Note: This translation has been prepared by the Registry for internal purposes and has no official
character
14687
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA)
SECOND PHASE
QUESTION OF REPARATION
MEMORIAL
OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
VOLUME 7
(Annexes 4.15 to 4.28)
September 2016
[Translation by the Registry]
LIST OF ANNEXES
Volume 7
Annexes 4.15 to 4.28
Annex Page
4.15 Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998 1
4.16 Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Seventieth Ordinary
Session, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the DRC,
6-10 July 1999
34
4.17 South Kivu Civil Society — Collective of South Kivu (DRC) Youth
Organizations and Associations (COJESKI), Events in the occupied provinces of
the DRC — large-scale violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law reaching fever pitch, Six-monthly report covering the period
from 1 April to 30 September 1999, October 1999
35
4.18 Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within the Rebel Alliances and
Factions in North-Eastern Congo. The Kisangani War, September 1999
85
4.19 Lotus Group, Conflict between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani, Kisangani,
May 2000
86
4.20 Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, July 2000 99
4.21 MONUC, Historic record of Kisangani cease-fire operation, 19 June 2000 99
4.22 United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2000/566, 12 June 2000
100
4.23 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh Session, Report on
the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/15, document E/CN.4/2001/40,
1 February 2001 (excerpts)
113
4.24 United Nations Security Council, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission
to Kisangani (pursuant to Security Council resolution 1304 (2000),
paragraph 14), document S/2000/1153, 4 December 2000
133
4.25 Claim of Société textile de Kisangani (SOTEXKI) 146
4.26 Claim of Société nationale d’électricité (SNEL) 149
4.27 Claim of the Régie des voies aériennes 153
4.28 Claim of the Archdiocese of Kisangani 155
ANNEX 4.15
Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998
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Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998
[Translation]
CONTENT
INTRODUCTION
PART I: WAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
I.1. The causes of the war
I.1.1. Indirect causes
I.1.2. Direct causes
I.2. The warring parties
I.2.1. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and its allies
I.2.2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and its allies
PART II: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN KISANGANI AND THE SURROUNDING AREA
II.1. Human rights violations under the authorities of the KABILA Government
A. Civil and political rights
B. Economic and social rights
C. Use of children as soldiers
D. Failure to protect civilians
II.2. Human rights under the rebel authorities
II.2.1. Inhuman treatment
II.2.2. Infringements of the right to life
II.2.3. Humiliating and degrading treatment
II.2.4. Physical, psychological and moral duress
II.2.5. Disappearances
II.2.6. Looting
II.2.7. Deterioration of health and humanitarian conditions and threats to medical
workers
II.2.8. Loss of material and social well-being
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PART III: THE ATTITUDE OF THE WARRING PARTIES TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
ABUSES COMMITTED
III.1. The governmental authorities
III.2. The rebel authorities
PART IV: THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE WAR
IV.1. The power struggle — developments on the ground
IV.2. The inhabitants — their concerns and expectations
IV.3. The efforts of the international community hesitant and inadequate (from August to
early October 1998)
IV.4. The future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Consitutional decree of 27 May 1998
Appendix 2: Chronology of events in Kisangani
Appendix 3: Declaration of the war of rebellion, 2 August 1998 [not attached]
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ABBREVIATIONS
AFDL: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo
ANR: National Intelligence Agency
BSRS: Special Investigation and Surveillance Brigade
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAC: Congolese Armed Forces
FAZ: Zairian Armed Forces
FEC: Congolese Business Federation
HCR-PT: High Council of the Republic — Transitional Parliament
OFIDA: Customs and Excise Office
OCPT: Congolese Post and Telecommunications Office
PIR: Rapid Intervention Police
RCD: Congolese Rally for Democracy
RVA: Air traffic control authorities
SADC: Southern African Development Community
UN: United Nations
WHO: World Health Organization
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INTRODUCTION
The major preoccupation of the first person ever to fashion a weapon on this earth was to
defend himself against attacks from wild animals. This defensive attitude has not endured over
time. Various changes and modifications have diverted those who take up arms from their noble
purpose of yesteryear. In our day and age most of the horrible scenes which plunge humankind in
to mourning and sadness can be put down to the abuse of weapons for fratricidal wars, revenge, or
rebellion, in short, violence in all its varying forms.
This is what the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been enduring
since the beginning of the 1990s. There have been countless deaths in the region during this
period, beginning with the influx of Hutu refugees from Rwanda in 1994, going on through the
so-called war of liberation waged by the AFDL in 1996, which brought Laurent Désiré KABILA to
power as the president of the DRC, and continuing with the rebellion of August 1998. Even the
so-called civilized powers, those world police officers in waiting who gladly seize any opportunity
to strike out at or destabilize régimes branded as dictatorships, have taken no notice of the fate of
innocent civilians or even the massacres that have resulted from the conflicts.
No sooner had Mobutu and his Government exited the stage and Kabila taken power than
those who wish to subjugate the world and will go to any length to tip the balance in favour of their
own interests inflicted another war on the Congolese at a time when they least expected it. It
seemed that the main purpose of the rebels was to effect a radical remedy to the totalitarian
tendencies of the DRC’s current leader. They began in Goma and, in record time, they had
conquered a number of the country’s cities and strategic centres including Bukavu, Uvira, Beni,
Butembo, Bunia, and Kisangani, paving the way for their assault on Kinshasa, the capital and seat
of Government.
Kisangani, the third largest city in the country is the administrative centre of Orientale
Province, which is the largest and most highly populated of the DRC’s 11 provinces. It has around
700,000 inhabitants of varying cultural origin. It has an international airport (Bangboka), a military
air-base (Plateau Médical) and a port on the Congo river providing a direct link to the capital of the
DRC, Kinshasa. There are roads from Kisangani to Uganda via Bunia, the Central African
Republic via Bondo and Sudan via Isiro.
In the political history of the country, Kisangani was the fiefdom of the national hero,
Patrice Hemery LUMUMBA and the political centre of the Mulelist uprising of 1964. Under
Mobutu Sese Seko it was the stronghold of the party of the State, the Popular Movement of the
Revolution (MPR) and so this was where the lightning counter-offensive against the AFDL
uprising was organized. In March 1997, the rebellion led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo met with remarkable success in Kisangani,
encouraging him to continue his struggle until he was able to take power in Kinshasa.
Kisangani is the focus of the area in which LOTUS conducted the investigations that led to
this report. The report details the human rights violations which took place there, in particular from
4 August 1998 (the date on which sections of the Congolese Armed Forces supporting the rebels
first attempted to take Kisangani) to 23 August 1998 (the date on which the rebel forces actually
entered Kisangani) and the period from 23 August to 15 October 1998 (the end of the period of
observation). The report acts both as a window and a mirror. Through the window, the outside
world will most certainly come to acknowledge Kisangani’s tragic situation and, who knows, may
be prompted to do what it can to ensure that these kinds of circumstances no longer arise anywhere
in the world. In the mirror, those who call for and wage war can see and meditate on what they
have done, if only for the sake of the universal nature of human values.
Save for the introduction, the conclusions and the recommendations, this report is divided
into four main parts. The first relates primarily to some of the main keys to an understanding of the
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new war in the DRC. The second part focuses on the human rights violations in the region both
before and after the taking of Kisangani. The third describes the warring parties’ attitudes towards
human rights violations and abuses; and the final part sets out a few theories about the future of the
DRC based on some free thinking about the situation.
PART I:
WAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
On 2 August 1998, to everyone’s great surprise, foreign radio stations announced that parts
of the 10th Army Brigade in Goma had mutinied. That day, at a gathering of all 21 of the
battalions making up the brigade, the commander announced a break with the Government in
Kinshasa and his decision to wage war on the Kabila Government until it was overthrown. How
did this turn of events come about? Who was pulling the strings? The following sections should
provide some sort of an explanation.
I.1. The causes of the war
I.1.1. Indirect causes
(a) The disillusionment of Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s former allies
Without entering into a detailed chronology of events it should be recalled that President
Kabila’s main allies throughout his war of liberation were Rwanda and Uganda. Their support
stemmed from a desire to protect their governments and secure their frontiers but unfortunately
they soon found themselves right back where they started from.
At the beginning of hostilities in 1996, units of the Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces
formed the spearhead of Kabila’s troops, but once victory had been secured the new authorities in
Kinshasa regarded them as surplus to requirements. Certain senior army officers regarded as
‘military advisers’ were banished from the Government’s decision-making elite.
In the meantime the threats that Uganda and Rwanda thought they had warded away from
their frontiers re-emerged in the form of rebel groups taking advantage of the almost total lack of
supervision by the Kinshasa régime and using the DRC as a retreat. This was the case with the
Alliance of Democratic Forces and the former Rwandan Armed Forces.
(b) Difficult living conditions for some of the supporters of the former Mobutu régime
Not only did the Mobutu régime introduce anarchy but it also consciously and intentionally
established the law of the jungle by means of the unbridled accumulation of riches by one
individual and a court of dignitaries who were the representatives of economic monopolies and
secret lobbies, all of which formed a kind of debased State bourgeoisie. The dignitaries had come
to rely on the magnanimity of the president and the law of the least possible effort by dipping into
the State’s coffers and cultivating numerous supporters and fanatics, but they fell into disgrace
under Kabila. Their ill-gotten gains had to be returned, their lucrative positions were lost, and their
bank reserves were considerably undermined.
Their supporters, who had also got used to the law of the least possible effort, ended up
destitute and hopeless. Neither did most of those who chose to go into exile find themselves in a
very enviable situation. Exile was nowhere near as profitable because most governments did not
wish to see their relations with the new Government in Kinshasa deteriorate immediately. There
was plenty of reason for these people to hark back to the old days. Given the circumstances, they
were certain to support any activity aimed at undermining the Kabila Government.
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(c) Difficulties for the international community in taming the Kabila régime
The multinational companies which had hastened to sign mining contracts with Kabila when
he was a rebel chief expected to be granted privileges in Congo. The fact that the Kabila
Government proceeded to call all of these contracts into question and that its Ministry of Mines
introduced highly restrictive laws to govern them disappointed these companies as well as the
states in which they were based.
It would appear that President Kabila’s official journeys abroad since his accession to power,
including visits to China, Cuba, Libya, Namibia, and South Africa, have done little to help people
understand his approach and his heartfelt desire to solve his country’s economic and social
problems.
Recently, his detractors, who believe that the only way for a Third World country to make
economic progress is to attract western capital, have branded him with various unflattering labels
such as communist, Africanist or nationalist.
His noteworthy absence from the summit of French-speaking communities in Hanoi, his
refusal to meet the American emissary, Jesse Jackson, his reluctance to co-operate with United
Nations missions to investigate allegations that Rwandan Hutu refugees were massacred in Congo,
and his reservations about touring western capitals in search of the foreign investment which is
often presented as a panacea for kick-starting Third World economies are all points in his disfavour
on the international scene.
(d) The failure to hold a political round table meeting after the AFDL’s military victory
In eight years of transition there has been much political dialogue (the 1st and 2nd Marble
Palace agreements, the National Sovereign Conference, the political “conclave” and the political
discussion at the People’s Palace), all of which has led to the emergence of a new class of
politicians made up of unprincipled opportunists and careerists, capable of changing their minds
with the weather, most of whom can be encountered in Kinshasa. Their ongoing preoccupation is
to occupy a public post (whether in a ministry or not) but this is not to serve the public but to fulfil
their own political ambitions and gain social status. These politicians were probably expecting to
make the most of the opportunity when Kabila came to power. It was not long before they realized
that something else was happening. The refusal to resurrect Mobutu’s last lumbering parliament
(the HCR-PT), the importance attached to the opinions of the Congolese Diaspora when taking
national policy decisions and the appointment of a government with a very small number of
ministers help to explain the predicament of these opportunist politicians and what they have been
saying about Kabila.
I.1.2. The direct causes
All of the foregoing shows us the underlying tensions both inside and outside Congo. All
that was needed was a small spark for the whole country to blow up like a powder keg.
In a bid to boost his popularity, President Kabila reacted to all the complaints he had
received regarding the abuses of his military allies and — following a process of verification which
it has to be said took a relatively long time — decided to repatriate all the foreign soldiers stationed
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without mentioning the real reason for this. The
president’s decision was announced and read out on national television on the night of
24-25 July 1998.
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The people welcomed President Kabila’s decision as they had already had enough of the
foreign military presence which seemed to excel in abusing its power, occupying senior military
posts and taking full advantage of its many privileges. However, this was not the case with the
soldiers themselves who felt considerably aggrieved. In both Kisangani and Kinshasa the process
of disarming these soldiers did not go smoothly.
It was against this background of a compulsory withdrawal for some and a boost in national
pride for others that a mutiny broke out in Goma on 2 August 1998.
I.2. The warring parties
Mobutu’s advancing illness and the inevitable collapse of his régime meant that the question
of his succession and the hegemony of certain powers over the Democratic Republic of the Congo
could be raised once again on the international scene. The balance undoubtedly turned in favour of
the English-speaking protectors of the Great Lakes region who used their usual channels of
influence.
However, no sooner was the fighting all over and the matter apparently settled once and for
all, than Kabila snubbed those who had helped him to come to power, turning instead to southern
Africa and even going so far as to help create the SADC (Southern African Development
Community).
Though this significant and decisive step was bound to distance Kabila from his former
patrons, it was possible that it was a sign of future affiliations elsewhere.
I.2.1. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and its allies
The RCD is a political and military organization set up in August 1998 with a view to
overthrowing the Kabila Government and establishing a democratic régime based on genuine
popular legitimacy. It believes that war is the only method likely to succeed in this. The fact that it
emerged only a few days after the beginning of the fighting (on 12 August 1998) may bear out its
claims to be the instigator of the rebellion but it may also reflect a kind of incoherence within the
rebel movement, with the political leaders on one side and the military chiefs on the other,
especially since it was the military leaders who had called on the politicians to work together to
decide on the country’s political orientation.
The RCD’s political declaration and the communiqué announcing the launch of the second
war of liberation — which it calls the war of rectification are similar in their criticisms of the
Kabila régime (accusing it of tribalism, exclusion, misappropriation of public funds, etc.).
It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty who the warring parties’ allies are since no
specific statements have been made on the subject. However, the coincidence between the decision
to remove foreign soldiers from Congolese territory, the opposition of those concerned, the launch
of the rebellion in Goma, which is such a strategic town, and the opening up of a western front (in
Kitona, more than 2,000 kilometres from Goma), requiring the deployment of airborne troops, does
seem to indicate that there was some foreign support. Rwanda and Uganda are among the prime
candidates in so far as Rwanda acknowledges that it supports the rebellion “politically and
morally” while Uganda’s President Museveni has admitted before his own parliament that
defensive Ugandan military forces are present on Congolese territory.
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I.2.2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and its allies
Lawful governments often take up arms in response to rebel movements in their own country
either to hold back their advances or to snuff them out. The Government of the DRC had to react
to the offensive against it and so it mobilized its troops on various fronts. In its attempt to make up
the ground it had lost it was officially supported by Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Chad.
Angola’s vigorous intervention could be put down to threats to the security of its borders but the
same could not be said of the other countries involved, which simply came to the aid of a fellow
government and a friend in danger and found it difficult to accept that a régime which had been so
remarkably popular until then was being undermined.
PART II
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN KISANGANI AND THE SURROUNDING AREA
II.1. Human rights violations under the authorities of
the KABILA Government
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which protect the
victims of armed conflicts and the civilian population.
An analysis of events on the ground reveals that the Government of the DRC has not only
failed to make enough effort to promote these rights but has also been contributing in one way or
another to their violation.
Between the outbreak of fighting in Kisangani on 4-6 August 1998 and the rebel conquest of
the town on 23 August the following violations were committed by President Kabila’s Government
forces:
A. Civil and political rights
Infringements of the right to life: summary executions
On 5 August 1998, Mr. Faustin IBANDA, a student in his last year at the Yangambi University
Institute of Agronomics and an employee of the Sunair air company, was shot dead by
members of the Congolese Armed Forces at his home in the SEDEC building in Makiso
because of his physical resemblance to a Tutsi. He was in fact a member of the Hema tribe
from the Ituri forest.
It is alleged that there were summary executions of Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis
(Banyamulenge) captured during the fighting of 4 to 6 August by Congolese soldiers (from the
military police unit) on suspicion of collaborating with Rwandans and Rwandan civilians.
They are said to have been executed at Bangboka International Airport, at the warehouse of the
Congo-SEP oil company about 7 km away from the town centre on the road to Yangambi, and
in the vicinity of the military air-base at Plateau Médical. Around 53 of the alleged victims are
said to have been buried in common graves near the morgue at Kisangani General Hospital,
another 19 in the vicinity of the ferry crossing on the River Lindi about 15 km from the city
centre, and an unknown number thrown into the river near the Congo-SEP warehouse.
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Cases of physical and psychological duress as well as torture and inhuman treatment
During this period, it was enough to be accused of being a Rwandan or a friend of the
Rwandans to be apprehended and subjected to all manner of ill-treatment. This is what happened
to Ms Eyanga of 18, 5ème Avenue in Tshopo district, who was arrested for hiding two Rwandans.
She was whipped by police officers then taken to military headquarters where she was released
after 48 hours.
A number of people identified as Rwandan citizens were arrested and kept in inhuman
conditions in lockups at military HQ or the BSRS (the Special Investigation and Surveillance
Brigade) in Mangobo.
Cases of arbitrary arrest
On 11 August 1998, Mr. Dieudonné Ngwasi, the deputy provincial director of the Directorate
General of Migrations in Orientale Province, was arrested by police officers at the Hotel
Zongia where he was staying. He was initially held at the office of the PIR (Rapid Intervention
Police) (formerly the Civil Guard office) then transferred to the military lockup known as
Bureau II. He was suspected of being in contact with rebels because his cousin,
Mr. Joseph Mudumbi, is a member of the rebels’ Political Directorate in Goma. He was
released the day before the rebel troops entered Kisangani (i.e., on 22 August 1998).
Mr. Jacques Manga, a 19 year-old pupil at the school complex of the University of Kisangani
from 37, 1ère Avenue, Tshopo, was arrested on 18 August 1998 by members of the Mai-Mai
militia who are working alongside the Government troops. They claimed that he is a Rwandan
whereas in fact he is a Congolese citizen. He was held for 26 hours in a room in the old
orphanage converted into a rehabilitation centre being used as a base by the Mai-Mai. His life
was in danger because, by that stage, the Government forces had already distributed weapons
to the Mai-Mai.
Mr. Shakira, deputy public prosecutor, was held and questioned for several hours at the
National Intelligence Agency (ANR) because it was alleged that he is a Rwandan whereas in
fact he is a Congolese citizen from South Kivu province.
Violations of the right to property
A number of wireless telegraphs and other communications devices owned by individuals
and corporate entities were confiscated by the security forces. Private and company vehicles were
commandeered without going through official procedures.
A Yamaha sports motorbike belonging to Mr. Faustin Kinzonzoli, the Executive Secretary of
the NGO APILAF (the Association for the Promotion of Local Initiatives in the African Forest),
was stolen by Government forces the day before the rebels took the city.
Threats to Human Rights Organizations
On 12 August 1998 the Lotus Group offices were visited by the Rapid Intervention Police
who suspected the group of possessing communications devices used to broadcast information
abroad. A verbal order was issued for the group to suspend its activities.
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Infringements of the right to a fair trial
The commander of the 25th Kisangani Brigade, Mr. Lisasi, and thirty or so soldiers from the
Government forces accused of treason were arrested, tied up and transported to Kinshasa without
being brought before the local courts.
Cases of disappearances
Mr. Chiasha, a former member of the intelligence services from South Kivu province,
married to a Rwandan Tutsi, and his son Papy, a fourth-year secondary school pupil; Mr. Hemedi,
a customs and excise officer, claiming to hail from the Hema tribe from the Ituri forest in Congo,
arrested at his home by police officers on 11 August 1998; a man identified only as Mr. Bedel, a
Rwandan Tutsi and 3rd year student at the Faculty of Medicine, arrested by members of the
Mai-Mai militia on the university campus at the Elungu Home Complex, Block B No. 4, along with
his friend identified only as Bienvenu, a first year student at the Yangambi University Institute of
Agronomics and a Rwandan Tutsi; Mr. Rutaramera Bigega, an employee of the National
Electricity Board, Kisangani, considered to be Rwandan and arrested by police officers at his
home.
None of these people have yet been found. All the searches conducted in various prisons
have been to no avail.
B. Economic and social rights
Deterioration of the population’s social and economic situation
Between the outbreak of hostilities and 23 August 1998, both governmental and provincial
authorities failed to make up the 11-month arrears in salary payments to the people of Kisangani
and provide basic foodstuffs such as meat and beans which came from rebel-controlled Goma and
Bunia. At the time there were already signs of inflation linked to the fact that considerable sums
were being kept back to pay soldiers.
Restrictions on the right to education
Because of the insecurity which reined in Kisangani during and after the fighting of 4 to
6 August 1998 classes were suspended in all the city’s higher education establishments (the Higher
Institute of Medical Techniques, the Higher Institute of Education and the Higher Institute of
Commerce) and at the University Institute of Agronomics in Yangambi.
C. Use of children as soldiers
Weapons were distributed to children under fifteen years of age based in the former
orphanage in Mangobo and commonly referred to as the Mai-Mai and others from H site (a
half-built General Hospital building). Some of these children were sent to the front (along the Ituri
and Lubutu roads).
D. Failure to protect civilians
Innocent civilians were wounded and killed in some of the fighting at certain points in the
city (the Canon roundabout, military HQ, neighbourhoods in Kabondo and the city centre) and left
to their sad fate in the city’s hospitals. The following cases were recorded:
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Ms Moza, aged 27, of 20, 11ème Avenue, Kabondo, was hit by a stray bullet causing wounds
to her chest and her upper left arm. Doctors at the Kisangani University Clinic saved her life.
Mwembo, aged 12, of 40, Avenue du 30 octobre, Makiso, sustained deep abdominal wounds
from a bullet fired in his direction by a soldier. His life was also saved by doctors at the
University Clinic.
Ms Honorine Mauwa, aged around 60, of 6, 12ème Avenue, Kabondo, was hit by a bullet fired
at her by a soldier causing a compound fracture of both legs. She was admitted to the
University Clinic but died on 10 August 1998.
Finally, against the overall background of insecurity which reined from 4 to 6 August in
which there was both fighting between Tutsi and Congolese soldiers and searches for Rwandan
soldiers hiding in the town, Mr. Mbombo Mujene, a 51 year-old inspector at the Congolese Post
and Telecommunications Office (OCPT), was murdered by an armed man from the neighbouring
area inhabited by Tutsi civilians and soldiers at around 9 p.m. on 6 August 1998. According to his
children’s testimonies, the attacker was Nilotic in his physical appearance with features resembling
their neighbour Catablos, who is the local branch manager of the Sunair airline.
II.2. Human rights under the rebel authorities
Over the years various attempts have been made to introduce international legal instruments
to protect the integrity of the human person in times of conflict, and it was this desire which gave
rise to the four international conventions of 1949 known as the Geneva Conventions. They related
to the improvement of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field, the
improvement of the condition of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at
sea, the treatment of prisoners of war, and the protection of civilian persons in time of war.
Subsequent application in the field revealed certain shortcomings in the protection the
Conventions afforded to the integrity of the person. Fortunately, however, in 1977, the protocols
on international and non-international conflicts were introduced to fill the gap. The latter
prohibited inhuman treatment, violence to the life, health or physical or moral well-being of
persons, collective punishments, hostage taking, terrorism, humiliating and degrading treatment,
looting, etc. In short, civilians were expected to be given overall protection from the consequences
of hostilities. The DRC has ratified the four Geneva Conventions but has not yet ratified the
second additional protocol on non-international conflicts thus exempting itself from the rules of the
international community in this respect so as not to provide an opening for movements of
insurrection or rebellion.
Nonetheless, Common Article 3 of the conventions does commit the parties to a minimum
number of guarantees which are regarded as essential and applied automatically in the event of an
internal armed conflict.
The following cases, observed in Kisangani and subsequently verified, enable us to gauge
the extent to which the new authorities have been respecting and protecting human rights since they
took over the city on 23 August 1998.
II.2.1. Inhuman treatment
For reasons that it is difficult to understand, a considerable number of inhuman acts were
committed by the armed forces.
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Occupation of buildings and destruction of property
Schools were converted into military camps. Examples are the Tufuate and Lisanga primary
schools on 18ème Avenue, Tshopo, which used to be run by the Protestant church network.
Throughout their occupation, benches, tables and doors were used as firewood and the classrooms
were filled with faeces.
Private homes were not spared either. Rebel soldiers occupied and partly destroyed furniture
in houses around the military air-base and guest house, including those of the director and the
deputy director of the air traffic control authorities, the RVA, the director of the meteorological
office, the OCPT chief accountant and the OCPT clerk, Mr. Ngoy.
Hard labour and house arrest
Trésor Selego, a fifteen year-old school pupil, of 40, Avenue Kinshasa, was apprehended on
25 September 1998 outside the residence of the former general Likulia and forced to wash military
uniforms.
Mr. Raymond Mokeni Ekopi Kane, a Kisangani businessman and the Chairman of the
employers’ organization, the Congolese Business Federation, was placed under house arrest from
12 to 21 September 1998 on suspicion of possessing a satellite link-up device. Following a
thorough search of his Arcadia residence, his telephone and fax machine were confiscated. It is
reported that he was charged with funding government forces and refusing the rebel forces’ offer to
take up the post of Provincial Governor. Mr. Georges Yangala, the director of Belect, was also put
under house arrest along with his employee Mr. Mokeni, and robbed of his Comcell
communication device.
Breaking and entering into private homes and public buildings
On the night of 25 to 26 August 1998 armed officers used force to break into the home of
Mr. Masudin at 78, 3ème Avenue bis, Tshopo, and stole bar and hotel receipts which had not yet
been counted as well as money intended to pay soldiers in Buta. The Buta paymaster had lived at
the address before he fled.
Mr. Tanza and Mr. Garry, two West African subjects, of 24, 1ère Avenue, Tshopo, were
visited by members of the armed forces on 26 August 1998 and robbed of 95,000,000 new zaïres.
Mr. Yahya and Mr. Muhemedi, both Gambian subjects, of 3, 8ème Avenue, Tshopo,
underwent similar treatment on the night of 20 to 21 September 1998. The intruders succeeded in
taking away a 14-inch Sony colour television.
On 22 September 1998, three soldiers broke into the garage at Kisangani University’s
Faculty of Science. They stole a Land Rover, which was recovered in a badly damaged condition
some days later.
In late September 1998, rebel soldiers broke into the monastery at Simi-Simi and extorted a
sum of 10 million new zaïres (about US$50) from the parish priest and a sum of 800 US dollars
and 150 million new zaïres (about US$600) from Father Martin Konings. The money was
originally intended to pay workers at the Simama Centre for the Disabled.
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De-allocation of the wages of certain State officials
The National Intelligence Agency (ANR) is said to have lost six billion new zaïres which
were withdrawn from the accounts of the Beltexco Company and intended to cover the wages of its
acting staff and 200 million new zaïres from its pension fund.
II.2.2. Infringements of the right to life
Deaths recorded included both soldiers and civilians.
In response to the popular uprising of 26 August 1998 provoked by an attempt to confiscate
a Suzuki Vitara Jeep belonging to the priests of the Sacred Heart church in Tshopo in which
5 soldiers are said to have lost their lives, a reprisal operation was conducted in the districts of
Tshopo, Mangobo and Kabondo. Children and adults were murdered in cold blood;
In Tshopo: Mr. Georges Adembo, a nurse at the ophthalmological service of the CNCA
hospital, from 95, 14ème Avenue, died at around 5 p.m. on 26 August 1998 from a point-blank
shot to his face by soldiers patrolling on 15ème Avenue;
In Mangobo: Faustin Lokwa Alife and Cédric Badjoko Bobo, of 106, Quartier Basoko, were
shot down in cold blood in front of their home at about 9 a.m. on 27 August 1998;
In Kabondo: between 26 and 30 August 1998 the following people were shot dead by soldiers:
Mulamba, father of 3, of 17, 19ème Avenue;
Selemani, aged 15, of 95, 16ème Avenue bis;
Miss Jeanne (second name unknown) of 85, 5è Transversale, killed at her aunt’s
house, at 40, 14ème Avenue bis;
Assani, an invoice clerk with the Mimco company and a third-year student in
mathematics at the Kisangani Free Higher Institute of Education;
Mombesa, alias Bourray, a hairdresser from 106, 10ème Avenue bis behind the
former Bar de la Cueillette, killed on 4è Transversale opposite the Kabondo
community home;
Mr. Pierrot Manyonga Matanda, aged 26, of 27, 1ère Avenue, Tshopo, shot dead
by soldiers at 5 a.m. on 28 September 1998. He had already been identified as a
wanted man some days before.
On suspicion of arms possession, a bandit identified only as being a member of
the family of Papa Boola, a guard in the parish of St. Sacrement, had his throat cut
by soldiers in Lubunga in September 1998. In the same month and in the same
district (Lubunga), a former member of the Congolese Armed Forces (not otherwise
identified) also had his throat cut. He was surprised with a weapon which was said
to have been used for ignoble acts.
II.2.3. Humiliating and degrading treatment
Mr. Jean-Paul Kabiona, a member of the Government wing of the Congolese Armed Forces
was arrested some days after the fall of Kisangani and held in the military “Mabuso” lockup in
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Kisangani. He was charged with refusing to serve in the new army. Throughout his imprisonment
he was given 60 lashes a day.
In the same lockup, two persons suspected of “stealing” were held in appalling conditions.
They were subjected to serious torture and as a result one of them died during the month of
September.
The wife of the deputy director of the National Intelligence Agency, Emmanuel
Sanzunguimo, was arrested on Saturday 26 September 1998 and taken to the Kisangani military
lockup with her one-and-a-half year old baby. She was accused of possessing a portable telephone
and kitchen utensils belonging to the agency. She is said to have just escaped being raped. She
was released the next day.
II.2.4. Physical, psychological and moral duress
On the night of 11 to 12 August 1998 at around 3 a.m., Ms Rita Assumani, the mother of
three children, was seriously threatened by three men in uniform who succeeded in climbing over
the fence around her house at 50, 8ème Avenue, Tshopo district. She was robbed of three million
new zaïres.
Suspected of being the ring leader of a group of persons holding weapons in preparation for
a military operation in the district of Plateau Boyoma, Mr. Selego Chalanda, a student residing at
40, Avenue Kinshasa, Makiso, was harassed by soldiers for two whole days (28 and
29 September 1998).
Mr. David Mondele, 28, a married father of two, was hit by bullets in his right biceps at
around 11 p.m. on 26 August 1998 in his home at 10, 9ème Avenue, Tshopo.
On the night of 23 to 24 August 1998, the Provincial Director of the National Institute of
Social Security was abducted and kept in a secret location from 11 p.m. to 3 a.m.
Mr. Georges Ngoy received death threats on 10 September 1998 as he was leaving for
Plateau Médical to assess the damage caused to his family home occupied by soldiers.
II.2.5. Disappearances
Da Silva Figueiredo, 50, Portuguese, of 5, Avenue Lac Nyassa, Makiso; Osvaldo de Sousa
Queiroz, 38, Angolan, of 5, Avenue Lac Nyassa, Makiso; Miala Garcia, 40, Angolan, of 42b,
Boulevard Lumumba, Makiso; Aires Queiroz Guinaires, 28, Angolan, of 42b, Boulevard
Lumumba, Makiso; Miguens Julio, 28, Angolan, of 42b, Boulevard Lumumba, Makiso; Leonel
Carlos de Sousa, 27, of 42b, Boulevard Lumumba, Makiso, and; Ribeiro Galvino Faustino, of 42b,
Boulevard Lumumba, Makiso.
These were all businessmen who had come to invest in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and were awaiting the launch in Congo of their company, Bhagmek International.
Twenty-four hours after Kisangani was captured by the rebels, they received death threats from the
rebels because of Angola’s involvement in the conflict in the DRC. All of their property, including
that of their company, has been looted and to this day their homes are occupied by the assailants.
We know nothing about their fate or in what direction they may have fled. Tati Domingos, an
Angolan student in his first year studying educational science at the University of Kisangani, and
three of his compatriots are said to have disappeared under similar circumstances.
Mai-Mai child soldiers housed at Kisangani General Hospital (for health reasons) and at the
H Site in Mangobo (for training) are said to have disappeared. This would seem to be the result of
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their rearmament and recruitment to the Government forces to halt the advance of the rebel army
on Kisangani.
II.2.6. Looting
Kisangani has not yet totally recovered economically from the looting which took place
between September 1991 and December 1993. Since then only a few companies have kept going
and kept the local labour-force in employment. But now they have been dealt a fatal blow:
In the week of 24 to 30 August 1998, two giant logging companies, Amexbois and
Forestiere, were looted by soldiers. All of their stocks of processed timber and fuel, their vehicles
and the dynamos used to power the sawmills were taken away.
The following items were taken from the road transport office: 2,000 litres of diesel, all the
wages of the employees working in the province, and a large number of spare parts both from the
road centre and the ferry centre.
Soldiers broke into the central store, the central cash-desk and the offices of the managing
director and the chief accountant of Sorgeri. Livestock belonging to the company’s managers were
also slaughtered (200 pigs and a number of goats).
In Yanonge, about 58 km from Kisangani, the Agricultural Technical Institute and the
Mogoya Institute of Carpentry were looted. Typewriters, wood and clocks were taken away.
Benches were broken up and used as firewood.
In Yangambi, about 100 km from Kisangani, some of the premises of the National Institute
of Agronomics were looted and stripped of their corrugated metal cladding.
