Volume III - Annexes 3.1 - 3.8

Note: This translation has been prepared by the Registry for internal purposes and has no official
character
14684
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA)
SECOND PHASE
QUESTION OF REPARATION
MEMORIAL
OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
VOLUME 3
(Annexes 3.1 to 3.8)
September 2016
[Translation by the Registry]
LIST OF ANNEXES
Volume 3
Annexes 3.1 to 3.8
Annex Page
Chapter 3
3.1 United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, document A/55/403, 20 September 2000
1
3.2 United Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002
2
3.3 Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold. Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005
(excerpts)
16
3.4 United Nations Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2001/128, 12 February 2001 (excerpts)
70
3.5 Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood”. Ethnically Targeted Violence
in Northeastern DR Congo, Vol. 15, No. 11(A), July 2003
78
3.6 United Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, document S/2003/566, 27 May 2003
79
3.7 IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], Nairobi, 3 March 2000 108
3.8 Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à
l’autodétermination du peuple congolais”, 31 August 1999
109
ANNEX 3.1
United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document A/55/403, 20 September 2000
- 1 -
United Nations
• General Assembly
~'-.~
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item l 14 (c)
Human rights questions: human rights situations and
reports of special rapporteurs and representatives
Distr.: General
20 September 2000
English
Original: Spanish
Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Note by the Secretary-General•
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the
report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic
. Republic of the Congo, Mr. Roberto Garret6n (Chile), pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 54/179 and Commission on Human Rights decision 2000/15, endorsed by
the Economic and Social Council in its decision 2000/248.
* In accordance with General Assembly resolu1ion 54/248, sect. C, para. I. this report is being
submitted on 20 September 2000 so as lo include as much upda1ed information as possible.
00-65326 (E) 121000 181000
A,ss1403
A/55/403
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Contents
I. Introduction ......................................................... .
A. Mandate ........................................................ .
B. Activities and administrative obstacles ............................... .
C. Pending activities and investigations ................................. .
D. International obligations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ........ .
E. Reprisals against individuals who cooperated with the United Nations ..... .
II. The various armed conflicts ............................................ .
A. The conflict between the Government and RCD ....................... .
B. The conflict between the Government and M LC ....................... .
C. Clashes between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani .................... .
D. Tribal conflict between the Balendu and the Bahema ................... .
E. Ceasefire agreements and observance thereof .......................... .
F. Impact of the war ................................................ .
G. Situation of persons at risk ......................................... .
HI. Political development and democratization in Government-controlled territory .. .
IV. Political development and democratization in territory controlled by rebel
movements .......................................................... .
V. Human rights violations committed by the Government ..................... .
VI. Human rights violations committed in territory occupied by RCD and MLC .... .
VII. Violations of international humanitarian law .............................. .
A. Violations by the Government, allies and related groups ................. .
B. Violations by RCD, RCD/ML, MLC and allied foreign military forces ..... .
VIII. Conclusions and recommendations ...................................... .
A. Conclusions ..................................................... .
B. Recommendations ................................................ .
2
Paragraphs Page
1-14 3
3
2-8 3
9-10 3
11 4
12-14 4
15-37 4
16-21 4
22 5
23-25 5
26 5
27-31 5
32-36 6
37 6
38-42 6
43-52 7
53-75 8
76-93 10
94-106 12
94-97 12
98-106 12
107-131 13
107-125 13
126-131 15
I. Introduction
A. Mandate
1. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
submits his fourth preliminary report on the situation
of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (formerly Zaire) to the General Assembly,
pursuant to Assembly resolution 54/179 and
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/15. The
report covers incidents that occurred up to 25 August.
B. Activities and administrative obstacles
2. The Special Rapporteur participated in the special
session of the Security Council. held in January 2000
to consider the situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. convinced that human rights matters cannot
be separated from the settlement of conflicts, whose
root cause is the violation of human rights. The
Carlsson report on United Nations responsibility in the
Rwanda genocide, which concluded that the failure to
heed the report of a Commission on Human Rights
rapporteur had been one of the main reasons for the
genocide, had already been published.
3. In order to attend the special session of the
Security Council, the Special Rapporteur had to reduce
the length of his only visit to the Democratic Republic
of the Congo to only 10 days and limit his
consultations to just one in Geneva, where there are
few Congolese refugees.
4. The only assistance which the Special Rapporteur
received was from an extremely efficient assistant in
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, who, however, also has
responsibility for four other States.
5. The Ambassador of the United States of America
to the United Nations, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the leaders of the
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie {RCD)
and of the Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC).
ambassadors in Kinshasa and the heads of United
Nations agencies expressed concern at the fact that the
Special Rapporteur had paid only one brief visit to the
country, which they felt would affect his credibility.
A/55/403
6. During his mission to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo ( 13-26 August 2000), the Special
Rapporteur visited Kinshasa. He also visited Goma,
Bukavu and Kisangani, which are under the control of
RCD/Goma faction and Gbadolite, which was captured
by MLC. Both the Government and rebel authorities
permitted him to work and conduct his interviews
freely. Obstacles were encountered, however, when he
attempted to visit the military and police detention
centres in Kinshasa and Bukavu. He also had meetings
with or reviewed the reports of political parties and of
intergovernmental and non-governmental institutions
and organizations (see E/CN.4/2000/42, annexes II-V).
7. The Special Rapporteur transmitted 22
communications and urgent actions to the Government
including 86 allegations of violations of human rights:
Three of these were acknowledged and one reply
received.
8. RCD authorities submitted two extensive reports
to the Special Rapporteur, which the latter welcomes.
C. Pending activities and investigations
Joint mission to investigate allegations of
massacres committed in 1996
9. In paragraph 5 (b) of its resolution 2000/15, the
Commission on Human Rights renewed the mandate of
the joint mission established by its resolution 1997/58
to investigate violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed in the east of
the former Zaire between 1996 and 1997.
10. The Government also requested the SecretaryGeneral
to carry out an investigation into the events
that occurred in the locality of Ituri (letter of 8
February 2000) as well as an investigation into
allegations of the deaths of 15 women who were buried
alive or burnt in Mwenga, situated in RCD-controlled
territory. Both the Government and RCD requested
special investigations into the Katogota massacre.
Because of the prevailing insecurity and lack of
financial resources, these investigations are still
pending.
3
A/55/403
D. International obligations of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
11. Contrary to the public announcement, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo did not accede to
the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions.
The Government is late in submitting 10 reports to
treaty bodies. It has not completed a single report nor
replied to the communications addressed to it by the
respective treaty bodies.
E. Reprisals against individuals who
cooperated ".t'ith the United Nations
12. The Special Rapporteur denounces the reprisals
taken against the following persons who cooperated
with him during his visits or who submitted reports to
him, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights
resolution 2000/20.
13. In RCD-controlled territory: Monsignor
Emmanuel Kataliko, Archbishop of Bukavu, who had
been interviewed by the Special Rapporteur, was
detained and subsequently exiled to Butembo, on 12
February 2000. Collete Kitoga was arrested in Goma
upon her return from the fifty-sixth session of the
Commission on Human Rights.
14. In territory controlled by the Rassemblement
congolais pour la democratie/Mouvement de libtration
(RCD/ML), Sylvain Mudimbi Masudi was detained in
Benin for attending the session of the Commission on
Human Rights and was transferred to Uganda.
II. The various armed conflicts
15. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is
bedevilled by various armed conflicts, some
international, others internal and yet other internal
conflicts that have been internationalized (see
E/CN .4/2000/42, para. 20). Participants in these
conflicts include at least eight national armies' and 21
irregular armed groups. All of these forces are
operating entirely in the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which has seen its population
decimated and its wealth extracted by occupying and
rebel forces.2
4
A. The conflict between the Government
and RCD
16. The conflict between the Government and RCD
began on 2 August 2000, following Rwanda's invasion
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is the most
serious of the conflicts, not only because of its political
and economic repercussions but also because it
restricts the enjoyment of the civil, cultural, economic,
political and social rights of the population of the
entire region.
17. On one side are the armies of Rwanda, Burundi,
Uganda and RCD/Goma faction, together with its
paramilitary group Local Defence Unity. Allegations
have been made of the involvement of lnterahamwe
deserters and Rwandan Hutu prisoners, who were
released and sent to the front. The mineral riches of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in Katanga,
Orientate province and Kasai Oriental have been
depleted by foreign troops and RCD.
18. For its part, the Government has relied for its
defence on counter-rebel militias: it has open and
confirmed ties to the Mai-Mai ,3 a group that is gaining
in popularity with a local population tired of being
subjected to the control of forces they consider foreign.
It also has informal ties to other "counter rebels": RCD
deserters, Rwandan B ahutu I nterahamwe, members of
the former Rwandan Armed Forces (PAR), and
Burundian Bahutu, among others.
19. The violence is unleashed by the attacks of the
counter-rebels against military forces which they
consider to be aggressors. The response of the
Rwandan army, RCD and the Burundian army is to
attack the defenceless civilian population, committing
indescribable massacres, such as those that took place
at Katogota, on 15 May 2000, Kamanyola, Lurbarika
and Luberizi, or the massacre in July 2000 on the
Lusenda-Lubuma highway (see E/CN .4/2000/42), as
well as the events - denied, as others have been, by
RCD/Goma faction - that took place in Mwenga in
November 1999, in which 15 women were tortured and
buried alive (see S/2000/330, para. 61).
20. Another factor contributing to the violence is the
antagonism between RCD and Banyamulenge, who are
fed up at being the target of the resentment of
Congolese over the abuses committed by the Armee
patriotique rwandaise (APR).
21. By its resolution 1304 (2000), the Security
Council demanded that Uganda and Rwanda, which
have violated the sovereignty and lerritorial integrity of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, withdraw all
their forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The withdrawal should be
followed by reciprocal actions by the other parties,
which have not taken any such action.
B. The conflict between the Government
andMLC
22. In Equnteur province, the Congolese Armed
Forces (FAC), supported by Zimbabwe and Namibia,
are fighting MLC, which is supported by Uganda. It is
in this province that the parties have shown the least
respect for the ceasefire, and indeed the rebel leader
has long maintained that he felt under no obligation to
observe it. President Kabila contends that MLC has
rendered the ceasefire agreement null and void.
C. Clashes between Uganda and Rwanda
in Kisangani
23. Once again there were clashes in Kisangani, the
third largest town in the country, previously controlled
by the two RCD factions and currently controlled by
RCD/Goma, between the "uninvited armies" of
Rwanda and Uganda (supported by RCD/MLI). The
worst clashes occurred on 5 and 9 May and on 8 June
2000. The causes are economic (both armies want the
huge wealth of Orientale province) as well as political
(control of the territory).
24. During the confrontations, particularly the most
recent one, not only combatants but also close to I ,OOO
Congolese civilians were killed , thousands were
wounded and much of the town was destroyed, as the
Special Rapporteur in the field has confirmed .
25. Calls for a ceasefi re, including from the Security
Council, went unheeded and moves towards
demilitarization were disregarded the very next day.
Only the latest one seems to be holding.
A/55/403
D. Tribal conflict between Balendu
and Bahema
26. The Ugandan occupation of the lturi region has
led to conflict between the Bahema (of Ugandan
origin) and the Balendu , who have been in the region
longer. With support from the Ugandan soldiers. the
authorities appoi nted by them and RCD/ML, the
Bahema have seized land from the Balendu who have
no support. Except for some incidents in l 911, 1923
and 1955, these two ethnic groups had Ii ved without
major difficulties for nearly three centuries. The
current confrontatio ns, which flared up again in August
2000, have resulted in some 8,000 deaths and the
displacement of some 50,000 people.
E. Ceasefire agreements and observance
thereof
27. Following tremendous pressure from the
international community (see E/CN .4/2000/42, para. 18
and annex X), the parties concluded a ceasefire
agreement in Lusaka, in 1999. They did not abide by
the agreement and, as a result, the timetable had to be
adjusted (Lusaka, 12 February 2000. Kampala. 1
March and 8 April , at which time it was agreed that
hostilities would cease from 14 April 2000). Only the
last one was observed, except in the fighting between
MLC and RCD. In spite of everything, the belligerents
have, on the whole, kept to the positions they held in
August 1999.
28. The Lusaka agreement provided for the
deployment of a United Nations force - the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MON UC) - of some 5,537
observers and security personnel in the territory in
conflict and for the demobilization and disarming of
the armed groups. MONUC quite rightly maintains that
disarming the groups, if they do not disarm themselves,
is not part of its mandate but a matter for the
signatories.
29. Inexplicably, the Government received MONUC
aggressively and blamed the United Nations for the
death of Lumumba back in 1961.4 MONUC continued
to be attacked verbally and in fact (pro-Government
demonstrations in June 2000) for its lack of objectivity,
based on the fact that its reports are said to give more
importance to the Mai-Mai and l ntera hamwe attacks on
5
A/55/403
the RCD forces and their allies than to the latter's
counterattacks on civilians.
30. Despite all the statements to the contrary and
despite the conversations between Presidents Kabila
and Kagame (Eldoret, Kenya) and the influence of
Kenya, Zambia, South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria,
Botswana, Mozambique, Mali, the Organization of
African Unity, the United Nations and others, the
parties all seem bent on winning the war by military
means.
31. A meeting of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) on 14 August 2000 failed because
Kinshasa opposed any solution, feeling that since the
circumstances of the conflict had changed the Lusaka
agreement should be adjusted. A proposed change was
submitted to the other parties on 23 August 2000.
F. Impact of the war
32. The war has destroyed the country. More than
half the population has been affected. All public
moneys are being diverted to the war effort. There have
been terrible epidemics. Only 9 per cent of all health
districts have refrigerators for keeping medicines.
Since it is impossible to cultivate the land due to the
war, 17 per cent of the population (14 million people)
are now affected by food insecurity, according to the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO). The number of sheques (street
children) has risen alarmingly.
33. The Congolese people have looked on helplessly
while those whom it calls aggressors have taken away
all its wealth and caused enormous ecological damage.
34. There are more than 1,300,000 internally
displaced persons, many of whom are without any
assistance. The vast majority come from the occupied
territories in the east. Their situation was made worse
by the attacks carried out in July 2000 on the displaced
persons camps in Sake and Uvira, both by the MaiMai
and by Rwandan soldiers; these attacks forced
many non-governmental organizations to suspend their
relief activities.
35. If one includes those who sought asylum when
Mobutu was in power, there are Congolese refugees all
over the world. Most recently, due to the fighting
between RCD and MLC, there are reported to be some
72,000 refugees in Congo Brazzaville.
6
36. Congolese Tutsi who had sought refuge in
Rwanda are returning to Goma with support from RCD
through one non-governmental organization, but
against the wishes of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which
fears that this may lead to increased violence.
G. Situation of persons at risk
37. These are the Batutsi or people who look like
Tutsi Ii ving in the territory under government control,
who fear reprisals from the population for the
"Rwandan aggression". At the start of the war, the
Government called for their elimination (see
E/CN .4/1999/31, para. 45), but later it opted for a
position of protection and even established protection
centres (not detention centres as alleged by the
Rwandan Government and RCD) with the help of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
foreign Governments. This policy has made it possible
for many people to be repatriated or to take refuge in
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi and others have found
refuge in Cameroon, Benin, the United States or
Canada. In 2000, there were 2,796 people living in the
protection camps; when the Special Rapporteur visited
· the camps in Kinshasa, the number had fallen to 299.
III. Political development and
democratization in Governmentcontrolled
territory
38. The power structure described in all reports since
1997 remains intact; tremendous power {executive,
legislative and much of the judicial power) remains
concentrated in the hands of President Kabila (see
E/CN .4/1998/65, para. 32 to 37; E/CN .4/1999/31, para.
17 and E/CN.4/2000/42, paras. 32, 33 and 127).
39. The Government has made us move towards
democracy; according to all the indications, it does not
wish to do so. The only thing that has changed is that
the "national debate", which the President instituted in
1999 but which was never accepted by civil society,
has ended. Although the main moral, religious,5
political and civil institutions are clamouring for
democracy - in the sense of Commission on Human
Rights resolution 2000/47 - and demanding the
dialogue provided for at Lusaka as a means thereto,
President Kabila has shown no interest in the matter.
40. Indeed, the President has always rejected the
national dialogue. The facilitator designated by OAU,
the distinguished former president of Botswana,
Ketumile Masire, was accepted and later rejected by
the Government; the latter has consistently prevented
him from fulfilling his delicate mission; (it has levelled
vague charges of "duplicity of roles" against him;
prevented him from travelling to towns under rebel
control; rejected his work plan; failed to attend, and
prohibited political parties and civil society from
attending, the preparatory meeting in Benin; withheld
tickets and passports; refused to receive him, closed his
office and so forth).
41. In addition, the ban on political parties and civil
organizations that do not meet the draconian conditions
set by Decree Law 194 and Decree Law 195 (see
E/CN .4/2000/42, para. 33 and 70) remains; persons
who are not members of a party constituted in
accordance with the new law are not permitted to make
political speeches; pro-Government parties (the only
ones recognized) have been established; and all
political activity has been suppressed, resulting in
hundreds of arrests and personal attacks (Union pour la
democratie et Ja progres social (UDPS), 26 July 2000);
persecution by the People's Power Committees (CPP)
(Parti Lumumbiste unifie (PALU), 17 January 2000);
unlawful searches (MNC/L, 22 April 2000); the
discredited CPP remain (the election of members failed
due to lack of interest on the part of the population), as
does the Force d'auto-defense populaire (FAP) militia;
the agreements regarding the democratization of the
"national consultation" which had been called for by
the religious leaders and which demanded that the
Lusaka agreements and the inter-Congolese dialogue
be respected have been rejected; limited dialogues have
been convened (January, February and May 2000) but
are limited to supporters, etc.
42. On 21 August 2000, notwithstanding the Lusaka
accords, a Constituent and Legislative Assembly was
established; under the sole direction of the President
and without any consultation and without consensus, it
was decided that the Assembly's headquarters would
be in Lubumbashi. Although a few opponents were
called, in their personal capacity, the Assembly was not
accepted by the country's best known leaders. In any
event, its mandate is purely consultative and it in no
way diminishes the absolute powers of the President.
A/SS/403
IV. Political development and
democratization in territory
controlled by rebel movements
Territory controlled by RCD
43. In the territory controlled by RCD, the Congolese
people's feelings of terror and humiliation not only
persist but are growing stronger (see document
E/CN.4/2000/42, paras. 43-47, 125 and 133). This
explains the increasing popularity of the Mai-Mai.
44. RCD is the only party, and it holds absolute
power to such an extent that the provincial governors
and heads of public services preside over their own
RCD cells. Party officials deny that theirs is a "State
party", saying that it is not a party but a movement of
trade unions, and that pluralism will come about
eventually. Jn the Special Rapporteur's view, this
explanation only confirms that the party is, in reality,
State-run. No efforts towards greater pluralism are in
evidence. The paramilitary "local defence units" are a
contributing factor in the considerable feeling of
insecurity.
45. All forms of dissidence are suppressed; any
criticism is considered an incitement to national hatred
or genocide and the whole population is suspected of
collaborating with the Mai-Mai. A typical example is
the absurd expulsion of Archbishop Emmanuel
Kataliko from Bukavu for his Christmas message,
which was considered to be an incitement to genocide.
The Special Rapporteur has read and studied the text
closely, and he can safely say that there is not a single
sentence, word or idea, taken in isolation or in context,
that could be interpreted, even with the worst of
intentions, in this way.
46. Attempts to humiliate the population continue
(see document E/CN .4/2000/42, para. 46). As a new
way of castigating the Nyndu tribe, already punished
by the horrible Kasika massacre in 1998 (see document
E/CN .4/1999/31, para. 56), RCD/Goma has taken land
from them in order to create a Minembwe territory.
RCD has provided the facilitator, Kctumile Masire,
with a list of "opposition parties", such as the Front uni
de )'opposition non armee (FRONUAR), and others
that exist in Kinshasa without representatives in the
region.
7
A/551403
47. The population recognizes and defends the
guerrilla activities of the Mai-Mai, blaming "Rwandan
soldiers" instead for the violence.
48. The population's opposition is illustrated by
various acts of protest, such as the general strikes in
Bukavu by students on 24 January 2000 and from 31
January to 6 February 2000; a demonstration in
Kisangani by women on 31 January 2000, in Goma, on
14 February 2000; in Uvira, Kindu and Bukavu (a
week-long beer strike successfully carried out in April
2000), among others.
49. RCD has frequently split into factions (see
document E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 43), and efforts at
reunification are being made not among Congolese
leaders, who appear to be leading the factions, but
between the Presidents of Uganda and Rwanda
(November 1999; January 2000). In March 2000, three
RCD/Goma leaders defected and were later accused of
spying by Kabila; subsequently, other internal
dissidents broke away and formed RCD/National. The
Banyamulenge expressed their concern about
massacres of the local population in July 2000, which
made their own situation worse, and they organized
marches in Bukavu and Uvira.
50. In April and August 2000, attempts to depose the
President of RCD/Bunia were defeated through the
influence, once again, of the President of Uganda and
his army.
51. The small RCD/Bunia faction has also taken steps
that have stirred up the population, such as supporting
the Hema against the Lendu, or the creation of the
Kibali-Ituri province to favour the former.
Territory controlled by MLC
52. In the territory controlled by MLC, the people do
not live in terror, but there is one-party rule. The
representative of civil society to Benin was appointed
by MLC.
8
V. Human rights violations committed
by the Government6
Right to life
Death penalty
53. The Government, which says it is against the
death penalty, made a number of announcements (on 10
December 1999 and 27 January 2000) to the Special
Rapporteur on the suspension of this penalty (see
document E/CN .4/2000/42, paras. 49 and 50), but
continued to apply it, at least until February 2000,
when 19 persons were executed. The President of the
Military Court reported that it continues to be enforced
"on the front". The Special Rapporteur visited 41
persons who are awaiting a pardon, which the President
has promised to grant.
Enforced disappearances
54. The number of reported disappearances has
declined. None of the cases recorded in previous years,
however, have been cleared up. Nicolas Bantu, Aime
Ngobe and Serge ltala have been missing since their
arrest in December 1999.
Death by torture
55. Given the systematic and habitual practice of
torture, deaths have been reported, such as that of
Kalombo llunga in July 2000; he had been detained by
the police in Lubumbashi, and his corpse was found in
the morgue.
Political assassinations
56. None have been reported.
Right to physical and psychological integrity
57. Torture is brutally and systematically practised,
especially by GSSP but also by the National
Information Agency (ANR). Tolerance of the existence
of secret detention centres, lacking any control
whatsoever, contributes to this scourge. One
particularly well-known centre is that of the Litho
Moboti Group (GLM); its commander was detained on
9 March 2000 but unfortunately was freed days later,
with no charges having been filed. Torture is facilitated
by the fact that the Detection of Unpatriotic Activities
Police (DEMIAP) has no public register of detainees,
and in the provincial police inspectorate (formerly
Circo) all detainees are not placed in a single centre, as
the Special Rapporteur observed. Representatives of
the Human Rights Office of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo are not authorized to enter any centre that
is not a prison.
Right to personal liberty
58. This is the right most often threatened.
Journalists, lawyers, religious leaders, human rights
workers, politicians, trade union leaders and others are
detained, generally on the grounds of violating the ban
on political activities or of colluding with the rebels.
The times vary from a few days to years. Often, no
charges are filed against the prisoner, although
sometimes detainees are transferred to the Court of
State Security and the Military Court. No one escapes
the risk of jail, not even retired judges (for example,
the former President of the Supreme Court) or active
judges (a military magistrate), ambassadors (the
representative to Kenya), ministers (six were detained
on 2 June 2000) or other officials at this level, and
even a member of the Constitutional and Legislative
Assembly.
59. A positive step has been the admittedly partial,
discretional and conditional amnesty declared on 19
February 2000, by which some 300 prisoners were
belatedly released. In July 2000, 800 soldiers were also
released, to be sent to the front.
Right to enter and leave the country
60. It is difficult for opponents to leave the country,
since their passports and airline tickets are often
confiscated. Similar problems affect journalists, priests
and human rights activists. Representatives of civil
society were prevented from travelling to Benin to the
preparatory meeting for the national dialogue provided
for in the Lusaka Agreement.
Right to due process
61. The criticisms of the Military Court concerning
procedural irregularities (summary judgements, sole
jurisdiction and others) are still absolutely valid. (See
documents E/CN.4/1999/31, paras. 90, 91 and 137, and
E/CN.4/2000/42, paras. 63, 122 and 137.) Detainees
are held for a long time awaiting trial.
62. One indication of the lack of independence of the
judiciary, which is referred to in Commission on
A/55/403
Human Rights resolution 200/42, is that the ProcuratorGeneral
of the Court of State Security was held in
prison for 30 days for refusing to approve a raid on the
Belgian Embassy. The attorney-general was also
detained.
63. Owing to the lack of guaranties, the 15 defenders
of an independence fighter refused, with his agreement,
to defend him, and he was sentenced to four years of
hard labour.
Freedom of expression and opinion
64 .. The Special Rapporteur has transmitted
communications to the Government from more than 30
detained journalists, who were tried and/or convicted
by the Military Court or frightened away from
practising their profession. Mobutu's draconian laws
are still in full force. The Vice-Minister of Information
justifies this by saying "we cannot tolerate traitors",
and the President has said that "the law must be
obeyed". The main private television station was
confiscated in March 2000. Independent media have no
access to the authorities.
65. Despite the existence of some newspapers, the
judgement is categorical: there is no freedom of
expression in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Freedom of association
66. Political parties are still banned, unless they
submit to new registration requirements and risk being
rejected. Political activity, even making speeches, is
prohibited. Dozens of leaders and activists have been
detained or prevented from leaving the country or the
city where they live, and their headquarters have been
attacked and ransacked.
67. Human rights organizations suffer similar
treatment. The ban on them has not been lifted.
Economic, social and cultural rights
68. Public employees, except for some in Kinshasa,
have still not been paid, and trade union leaders who
protest against this are accused of endangering State
security. More than a third of the population lack even
the basic necessities of life. The real malnutrition rate,
according to some sources, is 26 per cent.
69. Serious epidemics have been left untreated
because the war uses up most of the country's income.
9
A/55/403
Situation of women
70. The situation described in previous reports
remains unchanged. A new form of discrimination has
appeared: women's organizations have lost their voice
to a para-State group known as Regroupement des
Femmes Congolaises (REFECO), and their
employment and educational situation has deteriorated
as a result of the war.
71 . Sources have told the Special Rapporteur that
8 per cent of women have acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), owing to poverty, lack of education
and, especially, sexual contact with Rwandan and
Ugandan soldiers, whose countries have a high AIDS
rate.
72. Only 24 out of 300 members of the Constitutional
and Legislative Assembly are women.
Situation of children
73. The right to education has been greatly curtailed
by the war and poverty, resulting in irreparable harm to
many children. Violations of children's rights also
include child labour in inhumane conditions in the
diamond mines.
74. On a more positive note, Decree Law 66 was
enacted in June 2000, demobilizing children and other
vulnerable groups and creating a commission on
demobilization and reintegration.
Freedom of conscience and religion
75. The Special Rapporteur is dealing with this topic
for the first time. The Government regards religious
congregations as enemies who are allied with rebellion
or aggression. Peace messages are viewed with
suspicion, and the proclamation of freedom and justice
are considered subversive. Presbyterian churches, the
Ubangi-Mongola Evangelical Community, the Bundu
dia Kongo sect, the Siani and Unification/Cabinda,
together with German, Austrian and Belgian priests and
a Catholic bishop, have been repressed.
10
VI. Human. rights violations committed
in territory occupied by RCD
andMLC
Violations in RCD territory
Right to life
Death penalty
76. The Special Rapporteur had welcomed the fact
that RCD did not apply the death penalty (see
E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 81). Nevertheless, on 17 March
2000, the Conseil de guerre operationnelle, in two
proceedings within 24 hours, tried a corporal, who was
executed on the spot, and three other persons
condemned to death in July 2000 were taken from the
prison and never returned.
Political murders
77. Soldiers referred to as ''Banyamulenge",
"Rwandans", "Ugandans" and "Burundians" have
committed countless murders of persons suspected of
being members of the Mai-Mai or lnterahamwe.
Among the victims are priests, Protestant pastors,
Baptists, traditional tribal leaders and peaceful citizens.
Three youths were murdered simply because they bore
tattoos, leading Burundian soldiers to assume that they
were members of the Mai-Mai.
Death by torture
78. The frequency and cruelty of torture was
mentioned frequently to the Special Rapporteur. One
person was arrested and tortured to death for carrying
out political activity in Kiwandja (North Kivu) in
March 2000.
Right to physical and psychological integrity
79. Most of the complaints of torture involve the
police headquarters known as chien mechant ("vicious
dog") and "Bureau II", which sources say are
administered by "Rwandan soldiers" and, in Kisangani
and Bunia, by "the Ugandans". It is claimed that
Congolese are among the victims, as well as Rwandans
transferred from Rwanda. The victims are mainly those
suspected of being members of the Mai-Mai and
lnterahamwe. Representatives of the Human Rights
Office in Goma can only visit the jails, like other
detention centres. The Special Rapporteur confirmed
that the records of the RCD Sixth Brigade do not
account for all inmates.
Right to liberty of person
Arbitrary detention
80. Human rights defenders, leaders of civil society,
journalists and members of the clergy have continually
been deprived of their freedom and are at constant risk
of being detained again. The arrests are aimed at
suppressing activities lawful in a democratic society,
such as dissidence, criticism, education, culture and
freedom of conscience, or are preventive: persons
suspected of not being devoted to the RCD authorities
are detained because of actions that they might carry
out, as occurred, for example, prior to the civil strikes
carried out in Goma, Bukavu and elsewhere. Resigning
from RCD carries with it the certainty of arrest. The
same thing happens in territory occupied by
RCD/Bunia, where two high-ranking leaders of
RCD/ML were detained and tortured near Bunia in
July 2000.
Deportations
81. In Geneva in March 2000, the RCD authorities
explained to the Special Rapporteur that there are no
cases of deportation of prisoners from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to Rwanda, Uganda or Burundi
and that, at most, prisoners of war are involved. The
incidents are more frequent under RCD/Bunia than
under RCD/Goma. In any event, the Special
Rapporteur emphasizes that, during the period under
review, he learned of various cases of human rights
defenders and others (traders) detained in Congolese
territory and taken to Katuna (Rwanda) or Uganda.
Right to enter and leave one's own country
82. There are lists of persons linked to human rights
organizations who have been prevented from leaving
RCD-controlled territory; many cannot even leave
Kivu. In early March 2000 there were reports of an
ordinance which prevents all Congolese from travelling
to countries other than Rwanda or Burundi without
official permission, which is generally denied. Even
members of the Protestant clergy could not travel to a
conference in Nairobi in 1999.
A/55/403
Right to due process
83. Generally speaking, defendants are not tried; their
release is at the discretion of the authorities. In any
event, the most serious breaches of the norms of due
process stem from the guarantee of impunity for the
massacres, murders and tortures inflicted on those
accused of inciting hatred. The so-called, belated
prosecution of the person responsible for the deaths of
15 women in Mwenga ended with the flight of the
individual who is seen as the main perpetrator and as
an emblematic figure because of his ferocity. The fact
that those allegedly responsible for the flight are being
prosecuted in no way justifies the action.
Right to freedom of expression and opinion
84. There have been no changes with regard to the
statements made in document E/CN .4/2000/42,
paragraphs 91 to 93. There is no freedom of
expression; there are no daily newspapers; Radio
Maendeleo was returned to its operators, but has been
prohibited from broadcasting political opinion and
news.
85. In Kisangani, while Rwandans and Ugandans
shared power, the radio stations vehemently incited
racial hatred: Liberte, against the Rwandans, and
RTNC/Rebelde, against the Ugandans. But the victims
are Congolese.
Freedom of association
86. There are, of course, no political parties, except
RCD and FROUNAR, for ex.ample, which RCD formed
prior to the visit of the Facilitator, Ketumile Masire, in
May 2000. All political activity is prohibited and
punished.
Human rights organizations
87. RCD responded to the report of the Special
Rapporteur, claiming that it was established beyond a
doubt that the non-governmental organizations in South
Kivu were operating with financial support from the
Kabila Government and that they are the sources of
information for the Special Rapporteur. That point was
emphasized during the visit. In fact, the nongovernmental
organizations are severely persecuted,
always on the charge of inciting ethnic hatred, but not a
shred of evidence has been presented in this regard.
Many defenders have been imprisoned, tortured and
threatened and many have had to seek refuge abroad.
11
A/55/403
Freedom of assembly
88. No allegedly critical gatherings are tolerated, and
the protests called viJles mortes (civil strikes) have
been suppressed with arrests and threats.
Economic, social and cultural rights
89. The extremely serious situation throughout the
country is particularly serious in the east: malnutrition
in Kisangani reportedly affects 30 per cent of adults
and 60 per cent of children. Civil servants remain
unpaid. The health care system is destroyed and family
members usually take turns eating.
Situation or women
90. In addition to the Mwenga incident, mention
should be made of the arrests of feminist activities,
rapes and beatings of female secondary-school students
detained for insisting on the validity of their
examinations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and continual cases of rape of women detainees.
Situation of children
91. As in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
RCD is establishing a commission for demobilization
of child soldiers. Nevertheless, the Mission has noted
that the level of recruitment of children is much higher
in the east than under Kabila. An example of this is
N yalek.e, near Beni, where Ugandan soldiers are
training 10-year-old children.
Freedom of conscience and religion
92. In RCD territory, too, the Catholic and Protestant
churches are persecuted because of their messages of
peace; this has made it possible to assert that the only
thing that unites Rwandans and Ugandans is their
hatred of the Christian churches. In the east the
majority Catholic Church has been the most
persecuted: murders of several priests, banishment of
the Archbishop of Buk.avu, attacks on convents and
parish houses, and so on.
Human rights violations in MLC
territory
93. There is minimal information on the region,
which has negligible civic activity. There are very few
non-governmental organizations and newspapers. The
12
Special Rapporteur spent a few hours visiting the small
hamlet of Gbadolite, but was unable to visit other
towns in which there are more victims of human rights
violations.
VII. Violations of international
humanitarian law
A. Violations by the Government, allies
and related groups
Government
94. The Government is responsible for the bombings
of the Libenge hospital on 27 July 2000; of Gemena
and elsewhere, which affected civilian populations; and
of aircraft loaded with poliomyelitis vaccines (war
against MLC).
Mai-Mai
95. The Government's support for the Mai-Mai
makes it responsible for the offences perpetrated by the
latter. While, generally speaking, they attack Rwandan
and RCD soldiers, they have also committed violence
against civilians suspected of collaborating with those
whom they regard as the "enemy". The growing
popularity which they enjoy among the Congolese does
not absolve them of responsibility. Among their acts of
brutality are those at Lubero in April 2000, Nyabibwe,
Numbi (50 dead) and Kihuha in July 2000.
Interahamwe/ex-FAR combatants
96. The Interahamwe and ex-FAR combatants are
responsible for attacks on the civilian population
(Loashi, Luhinzi, Rutshuru, Kione, Ngesha and many
others). In the villages which they attack they
commonly rape women and girls.
Freed Rwandan prisoners
97. It should be noted that freed Rwandan prisoners
who had been held in Kinshasa acknowledged that they
had been well treated while they had been prisoners of
the Zimbabweans, to the point where at least four
preferred to stay in Kinshasa rather than return to their
homeland.
B. Violations by RCD, RCD/ML, MLC
and allied foreign military forces
Components of RCD
98. The population does not distinguish among the
various components of RCD, which it identifies as
Rwandan soldiers or Banyamulenge.
99. Any attack by members of the lnterahamwe, MaiMai,
and so on is met by totally disproportionate
violence; massacres are committed, resulting in many
deaths. Mere suspicion of sympathy with the Mai-Mai
provokes reprisals against the civilian population:
Ngenge (November 1999); Kalehe {December (999, 23
dead); Kilambo (February 2000, 60 dead); Katogota
(May 2000, 40 to 300 dead); Kamanyola, Lurbarilca,
Luberezi, Cidaho, Uvira, Shabunda; Lusenda-Lubumba
(July 2000, 150 dead).
100. Particularly reprehensible is the treatment of
prisoners by Rwandan soldiers. The Special Rapporteur
visited one Congolese soldier taken prisoner in
Katanga who was beaten, tortured, castrated and
abandoned, a practice condemned earlier by the Special
Rapporteur (see E/CN .4/2000/42, para. 117).
101. Humanitarian assistance has been intercepted and
diverted to Congolese Batusti repatriated from
Rwanda.
Burundian soldiers
102. Burundian soldiers are accused of killing nine
civilians in Sebele in reprisal for a Mai-Mai attack in
April 2000.
Ugandan troops
103. Ugandan troops have murdered civilians. The
most serious incidents occurred during the UgandanRwandan
battle at Kisangani, in whose vicinity,
furthermore, they planted antitank and anti-personnel
mines.
104. In alliance with the Bahema, they have committed
atrocities against civilians (for example, Libi, March
2000, nine dead) and taken civilians prisoner, including
children (Walendu Tatsi).
