there cannot be any real reconciliation or the building of the
foundation of long-term, sustainable peace. MONUC, working closely with the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, intends to
strengthen its capacity to support the building up of national human rights
infrastructures as well as the setting up of transitional justice arrangements. The
added focus on human rights investigations will be accompanied by close attention
to strengthening — and coordinating the international effort concerning — the
ability of national institutions, including the National Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the National Observatory for Human Rights (the creation of which
is envisaged under the terms of the All-Inclusive Agreement), to adequately address
the concerns of the Congolese people. In this context, it would be important to
ensure that attention is paid to child protection issues.
Facilitating humanitarian assistance
63. It is also vital to continue and indeed expand the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. More than 3.5 million people are estimated to have died since 1998
directly or indirectly as a result of the conflict. Despite the need to plan for future
recovery and development opportunities, there are still enormous unmet needs that
require immediate life-saving assistance. The main obstacle to this assistance has
been the lack of access to populations in need and the insecurity created by the acts
of the parties to the conflict.
64. The humanitarian objectives of MONUC will continue to focus on facilitating
and ensuring access to vulnerable populations for the delivery of much-needed
assistance, in close coordination with the Office for the Coordination of
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Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.
It will do this in three ways: (a) it will initiate and participate in joint humanitarian
assessment missions with the intention of facilitating access to previously
inaccessible areas and facilitating the delivery of target assistance where it is most
needed; (b) it will systematically engage with belligerents to negotiate a safe and
secure access for humanitarian workers, as has been the case in North Kivu where a
forum for dialogue with a local Mai-Mai alliance is under way; and (c) it will
actively engage non-governmental organization partners in linking demining efforts
with planned humanitarian activities, especially in areas where the presence of
mines has hindered humanitarian activity.
Responding to mine threats
65. The serious mine incident reported in paragraph 14, the second such incident
since the inception of MONUC, illustrates the requirement for MONUC to maintain
a capacity to provide mine risk education to Mission personnel and the communities
in which they work, in collaboration with UNICEF and other local partners. The
Mission also requires the capability to collect, analyse and disseminate information
about mine and unexploded ordnance contamination, and to respond with a
clearance capability when required. The Mission will also advocate that all parties
stop the use of landmines and provide information on mined areas.
66. The Mine Action Coordination Centre is an integral part of the Mission, and
manages a database on contaminated areas for the benefit of the Mission and
humanitarian organizations. The Centre’s personnel provide expert advice to the
Mission and other components of the United Nations system, coordinate the
deployment of mine action operators and conduct threat assessment missions in
support of MONUC. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
which recently acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel
Mines, has requested the Centre to also coordinate the provision of external support
for mine action programmes throughout the country. Consequently, it is proposed
that the Centre be strengthened by the provision of three additional experts and
resources for its operations. At the same time, the Mine Action Service of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations is actively seeking voluntary contributions
from donors to develop an operational capability in support of humanitarian
requirements. Such a capability could also be provided, in part and in direct support
of MONUC, through the deployment of appropriately qualified units from troopcontributing
countries.
B. Long-term priorities
67. Clearly, assisting the transition process in a country as large and as devastated
as the Democratic Republic of the Congo will present a vast challenge to all
concerned. It will require a comprehensive approach in which the United Nations
system, the Bretton Woods institutions, and bilateral and multilateral donors plan
and coordinate their activities to an almost unprecedented degree. The political
arrangements underlying the transition process are complex, the country lacks a
strong and efficient public administration, and many of the political actors have
little direct experience in democratic practices. Basic mechanisms for the
functioning of a modern State (such as a State-wide banking system) are often non-
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existent. Consequently, support to the transitional process has to be extensive and
imaginative.
68. As outlined in my last report, in addition to the immediate priorities identified
in paragraphs 30 to 66 above, the United Nations — in cooperation with
organizations of the United Nations system, Bretton Woods institutions and other
international partners — will assist the Transitional Government in meeting longerterm
goals with regard to elections, the establishment of the rule of law and security
sector reform, in particular the disarmament and demobilization of Congolese
groups. The transition period could also serve as a bridge between the ongoing
humanitarian programmes and expanding development initiatives.
Support for elections
69. The holding of free, fair and transparent elections towards the end of the twoyear
transition period can become one of the key elements in the exit strategy of
MONUC. Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo pose a monumental
challenge. The country has never held democratic polls since gaining independence
43 years ago, and no legal framework for the electoral process currently exists. The
conditions for organizing the referendum and presidential and legislative elections
would therefore need to be specified in an electoral law adopted by the transitional
parliament. In a country the size of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with its
relatively poor communication and logistical links, the elections will be very costly,
and will require a major cooperative effort between the transitional authorities, the
United Nations and bilateral donors.
70. Following preliminary discussions between the United Nations and
international representatives in Kinshasa, it could be envisaged that MONUC could
provide technical and logistics assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission
and facilitate its work through coordination of international support to this end. The
precise contribution of MONUC will however depend on the views of the
Transitional Government when it is established. As soon as this occurs, a feasibility
assessment mission will be dispatched. In the interim, MONUC will have to
establish a small electoral cell to commence further planning and liaison.
Rule of law
71. The situation throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
characterized by a pervasive culture of impunity and extremely poor governance.
The strengthening of the rule of law is one of the fundamental challenges to be
overcome, to break the vicious circle of violence, eradicate impunity, combat the
root causes of the conflict and lay the foundation of a democratic society. The
responsibility and political will of the transitional authorities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo must be paramount in this regard. As I outlined initially in
my thirteenth report to the Security Council (S/2003/211, para. 59), MONUC could
assist in the sector of the rule of law by coordinating the overall international effort
in the areas of civilian police, human rights, the judiciary and correctional facilities.
To enable it to do so, and ensure the harmonization of initiatives, the close support
and collaboration of bilateral donors and multilateral and other agencies will be
required. My Special Representative intends to establish a multi-disciplinary task
force on the rule of law to ensure internal and external coordination of effort. While
emphasizing Congolese ownership in all steps of the transition, MONUC is well
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placed to provide facilitation and coordination, technical and training advice and
structures that could contribute to the establishment of a functional police and to
respect for human rights, and to assist in the reform of the judiciary and correctional
services.
72. To achieve such goals, a detailed assessment of the rule of law sector will be
necessary. Towards this end, representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, MONUC, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and UNDP met for preliminary consultations, at Geneva on 6 May,
with other United Nations and international actors in this field. Such consultations
will be actively followed up, and will also include the Transitional Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular, the Ministries of Justice, the
Interior and Human Rights, once such a government is installed, as well as those
bilateral donors interested in actively providing assistance in this vital sector.
Subsequently, a multidisciplinary team will have to conduct a comprehensive
assessment of this sector and recommend a framework in which each actor
interested in providing assistance can be identified, taking into account the wishes
of the new Government and the advice of various national players in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, including civil society.
73. At the United Nations country team level, a thematic group on human rights
and justice has also commenced preparations for a comprehensive programme of
support to the Transitional Government. The main areas of United Nations system
assistance, in close collaboration with and in support of other actors, have been
identified as: reform and strengthening of the legal framework and judicial system;
reform, rehabilitation and development of an integrated national police service with
particular emphasis on the rule of law and human rights issues; reform and
strengthening of the correctional system; training the armed forces on the rule of law
and human rights issues; support to the national human rights institutions; support to
the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and introduction of
measures to promote democratic and participatory governance. Measures to monitor,
address and redress violations of human rights will need to be given top priority.
74. As regards the support that may be required for the creation of a national
integrated police force, in addition to assisting the formation of the integrated police
unit in Kinshasa, and possibly in Ituri, the objectives for the international
community and MONUC would include contributing to improvements in
professional competence, organizational capacity and institutional integrity; public
awareness of the role of the police in a democratic society; and the cooperation
between the police, the judiciary and the correctional system. These objectives can
be achieved through advisory, training and development roles supported by the
provision of some material and financial assistance for equipment and facilities
including the possible rehabilitation of former training facilities, in five regional
centres — Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani, Gbadolite and Bukavu. While some
Member States have already offered bilateral assistance in equipping and training
the national police, a special multi-donor mission should be dispatched to further
study this vital area of activities and provide recommendations to the international
community.
75. International assistance in police training will however need to be linked to a
number of benchmarks to be implemented by the Congolese authorities, including
regular payment of adequate salaries, transparency in recruitment, promotion and
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discipline, deployment of personnel based on the type of training received,
development and implementation of internal accountability mechanisms, and a
maintenance programme financed by the authorities for buildings refurbished by the
international community. All efforts in support of the police must include concurrent
efforts in support of the judiciary and the correctional services, and the necessary
budgetary appropriations should be well coordinated with the Bretton Woods
institutions.
Security sector reform/disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
Congolese combatants
76. A main objective during the transition period will be security sector reform. It
will be vital for new national, integrated security institutions to be established in a
transparent manner if they are to play a legitimate and democratically accountable
role in providing security for all Congolese people. As indicated above, the creation
of an integrated police force that will be responsible for internal security is an
immediate priority. The earliest possible formation of the professional national
armed forces is also essential. Some bilateral donors have indicated preliminary
interest in a possible role in assisting the Transitional Government in these areas.
77. The establishment of a national army and the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of combatants will be a vital aspect of any security sector reform.
MONUC has explored with UNDP, the World Bank-led Multi-Country
Demobilization and Reintegration Programme and United Nations agencies the
possible follow-up to the proposal in my last report (S/2003/211, para. 60) that the
expertise of MONUC in disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration could be extended to the disarmament of Congolese combatants and
the coordination of the activities of bilateral donors.
78. Any action MONUC would take in this respect, subject to the agreement of the
Security Council, would support the process of creating unified national Congolese
armed forces. MONUC activities in the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of Congolese combatants could include (a) providing information on
Congolese armed groups, using its already established database; (b) building on its
already established contacts to sensitize non-signatory Congolese armed groups, as
well as Mai-Mai, about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; (c) assisting
in the public information campaign; and (d) providing the necessary technical
assistance to the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme
to be developed. Additional recommendations concerning a possible role for
MONUC in the disarmament of Congolese combatants would be provided to the
Security Council at a later stage.
79. In response to a formal request from President Kabila in September 2002, and
following consultations within the United Nations country task force, UNDP was
designated as the lead agency for the coordination of international efforts for the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Congolese forces. This
decision was endorsed by the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration
Programme in February 2003. UNDP has developed an interim strategy for the
development of a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
programme for the next three to six months, which was discussed during a recent
meeting of the Multi-Country Programme in Paris in April. This interim strategy is
based on four simultaneous approaches, namely, (a) a dialogue between the principal
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political actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the structure and
management of a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
programme which should have the active support of all components of the
Transitional Government; (b) the planning of a large and logistically complex
national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme; (c) the
development of a rapid response mechanism to address these issues pending the full
establishment of a national programme; and (d) current efforts led by UNICEF for
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, as well as
UNDP support for disabled ex-combatants, which will continue and be incorporated
into a national programme.
Child protection and gender affairs
80. Many of the Mission’s currently mandated tasks, in particular those that it has
been unable to fulfil completely because of fighting and insecurity, will be even
more relevant in the transition period. During this period, MONUC will monitor the
integration of child protection issues into new or reformed institutions and
legislation to ensure that needs are fully addressed. The disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers is likely to increase tremendously
once the national programme is implemented and conditions are favourable. The
challenge remains enormous given the high numbers of child soldiers still on the
front lines or in military camps throughout the country, and the precarious security
conditions in some areas, which make reintegration difficult and the risks of rerecruitment
high. MONUC will also continue to monitor violations of children’s
rights in order to evaluate the impact of the transition on children. The already
robust involvement of the MONUC gender affairs component with civil society and
political parties will also be instrumental in capacity-building to allow women
leaders and women’s organizations to play a greater role in the democratic process.
Towards a comprehensive approach to support the peace process
81. The work of MONUC, as outlined above, is designed to be carried out in the
framework of its partnerships within the United Nations system and the wider
international community. Even so, its work will be limited and the needs of the
transition will be great. The immediate priorities are the rehabilitation of
infrastructure and the provision of technical support for the efficient functioning of
the new governmental structures. Even at this early phase, however, there is a need
for a comprehensive package aimed at setting the stage for good governance and
consisting of both short-term and long-term activities. With respect to infrastructure,
the immediate need is for office space for the additional institutions and positions
created. The Government has requested the help of UNDP, the World Bank and the
European Union to mobilize the necessary resources for the rehabilitation of
existing governmental buildings. An assessment of needs is under way, and once
finalized will be presented to the donor community. The presentation should be
made by the Follow-up Commission and could well be cast as the first phase of
donor support for governance in the transition, which would culminate in support for
the preparation and organization of the elections.
82. To complement the support in the rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure,
other needs will be addressed, namely the need for training and provision of
technical support for the efficient functioning of the new structures, taking into
consideration the time limitation of their mandate. The role to be played by the
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United Nations system should be catalytic. UNDP and other partners have started
work on a public service reform programme and on an interim capacity-building
strategy. The support of the United Nations system will be further extended to
include the administrations in the provinces, with a view to promoting the unity of
the national administration and laying the ground for the organization of the
elections at the end of the transitional period.
83. In the medium term, the unification of the territory and complete freedom of
movement is a priority for humanitarian and development actors. Insecurity is the
major constraint at present; the wider deployment of MONUC in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo could help to alleviate the situation, although the
onus clearly rests with the parties to cease all military activities. At the same time,
enhanced mobility will require significant improvements to the country’s
transportation infrastructure, which is virtually non-existent. Discussions are already
under way to join efforts with bilateral donors in the rehabilitation of roads and
other transport links and facilities. In the meantime, the United Nations system and
implementing parties will continue to rely on the Mission’s transportation
capabilities.
84. With regard to the effective management of natural resources, new legislative
and regulatory frameworks have already been established with the assistance of the
World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. A
process of validation of existing titles and concessions is foreseen as part of the
transition process, pursuant to a decision to this effect of the Economic Working
Group of the inter-Congolese dialogue. It would be important to start the process of
validation quickly, as the current uncertainty over many titles and concessions will
delay all productive investments in this important sector. At the same time, it is
essential that the different parties start cooperating urgently on enforcement of
legislation, to prevent a sudden burst of uncontrolled exploitation — especially of
the forest — with potentially very negative environmental consequences. UNDP and
the Global Environment Facility are involved in the environmental management of a
number of sites throughout the country. The international community could provide
valuable assistance, via the Congo Basin initiative, as well as by involving reputable
non-governmental organizations in the monitoring of logging activities.
85. On the issue of longer-term reconstruction and rehabilitation, the Emergency
Humanitarian, Social and Cultural Programme adopted during the inter-Congolese
dialogue at Sun City provides a viable framework. The Congolese parties should
develop a mechanism for strategy formulation and donor coordination, so as to
maximize donor involvement and the speed of implementation. The key process in
this context is that of the poverty reduction strategy paper, which was endorsed at
Sun City. In addition, it is important to follow up on the decisions made at the
meeting of the Consultative Group for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
Paris in December 2002. Those include the acceptance by the Government and all
donors of the Emergency Multi-Sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Programme as the framework for financing public investment and reconstruction,
and the decision that, as soon as feasible, a multi-donor effort would work to extend
the framework to cover the entire country. It is essential that the extension of that
Programme be harmonized with the important humanitarian programme coordinated
by the United Nations system, so as to ensure a smooth transition from humanitarian
assistance (especially in the east) to recovery and reconstruction and longer-term
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development. In addition, it is important that the work be focused not only on
physical reconstruction but also on governance and reconciliation.
86. A first step to achieving this could be the constitution of technical-level
national working groups on a few issues which are universally viewed as urgent.
Experience in other post-conflict situations shows that such technical-level
cooperation can be an important element in confidence-building. To this end,
coordination should be well established between the political and technical decisionmaking
institutions — the Follow-up Commission and the International Committee
on one side and the United Nations agencies and Bretton Woods institutions on
another. MONUC, which is involved in the political process, could serve as a link.
The success of the activities of the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions
would very much depend on the establishment of reliable coordination mechanisms
(the above-mentioned technical-level national working groups) and the efficient use
of existing ones (United Nations regional coordinator and country team, regional
initiatives and others). Three initial topics could be disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration, currency and HIV/AIDS. As a second step, a multi-donor mission
in June could serve to render more visible the efforts of the international community
to translate the transition into concrete results for the population. This could be
followed by a high-level multi-donor mission late in the summer, which would lead
to important resource mobilization at the next Consultative Group meeting in the
autumn.
V. Financial and administrative aspects
87. The General Assembly, by its resolution 56/252 C of 27 June 2002,
appropriated an amount of $581.9 million for the maintenance of MONUC for the
period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003. As at 30 April 2003, unpaid assessed
contributions to the MONUC special account amounted to $108,752,465. The total
outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date
amounted to $1,375,914,354. Since its establishment in October 1999, the Trust
Fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has
received voluntary contributions amounting to $1,124,980, with expenditures
authorized to date in the full amount.
88. So far, the Mission’s logistics resources, including aviation, have been planned
for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
operations, primarily in the areas of Kindu and Kisangani. Owing to the poor
internal infrastructure throughout the country, the Mission continues to rely heavily
on air assets and has requested the deployment of the second Mi-26 helicopter. A
military airfield service unit has been identified for the deployment, and an ICAO
airfield rehabilitation project is expected to be under way shortly, focusing on
important airfields in the east. The deployment to Ituri and the sustainment of the
force there will pose a considerable unforeseen logistical challenge. MONUC will
have to develop a supportable logistics infrastructure to sustain a military and
civilian force of up to 3,800 in Ituri. The main costs will arise from the requirement
for additional medium and heavy transport aircraft, repairs to the Bunia airstrip and
the rehabilitation of the surface transport infrastructure for long-term support. This
will require considerable investment.
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89. In view of the limited accessibility to the Ituri region, it is envisaged that
logistics support will be provided using a combination of sea, road, rail and air
transport through Uganda for the deployment of the forces and the sustainment of
the MONUC military and civilian presence. Uganda has useable airports and a
reasonably good road infrastructure leading to the border with the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The road network in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
leading to Bunia is in poor condition and will require extensive rehabilitation. As
this will take some time, resupply of the military contingents will primarily be
conducted by air for the foreseeable future.
VI. Observations
90. After nearly five years of continuous fighting, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo finds itself at an intersection of peace and war. The definitive and successful
conclusion of the inter-Congolese dialogue is a crucial milestone that constitutes the
commitment by the Congolese parties to finally pursue a path of peace and
reconciliation. The Congolese leaders must fulfil their obligations to the Congolese
people, who have been waiting too long for their suffering to end. I wish to
congratulate the Congolese parties in taking this step and to thank Sir Ketumile
Masire, the neutral facilitator, and my Special Envoy for the inter-Congolese
dialogue, Moustapha Niasse, for their tireless and determined efforts to complete
this process. I would also congratulate the African Union, in particular its current
Chairman, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, for the extensive support and
assistance rendered throughout the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
91. This is also a milestone for the United Nations. Since August 1999, the
primary role of MONUC has been to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement and supplementary bilateral agreements that provided the
framework for addressing the military dimension of the conflict. Despite slow and
partial compliance by the parties, there have been major achievements, including the
disengagement of foreign armed forces and their allies to defensive positions, the
withdrawal of the majority of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and initial progress in the ad hoc disarmament, demobilization and
repatriation of Rwandan armed groups. I wish to pay special tribute to the men and
women of MONUC, especially my Special Representative, Amos Namanga Ngongi,
and the Force Commander, General Mountaga Diallo, for their courageous and
indispensable efforts in advancing the peace process.
92. The peace process has now moved beyond the Lusaka framework and begun a
new chapter that, more than ever, will require the comprehensive engagement and
assistance of the United Nations and the international community at large. The
magnitude of the challenges should not be underestimated: the country is still
divided, military hostilities continue in the east, the population is traumatized by
years of conflict, the country is poverty stricken and State services and
infrastructure are non-existent.
93. MONUC is well, if not uniquely, placed to play a central catalytic role in
assisting the parties through the transition period. For this reason I believe that the
main focus of MONUC should now shift to facilitating and assisting the transitional
process, and that the Mission should be reconfigured and augmented accordingly.
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The immediate priority is to assist in the establishment of the Transitional
Government. In the All-Inclusive Agreement, and in a letter dated 4 May from
President Kabila, the United Nations has been requested to deploy a force to
participate in the proposed multi-layered confidence-building security system to
give confidence to transitional leaders in Kinshasa, outlined in paragraphs 33 to 38
of this report. I recommend that the Council agree to these requests by approving the
proposed involvement of MONUC.
94. With respect to the institutions of the transition, I welcome the initial positive
steps such as the formation of the Follow-up Commission and the participation of all
its members, and the establishment of the International Committee in Support of the
Transition that is convened by my Special Representative. The new Transition
Support Unit in MONUC has already been instrumental in facilitating the
preparatory phase of the implementation of the All-Inclusive Agreement. I intend to
supplement it by establishing a small electoral assistance cell to commence planning
the possible United Nations role in support of elections.
95. Many other challenges, especially the brutal conflicts in Ituri and in the Kivus,
stand on the path to the transition. The ongoing strife in Ituri is a humanitarian
catastrophe that threatens to derail the overall peace process. Supporting the
representative, interim administration that was established on 14 April by the Ituri
Pacification Commission is the only viable strategy for achieving peace in this
troubled area. Uganda’s withdrawal from Ituri is welcome, but it and all other
external actors must recognize their accountability for the actions of those armed
groups they helped create and must cease to supply them or give them succour.
96. In the current situation of instability and violence, and in the context of the
Ituri Pacification Commission and the All-Inclusive Agreement, there can be no
justification for supplying weapons to any group. I therefore recommend that the
possibility of imposing an arms embargo be considered in Ituri as well as in the
Kivus, with an exemption for the equipment of members of the future integrated
armed and police units.
97. MONUC, through its enhanced presence backed up by the deployment of a
brigade-size force as described in paragraphs 45 to 54, has a vital role to play in
support of the still fragile Ituri political process. I am extremely concerned about the
Mission’s current limited presence in Ituri, especially in view of the immense gap
between its capabilities and the high expectations of the population. The
international community has a collective responsibility to address the rapidly
deteriorating security situation in Bunia. I appeal to the Security Council to urgently
approve the deployment of a task force to Bunia, as well as the concept of
operations for a MONUC brigade-size force as described in paragraphs 51 to 54
above.
98. At the same time, the deployment of such a force would not be possible before
the end of July even under the best of circumstances, leaving a dangerous interim
gap in this highly volatile area. I therefore call on the Security Council to urgently
consider the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well equipped force,
under the lead of a Member State, to provide security at the airport as well as other
vital installations in that town and protect the civilian population, as a temporary
bridging arrangement before the possible deployment of a reinforced United Nations
presence. Such a deployment — for a limited period of time — should be authorized
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
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Neighbouring States and any other actors concerned should refrain from interfering
in the ongoing developments in Ituri.
99. The ongoing military offensives in the Kivus continue to cause widespread
suffering and undermine disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration activities, and entail the risk of the direct re-engagement of
neighbouring States. I call on all those involved in the fighting — RCD-Goma,
various Mai-Mai groups and other local militias — to cease hostilities immediately.
Arms supplies and other military support to all groups should also cease without
delay. But these measures alone would not be enough. MONUC has a role to play in
encouraging and assisting local and international partners in conflict resolution
efforts by expanding the presence of its civilian personnel and military observers in
the Kivus. I call on donors to contribute to a special fund for local peacemaking to
be used by my Special Representative. Resources provided to such a fund could be
used as seed money to supplement MONUC quick-impact projects in support of
local grass-roots initiatives.
100. The disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
of foreign armed groups must remain an important goal of the international
community, as that process lies at the heart of the Great Lakes conflict. There is
growing recognition, however, that a successful disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme is not the prerequisite to a
lasting peace process, but its by-product. The work of the Third Party Verification
Mechanism established pursuant to the agreement of 30 July 2002 between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, has been a useful instrument for
accelerating the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of Rwandan armed
groups. Having accomplished its overall mission, the Mechanism is expected to
conclude its work shortly. The full deployment during this month of the first task
force in the Kivus will put the current ad hoc disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration activities of MONUC on a firmer
footing. I call on all concerned to cooperate with MONUC so that it can carry out
this important task. I also encourage the Transitional Government of Burundi,
together with all armed groups, to establish a disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration programme there, so that those Burundian armed groups identified by
MONUC in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo may be repatriated to
their country of origin within an established structure.
101. Equally important for the transition process in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese armed and
irregular forces. Further to the suggestion I made in my last report, I propose to the
Security Council that the mandate of MONUC be expanded to assist the Transitional
Government, at its request, to plan the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of Congolese combatants. This should be done in the context of the
creation of unified national Congolese armed forces, and in close collaboration with
the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, bilateral donors
and United Nations agencies. I shall revert to the Council in due course with any
operational recommendations that may be necessary in this regard.
102. I am appalled by the egregious level of gross human rights violations that
continue to be committed throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo, some
of which have been documented extensively by MONUC. I appeal to the transitional
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Congolese leaders to make the protection of human rights one of the highest
priorities of the new Transitional Government. MONUC and the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights will work closely with the
transitional institutions in this regard.
103. The immediate priorities, especially those related to the security arrangements
in Kinshasa and peace initiatives in Ituri, clearly require further resources for
MONUC. Taking into account the major operational readjustments that have been
undertaken, I recommend that the mandate of MONUC be extended for another year,
until 30 June 2004, and that the authorized military strength of MONUC be
increased to 10,800 all ranks. I also recommend that the number of civilian police
personnel be increased from the current level of 100 to 134 police officers. It should
be noted that 6 to 48 additional officers will also be required, depending on the
training option for the integrated police unit to be followed (see paras. 41 and 42
above). Other specialized personnel to support the immediate priorities of MONUC
(see sect. IV.A) will also have to be augmented. While the troop level will be kept
under constant review, it should be noted that the current requirements are based on
the present threat assessments and that, should the situation deteriorate, additional
resources may be required. I shall revert to the Security Council with specific
recommendations for longer-term objectives, which are described in paragraphs 67
to 86 of the report.
104. A United Nations peacekeeping operation relies on cooperation with other
partners to consolidate a hard-won peace. I call on all concerned to coordinate their
efforts to harmonize initiatives, aimed at maximizing results in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. I am pleased to note that the World Bank and other donors
are already increasing their assistance to the country.
105. Despite the best will of the United Nations and its partners, the peace process
cannot move forward without the demonstrated commitment of the Congolese
leaders. There are a number of key benchmarks that the parties must observe in the
coming weeks to maintain momentum and demonstrate their commitment. They
include the immediate cessation of hostilities and of inflammatory rhetoric and
propaganda; the lifting of restrictions on the free movement of goods and people
throughout the country; the liberalization of political activity in the areas under their
control; the disbandment of armed groups or their transformation into political
parties; and taking steps to establish the high command of the integrated national
armed forces and to form an initial unit of integrated police.
106. The illicit exploitation of natural resources has criminalized the conflict in
some areas, making it all the more difficult to stop, as well as depriving the
Congolese people of their heritage and livelihood. The Transitional Government
must produce, in a transparent manner, a budget with provisions for key State
services. To this end, the Government should be held accountable for the effective
management of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
necessary assistance should be provided towards this end.
107. The challenge at hand is enormous. It is up to the Congolese themselves to
keep the peace process vibrant, dynamic and successful. The international
community, including MONUC, will follow their lead and provide the necessary
assistance in translating the vision of peace into a reality.
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- 90 -
ANNEX 2.3.C
United Nations Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/128,
12 February 2001
(Excerpts)
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- 98 -
ANNEX 2.4.A
IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], Nairobi, 3 March 2000
[Original English: not reproduced]
___________
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ANNEX 2.4.B
MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,
document S/2004/573, 16 July 2004
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ANNEX 2.4.C
Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood”. Ethnically Targeted Violence in
Northeastern DR Congo, Vol. 15, No. 11 (A), July 2003
[Original English: not reproduced]
___________
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ANNEX 4.1.A
Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre du Congo à Kisangani et les violations
des droits de l’homme du 2 août au 17 septembre 1998”,
Kisangani, 18 September 1998
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 4.1.B
Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés à Kisangani et
le droit international humanitaire”, 12 May 1999
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 4.1.C
Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit
à l’autodétermination du peuple congolais”, 31 August 1999
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 4.1.D
Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des Alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au
10 juin 2000) et le droit à la paix”, 30 June 2000
[Annex not translated]
___________
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ANNEX 4.2
Cost of repair of buildings in Ituri by BCeCo
- 168 -
Cost of repair of buildings in Ituri by BCeCo
[Translation]
Letter to the Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals, dated 17 October 2018,
from the Managing Director of BCeCo
Re: Your letter 1924/BNS673/KN/CAB/ME/MIN/J&GS/2018
We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your above-referenced letter of 12 October
2018 relating to the gathering of information requested by the International Court of Justice in
The Hague, for which we thank you.
As Delegated Project Manager, BCeCo has indeed signed building contracts with local
implementing agencies following transparent procurement procedures in order to achieve the
objectives of the Project Owner, in this instance the Ministry of Primary, Secondary and
Occupational Education, as part of the scheme to rebuild and repair educational infrastructure
throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
With regard to Ituri Province, 25 schools were identified, 18 of which have been rebuilt and
partially equipped with classroom furniture and 7 of which are awaiting funding to begin work.
These 25 schools are located throughout the territories of Aru, Bunia, Djugu, Irumu, Mahagi and
Mambasa.
The average unit cost of rebuilding a school and equipping it with classroom furniture is
assessed at US$154,150, excluding management fees and the cost of supervising and monitoring
the work, which is estimated at US$22,000 on average.
Appended to this letter is a detailed assessment of the average unit cost, based on a
significant sample representing 20 per cent of the schools to be rebuilt in Ituri Province.
COSTS
Province Territory Qty Primary schools Building 1 Building 2 Administrative
building
Sanitary
facilities
Total
works per
school
Management
fees Furniture Site
engineer Total cost
ITURI
DJUGU 1 PS1 KILO 60,002.67 60,002.67 17,560.55 10,445.08 148,010.97 17,761.32 25,000.00 3,550.00 194,322.29
DJUGU 1 PS2 BWA 60,002.67 60,002.67 17,560.55 10,445.08 148,010.97 17,761.32 25,000.00 3,550.00 194,322.29
MAMBASA 1 PS NYANYA 1 65,095.12 65,095.12 19,308.23 10,774.13 160,272.60 19,232.71 25,000.00 3,550.00 208,055.31
MAMBASA 1 PS NYAMOVE 65,095.12 65,095.12 19,308.23 10,774.13 160,272.60 19,232.71 25,000.00 3,550.00 208,055.31
IRUMU 1 PS IRUMU 60,002.67 60,002.67 17,560.55 10,445.08 148,010.97 17,761.32 25,000.00 3,550.00 194,322.29
5 310,198.25 310,198.25 91,298.11 52,883.50 764,578.11 91,749.37 125,000.00 17,750.00 999,077.48
___________
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ANNEX 4.3
Cost of repairs to buildings belonging to the Catholic church by BDOM,
Archdiocese of Kisangani
[Relevant extracts only]
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Cost of repairs to buildings belonging to the Catholic church by BDOM,
Archdiocese of Kisangani
[Translation]
[Cover letter]
Archdiocese of Kisangani
Works to repair the damage caused by the war
of 5-10 June 2000
No. Site Amount
[List of 17 items]
Total (excluding taxes):
US$4,811,713.19
[Detailed breakdown of each item]
___________
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ANNEX 5.1
Map of mining concessions in the Congo, 30 June 1960
[Annex not translated]
___________
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ANNEX 5.2
United Nations Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, document S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001
(Excerpts)
United Nations S/2001/1072
Security Council Distr.: General
13 November 2001
Original: English
01-63001 (E) 151101
*0163001*
Letter dated 10 November 2001 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council
I wish to refer to the presidential statement dated 3 May 2001
(S/PRST/2001/13), in which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a final period of three months. I
also wish to refer to the President’s letter, by which the Panel’s mandate was
extended until 30 November 2001 (S/2001/951), and the Panel was requested to
submit, through me, an addendum to its final report.
I have the honour to transmit to you the addendum to the report of the Panel,
submitted to me by the Chairperson of the Panel. I should be grateful if you would
bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
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Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–9 4
II. Historical perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10–11 5
III. Situation in the Great Lakes region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12–14 5
IV. Exploitation of the natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15–55 6
Coltan (columbo-tantalite) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17–25 6
Gold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26–29 8
Copper and cobalt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30–35 8
Diamonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36–47 9
Timber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48–55 11
V. The link between exploitation of resources and the continuation of the conflict . . . 56–104 13
Democratic Republic of the Congo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61–75 14
Zimbabwe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76–82 16
Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83–86 18
Namibia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87–90 18
Rwanda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91–94 19
Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95–100 20
Burundi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101–104 21
VI. Transit countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105–122 21
South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106–109 21
Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110–114 22
United Republic of Tanzania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115–117 22
Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 23
Central African Republic and Republic of the Congo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–122 23
VII. Armed groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123–142 23
National armed groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123–134 23
Foreign armed groups (the negative forces). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135–142 25
VIII. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143–151 26
IX. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152–160 27
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Annexes
I. Countries visited and representatives of Governments and organizations interviewed . . . . . . . 29
II. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
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S/2001/1072
I. Introduction
1. By the statement of its President of 2 June 2000
(S/PRST/2000/20), the Security Council requested the
Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts on
the illegal exploitation of the natural resources and
other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo with the following mandate:
(a) To follow up on reports and collect
information on all activities of illegal exploitation of
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, including in
violation of the sovereignty of that country;
(b) To research and analyse the links between
the exploitation of the natural resources and other
forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo
and the continuation of the conflict.
2. By his letter dated 12 April 2001 (S/2001/357),
the Secretary-General transmitted the report of the
Panel. The Security Council, in the statement of its
President of 3 May 2001 (S/PRST/2001/13), requested
the Secretary-General to extend the mandate of the
Panel for a final period of three months, at the end of
which the Panel would present an addendum to the
report which would include the following:
(a) An update on the relevant data and analysis
of further information, including as pointed out in the
action plan submitted by the Panel to the Security
Council;
(b) Relevant information on the activities of
countries and other actors for which necessary quantity
and quality of data were not made available earlier;
(c) A response, based as far as possible on
corroborated evidence, to the comments and reactions
of the States and actors cited in the report of the Panel;
(d) An evaluation of the situation at the end of
the extension of the mandate of the Panel, and of its
conclusions, assessing whether progress has been made
on the issues, which come under the responsibility of
the Panel.
3. The new Panel was composed as follows:
Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt),
Chairman;
Brigadier General (Ret.) Mujahid Alam
(Pakistan);
Mel Holt (United States of America);
Henri Maire (Switzerland);
Moustapha Tall (Senegal).
4. The Panel was assisted by a technical adviser,
Gilbert Barthe, two political officers, as well as an
administrator and a secretary.
5. Following a brief period of consultations in New
York, the Panel began its work in Nairobi on 30 July
2001. Panel members, together or individually, because
of time constraints, visited Angola, Belgium,
Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Kenya,
Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South
Africa, Uganda, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania,
the United States of America, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
6. In acquiring and updating its information, the
Panel relied on meetings with heads of State,
government officials, non-governmental organizations
and stakeholders, business people, academics, members
of the press, individuals and others. Meetings were also
held with parties cited in the report, representatives of
Governments, entities, private companies and
individuals who had submitted written reactions to the
report.
7. The Panel did not have the power to compel
testimony and thus relied on information voluntarily
provided by States and other sources. Information was
not forthcoming from South Africa, the United
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Information was finally received, but with considerable
delay, from Angola. This factor, as well as the
constraints of its short mandate, limited the Panel’s
ability to present a more complete addendum.
8. Throughout its consultations and work, the Panel
was mindful of the progress being achieved in the
ongoing peace process in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, regarding the implementation of the
Ceasefire Agreement signed at Lusaka on 10 July 1999
(S/1999/815) and, in particular, the inter-Congolese
dialogue.
9. The Panel tried its best to address the complaints
and reactions as a consequence of the report and
succeeded in meeting most of the parties. However,
owing to severe time constraints, it was not possible to
address this issue in its totality.
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II. Historical perspective
10. The Panel wishes to emphasize that the history of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, regardless of
the political system or governing authority in place, has
been one of systematic abuse of its natural and human
resources. This exploitation has almost always been
backed by the brutal use of force and directed to the
benefit of a powerful few. As the country’s precious
resources were plundered and mismanaged, an informal
economy based on barter, smuggling and fraudulent
trade in commodities thrived, becoming the sole means
of survival for much of the population. This commerce
reinforced pre-existing ties based on ethnicity, kinship
and colonial structures between the Kivu regions and
neighbouring States such as Burundi and Rwanda, as
well as Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of
Tanzania. Similar patterns of informal trade closely
linked Katanga Province with Zambia and Angola.
11. The result was that a country renowned for its
vast natural wealth was reduced to one of the poorest
and debt-ridden States by the early 1990s. From the
early days of the rebellion of the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire,
President Laurent-Désiré Kabila perpetuated many of
the practices of his predecessors. He wielded a highly
personalized control over State resources, avoiding any
semblance of transparency and accountability.
Management control over public enterprises was
virtually non-existent and deals granting concessions
were made indiscriminately in order to generate
quickly needed revenues and to satisfy the most
pressing political or financial exigencies. Familiar
patterns of unaccountability, corruption and patronage
re-emerged rapidly. This is the setting in which the war
of August 1998 began.
III. Situation in the Great Lakes region
12. Since 12 April 2001, the ceasefire has held along
the confrontation line among the parties. Uganda began
pulling out some troops and Namibia withdrew almost
all its troops. Disengagement to new defensive
positions, in accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement, appears to have been completed. Sporadic
fighting nonetheless continued, shifting the conflict
towards the east along the borders with Rwanda and
Burundi and the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Much of
this fighting has pitted the Rwandan and Burundi
armed groups or “negative forces” and the Congolese
Mayi-Mayi militias against the Rwandan Patriotic
Army, the Burundi Army and the RCD-Goma rebel
forces. ALIR I, regrouping ex-FAR and Interahamwe,
moved through the Kivus and crossed the border to
attack RPA. The attack was repelled by RPA. The most
recent armed activity has centred on the town of Fizi in
South Kivu near Lake Tanganyika. There have also
been reports of sporadic clashes between Mayi-Mayi
fighters and different forces in the north-eastern
regions of Orientale Province and North Kivu. Some
fighting was also reported to have broken out among
different factions of the Ugandan-backed rebel groups.
13. Efforts towards reconciliation and reunification
moved forward. In August 2001, the preparatory
meeting for the inter-Congolese dialogue, the
negotiations among the Congolese parties on a postconflict
political transition, was held at Gaborone. A
sense of compromise and cooperation reigned and one
result was the signing of a Declaration of Commitment
by all the participants. Among the many issues on
which the participants committed themselves to start
taking action was the protection of natural resources
from illegal exploitation. The dialogue itself began at
Addis Ababa in September; the talks, which adjourned
prematurely, in part because of funding problems, will
reportedly resume in December in South Africa. The
Kinshasa Government continued to push for the
participation of the Mayi-Mayi groups in the
negotiations. Talks aimed at building confidence were
held between President Joseph Kabila and the heads of
State of the signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement. As a gesture of good will, intended to
encourage the withdrawal of Rwandan troops,
President Kabila announced that 3,000 soldiers in
Katanga Province, identified as ex-FAR and
Interahamwe, would be disarmed and demobilized
under the supervision of the United Nations.
14. As regards the exploitation of natural resources,
Zimbabwe is the most active of the allies. Many of its
joint ventures are in the development stage and likely
to mature with the help of badly needed capital from
outside investors. While many of the investors are
offshore companies, Zimbabwe also appeared to be
considering a less active role for its army in these
commercial activities and more involvement by
government ministries. On the side of the uninvited
forces, the commercial networks put in place by UPDF
commanders have allowed them to continue their
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exploitation activities despite the withdrawal of a
significant number of troops. RPA continued to collect
and channel profits from trade in natural resources
through a sophisticated internal mechanism.
IV. Exploitation of the natural
resources
15. Investigations conducted by the Panel, which
focused on evaluating whether changes in trends had
occurred since the release of the report, confirmed a
pattern of continued exploitation. The exploitation is
carried out by numerous State and non-State actors,
including the rebel forces and armed groups, and is
conducted behind various facades in order to conceal
the true nature of the activities. While some of these
activities may be conducted under the umbrella of joint
ventures, other activities are carried out by the de facto
authority in the area, which purports to exercise the
same authority and responsibilities as the legitimate
Government. Still others take different forms, which
will subsequently be highlighted. Given its mandate,
the Panel limited its examination of specific material
resources to coltan, gold, copper and cobalt, diamonds
and timber, since they best illustrate the current
patterns of exploitation. Selecting these resources also
permitted the Panel to examine some of the reactions
presented to the report.
16. The Panel would also like to emphasize another
very important aspect of the exploitation that
previously was not given sufficient importance. This
relates to the exploitation of human resources by all
parties to the conflict, a far graver phenomenon than
the exploitation of material resources. This form of
exploitation has resulted in flagrant and systematic
violations of the fundamental human rights of the
Congolese people. Human resources constitute the
most important wealth of a nation, and the Panel
strongly feels the need to reinforce the international
community’s attention to this situation so that urgent
measures are taken.
Coltan (columbo-tantalite)
17. An excellent conductor, this metal ore occurs
throughout the eastern region of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. After increased demand from
the hi-tech, communications and aerospace industries
drove coltan prices to an all-time high of more than
$300 per pound in 2000, prices plummeted during the
first six months of 2001, levelling off at the current $20
to $30 per pound. This price fluctuation, due to an
increase in world production — in particular in
Australia — and diminished demand, coincided with
the publication of the Panel’s report. There have been
some accounts that part of the decrease in demand
resulted from manufacturers’ desire to disassociate
themselves with what became known, following release
of the report, as “blood tantalum”.
18. The fluctuation in the price, as well as the Panel’s
report, have had a number of effects on the coltan trade
from the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. In response to the recommendations of the
Panel, a bill was introduced in September 2001 in the
United States House of Representatives to prohibit
temporarily coltan imports from certain countries
involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Some United States corporations that
process and use tantalum, such as Kemet and Cabot
Corporation, cancelled orders for coltan originating
from the region. The Panel also confirmed that the
Belgian company Sogem, a subsidiary of Umicore
(formerly Union Minière), which was cited in the
report, ended its partnership with its coltan supplier,
MDM, in Bukavu in November 2000. Sogem, it should
be added, had been operating and was established in
the area long before the outbreak of hostilities.
19. These factors have also led to a change in tactics
by the Rwandan army. Congolese operators were
selected as partners to handle the coltan trade. In
addition, the Rwandans relocated some of their
comptoirs, which had operated in Bukavu and Goma,
back to the Rwandan border towns of Cyangugu and
Gsenyi. In addition, the decrease in coltan prices has
meant a sharp reduction in revenues for the Congolese
rebel groups such as RCD-Goma. For example, the
Panel received reports that only one of the six
remaining comptoirs d’achat has been able to pay its
mandatory contribution to RCD-Goma. The rebel
group has, as a result, resorted to other means of
collecting revenue. RCD-Goma officials are now
retroactively demanding higher taxes from local
businesses and have imposed much higher customs
tariffs. Desperately short of funds, RCD-Goma has
even begun imposing customs duties on relief material
brought in by humanitarian organizations.
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covered in the early 1990s for economic losses
incurred because of the wars in the east of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo”. The Government
of Germany has emphasized that it does not offer
“trade promotion measures” to SOMIKIVU or any
other company named in the report.
Gold
26. Gold deposits can be found in the north-east and
eastern regions, in the Kivus and Maniema and Ituri
Provinces. During the last days of the Mobutu era, this
was the only mineral that was recording increases in
sales. Following an initial attempt at privatizing the
gold mines through joint ventures, industrial gold
mining practically came to a halt as a result of the civil
war that began in 1996. However, artisanal gold mining
continued and continues to this date on a large scale.
27. The Panel’s report sheds light on the gold mining
activities carried out by the Ugandan army, which
assumed control of this gold-rich area. The sharp rise
in Ugandan gold exports, which also exceeded national
production, was given as further evidence that this gold
is transported by UPDF elements to Kampala, from
where it is exported. The Government of Uganda
contested the findings of the Panel in its report,
attributing the increase in its exports to 1993 policies
liberalizing gold sales and exports, where the revamped
policies permitted artisanal miners in Uganda to keep
hard currency earned from sales. Officials claimed that
as a result of the ease with which gold can be
smuggled, Uganda became the preferred destination for
gold produced by artisanal miners in the surrounding
region.
28. The discrepancy between the gold export figures
registered by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral
Development and those recorded by the Uganda
Revenue Service was attributed to the fact that the
Ministry’s figures reflect the quotas set for the
production of the Ugandan export permit holders.
These permit holders can buy from artisanal miners,
the total of which appears on the export permits. While
small-scale smuggling may in part explain the
discrepancy in Uganda’s production and export figures,
the Panel has evidence that artisanal gold mining
activities in the north-east by UPDF and RCD-ML, as
well as the short-lived rebel coalition FLC, have
continued. In the Kilo-moto area for example,
operations at the Gorumbwa and Durba sites are under
the control of UPDF and RCD-ML. The Malaka site
reportedly employs 10,000 diggers and generates
amounts of gold valued at $10,000 per day. Gold
produced is still being sold through the Victoria
comptoir in Kampala.
29. Another destination for the gold originating in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is Bujumbura. The
Panel has learned from official and business sources in
Bujumbura that gold smuggling into Burundi from
Bukavu, Fizi Baraka and Uvira is a traditional activity
because of the porous borders and Bujumbura airport’s
capacity to handle large cargo planes. In Bujumbura,
gold dealers from countries such a Senegal, Pakistan
and Greece buy this smuggled gold, which they
subsequently transport personally to Europe and other
destinations.
Copper and cobalt
30. Gécamines, the largest mining operation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and once wholly
State-owned, has holdings in government-controlled
Katanga Province, which contain one of the largest
concentrations of high-grade copper and cobalt in the
world. Embezzlement, theft and pilfering,
mismanagement and a lack of re-investment
transformed it from the pillar of the Congolese
economy, once earning 70 per cent of the country’s
hard currency in exports, into a dilapidated enterprise
with production now at only one tenth of its former
capacity.
31. Although Australian, United States, Canadian,
Belgian and South African companies have established
joint ventures in Gécamines’ concession areas, the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
has primarily relied on it as a means to ensure the
continued support of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean Billy
Rautenbach was named the Managing Director of
Gécamines in November 1998 during a visit to Harare
by President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. According to this
deal, some of Gécamines’ best cobalt-producing areas
were also transferred to a joint venture between Mr.
Rautenbach’s Ridgepoint Overseas Development Ltd.
and the Central Mining Group, a Congolese company
controlled by Pierre-Victor Mpoyo, then Minister of
State. Mr. Rautenbach also acted as Managing Director
of the joint venture, a blatant conflict of interest. The
Panel has information that President Kabila’s decision
to appoint Mr. Rautenbach — a man with no mining
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experience but with close ties to the ruling ZANU-PF
party in Zimbabwe — was made at the request of
President Robert Mugabe during that visit.
32. However, President Kabila replaced
Mr. Rautenbach with Georges Forrest, a Belgian
businessman, in March 1999, reportedly after the
former failed to pay the Government’s share of the
profits from the joint venture. President Kabila accused
him of transferring profits to a shell company, as well
as stockpiling cobalt in South Africa. Shipments of
cobalt had allegedly been seized in Durban to pay
Gécamines’ South African creditors. Mr. Rautenbach
has since taken legal action against the Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
33. Under Zimbabwean pressure, in January 2001
John Bredenkamp’s Tremalt Ltd. formed a joint venture
with Gécamines, the Kababancola Mining Company
(KMC). In a 25-year agreement, KMC acquired rights
to a concession representing the richest Gécamines
holdings. Mr. Bredenkamp, who pledged to invest $50
million in the mining operations, controls 80 per cent
of this venture. Profits from his company’s share will
be split between the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (68 per cent) and Tremalt
(32 per cent).
34. The management of Gécamines changed hands
again following an audit of all State-owned enterprises.
The Minister to the Presidency, who has oversight for
all public enterprises through his other post as Minister
of the Portfolio, supervised an audit of these
enterprises early in 2001. The audit reportedly revealed
gross mismanagement and led to the firing of senior
management officials at these enterprises in August
2001. A relative of the Minister was subsequently
appointed to an influential post in the new management
committee of Gécamines.
35. As in the past, Gécamines still continues to serve
as a source of revenue for the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. However,
Gécamines’ revenue-generating capacity no longer
stems primarily from actual production, as it did during
the early years of President Mobutu’s regime. Instead,
revenue mainly flows from the initial payments
pledged by potential foreign joint-venture partners in
return for the granting of concessions. The Panel has
established that the amount of the payment is one of
the primary considerations for the cash-strapped
Government in granting concessions. As a result,
unsustainable and environmentally hazardous mining
operations currently characterize Gécamines’ copper
and cobalt mining activities. The future of what was
once the giant of the country’s economy appears bleak.
Diamonds
36. Owing to the size of the industry and the
relatively stable price of diamonds, it is now an
established fact that diamonds have had a significant
effect on conflicts in Africa. In Angola and Sierra
Leone, “conflict diamonds” mined in rebel-held areas1
have served as a motivation for and a means by which
some of the longest and bloodiest civil wars in Africa
have been and are still being fought. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo is not an exception. In this
respect, the Panel would like to emphasize the
importance of efforts by those involved in the
“Kimberley process” in developing an international
regulatory framework that will prevent conflict
diamonds from being marketed and traded through
legitimate industry channels. The Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has recently begun
participating in these efforts.
37. In 1998, the former Governor of Kasai Oriental
Province, Jean Charles Okoto, was named Managing
Director of Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA).
Statistics obtained by the Panel show that while
industrial and lower grades of diamonds have
consistently accounted for over 90 per cent of MIBA
production over the past decade, the small proportion
of gem and near-gem quality stones, which averaged
around 4 per cent of production, has shrunk
progressively since 1999. By 2001, they represented
barely 1.8 per cent of total production. The data,
together with information provided by highly reliable
sources, suggest that much of the company’s most
valuable diamond production is being embezzled and
sold for personal profit by high-level MIBA and
possibly other Government officials. The Panel
believes, on the basis of credible, independent reports,
that a portion of these embezzled gems are being
smuggled through South Africa for sale in third
countries. Credible information also suggests that
__________________
1 Diamonds that originate in areas controlled by forces or
factions opposed to legitimate and internationally
recognized Governments, and are used to fund military
action in opposition to those Governments or in
contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.
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Congolese authorities regularly skim millions of
dollars from the proceeds of MIBA sales. In some
cases, the funds are directly transferred from the
company’s Brussels account at the Banque Belgolaise.
There are also widespread allegations, which the Panel
was not able to substantiate, that diamonds from the
Angolan rebel force UNITA are being laundered
through MIBA in its tenders.
38. One of the largest joint ventures involving the
Zimbabwe Defence Forces is the Sengamines diamond
concession. The 25-year concession clearly represents
the richest diamond deposits of MIBA holdings, with a
potential production value estimated at over several
billion dollars.
39. The joint venture originally featured a partnership
between the ZDF-owned OSLEG (Operation Sovereign
Legitimacy) and the Congolese company COMIEXCongo.
COMIEX-Congo is a State-private venture that
acts as the Government’s main platform for
commercial deals and is reportedly linked to the
Presidency and senior government ministers. The
resulting joint venture, COSLEG, had neither the
capital nor the expertise to develop the full potential of
the concession. In a pattern that has developed in all of
Zimbabwe’s commercial investments in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, technical and financial support
was sought from a third party. In this case, the party
was Oryx Natural Resources, a British-Omani
company.2
40. The exact capital structure of Sengamines
remains somewhat unclear. Information obtained from
Sengamines representatives and COMIEX in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo indicated that Oryx
retained 49 per cent of the shares, COMIEX 33.8 per
cent and MIBA 16 per cent. The remaining 1.2 per cent
is divided among several individuals, including the
Minister for Public Security. Sengamines
representatives also told the Panel that COMIEX would
soon be dissolved and the government share in the
venture would be controlled by the Ministry of the
Portfolio. In a document concerning a planned reverse
takeover of Oryx Natural Resources in 2000, reference
is made, however, to dividing the “distributable
profits” from the concession on the following basis: 40
per cent to the Oryx group, 20 per cent to OSLEG and
20 per cent to COMIEX-COSLEG. In this scenario, the
__________________
2 The company, directed by an Omani entrepreneur, is
registered in the Cayman Islands.
Congolese partners would be considerably
marginalized, especially MIBA. The separate Oryx
Zimcon joint venture, involving yet another ZDFowned
company, is described as holding 90 per cent of
the concession mining rights. Many well-informed
sources emphasized to the Panel that the concession
granted to Sengamines was the last strategic diamond
reserve of MIBA and that MIBA has been irreparably
weakened by the loss of this concession. Some sources
even alleged that the granting of the concession is the
prelude to liquidating MIBA, with Sengamines
replacing it as the new premier diamond producer in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
41. While the Congolese partner provides the
resources to be exploited, Oryx furnishes the necessary
capital and expertise. Through Abadiam, its agent in
Antwerp, Oryx is also directly involved in the
marketing process. Although sharing substantially in
the profits, the Zimbabwean side in this complex joint
venture has no apparent role, apart from its strategic
troop deployment in the diamond-rich Kasai region.
This area is known for its secessionist tendencies and
being the stronghold of popular opposition politician
Etienne Tshisekedi of the Union pour la démocratie et
le progrès social (UPDS).
42. An estimated one third of the total rough diamond
production of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
valued at $300 million a year, is smuggled to the
Central African Republic and the Republic of the
Congo because the export duties are much lower in
those countries. A significant percentage of these
diamonds also find their way to South Africa. The
Panel believes that the stones are mostly exported from
these transit points, to the major diamond trading
centres in Belgium, the Netherlands, Israel and the
United Kingdom. The smaller diamond centres in
Mauritius, India and the United Arab Emirates (Dubai),
reportedly receive a lesser share. The new mining code
of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, being drafted with assistance from the World
Bank and advice from the World Diamond Council, is
expected to redress the issue of the heavy taxes levied
by the revenue-starved Government on diamond
exports, which helps spur this illicit trade.
43. In following the trail of diamond exports from the
Zimbabwean ventures in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the Panel learned from the Ministry of
Mines of Zimbabwe that the import of rough diamonds
into Zimbabwe is prohibited. This information was
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corroborated by data provided by other credible
sources, which showed no diamond imports originating
from Zimbabwe. The Panel has been able to establish
that these diamonds are handled by the South Africanbased
Petra Diamonds Ltd.,3 which now owns Oryx
Natural Resources, following a reverse takeover in
2000.
44. Diamonds from artisanal mining in the northern
Kisangani area have provided a source of revenue for
the rebels, RPA and UPDF for the continuation of the
conflict. The high combined taxes imposed by the
RCD-Goma rebel group and RPA ultimately resulted in
diamonds mined in this area being redirected to
Kampala, where lower tax rates prevail. Data on
Ugandan diamond exports confirm this. From 1987 to
1996, no diamond exports from Uganda were recorded
for this market. From 1997 to 2000, exports from
Uganda ranged from 2,000 to 11,000 carats, with
values of up to $1.7 million per year. Figures for 2001,
extrapolated from the sales for the first eight months,
show an estimated 35,000 carats, valued at $3.8
million, in Ugandan diamond exports to Antwerp.
45. To gain a better understanding of the diamond
exploitation activities carried out in the rebel-held and
occupied territories, the Panel has taken a closer look
at the activities of the Belco-Diamant comptoir in
Kisangani. Following the rebel administration’s
cancellation of the monopoly on diamond exports
granted to Mr. Nassour in Kisangani, the Belco
comptoir was established. This comptoir is owned by
Mr. Lukasa, a former minister under President Mobutu,
as well as Emile Serphati, and was licensed to export
diamonds by the rebel administration. Although Belco
pays a 5 per cent export tax to the RCD-controlled
Ministry of Mines, the Panel has information that a 10
per cent tax is also levied on the comptoir by the
“Congo desk” in Kigali. Buyers, such as Arslanian
Frères, purchase diamonds from Belco, which are then
shipped directly to Antwerp in Belgium. As there is no
sanctions regime in effect against diamonds originating
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Diamond
High Council in Antwerp inspected and approved
__________________
3 Petra Diamonds Ltd. is actually registered in Bermuda
although most of its operations and holdings are in South
Africa. The company also has subsidiaries or
concessions, some active and other not, in Namibia,
Botswana and Angola. Its directors include a former
United States diplomat, an Omani government official
and a Commonwealth Secretariat official.
Arslanian Frères’ imports of diamonds originating in
the rebel-controlled region of Kisangani. The owner,
Raffi Arslanian, told the Panel that Arslanian Frères
had ceased all imports from Belco in May 2001 and
furnished purchase receipts to substantiate this.
46. Statistics from credible sources also showed that
diamond exports from Rwanda to Antwerp, in contrast
to Uganda, have not increased. They informed the
Panel that the reason behind this is the Rwandan Congo
desk’s relatively high tax (10 per cent) levied on the
export of diamonds from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, added to the 5 per cent tax charged by the
Congolese rebel administration. These taxes have
driven many of the artisanal miners from the Kisangani
area to smuggle their production through the Central
African Republic and the Republic of the Congo.
Diamonds are also reportedly transported personally by
Asian and Lebanese traders operating in the eastern
region, to South Africa and to Belgium and other
European countries.
47. Belgium, along with the Diamond High Council
in Antwerp, has taken serious steps to halt imports of
conflict diamonds, for example from Angola and Sierra
Leone, by instituting strict controls and by playing a
leading role in the design and adoption of an
international diamond certification system. However, it
still remains an important destination for those tainted
diamonds owing to the lack of similar controls in other
European Union countries. Another related issue raised
in the Kimberley process is the difficulty of adapting a
certification and inspection regime to the customs and
other trade procedures of a single integrated trade
market such as the European Union.
Timber
48. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is
endowed with some of the finest hard woods in the
world. Most timber products from the eastern region
have traditionally been shipped via the Congo River for
export in Kinshasa. The Panel learned, however, that
since the beginning of the 1998 war, logging
companies in the eastern region have used the port of
Mombasa in Kenya for exports. Although the Panel has
evidence to show that timber from the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo is exported both
from the port of Dar es Salaam and through Kampala to
the port of Mombasa, the Governments of both the
United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda denied that
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any transited through either country. Information
provided to the Panel proves however that timber
processed at Mangina (North Kivu) transits through
Uganda on its way to Mombasa, transported by the
freight company TMK. With regard to the United
Republic of Tanzania, the Panel has obtained
documents that clearly indicate that, during the period
from December 2000 to March 2001, at least two
shipments of timber originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo were transported across the
United Republic of Tanzania by railway from Kigoma
to the port of Dar es Salaam. The documents also show
that both shipments were intended for transit through
the port. These shipments were consigned to companies
in Greece and Belgium.
49. The exploitation of timber is also occurring in the
Government-held territories. In 2000 COSLEG, the
joint venture between the ZDF-owned OSLEG and
COMIEX, established a subsidiary, Société congolaise
d’exploitation du bois (SOCEBO), for the exploitation
and commercialization of timber in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. It was set up with the aim to
“contribute in the war effort in the framework of
South-South cooperation”.
50. The Panel has gathered contradictory information
about the exact size of the concessions granted to the
joint venture, as well as its operational status and
investment strategies. SOCEBO representatives told
the Panel that six concessions had been applied for in
the Bandundu, Bas-Congo, Kasai and Katanga
Provinces, totalling 1.1 million hectares. However, the
United Kingdom non-governmental organization
Global Witness reports that four concessions totalling
33 million hectares were granted, making it the largest
timber exploitation operation in the world. According
to Global Witness, these concessions cover 15 per cent
of the national territory. The by-laws show COSLEG as
holding 98.8 per cent of the shares in the joint venture,
with the remaining 1.2 per cent of shares divided
between Mawapanga Mwana Nanga, Abdoulaye
Yerodia Ndombasi, Godefroid Tchamlesso, Charles
Dauramanzi, Collins Phiri and Francis Zvinavashe.
51. According to some sources, timber from the
Kasai and Katanga concessions would be transported
by train from Lubumbashi, through Zambia to the port
of Durban in South Africa, where it would be exported
to Asia, Europe and the United States. The Panel also
received very credible information that SOCEBO target
markets would include South Africa.
52. President Mugabe told the Panel at a meeting in
Harare that, although SOCEBO was supposed to
commence logging activities in May 2001, it had been
delayed owing to an inability to pay the customs duties
to the Zimbabwe Revenue Service on machinery
imported for the project. The SOCEBO Directors in
Kinshasa emphasized, however, that a lack of sufficient
capital had been the main obstacle to making SOCEBO
fully operational. The Panel also received credible
reports that the initial start-up capital of $600,000
intended for SOCEBO operations had been embezzled
by representatives of the diamond buying office,
Minerals Business Company, another COSLEG
subsidiary. The Panel learned that a police inquiry into
the disappearance of those funds had been suspended.
53. Heavy investment will still be required in order
for the company to realize its objectives, over $5
million according to the company’s own business plan.
The Panel has not been able to substantiate reports that
ZDF have contacted Malaysian, Lebanese and French
investors to explore the possibility of forming joint
ventures to develop these concessions.
54. According to information provided by SOCEBO,
however, in July 2001 a joint venture was established
with Western Hemisphere Capital Management
(WHCM), described by some as a United Kingdom
company based in Harare. The venture, SAB-Congo,
was formed to develop one of the concessions in
Katanga Province. WHCM, which is providing the
needed capital and equipment, currently owns 60 per
cent of the shares. SOCEBO holds 35 per cent, while
the Institut National pour l’étude et la recherche
agronomique (INERA), a Congolese State-run institute
for agriculture, holds 5 per cent. The duration of the
agreement is 10 years. The first timber sales from the
venture are expected in November 2001. The Panel was
unable to determine if WHCM is in any way linked to
Western Hemisphere Resource Exploration (WHRE),4
which recently formed a diamond mining joint venture
with COSLEG, the Société congolaise d’exploitation
minière. SOCEBO is also currently conducting
negotiations with Assetfin, a Zimbabwean company
owned by Time Bank, in a similar arrangement for
another concession.
55. The Directors of SOCEBO told the Panel during
an interview in September in Kinshasa that, while it
__________________
4 WHRE is registered in the Isle of Man and according to
the by-laws is owned by Elki Pianim.
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continues to seek investors, it is currently exporting
timber bought from local small-scale loggers. It is also
in the process of annulling a partnership deal with a
private Congolese logging company for its concession
in the Bas-Congo, which it described as “unprofitable”.
While SOCEBO directors painted a picture of a
company still struggling to get operations under way
and burdened by debts and back-tax bills, the Panel has
received credible reports that Zimbabwean military
personnel have been carrying out intensive logging
operations in the SOCEBO concession in Katanga,
apparently in conjunction with SAB-Congo.
V. The link between exploitation of
resources and the continuation of
the conflict
Overview
56. Through its fact-finding, the Panel attempted to
analyse to what degree the exploitation of natural
resources and other forms of wealth constitutes the
motivation behind each party’s activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to what extent
the exploitation provides the means for sustaining the
conflict. In doing so, it assessed the recent
developments in the conflict area and their implications
for the exploitation activities. The Panel then
evaluated, on an individual basis, the activities of the
different States involved in the exploitation process.
Recent developments and their implications
57. There are indications that clashes during the past
seven months in the Oriental and Kivu regions between
the Mayi-Mayi, who appear to be better equipped and
coordinated than before, and UPDF and the MLC rebel
group have been directly related to control of coltan
and gold. Similar short-lived battles have been fought
by the Mayi-Mayi with RPA over access to coltan
throughout the Kivus. The Panel also believes that the
infighting among the Congolese rebel groups in recent
months, which has caused them to splinter and led to
occasional violence, has been related to control over
coltan, gold and diamonds in the Beni and Bafwasende
areas.
58. The Panel received credible information,
corroborating reports from independent sources, that
Zimbabwe is supporting the Burundian FDD rebel
forces by supplying them with weapons and expertise.
Many reliable sources have informed the Panel in this
regard that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces are training
FDD in Lubumbashi, where the FDD leadership is
based and where Zimbabwean copper and cobalt
investments are located. Another sign of their loosely
structured coordination with the Burundian rebels is
that the ALIR II forces are based near FDD in South
Kivu and also have a command and liaison presence in
Lubumbashi. The Panel concluded that the arming of
these irregular groups is contributing to sustaining
what could be viewed as a war by proxy in the east. It
allows the ceasefire to remain intact, while creating a
“controllable” conflict in the occupied zone that
satisfies the interests of many parties. With this
sporadic, low-intensity conflict dragging on, a certain
status quo is being maintained in this region where
many precious resources are extracted, traded and
routed for export. Zimbabwe and Rwanda have the
most important commercial presence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo as a result of their involvement
in the war. The role that Zimbabwe plays in regard to
continuing the conflict may well be shared with the
Government of the Democratic of the Republic of the
Congo, or at least some elements in it, as well as
others. This armed activity can continue to feed
Rwandan and Burundian security concerns, becoming
an added justification for those two countries to
maintain their military positions. In the case of
Rwanda, control can then be legitimately deepened
over a considerable expanse of territory, as well as its
population and resources. As Zimbabwe’s joint
ventures in mining and timber begin to mature and
become profitable, it may be tempted to retain a
sizeable military presence in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The profiteering of private businesses of
all kinds in illicit and criminal activities gives them
vested interests in seeing the conflict continuing, in
particular businesses in South Africa, Kenya and the
United Republic of Tanzania.
59. The link to the control and commercialization of
the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
is more implicit than explicit. The Fizi Baraka region,
where the most recent and intense fighting has
occurred, is strategic for many reasons. It has been a
stronghold for certain Mayi-Mayi groups and a base for
the Burundian rebel forces, particularly FDD. ALIR II
forces, which many military sources describe as the
better armed and commanded of the Interahamwe and
ex-FAR groups, use this area and nearby Shabunda to
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66. Documentary evidence gathered shows that, in
1999, over 30 per cent of the first semester earnings of
MIBA were transferred to Government accounts. Those
transfers were vaguely labelled “payments to fiscal
accounts” (paiements accomptes fiscaux). It is not clear
who within the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo controls these accounts, or what
the funds transferred to them are used for. Another 11
per cent of the earnings from that period were
funnelled directly to the Congolese armed forces. Other
transfers from MIBA sales are described in official
documents as “deductions for the war effort”,
amounting to tens of millions of dollars. Testimony
from very credible sources corroborates what these
documents suggest: a pattern over the past three years
of diverting a hefty percentage of MIBA earnings to
high-level government officials for their personal
benefit, as well as to cover war or military-related
expenses.
67. In some cases, it appears that deals were
concluded because they were linked, directly or
indirectly, to arms and military support. In 1997, the
Kabila Government ended the exclusive contract it had
with De Beers to buy all of the industrial diamond
output of MIBA. Following a period in which
Congolese diamonds were sold on the international
auction market to the highest bidder, President Kabila
reached an agreement with the Israeli-owned
International Diamond Industries in August 2000 for a
monopoly on diamond sales. According to the terms of
the agreement, IDI agreed to pay $20 million in return
for a monopoly on sales valued at $600 million
annually. The Panel was informed by very credible
sources that this deal included unpublished clauses, in
which IDI agreed to arrange, through its connections
with high-ranking Israeli military officers the delivery
of undisclosed quantities of arms as well as training for
the Congolese armed forces.
68. IDI ultimately paid only $3 million from the
agreed sum of $20 million. President Joseph Kabila
decided in April 2001 to end the contract, citing failure
to pay as the reason. In his statement, the owner of IDI,
Dan Gertler, claimed that IDI had complied with its
obligations and alleged that the Government’s decision
was motivated by the fact that information about the
agreement was included in the Panel’s final report. The
statement also insisted that the Panel did not consult
with IDI and demanded that the Panel rectify its report.
The Panel requested to meet with IDI representatives in
Kinshasa in September 2001. IDI declined this request.
IDI is reportedly trying to negotiate some form of
compensation for breach of contract with the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
69. It is important to look at this failed Kabila-Gertler
deal as a number of key aspects are significant. On the
Congolese side, it comes within a pattern of
miscalculated decisions taken by the cash-strapped
Laurent-Désiré Kabila, whose main interest was the
immediate cash flow. Although there was some
discontent within Kabila’s entourage at the
outrageousness of the deal, it was, nonetheless, not
revoked until seven months after it was signed. The
Panel has credible information indicating that there is a
growing involvement of Israeli businessmen in the
region. Taking advantage of the withdrawal of De
Beers from conflict diamond regions, a whole network
of Israelis was established, including Mr. Gertler in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lev Leviev in
Angola and Shmuel Shnitzer in Sierra Leone. In all
three cases, the pattern is the same. Conflict diamonds
are exchanged for money, weapons and military
training. These diamonds are then transported to Tel
Aviv by former Israeli Air Force pilots, whose numbers
have significantly increased both in UNITA-held
territory in Angola and in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. In Israel, these diamonds are then cut and
sold at the Ramat Gan Diamond Centre.
70. During their meetings with the Panel, members of
the Congolese Commission indicated that, as the
country moves towards greater political openness, the
Kinshasa Government will have to take action on the
issue of Zimbabwe’s activities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Commission also
expressed their view that the question should figure on
the agenda of the inter-Congolese dialogue, and that a
protocol d’accord must be established between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe to
rectify the irregularities, including agreements secretly
signed under pressure of the military situation at the
time.
71. Further evidence of this collapse of a functional
State, and its inability to make decisions in its national
interest, is reflected in the stance currently adopted by
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo towards the activities being carried out in the
rebel-held areas. The Panel has learned, from
commercial companies and individual business people
who have operated under both the Kinshasa
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Government and rebel authorities, that the regulations
and procedures have not, for the most part, changed
under rebel administrations. In fact, civil servants
appointed by the Government are still performing such
duties as customs control and tax collection in rebelheld
areas. However, the taxes are not received by the
Government in Kinshasa but are diverted for the use of
the rebels and Uganda and Rwanda. This is
acknowledged by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which, offered in September
2001 to pay the 37-month arrears and salaries of those
civil servants. Furthermore, the Government in
Kinshasa appears to have recognized the activities of
the commercial entities in the rebel-held areas. One of
the many examples is the German-owned company
Somikivu, which operates in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, but continues to pay taxes to
the rebels and maintains an office in Kinshasa. When
asked about the legal status of the commercial entities
operating in the rebel-held and occupied territories, the
Congolese Minister of Justice informed the Panel
during a meeting in September 2001 that none of the
concessions had been revoked thus far, and that an
evaluation on a case-by-case basis would be conducted
when the Government regained control of the areas in
which they are operating.
72. To further demonstrate this, the Panel has taken a
closer look at the legal status of DARA Forest, a Thaiowned
company operating in North Kivu Province.
DARA Forest is a Congolese-registered logging
company owned by five shareholders. Royal Star
Holdings is the main shareholder, and is partly owned
by the managing director of DARA Forest, John
Kotiram. Besides Mr. Kotiram, there are three
Congolese shareholders. In March 1998, DARA Forest
registered as a Congolese company in Kinshasa, after
which work was begun on building a sawmill in
Mangina in North Kivu Province. In June 1998, DARA
Forest was granted a 35,000-hectare logging
concession from the North Kivu Provincial Authority,
which grants these concessions following registration
with the central Government. DARA Forest also
acquired an exploitation licence from the same
authority to buy and export from local loggers. Its
exports, which were to the United States and China,
started early in 1999, months after the beginning of the
war.
73. DARA Forest, which the Panel has found to have
complied with all the regulations in effect, currently
pays its taxes at the same bank as it did before the area
came under rebel control. It also deals with the same
customs officials as it did before the rebels took control
of the area when it exports its products and imports
production equipment. The Panel has also learned that
a bimonthly check is conducted by the local Congolese
authorities in North Kivu to ensure that DARA Forest
is complying with the terms of licences granted to it.
Furthermore, DARA Forest was granted on 12
September 2001 a certificate of registration from the
Ministry of Justice in Kinshasa. This would appear to
be a clear sign of recognition of the company and
acceptance of its work in the rebel-held areas by the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
74. The case of Arslanian Frères also demonstrates
the ambiguity of the Government’s approach. The
diamond company Arslanian Frères, based in Belgium,
has an agreement to buy all the stock of the Belco
Diamants comptoir in Kisangani and to “help them
financially when needed” and has been travelling to
Kisangani to openly purchase diamonds mined in the
rebel-held areas surrounding the town. Nevertheless,
one of the owners of the company, Raffi Arslanian, was
approached in writing in 2001 by the Government’s
Minister of Mines to invest in a multi-million-dollar
project aimed at reorganizing the State-owned
diamond-producing enterprise MIBA.
75. There are many indications that President Joseph
Kabila is genuinely interested in bringing about
positive changes in his country. The Panel has noted
that, not withstanding the political considerations
involved in the granting of favourable concessions to
his allies, there are serious attempts to attract foreign
investment to restructure, modernize and liberalize the
remaining State assets in the mining business. In this
respect, the country’s new mining code is expected to
bring about some fundamental and positive changes to
the mining industry in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
Zimbabwe
76. According to information available to the Panel,
there are five main factors at play, which helped to
shape the Zimbabwean objectives in its involvement in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. One
determining factor is Zimbabwe’s desire to assert its
role within SADC. Supporting the Democratic
Republic of the Congo militarily presented such an
opportunity. A second factor lies in Zimbabwe’s ailing
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of the shares in BCDI. The 2000 audit report on BCD,
set up as a joint venture by the AFDL-controlled
COMIEX, shows that Tristar owns 10 per cent of the
shares. Mr. Kalisa told the Panel that information in its
report regarding a banking transaction for monies paid
to COMIEX-AFDL in 1997 was inaccurate. The Panel
has been able to corroborate Mr. Kalisa’s description of
the transaction, in which $3.5 million were transferred
from the Banque Belgolaise through Citibank to BCDI
for payment to COMIEX. Mr. Kalisa also told the
Panel that information in the report regarding a
$1 million loan to the RCD-Goma controlled SONEX
for payment of fuel bills with Jambo Safari airlines was
incorrect. The loan was made, according to Mr. Kalisa,
for payment of fuel from Alliance Express airlines.
Uganda
95. Uganda also has some legitimate security threats,
which prompted its military intervention in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. In so intervening,
the Government of Uganda enacted a protocol between
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda,
signed in April 1998, allowing two battalions from
each country to cross the border in pursuit of
perpetrators of terrorist activities.
96. The Panel notes that Uganda has complied with
the presidential statement (S/PRST/2001/13) by
establishing a national Commission of Inquiry, the
Porter Commission.
97. While the effect of the Panel’s report and the
significant withdrawal of UPDF troops have given the
impression that the exploitation activities have been
reduced, they are in fact continuing. The commercial
networks put in place by Ugandan army commanders
and their civilian counterparts that were described in
the report are still functioning in Oriental Province and
Kampala. The Trinity and Victoria companies, for
example, are still actively exploiting diamonds, gold,
coffee and timber. UPDF have thus been able to pull
out their troops, while leaving behind structures that
permit military officers and associates, including rebel
leaders, to continue profiting.
98. While the Government of Uganda does not
participate directly in the exploitation activities, the
culture in which its military personnel function
tolerates and condones their activities. The commercial
activities of senior UPDF officers are public
knowledge. In an interview with the Panel in August
2001, the now retired General Salim Saleh admitted
that, while never having been in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, one of his companies had been
engaged in exporting merchandise to the eastern part of
the country. He noted that the aircraft transporting the
merchandise was initially confiscated by General
James Kazini. General Kazini, who also participated in
the interview, in turn described his role in facilitating
the transport of Ugandan merchandise to Kisangani and
other areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
In full control of the areas under their administration,
General Kazini and others used this power, as they
would have done elsewhere, to establish a mechanism
to promote their business interests. The characteristics
of the area under their control predominantly determine
the kind of exploitation activities carried out by UPDF
personnel.
99. The Panel has noted that the UPDF officers
usually conduct their business through a Congolese
affiliate, on whom they bestow power and support.
This was the case with Jean-Pierre Bemba, Adele
Lotsove and, more recently, Roger Lumbala of the now
defunct RCD-National, as well as Mbusa Nyamwisi.
Sources have informed the Panel that RCD-National
was formed by General Kazini in 2000 from RCDGoma
defectors, who gave them Bafwasende as their
base. More recently, the Panel learned that
Mr. Lumbala had signed two commercial agreements
bearing the signatures of UPDF Commander Kahinda
Otafire and Belgian and Austrian parties. In addition,
the Panel has learned that, late in December 2000,
Lumbala — who is reportedly a front for the monopoly
of the Victoria company on the Bafwasende
diamonds — was in Kampala delivering diamonds to
what the sources termed his “masters”. Another
activity UPDF officers are involved in is the liberal
siphoning off of the customs revenues on the illicit
trade between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda. A very credible source informed the Panel
in that regard that Mr. Nyamwisi “skims” up to
$400,000 off the tax revenues collected from the Beni
customs post at the Uganda border. According to the
same source, Mr. Nyamwisi shares this money with
General Kazini and General Salim Saleh.
100. There is a link between the continuation of the
conflict and the exploitation of the natural resources, in
the case of Uganda. Influential Government officials,
military officers and businessmen continue to exploit
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the security situation for their vested commercial
interests.
Burundi
101. The Panel found no evidence directly linking the
presence of Burundi in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to the exploitation of resources. Although its
army is positioned in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo near a traditional trade and transit point for
minerals, its presence has been and continues to be
directed at blocking attacks from the Burundi rebel
groups, particularly FDD, which are based in South
Kivu and Katanga.
102. In its reaction to the Panel’s report, the
Government of Burundi contested the Panel’s
conclusions that Burundi had been exporting minerals
it did not produce, and specifically mentioned the case
of diamond exports coinciding with the 1998
occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In an effort to verify this information, the Panel
contacted the Africa Department of IMF, requesting a
copy of an IMF memorandum which supports the
report’s statements. Although IMF representatives
confirmed that they were trying to locate the document,
the Panel has not been able to obtain a copy of it. In
addition, the Minister of Energy and Mines and
representatives of Burundi’s mining sector provided the
Panel with information supporting Burundi’s claims
that gold, coltan and cassiterite deposits can be found
in its northern and north-eastern regions. Modest
quantities of coltan and cassiterite have also been
produced and exported during the past eight years. The
Panel found however that the data on gold production
and exports were not coherent, as they confirmed that
artisanal gold mining has continued over the past eight
years, whereas export statistics recorded zero gold
exports from 1997 to 2000. Concerning cobalt, the
Panel was informed that there are significant deposits,
but that production has not yet been developed. Private
sector and Government representatives also stressed
that there is no domestic production of copper or
diamonds at this time.
103. The Panel confirmed that Burundi has
traditionally served as a re-export and transit centre for
gold and diamonds originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Much of this trade has however
subsided following a three-year embargo imposed on
Burundi in 1996. Officials also emphasized that
Burundi’s inability to control its borders, together with
its tradition of cross-border trade, has led to
widespread smuggling by small-scale operations.
104. The Government of Burundi also provided the
Panel with information to the effect that it had had a
legitimate opportunity to profit from the mineral
wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
1997 and had turned it down. A copy of the draft
agreement shows that the Congolese Minister of Mines
had offered the Government of Burundi and
businessmen a joint mining venture in the Bafwasende
region for a concession area of 20,000 km2, with
abundant deposits of gold, diamonds, coltan and
cassiterite.
VI. Transit countries
105. Although they are not directly involved in the
conflict, the Panel has investigated the role of some of
the neighbouring countries in the region to establish a
more comprehensive picture of the exploitation
activities.
South Africa
106. South Africa maintains a neutral stance towards
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and is calling for the implementation of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement and the end of the conflict. South
Africa also maintains close ties with all the parties and
is actively involved in the peace process. Its former
President, Nelson Mandela, is also the mediator for the
Arusha peace process in Burundi.
107. On the commercial level, South Africa is very
much involved in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. The Panel was able to see this at first hand
during its visit to the northern Zambian border area
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Around
150 large trucks cross this border every day, carrying
foodstuffs, machinery and other products
predominantly from South Africa. Many of the trucks
transport copper and cobalt to South Africa on the
return trip, where it is processed and shipped from the
ports of Durban and Nelson Mandela (Port Elizabeth)
to its final destinations, thus effectively ending the role
of the port of Dar es Salaam as the traditional port of
exit for Congolese copper and cobalt. As South Africa
is a country with potential water shortages, South
African businessmen are currently studying the option
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142. ALIR II, over 5,000 strong, is mostly based in
South Kivu, near Shabunda, Fizi and Baraka, but also
has a command and liaison presence in Lubumbashi in
Katanga Province. Some of its troops are reportedly
recruited from the Zambian refugee camps. As part of a
fluid, ongoing alliance with FDD and the Mayi-Mayi,
they reportedly have been clashing with RCD-Goma
and Rwandan and Burundian forces in the South Kivu
region. The continued, and sometimes intensifying,
fighting appears aimed, in the opinion of many
informed sources, at either controlling a corridor into
Burundi or continuing to destabilize the region so as to
prevent an effective demobilization effort from getting
under way. Credible sources also indicate that several
thousand ALIR combatants were recently incorporated
into the Congolese Armed Forces. During the visit of
the Secretary-General to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo in September, President Kabila announced
that 3,000 ex-FAR and Interahamwe soldiers located in
Kamina (Katanga Province) would be demobilized,
under the supervision of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
VIII. Conclusions
143. The systematic exploitation of natural resources
and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo continues unabated. These activities
involve a large number of State and non-State actors,
belonging both to the region and outside, some directly
involved in the conflict, others not. The exploitation
has resulted in the further enrichment of individuals
and institutions, who are opportunistically making use
of the current situation to amass as much wealth as
possible.
144. Without a resolution of the broader conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, it
would be highly unrealistic to expect an end to the
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth in the country. Exploitation of natural resources
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be
viewed and dealt with in isolation, disregarding the
factual situation existing in the area. It needs to be
realized that this is one part of the problem which is
inextricably linked to other serious issues in the region.
145. A primary and fundamental reason for the
continuing and systematic exploitation by various
“predatory” groups operating in the country is the
effective collapse of all State institutions and structures
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Unable or
unwilling to resist any pressure, it is vulnerable in the
extreme. It must be remembered that a weak State
offers significant financial opportunities and rewards to
unscrupulous elements operating under the garb of
various Governments, businesses, mafias, individuals
etc. It would be highly unrealistic to expect a State
under such conditions to exercise even a modicum of
authority over its territory. In order to redress this
grave condition, it is of the utmost importance to start
rebuilding the State institutions. This will require a
systematic and sustained approach stretching over
many years, and with the full assistance and
cooperation of the international community.
146. The conflict continues at a low intensity level,
mainly by the various armed groups confronting the
foreign forces so as to deny them access to and control
of various resources. However, the ceasefire is
generally respected on the front line, leaving the
exploitation of the resources as the main activity of the
foreign troops, as well as the different armed groups,
where the former tolerate the activities of the latter as a
controlled military opposition to ensure the
continuation of the security threats, and hence justify
their continued military presence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
147. Accordingly, there is a clear link between the
continuation of the conflict and the exploitation of
natural resources. It would not be wrong to say that one
drives the other. The military operations and presence
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of all sides
have been transformed into self-financing activities,
whereby no real budgetary burden is borne by the
parties concerned. This allows them a greater degree of
freedom and no financial compulsion to end the
conflict.
148. The initial motivation of foreign countries or
armies to intervene in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo was primarily political and security-related in
nature; over a period of time, and owing to the
evolving nature of the conflict, it has become the
primary motive of extracting the maximum commercial
and material benefits. This holds true for both
government allies and rebel supporters.
149. Owing to the prolonged nature of conflict and
civil war in the region, many countries appear to have a
sense of heightened insecurity and suspicions about
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their neighbours’ motives. Countries involved in the
conflict should not, however, be allowed to use this as
a pretext for furthering their own national ambitions
and agendas.
150. Contrary to its strong protestations, the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
has been involved in allowing some foreign companies
to continue the exploitation of resources in rebeloccupied
areas without renouncing or cancelling any
concessions. This is borne out by the fact that some
ministries in Kinshasa maintain contacts with these
companies, with whom they actively interact.
151. The actual sources for financing the war effort by
all parties in the conflict, including the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, remain shrouded in mystery.
No clear answer was given by anyone the Panel
questioned and it was evident that there was much to
conceal and not make public. The official defence
budgets of countries engaged in the hostilities, in those
cases where selected information was provided, clearly
indicate that these countries could not afford the cost of
their involvement in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. It is evident that in such cases the war effort
was financed from extrabudgetary sources, giving rise
to much suspicion and misgivings. Some of the
international aid may have been misused for financing
the conflict. This can be misconstrued as recognition
and acceptance of their activities in perpetuating the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
IX. Recommendations
Institutional
152. To enable the Democratic Republic of the Congo
to have effective control over its territory and to protect
its natural resources from illicit activities, the
international community should assist in formulating a
plan of action on the rebuilding of State institutions in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This should be
linked to the convening of an international conference
on peace and development in the Great Lakes region.
153. All concessions, commercial agreements and
contracts signed during the era of Laurent-Désiré
Kabila (1997-2001) and subsequently in the rebel-held
areas, including such concessions, contracts and
commercial agreements signed secretly and under
duress, should be reviewed and revised to address and
correct all the irregularities. In redressing these
contractual obligations, the renegotiation process
should be conducted under the auspices of a special
body to be created by the Security Council. This
process will enhance President Joseph Kabila’s efforts
towards rebuilding and reconstructing his country in a
transparent and structured manner, which would
encourage the genuine foreign investment of which the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is in such dire need.
Establishment of a broad-based government of national
unity may facilitate this process.
154. The United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo should accelerate
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
process in order to reduce the security concerns
expressed by a number of States in the region,
including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to a
level that makes it possible for the countries concerned
to negotiate among themselves the modalities of
securing their borders without infringing upon the
sovereignty of any State.
Financial and technical
155. The World Bank, IMF and the other international
donors are best placed to critically evaluate their
assistance. Those international donors may consider
submitting to the Security Council, within the shortest
possible time, their assessment of the role of their
assistance in helping to finance the continuation of the
conflict and the maintenance of the status quo in the
Great Lakes region.
156. A moratorium should be declared for a specific
period of time banning the purchase and importing of
precious products such as coltan, diamonds, gold,
copper, cobalt, timber and coffee originating in areas
where foreign troops are present in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, as well as in territories under
the control of rebel groups.
157. During the period of the moratorium, countries
directly or indirectly involved in the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo — in particular
transit countries such as Zambia, South Africa, Kenya
and the United Republic of Tanzania — should review
their national legislation, and pass the necessary laws
to investigate and prosecute the illicit traffickers of the
high-value products from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
158. During the same period, all technical measures
that are under consideration should be finalized, such
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as the standardization of certificates of production,
harmonization of tax regimes and verification
regulations, compilation of analyses of diamond
production and trade statistics. These measures should
be monitored to verify their effectiveness by the related
bodies such as the World Diamond Council, the United
Nations Forum on Forests and CITES. Emphasis on
standardization and unification of procedures and
regulations should also be placed at the ports of entry
at the final destination.
159. Revenues from the resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo should be channelled through
States’ budgets. Tax collection and use should be
rigorously controlled, transparent and accountable.
Sanctions
160. The Security Council may consider the
imposition of sanctions. The timing of such sanctions
would depend, however, on the evolution of the
situation with regard to the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as
well as developments in the Great Lakes region, after
the present addendum is issued. Pending any action
that the Security Council may decide to take, there is a
need to establish a monitoring and follow-up
mechanism, which would report on a regular basis to
the Security Council on whether progress has been
made in exploitation activities and other issues under
consideration by the Council, prior to a decision on
sanctions.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem, Chairman
(Signed) Mujahid Alam
(Signed) Mel Holt
(Signed) Henri Maire
(Signed) Moustapha Tall
(Signed) Gilbert Barthe
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Annex I
Countries visited and representatives of Governments and
organizations interviewed
The Panel wishes to express its deep appreciation to the government officials,
diplomats, non-governmental organizations, journalists and others with whom the
Panel met and who have assisted it in making possible the present addendum. The
Panel would especially like to express its gratitude for the high level of cooperation
extended to it by the Governments of Burundi, Namibia and Uganda.
The Panel, however, expresses its disappointment at the lack of adequate
cooperation from the Governments of South Africa, the United Republic of
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The Panel also wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and, in particular,
both Ambassador Kamal Morjane and Ambassador Amos Namanga Ngongi; the
United Nations Office at Nairobi, the United Nations Office in Angola and the
United Nations Office in Burundi, as well as the United Nations Development
Programme offices in Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Harare, Kampala, Kigali, Lusaka,
Pretoria and Windhoek.
The following is the list of government officials and others with whom the
Panel met during the course of its mandate. This list does not include many others
with whom the Panel met, who, in their interest, did not wish to be mentioned.
Angola
Government officials
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Minister of the Interior
Minister and Vice-Minister of Geology and Mines
Minister of Petroleum
Governor of the Central Bank
Vice-Minister of Commerce
Vice-Minister of Finance
Chairman of Sonangol
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Embassy of Portugal
Embassy of the United States of America
International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in Angola
Others
Chairman and General Director of the Angola Selling Corporation (ASCORP)
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Belgium
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Economic Affairs
Others
Chairman of the Belgian (Geens) Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on the
Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Diamond High Council (HRD), Antwerp
University of Antwerp
International Peace Information Service (IPIS)
Burundi
Government officials
His Excellency President Pierre Buyoya
His Excellency Vice-President Domitien Ndayizeye
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Minister of Commerce and Industry
Minister of Energy and Mines
Minister of Finance
Department of Customs
Bank of the Republic of Burundi
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of the United States of America
International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
Heads of the United Nations agencies
World Bank
Others
Association de banques commerciales
Comptoir minier des exploitations du Burundi (COMEBU)
Burundi Mining Company (BUMINCO)
International Rescue Committee
Central African Republic
Government officials
Ministry of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics
Central Bank of the States of Central Africa
Office de la réglementation de la commercialisation et du contrôle des produits
agricoles
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State representatives
Embassy of France
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Honorary Consul of Belgium
European Union
International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
UNDP
Others
Diamond export comptoirs
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
His Excellency President Joseph Kabila
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister to the Presidency
Minister of National Security and Public Order
Minister Delegate of Defence
Minister of Economy, Finance and Budget
Minister of Justice
Minister of Planning and Reconstruction
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Health
Minister of Environment and Tourism
Minister of PTT
Minister of Transport and Communications
Minister and Vice Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons
OFIDA (Office of Customs and Excise)
State representatives
Ambassador of Angola
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Namibia
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Embassy of France
Embassy of the United States of America
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
MONUC Force Commander and Chief of Staff
Major General Chingombe, SADC Task Force Commander
UNDP Resident Coordinator and Deputy Resident Coordinator
Others
Jean-Pierre Bemba, MLC/FLC
Banque de commerce et du développement
Commission of National Experts on the Pillaging and Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth
COMIEX
COSLEG
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Catholic Relief Services
Group Forrest
International Human Rights Law Group
Kababankola Mining Company
Kisenge Manganese
Oxfam (United Kingdom)
Sengamines
SOCEBO
SODIMICO
France
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kenya
Government officials
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Office of the President
Ministry of Finance and Planning
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Transport and Communications
Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources
Department of Defence
Customs and Excise Division
Port Authority, Port of Mombasa
Customs Division, Port of Mombasa
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of China
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of Rwanda
Ambassador of Switzerland
Ambassador of Thailand
Ambassador of the United States of America
High Commissioner of Uganda
High Commissioner of the United Republic of Tanzania
High Commissioner of Zambia
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of Germany
Embassy of the Netherlands
Embassy of the Sudan
High Commission of South Africa
High Commission of the United Kingdom
Head of the European Commission delegation
Namibia
Government officials
His Excellency President Sam Nujoma
Minister and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Minister of Trade and Industry
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Minister of Mines and Energy
Permanent Secretary of the National Planning Commission
Office of the President
State representatives
High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Ambassador of France
Head of the European Commission delegation
International organizations
UNDP Resident Coordinator
Others
August 26 Holding Company
Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Department of Customs
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
European Union
Rwanda
Government officials
His Excellency President Paul Kagame
Office of the President, Special Envoy for the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Burundi
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Patriotic Army
Minister of Commerce
Minister of Energy, Water and Natural Resources
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Justice
National Bank of Rwanda
Rwanda Revenue Authority
Magasins généraux du Rwanda (MAGERWA)
State representatives
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of Canada
Embassy of France
Embassy of Germany
Embassy of the Netherlands
Embassy of South Africa
Embassy of Switzerland
Embassy of the United States of America
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International organizations
World Bank
Heads of the United Nations agencies
Others
Federation of the Rwandan Private Sector (FSPR)
Federation of Customs Clearance Commissioners
Bank of Commerce, Development and Industry (BCDI)
Rwandan Bankers Association
Banque commerciale du Rwanda
Banque de Kigali
Eagles Wings Resources
Rwanda Metals SARL
SOGERMI SARL
South Africa
Government officials
Department of Foreign Affairs
Government Diamond Valuator
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Ambassador of France
International organizations
Heads of the United Nations agencies
Others
Institute for Strategic Studies
Anglo American Corporation
Uganda
Government officials
His Excellency President Yoweri Museveni
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Tourism, Trade and Industry
Minister of State for Mineral Development
Minister of State for Environment
General James Kazini
Lieutenant Colonel Nobel Mayumbu
State representatives
High Commission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Embassy of France
International organizations
Resident Representative of the World Bank
Resident Representative of the International Monetary Fund
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Others
General (Ret.) Salim Saleh
The Ugandan Commission of Inquiry (Porter Commission)
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
The East African
The Monitor
The New Vision
DARA Forest
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Customs and Excise
Others
Amnesty International
Africa Confidential
Global Witness
British Petroleum
De Beers
Anglo American Corporation
America Mineral Fields
Oxfam
Hart Ryan Productions
United Republic of Tanzania
Government officials
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals
Ministry of Industry and Trade
Ministry of Home Affairs
Governor of the Bank of Tanzania
Tanzania Harbour Authority
United States of America
World Bank
International Monetary Fund
Zambia
Government officials
His Excellency President Frederick Chiluba
Minister of Defence
Minister of Finance and Economic Development
Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Minister of State for Presidential Affairs
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development
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State representatives
Ambassador of the United States of America
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of France
International organizations
Secretary-General of COMESA
SADC Mining Coordinator
Others
Afronet
Zimbabwe
Government officials
His Excellency President Robert Mugabe
Minister of Mines and Energy
Minister of Transport and Communications
Minister of Environment
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chief of the Army
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
International organizations
United Nations Resident Coordinator
Others
Commercial Farmers’ Union
Zimbabwe Defence Industries
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Annex II
Abbreviations
AFDL Alliances des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-
Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-
Zaire)
ADF Allied Democratic Forces
ALIR Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of
Rwanda)
BCD Banque de commerce et du développement (Trade and Development
Bank)
BCDI Banque de commerce, de développement et d’industrie, Kigali
coltan columbo-tantalite
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMIEX Compagnie mixte d’import-export
COSLEG COMIEX-OSLEG joint venture
FAC Forces armées congolaises
ex-FAR former Forces armées rwandaises
FDD Forces pour la défense de la démocratie
FLC Front de libération du Congo
FLEC Frente para a Libertaçao do Enclave de Cabinda (Front for the
Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda)
FNL Forces nationales pour la libération
Gécamines Générale des carrières et des mines
IDI International Diamond Industries
IMF International Monetary Fund
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
MIBA Societé minière de Bakwanga
MLC Mouvement de libération congolais
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
OSLEG Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
PRA People’s Redemption Army
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese
Democracy)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Goma
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RCD-ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Mouvement de
libération, initially based in Kisangani, now based in Bunia
RCD-National Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, was based in
Bafwasende
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC Southern African Development Community
SCEM Société congolaise d’exploitation minière
SOCEBO Société d’exploitation du bois
SOMIKIVU Société minière du Kivu
Sonangol Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZDI Zimbabwe Defence Industries
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ANNEX 5.3
United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/565, 22 May 2002
United Nations S/2002/565
Security Council Distr.: General
22 May 2002
Original: English
02-38366 (E) 210502
*0238366*
Letter dated 22 May 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the President of the Security Council
I wish to refer to the presidential statement (S/PRST/2001/39) dated 19
December 2001, in which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of six months. The Security
Council requested the Panel to submit an interim report after three months and a
final report at the end of its mandate.
I have the honour to transmit to you the interim report of the Panel submitted
to me by the Chairman of the Panel. The report contains the Panel’s independent
assessment of the situation on the ground and its observations on the illegal
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I
should be grateful if you could bring the report to the attention of the members of
the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
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S/2002/565
Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
I. Introduction
1. At the request of the Security Council, the Panel
of Experts returned to Nairobi on 18 February 2002 to
carry out a third round of fact-finding on the
plundering of the natural resources and other forms of
wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the links between those activities and the continuation
of the conflict.
2. Two Panels were earlier mandated by the Security
Council (see S/PRST/2000/20 and S/PRST/2001/13) to
investigate these same issues and submit reports. The
Panel’s first report to the Security Council was issued
on 12 April 2001 (S/2001/357). The second Panel
continued the investigations in order to provide an
update, gather information on the countries and actors
that had not been sufficiently covered in the report and
respond to the reactions generated by the report. It
submitted to the Security Council an addendum to the
report, dated 13 November 2001 (S/2001/1072). In the
addendum, the Panel examined the role in the illegal
exploitation of Congolese resources not only of the
seven countries directly engaged in the conflict but also
of six African transit countries.
3. The Security Council, in a statement by its
President dated 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39),
requested the Secretary-General to renew the Panel’s
mandate for six months and asked the Panel to submit
both an interim and a final report. The mandate, which
has been enlarged, stipulates that the reports should
include the following:
(a) An update of relevant data and analysis of
further information from all relevant countries, in
particular from those which thus far have not provided
the Panel with the requested information;
(b) An evaluation of the possible actions that
could be taken by the Council, including those
recommended by the Panel in its report and the
addendum thereto, in order to help bring to an end the
plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, taking into account the impact
of such actions on the financing of the conflict and
their potential impact on the humanitarian and
economic situation in the country;
(c) Recommendations on specific actions that
the international community, in support of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
might take, working through existing international
organizations, mechanisms and United Nations bodies,
to address the issues in the report and the addendum;
(d) Recommendations on possible steps that
might be taken by transit countries as well as end-users
to contribute to ending the illegal exploitation of the
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
4. The Council also stressed the importance of the
Panel’s “maintaining a high level of collaboration with
all the Congolese players, governmental and nongovernmental,
throughout the national territory”.
5. The current Panel is composed of:
Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt),
Chairman
Jim Freedman (Canada)
Mel Holt (United States of America)
Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium)
Moustapha Tall (Senegal).
6. The Panel has been assisted by a part-time
technical adviser, Gilbert Barthe (Switzerland) and two
political officers, as well as an administrator and a
secretary. Certain administrative difficulties have
hampered the Panel’s work during this period. Some
have been resolved, but the Panel continues to operate
without one member and one part-time technical
adviser. The Panel has nevertheless striven to fulfil its
mandate to the best of its ability.
7. To guide its work, the Panel developed a plan of
action, which was transmitted to the Security Council.
The Panel decided during the first three months to
focus on four aspects of its mandate, namely, an update
of information; the role of transit and end-user
countries; the humanitarian and economic impact of the
exploitation activities and the armed conflict; and
maintaining a high level of collaboration with all
Congolese actors. Several of these elements are being
carried out in preparation for evaluating which
measures would be most effective in curbing the illegal
exploitation. Fact-finding is being limited to diamonds,
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gold, coltan, copper, cobalt, timber, wildlife reserves
and fiscal resources. The relationship between the
exploitation activities and arms trafficking and other
organized criminal activities is also a part of the
Panel’s investigations.
II. Activities in Africa
8. The Panel visited three of the countries in the
Great Lakes region that have been involved in the
conflict and which have also served as transit points for
certain natural resources: Uganda, Rwanda and
Burundi. The Panel visited the Democratic Republic of
the Congo twice, as well as two African transit
countries outside the region, the Republic of the Congo
and the Central African Republic. During those visits,
the Panel met with high-level government authorities,
technical officials, leading members of Congolese rebel
groups, representatives of the diplomatic corps,
MONUC, United Nations agencies, multilateral donors,
non-governmental organizations and civil society
associations. It also met with private commercial
operators. Technical meetings were held with officials
in each of the five transit countries visited to discuss
Governments’ responses to questions submitted by the
Panel regarding transit trade in resources such as
coltan, diamonds and gold.
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi
9. As the mandate of the Judicial Commission of
Inquiry established by the Government of Uganda was
originally due to expire in March, the Panel scheduled
its first visit in the region to Kampala. A working
session was held with the Commission, headed by
Justice David Porter. The Commission is also
investigating the illegal exploitation of resources in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and specifically the
involvement of the Government and other Ugandan
parties. This was the third meeting between the Panel
and the Porter Commission.
10. At the request of the Commission and
government authorities, and with the encouragement of
members of the international community, the Panel
decided to transmit to the Commission three pieces of
documentary evidence gathered in the course of its own
investigations. This evidence, which the Panel feels is
of considerable value, was presented to Justice Porter
in mid-March. The Panel hopes that this gesture of
cooperation will assist the Porter Commission in
advancing its inquiry and formulating constructive
recommendations for action by the Government of
Uganda. The Commission’s mandate has been extended
to the end of May 2002.
11. During the Panel’s visit to Kigali, Rwandan
authorities continued to insist on the persistent and
extensive nature of their security concerns as a result of
the actions of Hutu armed opposition groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. They emphasized
that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo should address these concerns within the
framework of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. They
also expressed the view that the exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and trade in many of these commodities, which
has traditionally existed across the two countries’
borders, are secondary issues which cannot be properly
resolved before progress is made on the fundamental
political and security issues.
12. The Panel also visited Bujumbura. The
relationship between the conflicts in Burundi and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the possible
repercussions for regional stability were one important
aspect of the Panel’s fact-finding during this visit.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Inter-Congolese dialogue
13. In accordance with its mandate and its plan of
action, the Panel had intended to visit South Africa in
order to meet with representatives of the various
sectors participating in the inter-Congolese dialogue at
Sun City. The Panel consulted with the office of the
facilitator, the Government of South Africa and
MONUC regarding the advisability and the timing of
its proposed visit to South Africa to meet with the
delegates at the inter-Congolese dialogue. On the
advice of the facilitation team, which expressed the
view that the Panel’s presence might have a detrimental
impact, the Panel decided not to visit South Africa
before the end of the dialogue. As a result, the Panel
has been obliged to seek out representatives of the
sectors invited to the dialogue in different regions of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These efforts
will continue under the second half of its mandate.
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Kinshasa and the eastern Democratic Republic
of the Congo
14. The extension of the inter-Congolese dialogue for
one week coincided with the Panel’s visit to Kinshasa,
making it difficult for the Panel to meet with leading
members of various delegations. Despite these
complications, the Panel was able to meet with some
ranking government and civil society representatives,
as well as a few opposition party and Mayi-Mayi group
members during its visit.
15. Congolese actors and international observers
communicated their views on developments at the
inter-Congolese dialogue and the potential
ramifications of decisions taken at Sun City. The Panel
pursued its enquiries into different strategies,
mechanisms and actors implicated in the exploitation
of resources. Environmental and human rights issues
relating to the exploitation activities and the conflict
were an important focus of this visit. Part of the Panel’s
fact-finding also concerned reforms being undertaken
by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo that could contribute to curbing the exploitation.
The Panel met twice with members of the Commission
of National Experts, established by the Government in
May 2001. The Panel submitted a series of questions to
the Commission relating to various elements of its
mandate.
16. Two Panel members visited the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo, travelling for
almost three weeks in Orientale Province and North
and South Kivu. Panel members collected extensive
information on the plight of civilian populations and
the state of local economies in the eastern region as a
consequence of the armed conflict and the economic
exploitation. They also investigated the strategies and
mechanisms for the exploitation of natural resources,
appropriation of fiscal resources and control of trade by
foreign armies and a variety of armed parties present in
the region, with the collusion of private operators in
some instances.
Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic
17. Part of the Panel’s fact-finding visit in the
Republic of the Congo focused on the illicit trade in
diamonds originating in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Authorities and some private operators
emphasized the difficulties in controlling the transit
trade entering from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo via the Congo River. The Panel also visited
Bangui. Transit trade in coffee as well as trafficking in
diamonds and gold were among the issues raised in
discussions with officials of the Central African
Republic.
Briefing for the Security Council mission in
South Africa
18. At the request of the head of the Security Council
mission, Ambassador Jean-David Levitte, the Panel
travelled to Pretoria to meet on 28 April with the
mission to the Great Lakes region, which was intended
to bolster support for peace initiatives in the region.
During the closed-door meeting, the Panel briefed the
Security Council mission about recent developments in
the Great Lakes region and the recent findings of its
fieldwork.
III. Activities outside Africa
Consultations in New York and Washington
19. Before resuming its work in the Great Lakes
region, the Panel reconvened at United Nations
Headquarters on 4 February. The Panel held
consultations with the Permanent Representatives of 17
Member States, including members of the Security
Council and countries involved in the conflict, who
expressed their support for the Panel’s work. The Panel
met with United Nations Secretariat officials and
representatives of United Nations agencies and nongovernmental
organizations. In Washington, the Panel
met with representatives of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. They discussed the types
of assistance provided to countries involved in the
conflict and the extent to which their respective
institutions could contribute to curbing the illegal
exploitation of the resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in those countries.
Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom
20. Secondary transit and end-user countries. One
of the methodologies being used in the Panel’s
investigations is an analysis of the commercial chains
for specific commodities originating from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has
attempted to piece together these chains, from the
extraction and production phases to the processing and
end-use phases, including transport networks. This
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approach was adopted in order not only to identify
those involved in the commercialization of the
commodities and where they are located, but also with
a view to developing proposals for the most effective
measures to curb the illicit trade. On the basis of a
partial analysis of these chains, the Panel has been able
to identify various countries which are not only endusers
of the processed or refined commodities but are
also key secondary transit points for primary
commodities. Among them are several western
European countries, which are the principal locations
for some of the wholesale traders, assayers, trade
associations and air transport companies dealing in
commodities targeted by the Panel. The Panel visited
the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany and France
from 1 to 10 April. Meetings were held with officials
from government ministries, representatives of
Parliament, members of non-governmental
organizations and commercial operators. Private
operators in the coltan and diamond trade, as well as
representatives of one trade association, expressed the
view that they had gained a better understanding of the
implications of the exploitation of the resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo as a result of
meetings with the Panel.
IV. The donor community
21. Pursuing contacts it had initiated in Washington
with donors, the Panel in the course of its enquiries in
both Europe and Africa has sought to meet with both
multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as
international non-governmental organization donors.
The Panel regards these contacts with the donor
community as integral to its work. In Belgium, the
Panel met with the European Commission’s
Development Directorate-General. These officials
briefed the Panel on the various types of aid granted to
countries in the Great Lakes region and their respective
control and auditing mechanisms. The issues of the
fungibility of European Community financial
assistance and the monitoring of financial flows used
for money-laundering were also discussed. It was
agreed that the Panel and representatives of the
Commission’s delegations in the Great Lakes region
would meet at the end of May in Kinshasa for further
discussions on how international donor assistance
might contribute, either indirectly or directly, to the
continuation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
22. In both Europe and Africa the Panel has detected
a growing interest among donors in exploring ways in
which aid policies may be used as effective vehicles for
conveying the convictions of donor organizations, and
perhaps for influencing the policies of these countries.
V. Transit trade
23. The Panel was mandated by the Security Council
to submit recommendations on possible steps that
could be taken by transit as well as end-user countries
to contribute to curbing the illegal exploitation of the
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
24. In accordance with its plan of action, the Panel
submitted a series of questions to 11 African transit
countries. Some of those countries are directly
involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, namely, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe. The Panel also contacted other African
countries it identifies as key transit routes for
commodities from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo: the Central African Republic, Kenya,
Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo, South Africa,
the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.
25. Through its nine questions, the Panel enquired
about relevant legislation, official investigations into
the illicit flow of commodities, measures already taken
to try to curb the flow, the effectiveness of those
measures, other possible measures that could be
enacted and those Governments’ needs for additional
assistance and expertise.
26. The Panel followed up with a number of on-site
visits to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Central African
Republic and the Republic of the Congo, during which
it met with representatives from various ministries and
institutions in charge of different aspects of the transit
trade. Written responses promised by some
Governments are still pending. Consultations with
other government officials for the purpose of gathering
additional information will be necessary before the
Panel can complete its analysis.
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VI. Context and orientations of the Panel’s
work: resource exploitation, its links to
the conflict and the humanitarian and
economic crisis
Exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth and the links to the conflict
27. The Panel continues to pursue investigations into
the different strategies used by both local and foreign
actors in the exploitation of resources and the degree to
which these different strategies contribute to the
continuation of the conflict. The following are some of
the trends and investigative leads that have guided and
will continue to guide the Panel’s work in the field.
28. On the basis of two months of fact-finding within
and outside the region, the Panel’s tentative assessment
is that the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources is
continuing, and that it is being consolidated in many
areas. For example, despite the sharp decrease in coltan
prices in 2001, coltan mining operations are continuing
throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. While several commercial operators based
outside the Great Lakes region have stopped exporting
coltan from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
because the price decrease drastically reduced the
profitability of this trade, operators linked to the parties
involved in the conflict have continued to export a
substantial volume of coltan. Another example of the
continuing exploitation is an increase in licensing fees,
taxes and customs levies, apparently to compensate for
decreased revenues from the trade in coltan.
29. The Panel is gaining a more incisive
understanding of the varying roles of foreign armies,
foreign armed opposition groups, Congolese rebel
groups and Mayi-Mayi groups1 in the exploitation of
resources and the armed conflict. Enquiries are also
being focused on how the diverse types of conflict that
exist among these armed parties, some of which seem
__________________
1 Mayi-Mayi groups are a distinctly Congolese
phenomenon and should not be confused with the
foreign armed groups explicitly mentioned in the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement. The term generally refers to
community-based fighters who organize themselves to
defend their local territory, including against foreign
armies and their allies. However, the structure, military
capability and political orientation of the many groups
scattered throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo that identify themselves as Mayi-Mayi vary
widely.
to be intensifying while others appear to be
diminishing, may be linked to control of resources,
territory, fiscal revenues and trade in general. It
appears that the scope, intensity and modalities of the
activities related to the exploitation of resources are in
some cases reflected in the highly commercialized
power bases of certain military and political actors in
the conflict. In the case of the foreign armies present in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Panel is
investigating the direct, institutionalized involvement
of some in the exploitation of resources and in
exercising far-reaching control over local economies.
30. There are indications that criminal networks and
activities are being imported into the Great Lakes
region from other African countries and regions outside
Africa. The Panel is looking into alleged criminal
networks based outside Africa that may be using trade
in certain resources from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo for the purposes of money-laundering. The
Panel is also following up on the activities of an
organized crime network which has been involved in
the extraction of Congolese resources, the transport of
certain commodities out of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo for export and the import of arms into the
Great Lakes region. That network’s operations are now
the target of judicial investigations in at least one
country. Another network, based in Africa, is
purportedly financing one set of criminal activities
through profits garnered from the smuggling of certain
resources. Other networks may be connected to
poaching and related smuggling activities. Additional
investigations are being carried out into allegations
linking the trafficking in the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to certain
organizations inside and outside Africa. Those
organizations have reportedly begun to use precious
mineral resources for transactions instead of hard
currencies, which are more and more easily traced by
financial institutions and Governments. Some of these
organized criminal activities may also aim at political
destabilization.
31. The Panel is continuing to study the commercial
chains for specific commodities. This study has
permitted the Panel to gain more insight into various
aspects of the commerce in these commodities and
progressively verify certain patterns, for example:
(a) The well-established links between certain
individual commercial operators and private companies
and government officials and institutions;
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(b) The varying degrees to which individuals,
companies or entities and Governments are implicated
in the trafficking in natural resources;
(c) Which segments of the commercial chains
involve criminal networks;
(d) The importance of the use of military bases
by different actors in the conflict for the evacuation of
commodities to the initial export point;
(e) The lack of adequate controls in the civil
aviation systems in different regions in Africa,
resulting in part from outdated legal instruments and
procedures, poor implementation of existing
regulations and procedures and insufficient resources;
(f) A growing awareness among some
commercial operators, who wish to conduct trade in a
more transparent and ethical manner, that certificate of
origin regimes should be established for commodities
other than diamonds;
(g) How market factors are affecting the
exploitation activities;
(h) How those involved in the illicit trade in
Congolese resources are once more evolving their
operations and tactics in an attempt to dissimulate their
activities.
The Panel has learned that transit routes for
commodities are again being altered and Congolese
resources are apparently being relabelled during transit
to disguise their origins. “Congolese” or foreign
business partners are being used as a legitimizing
facade, while commercial entities are being
reconfigured so as to obscure links and activities. A
greater emphasis is also being placed by different
actors on controlling customs and tax revenues
resulting from trade in general, specifically the trade in
natural resources, as well as on the seizure of assets.
32. A substantial volume of certain resources
continues to transit through countries bordering the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, some by
clandestine means and some openly under the guise of
legitimate transit trade. The Panel is in the process of
identifying which operators are involved in these
commercial flows and determining whether they are
connected to the main actors in the conflict.
33. The Panel is reviewing the impact on the
exploitation of resources of a series of reforms being
undertaken by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. These include the
implementation of a diamond certification scheme
already concluded on a bilateral basis with the Diamond
High Council in Belgium, the pending implementation
of the new mining code and the drafting of a forestry
code, the latter two activities being carried out with the
support of the World Bank. During the remaining part of
its mandate, the Panel will also evaluate the potential
impact of the application of the resolution on the review
of all commercial agreements and contracts signed
during the conflict, adopted during the inter-Congolese
dialogue at Sun City, and the establishment of an anticorruption
and ethics commission, one of the civic
institutions created under the partial agreement on the
democratic transition reached during the dialogue. In
addition, the Panel is following the participation of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
the Kimberley Process, which is scheduled to finalize an
international diamond certification scheme by late 2002.
34. The status and functioning of joint ventures in
certain resource sectors in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo also continue to be the focus of the Panel’s
fact-finding.
The current nature of the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
35. In the Panel’s view, direct confrontation among the
principal adversaries that are parties to the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement has all but disappeared. In a
conventional sense, the armies of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and its allies no longer militarily
engage their enemies, the Congolese rebel forces and the
foreign armies backing them. Overall, the main
adversaries remain separated by the ceasefire line, which
has de facto partitioned the country and has virtually
eliminated direct encounters between the previously
warring parties. The most notable exception to this was
the ousting in March 2002 of Government troops (FAC)
and Burundian rebel forces (FDD) from the village of
Moliro in Katanga Province during an offensive by the
RCD-Goma army, with support from RPA.2
__________________
2 Moliro is a strategic point on the southernmost shores of
Lake Tanganyika near the Zambian border. Despite the
agreements worked out under the Kampala and Harare
disengagement plans in 2000, it seemed that claims on
Moliro as a new defensive position had never been
properly resolved. The build-up of forces around this area
over the course of several months infused preparations
for the inter-Congolese dialogue with uncertainty and
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36. On either side of the ceasefire line, foreign armies
have consolidated their presence and the struggle over
maintaining control of natural resources and territory
has become a principal preoccupation. Conflict over
the resources has a different complexion on either side
of the ceasefire line. Foreign forces in the west, in
concert with certain Congolese parties, have
entrenched themselves and continue to pursue their
economic interests in the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, while adopting a
more discreet profile. Their activities may also include
asserting a certain control over local economies. For
example, while Zimbabwe has officially declared the
withdrawal of a substantial number of troops over the
past year and a half, the Panel has received reports that
replacement troops are being brought into areas such as
Kasai, where Zimbabwean parties have interests in
diamond mining. In Government-controlled regions,
there may not be open armed conflict among
competitors for resources or political adversaries as in
the eastern region. The Panel has, nevertheless,
received reports of the continuing negative impact that
the presence of foreign troops, in particular
Zimbabwean forces, has had on civilian populations.
These include grave human rights violations and
abuses of authority.
37. In contrast to the relative calm along the ceasefire
corridor and the quieter pursuit of the exploitation of
resources in the west, the quest for natural resources in
the east is characterized by armed violence of varying
degrees of intensity among foreign armies, foreign
armed groups, rebel armies and Mayi-Mayi groups.
These conflicts incite others. Some of the conflicts are
about dispersing opposition forces. Some are linked to
rekindled ethnic tensions. Others are about large
numbers of people bearing arms for survival purposes.
38. Over the past five months, fighting has re-erupted
continuously throughout the east. The fighting has at
times been heavy. The areas where the clashes have
occurred are strung out across the entire length and
breadth of the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, stretching from the centre of Orientale
Province east to the areas bordering Uganda,
throughout the Kivus and west and south into the
__________________
tension. Following the attack, the Security Council
adopted resolution 1399 (2002), demanding the
immediate withdrawal of RCD-Goma troops from Moliro
and Pweto in Katanga Province and for all parties to pull
back to positions defined under the disengagement plans.
Maniema and Katanga Provinces. Reports and
testimony indicate that civilian populations have
suffered greatly as a result, with casualties, forced
displacements, increased food insecurity and
malnutrition. A state of generalized insecurity reigns in
many rural areas in the Orientale Province and the
Kivus, as bands of youthful “soldiers” or free-floating
militias attack, loot and burn villages and fields.
39. In the area of the north-eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo where two battalions of
Ugandan troops are still stationed, violent armed
conflicts have primarily been among the three
Ugandan-backed Congolese rebel groups that dominate
the northeast — MLC, its purported ally RCD-N and
RCD-ML. Some of these rebel armies have been
reinforced at times by highly fluid alliances with what
have been described as Mayi-Mayi groups. In some
cases, UPDF soldiers also intervened. Battles have
been fought over control of Buta, Isiro, Watsa,
Bafwasende and Bunia, all endowed in varying degrees
with deposits of gold, diamonds, coltan or cassiterite as
well as stands of timber. Butembo, a major import and
distribution centre where the country’s second largest
customs post is located, was also attacked repeatedly.
Control of precious resources and customs and tax
revenues, all vital to the consolidation of the highly
commercialized power bases of certain individuals and
groups, have reportedly fuelled these battles. Over the
course of three-and-half years of conflict, various
armies have clashed over these economically strategic
areas, trading control back and forth among them.
40. Well ensconced in four of the mineral-rich
provinces of the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Rwandan-controlled forces, RCD-Goma and
RPA, have been pushing northward in North Kivu in
recent months and advancing north-west of Kisangani
in Orientale Province in April, towards territories
occupied by RCD-ML and MLC forces respectively.
RPA forces recently occupied Kowe, an area in North
Kivu where diamond deposits have been discovered.
More or less simultaneously, additional forces were
being deployed farther south in Katanga Province. Few
of these troop movements reportedly resulted in any
engagements of Rwandan Hutu armed groups.
41. Since February, RCD-Goma and the Rwandan
army have come under pressure from intensifying
attacks in the south. Offensives have multiplied against
Rwandan-backed forces in South Kivu, Maniema and
upper Katanga, regions rich in coltan, cassiterite, gold
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and diamonds. In these areas both RCD-Goma and
RPA have a long-established presence and appear to be
expanding their control of territory, assets, tax revenues
and mineral wealth. These conflicts, some short-lived,
but recurring, have mostly been initiated by different
Mayi-Mayi groups, occasionally allied with ALIR II
forces. The Panel recently received reports that various
Mayi-Mayi groups have adopted a strategy of attacking
the locations of mining activities controlled by RCDGoma
or RPA, in an effort to either wrest control of
them or disrupt them and make them less profitable.
The locations of a few recent battles led by Mayi-Mayi
groups correspond with such tactics, such as fighting in
South Kivu in Shabunda (gold and coltan as well as the
location of an airport) and Kitutu near Kamituga (gold
and cassiterite or coltan).
Humanitarian and economic situation: the toll of the
exploitation and the conflict
42. The Panel has been compiling and reviewing
reports on the economic, social and humanitarian
impact of the conflict and the exploitation activities. It
is applying this to orienting its fact-finding and
developing its own analysis and conclusions.
43. The Panel’s investigations are in part focusing on
how different strategies for the exploitation of
resources affect populations at the local level,
according to conditions that are unique to each locality,
and how this in turn shapes the specific humanitarian
impact of both the conflict and the trade in resources,
which also varies from locality to locality. There are
some broad generalizations that can be made,
particularly with regard to the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and this has been the primary
focus of the Panel’s work during the first half of its
mandate.
44. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,
population displacement, repeated outbreaks of violent
armed conflict and generalized insecurity are common.
One of the consequences is the destruction of crop and
grazing fields in rural areas, halting food production
and increasing pressure on existing food resources.
This has resulted in mounting food insecurity.
Humanitarian organizations, refused protection by
armies or militias, find it difficult to gain access to
these areas to provide assistance.
45. A variety of sources report that local populations,
including children, are being conscripted and used as
forced labour in the extraction of resources by some
military forces in different regions. Other tactics, such
as the destruction of the infrastructure for agricultural
production, are allegedly employed by different armed
parties in order to constrain local populations to
participate in the extraction of resources.
46. In some areas, entire communities have been
forcibly displaced by armed forces so that they can
take control of resource-rich zones or the access roads
for those zones. Military forces and militia have
reportedly evicted local artisanal diggers in order to
seize production or take control of informal mining
sites. Other serious human rights violations, including
killings, sexual assaults and abuse of power for
economic gain, have been reported as directly linked to
military forces’ control of resource extraction sites or
their presence in the vicinity of such sites.
47. Excessive taxes, revenue siphoning, seizure of
local resources, forced requisitioning of assets and
deepening control over general trade by foreign and
local military, with or without the collusion of
commercial operators, have paralysed local economies.