In Banalia, about 128 km from Kisangani, private homes belonging to people who had fled
into the bush, the Catholic mission and the general hospital were all looted.
II.2.7. Deterioration of health and humanitarian conditions and threats to medical workers
The insecurity and isolation of the city as a factor in the deterioration of health and
humanitarian conditions
(a) Insecurity
The two major hospital complexes in Kisangani, namely the university clinic and laboratory
and the general hospital, are in the Plateau Médical neighbourhood in Makiso.
Rebel soldiers with instructions to guard the military air-base at Simi-Simi overran the area
surrounding these hospitals making it difficult for health workers and the sick to move around in
the area. There was looting of the hospitals, humanitarian agencies, and stores of foodstuffs and
other urgently needed items, and certain medical workers were physically assaulted or threatened.
Inevitably this has meant that hospitals have been abandoned by patients and medical staff,
and humanitarian agencies, dispensaries and food warehouses and stores have been closed down.
(b) The city’s isolation
Kisangani is currently cut off from all of its sources of supplies, namely Kinshasa, the
interior, and the East (Goma, Bunia, Butembo, Bukavu, etc.). It now finds itself in complete
- 16 -
isolation. As we explained above, the city does not have enough pharmaceutical stores or
dispensaries or stocks or stores of food to support the population for a long period of complete
isolation. Its main sources of supplies in medicines are the diocesan pharmacy, Mimco-Pharma
and the Pars pharmaceutical warehouse.
The following instances of infringements of the right to treatment and threats to medical
workers were recorded :
At the university clinic, on 24 August 1998, all the patients were forced to leave the hospital
because of the prevailing insecurity. Medical and paramedical staff came to work in some
apprehension. Some days later they realized that they too were in danger. On 26 August 1998,
Professor Wami Wifonga, the doctor in charge of the university clinic and a teacher at the
faculty of medicine was accosted in his office by three Tutsi and two Ugandan rebels. They
demanded money and medicines. By threatening him they succeeded in making off with a sum
of 200 US dollars and a large stock of medicine.
On 30 August 1998, Dr. Luka, a doctor at the department of gynaecology and obstetrics and
assistant at the faculty of medicine attempting to enter the university clinic at around 1 p.m.,
was apprehended by two armed persons with the physical features of Tutsis in the grounds of
the clinic itself and dragged into the bush towards the tuberculosis treatment centre where he
was subjected to inhuman treatment then stripped of his shoes, his shirt and a sum of
15 Congolese francs.
At around 7 p.m. on 3 September 1998, Dr. Lola Kisanga of the university clinic’s internal
medicine department was apprehended by 4 Ugandan soldiers in the grounds of the University
Institute of Agronomics as he was going from the clinic to the guest house. He was
immediately released.
On 19 September 1998, the faculty of medicine’s research laboratory and the university clinic’s
biochemical unit were systematically looted.
The following items were taken away:
4 photospectrometers;
6 electronic microscopes;
a large number of chemical reagents;
other extremely valuable items of equipment.
At the Kisangani General Hospital
Wards were occupied by the rebels;
Furniture was broken up and used as firewood;
A telegraph device belonging to the Kisangani branch of the Extended Vaccination Programme
(PEV) was seized, the unit’s activities were halted and the polio vaccination campaign due to
take place in August was suspended.
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At the Kisangani branch of the WHO
The home of the branch head doctor was occupied by rebel soldiers immediately after their
arrival in Kisangani (23 August 1998);
The WHO pharmaceutical store was looted;
Under threats, Ms Christine Sefu, the supervisor of the WHO Kisangani branch, was forced to
hand over the WHO’s vehicle to the rebels;
Kisangani UNICEF’s vehicle was also commandeered by rebels.
At Caritas Kisangani
Vehicles were commandeered to transport rebel soldiers to the front;
General hospitals at Lubunga and Ubundu (129 km from Kisangani) were looted;
Doctor Jean Mopepe, the head doctor at the Kisangani Orchid Clinic (COKIS) was threatened
because of his family links with Governor Jean Yagi Sitolo, who owns the clinic.
The water distribution company, REGIDESO, realised that the stock of inflowing water was
in the process of drying up and so it began supplying water for only six hours a day. The quality of
the water supplied to the public has now become questionable and there are fears that epidemics of
diarrhoeal diseases will break out (such as bacillary dysentery, salmonellosis, cholera, and
amoebiasis).
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Table 1: Prices of medicines before and after the rebel take-over of Kisangani
PRODUCT Price before the war Current price
20 aspirin tabs.
20 chloroquine tabs.
20 novalgine tabs.
10 quinine tabs.
1 flask of procaine penicillin
20 indocid tabs.
16 tetracycline caps. (250mg)
16 ampicillin caps. (250 mg)
16 chloramphenicol caps.
20 bactrim tabs.
1 single-use syringe
1 litre of glucose serum 5%
1 litre of NaCal 0.9%
1 Ampicillin 1g
1 flask Chloramphenicol
1 phial Quinine
1 phial Chloroquine
1 phial Dypirone
$ 0.13
$ 0.20
$ 0.16
$ 0.66
$ 0.53
$ 0.20
$ 0.33
$ 0.66
$ 0.66
$ 0.40
$ 0.13
$ 2.00
$ 1.66
$ 0.53
$ 0.53
$ 0.40
$ 0.16
$ 0.16
$ 0.66
$ 1.00
$ 0.66
$ 2.00
$ 2.00
$ 0.66
$ 1.00
$ 1.66
$ 1.33
$ 1.00
$ 0.40
$ 5.33
$ 5.00
$ 1.33
$ 1.33
$ 1.00
$ 0.33
$ 0.50
N.B.: 1 US dollar ($) = 250,000 new zaïres (at the rate on 29 September 1998)
Prices are those which applied on 29 September 1998.
If no more medicines are supplied, prices are bound to continue rising.
Cost of treatment of a malaria crisis combined with a case of verminosis and urinary
infection (common in tropical Africa):
Doctor’s consultation fee — $ 1 to $ 2. 15 vials of quinine — $ 10.
5 litres of glucose serum — $ 5. 72 capsules of Ampicillin — $ 5.
3 vials of dypirone — $ 1. Hospitalization — $ 1 per day.
Nursing — $ 1 per day. Lab. tests — $ 5 (standard tests).
Laparotomy — $ 150-200.
(All prices quoted in US dollars).
Another point worth mentioning is that the arrival in Kisangani of Rwandan and Ugandan
soldiers from regions with a high incidence of AIDS and their licentious sex life is said to have led
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to an increase in the rate of HIV infection in Kisangani and all the other regions occupied by the
rebels.
II.2.8. Loss of material and social well-being
The people of Kisangani have experienced enormous social and economic difficulties since
23 August 1998. Shop owners and traders are now cut off from their main supply centres and,
though they still have stocks of some manufactured goods, they have been ruthlessly increasing
prices. The exchange rate has been soaring to such an extent that some economic agents have
decided simply to suspend their activities for a time, claiming that they fear looting if there is a
victorious counter-attack by the Government forces.
The two following tables show to what extent the economic situation has deteriorated:
(a) Exchange rates
Date Currency Equivalent in
new zaïres (NZ)
Equivalent in
Congolese francs
(FC)
Percentage
increase
01.07.98 $ 1.00 NZ 140,000 FC 1.40 -
01.08.98 $ 1.00 NZ 150,000 FC 1.50 10.71 per cent
23.08.98 $ 1.00 NZ 190,000 FC 1.90 13.57 per cent
27.09.98 $ 1.00 NZ 240,000 FC 2 .40 12.42 per cent
(b) Market prices
Article Price on 1 July 1998 Price on
23 August 1998
Price on
23 September 1998
72 cl of cooking oil NZ 25,000 NZ 60,000 NZ 75,000
1 kg of rice NZ 30,000 NZ 60,000 NZ 80,000
1 kg of sugar NZ 70,000 NZ 120,000 NZ 150,000
1 bar of soap NZ 35,000 NZ 65,000 NZ 80,000
The financial and monetary situation is far from stabilizing. The new authorities have
withdrawn considerable sums from the Kisangani Central Bank to cover the wages of State
employees, civil servants and soldiers — as well as FC 35,000 and NZ 70 billion ready for
incineration as part of the procedural measures for the monetary reform being carried out. As a
result the Congolese franc is increasingly declining in value and the dollar has now risen to
270,000 new zaïres. At the same time, there has been runaway inflation in the market prices of
manufactured goods. Attempts to offset losses (for instance, Beltexco has lost 24,000 US dollars
confiscated by the military and had large sums withdrawn from it by the civilian authorities) and a
substantial decrease in stocks are the causes of the price-rises.
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PART III:
THE ATTITUDE OF THE WARRING PARTIES TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AND ABUSES COMMITTED
III.1. The governmental authorities
After the appeals and speeches made to the public on the radio and the television identifying
the country’s aggressors as Rwandans and in response to the increasing hatred felt towards
Rwandans (civilians and soldiers), the local authorities appealed to the population to attack only
Rwandan soldiers. No judicial proceedings have been instituted against those who have carried out
abuses against Rwandan civilians.
III.2. The rebel authorities
Following the revenge attack by the rebel army on the population after the demonstration of
23 August1998, the military commander in Kisangani demanded apologies from the entire
community for the aberrations of some of its inhabitants. He also said that he had taken all the
necessary steps to ensure the security of persons and their property. However, no judicial
proceedings were instituted against those responsible.
A few days after the demonstrations of 23 August 1998, 5 and 10 centime bills were thrown
to the crowds from military vehicles at the roundabout on 15ème Avenue, Tshopo, the main market
and other points in the city centre.
Aiming to make civilians forget all their abuses and join the rebellion, the rebel authorities
distributed sums of 28 Congolese francs (US$10) to each participant at the end of their ideological
training seminar, 5 Congolese francs to each student at the University of Kisangani (about US$2)
and a large sum estimated at over US$300 to the members of an informal youth organization in
Mangobo called “The Children of the United States” for them to attend the meeting of the
RCD leader, Mr. Lunda Bululu.
PART IV:
THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE WAR
The current war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be compared to an iceberg:
The visible part is the rebellion against the Kabila Government and the conflict between the
Government’s allies and the rebels’ allies.
The invisible protagonists are the major foreign powers, economic and political lobbies, and
progressive Third-World forces.
The outcome of the war may alter a number of national, regional and international
parameters.
In the following sections we shall describe the situation on the ground, the reaction of the
inhabitants, and the steps taken by the international community to date, before going on to forecast
what may happen in the future.
IV.1. The power struggle — developments on the ground
Since hostilities began on 2 August 1998, the power struggle has divided the country into
two parts, namely the west, which is controlled by the Government forces and their allies, and the
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east, which is controlled by the rebel forces and their allies. However, the rebellion is gaining
ground in the east because Kabila’s allies are reluctant to engage in conflict here, not only through
lack of interest but also because they have misgivings about attacking the rebels’ allies so close to
their home bases.
IV.2. The inhabitants — their concerns and expectations
The Congolese are not used to war and so they mistrust the rebellion which they regard as
untimely, hybrid or even traitorous. What the war is revealing to them is the inability of Congolese
soldiers (whether from the Government or the rebels) to defend the country’s territorial integrity
and ensure them peace and security, the Congolese politicians’ insensitivity to their suffering and,
finally, the indifference of the international community.
IV.3. The efforts of the international community hesitant and inadequate
(from August to early October 1998)
The Government of the DRC alerted national and international opinion to the invasion of its
territory by Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Its emissaries to the United Nations, the OAU and
other international institutions made official complaints against Rwanda and Uganda but the
response to these complaints was slow, guarded or even mitigated.
Various reactions to the situation in the DRC have been expressed during regional or
international summits, conferences and meetings of heads of State and Government. The following
is a brief outline of the outcome of these meetings:
Victoria Falls Summit I
Instigated by President Mugabe under the auspices of the SADC, bringing together the
Heads of State of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Namibia.
Outcome: disagreement between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda over the aggression.
Summit of non-aligned countries held in Durban, South Africa
This summit, presided over by Nelson Mandela, was attended by representatives of all the
countries at war in the DRC (DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda) as well as
leaders of other non-aligned countries (e.g., Fidel Castro) and the United Nations
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.
Outcome:
Acknowledgement of an act of aggression against the DRC though the names of the assailants
were not cited;
Appointment of President Mandela as mediator in the Congolese crisis.
United Nations Security Council
The member States of the United Nations Security Council acknowledged that the DRC was
being attacked by foreign powers without naming them. They appealed for respect for the
territorial integrity of the DRC.
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Victoria Falls Summit II
Presided over by the Zambian president, Frederick Chilupa, this summit brought together the
Heads of State of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, a representative of the Angolan
president, and the Secretary-General of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim. The Zambian president
went back and forth between the meeting room of the Heads of State and the room assigned to the
rebel delegation, led by Mr. Z’Haidi Ngoma and Mr. Bizima Karaha;
Outcome:
No agreement over the act of aggression against the DRC;
Acceptance of the principle that foreign troops should be withdrawn.
Addis-Ababa Conference
Conference bringing together the ministers of defence of all the countries involved in the
conflict. The DRC was represented by its minister of foreign affairs.
Outcome:
No agreement on the arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign troops.
Mauritius Summit
Summit called by the SADC to discuss its members’ economic problems. The Congolese
crisis was one of the items on the agenda.
Outcome:
Failure to agree that there had been an act of aggression against the Congo;
Reinforcement of the military positions of President Kabila’s allies;
Doubts expressed over President Mandela by President Mugabe.
Libreville Summit
Summit called by the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, bringing together the Heads of State
of Central Africa to examine the Congolese crisis.
Outcome:
Acknowledgement that foreign forces had attacked the DRC;
Contacts established by the Kinshasa Government with other Central African countries and
France;
Acceptance of Chad’s military involvement in the DRC.
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Tripoli meetings and the Qaddafi Intervention Force Plan (involving Chad, Niger and
Eritrea)
President Qaddafi met President Kabila of the DRC and President Museveni of Uganda in
turn and listened to each leader’s views on the crisis. Following this he met the presidents of Chad,
Niger and Eritrea.
Outcome:
Proposal to withdraw all foreign forces from the DRC;
Proposal to post a neutral intervention force (provided by Chad, Niger and Eritrea) along the
entire length of the border between Rwanda and Uganda and Congo and Uganda.
This realistic plan does not seem to have earned the support of the international community.
European Union
The EU special envoy to the Great Lakes region has met the presidents of the DRC, Rwanda,
Uganda and Angola.
Outcome:
All the countries allied to the warring parties wish to secure their frontiers;
The possibility of holding an international conference was raised.
United States Ambassador to the DRC
On 14 October 1998, having met President Kabila in Lubumbashi, the United States
Ambassador acknowledged that the DRC had been invaded by foreign forces.
IV.4. The future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The current régimes in Kigali, Kampala and Kinshasa, which are the products of the force of
arms and rebel alliances of the past, have failed to find democratic solutions to their political,
economic and social problems and so they find themselves at war.
Therefore, the political fate of the DRC is inextricably tied up with that of its neighbours in
the region. It will be determined by the outcome of a war with international ramifications between
enemies who seem to spurn human rights and the rights of peoples.
A. In the event of the military victory of President Kabila
Kabila’s plus-points
If President Kabila brings democracy to the country, as he frequently says he will, he will be
able to mobilize the Congolese people around the major reforms required for national
reconstruction. He draws the legitimacy for his power and his charisma from three aspects:
- 24 -
(a) The success of his armed insurrection against the neo-patrimonial and dictatorial régime of
President Mobutu, which was demonized and called into question for its political, economic
and social practices. As the sworn enemy of Mobutu, the public regard him as the liberator of
the Congolese people, the leading figure of a new era in Congolese politics which will make
the decaying Congolese State a prosperous, powerful State governed by the rule of law.
(b) The success of his struggle against the Tutsi bid for total power. Is this an ideological
smoke-screen or a sociological reality? Notwithstanding, the president’s rhetoric on this subject
has met with substantial support from the Congolese people and is used to legitimize the
Government’s war against the rebels.
(c) The Kabila Government’s attempts to improve the social and economic situation, particularly
in the area of combating immoral practices (corruption, embezzlement and harassment),
rehabilitating and improving the apparatus of the State, and curbing inflation, have raised hopes
among the population.
Dangers to be avoided
President Kabila’s autocratic reflexes mean that we should be sceptical about his claims to
have been converted to the democratic management methods of the modern State. They point to a
number of potential dangers that must be avoided, namely the possibility that the head of State will
be granted absolute power, that the Tutsis will be totally excluded and that more armed conflicts
will emerge in the region.
(a) The absolutism of the head of State
While the DRC is at war, the self- proclaimed president, Mr. Kabila, who is hostile to
multiparty politics, remains the official lone decision-making authority to whom all appeals must
be addressed. After the war, it may be prudent to establish legal and political safeguards to counter
the authoritarian impulses which the growing personality cult around him seems to be fostering in
the mind of the AFDL leader. The best democratic ingredients for a transition period heralding a
third democratic republic would be a multiparty system based on clearly established laws and
mechanisms for the consultation of the head of State on the future of the nation.
(b) The total exclusion of the Tutsis and a conflagration in the Great Lakes region
Since the outbreak of the rebellion, in the national and international press and on national
television, President Kabila has been accusing the governments in Kigali and Kampala of
aggression, stating that Tutsi ideas of hegemony over the Congo and its sphere of influence are a
delusion, and threatening to take the war back to where it came from, namely Uganda and Rwanda.
Ethnic arguments are clearly being deployed: the Tutsis in the Congo are coming under
attack while Rwandan rebels (mostly Hutu) and some Ugandans (at least according to the
accusations of the leaders of the rebellion against Kabila) have joined Kabila’s Government troops.
The Kabila Government is thought to pose a serious threat to the Rwandan and Ugandan régimes.
If no precautions are taken and Kabila wins the war, there could be an exodus of Tutsis, exporting
the war to Uganda and Rwanda and possibly even undermining their governments.
- 25 -
B. If the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) were actually to take power
Advantages
The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) arose from various divisions within the AFDL
and, though it claims to be in favour of democratizing the DRC’s political institutions, it has
decided to attempt to wrest power through an armed rebellion driven by Ugandan and Rwandan
Government forces. The following advantages could result from its actually taking power:
the potential for political liberalism stemming from the absence within the movement of a
charismatic civil or military leader who cannot be ignored though this does not rule out the
possibility that the Government will be dominated by an RCD oligarchy;
special measures to protect a Tutsi minority threatened with extermination or exile;
peaceful co-existence between the region’s régimes through the reciprocal elimination of rebel
movements in each country.
Drawbacks
The RCD is considered by most Congolese to be of strict Tutsi allegiance and pieced
together from the cast-offs of the disreputable former Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) and so any
régime it sets up is likely to be unpopular and have difficulty in forming a Congolese national army
capable of winning the confidence of the Congolese people.
It will be constantly faced with the aggravated hatred of certain sections of the native
Congolese population towards the Tutsi minority living in the Congo.
If the RCD were to fail in rendering the Ugandan and Rwandan Hutu rebel movements
working from Congo inoperative, its current Ugandan and Rwandan allies would engage in war
against it.
C. In the event of a negotiated settlement
Advantages
The DRC is a State in need of reconstruction and war is synonymous with destruction. The
country requires a consensual and peaceful context for its development and therefore a negotiated
settlement discarding all violence seems the most productive approach to its future.
Jointly negotiated settlements relating to the various issues over which the warring parties
have been fighting may create the conditions for the redistribution of power between the internal
forces involved (AFDL, RCD, opposition parties and civil society) thus preventing the State from
being treated as an item of private property.
They may also establish a new equilibrium within the region, dictated by the desire to
stabilize international relationships with the sole aim of promoting development for the well-being
of the people living in the States in question.
The shortcomings of a negotiated settlement
In its attempts, via the various aforementioned summits, to reach a negotiated settlement to
the conflict, the international community wishes to apply the principles of collective responsibility
- 26 -
which place a premium on human fellowship or the interdependence of States with a view to
pooling everyone’s efforts to establish harmonious international relations.
But in seeking a negotiated settlement, peace-brokers tend to reconcile the warring parties
without insisting on the civil and political rights that can be invoked against the State. This
situation tends to facilitate the survival of authoritarian régimes incapable of establishing and
upholding their citizens’ civil and political rights.
The principle of the right of all peoples to self-determination formally established in
resolution 1514 (XV) of the United Nations General Assembly in December 1960 gave a boost to
the process of decolonization in Africa. Today, however, it nurtures and protects Africa’s
dictatorships; national leaders who hold this kind of power can uphold one another for the duration
of their régimes (Mr. Mobutu was a master at this). This explains the covert existence of certain
regional or sub-regional organizations in Africa. Under these conditions it seems warranted to
invoke the duty of third parties to intervene every time democracy is threatened and the rights of
individuals and peoples are violated.
As things stand, even if there were a negotiated settlement reconciling the Government in
Kinshasa with the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, the problem of the legitimacy of all three
régimes would remain.
Therefore, the future of the DRC will depend on its capacity to build a democratic State
which will successfully fulfil its strategic geographical role at the heart of Africa while respecting
the rights of individuals, citizens and other peoples.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Between 17 May 1997, when President Kabila came to power, and the outbreak of the
rebellion in early August 1998, the state of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo was still a cause for concern. Not only were political parties
suspended and some of their leaders thrown in prison and human rights organizations threatened
but also, and above all, the Government of the DRC failed to show any real desire to prosecute the
perpetrators of certain widespread, blatant and systematic violations of human rights committed on
its territory.
The current war between the Government of the DRC and the rebel troops led by the
Congolese Rally for Democracy has aggravated the human rights situation. The war involves not
only internal Congolese forces but also Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces who have joined the
rebel side to overthrow the Kabila Government and hence, it is claimed, to protect their frontiers
and the endangered Tutsi minority.
During the conflict, Government forces have carried out summary executions, arbitrary
arrests and other acts liable to trouble people’s consciences, but the rebels for their part have
resorted to the physical elimination or inhuman treatment of civilian populations attempting to
resist them, the extortion of private and public property in various forms, corruption, favouritism
and looting of public funds and property, thus adding to the people’s destitution.
It is because of its alarm at this continuing deterioration of the human rights situation and
upsurge of violence which are inexorably dragging the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the
brink of chaos and are liable to inflame not only the Great Lakes region but also the whole of
Central Africa, and because it is anxious for the rule of law to be established in the DRC, that the
Lotus Group makes the following recommendations:
- 27 -
To the Congolese Government:
to agree to negotiate with all the conflicting parties and to convene, as soon as possible, a
political round table meeting to examine and establish the procedure for this negotiation but
also to rekindle the democratic process and promote national reconciliation;
to make protection of and respect for human rights one of the Government’s priorities with a
view to establishing the rule of law in the DRC;
to take legislative and social steps for the establishment of an independent, impartial judiciary;
to pursue an open and active co-operation policy with national and international human rights
organizations working to prevent, investigate and punish human rights violations and with
humanitarian aid organizations wishing to help the people of Congo;
to devise a realistic and effective strategy to prevent the unchecked distribution and trafficking
of arms in the country.
To the rebel authorities:
to halt their advance and negotiate with the Government of the DRC;
to protect civilians and all victims of the armed conflict in accordance with international
humanitarian law and national legislation;
to improve the social and economic situation of the people under their control by opening up
new channels for the supply of raw materials and manufactured goods;
to co-operate with international organizations to remedy the current emergency situation in
Kisangani;
to ensure that the territorial integrity of the DRC and its national heritage are protected.
To Congolese civil society:
to encourage all the warring parties to negotiate to avoid a military victory which might rule
out any hope of national reconciliation;
to encourage all the warring parties to respect human rights, international humanitarian law,
territorial integrity and the national heritage;
to provide the necessary assistance to victims of human rights violations;
to perform its duty to remember and testify to all the acts of oppression and violations
committed by the warring parties.
To the international community:
to bring all the conflicting parties to the negotiating table to end a war which is costing an
enormous amount, both financially and in terms of human lives;
- 28 -
to hold the warring parties accountable for the deterioration of the human rights situation in the
DRC;
to ensure that the compromises negotiated at the summits held thus far with a view to settling
the Congolese conflict are observed;
to provide humanitarian aid to the Congolese people with the help of non-governmental food
and health organizations;
to ensure that the DRC’s territorial integrity is respected;
to call an international conference to resolve the thorny question of security in the Great Lakes
region.
Done in Kisangani, 15 October 1998
Gilbert Kalinde ABELI, Dismas Kitenge SENGA,
Secretary. Chair.
___________
- 29 -
APPENDIX 1
Full text of Constitutional Decree No. 3 of 27 May 1997 on the organization and exercise of
power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The President of the Republic,
Having regard to the seizure of power by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Congo (AFDL) on 17 May 1997;
Having regard to the need for emergency measures;
Decrees the following:
Part I General provisions
Art. 1. Until the Transitional Constitution is adopted by the Constituent Assembly, the
organization and exercise of power shall be governed by the present Constitutional Decree.
Art. 2. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the exercise of individual and collective
rights and freedoms shall be guaranteed subject to respect for the law, public order and morality.
Part II The institutions of the Republic
Art. 3. The institutions of the Republic are:
1. The President of the Republic;
2. The Government;
3. The courts.
Section I The President of the Republic
Art. 4. The President of the Republic is the Head of State. He represents the nation.
Art. 5. The President of the Republic shall exercise legislative power by issuing legislative
decrees discussed with the cabinet. He is the head of the executive and the armed forces. He shall
exercise his power to make regulations by issuing decrees. He is entitled to strike coins and issue
paper money in accordance with the law.
Art. 6. The President of the Republic shall appoint, relieve of their duties and, where
appropriate, dismiss on the proposal of the Government: ambassadors and special envoys,
governors and vice-governors of provinces, senior officers and generals of the army, executive
officers in the management of public services, and acting and non-acting administrators of State
enterprises and public bodies. He shall appoint, relieve of their duties and, where appropriate,
dismiss on the proposal of the judicial service commission, judges and public prosecutors.
- 30 -
Art. 7. The President of the Republic shall accredit ambassadors and special envoys to
foreign States and international organizations. Foreign ambassadors and special envoys shall be
accredited to the President.
Section II The Government
Art. 8. The Government shall carry out the national policy laid down by the President of the
Republic. It shall execute the laws of the Republic and the decrees of the head of State. It shall
negotiate international agreements under the authority of the head of State. It has the civil service
and the army at its disposal.
Art. 9. The Government shall meet in a cabinet meeting presided over by the head of State or
one of its own members with delegated powers.
Art. 10. Ministers shall be accountable for the management of their ministries to the
President of the Republic. They shall enact laws by means of orders.
Section III The courts
Art. 11. The courts form the judiciary. The judiciary shall be independent from the
legislative and the executive.
Art. 12. The task of hearing and determining cases shall be assigned to the courts. Judges
shall be independent in the discharge of these functions and, in so doing, shall be subject only to
the authority of the law.
Chapter III — Final provisions
Art. 13. Provided that they are not at variance with the provisions of the present
constitutional decree, statutes and regulations existing prior to the date of its promulgation shall
remain in force until such time as they are repealed.
Art. 14. All former constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions at variance with the
present constitutional decree are hereby repealed.
Art. 15. The present constitutional decree shall come into force on the date of its
promulgation.
Done in Kinshasa on 28 May 1998
Laurent-Désiré KABILA,
President of the Republic.
- 31 -
APPENDIX 2
Chronology of events in Kisangani
August 1998
4-6 August
Fighting between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis at Bangboka airport,
the Canon roundabout and military headquarters.
Incorporation of former FAZ soldiers re-educated at Base Camp (11 km from the town centre
on the road to the airport) into the Congolese Armed Forces.
Summary executions and murders.
10 August
Civilian march to express anger against Rwandan aggression against the DRC (about
3,000 participants).
7 to 23 August
Curfew throughout the city every day from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m.
Distribution of weapons to young Mai-Mai soldiers based at H site (a half-built General
Hospital building) and the former Mangobo orphanage.
Rwandans and their “Congolese accomplices” arrested and detained at military headquarters,
the National Intelligence Agency and the former lockup of the Mangobo BSRS; some are
transferred to the Congo-SEP warehouse (about 7 km along the road to Yangambi).
23 August The city is taken over by the rebels.
26 and 27 August
Demonstrations (in the form of marches) in a number of the city’s districts (Tshopo, Mangobo
and Kabondo) provoked by the rebel soldiers’ attempt to commandeer a car belonging to the
priests of the church of the sacred heart in Tshopo.
Six rebel soldiers are killed.
Revenge attacks by the rebel soldiers on the civilian population (1 death in Tshopo, 5 in
Kabondo, and 2 in Mangobo).
29 August: Arrival of the rebels’ political delegation led by Mr. Joseph Mudumbi, the RCD’s
officer for internal affairs and administration.
- 32 -
September 1998
26 September
Meeting between the RCD leader, Mr. Lunda Bululu, and the inhabitants of Kisangani.
Appointment and presentation of the Governor of Orientale province (Prof. L. Bene Kabala),
his Vice-Governor (Adèle Lotshove) and the new mayor of Kisangani (Mr. Gabriel Boondo
Lotika) to replace the former authorities who had fled.
___________
- 33 -
ANNEX 4.16
Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Seventieth Ordinary Session,
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the DRC, 6-10 July 1999
- 34 -
ANNEXE MRDC 49
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo
6-10 juillet 1999
MRDC49
ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY
ORGANIZA<;Ao DA
UNIDADE AFRICANA
ORGANISATION DE
L'UNITE AFRICAINE
Addis Ababa - Ethiopia· - Box 3243 Tel. 51 77 00 Tele: 20046 Fax (251-1) 51 30 36
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Seventieth Ordinary Session/
Fifth Ordinary Session of the AEC
6 - 10 July, 1999
Algiers, Algeria
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Original: English
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
SITUATION IN THE DEl\tIOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 1
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE
SITUATION 11' THE DEl\tlOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
1. The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has
continued to be a major source of concern to the OAU, SADC, the UN and all
the countries of the Region. As I had indicated in my Report to the Sixty-ninth
Ordinary Session of Council, the conflict in DRC has continued to pre-occupy my
attention as it has continued to pose a serious threat to peace. security and
stability in the Region. The conflict has resulted in a massive exodus of refugees
and displacement of people. Consequently, it has caused a. major humanitarian
crisis in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region as a whole.
I. EFFORTS TO CO~T AIN THE CRISIS
2. As Council is aware, since August 2, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) has been plunged into a second round of armed conflict with grave
implications for peace and security in the East, Central and Southern African
regions of the Continent. This concern is, particularly real in the Great Lakes
Region.
3. I should like to report that since the outbreak of this latest conflict in the
DRC, several efforts have been deployed in the search for a peaceful resolution.
Indeed, African leaders have collectively and individually, devoted considerable
efforts and time to bring this conflict to an end. The OAU has also been actively
seized with the conflict. In this regard, the OA U, in collaboration with countries
of the region and the· United Nations, has continued to deploy efforts aimed at
securing a Ceasefire Agreement, addressing humanitarian concerns and restoring
peace in the DRC. On my part, I have always insisted that whatever initiatives
that are taken with respect to finding a durable solution to the crisis in the DRC
should be in support of the Lusaka Peace Process facilitated principally by
President Frederick Chiluba. In this regard, I am encouraged by the fact that all
initiatives that have been taken over the past few months outside the SADC l
Region, by individual countries or groups of leaders, have recognized the central /\
and significant role of the Lusaka Peace Process.
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 2
I. REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL INITIATIVES
ONDRC
4. Council will recall that immediately following the eruption of the second
round of armed conflict in the DRC, the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, was convened at
Ambassadorial level and other Plenipotentiaries, on 17 August 1998 to deliberate
on the crisis in the DRC. At the end of the deliberations, the Central Organ
clearly articulated its support to the government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and OAU' s commitment to the unity, cohesion and respect of the
f sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. Subsequently, several other
initiatives were undertaken by the countries of the region. These include the First
~ctoria Falls Summit, 7 - 8 August 1998; the Pretoria Summit, 23 August 1998;
the Durban Consultations which took_place between)' - 3 September 1998, on the
margins of the Non-Aligned Summit and the Second Victoria Falls Summit, 7 - 8
Seetember 1998. Furthermore, there was also the Meeting of Ministers of
Defence and other Officials of Countries Participating in the Victoria Falls II
Summit, 10 - 11 September 1998 in Addis Ababa. This particular meeting
adopted a text on a Draft Ceasefire Agreement, a Mechanism for the
establishment of an OAU Observer Mission and the mounting of a UN
Peacekeeping Operation together with "Proposed Modalities", as well as a series
of "Recommendations" to be made to the Heads of State and Government of the
participating countries. (' , ~ . LtA-''". 'I'
5. These meetings were followed by the SADC Summit (Port Louis 12 - 14 ~
September); the tLibreville Summit of 24 September 1998, the ~ew York i
Consultations in September - October 1998; the lt:ast African Cooperation ~
Consultative Summit held in Nairobi on 18 October 1998;(the Lusaka Meeting-of \
26 - 27 October 1998; ~he Meeting of the Ad-Hoc Committee of Minist~~~ _heL( in \
Gaborone on 20 - 21 November 1998;1and the France-Africa Conference held in ,\, -=----=---~::---=--·-- ---- - - . -------- --------- -- - --· -- . --- - I
Paris, France, 26 - 28 November 1998.
6. The situation in the DRC was also on the Agenda of the Fourth Ordinary
Session of the \Central Organ, at the level of Heads of State and Government, held
in Oua0 adougou, 17 - 18 Dec mb r 98.