105. Ugandan troops also shelled a boat in which
women and children were fleeing the war, causing
some 30 deaths; no assistance was given to them.
106. They recruit many child soldiers.
VIII. Conclusions and
recommendations
A. Conclusions
The catastrophe in Central Africa
AJSS/403
107. Central Africa is a region of great riches, but its
inhabitants are living in e;,.treme poverty. The terrible
history of unscrupulous dictators - all of whom,
however, had support from abroad - is one of the
causes of the catastrophic situation that now exists.
Eight national armies and numerous armed groups are
involved in the primary war between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, Rwanda and
Burundi, which may rightly be called the first world
war in Africa, and nine more armed conflicts are taking
place in the same country. EMreme poverty, which
existed even prior to the current wards, has reached
catastrophic levels that have been further increased by
the war. The Congolese people cannot understand why
those responsible for their problems, who are members
of the international community, do not come to their
aid now.
108. The parties, their allies, other African countries,
the major Powers, the Organization of African Unity
{OAU) and the United Nations have failed to achieve
peace since it seems that economic and political
interests other than those of the Congolese people are
involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
the Congolese are aware of this fact. There can be no
peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without
lasting peace in the region. There are historical
conflicts and ambitions that require long-term solutions
based on respect for principles on which there can be
no disagreement: respect for the human rights of all
Congolese, justice for those responsible for the crimes
against humanity which have been committed and
respect for the borders inherited from the colonial era.
The armed conflict
109. None of the parties to the nine conflicts, whether
internal, internationalized internal or international, is
fully respecting the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement,
although there has been no significant change in their
positions. The Congolese consider the Rwandan,
Ugandan and Burundian armies to be "aggressors"
rather than as providing support to the rebels. While
the activities of the Interahamwe and Mai-Mai are the
13
A/SS/403
primary cause of the violence, it is the armies of
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Rassemblement
congolais pour la d~mocratie (RCD) which are causing
the greatest damage and which have once again
committed terrible massacres of the civilian
population. In addition, Rwanda and Uganda have
expanded their own conflicts into Congolese territory,
causing death and destruction on neighbouring soil.
The occupation or the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
110. The Special Rapporteur has often been asked
whether the occupation of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo should be considered permanent. That issue
should not even be raised since there can be no
justification for the conquest or partition of a country
by foreign forces. This is the position stated in the
fourth preambular paragraph of Security Council
resolution 1304 (2000}. In occupied territory, the sense
of humiliation and terror described in previous reports
still prevails.
Immediate effects of the Special Rapporteur•s
visit
111. Days prior to the visit, and particularly during his
visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. both in
Government- and RCD-controlled territory, prisoners
were freed or transferred from illegal detention centres
to official jails; judicial proceedings that should have
begun months previously were opened; sick prisoners
were given better medical care and journalists were
given greater access to information sources.
Violations of international humanitarian law
112. The most serious incidents were the massacres
committed by RCD and Rwandan forces, attacks on
civilians during the Rwandan-Ugandan wars and
Government bombing of civilian populations in the
north.
Human rights
113. In the Government-controlled territory. the rights
most affected are political rights (participation,
assembly, association and freedom of expression}. In
RCD- and RCD/ML-controlled territory, the rights
most often violated are human rights (life and physical
integrity} without prejudice to political freedom. There
14
is insufficient information on the MLC-controlled
territory.
Right to democracy
114. Neither the Government authorities nor those of
RCD, RCD/ML or MLC have taken any steps towards
democracy. The Government continues to reject all
dialogue with the national democratic opposition; it
persecutes political parties, continues to declare them
illegal and punishes their leaders and activists. It
rejects the mediator whom it had previously accepted.
It is establishing new and illegal structures. In the
occupied territories there is only one party, either RCD
or MLC. Other parties only appear to exist. Those not
in sympathy with RCD have ceased all activities and
their leaders have chosen exile. MLC is the only party
in the territory it controls.
Human rights advocates
115. They are persecuted by both sides; one considers
them to be "in league with the rebels". the other
considers them to be "in Kabila's pay" or
"Interahamwe or Mai-Mai collaborators".
Death penalty
116. The Government maintains it but has not
implemented it since February 2000. RCD, which had
never implemented it, began to do so in 2000.
Liberty of person
117. It is constantly violated, and there are many
political prisoners on both sides. The Kinshasa amnesty
was encouraging, but it did not affect all prisoners and
politically-motivated imprisonment of, inter alia,
Ministers and other high-level officials has continued.
Freedom of expression
118. There is none. In Government-controlled
territory, there are a few newspapers with a limited
circulation and journalists are regul~rly harassed. In
RCD-controlled territory there are no opposition
newspapers and the few independent radio stations
have been shut down, censored and prevented from
broadcasting any news programmes other than the
official ones.
Torture
ll9. Torture is practised by all parties and in many
instances it has resulted in death.
Right to due process
120. It is not respected by any of the parties. In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Military Court,
which is the only court in which civilians, journalists
and human rights advocates are tried, remains fully
functional. Victims of human rights violations are not
granted redress, a fact which further confirms impunity.
In RCD-controlled territory, the death penalty has been
reinstituted through trials of the most summary nature
in which no defense is admitted.
Freedom of movement
121. In both Kinshasa and Goma, members of the
opposition are prevented from leaving the country and
even from movement within it.
122. But the most serious issue is the deportation of
Congolese citizens to Rwanda, where, in many cases,
all trace of the prisoner is Jost.
Freedom of conscience
123. In both sectors, religious persecution has been a
constant throughout the year. Bishops, priests and
ministers have been arrested, tortured, expelled and
murdered. The most emblematic case has been that of
the Archbishop of Bukavu, who was expelled from his
diocese by RCD.
Persons at risk
124. The Government, with international assistance,
has continued to provide protection to people who look
like Tutsi in order to prevent reprisals against them,
thereby disproving accusations of genocide.
Women and children
125. The situation continues to worsen. The
Government and RCD have taken steps to demobilize
children, but neither MLC nor the Ugandan troops have
done so.
A/55/403
B. Recommendations
The parties in the wars
126. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the
parties in the wars should: (a) fully implement the
Lusaka Agreement and the necessary agreed
adjustments thereto, considering the provisions of
Security Council resolution 1304 (2000): (b) cooperate
with the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC); and (c)
put an end to all forms of impunity.
The Government
127. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the
Government should: (a) immediately establish the
inter-Congolese dialogue, cooperating closely and
actively with the Facilitator, who is a friend of the
Congolese people, and with those who accompany him;
(b) repeal the legislation on political parties and nongovernmental
organizations, recognize those which
already uist and allow them to operate; {c) abolish the
death penalty; (d) eliminate the Military Court; (e) free
all political prisoners; (f) cease all forms of pressure or
censorship of the press; (g) abolish the Constitutional
and Legislative Assembly in order to permit the
dialogue agreed to in Lusaka; {h) cease all cooperation
with the Mai-Mai and the Interahamwe; (i) commute
death sentences; U} begin the demobilization of child
soldiers; (k) restore relations with other States,
intergovernmental organizations, the United Nations
and OA U and attend the conferences and meetings
organized by them since none of them is an enemy of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all of them
are simply endeavouring to assist it; (I) authorize the
Human Rights Field Office in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo to visit not only the jails, but all places of
detention; (m) implement a human rights action plan;
and (n) give international human rights instruments
precedence over national law and honour the
commitments made under them.
RCD and other rebel groups
128. The Special Rapporteur recommends that RCD
and other rebel groups should: (a) cease all cooperation
with foreign armies; (b) avoid committing any act
which implies the exercise of sovereignty over foreign
armies (including the flying of flags, partition or
creation of provinces, town-twinning or sale of public
property); (c) refrain from issuing fictitious accounts of
15
A/55/403
the atrocities committed by their troops and foreign
allies and conduct objective investigations of
allegations; (d) free political prisoners; (e) demand that
their foreign allies return the deported Congolese to the
State; (f) abolish the death penalty; (g) cease to
interpret all acts of opposition as an alleged incitement
to ethnic hatred; (h) permit organizations of civil
society, particularly human rights organizations, to
function freely; and {i) demobilize child soldiers.
Foreign armies occupying Congolese territory
129. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the
foreign armies occupying Congolese territory should:
(a) implement the Lusaka Agreement and, in particular,
Security Council resolution 1304 (2000}, which
demands that they should withdraw immediately and
prior to the withdrawal of the forces present at the
Government's invitation; (b) accept the fact that they
have lost all respect in the eyes of the Congolese
people and refrain from all reprisal; (c) permit
investigations of violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law and, in particular, of the
massacres that took place on 2 August 1998;
(d) provide immediate compensation to the victims of
the incidents that occurred at Kisangi and in other parts
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and
(e) return the Congolese property that has been taken
from the country since 1998.
Organs of the United Nations
130. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the
organs of the United Nations should: (a) continue to
support the peace process in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and the inter-Congolese dialogue;
(b} heed the words of the special rapporteurs on human
rights in order to prevent recurrence of the incident
reported in the Carlsson report on the occasion of the
genocide in Rwanda, which a special rapporteur had
predicted a year in advance without any action being
taken. This recommendation is especially important in
light of the establishment of peacekeeping
mechanisms; (c) provide greater financial and logistical
assistance to the mechanisms of the Commission on
Human Rights; and (d) establish an effective arms
embargo on all countries involved in the Congolese
conflict.
16
Other organs of the international community
131. The Special Rapporteur recommends that other
organs of the international community should:
(a) support the peace process, the inter-Congolese
dialogue and the democratization process; and
(b) make their voices heard and their moral authority
felt with regard to the massacres committed on
Congolese soil.
Notes
1 Chad withdrew its forces on 26 May 1999. The Sudan
has troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but
these are not participating in the fighting.
2 The Security Council (see SIPRST/2000/20) established
an ex.pert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural
resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
3 The Mai-Mai guerrillas, originally from the Banande and
Bahunde tribes, have enlisted thousands of young people
from all ethnic groups who are opposed to what they
refer to as "Rwandan aggression". See E/CN.4/1999142.
note 4.
~ In his report to the Commission on Human Rights (see
E/CN .4/2000/42, para. I 8), the Special Rapporteur stated
that there is a general feeling throughout the country that
the international community is not doing anything to end
the conflict but that when that abstraction does do
something, it is rejected for doing so. This reaction
confirms this.
s See, for ex.ample, the statement by the Conference of
Catholic Bishops in August 2000.
" The Special Rapporteur's report to the Commission on
Human Rights (E/CN .4/2000/42) denls with individual
cases of human rights violations.
ANNEX 3.2
United Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002
- 2 -
United Nations S/2002/1005
Security Council Distr.: General
10 September 2002
Original: English
02-58220 (E) 110902
*0258220*
Special report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the
statement of the President of the Security Council of 15
August (S/PRST/2002/24), in which the Council
requested me to put forward recommendations on how
the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and,
through the Mission’s coordination, all relevant United
Nations agencies can assist the parties in the fulfilment
of their responsibilities to implement the Peace
Agreement between the Governments of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of
Rwanda on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops
from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the Dismantling of the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe Forces in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (S/2002/914, annex), signed in Pretoria on
30 July 2002.
2. The present report outlines the tasks associated
with the Pretoria Agreement and contains
recommendations on action that the United Nations
could take to assist the parties in its implementation. It
also contains an analysis of the Agreement between the
Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and the Republic of Uganda on the Withdrawal of
Ugandan Troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Cooperation and Normalization of Relations
between the Two Countries, signed by the States
concerned in Luanda on 6 September. In addition, the
report describes the situation in the north-eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo and sets forth
recommendations on action that the United Nations
could take in this regard.
3. Other developments since the issuance of my
eleventh report on MONUC (S/2002/621) will be
reflected in a further report, which will be submitted to
the Security Council in early October.
II. Provisions of the Agreements and
action taken to date
A. Pretoria Agreement
4. In Pretoria on 30 July 2002, the Heads of State of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda
signed the Peace Agreement on the withdrawal of
Rwandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the dismantling of the former Rwandan
Armed Forces (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe forces in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The President of
the Republic of South Africa and I signed the
Agreement as witnesses.
5. Key provisions of the Agreement relate to the
undertaking of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government to continue the process of “tracking down
and disarming” (S/2002/914, annex, para. 8.1) the
Interahamwe and ex-FAR within the territory under its
control. The Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government has also agreed to collaborate with
MONUC, the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and
“any other force constituted by the third party, to
assemble and disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe”
(ibid., para. 7) in the whole of the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government of
Rwanda, for its part, has committed itself to
withdrawing its troops from the Democratic Republic
- 3 -
2
S/2002/1005
of the Congo “as soon as effective measures that
address its security concerns, in particular the
dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces,
have been agreed to” (ibid., para. 5). The Agreement
stipulates that Rwanda’s withdrawal should start
simultaneously with the implementation of these two
measures, both of which will be verified by MONUC,
JMC and the third party.
6. The third party — which is defined as “the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and South
Africa, in its dual capacity as Chairperson of the
African Union and as facilitator” (ibid., p. 4) — is
entrusted with a number of verification tasks, including
the verification of information to be provided by the
parties on the armed groups, and of the implementation
of effective measures in regard to their dismantling.
MONUC is specifically called on to immediately
complete its phase III deployment and to operationalize
and provide security at assembly points for ex-
FAR/Interahamwe elements, as well as to facilitate
their repatriation.
7. The Programme of Implementation of the Peace
Agreement (ibid., pp. 4-6) envisages a 90-day
timetable and includes the following elements:
(a) The establishment of a third-party
verification mechanism;
(b) The finalization of MONUC phase III
deployment;
(c) The establishment of assembly points for
ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements;
(d) The tracking down, disarming and
dismantling of those armed groups;
(e) Various monitoring and verification tasks;
(f) The complete withdrawal of Rwandan
troops from Democratic Republic of the Congo
territory.
Subsequently, the third party is to conduct the final
verification of the completion of the 90-day
Programme of Implementation and submit a report
within 30 days thereafter.
Action taken to date
8. Following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement,
the United Nations undertook consultations with the
Governments of South Africa, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and Rwanda in order to gain greater
insight into the background to the Agreement and to
seek the clarifications necessary for the Organization to
plan its role in support of the Agreement. Several
meetings were held with delegations from the three
countries during the week of 5 August 2002.
Additional clarifications were provided on 8 August at
the meeting that the Security Council held with the
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of South Africa and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Special
Envoy of the President of Rwanda on the Great Lakes
region. On 6 August, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations provided the Security Council with a
preliminary analysis of the implications of the Pretoria
Agreement.
9. On 9 August, following consultations with a
South African Government delegation at United
Nations Headquarters, a joint communiqué was issued
in New York on the establishment of a secretariat of the
third-party verification mechanism. That communiqué
indicated the readiness of the United Nations and South
Africa to work closely together to oversee and verify
the implementation of the commitments made by both
signatories. The communiqué also announced that the
secretariat of the verification mechanism would
comprise the following personnel, to be assisted as
required by the necessary experts: for the United
Nations, my Deputy Special Representative for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Deputy
Force Commander of MONUC; and for South Africa,
the Security Adviser to the President, the Foreign
Affairs Adviser to the President, the Chief Director for
Central Africa of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and the Special Representative of the Department of
Defence.
10. Subsequently, the secretariat of the third-party
verification mechanism was established in Kinshasa. It
will also have a liaison group in Kigali. MONUC
intends to extend its fullest cooperation to the
verification mechanism by, inter alia, assisting in
carrying out the latter’s verification tasks. At the same
time, MONUC will continue to discharge the mandate
entrusted to it by the Security Council, in accordance
with its established chain of command and procedures.
The terms of reference for the verification mechanism
are in the process of being finalized.
11. The third-party verification mechanism held its
first meeting in Kinshasa on 21 August and discussed
its programme of work and rules of procedure. It also
- 4 -
3
S/2002/1005
held initial meetings with the Governments of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda on 26
and 27 August to discuss the way forward and to
request that they appoint contact groups to serve as
their primary interlocutors vis-à-vis the verification
mechanism. The mechanism will determine in due
course specific modalities for the various verification
tasks envisaged in the Pretoria Agreement.
12. In the course of my recent visit to southern
Africa, I conducted extensive consultations with
regional leaders on the various practical modalities for
the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
13. Since the signing of the Agreement, the
Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Rwanda have maintained regular contacts to
discuss its implementation. The Government of
Rwanda has provided the third-party verification
mechanism with initial information on its plan for the
withdrawal of its troops from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, as well as information concerning the
Rwandan armed groups operating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, a preliminary
assessment of these documents has indicated that much
more information is required in these areas. The
verification mechanism, in the meantime, is also
awaiting the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government’s submission of information concerning
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements allegedly present in
the western Democratic Republic of the Congo,
including, in particular, information on the
whereabouts of their known leaders.
B. Luanda Agreement
14. On 6 September 2002, at Luanda, the Heads of
State of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
Republic of Uganda signed an Agreement on the
withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and cooperation and
normalization of relations between the two countries.
The Head of State of Angola signed the Agreement as a
witness.
15. Under the Agreement, the Government of Uganda
committed itself to the continued withdrawal of its
forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
accordance with a jointly agreed calendar. In particular,
the Ugandan troops are to immediately withdraw from
Gbadolite, Beni and their vicinities. Uganda also
reaffirmed its readiness to withdraw its troops from
Bunia following the establishment of an administrative
authority in Ituri. The agreement also stipulates that
Ugandan troops on the slopes of Mount Ruwenzori will
remain until the parties put in place “security
mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda’s security”,
including coordinated patrols along the common border
of the two countries.
16. With regard to the situation in Ituri, the two
parties have agreed to establish, with the assistance of
MONUC, a Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri
comprising representatives of the Governments of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda and
various leaders on the ground. According to the
implementation calendar annexed to the Agreement,
the Committee would be established within 20 days of
the signing of the Agreement. Following a decision on
a mechanism to maintain law and order in Ituri, an
administrative authority would be set up. Subsequently,
Uganda would develop a plan for withdrawal from
Bunia that would envisage the completion of the
withdrawal of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force
(UPDF) within 100 days.
17. Other provisions of the Agreement concern the
normalization of relations between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, including through
the restoration of the sovereignty of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, while Uganda’s security
concerns are also addressed; by refraining from all
types of military and logistical support to the armed
groups; by expediting the pacification of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo territories currently
under Ugandan control and the normalization of the
situation along the common border between the two
countries; through exchanges of intelligence on all
matters of security interest; by restoring full diplomatic
relations; and by re-establishing the Joint Ministerial
Commission for cooperation in various areas, including
defence, security, trade, investment, infrastructure,
transport, communications and cultural exchanges. The
parties also agreed to resolve any future differences
between them through dialogue and other peaceful
means.
18. At the time of the preparation of this report, the
Government of Uganda had withdrawn some 1,200
troops from Beni and 650 troops from Gbadolite since
late August. MONUC has observed the return of these
UPDF troops to Uganda. It is expected that the
- 5 -
4
S/2002/1005
withdrawal of Ugandan troops from those locations
will be completed by the end of September.
III. Implementation challenges
A. Pretoria Agreement
19. The signing of the Pretoria Agreement has been
characterized by the parties and the facilitator as an
effort to overcome the main obstacles to the
implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
(S/1999/815, annex), namely, the lack of progress in
the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and in the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration of ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements
operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Hence, it provides a political framework within which
the main issues of concern could be addressed, thus
enabling the parties to resolve their long-standing
conflict.
20. It is in this context that the MONUC concept of
operations for phase III has been revised, as outlined in
section IV below, to reflect the adjustments necessary
to support the implementation of the Pretoria
Agreement, including the various verification tasks
envisaged for the third-party verification mechanism
and voluntary, progressive disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration of the armed groups in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, with an emphasis on the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe elements.
21. The key to operationalizing the Pretoria
Agreement will be the continued resolve of both parties
to work closely with each other — with the assistance
of the third party — in a climate of confidence. It is
only in this context that a number of continuing
differences — such as the divergence of views between
the two Governments on the number and locations of
the Rwandan armed groups and on the yet-to-bedefined
“effective measures” (S/2002/914, annex, para.
5) regarding the dismantling of the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe — can be overcome. It will also be
important for the parties to reach — as soon as
possible — a common understanding on their
obligations under the Agreement. President Mbeki’s
proposal of monthly, or at least regular, review
meetings at the Head of State level should therefore be
strongly supported, since such meetings would be an
essential instrument in maintaining the resolve of the
parties and ensuring that the process remains on track.
22. The continuing contacts between the parties since
the signing of the Pretoria Agreement are encouraging
signs of their commitment to the peace process. At the
same time, the reported intensification of military
activity on the ground and a recent exchange of public
accusations regarding non-compliance with the
Agreement may not be conducive to the prompt
implementation of the Agreement. While the cessation
of hostilities between the Governments of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda has
largely held along the disengagement line for some
time, it will be crucial for the parties to demonstrate
their commitment to the Pretoria Agreement by
ensuring that secure conditions are created both for
MONUC’s deployment and for the voluntary
disarmament of the armed groups. The parties will also
need to exert influence over those concerned to lay
down their arms and enter into a voluntary
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration process.
23. Although not directly linked to the Pretoria
Agreement, an overall political settlement among the
parties to the inter-Congolese dialogue is also a critical
element for ensuring its successful implementation. An
all-inclusive transitional Government should be in a
position to effectively extend its authority throughout
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, following the
withdrawal of foreign forces. Obviously, the ongoing
efforts of my Special Envoy, Mustapha Niasse, require
the strong support of all concerned, with a view to a
timely, all-inclusive agreement among the Congolese
parties on the transitional arrangements.
B. Luanda Agreement
24. The Agreement reached between the
Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda provides for the total withdrawal of the
latter’s troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the normalization of the relations between
the two countries. As regards Bunia, a key town in the
resource-rich Ituri region that was until recently a
political hub for the Rassemblement congolais pour la
démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCDK/
ML) in an acutely contested territory, Uganda’s
decision to withdraw its battalion from this area once
- 6 -
5
S/2002/1005
an administrative authority has been established in Ituri
could have both positive and negative consequences.
25. As indicated in my previous reports to the
Security Council, Ituri has for decades been afflicted
by a series of violent clashes, particularly between the
Lendu, the Hema and their affiliated groups. It should
be noted, however, that the Lendu-Hema tension does
not represent a typical majority-minority conflict as
witnessed elsewhere. Since June 1999, the tension in
Ituri has reached an unprecedented level, with —
according to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government — up to 20,000 people having lost their
lives. Recently, in the whole of Ituri, which has a
population of 4.6 million, some 500,000 people were
newly displaced, with 60,000 displaced in Bunia alone.
The precarious security situation was vividly illustrated
by the assassination in April 2001 of six International
Committee of the Red Cross workers by unidentified
assailants some 30 kilometres from Bunia, which is
speculated to have been an effort to keep the eyes and
ears of the international community away from the
situation there.
26. The ongoing extreme violence is often attributed
to a lack of impartial administration; to the power
struggle between the leaders of the RCD-K/ML; to
rivalry between prominent business people over
economic interests; to perceived or real interference by
some UPDF elements on the ground; and to ongoing
efforts to build up ethnically based militias by various
sponsors who have different political, military and
economic motivations.
27. The total number of killings in Ituri in recent
weeks is impossible to ascertain. It is widely accepted
that in Bunia itself there have been hundreds, but as the
violence has increased and spread to villages as far as
90 kilometres from Bunia, figures provided by nongovernmental
organizations and other sources have
suggested that thousands may have died in August
alone, with tens of thousands displaced, although it has
not been possible to confirm these figures
independently. A recently well-supplied Hema/Gerere
militia group, the Union des patriotes congolais (UPC),
has reportedly captured important towns on the
Mahagi-Bunia-Beni axis, establishing its control of the
immediate environs of Bunia, thereby reducing the
RCD-K/ML power base. The Lendu and Hema
communities are now deeply suspicious of each other
and have entered a deadly cycle of revenge killings. In
recent months, individuals who have reportedly sought
to restore normalcy have received death threats, forcing
them to flee the area.
28. On 29 August, the Human Rights Minister of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Luaba Ntumba,
and his associates, were abducted by a group of UPC
militia members near the Bunia airport. The hostages
were released three days later in exchange for the
return to Bunia of nine associates of the UPC leader,
Thomas Lubanga, who was formerly an RCD-K/ML
leader in charge of the movement’s “defence portfolio”.
MONUC assisted in this situation by providing good
offices and appealing to all concerned to reach a
peaceful solution.
29. While any long-term solution must be based on
the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the area and
the introduction of a legitimate national authority that
will exercise impartially its civil administration
responsibility, it is unlikely that such an
administration — acceptable to all communities in
Bunia — can be effectively installed at short notice.
Despite a general perception that some UPDF troops
have not acted even-handedly, for the time being they
remain the only force in Bunia that can provide
security, albeit limited and localized. It should also be
noted that the situation in the north-east has been
further destabilized by a military offensive conducted
by RCD-National, reportedly backed by the
Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), towards
Isiro. RCD-National has reportedly advanced to within
200 kilometres of Bunia.
30. The need to address the deteriorating situation in
Bunia is critical not only for the implementation of the
Luanda Agreement, but also for the normalization of
security conditions in the north-east and the
furtherance of the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in general. The proposed
MONUC role in this regard is outlined in paragraphs
57-63 below.
IV. Role of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
in support of the Agreements
31. My ninth report to the Security Council
(S/2001/970) presented the initial plan of MONUC for
its phase III deployment, which indicated that the
- 7 -
6
S/2002/1005
Mission would take a step-by-step approach to the
implementation of disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of the
armed groups while continuing with relevant phase II
tasks, in particular monitoring the disengagement of
the parties to new defensive positions, investigating
alleged ceasefire violations and observing the
withdrawal of foreign forces.
32. Over the past year, MONUC has made
considerable strides in its phase II activities, but also in
preparing for its phase III tasks, in particular by
deploying civilian and military personnel in Kindu and
Kisangani. In this regard, the preliminary information
gathered on the armed groups was provided to the
Security Council in the annex to my letter of 1 April
2002 (S/2002/341). However, in the absence of an
overall political agreement on disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration and without a cessation of hostilities in
the eastern parts of the country, the Mission has not
been able to achieve much with regard to disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration beyond providing assistance in response
to ad hoc requests for demobilization and repatriation
of combatants such as those assembled in Kamina and
Beni, and planning for the wider disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration operation.
33. The Pretoria and Luanda Agreements, which
support the principles laid down in the Lusaka
Agreement, now provide a concrete opportunity to
move forward with the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of armed
groups and the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan
forces.
A. Disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration
1. Principles involved in the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration of foreign armed groups
34. The main principles that will guide MONUC
involvement in the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign
armed groups are as follows:
(a) The Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Rwanda must provide all information they possess on
the locations, numbers, and weaponry of the armed
groups, to be verified by the third-party verification
mechanism;
(b) Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration activities will take place
in a permissive environment, which is to say, a
cessation of all hostilities is necessary;
(c) The disarmament, demobilization and
repatriation of armed groups will be undertaken on a
voluntary basis. MONUC will in no way attempt to
forcibly disarm combatants;
(d) The disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process will
also address the voluntary repatriation of both excombatants
and their family members. It is essential
that the countries in question provide guarantees that
ex-combatants and their dependants will be able to
return in conditions of safety and security. In this
respect, the necessary confidence-building measures,
including international monitoring and reintegration
assistance, will have to be put in place. Consideration
should also be given to members of “mixed families”
(such as Rwandan ex-combatants who have Congolese
wives);
(e) The question of ex-combatants who may not
wish to return to their home countries must be
addressed prior to the commencement of the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration exercise. MONUC and the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) will undertake further consultations with the
parties, as well as with other Governments, on the
identification of various durable solutions, including
asylum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
resettlement to third countries, for those people who
qualify as refugees and are unwilling to return to their
home countries;
(f) MONUC and UNHCR will seek to work
with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Rwanda, as well as with other countries
concerned, to ensure that those two Governments make
available to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
- 8 -
7
S/2002/1005
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994 any persons sought by the Tribunal;
(g) In areas not under the control of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo Government,
MONUC will provide “point security” for the
disarmament and demobilization sites, but the local
authorities will continue to be responsible for
providing overall “umbrella security”. In areas
controlled by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the Government will be
expected to provide security at the disarmament and
demobilization sites;
(h) A clear understanding should be reached
with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Rwanda on their respective roles and
responsibilities, as well as those of MONUC, UNHCR
and other relevant United Nations agencies, with
regard to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants and
associated tasks.
2. Envisaged disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
arrangements
35. In areas controlled by the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, any ex-FAR or
Interahamwe members identified as operating
alongside the Congolese armed forces would remain in
their formations until they were, as was the case in
Kamina, disarmed by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo Government, where they would be screened,
demobilized and repatriated by MONUC. The
Congolese armed forces would be responsible for
maintaining security during the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration exercise. MONUC would not be required
to provide protection, beyond guard units necessary to
protect United Nations personnel and equipment.
Accordingly, it will be possible for MONUC to proceed
with the initial stages of disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration within its
current resources in the areas under Government
control as soon as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe are
identified.
36. In the east, disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration will
continue to present a major political, security and
logistical challenge. As noted in my previous reports,
the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo remains highly volatile. The general
environment of hostility and the lack of law and order
are likely to remain, even with a formal cessation of
hostilities. In this light, it is proposed that the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration process in the east would initially
commence in areas of relative security.
37. The proposed disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration plan
envisages that MONUC will simultaneously operate
two to four mobile reception centres for disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration at any given time. It is
estimated that a total of 10 to 12 mobile reception
centres could be created during the entire process.
These centres would be set up by MONUC in
partnership with UNHCR, the World Food Programme
(WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In addition
to the military presence of MONUC, including military
observers, a multidisciplinary civilian team would also
be attached to each centre.
38. Following consultations with United Nations
agencies, it has been agreed in principle that UNHCR
will assist in the reception and repatriation of excombatants’
dependants, who will be accommodated at
a separate camp. WFP will provide and distribute food,
UNICEF will assist with the child soldiers and WHO
will support the provision of medical services.
MONUC and the United Nations agencies will also
work in close partnership with non-governmental
organizations that may assist the process. In this
connection, specialized training in child protection and
gender issues will be provided to civilians and military
personnel who will be involved in the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration process.
39. According to preliminary estimates, it could take
about two months to establish one mobile centre, two
months to process the combatants and their dependants
there and one month to disassemble the camp. The total
caseload, including dependants, could be as high as
90,000. MONUC estimates that, with the assistance of
its implementation partners, it could repatriate up to
200 people per day from each reception centre and that
up to 7,000 people would be processed at each centre
over a two-month period, depending on location and
logistical conditions.
- 9 -
8
S/2002/1005
40. The extensive use of the Mission’s public
information capacities will be essential in
disseminating information on the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration process. MONUC will step up the use of
Radio Okapi to broadcast information on Rwanda’s
policy on the issue of returning ex-combatants who
have already been repatriated, in order to further
encourage combatants to disarm and repatriate. In so
doing, it will continue to broadcast from already
established bases in Kindu and Kisangani and use its
three mobile FM radio transmitters.
B. Overall framework for
phase III activities
41. As envisaged in the Pretoria Agreement, the
third-party verification mechanism will verify the
information provided by the parties on armed groups.
Moreover, the verification mechanism will play a vital
role in overcoming any potential stumbling blocks in
the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement by
making a final determination on the measures taken
vis-à-vis the dismantling of armed groups. While
MONUC is a separate entity, it is expected to serve as
the main operational arm of the verification mechanism
in regard to its verification tasks. Other bodies, such as
the JMC, will be invited to participate in the activities
of the verification mechanism, as appropriate, pursuant
to the Pretoria Agreement.
42. The role of the third-party verification
mechanism in verifying the cessation of support to
armed groups will be particularly important, as this is
understood to be an essential element of the “effective
measures” aimed at dismantling the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe. To assist in this endeavour,
MONUC is expected to establish an observation
presence at key points on the alleged supply routes,
including at Ndjili airport and at Kamina and
Lubumbashi airfields. The verification mechanism will
also work with both the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Rwandan Governments to identify leaders
of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, with a view to
establishing their whereabouts and handing them over
to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (see
also para. 34 (f) above).
43. The structure of MONUC — both civilian and
military — would be adjusted in order to meet the
challenges that the Mission will face in the coming
phase. A joint coordination committee for
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration, of which the current disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration division will form the core, would be set
up directly under the responsibility of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General. The
coordination committee would include the various
components of MONUC and its principal partners —
UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United
Nations Development Programme.
44. Given the immense logistical challenges and the
need for effective coordination with the multitude of
players involved in the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration exercise, I
intend to appoint to MONUC a second Deputy Special
Representative to be responsible for operations and
management, including all support aspects of the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration programme. My first Deputy Special
Representative will, in addition to her other functions,
retain responsibility for political guidance on
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration. She will also, as noted in paragraph
9 above, be my senior representative in the third-party
verification mechanism.
45. A forward Mission headquarters, to be directed
by a senior civilian officer, will be established at
Kisangani, in order to coordinate MONUC activities in
the east and to spearhead disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration in this
region. The creation of such a forward Mission
headquarters will enable MONUC to shift the “centre
of gravity” of its activities gradually towards the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as the
Mission embarks on its phase III activities.
46. In the meantime, MONUC offices in Kampala
and Kigali will also be strengthened to support the
work of the Mission, especially in the implementation
of the Pretoria and Luanda Agreements, and to provide
better political liaison and analysis of developments in
Uganda and Rwanda. MONUC also expects to
establish a field presence in Lubumbashi.
47. International monitoring of the returning excombatants
and dependants in Rwanda is an essential
confidence-building measure. It is envisaged that
UNHCR will undertake its normal monitoring
- 10 -
9
S/2002/1005
functions in relation to returning refugees. At the same
time, discussions are under way to identify the most
effective way to monitor ex-combatants who are
repatriated through “solidarity camps” before they are
returned to their communities of origin. The experience
in Kamina has demonstrated that confidence-building
measures are necessary to ensure that ex-combatants
can benefit from the security guarantees extended by
the Rwandan Government.
Concept of operations
48. In order to support the conduct of disarmament,
demobilization, and repatriation of foreign armed
groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
military component of MONUC will need to be
significantly strengthened by creating a forward force.
The forward force will comprise two robust task forces,
based in Kindu and Kisangani, as well as one reserve
battalion, riverine units and specialized enabling units
to enhance the Mission’s military logistics capacity.
49. Each task force will be an integrated (i.e.,
including command, combat and support elements) and
flexible force of approximately 1,700 troops with
in-built mobility, structured around a well-equipped
infantry battalion. It will also be supported by integral
utility (transport) aviation with a lift capability of 120
personnel, specialized logistics elements and two
military engineer units, each with a limited demining
and construction capability. Additionally, a single
armed helicopter unit will be deployed in the east to
support the forward force. While the two task forces
will maintain their primary bases in Kindu and
Kisangani, each one will have the capability to deploy
forward up to three company groups to mobile
disarmament and demobilization sites in the east.
50. The task forces will, inter alia, provide “point
security” at disarmament and demobilization sites for
the conduct of the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration process, support the engineering
preparation of disarmament and demobilization sites,
destroy weapons and munitions, and provide limited
demining capability.
51. A force reserve battalion, provided by a single
troop-contributing country, will comprise a
headquarters and four infantry companies. This reserve
battalion will be located at Kisangani and will provide
flexibility and the ability to meet unexpected
contingencies. It may also assist specialized civilian
and military teams with ad hoc disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration operations carried out in the west of the
country, as a prelude to the wider disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration operation.
52. It is proposed that airfield services be provided
by the military component, aimed at enabling MONUC
to quickly expand its disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration operations. These will include essential
capabilities in areas such as meteorology, air traffic
control, movement control and cargo-handling support
that are necessary to ensure flexible, safe and reliable
airfield operations.
53. The riverine units will be used to support the
reopening of the Congo River for commercial traffic
and the movement of United Nations transports, as well
as to facilitate MONUC monitoring in the area southeast
of Kisangani. Additional military observers are
also envisaged to staff the military component of the
forward Mission headquarters in Kisangani and to
support broader phase III tasks, including by assisting
in the screening of combatants in the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration exercise.
54. The current military deployment of MONUC
comprises approximately 640 military observers and
3,600 troops. To undertake the tasks described above in
the revised concept of operations, an additional 120
military observers and up to 4,340 troops will be
necessary, bringing the total authorized strength to
8,700 military personnel. The overall troop
requirement will be kept under close review, especially
with regard to tasks undertaken under the earlier phase
II deployment. As discussed in paragraph 48 above, the
new military requirements for the Mission include
essential military logistics capabilities. It should be
noted, however, that in the past it has been extremely
difficult for the United Nations to obtain such troops
from Member States. If they are not made available,
specialized civilian contracts will have to be sought.
Such contracts are usually very costly and may be very
slow to materialize.