As a result, very few commercial enterprises are still
operational in many areas. Conditions in some towns,
which have become more and more like enclaves, are
increasingly similar to those that might result from an
embargo.
48. Almost no revenues are allocated for public
services such as utilities, health services and schools.
Infrastructures and services are quasi-inexistent. The
Panel has learned that few, if any, State administration
employees are paid salaries. This appears also to be the
case for members of local armies and police. With
most workers unemployed or unpaid in urban areas,
and food production plummeting in rural areas,
malnutrition rates are rising to very high levels,
especially in areas where economic exploitation is most
intensive.
49. Large numbers of conflict-related deaths are
adding to an even greater number of deaths from
malnutrition and disease, resulting in extremely
elevated mortality rates for all ages. Infants and
children have been particularly affected. Mortality
rates surveyed in conflict areas in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo are among the
highest recorded in the world.
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Environment: other consequences of the conflict and
the exploitation activities
50. The Panel is updating its earlier investigations
regarding the extent of the ecological destruction that
the conflict has engendered. One focus of the Panel’s
enquiries concerns the situation within the national
parks of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
particularly in terms of the illicit exploitation of
wildlife, forest and other resources. The intensive and
unsustainable mining and logging activities being
conducted outside these protected wildlife reserves, in
both the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Government-controlled regions, also present real
environmental dangers, which will require further
investigation. In the course of its information
gathering, the Panel was informed of the negative
impact of the conflict, due to massive refugee
movements, on the environments of neighbouring
countries such as the Republic of the Congo and the
Central African Republic.
51. Five of the eight national parks established in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo are located in the
eastern region. This region features one of the highest
mountain ranges in Africa and is renowned for its
unique diversity of habitats and wildlife. Of the five
wildlife reserves, many of which are home to rare
endangered species, four have been designated as
World Heritage sites by UNESCO — Virunga National
Park, Kahuzi-Biega National Park, Garamba National
Park and Okapi Wildlife Reserve. One of the reserves,
Okapi, is also the traditional habitat of nomadic pygmy
tribes.
52. The combination of the exploitation activities and
ongoing conflict has effectively eliminated State
administrative control over the parks and led to the
militarization of many of them, for example, the
Virunga, Kahuzi-Biega and Okapi reserves. These
parks are strategically located along the eastern border,
and are regularly used as crossing points by military
forces to gain access to the interior of the eastern
region. The increased presence of foreign military,
local rebel forces and armed groups, some of which
occupy areas within the parks on a quasi-permanent
basis, has resulted in the development of highly
organized and systematic exploitation activities at
levels never before seen. These activities include
poaching for ivory, game meat and rare species,
logging, and mining for coltan, gold and diamonds.
Exploitation activities reportedly involve a wide range
of Congolese operators and armed groups. They are
mostly carried out under the control of foreign military,
however, often with their logistical support and under
their protection. Much of the production or bounty is
transported first to neighbouring countries, to be
exported to third countries. Poaching activities and the
massive military presence have given rise to arms
trafficking within some parks. The reserves are also
occasionally the sites of violent clashes between some
of the armed parties. Armed conflict has exacted its toll
in human lives in the parks. Over 50 park guards and
other staff employed by the Congolese Institute for
Nature Conservation3 have been killed since 1996.
53. The impact of the conflict on the economies of
nearby communities has also spurred local populations
to relocate in increasing numbers to the parks, settling
there to carry out more and more subsistence logging,
fishing and poaching activities. There are additional
reports that populations from neighbouring countries
have moved to the parks. The natural migration
patterns of many wildlife species have been
significantly disrupted, contributing to long-term
problems in terms of repopulating certain park areas or
maintaining population balances within others.
VII.Observations
Recent strategies for profiteering and sustaining
the conflict
54. Control over fiscal resources — licensing fees,
export taxes, import duties and general state and
community taxes — seems to be gaining increasing
importance in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo for the rebel groups and the foreign armies.
Some of the revenues are reportedly diverted to
individuals or groups of individuals for their personal
profit. Others are allegedly siphoned off for payments
to foreign armies, either to maintain their support
against rival groups or to finance continuing, extensive
military operations. Recent periods have seen tax rates
double or triple in certain areas and increasingly harsh
penalties imposed when payment is not made. With
many land routes impracticable and unsecured and
river traffic having ceased, some areas have become
increasingly isolated, making control of trade all the
easier. The immediate impact of these strategies has
been the further collapse of most local economies and
__________________
3 The government body that oversees the wildlife reserves.
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the deepening impoverishment of most Congolese
families.
The inter-Congolese dialogue and the issue of the
exploitation of resources
55. Regarding the general issue of the illegal
exploitation of natural resources, the Panel was
informed by a variety of sources that repeated attempts
by civil society representatives at the inter-Congolese
dialogue to open discussions on this subject were
thwarted. It was interesting to note that there was a
great reluctance on the part of at least the three major
belligerent parties to discuss the issue. This raises the
question whether those three parties, as well as others,
are implicated in and benefit from the exploitation
activities.
56. At the inter-Congolese dialogue, the Economic
and Finance Committee adopted resolutions on setting
up mechanisms for the review of all commercial
agreements and contracts signed during the current
conflict as well as evaluating the costs of both conflicts
fought since 1996. The review and revision of all
concessions and agreements was one of the Panel’s
previous recommendations, the issue of the cost of the
war being the subject of the Panel’s earlier fact-finding.
Those resolutions reflected the views of most
Congolese. However, certain Congolese officials
expressed the view that only the concessions and
agreements relating to the rebel-held eastern region of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be
reviewed, in accordance with the new mining code. On
the other hand, representatives of civil society
organizations, the private sector and the political
opposition were of the opinion that all the concessions
and agreements signed, whether on the side of the
allies or the rebel groups, should be reviewed or
revised.
The humanitarian tragedy
57. The occupation of large portions of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by the armies of
neighbouring States has caused considerable suffering
among all segments of the population, affecting
farmers, traders, businessmen, public servants,
professionals, men and women of all ages, as well as
children. Military support to the rebel movements and
the use of national armies from neighbouring States to
support the exploitation of resources have resulted in
widespread conflict, indiscriminate arming of large
portions of the population and considerable insecurity.
A minimum of 15 per cent of the population of North
and South Kivu has been displaced over the past 18
months as a result of the conflicts. The economies of
many of the principal urban centres and surrounding
areas have collapsed while rural economic activities
have ceased altogether in many places. Food insecurity
is rampant, unemployment may be as high as 80 to 90
per cent in many areas, reducing both rural and urban
populations to extreme poverty. Acute malnutrition
rates are alarmingly high. While mortality levels vary
greatly from place to place depending on the extent of
conflict and the availability of health services, overall
they are among the highest in the world.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem, Chairman
(Signed) Jim Freedman
(Signed) Mel Holt
(Signed) Bruno Schiemsky
(Signed) Moustapha Tall
(Signed) Gilbert Barthe
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Annex I
Countries visited and representatives of Governments and
organizations interviewed
The Panel wishes to express its deep appreciation to the Government officials,
diplomats, United Nations agencies, donor institutions, non-governmental
organizations, civil society groups, journalists, commercial operators and others
with whom it met and who have assisted in making possible the present report.
The Panel also wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in particular to
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Amos Namanga Ngongi. In addition, the Panel would like to thank the
United Nations Office in Burundi and the UNDP offices in Bangui, Brazzaville,
Bujumbura, Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa and Yaounde for their assistance and
support.
Belgium
Government officials
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural
Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Inter-Ministerial Ad Hoc Working Group on the Illegal Exploitation of the
Natural Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
State representatives
European Union
Others
Tantalum Niobium International Study Center
SOGEM mineral trading company (division of Umicore)
Arslanian Frères
International Peace Information Service
Burundi
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Energy and Mines
Minister of Finance
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of France
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International organizations
Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Burundi
Others
ASYST mineral trading company
Affimet gold trading company
Comptoir minier des exploitations du Burundi (COMEBU)
HAMZA mineral trading company
Central African Republic
Government officials
Minister of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics
Minister of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Economy
Ministry of Equipment, Transport and Settlement
Ministry of Finance and Budget
Department of Customs
State representatives
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of France
European Union
International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
ASECNA
UNHCR
UNDP
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Land Affairs, Environment and Tourism
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Vice-Minister of Mines
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Governor of the Central Bank
Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de certification des matières précieuses
Comité interministériel du Small Scale Mining (CISSCAM)
Régie des voies aériennes
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State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Canada
Ambassador of Germany
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Embassy of Denmark
Embassy of France
Embassy of the United States of America
European Union
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
ECHO
GTZ
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
UNDP
UNICEF
World Bank
World Food Programme
RCD-Goma
Vice-President
Department of Mines and Energy
Vice-Governor of Kisangani
RCD-ML
Second Vice-President
Minister of the Interior
Acting Chief of Staff for APC
Governor of Ituri Province
Mayor of Butembo
Others
Anglican Church
Ashanti Goldfield
Association africaine des droits de l’homme (ASADHO)
Banque internationale de commerce
Centre national d’appui au développement et à la participation populaire
(CENADEP)
Church of Christ of the Congo
Conseil apostolique des laïques catholiques au Congo (CALCC)
Dara Forêt
Exploitation forestière, sciérie raffinage de la papaine (ENRA)
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Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC — Kinshasa, Kisangani, Beni,
Goma, Bukavu)
Groupe Lotus
Groupe musulman des droits de l’homme
Héritiers de la Justice
International Human Rights Law Group
International Rescue Committee
Mayi-Mayi representatives
Medecins sans Frontières (Belgium and France)
Mennonite Church
National Commission of Experts on the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
National Council of Development NGOs
Okimo
Parti démocrate et social chrétien (PDSC)
Peace and Justice Commissions
Pharmakina
Pole Institute
Programme d’appui aux femmes victimes des conflits et des catastrophes
Regional Committee of Development NGOs
SOCEBO
Société civile du Congo (SOCICO)
Société de renforcement de comunauté de base (SERACOB)
Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA)
Solidarité
TOFEN-CONGO
TRAFCO freight company
UDPS (provincial committee of Goma)
UPDF Sector Commander in Bunia
UPDF Battalion Commander in Butembo
UPDF Colonel Peter Karim
Union des banques congolaises
France
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Others
Air France Cargo
Germany
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Others
Karl-Heinz Albers Mining and Minerals Processing
H. C. Starck
Kenya
Government officials
Kenya Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Rwanda
High Commissioner of Uganda
Belgian Ministry of Defence
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
High Commissioner of the Republic of South Africa
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
World Customs Organization
Others
Chairman of the Association of Cargo Airliners
International Crisis Group
Kencargo
Martin Air
Oxfam
World Vision
Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Environment
Ministry of Transport
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
European Union
International organizations
UNDP
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Rwanda
Government officials
Special Envoy of the President for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Burundi
Office of the President of Rwanda
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Customs Commission
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
European Union
International organizations
MONUC
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
Adolphe Onusumba, President of RCD-Goma
SDV transportation company
Eagles Wings Resources
SOGERMI mineral trading company
Uganda
Government officials
First Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Chief of Staff of UPDF
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry
Bank of Uganda
Department of Geological Survey and Mines
Uganda Bureau of Statistics
Uganda Civil Aviation Authority
Uganda Coffee Development Authority
Uganda Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Denmark
Ambassador of France
High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
Head of the delegation of the European Union
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International organizations
UNDP
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
Amnesty International
Judicial Commission of Inquiry
Uganda Debt Network
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
United States of America
State representatives
Permanent Representatives of Security Council members and other Member
States
International organizations
International Monetary Fund
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict
UNDP
Forum on Forests
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
World Bank
Others
Human Rights Watch
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Annex II
Abbreviations
ALIR Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of
Rwanda)
APC Congolese Patriotic Army (of the RCD-ML rebel group)
ASECNA Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à
Madagascar
coltan columbo-tantalite
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
FAC Forces armées congolaises
ex-FAR former Forces armées rwandaises
FDD Forces pour la défense de la démocratie
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German
Government agency for international cooperation)
MLC Mouvement de libération congolais
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Okimo Office des Mines d’or de Kilo-Moto
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese
Democracy)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Goma
RCD-ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Mouvement de
libération, initially based in Kisangani, now headquartered in Bunia
RCD-N Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-National
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
SOCEBO Société d’exploitation du bois
UDPS Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
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- 223 -
ANNEX 5.4
United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002
United Nations S/2002/1146
Security Council Distr.: General
16 October 2002
English
Original: French
02-62179 (E) 171002 181002
*0262179*
Letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council
I have the honour to refer to the statement by the President of the Security
Council dated 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39), whereby the Security Council
renewed for a period of six months the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council requested the Panel to submit to it
an interim report after three months, followed by a final report at the end of its
mandate. I refer also to the letter dated 12 July 2002 from the President
(S/2002/763), by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel
until 31 October 2002.
I have the honour to transmit to you the final report of the Panel, which was
submitted to me by its Chairman, Mr. Mahmoud Kassem. This independent report
comprises an evaluation of the situation on the ground and the Panel’s observations
on the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. I should be grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the
members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
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Annex
Letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Chairman of the Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
addressed to the Secretary-General
[Original: English]
In accordance with the statement of the President of the Security Council
(S/PRST/2001/39) dated 19 December 2001 and the letter dated 12 July 2002
addressed to you by the President of the Council, the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is pleased to submit its report for transmission to the
President of the Security Council.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem
Chairman
Panel of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo
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S/2002/1146
Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–11 4
II. Change in tactics by elite networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12–21 5
III. Government-controlled area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22–64 7
IV. Rwanda-controlled area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65–96 14
V. Uganda-controlled area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97–131 19
VI. Collaboration of the Panel with the Porter Commission in Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132–138 24
VII. Transit and end-user trade issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139–148 26
VIII. Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149–154 28
IX. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155–160 29
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161–188 30
Annexes
I. Companies on which the Panel recommends the placing of financial restrictions
II. Persons for whom the Panel recommends a travel ban and financial restrictions
III. Business enterprises considered by the Panel to be in violation of the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises
IV. Countries visited and representatives of Governments and organizations interviewed
V. Abbreviations
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I. Introduction
1. The Security Council, in a statement by its
President dated 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39),
requested the Secretary-General to renew for six
months the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and asked the Panel to submit both an interim
and a final report. The new mandate stipulated that the
reports should include the following:
(a) An update of relevant data and an analysis
of further information from all relevant countries,
including in particular from those which thus far had
not provided the Panel with the requested information;
(b) An evaluation of the possible actions that
could be taken by the Council, including those
recommended by the Panel in its report (S/2001/357)
and the addendum thereto (S/2001/1072), in order to
help bring to an end the plundering of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
taking into account the impact of such actions on the
financing of the conflict and their potential impact on
the humanitarian and economic situation of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo;
(c) Recommendations on specific actions that
the international community, in support of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
might take, working through existing international
organizations, mechanisms and United Nations bodies,
to address the issues in the report and its addendum;
(d) Recommendations on possible steps that
might be taken by transit countries as well as end-users
to contribute to ending illegal exploitation of the
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
2. The Security Council also stressed the importance
of the Panel’s maintaining a high level of collaboration
with all the Congolese players, governmental as well as
non-governmental, throughout the national territory.
3. The Panel submitted to the Security Council an
interim report (S/2002/565) on 22 May 2002. At the
request of the Council, the Panel responded in writing
to questions and comments from Council members
regarding the interim report and the Panel’s ongoing
work. Prior to presenting its interim report, and at the
request of the head of the Security Council mission to
the Great Lakes region, the Panel travelled to Pretoria
on 28 April to brief the mission’s members.
4. To orient its work under the current mandate, the
Panel developed two successive plans of action, which
were transmitted to the Council. Under these plans,
fact-finding focused on diamonds, gold, coltan, copper,
cobalt, timber, wildlife reserves, fiscal resources and
trade in general.
5. The Panel determined that a central focus of its
work should be gathering information about politically
and economically powerful groups involved in the
exploitation activities, which are often highly
criminalized. As a result, the Panel developed the
central concept of the elite network (outlined in section
II) as an operational thesis.
6. In organizing its investigations, the Panel divided
the Democratic Republic of the Congo into three areas,
namely, the Government-controlled area, the Rwandacontrolled
area and the Uganda-controlled area. These
descriptors are based on the identity of the actors that
constitute the three principal networks involved in the
exploitation. The Panel also concluded that each of
these three areas, while conforming to the Panel’s
understanding of the elite networks, featured
substantive variations.
7. The Panel obtained information from a wide
variety of sources, including from Governments
(civilian and military representatives),
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental
organizations, businesses and private individuals.
Owing to the nature of its mandate, gaining access to
information has been difficult. Nevertheless, the Panel
collected well-substantiated and independently
corroborated information from multiple sources. These
knowledgeable sources provided documents
and/or eye-witness observations. It is this type of
information — consisting mostly of documentary
evidence — that the Panel has relied on its report.
8. The Panel has operated under a reasonable
standard of proof, without recourse to judicial authority
to subpoena testimony or documents. It obtains
information from sources on a strictly voluntary basis.
Furthermore, the Panel has made every effort to fairly
and objectively evaluate the information it has
gathered.
9. Throughout its work, the Panel has paid close
attention to the evolution of the peace process in the
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Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as that in
neighbouring Burundi. The Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement of 1999 and the Arusha Agreement on
Peace and Reconciliation, of 2000, served as important
points of reference for its work. The Sun City, Pretoria
and Luanda Agreements have also informed the Panel’s
work.
10. The Panel was composed as follows:
Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt),
Chairman
Jim Freedman (Canada)
Mel Holt (United States of America)
Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium)
Moustapha Tall (Senegal).
11. Two part-time technical advisers, Gilbert Barthe
(Switzerland) and Patrick Smith (United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland), also served with
the Panel. In addition, two political officers, an
administrator and a secretary assisted the Panel.
II. Change in tactics by elite networks
12. The regional conflict that drew the armies of
seven African States into the Democratic Republic of
the Congo has diminished in intensity, but the
overlapping microconflicts that it provoked continue.
These conflicts are fought over minerals, farm produce,
land and even tax revenues. Criminal groups linked to
the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
have benefited from the microconflicts. Those groups
will not disband voluntarily even as the foreign
military forces continue their withdrawals. They have
built up a self-financing war economy centred on
mineral exploitation.
13. Facilitated by South Africa and Angola, the
Pretoria and Luanda Agreements have prompted the
recent troop withdrawals from the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Welcome as they may be, these
withdrawals are unlikely to alter the determination of
Rwanda and Zimbabwe, and Ugandan individuals, to
exercise economic control over portions of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The departure of
their forces will do little to reduce economic control, or
the means of achieving it, since the use of national
armies is only one among many means for exercising
it. All three countries have anticipated the day when
pressure from the international community would make
it impossible to maintain large forces in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Governments of Rwanda
and Zimbabwe, as well as powerful individuals in
Uganda, have adopted other strategies for maintaining
the mechanisms for revenue generation, many of which
involve criminal activities, once their troops have
departed.
14. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces continue to
provoke ethnic conflict, as in the past, clearly
cognizant that the unrest in Ituri will require the
continuing presence of a minimum of UPDF personnel.
The Panel has evidence that high-ranking UPDF
officers have taken steps to train local militia to serve
as a paramilitary force, directly and discreetly under
UPDF command, which will be capable of performing
the same functions as UPDF. There will be little change
in the control that Ugandans now exercise over trade
flows and economic resources. As UPDF continue to
arm local groups, only less conspicuously than before,
the departure of Ugandan armed forces is unlikely to
alter economic activities by those powerful individuals
in the north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
15. Like UPDF, and under pressure from its closest
allies, Rwanda has started withdrawing. It has prepared
for withdrawal by putting in place economic control
mechanisms that do not rely on an explicit presence of
the Rwandan Patriotic Army. It has replaced Congolese
directors of parastatals with businessmen from Kigali
to ensure continuing revenue from water, power and
transportation facilities. It has replaced local currency
with Rwandan currency. RPA battalions that specialize
in mining activities remain in place, though they have
ceased wearing RPA uniforms and will continue the
activities under a commercial guise. The Panel’s
sources have reported that RPA recently undertook an
operation to obtain a large number of Congolese
passports so as to give an appropriate identity to RPA
officers who continue to be stationed at strategically
important sites in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
16. The Panel has learned of other tactics for
disguising the continuing presence of an armed force
loyal to Rwanda. Reliable sources have reported an
initiative by the Chief of Staff of the Armée nationale
congolaise, Major Sylvain Mbuki, to reorganize the
RCD-Goma forces in order to accommodate large
numbers of RPA soldiers inside ANC units and local
defence forces made up of pro-Rwanda elements. Most
of the ANC units have had RPA leadership for some
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time, and now, with this reorganization, a significant
number of RPA soldiers will be integrated into the
ANC rank and file. Instead of departing for Rwanda,
large numbers of Rwandan Hutus serving in RPA have
been provided with new uniforms and assigned to ANC
brigades as Congolese Hutu. Rwanda has diverted
attention from those soldiers staying in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo by drawing particular attention
to those who depart. Ceremonies have been held at
points of re-entry. In fact, the number of soldiers who
have left the Democratic Republic of the Congo is so
far only a portion of the total number of RPA troops in
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which
various sources estimate at between 35,000 and 50,000.
Simultaneously with the RPA troop withdrawals,
Rwandan officials have repatriated to North Kivu
thousands of Congolese Tutsi refugees under duress
from the camps around Byumba and Kibuye Provinces
in Rwanda. Schools in the Rwandan camps have
remained closed and some camp structures have been
razed to encourage further repatriations. All the Panel’s
sources have also suggested that this movement could
be part of the new tactic for maintaining Rwanda’s
presence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
17. Although troops of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces
have been a major guarantor of the security of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
against regional rivals, its senior officers have enriched
themselves from the country’s mineral assets under the
pretext of arrangements set up to repay Zimbabwe for
military services. Now ZDF is establishing new
companies and contractual arrangements to defend its
economic interests in the longer term should there be a
complete withdrawal of ZDF troops. New trade and
service agreements were signed between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe just
prior to the announced withdrawal of ZDF troops from
the diamond centre of Mbuji Mayi late in August 2002.
18. Towards the end of its mandate, the Panel
received a copy of a memorandum dated August 2002
from the Defence Minister, Sidney Sekeramayi, to
President Robert Mugabe, proposing that a joint
Zimbabwe-Democratic Republic of the Congo
company be set up in Mauritius to disguise the
continuing economic interests of ZDF in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The memorandum
states: “Your Excellency would be aware of the wave
of negative publicity and criticism that the DRCZimbabwe
joint ventures have attracted, which tends to
inform the current United Nations Panel investigations
into our commercial activities.” It also refers to plans
to set up a private Zimbabwean military company to
guard Zimbabwe’s economic investments in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo after the planned
withdrawal of ZDF troops. It states that this company
was formed to operate alongside a new military
company owned by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
19. At the same time, local militias and local
politicians have supplemented the role that State
armies previously played in ensuring access to and
control of valuable resources and diverting State
revenue. The looting that was previously conducted by
the armies themselves has been replaced with
organized systems of embezzlement, tax fraud,
extortion, the use of stock options as kickbacks and
diversion of State funds conducted by groups that
closely resemble criminal organizations.
20. Such activities have become increasingly
prominent in the techniques of exploitation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has
identified three distinct groups engaged in activities in
three different areas and refers to them as elite
networks. These elite networks have control over a
range of commercial activities involving the
exploitation of natural resources, diversion of taxes and
other revenue generation activities in the three separate
areas controlled by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda,
respectively.
21. The Panel has identified the following elements
that are common to all of the elite networks and that
are essential to understanding the nature of the
exploitation carried out by these networks in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo:
• The networks consist of a small core of political
and military elites and business persons and, in
the case of the occupied areas, selected rebel
leaders and administrators. Some members of the
elite networks occupy key positions in their
respective Governments or rebel groups.
• Members of these networks cooperate to generate
revenue and, in the case of Rwanda, institutional
financial gain.
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• The elite networks ensure the viability of their
economic activities through control over the
military and other security forces that they use to
intimidate, threaten violence or carry out selected
acts of violence.
• The networks monopolize production, commerce
and fiscal functions.
• The elite networks maintain the facade of rebel
administrations in the occupied areas to generate
public revenues that they then divert into the
networks, thereby depleting the public treasury.
• The elite networks derive financial benefit
through a variety of criminal activities including
theft, embezzlement and diversion of “public”
funds, undervaluation of goods, smuggling, false
invoicing, non-payment of taxes, kickbacks to
public officials and bribery.
• The elite networks form business companies or
joint ventures that are fronts through which
members of the networks carry on their respective
commercial activities.
• The elite networks draw support for their
economic activities through the networks and
“services” (air transport, illegal arms dealing and
transactions involving the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo) of organized
or transnational criminal groups.
III. Government-controlled area
22. The elite network of Congolese and Zimbabwean
political, military and commercial interests seeks to
maintain its grip on the main mineral resources —
diamonds, cobalt, copper, germanium — of the
Government-controlled area. This network has
transferred ownership of at least US$ 5 billion of assets
from the State mining sector to private companies
under its control in the past three years with no
compensation or benefit for the State treasury of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
23. This network benefits from instability in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its representatives
in the Kinshasa Government and the Zimbabwe
Defence Forces have fuelled instability by supporting
armed groups opposing Rwanda and Burundi.
24. Even if present moves towards peace lead to a
complete withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces, the
network’s grip on the richest mineral assets of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and related
businesses will remain. Zimbabwe’s political-military
elite signed six major trade and service agreements in
August 2002 with the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Reliable sources have told the
Panel about plans to set up new holding companies to
disguise the continuing ZDF commercial operations in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a ZDFcontrolled
private military company to be deployed in
the country to guard those assets.
The elite network
25. The elite network in the Government-held area
comprises three circles of power, namely, Congolese
and Zimbabwean government officials and private
businessmen. Chief figures in the Congolese branch of
the network are the National Security Minister,
Mwenze Kongolo, a shareholder and deal-broker for
both diamond and cobalt ventures; the Minister of
Presidency and Portfolio, Augustin Katumba Mwanke,
a former employee of Bateman’s mining company in
South Africa and a key power broker in mining and
diplomatic deals; the President of the State diamond
company, Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), Jean-
Charles Okoto; the Planning Minister and former
Deputy Defence Minister, General Denis Kalume
Numbi, a stakeholder in the lucrative Sengamines
diamond deal and in COSLEG; and the Director
General of Gécamines, Yumba Monga, pivotal in
facilitating several asset-stripping joint ventures
between the State mining company and private
companies.
26. The Congolese branch also includes active, but
less visible members. Frédéric Tshineu Kabasele is a
director of three joint ventures with Zimbabwe using
the COSLEG platform — the diamond trading
Minerals Business Company, the logging company
SOCEBO and the First Banking Corporation Congo.
The Director of the National Intelligence Agency,
Didier Kazadi Nyembwe, has oversight of many of the
private commercial operations and has been linked by
several sources to arms supplies for Burundi opposition
groups and Mayi-Mayi groups in Maniema and South
Kivu. COSLEG, a Congo-Zimbabwe joint stock
company, remains a key vehicle for military-backed
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commerce involving mostly diamonds, banking and
timber in the Government-held areas. The Technical
Director of COSLEG, Mfuni Kazadi, specializes in the
writing of joint venture contracts to accommodate the
private interests of the elite network.
27. The key strategist for the Zimbabwean branch of
the elite network is the Speaker of the Parliament and
former National Security Minister, Emmerson
Dambudzo Mnangagwa. Mr. Mnangagwa has won
strong support from senior military and intelligence
officers for an aggressive policy in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. His key ally is a Commander of
ZDF and Executive Chairman of COSLEG, General
Vitalis Musunga Gava Zvinavashe. The General and
his family have been involved in diamond trading and
supply contracts in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. A long-time ally of President Mugabe, Air
Marshal Perence Shiri, has been involved in military
procurement and organizing air support for the pro-
Kinshasa armed groups fighting in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is also part of
the inner circle of ZDF diamond traders who have
turned Harare into a significant illicit diamond-trading
centre.
28. Other prominent Zimbabwean members of the
network include Brigadier General Sibusiso Busi
Moyo, who is Director General of COSLEG. Brigadier
Moyo advised both Tremalt and Oryx Natural
Resources, which represented covert Zimbabwean
military financial interests in negotiations with State
mining companies of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Air Commodore Mike Tichafa Karakadzai is
Deputy Secretary of COSLEG, directing policy and
procurement. He played a key role in arranging the
Tremalt cobalt and copper deal. Colonel Simpson
Sikhulile Nyathi is Director of defence policy for
COSLEG. The Minister of Defence and former
Security Minister, Sidney Sekeramayi, coordinates with
the military leadership and is a shareholder in
COSLEG. The Panel has a copy of a letter from Mr.
Sekeramayi thanking the Chief Executive of Oryx
Natural Resources, Thamer Bin Said Ahmed Al-
Shanfari, for his material and moral support during the
parliamentary elections of 2000. Such contributions
violate Zimbabwean law.
29. In June 2002, the Panel learned of a secret new
ZDF diamond mining operation in Kalobo in Kasai
Occidental run by Dube Associates. This company is
linked, according to banking documents, through
Colonel Tshinga Dube of Zimbabwe Defence Industries
to the Ukrainian diamond and arms dealer Leonid
Minim, who currently faces smuggling charges in Italy.
The diamond mining operations have been conducted
in great secrecy.
30. Among the businessmen in the elite network, a
Belgian national, George Forrest, pioneered the
exploitative joint venture agreements between private
companies and Gécamines. Mr. Forrest owes his
commercial ascendancy to his long-standing ties to the
establishment in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. One of his companies also makes and markets
military equipment. Since 1994, he has owned 100 per
cent of New Lachaussée in Belgium, which is a leading
manufacturer of cartridge casings, grenades, light
weapons and cannon launchers. In a flagrant conflict of
interest, Mr. Forrest was appointed Chairman of
Gécamines from November 1999 to August 2001 while
his private companies negotiated new contracts with
the explicit intention of using Gécamines’ assets for
personal gain. During that time he built up the most
wide-ranging private mining portfolio in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. He benefits from
strong backing from some political quarters in Belgium
where some of his companies are based. His operations
have been strongly criticized (one Belgian diplomatic
cable referred to Mr. Forrest running a “strategy of
attrition” in the mining sector of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo) and have recently come under
the scrutiny of the Belgian Senate’s investigation into
resource exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
31. The techniques used by Mr. Forrest have since
been replicated by Zimbabwean-backed entrepreneurs
John Arnold Bredenkamp and Mr. Al-Shanfari. Mr.
Bredenkamp, who has an estimated personal net worth
of over $500 million, is experienced in setting up
clandestine companies and sanctions-busting
operations. Mr. Al-Shanfari has gained privileged
access to the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and its diamond concessions in exchange
for raising capital from some powerful entrepreneurs in
the Gulf such as Issa al-Kawari who manages the
fortune of the deposed Amir of Qatar. Also working
with ZDF is a convicted criminal based in South
Africa, Nico Shefer, who has arranged for Zimbabwean
officers to be trained in diamond valuation in
Johannesburg. Mr. Shefer’s company, Tandan
Holdings, has a 50 per cent stake in Thorntree
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Industries, a joint venture diamond-trading company
with ZDF.
32. Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach headed a joint
venture cobalt-mining company and was Chief
Executive of Gécamines from November 1998 to
March 2000. Although stripped of his cobalt
concessions in Katanga, Mr. Rautenbach told the Panel
that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo had offered his company, Ridgepointe
International, mining rights to Gécamines concessions
at Shinkolobwe, which include substantial deposits of
uranium, copper and cobalt. Mr. Rautenbach’s
representatives said that any new agreement would be
subject to the new mining code of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and any uranium mining
operations would be open to inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
33. Such high levels of mineral exploitation would be
impossible without the collusion of highly placed
government officials who provide mining licences and
export permits in return for private gain. The Panel has
compiled extensive documentation of such
facilitations. For example, in its attempts to buy rights
to the Kolwezi Tailings, First Quantum Minerals
(FQM) of Canada offered a down payment to the State
of $100 million, cash payments and shares held in trust
for Government officials. According to documents in
the possession of the Panel, the payments list included
the National Security Minister, Mwenze Kongolo; the
Director of the National Intelligence Agency, Didier
Kazadi Nyembwe; the Director General of Gécamines,
Yumba Monga; and the former Minister of the
Presidency, Pierre-Victor Mpoyo. The FQM share offer
to those officials was premised on a sharp rise in its
share price once it was announced that it had secured
some of the most valuable mineral concessions in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
34. The Panel has documents showing that three
“clans” of Lebanese origin, who operate licensed
diamond businesses in Antwerp, purchased diamonds
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo worth
$150 million in 2001, either directly through Kinshasa
or through comptoirs in the Republic of the Congo. The
three “clans” — Ahmad, Nassour and Khanafer — are
distinct criminal organizations that operate
internationally. Their activities, known to intelligence
services and police organizations, include
counterfeiting, money-laundering and diamond
smuggling. Several credible sources have reported that
the clans also have ties with Amal and Hezbollah.
Some businesses associated with the clans are Sierra
Gem Diamonds, Asa Diam, Triple A Diamonds and
Echogem. A group linked to the clans operations is
providing counterfeit United States dollars to former
generals from the time of President Mobutu, who are
trying to overthrow the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
Strategies and sources of revenue
35. The Panel has identified five strategies for
generating revenues for the elite network through
diamond, copper and cobalt mining companies. The
network coordinates its operations between its
political, military and business wings to generate
maximum income.
Asset stripping of State mining companies
36. The richest and most readily exploitable of the
publicly owned mineral assets of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo are being moved into joint
ventures that are controlled by the network’s private
companies. These transactions, which are controlled
through secret contracts and off-shore private
companies, amount to a multi-billion-dollar corporate
theft of the country’s mineral assets. Some 30
businessmen, politicians and military officers are the
main beneficiaries of the arrangements. The elite
network has been trying to legitimize such corporate
theft and market these assets to legitimate international
mining companies.
37. The Panel has now obtained documentary
evidence that Mr. Al-Shanfari’s company, Oryx Natural
Resources, is being used as a front for ZDF and its
military company OSLEG. Sengamines claims an 800
square kilometre concession, just south of Mbuji Mayi,
carved out of the concession of the Société Minière de
Bakwanga. According to company officials,
Sengamines’ diamond concessions would be worth at
least $2 billion if they were put into full production.
38. Sengamines claimed that it had reconfigured its
equity after a failed attempt to be listed on the London
Stock Exchange in June 2000, as follows: 49 per cent
for Oryx Natural Resources, 35 per cent for COMIEXCongo,
and 16 per cent for MIBA. The Panel has
learned that this purported buyout never happened. It
was a device to disguise the close association between
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Sengamines and ZDF, and to deceive international
investors. ZDF, through OSLEG, owns the 49 per cent
of Sengamines that is publicly claimed by Oryx. In the
course of a meeting held on 1 August 2000, OSLEG
nominated Oryx to hold its 49 per cent interest in
Sengamines; 35 per cent is held by COMIEX-Congo,
and 16 per cent has been allocated to MIBA.
39. Tremalt Ltd., represented by Mr. Bredenkamp,
holds the rights to exploit six Gécamines concessions
containing over 2.7 million tons of copper and 325,000
tons of cobalt over 25 years. Tremalt paid the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
just $400,000, but the estimated worth of the six
concessions exceeds $1 billion. The joint venture
running the concession is the Kababankola Mining
Company, in which Tremalt has an 80 per cent share to
Gécamines’ 20 per cent. Under this agreement, the
Panel has learned that Gécamines derives no direct
financial benefit. Although Tremalt representatives told
the Panel that they have invested $15 million to date,
there are no signs of substantial investments having
been made on the concessions, nor has any schedule of
investment in the form of a business plan been released
to Gécamines.
40. Like Oryx, Tremalt insists that its operations are
not linked to ZDF or the Government of Zimbabwe.
However, the Panel has obtained a copy of the
confidential profit-sharing agreement, under which
Tremalt retains 32 per cent of net profits, and
undertakes to pay 34 per cent of net profits to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and 34 per cent to
Zimbabwe. This profit-sharing agreement was the
subject of a confidential memorandum from the
Defence Minister, Mr. Sekeramayi, to President
Mugabe in August 2002. Tremalt also undertakes to
provide the Congolese and Zimbabwean militaries with
motor vehicles, trucks, buses and cash payments as
necessary. These are to be subtracted from the two
countries’ part of the profit share. A forum has been
established between Tremalt and ZDF to plan strategy
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and “look
after the interests of the Zimbabweans”. Meeting
monthly, the forum’s main members are General
Zvinavashe, Brigadier Moyo, Air Commodore
Karakadzai, Mr. Bredenkamp, the Managing Director
of KMC, Colin Blythe-Wood, and the Director of
KMC, Gary Webster.
41. Gécamines officials told the Panel that the
National Security Minister of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Mwenze Kongolo had pressured their
negotiators to agree to the joint venture contract
despite its negative implications for the State
company’s finances. The ultimate owners and
beneficiaries of Tremalt are hidden behind a web of
trusts and private holding companies registered in the
British Virgin Islands and the Isle of Man to whose
records the Panel was not allowed direct access.
Control of procurement and accounting
42. Management control is essential to the elite
network’s strategy for extracting maximum revenue
from the joint ventures. Much of the revenue from the
joint ventures is off the balance sheet in overpriced
subcontracting and procurement arrangements with
companies and individuals linked to the network. The
two biggest Zimbabwe-Democratic Republic of the
Congo joint ventures — Sengamines and KMC — are
declaring huge losses.
Enterprise General Malta Forrest and Groupe
George Forrest
43. Groupe George Forrest (GGF) in partnership with
the United States-based OM Group currently runs one
of the most profitable mining operations from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo with only the most
marginal benefit for the State mining company,
Gécamines. Through this venture, the Scories du Terril
de Lubumbashi (STL), also known as the Big Hill
Project, Mr. Forrest and OM Group have secured
access to a copper and cobalt stockpile which contains
over 3,000 tons of germanium, a rare metal used in
optical fibres, infrared lenses and telecommunication
satellites. This stockpile, formerly the property of
Gécamines, has a current market value of more than $2
billion. Although the shareholdings for the STL project
are divided between OM Group (55 per cent), GGF (25
per cent) and Gécamines (20 per cent), the State
company has been expressly excluded from the
revenues derived from the germanium processing.
44. Gécamines officials complain that OM Group and
GGF have deliberately ignored the agreed technical
plan for the STL project, which provided for two
electric-powered refineries and a converter to be built
adjacent to the copper and cobalt stockpile. This would
have meant that all the germanium would have been
processed within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and Gécamines would have been entitled to a
revenue share. Instead the semi-processed ore is
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shipped to OM Group’s plant in Finland where the
germanium is extracted. The former Chairman of
Gécamines, Mr. Forrest, whose construction companies
built the STL project, has declined to intervene on
behalf of the State company. Gécamines has rejected an
offer by OM Group to cede the State company just 5
per cent of the revenues from the germanium
processing in Finland.
45. Mr. Forrest has used his position in the elite
network in an attempt to control the mining sector in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to
several reliable sources. For example, the Kinross Gold
Corporation of Canada had sought to invest up to $1
billion in copper and cobalt mining operations, but was
thwarted by interventions from Mr. Forrest and senior
Government officials. The company returned to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo late in 2001 as part
of Kinross-Forrest Ltd., a company registered in the
British Virgin Islands. A smaller Belgian-based
company, Madsa, obtained the support of the World
Bank and the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization for a $20 million development package to
build processing plants to service the mining sector: a
smelter, an acid manufacturing plant and a cement
factory. Mr. Forrest and his business allies have
opposed this development, in part, it seems, because it
would cut their profits from the current overpriced
procurement contracts.
Tremalt Ltd. (John Bredenkamp)
46. Tremalt’s 80 per cent stake in KMC gives it
management control over day-to-day administration
and longer-term strategic decisions about exploiting the
concession. Tremalt also procures equipment for ZDF
and the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the cost of
which it deducts from their share of KMC profits.
Although Ridgepointe International, run by Mr.
Rautenbach, the previous foreign investor in the
Kababankola concessions, had to operate with much
more dilapidated processing plants, it generated more
than $20 million profit within 18 months of taking
over. Industry analysts say that Tremalt’s claimed
losses of more than $13 million from February 2001 to
July 2002 are not credible.
Organized theft
47. FAC and ZDF officers who controlled security at
the main joint venture sites have been involved in and
facilitate high levels of theft from production. Reliable
sources have informed the Panel that managers in
several companies, with support from the members of
the elite network, collude in these thefts.
48. The State-owned Société minière de Bakwanga
diamond company has been plundered by a
management that condones widespread theft by
company insiders. Three theft rings operate in the
MIBA compound known as the polygone. The first of
these rings was organized and operated by 48
Zimbabwean soldiers who had been stationed at five
different locations throughout the large mining site.
Zimbabwe military personnel allow groups of people to
enter the polygone and dig for diamonds, and in
exchange receive compensation in the form of money
and diamonds.
49. A second theft ring is operated by the Brigade
Minière or provincial mining police, who are trained to
guard the mine. Previously sacked for theft, Brigade
Minière Commander Mushitu has returned to the force.
In exchange for protection, the Commander receives
sacks of diamond-rich gravel. However, the diamond
diggers are often caught in exchanges of fire between
the Brigade Minière and the Zimbabweans in their
efforts to control the diamond thefts.
50. These losses are probably modest compared to
the losses from a third theft ring that involves highlevel
MIBA managers and occurs inside the cleaning,
sorting and classification operation facility. The thefts
include gem and near-gem production. About 50 per
cent of all company revenues are generated by the 3 to
4 per cent of gem and near-gem production. The drop
in revenues resulting from theft has been estimated at
about 25 per cent of total revenue, roughly 25 million
dollars per annum. Under pressure from its creditors,
MIBA was obliged to engage the services of a private
security firm, Overseas Security Services, which
determined that a criminal syndicate was operating
inside the classification operation.
Using the corporate facade as a cover for
criminal activities
51. Some members of the elite network running joint
ventures are linked to the smuggling of precious metals
and gems, arms trafficking, illegal foreign exchange
trading and money-laundering. The Panel has received
extensive documentation and first-hand testimony
explaining the mechanics of these criminal operations.
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52. Sengamines supplements its revenues by
laundering diamonds smuggled from Angola and Sierra
Leone. Sengamines also smuggles its own diamonds
out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
Panel has learned of specific instances, times, places
and persons involved. For example, in March 2001, Mr.
Al-Shanfari instructed his security chief to smuggle
diamonds from the Sengamines concession to
Johannesburg, South Africa, and deliver them to Ken
Roberts, the chief executive of Serengeti Diamonds.
53. Sengamines has also served as a front for illegal
foreign exchange transactions using several routes into
and out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most
of the latter involved breaking the country’s foreign
exchange laws and profiting from arbitrage between
differential exchange rates for the United States dollar
and Congolese franc in Kinshasa and the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo, respectively. In one
example, on 13 March 2000, Oryx officials in Kinshasa
loaded an aircraft belonging to Mr. Bredenkamp with
eight crates of Congolese francs for shipment to
Harare. The Panel also has documentation
substantiating information that an Oryx employee
regularly transported parcels of United States dollars
($500,000 at a time) that were withdrawn from
the Oryx account at Hambros Bank, London, to
Kinshasa without declaring them to the Congolese
authorities; at Kinshasa the money was changed into
Congolese francs and further transported to Harare
and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Oryx employees said they were asked to pay
Mr. Mnangagwa a commission on these transactions
which contravened Zimbabwe law. Despite repeated
claims by Mr. Bredenkamp’s representatives that he has
no business relationship with Mr. Al-Shanfari,
the Panel has received a document — dated January
2001 and jointly signed by Mr. Bredenkamp and
Mr. Al-Shanfari — guaranteeing a $1.5 million loan to
Oryx Natural Resources from Python Services Ltd.
Mining revenues and the military
54. The procurement of military equipment and
services is a major source of revenue for the elite
network. Several joint venture mining companies have
strong links with the military supply companies who
facilitate their operations in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The Panel has information that diamond
revenues were used to pay for arms purchases for FAC
and indirectly used to finance the contribution of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
to salary payments for ZDF. It has received a document
recording a transfer of MIBA funds requested by
Brigadier General François Olenga for the purchase of
weapons for FAC.
55. Oryx Natural Resources has a close working
relationship with Avient Air, a military company which
supplies services and equipment to ZDF and FAC. In
April 2002, Avient Air brokered the sale of six attack
helicopters to the Kinshasa Government. Bank records
show several transactions between Avient and accused
trafficker Leonid Minim. Under the management of
Andrew Smith, a former British army captain, Gerry
O’Brien and Lewis Kling, Avient was contracted to
organize bombing raids into the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo in 1999 and 2000. At the same
time Avient organized logistics and transportation of
mining equipment for Sengamines and enjoyed security
clearance as a military company working with ZDF.
The Panel has a record of a payment in September
2001 of $35,000 from the Oryx account at Banque
Belgolaise to Avient Ltd., Avient Air’s sister company
based in the United Kingdom.
56. John Bredenkamp, who has a history of
clandestine military procurement, has an investment in
Aviation Consultancy Services Company (ACS). The
Panel has confirmed, independently of Mr.
Bredenkamp, that this company represents British
Aerospace, Dornier of France and Agusta of Italy in
Africa. Far from being a passive investor in ACS as
Tremalt representatives claimed, Mr. Bredenkamp
actively seeks business using high-level political
contacts. In discussions with senior officials he has
offered to mediate sales of British Aerospace military
equipment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Mr. Bredenkamp’s representatives claimed that his
companies observed European Union sanctions on
Zimbabwe, but British Aerospace spare parts for ZDF
Hawk jets were supplied early in 2002 in breach of
those sanctions. Mr. Bredenkamp also controls
Raceview Enterprises, which supplies logistics to ZDF.
The Panel has obtained copies of Raceview invoices to
ZDF dated 6 July 2001 for deliveries worth
$3.5 million of camouflage cloth, batteries, fuels and
lubricating oil, boots and rations. It also has copies of
invoices for aircraft spares for the Air Force of
Zimbabwe worth another $3 million.
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Case study of a commercial chain involving
diamonds
57. The Democratic Republic of the Congo-
Zimbabwe joint venture Minerals Business Company
represents Zimbabwe’s interests in the lucrative
diamond trade of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. It buys and markets production from the joint
venture Sengamines, which has attempted to conceal its
links with ZDF. The Minerals Business Company uses
Zimbabwe’s military and political influence to evade
the legal requirements of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and to avoid paying the costly licensing
fees. The refusal of MBC to honour its obligations to
the public treasury has prompted official complaints
from the Ministry of Mines demanding that MBC
comply with the law. MBC officials have asserted that
Zimbabwean entities are not obliged to adhere to the
laws of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
58. The Minerals Business Company allows a limited
number of other diamond companies to take advantage
of the privileged status it enjoys in Kinshasa. Sandrian
Mining, based in Kinshasa, has a contractual
relationship with MBC. Thorntree Industries, a joint
venture between South Africa-based Nico Shefer’s
Tandan group and ZDF, also has contracts with MBC,
as does Mixen Trading, which has offices in
Zimbabwe. MBC sells to the United States-based
Flashes of Color, and the Swiss-registered Ibryn &
Associates, as well as to the Belgian-registered Jewel
Impex, Komal Gems and Diagem. One of the most
important trading partners of MBC is the Belgianbased
company Abadiam, which buys from MBC as
well as directly from Sengamines. The Panel has bank
records dated September 2001 showing transfers of
more than $1 million from the Belgian account of Oryx
Natural Resources to Abadiam.
Collapse of the public sector; armed
conflict and its humanitarian
consequences
Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental
59. The diversion of funds from State companies and
public coffers, by fraud or under the pretext of effort de
guerre, has contributed to eliminating funds available
for public services. The public sector in the two Kasai
Provinces has effectively disappeared. Of the five
water production plants in Kasai Oriental, four plants
no longer function and the fifth, in the city of Mbuji
Mayi, is said to function at less than 20 per cent
capacity. Of the six water production plants in Kasai
Occidental, five no longer function; the sixth, in the
city of Kananga, operates at best at 10 per cent
capacity.
60. Government officials blame the precipitous
decline in public spending on the war. Most soldiers
are unpaid and become social predators, financing
themselves through theft and pillage, living off the
population they are presumed to protect, and provincial
governments make little effort to discourage them.
Taxes and licensing fees have nevertheless increased,
as have the forced acquisition of the resources of State
enterprises in the name of the war effort. The
Government has therefore benefited from the state of
war by using it as a pretext, not only to justify an
increase in demands on the population to increase
government revenues, but also to justify a decrease in
expenditure. Insecurity in the Government-controlled
area is only a small part of the consequences of support
for the military in war. It is much more a consequence
of the deliberate neglect of the military, who by virtue
of this neglect turn their weapons on the population.
61. The pretext of war, increased government levies,
unpaid salaries and the absence of government services
have combined to precipitate a collapse in the urban
economies of Mbuji Mayi, Kananga and, to a lesser
extent, of Lubumbashi. Banks no longer offer credit in
the Kasai Provinces. The absence of local credit and
the decline of road transport have forced most local
industries in Kananga to close.
Katanga
62. Lubumbashi, and southern Katanga generally,
have been affected by Rwanda’s presence in the north.
The occupation by RPA of the northern portion of
Katanga, the rich agricultural plains around Nyunzu
and Kongolo, has cut the southern portion off from
what was once the breadbasket of Katanga.
63. A recent study by Médecins sans Frontières in
Kilwa, a representative town in southern Katanga south
of the front line, with a population of 350,000, has
found a death rate for children under 5 of 3.2 per
10,000 per day. Over the course of a year this means
that 12 per cent of all children under 5 years old will
die, and one out of every four children die over a
period of two years. Notably, virtually none (0.6 per
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cent) of the deaths resulted from violence. Deaths
instead result from illness — malaria and dysentery:
conditions closely linked to malnutrition and the
absence of medical facilities.
64. Malaria and dysentery are treatable. International
non-governmental organizations — World Vision and
Médecins sans Frontières in this case — try to step in
where government facilities no longer function.
However, the soaring death rates in the Governmentheld
areas around Ankoro, Kilwa, Dubie and Lwanza,
especially where medical facilities are non-existent and
where State medical professionals receive no salaries,
are indications of Government negligence. The rates of
malnutrition and mortality are measures of that
negligence and are the consequence, in part, of
diverting State resources from State companies such as
Gécamines into the private accounts of Zimbabwean
individuals, other private interests, and Congolese
individuals.
IV. Rwanda-controlled area
65. The claims of Rwanda concerning its security
have justified the continuing presence of its armed
forces, whose real long-term purpose is, to use the term
employed by the Congo Desk of the Rwandan Patriotic
Army, to “secure property”. Rwanda’s leaders have
succeeded in persuading the international community
that their military presence in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo protects the country against
hostile groups in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, who, they claim, are actively mounting an
invasion against them.
66. The Panel has extensive evidence to the contrary.
For example, the Panel is in possession of a letter,
dated 26 May 2000, from Jean-Pierre Ondekane, First
Vice-President and Chief of the Military High
Command for RCD-Goma, urging all army units to
maintain good relations “with our Interahamwe and
Mayi-Mayi brothers”, and further, “if necessary to let
them exploit the sub-soil for their survival”.
67. Prominent members of a Congolese Hutu group,
Benemugabohumwe, recently began to encourage
Hutus living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
some of them opposition groups, to work instead for
the cause of Rwanda in the country. Eugene Serufuli,
RCD-Goma Governor of North Kivu Province and
reportedly himself a Hutu, has promoted a nongovernmental
organization, Tous pour la paix et la
démocratie, aiming to conscript Hutus of all political
persuasions to throw in their lot with the Rwandans.
Their purpose, as described by the Nord Kivu Reveil in
a circular dated 16 April 2002, has been to “express
allegiance to Rwanda by joining its efforts to control
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo”.
68. A 30-year-old Interahamwe combatant living in
the area of Bukavu described the situation in a taped
interview with a United Nations officer in early 2002.
We haven’t fought much with the RPA in
the last two years. We think they are tired of this
war, like we are. In any case, they aren’t here in
the Congo to chase us, like they pretend. I have
seen the gold and coltan mining they do here, we
see how they rob the population. These are the
reasons for their being here. The RPA come and
shoot in the air and raid the villagers’ houses but
they don’t attack us any more. If you are lucky,
and you have a big brother in the RPA, he might
be able to get you some food and ammunition.
69. On the basis of its analysis of considerable
documentation and oral testimony, the Panel holds the
view that the rationale for Rwanda’s presence is to
increase the numbers of Rwandans in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo and to encourage
those settled there to act in unison to support its
exercise of economic control. The recent departure of
troops should not be interpreted as a sign of Rwanda’s
willingness to reduce its considerable involvement in
the evacuation of valuable resources, to reduce the
level of armed conflict or to diminish the humanitarian
crisis in the region. Economic exploitation in its
various forms will continue, relying on a less
conspicuous armed force and alternative strategies for
carrying out the exploitative activities.
The elite network
70. The elite network’s operations in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo are managed
centrally from the RPA Congo Desk, which serves to
link the commercial and military activities of RPA. The
Panel has described this function in some detail in
previous reports. The Panel continues to receive
documentation on ways in which the proceeds of the
RPA commercial wing finance an armed presence. As
an illustration, the Panel has recently acquired
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documents showing coltan sales being negotiated by
ranking Congo Desk officials. The Panel has copies of
faxes sent from the office of RPA Major Dan Munyuza
on behalf of Maniema Mining Company and another
fax sent from the office of RPA Chief of Staff General
James Kaberebe.
71. While revenues and expenditure in the Congo
Desk are considerable, they are kept strictly separate
from Rwanda’s national budget. A reliable source
associated with the Congo Desk has calculated that
income to the Desk provided 80 per cent of all RPA
expenditure in 1999. The official Rwandan budget for
1999 allocated $80 million to the military. If this
official budget allocation of $80 million represents the
20 per cent referred to by the Panel’s source as the
portion of military expenditure not covered by the
Congo Desk, then the total military budget from all
sources would approximate $400 million. This comes
to 20 per cent of GNP for 1999 and approximately 150
per cent of recurring budget expenditure for that year.
The Congo Desk’s contribution to Rwanda’s military
expenses would therefore have been in the order of
$320 million. The activities funded by revenues
generated by the Congo Desk strongly shape Rwanda’s
foreign policy and directly influence national decisionmaking
in a number of domains. These transactions
are, however, hidden from the scrutiny of international
organizations.
72. The elite network maintains close commercial
ties with transnational criminal networks, including
those of Victor Bout, Sanjivan Ruprah and Richard
Muamba Nozi. Victor Bout’s aircraft are utilized for a
number of purposes including transport of coltan and
cassiterite, the transport of supplies into mining sites,
and the transport of military troops and equipment.
During the last major military campaign in Pweto,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Victor Bout’s
aircraft were used to transport RPA personnel to the
area.
73. While Sanjivan Ruprah has frequently worked
within Victor Bout’s criminal organization, he
maintains an independent affiliation with the Congo
Desk in Kigali. On 7 February 2002, Mr. Ruprah was
arrested in Belgium on suspicion of planning to
provide 6 million new zaire banknotes — still valid in
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo — to
RCD-Goma with financing by diamond dealers based
in Belgium. The President of RCD-Goma, Adolphe
Onusumba, who has kinship and business ties with
Mr. Ruprah, played a key role in this counterfeit
operation. Another group, the Muamba Nozi
counterfeiting operation, also provides counterfeit
Congolese francs to RCD-Goma. Its regional base of
operations is located at Nairobi, where they print and
distribute to the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo large quantities of counterfeit Congolese francs.
Officials in the Central Bank of Kinshasa have
informed the Panel that Mr. Muamba Nozi’s counterfeit
activities are politically motivated and designed to
deliberately destabilize the present regime by
weakening the currency.
Strategies and sources of revenue
Coltan
74. The end of the SOMIGL coltan monopoly in
April 2001 was less a consequence of the falling price
of coltan and more a consequence of Rwanda’s
determination to capture more of the revenue that was
being taken in taxes by the RCD-Goma rebel
administration. The termination of the agreement with
SOMIGL made it possible for RPA to frustrate the
efforts of RCD-Goma to raise revenue for its own
purposes.
75. The bulk of coltan exported from the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo, as much as 60 to
70 per cent, has been mined under the direct
surveillance of RPA mining détachés and evacuated by
aircraft from airstrips near mining sites directly to
Kigali or Cyangugu. No taxes are paid. Rwandan
military aircraft, Victor Bout’s aircraft and small airline
companies are used in the evacuation of the coltan.
RPA has maintained control over most of the coltan
sites where rich deposits are found, where the
percentage of tantalum is high, and where local
airstrips are accessible. A variety of forced labour
regimes are found at sites that have been managed by
RPA mining détachés, some for coltan collection, some
for transport, others for domestic services. Many
accounts report the widespread use of prisoners
imported from Rwanda who work as indentured labour.
76. A smaller portion, perhaps 15 to 25 per cent of
the total coltan exported, is purchased by comptoirs
owned by Rwandans who buy from local négotiants at
remote coltan sites or from the agents of local defence
groups. More typically these comptoirs, owned by
Rwandan army officers or those closely linked to the
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Government of Rwanda, such as MHI comptoir, Eagle
Wings or Rwanda Metals, have obtained their own
mining sites and conscript their own workers to exploit
the sites under severe conditions.
77. The smallest portion of coltan is purchased by the
few remaining Congolese-owned comptoirs at one of
the large number of coltan sites in remote areas. Most
of the Congolese comptoirs have found it impossible to
compete with the RPA or Rwanda-owned comptoirs.
78. As mining profits to the Congo Desk have
increased, the share of RCD-Goma has declined. The
Congo Desk has perennially deprived its junior partner,
RCD-Goma, of any significant share in resources and
prerogatives, and RCD-Goma has perennially
complained. RCD-Goma administrators have
frequently pointed out that they were unable to manage
their army without sufficient revenue. Lacking
financial support, the ANC brigades have turned to
pillaging villagers throughout the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The third Brigade has stolen a
large number of cattle around Kalemie, and the first
Brigade has taken diamonds from Opala. The Panel
possesses extensive documentation on these activities.
Most of these rebel forces are under the command of
RPA officers. They have little hesitation, when so
directed, in attacking local self-defence groups who
obstruct their commercial operations, to eliminate
specific enemies, to provide security around gold,
coltan and diamond rich areas, to provide police
services in urban areas and occasionally to keep a force
present along the front lines. Since ANC troops are
neither paid nor disciplined, they use their weapons to
prey on the population, frequently burning whole
villages to acquire property and food.
Case study of a commercial chain involving
coltan
79. Eagle Wings Resources International, a coltan
comptoir in Bukavu, is a subsidiary of Trinitech
International Inc., based in Ohio, United States. Eagle
Wings has offices in Rwanda, Burundi and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The manager of
Eagle Wings in Kigali has close ties to the Rwandan
regime. Consequently, Eagle Wings operates in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo as a Rwandacontrolled
comptoir with all the privileges derived
from this connection. Eagle Wings is not obliged to
fulfil its full responsibilities to the public treasury
managed by the RCD-Goma administration. Like other
Rwanda-controlled coltan comptoirs, Eagle Wings
collaborates with RPA to receive privileged access to
coltan sites and captive labour.
80. Approximately 25 per cent of Eagle Wings coltan
is shipped from Kigali to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant
of NAC Kazatomprom, in Kazakhstan. Another 25 per
cent is sold to the parent company of Eagle Wings,
Trinitech International Inc. in the United States, which
arranges for sales to both Ulba and to the Chinese
processing facility at Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metals
Smeltery (NNMS). H. C. Starck, based in Germany and
a subsidiary of the transnational corporation Bayer AG,
purchases about 15 per cent of Eagle Wings coltan.
H. C. Starck has denied on numerous occasions
obtaining coltan originating from Central Africa. In a
press statement issued on 24 May 2002, H. C. Starck
reiterated that the company had purchased no material
originating in Central Africa since August 2001. The
Panel possesses documents showing the contrary. In the
same press release, H. C. Starck claimed that its coltan
originates from “peasant suppliers” and not from rebel
groups. In fact, no coltan exits from the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo without benefiting
either the rebel group or foreign armies.
81. In one instance on which the Panel has
documentation, Mozambique Gemstone Company
provided false documents establishing Mozambique as
the origin of a shipment of coltan originating in
Rwanda and transiting through South Africa.
Mozambique Gemstone Company then sold the
consignment to AMC African Trading and Consulting
Company Ltd., based in South Africa, which
subsequently sold the consignment to H. C. Starck Ltd.
in Rayong, Thailand, on 21 September 2001. H. C.
Starck sent a letter of credit for this consignment on
9 May 2002 to Chemie Pharmacie Holland, which
oversaw the transaction, and which is a commercial
partner of Eagle Wings providing logistical and
financial services. Eagle Wings is the only coltan
source for Chemie Pharmacie. Eagle Wings has no
operations in Mozambique.
82. The Panel has also had direct contacts with the
Chinese processing facility, NNMS, to determine
whether they use coltan originating in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. NNMS
categorically denied doing business with “any
individual or any entity that represents somebody or
some entity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
In fact, a number of brokers trading in coltan
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originating from the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo have informed the Panel of their sales to
NNMS. A publicity presentation prepared by NNMS
itself has stated that the reason that they are able to
provide low prices for their output is that NNMS buys
significant amounts of cheap raw material from Central
Africa. One NNMS report notes that 50 per cent of all
coltan purchased for processing originates in Central
Africa. Frequent follow-up Panel enquiries with NNMS
were ignored.
Diamonds
83. The diamond market was the prize Rwanda
fought Uganda to have for its own. After the last clash
in Kisangani in June 2000, RPA worked through the
RCD-Goma administration to funnel all the diamonds
in Kisangani through the Congo Desk control. The
technique was to oblige all local diamond traders to
sell to one principal comptoir holding exclusive export
rights.
84. The Congo Desk gave Aziz Nassour the first
monopoly. Aziz Nassour fell out of favour with the
Congo Desk and was replaced by an Israeli diamond
dealer, Philippe Surowicz. Diamond traders in
Kisangani remember the Surowicz period as a “reign of
terror”. Diamond sellers frequently reported entering
“Monsieur Philippe’s” comptoir only to be confronted
with RPA military who named a derisory price and
took the diamonds. The Congo Desk replaced
Mr. Surowicz in October 2001 with a Lebanese, Hamad
Khalil, who worked through the Bakayoko comptoir in
Kisangani.
85. In mid-November 2001, the Department of
Lands, Mines and Energy of RCD-Goma conducted a
study of Hamad Khalil’s performance in the first month
of his tenure. His quota had been set at a minimum of
$500,000 per month. Mr. Khalil met his quota
exporting diamonds valued at $576,380 over a period
of 27 days. The performance was adequate, but it was
far below the Kisangani sales potential of up to
$2 million per month. His poor performance raised the
suspicion that the Congo Desk was using Mr. Khalil to
divert revenues that might otherwise accrue to the
RCD-Goma administration. A similar inspection of
diamond production in the Sankuru and Lodja areas of
Northern Kasai the week before had also revealed that
RPA officers were clandestinely taking large quantities
of diamonds out of Northern Kasai directly to the
Congo Desk in Kigali. RCD-Goma determined that Mr.
Khalil was undervaluing the diamonds, and the
consequence was a reduction in taxes payable to RCDGoma’s
public treasury as well as a greater margin of
profit for Mr. Khalil and the Congo Desk. The study
concludes that “The public treasury would have four
times the present revenue from diamonds were it not
for fraudulent practices and the under-valuation of
diamonds”.
Imports, taxation and requisition by the
public sector
86. The controversial “conflict” diamonds from
Kisangani are marketed by criminal networks.
Proceeds from these criminal sales are laundered by the
purchase of large quantities of household goods in
Dubai — sugar, soap, cloth and medicines — which are
then imported to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and offered to local sellers at attractive prices. The
Rwandan wholesalers use the profits in Congolese
francs to buy dollars and, to close the trade circuit, to
purchase diamonds.
87. The interest of the RPA commercial wing in
selling consumables at attractive prices is not only to
launder money from criminal diamond sales, but also
to place the once-thriving Kisangani economy under
Rwanda’s control. The cloths that were once
manufactured at the Kisangani Sotexki factory and
renowned for their quality no longer compete with the
cheaper imports, and the result is that the Sotexki
labour force, once 2,000, now stands at 100. The palm
oil once produced locally at the Unilever-owned plant
can no longer compete with the imported oil that is
sold in Kisangani at a third of the price of locally
produced oil. The Unilever-owned palm oil plants in
Kisangani are practically at a standstill. Weakening
local production not only undermines the local
manufacturing economy and makes the Kisangani
population captive consumers, it also shifts Kisangani’s
manufacturing economy to Kigali.
88. Another strategy for raising revenue is to use
RCD-Goma’s public sector facade to requisition funds
from public enterprises. On 21 November 2001, the
Secretary General of RCD-Goma requisitioned by
decree all revenues generated by public utilities and
parastatals. On the following day the Secretary General
annulled all existing collective agreements for workers
in those enterprises. The decrees were applicable to all
public enterprises, including the water utility, the
airport authorities, the electricity utility, the road and
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transport authority among others. RCD-Goma declared
the requisitions to be in the public interest. Within a
month, the water utility lacked sufficient funds to
purchase water purification chemicals in Kisangani and
Bukavu and power stations stopped functioning for
lack of necessary repairs. The International Committee
of the Red Cross has stepped in to provide 60 tons of
chemicals for water purification and has financed
costly repairs at Tshopo power station to avert a
discontinuation of water supply in Kisangani and avert
a cholera outbreak. The parastatal transport company
ceased to function, and the airport authorities appealed
to RCD-Goma to restore a portion of the requisitioned
funds since no salaries had been paid for six months.
89. Following a decree on 15 March 2002, new taxes
were introduced and all existing tax rates have been
increased. Over an 18-month period, since the previous
tax decree of September 2000, taxes on electrical
consumption have increased by 200 per cent. Licences
for trading in agricultural products increased fourfold.
Most licensing fees for operating a business were
doubled or tripled. The number of different taxes
collected in the area under RCD-Goma administration
has increased four times since 1998. None of the tax
revenue is used to provide public services.
Armed conflict and its consequences
90. Medical practitioners, church workers, and nongovernmental
organizations in northern Katanga all
attest to rapidly escalating disorder in Kalemie and an
increased use of arms by a wide range of groups, some
affiliated with RCD-Goma and others not. Fighting
between RPA and FAC has been limited to Rwanda’s
seizure of northern Katanga in November 1998 and a
government counter-offensive in October 2000. These
confrontations resulted in considerable displacement of
populations in the path of troop movements. However,
it was the aftermath of those confrontations that
resulted in the most severe armed conflict. Rwandan
troops seized material for their campaigns. The RCDGoma
third ANC Brigade, following Rwanda’s
example in their own random fashion, seized food and
other property. Armed movements arose among local
populations for self-defence, and occasionally these
local militias banded together with other local militias
to create larger armed groups. The Panel has received
extensive documentation from local lawyers, Catholic
and Protestant churches, the Fédération des Entreprises
au Congo and others detailing thefts of cattle valued at
more than $15 million, thefts of over $1 million worth
of retail goods and the destruction or fraudulent sale of
equipment from the Société nationale de chemin de fer
du Congo.
91. The Catholic Church in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo has spoken out boldly about the
thefts, killings, torture, extortions, rapes and piracy on
Lake Tanganyika perpetrated originally by RPA and
continued by ANC, the RCD-Goma police and the
Banyamulenge militia. The Church, and most notably
the Bishop of Kalemie-Kirungu, recently headed a
campaign to expose these abuses. Directors of RCDGoma’s
Department of Security and Information
responded by threatening to kill prominent church
leaders. The Catholic Diocese published a list of those
threats on 15 May 2002.
92. The multiplication of armed forces and fighting
in the interior have all but destroyed farm production
on the rich plateau in the interior of northern Katanga.
Excesses by RPA in requisitioning resources for the
“war effort” set a standard for behaviour by the far less
disciplined ANC rebel forces, who have ravaged the
countryside. Growers are reluctant to invest in crops
when they are so likely to be stolen. Large numbers of
persons have been displaced from their homes and have
abandoned their lands out of fear. The Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has estimated
that, in the northern Katanga area alone, 350,000
displaced persons are living away from their homes,
with neighbours, in the cities or in the bush.
93. Armed conflict along the Masisi-Walikale-Goma
axis arises from tensions between the large numbers of
RPA in place to manage mining operations and Hutus
who may be resident, but who are also imported or
conscripted by Rwandan forces to carry out mining
under forced labour conditions. Separate Rwandaowned
comptoirs have quarrelled among themselves
for access to sites. RPA forces have attacked and
burned villages to seize coltan mined by some Hutu
groups or local villagers. The Panel has taken
testimony from villagers who have been forced to leave
their villages following attacks. With minor exceptions,
the objective of military activity is to secure access to
mining sites or ensure a supply of captive labour.
94. Population displacement is the outcome of
frequent armed conflict, with the predictable
consequences of food insecurity, malnutrition and high
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mortality rates for both the displaced and host
populations. The Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 1.5 million
persons were displaced in March 2001 in the areas
occupied by Rwanda in North and South Kivu,
Maniema and Katanga, nearly 14 per cent of the
population. More than three quarters of families living
in the rural areas have probably been forced to move at
least once in the last five years. This degree of armed
conflict undermines local authority and encourages an
abusive social environment. Public infrastructure is
destroyed. School enrolment in Shabunda has dropped
56 per cent since 1998. Men are led to abuse women on
a surprising scale throughout the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. International non-governmental
organizations have provided comprehensive reports
about groups of women being taken hostage and
submitted to long periods of sexual abuse. Children
become instruments of war, forced to work in the
mines and conscripted into armed forces. United
Nations officials have suggested that the number of
child soldiers in the rebel armies is much higher than
reported by the rebel administrations, and that 50 per
cent of local defence and Mayi-Mayi groups are
children.
Malnutrition and mortality
95. Malnutrition studies carried out by nongovernmental
organizations in both northern Katanga
and the Kivus have shown that, in some places, as
many as 25 to 30 per cent of all children under 5 years
are malnourished. In most cases, this is due to the large
numbers of displaced persons who have been forced to
leave their own agricultural production and have taken
refuge in nearby host villages. A number of studies
have shown the close link between elevated
malnutrition levels and mortality rates in this region.
96. The most commonly quoted conclusion from the
International Rescue Committee’s surveys is that 2.5
million more people died since the beginning of the
war than would have died had the war not occurred.
While the study is directly relevant to the sample
population of 1.3 million, the International Rescue
Committee has assumed that conditions are sufficiently
similar throughout all five provinces of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo to justify applying
the mortality rates found in the sampled population to
the larger population in all five provinces. The study
covered the period from August 1998 to April 2001. If
one assumes mortality to have continued at the same
rate, this would mean that more than 3.5 million excess
deaths would have occurred from the beginning of the
war up to September 2002. These deaths are a direct
result of the occupation by Rwanda and Uganda.
Extensive mortality, especially mortality among
children, is the consequence of a cycle of aggression,
the multiplication of armed forces, a high frequency of
conflict and its consequences, especially displacement.
One should not be surprised to find, in areas most
affected by the conflict, a mortality rate for children
under 5 years of 35 per cent.
V. Uganda-controlled area
97. The objective of the elite network in the areas
controlled by Uganda has been to exercise
monopolistic control over the area’s principal natural
resources, cross-border trade, and tax revenues for the
purpose of enriching members of the network.
Notwithstanding the current political rapprochement
and the apparent momentum towards normalizing
relations between Uganda and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the elite network continues to increase its
economic hold over the area.
The elite network
98. The elite network operating out of Uganda is
decentralized and loosely hierarchical, unlike the
network operating out of Rwanda. The Uganda network
consists of a core group of members including certain
high-ranking UPDF officers, private businessmen and
selected rebel leaders/administrators. UPDF Lieutenant
General (Ret.) Salim Saleh and Major General James
Kazini are the key figures. Other members include the
Chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Noble
Mayombo, UPDF Colonel Kahinda Otafiire and
Colonel Peter Karim. Private entrepreneurs include
Sam Engola, Jacob Manu Soba and Mannase Savo and
other Savo family members. Rebel politicians and
administrators include Professor Wamba dia Wamba,
Roger Lumbala, John Tibasima, Mbusa Nyamwisi and
Toma Lubanga.
99. The network continues to conduct activities
through front companies such as the Victoria Group,
Trinity Investment, LA CONMET and Sagricof. Each
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of these companies may concentrate on one or two
commercial niches, though these may change. The role
of the companies is to manage their respective niche
activities by assembling the personnel, logistics and
occasionally the financing for the operations.
100. The network generates revenue from the export of
primary materials, from controlling the import of
consumables, from theft and tax fraud. The success of
the network’s activities in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo relies on three interconnected features,
namely, military intimidation; maintenance of a public
sector facade, in the form of a rebel movement
administration; and manipulation of the money supply
and the banking sector, using counterfeit currency and
other related mechanisms.
101. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces and their
associated rebel militias have been used as the de facto
enforcement arm of the network, ensuring the
network’s pre-eminent commercial position through
intimidation, and the threat and use of force. UPDF or
militias associated with individual UPDF officers have
established physical control over areas containing
commercially viable natural resources — coltan,
diamonds, timber and gold. They establish authority in
major urban and financial centres, such as Bunia, Beni
and Butembo, where they use the rebel administration
as a public sector facade to generate revenue,
specifically to collect taxes under various pretexts,
including licensing fees for commercial operators,
import and export duties and taxes on specific
products.
102. Uganda has recently agreed to withdraw all
UPDF troops except for a reinforced battalion in Bunia
and a small number of units on the slopes of the
Ruwenzori Mountains. In anticipation of this
withdrawal, a paramilitary force is being trained under
the personal authority of Lt. General Saleh which,
according to the Panel’s sources, is expected to
continue to facilitate the commercial activities of
UPDF officers after UPDF have departed. This military
group draws on dissidents from Jean-Pierre Bemba’s
MLC, members of the Uganda-supported RCD-Congo
including its leaders Professor Kin-kiey Mulumba and
Kabanga Babadi, and others in the north-eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo who have supported
UPDF in the past. It has been reported that Lt. General
Saleh discreetly provides financial support for this new
rebel group. The Panel’s sources have indicated that
Heckie Horn, Managing Director of Saracen Uganda
Ltd., is a key partner with Lt. General Saleh in
supporting this paramilitary group and that Lt. General
Saleh himself is a 25 per cent owner in Saracen.
Saracen’s managing director also provides military
training and arms to members of this group. In an
interview with Panel members, the Managing Director
of Saracen Ltd. categorically denied any involvement
with Lt. General Saleh’s activities in the north-eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
103. Panel sources report that Lt. General Saleh and
Mr. Horn consulted President Joseph Kabila to obtain
support for this covert operation. Its primary objective
has been to replace Mbusa Nyamwisi with Roger
Lumbala as head of RCD-K/ML in order to ensure
access to the diamond-rich areas around Buta and Isiro
controlled by Mr. Lumbala’s rebel group, RCDNational.
This objective has largely been achieved.
Their more long-term objective is to bring about the
downfall of Jean-Pierre Bemba, adding the growing
number of dissidents in Mr. Bemba’s ranks to the new
rebel movement RCD-Congo. With increased numbers
and training, they will then be in a position to confront
RCD-Goma and Rwanda.
104. Members of the Ugandan network are typically
tax exempt. The Panel is in possession of documents
showing that the network uses its control over the
RCD-K/ML rebel administration to request tax
exonerations for imports of high-value commodities.
The granting of numerous tax exonerations to UPDF
Colonel Otafiire between late 2001 and early 2002 is
one of numerous cases. Not only did Colonel Otafiire
benefit financially but, eventually, those exonerations
forced local competitors out of markets in Bunia and
Beni, leaving the petrol trade largely under the control
of the network.
105. Local commercial operators are, however,
required to pay substantial import and export duties.
These operators may be favoured with discounted tax
payment deals, in the form of prefinancing
arrangements, but tax payment for local operators is
mandatory. Prefinancing arrangements involve the
payment by an importer of discounted tax payments in
exchange for a financial payment to an authorizing
rebel politician or administrator. None of these
payments to the rebel administration is used to finance
public services.
106. The network uses its economic influence to
control the banking sector, which in turn allows the
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network to further control access to operating capital
for commercial operators in the area. Economically
speaking, this region has become a captive region, where
the types of commercial ventures are manipulated and
the viability of local businesses is controlled.
Furthermore, the flow of money is regulated by the
network through currency trading and the widespread
introduction of counterfeit Congolese francs.
107. As in the past, the network continues to involve
the transnational criminal group of Victor Bout. Mr.
Bout recently purchased the Uganda-based nonoperational
airline company Okapi Air. The purchase
of the company allowed Victor Bout to use Okapi’s
licences. The company was subsequently renamed
Odessa. The Panel is in possession of a list of outbound
flights from 1998 to the beginning of 2002 from
Entebbe International Airport, which confirms the
operational activities of Mr. Bout’s aircraft from
Ugandan territory. Currently, Mr. Bout’s aircraft share
the flight times and destinations (slots) with Planet Air,
which is owned by the wife of Lt. General Salim Saleh
and which facilitates the activities of Mr. Bout by filing
flight plans for his aircraft.
Strategies and sources of revenue
Coltan
108. Coltan has been exploited extensively in
Orientale Province by various armed groups under the
protection of UPDF. A number of coltan operations,
especially under the supervision of UPDF Colonels
Muzora and Burundi, have been coordinated under the
front company Trinity Investment, where UPDF Major
General Kazini is the principal figure. Armed groups
frequently identified with militias under the command
of UPDF officers manage sites in remote locations
where diggers pay a daily fee to exploit an area.
Case study of a commercial chain
involving coltan
109. During March 2002, Panel members met with
Valentina Piskunova who, together with her husband
Anatoly Piskunov, represents and operates the company
LA CONMET from its base in Kampala. During
discussions with the Panel, Ms. Piskunova explained
that, because of the collapsed international coltan
market, prices for the mineral in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo had dropped
dramatically. However, Ms. Piskunova told the Panel
that the continuing international interest in coltan from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo is due to the
“very low” labour costs for extracting the mineral.
Therefore, the company continued to buy coltan from
its office at Butembo in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. She said that their purchase price for coltan
with a 30 per cent tantalum content was $10 per
kilogram. The same coltan was then sold for $17 per
kilogram.
110. Ms. Piskunova went on to tell the Panel that the
company’s coltan was transported by road across the
border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda at Kasindi to Entebbe International
Airport, where it was then transported by Boeing 707,
via Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, at a cost of
$140,000 per flight, to Ulba, Kazakhstan, for
processing.
111. In addition to the profit made on the sales of
coltan, LA CONMET also experienced savings by
being granted “full exoneration” for “all activities
involving exploitation for the territory of Beni-Lubero”
(Democratic Republic of the Congo), including
freedom from paying fiscal and customs duties. The
document granting the exonerations is in the possession
of the Panel. It was signed at Kampala by Mbusa
Myamwisi, then Commissioner General for RCDKisangani,
on 5 January 2000, identifying Salim Saleh
as the owner of LA CONMET and designating his
representatives as “the Russian group LA CONMET”.
Diamonds
112. The network coordinates all elements of the
diamond trade, local buying houses, Lebanese
exporters, army protection from UPDF and individual
militias, tax exonerations from the public sector, and
Lebanese connections in Antwerp, under the aegis of
the front company, the Victoria Group. Considerable
evidence available to the Panel has named the
Lebanese-born, Khalil Nazeem Ibrahim, and another
known as Mr. Abbas, as the present focal points in
Kampala for Victoria’s diamond operations. The Panel
has credible evidence that Khalil Nazeem Ibrahim used
the capital and marketing services of Hemang Nananal
Shah, proprietor of Nami Gems in Antwerp. Lt.
General Saleh is recognized by the Panel’s sources in
Bunia, Kisangani and Kampala as the founder and
director of the Victoria Group and as the mastermind of
its operations.
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113. The Lebanese individuals, together with their
families, who are commonly named in connection with
the Victoria Group, are also regarded as closely
associated with the Lebanese families Khanafer and
Ahmad. Khanafer Nahim, in particular, has been named
as a key figure in Victoria Group operations. He is well
known by a number of national intelligence and police
organizations for the production of counterfeit
currency, money-laundering and diamond smuggling
on behalf of generals who were prominent in President
Mobutu’s time and are still interested in returning to
power. The Victoria Group’s use of counterfeit United
States currency in Bunia to purchase gold from local
comptoirs is widely known.
Tax fraud and the requisition of assets
114. Control over imports is as lucrative as the
monopolization of exports. Exoneration from import
duties gives the network an advantage in the northeastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo over local
importers who pay duties and taxes. An across-theboard
exoneration was recently proclaimed in the
Protocole d’Accord issued by RCD-K/ML on 22
February 2002, which ensured Ugandan commercial
operators complete exoneration from all taxes in the
area under their control.
115. But increased profit margins from tax-free
imports provide only a fraction of the benefits. Equally
lucrative is access to the taxes themselves,
monopolized by the network that uses the rebel
administration’s facade of a public treasury and its
collection agents to raise revenue from local
businessmen and the population at large. Hundreds of
containers are imported each month into the Butembo,
Beni and Bunia areas, and importers are obliged to pay
an average of $8,000 per container. Revenue from these
import duties can be considerable. Some revenue is
also diverted through prefinancing arrangements,
which provide discounted import duties in exchange
for kickbacks to rebel politicians. The Panel’s sources
insist that the revenues generated from import duties
and prefinancing payments are diverted to UPDF
officers. None is utilized for public services.
116. Trinity Investment’s local transporters in Bunia,
the Savo family group among others, carry agricultural
products, wood and cattle from Bunia to Kampala
exempt from UPDF toll barriers and export taxes.
Trinity investment also works with another front
company under the name of Sagricof to fraudulently
evacuate wood from North Kivu and the Ituri area.
Tree plantations have been raided in the areas of
Mahagi and Djugu along the north-eastern border with
Uganda. Concerned citizens and research by local nongovernmental
organizations have identified Colonel
Peter Karim and Colonel Otafiire, in addition to the
Ugandan parliamentarian Sam Ngola, as key figures in
the illegal logging and fraudulent evacuation of wood.
117. Many of the cattle removed have been forcibly
taken from villages that have been the objects of attack
by Hema militia supported by UPDF troops. The Panel
has received reports from ranchers in areas to the south
of Bunia as well as to the north in Mahagi detailing the
removal of large numbers of cattle by UPDF troops.
The representative of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations in Bunia has
reported the more recent UPDF practice of offering
protection to ranchers against attacks that they
themselves have orchestrated, in exchange for regular
payment in animals. UPDF have also required local
butchers to hand over hides from animals butchered
locally, and these hides are then transported to
Kampala where they are reputedly sold to Bata Shoe
Manufacturing.
Economic exploitation and ethnic conflict
118. The ongoing armed conflict between members of
the Hema and Lendu clans stems, in part, from
attempts by powerful Hema businessmen and
politicians to increase the benefits they derive from the
commercial activities of the elite network through their
front companies, the Victoria Group and Trinity
Investment, in the Ituri area.
119. Hema clan members, particularly members of the
sub-clan Gegere, have justified the purchase of arms
and the training of their own militia by the need to
defend themselves against their traditional enemies, the
Lendu. It is true that a long-festering dispute over land
has resulted in discord between the two groups.
Recently, however, the traditional enmity over land and
the ongoing feud between the two groups is used as a
rationale by the Hema, and especially by the extremist
sub-clan Gegere, for importing arms and training their
own militia with the ultimate unspoken objective of
consolidating their economic strength in the region.
120. The Gegere sub-clan plays an important role in
the operation of the elite network. The majority of
transporters and local traders in Bunia come from this
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group. Jacob Manu Soba, Manasse Savo and other
members of the Savo family are among those who have
provisioned UPDF in the area and who provide
transport, logistical services and local commercial
links. They have established close links with a
succession of UPDF commanders and troops in the
area and work closely with them in conducting crossborder
trade.
121. The Hema fill an important niche in the operation
of the criminal enterprises as truck owners and
businessmen. They transport shipments of primary
products from Ituri across the border to Uganda under
the protection of UPDF troops and return with
gasoline, cigarettes and arms, all exempt from taxation.
They benefit from the trade and the generous profit
margins, and from their association with the Trinity
Group’s Ugandan patrons. But their niche has remained
marginal. They control none of the primary product
exports themselves. They remain peripheral to the
alliance between RCD-K/ML leaders, the Ugandan
patrons and UPDF. The plot to replace Mr. Nyamwisi
with Mr. Lubanga, which appears now to be a fait
accompli in Bunia, is part of an attempt by these Hema
traders to secure greater control over the spoils
available to inside members of RCD-K/ML.
122. UPDF have created the conditions that require the
presence of troops and their continued involvement in
commercial operations. This has entailed providing
arms to both sides in the ethnic conflict, the Lendu and
the Hema. The consequent increase in ethnic fighting
has resulted in UPDF being urged to assist in furthering
the peace process in Bunia. This function was
formalized in an official Protocole d’Accord signed on
22 February 2002 by Mbusa Nyamwisi and John
Tibasima as President and Vice-President of RCDK/
ML and by Colonel Noble Mayombo as an official
representative of the Government of Uganda. The
Protocole d’Accord gave UPDF official responsibility
for reducing the conflits armés inter-ethnique en Ituri
and for assisting in bringing about a retour de la paix
by keeping a contingent in place for observation and
for negotiating an eventual long-term solution. In
exchange, UPDF were promised a monthly stipend of
$25,000 from the RCD-K/ML public treasury, and all
Ugandan enterprises that were approved by UPDF were
accorded exoneration from all duties and taxes due to
the rebel administration. This has given UPDF a
legitimate cover for continuing military support for the
elite network’s activities in the area.
123. The Protocole d’Accord was signed a week after
UPDF had been involved in a succession of attacks,
from 11 to 16 February 2002, on villagers at Geti. The
Panel’s sources on the matter stated that the attack had
been financed by Hema businessmen in Bunia. The
UPDF motive was clarified even further in the course
of a meeting with RCD-K/ML department chiefs on 12
July 2002, when a Panel member was informed that the
Hema businessmen in question sought to have control
over gold deposits in the Geti area, and that in fact the
ethnic conflict was a minor issue.
Armed conflict and its consequences
124. UPDF military operations have contributed to the
arming of large numbers. UPDF have trained the
militia of their Ituri commercial allies, the Hema, and
provoked the need for the victims of Hema attacks to
defend themselves. Lendu villages have mounted their
own local forces, and they in turn have frequently
attacked Hema villages. The creation of local selfdefence
groups is a familiar pattern: local ethnic groups
frequently assemble armed groups to defend their
villages or collectivities.
125. Armed conflict has spread throughout society, as
economic and personal insecurity reach extreme levels.
Large numbers of young men join one or another
armed group because they have no other means of
finding food or medicine or because they have no one
to care for them. The young men in the Armé
Patriotique Congolaise are unpaid but are provided
with weapons and a uniform giving them the tools for
menacing others. Widespread armed activity is
characterized by opportunistic and chaotic encounters.
Children are killed, adult victims are eviscerated,
women are raped, property stolen, houses burned,
churches demolished and whatever infrastructure exists
is laid waste.
126. In the cities, young men dressed in military
uniform and equipped with guns target businesses,
households and churches. In the countryside, armed
groups target whole villages. The attack on the village
of Mpingi on 24 December 2001 is illustrative. A small
Mayi-Mayi group had teamed up with a group claiming
to be members of a Hutu opposition to set up a
roadblock on the road from Butembo to Kanyabayonga.
When the roadblock drew the attention of APC, the
Mayi-Mayi group withdrew to the west into the village
of Mpingi where they sought refuge. APC followed
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them in force and attacked the entire village of Mpingi,
destroyed and burned houses, vandalized the church,
razed the school and clinic and forced the residents to
flee. Targeting whole villages with violence, brutally
raping and murdering residents, removing livestock,
food and other property and dispersing residents has
been the trademark of armed aggression. A portion of
those who flee seek protection in nearby villages,
abandoning their own productive activities in their
home village while becoming dependent on the
resources of host populations.
127. A portion of the displaced population take refuge
in urban areas where they benefit from somewhat better
security but have little, if any, means for survival.
Unemployment rates in cities and towns often reach 90
per cent. An income survey by civil society groups in
Butembo found that 90 per cent lived on a few cents a
day and ate one meal a day. Urban families break up to
seek survival in separate ways. The women engage in
prostitution, the older men may return to what remains
of their villages or mining sites and the young men
enter the rebel army, swelling both the ranks of its
forces and the numbers of young boys without
subsistence possessing weapons.
128. In March 2001, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs estimated that there were
620,000 displaced persons in North Kivu, which
amounted to 16 per cent of the total population. The
area covered by the Office’s survey includes both
Uganda-controlled and Rwanda-controlled areas, but
the conditions surveyed are representative of the
Uganda-controlled area. Given the frequency of
displacement in the area, this would mean that four out
of five rural residents have been forcibly displaced at
one time or another since 1998. This is the highest
number ever registered for Africa. These aggregates
have been confirmed for specific localities surveyed by
international non-governmental organizations.
129. The spread of HIV/AIDS, the large numbers of
child soldiers and the rape of women are other
consequences of the pervasive armed conflict. Many
soldiers are young boys who hardly seem capable of
wielding the weapons they carry. The issue of child
soldiers surfaced when 700 young recruits from the
Bunia area were discovered at a UPDF training camp
in Tchakwanzi, Uganda, of whom 165 were between 14
and 16 years of age. The programme to demobilize
those 165 children, two of whom were girls, has
attracted considerable attention. The issue also
received attention recently when the Governor of
Bunea, Jean-Pierre Molondo, revealed that, of the
recruits being trained for the extremist Hema militia,
60 per cent were under the age of 18.
Malnutrition and mortality
130. Population displacement has a direct impact on
agricultural production, food security and levels of
malnutrition. The threat of attack and displacement is
so prevalent in this area that farm families adopt
farming strategies that minimize losses under
conditions of extreme insecurity. They cease raising
animals, since animals can be easily stolen. Fewer
families raise protein-rich legumes, since these crops
require attention through the growing cycle, and this
attention can rarely be given. Malnutrition, in turn,
substantially increases the exposure of the population
to life-threatening illnesses.
131. The International Rescue Committee surveys
provide the most comprehensive research into mortality
in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. None
of the health zones sampled in its two major surveys
was in the areas now controlled by Uganda. However,
the pattern of armed conflict, population displacement,
food insecurity and malnutrition in Uganda-controlled
areas resembles the pattern that explains the very high
mortality rates in the seven health zones where the
research was conducted. The Committee’s team judged
the similarities to be sufficient to warrant extrapolating
the results of areas sampled in the Kivus to the entire
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including
areas under Ugandan control. The Panel concurs. One
can expect the same range of mortality for children
under 5, from nearly 30 per cent per year in areas of
extreme insecurity without health facilities to 7 per
cent in areas where there is less insecurity and some
services. For the more than 20 million people living in
the five eastern provinces, the number of excess deaths
directly attributable to Rwandan and Ugandan
occupation can be estimated at between 3 million and
3.5 million.
VI. Collaboration of the Panel with the
Porter Commission in Uganda
132. During its previous mandate, the Panel’s relations
with the Judicial Commission of Inquiry headed by
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Justice David Porter (Porter Commission) were
occasionally strained. However, with the
encouragement of Member States, notably the members
of the Security Council, the Panel established an
amiable working relationship with the Commission.
This relationship is unique in the history of panels of
experts mandated by the Council, given the degree and
the nature of the cooperation developed between the
two bodies.
133. Panel members held frequent discussions with the
Porter Commission. From the outset, Justice Porter was
critical of the quality of the Panel’s reports and the
credibility of its sources. At the same time, he claimed
that the Commission’s investigations, ongoing now for
more than a year, were stymied primarily because of a
“conspiracy of silence” within UPDF. Under the
Commission of Inquiry Act, the Commission has the
power to conduct searches and compel the production
of documents and testimony.
134. The Panel made evidence available to the
Commission, including copies of 12 letters and a
statement from a witness, together with five original
audiotapes containing testimony given by a primary
source. These materials represent only a small sample
of the documentation gathered by the Panel on the
involvement of leading Ugandan military and senior
Ugandan Government personnel. They provide
evidence of criminal activity by such ranking Ugandan
authorities. They show officials demanding extortionist
payments and tax exonerations from Congolese rebel
movements, including the UPDF Chief of Staff
demanding that his vehicles transporting coltan be
allowed to cross the border without paying export
duties. The Panel also arranged for one of its sources to
testify before the Commission at a special hearing in
spite of the risk of exposure to the source. In exchange,
the Porter Commission provided the Panel with copies
of the testimony of certain high-ranking military
officers, Government officials, private businessmen
and other individuals who had appeared before it.
135. The Panel’s many efforts to establish a
constructive relationship with the Commission have
mostly been met with attempts to dismiss its
credibility. The Commission has challenged the
authenticity of letters provided by the Panel that show
significant payments to UPDF officers from rebel
movement budgets, even when reliable witnesses have
testified to their validity. It has submitted other
documents signed by ranking officials to handwriting
analysis and used this analysis to imply that they may
be forgeries. The analysis of those documents,
however, suggested that the signatures were probably
genuine. During a specially arranged hearing aimed at
corroborating the authenticity of certain documents
transmitted by the Panel, the Porter Commission
submitted one of the Panel’s informants to an unusually
aggressive questioning designed to frighten the
individual and discredit his testimony.
136. When the Commission recalled Major General
James Kazini in May 2002 to question him on the basis
of documents supplied by the Panel, the UPDF military
commander finally admitted that the signatures on the
documents were indeed his and accepted that the
documents related to his actions as the former
commander of UPDF operations in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Justice Porter commented
during the questioning that General Kazini, who had
consistently denied under oath any involvement in such
illicit economic exploits, had perjured himself
repeatedly during both that hearing and his original
testimony before the Commission the previous year.
The head of the Commission also conceded, according
to transcripts of the hearing, that the Panel’s
“allegations” about General Kazini’s involvement in
exploitation activities, including those related to the
diamond trade and tax revenues, “were actually true”.
Justice Porter reconfirmed these observations in
meetings with the Panel, again conceding that the
conclusions of the Panel’s earlier reports about this
officer and the involvement of UPDF in the illicit
exploitation were “right”. In an electronic message
dated 25 May 2002, Justice Porter wrote to the
Chairman of the Panel regarding the documentary
evidence provided and General Kazini’s second
appearance before the Commission. He expressed his
appreciation to the Panel, saying, “We feel, and hope
you agree, that with your assistance we have at last
been able to break what we have described as a
conspiracy of silence within UPDF, at least in relation
to diamonds and ‘security payments’, and we are
extremely grateful to you for enabling us to do so.”
137. During the Panel’s last meeting with the
Commission in September 2002 in Kampala, Justice
Porter explained that any recommendation by the
Commission to refer an individual for criminal
prosecution as the result of its enquiries must first be
approved by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
President Museveni. A criminal investigation would
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then be necessary before the authorities could
determine if grounds for prosecution existed. The Panel
also understood that, in spite of the Commission’s
extensive investigative powers, its terms of reference
restrict the scope of its enquiries into the activities of
military personnel. It is not empowered to obtain
military records and documents from the Defence
Ministry. Nor can it conduct audits of individual
officers’ finances.
138. The Porter Commission’s mandate has now been
extended beyond that of the Panel, to 15 November
2002, allowing it the opportunity to comment on the
Panel’s report. In the event that the Porter Commission
ignores or rejects the validity and evidentiary value of
the documents provided or attempts to further discredit
the Panel’s work, the Chairman of the Panel requests
that the Security Council authorize the Panel to
respond to the Commission’s report in a letter
addressed to the Security Council, which would be
circulated as a United Nations document.
VII. Transit and end-user trade issues
Transit countries
139. The Panel identified 11 African States through
whose territory goods originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo are likely to pass. Some are
directly involved in the conflict, namely, Burundi,
Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The remaining seven
are the Central African Republic, Kenya, Mozambique,
the Republic of the Congo, South Africa, the United
Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The Panel submitted
questions to all 11 countries and held substantive
discussions with government representatives from five.
The Panel enquired about relevant legislation,
investigations into the flow of the commodities,
measures taken to curb those flows, other possible
action to be taken and those Governments’ needs for
assistance. Four of the 11 countries — the Republic of
the Congo, Mozambique, the United Republic of
Tanzania and Zimbabwe — declined to respond. The
Panel later identified yet another transit point for
Congolese coltan, Nigeria, and requested information
about this trade. No response was received. Virtually
none of the countries that responded to the Panel’s
questions had conducted any investigations or adopted
any specific procedures for the identification or
inspection of the transiting of commodities from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Ugandan
authorities mentioned the impounding of a cargo of
smuggled ivory. South African officials confirmed the
seizure of a sizeable clandestine shipment of diamonds
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but
provided no details. None of the authorities in these
countries gave any indication that Congolese resources
traded through their territories should or could be
regarded as conflict goods. Almost none of the
countries proposed any meaningful measures to help
curb trade in Congolese commodities that are tainted
by criminality and militarization. Kenya, however,
proposed the reopening of the Northern Corridor route,
under the Transit Transport Coordination Authority,
with the assistance of the international community.
140. Reliable sources have told the Panel that gem
diamonds from Mbuji Mayi in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo account for much of the
phenomenal increase in diamonds transiting through
Dubai in recent years. Exports from the United Arab
Emirates to Antwerp increased to $149.5 million in
2001 from $4.2 million in 1998 according to the
Diamond High Council’s statistics. The Panel has been
told of chartered flights direct from Mbuji Mayi to
Dubai, and other routes via Dar es Salaam, on which
illicit diamond exports have been carried. Likewise,
Dubai has become a transit point for coltan from the
Uganda-controlled area and a portion of the diamonds
originating from Kisangani in the Rwanda-controlled
area. The arms and diamond smuggler Victor Bout uses
the United Arab Emirates as his permanent base, with
nine of his aircraft stationed at Ra’s al Khaimah
International Airport.
End-user countries
141. In an effort to determine what measures might be
taken at the end of the commercial chain to control the
trade in resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and sever its links to the armed conflict, the
Panel surveyed 17 end-user countries in Asia, Europe,
the Middle East and North America. Many of these
countries serve as secondary transit points and
processing centres as well as major consumer markets.
They included Belgium, China, France, Germany,
India, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia,
the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Switzerland,
Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the United
Kingdom and the United States. In its requests, the
Panel stressed that its aim was not to obstruct trade, but
to identify mechanisms or practices that would
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eliminate the costs in war and human lives that occur in
the course of extracting and commercializing resources
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In seeking
these countries’ views, the Panel made reference to a
range of possible initiatives, while leaving open the
possibility for innovation based on lessons learned
from other conflict situations. Four countries did not
respond: India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and the United
Arab Emirates. Few respondents commented explicitly
on the role that the trade in these commodities plays in
fuelling the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
142. The responses nevertheless indicated that efforts
are being stepped up to tackle the illicit trade in natural
resources and that awareness is growing of the ethical
responsibilities posed by conflict-driven trade in
commodities. France, Japan, Israel, Thailand and the
United States emphasized the adequacy of existing
certificates of origin or product certification regimes in
stemming the illegal trade, including the certification
scheme now in the process of being implemented under
the Kimberley Process. Like China, the Russian
Federation stressed that its participation in the
Kimberley Process is aimed at helping to sever the
links between the illegal trade in rough diamonds and
armed conflict, particularly in Africa. Germany stated
that companies in transit and end-user countries should
cease all commercial and transport activities related to
the trade in resources from the region, “unless their
counterparts are able to provide clearly documented
certificates of origin”. Most responses did not evaluate
the comparative successes and failures of certification
regimes in the face of highly criminalized or opaque
commercial chains. Switzerland expressed the view
that until the Kimberley Process certification scheme
had entered into force and more experience had been
gained from its implementation, it would be premature
to comment on the use of such regimes in regulating
the trade in commodities from certain regions. Enduser
countries did not specifically call for countries
bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo such
as Burundi, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and
Uganda, which also trade in rough diamonds, to join
the Kimberley Process. Lebanon suggested that
standardized, mandatory certificates of origin could be
developed for certain precious commodities through
the relevant United Nations body or bodies.
143. The Russian Federation cautioned that any
proposed measures on curbing conflict-linked trade
should not hinder legitimate trade in primary
commodities or “impose an excessive burden on the
countries participating in such trade”. Several
European Union members, including France and the
Netherlands, observed that any measures affecting
trade flows would have to be taken within the
framework of the European Union and its trade
regulations. Belgium and the United Kingdom stressed
that the burden of ensuring transparency in commercial
and financial flows or supply chains should be borne
primarily by private companies and should be based on
either voluntary measures or the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Germany echoed this, saying
that it had appealed to German companies to adhere to
those guidelines as well as the principles of the
European Union Commission’s Green Paper on Social
Responsibility and the United Nations Global Compact
in their business activities in the region. Germany also
encouraged the Panel to continue its efforts to increase
the transparency of the commercial chains for the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, especially by intensifying its dialogue with
private companies. Only Belgium suggested the
possibility of imposing targeted sanctions against
businesses or individuals profiting from the trade in
conflict goods. The Netherlands expressed the view
that the verification of commodities would be less
difficult and costly if carried out at the beginning of the
commercial chain.
144. Belgium, Germany and the United States also
highlighted the re-establishment of the State’s authority
throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo as essential to combating the illicit
exploitation, and the need for capacity-building to help
achieve this. Similarly, Lebanon said that the customs
administration of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo should be reinforced so that it could more
effectively control borders, monitor trade flows and
prevent smuggling.
International and regional organizations
145. The Southern African Development Community
shared the view of some end-user States that existing
certificates of origin were adequate for demonstrating
that products had been legally produced and acquired.
Customs intelligence and investigative capability for
combating smuggling are still being developed within
SADC. Issues of capacity-building and information-
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sharing within the region will have to be addressed as
this process advances.
146. The World Customs Organization informed the
Panel that it had established a network of Regional
Intelligence Liaison Offices, each assigned to a number
of countries, to facilitate the exchange of information
and cooperation within a region. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo and many francophone
countries in the surrounding region are attached to the
Liaison Office at Douala, Cameroon. WCO observed
that the use of the Liaison Office and the WCO
Internet-based Customs Enforcement Network by the
Douala region’s members was quite low. It stressed that
curbing fraudulent trade in commodities transiting
through a region depends on effective communication
between the countries concerned.
147. With regard to trade flows, the World Trade
Organization explained in its reply to the Panel that
two provisions of the 1994 GATT, a component of the
WTO treaty, authorize members to take measures that
otherwise would be inconsistent with GATT/WTO
rules. These rules generally prohibit trade restrictions
and discrimination. Articles XXI (c) and XX describe
situations and policy aims permitting exceptional
measures. The former, the security exception provision,
refers to exceptions related to a State fulfilling its
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.
This might serve as justification for Members taking
action in compliance with a Security Council resolution
on maintaining peace and security, commented WTO.
Article XX, the provision on general exceptions, may
be evoked if the measure is adopted pursuant to one or
more policies listed in the article’s subparagraphs. For
example, subparagraph (b) refers to measures
necessary to protect human life.
148. The Economic Commission for Africa concurred
with Belgium that “smart sanctions” should be part of
the solution to ending the illegal trade. It added that the
Governments of the countries involved should also be
“held accountable for the illegal activities of
individuals and/or companies as well as banks that are
operating in their country since they have the power to
regulate them”.
VIII. Observations
149. The illegal exploitation of natural resources,
gross violations of human rights and a dire
humanitarian situation are some of the consequences of
four years of war and the lack of a central government
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the
authority and capacity to protect its citizens and
resources.
150. The withdrawal of foreign forces is an important
step towards ending the illegal exploitation of natural
resources. Yet the necessary networks have already
become deeply embedded to ensure that the illegal
exploitation continues, independent of the physical
presence of the foreign armies.
151. Another step towards halting the exploitation of
natural resources will be the early establishment of an
all-inclusive transitional government in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which would ensure that
central government control is reinstated and that viable
local administrations are empowered to protect and
regulate the exploitation activities to the benefit of the
populace. However, it is clear that, even with the
establishment of an all-inclusive government,
exercising effective control over territory and natural
resources would require time and would be possible
only within the context of a broader framework of
sound institution-building. In the interim, it is the view
of the Panel that continued monitoring and reporting on
the illegal exploitation of resources will at least serve
to deter these activities.
152. The most important element in effectively halting
the illegal exploitation of resources in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo relates to the political will of
those who support, protect and benefit from the
networks. This may pose a great challenge, given the
intricate relationships they have forged and the
dependency they have developed on the profits from
these activities. The war economy controlled by the
three elite networks operating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo dominates the economic
activities of much of the Great Lakes region. Yet the
Lusaka, Pretoria and Luanda Agreements do not
address this all-important economic component of the
conflict.
153. Armed groups, whether foreign or Congolese,
who are benefiting from these exploitation activities,
should also be taken into account in efforts to halt the
exploitation. Years of lawlessness and a Government
incapable of protecting its citizens have allowed the
armed groups to loot and plunder the country’s
resources with impunity. While some hide behind a
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political agenda, all are pursuing illegal economic
activities as a matter of survival. It is hoped that
progress in the peace process, together with an
effective and responsive programme of disarmament,
demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration and
resettlement, would provide better alternatives to the
armed groups. This would require the necessary
funding for reintegration programmes and security
assurances for those who are not wanted for war crimes
or acts of genocide. The international community must,
therefore, provide the assistance to these programmes,
invest in publicizing them and encourage the armed
groups to participate.
154. The Panel is hoping that this report will
contribute to a shift in policies — in the light of the
recent encouraging political and military developments
on the ground — that will bring the exploitation of
resources back to a legally acceptable level.
IX. Conclusions
155. An embargo or a moratorium banning the export
of raw materials originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo does not seem to be a viable
means of helping to improve the situation of the
country’s Government, citizens or natural environment.
Massive technical and financial assistance for the
population would be required to offset the
humanitarian impact of such restrictive measures. At
the same time, if the Panel in its report does not
recommend any punitive measures to curb the illegal
exploitation and trade originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, this will only encourage a
continuation of the exploitation by different criminal
organizations. This could easily lead to an increase in
these activities. There must be sustained efforts to deter
illicit and illegal exploitation.
156. Restrictive measures nevertheless need to be
taken vis-à-vis the role of companies and individuals
involved in arms supply and resource plundering. The
international and multinational dimension of these
illegal activities is very important. Ethical and
transparent business practices are needed to combat
these illegal activities.
157. The establishment of a transitional government in
Kinshasa should be accompanied by four elements,
namely, the disarmament of all rebel groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo; phased withdrawal
of foreign troops; measures to drastically curb the
illegal exploitation and encourage legal exploitation;
and the application of serious leverage through
multilateral pressures and incentives. To these elements
must be added a dynamic monitoring process. All must
be phased, interlinked and ongoing. This dynamic
package would not only advance the peace process in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but would also
lead to a peaceful and final settlement of the
exploitation issue, ensuring that legal modes of
resource exploitation prevail. The first two elements
seem to be finding their way to an interlinked and
phased implementation as a result of the recent
agreements signed in Pretoria and Luanda. The third
element is intrinsically linked with the fourth, namely
applying leverage through incentives and disincentives.
158. In order to readjust the present process of illegal
exploitation and encourage legal exploitation, which
could contribute to the economic stability of all parties,
there is a need to apply forceful disincentives and
incentives. These should be monitored through a
proactive monitoring body. Until now, all the parties
involved in the illegal exploitation have had no strong
incentive to alter the economic status quo. It is
necessary, therefore, to find measures that address their
fears of losing revenues. Such measures will however
be effective only if a political process is undertaken
simultaneously.
159. Reconstructing and reorienting the region’s
economies are essential to peacemaking and peacebuilding.
The Panel believes that a peace dividend in
the form of economic incentives should be emphasized
by the international community in order to promote the
parties’ adherence to the peace agreements and
encourage confidence-building. The Panel also
proposes in its recommendations that a set of
disincentives be enacted to apply pressure in the case
of non-compliance with the agreements.
160. Many of the Panel’s conclusions about the
economic roots and consequences of the conflict have
been echoed in ideas associated with the proposals for
an international conference on peace, security,
democracy and sustainable development in the Great
Lakes region. Recently signed agreements may signal
that the time for organizing this conference is
approaching. Such a conference would be an ideal
forum to address the need to reorient the regional
trading system to post-conflict imperatives and for
negotiating the framework of a multilateral agreement
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to carry this out. This reorientation will require
providing the incentives and means to promote regional
economic integration, which would marginalize
criminal and military-driven trade in favour of
legitimate commercial development that is transparent
and growth-oriented. Supporting regional economic
integration could help to gradually draw the countries
involved in the conflict closer and act as a barrier to
future outbreaks of armed conflict.
X. Recommendations
Peace dividend
161. In the light of the new dynamic and progress
created by the signing of the political and military
agreements in Sun City, Pretoria and Luanda, the Panel
believes that a set of agreements or initiatives on
reconstruction and sustainable development are needed
to address the economic dimension of the Lusaka peace
process and provide incentives for continuing progress.
The first set of initiatives could be for quick-disbursing
aid for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
other Great Lakes countries involved in the conflict,
for reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes,
aimed at creating jobs, rebuilding infrastructure and
improving conditions for local populations, notably in
the areas of education, health, water and sanitation.
162. Regional economic integration and trade could be
the focus of an agreement or set of agreements that
could emerge from discussions regionally, including at
the international conference on peace, security and
sustainable development. The international community,
in particular the United Nations and the developed
countries that have actively supported the signing of
the recent agreements, can take a leading role in
convening this conference.
Institutional reforms
Capacity-building for the State institutions
163. Reconstructing and reforming the State
institutions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
particularly the State’s capacity to secure its territory
and borders, is the counterpoint to the withdrawal of
the foreign troops. The main purpose should be to
enable the legitimate transitional government to control
the country’s natural resources and borders without
foreign intervention.
164. A fast-track programme is needed to retrain and
professionalize the entire national security apparatus,
including military and intelligence, law enforcement
and regulatory bodies, such as customs, revenue
authority, immigration and natural resources agencies.
This process will require extensive international aid
and careful monitoring of progress over a sustained
period. There is a need for multilateral and bilateral
donors, together with international organizations, to
coordinate their efforts, draw on best practices
developed during other post-conflict transitions and
encourage the participation of all sectors of Congolese
society.
165. The priority areas for reform and the
strengthening of national or central institutions would
include:
• Combating the widespread criminalization in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
• Enhancing scrutiny and transparency
• Increasing accountability and ending the impunity
enjoyed by high-ranking officials and various
levels of civil servants
• Building regulatory capacity and controls
• Professionalizing institutions and their personnel,
including ensuring their independence and
neutrality
• Reforming customs and revenue administrations,
such as the Office des douanes et accises and the
Direction générale des recettes administratives,
judiciaires, domaniales et de participations
• Building the capacity of ministries and
specialized agencies related to natural resources
such as the Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de
certification des matières précieuses and the
Institut congolais pour la conservation de la
nature.
Promoting legitimate and accountable civil
administrations in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo
166. The Panel recommends that a comprehensive
economic and social development programme in the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo be set up to
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assist a transition to a legitimate civilian administration
with a capable security and law-enforcement apparatus.
Such a programme may be partially financed from the
substantial assistance commitments pledged by the
European Union, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund for post-conflict reconstruction in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Good governance in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and its compliance with peace
agreements
167. The Panel regards the quick disbursal of
development assistance as essential to addressing the
pressing social and economic needs of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, it also recommends
that disbursal should be contingent on the adherence of
the Government to the peace agreements it has signed
with Rwanda and Uganda, its commitment to
democratization and its progress in curbing the illegal
exploitation of its natural resources.
Reform of natural resource sectors
168. Reforms of the mining and the forestry sectors
should include the review of all concessions and
contracts signed during both wars. The resolution
adopted during the inter-Congolese dialogue,
establishing a special commission to examine the
validity of economic and financial agreements, could
serve as the framework for this process. On the basis of
the Panel’s findings, this could also target all informal
agreements on the awarding of concessions and the
implementation of contracts. The international
community, including the World Bank, the
International Finance Corporation and UNDP, could
collaborate closely with this commission and provide
the support necessary for it to carry out its work in a
thorough and objective manner. This could include
expert advice and technical assistance, part of which
could be focused on raising long-term international
investment for the rehabilitation of the mining and
forestry sectors and sustainable revenue generation.
Financial and technical measures
169. In the event of non-compliance with the recently
signed agreements, and the continuing illicit and illegal
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the Panel recommends that a
series of measures be taken against the concerned
parties.
Role of Governments
170. The Governments of the countries where the
individuals, companies and financial institutions that
are systematically and actively involved in these
activities are based should assume their share of the
responsibility. The Governments have the power to
regulate and sanction those individuals and entities.
They could adapt their national legislation as needed to
effectively investigate and prosecute the illegal
traffickers. In addition, the OECD Guidelines offer a
mechanism for bringing violations of them by business
enterprises to the attention of home Governments, that
is, Governments of the countries where the enterprises
are registered. Governments with jurisdiction over
these enterprises are complicit themselves when they
do not take remedial measures.
Reducing official development assistance
171. The Panel’s exchange of views with bilateral and
multilateral organizations, as well as a review of
applicable agreements such as the Cotonou
Convention, indicates that there is ample justification
for donors to respond to a Security Council
resolution — which might be necessary — which
would propose certain reductions in official aid to
promote peace and good governance.
172. Measures should also be aimed at making aid
disbursements to Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe conditional on their compliance with the
relevant agreements in the Lusaka peace process and
on verifiable measures taken to halt the illegal and
illicit exploitation of the resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo which can help to achieve
multiple objectives. Non-compliance would
automatically trigger a review and reduction of
assistance programmes for those countries. It should be
stipulated that reductions of aid disbursements are to
be applied to institutional budget support, stabilization
lending or project lending and not sector-specific
allocations.
173. Implementation would proceed in three stages:
(a) A brief grace period to permit the
verification of the compliance of all the parties to the
conflict;
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(b) An initial period when aid disbursements
are reduced by a modest percentage if the countries
involved have not met withdrawal targets;
(c) A subsequent period during which the aid is
proportionately reduced at regular increases at regular
intervals unless troop withdrawals and compliance with
the peace agreements meet the required standards.
Restrictions on business enterprises and
individuals
174. The Panel has compiled an extensive list of
business enterprises and individuals whose
involvement in the commercial activities of the three
elite networks active in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is well documented. At this time it is however,
focusing its recommendations regarding restrictive
measures on only a small number of enterprises (annex
I) and individuals (annex II) — many of them cited in
this report — as a result of the wealth of information
and documentary evidence gathered on them by the
Panel.
175. By contributing to the revenues of the elite
networks, directly or indirectly, those companies and
individuals contribute to the ongoing conflict and to
human rights abuses. More specifically, those business
enterprises are in violation of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Therefore, the Panel
recommends that the Security Council consider
imposing certain restrictions on a selected number of
business enterprises and individuals involved in
criminal and illicit exploitation that are identified in
this report. The list emphasizes the implication of
foreign enterprises as well as nationals of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in the economic
exploitation.
176. There could be a short grace period of four to five
months before the restrictions set out below are
applied, during which the targeted entities and
individuals would have the opportunity to prove that
they have ceased all involvement in the exploitation
activities. The restrictive measures could include:
(a) Travel bans on selected individuals
identified by the Panel;
(b) Freezing of the personal assets of persons
involved in illegal exploitation;
(c) Barring selected companies and individuals
from accessing banking facilities and other financial
institutions and from receiving funding or establishing
a partnership or other commercial relations with
international financial institutions.
Adherence of business enterprises to the OECD
Guidelines
177. The Panel has drafted another list of business
enterprises (annex III) which, in the view of the Panel,
are in violation of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Countries which are
signatories to those Guidelines and other countries are
morally obliged to ensure that their business
enterprises adhere to and act on the Guidelines.
178. The OECD Guidelines outline a procedure for
bringing violations of the Guidelines to the attention of
the Governments of the States where the business
enterprises are registered. Home Governments have the
obligation to ensure that enterprises in their jurisdiction
do not abuse principles of conduct that they have
adopted as a matter of law. They are complicit when
they do not take remedial measures. The monitoring
body, as described below, will contribute to
implementing these procedures by verifying and
updating its list of business enterprises in violation of
the OECD Guidelines and transmitting evidence of
those violations to the OECD National Contact Points
in the home Governments of the enterprises.
Transit trade and regional organizations
179. To promote post-conflict peace-building
programmes, the Panel recommends that the
international community support the following
confidence-building measures:
(a) Encouraging the East African Community,
composed of Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic
of Tanzania, to include Rwanda and Burundi in its
membership;
(b) Helping to re-establish historical and legal
trading patterns, for example by reopening the
Northern Corridor transit route to legal trade among the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda,
Uganda and Kenya;
(c) Assisting the relevant African regional trade
organizations to improve their customs and trade
monitoring mechanisms. These might include
juxtaposed border control facilities, harmonization of
controls to promote the system and use of certificates
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of origin and destination, and assistance in developing
national legislation for monitoring financial flows
related to trade;
(d) Improving air traffic control services in the
Great Lakes region. The Technical Cooperation
Programme of ICAO can provide assistance to States in
the region that need to improve their air traffic control
service.
Regulating commodity trade from conflict areas
180. Specialized industry organizations such as the
Tantalum Niobium International Study Centre, the
International Gold Council and the International Coffee
Federation could be requested, in cooperation with the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
to monitor trade in commodities from conflict areas.
This would result in a reliable body of data that
includes information relating to the evacuation of
commodities, transit routes through neighbouring
countries and information on end-users and their
operations. The data produced could be the basis of
industry policing of those individuals, companies and
financial institutions that trade in commodities from
conflict areas. The data could also serve in the event
that a moratorium is called for on the illegal trade in
commodities originating in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, such as coltan.
Kimberley Process
181. All Member States where trade in rough
diamonds is being carried out should join the
Kimberley Process. Universal participation will make
the Kimberley Process a more effective instrument.
182. Diamond-producing countries should apply
internal controls from extraction to exportation.
Consideration should be given to establishing a set of
internationally agreed upon standards for this process.
A specialized enforcement organization within each
member country needs to be formed that has the
authority, knowledge and specialized training
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Kimberley
Process.
183. A permanently staffed secretariat should be
created with the responsibility of coordinating the
implementation of the Kimberley Process.
Protecting timber and forestry products
184. The Panel recommends that Member States
actively support the efforts by intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations at both the
international and regional levels to halt illegal logging
and to develop an international definition of “conflict
timber”.
Trade in endangered species
185. Trade involving endangered species of wild fauna
and flora taken from protected areas of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo is another activity
in which elements of the criminal networks are
engaged. Member States are asked to support the Task
Force established under the Lusaka Agreement on
Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at
Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora by
(a) strengthening their national legislation to reinforce
the powers of investigation and prosecution of the Task
Force’s personnel and (b) ensuring that their National
Bureaus, established under that Agreement, intensify
their investigations into the criminal traffic in
endangered species of wild animals and plants as
outlined by CITES.
Monitoring process
186. There is a need for a monitoring process that
continues to scrutinize the situation in the Great Lakes
region to ensure that exploitation activities are
significantly curbed. A monitoring body, which the
Security Council may consider establishing, could
report to the Security Council on a regular basis on its
findings, including recommendations about further
action to halt activities that violate the Council’s
decisions. The Panel’s expertise could be helpful in this
regard.
187. The monitoring body could report to the Security
Council on any State or company that might be
involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
The monitoring body could recommend to the Council
that major multilateral institutions and bilateral donors
review and reduce the financial assistance programmes
of any State found to be involved in these illegal
activities. It could recommend to the Council that any
company found to be implicated in the illegal economic
exploitation be added to or kept on the list of those
enterprises subject to financial and travel restrictions.
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In addition, the monitoring body could collaborate
closely with national officials, including from the
Central Bank of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Office des douanes et accises (customs
administration) and the Direction générale des recettes
administratives, judiciaires, domaniales et de
participations (revenue administration), the Ministry of
Mines and Hyrdocarbons, the State mining enterprises
and private mining and mineral companies, in order to
update information on how capacity-building and
reforms are affecting the exploitation activities. In
carrying out these tasks, the monitoring body could
coordinate with the international financial institutions,
the African Union, and the Economic Commission for
Africa.
188. The Panel would also recommend that the
monitoring body, with the adequate expertise and
resources, track the following:
(a) Possible reductions in the level of illegal
exploitation;
(b) The implementation of possible travel bans
and the freezing of assets;
(c) Ongoing investigations into the illicit
commerce in minerals, timber and endangered species
of fauna and flora. The monitoring body could also
collaborate further on some of these investigations;
(d) The sectors of the economy that have been
affected by the exploitation activities;
(e) The impact on the humanitarian situation in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region;
(f) The reduction in violent conflict and the
maintenance of civil order in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, as well as the viability of local
administrations and institutions related to the mandate
of the monitoring body which might be adopted by the
Council.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem
Chairman
(Signed) Jim Freedman
(Signed) Mel Holt
(Signed) Bruno Schiemsky
(Signed) Moustapha Tall
(Signed) Patrick Smith
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Annex I
Companies on which the Panel recommends the placing of
financial restrictions
Name Address Business Principal officers Comment
1 AHMAD DIAMOND
CORPORATION
ANTWERP
BELGIUM
Diamond
trading
Mr. AHMAD Imad
2 ASA DIAM ANTWERP
BELGIUM
Diamond
trading
Mr. AHMAD Ali Said
3 BUKAVU AVIATION
TRANSPORT
DRC Airline
company
Mr. BOUT Victor
4 BUSINESS AIR
SERVICE
DRC Airline
company
Mr. BOUT Victor
5 COMIEX-CONGO KINSHASA
DRC
Mr. KABASELE
TSHINEU Frederic
6 CONGO HOLDING
DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY
DRC Trading and
exploitation of
natural
resources DRC
Mr. Félicien
RUCHACHA
BIKUMU
Mrs. Gertrude
KITEMBO
7 CONMET UGANDA and
DRC
Coltan trading Mr. Salim Saleh
Mr. and Mrs.