7. The Ouagadougou Central Organ Summit reaffirmed its support to the
Government of the DRC as well as the commitment of the OAU to the respect for
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 3
the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC in accordance with the i
provisions of the OAU Charter and, in particular, Resolution AHG/Res. 16 (I)
adopted in Cairo in 1964. It also supported the efforts by President Chiluba and
other leaders in the region aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the crisis and
securing a Ceasefire agreement among the concerned parties.
8. Other Sub-Regional Meetings include the Meetings of the Ad-Hoc
Committees, held in Lusaka, Zambia from 1 - 10 February 1999. the Committee
on the Modalities for ~plementation of the Ceasefire Agreement in the DRC;
the Committee on the Security concerns of the DRC and the Neighbouring
countries; and the Lusaka Consultations held from 19 - 20 February 1999.
9. Significantly, following wide consultations by all concerned, the rebels
directly participated for the first time in the second meeting of the Committee on
Modalities for the Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement held in Lusaka,
Zambia from 16 - 17 April 1999. During the opening session, the delegation of
the rebels thanked the Zambian Government, the OAU, the UN and SADC for
their tireless efforts to bring peace to the Congo. Further, the delegation
expressed its desire to negotiate directly with the DRC government and to involve
itself in all efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Congo.
10. The delegation of CRD withdrew from the meeting when their request to
instantly engage in direct talks with the DRC at that particular meeting was
rejected. The Chairman of the meeting had informed the CRD delegation that the
meeting was only mandated by the Regional Meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and Defence to discuss the agenda, on the finalization of the Modalities
for implementing the · Ceasefire Agreement, and not to facilitate the holding of
direct talks between the DRC and CRD within its present Agenda. Moreover, the
D RC delegation had declared that at that particular moment, it did not have the
mandate to hold direct talks with the CRD delegation.
11. Going by recent developments, it would appear that serious differences
have emerged within the ranks of the main rebel Movement in the DRC, The
Congolese Rally for Democracy. At the time of preparing this Report, two
factions had emerged, with both sides claiming to speak for the CRD. One of the
factions based in Kisangani, is led by Prof. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, while the
other faction based in Goma, is led by Dr Emile Ilunga.
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 4
12. The situation continues to evolve even as this report was being finalized.
u. OTHER INITIATIVES TO CONTAIN THE
CRISIS IN THE DRC
a. Summit of Regional Leaders on the Situation m the DRC,
Windhoek, Namibia, 18 Januarv 1999
13. Among the major initiatives undertaken in the past few months was the
Summit of regional leaders on the situation in the DRC, convened by H.E. Dr
Sam Nujoma, President of the Republic of Namibia, at the request of H.E.
Yoweri Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda. The Summit brought
together in Windhoek, on 18 January 1999, the above-mentioned Presidents as
well as the following Presidents and personalities : H.E. Mr Robert Mugabe,
President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, H.E. Mr Pasteur Bizimungu, President
of the Republic of Rwanda, General Pedro Sebastiao, Minister of National
Defence of Angola, and Dr Kaire Mbuende, Executive Secretary of SADC.
14. The purpose of the Summit was to create the atmosphere for greater
consultations among the countries directly involved in the conflict in the DRC in
order to clarify some particular points in preparation for the Summit of leaders
of the region, scheduled to be held in Lusaka with a view to speeding up the
process leading to the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement. The Summit issued a
Communique expressing its satisfaction at the significant progress made towards
ensuring a better understanding among the countries involved in the DRC. It
expressed the hope that such an understanding would significantly contribute
towards an immediate_ signing of a Ceasefire Agreement.
15. I have been given a comprehensive briefing on the exchange which took "
place in Windhoek and I am encouraged by the fact that the Summit addressed
critical issues such as the important question of the involvement of the rebels in
the negotiations, the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement, addressing the security
concerns of the DRC and its neighbours, the deployment of a peacekeeping force,
and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC.
b. The Sirte mini - Summit
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 5
16. As part of the continuing efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the
DRC crisis, Col. Mummar El Gaddafi, Leader of the Great El-Fateh Revolution,
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. convened a mini-Summit in Sine. from 17 - 18
April 1999, to discuss the situation in the DRC. The mini-Summit which was
attended by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Pres idem Idris Deby of
Chad, President Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea and President Laurent Desire Kabila
of the Democratic Republic of Congo resulted in the signing of a Peace
Agreement on the DRC. The leaders reaffirmed that the Sirte Peace Agreement
is linked to the Lusaka Peace Process and that it was a declaration of commitment
to the on-going regional peace process under the facilitation of President
Chiluba.
17. The signatories of the Sine Peace Agreement agreed on the following :
► Affirm the security and integrity of the political borders of all States;
► Immediate cessation of hostilities to pave the way for dialogue and
peaceful solution;
► Deployment of neutral African Peacekeeping Forces in the area where
there are troops of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi inside the DRC;
► Withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops will be timed with the
arrival of the African Peace Forces;
► The signatories to this Agreement condemn all acts of violence and mass
murder, and affirm the need to chase the killers, punish and disarm
them;
► Encourage DRC to initiate a national dialogue for all parties;
► Withdrawal of all foreign forces present in the DRC as soon as peace
agreement is reached;
► All parties pledge to refrain from taking actions to overthrow the regime
in the DRC;
► Respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
countries;
► Stress the continuity of the leading role of the brother leader as peace
coordinator in the Great Lakes Region, in creating the climate and
mechanism and to liaise with President Chiluba and to accelerate the
process of peace.
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 6
18. A second Summit was also held in Sirte, from 14 - 15 May, 1999, with the
intention of facilitating the Peace Process in the DRC. Participating in that
Summit which was convened at the invitation of the leader of the Great Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, were : the Current Chairman of the OAU, President Blaise
Campaore, the President of the Republic of Tchad, Mr Idris Deby, President
Ange Felix Patasse of the Central African Republic, President Isaias Afeworki of
the State of Eritrea, President Laurent Desire Kabila of the Democratic Republic
of Congo, President Yaya Jammeh of the Republic of Gambia: Vice President
Paul Kagame of the Republic of Rwanda and Mr Mustapha Niasse, the Special
Envoy of the UN Secretary General to the Great Lakes Region. Mwalimu Julius
Nyerere and Mr Ahmed Ben Bella were also present during the Summit.
19. According to the press release issued following the meeting, an agreement
was concluded on :
► The support and confirmation of Sirte Peace Agreement;
► Re-affirming the Ceasefire Agreement between the belligerent parts m
the region;
► The Government of the Republic of Congo agreed to enter into direct
dialogue with all the opposing parties;
► The convening of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the concerned
countries in Lusaka with the participation of all the conflicting parties in
the Democratic Republic of Congo;
► The convening of a regional summit to determine the final solution to
the conflict in the region.
20. I wish to acknowledge the fact that I have been briefed by the Libyan
leader on his efforts and the outcome of the two rounds of discussions in Sirte,
involving some of the key actors in the DRC problem. I was encouraged by
those discussions.
21. Following the Sirte Agreement, it has been reported that most of the troops
sent by the Republic of Chad in 1998, to support the Government of President
Laurent Desire Kabila of the DRC, have been withdrawn from that country.
According to those reports, the bulk of the contingent had arrived in Sahr, southwestern
Chad by 31 May 1999, while the rest were expected to return from
Bangui, Central African republic, where they had transited.
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 7
22. At about the same time also, it was reported that Uganda had pulled its men
and equipment out of Goma, to the Kisangani area.
c. The Dodoma and Dar-es-Salaam Mini-Summits
23. At the invitation of President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, Presidents
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Bizimungu of Rwanda met for a two-day
consultative session in Dodoma, Tanzania from 4 - 5 May, 1999. The Dodoma
Summit reviewed developments on the ongoing conflict in the DRC and focused
on the way forward towards achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict within
the framework of the SADC Lusaka Peace initiative and process. In this regard,
the Summit took note of the Sirte Peace Agreement as a contribution to the
Lusaka Peace Process.
24. The Summit also reaffirmed the need for peace, unity, reconciliation and
reconstruction in the DRC, as well as an all-inclusive national dialogue of the
stakeholders, to discuss and determine the new political dispensation in the
country. In this regard, the Summit welcomed President Kabila' s expressed
readiness to hold direct talks with the rebels.
25. The Dodoma Summit was followed by another round of consultations at
Summit level in Dar-es-Salaam from 12 - 13 May 1999, involving Presidents
Mkapa, Chiluba and Chissano, as well as the former President of Tanzania,
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.
26. A third Summit on the DRC also took place in Dar-es-Salaam on 1 June
1999. Presidents Museveni of Uganda, Mkapa of Tanzania and Bizimungu of
Rwanda were in attendance. So also was Major-General Paul Kagame, Vice
President and Minister of Defence of Rwanda. The Summit deliberated on the
way forward towards realizing a peaceful solution to the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and agreed on the urgent need to restore peace in
the country to enable the people of that country to pursue developmental
activities. Following their deliberations, the leaders welcomed the commitment l
made by the DRC and Uganda towards achieving a peaceful solution to the·\
conflict. They also re-affirmed the need for a peaceful solution to the conflict in
the D RC. In this regard, they welcomed the unilateral cessation of hostilities
declared by the government of Rwanda, intended to enhance the chances of a
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 8
negotiated and comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, within the context of the
Lusaka Peace Process.
27. Mention should also be made of the consultations undertaken by several
other leaders of the Region, aimed at giving momentum to the peace process in
the DRC. These consultations have involved on different ocassions, Presidents
Nelson Nlandela of South Africa, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Sam Nujoma of
Namibia. Jose Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola and Omar Bongo of Gabon, as well
as others outside the Region.
28. Apart from these efforts by the leaders of Africa and their Organizations,
the conflict in the DRC has also been the focus of attention at the level of the
United Nations and especially, the Security Council.
29. Among other Decisions taken by the UN Security Council, was Resolution
1234 (1999) adopted at the 3993ni meet.ing Session of the Council on 9 April
1999, which inter-alia, deplored the continuing fighting and the presence of
forces of foreign States in the DRC in a manner inconsistent with the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations, and calls upon those States to bring to an end
the presence of these uninvited forces and to take immediate steps to that end.
Additionally, the Resolution called for the immediate signing of a Ceasefire
Agreement, that would pave the way for the withdrawal of foreign forces, the reestablishment
of the authority of the government of the DRC throughout its
territory, the disarmament of non-governmental armed forces in the DRC.
Additionally, the Resolution stressed the fact that in the context of finding a
lasting and peaceful settlement to the conflict, there is need for an all-inclusive
process of political dialogue with a view to achieving national reconciliation and
the holding of an early date, of a democratic, free and fair elections, and· for the
provision of arrangements for security along the relevant international borders of
the DRC.
30. It is also pertinent to point out that the Security Council in the Resolution
under reference, welcomed the intention of the Government of the DRC to hold
an all-inclusive national debate, as a percusor to elections, and encouraged further
progress in that respect.
31. It should be recalled that prior to the adoption of the Security Council
Resolution 1234/1999, the Secretary General of the United Nations, had on April
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
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5, 1999, announced the appointment of Mr l\tloustapha Niasse. the former
Foreign Minister of Senegal, as his Special Envoy to advance the search for an
end to the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Following his
appointment, Mr Niasse travelled to the OAU Headquarters in Addis Ababa on
his first mission, during which visit we consulted extensively on how the OAU
and the UN should coordinate their efforts on the DRC.
32. Subsequently, Mr Niasse travelled extensively in the Region and elsewhere,
to consult with the leaders on the conflict in the DRC and the effons to resolve it.
Needless to say, we shall continue to work closely with the Special Envoy and the
UN as a whole, to consolidate our efforts.
33. Apart from the United :Kations, mention must also be made of the efforts
by several non-African powers. individually or collectively, as in the case of the
European Union, to facilitate a resolution of the c;:risis. In this context, it is worth
noting the efforts of the Special Envoys of the European Union and the United
States of America, who have been active in the Region.
II. lVIY \VORKING VISIT TO THE DRC
34. As part of efforts aimed at consolidating the Peace Process in the DRC, I
undertook a working visit to the DRC, from 31 March to 2 April, 1999, at the
invitation of the Government of that country. The visit provided me with an
opportunity to consult with President Kabila and other high ranking Government
officials of the Democratic Republic of Congo and to review the situation
prevailing in the DRC.
35. During my visit, President Kabila informed me that as part of his initiative
to promote national reconciliation within the DRC, there were plans to convene a
National Debate that will be open to all Congolese, including those who were
within the country, those on voluntary exile and those who have taken up arms to
oppose the legitimate government of the DRC. According to the President, the
objective of the proposed National Debate was to enable those who do not agree
with the government of the DRC to discuss the situation in the country and to
express their views on how to take the country forward in the process of
reconciliation and reconstruction of the DRC. In this rega~d, he stated that the
Agenda for the Debate would be a subject of further consultations with all the
concerned parties and will focus on the following issues:
•,·.
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 10
► The mode or process of acceding to power in the DRC;
► Consideration of the Draft Constitution prepared by "non-partisan
Experts" with the participation and inputs from officials of the Ministry
of Justice. Already, copies of the Draft Constitution have been
distributed widely to NGOs, civil society groups, political parties,
clergy and moral authorities, in order to obtain their reaction and inputs
before the finalization of the document;
► Plans for the full democratization of the country which process was
curtailed by the externally imposed war;
► Discussion and formulation of laws on the establishment of national
political parties.
36. The President also informed me that the proposed national Debate was in
fulfillment of the pledge by the government of the DRC, to fully democratize the
country. The President also referred to the demands by a section of the
opposition for the convening of a Round table instead of the proposed National
Debate. According to him, the government of the DRC is of the view that a
Round Table as demanded by the opposition, would only serve to undermine the
legitimacy of the government of the DRC and its institutions. Moreover, he was
convinced that such a Round Table would serve the interest of only a small clique
in the DRC and would therefore be undemocratic. Such an approach according to
the President, is inconsistent with the actions of the Congolese people who chased
away the old leadership in the Congo. The government of the DRC is therefore
determined to ensure that the supreme will of the people must prevail in the
country. President Kabila was emphatic in his view that the people of the DRC
do not want a Round Table. They want a broad-based National Debate ~nd this
desire has been evidenced in the views being expressed by many ordinary
Congolese on the streets, in the media and in different fora. President Kabila
appealed to the OAU to help the Congolese people and their government to
succeed with the National Debate as a means of resolving the contradictions in the
country.
37. In this regard, President Kabila also informed me that the DRC government
has requested La Francophonie to help it with the organisation of the National
Debate. He recalled that Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali, the Secretary General of La
Francophonie, had previously sent a delegation to the DRC. According to him,
the government has also approached Saint Egidio in Rome and the Mission had
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 11
agreed to convene the National Debate in Rome. The Italian government had also
undertaken to consult with the European Union to facilitate the convening of the
Conference in Rome. France had also offered to help.
38. In my response, I recalled the fact that right from the inception of the crisis
in the DRC, the OAU had emphasized the core principles which are at stake in
that crisis. These include the following position which was taken by the Central
Organ of the OAU:
respect for the umry, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the
DRC;
opposition to external intervention in the DRC and support for the
legitimate government of President Kabila;
condemnation of the recourse to armed rebellion to settle political
disputes and differences .
39. On tl~e proposed National Debate, I informed the President that the
initiative was a sound one and that it is consistent with the decisions of the OAU,
SADC and other Regional Summits which had always stressed the need for
dialogue in order to broaden the political space in the DRC. I urged the President
to ensure that the National Debate is well prepared and that he should continue to
show flexibility by allowing all the political forces in the country to participate in
the Debate. I also informed him that the proposed Agenda for the National
Debate appeared to be quite comprehensive. I made the point that in finalizing the
preparations for the Debate, especially its Agenda, the Organizers should be open
to other ideas, proposals and suggestions. Furthermore, I stressed the importance
of ensuring that the whole exercise is conducted in a transparent manner, which
transparency should be visible at all stages of the process.
40. On the venue for the proposed Debate, I told the President that from a
political, psychological and moral standpoint, the OAU would prefer the
convening of the debate within Africa. I underscored the point that if for reasons
which are understandable the debate cannot take place in Kinshasa, it should be
possible to find an African country where the National Debate can take place.
However, I assured the President that the OAU will not make this a precondition
for its support. The OAU position is to help and not to create more
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 12
complications and obstacles. therefore, whatever is the final choice of the
Congolese people decided in a transparent manner, will be respected by the
OAU.
41. On the issue of sponsorship of the National Debate by the OAU, I also
informed the President that I did not envisage any problems for the Central Organ
to support the idea, once there is clarity on the preparations and consultations that
are being made for the Debate.
42. On the Lusaka Process. I stressed the point that the OAU remains of the
view that while the initiative on the National Debate is important, the process
which is to lead to a Ceasefire in the DRC is also particularly crucial. This
position is informed by the fact that unless the war is brought co an end in the
DRC, not much will be realized on the political and economic fronts. I drew the
President's attention to the face that President Chiluba had informed me that he,
President Kabila, had agreed co the participation of the rebels at the Technical ..
Working Group Meetings in Lusaka, aimed at achieving a Ceasefire in the
current fighting in the DRC. I welcomed this development. I stressed that
parallel to the preparations for the National Debate, the efforts to end the war
should be intensified because the two processes are not mutually exclusive but in
many ways than one, mutually reinforcing.
43. My visit to the DRC and especially my meeting with President Kabila,
afforded us an opportunity to express the commitment of the OAU to continue to
encourage and facilitate dialogue between the people of the DRC in all respects.
44. The decision t;,y the government of the DRC to initiate a process of
National Debate on the future of the country, needs and merits the support of the
OAU. However, a lot more requires to be done to prepare for the Debate. In
particular, there is a strong need for the broadest consultation to be undertaken in
order to build a national consensus for dialogue. Such consultations should also
assist in determining such issues as the Agenda and Format of the Debate, criteria
for participation and rules governing its conduct. There is also need for broadbased
participation and more clarity on the objectives and anticipated outcome of
the Debate.
45. With respect to the venue of the proposed Debate and as I informed the
Central Organ at Ambassadorial level on Thursday, 8 April 1999, the government
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 13
of Kenya has offered to -host rhe Debate on the future of the DRC. This is an
important development for which the Government of Kenya should be
commended. However, beyond the commendation, there is need for OAU
Member States and the wider International Community to extend financial,
material and technical support to ensure the success of the National Debate.
46. Finally, in my view, the proposed National Debate and the Lusaka Process
aimed at achieving a Ceasefire in the current fighting are complementary and both
processes should be encouraged. The Lusaka Process is critical for the attainment
of peace in the DRC. The Karional Debate is important within the context of
broadening the political space and allowing all Congolese of different political
persuasions and backgrounds, to dialogue on their future.
III. CONCLUSION
47. Clearly, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo continues to cause
havoc and destruction, as well as instability in that country and the Region as a
whole. It is a war that has caused considerable pain to all Africans and even
people outside the Continent. As is evident from this Report, considerable efforts
have been deployed by many African leaders, by the OAU, SADC, the UN and
the wider International Community.
48. While no evident breakthrough has yet been achieved as a result of these
efforts, it is important to underscore the significant developments that have taken
place since the last Session of the Council of Ministers in March 1999 in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.
49. Such developments include the initiative by President Kabila to convene a
National Debate. This Decision marks an important step forward in the overall
attempt to achieve a national consensus on how to achieve national reconciliation
and reconstruction in the DRC. Additionally, the initiative is consistent with the
need to broaden the political space in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which
has been the demand of the Region and of the OAU, right from the inception of
the conflict.
50. Another significant development in the DRC peace process, is the emerging
disposition to have the rebels participate in the negotiations that would pave the
way for the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement to end the fighting and prepare the
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 14
ground for a new political dispensation in the DRC. This is indeed an important
development, not the least because efforts to secure an end to the fighting, must
of necessity, involve all those who are currently engaged in actual fighting on the
ground.
51. The unilateral declaration of a cessation of hostilities by Rwanda, is also an
important development which must be encouraged and sustained. It is equally
important to acknowledge and commend the commitment demonstrated by the
governments of the DRC, and Uganda towards achieving a peaceful solution to
the on-going war in the DRC. Undoubtedly, the situation is evolving positively
and the OAU must continue to support all these emerging trends, which give hope
for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the DRC.
52. In this regard, the ongoing efforts by President Frederick Chiluba,
supported by Presidents Chissano and Mkapa of Mozambique and Tanzania
respectively, within the Framework of the Lusaka Process deserve the
encouragement and support of Africa. So also do the efforts of the Leader of the
Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The commitment entered into by the Parties to
the Sirte Agreement are significant and worthy of support. The idea of dialogue
and the preparedness of the concerned Parties, to work for the achievement of a
Ceasefire and a lasting solution to the conflict in the DRC should be welcomed
and strongly supported. Such a development, represents an acknowled_gement
that the Lusaka Process is central to the efforts to end the war through the signing
of a Ceasefire Agreement.
53. Against this background, the OAU should reaffirm its support for the
efforts of President Chiluba and other African leaders, aimed at finding a peaceful
solution to the crisis and securing a Ceasefire Agreement among the Parties to the
conflict. Similarly, the other initiatives that have so far been taken by individual
countries and groups, to complement the Lusaka Peace Process, should be
welcomed. It is my hope that the tireless efforts deployed by President Chiluba
and his colleagues will bear fruit and that peace will soon return to the DRC.
54. Beyond what has been documented in this Report, it is critical to ensure
that all the efforts and initiatives that are being deployed to bring peace to the
DRC, should be coordinated, harmonized and consolidated for maximum results.
To achieve the above objective, the OAU will continue to cooperate very closely
with President Chiluba, who is spearheading the regional initiative. This
CM/2099 (LXX) - d
Page 15
particular initiative of the region continues to enjoy the broad support of the
Parties to the conflict, as well as with the other leaders, who are complementing
the Lusaka Peace Process.
55. On my part, I shall continue to follow closely the events in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and to provide support to the on-going efforts aimed at
achieving a Ceasefire and promoting the resumption of dialogue among all the
stakeholders in the conflict in that country. In this connection, I should like to
report that as of the time of finalizing this report, preparations were underway to
convene a Summit of the countries of the Region in Lusaka in the course of June
1999, aimed at achieving and signing the Ceasefire Agreement. The OAU will
spare no effort in working for the success of the proposed Summit.
ANNEX 4.17
South Kivu Civil Society — Collective of South Kivu (DRC) Youth Organizations
and Associations (COJESKI), Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC —
large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
reaching fever pitch, Six-monthly report covering the period from
1 April to 30 September 1999, October 1999
- 35 -
South Kivu Civil Society — Collective of South Kivu (DRC) Youth Organizations
and Associations (COJESKI), Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC —
large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
reaching fever pitch, Six-monthly report covering the period from
1 April to 30 September 1999, October 1999
[Translation]
CONTENT
0.0 General introduction
0.1. Overview of the humanitarian crisis in the occupied provinces of the DRC
I. The human rights situation in South Kivu Province
I.1 Infringement of the DRC’s sovereignty and integrity
I.1.1. Joint communiqué on the twinning and co-operation agreement between South
Kivu Province and the prefecture of the city of Kigali
I.1.2. Twinning and co-operation agreement between South Kivu Province and the
prefecture of the city of Kigali
I.1.3. Membership and report of the urban planning and housing committee
I.1.4. Report of the transport and communications committee
I.1.5. Report on the workshop activities of the political and security committee
I.1.6. Committee on agriculture, stock-breeding, environment and tourism
I.1.7. Report on the workshop activities of the committee on the economy, trade and
industry
I.1.8. Socio-cultural workshop
I.1.9. Overall conclusion
I.2. Infringements of the right to life and casual killing
I.3. Arbitrary arrest, abductions and unlawful detention
I.4. General insecurity
I.4.1. The army and the police of the DRC under the Rwandan, Burundian and
Ugandan occupation
I.5. Restrictions on freedom of expression and denial of the right to information
I.5.1. Radio Maendoleo, Bukavu
I.5.2. Human rights organizations
I.5.3. Members of the South Kivu Civil Society
- 36 -
I.6. Abuse of political power
I.7. Incitement to tribal hatred
I.8. Vicious, barbaric destruction
II. The human rights situation in North Kivu Province (focusing exclusively on Masisi
Territory)
II.1. Infringements of the right to life and casual killing
II.2. Arbitrary arrest and detention and abductions
II.3. General insecurity
II.4. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
III. The human rights situation in Orientale Province
III.1 Overview of the situation from 1 January to 30 March 1999 (for publication)
III.1.1. Infringement of human dignity/sabotage of the right to a wage
III.1.2. Absence of the right to medical treatment
III.1.3. Absence of the right to education
III.1.4. Insecurity and police harassment
III.1.5. Abductions
III.1.6. Extortion and summary executions
III.1.7. The repercussions of the bombing of Kisangani on 10 January 1999
III.2. The fighting in Kisangani: an outrage against peace and telling evidence of
international collusion in the current crisis in the Congo
III.2.1. General introduction
III.2.2. The position of the allies and the consequences of the fighting between the
Rwandan and Ugandan armies on Congolese soil
III.3. The former Mai-Mai militia being wiped out in Kisangani, Orientale Province
IV. The human rights situation in the occupied part of Katanga Province
IV.1. Killings in Kongolo, Northern Katanga
IV.2. Killings in Kimbumbu and Nonge Territories, Northern Katanga
IV.3. Massacres at Kasala and Malembankulu in Upper Lomami, Katanga
Overall conclusion
Sources
- 37 -
0.0. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The occupied provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are still enduring the
harmful consequences of disastrous and/or rapacious management of their human and material
resources by the armed forces of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, who are now acknowledged by the
international community to have invaded the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
From April to September 1999, large-scale violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law reached fever pitch in this disaster-stricken part of the country.
This half-yearly report, which also describes the incidents reported, is the logical follow-up
to the following reports published by the Collective of South Kivu Youth Organizations and
Associations (COJESKI) since the invasion of the DRC on 2 August 1998:
1. Overview of large-scale human rights violations during the first three months of occupation in
South Kivu, DRC (COJESKI report published on 20 November 1998);
2. Five months of invasion in the DRC: human rights in peril in the occupied provinces of eastern
Congo. The case of Orientale province, South Kivu province and North Kivu province.
(Report describing events between 2 August 1998 and 3 January 1999, published on
10 January 1999).
3. Human tragedy in Kivu, DRC. The apocalyptic human rights situation between 1 January and
31 March 1999. (Quarterly report published on 15 May 1999).
4. The role of Burundi in the large-scale human rights violations in Kivu, DRC. (Report
submitted by three of COJESKI’s human rights militants following eight months living under
cover in Burundi, published on 27 August 1999).
5. No to the Balkanization, the abandonment and the protectorate of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (2nd COJESKI memorandum sent to the United Nations Secretary-General in
New York and published on 18 September 1999).
Compendium of information on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and its impact on the DRC
over the following five years (encoded documents made public on 27 October 1999).
Compendium produced in close co-operation with the International Panel of Eminent Personalities
to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events (IPEP, OAU).
The present report relates solely to the occupied provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu,
northern Katanga and Orientale province and hence covers the following main subject areas:
infringements of the right to life and casual killing;
arbitrary arrest, abduction and unlawful detention;
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment;
widespread insecurity and police harassment;
restrictions on freedom of expression;
impunity and abuse of public office;
incitement to tribal hatred;
- 38 -
wilful destruction and extortion;
murder and summary execution.
These problems clearly illustrate the tragic circumstances and the tyrannical conditions under
which millions of Congolese inhabitants in the occupied provinces continue to pay the price of an
unjust war. And all of this is happening under the complicitous gaze of the international
community which is directly and implicitly responsible for the Balkanization and the current
invasion of the DRC and all its present and future repercussions.
0.1. Overview of the humanitarian crisis in the
occupied provinces of the DRC
When finalizing the report of the CADDHOM (the Collective of Actions for Human Rights
Development) published in August 1999, we observed that after one year of occupation and
rebellion in Kivu the situation was catastrophic. Some 6,000 civilians had been massacred and/or
murdered, more than 500 had disappeared, there were thousands of refugees and displaced persons,
and hundreds of community leaders, human rights militants and priests had been forced into exile.
Millions of dollars-worth of equipment and property had been looted or destroyed, thus
condemning 10 million people to sickness, famine, destitution, and anguish, or, in short, death.
The international community (the United Nations, European Union and OAU) knows this.
But it has made itself an accessory to the crimes against humanity being committed in Kivu
through its allegiance to “Tutsiism” and centres of economic power which manipulate the truth so
as to continue to be able to take advantage of the trafficking organized by the rebels and the
occupying forces, thereby establishing a Mafia threatening peace throughout the Great Lakes
region. It has tried tentatively to uphold respect for the Lusaka peace accords signed by the
warring parties but has taken no practical action.
The result has been a hecatomb. Looting and stealing have destroyed the social and
economic fabric and the environment, and mass murder, repression, summary executions and
kidnapping have become the norm among the warlords who rule the DRC’s occupied provinces.
The administration of the population is based on terror, financial interests take precedence
over the law and ethnic prejudice and major human rights violations have become the everyday lot
of the people. Despite the advances of the occupiers and the rebels in the provinces of Kasaï,
Equateur and Katanga, they do not yet control the whole of Kivu; half the region remains in the
hands of the Mai-Mai resistance and so Kivu is divided into two parts, each with its own leaders,
laws and administration. Total confusion reins.
On the social and economic front, most of the rural population now lives in the bush where
they have fled to escape punishment from one side or the other. Having abandoned their villages
and fields, they now have to contend with famine and illness and live like wild animals. Boys have
all left school and enrolled in the rebel forces or the Mai-Mai resistance for their safety and
survival. Girls are forced into prostitution from the age of 12 on. There are no more wages to be
had. Shopkeepers are gradually becoming bankrupt. Bartering has become the norm and seasonal
food shortages affect every corner of the occupied provinces. The people are now living in a
situation of indescribable poverty.
Thus, the RCD’s war, instead of resolving social problems and the problems of ethnic
coexistence, has widened the gap between the various ethnic groups more than ever, increasing the
number of barriers and fostering suspicion, fear and hatred.
- 39 -
The fact that new flags were raised over Kivu on 30 June 1999, Congo-Kinshasa’s
independence day, appeared to bear out the native population’s suspicions that Rwanda has
expansionist aims in the Congo.
On the health front
The situation is terrible. There are practically no more medical or health centres and where
they do exist, most have become no more than refuges for the dying in which pharmaceutical
products are an unusual rarity. The population gets its supplies from travelling traders with no
medical training who sell products which are often poorly preserved and come in unspecified doses
carrying the risk of intoxication. Epidemiological monitoring services have ceased to exist. There
has been an upsurge in certain illnesses including AIDS, cholera, bloody diarrhoea, meningitis,
poliomyelitis, and all the other parasitic, endemic and malnutrition-related diseases. There are no
more medicines for lepers and tuberculosis patients and some have had to interrupt their treatment
for want of supplies. The only relief lies in traditional medicine and fetishism. The most
vulnerable groups are the elderly, pregnant women, children and young people. The result is that
the victims run into their thousands.
On the political front
The rebellion is unpopular. It has no support among the inhabitants of the occupied zones.
It is riddled with internal strife. The security of people and their property, for which the rebels
once claimed to be fighting have been forgotten. The rebels have no democratic values and no
plans for the social and economic recovery of the occupied zones.
On the religious front
Relations with the church, particularly the Roman Catholic church, can hardly be said to be
set fair. Since the death of the Archbishop of Bukavu (DRC), Monsignor Christophe Munzinhirwa,
SJ, on 29 October 1996, the list of clerics who have been killed has kept on growing. It includes
4 priests, 1 deacon, 3 nuns killed in Uvira, 3 others in Bukavu, 2 in Goma and 8 priests and
3 Rwandan nuns killed in Kalima (Kasongo/Maniema). 4 nuns have also been raped. Many
churches have been desecrated and ransacked (including Kasika, Fizi, and Sange). Convents have
been burgled and stripped of everything in the presence of their congregations. These incidents
appear to herald a new persecution of the church. Many priests and ministers now live in exile or
in hiding in their own country. Eastern DRC has become a powder-keg. It has become the
battlefield of eight armies, a dozen militias and any number of secret armies. Human rights are
suffering enormously on account of this. The social and economic fabric has been largely eaten
away and moral and religious values tarnished. The people are at the mercy of the warring parties.
And all of this is happening under the culpable eyes of the international community.
I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE
I.1. Infringement of the DRC’s sovereignty and integrity
Negotiations were going well in Lusaka when, in Kivu, the RCD and Kigali hoisted new
flags signalling the secession of the province. This was too much for the inhabitants to take. On
30 June 1999, under the auspices of COJESKI (the Collective of South Kivu Youth Organizations
and Associations) a peaceful protest march was held in Bukavu ending with the destruction of all
the flags by the crowd.
- 40 -
Kigali’s actions are also a violation of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights
and even the UN Charter.
Without further ado, here is the entire text of the joint communiqué on the twinning and
co-operation agreement between South Kivu province and the Prefecture of the city of Kigali
which amounts to the annexation of South Kivu to Rwanda under another name.
I.1.1. Joint communiqué on the Twinning and co-operation agreement between South Kivu
Province and the prefecture of the city of Kigali
At the invitation of the administration of the Prefecture of the city of Kigali, represented by
the prefect, Mr. Marc Kabandana, a delegation from South Kivu Province led by his excellency,
Norbert Bazengezi Katintima, the governor of the province, conducted a working visit to Kigali
from 21 to 24 August 1999.
The visit was in connection with the twinning and co-operation agreement between the two
administrative bodies.
The meetings were held at the Hotel Windsor Umubano, opened by his excellency,
Désiré Nyandwi, the Minister for Local Government Affairs of the Rwandan National Union
government, and attended by Mrs. Constance Mukayuhi Rwaka, Secretary General of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Regional Co-operation.