C. Withdrawal of foreign troops
55. MONUC will continue to monitor the withdrawal
of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, which remains a key element of an overall
- 11 -
10
S/2002/1005
settlement. The Mission has observed the recent
withdrawal of Ugandan troops from Beni and
Gbadolite and is also currently monitoring the
redeployment of Zimbabwean troops to assembly areas,
in preparation for their withdrawal from Democratic
Republic of the Congo territory. MONUC has recently
observed the repatriation of a number of Zimbabwe
Defence Forces troops from the area of Mbandaka and
Mbuji-Mayi. A MONUC military liaison officer is
present in Zimbabwe to monitor the arrival of
withdrawing Zimbabwean troops in the country.
56. MONUC will also be prepared to monitor the
withdrawal of Rwandan troops, the largest foreign
military presence in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, in accordance with Security Council resolution
1304 (2000) and subsequent resolutions. It is hoped
that the third-party verification mechanism will be able
to assist in this process. In the meantime, the initial
withdrawal plan provided by the Rwandan Government
lacks some specific information that is required,
including information on the numbers, equipment and
locations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) units
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as
their exit routes. A timetable for the withdrawal of
Rwandan troops should also be developed and
promptly submitted to the third-party verification
mechanism. Once the necessary information is made
available, MONUC will develop its own plan to
monitor the withdrawal of the RPA troops from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
D. Restoring security in the north-east
57. The currently explosive situation in Bunia calls
for intensified efforts by the parties and the
international community to defuse the tension and to
urgently inject a sense of normalcy. It is envisaged that
the response of MONUC will be twofold: promoting
accountability from the de facto authorities and
launching measures to build confidence between the
communities.
58. Given the prevailing volatile environment,
security responsibilities should continue to be
discharged by UPDF, in an impartial manner, until such
time as it can be replaced by a capable police force
representing a legitimate authority acceptable to the
communities in Ituri. In due course, once an agreement
on the installation of a new administration in Ituri is
reached, further consideration could be given to
MONUC providing police training and monitoring
assistance in this region. It is also important that
external players refrain from exploiting the precarious
situation in Ituri.
59. In view of the pervasive fear and mistrust that
characterize relations between the Lendu and the
Hema, it is essential that a dialogue between the two
groups, as well as with the wider community of Ituri be
initiated and maintained. In the past, the organization
of forums and round tables involving community
leaders and traditional chiefs has helped defuse
tensions. However, the lack of follow-up or the nonimplementation
of agreed measures has impeded the
furtherance of reconciliation efforts.
60. Pursuant to the Luanda Agreement, the
Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda are envisaged to establish a Joint
Pacification Committee on Ituri (see para. 16 above).
MONUC will work with the two Governments and
with key personalities on the ground on the proposed
initiative, with a view to assisting them in the search
for a solution to the troubling situation in Ituri.
61. In the meantime, MONUC intends to increase its
presence in Bunia, with a senior political adviser
leading the team there. The team will collect and
analyse information on trends that are likely to have an
effect on the security environment. To this end,
MONUC has already strengthened its office in the area
by dispatching a political officer, a civil affairs officer
and a humanitarian officer to Bunia. However,
sustaining a large MONUC civilian presence in Ituri
requires that all concerned urgently address the
security situation.
62. An important factor contributing to the highly
volatile environment in Ituri is the lack of access to
objective and impartial information, making the
population susceptible to manipulation and, sometimes,
incitement by those who want to destabilize the
situation. MONUC will do its best to intensify its
public information efforts in Bunia, and has already
made arrangements to install a Radio Okapi transmitter
there.
63. It is widely felt that a small number of leaders are
responsible for deliberately creating a confused
situation in the Ituri region, pitting one community
against another, to further their own interests. In order
to end the cycle of violence in an environment of
- 12 -
11
S/2002/1005
impunity, these leaders should be held accountable for
their actions.
E. Civilian police aspects
64. It will be recalled that the idea of establishing a
civilian police component in MONUC was first
broached in my eighth report on MONUC
(S/2001/572), in the context of assisting local
authorities to enhance their capacity to maintain law
and order in areas from which foreign forces would
withdraw and disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration would take
place. Under resolution 1355 (2001) of 15 June 2001,
the Security Council approved the establishment of a
civilian police component in MONUC to conduct an
in-depth assessment of policing institutions, needs and
capabilities, and ultimately to prepare
recommendations for an eventually expanded MONUC
civilian police component. The task of the civilian
police component was to advise and assist the local
authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities to
ensure the security of the local population, particularly
in regard to the internal security situation following the
withdrawal of the foreign forces.
65. With the signing of the Pretoria and Luanda
Agreements, MONUC has been considering in more
concrete terms the type of assistance the Mission could
provide in areas from which RPA and UPDF troops
would withdraw. As the situation in these areas
becomes clearer in the coming months, I intend to
return to the Security Council with recommendations
regarding the assistance MONUC could provide in
relation to capacity-building for local internal security
mechanisms — including broader law and order issues,
such as human rights and the judiciary.
V. Observations and recommendations
66. The signing of two separate bilateral Agreements
between the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and the Governments of Rwanda and
Uganda is an extremely important development in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo peace process, and
could be a major step forward in the continuing efforts
to end a long-standing conflict. The highly
commendable initiatives of the Governments of South
Africa and Angola to introduce a new dynamic in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo peace process
deserve our strong support. It is important that the
parties on the ground now demonstrate their full
commitment to these Agreements through concrete and
decisive steps.
67. In this connection, the reports of intensified
military activities in the east are a source of major
concern. I call on the parties to do everything possible
to achieve an immediate ceasefire and to end all
support to the armed groups, as a sign of good will. I
also call on all concerned — in particular RCDNational,
supported by MLC, and RCD-K/ML — to
cease all military activities in the north-east. The gap
that still exists between the increasingly positive
diplomatic efforts and the deteriorating situation on the
ground must not be allowed to widen.
68. I am particularly concerned about the security
conditions in the Ituri region. The tensions between the
local communities have been aggravated by the
dynamics affecting the larger Democratic Republic of
the Congo conflict. I call on all concerned not to take
any action that might exacerbate existing tensions. The
developments in Ituri underscore the pressing need to
arrive at an all-inclusive agreement on a transitional
Government that could promptly extend its authority
effectively throughout the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
69. In the framework of the Luanda Agreement, I
urge the Governments of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Uganda to continue their consultations,
with a view to addressing the troubling situation in
Ituri and, in particular, ensuring that there is no
security vacuum in the region. In this connection, their
decision to establish a Joint Pacification Committee on
Ituri is a welcome development.
70. The efforts of humanitarian agencies to meet the
vast needs in that region and elsewhere in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo are vital.
Humanitarian agencies have recently established a task
force on the situation in Ituri in order to closely
monitor developments and to coordinate an effective
response. However, the needs are overwhelming and
cannot be met with current resources alone. I strongly
appeal to donors to provide generous funding to the
humanitarian agencies operating in the area. Their
work also requires adequate security arrangements, and
all parties in the Ituri region are urged to allow the
- 13 -
12
S/2002/1005
humanitarian agencies full and complete access to all
those in need.
71. The Pretoria and Luanda Agreements have laid a
foundation for building a lasting peace in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. They address the
main aspects of the conflict by providing a framework
for the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration of foreign armed groups
and for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops.
The repatriation of UPDF from Beni and Gbadolite,
which paves the way for Uganda’s total withdrawal
from Democratic Republic of the Congo territory, is an
important step forward. While Zimbabwe is not a party
to the Pretoria Agreement or the Luanda Agreement,
the recent announcement of its intention to repatriate
its troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
is also a welcome step. I call on the Government of
Zimbabwe to work closely with MONUC to ensure that
its withdrawal is conducted in a transparent and orderly
manner. Rwanda should also demonstrate its
willingness to withdraw its troops from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, in accordance with relevant
Security Council resolutions.
72. There should be no doubt that the ability of
MONUC to implement its revised concept of
operations will depend on the full cooperation of the
parties, which includes the provision of all necessary
information; a full cessation of hostilities throughout
the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
in particular of the fighting between the nonsignatories
to the Lusaka Agreement and the
Rwandan/RCD-Goma forces; the cessation of support
from the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and its allies for ex-FAR/Interahamwe and
other armed groups; and the parties’ provision of
security, access and freedom of movement to MONUC.
73. It is my sincere hope that the obstacles that have
impeded the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement in the past will be overcome through the
third-party verification mechanism. MONUC will
extend its fullest cooperation to the verification
mechanism, and will report on the possible financial
implications.
74. The effective conduct of disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration of foreign armed groups will be
imperative for the settling of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo conflict. On the basis of lessons learned
in similar situations, the delays usually caused by a
shortage of funds provided on a voluntary basis must
be avoided. The international community cannot afford
to miss the opportunity offered by the Pretoria
Agreement to disarm, demobilize and repatriate foreign
armed groups — a goal that has been pursued for
several years now. It is therefore recommended that the
costs of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation
of members of armed groups be borne under the
assessed budget. At the same time, I intend to do
everything possible to encourage donors to mobilize
funds for this process on a voluntary basis, with a view
to reimbursing the assessed budget allocations. In
addition, any costs related to reintegration would
continue to be funded through voluntary contributions
to Governments and agencies concerned. I call on the
international community to support these efforts
generously, particularly through assistance to the
communities where the ex-combatants will resettle.
75. In this context, I would also like to recommend
an extension of quick-impact project funding for
MONUC, which is absolutely essential as the Mission
enters a new phase of its mandate and expands its
deployment and visibility. Such projects, while
representing a very small percentage of the Mission’s
overall budget, can go a long way in helping the
Mission to provide tangible benefits to the
communities where it is deployed and in winning the
support of the local population.
76. While it is clear that the implementation of the
Agreements will depend primarily on the political will
and determination of the parties to abide by their
commitments, much remains to be done by the
international community in assisting the parties to
implement their undertakings. In this regard, an
adjustment and reconfiguration of the MONUC
structure and deployment has been carefully considered
in order to determine how the Mission can most
effectively play its role in support of the peace process.
Consequently, it is proposed that MONUC shift the
emphasis of its activity eastward, enhance its
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration capacity and strengthen its presence
considerably, essentially through the deployment of
two task forces, as outlined in paragraphs 48 to 54
above.
77. Accordingly, I recommend that the authorized
military strength of MONUC be increased up to 8,700
all ranks, bearing in mind that the troop level will be
- 14 -
13
S/2002/1005
kept under constant review as the process unfolds. In
anticipation of a Security Council decision and in order
to ensure an expeditious response by the United
Nations, I have instructed the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations to step up its efforts to
consult potential troop contributors. In this connection,
I particularly appeal to countries that have the
capability to provide specialized military units, such as
military aviation units, airfield services and engineers,
to contribute to MONUC.
78. I strongly urge the Congolese parties to reach an
all-inclusive agreement on a new political dispensation
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as soon as
possible. My Special Envoy, Mr. Niasse, will continue
to work closely with the Congolese leaders to reach
this very important goal. Any delay in achieving such a
political settlement could undermine the recent
momentum created by the Pretoria and Luanda
Agreements.
79. As noted in the Pretoria Agreement, the
resolution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
conflict is a process, not an event. Therefore, the
signing of the recent Agreements — while an important
step towards peace — is only the beginning of a
process, the progress of which will depend, first, on the
commitment of the parties and, second, on the decisive
support that the international community will be
willing to provide.
- 15 -
ANNEX 3.3
Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold. Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005
(Excerpts)
- 16 -
The Curse of Gold
Democratic Republic of Congo
Human Rights Watch
- 17 -
The Curse of Gold
I. Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 1
II. Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 5
III. Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 9
IV. Background: Enriching the Elites...................................................................................... 12
The Significance of Gold.......................................................................................................13
Ugandan Forces Plunder the Gold of Haut Uélé District, 1998-2002...........................15
Local Armed Groups Fight for the Gold of Ituri, 2002-2004.........................................20
V. Human Rights Abuses in the Mongbwalu Gold Mining Area........................................ 23
Massacres and other Abuses by the UPC and their Allies................................................27
Massacre at Mongbwalu, November 2002 ..................................................................... 27
Massacre at Kilo, December 2002 ................................................................................... 29
Arbitrary arrest, torture and summary executions......................................................... 31
Mining the Gold: Instances of Forced Labour .............................................................. 33
Increased Commerce ......................................................................................................... 35
Justice for UPC crimes ...................................................................................................... 36
Massacres and other Abuses by the FNI, FAPC and the Ugandan Army.....................36
Massacre at Kilo, March 2003 .......................................................................................... 37
Accountability for the March 2003 Kilo Massacre........................................................ 39
The 48 Hour War, June 2003 and subsequent massacres ............................................ 40
A ‘Witch Hunt’ for Hema Women and other Opponents........................................... 43
Murder of two MONUC Observers................................................................................ 46
Threat Against Human Rights Defenders and Others Reporting Abuses ................ 47
Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Forced Labor ................................................................ 48
Control of the Gold Mines ............................................................................................... 51
VI. AngloGold Ashanti – Starting Gold Exploration Activities.......................................... 58
Competition for the Mining Rights to the Mongbwalu Mines ........................................60
AngloGold Ashanti Seeks to Start Exploration Activities in Mongbwalu, 2003 ..........61
AngloGold Ashanti develops a relationship with the FNI armed group .................. 65
AngloGold Ashanti benefits from its relationship with the FNI armed
group..................................................................................................................................... 68
Benefits for the FNI Armed Group................................................................................ 72
AngloGold Ashanti View of Contacts with the FNI.................................................... 75
Failure to Respect Human Rights, International Norms and Business Standards .......77
VII. Human Rights Abuses in the Durba Gold Mines and Trade Routes......................... 84
Summary Executions by Commander Jérôme, 2002-2004...............................................86
Executing and Torturing Supposed Political Opponents ............................................ 87
Arbitrary Detention and Torture ..................................................................................... 90
- 18 -
Tolerating Abuses by Business Allies .............................................................................. 93
Djalasiga: Continued Conflict over Gold Mines................................................................94
VIII. Trade in Tainted Gold...................................................................................................... 97
The New DRC Mining Code ................................................................................................98
Organization of the Gold Trade through Butembo and Ariwara .................................100
Dr Kisoni in Butembo..................................................................................................... 100
Omar Oria in Ariwara...................................................................................................... 104
Congolese Gold Exported to Uganda ...............................................................................105
Gold Export Figures from Uganda ............................................................................... 107
Gold Traders in Kampala................................................................................................ 108
Encouragement of the Gold Trade by the Ugandan Government .......................... 110
Buyers of Tainted Gold .......................................................................................................111
Switzerland: Unaccounted Gold?................................................................................... 111
Metalor Technologies SA................................................................................................ 113
IX. International Initiatives to Address Resource Exploitation in the DRC................... 118
U.N. Panel of Experts Reports on Illegal Resource Exploitation in the DRC...........118
Investigations on Breaches of the OECD Guidelines ....................................................121
Response of Regional Governments .................................................................................122
The Ugandan Porter Commission ................................................................................. 122
Rwandan Investigations................................................................................................... 123
DRC Government Response.......................................................................................... 124
MONUC................................................................................................................................125
International Financial Institutions ....................................................................................126
International Criminal Court...............................................................................................127
X. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 129
XI. Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 130
XII. Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 131
This report was written in English and translated into French. If there are any inconsistencies between
the French and English versions of this document, the English version will govern. This report was
correct as at April 26, 2005.
- 19 -
1 SUMMARY
I. Summary
“We are cursed because of our gold. All we do is suffer. There is no benefit to us.”
Congolese gold miner
The northeast corner of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is home to one of
Africa’s richest goldfields. Competition to control the gold mines and trading routes has
spurred the bloody conflict that has gripped this area since the start of the Congolese
war in 1998 and continues to the present. Soldiers and armed group leaders, seeing
control of the gold mines as a way to money, guns, and power, have fought each other
ruthlessly, often targeting civilians in the process. Combatants under their command
carried out widespread ethnic slaughter, executions, torture, rape and arbitrary arrest, all
grave human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. More than
sixty thousand people have died due to direct violence in this part of Congo alone.
Rather than bringing prosperity to the people of northeastern Congo, gold has been a
curse to those who have the misfortune to live there.
This report documents human rights abuses linked to efforts to control two key gold
mining areas, Mongbwalu (Ituri District) and Durba (Haut Uélé District), both bordering
Uganda.
When Uganda, a major belligerent in the war, occupied northeastern Congo from 1998
to 2003, its soldiers took direct control of gold-rich areas and coerced gold miners to
extract the gold for their benefit. They beat and arbitrarily arrested those who resisted
their orders. Ignoring the rules of war for the conduct of occupying armies, they helped
themselves to an estimated one ton of Congolese gold valued at over $9 million. Their
irresponsible mining practices led to the collapse of one of the most important mines in
the area in 1999, the Gorumbwa mine, killing some one hundred people trapped inside
and destroying a major livelihood for the residents of the area.
The Ugandan army withdrew from Congo in 2003, following Rwanda, another major
belligerent, which had withdrawn the year before. Each left behind local proxies, the
Lendu Nationalist and Integrationist Front (Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes, FNI)
linked to Uganda, and the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes
Congolais, UPC), supported by Rwanda. With continued assistance from their external
backers, these local armed groups in turn fought for the control of gold-mining areas
and trade routes. As each group won a gold-rich area, they promptly began exploiting
- 20 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 2
the ore. The FNI and the UPC fought five battles in a struggle to control Mongbwalu,
each resulting in widespread human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch researchers
documented the slaughter of at least two thousand civilians in the Mongbwalu area alone
between June 2002 and September 2004. Tens of thousands of civilians were forced to
flee from their homes into the forests to escape their attackers. Many of them did not
survive.
In 2003, peace talks at the national level culminated in the installation of a transitional
government, but northeastern Congo remained volatile and beyond central government
control. Multinational corporations nonetheless sought to sign new deals or revitalize old
ones to start gold mining and exploration operations in the rich gold concessions in the
northeast. One of these companies, AngloGold Ashanti, one of the largest gold
producers in the world, started exploration activities in the Mongbwalu gold mining area.
Following earlier attempts to make contact with the UPC armed group, AngloGold
Ashanti representatives established relations with the FNI, an armed group responsible
for serious human rights abuses including war crimes and crimes against humanity, and
who controlled the Mongbwalu area. In return for FNI assurances of security for its
operations and staff, AngloGold Ashanti provided logistical and financial support – that
in turn resulted in political benefits – to the armed group and its leaders. The company
knew, or should have known, that the FNI armed group had committed grave human
rights abuses against civilians and was not a party to the transitional government.
As a company with public commitments to corporate social responsibility, AngloGold
Ashanti should have ensured their operations complied with those commitments and did
not adversely affect human rights. They do not appear to have done so. Business
considerations came above respect for human rights. In its gold exploration activities in
Mongbwalu, AngloGold Ashanti failed to uphold its own business principles on human
rights considerations and failed to follow international business norms governing the
behavior of companies internationally. Human Rights Watch has been unable to identify
effective steps taken by the company to ensure that their activities did not negatively
impact on human rights.
In other small-scale mining operations conducted throughout the duration of the
conflict, armed groups and their business allies used the proceeds from the sale of gold
to support their military activities. Working outside of legal channels, a network of
traders funnelled gold mined by artisanal miners and forced labour out of the Congo to
Uganda. In return for their services some traders counted on the support of combatants
from the armed groups who threatened, detained, and even murdered their commercial
rivals or those suspected of failing to honor business deals. These traders sold the ore to
- 21 -
3 SUMMARY
gold exporters based in Uganda who then sold to the global gold market, a practice that
continues today.
In 2003, an estimated $60 million worth of Congolese gold was exported from Uganda,
much of it destined for Switzerland. One of the companies buying gold from Uganda is
Metalor Technologies, a leading Swiss refinery. The chain of Congolese middlemen,
Ugandan traders, and multinational corporations forms an important funding network
for armed groups operating in northeastern Congo. Metalor knew, or should have
known, that gold bought from its suppliers in Uganda came from a conflict zone in
northeastern DRC where human rights were abused on a systematic basis. The
company should have considered whether its own role in buying gold resources from its
suppliers in Uganda was compatible with provisions on human rights and it should have
actively checked its supply chain to verify that acceptable ethical standards were
maintained. Through purchases of gold made from Uganda, Metalor Technologies may
have contributed indirectly to providing a revenue stream for armed groups that carry
out widespread human rights abuses.
The international community has failed to effectively tackle the link between resource
exploitation and conflict in the Congo. Following three years of investigation into this
link, a United Nations (U.N.) panel of experts stated that the withdrawal of foreign
armies from Congo was unlikely to stop the cycle of conflict and exploitation of
resources. But the U.N. Security Council established no mechanism to follow up on the
recommendations of the panel. The trade in gold is just one example of a wider trend of
competition for resources and resulting human rights abuses taking place in mineral rich
areas throughout the Congo. The link between conflict and resource exploitation raises
broader questions of corporate accountability in the developing world. Given the
troubling allegations described in the U.N. panel of experts reports and in this report, it
is imperative that further steps be taken to deal with the issue of natural resources and
conflict in the Congo and beyond.
In preparation for this report, Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed over 150
individuals including victims, witnesses, gold miners, gold traders, gold exporters,
customs officials, armed group leaders, government representatives, and officials of
international financial institutions in Congo, Uganda and Europe in 2004 and 2005.
Human Rights Watch researchers also met with and engaged in written correspondence
with representatives from AngloGold Ashanti and Metalor Technologies to discuss
concerns.
- 22 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 4
We wish to thank our Congolese colleagues in Justice Plus, and other individuals who
cannot be named for security reasons, for their assistance and support in our research.
They risk their lives to defend the rights of others and are to be commended for their
courage and commitment.
- 23 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 12
IV. Background: Enriching the Elites
Gold, one of the richest resources in the Congo, offers the potential to contribute to
financial reconstruction after a war that has cost millions of lives and has left countless
others in desperate poverty. But in recent years it has enriched only a fortunate few,
many of whom have won control over the gold by use of force. Gold has contributed
little to the overall prosperity of the nation; on the contrary it has been a curse to those
who have the misfortune to live in regions where it is found.
In 1996 Rwandan and Ugandan forces invaded the Congo, ousted long-time ruler
Mobutu Sese Seko, and installed Laurent Desiré Kabila in power. In July 1998 Kabila
tried to expel the Rwandan troops, but they and the Ugandan forces instead engaged
Kabila’s government in the second Congo war, one that eventually drew in Zimbabwe,
Angola, Namibia (supporting Kabila) and Burundi (allied with the Rwandans and
Ugandans). Often termed as Africa’s first world war, the conflict resulted in the deaths
of 3.5 million people, the great majority in eastern DRC. Many victims were displaced
people who died from exposure, hunger, or lack of medical assistance.1 A first peace
agreement, signed in Lusaka in 1999, had little effect but the U.N. agreed to establish a
peacekeeping force known as the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (MONUC) in November 1999. Through continued international
pressure, the national government and major rebel movements eventually signed a
power-sharing agreement at Sun City in April 2002 that allowed for the establishment of
the Global and All Inclusive Peace Agreement which set up the transitional government
in June 2003. Despite this agreement and other bilateral and regional security
agreements, insecurity continued in large parts of eastern Congo.
The war in northeastern Congo, specifically in Ituri, sprang from the larger Congo war,
and became a complex web of local, national, and regional conflicts. It developed after a
local land dispute in 1999 between Hema and Lendu ethnic groups was exacerbated by
the Ugandan army who occupied the area and by national rebel groups keen on
expanding their power base. The availability of political and military support from
external actors, notably Uganda and Rwanda, plus growing extremists’ sentiments,
encouraged local leaders in Ituri to form more structured movements. Armed groups
were born, generally based on ethnic loyalties, including the predominately northern
1 International Rescue Committee and Burnet Institute, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results
from a Nationwide Survey, December 2004.
- 24 -
13 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
Hema group the UPC2, the predominately Lendu FNI3, the southern Hema group
PUSIC and the more mixed FAPC.4 Each of these groups received military and
political support from either the DRC5, Ugandan or Rwandan governments at different
times turning Ituri into a battleground for the war between them.6
Between 2002 and 2004 these Ituri armed groups attempted to gain recognition on the
national scene, hoping for positions in the Kinshasa based transitional government and
in the newly integrated army. In this scramble, local militia leaders frequently switched
alliances between themselves and other backers as their interests dictated. They
attempted to control huge swathes of territory and strategic sites, including gold mines
and lucrative customs posts, in order to enhance the importance of their movement.
The strategic sites also provided much needed finance for the armed groups and favor
with their backers. A U.N. special report on the events in Ituri published in July 2004
underlined that the competition for control of natural resources, particularly gold, by
these armed groups was a major factor in prolonging the crisis in Ituri.7
The Significance of Gold
Gold was first discovered in the Agola River in northeastern Congo in 1903 by two
Australian prospectors. They named the area after the local chief Kilo8 and shortly
thereafter made a similar discovery in the Moto River just to the north, from which the
name Kilo-Moto derives. Exploitation of the gold started in 1905 and continued on an
increased scale. During the first half of the twentieth century, colonial entrepreneurs
exploited gold through private companies that introduced large-scale or industrial
mining. After independence in 1960, the state nationalized many of these companies,
including, in 1966, the Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto (SOKIMO) that worked
the lodes of northeastern Congo. It granted the large SOKIMO concession in Ituri and
Haut Uélé Districts of Orientale Province to a new state-owned Office of the Gold
Mines of Kilo-Moto (OKIMO). To date, OKIMO officials estimate that more than 400
2 The northern Hema group is often referred to as Gegere, a sub-clan of the Hema.
3 This included temporarily the southern Lendu group known as the Ngiti, who had formed the FRPI miltia.
4 Another group, the Popular Forces for the Democracy of Congo (FPDC) was also born but it has played only a
minor role. PUSIC has not been active in the gold mining areas of Mongbwalu and Durba and so goes largely
unmentioned in this report.
5 Assistance was received from the pre-transition Kinshasa government before mid-2003, though support
allegedly continued from certain components of the transitional government after mid-2003.
6 Human Rights Watch, “Ituri: ‘Covered in Blood’ – Ethnically Targeted Violence in North-eastern DRC”, A Short
Report, July 2003.
7 Letter from the U.N. Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, “Special Report on the Events
in Ituri January 2002 – December 2003”, July 16 2004, p. 5.
8 The local chief was actually called Krilo, but the Australians mistook the name for Kilo.
- 25 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 14
tons of gold have been extracted from their concession and that much more remains,
though there is no precise estimate of how much.9 Many industry experts agree that the
OKIMO concession is one of the most exciting, and potentially the largest, unexplored
gold reserve in Africa.10 In the early 1990s OKIMO entered into arrangements with
multinational corporations to exploit the large mines of northeastern Congo using
industrial methods (discussed below) and also licensed local miners to work other areas
by artisanal methods.
In 2000, the U. N. Security Council expressed concern that Congo’s natural resources
such as gold, diamonds and other minerals were fuelling the deadly war. They appointed
a panel of experts11 to look into the matter who published four separate reports between
April 2001 and October 2003. 12 In these series of reports, the U.N. panel of experts
reported that Rwandan, Ugandan, and Zimbabwean army officers as well as members of
the Congolese elite were growing rich from the wealth of the Congo. They showed how
extraction of these resources helped fund armed groups, thus fueling the war. They
further documented how the minerals of the Congo were fed into the networks of
international commerce. The panel concluded in its report of October 2002 that the
withdrawal of foreign armies would not end the resource exploitation because the elites
had created a self-financing war economy.13
In 2002, following heavy international pressure, in part because of the U.N. panel
reports, both the Rwandan and Ugandan governments agreed to withdraw their soldiers
from Congo. Uganda subsequently arranged with the Congolese government to keep
some forces in northeastern Congo until 2003 when the last of their troops withdrew.
This report, focused on control of gold in northeastern Congo, shows that the pattern of
exploitation of natural resources described by the U.N. panel of experts, does indeed
continue as of this writing, resulting in widespread abuses of human rights. The trade in
gold is just one example of a wider trend of competition for resources and resulting
human rights abuses taking place in mineral rich areas throughout the Congo.
9 Pasteur Cosma Wilingula Balongelwa, General Director of OKIMO, “Written Presentation on OKIMO”,
Kinshasa, January 31, 2004.
10 Human Rights Watch interviews, gold industry experts, Bunia, Kampala, London, February – May 2004.
Industry experts use the term ‘ore body’ instead of the lay term gold reserve.
11 Known as the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo; hereafter the U.N. panel of experts.
12 See reports from the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 12, 2001 (S/2001/357), May 22, 2002 (S/2002/565),
October 16, 2002 (S/2002/1146), October 23, 2003 (S/2003/1027) plus other addendums.
13 Ibid., U.N. panel report (S/2002/1146), October 16, 2002.
- 26 -
15 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
Gold miners working in an open pit mine in Durba. © 2004 Marcus Bleasdale
Ugandan Forces Plunder the Gold of Haut Uélé District, 1998-2002
In August 1998, shortly after the start of the second Congolese war, Ugandan troops
occupied gold-rich areas of Haut Uélé, including the town of Durba, (Watsa Territory,
Haut Uélé District, Orientale Province), site of three important gold mines: Gorumbwa,
Durba and Agbarabo. According to estimates of engineers and geologists familiar with
the area, nearly one ton of gold was extracted from this region during the four-year
period of Ugandan occupation.14 Based on prices at the time, this would have been
valued at some $9 million dollars.
Ugandan troops were supporting the advance of their Congolese allies, the rebel Rally
for Congolese Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD) and
the Congolese Liberation Movement (Movement pour la Liberation du Congo, MLC),
but according to local observers, the Ugandans took Durba primarily for the wealth it
offered. Within weeks of the second war, the Rwandan and Ugandan backed RCD rebel
forces quickly announced their “control over the OKIMO mines” and in a written
decision prohibited any illicit mining stating that the RCD was going to “economically
14 Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO engineers and geologists, Durba, May 13, 2004. Estimates were
based on regular observation and monitoring.
- 27 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 16
reorganize the territory under its control.”15 One witness in Durba who witnessed the
Ugandan army enter said, “The Ugandans were only here for the gold. . . There was no
military reason [to be here] and they never fought any battles here.”16 Officials of the
state-owned gold mining agency OKIMO had been left in charge of the Durba mines
after the flight of the expatriate staff of the Barrick Gold Corporation, a mining
company which held a concession from OKIMO. A former OKIMO employee present
when the Ugandans arrived said, “We understood that they came to our area only for
economic interests. The moment they arrived they were more interested in OKIMO
than anything else.”17
In the early days of the occupation, Ugandan soldiers, including a Ugandan officer called
Major Sonko, came by helicopter to try to start gold production.18 Finding it too difficult
and costly to operate the mines on an industrial scale, they decided to use artisanal
miners, (orpailleurs), although Congolese mining regulations prohibited such miners from
working in industrial mines and restricted them to smaller-scale holdings. According to
one former OKIMO employee, the decision to get gold immediately and cheaply by
using artisanal miners led to the reckless mining practices that would destroy Gorumbwa
mine, the most important in the area.19
Local sources said that Ugandan Lieutenant David Okumu gave the initial order to start
mining in Gorumbwa.20 According to a report prepared by OKIMO officials that
provides further details, Ugandan soldiers took over mine security, chasing away
OKIMO guards and the local police in order to benefit from the gold mining.21 Local
miners went to work in the mines, even though they were required to pay an entrance
fee to Ugandan soldiers or to give them a portion of their ore when leaving. Witnesses
reported that Ugandan soldiers beat local miners who refused to work under these
conditions or who failed to deliver the expected amount of gold.22 To speed extraction
of the ore, Ugandan soldiers directed miners to use explosives taken from OKIMO
15 Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Démocratie (RCD), Cabinet du Coordinateur, Décision No.
004/RCD/CD/LB/98, Goma, October 28, 1998.
16 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 11, 2004.
17 Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO employee, Durba, May 13, 2004.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Human Rights Watch interviews, Congolese miners and other sources, Durba and Watsa, May 10 - 13, 2004.
21 OKIMO Internal Memorandum to General Management, “La sécurité au Groupe d’Exploitation Moto”, March
17, 2000. Further details also provided in internal OKIMO memos of September 9, 1999 and May 29, 2000.
Documents on file at Human Rights Watch. See also, William Wallis, “Warlords and Adventurers in Scrambles
for Riches,” Financial Times, July 15, 2003.
22 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 13, 2004.
- 28 -
17 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
stocks. Local residents said that there were more than fifty explosions in the mines
during the month of December 1999, some of them severe enough to shake nearby
housing. Even the rock pillars that supported the roof in the mine were blasted to
extract any ore that might be inside them.23
On several occasions OKIMO officials protested to Ugandan army commanders about
the illegal mining, the theft of fuel and explosives from their stock, and the possible
damage to the mines through the explosions.24 Ugandan soldiers beat, arrested, and
threatened some of those who protested. Lieutenant Okumu arrested the local OKIMO
Director Samduo Tango and had him publicly beaten. A witness at the scene of the
beating said,
[Samduo Tango] was arrested and taken to “Les Bruns” [a house in the
OKIMO concession] by Commander Okumu and he was beaten. He
was protesting against how the Ugandans were doing things. It
happened a few months after the Ugandans arrived. They also beat
other workers who were against them. Samduo had to pay to be
released and then he fled. Another person who was beaten was Aveto
as he witnessed the Ugandans taking dynamite from the warehouse. He
was arrested along with Samduo and also publicly beaten. Commander
Okumu beat them himself and he asked other soldiers to also beat them.
I saw this myself.25
Another OKIMO official told a Human Rights Watch researcher,
I had many meetings with [Commander Okumu] to make him
understand that they must not destroy the mine. But these meetings
only put us more at risk. I myself was threatened because of all this.
One time I was taken to their military camp for questioning.26
Lt Okumu left the Durba area in early 1999 but other Ugandan commanders continued
with similar practices and took no actions to stop the illegal mining. In June 1999
OKIMO officials reported again on the situation and asked Commander Sula based in
23 Ibid., OKIMO Internal Memorandum, March 17, 2000, Also Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO engineer,
Durba, May 13, 2004.
24 Ibid., OKIMO Internal Memorandum, March 17, 2000.
25 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 13, 2004.
26 Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO employee, Durba, May 13, 2004.
- 29 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 18
Isiro to intervene. He ignored the request and soon after the Durba-based Ugandan
officer Freddy Ziwa arrested one of the OKIMO officials.27 According to an internal
OKIMO memorandum, Commander Sula met with local miners and Ugandan soldiers
on July 12, 1999 in Durba and ordered them to organize more extensive mining in the
OKIMO concession. On July 29, 1999 artisanal miners and Ugandan soldiers began
work in the second largest mine in the area, the Durba mine.28 The miners were
reportedly transported to work in army vehicles.29
In December 1999, OKIMO officials met with two other Ugandan army officers heavily
involved in the mining, Commanders Bob and Peter Kashilingi. They sought an end to
the mining and warned again that Gorumbwa mine might collapse if the practice of
blasting the supporting pillars continued. According to OKIMO officials, no action was
taken by Ugandan commanders.30
In late 1999 the Gorumbwa mine collapsed killing a reported one hundred miners
trapped inside and flooding the area.31 According to one local engineer:
The Ugandan army were responsible for the destruction of Gorumbwa
mine. They started to mine the pillars. It was disorderly and very
widespread. People were killed when the mine eventually collapsed. It
was not their country so they didn’t care about the destruction. They
kept promising to help stabilise the mine, but they never did.32
Another engineer thrown out of work by the collapse of the mine explained,
“Gorumbwa mine was the most important. It was ruined by the Ugandans and this has
halted development here. It has caused social degradation.”33
In December 1998, an epidemic of Marburg hemorrhagic fever killed more than fifty
people in Durba, the majority of them miners. The outbreak was believed to have
27 Ibid., OKIMO Internal Memorandum March 17, 2000.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 13, 2004. See also OKIMO Internal Memorandum, March 17,
2000.
31 Wallis, “Warlords and Adventurers in Scrambles for Riches”.
32 Human Rights Watch interview, engineer, Durba, May 13, 2004.
33 Human Rights Watch interview, former engineer, Durba, May 11, 2004.
- 30 -
19 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
begun in Gorumbwa mine.34 According to a team of medical experts sent to the area by
the U.N. several months later, the unhealthy conditions in the Gorumbwa mine
increased the risk of workers contracting this fever.35
Ugandan soldiers had no authority to extract gold from mines in the Durba area.