PISKUNOV
8 COSLEG ZIM and DRC Joint-venture
COMIEX and
OSLEG
Mr. KABASELE
TSHINEU Frédéric
ZVINAVASHE Gava
MUSUNGWA Vitalis
9 EAGLE WINGS
RESOURCES
INTERNATIONAL
PO BOX 6355
Kigali, Rwanda
Exploitation
coltan from
the DRC
Mr. Alfred RWIGEMA
Mr. Anthony
MARINUS
Mr. Ronald S.
SMIERCIAK
Tel:
+250.51.17.25
10 ENTERPRISE
GENERAL MALTA
FORREST
Exploitation
Cobalt,
Copper in
DRC
Mr. George FORREST
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Name Address Business Principal officers Comment
11 EXACO Exploitation
Cobalt,
Copper in the
DRC
12 GREAT LAKES
GENERAL TRADE
BP 3737
KIGALI,
RWANDA
Mineral
trading
Maj Dan MUNYUZA
Mr. E. GATETE
Mr. Steven K.
AKHIMANZI
Tel/Fax:
+250.78.792
13 GREAT LAKES
METALS
Kigali, Rwanda Mineral
trading
14 GROUP GEORGE
FORREST
Exploitation
Cobalt and
Copper
Mr. George FORREST
15 MINERALS BUSINESS
COMPANY
Boulevard Du
30 Juin,
Immeuble ex-
SCIBE,
Kinshasa, DRC
Mineral
trading
Mr. KABASELE
TSHINEU Frederic
Lt General
ZVINAVASHE Gava
Musungwa Vitalis
Mr. Charles
DAURAMANZI
16 OKAPI AIR
ODESSA AIR
Uganda Airline
company
Mr. BOUT Victor
17 OPERATION
SOVEREIGN
LEGITIMACY (OSLEG)
Pvt Ltd
Harare,
Zimbabwe
Commercial
interests ZIM
in DRC
Lt General
ZVINAVASHE Gava
Musungwa Vitalis
18 ORYX NATURAL
RESOURCES
DRC Diamond
exploitation in
the DRC
Mr. AL-SHANFARI
Thamer Said Ahmed
19 RWANDA ALLIED
PARTNERS
Kigali, Rwanda Mineral
trading
Mr. Hadji OMARI
Mr. Simba MANASE
20 RWANDA METALS Kigali, Rwanda Mineral
trading
21 SARACEN UGANDA
Ltd
Uganda Security
Company
Lt General (Rtd) Salim
Saleh
Mr. Heckie HORN
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Name Address Business Principal officers Comment
22 SIERRA GEM
DIAMONDS
ANTWERP
BELGIUM
Diamond
trading
Mr. AHMAD Said Ali
Mr. AHMAD Hassan
Mr. AHMAD Nazem
23 TANDAN GROUP SOUTH
AFRICA
Holding Mr. Niko SHEFER
24 THORNTREE
INDUSTRIES (Pvt) Ltd
Provides
capital to
MBC
Mr. Niko SHEFER
25 TREMALT Ltd Exploitation
cobalt and
copper
Mr. John Arnold
BREDENKAMP
26 TRINITY INVESTMENT
GROUP
DRC and
UGANDA
Exploitation
resources and
tax fraud
Mr. NGOLA Sam
General KAZINI
27 TRIPLE A DIAMONDS ANTWERP
BELGIUM
Diamond
trading
Mr. AHMAD Moussa
Ahmad
Mr. AHMAD Ahmad
Ali
28 TRISTAR Kigali, Rwanda Holding FPR
29 VICTORIA GROUP DRC and
UGANDA
Exploitation
resources and
tax fraud
Lt General (Rtd) Salim
Saleh
Mr. KHANAFER
Nahim
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Annex II
Persons for whom the Panel recommends a travel ban and
financial restrictions
Last name First name Alias Date of birth
Passport
number Designation
1 AHMAD Ali Said 01.03.1959 Businessman
2 AHMAD Ahmad Ali 01.01.1929
3 AHMAD Imad Businessman
4 AHMAD Said Ali 09.04.1935 Businessman
5 AHMAD Hassan 21.05.1957 Businessman
6 AHMAD Moussa Ahmad
7 AHMAD Nazem 05.01.1965 Businessman
8 AKHIMANZA Steven K. Businessman
9 AL-SHANFARI Thamer Said Ahmed 03.01.1968 00000999
(Oman)
Chairman & Managing
Director ORYX Group and
ORYX Natural Resources
10 BOUT Victor Anatoljevitch BUTT,
BONT,
BUTTE,
BOUTOV,
SERGITOV
Vitali
13.01.1967
or
???
21N0532664
29N0006765
21N0532664
21N0557148
44N3570350
Dealer and transporter of
weapons and minerals
11 BREDENKAMP John Arnold 11.08.1940 Businessman
12 BURUNDI Colonel UPDF
13 DAURAMANZI Charles Shareholder MBC
14 ENGOLA Sam Businessman
15 FORREST George A. Businessman
16 GATETE Edward Officer RPA; Operation
Congo Desk
17 HORN Heckie Manager Saracen Uganda
Ltd
18 KABANDA Emmanuel Officer RPA; Operation
Congo Desk
19 KABAREBE James Chief of Staff RPA; Former
Chief of Staff DRC; in
charge of Congo Desk
20 KABASELE
TSHINEU
Frédéric Manager COMIEX,
representative of COSLEG
21 KALUME
NUMBI
Denis General, shareholder SENGA
SENGA
22 KARIM Peter Officer UPDF
23 KATUMBA
MWANKE
Augustin Minister of Presidency, DRC
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Last name First name Alias Date of birth
Passport
number Designation
24 KAZADI
NYEMBWE
Didier Director Agence National de
Renseignements DRC
25 KAZINI James Chief of Staff, Maj. General
UPDF
26 KHANAFER Nahim Businessman
27 KIBASSA
MALIBA
Politician, former Minister of
Mines, shareholder SENGA
SENGA
28 KITEMBO Gertrude Businesswoman
29 KONGOLO Mwenze Minister DRC, shareholder
SENGA SENGA
30 MANASE SIMBA Businessman
31 MAWAPANGA Mwana Nanga Ambassador DRC in Harare
32 MAYOMBO Nobel Chief Military Intelligence
(CMI) in Uganda
33 MNANGAGWA
DAMBUDZO
Emmerson Speaker of Parliament
ZIMBABWE
34 MOYO Mike Wing Commander ZDF
35 MOYO Sibusio Bd-Gen (Rtd) ZDF
36 MUAMBA NOZI Richard MWAMBA
NOZY
Congolese diamond trader;
Counterfeiter
37 MUNYUZA Dan Colonel RPA; In charge of
security DRC (96-98)
38 MWENZE
KONGOLO
Minister National Security,
DRC
39 NUMBI
KALUME
Denis Minister of Planning and
Reconstruction DRC
40 NZIZA Jack Officer RPA
41 OKOTO
LOLAKOMBE
Jean-Charles PDG MIBA
42 OMARI HADJI Businessman
43 OTAFIRE
KAHINDA
Colonel UPDF
44 MARINUS Anthony Manager Eagle Wings
45 PISKUNOV Anatol Businessman
46 PISKUNOVA Valentina Businesswoman
47 RUCHACHA
BIKUMU
Felicien Businessman
48 RUPRAH Sanjivan Samir Nasr
Medhi Khan
09.08.1966 D-001829-00 Businessman
49 RWIGEMA Alfred Manager Eagle Wings
50 SALIM SALEH AKANDWA
NAHO Caleb
Lt General (Ret.) UPDF
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Last name First name Alias Date of birth
Passport
number Designation
51 SHEFER Niko Nico 25.12.1950 7616225
(Israel)
6651101
(Israel)
Businessman
52 SMIERCIAK Ronald S. Manager Eagle Wings
53 YUMBA MONGA Manager GECAMINES
54 ZVINAVASHE
GAVA
MUSUNGWA
Vitalis Lt General ZDF, Rep. of
COSLEG, shareholder MBC
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Annex III
Business enterprises considered by the Panel to
be in violation of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises
Name of company Business Country
Country signatory of
OECD Guidelines
1 AFRICAN TRADING
CORPORATION Sarl
Trading of natural resources
from DRC
SOUTH AFRICA NO
2 AFRIMEX Coltan trading UK YES
3 AHMAD DIAMOND
CORPORATION
Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
4 A.H. PONG & Sons Import-Export SOUTH AFRICA NO
5 A. KNIGHT
INTERNATIONAL Ltd
Assaying UK YES
6 A & M MINERALS and
METALS Ltd
Trading minerals UK YES
7 ALEX STEWART (Assayers)
Ltd
Assaying UK YES
8 AMALGAMATED METAL
CORPORATION Plc
Trading coltan UK YES
9 AMERICA MINERAL FIELDS
(AMFI)
Mining USA YES
10 ANGLO AMERICAN Plc Mining UK YES
11 ANGLOVAAL MINING Ltd Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
12 ARCTIC INVESTMENT Investment UK YES
13 ASA DIAM Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
14 ASA INTERNATIONAL BELGIUM YES
15 ASHANTI GOLDFIELDS Mining GHANA NO
16 AVIENT AIR Private military company ZIMBABWE NO
17 BANRO CORPORATION Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
18 BARCLAYS BANK Banking UK YES
19 BAYER A.G. Chemical industry GERMANY YES
20 B.B.L. Banking BELGIUM YES
21 BELGOLAISE Banking BELGIUM YES
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Name of company Business Country
Country signatory of
OECD Guidelines
22 CABOT CORPORATION Tantalum processing USA YES
23 CARSON PRODUCTS Commercialization of resources
of the DRC
SOUTH AFRICA NO
24 CHEMIE PHARMACIE
HOLLAND
Financial and logistical support
to EWRI
NETHERLANDS YES
25 COGECOM Coltan trading BELGIUM YES
26 C. STEINWEG NV Freight Forwarders BELGIUM YES
27 DARA FOREST Timber exploitation THAILAND NO
28 DAS AIR Airline company UK YES
29 DE BEERS Diamond mining and trading UK YES
30 DIAGEM BVBA Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
31 EAGLE WINGS RESOURCES
INTERNATIONAL
Exploitation coltan from the
DRC
USA YES
32 ECHOGEM Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
33 EGIMEX BELGIUM YES
34 ENTREPRISE GENERALE
MALTA FORREST
Construction, Mining, Trading DRC NO
35 EUROMET Coltan trading UK YES
36 FINCONCORD SA Coltan trading from DRC SWITZERLAND YES
37 FINMINING Coltan trading from DRC SAINT KITTS NO
38 FIRST QUANTUM
MINERALS
Mining CANADA YES
39 FLASHES OF COLOR Diamond trading USA YES
40 FORTIS Banking BELGIUM YES
41 GEORGE FORREST
INTERNATIONAL AFRIQUE
Management DRC NO
42 HARAMBEE MINING
CORPORATION
Mining CANADA YES
43 H.C. STARCK GmbH & Co
KG
Processing coltan GERMANY YES
44 IBRYV AND ASSOCIATES
LLC
Diamond trading SWITZERLAND YES
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Name of company Business Country
Country signatory of
OECD Guidelines
45 INTERNATIONAL
PANORAMA RESOURCES
Corp
Mining CANADA YES
46 ISCOR Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
47 JEWEL IMPEX Bvba Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
48 KABABANKOLA MINING
COMPANY
Mining ZIMBABWE NO
49 KEMET ELECTRONICS
CORPORATION
Capacitor manufacture USA YES
50 KHA International AG Minerals trading and
exploitation
GERMANY YES
51 KINROSS GOLD
CORPORATION
Mining USA YES
52 K & N Project development BELGIUM YES
53 KOMAL GEMS NV Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
54 LUNDIN GROUP Mining BERMUDA NO
55 MALAYSIAN SMELTING
CORPORATION
Coltan processing MALAYSIA NO
56 MASINGIRO GmbH Minerals trading GERMANY YES
57 MELKIOR RESOURCES Inc Mining CANADA YES
58 MERCANTILLE CC Trading in natural resources
from DRC
SOUTH AFRICA NO
59 MINERAL AFRIKA Limited Trading in natural resources
from DRC
UK YES
60 NAC KAZATOMPROM Tantalum processing KAZAKHSTAN NO
61 NAMI GEMS Diamond trader BELGIUM YES
62 NINGXIA NON-FERROUS
METALS SMELTER
Tantalum processing CHINA NO
63 OM GROUP Inc Mining USA
FINLAND
YES (USA)
YES (FINLAND)
64 OPERATION SOVEREIGN
LEGITIMACY (OSLEG) Pvt
Ltd
Commercial interests
ZIMBABWE in the DRC
ZIMBABWE NO
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Name of company Business Country
Country signatory of
OECD Guidelines
65 ORION MINING Inc Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
66 PACIFIC ORES METALS
AND CHEMICALS Ltd
Coltan trading HONG KONG NO
67 RAREMET Ltd Coltan trading from DRC SAINT KITTS NO
68 SARACEN Security company SOUTH AFRICA NO
69 SDV TRANSINTRA Transport FRANCE YES
70 SIERRA GEM DIAMONDS Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
71 SLC GERMANY GmbH Coltan transport GERMANY YES
72 SOGEM Coltan trading BELGIUM YES
73 SPECIALITY METALS
COMPANY SA
Coltan trading BELGIUM YES
74 STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK
Banking U.A.E. NO
75 SWANEPOEL Construction SOUTH AFRICA NO
76 TENKE MINING
CORPORATION
Mining CANADA YES
77 THORNTREE INDUSTRIES
(Pvt) Ltd
Provides capital to MBC ZIMBABWE NO
78 TRACK STAR TRADING 151
(Pty) Ltd
Exploitation and trading
minerals DRC
SOUTH AFRICA NO
79 TRADEMET SA Coltan trading BELGIUM YES
80 TREMALT Ltd Mining British Virgin
Islands
NO
81 TRINITECH
INTERNATIONAL Inc
Coltan trading and exploitation USA YES
82 TRIPLE A DIAMONDS Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
83 UMICORE International Metals and
Materials Group
BELGIUM YES
84 VISHAY SPRAGUE Capacitor manufacture USA and
ISRAEL
YES (USA)
NO (ISRAEL)
85 ZINCOR Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
- 267 -
11
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Annex IV
Countries visited and representatives of Governments and
organizations interviewed
The Panel wishes to express its deep appreciation to the Government officials,
diplomats, United Nations agencies, donor institutions, non-governmental
organizations, civil society groups, journalists, commercial operators and others
with whom it met and who have assisted in making possible the present report.
The Panel also wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, the
Panel would like to thank the United Nations Office in Burundi and the UNDP
offices in Bangui, Brazzaville, Bujumbura, Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa, Pretoria and
Yaounde for their assistance and support.
Austria
International organizations
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
Belgium
Government officials
Inter-Ministerial Ad Hoc Working Group on the Illegal Exploitation of the
Natural Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural
Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
State representatives
European Union Commission
Others
Arslanian Frères
International Peace Information Service
Sibeca
Sogem mineral trading company (division of Umicore)
Tantalum Niobium International Study Center
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Burundi
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Energy and Mines
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Minister of Finance
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of France
International organizations
Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Burundi
Others
Affimet
ASYST mineral trading company
Comptoir minier des exploitations du Burundi (COMEBU)
HAMZA mineral trading company
Central African Republic
Government officials
Ministry of Economy
Ministry of Equipment, Transport and Settlement
Ministry of Finance and Budget
Minister of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics
Minister of Trade and Industry
Department of Customs
State representatives
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of France
European Union
- 269 -
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International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
ASECNA
UNHCR
UNDP
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Land Affairs, Environment and Tourism
Minister of Planning and Reconstruction
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vice-Minister of Mines
Deputy Chief of Staff of the FAC
Governor of the Central Bank
Governor of Equateur Province
Governor of Katanga
Governor of Mbuji Mayi
Vice-Governor, in charge of the Economy, Finance and Development, Equateur
Province
Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de certification
Comité interministériel de “Small Scale Mining”
Générale des carrières et des mines (Gécamines)
Office national des transports
Régie des voies aériennes
Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA)
State representatives
Ambassador of Angola
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Canada
Ambassador of Germany
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
- 270 -
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S/2002/1146
Belgian Consul
Embassy of Denmark
Embassy of France
European Union
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)
FAO
GTZ
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
World Bank
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
MLC
President
Secretary-General
RCD-Goma
Vice President
Commissioner of the Interior
Governor of Kalemie
Department of Mines and Energy
Vice-Governor of Kisangani
Customs officials
RCD-K/ML
Second Vice-President
Minister of Interior
Acting Chief of Staff for the APC
Governor of Bunia
- 271 -
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S/2002/1146
Governor of Ituri Province
Mayor of Butembo
Others
Action contre la faim
ADETE
Agro Action Allemand
Associazione per la Cooperazione Internationale e l’Ainto Umanitario
Anglican Church
Ashanti Goldfield
Association africaine des droits de l’homme (ASADHO)
Banque internationale de commerce
BEP Productique (BEPROD)
Conseil african et malgache pour l’enseignement supérieur (CAMES)
Caritas
Centre d’information et d’animation missionnaire (CIAM)
Centre d’etudes national sur le développement populaire (CENADEP)
Centre de formation, recherches en conservation forestière
Centre national d’appui au développement et à la participation populaire
(CENADEP)
Church of Christ of the Congo
Comité provincial des diamantaires (CPD)
Commissions diocésaines Justice et Paix (CDPJ)
Conseil apostolique des laïques catholiques au Congo (CALCC)
Conference on Central Africa Moist Forest Ecosystems participants
Confédération de petites et moyennes enterprises du Congo (COPEMECO)
COSLEG (joint venture of COMIEX Congo and OSLEG)
Dara Forêt
Exploitation forestière, sciérie raffinage de la papaine (ENRA)
Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC — Kinshasa, Kisangani, Mbandaka,
Beni, Goma, Gémena, Bukavu)
Fédération nationale des parents d’élèves du Congo (FNPEC)
Fédération des ONG laïques à vocation économique au Congo (FOLECO)
Forces novatrices pour l’union et la solidarité (FONUS)
Groupe de recherches et d’échanges technologiques (in Kabinda)
- 272 -
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Groupe Lotus
Groupe musulman des droits de l’homme
GST (Gécamines labour union)
Héritiers de la justice
International Human Rights Law Group
International Rescue Committee
Inter Press Service (IPS)
JAMS
Journalistes en danger
Justice et Paix
Ligue des avocats pour les droits de l’homme
Kababankola Mining Company
Kotinne Plantation
Jardin botanique d’Eala
Maintenance, Assistance, Technique and Design
Mayi-Mayi representatives
Médecins sans Frontières (of Belgium and France)
Mennonite Church
Mouvement nationale congolais Lumumba (MNCL)
Mouvement des pionniers de l’indépendence
Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR)
National Commission of Experts on the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
National Congolese Railway Society (SNCC)
National Council of Development NGOs (CNONGD)
Nganga Plantation
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
Organisation concertée des ecologistes et amis de la nature (OCEAN)
OKIMO
Oxfam
Parti démocrate et social chrétien (PDSC )
Parti lumumbiste unifié (PALU)
Pharmakina
Pole Institute
- 273 -
17
S/2002/1146
Promotion de la femme rural (PROFER)
Programme d’appui aux femmes victimes des conflits et des catastrophes
Radio Okapi
Regional Committee of Development NGOs (CRONGD)
Religious community representatives
Radio Télé Debout Kasaï (RTDK)
Save the Children
Sengamines
Shenimed Coltan Comptoir
Syndicat des exploitants alluvionnaires du diamant (APLOKA)
SOCEBO
Société civile du Congo (SOCICO)
Société de renforcement de communauté de base (SERACOB)
Solidarités
TOFEN-CONGO
TRAFCO Freight Company
UDPS representatives
UPDF Sector Commander in Bunia
UPDF Battalion Commander in Butembo
UPDF Colonel Peter Karim
Union des banques congolaises
Voix du handicape pour les droits de l’homme (VHDH)
Wildlife Conservation Society
France
Government officials
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Others
Air France Cargo
Germany
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 274 -
18
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Others
H. C. Starck
Karl-Heinz Albers Mining and Minerals Processing
Kenya
Government officials
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Transport and Communications
Kenya Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
High Commissioner of the Republic of South Africa
Ambassador of Rwanda
High Commissioner of Uganda
Belgian Ministry of Defence
German Embassy
Belgian Parliamentary Inquiry Commission
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Democratic Republic of the Congo National Parks representatives
Institut congolais de conservation de la nature (Ministry of Environment,
Democratic Republic of the Congo)
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
Special Adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
World Customs Organization
World Wildlife Fund
Others
Association of Cargo Airliners
Congolese Commission of National Experts
Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund
- 275 -
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International Crisis Group
Kababankola Mining Company/Tremalt Ltd.
Kencargo
Lusaka Agreement Task Force
Martin Air
Oryx Natural Resources
Oxfam
World Vision
Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Environment
Ministry of Transport
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
European Union
International organizations
UNDP
Rwanda
Government officials
Special Envoy of the President for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Burundi
Office of the President of Rwanda
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Customs Commission
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
European Union
- 276 -
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International organizations
MONUC
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
President of RCD-Goma
Eagle Wings Resources
SDV Transintra
SOGERMI mineral trading company
South Africa
Government officials
Acting Director-General for Foreign Affairs
Department of Foreign Affairs
Department of Defence
Department of Home Affairs
Department of Minerals and Energy
Financial Intelligence Centre
National Intelligence Agency
National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
National Prosecuting Authority
National Treasury
Secretariat for Safety and Security
South African Diamond Board
South African Police
South African Revenue Service
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United States
High Commission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
- 277 -
21
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Others
Banro
Bateman Minerals and Metals
Centre for the Study of Economic Crime
Cobalt Metals Company
Compliance Institute
De Beers Group
DiamondWorks
Executive Outcomes
Fluxmans Attorneys
Grove Family Trust
International Institute of Security Studies
Kimberley Process Secretariat
Money Laundering Forum
Overseas Security Services
PricewaterhouseCoopers Forensic Services Division
Rand Afrikaans University
Rand Merchant Bank
SaferAfrica
STK Consulting
Tandan Holdings
Trans Hex
Ware Associates
University of South Africa at Pretoria
University of Witwatersrand/South African Institute for International Affairs
Uganda
Government officials
First Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Chief of Staff of UPDF
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry
Bank of Uganda
- 278 -
22
S/2002/1146
Department of Geological Survey and Mines
Uganda Bureau of Statistics
Uganda Civil Aviation Authority
Uganda Coffee Development Authority
Uganda Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Denmark
Ambassador of France
High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
Head of the Delegation of the European Union
International organizations
UNDP
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
Amnesty International
Judicial Commission of Inquiry
Saracen Uganda Ltd.
Uganda Debt Network
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
United States of America
Government officials
Department of Justice
State representatives
Belgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, Security Council members
and other Member States
- 279 -
23
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International organizations
International Monetary Fund
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict
UNDP
Forum on Forests
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
World Bank
Others
Human Rights Watch
Oxfam
Winston Strawn and Partners
Zambia
Others
Non-governmental organizations
Zimbabwe
Government officials
Ministry of Mines
State representatives
British High Commission
Others
Renaissance Bank
Dozer Parts
- 280 -
24
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Annex V
Abbreviations
ADB African Development Bank
ANC Armée nationale congolaise (army of RCD-G movement)
APC Armée patriotique congolaise (army of the RCD-ML rebel group
ASECNA Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à
Madagascar
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora
coltan columbo-tantalite
COMIEX Compagnie mixte d’import-export
COSLEG COMIEX-OSLEG joint venture
FAC Forces armées congolaises
ex-FAR former Forces armées rwandaises
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gécamines Générale des carrières et des mines
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschafte für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German
Government agency for technical cooperation)
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
KMC Kababankola Mining Company
MIBA Société minière de Bakwanga
MLC Mouvement de libération congolais
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OKIMO Office des Mines de Kilo-Moto
OSLEG Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese
Democracy)
RCD-Congo Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (newly formed rebel
group made up of MLC and RCD-Goma dissidents)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Goma
RCD-K/ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Mouvement de
libération, initially based in Kisangani, now headquartered in Bunia
- 281 -
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RCD-N Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-National
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
SADC Southern African Development Community
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SOMIGL Société minière des Grands Lacs
SOCEBO Société congolaise d’exploitation du bois
UDPS Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WCO World Customs Organization
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Forces
- 282 -
- 283 -
ANNEX 5.5
Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold. Democratic Republic of Congo, April 2005
(Excerpts)
The Curse of Gold
Democratic Republic of Congo
Human Rights Watch
- 284 -
The Curse of Gold
I. Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 1
II. Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 5
III. Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 9
IV. Background: Enriching the Elites...................................................................................... 12
The Significance of Gold.......................................................................................................13
Ugandan Forces Plunder the Gold of Haut Uélé District, 1998-2002...........................15
Local Armed Groups Fight for the Gold of Ituri, 2002-2004.........................................20
V. Human Rights Abuses in the Mongbwalu Gold Mining Area........................................ 23
Massacres and other Abuses by the UPC and their Allies................................................27
Massacre at Mongbwalu, November 2002 ..................................................................... 27
Massacre at Kilo, December 2002 ................................................................................... 29
Arbitrary arrest, torture and summary executions......................................................... 31
Mining the Gold: Instances of Forced Labour .............................................................. 33
Increased Commerce ......................................................................................................... 35
Justice for UPC crimes ...................................................................................................... 36
Massacres and other Abuses by the FNI, FAPC and the Ugandan Army.....................36
Massacre at Kilo, March 2003 .......................................................................................... 37
Accountability for the March 2003 Kilo Massacre........................................................ 39
The 48 Hour War, June 2003 and subsequent massacres ............................................ 40
A ‘Witch Hunt’ for Hema Women and other Opponents........................................... 43
Murder of two MONUC Observers................................................................................ 46
Threat Against Human Rights Defenders and Others Reporting Abuses ................ 47
Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Forced Labor ................................................................ 48
Control of the Gold Mines ............................................................................................... 51
VI. AngloGold Ashanti – Starting Gold Exploration Activities.......................................... 58
Competition for the Mining Rights to the Mongbwalu Mines ........................................60
AngloGold Ashanti Seeks to Start Exploration Activities in Mongbwalu, 2003 ..........61
AngloGold Ashanti develops a relationship with the FNI armed group .................. 65
AngloGold Ashanti benefits from its relationship with the FNI armed
group..................................................................................................................................... 68
Benefits for the FNI Armed Group................................................................................ 72
AngloGold Ashanti View of Contacts with the FNI.................................................... 75
Failure to Respect Human Rights, International Norms and Business Standards .......77
VII. Human Rights Abuses in the Durba Gold Mines and Trade Routes......................... 84
Summary Executions by Commander Jérôme, 2002-2004...............................................86
Executing and Torturing Supposed Political Opponents ............................................ 87
Arbitrary Detention and Torture ..................................................................................... 90
- 285 -
Tolerating Abuses by Business Allies .............................................................................. 93
Djalasiga: Continued Conflict over Gold Mines................................................................94
VIII. Trade in Tainted Gold...................................................................................................... 97
The New DRC Mining Code ................................................................................................98
Organization of the Gold Trade through Butembo and Ariwara .................................100
Dr Kisoni in Butembo..................................................................................................... 100
Omar Oria in Ariwara...................................................................................................... 104
Congolese Gold Exported to Uganda ...............................................................................105
Gold Export Figures from Uganda ............................................................................... 107
Gold Traders in Kampala................................................................................................ 108
Encouragement of the Gold Trade by the Ugandan Government .......................... 110
Buyers of Tainted Gold .......................................................................................................111
Switzerland: Unaccounted Gold?................................................................................... 111
Metalor Technologies SA................................................................................................ 113
IX. International Initiatives to Address Resource Exploitation in the DRC................... 118
U.N. Panel of Experts Reports on Illegal Resource Exploitation in the DRC...........118
Investigations on Breaches of the OECD Guidelines ....................................................121
Response of Regional Governments .................................................................................122
The Ugandan Porter Commission ................................................................................. 122
Rwandan Investigations................................................................................................... 123
DRC Government Response.......................................................................................... 124
MONUC................................................................................................................................125
International Financial Institutions ....................................................................................126
International Criminal Court...............................................................................................127
X. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 129
XI. Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 130
XII. Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 131
This report was written in English and translated into French. If there are any inconsistencies between
the French and English versions of this document, the English version will govern. This report was
correct as at April 26, 2005.
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1 SUMMARY
I. Summary
“We are cursed because of our gold. All we do is suffer. There is no benefit to us.”
Congolese gold miner
The northeast corner of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is home to one of
Africa’s richest goldfields. Competition to control the gold mines and trading routes has
spurred the bloody conflict that has gripped this area since the start of the Congolese
war in 1998 and continues to the present. Soldiers and armed group leaders, seeing
control of the gold mines as a way to money, guns, and power, have fought each other
ruthlessly, often targeting civilians in the process. Combatants under their command
carried out widespread ethnic slaughter, executions, torture, rape and arbitrary arrest, all
grave human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. More than
sixty thousand people have died due to direct violence in this part of Congo alone.
Rather than bringing prosperity to the people of northeastern Congo, gold has been a
curse to those who have the misfortune to live there.
This report documents human rights abuses linked to efforts to control two key gold
mining areas, Mongbwalu (Ituri District) and Durba (Haut Uélé District), both bordering
Uganda.
When Uganda, a major belligerent in the war, occupied northeastern Congo from 1998
to 2003, its soldiers took direct control of gold-rich areas and coerced gold miners to
extract the gold for their benefit. They beat and arbitrarily arrested those who resisted
their orders. Ignoring the rules of war for the conduct of occupying armies, they helped
themselves to an estimated one ton of Congolese gold valued at over $9 million. Their
irresponsible mining practices led to the collapse of one of the most important mines in
the area in 1999, the Gorumbwa mine, killing some one hundred people trapped inside
and destroying a major livelihood for the residents of the area.
The Ugandan army withdrew from Congo in 2003, following Rwanda, another major
belligerent, which had withdrawn the year before. Each left behind local proxies, the
Lendu Nationalist and Integrationist Front (Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes, FNI)
linked to Uganda, and the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes
Congolais, UPC), supported by Rwanda. With continued assistance from their external
backers, these local armed groups in turn fought for the control of gold-mining areas
and trade routes. As each group won a gold-rich area, they promptly began exploiting
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 2
the ore. The FNI and the UPC fought five battles in a struggle to control Mongbwalu,
each resulting in widespread human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch researchers
documented the slaughter of at least two thousand civilians in the Mongbwalu area alone
between June 2002 and September 2004. Tens of thousands of civilians were forced to
flee from their homes into the forests to escape their attackers. Many of them did not
survive.
In 2003, peace talks at the national level culminated in the installation of a transitional
government, but northeastern Congo remained volatile and beyond central government
control. Multinational corporations nonetheless sought to sign new deals or revitalize old
ones to start gold mining and exploration operations in the rich gold concessions in the
northeast. One of these companies, AngloGold Ashanti, one of the largest gold
producers in the world, started exploration activities in the Mongbwalu gold mining area.
Following earlier attempts to make contact with the UPC armed group, AngloGold
Ashanti representatives established relations with the FNI, an armed group responsible
for serious human rights abuses including war crimes and crimes against humanity, and
who controlled the Mongbwalu area. In return for FNI assurances of security for its
operations and staff, AngloGold Ashanti provided logistical and financial support – that
in turn resulted in political benefits – to the armed group and its leaders. The company
knew, or should have known, that the FNI armed group had committed grave human
rights abuses against civilians and was not a party to the transitional government.
As a company with public commitments to corporate social responsibility, AngloGold
Ashanti should have ensured their operations complied with those commitments and did
not adversely affect human rights. They do not appear to have done so. Business
considerations came above respect for human rights. In its gold exploration activities in
Mongbwalu, AngloGold Ashanti failed to uphold its own business principles on human
rights considerations and failed to follow international business norms governing the
behavior of companies internationally. Human Rights Watch has been unable to identify
effective steps taken by the company to ensure that their activities did not negatively
impact on human rights.
In other small-scale mining operations conducted throughout the duration of the
conflict, armed groups and their business allies used the proceeds from the sale of gold
to support their military activities. Working outside of legal channels, a network of
traders funnelled gold mined by artisanal miners and forced labour out of the Congo to
Uganda. In return for their services some traders counted on the support of combatants
from the armed groups who threatened, detained, and even murdered their commercial
rivals or those suspected of failing to honor business deals. These traders sold the ore to
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3 SUMMARY
gold exporters based in Uganda who then sold to the global gold market, a practice that
continues today.
In 2003, an estimated $60 million worth of Congolese gold was exported from Uganda,
much of it destined for Switzerland. One of the companies buying gold from Uganda is
Metalor Technologies, a leading Swiss refinery. The chain of Congolese middlemen,
Ugandan traders, and multinational corporations forms an important funding network
for armed groups operating in northeastern Congo. Metalor knew, or should have
known, that gold bought from its suppliers in Uganda came from a conflict zone in
northeastern DRC where human rights were abused on a systematic basis. The
company should have considered whether its own role in buying gold resources from its
suppliers in Uganda was compatible with provisions on human rights and it should have
actively checked its supply chain to verify that acceptable ethical standards were
maintained. Through purchases of gold made from Uganda, Metalor Technologies may
have contributed indirectly to providing a revenue stream for armed groups that carry
out widespread human rights abuses.
The international community has failed to effectively tackle the link between resource
exploitation and conflict in the Congo. Following three years of investigation into this
link, a United Nations (U.N.) panel of experts stated that the withdrawal of foreign
armies from Congo was unlikely to stop the cycle of conflict and exploitation of
resources. But the U.N. Security Council established no mechanism to follow up on the
recommendations of the panel. The trade in gold is just one example of a wider trend of
competition for resources and resulting human rights abuses taking place in mineral rich
areas throughout the Congo. The link between conflict and resource exploitation raises
broader questions of corporate accountability in the developing world. Given the
troubling allegations described in the U.N. panel of experts reports and in this report, it
is imperative that further steps be taken to deal with the issue of natural resources and
conflict in the Congo and beyond.
In preparation for this report, Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed over 150
individuals including victims, witnesses, gold miners, gold traders, gold exporters,
customs officials, armed group leaders, government representatives, and officials of
international financial institutions in Congo, Uganda and Europe in 2004 and 2005.
Human Rights Watch researchers also met with and engaged in written correspondence
with representatives from AngloGold Ashanti and Metalor Technologies to discuss
concerns.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 4
We wish to thank our Congolese colleagues in Justice Plus, and other individuals who
cannot be named for security reasons, for their assistance and support in our research.
They risk their lives to defend the rights of others and are to be commended for their
courage and commitment.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 12
IV. Background: Enriching the Elites
Gold, one of the richest resources in the Congo, offers the potential to contribute to
financial reconstruction after a war that has cost millions of lives and has left countless
others in desperate poverty. But in recent years it has enriched only a fortunate few,
many of whom have won control over the gold by use of force. Gold has contributed
little to the overall prosperity of the nation; on the contrary it has been a curse to those
who have the misfortune to live in regions where it is found.
In 1996 Rwandan and Ugandan forces invaded the Congo, ousted long-time ruler
Mobutu Sese Seko, and installed Laurent Desiré Kabila in power. In July 1998 Kabila
tried to expel the Rwandan troops, but they and the Ugandan forces instead engaged
Kabila’s government in the second Congo war, one that eventually drew in Zimbabwe,
Angola, Namibia (supporting Kabila) and Burundi (allied with the Rwandans and
Ugandans). Often termed as Africa’s first world war, the conflict resulted in the deaths
of 3.5 million people, the great majority in eastern DRC. Many victims were displaced
people who died from exposure, hunger, or lack of medical assistance.1 A first peace
agreement, signed in Lusaka in 1999, had little effect but the U.N. agreed to establish a
peacekeeping force known as the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (MONUC) in November 1999. Through continued international
pressure, the national government and major rebel movements eventually signed a
power-sharing agreement at Sun City in April 2002 that allowed for the establishment of
the Global and All Inclusive Peace Agreement which set up the transitional government
in June 2003. Despite this agreement and other bilateral and regional security
agreements, insecurity continued in large parts of eastern Congo.
The war in northeastern Congo, specifically in Ituri, sprang from the larger Congo war,
and became a complex web of local, national, and regional conflicts. It developed after a
local land dispute in 1999 between Hema and Lendu ethnic groups was exacerbated by
the Ugandan army who occupied the area and by national rebel groups keen on
expanding their power base. The availability of political and military support from
external actors, notably Uganda and Rwanda, plus growing extremists’ sentiments,
encouraged local leaders in Ituri to form more structured movements. Armed groups
were born, generally based on ethnic loyalties, including the predominately northern
1 International Rescue Committee and Burnet Institute, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results
from a Nationwide Survey, December 2004.
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13 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
Hema group the UPC2, the predominately Lendu FNI3, the southern Hema group
PUSIC and the more mixed FAPC.4 Each of these groups received military and
political support from either the DRC5, Ugandan or Rwandan governments at different
times turning Ituri into a battleground for the war between them.6
Between 2002 and 2004 these Ituri armed groups attempted to gain recognition on the
national scene, hoping for positions in the Kinshasa based transitional government and
in the newly integrated army. In this scramble, local militia leaders frequently switched
alliances between themselves and other backers as their interests dictated. They
attempted to control huge swathes of territory and strategic sites, including gold mines
and lucrative customs posts, in order to enhance the importance of their movement.
The strategic sites also provided much needed finance for the armed groups and favor
with their backers. A U.N. special report on the events in Ituri published in July 2004
underlined that the competition for control of natural resources, particularly gold, by
these armed groups was a major factor in prolonging the crisis in Ituri.7
The Significance of Gold
Gold was first discovered in the Agola River in northeastern Congo in 1903 by two
Australian prospectors. They named the area after the local chief Kilo8 and shortly
thereafter made a similar discovery in the Moto River just to the north, from which the
name Kilo-Moto derives. Exploitation of the gold started in 1905 and continued on an
increased scale. During the first half of the twentieth century, colonial entrepreneurs
exploited gold through private companies that introduced large-scale or industrial
mining. After independence in 1960, the state nationalized many of these companies,
including, in 1966, the Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto (SOKIMO) that worked
the lodes of northeastern Congo. It granted the large SOKIMO concession in Ituri and
Haut Uélé Districts of Orientale Province to a new state-owned Office of the Gold
Mines of Kilo-Moto (OKIMO). To date, OKIMO officials estimate that more than 400
2 The northern Hema group is often referred to as Gegere, a sub-clan of the Hema.
3 This included temporarily the southern Lendu group known as the Ngiti, who had formed the FRPI miltia.
4 Another group, the Popular Forces for the Democracy of Congo (FPDC) was also born but it has played only a
minor role. PUSIC has not been active in the gold mining areas of Mongbwalu and Durba and so goes largely
unmentioned in this report.
5 Assistance was received from the pre-transition Kinshasa government before mid-2003, though support
allegedly continued from certain components of the transitional government after mid-2003.
6 Human Rights Watch, “Ituri: ‘Covered in Blood’ – Ethnically Targeted Violence in North-eastern DRC”, A Short
Report, July 2003.
7 Letter from the U.N. Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, “Special Report on the Events
in Ituri January 2002 – December 2003”, July 16 2004, p. 5.
8 The local chief was actually called Krilo, but the Australians mistook the name for Kilo.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 14
tons of gold have been extracted from their concession and that much more remains,
though there is no precise estimate of how much.9 Many industry experts agree that the
OKIMO concession is one of the most exciting, and potentially the largest, unexplored
gold reserve in Africa.10 In the early 1990s OKIMO entered into arrangements with
multinational corporations to exploit the large mines of northeastern Congo using
industrial methods (discussed below) and also licensed local miners to work other areas
by artisanal methods.
In 2000, the U. N. Security Council expressed concern that Congo’s natural resources
such as gold, diamonds and other minerals were fuelling the deadly war. They appointed
a panel of experts11 to look into the matter who published four separate reports between
April 2001 and October 2003. 12 In these series of reports, the U.N. panel of experts
reported that Rwandan, Ugandan, and Zimbabwean army officers as well as members of
the Congolese elite were growing rich from the wealth of the Congo. They showed how
extraction of these resources helped fund armed groups, thus fueling the war. They
further documented how the minerals of the Congo were fed into the networks of
international commerce. The panel concluded in its report of October 2002 that the
withdrawal of foreign armies would not end the resource exploitation because the elites
had created a self-financing war economy.13
In 2002, following heavy international pressure, in part because of the U.N. panel
reports, both the Rwandan and Ugandan governments agreed to withdraw their soldiers
from Congo. Uganda subsequently arranged with the Congolese government to keep
some forces in northeastern Congo until 2003 when the last of their troops withdrew.
This report, focused on control of gold in northeastern Congo, shows that the pattern of
exploitation of natural resources described by the U.N. panel of experts, does indeed
continue as of this writing, resulting in widespread abuses of human rights. The trade in
gold is just one example of a wider trend of competition for resources and resulting
human rights abuses taking place in mineral rich areas throughout the Congo.
9 Pasteur Cosma Wilingula Balongelwa, General Director of OKIMO, “Written Presentation on OKIMO”,
Kinshasa, January 31, 2004.
10 Human Rights Watch interviews, gold industry experts, Bunia, Kampala, London, February – May 2004.
Industry experts use the term ‘ore body’ instead of the lay term gold reserve.
11 Known as the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo; hereafter the U.N. panel of experts.
12 See reports from the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 12, 2001 (S/2001/357), May 22, 2002 (S/2002/565),
October 16, 2002 (S/2002/1146), October 23, 2003 (S/2003/1027) plus other addendums.
13 Ibid., U.N. panel report (S/2002/1146), October 16, 2002.
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15 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
Gold miners working in an open pit mine in Durba. © 2004 Marcus Bleasdale
Ugandan Forces Plunder the Gold of Haut Uélé District, 1998-2002
In August 1998, shortly after the start of the second Congolese war, Ugandan troops
occupied gold-rich areas of Haut Uélé, including the town of Durba, (Watsa Territory,
Haut Uélé District, Orientale Province), site of three important gold mines: Gorumbwa,
Durba and Agbarabo. According to estimates of engineers and geologists familiar with
the area, nearly one ton of gold was extracted from this region during the four-year
period of Ugandan occupation.14 Based on prices at the time, this would have been
valued at some $9 million dollars.
Ugandan troops were supporting the advance of their Congolese allies, the rebel Rally
for Congolese Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD) and
the Congolese Liberation Movement (Movement pour la Liberation du Congo, MLC),
but according to local observers, the Ugandans took Durba primarily for the wealth it
offered. Within weeks of the second war, the Rwandan and Ugandan backed RCD rebel
forces quickly announced their “control over the OKIMO mines” and in a written
decision prohibited any illicit mining stating that the RCD was going to “economically
14 Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO engineers and geologists, Durba, May 13, 2004. Estimates were
based on regular observation and monitoring.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 16
reorganize the territory under its control.”15 One witness in Durba who witnessed the
Ugandan army enter said, “The Ugandans were only here for the gold. . . There was no
military reason [to be here] and they never fought any battles here.”16 Officials of the
state-owned gold mining agency OKIMO had been left in charge of the Durba mines
after the flight of the expatriate staff of the Barrick Gold Corporation, a mining
company which held a concession from OKIMO. A former OKIMO employee present
when the Ugandans arrived said, “We understood that they came to our area only for
economic interests. The moment they arrived they were more interested in OKIMO
than anything else.”17
In the early days of the occupation, Ugandan soldiers, including a Ugandan officer called
Major Sonko, came by helicopter to try to start gold production.18 Finding it too difficult
and costly to operate the mines on an industrial scale, they decided to use artisanal
miners, (orpailleurs), although Congolese mining regulations prohibited such miners from
working in industrial mines and restricted them to smaller-scale holdings. According to
one former OKIMO employee, the decision to get gold immediately and cheaply by
using artisanal miners led to the reckless mining practices that would destroy Gorumbwa
mine, the most important in the area.19
Local sources said that Ugandan Lieutenant David Okumu gave the initial order to start
mining in Gorumbwa.20 According to a report prepared by OKIMO officials that
provides further details, Ugandan soldiers took over mine security, chasing away
OKIMO guards and the local police in order to benefit from the gold mining.21 Local
miners went to work in the mines, even though they were required to pay an entrance
fee to Ugandan soldiers or to give them a portion of their ore when leaving. Witnesses
reported that Ugandan soldiers beat local miners who refused to work under these
conditions or who failed to deliver the expected amount of gold.22 To speed extraction
of the ore, Ugandan soldiers directed miners to use explosives taken from OKIMO
15 Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Démocratie (RCD), Cabinet du Coordinateur, Décision No.
004/RCD/CD/LB/98, Goma, October 28, 1998.
16 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 11, 2004.
17 Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO employee, Durba, May 13, 2004.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Human Rights Watch interviews, Congolese miners and other sources, Durba and Watsa, May 10 - 13, 2004.
21 OKIMO Internal Memorandum to General Management, “La sécurité au Groupe d’Exploitation Moto”, March
17, 2000. Further details also provided in internal OKIMO memos of September 9, 1999 and May 29, 2000.
Documents on file at Human Rights Watch. See also, William Wallis, “Warlords and Adventurers in Scrambles
for Riches,” Financial Times, July 15, 2003.
22 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 13, 2004.
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17 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
stocks. Local residents said that there were more than fifty explosions in the mines
during the month of December 1999, some of them severe enough to shake nearby
housing. Even the rock pillars that supported the roof in the mine were blasted to
extract any ore that might be inside them.23
On several occasions OKIMO officials protested to Ugandan army commanders about
the illegal mining, the theft of fuel and explosives from their stock, and the possible
damage to the mines through the explosions.24 Ugandan soldiers beat, arrested, and
threatened some of those who protested. Lieutenant Okumu arrested the local OKIMO
Director Samduo Tango and had him publicly beaten. A witness at the scene of the
beating said,
[Samduo Tango] was arrested and taken to “Les Bruns” [a house in the
OKIMO concession] by Commander Okumu and he was beaten. He
was protesting against how the Ugandans were doing things. It
happened a few months after the Ugandans arrived. They also beat
other workers who were against them. Samduo had to pay to be
released and then he fled. Another person who was beaten was Aveto
as he witnessed the Ugandans taking dynamite from the warehouse. He
was arrested along with Samduo and also publicly beaten. Commander
Okumu beat them himself and he asked other soldiers to also beat them.
I saw this myself.25
Another OKIMO official told a Human Rights Watch researcher,
I had many meetings with [Commander Okumu] to make him
understand that they must not destroy the mine. But these meetings
only put us more at risk. I myself was threatened because of all this.
One time I was taken to their military camp for questioning.26
Lt Okumu left the Durba area in early 1999 but other Ugandan commanders continued
with similar practices and took no actions to stop the illegal mining. In June 1999
OKIMO officials reported again on the situation and asked Commander Sula based in
23 Ibid., OKIMO Internal Memorandum, March 17, 2000, Also Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO engineer,
Durba, May 13, 2004.
24 Ibid., OKIMO Internal Memorandum, March 17, 2000.
25 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 13, 2004.
26 Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO employee, Durba, May 13, 2004.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 18
Isiro to intervene. He ignored the request and soon after the Durba-based Ugandan
officer Freddy Ziwa arrested one of the OKIMO officials.27 According to an internal
OKIMO memorandum, Commander Sula met with local miners and Ugandan soldiers
on July 12, 1999 in Durba and ordered them to organize more extensive mining in the
OKIMO concession. On July 29, 1999 artisanal miners and Ugandan soldiers began
work in the second largest mine in the area, the Durba mine.28 The miners were
reportedly transported to work in army vehicles.29
In December 1999, OKIMO officials met with two other Ugandan army officers heavily
involved in the mining, Commanders Bob and Peter Kashilingi. They sought an end to
the mining and warned again that Gorumbwa mine might collapse if the practice of
blasting the supporting pillars continued. According to OKIMO officials, no action was
taken by Ugandan commanders.30
In late 1999 the Gorumbwa mine collapsed killing a reported one hundred miners
trapped inside and flooding the area.31 According to one local engineer:
The Ugandan army were responsible for the destruction of Gorumbwa
mine. They started to mine the pillars. It was disorderly and very
widespread. People were killed when the mine eventually collapsed. It
was not their country so they didn’t care about the destruction. They
kept promising to help stabilise the mine, but they never did.32
Another engineer thrown out of work by the collapse of the mine explained,
“Gorumbwa mine was the most important. It was ruined by the Ugandans and this has
halted development here. It has caused social degradation.”33
In December 1998, an epidemic of Marburg hemorrhagic fever killed more than fifty
people in Durba, the majority of them miners. The outbreak was believed to have
27 Ibid., OKIMO Internal Memorandum March 17, 2000.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 13, 2004. See also OKIMO Internal Memorandum, March 17,
2000.
31 Wallis, “Warlords and Adventurers in Scrambles for Riches”.
32 Human Rights Watch interview, engineer, Durba, May 13, 2004.
33 Human Rights Watch interview, former engineer, Durba, May 11, 2004.
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19 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
begun in Gorumbwa mine.34 According to a team of medical experts sent to the area by
the U.N. several months later, the unhealthy conditions in the Gorumbwa mine
increased the risk of workers contracting this fever.35
Ugandan soldiers had no authority to extract gold from mines in the Durba area.
Possibly aware of the illegal nature of their exploitation, they sought once in May 1999
to create a semblance of legitimacy for their activities. Working through their local
Congolese proxy the RCD, the local Congolese Brigade Commander, Mbanga Buloba,
held a meeting questioning OKIMO’s legal title to the mining rights in the area and
claiming it was the new rebel administration who were entitled to manage the artisanal
gold exploitation. The effort, described in a memorandum by OKIMO officials, came
to nothing.36
Nor did Ugandan soldiers have any military imperative to exploit or destroy the gold
mines in the Durba area. As an occupying power they were responsible under
international law for protecting civilian and non-military state assets, including mines,
and had an obligation to properly maintain them. Their systematic and abusive
exploitation of the gold mines represented an immediate loss to state assets and their
destruction of the infrastructure and damage to the Gorumbwa mine decreased the value
of the state assets for future use, all in violation of international law.37
In 2001 the U.N Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation in the DRC reported on the
involvement of Ugandan officers in mining activities in Durba.38 Their reports were
followed-up in 2002 by the Ugandan government appointed judicial commission of
inquiry led by Justice David Porter, commonly known as the Porter Commission, who
were instructed to respond to the allegations made by the panel.39 The Porter
Commission interviewed various Ugandan officers about their involvement in illegal
gold mining in Durba including Lt Okumu, Major Sonko and Lt Col Mugeny amongst
34 Human Rights Watch interview, Watsa, May 12, 2004. There have been previous outbreaks of Marburg fever
in the area in 1992, 1994 and 1997. See also medical papers by Dr Matthias Borchert.
35 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Rapport de mission du Conseiller Humanitaire: Epidémie
de Fièvre hémorragique de Durba/Province Orientale,” May 1999. Also Human Rights Watch interview, medical
professional, Watsa, May 13, 2004.
36 Ibid., OKIMO Internal Memorandum March 17, 2000.
37 Article 55 of the Hague Regulations (Convention IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, October 18, 1907.
38 U.N. Panel of Experts, Report (S/2001/357), April 12, 2001, p. 11.
39 “Final Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2001 (May 2001 – November
2002)”, November 2002. Hereafter, this will be referred to as the “Porter Commission report”.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 20
others. All of them denied any involvement in such activities. The Porter Commission
found the officers were lying and declared there had been “a cover-up” inside the UPDF
to hide the extent of such activities.40
Despite the findings of the Porter Commission, no arrests were made of officers
responsible for the wide-scale and abusive looting, nor was any compensation provided
to OKIMO or the Congolese state for such activities. In September 2004 the DRC
government demanded $16 billion in compensation from the Ugandan government for
the plunder of natural resources by its forces while they occupied parts of the DRC, in
violation of international law.41 In newspaper reports, representatives from the Ugandan
government acknowledged some responsibility for the killings, plunder and looting the
DRC suffered at the hands of their troops, but made no commitment to pay
compensation stating the amount demanded was “colossal.”42
In 2002 under international pressure Ugandan forces started to withdraw from parts of
the DRC and moved their troops out of Durba leaving the area to a breakaway faction
of the original RCD, this one known as the RCD-ML and its armed group, the APC.
After the Sun City agreement in 2002, RCD-ML became allied also with the national
government. In the following two years, this gold mining region changed hands several
times between rival national movements and local armed groups. Each time there was
one constant. “Every time there was a change of armed group,” said one witness, “the
first thing they did was to immediately start digging for gold.”43 With the establishment
of the transitional government in mid-2003, Kinshasa supposedly reasserted control over
the region, but in fact formerly rebel military forces continued to play a role in exploiting
the gold though they now claimed to be part of a newly integrated national army.44
Local Armed Groups Fight for the Gold of Ituri, 2002-2004
With the withdrawal of all – or most – of the Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers from
eastern Congo in 2002 and 2003, local armed groups became the main direct contenders
for control of areas rich in gold. In Ituri District the most important of these groups
were affiliated with either the Hema or the Lendu, ethnic groups that had been battling
40 Ibid., p. 69 and 70.
41 Article 55 of the Hague Regulations (Convention IV).
42 David Musoke and A. Mutumba-Lule, “DRC Wants $16 billion for Plunder by Uganda, Rwanda,” East African,
September 27, 2004.
43 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 13, 2004.
44 Human Rights Watch interviews, Durba and Watsa, May 11 – 13, 2004.
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21 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
over land and fishing rights since 1999.45 Because the ethnic conflict became
intertwined with the struggle over gold, the fighting in Ituri District drew in far larger
numbers of civilians than was the case around Durba, in Haut Uélé District. Both areas
had significant gold mines but Durba suffered less historical ethnic tensions between the
Hema and Lendu. Controlling sites rich in gold assured armed group leaders the means
for buying guns and other supplies to carry on the conflict and also guaranteed political
importance to the leaders, increasing the possibility that they would earn recognition and
coveted posts at national level.46
Although local armed groups moved to center stage as the major actors, Ugandan and
Rwandan soldiers continued to play a role, providing arms and advice to leaders of these
armed groups, sometimes directly, sometimes through one or the other of the Congolese
rebel movements with which they were allied. These supporting actors had their own
agendas and were ready to shift alliances with local actors as circumstances changed. By
2002 Rwanda and Uganda had fallen out, a split highlighted by combat between their
forces at Kisangani in May 2002. The division between them added further complexity
to the dynamics of local alliances, sometimes increasing opportunities for local groups to
play off one powerful backer against the other. A third armed group of mixed ethnicity,
the FAPC led by Commander Jérôme Kakwavu, a Congolese Tutsi and former RCDML
commander, joined the struggle in support of the Hema. Local armed groups, rebel
movements, and Rwanda and Uganda all juggled multiple interests, but always important
among them was desire to control the gold.
During this period, the Congolese government had little influence in Ituri, leaving local
affairs largely to its ally, the RCD-ML. In an attempt by the international community to
find a political solution to the ongoing fighting in Ituri, the U.N. chaired dialogue
between the Congolese government, armed groups and the Ugandan government
resulting in the establishment of an ad hoc Ituri Interim Administration (IIA) in April
2003. When this body proved ineffective, the national government and MONUC in May
2003 pressured representatives of six armed groups to pledge in writing to cooperate
with the peace process. The Foreign Affairs Commissioner of the FNI showed no
intention of honoring the pledge, saying, “We were forced to sign the document. It
means nothing to us.”47 Leaders of other groups apparently felt the same way and
fighting has continued since then between militia themselves and between militia and
45 Human Rights Watch, “Ituri: ‘Covered in Blood’” and “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fuelling Political and Ethnic
Strife”, A Short Report, March 2001 and “Chaos in Eastern Congo: U.N. Action Needed Now,” A Briefing Paper,
October 2002.
46 United Nations Security Council, “Special Report on the Events in Ituri”, July 16, 2004, p. 5.
47 Human Rights Watch interview, Floribert Njabu, President of the FNI and Lonu Lonema, Foreign Affairs
Commissioner FNI, Kampala, July 3, 2004.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 22
MONUC peacekeeping troops. In February 2005, after the killing of more U.N.
peacekeepers in Ituri, MONUC renewed its pressure on the armed groups. Some of the
militia leaders declared again they were prepared to participate in disarmament
operations, though at the time it writing it was unclear if this time they would stick to
their commitments.
Poorly funded by the international community and not supported by MONUC, the
interim administration accomplished little and was dissolved in June 2004. The
transitional government restored local administrative structures, and appointed
administrators with little or no connection to the armed groups. The new functionaries
remained largely unpaid and had no means to exercise control over armed groups.
In an attempt to resolve the security problems, President Joseph Kabila, who succeeded
as president after the death of his father Laurent Kabila in 2001, signed a decree in late
2004 granting six leaders of the Ituri armed groups positions as generals in the newly
integrated Congolese army and a further thirty-two militiamen positions as lieutenantcolonels,
colonels and majors. Despite divisions within the transitional government
about these appointments, the generals were welcomed into army ranks in January 2005.
The government provided no assurances that the newly appointed generals would not be
returned to Ituri nor did it make any commitments to starting judicial investigations into
serious allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly carried out by the
new appointees. The integration of alleged war criminals into senior army ranks was
denounced by Human Rights Watch and international diplomats.48 In the aftermath of
the killing of nine U.N. peacekeepers in Ituri in February 2005, the transitional
government arrested Floribert Njabu, Thomas Lubanga and a handful of other senior
Ituri commanders though at the time of writing they had not yet been charged with any
crimes or brought to justice.
48 See Human Rights Watch, “D.R. Congo: Army Should Not Appoint War Criminals,” Press Release, January
14, 2004.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 36
Justice for UPC crimes
Human Rights Watch reported on the November 2002 massacre at Mongbwalu in July
2003 and a year later a report to the U.N. Security Council also detailed the massacre of
civilians around Mongbwalu. To date the perpetrators of these crimes have not been
brought to justice either by the UPC or by the DRC transitional government.
The UPC splintered into two factions in early December 2003. The branch led by
Commander Kisembo changed from a largely military movement to a political party and
received recognition as a national political party in mid-2004. Commander Kisembo was
arrested by MONUC troops on June 25, 2004 for continued military recruitment but
was later released without charge. Since October 2003 Thomas Lubanga, leader of the
other UPC faction, has been restricted by the transitional government to Kinshasa where
he lives at the Grand Hotel. He was arrested in Kinshasa in March 2005 but has not yet
been charged with any crimes. Commander Bosco remains the chief military officer in
charge of the UPC Lubanga faction based in Ituri. MONUC claims he is responsible for
the attack on a MONUC convoy resulting in the death of a Kenyan peacekeeper in
January 2004 and for taking a Moroccan peacekeeper hostage in September 2004.92
Commanders Salumu and Sey, still part of Commander Jérôme’s forces, were selected
for training at the Superior Military College in Kinshasa in preparation for joining the
newly integrated Congolese army as senior officers. Human Rights Watch is not aware
of any vetting carried out by DRC military officials or international donors who support
army integration to determine their unsuitability for senior posts because of their
involvement in human rights abuses.93
In March 2003, the UPC lost control of the Mongbwalu area and the profits from its
gold mines when they were attacked and pushed back by a new alliance of forces led by
their former ally turned enemy: the Ugandan army.
Massacres and other Abuses by the FNI, FAPC and the Ugandan
Army
After having dropped the Hema, Ugandan soldiers built a new alliance with the Lendu,
who had created the FNI party under Floribert Njabu in November 2002. At the end of
February 2003, Commander Jérôme also ended his link with the UPC and created his
92 Human Rights Watch interview, MONUC human rights section, Bunia, February 20, 2004.
93 Donors involved in security sector and army reform in the DRC include the Belgian and South African
governments and the European Union.
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37 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
militia, known as the FAPC, based in the important border town of Aru, northeast of
Mongbwalu. According to a special report to the U.N. Security Council on Ituri, the
FAPC was created with direct Ugandan support.94
With international pressure growing to withdraw their troops from Ituri, Ugandan
soldiers sought to secure maximum territory for their local allies. On March 6, 2003
reportedly in response to an attack by the UPC, the Ugandan army drove the UPC out
of Bunia with the assistance of Lendu militias. One former Lendu leader who
participated in the operation said that he and his men had done so at the request of
Ugandan army Brigadier Kale Kayihura.95 Ugandan soldiers and FNI combatants
chased fleeing UPC troops northwards towards Mongbwalu.
Massacre at Kilo, March 2003
On March 10, 2003 the Ugandan and Lendu forces attacked Kilo, a town just south of
Mongbwalu, with the Lendu arriving several hours before the Ugandans.96 The Lendu
combatants met little resistance from the UPC and began killing civilians who they
presumed to be of Nyali ethnicity, accusing them of having helped the Hema. According
to local sources, they killed at least one hundred, many of them women and children.
They looted local residences and shops and required civilians to transport the booty for
them.97 Residents walking on the road near the town of Kilo nearly a month later still
reported the smell of corpses rotting in the forest.98
A local woman witnessed her house being burned and then saw the Lendu combatants
kill a man, five women, and a child with machetes. She was then forced to help transport
loot for the Lendu combatants. She recounted that, en route, the Lendu selected four
children between ten and fifteen years old, Rosine, Diere, Kumu and Flory, from the
group and killed them and then killed five more adults. When some of the women
faltered under the heavy loads they were forced to carry, the Lendu killed them and cut
off their breasts and then cut their genitals. The witness said,
At Kilo Mission on top of the hill there were many Lendu combatants.
They had a few guns but mostly machetes, bows and arrows. They were
94 Ibid., 0 Nations Security Council, “Special Report on the Events in Ituri”, p13
95 Human Rights Watch interview, former Lendu militia leader, February 21, 2004.
96 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
97 Human Rights Watch interview, local analysts, Bunia, October 10, 2004. Also Human Rights Watch
interview, Floribert Njabu, President of the FNI, May 2, 2004.
98 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 38
very dirty and had mud on their faces so we wouldn’t recognize them.
On the hill we saw many bodies of people who had been killed. They
were all lying face down on the ground. They were naked. The Lendu
were getting ready to burn the bodies. There were many of them, too
many to count.99
According to witnesses, Commander Kaboss commanded the attack. He reported to
Commander Matesso Ninga, known as Kung Fu, who was in charge of operations for
the FNI, though he was not seen at Kilo during the massacre. At the time, the FNI
Military Chief of Staff was Maitre Kiza.100
Ugandan troops under Commander Obote arrived a few hours after the Lendu and tried
to stop their killing. The witness said,
When the Ugandan soldiers arrived they started to hit the Lendu and
shot at them. They said to them, “Why have you killed people, we said
you could loot but not to kill people. You will tarnish our reputation.”
They tried to return some of the loot but the Lendu were starting to run
away. The Ugandans said they regretted the way the Congolese
behaved and they regretted very much that the chief’s house had been
burned and ruined.101
Although the Ugandans stopped the killings in the town, the FNI combatants continued
to kill people in the surrounding villages such as Kabakaba, Buwenge, Alimasi and Bovi.
“If the Ugandans heard about the killings,” said one witness, “they would go to try and
stop it, but it was often too late.102 Local authorities also reported the rape of some
twenty-seven women and the burning of villages, including Emanematu and Livogo
which were completely destroyed.103
Although the Ugandan soldiers tried to limit FNI abuses after the Kilo attack, they
neither disarmed the combatants nor ended their military alliance with them. Instead
they continued their joint military operation towards Mongbwalu arriving there on
99 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 24, 2004.
100 Human Rights Watch interview, local analysts, Bunia, October 10, 2004. Also Human Rights Watch
interview, Floribert Njabu, President of the FNI, May 2, 2004.
101 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 23, 2004.
102 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 24, 2004.
103 Human Rights Watch interview, local authorities, Bunia, October 8, 2004.
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39 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
March 13, 2003 and set up the military headquarters for the 83rd Battalion.104 The next
day a community leader sought security assurances from Ugandan Commander Okelo,
who was in charge of the military camp. According to him, Commander Okelo
confirmed that “he controlled the Lendu combatants and he had given them one week
to put down their traditional weapons.”105 Witnessed observed Ugandan army troops
carrying out joint patrols with Lendu combatants and reported that “it was clear the
Ugandan army was in command.”106
When the Ugandan soldiers left Ituri two months later, they were still working closely
with the FNI. According to an Ugandan army document dated May 1, 2003, Ugandan
Major Ezra handed over control of Mongbwalu to FNI Commanders Mutakama and
Butsoro as Ugandan army troops left the area. All parties signed the document,
witnessed by MONUC observer Oran Safwat.107 Although Commander Jérôme and
most of his troops had withdrawn to Aru, a contingent under Commander Sey remained
at Mongbwalu.
Witnesses also said that Ugandan army commanders left behind some of their
ammunition and weapons for the FNI.108 In addition, a shipment of Ugandan arms
bound for Mongbwalu was seized by MONUC in Beni several months after the
Ugandans withdrew. Those accompanying the arms reported that the FNI were still
getting aid from Uganda and that the weapons seized in Beni were meant for them.
According to the MONUC report on the incident, one of those accompanying the
weapons, a deputy administrator from Mongbwalu, admitted he was constantly in touch
with the Ugandans.109
Accountability for the March 2003 Kilo Massacre
Many witnesses reported the abuses to local authorities who in turn wrote a letter to the
MONUC human rights section in Bunia on September 26, 2003 listing 125 civilian
deaths, cases of torture and rape in the Kilo area from March to May 2003 carried out by
104 Letter from Brigadier Kale Kayihura to the Regional Director of MONUC in Bunia, RE: Disposition of UPDF in
the Two Command Sectors of Bunia and Mahagi., April 17, 2003. The document also confirms that 1 Infantry
Coy was left in Kilo.
105 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 2 and 4, 2004.
106 Ibid.
107 UPDF Restricted Document, “Withdrawal of Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces from the Democratic
Republic of Congo,” UPDF Form No. AC/DRC/01 signed in Mongbwalu, May 1, 2003. Document on file at
Human Rights Watch.
108 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004.
109 Confidential U.N. internal report on the investigation into the plane seizure in Beni, July 25, 2003.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 40
FNI combatants while Ugandan soldiers were still present in the area.110 No response
was received and on November 20, 2003 a second letter was sent detailing a further
nineteen deaths, eight cases of torture and two cases of rape between July to November
2003. 111
The Ugandan army had command control over the FNI combatants during their joint
military operation and should be held responsible for the abuses committed by FNI
combatants. Although they may have attempted to minimize crimes by organizing joint
patrols and requesting that combatants lay down their traditional weapons, they did not
carry out any further steps to ensure accountability for these crimes. In addition, they
soon armed the FNI with modern weapons. Human Rights Watch is not aware of any
investigation or arrest made by either the Ugandan army or the FNI authorities into
abuses committed by their troops. To date no one has been held responsible for the
massacre of civilians and other serious human rights abuses committed in Kilo.
The 48 Hour War, June 2003 and subsequent massacres
After the Ugandan forces left in May 2003, the UPC retook Mongbwalu on June 10,
2003. Despite having recently received additional weapons from Rwanda, delivered at a
newly constructed airstrip some 30 kilometers from Mongbwalu,112 the UPC was able to
hold the town for only forty-eight hours before being pushed back by the FNI
combatants under the command of Mateso Ninga, known as Kung Fu. The FNI counter
attacked with heavy weapons that had reportedly been left behind by the Ugandans.113
For the Lendu, their victory in what became known as the “48 Hour War,” was a source
of great pride. Based on local testimony, it appears that some 500 persons were killed
during the Lendu counterattack, many of them civilians.114
FNI authorities asserted that the UPC attacked Mongbwalu in order to regain control of
the gold.115 In addition, a large number of civilians accompanied the combatants,
apparently intent on looting and helping the combatants loot the town.116 According to
110 Letter from local authorities to MONUC Human Rights Section in Bunia, “Transmission of report on the tragic
events carried out by Lendu combatants in Banyali/Kilo from March 9, 2003 till present against the civilian
population”, Ref No 323/09/1,180/2003, September 26, 2003.
111 Letter from local authorities to MONUC Human Rights Section in Bunia, “Table of Human Rights Violations in
B/Kilo Sector”, Ref No 323/21/1,180/2003, November 20, 2003.
112 Ibid., Panel of Experts, “Confidential Supplement to the U.N. Security Council”, November 2003.
113 Human Rights Watch interviews, FNI authorities, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004 and local residents, May 3, 2004.
114 Human Rights Watch interviews, Beni and Mongbwalu, February 27 and May 2, 2004.
115 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI authorities, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004.
116 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 27, 2004.
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41 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
witnesses and FNI authorities, they represented a large number of those killed during the
Lendu counterattack.117 One witness recounted being shocked at the sight of so many
bodies, civilians as well as combatants, in town on the day of the Lendu victory. He
said,
[Commander] Kung Fu saw that many people died and he asked people
to help with burying. But there were too many so they just decided to
burn them instead. They burned for at least three days. There was a
terrible smell in the air.118
FNI officials acknowledged to a Human Rights Watch researcher that civilians had
accompanied the UPC combatants.119 During a commemorative re-enactment of the
battle at 2004 May Day celebrations in Mongbwalu stadium, witnessed by Human Rights
Watch, women and young people playing the role of Hema civilians were portrayed
carrying goods before they were killed by Lendu combatants under the command of
Kung Fu. The play went on to show the community burning the bodies of those killed
and declaring Commander Kung Fu a hero.120 But when questioned on the issue, the
self-styled president of the FNI, Floribert Njabu, asserted that there had been no
civilians with the attacking combatants. He declared that the FNI had “professional
commanders who know about the international rules of war”121 implying they would not
have killed civilians.
There is no evidence to suggest that the FNI combatants distinguished between military
and civilian targets during the battle. According to local reports and witnesses the killing
was indiscriminate and did not distinguish women and children from combatants. While
it is not unusual for women and children to take part in looting activities in such military
operations in Ituri, they should have been respected.
Shortly after retaking Mongbwalu from the UPC, FNI combatants continued their
attacks against Hema civilians. Between July and September 2003, FNI combatants
attacked numerous Hema villages to the east of Mongbwalu including Nizi, Drodro,
Largo, Fataki and Bule. In the town of Fataki a witness arriving shortly after one such
attack by FNI combatants reported seeing the fresh corpses of victims dead in the
117 Human Rights Watch interviews, Beni and Mongbwalu, February 27 and May 2, 2004.
118 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 1, 2004.
119 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI officials, May 2, 2004.
120 May Day Celebrations, Mongbwalu Stadium, May 1, 2004 attended by a Human Rights Watch researcher.
121 Human Rights Watch interview, President Floribert Njabu of the FNI, Mongbwalu, May 7, 2004.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 42
streets with their arms tied, sticks in their rectums, and body parts such as ears cut off.122
In Drodro witnesses reported that FNI combatants attacked the hospital shooting Hema
patients in their beds.123 Local sources claimed scores of civilians had been killed in
these attacks and thousands of others were forced to flee. A stark warning was left
behind by the attackers etched on the wall of a building in Largo, “Don’t joke with the
Lendu.”124
A young Hema victim
in the hospital in
Drodro. Lendu
combatants tried to
kill her by chopping
her neck with
machetes. Many
women and children,
both Hema and
Lendu, have been
targeted on the basis
of their ethnicity.
© 2003 Marcus
Bleasdale.
122 Human Rights Watch interview, international journalist, London, January 12, 2005.
123 Ibid., See also Helen Vesperini, “DR Congo villagers reel from second massacre in four months,” Agence
France Presse, July 27, 2003.
124 Ibid.
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43 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
There was a substantial MONUC presence in Ituri at the time as well as European
Union peacekeeping troops as part of Operation Artemis.125 No U.N. officials reported
on the killings in Mongbwalu in June 2003. U.N. and E.U. troops were made aware of
the later killings in areas to the east of Mongbwalu by international journalists who had
visited the area and conducted fly-over operations in attempts to deter further violence.
The Artemis mandate granted by the U.N. security council did not allow for
peacekeeping actions outside of the town of Bunia.
A ‘Witch Hunt’ for Hema Women and other Opponents
Shortly after the UPC attack in June 2003, FNI combatants began accusing Hema
women living in and around Mongbwalu of spying for Hema armed groups. Hema
women still living in the area were few in number and most of them were married to
Lendu spouses and had been able to live safely within the Lendu community. But after
the “48 hour war” Lendu combatants arrested, tortured and killed these women and
some men, accusing them of ‘dirtying and betraying’ their society. Using charges of
witchcraft, Lendu combatants and spiritual leaders covered their crimes by claiming the
killings had been ordered by a spirit known as Godza. More moderate FNI officials
found it difficult to counter these claims and did nothing to stop them. A witness said,
After the June [2003] attack, the Lendu decided to kill all the Hema
women without exception. There were women I knew who were
burned. I had never seen that kind of thing before. Previously Hema
women who were married to outsiders were not harmed. Now they
wanted to hunt these women. The Lendu spirit, Godza, told them to kill
all the Hema women during one of the Lendu spiritual ceremonies.
One of the women they killed was Faustine Baza. I knew her well. She
was very responsible and lived in Pluto. The FNI came to get her and
took her to their camp. They killed her there. They killed other women
as well. I did not want to be a part of this so I left. I couldn’t stay while
they were exterminating these Hema women. They did it in Pluto and
Dego. They came from Dego with thirty-seven Hema women to kill. I
don’t want to return now - it’s too hard.126
125 Operation Artemis was the name of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force sent by the European Union
and authorised by the U.N. Security Council under Resolution 1484 on May 30, 2003 to contribute to the
security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia. It was a limited three month mission with a
geographical scope to cover only the town of Bunia.
126 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 27, 2004.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 44
Another witness said,
In July women were killed at Pluto and Dego. The strategy was to close
them in the house and burn it. More than fifty were killed. Pluto was
considered the place of execution for Hema people from Pluto and
other places too. They captured the women from the surrounding
countryside. They said it was to bring them to talk about peace. They
put ten women in a house, tied their hands, closed the doors, and
burned the house. This lasted about two weeks, with killing night and
day. After that, no more Hema women were left in [our area] and the
men were prevented from leaving with their children. They called the
women “Bachafu” – dirty. Sometimes the men would be taken to
prison. Suwa’s husband was asked to pay $300. They told him they
killed his wife, and he had to pay thirty grams of gold ($300) to clean the
knife they had killed her with.127
Many people were aware of the killings and bodies were often seen in the towns. A
witness reported seeing six bodies of women at the Club, a well-known building in
Mongbwalu, in mid-2003. He said many other passers-by also saw the nude and
brutalized bodies and that Lendu combatants were trying to recruit people to help burn
them.128 A community leader in an outlying village expressed his frustration about the
continuation of the practice, saying he had been interrogated more than ten times by
Lendu combatants as to the whereabouts of Hema women. He said to a Human Rights
Watch researcher, “I want to know what Kinshasa is going to do to help us. Are they
going to let the FNI stay here? The population is really suffering.”129
The operation against Hema women extended to men and other tribes as well and
continued at least until April 2004, killing some seventy persons in Pluto, Dego,
Mongbwalu, Saio, Baru, Mbau and Kobu and possibly in other locations in the
Mongbwalu area. By this point, the allegation of witchcraft became a common
accusation, often resulting in death after a ‘judging ceremony’ by local spiritual leaders.
Carried out in secret these judging ceremonies used different methods to determine a
person’s guilt or innocence. One civilian accused of being Hema described to a Human
Rights Watch researcher the ceremony he and others were forced to undergo after being
caught by Lendu combatants in 2003:
127 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 27, 2004.
128 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004.
129 Human Rights Watch interview, village outside Mongbwalu, May 6, 2004.
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45 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
A local fetisher [spiritual leader] came to the place I was being held. He
had two eggs with him. I was tied up and very scared. He rolled the
eggs on the ground at my feet. I was told if the eggs rolled away from
me then I would be considered innocent. But if the eggs rolled back
towards me than I was considered to be a Hema and I would be guilty.
I was lucky, the eggs rolled away from me. Another person, Jean, who I
was with, was not so lucky. The eggs rolled the wrong way and he was
told to run. As he ran the Lendu shot their arrows at him. He fell. They
cut him to pieces with their machetes in front of my eyes. Then they ate
him. I was horrified.130
In the Mongbwalu area the killings continued throughout 2003 and into 2004. A witness
described to a Human Rights Watch researcher the ongoing killings:
[After the June war] they said they did not want the Hema to return.
Those who stayed were killed. They killed them in Saio and Baru. They
would just take them away. A man called Mateso, Bandelai Gaston, a
Nyali, and his brother Augustin were killed because they were accused
of being witches. There were also women who were killed. Celine, an
Alur, was killed for witchcraft. Gabriel, a Kakwa, and his wife were also
killed. They were accused of protecting Hema people.131
Some community leaders raised concerns about the ‘Godza ceremonies’ with FNI leader
Njabu, in July 2003. At the time he seems to have done nothing to stop the killings, but
according to local residents, the number decreased after he moved to Mongbwalu in
February 2004, whether simply as a coincidence or as the result of his presence is
unclear.132
While some FNI authorities may have been against such killings, and perhaps took steps
to minimize them, at the time of writing no one has been held responsible for them.
Human Rights Watch is not aware of any investigation carried out by FNI
representatives into these killings.
130 Human Rights Watch interview, Arua, Uganda, February 2003.
131 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
132 Human Rights Watch interviews, Mongbwalu, May 2 and May 4, 2004.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 46
Murder of two MONUC Observers
On May 12, 2003, shortly after Ugandan troops had left Mongbwalu to the FNI and the
FAPC, FNI combatants deliberately killed two unarmed U.N. military observers, Major
Safwat Oran of Jordan and Captain Siddon Davis Banda of Malawi. Rumors of an
impending Hema attack—which would actually happen with the “48 hour war” a month
later—caused panic among town residents, about one hundred of whom sought refuge
at the residence of the MONUC observers. The observers, apparently concerned
themselves, arranged to be evacuated. When the U.N. helicopter arrived at a nearby
airstrip, FNI combatants refused to allow the observers to pass. Led by FNI
Commander Issa, the combatants took them to FAPC Commander Sey at his
headquarters at the “apartments.” “The combatants were chanting that Sey should not
let them leave,” said one witness.133
Shortly after, the combatants led the observers away again, apparently because Sey
declined to take them under his protection, and killed them a short distance from the
“apartments.” A witness who passed by later that afternoon said,
I found the bodies on the road leading down from the apartments.
They had both been shot. One was shot in the head and the other in
the stomach. I found the military of the FAPC around the bodies.134
Local residents transported the bodies to the FAPC headquarters and placed them in a
nearby empty house. Sey and his combatants fled from Mongbwalu that evening,
apparently seeking to distance themselves from the crime.135 Local residents later buried
the two bodies in a shallow grave in Mongbwalu.136
According to several Mongbwalu residents, FNI Commander Issa was responsible for
the killings. Witnesses reported that FNI combatants took possession of the observers’
U.N. cars and used them until they were recovered by the U.N.137
During discussions with a Human Rights Watch researcher, the FNI’s leader Njabu said,
“We did not investigate the killings. It is not our affair. Our military were at Saio at the
133 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
134 Ibid.
135 Human Rights Watch interview Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
136 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
137 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, and Mongbwalu, February 19 and May 4, 2004.
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47 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
time, seven kilometers away. Commander Jérôme’s combatants were at the apartments.
You should ask Commander Sey what happened.”138 But in a second interview days
later he admitted that Commander Issa might also have been present and he indicated
that an investigation was ongoing.139 More than one year later, FNI authorities had not
yet announced any results of an investigation. According to one unconfirmed local
report, FNI Commander Kung Fu did carry out an investigation and, presumably as a
result, Commander Issa fled and was reportedly later killed.140
Threat Against Human Rights Defenders and Others Reporting Abuses
Some FNI combatants tried to keep local people from being in touch with MONUC or
other outside agencies, apparently for fear that they would pass on information about
FNI abuses.
Important FNI commanders threatened human rights activists from the organization
Justice Plus after they had traveled to Europe and spoken about the situation in Ituri.141
Other FNI leaders reportedly planned to look into activities of the organization and
threatened that its staff would be considered enemies if they were found to have had
contacts with the Rwandans and the Hema.142
FNI combatants acted more directly and immediately against local residents known to
have spoken with MONUC staff during their occasional visits to Mongbwalu in late
2003.143 One person so abused said,
I was taken by nine [Lendu] combatants in uniform. They came to my
house and shouted, “Get up! What did you say to MONUC?” They
threatened me with their spears. They took me to the apartments and I
was interrogated by [a Lendu commander]. He asked me what I had said
to MONUC. That is all he wanted to know. He threatened me. They
hit me on the face. I said I had told MONUC nothing. They said they
138 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI President Floribert Njabu, May 2, 2004.
139 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI President Floribert Njabu, May 7, 2004.
140 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
141 Human Rights Watch interview, Justice Plus, Bunia, February 24, 2004.
142 Human Rights Watch interview, Justice Plus, Bunia, February 24, 2004.
143 After the killing of the two MONUC observers, no other MONUC staff were posted to Mongbwalu until April
2005.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 48
would put me in prison. They took $100 from me but a commander
who knew me saved me and they let me go.144
The same person was arrested a second time and severely beaten with bats and ropes.
He was kept for seven days and regularly beaten.145
Witnesses reported that civilians were threatened for having applauded visits of
MONUC staff.146 After one such mission in November 2003, some twelve civilians
were beaten and arrested, and at least one, a man named Choms, was summarily
executed. A witness told a Human Rights Watch researcher that Mr. Choms had
applauded the arrival of a U.N. plane, saying he thought this meant peace was coming.
Local police reported this to the FNI and two combatants of the force arrested Mr.
Choms and another person and took them to the police station. A witness who went to
the police station the next day to check on Mr. Choms said,
The other prisoners told me he had been interrogated and beaten and
that this was followed by a shot. . . . I forced my way into the room and
the body was still there. He had no shirt on and there was a bullet in his
chest. He had marks on his back from being whipped. They then
questioned me and forced me to leave. They wouldn’t give us the body
for burial.147
Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Forced Labor
FNI combatants imposed a number of “taxes,” collected in an arbitrary and irregular
way, and organized forced community labour known as “salongo”. FNI representatives
resorted to arbitrary arrests, beatings, and other forms of cruel and degrading treatment
to obtain the maximum possible payment and service from civilians. According to local
residents, these practices worsened considerably after the departure of Ugandan
troops.148
144 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
145 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
146 Ibid.
147 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
148 Human Rights Watch interview, local residents, Mongbwalu, May 3 and 4, 2004.
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49 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
Residents were required to pay a “war tax” that varied in amount and in the frequency
with which it was due.149 Traders at the market were also subject to confusing and
irregular “tax” demands. One businessman said,
There are about five or six different taxes. They range from $2 to $20.
Everyone has to pay. You pay when they come and sometimes they
come back again after just a few days. It is very irregular. If you don’t
pay you are beaten or taken to prison. . . . Both military of the FNI and
civilians do this.150
Human Rights Watch researchers documented similar abusive cases throughout the
Mongbwalu area, Kilo, Rethy and Kpandruma. “The people can say or do nothing,” said
one witness. “We just do what the FNI say.”151
A young trader arrested on February 5, 2004 by the FNI for non-payment of tax was
beaten and taken to the Scirie-Abelcoz military camp. He said,
There I spent two days in. . . a hole in the ground covered by sticks.
They took me out of the hole to beat me. They tied me over a log and
then they took turns hitting me with sticks – on my head, my back, my
legs. They said they were going to kill me.. . .There was a woman with
me in the underground prison. They hit her also. They tried to force me
to have sex with her but I couldn’t. She was called Bagbedu.
After two days I was taken to Mongbwalu. They made me carry the
woman and forced me to sing songs as I was carrying her. I was
escorted by three FNI combatants and one kadogo [child soldier]. On
the road, we met other soldiers who forced me to drop the woman and
beat me more. In Mongbwalu the soldiers beat me again with sticks.
They took me to a prison in a house. They also put the woman in the
prison but she died four days later. I spent five days there. Every day
they beat me.152
149 Ibid.
150 Human Rights Watch interview, Ariwara, March 7, 2004.
151 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 20, 2004.
152 Ibid.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 50
After a week, his family paid $80 and Commander Maki of Camp Goli freed him.
FNI representatives showed a Human Rights Watch researcher a long list of taxes asked
of residents, including a “war tax” that they claimed was voluntary.153
The FNI used similar practices to enforce the salongo policy of community labour to fix
roads, collect firewood for the military, clean up the military camp, or even burn bodies
as described above. At times salongo was required for as much as two full days a week,
although by late 2004 it had been decreased to once a week for three hours. Participants
received a piece of paper showing they had done the required labour. Persons who could
not present such proof when asked by police or combatants were subject to beatings,
arrest, fines or even death. According to one witness, a young man named Lite who
failed to present the required proof when asked was smashed in the head with a gun by a
FNI combatant and died from the blow. The witness asked FNI authorities what justice
there would be for the family of Lite and, he said, “They responded that the family of
Lite could kill the man who had done this act, but the family would not.”154
Another man reported that he was rounded up with a group of about one hundred men
who had all refused to report for salongo labour some fifteen miles from their homes,
saying it was too far. They were forced to walk all night and then were imprisoned and
had to pay $5 for each elderly person, $10 for each young person, and $20 for each
businessman in order to be freed.155
A local administrative official admitted that in order to get laborers for salongo they
needed to “intimidate people to come, otherwise they would not.”156 A person
responsible for the salongo in Saio told a Human Rights Watch researcher that the local
chief would “deal with people who don’t work,” while a police commander added that
he “sanctioned those who refused to work.”157 He would not elaborate on what kind of
sanctions were involved.
153 Human Rights Watch interview, Jean Pierre Bikilisende Badombo, Chef de Cité and Sukpa Bidjamaro,
Deputy Chef de Cité, May 3, 2004.
154 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 23, 2004.
155 Human Rights Watch interview, Ariwara, March 7, 2004.
156 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
157 Human Rights Watch interview, Manu Ngabi, local authority and Gerard Kitabo, Police Commander, Saio,
May 5, 2004.
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51 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
Young gold trader arrested and tortured in Mongbwalu in February 2004 by Lendu FNI
combatants for being unable to pay a market tax. © 2004 Human Rights Watch
Control of the Gold Mines
Upon taking control of Mongbwalu on March 13, 2003, the FNI militia leaders, like the
UPC previously, moved immediately to begin profiting from gold mining. Artisanal
miners resumed digging, but had to pay FNI combatants fees to enter the mines, $1 per
person at some mines. Based on entrance records kept by FNI security guards at one
mine and seen by Human Rights Watch researchers, the FNI made $2,000 per month in
entrance fees at this one mine alone.158 Miners also had to deliver to FNI two to five
grams of gold per week, often as raw ore. From such ore FNI combatants were able to
158 Human Rights Watch visit to Adidi mine, May 3, 2004. Statistics from the entrance book kept by FNI security
officials at the entrance mine. Book clearly labeled as FNI.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 52
assess the density of the gold and thus to locate the most valuable veins. They could
then send in their own men to mine those areas.159 As one miner said,
The money that circulates in Mongbwalu is gold. Gold is the economy.
The Lendu take the gold from the diggers. They take the best gold areas
by force. Lots of people don’t want to go and dig for gold as they know
it will be taken from them.160
FNI combatants, some of them previously gold diggers, also mined gold themselves or
organized groups of people to dig for them. In Itendey, a gold area just to the south of
Mongbwalu, for example, FNI combatants forced young men to mine gold in a nearby
riverbed. A local community leader who had fled from the area told a Human Rights
Watch researcher,
The FNI combatants come every morning door-to-door. They split up
to find young people and they take about sixty of them to the Agula
River to find the gold. They [the young people] are guarded by the
military and are not paid. They are forced to work. If the authorities try
to intervene they are beaten. The chief has tried to stop this by
reasoning with them, but they don’t like this. They even force the
younger children to leave school to carry sand or transport goods.161
Miners worked in deplorable conditions, exposed to risk of accidents both in the mines
and when handling mercury to process the ore.
159 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 23, 2004.
160 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 25, 2004.
161 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 20, 2004.
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53 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
Entrance register kept by FNI security guards at Adidi gold mine (“Management of Adidi
mine for the financial management and daily report, Ndjabu-Simo, FNI-FR”). Each gold
miner paid US$1 to enter the mine and was forced to give a portion of the mined gold to
the guards when exiting. © 2004 Human Rights Watch
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 54
Box 2 - Conditions at the Mines
In May 2004 a Human Rights Watch researcher visited mines in Mongbwalu and Durba
where many miners and engineering experts spoke of the deteriorating safety conditions
at the mines. One former OKIMO engineer told Human Rights Watch about the lack
of air in parts of the underground mine where equipment that used to ensure oxygen
flows was no longer working. Miners recounted that some of their colleagues had died
of suffocation in parts of the mine, especially when fires were lit in attempts to soften
hard rock areas, a technique witnessed by Human Rights Watch researchers.162 Miners
also spoke of frequent rocks falls, flooding and other accidents. No safety equipment of
any kind was visible.
Miners worked individually or in small groups with rudimentary tools such as hammers
and chisels. They were generally in bare feet and carried candles or small flashlights to
light their way. In some underground mines, workers walked for kilometers through
chest-high water and narrow passages to get to galleries where they could work. Women
also worked in the mines often being used as porters.
Mining in open-pit mines, some as deep as 300 meters, is also precarious. Miners spoke
of frequent mud-slides and falls. Expert gold engineers lamented the anarchic mining
that was taking place with no regard for the safety of the miners themselves or for the
longer term damage being caused to the mining facilities.163
One miner said, “There are some areas which were boarded up by the Belgians many years ago. But
we just break down the boards and go in anyway. We use a hammer and a large iron bolt or chisel to
dig for the gold. The work is very hard and I could only work about six hours per day.” 164
Miners, if they are lucky, get about $10 per day. One miner said, “I can make between $5
and $20 per day if I am lucky and find a good gold vein. Otherwise I could work for 2 weeks just
looking for gold and make nothing.165
162 Human Rights Watch interview, former gold engineer, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004. Also Human Rights Watch
visit to Adidi and Makala mines, Mongbwalu, May 3, 2004.
163 Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO engineer, Durba, May 13, 2004.
164 Human Rights Watch interview, gold miner, Bunia, February 21, 2004.
165 Ibid.
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55 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
When asked why they worked in such dangerous conditions, one miner responded, “Tell
me what choice I have? This is the only way I can make any money. Its about my own survival and
that of my family.”166
The entire mining and refining process is done by hand. After the ore is mined, it is
pounded down into sand with the use of an iron bar. The sand is then mixed with water
and mercury, which attracts the gold particles and separates it from the rock dust. The
mixture of gold and mercury is then heated so the mercury evaporates and the gold
remains. Mercury, a dangerous substance, is readily available in the market areas.
Human Rights Watch witnessed numerous miners using mercury with no gloves or
masks, taking no safety precautions when handling the substance.
In addition to profiting directly from mining, FNI leaders sought to control the trade in
gold. According to gold traders, FNI control of the trade was still haphazard and
sometimes involved direct use of force. In May 2004, the FNI Commissioner of Mines
explained to a Human Rights Watch researcher that the FNI were well aware of the
significance of the gold market in Mongbwalu and that “they were looking for additional
ways to control the trade.”167 There are no reliable statistics on the amount of the gold
trade from Mongbwalu nor of the proceeds reaped by the FNI from it. Local traders
and other informed sources estimated that between 20 and 60 kilograms of gold left the
Mongbwalu area each month, a value of between $240,000 to $720,000 per month at the
time of writing. The majority of the gold is traded from Mongbwalu to Butembo in
North Kivu where Dr Kisoni Kambale is one of the main gold exporters (see below).
As one gold miner explained, “The profits enter into the pockets of the FNI,”168 both in
the sense of personal profit and in the sense of profit to the FNI. A former senior FNI
commander told a Human Rights Watch researcher that some of the gold proceeds were
used to buy weapons and ammunition to supplement weapons recuperated from the
battlefield.169 The leader of the FNI, Njabu, himself admitted to Human Rights Watch
researchers that his combatants mined gold and that he traded gold for weapons. He
calculated the proceeds he would make from the sale of five kilograms of gold to be
about $50,000, adding “This is not looting as I am Congolese.”170 A MONUC
166 Human Rights Watch interview, gold miner, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004
167 Human Rights Watch interview, Mr. Basiani, FNI Commissioner of Mines, May 5, 2004.
168 Human Rights Watch interview, gold miner, Bunia, February 23, 2004.
169 Human Rights Watch interview, former FNI commander, Bunia, February 21, 2004.
170 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI President Floribert Njabu, Kinshasa, October 7, 2003.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 56
investigation into weapons seized in Beni in July 2003 confirmed that the FNI used taxes
from the gold mines to buy weapons.171 Njabu admitted to a Human Rights Watch
researcher that he had purchased these weapons, adding, “I want them back or I will
fight to get them.”172
Artisanal miners transporting tubs of raw ore mixed with dirt out of an open-pit gold mine
in Durba. Mining in open-pit mines, some as deep as 300 meters, can be precarious with
frequent mud-slides and falls. © 2004 Marcus Bleasdale
171 U.N. internal report on the investigation into the plane seizure in Beni, July 25, 2003.
172 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI President Floribert Njabu, Kinshasa, October 7, 2003.
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57 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
The FNI armed group was also approached by multinational companies eager to gain
access to the significant gold reserves in the area. The FNI Commissioner of Mines
explained to Human Rights Watch that they had been approached by a number of
different companies but that officially AngloGold Ashanti had the concession in the
Mongbwalu area and that they were in contact with them (see below for further
information).173 The arrival of multinational companies into a volatile area where
conflict and competition for the control of natural resources are closely interlinked
creates further complexities and has the potential to create more violence. While
AngloGold Ashanti is the only mining company working in the Mongbwalu area, other
companies have signed contracts for work in gold mining areas further north in the town
of Durba.
173 Human Rights Watch interview, Mr. Basiani, FNI Commissioner of Mines, May 5, 2004.
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105 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
area. Many local traders in Durba confirmed that they worked for Mr. Oria.370 In an
interview with a Human Rights Watch researcher, Mr. Oria said that he traded gold,
explaining that he sold gold in Uganda for Congolese clients and then depositing the
proceeds into foreign bank accounts on their behalf.371
Mr. Oria’s business is not authorized by the state as a trading house and so cannot legally
export gold from the Congo nor is it licensed to operate in the foreign exchange
market.372 Mr. Oria’s relationship with Commander Jérôme facilitates his illegal trade.
Mr. Oria is protected by some of Commander Jérôme’s combatants, several of whom
have beaten, tortured, and even killed gold traders accused by Mr. Oria of having
cheated him (see above). Witnesses claimed Mr. Oria helped finance the FAPC
movement and regularly provided food and perhaps other supplies for FAPC
combatants.373 The U.N. group of experts investigating violations of the arms embargo
concluded that proceeds from customs and immigration, including those from the gold
trade, were channeled into the coffers of the FAPC and used to pay for its military
infrastructure. In one case, the group of experts obtained forty handwritten receipts
signed by FAPC commanders withdrawing cash from border proceeds for “military
emergencies” and “combat rations.”374 Several witnesses said that Mr. Oria and
Commander Jérôme were frequently seen together and that Mr. Oria on occasion stayed
in Angarakali, the FAPC military camp in Ariwara. 375
Congolese Gold Exported to Uganda
The gold traded from northeast Congo goes principally to one destination – Uganda.
Both Dr Kisoni and Mr. Oria sell their ‘tainted gold’ to Ugandan traders based in
Kampala, many of whom in turn sell gold to companies in Switzerland and other
destinations.376 Most of this gold is exported illegally from Congo: traders have no
export permits or exchange documents, are not authorized trading houses, do not keep
accounts at the Central Bank of Congo and do not pay relevant taxes and duties as
required under Congolese law.377 The Congolese population gain almost no benefit
370 Human Rights Watch interview with gold traders and business people in Durba, May 13, 2004.
371 Human Rights Watch interview, Omar Oria, Kampala, March 10, 2004.
372 Mining Code, Articles 120, 126 , 128.
373 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ariwara, March 6 and 7, and Aru March 7, 2004.
374 Ibid., Report of the Group of Experts on the U.N. Arms Embargo, January 25, 2005, para 109.
375 Human Rights Watch interviews Ariwara, March 6, 2004 and March 7, 2004.
376 While the primary destination is Switzerland, gold is also traded to Dubai, South Africa and other European
countries.
377 All these requirements are set out under the Mining Code of July 2002.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 106
from this trade; instead they suffer grave human rights abuses by groups seeking to
control the trade and the gold mines.
Gold traders conducting business. © 2004 Marcus Bleasdale
The gold is “legalized” in Uganda. Traders in Kampala do not require their Congolese
clients to present documents authorizing the export of gold, operating on an “ask no
questions” basis. They treat the gold as if it were a transit good, filling out customs
forms and other documents required to make its export legal from Uganda and
acceptable in the unregulated global market.378
In the 1990s most unlicensed exports of gold from Congo went to Burundi, but civil war
in Burundi and a regional trade embargo declared in 1997 made Burundi less attractive
as a transit point. After a brief shift through Kenya, the trade moved to Kampala where
the climate was more favorable. In 1993 the Ugandan Central Bank eased restrictions
on gold sales and decided not to tax gold exports.379 This change followed five years
later by the establishment of Ugandan army control over rich gold mining areas of
378 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Machanga Ltd
and A. P. Bhimji Ltd, Kampala, July 7 and 8, 2004.
379 U.S. Geological Survey, “The Mineral Industry of Uganda”, 1997.
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107 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
northeastern Congo resulted in a dramatic increase in gold exports from Uganda (see
chart below).
Gold Export Figures from Uganda
According to official statistics, Uganda exported nearly $60 million in gold in 2002, a
peak year, and about $46 million in 2003. But in 2003 specialists in the trade valued it
still at $60 million.380 According to the Central Bank of Uganda, data from these
industry experts may be more accurate than that compiled from government customs
data.381 Whether using industry or official statistics the increase in gold exports has been
remarkable. Gold is currently the third top Ugandan export, after coffee and fish.382 In
2001 gold accounted for 84 percent of the total value of all minerals exported from
Uganda; in 2002 it was 99 percent.383
Most of the gold exported from Uganda comes from Congo. Domestic production in
Uganda is negligible, despite encouragement from the World Bank and new mining
regulations introduced in 2001. Statistics from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral
Development and official export figures shows that Ugandan gold production accounts
for less than 1 percent of the official gold exports.384 In the annual report of the Ministry
of Energy and Mineral Development, discrepancies between gold production and gold
exports are striking. In 2002, for example, domestic gold production was valued at
$24,817 while gold exports for the same year were listed as just under $60 million.385
When Human Rights Watch researchers asked Ministry representatives about this
discrepancy, they refused to comment.386
Import statistics fail to show the real scale of the gold trade. Officially, gold brought into
Uganda should be declared upon entry as an import if expected to stay in the country, or
as a transit good if intended for another final destination. But official Ugandan import
statistics show a tiny amount of gold imported to the country and show no statistics for
380 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Machanga Ltd
and A. P. Bhimji Ltd, Kampala, July 7 and 8, 2004.
381 E-mail correspondence with the Central Bank of Uganda, July 12, 2004.
382 Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, Value of Exports by Commodity 1998 – 2003.
383 Annual Report 2002, Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development available at
www.energyandminerals.go.ug (retrieved at February 2005).
384 Based on statistics on production from the Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and official
export figures from the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics from 1998 to 2003.
385 Annual Report 2002, Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral.
386 Human Rights Watch interview, Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development Representative, July
2004.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 108
transit goods. The unofficial trade in gold is likely facilitated by the lax enforcement of
regulations at the Uganda-Congo border posts. According to a study conducted in 2004
by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), over 50 percent of all imports and exports
went unrecorded at six border posts.387 In cases where people wanted to hide precious
minerals, the study estimated the entry of such goods went completely unrecorded. The
U.N. group of experts monitoring the arms embargo to eastern DRC observed that at
the northern border post of Vurra, between Aru (DRC) and Arua (Uganda), there was
limited or no customs and immigration inspection, especially in the case of FAPC
combatants who were allowed to cross freely.388
Since Ugandan gold production figures are less than 1 percent of official exports, most
gold being exported must have entered Uganda from elsewhere. Official statistics fail to
record the entry of significant amounts of gold hence most of this trade must be illegal
and unrecorded. In 2004 the discrepancy between gold produced in the country and
that exported was just over $45 million per year, as shown by the official figures below.
Table 1:
Official Ugandan Gold Import, Export and Production, Figures in US$
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gold Exports 18,600,000 38,360,000 55,730,000 50,350,000 59,900,000 45,760,000 45,590,000
Gold Imports 0 2,000 3,076,000 890,000 0 2,000 n/a
Local Gold Production n/a 40,307 477,000 1,412 24,817 23,000 21,000
Discrepancy 18,600,000 38,317,693 52,177,000 49,458,588 59,875,183 45,735,000 45,569,000
Note: Statistics for 2004 are estimates
Source: Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and Central Bank of Uganda.
Gold Traders in Kampala
Gold industry experts in Kampala acknowledged and readily explained the discrepancy
between domestic production of gold and amount of its export, as shown by official
statistics. In interviews with Human Rights Watch researchers, gold traders confirmed
387 Human Rights Watch interview, Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, Trade Representative, Entebbe, July 2004.
388 Ibid., Report of the Group of Experts on the U.N. Arms Embargo, January 25, 2005, para 98.
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109 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
that most of the gold they exported came from Congo. They estimated the trade to be
worth about $60 million per year.389 There are three main gold export businesses in
Kampala. The largest two, Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd and Machanga Ltd, control
an estimated 70 percent of the export trade from Uganda. Since profit margins on each
trade are relatively small, these traders make profits by trading in high volume and by
offering good quality gold, for which they need a reliable source of supply.
Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd. is the largest gold exporter in Uganda. In an interview
with Human Rights Watch researchers, its representatives said that nearly 90 percent of
their gold came from Ituri and they confirmed that Dr Kisoni Kambale from Butembo
was “one of their customers.”390 Company representatives explained they paid their
customers cash for the gold or transferred funds into the customer’s bank accounts held
either locally or abroad. Like Dr. Kisoni, they had their own refinery on the premises, to
process any gold that arrived as ore before exporting it to Switzerland and South Africa.
Representatives of the company stated they declared the gold upon export, ensuring that
a customs form and airway bill accompanied each shipment.391
Representatives of Machanga Ltd, the second largest gold exporter, also told Human
Rights Watch researchers that the gold they traded came from Congo and they
confirmed that one of their customers was Mr. Omar Oria.392 They further explained
they advanced cash for the purchase of gold, sometimes as much as 30 percent of the
anticipated purchase price, a system used also by Mr. Oria in Ariwara. Machanga
representatives stated they exported all their gold to Metalor Technologies SA, a gold
refining company in Switzerland.393 Other traders stated they also sold gold to
Switzerland as well as to other locations such as South Africa and Dubai.
Trading companies in Kampala do not operate illegally but rather benefit from the loose
regulation of the gold trade. Not required to request import documentation or to ask the
origin of the gold, they buy smuggled Congolese gold as if it had entered Uganda legally
and export it as a legal commodity. An essential bridge to the global economy, they
benefit from the risks taken by Congolese dealers like Dr. Kisoni and Mr. Oria and from
their relationships with local armed groups.
389 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Machanga Ltd
and A. P. Bhimji Ltd, Kampala, July 7 and 8, 2004.
390 Human Rights Watch interview, Kanal Chune, Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Kampala, July 7, 2004.
391 Ibid.
392 Human Rights Watch interview, Jigendra Jitu, Machanga Ltd, Kampala, July 8, 2004.
393 Ibid.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 110
They may however be breaching a U.N. arms embargo. The U.N. group of experts
concluded that firms and individuals entering into financial relationships with Ituri
armed groups may be in violation of the U.N. arms embargo on eastern DRC.394
Encouragement of the Gold Trade by the Ugandan Government
President Museveni has sought to expand the weak economic base in Uganda by
increasing exports. Coffee, the most important export commodity in the past, provided
some 40 percent of overall export earnings. But a drop in world price for coffee hit the
Ugandan economy hard, as did increased international oil prices. Continuing poor
revenue return and corruption have further weakened the economy. The impact of
joining the East African Community customs union, expected to be beneficial in the
long run, may be negative at first.395 Increase in the export of gold, one of the fastest
growing non-traditional export sectors, offers some hope in this otherwise bleak picture.
The government believes that trade in minerals has the potential to rival coffee as a
source of foreign exchange for Uganda. In January 2004 the Ugandan government
signed a $25 million loan agreement with the World Bank to finance exploration of the
country’s mineral deposits.396 Domestic mineral production may at some point
substitute for some of the gold imported from Congo, but such a development is a long
time in the future.
Since 1999 the Ugandan government has rewarded Ugandan gold exporters for their
efforts to promote the trade. In 2002 Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd. received the
President’s Export Award for best performance in the gold trade sector and Machanga
Ltd. placed second in the competition. Hon. Omwony Ojok, the Minister of State in the
office of the President responsible for Economic Monitoring, represented the President
at the gala awards ceremony, attended also by five other government ministers.397 The
companies were honored for encouraging the export trade and for fulfilling social
responsibilities as part of their business. It is not clear how carefully the selection
committee examined their business relationships with Congolese traders, themselves
linked to armed groups responsible for human rights abuses in Congo.
394 Ibid., Report of the Group of Experts on the U.N. Arms Embargo, January 25, 2005, pages 30-33.
395 Human Rights Watch interview, World Bank economist, Kampala, July 2004 and diplomatic economic
advisors, Kampala, July 2004.
396 Steven Odeu, “Uganda gets funds to explore minerals,” New Vision, January 22, 2004.
397 Ugandan Export Promotion Board, Export Bulletin, News Highlights: Presidents’ Export Aware (PEA) 2002,
Edition 3, Jan-March 2004. Also President Export Award 2002, Evening Programme, December 5, 2003.
Ugandan Commercial Impex Ltd also won the Gold Award in 1998 and 1999.
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111 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
The Ugandan government has proposed tighter controls on gold imports, perhaps in an
effort to increase its own revenues. Among the regulations being discussed is one that
requires permits for all precious metals imported into Uganda and that imposes an
import tax of .5 percent of the purchase price.398 These regulations have not yet been
accepted as law. Stricter regulation of the gold trade in Uganda and other transit
countries would assist in stamping out the illegal smuggling and in cutting the link
between the gold traders and armed groups who commit human rights abuses. The
proposals by the Ugandan government would increase Ugandan revenue and may help
somewhat in recording the gold trade coming from the DRC but without requiring
further checks such as exit certificates, it is unlikely to curb the trade by illegal smugglers.
Buyers of Tainted Gold
According to the U.N. panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of Congolese
resources, companies who buy gold from Uganda may also be contributing indirectly to
human rights abuses in the Congo. After mapping the interconnections between
Congolese parties to the conflict, foreign governments, and companies, the panel
maintained that some business activities, directly or indirectly, deliberately or through
negligence, contributed to the prolongation of the conflict and related human rights
abuses.399 Gold industry experts and companies who trade in gold must, or should be,
aware that most of the gold traded from Uganda comes from a conflict zone in the
Congo and that it was likely to have been exported illegally.
Switzerland: Unaccounted Gold?
According to industry experts in Uganda, over 70 percent of the gold exported from
Uganda is destined for Switzerland. Switzerland is one of Uganda’s main trading
partners. According to Ugandan trade statistics, exports to Switzerland jumped from
$29 million in the year 1999 to $99 million in the year 2000, a record high for trade from
Uganda to Switzerland. Although trade decreased to $70.6 million and then to $69
million in the following two years, it remained considerably higher than in the years
before war began in Congo. According to Ugandan trade figures in 2002, Switzerland
was Uganda largest single trading partner receiving over $69 million worth of goods,
with Kenya its second largest trading partner receiving goods valued at $61.5 million.400
398 Ugandan Government Draft Mining Regulations 2004, Subsection 3, Section 117.
399 Ibid., U.N. Panel of Experts reports, April 12, 2001 (S/2001/357) para 215, and October 16, 2002
(S/2002/1146) paras 174 and 175.
400 Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, “Statistical Abstract 2003”, Exports by Region and Country of Destination
1998 – 2002.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 112
It is likely that a large percentage of the trade from Uganda to Switzerland is gold.
According to official Swiss information, imports from Uganda, excluding gold,
amounted to just over $11 million in both 2002 and 2003; most of this trade was in
coffee.401 Swiss imports of gold are classified as “sensitive data.” The Swiss government
provides only the total amount of gold it imports and exports each year, without
producing a breakdown of the country of origin. But Swiss government officials
estimated imports from Uganda, to have been approximately $13 million in 2003 (see
table below).402
Table 2:
Swiss Import and Ugandan Export Statistics:
Some Glaring Discrepancies
Year 2001 2002 2003
Swiss imports from Uganda excluding gold $6,965,000 $11,405,898 $11,637,025
Swiss gold imports from Uganda (unofficial number) $14,315,187 $1,684,140 $12,631,047
TOTAL Swiss imports from Uganda according to
Swiss import statistics (gold plus other imports) $21,280,187 $13,090,037 $24,268,072
TOTAL exports from Uganda to Switzerland
according to Ugandan export statistics $99,104,000 $70,674,000 $69,011,000
Discrepancy $77,823,813 $57,583,963 $44,742,928
Source: Administration Federale des Douanes (AFD), Commerce Exterieur de la Suisse; and
Ugandan Bureau of Statistics. Unofficial figures come from Swiss federal government sources.
A comparison of Ugandan export and Swiss import statistics in 2001, 2002 and 2003
shows some glaring discrepancies. In 2003 goods from Uganda worth over $44 million
were not registered at the point of entry into Switzerland and were unaccounted for; in
2001 the figure was $77 million. When questioned about the discrepancies, Swiss
customs agents told Human Rights Watch researchers that it was possible the goods had
entered Swiss free port zones; areas normally based around airports which effectively
401 Administration Fédérale des Douanes (AFD), Commerce Extérieur de la Suisse, “Statistiques Selon Les
Pays et Marchandises", 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003.
402 Human Rights Watch interview, Swiss official, Berne, January 26, 2005.
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113 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
operate outside of Swiss government control.403 Goods entering such zones are not
registered or taxed, are not reflected in Swiss import statistics and are sent to other
locations without export duties. As the most valuable commodity imported from
Uganda, gold could form a substantial part of the Ugandan goods entering the free port
zones. According to one Swiss trade official, Swiss banks are possible candidates who
may be buying gold through free port zones.404 While free port zones are part of Swiss
territory, they operate outside of Swiss customs control. A Swiss customs official told
Human Rights Watch researchers, “The control of free ports is beyond us.”405
Free ports are not transparent and may hide illegal activities. Recognizing these risks,
the Swiss government in December 2003 submitted a new Customs Act to parliament to
tighten control at free ports. At the time of writing the new act was still under
discussion with no consensus on which goods should be more closely monitored by
customs agents. But a Swiss customs official told Human Rights Watch researchers that
gold was unlikely to be subject to stricter controls under the new law.406 Were
Switzerland to impose stricter controls on gold transiting through free ports, it could
facilitate efforts to stop the trade in tainted gold from Congo to other parts of the world.
Metalor Technologies SA
While a large part of the gold traded from northeastern Congo via Uganda is difficult to
trace, it is clear that an estimated $13 million worth of gold entered Swiss territory from
Uganda in 2003 and was officially registered as an import.407 According to research
done by Human Rights Watch, some of this gold imported into Switzerland is bought by
Metalor Technologies SA based in Neuchâtel, Switzerland, one of the oldest
manufacturers of products for the international gold market. Metalor ranks among the
leading refiners in the world of gold and other precious metals. In 2003 the company’s
net sales were $225 million.408
403 Human Rights Watch interviews, Swiss customs agents, Berne, January 26, 2005. Free ports also exist in
other countries, but control of free ports in Switzerland is considered weaker than that in other European
countries, making it attractive for many traders.
404 Human Rights Watch interview, Swiss trade official, Berne, January 26, 2005. A statement supported by a
Ugandan based trader who stated he sold gold to Swiss banks, Human Rights Watch interview with
representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, July 7, 2004.
405 Human Rights Watch interview, Swiss customs agent, Berne, January 26, 2005.
406 Ibid.
407 Human Rights Watch interview, Swiss industry expert, Berne, January 26, 2005.
408 “Annual Report 2003”, Metalor Technologies International SA.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 114
A representative of the Ugandan-based gold exporting agency Machanga Ltd., told
Human Rights Watch researchers that his company exported all its gold to Metalor.409
Representatives of Machanga also confirmed to Human Rights Watch representatives
that they bought gold from Mr. Omar Oria, 410 a close business associate of Commander
Jérôme, based in northeastern Congo. Mr. Oria directly participated in human rights
abuses including cases of torture and arbitrary detention carried out by Commander
Jérôme and his FAPC armed group as documented by Human Rights Watch (see
above). A United Nations group of experts monitoring the arms embargo on eastern
DRC also reported that Metalor was a buyer of gold from Machanga.411 Thus Metalor
through its purchases of gold from Machanga may be indirectly involved in a trade that
supports an armed group responsible for serious human rights abuses.
In a December 17, 2004 letter responding to an inquiry from Human Rights Watch,
Metalor declined to say whether Machanga was a supplier of gold to the company
without first seeking Machanga’s approval, stating that “disclosing information on our
suppliers and certain transactions would be contrary to confidentiality and secrecy
obligations imposed on us.”412 It is not clear from this or subsequent correspondence if
the company attempted to contact Machanga to obtain such permission.413 In a meeting
with Human Rights Watch on April 21, 2005, a representative from Metalor confirmed
the company bought gold from suppliers in Uganda, though the company insisted on
retaining confidentiality as to the identity of those suppliers.414
In its meeting with Human Rights Watch and in its letters of December 17, 2004 and
April 14, 2005, Metalor stated it did not accept goods originating from criminal activity,
from criminal or terrorist groups or goods used to finance criminal activities. It claimed
to comply with all measures required by a Swiss federal law on money-laundering and
the Swiss precious metals control act, including requiring assurances from its suppliers
that they owned the goods, that such goods had been acquired legally and that all
necessary measures had been taken to prohibit the trade of goods from unlawful
409 Human Rights Watch interview, Jigendra Jitu, Machanga Ltd, Kampala, July 8, 2004
410 Human Rights Watch interview, Jigendra Jitu, Machanga Ltd, Kampala, July 8, 2004.
411 Ibid., Report of the Group of Experts on the U.N. Arms Embargo, January 25, 2005, p. 32.
412 Dr. Scott Morrison, Chief Executive Officer, Metalor Technologies to Anneke Van Woudenberg, Human
Rights Watch, December 17, 2004. Document on file at Human Rights Watch.
413 Ibid., Also Letter from Dr. Scott Morrison, Chief Executive Officer, Metalor Technologies to Anneke Van
Woudenberg, Human Rights Watch, April 14, 2005. Also e-mail from Morrison to Van Woudenberg, February
1, 2004. Documents on file at Human Rights Watch.
414 Human Rights Watch interview, Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance, Metalor
Technologies SA, Neuchâtel (Switzerland), April 21, 2005.
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115 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
origin.415 In its meeting with Human Rights Watch, the company representative
explained that Metalor’s client managers regularly visited their suppliers, including any in
Uganda, to conduct due diligence checks, though she was unclear as to when the last
visit had taken place to the company’s suppliers in Uganda.416
In an email communication on February 1, 2005, Metalor claimed, “Due diligence [was]
carried out by all reasonable and lawful available means (such as governmental bodies,
official institutions, diplomatic representations, financial information providers, registries
of commerce, etc.).”417 In its April 2005 meeting with Human Rights Watch, a Metalor
representative stated that as part of these checks the company had sought information
from authorities such as the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO).418
When questioned about the results of these checks, the Metalor representative explained
that such contacts were not always formal or documented but that the company had
received no “negative responses” in relation to the trade of gold from Uganda.419
Despite these assurances, questions remain about the thoroughness of Metalor’s due
diligence checks. Since Uganda’s domestic gold production is negligible and since
Uganda does not import gold from other countries, gold exported from Uganda to
Metalor is almost certainly mined in northeastern Congo. When presented with publicly
available gold export and mining production statistics from official Ugandan sources, the
Metalor representative expressed surprise at the obvious discrepancy.420 The
representative stated Metalor had never seen such statistics and was unaware of any
discrepancy, even though the company admitted to having met on more than one
occasion with the Ugandan mining commissioner, 421 an individual likely to have been
well aware that the vast majority of gold exported from Uganda originated from
northeastern Congo as reflected by the statistics published in department’s annual
report.422 Metalor stated the information presented by Human Rights Watch during the
meeting of April 2005 would be fed into its due diligence process.
415 Ibid., Morrison to Van Woudenberg, December 17, 2004 and April 14, 2005. Documents on file at Human
Rights Watch. Also Human Rights Watch interview, Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance,
Metalor Technologies SA, Neuchâtel, Switzerland, April 21, 2005.
416 Human Rights Watch interview with Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance, Metalor
Technologies SA, Neuchâtel, April 21, 2005. Also Ibid., Metalor Annual Report 2003.
417 Ibid., Morrison to Van Woudenberg, e-mail correspondence, February 1, 2005. Document on file at Human
Rights Watch.
418 Ibid., Morrison to Van Woudenberg, April 14, 2005.
419 Human Rights Watch interview with Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance, Metalor
Technologies SA, Neuchâtel, April 21, 2005.
420 Ibid.
421 Ibid.
422 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, Government of Uganda, Annual Report, 2002.
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THE CURSE OF GOLD 116
The Metalor representative stated to Human Rights Watch that the company “believed
the gold [it bought] was of legal origin.”423 Yet the gold traders in Kampala from whom
Metalor acquired its gold were clear when interviewed by Human Rights Watch
researchers that the gold they bought originated from Congo and that they did not
request documentation from their Congolese suppliers such as import and export
certificates.424 Between 2001 and 2004 numerous reports were published, including
ones in Swiss newspapers, about the trade in natural resources from the Congo
describing the horrific human rights abuses that the revenue helped to finance.425 In its
April 2005 meeting with Human Rights Watch, the representative from Metalor stated
the company was unaware of such information and had not heard about a series of
public U.N. panel of experts reports published between April 2001 and October 2003
describing in detail how the exploitation of Congo’s resources had funded armed groups
in eastern Congo and how the trade in gold from Congo was being funneled through
Uganda.426 In its meeting with Human Rights Watch, the Metalor representative
explained that on occasion the company carried out additional checks on its suppliers in
circumstances when it noticed ‘red flags’ – information from public or private sources
raising questions about a specific country of origin or the ethics of a supplier.427 Until
recently when Metalor was mentioned in a report by a U.N. group of experts monitoring
the arms embargo in eastern DRC, it appears no red flags were raised in relation to the
gold Metalor bought from its suppliers in Uganda. Metalor representatives did inform
Human Rights Watch that they were carrying out further checks with their suppliers in
light of the U.N. report.428
423 Ibid.
424 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Machanga Ltd
and A. P. Bhimji Ltd, Kampala, July 7 and 8, 2004.
425 There were numerous public reports about the situation in Ituri and the human rights abuses of armed
groups. For reports published in Swiss newspapers see, for example, “Or: la descente aux enfers,” L’Hebdo,
July 29, 1999; David Haeberli, “Justice : La Suisse bloque 13 millions de dollars issus d’un trafic de minerai
congolais”, Le Temps, November 30, 2002; Alexis Masciarelli, “Après le départ de l’armée ougandaise, les
massacres interethniques reprennent à Bunia,” Le Temps, May 12, 2003 ; “Les vraies causes des guerres
civiles: Misère ethnique? Non, économique”, L’Hebdo, June 19, 2003; “La CPI s’intéressera tout d’abord au
Congo. Deux priorités pour le procureur de la CPI : L’Ituri et le business de la guerre”, La Tribune de Genève,
July 17, 2003. See also Ibid., Reports from Human Rights Watch, March 2001, October 2002 and July 2003;
Amnesty International, October 2003; International Crisis Group, June 2003; U.N. Security Council, July 2004
amongst others.
426 See reports from the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 12, 2001 (S/2001/357), May 22, 2002 (S/2002/565), October
16, 2002 (S/2002/1146), October 23, 2003 (S/2003/1027) plus other addendums.
427 Ibid., Human Rights Watch interview with Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance, Metalor
Technologies SA, Neuchâtel, April 21, 2005.
428 Ibid.
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117 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
Metalor knew, or should have known, that gold bought from its suppliers in Uganda
came from a conflict zone in northeastern DRC where human rights were abused on a
systematic basis. Under international business norms such as the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, to which Switzerland is a party, companies are obliged to
encourage suppliers to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible with the
OECD Guidelines, including provisions on human rights.429 The U.N. Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, state that companies “within their respective spheres of
activity and influence,”430 including through their suppliers, have an obligation to
promote and ensure respect for human rights. Metalor should have considered whether
its own role in buying gold resources from its suppliers in Uganda was compatible with
ensuring respect for human rights and it should have actively checked its supply chain to
verify that acceptable ethical standards were maintained. In its own annual report, the
company reaffirmed its commitment to do so.431
Armed groups in Ituri would face serious difficulties in supporting their military
operations if they were unable to turn gold into funds to buy arms and other necessities.
The chain of Congolese middlemen, Ugandan traders and multinational corporations
together generate the revenue stream from which armed groups reap substantial financial
benefits. Through any purchases of gold made from this network, Metalor Technologies
may have contributed indirectly to the revenue stream that supports armed groups in
Ituri who carry out widespread human rights abuses. Any failure to terminate
relationships with suppliers in Uganda dealing with armed group leaders in Congo may
indirectly implicate Metalor in the human rights abuses these groups were committing.
429 Ibid., OECD Guidelines Paragraph II.10 and General Policies, paragraphs 1 and 2. A recent study in the
OECD looked specifically at the issue of trade from conflict zones. See OECD Working Party of the Investment
Committee, “Conducting Business with Integrity in Weak Governance Zones: Issues for Discussion and a Case
Study of the DRC,” November 26, 2004.
430 Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (2003), Section A, General Obligations.
431 Ibid, Metalor Annual Report 2003.
- 336 -
- 337 -
ANNEX 5.6
International Alert, The Role of the Exploitation of Natural Resources in Fuelling and
Prolonging Crises in the Eastern DRC, January 2010
Understanding conflict. Building peace.