The meeting was also attended by representatives of various administrative, social and
economic institutions.
Over the four working days the participants discussed the following six key areas of activity:
Economy, trade and industry;
Transport and communication;
Social and cultural matters;
Agriculture, stock-breeding, fishing, tourism and the environment;
Town planning and housing;
Politics and security.
The opening ceremony was followed by a plenary session during which a working method
was adopted.
Participants divided up the work according to their areas of expertise and appointed the
various committees.
The following recommendations emerged from the work of the committees.
1. In the area of the economy, trade and industry
The two parties undertake to:
simplify customs formalities;
- 41 -
promote training and exchange;
co-operate in the investigative activities of our customs authorities;
exchange all necessary information to combat fraud, which only benefits individuals;
harmonize customs rules;
hold training seminars and colloquies to improve customs techniques;
hold regular meetings between the customs authorities and the economic agents of the two
entities;
facilitate regular meetings between the customs authorities and economic agents of the two
entities;
support private or semi-public property companies carrying out development or construction
projects.
6. In the area of politics and security
provide the people with a general and political education;
support the principle of regional co-operation;
establish a standing joint security committee;
foster good governance and take thorough measures against impunity;
see to it that this twinning arrangement acts as a bridge between the two states;
combat the mutual feeling of mistrust and suspicion by promoting joint training in the areas of
policing, security, political management and the retraining of soldiers;
hold seminars for administrative officials from South Kivu province and the Prefecture of the
City of Kigali.
Done in Kigali on 24 August 1999
I.1.2. Twinning and co-operation agreement between South Kivu Province and the Prefecture
of the City of Kigali
The Province of South Kivu, represented by its GOVERNOR;
And:
The Prefecture of the city of Kigali, represented by its PREFECT;
Having regard to the historical links between the two peoples;
Having regard to the proximity of the Province of South Kivu to the Rwandan Republic;
Considering the need for complementarity between the two administrative entities;
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In view of the need for economic, social and cultural development;
Wishing to preserve lasting security by means of sound policies;
Bearing in mind the phenomena of sub-regional interdependence;
Considering the freely expressed wishes of both parties;
HAVE AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Article 1
The Province of South Kivu and the Prefecture of the City of Kigali undertake to co-operate
and facilitate direct meetings between their inhabitants to exchange views on the following matters:
1. The economy, trade and industry;
2. Transport and communication;
3. Social and cultural affairs;
4. Agriculture, stock-breeding, fishing, the environment and tourism;
5. Town planning and housing;
6. Politics and security.
1. The economy, trade and industry
Revitalize industrial activities as far as we are able;
Simplify customs procedures;
Introduce a concerted policy to combat fraud;
Increase co-operation between our two Chambers of Commerce;
Breathe new life into the services sector.
2. Transport and communication
Pool experiences;
Encourage investment by the public and/or private sectors;
Promote new communication technologies;
Facilitate the use of existing infrastructure.
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3. Social and cultural affairs
Pool information and share experiences;
Foster the emergence of a spirit of peace, unity and reconciliation;
Facilitate exchanges in the area of training, education and research;
Collaborate in the area of preventive and curative health;
Support the promotion, organization and dissemination of cultural and sporting activities;
Foster the emergence of a responsible free press.
Article 4
This twinning and co-operation arrangement shall last for an unspecified period.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the duly authorized representatives have signed the present
agreement.
There shall be two original copies of this agreement.
Done in Kigali on 24 August 1999.
FOR THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH FOR THE PREFECTURE OF THE
KIVU CITY OF KIGALI
Norbert Basengezi Katintima Marc Kabandana
GOVERNOR PREFECT
I.1.3. Membership and report of the committee on town planning and housing
The committee had 7 members:
1. Thadée Mutware Chair (Rwanda)
2. Ms Louise Mujijima Secretary (Rwanda)
3. Mushengezi Nyamuhama (South Kivu)
4. Jean-Pierre Babulimo Banga (South Kivu)
5. Butera Bazimya (Rwanda)
6. Léonard Sesonga (Rwanda)
7. André Ijambao Sema
8. Callixte Kanamugire (Rwanda)
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In the context of the twinning arrangement the question of town planning was addressed
from the three following angles:
1. The importance of town planning as a whole;
2. The current town-planning situation in Bukavu and Kigali;
3. Recommendations.
1. The importance of town planning as a whole;
To ensure that the discussions started with everyone talking the same language, the
committee began by defining town planning, which it described as a science, an art and a series of
techniques which result in the appropriate management of the urban environment.
Town planning can be divided into three main projects:
(i) devising land-use plans;
(ii) development and implementation;
(iii) management of available spaces.
2. The current town-planning situation in Bukavu and Kigali
(a) Bukavu
Town-planning in Bukavu can be divided into three periods:
The colonial period: Everything was planned, there were town-planning documents and urban
management as a whole was good; in other words town-planning legislation was respected.
The period of the Mobutu regime: Initially, good management practices continued. However
in around 1975 anarchy began to set in, legislation relating to land use was no longer respected,
government officials were no longer paid and the situation affected town-planning as well.
For their own survival, town-planning officials began to hand out unallotted plots of land in
exchange for commissions. A flight from the countryside gave rise to unplanned
neighbourhoods in Bukavu.
The present time: Between the war of 1996 and the present, the new authorities have merely
been dealing with the consequences of the situation described above. To date, there have not
been enough funds available to be able to remedy the urban planning mistakes of previous
regimes.
(b) Kigali
Generally speaking, the town-planning situation in Kigali is practically the same as that in
Bukavu (unplanned neighbourhoods, non-existent or inadequate social amenities such as roads,
drinking water, electricity, drainage, etc.).
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3. Recommendations
A national housing policy should be devised and implemented;
Documentation centres should be set up enabling documentary information to be exchanged;
An exchange programme should be established by means of:
training visits by municipal experts;
exchanges in the field of academic education;
exchanges of experts in the context of bilateral co-operation (land management and
planning).
The property market should be opened up to investors and businessmen;
Spaces should be set aside for monuments and green spaces intended to improve relations
between the two regions and works to be created symbolizing their history.
I.1.4. Report of the committee on transport and communication
The committee had five members:
1. Morisho Selemani Chair of the Committee (South Kivu)
2. Innocent Rwagasore Secretary of the Committee (Rwanda)
3. Mulonda Wilolwa Member (South Kivu)
4. Jean-Pierre Kayihura Member (Rwanda)
5. Maussen Irankunda Member (Rwanda)
The problems in this sector are linked to basic infrastructure and use.
I. Transport
(a) Land transport
Infrastructure
The parties agree that there is a road between Kigali and Bukavu and that it is in good
condition. There is also a national road from Kigali to Uvira (via the Ngomo escarpment) which is
a dirt road but well maintained. Uvira can also be reached via Bugarama and Kamaniola.
South Kivu is in the process of repairing its regional roads and this will make it possible, in
the framework of this twinning agreement, to link Kigali to the interior of South Kivu province.
The two parties recommend harmonizing road building standards in respect of axle loads as well as
exchanges between experts on the subject of repairs to infrastructure.
Use
The two parties noted that the road is used in one direction only and to a much greater extent
in Rwanda (by private and public transport).
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Unfortunately, transport usually stops in Cyangungu. As part of the twinning arrangement
the parties hope that Rwandan routes will extend as far as South Kivu and that South Kivu will
make similar efforts as far as Kigali. Regular meetings should be held between public and private
road users’ associations from Kigali and South Kivu.
(b) Air transport
Infrastructure
The committee noted that the airport facilities in Kigali comply with international standards.
Kavumu airport in South Kivu is suitable for large aircraft but unfortunately it has no runway lights
and practically no communications facilities. There are also airfields in each of South Kivu’s
territories which are accessible to light aircraft.
[Translator’s note: page missing]
1. Causes of insecurity
The committee pinpointed the following major causes of insecurity:
(a) Ignorance
(b) Poverty
(c) Injustice
(d) Imperialism
(e) Lack of unity, co-operation and regional disintegration
(f) Bad governance and corruption
2. Recommendations
The committee made the following recommendations:
(a) Provide people with a general and political education;
(b) Encourage the principle of regional co-operation;
(c) Set up a standing joint security committee;
(d) Foster good governance and take thorough measures against impunity;
(e) See to it that this twinning arrangement acts as a link between the two states;
(f) Combat the mutual feeling of mistrust and suspicion by promoting joint training in the areas of
policing, security, political management and the retraining of soldiers;
(g) Hold seminars for administrative officials from South Kivu province and the Prefecture of the
City of Kigali;
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(h) The people of South Kivu province and the city of Kigali call for the Lusaka cease-fire accords
to be signed and call on the international community to remove all the obstacles to the signing
of these accords.
I.1.6. Committee on agriculture, stock-breeding, environment and tourism
The committee had 10 members:
1. Isidore Gasarasi Chair of the Committee (Rwanda)
2. Dr. Asumani Secretary of the Committee (South Kivu)
3. Prof. Bitijula Member (South Kivu)
4. Dr. Octavien Ndakengerwa Member (Rwanda)
5. Anne-Marie Kantengwa Member (Rwanda)
6. Prosper Mary Member (Rwanda)
7. Augustin Muvunyi Member (Rwanda)
8. Eulalie Umutanguha Member (Rwanda)
9. Manzi Gatera Member (Rwanda)
10. Gervais Dusabemungu Member (Rwanda)
I. Tourism
(a) List of existing resources
City of Kigali
Intore dancing
Hotels
Airstrips
Local breed of Ankore cattle (Nyambo)
National Parks including Akagera and the Volcanoes Park
Nyungwe Forest
Works of art
Others
South Kivu
Kahuzi-Biega National Park
Hotels
Itombwe Forest Reserves many animal and plant species
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Lake Kivu and its islands and islets
Works of art
Spas
(b) Recommendations
Open zoological gardens and recreation parks and exchange attractions
Create museums making use of tourist heritage
Publish a pamphlet promoting specific sites
Launch a joint project to establish a tourism and hotel management college or training centre.
II. Environment
Exchange experiences in the conservation of protected animal or plant species
Apply the same environmental management rules
Devise joint strategies to combat disasters
Devise joint strategies to manage waste water and solid waste disposal systems
Exchange experiences with a view to setting up green spaces and amusement parks
Pursue a joint nature conservation policy.
(c) Agriculture and stock-breeding
Introduce a joint policy on the taxation of items entering into the production of agricultural
goods
Pool results and experiences in the area of agricultural and zootechnic research
Share appropriate agricultural and zootechnic technologies including improved seeds, food
processing techniques, and mushroom production
Pool knowledge in the area of livestock farming in stables
Set up a free trade zone for agricultural and pastoral products
Make it easier to acquire improved and adapted genetic stocks
Facilitate the sale of animal products, particularly meat and milk
Devise a joint strategy to combat animal and plant diseases
Set up a permanent office for the exchange of information on agriculture and livestock
breeding
- 49 -
Set up a data base on traditional cures for the region’s animal and plant diseases and their
administration and dosage
Pool experience in the processing and preservation of farm products (milk, sweet potatoes, etc.)
Adopt policies to integrate approaches to crop farming and livestock farming
(d) Fishing
Adopt joint policies for the conservation of fish species
Facilitate access to the fish stocks in Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika
Pool experiences of family-run fish farms.
Conclusion
In the areas that concern us, particularly agriculture, stock-breeding, the environment and
tourism, this twinning arrangement can resolve many of the problems which lie at the root of our
poverty.
The city of Kigali and South Kivu are confronted with the same day-to-day problems and so
joint solutions are a perfect means of promoting social, economic and political development.
I.1.7. Report of the workshop activities of the committee on the economy, trade and industry
The committee was made up of the following members:
1. Chihubagala Chinja (South Kivu)
2. Milabyo Mughima Basila (South Kivu)
3. Simon Buabua (South Kivu)
4. Maurice Kaongo (South Kivu)
5. Shungu Musolo (South Kivu)
6. Simon Sebitereko (Rwanda)
7. Antoine Munyakazi Juru (Rwanda)
8. Alphonse Rugiramumaro (Rwanda)
9. Egide Gakuba Rubojo (Rwanda)
10. Alexis Kadeli (Rwanda)
11. Irennee Bubingo (South Kivu)
1. Membership of the Bureau
After some discussion, debate and deliberation, the Bureau was appointed as follows:
1. Chair Antoine Munyakazi Juru (Rwanda)
2. 1st Secretary Milabyo Mughima Basila (South Kivu)
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3. 2nd Secretary Simon Buabua Ndaye (South Kivu)
2. The work itself
The committee examined the draft co-operation agreement between the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of Rwanda and the Congolese Business Federation signed in Kinshasa on
12 August 1997 with the aim of increasing and extending economic and commercial co-operation
links between Rwanda and Congo.
Having examined this document, the committee proposed that it should serve as the legal
basis to promote economic and commercial co-operation between the province of South Kivu and
the Prefecture of the City of Kigali.
The committee also took note of a document drawn up by the Rwandan participants relating
to the strengthening of economic and commercial links between the east of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Following some discussion, the committee acknowledged the
relevance of some of the proposals made in this document and suggested that it should serve as a
guide for future activities relating to the economy and commerce.
After this the committee went on to deal with some urgent matters:
1. With regard to the two Chambers of Commerce
The Rwandan participants undertook to simplify the formalities for lorries transporting goods
to South Kivu.
Regarding the ban on lorries transporting salted fish to South Kivu from passing through
Rwanda, the Rwandan participants drew attention to the fact that it was temporarily prohibited
to import fish into Rwanda because of the poisoning of Lake Victoria and that steps were being
taken to find a solution to this problem.
The two sides agreed that Rwandan economic agents wishing to set up business in South Kivu
must scrupulously abide by the economic legislation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The two sides should co-operate to provide training for bank clerks in South Kivu and support
the revitalization of the banking sector. The Rwandan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
would alert the City of Kigali’s economic agents to this need.
The two Chambers of Commerce agreed to exchange every necessary piece of information to
combat fraud, which could only be of any benefit to individuals.
2. With regard to the Congolese Customs and Excise Office (OFIDA) and the Rwanda
Revenue Authority (RRA)
The committee suggested:
(a) harmonizing South Kivu and Kigali’s customs rules;
(b) sharing experiences by organizing training seminars and colloquies with a view to improving
customs techniques;
(c) promoting co-operation between the investigative services of each body’s customs authorities
with a view to stamping out fraud;
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(d) organizing regular meetings between the customs authorities and the economic agents of the
two entities;
(e) simplifying administrative procedures at the customs posts on the border between Rwanda and
South Kivu.
3. In the energy field
The committee proposed:
providing the population with increasingly improved access to electricity;
signing an agreement between Electrogaz and SNEL to install electricity in Kamanyola;
sharing energy-related expertise, equipment and materials;
co-operating in arranging exchanges of water treatment equipment owned by traditional
entities;
rehabilitating energy-related research (methane gas at Lake Kivu, turf, ethanol, bio-gas, etc.).
Conclusion
The committee proposed that a follow-up committee on economic, commercial and financial
affairs be set up and meet at least once a month. It was suggested that the next meeting should be
held the following month in Bukavu.
The committee members welcomed the spirit of fraternity and mutual understanding which
had prevailed throughout their work and were convinced that this spirit would contribute a great
deal to promoting trade between South Kivu and Kigali.
I.1.8. Social and cultural workshop
The committee was made up of the following 15 members:
1. Mwenyemali Kasilembo (South Kivu)
2. Maman Tshisekedi (South Kivu)
3. Mulindwa Itongwa (South Kivu)
4. Balthazar Muhigirwa (South Kivu)
5. Joseph Mbonekube (South Kivu)
6. Aloys Mwitende (South Kivu)
7. Vianney Makuza (Rwanda)
8. Rwigamba Barinda (Rwanda)
9. Jean Butoto (Rwanda)
10. Anastasie Nyirabukeye (Rwanda)
11. Marie-Rose Nirere (Rwanda)
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12. Gérard Rutali (Rwanda)
13. Mary Ashimwe (Rwanda)
14. Constance Rwaka (Rwanda)
Membership of the Bureau
1. Prof. Rwigamba Barinda Chair (Rwanda)
2. Mwenyemali Kalisembo Vice-Chair (South Kivu)
3. Balthazar Muhigirwa Secretary for South Kivu (South Kivu)
4. Anastasie Nyirabukeye Secretary for Kigali (Rwanda)
Working methods adopted:
The committee dealt with the following series of topics drawn from the 2 core documents:
1. Education
2. Health
3. Women and families
4. Youth
5. Vulnerable groups
6. Sport and leisure
7. Culture, information and the press
Recommendations adopted in each area were as follows:
1. Education
Bearing in mind the present situation, the committee recommended:
that teachers should be recruited through a twinning arrangement supervised by a monitoring
body specially set up for the purpose;
that the sum of teachers’ social contributions should be paid into their accounts after they
leave, die, etc.;
in the area of higher education, universities and scientific research, the committee would like to
see:
exchanges of teachers and research workers;
sharing of the results of research;
exchanges between various higher education establishments;
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exchanges of students in training or work placements;
proposals to send students from Kigali to the ISDR (the Higher Institute of Rural
Development) in Bukavu.
an important recommendation was made concerning children who had recently finished
humanities classes in South Kivu but whose examination answers could not be corrected
because of the war.
The committee recommended that everything be done to ensure that the 1998 and 1999 state
examinations could be corrected, for example by turning to UNESCO.
2. Health
Exchanges of medical staff
Transfer of the sick under the SUREMED arrangement
Training 3rd year medical students to specialize in surgery, paediatrics, gynaecology and
internal medicine in Kigali
Sharing information on strategies to combat AIDS, other sexually-transmitted diseases, malaria
and other illnesses.
3. Women and families
Following a description of the problems of South Kivu’s mothers by a member of the
committee, the following recommendations were made:
The women of South Kivu should establish contact with Rwandan women’s associations,
particularly the collective Pro-femme twese Hmwe, to benefit from their experiences.
Exchanges should be organized.
4. Youth
[Translator’s note: page missing]
I.2 Infringements of the right to life and casual killings
On 16 April 1999 at Mpene Kusu, Moire and Salome’s throats were cut by the Mai-Mai
militia for collaborating with the RCD.
On 22 April 1999 at Nyalukungu/Shabunda, Mai-Mais executed Mrs. Bitondo, Kisama,
Kabusango and Nsinga (all of whose throats were cut) while Kisambale was burnt alive for
witchcraft.
On 25 April 1999 in Mwamba, Mr. Mungalama and the Reverend Kabusuku’s throats were
cut.
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In May 1999 in Kitutu, Mai-Mais cut the throats of Ms Ngozi (for witchcraft), the local
traditional chiefs, Muganza Musali, Banamukika, Ombeni Kisegenyo and Mr. Wabenga, and
Mrs. Kamwanga for slovenliness and refusing to fight the RCD.
On 5 May 1999 in Shabunda-Mpenekusu, RCD members cut Mr. Mathias Kingambwa’s
genitals off then executed him for conspiring with the Mai-Mai.
On 10 May 1999 in Kazombo, 3 people were murdered by the RCD.
On 12 and 17 May 1999 in Binkutu, Lusenge and Nyalukungu, 12 people, including two
men called Bernard and Baudouin, were murdered by the RCD for collusion with the Mai-Mai.
On 25 May 1999 in Kingulube, Dalida Mukuzu was murdered for collaborating with the
Mai-Mai.
On 31 May 1999, 100 people living in the area between Kingulube and Shabunda-Centre were
massacred by RCD forces.
On 15-16 May 1999 in Uvira, Tutsi soldiers from the RCD murdered 12 people, including
Ndaye Risasi, aged 25, and Kalenga Ebochwa, as punishment for the death of a Tutsi soldier at
Kilimabenge.
20 June 1999 saw the murder of a man identified only as a messenger from Uvira bishopric.
On 24 June 1999 in Rubanga (Ruzizi Plain), RCD Commander, Jaguar Kamonyo carried out
executions using the “necklace” method; he also burnt alive two former members of the FAC,
Déogratias Bwima (aged 39) and Jojo Fataki.
On 30 June 1999 in Bukavu, Mushagalusa was arrested by RCD soldiers for taking part in the
peaceful demonstration against the raising of new flags over the town. He was deported to
Rwanda and there has been no news of him since.
On 31 May to 6 June, after an armed clash between the Mai-Mai and RCD forces, the latter
burnt down 18 villages in Shabunda territory including Mpenekusu, Mwamba, Kiloza,
Wasezia, Mikaba, Lugezi, Nyalukungu, Idemba, Kyanama, Penekasingi, Mizombo, Tangila,
Kizinga, Kipombo, Lukamba, Kibanda, Idumbo, and Mugingini.
Under the same heading of casual killing we should mention the report of the conference of
South Kivu’s chefs coutumiers (traditional chiefs) held at Bukavu sports centre from 4 to 9 October
1999 which described the following dismal situation:
approx. 240 people killed in Kasika, Mwenga.
approx. 60 people killed on the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira Territory.
approx. 72 people killed in Burhinyi, Mwenga.
approx. 136 people killed in Kitutu, Mwenga.
approx. 40 people killed in Luhwinja, Mwenga.
approx. 134 people killed in Kaziba, Walungu.
approx. 40 people killed in Nyalukungu, Wakabungu.
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This incomplete list which was read out in the presence of the rebel governor of South Kivu
provides plentiful evidence of the level of violations of the right to life in South Kivu.
I.3. Arbitrary arrest, abductions and unlawful detention
4 April 1999, Bagira: abduction of the Reverend Paul Bashombana Cihirwa on suspicion of
being an Interahamwe. In fact he is simply a Hutu living in the Congo. There has been no
word of him since.
On the night of 4 to 5 April 1999: looting by RCD forces in the villages of Mabingu and
Kabushwa in Kabare/Bukavu territory.
5 April 1999: A team of 27 soldiers under the command of Didier Mulikuya invaded Funu
(Garanua) at around 7 p.m. The soldiers arrested all the young boys, women, men and children
that they came across and robbed those who had anything worth taking. They claimed to be
aiming to break up a small group of Mai-Mai who were learning how to use firearms.
Ironically, not a single firearm was found in the locality; the innocent people who had been
arrested were released only after they had given the commander money.
7 April 1999, Funu: At around 7.15 p.m. soldiers stole Mr. Jean-Jacques Sainzonga’s watch,
identity papers and belt.
10 April 1999: Mr. Théophile Sainzonga was standing in front of his own house when soldiers
robbed him of his watch, 10 US dollars and his shoes.
Also in April 1999: The owner of Lumière, a shop in the shopping centre in Cimpunda ONL
(housing project) was shot three times in the leg after soldiers had ransacked his shop.
On 5 April 1999: The wife of the late Tabaro Sandoka living in Cimpunda was threatened by
three soldiers who stole a packet of cigarettes from her and promised her that she would
“follow” her husband in a few days’ time simply because she had refused to be swayed by
these collaborators’ threats. The case has been referred to the military and civilian authorities
in Kadutu but no-one dares to trouble these three youths from Cimpunda ONL for their
activities as collaborators. Mr. Tabaro Sandoka was killed by six Tutsi soldiers on his way
from the Cimpunda shopping centre where he was selling cigarettes. His murderers stole
US$100, NZ 1,600,000 and 10 packs of cigarettes from him.
In early April the chief of the district of Nyamugo, Mr. Kibikibi Walumona, died as a result of
tortures inflicted on him by the soldiers of Commander Chuma (a former Mai-Mai now
working for the aggressors).
Also in April 1999, Father Emmanuel Musoda, the Cimpunda parish priest, was threatened
repeatedly by soldiers from a nearby military camp supervised by Commander Justin Nardin
Lubala. He was accused of making political speeches in church.
In late April 1999, the family of a Congolese citizen Mr. Tebura, living on Buhende Avenue
in Cimpunda was visited once again by Rwandan soldiers. They were looking for one of
Mr. Tebura’s sons, whose nickname is le Pasteur (the minister) and had lived for some years in
Rwanda, but was separated from his wife. Since the events of 1994 he has frequently been
troubled by Tutsi soldiers under the command of his wife’s partners. His wife is concerned
that he will claim back the property he left behind in Rwanda. The Rwandans are now
accusing le Pasteur of being an Interahamwe so that they can kill him immediately if they
happen to catch him.
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In the same month the Ciriri parish priest, Father Prothée, was escorted away by soldiers like
a common thief along with ten or so members of his congregation. The grounds for the arrest
was the list of names of victims of military harassment which had been drawn up by members
of the congregation along with details of objects that had been seized. They were released after
being tortured in response to pressure from the congregation, other priests, and, above all, the
archbishop.
In late April and early May 1999, the chief of Nkafu district in the municipality of Kadutu,
Mr. Patient Bagalwa, was arrested four times in the space of a month-and-a-half by
Commander Jean-Marie (a Rwandan national) then by the head of the judge advocate’s
department, Inspector Kandudie.
On each occasion he was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in front of his family
and congregation. Soldiers working with Mr. Tembetembe, a neighbourhood chief in his
district, accuse him of being in secret contact with the Mai-Mai.
On 9 May 1999, Mr. Jagen (Mr. Karashima’s grandson), an accountant employed by Ibanda
municipality, was tied up by deserters at around 5.30 a.m. He was released some 100 metres
from his home having handed over a sum of NZ 1,500,000 (about US$150). Five days later a
search for him was being organized by Commander Chris from the intelligence service based at
the Brigade.
On 14 June 1999, Commander Justin Nardin Lubala’s replacement at TV Camp, Commander
Adolphe Bila, organized a round-up in Cimpunda and Nyakaliba . His soldiers arrested a large
number of children, young people and adults. The people were accused of throwing stones at
soldiers.
On 15 June 1999, the chief of Mosala district, Mr. Pascal Mazinge, avoided a number of RCD
traps. Later he was suspended from office by the mayor of Kadutu at the instigation of the
RCD leadership for having disturbed a meeting between the military authorities and the
traditional leaders of Kadutu. He was accused of making no effort to adhere to the RCD’s
ideas. When he attempted to hand in his resignation, he was threatened by the security forces.
On 25 June 1999 saw the arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention of Mr. Djuma Emedi and
Mr. Idi Abedi for submitting a request to Commander Machumu for their bus to be returned.
They were accused of conspiring with the Mai-Mai.
3 July 1999 saw an attempted robbery by RCD rebels at the convent of the missionary nuns of
Africa housed in the Wima upper secondary school in Bukavu. The nuns were saved by
civilians who ran to their rescue. Mr. Butonyi was shot dead by a fleeing RCD soldier.
On 22 September 1999, the RCD authorities in Goma arrested Mr. Patient Bagenda Balagizi,
Secretary General of the NGO, the South Kivu Anti-Bakwi Committee, as he was passing
through Goma on his way to Entebbe in Uganda. He was released only at 6 p.m. after a
rigorous interrogation in which he had to answer for all the visas for journeys he had made
since the beginning of the year, his business and leisure activities, his acquaintances in
Kinshasa, his membership of the South Kivu Civil Society and his supposed intention to travel
to Kinshasa. He was also questioned about certain contacts the Goma authorities claimed he
had had with the chargé d’affaires at the Congolese Embassy in Nairobi.
He also had to report to the Directorate General of Internal Security at the building known as
the Chien méchant (the vicious dog) for two days running from around 10 a.m. to 3 p.m.
It was not until late on Friday 24 September 1999 that the Deputy Director General, Mr. Justin
Kozanga, allowed him to return to Bukavu without his passport and identity papers and with a
- 57 -
promise that the investigation into his activities would continue. In the meantime, he must
manage without his identity papers and his passport until the “investigation” is over. Let us
pray to God that he will get them back one day.
I.4. General insecurity
Kivu is still divided between areas under Mai-Mai and RCD influence. This creates barriers
between the two sides which it is practically impossible for ordinary citizens to cross without being
harassed in various ways. As a result most people have opted to stay put in the cities or the
countryside and hardly move around anymore at all.
The Mai-Mai will not let any traffic through at all on the roads to Bukavu, Uvira and Goma
in an attempt to asphyxiate the rebel and occupation forces in the towns and cities.
On the Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu road, all traffic is blocked between the villages
of Tubimbi and Mungombe. This means that the people (including the RCD rebels) are forced to
use an aircraft provided by Mrs. Aziz Khursum (the director of the Uzabuco tobacco factory in
Bukavu who has been running a gold-trading office in Kamituga since February 1999. She was
also involved in arms trafficking for the Burundian rebels of the CNDD between 1994 and 1996).
The situation is also making it difficult to get supplies of food, medicine and other essential
products into the town of Kamituga and the rural area around Mwenga and Shabunda.
On other roads in Kivu (Bukavu-Goma-Butembo and Bukavu-Uvira-Fizi) traffic is thin but it
does exist. However, there is practically always some danger in using these roads, because the
various warring factions (RCD, Mai-Mai, former Rwandan armed forces) have set up police road
blocks and carry out sporadic raids on lorries transporting goods. The following are some
examples:
On 13 July 1999 a group of former Rwandan soldiers, Interahamwe and their Mai-Mai allies
attacked and robbed six goods lorries on the Ngomo escarpment taking away booty valued at
over US$20,000.
On 4 July 1999, at Cigogo, between Nyagezi and Mumosho (on the Bukavu-Uvira road) they
robbed another 3 vehicles including one belonging to Catholic nuns.
A customs post has been set up on the Bukavu-Butembo road to collect duties on goods
arriving from the Congolese town of Butembo. Since July 1999 a container of Dubai wax has
been subject to a duty of US$21,000 here whereas the equivalent cost only US$2,100 in June.
The lower rate still applies in the areas of Kivu under the control of the RCD, Rwanda, Burundi
and Uganda.
I.4.1. The army and the police of the DRC under Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan
occupation
(a) The army
The army is an instrument of terror under the orders of the Rwandan aggressors in the
territories under their control. Every three months, the soldiers are switched from one location to
another. Before they leave, they cause a great deal of human suffering and material damage,
particularly those based in Ciriri and the TV camp in the municipality of Kadutu, who are used to
this kind of operation. Because they do not get their pay, they survive by scheming and fleecing
the inhabitants with the tacit agreement of their military superiors.
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To harass civilians, the soldiers organize patrols from 5 p.m. onwards, dividing up into small
groups or teams of 3 to 5. They spread out in the streets and wait in dark corners. Passers-by
returning from the market or from work are robbed of their belongings and if they resist, they are
beaten, tied up and accused of being a Mai-Mai when they are brought before the authorities.
Mothers returning from market are robbed of the food they are bringing home for their
families along with their money and gold chains if they have any. If they have nothing on them
that can be stolen, the soldiers may go so far as to strip them and rape them.
Many of the men in the region no longer have their watches or their identity papers. Soldiers
steal them and sell them to third parties for a derisory sum. Most of the identity papers are passed
on to Rwandan citizens.
Harassment by soldiers takes place chiefly between 6 p.m. and 9 a.m. at the following well
known locations:
Ruvumba Hill (near Lupulu bridge);
Cimpunda girls’ school;
Burhende road (Nyamulagira);
the ONL centre, Cimpunda;
Funu playing field;
Mahamba Hill;
Kadutu cross-roads;
A bend in the road by the Kadutu recreation centre;
Kibonge Square;
Kadutu market;
On Industrial Avenue in front of the offices of the PIR (Rapid Intervention Police) and the
police courts (TP);
In front of the Cheche social club;
The section of road between the Wima upper secondary school and the Economat;
The junction of the Kadhuru road and the roads leading to Wima School and the ISTM;
Kadutu girls’ school.
(b) The police
Officers of the PNC (the Congolese National Police Force) working in South Kivu province
generally have a higher standing with the people. We appreciate their presence in our day-to-day
lives, particularly during round-ups. On the other hand, most senior police officers bow to the
authority of the aggressors to save their jobs and, if they wish to be promoted, they have to act as
slaves following their orders unquestioningly.
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It is for this reason that some officers are obliged to punish anyone who does not adopt the
RCD’s ideas.
Many police captains have been illegally suspended or even thrown in jail because they have
refused to obey their superiors’ unpopular orders.
Among the PNC officers in South Kivu who have undergone degrading treatment as a result
of actions which are claimed to undermine RCD policy are officers Lwabanji and Ngongo from the
police camp and inspector Saidi.
(b1) The PIR (Rapid Intervention Police)
The PIR operates under the aggressors’ orders. The PIR office is based on Industrial Avenue
in the old town hall. Many of its officers are inciviques (collaborators) from the Civil Guard or the
SARM, the Second Republic’s “Service for Military Action and Intelligence” and/or criminals and
delinquents taken from problem neighbourhoods. They have no education or morals and so they
think they can do anything and get away with it. The Kasali and Nkafu inhabitants of Nyamugo
are ill-at-ease in the presence of these RCD murderers. They say: “This is a rebellion in which no
holds are barred; we live in the jungle and those who feel strong bully the weak”.
In their enthusiasm to fleece the public, soldiers and PIR officers will take up any case they
come across whether it is true or false. They have also become judges and converted their offices
into a court room in which they hear criminal and civil cases. People are known to have been
detained for two or three works without a trial. Public prosecutors do not have access to military
lockups and cannot enquire about a case which is being looked into by a criminal investigator
working for the military.
Before being released, prisoners have to pay fines ranging between US$15 and US$150
depending on their case and their social status. It is common for PIR officers to burst into a bar and
arrest the owner and all the customers on the pretext that they are holding a “Mai-Mai meeting”.
Once the customers have been arrested they are robbed of all their belongings. When arresting
people, the PIR frequently claim that they are suspected of being Mai-Mai.
In response to all this harassment from the police and the army and on the initiative of some
young members of the Cimpunda youth federation, a forum was established in April 1999 bringing
together some of Kadutu’s associations. It has been named the Kadutu Youth Forum and not only
is it a platform for the development of the community but also and above all it carries out lobbying
campaigns.