Possibly aware of the illegal nature of their exploitation, they sought once in May 1999
to create a semblance of legitimacy for their activities. Working through their local
Congolese proxy the RCD, the local Congolese Brigade Commander, Mbanga Buloba,
held a meeting questioning OKIMO’s legal title to the mining rights in the area and
claiming it was the new rebel administration who were entitled to manage the artisanal
gold exploitation. The effort, described in a memorandum by OKIMO officials, came
to nothing.36
Nor did Ugandan soldiers have any military imperative to exploit or destroy the gold
mines in the Durba area. As an occupying power they were responsible under
international law for protecting civilian and non-military state assets, including mines,
and had an obligation to properly maintain them. Their systematic and abusive
exploitation of the gold mines represented an immediate loss to state assets and their
destruction of the infrastructure and damage to the Gorumbwa mine decreased the value
of the state assets for future use, all in violation of international law.37
In 2001 the U.N Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation in the DRC reported on the
involvement of Ugandan officers in mining activities in Durba.38 Their reports were
followed-up in 2002 by the Ugandan government appointed judicial commission of
inquiry led by Justice David Porter, commonly known as the Porter Commission, who
were instructed to respond to the allegations made by the panel.39 The Porter
Commission interviewed various Ugandan officers about their involvement in illegal
gold mining in Durba including Lt Okumu, Major Sonko and Lt Col Mugeny amongst
34 Human Rights Watch interview, Watsa, May 12, 2004. There have been previous outbreaks of Marburg fever
in the area in 1992, 1994 and 1997. See also medical papers by Dr Matthias Borchert.
35 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Rapport de mission du Conseiller Humanitaire: Epidémie
de Fièvre hémorragique de Durba/Province Orientale,” May 1999. Also Human Rights Watch interview, medical
professional, Watsa, May 13, 2004.
36 Ibid., OKIMO Internal Memorandum March 17, 2000.
37 Article 55 of the Hague Regulations (Convention IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, October 18, 1907.
38 U.N. Panel of Experts, Report (S/2001/357), April 12, 2001, p. 11.
39 “Final Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2001 (May 2001 – November
2002)”, November 2002. Hereafter, this will be referred to as the “Porter Commission report”.
- 31 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 20
others. All of them denied any involvement in such activities. The Porter Commission
found the officers were lying and declared there had been “a cover-up” inside the UPDF
to hide the extent of such activities.40
Despite the findings of the Porter Commission, no arrests were made of officers
responsible for the wide-scale and abusive looting, nor was any compensation provided
to OKIMO or the Congolese state for such activities. In September 2004 the DRC
government demanded $16 billion in compensation from the Ugandan government for
the plunder of natural resources by its forces while they occupied parts of the DRC, in
violation of international law.41 In newspaper reports, representatives from the Ugandan
government acknowledged some responsibility for the killings, plunder and looting the
DRC suffered at the hands of their troops, but made no commitment to pay
compensation stating the amount demanded was “colossal.”42
In 2002 under international pressure Ugandan forces started to withdraw from parts of
the DRC and moved their troops out of Durba leaving the area to a breakaway faction
of the original RCD, this one known as the RCD-ML and its armed group, the APC.
After the Sun City agreement in 2002, RCD-ML became allied also with the national
government. In the following two years, this gold mining region changed hands several
times between rival national movements and local armed groups. Each time there was
one constant. “Every time there was a change of armed group,” said one witness, “the
first thing they did was to immediately start digging for gold.”43 With the establishment
of the transitional government in mid-2003, Kinshasa supposedly reasserted control over
the region, but in fact formerly rebel military forces continued to play a role in exploiting
the gold though they now claimed to be part of a newly integrated national army.44
Local Armed Groups Fight for the Gold of Ituri, 2002-2004
With the withdrawal of all – or most – of the Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers from
eastern Congo in 2002 and 2003, local armed groups became the main direct contenders
for control of areas rich in gold. In Ituri District the most important of these groups
were affiliated with either the Hema or the Lendu, ethnic groups that had been battling
40 Ibid., p. 69 and 70.
41 Article 55 of the Hague Regulations (Convention IV).
42 David Musoke and A. Mutumba-Lule, “DRC Wants $16 billion for Plunder by Uganda, Rwanda,” East African,
September 27, 2004.
43 Human Rights Watch interview, Durba, May 13, 2004.
44 Human Rights Watch interviews, Durba and Watsa, May 11 – 13, 2004.
- 32 -
21 BACKGROUND: ENRICHING THE ELITES
over land and fishing rights since 1999.45 Because the ethnic conflict became
intertwined with the struggle over gold, the fighting in Ituri District drew in far larger
numbers of civilians than was the case around Durba, in Haut Uélé District. Both areas
had significant gold mines but Durba suffered less historical ethnic tensions between the
Hema and Lendu. Controlling sites rich in gold assured armed group leaders the means
for buying guns and other supplies to carry on the conflict and also guaranteed political
importance to the leaders, increasing the possibility that they would earn recognition and
coveted posts at national level.46
Although local armed groups moved to center stage as the major actors, Ugandan and
Rwandan soldiers continued to play a role, providing arms and advice to leaders of these
armed groups, sometimes directly, sometimes through one or the other of the Congolese
rebel movements with which they were allied. These supporting actors had their own
agendas and were ready to shift alliances with local actors as circumstances changed. By
2002 Rwanda and Uganda had fallen out, a split highlighted by combat between their
forces at Kisangani in May 2002. The division between them added further complexity
to the dynamics of local alliances, sometimes increasing opportunities for local groups to
play off one powerful backer against the other. A third armed group of mixed ethnicity,
the FAPC led by Commander Jérôme Kakwavu, a Congolese Tutsi and former RCDML
commander, joined the struggle in support of the Hema. Local armed groups, rebel
movements, and Rwanda and Uganda all juggled multiple interests, but always important
among them was desire to control the gold.
During this period, the Congolese government had little influence in Ituri, leaving local
affairs largely to its ally, the RCD-ML. In an attempt by the international community to
find a political solution to the ongoing fighting in Ituri, the U.N. chaired dialogue
between the Congolese government, armed groups and the Ugandan government
resulting in the establishment of an ad hoc Ituri Interim Administration (IIA) in April
2003. When this body proved ineffective, the national government and MONUC in May
2003 pressured representatives of six armed groups to pledge in writing to cooperate
with the peace process. The Foreign Affairs Commissioner of the FNI showed no
intention of honoring the pledge, saying, “We were forced to sign the document. It
means nothing to us.”47 Leaders of other groups apparently felt the same way and
fighting has continued since then between militia themselves and between militia and
45 Human Rights Watch, “Ituri: ‘Covered in Blood’” and “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fuelling Political and Ethnic
Strife”, A Short Report, March 2001 and “Chaos in Eastern Congo: U.N. Action Needed Now,” A Briefing Paper,
October 2002.
46 United Nations Security Council, “Special Report on the Events in Ituri”, July 16, 2004, p. 5.
47 Human Rights Watch interview, Floribert Njabu, President of the FNI and Lonu Lonema, Foreign Affairs
Commissioner FNI, Kampala, July 3, 2004.
- 33 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 22
MONUC peacekeeping troops. In February 2005, after the killing of more U.N.
peacekeepers in Ituri, MONUC renewed its pressure on the armed groups. Some of the
militia leaders declared again they were prepared to participate in disarmament
operations, though at the time it writing it was unclear if this time they would stick to
their commitments.
Poorly funded by the international community and not supported by MONUC, the
interim administration accomplished little and was dissolved in June 2004. The
transitional government restored local administrative structures, and appointed
administrators with little or no connection to the armed groups. The new functionaries
remained largely unpaid and had no means to exercise control over armed groups.
In an attempt to resolve the security problems, President Joseph Kabila, who succeeded
as president after the death of his father Laurent Kabila in 2001, signed a decree in late
2004 granting six leaders of the Ituri armed groups positions as generals in the newly
integrated Congolese army and a further thirty-two militiamen positions as lieutenantcolonels,
colonels and majors. Despite divisions within the transitional government
about these appointments, the generals were welcomed into army ranks in January 2005.
The government provided no assurances that the newly appointed generals would not be
returned to Ituri nor did it make any commitments to starting judicial investigations into
serious allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly carried out by the
new appointees. The integration of alleged war criminals into senior army ranks was
denounced by Human Rights Watch and international diplomats.48 In the aftermath of
the killing of nine U.N. peacekeepers in Ituri in February 2005, the transitional
government arrested Floribert Njabu, Thomas Lubanga and a handful of other senior
Ituri commanders though at the time of writing they had not yet been charged with any
crimes or brought to justice.
48 See Human Rights Watch, “D.R. Congo: Army Should Not Appoint War Criminals,” Press Release, January
14, 2004.
- 34 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 36
Justice for UPC crimes
Human Rights Watch reported on the November 2002 massacre at Mongbwalu in July
2003 and a year later a report to the U.N. Security Council also detailed the massacre of
civilians around Mongbwalu. To date the perpetrators of these crimes have not been
brought to justice either by the UPC or by the DRC transitional government.
The UPC splintered into two factions in early December 2003. The branch led by
Commander Kisembo changed from a largely military movement to a political party and
received recognition as a national political party in mid-2004. Commander Kisembo was
arrested by MONUC troops on June 25, 2004 for continued military recruitment but
was later released without charge. Since October 2003 Thomas Lubanga, leader of the
other UPC faction, has been restricted by the transitional government to Kinshasa where
he lives at the Grand Hotel. He was arrested in Kinshasa in March 2005 but has not yet
been charged with any crimes. Commander Bosco remains the chief military officer in
charge of the UPC Lubanga faction based in Ituri. MONUC claims he is responsible for
the attack on a MONUC convoy resulting in the death of a Kenyan peacekeeper in
January 2004 and for taking a Moroccan peacekeeper hostage in September 2004.92
Commanders Salumu and Sey, still part of Commander Jérôme’s forces, were selected
for training at the Superior Military College in Kinshasa in preparation for joining the
newly integrated Congolese army as senior officers. Human Rights Watch is not aware
of any vetting carried out by DRC military officials or international donors who support
army integration to determine their unsuitability for senior posts because of their
involvement in human rights abuses.93
In March 2003, the UPC lost control of the Mongbwalu area and the profits from its
gold mines when they were attacked and pushed back by a new alliance of forces led by
their former ally turned enemy: the Ugandan army.
Massacres and other Abuses by the FNI, FAPC and the Ugandan
Army
After having dropped the Hema, Ugandan soldiers built a new alliance with the Lendu,
who had created the FNI party under Floribert Njabu in November 2002. At the end of
February 2003, Commander Jérôme also ended his link with the UPC and created his
92 Human Rights Watch interview, MONUC human rights section, Bunia, February 20, 2004.
93 Donors involved in security sector and army reform in the DRC include the Belgian and South African
governments and the European Union.
- 35 -
37 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
militia, known as the FAPC, based in the important border town of Aru, northeast of
Mongbwalu. According to a special report to the U.N. Security Council on Ituri, the
FAPC was created with direct Ugandan support.94
With international pressure growing to withdraw their troops from Ituri, Ugandan
soldiers sought to secure maximum territory for their local allies. On March 6, 2003
reportedly in response to an attack by the UPC, the Ugandan army drove the UPC out
of Bunia with the assistance of Lendu militias. One former Lendu leader who
participated in the operation said that he and his men had done so at the request of
Ugandan army Brigadier Kale Kayihura.95 Ugandan soldiers and FNI combatants
chased fleeing UPC troops northwards towards Mongbwalu.
Massacre at Kilo, March 2003
On March 10, 2003 the Ugandan and Lendu forces attacked Kilo, a town just south of
Mongbwalu, with the Lendu arriving several hours before the Ugandans.96 The Lendu
combatants met little resistance from the UPC and began killing civilians who they
presumed to be of Nyali ethnicity, accusing them of having helped the Hema. According
to local sources, they killed at least one hundred, many of them women and children.
They looted local residences and shops and required civilians to transport the booty for
them.97 Residents walking on the road near the town of Kilo nearly a month later still
reported the smell of corpses rotting in the forest.98
A local woman witnessed her house being burned and then saw the Lendu combatants
kill a man, five women, and a child with machetes. She was then forced to help transport
loot for the Lendu combatants. She recounted that, en route, the Lendu selected four
children between ten and fifteen years old, Rosine, Diere, Kumu and Flory, from the
group and killed them and then killed five more adults. When some of the women
faltered under the heavy loads they were forced to carry, the Lendu killed them and cut
off their breasts and then cut their genitals. The witness said,
At Kilo Mission on top of the hill there were many Lendu combatants.
They had a few guns but mostly machetes, bows and arrows. They were
94 Ibid., 0 Nations Security Council, “Special Report on the Events in Ituri”, p13
95 Human Rights Watch interview, former Lendu militia leader, February 21, 2004.
96 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
97 Human Rights Watch interview, local analysts, Bunia, October 10, 2004. Also Human Rights Watch
interview, Floribert Njabu, President of the FNI, May 2, 2004.
98 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
- 36 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 38
very dirty and had mud on their faces so we wouldn’t recognize them.
On the hill we saw many bodies of people who had been killed. They
were all lying face down on the ground. They were naked. The Lendu
were getting ready to burn the bodies. There were many of them, too
many to count.99
According to witnesses, Commander Kaboss commanded the attack. He reported to
Commander Matesso Ninga, known as Kung Fu, who was in charge of operations for
the FNI, though he was not seen at Kilo during the massacre. At the time, the FNI
Military Chief of Staff was Maitre Kiza.100
Ugandan troops under Commander Obote arrived a few hours after the Lendu and tried
to stop their killing. The witness said,
When the Ugandan soldiers arrived they started to hit the Lendu and
shot at them. They said to them, “Why have you killed people, we said
you could loot but not to kill people. You will tarnish our reputation.”
They tried to return some of the loot but the Lendu were starting to run
away. The Ugandans said they regretted the way the Congolese
behaved and they regretted very much that the chief’s house had been
burned and ruined.101
Although the Ugandans stopped the killings in the town, the FNI combatants continued
to kill people in the surrounding villages such as Kabakaba, Buwenge, Alimasi and Bovi.
“If the Ugandans heard about the killings,” said one witness, “they would go to try and
stop it, but it was often too late.102 Local authorities also reported the rape of some
twenty-seven women and the burning of villages, including Emanematu and Livogo
which were completely destroyed.103
Although the Ugandan soldiers tried to limit FNI abuses after the Kilo attack, they
neither disarmed the combatants nor ended their military alliance with them. Instead
they continued their joint military operation towards Mongbwalu arriving there on
99 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 24, 2004.
100 Human Rights Watch interview, local analysts, Bunia, October 10, 2004. Also Human Rights Watch
interview, Floribert Njabu, President of the FNI, May 2, 2004.
101 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 23, 2004.
102 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 24, 2004.
103 Human Rights Watch interview, local authorities, Bunia, October 8, 2004.
- 37 -
39 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
March 13, 2003 and set up the military headquarters for the 83rd Battalion.104 The next
day a community leader sought security assurances from Ugandan Commander Okelo,
who was in charge of the military camp. According to him, Commander Okelo
confirmed that “he controlled the Lendu combatants and he had given them one week
to put down their traditional weapons.”105 Witnessed observed Ugandan army troops
carrying out joint patrols with Lendu combatants and reported that “it was clear the
Ugandan army was in command.”106
When the Ugandan soldiers left Ituri two months later, they were still working closely
with the FNI. According to an Ugandan army document dated May 1, 2003, Ugandan
Major Ezra handed over control of Mongbwalu to FNI Commanders Mutakama and
Butsoro as Ugandan army troops left the area. All parties signed the document,
witnessed by MONUC observer Oran Safwat.107 Although Commander Jérôme and
most of his troops had withdrawn to Aru, a contingent under Commander Sey remained
at Mongbwalu.
Witnesses also said that Ugandan army commanders left behind some of their
ammunition and weapons for the FNI.108 In addition, a shipment of Ugandan arms
bound for Mongbwalu was seized by MONUC in Beni several months after the
Ugandans withdrew. Those accompanying the arms reported that the FNI were still
getting aid from Uganda and that the weapons seized in Beni were meant for them.
According to the MONUC report on the incident, one of those accompanying the
weapons, a deputy administrator from Mongbwalu, admitted he was constantly in touch
with the Ugandans.109
Accountability for the March 2003 Kilo Massacre
Many witnesses reported the abuses to local authorities who in turn wrote a letter to the
MONUC human rights section in Bunia on September 26, 2003 listing 125 civilian
deaths, cases of torture and rape in the Kilo area from March to May 2003 carried out by
104 Letter from Brigadier Kale Kayihura to the Regional Director of MONUC in Bunia, RE: Disposition of UPDF in
the Two Command Sectors of Bunia and Mahagi., April 17, 2003. The document also confirms that 1 Infantry
Coy was left in Kilo.
105 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 2 and 4, 2004.
106 Ibid.
107 UPDF Restricted Document, “Withdrawal of Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces from the Democratic
Republic of Congo,” UPDF Form No. AC/DRC/01 signed in Mongbwalu, May 1, 2003. Document on file at
Human Rights Watch.
108 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004.
109 Confidential U.N. internal report on the investigation into the plane seizure in Beni, July 25, 2003.
- 38 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 40
FNI combatants while Ugandan soldiers were still present in the area.110 No response
was received and on November 20, 2003 a second letter was sent detailing a further
nineteen deaths, eight cases of torture and two cases of rape between July to November
2003. 111
The Ugandan army had command control over the FNI combatants during their joint
military operation and should be held responsible for the abuses committed by FNI
combatants. Although they may have attempted to minimize crimes by organizing joint
patrols and requesting that combatants lay down their traditional weapons, they did not
carry out any further steps to ensure accountability for these crimes. In addition, they
soon armed the FNI with modern weapons. Human Rights Watch is not aware of any
investigation or arrest made by either the Ugandan army or the FNI authorities into
abuses committed by their troops. To date no one has been held responsible for the
massacre of civilians and other serious human rights abuses committed in Kilo.
The 48 Hour War, June 2003 and subsequent massacres
After the Ugandan forces left in May 2003, the UPC retook Mongbwalu on June 10,
2003. Despite having recently received additional weapons from Rwanda, delivered at a
newly constructed airstrip some 30 kilometers from Mongbwalu,112 the UPC was able to
hold the town for only forty-eight hours before being pushed back by the FNI
combatants under the command of Mateso Ninga, known as Kung Fu. The FNI counter
attacked with heavy weapons that had reportedly been left behind by the Ugandans.113
For the Lendu, their victory in what became known as the “48 Hour War,” was a source
of great pride. Based on local testimony, it appears that some 500 persons were killed
during the Lendu counterattack, many of them civilians.114
FNI authorities asserted that the UPC attacked Mongbwalu in order to regain control of
the gold.115 In addition, a large number of civilians accompanied the combatants,
apparently intent on looting and helping the combatants loot the town.116 According to
110 Letter from local authorities to MONUC Human Rights Section in Bunia, “Transmission of report on the tragic
events carried out by Lendu combatants in Banyali/Kilo from March 9, 2003 till present against the civilian
population”, Ref No 323/09/1,180/2003, September 26, 2003.
111 Letter from local authorities to MONUC Human Rights Section in Bunia, “Table of Human Rights Violations in
B/Kilo Sector”, Ref No 323/21/1,180/2003, November 20, 2003.
112 Ibid., Panel of Experts, “Confidential Supplement to the U.N. Security Council”, November 2003.
113 Human Rights Watch interviews, FNI authorities, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004 and local residents, May 3, 2004.
114 Human Rights Watch interviews, Beni and Mongbwalu, February 27 and May 2, 2004.
115 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI authorities, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004.
116 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 27, 2004.
- 39 -
41 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
witnesses and FNI authorities, they represented a large number of those killed during the
Lendu counterattack.117 One witness recounted being shocked at the sight of so many
bodies, civilians as well as combatants, in town on the day of the Lendu victory. He
said,
[Commander] Kung Fu saw that many people died and he asked people
to help with burying. But there were too many so they just decided to
burn them instead. They burned for at least three days. There was a
terrible smell in the air.118
FNI officials acknowledged to a Human Rights Watch researcher that civilians had
accompanied the UPC combatants.119 During a commemorative re-enactment of the
battle at 2004 May Day celebrations in Mongbwalu stadium, witnessed by Human Rights
Watch, women and young people playing the role of Hema civilians were portrayed
carrying goods before they were killed by Lendu combatants under the command of
Kung Fu. The play went on to show the community burning the bodies of those killed
and declaring Commander Kung Fu a hero.120 But when questioned on the issue, the
self-styled president of the FNI, Floribert Njabu, asserted that there had been no
civilians with the attacking combatants. He declared that the FNI had “professional
commanders who know about the international rules of war”121 implying they would not
have killed civilians.
There is no evidence to suggest that the FNI combatants distinguished between military
and civilian targets during the battle. According to local reports and witnesses the killing
was indiscriminate and did not distinguish women and children from combatants. While
it is not unusual for women and children to take part in looting activities in such military
operations in Ituri, they should have been respected.
Shortly after retaking Mongbwalu from the UPC, FNI combatants continued their
attacks against Hema civilians. Between July and September 2003, FNI combatants
attacked numerous Hema villages to the east of Mongbwalu including Nizi, Drodro,
Largo, Fataki and Bule. In the town of Fataki a witness arriving shortly after one such
attack by FNI combatants reported seeing the fresh corpses of victims dead in the
117 Human Rights Watch interviews, Beni and Mongbwalu, February 27 and May 2, 2004.
118 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 1, 2004.
119 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI officials, May 2, 2004.
120 May Day Celebrations, Mongbwalu Stadium, May 1, 2004 attended by a Human Rights Watch researcher.
121 Human Rights Watch interview, President Floribert Njabu of the FNI, Mongbwalu, May 7, 2004.
- 40 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 42
streets with their arms tied, sticks in their rectums, and body parts such as ears cut off.122
In Drodro witnesses reported that FNI combatants attacked the hospital shooting Hema
patients in their beds.123 Local sources claimed scores of civilians had been killed in
these attacks and thousands of others were forced to flee. A stark warning was left
behind by the attackers etched on the wall of a building in Largo, “Don’t joke with the
Lendu.”124
A young Hema victim
in the hospital in
Drodro. Lendu
combatants tried to
kill her by chopping
her neck with
machetes. Many
women and children,
both Hema and
Lendu, have been
targeted on the basis
of their ethnicity.
© 2003 Marcus
Bleasdale.
122 Human Rights Watch interview, international journalist, London, January 12, 2005.
123 Ibid., See also Helen Vesperini, “DR Congo villagers reel from second massacre in four months,” Agence
France Presse, July 27, 2003.
124 Ibid.
- 41 -
43 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
There was a substantial MONUC presence in Ituri at the time as well as European
Union peacekeeping troops as part of Operation Artemis.125 No U.N. officials reported
on the killings in Mongbwalu in June 2003. U.N. and E.U. troops were made aware of
the later killings in areas to the east of Mongbwalu by international journalists who had
visited the area and conducted fly-over operations in attempts to deter further violence.
The Artemis mandate granted by the U.N. security council did not allow for
peacekeeping actions outside of the town of Bunia.
A ‘Witch Hunt’ for Hema Women and other Opponents
Shortly after the UPC attack in June 2003, FNI combatants began accusing Hema
women living in and around Mongbwalu of spying for Hema armed groups. Hema
women still living in the area were few in number and most of them were married to
Lendu spouses and had been able to live safely within the Lendu community. But after
the “48 hour war” Lendu combatants arrested, tortured and killed these women and
some men, accusing them of ‘dirtying and betraying’ their society. Using charges of
witchcraft, Lendu combatants and spiritual leaders covered their crimes by claiming the
killings had been ordered by a spirit known as Godza. More moderate FNI officials
found it difficult to counter these claims and did nothing to stop them. A witness said,
After the June [2003] attack, the Lendu decided to kill all the Hema
women without exception. There were women I knew who were
burned. I had never seen that kind of thing before. Previously Hema
women who were married to outsiders were not harmed. Now they
wanted to hunt these women. The Lendu spirit, Godza, told them to kill
all the Hema women during one of the Lendu spiritual ceremonies.
One of the women they killed was Faustine Baza. I knew her well. She
was very responsible and lived in Pluto. The FNI came to get her and
took her to their camp. They killed her there. They killed other women
as well. I did not want to be a part of this so I left. I couldn’t stay while
they were exterminating these Hema women. They did it in Pluto and
Dego. They came from Dego with thirty-seven Hema women to kill. I
don’t want to return now - it’s too hard.126
125 Operation Artemis was the name of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force sent by the European Union
and authorised by the U.N. Security Council under Resolution 1484 on May 30, 2003 to contribute to the
security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia. It was a limited three month mission with a
geographical scope to cover only the town of Bunia.
126 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 27, 2004.
- 42 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 44
Another witness said,
In July women were killed at Pluto and Dego. The strategy was to close
them in the house and burn it. More than fifty were killed. Pluto was
considered the place of execution for Hema people from Pluto and
other places too. They captured the women from the surrounding
countryside. They said it was to bring them to talk about peace. They
put ten women in a house, tied their hands, closed the doors, and
burned the house. This lasted about two weeks, with killing night and
day. After that, no more Hema women were left in [our area] and the
men were prevented from leaving with their children. They called the
women “Bachafu” – dirty. Sometimes the men would be taken to
prison. Suwa’s husband was asked to pay $300. They told him they
killed his wife, and he had to pay thirty grams of gold ($300) to clean the
knife they had killed her with.127
Many people were aware of the killings and bodies were often seen in the towns. A
witness reported seeing six bodies of women at the Club, a well-known building in
Mongbwalu, in mid-2003. He said many other passers-by also saw the nude and
brutalized bodies and that Lendu combatants were trying to recruit people to help burn
them.128 A community leader in an outlying village expressed his frustration about the
continuation of the practice, saying he had been interrogated more than ten times by
Lendu combatants as to the whereabouts of Hema women. He said to a Human Rights
Watch researcher, “I want to know what Kinshasa is going to do to help us. Are they
going to let the FNI stay here? The population is really suffering.”129
The operation against Hema women extended to men and other tribes as well and
continued at least until April 2004, killing some seventy persons in Pluto, Dego,
Mongbwalu, Saio, Baru, Mbau and Kobu and possibly in other locations in the
Mongbwalu area. By this point, the allegation of witchcraft became a common
accusation, often resulting in death after a ‘judging ceremony’ by local spiritual leaders.
Carried out in secret these judging ceremonies used different methods to determine a
person’s guilt or innocence. One civilian accused of being Hema described to a Human
Rights Watch researcher the ceremony he and others were forced to undergo after being
caught by Lendu combatants in 2003:
127 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 27, 2004.
128 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004.
129 Human Rights Watch interview, village outside Mongbwalu, May 6, 2004.
- 43 -
45 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
A local fetisher [spiritual leader] came to the place I was being held. He
had two eggs with him. I was tied up and very scared. He rolled the
eggs on the ground at my feet. I was told if the eggs rolled away from
me then I would be considered innocent. But if the eggs rolled back
towards me than I was considered to be a Hema and I would be guilty.
I was lucky, the eggs rolled away from me. Another person, Jean, who I
was with, was not so lucky. The eggs rolled the wrong way and he was
told to run. As he ran the Lendu shot their arrows at him. He fell. They
cut him to pieces with their machetes in front of my eyes. Then they ate
him. I was horrified.130
In the Mongbwalu area the killings continued throughout 2003 and into 2004. A witness
described to a Human Rights Watch researcher the ongoing killings:
[After the June war] they said they did not want the Hema to return.
Those who stayed were killed. They killed them in Saio and Baru. They
would just take them away. A man called Mateso, Bandelai Gaston, a
Nyali, and his brother Augustin were killed because they were accused
of being witches. There were also women who were killed. Celine, an
Alur, was killed for witchcraft. Gabriel, a Kakwa, and his wife were also
killed. They were accused of protecting Hema people.131
Some community leaders raised concerns about the ‘Godza ceremonies’ with FNI leader
Njabu, in July 2003. At the time he seems to have done nothing to stop the killings, but
according to local residents, the number decreased after he moved to Mongbwalu in
February 2004, whether simply as a coincidence or as the result of his presence is
unclear.132
While some FNI authorities may have been against such killings, and perhaps took steps
to minimize them, at the time of writing no one has been held responsible for them.
Human Rights Watch is not aware of any investigation carried out by FNI
representatives into these killings.
130 Human Rights Watch interview, Arua, Uganda, February 2003.
131 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
132 Human Rights Watch interviews, Mongbwalu, May 2 and May 4, 2004.
- 44 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 46
Murder of two MONUC Observers
On May 12, 2003, shortly after Ugandan troops had left Mongbwalu to the FNI and the
FAPC, FNI combatants deliberately killed two unarmed U.N. military observers, Major
Safwat Oran of Jordan and Captain Siddon Davis Banda of Malawi. Rumors of an
impending Hema attack—which would actually happen with the “48 hour war” a month
later—caused panic among town residents, about one hundred of whom sought refuge
at the residence of the MONUC observers. The observers, apparently concerned
themselves, arranged to be evacuated. When the U.N. helicopter arrived at a nearby
airstrip, FNI combatants refused to allow the observers to pass. Led by FNI
Commander Issa, the combatants took them to FAPC Commander Sey at his
headquarters at the “apartments.” “The combatants were chanting that Sey should not
let them leave,” said one witness.133
Shortly after, the combatants led the observers away again, apparently because Sey
declined to take them under his protection, and killed them a short distance from the
“apartments.” A witness who passed by later that afternoon said,
I found the bodies on the road leading down from the apartments.
They had both been shot. One was shot in the head and the other in
the stomach. I found the military of the FAPC around the bodies.134
Local residents transported the bodies to the FAPC headquarters and placed them in a
nearby empty house. Sey and his combatants fled from Mongbwalu that evening,
apparently seeking to distance themselves from the crime.135 Local residents later buried
the two bodies in a shallow grave in Mongbwalu.136
According to several Mongbwalu residents, FNI Commander Issa was responsible for
the killings. Witnesses reported that FNI combatants took possession of the observers’
U.N. cars and used them until they were recovered by the U.N.137
During discussions with a Human Rights Watch researcher, the FNI’s leader Njabu said,
“We did not investigate the killings. It is not our affair. Our military were at Saio at the
133 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
134 Ibid.
135 Human Rights Watch interview Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
136 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
137 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, and Mongbwalu, February 19 and May 4, 2004.
- 45 -
47 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
time, seven kilometers away. Commander Jérôme’s combatants were at the apartments.
You should ask Commander Sey what happened.”138 But in a second interview days
later he admitted that Commander Issa might also have been present and he indicated
that an investigation was ongoing.139 More than one year later, FNI authorities had not
yet announced any results of an investigation. According to one unconfirmed local
report, FNI Commander Kung Fu did carry out an investigation and, presumably as a
result, Commander Issa fled and was reportedly later killed.140
Threat Against Human Rights Defenders and Others Reporting Abuses
Some FNI combatants tried to keep local people from being in touch with MONUC or
other outside agencies, apparently for fear that they would pass on information about
FNI abuses.
Important FNI commanders threatened human rights activists from the organization
Justice Plus after they had traveled to Europe and spoken about the situation in Ituri.141
Other FNI leaders reportedly planned to look into activities of the organization and
threatened that its staff would be considered enemies if they were found to have had
contacts with the Rwandans and the Hema.142
FNI combatants acted more directly and immediately against local residents known to
have spoken with MONUC staff during their occasional visits to Mongbwalu in late
2003.143 One person so abused said,
I was taken by nine [Lendu] combatants in uniform. They came to my
house and shouted, “Get up! What did you say to MONUC?” They
threatened me with their spears. They took me to the apartments and I
was interrogated by [a Lendu commander]. He asked me what I had said
to MONUC. That is all he wanted to know. He threatened me. They
hit me on the face. I said I had told MONUC nothing. They said they
138 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI President Floribert Njabu, May 2, 2004.
139 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI President Floribert Njabu, May 7, 2004.
140 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
141 Human Rights Watch interview, Justice Plus, Bunia, February 24, 2004.
142 Human Rights Watch interview, Justice Plus, Bunia, February 24, 2004.
143 After the killing of the two MONUC observers, no other MONUC staff were posted to Mongbwalu until April
2005.
- 46 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 48
would put me in prison. They took $100 from me but a commander
who knew me saved me and they let me go.144
The same person was arrested a second time and severely beaten with bats and ropes.
He was kept for seven days and regularly beaten.145
Witnesses reported that civilians were threatened for having applauded visits of
MONUC staff.146 After one such mission in November 2003, some twelve civilians
were beaten and arrested, and at least one, a man named Choms, was summarily
executed. A witness told a Human Rights Watch researcher that Mr. Choms had
applauded the arrival of a U.N. plane, saying he thought this meant peace was coming.
Local police reported this to the FNI and two combatants of the force arrested Mr.
Choms and another person and took them to the police station. A witness who went to
the police station the next day to check on Mr. Choms said,
The other prisoners told me he had been interrogated and beaten and
that this was followed by a shot. . . . I forced my way into the room and
the body was still there. He had no shirt on and there was a bullet in his
chest. He had marks on his back from being whipped. They then
questioned me and forced me to leave. They wouldn’t give us the body
for burial.147
Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Forced Labor
FNI combatants imposed a number of “taxes,” collected in an arbitrary and irregular
way, and organized forced community labour known as “salongo”. FNI representatives
resorted to arbitrary arrests, beatings, and other forms of cruel and degrading treatment
to obtain the maximum possible payment and service from civilians. According to local
residents, these practices worsened considerably after the departure of Ugandan
troops.148
144 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
145 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
146 Ibid.
147 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 5, 2004.
148 Human Rights Watch interview, local residents, Mongbwalu, May 3 and 4, 2004.
- 47 -
49 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
Residents were required to pay a “war tax” that varied in amount and in the frequency
with which it was due.149 Traders at the market were also subject to confusing and
irregular “tax” demands. One businessman said,
There are about five or six different taxes. They range from $2 to $20.
Everyone has to pay. You pay when they come and sometimes they
come back again after just a few days. It is very irregular. If you don’t
pay you are beaten or taken to prison. . . . Both military of the FNI and
civilians do this.150
Human Rights Watch researchers documented similar abusive cases throughout the
Mongbwalu area, Kilo, Rethy and Kpandruma. “The people can say or do nothing,” said
one witness. “We just do what the FNI say.”151
A young trader arrested on February 5, 2004 by the FNI for non-payment of tax was
beaten and taken to the Scirie-Abelcoz military camp. He said,
There I spent two days in. . . a hole in the ground covered by sticks.
They took me out of the hole to beat me. They tied me over a log and
then they took turns hitting me with sticks – on my head, my back, my
legs. They said they were going to kill me.. . .There was a woman with
me in the underground prison. They hit her also. They tried to force me
to have sex with her but I couldn’t. She was called Bagbedu.
After two days I was taken to Mongbwalu. They made me carry the
woman and forced me to sing songs as I was carrying her. I was
escorted by three FNI combatants and one kadogo [child soldier]. On
the road, we met other soldiers who forced me to drop the woman and
beat me more. In Mongbwalu the soldiers beat me again with sticks.
They took me to a prison in a house. They also put the woman in the
prison but she died four days later. I spent five days there. Every day
they beat me.152
149 Ibid.
150 Human Rights Watch interview, Ariwara, March 7, 2004.
151 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 20, 2004.
152 Ibid.
- 48 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 50
After a week, his family paid $80 and Commander Maki of Camp Goli freed him.
FNI representatives showed a Human Rights Watch researcher a long list of taxes asked
of residents, including a “war tax” that they claimed was voluntary.153
The FNI used similar practices to enforce the salongo policy of community labour to fix
roads, collect firewood for the military, clean up the military camp, or even burn bodies
as described above. At times salongo was required for as much as two full days a week,
although by late 2004 it had been decreased to once a week for three hours. Participants
received a piece of paper showing they had done the required labour. Persons who could
not present such proof when asked by police or combatants were subject to beatings,
arrest, fines or even death. According to one witness, a young man named Lite who
failed to present the required proof when asked was smashed in the head with a gun by a
FNI combatant and died from the blow. The witness asked FNI authorities what justice
there would be for the family of Lite and, he said, “They responded that the family of
Lite could kill the man who had done this act, but the family would not.”154
Another man reported that he was rounded up with a group of about one hundred men
who had all refused to report for salongo labour some fifteen miles from their homes,
saying it was too far. They were forced to walk all night and then were imprisoned and
had to pay $5 for each elderly person, $10 for each young person, and $20 for each
businessman in order to be freed.155
A local administrative official admitted that in order to get laborers for salongo they
needed to “intimidate people to come, otherwise they would not.”156 A person
responsible for the salongo in Saio told a Human Rights Watch researcher that the local
chief would “deal with people who don’t work,” while a police commander added that
he “sanctioned those who refused to work.”157 He would not elaborate on what kind of
sanctions were involved.
153 Human Rights Watch interview, Jean Pierre Bikilisende Badombo, Chef de Cité and Sukpa Bidjamaro,
Deputy Chef de Cité, May 3, 2004.
154 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 23, 2004.
155 Human Rights Watch interview, Ariwara, March 7, 2004.
156 Human Rights Watch interview, Mongbwalu, May 4, 2004.
157 Human Rights Watch interview, Manu Ngabi, local authority and Gerard Kitabo, Police Commander, Saio,
May 5, 2004.