THE ROLE OF THE EXPLOITATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES IN FUELLING
AND PROLONGING CRISES IN THE
EASTERN DRC
January 2010
this initiative is funded
by the european union
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About International Alert
International Alert is an independent peacebuilding organisation that has worked for over 20 years
to lay the foundations for lasting peace and security in communities affected by violent conflict. Our
multifaceted approach focuses both in and across various regions; aiming to shape policies and practices
that affect peacebuilding; and helping build skills and capacity through training.
Our field work is based in Africa, South Asia, the South Caucasus, Latin America, Lebanon and the
Philippines. Our thematic projects work at local, regional and international levels, focusing on crosscutting
issues critical to building sustainable peace. These include business and economy, gender,
governance, aid, security and justice. We are one of the world’s leading peacebuilding NGOs with more
than 120 staff based in London and our 11 field offices.
For more information, please visit www.international-alert.org
This publication has been made possible with the help of the European Union. Its contents are the
sole responsibility of International Alert and can in no way be regarded as reflecting the point of view
of the European Union.
© International Alert 2009
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or
by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution.
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THE ROLE OF THE EXPLOITATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN
FUELLING AND PROLONGING
CRISES IN THE EASTERN DRC
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2 International Alert
Table of contents
List of abbreviations 3
Executive summary 5
Introduction 9
Chapter 1: Overview of mining exploitation 13
1.1 Exploitation of mines: an old story 13
1.2 The exploitation sites: an approximate mapping 16
1.3 The North Kivu mining sites 17
1.4 The South Kivu mining sites 18
1.5 The Maniema mining sites 19
1.6 The Ituri and upper Uélé mining sites 20
1.7 The challenge of quantifying the mining sector 21
Chapter 2: The system of production 23
2.1 Property rights, prospecting rights and exploitation rights: confusion,
uncertainty and “local arrangements” 24
2.2 Rights of international mining groups: old and new actors 26
2.3 The armed forces and the control of the territory of the mines 29
2.4 An organised and structured work force 31
Chapter 3: Systems of commercial trading 34
3.1 Two commercial systems 35
3.2 The geo-economy of trade 38
3.3 Key actors 42
3.4 The distribution of benefits along the trading chain 47
Chapter 4: Mechanisms of fraudulent activity 49
4.1 Nature of fraudulent activity 49
4.2 Attempts at regulation/accountability in the mineral trade 54
Chapter 5: Impact of mining exploitation on the people and the environment 57
5.1 The mining economy as a poverty trap 57
5.2 Insecurity and violence in the artisanal mining sector 60
5.3 Geo-environmental impact 62
Chapter 6: Summary of recommendations 65
6.1 Main recommendations by theme 65
6.2 From the ineffectiveness of the present sanctions regime to certification/traceability 68
6.3 A new paradigm: making trade formal to make it ethical 70
6.4 Past and present initiatives 71
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 3
Acronyms
AFDL Alliance des Forces Démocratiques de Libération
AFED Amis de la Forêt et de l’Environnement pour le Développement
AGK AngloGold Ashanti Kilo
AMG Advanced Metallurgical Group
ANR Agence Nationale de Renseignement
APPG All Party Parliamentary Group
BEST Bureau d’Etudes Scientifiques et Techniques
BGR Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe
BNA Bureau de la Navigation Aérienne
CAMI Cadastre minier
CASM Communities and Small-Scale Mining
CdC Cadre de Concertation
CEDAF Centre d’Etude et de Documentation Africaines
CEEC Centre d’Expertise, d’Evaluation et de Certification
CEPAS Centre d’Etudes pour l’Action Sociale
CEPGL Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
CHDC Congo Holding Development Company
CIRAD Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement
CIRDI Centre International pour le Règlement des Différends relatifs aux Investissements
CIRGL Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs
CNDP Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
COCABI Coopérative des Creuseurs Artisanaux de Bisié
COFED Cellule d’Appui à l’Ordonnateur National du Fonds Européen de Développement
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMIMPA Coopérative Minière Mpama Bisié
DDR Désarmement, Démobilisation, Réinsertion
DfID Department for International Development
DGM Direction Générale des Migrations
UAE United Arab Emirates
FAPC Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais
FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FEC Fédération des Entreprises Congolaises
FNI Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes
GFE Gesellschaft für Elektrometallurgie
GMB Groupe Minier Bangandula
GRAMA Groupe de Recherche sur les Activités Minières en Afrique
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICCN Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature
INICA Initiative pour l’Afrique Centrale
IPIS International Peace Information Service
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4 International Alert
ITIE Initiative pour la Transparence dans les Industries Extractives
KIMIN Kilo-Moto Mining International
KMC Krall Metal Congo
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
MDDZ Mines d’or du Zaïre
MGL Minière des Grands Lacs
MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo
MPA Metal Processing Association
MPC Mining and Processing Congo
MPR Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution
NMC Niobium Mining Company
OCC Office Congolais de Contrôle
OCDE Organisation pour la Coopération et le Développement Economique
OCHA Bureau de Coordination des Affaires Humanitaires
OFIDA Office des Douanes et Accises
OKIMO Office des Mines d’Or de Kilo Moto
ONG Organisation non gouvernementale
ONU Organisation des Nations Unies
PARECO Alliance des Patriotes pour la Refondation du Congo
PNC Police Nationale Congolaise
PNKB Parc National de Kahuzi Biega
RAID Rights and Accountability in Development
RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RDC République Démocratique du Congo
RMA Ressources Minérales Africaines
SAESSCAM Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement de l’Artisanat Minier
SAKIMA Société Aurifère du Kivu-Maniema
SARW Southern Africa Resource Watch
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOKIMO Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo Moto
SOMICO Société des Mines du Congo
SOMIGL Société Minière des Grands Lacs
SOMINKI Société Minière du Kivu
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
UCI Uganda Commercial Impex
UPC Union des Patriotes Congolais
UPDF Uganda People Defence Force
USAID US Agency for International Development
WCS Wildlife Conservation Society
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 5
Executive Summary
1. Gold and various metals of the tin group (cassiterite, coltan, niobium and tungsten) have
been mined in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since the
beginning of the 20th century. The mining sector was heavily affected by the disintegration of
the Congolese state, by widespread corruption and by the destruction of local infrastructure.
The national mining companies in the eastern DRC (OKIMO, SOMINKI) collapsed during
the 1990s, leaving the way open for informal artisanal mining, in which thousands of miners
were employed. The wars waged in North and South Kivu and Ituri between 1996 and 2003
strengthened the illegal character of artisanal mining and fueled the formation of militias
who exploited their control of the mines in order to raise the funds necessary for their own
economic survival and arms purchases.
2. In a situation where insecurity and illegality fed on each other, the mining economy became
a particularly opaque conflict economy (“conflict minerals”). The eastern DRC became an
area of uncontrolled extraction of raw materials, organised by local and regional interests
operating with actors in the international market.
3. The geography of the mining areas is not well documented. Among the most important
sites are Mongbwalu and Djalassiga (Ituri), Durba (Upper Uélé) Numbi, Kama, Kamituga,
Twangiza, Lugushwa and Minoro (South Kivu) and Bisié, Itebero, Mumba-Bibatama, Lueshe,
Fatwa Kasugho, Musienene and Manguredjipa (North Kivu), Kalima, Kampene, Namoya,
and Makania (Maniema). Although the system of mining and marketing of mineral ores in the
Kivus has been widely publicised, it is still not possible to provide a complete cartography of
production sites. This is partly due to the fact that it is nearly impossible for artisanal mining
to act in conformity with the new Mining Code of 2002, which stipulates that it should
be carried out in a mining area ‘demarcated by surface area and depth’; Article IV states
that wherever the conditions ‘do not allow for industrial or semi-industrial exploitation, the
Ministry of Mines can construct settlements inside the boundaries of a defined geographical
area in a zone of artisanal exploitation’. But none of these zones in the eastern DRC have
been defined to date. Information on mining activity should in principle be centralised in the
Provincial Mining Directorates, which do not have the resources enabling them to carry out
these tasks. As a result, available information is incomplete. The opaqueness of the mining
sector is not simply due to deliberate concealment and fraud, nor to the problems caused by
the continued presence and activities of armed groups. The problem starts with the existence
of huge gaps in available information about the geography of production.
4. For a number of reasons it is at present not possible to know with any degree of certainty
how much ore is produced and exported, due to the multiplicity of government bodies that
interfere in the control of production and exportation of ore, and because of deficiencies
in the accounting, fraud and smuggling across borders, especially with regard to gold.
The quantitative measurement of production requires a system for recovering information
which has yet to be developed from administrative statistics, the Fédération des Entreprises
Congolaises (FEC) and field research among producers and transporters. Taking into account
the lack of centralisation and reliable statistics, any such investigation will necessarily be
localised and will not provide an overall view. Smuggling will remain the blind spot in any
attempt at quantification.
5. Production from the mining sites in Orientale Province, in Maniema and in North Katanga
passes in part through the Kivus and Ituri. Orientale Province, Maniema and North Katanga
suffer from a lack of knowledge, as do the diamond mining areas in the Kivus.
- 344 -
6. The informal nature of mining production does not mean that it is not structured. The system
of production is based on exploiting a labour force of countless underpaid labourers and on a
series of exactions sought by all those people, whether civilian or military, intervening along
the way between the mine and the trading houses. Diggers, shovelers and transporters of the
ore are working with primitive tools and raw muscle power under the watch of team leaders
or soldiers. The various armed groups, as well as the Congolese Army (FARDC), actively take
part in this predatory process.
7. The history of concessions illustrates the instability of prospecting and exploitation rights. The
“waltz of contracts” that characterised the end of Mobutu’s reign and the regime of Laurent-
Désiré Kabila can be explained by the nature of arbitrary power, not through economic
reasoning. In the regions analysed, mining activity is based on local arrangements, where
modern legal rights must coexist with customary law. Nevertheless, and even if the foreign
companies that have taken over from SOMINKI and OKIMO have been slow to relaunch
mining activities, international companies remain very interested in working in the DRC.
8. Since 2000, there have been two systems for the commercial trading of “conflict minerals”:
informal trading by purchasing agents and trading by the military. Even after the official
withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Congolese soil, military trading has not completely
disappeared. The FARDC and the various armed groups have militarised, brutalised and bled
dry artisanal mining, extracting handsome profits. Mining is therefore an important issue for
security and conflict resolution.
The substantial involvement of the FARDC in mineral trading makes the army a “selfgenerating
revenue agency”. The high-level beneficiaries of these illegal activities ensure that
they stay below the radar. The FARDC’s involvement has also led to the creation of a criminal
network of senior army officers who act in collusion with those in senior governmental
positions. The FARDC’s major involvement in the mining trade, and the desire to maintain
the status quo, is a factor that has slowed down the army’s “integration” efforts, and thus
army reform.
9. The current system of commercial trading is an oligopolistic one that enriches a whole group
of government officials, army officers, militia leaders, traders, transporters and foreign
intermediaries whose profits are thought to be running in the millions of dollars. The attempts
by the UN and by NGOs at identifying the individuals involved in these “networks of elites”
have only been partially successful, Despite their lack of transparency, these “networks of
elites” illustrate the criminal nature of relationships between business, politics and violence.
Trade in minerals represents a significant part of the legal and illegal income of officials
responsible for regulating the trade; even if the taxes imposed are less than they should be
due to fraud, they still amount to several million dollars each year. In this light it can be seen
that the “mining question” represents high stakes for governance in the eastern DRC.
10. The minerals trade in the DRC is based on a multimodal system of communication, which
includes porterage, road and air transport, and reveals a regional geo-economy that is firmly
turned towards East Africa. Border towns or those near the border, such as Goma, Bukavu,
Uvira, Beni, Butembo and Bunia where the trading agencies are set up – create a bridge between
the informal upstream chain and the downstream linked to the circuits of the globalised
economy. The trade in minerals contributes to the informal economic integration of the Great
Lakes Region and demonstrates a clear separation between politics (within the framework of
national sovereignty) and economics (within the system of integrated trade in East Africa).
Congolese minerals are exported through official trading networks that transit through
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Minerals are also smuggled across the eastern borders of these
three transit countries and the origin of the exported minerals is systematically concealed.
The minerals follow the same commercial routes as other merchandise and are part of a
6 International Alert
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 7
cross-border trade. A degree of specialisation in the commercial routes exists, corresponding
to political and above all economic considerations. The Uvira-Bujumbura route is particularly
used for gold shipments and the Bukavu-Cyangugu route for exports of gold, cassiterite and
coltan. In the early 1990s, Burundi was the most important transit point for Congolese gold,
but following the international embargo against the Buyoya regime, and the creation of a tax
exemption system for gold in Uganda, Uganda replaced Burundi. In recent years, Tanzania
has also become increasingly important in the export of diamonds.
11. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda profit greatly from the trade in Congolese minerals, which
constitute a major source of income. Specialisation applies here too: gold moves through
Burundi and Uganda and minerals from the tin group pass through Rwanda. Their spheres
of economic influence in eastern DRC have remained fairly stable since 2000. The “mining
question” therefore represents major stakes in the geo-economy of the whole region.
12. The investigations carried out by the UN and NGOs have brought to light the ultimate
recipients in the trade of “conflict minerals” in Europe, the United States, the Middle East and
Asia, as well as the pivotal role of certain groups of businessmen (Lebanese, Indo-Pakistani,
Russian, etc.). The American, Russian and Chinese networks are the least well documented.
13. Mining fraud takes the form of illegal taxation (over- or under-taxation) and of smuggling.
Corruption in the mining sector impedes all serious attempts to re-establish the authority
of the state and contributes to “governance through disorder” in this region. The problem
of corruption in the mining sector is a major governance issue in the DRC. National and
international initiatives (EITI) set up to regulate the Congolese mining industry have not yet
been implemented in the eastern part of the country and have had few results nationally.
14. The social and economic stakes of artisanal mining are considerable. For most of the miners
involved in it as a means of survival, either willingly or by necessity, artisanal mining is
a poverty trap. Work in a mine represents a break with traditional social organisation by
changing the roles of young people and women. It is dangerous, with the risk of accidents,
and violent, in light of the sharp rivalries between armed groups and mine site owners.
In spite of its job-creation effects, mining is a poverty trap: behind the illusion of sudden
wealth, it generates a dynamic of impoverishment. Research on the human consequences
of artisanal mining has concentrated on the diggers, who are the most numerous and the
worst off. Some attention has, however, been paid to the various actors along the trading
chain, once the minerals leave the mine all the way to the trading houses. There are winners
and losers among them, but who are they? A close study would undoubtedly show that the
ethnic groups who traditionally held dominant trading positions also control the minerals
trade, such as the Bashi in South Kivu and the Nande in North Kivu. Both of these regard
the Banyarwanda as intruders and have always sought to discredit them because they are
competitors.
Artisanal mining is part of a worldwide process of social transformation driving people from
the countryside towards the mines and urban centres. Small towns have sprung up around
the largest mining sites, further altering the spatial distribution of the population. These
agglomerations created from mining have changed economic, social and cultural life in the
Kivus and Ituri.
The system of artisanal mining exploitation produces both direct and indirect violence.
Direct violence throughout the trading chain of mining production can be classified into two
categories: violence perpetrated by armed men (militia and security forces) towards those
engaged in trade, and violent conflict among traders themselves. The minerals trade is a violent
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8 International Alert
business, and even when the mining areas are “calm”, they still resemble the “Congolese Far
West” or, strictly speaking, the “Far East”. The conflicts between the informal owners of
mining carrés [squares] can turn violent when the intervention of the authorities determining
rights is insufficient. The presence of militias and the army is naturally an important catalyst
of violence. Traders also fall victim to armed men who often intercept them to steal their
goods.
15. The environmental consequences of mining are negative in every respect, from chemical
pollution of the water table, deforestation, diversion of rivers, the sweeping away of whole
sections of hillsides and the disappearance of arable land to intensive poaching in national
parks to feed the miners. These parks have had to pay a heavy price for anarchic mining
activities, especially in the Kahuzi Biega National Park, where mining of coltan and cassiterite
is in full swing. Given the park’s immense size, the damage inflicted by opening the mines
appears as only a few scars in the dense forest. But the slaughter of wild animals to feed the
workforce has caused considerable damage, especially since part of the poached game is
diverted to markets in the towns in Kivu. Therefore, the mining issue is also an environmental
issue in eastern DRC.
16. The current UN sanctions regime (a freeze on assets and travel bans) is directed against the
traders and not against the trade in minerals. The UN itself admits the sanctions regime is
ineffective because of the lack of cooperation on the part of governments and the lack of any
perceived harm by the companies that have learned to manage the risk to their reputation
from their activities in the conflict zones. For the moment, the most striking result of being
added to the UN list has been the suspension of certain supply contracts by import companies.
Some Western firms have distanced themselves from their Congolese suppliers. The UN is
now focusing on mapping publications of the mining sites and on controlling borders.
17. Currently two responses to the problem of “conflict minerals” are being debated: restrict trade
(to a greater or lesser degree – from total embargo to selective bans) or formalise the trade
through a mix of economic, institutional and security actions. Sceptical about the possibility
of reducing insecurity by restricting trade, some organisations (INICA, DfID, USAID, etc.)
have proposed an alternative of trying to formalise it in order to make it more disciplined and
ethical. The latter option, inspired by the Kimberley Process and by the development sector,
would involve a global strategy linking sanctions with an improvement in security in all its
aspects (legal, economic and physical) and a reform of mining activities.
18. There have been no tangible results from Congolese efforts to improve the situation, such as
suspending exports of ore in 2007, closing customs posts in Bunagana and Ishasha in 2008,
closing the mines in Walikale and Adidi in 2008, etc. While international initiatives on this
problem tend to multiply, it is worth drawing attention to the initiatives to trace coltan by
Germany and the requirement to declare the origin of minerals by the US.
19. With a view to helping establish a mining industry that does not generate further violent
conflict, this report recommends the following:
1. Improving geographical knowledge about mining activities;
2. Improving knowledge about mining in Ituri and in the Kivus;
3. Understanding the downstream side of the commercial chain;
4. Evaluating the possibilities of imposing sanctions;
5. Spreading information in the DRC;
6. Supporting the proposal of formalising trade;
7. Reducing incentives for smuggling by harmonising and simplifying customs tariffs at a
regional level.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 9
Introduction
‘In Africa, trade never stops. It is only interrupted.’
A Bend in the River. V. S. Naipaul
The economy and conflicts, the economics of conflicts: Exposure and research on
“conflict minerals” in eastern DRC
There is a large variety of publications today about the ways in which the exploitation of mineral
resources is a factor in unleashing war. Up until the beginning of the 1998 rebellion, the analyses
of war in the Great Lakes region were written in the shadow of the Rwandan genocide and
the regional upheavals provoked by regime change in Kigali. In Filip Reyntjens’ 1999 book, La
guerre des Grands Lacs [The Great Lakes War], the economic dimension of the conflict is barely
mentioned.1 Another work completed in the same year, under the direction of Paul Mathieu and
Jean-Claude Willame, Conflits et guerres au Kivu et dans la région des Grands Lacs [Conflicts and
wars in Kivu and the Great Lakes region] concentrated on the land question in Kivu and on the
regional aspects of the war. Only one page refers to the ‘economic interests of the conflict’.2 It was
primarily the press and particularly the Belgian newspapers, Le Soir and Libre Belgique, which
exposed the ‘pillage of the Congo’3 by Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers. Le Soir reported that
Museveni was criticised in Uganda, because of the ‘involvement of his half-brother, Salim Saleh,
in trafficking in gold and precious wood’, and also that ‘the donor community was concerned
about the resources devoted to the war’.4 In 1999, L’Enjeu congolais [What is at stake in the
DRC], by Colette Braeckman, denounced the “war of loot” and described the evolution of events
in the DRC from 1996 onwards as ‘a new chapter in the hold-up of the Congo that has been going
on for over a century’,5 but she did not elaborate on this aspect of the conflict. In Les Nouveaux
Predateurs [The New Predators], published in 2003, she returned at greater length to this “hold
up”.6 The thesis of a war self-financed by the exploitation of the natural resources of the Kivus
meanwhile was solidly supported by the work of the UN Group of Experts. This understanding
of the conflict coincides with the views of Paul Collier, writing for the World Bank, and is now
common knowledge.7
The first comprehensive studies devoted to the mining aspects of the war in eastern DRC were
written during the period when, after looting by soldiers, coltan fever seized the Kivus. Coltan
(Colombo-tantanite), the mineral that experienced a boom in 1999-2000, caused the furor. At
the time of this boom, several NGOs in Belgium mobilised forces through the campaign ‘No
blood on my cell phone’ to expose the purchases of coltan by European companies in the conflict
zones. This exposure resulted in the Security Council setting up a Group of Experts on the Illegal
exploitation of the natural resources and other riches of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a
group that has been maintained ever since it was first created in June 2000. The interest of NGOs
1 F. Rentjens (1999). La guerre des Grands Lacs. Alliances mouvantes et conflits extraterritoriaux en Afrique centrale [The Great Lakes War –
Shifting alliances and extraterritorial conflicts in Central Africa]. Paris: L’Harmattan.
2 P. Mathieu et J-C. Willame (1999). Conflits et guerres au Kivu et dans la région des Grands Lacs. Entre tensions locales et escalade régionale
[Conflicts and wars in Kivu and the Great Lakes region – Between local tensions and regional escalation]. Paris: Cahiers africains No.
39–40. Tervuren. Institut Africain-CEDAF. L’Harmattan.
3 Le Soir, 23rd December 1998.
4 Le Soir, 28th December 1998.
5 C. Braeckman (1999). L’enjeu congolais. L’Afrique centrale après Mobutu [What’s at stake in the Congo—Central Africa since Mobutu]. Paris:
Fayard.
6 C. Braeckman (2003). Les nouveaux prédateurs. Politiques des puissances en Afrique centrale [The New Predators : The big powers’ policies
in Central Africa]. Paris: Fayard. New revised edition in 2009.
7 P. Collier (2000). Economic causes of conflict and their implication for policy. Policy Research Paper. Washington: World Bank.
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10 International Alert
and the UN in this question led at first to a large body of investigative and exposure literature,
followed by field research on the theoretical aspects of the relationship between conflict, war
economies, natural resources and development.
Local researchers have been studying the links between conflicts and natural resources at the
same time as the UN panel of experts. The Pole Institute in Goma (Institut Interculturel dans la
région des Grands Lacs), created at the end of the 1990s, published a study under the direction of
Aloys Tegera, Le coltan et les populations du Nord-Kivu [Coltan and the people of North Kivu]
in February 2001.8 Didier De Failly of BEST (Bureau d’Etudes Scientifiques et Techniques) in
Bukavu, carried out specific investigation of the artisanal exploitation of coltan and the marketing
chain.9Many other researchers have pointed to his concrete explanations of the modus operandi of
those involved in mining, transporting and marketing coltan within a globalised system; (Stephen
Jackson, for example, argued that the producers ‘are linked to the world market through a chain
of intermediaries and are exposed to all the ups and downs of this market’).10 The exploitation of
minerals, whether on an industrial or an artisanal scale, is indeed heavily influenced by demand
fluctuations in world markets. The miner who earns his living by using his own physical energy
to dig up coltan in some forgotten forest in Kivu forms the first link of a global chain, the last link
of which is the mobile phone user.
A considerable (although often repetitive) body of literature on mineral exploitation and the
conflict in the eastern the DRC is available today. This plethora of reports and publications,
mostly accessible on the internet, forces us to be selective.
The numerous reports of UN expert groups, such as the Panel of Experts from 2000 to 2003
or the Group of Experts since 2004, are a basic source, starting from their first report of 12
April 2001 up to their latest of 18 May 2009. Among the many studies of NGOs and research
groups, those of the Pole Institute, International Peace Information Service (IPIS), Global Witness,
International Crisis Group, International Alert and Human Rights Watch (HRW) are essential
sources, since they cover the entire period from 2001 to 2008 and also the different aspects of
research. The Diane Fossey Gorilla Fund has carried out a series of studies on the impact of illicit
exploitation of coltan on wildlife in the national parks. The Canadian group GRAMA (Groupe
de Recherche sur les Activités Minières en Afrique) of the University of Quebec in Montreal
studied the marketing of coltan from the DRC.11 In 2007, a report from Pact, commissioned by
DfID, USAID and COMESA, analysed the connections between mining activities and commercial
circuits in the DRC.12 A 2008 study by Communities and Small-Scale Mining (CASM) contained
very precise information on the exploitation of and trade in cassiterite, drawing on the example
of the Bisié mine, the largest in North Kivu.13 This mine, which had already been researched
by others, including AFED (Amis de la Forêt et de l’Environnement pour le Développement) in
2007, provides a good illustration of how the mining sector works throughout the Kivu region.
Very recently, in April 2009, expanding the experience gained from investigating Bisié, Nicholas
Garrett and Harrison Mitchell published their work on the relationship between the trade in
minerals and development in conflict areas in eastern DRC.14 This study was carried out with
support from DfID, the London School of Economics, the Crisis States Research Centre and the
8 A. Tegera (Ed.) (2002). Le coltan et les populations du Nord-Kivu [Coltan and the people of North Kivu]. Jointly researched by the Pole
Institute & CREDAP. Regards croisés No. 007. Pole Institute.
9 D . De Failly (2001). ‘Coltan: pour comprendre’, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs – Annuaire 2000-2001 [Great Lakes Africa – Yearbook], pp.279–306.
Paris: L’Harmattan.
10 S. Jackson (2001). ‘Nos richesses sont pillées! Economies de guerre et rumeurs de crime au Kivu’ [Our wealth has been plundered! War
economies and rumours of crime in Kivu], Politique africaine, No. 84, pp.117–135.
11 P. Martineau (2003). La route commerciale du coltan congolais: une enquête [The trade route of Congolese coltan : an investigation]. GRAMA.
UQAM.
12 Pact (2007). Researching natural resources and trade flows in the Great Lakes Region.
13 N. Garrett (2008). Artisanal cassiterite mining and trade in North Kivu: Implications for poverty reduction and security, CASM.
14 N. Garrett and H. Mitchell (2009). Trading conflict for development: Utilising the trade in minerals from eastern DR Congo for development.
Resource Consulting Services.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 11
Conflict Research Group. In the US, Enough – from the Centre for American Project devoted
to the prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity – has also shown an interest in the
Kivus.15
A review of the literature shows the central role played by Anglo-Saxon organisations, whether
their aims are humanitarian, academic or correspond to economic considerations or interests.
Much of the expertise available comes from Belgian researchers, such as the Africamuseum of
Tervuren (geology, cartography, and the Centre d’Etude et de Documentation Africaine – CEDAF),
as well as universities and research groups in Antwerp16 Ghent and Leuven. The works of Koen
Vlassenroot are particularly indispensable. Beyond to Belgium and Great Britain, several other
European research centres have contributed to the debate on mining exploitation and conflict in
eastern DRC, such as SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.17 In Germany,
the Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR) [Federal Institute for Geosciences
and Natural Resources] published a study on natural resources in the DRC in 2007, in association
with KfW Entwicklungsbank [KfW Development Bank].18 After recommendations were drawn
up by the International Conference on the Great Lakes region, seeking a ‘Regional Mechanism
for Certification of Natural Resources’,19 a G8 summit initiative at Heiligendamm in June 2007
on the certification of minerals has become a reality. Researchers from the BGR are working on
the geochemical fingerprint of metals, particularly tantalum in order to establish their origin; a
pilot project has just been launched in Rwanda to develop the forms of scientific support to be
provided by CTCs, Certified Trading Chains.20
South Africa, which itself has a large mining industry, has understandably followed the situation
in the DRC very closely. In 2007, Southern Africa Research Watch (SARW) published a study
on the revision of mining contracts.21 Roland Pourtier, as part of Initiative for Central Africa
(INICA), completed a study in 2004 on the regional implications of artisanal mining in Kivu.22
Alain Karsenty, a CIRAD researcher based in Montpellier, studied taxation of natural resources
in the DRC.23
How the maps are conceived
Maps are an integral part of this report. Somey of them localise mining resources, the principal
mines and armed groups, drawn up from various bibliographical and cartographical sources
that have been consulted. Other maps illustrate commercial aspects of the mining economy –
from a local up to a global scale: transport of mineral ores from Bisié mine) to the comptoirs
[trading houses] in Goma, regional corridors between the eastern DRC and the Indian Ocean
ports; importing countries. Some maps show the basic structural data which is essential to an
15 Enough Project Team (2009). A comprehensive approach to Congo’s conflict minerals. Strategy Paper.
16 In particular, the Centre d’étude de la région des Grands Lacs d’Afrique, which since 1997 has published a Yearbook under the direction of
Stefaan Marysse and Filip Reyntjens: L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Paris: L’Harmattan.
17 R. de Koning (2008). ‘Resource-conflicts links in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’. SIPRI Insights on Peace and
Security, 2.
18 C. Berke, J. Pulkowski, N. Martin, J. Vasters, M. Wagner (2007). Les ressources naturelles en République démocratique du Congo – Un
potentiel de développement? [Natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo – Potential for development?]. Frankfurt: BGRKMW.
19 Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs (2006). Programme d’Action Régional de Certification des Ressources Naturelles.
Projet n° 3.2.2. Dar es Salaam.
20 BGR Press Release (13th March 2009). ‘BGR-Pilotprojekt in Rwanda: Transparenz, sozial-und umweltstandards durch zertifizierung
mineralischer rohstoffe’ [BGR’s Pilot project in Rwanda: Transparency, social and environmental standards through certification of mineral
resources].
21 C. Kabamba (2007). Directives pour une révision des contrats d’exploitation Minière en RDC [Directives for revising mining exploitation
contracts in the DRC], June 2007. Johannesburg: Braamfontein. [email protected]
22 R. Pourtier (2004). L’artisanat minier au Kivu et ses implications régionales [Artisinal mining in Kivu and regional implications]. Paris: INICAOCDE.
L’économie minière au Kivu et ses implications régionales [The mining economy in Kivu and its regional implications]
23 A. Karsenty (2006). Etude d’identification d’un programme pour l’amélioration des recettes fiscales et domaniales en République
Démocratique du Congo (composante ‘ressources naturelles’ d’un programme d’appui à la gouvernance en RDC) [Study to identify a
programme to improve state and tax revenue in the DRC (“natural resources” component of a governance support programme in the
DRC)]. Ministère des Finances. Cellule d’Appui à l’Ordonnateur National du FED (COFED). CIRAD.
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12 International Alert
understanding of the conflicts in Kivu: the colonial legacy of the mining economy, the distribution
of ethnic groups, chiefdoms and population densities.
The main difficulty in drawing up maps arises from the lack of any cartography for the DRC that
is consistent, complete and up-to-date. A project for a ‘Reference Common Geography’ (RCG) is
underway, launched in 2006 by the UN Logistics Centre, supported by OCHA and coordinated
since 2007 by the UNDP. In a Cartography of Motives, IPIS has made use of the data available
from RGC. Its mapping to a scale of 1/1,000,000 covers most of North and South Kivu, but not
Maniema. However, Maniema is included in the satellite maps at a scale of 1/200,000 produced
by the University of Ghent. These two series do not, unfortunately, map the whole area of the
region under study. To obtain a homogenous base for mapping, we have used the map of the DRC
at a scale of 1/2,000,000, drawn up by the Catholic University of Leuven in 2007.24Additional
information was found in the Management Kongo Development map of the DRC published in
2000, which is based on a digital terrain model by the United States Geological Service. Several
minor distortions can be seen in comparing these different sources, but they do not affect the
maps that figure in this report. The hydrographic data are compatible between the different maps,
but this is not the case for roads and the tracing of administrative boundaries, which reveal real
differences.
Uncertainty concerning toponomy is a more serious difficulty. Many village names differ from
map to map. It is impossible to say where some mines referred to in the documents are situated,
as their names do not appear on any map. Even significant sites such as Lueshe, the only industrial
site in North Kivu, do not appear on recent maps. Similarly, Ariwara is nowhere to be found,
even though it is one of the largest gold-trading centres in Ituri; with the help of a Human Rights
Watch study, we were able to situate it. The maps attached to the report have only a relative
degree of accuracy. They are drawn up to provide a synthetic view by adding the force of visual
images to the text.
Maps and a bibliography are located in the appendix to this report
The area covered by the study
Area (sq. km) Population Density (inhab./sq. km)
1984 2008 1984 2008
(census) (estimates)
North Kivu 59 483 2 434 000 5 200 000 41 87
South Kivu 65 070 1 940 000 4 700 000 30 72
Ituri 65 658 1 749 000 4 200 000 27 64
Maniema 132 250 850 000 2 250 000 6 17
Source for 2008: OCHA, Plan d’action humanitaire 2009
24 République Démocratique du Congo, 1/ 2 000 000, Unité de recherche en environnemétrie et géomatique, Université catholique de Louvain.
With the collaboration of the Institut Géographique du Congo and the Belgian Institut Géographique National. ULC-Géomatics, Louvain-laneuve
(2007).
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 13
Chapter 1: Overview of Mining Exploitation
Summary:
Gold and tin have been mined in the eastern provinces of the DRC since the beginning of the 20th
century. The mining sector has been seriously disrupted by the disintegration of the Congolese state,
by corruption and the destruction of local infrastructure. The mining industry collapsed in the 1990s,
giving way to informal artisanal exploitation, which employed hundreds of thousands of miners. The
wars that affected North and South Kivu and Ituri between 1996 and 2003 reinforced the illegal nature
of the mining of ores and promoted the formation of militias, which were able to finance their purchases
of arms from their control and exploitation of the mines. In a situation in which insecurity and illegality
fed on each other, the mining economy became highly opaque. This has made access to any reliable
and accurate information (mines sites and production levels) extremely difficult.
1.1 Exploitation of mines: An old story
The colonial origins of the mining economy
The exploitation of minerals in the eastern DRC began over a century ago.25 Two Australian
prospectors found gold in the Agola River in 1903 and named this area after the Chief Kilo. After
the discovery of the site in Moto, the gold-bearing region of Upper Ituri was given the name of
Kilo-Moto. For more than a century, this name has been the symbol of the DRC’s gold, whose long
history has recently been tarnished by the massacres of 2002-2003 in Mongbwalu.26 The Société
des Mines d’Or de Kilo Moto (SOKIMO) was created in 1926, following the pattern of the major
colonial companies such as the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, which were characterised by their
paternalist policies towards their labour force, poorly paid but whose basic needs were provided
for. These companies, veritable states within a state, were closely involved in the financing and
management of regional infrastructure, including socio-educative infrastructure such as transport,
health and education.
In the Kivus,27 mining only became important in the 1920s. The Minière des Grands Lacs (MGL)
and the CNKI Comité National du Kivu (CNKI) had begun to mine gold before cassiterite was
discovered in 1926. Maniema soon became the major area for tin-mining, with centres in Kalima,
Punia, Kasese and Sakumakanga. Two companies, Symetain and Cobelmin of the Empain Group,
established in 1932 and 1933, dominated the mining sector until after the DRC’s independence.
The annual reports on economic affairs in the Kivus28 provide interesting production figures when
compared with current evaluations:
Gold and cassiterite production during the colonial period
1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1959
Gold (kg) 2 954 6 269 3 174 2 397 2 107 3 449
Cassiterite (t.) 1 200 5 250 12 110 8 383 11 379 6 074
25 See maps: Tin basin in the Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi and mining resources.
26 Human Rights Watch (2005). Le Fléau de l’Or [The Curse of Gold]. New York: HRW.
27 The Kivu region, whose boundaries were determined by the colonial administration, includes the three areas of North Kivu, South Kivu
and Maniema. In 1988 they became provinces.
28 Bashizi Musharhamina (1998). ‘Conjoncture mondiale et exploitation minière au Kivu (1933-1959)’ [World conjuncture and mining exploitation
in Kivu]. Likunduli. Enquêtes d’histoire coloniale [Likunduli - Enquiries into colonial history], 9,1, pp.108–121. Lubumbashi: CERDAC.
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14 International Alert
Employment in the mining sector during the colonial period was already considerable, as the
figures for all of the Belgian Congo reflect:29
Employment in the main mining sectors
Annual average Gold Tin Copper Diamonds
1928-1929 21 000 5 000 16 500 28 600
1938-1940 90 437 38 588 8 498 17 582
1941-1943 88 177 73 303 14 365 12 319
Independence and the collapse of the mining economy: The remarkable failure of
SOMINKI and KILO MOTO
Industrial mining became the victim of a combination of two factors:
• The instability of world markets;
• The weakening and disorganisation of economic and administrative structures in a society
marked by the “Zaire disease”, a catastrophic variety of bad governance, associated with
widespread corruption.
In 1976, Symetain and Cobelmin and some other companies created the Société Minière du
Kivu (SOMINKI), in which Zaire held 28% of the capital and the Empain Group 72%. Already
handicapped by the costs stemming from the relative isolation of the Maniema mines, which were
cut off from the outside world, SOMINKI proved unable to cope with the sharp drop in the price
of tin on the world market in 1985. After reaching a peak in February 1985 of over £10,000 a
tonne, the price fell to around £4,300 a year later. The continuing decline caused the Empain
Group to sell its majority share-holding in SOMINKI.
The world tin market (in tonnes)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
1 500 3 000 7 200 9 200 3 500 3 500
Production of tin and associated metals by SOMINKI (in tonnes)
1980 1985 1990 1995
3 000 4 000 2 500 1 000
The decline in tin production following the collapse of world prices in fact preceded the series
of lootings by the AFDL. In 1996 this dealt the final blow to a dying company, whose salaried
employees had already greatly decreased in number:
Changes in the SOMINKI labour force (1978-1995)
Year Expatriates Senior Staff Production Staff
1978 110 215 16 500
1985 80 283 11 500
1990 24 275 8 500
1995 13 221 5 700
29 J-L Vellut (1981). Les bassins miniers de l’ancien Congo Belge. Essai d’histoire économique et sociale (1900–1960) [The mine basins in the
former Belgian Congo; An essay on the social and economic history of 1900 to 1960]. Cahier 7. CEDAF.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 15
SOMINKI was bought in 1996 by the Canadian group, Banro. After chaotic years of war and
rebellion, Banro’s legal position was clarified in 2003, allowing it to resume its mining activity.30
This is planned, but production had not yet started by 2008.
The Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo Moto (SOKIMO) was formed in 1926 and built practically all
the main infrastructure of the Ituri district during the colonial period. It developed a paternalistic
management of its labour force. The company was nationalised in 1966 under the name of Office
des Mines d’Or de Kilo Moto (OKIMO), which took over the concessions of 83,000 sq. km
divided between Ituri and Upper Uélé. The main mining site in Ituri, Mongbwalu, was divided
into three blocks (38, 39 and 40). The steady decline of the company led during the 1990s to
sub-contracting to artisanal miners, with the possibility of individuals to prospect (US$150), to
exploit an area of 500 m2 (US$250), or even more (against 30% of the profits for OKIMO).
This system of sub-contracting both production and exploration compensated OKIMO’s lack
of capacity to exploit the mines. It should also be noted that OKIMO did not even have the
resources to buy the gold mined by the diggers and bring it to the market. During the 1990s,
OKIMO leased its concessions to entrepreneurs who controlled access to the mines and collected
taxes, sometimes becoming selling the gold themselves. In the past, these sub-contractors had
honoured their obligation to pay fees to OKIMO but this came to an end.
Informal artisanal mining and the disintegration of the Congolese state
Since SOMINKI and OKIMO stopped their activities, industrial mining has disappeared in Kivu
and Ituri. On the old mining sites, only a few buildings, mining installations in ruin and rusty
machinery are left, recalling the period when the DRC’s economy had not entirely sunk into the
informal domain.31 Industrial mining was not replaced by artisanal mining all at once, but rather
accompanied the gradual breakdown of the Congolese state. Artisanal mining has existed for a
long time in the DRC: without going back to historic Katanga whose copper croisettes served
as currency over much of Central Africa, gold-panning was practised during the colonial period
and the early years of independence, but only on a small scale. It was the disorganisation of
the economy resulting from “zairianisation” in 1974 that turned all productive activities into
informal ones. The confiscation of the colonists’ assets and their squandering by those benefiting
from a redistribution policy not based on competency but on loyalty to the Popular Movement
for the Revolution (MPR), had disastrous consequences for the economy. As the “Zaire disease”
and the application of “Article 15” of the Constitution (“solve it yourselves”) became the norm,
the number of artisanal miners increased, particularly in the diamond mining areas of Kasai.
Artisanal exploitation was authorised in 1982 outside the mining concessions. The new legislation
legalised the already existing situation and encouraged the development of artisanal mining.
Many miners in Kivu, who had lost their jobs with the collapse of SOMINKI, sought compensation
by informally exploiting the deposits they knew well. A truly parallel economy – semi-legal – came
increasingly into being, involving a range of actors from the mine to the export agencies. The armed
clashes in Kivu during the AFDL’s campaign in 1996-1997 and the occupation by the Rwandan and
Ugandan military during the period of rebellion (1998-2002), completed the destructuring of the
formal economy and made the control of mineral resources one of the major issues in a regional
conflict. The coltan boom of 1999-2000 led to an unprecedented rush to the mining areas by young
people attracted by the hope of rapid gain. Coming from rural or urban backgrounds, these men and
women thought they could find in the mines a way of emancipating themselves from a society in deep
crisis that could not offer them any prospects of a satisfying future. The coltan boom was short-lived.
After selling at US$230 a pound in 2000, tantalum returned by the end of 2001 to its pre-1999 value,
between US$25 and US$30. This episode nevertheless had long-term consequences, as it represented
an irreversible change for many young people who had cast their hopes in the mines.32
30 See Chapter 2.2.
31 See Y. Lammens & C. Braeckman (2007). L’or noyé de Kamituga [Kamituga’s drowned gold]. Film produced by Simple Production –Philofilm.
32 See Chapter 5.1.
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16 International Alert
1.2 The exploitation sites: An imperfect mapping
Although the system of production and commercialisation of minerals in Kivu is well documented
today, it is still not possible to draw up a precise and exhaustive cartography of the production
sites. The document of reference – the geological and mining map of the DRC published in
2005 by the Africamuseum in Tervuren33 – uses data from the 1976 map of mineral deposits in
Zaire.34The location of mineral resources is certainly useful, but it doesn’t indicate whether or
not they are being exploited. The MONUC and OCHA maps provide only brief and fragmentary
information about mining sites.
The most interesting document is one published by the International Peace Information Service
(IPIS), the ‘Cartography of the motives behind the conflicts’, which provides locations not only
of the mines but also the different armed groups in North and South Kivu for the period between
September 2007 and January 2008.35 This substantial work inevitably has its limitations, since
it is impossible to provide simultaneous mapping of constantly changing situations throughout
a territory covering 59,500 sq. km for North Kivu and 65,000 sq. km for South Kivu. Such
a Sisyphean task would depend on information from local correspondents who are difficult
to coordinate. IPIS’s cartography gives locations for a large number of mining sites, without
distinguishing between presently-existing and past sites. For example, in the National Park of
Kahuzi Biega all the names of coltan mining sites appear, which were already shown in INICA’s
2004 map, itself based on an earlier study by an NGO in Bukavu. A multi-layered collection of
data piling up all the locations, often inexact as regards both time and place, is inadequate to
provide an accurate and up-to-date inventory.
The geography of the mines is often still imperfect. This is due on the one hand to the near
impossibility for artisanal mining to conform to the 2002 Mining Code. It stipulates that artisanal
activity must be carried out in an area of exploitation ‘demarcated as to its surface and to its
depth’. Article IV specifies that where conditions ‘do not allow for industrial or semi-industrial
exploitation, the Minister of Mines may set up such sites within the limits of a geographical area
determined to be an area of artisanal exploitation’. But no such areas have so far been defined in
eastern DRC.
Information about mining activities should in theory be concentrated in the Provincial Mining
Directorates. Unfortunately, they lack the material and financial resources to visit mining sites.
The result is that their information is very limited. The opaqueness of the mining sector is not
only due to the practice of dissimulation and fraud as well as the activities of armed groups; its
starting point is the serious gaps in the geography of production that is only roughly outlined.
Many mining sites referred to in certain reports cannot be precisely located. Mine locations are
shown on only some of the satellite mapping plates produced by the University of Ghent for the
Museum in Tervuren, in particular those of the tin-bearing region of Maniema.
Mineral exploitation in the eastern DRC can be divided between two main types of production:
• Gold – alluvial or in lode deposits – represents most of Ituri’s production (Orientale Province)
and is also found in many North and South Kivu sites.
• Various metals make up the composite minerals in the tin group – the “3Ts” – tin, tungsten and
tantalum. In DRC, tungsten is known as wolfram/wolframite; tantalum is present in Colombotantalite,
commonly known as coltan, which also contains varying proportions of niobium.
The composition of the ore varies according to the sites. Coltan and cassiterite are often found
33 Musée royal de l’Afrique Centrale (2005). Carte géologique et minière de la République Démocratique du Congo [Geological and mining map
of the DRC], scale 1/2 500 000, Tervuren.
34 Service géologique du Zaïre, Musée Royal de l’Afrique centrale et BRGM (Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières) (1976). Carte des
gîtes minéraux du Zaïre [Map of Zaïre’s mineral deposits], scale 1/200 000.
35 S. Spittaels & F. Hilgert (2008). Cartographie derrière les conflits: le cas de l’Est de la RDC [Cartography behind the conflicts: the case of
eastern DRC]. Anvers: IPIS, Fatal Transactions.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 17
together, but coltan can also be found with tungsten. The interest in one or another metal
depends on demand: in 1999-2000, cassiterite was merely a not very valuable by-product of
coltan; today, the opposite is true. The ores also always contain iron, regarded as an impurity,
which requires processing to separate it out, so as to reach a sufficient concentration of tin –
65%, if possible – that can be sold at a good price.
n Establishing a complete and up-to-date cartography is a prerequisite for properly understanding
the highly dispersed artisanal mining sector.
The principal known mining sites36
Provinces Name of the mining area Production (mineral and amount) Number of
miners
Orientale – Ituri
(Eastern)
– Haut Uélé
Mongbwalu, Kilo-Moto
Djalassiga
Durba
Gold
Gold production in the whole
eastern region of the DRC:
estimate 5 to 10 tonnes
60 000
North Kivu Bisié (Walikale)
Itebero
Mumba-Bibatama
Lueshe
Fatwa Kasugho
Musienene
Manguredjipa
Cassiterite, 10 000 tonnes
Coltan, cassiterite
Coltan, cassiterite
Wolframite
Production de cassiterite in North
Kivu estimated at 14 000 tonnes
Niobium
Diamonds
Diamonds
Gold
Estimate
for the
Province:
200 000
South Kivu Numbi
Nyabibwe
Kama
Kamituga
Twangiza
Lugushwa
Minoro
Coltan, cassiterite,
Tourmaline
Coltan, cassiterite
Coltan, cassiterite
Gold
Gold
Gold
Diamonds
1.3 The North Kivu mining sites
Minerals of the tin group
Most of the sites are located in the “Little North”, which includes the Walikale, Masisi, Rustshuru
and Nyiragongo territories. This is the richest region, especially Walikale, but is also the most
complicated area of the Kivus, since all the tension-creating factors – land ownership, demographic,
ethnic, economic and military – are concentrated there. In 2007 and 2008 this area was at the
centre of the conflicts between the CNDP on the one hand and, on the other, the FARDC and their
supporters at that time, the Mai Mai and sometimes the FDLR.
36 See map: Mining exploitation sites.
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18 International Alert
The largest mining site today is Bisié in the Walikale territory. According to Nicholas Garrett’s indepth
study,37 this exceptional deposit produced 70% of the cassiterite exported from Goma. At the
time of research (April-December 2007), the four production sites had 1,732 workers. Another study
spoke of “7,000 heads” on the site:38 in addition to the miners, there were also porters, traders, family
members and prostitutes.
Some mining sites are more or less easily accessible by road and their location can be established
precisely, for example in Masisi, known mainly as an agro-pastoral area before the war, but which
also has several mining carrés [squares]. In Mumba-Bibatama, in the Ngungu area, three quarries
are being exploited, one of which belongs to a leading Tutsi personality in the province, Senator
Edouard Mwangaschuchu Hizi.
In many cases, however, it is difficult to locate these mines on a map. In its study on ‘Coltan and
the people of North Kivu’,39 the Pole Institute refers to a great number of mining sites (about
thirty) in the Masisi, Kalehe and Walikale territories, without indicating where exactly they are
found, especially since the names of villages vary from one map to another. “Mining foyers”
are referred to south of Walikale, near Itebero, but without any further details about where the
“hills” Nkuba and Kakelo are to found.40 The Pole Institute also mentions exploitation sites to
the north of the Kahuzi Bieza National Park, but those cannot be found because of the absence
of any geographical indicators. The Atlas of the Administrative Organisation of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo41 is of little assistance, since in the studies consulted, the mining sites are
seldom cross-referenced with groupings or local government areas they are part of.
Lueshe, the only industrial site in North Kivu, specialises in processing pyrochlore (niobium) and
does not appear on IPIS maps, nor on satellite maps, nor on any of the general maps of the DRC.
It does, however, appear on the 1988 map of the Republic of Zaire. This disappearance of Lueshe
is surprising. It illustrates the importance of developing a rigorous cartographical update.
Gold and diamonds in the “Great North”
The Great North, which includes the territories of Lubero and Beni, has only a few tin-bearing
sites. Gold is mainly mined here, mostly in the Beni area and diamonds near Butembo and Lubero.
Fewer studies exist, compared with the “Little North”, probably because the “Great North” has
been less affected by armed conflict. The Nande provide a strong degree of social cohesion in the
Great North, whose economy is one of the most dynamic in the DRC. Butembo and Beni are very
active trading centres, particularly for high value items such as gold and diamonds.42
1.4 The South Kivu mining sites
The mining sites can be divided into two groups: minerals of the tin group are dominant in the
north of the province and in the south, gold.
Minerals of the tin group
The most accessible sites are along the routes from Bukavu to Walikale and from Bukavu to
Goma. The Nyabibwé mine (cassiterite-coltan) is to the south of Saké, along the road remade by
“Agroallemande” (Welthungershilfe). The remains of abandoned equipment recall the “pre-artisanal”
37 N. Garrett (2008). Op. cit.
38 AFED, Amis de la forêt et de l’Environnement pour le Développement (2007). Rapport général de l’étude sur l’exploitation artisanale des
ressources minières en territoire de Walikale: Cas du Coltan [General report on the artisanal exploitation of mining resources in Walikale
territory: the case of coltan]. Goma: AFED.
39 A. Tegera (2002). Op. cit.
40 R. Pourtier (2004). L’économie minière au Kivu et ses implications régionales. INICA-OCDE.
41 L. de Saint Moulin, J-L. Lalombo Tshibanda (2005). Atlas de l’organisation administrative de la République Démocratique du Congo. Kinshasa:
CEPAS.
42 See Chapter 3. Geo-economy of trade.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 19
era. The important mining centre in Numbi (coltan, cassiterite and tourmaline) on the boundary
between North and South Kivu is very difficult to reach.
The western part of the Kahuzi Biega National Park, which straddles South and North Kivu,
was invaded in total illegality during the coltan boom. The eastern part around Mount Biega,
famous for its mountain gorillas, has, on the other hand, remained more protected. The NGO
Vision Verte [Green vision] of Bukavu has accurately mapped the sixty-some mines that have
been exploited inside the Park. The Diane Fossey Gorilla Fund has paid particular attention to
the destruction inflicted on the flora and fauna by the presence of miners.43 Recent information
updating the situation there is lacking.
Gold
The gold-bearing area of South Kivu comprises three main areas, Twangiza, Kamituga and
lgushwa, which form – together with Namoya, situated in Maniema – the “Golden Furrow” to
the south-west of Bukavu. Alluvial gold has been mined since the 1920s around Kamituga, gold in
lode deposits from a later date. After the period of legal confusion during the war years, SAKIMA
(Banro Group) became the sole holder of mining rights, but this Canadian company is confronted
on the ground by the resistance of artisanal miners who have been working alluvial sites inside the
concession boundaries for a long time. During recent years, Banro has concentrated on preliminary
work for a future relaunch of exploitation (geological and mineralogical research, prospection,
etc.). South African engineers carried out a very detailed study on Namoya in 2007.44 According
to oral testimony, Chinese are taking part in the exploitation of the site for Banro.
Information available on Banro’s website makes it possible to locate the mines with great precision
within the company’s perimeters. However, knowledge of where artisanal sites are being exploited
outside these boundaries is more uncertain. This contributes to the lack of transparency in the
production and marketing of gold, which manages to dodge the control of state institutions to a
great extent, but not that of other forms of power, whether military or civilian.
Another resource that eludes state control is diamonds. It appears that there are an increasing
number of diamond exploitation sites in the Kivus, although they attract little attention, perhaps
because diamonds are considered to be the business of Kasaï, the Bandundu areas bordering
Angola and the Kisanagani region. IPIS has noted that there is significant production in the
Shindano mine, near Minoro (north of Shabunda).45 The Pole Institute mentions the in Makania
mine in the Punia region, where thousands of diggers have left the cassiterite quarries to pursue
diamonds. Other mines are reported to the south-east of Lubutu.
n The geography of artisanal mining is evolving, since the diggers are easily mobilised and willing
to move.
1.5 The Maniema mining sites
Maniema has for a long time been at the heart of mining in the Kivus. Up until the collapse of
the tin market in 1985, the exploitation of tin was more industrial in nature, with energy being
provided by hydro-electric plants in Lutshulukulu and Ambwe to supply Kalima and Kailo. The
SOMINKI mining centres were closed one after the other during the 1990s, but the recovery in
tin prices boosted artisanal exploitation. Information on Maniema, compared with that on North
43 I. Redmond (2001). Coltan boom, gorilla bust. The impact of coltan mining on gorillas and other wildlife in eastern DR Congo, May. Diane Fossey
Gorilla Fund and Born Free Foundation; Jevin D’Souza (2003). Scoping study of the artisanal mining of coltan in the Kahuzi Biega National
Park (April). London: Diane Fossey Gorilla Fund.
44 SENET (2007). Preliminary assessment no 43-101. Technical Report, Namoya Gold Project, Maniema Province, RDC, prepared for Banro
Corporation. Johannesburg: Senet House.
45 S. Spittaels & F. Hilgert (2008). Op. cit.
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20 International Alert
and South Kivu, is very scarce. This lost corner of the world has been spared from recent military
violence, and has aroused little interest among researchers or humanitarian organisations.
The location of the old SOMINKI mines can be seen on satellite imaging maps. What is missing
is information about their present condition. Kalima, the former headquarters of SOMINKI’s
General Management, accessible by road from Kindu, is at the heart of an area that still has
great mining potential. Several airstrips in Kamisuku, Kinkungwa, Kama and Kampene, are used
to carry ore to Bukavu. Kailo used to be an important mining centre and its cassiterite and
wolframite were taken to Kindu. Punia and Kasese produce cassiterite and coltan. According
to a research student preparing a thesis on Maniema, Mr Kalombo Vivi Lukongo, gold is also
being actively sought. There are several gold-washing sites between Kasese and Shabunda as well
as near Kama and Kampene. In the Kasongo territory, Bikenge is a significant centre for gold
production, taken out through Kama. To the north of Maniema, diamond quarrying has been
referred to near Lubutu. Maiko Park contains gold mines. Grégoire Kayobo, a former Simba,
who fought alongside Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 1964, still has his power base here.
n Information about Maniema remains sparse. It would be helpful to carry out field research, so
as better to understand the mining economy in an area in which the mineral production passes
through the Kivus.
1.6 The Ituri and Upper Uélé Mining Sites
Mining activity is less scattered here than in North and South Kivu. It is confined to gold-mining
in the huge gold-bearing basin which stretches to the north-west of Bunia, near two large centres
of production, Mongbwalu in Ituri and Durba in Upper Uélé. Control of the gold mines has been
at the heart of extremely violent armed conflicts among various political and military groups
between 2002 and 2004. Human Rights Watch has analysed these events in a well-referenced
report published in 2005.46
Like all the other nationalised Zairean companies, OKIMO was unable to escape predatory
management. Having sub-leased its concessions to sub-contractors, it turned to seeking
partnerships with international groups. Ashanti Goldfields acquired parts of Kilo-Moto Mining
International, but, like for Banro, the period extending from Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s military
campaign in 1996-1997 up until the retreat of Ugandan forces in 2003 was one of risk-filled
tribulations. During the rebellion, the RCD-ML leader, Mbusa Nyamwisi, a dissident from
RCD-Goma, played a key role in mining affairs.47 A joint venture was finally negotiated in 2003
for the exploitation of Concession 40, which covered 8,191 sq. km around Mongbwalu. AGK
(AngloGold Ashanti Kilo) brought together OKIMO (13.787%) and Anglo-Gold (86.22%).
Gold has whetted the appetites of all the parties involved in the regional conflicts, such as the
looting by the Ugandan armed forces, denounced in the first UN panel of experts report, as well as
the ethnic conflict between the Hema and Lendu over land and fishing rights. The withdrawal of
the Ugandan troops left the field open to militias who fought for control of Mongbwalu in 2002-
2003. The Hema of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) led by Thomas Lubanga48 and then
the Lendu of the Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI) sadly distinguished themselves
by carrying out massacres, in particular in Mongbwalu. This recent past, full of violence, has
left its mark, particularly because Anglo-Gold had made agreements with the FNI and with the
return to a more “normal” situation suspicions continue to abound. AGK’s activities have been
confined to exploration and feasibility studies on the one hand and some social good will actions
46 Human Rights Watch (2005). Op. cit.
47 Mbusa Nyamwisi, a Nande, became minister during the Transition and has held a ministerial portfolio ever since.
48 Thomas Lubenga was one of the first to be arrested for war crimes and referred to the IPC.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 21
on the other, such as renovating the hospital and paying salaries owing in the health, education
and energy sectors. Relaunching production is not envisaged before 2011 – the current crisis is
not likely to speed things up.
n The gaps in information about Upper Uélé call for field research, especially now that the LRA
has become involved in mineral trading, according to various sources.
1.7 The challenge of quantifying the mining industry
It is not possible at the present time to know with any acceptable degree of accuracy what
quantity of mineral ore is being produced and exported. The principal difficulties in establishing
any quantitative measurement of the mining economy include:
• The multiplicity of organisations involved in the regulation of production and export of
minerals, and the lack of coordination between them;49
• Deficiencies in handling statistical data, which helps to keep the mining economy in a state of
deliberate obscurity, thus encouraging fraudulent activities;
• Administrative fraud: under-declaration of quantities exported and falsification of documents
by the customs service; smuggling across borders, particularly of gold.
Using the example of wolframite exported through Goma in 2006, the Pole Institute illustrated
the statistical discrepancies among the various administrative services:
OFIDA 392 t Mining Division 401 t
OCC 268 t Foreign Trade 295 t
OFIDA’s 2006 data for North Kivu is incomplete: it totals the exports through Goma and Kasindi,
but doesn’t include those through Bunagana and Ishasa, due to the insecurity caused by fighting
between the FARDC, FDLR and Mai Mai.
Mined mineral exports from North Kivu in 2006 (OFIDA)
Weight Value in US$
Cassiterite (t.) 2 968 7 065 123
Wolframite (t.) 483 1 063 567
Coltan (t.) 41 217 558
Niobium (t.) 8 17 136
Gold (kg) 9 109 918
In addition to this uncertainty over production, mining potential is also unclear, due either to the
mining companies’ cult of secrecy or to a lack of basic knowledge. Estimates of tantalum reserves
therefore vary widely, as much as from 15% to 60% of world reserves.
Researchers attempting to quantify the volumes and value of minerals turn to various indirect
methods:
• Estimating the number of flights by small transport aircraft serving the mining areas, on the
basis that they carry 2 tonnes on each flight;
• Comparing the results of surveys conducted with miners, traders and trading houses, but only
a small number of mines, such as Bisié, are documented in this way, which means that without
49 See Chapter 3. Key actors in trade, administrative services.
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22 International Alert
thorough research, extrapolations represent little more than statistical tinkering;
• Research downstream in the marketing chain: unlike the DRC, Rwandan foreign trade
ministries properly maintain statistics and they can be considered reliable. Administrative
organs in Uganda and Burundi are not as capable as those in Rwanda, but their statistical data
are nevertheless usable;
• Surveys conducted with transporters;
• Using figures for foreign trade from major data banks (EUROTRACE, TRADEMAP,
EUROSTAT, etc.), which unfortunately are not consistent;
• Analysing data provided by European, American and Asian companies importing minerals
from the Great Lakes region in Africa.
Estimates of production/export mentioned in reports are invariably fragmentary. The most recent
study (April 2009), Trading conflict for development,50 gives the following figures for production,
based on data from the Mining Division in Goma and from the FEC (Federation of Business
Enterprises in the DRC) in Bukavu. The authors apply a coefficient of 35% to these figures to
account for smuggling. This coefficient is itself an estimate.
Export of minerals from Kivu, 2007 and 2008 (in tonnes)
2007 + 35% 2008 + 35%
Cassiterite 13 656 18 435 18 216 24 592
Wolframite 1 095 1 479 652 880
Tantalum 267 360 383 517
The Pole Institute has produced estimates covering a longer period (1999-2006) that show
production trends for each mineral: the temporary boom of coltan, the spectacular rise of
cassiterite, and more recently of wolfram (tungsten), and the collapse of niobium in Lueshe. These
figures are, however, far from reflecting real production volume because of widespread fraud.
Year Cassiterite Coltan Wolframite Niobium
1999 71 5 5
2000 23 15 15 22
2001 550 90 28 605
2002 497 28 28 1339
2003 938 26 26 670
2004 4 672 42 42 386
2005 3 599 26 26 91
2006 2 909 39 401 9
Source: Pole Institute, 2007
n In conclusion, the statistical problem remains unsolved. The collection of quantitative data
on the volume of mining production does not allow for reliable quantification throughout the
area under study.
n A quantitative evaluation of production requires a method of cross-checking data that is
yet to be constructed on the basis of administrative data, the FEC and field research among
producers and transporters. Given the lack of centralisation, the poor reliability of statistics
and the dispersal of mining sites, such research would need to be localised and would not
provide a full picture. Smuggling will always be the blind spot of quantification attempts.
50 N. Garrett and H. Mitchell (2009). Op.cit.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 23
Chapter 2: The System of Production
Summary:
The informal nature of mining production does not prevent it from being highly structured. The system
is based on exploiting the labour of thousands of miners and imposing a whole series of charges by
those persons – military or civilian – intervening all along the chain, from mine to trading house.
Diggers, shovelers, and porters all work with rudimentary tools and bare muscle power under the
watch of team leaders or soldiers. The various armed groups, just like the Congolese Army (FARDC),
all take an active part in the predatory process.
The muddle between customary law and modern law leads to legal confusion, a potential source of
conflict. The international companies (Banro Group, AngloGold Ashanti) that have replaced SOMINKI
and OKIMO are slow to launch activities in an insecure environment. Their arrival raises questions
about the future of the miners and the coexistence of artisanal mining and industrial exploitation.
For the reasons given in Chapter 1, mineral production in the Kivus and in Orientale Province
remains entirely artisanal in the absence of the large international groups. Their return is delayed
by endemic insecurity and, since 2008, by the world economic crisis that provoked a major
decrease in the prices of raw materials, with the exception of gold.
Although the artisanal mining is considered to be part of the “informal sector”, it is nonetheless
highly organised. All economic actors take part in a system with its own internal coherence and
its rules, even if it functions in the margins of official legality, with the force of armed groups.
Various contradictions flow from this, particularly between the customary and administrative
authorities, but it also creates hybrid forms of management linking tradition and modernity
within the framework of local institutional improvisations.
The production of minerals remains at the hunter-gatherer economy stage prevailing at the
beginning of the colonial period. An unlimited labour force works with rudimentary tools and
depends completely on its own muscle power to dig out from the soil the products that will be
exported in their raw state or, at best, having undergone a first stage of processing in the trading
houses. (Since 2007, in principle the only trading houses to receive authorisation are those that
are equipped with magnetic separators and concentrators that give added value to metals of the
tin group.)
The same artisanal extraction methods are used in Kivu, Ituri and all other regions of the DRC
engaged in mining activity, whether it is the Kasais or Katanga. The digger is a national figure,
with some specialists estimating there are as many as two million artisanal miners in the whole
country. Mining in the eastern part of the DRC differs from that in other mining regions:
• All of production depends on the work of the diggers;
• Social and ethnic tensions are exacerbated by land disputes, the resentment by “locals”
towards “outsiders” and the legacy of violence in Rwanda spilling into eastern Kivu. The
spread of artisanal labour has occurred in this context, which has favoured the militarisation
of the economy.
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2.1 Property rights, prospecting rights and exploitation rights:
Confusion, uncertainty, overlapping and “local arrangements”
A blurry legal situation
Knowing who owns a mine may appear to be very simple but this is far from the case. In reality,
it is highly complex because of overlapping legal systems. Like everywhere in Sub-Saharan Africa,
customary law and modern law, as it emerged from colonisation, clash head on. The transposition
of European property rights to a society where access to land depends on other criteria than
private property has encountered resistance from the traditional authorities in the countryside.
In those chiefdom-based societies in eastern Kivu, the mwami are the holders of property rights,
which they concede to “land chiefs” or “hill chiefs”; these chiefs’ legitimacy is based on the right
of being the first occupant, a right that is inherited. The colonial administration relied on the
traditional chiefs by giving them administrative responsibilities. The creation of the Republic
weakened their authority as it deprived them, from a legal point of view, of their prerogatives over
land. The Bakajika Law of 1966, as amended by the 1973 Land Act, effectively attributed to the
state full legal power over the land and what lay beneath it as well as exclusive jurisdiction over
land transactions. There is a vast difference between what is written and practice, particularly in
a failing state unable to apply its own laws.
In territories far away from Kinshasa, increasingly isolated because of the collapse of the transport
infrastructure, customary chiefs have retained real power and they continue to insist on their
leading role in regulating land ownership. Yet they are well-informed about the legal procedures
for accessing property and adept at playing both systems for obtaining land titles. A double
system of law persists, therefore, which adds to confusion over land status and leads in practice
to opening up the land market and creating a new class of landowners of “big men” farmers,
especially cattle-farmers, traders, politicians and senior army officers. Transactions in land titles
tend to vary according to political changes. Under the RCD-Goma administration, Rwandans,
mainly Tutsi, were favoured. A document drawn up by the customary authorities of Kalehe
territory in 2004 criticised the anarchic sales of land with the ‘complicity of the provincial and
cadastral authorities and Land Affairs in Bukavu’. They added a list of purchasers, which included
a DRC deputy and the governor of North Kivu, Eugène Serufuli. Photocopies of documents of the
sale of land titles and of long-term leases were added to support the memorandum’s arguments,
which called for restoring the rights of Mwami Ntale IV of the Buhavu chieftainship.51 A great
number of memoranda are produced by civil society, including local associations and NGOs,
giving a first-hand feel for the local reality and the conflicts of interest. One of the main problems
is how to clarify land disputes, which have multiplied since the displacements of people caused
by the wars.52 This is a particularly complex task because of the lack of transparency of cadastral
services and the endless disagreements between the rightful owners and those actually occupying
the land.
n Landowning interests interfere with mining interests.
The hill and the carré [square]
Mining has introduced a new legal element, since mining rights are distinct from land rights.
According to the 2002 Code, the mining registry has precedence over the land registry. If mining
licences are granted, land title holders are limited to claiming compensation. Since in most cases
customary chiefs do not possess land titles, this opens the way to negotiations or to a power
struggle. In the eastern DRC, the customary chiefs who proclaim themselves “owners of the hill”
argue that they have the right to exploit the minerals or to receive rental income. The “hill” has
51 Entente des ressortissants du territoire de Kalehe “EREKA”, Memorandum des notables du territoire de Kalehe à l’intention de son excellence
Monsieur le Président de la République Démocratique du Congo à Kinshasa [Memorandum of the Kalehe territory notables to his excellence
the President of the DRC in Kinshasa], 4th May 2004.
52 S. Mugangu Matabaro (2008). ‘La crise foncière à l’est de la RDC’ [The land crisis in eastern DRC]. L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Yearbook
2007–2008, pp. 385–414.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 25
no legal existence as far as the Mining Code is concerned.53 A mining right is only acceptable
under the Mining Code if it is registered with the Mining Registry (CAMI). Mining regulations54
include all the technical considerations governing boundaries within the country.
The basic surveying unit is the square (carré). The sides of the square, lying east-west or northsouth
correspond to ‘an angular distance of 30 seconds in geographical coordinates as represented
on the official maps of the whole country, produced by the Geographical Institute of the Congo
on a scale of 1/200,000’ (Article 39 of the mining regulations). Each square covers an area of
84,955 hectares. Admirably precise, considering the state of cartographical coverage. Boundaries
for mining concessions and exploration permits are determined by these squares. As for artisanal
mining, the Ministry of Mines defines the zones for artisanal exploitation and notifies the Mining
Registry, which marks them on the mining resources maps (Article 109 of the Mining Code). Article
109 also stipulates that a ‘Perimeter with a currently valid mining title cannot be transformed into
an artisanal exploitation zone’.
The situation on the ground the situation is quite removed from a Code that doesn’t apply to the
Congolese context. Almost all the artisanal exploitations in the eastern DRC are outside the law,
because
• Not a single artisanal exploitation zone has been defined in recently-opened mines (also called
quarry or work area);
• Miners rarely officially declared;
• A large number of sites being exploited are located within concessions theoretically protected
by mining titles.
The overlapping of hill and square creates legal situations of a hybrid nature and often leads to
disputes quarry miners, permit holders and land “owners”. The Pole Institute gives an example in
the Masisi with the reminder that these conflicts are not new, that rights are acquired by payment
in this jungle, where the survival of the fittest is the norm, where ‘cows are now replaced by the
famous “mining squares” for the exploitation of coltan’.55 The reality on the ground is always
very complex. In the Masisi, the Mumba/Bibatama mine, for example, comprises three squares
rich in cassiterite, coltan and wolframite. One is exploited by the Hizi International Company,
and it seems that the owner, Senator Mwangachuchu, is the only one to hold a production licence.
The formal sector, in good standing with the Mining Code, thus coexists with the informal sector.
One type of arrangement between legal and illegal actors: The Bisié mine
The economic issues provoked by the Bisié mine illustrate the ways in which the two levels of law
overlap and in which international and local groups compete.56 After the wealth of mining site had been
discovered, two trading houses in Goma began to compete for their share in its economic exploitation,
the Groupe Minier Bangandula (GMB) and the Mining and Processing Congo (MPC). The GMB was set
up by local shareholders, led by Alexis Makabuza (with 50% of the shares), one of the most prominent
men in Goma politico-business circles and close to Laurent Nkunda. The MPC was associated with
the Metal Processing Association (MPA), supplier of the tin foundry in Gisenyi. Both companies are
subsidiaries of the South African group, Kivu Resources, based in Mauritius.
On site, each company allied itself with an influential customary chief from one of the four families
who claimed to hold land rights: the Bangandula family for the GMP and the Bassa family for the
MPC. Both of these chiefs claimed to be “chief of the hill” by dint of their “right of first occupant”. On
the legal front, GMB signed a leasing contract with Sakima in October 2005 covering 7 concessions,
including Biruwe that was supposed to include Bisié. During 2006, GMB took “possession” of the mine
after signing a contract with the Administrator of Walikale territory to ensure the safety of its staff,
53 Code minier. Loi n° 007/2002 of 11th July 2002. Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 15th July 2002.
54 Règlement minier, Décret n° 038/2003 of 26th March 2003, Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 1st April 2003.
55 A. Tegera (Ed.) (2002). Op. cit.
56 N. Garrett (2008). Op. cit.
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26 International Alert
and above all after reaching an understanding with the non-integrated 85th Brigade which had de
facto control over the mining zone. As for MPC, after proving by Global Positioning Satellite that Bisié
was outside the concession, it obtained an exploration licence in September 2006 covering the area in
dispute.
The chiefs of the hill from the Bangandula and Bassa families ended up reaching an understanding
and signing an agreement with the MPC, which promised to give them a percentage of its revenues.
The 85th Brigade, for its part, guaranteed the functioning of the system and a minimum of security, in
exchange for a share of the production as it left the mine. Their interests were more complementary
than conflictual between the “legal” actors, such as the MPC, who observed the Mining Code, and
those actors basing themselves on customary law or on the force of arms.
n The period of disturbances, along with the informalisation of the Congolese state, aggravated
legal uncertainties. This opened the doors to all kinds of arrangements between the different
forms of local power (civil servants, customary chiefs, militia, local politicians, and security
forces) and Congolese businessmen. Gaining “ownership” of a mining site is never a permanent,
but rather a changing compromise between local powers.
2.2 Rights of international mining groups: Old and new actors
Since Mobutu was overthrown in 1997, civil wars, a transition with labyrinthine-like negotiations,
and the long time taken to set up new institutions all had serious consequences for both the old and
new mining companies, which were slow to launch their operations. Despite all the uncertainties,
new mining groups that had no past history to live down entered the stage and gambled on the
future by taking up positions in the Kivus.
The disputed legacy of SOMINKI
The sale of SOMINKI gave rise to a legal imbroglio with which Congo-Zaire was all too familiar.
Envisaged from 1986 onwards by the Empain Group, it was not concluded until ten years later,
in 1996, by its sale to the Canadian group Banro and the Belgian company Mines d’or de Zaire
(MDDZ). After buying out MDDZ’s share, Banro set up the Société Aurifère du Kivu-Maniema
(SAKIMA). Legally confirmed by a decree dated 6 May 1997, just ten days before the fall of
Mobutu, Banro became the holder of 47 concessions covering a total of over 10,000 sq. km
representing SOMINKI’s holdings, and included six gold-bearing concessions – Kamituga (3),
Lugushua, Namoya and Twangitza.
The liquidation of SOMINKI was carried out amidst great confusion as a result of the political
situation – the AFDL’s military campaign and looting of the company’s buildings and stocks,
then Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s accession to power. Mainly interested in gold, Banro decided not
to become directly involved in the tin-bearing concessions. In October 1997, SAKIMA signed
a leasing agreement with the Ressources Minérales Africaines (RMA), a Kinshasa company
belonging to the Belgian-American, Bernard Van Rooyen. RMA’s management was put in the
hands of a well-known Goma businessman, Victor Ngezayo, a mixed-race Tutsi.57
Banro’s decision to withdraw from the tin side of its business, the calling into question of contracts
signed by Mobutu during the war of liberation led by Kabila, and no doubt Kabila’s increasing
hostility towards the Rwandan leaders, led him to abrogate the decree that established SAKIMA
by another decree of 29July 1998 – on the eve of the unleashing of the second war. On the same
57 His brother, Albert, had been assassinated in March 2008, perhaps as a result of confusion on the part of the killers. In any case, he had
not been involved in mining and political affairs, unlike his brother Victor. Victor wanted his rights recognised, or to sell them. During the
rebellion, he kept his distance from the RCD-Goma, by creating his own political party. Regardless, assassinations and other settling of
political scores are common in the Congolese “Far East”, and add to the endemic insecurity there.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 27
day, a new company, Société Minière du Congo (SOMINCO) was created, followed on 31 July by
the loss of all Banro’s mining rights, reclaimed by the Congolese state. It is not insignificant that
the nomination as administrator-delegate of SOMINKO was won by the mwami of Luhwinja,
Philemon Naluhwindja, who had never stopped claiming his rights over the land attributed to the
concessions. Customary authorities remain one of the active forces in this complex game which
links economic interests, legal claims and political posturing.
The Congolese actors were not, however, in control of a game subject to international rules. The
case between Banro and the Congolese state was taken to the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington. The war generated enormous confusion, but
afterwards the situation returned to normal, at least legally, and Banro’s concessions were restored
(April 2003 decision), although the dispute between Banro and the RMA had not been settled.
The legal situation may have been clarified in principle, but work at the mines was limited to
some preparations for exploitation. While the lawyers and experts battled things out in the gilded
rooms of international justice, tens of thousands of diggers were digging up the ground on the
concession-holder’s lands.
SOMIKIVU: A confused situation and an uncertain future
La Société des Mines du Kivu, set up in 1982, brought together the Congolese state (20%), the
German company Gesellschaft für Elektrometallurgie (GFE) (70%) and the Belgian company
Cofimines (10%). GFE was a subsidiary of the American Metallurg, whose main shareholder,
according to David Barouski, was the Safeguard International Fund based in Wayne, Pennsylvania.58
In 2006, Metallurg took over the Dutch company Advanced Metallurgical Group (AMG), whose
supervisory board included, according to Barouski, many influential political and financial
personalities. In the DRC, as the last link of the chain of the politico-financial networks of the
great powers, the role of Director-General of SOMIKIVU was taken by Modeste Makabuza, one
of the leading businessmen in Goma; his brother, Alexis, said to be close to Laurent Nkunda, was
also active in the mining sector through the Bangandula Group.
SOMIKIVU had been inactive since 1993, as all the expatriate staff had left due to the climate of
insecurity caused by the inter-ethnic massacres. Activity resumed during the period that the RCDGoma
was in charge in the area, under the direction of Karl-Heinz Albers, with the England-based
Niobium Mining Company (NMC), providing technical assistance. The legal position became
complicated, when the Congolese state granted Krall Metal Congo (KMC), a company set up in
1999 in Kinshasa, GFE’s (6th April 1999 decision). After the “reunification”, Krall Metal tried to
assert its rights with the help of Kinshasa, who saw this as an opportunity to restore its authority
in Kivu by weakening the legacy of the RCD that had profited from a company involved in the
looting of resources. Facing legal proceedings, Karl-Heinz Albers resigned in March 2004 and
delegated his powers to Julien Boillot, an officer of the Niobium Mining Company, who in turn
delegated them to Modeste Makabuza. According to a 2001 UN Report, he was on good terms
with Paul Kagame. His company, Jumbo Safari, took part in the transporting of mineral ores.
NMC’s purchase of the tin foundry in Kigali in 2003 strengthened ties with Rwanda.
The SOMIKIVU manager announced a resumption of production in 2007. But in fact nothing
happened for several reasons, including the continuing armed violence and lack of security, the
increasing difficulties to access the mine because of the deterioration of the road infrastructure,
the chronic lack of electricity, and declining world demand for pyrochlore which did not justify
significant investment in a country at risk.
The waltz of contracts for Kilo Moto
The history of the ownership of the Kilo Moto gold mines has been particularly turbulent.
In 1991, Kilo-Moto Mining International (KIMIN) signed a contract with OKIMO for
58 D . Barouski ‘The case of the Lueshe Mine’, ZSpace, 27th July 2008. Available at http://www.zmag.org/zspace/commentaries/3566.
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28 International Alert
2,000 sq. km around Mongwalu. In 1996, Ashanti Goldfields bought KIMIN’s share, but in 1997,
Laurent-Désiré Kabila unilaterally annulled this contract and granted it to Russell Resources
International (Australia). Mbusa Nyamwisi, then head of the RCD-ML before he became a
minister during the transition, awarded the management of the state enterprise OKIMO to a
Mr Kiza, who leased his concessions to members of his family. In 2000, a new contract was
signed between Ashanti and OKIMO, which led to the creation of a joint venture (AngloGold
Ashanti Kilo – AGK), and in 2001, Ashanti obtained rights over the whole concession 40. The
joint venture has held rights over this concession since 2003 – OKIMO 13.78% and Anglo
86.22%. AGK returned to the area in 2004, but had “dubious relations” with the FNI, which
were reported in the international press – medical care for militia members, giving a house to a
militia chief and money transfers – and forced the company to denounce these practices.59 The
state’s reestablishment of control in Mongbwalu, an area much disputed between militias, was
achieved thanks to MONUC via the deployment of a Pakistani infantry battalion in 2005 and
to one of the first integrated brigades of the FARDC. Between 2005 and 2007, AGK carried out
exploration and feasibility studies with plans to begin production only in 2011 because of the lack
of infrastructure. From then on, the problem was no longer the armed groups, but the artisanal
miners who were in physical control of the mineral deposits. In December 2007, the Governor of
Orientale Province, Médard Autsai Asenga, announced the closure of the Adidi mine for ‘reasons
of health and security’. This represented a manoeuvre to allow the AGK to physically regain
control of the site with the help of the police, who blocked entry to it.
The newcomers
The likelihood that the political situation in the DRC would be normalised, together with the sharp
rise in minerals prices, cassiterite among others, between 2004 and 2008 attracted international
companies, that had hitherto not been present in the DRC. These newcomers have obtained
rights, but have so far not yet begun prospection.
This is the case, for example, of Shamika Resources Inc., a company registered in Canada, which
calls itself a junior mining company, aiming to promote sustainable development for the benefit
of the population through developing mining. It set up a Congolese subsidiary in January 2007,
Shamika Congo Kalehe Sprl, and opened an office in Goma. According to its website,60 it has
acquired mining rights in North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Orientale Province and Katanga.
It holds three licences in Maniema in the Punia-Lubutu region. In South Kivu the company holds
licences on the island of Idjwi and in Kalehe. In North Kivu, it has designs on Walikale territory,
in Orientale on the Poko site, in Katanga on Manono, which was once the centre of the industrial
exploitation of tin in the DRC. In all, it holds 15 exploration licenses.
Transafrika, a company under Mauritian law, with a majority holding of South African capital,
holds exploration licences in the south of South Kivu, but has not yet begun prospecting.
At the beginning of 2009, a Russian company, Congo Russian Industry, a subsidiary of
Rosspetssplav, declared its intention to relaunch production of niobium in North Kivu. A holding
company, based in Luxembourg, Midural Inc., owns the Congolese shares and the Congolese
Foreign Affairs Minister paid a visit to Russia. Russian penetration in this sector has already
encountered some problems: the Congolese authorities confiscated a consignment of niobium on
the grounds that the ore came from an area previously controlled by the CNDP.61
n Since the informal economy has become deeply rooted in social practice since 1982, the return
of industrial companies poses in an acute way the question of the future of the diggers in all
mining regions of the DRC.
59 Human Rights Watch (2005). Op. cit.
60 Shamika Resources. Available at http://www.shamikaresources.com/overview.cfm
61 Africa Mining Intelligence, 29th April 2009.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 29
n Like Katanga, Kivu is also subject to major manoeuvring by international groups dominating
the mining sector. An overall view requires research into the delivery of rights by mining
authorities.
2.3 Armed groups and territorial control of the mines
• Armed groups are crucial actors in the economic system of mining, as has been illustrated by
the many UN enquiries and also those of NGOs working for peace and respect for human
rights.62 The remarkable cartographic work by IPIS located the positions of the different armed
groups during the period from September 2007 to January 2008. Since then, major changes
took place after the fighting during the summer and autumn of 2008 and above all after the
military events of the winter of 2009. These included the arrest of Laurent Nkunda in January,
followed by the integration of the CNDP troops into the FARDC and the joint offensive by
Rwanda and the DRC against FDLR soldiers. After fleeing into the depths of the forest, the
FDLR are now ready to make a come-back, which could have disastrous consequences for the
village people.
• The FDLR63 are present in North and South Kivu, with a strong concentration of their troops
in the “Little North”, where their headquarters are based in Kalonge. They are mainly located
in the forest areas, particularly along the edges of the national parks and nature reserves, such
asVirunga, Kahuzi Biega and Tayna. The forest is an especially important a refuge for that
section of the FDLR made up of old Hutu militias interahamwe, who live in fear of being
judged and condemned as perpetrators of genocide if they return to Rwanda. According to
the expert group’s preliminary report, they make several million dollars, through their direct
control of many production sites. (75% of their income comes from trade in mineral ores.)
They control most of the artisanal sites of South Kivu except Kamituga (cassiterite, gold and
coltan), gold deposits to the west of Lubero and cassiterite in the Walikale area in North Kivu,
the Unde mine in the “Great North” and other sites in the Kahuzi-Biega Park on the border
between the two Kivus. The 3rd battalion of the FDLR-FOCA is present in the Kilembwe area
and receives a share of the gold and cassiterite.
• The CNDP has established itself around Masisi and in the Rutshuru region where the “Congolese
Tutsi” are the most numerous. These are areas devoted to agro-pastoral activities with few mining
sites. In 2007 and 2008, when the CNDP, fresh from its military successes, was strengthening its
positions, it organised a parallel taxation system for its own benefit at the border posts of Ishasa
and Bunangana. Like all the other armed bands, it levied its taxes at all the road barriers erected
on the main roads.64 The CNDP has also been present at some coltan sites and at the Lueshe
mine. According to the UN, only 15% of its income comes from mining activities.
• The Mai Mai and other local militias adopted an old self-defence tradition of rural communities.
Under the leadership of a Nande, General Sikuli Lafontaine, PARECO brought together several
“indigenous” ethnic groups, particularly the Hunde, Nyanga and Temba, already allied during
the interethnic massacres, in which they fought against the Banyawarandas, joined by the
Havus and a few Hutus. The December 2008 UN experts’ report considered them to be the
third largest armed group. Quite attached to their independence but at the same time easily
manipulated by political leaders, their alliances changed constantly; the only point all the
Mai Mai groups had in common was a visceral rejection of “outsiders”, especially the Tutsi.
Disputes over land, rather than mining, were at the centre of the fighting by the Pareco, who
denounced what seemed to them to be the creation of a “Tutsiland” and opposed the return of
62 See map of Armed Groups in Kivu.
63 See map of FDLR locations.
64 S.S. Andrew (2008). Laurent Nkunda et la rébellion du Kivu. Au coeur de la guerre congolaise [Laurent Nkunda and the Kivu Rebellion – at the
heart of the Congolese war]. Paris: Karthala.
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30 International Alert
Tutsi refugees. In Shabunda and in the extreme north of Kahele, the PARECO deployed units
at the mining sites. The Mai Mai, like all the armed groups, took part in the general system of
extortion in exchange for “protecting” mines situated in areas under their control, especially
in the “Little North” and in exacting taxes at the road barriers set up along the main routes.
• The FARDC: In the Kivus and Ituri the Congolese army has found an ideal opportunity as
predators in the mining economy. In the mines and along the roads, soldiers levy illegal taxes,
said to be destined to the military hierarchy in Bukavu. Several brigades join in and profit from
the militarisation of artisanal mining activity:65
-- The 18th integrated Brigade controls the landing strip in Lulingu in South Kivu used
exporting minerals from Kahuzi Biega.
-- The 122nd Brigade controls Kamituga and the road between Mwenga and Kitutu in
South Kivu.
-- Soldiers from the 12th battalion of the FARDC exploit gold from the Mufa mine) and
cassiterite from Karhembu in Tubimbi in the Walungu territory (South Kivu).
-- The 11th integrated Brigade controls Shabunda, the town from where exports left for
Bukavu.
-- The 6th Brigade from South Kivu controls Mobale Mine.
-- The 85th Brigade, commanded by Colonel Samy Matumo, controlled the area around
Walikale and in particular the coltan mine in Bisié, at two days journey on foot from
Walikale, which produced 70% of the cassiterite reaching the trading houses in Goma.
This brigade was replaced by elements of the CNDP after the Congolese-Rwandan
operation of early 2009.
-- Soldiers have been involved in the exploitation of cassiterite in Lemera in South Kivu.
-- A brigade was deployed in Mongbwalu in Ituri.
-- The FARDC is also present at mining sites in Kamole and Nyamkinga on the Island of
Idjwi on Lake Kivu.
The mining sites attracted and still attract the greed of the armed groups. Ituri provides a good
illustration of the fight for gold between armed groups: the Ituri militia (UPC, FNI, and FAPC)
fought each other for the control of the gold deposits. The FAPC and the FNI clashed over the
control of Djalasiga. The UPC held Mongbwalu up until 2003 and were then replaced by the
FNI, who were succeeded by the first brigade of the FARDC to be deployed in Ituri. At the time
they dominated, the FNI imposed an entry fee at the mine on the diggers and began to exchange
arms for gold, blemishing the UN peacekeepers’ reputation. It should be recalled that in their first
deployment in Ituri in 2005, the Congolese Army immediately established itself at the mining sites
of Mongbwalu and Bambu, from where they drove off the local militia by force, with no regard
for the local civilian population.66 Clashes between FDLR and FADRC also occurred in 2005 over
the control of Mwenga in South Kivu.
It should, however, be noted that the armed forces present did not carry on a permanent mining
war. They could make agreements to divide the profits from a production site and seek a partial
economic balance. What happened on the ground was in fact much more complicated than might
be expected from hostility between rival groups. Before “Operation Kimia II”, the Shabunda area
was peacefully “shared” between the 4th Battalion of the FDLR-FOCA, the Mai Mai and the
FARDC. The mining production zone was under the control of the FDLR, while the local airports
were under the FADRC’s control, which meant the two sides had to cooperate. The Numbi
mine in the north of South Kivu that produces cassiterite, coltan, manganese and tourmaline,
was “shared”. This large mining area was a source of income for the RCD and for Rwanda
during the military occupation.67 IPIS reported at the time of its enquiry in February 2007 that
65 Global Witness (2009). Face à un fusil, que peut-on faire ? La guerre et la militarisation du secteur minier dans l’Est du Congo [What can you do
in the face of a rifle? War and militarisation of the mining sector in eastern Congo]. London: Global Witness.
66 Justice Plus (2007). Ituri: l’armée n’a pas fait la différence.
67 The Report of the Group of Experts of 12th April 2001 mentioned the fact that the Patriotic Rwandan Army was using 1,500 prisoners to
exploit coltan in the area around Numbi.
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Numbi was controlled by the 14th integrated Brigade. Military units from PARECO and the
FDLR were stationed in the villages around the mining area, each one levying a percentage of
the production. The CNDP, a new arrival and common enemy, also no doubt profited from the
mining exploitation. The owners of the mining sites are mostly Congolese Tutsi, the main operator
being – like in Mumba – Edouard Mwangachuchu, one of the strongest supporters of the CNDP.
Therefore, arrangements exist for embezzling mining resources, arrangements that transcend
military outcomes, and whose main beneficiaries are the “big men” – military or civilian. This
logic of dividing up the economic spoils works particularly among the three forces mentioned
(FARDC, Mai Mai and FDLR), although such arrangements are always unstable.
n The armed groups and the FARDC exercise tight territorial control over the main mining sites.
Only secondary mining sites escape from their grip. This territorial hold is both their strength
and their weakness.68 Still, this is not a “blood diamonds” scenario, where the local people
are reduced to slavery in order to dig in the mines.
n The FARDC’s substantial involvement in the mining trade made the army a “self-generating
revenue agency”, whose highly-placed beneficiaries of this racket carefully remain in the
shadows. This involvement has generated a veritable mafia within the high-ranking military.
n The FARDC’s substantial involvement in the mining trade is a factor slowing down their
“integration” and therefore the reform of the army (since they prefer to stay where they are).
n Certain troop movements after the Congolese-Rwandan operation can be interpreted as
changes in military control over mining sites, such as the CNDP in Bisié and the aborted shift
of the CNDP towards Shabunda to take over the mining sites).
2.4 An organised and hierarchical work force
Exploitation techniques
Numerous studies have described the organisation of work in the mines, ranging from the
Pole Institute in 2001 up to the detailed analysis of the Bisié mine in 2008. The mines function
somewhat differently, according to whether it is a quarry in an alluvial area, an open-cast mine
or an underground mine. The tools are invariably rudimentary, picks and shovels, hammers to
break up the blocks of ore or to chisel the rock, basins and jerry cans, punctured for goldwashing.
Mining galleries can be several dozen metres deep, with or without props, depending
on the nature of the rock. The work is exhausting and dangerous. Several films provide a good
illustration of this, such as L’or noyé de Kamituga [The drowned gold of Kamituga]69 or the
recent Katanga Business.70
Artisanal gold-mining techniques
Two types of gold are mined in Mongbwalu: dry gold (90% to 95% purity) and amalgam gold (82-90%
purity). Before the Adidi deposit was closed, 35-40 kg of gold a month were produced there (25% dry
gold and 75% amalgam gold). Several mining methods are used:
• Underground in three old industrial mines (Adidi, Senzere and Makala). The largest was in Adidi, 4
km from Mongbwalu, with about 2,000 diggers before its closure in 2007, and 5,000 workers total,
including porters, pulverisers, etc.
• Pit mining: 365 in Concession 40 and 33 near Mongbwalu
• Alluvial mining: dredgers (some traders have obtained them) or changing the course of streams
68 See Chapter 3.
69 Yvon Lammens and Colette Braeckman (2007). Op. cit.
70 Katanga Business (2009), film by Thierry Michel.
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32 International Alert
There are two systems of gold exploitation in Kamituga: open-pit mining, in which mud is filtered into
receiving basins by the gold-washers; underground exploitation that involves blasting with dynamite
and retaining galleries propped up with wooden poles – resulting in many work accidents. There are
several systems of production/commercialisation: gold-washers sell their product to the owners of
the outra or they are employed by the doyen or “guard” or they work directly for the trading agencies.
As a general rule, the exploitation is strictly manual, with some help from motorised pumps to
speed up the flow. Only one company, Hizi International, exploits its coltan mine with machinery
to wash the ore, which represents a technological advance.
The organisation of production units
The organisational structure of mine exploitation includes the “owner” of the mine or the tenant
of the land on which it is situated. A manager, paid by the owner according to a percentage of
the production that is defined by contract supervises the work and collects the ore. Team leaders
organise the work of a dozen people. “Diggers”, are different from “shovelers”. The workplace
is under the surveillance of “policemen” responsible for making sure that the miners do not steal
any ore. In areas controlled by the armed forces, they often carry out this task themselves. The
porters form a separate category. A detailed study, like that by Nicholas Garrett,71 shows that
there exists a hierarchy among the diggers between a small minority of card-holders and the
others. The rock crushers are at the bottom of the labour hierarchy.
The question of how many diggers there are72 remains unclear, since only a small number of them
are complying with the Mining Code, and have purchased their digger’s card. They sometimes
form cooperatives which are not without problems. Organising a cooperative is often beyond the
abilities of the diggers, many of whom are young school leavers, with neither social capital nor
legitimacy. Since they must adhere to certain norms, particularly for accounting, cooperatives are
most often placed under the responsibility more educated people or local notables. For example,
in a document intended to seek funding for artisanal miners and ‘women involved in forest-based
nutritional activities’ the president manager of the Kakelo/Walikale Mining Cooperative is none
other than the owner of the Kakelo “hill”. Experience shows that good intentions do not prevent
the abuse of positions of president or treasurer. Neither does the setting up of cooperatives escape
from manipulation, as the Bisié case demonstrated: both of the rival companies pressed for creating
miners’ cooperatives. GMB was behind the Coopérative Minière Mpama Bisiye (COMIMPA)
and half the members of this cooperative, notably Alexis Makabuza, were shareholders in
the Bangandula Group. MPC reacted by encouraging the creation of a rival cooperative, the
Coopérative des Creuseurs Artisanaux de Bisié (COCABI). In 2007, at the end of negotiations
among those concerned, a compromise was reached protecting the MPC’s commercial interests,
while letting COMIMPA intervene in the production phase. In a country where associations
spring up like mushrooms, the diggers seem poorly organised. Some of them work in small groups
outside the large mining sites, independently, but run the risk of their production being stolen.
Most of them do their work under the control of team leaders, sometimes backed up by armed
men. In social environments where social structure has broken down and where life is a matter of
improvisation, individualism prevails.
n Production techniques are rudimentary and dangerous and could be improved with modest
investment.
n The weakness of the diggers’ collective organisation points to the need for studies on the
sociology of work, which are sorely lacking at present.
71 N. Garrett (2008). Op. cit.
72 See Chapter 5.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 33
Photos of artisanal exploitation techniques
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34 International Alert
Chapter 3: Commercial Trading Systems
Summary:
Since 2000 there have been two commercial trading systems of “conflict minerals”: informal trade
through trading houses and “military commercialism”. Despite the departure of foreign troops on
Congolese soil, military commercialism has not completely disappeared. The FARDC and various
armed groups have taken up this form of trading for themselves, in a less organised way that is
very “decentralised” and parasitical. Mineral trading in the DRC is based on a multimodal system of
communications using porterage, roads and aircraft. The Kivus and Ituri are not only production areas,
they are also export routes for the minerals that come from deep within the Congo in Orientale Province,
Maniema, and North Katanga. The towns on or near the border where the trading houses have been set
up in Goma, Bukavu, Uvira, Beni, Butembo and Bunia fill an essential place in the commercial trading
system. These towns form a bridge between an informal upstream and a downstream linked to the
circuits of the globalised economy.
This trade constitutes an oligopolistic system that benefits an assortment of officials, soldiers, militia
leaders, traders, transporters and foreign intermediaries, which the UN and NGOs have tried to identify
with only partial success.
Described as one, if not the only motive, behind the wars in eastern DRC, the trade in minerals
has been and still is a focus of international attention. While the reports of the Group of Experts,
of IPIS, Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, etc., are essentially aimed at denouncing the
economic basis for the conflicts in the eastern DRC and unmasking the relations between actors in
the international raw materials market and the perpetrators of violence in the DRC, the research
literature attempts to decipher the mechanisms of international trade and its impact, particularly
as it operates in the DRC. Thus this twofold literature moves back and forth between the minerals
trade seen as trafficking (the UN perspective) and this trade seen as one of the manifestations of
the informal economy that dominates the DRC and challenges even the very categories of legality
and illegality. As this trade is largely informal, some writers judge that it is more “non-legal” than
“illegal”.73 It should be noted that of all the minerals traded commercially in the eastern DRC,
coltan has been best documented, for the reason cited above. Given the strength of the market
after the crisis in 2008, the gold is now attracting most attention.
In addition to the reports by the Group of Experts, the following documents are especially useful
for the analysis of the minerals trade in eastern DRC:
• Analysis of trade: publications of the Pole Institute (Mined resources, formal and informal
cross-border trade in eastern DRC), of Resource Consulting Services (Trading conflict for
development), of DfID (Trading for Peace), of INICA, (L’Economie minière au Kivu et ses
implications régionales) and GRAMA, (La route commerciale du coltan congolais);
• Analysis of relations between actors in the conflict and international trade: all Human
Rights Watch publications, (The Curse of Gold), those of IPIS (particularly Cartographie
des motivations derrière les conflits), and of Global Witness (Under-mining peace: tin – the
explosive trade in cassiterite in eastern DRC).
73 On the relevance of the concepts of legality and illegality, as applied to the trade in minerals, see particularly Les ressources minées (Pole
Institute) and Trading conflict for development (Resources Consulting Services). These two studies challenge the relevance of the notion of
illegal exploitation, since in the DRC the informal economy is the way the majority of people survive and for them “legality” is synonymous
to theft by the state.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 35
Various trading systems are used for trading mineral ores in the eastern DRC. They have not so much
emerged successively as they have been superimposed one on top of the other. The trading system
based on artisanal miners coexisted with official industrial commercialisation during the colonial
period and the Mobutu regime. As indicated in Chapter 1, commercial trading based on formal
industrial companies (whether national or foreign) disappeared during the 1990s, swept away by the
general disintegration at the end of the Mobutu regime. This kind of trade has not re-emerged, since
the two large companies that returned to Kivu (Banro) and to Ituri (AngoGold Ashanti) are still in
the study phase and do not trade in artisanal production (confirmed by the UN Group of Experts).
From the time Mobutuism collapsed and the AFDL and RCD appeared, the gap left by the industrial
firms has been filled by largely informal trade of the comptoirs and by “military commercialism”.
These two commercial trading systems reveal the culpable relationships between business, politics
and violence as well as the criminalisation of the minerals trade in this part of the world.
3.1 Two commercial systems
“Military commercialism”74
“Military commercialism” defines the system of exploitation implemented by Uganda and
Rwanda during the two wars (1996-97 and 1998-2002). It was based on the more or less direct
involvement of the army in the commercial minerals trade. Described in detail by the UN Group
of Experts and several NGOs, military commercialism refers to the use of the army in order to
generate direct profits for the political-military elites of Kampala and Kigali. The involvement
of Ugandan and Rwandan army officers in the natural resources trade has been demonstrated
in several reports. An aircraft accident in 1998 in Ituri exposed the presence together of a UPDF
general, Israeli and Indo-pakistani businessmen and family members of James Kazini, Commanderin-
chief of the Ugandan army in the DRC; they were carrying US$1.2 million for buying gold.75
In addition to this accidental revelation, the mineral exports from Uganda (particularly of gold)
and from Rwanda (of coltan) increased significantly after their military intervention in the DRC,
considered to be the result of smuggled exports organised by the two countries’ armies. Similarly,
according to the Group of Experts, Rwanda and Uganda respectively exported US$4.5 million
and US$6.2 million in diamonds to Belgium between 1998 and 2001, although neither country
has any diamond deposits. After the UPDF’s intervention in Ituri, gold exports from Uganda
rose appreciably from 225 kg in 1994 to 6,819 kg in 1997. It should be noted that the Porter
Commission challenged the idea that gold production from the DRC had been seized, arguing
that the variations in the export figures were due to an initial under-estimation of gold production
in Uganda in the official statistics, because of the prevalence of artisanal mining; (90% of artisanal
mining takes place outside Uganda’s legal framework).
This military commercialism took different forms in Kampala and in Kigali
The Rwandan army organised its natural resources grabbing in a highly rational way, while the less
disciplined Ugandan army quickly fell into the trap of this pillage, its officers taking part straight
away as both “public” and private operators. In Rwanda, from the beginning of the first war,
Congolese mineral imports were controlled by the “Congo desk”, an offshoot of the intelligence
services. They are said to have registered US$64 million of coltan in 2000 and US$44 million in
2001 (according to IPIS) and to have reinvested between 60% and 70% of the profits in financing
the war effort. The grabbing of natural resources was directly organised by the Rwandan army:
during the coltan boom (from November 1999 to March 2001), direct flights were made from the
production sites in South Kivu to Kigali. In addition, Rwandan trading companies often included
high-ranking military officers in their staff (Rwanda Metals, Prime Holdings, Caldar Holdings,
TriStar, Rwanda Investment Group). According to the Expert Group, the coltan boom, which
lasted only 18 months, brought in US$250 million to the Rwandan army.
74 Expression invented by IPIS.
75 G. Prunier (1999). ‘L’Ouganda et les guerres congolaises’, Politique africaine, No. 75, pp. 43–62.
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Salim Saleh, the Ugandan President’s brother-in-law, and James Kazini, the general in charge
of the UPDF’s campaign in the DRC, set up several companies in order to channel Congolese
mineral resources towards Kampala; these included Caleb International, a trading company in
Kisangani, and an airline, Air Alexander. As Commander-in-chief, James Kazini sent orders to the
occupying units of the UPDF to give assistance to the Victoria Company. This company, set up in
1999 and managed by Salim Saleh, his wife and Muhoozi Kainerugabe (one of Museveni’s sons),
‘enjoyed the monopoly of coffee, diamond and gold exports in the area under his command’.76
After breaking with Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the Ugandan army, which was present in the Orientale
Province, rapidly took over positions in the gold-bearing areas of the north-east (Durba in the
Haut Uélé district) and Mongbwalu (in the Ituri district) and laid its hands on about one tonne
of gold taken from OKIMO’s concessions. The Ugandan army’s seizing control of the public
company OKIMO’s concessions resulted in intimidation and violence towards the Congolese staff
of the company who did not want to collaborate.
This military commercialism was also carried on through the intermediary of the Congolese armed
movements affiliated to Kigali and Kampala, who took over mining concessions and trading rights.
Tibasima, in Ituri, one of the leaders of the RCD-ML, granted the Trinity Investment company
a tax exemption covering all its trading activities in the area controlled by this movement –
including the transport of gold, coffee and wood from Orientale province to Uganda. During the
coltan boom, RCD-Goma granted a monopoly of export taxes on coltan to the Société Minière
des Grands Lacs (SOMIGL 2000-2001), and later to the Congo Holding Development Company
(CHDC), managed by Gertude Kitembo. These two companies were both commercial arms of
the RCD-Goma.77
This military commercialism was based on the domination of the Ugandan and Rwandan armies
and of their Congolese allies. It follows from this that their performance depended on the territorial
control of the armies. The attempt to control the production of the mining sites in South Kivu
through the CHDC, which in exchange for military protection by the RCD-Goma was supposed
to hand over half of its profits to Kigali, failed. The RCD-Goma controlled only the main roads
from Bukavu but never managed to exert any real control over sites far away from urban centres
and frequently under attack by the FDLR and the Mai Mai. Military commercialism was thus
limited by the degree of territorial control exercised by the armies on the ground.
The Ugandan and Rwandan governments rejected the accusation of military commercialism
levelled at them by the Group of Experts.78 They always attributed this phenomenon to isolated
acts perpetrated by misguided soldiers. President Kagame accepted that some of the military
had engaged in illegal exploitation of natural resources, but said they had been punished. In
Uganda, the Porter Commission, set up following the Group of Experts’ accusations, exonerated
the government of any official involvement in the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources, but
nevertheless recommended supplementary enquiries concerning General Kazini and the President’s
brother, Salim Saleh. The Ugandan government recounted anecdotes to the Group of Experts
that gifts in kind (mineral ore) had been given to Ugandan soldiers who had married Congolese
women. Military commercialism came to an end with the official withdrawal of the Rwandan
and Ugandan armies in 2003), but the commercial relations established during the period 1996-
2003 between the Rwandan and Ugandan political-military elites and big Congolese traders die
hard. As one of the panel members remarked, ‘When the spider leaves, the web remains!’ (Mervin
Holt). It is easy to understand that the recent Congolese-Rwandan offensive gave rise to strong
suspicions that Rwandan military commercialism has returned to North Kivu.
76 T. Raeymaekers (2003). ‘Network war: An introduction to Congo’s privatised war economy’, IPIS.
77 Idem.
78 Group of Experts’ report dated 16th January 2001.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 37
n In spite of the end of the foreign military presence on Congolese territory, military commercialism
has not completely disappeared: the FARDC and various armed groups have taken up military
commercialism on their own account. It continues, then, in a much less organised form, very
“decentralised” and parasitic.79
The system of comptoirs (trading houses)
Informal artisanal production in the DRC gives rise to trade that is just as informal, meaning that
it functions outside administrative and state regulations. This informal trade is a marketing funnel
system run by a chain of traders stretching from the mining sites to the export centres where the
main trading houses are located in Bukavu, Bunia, Butembo, Goma and Uvira. This chain begins
with the small traders operating near the mines selling to other traders, who themselves re-sell
to “big traders” at the comptoirs, the only ones authorised to export, at least in theory. This
commercial chain is extended into the capitals of neighbouring countries such as Bujumbura,
Kigali and Kampala by officially registered trading companies that are the necessary intermediaries
for international trade to buyers in Europe, Asia and the United States.
The “big traders” in the DRC, those with the largest volume of business, advance the necessary
funds to intermediate traders to buy mineral ores. In some mining sites, trade is dispersed among
a large number of sellers (250 in Mongwalu!), whereas at other sites, trading is handled by a
few persons in a dominant position. This marketing funnel commercial chain is dominated by
a handful of big traders who give the orders: they have the money needed to arrange transport
and purchase the minerals. The traders’ activity is largely dependent on the prefinancing
provided by the exporters. There are, therefore, many small sellers, many traders, but only a
few exporters. Panju, Groupe Olive, MDM, Etablissement Namukaya, World Mining Company
and Etablissement Muyeye are the six main exporters dominating the South Kivu market. The
principal gold traders in Bukavu are the Namukaya (Congocom) and Panju firms, which sell
large amounts of gold and cassiterite from Shabunda and Kamituga. (Between April 2005 and
February 2006 Namukaya declared 109.11 kg of gold exports and Panju 549.95 kg.) There are
some sixty traders in Butembo, of whom a dozen enjoy a dominant position. As a result of this
position, the exporters are able to influence prices in various ways, through stocking, control of
transport, etc. This commercial chain is not always followed of course, since some buyers try
to bypass the intermediate traders and even the comptoirs. In Mongbwalu, for example, buyers
come directly from Butembo or from Uganda.
While the production phase is totally informal, the commercial trading phase is only partly so. Of
the seven diamond comptoirs in Butembo, only one has a licence. The traders are rarely registered
– of the 60 traders in Butembo, only one third are declared – whereas the trading houses are more
frequently operating legally. Whether registered or not, these commercial operators rarely respect
the mining code and rarely declare their total sales.80 Some of the mineral ores cross the border
through smuggling – particularly gold, which is easily carried – but those that are “voluminous”
and require heavy transport (aircraft or lorries) are registered by different administrative services,
sometimes right at the production sites. In the export centres, a degree of formalisation of trade
exists in the form of registration of quantities and the levying of taxes by various offices. Coltan
from Walikale, for example, follows a relatively formal commercial circuit to the extent that the
quantities of coltan sent to Goma by air are “registered” by various administrative services and
are taxed. This administrative formalisation of trade is obviously not complete, since some coltan
is smuggled out and because, as is shown in Chapter 4, there is a widespread practice of underrecording
of quantities. Formalisation is more generalised in the regional export centres. Trading
companies are often – though not systematically – officially registered by the authorities and they
declare at least part of their sales, as can be seen from OFIDA, CEEC and OCC records.
79 On this point, see Chapter 3.3, ‘The key actors’.
80 See Chapter 4.
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The formalisation of sales takes a decisive step in the capitals of the other regional countries,
where buyers operate in a context of state governance that is stricter than in the eastern DRC.
This means official companies are operating in conformity with the commercial legislation in
force, maintain accounts, pay taxes and keep records of their sales and purchases. As has been
shown by research of the Group of Experts and IPIS, these trading companies have contracts
drawn up in due form with the traders based in the countries where the raw materials are
processed or with totally official industrial processing companies.81 At this point, the trading of
Congolese minerals largely leaves the informal sector and becomes part of the world market. This
integration into formal trade takes place in the transit countries (Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda),
even if smuggling still goes on at the eastern borders of these states and if the concealment of the
country of the minerals’ origin is still current practice.
Diagram of the gradual formalisation of trade in mining products82
Sellers at the sites
Traders
Congolese exporters
Exporters in neighbouring countries
n The upstream part of the commercial trade chain is relatively hidden but it becomes more
open as it moves downstream.
3.2 The geo-economy of trade
The commercial chain shapes the commercial geography of the region. Intermediate traders –
about 10 Indian businessmen and 30 local traders in this “exit” for Watsa gold in Ariwara)83
– are located in the secondary commercial centres while the “big traders” – a handful in each
town – manage their business from Congolese export centres. The commercial routes lead from
the principal sites to the two main ports in Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam.
Commercial flows to the East84
All the mineral ores extracted from the areas under consideration in this study follow routes by
road or air to the East. There are seven main commercial routes leaving from Ituri and the Kivus
towards East Africa that join the two corridors leading to the Indian Ocean – one to Mombasa
and the other to Dar-es-Salaam:
• The route Beni-Butembo-Kasese-Kasindi-Kampala-Nairobi-Mombasa, the best land route
(wide tarred road);
• The route Goma-Gisenyi-Kigali-Dodoma-Dar es Salaam;
• The route Uvira-Bujumbura-Dodoma-Dar es Salaam;
• The route Uvira-Fizi-Baraka-Kigoma: a more difficult route which involves a lake crossing,
but connects to the rail and road network in Tanzania;
• The route Bukavu-Cyangugu-Bujumbura-Dodoma-Dar es Salaam;
• The route Bunia-Kampala-Nairobi-Mombasa: air route and road transport;
• The route Aru-Arua-Kampala-Nairobi-Mombasa: land route.
Besides these international commercial routes, there are also more modest trading routes from the
border towns of Ariwara and Mahagi in Ituri into Uganda. While departure points in the DRC are
numerous, cargo by land always ends up on two trade routes: the one leading from Kampala to
Mombasa (tarred road throughout) and the other that leads from the west of Tanzania and from
81 To learn the identity of the final buyers, see Chapter 3.3 The final buyers
82 The degree of clarity indicates the degree of formalisation of the commercial actors.
83 Ariwara is a small commercial town in Ituri, to the north of Aru, near the Ugandan border.
84 See the map: Access corridors in the eastern DRC
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 39
Burundi and Rwanda to Dar-es-Salaam (less negotiable than the first, but with the advantage of
being both a road and a rail route).
Minerals follow the same trading routes as other merchandise and are part of cross-border trade.
Political and especially economic considerations accord a certain degree of specialisation in these
trading routes. The route from Uvira to Bujumbura is best known for gold exports and the route
from Bukavu to Cyangugu for gold, cassiterite and coltan. At the beginning of the 1990s, Burundi
was the most important transit country for Congolese gold, but after the regional embargo against
the Buyoya regime and the creation of a tax exemption system for gold in Uganda, Uganda
became the main transit country. Similarly, Tanzania has played a more important role in recent
years for diamond exports (up from US$115,392 in 2000 to US$16,015,349 in 2004, without
any particular explanation), which illustrates the vitality and development of trading routes in
East Africa.
It is revealing from this angle that in its project on ‘the DRC’s relations with the countries of
Central Africa and the Great Lakes region’, the CEEC proposes purely and simply a diversion of
the cassiterite traffic from the East to the West by river through Kisangani, arguing that this would
cost less (!) than air freight through the East and avoid the loss of commercial opportunities for
Congolese businessmen.
n As the whole mineral trade from the Kivus and Ituri is oriented towards the East, diverting
it towards the West and Kinshasa would be an economic, geo-strategic and nationalist
challenge.
n Multiplicity of trading routes in the DRC, in spite of the poor infrastructure
The contrast between the disappearance of transport infrastructure in the DRC and the multiplicity
of commercial export routes is striking. Studied in detail in Researching natural resources and
trade flows in the Great Lakes Region, the routes for taking gold out of Mongbwalu, an area long
without any road access, provide a typical example of this situation:
• Mongbwalu-Bunia-Kampala (air route)
• Mongbwalu-Kwandroma-Mahagi-Kampala (land route)
• Mongbwalu-Watsa-Ariwara-Kampala (land route)
• Mongbwalu-Bunia-Beni-Butembo-Kampala (air route)
Human porterage is often the primary means of carrying mineral ores. Bicycles and tchukudu 85
are used wherever there is a viable path. The Bisié site, for example, is isolated in the forest with
no road to link it to the Goma-Kisangani route, itself barely usable. The path most used to reach
the route stretches 45 km between the village of Manoiré in the middle of the mining zone and
Ndjingala. The ore is carried on the backs of porters in 50 kg sacks and the trip takes 16 hours.
Once it arrives in Ndjingala, the ore is taken by lorry to the improvised landing strip on a section
of the tarred road in Kilambo, where small cargo aircraft carry 2 tonnes per flight.86
85% of the gold that reaches Bunia leaves by air for Kampala while the remaining 15% goes to
Butembo.87 From Bunia, the airport used for exporting gold from Mongbwalu, the gold follows
one of two routes, an indirect one to Butembo in North Kivu, or a direct route to Kampala. Both
routes lead to the same destination, Kampala. Other export centres on the Uganda/Ituri border
are more direct (Ariwara, Aru, Mahagi). Ariwara is a market for gold heading towards Uganda
and handles an estimated quantity of 5 kg a week. Despite the deterioration or even the absence
of roads, mineral ores cover great distances. According to the CEEC’s branch in Butembo, the
85 A large home-made wooden scooter that can carry loads of over 100 kg.
86 See Map: Transport of cassiterite from Bisié to Goma.
87 See Map: Production and commercial trading of gold in Ituri.
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40 International Alert
gold traded in that town comes mainly from Orientale Province (and from Ituri in particular),
from North Kivu (Lubero, Beni, Walikale), from South Kivu, but also from Katanga and from
Equatorial Province. Diamonds from Kisangani, Bafwasende, Mambasa and even from the Park
of the Garamba bordering Sudan come to Butembo. Another example: gold and cassiterite from
Kilembwe take the road to Fizi, then to Baraka, and arrive in Uvira for export.
Air transport plays a major role in the domestic minerals trade, since some sites are completely
isolated.88 Butembo is an important minerals market both because of the deposits nearby and its
“airport infrastructure” which enables its trading houses to move the production out from Upper
and Lower Uélé. The ore from Namoya in Maniema reaches Bukavu by air, since there are no
longer any usable roads. The same applies to ore from Kamituga, since the RN2 to Bukavu is in
a terrible state, and also to ore from the Kahuzi Biega Park, a large part of which is taken out via
the Lulingu landing strip. At the height of the coltan boom, there were around 7 to 10 flights a
day between Mubi and Goma. In addition to the international connections from the border towns
in Rwanda (Bukavu and Goma) or near the Ugandan border (Bunia, Beni and Butembo), there
are direct “international flights” from deep inside Congolese territory – for example between Isiro
and Entebbe for the export of minerals and diamonds.
n Despite their difficulty, cost and even dangers, the various domestic trade routes provide a
much deeper and denser network for commerce than might be imagined.
n The mineral trade in the DRC depends on a multimodal transport system combining porterage,
roads and aircraft.
n The Kivus and Ituri are not only production areas, they are also exit routes for minerals
that come from deep within Congolese territory in Orientale Province, Maniema and North
Katanga.
n Border towns or those close to the borders, where the comptoirs are located, fulfil an important
role in the system of commercial trading. These towns are a bridge between the informal
upstream and the downstream connected to the circuits of the globalised economy.
The final destinations89
A study of several records of commercial exchanges (EUROTRACE, COMESA, TRADEMAP,
EUROSTAT) indicates that in 2005-2006, companies importing minerals from the DRC were
located in Europe, North America, the Middle East and the Far East:
• Belgium (diamonds, cassiterite, wolframite, cobalt)
• Germany (coltan)
• United Kingdom (cassiterite, cobalt, wolframite)
• Dubai/UAE (gold)
• China (coltan)
• Malaysia (cassiterite)
• Israel (diamonds)
• Netherlands
• Thailand (coltan)
Recent research by the Group of Experts expands this list.90 Usually through Rwanda, cassiterite,
wolframite and coltan are sent to Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, India, Malaysia, Thailand,
South Africa, Switzerland, Netherlands, Russia, the UAE and the United Kingdom. Gold goes
88 See map: Transport of mineral ore by air.
89 See map: Countries importing minerals from the eastern DRC.
90 See December 2008 report.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 41
primarily to the UAE and to Europe (Belgium and Switzerland), passing mainly through Uganda
and Burundi.91 The commercial chains highlighted are the following:
• Export of coltan:
The Kazakh connection: Rwanda Metals – Raremet, Finconcord and Finmining (off-shore
companies owned by a Swiss businessman, Chris Huber)92– Ulba Mechanical Works (processing
works in Kazakhstan);
The Russian connection: Pan African Business Group (Goma trading house) – Eurosib Logistics
(St. Petersburg-based company) – Novosibirsk Integrated Tin Works;
The German connection: Rwanda Metals, Grands Lacs Metals – A&M Minerals and Metals
(Trading company in Great Britain) – H.C. Starck (Germany, processing works, Group Bayer
AG, market leader);
The Belgian connection: Hua Ying, Gemico, Kivu Metal, WMC (Goma trading houses) –
Traxys (Belgium);
The Belgian-Asian connection: Munsad, Amur, Clepad (agencies) – Trademet – re-exportations
to India, China and Thailand;
The British connection: Socomi and Kotecha (based in Bukavu) – Afrimex – Thailand
Smelting and Refining Corporation (belonging to the British company Amalgamated Metal
Corporation);
The American connection: Eagles Wing Resources (Rwanda) – Cabott (USA), Trinitech (USA).
• Export of gold:
The Emirates connection: Machanga and UCI (Burundi and Uganda) – Emirates Gold
(Dubai);
The Swiss connection: Machanga and UCI (Burundi and Uganda) – Metalor (Switzerland)
(subsidiary officially suspended after UN sanctions);
The Belgian connection: Etablissements Namukaya (Bukavu) – Machanga (Burundi) –
(Belgium).
It should be noted that the importing companies are either companies trading in metals or
metallurgical companies directly involved in processing.
In their October 2002 report, the Group of Experts accused 85 companies of having violated
OECD principles concerning the involvement of multinational firms in conflict zones. Most of
these companies were European.93 The links in the UN reports said to exist between some foreign
economic operators and arms sales (notably by the Kazakh connection with the appearance of
Victor Bout’s transport company) corroborated the accusation of actively participating in the
conflict that was directed to certain foreign business groups.
91 For example, Burundi exported US$ 55 million in gold in 2005 to the UAE, Switzerland and Belgium, according to COMESA.
92 Chris Huber, with his Russian associates, was the pivot of the Kazakh coltan network. After his Swiss company Finconcord was condemned
for tax evasion in Kazakhstan, he set up two others registered in St. Kitts.
93 UN Panel of Experts Report (October 2002). Annex III, p.7.
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42 International Alert
3.3 The key actors
Armed groups and security forces
The role of armed groups in the minerals traffic has been and continues to be a subject of attention
by the United Nations, which created a Group of Experts specially dedicated to this task. While
the involvement of armed groups in the minerals trade has been known and documented from
early on, the involvement of the security forces (FARDC, PNC) has begun to attract attention, as
is indicated in the recent report by Global Witness.94
Over the years, the Expert Group has accumulated proof of how armed groups have been financed
by the trade in minerals and it believes that no armed group has stood outside this system.
According the December 2008 Group of Experts’ report, the CNDP was in contact with
Tutsi businessmen active in the minerals trade (such as Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa, Senator
Mwangachuchu or the Makabusa brothers). The CNDP received taxes of US$700,000 between
September 2007 and September 2008 at the Bunagana customs posts, as well as around the coltan
mine in Bibatama, exploited by two comptoirs whose activities it had authorised (MUNSAD
and MH1). According to the UN, about 15% of the CNDP’s financial resources came from the
minerals trade since its financial base was quite varied, including taxation at the customs posts in
Bunagana and Ishasha.
As well as being a mineral ore supplier, the FDLR collects taxes on merchandise along strategic
export routes. The Group stressed FDLR’s relations with the large Bukavu traders. In addition,
the FDLR traders maintained close business ties with the comptoirs, some of which were run by
Tutsis.
In its latest report, Global Witness brought to light the FARDC’s involvement in mining exploitation
in North and South Kivu, either by being physically present or by having local commercial agents.
(For instance, the mining shafts “belong” to the provincial military authorities.) The 85th Brigade
in Bisié, composed of former Mai Mai, had instituted a double system of taxation: taxes on the
production of mineral ores (which brought in about US$120,000 a month) and taxes on imported
merchandise, collected at barriers along the route from Njingala to Bisié, (said to have brought in
a further US$100,000 a month).