In retaliation to the barbarian acts committed by patrolling soldiers some youths started to
conduct night-time and day-time operations against these collaborators; they even managed to face
up to their tormentors. These operations prompted the military authorities to arrest many young
people in the course of a round-up on 14 June 1999. These arrests will not be appreciated by the
population. Secret meetings have been held to devise plans to rescue prisoners held in TV Camp
and enable the population of the municipality of Kadutu to move around freely during the day and
the night.
Faced with the mounting tension in Cimpunda, the military authorities of the Brigade
panicked and organized a meeting with the people of Cimpunda Hill from which it barred access to
all Tutsis. The meeting ended in a stalemate.
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I.5. Restrictions on freedom of expression and denial
of the right to information
I.5.1. Radio Maendeleo, Bukavu
Radio Maendeleo, which is called a “radio of the people” or a “community radio”, is run by
South Kivu development NGOs. Among the highly reputable journalists who work for the station
are Kizito Mushizi Nfundiko (director), Paulin Bapolisi (former chief adviser to the late Professor
Jean-Charles Magabe), bombardier Kamengele Omba, Jules Bahati (the “golden tongue”) and
Aziza Bangwene.
This radio station is a vital means of expression for all of South Kivu’s social classes. It is
the most popular radio station in the area, primarily because of its objective news coverage.
Unfortunately, it has a bad reputation among the enemies of peace because of its radio news
bulletins and other programmes such as Jules Bahati’s mouthpiece for youth issues, the Micro des
jeunes, Father Jean Bosco Bahala’s Catholic programme, the Lufaheri sketch, Kamengele Omba’s
Sunday programme on which he invites leading members of the community to enlighten the public
about the week’s events or controversial issues, and finally the programmes produced by various
human rights associations.
Because of these programmes which undermine the RCD’s policies, the authorities have
repeatedly threatened to close Radio Maendeleo down. The Governor of South Kivu, Norbert
Bashengezi Katintima and his so-called minister of the interior, Joseph Mudimbi, have repeatedly
threatened Radio Maendeleo’s journalists in press releases. In early July the authorities appointed
Mr. Jérémie, a former BBC journalist, as a supervisor, responsible for listening to everything
broadcast on the radio station and reporting back to the RCD. The station’s equipment was then
taken away to an unknown destination.
Recently, at the beginning of September 1999, it was reported that the director of Radio
Maendeleo, Kizito Mushizi Nfundiko, and some of its journalists including Kamengele Omba had
been arrested.
This is a perfect example of how the media are being persecuted and silenced in the occupied
territories while at the same time the authorities claim to promote democracy. What kind of
democracy is this?
I.5.2. Human rights associations
Groupe Jérémie
On the afternoon of 4 June 1999 a group of soldiers armed to the teeth and led by
commander Didier Mulikuwa broke into the headquarters of the Groupe Jérémie. They forced the
door open and pillaged practically everything they found on the premises. After the operation they
sealed the door and began searching for the group’s activists. The group was already being
examined by criminal investigator Chihenga at the 222nd Brigade’s intelligence office. The case
was subsequently transferred to an ordinary criminal jurisdiction (Bukavu public prosecutor’s
office). Ironically, this was mainly because the military authorities found no evidence with which
to charge the members of Groupe Jérémie. Another factor was a fear of local and international
pressure. The case was assigned to a judge who is a member of the GAAP (the “political action
group”) which is a branch of the RCD.
The authorities were looking for the following human rights activists from Groupe Jérémie:
Georges Bahaya, Moreu Tubibu, Mr. Jean-Baptiste Mulengezi, Maheshe from the Alfajiri lower
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secondary school, Remy Mitima and Mr. Déogratias Kiriza. Paradoxically, the authorities claim
that the group is endangering state security.
Héritiers de la justice
This association is also threatened by the RCD authorities and its activists force themselves
to work despite the intimidation. For example, Mr. Jean-Paul Bengeya has been repeatedly
harassed and threatened by Commander Elias, a Tutsi in charge of security in South Kivu province.
The commander has a private jail at his home on Avenue Nyofu in Nyawera; he has converted one
of his rooms into a lockup.
Early September 1999 saw the arrest of Mr. Raphael Wakenge, a human rights leader and
activist with Héritiers de la justice who was released after one week of imprisonment at Bukavu
Central Prison.
I.5.3. Members of the South Kivu Civil Society
The Civil Society deserves praise for the many roles it plays, above all that of promoting and
protecting the interests of its members and the whole population. Alas, some of the more active
members have received death threats from the RCD’s political and military authorities who are
always looking for some reason to eliminate them physically. The main targets have been activity
leader Gervais Chirhalwirwa (known as “uncle”), Patient Bagenda, Oscar Baharanyi, activity
leader Prosper Birhakaheka, activity leader Paulin Bapolisi, Dr. Balegalmire and the pharmacist,
Mr. Bapolisi.
In the last two weeks of May 1999, the governor of South Kivu once again threatened some
of the activists that he would do everything to destabilise political life in South Kivu. For example,
in early June 1999, Dr. Balegamire narrowly escaped an assassination attempt organized by the
provincial authorities of South Kivu. The failed mission was to be carried out by Rwandan soldiers
but when they arrived at his house he was absent.
(d) The Catholic Church in Bukavu under threat
The clergy of Bukavu bishopric have been subjected to harassment and death threats. The
Catholic church has a duty to continue to fight against immorality to prevent all violations of
human dignity, particularly during these difficult times for the whole of the eastern part of the
DRC.
In response to the stance taken by the church, the RCD authorities, from the governor right
down to the municipality, have publicly attacked His Excellency Emmanuel Kataliko the
Archbishop of Bukavu and his vicar-general. Neither have the abbots and priests of the town and
country parishes been spared. The authorities have to attack the Catholic church to protect and
preserve their power to influence and terrorize the people. Examples are the desecration of the
churches of Burhale and Kasika and the threats made to the following clergymen:
Father Emmanuel Musoda of Cimpunda parish;
Father Prothée of Ciriri parish;
Father Georges Maroyi (who escaped from Uvira bishopric) and Father J. Bosco Bahala, both
now working in Kadutu parish;
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Father Gianny of Chaï parish;
Father Georges of Muhungu parish;
Father Balegamire of Kabare parish;
Father Eliézère of Bagira parish.
This is not a complete list of the clergy whose lives have been threatened. Some
communities of local and foreign nuns have also been threatened, particularly at night. Several
times the Archbishop of Bukavu has been summoned to the governor’s residence to answer
questions and receive orders. In particular he has been asked to transfer certain troublesome priests
such as Jean Bosco Bahala.
At a security meeting in Kadutu, the deputy mayor, Mr. Biganza Sadock (who is a Rwandan
citizen), suggested that Kadutu parish and the Dominican chapel in which Father J.B. Bahala
preaches be closed down. If nothing changed, then the priest would be publicly executed on the
Place de l’Indépendance (formerly Place du 24 Novembre).
This Rwandan official also said the following: “When Archbishop Muzihirwa died, the
Vatican talked about it for a week and then it was all over. We could arrest certain people and
execute certain priests. The Vatican would protest for three or four days but nothing would change
and in the meantime we will have got the situation under control”.
Every Sunday, the RCD sends out spies to all the parishes to listen to everything that is said
in the sermons and report back immediately once Mass is over. This has happened several times in
Cimpunda and Kadutu. Furthermore on one particular Sunday in April 1999, before the 3rd Mass,
Kadutu parish was invaded by vans full of soldiers armed with rocket-launchers and machine guns.
They came and harassed the priests and the congregation before heading off for Cimpunda.
The insecurity which threatens the Catholic church should concern all of the Congo’s official
churches prompting them to come together and fight as one man. They should do their duty, which
is to protect and ensure the well-being of human beings. Against a background of increased
gagging of public expression, the RCD has been trying to destroy the Catholic church ever since
the very beginning of hostilities. This is for the simple reason that the only body which,
fortunately, continued to function after the collapse of the Mobutu regime was the Church. It is the
people’s only hope. In response the authorities have destroyed parishes, looted convents, and
assassinated priests, ministers, nuns and believers, thus destroying the very foundations of the
Church. Most priests have now been forced into exile and/or hiding. Christendom stands alone
against hatred, anguish and mistrust. Any Christian morals observed hitherto are now in jeopardy.
I.6. Abuse of public office
On 7 August 1999, in total defiance of basic democratic standards, the Congolese Rally for
Democracy (RCD), acting through the intermediary of Mr. Norbert Basengezi Katintima, the
Governor of South Kivu appointed by the aggressors and rebels, set up a Provincial “Barza”
(Assembly).
It has 67 appointed members including only 54 women and the Governor immediately
appointed the members of the provisional bureau of this new institution himself, taking no account
of the will of the people. Strangely, the leadership of the institution was assigned to two members
of this provisional bureau who were selected simply because they were the oldest and the youngest
members.
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Some of the members of the Barza, which claims to be promoting peace in South Kivu, have
already gained a major reputation for plotting and intrigue and it will not be long before their true
shark-like nature will re-emerge and they will attempt to take up another lucrative but no less
short-lived post. They are so possessed by political greed that they feign ignorance of the
sacrosanct principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under which:
“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures” (Article 21.3).
Therefore, the only person who is entitled to become a provincial or national member of
parliament is someone who has been elected somewhere, or in other words, who has received a
mandate from some electoral constituency or another, under an electoral law ratified by some form
of consultative preliminary.
Accordingly, any Barza member, deputy or parliamentarian who is simply assigned to an
area at whatever political rank, owes his office to the authority that appointed him and legally
created him and therefore he can act only in the interests of his begetters.
The Civil Society of South Kivu noted that the establishment of a Barza in South Kivu was a
total sham amounting to a confiscation of the power of the supreme sovereign of South Kivu in so
far as it should be associated with and/or form part of a national process of institutional reform in
the DRC. Accordingly, on 23 August 1999, the provincial co-ordinating office of the Civil Society
sent a letter (No. BCSK/020/99) to the governor of South Kivu, in which it said that it could not
accept an abuse of public office and demanded the dissolution of the Barza of South Kivu on the
ground that it was a plutocratic, sadistic and cynical oligarchy, made up solely of the inhabitants of
Ibanda as if this single municipality could pacify the whole province. It concluded that genuine
peace should reside in the very heart of our rural districts where, day-in, day-out, the people are
despoiled, hounded and butchered by one side or another according to the outcome of our
demented fratricidal battles.
I.7. Incitement to ethnic hatred
In a number of areas in South Kivu the people live in a general state of trauma as a result of
the massacres, rapes and pillaging carried out by the various forces that have occupied them. This
was the message passed on by 15 of South Kivu’s traditional chiefs from COBASKI during their
conference of 4 to 9 October 1999 at the Bukavu Sports Centre which was held under the patronage
of the Governor of South Kivu. The situation exacerbates and incites hatred between
Banyamulenge communities and the tribes of South Kivu. These Bami chiefs highlighted some of
the harmful consequences of this hatred in the region, in particular:
some 10,000 war refugees assembled in Uvira;
some 10,000 Bafumiru war refugees who have fled to Ruzizi Plain;
some 3,500 war refugees who have fled to Burundi (most of them settling in Cibitoke
province);
some 11,000 Rwandan Viura war refugees from Moba and Kabalo in northern Katanga forced
to move to the Ruzizi Plain in South Kivu;
80 or so Bahuvu war refugees from Kalehe forced to move to the island territory of Idjwi in
South Kivu;
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some 50,000 war refugees from the chiefdom of Wamuzimu;
hundreds of thousands of Congolese refugees from South Kivu exiled abroad, particularly in
Tanzania;
some 80,000 homeless persons in the chiefdom of Basile;
a number of priests and nuns confined to Luhwindja, Mwenga and Murhesa, Kabare;
others.
All of these problems reveal the policies of those who govern South Kivu and stem from
hasty administrative and political decisions at variance with the aspirations of the people whose
direct representatives are not consulted. This is what lies at the base of the hatred, the unhealthy
atmosphere and the suffering that the people of South Kivu are having to endure (including the
destruction of Bami homes, murder attempts on certain Bami and the cowardly assassinations of
traditional chiefs including Mwami Lenge in 1996 and François Mwami Bwami Nalwindi in
August 1998 and all their repercussions).
In our opinion, the resurgence of tribal wars between the Bembe and the Rega and the
ongoing conflicts between the Banyamulenge community and the population of South Kivu as a
whole are the ultimate outcome of incitement to hatred in the disaster-stricken and battered
province of South Kivu.
I.8. Vicious, barbaric destruction
Since the outbreak of war in the DRC on 2 August 1998, South Kivu has continued to be
subjected to unprecedented humanitarian crises. In this report, which covers the period from April
to September 1999, we shall merely pass on the following incomplete list of alarming incidents
described at the conference of traditional chiefs held at the Bukavu sports centre from 4 to
9 October 1999:
Some 545 houses burnt down in Wakabongo I;
Some 62 houses burnt down in Luhwindja;
Some 50 houses burnt down in Bavira;
Some 700 houses burnt down in Wamuzimu;
Systematic destruction and looting of a number of health facilities (hospitals and medical
centres);
Destruction and looting of a number of homes of traditional chiefs (Bami);
Destruction of a number of school buildings and looting of school teaching equipment and
materials;
Destruction of roads, rendering them impassable (including farm tracks), and poor and
inadequate transport facilities, adding to problems by creating bottlenecks preventing goods
and people from moving around freely.
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Of the 1,300 inhabitants of the aforementioned burnt-down houses, some are now dead
whereas others have fled into the bush where they will be homeless, in distress, and prey to all sorts
of bad weather and parasitic diseases, in short, abandoned to their sad fate.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN NORTH KIVU PROVINCE
(FOCUSING EXCLUSIVELY ON MASISI TERRITORY)
[Translator’s note: page missing]
Luanda (farmer). 9 people were killed on the road from Kitchanga to Mweso in the
chiefdom-community of the Bashali. Among the victims were Mr. Mbaire Kahunde (49), the chief
of the village of Luhanga.
On 6 April 1999
The assassination of Father Paul Juakali of Mweso parish in the bishopric of Goma. The
people of Goma were appalled to learn of the sad and untimely death of the extremely young,
dynamic and likeable figure of Father Paul Juakali who had made a name for himself because of
his well-balanced yet highly topical, and apposite sermons. Our sadness grew when we learnt that
Father Paul was not allowed to die a dignified death but viciously “hacked about” by armed men
before they finished him off. The 29-year-old priest was travelling in a parish car along the road
from Pinga Hospital where he had been asked to drive a patient home to the village of Ngingwe
(17 km from Pinga) when he was dragged from the car and separated from the other passengers by
a number of armed men. He was tortured with knives before being finished off with a bullet which
passed right through his skull from the lower jaw to the occipital bone traversing the brain.
According to the witnesses’ statements, there were 6 men and they killed Father Paul only after
they had robbed him of everything he had including US $ 400. They had a photo of him so that
they would not get the wrong man. Eyewitnesses also said that Father Juakali’s killers were from
the so-called “Self-Defence Forces” which operate in Masisi territory.
In the same month 37 unarmed civilians are said to have been killed at Lukweti in the
chiefdom-community of the Bashali.
From 23 to 28 April 1999
31 young people were killed in Masisi-Centre in the community of Osso-Banyungi as well as
12 others from Goma on the road from Sake to Masisi.
May 1999
On 25 May 1999, 50 people were killed at Sake in the chiefdom-community of the Bahunde.
Kiyana Bulenda is the only known victim. The rest were buried in a communal grave and have not
yet been identified.
In the second half of the month, 14 people were killed at Kalembe in the
chiefdom-community of the Bashali by the “Self-Defence Forces” (FAD). Among the victims
were Mrs. Mukewa (69), Mr. Maneno (43), his wife and his children, and Mr. Kazimiri (71). All
their belongings were looted and the other people in the village were so traumatised that they had
to desert the village and take refuge in Pinga and Kitchanga (other villages in Masisi territory).
3 people were killed at Kiusha Muongozi in the chiefdom-community of the Bashili. Among
the victims was Mr. Kinkone (69).
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4 people were killed in Nyabiondo. Among the victims were a schoolboy in the first year of
secondary school and Mr. Biloto, the son of Maneno.
6 people were killed in Kilambo in the chiefdom-community of the Bashali and several other
unidentified persons are reported to have been massacred by the FAD in a local church.
4 boys suspected of being Interahamwe were killed in Loashi in the community of
Osso-Banyungu.
June 1999
On 16 June 1999, Mr. Baba Rife was cravenly murdered along with two other people who
have not yet been identified in Bweremana, the main village of the chiefdom-community of the
Bahunde.
Since 2 August 1998 more than 382 unarmed civilians of Masisi territory are reported to
have been murdered in cold blood by forces working for the RCD, particularly the FAD.
NB.: Whereas Part IV of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention protects both civilians and
civilian objects, the civilians of Kivu in general and Masisi territory in particular are victims of a
failure by the warring parties in the DRC to respect international humanitarian law. And the
astonishing thing is that whenever one massacre or another is exposed the only reaction one gets is
that “there were only x deaths”, in an attempt to play the matter down and clear the criminals.
II.2. Arbitrary arrests and detention and abductions
In Masisi it is enough to be suspected or unjustifiably accused (often to settle an old score) of
being a Mai-Mai or an Interahamwe in order to be arbitrarily arrested, abducted, tortured or even
murdered. Reliable sources have told us how many people have been abducted or gone missing to
be subjected to inhuman treatment and found a week or a month later if ever again.
In Kitchanga for example a number of people are reported to have been unlawfully detained
in Kahe, on the premises of the war-damaged tea factory which used to belong to the international
trade and industry association, SICIA. They are now said to be in the hands of members of the
RCD-sponsored Rwandan Army (APR) on suspicion of being Mai-Mai or Interahamwe or
possession of firearms.
On 8 June 1999, members of the APR working for the RCD sealed off the market town of
Kitchanga from 4 to 11.30 a.m. on the pretext that they were searching for civilians in possession
of fire-arms. The whole population was traumatized by this incident in which they were
surrounded by APR soldiers armed to the teeth. No arms were found but the search was stepped up
afterwards.
Following this incident, some of the chiefs and prominent personalities of Masisi territory
were forced to flee Masisi for the city where they have no right to any assistance. As a result some
of these once wealthy people have had to resort to begging in Goma or Sake, getting by and living
as street-dwellers or tramps.
In view of everything that is happening to the Bahunde in Masisi, some people cannot help
thinking that the RCD has a hidden agenda in this territory, namely the systematic elimination of
these people who have long been prevented from considering themselves the only native
community in the area. Since the Bahunde refuse to give in, despite all the harassment to which
they have been subjected since 1990, the RCD appears to have decided to implement a “final
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solution”, in other words a fully-fledged process of ethnic cleansing. However, they are doing this
very discreetly outside the eye of the media, on the pretext that they are “hunting down
Interahamwe wherever they can be found”. These accusations do appear to be founded because, as
early as September 1998, human rights activists were observing the following:
The instances of abduction, arbitrary arrest and expulsion which are currently
taking place in the city of Goma and its outskirts have aroused considerable concern.
There have been too many violations of the rights to peace, security and justice which
are guaranteed to every community under national and international law and too many
death threats and other abuses. To be more specific we would like to highlight the
following examples of arbitrary arrests, expulsions and abductions:
Mama Maombi Feza, a nurse, was arrested on 14 September 1998 for having
attended to a wounded man. She was set free only after repeated calls for her
release, including an appeal from the Bishop of Goma.
Mr. Kizungu Bulere Kiana was arrested on an unknown date and taken to the
Brigade’s 2nd office in connection with a dispute over a plot of land. His
adversary has accused him of being a Mai-Mai rebel and so he is still being held.
Mr. Bonhomme Balume was arrested for harbouring a Masisi village chief
suspected of colluding with Mai-Mai rebels and is still being held3.
The elderly Mr. Salumu of Sake was abducted with his son. Mulonda, Mutima,
Mrs. Bulondo, Pascal, Mwendabandu, Mr. Desire Muiti, Kashani, Miancho and
many others have also been abducted.
Mama Malira Bahati was abducted at 2 a.m. on 13 September and taken to
Gisenyi, Rwanda, where she was saved by divine providence having been thrown
into a stream of urine and a pond4. We would remind you that life belongs to God
alone and that such schemes amount to genocide.
II.4 General insecurity
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.
Article 28, UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights)
Insecurity has been exacerbated in Masisi territory as a result of the presence both of armed
groups including Interahamwe, former Rwandan soldiers and Self-Defence Forces
(RCD militia groups) and certain members of the Congolese Armed Forces who
are still loyal to the central government in Kinshasa. All of these groups organise
3The village chief in question was imprisoned and tortured for a long period and is no other than
Mr. Mwanda-Bandu Venant who expressed public indignation at the statements of the Governor of the Province when he
mocked the inhabitants of Masisi after some of them had been massacred. After Rwandan soldiers had burnt down the
villages and murdered civilians, the governor visited the area to assess the damage. It was at this point that he claimed
that the inhabitants of Masisi had carried out these crimes themselves and he called them “Wapumbafu”.
4Note that all of these victims are civilians who have nothing to do with the Mai-Mai or the Interahamwe. Their
only sin is that they are all from Masisi territory.
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occasional looting raids on shops and motor vehicles, particularly those taking the
following routes: Goma-Sake; Goma-Rutshuru-Kanyabayonga; Sake-Masisi; Sake-Bweremana;
Sake-Kitchanga-Mweso-Kalembe-Pinga; and Sake-Ngungu-Ufamando.
II.3. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.
Article 5, UDHR
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations
and of any criminal charge against him.
Article 10, UDHR
It should be said that, in Masisi territory, everyone who is murdered is first tortured before
being murdered or finished off with a bullet.
On 6 April 1999, Father Paul Juakali was tortured and hacked about with knives at Ngingwe
(17 km from Pinga on the road from Mweso) before being finished off with a bullet by six armed
men from the RCD-sponsored “Self-Defence Forces”.
In the second half of May 1999, Mr. Camarade Mabwire, a butcher, fell victim to a shooting
in which he was wounded in the leg by patrolling forces working for the RCD. The victim was
taken to the CBK hospital in Goma for medical treatment.
Several other cases of violations of Article 5 of the UDHR have occurred in the various
prisons and remand centres in Goma and Masisi territory. The following table drawn up by human
rights activists for February 1999 speaks dismal volumes even though it is far from complete:
Murders by RCD forces in Masisi Territory in February
DATE VILLAGE NUMBER OF
VICTIMS
COMMENTS
11/02/99 Loashi 10 Including 6 schoolchildren shot and/or drowned
Ngesha 4
Busoro 3
Lushebere 2 Including one victim who died under torture
Bukombo 2
Nyabiondo 3
18/02/99 Lwibo 1
Lukweti 47 At the market
19/02/99 Mahanga 154 At the market
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Some of the victims who have been identified
Loashi:
Kwabo Busanga, around 25 years of age (farmer); Hélène Bandu (pregnant); Luanda
Lubira, 32 (cleaning lady); Muhombo Balaa and his two children, among them one of the drowned
schoolchildren; Kaendo Lubira, 43 (son of Mr. Mashini); Vumilia (cleaning lady), Charles
Bolingo, 43 (farmer); Rujori.
Ngesha:
Maombi (cleaning lady) and her child; two women who are known to have been passing
through but have not been otherwise identified.
Bushoro:
Kamusehe (farmer), around 55 years of age, who died under torture, and a passing nurse who
has not been otherwise identified.
Lushebere:
Kulu Kyabinduka (farmer), around 60 years of age, and Siméon, around 30.
Lwibo:
Baeni (farmer), around 45.
Mahanga:
Mabondo (carpenter), around 40, and Brigitte (cleaning lady), 38.
II.5. Violations of the right to freedom of expression
and denial of the right to information
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
UDHR, Article 19
Despite the various abuses and cases of human rights violations carried out by the RCD and
armed gangs in Masisi territory, nobody dares to condemn them or speak out about the situation for
fear of being abducted or executed. The unarmed civilians of Masisi territory live in terror and the
churches, which used to act as their spokespersons, have now opted to say nothing or sometimes
been forcefully silenced5.
As one trustworthy clergyman has said, the Catholic Church and the traditional chiefs appear
to have been singled out as targets by the warlords.
5Mutongo church was forced to close after the murder of the much-loved parish priest, Father Ndyanabo Boneza
Conrad, on 12 December 1994.
Likewise, the priests of Mweso do not now dare to go to their parishes because they were so shocked by the
recent murder of their colleague, Paul Juakali.
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“It is my impression that, over and above the specific crimes which each side
rightly or wrongly accuses the other of committing, there is a strategy aimed at
destroying everything that the people regard as sacred. Once the core around which a
people’s cohesion and common identity is built is destroyed, it is thought that it will
be easier to subject these defenceless and directionless peoples to the arbitrariness of
totalitarian ideology and a system which intends to prevail at all costs. In this context,
the Catholic Church and the traditional chiefs are the obvious target for a power which
wishes to wipe the slate clean of all Christian and traditional values. The method it
uses is to disorganize the people, striking at the very roots of their identity to be able
to subjugate them even more. After this it imposes its new values. But the question is
which ones.”6
It is for this reason that any traditional chiefs who still dare to say anything to defend the
interests of their prostrate people become the targets of threats, persecution and intimidation from
the RCD’s political authorities. Most of Masisi’s traditional chiefs have fled to Goma where all
their movements are carefully monitored in something amounting to a kind of house arrest.
To undermine completely the influence of the legitimate traditional chiefs in the
administrative area of Masisi, the current RCD leadership has had no hesitation in replacing
eligible rulers by members of the MAGRIVI (the Agricultural Society of Virunga), a process which
the Sovereign National Conference unanimously condemned7. Its members have been recognised
as guilty parties in the other war that has been bathing the Congo in blood since 1990, the
“Kanyarwanda”8.
The following are some cases in which traditional rulers have been replaced by members of
the MAGRIVI:
In the chiefdom-community of the Bashali, Mr. Erasto Binwagari from Busumba in
Bashali-Mukoto now calls himself a Mwami and acts as the chief of the chiefdom-community of
the Bashali, replacing the traditional Mwami, Bashali Wa Mukoto Nyanguba.
Mr. Mbarare: Chef de Groupement (area chief) of Kibachiro
Bamenya: Chef de localité (local chief) of Kirumbu
Ngenda Semajeri: Chef de localité of Kahira
Munyaganizi and Nzabonimpa: heads of the village of Mbuhi
Madui: Chef de localité of Mweso
Kikeri (one of the people behind the massacre of 7 May 1993 at Kibachiro-Karole in which
250 young Hunde lost their lives): Chef de localité of Lubula-Bwimire
Utazirubanda Kabagema: Capita/ chief of the village of Kitobo-Kitchanga
6E. Kataliko, Archbishop of Bukavu, in his statement of 1 May 1999 entitled “Solidarity of the Catholic Church
of Bukavu with that of Rwanda in relation to the arrest of Mgr. Misago Augustin”.
7See the conclusions of the Vangu Mambweni report (HCR-PT).
8People who do not understand the real situation in North Kivu believe that the current war started in 1993. In
Masisi the war actually started in the period prior to 1 October 1990, the date of the official outbreak of war in Rwanda.
Rwanda was as cunning as a fox and managed to rid itself of the war and its torments by passing it on in the manner of an
injection of HIV to what can be considered its “brother” country through the intermediary of Congolese “bicucu”.
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In the area of Bashali-Kaembe, the heads of the various settlements were granted official
recognition by the administrator of the territory based in Mweso, Mr. Zacharie Bizumyremyi
Ukobizaba, on 22 February 1999.
Responsibilities were divided up as follows:
Thomas Munyagishari: head of the village of Nyamitaba;
Oscar Nkurikiyinka: head of the village of Tunda/Lubale;
Bonaventure Kisangani: head of the village of Lushangi-Burumo;
Wenceslas Turikinko: head of the village of Busihe-Kalonge;
Kamanzi Kayitani: head of the village of Mutobo;
Joke Mbendubundi: head of the village of Musongati;
Jean-Claude Habyarimana: head of the village of Burungu.
The following traditional chiefs were dismissed:
Luanda Bahati, Sereme Ndabigiro, Bonane Kaembe, Bulenda Mapfumo, Kulu Wabo,
Mateso Kaembe and Mrs. Safi Bulenda (represented by Maonero Kisa Kisa).
In the community of Osso-Banyungu, the traditional chief of the Bapfuna groupement,
Mr. Michel Bakungu Pfuna-Mapfuna was replaced by Mr. Munyabariba (a Rwandan Hutu).
These Rwandan immigrants and resettled persons generally Hutus who have taken
unlawful control of some of the groupements, settlements and villages in Masisi territory wrongly
accuse the dismissed Hunde and Nyanga chiefs of possessing firearms. The aim of this ploy is for
them to be hunted down and physically eliminated. Some chiefs have already lost their lives and
those on the hit-list have fled Masisi and taken refuge in Goma where the authorities keep a close
eye on them. When the time is ripe, they too will be wiped out.
II.6. Impunity and abuse of public office
II.6.1. Impunity
Massacres, assassinations, murders, inhuman and degrading treatment, looting of civilian
property, extortion and fleecing, unlawful and arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, torture, rape,
misuse of public property and other human rights violations are being carried out in Masisi territory
in North Kivu in complete impunity. The whole situation seems to indicate that the inhabitants of
this territory are regarded as animals whose only right is to die.
No enquiry has been opened into the death of Father Paul Juakali who was sadistically tortured
with knives before being finished off with a bullet at Ngingwe on 6 April 1999. And yet three
armed Hutus suspected of being involved in the priest’s death were captured and handed over
to the administrator of the territory living in Mweso, Mr. Zacharie Bizumuremyi Ukobizaba (a
Hutu himself), and the military commander in Mweso (who is a Tutsi) by the chief of
N’Suka/Kalonge, Mr. Célestin Kibira Biandja. The three suspects were released with their
weapons and without any form of trial. Following their release it was not long before they
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threatened the chief who had handed them over with death, saying that he had denounced them.
They are reported to have sworn that they will continue to block the road between Mweso and
Pinga and kill any Hunde or Nyanga who dared to try to use this road.
No charges have been brought against the APR members working for the RCD who were
responsible for the shooting and wounding of Mr. Camarade Mabwire, now in the CBK
hospital in Goma. Many other cases of impunity have been recorded in Masisi particularly
with respect to the so-called self-defence forces who carry out a whole range of crimes with the
full knowledge of the political, administrative and military authorities.
II.6.2. Abuse of office
Under a resolution of the former Zairian parliament, the HCR-PT, of 28 April 1995, the
MAGRIVI (Agricultural Society of Virunga) was supposed to be eradicated from Congolese
territory and some of its leaders were to be expelled from the Congo with the possibility that legal
proceedings would be initiated against them for having incited immigrants and resettled persons to
an insurrection against any attempt to impose the Congolese nationality act and called for civil
disobedience in the administrative territories of Masisi, Walikale, Rutshuru, Nyiragongo, Karisimbi
and Goma in North Kivu, and Kalehe in South Kivu. The native inhabitants of the area were
understandably surprised when the RCD authorities began appointing these people who had been
declared persona non grata in the Congo to positions of responsibility.
Among them are Mr. Nzabara Matsetsa, the Mayor of Goma, and Mr. Zacharie
Bizumuremyi Ykobizaba, the administrator of Mweso territory, who have conspired with the RCD
authorities to legitimize the authority of the MAGRIVI in spite of the fact that it was condemned
by the Congolese people at the CNS (the Sovereign National Conference). In this connection, see
the description above of the repression of traditional authority through the dismissal of traditional
chiefs.
II.7. Incitement to hatred
Whereas sub-paragraph 2 of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states that: “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”, tribal and ethnic hatred is rife in
Masisi territory and the surrounding area. The hatred stems from grudges harboured since the war
that broke out in 1993 between the native Hunde, Nyanga and Tembo groups and Rwandan
immigrants and deportees. These grudges are the root cause of the massacres, assassinations,
murders, looting and other human rights violations carried out and orchestrated by forces working
under RCD orders, particularly the latter’s militia groups.
Nothing happens by chance in the RCD. During various peacekeeping tours and
assignments only the native population has been disarmed by the authorities and to date not a single
attempt has been made to disarm the Hutus. Quite on the contrary, our impression is that they are
regularly supplied with arms and ammunition by the authorities in office.
The aim of this operation is not only to usurp traditional power but also to silence those
members of the native population who refuse to join their movement.
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THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ORIENTALE PROVINCE
III.1 Overview of the situation between 1 January
and 30 March 1999 (to be published)
III.1.1. Loss of dignity/sabotage of the right to a wage
The social situation in the territories occupied by the RCD is still precarious. The people are
sunk in destitution and to cap it all they have to endure humiliation, harassment and physical and
moral torture from the soldiers of the RCD and its allies.
There is also some dissension between the Congolese rebels and their allies. In statements
on the radio on 5 April 1999, Mr. Balengela Tango-Tango, commander of operations of the
7th rebel brigade asked the Congolese people to come to the assistance of the FAC-RCD
Congolese Armed Forces because the Congolese were increasingly subjected to humiliations in
their own country at the hands of foreign soldiers (from Rwanda and Uganda).
To back up his appeal he referred to the case of Vice Governor M. Yogba who arrived on a
trip to Isiro and was immediately ordered by Ugandan soldiers to lie on the bare ground, then get
up and get back in the plane that had brought him from Kisangani. It would seem that the
Ugandans forgot that he was on an “official” tour of the various districts of Orientale province.
Alongside these humiliations undermining people’s dignity, the RCD’s allies ride roughshod over
the laws of the Congo.