- 49 -
51 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
Young gold trader arrested and tortured in Mongbwalu in February 2004 by Lendu FNI
combatants for being unable to pay a market tax. © 2004 Human Rights Watch
Control of the Gold Mines
Upon taking control of Mongbwalu on March 13, 2003, the FNI militia leaders, like the
UPC previously, moved immediately to begin profiting from gold mining. Artisanal
miners resumed digging, but had to pay FNI combatants fees to enter the mines, $1 per
person at some mines. Based on entrance records kept by FNI security guards at one
mine and seen by Human Rights Watch researchers, the FNI made $2,000 per month in
entrance fees at this one mine alone.158 Miners also had to deliver to FNI two to five
grams of gold per week, often as raw ore. From such ore FNI combatants were able to
158 Human Rights Watch visit to Adidi mine, May 3, 2004. Statistics from the entrance book kept by FNI security
officials at the entrance mine. Book clearly labeled as FNI.
- 50 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 52
assess the density of the gold and thus to locate the most valuable veins. They could
then send in their own men to mine those areas.159 As one miner said,
The money that circulates in Mongbwalu is gold. Gold is the economy.
The Lendu take the gold from the diggers. They take the best gold areas
by force. Lots of people don’t want to go and dig for gold as they know
it will be taken from them.160
FNI combatants, some of them previously gold diggers, also mined gold themselves or
organized groups of people to dig for them. In Itendey, a gold area just to the south of
Mongbwalu, for example, FNI combatants forced young men to mine gold in a nearby
riverbed. A local community leader who had fled from the area told a Human Rights
Watch researcher,
The FNI combatants come every morning door-to-door. They split up
to find young people and they take about sixty of them to the Agula
River to find the gold. They [the young people] are guarded by the
military and are not paid. They are forced to work. If the authorities try
to intervene they are beaten. The chief has tried to stop this by
reasoning with them, but they don’t like this. They even force the
younger children to leave school to carry sand or transport goods.161
Miners worked in deplorable conditions, exposed to risk of accidents both in the mines
and when handling mercury to process the ore.
159 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 23, 2004.
160 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 25, 2004.
161 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 20, 2004.
- 51 -
53 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
Entrance register kept by FNI security guards at Adidi gold mine (“Management of Adidi
mine for the financial management and daily report, Ndjabu-Simo, FNI-FR”). Each gold
miner paid US$1 to enter the mine and was forced to give a portion of the mined gold to
the guards when exiting. © 2004 Human Rights Watch
- 52 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 54
Box 2 - Conditions at the Mines
In May 2004 a Human Rights Watch researcher visited mines in Mongbwalu and Durba
where many miners and engineering experts spoke of the deteriorating safety conditions
at the mines. One former OKIMO engineer told Human Rights Watch about the lack
of air in parts of the underground mine where equipment that used to ensure oxygen
flows was no longer working. Miners recounted that some of their colleagues had died
of suffocation in parts of the mine, especially when fires were lit in attempts to soften
hard rock areas, a technique witnessed by Human Rights Watch researchers.162 Miners
also spoke of frequent rocks falls, flooding and other accidents. No safety equipment of
any kind was visible.
Miners worked individually or in small groups with rudimentary tools such as hammers
and chisels. They were generally in bare feet and carried candles or small flashlights to
light their way. In some underground mines, workers walked for kilometers through
chest-high water and narrow passages to get to galleries where they could work. Women
also worked in the mines often being used as porters.
Mining in open-pit mines, some as deep as 300 meters, is also precarious. Miners spoke
of frequent mud-slides and falls. Expert gold engineers lamented the anarchic mining
that was taking place with no regard for the safety of the miners themselves or for the
longer term damage being caused to the mining facilities.163
One miner said, “There are some areas which were boarded up by the Belgians many years ago. But
we just break down the boards and go in anyway. We use a hammer and a large iron bolt or chisel to
dig for the gold. The work is very hard and I could only work about six hours per day.” 164
Miners, if they are lucky, get about $10 per day. One miner said, “I can make between $5
and $20 per day if I am lucky and find a good gold vein. Otherwise I could work for 2 weeks just
looking for gold and make nothing.165
162 Human Rights Watch interview, former gold engineer, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004. Also Human Rights Watch
visit to Adidi and Makala mines, Mongbwalu, May 3, 2004.
163 Human Rights Watch interview, OKIMO engineer, Durba, May 13, 2004.
164 Human Rights Watch interview, gold miner, Bunia, February 21, 2004.
165 Ibid.
- 53 -
55 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
When asked why they worked in such dangerous conditions, one miner responded, “Tell
me what choice I have? This is the only way I can make any money. Its about my own survival and
that of my family.”166
The entire mining and refining process is done by hand. After the ore is mined, it is
pounded down into sand with the use of an iron bar. The sand is then mixed with water
and mercury, which attracts the gold particles and separates it from the rock dust. The
mixture of gold and mercury is then heated so the mercury evaporates and the gold
remains. Mercury, a dangerous substance, is readily available in the market areas.
Human Rights Watch witnessed numerous miners using mercury with no gloves or
masks, taking no safety precautions when handling the substance.
In addition to profiting directly from mining, FNI leaders sought to control the trade in
gold. According to gold traders, FNI control of the trade was still haphazard and
sometimes involved direct use of force. In May 2004, the FNI Commissioner of Mines
explained to a Human Rights Watch researcher that the FNI were well aware of the
significance of the gold market in Mongbwalu and that “they were looking for additional
ways to control the trade.”167 There are no reliable statistics on the amount of the gold
trade from Mongbwalu nor of the proceeds reaped by the FNI from it. Local traders
and other informed sources estimated that between 20 and 60 kilograms of gold left the
Mongbwalu area each month, a value of between $240,000 to $720,000 per month at the
time of writing. The majority of the gold is traded from Mongbwalu to Butembo in
North Kivu where Dr Kisoni Kambale is one of the main gold exporters (see below).
As one gold miner explained, “The profits enter into the pockets of the FNI,”168 both in
the sense of personal profit and in the sense of profit to the FNI. A former senior FNI
commander told a Human Rights Watch researcher that some of the gold proceeds were
used to buy weapons and ammunition to supplement weapons recuperated from the
battlefield.169 The leader of the FNI, Njabu, himself admitted to Human Rights Watch
researchers that his combatants mined gold and that he traded gold for weapons. He
calculated the proceeds he would make from the sale of five kilograms of gold to be
about $50,000, adding “This is not looting as I am Congolese.”170 A MONUC
166 Human Rights Watch interview, gold miner, Mongbwalu, May 2, 2004
167 Human Rights Watch interview, Mr. Basiani, FNI Commissioner of Mines, May 5, 2004.
168 Human Rights Watch interview, gold miner, Bunia, February 23, 2004.
169 Human Rights Watch interview, former FNI commander, Bunia, February 21, 2004.
170 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI President Floribert Njabu, Kinshasa, October 7, 2003.
- 54 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 56
investigation into weapons seized in Beni in July 2003 confirmed that the FNI used taxes
from the gold mines to buy weapons.171 Njabu admitted to a Human Rights Watch
researcher that he had purchased these weapons, adding, “I want them back or I will
fight to get them.”172
Artisanal miners transporting tubs of raw ore mixed with dirt out of an open-pit gold mine
in Durba. Mining in open-pit mines, some as deep as 300 meters, can be precarious with
frequent mud-slides and falls. © 2004 Marcus Bleasdale
171 U.N. internal report on the investigation into the plane seizure in Beni, July 25, 2003.
172 Human Rights Watch interview, FNI President Floribert Njabu, Kinshasa, October 7, 2003.
- 55 -
57 ABUSES IN THE MONGBWALU GOLD MINES
The FNI armed group was also approached by multinational companies eager to gain
access to the significant gold reserves in the area. The FNI Commissioner of Mines
explained to Human Rights Watch that they had been approached by a number of
different companies but that officially AngloGold Ashanti had the concession in the
Mongbwalu area and that they were in contact with them (see below for further
information).173 The arrival of multinational companies into a volatile area where
conflict and competition for the control of natural resources are closely interlinked
creates further complexities and has the potential to create more violence. While
AngloGold Ashanti is the only mining company working in the Mongbwalu area, other
companies have signed contracts for work in gold mining areas further north in the town
of Durba.
173 Human Rights Watch interview, Mr. Basiani, FNI Commissioner of Mines, May 5, 2004.
- 56 -
105 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
area. Many local traders in Durba confirmed that they worked for Mr. Oria.370 In an
interview with a Human Rights Watch researcher, Mr. Oria said that he traded gold,
explaining that he sold gold in Uganda for Congolese clients and then depositing the
proceeds into foreign bank accounts on their behalf.371
Mr. Oria’s business is not authorized by the state as a trading house and so cannot legally
export gold from the Congo nor is it licensed to operate in the foreign exchange
market.372 Mr. Oria’s relationship with Commander Jérôme facilitates his illegal trade.
Mr. Oria is protected by some of Commander Jérôme’s combatants, several of whom
have beaten, tortured, and even killed gold traders accused by Mr. Oria of having
cheated him (see above). Witnesses claimed Mr. Oria helped finance the FAPC
movement and regularly provided food and perhaps other supplies for FAPC
combatants.373 The U.N. group of experts investigating violations of the arms embargo
concluded that proceeds from customs and immigration, including those from the gold
trade, were channeled into the coffers of the FAPC and used to pay for its military
infrastructure. In one case, the group of experts obtained forty handwritten receipts
signed by FAPC commanders withdrawing cash from border proceeds for “military
emergencies” and “combat rations.”374 Several witnesses said that Mr. Oria and
Commander Jérôme were frequently seen together and that Mr. Oria on occasion stayed
in Angarakali, the FAPC military camp in Ariwara. 375
Congolese Gold Exported to Uganda
The gold traded from northeast Congo goes principally to one destination – Uganda.
Both Dr Kisoni and Mr. Oria sell their ‘tainted gold’ to Ugandan traders based in
Kampala, many of whom in turn sell gold to companies in Switzerland and other
destinations.376 Most of this gold is exported illegally from Congo: traders have no
export permits or exchange documents, are not authorized trading houses, do not keep
accounts at the Central Bank of Congo and do not pay relevant taxes and duties as
required under Congolese law.377 The Congolese population gain almost no benefit
370 Human Rights Watch interview with gold traders and business people in Durba, May 13, 2004.
371 Human Rights Watch interview, Omar Oria, Kampala, March 10, 2004.
372 Mining Code, Articles 120, 126 , 128.
373 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ariwara, March 6 and 7, and Aru March 7, 2004.
374 Ibid., Report of the Group of Experts on the U.N. Arms Embargo, January 25, 2005, para 109.
375 Human Rights Watch interviews Ariwara, March 6, 2004 and March 7, 2004.
376 While the primary destination is Switzerland, gold is also traded to Dubai, South Africa and other European
countries.
377 All these requirements are set out under the Mining Code of July 2002.
- 57 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 106
from this trade; instead they suffer grave human rights abuses by groups seeking to
control the trade and the gold mines.
Gold traders conducting business. © 2004 Marcus Bleasdale
The gold is “legalized” in Uganda. Traders in Kampala do not require their Congolese
clients to present documents authorizing the export of gold, operating on an “ask no
questions” basis. They treat the gold as if it were a transit good, filling out customs
forms and other documents required to make its export legal from Uganda and
acceptable in the unregulated global market.378
In the 1990s most unlicensed exports of gold from Congo went to Burundi, but civil war
in Burundi and a regional trade embargo declared in 1997 made Burundi less attractive
as a transit point. After a brief shift through Kenya, the trade moved to Kampala where
the climate was more favorable. In 1993 the Ugandan Central Bank eased restrictions
on gold sales and decided not to tax gold exports.379 This change followed five years
later by the establishment of Ugandan army control over rich gold mining areas of
378 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Machanga Ltd
and A. P. Bhimji Ltd, Kampala, July 7 and 8, 2004.
379 U.S. Geological Survey, “The Mineral Industry of Uganda”, 1997.
- 58 -
107 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
northeastern Congo resulted in a dramatic increase in gold exports from Uganda (see
chart below).
Gold Export Figures from Uganda
According to official statistics, Uganda exported nearly $60 million in gold in 2002, a
peak year, and about $46 million in 2003. But in 2003 specialists in the trade valued it
still at $60 million.380 According to the Central Bank of Uganda, data from these
industry experts may be more accurate than that compiled from government customs
data.381 Whether using industry or official statistics the increase in gold exports has been
remarkable. Gold is currently the third top Ugandan export, after coffee and fish.382 In
2001 gold accounted for 84 percent of the total value of all minerals exported from
Uganda; in 2002 it was 99 percent.383
Most of the gold exported from Uganda comes from Congo. Domestic production in
Uganda is negligible, despite encouragement from the World Bank and new mining
regulations introduced in 2001. Statistics from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral
Development and official export figures shows that Ugandan gold production accounts
for less than 1 percent of the official gold exports.384 In the annual report of the Ministry
of Energy and Mineral Development, discrepancies between gold production and gold
exports are striking. In 2002, for example, domestic gold production was valued at
$24,817 while gold exports for the same year were listed as just under $60 million.385
When Human Rights Watch researchers asked Ministry representatives about this
discrepancy, they refused to comment.386
Import statistics fail to show the real scale of the gold trade. Officially, gold brought into
Uganda should be declared upon entry as an import if expected to stay in the country, or
as a transit good if intended for another final destination. But official Ugandan import
statistics show a tiny amount of gold imported to the country and show no statistics for
380 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Machanga Ltd
and A. P. Bhimji Ltd, Kampala, July 7 and 8, 2004.
381 E-mail correspondence with the Central Bank of Uganda, July 12, 2004.
382 Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, Value of Exports by Commodity 1998 – 2003.
383 Annual Report 2002, Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development available at
www.energyandminerals.go.ug (retrieved at February 2005).
384 Based on statistics on production from the Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and official
export figures from the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics from 1998 to 2003.
385 Annual Report 2002, Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral.
386 Human Rights Watch interview, Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development Representative, July
2004.
- 59 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 108
transit goods. The unofficial trade in gold is likely facilitated by the lax enforcement of
regulations at the Uganda-Congo border posts. According to a study conducted in 2004
by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), over 50 percent of all imports and exports
went unrecorded at six border posts.387 In cases where people wanted to hide precious
minerals, the study estimated the entry of such goods went completely unrecorded. The
U.N. group of experts monitoring the arms embargo to eastern DRC observed that at
the northern border post of Vurra, between Aru (DRC) and Arua (Uganda), there was
limited or no customs and immigration inspection, especially in the case of FAPC
combatants who were allowed to cross freely.388
Since Ugandan gold production figures are less than 1 percent of official exports, most
gold being exported must have entered Uganda from elsewhere. Official statistics fail to
record the entry of significant amounts of gold hence most of this trade must be illegal
and unrecorded. In 2004 the discrepancy between gold produced in the country and
that exported was just over $45 million per year, as shown by the official figures below.
Table 1:
Official Ugandan Gold Import, Export and Production, Figures in US$
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gold Exports 18,600,000 38,360,000 55,730,000 50,350,000 59,900,000 45,760,000 45,590,000
Gold Imports 0 2,000 3,076,000 890,000 0 2,000 n/a
Local Gold Production n/a 40,307 477,000 1,412 24,817 23,000 21,000
Discrepancy 18,600,000 38,317,693 52,177,000 49,458,588 59,875,183 45,735,000 45,569,000
Note: Statistics for 2004 are estimates
Source: Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and Central Bank of Uganda.
Gold Traders in Kampala
Gold industry experts in Kampala acknowledged and readily explained the discrepancy
between domestic production of gold and amount of its export, as shown by official
statistics. In interviews with Human Rights Watch researchers, gold traders confirmed
387 Human Rights Watch interview, Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, Trade Representative, Entebbe, July 2004.
388 Ibid., Report of the Group of Experts on the U.N. Arms Embargo, January 25, 2005, para 98.
- 60 -
109 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
that most of the gold they exported came from Congo. They estimated the trade to be
worth about $60 million per year.389 There are three main gold export businesses in
Kampala. The largest two, Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd and Machanga Ltd, control
an estimated 70 percent of the export trade from Uganda. Since profit margins on each
trade are relatively small, these traders make profits by trading in high volume and by
offering good quality gold, for which they need a reliable source of supply.
Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd. is the largest gold exporter in Uganda. In an interview
with Human Rights Watch researchers, its representatives said that nearly 90 percent of
their gold came from Ituri and they confirmed that Dr Kisoni Kambale from Butembo
was “one of their customers.”390 Company representatives explained they paid their
customers cash for the gold or transferred funds into the customer’s bank accounts held
either locally or abroad. Like Dr. Kisoni, they had their own refinery on the premises, to
process any gold that arrived as ore before exporting it to Switzerland and South Africa.
Representatives of the company stated they declared the gold upon export, ensuring that
a customs form and airway bill accompanied each shipment.391
Representatives of Machanga Ltd, the second largest gold exporter, also told Human
Rights Watch researchers that the gold they traded came from Congo and they
confirmed that one of their customers was Mr. Omar Oria.392 They further explained
they advanced cash for the purchase of gold, sometimes as much as 30 percent of the
anticipated purchase price, a system used also by Mr. Oria in Ariwara. Machanga
representatives stated they exported all their gold to Metalor Technologies SA, a gold
refining company in Switzerland.393 Other traders stated they also sold gold to
Switzerland as well as to other locations such as South Africa and Dubai.
Trading companies in Kampala do not operate illegally but rather benefit from the loose
regulation of the gold trade. Not required to request import documentation or to ask the
origin of the gold, they buy smuggled Congolese gold as if it had entered Uganda legally
and export it as a legal commodity. An essential bridge to the global economy, they
benefit from the risks taken by Congolese dealers like Dr. Kisoni and Mr. Oria and from
their relationships with local armed groups.
389 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Machanga Ltd
and A. P. Bhimji Ltd, Kampala, July 7 and 8, 2004.
390 Human Rights Watch interview, Kanal Chune, Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Kampala, July 7, 2004.
391 Ibid.
392 Human Rights Watch interview, Jigendra Jitu, Machanga Ltd, Kampala, July 8, 2004.
393 Ibid.
- 61 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 110
They may however be breaching a U.N. arms embargo. The U.N. group of experts
concluded that firms and individuals entering into financial relationships with Ituri
armed groups may be in violation of the U.N. arms embargo on eastern DRC.394
Encouragement of the Gold Trade by the Ugandan Government
President Museveni has sought to expand the weak economic base in Uganda by
increasing exports. Coffee, the most important export commodity in the past, provided
some 40 percent of overall export earnings. But a drop in world price for coffee hit the
Ugandan economy hard, as did increased international oil prices. Continuing poor
revenue return and corruption have further weakened the economy. The impact of
joining the East African Community customs union, expected to be beneficial in the
long run, may be negative at first.395 Increase in the export of gold, one of the fastest
growing non-traditional export sectors, offers some hope in this otherwise bleak picture.
The government believes that trade in minerals has the potential to rival coffee as a
source of foreign exchange for Uganda. In January 2004 the Ugandan government
signed a $25 million loan agreement with the World Bank to finance exploration of the
country’s mineral deposits.396 Domestic mineral production may at some point
substitute for some of the gold imported from Congo, but such a development is a long
time in the future.
Since 1999 the Ugandan government has rewarded Ugandan gold exporters for their
efforts to promote the trade. In 2002 Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd. received the
President’s Export Award for best performance in the gold trade sector and Machanga
Ltd. placed second in the competition. Hon. Omwony Ojok, the Minister of State in the
office of the President responsible for Economic Monitoring, represented the President
at the gala awards ceremony, attended also by five other government ministers.397 The
companies were honored for encouraging the export trade and for fulfilling social
responsibilities as part of their business. It is not clear how carefully the selection
committee examined their business relationships with Congolese traders, themselves
linked to armed groups responsible for human rights abuses in Congo.
394 Ibid., Report of the Group of Experts on the U.N. Arms Embargo, January 25, 2005, pages 30-33.
395 Human Rights Watch interview, World Bank economist, Kampala, July 2004 and diplomatic economic
advisors, Kampala, July 2004.
396 Steven Odeu, “Uganda gets funds to explore minerals,” New Vision, January 22, 2004.
397 Ugandan Export Promotion Board, Export Bulletin, News Highlights: Presidents’ Export Aware (PEA) 2002,
Edition 3, Jan-March 2004. Also President Export Award 2002, Evening Programme, December 5, 2003.
Ugandan Commercial Impex Ltd also won the Gold Award in 1998 and 1999.
- 62 -
111 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
The Ugandan government has proposed tighter controls on gold imports, perhaps in an
effort to increase its own revenues. Among the regulations being discussed is one that
requires permits for all precious metals imported into Uganda and that imposes an
import tax of .5 percent of the purchase price.398 These regulations have not yet been
accepted as law. Stricter regulation of the gold trade in Uganda and other transit
countries would assist in stamping out the illegal smuggling and in cutting the link
between the gold traders and armed groups who commit human rights abuses. The
proposals by the Ugandan government would increase Ugandan revenue and may help
somewhat in recording the gold trade coming from the DRC but without requiring
further checks such as exit certificates, it is unlikely to curb the trade by illegal smugglers.
Buyers of Tainted Gold
According to the U.N. panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of Congolese
resources, companies who buy gold from Uganda may also be contributing indirectly to
human rights abuses in the Congo. After mapping the interconnections between
Congolese parties to the conflict, foreign governments, and companies, the panel
maintained that some business activities, directly or indirectly, deliberately or through
negligence, contributed to the prolongation of the conflict and related human rights
abuses.399 Gold industry experts and companies who trade in gold must, or should be,
aware that most of the gold traded from Uganda comes from a conflict zone in the
Congo and that it was likely to have been exported illegally.
Switzerland: Unaccounted Gold?
According to industry experts in Uganda, over 70 percent of the gold exported from
Uganda is destined for Switzerland. Switzerland is one of Uganda’s main trading
partners. According to Ugandan trade statistics, exports to Switzerland jumped from
$29 million in the year 1999 to $99 million in the year 2000, a record high for trade from
Uganda to Switzerland. Although trade decreased to $70.6 million and then to $69
million in the following two years, it remained considerably higher than in the years
before war began in Congo. According to Ugandan trade figures in 2002, Switzerland
was Uganda largest single trading partner receiving over $69 million worth of goods,
with Kenya its second largest trading partner receiving goods valued at $61.5 million.400
398 Ugandan Government Draft Mining Regulations 2004, Subsection 3, Section 117.
399 Ibid., U.N. Panel of Experts reports, April 12, 2001 (S/2001/357) para 215, and October 16, 2002
(S/2002/1146) paras 174 and 175.
400 Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, “Statistical Abstract 2003”, Exports by Region and Country of Destination
1998 – 2002.
- 63 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 112
It is likely that a large percentage of the trade from Uganda to Switzerland is gold.
According to official Swiss information, imports from Uganda, excluding gold,
amounted to just over $11 million in both 2002 and 2003; most of this trade was in
coffee.401 Swiss imports of gold are classified as “sensitive data.” The Swiss government
provides only the total amount of gold it imports and exports each year, without
producing a breakdown of the country of origin. But Swiss government officials
estimated imports from Uganda, to have been approximately $13 million in 2003 (see
table below).402
Table 2:
Swiss Import and Ugandan Export Statistics:
Some Glaring Discrepancies
Year 2001 2002 2003
Swiss imports from Uganda excluding gold $6,965,000 $11,405,898 $11,637,025
Swiss gold imports from Uganda (unofficial number) $14,315,187 $1,684,140 $12,631,047
TOTAL Swiss imports from Uganda according to
Swiss import statistics (gold plus other imports) $21,280,187 $13,090,037 $24,268,072
TOTAL exports from Uganda to Switzerland
according to Ugandan export statistics $99,104,000 $70,674,000 $69,011,000
Discrepancy $77,823,813 $57,583,963 $44,742,928
Source: Administration Federale des Douanes (AFD), Commerce Exterieur de la Suisse; and
Ugandan Bureau of Statistics. Unofficial figures come from Swiss federal government sources.
A comparison of Ugandan export and Swiss import statistics in 2001, 2002 and 2003
shows some glaring discrepancies. In 2003 goods from Uganda worth over $44 million
were not registered at the point of entry into Switzerland and were unaccounted for; in
2001 the figure was $77 million. When questioned about the discrepancies, Swiss
customs agents told Human Rights Watch researchers that it was possible the goods had
entered Swiss free port zones; areas normally based around airports which effectively
401 Administration Fédérale des Douanes (AFD), Commerce Extérieur de la Suisse, “Statistiques Selon Les
Pays et Marchandises", 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003.
402 Human Rights Watch interview, Swiss official, Berne, January 26, 2005.
- 64 -
113 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
operate outside of Swiss government control.403 Goods entering such zones are not
registered or taxed, are not reflected in Swiss import statistics and are sent to other
locations without export duties. As the most valuable commodity imported from
Uganda, gold could form a substantial part of the Ugandan goods entering the free port
zones. According to one Swiss trade official, Swiss banks are possible candidates who
may be buying gold through free port zones.404 While free port zones are part of Swiss
territory, they operate outside of Swiss customs control. A Swiss customs official told
Human Rights Watch researchers, “The control of free ports is beyond us.”405
Free ports are not transparent and may hide illegal activities. Recognizing these risks,
the Swiss government in December 2003 submitted a new Customs Act to parliament to
tighten control at free ports. At the time of writing the new act was still under
discussion with no consensus on which goods should be more closely monitored by
customs agents. But a Swiss customs official told Human Rights Watch researchers that
gold was unlikely to be subject to stricter controls under the new law.406 Were
Switzerland to impose stricter controls on gold transiting through free ports, it could
facilitate efforts to stop the trade in tainted gold from Congo to other parts of the world.
Metalor Technologies SA
While a large part of the gold traded from northeastern Congo via Uganda is difficult to
trace, it is clear that an estimated $13 million worth of gold entered Swiss territory from
Uganda in 2003 and was officially registered as an import.407 According to research
done by Human Rights Watch, some of this gold imported into Switzerland is bought by
Metalor Technologies SA based in Neuchâtel, Switzerland, one of the oldest
manufacturers of products for the international gold market. Metalor ranks among the
leading refiners in the world of gold and other precious metals. In 2003 the company’s
net sales were $225 million.408
403 Human Rights Watch interviews, Swiss customs agents, Berne, January 26, 2005. Free ports also exist in
other countries, but control of free ports in Switzerland is considered weaker than that in other European
countries, making it attractive for many traders.
404 Human Rights Watch interview, Swiss trade official, Berne, January 26, 2005. A statement supported by a
Ugandan based trader who stated he sold gold to Swiss banks, Human Rights Watch interview with
representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, July 7, 2004.
405 Human Rights Watch interview, Swiss customs agent, Berne, January 26, 2005.
406 Ibid.
407 Human Rights Watch interview, Swiss industry expert, Berne, January 26, 2005.
408 “Annual Report 2003”, Metalor Technologies International SA.
- 65 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 114
A representative of the Ugandan-based gold exporting agency Machanga Ltd., told
Human Rights Watch researchers that his company exported all its gold to Metalor.409
Representatives of Machanga also confirmed to Human Rights Watch representatives
that they bought gold from Mr. Omar Oria, 410 a close business associate of Commander
Jérôme, based in northeastern Congo. Mr. Oria directly participated in human rights
abuses including cases of torture and arbitrary detention carried out by Commander
Jérôme and his FAPC armed group as documented by Human Rights Watch (see
above). A United Nations group of experts monitoring the arms embargo on eastern
DRC also reported that Metalor was a buyer of gold from Machanga.411 Thus Metalor
through its purchases of gold from Machanga may be indirectly involved in a trade that
supports an armed group responsible for serious human rights abuses.
In a December 17, 2004 letter responding to an inquiry from Human Rights Watch,
Metalor declined to say whether Machanga was a supplier of gold to the company
without first seeking Machanga’s approval, stating that “disclosing information on our
suppliers and certain transactions would be contrary to confidentiality and secrecy
obligations imposed on us.”412 It is not clear from this or subsequent correspondence if
the company attempted to contact Machanga to obtain such permission.413 In a meeting
with Human Rights Watch on April 21, 2005, a representative from Metalor confirmed
the company bought gold from suppliers in Uganda, though the company insisted on
retaining confidentiality as to the identity of those suppliers.414
In its meeting with Human Rights Watch and in its letters of December 17, 2004 and
April 14, 2005, Metalor stated it did not accept goods originating from criminal activity,
from criminal or terrorist groups or goods used to finance criminal activities. It claimed
to comply with all measures required by a Swiss federal law on money-laundering and
the Swiss precious metals control act, including requiring assurances from its suppliers
that they owned the goods, that such goods had been acquired legally and that all
necessary measures had been taken to prohibit the trade of goods from unlawful
409 Human Rights Watch interview, Jigendra Jitu, Machanga Ltd, Kampala, July 8, 2004
410 Human Rights Watch interview, Jigendra Jitu, Machanga Ltd, Kampala, July 8, 2004.
411 Ibid., Report of the Group of Experts on the U.N. Arms Embargo, January 25, 2005, p. 32.
412 Dr. Scott Morrison, Chief Executive Officer, Metalor Technologies to Anneke Van Woudenberg, Human
Rights Watch, December 17, 2004. Document on file at Human Rights Watch.
413 Ibid., Also Letter from Dr. Scott Morrison, Chief Executive Officer, Metalor Technologies to Anneke Van
Woudenberg, Human Rights Watch, April 14, 2005. Also e-mail from Morrison to Van Woudenberg, February
1, 2004. Documents on file at Human Rights Watch.
414 Human Rights Watch interview, Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance, Metalor
Technologies SA, Neuchâtel (Switzerland), April 21, 2005.
- 66 -
115 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
origin.415 In its meeting with Human Rights Watch, the company representative
explained that Metalor’s client managers regularly visited their suppliers, including any in
Uganda, to conduct due diligence checks, though she was unclear as to when the last
visit had taken place to the company’s suppliers in Uganda.416
In an email communication on February 1, 2005, Metalor claimed, “Due diligence [was]
carried out by all reasonable and lawful available means (such as governmental bodies,
official institutions, diplomatic representations, financial information providers, registries
of commerce, etc.).”417 In its April 2005 meeting with Human Rights Watch, a Metalor
representative stated that as part of these checks the company had sought information
from authorities such as the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO).418
When questioned about the results of these checks, the Metalor representative explained
that such contacts were not always formal or documented but that the company had
received no “negative responses” in relation to the trade of gold from Uganda.419
Despite these assurances, questions remain about the thoroughness of Metalor’s due
diligence checks. Since Uganda’s domestic gold production is negligible and since
Uganda does not import gold from other countries, gold exported from Uganda to
Metalor is almost certainly mined in northeastern Congo. When presented with publicly
available gold export and mining production statistics from official Ugandan sources, the
Metalor representative expressed surprise at the obvious discrepancy.420 The
representative stated Metalor had never seen such statistics and was unaware of any
discrepancy, even though the company admitted to having met on more than one
occasion with the Ugandan mining commissioner, 421 an individual likely to have been
well aware that the vast majority of gold exported from Uganda originated from
northeastern Congo as reflected by the statistics published in department’s annual
report.422 Metalor stated the information presented by Human Rights Watch during the
meeting of April 2005 would be fed into its due diligence process.
415 Ibid., Morrison to Van Woudenberg, December 17, 2004 and April 14, 2005. Documents on file at Human
Rights Watch. Also Human Rights Watch interview, Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance,
Metalor Technologies SA, Neuchâtel, Switzerland, April 21, 2005.
416 Human Rights Watch interview with Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance, Metalor
Technologies SA, Neuchâtel, April 21, 2005. Also Ibid., Metalor Annual Report 2003.
417 Ibid., Morrison to Van Woudenberg, e-mail correspondence, February 1, 2005. Document on file at Human
Rights Watch.
418 Ibid., Morrison to Van Woudenberg, April 14, 2005.
419 Human Rights Watch interview with Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance, Metalor
Technologies SA, Neuchâtel, April 21, 2005.
420 Ibid.
421 Ibid.
422 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, Government of Uganda, Annual Report, 2002.
- 67 -
THE CURSE OF GOLD 116
The Metalor representative stated to Human Rights Watch that the company “believed
the gold [it bought] was of legal origin.”423 Yet the gold traders in Kampala from whom
Metalor acquired its gold were clear when interviewed by Human Rights Watch
researchers that the gold they bought originated from Congo and that they did not
request documentation from their Congolese suppliers such as import and export
certificates.424 Between 2001 and 2004 numerous reports were published, including
ones in Swiss newspapers, about the trade in natural resources from the Congo
describing the horrific human rights abuses that the revenue helped to finance.425 In its
April 2005 meeting with Human Rights Watch, the representative from Metalor stated
the company was unaware of such information and had not heard about a series of
public U.N. panel of experts reports published between April 2001 and October 2003
describing in detail how the exploitation of Congo’s resources had funded armed groups
in eastern Congo and how the trade in gold from Congo was being funneled through
Uganda.426 In its meeting with Human Rights Watch, the Metalor representative
explained that on occasion the company carried out additional checks on its suppliers in
circumstances when it noticed ‘red flags’ – information from public or private sources
raising questions about a specific country of origin or the ethics of a supplier.427 Until
recently when Metalor was mentioned in a report by a U.N. group of experts monitoring
the arms embargo in eastern DRC, it appears no red flags were raised in relation to the
gold Metalor bought from its suppliers in Uganda. Metalor representatives did inform
Human Rights Watch that they were carrying out further checks with their suppliers in
light of the U.N. report.428
423 Ibid.
424 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Machanga Ltd
and A. P. Bhimji Ltd, Kampala, July 7 and 8, 2004.
425 There were numerous public reports about the situation in Ituri and the human rights abuses of armed
groups. For reports published in Swiss newspapers see, for example, “Or: la descente aux enfers,” L’Hebdo,
July 29, 1999; David Haeberli, “Justice : La Suisse bloque 13 millions de dollars issus d’un trafic de minerai
congolais”, Le Temps, November 30, 2002; Alexis Masciarelli, “Après le départ de l’armée ougandaise, les
massacres interethniques reprennent à Bunia,” Le Temps, May 12, 2003 ; “Les vraies causes des guerres
civiles: Misère ethnique? Non, économique”, L’Hebdo, June 19, 2003; “La CPI s’intéressera tout d’abord au
Congo. Deux priorités pour le procureur de la CPI : L’Ituri et le business de la guerre”, La Tribune de Genève,
July 17, 2003. See also Ibid., Reports from Human Rights Watch, March 2001, October 2002 and July 2003;
Amnesty International, October 2003; International Crisis Group, June 2003; U.N. Security Council, July 2004
amongst others.
426 See reports from the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 12, 2001 (S/2001/357), May 22, 2002 (S/2002/565), October
16, 2002 (S/2002/1146), October 23, 2003 (S/2003/1027) plus other addendums.
427 Ibid., Human Rights Watch interview with Mrs Nawal Ait-Hocine, Head of Legal and Compliance, Metalor
Technologies SA, Neuchâtel, April 21, 2005.
428 Ibid.
- 68 -
117 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
Metalor knew, or should have known, that gold bought from its suppliers in Uganda
came from a conflict zone in northeastern DRC where human rights were abused on a
systematic basis. Under international business norms such as the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, to which Switzerland is a party, companies are obliged to
encourage suppliers to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible with the
OECD Guidelines, including provisions on human rights.429 The U.N. Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, state that companies “within their respective spheres of
activity and influence,”430 including through their suppliers, have an obligation to
promote and ensure respect for human rights. Metalor should have considered whether
its own role in buying gold resources from its suppliers in Uganda was compatible with
ensuring respect for human rights and it should have actively checked its supply chain to
verify that acceptable ethical standards were maintained. In its own annual report, the
company reaffirmed its commitment to do so.431
Armed groups in Ituri would face serious difficulties in supporting their military
operations if they were unable to turn gold into funds to buy arms and other necessities.
The chain of Congolese middlemen, Ugandan traders and multinational corporations
together generate the revenue stream from which armed groups reap substantial financial
benefits. Through any purchases of gold made from this network, Metalor Technologies
may have contributed indirectly to the revenue stream that supports armed groups in
Ituri who carry out widespread human rights abuses. Any failure to terminate
relationships with suppliers in Uganda dealing with armed group leaders in Congo may
indirectly implicate Metalor in the human rights abuses these groups were committing.
429 Ibid., OECD Guidelines Paragraph II.10 and General Policies, paragraphs 1 and 2. A recent study in the
OECD looked specifically at the issue of trade from conflict zones. See OECD Working Party of the Investment
Committee, “Conducting Business with Integrity in Weak Governance Zones: Issues for Discussion and a Case
Study of the DRC,” November 26, 2004.
430 Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (2003), Section A, General Obligations.
431 Ibid, Metalor Annual Report 2003.
- 69 -
ANNEX 3.4
United Nations Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2001/128, 12 February 2001
(Excerpts)
- 70 -
- 71 -
- 72 -
- 73 -
- 74 -
- 75 -
- 76 -
- 77 -
ANNEX 3.5
Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood”. Ethnically Targeted Violence in
Northeastern DR Congo, Vol. 15, No. 11 (A), July 2003
- 78 -
350 Fifth Ave 34th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10118-3299
http://www.hrw.org
(212) 290-4700
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO
Vol. 15, No. 11 (A) - July 2003
I hid in the mountains and went back down to
Songolo at about 3:00 p.m. I saw many people
killed and even saw traces of blood where
people had been dragged. I counted 82 bodies
most of whom had been killed by bullets. We
did a survey and found that 787 people were
missing - we presumed they were all dead
though we don't know. Some of the bodies
were in the road, others in the forest. Three
people were even killed by mines. Those who
attacked knew the town and posted themselves
on the footpaths to kill people as they were
fleeing.