In Ituri, the UPC, a Hema movement, exploited the gold-bearing zone of Mongbwalu, following
an agreement with the OKIMO management, facilitated by their belonging to the same ethnic
group. When the FNI took over, it levied a tax of US$1 on the gold-panners, bringing in about
US$2,000 a month.95
• Armed men profit from the mining trade in at least three ways:
• levying taxes;
• payment for protection (the PNC and the FARDC protect the mining sites where Banro and
AGK work);
• receiving a share of mineral ores (the least common method).
n Armed men are fiscal parasites on the mining trade at the production sites and on the transport
routes. They were also implicated in human rights violations (see Chapter 5).
94 Face à un fusil, que peut-on faire ? La guerre et la militarisation du secteur minier dans l’Est du Congo (2009). Global Witness.
95 Human Rights Watch (2005). Op. cit.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 43
“Administrative services”: an institutionalised maquis96
There is a wide gap between the authorities who hold responsibility for managing the exploitation
and trade of mining products and those who levy taxes on the trade. According to Congolese
regulations, the administrative services are five in number, while the number of tax collectors
varied depending on the imagination of the officials and, above all, on the physical presence of
the authorities in places where exploitation and trade were actually going on. (For example, the
CEEC were not present at all the export centres in the East, only in Butembo and Goma). These
five services include:
• OFIDA, Office of Customs and Excise. It registers and regulates exports and imports. It imposes
duties of 5% of the value of products exported and also collects the fees for OGEFREM, the
Office for managing maritime freight, and to FPI, the Fund for the Promotion of Industry.
• The Mining Division, whose agents regulate mining products, including weighing and storing
before export, either at the comptoirs or at the airports. It receives 45% of a compensatory
tax, estimated at 1.25% of the value of exports – the balance of 55% destined for the CEEC.
• The OCC, Congolese Control Office, was set up to check the quality and quantity of exported
products, but it lost this control over gold and diamonds in 1999.
• The CEEC, Centre for Expertise, Evaluation and Certification, was created in 2003, with the
purpose of implementing the recommendations of the Kimberley process for diamonds.
• The Foreign Trade Division registers documents regarding exported and imported products.
Several other services belong on this list, which also provide statistical data – in particular the
BNA (Bureau of Air Traffic) and the DGM, the central migration authorities.
As a result of the lack of resources and degradation of Congolese administrative services,
predatory exactions are imposed along the entire chain of commercial mineral trading in the
name of offialdom. Monographs have highlighted this administrative parasitism which begin at
the mining sites and continue to the point of export.
Some examples of administrative exactions
At Aru/Arua, 12 different services levy taxes on exported minerals:97 OFIDA, OCC, OGEFREM, ANR,
DGM, provincial authorities, territorial authorities, border police, BIC, foreign trade, hygiene and the
mining division.
Between the mine in Bisié and the customs post in Goma, mining production is taxed 23 times (many
times by the same administrative service: 3 times by DGRAD, 3 times by CEEC, etc.) amounting to a
total of about15% of the product’s value (or US$365 per tonne). The actual level of taxation is 40% for
exporting gold exported from Ituri.
It should be noted that everyone considers it natural that the civilian and military intelligence services
are involved in the taxation of mining
It is common ground that an increase in the fiscal burden on the mining sector accompanied
administrative reunification – moving from the RCD-Goma’s regulations to those of Kinshasa
– and the creation of “reunified tariffs”.98 In its day, RCD-Goma had already raised the price
of cards for the diggers (US$50) as well as operating permits for the trading houses (US$15,000
a year), and these rates have increased even more. In North Kivu, mineral exports brought in
US$ two million (2007) and US$4.3 million (2008) to the customs authorities, to CEEC, OCC,
DGRAD and the Decentralised Administrative Entities; (OFIDA was by far the main beneficiary).
Taxation by the administrative authorities is relatively arbitrary at the production sites and on
96 See map: Local authorities in North and South Kivu
97 Pact (June 2007). Researching natural resources and trade flows in the Great Lakes Region. DfID, USAID, COMESA.
98 Pole Institute (2005). Ressources minées, la faillite de la politique minière en RDC [Mined resources, the bankruptcy of DRC’s mining
policy].
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44 International Alert
the transport routes, but it has stabilised somewhat at the export centres. Still, it should be noted:
• The final recipients of administrative taxes levied on the mining trade remains obscure;
• Taxation is generally arbitrary and not based on legal documents;
• In addition to it being arbitrary, the export tax regime for DRC minerals is much more onerous
than that in neighbouring countries;
• The attempt to put things in order in the tax services at border posts failed. In 2002, the
government decreed that only four administrative services should operate at border posts:
OFIDA, DGM, OCC and the Hygiene Service. This decree has never been respected.
n The trade in minerals represents a major part of the legal and illegal revenues of officials in
charge of regulating trade, and even if the taxes levied are less than they should be because of
fraud, they amount to several million dollars a year.
The “Big Men” of trade
The big traders are at the centre of the political-financial system that forms the backdrop to the
minerals trade. Their financial power gives them access to local and national politicians, the
ability to pre-finance the largest purchases of mineral ores, to control the means of transport from
the mining areas with difficult access, to set the local price for minerals, to buy protection from
armed groups and security forces, and sometimes to instrumentalise them in their competition
with rival traders. In 2006, for example, MONUC, Global Witness and the Pole institute reported
on tensions between two companies for the control of the mine in Bisié in North Kivu. Mining
Processing Congo, a South African company, with good connections in Rwanda, competed
with the Groupe Minier Bagandula (GMB), a company also closely tied to the members of the
RCD-Goma, for access to the mine. GMB “won” by signing an agreement with the territorial
administrator on 28th August 2006, ceding to him 10% of Bisié’s production, for security, i.e.
the support of the local FARDC brigade. In addition, the Coopérative Minière de Mpama Bisiye
(Comimpa) is a GMB creation: of its 22 founder members, 11 are GMB shareholders. GMB was
set up on 23rd September 2005 and half of its shareholding belongs to the Saphir Society. One of
GMB’s key people is Alexis Makabuza, a financial backer of CNDP.
Three other “Big Men” in the trade have been identified:
• Senator Mwangachuchu, the owner of the MHI Company (Mwangachuchu Hizi International),
holds the mining squares (carrés) of the Bibatama site in Masisi – where the CNDP is active –
as well as interests in the Numbi mine in South Kivu.
• Madame Aziza Kulsum, otherwise known as Madame Gulamali, is a mixed-race person from
Bukavu, who managed SOMIGL, the company to which RCD-Goma had granted the export
monopoly of minerals in South Kivu in exchange for US$1 million a month. She owns a
coltan-trading company (Shenimed) with comptoirs in Nukavu and Goma. Her payments
to RCD-Goma enabled that movement to draw up a budget for the first time in December
2000. She also owned a tobacco factory in Bukavu (Uzabuco) and has been accused of arms
trafficking with the Burundi rebel forces FDD and with RCD-Goma. Mme Gulamali is in
business with Panju in Bukavu.
• Mr Omar Oria, a Ugandan citizen settled in Ariwara, appears to be the leading gold trader in
that area, which owes its expansion to the trade. Together with James Nyakumi and Vincent
Adjua, Omar Oria was one of the leading traders/financiers of the FAPC under Commander
Jerome. In exchange for protection and a kind of commercial monopoly granted by the FAPC,
Omar Oria arranged for gold to be moved to Kampala and helped to finance this militia.
These big traders are so powerful they can sometimes disagree with the dominant armed
movements. A good example is the failure to control SOMIGL’s mineral exporting, a company
that RCD-Goma had given the monopoly exports to in South Kivu. The network of Bashi traders,
who were cheated by this decision, resisted and smuggled out mineral ores. As a result, SOMIGL
has never been able to impose its monopoly and was abandoned in 2002.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 45
Tragic end of a Nande Big Man trader: The murder of Kambale Kisoni
Kambale Kisoni, the managing director of Congo Metal, was one of the biggest gold traders of Butembo.
Placed on the UN sanctions list in March 2007 because of his connections with the FNI that controlled
Mongbwalu, he was assassinated on 5th July 2007; he was a close associate of Mbusa Nyamwisi and an
amiable contributor to the RCD-ML’s war effort, indeed its main paymaster. His air company, Butembo
Airlines, flew directly between Mongbwalu and Butembo and carried arms and troops for the FNI,
besides gold, which earned him a spot on the UN sanctions list.
He was gunned down in his Butembo office by a team of international killers (Kenyan and Ugandan).
Shortly before his death, he had taken steps to be removed from the UN sanctions list. Several theories
circulated about his assassination: jealous businessmen who wanted to take over his business,
and concerns in Kinshasa or Kampala about possible revelations in exchange for taking him off the
sanctions list. The Butmembo trading community observed a day of mourning in his memory by closing
their shops. His wife took over his business and converted it into a clothing and other consumer goods
business, gave up the mineral trade and moved to Uganda.
n The “big traders” are the strategic link in the system of commercial mineral trading and the
point of concentration of capital and of the network of relationships that is indispensable to
doing business in this environment. Who they are is still only partly known.
n The network of traders often have an ethnic base (Hemi, Bashi, Nandé and Rwandaphone
traders divide the market), although no ethnic group has an exclusive hold on trade.99
The indispensable intermediaries
The transporters and the trading companies based in neighbouring countries are the indispensable
intermediaries of this trade.
TMK is the main transporter in Goma and provides transport between Beni and Goma, and
then through the north corridor from North Kivu to Mombasa. The Jumbo Safari Company is
in second place. The air carriers involved in the mineral trade in Bukavu include: Delta Force,
Atral, Zalia (flights for Kamituga), Agefreco Air, Congocom Air and Stellavia (flights to Namoya),
Agefreco Air, Congocom Air, Grace Express, Lokole and Acosha (flights to Namoya) Agefreco
Air, Congocom Air, Grace Express, Lokole and Acosha (flights to Shabunda and Lulingu). Two
Bolloré subsidiaries are also present in the region – Agetraf SDV in Bukavu and SDV Transami
in Kigali.
Aided by very favourable policies for exporters (no import taxes) and by the Ugandan Army’s
control over the north-east of the DRC, Ugandan companies successfully began exporting gold.
Between 2002 and 2006 the main gold exporters were:
• Uganda Commercial Impex
• Machanga Limited
• AP Bhimji Limited
UCI and Machanga have been on the UN list since 2007. Machanga Ltd. has a branch in
Bujumbura and therefore also buys gold coming from South Kivu. Between 2005 and 2007,
Emirates Gold bought from this company in Uganda and in Burundi 10.17 tonnes of gold, 6.61
tonnes from UCI, 1.39 tonnes from AP Bhimji Ltd. and 0.03 tonnes from Congomet. UCI has a
refinery for treating the gold it imports.
The main gold export companies in Bujumbura were Farrel Trade & Investment and Gold Link
Burundi Trading, managed by Mutoka Ruganyira. The first of these companies ceased trading
99 See map: Ethnic groups in Kivu.
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46 International Alert
in 2009, leaving the second in a monopoly position; its director was well connected to power
circles in Burundi and often travelled to Dubai. There are altogether 64 registered trading houses
in Burundi.
On the Rwandan side, trading companies are numerous:100
• Africa Primary Tungsten
• Afriprom
• Albert Mupenzi
• Centrale Multi Services
• Copimar
• Ets Munsad
• Ets Mbanzabugabo
• Eurotrade International
• Harelimana Froduald Enterprises
• Imperial Trading Company
• Metal Processing Association
• Metrade Overseas
• Minerals Supply Africa
• Multiserve Consult
• NRD Rwanda
• Niobium Mining Company
• Phoenix Metal
• Pyramide
• Redemi
• Rwanda Metals
• Sodem
• Trading Services Logistics
• Valence Kalinda
It should be noted that Rwanda carries out (primary) processing of mineral ores. Gisenyi has a
tin foundry – the property of Metal Processing Association, which owns Metal Processing Congo
in Goma101 – while in Kigali several trading houses separate out other components such as iron
and tungsten from the coltan. According to the Rwandan minister of mines, 25% of Rwandan
imports come from the DRC, although Global Witness estimates this figure could be closer to
80%.102
n There is a lack of information about exporters in neighbouring countries, especially in Burundi
and Uganda.103
n There is a lack of information about who are the real owners of trading companies in the three
neighbouring countries.
The foreigners
The presence of foreign business milieus in the Great Lakes commercial trading system is a
phenomenon that cannot be overlooked. Three groups of foreigners appear repeatedly during
investigations into the minerals trade:
Businessmen from the former Soviet Union: at the time of the coltan boom, many citizens of
the former Soviet Union turned up (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Russians, etc.). Conmet, an active trading
100 N. Garrett & H. Mitchell (April 2009). Op. cit.
101 MPA is considered to be a South African company. Created in 2001, it produces 200 tonnes of tin ingots a year.
102 Global Witness (July 2009). Op. cit.
103 In their last report, the Group of Experts emphasised the lack of cooperation by the authorities in Burundi over providing information on
export companies and their alleged links with FDLR networks.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 47
house in Beni and Butembo, was run by Russians, whose managers were based in Kampala.
Valentina Pisnakova was the general manager of Conmet, which belonged to the Ugandan
company, Kullinan Finance Investment that had supply contracts with Germany, South Africa
and Kazakhstan. Valentina Piskanova also had a presence in Ituri through the Ituri Gold Mining
Company Limited. This Russian presence via Uganda was part of the Kazakh coltan connection.
In addition, there has been a renewal of Russian interest in niobium.104
Lebanese diamond merchants appeared to be closely connected to the Ugandan elite at the time
when the UPDF were in the DRC. IPIS and the Group of Experts have documented their activities
by showing Lebanese ties with the Victoria Company. (Khalil Nazzeem Ibrahim, one of the key
persons in this company, owned a restaurant jointly with Salim Saleh’s wife.) They also showed
the Lebanese presence in the DRC through diamond comptoirs in Orientale Province in Beni
and Bukavu as well as their relations with Belgium (where they export diamonds and own other
companies and real estate). Clearly, the Lebanese circles active in the diamond sector in eastern
DRC redirected their activities to Kampala, when Uganda became the “dominant power”. The
trading house Sodexmines in Goma has been managed by a Lebanese businessman since 2005 on
behalf of one of the big businessmen of the DRC.
Indo-Pakistani businessmen from the Great Lakes are highly active in the gold trade in Uganda
(through the companies UCI and Machanga Ltd) and in Burundi, through Farrel Trade and
Investment Corporation. Machanga is run by the businessmen Rajendra Vaya and Vipul Kumar
and UCI by J.V. Lodhia. The Indo-Pakistanis of Kampala have also been accused of involvement
in gold-trafficking, implicating the Pakistani UN peacekeepers in Ituri. At the moment, the Indo-
Pakistanis of Uganda are the only people whose companies remain on the UN sanctions list (UCI
and Machanga).
It should also be noted that SDE and Sodexmines, two Goma trading houses, belong to the Elwyn
Blattner’s group, an American businessman who settled long ago in the DRC and owns several
companies.
n This change of direction and the appearance of Lebanese diamond merchants in Kampala’s circles
of power indicate the extreme flexibility and adaptability of the actors in the diamond trade.
n These business milieus often serve as a bridge between the Congolese mineral trade and the
international criminal community, particularly mafia-like organisations, illustrated by the
appearance of Victor Bout as a transporter and the links the UN uncovered between the arms
traffic and mineral exports.
3.4 Distribution of benefits along the trading chain
The lack of a consistent application of fiscal regulations, the interest of the operators in
maintaining a degree of opaqueness around their activities, and the various mechanisms for
fraud make it impossible to calculate the real profits from mineral exploitation in the eastern
DRC that are derived by those participating actively or passively in this trade. A number of
studies have tried to evaluate the income of the different actors. While it is not possible to
achieve a high degree of precision, there is no doubt that the diggers receive only smallest
portion of the value added coming from the mine. Their daily pay is around 1 or 2 or 3 (US)
dollars a day, amounts spent at once with the shopkeepers for daily necessities, particularly
food. The isolation of many of the mines has a heavy impact on the cost of living, since much
of the supplies are flown in. As can be seen from the various reports on the mining economy,
104 See Chapter 2.
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48 International Alert
most of the value of production leaving the mine is divided among team leaders, managers,
owners and the military.
Nevertheless, field observations confirm the impression that the higher one goes in the commercial
chain, the greater the benefits obtained. The diggers at the bottom of the chain hardly earn
enough to survive; the traders who control the commercial flow between the mine quarries and
the trading houses are able to make a profit – approximately US$100 per month, according to
local traders. Depending on the volume of their trade, the exporters earn profits that amount to
thousands, if not millions of dollars – just like the passive actors in the trade, represented by the
officials and armed men. Whilst the analyses do not show how value is distributed throughout
the commercial chain, they all agree on the fact that the great losers in the trade are the diggers.
On the one hand, the diggers are victims of a lack of balanced information, compared with the
buyers, who analyse samples and accordingly fix the price and on the other hand, the diggers have
no capacity to save.105
The neighbouring countries are the real beneficiaries of this shared income, to the extent that
mining production in the DRC enables them to increase their own exports of minerals and
therefore to improve their balance of trade and strengthen their national budgets. This forced
division of the Congolese mining income has been highlighted by comparing national output and
exports. In a 2005 study, Global Witness106 quotes OCC figures for the total exports of cassiterite
from North and South Kivu: 7,591 tonnes. An analysis of data collected in Rwanda shows that
it exported 1,800 tonnes more than its own nationally-produced cassiterite This NGO drew the
conclusion that ‘it is very likely that these imports came mainly from the eastern DRC, including
the conflict zones.’ Similarly, a comparison between gold production and exports in Uganda is
rather telling, revealing that the exported gold came mainly from the DRC, and more particularly
from Orientale Province.
Exports and gold production in Uganda (kg)
1994 1996 2000 2004 2006 2007
Exports 225 3206 7 303 5 465 6 937 3 556
Production 2 3 56 178 22 25
Source: D. Fahey (2008). ‘The River of Gold: gold production and trade from Mongbwalu, DRC’. pp. 357–383. L’Afrique des
Grands Lacs. Annuaire 2007–2008. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Quite apart from the quality of the mineral ores, it goes without saying that the profitability of
this trade depends on many parameters: transport costs, the extent of fraud and changes in world
prices influence profitability more than the diggers’ earnings. The factor of “changing world
prices” was clearly seen during a) the coltan boom that allowed for the rapid enrichment of some
operators and b) the collapse of prices in 2008. Since then, the actors in the mineral trade have
tried to reposition themselves in gold, whose price is stable.
n The profitability of the mining industry depends on too many parameters (particularly
parameters for which information is weak) to be evaluated without an econometric model.
105 See Chapter 5.
106 Global Witness (2005). Under-Mining Peace: Tin – the Explosive Trade in Cassiterite in Eastern DRC.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 49
Chapter 4: Mechanisms of Fraudulent Activity
Summary:
The minerals trade in the DRC is characterised by a high degree of fraudulent activity in terms of illegal
taxation and of fraud over exporting/smuggling. The difference between legal, illegal and “deregulated”
activities is often difficult to establish and most of the trade is carried on in a subterranean economy,
which gradually becomes a more formalised one as the mineral ores approach closer to the borders
for export to the world market. A certain number of national and international mechanisms aimed at
improving the regulation of the mining sector have not yet reached the Kivus, and their success is still
very limited at national level.
4.1 Nature of fraudulent activity
Fraud in the minerals trade in the DRC is a vast subject. A good deal of information and detailed
documents are available about it. Many sources give excellent descriptions of the character of fraud
in both the formal and informal mining sectors in the DRC. They contain far more elements revealing
the complexity of the question than can be elaborated in the present study. The sources are as follows:
• Reports of the Pole Institute (Goma, DRC), in particular ‘Rules for Sale’;
• Documentation of the research project ‘Trading for peace’, financed by DfID, USAID and
COMESA;
• The reports of the Panel of Experts and of the Group of Experts of the UN.
Other reports and comments from NGOs, such as Global Witness and Rights and Accountability
in Development (RAID), go more deeply into the links between the minerals trade and violent
conflicts, and emphasise the question of corruption in the process. Other writers, Hans Romkema,
Koen Vlassenroot and Tim Raeymaekers, have also brought information together on fraud in the
minerals trade in connection with local government and societal changes. The recent analysis,
Trading conflict for development: Using the trade in minerals from eastern DRC for development,
published in April 2009 in the context of the project ‘Trading for peace’, gives the most up-to-date
perspective of the functioning of the mining sector, with a thorough-going discussion on fraud
amongst the principal local actors.
According to the 2007 report entitled ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’, the percentage of
specific exports from the DRC, which officials did not record as they should have, was estimated
to be 50%. This problem can be attributed to bureaucratic inadequacies, to the poor management
of the state regulatory agencies and to fraudulent conduct aimed at evading taxes and charges.
Officials themselves often violate the regulations, which the 2007 report identifies as the principal
reason why the traders take part in fraudulent behaviour.107
This chapter of the study deals essentially with fraudulent behaviour, although bureaucratic and
regulatory inadequacies make the system particularly open to corruption.108 There are different
kinds of fraudulent behaviour discussed in the resources trade literature, namely:
107 D fID, COMESA and USAID (October 2007). ‘Le commerce au service de la paix: Instauration de la sécurité et réduction de la pauvreté par le
commerce des ressources naturelles dans la Région des Grands Lacs’ [Trading for peace : bringing security and reducing poverty through
the natural resources trade in the Great Lakes region], p.4–7.
108 Ibid. p.5.
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50 International Alert
1. Illegal taxation
2. Fraudulent exporting/contraband
Illegal Taxation
Taxation of the mining sector is not illegal in itself, but many state officials levy heavier taxes
than what is authorised by Congolese law.109 Although Congolese law specifies which agencies are
authorised to regulate trade at the borders, this law is not respected and quite often, more agents
are present there than the law authorises. In addition, there are frequent complaints of taxation
by the Congolese army, illegal in all cases, particularly in the eastern DRC.110 It should be noted
that taxation by armed groups is not limited to the trade in mineral ores. In the eastern DRC in
general, the strong presence of security forces (the army, the government police or members of
armed groups) leads to the harassment of the population in all economic sectors.111
In the eastern DRC, there is also the phenomenon of “legal but not recorded” trade in products
not liable to tax, which the officials do not bother to list. Handicapped persons are exempt from
taxation at the borders and are therefore used as traffickers. They can move whole lorry loads
in a very short space of time by making multiple journeys in their wheelchairs or in specially
adapted carts.112 At the height of the conflict, a large part of the mining sector operated without
any regulation or formal structure, which is what we mean by “deregulation”.113 Indeed in
2001, the UN panel of experts tackled the question of the exploitation of resources from the
point of view of a “financial war”, rather than that of a confrontation between legal and illegal
activities.114Similarly, artisanal mining can be described as “deregulated”, even if it produces
beneficial results for individuals and the state.115
The Mining Division estimates revenue received in the Kivus between January 2007 and September
2008 at US$6 million, which means that the formal part of trade was far from negligible.116 The
situation is complicated at local level, however, where even taxes legally collected (in other words
by those who are legally empowered to collect them) can be utilised illegally by the same officials
for personal enrichment rather than being placed in the official accounts. According to the study
‘Le commerce pour la paix’, 30 to 40% of the taxes legally collected end up in the pockets
of the officials who collect them.117 In other words, there is no budgetary transparency in the
administration and taxes legally collected can be used in illegal ways.
Both legal and illegal taxation is levied along the whole length of the trading chain, from the mine
up to the market. Efforts have been made for years to set up a legislative framework in order to
fill legal holes. As is shown in one of the Pole Institute’s reports, ‘One can never be certain, for
example, if trade in a rebel area should be considered illegal if the trader pays no tax at all or
if, on the other hand, he does pay it’.118 To take another example, should tax evasion be seen as
fraudulent even if it is common knowledge that tax receipts are used improperly by those who
collect them instead of being placed in the state treasury? The Pole Institute’s report also shows
that the existing structures for exploiting resources were only made legal when the belligerents
became legitimate leaders, although the resources still failed to benefit the Congolese people.119
109 See Chapter 3, ‘Key actors’.
110 N. Garrett and H. Mitchell (2009). Op. cit., p.7.
111 A. Tegera and D. Johnson (May 2007). Rules for sale: formal and informal cross-border trade in eastern DRC, p.7. Goma: Pole Institute.
112 ‘A. Tegera and D. Johnson (2007). Op. cit., p.21.
113 ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’, Op.cit., p.14.
114 T. Raeymaekers (2003). Op. cit., p.11.
115 N. Garrett and H. Mitchell (2009). Op. cit., p.7.
116 Ibid.
117 ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’, Op.cit., p.26.
118 ‘Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Seminar Report’, p. 18. (February 2004). Pole
Institute & International Alert.
119 Ibid., p.24.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 51
Fraudulent exporting/contraband
Trade across the borders between the DRC and its eastern neighbours has existed since long before
the conflict. There are strong ethnic links that cross over borders, notably between the Nande of
the “Great North” in North Kivu and the Kondjo in Uganda and between the Banyarwanda of
the “Little North” and the Rwandans. Another fraudulent trading practice dating from before
the war: some people try not to pay taxes to the bureaucrats in Kinshasa.120 Gold is apparently
one of the commodities traded fraudulently, as it can easily be carried or concealed. While reliable
statistical data for trade in the eastern DRC remain difficult to obtain, it is estimated that 35%
of trade in the East is never reported. For cassiterite leaving the airport in Goma, this would
correspond to the equivalent of around US$9.4 million (in 2007 prices).121 This figure could reach
as high as 95% for gold.122 According to a May 2008 World Bank report, the whole DRC mining
sector should produce about US$200 million in revenue per year (an estimate made before the
current financial crisis). Yet in 2005, the government declared that it had received US$27 million
in taxes from the mining sector.123
The traders often avoid paying taxes and duties at the areas of control at the borders by
“negotiating” with officials. They pay them something in an informal way rather than paying
taxes to them. This suits both parties and has given rise to the expression of “fraud between
consenting adults”.124 Another possibility is for the traders to avoid the places where taxes are
collected by using another means of transport. The Pole institute has identified several different
forms of export fraud in the mining sector in North Kivu.
Mechanisms for fraudulent exporting
The operators and service providers in North Kivu conspire to arrange that a large proportion of goods
enter the province from neighbouring countries and leave the province for these same countries
informally, even at official border posts. This fraudulent transit operates in various ways:
The goods are untaxed or exempt from entry or exit duties, and thus the customs do not even bother
to record them;
The incorrect usage of trade nomenclature for calculating the taxes is another way of exacting higher
sums than the amounts due;
The goods are subject to tax, but to reduce the amount, the importers and exporters bribe the customs
officials and other agents of the state to record lower quantities or lower value or let them pass without
declaring anything at all;
The state organisations involved abuse their status and do not apply the tax or customs rules, either in
part or in total, to traders or certain traders, in return for personal payments;
Taxable goods are hidden beneath non-taxable goods and only a minimum of careful inspections are
made or none at all, in exchange for personal payments;
Traders benefiting from tax exemptions for certain goods conceal other goods within a consignment
of exempt goods;
Traders enjoying tax exemptions act on behalf of others who are not exempted;
Goods are handled by people who know highly placed officers or other members of the army and security
forces instruct the civilian service representatives to “look the other way” when vehicles pass;
Goods pass through unofficial border posts – in the open country, on minor roads or by boat, crossing
the lakes.
Source: Pole Institute, Interviews with state officials and traders in Goma, January-April 2007.
Source: ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’, p.25
120 A. Tegera et D. Johnson (2007). Op. cit., p.15.
121 N. Garrett and H. Mitchell (2009). Op. cit., p.29.
122 Ibid., pp.7 and 23.
123 World Bank (May 2008). ‘République Démocratique du Congo: La bonne gouvernance dans le secteur minier comme facteur de croissance’,
p.6. Report No. 43402-ZR.
124 A. Tegera et D. Johnson (2007). Op. cit., p.7.
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52 International Alert
According to the study ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’, the traders and a large number of
officials would actually prefer a better system of regulation that was “fairer” than the existing
one. But the current system is more economical for the traders than the formal system. The Pole
Institute quotes an observer for whom, ‘If everyone paid all their taxes, everything would become
too expensive for people to buy’.125
Another Goma trader explains, ‘At present, I have to pay US$6,500 in tax to legally export a 25-tonne
container of cassiterite from the DRC. If I export it from Rwanda, it costs me US$200; from Uganda
US$40. So if I can first get my product to Rwanda or to Uganda and then export it officially from those
countries, I save a lot of money. To avoid the DRC taxes costs me US$2,000 for each container, so I save
US$4,500. The DRC is the only country in the region that still levies an export tax. It has been abolished
everywhere else’.
Source: ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’, p.26.
n ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’ compared the mining sector’s recorded exports with the real
figure, which revealed the gap between the two and the serious under-reporting of information.
This does not apply only to minerals, but also to foodstuffs, machinery, vehicles, etc. Several
official agencies collect data about trade, which explains the lack of a single reliable source.126
Different agencies collect information on different products and some statistics on the same
products even differ between agencies. Some goods are registered in categories in which they
do not belong.
Attempts to quantify fraud
Several efforts have been made to estimate the extent of fraud. The above-mentioned Pole
Institute study tried to estimate it from the specific case of cassiterite coming from Walikale (Bisié
mines) and exported through Goma, by comparing the data of different administrative agencies,
including the Office of Aerial Navigation in Goma, the Walikale Mining Office and the DGM
[National Migration Agency] in Walikale.
Estimate of cassiterite from Walikale on its way to Goma in 2006 (in tonnes)
OFIDA Foreign
Trade
OCC Mine
Division
BM
Walikale
BNA Goma DGM
Walikale
2 948 2 896 2 912 2 904 4 767 4 818 10 309
These figures show little difference between the four services directly involved in exports. On the
other hand, the differences between the figures provided by the Walikale mining office, the Office
of aerial navigation in Goma, and particularly the office of the migration authorities (DGM)
in Walikale are substantial. If the data recorded by the DGM is reliable – as the researchers of
the Pole Institute believe – this implies that half the production disappears between Walikale
and Goma; if one compares these data with OFIDA’s statements, more than two thirds of the
production vanishes and escapes from state control and taxation. For the researchers of the Pole
Institute, the DGM’s registry differs from all the others because its agents are not in a position to
“negotiate” any service they can render.
This carefully-studied example shows how difficult it is to obtain satisfactory statistical information.
Everyone is aware that production figures are seriously under-estimated by the official services,
but by how much? The figure of 35% put forward in ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’ is only
a hypothesis. Fraud is especially significant for gold, since the majority of its production is moved
125 Ibid.
126 The organisations that collect statistics are OFIDA (customs office), the provincial trade department, the OCC (Congolese control office),
the Mines and Geology Division and the CEEC (Centre for expertise, evaluation and certification). The Pole Institute’s report ‘Rules for Sale’
suggests that a detailed examination be undertaken of how all these agencies carry out their tasks.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 53
fraudulently into the neighbouring countries. According to a study of cross-border trade carried
out by INICA in 2007, most of the gold produced in South Kivu leaves as contraband on its way
to Bujumbura.127 The authors of ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’128 compare official figures for
North and South Kivu mineral exports with figures they think correspond to reality:
Recorded exports Real exports
cassiterite (2006) 6 748 t 16 870 t
gold (2005) 609 kg 10 000 kg
The table below shows the difference between the reported level of exports and the estimated real
level.
Table 1: Evaluation of real and recorded exports from the DRC
Registered exports
from the DRC
Estimated real exports Observations
Copper (2005)
OFIDA, 117 315 T 223 000 T Real volume based on registered imports into
Zambia, adjusted upwards by 10%
Gold (2005)
600 kg (South Kivu); 9
kg (North Kivu)
About 10 T Based on the quantities produced, the US
Geological survey, and traders’ estimates
Cassiterite (2006)
3 599 T (DM, North
Kivu)
3 149 T (OFIDA, South
Kivu)
16 870 T Estimate of real volumes based on the details of
air freight loaded in Walikale, as recorded by the
Mining General Management, and on estimates
from traders on the levels of exports and
unregistered production
Wood (2006)
25 000 m3, see
paragraph 40
50-70 000 m3 from Ituri,
North Kivu
Exports from eastern DRC. Real quantities based
on wood imports registered in Uganda, Rwanda and
Burundi, where data collection is relatively reliable.
Imports of petroleum products (2005)
Recorded volume,
16 264 m3
Real volume,
25 805 m3
Data compiled by the Beni branch of the national
petroleum company SEP-Congo, 2005 (June to
September)
Source: ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’, p.17.
In addition, mineral ores are recorded several times along the commercial chain, leaving the way
open to multiple possibilities for fraud. The mineral ores dispatched from the mines to the trading
centres near Walikale are recorded on their departure from the airport in Walikale, a second time
when they reach the airport in Goma, and again on their leaving Goma by road for the international
market. In addition, records are maintained by neighbouring and transit countries. The banking
system also provides a strong potential for fraud. Income from foreign trade is indeed illegally taken
127 INICA, UNECA (2007). Natural resources and trade flows in the Great Lakes Region.
128 H. Sunman and Nick Bates (2007). ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’. DfID, USAID, COMESA.
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54 International Alert
by the central government to finance its expenses.129 All this provides a strong incentive for traders to
avoid the formal sector altogether. Similarly, the traders’ evaluation of the ore at the production site
gives rise to fraud towards the producers, as they under-estimate the quality or manipulate prices.
n The style of fraudulent activities is classic (swindling and fiscal confusion, abuse of power by
officials, etc.) and characteristic of a predatory administration operating in the context of a
failed state.
4.2 Attempts at regulation/accountablity in the mineral ore trade
National initiatives
The Government of the DRC promulgated a Mining Code in 2002,130 followed by Mining
regulations in 2003,131 defining how the Code was to be applied. The Mining Code confirmed
which agencies were empowered to regulate the mining sector, namely the Minister of Mines, the
Mining Survey Department, the Mining Division and the department responsible for protecting
the mining environment.132 The Code also established a baseline for working out taxes, customs
dues and payments associated with the minerals trade. But like many laws in the Congo, the code
has never been fully applied.
The Mining Code set up, among other things, a mining survey or cadastral service, under the
supervision of the Mining and Finance ministries, in order to regulate the management of mining
rights and titles, and thus reduce the possibilities for fraud. This service, the Cadastre Minier
(CAMI) receives requests and issues permits for research and exploitation. The World Bank has
noted problems in following up payments, between those billed by CAMI and those received by the
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. The World Bank has also taken note of the accusations
of pressure on the CAMI in order to obtain ‘exceptional treatment with regard to the directives and
established criteria within the framework for transparency in issuing mining rights’.133
A certain number of government organs are responsible for different aspects of follow- up and the
regulation of the mining sector. The CEEC,134 an autonomous agency, was created to implement the
Kimberley process, but it is also responsible, under a recent Decree, to evaluate and supervise the
quality of mineral ores before they are exported. The OCC has responsibility for supervising the
quality and quantity of products imported and exported. Given the poor capacity of all state agencies
to supervise trade in an effective way, the possibilities are growing for those interests hostile to change
to use the supervision process for their own benefit. As indicated in a report from CASM in 2008,
‘it is not uncommon for individuals or organisations (mining companies, politicians or military) to
spread false information deliberately, to exaggerate or to seek favours from the authorities, in order
to be in a good position during and after the formalisation process’.135 The SAESSCAM (Service
d’assistance et d’encadrement de l’artisanat minier) is a state agency set up to provide technical help
and advice to artisanal miners to inform them of the law, training in mining methods, organisation
of cooperatives, as well as health and safety, etc.136 In principle, this initiative should help to reduce
the exploitation of artisanal miners. But in addition to problems caused by insufficient funding, the
SAESSCAM has faced accusations of conflicts of interest over its responsibility for collecting taxes
and internal corruption. These accusations come from the artisanal miners themselves.137
129 A. Tegera et D. Johnson (2007). Op. cit., p.59.
130 Law No. 007/2002 of 11th July 2002.
131 D ecree No. 038/2003 of 26th March 2003.
132 ‘Corruption et gouvernance en RDC durant la transition (2003-2006)’, p.53.
133 ‘République Démocratique du Congo: La bonne gouvernance dans le secteur minier comme facteur de croissance’ May 2008, p.41. World
Bank.
134 D ecree creating this agency included in annex.
135 N. Garrett (2008). Op. cit., p.24. Communities and Artisanal & Small-Scale Mining Initiative (CASM) 1st June.
136 N. Garrett (22 October 2007). ‘Preliminary observations from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’. Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Artisanal & Small-scale Mining (ASM), pilot study.
137 N. Garrett (2008). Op. cit., p.22.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 55
A certain number of national initiatives have been undertaken to examine the fraudulent or
abusive aspects of mining contracts. The peace agreement signed in 2003 called for setting up a
multiparty parliamentary commission to investigate the exploitation of natural resources during
the war from 1996 to 2003. Under the leadership of Christophe Lutundula, the “Lutundula
Commission” published its 2005 report, pointing to the mining contracts that should be cancelled
or renegotiated. The Commission also recommended the institution of legal procedures against
certain political figures and businessmen.138 At the time, some NGOs criticised the National
Assembly and the Government for their lack of reaction to the recommendations in this report.
In 2007, the Congolese Government began examining 61 mining contracts, with a view to issuing
recommendations over the revision or cancellation of these contracts. The aim was to put right
the “imbalance towards private enterprises to the detriment of the state. 139 The final report of
the investigative commission, published in March 2008, recommended that 39 contracts should
be renegotiated and 22 terminated. The Australian company, Anvil Mining, in whose case a
cancellation was recommended, had obtained a complete exemption from taxes for itself and for
one of its sub-contractors for twenty years, thanks to a contract signed in 1998. The Congolese
Government began a long-term process of renegotiation with the last six mining enterprises,
whose contracts had not been dealt with. This process, involving AngloGold Ashanti, Banro,
First Quantum, Gold Fields, Freeport-MacMoRan and Mwana Africa, has just been extended
for six months.140 NGOs such as Global Witness have criticised the lack of transparency and
accountability in this examination process.141
Initiatives by the international mining sector
The Initiative for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a coalition of
governments, private companies, civil society organisations and concerned parties who support
better state governance in the mining sectors through transparency and the publication of corporate
tax payments and government receipts. The EITI proposes norms and guiding principles, but putting
these into practice is the responsibility of member states. The DRC is a candidate member of EITI
and must validate its application between now and 9 March 2010 in order to become a member in
good standing. A national committee has been created and has published a work schedule.142
The OECD’s guiding principles for multinational businesses represent the norms to which
governments voluntarily adhere concerning corporate behaviour on human rights questions, on
the fight against corruption, on taxation, and on publishing information, amongst other things.
During the conflict, the UN Panel of Experts drew on them as a reference for evaluating the role
played by businesses in supporting the economic activities of the armed groups in the eastern
DRC. The Panel specifically recommended that the signatory governments should make sure that
businesses registered in their countries should not violate OECD principles.143
According to ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’, the Kimberley process has clarified the management
of the diamond sector, but ‘production and sales remain considerably under-declared’.144 Others
have commented that the Kimberley process set in motion ‘commercial processes aimed at putting
an end to what is essentially a problem of governance, of which insecurity is a symptom, [and is
therefore] mistaken about the fundamental dynamics of the question’.145
138 Global Witness, ‘R.D. Congo: mettre fin à l’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles’, press release. 12th February 2006. See http://
www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/422/fr/r.d._congo_mettre….
139 IPIS ‘République Démocratique du Congo: Contrats miniers – État des affaires’, p.1. (25th March 2008). Antwerp.
140 The Northern Miner, ‘More delays for DRC’s big miners’. 17th April 2009.
141 See for example ‘L’examen des contrats miniers en RDC: filière rapide ou fausse piste ?’ [Congo Mining Contract Review: Fast Track
or False Trail?], a Global Witness press release, 18th February 2008. http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/629/fr/
lexamen_des_contrats_miniers_en_rdc_filiere_rapide_t
142 See web page at http://eitransparency.org/fr/R%C3%A9publiqueD%C3%A9mocratiqueCongo.
143 Report of the UN Panel of Experts, October 2002, p.36.
144 ‘Le commerce au service de la paix’, Op. cit., p.24.
145 ‘Trading conflict for development’, Op. cit., p.28.
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56 International Alert
Actions by the United Nations
The UN Security Council has passed many resolutions concerning the DRC and the exploitation
of natural resources. In 2000, the Security Council set up a Panel of Experts on the illegal
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC. This panel was mandated
to collect information and to make recommendations to the Council about the illegal exploitation
of resources in the DRC and the connections to the conflict. In 2004, the Security Council set up a
Sanctions Committee and a Group of Experts to supervise the launching the arms embargo in the
DRC.146 In numerous reports, the Group of Experts mentions the criminal networks operating in
the eastern DRC that provide support to the armed groups and goes into role of the mining sector.
To insure the improved regulation of the mining sector, the Group of Experts in its December
2008 report recommended that the Security Council call on MONUC to establish teams at the
Bunagana and Kasindi border posts to carry out cross-border spot-checks.147 The Group also
recommended that the member states should work out and publish a map of mineral-rich regions
and the position of armed groups, in order to inform businesses of the origins of the minerals
they were buying. These two recommendations have been implemented. The member states were
also encouraged to ensure that businesses under their jurisdiction were exercising reasonable
diligence over the question of origin.148 In its previous reports, the Group had recommended to
neighbouring states to carefully screen and prevent economic partnerships between their national
enterprises and the armed groups.149
Following the recommendations of the Group of Experts, the Security Council gave MONUC a
mandate to ‘prevent the provision of any support’ to illegal armed groups, by means obtained
through illicit economic activities’ and ‘to use its means of surveillance and inspection to prevent
illegal armed groups from benefiting from support coming from any traffic in natural resources’.150
In another resolution, the Security Council extended the ban on travel and the freezing of assets to
include ‘persons or organisations supporting the illegal armed groups in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo by means of illicit trade in natural resources’.151 The same Resolution
encouraged member states to ensure that importers, processing industries and consumers ‘exercise
all the necessary precautions in regards tot their suppliers and to the origins of minerals they
purchase’ and to transmit to the Sanctions Committee the names of persons or entities to be put
on the list of travel bans and the freezing of assets. 152 As Security Council resolutions are legally
binding, individuals can be prosecuted for commercial transactions benefitting armed groups.
But the Group of Experts also indicated that many member states are not fully applying existing
sanctions against individuals.153
n None of these attempts at regulation or enforcing a return to order has borne fruit.
146 Security Council Resolution S/RES/1533 of 12th March 2004.
147 Report of the UN Group of Experts, December 2008, p.57.
148 Ibid, p.58.
149 See for example Report of the UN Group of Experts, S/2004/551 of 15 July 2004, p.31.
150 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1856 of 22 December 2008, Operative paragraphs 3(g) et (j), pp.4-5
151 Ibid., Operative paragraph 4(g), p.3.
152 Ibid., paragraphs 15-16.
153 Report of the UN Group of Experts, December 2008, p.52.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 57
Chapter 5: Impact of Mining Exploitation on the People
and the Environment
Summary:
Most artisanal miners are in a poverty trap, as they either choose or are compelled to work in the mines
in order to survive. The economic and social impact of a massive flow of people towards the mining
sites can only be evaluated by integrating all of the activities of the people, particularly agriculture,
since heading for the mine is often provoked by crisis in the countryside. Mining work represents a
break with traditional social organisation by changing the roles of young people and women. It is a
dangerous activity with the risk of accidents as well as violent in the context of rivalries between armed
groups. Sexual violence towards women is a result of this generalised insecurity more than of mining
as such.
The Rwandan and Ugandan military occupation and the coltan boom transformed mining exploitation
into a real pillaging of natural resources, with no respect for the natural parks and animal reserves.
Wild animals have paid a heavy tribute as hunting escalates to supply game to the miners and the
military. The environmental consequences of mining activity depend greatly on population densities.
The United Nations recognises the negative impact of mining exploitation on the people and
on the environment, but this is more specifically documented by NGOs that have denounced
the “war commerce” in the eastern DRC. Inspired by both human rights and by environmental
questions, substantial literature has developed on this point, including key studies by the Pole
Institute, particularly Le coltan et les populations du Nord Kivu [Coltan and the people of North
Kivu], the reports of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Global Witness, not to
mention the documents published in journals such as Congo-Afrique by CEPAS in Kinshasa or the
Annual L’Afrique des Grands Lacs by the Centre d’Etude de la région des Grands Lacs d’Afrique
in Antwerp.
5.1 The mining economy as a poverty trap
Mining activity: Between poverty machine and economic lifeline
The artisanal mining economy is a survival economy on a grand scale affecting hundreds of
thousands of Congolese. Estimates of the number of miners in the literature are somewhat random.
But the figures are striking: 200,000 people are thought to be involved in the mining economy in
North Kivu. This order of magnitude is not impossible for a province that already had a population
of 2,434,000 inhabitants in 1984. According to the head of the Mining Division in Bunia, Ituri
has at least 60,000 gold-panners, divided amongst the sites in Mahagi (10,000), Djugu (20,000),
Irumu (10,000) and Mambasa (20,000). In Mongbwalu alone, artisanal exploitation involves
from 50,000 to 60,000 miners on the concession, according to the recent well-documented study
by Dan Fahey, ‘Le fleuve d’or’ [River of gold].154 In addition, there are the South Kivu sites and
in Maniema, for which there are no estimates, but which undoubtedly reach into the tens of
thousands of people, given the number of known mining sites. Whilst only very rough estimates
are possible, one thing is certain: the artisanal mining force is an essential source of income for
hundreds of thousands of families throughout eastern DRC.
154 D . Fahey (2008). ‘Le fleuve d’or: The production and trade of gold from Mongbwalu, DRC’, pp.357–383. L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire
2007–2008. Paris: L’Harmattan.
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58 International Alert
Despite its effect of creating jobs, mining activity is a poverty trap. Behind the illusory appearance
of sudden enrichment, it generates a dynamic of impoverishment. Research into the human
consequences of artisanal mining usually concentrates on the diggers. These are certainly the
most numerous categories and the least well provided for. Other actors in the trading chain from
the mine gate to the comptoirs are not however altogether neglected. There are winners and losers
amongst them, but who are they? A detailed study would certainly show that those ethnic groups
who traditionally fill the commercially dominant positions are the same as those who control the
mineral trade – the Bashi in South Kivu, and the Nande in North Kivu. Both of these consider the
Banyarwanda intruders and have always sought to discredit them since they are competitors.
The diggers’ earnings from their work are minimal, which means they are unable to turn them
into advantage. Different sources – the UN Group of Experts and the NGOs – have tried to
calculate the diggers’ income. For gold-panners, for example, it can vary from US$1 and US$6
a day, depending on the sites, which is not a poor salary by Congolese standards. The monthly
income of diggers in Kamituga is close to US$30. In 2007, a study155 on gold exploitation in
Ituri and Orientale Province estimated the daily production per miner to be about 0.5 grams on
average. The diggers earn between US$1 and US$2 a day. According to the Group of Experts,
of the 17 mining areas studied in Ituri, only four made net gains. Out of 39 households studied
in Nord and South Kivu, 75% were indebted. Because of the remoteness of the sites, food and
consumer goods were between two and three times more expensive near the mines. The diggers
also spent some of their earnings on beer and women. They were often forced to incur debts with
the traders who manage the commercial circuits between the quarries and the trading houses as
well as the flow of consumer goods in the other direction. The miners are completely dependent
on those controlling the exploitation of the mines and the sale of the ore. This indebtedness is
more apparent in the rainy seasons when it is difficult to work. Overall, the median income of the
miners is just enough to survive. The Group of Experts even concluded that in the end the diggers’
yearly income was negative and that they were easy prey for the money-lenders. However, this
idea of a negative income, based on an accounting approach to the problem, seems inadequate
to explain this grim reality completely submerged in the informal. The diggers’ financial position
appears to be similar regardless of the mineral they are mining.
Before becoming a “poverty trap” for them, the mine represented an attractive economic alternative
for many, because they saw it as a way of stepping into the modern world and a chance of making
– or so it is believed – easy money. A large number of people have been displaced by the armed
violence suffered by the civilian population in Kivu. When they are not looked after by the UNHCR
or humanitarian NGOs, they find salvation in the mines, a local alternative to migration to some
faraway town. Those who have been marginalised by being uprooted find themselves compelled into
accepting the least well paid work, which is breaking up the mineral ore. Alongside these poorest
of the poor, who have fled from their villages, are town dwellers, young school dropouts or officials
whose salary – when they get one – is not sufficient to provide a living for their families. A number of
teachers are among them, some working full time in the mine, others during the school holidays. After
the MONUC-sponsored disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion operations, former soldiers,
particularly those from the Mai Mai, became miners. Mines also offers economic opportunities for
women, like small canteens run by “mothers” who need only a saucepan to set up a restaurant and
feed the unmarried men. The least well off women find a place in the mineral production chain by
taking part in breaking up cassiterite and coltan ore, in gold-washing and in carrying water.
Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, in their study on Kamituga, noted that people
dig for gold because growing manioc doesn’t bring them any money. They mention the fact
that the gold-washers or garimpeiro156 who succeed are an example for their children.157 This
155 K. Hayes et al. (2007). Researching natural resources and trade flows in the Great Lakes Region. PACT.
156 D e Boeck Filip (2001). ‘Garimpeiro worlds: Digging, dying and “hunting” for diamonds in Angola’, pp. 549–562. Review of African Political
Economy, 90/28.
157 K. Vlassenroot and T. Raeymaekers (2004). ‘Divisé en deux. Or et identité sociale à Kamituga (Sud-Kivu)’ [Split in two. Gold and social
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 59
phenomenon was already noticeable before the war, according to a 1987 study in the Bushi
country, where 30% of the young men had left farming for the mines.158 In the highly populous
regions in the eastern edge of Kivu, difficult land access for the youth is one of the main reasons
why they leave the area.
Faced with an economy of extortion that exploits their labour power, the miners have few means
of defence. They try to reconstitute some sort of society in places where photographs and films
come close to evoking penal labour. To make up for the loss of social cohesion previously rooted
in family structures, new kinds of social ties emerge, similar to the dynamics in the very poorest
towns, where poverty, in the words of Theodore Trefon, is transformed into the “solidarity of
despair”.159 But however painful the miners’ conditions, abused by the mirage of enrichment or
under duress from a situation of armed conflict, in their eyes such a life is better than that of
agricultural labourers stuck in their villages without any access to basic social services.
n Whilst the artisanal mining economy provides no lasting wealth for basic workers, it does offer a
means of survival to all those who either voluntarily or under duress end up working in a mine.
n Only with solid quantitative data – as accurate as possible – will it be possible to correctly
measure the economic and social impact of artisanal mining.
Social transformations and artisanal mining
The artisanal labour force engaged in mining is part of a worldwide social transformation that
brings with it migrations from the countryside to mines and to urban centres. Small towns develop
in the largest mining areas. By shifting the geographical distribution of the population, these
centres of urban growth around the mines produce changes in the economic, social and cultural
arenas in the Kivus and Ituri.
This profound change does not date from the recent wars but goes back to the 1980s, when
the liberalisation of mining attracted tens of thousands of young people. Social change is to be
measured according to all the dynamics affecting society and the physical space it inhabits. From
this angle, Kivu was not spared from the deterioration of transport infrastructures which led
converting the Congo into a series of “islands”. The breakdown of links between town and country
moved isolated villages backwards in time towards the sphere of self-sufficiency, jeopardising food
supplies to the towns and to the mining areas. The demands of the armed groups and the pillaging
of harvests have accentuated the division between towns and their hinterland. Kamituga, about
180 kilometres to the south-west of Bukavu, became impossible to reach by road, except with
such difficulty that the aeroplane replaced the lorry to supply an urban centre with more than
10,000 inhabitants. The impact of the cost of transport on consumer goods weighs heavily on
the personal budgets of the miners, who must bear the expenses of isolation. Older people recall
with some nostalgia the days when SOMINKI used to buy part of the local food crops in order to
feed its own workers. Back then the roads played their role as a link between sellers and buyers.
A return to a formal economy is only conceivable if the transport infrastructure is improved.
The consequence of this exodus of young men from the rural economy is hard to evaluate beyond
taking note of a decline in agriculture and a reduction in food security, which the reports attribute
to a deficit in the male labour force. Everyone interrogated during the Pole Institute’s field studies
referred to the effects of evictions on agro-pastoral activities and mining. The actual situations
is often more complicated: it is not exceptional for miners to own land that members of their
families are exploiting, as a safety net. Systems of agricultural production need to be carefully
studied. Amongst Bantu groups living in the forest, for example, women play a central role in
identity in Katimuga]. L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 2003-2004.
158 H. Dupriez (1987). Bushi: l’asphyxie d’un peuple [Bushi : the asphyxiation of a people]. Bukavu: ADI-Kivu.
159 T. Trefon (2002). ‘The political economy of sacrifice: Kinois and the State’. Review of African Political Economy, No. 93/94.
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60 International Alert
labour, while men primarily prepare the fields for cultivation using slash and burn techniques.
Women perform all the remaining work – sowing, planting, weeding, reaping and transporting
crops from the field to the village. The men’s absence is only a real problem during the period of
slash and burn in the dry season. This is a critical period, but it lasts only a few weeks, or only
several days if a chain saw is available. The many reports on mine conditions do not tackle or
only in a very limited way the question of the work timetables. This calls for investigation, since
informal production systems are often characterised by multiple activities.
It is the prolonged absence of the young men at the mines that destabilises the farms. It reduces
the productive capacity of family farming, since the women and the older men are unable to carry
out the work involving heavy labour such as clearing the ground. The production of food crops is
thus affected quantitatively and also qualitatively. The loss of wild game resources, due above all
to reckless slaughter by the armed groups, leads to protein deficiencies. Doctors point to a return
of kwashiorkor. Isolation, the lack of health care structures and the lack of security all contribute
to aggravating living conditions in the villages.
n The diggers are not a homogenous group, either socially or culturally, contrary to the
conclusions of most studies focusing on their economic status, their income levels and the
nature of their expenses. The sociological complexity of hundreds of thousands of diggers
within the DRC must be taken into account in the perspective, even if a distant one, of their
reinsertion into an economic system that is less informal than today’s.
n The sustainable improvement of the miners’ economic situation does not depend only on
increasing their income, but also and perhaps above all on rebuilding transport infrastructure,
as it is key in connecting rural areas to markets; is the disappearance of road traffic that has
transformed these areas into enclaves.
n The struggle against poverty depends on re-launching all segments of the economy, reintegrating
agriculture into the national market economy, as well as improving working conditions in the
mines.
5.2 Insecurity and violence in the artisanal mining sector
The system of artisanal mining exploitation leads to direct and indirect violence. The acts of
direct violence along the whole length of the trading chain of mining products can be placed into
two categories: those carried out by armed men (militia or security forces) against those carrying
on the trade and those carried out between traders themselves. The minerals trade is a violent
business, and even when the mining areas remain “calm” they are still areas of violent peace,
the “Congolese Far West”, or more correctly the “Far East”. The conflicts between the informal
owners of mining “squares” often give rise to violence, when the intervention of the authorities
regarding questions of rights is not sufficient. For example, in Mukungwe (South Kivu) two
groups claiming ownership of the mining site appealed to military men to help them get the
upper hand. The presence of armed groups is naturally the leading factor of violence. Even if the
NGOs agree that the phenomenon of enslavement of the local populations by the armed groups
is rare in artisanal mining, some cases of this have been found. The NGO Justice Plus denounced
the FARDC’s enslavement of the Walendu Bindi in Bhavi, forcing the young men to dig gold for
them.160 The Ugandan army perpetrated violence in Durba against OKIMO managerial staff from
1999 on, to force them to take part in their acts of pillage and to increase gold production. In
Mongbwalu, where confrontation between the FNI and the UPC for the control of the area caused
some 2,000 deaths between 2002 and 2004, it is believed that the exactions by the militia were
replaced by those of the FARDC, when they took over the concession. The Groups of Experts,
in its February 2007 report, confirmed that there was no difference between the militia and the
160 Justice Plus (2007). Ituri: l’armée n’a pas fait la différence.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 61
FARDC, who in Ituri, ‘occupied the gold mining areas where they replaced the different militias
and use force to impose their will and extort taxes from the mining communities’. In Ituri again,
it should be noted that two military observers from MONUC, deployed in Mongbwau, have been
assassinated. The traders are also the victims of armed men who often intercept them in order to
steal the goods they are carrying. Banditry did not stop at the borders: the route from Entebbe to
Kampala, notorious for being used by smugglers, was the scene of many bloody robberies.
The role of violence in the exploitation of and trade in minerals is controversial. The level of
violence carried out by men in arms varies in fact considerably from one group to another and
from one site to another. In Bisié, the 85th Brigade exercised control rather than coercion over the
population by the selective use of violence. A kind of unequal exchange appears to have developed
between the people who dig and upon whom the armed groups depend for their funding and the
latter, who ensure the diggers’ physical protection.161 This phenomenon can also be seen in Kilo
Moto, where during the Ugandan occupation, certain UPDF commanders invited and encouraged
the population to come and work in the mines, through an agreement to divide up the gold
produced: each miner had to pay one gram of gold a day in return for protection.
Indirect violence involves women and children. The social impact of mining activity is regarded in
a very negative light by the Congolese who associate mining sites with the breakdown of families,
the deterioration of moral standards and the emptying of the schools. The women complain of
being left behind in the village and having to bring up the children and cultivate the land without
any financial support, as most of the diggers are unable save any money. The men’s absence not
only has economic consequences, but is felt also on the level of personal security. Women on their
own are less secure than when there is a man in the household. The women are the main victims
of a general lack of security. Just recently, a campaign by the group Enough described the eastern
DRC as the most dangerous place on earth for women.162
Sexual violence is not directly connected with the mining economy, but with the lack of security
and the reigning anomie in the areas outside the law where the Kalashnikov is king. Against this
background, the mine milieu is more protected than the isolated villages without defence, which
are exposed to exactions of every kind by those carrying weapons. On the other hand, they are
major centres of prostitution. Young girls who want to escape from the constraints of family
authority are lured by making money. Others drift to the mines because they have been rejected
by their families, for example after being raped. This prostitution in places with deplorable health
conditions is a factor in spreading AIDS.
Children are also involved in mining production. In Kamituga, they go to school in the morning
and look for gold in the afternoon. The small amount of money they earn pays for their schooling.
According to reports, the dropping out of school is worse in mining areas than in rural areas, but
what is in the situation today in the village schools? They too have not been left untouched by the
disorganisation of education resulting from the war. Even the category of “child” is unclear without
precise research work on the age and jobs that children perform. For example, at what age do youth
start working underground? Young boys are often appreciated for their suppleness and agility,
allowing them to slip easily into the bowels of underground exploitations. Many children present
on the mining sites help their parents or their teachers because of their physical abilities. The war
produced many orphans and some have found the mines to be a means of survival.
n Relations between the labourers and the armed forces are based on a forced alliance of
interests.
n Individuals at artisanal mining sites face a permanent state of insecurity.
161 Report of the Experts’ Group of December 2008, and N. Garett (2008). Op.cit.
162 Enough (2009). Ten reasons why eastern Congo is the most dangerous place on earth for women. Washington, DC: Center for American
Progress.
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62 International Alert
Accidents at work and health risks
Working conditions in artisanal mines are extremely dangerous. Every year, landslides sweep
away their quota of diggers. The rudimentary techniques employed in the underground mines
also lead to frequent accidents. Miners in Adidi, an underground mine in the Mongbwalu area,
were exposed to continual risks: lack of ventilation, use of charcoal fires to weaken the rock and
improvised roof supports. During the Ugandan occupation, security was the last of the military’s
considerations, who thought only about pillaging resources. Towards the end of 1999, about
100 miners died in the collapse of the underground mine of Gorumbwa, because of intensive
exploitation methods. Several dozen miners were buried alive in Bibatama, in Kibabi in March
2001 due to inadequate roof supports. The technical side of artisanal exploitation means the risks
are always high. Two miners were suffocated, for example, in the underground mine in Senzere
(Mongbwaku) on 24th February 2004.
In addition to the fact that the diggers risk their lives at the mine, the physically exhausting
work there affects their health. Some local initiatives are aimed at better managing the risks
and minimising the nuisances created by extractive activities. Mining companies say they are
concerned by these questions. In Mongbwalu, a study on the miners’ living conditions carried
out in 2007 by the Cadre de Concertation (CdC), set up by AGK, revealed the deterioration of
the state of health of those living in mining areas: illnesses due to dust and chemical substances
used (mercury and acids), sexually transmitted diseases, accidents, miscarriages among women
working at the mine, without forgetting the cost to children of hard work and sexual abuse. The
CdC report provides examples of social actions in favour of the diggers that include education for
better use of their income, and encouragement for economic diversification. Such initiatives are
still rare, and people are usually left to their own devices or seek succour for their distress from
religious groups and from the sects flourishing in this atmosphere of misery. All this is a general
problem, not one specific to the mining world.
5.3 Geo-environmental impact
The environmental consequences are all highly negative: chemical pollution of water tables,
deforestation, diversion of rivers, levelling of entire hills and disappearance of arable land as well
as intensive poaching in the parks to feed the miners.
The different areas protected, including national parks, game reserves, and national reserves, have
all greatly suffered from the wars and from invasion by miners. The degradation of the fauna and
flora has been well documented by the major international NGOs devoted to the protection of
nature and by their local connections. The Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature
(ICCN) has, for example, received support from GTZ for a project concerning the National Park
of Kahuzi Biega (PNKB). The Wild Life Conservation Society (WCS) is also very active in the
area. In the lower part of the park called “Low Altitude”, covering 90% of the park’s 5,400 sq.
km, the WCS counted nearly 3,600 elephants and 8,000 gorillas, figures reported in Le Gorille,
an environmental communication journal, published by the Project PNKB-GTZ.163 During the
coltan “fever” in 1999-2000, some 12,000 local and foreign diggers (Hutus from the current
FDLR) settled inside the park on some twenty sites. The NGO, Vision Verte, from Bukavu, drew
up a precise map of this.164A comparison between this map and a GTZ map several years earlier
is telling: back then the park was practically uninhabited.165
Considering the park’s immense size, the damage inflicted by the opening of these mines was little
more than a few gashes in the gigantic mass of the forest. But the slaughter of wild animals to
163 SOS (2001). ‘Le PNKB à la merci du Coltan’. Le Gorille, June, No. 4.
164 See map: Sites of coltan exploitation in the Kahuzi Biega Park.
165 Institut Zaïrois de Conservation de la Nature-GTZ (1996). Cartes de la végétation et de l’utilisation des terres du Parc National de Kahuzi Biega
et des régions avoisinantes [Maps of vegetation and land use in Kahuzi Biega National Park and neighbouring regions].
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 63
feed the workforce has caused considerable damage, especially since part of the poached game is
diverted to markets in the Kivu towns. Dried game meat (the lack of roads prevents transporting
fresh meat) from the national park is for sale in Bukavu market stalls, where ivory is also easily
found. The losses caused to the environment cannot all be attributed to the mining economy, but
rather to the whole predatory system that the war unleashed for which biodiversity also pays a
high price. The small mountainous part of the PNKB, called “High Altitude”, which is home to
world heritage of the mountain gorillas, has also suffered, not from mining activity, but from the
powerlessness of the park managers, helpless in the face of the armed bands in search of trophies.
During the summer of 2000, the WCS organised a census of the gorillas, estimating their number
had dropped to 130 from the 258 recorded in 1996.
The activities of the Diane Fossey Foundation, supported by the media and its publications,166 have
contributed towards awareness among many actors and decision-makers in the North. Created in
2003, the Durban Process fought for the protection of the Kahuzi Biega gorillas. This advocacy
work made an impression on the companies in the North. The American company, Cabot, one of
the largest in the tantalum industry that was targeted by the 2000 UN experts’ reports, decided
to stop buying coltan coming from the DRC, in particular from the protected areas. ‘We do not
and will not knowingly purchase any material containing Tantalum, including coltan, which was
mined in the Kahuzi-Biega National Park and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve in the Congo’.167
The environmental consequences of mineral exploitation largely depend on population density.
From this point of view, Kivu is quite varied. Its eastern part, up to a hundred kilometres from
its borders with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, has the highest densities in the DRC, up to
250 inhabitants per sq. km, or more, whereas towards the West, the territories of Walikale and
Shabunda have fewer than 10 inhabitants per sq. km, according to the 1984 census, as is shown
in Henri Nicolai’s precise cartography.168 Twenty-five years later, the contrast between populated
or over-populated areas and those that are empty spaces remains stark. In the absence of a census,
satellite imagery provides confirmation. In the meantime, the population has doubled. One of
Kivu’s basic characteristics is this “oro-demographic escarpment”, which separates the populated
highlands from the empty lowlands. Daily life in the mines also depends on human densities in the
surrounding areas. The opening of a quarry generates conflict only in areas of dense settlement. On
the other hand, feeding the miners is less difficult there than in isolated areas far from habitation
that must rely on supplies being flown-in.
166 I. Redmond (2001). Op. cit.; K. D’Souza (2003). Op. cit.
167 Cabot Position on Tantalum and Coltan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (August 2008). Cabot.
168 H. Nicolaï (1998). La répartition et la densité de la population du Kivu [Population distribution and density in Kivu]. Brussels: Académie Royale
des Sciences d’Outre-Mer. See map of North and South Kivu: population density by community.
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64 International Alert
Destruction of river banks and deterioration of the landscape at the gold-bearing
sites in Ituri
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 65
Chapter 6: Summary of Recommendations
Summary:
The current sanctions regime is not effective. The problem of “conflict minerals” gives rise to two main
groups of recommendations:
- Restrict trade, more or less radically, from total embargo to selective bans;
- Formalise or regulate trade by a mixture of economic, institutional and security initiatives.
Several initiatives are underway, including one on traceability (Germany) and another on the obligation
to certify the origin of mineral ores (USA).
All the actors (NGOs, UN, Parliamentary groups, etc.,) are looking for a solution to “conflict
minerals” and combine their reports with recommendations. The first generation of reports, which
coincided with the coltan boom, suggested a boycott of Congolese mining products and sanctions
against those involved in the trade. These recommendations were applied in some respects and ten
years later it is possible to draw some conclusions. A second generation of reports now calls for a
“global strategy” which would link sanctions, an improvement in security and the formalisation
of the mining sector. The most recent version of this second generation of recommendations was
produced by the American NGO, Enough. It proposes in its ‘comprehensive approach to the
DRC’s conflict minerals’, 169 a four-pronged strategy:
• transparency in the supply chain;
• making strategic mines secure;
• reforming governance;
• developing economic opportunities for the diggers.
6.1 Main recommendations, classified by theme
In this chapter, recommendations are classified according to the thematic order of this report, and
their originating organisation is indicated in brackets.
Recommendations relating to the system of production
Recommendations Methods of implementation
Break the territorial
control of armed
groups over the
production of
minerals
Deploy FARDC and MONUC in the principal mines and trade routes
(Resource Consulting Service)
Prevent access to mining sites and trade routes to the belligerents by means
of surveillance by MONUC (Global Witness)
Legal action against soldiers involved in minerals trading (Global Witness)
Cautious reindustrialisation (bring in responsible mining companies, while
leaving room for artisanal miners) (Resource Consulting Service)
Reform the security
system
Training, discipline and regular payment of the PNC and FARDC (UN, DfID,
APPG, SARW, Global Witness)
169 Enough. Comprehensive approach to Congo’s conflict minerals. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress. 23rd April 2009.
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66 International Alert
Formalise the
artisanal mining
sector
Set up mining cooperatives (World Bank, Global Witness, Pact)
Develop SAESSCAM (register diggers, issue cards, etc.) (Resource
Consulting Service, World Bank, Global Witness)
Officially designate areas for artisanal mining (Resource Consulting
Service, World Bank)
Develop CEEC controls in artisanal mines (Resource Consulting Service,
CEEC)
Restore legal
security
Review land titles, mining contracts and local community rights (DfID)
Simplify and clarify mining rights, particularly to distinguish the roles of
traders and agencies (UN) and resolve conflicts between customary rights,
land rights and mining rights (Pact)
Extend CAMI’s services in the provinces (World Bank, Global Witness)
Reinforce the
application of mining
rights
Set up an independent mining authority (national and international) to
supervise application of the mining law and especially the attribution of
concessions in the Kivus (APPG)
Create a Congolese parliamentary commission on natural resources (APPG)
Recommendations relating to the system of commercial trading and the struggle against
fraud170
Recommendations Method of implementation
Reduce the revenue
taken out of the
minerals trade by
armed groups
Total ban on the import of certain minerals from the eastern DRC (IPIS,
HRW)
Implementation of reasonable diligence (UN, Global Witness, Enough)
Simplify, harmonise
and clarify customs
tariffs in the Great
Lakes region
Negotiations in the framework of the CEPGL (DfID, Resource consulting
services)
Establish a regional customs organisation (DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda,
Tanzania) (INICA)
To ensure traceability
along the supply
chain
Obligation on the importing companies to publish the origin of their mineral
ores (Enough, IPIS)
Effective application of “due diligence” (Global Witness, HRW)
Setting up of an administrative procedure for identifying mineral ores170 (ITRI)
Statutory obligation for independent audits on importing companies on the
origin of mineral ores, with fines for violations (Global Witness, Enough,
IPIS, HRW)
Developing an administrative certification throughout the supply chain (DfID,
Global Witness, Pact, Resource consulting services, UN)
Developing a geochemical certification (Pact, Institut fédéral de
géosciences)
Monitoring of mining activities by civil society (APPG, HRW)
To formalise crossborder
trade
Publish accounts and of export taxes paid by the trading houses (DfID,
Resource consulting services)
Institutionalise a forum for regional dialogue (Resource consulting
services, Pact)
Establish joint customs posts (Resource consulting services)
Set up a regional EITI or apply the national EITI to the Kivus (Global Witness,
DfID, Resource consulting services)
170 ‘Progress report: towards a responsible cassiterite supply chain’. Available at www.itri.co.uk.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 67
To fight against
customs fraud
Independent monitoring of administrative services’ behaviour at the borders
by observatories of cross-border trade (DfID, INICA, UN)
Training of and regular salary payment to customs officers
Reform of customs procedures (DfID)
Reduce the number of administrative services involved in cross-border trade
(DfID)
Privatise customs services (UN, APPG)
Reveal the identities of corrupt officials and prosecute them (Pole Institute)
Define the payment at source of 40% of receipts, according to the
Constitution (Pole Institute, SARW)
Ensure that OECD
principles and
UN sanctions are
respected
Publish maps of the mining production areas under the control of armed
groups (UN)
Surveillance of trading and industrial companies by their governments (IPIS,
UN, Global Witness, HRW)
Prosecution by the IPC of traders involved in “conflict minerals” (Global
Witness)
Systematic commitment to criminal prosecution of companies violating
sanctions (Global Witness, HRW, Resource consulting services)
Boycott by Western consumers of products made with “conflict minerals”
(Enough)
Stop the exploitation of minerals in certain zones occupied by armed groups
(HRW, IPIS, Global Witness)
Create a “gold observatory” in Ituri (HRW)
Recommendations relative to the impact on people and the environment
Recommendations Methods of implementation
Diversify local
economic
opportunities
Agricultural development (SARW, INICA, Pole Institute, Pact, Global
Witness)
Development of infrastructure (particularly roads to serve agriculture)
(INICA, Pole Institute, SARW, Global Witness)
Create local markets (INICA, Pact)
Develop social
responsibility
among mining
companies present
in the DRC
Develop a code of conduct for mining enterprises (UN)
Adopt Congolese
environmental
standards suitable
for artisanal and
industrial mining
activities
Law or Decree (INICA)
Improve the
diggers’ safety
Surveillance of working conditions in artisanal mines by SAESSCAM
(World Bank)
Increase the
awareness of the
diggers about their
rights and market
prices
Mobile telephones (INICA)
Dissemination of the Mining Code (INICA, World Bank)
Training of diggers by SAESSCAM (World Bank)
Reduce child
labour
Programme of education for children employed in the mines (Pact)
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68 International Alert
6.2 Moving from the ineffectiveness of the current sanctions regime
to certification/traceability
Emerging from the work of the Group of Experts, the first generation of measures passed consisted
of targeted sanctions, decreed by the UN Security Council. These took the form of:
• Blacklisting (individuals or companies appearing on the UN List are no longer to be used as
suppliers or traders by mining sector companies);
• Freezing assets;
• Ban on visas.171
Even the United Nations conceded that these sanctions, which do not target trade in itself but only
certain actors in illegal trade, have not had the intended effect. The ‘sanctions bother their targets,
(but) their general effect is to reduce hardly at all the activities they aim to put an end to’.172 In other
words, they did not stop the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources, nor prevent the
armed groups from profiting from the mineral trade, nor put an end to violence. The multiplicity of
traders, of comptoirs and of export possibilities render ineffective sanctions targeting a few traders
who conduct business with armed groups. In other words, the present sanctions are incapable of:
• Limiting the recourse to force in the extraction of mineral resources;
• Discouraging fraud;
• Punishing all the mining operators who are guilty of having relations with the militias.
According to the UN, one of the great weaknesses of the present sanctions systems is the lack of
cooperation among the states that have responsibility for implementing the sanctions. Although
the UN put the two largest Ugandan gold exporters on their list in 2007, these companies were
never bothered by the Kampala authorities: one of big traders in Ariwara, Ozia Mazio, who
died in 2008 and was on the list of people violating the embargo by supplying arms to the
FAPC -- blacklisted by the US Treasury and the Bank of England for gold trading -- continued
to buy gold in Mongbwalu in 2008 and went regularly to Kampala to sell it. (He is said to have
learned that he was on the list from UN officials). The Group of Experts’ December 2008 report
emphasises the reluctance of the Ugandan Central Bank and of several other banks in Kampala
to freeze the accounts of Ugandan gold-trading companies blacklisted by the UN. In Uganda, the
Porter Commission recommendations to initiate further enquiries have never been carried out.
The Rwandan and Burundian Governments do not exercise any “due diligence” towards gold
importers or importers of other minerals who were operating on their territory.
The governments of the region are not the only ones at fault; European governments are also
very reluctant to police the European companies denounced by the United Nations. Up until
now, not one of them has been found guilty by a court; at a maximum a few of them have
been called to “hearings” (more by parliamentary investigative commissions than by judges).
The heaviest “sanction” so far imposed has been an official declaration of having violated OECD
principles concerning the activities of multinationals in conflict zones. Even those companies
who have been caught “red handed” (AngloGold Ashanti with the FNI, Traxys and Trademet
with the trading houses that buy from the FDLR) in dealings with armed groups have not been
pursued. The Belgian authorities made known their concern to Trademet and Traxys, but refuse
to go any further for the moment. AngloGold Ashanti, who had provided logistic and financial
support to the FNI militia, in exchange for guarantees of security,173 has faced no legal actions in
consequence, and the company, while admitting its inappropriate relationships with a militia, had
mainly relied on public relations statements to handle this problem. No European government
seems at present willing to impose any obligation of “due diligence” on companies, NGOs have
insisted. Another limit to the effectiveness of sanctions is that exporting companies named by the
171 The travel ban and the freezing of assets date back to 2005 (Resolution 1596) and have invariably been renewed.
172 Group of Experts’ Report of 8th February 2008
173 Human Rights Watch (2005). Op. cit.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 69
UN reorganise to carry out their activities clandestinely or hide themselves behind other names.174
In the absence of sanctions against companies, the UN’s measures are reduced to a sort of moral
embargo on “conflict minerals”. Observing these measures is left to the good will of private
companies who at present exercise hardly any control over their suppliers.175
The case of Afrimex: Denunciation without condemnation
In Europe, only the United Kingdom has dared to declare one of its enterprises as having violated
the OECD principles, following a complaint by Global Witness in February 2007. The British National
Point of Contact for implementing these principles indicated in 2009 that Afrimex, which figured on the
UN list since 2002 because of its links with the shadow company RCD-Goma, had violated the OECD
principles. But this did not lead to any legal action. Afrimex claimed to have stopped acquiring any
mineral ores in the DRC, and in its latest report, Global Witness demanded that the British Government
independently verify this statement.
For the time being, the most serious result of being put on the UN list has been the suspension
of some purchasing contracts by importing companies. Some Western companies have officially
kept their distance from their Congolese suppliers. In 2001, following the Group of Experts’
report, American Cabot stopped importing Congolese coltan and Eagles Wing Resources gave
up importing coltan from the DRC and turned to Rwanda. After the large Ugandan exporters
and the AngloGold Ashanti scandal were placed on the UN list, the Swiss company Metalor
Technologies SA stopped buying Ugandan gold from 2005 onwards; the Ugandan companies
involved (UCI and Machanga) then found a new buyer in the Gulf, Emirates Gold, based in Dubai.
This company bought 18 tonnes of gold from Uganda and Burundi, but in 2007, the Emirates
authorities requested that it to stop these purchases and Emirates Gold blocked the accounts of
UCI and Machanga. Nevertheless, the Group of Experts brought to light in its December 2008
report the fact that Emirates Gold had continued to buy gold from doubtful sources even after
2007. The same reaction came from Hussar Ltd to UCI, which it accused of not having revealed
the real origin of its gold. The most striking result was the financial retaliation by the buyers
against their suppliers, because of the risk of damaging their reputation. Very recently (May
2009), the Belgian company Traxys announced its intention to stop purchasing in Kivu following
the revelations by IPIS of the links between one of its trading suppliers (World Mining Co) and
two armed groups (the Mai Mai of Pareco and the FDLR). The risk to reputation is a lever that
may have some effect, but it has its limits. The large electronic companies (Ericsson, Hewlett
Packard, Intel and Motorola) have reacted to the “No blood in my mobile phone” campaign by
turning mainly to public relations (by developing codes of conduct), by blaming their suppliers
and by trying to pass blame and responsibility down the supply chain.176
The notion that the ineffectiveness of the present sanctions regime gives cause for considering a
second generation of measures that moves away from the idea of blocking trade in minerals was
recognised by the United Nations in a report that makes a show of “soul searching” and was
reaffirmed in the December 2008 Group of Experts report.177 The idea of an embargo or of a boycott
of mineral products from the eastern DRC was put forward in reaction to the ineffectiveness of
the sanctions in question. In 2001, IPIS called for a complete embargo on coltan from this area.
In the same perspective, the American NGO Enough along with Amnesty International argue
that the UN should adopt resolutions in order to prohibit the buying and selling of minerals
coming from the conflict zones in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Amnesty International
174 In its December 2008 report, the Group of Experts indicated that the blacklisted gold-trading company, Machanga Limited, based in
Kampala, had created a shadow company in Nairobi, Usindi Exports, through which its exports transited to Emirates Gold.
175 Global Witness (2009). Op. cit.
176 The electronic companies are prepared to accept responsibility for their immediate suppliers, but not for those lower on the chain, who
should be monitored by other supplier companies in the chain. In other words, these companies refuse to accept responsibility for the
whole chain of their suppliers.
177 Chapter 196, p.50 ‘If steps are not taken by Member States to enforce compliance with the sanctions regime and relevant Security Council
resolutions, the work of the Group will have little impact.’
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70 International Alert
called for dismantling the mafia-like networks behind the wars and that maintain armed groups,
considering that the end of the war depends on ending the illegal exploitation and the fraudulent
sale of the country’s wealth.
Even if the option for a trade ban without a ban on named traders continues to be raised, there
is now a consensus between the United Nations and the NGOs not to pursue the trade embargo
angle, because it could lead to:
• penalising artisanal miners, who are among the poorest people;
• penalising the Congolese government;
• discrediting legitimate exports of minerals from neighbouring countries;
• a risk of reprisals against the MONUC;
• armed groups substituting other resources;
• avoiding the embargo by falsifying the real origins of mineral ores;
• an expansion of smuggling (particularly of gold, which is easily exported in small quantities).
“Due diligence” (checking the blacklist during any commercial transactions) remains therefore
the currently favoured solution, but to be fully effective, it assumes a) that it will be obligatory
b) that the precise origin of mineral can be ascertained. This could be achieved by administrative
means (certificates of origin) or physical means (geochemical traceability of the mineral ore).
Drawing on the Kimberley process, Germany has developed a pilot project for certification of the
“business chain” in Rwanda for coltan and it hopes to extend it to the DRC. This project is part
of the industrial logic of labelling, which does not concern the quality of the ore but its “political
ownership”. From across the Atlantic, an American initiative is designed to make “due diligence”
obligatory for companies listed on a stock exchange, and this could be an important step in
moving from a regime of good intentions to a system of contradictory obligations that could be
reviewed (verification of declarations by auditors independent of the supply chain).
n Sanctions supporters look for suitable pressure points in the supply chain: the western NGOs
consider that pressure should be applied to the end-user companies through consumers and
legislators, so that they can apply pressure in return on the suppliers. This strategy, some fear,
may be too indirect to make a real impact on the ground, since the suppliers can always find
other buyers and/or conceal the origin of the minerals.
n The technical, financial and institutional feasibility of certification/traceability, as a kind of
transposition of the Kimberley process to the “conflict minerals”, remains in question.
6.3 A new paradigm: Make trade formal to make it moral
Opinions differ on the usefulness of systems of banning trade in minerals, whether selectively or
not, since bans depend on capacities for due supervision and verification (“due diligence” and
“certification schemes”). Some organisations (INICA, DfID, USAID, etc.) remain sceptical about
the possibility of reducing insecurity by restricting trade and offer another alternative, which
involves no longer placing sanctions on trade but trying to formalise it in order to give it discipline
and morality. Their reports favour a formalisation/ return to order of the mineral trade in the region,
which implies a wide range of economic measures (clarification and simplification of Congolese
customs regulations, reindustrialisation, publication of legal taxes, regional customs system, etc.).
Whilst these reports distance themselves from systems of constraint (embargo, targeted sanctions
and certification measures), they acknowledge the need to have recourse to constraint, particularly
in order to drive armed groups away from the mining sites (simultaneously bringing in Congolese
forces of order and industrial mining operators). The report, Trading conflict for development,
recommends, for example, a strategy of constraint against the FDLR: targeted sanctions against
the leadership, military operations against their mining sites, legal prosecutions, etc.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 71
The period of economic solutions has replaced the period of legal solutions (sanctions) with the
move towards formalising the mining trade. This formalisation should achieve what sanctions
have not been able to do, that is gradually marginalising armed groups in this sector. This solution
through the economy is opposed, for example, to targeted sanctions, which lead to strengthening
the informalisation of the sector by driving trade activity into clandestinity. From restricting trade
in the eastern DRC, there would be a move to formalisation, which implies a whole range of
measures:
• Reforming the security sector;
• Reforming customs;
• Fighting corruption in the mining police, the OFIDA, the intelligence services and the Ministry
of Mines;
• Developing legislation on transparency and ethics of companies operating in conflict zones;
• Creating a cross-border commission to set up mechanisms for joint control, or even privatising
customs control;
• Certifying mineral ores by the CEEC;
• Harmonising regional customs regimes, to reduce incentives for smuggling;
• Setting up joint customs posts.
To ensure its effectiveness any move towards formalisation would mean the consensual
involvement of a multitude of actors (Congolese government, the governments of neighbouring
countries, international actors and private sector operators) in long-term actions, dealing with
complex subjects and various structural reforms (security, customs, etc.). This formalisation must
rely on a strategy of incentives, and it is not easy to see at this stage what they might be. (What,
for example, would be Rwanda’s motivation for introducing transparency in its imports from the
DRC?) Writers sidestep this problem by insisting on the traders’ willingness to operate legally, if
the government improves its performance.
n Inspired by the EITI and by the strenuously developmental Kimberley process, the formalisation
of trade is an attractive alternative to ineffective sanctions, but it opens up a vast field of
activity, all of the parameters of which are far from being controllable, much less identified.
6.4 Past and present initiatives
The discussions taking place at the United Nations or amongst NGOs about what measures
might be effective do not imply total inertia concerning attempts to regulate the mining trade
in the Great Lakes region. In addition to national processes (EITI etc.), referred to in Chapter
4, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region has taken up the question of illegal
exploitation of natural resources. Particular measures have been implemented inside the DRC,
such as the suspension of exports of mineral ores in 2007, closing the customs posts in Bunagana
and Ishasha in 2008, closing the mines in Walikale and Adidi in 2008, etc., and a more structured
course of action is underway.
Past Initiatives Commentary
Closing the customs posts in
Bunagana and Ishasha (2008)
These closures aimed at depriving the CNDP of customs revenues,
but according to the latest reports from the UN, this post is still
used by the CNDP.178
Closing the mines in Walikale
and Adidi (2008)
Setback. The mine in Walikale was reopened in April 2008, under
pressure from the traders.
Suspension of mineral ore
exports (April 2007)
Reassignment of licences to 11 trading houses.
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72 International Alert
Ban on importing unprocessed
ore
Setback, as there is no processing capacity in the DRC. In 2005,
when Kabila visited China and South Korea, projects for a coltan
processing plant were submitted to him.
Demand by the Deputy
Governor of South Kivu to
demilitarise the mining sites
(2008)
No result.
Establishing a single window Setback, as a multitude of administrative services for customs
formalities persists.
Rwandan-Congolese military
operation against the FDLR
(2009)
The Congolese-Rwandan offensive was meant to cut off the
FDLR from the mining production areas. After withdrawing, the
FDLR returned. Operation limited to North Kivu – no impact
on their mining resources in South Kivu and use of gold easily
transportable. Setback from mining standpoint.
Initiatives underway Commentary
Pilot project for certifying the
commercial chain (CTC) begun
in September 2008 in Rwanda
by Federal German Institute
for geosciences and natural
resources (BGR). The project
concerns Colombo-tantalite,
cassiterite and wolframite.
18-month project, could be extended to the DRC. Certification
depends on good will in the countries of origin. Possibility of
sidestepping it by mixing ores from various sources.
Determining the source of tantalum by geochemical processes
(Fingerprint), tried out by BGR in another project, is long and
costly.
Random MONUC inspections
of loading mineral ores
(Resolution 1856)
These inspections should be made in the presence of Congolese
authorities who are not always available and MONUC has no
powers of arrest if it discovers trafficking.
Preparation of a draft law in
the US Congress imposing “due
diligence” on companies and
obligations to declare origins
Three US Senators, with the support of the NGO Enough,
Republican Sam Brownback and Democrats Dick Durbin and
Russell Feingold initiated a draft law on conflict metals in the
DRC, which aims to control the purchase of metals for the
manufacture of high technology products (radar, mobile phones,
etc.) that enable armed groups in the DRC to be financed. If this
draft law were accepted, companies registered on American stock
exchanges would be under the obligation to ‘declare annually to
the ASEC, gendarme for the US stock exchange, the countries of
origin of these raw materials. If these countries were the DRC
or its neighbours, the company would have to state which mine
the ore came from,’ according to the draft law. In addition to this
obligation to make a declaration of origin, the companies would
also have to submit to independent audits of their supply chains.
Enough is conducting a public campaign in support of this draft
law (www.raisehopeforcongo.org ).
Extending the competence of
certification of the CEEC to all
mineral ores
The CEEC has received authorisation to certify all mineral ores
and is seeking support to expand its work. It is now present in
Bukavu, Goma and Butembo.
Regional struggle against
the illegal exploitation of
natural resources (meeting in
Bujumbura in April 2009)
A meeting of the Regional Initiative against illegal exploitation was
held in Burundi in April and the agenda included a draft regional
mechanism for certification, and a regional protocol on illegal
exploitation and on capacity-building. This plan remains quite
vague.
178 Group of Experts’ report of 18th May 2009.
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 73
n Congolese initiatives have been blocked by Congolese interests; the regional initiative remains
unclear and slow; bilateral initiatives (American and German) are the most likely to be
completed within a reasonable timescale.
n Two main schools of thought are contending over the problem of the illegal exploitation of
minerals:
• Restricting trade (in a more or less radical way, from complete embargo to selective bans);
• Reforming trade through a combination of economic, institutional and security measures.
- 412 -
74 International Alert
parc national
moins de 10
10-35
36-89
90-149
150-250
plus de 250
Hab./km2
GOMA
Butembo
Uvira
BUKAVU
Lac Kivu
Lac
Tanganyika
Lac
Edouard
S U D
K I V U
N O R D
K I V U
Fizi
Mwenga
Shabunda
Walikale
Walungu
Kabare
Kalehe Idjwi
Masisi
Rutshuru
Lubero
Beni
limite de province 0 100 km
limite de collectivité
chef-lieu de province
chef-lieu de zone
Source : H. Nicolaï. La répartition et la densité de
la population au Kivu. - ARSOM 1998
N et R POURTIER
NORD ET SUD KIVU : DENSITÉ DE LA POPULATION
PAR COLLECTIVITÉ - (recensement de 1984)
NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU: POPULATION DENSITY
BY ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT (1984 CENSUS)
- 413 -
The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 75
25 km
Muliko Egypte Mibalabala
Nawitimbaya
Tshivanga
Kinshasa
Amérique
Londres
Celamasi
Camp diamant
Kalemie
Busakala
Busu Lungi
Afrique du Sud Nabiloko
Apipa 1
Apipa 2 Nabiema
Chamukwale
Selele
Mankese
Ititi
Nyamilenge
Nkumwa Kibungabunga
Matamba 1
Matamba 2
Mugondoli Lugonduzi Mitaka
Nkunku
Masingu 1
Masingu 2
Wankuba 2
Wankuba 1 Nyangogoma 1
Migelo 1
Migelo 2
Katusi
SuizaNyakansago
LubumbMaululo Kakili 2
Katusi 1
Nsonga 1 Kankele
Kembe
Nyakyungwa
Kosovo
Divuye
Mubandane
KabuyeKanoso
Bizembwe
Kabukiki
BUKAVU
Kahuzi
Mt Biega
Lac Kivu
route principale
route secondaire et sentier
site d'exploitation
SITES D'EXPLOITATION DE COLTAN DANS LE PARC DE KAHUZI BIEGA
(situation fin 2001)
Source : Vision verte et GTZ
N et R Pourtier
SITES OF EXPLOITATION OF COLTAN IN THE KAHUZI BIEGA PARK
(situation at the end of 2001)
- 414 -
76 International Alert
ETHNIC GROUPS IN KIVU
C o n g o
KISANGANI
BUKAVU
KINDU
GOMA
Rutshuru
Lubero
Masisi
OUGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
TANZANIE
KIGALI
BUJUMBURA
Lac Albert
Lac Edouard
Lac Kivu
Lac Tanganyika
Parc de la
Maiko
Parc
des
Virunga
Biega
Parc de
Kahuzi
GROUPES ETHNIQUES DU KIVU
Tumbwe
Hemba
Luba
Binja
Langa
Bangubangu
Kusu
Bambuli
Wagenia
Pere
Mvuba
Nyintu
Binja
Nord
Amba
Nyanga
Tembo
Shi
Ngengele
Kunda
Songola
Hunde
Havu
Fulero
Bembe
Boyo
Kusu
Lombi
Bira
Kumu
Nande
Lega
Songye
Tetela
Watambulu
M A N I E M A
S U D
N O R D
K I V U
K I V U
limite de province Hemba groupe ethnique
source : Léon de Saint-Moulin. "Congo-Afrique", février 2003.
forte concentration de rwandophones
(Banyarwanda, Banyamulenge)
limite groupe ethnique
100 km
Lengola
N et R POURTIER
- 415 -
The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 77
COUNTRIES IMPORTING MINERALS FROM THE EASTERN RDC
0°
45°
45°
COUNTRIES IMPORTING MINERALS FROM THE EAST OF DRC
R D C
tin and other metals
gold
N. et R. POURTIER
UNITED
UNITED STATES
CANADA
RUSSIA
KAZAKHSTAN
KINGDOM
BELGIUM
NETHERLANDS
GERMANY
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
U.A.E. INDIA
MALYSIA
THAILAND
SOUTH AFRICA
CHINA
- 416 -
78 International Alert
TRANSPORT OF MINERALS BY AIR
Rutshuru
Walikale
Kalehe
Shabunda Walungu
Beni
Lubero
Idjwi
Mwenga
Uvira
Pangi
Lubutu
Punia
Mambasa
Irumu
Bafwasende
Masisi
Kitongo
Kiliza
Neremere
Elila
Elila
Kiliba
Sange
Luberizi
Elila
Kioloba
Biriki
Mosala
Ulindi
Ulindi
Lugulu
Lu bilu
Legulu
Lubiadja
Ruzizi
Lowa
Lubutu
Lowa
BiasiLutu
Luka
Luhoho
Talias
Ruindi
Rutshuru
Mesa
Oso
Oso
Bilati
Lubonga
Maiko
Tshopo
Legwe
Opienge
Lubero
Tayn
Lindi
Kanabiro
Loya
Mososa
Lukalia
Taiya
Semliki
Ligembe
Apale
Lindi
Ituri Lenda
Ibina
Biabono
Luna Laya
Ituri
Sumaie
Epulu
Duve
Lubilo
Semue
Lake Kivu
Lake
Tanganyika
Lake
Edward
UGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
National Park
Game Reserve
National Reserve
airport
airstrip
TRANSPORT OF MINERALS BY AIR
N. et R. POURTIER
50 km
Kawumu
Baraka
Komanda
Biambwe
Butembo
Kasindi
Kanyabayonga
Ishasha
Rwindi
Bunagana
Pinga
Lueshe
Mubi
Ibondo
Kasese
Sulia
Kilambo
Biruwe
Bisie
Katanti
Moga
Nzowu
Tshonka
Mumusho
Bizinzo
Kiakupe
Kalima
Kama
Kamituga
Lugushwa
Kasongo Fizi
Kampene
Namoya
Kahuzi
Niania Lolwa
Epulu
Boga
Opienge
Oicha
Luengbe
Ishango
Mutwanga
Lulindi
Kandja
Kunca
Luiko
Kalamia
GOMA
BUKAVU
Sources : IPIS cartographie des motivations
et divers
- 417 -
The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 79
ACCESS ROUTES TO AND FROM THE EAST OF THE DRC
main road water transport
secondary road
railway
pipeline
BUKAVU
NAIROBI
DODOMA
KAMPALA
Mwanza
Rutshuru
Nord
Kivu
Kivu
Sud
Maniema
Haut-Uele
Ituri
ACCESS ROUTES TO AND FROM THE EAST OF DRC
Kigoma
Tabora
Arusha
Mombasa
Dar es salaam
Lubero
Butembo
Beni
Kasese
Bukoba
Butare
Uvira
Fizi
Isiro
Bunia
Gulu
Arua
Eldoret
Nakuru
Aru
Watsa
INDIAN
OCEAN
UGANDA
SUDAN ETHIOPIA
KENYA
TANZANIA
Lake Edward
Lake Victoria
Lake Albert
Kivu
Lake
Lake Tanganyika
KIGALI
Bunangana
Ishasha
BUJUMBURA
GOMA
Entebbe
Kisumu
Province Orientale
BURUNDI
RWANDA
Kabale
200 km
Katanga
N. et R. POURTIER
- 418 -
80 International Alert
Parc National de la
P. N.
BUKAVU
Luberizi
Ulindi
Lugulu
Lubilu
Ruzizi
Lowa
Biasi
Lutu
Luka
Luhoho
Talias
Ruindi
Rutshuru
Mesa
Oso
Oso
Bilati
Lubonga
Lubero
Tayn
Lindi
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò ò ò
ò
Coltan
cassitérite
coltan/cassitérite
tungsten
or
diamant
50 km
O U G A N D A
RWANDA
BURUNDI
FDLR
FDLR base principale
FDLR base secondaire
Quartier Général
Kalehe
Kalonge
Kabare
Shabunda Walungu
Makutano
Lubero
Rutshuru
Idjwi
Mwenga
Masisi
Kasindi
Kanyabayonga
Ishasha
Kiwandja
Rumangabo
Bunagana
Kibumba
Saké
Pinga
Mubi
Biruwe
Bisie
Kahuzi-Biega Kahuzi
P. N.
Maiko
Virundgeas
R. N.
R. N.
de Tayna
de Kisamba-Ikobo
Lac Kivu
Lac
Edouard
Walikale
Mt Biega
GOMA
de
Parc National
Réserve de faune
Réserve Nationale
Source : Cartographie des motivations derrière les conflits. IPIS 2008
LOCALISATION DES FDLR (FIN 2007)
N. et R. POURTIER
LOCALISATION OF FDLR (END OF 2007)
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The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 81
BUKAVU
Kitongo
Kiliza
Neremere
Elila
Elila
Kiliba
Sange
Luberizi
Elila
Kioloba
Biriki
Mosala
Ulindi
Ulindi
Lugulu
Lubilu
Legulu
Lubiadja
Ruzizi
Lowa
Lubutu
Lowa
Biasi
Lutu
Luka
Luhoho
Talias
Ruindi
Rutshuru
Mesa
Oso
Oso
Bilati
Lubonga
Maiko
Tshopo
Legwe
Opienge
Lubero
Tayn
Lindi
Kanabiro
Loya
Mososa
Lukalia
Taiya
Semliki
Ligembe
Apale
Lindi
Ituri Lenda
Ibina
Biabono
Luna Laya
Ituri
Sumaie
Epulu
Duve
Lubilo
Semue
GOMA
Lac Kivu
Lac
Tanganyika
Lac
Edouard
Kalehe
Kabare
Shabunda Walungu
Beni
Lubero
Rutshuru
Idjwi
Mwenga
Uvira
Pangi
Lubutu
Punia
Mambasa
Irumu
Bafwasende
Masisi
O U G A N D A
RWANDA
NORD -
KIVU
SUD-KIVU
MANIEMA
BURUNDI
Komanda
Biambwe
Butembo
Kasindi
Kanyabayonga Ishasha
Kiwandja
Rumangabo
Bunagana
Saké Kibumba
Pinga
Mubi
Biruwe
Bisie
Katanti
Kalima
Kamituga
Kahuzi
Mt Biega
Kahuzi-Biega
P. N.
Parc National de la
Réserve de faune
à Okapis
P. N.
Maiko
Virunga
des
R. N.
d'Itombwe
R. N.
R. N.
de Tayna
de Kisamba-Ikobo
de
Walikale
FDLR
CNDP
FARDC
PARECO
route asphaltée limite de province
route en terre
piste
sentier
50 km
LES GROUPES ARMÉS AU KIVU (FIN 2007)
Source : Cartographie des motivations derrière les conflits. IPIS 2008
N. et R. POURTIER
ARMED GROUPS IN KIVU (END OF 2007)
- 420 -
82 International Alert
limite de province 0 100 km
limite de collectivité
parc national
GOMA
Butembo
Uvira
BUKAVU
Lac Kivu
Lac
Tanganyika
Lac
Edouard
WALIKALE
SHABUNDA
KALEHE
WALUNGU
MWENGA
FIZI
LUBERO
BENI
LES COLLECTIVITÉS AU NORD ET AU SUD KIVU
MASISI
RUTSHURU
Bapere
Beni
Watalinga
Baswagha Bashu Ruwenzori
Batangi
Bamate
Wanianga
Bakano
Bakisi
Wakabango
Wamuzimu
Lulenge
Gandja
Mutambala
Tanganika
Bavira
Bafulero
Ruzizi
Basile
Nindja
Ngweshe
Luindi
Itombwe
Kaziba
KABARE Buloho
Luhwindja
Burhinyi
Buhavu
Katoy
Bahunde
Osso
Bashali Bwito Bwisha
Bukumu
N O R D
S U D
K I V U
K I V U
Source : H. Nicolaï. La répartition et la densité de la
population au Kivu. - ARSOM 1998
N et R POURTIER
ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS IN NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU
- 421 -
The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 83
Lubero
Mososa
Semliki
Ibina
Duve
Epulu
Sumaie
Laya
Ituri
Biabono
Dungu
Nzoro
Kibali
Abu
Beni
Lubero
Butembo
Mambasa
Faradje
vers Kampala
vers Kampala
et Kigali
Aru Arua
Mahagi
Djugu
Nizi Lita
Kilo Bambumine
Mongbwalu
Djalasiga
Watsa
Durba
Ariwara
Irumu
Lac
Edouard
OUGANDA
SOUDAN
BUNIA
PRODUCTION ET COMMERCIALISATION DE L'OR EN ITURI
source : Le fléau de l'or. - HRW - 2005
concession d'or
mine d'or principale
place d'exportation de l'or
H A U T - U E L E
I T U R I
N O R D - K I V U
Lac
Albert
0 100 km
N. et R. POURTIER
PRODUCTION AND COMMERCIALISATION OF GOLD IN ITURI
- 422 -
84 International Alert
BUKAVU
Kitongo
Kiliza
Neremere
Elila
Elila
Kiliba
Sange
Luberizi
Elila
Kioloba
Biriki
Mosala
Ulindi
Ulindi
Lugulu
Lubilu
Legulu
Lubiadja
Ruzizi
Lowa
Lubutu
Lowa
BiasiLutu
Luka
Luhoho
Talias
Ruindi
Rutshuru
Mesa
Oso
Oso
Bilati
Lubonga
Maiko
Tshopo
Legwe
Opienge
Lubero
Tayn
Lindi
Kanabiro
Loya
Mososa
Lukalia
Taiya
Semliki
Ligembe
Apale
Lindi
Ituri Lenda
Ibina
Biabono
Luna Laya
Ituri
Sumaie
Epulu
Duve
Lubilo
Semue
Oku
GOMA
Lac Kivu
Lac
Tanganyika
Lac
Edouard
O U G A N D A
RWANDA
BURUNDI
Kahuzi-Biega
P. N.
Parc National de la
Réserve de faune
à Okapis
P. N.
Maiko
Virunga
des
R. N.
d'Itombwe
R. N.
R. N.
de Tayna
de Kisamba-Ikobo
50 km
Penge
Namoya
Kasongo
Fizi
Baraka
Kama
Gombe
Kampene
SITES D'EXPLOITATION MINIERE
N O R D KIVU
MANIEMA
SUD KIVU
PROVINCE ORIENTALE
Mumba
Sources : IPIS cartographie des motivations
Spatiocartes, Africamuseum, et divers
N. et R. POURTIER
Kalehe
Shabunda Walungu
Beni
Lubero
Rutshuru
Idjwi
Mwenga
Uvira
Pangi
Lubutu
Mambasa
Irumu
Bafwasende
Masisi
Walikale
Punia Makania
Sulia Itebero
Tshamaka
Komanda
Biambwe
Manguredjipa
Butembo
Musienene Kasindi
Kanyabayonga Ishasha
Bunagana
Saké
Pinga
Mubi
Biruwe
Bisie
Katanti
Minoro
Kitamuna
Kalima
Kailo
Kamituga
Twangiza
Lugushwa
Kahuzi
Ngungu
Numbi
Nyabibwe
Nabiema
Matamba
Katusi
Kabuye
Lueshe
ò
ò ò ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
coltan
cassitérite
coltan/cassitérite
wolfram
niobium
ò or
diamant
route asphaltée
route en terre
piste
SITES OF MINERAL EXPLOITATION
- 423 -
The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 85
Lowa
Lutu
Luka
Luhoho
Oso
Lubonga
transport pédestre
transport par camion
transport aérien
GOMA
Lac Kivu RWANDA
Rutshuru
Idjwi
Masisi Bunagana
Saké
Pinga
Mubi
Ndjingala
Kilambo
Biruwe
Bisie
Walikale
50 km
Source : Nicholas Garrett, Artisanal Cassiterite Mining and trade in North Kivu
TRANSPORT DE LA CASSITÉRITE DE BISIE À GOMA
N. et R. POURTIER
✈
✈
TRANSPORT OF CASSITERITE FROM BISIE TO GOMA
- 424 -
86 International Alert
ò
ò
òò
ò
ò
ò ò
òò
ò
òò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò ò
ò
òò
òò
òòòò
òò ò
òò ò
òòò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò ò
ò
ò
ò ò
ò
ò
òò ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
òò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
òò
òò
ò
òò
ò
BUKAVU
GOMA
Lac Kivu
Lac
Tanganyika
Lac
Edouard
Kalehe
Shabunda Walungu
Beni
Lubero
Rutshuru
Idjwi
Mwenga
Uvira
Pangi
Lubutu
Punia Kasese
Mambasa
Irumu
Bafwasende
Masisi
O U G A N D A
RWANDA
BURUNDI
Komanda
Biambwe
Butembo
Kasindi
Kanyabayonga
Ishasha
Bunagana
Saké Kibumba
Pinga
Mubi
Biruwe
Katanti
Kalima
Kamituga
Kahuzi Mt Biega
Kahuzi-Biega
P. N.
Parc National de la
Réserve de faune
à Okapis
P. N.
Maiko
Virunga
des
R. N.
d'Itombwe
R. N.
R. N.
de Tayna
de Kisamba-Ikobo
Walikale
50 km
Penge
Namoya
Kasongo Fizi
Baraka
Lumana
Gombe
Moyo
Kampene
GISEMENTS MINIERS
PROVINCE ORIENTALE
MANIEMA
SUD KIVU
NORD KIVU
Source : Carte Géologique et Minière de la République Démocratique du Congo
Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, Tervuren 2005
N. et R. POURTIER
Parc National
Réserve de faune
Réserve Nationale
ò or
diamant
platine
tungstène
étain
coltan
fer
cuivre
Kitongo
Kiliza
Neremere
Elila
Elila
Kiliba
Sange
Luberizi
Elila
Kioloba
Biriki
Mosala
Ulindi
Ulindi
Lugulu
Lubilu
Legulu
Lubiadja
Ruzizi
Lowa
Lubutu
Lowa
BiasiLutu
Luka
Luhoho
Talias
Ruindi
Rutshuru
Mesa
Oso
Oso
Bilati
Lubonga
Maiko
Tshopo
Legwe
Opienge
Lubero
Tayn
Lindi
Kanabiro
Loya
Mososa
Lukalia
Taiya
Semliki
Ligembe
Apale
Lindi
Ituri Lenda
Ibina
Biabono
Luna Laya
Ituri
Sumaie
Epulu
Duve
Lubilo
Semue
MINERAL DEPOSITS
- 425 -
The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the Eastern drc 87
étain
or
100 km
limite de province
voie ferrée
route
N. et R. POURTIER
Lowa
Lualaba
Ulinda
Lugulu
Elila
Lualana
Lukuga
Luvua
Oso
Kindu
Goma
Uvira
Usumbura
Kamituga
Rutshuru
Matiko
Masisi
Gatumba
Rutongo
Mbarara
Lugarama
Kigali
Costermansville
Astrida
Kayanza
Muhulu
Shabunda
Alimba
Kabambare
Saramabila
Kigoma
Albertville
Moba
Kabalo Niemba
Mayumba
Kabongo
Mwanza
Mitwaba
Sampwe
Bukama
Luena
Lubudi
Busango
Tenke
Kolwezi
Manono
Kiambi
Kasongo
Wamasa
Kampene
Pangi
Kowa
Lowa Punia
Kirundu
Kima Kasese
Kailo
Lubutu
Ponthierville
Kalima
Lac
Moero
Lac Edouard
Lac Kivu
Lac Tanganyika
Source : Belgian Congo. Tin mining areas
- US Department of the Interior,
Mineral Resources
OUGANDA
RWANDAURUNDI
TANZANIE
K I V U
K A T A N G A
LE BASSIN DE L’ÉTAIN AU CONGO BELGE ET AU
RWANDA-URUNDI EN 1945
THE TIN BASIN IN THE BELGIAN CONGO AND IN RWANDA-URUNDI IN 1945
- 426 -
International Alert.
346 Clapham Road, London SW9 9AP, United Kingdom
Tel +44 (0)20 7627 6800, Fax +44 (0)20 7627 6900, Email [email protected]
www.international-alert.org
- 427 -
- 428 -
ANNEX 5.7
Partnership Africa Canada, All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of
Conflict Minerals, May 2014
ALL THAT GLITTERS IS NOT GOLD:
Dubai, Congo and
the Illicit Trade of
Conflict Minerals
PARTNERSHIP
AFRICA CANADA
- 429 -
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Series Editors: Alan Martin and Bernard Taylor
Design: Marie-Joanne Brissette
ISBN: 978-1-897320-29-7
© Partnership Africa Canada
May 2014
For permission to reproduce or translate all or parts of this publication, please
contact Partnership Africa Canada
Partnership Africa Canada is very grateful for the support for its research
programme provided by Irish Aid. However, the ideas, opinions and comments
within this publication are entirely the responsibility of its authors and do not
necessarily represent or reflect Irish Aid policy.
331 Cooper Street, Suite 600
Ottawa, Ontario, K2P 0G5
Canada
Tel: +1-613-237-6768
Fax: +1-613-237-6530
[email protected]
www.pacweb.org
PARTNERSHIP
AFRICA CANADA
DDEE DE
DEM. REP.
OF THE CONGO BURUNDI
TANZANIA
KENYA
UGANDA
SOUTH
SUDAN
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES (UAE)
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Introduction
Problems of conflict financing, tax evasion and corruption have tainted the gold and
diamonds trade from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for more than a decade,
scaring off investors and depressing trade throughout the region. Gold is considered
the most persistent ‘conflict mineral’ today, with more than half of the estimated 800
artisanal gold mines in eastern DRC under illegal rebel or army control.1 Almost the entire
production of these mines—98% according to the United Nations—is smuggled out of
the country, implying enormous tax losses to the Congolese fiscus.2 While the majority
of DRC’s diamonds are produced outside the notorious conflict zones in the east, and
certified as conflict-free though the Kimberley Process (KP), the sector’s contribution
to state revenues is hampered due to rampant smuggling and undervaluation. Poor
internal controls in DRC also make it highly vulnerable to smuggled goods from conflict
affected areas, most recently the Central African Republic.
This report is a contribution to a growing body of research that seeks to better
understand the illicit trade of gold (and to a lesser degree, diamonds) emanating from
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the role industry and state actors play (primarily
in neighbouring countries and the United Arab Emirates) in facilitating this illegality.
The focus on DRC is not accidental. It is the second biggest diamond producing country
by volume, and has been the site of a corrupt and often violent extraction of valuable
natural resources for over a century. More recently, gold mines in eastern DRC have
been at the epicentre of a protracted armed conflict that has claimed millions of lives
and economically destabilized the Great Lakes region for the last decade. Despite
being mineral rich, DRC’s underdevelopment is directly linked to a myriad of interrelated
factors including corruption, armed conflict, political instability, poor domestic
enforcement capacity and a lack of fiscal instruments to realize the full potential of its
mineral wealth.
But just as important is how sophisticated international smuggling syndicates have
exploited—and in some case encouraged—these vulnerabilities for their benefit. Our
investigations explore the illicit trade of these minerals from mine site to leading gold
refiners and diamond trading centres in UAE (Dubai)—and finally for onward travel to
the jewellery factories of India, and beyond.
ALL THAT GLITTERS IS NOT GOLD:
Dubai, Congo and the Illicit
Trade of Conflict Minerals
1 “Analysis of the interactive map of artisanal mining areas in Eastern DR Congo”, International Peace Information Service (IPIS),
November 2013
2 Final Report, UN Group of Experts on DRC, S/2014/41, 23 January, 2014, para 171.
1
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
This report explains how Dubai came to play such a central role in this trade, and the
way it has managed to attract an ever-increasing proportion of the worldwide gold and
rough diamonds trade over the last decade. In 2013, 40% of the world’s gold trade,
worth an estimated $75 billion, passed through Dubai3, a 12-fold increase in value over
a decade previous4. In 2013, over 15% of the world’s rough diamonds, worth $12.4
billion, were traded through the Emirate, compared with $690 million in 2003.5
Part of this increase is due to rising flows of Congolese gold and diamonds making their
way into the Dubai market. Prior to 2006, Congolese gold (most of which is artisanally
mined) was exported primarily to Switzerland or South Africa, but it is now almost
exclusively sent to UAE, after transiting through neighbouring countries like Uganda,
Burundi, Tanzania or Kenya.6 While the European Union remains the principal export
destination for Congolese diamonds, close to a third of legal exports now go to UAE,
up from 3% in 2003.7
Faced with declining oil reserves, the UAE has sought to diversify its economy, and
central to that is an aggressive strategy to woo business away from traditional gold
and diamond centres in Europe. UAE generally owes its rise as a commodity trading
hub to its zero-tax regime, on imports and exports, as well as its lack of corporate
taxes. Some commodity-specific factors not in play in other jurisdictions also explain
the rise. Documentary requirements for hand-carried gold imports are minimal, mineral
related deals (some worth millions of dollars) are allowed to be transacted in cash rather
than through formal banking channels, and a lack of transfer pricing legislation offers
opportunities for associated companies to route undervalued diamonds mostly from
African producers through UAE to trading centres like Antwerp and Tel Aviv, and the
diamond factories of Surat, India.
3 “Dubai gold trade grows to $70bn”, The National, April 9, 2013; http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/
economics/dubai-gold-trade-grows-to-70bn
4 “Dubai gold trade reached $75 billion in 2013,” Mining.com, April 7, 2014 http://www.mining.com/dubai-gold-tradereached-
75-billion-in-2013-26806/
5 Kimberley Process Rough Diamond Statistics, Annual Global Summary 2004 and 2012; https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.
org/public_statistics
6 UN Comtrade
7 KP statistics on DRC, 2003 & 2013.
Artisanal gold miners,
Orientale province, DRC.
Photo credit: Joanne Lebert/PAC
2
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
3
While the Congolese gold and diamonds trade are not under embargo, companies in
UAE and elsewhere have the obligation under the UN arms embargo to ascertain that
their purchases do not indirectly finance armed groups. To help companies mitigate this
risk, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued a set
of voluntary due diligence guidelines to encourage responsible sourcing practices for
tin, tungsten and tantalum (colloquially known as the 3Ts) and gold in 2010.8
While the KP certificate offers assurance of conflict-free sourcing, appeals for diligent
diamond sourcing increasingly go beyond KP certification, to include issues such as tax
evasion, under-valuation and organized criminality. The credibility of KP certification
has also come into question in recent years over resistance by member states to accept
a broadened conflict-diamond definition that includes abuses perpetrated not only by
rebel groups (as defined at the KP’s inception in 2000), but also abuses committed by
state actors or private security companies. While due diligence guidances developed
for the 3Ts have begun to take effect, gold and diamonds continue to lag behind
international requirements—something this report concludes is a major reputational
vulnerability for the gold and diamond sectors and a significant factor in the on-going
insecurity and economic underdevelopment in the Great Lakes region.
With this in mind this report situates the illicit trade of gold and diamonds into an
increasingly established and harmonized international framework of due diligence
efforts for conflict-affected minerals. In addition to the OECD, other complementary
due diligence processes are currently under way in the African Great Lakes Region.
Smelters and end users operating in the 3T sector have started to track and trace their
supplies to conflict-free mines of origin in places like Rwanda, North Katanga and South
Kivu in DRC. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has also
developed a Regional Certification Mechanism for 3T minerals and gold, which sets the
standards and procedures for countries to issue regional certificates for conflict-free
exports.9 PAC is also currently piloting the first-ever clean artisanally mined gold supply
chain in DRC (Orientale province) and expects to expand the project to three more later
in 2014.
In the Emirates, the free zone’s regulator for precious metals and gems, the Dubai Multi
Commodities Centre (DMCC), also implemented mandatory requirements on refiners
with respect to responsible sourcing in 2012 through the Dubai Good Delivery (DGD)
standard. This standard is also based on the OECD Due Diligence Guidance. Three refiners
have thus far undergone independent audits and were found compliant, although
the thoroughness and integrity of the audit of the biggest refiner, Kaloti Jewellery
International, has been brought into question after an auditor alleged his former firm
(Ernst and Young), Kaloti and the DMCC colluded to whitewash unfavourable findings,
including smelting sizeable amounts of gold that originated from either high-risk or
unknown sources10.
One of the main findings of this report is that the gold sector in Dubai has yet to develop
a coherent, comprehensive and universally applied strategy to apply due diligence or
implement a chain of custody over its gold supply. Due diligence efforts by UAE refiners,
for example, are primarily focused on stopping direct supplies of mined gold from DRC
and known transit countries, but little has been done to set up traceable supply chains
that extend back to mine sites.
8 http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf
9 Rwanda issued the first ICGLR certificate for its 3T exports in November 2013.
10 “City of Gold: Why Dubai’s first conflict gold audit never saw the light of day,” Global Witness, February 2014; http://
www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/dubai_gold_layout_lr…
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4
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Moreover, efforts of the DMCC and some of its member companies notwithstanding,
the trade of gold (and to a lesser extent diamonds) from DRC to UAE lacks transparency
and due diligence engagement of most companies and individuals involved. DRC’s
smuggling economy has been described in much detail, but the working methods of
regional exporters are poorly understood, while importing jewellers and traders are
seldom identified and engaged in the matter. In the diamond sector DRC has routinely
been identified as a country through which conflict affected diamond have fraudulently
obtained KP certificates, for onward travel to trading centres, including Dubai. This
was the case with sanctioned Marange diamonds from Zimbabwe that first appeared
in Kinshasa comptoirs in 2008-200911; while more recently there are concerns DRC’s
internal controls have been breached by embargoed stones from neighbouring and
war-torn Central African Republic12.
This report further concludes that due to weak chain of custody procedures in Uganda,
Kenya, Burundi and DRC, exporters deliberately disguise or fail to know the origin of
their exported gold. Weak export procedures similarly allow for gross under-declaring of
gold, particularly in Uganda, as well as undervaluation of diamond exports in DRC. This
represents a significant deprivation to the region’s economies.
The number of individuals responsible for the organized export of illicit Congolese gold
to Dubai is quite small. Previous reports of the UN Expert Panel on DRC have identified
some of the central players, such as Ugandan-based Rajendra Vaya Kumar and Jamnadas
Vasanji Lodhia, and his son, Kunal; however, despite them being red-flagged they
continue to export gold without administrative or legal sanction by either exporting
countries in East Africa or Dubai. Part of this could be due to the aforementioned lack of
traceable supply chains, but in some instances the impunity with which rogue exporters
operate may be due to political protection they enjoy. This is especially believed to be
the case with Sibtein Alibhai, a Canadian national who is considered “a key channel”
behind gold exports from Africa and Dubai.
Another key finding is that misrepresented gold and undervalued diamonds from the
region freely enter the UAE. Documentary checks are minimal in the case of handcarried
gold imports, and buyers are not verified. Gold from the region can be sold
anywhere in Dubai as long as Customs are cleared. While the larger share is sold to
jewellers, there is a considerable and credible risk that gold from the region is sold on to
UAE’s main refiners disguised as scrap or hidden in supplies from “accepted” countries
of origin.
Transfer pricing also poses significant ethical and enforcement challenges to Dubai’s
diamond sector. Re-exported diamonds are on average valued at 44% higher than what
they were valued at import—a figure that is over five times greater than Dubai’s next
closest competitor, Switzerland. A conclusion of a seminal study by the Financial Action
Task Force and the Egmont Group that looked at the intersection between diamonds,
money laundering and terrorism financing—and shared by this one—is that Dubai’s
status as a free trade zone makes its diamond trade particularly vulnerable to abuse by
criminal and terrorist networks.13
11 “Reap What you Sow: Greed and Corruption in Zimbabwe’s Marange Diamond Fields,” Partnership Africa Canada,
November 2012; http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/diamonds_KP/Reap_What_You_Sow-eng-Nov20…
12 “Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic,” Enough Project, May 2014; http://www.
enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf
13 “Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Through Trade of Diamonds,” FAFT-Egmont Group, October 2013, p. 63
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML-TF-through-tra…
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5
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
We make several recommendations, the full list of which can be found at the end of
this report.
The Governments of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and DRC and other ICGLR countries
should:
Integrate due diligence and the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism in national
mining sector legislation, and operationalize implementation in the gold sector.
Harmonize policies and practices with an aim to interrupt illicit trading. This should
include further harmonization of tax regimes, and greater enforcement strategies
and trans-border cooperation.
Investigate and prosecute individuals and companies involved in illegal gold trade
from the DRC, including the beneficiary owners of UN sanctioned entities and their
front companies.
Finalize the institution of the ICGLR’s Independent Mineral Chain Auditor office,
meant to investigate illicit mineral activity, as well as the ICGLR’s exporter third part
audit system.
The Kimberley Process should:
Create a special taskforce to investigate the issue of transfer pricing in the diamond
industry, with a view to recommend ways African diamond producing countries can
secure fairer and more accurate diamond valuations, and predictable tax revenues.
The Government of the UAE should:
Tighten regulatory controls on gold imports, particularly on hand carried gold,
including verification of the consignee, the (authenticity of) certificate of origin or
export permit, and customs clearance documents (including tax receipts).
Address transfer pricing of diamonds through federal legislation and introduce
frequent and routine inspections of the value of imported parcels by the DMCC,
with a rejection threshold of 15% undervaluation.
Send shipments above the 15% threshold back to the country of origin so authorities
there can tax them appropriately, after having been accurately appraised by an
independent evaluator.
Participate constructively in efforts to design a due diligence guidance for diamonds
and precious stones commensurate with Dubai’s leadership role in the diamond
industry.
Proactively disclose on a quarterly basis all data related to the import and export of
gold.
UAE traders and jewellers and refiners that are directly or indirectly sourcing mined gold
from the ICGLR region should:
Adopt and implement due diligence policies in line with the OECD guidance
supplement on gold, i.e. through on-the-ground inspection of circumstances of
mineral extraction and trade, and establishment of a chain of custody and/or
traceability system with local exporters.
This paper is divided in four parts. The first section compares export statistics of principal
transit countries for Congolese gold with UAE import statistics from these countries in
order to estimate the volume of legal and illegal trading activity. It also describes the
players, practices, procedures and main evolutions involved in the legal and illegal gold
trade in Uganda, Kenya, Burundi and DRC. The second part considers the ways gold
enters and circulates in UAE, and is exported, mainly to India. The third part focuses on
the issue of undervaluation of DRCs diamonds and associated transfer pricing in UAE.
The fourth and final part takes stock of supply chain policies and legislation in selected
African countries and UAE, and provides policy recommendations for governments and
companies in countries discussed.
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
This section examines regional and bilateral trade statistics for gold exports between the
Great Lakes region and Dubai, and some of the discrepancies reconciling official trade
figures. It lays out some of the practices and loopholes by which mostly Congolese gold
evades local export regulations before being shipped to Dubai. The section also explores
some of the reasons why traders are resistant to adopting responsible sourcing at the
initial point of export. The findings presented here are based on first hand interviews
with exporters, mining and customs officials and an analysis of export documentation
found in the relevant countries.