For example under Congolese law, foreigners are not authorized to visit the country’s mining
regions unless they are given express authorization to do so by the state. In Kisangani the people
have been dumbfounded to see the constant stream of Rwandan and Ugandan machines and lorries
passing through on their way to the nearby diamond and gold mines.
Under Article 23.3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights everyone who works has
the right to a fair and decent wage corresponding to his efforts and satisfying the basic needs of the
worker and his family.
In the territories occupied by the RCD public employees have forgotten what a wage is.
Every time civil servants or state-employed teachers dare to demand their wages they are asked to
be patient and wait until Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has been
taken.
III.1.2. Absence of the right to medical treatment
Ever since the Second Republic, hospitals have had to make do without State grants and
funds to cover operating costs. Now there is no more money to pay wages. This situation has
caused the corrupt practices which were decried during the Mobutu regime to resurface.
The isolation of Orientale province caused by the rebel occupation has made the situation
even worse. Medical treatment has become the exclusive right of businessmen and those who have
the character to influence groups of men whom they can easily exploit.
Pharmaceutical products provided by UNICEF only help line the pockets of health workers.
We have it from reliable sources that these products have been misappropriated in Kisangani,
Isangi and Yangambi.
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III.1.3. Absence of the right to education
Several schoolchildren have had to leave school because their parents are no longer able to
pay the fees that schools demand. RCD leaders based in Orientale province have simply asked
1997-98 school-leavers to start at university or in higher education institutions without their
certificates these people are referred to as the sans papiers. Even the national education system
has been Balkanized.
The question is whether UNESCO will be able to validate their degrees from university or
higher education institutes. The same thing is worrying schoolchildren for whom 1998-1999 is
their final school year. For the moment they are carrying on studying but they cannot be certain
that they will successfully complete their secondary education.
III.1.4. Insecurity and police harassment
All the warring parties keep on claiming that they are fighting for the freedom of the people.
For some the people need to be liberated from the dictatorship of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
For others they have to be freed from the Rwando-Ugandan invasion. And for still others they
have to be relieved of the hegemony of the Hima-Tutsi empire.
But the actual truth is that the people, particularly in the territories occupied by the RCD, are
left to fend for themselves. They live in total and utter insecurity. Not a single day passes without
the sound of gunfire and not a single night without some private homes being “visited” by soldiers.
Very often these visits are accompanied by gunfire but never are the soldiers troubled by
those who claim to protect the people and their property.
By way of example:
Between 25 and 28 January 1999, three households in Kitenge II neighbourhood were the
victims of night-time visits accompanied by gunshots. The houses in question were No. 29 on
Boulevard Kiwele, Mr. Nzuzi’s house at 17, Avenue Likinda, and Mr. Basila’s at 53, Avenue
Botalimbo. This neighbourhood is only a few metres away from the military air-base but these
civilians were left to fend for themselves and given no help to protect their property. The
robbers abandoned the operation once they had managed to steal some items of value.
On the night of 11-12 March 1999, two men in uniform, armed to the teeth, attacked the
home of Mr. Ngubi at 20, 13ème Avenue Transversale, in the district of Kabondo. They stole
NZ 35,000,000 (US$100), 10 items of Wax clothing and other items of value.
On 10 March 1999, a 10-strong commando group besieged the Monga neighbourhood in
Kabondo district. The Basai family was rescued thanks to the human chain popularized by the
Friends of Nelson Mandela (ANM).
On the night of 16-17 January 1999, several heavily-armed men in uniform besieged the
Public Works and Regional Development (TPAT) offices. They removed the corrugated iron
cladding from some of them, making off with some 200 sheets. As things stand, this kind of
activity can take place in broad daylight without being interrupted.
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III.1.5. Abductions
In defiance of international law provisions on the situation of civilians during periods of
armed conflict, civilians in the DRC are not protected, particularly in the eastern part of the
country. They are often subject to human rights violations on the pretext that they are acting as
scouts for the enemy or that military targets have not been clearly identified. One example is the
case of the village of Makobola where Rwandan soldiers killed over 500 people on 7 January 1999
because they were unable to distinguish soldiers from civilians. To date neither the UN nor the
OAU nor the government of the DRC nor even the RCD (the Congolese Rally for Democracy) has
conducted an investigation.
Here are a few other examples:
On 10 January 1999, the deaths of 16 civilians in Kisangani were blamed on government
bomber plane whereas in fact these 16 people were killed by shells fired at the plane by the
RCD (cf. ANM report of 10 January 1999 on the bombing of Kisangani).
On the night of 19-20 January 1999, Mr. Simon Engwande of 46, 17ème Avenue
Transversale in Kabondo district died at the Protestant hospital from 6 bullet-wounds in the
chest caused by a soldier who had shot him when he had refused to allow him onto his land.
On 1 February 1999, the body of an unidentified man with traces of bayonet wounds was left
to decompose at the morgue in Kisangani General Hospital and eaten by dogs.
Mr. Bassay, around 27, who drove a bicycle taxi and was the son of an employee of the
Yangambi University Institute of Agronomics was shot dead on the premises of the company,
Busira Lomami, in Isangi (125 km from Kisangani on the River Congo). The Ugandan soldiers
who had arrested him told his family that he was in secret contact with Congolese government
soldiers.
On 9 February 1999, four unidentified persons accused of witchcraft and two others arrested
for unlawful possession of firearms were buried alive in a communal grave in Isangi (125 km
from Kisangani).
In Yangambi, some 97 km away from Kisangani, there is a militia group called Esende Buka
which has set itself the goal of “killing all witches”. It operates in broad daylight with the tacit
agreement of the local police. Among the victims of this group are Mr. Omangaoto, aged
around 60, who was stoned to death in front of soldiers who simply looked on and fired into the
air as the local children gathered round him yelling in triumph. There is also Mrs. Toleya, the
single mother of a large family, who teaches at the Yangambi girls’ school. She was brutally
dragged from her classroom by a group of youths and thoroughly beaten in front of her pupils.
She was saved thanks to the intervention of the Yangambi ANM office.
III.1.6. Extortion and vicious destruction
Abductions are among the most common methods used to intimidate opponents into
accepting the authorities’ line.
On 25 January 1999, Mr. Molisho, a public prosecutor at Kisangani Regional Court, was
abducted by a large group of armed men in uniform. He was accused of being in contact with
Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the commander of the rebel group called the MLC (the National
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo).
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The same reason was given for the abduction of Mr. Biona Wa Biona, a metropolitan police
inspector and commander of the city of Kisangani. The latter was also accused of being in
contact with some of the dignitaries of the MPR, including Mr. Kpama and Mr. Nzimbi who
were both high-ranking officers in the SARM (the Mobutu regime’s military intelligence
service).
On 25 January 1999, the mayor of the municipality of Mangobo, Mr. Loela was wanted by
officers of the law in connection with rumours that the people of his municipality were secretly
preparing a protest march against the possible abduction of their mayor. He gave himself up to
the authorities and was held for a number of days.
As we have always said, many Congolese politicians are concerned only with their own
personal interests. Their talk of liberating the people is merely a smoke-screen.
While the major authorities are greedily pouncing upon the riches in the ground, the minor
officials, policemen and soldiers are making do with the riches of innocent civilians.
They resort to inhuman methods to get their hands on other people’s property. They
organize arbitrary arrest and detention, they torture and some go so far as to kill.
The following examples speak volumes:
On 7 January 1999, at Banalia, 128 km from Kisangani, Congolese RCD soldiers and their
allies systematically looted the whole place then went on to rape women in the surrounding
villages.
On 9 January 1999, three armed men in military uniform extorted property from the people of
Kabondo district in Kisangani. They began in the evening and did not stop until the small
hours of the morning. Among the victims was Mr. Katsuva, the owner of the pharmacy on
6ème Avenue, Kabondo, who lost NZ 5,500,000 (US $ 157) and a large number of
pharmaceutical products.
On 14 January 1999, a group of armed men in military uniform occupied the village of
Kondolole, some 180 km from Kisangani on the river Lindi. They took possession of a dugout
belonging to the company Etablissments Jidex containing goods belonging to traders who
travelled regularly to the diamond quarries in the area.
On 8 January 1999, priests returning from Kisangani to the Church of St Elizabeth in Banalia
were stopped and robbed by soldiers on two occasions. On the first occasion, some 40 km
from Kisangani, they lost a sum of NZ 5,000,000 and on the second, 50 km further on, the
soldiers took a bag containing several items including a radio cassette player and their food
supplies for the next month.
On 20 January 1999, Mrs. Mariam, who is better known under her pseudonym of Mama
Kadafi, was visited by a group of armed men in uniform. Having completely ransacked her
home and fired three shots they demanded that she hand over a sum of US$10,000. The men
took away several items of value. The victim lives in the Kiwele block behind the veterinary
surgery in Makiso district.
On the same date, Mr. Amisi Rashidi of 67, 1ère Avenue in Kabondo district, who is a student
at the Kisangani Institute of Medicine (ITM) was visited by a group of armed men in uniform.
They made off with two Sharp radios and his wife’s case having raped his sister.
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While based in Yangambi, Ugandan soldiers removed the corrugated iron cladding from four
residences belonging to the National Institute of Agronomic Studies and Research (INERA).
They sold this material to the inhabitants of the housing developments. Once they had left, the
police who were brought in to replace them proceeded to go around and get the cladding back.
The police did not have a list of the people who had bought cladding and so they began
removing the cladding from all the houses built in the town in 1998. A delegation of the
Kisangani ANM who were staying in Yangambi received complaints from Mr. Mboole and
Mr. Kambale who had bills confirming that their cladding was bought in Kisangani before
1998. In the major cities the officers of the law show a degree of restraint towards civilians but
in the provinces, or in other words the countryside, the people are constantly harassed.
For every offence there is a fine of at least NZ five million (US$14), often supplemented by
two or three goats and five or six chickens or ducks:
On 21 January 1999, Mrs. Kitundu, a married mother of five children around 45 years of age
living in the Lever Plantation work camp at Lokutu some 200 km from Kisangani was shot at
point-blank range by a policeman who had discovered her cutting down palm nuts. The
victim’s husband, Mr. Kasiala, who was immediately alerted by the other women working on
the plantation, went straight to the scene and stabbed the policeman to death. The incident was
taken up by the administrator of the territory who went to Lokutu with a group of police
officers who then looted the housing development and arrested several innocent parties. They
were released on condition that they paid a fine of NZ 5,000,000 (circa $US155). It should be
noted that, in this kind of situation, the victims’ goats and chickens are the first things to be
taken away.
On 3 March 1999, Mr. Basila, a 34-year-old married father of three, living in Basoko (237 km
from Kisangani) was arrested and ordered to pay a fine of NZ 7,000,000 plus two goats. He
was charged with asking the wife of a policeman referred to only as “Mr. Alpha” to come to his
house and collect the bill for the arak (a local liqueur) he had just drunk.
III.1.7. The repercussions of the bombing of Kisangani on 10 January 1999
On 10 January 1999 at 9.50 p.m., a plane dropped bombs on the city of Kisangani.
“The Friends of Nelson Mandela for the Defence of Human Rights” (ANM) has looked very
closely into this incident and feels that it must alert the national and international community about
the way in which several families in Kisangani lost relatives in the incident.
Based on investigations in the field, it can be confirmed that the bombers belonged to the
government forces who were launching a counter-offensive with a view to dislodging the rebel
forces of the RCD (the Congolese Rally for Democracy) from Kisangani. Accordingly, they
concentrated their attack on some of the city’s strategic points such as the Simi-Simi II military
air-base, the Hotel Zongia, where some of the rebel authorities were based, and the international
Bangboka airport.
During the operation, bombs fell behind the training room at the Kisangani Sanatorium,
about 500 metres from the hangar at the end of the runway at Simi-Simi air-base, and on the
premises of Mr. Didier Kanima at 1, 5ème Avenue, Makiso district, in the Quartier des musiciens,
about 10 metres from the Hotel Zongia.
The RCD’s attempts to shoot the plane down caused damage to property and losses of
civilian lives.
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The first shell fired at the plane landed on the premises of Mr. Ilongo-Longo on 28, 2ème
Avenue, while the second exploded on the premises of Mr. Epidi Djafard at 36, 3ème Avenue
Dépotoir in Tshopo district.
The following people were killed or wounded as a result:
I. Dead:
Name Sex Address in Tshopo Marital status Age
1. Loleka (father) M 28, 2ème Ave. Married 60
2. Loleka (son) M 28, 2ème Ave. Single 12
3. Bandole Metaleke M 20, 2ème Ave. Single 18
4. T.F. Basosila M 23, 2ème Ave. Married 43
5. Jean-Paul Mbula M 29, 2ème Ave. Single 13
6. Passy Lokita F 30, 3ème Ave. Single 19
7. Sylvie Lokita F 30, 3ème Ave. Single 16
8. Jean Longala M 33, 3ème Ave. Single Over 30
9. Botwetwe M 23, 2ème Ave. Single 36
10. Manu Mazumunu M 21, 2ème Ave. Single 42
11. Nora Dalige F 19, 2ème Ave. Single 12
12. Liense Zakalo F 2ème Ave. Single 20
II. Wounded:
Name Sex Address in Tshopo Marital status Age
1. Okito M 28, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single Over 25
2. J.-Louis Mangwangu M 28, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single Over 25
3. Pascal Botsho M 28, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single Over 27
4. Keni Mozart M 28, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single 12
5. Bandole Bamiwa F 20, 2ème Ave. Single 20
6. Célestin M 23, 2ème Ave. Single Over 25
7. Mama Lyly F 25, 2ème Ave. Married Over 30
8. Nene F 25, 2ème Ave. Single Over 18
9. Jean Tulanga M 29, 2ème Ave. Single 20
10. Lutambula F 19, 2ème Ave. Married Over 35
11. Manu “le blanc” M 25, 2ème Ave. Single 13
12. Manu F 25, 2ème Ave. Single 11
13. Bolanda M 30a, 2ème Ave. Dépotoir Single 29
14. Mukuphar M 2ème Ave. Married -
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III. Damage to property: Six houses were destroyed as well as a number of items of value inside.
Under international humanitarian law, warring parties must guarantee the protection of
civilians and their property during wars. Neither are warring parties ever permitted to launch
attacks on civilians or use them as human shields. (This universal principle has never been applied
in occupied DRC).
III.2. The war in Kisangani: an outrage against peace and telling evidence of
international collusion in the present crisis in the Congo
III.2.1. General comments
As the 20th century draws to a close much of the human suffering in Africa in general and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular can be put down to armed conflicts in which
human rights are trampled upon. Most of the time it is innocent civilians who pay the cost.
Current events are showing once again that if a problem is left without being thoroughly
resolved, it results in a spiral of violence which leads in turn to war and senseless killing.
The fighting between Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani is a case in point.
At a time when the attention of the entire population of the occupied territories is focusing
on the conclusions of the verification committee, which will also issue a final opinion on the
question of the signature by rebel groups of the Lusaka cease-fire accords, Kisangani is mourning
and burying its dead.
III.2.2. Position of the allies and consequences of the fighting between the Rwandan and
Ugandan armies on Congolese soil
Agreements between the allies
If we look back at the war which is currently ravaging the DRC, we see that the Congolese
Rally for Democracy (RCD) had two allies from the outset in the form of Rwanda and Uganda.
The two countries claimed that their presence deep in Congolese territory over 1,500 km from their
frontiers was justified by a concern for the security of their borders. Just like the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo, the RCD and MLC rebels have never told the
people who their allies are.
However, the public claims that the two allies came to an agreement in their draft accord on
the administration of the occupied territories. Uganda was to be responsible for the political and
economic management of the northern part of these territories comprising Equateur and Orientale
provinces and the northern part of North Kivu province, namely Beni, Butembo and Lubero, while
Rwanda was to deal with the south, in other words South Kivu, East and West Kasai, Katanga,
Maniema and the remaining part of North Kivu.
[Translator’s note: two pages missing]
The fighting had the following disastrous consequences:
a gross violation by Rwanda and Uganda of UN Security Council Resolution 1234 of
9 April 1999;
a gross violation by Uganda of the Sirte Peace Accord (Libya);
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the collusion of the United Nations and their inability to make Rwanda and Uganda respect the
international charter of human rights and the constitutive charter of the United Nations;
the sabotage of 3 million doses of vaccine destined for thousands of children from nought to
5 years of age as part of the National Polio Vaccination Campaign in Orientale province;
the death of more than 175 innocent victims, including scores of young people, women and
children;
the destruction of public and private amenities as a result of fighting using heavy artillery;
a power cut and all the problems associated with this for the City of Kisangani.
III.3. Former Mai-Mai fighters being wiped out in Kisangani, Orientale Province
In its task of promoting and protecting human rights in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo the ANM has looked once again into the plight of the former Mai-Mai soldiers in
Kisangani.
It should be recalled that the Mai-Mai are Congolese citizens from South Kivu province who
have been fighting for some years now to counter the expansionist aims of the Tutsis in the
provinces of North and South Kivu.
During the first war, the so-called war of liberation, these Congolese citizens fought on the
side of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) led by the
current president, Laurent Désiré Kabila.
Once Kabila had taken power, they were incorporated into the Congolese Armed Forces
(FAC) and accommodated at the Kapalata military training camp in Kisangani where, under the
vigilant eye of Rwandan instructors, over two thousand of them died. It was in this connection that
the ANM launched an urgent appeal on 2 January 1998 entitled as follows:
“Do the Mai-Mai militia have cholera or are they suffering from malnutrition?”
Now history seems to be repeating itself. When Kisangani fell into the hands of the rebels
(the Congolese Rally for Democracy), the former Mai-Mai soldiers were taken to the military camp
known as “Base” over 9 km from the centre of Kisangani.
Following the rumours that were circulating and its own investigations, the ANM has
reported that the Mai-Mai have been left to their own devices and are being gradually wiped out.
They roam the streets of Kisangani from morning to night. Some of them look for a small job to
earn enough to eat, others are forced to take to begging, while others still abandon themselves to
total destitution.
The 150 sick Mai-Mai transferred to Kisangani General Hospital have been almost totally
abandoned. They are denied medical treatment, food and even prescriptions.
In this degrading situation, many of them are weak, starving, and disease-ridden and every
day one of them dies.
The most shocking case is that of Mr. Heshima, a man around 20 years of age, who died at
the door of the Higher Institute of Medicine (ISTM), some fifty metres from the hospital.
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In view of the ongoing situation on the ground, the public’s suspicions that the former
Mai-Mai soldiers are purely and simply being exterminated may be founded, despite the fact that
they too are covered by the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law.
Faced with the growing number of victims, ANM has launched an urgent and heartfelt
appeal to the national and international community to assist the following 77 former Mai-Mai:
List of former Mai-Mai soldiers in danger of dying at Kisangani General Hospital
1. Ngenda
2. Paruku
3. Kitisao
4. Mikayele
5. Madudu
6. Muzuhuke
7. Mapendo Kambale
8. Faustin Kambale
9. Patrice
10. Jackson
11. Biyamungu
12. Nzabanita
13. Habiyana
14. Amabu
15. Dume
16. Ilunga
17. Mbo
18. Bamuparabi
19. Kalombo
20. Kavuma
27. Bosongo
28. Bosembayi
29. Soudanais
30. Safari Jacques
31. Baribonera
32. Udino
33. Musubao
34. J.P. Lwansa
35. Basengo Nyembo
36. Musafiri
37. Kayumba
38. Mulemba
39. Kibonge Mutwale
40. Safari Tshelubala
41. Lokalanga
42. Yamnonga Ngugandje
43. Moyinda
44. Kasangai Sossa
45. Rubunda Ngagidje
46. Marie Salisali
53. Samusoni
54. Bisuru
55. Masikirizano
56. Milieza
57. Nzabirinda
58. Dine
59. Sibomana
60. Janvier
61. Shirambere
62. Mateso
63. Bazirake
64. Kabalira
65. Turinabo
66. Turidumwe
67. Nguba
68. Sadiki
69. Etienne
70. Kambale
71. Habimana Rusasa
72. Roger Dunia
[Translator’s note: 1 page missing]
[...]
Details of these heinous crimes came from sources including a little girl who had escaped
and was taken for appropriate medical treatment to the Sendwe General Hospital in Lubumbashi
(the administrative capital of Katanga).
IV.4. Arbitrary arrests and abductions
August 1999 was a deadly month for the people of occupied northern Katanga. It saw the
sudden abduction of 40 Franciscan nuns from Sola in northern Katanga by members of the
occupying Rwandan army, as well as the abduction of Father Baudouin Waternane (a Belgian
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subject), a sacristan and a seminarist from Sola parish, and the headmaster of a local school. After
several days of investigation 18 sisters have been found again but the other 22 are still missing.
N.B.: As far as the human rights situation in the occupied part of northern Katanga is
concerned, apart from the killings and the abductions that have been recorded, the humanitarian
situation is also totally disastrous. Several hundreds of families are now homeless, over
114 houses have been burnt down, various churches and schools have been quite simply
destroyed and a number of girls have been forced into prostitution or raped.
The humanitarian problems in this part of the country are acute.
OVERALL CONCLUSION
The large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the
occupied provinces of the DRC provide telling evidence of the United Nations’ inability to manage
international conflicts when faced with the agonizing indecision of the imperialist powers involved,
who are more preoccupied with sub-regional geo-strategic interests than the lives of human beings.
In a limited period of six months, the provinces of the DRC occupied by Rwanda, Burundi
and Uganda have been the scene of criminal acts, senseless massacres of civilians, killings of every
other kind and all the other possible forms of large-scale human rights violations that might be
imagined.
Tragedy is everywhere: Homes have been torched, thousands of civilians have become war
refugees, hundreds of access roads to farming land have been abandoned, seasonal food shortages
are on the increase, freedom of expression has been muzzled as never before, public amenities have
been destroyed, natural resources and other national assets have been systematically looted, and
millions of people have been traumatized. This is a huge humanitarian crisis whose ins and outs
are liable now more than ever to result in human slaughter given the popular resistance to all of the
activities of the aggressors and their Congolese proxies, who seem to have forgotten that:
“You can achieve everything by force except to make yourself loved” and/or “it
is better to have a just war than an unjust peace which takes no account of the
deep-seated aspirations of the people involved”.
This six-monthly report covering events in the occupied provinces of North Kivu, South
Kivu, northern Katanga and Orientale province between 1 April and 30 September 1999 does not
claim to be a panacea for all the large-scale human rights violations reported since the invasion of
the DRC, but neither can it be regarded as the mere product of speculation. Instead it is intended to
provide a data base on the criminal acts carried out on the cosmopolitan and hospitable Congolese
people which will certainly be used as a source of information in the future investigations and
reparations without which these war criminals will never be held to account for their acts before the
inevitable and essential appropriate judicial bodies.
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This report should not now be filed away and treated as a closed matter. It should be
analyzed and used for the benefit of the peace-loving inhabitants of the occupied provinces of the
DRC.
Done in Kinshasa on 30 October 1999.
For the 152 youth movements and associations of South Kivu, DRC
which are the members of COJESKI
1. Christian Bulambo Wandila
Provincial administrator of the social committee.
2. Marcel-Joseph Kamba Nyunyu
Provincial administrator for ethics and morals.
Special advisor on the preparation, planning and evaluation of development projects.
3. Fernandez Murhola Muhigirwa
Provincial administrator of the political committee.
Security adviser to the South Kivu Civil Society.
4. Willy Tshitende Wa Mpinda
Deputy co-ordinator.
___________
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ANNEX 4.18
Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within the Rebel Alliances and
Factions in North-Eastern Congo. The Kisangani War, September 1999
[Annex not translated]
___________
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ANNEX 4.19
Lotus Group, Conflict between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani,
Kisangani, May 2000
[Relevant extracts only]
- 86 -
Lotus Group, Conflict between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani,
Kisangani, May 2000
[Translation]
Contents
Introduction
I. Background
1.1. Indirect causes
1.2. Direct causes
II. The actual fighting
2.1. Positions of the troops
Ugandan troops
Rwandan troops
2.2. The outbreak of the fighting
2.3. The end of the fighting
III. The damage done
3.1. Loss of life
3.2. Wounded
3.3. Material damage
IV. Consequences of the fighting
4.1. Violations of international humanitarian law
4.2. Deterioration of the social and economic situation
V. Various reactions registered
5.1. Locally
5.2. Nationally
5.3. Internationally
VI. Reasons for the preoccupation with Kisangani
6.1. Political reasons
6.2. Economic reasons
6.3. Strategic reasons
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VII. The Congolese rebellion and the implications of the second clash between Rwanda and
Uganda in Kisangani
7.1. The rebels’ arguments
7.2. Demilitarization of the City of Kisangani
7.3. The arguments of the rebels’ allies
7.4. The leadership conflict
Conclusion
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I. Background
1.1. Indirect causes
1.1.1. The affront to the UPDF (the Ugandan army) during the three-day war
The battle of Kisangani between the Ugandan and Rwandan armies from 15 to
17 August 1999 ended in a minor victory for the Rwandans in which they gained control of the
main transport routes and the entire city of Kisangani.
Ever since this conflict the Ugandans had been harbouring a desire for vengeance stemming
from a wish to restore their morale by humiliating the Rwandan soldiers who had pointedly
displayed dead Ugandan soldiers in public. They were also keen to salvage their dented prestige
and thus regain the trust of the Congolese people by deserving it still more and reassure the
Ugandan people that the Ugandan army was superior to the Rwandan one.
1.1.2. Violations of the agreement entered into after the three-day war
Enquiries conducted by the chiefs of staff of the Rwandan and Ugandan armies, Kayumba
and Jeje Odongo, who were hurriedly dispatched to Kisangani to look into what had happened and
establish who was responsible for what, resulted in an agreement between the two parties including
the following provisions:
The city of Kisangani was to be demilitarized by withdrawals of troops from both camps to
locations 40 km away from the city. Subsequently the city was to be placed under the control
of a joint Rwandan and Ugandan military committee.
Elections were to be held at various levels with a view to establishing political authorities
which would be suitably unbiased and bound by no allegiances.
Public meetings were banned.
Local radio stations and television companies were expected to use courteous language.
Unfortunately both signatories have since accepted deliberate violations of these rules.
Following a vague semblance of some troop withdrawals (the Ugandan army withdrew 36 km
along the Buta and Bafwasende road while the Rwandan army moved towards Lubutu and
Wanierurkula), the two parties made a series of unwarranted advances which brought them closer
to the city and enabled them to reinforce their representatives there. Through a lack of political
resolve and the fear of losing its control over public services, the RCD/Goma, which is totally
reliant on Rwandan support, did nothing to promote or give any practical force to the idea of
holding elections.
The two local radios (Radio Liberté, which supports the MLC, and RTNC, which supports
the RCD/Goma) engaged in personal attacks, offensive remarks and spiteful rhetoric.
In December 1999, the Kabale accords had resulted in a “Common leaders’ front” involving
the three factions of the Congolese rebellion, namely the RCD/Goma, the MLC and the RCD/ML.
In these accords it was decided that the three groups would meet in Kisangani on 4 February 2000
to continue their discussions on Kabale II.
As the meeting date approached, the Ugandans and Professor Wamba’s RCD/ML were
systematically maligned on RTNC radio. In an interview on the RTNC’s regular programme “Vie
et Société” in late January 2000, the Governor of the Province appeared neither to acknowledge nor
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even accept the existence of the RCD/ML. He went on to say that the co-ordinating office of the
RCD/ML should have been evicted from the CADECO buildings.
In a similar vein, the people were encouraged to demonstrate their displeasure with
Professor Wamba and the Ugandans. Twenty or so saleswomen even organized a march from the
city hall to the Franco-Congolese alliance building to signal their disapproval at the continued
presence in Kisangani of Wamba, who is blamed for all the deaths during the three-day war.
On the afternoon of the same day, some of Orientale Province’s traditional leaders, who
claim to be Kisangani’s natural rulers but whose political ideas are not far removed from those of
the RCD/Goma, issued a memorandum in which they refused to allow rebel meetings to be held in
Kisangani and called for Mr. Wamba to be expelled. In response, the Ugandan army sent out a
tank to patrol the streets of Kisangani for a day and Ugandan soldiers were placed on alert.
1.2. Direct causes
1.2.1. Occupation by the Ugandan army of the Kapalata training centre, renamed
the P. E. Lumumba Training Centre
Kapalata is a major police training centre 6 km from the city centre on the right bank of the
River Tshopo. Following the collapse of the Mobutu régime and the fall of Kisangani in 1998 it
was not being sufficiently used. It had been empty for months and so it was an obvious target for
the Ugandans in their quest to approach and surround the city.
All of this coincided with the presence in the city of Commander William Balengele Kazadi,
known as Tango Tango, the former commander of the 7th Brigade which had broken away from
the RCD/Goma to back Wamba. The presence in Kisangani of the person who was already being
sounded out as the potential instructor of the Congolese branch of the Wamba army at the
P. E. Lumumba Training Centre was tantamount to provocation. On 20 March 2000, during an
official visit to Kisangani, Mr. Lambert Mende, who was the head of the RCD/Goma’s
mobilization and propaganda department at the time, granted an interview on Radio RTNC in
which he described the commander as a persona non grata.
The same day, an incident was narrowly avoided at Tshopo bridge between the Ugandan
army and Congolese police officers who intended to remove the centre’s new occupiers by force.
Spokesmen for the Congolese National Police said that the centre had been made available to them
and they had already carried out some work on it but it had not been intended to use it until certain
logistical problems had been resolved.
1.2.2. The embargo on the city of Kisangani
Around mid-April, shopkeepers in the habit of travelling to and fro between Kisangani and
Bumba to purchase provisions for the city including smoked fish, salted fish, rice and maize put
about information to the effect that the MLC had declared an embargo on the city of Kisangani and
no more goods would be allowed through the border-posts at Bumba. It was not long before the
price of the goods concerned began to rocket. Not only . . .
[Translator’s note: whole section missing here]
At the Sergeant Ketele camp, in Makiso district near the edge of Kabondo district.
At Simi-Simi airport, Plateau Médical, Makiso district.
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At the former official residence of the provincial governor at Plateau Médical, occupied by
Rwandan soldiers since their arrival in Kisangani.
At Bangboka Airport
In addition, the fact that they controlled the city centre gave them the advantage of being
able to move around and spread out via the main routes in the various districts.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2. How the fighting was conducted
Unlike the three-day war, when the belligerents used both heavy artillery and light infantry,
the main weapons used this time were highly destructive 60 and 80 mm mortars and rockets.
According to other sources, hand-to-hand combat necessitating the use of individual
weapons took place on the road to Bangboka Airport and at the airport itself.
2.3. The end of the fighting
Calm was restored that same evening as the result of a cease-fire agreement negotiated by
the high command of the warring parties whereas neither party had moved one inch from its
starting position.
However it should be said that the soldiers on both sides had far less room for manoeuvre
this time round and could not easily move into areas occupied by the enemy. It was inadvisable for
aircraft to attempt a landing at either airport without the permission of the Ugandans unless they
were prepared to risk being shot at.
III. The damage done
The extent of the damage done to people and property in the course of these conflicts
provide a perfect illustration of the degree of destruction and violence to which the two armies are
prepared to go. It may be understandable that armies will fight, even outside their own territory.
But the matter becomes far more alarming when they aim shells at targets that clearly have nothing
to do with the conflict.
Volunteers quickly began working to get the wounded to hospital. Some of them were
supported by humanitarian groups. Others had their medical costs covered by their families.
Health workers (doctors and nurses) made enormous sacrifices, putting their lives in danger by
going out on the streets in search of first-aid products.
The day after the clashes, Kisangani ICRC gathered the wounded at the university clinic and
Kisangani General Hospital, distributed bandages to the hospitals it visited and began cleaning up
the areas in which fighting had taken place and removing the waste caused by the clashes.
According to preliminary estimates arrived at by the Lotus Group on the basis of reports
which it has verified on the ground, the fighting resulted in 32 deaths, 80 wounded and damage to
33 houses and other buildings.
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3.1. Loss of human life 20 direct deaths
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1. Violations of international humanitarian law
4.1.1. Outrages to human dignity
Arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention
Peaceable citizens suspected of conspiring with the Ugandans or the Rwandans
yesterday’s allies who had now become a convenient enemy were arrested and treated with no
respect for their human dignity. Among them were:
Mr. Kasongo, the manager of the Congolese Oil Company, of 1, Avenue des Cocotiers,
Makiso. He was arrested on Sunday 7 May 2000 by soldiers from the RCD/Goma and released
on 9 May 2000 following a number of local raids. His companions in misfortune,
Mr. Kabuluku, Mr. Katumba and Mr. Kabemba, were released on 11 May 2000 having been
interned at Ketele Camp. They were accused of being in league with the Ugandans.
On 9 May 2000, Mr. Ramazani Mwenyewe, the owner of the private school, the Complexe
Scolaire du Progrès and a resident of the Saïo Building at 41, 3ème Avenue bis, in the
Quartier des musiciens, Makiso, was arrested while putting up posters calling for the
withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops from Kisangani. He was taken to the residence of
the Commander of the 7th Brigade then transferred to Ketele Camp the day after his arrest. He
was released on Tuesday 16 May 2000. Everything he had on him at the time was confiscated
including a watch, a bicycle, his shoes, his clothes and a sum of US$600 with which he was
intending to pay his teaching staff.
On 20 May 2000, Mr. Gauthier Liambi, a journalist from Lubunga District working for Radio
Liberté, was abducted for reasons linked to his professional activities by Congolese
RCD soldiers under the orders of the Congolese Commander Sadam of ANC Bureau II posted
at Lukusa Camp in Lubunga.
Mr. Bernard Luhayo Pene Kamba, a journalist working for Radio Liberté of 62, Avenue
Baraka in Lubunga district, has had property looted by Congolese RCD soldiers. He is now
wanted by the authorities and has gone into hiding.