-- Testimony to Human Rights Watch
ITURI: "COVERED IN BLOOD"
Ethnically Targeted Violence In Northeastern DR Congo
1630 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, DC 20009
TEL (202) 612-4321
FAX (202) 612-4333
E-mail: [email protected]
2nd Floor, 2-12 Pentonville Road
London N1 9HF, UK
TEL: (44 20) 7713 1995
FAX: (44 20) 7713 1800
E-mail: [email protected]
15 Rue Van Campenhout
1 OOO Brussels, Belgium
TEL (32 2) 732-2009
FAX (32 2) 732-0471
E-mail: [email protected]
"You cannot escape from the horror"
This story of fifteen-year-old Elise is one of many in Ituri. She fled one attack after another and
witnessed appalling atrocities. Walking for more than 300 miles in her search for safety, Elise survived to
tell her tale; many others have not.
I am fifteen years old and my father is Hema while my mother is Nande. I was in Komanda in August
2002 when Ngiti fighters attacked the town. They were killing people especially the Hema. I hid with my
family in the forest but they found us. There were six of them in civilian clothes with axes and machetes.
I saw people being killed, men, women and children. Then it was our turn. They asked us what ethnic
group we were. We said Nande. They did not believe us and said they would kill us. They took us one by
one. They killed my mother, father and older brother. Then they took me and cut my wrist, my neck and
both shoulders. They thought I was dead, so they left me. I think more than 200 people were killed that
day, mostly Hema and Gegere.
I managed to get up and find a hospital in Komanda. It took me about five hours. I had to walk six miles
to get there. I was all alone. At the hospital they treated my hand and neck. I spent some time in the
hospital before the Hema militia decided to take me to the bigger hospital in Nyakunde. I spent one month
there or so, and then on September 5 the Ngiti attacked that town as well. They killed many people. This
time it was the Ngiti, Lendu, and the APC soldiers. I hid in the operating room with other Hema people.
They were killing everybody leaving only Nande and those who were not Hema. I did not know what to
do. I told them I was Nande and I managed to escape. Along with about 50 others we were able to run
away.
I wanted to go far away from the killing and so I walked to Mambasa [about 200 miles away]. I went to
the white priest, who arranged for me to get treatment in Mambasa hospital. Another women also helped
to look after me. But then in October, Mambasa was also attacked by the Effaceurs [MLC and RCD-N
troops]. They were shootingfrom morning till evening. We fled into the forest. They looted our things.
They raped many girls. I spent about one month in the forest. They killed four people in Mambasa. They
were killed under a tree near the house of the commissaire. They were buried in a mass grave. !found
the bodies decomposing. I fled again to Mayuano, some 20 miles away, but the Effaceurs reached there
too. So I went to Teturi where they also attacked and then to Byakato. I continued on to Mangina where
I stayed.
Will this killing ever stop?
(Human Rights Watch interview, Mangina, February 2003)
July 2003
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
ITURI: "COVERED IN BLOOD"
Ethnically Targeted Violence In Northeastern DR Congo
Vol. 15, No. 11 (A)
LIST OF ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................................................. i
I. SUMMARY ................................................................. .......................................................................................... l
II. RECOMMEND A TI ONS ...................................................................................................................................... 3
To the Ugandan, Rwandan and DRC Governments: ............. .. ............................................... ................................ 3
To the Ugandan Government: ................................................................................................................................ 3
To the DRC Government: ....... ...................................................................................................... .. ..................... .. 3
To the Hema, Lendu, Ngiti and Other Armed Political Groups: ............................................................................ 3
To the United Nations: ........................................................................................................................................... 3
To Donor Governments: ...................... .... ............... ..................... .. ............. ............ .. .......................... ... .. .. ............ .4
To the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: ................................................................... .4
III. CONTEXT: EXTERNAL ACTORS ................................................................................................................... 5
The Peace Process and Ituri .................................................................................................................................... 5
RCD-ML and Its Links with Ethnic Groups in Ituri .............................................................................................. 5
Ugandan Manipulation of Local Politics ................................................................................................................ 6
The Ugandan Government Response ................................................................................................................. 7
The Role of the DRC Government in Ituri ............................................................................................................. 8
Military Assistance to the RCD-ML and Other Armed Groups ......................................................................... 9
DRC Minister of Human Rights Taken Hostage .............................................................................................. I 0
Involvement of RCD-Goma and the Rwandan Government in Ituri.. .......................................... ... ..................... l 0
Economic Gain ..................................................................................................................................................... 12
IV. LOCAL CONTEXT-ARMED POLITICAL GROUPS ................................................................................. 14
Proxies Pursuing Their Own Interests .................................................................................................................. 14
The Hema - Lendu Conflict ....................................................................................................................... .. ......... 18
Rum or, Propaganda and Prejudice ......................................................... ............ ........ .... .................................. 18
V. MASSACRES AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES .............................................................................. 19
The Attack on Bunia ............................................................................................................................................. 19
Massacres and other Abuses by the UPC ............................................................................................................. 21
The UPC Government and the Growth of Extremism ...................................................................................... 21 ·
Attack at Mabanga ............................................................................................................................................ 22
Massacre at Songolo ... ...................................................................................................................................... 22
Massacre at Mongbwalu ................................................................................................................................... 23
UPC Abuses of Lendu and Others Seen as Political Opponents ...................................................................... 27
Massacres and Other Abuses by the APC and by Lendu and Ngiti Armed Groups ............................................. 30
Nyakunde Massacre ......................................................................................................................................... .30
Lendu and Ngiti Summary Executions Tolerated by RCD-ML Authorities ............................................ ....... .35
Abuses by the MLC and RCD-N .......................................................................................................................... 36
Summary Executions and Looting at Mambasa .................................................... .............................. ............. 36
Assassination of Governor Joseph Enecko ........................................................................................................... 38
Blocking Humanitarian Aid and Targeting Humanitarian Workers ..................................................................... 39
The Murders of ICRC Staff ............................................................................................................................. .40
Inhumane Acts- Cannibalism and Deliberate Mutilations of Corpses ............................................................... .42
Sexual Violence .... ......... ............................................................................... .. ......... ............................................ .44
Child Soldiers ...................................................................................................................................................... .46
VI. THE CURRENT SITUATION ........................................................................................................................ .48
VII. International Law and Justice ..................................................................................... : .................................... 48
International Humanitarian Law ........................................................................................................................... 48
International Criminal Court ................................................................................................................................ 50
VII. RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ........................................................................... 50
The United Nations and MONUC ........................................................................................................................ 51
International Donors ............................................................................................................................................. 5 3
The European Union ............................................................................................................................................. 54
The United Kingdom ............................................................................................................................................ 54
The United States ................................................................................................................................................. 55
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................................... 56
APC:
FAC:
FAPC:
FIPI:
FLC:
FNI:
FPDC:
FRPI:
ICC:
IEMF:
IPC:
LRA:
MLC:
MONUC:
PRA:
PUSIC:
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Congolese Popular Anny, armed wing of the RCD-ML (Armee Populaire Congolaise)
Congolese Anned Forces (Forces Annees Congolaise)
People's Anned Forces of Congo (Forces Armees Populaire du Congo)
Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri (Front pour L'Integration et Paix en Ituri)
Front for the Liberation of Congo (Front de Liberation du Congo)
Front for National Integration (Front Nationalist et Integrationist)
Popular Force for Democracy in Congo (Force Populaire pour la Democratie du Congo)
Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (Force des Resistance Patriotique d'Ituri)
International Criminal Court
Interim Emergency Multinational Force
Ituri Pacification Commission
Lords Resistance Army
Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Movement Pour la Liberation du Congo)
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
People's Redemption Army
Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo
RCD-GOMA: Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (Rassemblement Congolais pour la DemocratieGoma)
RCD-ML: Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour
la Democratie-Mouvement de Liberation
RCD-N: Congolese Rally for Democracy- National (Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Democratie- National)
RPA: Rwandan Patriotic Anny
UPC: Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriots Congolais)
UPDF: Ugandan People's Defence Forces
Human Rights Watch July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
C
0
5
10
10
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO
0
®
0
...............
+
0
0
International boundary
District boundary
National capltal
District capltal
Town, village
MaK1 road
Secondary road
Railroad
Airport
100 200
100
300km
200mi
15 CENTRAL AFR}CAN REPUBLIC 25 .-, • ........._ ,_:. ao
,-"'J1,,;~ Bangassou_R ··"'··-· •• --~~\ SUDAN 5
BanguloL ~.fl. \ ,: ..._,; ~./ • .'"' ......
0Juba
'j5 Zongo "<). •,-.:,. ~. ,1 . 1 • - • • •• , •
~ ~ Gbadohte -~ Bondo ., r _ Faradje'\.. '- /,
~ _........ Libeoge I Businga -...____;-:;::, -,. l',•lc 0< ~ , i ··-~n'--'"'".:£:r-•~---J--:....i"'·•..I' r··"-·· '·
• '°' \. : • 0 . - o,, <t ... ~~ - - ' ,- , ' •• t J / Gemena ( v.1, Aketi Bula L 1.- 1siro Watsa0'--4;(1..,4 : • y - ' . - 0~-~ ";"'-o - }
~
: j ..,.\o''i;".!.~) Lisala Bumba r . r ·ifo V I N C E ., Mungbere / • i oGulu
'--... olmese , /"'-. o ~ v·-l lluri ' "'- _,... UGANDA
, lmpfondoo ,, ' ~ 0 R l EN r AL E o ,
bu._e, sso > %1;<:, j c,~ cfa.;i:~ ~~-~"" ' , 0B..,a...s.,o..k9o. J:JO' .v81 "fw''1 1" '-nd-e -~- . - B..u1n~ia o_. ,;_ -/ ~,ui~"k<-c!....~.,:;M ~JJi,.;..,1k1.g,a
1 , J!l ,-<''>,,-;;(.:'ii Basankusu -, \ .. _ -....... analia a ase o "'-..£-....,J r rv-:1-- )' 1 • •
:::t 1/ \l\,,lc ~ ' • J --- Berif • • \,I , '
,....._ \ 0 \ f( \· E Q Li ATE L R \-. Yangain~4'.~~ngarn c:·;;·-~~ /, . _'7 Ka~~}Aj~
i. • f £ ~ba \,..:.... ..... .........--- -~ r 0 Ekoli 1, , em o':7\. '~ ~ "':- "'.
CONGO • ,~~ < ~ , _0 §9ende ~- \ Ubundu ~• . .,.:·, N O R D r J:i..,-: 'r;:tf-' · .. -1..~.
11n,,J,,,~l;{ \-". \. '-~ ··~ ..... • i.- ~0Pene1uta-' ~ , ' Lake .,,.-.· 7!, .J{i
--~>-L. ~ ~--~- ""' - 11''{1;, .>--.,.J\<,.. '~ i 'oLubutu ;· K ] V l I '..--.Eilward I f , i ./.. // '"._.s. ( 1 ( \ / -., °? ' - ,';,-; • . • ~ ..flfli: ') ......_ ?T ,-._.; \. \<;. , \ 1~e1ao~. ~ \ :'~( Punia'~ G.... \1 ~c--··~) Vi ctori" ~··
, .. .// -· I \ '-{'-< % } ·-· t:::.. ,....- o '\ ~ Om'!J-• / ( '- , ~
1 ./ { i:Jlnongo •/'. ~~- " r., .L\ ) .I~?~ · /.,1kl [ • • RWANDA :r'
~ ~bo )jv -·:-.'\... f"'°"'\:...; \ \""'I:./ (fV''< '"· ._,.J.·-Kt~! 1 0Ki91!II £ ~!?{
\ Kutu If foe . \.::::~-/.i) _'l,.. \ ._J \r. ,.f Bukavu B{Jta~.. '~"" • ,..._ '--'.'.) l O! M.1J-V.k•m1>< • \ rf l \ }• . ., '"···......_ • o 1 -. r "''""l -<'"'
~ -" I ~ KA S ·\ I '; i' K"nd I... " lJ o·- .. .. " . ~ .--"1i'" • • ~ .. • • I U . ... , -, " -. • - 'p
' ),B!!_nd~ndu _-.(.'!~~!c..,.-..f_,t<i(I _...!,.QQ@o '-.,, 1 ··1egwwe I . . u~dic:1:0 Bujum~~ra
Brazzaville .Ao. , /_., ; (..,...~-<--, S,1, -' '. • o ._Makobola , •
I ' ~~N • --~) R I ENT A LI Kibombo f IV lJ::::i .d ( BURUNDI
~ 'O~~ Kinsfl11sa i~ '---.1,~~K • :.',A• 1
•'- r• ·~ 'i..--oi'.(~ Jl \:l AN!. EM A ·-.0 l1 \ ,I Pointe-Noire~ J · .· ......._. ·:...,·· K'J,~..,.~ q/j ~enge---<;,..'_Q Bul "' ' .,, " BeQll., ~ ~OKa ' ' •• l ungu \ ~aka .,)i~Lusambo \ Mamba songo • !<igoma
Cabind~ ! B ·\ S· co~t, 0 ...... , Kikwito' 0 Cl' IDEN T .-\°L , ', L~ba~) · ·-Kongo0 io'"~...l..- -~) ··- TJA aborahl s
, oMbanza-. - '- ....._ , • '.- } ~
(ANGOLt',J,;8o.(!l<IJ3
18d1 N.,mLngu_L \ BAND U l\ D lJ } / K \' _......r.M· .b .. M . 9i C b
1
, v•~f{:" ) ~ UNITED
A Tl .1 X TJC
OCEA :\' N'zeto
10
··-·· - ~ ./ ananga• - i.. r.:.. UJI· ayi ~ Kaao _;;-,, KaieniiiR "r REPUBLIC
l I Tshlkapa - / 1 ..!ll O ...,.-"' J r- \
• . : . o~ , i I Kabinda ~; • ·% Mata''· OF
7'- ' , "-1;, ' 1' ,-• ., 1
- P O """ .f',;. r'·": "'1?.-: u ·. ;-.., ..,· ,,) ,}-...M -q; Mob;0~\ TANZANIA
~ , : -··- Mwene-D1tu . , ~· o"'--8!!°"° Kab b"'o~\ Rukwa
, Kahemba<'f • ,. _J. , /(j 1 ) ""'· am a , ~ 0
f •• ..., •• -... •• ) , \!"..·'1· __ ,,.) . KA TANG A 0,~ / Motik:;_\\. f' Sumbawanga
\.., 1 1,Kapanga .# . d~- \ ~ .,,,,~~'~··"'~
\ I' ;. ) .._ IKa~1n~7f /) 1.r;,- ("'°'v~ Mbeya
\
, ;e t (_ .' \ .~ ~ / f./ • '\,,
-~-~:-~~ ANGOLA ~ . \; . ~"',\ ., ' Kaft'- <· /nga ~ '\.~I ('~./. fokc \ .· • · ) 2 •. ,Mll'cm • 0 Saunmo \. / ~ Rlateau J~ ~
\,__ · ~; ' Dilo/o - if.: \ ~' ) ..lKasenga ZAMBIA
-...., .i ,• • - • :1: ... K~olweZJ ~Lika ~. .! '" ;~ , /".! :'
)1 ·, ~<""-ctr V.- J• • -·~ \ __ SrI· ', j.•~ • /,ake 1-~~ ,: .,,... Lub-lmbashi ,a:1Ba11.l'l>"C1J/11 ~ . •v-· '\ _,,
' Solwezi;;- • • Kipu5hi . , ....
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this l : • ~ ·-..$'-17 map do not Imply olllclal endorsement or accep1ance by lf>e United \ I ~karna I
Nations. ( •• ~ • - •} Ndola(i ;
15 / 2!) I \ 25 ·-·:J.30
·~z-~\
./ ..
,~ )lt_i ·. > ..
( ~ ,: _,.,,~ >~'- i ::_ ', ~'
j ..-r
Map No. 4007 Rev 7 UNITED NATIONS
Mar,;h 2002
Department of Public Information
canographic Sedion
IITurul
lturi \
( D-...,n •• -
Sota
~ \......L ___..."{'
BUNIA ~Dele
.,
--..·I
-
'T-- J I
I
~.-
~·"i
0- = !!
a
E
E
0 u
l"
i
a :..,
p-- :.l. a.
a
..C... ]!
a e
0
C: .g. :
0 -:::
t., CHEF LIEU DE PROVINCE
-, CHEF LIEU DE TERRITOIRE
• Localite
Route principale
route secondaire
IIJ
.. a
~..
"
I. SUMMARY
Ituri is often described as the bloodiest comer of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite three peace
agreements purportedly ending the five year-old Congolese war, fighting in northeastem DRC intensified in late
2002 and early 2003. In early May 2003, hundreds of civilians were slaughtered in the town of Bunia and tens of
thousands of others were forced to flee. Some sought shelter near the United Nations compound desperately
looking for protection from the violence. While the international community focused on the town of Bunia,
massacres continued in other parts of lturi away from media attention. As one witness described it, "Ituri was
covered in blood."
Based on information gathered by its researchers and on other reports, Human Rights Watch estimates that at least
5,000 civilians died from direct violence in Ituri between July 2002 and March 2003. These victims are in
addition to the 50,000 civilians that the United Nations estimates died there since 1999. These losses are just part
of an estimated total of 3.3 million civilians dead throughout the Congo, a toll that makes this war more deadly to
civilians than any other since World War II.
Armed groups have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law on a massive scale in Ituri. Assailants have massacred unarmed civilians,
often solely on the basis of their ethnicity, killing scores and sometimes hundreds of civilians in each such attack.
In one of several such massacres documented by Human Rights Watch researchers, Ngiti combatants together
with soldiers of the Congolese Popular Army (Armee Populaire Congolaise, APC) of Mbusa Nyamwisi killed at
least 1,200 Hema and Bira children, women and other civilians in Nyakunde. Over a ten-day period assailants
carried out a well-planned operation, systematically slaughtering and often torturing civilians in house-to-house
searches and executing hospital patients still in their beds. Many other massacres, especially those that occurred
in more remote areas, were never even reported.
Armed groups also committed summary executions, forcefully abducted persons whose whereabouts remain
unknown and arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained others, some of whom they subjected to systematic
torture. Survivors told Human Rights Watch researchers that the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)
conducted a "man hunt" for Lendu and other political opponents shortly after taking power in August 2002.
Many Lendu were arrested. Others fled or went into hiding, afraid to walk openly in the streets of Bunia.
According to witnesses, senior UPC military officers were in charge of two prison areas that became notorious
places of summary execution and torture.
Combatants of armed groups also committed rapes and engaged in such inhumane acts as mutilations and
cannibalism, a practice meant to bring ritual strength to perpetrators and to inspire terror in opponents.
All groups have recruited children for military service, some as young as seven years old, subjecting them to the
risks and rigors of military operations. As the war intensified, the forced recruitment of children increased so
dramatically that observers described the fighting forces as "armies of children."
More than 500,000 people have been forced to flee from their homes in Ituri often encountering further violence
in their flight. Members of armed groups h.ave looted many of these homes and have sometimes burned down
entire villages, destroying them to discourage any return. Armed political groups and their outside backers have
violated international humanitarian law by deliberately preventing humanitarian agencies from delivering
assistance to people whom they have defined as their enemies. In the last year, there have been more than thirty
cases where humanitarian workers have been detained, threatened, beaten or expelled from Ituri. The most
serious attack was the murder of six staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross in April 200 I, an
incident with wide ramifications further documented in this report.
Perpetrators of these crimes are rarely punished. According to information available to Human Rights Watch
researchers, Hema, Lendu and other armed groups have not investigated any of the abuses described in this report
nor have they held accountable those responsible for them. In those few cases where political movements have
Human Rights Watch July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
bowed to local or international pressure and have tried alleged perpetrators, the proceedings have not met
international fair trial standards.
The war in Ituri is a complex web of local, national, and regional conflicts that developed after a local dispute
between Hema and Lendu was exacerbated by Ugandan actors and aggravated by the broader international war in
the DRC. National rebel groups such as the Congolese Liberation Movement (Mouvement pour la Liberation du
Congo, MLC), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Democratie-Mouvement de Liberation, RCD-ML) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma
(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma, RCD-Goma) have supported local militia in their conflicts
as a way to expand their own base of power in the DRC transitional government or perhaps even to derail
negotiations. These national groups, as well as local ethnic groups in Ituri, have been and, in some cases, still are
supported by the Ugandan, Rwandan and DRC governments.
Ituri is now the battleground for the war between the governments of Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC which have
provided political and military support to local armed groups despite abundant evidence of their widespread
violations of international humanitarian law. In doing so and in failing to exercise their influence over them to
bring such abuses to an end, they share responsibility for these crimes. International leaders and the UN Security
Council regularly denounce the crimes, but have also failed to end them or to deliver justice for them.
Uganda, the occupying power in Ituri from 1998 to 2003, failed in its obligation under international humanitarian
law to protect the civilian population. The Ugandan authorities played a direct role in political and administrative
changes in Ituri, stimulating new political parties and militia groups to form. As this conflict expanded to
encompass more people and wider areas, Uganda used it as a pretext to remain in the resource-rich area,
exploiting its minerals and commerce.
The availability of political and military support from external actors, whether national governments or rebel
movements, encouraged local leaders to form new groups, generally based on ethnic loyalty. Some of these
groups advocated increasingly extreme ethnically based positions. Leaders of these groups often set their own
agendas and readily switched patrons as their interests dictated. In this fast-changing scene there was one
constant: the abuses committed against the civilian population.
The conflict in lturi is important not just because of the extent of the suffering and destruction imposed on local
people, but also because of these links with broader struggles. The complex mix of local, national, and regional
conflicts exists also in the Kivus, where civilians have suffered from massacres and other grave abuses, and it
may develop elsewhere in the DRC. The continuation of this kind of local level combat endangers the peace
process throughout the country and beyond.
Until recently, the conflict in lturi has been largely ignored by the international community. Despite information
to the contrary, some UN member states and UN officials viewed lturi as merely a "tribal war" not related to the
broader war in the DRC. Between 1999 and April 2003 the U.N. Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC)
had only a small team of fewer than ten observers covering this volatile area of some 4.2 million people.
MONUC forces were urgently increased to several hundred in April 2003, but they had no capability to protect
thousands of civilians who fled to them for protection when fighting again broke out between opposing militia
groups in early May. The UN Security Council authorised an Interim Emergency Multinational Force with a
Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians and UN staff in the town of Bunia for a short period while MONUC
reinforced its presence. This decision, while helpful to residents of the town, has left tens of thousands of
civilians outside Bunia unprotected and at the mercy of armed groups who continue to fight. At the time of
publication, Human Rights Watch continues to receive reports of massacres in lturi.
This report results from fieldwork done by two Human Rights Watch researchers in· February 2003, along with
follow-up research up until late June, focusing on ethnically targeted violence, violations of international
humanitarian law, and the role of foreign armies in Ituri. It is based on investigations in Bunia, displaced persons
camps north of Beni, and western Uganda border areas. Human Rights Watch acknowledges with gratitude and
Human Rights Watch 2 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
respect the assistance given its researchers by Congolese human rights organizations and numerous other groups
and individuals who took great risks to provide information. For their safety we have withheld their names and
details necessary to protect their identities.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Ugandan, Rwandan and DRC Governments:
• Provide no military, financial, or other assistance to armed groups that have committed serious violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law in Ituri. This should include Lendu, Ngiti and Hema militias,
parties such as the UPC and PUSIC, as well as the RCD-ML, RCD-N and the MLC. Use your influence with
these groups to persuade them to halt these abuses.
To the Ugandan Government:
• Investigate alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by Ugandan forces and
bring to justice those accused of having committed such crimes or of having facilitated or tolerated the
commission of such crimes by local groups over which they exercised control.
To the DRC Government:
• Make the development of an effective, independent and impartial national justice system a priority, focusing
efforts first in areas where grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have been
committed.
• Pass the necessary legislation implementing the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Request
the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to conduct a preliminary examination of those cases
within the jurisdiction of the court.
• Request that the U.N. Security Council establish a judicial mechanism to prosecute the most serious
violations of international humanitarian law that are outside the jurisdiction of the ICC.
To the Hema, Lendu, Ngiti and Other Armed Political Groups:
• Direct your combatants to adhere to international humanitarian law in all military operations, particularly as it
relates to the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian aid. Investigate alleged violations of
international humanitarian law, including those described in this report, and hold combatants accountable for
them.
• Stop the recruitment and training of children under the age of eighteen and disarm, demobilize, rehabilitate
and return to their homes all such children.
To the United Nations:
• The UN Security Council should strengthen the MONUC mandate to one based on chapter VII that allows for
the robust use of force by MONUC troops in protection of the civilian population throughout the DRC.
Provide the force with adequate numbers of troops and the necessary resources and equipment so that it can
fulfill its mandate, particularly with regard to the protection of civilians.
• Urge the commander of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force to interpret the mandate accorded by the
Security Council in resolution 1484 to ensure the full protection of civilians both inside and outside of Bunia.
• In follow up to resolution 1468, the Security Council should establish a credible and effective international
justice mechanism for the DRC to investigate and prosecute grave violations of international humanitarian
law committed by all parties, including citizens of countries other than the DRC from 1996 to July 2002.
• The UN secretary general should establish a team of MONUC human rights investigators in Ituri with
sufficient resources to document and publicly report on violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law.
• The High Commissioner for Human Rights should establish a field office in Bunia to assist the MONUC
human rights team in monitoring and publicly reporting on human rights violations and to strengthen local
human rights organizations.
Human Rights Watch 3 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
• Within the context of the World Bank coordinated regional demobilization program, UNICEF should support
the demobilization, disarmament and re-integration of child soldiers under the age of 18 from all armed forces
or groups regardless of ethnicity and political affiliation.
To Donor Governments:
• Exert political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on the Ugandan, Rwandan and DRC governments to
dissuade them from supporting local armed groups responsible for crimes against humanity and other serious
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. Publicly denounce violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law, including recruitment of child soldiers, by all local armed political
groups and their backers in Ituri and insist upon accountability for the perpetrators of such crimes.
• Support efforts in the Security Council to establish a credible and effective international justice mechanism to
investigate and prosecute grave violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the DRC war,
including those who are not citizens of the DRC.
To the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court:
• As set out under article 15 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, initiate an investigation
proprio motu by undertaking a preliminary investigation of serious crimes committed in Ituri within the
presumptive jurisdiction of the ICC for possible prosecution.
Human Rights Watch 4 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
III. CONTEXT: EXTERNAL ACTORS
The Peace Process and Ituri
The second Congo war began in 1998 and pitted the DRC government, supported by Angola, Zimbabwe, and
Namibia, against several rebel movements backed by Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. In 1999 the major parties to
the war signed the Lusaka Peace Accords, resulting in the deployment in 2000 of a United Nations force, the U.N.
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to monitor arrangements for ending
the conflict. But the accords were not respected and the DRC was in effect divided among four regimes, each of
which depended on foreign troops to survive. After further negotiation, the DRC government reached an accord
on future political arrangements with two of the three major rebel movements, the MLC and RCD-ML.1 Known
as the Sun City accord, the agreement was signed in April 2002 without the signature of the third important rebel
movement, the RCD-Goma.
After further international pressure and shuttle diplomacy, the government of the DRC signed bilateral accords
with Rwanda (July 2002) and with Uganda (September 2002), paving the way for withdrawal of their troops. The
Rwandan soldiers left in October and Ugandan troops began withdrawing soon after, although some stayed on.2 In
early 2003 Uganda briefly increased the number of its soldiers in Ituri, but under significant international pressure
it started its final withdrawal of troops in May. In April 2003 RCD-Goma joined the other DRC parties to the
conflict in the All Inclusive Agreement on the Transitional Government, meant to settle interim political
arrangements.
Despite the agreements and the troop movements, the war in Ituri intensified as local surrogates carried on the
battles of the national and international actors.
RCD-ML and Its Links with Ethnic Groups in Ituri
Links between the RCD-ML and ethnic groups form one strand of the complex political fabric in lturi. The RCDML
split off from the original RCD in 1999 and moved its base from Kisangani to Bunia. Mbusa Nyamwisi
sought to oust the first RCD-ML president, Wamba dia Wamba, from his post. During their year-long struggle in
2000 each appealed to ethnic groups for support, with Wamba relying on the Lendu, and Mbusa Nyemwisi,
together with Hema businessman Tibasima Ateenye, drawing strength from the Hema. Ethnically- based militia,
incorporated into the RCD-ML forces, supported their chosen candidates, sometimes by force of arms. Mbusa
Nyamwisi triumphed and Wamba left the scene. Nyamwisi, himself a Nande, then began fostering ties with the
Lendu. In early 2002, he named Jean-Pierre Molondo Lompondo, an outsider from Kasai, as governor of Ituri
and allowed him to take control of the RCD-ML forces, thus limiting the power of Thomas Lubanga, a leading
Hema member of the movement and nominally his minister of defense. As Nyamwisi depended more on the
Lendu, he increasingly alienated his former supporters among the Hema. In April 2002, Nyamwisi's bodyguard
was assassinated, a crime widely attributed to Lubanga. Skirmishes followed between those RCD-ML troops,
known now as the Congolese Popular Army (Armee Populaire Congolaise, APC), who supported Nyamwisi, and
combatants backing Lubanga. Lubanga and his forces, identified with the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), set
up their own base at Mandro, some twelve miles outside Bunia and took control of part of Bunia town from the
APC. In the process, both sides committed abuses against the civilian population.3
In April 2002, Nyamwisi participated in the Sun City negotiations, establishing links with the DRC government
that he could use to strengthen his base at home. During his absence in Sun City, the UPC circulated a document
in Bunia denouncing the RCD-ML for its willingness to deal with outsiders. Under the slogan "Ituri for Iturians,"
they advocated regional autonomy.4
1 Initially known as the RCD-Kisangani, the name was changed to RCD-ML after the move to Bunia. It is sometimes
referred to as RCD-K-ML to denote its early origins.
2 Under the Luanda Accords, Uganda promised to withdraw its forces immediately from Gbadolite and Beni but arranged to
keep soldiers in Bunia until a civilian administration was established there.
3 Human Rights Watch, "Chaos in Eastern Congo: UN Action Needed Now," A Briefing Paper, October 2002.
4 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch 5 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
In the following months, Governor Molondo integrated Lendu militia into the RCD-ML forces in accord with the
Sun City agreement. The Hema militia charged Molondo with favoring the Lendu and remained apart from the
APC. In June, Ugandan authorities detained Lubanga and eight aides while they were in Kampala and then
delivered them to Kinshasa where they were held under house arrest. But two months later, Ugandan authorities
switched clients and Ugandan troops joined the UPC in ousting Governor Molondo and APC forces from Bunia.
Soon after, the UPC set up a government purporting to control Bunia and the rest oflturi.5
Ugandan Manipulation of Local Politics
Ugandan involvement with the RCD-ML and other political groups in Ituri constituted another strand of the
complex political fabric. This link was sometimes echoed by further ties between the RCD-ML and locally- based
groups. In other cases, Ugandans cooperated directly with the locally- based groups, creating still another strand
of political involvement.
During its four years occupying the north-eastern DRC, the Ugandan army--the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force
(UPDF)--claimed to be a "peacemaker" in a region tom by ethnic strife. In reality the Ugandan army provoked
political confusion and created insecurity in areas under its control. From its initial involvement in a land dispute
between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups in 1999 through its joint operation with Lendu and Ngiti militias to
dislodge Hema from Bunia in March 2003, the Ugandan Army more often aggravated than calmed ethnic and
political hostilities.6
Since 1999 the initial conflict between Hema and Lendu drew in more ethnic groups and spawned increasing
numbers of ethnically- based militia. Uganda provided assistance to many of these groups often helping to launch,
arm, and train them, but its support was erratic and determined by its own interests.7 A local politician who
discussed Ituri political affairs with Ugandan authorities in late 2002 told Human Rights Watch researchers, "It
was clear to me that Uganda wanted a pawn in Ituri. When their pawn didn't work, they were happy to change it
for another. ... If Uganda continues to play games like this there will never be peace in Ituri."8
The list below summarizes some of the ways that Uganda intervened in Ituri politics.9
• There are currently ten armed political groups operating in Ituri (see box below). Since 1998 most of these
groups have at one point or another been armed, trained or politically supported by the Ugandan authorities.
For some this support has been only of brief duration while for others it has been more long-term. 10 Uganda
has played a major role in launching or supporting at least five of these groups. 11
• On the political level, Ugandans directed important changes in the rebel movements based in Bunia, including
removing Wamba dia Wamba as head of the RCD-ML and replacing him by Mbusa Nyamwisi; supporting
the creation of two coalitions, the Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC) which grouped rebel movements at
the national level and the Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri (FIPI) which grouped local rebel groups of
the Lendu, Alur and dissatisfied Hema; and driving away the RCD-ML and helping install the UPC in Bunia
in August 2002. These changes were directed from Kampala and supported by the Ugandan forces in lturi.
• Uganda intervened in local administration by establishing a new province, Kibali-Ituri, in 1999, by naming its
first governor, and by playing a major role in changing four of the six governors since then. Three governors
5 Human Rights Watch, "Chaos in Eastern Congo: UN Action Needed Now."
6 Human Rights Watch, A Short Report, Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fuelling Political and Ethnic Strife, March 2001.
7 Ibid. See also U.N. Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), Special on Ituri, December 2002.
8 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
9 Human Rights Watch interviews, Bunia, Beni, and Kampala, February 2003; Human Rights Watch, Uganda in Eastern
DRC: Fuelling Political and Ethnic Strife, March 200 I; and IRIN chronology on Ituri, December 2002.
'
0 Ibid.
11 RCD-ML, MLC, RCD-N, UPC and the FIPI platform of three ethnic based groups. For support to the RCD-ML, MLC and
RCD-N see Human Rights Watch, A Short Report, Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fuelling Political and Ethnic Strife, March
2001. For support to the UPC and FIPI see following chapters in this report.
Human Rights Watch 6 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
were removed directly by Ugandans with their army providing the force in two of these cases. 12 One governor
was forced to leave after the Ugandan-backed coalition FLC failed and another was never accepted by the
local population and was unable to carry out his duties. 13 Between January and May 2001, Col. Edison
Muzoora of the Ugandan Army effectively acted as governor, a period during which inter-ethnic violence
escalated dramatically. 14
• Of the seven Ugandan commanders in charge of the Ugandan forces in lturi, four were accused by local actors
and other independent groups of favoring the Hema over the Lendu.15 The Porter Commission set up by the
Ugandan government also acknowledged that it had received evidence that four senior Ugandan Army
officers (two of whom were the same accused by local groups) had in one way or another been highly
suspected of involvement in the Hema-Lendu conflict. 16 Another commander was removed supposedly after
he tried to stop the Ugandan exploitation ofDRC resources. 17
• Ugandan authorities often managed and chaired political negotiations on lturi. Between 1999 and February
2003, Ituri leaders went to Kampala for political negotiations more than fifteen times and met frequently with
either President Museveni or his brother Salim Saleh.
Ugandan meddling in Ituri politics stimulated new political parties and militia groups to form and most did so
along ethnic lines, contributing to growing ethnically- based extremism.
On many occasions since their arrival in Ituri in 1998, Ugandan forces failed to protect civilians in areas under
their control, most dramatically in Bunia on January 19, 2001 and between August 6 and 10, 2002 when ethnic
killings took place within ·a kilometer of the large Ugandan army camp at the airport. In a few cases, however,
Ugandan soldiers did protect civilians. During the early August attacks in Bunia, for example, two Ugandan
soldiers reportedly died protecting Hema at Lengabo. In another case at Mabanga on August 28, 2002, Ugandan
troops sheltered hundreds of Lendu and others from Hema attack and then the next day escorted them to safety
past hostile Hema militias and the bodies of their relatives and friends.
Tl,e Ugandan Government Response
On April 15, 2003 Ugandan army Brig. Kale Kayihura, addressing the Ituri Pacification Commission in the name
of President Museveni, reportedly deviated from his prepared text to ask the delegates to excuse Ugandan troops
for atrocities they committed in lturi. 18 If so, this represented an unusual recognition of wrongdoing by Ugandan
military authorities who more frequently claimed. to have acted as peacekeepers and perhaps even to have
prevented a genocide. As Brigadier Kayihura told journalists, "There are indicators of possible genocide if the
UPDF leaves the area without an effective peacekeeping force and administration. The savage killings in Drodro
are a reminder to the international community to stop the genocide before it reaches alarming levels."19 President
Museveni reportedly denigrated MONUC and its ability to deal with the threat, saying "MONUC is just a tourist
group."20
Ugandan authorities claimed in the press that the UN asked them to stay in lturi, although the UN never explicitly
did so. Ugandan spokesmen relied on a September 2002 report by the U.N. secretary general in which he called
12 Governors Adele Lotsove Mugisa, Ernest Uringi Padolo and Jean Pierre Molondo Lompondo.
13 Col Mohammed Buli Bangolo was the first, Ruhugwa Baguma the second.
14 During this time there was no official governor and Colonel Muzoora effectively held administrative control.
15 Captain Kyakabale, Colonel Arosha, Col. Edison Muzoora and Col. Freddy Segamwenge.
16 Final Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Fonns of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2001 (May 2001 - November 2002), November 2002, p. 138.