The DRC is estimated to produce at least 12 tons of artisanal gold each year, representing
a value of up to $500 million.14 In 2006 combined exports from Uganda and Burundi
amounted to 11.5 tons,15 despite having minimal gold production of their own. UN
sanctions against two principal Kampala-based gold exporters in March 2007 led to a
sharp decline in official exports, from almost seven tons in 2006 to 165 kilograms in
2013.16 The decline of Uganda’s official trade does not imply that real volumes transiting
through Kampala dropped as much. Official import records list as much as three tons
from Uganda entering UAE in both 2010 and 2011, placing the real decline of traded
gold closer to 50%.17
The decline of Burundian official exports has been less pronounced than in Uganda,
dropping from 4.5 tons in 2006 to 313 kilograms in 2010, but rebounding to over 2.5
tons in 2013.18 Kenya’s gold exports figures are rather erratic, but appear to have settled
at about 2.5 tons per year in recent years.
Tanzania is another conduit for illicit Congolese gold transiting to Dubai. Unlike most
of its neighbours, Tanzania is an established industrial producer of gold, mining almost
$2billion a year. Like Kenya, the majority of its industrial production is exported to
either Switzerland or South Africa for refining; however its supply chain is nonetheless
compromised by illicit Congolese flows that enter through the border-town of Kigoma
and exit through Dar es Salaam. However, due to logistical and time constraints Tanzania
was not included in the scope of this research.
Figure 1: Export statistics
of for gold (in kilos)
from selected countries
compared to UAE import
statistics from those
countries (2011).
Source: Comtrade, Reuters19
Section One CASE STUDIES IN THE GOLD TRADE
14 “Striking Gold: How M23 and its Allies are Infiltrating Congo’s Gold Trade”, Enough Project, October 2013; p 1.
15 De Koning, R.,“Conflict Minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Aligning Trade and Security Interventions”
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2011, p 12.
16 Ibid., and gold export statistics for 2013 from the Ugandan Department of Geological Surveys and Mines, unpublished
data.
17 http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.aspx?px=H2&cc=7108&r=784&…
18 De Koning, Ibid; Final Report, UN Group of Experts on DRC, S/2014/41, 23 January, 2014, p. 196; http://comtrade.
un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.aspx?px=H2&cc=7108&r=108&y=2010;
19 http://comtrade.un.org/db/mr/daCommoditiesResults.aspx?px=H2&cc=7108; and “Conflict gold trade
continues in face of U.S. law”, Reuters, 29 June, 2012; http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-gold-conflictidUSBRE85S1A4…
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
The large discrepancy between Ugandan exports to UAE, and UAE declared imports
from Uganda, suggests significant under-declaring or smuggling. This discrepancy is
smaller in Kenya, suggesting that the larger share of real exports to UAE is declared
upon export. In Burundi more gold is declared exported to UAE than what appears from
UAE import statistics. Possibly part of Burundi’s gold takes another direction, or transits
through another country that is considered the country of origin upon entry into UAE.
Hardly any Congolese gold exports are declared and only a small volume is imported in
UAE as originating from DRC.
It is unclear whether the above-mentioned discrepancies reproduced themselves after
2011. For the purposes of this research, PAC received Ugandan and Congolese export
data from mining authorities, and retrieved Burundian statistics from other reports, but
UAE import statistics per country of origin are not publicly available for 2012 and 2013.
PAC requested such data from the UAE government, but was unsuccessful. DMCC
and UAE customs representatives told PAC that, considering stricter import procedures,
discrepancies observed in 2011 for countries like Uganda would be less likely.20 Without
any UAE import data, it is impossible to verify whether this is the case or not.
UGANDA
As indicated above, the Ugandan gold trade moved largely underground following
UN sanctions on its two leading export firms in 2007. It would be wrong, however,
to suggest that the ongoing trade between DRC, Uganda and UAE is entirely illegal.
Traders operate through legal entities and follow import and export procedures in
Uganda. At the same time they misrepresent the origin of gold, falsify documents,
under declare gold and thus evade taxes. Ugandan authorities hide behind the veneer
of legality dealers put up, claiming ignorance to ongoing activities of the former owners
of sanctioned entities and their
family members.21
The use of front companies, of
which the ownership structure
remains obscure, is common
practice for gold traders that wish
to disguise their involvement. In
2012 the UN Group of Experts
to DRC alleged that Rajendra
Vaya Kumar, of the sanctioned
entity Machanga Ltd, used the
company Mineral Impex Uganda
to ship out his gold.22 According
to intermediary traders, two
other defunct gold exporting
companies use Mineral Impex as
a cover for their ongoing exports.
From 2011 to 2013 Mineral
Impex exported 240 kilograms
of gold, according to statistics
of the Ugandan Department of
Geological Survey and Mines.23
20 Interviews, DMCC and UAE Customs officials, Dubai, 4-7 February, 2014.
21 Final Report, UN Group of Experts on DRC, S/2014/41, 23 January, 2014, para 187.
22 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pdf/1533_list.pdf
23 Unpublished government document.
To UAE (Dubai)
To Dar Es Salaam
To UAE, via Juba,
South Sudan
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
24 Uganda Mining Act (2003), Mining regulations Part B (7), prescribes import fees. If minerals are imported, from DRC or
South Sudan for example, dealers are supposed to pay 0.5 % fee for precious metals and stones and 1% for base metals at
London Metal Exchange (LME) prices. In reality gold imports are taxed at the rate for base metals. PAC also saw calculations
for import fees of gold by the Department of Geological Surveys and Mines set at a 1 % rate.
25 The 2003 Mining Act is silent on the documentary requirements for mineral imports; however, a 2010 government
statistics report cites a requirement that dealers produce verifiable certificates of origin of minerals before they can be issued
with import permits—the first time this has been publicly disclosed. “Mines Division Annual Statistics Report, 2010”, April
2011, unpublished government document.
26 Uganda’s official exports from domestic gold production is still minimal, 12 kilograms per year on average since 2011.
Calculated from export statistics for 2011-2013, compiled by the Department of Geological Surveys and Mines, unpublished
government documents.
27 Interview, official from Department of Geological Surveys and Mines (Uganda), Kampala, 27 January, 2014.
28 Email correspondence, chief of the Congolese Mines Division of North Kivu, 28 January, 2014.
29 Telephone interview, former antenna chief of the Congolese Mines Division in Butembo, 28 January, 2014. The Chief of
the Mines Department in Goma confirmed his account.
30 Telephone interview, managing director of Treasure Highland Caves, 1 February, 2014.
Ugandan export companies like Mineral Impex and Silver Mineral, which has also been
alleged to source from DRC, used to claim that the gold they exported came from South
Sudan, an emerging gold producing country. By doing so, they would pay a 1% import
tax, rather than 3% royalties on domestically sourced gold.24 At the same time they
routinely disguised the real origin of the gold. Since May 2013 the Mines Commissioner
no longer issues import permits on the basis of commercial invoices alone, but insists on
certificates of origin from source countries.25 Silver Mineral failed to produce these and
now claims to source domestically26. Mineral Impex has not exported since documentary
requirements were raised.
One company, Westcorp Mining, imported 40 kilograms of gold after May 2013,
presenting a Southern Sudanese certificate of origin that Ugandan mining officials
consider to be genuine.27 PAC could not reach relevant authorities in South Sudan to
comment on the authenticity of the certificate, but it should be noted that the name
of the issuing ministry is wrong. It should have been the ministry of petroleum and
mining rather than energy and mining. The website mentioned on the certificate is an
investor website not hosted by the government of South Sudan. The email address and
telephone number mentioned on the certificate were not in service.
In June 2013, a new company called Treasure Highland Caves also requested a Ugandan
import permit for 156 kilograms of gold from Butembo in North Kivu, showing several
Congolese certificates of origin. One certificate appears genuine, but mining authorities
in North Kivu did not know the company and
denied it having been issued any certificate.28 The
other certificates are copies of the original, with
the same registration number and supposedly
signature of a former Mining Department official
in Butembo. This official told PAC he could never
have signed the certificates because he was
transferred to another part of the country three
years prior.29
Eventually Ugandan authorities did not issue
any import permit because Treasure Highland
Caves did not pay the 1% tax. PAC contacted
the company’s managing director who said that
he had not yet consolidated the total amount of
gold for export and that he had wanted to see
whether he would be able to obtain a Ugandan
import permit.30 He now intends to operate
through a yet-to-be-licensed exporting house
in Butembo, Northern Gold, and get genuine
export documents in order in DRC.
UGANDAN GOLD DEALERS’
RECORD KEEPING
According to Article 72 of the
2003 Ugandan Mining Act
mineral dealers are, inter alia,
supposed to keep a register
showing (1) the name and
address of the vendor and
his or her right to be in
possession of such minerals,
and (2) the name and
address of the purchaser or
consignee to whom minerals
are sold. Records are to be
submitted periodically to the
Department of Geological
Surveys and Mines.
When domestically sourcing
from artisanal, unlicensed
producers, the first point
would pose a problem
for dealers. In reality,
the problem of right of
possession of suppliers
is circumvented through
representing suppliers
as goldsmiths and retail
shopkeepers or by letting
supplies run through them.
Both entities have the right
to possess minerals, but do
not need to demonstrate
the right of possession of
minerals of their suppliers.
On the second point, the
Department of Geological
Surveys and Mines claims
not to possess any details
of the foreign purchaser or
consignee of dealers’ exports.
Only the export destination
is retrieved from the dealers
export permit application
and represented in trade
statistics.
8
Fake South Sudanese certificate used by
Westcorp Mining to export 40kg of gold in May
2013.
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
PAC visited the premises of Treasure Highland Caves
and received the telephone number of the director of
another company called Midas Ltd., whom we were
told could provide us with information regarding the
former company. The director of this company told
PAC that he only advised the company and had no
stakes in it.31 He further told PAC that his former
company Midas All Minerals stopped exporting gold
after running into financial difficulties after his gold
was stolen at Entebbe airport in November 2011.
Like the managing director of Treasure Highland
Caves, the director of Midas Ltd. is aware of the need
to start-up legal exports of Congolese gold from
Congo, rather than from Uganda, as a first step to
conduct due diligence on the supply chain. However,
he considers the lengthy licensing process, the 2%
export tax32, and corruption and insecurity as principal
obstacles to start-up legal trading from DRC.
Besides operating through front companies, some gold traders also appear to bypass
mining authorities entirely. Officially traders must show their export permit and dealers
license, both obtained from mining authorities, in order to clear gold with customs.33
However, Ugandan Customs statistics of 2011 and 2012 show a larger number of dealers
exporting than statistics from the Department of Geological Surveys and Mines.34 This
would suggest that some dealers are able to clear customs without obtaining their
export permits.
Indeed, a gold consignor told PAC that some Customs agents at Entebbe airport do
not ask for any permit other than the dealer license, clearing gold after “tax” payment
of “a percentage”.35 More dealers are likely to bypass the Department of Geological
Surveys and Mines, now that the Department insists on certificates of origin when reexporting
gold. Indeed, sources close to Rajendra Kumar told PAC that he intends to
stop obtaining export permits via Mineral Impex and “settle” with customs only.36
After clearing customs gold is either shipped out as (value) cargo or hand-carried, in
both cases on regular commercial flights. According to a representative of a cargo
service operating between Kampala/Nairobi and Dubai, hand carrying has practically
become the sole option because most commercial airlines are refusing gold as cargo.37
This is mainly because freight-forwarding companies are unable to insure the gold on
these routes, putting the liability on the airliner in case of loss or theft.
31 Interview, director of Midas Ltd, 28 January, 2014.
32 Although the official tax is 2%, many exporters say it is closer to 10% once various levels of corruption by officials are
factored in.
33 Documentary requirements also include an export certificate from the Ministry of Tourism Trade and Industry. But since
issuance of the export certificate relies on the export permit, it appears to be optional. “Required Documents at the Point
of Entry”, Uganda Revenue Authority, 2011/12;
http://www.ura.go.ug/openFile.do?path=//webupload//upload//download//st…
Doc.pdf
34 Ugandan Revenue Authority (URA) customs statistics January 2011-April 2012, unpublished government document.
35 Interview, gold consignor, Kampala 29 January, 2014.
36 Telephone Interview, gold trade insider, 13 February, 2014
37 Interview, cargo handler, Dubai, 6 February, 2014.
Fake export certificate used by Treasure
Highland Caves to export gold from DRC
to Uganda
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Ugandan Customs data show an average of just over three kilograms for each gold
consignment. According to industry experts with experience shipping gold from Africa
these figures are bogus, as exporters need shipments of at least five kilograms just
to recover logistical costs.38 Two cases of theft also suggest that consignments from
Uganda tend to be much larger that reported. In one incident a $800,000 shipment
belonging to Midas All Minerals was stolen at Entebbe airport in November 2011,39
putting the export at about 20 kilograms. Customs records, however, show the company
legally exported only 2.5 kilos during the entire year.40 Another more recent case at the
Dubai airport concerned a Ugandan jeweller who was robbed of 25 kilograms during a
delivery to Dubai’s gold souk.41
Both examples point to considerable underreporting or illegal exports of gold from
Uganda, which, if practiced across the board, could explain the large discrepancy
between official exports from Uganda to UAE and registered imports from Uganda into
UAE.
KENYA
Two companies, Skyhawk International Limited and Ushindi Exports Limited, have for
several years dominated Kenya’s gold exports. Ushindi has been active since 2005,
officially exporting an average of about one ton per year, while Skyhawk has been
active since 2010, exporting an average of 1.7 tons per year until 2013.42 Kenyan
Customs data for 2010 and 2011 show exports are exclusively to UAE.43 The discrepancy
between recorded Kenyan exports and UAE imports is much smaller compared to
Uganda (see figure 1), which suggests relatively little under-declaring or illegal exports.
Kenyan Customs data for 2011 show individual consignments of gold by the two
companies averaging 23 kilograms, which is a realistic amount for hand-carried gold
consignments.44
In August 2013 mineral royalty rates in Kenya changed, introducing a flat 2% rate
on the value of all exported gold. Hitherto royalty rates were separately fixed for the
country’s two industrial concessions – 2.5% for Karebe Gold and 5% for Kilimapesa
Gold45 – payable in principle by licensed dealers exporting the gold but, subject to any
agreement, to be recovered from the company on whose behalf gold was exported.46
Gold from both concessions goes to South Africa for refining47, not UAE, and thus does
not appear to make up any of the gold exported by Skyhawk and Ushindi.48
38 Interview, gold importer, Dubai, 3 February, 2014.
39 “Airport staff jailed over stolen gold”, Daily Monitor, 28 January, 2012; http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/-
/691252/1314966/-/format/xhtml/-/pgoc9/-/index.html
40 URA customs statistics January 2011-April 2012, unpublished government document
41 “Four cops in dock over Dhs1.2m gold theft”, The Gulf Today, 20 December, 2013; http://gulftoday.ae/portal/
b4568825-bd93-4b9c-a28a-03f23a46c8c0.aspx
42 “DCI wants suspended mining boss charged”, The People, 14 August, 2013; http://www.ipsos.co.ke/NEWBASE_
EXPORTS/Bamburi/130814_The%20People%20-%20Wednesday_2_5a600.pdf
43 Kenya Revenue Authority, customs statistics, January 2010-April 2011. Unpublished government document.
44 Ibid.
45 Press Statement on the status of Mining in the country, Hon. Najib Balala, 5 August, 2013; http://www.mining.go.ke/
index.php/2013-06-10-13-08-38
46 Republic of Kenya, “Trading in Unwrought Precious Metals Act (1987)”, Chapter 309, T12-9.
47 “Goldplat Kilimapesa Gold Project, Kenya”, Mining Technology, no date; http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/
golplat-kilimapesa/; and Kenya Revenue Authority, customs statisticis, January 2010-April 2011. Unpublished government
document.
48 Karebe and Kilimapasi produced 536 kilograms of gold between January and June 2013, according to evidence
submitted by the Criminal Investigation Department to the Parliamentary Committee on Environment and Natural Resources
in August 2013. See “CID wants mines boss prosecuted over gold exports”, Business Daily, 11 August, 2013; http://www.
businessdailyafrica.com/CID-wants-mines-boss-prosecuted-over-gold-exports/-/539546/1944352/-/pfdfyiz/-/index.html
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
In May 2013, the activities of Ushindi and Skyhawk were suspended, when the
Parliamentary Committee on Environment and Natural Resources started an inquiry
into their gold dealings. A report submitted to the Committee by the Criminal
Investigation Department (CID) raised a number of issues regarding both companies’
sourcing practices. Concerns about corruption were also raised after it was revealed
that consecutive Commissioners of Mines allegedly wrote letters—in 1997 and again in
2012—exempting the two exporters from revealing the sources of gold as well as the
identity of their suppliers.49
Kenyan mining authorities informed PAC that they had always emphasized that
exporters maintain and transmit records about the place, date, quantity and prices of
purchases (although did not mention the identity of any sellers).50 Through field visits
authorities also claim they were able to estimate production levels of different areas and
assess the truthfulness of the stated origin of exported consignments.51
Ushindi claims it kept records through issuing payment vouchers, and had supplied
these to the investigation team,52 but dismisses the requirement to register and verify
the identity of sellers as unworkable, because many artisanal miners fear arrest because
they operate without a license—a point conceded by mining authorities.
Where do Ushindi and Skyhawk get their gold from, then? The chairmen of both
companies allegedly admit to buying some of it from traders from neighbouring
countries like DRC, Tanzania and Uganda.53 One Ushindi director similarly told PAC that
the company bought its gold from artisanal miners in places all over Kenya like Turkana,
Lodwar, Logorien and Migori, but that it would be impossible to give
assurances that no gold from outside Kenya entered their chain of
custody. The director also argued the 2% royalty rate is too high, and
acts as a disincentive to legal gold exports.
BURUNDI
For many years, Berkenrode and its successor, Ntahangwa Mining,
dominated Burundian gold exports. However, several new companies
sprung up in 2012 and 2013 and exported significant quantities of
gold, boosting exports to over 2.5 tons in 2013, practically all of which
went to UAE.54 Burundi’s favourable tax regime of 0.3% was changed
in October 2013 with the adoption of a new Mining Code, lifting it to
2%, thereby making it the same as in DRC.55 The two fastest growing
newcomers in the market are Golden Gold and SCEEMB with about
half a ton of exports each between January and October 2013.
49 Interview, CID Director, Nairobi, 31 January 2014.
50 Interview, officials at the Mines and Geology Department (Kenya), Nairobi, 30 January, 2014.
51 PAC requested documentary evidence of this working method, but was told the investigating team had taken many of
the records and ongoing investigations prevented the sharing of any available information.
52 Telephone interview, director of Ushindi Exports, 30 January, 2014.
53 Op cit. Business Daily, 11 August, 2013.
54 Final Report, UN Group of Experts on DRC, S/2014/42, 23 January, 2014, para 196; http://www.securitycouncilreport.
org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42.pdf
55 Ibid., para. 193
Export declaration form of a company
affiliated with Sibtein Alibahai, indicating
gold exported through airplane carry-on.
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Another major player is Etablissement Jean Jbeili, even though official statistics do
not fully capture its prominence. In 2013 Jbeili told the UN Expert Group that it had
not exported any gold, although official export documentation showed otherwise.
The company legally exported 45 kg between January and October, including 1 kg to
Lebanon; even though Lebanon did not report any imports from Burundi for 2013. Jbeili
is also unusual in that it has a license and facilities to refine gold, although it is forbidden
from doing so until it conforms to government traceability regulations.56
According to Burundian mines authorities the boost in exports is due to the rapid
expansion of artisanal mining in the northeastern province of Muyinga.57 However,
Burundian production capacity was estimated to be around 750 kilograms in 2011,58
making a tripling of production in two years unrealistic. The UN Group of Experts to
DRC have repeatedly alleged that Berkenrode’s owner (Mutoka Ruganyira) sources his
gold mostly from DRC with the help of the rebel group FDLR. They also concluded
that Mutoka is able to continue trading without any legal hindrances thanks to the
protection of top security officials in both Burundi and the DRC.59
Golden Gold, registered in Bujumbura, has been alleged to export gold on behalf of
AR Gold in Goma without the authorization of Congolese authorities.60 The principal
owner of AR Gold is Sibtein Alibhai, while his associate Karim Somji runs Golden Gold.
Alibhai is variously described as having Canadian61 and Mozambican62 nationality.
Before venturing into the African mineral trade Alibhai was a real estate developer with
his brother, Mohamed Aquil Ali, in Costa Rica. Alibhai was forced to flee when he
was implicated in providing material support to a suspected money launderer fleeing
American prosecutors.63 He is also known to control Alfa Gold (based in Bukavu,
DRC), Alfa Gold Corp (headquartered in the DMCC in Dubai) and Alfa Gems Corp
(Manica, Mozambique). The location of the latter company is notable: while there is
a modest artisanal gold sector in that part of Mozambique, the town is infamous for
being one of the leading smuggling hubs for Marange diamonds during the 2009-2012
KP embargo.64 In Dubai, Alibhai is considered politically untouchable thanks to close
relations with members of the Royal family.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
The exporters in transit countries rely on smugglers to bring gold in from DRC. Many of
the smugglers have been identified through the work of UN Groups of Experts. While
several of them have licenses to trade within DRC, and at times they do sell to Congolese
export houses, they are primarily tied to exporters outside DRC. Having controlled the
business for many years, Kampala and Bujumbura based exporters are said to have
a much larger cash flow than Congolese exporters and are thus able to pre-finance
Congolese suppliers in larger amounts and temporarily offer above-market prices to
assure their loyalty.65
56 Ibid para. 192
57 Telephone interview, official at the Geology and Mining Ministry (Burundi), 10 February 2014.
58 Yager, T.R., “The Mineral Industry of Burundi”, U.S. Geological Survey, 2011.
59 Final Report, UN Group of Experts on DRC, S/2009/603, 23 November 2009, para. 140-154;
60 “Striking Gold: How M23 and its Allies are Infiltrating Congo’s Gold Trade”, Enough Project, October 2013; p 6.
61 http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/Legisla/boletinRep/boletins-da-republ…
SERIE_2010.pdf
62 http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/Legisla/boletinRep/boletins-da-republ…
SERIE_3.o%20SUPLEMENTO_2012.pdf
63 Enough Project, October 2013; p 31.
64 “Diamonds and Clubs: The Militarized Control of Diamonds and Power in Zimbabwe,” Partnership Africa Canada, June
2010; http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/diamonds_KP/Zimbabwe-Diamonds_and_clubs…
65 Interim Report, UN Group of Experts for DRC, S/2012/348, para 157.
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Although most Congolese artisanal gold is smuggled across its porous borders, DRCs official
exports are slowly increasing: from 112 kilograms in 201166 to at least 203 kilograms in
2013 (see table 1). A number of new export houses have also been established in recent
months in places like Bunia and Bukavu. Part of the explanation for this upward trend may
be the reduction of export tax from 3.5% to 2% in 2012, in line with Burundi and Kenya.67
Congolese export houses can only legally purchase gold from licensed intermediary traders.
For each sale the latter must produce a transport authorization issued by mine authorities
from where gold is purchased or transported. Such authorizations usually refer to either the
territory where gold was supposedly produced or the town from where it was transported.
To be compliant with the DRC Mining Code, export houses make sure that the volume of
their legal purchases reflects the volume they legally export.
Although helping to formalize exports, the establishment of new buying houses generally
does not appear to lead to more diligent sourcing. Several companies, such as Mining
Congo, DTA, Glory Minerals, AR Gold and Namukaya (in previous years), are alleged to buy
indiscriminately from mining areas that are entirely or partly controlled by armed groups.68
This is not to say there is no potential for, or interest in, diligent sourcing. PAC was shown
an elaborate due diligence strategy from the new buying house Metaux Precieux in Bunia,
to assure legal purchases from cooperatives in conflict-free areas in Orientale province,
involving screening of intermediate traders and insisting on bank transfers, chain of custody
documentation, and photographic evidence of sources of gold.69
Source: Final Report, UN Group
of Experts on DRC, S/2014/41,
23 January 2014, p. 165; Centre
d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de
Certification (CEEC) Bukavu, export
statistics for September-December
2013.
Table 1: DRC official gold exports for 2013
Location Exporter Weight (kg) Period Destination
Kinshasa SatisRessources 3.16 Jan-Oct
Centauris 1.02 Jan-Oct (Switzerland)
Metal Aurum 37.43 Jan-Oct
Eda Velma 9.55 Jan-Oct Ramp International (UAE)
Bukavu DTA 10.66 Jan-Dec Al Refaa Star Trading (UAE)
Mining Congo 49.28 Jan-Dec Viren Jewellers (UAE)
Namukaya 7.08 Jan-Dec Economic Exchange Centre,
Sharjah (UAE)
Cavichi 12.19 Jan-Dec Cavichi Jewellery (UAE)
Kisangani Metal Aurum 44.31 Jan-Oct
Centauris 11.84 Jan-Oct
Eda Velma 2.65 Jan-Oct
Divas 2.57 Jan-Oct
Butembo Glory minerals 2.1 Jan-Oct Sakshi Jewellery (UAE)
Bunia MetauxPrecieux 8.99 Jan-Oct
Total 202.83
66 Hogg, J. and Harvey, J. op cit.
67 “The poverty of the DRC’s gold miners,” Irin News, 29 January, 2013; http://www.irinnews.org/report/97356/thepoverty-
of-the-drc-apos-s-gold-miners
68 Final Report, UN Group of Experts on DRC, S/2009/603, 23 November, 2009, para. 130; Final Report, UN Group of
Experts on DRC, S/2012/843, 15 November, 2012, para. 186; Final Report, UN Group of Experts on DRC, S/2011/738, 2
December, 2011, para. 200; Final Report, UN Group of Experts on DRC, S/2014/41, 23 January, 2014, para. 168.
69 Telephone Interview, Managing Director, Meteaux Precieux, 21 February, 2014.
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
In 2011 gold imports in UAE totalled 834 tons, the large majority of which came to
Dubai.70 The Emirate imported 745 tons of gold that year, worth over $32 billion, and
exported 451 tons, leaving 383 tons to be sold locally.71 Congolese gold alone represents
a fraction of total UAE gold imports. The ICGLR region together – including also North
Sudan and Tanzania that are equally “high-risk countries” by OECD standards – makes
up about a tenth of total UAE gold imports.72
Documentary requirements for importing gold in UAE appear to have become more
stringent in recent years. The 2009 Inspection Procedures of the Dubai Customs Gold
Office require cargo agents bringing in gold to present: Import Declaration, Airway Bill,
Delivery Order and Original Invoice.73 Procedures make no reference to certificates of
origin, customs declaration forms from the port of exit or proof of payment of export
tax in the country of origin. However, according to gold consignors shipping gold into
Dubai from Africa, cargo gold now has to be accompanied with certificates of origin and
customs declaration forms.74 PAC could not retrieve any official procedures for handcarried
gold, but from experiences of gold consignors it appears that only a customs
declaration is required.
The predominance of hand carried gold (as opposed to shipping it via cargo) from the
countries in question limits the possibility to trace it through the supply chain after entry
into UAE. For gold shipped by cargo, the commercial invoice must specify the consignee,
i.e. a licensed trader or refiner, who is notified and is supposed to collect the shipment
from the Gold Office at Customs at the Dubai airport. In contrast, the commercial
invoice in a hand carry scenario does not need to be made out to the consignee, but is
usually in the name of the consigner.75 And if a consignee is mentioned on the invoice
it is not certain whether this is the actual buyer of the gold, since the consignee is not
supposed to collect it. In practice, the consignor can go to any jeweller in the souk.
PAC contacted five out of ten jewellers and gold
trading companies indicated as consignee on export
records from customs or mine authorities in DRC and
Uganda, and asked whether they accept mined gold
from DRC and neighbouring countries.76 The exact
origin and circumstances under which gold was
produced was immaterial to all of them. The only
criteria they had in accepting gold was whether it
has been cleared by customs at the port of exit and
at the port of entry.
Section Two THE UAE CONNECTION
70 UN Comtrade statistics for 2011; http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.
aspx?px=H2&cc=7108&r=784&y=2011
71 http://www.dmcc.ae/gold-overview
72 UN Comtrade statistics for 2011; http://comtrade.un.org/db/mr/daCommoditiesResults.aspx?px=H2&cc=7108
73 “Inspection procedures at the gold office”, Dubai Customs, 2009; http://www.dubaicustoms.gov.ae/en/Procedures/
CustomsDeclaration/Pages/InspectionProceduresGold.aspx. Customs authorities did not respond to PACs information
request for (updated) inspection procedures for gold imports.
74 Interviews, gold consignors and importers, Dubai, 4-7 February 2014.
75 Ibid.
76 Interviews, Jewellers, Dubai, 3-7 February 2014.
Gold dust gets weighed at a comptoir in
Mangi, Orientale Province, DRC
Credit: Joanne Lebert/PAC
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The Brewing Storm: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
One jeweller told PAC that most gold from the ICGLR region is sold in the
souk because it has become more difficult to sell such gold on to DMCC
refiners since audits on their responsible sourcing practices began. Refiners
supposedly request customs clearance for the exact amount supplied,
refusing any gold shipped from DRC or neighbouring countries. However,
Kaloti appears not to be the only refiner in Dubai with compromised due
diligence systems. The same jeweller admitted slipping a small quantity of
mined gold from DRC into a DMCC refiner, along with mined gold from
accepted countries of origin like Ghana and South Africa.
Another jeweller told PAC that he could mix mined gold, from DRC or
anywhere else, with scrap gold and sell it to refiners without this being
detected. According to an industry expert this would be possible as long as
the mined gold does not represent more than 10 per cent of a jewellery scrap
bar, when it would pass x-ray testing.77 To prevent such gold entering legal
channels, some refiners ask scrap suppliers to show photos of the jewellery
that was melted into scrap, produce invoices of their suppliers, and explain
why the jewellery was melted down and not delivered to them as such.78
While some mined gold from DRC and neighbouring countries still enters
audited DMCC refiners – misrepresented as scrap gold or as mined gold
from another country – testimonies from jewellers suggest that this gold is
more likely to be absorbed in the jewellery market, or exported to countries
like India (see box UAE Gold Trade to India). Besides the jewellers consulted
by PAC, and clear evidence of gold appearing on Congolese and Ugandan
export statistics, Congolese traders in Dubai provided names of another six
jewellers who regularly buy Congolese gold.79
This suggests two things. The first is that with the current focus on refiners,
the UAE is overlooking vulnerabilities in its jewellery sector, and it needs to
design a strategy to address conflict gold entering the global market through
this loophole. Secondly, due diligence efforts, whether at the refiner or
jeweller level, should not seek to simply “avoid” Congolese gold. Rather
efforts need to prioritize engagement with all actors in the ICGLR, including
key exporters, government officials and mining communities. Doing so will
set in place necessary due diligence systems that extend back to the mine
site, create greater flows of legal gold exports (from all countries) and, most
importantly, contribute to regional political and economic stability.
UAE GOLD TRADE TO INDIA
In 2011, about half of UAE’s gold
exports went to India, with Switzerland
ranking second with 22%, followed
by Iran and Turkey with 5% each,
according to UN Comtrade data.80
Agencies nominated by the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) to import gold for
use in the domestic sector are permitted
to buy from DMCC refiners that been
successfully audited for responsible
sourcing practices.81 But other gold
from UAE can, and does, enter special
economic zones where nominated
agencies are not involved. As such, gold
trade with India can involve bullion
gold produced by DMCC refiners, as
well as jewellery and jewellery scrap.
In 2013 India increased its import duties
on gold three times to a record 10%
for bullion and 15% for jewellery, in a
bid to discourage gold imports that are
generating enormous currency account
deficits and were pushing down the
rupee. In addition, in August 2013 the
RBI made it mandatory for nominated
importers to set aside 20% for re-export
as jewellery.82 As a consequence of
this, formal exports from Dubai based
companies to India dropped by almost
20% in 2013.83
These import measures, however, seem
to have affected India’s jewellery trade
less than its bullion trade. Squeezed
supplies and steady Indian consumer
demand for jewellery has driven up
local prices in India, still making it
profitable for Dubai-based jewellers
(who are not bound to reserve 20%
for re-export) to either ship jewellery
or individual gold bars with expatriate
passengers and pay required taxes.84
Smuggling is allegedly also on the rise,
either over land through neighbouring
countries like Nepal and Pakistan, or
by transiting from an international to
a domestic airport, thus avoiding strict
controls.
77 Telephone interview, gold industry expert, 9 February, 2014
78 Interview, gold refiner, Dubai, 3 February 2014.
79 Interviews, Congolese traders, Dubai, 3-7 February 2014
80 UN Comtrade, op cit.
81 “Dubai precious metals conference (6-7 April 2013) live update”; http://dpmc.ae/liveupdates.aspx
82 “Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies/Entities,” Reserve Bank of India, Circular No. 25, 14
August, 2013; http://rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=8312&Mode=0
83 Arnold, T. ‘Dubai feels the pain from India’s gold taxes’, The National, 13 October, 2013; http://
www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/economics/dubai-feels-the…
ixzz2tIBVIxGW
84 Interviews with Dubai based gold traders, 3-7 February, 2013.
15
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16
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Geographically, Dubai lies at a crossroads in the world diamond trade. At the eastern
end of the Arabian Peninsula, it straddles the divide between southern producing
countries, the Western “old world” diamond centres of Antwerp, Tel Aviv and London,
and the “new world” promise of Mumbai and Shanghai.
Since 2003, Dubai has emerged from obscurity to be the third largest diamond trading
centre in the world, trading almost $42 billion worth of stones in 2013—$12.4 billion
of which were rough.85
Location is not the only reason for the UAE’s success. Faced with declining oil reserves,
Dubai successfully set out to reinvent itself as a regional trading hub, guided by laissezfaire
regulations and generous 50-year tax holidays that its main rivals like Antwerp
could not match. Its dual role as a transit hub where diamonds can be re-exported
and revalued makes Dubai extremely attractive to those seeking to give illegitimate
diamonds a new lease on life, or to cheat African producing countries out of taxes that
they would otherwise have to pay.
According to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, all rough diamonds traded in
the world are to be accompanied by certificates detailing the value and origins of the
stones. Operating properly, the system should be able to stop stones with questionable
origins or values that do not match the geological footprint of the country of export.
Unfortunately, those seeking to cover their tracks can easily circumvent this system
through the use of certificates of mixed origin, gained by routing such diamonds
through trading hubs such as Dubai.
Companies, individuals or criminal networks seeking to disguise problematic diamonds
will initially ship their stones—more often than not with valid certificates obtained in
third countries— to Dubai where the parcels can then be mixed with other shipments.
From there, stones are sent on to other jurisdictions for cutting and polishing, only
this time accompanied by a KP certificate from Dubai, rather than the initial country
of export. By repeating this process such diamonds become extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to trace. This practice is problematic not only because it can be used to
disguise purchases from legal, yet reputationally challenged sources (like Zimbabwe’s
Marange diamond fields); it can also be used to hide the origins of diamonds which do
not meet KP certification requirements.
Prior to the advent of the KP, African diamonds were routinely bought at bargain prices,
and re-priced more accurately as they passed through the diamond supply chain. Doing
so minimized export taxes and disguised the margins between the purchase and real
price of the stones. The KP’s requirement that diamonds be accompanied by certificates
stating the price of a given parcel and issued at the point of origin was intended to
make this practice more difficult. In reality, however, the problem continues.
Section Three DIAMONDS TRADE FROM DRC TO UAE
85 http://www.dmcc.ae/dubai-diamond-trade-statistics
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17
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
UAE’s biggest draw is its tax-free status. Diamonds imported to the UAE from the country
of origin can be revalued closer to market price, and re-exported without tax consequences.
KP statistics from 2013, for example, show that the average per carat value of diamonds
entering the UAE was $74.40, yet the average re-export was $107.05 per carat – a 43.8%
increase. The difference was even more dramatic in 2011, reaching 74%, according to a
ground-breaking study by the Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group looking
at the intersection between diamonds, money laundering and terrorism.86
In 2012, the DRC was the second largest diamond producer in the world by volume,
producing over 21 million carats. In value, however, it ranks 10th place.87 Despite
its prominence, the DRC contributed only 7% of the almost 67 million carats UAE
imported in 2013. In value terms, this translated into just over 1% of the total value of
UAE imports that year ($5.1 billion).88
The average value of Congolese industrial diamonds has been steadily decreasing in
the past decade along with the total volume. Congolese diamond exports are grossly
undervalued by exporters and the government valuation office, the Centre d’Evaluation,
d’Expertise et de Certification (CEEC), largely to minimize paying the 3.75% export
taxes.89 For example, exporters declared their diamonds at an average value of $10 per
carat in 2013, while CEEC valuators averaged $14 per carat.
According to a diamond trade expert the latter average value is still suspiciously low
considering the fact that since 2010 Congolese exporters are obliged to deoxidize
diamonds to improve their appearance.90 This process can increase the value of
gemstone diamonds by up to 40% and industrial diamonds by 25%. In reality, the per
carat value of industrial diamonds decreased by 30% compared to the average per
carat value over three years preceding 2010, while gem quality diamonds saw a 20%
improvement over the same time period.91
Table 2: CEEC Export statistics for 2013
Exporter Quantity, cts Declared value Average Value after Average Destination
$US per carat expertise $US per carat
1 Afrogem 1,317,454.67 31,226,296 23.70 41,848,275 31.76 UAE and Belgium
2 Kasai wa 8,284,051.69 32,520,255 3.93 56 905 220 6.87 UAE and Belgium
Balengela
3 Saga 2,839,584.82 56,781,649 20.00 77,196,662 27.19 Israel and Belgium
4 Solidiam 3,125,684.28 35,829,705 11.46 44,867,025 14.35 UAE and Belgium
Total 15,566,775 156,357, 905 10.04 220,817,182 14.19
Source: Centre for Evaluation, Expertise and Certification, Kinshasa
86 “Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Through Trade of Diamonds,” FAFT-Egmont Group, October 2013, p. 34;
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML-TF-through-tra…
87 Kimberley Process statistics, annual global summary 2012; https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/public_statistics
88 Kimberley Process statistics for DRC and UAE, 2013; unpublished industry data
89 Email communication, diamond trade expert, Kinshasa, 31 January, 2013.
90 Ibid.
91 Calculated from Kimberley Process statistics for DRC; upublished industry data
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18
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
In theory, part of the higher valuation in Dubai can be attributed to mixing or “sorting”
parcels to make them more attractive to onward buyers. Generally this process can
result in a 10-15% increase. However, in practice the “trades” taking place in Dubai
are effectively just revaluations occurring within the same family of companies. Basically
the same rough diamonds go in and out but at a much higher price. This phenomenon
known as transfer pricing enables associated companies to under declare the value of
their diamond exports in producer countries, thereby minimising due taxes.
As one diamond consultant noted: “In essence, diamond multinationals will channel
their rough diamond purchases...through Dubai. Often, the parcels are not even opened
and, after re-invoicing, are shipped to the final destination, often Belgium, India or fareast
cutting centres. The invoice will inevitably provide a higher figure...As a result, the
local company produces a profit – which is a purely paper profit, because it generally
remains a transaction between affiliated companies.”92
To African governments the difference between tax avoidance (which many consider a
legal practice) and tax evasion (which is illegal) is a semantic one. In 2013 alone, price
manipulations due to transfer pricing generated in excess of $1.6 billion in “profits”
in the UAE, and represents a major deprivation for African treasuries, which lost
much needed tax revenues. In the Congolese diamond context transfer pricing cost
the treasury an estimated $66.2 million in 2013. Perhaps one of the worst affected
countries is Zimbabwe, which lost an estimated $770 million in taxable revenues on
exports to UAE between 2008 and 2012 due to an average 50% undervaluation of its
diamonds.93
For the international law enforcement community, it spells a concern of a different kind.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is one of the world’s leading agencies studying
the issue of money-laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF), and its October 2013
report concluded that transfer pricing in Dubai posed unique reputational risks to the
diamond trade and could be enabling terrorist organizations:
“Diamond trade centres like Dubai, which operate as Free Trade Zones (FTZ) are
susceptible to [money-laundering] vulnerabilities…This, in combination with the specific
vulnerabilities of the diamond trade and the mechanism of transfer pricing, creates a
significant vulnerability for ML and TF activities. By way of over or under invoicing with
affiliate diamond companies located in FTZ, it is possible to illegitimately shift profits
from diamond companies in high tax rate countries to FTZs and thus avoid taxes. It is
also possible to use the same scheme for ML/TF purposes. The combination of a lack
of transparency in the diamond trade with a lack of transparency in a FTZ provides an
excellent atmosphere to conduct large volume transactions without being detected.”94
92 Even-Zohar, C. (2004), Diamond Industry Strategies to Combat Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, ABN
AMRO, p. 101 .
93 KP statistics
94 FATF-Egmont Group, op cit, p. 63
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19
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Compounding these concerns is Dubai’s practice of allowing diamond deals—often
worth many million dollars—to be transacted in cash, rather than formal banking
channels. While UAE is not the only jurisdiction that allows this, it is worrying that Dubai
was especially vocal in opposing KP efforts in 2013 to bring such transactions within
the banking system, where anti-money laundering screening initiatives such as “know
your customer” could provide added assurance to who may be behind the transaction.
For its part, the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC), which implements the KP
certification in the UAE, claims it conducts independent valuation of the imported
parcels on an ad hoc basis. According to the Director for the UAE Kimberley Process,
undervaluations of over 30% are not accepted for gemstone diamonds, while the
margin of acceptable difference is only a few per cent for industrial diamonds.95 While
an unknown number of shipments were rejected eight years ago when random checks
started, no parcels have been rejected due to unacceptable levels of undervaluation in
the past five years.
The huge discrepancies between the average
import and export value also sets Dubai apart
from the other main rough diamond trading
centres: in the European Union it averages 5%,
while in Switzerland and Israel it is 8% and 6%,
respectively.96 In Belgium and Israel the diamond
industry is subjected to a very small presumptive
tax for the net income calculated as a percentage
of turnover. This would naturally reduce the
incentive to practice transfer pricing, as this would
inflate presumed taxable income. Under a zerotax
regime, UAE would need to introduce transferpricing
regulation to tackle the issue. Currently,
there are no provisions relating to transfer pricing
in the UAE.97
95 Interview, Director, UAE Kimberley Process, Dubai, 5 February 2014.
96 Kimberley Process statistics for Switzerland, Israel and the EU for 2013; upublished industry data
97 ‘Taxation of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, United Arab Emirates’, KPMG International, 2012;
An artisanal miner shows off a diamond
he found. Credit: Shawn Blore/PAC
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All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Smuggling, underdeclaring and undervaluation practiced across the
Great Lakes Region undermines diligent sourcing of Congolese gold and
diamonds, fosters conflict financing and deprives the DRC government
of critical tax revenues. The lack of verification of importers of gold and
their paperwork, and the failure to further address transfer pricing of
diamonds in UAE perpetuates the problems in the Great Lakes Region.
The list of efforts needed to stem illicit and undervalued gold and
diamonds trading and facilitate diligent sourcing is long, both on the
supply and demand side.
Supplier countries must move to formalize the gold trade, integrate
due diligence obligations (See box Due Diligence in the Gold Sector)
in national policies and legislation, and take legal action against
exporters that violate chain of custody and export procedures. ICGLR
Member States also need to further harmonize tax regimes and improve
enforcement cooperation as means by which to tackle smuggling. The
political will of Uganda and Burundi to take action is particularly weak
and evident. Kenya is doing better in many respects, while progress in
the DRC remains limited due to the lack of administrative capacity and
political will to address smuggling and formalize trade.
The Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development is proposing
a legal and regulatory review for the mining sector although follow
through on plans to operationalize the ICGLR Regional Certification
Mechanism have been very slow to materialize.101 Funding for the
review, which is to run from 2014 to 2019, has yet to be secured.
In terms of actual control measures, no seizures or arrest have been
made in relation to gold smuggling from DRC, allowing the owners
of UN-sanctioned entities to continue to export with impunity. Official
indifference also extends to Ugandan mining authorities that do not
inspect gold parcels upon export, and do not reconcile statistics with
their counterparts in customs.102 As stated earlier this has led some
exporters to bypass mining authorities altogether and thus avoid
obtaining export permits and paying taxes.
Section Four ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
98 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010; http://www.sec.gov/about/
laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf
99 “Due diligence guidelines for the responsible supply chain of minerals from red flag locations
to mitigate the risk of providing direct or indirect support for conflict in the eastern part of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, UN Security Council, 2010; http://www.un.org/sc/
committees/1533/pdf/due_diligence_guidelines.pdf; “OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, Second Edition”, OECD, 17
July, 2012, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf.
100 “Practical Guidance for Market Participants in the Gold and Precious Metals Industry”, Dubai
Multi Commodities Centre, 2012; http://www.dmcc.ae/gold-responsible-sourcing-precious-metals;
The OECD Guidance Supplement on Gold formed the basis for guidance documents developed by
the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) for their respective member refiners to implement.
101 “Strengthening mineral sector through inspection for legal and environmenal compliance”,
Uganda Department of Geological Surveys and Mines, 11 April, 2013, unpublished government
project proposal document.
102 Interview, official from Department of Geological Surveys and Mines (Uganda), Kampala, 27
January, 2014.
20
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE GOLD SECTOR
The US Congress passed the The Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act in July 2010. Section 1502
of the Act requires US-listed companies
using minerals, including gold, from DRC
and neighbouring countries to conduct
due diligence on their supply chain.98
Later that year the UN Security Council
and the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD),
published compatible guidance documents
outlining a five-step approach to ensure
that companies, like gold refiners are
not contributing to conflicts or human
rights violations through their mineral
purchases:99
1. Establish strong company management
systems, including maintaining inventory
and transaction documentation, and
specifying the nature of gold (i.e. mined
or scrap) and supplier details
2. Identify and assess risks in the
supply chain, including making a
reasonable determination of origin,
and investigating the circumstances of
mineral extraction, trade and export of
mined gold from conflict-affected and
high-risk areas
3. Design and implement a strategy to
respond to identified risks
4. Carry out an independent third-party
audit
5. Report annually on supply chain due
diligence.
The DMCC’s Practical Guidance for
Responsible Sourcing of Precious Metals,
which was introduced in April 2012,
is based on the OECD Due Diligence
Guidance.100 In October 2013, the DMCC
signed a cross-recognition agreement
with the Responsible Jewellery Council
(RJC). As a result, RJC members – including
companies like Tiffany & Co, Signet and JC
Penney – seeking compliance with Dodd-
Frank can rely on DMCC accredited refiners
as sources of conflict-free gold.
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21
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Kenya has a new Mining Bill in draft, which should be ratified in parliament in mid-2014.
According to mining officials the new bill makes reference to ICGLR certification and
provides for proper identification of artisanal and small-scale miners and recording of
production and sales.103 These elements are supposed to remedy the loopholes Kenya’s
two main exporters are alleged to have taken advantage of in recent years. Ongoing
investigations of the companies demonstrate a welcomed commitment by the Kenyan
government to enforce existing chain of custody procedures. While illegal or underdeclared
exports appear to have been minimal in Kenya in recent years, mining officials
attribute this to the fact both mining and customs officials are required to put their seal
on exported parcels, and statistics from both institutions are reconciled prior to export.
Burundi passed a new mining code in 2013 that introduced high penalties for mineral
smugglers, while authorities tightened export controls at the airport to combat
smuggling. However, there is still no verified or plausible production data for gold in
Burundi, or, at the time of writing, initiatives to launch traceability in the gold sector,
making it difficult to detect and address exporters that illegally source gold from
elsewhere. The government has yet to develop any strategies to address its biggest
vulnerability: illegal flows of Congolese gold entering Burundi. It is equally unclear how,
or when, the government plans to implement due diligence practices for gold or the
ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism.104
In the country at the heart of this issue—the Democratic Republic of Congo—small
steps are being taken in the right direction. In February 2012, the Ministry of Mines
adopted the OECD due diligence standards into national law by administrative order,
as part of its conformance with the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism.105 Failure
to conduct due diligence led to the temporary suspension of two export houses in the
3T sector in May 2012106 , but so far no gold export houses have been suspended on
the same basis—likely in an attempt to attract companies to open a gold export house
rather than scare them away with regulation.
Another administrative order, issued by the Ministry of Mines in 2010, launched a
traceability procedures manual for mining products, including gold, from extraction to
exportation. However, the manual itself has yet to be harmonized with the ICGLR’s
standards.107 Extension of services to provide chain of custody documentation in remote
gold mining areas has, however, been too limited to allow exporters to trace back their
gold purchases to the exact mine of origin. Reports of smuggling by intermediate traders
has so far not led to any formal investigations or suspensions of licenses.
103 Interview, officials at the mines and geology department (Kenya), Nairobi 30 January, 2014.
104 Final Report, UN Group of Experts on DRC, S/2014/41, 23 January 2014, para. 193.
105 Administrative Order, No. 0057.CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2012, 29 February 2012, Article 8.
106 Interim Report, UN Group of Experts for DRC, S/2012/348, para. 142.
107 Administrative Order, No. 0711/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2010, 15 October 2010.
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22
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicite Trade of Conflict Minerals
During its chairmanship of the Kimberley Process in 2011, DRC sought to make
undervaluation of diamonds one of its legacy issues. Although it received support from
many African producers, as well as civil society groups, the issue stalled in the face of
industry resistance, and was largely overshadowed by the debate about whether or
not to lift export restrictions on Marange diamonds from Zimbabwe. However, DRC is
currently serving as part of a team of KP members (which includes PAC) that is looking at
creating a regional approach to KP compliance in the Mano River Region of West Africa.
Tackling transfer pricing and ensuring fairer diamond valuations are key components of
that work, which is envisioned could be expanded to other diamond producing areas in
Africa, most notably Central Africa.
On the demand side, the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre extended the application
of its responsible sourcing guidance beyond its refiners in 2013, through a so-called
Responsible Market Participant accreditation initiative aimed at member traders,
jewellers and manufacturers.108 As in the case of refiners, accreditation is subject to
audits on the basis of the DMCC review protocol, but application is not mandatory as
in the case of DMCC refiners.
PAC is not aware of any public or private initiatives to promote due diligence in the
gold sector beyond the DMCC, for example in the gold souk. Jewellers interviewed
seem unaware of any responsibility other than seeking legal compliance of their gold
suppliers.
In 2012 the DMCC started to reach out to UAE federal Customs authorities on the
topic of responsible sourcing.109 From discussions with the DMCC and with customs
authorities it remains unclear whether and to what extent detailed gold import data are
shared with the DMCC to facilitate the tracking of supplies to imports from DRC and
neighbouring countries. In any case refiners do not have access to such data.110
With respect to undervaluation or mitigating reputational vulnerabilities in the diamond
sector—most notably the sourcing of diamonds from conflict–affected areas other than
those in the midst of traditional civil wars, enabling money laundering or terrorism
financing—the DMCC has yet to publicly disclose what steps it has or would take
to address these issues. During a two-year internal discussion on ways to reform the
Kimberley Process, as well as current deliberations on whether to establish an OECD
due diligence for diamonds and other precious stones, Dubai’s position can best be
described as hostile and dismissive.
108 http://www.dmcc.ae/gold-responsible-sourcing-precious-metals
109 Sharma, C. “DMCC’s responsible sourcing initiatives”, presentation at Dubai Precious Metals Conference, 6 April
2013; available at http://www.dpmc.ae/dpmc2013/Presentation/3Masterclass_Responsble_sourci…
DMCC.pdf
110 Interview, gold refiner, Dubai, 3 February, 2014.
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23
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
In the light of the policy analysis above PAC makes the following recommendations to
governments and private sector operators:
The Governments of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and DRC and other ICGLR countries
should:
Integrate due diligence and the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism in national
mining sector legislation, and operationalize implementation in the gold sector.
Carry out mine inspections as defined in the ICGLR RCM for the gold sector, in
order to establish a national mine site and production database and a regional
tracking database. This national database should be used to support and protect
legitimate domestic mineral production, such as by being used to verify the mine of
origin upon export and to justify national gold production.
Harmonize policies and practices with an aim to interrupting illicit trading. This
should include further harmonization of tax regimes, and greater enforcement
strategies and trans-border cooperation.
Further clarify chain of custody procedures for “conflict-free” mineral trading
and build state capacity to carry out certification export procedures in accordance
with the ICGLR standards, including the issuance, transmission and verification of
required documentation, particularly in gold producing areas.
Tighten controls on gold and diamond exports, involving crosschecking of
documentary requirements by issuing authorities upon export, and accurate
independent valuation.
Investigate and prosecute individuals and companies involved in illegal gold trade
from the DRC, including the beneficiary owners of UN sanctioned entities and their
front companies.
Through the ICGLR Secretariat in Bujumbura, finalize the institutionalization of the
ICGLR’s Independent Mineral Chain Auditor office that is meant to investigate illicit
mineral activity and evaluate the chain of custody systems in operation to ensure
compliance with ICGLR standards.
Gold exporting companies in Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and DRC and other ICGLR
countries should:
Relocate or open up branch offices in the DRC, if involved in trading Congolese
gold, and seek full legal compliance when exporting such gold.
Adopt and implement due diligence policies in line with OECD guidance, demand
state mining authorities deliver necessary chain of custody documentation, and/or
develop traceability systems, preferably with support from client companies.
Adhere to all five steps in the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, in particular Step 5
that requires annual public reporting on due diligence in order to generate public
confidence in the measures adopted by gold exporting companies.
The Kimberley Process should:
Create a special taskforce to investigate the issue of transfer pricing in the diamond
industry, with a view to recommend ways African diamond producing countries can
secure fairer and more accurate diamond valuations, and predictable tax revenues.
- 453 -
24
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
The government of the UAE should:
Tighten regulatory controls on gold imports particularly on hand carried gold,
including verification of the consignee, the (authenticity of) certificate of origin or
export permit, and customs clearance documents (including tax receipts).
Make verified data on consignees of gold imports available to the DMCC and other
economic free zone regulators to help registered companies further investigate their
supply chain.
Proactively disclose on a quarterly basis all data related to the import and export of
gold.
Address transfer pricing of diamonds through federal legislation and introduce
frequent and routine inspections of the value of imported parcels by the DMCC,
with a rejection threshold of 15% undervaluation.
Send shipments above the 15% threshold back to the country of origin so authorities
there can tax them appropriately, after having been accurately appraised by an
independent valuator. Exporters who consistently engage in gross undervaluation
should have their names shared with authorities in the country of origin, with a view
to prosecute them.
Demonstrate what safeguards it intends to introduce to its system to mitigate
against associated risks related to diamonds, money laundering and terrorism
financing. Consideration should be given to discontinuing the current practice
that permits diamond transactions to be made in cash, rather than through formal
banking channels.
Participate constructively in efforts to design a due diligence guidance for diamonds
and precious stones commensurate with Dubai’s leadership role in the diamond
industry
UAE traders and jewellers and refiners that are directly or indirectly sourcing mined gold
from the ICGLR region should:
Adopt and implement due diligence policies in line with OECD guidance supplement
on gold, i.e. through on-the-ground inspection of circumstances of mineral
extraction and trade, and establishment of a chain of custody and/or traceability
system with local exporters.
Adhere to all five steps in the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, in particular Step 5
that requires annual public reporting on due diligence in order to generate public
confidence in the measures adopted by gold exporting companies.
UAE refiners found to be compliant with the DMCC responsible gold guidance could:
Improve on gold fingerprinting techniques on supplies of recycler/scrap gold in
order to detect potentially misrepresented mined gold and conduct due diligence
accordingly.
Provide financial support to multi-stakeholder commissions to assess mine sites,
transportation routes, and points where gold is traded; and chain of custody and/or
traceability schemes (as per OECD guidance) in ICGLR countries.
Re-engage in the ICGLR region through purchases from assessed mines and
transportation routes with chain of custody and/or traceability systems in place.
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25
All that Glitters is Not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the Illicit Trade of Conflict Minerals
Partnership Africa Canada Publications
Partnership Africa Canada is working to strengthen good governance and respect for human rights,
prevent conflict related to natural resource exploitation, and promote sustainable development.
The following PAC reports related to diamonds can be found on PAC’s web site.
Reap What You Sow: Greed and Corruption in Zimbabwe’s Marange Diamond Fields
Diamonds Without Borders: An Assessment of the Challenges of Implementing and Enforcing the KP
Certification Scheme
Diamonds and Clubs: The Militarized Control of Diamonds and Power in Zimbabwe
Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform
Zimbabwe, Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History
Loupe Holes: Illicit Diamonds in the Kimberley Process
Land Grabbing and Land Reform: Diamonds, Rubber and Forests in the New Liberia
The Lost World: Diamond Mining and Smuggling in Venezuela
Killing Kimberley? Conflict Diamonds and Paper Tigers
Triple Jeopardy - Triplicate Forms and Triple Borders: Controlling Diamond Exports from Guyana
Fugitives and Phantoms: The Diamond Exporters of Brazil
Implementing Kimberley Process - 5 years on - how effective is the Kimberley Process and what more
needs to be done?
The Failure of Good Intentions
Rich Man, Poor Man – Development Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the
Artisanal Alluvial Diamond Fields of Africa
The Key to Kimberley: Internal Diamond Controls-Seven Case Studies
Diamonds Without Maps: Liberia, the UN, Sanctions and the Kimberley Process
Motherhood, Apple Pie and False Teeth: Corporate Social Responsibility in the Diamond Industry
West Africa: Rocks in a Hard Place. The Political Economy of Diamonds and Regional Destabilization
Diamonds in the Central African Republic: Trading, Valuing and Laundering
No Problems Here: Success, Complacency and Suspicion in the Indian Diamond Industry
War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection
The Kimberley Process: The Case for Proper Monitoring
Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy of the Democratic Republic of Congo and its
Neighbours
Diamonds: Forever or for Good? The Economic Impact of Diamonds in Southern Africa
Fire in the Ice: Benefits, Protection and Regulation in the Canadian Diamond Industry
Destabilizing Guinea: Diamonds, Charles Taylor and the Potential for Wider Humanitarian Catastrophe
The Heart of the Matter - Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security
www.pacweb.org
- 455 -
- 456 -
ANNEX 5.8
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo 2001 (“Porter Commission”), Final Report, November 2002
[Original English: not reproduced]
___________
ANNEX 5.9
Location of exclusive prospecting areas and concessions
[Annex not translated]
___________
- 457 -
ANNEX 5.10
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2001/357, 12 April 2001
United Nations
•
Security Council Distr.: General
12 April 2001
Original: English
Letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-General
to the President of the Security Council
I wish to refer to the presidential statement dated 2 June 2000
(S/PRST/2000/20) in which the Security Council requested me to establish a Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of six months. The
Council also requested that the expert panel, once established, submit to the
Council, through me, its final report at the end of the mandate.
Further to my letter dated 2 April 2001, I have the honour to transmit to you
the report of the Panel, submitted to me by the Chairperson of the Panel. I should be
grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security
Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
01-32354 (E) 130401
11111 11 111 11 111 11 111 11 111 11 11111 111 11 111 1 1111
S120o113s1
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S/2001/357
Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Contents
2
I. Introduction .............................................. , ........... .
A. Summary ........................................................ .
B. Methodological framework ......................................... .
C. Overview ............ .- ...............................•............
D. Background .........................................••............
II. Illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth ............. .
A. Pre-existing structures that facilitated illegal exploitation ................ .
B. Mass-scale looting ................................................ .
C. Systematic and systemic exploitation ................................. .
D. Current structures of illegal exploitation .............................. .
E. Individual actors .................................................. .
F. Economic data: confirmation of the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ..................... .
III. Links between the exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the
conflict ............................................................. .
A. Budgets compared to military expenditures. ........................... .
B. Financing the war ................................................. .
C. Special features of the links between the exploitation of natural resources
and the continuation of the conflict .................................. .
D. Facilitators or passive accomplices? .................................. .
IV. Conclusion and findings ............................................... .
V. Recommendations ........................................ , ........... .
Annexes
Paragraphs Page
1-24 3
4-8 3
9-16 4
17-20 5
21-24 6
25-108 6
26-31 6
32-45 8
46-70 9
71-86 14
87-93 17
94-108 19
109-212 27
110-124 27
125-172 29
173-180 36
181-212 37
213-218 41
219-242 42
I. Sample of companies importing minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
via Rwanda ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
II. Countries visited and representatives of Governments ·and organizations interviewed . . . . . . . 48
III. Abbreviations ...... : ..................................... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
- 459 -
I. Introduction
1. By the statement of its President of 2 June 2000
(S/PRST/2000/20), the Security Council requested the
Secretary-General to establish an expert panel on the
illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms
of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for
a period of six months, with the following mandate:
- To follow up on reports and collect information
on all activitties of illegal exploitation of natural
resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, including in
violation of the sovereignty of that country;
To research and analyse the links between the
exploitation of the natural resources and other
forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and the continuation of the conflict;
- To revert to the Council with recommendations.
2. The Secretary-General, in his letter to the
President of the Security Council dated 31 July 2000
(S/2000/796), notified the President of the Security
Council that the composition of the Panel was as
follows:
Mme Safiatou Ba-N'Daw (Cote d'Ivoire)
(Chairperson);
Mr. Franyois Ekoko (Cameroon);
Mr. Mel Holt (United States of America);
Mr. Henri Maire (Switzerland);
Mr. Moustapha Tall (Senegal).
3. The Panel was assisted by a technical advisor, an
associate political officer, an administrator and a
secretary.
A. Summary
4. Illegal exploitation of the mineral and forest
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
taking place at an alarming rate. Two phases can be
distinguished: mass-scale looting and the systematic
and systemic exploitation of natural resources.
5. Mass-scale looting. During this first phase,
stockpiles of minerals, coffee, wood, livestock and
money that were available in territories conquered by
the armies of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda were
S/2001/357
taken, and either transferred to those countries or
exported to international markets by their forces and
n·ationals.
6. Systematic and systemic exploitation. Planning
and organization were required for this phase. The
systematic exploitation flourished because of the preexisting
structures developed during the conquest of
power of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Congo-Zaire. These pre-existing
structures were improved over time and new networks
for channelling extracted resources were put in place.
However, the systemic exploitation used the existing
systems of control established by Rwanda and Uganda .
In both cases, exploitation was often carried out in
violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the national legislation and
sometimes international law, and it led to illicit
activities. Key individual actors including top army
commanders and businessmen on the one hand, and
government structures on the other, have been the
engines of this systematic and systemic exploitation.
7. The consequence of illegal exploitation has been
twofold: (a) massive availability of financial resources
for the Rwandan Patriotic Army, and the individual
enrichment of top Ugandan military commanders and
civilians; (b) the emergence of illegal networks headed
either by top military officers or businessmen. These
two elements form the basis of the link between the
exploitation of natural resources and the continuation
of the conflict. Other contributing factors however
exist - the roles played by some entities and
institutions, and the opportunistic behaviour of some
private companies and influential individuals,
including some decision makers in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe. Some leaders in
the region bear a direct responsibility. The Panel
concludes that tough measures must be taken to bring
to an end the cycle of exploitation of the natural
resources and the continuation of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
8. The Panel's recommendations revolve around six
broad themes: (1) sanctions against countries and
individuals involved in the illegal activities;
(2) preventive measures to avoid a recurrence of the
current situation; (3) reparations to the victims of the
illegal exploitation of natural resources; (4) design of a
framework for reconstruction; (5) improvement of
international mechanisms and regulations governing
some natural resources; and (6) security issues.
3
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S/2001/357
B. Methodological framework
9. Methodology. Owing to the nature of the work
and the complexities of the issues, a methodology that
allows flexible data collection was essential in order to
complete this project. The Panel has therefore utilized:
(a) Primary data collection. Official
documentation from ministries and other institutions as
well as recorded minutes of meetings involving various
relevant actors;
(b) Secondary sources. Reports, workshop
proceedings, published and unpublished literature;
(c) Interviews. Structured, semi-structured and
open interviews as well as interviews resulting from
various network referrals.
I 0. A vast amount of data was obtained from three
essential sources:
(a) Countries and other entities involved in the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
namely: Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe,
RCD-Goma and RCD-ML;
(b) "Third-party" sources such as Belgium,
Cameroon, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Kenya,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Ta nzania,
the United States of America, Switzerland, various
United Nations agencies, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization,
OECD, the International Coffee Organization, De
Beers, the Diamond High Council, the International
Diamond Manufacturers Association, the University of
Maryland, the World Resource Institute and CIFOR;
(c) Various individual actors and stakeholders
who expressed an interest for various reasons in
sharing their knowledge and understanding with the
Panel.
11. The production and export data series available
for the analysis cover the period 1995-2000. Data were
systematically analysed separately and then compared
with one another. Comparative · analysis thus
contributed to the Panel's ability to develop a good
understanding of the issues. In addition, the Panel
sought to cross-check every item of information
received. In relation to this and to the extent possible,
Panel members attempted to speak to individuals
against whom serious allegations were made. When
access to those key witnesses or primary actors was
denied, Panel members often relied on their closest
collaborators for insight. The Panel however faced a
problem of imbalance in the acquisition of data. Indeed
data was abundant for Rwanda, Uganda, RCD-Goma,
RCD-ML and MLC. This is partly due to the high
number of insiders living in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and in Europe who were directly involved
with those entities and who offered to share almost
everything they knew or had experienced or gathered
as documentation while they were involved with them.
The same quantity and quality of data were not
available for Angola, Namibia or Zimbabwe, although
the Panel visited those countries. This constraint can be
felt in the report. Overall the report was written using
the empirical method combined with the economic
analysis of data collected, supported by elements of
evidence.
12. Establishing boundaries. Geographically, data
were gathered for occupied and non-occupied
territories within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo as well as for any country involved in the
conflict or of other strategic importance, geographic,
financial or other. With respect to natural resources, the
Panel focused on minerals, forest and agricultural
products and other forms of wealth, primarily taxes.
Given the high number of natural resources found in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the high level
of exploitation by numerous parties, and the limited
time and resources available to the Panel, the following
criteria for the selection of resources to be examined
were developed:
• The commercial value of the resources in
absolute terms;
• The interest of parties in the resources;
• The scale of exploitation.
13. Based on these criteria, three categories of
products were of primary consideration: (a) mineral
resources, primarily coltan, diamonds, gold and
cassiterite; (b) agric-μlture, forests and wildlife,
including timber, coffee and ivory; and (c) financial
products, mainly in regard to taxes. Copper, cobalt,
livestock, gorillas, okapis, tobacco, tea, palm oil and
land allocation deserved to be among the resources and
products to be studied. Some did not meet established
criteria, however, and for others, such as copper and
cobalt, time constraint was the main reason for a lack
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S/20011357
of study. These resources are touched upon in the protect some interests or to create a situation of
report for illustrative purposes, but were not monopoly.
systematically studied.
14. Defining the key concepts. In determining the
parameters of the project the definition or
interpretation of illegality and exploitation was
vigorously debated.
15. Illegality. The most contentious concept in the
mandate has been the term "illegality" with regard to
exploitation. Almost all actors in the conflict and
observers requested a clear definition of illegality. In
the Panel's view, the understanding of illegality is
underpinned by four elements all related to the rule of
law, namely:
(a) Violation of sovereignty. The first element
is based on the Security Council's understanding of
illegality as described in the Panel's mandate (see the
statement of the President of the Security Council of 2
June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/20)). This posits that all
activities - extraction, production, commercialization
and exports - taking place in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo without the consent of the legitimate
government are illegal. This interpretation suggested
that only non-invited forces and their nationals are
carrying out illegal activities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
(b) Respect by actors of the existing regulatory
framework in the country or territory where they
operate or carry out their activities. The Panel
considers that if authorities exerting effective power
and control over their sovereign area recognize or set
up a regulatory framework to govern the use or
exploitation of resources, this framework shall be
respected. Failure to do so may lead to the
infringement of the law and, therefore, activities
considered illegal or unlawful. In this case, the Panel
deems illegality to be the carrying out of an activity in
violation of an existing body of regulations.
(c) The discrepancy between widely accepted
practices in trade and business and the way business is
conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In
this category, the Panel has considered that the use and
abuse of power by some actors fall into the category of
illegality. This includes forced monopoly in trading,
the unilateral fixing of prices of products by the buyer,
the confiscation or looting of products from farmers,
and the use of military forces in various zones to
(d) The violation of international law including
"soft" law. The Panel considers that business activities
carried out in violation of international law are illegal.
The Panel utilized the aforementioned elements in a
complementary manner, refusing to be exclusive or to
fous o on. sngle element. On the basis of
discussions with different members of the Security
Council, the Panel has interpreted the wish of the
Security Council to be a broad interpretation of the
concept of illegality.
16. Exploitation. The Panel opted for a broad
understanding and interpretation of exploitation.
Exploitation was used beyond the mere consideration
of production and extraction. It was viewed as all
activities that enable actors and stakeholders to engage
in business in first, secondary and tertiary sectors in
relation to the natural resources and other forms of
wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
broad interpretation enabled the Panel to look into
extraction, production, commercialization and exports
of natural resources and other services such as
transport and financial transactions.
C. Overview
17. This section offers a general overview of the
report. Initially, the Panel examined the pre-existing
structures that have facilitated the illegal exploitation
of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. These elements encompass the
financial/commercial links and the transportation
networks that essentially laid the foundation for the
current situation of illegal exploitation.
18. The Panel then reviewed the primary processes
by which the natural resources are physically exploited
by the occupying forces, primarily Rwanda and
Uganda, in conjunction with their respective rebel
counterparts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Subsequently, the current structures of exploitation
were discussed in order to demonstrate the evolution of
the process to its present state. Selected individuals
were then profiled to illustrate the extent to which this
is an organized and embedded venture. Economic data
were then analysed to confirm the findings described
above.
5
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S/2001/357
19. The focus then moved to exploring the
complexities of the links between the continuation of
the conflict and the exploitation of resources through
the use of specific country examples. The aim is to
demonstrate the varying means by which power
structures can manipulate situations for the most
favourable outcome. This section is directly linked to
the previous one and, in some cases, information
overlapped. This was unavoidable because of the
intricate nature of the problem at hand.
20. The report goes on to discuss more incidental
elements in this exploitation, which are nonetheless
important and relevant: official and non-official fronts
utilized as well as the facilitators or passive
accomplices within the processes. The report concludes
with a summary of the findings and recommendations
for action.
D. Background
21. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is located
in the heart of equatorial central Africa and has an area
of 2,267,600 square kilometres and a current
population estimated at 50 million. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo is endowed with a unique
biodiversity, vast mineral and forest resources, and rich
soils conducive to agriculture (see map). These
favourable conditions, concentrated in the eastern
regions, are the setting for the current ongoing
occupation and struggle to exploit these natural
resources.
22. The initial disruption, predominantly affecting the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, began with
the 1994-1995 refugee crisis in the region, spawned by
the war in neighbouring Rwanda. The sudden influx of
hundreds of thousands of refugees, including members
of the lnterahamwe, created a new demographic
dynamic in the subregional population, abruptly
disturbed the delicate balance of the ecosystems and
generated a new security situation along the border
between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Rwanda.
23. The situation further deteriorated in 1996 with the
war between the Zairian forces and the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
(AFDL), the rebel movement led by the late LaurentDesire
Kabila and supported by the Angolan, Rwandan
and Ugandan forces. This AFDL-led conquest of then
6
eastern Zaire fundamentally altered the composition of
the regional stakeholders and the distribution of natural
resources. Previously, the distribution norm was (via
legal and illegal channels) through locally based
Congolese, mostly . civilian-managed, business
operations. However, these traditional modes were
quickly overtaken by new power structures. Along with
new players came new· rules for exploiting natural
resources. Foreign troops and their "friends" openly
embraced business in "liberated territories",
encouraged indirectly by the AFDL leader, the late
President Kabila.
24. In August 1998, fighting erupted again in the
northern, western and eastern parts of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, this time between Rwandan and
Ugandan troops and the Congolese army, with the
assistance of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean
armies, as well as Sudanese and Chadian forces. The
last two countries have since withdrawn their soldiers
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
II. Illegal exploitation of natural
resources and other forms of
wealth
25. The illegal exploitation of resources by Burundi,
Rwanda and Uganda took different forms, including
confiscation, extraction, forced monopoly and pricefixing.
Of these, the first two reached proportions that
made the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
a very lucrative business. Prior to defining the type and
manner of illegal exploitation, however, it is important
to examine the pre-existing structures which facilitated
this process.
A. Pre-existing structures that facilitated
illegal exploitatioo
26. Illegal exploitation 1 by foreigners aided by the
Congolese began with the first "war of liberation" in
1996. The AFDL rebels. ·backed by Angolan, Rwandan
and Ugandan soldiers conquered eastern and south
eastern Zaire. As they were advancing, the then AFDL
leader, the late Laurent-Desire Kabila, signed contracts
with a number of foreign companies. Numerous
accounts and documents suggest that by 1997 a first
t In the context of the Panel's mandate.
- 463 -
wave of "new businessmen" speaking only English,
Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili had commenced operations
in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.2
Theft of livestock, coffee beans and other resources
began to be reported with frequency. By the time the
August 1998 war broke out, Rwandans and Ugandans
(top officers and their associates) had a strong sense of
the potential of tlhe natural resources and their locations
in the eastern the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Some historians have argued that Ugandan forces were
instrumental in the conquest of areas such as Wasta,
Bunia, Beni and Butembo during the first war.
27. Numerous accounts in Kampala suggest that the
decision to ent,er the conflict in August 1998 was
defended by some top military officials who had served
in eastern Zaire during the first war and who had had a
taste of the business potential of the region. Some key
witnesses, who served with the Rally for Congolese
Democracy rebel faction in early months, spoke about
the eagerness of Ugandan forces to move in and
occupy areas where gold and diamond mines were
located. Other sources informed the Panel that, late in
September 1998, they were already engaged in
discussions with General Salim Saleh on the creation
of a company that would supply the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo with merchandise, and on the
import of natural resources. The project never
materialized in this form, but the sources reportedly
also discussed this and other business venture
possibilities with the President of Uganda, Yoweri
Museveni.
28. There are strong indications that, if security and
political reasons were the professed roots of the
political leaders' motivation to move into the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo, some top army
officials clearly had a hidden agenda: economic and
financial objectives. A few months before the 1998 war
broke out, General Salim Saleh and the elder son of
President Museveni reportedly visited the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. One month after
the beginning of the conflict, General James Kazini
was already involved in commercial activities.
According to very reliable sources, he knew the most
profitable sectors and immediately organized the local
commanders to serve their economic and financial
objectives.
2 Cross-border commercial exchanges between people of
the region have traditionally existed.
S/2001/357
29. Financial and commercial links. During the
early months of the rebellion, the financial setting and
networks were already in place. At the heart of the
financial setting is the Banque de commerce, du
developpement et d'industrie (BCDI) located in Kigali.
According to some sources, there was an understanding
between the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame,
President Museveni and the late Laurent-Desire Kabila
on the collection and use of financial resources during
the time of the AFDL rebellion. This collaboration led
many sources to believe that the three leaders were
shareholders in BCD!. But this was not the case.
30. The following example illustrates the nature of
the financial transactions and links involving BCDI,
Citibank New York as a corresponding bank, and some
companies and individuals. In a letter signed by
J. P. Moritz, General Manager of Societe miniere de
Bakwanga (MIBA), a diamond company, and Ngandu
Kamenda, the General Manager of MIBA ordered a
payment of US$ 3.5 million to la Generale de
commerce d'import/export du Congo (COMIEX),3 a
company owned by late President Kabila and some of
his close allies, such as Minister Victor Mpoyo, from
an account in BCDI through a Citibank account. This
amount of money was paid as a contribution from
MIBA to the AFDL war effort.
31. Transportation networks. Illegal activities also
benefited from the old transportation network that
existed prior to the 1998 war. This network consists of
key airlines and trucking companies, a number of
which aided AFDL troops in their war against the
Mobutu regime. The pattern of transport remains
similar today: merchandise or arms are flown in and
natural resources or their products are flown out. For
example, Aziza Kulsum Gulamali, a businesswoman
operating within the region for some time, utilized this
network even in the 1980s. She contracted Air Cargo
Zaire to transport arms to the FDD Hutu rebels in
Burundi and smuggled cigarettes on the return flight.
Since 1998, aircraft also fly from the military airports
at Entebbe and Kigali, transporting arms, military
equipment, soldiers and, for some companies,
merchandise. On the return flights, they will carry
coffee, gold, diamond traders and business
representatives and, in some cases, soldiers. The Panel
3 COMIEX is registered as follows: immatricule No.
43797, identification nationale No. 31837T, Siege
sociale Kinshasa/Gombe No. 4 Avenue de la Justice.
Administrateur Directeur generate: Frederic Kabarele.
7
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S/2001/357
concludes that these pre-existing networks and
structures constitute the basis for the current
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
B. Mass-scale looting
32. Between September 1998 and August 1999,
occupied zones of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo were drained of existing stockpiles, including
minerals, agricultural and forest products and livestock.
Regardless of the looter, the pattern was the same:
Burundian, Rwandan, Ugandan and/or RCD soldiers,
commanded by an officer, visited farms, storage
facilities, factories and banks, and demanded that the
managers open the coffers and doors. The soldiers were
then ordered to remove the relevant products and load
them into vehicles. The Panel received numerous
accounts and claims of unlawful removal of products
by Rwandan or Ugandan armies and their local RCD
allies. The Panel has chosen to illustrate this point with
some examples.
33. In the mining sector, SOMINKI (Societe miniere
et industrielle du Kivu) had seven years' worth of
columbo-tantalite (coltan) in stock in various areas.
From late November 1998, Rwandan forces and their
RCD allies organized its removal and transport to
Kigali. Depending on the sources, between 2,000 and
3, OOO tons of cassiterite and between 1, OOO and 1 ,SOO
tons of coltan were removed from the region between
November 1998 and April 1999. A very reliable source
informed the Panel that it took the Rwandans about a
month to fly this coltan to Kigali. The Panel, however,
received official documents including one in which
RCD acknowledged removing 6 tons of coltan and 200
tons of cassiterite from SOMINKI for a total of
US$ 722,482.
34. Late in late August 1998, General Kazini's
soldiers absconded with the stockpiles of timber
belonging to the logging company Amex-bois, located
in Bagboka. In December that year, the same General
ordered the confiscation of all the stocked timber
belonging to the logging company La Forestiere.
General Kazini was reportedly seen in the area at least
twice during the period when the looting occurred and
temporarily established his headquarters in the area.
35. Then, in January 1999, in Equateur Province,
Jean-Pierre Bemba and General Kazini organized a
8
large operation for the confiscation of coffee beans.
Mr. Bemba initiated, encouraged and perpetuated such
practices in the Province. In a written letter to one of
his commanders, he urged him to release a bigger
vehicle he was using because it was needed urgently.
The source indicated that this was later used to carry
away tons of coffee beans. A participant in this
operation, who has since left the movement, explained
that two months were required to remove the enormous
quantities of coffee. In the past, this province produced
60 per cent of the country's robusta coffee. The
localities of Bumba, Lisala, Bosonzo, Binga and
Mindembo for a year did not have coffee stocks to
export because of these seizures. The Societe
congolaise du cafe, the largest owner of coffee stocks
in the area. went bankrupt. The mass-scale looting
reached such levels that, in one instance, Mr. Bemba
seized 200 tons of coffee beans from the SCIBE
company, which was owned by his father, Saolona
Bemba. The matter remains unresolved in court.
36. In some cases, factories were dismantled or
machinery spare parts were taken away, as in the case
of the sugar factory of Kaliba in South Kivu. When the
Panel asked about the dismantling of some factories,
the RCD cabinet replied that investors were free to
dismantle their factories and relocate wherever they
wanted. In essence, RCD recognized the phenomenon,
but explained it in terms of the investors' decision to
relocate the factories while taking the raw materials
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Cars and
other items were apparently also taken from the
country, as statistics on Ugandan registered cars
reflected an increase of about one quarter in 1999.
37. The financial sector was not left untouched either.
A defector from RCD who participated in some looting
informed the Panel that Rwandan soldiers
systematically targeted local banks as soon as they
conquered a town. In many cases, they would use the
RCD soldiers to collect the money while those who
were armed would surround the bank. For example, the
Kisangani Bank, a branch of the central bank, received
a visit of RCD staff accompanied by Rwandan soldiers.
Depending on the source (central bank in Kinshasa or
eyewitness). anywhere between $ I million and
$8 million worth of Congolese francs was taken. The
Panel was told that the operation took place a couple of
days after the central bank and Ministry of Finance
officials deposited money to pay civil servants and old
Congolese franc notes were replaced by new ones.
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38. Under the escort of soldiers, the money was taken
to the Palm Beach Hotel. The hotel management
recalled that bags full of money were stored in one of
the rooms and that during those few days armed
soldiers who could not speak Lingala (the most
commonly spoken Congolese language) guarded the
hotel premises. Could such an operation involving a
number of armed soldiers be carried out without the
knowledge and consent of the highest Rwandan
commander in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
39. Aides of Jean-Pierre Ondekane (an RCD leader)
reportedly collected the money from the Palm Beach
Hotel, flew with it to Goma and handed it over to
Emmanuel Kamanzi (former chief of the Finance
Department of RCD), who then flew on to Kigali. The
Panel could not identify the final recipient of the
money or how much disappeared between Kisangani,
Goma and Kigali. However, some sources told the
Panel that Mr. Kamanzi was imprisoned briefly at some
point after this transaction. According to the same
sources, he had apparently helped himself to the money
he was ordered only to transport. Mr. Kamanzi told
friends that he simply took a break of two months in
Kigali.
40. During the period when this operation was under
way, in Equateur Province, Mr. Bemba's men visited
several banks. According to a reliable source
Mr. Bemba's instructions to his soldiers were to
systematically empty the bank once a town was
captured. His troops took an equivalent of $400,000
from the Banque commerciale du Congo branch in
Bumba, $500,000 in Lisala, and approximately
$600,000 in Gemena.
41. The pilfering was also occurring in Kinshasa. The
Panel has evidence of a widespread practice by which
the late President Kabila would by proxy have
companies give a certain percentage of their profits.
For example, certain oil companies in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, under the umbrella of taxe
parafiscale, were delivering sums of money, in hard
cash, daily or weekly to the late President via his
Minister, friend and right-hand man, Mr. Mpoyo. Other
companies, such as MIBA, were asked to hand over
part of their profits to the late President's regime, and
all parastatals and important private companies were
invited to open bank accounts in the Banque de
commerce et du developpement (BCD) (see para. 78).
S/2001/357
42. However, over time the mass-scale looting
described above diminished and theft by individual
soldiers became more visible. For example, in Bunia,
during Panel discussions, local non-governmental
organizations, eyewitnesses and victims mentioned
cases in which Congolese civilians were injured or
murdered for resisting the attempted seizure of
property by the RCD rebels and foreign soldiers. In
Bukavu, individuals have told Panel members how
Rwandan soldiers confiscated their life savings in
dollar notes and some of the gold they were buying and
keeping as monnaie refuge in the face of the repeatedly
devalued Congolese franc. Partially, this has
contributed to the increasing resentment felt by the
Congolese population towards foreign soldiers and
some rebels.
43. The lootings of manufacturing plants, stocks and
private property were not only acts of isolated
individual soldiers but were encouraged, sometimes
organized and coordinated, by the highest army
commanders of both Rwanda and Uganda.
44. General Kazini used the same method to facilitate
looting activities. He would appoint loyal commanders
and reliable civilian Congolese in the civil
administration in areas potentially rich in natural
resources in order to secure his networks. This was
exactly the case in lturi, where he appointed Adele
Lotsove in 1999 (see para. 71). In turn, these top layers
of collaborators, colonels and majors utilized their
right-hand men to carry out the actual looting.
45. The Panel has strong indications after talking to
numerous witnesses (key and others) that key officials
in the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda were aware
of the situation on the ground, including the looting of
stocks from a number of factories. In some cases, the
level of production of mineral resources would have
alerted any government, such as those of gold for
Uganda and coltan for Rwanda (from 99 tons in 1996
to 250 tons in 1997).
C. Systematic and systemic exploitation
46. Extraction phase. The mass-scale looting carried
out on many levels within the Democratic Republic of
the Congo by rebels and foreign soldiers overshadowed
extraction activities during the first 12 months of the
second war. When resource stockpiles were looted and
exhausted by occupying forces and their allies, the
9
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exploitation evolved to an active extraction phase: Both
Congolese (civilians and soldiers) and foreigners
(civilians and soldiers) became involved in the
extraction of natural resources. This section highlights
one particular case study rather than offering a number
of shorter illustrative examples. The study will in effect
demonstrate how a company used illicit business
practices and complicity with occupying forces d the
Government as well as its international connections to
exploit the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
47. DARA-Forest case study. A Ugandan-Thai
forest company called DARA-Forest moved to the Ituri
area late in 1998. In March 1998, DARA-Forest
applied for a licence to carry out logging activities. in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but was dented
a forest concession by the Kinshasa authorities. In
1999 the company began to buy production by hiring
indiv,iduals to harvest timber and then sell it to the
company. Initially, these individuals were Congolese
operating in partnership with Ugandans. The same
year, DARA engaged in industrial production wi!h the
construction of a sawmill in Mangina. By 2000, 1t had
obtained its own concession from RCD-ML. Analysis
of satellite images over a period of time reveals the
extent to which deforestation occurred in Orientale
Province between 1998 and 2000. The most harvested
forests in the areas were around Djugu, Mambassa,
Beni, Komanda, Luna, Mont Moyo and Aboro. This
logging activity was carried out without consideation
of any of the minimum acceptable rules of timber
harvesting for sustainable forest management or even
sustainable logging.
48. Timber harvested in this region, which is
occupied by the Ugandan army and RCD-ML, has
exclusively transited or remained in Uganda. Our own
investigation in Kampala has shown that mahogay
originating in the Democratic Republic of the <?ongo 1s
largely available in Kampala, at a lower price than
Ugandan mahogany. This difference in price is simply
due to the lower cost of acquisition of timber. Timber
harvested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by
Uganda pays very little tax or none at all. In addition,
customs fees are generally not paid when soldiers
escort those trucks or when orders are received from
some local commanders or General Kazini. Timber
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is then
exported to Kenya and Uganda, and to other continents.
The Panel gathered from the Kenyan port authorities
10
that vast quantities of timber are exported to Asia,
Europe and North America.
49. The Panel also discovered during its investigation
that individual Ugandan loggers violated forestry
legislation, recognized by their ally RCD-M, by
logging (extracting) the timber directly. According to
the Congolese legislation on the permis de coupe, only
individual Congolese nationals are allowed to harvest
timber and only in small quantities. Foreigners must
apply for the larger concessions. Initially, Ugandans
operated in partnership with a Congolese permit holder.
Soon, the Ugandans began to pay the Congolese to
sub-lease the permit and, subsequently, to obtain the
licence in direct violation of the law.
50. Timber extraction in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and its export have been characterized by
unlawfulness and illegality. Besides extracting timber
without authorization in a sovereign country and in
violation of the local legislation, DARA-Forest
consistently exported its timber without any
certification procedure. It tried to approach some
certification bodies licensed by the Forest Stewardship
Council. These bodies requested documentation and
elements that the company failed to provide. Yet
DARA-Forest exported timber in violation of a normal
procedure generally required and accepted by the
international forest community and gradually
considered to be international "soft law". Companies
importing this uncertified timber from DARA-Foest
were essentially in major industrialized countries,
including Belgium, China, Denmark, Japan, Kenya,
Switzerland and the United States of America.
51. The Panel also realized that DARA Great Lakes
Industries (DGLI), of which DARA-Forest is a
subsidiary, along with a sister company in Uganda,
Nyota Wood Industries, is in collusion with the
Ministry of Water, Land and Forests of Uganda in
establishing a scheme to facilitate the certification of
timber coming from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In May 2000, DGLI signed a contract for forest
stewardship certification with SmartWood and the
Rogue Institute for Ecology and Economy in Oregon,
United States of America. On 21 March 2000, the
Director of the DARA group, Prossy Balaba, sent a
letter to the Commissioner asking him to allow an
official of SmartWood to visit certain forests, such as
Budongo and Bugoma; he was due to visit the region in
mid-April. The visit was meant to deceive the offiial
by presenting those forests as the ones for which
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certification was sought and to convince SmartWood to
work for the certification of their timber. Indeed, when
the visit took place, from 14 to 16 April, the DARA
group had not even applied for the concession of the
Budongo forest (Uganda). It was only on 5 July 2000
that John Kotiram of the DARA group wrote to the
Commissioner to request the concession on the
Budongo forest.
52. The idea behind this is to use Budongo forest as a
model of forests from which timber is harvested and
which comply with the international requirements for
certification, in order to certify timber coming from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo for which basic
elements of certification do not exist. Future plans for
beating the international system are already in place.
According to internal documents of DGLI, DARAForest
will import timber from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo into Uganda, which will be
processed for different types of products in the new
plant in Namanve for the sawmilling of hardwood, both
imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and harvested in Uganda. DGLI partners in this new
scheme include DARA Europe GmbH Germany,
Shanton President Wood Supply Co. Ltd China,
President Wood Supply Co. Ltd Thailand, DARA
Tropical Hardwood, Portland, Oregon, United States of
America. The distribution of sales of the company is
thought to remain the same, about 30 per cent to the
Far East, China, Japan and Singapore, 40 per cent to
Europe and 25 per cent to North America. DARA Great
Lakes Industries, shareholding and management is
between Thai and Ugandan nationals, among them
John Supit Kotiran and Prance Chanyuttasart of
Thailand and Prossy Balaba of Uganda. Some
unconfirmed information indicates that members of
President Museveni's family are shareholders of DGLI,
although more investigation is needed.
53. The DARA group also established another
scheme to carry out fraudulent activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The objects of
DGLI range from logging to financial and industrial
activities. Because of the confusion created between
DARA-Forest, which received a concession from RCD,
and DGLI, DARA-Forest has also been dealing in
diamonds, gold and coltan. The Panel has received
reports from the custom posts of Mpondwe, Kasindi
and Bundbujyo of the export from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo of minerals such as cassiterite
and coltan in trucks. During the Panel's visit to Bunia it
S/2001/357
was reported that other products were loaded in trucks
which are supposed to carry timber only; it is likely
that coltan and cassiterite were these products.
Moreover. the fraud extends to the forging of
documents and declarations "originating" in Kinshasa.
54. The logging rate was alarming around Butembo,
Beni, Boga and Mambassa. The RCD-ML
administration acknowledged its lack of control over
the rate of extraction, the collection of taxes on logging
activities and the customs fees at the exit points. On the
basis of eyewitness accounts, satellite images, key
actors' acknowledgements and the Panel's own
investigation, there is sufficient evidence to prove that
timber extraction is directly related to the Ugandan
presence in Orientate Province. This has reached
alarming proportions and Ugandans (civilians, soldiers
and companies) are extensively involved in these
activities. In May 2000, RCD-ML attributed a
concession of 100,000 hectares to DARA-Forest. Since
September 1998, overall DARA-Forest has been
exporting approximately 48,000 m3 of timber per year.
55. Other extraction schemes. Burundians and
Rwandans have also extracted timber or have been
associated with Congolese loggers. Roads to evacuate
timber from places deeper in the forest are in a very
bad state. Yet Congo timber, as it is referred to in
Bujumbura, is readily available in Burundi and
Rwanda. Some Burundians, however, are also involved
in the harvesting of bark from prunus Africana. This
tree is known and used in medicine for prostate
treatment. Statistics gathered from the Tanzanian Port
Authority clearly indicate that Burundi exported those
barks in 1998 and 1999. Prunus Africana is not found
in Burundi, however, but rather in the forests of South
Kivu.
56. Mining sector. In the mining sector, direct
extraction was carried out in three ways, namely (a) by
individual soldiers for their own benefit; (b) by locals
organized by Rwandan and Ugandan commanders; and
(c) by foreign nationals for the army or commanders'
benefit.
57. The Panel came across a number of cases in
which soldiers were directly involved in mining in
Watsa. In September 1999, the UPDF local commander
demanded the extraction of gold on the pillars of the
Gorumbwa mine galleries in which dynamite was used.
On 9 September, the galleries collapsed, leading to the
death of a number of Congolese miners. Some months
11
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later, Ugandan soldiers who came to mine in the same
area contracted respiratory disease. Other returning
UPDF soldiers have themselves told friends how they
operated in order to acquire the gold. From these
accounts, it appears that, even when the local
commanders were informed about these activities,
there was an acceptable level of tolerance. Although
the Panel qualifies this behaviour as passive complicity
on the part of some commanders, it is not clear whether
soldiers shared the acquired minerals with their allies.
58. Local Congolese have been mining for years for
their own benefit. The novelty of their involvement lies
in the fact that some of them were used as "convincible
labour" to mine gold, diamonds or coltan. In the Bondo
locality within Equateur Province, young men from 12
to 18 years were recruited by Jean-Pierre Bemba. The
Ugandan allies trained the recruits and shared with
them the idea that the Ugandan army was an "army of
development" that aimed at improving ordinary
people's living conditions. After the one-hour morning
physical training session, they were sent to gold mines
to dig on behalf of the Ugandans and Mr. Bemba.
According to eyewitnesses, in Kalima, RPA
commander Ruto enrolled two teams of local
Congolese to dig coltan; these Congolese worked under
the heavy guard of Rwandan soldiers.
59. In the Kilo-Moto mineral district, Ugandan local
commanders and some of the soldiers who guarded the
different entry points of the mining areas allowed and
encouraged the local population to mine. The
arrangement between the soldiers and the miners was
that each miner would leave at the entry/exit point one
gram of gold every day. A key informant of the Panel
indicated that on average 2,000 individuals mined this
large concession six days a week. This source,
confirmed by other sources, informed the Panel that it
was so well organized that the business ran smoothly.
On average 2 kg of gold are delivered daily to the
person heading the network.
60. The last pattern of organized extraction by the
occupying forces involves the import of manpower for
mining. Occupying forces brought manpower from
their own countries and provided the necessary security
and logistics. In particular, Rwanda utilized prisoners
to dig coltan in exchange for a sentence reduction and
limited cash to buy food. The Panel was recently
informed that there is a presence of 1,500 Rwandan
prisoners in the Numbi area of Kalehe. According to
the same report, these prisoners were seen mining
12
coltan while· guarded by RPA soldiers. Human Rights
Watch also reported the same information in March
2001. This recent report confirms numerous other
reports and eyewitness accounts of the involvement of
prisoners, some of whom are former refugees.
61. Impact on wildlife. Wildlife has also suffered a
great deal from the conflict. Numerous accounts and
statistics from regional conservation organizations
show that, in the area controlled by the Ugandan troops
and Sudanese rebels, nearly 4,000 out of 12,000
elephants were killed in the Garamba Park in northeastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo between
1995 and 1999. The situation in other parks and
reserves is equally grave, including Kahuzi-Biega Park,
the Okapi Reserve and Virunga Park. The number of
okapis, gorillas and elephants has dwindled to small
populations. In the Kahuzi-Biega Park, a zone
controlled by the Rwandans and RCD-Goma and rich
in coltan, only 2 out of 350 elephant families remained
in 2000. There is serious concern among
conservationists that the rest fled of their own accord
or were killed, as two tons of elephant tusks were
traced in the Bukavu area late in 2000. Already by
April 2000, about three tons of tusks were temporarily
seized by RCD-ML in lsiro. After strong pressure from
Uganda, the cargo was released and transferred to
Kampala.
62. The Panel has indications that, in most cases,
poaching of elephants in violation of international law
(Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)) was well
organized. Either soldiers hunted directly with the
consent of the commander or they provided equipment
and protection to local villagers to execute the task
with the objective of collecting elephant tusks. For
example, in August 2000, UPDF Colonel Mugeni and a
crew of his soldiers were discovered with 800 kg of
elephant tusks in their car near Garamba Park. The
Government of Uganda received detailed notification
of this incident. Eyewitnesses reported to the Panel
several incidents that involved Rwandan soldiers in the
trading of elephant and buffalo meat. In the Bukavu
and Goma areas, there appears to be a pattern: high
commanders take the tusks, soldiers negotiate the
wholesale price with some locals, and the locals sell
the meat in the market place as retailers.
63. Harvesting of coffee by non-owners has been
another feature of the exploitation of natural resources.
Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of MLC and now the
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President of the Front de liberation du Congo, a partner
in the coffee business with General Kazini, has been
harvesting coffee directly from plantations he does not
own. During our visit to Gbadolite, some locals
mentioned that coffee was harvested by Mr. Bemba's
men from some private plantations that belonged to
individuals who had fled the region.
64. Monopolies and price-fixing. In addition to
looting and extracting resources, rebels and Rwandan
and Ugandan troops have abused the commerce and
trade system. In some cases, they forced locally owned
and some foreign-owned businesses to close down. The
methods used varied from looting to harassing the
owners. The end objective was to gain control of local
commerce. The result is unprecedented control of the
economy of the eastern and north-eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. During its field visit, the Panel
noted that consumer goods and other merchandise
found in Gbadolite and Bunia originated mostly in
Uganda. During its field visit to Bunia, the Panel
members witnessed the unloading of beer crates from
an aircraft coming from Uganda. In Gbadolite, most
cigarettes, beverages, toilet paper etc. are imported
from Uganda. Equally, goods in Kisangani, Bukavu
and Goma come mainly from Burundi or Rwanda.
Imported goods for the occupied zones arrive via the
ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. This was
confirmed during the Panel's visit to the customs
services (Internal Revenue Authority) in Kampala.
Furthermore, depending on the importer of the goods,
taxes are not paid. The failure to pay taxes, especially
in Orientate Province, was acknowledged to the Panel
by RCD-ML during our discussions in Bunia in
October 2000.
65. Rwandan and Ugandan troops and their
Congolese allies have also been exploiting local
farmers. They have imposed prices and conditions on
the farmers. In one instance, a farmer living near the
Ubangi River, 20 km from Gbadolite, explained to a
member of the Panel how he is dependent on the coffee
dealers for the supply of the bags imposed by the
coffee collectors (buyers). Failure to use these bags
leads to an automatic reduction in the price of the
coffee. These bags are not produced in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo and they have to
buy them.
66. In another instance, one woman explained how
she and her husband could no longer sell their palm oil
to the neighbouring Central African Republic or ship it
S/2001/357
to Kinshasa for a better price. The control of trade and
other business networks for commercial crops, such as
coffee and palm oil, is almost total within the occupied
zones. This translates into a de facto monopoly like the
one Jean-Pierre Bemba has on coffee exports in
Equateur Province. The locals who desperately remain
in the villages work more for less, if anything at all.
Humanitarian organizations working in the occupied
zones told the Panel stories of a number of women in
some villages who have simply stopped taking their
children to the health centres because they no longer
possess simple items of clothing to preserve their
dignity.
67. Exploitation of resources becomes even more
questionable, as some ofthe players not only produce
counterfeited Congolese francs, but use them to
purchase natural resources. According to reliable
sources, the Victoria Group, whose key shareholder is
General Khaleb Akandwanaho, alias Salim Saleh, was
involved in the making of counterfeit Congolese
francs. These notes are used for the purchase of
commercial crops, primarily coffee. A very reliable
source told the Panel that in mid-1999 Jean-Pierre
Bemba ordered the production of 100-franc Congolese
notes. Simultaneously the Victoria Group also
produced counterfeit Congolese francs. By the end of
1999, Equateur Province was flooded with counterfeit
Congolese currency so that Mr. Bemba decided to
suspend all 100-franc notes, including the ones he had
produced, so as to stop inflation in the areas he
controlled.
68. The Panel has evidence that the illegal
exploitation of natural resources goes beyond mineral
and agricultural resources. It is actively occurring also
in respect of financial transactions, taxes and the use of
cheap labour, which our mandate qualified as other
forms of wealth. Local banks and insurance companies
operating in Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani, Bunia and
Gbadolite deal directly with Kigali or Kampala. A
system of tax collection - enforced in some cases -
has been implemented by MLC, RCD-ML and RCDGoma
with their established Ugandan and Rwandan
counterparts. In the rebels own words, these taxes are
aimed at "financing or supporting the war effort".
Indeed, part of the funds collected is sent to Kigali (in
the case of RCD-Goma). In the case of the former
RCD-ML and MLC, not only was part of the taxes sent
to Kampala but also individual colonels would claim
direct payment from RCD-ML. In Bunia and Bukavu,
13
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people protested, demonstrated and denounced this
practice of abuse. In areas controlled by Mr. Bemba,
peasants carrying palm oil on bicycles have to pay
taxes on the bicycles.
69. The use of child labour is also rampant in the
occupied territories. Some children are reportedly
mining gold in the Kilo Moto mines. In Equateur
Province, some children were seen in the diamond
mines. The Panel members witnessed the presence of
young MLC recruits at Gbadolite airport and in the
city. They were at the airport waiting for a flight,
having recently completed their military training.
70. The aforementioned demonstrates that the
procedures and processes for exploiting the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are
continuously evolving. Occupying forces began with
the easiest method, looting stockpiles. As the wells ran
dry, they developed efficient means of extracting the
additional resources necessary to keep the coffers full.
Eventually, any means necessary was recognized as a
legitimate mode of acquisition. From all the evidence
offered above, it appears that this process will continue
to evolve as is deemed necessary.
D. Current structures of illegal
exploitation
71. Administrative structures. The illegal
exploitation of natural resources is facilitated by the
administrative structures established by Uganda and
Rwanda. Those countries' leaders directly and
indirectly appointed regional governors or local
authorities or, more commonly, appointed or confirmed
Congolese in these positions. Typical examples are, on
the Ugandan side, the appointment of the Governor of
Ituri Province. On 18 June 1999, Ugandan General
Kazini appointed as Governor of this Province Adele
Lotsove, a Congolese who had already been employed
by the Mobutu and Kabila administrations. Information
gathered clearly indicates that she was instrumental in
the collection and transfer of funds from her assigned
administrative region to the Ugandan authorities in
1999. According to some sources, she also contributed
to the reallocation of land from Lendus to Hemas. On
the Rwandan side, according to one reliable source,
Rwandan authorities have helped secure the
appointment of Gertrude Kitembo as Governor of
Maniema.
14
72. Modes of transportation. Illegal activities have
benefited from the evolution of the means of
transportation in the region. Prior to the second war
most exchanges of goods and products were conducted
through road transportation. To a large extent,
smugglers utilized Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika to
smuggle goods and products to and from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and, in limited
circumstances, used aircraft. The shift over the past
four years has been noticeable. An increasing number
of aircraft are utilized to transport products and arms
into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while
transferring out vast quantities of agricultural products
and minerals, in particular to Kampala and Kigali. The
other novelty of increased air transport has been the
use of aircraft leased by the army for commercial and
non-military functions. Different categories of people,
including soldiers, journalists and traders, have told the
Panel about their journeys in aircraft alongside bags of
coffee and other non-military products.
73. This change in mode of transportation was
accompanied by a change in players as well as a
redefining of transportation companies. Traditional and
well-established companies such as TMK saw their
share of the market erode while others simply
disappeared (Air Cargo Zaire). At the same time, new
companies emerged and expanded, such as Air Navette
and Jambo Safari; they are owned or controlled by the
relatives and friends of generals, colonels and
Presidents. At the other end, outsiders who entered the
region with the AFDL ''conquest" of Kinshasa during
the first war, by transporting troops, remained and
consolidated their position; that is the case of Victor
Butt, a notorious arms dealer in the region. Most flights
to and from Equateur and drientale Provinces originate
from the Entebbe military airport. During a visit to
Kampala, the Panel was informed about the concern
expressed by the Ugandan Internal Revenue to the
Ministry of Defence. This complaint raised the issue of
revenue loss to the treasury due to the fact that
products entering or leaving the Democratic Republic
of the Congo by air to and from Entebbe military
airport are not checked, and taxes are not levied by the
customs services.
74. On the Ugandan side, three main private
companies are involved:
• Air Alexander, whose owner is Jovia
Akandwanaho, the wife of Salim Saleh and sisterin-
law of President Museveni. Her company
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mainly operated between Entebbe and Kisangani
before the last battle of Kisangani. According to
some sources, the company continues to operate
in the territory held by Ugandan troops.
• Air Navette has dealings with General Salim
Saleh and Jean-Pierre Bemba. The company flies
to Gbadolite, Gemena, Kisangani, Bunia and
Kampala. This company uses an Antonov 26 and
an Antonov 12.
• Uganda Air Cargo, which mainly deals with the
Ugandan Ministry of Defence. Previously, it was
using a C-130, but currently uses an llyushin 76
and an Antonov 12. This company flies to
Entebbe, Gemena, Basankasu, Isiro and Buta.
The Panel has indications that most private air
companies do not own the aircraft they use; the owners
are usually people like Victor Butt.
75. On the Rwandan side, a number of private
companies operate in the territory. These are:
• New Gomair, which flies to Kisangani-Goma and
Kigali. According to some sources, the wife of
the current Minister of Finances of Rwanda is a
shareholder.
• Air Navette flies to Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani
and Kigali. According to some sources, one of the
major shareholders, Modeste Makabuza, also
owner of Jambo Safari, is a known figure in the
entourage of President Kagame.
• Air Boyoma is a shuttle between Goma and
Lodja; according to some sources Mr. Ondekane,
former first Vice-President of RCD-Goma, is a
shareholder.
• Other companies, such as Compagnie aerienne
des Grands Lacs et Cargo fret international, Sun
Air Services and Kivu Air Services, operate in the
area.
76. CHents and other very reliable sources have
indicated that Sabena Cargo is transporting illegal
natural resources extracted from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Sabena Cargo is said to carry
coltan extracted from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo from Kigali airport to European destinations.
The Panel asked to meet with the management of
Sabena in Kampala and in Brussels, but no one was
made available to speak to the Panel members.
S/20011357
77. Financial network. All illegal activities in the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, primarily
the commercial and trade operations, utilize the
financial network to some extent. One of the
characteristics of this network bas been its ability to
quickly adapt to the new political and economic
environment. Cities like Kisangani and Goma were
already big trading centres for diamonds and consumer
goods. Most banks operating in the occupied zones
were already in operation in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo before the August 1998 war. Their
headquarters or corresponding banks were generally in
Kinshasa. With the occupation, headquarters and
corresponding banks tended to move to Kigali. Some
of these banks are:
• Union des banques congolaises. Although the
headquarters remains in Kinshasa, it has ongoing
operations in areas controlled by Rwanda.
• Banque commerciale du Congo. The headquarters
is in Kinshasa and it has branches in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Director
was transferred to Kigali in order to oversee
operations in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo. This bank is linked to the Belgolaise,
a Belgian bank consortium.
• Banque commerciale du Rwanda. The
headquarters is in Kigali, but it has operations in
Kisangani, Bukavu and Goma. The Government
of Rwanda is said to be one of the shareholders.
• Banque a la confiance d'or (BANCOR). One of
the newest banks in Kigali which started its
activities in I 995. It was family owned until 1999
but early in 2000 a businessman, Tibere Rujigiro,
purchased the bank at a very low price according
to various sources.
78. Special cases: BCDI and BCD. The Banque de
commerce, du developpement et d'industrie is the
newest bank, created in November 1996 and
headquartered in Kigali. Its involvement with the
Democratic Republic of the Congo dates back to the
beginning of the AFDL conquest of the former Zaire.
BCDI operated most AFDL financial transactions
before Laurent-Desire Kabila took power. The Panel
was told that its shareholders are essentially the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, COMIEX, Alfred Khalissa
and some Angolans. The real shareholders are the
allies, except Uganda. Some documents, receipts for
payments and authorization for payments made by
15
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S/2001/357
some large companies in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo between early and late 1997 clearly indicate
that payments are to be made through BCDI for the
contribution to "the war effort". When the late
President Kabila came to power, he created the Banque
de commerce et du developpement, which has the
peculiarity of having as shareholders Tristar, COMIEX
and Alfred Khalissa of BCDI. The Rwandan Patriotic
Front remains, through BCDI and Tristar, a shareholder
in BCD in spite of the war situation.
79. Other private companies. A number of
companies were created to facilitate illegal activities in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Others have
existed in the region for decades and joined the
bandwagon to pursue the obvious financial windfalls
involved in the exploitation of the country. On the
Ugandan, MLC and RCD-ML side, rebel leaders and/or
Ugandan military officials created new companies and
businesses using prete-noms. Most, if not all, of these
companies are privately owned by individuals or a
group of individuals.
80. Among the companies involved in the illicit
acquisition of natural resources in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Trinity and Victoria seem to be
the most interesting given their modus operandi,
activities and respective shareholders. Victoria Group
is chaired by Mr Khalil and its headquarters is in
Kampala. According to reliable sources, Mr. Khalil
deals directly with Mrs. Akandwanaho on diamond
issues. Mr. Khalil has two collaborators in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, based in Kisangani
and Gbadolite. Both are said to be from Lebanon, they
are Mohammed Gassan and Mr. Talal. During its visit
to Gbadolite, the Panel received confirmation of the
presence of one of them and his leading role in the
purchase of diamonds in the region. A reliable source
told members of the Panel that the Victoria Group
belongs jointly to Muhoozi Kainerugabe, son of
President Museveni, and Jovia and Khaleb
Akandwanaho. Victoria Group is involved in trading
diamonds, gold and coffee. The Group purchases these
mineral and agricultural products in Isiro, Bunia,
Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani. The company paid
taxes to MLC, but failed to do so with RCD-ML. When
counterfeit currencies (Congolese francs and United
States dollars) were found in areas where the company
buys the natural resources, fingers were pointed at the
Victoria Group. Other sources have confirmed to the
16
Panel the involvement of the Victoria Group in the
making of counterfeit currency.
81. Trinity is an equally interesting case. Ateenyi
Tibasima, second Vice-President of RCD-ML and now
the Commissaire general adjoint of FLC, was the
"manager" of the company. According to reliable
sources, Trinity is a fictitious company and a
conglomerate of various businesses owned by Salim
Saleh and his wife. Its primary purpose was to facilitate
their business activities in Orientate Province. To this
end, Mr. Tibasima granted a tax holiday to all Trinity
activities in the areas controlled by Uganda and
administered by RCD-ML in November I 999. Trinity
has imported various goods and merchandise and has
taken from Orientate Province gold, coffee and timber
without paying any tax. Different individuals,
Ugandans as well as Congolese, have taken the
opportunity created by the confusion over Trinity to
export from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (on
behalf of Trinity) various natural resources, also
without paying taxes.
82. On the Rwandan side, most companies with
important a.ctivities related to the natural resources of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo are owned
either by the Government or by individuals very close
to the inner circle of President Kagame. Rwanda
Metals, for example, is a company involved in coltan
dealing. It purchases coltan and exports it out of the
continent. The Panel has strong indications that RPF
controls Rwanda Metals. In mid-January 2001, some
very reliable sources met with the senior management
of Rwanda Metals in Kigali. During these discussions,
the Director told them that Rwanda Metals was a
private company with no relation to the army. He
further explained that he was expecting key partners
that very morning for discussions. As discussions
continued, the so-called. partners arrived as planned;
unfortunately they were in Rwandan army uniforms
and were top officers. This incident confirms accounts
from varit>Us sources indicating that Rwanda Metals is
controlled by RPF. Meanwhile there are also
indications that RPA is a shareholder of Grands Lacs
Metals, a company also dealing in coltan.
83. Jambo Safari is another company whose
emergence and growth has raised some eyebrows in
Goma and Bukavu. When the August 1998 war started,
Modeste Makabuza was buying oil from Kenya and
selling it in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Jambo Safari has benefited from an internal
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network of false receipts within RCD-Goma and RPA.
According to a very reliable source, Jambo Safari
would charge RCD-Goma for three times the quantities
of oil delivered and any attempt to question the figures
would be suppressed. In a rare ,attempt to clarify the
situation, some members of RCD-Goma during the last
General Assembly meeting, in June 2000, requested
that a commission be set up to conduct an internal
audit. Kigali agreed to send a colonel to conduct the
audit along with an RCD team. When the issue of false
receipts and overpayment · was established, Kigaii
recalled the colonel and suspended the inquiry. Some
·sources have confirmed the close ties between Mr.
.Makabuza, the apparent owner of Jambo Safari, an·d
President Kagame. Jambo Safari has diversified since
its original business venture, is now dealing in coffee,
recently purchased a fleet of new trucks and is also
involved in air transport with Air Navette.
84. Other minor companies also operate with the
protection of some local commanders. For example,
Etablissement Habier is involved in the.distribution of
oil and petrol in Goma and Bukavu. This company is
said to belong to Ernest Habimana, who is closely
linked to RPA, especially to Major Karasira and
Mr. Gakwerere. STIPAG, a company owed by Mr.
Mbugiye operating in collaboration with Major Kazura
(chief of security of the Rwandan Army in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Major Gatete,
is among those junior companies involved in coffee
and diamond dealing. Finally a myriad of small
companies was created and their shareholders are
invariably powerful individuals in the Rwandan
nomenklatura or in RCD structures. That is the case of
Grands Lacs Metals, where Majors Gatete, Dan and
Kazura are reportedly shareholders. In other cases,
foreign companies incorporate local potentates on their
board, as in the case of Gesellschaft fUr
Elektrometallurgie (GFE), with Karl Heinz Albers and
Emmanuel Kamanzi as partners, or MOM with Mr.
Makabuza.
85. The Panel, on the basis of the data, accounts and
documents received and analysed, came to the
conclusion that the systems of illegal exploitation
established by Ugandans and Rwandans differ from
each other. In the case of Uganda, individuals, mainly
top army commanders, using their hold over their
collaborators and some officials in rebel movements,
are exploiting the resources of the Democratic
S/2001/357
Republic of the Congo. However, this is known by the
political establishment in Kampala.
8(>. In the case of Rwanda, things are more systemic.
There are linkages and bridges between some key
companies, as in the case of Tristar and BCDI and,
above all, the relationship between RPA, RPF, BCDI,
Rwanda Metals, Grands Lacs Metals and Tristar. The
senior management of these companies seems to report
separately to the same people at the top of the pyramid.
On the other hand, all key managers have personal
relationships with different army commanders who
themselves report to the leadership. This pyramidal and
integrated structure coupled with the strict discipline of
the group has made the exploitation of the resources of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo more
systematic, efficient and organized. There is equally a
bridge between the internal Rwandan structures of
illegal exploitation and the RCD-Goma structures. The
Government of Rwanda made arrangements with RCDGoma
to drain resources from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. There is a case of loans made by BCDI
to RCD to pay suppliers whose business is related to
RPA. This "financial bridge" is statutory; indeed the
RCD statute indirectly recognizes the role of Rwanda
in overseeing the finances of the movement and its
participation in decision-making and control/audit of
finances.
E. Individual actors
87. The list that follows is not exhaustive, but the
Panel's choice was based on the crucial roles played by
these persons and their direct involvement in either
providing support, entertaining networks or facilitating
the exploitation of natural resources within the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. On the Ugandan
side, some familiar names surface frequently, such as
Major General Salim Saleh, Brigadier General James
Kazini, Colonel Tikamanyire, Jovia Akandwanaho,
Colonel Utafire, Colonel Mugeni, Mr. Khalil, Ateenyi
Tibasima, Mbusa Nyamwisi, Nahim Khanaffer, Roger
Lumbala, Jean-Yves Ollivier, Jean-Pierre Bemba,
Adele Lotsove, Abdu Rhaman and latecomers such as
Colonel Muyombo.
88. The Panel has selected to focus on three key
actors. First and second are Major General (retired)
Salim Saleh and his wife, Jovia Akandwanaho. Khaleb
Akandwanaho, alias Salim Saleh, and his spouse Jovia
are at the core of the illegal exploitation of natural
17
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S/2001/357
resources in areas controlled by Uganda. He is the
younger brother of President Museveni (very popular
in the army) and he pulls the strings of illegal activities
in areas controlled by Uganda and allies. James Kazini
is his executing arm and his right hand. He controls
and protects Mbusa Nyamwisi and Ateenyi Tibasima.
In return, they protect his commercial and business
interests in regions controlled by the former RCD-ML.
He used both the Victoria Group and Trinity for the
purchase and the commercialization of diamonds,
timber, coffee and gold. Very reliable sources have told
the Panel that behind Salim Saleh there is Jovia
Akandwanaho, who is more aggressive on the issue of
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. She is particularly interested in
diamonds. According to very reliable sources, she is at
the root of the Kisangani wars. She wanted control of
the Kisangani diamond market after having
confirmation from Mr. Khalil, "Director" of the
Victoria Group, that it was a good idea and that it was
feasible to control the Kisangani market.
89. The third is Brigadier General James Kazini,
former Chief of Staff of UPDF and former commander
of military operations in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. He is the master in . the field; the
orchestrater, organizer and manager of most illegal
activities related to the UPDF presence in north and
north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is
the right hand of Salim Saleh. He very much relies on
the established military network and former comrades
and collaborators, such as Colonels Tikamanyire and
Mugeni. He has been close to Messrs. Nyamwisi,
Tibasima and Lumbala and to Jean-Pierre Bemba, all of
whom have facilitated his illegal dealings in diamonds,
coltan, timber, counterfeit currency, gold and coffee,
and imports of goods and merchandise in Equateur and
Orientale Provinces. He is said to have a good
relationship with Mr. Baramoto, a former general of
President Mobutu. In spite of being discharged from
his responsibilities as commander of UPDF forces in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, his networks
remain in place. The Panel asked to meet with these
key actors, but the request was turned down.
90. Actors from Rwanda and RCD-Goma involved in
the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be separated
from the structure they serve. Most of these people
serve a system. The Panel has, however, noticed a
recurrence of some names or the particular role that
18
some individuals have played at a given time and for
some operations. In addition to the names mentioned in
the paragraphs on main companies, certain names can
be highlighted.
91. First, Ali Hussein, who plays a major role in
diamond and gold deals in Bukavu and Kisangani.
Those who have dealt with him in the past have
mentioned the presence of a Rwandan national during
commercial negotiations. There are indications that the
Rwandan citizen attending the meetings is a civil
servant working in the President's office in Kigali.
Second is Colonel James Kabarebe, who is the RPA
facilitator for some deals. According to some sources
he has been in contact with Victor Butt [or Bout] for
the lease of an Ilyushin 76 that served to carry coltan
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Kigali.
He is said to be a partner to Mohamed Ali Salem,
manager of the company Global Mineral. This
company is involved in coltan purchasing in Bukavu
and Goma. Third, Tibere Rujigiro, member of RPF,
who is considered to be one of the main money
providers to the party during the 1990-1994 war. He is
a major shareholder in Tristar Investment, a company
equally close to RPF. He is said to be also involved in
the tobacco business.
92. The fourth, Aziza Kulsum Gulamali, is a unique
case among key actors in the illegal exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Mrs. Gulamali is said to hold several passports.
She lives in Bukavu, Brussels or Nairobi, depending on
her schedule. Mrs. Gulamali has acknowledged having
been involved in the past in the Burundi civil war.
According to reliable sources she armed and financed
the Hutu rebels of FDD in Burundi. Yet she built new
alliances with the Government of Rwanda and has
become a major ally of the Kigali regime and RCDGoma.
Mrs. Gulamali is involved in gold, coltan and
cassiterite dealings in territories controlled by the
Rwandans. Prior to that, she was involved in arms
trafficking for the benefit of the Burundian Hutus and
was equally involved in gold and ivory trafficking. Her
name was also mentioned in connection with cigarette
smuggling. Very reliable sources told the Panel that she
covered her illegal dealings by her cigarette factory,
now in bankruptcy. In the coltan business, her clients
include Starck, Cogecom and Sogem; the Bank
Bruxelles Lambert handles some of her financial
transactions. The Panel requested RCD-Goma several
times for a meeting with Mrs. Gulamali and also
- 475 -
contacted her aides, but she never arranged a meeting
with the Panel.
93. She was recently appointed by RCD-Goma as
General Manager of SOMIGL, a conglomerate of four
partners, which obtained the monopoly for the
commercialization and export of coltan. This monopoly
has strengthened her position as a major player in the
trade in coltan in the region. RCD-Goma, in an attempt
to explain this partnership, said that she is a very useful
person and would bring $1 million to RCD monthly.
Some sources have told the Panel members that her
network of contacts is impressive and that she controls
almost every official in RCD-Goma. According to
some sources, sh is .also involved with her daughter
Djamila in counterfeiting currency. Mrs. Gulamali is
famous for forging customs declarations, especially for
the products she exports. Confronted recently with a
false customs declaration w}:lere coltan was declared as
cassiterite, she replied, "in this business everybody
does that". Her declaration alerted the Panel to the
extent to which fraud is prevalent among the
companies that export coltan.
F. Economic data: confirmation of the
illegal exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
94. All the empirical evidence provided above is
complemented by the economic analysis of data
provided by different sources.
Uganda
95. At the request of the Panel, the Ugandan
authorities provided extensive data, including
production and export values for agricultural products
such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. In terms of
minerals, the data also cover gold and coltan
production and export figures.
96. The official data contain substantial
discrepancies. First, export figures for gold are
consistently greater than production values, as shown
in table I and figure I.
97. The gap between production and export could
originate from the exploitation of the natural resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Central
Bank of Uganda has reportedly acknowledged to IMF
S/2()()1/357
officials that the volume of Ugandan gold exports does
not reflect this country's production levels but rather
that some exports might be "leaking over the borders"
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
central bank reported that, by September 1997, Uganda
had exported gold valued at $105 million, compared
with $60 million in 1996 and $23 million in 1995.
98. Second, the data from the Ugandan authorities are
silent with regard to diamond production and export.
Several third party sources (WTO, World Federation of
Diamond Bourses, Diamond High Council) indicate
diamond exports from Uganda during the last three
years. These diamond exports are suspicious for many
reasons:
(a) Uganda has no known diamond production;
(b) Diamond exports from Uganda are observed
only in the last few years, coinciding surprisingly with
the occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo as shown in table 2 and figure 2;
(c) Finally, these facts corroborate the Panel's
findings from field investigation, discussions and
external observers on the need to control the rich
diamond zone near Kisangani and Banalia.
99. These figures are understated and there are
indications that Uganda exported more diamonds.
However, this is not well captured in the statistics
because of the loose regulations governing the free
zone areas. These regulations permit diamonds
originating in any country to be repackaged, and then
to be sold from any country as diamonds from a
country of origin that is not necessarily the one
mentioned in the statistics.