Mr. Jefferson Amundala, a journalist and the director of Radio Liberté, living in Kisangani city
centre, has had his motorbike and other items of value stolen by Congolese RCD soldiers. He
is also wanted by the authorities and has gone into hiding.
Gabriel Mutabala, a journalist working for Radio Liberté and a student at Kisangani University,
was robbed of his bicycle by Congolese RCD soldiers on his way home from classes.
Nanga Bambanayo, a journalist at RTNC was arrested on 24 May 2000 for broadcasting news
that RCD soldiers arriving by foot along the Ubundu road in the company of
Vice-Governor Abibu Sakapela were terrorizing the local population. Mr. Bambanayo himself
was a member of Mr. Abibu’s delegation which was returning from a mission in Ubundu.
Mr. Baudouin Ndeke, the co-presenter of the programme “Masolo ma Nzanga” on RTNC, was
arrested on 5 May 2000 eleven kilometres along the Bangboka Airport road then taken to
Ugandan army headquarters in Kisangani at la Forestière on the ground that he was one of the
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journalists who were insulting the Ugandans all day and all night. He was released the same
day on the evidence of journalists from RALI-FM.
Mr. Doudou Lifetu, 25 years of age, living at 70, 15ème Avenue in Tshopo district was
arrested on 14 May 2000, seemingly on the orders of the secretary of the Commander of the
7th Brigade. He was asked to pay a debt of $US200 to his father and released a few days later.
During the week of 8 to 14 May 2000, Mr. Gérard Afino, who lives in Basoko but was in
Kisangani on business, was harassed because it was claimed that he had once transported
coffee for the Ugandans in his motorised canoe. He was cleared of all suspicion but only after
the arrest of his brother Kamaito, of Kitenge Block II, 23, Avenue Opala, in the Plateau
Médical neighbourhood of Makiso district.
Harassment and threats
Some people have been threatened because of their professional activities or their position in
society. Among these are the journalists, Liabo, Théophile Mbuyi, André Losana, Maman
Dorothée Magwamboa and Barnabé Nzale as well as a number of human rights activists. The latter
are repeatedly taken to task by the two local radio stations for sitting on the fence. In the
circumstances of mutual antagonism, each side would like to see the human rights organizations
acting in their own interests.
4.1.2. Violations of the right to property
Two motorbikes belonging to Ugandans were confiscated by unidentified Rwandan soldiers
from the garage of the Archbishopric of Kisangani on Avenue General Mulamba.
A bicycle belonging to Brother Gustave of the Archbishopric of Kisangani ridden by the
journalist Gabriel Mutabala was also confiscated.
A red Pajero belonging to Mr. Empereur Kennedy of 70, 15ème Avenue, Tshopo, was
commandeered, seemingly on the orders of the commander of the 7th Brigade. It would seem
that the vehicle was seized because Mr. Empereur owes the commander’s secretary US$200
and is rumoured to have joined the Bemba camp.
There have been night-time raids on private homes, particularly in the Kilima Ya Bahindi
neighbourhood of Makiso district.
4.1.3. Infringements of the right to freedom of movement
Since 4 May 2000, Ugandan soldiers have prevented everyone from crossing Tshopo bridge.
As a result, many people on both sides of the river have been separated from their families and
friends for days, living far away from their usual homes. Furthermore, for security reasons, people
living around the Ugandan positions on the right bank of the River Tshopo have been ordered to
leave their houses and withdraw to a distance of 10 kilometres.
[Translator’s note: section missing]
. . . the DRC, in total keeping with the principles of the United Nations with regard to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.
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The Kisangani Office of the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC) condemned the
initial attacks by Ugandans on Rwandans.
The Command of the Ugandan Army in Kisangani broadcast a three-part statement on
the MLC station Radio Liberté demanding:
that the SNEL (the Congolese national electricity company) re-establish the electric current to
Ugandan army headquarters at la Forestière;
that the RTNC (Congolese National Radio and Television) stop insulting the Ugandans and
apply professional standards of journalism;
that the authorities of the RCD/Goma remove the barrier set up 6 kilometres along the
Bangboka Airport road.
The population is fed up with the Ugandan and Rwandan military presence and has
expressed its dissatisfaction in the following ways:
On 28 May 2000 there was a popular uprising when the Ugandans refused to open the bridge
on the River Tshopo despite the media campaign on the process of demilitarization. When a
MONUC vehicle was allowed across the bridge the local inhabitants removed struts from either
side of the bridge so as to prevent the vehicle from returning and force the MONUC officer to
act as their spokesperson vis-à-vis the Ugandans.
On 29 May 2000 following the death of Mr. Jean Masudi Beyaya, a priest at the neo-apostolic
church, living at 40, Avenue Kirundu in Lubunga district, who was shot dead at point-blank
range at around 8 p.m. the previous evening, the people paraded his corpse around the main
streets of the city, ending up at the residence occupied by the MONUC officers. Throughout
this procession they chanted slogans against the RCD soldiers and their Rwandan allies.
The churches took advantage of this event to boost the inhabitants’ morale encouraging them
to continue to pray to the Creator, who may be the only person able to resolve the Congo’s
problems. Ministers, evangelists, priests and other servants of God begged for God’s grace to
achieve the liberation of the people of the Congo as with the Moabites and the Ammonites.
5.2. Nationally
The government in Kinshasa has described the situation as atrocious. It claims that a vast
plan for the extermination of civilian populations and the destruction of the city of Kisangani is
being put into practice.
5.3. Internationally
On a visit to Kampala, Mr. Aldo Ayello, the European Union representative to the Great
Lakes region, condemned the fighting and demanded that Rwandan and Ugandan troops be
withdrawn from the Congo.
The United States accused Uganda of provocation for having triggered the conflict. This
was liable to affect their diplomatic relations.
The much anticipated meeting between Presidents Museveni and Kagame at Mwanza in
Tanzania on 14 May 2000 produced few hopeful signs; they merely reiterated their undertakings to
demilitarize the city of Kisangani but made no further comments and left it up to their respective
- 94 -
chiefs of staff to agree on practical arrangements. This was all in spite of the fact that, some days
before, the chiefs of staff had suspended talks pending the conclusions of their superiors.
VI. Reasons for the preoccupation with Kisangani
Kisangani is a historic city which has been the scene of many significant events:
In 1955-56, Kisangani saw the political beginnings of Patrice Hemery Lumumba who was later
to become a national hero.
In 1964, the Mulelist uprising, which had spread to many parts of the country, met with a
crushing defeat in Kisangani by the Congolese National Army supported by Belgian soldiers.
In March 1997, with the fall of Kisangani, the last pocket of resistance of the Mobutu régime
was destroyed, opening the way for the AFDL to conquer other large cities and prepare a swift
assault on Kinshasa.
By capturing Kisangani, the RCD was able to forge another image of itself and escape the yoke
of North and South Kivu.
It was also in Kisangani that the Ugandans nurtured the political emergence of
Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba and his MLC and forcefully established Professor Wamba in May 1998
as his views began to diverge with those of the RCD/Goma.
With the gulf created by the establishment of the RCD/Kis, rivalries for the actual control of
the city of Kisangani were enhanced. But why is it that the Congolese rebels and their allies
are so keen to control Kisangani?
6.1. Political reasons
Because Kisangani has such an influence on other parts of the province, controlling
Kisangani may encompass other areas, especially since what is done in the chief city of the
province is considered to be more binding over the province than any measures taken elsewhere.
Furthermore, the city’s multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan dimension and anti-establishment views
deriving from the presence of a major state university and a number of other higher education
establishments make for constructive and frequently more objective debate enabling politicians to
work in a more integrative and open environment.
Looking forward to the essential negotiations prior to the re-establishment of peace in
the DRC, the influence of local and regional authorities may come into play when power is shared
out or at least when it comes to taking into account the arguments of the delegates during the
various discussions. The same applies to the governments whose armies are fighting in the DRC
since some of the conditions for their withdrawal may be decided with reference to the size of the
towns they occupy.
6.2. Economic reasons
[Translator’s note: another section missing here]
. . . permanent confiscation by the military and economic powers would make Uganda and
Rwanda’s acts of aggression a part of international custom.
- 95 -
The demilitarization of Kisangani may seem to provide a solution to the crisis but the major
question that remains is the political and administrative control of the city by the RCD/Goma and
Rwanda’s sphere of influence. If this problem, which has been a crucial factor in both wars, is not
resolved then the two other branches of the rebellion (Wamba’s RCD and Bemba’s MLC) will be
forced to adopt strategies of equivocation and circumvention in the absence of any satisfactory
compromise likely to be respected by all the parties. On the other hand, solving this problem is
tantamount to acknowledging the political and administrative rights of the antagonists over the city
of Kisangani which the RCD/Goma would find it difficult to accept since it regards itself as the
city’s “sole liberator” or at least its conqueror. Hence the danger of a new conflict for MONUC to
deal with.
Kisangani’s current difficulties provide a foretaste of the context in which the subsequent
process of national dialogue and hence the process of pacifying the whole country will take place.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3. The arguments of the rebels’ allies
There is a constant in the reasons the Ugandan and Rwandans give for their presence on
Congolese territory. They each claim to be have been providing security for their governments
against attacks from Hutu rebels, Ugandan rebels and the authorities in Kinshasa while at the same
time liberating the Congolese people from the dictatorial governments of Mobutu and now Kabila
with a view to establishing a democratic system in the Congo.
As members of the United Nations, the Ugandan and Rwandan allies argue that they are
waging a war in self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter and would seem at the same time to be
granting themselves a right to interfere in the Congo’s internal affairs for humanitarian reasons
which would amount to a duty to come to the assistance of the oppressed Congolese people, a right
which does not yet form an integral part of the international legal system.
The first argument actually stems from a desire to settle problems of minorities and
majorities by armed force thus leading to civil wars with international ramifications. This is the
logical upshot of an all-out struggle for power in which an ethnic minority and majority are
incapable of dividing up the power of the state legitimately.
The second argument is less convincing because the four governments now at war in
Africa’s Great Lakes Region (Uganda, Rwanda, Congo-Kinshasa and Burundi) are authoritarian
regimes which have emerged from violent coups characterized by gross human rights violations
and problems with coping with rebellions. Given this, some of them cannot claim to be in the
position to give lessons in democracy to others. It should be recalled that the Democratic Republic
of the Congo had been following the guidelines of the Sovereign National Conference and in so
doing was experimenting with a liberal, multi-party form of politics in contrast with others who had
opted for solutions by armed force and one-party systems.
The so-called allied Ugandan and Rwandan military occupation reflects a kind of transitional
situation or a job half-done because it demonstrates the glaring inadequacy of public international
law when faced with new circumstances expressed in the form of combined rebellions and foreign
acts of aggression.
The deterioration of the present situation in the DRC combined with the vicissitudes of
international diplomatic disputes may trigger off a conflagration throughout central or southern
Africa which could result in serious crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity and the possibility of a large-scale ethnic war.
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7.4. The leadership conflict
President Mobutu’s demise has now resulted in a leadership conflict both within the Congo
and throughout the Great Lakes region. One well-informed observer of the region, Laurent
Monnier, recognized President Mobutu’s directorial skills which derived from his practical
expertise in managing the balances of power which govern the world, acquired during his long
experience of power-brokering to ensure his own survival and that of his wealthy clients, a goal
which Mobutu fully realized in the Congo and in the Great Lakes region as a whole.
The military and economic powers are now said to be seeking a strong man to succeed
Mobutu Sese Seko in the region, but looking this time towards Rwanda and Uganda and not the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, which lost its geostrategical importance with the fall of
communism. This assumption seems to be borne out by the way in which the leaders of these
powers have been talking about the region’s political make-up. Rwanda and Uganda would appear
to be considered to be providing the Congo with the choice of how it is going to rehabilitate itself.
They seem to be expected to choose the Congolese president, supply the country with a decent
army and present it with its diplomatic options. In short they are to act as regional patrons in the
new political world order.
At national level the rebel chiefs controlled by Kigali and Kampala are jostling with
President Kabila, the former ally of Presidents Kagame and Museveni, to take exclusive control of
the presidential office vacated by President Mobutu. However, at regional level, Kagame and
Museveni are fighting over a position vacated by the former Zairian president, namely that of the
“top man” in the Great Lakes region.
In this quest for regional dominance, President Museveni appears to have a formidable
opponent in the figure of Mr. Kagame, the young Tutsi president of the Rwandan Republic
dominated by the Tutsi minority and receiving the patronage and support of the world’s major
capitalist powers. The fact that Uganda was given a harder time than Rwanda over the Kisangani
crisis could only be of any surprise to a casual observer. In the meantime, by controlling the
various Congolese rebel groups, both countries have been trying their hand at a form of
third-world-style imperialism by exploiting the Congo’s natural resources in the areas which they
claim to have liberated.
To resolve this regional crisis, of which the situation in Kisangani is merely a by-product, it
is essential for the international community to do as much as possible to ensure that the Lusaka
Agreement is applied.
Efforts also have to be made to induce the conflicting governments to resolve their problems
democratically and respect everybody’s territorial integrity.
The Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights still raise
great hopes of preserving peace. It is to be hoped that the great powers will halt . . .
[Translator’s note: another section missing]
Conclusion and recommendations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
to accept their responsibility for the security of people and their property;
to bring all perpetrators of serious human rights violations to justice and co-operate with the
MONUC office in Kisangani.
- 97 -
To Kisangani’s local radio stations:
to help bring calm to the city of Kisangani by advocating peaceful co-existence between
peaceable leaders and peoples;
to broadcast only factual information;
to apply professional standards of journalism.
To the people of Kisangani:
to champion respect for the Lusaka cease-fire agreement;
to work to establish a culture of dialogue and peace everywhere in Kisangani and at all levels;
to perform their duty to remember and testify to all the acts of oppression and violations
committed by the warring parties;
to co-operate with and support the MONUC office in Kisangani in its efforts to bring peace to
the city.
To the international community:
to make absolutely certain that the Lusaka cease-fire agreement is respected;
to be impartial in acknowledging and establishing the facts and the responsibilities of all the
parties to the conflict in the DRC;
to set up mechanisms for the enforcement of peace in the event of repeated gross violations of
the peace agreements signed by those involved in the conflict;
to urge the United Nations Security Council to establish an International Criminal Tribunal for
the DRC in view of the seriousness of the crimes committed since 1996;
to provide practical, financial and military support for MONUC;
to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Kisangani and the regions most seriously affected
by the current armed conflict in the DRC.
Done in Kisangani on 29 May 2000
For the Lotus Group
Gilbert Kalinde ABELI,
Secretary.
Dismas Kitenge SENGA,
Chairman.
___________
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ANNEX 4.20
Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, July 2000
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 4.21
MONUC, Historic record of Kisangani cease-fire operation, 19 June 2000
- 99 -
Annexe RRDC 84
United Nations Observers Mission in the DRC :
Historic record of Kisangani Cease-fire Operation
(Extraits)
___U_ N_I_T_E_D_N_A_T_I O_N_S_ _ NA TI ON S UN IE S
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION
IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
HISTORJC RECORD OF KISANGANI CEASE-FIRE OPERATION
The historic record is a summalJ' of the principal military and political events related to an
operation or campaign. The Chief of Staff who implements the Operation is obliged to
produce and present this document, which is one of the most noble and honorable of his
duties. This Commander present on the ground has the opportunity to reveal the falls, show
the brilliant actions and call all those who are mentioned to appear in jronl of the public
opinion and for posterity.
GENERAL STAFF OFFICER MANUAL, /vlADRID 1810
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Political situation
- The conflict in Congo has many different aspects and factors and is not the
object of this document to analyze them. However this introduction is needed
to understand the overall scenario where the Kisangani cease-fire episode had
occurred.
- In 1996-1997 a regional alliance composed of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola,
Burundi and Eritrea toppled Marshall Mobutu Sese Sekou and replaced him
with Laurent Desire Kabila in May 1997. The alliance formed three years
before broke down and reformed around the questions of whether or not
President Kabila should remain in power.
- T~e Lusaka A reement was si ed on 10th ul 1999 by six countries (DRC,
Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda) and by four witnesses
(the United Nations, the Organizations of African Unity, the Southern African
Development Community and the Government of Zambia).
- During the implementatioJ.1 of the Lusaka Agreement the tension between
Rwanda and Uganda resulted in a series of clashes, particularly in the area of
Kisangani. Precisely at the moment when the delegation of the Security
Council was visiting the region to address the Lusaka Peace process, the latest
fighting at Kisangani broke out. After this episode the international
community demanded both countries reach an agreement to cease the
hostilities and allow the entire peace process to continue.
___U_ N_I_T_E_D_N_A_T_I O_N_S_ _ NAT IO NS UN I E S
1
- At 0500 Hrs. UPDF started a very heavy bombardment over Kisangani
town. It continued up to 0700 Hrs. having more than 300 direct impacts on the
houses downtown. RPA fired back with minor intensity.
- At 0700 Hrs. RP A artillery increased the volume of fire over the Tshopo
River Bridge during three hours.
- At 1030 Hrs. Col. KK from RP A arrived at our HQ claiming intelligence that
Brig. Gen. Kazini had been personally organizing the UPDF officers and their
artillery materiel since the previous afternoon to launch the early morning
coordinated heavy bombardment over RP A troops in town. He presented the
following cease-fire agreement from his government:
"Instruction from H.E. the President of Rwanda:
• The RPA Sector Commander in Kisangani is to ensure that his forces
observe maximum cease-fire with effect from 1600 Hrs. Kisangani time.
• Even if the RPA forces are attacked by small arms firing or shelling,
there shall not be any retaliation until when H.E. the President of
Rwanda has been consulted. This restriction extends to self-defense
actions.
• MONUC shall be assisted in all possible ways to relocate on
RPA/UPDF sides.
• MONUC shall report on all incidents of cease-fire violations or any acts
not complying with the demilitarization of Kisangani program. In
specific terms, apportioning responsibility to concerned Parties for any
act committed.
• Brig Gen. Kayumba shall communicate to the RP A Sector Commander
as soon as possible in the modalities of relocation areas in Zone Two as
per the original demilitarization program. This must be done as soon
as he has consulted with the MONUC Force Commander and the
UPDF Army Commander.
• Instructions will be given as to which of the Kisangani RP A Local
Commanders are to be withdrawn to HQ."
- At 1100 Hrs. the representative of UPDF at ]CC passed to me a message
concerning cease-fire agreement from his government as follows:
"Instructions from H.E. the President of the Republic of Uganda.
• The COS of UPDF, Brig. Gen. James Kazini, has been directed by H.E.
the President of Uganda to cease-fire at 1600 Hrs. Kisangani time on
the 8th. June 2000.
• Thereafter MONUC /JCC should proceed across the River Tshopo to
observe any act of violation of the cease-fire.
12
___ U_N_I_T_E_D_N_A_T_I_O_N_S _ NAT I ON S UN IE S
- The end of the bombardment by both Parties and the opening of the Tshopo
River Bridge to the local population consolidated our public image. The pass
back home of 50,000 persons was mostly signed at the bridge by the military
salute of our MILOBs and the popular expression of "MERCI MONUC".
E. Humanitarian International Law
- According to the International practice and most common cases on history
when foreign regular armies are to fight in a town the civilian population
must be given an opportunity to evacuate the area, preventing them of get
trapped in massive artillery bombardments, permanent light weapons fire
and buildings destruction.
- As the physical and psychological effect on the population of Kisangani is
too wide to be condensed in this document the following are just a few facts
witnessed by our MILOBs to be considered by the interested humanitarian
agencies:
• From the very beginning of the hostilities both RPA and UPDF were
shelling and continuously firing machineguns on the Tshopo Bridge
neighborhood, where the concentration of houses is extremely high
• RPA placed their mortar and artillery batteries within the downtown
homes and also at the Rivier~ Gauche right next to the line of our HQ,
firing tracer ammunition during the night
• UPDF fired their mortars and artillery over international illegitimate l targets during their bombardments, i.e. a school killing many children
and wounding many others (1 st day), UN Operational HQ ( 2nd day),
Cathedral and team site Kilo 2 (3rd day), Kisangani Hospital (4th day),
etc.
• On the second day of the hostilities a group of Congolese nuns had to
move to La Procure due to the fact that RP A soldiers looted their
house. Similar situation was suffered among others, by the Congolese
family of Ms. Alice Mustum whose life-long savings (about USD$100)
were taken away by force.
• On 12th June we received a complaint from the Director of the Tshopo
River School giving accounts of about 200 teenagers that had been
taken to the northern bank of the river by UPDF during the
consolidation of their bridgehead. So far no further notice of their
whereabouts.
25
___ U_N_I_T_E_D_N_A_T_I_O_N_S _ NAT IO NS UN IE S
\ • On 13th June four foreign nuns (Sor Giovana from Italy, Sor Caroline
\ from Mexico, Sor Angeles and Sor Mariluz from Spain) reported at our
HQ that RP A settled their defensive positions around their convent at
La Plateu turning them into human shields.
• Not only adults were seriously affected but also infants, such as about
sixty children who were wandering within La Procure clueless of their
relatives wellbeing. In addition, two children were found still hugging
their mother who was lying dead for about two days.
• To make matters worse some alive ammunition was left behind after
the UPDF withdrawal causing the death of three children who where
playing with hand grenades. This ammunition was finally collected
and properly disposed by both RPA and UPDF after the reiterated
requests of our MILOBs and the International Committee of the Red
Cross' delegate.
F. Command
1. Chain of Command
- It was remarkable the permanent and unconditional backing during the
crisis given to our MILOBs at the fteld by the highest political level from the
SRSG, Ambassador Kernel Morjane to the UN Secretary General himself.
- From the military, the MONUC Force Commander, Gen. Montaga Diallo, in
permanent contact with us put constant pressure on both RP A and UPDF
highest military authorities to stress the need of coming into a cease-fire. The
MONUC COS, Col. Hamish McNinch, within a close supervision and friendly
direction gave us the necessary freedom of maneuvering, essential to succeed.
- The attentive attitude of both the Chief Administrative Officer Mr. Paul
Ardagjanian and the acting Chief of Integrated Support Services, Lt. Col.
Carlos Polcaro, made us feel pretty confident on the capabilities of working
out any major logistic problem.
- It was a pleasure to work together with Col. Steve Gagnon and Col. Zureck
Julian who consciously performed their duties representing the MONUC
authority at Kisangani.
- All the Team Leaders were the key to carry out the cease-fire operation,
through their permanent assessment and outstanding command of the
respective MILOBs .
- As Chief of Staff of the Operational HQ of MONUC at Kisangani and on
behalf of all MILOBs I commanded, I am glad to express our gratitude to
everybody's cooperation at MONUC HQ during the crisis.
26
___U_ N_I_T_E_D_N_A_T_I O_N_S _ NAT I ON S UN IE S
• The civilian population of Kisangani was affected "in extremis" and
fully relied on MONUC' s presence to sustain the horror and sufferings
of such a war. Both RP A and UPDF committed violations of the
international law, which can be judged by interested humanitarian
agencies. DRC Government imposed restrictions to the humanitarian
help by not allowing flights to Kisangani without passing through
Kinshasa
• The close pursuit of international press, particularly BBC and CNN,
was a positive factor to the resolution of the crisis. Unfortunately, the
local press highly influenced the population against MONUC's
purposes.
• The MONUC was able to overcome the situation of peace enforcement
with equipment and organization of Peacekeepers, thanks to the
professional and at times heroic spirit of MONUC MILOBs.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
• Due consideration be given to the role of international press in
publicising such conflicts, it is imperative at local level a Radio
Broadcasting to be established by MONUC like in the case of UNTAC.
• MILOBs cannot perform full-day monitoring tasks without the close
protection of an armed force. Considering the Jungle terrain of
Kisangani Sector and based on my personal experience as troop
commander and local military governor in Cambodia, I recommend
deploying there ASAP a 2 Coys light force of professional soldiers
trained to operate with helicopters.
As representative of a UN peacekeeping mission I believe in the fundamental truth of all
religions and fully respect all those who choose to be non-believers. I am deeply impressed by
the faith and courage shown by the people of Kisangani, who survived many years of
catastrophic war imposed on their homeland by foreigners. Following a tradition of my
country, I wish to say my words as witnessed by the Lord and offer all my services as Chief of
Staff of Kisangani MONUC Operational HQ to the Virgin Mary of Verdun, · as, Uruguay.
KINSHA ~. DRC, 19TH UN£, 00
Lt. Col. Danilo Paiva
28
ANNEX 4.22
United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, document S/2000/566, 12 June 2000
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- 110 -
- 111 -
- 112 -
ANNEX 4.23
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh Session, Report on the situation
of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with Commission on
Human Rights resolution 2000/15, document E/CN.4/2001/40,
1 February 2001
(Excerpts)
- 113 -
UNITED
NATIONS
E
Economic and Social
Council
Distr.
GENERAL
E/CN.4/2001/40
1 February 2001
ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH/FRENCH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-seventh session
Item 9 of the provisional agenda
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD
Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/15
GE.01-10837 (E)
- 114 -
E/CN.4/2001/40
page 2
Summary
Mandate
Since 1994, the Commission on Human Rights has been studying the situation of human
rights in the Republic of Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is the
seventh annual report of the Special Rapporteur and it is submitted in accordance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/15, which extended his mandate for one year.
In resolution A/C.3/55/L.62, the General Assembly requested him to submit a further report
in 2001. The Commission on Human Rights also requested him, together with the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and a member of the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, to conduct an investigation into human rights
violations and breaches of international humanitarian law committed between 1996 and 1997 in
the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, security conditions permitting. The
requirements of the resolution have not been met.
Activities
The Special Rapporteur carried out a mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
visiting the area governed by the Government and by two of the rebel groups, which, with
foreign support, control over 50 per cent of the territory of the country. He attended a special
session of the Security Council on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and was later received
by the Security Council at a special meeting under the so-called “Arria formula”. He spoke
with the highest authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, RCD, MLC, the
United Nations, the Facilitator for inter-Congolese dialogue, United Nations agencies and
non-governmental organizations. Although he was prepared to undertake more than one mission
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Geneva, as on other occasions, administrative
formalities prevented him from doing so.
Main conclusions
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, nine armed internal, international and
internationalized internal conflicts are going on with the participation of 6 national armies and
21 irregular groups. The most serious conflict is the one which pits Rwanda, Uganda and
Burundi, together with the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), against the Kinshasa
Government. RCD has split many times and the pro-Uganda and pro-Rwanda factions have
fought on Congolese soil, causing death and destruction in a foreign country. In another conflict,
the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) is fighting the Government of
President Kabila. Another conflict, started by Ugandan soldiers, opposes the Hema and Lendu
ethnic groups. The victims of all these conflicts are always Congolese. In its
resolution 1304 (2000), the Security Council expressly recognized that Uganda and Rwanda
have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Earlier, it described these two countries as “uninvited”.
- 115 -
E/CN.4/2001/40
page 3
None of the parties has respected the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, although the
forces’ positions have remained relatively stable. Without consultations, the Government
suspended the Agreement and has seriously hampered the work of the United Nations observer
mission, to which it agreed in Lusaka.
Violations of human rights attributed to the Kinshasa Government
The most serious are violations of public freedoms: liberty of person (many persons are
arrested for political reasons, regarded as traitors and sentenced as such), freedom of expression
and opinion (more than 35 journalists were arrested, threatened or sentenced during the year and
the media were warned by the Government about restrictions on what they could say) and
freedom of association (non-governmental organizations are not recognized). There have also
been cases of torture, some resulting in death. There have been attempts on people’s lives, but
less frequently than in RCD-controlled territory. President Kabila did not keep his word about
suspending the death penalty, which continues to be applied.
The Government has not taken any step in the direction of democracy and political
parties which do not adapt to new and inadmissible requirements continue to be prohibited.
Without consulting any social or political sector, it established a constituent assembly which is
lacking in representativity and in no way reduces the absolute powers assumed by the President
when he won out against Mobutu in 1997. The inter-Congolese dialogue agreed on in
Lusaka (1999) has been rejected by the Government.
Human rights violations in RCD-controlled territory
In the eastern regions occupied by the “rebel” or “aggressor” forces, there continues to be
a climate of terror imposed by the armies of Rwanda, Uganda - and sometimes Burundi - and
RCD. As in past years, massacres and other atrocities have been committed against the local
population. Foreign soldiers operate with full impunity. Torture has led to a number of deaths.
Liberty of person is violated and many non-governmental organization activists were detained or
threatened during the year. There are no independent media and the scant information provided
by organs of civil society is suppressed. Any dissent or opposition is presented as collaboration
with Kabila or as “attempted genocide”. There are frequent reports of transfers of Congolese to
Rwanda and especially to Uganda, including children (to be drafted into the Ugandan army) and
refugees, contrary to the principle of non-refoulement. The death penalty has been applied in a
number of cases, and this is a step backwards compared to the situation one year previously.
There have been attacks on parish churches and religious centres, priests and ministers have been
murdered, meetings in churches prohibited and the archbishop of Bukavu prevented from
carrying out his functions.
There is no room at all for political participation. RCD governs as a party-State and it
also relies on a paramilitary militia, the Local Defence Unit (ADL), which has carried out many
attacks.
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E/CN.4/2001/40
page 4
Breaches of international humanitarian law committed by Government forces
The Government is responsible for the breaches of international humanitarian law
committed by the Mai-Mai, which it has incorporated into the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC).
It is also responsible for bombings of civilian populations: Gemena, Boma, Libenge (hospital).
Breaches of international humanitarian law committed by rebel forces allied to the
uninvited countries
In reprisal for attacks on soldiers whom the Congolese population calls “aggressors”,
RCD forces retaliate by massacring defenceless civilian populations with machetes or knives and
guns, causing thousands of victims, most notoriously in Ngenge, Kalehe; Kilambo; Katogota,
Kamanyola, Lurbarika, Luberezi, Cidaho, Uvira, Shabunda; Lusenda-Lubumba, Lulingu,
Butembo and Mwenga, in November 1999, when 15 women were buried alive after being
tortured.
Situation of human rights advocates
The situation of human rights advocates is very precarious and dangerous. Throughout
the territory, they are persecuted, detained and threatened and their offices are shut down. In the
territory controlled by Kinshasa, they are regarded as allies of the Rwandans or the rebels and, in
the east, as allies of Kabila.
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E/CN.4/2001/40
page 5
REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, SUBMITTED BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR,
MR. ROBERTO GARRETÓN, IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION 2000/15
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1 - 19 10
A. Mandate .............................................................................. 1 - 2 10
B. Activities and administrative obstacles .............................. 3 - 12 10
C. Pending activities and investigations .................................. 13 - 14 12
D. International obligations of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo ....................................................................... 15 - 16 12
E. Reprisals against individuals who cooperate with the
United Nations .................................................................... 17 - 19 12
II. THE VARIOUS ARMED CONFLICTS .................................... 20 - 47 13
A. The conflict between the Government and the
Congolese Rally for Democracy ......................................... 21 - 26 13
B. The conflict between the Government and the
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo ........................ 27 14
C. Clashes between Ugandan and Rwandan military
forces in Kisangani ............................................................. 28 - 30 15
D. Tribal conflict between the Balendu and the Bahema ........ 31 15
E. Ceasefire agreements and observance thereof .................... 32 - 39 15
F. Impact of the war; refugees and displaced persons ............ 40 - 45 17
G. Situation of persons at risk ................................................. 46 - 47 18
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CONTENTS (continued)
Paragraphs Page
III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION
IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY ................ 48 - 58 18
IV. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION
IN TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY REBEL
MOVEMENTS ........................................................................... 59 - 72 21
V. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO ....................................................................... 73 - 108 23
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN
TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY RCD AND MLC ...................... 109 - 136 29
A. In RCD-controlled territory ................................................ 109 - 135 29
B. In MLC-controlled territory ................................................ 136 34
VII. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW ........................................................... 137 - 152 34
A. Violations by the Government, allies and related
groups ................................................................................. 137 - 140 34
B. Violations by RCD, RCD/ML, MLC and allied foreign
military forces ..................................................................... 141 - 152 35
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................... 153 - 180 36
A. Conclusions ........................................................................ 153 - 174 36
B. Recommendations .............................................................. 175 - 180 40
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CONTENTS (continued)
Annexes
Page
I. Reports and resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights
and the General Assembly ............................................................................. 43
II. Talks held during the mission to New York (24-29 January 2000) ............... 44
III. Officials, eminent persons and institutions with whom the Special
Rapporteur met and places he visited during his mission to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (13-25 August 2000) ............................. 45
IV. International instruments to which the Democratic Republic of
the Congo is a party ....................................................................................... 47
V. Armed conflicts taking place in the territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo ................................................................................................... 48
VI. Irregular armed groups directly or indirectly involved in the armed
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ........................................ 49
VII. Non-exhaustive list of human rights violations committed in territory
under the control of the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and brought to the Special Rapporteur’s attention
(16 December 1999 to 11 December 2000) ................................................... 50
VIII. Non-exhaustive list of human rights violations committed in territory
under the control of rebel movements and brought to the Special
Rapporteur’s attention (16 December 1999 to 11 December 2000) .............. 63
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Abbreviations
ACL - PT Constituent and Legislative Assembly - Transitional Parliament
ANR National Information Agency (Agence nationale de renseignements)
APR Rwandan Patriotic Army
ASADHO Association africaine de défense des droits de l’homme
CEDA Centre d’études, de documentation et d’animation civique
COM Military Court (Cour de l’ordre militaire)
CNONGD Conseil national des organisations non-gouvernementales de développement
CRONGD Conseil régional des organisations non-gouvernementales de développement
CPRK Kinshasa Penal and Rehabilitation Centre
DEMIAP Detection of Unpatriotic Activities Police (Détection militaire des activités
anti-patrie)
FAC Congolese Armed Forces
ex-FAR Former Rwandan Armed Forces
GSSP Special Presidential Security Group (Groupe spécial de sécurité présidentielle)
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
MLC Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (Mouvement pour la libération
du Congo)
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPR People’s Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement populaire pour la révolution)
OAU Organization of African Unity
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PALU Unified Lumumbist Party
PDSC Democratic Social Christian Party
PIR Rapid Intervention Police (Police d’intervention rapide)
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RCD Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie)
RCD/ML Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement (Rassemblement congolais
pour la démocratie/Mouvement de libération)
RCD/Goma Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement congolais pour
la démocratie)/Goma
REFECO Regroupement des femmes congolaises
RTNC Congolese National Radio and Television Corporation (Radio Télévision
Nationale Congolaise)
SADC Southern African Development Community
SCEPDHO Structure de culture, d’éducation populaire et des droits de l’homme
SOPROP Solidarité pour la promotion sociale et la paix
UDPS Union for Democracy and Social Progress
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
VSV Voix des sans Voix
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I. INTRODUCTION1
A. Mandate
1. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the former Zaire, submits his seventh report to the Commission on Human Rights,
in accordance with Commission resolution 2000/15. Pursuant to that resolution and
General Assembly document A/54/361, the Special Rapporteur submitted his fourth
interim report to the Assembly. The present report covers incidents that occurred up
to 11 December 2000.