The Porter Commission mentions Cap Kyakabale, Colonel Arosha, Cap. Peter Karim and Colonel Angina.
17 Col. Charles Angina.
18 Electronic mail and telephone communication with delegates who attended the conference, April 16, 2003.
19 "A Whole New Genocide is Well Underway in Congo," The New Vision, Kampala, April 17, 2003.
20 "Anny Sets Tenns for Pulling out ofDRC," The Monitor, Kampala, April 11, 2003.
Human Rights Watch 7 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
on the Ugandan army to exercise its security responsibilities "in an impartial manner"21 and on similar U.N.
statements reminding Uganda of its responsibility to protect civilians in Ituri. At first neither the secretary general
nor the Security Council explicitly refuted these assertions but they reportedly did so through diplomatic channels
several months later.22
In late April 2003, Brigadier Kayihura claimed also that Ugandan troops were needed "to secure the Ituri
Pacification Commission process" as well as to protect Uganda against the Ugandan dissident group the Peoples
Redemption Army (PRA) and armed cattle rustlers.23 When Uganda first sent troops to Ituri, authorities claimed
they were there to protect Uganda against the Ugandan rebel group the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).
Ugandan forces missed repeated deadlines for leaving Ituri but finally completed their withdrawal from Bunia on
May 6, 2003 and continued withdrawing from other areas in Ituri, claiming to have completed their total
withdrawal in early June. Foreign Minister James Wapakhabulo disclaimed Ugandan responsibility for "any ugly
situations such as massacres" that might happen after the Ugandan withdrawal.24 There were reports that the
DRC government was willing to allow one Ugandan army battalion to stay on the slopes of the Ruwenzori
mountains, although exactly where and for how long was unclear. Wapakhabulo also reportedly warned that the
Ugandan army withdrawal would not "remove an inherent right to self defence" and that Uganda would be
prepared to "carry out small military incursions" into Ituri if necessary.25
When Ugandan troops arrived in Uganda, they were welcomed by Defense Minister Amama Mbabazi who
congratulated them and declared their mission in DRC "an overall success". Brigadier Kayihura returning with
his troops from Bunia stated, "We return home keeping our heads high because we have done Uganda proud."26
The Role of the DRC Government ijn Ituri
Until April 2002, the Kinshasa government played little role in lturi but with the Sun City agreement, it sought
more influence in parts of northeastern Congo which were nominally under the control of the RCD-ML, though in
fact occupied by the Ugandan army. Focused first on regaining control over resources and strengthening the
military forces of its ally the RCD-ML, the DRC government otherwise lacked a coherent strategy for effectively
governing the northeast. Unlike Uganda which manipulated several local political links simultaneously, the DRC
government worked primarily with the RCD-ML and, through it, with Lendu, Ngiti, and other ethnic groups.
These links undermined the credibility of the DRC government with Hema ethnic groups and others allied with
them, and made it nearly impossible for the national government to serve as a neutral force in Ituri.
Shortly after the Sun City agreement was signed, the DRC authorities reclaimed control over Ituri's resources by
signing an exclusive oil exploration license with the Canadian-British Heritage Oil Company for the area on the
DRC side of the Semliki Valley.27 The agreement gained them some cash and set an important precedent for
future deals on resource exploitation, but did nothing to increase their authority over the area. The military wing
of the RCD-ML, the APC, had no control over most of the area where the oil exploration license had been granted
and was weakening elsewhere. Mbusa Nyamwisi himself was unable to return to Bunia after the Sun City
agreement was signed and he was forced to move his base to his hometown of Ben i.
21 U.N. Security Council, "Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo," S/2002/1005, September 10, 2002.
22 Human Rights Watch interviews, Kampala, February 2003.
23 "A Genocide Could Erupt After UPDF Quits DRC," the New Vision, Kampala, April 23, 2003.
24 "UPDF to Meet Congo Deadline, Says Wapa," The Monitor, Kampala, April 18, 2003.
25 Ibid.
26 "UPDF Says Congo Mission a Success," The Monitor, April 28, 2003.
27 On I O June 2002 Heritage Oil announced an agreement with the DRC government to develop oil production in
approximately 7.7 million acres of Eastern Congo (lturi). Dominic Johnson, "Shifting Sands: Oil Exploration in the Rift
Valley and the Congo Conflict," Pole Institute Report, March 13, 2003.
Human Rights Watch 8 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
Military Assistance to tl,e RCD-ML and Otl,er Armed Groups
Faced with the growing power of the UPC, the DRC government sought to strengthen the APC and to integrate it
more effectively into the DRC government army, the Forces Armees Congolaises (FAC). Kinshasa provided the
APC with uniforms, ammunition, and trainers from F AC. At several camps, such as that at Nyaleke, F AC soldiers
trained local forces, including APC, Lendu and Ngiti militias, and Mai Mai, groups of local combatants of various
ethnic groups united in their goal of expelling outsiders. According to local sources, approximately two F AC
battalions arrived in the Beni area to prop up the APC.
In February 2003 a witness described the training to Human Rights Watch researchers:
There is an alliance between the APC and the Ngiti. They are trying to find ways to integrate more
fighters into the army. There is a training center in Nyaleke where the F AC are training the APC, Mai
Mai, Ngiti and Lendu. Some of the fighters are young although there is an agreement that only those who
are 18 or older will be trained. In the training camp in Nyaleke, a F AC commander called Colonel Aguru
is responsible for the training. Currently there are more than fifty Ngiti and Lendu fighters being trained
in the camp. At Mangangu there is a camp just for the Mai M~i as they have different requirements than
do the APC soldiers.
In early February there was an agreement reached between the Ngiti leadership and Colonel Aguru that
Lendu and Ngiti fighters would not have to come to Beni for training but that they could be trained
locally in their own villages. This has made them very happy.28
Mbusa Nyamwisi admitted that his APC troops received support from the F AC but denied any alliance with the
Ngiti and the Lendu. As he said to Human Rights Watch researchers, "The Ngiti and Lendu see us as potential
allies, but I put the brakes on this alliance."29 Lendu leaders of the Front for National Integration (FNI) and Ngiti
leaders of the Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (FRPI), however, assert that such an alliance does exist.30
The training and support to the APC and others produced results. When the MLC attacked the ANC positions in
Mambasa in October, November, and December 2002, Mbusa Nyamwisi's troops together with the Mai Mai used
heavy weapons for the first time and stopped the MLC advance near Teturi and Eregenti. Local sources said
these new weapons had been delivered by the FAC.31
Ready to act through their local proxies, DRC authorities declined to openly confront Uganda. Instead the DRC
government agreed to a gradual withdrawal of Ugandan forces and to a period of joint control over the border
area, insisting on the Ugandan responsibility for helping to restore order in the area. "Uganda controlled this part
of our territory for the last four years, it is therefore duty bound to repair the damage it has caused," argued
Congo's General Commissioner for Peace Kamerhe.32
With no coherent plan for extending its authority in the northeast and little accurate information about local
realities, the DRC government engaged in several ad hoe interventions ranging from the symbolic declaration that
it would pay the salaries of the public sector employees in RCD-ML areas to the organization in Kinshasa of a
promising peace and reconciliation conference to resolve the lturi crisis. Leading the peace initiative was Ntumba
Luaba, the DRC Minister for Human Rights, who traveled to Bunia a number of times to persuade influential
actors to join discussions in Kinshasa.33
28 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003.
29 Human Rights Watch interview with Mbusa Nyamwisi, Beni, February 11, 2002.
30 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003.
31 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003.
32 Reseau Europeen Congo (REC), Bulletin d'Information no. 10 / 2002, October 16, 2002, item 17.
33 Representatives of the government, about 100 delegates of the nine ethnic communities of Ituri, members of MONUC,
civil society, and religious confessions were present at the conference, but there were no representatives of the rebel factions
and ethnic militias.
Human Rights Watch 9 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
DRC Minister of Human Rigi,ts Taken Hostage
In August 2002 peace discussions took on added urgency with the killings in Bunia (see below). Hoping to win
the UPC cooperation that had now become essential to ending the conflict, DRC Minister of Human Rights Luaba
went to Bunia on August 26 with Lubanga, still nominally under house arrest. Shortly before the delegation was
to leave Bunia, Lubanga persuaded the minister to visit Hema injured in the recent fighting. The minister agreed
and learned too late that this was a ruse to take him and others hostage to be held in exchange for Lubanga and for
others still in Kinshasa.
A witness recounted:
Heavily surrounded by the UPC Hema militias, the delegation was taken to the house of local Chief
Kahwa Mandro, where upon arrival they were informed by Chief Kahwa that the entire delegation had
become his hostages. MONUC was quickly informed of the situation and became the intermediary
between Chief Kahwa and the DRC government. The demands were clear: the Kinshasa government was
asked to release nine people34 who had been taken by the Ugandans to Kinshasa in exchange for the
return of the Minister of Human Rights and his delegation.35
Negotiations continued for three days while the hostages were kept in Mandro. On August 27, 2002, former Ituri
governor Adele Lotsove Mugisa arrived in Mandro reportedly declaring that she had been sent by Salim Saleh to
free the hostages.36 Two days later the hostages were permitted to fly back to Kinshasa and the UPC members
held in Kinshasa were also released.
Chief Kahwa told Human Rights Watch researchers:
I took the Minister of Human Rights hostage as I wanted to find a way to free Lubanga. I took them all
and then we negotiated the release of our friends. I planned it myself and it worked very well. Lubanga
and the others were freed. 37
Shortly after the plane departed, the UPC established a government that purported to control Bunia and the rest of
lturi. The participants in the hostage-taking assumed key posts in the new government: Thomas Lubanga became
President; Adele Lotsove Mugisa, criticized for having incited ethnic violence during her tenure as first governor
of Ituri, became Minister of Finance; Bosco Taganda became Assistant Minister of Defense; Chief Kahwa was
named Presidential Advisor; and Rafiki Saba Aimable, Chief of Security Services.
Neither the new UPC government nor Kinshasa investigated the taking of the hostages or pressed charges in
connection with the case. The UPC success in getting their members released showed its strength and the
corresponding weakness of the Kinshasa government, handicapped by the paucity of its local clients and by its
distance from the scene. The incident reportedly intensified the DRC government's determination to counter the
UPC and may have contributed to increased support for Lendu and Ngiti groups via the RCD-ML.38
Involvement of RCD-Goma and the Rwandan Government in Ituri
The UPC depended heavily on Ugandan assistance to win control of Bunia in August 2002, as is described below,
but it apparently simultaneously began cultivating links with the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma and with Rwanda
itself. Towards the end of the year, the UPC finally shifted from reliance on Ugandan support to reliance on the
RCD-Goma. The change was marked by a January 6, 2003 agreement in which the Rwandan-backed movement
agreed to provide military and political support to the UPC.39 The agreement, which committed Rwanda's local
34 These included Bagonsa and Bosco Taganda who would later become key individuals within the UPC administration.
35 Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, February 2003.
36 Ibid.
37 Human Rights Watch interview, ChiefKahwa Mandro, Kampala, February 22, 2003.
38 Human Rights Watch interviews, Beni and Kampala, February 2003.
39 Human Rights Watch interview, Thomas Lubanga, Bunia, February 14, 2003.
Human Rights Watch 10 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
partner to aiding the Hema group, was the clearest and most public indication until that time of Rwandan
involvement in Ituri which, according to local sources, had been growing throughout 2002.40
Rwandan involvement in lturi, whether directly or through RCD-Goma, increased the complexity of the conflict
as well as the risks that it may continue and expand. Rwanda and Uganda, enemies for the last three years, have
accused each other of preparing attacks in eastern DRC. The Ugandan government has charged Rwanda with
supporting anned groups hostile to it, including the Lord's Resistance Anny (LRA) and with training other
dissidents, such as the People's Redemption Army (PRA). The Rwandan government in turn asserted that Uganda
was assisting Rwandan rebels and the Interahamwe militia involved in the 1994 genocide, assistance which they
viewed as a "direct security threat" to Rwanda.41
In addition to continuing their conflict with Uganda, Rwandan authorities may also seek a role in lturi to counter
the deployment of F AC forces and the possible growth of DRC influence in the area; to win a share of the rich
resources of the region; and to support the Hema whom they view as an ethnic group related to the Tutsi and as a
threatened minority.42
Hema Chief Kahwa Mandro was apparently the first local actor to solicit Rwandan assistance. He told Human
Rights Watch researchers that he asked for Rwandan aid in June 2002 and discussed his request with General
James Kabarebe of the Rwandan general staff.43 His group then received arms, ammunition, and training from
Rwanda. Chief Kahwa reportedly assisted in bringing other UPC members into contact with Kigali, although he
himself eventually fell out with the UPC and resumed his allegiance to Uganda, his original backer.44
Numerous witnesses reported that Rwanda helped the UPC with advice and training and the delivery of
ammunition.45 A few even claimed having seen Rwandans fighting alongside UPC forces (see below). Many of
these reports come directly or indirectly from RCD-ML or Ugandan sources and must be treated with reserve.
Others, however, come from local witnesses not apparently attached to anti-Hema or anti-Rwandan groups.
Mbusa Nyamwisi, for example, alleged that Kigali was delivering anns, ammunition, and even Rwandan soldiers
into the airstrips at lrumu, Mongbwalu, and Bunia.46 One of his senior military staff told Human Rights Watch
researchers that in the first week of February 2003 an Antonov 26 landed in Irumu with weapons and people from
Kigali.47 Ugandan soldiers claimed to have flight data, collected by radar, showing planes such as Antonov 26
leaving Kigali and going to air strips in Ituri.48
MONUC passed on similar information to its Kinshasa headquarters, at least some of it obtained from Ugandan
military sources. On September 18, 2002 the MONUC team in Bunia reported to Kinshasa that "on 16 September
2002 at 18: 10, a plane from Rwanda airdropped arms, ammunition and unifonns at Mandro. The UPC are now
seen with new camouflage uniforms and new weapons." On October 7, 2002 MONUC reported that "Ugandan
army Major David Muhoozi states that the RP A 49 are in Bunia and are expected to be in Mandro training camp.
They are small in number and in civilian clothes." A day later again MONUC forces in Bunia told Kinshasa that
"the [Ugandan army] confirms that the RPA soldiers in Bunia are former RPA/Banyamulenge and are instructors
at Mandro. Also [Chief] Kahwa (UPC) has visited Rwanda for support."50
40 Human Rights Watch interviews, Beni and Kampala, February 2003.
41 "Congo, Rwanda Sabre Rattling Tums Into PR War," The East African Standard, Nairobi, March 31, 2003.
42 Human Rights Watch interviews with local analysts, Beni, Bunia and Kampala, February 2003.
43 Human Rights Watch interview, ChiefKahwa Mandro, Kampala, February 22, 2003.
44 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
45 Human Rights Watch interviews with a range of sources in Beni, Bunia, Kampala, February 2003 .
46 Human Rights Watch interview, Mbusa Nyamwisi, Beni, February 11, 2003.
47 Human Rights Watch interview, military commander, Beni, February 2003.
48 Human Rights Watch interview, Ugandan military source, Kampala, February 2003.
49 Then known as the Rwandan Patriot Army (RPA), the Rwandan armed forces are now called the Rwandan Defense
Forces, RDF.
50 Internal MONUC correspondence, September and October 2002.
Human Rights Watch 11 July 2003, Vol. 1 S,No. 11 (A)
A civilian witness unaffiliated with either the RCD-ML or the Ugandans saw Rwandans arrive at an airstrip near
Mahagi in northern Ituri in early 2003. He told Human Rights Watch researchers:
I was at the airstrip with a retired former Ugandan military man who had once trained Rwandans when
they were still in Uganda many years ago. The Rwandans recognized the old man and came over to
salute him as I was standing there. He asked them what they were doing and they said they were there to
train the UPC.51
Another witness in Kigali saw Lubanga and a high level delegation of UPC officials, including Jean Baptist
Dhetchuvi, Richard Lonema, Commander Kisembo, and Rafiki Saba Aimable, arrive in the Rwandan capital on
December 30, 2002. The witness said:
After a meeting in Gbadolite where Lubanga was refused a place in the talks with the MLC, RCD-N and
RCD-ML, the UPC delegation boarded an Antonov 26 and went straight to Kigali. In Kigali, UPC
officials said they met with James Kabarebe and President Kagame. They spent one night in Kigali and
. then the whole delegation returned to Bunia except for the foreign minister Jean Baptiste Dhetchuvi who
stayed behind to organize further details with Kigali and was then going to Goma to write the new
agreement. Before they returned [to Bunia] I saw the plane loaded with about five tons of ammunition
and weapons. 52
UPC Foreign Minister Dhetchuvi, a former biology professor at the National University of Rwanda, apparently
negotiated the Ja.nuary 6, 2003 agreement between RCD-Goma and the UPC in Goma just when the Ugandans
were organising talks with all the armed groups in Arua. A month later President Onasumba of the RCD-Goma
visited Bunia to solidify the new relationship.53
Economic Gain
Ituri is one of the richest areas of Congo with deposits of gold, diamonds, coltan, timber and oil. Foreign
governments, their soldiers, and numerous others unofficially attached to them as well as the DRC government
itself wanted to profit from the many and valuable resources of this area, including cross border trade and customs
revenue. A number of independent reports including those by a United Nations Panel of Experts and by
international non-governmental organizations have documented the link between the conflict in the DRC and the
exploitation of natural resources. In the case of Mongbwalu documented below, witness testimony showed how
quickly the victors in combat moved to exploit local resources-in this case, gold.
Trade statistics show the extent to which Uganda has profited from the riches of the DRC. Gold exports from
Uganda more than doubled after their troops crossed into the DRC, although there was no increase in domestic
production capacities.54 This upsurge coincided with a heavy deployment of Ugandan troops in mining areas in
Ituri such those near Kilo Moto, described as one of the most productive gold mines in Congo. The record of
diamond exports is even clearer. No diamond exports were recorded from Uganda in the decade before their
troops arrived in the DRC. Then from 1997 to 2000, diamond exports jumped from 2,000 to 11,000 carats. In
2001 an estimated $3.8 million worth of diamonds was exported.55
The final report of UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the DRC, published in October 2002, concludes that an elite network of Ugandan soldiers, officials,
and politicians, local rebels, and international businesses plundered the Congo for their own benefit and to finance
51 Human Rights Watch Interview, Paidha, February 2003.
52 Human Rights Watch interview, February 2003.
53 Human Rights Watch interview, Thomas Lubanga, Bunia, February 14, 2003. Also see local press reports in The
Millenaire, February 2003 and U.N. IRIN, February 2003.
54 U.N. Security Council, "Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC," S/2001/1072, November 13, 2001.
SS Ibid.
Human Rights Watch 12 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
the war.56 According to the Panel, this network included Hema businessmen like the Savo family in Ituri.
Museveni's brother Salim Saleh and former Ugandan army Major General James Kazini were identified as
leaders of the network, using the Ugandan army and various rebel militias as their personal enforcement arm for
commercial purposes.57
The Panel stated that the Hema-Lendu conflict stems in part from attempts by the Upndans and powerful Hema
businesspeople and politicians to increase their profits from commercial activities.5 The Hema, it said, fill an
important niche in the operation of the criminal enterprises by transporting primary products from Ituri across the
border to Uganda under the protection of Ugandan troops and bringing back gasoline, cigarettes and arms, all
exempt from taxation. Dissatisfied with their relatively limited share of the business, many of them joined the
UPC under Lubanga in an attempt to secure greater profits. 59
The Porter Commission established by the Ugandan Government on May 23, 2001 to look into the allegations of
Ugandan involvement in illegal exploitation of Congolese resources produced its final report in November 2002,
although it was only recently made public. The report exonerated the Ugandan government and its army of
official involvement in such exploitation.60 The Commission did, however, support the U.N. panel's findings in
relation to senior Ugandan army officers who, said the Commission, had "lied to protect themselves." It said also
that "officers to very senior levels, and men of the Ugandan army have conducted themselves in the DRC in a
manner unbecoming."61 It particularly singled out General Kazini for having "shamed the name of Uganda"62 and
it recommended disciplinary action against him. The Commission strongly recommended further investigation of
diamond smuggling, stating that there was a link between senior Ugandan army members, known diamond
smugglers, and a Ugandan business.63
Rwandan authorities allegedly also hoped to profit from the gold of Ituri. Lubanga's UPC was reportedly ready to
help Rwanda get a share of the gold mined in Mongbwalu but was unable to deliver when it lost power in Bunia.64
The discovery of oil in the Semliki Valley, an area straddling the border between Uganda and Ituri, ensures that
competition over lturi will increase. Heritage Oil, to which the DRC government has conceded exploration rights
in lturi, drilled test bores on the Ugandan side of the border. On March 31, 2003, the company announced it had
struck oil in Uganda and said the area had the potential of being a new world-class oil basin.65 The Ugandan
Director of Heritage Oil planned to start activities on the Congolese side of the border in March 2003 projecting
that it would take 5 years and $15 to $20 million in investment to turn a profit. 66 In addition to its contract with
the DRC government, Heritage Oil maintains close links with Ugandan authorities.67 In 2002 agents of the
company started to make contact with local chiefs in lturi, including several in Burasi as well as Chief Kahwa of
Mandro. 68 Chief Kahwa said "I have been contacted by the Canadian Oil people who came to see me. I told
them they could only start work in Ituri once I had taken Bunia from the UPC."69
56 U.N. Security Council, "Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Fonns of Wealth of the DRC," S/2002/1146, October 16, 2002.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., paragraph I I 8.
59 Ibid., paragraph I 21.
6° Final Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural resources and
Other Fonns of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2001 (May 2001 - November 2002), Kampala, November
2002, p 199.
61 Ibid., p.202 and 207
62 Ibid., p.203.
63 Ibid., p.205.
64 "UPC Rebels Grab Mongbwalu's Gold," African Mining Intelligence No. 53, January 15, 2003.
65 Heritage Oil Press Release, "Heritage Confirms Uganda Oil Potential and Outlines Further Investment Plans", March 3 I,
2003.
66 Ibid., Johnson, "Shifting Sands," p. 24.
67 Ibid., p. 24.
68 Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, February 2003.
69 Human Rights Watch interview, ChiefKahwa Mandro, Kampala, February 22, 2003.
Human Rights Watch 13 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
Kahwa's statement with its implication that oil rights could be traded for the backing needed to win Bunia
suggests the risks if ambitious local actors begin soliciting and receiving support from yet another group of
external actors, powerful international corporations. Local and international observers fear the consequences
should one of the world's most capital-intensive extractive industries enter one of the world's most complex
conflict areas. As UPC Foreign Minister Dhetchuvi claimed, "in Ituri we are in an oil war."70
IV. LOCAL CONTEXT- ARMED POLITICAL GROUPS
Proxies Pursuing Their Own Interests
Ituri is home to eighteen different ethnic groups, with the Hema/Gegere71 and Lendu/Ngiti72 communities together
representing about 40 per cent of the inhabitants. The other major groups are the Bira, the Alur, the Lugbara, the
Nyali, the Ndo-Okebo, and the Lese. With ethnic identity of growing importance, a new group has emerged, the
"non-originaires"73
, that is, 'outsiders' who were not born in Ituri. The Nande of north Kivu represent the most
prominent of the "non-originaires", due to their importance in the business sector. The emergence of Mbusa
Nyamwisi, a Nande, as the leader of the RCD-ML raised the profile of the Nande in lturi. Hema elites seeking to
assert or protect their control of the political and economic spheres in Ituri tend to consider the Nande as direct
competitors.
The Hema, Lendu, and other ethnic groups that serve as proxies for governments and rebel movements also seek
to set agendas that serve their own interests. They are skilled at playing off the various outside rivals and change
sides as their interests dictate. They adapt rapidly to developments on the national scene, working on the basis of
the enemy of my enemy is my friend-at least for the moment.
70 Ibid., Johnson, "Shifting Sands," p.19.
71 The Hema ethnic group is divided in two sub-groups: the Gegere, also known as the Hema from the north, who speak
Kilendu and the Hema, also know as Hema from the south, who speak Kihema. There are increasing divisions between
these two groups. This reports refers to the Hema for both groups and differentiates Gegere only when their views are
different.
72 The Lendu ethnic group is also divided into two sub-groups: Lendu who originate from the northern areas of Ituri and the
Ngiti who come from the south. In general they consider themselves as brothers and have similar political views.
73 In the local language this is expressed as "the Bakuyakuya".
Human Rights Watch 14 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
WJ,o is WJ,o -Armed Political Groups in Ituri (May 2003)
RCD-ML: Congolese Rally for Democracy- Liberation Movement
Current Leader: Mbusa Nyamwisi
Also know as RCD-Kisangani, the RCD-ML was launched in September 1999 in Kampala when Wamba dia
Wamba split from the RCD-Goma. Backed at the start by Uganda, the RCD-ML has been fractured by leadership
struggles and in-fighting. The current leader, Mbusa Nyamwisi took power after ousting Wamba dia Wamba.
The RCD-ML's military wing is the Congolese Popular Army (APC). The RCD-ML entered into the Sun City
agreement of April 2002 and the APC are now being trained and armed by Kinshasa.
MLC: Movement for the Liberation of Congo
Current Leader: Jean-Pierre Bemba
Based in Gbadolite, the MLC has been backed by Uganda since the start of the war in 1998 although there have
been occasional differences between the two. The MLC tried twice to establish a foothold in lturi: in 2001
Bemba had nominal control of the short-lived FPC coalition of Ugandan- backed rebel groups and in 2002 the
MLC attacked Mambasa in western Ituri but were forced backed by the APC of Mbusa Nyamwisi. The MLC has
occasionally fought alongside the UPC and has been a rival of Mbusa's RCD-ML.
RCD-National: Congolese Rally for Democracy - National
Current Leader: Roger Lumbala
Now based in Watcha, northern Ituri, the RCD-N initially operated as a front organization for the Ugandans in
exploiting the diamond riches of the town ofBafwasende. In 2001 and 2002, the RCD-N supported MLC attempts
to win resource-rich areas from the RCD-ML. RCD-N has few soldiers and relies on the MLC army.
UPC: Union of Congolese Patriots (predominately Hema/Gegere party)
Current Leader: Thomas Lubanga
Purportedly launched to promote reconciliation, the UPC quickly became a predominately Gegere-led political
party intent on promoting the interests of the Hema and related Gegere. It came to power in Bunia in August 2002
with the help of the Ugandans and used Hema militia as part of its armed forces. It turned to Rwanda for support
and formed an alliance with the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma after being excluded by the RCD-ML and the MLC
from the Mambasa ceasefire talks in December 2002. Having turned from Uganda politically, the UPC was
ousted from Bunia by the Ugandan army in March 2003 but fought its way back into town in May.
FIPI: Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri (platform of three ethnic-based parties)
Current Leader: A coalition of three leaders of PUSIC, FNI and FPDC
Created in December 2002 with Ugandan support, the three ethnically-based political parties shared the objective
of getting rid of the UPC. Otherwise FIPI has no apparent program. The group includes Hema dissatisfied with
the UPC, Lendu, and Alur, each with its own political party (see below). After the UPC was forced from Bunia,
the parties began squabbling and the coalition appears to have collapsed.
Human Rights Watch 15 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
Who is Who -Armed Political Groups in lturi (May 2003), continued
PUSIC: Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo (Hema dissatisfied with the UPC)
Current Leader: Chief Kahwa Mandro
Former UPC member Chief Kahwa created PUSIC in early February 2003. Most members appear to be Hema
from the south. Uganda supports the party as part of the FIPI coalition. Chief Kahwa was backed briefly by the
Rwandans when he was in the UPC, but claims that PUSIC currently has no such support and is more interested
in working with Kinshasa. PUSIC may have allied with the UPC against the Lendu in Bunia in May 2003; if so,
this alliance of convenience would be tenuous and probably short-lived. PUS IC appears to have continued close
links with Ugandan authorities.
FPDC: Popular Force for Democracy in Congo (Alur and Lugbara political party)
Current Leader: Thomas Unen Chen, a former member of the Zairian parliament
FPDC was created in late 2002 mostly by Alur and Lugbara from the Aru and Mahagi area, north Ituri, to counter
the UPC. Recently it started to recruit and train its own militias. Although professedly interested in dialogue, it is
prepared to fight if dialogue fails. It has been supported by Uganda as part of the FIPI coalition and appears to
have close ties with former Ugandan army Col. Peter Karim, an Alur from Uganda.
FNI: Front for National Integration (Lendu political party)
Current Leader: Floribert Njabu Ngabu
Lendu intellectuals and traditional chiefs established FNI but the party claims broad support by the Lendu
community in its effort to oppose the UPC. Lendu militias are reportedly being organised under the military wing
of this party, which some equate with the FRPI (see below). Supported by Uganda as part of the FIPI coalition, it
joined the Ugandan army in driving the UPC from Bunia on March 6, 2003, for which some its members were
publicly thanked by Brigadier Kayihura in April. FNI has also benefited from military training and support from
the RCD-ML and, through it, from Kinshasa.
FRPI: Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (Ngiti political party)
Current Leader: Dr Adirodo.
Launched in November 2002 the Ngiti party FRPI is said to be closely linked to the Lendu FNI. It is meant to
bring together Ngiti militias with traditional leaders in a single force against the UPC. Based in Beni and said to
number 9,000 combatants, the FRPI has close ties to the RCD-ML from which it receives both military training
and arms. It claims to have a large fighting force and many see it as the army of the FNI. It joined the Ugandans
in driving the UPC from Bunia in March 2003 and together with the FNI briefly controlled Bunia in May 2003 .
FAPC: People's Armed Forces of Congo (mixed)
Current Leader: Commander Jerome Kakawave Bakonde
Commander Jerome, based in Aru and Mahagi, established FAPC in March 2003. Jerome has changed
allegiances several times, moving from the RCD-ML, to the RCD-N, to the UPC and to the Ugandans but he has
more or less stayed in the area of Aru. His group recently obtained support from the Ugandans who attempted to
put Commander Jerome in charge of a mixed security apparatus in Buniajust prior to the start of their withdrawal.
Other parties objected and Commander Jerome returned to his home at Aru.74 A mutiny occurred in his ranks in
May 2003 which was allegedly put down with Ugandan support.75 Jerome is reportedly a Banyarwanda from
North Kivu.
74 Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Bunia, May 2003.
75 Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Kampala, May 2003.
Human Rights Watch · · 16 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
• Denotes national government
D Denotes national rebel movement
D Denotes local lturi armed group
Helps train
and arm
~~~
FNIJFRPI
~e~u~g~t~:
.-:.P..U.S.IC..·:
. ·. (Hema).·.· . . . . . . .
·: ·F·P.DC : ·.
(A.iu.d.Lu.g.b~.r~).
-: ·FAPC.-:
(Cmdt Jerome) . . ....
~
Web of Alliances in Ituri
DRC
(Kinshasa Govt)
Helps train and
arm I RC~N I
EJ
i
~
Fonned, helped train
and armed
\
\
\
\,\ (!)
Possible alliance
' \
\
\
\
\
~
.·.· upc·-·.-,
HN ~ 1,~m:a1~~~~e> .
but relationship broken
Helps arm&
support
• Official Political &
Military alliance
RCD-G
* FIPI Platform collapsed in May 2003
Please note that alliances change frequently.
This is accurate as of May 2003.
The actions of the Hema Chief Kahwa Mandro illustrate the readiness of local actors to change allegiances.
Initially supported by Uganda, Chief Kahwa and some other Hema noticed a decline in this backing and decided
that the Ugandan Army was not doing enough to protect them against the Lendu. Chief Kahwa Mandro explained
to Human Rights Watch researchers: ·
In August 2000, I was fighting the Lendu in Ituri. But I was accused of being with the Rwandans and the
Ugandan rebels, the ADF, so the Ugandans also started to fight with me. I decided I should go and talk to
President Museveni which I did in August. He decided that my cause was noble. Our group came for
training to Uganda on August 28, 2000. I was in Uganda for 6 months at Kyakwanzi training camp
where 705 ofus were trained.
After Sun City the Lendu started to be armed by Mbusa [RCD-ML] and so we decided we had to get rid
of him. Then Lubanga was arrested by the Ugandans. We didn't understand this. I stayed in Bunia while
Governor Molondo planned a genocide against us. 76 I started training about 3,000 fighters in Mandro with
the financial help of the Hema community. We collected guns from small attacks. We had been
negotiating with Uganda for three years and they had been responsible for so many deaths. No one was
aware of our problem. In June 2002 I decided to go to Rwanda to find help for our defense. They had
lived through a genocide so they knew what it was like. They understood me and provided us with
weapons and logistics. I discussed the situation with James Kabarebe.
Initially this support was good and I thought Rwanda understood my situation, but they profited from it to
create another situation. They wanted Ituri to be their rear base to attack Uganda. They continue to send
arms including missiles and ammunition for tanks when we don't even have tanks. They are even
sending troops. They are recruiting young soldiers and putting fear into them. They come in with small
planes to airstrips like Mongbwalu, Aru, Boga and Buie. I know they do this as I used to go myself on
small planes from Kigali to Ituri.77
After becoming disillusioned with Rwandan support and the policy direction of Lubanga's UPC, Chief Kahwa
felt threatened. He separated from Lubanga's group and re-established links with the Ugandans. He continued:
I was on the list of people to be eliminated by the UPC. When Museveni found out about this, he sent a
plane to come and get me. He encouraged me to talk to the Lendu in Kpandruma so we could stop
fighting. I started a political party, PUSIC, and then became part of the FIPI coalition which wants peace
in lturi and includes Lendu plus others. I talked to President Kabila in Dar es Salaam where I told him he
must stop supporting the Lendu. They were killing us. He understood.
I am going to attack Bunia again and will take it, even if I die. The Ugandan army is informed of our
plans but I don't count on them for help. 78
Assistance from external actors may prompt dissidents in a group to hive off and form their own organization, as
Chief Kahwa did. However, external actors can also promote coalitions, including those across ethnic lines, like
the FIPI group which included Hema, Lendu, and Alur political groups.
The increase in the number of combatant groups in and around Bunia has been matched by increased flow of arms
to Ituri as outside actors attempt to ensure victory for their local allies. This greater availability of arms
contributed to more casualties in Ituri including civilians.79 In addition to being better armed than in the past,
76 See below for conflict between Governor Molondo and Hema.
77 Human Rights Watch interview, ChiefKahwa Mandro, Kampala, February 22, 2003
78 Ibid.
79Different estimates exist of the number of people killed in lturi, none of which is based on a systematic survey. The UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) cited 50,000 dead in its Integrated Regional Infonnation
Network report on Ituri, December 2002.
Human Rights Watch 17 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
Hema, Lendu, and Ngiti militia groups also appear to be better organized and trained and to function with a more
structured military hierarchy.
The Hema - Lendu Conflict
The Hema are pastoralists and the Lendu agriculturalists, but historically there was a high degree of co-existence
between the two groups and intermarriage was common. Belgian colonial rule accentuated ethnic divisions
between the two communities, however, by trying to reorganize traditional chieftaincies into more homogeneous
groups and by favoring the Hema over the Lendu. Even after independence in 1960, the Hema continued as the
administrative, landowning, and business elite. When the territory of Kibali-Ituri was created in 1962, for
example, no Lendu obtained key positions in the administration. President Sese Sokoto Mobutu confirmed the
Hema in management positions in the farming, mining, and local administrative sectors as part of his
"Zairiaisation" policy. Hema and Lendu fought small battles over land and fishing rights on several occasions
after independence, but in general customary arbitration, backed by the state, contained the incidents.80
At no point in the documented history of Ituri has the violence attained the levels seen since 1999. The broader
war in Congo has undoubtedly sparked the greater violence of the current conflict.
This conflict began in June 1999 when a small number of Hema allegedly attempted to bribe local authorities into
modifying land ownership registers in their favor in the area of Walendu Pitsu, part of the Djugu district oflturi.
They reportedly used the false papers to evict Lendu inhabitants from the land, or so some local Lendu believed.
These Lendu decided to retaliate. In the absence of a strong local authority, the incident quickly turned into a
confrontation between the two communities.
Ugandan interference aggravated the situation. Brig. Gen. James Kazini, then in charge of the Ugandan army in
DRC, named Adele Lotsove Mugisa, a Hema, Provisional Governor of the districts of Ituri and Haut Uele81
,
formerly part of Orientale Province.82 Although the proposal to create such a unit had been backed by some
politicians in the area, it was the decree of the Ugandan general that altered administrative boundaries, effectively
creating a new "province." In his Jetter setting up the new post of governor, General Kazini gave full assurances
of Ugandan support for the endeavor.83 This important decision, coinciding with the local land dispute, created the
impression that the Ugandan army was siding with the Hema landholders. ·
By 2003 the original dispute had expanded in numbers of people and area touched by the violence. Groups like
the Nande, Bira, and Alur previously not associated with either of the contenders have now been forced to choose
sides.