19
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S/2001/357
Table 1
Uganda: mineral exports and production, 1994-2000
Year Gold 71n Co/Ian Cobalt
A. Mineral exports (tons)
1994 0.22
1995 3.09
1996 5.01 3.55
1997 6.82 4.43 2.57
1998 5.03 18.57
1999 11.45 69.5 67.48
2000 10.83 275.98
B. Mineral production (tons)
1994 0.0016 3.704 0.435
1995 0.0015 4.289 1.824
1996 0.003 0.38
1997 0.0064 1.81
1998 0.0082 1.102
1999 0.0047 76.74
2000 0.0044 287.51
Source: Uganda, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 2000 data are from January to
October.
Figure 1. Uganda: gold production and exports, 1994-2000
14
12
10
8
!
4
2
0
111114 1995 1996 1997 1998 111118 2000
Year
20
- 477 -
Table 2
Uganda: rough diamond exports, 1997-
0ctober 2000
Volume Value
Year (carats) (United States dollars)
1997 1 511.34 198 302
1998 11 303.86 I 440 OOO
1999 11 024.46 1813 500
2000 9 387.51 I 263 385
Source: Diamond High Council.
I 00. Data collected from any third party consistently
show that Uganda has become a diamond exporting
country; they also show that diamond exports from
Uganda coincide with the years of the wars in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, that is from 1997
onward.
l O I. As far as niobium is concerned, the pattern
appears to be the same: no production prior to 1997
followed by a seriies of increases in exports as shown in
table 3 and figure 3.
Table 3
Uganda: niobium exports, 1995-1999
(thousands of United States dollars)
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Source: World Trade Organization (aggregated data).
Niobium
0
0
13
580
782
102. T hird, the Ugandan authorities, in their response
to the Panel's questionnaire, stated that there was no
record of transit of mineral products. However, the
Panel received information from one Ugandan customs
post at the border between the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Uganda. Records for 1998, 1999 and
2000 reveal that mineral products as well as other
commodities left the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and entered Uganda (presumably this would
also prove true for the other dozen or so points of
entry). The following three examples show an increase
S/20011357
in the transboundary movement of natural resources
between 1998 and 1999.
Coffee
Timber
1998: 144,911 bags
1999: 170,079 bags
2000: 208,000 bags
1998: 1,900 m3
1999: 3,782 m3 and 46,299 pcs
2000: 3,272 m3 and 3,722 pcs
Cassiterite* 1998: None
1999: 30 kgs
2000: 151 drums
• The sudden increase in the import of cassiterite may
also mean an increase in the import of coltan. The Panel
discovered that cassiterite is often listed in lieu of
coltan, as coltan possesses a higher value, which
implies high import taxes in Uganda.
Rwanda
103. In response to the request for statistics by the
Panel, the Rwandan authorities provided the following
data:
Table 4
Rwanda: mineral production, 1995-2000
Gold Cassiterite Co/tan
Year (kg) (tons) (tons)
1995 247 54
1996 I 330 97
1997 10 327 224
1998 17 330 224
1999 10 309 122
2000 10 437 83
Source: Rwanda Official Statistics (No. 227/01/10/MIN).
21
- 478 -
S/2001/357
Figure 2. Uganda: rough diamond exports, by volume, 1997-0ctober 2000
12000
10000
8000
6000 !•Volume!
4000
1997 1998 1999 2000
22
- 479 -
800
700
600
500
300
200
100
S/20011357
Figure 3. Uganda: niobium exports by volume, 1995-1999
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
•us Dollars
(thousands)
23
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- 481 -
S/2001/357
104. The Rwandan authorities also underline the fact and pending deals give clear indications of their
that "Rwanda has no production of diamond, cobalt, potential impact on the balance of payments.
zinc, manganese, and uranium". However, in spite of
this statement, there is substantial evidence that
Rwanda has been exporting diamonds. In fact, several
organizations such as WTO and the High Diamond
Council, and Belgian statistics, have computed import
data for selected commodities and provide support for
the fact that Rwanda has been exporting diamonds (see
table 5 and figure 5). Production figures display some
irregular patterns for gold and coltan starting from
1997 (see figures 4.A and B). It is revealing that the
increase in production of these two minerals appeared
to happen while AFDL, backed by Rwandan troops,
was taking over power in Kinshasa.
Table 5
Rwanda: rough diamond exports, 1997-
0ctober 2000
l 07. The economic and resource-based analysis above,
by using the figures given by the respective
Governments, reveals that Uganda and Rwanda have
been exporting diamonds, and that this activity is
hidden and does not appear in the statistics they
disseminate. They do not produce diamonds, nor do
they officially export this mineral. It is probable that
these minerals are coming from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and would constitute the basis
for the re-exportation economy.
l 08. Regarding the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, mineral production and export display a
declining trend, imputable partly to the occupation of
the eastern side of the country. However, the
deterioration of the ural infrastructure represents a
limiting factor for mining as well as for agricultural
activities. -----------------------
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
Source: Diamond High Council.
Volume Value
(corals) (Uniled States dollars)
13 060.39 720 425
166.07 16 606
2 500.83 439 347
30 491.22 1 788 036
105. Burundi. An IMF office memorandum indicates
that "Burundi does not produce gold, diamonds,
columbo-tantalite, copper, cobalt, or basic metals".
Burundi however has been exporting minerals it does
not produce. As in the case of Uganda and Rwanda,
Burundi's export of diamonds dates from 1998,
coinciding with the occupation of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The coltan exports
span a longer period ( 1995-1999), perhaps suggesting
that this might be a regular activity.
106. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Only third
party sources were used to determine whether
production and export trends in these countries
displayed abnormalities. Av ailable production and
export statistics relative to Angola, Namibia and
Zimbabwe were fairly normal in terms of trend. They
did not reveal any suspicious behaviour. Additional
data are however needed for a definite stand on the
issue. In the case of Zimbabwe, accounts of ongoing
25
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S/20-01/357
26
Figure 5. Rwanda: rough diamond exports, by volume, 1997-0ctober 2000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
1997 1998 1999 2000
!•Volume!
- 483 -
m. Links between the exploitation of
natural resources and the
continuation of the conflict
109. The following sections explore the links between
the exploitation of natural resources and the
continuation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The sections are interrelated, but
separated for clarity. The first section outlines the
countries' budget allocations for their respective armed
forces versus the actual expenditures. It will be
demonstrated that military expenditures far outweigh
the supposed money allocated for such expenses. The
subsequent section will explore in depth the means by
which these countries find the necessary additional
financial resources to continue the war. 4 The panel
finds a link between the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the continuation of the conflict.
A. Budgets compared to military
expenditures
Rwanda
110. Rwanda spends about 3 per cent of its GDP or 29
per cent of its annual budget on its defence needs. In
the current fiscal year, $70 million was allocated to
defence in the .national budget. These official figures
provided by the Minister of Finance comprise every
single expense of the army, including, soldiers' pay and
bonuses and the maintenance and acquisition of new
military equipment.
S/20011357
112. An aircraft owner operating in the region has
indicated that he charges on average $2,000 per hour.
Based on his experience of three rotations per day in a
smaller area, the Panel estimates five rot.ations for
Rwanda at an average of six hours each. A simple
calculation gives a figure of $1.8 million per month
and $21.6 million per year.
113. Based on the minimum number of 25,000 soldiers
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and an
average $100 for pay and bonuses, the Panel has
calculated a total of $2.5 million per month and
$30 million per year. Transportation and pay of troops
alone in the Democratic Republic of the Congo amount
to $51.6 million per year, which is about three quarters
of the total Rwandan official defence budget. By taking
into consideration the remaining 20,000 soldiers
stationed in Rwanda and their average pay of $50 per
month, almost the total defence budget ($63 million) is
used on two items. RPA soldiers in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo have other basic needs,
however, such as ammunition for even their light
equipment, and maintenance and replacement of the
equipment.
114. All military experts consulted suggested that the
official defence budget of Rwanda cannot alone cover
the cost of their war and presence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Panel concurs with
President Kagame, wh described the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo as "a self-financing
war".
Uganda
115. Uganda officially spends about 2 per cent of its
111. Military specialists with a great deal of GDP on defence, which is being monitored by the
experience in the region agreed on the fa ct that Bretton Woods institutions. For the fiscal year 2000,
Rwandan soldiers use light equipment, so that expenses the defence budget was about $11 O million. This
on equipment have for a long time been limited. They budget covers pay of about $70 per month for 50,000
also recognize that, given the size of the Democratic soldiers, 10,000 of whom are stationed in the
Republic of the Congo and the portion of the territory Democratic Republic of the Congo, pays for the
under Rwandan control, there is a minimum number of. pension of retired soldiers, buys equipment and
soldiers needed to cover this area, which could be addresses other needs.
estimated at 25,000 soldiers on average during the
period of the conflict. Moreover, the use of aircraft for
the transport of troops and some types of equipment
and supplies may be costly.
• The number of soldiers has fluctuated during the period
of the war; the numbers used are therefore average
estimates.
116. According to various sources, UPDF has on
average l 0,000 soldiers in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo out of the 50,000 total. Indeed, the budget
line for pay alone for a year is about $41 million for
the 50,000 Ugandan soldiers. If a bonus of $20 is paid
to each of the 10,000 soldiers, that would amount to
27
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S/2001/357
$200,000 per month (in 1998 and 1999), a total of
$2.4 million per year.
117. On the basis of a rate of $2,000 per hour and six
hours on average for a return journey and three
rotations a day, UPDF spends on average $12.96
mi1Jion per year on transportation alone. Other
expenses for purchase, maintenance and replacement of
equipment are important. According to some sources,
Uganda spent about $126 million on its armed forces in
1999, an overspending of about $16 million.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
118. Of all the warring parties, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo presented the greatest challenge
as far as defence budget figures and number of troops
were concerned. Lack of reliable data and the barely
existent State apparatus have made the collection of
data very difficult. The country has been at war since
1996 and prior to that the anny was already
disintegrating. Various military experts that the Panel
members met agree on one point: the extreme difficulty
of giving an estimate of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo army. Those who try to give an estimate speak
of 50,000 to 55,000 soldiers.
119. According to some government sources, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo relies on Chinese
and Eastern European companies to supply its military
arsenal and required equipment. The Panel has strong
indications that the Government, despite its economic
problems, has invested a great deal in the defence of its
territory.
Zimbabwe
120. Zimbabwe's overall defence budget has been
decreasing at the very moment ZDF has· troops engaged
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A reduction
was announced early in January 2000, lowering the
budget from 2$ 15.3 billion in 2000 to 2$ 13.3 billion
in 2001. Yet, ZDF with approximately 10,000 troops
engaged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
spent on average about $3 million per month, a total of
$36 million in a year.
Angola and Namibia
12 l. Angola's presence is smaller than Zimbabwe's in
terms of troops. According to some sources, Angolan
troops number about 3,000. Namibia's presence is
limited to 2,000 troops. The defence budget of
28
N$ 24 million has remained at the same level since
1999 in spite of the support given to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, the emergency or
additional budget for the armed forces has decreased
from N$ 89 million in 1999 to NS 76 million in 2001.
Rebels
122. The rebel movements MLC, RCD-Goma and
RCD-ML have their own troops. MLC troops are
evaluated at 12,000 to 15,000 men. They usually use
light military equipment bought from Kampala. In
some cases, deals are done between Jean-Pierre Bemba
and other traders and businessmen. These deals consist
of giving them the opportunities to carry out business
activities or granting a mining concession, in exchange
for which the beneficiary would supply some military
items. In 1999, when Mr. Khalil demanded of Mr.
Bemba a concession for a diamond mine, he obtained a
concession in exchange for military fatigues and socks,
all made in Uganda.
123. The pay of these soldiers is unknown. The Panel
gathered however that these young men were not paid,
but could receive from time to time some money as
"help". The consequence has been their involvement in
the exploitation of natural resources. The cost of war
appears to be minimal. The war expenses are the
purchase of ammunition and light weapons, transport
of soldiers by air and the money MLC paid to UPDF
and individual top officers for their support. A similar
scenario was played out with RCD-ML, which has
approximately 3,000 soldiers.
124. The RCD-Goma troops are estimated to be
around 12,000 to 15,000. According to some sources,
the Rwandan army until recently used to supply the
RCD-Goma troops with military equipment. The
military budget was not offered to the Panel in spite of
its request, and the estimates are very difficult to make.
Military equipment and the transport of troops as well
as supplies of oil and petrol are the major expenses.
Pay is appa.rently uncertain, so that the soldiers when
possible try to survive, even at the expense of the local
population and the wildlife. For all parties involved in
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
this war seems to be expensive by African standards.
The question is: how do the different parties finance
their war effort?
- 485 -
B. Financing the war
125. There are three primary means of financing this
war: (a) purchase of arms and equipment through direct
payment; (b) barter (arms for mining concession ); and
(c) creation of joint ventures. The economies of
Rwanda and Uganda, unlike those of Angola and
Namibia, have to varying extents financially benefited
from the conflict. Zimbabwe is a special case given the
potential of concessions attributed to Zimbabwean
companies. Data received from various sources,
including the countries involved in the conflict, OECD
and the Bretton Woods institutions, demonstrate that in
broad terms the mineral production of those three
countries has decreased. However there are some
interesting peaks between 1997 and 1999 (see sect. 11.F
above). Isolated and varied examples of how these
countries finance their military presence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo are given below.
Rwanda
126. Rwanda's military appears to be benefiting
directly from the conflict. Indeed, the Panel has noted a
great integration between the military apparatus, the
State (civil) bureaucracy and the business community.
RPA finances its war in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in five ways: (a) direct commercial activites;
(b) profit from shares it holds in some companies;
(c) direct payments from RCD-Goma; (d) taxes
collected by the "Congo desk" and other payments
made by individuals for the protection RPA provides
for their businesses; and (e) direct uptake by the
soldiers from the land.
127. Since 1998, the Department of External
Relations, through the Congo desk has been receiving
substantial amounts of money from various comptoirs.
Several diamond comptoirs were operating in
Kisangani before the monopoly was given to two in
July 2000. According to very reliable sources, taxes
were paid directly to the Congo desk. On average, a
comptoir with a turnover of $4 million per month
would pay $200,000 per month to the Congo desk.
Every diamond dealer who intends to purchase
diamonds in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo or at Kigali would pay 5 per cent of the
diamond value to the Congo desk before the
transaction. This amount is consistent with the
so-called mandatory 5 per cent of the value of
purchased diamonds that the Congo desk takes from
S/2001/357
the two comptoirs controlling the Kisangani diamond
market. Messrs. Nassour and Arslanian, the "conflict
diamond dealers" in the eastern Democratic Republic
of the Congo, provided on average $2 million per year,
each directly to the Congo desk. A similar percentage
is applied for other mineral resources in the area
controlled by RCD-Goma.
128. Before July 2000, monopoly holders used to pay
the sum of $200,000 per month in its entirety to Kigali;
this has changed slightly since RCD-Goma claimed its
share. The larger diamond comptoirs would therefore
pay SI 00,000 to the Congo desk and $100,000 to the
RCD-Goma authority. The Panel believes that over a
period of two years the Congo desk would have
received about $4 million as direct payment for
granting the authorization to operate in the areas under
its control.
129. Some documents point to a direct implication of
the Rwandan Patriotic Army in commercial activities.
As mentioned earlier, RPA, through the companies
Rwanda Metals and Grands Lacs Metals, has big stakes
in the coltan business. Most of the coltan extracted by
civilians and prisoners is sold to intermediaries
(civilians or soldiers) who in turn sell it to comptoirs,
some of which are controlled by the Rwandan military.
The quasi-totality of this coltan is sent to Kigali, and
generally stored in facilities owned by the Government.
A good portion goes to Rwanda Metals and the rest is
exported directly by some professionals. Rwanda
Metals and Grands Lacs Metals, directly or through
Congo desk, contact clients on the availability of
coltan. Some of the letters sent to potential clients in
Europe and the United States of America are signed
Dan, who was the head of the Congo desk.
130. Given the substantial increase in the price of
coltan between late 1999 and late 2000, a period during
which the world supply was decreasing while the
demand was increasing, a kilo of coltan of average
grade was estimated at $200. According to the
estimates of professionals, the Rwandan army through
Rwanda Metals was exporting at least 100 tons per
month. The Panel estimates that the Rwandan army
could have made $20 million per month, simply by
selling the coltan that, on average, intermediaries buy
from the small dealers at about $10 per kg. According
to experts and dealers, at the highest estimates of all
related costs (purchase and transport of the minerals),
RPA must have made at least $250 million over a
period of 18 months. This is substantial enough to
29
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S/2001/357
finance the war. Here lies the vicious circle of the war.
Coltan has permitted the Rwandan army to sustain its
presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
army has provided protection and security to the
individuals and companies extracting the mineral.
These have made money which is shared with the
army, which in turn continues to provide the enabling
environment to continue the exploitation. The last
illustration of how Rwanda finances its war deals with
the financial transactions involving Rwandan banks,
RPA suppliers and RCD institutions. In these particular
cases, Rwanda has used BCDI and SONEX to pay RPA
suppliers.
131. SONEX was founded in March 1999 in Kigali. It
belonged to RCD-Goma and was managed by
Emmanuel Kamanzi, former chief of the Finance
Department of RCD-Goma. Its primary purpose was to
serve as the commercial and financial arm of RCD,
handling most commercial and financial deals. SONEX
was dissolved late in 2000, but it had sufficient time to
put in place a pattern for the transfer of resources from
RCD to Kigali. The Panel received documents
highlighting the financial transactions of SONEX and
BCDI. According to those documents, BCDI released
$1 million in mid-1999 for SONEX as a loan to pay
fuel bills to Jambo Safari. SONEX was to repay this
loan with the money obtained from the selling of coltan
and cassiterite. By February 2000, $200,000 to
$300,000 had already been reimbursed to BCDI. This
loan seems to be part of the financial transaction by
which money is transferred to Kigali, and some
individuals in RCD take their own substantial cut.
132. The same year, SONEX requested another loan of
$10 million from BCDI in Kigali, and $5 million was
approved. According to one of the actors at the time,
the $5 million loan was not physically paid to SONEX.
Instead, BCDI ordered Citibank in New York to pay
RCD suppliers with the loans technically given to
SONEX. This financial arrangement is suspicious in
many ways.
133. First, RPF through Tristar is a shareholder in
BCDI. Second, the suppliers of RCD are mostly
Rwandan companies whose owners are closely
acquainted with RPA or RPF. Third, the deal with
SONEX is handled by Major Dan, at the Congo desk,
who is related by marriage to Mr. Kamanzi, head of the
Finance Department and mastermind of the whole
operation.
30
134. The BCDI loans to SONEX could be well-crafted
operations to transfer money from BCDI to RPA and to
pay RPA suppliers by using SONEX. Paying RPA
suppliers is one way of financing the war without
taking from the official budget. Reliable sources report
that about $700,000 has already been paid back by
RCD. According to a RCD-Goma document explicitly
detailing how debts should be repaid with money made
out of the coltan sale, part of the $1 million per month
in taxes that Mrs. Gulamali pays to RCD for the
monopoly on coltan could also be used to pay back the
BCDI loan.
Uganda
135. Uganda unlike Rwanda did not set up an
extrabudgetary system to finance its presence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The regular
defence budget is used and broadly the deficit is
handled by the treasury. However, the Ugandan
economy benefited from the conflict through the reexportation
economy. In tum, the treasury benefited
and this allowed an increase in the defence budget.
136. The re-exportation economy implies that natural
resources imported from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo are repackaged or sealed as Ugandan natural
resources or products and re-exported. That is the case
for some gold, diamonds, coltan and coffee exported by
Uganda. The re-exportation economy has had a
tremendous impact on the financing of the war, in three
ways.
137. First, it has increased the incomes of key
businessmen, traders and other dealers. In the coffee
sector, gains have been substantial for the traders in
Kampala and Bujumbura. According to an expert in the
sector who lives in the region, there is a trick used by
coffee exporters in the region. Arabica coffee produced
in Bujumbura is of a higher grade than the one
produced in Kivu. The difference in price could be in
some cases one third. Burundian dealers by importing
Congolese coffee and mixing it, then presenting it as
Burundian coffee, gain a higher price. The Ugandan
traders use the same schemes. In the case of Uganda,
the dealers gain both ways. The trader buys
inexpensive coffee in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, often with counterfeit currency, eventually
mixes it with Uganda coffee, and then re-exports this
coffee as Ugandan robusta, which is of better quality
than Congolese robusta.
- 487 -
138. Second, the illegal exploitation of gold in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo brought a
significant improvement in the balance of payments of
Uganda. This in turn gave multilateral donors,
especially IMF, which was monitoring the Ugandan
treasury situation, more confidence in the Ugandan
economy. Third, it has brought more money to the
treasury through various taxes on goods, services and
international trade. Discussions with the Deputy
Commissioner of the Ugandan Revenue Authority
revealed that the tax collection level has increased
dramatically over the past five years. IMF figures on
Ugandan fiscal operations confirm this positive
evolution over the past three years. A detailed analysis
of the structure and the evolution of the fiscal
operations reveals that some sectors have done better
than others, and most of those tend to be related to the
agricultural and forestry sector in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Logs, sawn wood or planks
destined for Uganda, Kenya or for export out of the
continent pay customs duties as they enter Uganda.
139. Between 1998 and 2000, about 1,800 trucks
carrying logs, timber, coffee, medicinal barks,
cassiterite, pyrochlore, iron ore, tea and quinina have
transited through Uganda. The official figures from the
Government of Uganda show an average of 600 lorries
per year, all registered by customs officers. As Mrs.
Lotsove once noted, the tax exoneration given to the
Victoria and Trinity companies represents a net loss of
$5 million per month (there are 15 points of entry). The
Panel concludes that, given the absence of the
exoneration on the Ugandan side, and a higher level of
taxes in Uganda, customs duties related to the
transiting of Congolese natural resources exploited by
Ugandans and some Congolese in Equateur and
Orientale Provinces would bring the treasury at least
$5 million every month.
140. Another way of financing the presence of the
army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was to
purchase military supplies on credit. The Ugandan
army has purchased petrol on credit from a number of
private companies. The accruing debt is treated as
internal debt.
141. The Panel also gathered that the local
commanders of UPDF turn a blind eye to soldiers'
racketeering among the populations or their
involvement in small business. This is seen as a way to
pay their bonuses and this has proved to be a very
successful method. Information received from friends
S/2001/357
and relatives of UPDF soldiers who served in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo clearly shows that
there were elements of self-payment much more
satisfactory that the official bonus. Overall, the
military, its leaders and other involved individuals
manage to manipulate budgetary and other factors to
retain their control in the occupied territories.
142. The Ugandan situation can be summarized as
follows: the re-exportation economy has helped
increase tax revenues, allowing the treasury to have
more cash. Businesses related to the conflict and
managed by Ugandans have contributed to an extent to
generate activities in the economy in a sector such as
mining (gold and diamonds). The growth in these
sectors has had a trickle-down effect on the economy
and permitted Uganda to improve its GDP in 1998 and
maintain it somewhat in 1999.s The improvement in
GDP has permitted, according to Ugandan officials, an
increase in absolute terms of the military budget while
keeping the level of the military budget at the agreed 2
per cent of GDP. The apparent strength of the Ugandan
economy has given more confidence to investors and
bilateral and multilateral donors who, by maintaining
their level of cooperation and assistance to Uganda,
gave the Government room to spend more on security
matters while other sectors, such as education, health
and governance, are being taken care of by the bilateral
and mul tilateral aid.
MLC, RCD-Goma and RCD-ML
143. Officially, the rebel movements receive the bulk
of their military equipment through UPDF and RPA.
During discussions with the Ugandan Minister of
Defence and the Chief of Staff of UPDF, the Panel was
informed that weapons seized from the Congolese
armed forces are usually given to MLC and RCD-ML.
According to other sources, some military equipment is
acquired by these groups through direct purchase and
barter. The Panel came across a very interesting case in
which Mr. Bemba, at the instigation of General Kazini,
bargained with the highest authorities of Uganda for
the release of some Ukrainian pilots whose Antonov
has been captured. A very reliable source told the Panel
that in exchange Mr. Bemba received military fatigues,
boots and medical supplies for his soldiers from a third
party.
s Uganda's GDP has been increasing since the early
1990s. However, a slight decrease was noted in 1999.
31
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S/2001/357
144. RCD-Goma has designed a fiscal system based
mainly on the mining sector. About six different forms
of tax exist in this sector, and they are applied on
approximately eight different types of minerals
including the most important (coltan, gold and
diamonds). From RCD official statistics the Panel
notes that in 1999 on average 60 kg of gold was
extracted every month from the area controlled by
RCD. That is about 720 kg a year. In 2000, the
extraction was higher, up to I 00 kg a month. With
regard to coltan, 27 tons were extracted every month in
1999, while 29 tons were produced every month in
2000. Givn the number of comptoirs ( 19 for col tan),
and the six types of tax, the Panel concludes that
substantial revenues through tax collection are
available to RCD. It is however difficult to estimate the
figures, although some insiders have told the Panel that
the financial situation has been improving since late
2000, and the prospects for a balanced budget are
better than two years ago. Information obtained from
documents and individuals suggests that, in addition to
taxes levied and shares it holds in SOMIGL, RCDGoma
has given a monopoly of coltan to SOMIGL, in
exchange for which it receives $1 million monthly.
145. Illustration of the commercial activities of
RCD. A preponderance of information obtained from
documents and individuals regarding the activities of
RCD-Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, and
elsewhere during the current hostilities
overwhelmingly suggests that RCD-Goma and others
arc marketing the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo - gold, diamonds and
timber - through Dar es Salaam. Gold and diamonds
belonging to RCD-Goma are shipped through their
financial and logistical network, via Dar es Salaam, for
sale on the international market. In order to facilitate
the movement of the commodities and to give the
appearance of legitimacy, RCD-Goma obtains
documents to hide or cover their ownership. The
documents covering the shipments of gold and
diamonds are completed forms of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The forms indicate issuance
from a government organization, complete with the
required stamps and signatures indicating approval and
issuance in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. RCD-Goma's
represetatives in Dar es Salaam coordinate the receipt,
forwardmg and sale of gold and diamond shipments.
The gold shipments transit through Dar es Salaam
international airport for sale to buyers in Sri Lanka and
32
elsewhere. The diamond shipments are held at the
Bank of Tanzania before being forwarded to Belgium,
the Netherlands and South Africa.
146. The gold and diamonds are being sold by RCDGoma
in exchange for cash or bartered for armaments
and medicines to support continuation of the current
hostilities. RCD-Goma's representatives in Dar es
Salaam also arrange for the purchase of foodstuffs and
ther logistical needs for the war effort. In addition,
timber resources from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo are being shipped through Dar es Salaam to
Greece and Belgium. In the case of Greece, the timber
ansaction is .being partially arranged by an
import/export business located in Goma. The
shipments of gold, diamonds and timber are also
processed in Dar es Salaam in cooperation with RCD
representatives by a company believed to be a covert
business entity created for the purpose of facilitating
support for the financial and logistical operations of
RCD-Goma. It is important to note that the activities
described above represent an RCD-Goma operation and
are exclusive of operations handled by the Government
of Rwanda, via Kigali.
147. The Panel concludes on this point that the major
rebel groups are gradually becoming autonomous
(MLC/FLC and RCD-Goma) in terms of supply of
military equipment. They are capable of raising
subtantial amounts of cash, enough to buy the light
eq1pment they use. Equally they have put in place
their own network and contacts, which would allow
the.m to pu.rchase their own equipment when necessary.
This growmg autonomy has manifested itself recently
as RCD-Goma has requested that money usually given
to the Congo desk by diamond dealers be shared
q.ually between both entities. Equally, RCD-Goma has
mtiated some military attacks on RCD-ML positions
m order to occupy mineral-rich areas as shown earlier.
As the need for an autonomou supply of weapons
grows, so does the need to find additional resources,
and therefore clashes for the control of mineral-rich
areas will be recurrent; so goes the vicious circle of
war and exploitation of natural resources on the side of
the rebellion.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
148. The Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo has relied on its minerals and mining
industries to finance the war. Between 1998 and early
2001, the strategy for financing the war was based on
- 489 -
three pillars, namely (a) search for cash through the
attribution of monopolies; (b) direct and indirect
uptake of funds from parastatals and other private
companies; and (c) creation of joint ventures between
parastatals and foreign companies in countries allied
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
149. Search for cash. The late President used
different schemes to raise funds. He instituted the tax
parafiscale (see para. 41) and also implemented
schemes such as the creation of a monopoly for the
commercialization of diamonds.
150. Monopoly on diamonds granted to
International Diamond Industries (IDI). According
to government sources, the objective of this monopoly
was twofold: first, to have fast and fresh money that
could be used for the purchase of needed arms, and
address some of the pending problems with the allies.
Second, to have access to Israeli military equipment
and intelligence given the special ties that the Director
of International Diamond Industries, Dan Gertler, has
with some generals in the Israeli army.
151. This deal turned out to be a nightmare for the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and a disaster for the local diamond trade as well as an
embarrassment for the Republic of the Congo, which is
currently flirting with illicit diamonds. According to
different sources, IDI paid only $3 million instead of
$20 million and never supplied military equipment.
152. President Joseph Kabila has expressed
willingness to liberalize the diamond trade in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and IMF and the
World Bank are very supportive of this move. IDI is,
however, threatening to sue the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The IDI deal also
turns out to be a disaster for the local diamond trade.
As the monopoly was granted to IDI, most diamond
dealers operating in the Government-controlled area
crossed to Brazzaville to sell their diamonds. It is
estimated that during the first three months of the
monopoly, $60 million worth of diamonds from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo were sold on the
international market, and the Republic of the Congo
was mentioned as the country of origin. This
smuggling of diamonds deprived the already ailing
economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of
substantial sums of money and the treasury of
substantial tax revenues. This case shows that the
desperate need for quick cash to finance the defence of
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its territory has instead brought other problems to the
Government and has paradoxically deprived the
treasury of substantial revenue.
153. Uptaking money from parastatals. Another way
of financing the war has been the direct and indirect
uptake of money from parastatals and other private
companies, mainly the Societe miniere de Bakwanga
and the . Generale des carrieres et des mines
(Gecamines). The Government has claimed from
MIBA since August 1998 on average two fifths of their
earnings. The Panel was told that in some cases three
fifths, the equivalent of $4 million per sale, was sent to
the President's office. The Panel has also confirmation
that oil companies gave important sums of money as
taxes parafiscales to the Government. In most cases,
this cash in Congolese francs was delivered to Victor
Mpoyo, who then reported to the late President Kabila.
This money was used for the salary and bonuses of
Congolese soldiers in the battlefield. According to
some Congolese officials, the taxes parafiscales were
never used for the purchase of weapons.
154. MIBA receives from the Government the
equivalent of two fifths of its sales of diamonds in
Congolese francs changed at the official rate, which is
only one quarter of the black market rate. It is believed
that about 75 Congolese francs for each dollar changed
is unaccounted for and possibly used for defence
needs.6
155. The contribution of Gecamines to the war effort
appears to be on two levels. On the one hand, one third
of the company's profit was taken directly by the
Government in 1999 and in 2000. On the other, the
Government contributed indirectly to the expenses of
the Zimbabwe Defence Forces between May 1999 and
October 2000.
A special case: Zimbabwe
156. Zimbabwe has financed its involvement in the
conflict in two different ways: (a) by using the defence
budget - the bulk of Zimbabwe's military expenses
seem to be covered by the regular budget; (b) by
indirect financing of the war through direct payment by
some Congolese entities, mainly companies. According
to two very reliable sources, during the tenure of Billy
Rautenbach money from Gecamines paid bonuses to
the Zimbabwean soldiers. These payments might be
6 In 2000, the official exchange rate was one dollar for 23
Congolese francs.
33
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S/2001/357
linked to the contract between the Government and
Ridgepoint. Indeed, part of the rights to e,cploit
Gecamines mines was transferred to Ridgepoint
without apparent compensation. According to some
sources, the compensation, which is not mentioned in
the contract, could be the sharing of profits between the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Ridgepoint, on the basis of 80 per cent for the
Government and 20 per cent for Ridgepoint. According
to some sources, curiously, Mr. Mpoyo, the Congolese
minister, signed the contract as one of the officials of
Ridgepoint rather than signing on behalf of the
Government. Two months after the contract of Mr.
Rautenbach as Director of Gecamines came to an end,
discontent among Zimbabwean soldiers in Katanga
over their lack of bonuses was reported.
157. The Panel has, !however, noted a practice which is
neither the financing of war nor the provision of direct
assistance. The practice is qualified in this report as
"incentives for assistance". The former Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo often used the
potential of its vast resources in the Katanga and Kasai
regions to secure the assistance of some allies or to
cover some of the expenses that they might incur
during their participation in the war. Among all of its
allies, Zimbabwean companies and some decision
makers have benefited most from this scheme. The
following examples illustrate how different schemes
were implemented and benefited the decision makers,
the very group of officials who can decide about ZDF
assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The most utilized scheme has been the creation of joint
ventures.
158. Joint ventures. One way of securing the
engagement of some allies in the war has been the
provision of financial incentives by way of creating
business opportunities in the mining sector. At least
three features emerged from the scheme:
(a) Zimbabwean companies received interesting mining
concessions; (b) Zimbabwean companies using their
influence with the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo developed business partnerships
with private companies and parastatals; and (c) in turn,
received preferential treatment for their businesses.
159. Sengamines: example of a joint venture. The
Panel gathered that, late in 1998, a private
Zimbabwean company, Operation Sovereign
Legitimacy (OSLEG), whose shareholders are
Lieutenant General Vitalis Musungwa Zvinavashe, Job
34
Whabira, former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry
of Defence, Onesimo Mciyo, President of Minerals
Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, and Isaiah
Ruzengwe, General Manager of Zimbabwe Mining
Development Corporation, got into a partnership with
COMIEX; COSLEG was· born of this partnership.
Through COSLEG, Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF) could
exploit and market minerals, timber and other
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
160. Reliable sources told the Panel that a
Zimbabwean delegation headed by the then Minister of
Justice, Emmerson Munangagwa, visited the Kasai
region to see the various mining concessions given by
the late President Kabila to ZDF as barter payment for
its military support. The team was composed of the
former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
Defence, Moven Mahachi; the Chief of the Armed
Forces, General Zvinavashe; and the President of
MIBA, Kadende Muya. President Kabila's gift to the
Zimbabwean military was causing a problem, however,
as they did not have the financial and technical
expertise to exploit their mining concessions. Late in
1998, Thamer AI Shanfari, Chairman of Oryx Natural
Resources, was asked to provide the needed financial
and technical expertise. Mr. Al Shanfari decided to
create Oryx Zimcon, Ltd., a joint venture between
Oryx Natural Resources and COS LEG.
161. Instead of selecting one of the various mines
belonging to COSLEG to start its investment, Oryx
Zimcon wanted the best mines which initially belonged
to MIBA. At the request of ZDF and on the advice of
Victor Mpoyo and Mwenze Kongolo,7 the late
President Kabila transferred two of MIBA's richest
concessions - the kimberlite deposits in Ts hibua and
the alluvial deposits in the Senga Senga River, to Oryx
Zimcon. Oryx Zimcon and COSLEG together created
Sengamines.
162. As promised, Mr. Al Shanfari started investing in
Sengamines and used the Breco group of companies of
John Bredenkamp to transport mining equipment to the
mines. As the technical anQ financial partner, Oryx was
to receive 40 per cent, OSLEG 40 per cent and
COSLEG 20 per cent. As· the need for money grew,
7 According to some sources, Mwenze Kongolo is involed
in most COMIEX dealings. Most importantly, it is said
to the main bridge between Zimbabwean officials such
as the influential Emmerson Munangagwa and the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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Mr. Al Shanfari decided to launch Oryx on London's
Alternative Investment Market under the name Oryx
Diamonds. Upon strong objections from various
stakeholders, Oryx Diamonds was withdrawn from the
market. The new statute of the company does not
mention the name OSLEG.s The Panel was informed,
however, that the increase in the shares of COMIEX as
seen in the new statute was meant to preserve the
interests of Zimbabweans. The Panel was also told that
payment would be made to the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo only after the loan
taken for this operation (about $25 million) was repaid.
163. The ease with which the Tshibua and Senga
Senga River concessions were given to Oryx without
due regard for the legal requirements and the
preferential treatment given to Oryx show the
determination of the former Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to reward some of
its allies.
Attribution of concessions
164. According to some sources, a very recent (26
February 200 I) concession of cobalt and copper in
Kambove-Kakanda was to be given KMC Group of the
Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach. According to very
reliable sources, different ministers had signed the
concession two days before the assassination of the late
President Kabila and only his signature was missing.
The trade unionist of Gecamines has indicated that the
cession was completed, but President Joseph Kabila
told the Panel that the deal has not been signed yet. If it
is signed, there could be a rapprochement of activities.
165. This case shows rapprochement of the activities
and interests of some Zimbabwean businessmen, and a
possible link between arms dealing and mining
activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Indeed Mr. Bredenkamp is said to have an interest in
this venture, although he was alleged to be an arms
dealer. In November 2000, a month after the departure
of Mr. Rautenbach from Gecamines, Mr. Bredenkamp
is said to have established a direct link with Mr.
Rautenbach. According to three reliable sources, Mr.
Rautenbach, Mr. Bredenkamp and Mr. Munangwana,
the current Speaker of the House of Zimbabwe,
Chairman of ZANU-PF and director of many
s The distribution of shares is a follows: Oryx 49 per cent,
COMIEX 33 per cent, MIBA 16 per cent and Congolese
partners 3 per cent.
S/2001/3S7
companies belonging to ZANU-PF, met with the late
President Kabila to negotiate this contract of the
central part of the Gecamines concessions. The Panel
does not draw any conclusions, but wishes to highlight
the quality of the people involved in the negotiations,
their past records, current activities and position in
Zimbabwe.
166. Many other deals are ongoing such as the one
concerning the supply of foodstuffs to the Congolese
army, for which General Zvinavashe's company is said
to have been attributed the transport. President Robert
Mugabe once told interlocutors that the late President
Kabila had given him a mine concession.
167. The Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, in its effort to defend its territory and
secure the supply of military equipment, has signed a
contract worth several million United States dollars
with the Government of China. Official sources in
Kinshasa, while confirming this deal, have informed
the Panel that in exchange a mining concession was
awarded to a joint venture between a Chinese company
and a parastatal of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
168. In the same vein, the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has made a deal
with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
which trains troops of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and in exchange, it is believed, has received a
mining concession around Shinkolobwe, very rich in
uranium. The Americans in the past extracted uranium
from this mine. Challenged on this issue, officials of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo mentioned high
radioactivity in the area, making it impossible for
anyone to work there.
169. According to some officials, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo has asked the United States of
America to consider addressing the problem of
radioactivity in the area, given their historical presence
in mining that particular area for uranium. The official
denial of a deal between the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea was based on the fact that the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has sought United
States assistance - which it cannot receive if the
Koreans are mining the same area.
170. The Panel has enough elements and evidence to
suggest that the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo under the late President Kabila,
35
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S/2001/357
gave strong incentives in the form of access,
exploitation and management of mineral resources.
These incentives in tum have "convinced" the
Zimbabwean authorities to remain engaged in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The incentives
have, however, been so important that the whole
balance of the mining industries is likely to be affected.
The question in the region is which course of action
will sidelined companies take in the future to guarantee
their presence in the mining sector? Will it be another
cycle of war or intensification of war in relation to the
securing of access to the rich cobalt and copper area of
the Democratic Repu\blic of the Congo?
Angola and Namibia
171. These two countries have financed their
participation in the conflict with their regular defence
budget. In the case of Angola, some deals, minor
compared to those of Zimbabwe, have been signed,
such as the creation of Sonangol, in which Sonangol
Angola has 60 per cent of shares and COMIEX 40 per
cent. Sonangol Angola is a 100 per cent State-owned
company (Sonangol supplies oil to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo). The two countries have also
signed a letter of intent to jointly exploit crude oil off
their coast when peace returns to the region.
172. In the case of Namibia, the Panel was informed
by the Namibian authorities of the existence of a joint
venture between a Namibian company called August
26, whose main shareholder is the Ministry of Defence,
an American company and a "company" of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other deals
involving individuals have been signed. At this point,
the Panel has not found substantial evidence that
Angola and Namibia have signed commercial deals in
the nature of "arms and support for natural resources".
Their motivation seems to be solely political and
strategic (for Angola). According to very reliable
sources, joint ventures proposed to these two countries
were a sign of gratitude rather than an incentive for
their support and they never pressed for it.
C. Special features of the links between
the exploitation of natural resources
and the continuation of the conflict
173. It is often said that the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is low-intensity warfare, as
36
armies do not confront each other on a daily basis and
battles or rather serious battles are not frequent. The
Panel noted that the conflict, especially in occupied
zones, is fought on three levels:
(a) Government forces and the allies versus the
rebels and their Ugandan-Rwandan and Burundian
allies;
(b) RCD-Goma and its Rwandan allies versus
MLC or RCD-ML and their Ugandan allies;
(c) Rebel movements and their allies (Rwanda
or Uganda versus the so-called negative forces:
Interahamwe, MaY-MaY and other dissident groups).
174. Indeed, the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo is being fought on two fronts, official and
unofficial. The official front is that of classic
warfare - two or more armies confronting each other.
This front goes from Pweto to Mbandaka on an uneven
line crossing various localities. The unofficial front is
concentrated inside zones controlled by rebels and their
Ugandan and Rwandan allies.
175. The analysis of battles and skirmishes recorded
from mid-1999 to 2001 shows that:
(a) Overall, the number of battles on the official
front with the engagement of the army is lower than the
number of skirmishes, about 96 between 1999 and
2001;
(b) The number of battles has been decreasing
over the years. In the first quarter of 200 I, only eight
confrontations were reported on the official front line;
(c) Current big battles have been fought in
areas of major economic importance, towards the
cobalt- and copper-rich area of Katanga and the
diamond area of Mbuji May i. Military specialists argue
that the Rwandan objective is to capture these mineralrich
areas to deprive the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo of the financial sources of its
war effort. Without the control of this area, the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
cannot sustain the war. This rationale confirms that the
availability of natural resources and their exploitation
permits the continuation of the war. This may be true
for all the parties. In view of the current experience of
the illegal exploitation of the resources of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo by Rwanda and
Uganda, it could also be thought that the capturing of
this mineral-rich area would lead to the exploitation of
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those resources. In that case, control of those areas by
Rwanda could be seen primarily as an economic and
financial objective rather than a security objective for
the Rwandan borders.
176. The number of skirmishes between rebel forces
and their allies, and the armed group Mar-Mar has
increased. From May to December 2000, about 177
clashes were reported. The battlefields are generally
around coltan- and diamond-mining or coltan-rich
areas. The Panel has strong indications that most of the
fights between Rwandan soldiers and Mar-Mar have
occurred in the so-called "coltan belt". Some areas
experienced up to I O skirmishes in 2000. According to
some sources, numerous reports and accounts of
eyewitnesses mention the presence of Rwandan and
Ugandan soldiers providing security around coltan and
diamond mines. Officials of RCD-Goma have
confirmed the risk posed by the Mar-Mar and "negative
forces" in those areas. A senior RCD official specified
that only very well organized entities with the
necessary security infrastructure can carry out the
exploitation of coltan in those areas. In this particular
case, the Rwand!an army is the only institution with that
capability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
177. Rwanda's "unusual" tactics. The Rwandan
forces will attack the same area for two days then pull
back. According to our sources, these attacks seem to
coincide with the period when coltan has been
extracted and put in bags for evacuation by the MarMar.
Attacked, the Mar-Mar abandon their coltan,
which is then taken away by small aircraft. The
Rwandan soldiers retreat again waiting for the next
information on available coltan. In the areas where
their grip is weaker, Rwanda in particular has designed
strategies to retain control within certain echelons of
the existing local hierarchies. In those areas controlled
by the Interahamwe and MaY-Mar forces, either RPA,
from time to time, mounts military operations that
allow it to capture the areas temporarily and evacuate
the coltan, or else middlemen are used for the purchase
of col tan from the Mar-Mar and "negative forces".
I 78. Battles between rebel movements are also
reported in areas rich in mines. On 18 November 2000,
RCD-Goma and its Rwandan allied troops based in
Kisangani attacked positions of MLC in Bengamisa, 50
km north-west of Kisangani, and took control of this
rich diamond area. On 31 December 2000, RCD-Goma
and its allies launched an attack on the area controlled
S/2001/357
by RCD-ML and captured Kandole, an area rich in
diamonds and with some coltan. Also late in December
2000, RCD-Goma initiated an attack from Lindi to
conquer Lakutu, another diamond-rich area.
I 79. Finally, in areas where the risks are too high,
adversaries, if not enemies, become partners in
business. That is the case of the Mar-Mar doing
business with RPA civilian coltan dealers, who in turn
sell to comptoirs controlled by Rwandans and their
companies Grands Lacs Metals and Rwanda Metals.
The most famous case was when the Mar-Mar chief,
General Padiri, informed people in Kigali in November
2000 that he was selling 60 tons of coltan.
180. Strategies to sustain the vicious circle of war
and exploitation: the example of Uganda. Top UPDF
commanders have essentially used the Hema/Lendu
conflict. The Panel bas received very reliable
information clearly showing how General Kazini and
Colonels Kyakabale and Arocha assisted in training
different Hema militia, and manipulated those groups
to fight each other. Reports clearly showed that while
the Kazini camp· was helping with the training of the
Hemas, the Colonel Peter Karim camp was assisting in
training the Lendus. Both camps belonging to UPDF.
There are strong indications that some UPDF elements
may spark violence so as to remain in the region in an
attempt to control the gold-rich area and the potentially
coltan-rich areas ofNyaleki. There is, therefore, a clear
intent of the military commanders to control these
mineral-rich areas and keep them for long-term
exploitation. The Nia-Nia confrontation in October
2000, in which UPDF General Kazini and Roger
Lumbala fought another UPDF group and RCD-ML is
a variation of the fighting inside UPDF for control of
coltan-rich areas. According to different sources, Roger
Lumbala, of RCD-national, has been used by General
Kazini to control the Bafwasende area, rich in
diamonds and coltan.
D. Facilitators or passive accomplices?
181. The link between the continuation of the conflict
and the exploitation of natural resources would have
not been possible if some entities, not parties in the
conflict, had not played a key role, willingly or not.
Bilateral and multilateral donors and certain
neighbouring and distant countries have passively
facilitated the exploitation of the resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
37
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S/2001/357
continuation of the conflict; the role of private
companies and individuals has also been vital.
182. The Panel has gathered information showing that
linkages between different actors and stakeholders are
very well structured to the point that Governments and
large reputable companies operate in confidence. In the
case of coltan, all the needed documentation for its
export is provided in Kigali, but there are accomplices
in Kinshasa in the Ministry of Mines. The importing
companies and their facilitators are aware of the real
origin of the coltan. however. According to manifests
that the Panel received, Sabena Cargo as well as SDV
of the Bollore group have been among the key
companies in thiis chain of exploitation and
continuation of war. Thousands of tons of coltan from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo were carried
from Kigali or through the port of Dar es Salaam.
183. The Panel also has indications of the direct and
indirect involvement of some staff of tlie embassies and
cooperation agencies of developed .countries. They
have facilitated the purchase of illegal minerals. The
United States honorary consul in Bukavu, as he
presented himself, Ramnik 0. Kotecha, in addition to
promoting deals between American companies and
coltan dealers in the region, is himself Chairman of the
Kotecha group of companies based in Bukavu and
deals in coltan.
184. On the basis of the facts and their analysis, the
Panel reaches the conclusion that the increase in
revenues of the Rwandan army from coltan sales was
made easy by three key factors:
(a) The passive role of some private companies
such as Sabena and SDV for the transport of coltan,
Citibank for the financial transaction as the
corresponding bank of BCDI, the self-proclaimed
United States honorary consul in Bukavu and some
staff in various embassies in Kigali;
(b) The rush to profit of some foreign
companies that were ready to do business regardless of
elements of unlawfulness and irregularities (see
annex I for a sample of companies);
(c) The political legitimization provided by
some developed countries. In November 2000 in
Kigali, the Panel was told that the illegal exploitation
of resources and the financial gains of RPA were
justified as the repayment for the security that Rwanda
provides.
38
Bilateral donors
185. The main bilateral donors to Rwanda and Uganda
have been the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Denmark, Germany and the United
States of America in various sectors. The analysis of
their cooperation shows that sectors benefiting from
this assistance are related to poverty, education and
governance. Priority sectors have been water and
sanitation, health and governance, including
institutional reforms, justice and human rights,
especially for Rwanda. In some cases, direct aid to the
budget is provided. The balance of payments of
Rwanda shows that budget support has steadily
increased, from $26.1 million in 1997 to $51.5 in I 999.
While such support is legitimate, the problem is that
expenditures and services which were supposed to be
provided and covered by the Governments of Rwanda
and Uganda and which are covered by the bilateral aid
constitute savings in the national budget. Were these
savings used to finance this war?
186. The German Ambassador in Kigali told the Panel
about German support to German business dealing in
pyrochlore and coltan in the occupied Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In this particular case, German
cooperation has given a preferential loan of DM
500,000 to Karl Heinz Albers, a German citizen, to
expand his coltan business in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (SOMIKIVU) and Mr. Albers's business
is guarded by RCD-Goma soldiers.
Multilateral donors
187. The World Bank has praised Uganda for its
economic performance and the reforms under the
structural adjustment programme as a success story and
has promoted its case for the new debt relief
programme, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
initiative.
188. The Panel has however indications that this
economic performance was driven in part, especially
over the past three years, by the exploitation of the
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Notes exchanged between World Bank staff clearly
show that the Bank was informed about a significant
increase in gold and diamond exports from a country
that produces very little of these minerals or exports
quantities of gold that it could not produce (see para.
97). Internal discussions of the World Bank staff also
confirm this knowledge of the situation: in one of those
- 495 -
internal exchanges, a staff member warned his
colleague that the World Bank silence would blow up
in the Bank's face.
189. In the case of Uganda and its exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the World Bank never questioned the
increasing exports of resources and in one instance a
staff member even defended it. During the Panel's visit
to Uganda, the representative of the Bank dismissed
any involvement of Uganda in the exploitation of those
resources. The Bank not only encouraged Uganda and
Rwanda indirectly by defending their case, but equally
gave the impression of rewarding them by proposing
these countries for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
debt relief initiative.
190. The Bank's shadow on the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is even more
apparent on the budget. The balance of payments of
both Uganda and Rwanda shows a significant increase
in long-term borrowing in support of the budget. The
defence budget however has increased in absolute
terms, allowing Uganda and Rwanda ,to continue the
conflict. There seems to be a precedent for the Bank's
behaviour. During the Cambodian crisis in the 1980s,
the Bank turned a blind eye to the illicit exploitation of
Cambodian timber; the question is whether it is World
Bank policy to ignore broad governance issues (hard or
soft) while dealing with its clients.
Transit countries
191. Countries in the region have indirectly and
passively facilitated the cycle of exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the continuation of the conflict. This has
usually happened without any intent to cover up or
protect some interests. That is particularly the case of
countries with seaports. Those countries have served as
the hub for the export of natural resources. They were
bound by regulations and agreements signed within the
framework of subregional organizations such as
COMESA for the seaports of Mombasa and Dar es
Salaam and UDEAC/CEMAC for the port of Douala.
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam were the main ports used
by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi to export some
natural resources, such as timber, cassiterite, coffee and
various barks. Douala seaport was also used for coffee
from Equateur Province and transported from Bangui.
S/20011357
192. According to some sources, the Government of
the Central African Republic was aware of the
commercial activities of MLC in Bangui. Jean-Pierre
Bemba 's friends, · Jean-Yves Ollivier, Jean-Pierre
Dupont and Jean-Pierre Saber, have all used Bangui as
the arriere-base for their diamond and coffee deals.
The Government never prevented MLC from using the
Central African Republic for economic activities. In
addition, some individuals were using the territory of
the Central African Republic to carry out their illegal
activities, as was the case with Victor Butt, who used
Bangui airport to load and offload coffee and arms.
193. According to some sources, some countries in the
region have been very attractive to Rwandan families
with an acceptable level of wealth. Army salaries
cannot sustain such lucrative properties and standards
of living. How do they sustain these families? Where
did the money come from?
194. Kenya has played a different role in the
exploitation of the resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. It has been the base for the
supply of counterfeit United States dollars and also the
venue of financial transactions of various traders who
export their resources (timber, coffee and tobacco)
through the port of Mombasa.
The pivotal role of leaders
195. Th(s section aims to show how Presidents and
other decision makers tolerate, organize or put in place
the framework and conditions to maintain the status
quo of exploitation and war. The Panel refrains from
making allegations about the personal involvement of
Presidents in the illegal and financial activities until
further investigation is carried out. For instance, the
Panel received but dismissed, for lack of evidence,
allegations of the involvement of President Kagame's
family in diamond dealing; it focused rather on the
objective elements of the President's political
responsibility. In some reports and accounts, the name
of President Museveni was mentioned as a shareholder
in a specific company. The Panel refrains from citing
these accounts until further research is conducted.
196. President Paul Kagame. His position in the
State apparatus with regard to the exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the continuation of the war has evolved, yet
his role has remained pivotal. This role can be situated
on three levels: his relations with the Rwandan
39
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S/2001/357
business community operating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, control over the army, and the
structures involved in the illegal activities.
197. According to some reliable sources, President
Kagame has close relationships with top Rwandan
businessmen. For instance, he maintains good relations
with Modeste Makabuza, "owner" of Jambo Safari. He
is also close to Alfred Khalissa, the "founder" of BCDI
and former manager of BCD. The same sources told
the Panel that President Kagame is very close to Tibere
Rujigiro, who is known for generous financial support
to RPF during the 1990-1994 war. Mr. Rujigiro is one
of the shareholders of Tristar Investment, with very
close ties to RPF. This close aide to President Kagame
has business relationships with Faustin Mbundu, who
is known for his arms dealing activities. What all these
businessmen have in common is their direct
involvement in the exploitation of natural resources in
the areas that Rwanda controls. Different sources have
told the Panel that each of these businessmen has at a
certain point benefited from the President's "help".
198. President Kagame, when he was Minister of
Defence, reorganized or approved the reorganization of
the Rwandan army and the Ministry of Defence, which
subsequently led to the creation of the Department of
External Relations in which the Congo desk is located.
This unit has been the cornerstone of the financial
transactions of RPA. The former Minister of Defence
should have been aware of the functioning of RPA as
well as the daily operations of the army.
199. Two very reliable sources told the Panel that in
September 1998 the then Vice-President, during a
meeting with various officials of RCD · and RPA top
commanders, informed the participants that there was a
need to raise $50 million to make it possible to reach
Kinshasa in two months.
200. Finally, when faced with the question of the
involvement of RPA in the exploitation of the resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the President
announced in a radio interview that private Rwandan
citizens were carrying out commercial activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Was this a
deliberate act to mislead various partners or was it
translating the President's lack of information on the
issue? Meanwhile, the President has admitted in the
past that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo was self-financing. All these elements
combined suggest the President's degree of knowledge
40
of the situation, his implicit approval of the
continuation of the illegal exploitation of the resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and somehow
his complicity as well as his political and moral
responsibility.
201. President Yoweri Museveni. President Yoweri
Museveni's role in the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the continuation of the war can be situated at the
following levels: his policy towards the rebel
movements, his attitude towards the army and the
protection provided to illegal activities and their
perpetrators.
202. He has shaped the rebellion in the area controlled
by Uganda according to his own political philosophy
and agenda. He opted for a more decentralized
authority and only intervenes when major problems
arise, but he has a very good knowledge of the
situation on the ground.
203. Messrs. Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasima, former
first and second Vice-Presidents close to General Salim
Saleh and General Kazini, are more inclined to
business and the extraction of natural resources. In
December 1999, a report was handed over to the
President of Uganda, specifically pointing out the
embezzlement of $10 million by Mr. Nyamwisi and
$3 million by Mr. Tibasima. Another report was handed
to President Museveni in February 2000, specifically
denouncing the collusion between Trinity Group and
Mr. Tibasima and the impact on the collection of
customs duties. President Museveni chose to give the
direction of the Congolese Liberation Front to those
who are the accomplices of illegal cartels.
204. President Museveni was also informed of the
situation on the ground, the exploitation being carried
out and the involvement of officials of MLC and RCDML,
includin.g the conflict between Hemas and Lendus.
205. The President's family has also been very
involved in business in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in the occupied zones. General Salim Saleh and
his wife, shareholders in Victoria and Trinity, have
confidently carried out their activities undisturbed.
206. The Panel concludes that when the information is
passed to the President and he chooses not to act, when
he appoints the very people who carry out criminal
activities, and when his family members get away with
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criminal activities, it becomes overwhelming that the
President has put himself in the position of accomplice.
207. The late President LaurentDesire Kabila. His
role in the continuation of the war has survived his
death. On three levels, he bears part of the
responsibility for the current situation. First, as the
chief of AFDL, he created a precedent in giving a
character of "legality" or legitimacy to otherwise
illegal operations. During his advance on Kinshasa, he
granted concessions even though he did not have
authority to do so. These are the same methods being
used by some armed groups to fight for power.
208. Second, he allowed and tolerated some unlawful
ventures as a way of rewarding allies. He also initiated
the barter system in order to defend his territory. This
is gradually becoming the normal practice for the rebel
groups.
209. Third, he offered a good excuse and a pretext to
those who had carefully planned the redrawing of the
regional map to redistribute wealth. Many sources have
told the Panel how they were approached and asked to
think about the distribution of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in terms of their
personal enrichment.
210. According to the facts, accounts and information
gathered, the pivotal roles of the Ugandan and
Rwandan leaders reside in the way in which they
diverted the primary mission of their armies from
protection of their territory and made them armies of
business. By the same token, they indirectly created
within their armies conditions for top officers to put in
place networks that they controlled. These networks
are becoming cartels, which will take over the war for
natural resources.
211. Presidents Kagame and Museveni are on the
verge of becoming the godfathers of the illegal
exploitation of natural resources and the continuation
of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. They have indirectly given criminal cartels a
unique opportunity to organize and operate in this
fragile and sensitive region. Finally, the attitude of the
late President has possibly planted the seeds for
another round of war for resources in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Politicians such as Jean-Pierre
Bemba, Mwenze Kongolo, Victor Mpoyo, Adolphe
Onusumba, Jean-Pierre Ondekane and Emmanuel
Kamanzi are ready to make any deal for the sake of
power or for personal enrichment. Companies such as
S/2001/357
IDI and Sengamines some of which reportedly have
ties with arms dealers, are likely to create a more
troubling situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Equally, joint ventures and concessions given
to some allies as rewards may cause some problems
given the nature of the shareholders who are either
armed forces or powerful and influential politicians.
The situation is now deeply embedded and the regional
power structures are consequently not stable.
212. The link between the exploitation of natural
resources and the continuation of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo does exist, and it is
based on five factors which are not mutually exclusive.
First, the capacity of countries to use their own
resources to sustain the war up to a certain stage, as in
the case of Angola. Second, the ability of countries to
take resources from enemies and use it to fight the socalled
"self-sustahiing'; war; as in the case of Rwanda.
Third, the intent of some Governments to take
advantage of the war situation and use it to transfer
wealth from one country to their national economy, as
is the case with Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Fourth, the
will of private citizens and businesses who endeavour
to sustain the war for political, financial or other garns;
for example, generals and other top officers in the
Ugandan and Zimbabwean army and other top officials
and unsavoury politicians (Victor Mpoyo, Gaetan
Kakudji, Mwenze Kongolo) in the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Fifth, the capacity
of one of the warring parties to give incentives
(mineral and others) to its allies and soldiers, for
example the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
IV. Conclusion and findings
213. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo has become mainly about access, control and
trade of five key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds,
copper, cobalt and gold. The wealth of the country is
appealing and hard to resist in the context of
lawlessness and the weakness of the central authority.
214. Exploitation of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by foreign armies
has become systematic and systemic. Plundering,
looting and racketeering and the constitution of
criminal cartels are becoming commonplace in
occupied territories. These criminal cartels have
ramifications and connections worldwide, and they
41
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S/2001/357
represent the next serious security problem in the
region.
215. The role of the private sector in the exploitation
of natural resources and the continuation of the war has
been vital. A number of companies have been involved
and have fuelled the war directly, trading arms for
natural resources. Others have facilitated access to
financial resources, which are used to purchase
weapons. Companies trading minerals, which the Panel
considered to be "the engine of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo" have prepared the
field for illegal mining activities in the country.
216. Bi lateral and multilateral donors have sent mixed
signals to Governments with armies in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
217. Top m ii itary commanders from various countries,
for different reasons, needed and continue to need this
conflict for its lucrative nature and for temporarily
solving some internal problems in those countries as
well as allowing access to wealth. They have realized
that the war has the capacity to sustain itself, and
therefore have created or protected criminal networks
that are likely to take over fully if all foreign armies
decide to leave the Democratic Republic of the'Congo.
218. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, because of its lucrative nature, has created a
"win-win" situation for all belligerents. Adversaries
and enemies are at times partners in business (MaY-MaY
and Rwandans and Congolese rebels), prisoners of
Hutu origin are mine workers of RPA, enemies get
weapons from the same dealers and use th'e same
intermediaries. Business has superseded security
concerns. The only loser in this huge business venture
is the Congolese people.
V. Recommendations
Prerequisite
219. The Panel acknowledges the validity of Security
Council resolutions 1304 (2000) and 1341 (2001 ), as
well as the Lusaka Agreement, and puts its report and
recommendations within their broad framework. The
Panel believes its report and recommendations are
consistent with those resolutions.
42
Follow-up
220. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, to allow it to conduct a follow-up investigation
and report on the structures and networks put in place
or facilitated by warring parties to illegally exploit the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, including the situation after the withdrawal of
foreign military forces.
Sanctions
221. The Security Council should immediately declare
a temporary embargo on the import or export of coltan,
niobium, pyrochlore, cassiterite, timber, gold and
diamonds from or to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda
until those countries' involvement in the exploitation
of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo is made clear and declared so by the
Security Council. All countries should abstain from
facilitating the import or export of these resources. Any
country breaking this embargo should face sanctions;
Governments should take the measures necessary to
ensure that companies registered in their territory and
individuals breaking the embargo are punished.
222. The Security Council should decide that all
Member States without delay should freeze the
financial assets of the rebel movements and their
leaders. Member States should take the necessary
measures to ensure that their public and private
financial institutions stop doing business with banks
named in this report that are located in Burundi,
Rwanda and Uganda.
223. The Security Council should strongly urge all
Member States to freeze the financial assets of the
companies or individuals who continue to participate in
the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo immediately after
the publication of this report.
224. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
declare an immediate embargo on supply of weapons
and all military materiel to the rebel groups operating
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and consider
extending this embargo to the States that support or
assist those groups.
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225. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
decide that all military cooperation with States whose
military forces are present in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo in violation of its sovereignty be
suspended immediately until those armies withdraw
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Financial and economic matters
226. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
urge Member States to suspend balance of payments
support to the countries of the region involved in the
illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, until the Security
Council has evidence to its satisfaction that the illegal
exploitation of natural resources has stopped.
227. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
requests the World Bank and IMF to consider
suspending their support to the budgets of these
countries until the end of the conflict. If, within two
months after the publication of this report, clear
evidence and signs of the disengagement of these
countries from the exploitation of the natural resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not given
to the Security Council, cooperation between those
institutions and the countries involved should be
suspended. The World Bank and IMF should design a
policy guideline on cooperation between each
institution and countries involved in conflicts.
228. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
urge Member States sharing a common border with the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or serving 'as transit
countries for goods and natural resources from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to form a
commission to investigate financial and economic
activities conducted on their territories in connection
with the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and take the necessary action to curb or halt activities
that contribute to the continuation of hostilities.
Diamond business
229. The Security Council should call upon the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to take the
necessary steps to curb the flow of illicit diamonds by
liberalizing the diamond trade. A clear signal in this
regard should be sent to all companies that resist and
obstruct the liberalization of the mineral markets.
230. All diamond dealers operating in the territories
occupied by foreign forces should immediately stop
SIZOOl/357
doing business with rebels and Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda. Failure to do so should lead to action through
the World Diamond Council. The Republic of the
Congo and the Central African Republic should take
the necessary measures to stop abetting the trade in
illicit and conflict diamonds.
231. Furthermore, the Panel endorses all the relevant
recommendations on diamonds made by the Panel of
Experts established by resolution 1306 (2000) in
relation to Sierra Leone in its report (S/2000/1195,
paras. 155 to 166), in particular:
(a) A certification scheme similar to that
adopted by Sierra Leone should be required of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and all other
diamond-exporting countries in the region, within a
period of six months;
(b) Major trading centres should agree on a
recording and public documentation system for rough
diamond imports that clearly designates countries of
origin and provenance;
(c) All countries importing rough diamonds
must apply a "rough control" system whether they have
free trade zones or not;
(d) The European Union should have few entry
points for diamonds;
(e) The United Nations and the World Diamond
Council should form a commission to conduct an
annual review of the proper implementation of the
certification system;
(f) An annual statistical production report
should be compiled by each exporting country and
gathered into a central annual report, compiled by the
World Diamond Council and/or by the certification
body that is expected to emerge from the "Kimberley
process".
Forest and timber
232. The Panel proposes that countries with seaports
and those with transit facilities report to the United
Nations Forum on Forests on the transit of timber
through their territory. As the timber from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo transits through the
ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, the Governments
of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania should
declare to the Forum on Forests the origins of the
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timber that is being shipped from their seaports, as well
as the certification documents of such timber.
233. The Panel recommends that the United Nations
Forum on Forests unify the different schemes and
procedures for timber certification. The certification
scheme should be based on the broad framework of
principles, criteria and indicators promoted by the
International Panel on Forests and the International
Forum on Forests. New criteria on "conflict timber"
should be considered. The Forum on Forests should
become or designate one single accrediting body for
timber certification. The composition of such a body
should reflect the diversity of actors and interests as
well as the specificity of regions. Such a unified
mechanism would prevent some "loose codification"
and purely commercial certifying bodies from
delivering or attempting to deliver certificates. The
Panel urges the Security Council to declare timber and
non-timber forest products coming from warring areas,
"conflict timber and non-timber forest products".
Countries importing non-certified timber should put in
place minimum guidelines and sanctions for companies
that import timber and non-timber forest products from
countries at war or experiencing civil war related to the
allocation or distribution of natural resources.
234. The Panel proposes, following the declaration on
the control of illegal logging made by the Group of
Eight in 1998, and the ongoing discussions on "conflict
timber products", that a mandate be given to the United
Nations Forum on Forests:
(a) To compile information in collaboration
with various non-governmental organizations on illegal
logging and "conflict timber products" in the world;
(b) To publish annually a list of countries
involved in illegal and "conflict timber products" trade;
(c) To submit an annual report to the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
235. The Panel recommends that countries of transit
and final destination of the timber trade request from
logging companies certificates of origin for the timber
that is transiting through or arriving in their territory.
Those countries should send copies of these certificates
to Governments of countries of origin within three
days. Failure to abide by this should be considered to
be complicity on the part of those count' ries and they
should be listed as countries facilitating "illicit timber"
44
and "conflict timber product" trade in the report of the
Forum on Forests.
Reparation and compensation
236. The Panel recommends that individuals, in
particular farmers, religious groups and companies
whose properties, livestock and crops were damaged,
looted or expropriated by the Burundian, Rwandan or
Ugandan armed forces and their allies should be
compensated by the States concerned. Properties
confiscated should also be returned to their legitimate
owners. The Governments of Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda and their allies should pay compensation to the
companies whose properties and stocks of coltan,
cassiterite, gold, timber and other materials which were
confiscated or taken between 1998 and 2000. The
Security Council may consider how the Office of the
United Nations Resident Coordinator in Kinshasa could
help in gathering information on the claims.
237. UNESCO, in collaboration with UNEP, the
secretariat of CITES and non-governmental
organizations working in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo should assess the extent of damage to
wildlife in Garamba Park, Kahuzi-Biega Park, the
Okapi Reserve and Virunga Park, and propose
sanctions to be taken against those Governments whose
soldiers were involved in the mass killing of
endangered species.
Framework for reconstruction
238. The Security Council would give mandate and
means to a United Nations commission created to help
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo manage the transition in the formerly occupied
regions. The Commission will help design and put in
place the legal and administrative framework and
create an enabling environment for economic activities.
The Commission will also help put in place the
necessary conditions for the enhancement of State
authority and security over its territory.
General
239. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
consider establishing an international mechanism that
will investigate and prosecute individuals involved in
economic criminal activities (such as Khaleb
Akandwanaho alias Salim Saleh, Jean-Pierre Bemba,
James Kazini, Mbusa Nyamwisi, Ateenyi Tibasima,
- 501 -
Roger Lumbala, Aziza Kulsum Gulamali and others
named in this report), companies and government
officials whose economic and financial activities
directly or indirectly harm powerless people and weak
economies.
240. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
consider establishing a permanent mechanism that
would investigate the illicit trafficking of natural
resources in armed conflicts so as to monitor the cases
which are already subject to the investigation of other
panels, such as those of Angola, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone.
241. Member States should be encouraged to adopt
legislation that will forbid companies registered in their
territory from importing or exporting natural resources
to or from invading countries.
Security
242. The Panel urges the Security Council to hold
Governments of countries parties to the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, rebel movements
and those military representatives cited in the report
responsible if any harm is done to any member of the
Panel. The Security Council should encourage
individual countries to assist the Panel members by
providing security to each of them well after the Panel
is dissolved. The Security Council should urge the
Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements
to ensure the security of the Panel members well after
the Panel is dissolved. The Panel has received
information of harassment in Bunia and other localities
of individuals who may have been in.contact with the
Panel members. The Security Council should hold the
authorities of Rwanda, Uganda, RCD and FLC
responsible for any harm to witnesses who shared their
knowledge with the Panel.
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S/20011357
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Annex I
46
Sample of companies importing minerals from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo via Rwanda
Co,npany Co11ntry of dutjnation .Merchandise
Cogem Belgium cassiterites
M uka-Enterprise Belgium cassiterites
Issa Germany cassiterites
Chpistopa Floss Germany cassiterites
Redemi Rwanda cassiterites
Banro- Resources Corp. Malaysia cassiterites, coltan
Canada cassiterites
Bharat United Republic of cassiterites
Tanzania
Extano-Office Rwanda coltan
Coopimar Rwanda coltan
Geologistics Hannover Germany coltan
Rwasibo-Butera Switzerland coltan
Eagles wings Netherlands coltan
Veen Netherlands coltan
Soger Belgium coltan
Patel Warehouse Netherlands coltan
Afrimex United Kingdom of Great coltan
Britain and Northern
Ireland
Netherlands cassiterites
Chimie Pharmacie Netherlands coltan
Belgium coltan
Sogem Belgium coltan, cassiterites, tin
Cogecom Belgium coltan, cassiterites
Cogea Belgium coltan
Panalpina Kenya coltan
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Company
Tradement
Ventro Star
Raremet
Finconord
Finiming Ltd.
Finconcorde
Patel
Cicle International
Masingiro
Union-Transport
Specialty Metal
MOW
Transintra
Country of destination Merchandise
Belgium coltan, cassiterites
United Kingdom of Great coltan
Britain and Northern
Ireland
India coltan
Pakistan coltan
Belgium coltan
Russian Federation cassiterites, coltan
India cassiterites
Belgium coltan
Germany coltan
Germany coltan
Belgium coltan
Belgium cassiterites, coltan
Belgium cassiterites
Source: The Rwandan Revenue Authority.
S/2001/357
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Annex II
48
Countries visited and representatives of Governments
and organizations interviewed
The Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to express its
deep appreciation to the government officials, diplomats, non-governmental
organizations, individual relief workers, journalists, and others who assisted it in its
enquiries and helped to make this report possible.
The Panel further wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), in
particular Ambassador Kamel Morjane; to the United Nations Office at Nairobi, in
particular Klaus T6pfer and Alexander Barabanov; and to the Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, in
particular Ambassador Berhanu Dinka.
Among countries involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Panel would like to make special note of the cooperation received from
the Republic of Uganda, which provided the Panel with all information that was
requested.
The following list is incomplete in deference to the wishes of those who
reql!lested anonymity, in particular Congolese individuals who put their lives at risk
in order to provide the Panel with information.
Angola
Government officials
Vice-Minister of External Relations
Vice-Minister of Finance
Minister of Petroleum
Minister of Geology and Mines
United Nations agencies and offices
Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office
in Angola
United Nations Office in Angola
Belgium
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Communications, Civil Aviation Administration
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Cabinet of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Department of Customs and Accounts
Office beige du commerce exterieur
Departement de douanes et droits indirects
International organizations
Eurostat
World Customs Organization
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Other
Belgolaise
BHP Diamonds and Minerals
BHV
Diamond High Council
Independent Diamond Valuators
Institute of Politics and Development Management
Langer Diamonds
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (Nordic Africa Institute)
Royal Museum for Central Africa, Department of Geology and Mineralogy
SwissCargo
World Federation of Diamond Markets
Burundi
Government officials
His Excellency Major General Pierre Buyoya, President of the Republic of
Burundi
Minister of Agriculture and Livestock
Ministry of Finance
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation
Minister of National and Regional Development and Environment
Minister of Transportation, Post and Telecommunications
Representatives of States
Belgium
Democratic Republic of the Congo
France
United States of America
United Nations agencies and offices, and international organizations
MONUC
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
UNDP
World Bank
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
His Excellency Major General Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Commissariat general du Gouvernement charge des affaires de la MONUC
Banque nationale du Congo
Banque centrale
Departement des Forets
Direction generale des contributions (DGC)
Direction generale des recettes administratives, judiciaires, domaniales et de
participations (DGRAD)
Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature (ICCN)
Ministre des affaires foncieres de l'Environnement, de la conservation de la
nature et du developpement touristique
Ministre de l'agriculture et elevage
Ministre des droits humains
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50
Ministre de l'economie, du commerce, et de l'industrie
Ministre de l'energie
Ministre des finances et du budget
Ministere des mines
Ministre d'Etat charge du petrole
Ministre des transports et communications
!'Office des douanes et accises (OFIDA)
Representatives of States
Belgium
China
France
Italy
United States of America
Diplomatic Corps of Kinshasa
United Nations agencies and offices
FAO
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
WFP
WHO
Other
COSLEG Holding
Federation des entreprises du Congo (FEC)
Georges Forrest International
Governor of South Kivu and Provincial Directors
Observatoire gouvernance-transparence (OGT)
Kotecha Group of Companies
Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo
Olive Company
RCD-Goma
Rally for Congolese Democracy-ML/Kisangani
Trafca
World Resource Institute
France
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry - Department of the Treasury
French Development Agency
Inspector General of Civil Aviation and Meteorology
Direction generale des douanes et droits indirects - Sous-Direction de !'Union
douaniere et de la cooperation internationale
Bureau of Geological and Mining Research (BRG M)
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International organizations
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Kenya
Government officials
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Kenya Ports Authority
Representatives of States
Belgium
Democratic Republic of the Congo
France
Japan
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Special Representative
for the Great Lakes
Zimbabwe
International organizations
Office of the Facilitator for the peace process in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
United Nations agencies and offices
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great
Lakes Region
UNDP
UNEP
United Nations Office at Nairobi
Other
International Crisis Group (ICG)
Namibia
Government officials
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Information and Broadcasting
Minister of Finance
Deputy Minister of Defence
Minister of Mines and Energy
Minister of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development
Minister of Environment and Tourism
Representatives of States
China
France
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
S/2001/357
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S/2001/357
52
Rwanda
Government officials
His Excellency Major General Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of
Rwanda
Chef d'Etat major
Minister of Energy, Water and Natural Resources
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning
Minister of Agriculture, Forests and Livestock
Minister of Works, Transport and Communications
Minister of Energy, Mines and Water
Minister of Land, Resettlements and Environment
National Bank of Rwanda
Secretary-General of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Rwanda Revenue Authority
Representatives of States
Belgium
Canada
China
France
Germany
Netherlands
Russian Federation
Switzerland
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Office of the European Union Delegation
United Nations agencies and offices
ECA
FAO
Heads of United Nations agencies represented in Rwanda
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
South Africa
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Other
Anglo-American
De Beers
Swiitzerland
Government officials
Department of Foreign Affairs, Chef de la directi.on politique
Swiss Federal Administration
- 509 -
International organizations
World Trade Organization
Other
Societe generale de surveillance
Uganda
Government officials
His Excellency Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda
Civil Aviation Authority
Internal Revenue Authority
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Defence
Minister of Energy and Mineral Development
Minister of State for Environment, Water and Land
First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Finance
Minister of State for Planning and Investment
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications
Parliamentary Committee on Presidential and Foreign Affairs
Vice-President of the Republic of Uganda
Representatives of States
Belgium
Denmark
France
Italy
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
European Union Special Envoy to the Great Lakes
United Nations agencies
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
Heads of United Nations agencies in Kampala
Media
East African
Monitor
New Vision
Radio Uganda
Top Radio
Ugandan Television
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
S/2001/357
53
- 510 -
S/2001/357
Other
Cluff Mining
De Beers
The Economist
International Coffee Organization
World Diamond Council
United States of America
Government officials
Department of State
Bureau of African Affairs
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, Fifth District, Georgia
United Nations agencies and offices
UNESCO and United Nations Foundation/White Oak Conference
Ioteroational organizations
World Bank
Other
Oregon Certification Group
Smart Wood
University of Maryland
Zimbabwe
Government officials
Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Energy and Mines
Chief Executive Officer, Civil Aviation Authority
Representatives of States
Belgium
China
France
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
United Nations agencies and international organizations
UNDP
Heads of all United Nations agencies represented in Zimbabwe
Media
Zimbabwe Independent newspaper
Daily News
Other
First Banking Corporation Limited
Zimbabwe Transparency International
ZimTrade
- 511 -
Annex III
Abbreviations
AFDL
BCD
BCDI
CEMAC
CIFOR
coltan
COMESA
COMIEX (I)
COMIEX (2)
COSLEG
ECA
FAQ
FDD
FLC
Gecamines
IOI
IMF
MIBA
MLC
MONUC
OECD
OSLEG
RCD
Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du CongoZarre
(Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Congo-Zaire)
Banque de Commerce et du developpement (Trade and
Development Bank)
Banque de commerce, du developpement et d'industrie, Kigali
Communaute economique et monetaire de l' Afrique centrale
(Central African Economic and Monetary Community)
Centre for International Forestry Research
columbo-tantalite
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Compagnie mixte d'import-export
La Generale de commerce d'import/export du Congo
COMIEX-OSLEG joint venture
Economic Commission for Africa
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Forces pour la defense de la democratie
Front de liberation du Congo (merger of MLC and RCD-ML)
Generate de carrieres et des mines
International Diamond Industries
International Monetary Fund
Societe miniere de Bakwanga (Mining Company of Bakwanga)
Mouvement de liberation congolais (Congolese Liberation
Movement)
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (Rally for
Congolese Democracy)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie, based in Goma
RCD-Kisangani Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie, based in Kisangani,
later based in Bunia and referred to as RCD-ML
S/2001/357
55
- 512 -
SJ2001J357
56
RCD-ML
RCD-National
RPA
RPF
SOMIGL
SOMIKIVU
SOMINKI
UDEAC
UNDP
UNEP
UNHCR
UNESCO
UNICEF
UPDF
WFP
WHO
WTO
ZANU-PF
ZDF
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie - Mouvement de
Liberation, first based in Kisangani, later in Bunia
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie - National, located
in Bafwasende
Rwandan Patriotic Army
Rwandan Patriotic Front
Societe miniere des Grands Lacs (Great Lakes Mining Company)
Societe miniere du Kivu
Societe miniere et industrielle du Kivu
Union douaniere et economique de l' Afrique centrale (Central
African Customs and Economic Union)
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environment Programme
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations Children's Fund
Uganda People's Defence Forces
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
World Trade Organization
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
Zimbabwe Defence Forces
----------------------------------- ·-·-.
- 513 -
0
0
0
0
•
•
*
*
•
II
•
...
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Repoblique .Democratique du Congo
Gisements de classe A et 8
Substances
AIICI-A> 250tNJ
All Cl-• B 50- 250 t Au
CoCl•••A" 100000tCo
CoCINH810000-100000tCo
CUCt_A,. 10000000tCu
CUCl-81 000000-10000000
Ooam CIMae A > 100 OOO OOO cta
Diam Clasu 9 10 OOO OOO • 100 OOO
F•a.u.A" 1000000000tFe
Fe CI-B 100 OOO OOO -1000 OOO
U Cl- 9 500 OOO • 5 OOO OOO t
Mn o ... B 10 OOO OOO. 100 OOO 00
Nb Cl-• A> 250 OOO t Nb205
Nb Cluae 8 SO OOO • 2SO OOO t
Pb Cla&e B 100 OOO· 1 OOO OOO t
SnCI_A,. 100000tSn
Sno-e 10000-1oooootSn
Ta Cl- B 500 • 2500 t Ta205
U ClalM B 5000 • 50 OOO t U
211 Cl_ A" 2 OOO OOO tZn
Au:Or
U:uthlum
Ta: Tantale
. . .
Co: Cobalt
Mn:llanpnNa
U :Uranium
S/2001/3S7
---- llwi-Uele (COO)
-- t<llo (Zone de)
- Katange Province, Copperbelt
-·- - Shinllolo!Mle
Cu : Cuhmt Diam : Diamant
Nb : Niobium Pb: Ptomb
Zn :Zinc
Fe: Fer
Sn: Etaln
57
r
- 514 -
- 515 -
ANNEX 10.1
Judgment, Bulletin des arrêts de la Haute cour militaire — Sud Kivu
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 10.2
Avocats Sans Frontières, Recueil de décisions de justice et de notes de plaidoiries en matière de
crimes internationaux
[Annex not translated]
___________
- 516 -
ANNEX 13.1
Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998
- 517 -
Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998
[Translation]
CONTENT
INTRODUCTION
PART I:WAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
I.1. The causes of the war
I.1.1. Indirect causes
I.1.2. Direct causes
I.2. The warring parties
I.2.1. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and its allies
I.2.2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and its allies
PART II: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN KISANGANI AND THE SURROUNDING AREA
II.1. Human rights violations under the authorities of the KABILA Government
A. Civil and political rights
B. Economic and social rights
C. Use of children as soldiers
D. Failure to protect civilians
II.2. Human rights under the rebel authorities
II.2.1. Inhuman treatment
II.2.2. Infringements of the right to life
II.2.3. Humiliating and degrading treatment
II.2.4. Physical, psychological and moral duress
II.2.5. Disappearances
II.2.6. Looting
II.2.7. Deterioration of health and humanitarian conditions and threats to medical
workers
II.2.8. Loss of material and social well-being
- 518 -
PART III: THE ATTITUDE OF THE WARRING PARTIES TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
ABUSES COMMITTED
III.1. The governmental authorities
III.2. The rebel authorities
PART IV: THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE WAR
IV.1. The power struggle — developments on the ground
IV.2. The inhabitants — their concerns and expectations
IV.3. The efforts of the international community hesitant and inadequate (from
August to early October 1998)
IV.4. The future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Consitutional decree of 27 May 1998
Appendix 2: Chronology of events in Kisangani
Appendix 3: Declaration of the war of rebellion, 2 August 1998 [not attached]
- 519 -
ABBREVIATIONS
AFDL: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo
ANR: National Intelligence Agency
BSRS: Special Investigation and Surveillance Brigade
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAC: Congolese Armed Forces
FAZ: Zairian Armed Forces
FEC: Congolese Business Federation
HCR-PT: High Council of the Republic — Transitional Parliament
OFIDA: Customs and Excise Office
OCPT: Congolese Post and Telecommunications Office
PIR: Rapid Intervention Police
RCD: Congolese Rally for Democracy
RVA: Air traffic control authorities
SADC: Southern African Development Community
UN: United Nations
WHO: World Health Organization
- 520 -
INTRODUCTION
The major preoccupation of the first person ever to fashion a weapon on this earth was to
defend himself against attacks from wild animals. This defensive attitude has not endured over
time. Various changes and modifications have diverted those who take up arms from their noble
purpose of yesteryear. In our day and age most of the horrible scenes which plunge humankind in
to mourning and sadness can be put down to the abuse of weapons for fratricidal wars, revenge, or
rebellion, in short, violence in all its varying forms.
This is what the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been enduring
since the beginning of the 1990s. There have been countless deaths in the region during this period,
beginning with the influx of Hutu refugees from Rwanda in 1994, going on through the so-called
war of liberation waged by the AFDL in 1996, which brought Laurent Désiré KABILA to power as
the president of the DRC, and continuing with the rebellion of August 1998. Even the so-called
civilized powers, those world police officers in waiting who gladly seize any opportunity to strike
out at or destabilize régimes branded as dictatorships, have taken no notice of the fate of innocent
civilians or even the massacres that have resulted from the conflicts.
No sooner had Mobutu and his Government exited the stage and Kabila taken power than
those who wish to subjugate the world and will go to any length to tip the balance in favour of their
own interests inflicted another war on the Congolese at a time when they least expected it. It
seemed that the main purpose of the rebels was to effect a radical remedy to the totalitarian
tendencies of the DRC’s current leader. They began in Goma and, in record time, they had
conquered a number of the country’s cities and strategic centres including Bukavu, Uvira, Beni,
Butembo, Bunia, and Kisangani, paving the way for their assault on Kinshasa, the capital and seat
of Government.
Kisangani, the third largest city in the country is the administrative centre of Orientale
Province, which is the largest and most highly populated of the DRC’s 11 provinces. It has around
700,000 inhabitants of varying cultural origin. It has an international airport (Bangboka), a military
air-base (Plateau Médical) and a port on the Congo river providing a direct link to the capital of the
DRC, Kinshasa. There are roads from Kisangani to Uganda via Bunia, the Central African
Republic via Bondo and Sudan via Isiro.
In the political history of the country, Kisangani was the fiefdom of the national hero,
Patrice Hemery LUMUMBA and the political centre of the Mulelist uprising of 1964. Under
Mobutu Sese Seko it was the stronghold of the party of the State, the Popular Movement of the
Revolution (MPR) and so this was where the lightning counter-offensive against the AFDL
uprising was organized. In March 1997, the rebellion led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo met with remarkable success in Kisangani,
encouraging him to continue his struggle until he was able to take power in Kinshasa.
Kisangani is the focus of the area in which LOTUS conducted the investigations that led to
this report. The report details the human rights violations which took place there, in particular from
4 August 1998 (the date on which sections of the Congolese Armed Forces supporting the rebels
first attempted to take Kisangani) to 23 August 1998 (the date on which the rebel forces actually
entered Kisangani) and the period from 23 August to 15 October 1998 (the end of the period of
observation). The report acts both as a window and a mirror. Through the window, the outside
world will most certainly come to acknowledge Kisangani’s tragic situation and, who knows, may
be prompted to do what it can to ensure that these kinds of circumstances no longer arise anywhere
in the world. In the mirror, those who call for and wage war can see and meditate on what they
have done, if only for the sake of the universal nature of human values.
- 521 -
Save for the introduction, the conclusions and the recommendations, this report is divided
into four main parts. The first relates primarily to some of the main keys to an understanding of the
new war in the DRC. The second part focuses on the human rights violations in the region both
before and after the taking of Kisangani. The third describes the warring parties’ attitudes towards
human rights violations and abuses; and the final part sets out a few theories about the future of the
DRC based on some free thinking about the situation.
PART I:
WAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
On 2 August 1998, to everyone’s great surprise, foreign radio stations announced that parts
of the 10th Army Brigade in Goma had mutinied. That day, at a gathering of all 21 of the battalions
making up the brigade, the commander announced a break with the Government in Kinshasa and
his decision to wage war on the Kabila Government until it was overthrown. How did this turn of
events come about? Who was pulling the strings? The following sections should provide some sort
of an explanation.
I.1. The causes of the war
I.1.1. Indirect causes
(a) The disillusionment of Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s former allies
Without entering into a detailed chronology of events it should be recalled that President
Kabila’s main allies throughout his war of liberation were Rwanda and Uganda. Their support
stemmed from a desire to protect their governments and secure their frontiers but unfortunately
they soon found themselves right back where they started from.
At the beginning of hostilities in 1996, units of the Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces
formed the spearhead of Kabila’s troops, but once victory had been secured the new authorities in
Kinshasa regarded them as surplus to requirements. Certain senior army officers regarded as
‘military advisers’ were banished from the Government’s decision-making elite.
In the meantime the threats that Uganda and Rwanda thought they had warded away from
their frontiers re-emerged in the form of rebel groups taking advantage of the almost total lack of
supervision by the Kinshasa régime and using the DRC as a retreat. This was the case with the
Alliance of Democratic Forces and the former Rwandan Armed Forces.
(b) Difficult living conditions for some of the supporters of the former Mobutu régime
Not only did the Mobutu régime introduce anarchy but it also consciously and intentionally
established the law of the jungle by means of the unbridled accumulation of riches by one
individual and a court of dignitaries who were the representatives of economic monopolies and
secret lobbies, all of which formed a kind of debased State bourgeoisie. The dignitaries had come
to rely on the magnanimity of the president and the law of the least possible effort by dipping into
the State’s coffers and cultivating numerous supporters and fanatics, but they fell into disgrace
under Kabila. Their ill-gotten gains had to be returned, their lucrative positions were lost, and their
bank reserves were considerably undermined.
Their supporters, who had also got used to the law of the least possible effort, ended up
destitute and hopeless. Neither did most of those who chose to go into exile find themselves in a
very enviable situation. Exile was nowhere near as profitable because most governments did not
wish to see their relations with the new Government in Kinshasa deteriorate immediately. There
- 522 -
was plenty of reason for these people to hark back to the old days. Given the circumstances, they
were certain to support any activity aimed at undermining the Kabila Government.
(c) Difficulties for the international community in taming the Kabila régime
The multinational companies which had hastened to sign mining contracts with Kabila when
he was a rebel chief expected to be granted privileges in Congo. The fact that the Kabila
Government proceeded to call all of these contracts into question and that its Ministry of Mines
introduced highly restrictive laws to govern them disappointed these companies as well as the
states in which they were based.
It would appear that President Kabila’s official journeys abroad since his accession to power,
including visits to China, Cuba, Libya, Namibia, and South Africa, have done little to help people
understand his approach and his heartfelt desire to solve his country’s economic and social
problems.
Recently, his detractors, who believe that the only way for a Third World country to make
economic progress is to attract western capital, have branded him with various unflattering labels
such as communist, Africanist or nationalist.
His noteworthy absence from the summit of French-speaking communities in Hanoi, his
refusal to meet the American emissary, Jesse Jackson, his reluctance to co-operate with United
Nations missions to investigate allegations that Rwandan Hutu refugees were massacred in Congo,
and his reservations about touring western capitals in search of the foreign investment which is
often presented as a panacea for kick-starting Third World economies are all points in his disfavour
on the international scene.
(d) The failure to hold a political round table meeting after the AFDL’s military victory
In eight years of transition there has been much political dialogue (the 1st and 2nd Marble
Palace agreements, the National Sovereign Conference, the political “conclave” and the political
discussion at the People’s Palace), all of which has led to the emergence of a new class of
politicians made up of unprincipled opportunists and careerists, capable of changing their minds
with the weather, most of whom can be encountered in Kinshasa. Their ongoing preoccupation is to
occupy a public post (whether in a ministry or not) but this is not to serve the public but to fulfil
their own political ambitions and gain social status. These politicians were probably expecting to
make the most of the opportunity when Kabila came to power. It was not long before they realized
that something else was happening. The refusal to resurrect Mobutu’s last lumbering parliament
(the HCR-PT), the importance attached to the opinions of the Congolese Diaspora when taking
national policy decisions and the appointment of a government with a very small number of
ministers help to explain the predicament of these opportunist politicians and what they have been
saying about Kabila.
I.1.2. The direct causes
All of the foregoing shows us the underlying tensions both inside and outside Congo. All
that was needed was a small spark for the whole country to blow up like a powder keg.
In a bid to boost his popularity, President Kabila reacted to all the complaints he had
received regarding the abuses of his military allies and — following a process of verification which
it has to be said took a relatively long time — decided to repatriate all the foreign soldiers stationed
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without mentioning the real reason for this. The
- 523 -
president’s decision was announced and read out on national television on the night of
24-25 July 1998.
The people welcomed President Kabila’s decision as they had already had enough of the
foreign military presence which seemed to excel in abusing its power, occupying senior military
posts and taking full advantage of its many privileges. However, this was not the case with the
soldiers themselves who felt considerably aggrieved. In both Kisangani and Kinshasa the process
of disarming these soldiers did not go smoothly.
It was against this background of a compulsory withdrawal for some and a boost in national
pride for others that a mutiny broke out in Goma on 2 August 1998.
I.2. The warring parties
Mobutu’s advancing illness and the inevitable collapse of his régime meant that the question
of his succession and the hegemony of certain powers over the Democratic Republic of the Congo
could be raised once again on the international scene. The balance undoubtedly turned in favour of
the English-speaking protectors of the Great Lakes region who used their usual channels of
influence.
However, no sooner was the fighting all over and the matter apparently settled once and for
all, than Kabila snubbed those who had helped him to come to power, turning instead to southern
Africa and even going so far as to help create the SADC (Southern African Development
Community).
Though this significant and decisive step was bound to distance Kabila from his former
patrons, it was possible that it was a sign of future affiliations elsewhere.
I.2.1. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and its allies
The RCD is a political and military organization set up in August 1998 with a view to
overthrowing the Kabila Government and establishing a democratic régime based on genuine
popular legitimacy. It believes that war is the only method likely to succeed in this. The fact that it
emerged only a few days after the beginning of the fighting (on 12 August 1998) may bear out its
claims to be the instigator of the rebellion but it may also reflect a kind of incoherence within the
rebel movement, with the political leaders on one side and the military chiefs on the other,
especially since it was the military leaders who had called on the politicians to work together to
decide on the country’s political orientation.
The RCD’s political declaration and the communiqué announcing the launch of the second
war of liberation — which it calls the war of rectification are similar in their criticisms of the
Kabila régime (accusing it of tribalism, exclusion, misappropriation of public funds, etc.).
It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty who the warring parties’ allies are since no
specific statements have been made on the subject. However, the coincidence between the decision
to remove foreign soldiers from Congolese territory, the opposition of those concerned, the launch
of the rebellion in Goma, which is such a strategic town, and the opening up of a western front (in
Kitona, more than 2,000 kilometres from Goma), requiring the deployment of airborne troops, does
seem to indicate that there was some foreign support. Rwanda and Uganda are among the prime
candidates in so far as Rwanda acknowledges that it supports the rebellion “politically and
morally” while Uganda’s President Museveni has admitted before his own parliament that
defensive Ugandan military forces are present on Congolese territory.
- 524 -
I.2.2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and its allies
Lawful governments often take up arms in response to rebel movements in their own country
either to hold back their advances or to snuff them out. The Government of the DRC had to react to
the offensive against it and so it mobilized its troops on various fronts. In its attempt to make up the
ground it had lost it was officially supported by Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Chad. Angola’s
vigorous intervention could be put down to threats to the security of its borders but the same could
not be said of the other countries involved, which simply came to the aid of a fellow government
and a friend in danger and found it difficult to accept that a régime which had been so remarkably
popular until then was being undermined.
PART II
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN KISANGANI AND THE SURROUNDING AREA
II.1. Human rights violations under the authorities of
the KABILA Government
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which protect the
victims of armed conflicts and the civilian population.
An analysis of events on the ground reveals that the Government of the DRC has not only
failed to make enough effort to promote these rights but has also been contributing in one way or
another to their violation.
Between the outbreak of fighting in Kisangani on 4-6 August 1998 and the rebel conquest of
the town on 23 August the following violations were committed by President Kabila’s Government
forces:
A. Civil and political rights
Infringements of the right to life: summary executions
On 5 August 1998, Mr. Faustin IBANDA, a student in his last year at the Yangambi University
Institute of Agronomics and an employee of the Sunair air company, was shot dead by
members of the Congolese Armed Forces at his home in the SEDEC building in Makiso
because of his physical resemblance to a Tutsi. He was in fact a member of the Hema tribe
from the Ituri forest.
It is alleged that there were summary executions of Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis
(Banyamulenge) captured during the fighting of 4 to 6 August by Congolese soldiers (from the
military police unit) on suspicion of collaborating with Rwandans and Rwandan civilians. They
are said to have been executed at Bangboka International Airport, at the warehouse of the
Congo-SEP oil company about 7 km away from the town centre on the road to Yangambi, and
in the vicinity of the military air-base at Plateau Médical. Around 53 of the alleged victims are
said to have been buried in common graves near the morgue at Kisangani General Hospital,
another 19 in the vicinity of the ferry crossing on the River Lindi about 15 km from the city
centre, and an unknown number thrown into the river near the Congo-SEP warehouse.
- 525 -
Cases of physical and psychological duress as well as torture and inhuman treatment
During this period, it was enough to be accused of being a Rwandan or a friend of the
Rwandans to be apprehended and subjected to all manner of ill-treatment. This is what happened to
Ms Eyanga of 18, 5ème Avenue in Tshopo district, who was arrested for hiding two Rwandans.
She was whipped by police officers then taken to military headquarters where she was released
after 48 hours.
A number of people identified as Rwandan citizens were arrested and kept in inhuman
conditions in lockups at military HQ or the BSRS (the Special Investigation and Surveillance
Brigade) in Mangobo.
Cases of arbitrary arrest
On 11 August 1998, Mr. Dieudonné Ngwasi, the deputy provincial director of the Directorate
General of Migrations in Orientale Province, was arrested by police officers at the Hotel
Zongia where he was staying. He was initially held at the office of the PIR (Rapid Intervention
Police) (formerly the Civil Guard office) then transferred to the military lockup known as
Bureau II. He was suspected of being in contact with rebels because his cousin,
Mr. Joseph Mudumbi, is a member of the rebels’ Political Directorate in Goma. He was
released the day before the rebel troops entered Kisangani (i.e., on 22 August 1998).
Mr. Jacques Manga, a 19 year-old pupil at the school complex of the University of Kisangani
from 37, 1ère Avenue, Tshopo, was arrested on 18 August 1998 by members of the Mai-Mai
militia who are working alongside the Government troops. They claimed that he is a Rwandan
whereas in fact he is a Congolese citizen. He was held for 26 hours in a room in the old
orphanage converted into a rehabilitation centre being used as a base by the Mai-Mai. His life
was in danger because, by that stage, the Government forces had already distributed weapons
to the Mai-Mai.
Mr. Shakira, deputy public prosecutor, was held and questioned for several hours at the
National Intelligence Agency (ANR) because it was alleged that he is a Rwandan whereas in
fact he is a Congolese citizen from South Kivu province.
Violations of the right to property
A number of wireless telegraphs and other communications devices owned by individuals
and corporate entities were confiscated by the security forces. Private and company vehicles were
commandeered without going through official procedures.
A Yamaha sports motorbike belonging to Mr. Faustin Kinzonzoli, the Executive Secretary of
the NGO APILAF (the Association for the Promotion of Local Initiatives in the African Forest),
was stolen by Government forces the day before the rebels took the city.
Threats to Human Rights Organizations
On 12 August 1998 the Lotus Group offices were visited by the Rapid Intervention Police
who suspected the group of possessing communications devices used to broadcast information
abroad. A verbal order was issued for the group to suspend its activities.
- 526 -
Infringements of the right to a fair trial
The commander of the 25th Kisangani Brigade, Mr. Lisasi, and thirty or so soldiers from the
Government forces accused of treason were arrested, tied up and transported to Kinshasa without
being brought before the local courts.
Cases of disappearances
Mr. Chiasha, a former member of the intelligence services from South Kivu province,
married to a Rwandan Tutsi, and his son Papy, a fourth-year secondary school pupil; Mr. Hemedi, a
customs and excise officer, claiming to hail from the Hema tribe from the Ituri forest in Congo,
arrested at his home by police officers on 11 August 1998; a man identified only as Mr. Bedel, a
Rwandan Tutsi and 3rd year student at the Faculty of Medicine, arrested by members of the
Mai-Mai militia on the university campus at the Elungu Home Complex, Block B No. 4, along with
his friend identified only as Bienvenu, a first year student at the Yangambi University Institute of
Agronomics and a Rwandan Tutsi; Mr. Rutaramera Bigega, an employee of the National Electricity
Board, Kisangani, considered to be Rwandan and arrested by police officers at his home.
None of these people have yet been found. All the searches conducted in various prisons
have been to no avail.
B. Economic and social rights
Deterioration of the population’s social and economic situation
Between the outbreak of hostilities and 23 August 1998, both governmental and provincial
authorities failed to make up the 11-month arrears in salary payments to the people of Kisangani
and provide basic foodstuffs such as meat and beans which came from rebel-controlled Goma and
Bunia. At the time there were already signs of inflation linked to the fact that considerable sums
were being kept back to pay soldiers.
Restrictions on the right to education
Because of the insecurity which reined in Kisangani during and after the fighting of 4 to
6 August 1998 classes were suspended in all the city’s higher education establishments (the Higher
Institute of Medical Techniques, the Higher Institute of Education and the Higher Institute of
Commerce) and at the University Institute of Agronomics in Yangambi.
C. Use of children as soldiers
Weapons were distributed to children under fifteen years of age based in the former
orphanage in Mangobo and commonly referred to as the Mai-Mai and others from H site (a
half-built General Hospital building). Some of these children were sent to the front (along the Ituri
and Lubutu roads).
D. Failure to protect civilians
Innocent civilians were wounded and killed in some of the fighting at certain points in the
city (the Canon roundabout, military HQ, neighbourhoods in Kabondo and the city centre) and left
to their sad fate in the city’s hospitals. The following cases were recorded:
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Ms Moza, aged 27, of 20, 11ème Avenue, Kabondo, was hit by a stray bullet causing wounds
to her chest and her upper left arm. Doctors at the Kisangani University Clinic saved her life.
Mwembo, aged 12, of 40, Avenue du 30 octobre, Makiso, sustained deep abdominal wounds
from a bullet fired in his direction by a soldier. His life was also saved by doctors at the
University Clinic.
Ms Honorine Mauwa, aged around 60, of 6, 12ème Avenue, Kabondo, was hit by a bullet fired
at her by a soldier causing a compound fracture of both legs. She was admitted to the
University Clinic but died on 10 August 1998.
Finally, against the overall background of insecurity which reined from 4 to 6 August in
which there was both fighting between Tutsi and Congolese soldiers and searches for Rwandan
soldiers hiding in the town, Mr. Mbombo Mujene, a 51 year-old inspector at the Congolese Post
and Telecommunications Office (OCPT), was murdered by an armed man from the neighbouring
area inhabited by Tutsi civilians and soldiers at around 9 p.m. on 6 August 1998. According to his
children’s testimonies, the attacker was Nilotic in his physical appearance with features resembling
their neighbour Catablos, who is the local branch manager of the Sunair airline.
II.2. Human rights under the rebel authorities
Over the years various attempts have been made to introduce international legal instruments
to protect the integrity of the human person in times of conflict, and it was this desire which gave
rise to the four international conventions of 1949 known as the Geneva Conventions. They related
to the improvement of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field, the
improvement of the condition of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at
sea, the treatment of prisoners of war, and the protection of civilian persons in time of war.
Subsequent application in the field revealed certain shortcomings in the protection the
Conventions afforded to the integrity of the person. Fortunately, however, in 1977, the protocols on
international and non-international conflicts were introduced to fill the gap. The latter prohibited
inhuman treatment, violence to the life, health or physical or moral well-being of persons,
collective punishments, hostage taking, terrorism, humiliating and degrading treatment,
looting, etc. In short, civilians were expected to be given overall protection from the consequences
of hostilities. The DRC has ratified the four Geneva Conventions but has not yet ratified the second
additional protocol on non-international conflicts thus exempting itself from the rules of the
international community in this respect so as not to provide an opening for movements of
insurrection or rebellion.
Nonetheless, Common Article 3 of the conventions does commit the parties to a minimum
number of guarantees which are regarded as essential and applied automatically in the event of an
internal armed conflict.
The following cases, observed in Kisangani and subsequently verified, enable us to gauge
the extent to which the new authorities have been respecting and protecting human rights since they
took over the city on 23 August 1998.
II.2.1. Inhuman treatment
For reasons that it is difficult to understand, a considerable number of inhuman acts were
committed by the armed forces.
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Occupation of buildings and destruction of property
Schools were converted into military camps. Examples are the Tufuate and Lisanga primary
schools on 18ème Avenue, Tshopo, which used to be run by the Protestant church network.
Throughout their occupation, benches, tables and doors were used as firewood and the classrooms
were filled with faeces.
Private homes were not spared either. Rebel soldiers occupied and partly destroyed furniture
in houses around the military air-base and guest house, including those of the director and the
deputy director of the air traffic control authorities, the RVA, the director of the meteorological
office, the OCPT chief accountant and the OCPT clerk, Mr. Ngoy.
Hard labour and house arrest
Trésor Selego, a fifteen year-old school pupil, of 40, Avenue Kinshasa, was apprehended on
25 September 1998 outside the residence of the former general Likulia and forced to wash military
uniforms.
Mr. Raymond Mokeni Ekopi Kane, a Kisangani businessman and the Chairman of the
employers’ organization, the Congolese Business Federation, was placed under house arrest from
12 to 21 September 1998 on suspicion of possessing a satellite link-up device. Following a
thorough search of his Arcadia residence, his telephone and fax machine were confiscated. It is
reported that he was charged with funding government forces and refusing the rebel forces’ offer to
take up the post of Provincial Governor. Mr. Georges Yangala, the director of Belect, was also put
under house arrest along with his employee Mr. Mokeni, and robbed of his Comcell
communication device.
Breaking and entering into private homes and public buildings
On the night of 25 to 26 August 1998 armed officers used force to break into the home of
Mr. Masudin at 78, 3ème Avenue bis, Tshopo, and stole bar and hotel receipts which had not yet
been counted as well as money intended to pay soldiers in Buta. The Buta paymaster had lived at
the address before he fled.
Mr. Tanza and Mr. Garry, two West African subjects, of 24, 1ère Avenue, Tshopo, were
visited by members of the armed forces on 26 August 1998 and robbed of 95,000,000 new zaïres.
Mr. Yahya and Mr. Muhemedi, both Gambian subjects, of 3, 8ème Avenue, Tshopo,
underwent similar treatment on the night of 20 to 21 September 1998. The intruders succeeded in
taking away a 14-inch Sony colour television.
On 22 September 1998, three soldiers broke into the garage at Kisangani University’s
Faculty of Science. They stole a Land Rover, which was recovered in a badly damaged condition
some days later.
In late September 1998, rebel soldiers broke into the monastery at Simi-Simi and extorted a
sum of 10 million new zaïres (about US$50) from the parish priest and a sum of 800 US dollars
and 150 million new zaïres (about US$600) from Father Martin Konings. The money was
originally intended to pay workers at the Simama Centre for the Disabled.
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De-allocation of the wages of certain State officials
The National Intelligence Agency (ANR) is said to have lost six billion new zaïres which
were withdrawn from the accounts of the Beltexco Company and intended to cover the wages of its
acting staff and 200 million new zaïres from its pension fund.
II.2.2. Infringements of the right to life
Deaths recorded included both soldiers and civilians.
In response to the popular uprising of 26 August 1998 provoked by an attempt to confiscate
a Suzuki Vitara Jeep belonging to the priests of the Sacred Heart church in Tshopo in which
5 soldiers are said to have lost their lives, a reprisal operation was conducted in the districts of
Tshopo, Mangobo and Kabondo. Children and adults were murdered in cold blood;
In Tshopo: Mr. Georges Adembo, a nurse at the ophthalmological service of the CNCA
hospital, from 95, 14ème Avenue, died at around 5 p.m. on 26 August 1998 from a point-blank
shot to his face by soldiers patrolling on 15ème Avenue;
In Mangobo: Faustin Lokwa Alife and Cédric Badjoko Bobo, of 106, Quartier Basoko, were
shot down in cold blood in front of their home at about 9 a.m. on 27 August 1998;
In Kabondo: between 26 and 30 August 1998 the following people were shot dead by soldiers:
Mulamba, father of 3, of 17, 19ème Avenue;
Selemani, aged 15, of 95, 16ème Avenue bis;
Miss Jeanne (second name unknown) of 85, 5è Transversale, killed at her aunt’s house, at
40, 14ème Avenue bis;
Assani, an invoice clerk with the Mimco company and a third-year student in mathematics
at the Kisangani Free Higher Institute of Education;
Mombesa, alias Bourray, a hairdresser from 106, 10ème Avenue bis behind the former Bar
de la Cueillette, killed on 4è Transversale opposite the Kabondo community home;
Mr. Pierrot Manyonga Matanda, aged 26, of 27, 1ère Avenue, Tshopo, shot dead by
soldiers at 5 a.m. on 28 September 1998. He had already been identified as a wanted man
some days before.
On suspicion of arms possession, a bandit identified only as being a member of the family
of Papa Boola, a guard in the parish of St. Sacrement, had his throat cut by soldiers in
Lubunga in September 1998. In the same month and in the same district (Lubunga), a
former member of the Congolese Armed Forces (not otherwise identified) also had his
throat cut. He was surprised with a weapon which was said to have been used for ignoble
acts.
II.2.3. Humiliating and degrading treatment
Mr. Jean-Paul Kabiona, a member of the Government wing of the Congolese Armed Forces
was arrested some days after the fall of Kisangani and held in the military “Mabuso” lockup in
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Kisangani. He was charged with refusing to serve in the new army. Throughout his imprisonment
he was given 60 lashes a day.
In the same lockup, two persons suspected of “stealing” were held in appalling conditions.
They were subjected to serious torture and as a result one of them died during the month of
September.
The wife of the deputy director of the National Intelligence Agency, Emmanuel
Sanzunguimo, was arrested on Saturday 26 September 1998 and taken to the Kisangani military
lockup with her one-and-a-half year old baby. She was accused of possessing a portable telephone
and kitchen utensils belonging to the agency. She is said to have just escaped being raped. She was
released the next day.
II.2.4. Physical, psychological and moral duress
On the night of 11 to 12 August 1998 at around 3 a.m., Ms Rita Assumani, the mother of
three children, was seriously threatened by three men in uniform who succeeded in climbing over
the fence around her house at 50, 8ème Avenue, Tshopo district. She was robbed of three million
new zaïres.
Suspected of being the ring leader of a group of persons holding weapons in preparation for
a military operation in the district of Plateau Boyoma, Mr. Selego Chalanda, a student residing at
40, Avenue Kinshasa, Makiso, was harassed by soldiers for two whole days (28 and
29 September 1998).
Mr. David Mondele, 28, a married father of two, was hit by bullets in his right biceps at
around 11 p.m. on 26 August 1998 in his home at 10, 9ème Avenue, Tshopo.
On the night of 23 to 24 August 1998, the Provincial Director of the National Institute of
Social Security was abducted and kept in a secret location from 11 p.m. to 3 a.m.
Mr. Georges Ngoy received death threats on 10 September 1998 as he was leaving for
Plateau Médical to assess the damage caused to his family home occupied by soldiers.
II.2.5. Disappearances
Da Silva Figueiredo, 50, Portuguese, of 5, Avenue Lac Nyassa, Makiso; Osvaldo de Sousa
Queiroz, 38, Angolan, of 5, Avenue Lac Nyassa, Makiso; Miala Garcia, 40, Angolan, of
42b, Boulevard Lumumba, Makiso; Aires Queiroz Guinaires, 28, Angolan, of 42b, Boulevard
Lumumba, Makiso; Miguens Julio, 28, Angolan, of 42b, Boulevard Lumumba, Makiso; Leonel
Carlos de Sousa, 27, of 42b, Boulevard Lumumba, Makiso, and; Ribeiro Galvino Faustino, of
42b, Boulevard Lumumba, Makiso.
These were all businessmen who had come to invest in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and were awaiting the launch in Congo of their company, Bhagmek International.
Twenty-four hours after Kisangani was captured by the rebels, they received death threats from the
rebels because of Angola’s involvement in the conflict in the DRC. All of their property, including
that of their company, has been looted and to this day their homes are occupied by the assailants.
We know nothing about their fate or in what direction they may have fled. Tati Domingos, an
Angolan student in his first year studying educational science at the University of Kisangani, and
three of his compatriots are said to have disappeared under similar circumstances.
Mai-Mai child soldiers housed at Kisangani General Hospital (for health reasons) and at the
H Site in Mangobo (for training) are said to have disappeared. This would seem to be the result of
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their rearmament and recruitment to the Government forces to halt the advance of the rebel army
on Kisangani.
II.2.6. Looting
Kisangani has not yet totally recovered economically from the looting which took place
between September 1991 and December 1993. Since then only a few companies have kept going
and kept the local labour-force in employment. But now they have been dealt a fatal blow:
In the week of 24 to 30 August 1998, two giant logging companies, Amexbois and
Forestiere, were looted by soldiers. All of their stocks of processed timber and fuel, their vehicles
and the dynamos used to power the sawmills were taken away.
The following items were taken from the road transport office: 2,000 litres of diesel, all the
wages of the employees working in the province, and a large number of spare parts both from the
road centre and the ferry centre.
Soldiers broke into the central store, the central cash-desk and the offices of the managing
director and the chief accountant of Sorgeri. Livestock belonging to the company’s managers were
also slaughtered (200 pigs and a number of goats).
In Yanonge, about 58 km from Kisangani, the Agricultural Technical Institute and the
Mogoya Institute of Carpentry were looted. Typewriters, wood and clocks were taken away.
Benches were broken up and used as firewood.
In Yangambi, about 100 km from Kisangani, some of the premises of the National Institute
of Agronomics were looted and stripped of their corrugated metal cladding.
In Banalia, about 128 km from Kisangani, private homes belonging to people who had fled
into the bush, the Catholic mission and the general hospital were all looted.
II.2.7. Deterioration of health and humanitarian conditions and threats to medical workers
The insecurity and isolation of the city as a factor in the deterioration of health and
humanitarian conditions
(a) Insecurity
The two major hospital complexes in Kisangani, namely the university clinic and laboratory
and the general hospital, are in the Plateau Médical neighbourhood in Makiso.
Rebel soldiers with instructions to guard the military air-base at Simi-Simi overran the area
surrounding these hospitals making it difficult for health workers and the sick to move around in
the area. There was looting of the hospitals, humanitarian agencies, and stores of foodstuffs and
other urgently needed items, and certain medical workers were physically assaulted or threatened.
Inevitably this has meant that hospitals have been abandoned by patients and medical staff,
and humanitarian agencies, dispensaries and food warehouses and stores have been closed down.
(b) The city’s isolation
Kisangani is currently cut off from all of its sources of supplies, namely Kinshasa, the
interior, and the East (Goma, Bunia, Butembo, Bukavu, etc.). It now finds itself in complete
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isolation. As we explained above, the city does not have enough pharmaceutical stores or
dispensaries or stocks or stores of food to support the population for a long period of complete
isolation. Its main sources of supplies in medicines are the diocesan pharmacy, Mimco-Pharma and
the Pars pharmaceutical warehouse.
The following instances of infringements of the right to treatment and threats to medical
workers were recorded :
At the university clinic, on 24 August 1998, all the patients were forced to leave the hospital
because of the prevailing insecurity. Medical and paramedical staff came to work in some
apprehension. Some days later they realized that they too were in danger. On 26 August 1998,
Professor Wami Wifonga, the doctor in charge of the university clinic and a teacher at the
faculty of medicine was accosted in his office by three Tutsi and two Ugandan rebels. They
demanded money and medicines. By threatening him they succeeded in making off with a sum
of 200 US dollars and a large stock of medicine.
On 30 August 1998, Dr. Luka, a doctor at the department of gynaecology and obstetrics and
assistant at the faculty of medicine attempting to enter the university clinic at around 1 p.m.,
was apprehended by two armed persons with the physical features of Tutsis in the grounds of
the clinic itself and dragged into the bush towards the tuberculosis treatment centre where he
was subjected to inhuman treatment then stripped of his shoes, his shirt and a sum of
15 Congolese francs.
At around 7 p.m. on 3 September 1998, Dr. Lola Kisanga of the university clinic’s internal
medicine department was apprehended by 4 Ugandan soldiers in the grounds of the University
Institute of Agronomics as he was going from the clinic to the guest house. He was
immediately released.
On 19 September 1998, the faculty of medicine’s research laboratory and the university clinic’s
biochemical unit were systematically looted.
The following items were taken away:
4 photospectrometers;
6 electronic microscopes;
a large number of chemical reagents;
other extremely valuable items of equipment.
At the Kisangani General Hospital
Wards were occupied by the rebels;
Furniture was broken up and used as firewood;
A telegraph device belonging to the Kisangani branch of the Extended Vaccination Programme
(PEV) was seized, the unit’s activities were halted and the polio vaccination campaign due to
take place in August was suspended.
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At the Kisangani branch of the WHO
The home of the branch head doctor was occupied by rebel soldiers immediately after their
arrival in Kisangani (23 August 1998);
The WHO pharmaceutical store was looted;
Under threats, Ms Christine Sefu, the supervisor of the WHO Kisangani branch, was forced to
hand over the WHO’s vehicle to the rebels;
Kisangani UNICEF’s vehicle was also commandeered by rebels.
At Caritas Kisangani
Vehicles were commandeered to transport rebel soldiers to the front;
General hospitals at Lubunga and Ubundu (129 km from Kisangani) were looted;
Doctor Jean Mopepe, the head doctor at the Kisangani Orchid Clinic (COKIS) was threatened
because of his family links with Governor Jean Yagi Sitolo, who owns the clinic.
The water distribution company, REGIDESO, realised that the stock of inflowing water was
in the process of drying up and so it began supplying water for only six hours a day. The quality of
the water supplied to the public has now become questionable and there are fears that epidemics of
diarrhoeal diseases will break out (such as bacillary dysentery, salmonellosis, cholera, and
amoebiasis).
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Table 1: Prices of medicines before and after the rebel take-over of Kisangani
PRODUCT Price before the war Current price
20 aspirin tabs.
20 chloroquine tabs.
20 novalgine tabs.
10 quinine tabs.
1 flask of procaine penicillin
20 indocid tabs.
16 tetracycline caps. (250mg)
16 ampicillin caps. (250 mg)
16 chloramphenicol caps.
20 bactrim tabs.
1 single-use syringe
1 litre of glucose serum 5%
1 litre of NaCal 0.9%
1 Ampicillin 1g
1 flask Chloramphenicol
1 phial Quinine
1 phial Chloroquine
1 phial Dypirone
$ 0.13
$ 0.20
$ 0.16
$ 0.66
$ 0.53
$ 0.20
$ 0.33
$ 0.66
$ 0.66
$ 0.40
$ 0.13
$ 2.00
$ 1.66
$ 0.53
$ 0.53
$ 0.40
$ 0.16
$ 0.16
$ 0.66
$ 1.00
$ 0.66
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 0.66
$ 1.00
$ 1.66
$ 1.33
$ 1.00
$ 0.40
$ 5.33
$ 5.00
$ 1.33
$ 1.33
$ 1.00
$ 0.33
$ 0.50
N.B.: 1 US dollar ($) = 250,000 new zaïres (at the rate on 29 September 1998)
Prices are those which applied on 29 September 1998.
If no more medicines are supplied, prices are bound to continue rising.
Cost of treatment of a malaria crisis combined with a case of verminosis and urinary
infection (common in tropical Africa):
Doctor’s consultation fee — $ 1 to $ 2. 15 vials of quinine — $ 10.
5 litres of glucose serum — $ 5. 72 capsules of Ampicillin — $ 5.
3 vials of dypirone — $ 1. Hospitalization — $ 1 per day.
Nursing — $ 1 per day. Lab. tests — $ 5 (standard tests).
Laparotomy — $ 150-200.
(All prices quoted in US dollars).
Another point worth mentioning is that the arrival in Kisangani of Rwandan and Ugandan
soldiers from regions with a high incidence of AIDS and their licentious sex life is said to have led
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to an increase in the rate of HIV infection in Kisangani and all the other regions occupied by the
rebels.
II.2.8. Loss of material and social well-being
The people of Kisangani have experienced enormous social and economic difficulties since
23 August 1998. Shop owners and traders are now cut off from their main supply centres and,
though they still have stocks of some manufactured goods, they have been ruthlessly increasing
prices. The exchange rate has been soaring to such an extent that some economic agents have
decided simply to suspend their activities for a time, claiming that they fear looting if there is a
victorious counter-attack by the Government forces.
The two following tables show to what extent the economic situation has deteriorated:
(a) Exchange rates
Date Currency Equivalent in
new zaïres (NZ)
Equivalent in
Congolese francs
(FC)
Percentage
increase
01.07.98 $ 1.00 NZ 140,000 FC 1.40 -
01.08.98 $ 1.00 NZ 150,000 FC 1.50 10.71 per cent
23.08.98 $ 1.00 NZ 190,000 FC 1.90 13.57 per cent
27.09.98 $ 1.00 NZ 240,000 FC 2 .40 12.42 per cent
(b) Market prices
Article Price on 1 July 1998 Price on
23 August 1998
Price on
23 September 1998
72 cl of cooking oil NZ 25,000 NZ 60,000 NZ 75,000
1 kg of rice NZ 30,000 NZ 60,000 NZ 80,000
1 kg of sugar NZ 70,000 NZ 120,000 NZ 150,000
1 bar of soap NZ 35,000 NZ 65,000 NZ 80,000
The financial and monetary situation is far from stabilizing. The new authorities have
withdrawn considerable sums from the Kisangani Central Bank to cover the wages of State
employees, civil servants and soldiers — as well as FC 35,000 and NZ 70 billion ready for
incineration as part of the procedural measures for the monetary reform being carried out. As a
result the Congolese franc is increasingly declining in value and the dollar has now risen to
270,000 new zaïres. At the same time, there has been runaway inflation in the market prices of
manufactured goods. Attempts to offset losses (for instance, Beltexco has lost 24,000 US dollars
confiscated by the military and had large sums withdrawn from it by the civilian authorities) and a
substantial decrease in stocks are the causes of the price-rises.