2. In its resolution 55/117, the General Assembly renewed the Special Rapporteur’s
mandate and requested him to submit a new report at its fifty-sixth session. Annex I lists the
resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly, as well as all the
reports of the Special Rapporteur.
B. Activities and administrative obstacles
3. The Special Rapporteur participated in the special session of the Security Council held in
January 2000 to consider the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, convinced that
human rights matters cannot be separated from the settlement of conflicts, whose root cause is
the violation of human rights. The so-called “Carlsson report” (S/1999/1257) on the actions of
the United Nations during the genocide in Rwanda had recently been issued and it highlights the
fact that the genocide took place largely because the report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, which was released just weeks before the
genocide began and which announced that it was in preparation, had not been heeded and no
measures had been taken to avoid the genocide. The Special Rapporteur took the opportunity to
meet with the officials listed in annex II.
4. The Special Rapporteur then visited Geneva to submit his report at the fifty-sixth session
of the Commission on Human Rights. He attended the annual meeting of the special rapporteurs
and chairpersons of working groups of the Commission in June and then attended the
fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly to submit his interim report. In New York, the
Security Council preferred to hear the Special Rapporteur in closed session under the so-called
“Arria formula”. The Special Rapporteur hopes that the very interesting exchange of views that
took place will help the Security Council formulate the decisions it must take in its efforts to
bring peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
5. Despite the requests he made, the Special Rapporteur was able to carry out only
one two-week fact-finding mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a single visit to
Geneva during the year to prepare his interim report. The United Nations administration did not
agree that he should carry out a second visit to Europe (to Belgium or Geneva) or that his field
trip should last at least three weeks. It was even implied that the Special Rapporteur should
carry out the field trip without the help of his assistant. During this trip, the Special Rapporteur
held the meetings and visited the places listed in annex III.
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6. The Special Rapporteur is compelled to draw the attention of the Commission on
Human Rights to the difficult circumstances in which he has to carry out his duties. The only
assistance he receives is from an extremely efficient assistant in the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, who, unfortunately, also has responsibility for five other
States. Not only does the assistant have to undertake field trips to deal with her other activities,
but she also has no permanent contract and is forced to take a month-long break from work.
7. The President of the Security Council (the Ambassador of the United States of America
to the United Nations), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the leaders of the Congolese Rally for Democracy
(Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie) (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of
the Congo (Mouvement pour la libération du Congo) (MLC), eight ambassadors in Kinshasa,
senior officials from the United Nations in New York and the heads of United Nations agencies
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo expressed concern about the fact that the Special
Rapporteur was paying only one brief visit to the country, rightly maintaining that that would
affect his credibility.
8. Although his work is not remunerated, the Special Rapporteur has been and is still
prepared to carry out his mandate in the best way possible, for which he needs not only more
dedicated administrative support, but also, basically, to be able to carry out at least two visits a
year to the country that is the subject of his mandate and two missions to the countries with the
largest concentration of Congolese.
9. Furthermore, the United Nations administration is making it more and more difficult for
special rapporteurs to carry out their work. Subsistence allowances are not paid (only advances
are given against payment at a later date, which usually takes longer than eight months).2 Worse
still, extraordinary air-travel itineraries are chosen for missions (instead of a 10-hour non-stop
flight from Santiago to New York, a flight is chosen with two stop overs, a change of planes
and 15 hours’ flying time) and the Special Rapporteur is told of this only 6 hours before
departure, when the travel authorization has been issued a fortnight earlier. To give another
example, when the Special Rapporteur accepted another non-remunerated assignment to attend a
seminar in Ethiopia, he was sent, a few hours before the flight was due to take off, a ticket for
Geneva because it was cheaper. As a result of such absurdities, one fellow special rapporteur
refrained from introducing his report to the General Assembly in person and another, quite
rightly, decided not to continue with his mandate.
10. During his mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (13-25 August 2000), the
Special Rapporteur visited Kinshasa. He also visited Goma, Bukavu and Kisangani, which are
under the control of RCD/Goma, and Gbadolite, which was captured by MLC. Both the
Government and rebel authorities permitted him to work and conduct his interviews freely.
Obstacles were encountered, however, when he attempted to visit the military and police
detention centres in Kinshasa and Bukavu. He also had meetings with or reviewed the reports of
political parties and of intergovernmental and non-governmental institutions and organizations
(see E/CN.4/2000/42, annexes II-V).
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11. The Special Rapporteur transmitted 60 communications and urgent appeals on
behalf of 196 persons to the Government and 12 allegations of human rights violations
concerning 20 persons. Nine of these were acknowledged, but he was given no information.
12. RCD authorities submitted two extensive reports to the Special Rapporteur, which the
latter welcomes.
C. Pending activities and investigations
Joint mission to investigate allegations of massacres committed in 1996
13. In paragraph 5 (b) of its resolution 2000/15, the Commission on Human Rights renewed
the mandate of the joint mission established by its resolution 1997/58 to investigate, as soon as
security considerations permitted and, where appropriate, in cooperation with the National
Commission of Inquiry, the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
committed in the former Zaire between 1996 and 1997.
14. The Government also requested the Secretary-General to carry out an investigation into
the events that occurred in the locality of Ituri (letter of 8 February 2000), as well as an
investigation into allegations concerning the deaths of 15 women who were buried alive or burnt
in Mwenga, situated in RCD-controlled territory. Both the Government and RCD requested
special investigations into the Katogota massacre. Because of the prevailing insecurity and lack
of financial resources, these investigations are still pending.
D. International obligations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
15. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a party to the international human rights and
international humanitarian law instruments listed in annex IV. The former Zaire has been a party
since 8 June 1997 to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
(Protocol I), but, contrary to the announcement, has not acceded to the second Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions. The Government is late in submitting 10 reports to treaty
bodies. It has not completed a single report or replied to the communications addressed to it by
the special thematic mechanisms.
16. On 25 May, the Government signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and, on 8 September, the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Special Rapporteur, as well as
congratulating the Government, urges it to ratify both instruments as soon as possible.
E. Reprisals against individuals who cooperate with the United Nations
17. The Special Rapporteur denounces the reprisals taken against the following persons who
cooperated with him during his visits or who submitted reports to him, pursuant to Commission
on Human Rights resolution 2000/20.
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18. In territory controlled by RCD/Goma:
Monsignor Emmanuel Kataliko, Archbishop of Bukavu, who was interviewed by
the Special Rapporteur, was detained and subsequently exiled to Butembo on
12 February 2000;
Collete Kitoga was arrested in Goma upon her return from the fifty-sixth session of the
Commission on Human Rights;
Gervais Chirhalwira Nkunzimwami, Paulin Bapolisi Bahuga, Regine Mutijima Bazalake
and Alois Muzalia Wakyebwa, leaders of civil society in South Kivu with whom the
Special Rapporteur met on 18 August, were arrested 10 days later;
Marcelin Musemakweli, Muzalia Loochi, Francolis Maheshe, Michel Aissi,
Raphael Wakenge, Venantie Bisinwa, Mushagalusha, Baharanyi Bya Dunia,
Jules Lwesso, Moïse Cifende, Dunia Yogolelo, Kizungu, Judge Emmanuel Shamavu,
Kiza Kamatando, Moro Tubibu, Nestor Bauma and Joli Yaya, leaders of civil society and
non-governmental human rights organizations, were arrested and brutally beaten
on 9 October for having talks, a few days earlier in Bukavu, with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mrs. Mary Robinson. Many of them also met
with the Special Rapporteur during his visit to that city.
19. In territory controlled by RCD/ML:
Sylvain Mudimbi Masudi was arrested in Beni for attending the session of the
Commission on Human Rights and was transferred to Uganda.
II. THE VARIOUS ARMED CONFLICTS
20. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is bedevilled by various armed conflicts, some
international (the Democratic Republic of the Congo against Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi,
which receive RCD support, in the east) and others which are not international, but which have
been internationalized by the participation of foreign troops (the conflict between the Bahema
and the Balendu in the north-east). Others again are conflicts between outsiders fought in the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Republic of the Congo against various
opposition militias; Angolan, Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan rebels against their respective
Governments), which should be seen as outsiders’ internal conflicts that have become
internationalized (see annex V). At least six national armies3 and 21 irregular armed groups
(see annex VI) are involved in the conflicts, which all take place entirely in the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose population has been decimated.
A. The conflict between the Government and the Congolese
Rally for Democracy
21. The conflict between the Government and RCD, which began on 2 August 2000
following Rwanda’s invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is the most serious of
the conflicts, not only because of its political and economic repercussions, but also because it
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restricts the enjoyment of the civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights of the entire
region. The Security Council, in its resolution 1304 (2000), explicitly recognized that Uganda
and Rwanda “have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo”. The Security Council had previously called those two countries “uninvited”.
22. On one side are the armies of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and RCD/Goma, together with
its paramilitary group, the Local Defence Unit (ADL). During his visit to the country, the
Special Rapporteur received evidence of the involvement, on behalf of the armies of Rwanda and
Uganda, of Interahamwe deserters and Rwandan Bahutu prisoners, who were released and sent
to the front. The mineral riches of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Katanga,
Orientale province and Kasai Oriental have been so depleted by foreign troops and RCD that the
Security Council established an expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and
other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by occupying and rebel forces.4
23. The Government has relied for its defence on its own armed forces (FAC) and on
counter-rebel militias: it has open and confirmed ties to the Mai-Mai,5 a group that is gaining in
popularity with a local population tired of being subjected to the control of forces they consider
foreign. It also has informal ties to other “counter-rebels”: RCD deserters, Rwandan Bahutu
Interahamwe (the “Mongol” militia), members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and
Burundian Bahutu, among others.
24. The violence always follows the same pattern: it is unleashed by the attacks of the
counter-rebels against military forces which they consider to be aggressors. The response of the
Rwandan army, RCD and the Burundian army is to attack the defenceless civilian population,
committing indescribable massacres, such as those that took place at Katogota, on 15 May,
Kamanyola, Lurbarika and Luberizi, or the massacre in July on the Lusenda-Lubumba highway,
as well as the events - denied, as others have been, by RCD/Goma - that took place in Mwenga
in November 1999, in which 15 women were tortured and buried alive (see the report of the
Secretary-General in document S/2000/330, para. 61).
25. Some Banyamulenges (Batutsi of Rwandan origin, not recognized as having Congolese
nationality), who started the first war against the dictator Mobutu (1996-1997), have been
responsible for violent incidents aimed at RCD, as they were fed up at being the target of the
resentment of the Congolese over the abuses committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR).
26. Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), cited above, demands that Uganda and Rwanda
“withdraw all their forces” from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that this withdrawal
should be reciprocated by the other parties. The Secretary-General reported at the beginning of
December that neither Rwanda nor Uganda had withdrawn their troops.
B. The conflict between the Government and the Movement
for the Liberation of the Congo
27. In Equateur province, MLC, with the support of Uganda and the involvement, for which
there is convincing evidence, of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA), is fighting the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), which are supported by Zimbabwe
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and Namibia. It is in this province that the parties have shown the least respect for the ceasefire
and indeed the rebel leader has long maintained that he felt under no obligation to observe it.
President Kabila contends that MLC has rendered the ceasefire agreement null and void.
C. Clashes between Ugandan and Rwandan military forces in Kisangani
28. The conflict that best illustrates Rwanda’s and Uganda’s lust for conquest is the one in
Kisangani, the third largest city in the country, between the “uninvited armies” of Rwanda and
Uganda (supported by RCD/ML). Kisangani was previously under the control of the two RCD
factions, but, since the bloody clashes that destroyed the city on 5 and 9 May and 9 June, it has
been ruled with an iron fist by Rwanda and RCD/Goma. The cause of the conflict is both
economic (both armies want the huge wealth of Orientale province) and political (control of the
territory).
29. The Special Rapporteur saw for himself the destruction wreaked on the city by the
foreign armies, especially in the fighting in June. In addition to casualties among the soldiers,
about 1,000 Congolese civilians died and thousands more were wounded.
30. Calls for a ceasefire, including from the Security Council, went unheeded and moves
towards demilitarization were disregarded the very next day. Only the most recent agreement on
the withdrawal of the troops from the city appears to have been complied with.
D. Tribal conflict between the Balendu and the Bahema
31. This is a political and artificial conflict caused by the Ugandan presence in the region, but
it has been classed as a tribal conflict. Except for some incidents in 1911, 1923 and 1966, these
two ethnic groups had lived side by side without major difficulties for nearly three centuries.
However, since they arrived in the Ituri region, the Ugandan troops have encouraged and given
military support to the Bahema (who are of Ugandan origin) to seize land from the Balendu, who
have been in the region longer. All the officials appointed by the Ugandan soldiers are from the
Hema ethnic group. The current confrontations, which flared up again in August 2000, have
resulted in some 10,000 deaths and the displacement of some 50,000 people.
E. Ceasefire agreements and observance thereof
32. In the previous year’s report (E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 18 and annex X), it was reported
that, thanks to pressure from the international community, the parties concluded a ceasefire
agreement in Lusaka in 1999. As they did not abide by the agreement, the timetable had to be
adjusted (Lusaka, 12 February 2000; Kampala, 1 March and 8 April 2000). Only the last
agreement was observed, except in the fighting between MLC and RCD. Despite some
outbreaks of heavy fighting for example, in October, forces loyal to the Government attacked the
positions of RCD and the aggressors in Katanga; in November, the latter re-took Pepa; and, in
December, there was fighting in Pweto; the positions held by the belligerents in August 1999
have, on the whole, not changed a great deal. The most serious matter is the continued use of
hate speech, about which the General Assembly recently expressed its concern in paragraph 2 (b)
of its resolution A/C.3/55/L.62.
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68. The population’s opposition is illustrated by various acts of protest, such as the strikes
held in Bukavu (including the strikes by students on 24 January and from 31 January
to 6 February 2000; a demonstration by women in Kisangani on 31 January 2000; strikes in
Goma on 14 February and in Uvira and Kindu; and a highly successful week-long beer strike in
Bukavu in April). In July the Banyamulenge expressed their displeasure with the massacres of
the local population, which had made their own situation worse, by organizing marches in
Bukavu and Uvira. Women also demonstrated in Bukavu and Uvira in August to voice their
unhappiness with various measures.
69. RCD has frequently split into factions (see E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 43) and efforts at
reunification are being made not among Congolese leaders, who appear to be leading the
factions, but between the Presidents of Uganda and Rwanda (November 1999 and January 2000).
In March, three RCD/Goma leaders defected and were later accused, as usual, of spying by
Kabila; subsequently, other internal dissidents broke away and formed RCD/National, which is
headed by Roger Lumbala and has its headquarters at Bafwasende, near Kisangani. In October,
RCD/Goma abruptly replaced the man who had been its leader until then, Dr. Emile Elunga,
with Dr. Adolphe Onusumba, although it received support from Nzanga Mobutu, son of the
former dictator.
70. RCD/Bunia also split into factions. In April and August, attempts to depose the head of
that group were defeated through the influence, once again, of the President of Uganda and his
army, while, in September, the Ugandan army put down an uprising against Chairman Wamba,
with the rebels transferred to Kampala. Towards the end of 2000, the split between Wamba’s
faction and that of his former collaborators, Ateenyi Tibasima and Mbusa Nyamwisi, who are
supported by Uganda, which had produced confrontations and roughly 40 deaths, became
definitive.
71. The smaller RCD/Bunia faction has also taken steps that have stirred up the population,
such as supporting the Hema against the Lendu or the creation of the Kibali-Ituri province to
favour the former.
72. In the territory controlled by MLC, the people do not live in terror, but there is one-party
rule. The representative of civil society to the dialogue that was to be held in Benin was
appointed by MLC. The brief duration of the visit to Gbadolite made it impossible to obtain
further information.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO11
Right to life
73. While there have been infringements of the right to life, massacres do not generally occur
in the western part of the country as frequently as they do in the area controlled by RCD.
74. Death penalty. On numerous occasions (10 December 1999, 27 January 2000,
23 August 2000 and 2 September 2000), President Kabila or one of his ministers has announced
or informed the Special Rapporteur or the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
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detained for insisting that their examinations were valid in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo; and repeated instances of rape of women detainees, particularly in “Chien méchant”.
Those who resist are generally beaten. Rapes by Ugandan soldiers have also been reported in
Butembo, especially in Kihinga, Ruenda, Isango, Mutiri, Mukuna and Butalirya districts.
Situation of children
133. As in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, RCD is establishing a commission for the
demobilization of child soldiers. However, MONUC has noted that the level of recruitment of
children is much higher in the east than in the areas under Kabila. This is the case, for example,
in Nyaleke, near Beni, where Ugandan soldiers are training 10-year-old children. What is worse,
Congolese children are being deported to Uganda (see para. 117 above).
134. In flagrant violation of article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, minor
children of all ages who are suspected of offences are deprived of their liberty in ordinary
prisons, including security services prisons (Eric Mburanumwe Haguna, 12 years old, has been
held in Bureau II in Sake, North Kivu, since 14 November).
Freedom of conscience and religion
135. The persecution in RCD territory of Catholic and Protestant churches because of their
messages of peace has been particularly serious. One Catholic bishop said that the only thing
that united Rwandans and Ugandans was their hatred of the Catholic Church, but this also
applies to other Christian churches and to religious organizations in general. In the east, the
majority Catholic Church has been the most persecuted: priests have been murdered, the
Archbishop of Bukavu was banished, there have been attacks on convents and parish houses and
so forth. On 6 February, APR soldiers killed the pastor of a Protestant church (Mumboleo) in
Kilambo, North Kivu, and there have been many other similar incidents.
B. In MLC-controlled territory
136. There is minimal information on the region, since there is very little civic activity. There
are very few non-governmental organizations and newspapers. The Special Rapporteur spent a
few hours visiting the small village of Gbadolite, but was unable to visit other towns where there
were more victims of human rights violations.
VII. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A. Violations by the Government, allies and related groups
137. The Government is responsible for the bombing of the Libenge hospital on 27 July, the
bombing of Gemena, Boma (14 killed on 22 October), and other bombings that affected the
civilian population. It has also shot down aircraft carrying poliomyelitis vaccine (war
against MLC).
138. The Government’s support for the Mai-Mai makes it responsible for the offences
committed by the latter. While they generally attack Rwandan and RCD soldiers, they have also
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committed violence against civilians suspected of collaborating with those they regard as “the
enemy”. The high degree of popularity they enjoy among the Congolese does not absolve them
of responsibility. Incidents involving brutality include those that occurred at Lubero in April and
at Nyabibwe, Numbi (50 dead) and Kihuha in July.
139. The Interahamwe and former FAR combatants are responsible for attacks on the civilian
population in Loashi, Luhinzi, Rutshuru, Kione, Ngesha, Kahuzi-Biega (nine gorilla researchers
killed), Nyabiungu (seven persons killed on 13 October) and Munigi (nine persons killed
on 1 November). It is common for women and girls to be raped in the villages attacked.
140. It should be noted that freed Rwandan prisoners who had been held in Kinshasa
acknowledged that they had been well treated while held prisoner by the Zimbabweans, to the
extent that, as they told the Special Rapporteur, at least four of them preferred to remain in
Kinshasa rather than return to their country.
B. Violations by RCD, RCD/ML, MLC and allied foreign military forces
141. The population does not distinguish among the various components of RCD, which it
identifies as Rwandan soldiers or Banyamulenge.
142. Any attack by members of the Interahamwe, Mai-Mai or similar groups is met with
violence that is utterly disproportionate: innocent civilians having nothing to do with the conflict
are massacred and the death toll is high. Mere suspicion of sympathy with the Mai-Mai
provokes reprisals against the civilian population: Ngenge (November 1999), Kalehe
(December 1999, 23 dead), Kilambo (February, 60 dead), Katogota (May, between 40
and 300 dead), Kamanyola, Lurbarika, Luberezi, Cidaho, Uvira, Shabunda, Lusenda-Lubumba
(July, 150 dead), Lulingu (August, 300 to 700 dead, including children, women and many
disabled persons) and Butembo (11 September, 24 civilians killed).
143. Church-connected sites, particularly health centres, have been special targets, in grave
violation of articles 18, 57 and 58 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949: the
Burhale parish house; the Mubumbabo health centre (March); the parish house and maternity
clinic at Ciherano (April); the parish house and convent at Kabare and the Kabare hospital
(May-June); the Murhesa seminary and parish house (June); the Lwiro health centre (July); the
Luhwinja health centre and parish house (July); the Kaniola parish house and health centre
(August); the Mubumbano parish house in Walungu (2-3 October 2000); and so forth.
144. Particularly reprehensible is the treatment of prisoners by Rwandan soldiers. The Special
Rapporteur visited one Congolese soldier taken prisoner in Katanga who had been beaten,
tortured, castrated and abandoned, a practice condemned earlier by the Special Rapporteur (see
E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 117). The Special Rapporteur was surprised by the heartlessness and
cruelty displayed by the Second Vice-Chairman of RCD, Moïse Nyarugabu, when transmitting
the case. Without any proof, he said, “You don’t know how many he castrated”.
145. On other occasions, Rwandan soldiers, when attacking hospitals, have taken wounded
individuals suspected of being Mai-Mai out in order to shoot them in the street, as they did in
Lubero on 25 August.
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E/CN.4/2001/40
page 36
146. Humanitarian assistance has been intercepted and diverted to Congolese Tutsi repatriated
from Rwanda.
147. Burundian soldiers are accused of killing nine civilians in Sebele in retaliation for a
Mai-Mai attack in April.
148. Ugandan troops have also committed massacres, such as the one that took place in a
restaurant in Kirima on 28 August, when the owners and 10 customers were killed.
149. Extremely serious incidents occurred during the Ugandan-Rwandan fighting in
Kisangani; in addition, combatants from both sides have placed anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines around that city and these will wreak enormous devastation among the civilian population
in the future.
150. Ugandan soldiers, working together with Hema, have also committed atrocities against
civilians (in Libi, for example, where nine persons were killed in March) and taken civilians,
including children (Walendu Tatsi), prisoner.
151. Ugandan troops also shelled a boat in which women and children were fleeing the war,
killing some 30 persons; no assistance was given to them.
152. Proportionally, the Ugandan forces are more regular in the recruitment of children.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions
153. The catastrophe in Central Africa. Central Africa is a region of great riches, but its
inhabitants are living in extreme poverty. The dreadful legacy of slavery; the arbitrary partition
of borders without regard for territories and limits accepted by the original inhabitants;
colonization, with the lack of education and the looting of natural resources it left behind; and
the history of unscrupulous dictators - always with support from abroad, however, whether from
the former European metropolitan Power or from the great cold war Powers - are the cause of the
prices the peoples of Africa now have to pay.
154. Of the nine armed conflicts now going on in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, only
three involve inter-Congolese disputes: the Government against RCD (various factions); the
Government against MLC; and Balendu against Bahema. And all three were triggered by the
participation of invading forces. This is particularly significant because, although the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo has nearly 400 ethnic groups and 50 million inhabitants,
co-existence has historically been peaceful. No one denies that there have always been disputes
about land problems, but these were always settled through action by traditional chiefs (in the
case, for example, of conflicts between Balendu and Bahema in 1887, 1911, 1923 and 1966).
Only incitement by Ugandan soldiers has dragged these two ethnic groups into someone else’s
violence.
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ANNEX 4.24
United Nations Security Council, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission to
Kisangani (pursuant to Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), paragraph 14),
document S/2000/1153, 4 December 2000
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- 134 -
- 135 -
- 136 -
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- 139 -
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- 141 -
- 142 -
- 143 -
- 144 -
- 145 -
ANNEX 4.25
Claim of Société textile de Kisangani (SOTEXKI)
[Relevant extracts only]
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Claim of Société textile de Kisangani (SOTEXKI)
[Translation]
[Cover letter]
SOTEXKI DOSSIER
Société textile de Kisangani
Legal form: Private limited company
Nature of damage suffered: Material damage and looting as a result of the
war
Recording authority or office: Public Prosecutor’s office at the Kisangani
Tribunal de grande instance;
Governmental Victim Identification
Commission.
Documents appended:
Victim identification form, E2: businesses;
Memorandum No. 787/KKK/DPJ/707/99 of 14 September 1999 of the criminal
investigation department of the Public Prosecutor’s office at the Kisangani Tribunal de
grande instance;
Memorandum No. 790/KKK/DPJ/707/99 of 28 October [1999] of the criminal
investigation department of the Public Prosecutor’s office at the Kisangani Tribunal de
grande instance;
Evaluation total: US$1,642,224
Certified by the Government public debt department.
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Victim identification form, E2: businesses
Form No. 1
1. Name: SOCIÉTÉ TEXTILE DE KISANGANI, in abbreviated form “SOTEXKI”
2. Head office: KISANGANI
3. Legal form: SARL (PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY)
4. NRC/Licence:
National ID:
033/KISANGANI ORD. 71-285 of 13/10/1971
4-931-A 10698 D Decree 004/2002 of 02/02/2002
5. Person responsible: 1. LELIO KELIO PICCIOTTO, DELEGATED ADMINISTRATOR
2. RIDJA DJOZA BUMA LORI, DIRECTOR AND GENERAL
MANAGER
6. Damage suffered:
Description Date Alleged perpetrators
Malicious destruction and looting of SOTEXKI’s
property and equipment during clashes with heavy
weapons between the Ugandans and Rwandans
inside the factory. See appendices:
Memorandum No. 787/KKK/DPJ/707/99 of
14/09/1999 established by the criminal
investigation department of the Public
Prosecutor’s office;
Memorandum recording the damage caused in
the different departments;
Memorandum No. 790/KKK/DPJ/707/99 of
28/10/1999 established by the criminal
investigation department of the Public
Prosecutor’s office regarding the assessment of
the destruction, losses and loss of revenue
suffered by SOTEXKI as a result of these
clashes;
Damage report No. KIS. 2002/400/020 of
15/09/2000 established by the OCC.
15-17
August 1999
The Ugandan and
Rwandan armies
[Appendices]
___________
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ANNEX 4.26
Claim of Société nationale d’électricité (SNEL)
[Relevant extracts only]
- 149 -
Claim of Société nationale d’électricité (SNEL)
[Translation]
[Cover letter]
REPORT OF THE MISSION TO COMPILE VARIOUS DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EVALUATION
OF THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE CONGOLESE STATE AS A RESULT OF THE UGANDAN
ARMY’S OCCUPATION OF CONGOLESE TERRITORY FROM 1998 TO 2003
May 2016
0. Introduction
In response to Note 752/BNS/302/KN/CQB/MIN/JGS&DH/2016 of 4 April 2016 from the
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and Keeper of the Seals, SNEL and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs held a joint meeting on Wednesday 20 April 2016 to discuss the inventory of the damage
caused to SNEL’s electricity distribution network as a result of the Ugandan army’s occupation of
part of the Congolese territory, which is contained in Note DG/2016/2647 of 6 April 2016. Further
to that meeting, SNEL’s senior management instructed us to contact the managers of the SNEL
entities in the provinces concerned, in order to gather data and compile documentary evidence to
support the figures in the aforementioned inventory.
We examined the dossier appended to Note DG/2008/00002742 of 17 September 2008,
submitted by SNEL, with a view to collecting data from Butembo centre in North Kivu province,
Basankusu, Bumba, Gbadolite and Lisala centres in Equateur province, and the city of Kisangani
centre in Orientale province.
Our analysis of the 2008 dossier showed that the following five distribution centres, which
had been victims of the occupation, had been omitted:
Butembo centre in North Kivu province;
Buta centre in Orientale province;
Libenge, Yakoma and Zongo centres in Equateur province.
1. State of play with data collection
Data collection on the ground is progressing as expected. Before contacting the managers in
the various provinces concerned, we first consulted several archives available here in Kinshasa.
This enabled us to compile certain information, including some relating to the value of the
property, and to collect three video tapes, which give an idea of the scale of the damage.
One general finding is that nearly all the thermal power plants in the area that was under
occupation were left in an indescribable state of ruin.
Information taken from the reports valuing SNEL’s assets in the territories concerned, drawn
up by the Commission on the valuation of SNEL’s assets (CVAS), enabled us to make the
following observations in connection with some of the power stations.
- 150 -
2. Difficulties encountered
We encountered a range of difficulties when analysing the dossier submitted by SNEL,
including the following:
The sites are scattered around three provinces in the interior of a country the size of a
continent.
There are no valuations of the assets concerned, since the property inventory was drawn up
after the withdrawal of the troops.
Some of the figures in the 2008 working document have neither a market price list nor a
procedure to support them and are therefore open to challenge.
The period of almost 18 years that has elapsed between the withdrawal of the troops and this
inquiry makes it impossible for the Commission to assemble the data accurately in Kinshasa
within the desired time frame.
Several staff who experienced this tragedy and could have shed more light on the dossier have
now died.
Many of the company’s archives which were kept in the provinces, including records of certain
transactions dealt with directly by the provinces at the time of the occupation, have been
destroyed.
No title deeds are available for many of the properties, making it more difficult to supply
evidence for some of the losses (see DCT/MANDA/CTB).
Photos of the aforementioned properties before they were damaged were destroyed when the
photo albums at the centres concerned, some of which were looted after the departure of the
negative forces, disappeared, which also poses a problem.
3. Guiding principles for valuing the property
As agreed during the meeting of 25 May 2016, our approach to the valuation, given that we
are dealing with war damage, was to identify all the property concerned and then, rather than
calculating the residual value of the relevant equipment or structures at the time that they were
damaged, to ascertain the cost of replacing the equipment, most of which is still idle. Purchasing
new equipment is the only option, since much of the equipment is out-dated and it would be
difficult to acquire the necessary spare parts to repair it. The same applies to the structures, which
are in such a poor state that they need to be completely rebuilt, since most of their frames had been
wrecked, while others had been razed to the ground.
We believe that this clearly defined approach, which was discussed previously at the level of
the sub-commission set up by SNEL for this purpose, will be adopted by the joint commission, and
that the results will meet with the approval of all the stakeholders. This will avoid any disputes
about the amounts which SNEL presents to the Government when the joint commission’s work is
complete.
4. Valuation methodology
We have ascertained the cost of replacing all the property, including structures and
electro-mechanical equipment, and including any whose capital cost might now be regarded as
- 151 -
written off, since it was not at the time of the events of around 18 years ago; we have done so
by taking the price of similar ones purchased new.
A number of fixed assets had been cannibalized, or switched off suddenly when they were no
longer even of any use; in such cases we have taken the value of similar ones purchased new.
Some fixed assets were given overall valuations in the first report, without a detailed
breakdown being provided; in those situations we have used the same values, unless
supporting evidence was available, in which case we have reassessed that evidence and taken
the result as the new valuation.
Some fixed assets were omitted from the first assessment; given that they were affected by the
disaster, we have ensured that they are included in this assessment.
In the haste to prepare the first assessment, some fixed assets were wrongly valued or the
damage they sustained was inaccurately described; we have either removed them or reassessed
them on the basis of the information provided by the managers of the entities in the provinces
concerned, who have helped to complete the file with the information they have available.
5. Summary table showing the valuation of the damage caused in all the centres
Interviews with the various different managers and an analysis of the supporting files show
that the damage is valued at a total of US$97,412,090.04.
[Detailed breakdown follows]
___________
- 152 -
ANNEX 4.27
Claim of the Régie des voies aériennes
[Relevant extracts only]
- 153 -
Claim of the Régie des voies aériennes
[Translation]
Presentation of the estimated total cost of the injuries suffered by the Congolese State during
the military activities of the Ugandan army, which caused damage between 1998 and 2003 to the
airports, facilities, equipment and other structures owned by the Régie des voies aériennes. The
damage falls into the categories shown in the following table:
Energy Navaids Telecommunication Runway lighting
No. Airport
[Detailed breakdown]
Total:
US$19,353,000
___________
- 154 -
ANNEX 4.28
Claim of the Archdiocese of Kisangani
[Relevant extracts only]
- 155 -
Claim of the Archdiocese of Kisangani
[Translation]
[Cover letter]
Archdiocese of Kisangani
Works to repair the damage caused by the war
of 5-10 June 2000
No. Site Amount
[List of 17 items]
Total (excluding taxes):
US$4,811,713.19
[Detailed breakdown of each item]
___________
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Volume VI - Annexes 4.8 - 4.14