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PART III:
THE ATTITUDE OF THE WARRING PARTIES TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES COMMITTED
III.1. The governmental authorities
After the appeals and speeches made to the public on the radio and the television identifying
the country’s aggressors as Rwandans and in response to the increasing hatred felt towards
Rwandans (civilians and soldiers), the local authorities appealed to the population to attack only
Rwandan soldiers. No judicial proceedings have been instituted against those who have carried out
abuses against Rwandan civilians.
III.2. The rebel authorities
Following the revenge attack by the rebel army on the population after the demonstration of
23 August1998, the military commander in Kisangani demanded apologies from the entire
community for the aberrations of some of its inhabitants. He also said that he had taken all the
necessary steps to ensure the security of persons and their property. However, no judicial
proceedings were instituted against those responsible.
A few days after the demonstrations of 23 August 1998, 5 and 10 centime bills were thrown
to the crowds from military vehicles at the roundabout on 15ème Avenue, Tshopo, the main market
and other points in the city centre.
Aiming to make civilians forget all their abuses and join the rebellion, the rebel authorities
distributed sums of 28 Congolese francs (US$10) to each participant at the end of their ideological
training seminar, 5 Congolese francs to each student at the University of Kisangani (about US$2)
and a large sum estimated at over US$300 to the members of an informal youth organization in
Mangobo called “The Children of the United States” for them to attend the meeting of the
RCD leader, Mr. Lunda Bululu.
PART IV:
THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE WAR
The current war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be compared to an iceberg:
The visible part is the rebellion against the Kabila Government and the conflict between the
Government’s allies and the rebels’ allies.
The invisible protagonists are the major foreign powers, economic and political lobbies, and
progressive Third-World forces.
The outcome of the war may alter a number of national, regional and international
parameters.
In the following sections we shall describe the situation on the ground, the reaction of the
inhabitants, and the steps taken by the international community to date, before going on to forecast
what may happen in the future.
IV.1. The power struggle — developments on the ground
Since hostilities began on 2 August 1998, the power struggle has divided the country into
two parts, namely the west, which is controlled by the Government forces and their allies, and the
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east, which is controlled by the rebel forces and their allies. However, the rebellion is gaining
ground in the east because Kabila’s allies are reluctant to engage in conflict here, not only through
lack of interest but also because they have misgivings about attacking the rebels’ allies so close to
their home bases.
IV.2. The inhabitants — their concerns and expectations
The Congolese are not used to war and so they mistrust the rebellion which they regard as
untimely, hybrid or even traitorous. What the war is revealing to them is the inability of Congolese
soldiers (whether from the Government or the rebels) to defend the country’s territorial integrity
and ensure them peace and security, the Congolese politicians’ insensitivity to their suffering and,
finally, the indifference of the international community.
IV.3. The efforts of the international community hesitant and inadequate
(from August to early October 1998)
The Government of the DRC alerted national and international opinion to the invasion of its
territory by Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Its emissaries to the United Nations, the OAU and other
international institutions made official complaints against Rwanda and Uganda but the response to
these complaints was slow, guarded or even mitigated.
Various reactions to the situation in the DRC have been expressed during regional or
international summits, conferences and meetings of heads of State and Government. The following
is a brief outline of the outcome of these meetings:
Victoria Falls Summit I
Instigated by President Mugabe under the auspices of the SADC, bringing together the
Heads of State of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Namibia.
Outcome: disagreement between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda over the aggression.
Summit of non-aligned countries held in Durban, South Africa
This summit, presided over by Nelson Mandela, was attended by representatives of all the
countries at war in the DRC (DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda) as well as
leaders of other non-aligned countries (e.g., Fidel Castro) and the United Nations
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.
Outcome:
Acknowledgement of an act of aggression against the DRC though the names of the assailants
were not cited;
Appointment of President Mandela as mediator in the Congolese crisis.
United Nations Security Council
The member States of the United Nations Security Council acknowledged that the DRC was
being attacked by foreign powers without naming them. They appealed for respect for the territorial
integrity of the DRC.
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Victoria Falls Summit II
Presided over by the Zambian president, Frederick Chilupa, this summit brought together the
Heads of State of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, a representative of the Angolan
president, and the Secretary-General of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim. The Zambian president
went back and forth between the meeting room of the Heads of State and the room assigned to the
rebel delegation, led by Mr. Z’Haidi Ngoma and Mr. Bizima Karaha;
Outcome:
No agreement over the act of aggression against the DRC;
Acceptance of the principle that foreign troops should be withdrawn.
Addis-Ababa Conference
Conference bringing together the ministers of defence of all the countries involved in the
conflict. The DRC was represented by its minister of foreign affairs.
Outcome:
No agreement on the arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign troops.
Mauritius Summit
Summit called by the SADC to discuss its members’ economic problems. The Congolese
crisis was one of the items on the agenda.
Outcome:
Failure to agree that there had been an act of aggression against the Congo;
Reinforcement of the military positions of President Kabila’s allies;
Doubts expressed over President Mandela by President Mugabe.
Libreville Summit
Summit called by the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, bringing together the Heads of State
of Central Africa to examine the Congolese crisis.
Outcome:
Acknowledgement that foreign forces had attacked the DRC;
Contacts established by the Kinshasa Government with other Central African countries and
France;
Acceptance of Chad’s military involvement in the DRC.
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Tripoli meetings and the Qaddafi Intervention Force Plan (involving Chad, Niger and
Eritrea)
President Qaddafi met President Kabila of the DRC and President Museveni of Uganda in
turn and listened to each leader’s views on the crisis. Following this he met the presidents of Chad,
Niger and Eritrea.
Outcome:
Proposal to withdraw all foreign forces from the DRC;
Proposal to post a neutral intervention force (provided by Chad, Niger and Eritrea) along the
entire length of the border between Rwanda and Uganda and Congo and Uganda.
This realistic plan does not seem to have earned the support of the international community.
European Union
The EU special envoy to the Great Lakes region has met the presidents of the DRC, Rwanda,
Uganda and Angola.
Outcome:
All the countries allied to the warring parties wish to secure their frontiers;
The possibility of holding an international conference was raised.
United States Ambassador to the DRC
On 14 October 1998, having met President Kabila in Lubumbashi, the United States
Ambassador acknowledged that the DRC had been invaded by foreign forces.
IV.4. The future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The current régimes in Kigali, Kampala and Kinshasa, which are the products of the force of
arms and rebel alliances of the past, have failed to find democratic solutions to their political,
economic and social problems and so they find themselves at war.
Therefore, the political fate of the DRC is inextricably tied up with that of its neighbours in
the region. It will be determined by the outcome of a war with international ramifications between
enemies who seem to spurn human rights and the rights of peoples.
A. In the event of the military victory of President Kabila
Kabila’s plus-points
If President Kabila brings democracy to the country, as he frequently says he will, he will be
able to mobilize the Congolese people around the major reforms required for national
reconstruction. He draws the legitimacy for his power and his charisma from three aspects:
(a) The success of his armed insurrection against the neo-patrimonial and dictatorial régime of
President Mobutu, which was demonized and called into question for its political, economic
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and social practices. As the sworn enemy of Mobutu, the public regard him as the liberator of
the Congolese people, the leading figure of a new era in Congolese politics which will make
the decaying Congolese State a prosperous, powerful State governed by the rule of law.
(b) The success of his struggle against the Tutsi bid for total power. Is this an ideological
smoke-screen or a sociological reality? Notwithstanding, the president’s rhetoric on this subject
has met with substantial support from the Congolese people and is used to legitimize the
Government’s war against the rebels.
(c) The Kabila Government’s attempts to improve the social and economic situation, particularly
in the area of combating immoral practices (corruption, embezzlement and harassment),
rehabilitating and improving the apparatus of the State, and curbing inflation, have raised hopes
among the population.
Dangers to be avoided
President Kabila’s autocratic reflexes mean that we should be sceptical about his claims to
have been converted to the democratic management methods of the modern State. They point to a
number of potential dangers that must be avoided, namely the possibility that the head of State will
be granted absolute power, that the Tutsis will be totally excluded and that more armed conflicts
will emerge in the region.
(a) The absolutism of the head of State
While the DRC is at war, the self-proclaimed president, Mr. Kabila, who is hostile to
multiparty politics, remains the official lone decision-making authority to whom all appeals must
be addressed. After the war, it may be prudent to establish legal and political safeguards to counter
the authoritarian impulses which the growing personality cult around him seems to be fostering in
the mind of the AFDL leader. The best democratic ingredients for a transition period heralding a
third democratic republic would be a multiparty system based on clearly established laws and
mechanisms for the consultation of the head of State on the future of the nation.
(b) The total exclusion of the Tutsis and a conflagration in the Great Lakes region
Since the outbreak of the rebellion, in the national and international press and on national
television, President Kabila has been accusing the governments in Kigali and Kampala of
aggression, stating that Tutsi ideas of hegemony over the Congo and its sphere of influence are a
delusion, and threatening to take the war back to where it came from, namely Uganda and Rwanda.
Ethnic arguments are clearly being deployed: the Tutsis in the Congo are coming under
attack while Rwandan rebels (mostly Hutu) and some Ugandans (at least according to the
accusations of the leaders of the rebellion against Kabila) have joined Kabila’s Government troops.
The Kabila Government is thought to pose a serious threat to the Rwandan and Ugandan régimes.
If no precautions are taken and Kabila wins the war, there could be an exodus of Tutsis, exporting
the war to Uganda and Rwanda and possibly even undermining their governments.
B. If the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) were actually to take power
Advantages
The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) arose from various divisions within the AFDL
and, though it claims to be in favour of democratizing the DRC’s political institutions, it has
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decided to attempt to wrest power through an armed rebellion driven by Ugandan and Rwandan
Government forces. The following advantages could result from its actually taking power:
the potential for political liberalism stemming from the absence within the movement of a
charismatic civil or military leader who cannot be ignored though this does not rule out the
possibility that the Government will be dominated by an RCD oligarchy;
special measures to protect a Tutsi minority threatened with extermination or exile;
peaceful co-existence between the region’s régimes through the reciprocal elimination of rebel
movements in each country.
Drawbacks
The RCD is considered by most Congolese to be of strict Tutsi allegiance and pieced
together from the cast-offs of the disreputable former Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) and so any
régime it sets up is likely to be unpopular and have difficulty in forming a Congolese national army
capable of winning the confidence of the Congolese people.
It will be constantly faced with the aggravated hatred of certain sections of the native
Congolese population towards the Tutsi minority living in the Congo.
If the RCD were to fail in rendering the Ugandan and Rwandan Hutu rebel movements
working from Congo inoperative, its current Ugandan and Rwandan allies would engage in war
against it.
C. In the event of a negotiated settlement
Advantages
The DRC is a State in need of reconstruction and war is synonymous with destruction. The
country requires a consensual and peaceful context for its development and therefore a negotiated
settlement discarding all violence seems the most productive approach to its future.
Jointly negotiated settlements relating to the various issues over which the warring parties
have been fighting may create the conditions for the redistribution of power between the internal
forces involved (AFDL, RCD, opposition parties and civil society) thus preventing the State from
being treated as an item of private property.
They may also establish a new equilibrium within the region, dictated by the desire to
stabilize international relationships with the sole aim of promoting development for the well-being
of the people living in the States in question.
The shortcomings of a negotiated settlement
In its attempts, via the various aforementioned summits, to reach a negotiated settlement to
the conflict, the international community wishes to apply the principles of collective responsibility
which place a premium on human fellowship or the interdependence of States with a view to
pooling everyone’s efforts to establish harmonious international relations.
But in seeking a negotiated settlement, peace-brokers tend to reconcile the warring parties
without insisting on the civil and political rights that can be invoked against the State. This
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situation tends to facilitate the survival of authoritarian régimes incapable of establishing and
upholding their citizens’ civil and political rights.
The principle of the right of all peoples to self-determination formally established in
resolution 1514 (XV) of the United Nations General Assembly in December 1960 gave a boost to
the process of decolonization in Africa. Today, however, it nurtures and protects Africa’s
dictatorships; national leaders who hold this kind of power can uphold one another for the duration
of their régimes (Mr. Mobutu was a master at this). This explains the covert existence of certain
regional or sub-regional organizations in Africa. Under these conditions it seems warranted to
invoke the duty of third parties to intervene every time democracy is threatened and the rights of
individuals and peoples are violated.
As things stand, even if there were a negotiated settlement reconciling the Government in
Kinshasa with the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, the problem of the legitimacy of all three
régimes would remain.
Therefore, the future of the DRC will depend on its capacity to build a democratic State
which will successfully fulfil its strategic geographical role at the heart of Africa while respecting
the rights of individuals, citizens and other peoples.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Between 17 May 1997, when President Kabila came to power, and the outbreak of the
rebellion in early August 1998, the state of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo was still a cause for concern. Not only were political parties
suspended and some of their leaders thrown in prison and human rights organizations threatened
but also, and above all, the Government of the DRC failed to show any real desire to prosecute the
perpetrators of certain widespread, blatant and systematic violations of human rights committed on
its territory.
The current war between the Government of the DRC and the rebel troops led by the
Congolese Rally for Democracy has aggravated the human rights situation. The war involves not
only internal Congolese forces but also Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces who have joined the
rebel side to overthrow the Kabila Government and hence, it is claimed, to protect their frontiers
and the endangered Tutsi minority.
During the conflict, Government forces have carried out summary executions, arbitrary
arrests and other acts liable to trouble people’s consciences, but the rebels for their part have
resorted to the physical elimination or inhuman treatment of civilian populations attempting to
resist them, the extortion of private and public property in various forms, corruption, favouritism
and looting of public funds and property, thus adding to the people’s destitution.
It is because of its alarm at this continuing deterioration of the human rights situation and
upsurge of violence which are inexorably dragging the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the
brink of chaos and are liable to inflame not only the Great Lakes region but also the whole of
Central Africa, and because it is anxious for the rule of law to be established in the DRC, that the
Lotus Group makes the following recommendations:
To the Congolese Government:
to agree to negotiate with all the conflicting parties and to convene, as soon as possible, a
political round table meeting to examine and establish the procedure for this negotiation but
also to rekindle the democratic process and promote national reconciliation;
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to make protection of and respect for human rights one of the Government’s priorities with a
view to establishing the rule of law in the DRC;
to take legislative and social steps for the establishment of an independent, impartial judiciary;
to pursue an open and active co-operation policy with national and international human rights
organizations working to prevent, investigate and punish human rights violations and with
humanitarian aid organizations wishing to help the people of Congo;
to devise a realistic and effective strategy to prevent the unchecked distribution and trafficking
of arms in the country.
To the rebel authorities:
to halt their advance and negotiate with the Government of the DRC;
to protect civilians and all victims of the armed conflict in accordance with international
humanitarian law and national legislation;
to improve the social and economic situation of the people under their control by opening up
new channels for the supply of raw materials and manufactured goods;
to co-operate with international organizations to remedy the current emergency situation in
Kisangani;
to ensure that the territorial integrity of the DRC and its national heritage are protected.
To Congolese civil society:
to encourage all the warring parties to negotiate to avoid a military victory which might rule
out any hope of national reconciliation;
to encourage all the warring parties to respect human rights, international humanitarian law,
territorial integrity and the national heritage;
to provide the necessary assistance to victims of human rights violations;
to perform its duty to remember and testify to all the acts of oppression and violations
committed by the warring parties.
To the international community:
to bring all the conflicting parties to the negotiating table to end a war which is costing an
enormous amount, both financially and in terms of human lives;
to hold the warring parties accountable for the deterioration of the human rights situation in the
DRC;
to ensure that the compromises negotiated at the summits held thus far with a view to settling
the Congolese conflict are observed;
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to provide humanitarian aid to the Congolese people with the help of non-governmental food
and health organizations;
to ensure that the DRC’s territorial integrity is respected;
to call an international conference to resolve the thorny question of security in the Great Lakes
region.
Done in Kisangani, 15 October 1998
Gilbert Kalinde ABELI, Dismas Kitenge SENGA,
Secretary. Chair.
___________
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APPENDIX 1
Full text of Constitutional Decree No. 3 of 27 May 1997 on the organization and exercise of
power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The President of the Republic,
Having regard to the seizure of power by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Congo (AFDL) on 17 May 1997;
Having regard to the need for emergency measures;
Decrees the following:
Part I General provisions
Art. 1. Until the Transitional Constitution is adopted by the Constituent Assembly, the
organization and exercise of power shall be governed by the present Constitutional Decree.
Art. 2. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the exercise of individual and collective
rights and freedoms shall be guaranteed subject to respect for the law, public order and morality.
Part II The institutions of the Republic
Art. 3. The institutions of the Republic are:
1. The President of the Republic;
2. The Government;
3. The courts.
Section I The President of the Republic
Art. 4. The President of the Republic is the Head of State. He represents the nation.
Art. 5. The President of the Republic shall exercise legislative power by issuing legislative
decrees discussed with the cabinet. He is the head of the executive and the armed forces. He shall
exercise his power to make regulations by issuing decrees. He is entitled to strike coins and issue
paper money in accordance with the law.
Art. 6. The President of the Republic shall appoint, relieve of their duties and, where
appropriate, dismiss on the proposal of the Government: ambassadors and special envoys,
governors and vice-governors of provinces, senior officers and generals of the army, executive
officers in the management of public services, and acting and non-acting administrators of State
enterprises and public bodies. He shall appoint, relieve of their duties and, where appropriate,
dismiss on the proposal of the judicial service commission, judges and public prosecutors.
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Art. 7. The President of the Republic shall accredit ambassadors and special envoys to
foreign States and international organizations. Foreign ambassadors and special envoys shall be
accredited to the President.
Section II The Government
Art. 8. The Government shall carry out the national policy laid down by the President of the
Republic. It shall execute the laws of the Republic and the decrees of the head of State. It shall
negotiate international agreements under the authority of the head of State. It has the civil service
and the army at its disposal.
Art. 9. The Government shall meet in a cabinet meeting presided over by the head of State or
one of its own members with delegated powers.
Art. 10. Ministers shall be accountable for the management of their ministries to the
President of the Republic. They shall enact laws by means of orders.
Section III The courts
Art. 11. The courts form the judiciary. The judiciary shall be independent from the
legislative and the executive.
Art. 12. The task of hearing and determining cases shall be assigned to the courts. Judges
shall be independent in the discharge of these functions and, in so doing, shall be subject only to
the authority of the law.
Chapter III — Final provisions
Art. 13. Provided that they are not at variance with the provisions of the present
constitutional decree, statutes and regulations existing prior to the date of its promulgation shall
remain in force until such time as they are repealed.
Art. 14. All former constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions at variance with the
present constitutional decree are hereby repealed.
Art. 15. The present constitutional decree shall come into force on the date of its
promulgation.
Done in Kinshasa on 28 May 1998
Laurent-Désiré KABILA,
President of the Republic.
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APPENDIX 2
Chronology of events in Kisangani
August 1998
4-6 August
Fighting between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis at Bangboka airport,
the Canon roundabout and military headquarters.
Incorporation of former FAZ soldiers re-educated at Base Camp (11 km from the town centre
on the road to the airport) into the Congolese Armed Forces.
Summary executions and murders.
10 August
Civilian march to express anger against Rwandan aggression against the DRC (about
3,000 participants).
7 to 23 August
Curfew throughout the city every day from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m.
Distribution of weapons to young Mai-Mai soldiers based at H site (a half-built General
Hospital building) and the former Mangobo orphanage.
Rwandans and their “Congolese accomplices” arrested and detained at military headquarters,
the National Intelligence Agency and the former lockup of the Mangobo BSRS; some are
transferred to the Congo-SEP warehouse (about 7 km along the road to Yangambi).
23 August The city is taken over by the rebels.
26 and 27 August
Demonstrations (in the form of marches) in a number of the city’s districts (Tshopo, Mangobo
and Kabondo) provoked by the rebel soldiers’ attempt to commandeer a car belonging to the
priests of the church of the sacred heart in Tshopo.
Six rebel soldiers are killed.
Revenge attacks by the rebel soldiers on the civilian population (1 death in Tshopo, 5 in
Kabondo, and 2 in Mangobo).
29 August Arrival of the rebels’ political delegation led by Mr. Joseph Mudumbi, the RCD’s
officer for internal affairs and administration.
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September 1998
26 September
Meeting between the RCD leader, Mr. Lunda Bululu, and the inhabitants of Kisangani.
Appointment and presentation of the Governor of Orientale province (Prof. L. Bene Kabala),
his Vice-Governor (Adèle Lotshove) and the new mayor of Kisangani (Mr. Gabriel Boondo
Lotika) to replace the former authorities who had fled.
___________
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ANNEX 13.2
Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within the Rebel Alliances and Factions in
North-Eastern Congo. The Kisangani War, September 1999
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 13.3
Lotus Group, Conflict between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani,
Kisangani, May 2000
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 13.4
Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, July 2000
[Annex not translated]
___________
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ANNEX 13.5
South Kivu Civil Society — Collective of South Kivu (DRC) Youth Organizations and
Associations (COJESKI), Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC — large-scale
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law reaching fever pitch,
Six-monthly report covering the period from 1 April to 30 September 1999,
October 1999
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South Kivu Civil Society — Collective of South Kivu (DRC) Youth Organizations
and Associations (COJESKI), Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC —
large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
reaching fever pitch, Six-monthly report covering the period from
1 April to 30 September 1999, October 1999
[Translation]
CONTENT
0.0 General introduction
0.1. Overview of the humanitarian crisis in the occupied provinces of the DRC
I. The human rights situation in South Kivu Province
I.1 Infringement of the DRC’s sovereignty and integrity
I.1.1. Joint communiqué on the twinning and co-operation agreement between
South Kivu Province and the prefecture of the city of Kigali
I.1.2. Twinning and co-operation agreement between South Kivu Province and
the prefecture of the city of Kigali
I.1.3. Membership and report of the urban planning and housing committee
I.1.4. Report of the transport and communications committee
I.1.5. Report on the workshop activities of the political and security committee
I.1.6. Committee on agriculture, stock-breeding, environment and tourism
I.1.7. Report on the workshop activities of the committee on the economy, trade
and industry
I.1.8. Socio-cultural workshop
I.1.9. Overall conclusion
I.2. Infringements of the right to life and casual killing
I.3. Arbitrary arrest, abductions and unlawful detention
I.4. General insecurity
I.4.1. The army and the police of the DRC under the Rwandan, Burundian and
Ugandan occupation
I.5. Restrictions on freedom of expression and denial of the right to information
I.5.1. Radio Maendoleo, Bukavu
I.5.2. Human rights organizations
I.5.3. Members of the South Kivu Civil Society
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I.6. Abuse of political power
I.7. Incitement to tribal hatred
I.8. Vicious, barbaric destruction
II. The human rights situation in North Kivu Province (focusing exclusively on Masisi
Territory)
II.1. Infringements of the right to life and casual killing
II.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention and abductions
II.3. General insecurity
II.4. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
III. The human rights situation in Orientale Province
III.1 Overview of the situation from 1 January to 30 March 1999 (for publication)
III.1.1. Infringement of human dignity/sabotage of the right to a wage
III.1.2. Absence of the right to medical treatment
III.1.3. Absence of the right to education
III.1.4. Insecurity and police harassment
III.1.5. Abductions
III.1.6. Extortion and summary executions
III.1.7. The repercussions of the bombing of Kisangani on 10 January 1999
III.2. The fighting in Kisangani: an outrage against peace and telling evidence of
international collusion in the current crisis in the Congo
III.2.1. General introduction
III.2.2. The position of the allies and the consequences of the fighting between
the Rwandan and Ugandan armies on Congolese soil
III.3. The former Mai-Mai militia being wiped out in Kisangani, Orientale Province
IV. The human rights situation in the occupied part of Katanga Province
IV.1. Killings in Kongolo, Northern Katanga
IV.2. Killings in Kimbumbu and Nonge Territories, Northern Katanga
IV.3. Massacres at Kasala and Malembankulu in Upper Lomami, Katanga
Overall conclusion
Sources
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0.0. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The occupied provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are still enduring the
harmful consequences of disastrous and/or rapacious management of their human and material
resources by the armed forces of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, who are now acknowledged by the
international community to have invaded the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
From April to September 1999, large-scale violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law reached fever pitch in this disaster-stricken part of the country.
This half-yearly report, which also describes the incidents reported, is the logical follow-up
to the following reports published by the Collective of South Kivu Youth Organizations and
Associations (COJESKI) since the invasion of the DRC on 2 August 1998:
1. Overview of large-scale human rights violations during the first three months of occupation in
South Kivu, DRC (COJESKI report published on 20 November 1998);
2. Five months of invasion in the DRC: human rights in peril in the occupied provinces of eastern
Congo. The case of Orientale province, South Kivu province and North Kivu province. (Report
describing events between 2 August 1998 and 3 January 1999, published on 10 January 1999).
3. Human tragedy in Kivu, DRC. The apocalyptic human rights situation between 1 January and
31 March 1999. (Quarterly report published on 15 May 1999).
4. The role of Burundi in the large-scale human rights violations in Kivu, DRC. (Report submitted
by three of COJESKI’s human rights militants following eight months living under cover in
Burundi, published on 27 August 1999).
5. No to the Balkanization, the abandonment and the protectorate of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (2nd COJESKI memorandum sent to the United Nations Secretary-General in
New York and published on 18 September 1999).
Compendium of information on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and its impact on the DRC
over the following five years (encoded documents made public on 27 October 1999). Compendium
produced in close co-operation with the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events (IPEP, OAU).
The present report relates solely to the occupied provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu,
northern Katanga and Orientale province and hence covers the following main subject areas:
infringements of the right to life and casual killing;
arbitrary arrest, abduction and unlawful detention;
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment;
widespread insecurity and police harassment;
restrictions on freedom of expression;
impunity and abuse of public office;
incitement to tribal hatred;
wilful destruction and extortion;
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murder and summary execution.
These problems clearly illustrate the tragic circumstances and the tyrannical conditions under
which millions of Congolese inhabitants in the occupied provinces continue to pay the price of an
unjust war. And all of this is happening under the complicitous gaze of the international community
which is directly and implicitly responsible for the Balkanization and the current invasion of the
DRC and all its present and future repercussions.
0.1. Overview of the humanitarian crisis in the
occupied provinces of the DRC
When finalizing the report of the CADDHOM (the Collective of Actions for Human Rights
Development) published in August 1999, we observed that after one year of occupation and
rebellion in Kivu the situation was catastrophic. Some 6,000 civilians had been massacred and/or
murdered, more than 500 had disappeared, there were thousands of refugees and displaced persons,
and hundreds of community leaders, human rights militants and priests had been forced into exile.
Millions of dollars-worth of equipment and property had been looted or destroyed, thus
condemning 10 million people to sickness, famine, destitution, and anguish, or, in short, death.
The international community (the United Nations, European Union and OAU) knows this.
But it has made itself an accessory to the crimes against humanity being committed in Kivu
through its allegiance to “Tutsiism” and centres of economic power which manipulate the truth so
as to continue to be able to take advantage of the trafficking organized by the rebels and the
occupying forces, thereby establishing a Mafia threatening peace throughout the Great Lakes
region. It has tried tentatively to uphold respect for the Lusaka peace accords signed by the warring
parties but has taken no practical action.
The result has been a hecatomb. Looting and stealing have destroyed the social and
economic fabric and the environment, and mass murder, repression, summary executions and
kidnapping have become the norm among the warlords who rule the DRC’s occupied provinces.
The administration of the population is based on terror, financial interests take precedence
over the law and ethnic prejudice and major human rights violations have become the everyday lot
of the people. Despite the advances of the occupiers and the rebels in the provinces of Kasaï,
Equateur and Katanga, they do not yet control the whole of Kivu; half the region remains in the
hands of the Mai-Mai resistance and so Kivu is divided into two parts, each with its own leaders,
laws and administration. Total confusion reigns.
On the social and economic front, most of the rural population now lives in the bush where
they have fled to escape punishment from one side or the other. Having abandoned their villages
and fields, they now have to contend with famine and illness and live like wild animals. Boys have
all left school and enrolled in the rebel forces or the Mai-Mai resistance for their safety and
survival. Girls are forced into prostitution from the age of 12 on. There are no more wages to be
had. Shopkeepers are gradually becoming bankrupt. Bartering has become the norm and seasonal
food shortages affect every corner of the occupied provinces. The people are now living in a
situation of indescribable poverty.
Thus, the RCD’s war, instead of resolving social problems and the problems of ethnic
coexistence, has widened the gap between the various ethnic groups more than ever, increasing the
number of barriers and fostering suspicion, fear and hatred.
The fact that new flags were raised over Kivu on 30 June 1999, Congo-Kinshasa’s
independence day, appeared to bear out the native population’s suspicions that Rwanda has
expansionist aims in the Congo.
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On the health front
The situation is terrible. There are practically no more medical or health centres and where
they do exist, most have become no more than refuges for the dying in which pharmaceutical
products are an unusual rarity. The population gets its supplies from travelling traders with no
medical training who sell products which are often poorly preserved and come in unspecified doses
carrying the risk of intoxication. Epidemiological monitoring services have ceased to exist. There
has been an upsurge in certain illnesses including AIDS, cholera, bloody diarrhoea, meningitis,
poliomyelitis, and all the other parasitic, endemic and malnutrition-related diseases. There are no
more medicines for lepers and tuberculosis patients and some have had to interrupt their treatment
for want of supplies. The only relief lies in traditional medicine and fetishism. The most vulnerable
groups are the elderly, pregnant women, children and young people. The result is that the victims
run into their thousands.
On the political front
The rebellion is unpopular. It has no support among the inhabitants of the occupied zones. It
is riddled with internal strife. The security of people and their property, for which the rebels once
claimed to be fighting have been forgotten. The rebels have no democratic values and no plans for
the social and economic recovery of the occupied zones.
On the religious front
Relations with the church, particularly the Roman Catholic church, can hardly be said to be
set fair. Since the death of the Archbishop of Bukavu (DRC), Monsignor Christophe Munzinhirwa,
SJ, on 29 October 1996, the list of clerics who have been killed has kept on growing. It includes
4 priests, 1 deacon, 3 nuns killed in Uvira, 3 others in Bukavu, 2 in Goma and 8 priests and
3 Rwandan nuns killed in Kalima (Kasongo/Maniema). 4 nuns have also been raped. Many
churches have been desecrated and ransacked (including Kasika, Fizi, and Sange). Convents have
been burgled and stripped of everything in the presence of their congregations. These incidents
appear to herald a new persecution of the church. Many priests and ministers now live in exile or in
hiding in their own country. Eastern DRC has become a powder-keg. It has become the battlefield
of eight armies, a dozen militias and any number of secret armies. Human rights are suffering
enormously on account of this. The social and economic fabric has been largely eaten away and
moral and religious values tarnished. The people are at the mercy of the warring parties. And all of
this is happening under the culpable eyes of the international community.
I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE
I.1. Infringement of the DRC’s sovereignty and integrity
Negotiations were going well in Lusaka when, in Kivu, the RCD and Kigali hoisted new
flags signalling the secession of the province. This was too much for the inhabitants to take. On
30 June 1999, under the auspices of COJESKI (the Collective of South Kivu Youth Organizations
and Associations) a peaceful protest march was held in Bukavu ending with the destruction of all
the flags by the crowd.
Kigali’s actions are also a violation of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights
and even the UN Charter.
Without further ado, here is the entire text of the joint communiqué on the twinning and
co-operation agreement between South Kivu province and the Prefecture of the city of Kigali
which amounts to the annexation of South Kivu to Rwanda under another name.
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I.1.1. Joint communiqué on the Twinning and co-operation agreement between South Kivu
Province and the prefecture of the city of Kigali
At the invitation of the administration of the Prefecture of the city of Kigali, represented by
the prefect, Mr. Marc Kabandana, a delegation from South Kivu Province led by his excellency,
Norbert Bazengezi Katintima, the governor of the province, conducted a working visit to Kigali
from 21 to 24 August 1999.
The visit was in connection with the twinning and co-operation agreement between the two
administrative bodies.
The meetings were held at the Hotel Windsor Umubano, opened by his excellency,
Désiré Nyandwi, the Minister for Local Government Affairs of the Rwandan National Union
government, and attended by Mrs. Constance Mukayuhi Rwaka, Secretary General of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Regional Co-operation.
The meeting was also attended by representatives of various administrative, social and
economic institutions.
Over the four working days the participants discussed the following six key areas of activity:
Economy, trade and industry;
Transport and communication;
Social and cultural matters;
Agriculture, stock-breeding, fishing, tourism and the environment;
Town planning and housing;
Politics and security.
The opening ceremony was followed by a plenary session during which a working method
was adopted.
Participants divided up the work according to their areas of expertise and appointed the
various committees.
The following recommendations emerged from the work of the committees.
1. In the area of the economy, trade and industry
The two parties undertake to:
simplify customs formalities;
promote training and exchange;
co-operate in the investigative activities of our customs authorities;
exchange all necessary information to combat fraud, which only benefits individuals;
harmonize customs rules;
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hold training seminars and colloquies to improve customs techniques;
hold regular meetings between the customs authorities and the economic agents of the two
entities;
facilitate regular meetings between the customs authorities and economic agents of the two
entities;
support private or semi-public property companies carrying out development or construction
projects.
6. In the area of politics and security
provide the people with a general and political education;
support the principle of regional co-operation;
establish a standing joint security committee;
foster good governance and take thorough measures against impunity;
see to it that this twinning arrangement acts as a bridge between the two states;
combat the mutual feeling of mistrust and suspicion by promoting joint training in the areas of
policing, security, political management and the retraining of soldiers;
hold seminars for administrative officials from South Kivu province and the Prefecture of the
City of Kigali.
Done in Kigali on 24 August 1999
I.1.2. Twinning and co-operation agreement between South Kivu Province and the Prefecture
of the City of Kigali
The Province of South Kivu, represented by its GOVERNOR;
And:
The Prefecture of the city of Kigali, represented by its PREFECT;
Having regard to the historical links between the two peoples;
Having regard to the proximity of the Province of South Kivu to the Rwandan Republic;
Considering the need for complementarity between the two administrative entities;
In view of the need for economic, social and cultural development;
Wishing to preserve lasting security by means of sound policies;
Bearing in mind the phenomena of sub-regional interdependence;
Considering the freely expressed wishes of both parties;
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HAVE AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Article 1
The Province of South Kivu and the Prefecture of the City of Kigali undertake to co-operate
and facilitate direct meetings between their inhabitants to exchange views on the following matters:
1. The economy, trade and industry;
2. Transport and communication;
3. Social and cultural affairs;
4. Agriculture, stock-breeding, fishing, the environment and tourism;
5. Town planning and housing;
6. Politics and security.
1. The economy, trade and industry
Revitalize industrial activities as far as we are able;
Simplify customs procedures;
Introduce a concerted policy to combat fraud;
Increase co-operation between our two Chambers of Commerce;
Breathe new life into the services sector.
2. Transport and communication
Pool experiences;
Encourage investment by the public and/or private sectors;
Promote new communication technologies;
Facilitate the use of existing infrastructure.
3. Social and cultural affairs
Pool information and share experiences;
Foster the emergence of a spirit of peace, unity and reconciliation;
Facilitate exchanges in the area of training, education and research;
Collaborate in the area of preventive and curative health;
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Support the promotion, organization and dissemination of cultural and sporting activities;
Foster the emergence of a responsible free press.
Article 4
This twinning and co-operation arrangement shall last for an unspecified period.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the duly authorized representatives have signed the present
agreement.
There shall be two original copies of this agreement.
Done in Kigali on 24 August 1999.
FOR THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH FOR THE PREFECTURE OF THE
KIVU CITY OF KIGALI
Norbert Basengezi Katintima Marc Kabandana
GOVERNOR PREFECT
I.1.3. Membership and report of the committee on town planning and housing
The committee had 7 members:
1. Thadée Mutware Chair (Rwanda)
2. Ms Louise Mujijima Secretary (Rwanda)
3. Mushengezi Nyamuhama (South Kivu)
4. Jean-Pierre Babulimo Banga (South Kivu)
5. Butera Bazimya (Rwanda)
6. Léonard Sesonga (Rwanda)
7. André Ijambao Sema
8. Callixte Kanamugire (Rwanda)
In the context of the twinning arrangement the question of town planning was addressed
from the three following angles:
1. The importance of town planning as a whole;
2. The current town-planning situation in Bukavu and Kigali;
3. Recommendations.
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1. The importance of town planning as a whole;
To ensure that the discussions started with everyone talking the same language, the
committee began by defining town planning, which it described as a science, an art and a series of
techniques which result in the appropriate management of the urban environment.
Town planning can be divided into three main projects:
(i) devising land-use plans;
(ii) development and implementation;
(iii) management of available spaces.
2. The current town-planning situation in Bukavu and Kigali
(a) Bukavu
Town-planning in Bukavu can be divided into three periods:
The colonial period: Everything was planned, there were town-planning documents and urban
management as a whole was good; in other words town-planning legislation was respected.
The period of the Mobutu regime: Initially, good management practices continued. However in
around 1975 anarchy began to set in, legislation relating to land use was no longer respected,
government officials were no longer paid and the situation affected town-planning as well.
For their own survival, town-planning officials began to hand out unallotted plots of land in
exchange for commissions. A flight from the countryside gave rise to unplanned
neighbourhoods in Bukavu.
The present time: Between the war of 1996 and the present, the new authorities have merely
been dealing with the consequences of the situation described above. To date, there have not
been enough funds available to be able to remedy the urban planning mistakes of previous
regimes.
(b) Kigali
Generally speaking, the town-planning situation in Kigali is practically the same as that in
Bukavu (unplanned neighbourhoods, non-existent or inadequate social amenities such as roads,
drinking water, electricity, drainage, etc.).
3. Recommendations
A national housing policy should be devised and implemented;
Documentation centres should be set up enabling documentary information to be exchanged;
An exchange programme should be established by means of:
training visits by municipal experts;
exchanges in the field of academic education;
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exchanges of experts in the context of bilateral co-operation (land management and
planning).
The property market should be opened up to investors and businessmen;
Spaces should be set aside for monuments and green spaces intended to improve relations
between the two regions and works to be created symbolizing their history.
I.1.4. Report of the committee on transport and communication
The committee had five members:
1. Morisho Selemani Chair of the Committee (South Kivu)
2. Innocent Rwagasore Secretary of the Committee (Rwanda)
3. Mulonda Wilolwa Member (South Kivu)
4. Jean-Pierre Kayihura Member (Rwanda)
5. Maussen Irankunda Member (Rwanda)
The problems in this sector are linked to basic infrastructure and use.
I. Transport
(a) Land transport
Infrastructure
The parties agree that there is a road between Kigali and Bukavu and that it is in good
condition. There is also a national road from Kigali to Uvira (via the Ngomo escarpment) which is
a dirt road but well maintained. Uvira can also be reached via Bugarama and Kamaniola.
South Kivu is in the process of repairing its regional roads and this will make it possible, in
the framework of this twinning agreement, to link Kigali to the interior of South Kivu province.
The two parties recommend harmonizing road building standards in respect of axle loads as well as
exchanges between experts on the subject of repairs to infrastructure.
Use
The two parties noted that the road is used in one direction only and to a much greater extent
in Rwanda (by private and public transport).
Unfortunately, transport usually stops in Cyangungu. As part of the twinning arrangement
the parties hope that Rwandan routes will extend as far as South Kivu and that South Kivu will
make similar efforts as far as Kigali. Regular meetings should be held between public and private
road users’ associations from Kigali and South Kivu.
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(b) Air transport
Infrastructure
The committee noted that the airport facilities in Kigali comply with international standards.
Kavumu airport in South Kivu is suitable for large aircraft but unfortunately it has no runway lights
and practically no communications facilities. There are also airfields in each of South Kivu’s
territories which are accessible to light aircraft.
[Translator’s note: page missing]
1. Causes of insecurity
The committee pinpointed the following major causes of insecurity:
(a) Ignorance
(b) Poverty
(c) Injustice
(d) Imperialism
(e) Lack of unity, co-operation and regional disintegration
(f) Bad governance and corruption
2. Recommendations
The committee made the following recommendations:
(a) Provide people with a general and political education;
(b) Encourage the principle of regional co-operation;
(c) Set up a standing joint security committee;
(d) Foster good governance and take thorough measures against impunity;
(e) See to it that this twinning arrangement acts as a link between the two states;
(f) Combat the mutual feeling of mistrust and suspicion by promoting joint training in the areas of
policing, security, political management and the retraining of soldiers;
(g) Hold seminars for administrative officials from South Kivu province and the Prefecture of the
City of Kigali;
(h) The people of South Kivu province and the city of Kigali call for the Lusaka cease-fire accords
to be signed and call on the international community to remove all the obstacles to the signing
of these accords.
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I.1.6. Committee on agriculture, stock-breeding, environment and tourism
The committee had 10 members:
1. Isidore Gasarasi Chair of the Committee (Rwanda)
2. Dr. Asumani Secretary of the Committee (South Kivu)
3. Prof. Bitijula Member (South Kivu)
4. Dr. Octavien Ndakengerwa Member (Rwanda)
5. Anne-Marie Kantengwa Member (Rwanda)
6. Prosper Mary Member (Rwanda)
7. Augustin Muvunyi Member (Rwanda)
8. Eulalie Umutanguha Member (Rwanda)
9. Manzi Gatera Member (Rwanda)
10. Gervais Dusabemungu Member (Rwanda)
I. Tourism
(a) List of existing resources
City of Kigali
Intore dancing
Hotels
Airstrips
Local breed of Ankore cattle (Nyambo)
National Parks including Akagera and the Volcanoes Park
Nyungwe Forest
Works of art
Others
South Kivu
Kahuzi-Biega National Park
Hotels
Itombwe Forest Reserves many animal and plant species
Lake Kivu and its islands and islets
Works of art
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Spas
(b) Recommendations
Open zoological gardens and recreation parks and exchange attractions
Create museums making use of tourist heritage
Publish a pamphlet promoting specific sites
Launch a joint project to establish a tourism and hotel management college or training centre.
II. Environment
Exchange experiences in the conservation of protected animal or plant species
Apply the same environmental management rules
Devise joint strategies to combat disasters
Devise joint strategies to manage waste water and solid waste disposal systems
Exchange experiences with a view to setting up green spaces and amusement parks
Pursue a joint nature conservation policy.
(c) Agriculture and stock-breeding
Introduce a joint policy on the taxation of items entering into the production of agricultural
goods
Pool results and experiences in the area of agricultural and zootechnic research
Share appropriate agricultural and zootechnic technologies including improved seeds, food
processing techniques, and mushroom production
Pool knowledge in the area of livestock farming in stables
Set up a free trade zone for agricultural and pastoral products
Make it easier to acquire improved and adapted genetic stocks
Facilitate the sale of animal products, particularly meat and milk
Devise a joint strategy to combat animal and plant diseases
Set up a permanent office for the exchange of information on agriculture and livestock
breeding
Set up a data base on traditional cures for the region’s animal and plant diseases and their
administration and dosage
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Pool experience in the processing and preservation of farm products (milk, sweet potatoes, etc.)
Adopt policies to integrate approaches to crop farming and livestock farming
(d) Fishing
Adopt joint policies for the conservation of fish species
Facilitate access to the fish stocks in Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika
Pool experiences of family-run fish farms.
Conclusion
In the areas that concern us, particularly agriculture, stock-breeding, the environment and
tourism, this twinning arrangement can resolve many of the problems which lie at the root of our
poverty.
The city of Kigali and South Kivu are confronted with the same day-to-day problems and so
joint solutions are a perfect means of promoting social, economic and political development.
I.1.7. Report of the workshop activities of the committee on the economy, trade and industry
The committee was made up of the following members:
1. Chihubagala Chinja (South Kivu)
2. Milabyo Mughima Basila (South Kivu)
3. Simon Buabua (South Kivu)
4. Maurice Kaongo (South Kivu)
5. Shungu Musolo (South Kivu)
6. Simon Sebitereko (Rwanda)
7. Antoine Munyakazi Juru (Rwanda)
8. Alphonse Rugiramumaro (Rwanda)
9. Egide Gakuba Rubojo (Rwanda)
10. Alexis Kadeli (Rwanda)
11. Irennee Bubingo (South Kivu)
1. Membership of the Bureau
After some discussion, debate and deliberation, the Bureau was appointed as follows:
1. Chair Antoine Munyakazi Juru (Rwanda)
2. 1st Secretary Milabyo Mughima Basila (South Kivu)
3. 2nd Secretary Simon Buabua Ndaye (South Kivu)
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2. The work itself
The committee examined the draft co-operation agreement between the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of Rwanda and the Congolese Business Federation signed in Kinshasa on
12 August 1997 with the aim of increasing and extending economic and commercial co-operation
links between Rwanda and Congo.
Having examined this document, the committee proposed that it should serve as the legal
basis to promote economic and commercial co-operation between the province of South Kivu and
the Prefecture of the City of Kigali.
The committee also took note of a document drawn up by the Rwandan participants relating
to the strengthening of economic and commercial links between the east of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Following some discussion, the committee acknowledged the
relevance of some of the proposals made in this document and suggested that it should serve as a
guide for future activities relating to the economy and commerce.
After this the committee went on to deal with some urgent matters:
1. With regard to the two Chambers of Commerce
The Rwandan participants undertook to simplify the formalities for lorries transporting goods
to South Kivu.
Regarding the ban on lorries transporting salted fish to South Kivu from passing through
Rwanda, the Rwandan participants drew attention to the fact that it was temporarily prohibited
to import fish into Rwanda because of the poisoning of Lake Victoria and that steps were being
taken to find a solution to this problem.
The two sides agreed that Rwandan economic agents wishing to set up business in South Kivu
must scrupulously abide by the economic legislation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The two sides should co-operate to provide training for bank clerks in South Kivu and support
the revitalization of the banking sector. The Rwandan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
would alert the City of Kigali’s economic agents to this need.
The two Chambers of Commerce agreed to exchange every necessary piece of information to
combat fraud, which could only be of any benefit to individuals.
2. With regard to the Congolese Customs and Excise Office (OFIDA) and the Rwanda
Revenue Authority (RRA)
The committee suggested:
(a) harmonizing South Kivu and Kigali’s customs rules;
(b) sharing experiences by organizing training seminars and colloquies with a view to improving
customs techniques;
(c) promoting co-operation between the investigative services of each body’s customs authorities
with a view to stamping out fraud;
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(d) organizing regular meetings between the customs authorities and the economic agents of the
two entities;
(e) simplifying administrative procedures at the customs posts on the border between Rwanda and
South Kivu.
3. In the energy field
The committee proposed:
providing the population with increasingly improved access to electricity;
signing an agreement between Electrogaz and SNEL to install electricity in Kamanyola;
sharing energy-related expertise, equipment and materials;
co-operating in arranging exchanges of water treatment equipment owned by traditional
entities;
rehabilitating energy-related research (methane gas at Lake Kivu, turf, ethanol, bio-gas, etc.).
Conclusion
The committee proposed that a follow-up committee on economic, commercial and financial
affairs be set up and meet at least once a month. It was suggested that the next meeting should be
held the following month in Bukavu.
The committee members welcomed the spirit of fraternity and mutual understanding which
had prevailed throughout their work and were convinced that this spirit would contribute a great
deal to promoting trade between South Kivu and Kigali.
I.1.8. Social and cultural workshop
The committee was made up of the following 15 members:
1. Mwenyemali Kasilembo (South Kivu)
2. Maman Tshisekedi (South Kivu)
3. Mulindwa Itongwa (South Kivu)
4. Balthazar Muhigirwa (South Kivu)
5. Joseph Mbonekube (South Kivu)
6. Aloys Mwitende (South Kivu)
7. Vianney Makuza (Rwanda)
8. Rwigamba Barinda (Rwanda)
9. Jean Butoto (Rwanda)
10. Anastasie Nyirabukeye (Rwanda)
11. Marie-Rose Nirere (Rwanda)
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12. Gérard Rutali (Rwanda)
13. Mary Ashimwe (Rwanda)
14. Constance Rwaka (Rwanda)
Membership of the Bureau
1. Prof. Rwigamba Barinda Chair (Rwanda)
2. Mwenyemali Kalisembo Vice-Chair (South Kivu)
3. Balthazar Muhigirwa Secretary for South Kivu (South Kivu)
4. Anastasie Nyirabukeye Secretary for Kigali (Rwanda)
Working methods adopted:
The committee dealt with the following series of topics drawn from the 2 core documents:
1. Education
2. Health
3. Women and families
4. Youth
5. Vulnerable groups
6. Sport and leisure
7. Culture, information and the press
Recommendations adopted in each area were as follows:
1. Education
Bearing in mind the present situation, the committee recommended:
that teachers should be recruited through a twinning arrangement supervised by a monitoring
body specially set up for the purpose;
that the sum of teachers’ social contributions should be paid into their accounts after they
leave, die, etc.;
in the area of higher education, universities and scientific research, the committee would like to
see:
exchanges of teachers and research workers;
sharing of the results of research;
exchanges between various higher education establishments;
exchanges of students in training or work placements;
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proposals to send students from Kigali to the ISDR (the Higher Institute of Rural
Development) in Bukavu.
an important recommendation was made concerning children who had recently finished
humanities classes in South Kivu but whose examination answers could not be corrected
because of the war.
The committee recommended that everything be done to ensure that the 1998 and 1999 state
examinations could be corrected, for example by turning to UNESCO.
2. Health
Exchanges of medical staff
Transfer of the sick under the SUREMED arrangement
Training 3rd year medical students to specialize in surgery, paediatrics, gynaecology and
internal medicine in Kigali
Sharing information on strategies to combat AIDS, other sexually-transmitted diseases, malaria
and other illnesses.
3. Women and families
Following a description of the problems of South Kivu’s mothers by a member of the
committee, the following recommendations were made:
The women of South Kivu should establish contact with Rwandan women’s associations,
particularly the collective Pro-femme twese Hmwe, to benefit from their experiences.
Exchanges should be organized.
4. Youth
[Translator’s note: page missing]
I.2 Infringements of the right to life and casual killings
On 16 April 1999 at Mpene Kusu, Moire and Salome’s throats were cut by the Mai-Mai
militia for collaborating with the RCD.
On 22 April 1999 at Nyalukungu/Shabunda, Mai-Mais executed Mrs. Bitondo, Kisama,
Kabusango and Nsinga (all of whose throats were cut) while Kisambale was burnt alive for
witchcraft.
On 25 April 1999 in Mwamba, Mr. Mungalama and the Reverend Kabusuku’s throats were
cut.
In May 1999 in Kitutu, Mai-Mais cut the throats of Ms Ngozi (for witchcraft), the local
traditional chiefs, Muganza Musali, Banamukika, Ombeni Kisegenyo and Mr. Wabenga, and
Mrs. Kamwanga for slovenliness and refusing to fight the RCD.
On 5 May 1999 in Shabunda-Mpenekusu, RCD members cut Mr. Mathias Kingambwa’s
genitals off then executed him for conspiring with the Mai-Mai.
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On 10 May 1999 in Kazombo, 3 people were murdered by the RCD.
On 12 and 17 May 1999 in Binkutu, Lusenge and Nyalukungu, 12 people, including two
men called Bernard and Baudouin, were murdered by the RCD for collusion with the Mai-Mai.
On 25 May 1999 in Kingulube, Dalida Mukuzu was murdered for collaborating with the
Mai-Mai.
On 31 May 1999, 100 people living in the area between Kingulube and Shabunda-Centre were
massacred by RCD forces.
On 15-16 May 1999 in Uvira, Tutsi soldiers from the RCD murdered 12 people, including
Ndaye Risasi, aged 25, and Kalenga Ebochwa, as punishment for the death of a Tutsi soldier at
Kilimabenge.
20 June 1999 saw the murder of a man identified only as a messenger from Uvira bishopric.
On 24 June 1999 in Rubanga (Ruzizi Plain), RCD Commander, Jaguar Kamonyo carried out
executions using the “necklace” method; he also burnt alive two former members of the FAC,
Déogratias Bwima (aged 39) and Jojo Fataki.
On 30 June 1999 in Bukavu, Mushagalusa was arrested by RCD soldiers for taking part in the
peaceful demonstration against the raising of new flags over the town. He was deported to
Rwanda and there has been no news of him since.
On 31 May to 6 June, after an armed clash between the Mai-Mai and RCD forces, the latter
burnt down 18 villages in Shabunda territory including Mpenekusu, Mwamba, Kiloza,
Wasezia, Mikaba, Lugezi, Nyalukungu, Idemba, Kyanama, Penekasingi, Mizombo, Tangila,
Kizinga, Kipombo, Lukamba, Kibanda, Idumbo, and Mugingini.
Under the same heading of casual killing we should mention the report of the conference of
South Kivu’s chefs coutumiers (traditional chiefs) held at Bukavu sports centre from 4 to 9 October
1999 which described the following dismal situation:
approx. 240 people killed in Kasika, Mwenga.
approx. 60 people killed on the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira Territory.
approx. 72 people killed in Burhinyi, Mwenga.
approx. 136 people killed in Kitutu, Mwenga.
approx. 40 people killed in Luhwinja, Mwenga.
approx. 134 people killed in Kaziba, Walungu.
approx. 40 people killed in Nyalukungu, Wakabungu.
This incomplete list which was read out in the presence of the rebel governor of South Kivu
provides plentiful evidence of the level of violations of the right to life in South Kivu.
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I.3. Arbitrary arrest, abductions and unlawful detention
4 April 1999, Bagira: abduction of the Reverend Paul Bashombana Cihirwa on suspicion of
being an Interahamwe. In fact he is simply a Hutu living in the Congo. There has been no word
of him since.
On the night of 4 to 5 April 1999: looting by RCD forces in the villages of Mabingu and
Kabushwa in Kabare/Bukavu territory.
5 April 1999: A team of 27 soldiers under the command of Didier Mulikuya invaded Funu
(Garanua) at around 7 p.m. The soldiers arrested all the young boys, women, men and children
that they came across and robbed those who had anything worth taking. They claimed to be
aiming to break up a small group of Mai-Mai who were learning how to use firearms.
Ironically, not a single firearm was found in the locality; the innocent people who had been
arrested were released only after they had given the commander money.
7 April 1999, Funu: At around 7.15 p.m. soldiers stole Mr. Jean-Jacques Sainzonga’s watch,
identity papers and belt.
10 April 1999: Mr. Théophile Sainzonga was standing in front of his own house when soldiers
robbed him of his watch, 10 US dollars and his shoes.
Also in April 1999: The owner of Lumière, a shop in the shopping centre in Cimpunda ONL
(housing project) was shot three times in the leg after soldiers had ransacked his shop.
On 5 April 1999: The wife of the late Tabaro Sandoka living in Cimpunda was threatened by
three soldiers who stole a packet of cigarettes from her and promised her that she would
“follow” her husband in a few days’ time simply because she had refused to be swayed by
these collaborators’ threats. The case has been referred to the military and civilian authorities in
Kadutu but no-one dares to trouble these three youths from Cimpunda ONL for their activities
as collaborators. Mr. Tabaro Sandoka was killed by six Tutsi soldiers on his way from the
Cimpunda shopping centre where he was selling cigarettes. His murderers stole US$100,
NZ 1,600,000 and 10 packs of cigarettes from him.
In early April the chief of the district of Nyamugo, Mr. Kibikibi Walumona, died as a result of
tortures inflicted on him by the soldiers of Commander Chuma (a former Mai-Mai now
working for the aggressors).
Also in April 1999, Father Emmanuel Musoda, the Cimpunda parish priest, was threatened
repeatedly by soldiers from a nearby military camp supervised by Commander Justin Nardin
Lubala. He was accused of making political speeches in church.
In late April 1999, the family of a Congolese citizen Mr. Tebura, living on Buhende Avenue
in Cimpunda was visited once again by Rwandan soldiers. They were looking for one of
Mr. Tebura’s sons, whose nickname is le Pasteur (the minister) and had lived for some years in
Rwanda, but was separated from his wife. Since the events of 1994 he has frequently been
troubled by Tutsi soldiers under the command of his wife’s partners. His wife is concerned that
he will claim back the property he left behind in Rwanda. The Rwandans are now accusing le
Pasteur of being an Interahamwe so that they can kill him immediately if they happen to catch
him.
In the same month the Ciriri parish priest, Father Prothée, was escorted away by soldiers like
a common thief along with ten or so members of his congregation. The grounds for the arrest
was the list of names of victims of military harassment which had been drawn up by members
of the congregation along with details of objects that had been seized. They were released after
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being tortured in response to pressure from the congregation, other priests, and, above all, the
archbishop.
In late April and early May 1999, the chief of Nkafu district in the municipality of Kadutu,
Mr. Patient Bagalwa, was arrested four times in the space of a month-and-a-half by
Commander Jean-Marie (a Rwandan national) then by the head of the judge advocate’s
department, Inspector Kandudie.
On each occasion he was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in front of his
family and congregation. Soldiers working with Mr. Tembetembe, a neighbourhood chief in his
district, accuse him of being in secret contact with the Mai-Mai.
On 9 May 1999, Mr. Jagen (Mr. Karashima’s grandson), an accountant employed by Ibanda
municipality, was tied up by deserters at around 5.30 a.m. He was released some 100 metres
from his home having handed over a sum of NZ 1,500,000 (about US$150). Five days later a
search for him was being organized by Commander Chris from the intelligence service based at
the Brigade.
On 14 June 1999, Commander Justin Nardin Lubala’s replacement at TV Camp, Commander
Adolphe Bila, organized a round-up in Cimpunda and Nyakaliba . His soldiers arrested a large
number of children, young people and adults. The people were accused of throwing stones at
soldiers.
On 15 June 1999, the chief of Mosala district, Mr. Pascal Mazinge, avoided a number of
RCD traps. Later he was suspended from office by the mayor of Kadutu at the instigation of
the RCD leadership for having disturbed a meeting between the military authorities and the
traditional leaders of Kadutu. He was accused of making no effort to adhere to the RCD’s
ideas. When he attempted to hand in his resignation, he was threatened by the security forces.
On 25 June 1999 saw the arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention of Mr. Djuma Emedi and
Mr. Idi Abedi for submitting a request to Commander Machumu for their bus to be returned.
They were accused of conspiring with the Mai-Mai.
3 July 1999 saw an attempted robbery by RCD rebels at the convent of the missionary nuns of
Africa housed in the Wima upper secondary school in Bukavu. The nuns were saved by
civilians who ran to their rescue. Mr. Butonyi was shot dead by a fleeing RCD soldier.
On 22 September 1999, the RCD authorities in Goma arrested Mr. Patient Bagenda Balagizi,
Secretary General of the NGO, the South Kivu Anti-Bakwi Committee, as he was passing
through Goma on his way to Entebbe in Uganda. He was released only at 6 p.m. after a
rigorous interrogation in which he had to answer for all the visas for journeys he had made
since the beginning of the year, his business and leisure activities, his acquaintances in
Kinshasa, his membership of the South Kivu Civil Society and his supposed intention to travel
to Kinshasa. He was also questioned about certain contacts the Goma authorities claimed he
had had with the chargé d’affaires at the Congolese Embassy in Nairobi.
He also had to report to the Directorate General of Internal Security at the building known as
the Chien méchant (the vicious dog) for two days running from around 10 a.m. to 3 p.m.
It was not until late on Friday 24 September 1999 that the Deputy Director General,
Mr. Justin Kozanga, allowed him to return to Bukavu without his passport and identity papers
and with a promise that the investigation into his activities would continue. In the meantime, he
must manage without his identity papers and his passport until the “investigation” is over. Let
us pray to God that he will get them back one day.
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I.4. General insecurity
Kivu is still divided between areas under Mai-Mai and RCD influence. This creates barriers
between the two sides which it is practically impossible for ordinary citizens to cross without being
harassed in various ways. As a result most people have opted to stay put in the cities or the
countryside and hardly move around anymore at all.
The Mai-Mai will not let any traffic through at all on the roads to Bukavu, Uvira and Goma
in an attempt to asphyxiate the rebel and occupation forces in the towns and cities.
On the Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu road, all traffic is blocked between the villages
of Tubimbi and Mungombe. This means that the people (including the RCD rebels) are forced to
use an aircraft provided by Mrs. Aziz Khursum (the director of the Uzabuco tobacco factory in
Bukavu who has been running a gold-trading office in Kamituga since February 1999. She was also
involved in arms trafficking for the Burundian rebels of the CNDD between 1994 and 1996). The
situation is also making it difficult to get supplies of food, medicine and other essential products
into the town of Kamituga and the rural area around Mwenga and Shabunda.
On other roads in Kivu (Bukavu-Goma-Butembo and Bukavu-Uvira-Fizi) traffic is thin but it
does exist. However, there is practically always some danger in using these roads, because the
various warring factions (RCD, Mai-Mai, former Rwandan armed forces) have set up police road
blocks and carry out sporadic raids on lorries transporting goods. The following are some
examples:
On 13 July 1999 a group of former Rwandan soldiers, Interahamwe and their Mai-Mai allies
attacked and robbed six goods lorries on the Ngomo escarpment taking away booty valued at
over US$20,000.
On 4 July 1999, at Cigogo, between Nyagezi and Mumosho (on the Bukavu-Uvira road) they
robbed another 3 vehicles including one belonging to Catholic nuns.
A customs post has been set up on the Bukavu-Butembo road to collect duties on goods
arriving from the Congolese town of Butembo. Since July 1999 a container of Dubai wax has
been subject to a duty of US$21,000 here whereas the equivalent cost only US$2,100 in June.
The lower rate still applies in the areas of Kivu under the control of the RCD, Rwanda, Burundi
and Uganda.
I.4.1. The army and the police of the DRC under Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan
occupation
(a) The army
The army is an instrument of terror under the orders of the Rwandan aggressors in the
territories under their control. Every three months, the soldiers are switched from one location to
another. Before they leave, they cause a great deal of human suffering and material damage,
particularly those based in Ciriri and the TV camp in the municipality of Kadutu, who are used to
this kind of operation. Because they do not get their pay, they survive by scheming and fleecing the
inhabitants with the tacit agreement of their military superiors.
To harass civilians, the soldiers organize patrols from 5 p.m. onwards, dividing up into small
groups or teams of 3 to 5. They spread out in the streets and wait in dark corners. Passers-by
returning from the market or from work are robbed of their belongings and if they resist, they are
beaten, tied up and accused of being a Mai-Mai when they are brought before the authorities.
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Mothers returning from market are robbed of the food they are bringing home for their
families along with their money and gold chains if they have any. If they have nothing on them that
can be stolen, the soldiers may go so far as to strip them and rape them.
Many of the men in the region no longer have their watches or their identity papers. Soldiers
steal them and sell them to third parties for a derisory sum. Most of the identity papers are passed
on to Rwandan citizens.
Harassment by soldiers takes place chiefly between 6 p.m. and 9 a.m. at the following well
known locations:
Ruvumba Hill (near Lupulu bridge);
Cimpunda girls’ school;
Burhende road (Nyamulagira);
the ONL centre, Cimpunda;
Funu playing field;
Mahamba Hill;
Kadutu cross-roads;
A bend in the road by the Kadutu recreation centre;
Kibonge Square;
Kadutu market;
On Industrial Avenue in front of the offices of the PIR (Rapid Intervention Police) and the
police courts (TP);
In front of the Cheche social club;
The section of road between the Wima upper secondary school and the Economat;
The junction of the Kadhuru road and the roads leading to Wima School and the ISTM;
Kadutu girls’ school.
(b) The police
Officers of the PNC (the Congolese National Police Force) working in South Kivu province
generally have a higher standing with the people. We appreciate their presence in our day-to-day
lives, particularly during round-ups. On the other hand, most senior police officers bow to the
authority of the aggressors to save their jobs and, if they wish to be promoted, they have to act as
slaves following their orders unquestioningly.
It is for this reason that some officers are obliged to punish anyone who does not adopt the
RCD’s ideas.
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Many police captains have been illegally suspended or even thrown in jail because they have
refused to obey their superiors’ unpopular orders.
Among the PNC officers in South Kivu who have undergone degrading treatment as a result
of actions which are claimed to undermine RCD policy are officers Lwabanji and Ngongo from the
police camp and inspector Saidi.
(b1) The PIR (Rapid Intervention Police)
The PIR operates under the aggressors’ orders. The PIR office is based on Industrial Avenue
in the old town hall. Many of its officers are inciviques (collaborators) from the Civil Guard or the
SARM, the Second Republic’s “Service for Military Action and Intelligence” and/or criminals and
delinquents taken from problem neighbourhoods. They have no education or morals and so they
think they can do anything and get away with it. The Kasali and Nkafu inhabitants of Nyamugo are
ill-at-ease in the presence of these RCD murderers. They say: “This is a rebellion in which no holds
are barred; we live in the jungle and those who feel strong bully the weak”.
In their enthusiasm to fleece the public, soldiers and PIR officers will take up any case they
come across whether it is true or false. They have also become judges and converted their offices
into a court room in which they hear criminal and civil cases. People are known to have been
detained for two or three works without a trial. Public prosecutors do not have access to military
lockups and cannot enquire about a case which is being looked into by a criminal investigator
working for the military.
Before being released, prisoners have to pay fines ranging between US$15 and US$150
depending on their case and their social status. It is common for PIR officers to burst into a bar and
arrest the owner and all the customers on the pretext that they are holding a “Mai-Mai meeting”.
Once the customers have been arrested they are robbed of all their belongings. When arresting
people, the PIR frequently claim that they are suspected of being Mai-Mai.
In response to all this harassment from the police and the army and on the initiative of some
young members of the Cimpunda youth federation, a forum was established in April 1999 bringing
together some of Kadutu’s associations. It has been named the Kadutu Youth Forum and not only
is it a platform for the development of the community but also and above all it carries out lobbying
campaigns.
In retaliation to the barbarian acts committed by patrolling soldiers some youths started to
conduct night-time and day-time operations against these collaborators; they even managed to face
up to their tormentors. These operations prompted the military authorities to arrest many young
people in the course of a round-up on 14 June 1999. These arrests will not be appreciated by the
population. Secret meetings have been held to devise plans to rescue prisoners held in TV Camp
and enable the population of the municipality of Kadutu to move around freely during the day and
the night.
Faced with the mounting tension in Cimpunda, the military authorities of the Brigade
panicked and organized a meeting with the people of Cimpunda Hill from which it barred access to
all Tutsis. The meeting ended in a stalemate.
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I.5. Restrictions on freedom of expression and denial
of the right to information
I.5.1. Radio Maendeleo, Bukavu
Radio Maendeleo, which is called a “radio of the people” or a “community radio”, is run by
South Kivu development NGOs. Among the highly reputable journalists who work for the station
are Kizito Mushizi Nfundiko (director), Paulin Bapolisi (former chief adviser to the late Professor
Jean-Charles Magabe), bombardier Kamengele Omba, Jules Bahati (the “golden tongue”) and
Aziza Bangwene.
This radio station is a vital means of expression for all of South Kivu’s social classes. It is
the most popular radio station in the area, primarily because of its objective news coverage.
Unfortunately, it has a bad reputation among the enemies of peace because of its radio news
bulletins and other programmes such as Jules Bahati’s mouthpiece for youth issues, the Micro des
jeunes, Father Jean Bosco Bahala’s Catholic programme, the Lufaheri sketch, Kamengele Omba’s
Sunday programme on which he invites leading members of the community to enlighten the public
about the week’s events or controversial issues, and finally the programmes produced by various
human rights associations.
Because of these programmes which undermine the RCD’s policies, the authorities have
repeatedly threatened to close Radio Maendeleo down. The Governor of South Kivu, Norbert
Bashengezi Katintima and his so-called minister of the interior, Joseph Mudimbi, have repeatedly
threatened Radio Maendeleo’s journalists in press releases. In early July the authorities appointed
Mr. Jérémie, a former BBC journalist, as a supervisor, responsible for listening to everything
broadcast on the radio station and reporting back to the RCD. The station’s equipment was then
taken away to an unknown destination.
Recently, at the beginning of September 1999, it was reported that the director of Radio
Maendeleo, Kizito Mushizi Nfundiko, and some of its journalists including Kamengele Omba had
been arrested.
This is a perfect example of how the media are being persecuted and silenced in the occupied
territories while at the same time the authorities claim to promote democracy. What kind of
democracy is this?
I.5.2. Human rights associations
Groupe Jérémie
On the afternoon of 4 June 1999 a group of soldiers armed to the teeth and led by
commander Didier Mulikuwa broke into the headquarters of the Groupe Jérémie. They forced the
door open and pillaged practically everything they found on the premises. After the operation they
sealed the door and began searching for the group’s activists. The group was already being
examined by criminal investigator Chihenga at the 222nd Brigade’s intelligence office. The case
was subsequently transferred to an ordinary criminal jurisdiction (Bukavu public prosecutor’s
office). Ironically, this was mainly because the military authorities found no evidence with which
to charge the members of Groupe Jérémie. Another factor was a fear of local and international
pressure. The case was assigned to a judge who is a member of the GAAP (the “political action
group”) which is a branch of the RCD.
The authorities were looking for the following human rights activists from Groupe Jérémie:
Georges Bahaya, Moreu Tubibu, Mr. Jean-Baptiste Mulengezi, Maheshe from the Alfajiri lower
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secondary school, Remy Mitima and Mr. Déogratias Kiriza. Paradoxically, the authorities claim
that the group is endangering state security.
Héritiers de la justice
This association is also threatened by the RCD authorities and its activists force themselves
to work despite the intimidation. For example, Mr. Jean-Paul Bengeya has been repeatedly
harassed and threatened by Commander Elias, a Tutsi in charge of security in South Kivu province.
The commander has a private jail at his home on Avenue Nyofu in Nyawera; he has converted one
of his rooms into a lockup.
Early September 1999 saw the arrest of Mr. Raphael Wakenge, a human rights leader and
activist with Héritiers de la justice who was released after one week of imprisonment at Bukavu
Central Prison.
I.5.3. Members of the South Kivu Civil Society
The Civil Society deserves praise for the many roles it plays, above all that of promoting and
protecting the interests of its members and the whole population. Alas, some of the more active
members have received death threats from the RCD’s political and military authorities who are
always looking for some reason to eliminate them physically. The main targets have been activity
leader Gervais Chirhalwirwa (known as “uncle”), Patient Bagenda, Oscar Baharanyi, activity
leader Prosper Birhakaheka, activity leader Paulin Bapolisi, Dr. Balegalmire and the pharmacist,
Mr. Bapolisi.
In the last two weeks of May 1999, the governor of South Kivu once again threatened some
of the activists that he would do everything to destabilise political life in South Kivu. For example,
in early June 1999, Dr. Balegamire narrowly escaped an assassination attempt organized by the
provincial authorities of South Kivu. The failed mission was to be carried out by Rwandan soldiers
but when they arrived at his house he was absent.
(d) The Catholic Church in Bukavu under threat
The clergy of Bukavu bishopric have been subjected to harassment and death threats. The
Catholic church has a duty to continue to fight against immorality to prevent all violations of
human dignity, particularly during these difficult times for the whole of the eastern part of the
DRC.
In response to the stance taken by the church, the RCD authorities, from the governor right
down to the municipality, have publicly attacked His Excellency Emmanuel Kataliko the
Archbishop of Bukavu and his vicar-general. Neither have the abbots and priests of the town and
country parishes been spared. The authorities have to attack the Catholic church to protect and
preserve their power to influence and terrorize the people. Examples are the desecration of the
churches of Burhale and Kasika and the threats made to the following clergymen:
Father Emmanuel Musoda of Cimpunda parish;
Father Prothée of Ciriri parish;
Father Georges Maroyi (who escaped from Uvira bishopric) and Father J. Bosco Bahala, both
now working in Kadutu parish;
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Father Gianny of Chaï parish;
Father Georges of Muhungu parish;
Father Balegamire of Kabare parish;
Father Eliézère of Bagira parish.
This is not a complete list of the clergy whose lives have been threatened. Some
communities of local and foreign nuns have also been threatened, particularly at night. Several
times the Archbishop of Bukavu has been summoned to the governor’s residence to answer
questions and receive orders. In particular he has been asked to transfer certain troublesome priests
such as Jean Bosco Bahala.
At a security meeting in Kadutu, the deputy mayor, Mr. Biganza Sadock (who is a Rwandan
citizen), suggested that Kadutu parish and the Dominican chapel in which Father J.B. Bahala
preaches be closed down. If nothing changed, then the priest would be publicly executed on the
Place de l’Indépendance (formerly Place du 24 Novembre).
This Rwandan official also said the following: “When Archbishop Muzihirwa died, the
Vatican talked about it for a week and then it was all over. We could arrest certain people and
execute certain priests. The Vatican would protest for three or four days but nothing would change
and in the meantime we will have got the situation under control”.
Every Sunday, the RCD sends out spies to all the parishes to listen to everything that is said
in the sermons and report back immediately once Mass is over. This has happened several times in
Cimpunda and Kadutu. Furthermore on one particular Sunday in April 1999, before the 3rd Mass,
Kadutu parish was invaded by vans full of soldiers armed with rocket-launchers and machine guns.
They came and harassed the priests and the congregation before heading off for Cimpunda.
The insecurity which threatens the Catholic church should concern all of the Congo’s official
churches prompting them to come together and fight as one man. They should do their duty, which
is to protect and ensure the well-being of human beings. Against a background of increased
gagging of public expression, the RCD has been trying to destroy the Catholic church ever since
the very beginning of hostilities. This is for the simple reason that the only body which, fortunately,
continued to function after the collapse of the Mobutu regime was the Church. It is the people’s
only hope. In response the authorities have destroyed parishes, looted convents, and assassinated
priests, ministers, nuns and believers, thus destroying the very foundations of the Church. Most
priests have now been forced into exile and/or hiding. Christendom stands alone against hatred,
anguish and mistrust. Any Christian morals observed hitherto are now in jeopardy.
I.6. Abuse of public office
On 7 August 1999, in total defiance of basic democratic standards, the Congolese Rally for
Democracy (RCD), acting through the intermediary of Mr. Norbert Basengezi Katintima, the
Governor of South Kivu appointed by the aggressors and rebels, set up a Provincial “Barza”
(Assembly).
It has 67 appointed members including only 54 women and the Governor immediately
appointed the members of the provisional bureau of this new institution himself, taking no account
of the will of the people. Strangely, the leadership of the institution was assigned to two members
of this provisional bureau who were selected simply because they were the oldest and the youngest
members.
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Some of the members of the Barza, which claims to be promoting peace in South Kivu, have
already gained a major reputation for plotting and intrigue and it will not be long before their true
shark-like nature will re-emerge and they will attempt to take up another lucrative but no less
short-lived post. They are so possessed by political greed that they feign ignorance of the
sacrosanct principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under which:
“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures” (Article 21.3).
Therefore, the only person who is entitled to become a provincial or national member of
parliament is someone who has been elected somewhere, or in other words, who has received a
mandate from some electoral constituency or another, under an electoral law ratified by some form
of consultative preliminary.
Accordingly, any Barza member, deputy or parliamentarian who is simply assigned to an
area at whatever political rank, owes his office to the authority that appointed him and legally
created him and therefore he can act only in the interests of his begetters.
The Civil Society of South Kivu noted that the establishment of a Barza in South Kivu was a
total sham amounting to a confiscation of the power of the supreme sovereign of South Kivu in so
far as it should be associated with and/or form part of a national process of institutional reform in
the DRC. Accordingly, on 23 August 1999, the provincial co-ordinating office of the Civil Society
sent a letter (No. BCSK/020/99) to the governor of South Kivu, in which it said that it could not
accept an abuse of public office and demanded the dissolution of the Barza of South Kivu on the
ground that it was a plutocratic, sadistic and cynical oligarchy, made up solely of the inhabitants of
Ibanda as if this single municipality could pacify the whole province. It concluded that genuine
peace should reside in the very heart of our rural districts where, day-in, day-out, the people are
despoiled, hounded and butchered by one side or another according to the outcome of our
demented fratricidal battles.
I.7. Incitement to ethnic hatred
In a number of areas in South Kivu the people live in a general state of trauma as a result of
the massacres, rapes and pillaging carried out by the various forces that have occupied them. This
was the message passed on by 15 of South Kivu’s traditional chiefs from COBASKI during their
conference of 4 to 9 October 1999 at the Bukavu Sports Centre which was held under the patronage
of the Governor of South Kivu. The situation exacerbates and incites hatred between
Banyamulenge communities and the tribes of South Kivu. These Bami chiefs highlighted some of
the harmful consequences of this hatred in the region, in particular:
some 10,000 war refugees assembled in Uvira;
some 10,000 Bafumiru war refugees who have fled to Ruzizi Plain;
some 3,500 war refugees who have fled to Burundi (most of them settling in Cibitoke
province);
some 11,000 Rwandan Viura war refugees from Moba and Kabalo in northern Katanga forced
to move to the Ruzizi Plain in South Kivu;
80 or so Bahuvu war refugees from Kalehe forced to move to the island territory of Idjwi in
South Kivu;
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some 50,000 war refugees from the chiefdom of Wamuzimu;
hundreds of thousands of Congolese refugees from South Kivu exiled abroad, particularly in
Tanzania;
some 80,000 homeless persons in the chiefdom of Basile;
a number of priests and nuns confined to Luhwindja, Mwenga and Murhesa, Kabare;
others.
All of these problems reveal the policies of those who govern South Kivu and stem from
hasty administrative and political decisions at variance with the aspirations of the people whose
direct representatives are not consulted. This is what lies at the base of the hatred, the unhealthy
atmosphere and the suffering that the people of South Kivu are having to endure (including the
destruction of Bami homes, murder attempts on certain Bami and the cowardly assassinations of
traditional chiefs including Mwami Lenge in 1996 and François Mwami Bwami Nalwindi in
August 1998 and all their repercussions).
In our opinion, the resurgence of tribal wars between the Bembe and the Rega and the
ongoing conflicts between the Banyamulenge community and the population of South Kivu as a
whole are the ultimate outcome of incitement to hatred in the disaster-stricken and battered
province of South Kivu.
I.8. Vicious, barbaric destruction
Since the outbreak of war in the DRC on 2 August 1998, South Kivu has continued to be
subjected to unprecedented humanitarian crises. In this report, which covers the period from April
to September 1999, we shall merely pass on the following incomplete list of alarming incidents
described at the conference of traditional chiefs held at the Bukavu sports centre from 4 to
9 October 1999:
Some 545 houses burnt down in Wakabongo I;
Some 62 houses burnt down in Luhwindja;
Some 50 houses burnt down in Bavira;
Some 700 houses burnt down in Wamuzimu;
Systematic destruction and looting of a number of health facilities (hospitals and medical
centres);
Destruction and looting of a number of homes of traditional chiefs (Bami);
Destruction of a number of school buildings and looting of school teaching equipment and
materials;
Destruction of roads, rendering them impassable (including farm tracks), and poor and
inadequate transport facilities, adding to problems by creating bottlenecks preventing goods
and people from moving around freely.
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Of the 1,300 inhabitants of the aforementioned burnt-down houses, some are now dead
whereas others have fled into the bush where they will be homeless, in distress, and prey to all sorts
of bad weather and parasitic diseases, in short, abandoned to their sad fate.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN NORTH KIVU PROVINCE
(FOCUSING EXCLUSIVELY ON MASISI TERRITORY)
[Translator’s note: page missing]
Luanda (farmer). 9 people were killed on the road from Kitchanga to Mweso in the
chiefdom-community of the Bashali. Among the victims were Mr. Mbaire Kahunde (49), the chief
of the village of Luhanga.
On 6 April 1999
The assassination of Father Paul Juakali of Mweso parish in the bishopric of Goma. The
people of Goma were appalled to learn of the sad and untimely death of the extremely young,
dynamic and likeable figure of Father Paul Juakali who had made a name for himself because of
his well-balanced yet highly topical, and apposite sermons. Our sadness grew when we learnt that
Father Paul was not allowed to die a dignified death but viciously “hacked about” by armed men
before they finished him off. The 29-year-old priest was travelling in a parish car along the road
from Pinga Hospital where he had been asked to drive a patient home to the village of Ngingwe
(17 km from Pinga) when he was dragged from the car and separated from the other passengers by
a number of armed men. He was tortured with knives before being finished off with a bullet which
passed right through his skull from the lower jaw to the occipital bone traversing the brain.
According to the witnesses’ statements, there were 6 men and they killed Father Paul only after
they had robbed him of everything he had including US $ 400. They had a photo of him so that
they would not get the wrong man. Eyewitnesses also said that Father Juakali’s killers were from
the so-called “Self-Defence Forces” which operate in Masisi territory.
In the same month 37 unarmed civilians are said to have been killed at Lukweti in the
chiefdom-community of the Bashali.
From 23 to 28 April 1999
31 young people were killed in Masisi-Centre in the community of Osso-Banyungi as well as
12 others from Goma on the road from Sake to Masisi.
May 1999
On 25 May 1999, 50 people were killed at Sake in the chiefdom-community of the Bahunde.
Kiyana Bulenda is the only known victim. The rest were buried in a communal grave and have not
yet been identified.
In the second half of the month, 14 people were killed at Kalembe in the
chiefdom-community of the Bashali by the “Self-Defence Forces” (FAD). Among the victims were
Mrs. Mukewa (69), Mr. Maneno (43), his wife and his children, and Mr. Kazimiri (71). All their
belongings were looted and the other people in the village were so traumatised that they had to
desert the village and take refuge in Pinga and Kitchanga (other villages in Masisi territory).
3 people were killed at Kiusha Muongozi in the chiefdom-community of the Bashili. Among
the victims was Mr. Kinkone (69).
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4 people were killed in Nyabiondo. Among the victims were a schoolboy in the first year of
secondary school and Mr. Biloto, the son of Maneno.
6 people were killed in Kilambo in the chiefdom-community of the Bashali and several other
unidentified persons are reported to have been massacred by the FAD in a local church.
4 boys suspected of being Interahamwe were killed in Loashi in the community of
Osso-Banyungu.
June 1999
On 16 June 1999, Mr. Baba Rife was cravenly murdered along with two other people who
have not yet been identified in Bweremana, the main village of the chiefdom-community of the
Bahunde.
Since 2 August 1998 more than 382 unarmed civilians of Masisi territory are reported to
have been murdered in cold blood by forces working for the RCD, particularly the FAD.
NB.: Whereas Part IV of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention protects both civilians and
civilian objects, the civilians of Kivu in general and Masisi territory in particular are victims of a
failure by the warring parties in the DRC to respect international humanitarian law. And the
astonishing thing is that whenever one massacre or another is exposed the only reaction one gets is
that “there were only x deaths”, in an attempt to play the matter down and clear the criminals.
II.2. Arbitrary arrests and detention and abductions
In Masisi it is enough to be suspected or unjustifiably accused (often to settle an old score) of
being a Mai-Mai or an Interahamwe in order to be arbitrarily arrested, abducted, tortured or even
murdered. Reliable sources have told us how many people have been abducted or gone missing to
be subjected to inhuman treatment and found a week or a month later if ever again.
In Kitchanga for example a number of people are reported to have been unlawfully detained
in Kahe, on the premises of the war-damaged tea factory which used to belong to the international
trade and industry association, SICIA. They are now said to be in the hands of members of the
RCD-sponsored Rwandan Army (APR) on suspicion of being Mai-Mai or Interahamwe or
possession of firearms.
On 8 June 1999, members of the APR working for the RCD sealed off the market town of
Kitchanga from 4 to 11.30 a.m. on the pretext that they were searching for civilians in possession
of fire-arms. The whole population was traumatized by this incident in which they were surrounded
by APR soldiers armed to the teeth. No arms were found but the search was stepped up afterwards.
Following this incident, some of the chiefs and prominent personalities of Masisi territory
were forced to flee Masisi for the city where they have no right to any assistance. As a result some
of these once wealthy people have had to resort to begging in Goma or Sake, getting by and living
as street-dwellers or tramps.
In view of everything that is happening to the Bahunde in Masisi, some people cannot help
thinking that the RCD has a hidden agenda in this territory, namely the systematic elimination of
these people who have long been prevented from considering themselves the only native
community in the area. Since the Bahunde refuse to give in, despite all the harassment to which
they have been subjected since 1990, the RCD appears to have decided to implement a “final
solution”, in other words a fully-fledged process of ethnic cleansing. However, they are doing this
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very discreetly outside the eye of the media, on the pretext that they are “hunting down
Interahamwe wherever they can be found”. These accusations do appear to be founded because, as
early as September 1998, human rights activists were observing the following:
The instances of abduction, arbitrary arrest and expulsion which are currently
taking place in the city of Goma and its outskirts have aroused considerable concern.
There have been too many violations of the rights to peace, security and justice which
are guaranteed to every community under national and international law and too many
death threats and other abuses. To be more specific we would like to highlight the
following examples of arbitrary arrests, expulsions and abductions:
Mama Maombi Feza, a nurse, was arrested on 14 September 1998 for having
attended to a wounded man. She was set free only after repeated calls for her
release, including an appeal from the Bishop of Goma.
Mr. Kizungu Bulere Kiana was arrested on an unknown date and taken to the
Brigade’s 2nd office in connection with a dispute over a plot of land. His
adversary has accused him of being a Mai-Mai rebel and so he is still being held.
Mr. Bonhomme Balume was arrested for harbouring a Masisi village chief
suspected of colluding with Mai-Mai rebels and is still being held1.
The elderly Mr. Salumu of Sake was abducted with his son. Mulonda, Mutima,
Mrs. Bulondo, Pascal, Mwendabandu, Mr. Desire Muiti, Kashani, Miancho and
many others have also been abducted.
Mama Malira Bahati was abducted at 2 a.m. on 13 September and taken to
Gisenyi, Rwanda, where she was saved by divine providence having been thrown
into a stream of urine and a pond2. We would remind you that life belongs to God
alone and that such schemes amount to genocide.
II.4 General insecurity
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.
Article 28, UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights)
Insecurity has been exacerbated in Masisi territory as a result of the presence both of armed
groups including Interahamwe, former Rwandan soldiers and Self-Defence Forces (RCD militia
groups) and certain members of the Congolese Armed Forces who are still loyal to the central
government in Kinshasa. All of these groups organise occasional looting raids on shops and motor
vehicles, particularly those taking the following routes: Goma-Sake; Goma-Rutshuru-
Kanyabayonga; Sake-Masisi; Sake-Bweremana; Sake-Kitchanga-Mweso-Kalembe-Pinga; and
Sake-Ngungu-Ufamando.
1 The village chief in question was imprisoned and tortured for a long period and is no other than
Mr. Mwanda-Bandu Venant who expressed public indignation at the statements of the Governor of the Province when he
mocked the inhabitants of Masisi after some of them had been massacred. After Rwandan soldiers had burnt down the
villages and murdered civilians, the governor visited the area to assess the damage. It was at this point that he claimed
that the inhabitants of Masisi had carried out these crimes themselves and he called them “Wapumbafu”.
2 Note that all of these victims are civilians who have nothing to do with the Mai-Mai or the Interahamwe. Their
only sin is that they are all from Masisi territory.
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II.3. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.
Article 5, UDHR
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations
and of any criminal charge against him.
Article 10, UDHR
It should be said that, in Masisi territory, everyone who is murdered is first tortured before
being murdered or finished off with a bullet.
On 6 April 1999, Father Paul Juakali was tortured and hacked about with knives at Ngingwe
(17 km from Pinga on the road from Mweso) before being finished off with a bullet by six armed
men from the RCD-sponsored “Self-Defence Forces”.
In the second half of May 1999, Mr. Camarade Mabwire, a butcher, fell victim to a shooting
in which he was wounded in the leg by patrolling forces working for the RCD. The victim was
taken to the CBK hospital in Goma for medical treatment.
Several other cases of violations of Article 5 of the UDHR have occurred in the various
prisons and remand centres in Goma and Masisi territory. The following table drawn up by human
rights activists for February 1999 speaks dismal volumes even though it is far from complete:
Murders by RCD forces in Masisi Territory in February
DATE VILLAGE NUMBER OF
VICTIMS
COMMENTS
11/02/99 Loashi 10 Including 6 schoolchildren shot and/or drowned
Ngesha 4
Busoro 3
Lushebere 2 Including one victim who died under torture
Bukombo 2
Nyabiondo 3
18/02/99 Lwibo 1
Lukweti 47 At the market
19/02/99 Mahanga 154 At the market
Some of the victims who have been identified
Loashi:
Kwabo Busanga, around 25 years of age (farmer); Hélène Bandu (pregnant);
Luanda Lubira, 32 (cleaning lady); Muhombo Balaa and his two children, among them one of the
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drowned schoolchildren; Kaendo Lubira, 43 (son of Mr. Mashini); Vumilia (cleaning lady),
Charles Bolingo, 43 (farmer); Rujori.
Ngesha:
Maombi (cleaning lady) and her child; two women who are known to have been passing
through but have not been otherwise identified.
Bushoro:
Kamusehe (farmer), around 55 years of age, who died under torture, and a passing nurse who
has not been otherwise identified.
Lushebere:
Kulu Kyabinduka (farmer), around 60 years of age, and Siméon, around 30.
Lwibo:
Baeni (farmer), around 45.
Mahanga:
Mabondo (carpenter), around 40, and Brigitte (cleaning lady), 38.
II.5. Violations of the right to freedom of expression
and denial of the right to information
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
UDHR, Article 19
Despite the various abuses and cases of human rights violations carried out by the RCD and
armed gangs in Masisi territory, nobody dares to condemn them or speak out about the situation for
fear of being abducted or executed. The unarmed civilians of Masisi territory live in terror and the
churches, which used to act as their spokespersons, have now opted to say nothing or sometimes
been forcefully silenced3.
As one trustworthy clergyman has said, the Catholic Church and the traditional chiefs appear
to have been singled out as targets by the warlords.
“It is my impression that, over and above the specific crimes which each side
rightly or wrongly accuses the other of committing, there is a strategy aimed at
destroying everything that the people regard as sacred. Once the core around which a
people’s cohesion and common identity is built is destroyed, it is thought that it will
be easier to subject these defenceless and directionless peoples to the arbitrariness of
totalitarian ideology and a system which intends to prevail at all costs. In this context,
the Catholic Church and the traditional chiefs are the obvious target for a power which
3 Mutongo church was forced to close after the murder of the much-loved parish priest, Father Ndyanabo Boneza
Conrad, on 12 December 1994.
Likewise, the priests of Mweso do not now dare to go to their parishes because they were so shocked by the
recent murder of their colleague, Paul Juakali.
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wishes to wipe the slate clean of all Christian and traditional values. The method it
uses is to disorganize the people, striking at the very roots of their identity to be able
to subjugate them even more. After this it imposes its new values. But the question is
which ones.”4
It is for this reason that any traditional chiefs who still dare to say anything to defend the
interests of their prostrate people become the targets of threats, persecution and intimidation from
the RCD’s political authorities. Most of Masisi’s traditional chiefs have fled to Goma where all
their movements are carefully monitored in something amounting to a kind of house arrest.
To undermine completely the influence of the legitimate traditional chiefs in the
administrative area of Masisi, the current RCD leadership has had no hesitation in replacing
eligible rulers by members of the MAGRIVI (the Agricultural Society of Virunga), a process which
the Sovereign National Conference unanimously condemned5. Its members have been recognised
as guilty parties in the other war that has been bathing the Congo in blood since 1990, the
“Kanyarwanda”6.
The following are some cases in which traditional rulers have been replaced by members of
the MAGRIVI:
In the chiefdom-community of the Bashali, Mr. Erasto Binwagari from Busumba in
Bashali-Mukoto now calls himself a Mwami and acts as the chief of the chiefdom-community of
the Bashali, replacing the traditional Mwami, Bashali Wa Mukoto Nyanguba.
Mr. Mbarare: Chef de Groupement (area chief) of Kibachiro
Bamenya: Chef de localité (local chief) of Kirumbu
Ngenda Semajeri: Chef de localité of Kahira
Munyaganizi and Nzabonimpa: heads of the village of Mbuhi
Madui: Chef de localité of Mweso
Kikeri (one of the people behind the massacre of 7 May 1993 at Kibachiro-Karole in which
250 young Hunde lost their lives): Chef de localité of Lubula-Bwimire
Utazirubanda Kabagema: Capita/ chief of the village of Kitobo-Kitchanga
In the area of Bashali-Kaembe, the heads of the various settlements were granted official
recognition by the administrator of the territory based in Mweso, Mr. Zacharie Bizumyremyi
Ukobizaba, on 22 February 1999.
Responsibilities were divided up as follows:
Thomas Munyagishari: head of the village of Nyamitaba;
4 E. Kataliko, Archbishop of Bukavu, in his statement of 1 May 1999 entitled “Solidarity of the Catholic Church
of Bukavu with that of Rwanda in relation to the arrest of Mgr. Misago Augustin”.
5 See the conclusions of the Vangu Mambweni report (HCR-PT).
6 People who do not understand the real situation in North Kivu believe that the current war started in 1993. In
Masisi the war actually started in the period prior to 1 October 1990, the date of the official outbreak of war in Rwanda.
Rwanda was as cunning as a fox and managed to rid itself of the war and its torments by passing it on in the manner of an
injection of HIV to what can be considered its “brother” country through the intermediary of Congolese “bicucu”.
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Oscar Nkurikiyinka: head of the village of Tunda/Lubale;
Bonaventure Kisangani: head of the village of Lushangi-Burumo;
Wenceslas Turikinko: head of the village of Busihe-Kalonge;
Kamanzi Kayitani: head of the village of Mutobo;
Joke Mbendubundi: head of the village of Musongati;
Jean-Claude Habyarimana: head of the village of Burungu.
The following traditional chiefs were dismissed:
Luanda Bahati, Sereme Ndabigiro, Bonane Kaembe, Bulenda Mapfumo, Kulu Wabo,
Mateso Kaembe and Mrs. Safi Bulenda (represented by Maonero Kisa Kisa).
In the community of Osso-Banyungu, the traditional chief of the Bapfuna groupement,
Mr. Michel Bakungu Pfuna-Mapfuna was replaced by Mr. Munyabariba (a Rwandan Hutu).
These Rwandan immigrants and resettled persons generally Hutus who have taken
unlawful control of some of the groupements, settlements and villages in Masisi territory wrongly
accuse the dismissed Hunde and Nyanga chiefs of possessing firearms. The aim of this ploy is for
them to be hunted down and physically eliminated. Some chiefs have already lost their lives and
those on the hit-list have fled Masisi and taken refuge in Goma where the authorities keep a close
eye on them. When the time is ripe, they too will be wiped out.
II.6. Impunity and abuse of public office
II.6.1. Impunity
Massacres, assassinations, murders, inhuman and degrading treatment, looting of civilian
property, extortion and fleecing, unlawful and arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, torture, rape,
misuse of public property and other human rights violations are being carried out in Masisi territory
in North Kivu in complete impunity. The whole situation seems to indicate that the inhabitants of
this territory are regarded as animals whose only right is to die.
No enquiry has been opened into the death of Father Paul Juakali who was sadistically tortured
with knives before being finished off with a bullet at Ngingwe on 6 April 1999. And yet three
armed Hutus suspected of being involved in the priest’s death were captured and handed over
to the administrator of the territory living in Mweso, Mr. Zacharie Bizumuremyi Ukobizaba (a
Hutu himself), and the military commander in Mweso (who is a Tutsi) by the chief of
N’Suka/Kalonge, Mr. Célestin Kibira Biandja. The three suspects were released with their
weapons and without any form of trial. Following their release it was not long before they
threatened the chief who had handed them over with death, saying that he had denounced them.
They are reported to have sworn that they will continue to block the road between Mweso and
Pinga and kill any Hunde or Nyanga who dared to try to use this road.
No charges have been brought against the APR members working for the RCD who were
responsible for the shooting and wounding of Mr. Camarade Mabwire, now in the
CBK hospital in Goma. Many other cases of impunity have been recorded in Masisi
particularly with respect to the so-called self-defence forces who carry out a whole range of
crimes with the full knowledge of the political, administrative and military authorities.
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II.6.2. Abuse of office
Under a resolution of the former Zairian parliament, the HCR-PT, of 28 April 1995, the
MAGRIVI (Agricultural Society of Virunga) was supposed to be eradicated from Congolese
territory and some of its leaders were to be expelled from the Congo with the possibility that legal
proceedings would be initiated against them for having incited immigrants and resettled persons to
an insurrection against any attempt to impose the Congolese nationality act and called for civil
disobedience in the administrative territories of Masisi, Walikale, Rutshuru, Nyiragongo, Karisimbi
and Goma in North Kivu, and Kalehe in South Kivu. The native inhabitants of the area were
understandably surprised when the RCD authorities began appointing these people who had been
declared persona non grata in the Congo to positions of responsibility.
Among them are Mr. Nzabara Matsetsa, the Mayor of Goma, and Mr. Zacharie
Bizumuremyi Ykobizaba, the administrator of Mweso territory, who have conspired with the RCD
authorities to legitimize the authority of the MAGRIVI in spite of the fact that it was condemned
by the Congolese people at the CNS (the Sovereign National Conference). In this connection, see
the description above of the repression of traditional authority through the dismissal of traditional
chiefs.
II.7. Incitement to hatred
Whereas sub-paragraph 2 of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states that: “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”, tribal and ethnic hatred is rife in
Masisi territory and the surrounding area. The hatred stems from grudges harboured since the war
that broke out in 1993 between the native Hunde, Nyanga and Tembo groups and Rwandan
immigrants and deportees. These grudges are the root cause of the massacres, assassinations,
murders, looting and other human rights violations carried out and orchestrated by forces working
under RCD orders, particularly the latter’s militia groups.
Nothing happens by chance in the RCD. During various peacekeeping tours and assignments
only the native population has been disarmed by the authorities and to date not a single attempt has
been made to disarm the Hutus. Quite on the contrary, our impression is that they are regularly
supplied with arms and ammunition by the authorities in office.
The aim of this operation is not only to usurp traditional power but also to silence those
members of the native population who refuse to join their movement.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ORIENTALE PROVINCE
III.1 Overview of the situation between 1 January
and 30 March 1999 (to be published)
III.1.1. Loss of dignity/sabotage of the right to a wage
The social situation in the territories occupied by the RCD is still precarious. The people are
sunk in destitution and to cap it all they have to endure humiliation, harassment and physical and
moral torture from the soldiers of the RCD and its allies.
There is also some dissension between the Congolese rebels and their allies. In statements on
the radio on 5 April 1999, Mr. Balengela Tango-Tango, commander of operations of the 7th rebel
brigade asked the Congolese people to come to the assistance of the FAC-RCD Congolese Armed
Forces because the Congolese were increasingly subjected to humiliations in their own country at
the hands of foreign soldiers (from Rwanda and Uganda).
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To back up his appeal he referred to the case of Vice Governor M. Yogba who arrived on a
trip to Isiro and was immediately ordered by Ugandan soldiers to lie on the bare ground, then get
up and get back in the plane that had brought him from Kisangani. It would seem that the
Ugandans forgot that he was on an “official” tour of the various districts of Orientale province.
Alongside these humiliations undermining people’s dignity, the RCD’s allies ride roughshod over
the laws of the Congo.
For example under Congolese law, foreigners are not authorized to visit the country’s mining
regions unless they are given express authorization to do so by the state. In Kisangani the people
have been dumbfounded to see the constant stream of Rwandan and Ugandan machines and lorries
passing through on their way to the nearby diamond and gold mines.
Under Article 23.3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights everyone who works has
the right to a fair and decent wage corresponding to his efforts and satisfying the basic needs of the
worker and his family.
In the territories occupied by the RCD public employees have forgotten what a wage is.
Every time civil servants or state-employed teachers dare to demand their wages they are asked to
be patient and wait until Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has been
taken.
III.1.2. Absence of the right to medical treatment
Ever since the Second Republic, hospitals have had to make do without State grants and
funds to cover operating costs. Now there is no more money to pay wages. This situation has
caused the corrupt practices which were decried during the Mobutu regime to resurface.
The isolation of Orientale province caused by the rebel occupation has made the situation
even worse. Medical treatment has become the exclusive right of businessmen and those who have
the character to influence groups of men whom they can easily exploit.
Pharmaceutical products provided by UNICEF only help line the pockets of health workers.
We have it from reliable sources that these products have been misappropriated in Kisangani,
Isangi and Yangambi.
III.1.3. Absence of the right to education
Several schoolchildren have had to leave school because their parents are no longer able to
pay the fees that schools demand. RCD leaders based in Orientale province have simply asked
1997-98 school-leavers to start at university or in higher education institutions without their
certificates these people are referred to as the sans papiers. Even the national education system
has been Balkanized.
The question is whether UNESCO will be able to validate their degrees from university or
higher education institutes. The same thing is worrying schoolchildren for whom 1998-1999 is their
final school year. For the moment they are carrying on studying but they cannot be certain that they
will successfully complete their secondary education.
III.1.4. Insecurity and police harassment
All the warring parties keep on claiming that they are fighting for the freedom of the people.
For some the people need to be liberated from the dictatorship of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
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For others they have to be freed from the Rwando-Ugandan invasion. And for still others they have
to be relieved of the hegemony of the Hima-Tutsi empire.
But the actual truth is that the people, particularly in the territories occupied by the RCD, are
left to fend for themselves. They live in total and utter insecurity. Not a single day passes without
the sound of gunfire and not a single night without some private homes being “visited” by soldiers.
Very often these visits are accompanied by gunfire but never are the soldiers troubled by
those who claim to protect the people and their property.
By way of example:
Between 25 and 28 January 1999, three households in Kitenge II neighbourhood were the
victims of night-time visits accompanied by gunshots. The houses in question were No. 29 on
Boulevard Kiwele, Mr. Nzuzi’s house at 17, Avenue Likinda, and Mr. Basila’s at 53, Avenue
Botalimbo. This neighbourhood is only a few metres away from the military air-base but these
civilians were left to fend for themselves and given no help to protect their property. The
robbers abandoned the operation once they had managed to steal some items of value.
On the night of 11-12 March 1999, two men in uniform, armed to the teeth, attacked the
home of Mr. Ngubi at 20, 13ème Avenue Transversale, in the district of Kabondo. They stole
NZ 35,000,000 (US$100), 10 items of Wax clothing and other items of value.
On 10 March 1999, a 10-strong commando group besieged the Monga neighbourhood in
Kabondo district. The Basai family was rescued thanks to the human chain popularized by the
Friends of Nelson Mandela (ANM).
On the night of 16-17 January 1999, several heavily-armed men in uniform besieged the
Public Works and Regional Development (TPAT) offices. They removed the corrugated iron
cladding from some of them, making off with some 200 sheets. As things stand, this kind of
activity can take place in broad daylight without being interrupted.
III.1.5. Abductions
In defiance of international law provisions on the situation of civilians during periods of
armed conflict, civilians in the DRC are not protected, particularly in the eastern part of the
country. They are often subject to human rights violations on the pretext that they are acting as
scouts for the enemy or that military targets have not been clearly identified. One example is the
case of the village of Makobola where Rwandan soldiers killed over 500 people on 7 January 1999
because they were unable to distinguish soldiers from civilians. To date neither the UN nor the
OAU nor the government of the DRC nor even the RCD (the Congolese Rally for Democracy) has
conducted an investigation.
Here are a few other examples:
On 10 January 1999, the deaths of 16 civilians in Kisangani were blamed on government
bomber plane whereas in fact these 16 people were killed by shells fired at the plane by the
RCD (cf. ANM report of 10 January 1999 on the bombing of Kisangani).
On the night of 19-20 January 1999, Mr. Simon Engwande of 46, 17ème Avenue
Transversale in Kabondo district died at the Protestant hospital from 6 bullet-wounds in the
chest caused by a soldier who had shot him when he had refused to allow him onto his land.
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On 1 February 1999, the body of an unidentified man with traces of bayonet wounds was left
to decompose at the morgue in Kisangani General Hospital and eaten by dogs.
Mr. Bassay, around 27, who drove a bicycle taxi and was the son of an employee of the
Yangambi University Institute of Agronomics was shot dead on the premises of the company,
Busira Lomami, in Isangi (125 km from Kisangani on the River Congo). The Ugandan soldiers
who had arrested him told his family that he was in secret contact with Congolese government
soldiers.
On 9 February 1999, four unidentified persons accused of witchcraft and two others arrested
for unlawful possession of firearms were buried alive in a communal grave in Isangi (125 km
from Kisangani).
In Yangambi, some 97 km away from Kisangani, there is a militia group called Esende Buka
which has set itself the goal of “killing all witches”. It operates in broad daylight with the tacit
agreement of the local police. Among the victims of this group are Mr. Omangaoto, aged
around 60, who was stoned to death in front of soldiers who simply looked on and fired into the
air as the local children gathered round him yelling in triumph. There is also Mrs. Toleya, the
single mother of a large family, who teaches at the Yangambi girls’ school. She was brutally
dragged from her classroom by a group of youths and thoroughly beaten in front of her pupils.
She was saved thanks to the intervention of the Yangambi ANM office.
III.1.6. Extortion and vicious destruction
Abductions are among the most common methods used to intimidate opponents into
accepting the authorities’ line.
On 25 January 1999, Mr. Molisho, a public prosecutor at Kisangani Regional Court, was
abducted by a large group of armed men in uniform. He was accused of being in contact with
Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the commander of the rebel group called the MLC (the National
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo).
The same reason was given for the abduction of Mr. Biona Wa Biona, a metropolitan police
inspector and commander of the city of Kisangani. The latter was also accused of being in
contact with some of the dignitaries of the MPR, including Mr. Kpama and Mr. Nzimbi who
were both high-ranking officers in the SARM (the Mobutu regime’s military intelligence
service).
On 25 January 1999, the mayor of the municipality of Mangobo, Mr. Loela was wanted by
officers of the law in connection with rumours that the people of his municipality were secretly
preparing a protest march against the possible abduction of their mayor. He gave himself up to
the authorities and was held for a number of days.
As we have always said, many Congolese politicians are concerned only with their own
personal interests. Their talk of liberating the people is merely a smoke-screen.
While the major authorities are greedily pouncing upon the riches in the ground, the minor
officials, policemen and soldiers are making do with the riches of innocent civilians.
They resort to inhuman methods to get their hands on other people’s property. They organize
arbitrary arrest and detention, they torture and some go so far as to kill.
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The following examples speak volumes:
On 7 January 1999, at Banalia, 128 km from Kisangani, Congolese RCD soldiers and their
allies systematically looted the whole place then went on to rape women in the surrounding
villages.
On 9 January 1999, three armed men in military uniform extorted property from the people of
Kabondo district in Kisangani. They began in the evening and did not stop until the small hours
of the morning. Among the victims was Mr. Katsuva, the owner of the pharmacy on
6ème Avenue, Kabondo, who lost NZ 5,500,000 (US $ 157) and a large number of
pharmaceutical products.
On 14 January 1999, a group of armed men in military uniform occupied the village of
Kondolole, some 180 km from Kisangani on the river Lindi. They took possession of a dugout
belonging to the company Etablissments Jidex containing goods belonging to traders who
travelled regularly to the diamond quarries in the area.
On 8 January 1999, priests returning from Kisangani to the Church of St Elizabeth in Banalia
were stopped and robbed by soldiers on two occasions. On the first occasion, some 40 km from
Kisangani, they lost a sum of NZ 5,000,000 and on the second, 50 km further on, the soldiers
took a bag containing several items including a radio cassette player and their food supplies for
the next month.
On 20 January 1999, Mrs. Mariam, who is better known under her pseudonym of Mama
Kadafi, was visited by a group of armed men in uniform. Having completely ransacked her
home and fired three shots they demanded that she hand over a sum of US$10,000. The men
took away several items of value. The victim lives in the Kiwele block behind the veterinary
surgery in Makiso district.
On the same date, Mr. Amisi Rashidi of 67, 1ère Avenue in Kabondo district, who is a student
at the Kisangani Institute of Medicine (ITM) was visited by a group of armed men in uniform.
They made off with two Sharp radios and his wife’s case having raped his sister.
While based in Yangambi, Ugandan soldiers removed the corrugated iron cladding from four
residences belonging to the National Institute of Agronomic Studies and Research (INERA).
They sold this material to the inhabitants of the housing developments. Once they had left, the
police who were brought in to replace them proceeded to go around and get the cladding back.
The police did not have a list of the people who had bought cladding and so they began
removing the cladding from all the houses built in the town in 1998. A delegation of the
Kisangani ANM who were staying in Yangambi received complaints from Mr. Mboole and
Mr. Kambale who had bills confirming that their cladding was bought in Kisangani before
1998. In the major cities the officers of the law show a degree of restraint towards civilians but
in the provinces, or in other words the countryside, the people are constantly harassed.
For every offence there is a fine of at least NZ five million (US$14), often supplemented by
two or three goats and five or six chickens or ducks:
On 21 January 1999, Mrs. Kitundu, a married mother of five children around 45 years of age
living in the Lever Plantation work camp at Lokutu some 200 km from Kisangani was shot at
point-blank range by a policeman who had discovered her cutting down palm nuts. The
victim’s husband, Mr. Kasiala, who was immediately alerted by the other women working on
the plantation, went straight to the scene and stabbed the policeman to death. The incident was
taken up by the administrator of the territory who went to Lokutu with a group of police
officers who then looted the housing development and arrested several innocent parties. They
were released on condition that they paid a fine of NZ 5,000,000 (circa $US155). It should be
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noted that, in this kind of situation, the victims’ goats and chickens are the first things to be
taken away.
On 3 March 1999, Mr. Basila, a 34-year-old married father of three, living in Basoko (237 km
from Kisangani) was arrested and ordered to pay a fine of NZ 7,000,000 plus two goats. He
was charged with asking the wife of a policeman referred to only as “Mr. Alpha” to come to his
house and collect the bill for the arak (a local liqueur) he had just drunk.
III.1.7. The repercussions of the bombing of Kisangani on 10 January 1999
On 10 January 1999 at 9.50 p.m., a plane dropped bombs on the city of Kisangani.
“The Friends of Nelson Mandela for the Defence of Human Rights” (ANM) has looked very
closely into this incident and feels that it must alert the national and international community about
the way in which several families in Kisangani lost relatives in the incident.
Based on investigations in the field, it can be confirmed that the bombers belonged to the
government forces who were launching a counter-offensive with a view to dislodging the rebel
forces of the RCD (the Congolese Rally for Democracy) from Kisangani. Accordingly, they
concentrated their attack on some of the city’s strategic points such as the Simi-Simi II military
air-base, the Hotel Zongia, where some of the rebel authorities were based, and the international
Bangboka airport.
During the operation, bombs fell behind the training room at the Kisangani Sanatorium,
about 500 metres from the hangar at the end of the runway at Simi-Simi air-base, and on the
premises of Mr. Didier Kanima at 1, 5ème Avenue, Makiso district, in the Quartier des musiciens,
about 10 metres from the Hotel Zongia.
The RCD’s attempts to shoot the plane down caused damage to property and losses of
civilian lives.
The first shell fired at the plane landed on the premises of Mr. Ilongo-Longo on 28, 2ème
Avenue, while the second exploded on the premises of Mr. Epidi Djafard at 36, 3ème Avenue
Dépotoir in Tshopo district.
The following people were killed or wounded as a result:
I. Dead:
Name Sex Address in Tshopo Marital status Age
1. Loleka (father) M 28, 2ème Ave. Married 60
2. Loleka (son) M 28, 2ème Ave. Single 12
3. Bandole Metaleke M 20, 2ème Ave. Single 18
4. T.F. Basosila M 23, 2ème Ave. Married 43
5. Jean-Paul Mbula M 29, 2ème Ave. Single 13
6. Passy Lokita F 30, 3ème Ave. Single 19
7. Sylvie Lokita F 30, 3ème Ave. Single 16
8. Jean Longala M 33, 3ème Ave. Single Over 30
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9. Botwetwe M 23, 2ème Ave. Single 36
10. Manu Mazumunu M 21, 2ème Ave. Single 42
11. Nora Dalige F 19, 2ème Ave. Single 12
12. Liense Zakalo F 2ème Ave. Single 20
II. Wounded:
Name Sex Address in Tshopo Marital status Age
1. Okito M 28, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single Over 25
2. J.-Louis Mangwangu M 28, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single Over 25
3. Pascal Botsho M 28, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single Over 27
4. Keni Mozart M 28, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single 12
5. Bandole Bamiwa F 20, 2ème Ave. Single 20
6. Célestin M 23, 2ème Ave. Single Over 25
7. Mama Lyly F 25, 2ème Ave. Married Over 30
8. Nene F 25, 2ème Ave. Single Over 18
9. Jean Tulanga M 29, 2ème Ave. Single 20
10. Lutambula F 19, 2ème Ave. Married Over 35
11. Manu “le blanc” M 25, 2ème Ave. Single 13
12. Manu F 25, 2ème Ave. Single 11
13. Bolanda M 30a, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single 29
14. Mukuphar M 2ème Ave. Married -
III. Damage to property: Six houses were destroyed as well as a number of items of value inside.
Under international humanitarian law, warring parties must guarantee the protection of
civilians and their property during wars. Neither are warring parties ever permitted to launch
attacks on civilians or use them as human shields. (This universal principle has never been applied
in occupied DRC).
III.2. The war in Kisangani: an outrage against peace and telling evidence of
international collusion in the present crisis in the Congo
III.2.1. General comments
As the 20th century draws to a close much of the human suffering in Africa in general and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular can be put down to armed conflicts in which
human rights are trampled upon. Most of the time it is innocent civilians who pay the cost.
Current events are showing once again that if a problem is left without being thoroughly
resolved, it results in a spiral of violence which leads in turn to war and senseless killing.
The fighting between Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani is a case in point.
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At a time when the attention of the entire population of the occupied territories is focusing
on the conclusions of the verification committee, which will also issue a final opinion on the
question of the signature by rebel groups of the Lusaka cease-fire accords, Kisangani is mourning
and burying its dead.
III.2.2. Position of the allies and consequences of the fighting between the Rwandan and
Ugandan armies on Congolese soil
Agreements between the allies
If we look back at the war which is currently ravaging the DRC, we see that the Congolese
Rally for Democracy (RCD) had two allies from the outset in the form of Rwanda and Uganda.
The two countries claimed that their presence deep in Congolese territory over 1,500 km from their
frontiers was justified by a concern for the security of their borders. Just like the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo, the RCD and MLC rebels have never told the
people who their allies are.
However, the public claims that the two allies came to an agreement in their draft accord on
the administration of the occupied territories. Uganda was to be responsible for the political and
economic management of the northern part of these territories comprising Equateur and Orientale
provinces and the northern part of North Kivu province, namely Beni, Butembo and Lubero, while
Rwanda was to deal with the south, in other words South Kivu, East and West Kasai, Katanga,
Maniema and the remaining part of North Kivu.
[Translator’s note: two pages missing]
The fighting had the following disastrous consequences:
a gross violation by Rwanda and Uganda of UN Security Council Resolution 1234 of
9 April 1999;
a gross violation by Uganda of the Sirte Peace Accord (Libya);
the collusion of the United Nations and their inability to make Rwanda and Uganda respect the
international charter of human rights and the constitutive charter of the United Nations;
the sabotage of 3 million doses of vaccine destined for thousands of children from nought to
5 years of age as part of the National Polio Vaccination Campaign in Orientale province;
the death of more than 175 innocent victims, including scores of young people, women and
children;
the destruction of public and private amenities as a result of fighting using heavy artillery;
a power cut and all the problems associated with this for the City of Kisangani.
III.3. Former Mai-Mai fighters being wiped out in Kisangani, Orientale Province
In its task of promoting and protecting human rights in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo the ANM has looked once again into the plight of the former Mai-Mai soldiers in
Kisangani.
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It should be recalled that the Mai-Mai are Congolese citizens from South Kivu province who
have been fighting for some years now to counter the expansionist aims of the Tutsis in the
provinces of North and South Kivu.
During the first war, the so-called war of liberation, these Congolese citizens fought on the
side of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) led by the
current president, Laurent Désiré Kabila.
Once Kabila had taken power, they were incorporated into the Congolese Armed
Forces (FAC) and accommodated at the Kapalata military training camp in Kisangani where, under
the vigilant eye of Rwandan instructors, over two thousand of them died. It was in this connection
that the ANM launched an urgent appeal on 2 January 1998 entitled as follows:
“Do the Mai-Mai militia have cholera or are they suffering from malnutrition?”
Now history seems to be repeating itself. When Kisangani fell into the hands of the rebels
(the Congolese Rally for Democracy), the former Mai-Mai soldiers were taken to the military camp
known as “Base” over 9 km from the centre of Kisangani.
Following the rumours that were circulating and its own investigations, the ANM has
reported that the Mai-Mai have been left to their own devices and are being gradually wiped out.
They roam the streets of Kisangani from morning to night. Some of them look for a small job to
earn enough to eat, others are forced to take to begging, while others still abandon themselves to
total destitution.
The 150 sick Mai-Mai transferred to Kisangani General Hospital have been almost totally
abandoned. They are denied medical treatment, food and even prescriptions.
In this degrading situation, many of them are weak, starving, and disease-ridden and every
day one of them dies.
The most shocking case is that of Mr. Heshima, a man around 20 years of age, who died at
the door of the Higher Institute of Medicine (ISTM), some fifty metres from the hospital.
In view of the ongoing situation on the ground, the public’s suspicions that the former
Mai-Mai soldiers are purely and simply being exterminated may be founded, despite the fact that
they too are covered by the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law.
Faced with the growing number of victims, ANM has launched an urgent and heartfelt
appeal to the national and international community to assist the following 77 former Mai-Mai:
List of former Mai-Mai soldiers in danger of dying at Kisangani General Hospital
1. Ngenda
2. Paruku
3. Kitisao
4. Mikayele
5. Madudu
6. Muzuhuke
7. Mapendo Kambale
8. Faustin Kambale
27. Bosongo
28. Bosembayi
29. Soudanais
30. Safari Jacques
31. Baribonera
32. Udino
33. Musubao
53. Samusoni
54. Bisuru
55. Masikirizano
56. Milieza
57. Nzabirinda
58. Dine
59. Sibomana
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9. Patrice
10. Jackson
11. Biyamungu
12. Nzabanita
13. Habiyana
14. Amabu
15. Dume
16. Ilunga
17. Mbo
18. Bamuparabi
19. Kalombo
20. Kavuma
34. J.P. Lwansa
35. Basengo Nyembo
36. Musafiri
37. Kayumba
38. Mulemba
39. Kibonge Mutwale
40. Safari Tshelubala
41. Lokalanga
42. Yamnonga Ngugandje
43. Moyinda
44. Kasangai Sossa
45. Rubunda Ngagidje
46. Marie Salisali
60. Janvier
61. Shirambere
62. Mateso
63. Bazirake
64. Kabalira
65. Turinabo
66. Turidumwe
67. Nguba
68. Sadiki
69. Etienne
70. Kambale
71. Habimana Rusasa
72. Roger Dunia
[Translator’s note: 1 page missing]
[...]
Details of these heinous crimes came from sources including a little girl who had escaped
and was taken for appropriate medical treatment to the Sendwe General Hospital in Lubumbashi
(the administrative capital of Katanga).
IV.4. Arbitrary arrests and abductions
August 1999 was a deadly month for the people of occupied northern Katanga. It saw the
sudden abduction of 40 Franciscan nuns from Sola in northern Katanga by members of the
occupying Rwandan army, as well as the abduction of Father Baudouin Waternane (a Belgian
subject), a sacristan and a seminarist from Sola parish, and the headmaster of a local school. After
several days of investigation 18 sisters have been found again but the other 22 are still missing.
N.B.: As far as the human rights situation in the occupied part of northern Katanga is
concerned, apart from the killings and the abductions that have been recorded, the humanitarian
situation is also totally disastrous. Several hundreds of families are now homeless, over 114 houses
have been burnt down, various churches and schools have been quite simply destroyed and a
number of girls have been forced into prostitution or raped.
The humanitarian problems in this part of the country are acute.
OVERALL CONCLUSION
The large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the
occupied provinces of the DRC provide telling evidence of the United Nations’ inability to manage
international conflicts when faced with the agonizing indecision of the imperialist powers involved,
who are more preoccupied with sub-regional geo-strategic interests than the lives of human beings.
In a limited period of six months, the provinces of the DRC occupied by Rwanda, Burundi
and Uganda have been the scene of criminal acts, senseless massacres of civilians, killings of every
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other kind and all the other possible forms of large-scale human rights violations that might be
imagined.
Tragedy is everywhere: Homes have been torched, thousands of civilians have become war
refugees, hundreds of access roads to farming land have been abandoned, seasonal food shortages
are on the increase, freedom of expression has been muzzled as never before, public amenities have
been destroyed, natural resources and other national assets have been systematically looted, and
millions of people have been traumatized. This is a huge humanitarian crisis whose ins and outs are
liable now more than ever to result in human slaughter given the popular resistance to all of the
activities of the aggressors and their Congolese proxies, who seem to have forgotten that:
“You can achieve everything by force except to make yourself loved” and/or “it
is better to have a just war than an unjust peace which takes no account of the
deep-seated aspirations of the people involved”.
This six-monthly report covering events in the occupied provinces of North Kivu, South
Kivu, northern Katanga and Orientale province between 1 April and 30 September 1999 does not
claim to be a panacea for all the large-scale human rights violations reported since the invasion of
the DRC, but neither can it be regarded as the mere product of speculation. Instead it is intended to
provide a data base on the criminal acts carried out on the cosmopolitan and hospitable Congolese
people which will certainly be used as a source of information in the future investigations and
reparations without which these war criminals will never be held to account for their acts before the
inevitable and essential appropriate judicial bodies.
This report should not now be filed away and treated as a closed matter. It should be
analyzed and used for the benefit of the peace-loving inhabitants of the occupied provinces of the
DRC.
Done in Kinshasa on 30 October 1999.
For the 152 youth movements and associations of South Kivu, DRC
which are the members of COJESKI
1. Christian Bulambo Wandila
Provincial administrator of the social committee.
2. Marcel-Joseph Kamba Nyunyu
Provincial administrator for ethics and morals.
Special advisor on the preparation, planning and evaluation of development projects.
3. Fernandez Murhola Muhigirwa
Provincial administrator of the political committee.
Security adviser to the South Kivu Civil Society.
4. Willy Tshitende Wa Mpinda
Deputy co-ordinator.
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Volume II - Annexes