Rumor, Propaganda and Prejudice
As conflict between the Hema and Lendu spread and became more bitter, each group turned to propaganda and
myths to justify its cause. Hema and Lendu intellectuals alike distorted history for political gain, fabricating new
narratives that supported their point of view.84 One Hema spokesperson told Human Rights Watch researchers,
"We know there is a genocide against the Hema, but we have been ignored for a long time." Other Hema evoked
a connection with the Tutsi in Rwanda and claimed that the Lendu together with Interahamwe and Ugandan
rebels, the ADF, were perpetrating a genocide like that of 1994 in Rwanda. 85 These Hema expanded the term
"negative forces" to include the Lendu.86 The term had previously being used to describe the Interahamwe and
80 Tensions were high in 1962, 1965, 1975, 1983, 1984, 1997.
81 Governor Lotsove eventually let the Haute Uele district go its own way after it rebelled against her leadership; she retained
control over Kibali-Ituri, commonly known as Ituri.
82Ugandan High Command, Brig. Gen. James Kazini to Madame Lotsove, June 18, 1999, reference OPN/SH/C/6A.
83 Ibid.
84See Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century; Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
85 Human Rights Watch interview with Hema leaders including Dr Dhejju Maruka, Professor Karimagi Pilo, Mr Philemon,
and Mr Kiza, Bunia, February 13, 2003.
86 Jean Baptiste Dhetchuvi, open letter, Ituri - What Future?, September 1, 2002.
Human Rights Watch 18 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
ADF. Official Hema statements declared that these "negative forces" were hostile to peace and must be
eliminated.87 At times some Hema described the Lendu as "terrorists".
Some Lendu and Ngiti allied with them sought to whip up anger against Rwanda, Uganda, and their local allies.
The Ngiti armed group FRPI published a pamphlet charging that Presidents Kagame and Museveni sought to
establish a Hima88-Tutsi empire. They claimed that the Hema, backed by Uganda and Rwanda, would carry out
"ethnic purification" and eliminate the Lendu peoples (including the Ngiti) in Ituri. They urged "fierce
resistance" against external aggressors and those groups complicit with them. 89
In November 2002, a Lendu group, the LORI Cultural Association stressed the historical grievances of their
people and called on "all Lendu to resist aggression and all forms of domination that have been a part of Lendu
history."90 In a January 2002 communique, Lendu Chief Longbe Tschabi Linga complained about the
marginalization and subordination of his community. He went on to "denounce the alliance of death between the
UPC and RCD-Goma" that have resulted in the "Hema proudly singing about the extermination of the Lendu."91
V. MASSACRES AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
The Attack on Bunia
In early August 2002, the UPC combatants, then in control of part of Bunia, worked together with the Ugandan
army to dislodge the RCD-ML forces and take control of the town and some of its outlying areas. In the process,
they committed the abuses detailed below. The taking of Bunia was the prelude to the establishment of the UPC
government later the same month.92
The early August violence in Bunia demonstrates three essential aspects of the conflict in Ituri. First, all parties
commit abuses. In this case it was more or less simultaneously with both Hema and Lendu armed groups killing
civilians of the opposing ethnicity, often in their homes. In other cases the killing has taken place in succession
purportedly as retaliation for attacks. Second, the support of external actors is important. In most cases such
support remains in the background, but in this case, the aid of the Ugandan army clearly assured the UPC victory.
Third, as in all other cases, civilians bore and continue to bear the brunt of the casualties.
The build-up to the August violence began in June and July as Hema militia grew more and more hostile to
Governor Molondo as he integrated Lendu and Ngiti militia into the APC. Lodged at Lubanga's house and
protected by soldiers of the Ugandan army, they sought control of increasingly large parts of Bunia town. They
skirmished with APC combatants on July 10 at a bar called TVS and on July 25 at Camp Ndoromo, where the
APC were training an estimated 1,200 Lendu and Ngiti combatants. On August 6 Hema combatants reportedly
backed by Ugandan soldiers launched a major attack at Ndoromo and were repulsed only after fourteen hours of
fighting, supposedly with the loss of two Ugandan soldiers. According to local sources, the UPC used antipersonnel
mines, one of which wounded an APC soldier. Families of Lendu and Ngiti combatants fled to the
governor's residence in Bunia seeking protection.93
On August 7 and 8 UPC militia tried to occupy some neighborhoods of Bunia and in the process deliberately
killed Lendu civilians and others, such as Nande and Bira, seen as Lendu allies. Lendu militia targeted and killed
dozens of Hema civilians in the Mudzi Pela neighborhood and in other predominantly Hema neighborhoods like
87 Ibid.
88 Hima are an ethnic group in Uganda often said to be related to Tutsi of Rwanda; Museveni is said to have had a Hima
among his ancestors.
89 Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (FRPI), Manifesto of Resistance, January 2003.
90 LORI Cultural Association, Declaration of the Lendu Community, November 16, 2002.
91 ChiefLongbe Tchabi Linga and the Editorial Committee, SOS of the Lendu Community in Kpandruma, January 22, 2003.
92 Human Rights Watch interviews, Bunia, February 2003.
93Human Rights Watch interviews, Bunia, Beni, and Kampala, February 2003; Human Rights Watch, "Chaos in Eastern
Congo: UN Action Needed Now, A Briefing Paper, October 2002.
Human Rights Watch 19 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
Saio, Rwambuzi, and Simbiliabo. Both sides burned houses, displacing large numbers of civilians.94 A witness
said:
On August 7 the young Hema militias chased the Bira and the Lendu in Bunia. They knew which houses
to go to and whom to target. There were about 200 of them, a mix of those in uniform and in civilian
dress. They killed a lot of people that day - about thirty-seven - though I think there were more. A few
days later, on August 9, they were buried by the Red Cross and the chief of the area. They included men,
women and children. The killing went on from 7:00 a.m. till about 1 :00 p.m.95
Outside of town, at Lengabo, Lendu and Ngiti militia deliberately killed thirty-two Hema civilians who had
sought refuge at the farm of Tibasima Ateenye, a Hema leader once linked with the RCD-ML but at this time
resident in Kinshasa. A witness reported:
Thirty-two Hema people died there [at Tibasima's farm]. I counted them. About seven died from bullets
while the rest had died from machete wounds. This attack really increased the tensions. Some of the
injured came to Bunia. They had even cut off the legs of one
child and the arm of another.96
The militia reportedly killed two Ugandan soldiers who had been protecting the Hema at the farm and drove the
others away. It is unclear whether these Ugandan soldiers sought to protect Hema from a sense of duty-in
contrast to their fellows who did nothing or joined in killing Hema-or whether they had been privately hired to
protect Tibasima's farm, an arrangement that Ugandan soldiers sometimes made for their own profit.97
On August 8, 2002 the Governor met with Ugandan army commanders to appeal for restraint in the town. He said
that the Ugandan army was there to provide security, not to take sides. According to a witness at the meeting, one
of the Ugandan army commanders threatened Governor Molondo, saying that he had been ordered by the highest
military level in Kampala to neutralize him.98 At 8:00 p.m. that evening the Ugandan army attacked the
governor's residence. The attack lasted for only ten minutes but was enough to cause further panic in the town.
The Lendu, fearing for their lives, ran to the governor's residence for protection as killings continued in Mudzi
Pela and other areas of Bunia.
On August 9, 2002 at 2:00 p.m. the Ugandan army, followed by the UPC, again attacked the governor's residence
and the surrounding neighborhood, known as the sous-region, using heavy weapons including tanks. After a short
battle, Governor Molondo and APC troops fled on foot towards Beni. After they left, UPC combatants continued
killing Lendu, Nande, and Bira civilians near the main hospital in the Bigo neighborhood and near the central
prison. A witness reported:
On August 11 I was finally able to go to the governor's residence. I saw the Ugandan army and the Hema
looting the houses. In the house of a military commander called Pichu there were five bodies of women
including the wife of Pichu and four others. All had been shot and his wife had a bullet in the head. At
the next house I found another three bodies - one woman and two children. There were still people
seeking refuge there. Further along I found the body of a small child. That really shocked me. At the
vice-governor's house I saw seventeen bodies, including women and children. After seeing all this I
returned to where I was staying. I was scared.99
Several mass graves have been discovered, including two near the governor's residence and others near the prison
and the hospital. According to MONUC, 110 people died in the violence in and around Bunia, but local sources
94 Ibid.
95 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
96 Ibid.
97 Human Rights Watch, "Chaos in Eastern Congo."
98 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003. See also Human Rights Watch, "Chaos in Eastern Congo."
99 Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch 20 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
estimated the dead as at least 150. The victims included both Hema and Lendu civilians many of whom had been
targeted only on the basis of their ethnicity. Several mass graves were subsequently discovered including one
with twenty-six bodies of mostly women and children, many with bullet wounds in their backs. 100 Some witness
said that victims were also thrown in the Chari River. 101
The Ugandan army backed the UPC attack that deliberately killed large numbers of civilians. In addition, they
failed in most cases to protect civilians who were being targeted for killing in and around the town, despite having
large numbers of troops available less than a mile away. Ugandan soldiers also joined UPC and others in looting
homes and shops. Major David Muhoozi and Captain Eddy Muwonge of the Ugandan army disclaim
responsibility for these abuses, saying this was "a Congolese matter". 102
Massacres and other Abuses by the UPC
TJ,e UPC Government and tl,e Growtl, of Extremism
The UPC was the first ethnically- based political party established in lturi. Its formation of a government under
Thomas Lubanga in August 2002 sparked the creation of several other ethnically- based movements seeking to
counter its growth. (See box above.) Initially the UPC claimed to be a national and representative movement,
created by Iturians, for peace and reconciliation in the area. It was reportedly financed by key Hema businessmen
in the region who supposedly had a controlling hand in many political decisions. 103
From August 2002 to March 2003, the UPC controlled Bunia and the immediate surrounding area, including most
parts of the Djugu territory just to the north. Although it claimed to control all of the former district oflturi, it did
not control Mambasa to the west and the area of Kpandruma and Rethy to the north where the Lendu had their
base. It exercised only sporadic control over the Alur and Lugbara areas near the Ugandan border. During this
period, the former Governor of lturi, Jean-Pierre Lompondo Molondo appointed by Mbusa Nyamwisi of the
RCD-ML, claimed to still govern the western parts of Ituri that were under the military control of the APC.
On paper the UPC government appeared representative with a number of ministers from other ethnic groups, but
in practice it was controlled by the Gegere - the northern branch of the Hema ethnic group. Some representatives
of other ethnic groups joined the movement and the government under duress. One such minister said,
I decided to enter the UPC for security reasons and not because I wanted to. I was desperate to protect
my family. A lot of people were disappearing and I felt I had no choice. Everyday I go to work and to
the movement meetings, but my heart is not in it. There are many others in a similar position."104
Other persons unwilling to join the UPC or its government fled or went into hiding when they heard they had
been nominated to government posts. 105
At about the time the UPC established its government, a group composed mostly of Gegere attempted to set a
more clearly anti-Lendu policy for the party. The group reportedly included Adele Lotsove Mugisa, Jean Baptiste
Dhetchuvi, and Richard Lonema, an influential local Hema spokesperson. According to Hema now estranged
from the UPC, this group together with Lubanga-whom they may have led rather than followed--advocated
eliminating the Lendu and Ngiti in order to end ethnic conflict once and for all. They reportedly proposed killing
key Lendu and Ngiti leaders, especially intellectuals, and cutting economic links to Lendu communities. 106
100 Human Rights Watch interviews, Bunia, February 2003.
101 Human Rights Watch interviews, Bunia, February 2003.
102 Human Rights Watch Interview, Major David Muhoozi and Captain Eddy Muwonge, Bunia February 2003.
103 Human Rights Watch interviews, Bunia and Kampala, February 2003. See also U.N. Security Council, "Final Report of
the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC," S/2002/1 146,
October 16, 2002, paragraph 121.
104 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
105 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003.
106 Human Rights Watch interviews, Kampala and Bunia, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch · 21 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
A Hema now opposed to the UPC said, "Meetings of the movement became divisive as a core group including
Lotsove, Lubanga and Dhetchuvi held meetings apart in Kilendu, a language not spoken by Hema from the south.
It was clear to us they had a different vision."107 Some UPC members claimed they opposed the new direction.
One such person explained, "When we came to power the logic of the movement changed to eliminating the
Lendu and the Ngiti. I was against this and told the leadership this."108 After protesting, the dissident believed
the leaders planned to kill him and he fled for his life.
Against this backdrop of growing extremism, the UPC pressed for autonomy for Ituri. In public statements they
asked, "Why should non-Iturians be managing our territory?"109 and they argued that if the national government
took control of the area it would loot Ituri, as had others. Some UPC leaders talked in terms of the new division
of people into "originaires" and "non-originaires".110 While it was never completely clear who were
"originaires", many people understood them to be Hema and Gegere. People of other groups feared and resented
this UPC claim to being the original inhabitants of the area.
Attack at Mabanga
As UPC leaders began defining anyone not on their side as "the enemy", Hema and Gegere armed groups
attacked other groups that had previously seen themselves as neutral in the conflict. In Mabanga, a gold mining
town inhabited by several ethnic groups, for example, Gegere militias turned on the "non-originaires" on August
28, 2002. An attack by Lendu militia had just been repulsed and the local Gegere combatants forced the "nonoriginaires"
to join them in chasing the retreating Lendu fighters. After driving the assailants to a safe distance,
the Gegere combatants turned on the "non-originaires." A witness recounted:
When we returned from the fighting, the Gegere said that all those who spoke Swahili and were nonoriginaires
should leave straight away. Then I saw a group of Gegere who had come from Iga Barriere.
They were in civilian clothes, running together and were well armed with spears, machetes, chains, and
guns. They were chanting, "Non-originaires slaughtered, Bira killed." Within minutes of their arrival
they started to kill people. If they saw you and you were light skinned they would kill you shouting
"jajabo"111
• They were slashing people with their machetes on their arms and their heads. I saw them kill
people. They killed Mr. Totosca and also Ramon Faraho - two people that I knew. The hacked them to
death with their machetes and then burned them. 112
Massacre at Songolo
The UPC moved south after establishing its hold over Bunia and surrounding areas. The Ngiti, a people related to
the Lendu, who lived in this area felt increasingly under pressure as the UPC took market towns and key roads.
Those living near Nyakunde were particularly concerned because they had a history of land disputes with the
locally important Bira. During the August violence in Bunia, the Hema had attacked the Bira, lumping them
together with the Lendu. But in this area, perhaps because of the competition over land, the Bira were more often
allied with the Hema and wanted to drive away the Lendu, seeing their presence as a potential reason for
attracting war to their region. 113 In August 2002 UPC troops replaced a small Ugandan force that had withdrawn
107 Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, February 2003.
108 Ibid.
109 Jean Baptiste Dhetchuvi, open letter, lturi - What Future?, September 1, 2002.
110 "Originaires" and "non-originaires", meaning indigenous and non-indigenous. The French term is used throughout as it is
has a specific relevance in Ituri. The ethnic groups who are "originaires" tend to include Hema, Bira, Lendu, Ndo Okebo, and
Alur although this is contested. In practice since the Lendu are considered the "enemy", the concept "originaires" for the
Hema excludes them.
111 Local tenn for Lingala speakers not from the Ituri region.
112 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
113 This was done by the Bira Chief of Andisomma. It was likely also linked with historical tensions between the Bira and
the Ngiti over land. Much of this history has not been forgotten by either group and is often cited as further justification for
killings by both sides. Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch 22 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
from Nyakunde the week before. Several Ngiti civilians were killed in late August, for which many Ngiti held the
Hema combatants responsible.
Colonel Khandro and others from a group of Ngiti combatants reportedly met with Ngiti community leaders at
Songolo, a town some ten miles from Nyakunde to discuss possible military action against the Hema. The
community leaders appealed for restraint and got the combatants' agreement not to attack Nyakunde and to
launch military operations only in self-defense.
In the early hours of August 31, 2002, the UPC together with B ira attacked Songolo. A witness recounted:
The UPC and Bira attacked in three groups, about 500 of them, coming from three different directions.
They had military uniforms. Most of them were UPC. Commander Bagonza ordered the troops to attack
Songolo. He was there himself; I saw him. They were together with Bira in civilian clothes who had
machetes and spears. In the center of Songolo there was a clash between Ngiti fighters and the UPC and
Bira. They used mortars and rockets. We saw this from where we were, at the bottom of the hill. Nine
Ngiti combatants were killed and more than twenty Hema/UPC.
Then the Bira combatants guided the UPC to the houses. They killed people, most with bullets, others
with machetes and spears. I saw mostly old people killed. Some were attacked in their sleep, including
children and women. The Bira combatants also decapitated some people with machetes. There were 140
dead, including many women and children. We asked people to come out of the bush to bury the dead.
We took turns doing the burial. 114
The attack lasted about nine hours. Witnesses "felt surrounded" as the attackers entered the town, cutting off
escape routes, including the small footpaths. One said:
I hid in the mountains and went back down to Songolo at about 3 :00 p.m. I saw many people killed and
even saw traces of blood where people had been dragged. I counted 82 bodies most of whom had been
killed by bullets. We did a survey and found that 787 people were missing - we presumed they were all
dead though we don't know. Some of the bodies were in the road, others in the forest. Three people were
even killed by mines. Those who attacked knew the town and posted themselves on the footpaths to kill
people as they were fleeing. 115
Ngiti community leaders sought help by infonning MONUC in Bunia and submitting a report about the events.
MONUC did report back to its Kinshasa headquarters on September 3, 2002 that UPC soldiers were seen looting
in Songolo,116 but otherwise there was no action taken. Ngiti combatants accused the community leaders of
letting their people down "as the reports meant nothing."117 They began planning a reprisal attack against the
Hema which was carried out on September 5, 2002 in Nyakunde (see below).
Massacre at Mongbwa/u
Mongbwalu, an important gold mmmg town northwest of Bunia at the heart of the Ashanti Goldfields'
concession, changed hands frequently in a series of attacks and counter-attacks during this conflict. In mid-June
2002, while the RCD-ML were still in control of Ituri, their forces and Lendu militia attacked Hema civilians in
the town while Hema militia targeted Lendu civilians in outlying areas. For greater security people moved to
areas inhabited by others of their ethnic group, a move facilitated apparently by local chiefs. Many Hema civilians
left Mongbwalu through "safe corridors" to other areas. Those who decided to stay faced abuses by the Lendu,
including the summary execution of women and children accused of being witches (see below).
114 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
115 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003.
116 Internal MONUC correspondence, September and October 2002.
117 Ibid.
Human Rights Watch 23 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
When the UPC took power in Bunia in August, they were keen to take Mongbwalu to have access to its gold
mines. In October they attacked the town but were pushed back by the Lendu combatants and APC soldiers. The
UPC regrouped and in late November 2002 attacked again, this time joined by some of Bemba's MLC soldiers,
some Ugandans, and perhaps some Rwandans.
Bemba's MLC forces had been in the area for several weeks along with troops of Lumbala's RCD-N troops. They
were trying to push east into parts of lturi controlled by their rival Mbusa Nyamwisi's RCD-ML (see below).
Their campaign was known as "effacer le tableau" (Operation Erase the Blackboard) so witnesses referred to
Bemba's soldiers as the "Effaceurs." Numerous witnesses also said that Ugandans helped the UPC. One said,
"The Hema and the Ugandans were always together."118 Another witness explained their tactics, saying the
Ugandans led and the Hema were behind during the attack. 119
In their second attack, the UPC used heavy weapons, including mortars and other explosive devices, probably
made available to them through one or the other of their outside backers. They began their attack at a village
called Pluto on the outskirts of Mongbwalu. A witness recounted:
The Hema of the UPC, Ugandans and the "Effacer le Tableau" [MLC] came at 11 :00 on Friday. They all
worked together and attacked Pluto just outside Mongbwalu. They entered directly with their guns to
shoot at the population. I was at home in Pluto and I heard cries and mortars falling and I knew the war
had started. I fled from Pluto and ran to Mongbwalu. I saw that it was soldiers attacking us as they had
camouflage uniforms and some had black berets. They all had guns and they were everywhere.
As I was running I saw people being hit by bullets. Women and children were falling. Some people did
not run and hid in their houses in Pluto. I heard afterwards that these people were all slaughtered. The
assailants continued to kill people for five days in Pluto. People who escaped from Pluto told me this,
although not many managed to find their way out.
They then attacked Mongbwalu as well and I was forced to flee again to Saio, about three miles from
Mongbwalu. The attackers were looking for Lendu, Ngiti, and Nande people. The Hema combatants
knew us so they could easily find who we were. Other people were killed as well though. Not much later
they also came to attack us in Saio. I had to flee again. They killed many people. 120
Another witness told what happened in Mongbwalu itself:
The Hema and the "Effaceurs" [MLC] came into town and started killing people. We hid in our house. I
opened the window and saw what happened from there. A group of more than ten with spears, guns and
machetes killed two men in Cite Suni, in the center of Mongbwalu. I saw them pull the two men from
their house and kill them. They took Kasore, a Lendu man in his thirties, from his family and attacked
him with knives and hammers. They killed him and his son (aged about 20) with knives. They cut his
son's throat and tore open his chest. They cut the tendons on his heels, smashed his head and took out his
intestines. The father was slaughtered and burnt.
We fled to Saia. On the way, we saw other bodies. They were shooting anyone, just shooting.
Anyone caught by the bullets died. Most of the people were killed by bullets. There were also many
people killed at the airport, with machetes and guns. There were even more bodies there, more than
thirty. 121
A gold digger who worked in Mongbwalu said:
118 Human Rights Watch interview, Erengeti, February 2003.
119 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
Human Rights Watch 24 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
There were two groups of Hema militia: one with firearms, the other with machetes, spears, and mukuki
(a sharp knife attached to a piece of wood which is thrown). The second group was killing civilians who
hadn't fled. The victims were Lendu and Jajabo. The Hema militia didn't have any pity for people.
They slashed them with machetes and killed them. 122
Many civilians fled with the Lendu combatants to Saio, a few kilometers away. When the UPC, MLC, and
Ugandan assailants followed them there after taking Mongbwalu, some civilians ran into the forests while others
tried to hide in Saio, including at a church called "Mungu Samaki." When UPC combatants found the people in
the church, they slaughtered them. 123
The UPC combatants captured other civilians and imprisoned them at a military camp, where they later killed
them. A man who was imprisoned there told Human Rights Watch researchers:
I was taken to the prison and could see out the window of my cell. The Hema militia were killing people
from particular groups. They were especially looking for Lendu. They would pick out prisoners to kill.
They took them one by one to question them, then they released them or killed them. They shot people in
front of other prisoners. They tied their arms behind their backs with wires. They slashed their heads
with knives. They made them sit down and then they shot them. They also shot any who tried to escape.
Sometimes they took people outside and they never came back. They killed about twenty people,
including some boys I knew from my neighborhood. I even saw them kill two Pygmies - a man and a
woman. Another woman came to the prison to look for her son. They asked her why she had come there
and then they killed her. They beat us with whips and ropes. They questioned me too. They asked me
where the Lendu and the APC had fled to. I didn't say anything. I managed to escape the following day.
I saw more than ten bodies outside the prison. The Hema militia were everywhere in Mongbwalu and I
hid so they wouldn't see me. I saw holes, like graves on the edge of town. They were freshly dug and
covered with earth. I presumed there were people inside. 124
Based on witness statements, local human rights organizations estimate that at least 200 people were killed in and
around Mongbwalu, but the death toll could be much higher. The victims include Freddy Bosama, Lokana
Kpakani, and two teachers called Budhe and Lossa.125 A witness related:
Six days later I returned as I ·knew some Hema and I wanted to collect my things. There were only
combatants in Mongbwalu and they had looted everywhere. I saw that many Hema had returned to move
into Lendu houses. I counted five bodies of civilians including women and children. I had come into
Mongbwalu from the forest with another girl who was on her way to Saio. I saw her again later and she
told me that there were many bodies along the side of the road. Many houses had also been burnt. The
soldiers took many young men that day to bury the bodies of the people they had killed. 126
Abbe Boniface Bwanalonga, the Ngiti priest of Mongbwalu parish, disappeared during the November attack.
There are reports that the UPC combatants detained him along with two nuns. The nuns were released and later
returned to bring food to the abbe, but the UPC combatants refused them permission to see him and told them to
go away and not come back again. Abbe Bwanalonga has not been seen since. 127
The co-operation between Bemba's MLC and Lubanga's UPC was new. The UPC may have been exploring the
possibility of a real alliance with the MLC while it seems that the MLC was interested in getting access to
Mongbwalu's gold. A witness who returned to Mongbwalu after the attacks said:
122 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003.
123 Justice Plus interviews, Ituri, March 2003.
124 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003.
125 Justice Plus interviews, Ituri, March 2003.
126 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003.
127 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch 25 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
At that time it was clear the UPC were in charge. Commander Bosco had been at the head of the attack
but he didn't stay long after it was over. The troops of the MLC were led by the UPC. They all spoke
Lingala. I spoke to a person I knew from this group. He told me that the UPC from Aru had asked them
to come and attack Mongbwalu. They had been promised gold if they helped. As soon as they had
captured Mongbwalu they set up a system of collecting taxes and gold from people who were mining. 128
Soon after the attack, the UPC attempted to start up the gold operations. This required labor and the most
experienced diggers were Lendu and "non-originaires". The UPC sent out messengers to encourage the
population to return. According to a witness, " The UPC commander said in a meeting that the UPC was for
everyone. He asked the population to return, especially the Lendu, but they refused." 129 When a few people
returned, the UPC tried to use them to persuade others to come also. A witness said:
Gbala also came back and the Hema asked him to go into the forest and call for the others to return. He
did go into the forest and told the people the truth, that their homes had been looted. Some people
refused to return but others did. When Gbala returned on 16 December 2002 he was arrested and accused
of being against the UPC as he had denounced the looting. He was taken to prison and then killed. 130
Because most Lendu refused to return, UPC troops forced others to begin mining. A witness said:
Many people fled but those who stayed in Mongbwalu were made to work for the Hema militia digging
gold. There were three shifts: those who worked in the morning, those who worked in the afternoon, and
those who worked at night. They were not paid. It was hard labor. They had to dig under big stones
without machines. They had only hand tools like pick-axes. They were given bananas and beans to eat
and they were beaten. Some tried to run away by pretending to go to the toilet. The Hema militia were
keeping watch over the workers. As the Lendu had fled, all the other groups were made to dig. I saw
them working there on the first day. The Ugandans were also there to ensure security. If they hadn't
been there, it would have been terrible. The quarry belonged to Mr. Baou. Before, everyone used to dig
gold, but the Lendu were considered the experts. 131
In this case Ugandan soldiers present to protect the gold mining operations apparently also limited militia abuses
of persons forced to work there.
Local witnesses report that some Rwandans were present during the Mongbwalu attack, claiming they recognized
them by their language, their accents, and their appearance. According to one person, Lendu combatants captured
several Rwandans along with Ugandans in the fighting. He said, "They found their ID cards which showed they
were Ugandan and Rwandans. I saw them bringing Rwandans into Saio. The Lendu called out to us to come and
see the Rwandans they had captured."132
With the tension between Uganda and Rwanda, it is unlikely that regular soldiers of their armies would have
cooperated in military operations, but it is possible that dissidents or rebels from one force could have joined with
regular forces from the other. Such was the report in one journal that specializes in mining affairs. The
Rwandans, reportedly already supplying training and arms to the UPC, would have been prompted in part by a
desire to exploit local resources in gold. Lubanga reportedly promised to ship the gold out through Kigali rather
than through Kampala. 133
128 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003.
132 Human Rights Watch interview, Erengeti, February 2003 .
133 "UPC Rebels Grab Mongbwalu's Gold", African Mining Intelligence No. 53, January 15, 2003.
Human Rights Watch 26 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. l l (A)
Establishing the identity of all the perpetrators of abuses at Mongbwalu will require further investigation. What is
already known is that civilians suffered enormously from their exactions.
In addition to the cases documented above, Human Rights Watch researchers collected infonnation on deliberate
killings of civilians by UPC combatants at Bolombo in late August or early September 2002 and at Zungulouka in
October 2002.
UPC Abuses of Lendu and Others Seen as Political Opponents
Soon after taking power in Bunia and with extremists in powerful positions, Lubanga's UPC launched a campaign
of arbitrary arrests, executions and enforced disappearances. Witnesses described it as a "man hunt" for Lendu,
Ngiti, "non-originaires," and others opposed to extremist UPC policies. Many fled and others went into hiding.
Wherever the UPC took control, it initiated a campaign against the "enemy," including in Bunia, Mahagi, and
Aru. The campaign was systematic and often involved torture and apparently was authorized at the most senior
levels of the UPC leadership.
Commanders Bagonza, Kisembo Bahemuka (UPC Chief of Staff), and Rafiki Saba Aimable (UPC Chief of
Security Services) reportedly directed the campaign. Two prison areas in Bunia became notorious as places of
execution and torture. These included Bureau Deux134
, an old warehouse on one of the main streets in Bunia and
the house of Commander Bagonza himself just off the main street in the center of town. Human Rights Watch
researchers collected infonnation about more than 100 people victimized by this campaign, including the cases
described below.
On September 28, 2002, Adriko Johnson, the thirty-year-old assistant mayor of Bunia and a leading member of
the UPC, disappeared after a party meeting. A number of Lendu testified that Mr. Johnson had given them refuge
at his house when UPC troops were searching for Lendu in August. 135 Other witnesses testified that Johnson had
wanted to end the targeting of the Lendu and Ngiti, arguing that the movement could not be a based on one ethnic
group. According to reports, he was taken to the house of Commander Kisembo, the UPC Chief of Staff, the night
he disappeared. Here he was interrogated and then executed a few days later. No body has ever been found.
Friends and family members called on the UPC to launch an investigation. One told Human Rights Watch
researchers, "When we inquired about where he was the UPC wouldn't say. They said they would do some
research but they didn't. The UPC security services say it is a very complicated case but until today we know
nothing. We even spoke to the Ugandans and President Lubanga but they also did nothing. We have just
received silence." 136
Chief Bulamuzi Dieudonne, a forty-year-old traditional chief from Nyakunde, was killed in Bunia on September
5, 2002. He had been asked to join the UPC but had refused. He was allegedly tortured in Bureau Deux and was
then released. That same evening, six UPC soldiers came and shot him dead about 100 meters from his house. 137
A young student, accused of being a Lendu combatant, was taken by the UPC militia to an underground prison in
the compound of the governor's residence in Bunia where he spent at least four days with some corpses. He was
then taken to the prison of Commander Bagonza where he was tortured so severely that he still bears scars all
over his body. The torturers put a stone in his mouth and stamped on his head. He shouted and fainted. They
woke him up by whipping him and throwing water on him. Nearby Ugandan soldiers heard him shouting and
intervened to stop the abuse. He later escaped. 138
Persons suspected of being in contact with the DRC government or with RCD-ML authorities in Beni were
considered enemies and often subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture, and sometimes execution:
134 This is the term used by local residents.
135 Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, February 2003.
136 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
Human Rights Watch 27 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
On December 9, 2002 I was talking with my family in Aru when UPC soldiers entered the compound.
[Commanders] ... ordered the soldiers to shoot anyone who tried to flee. They forced us to strip, tied us
up, and made us lie face down. Then they hit us with large sticks all over our legs, buttocks, and backs.
One of the commanders accused us of communicating with Kinshasa, Beni, the Lendu and Aru to bring
the war to Bunia, but I was just a student. He said they were trying to find fuel to bum me. I prayed and
they laughed at me saying God couldn't save me. I was then taken to the house of one of the
commanders and put into a large hole in the ground. They beat us till we cried. There were other
prisoners in the hole who were in a terrible state. We were 20 in total. There were two Lendu men who
looked as if they had been really badly beaten: Ngdjole and Lobo, who had a broken arm, and a Nande
man called Kasiko. The night of December 12 the soldiers came with guns and called these three men.
All day long they had been taunting them, asking them how they wanted to die. We shouted at them
saying what they were doing was illegal. But they took the men anyway. We heard them cry and ten
minutes later the soldiers came back. I was told the three men had been killed. It wasn't a normal place;
it was a place of execution.139
In this case and those detailed below, witnesses identified their torturers by name to Human Rights Watch
researchers.
On November 11, 2002, UPC authorities arrested the most senior judge in lturi, Jacques Kabasele, accusing him
of having contacts with their enemies. The judge related:
I was at home when two people from the DGM [Department oflnternal Security] together with a soldier
told me that I had been summoned by their boss. They handed me a "bulletin des services" which said
that I was required for an investigation. They arrested me and took me to one of the prison cells at the
DGM. For two days I waited. There was no formal charge placed against me nor was I allowed access to
a lawyer. On November 13 at 7:00 p.m. a team came to interrogate me including officials from the DGM.
They asked me many questions about whether I had been in contact with Beni, Kinshasa, or the outside
world. They accused me of being in contact with Kabila, Mbusa Nyamwisi, and former Governor
Molondo but I had not. They told me the order for my arrest had come from President Lubanga and then
they left. I was not physically threatened and I believe they were more careful than usual as they were
aware of my knowledge of the Jaw.
They kept me in prison for eighteen days and then released me. No formal charge was laid against me. I
requested an official document to explain my absence from work and also I wanted my record cleared but
I received no document. The UPC President Lubanga refused to meet with me.
I cannot move around freely and I often do not sleep in my own house. People here are afraid. The UPC
does whatever they like and have no respect for the law. 140
Not only senior officials but also ordinary workers were accused of betraying the UPC. Bicycle carriers, known
locally as Kumba Kumba141
, were suspected of carrying messages from Beni or Mongbwalu to Bunia. On August
23, 2002, UPC authorities went to a warehouse where the bicycle carriers usually picked up their goods. They
arrested eleven men including Mahamba Kisala, Tavugha Nzuva, Kalandero Kambale and Sivyalo Ndungo. A
witness said:
The UPC asked the carriers for their ID cards. Most of them have two ID cards in order to facilitate their
work - one where they are from and one to where they are going. This is quite common. But the UPC
139 Human Rights Watch interview, Arua, February 2003.
140 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
141 Lingala word meaning people of the bikes.
Human Rights Watch 28 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
used this as an excuse to arrest them and they also asked them for money. They took them to Bureau
Deux and they have not been seen since.
Some days later bodies were thrown into the Chari River in Bunia. I don't know how many bodies there
were but someone I know ... recognized the bodies as those of the Kumba Kumba who had been arrested
earlier. There is now no more transportation on bicycles as people are too scared. 142
A similar campaign was carried out in areas in northern Ituri such as Mahagi and Aru where UPC troops
threatened, tortured, and killed many business people involved in trade with the Lendu. Two Alur businessmen
said:
On November 23, 2002 we were arrested on the road in Aru by two UPC Commanders. They took us to
their headquarters and then four soldiers beat us with sticks for over an hour on our backs, legs and
buttocks. They accused us of being pro-Lendu and against the UPC. After beating us they put us in a
container143 that they used as a prison. There were another four people besides us held prisoner there. We
were kept for eleven days. Our wives had to pay the UPC $4 per meal to feed us. After pressure from
others, we were released and then we fled. There are many others like us here. 144
Concerned about their abuses becoming known, UPC authorities also targeted those who had talked to MONUC
and international journalists. A Lendu student suspected of contacts with MONUC said:
The UPC soldiers arrested me on October 29, 2002 and took me to the home of one of the commanders. I
saw him on the veranda. When we got there, they threw me to their colleagues. They kicked me and hit
me with the butts of their guns. They undressed me. They dragged me to a shallow well and threw me in
it. They hit me with stones. I put my arms over my head. They asked me what I was doing at MONUC
but they didn't let me answer. There were seven of us in total in a space of two square meters. Other
prisoners said that the day before, soldiers had shot dead a Lendu. civilian prisoner. The next morning, the
soldiers took me to the commander who interrogated me about my contacts with MONUC. I told him.
He said: "if you continue lying, you will end up dead like the others." He questioned me for about fifteen
minutes .... When I went to fetch the water, they beat me with sticks, like a goat. Then they put me in the
well again. I was released only because MONUC intervened. 145
The MONUC team in Bunia knew of some of these cases of arbitrary execution, arrest, and torture and reported
some twenty of them, involving scores of people, to MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa in September and October
2002. These reports included one on September 9 about thirty-three local businessmen arrested by the UPC;
another on September 12 about the slaughter outside Bunia of ten men and six women, whose bodies were then
thrown in the river; and yet another on September 14 about a businessman arrested by the UPC and later found
dead in Bunia town. 146 Despite these reports, no human rights staff from MONUC headquarters came to
investigate the matter until January 2003 and no public denunciations were made concerning these serious abuses.
In several cases, however, MONUC staff intervened at the time to stop abuses and to arrange the release of
persons arbitrarily arrested. 147
Honore Musoko, a lawyer and president of Justice Plus, a human rights organization based in Bunia, sought to
defend several victims abused by UPC authorities. 148 He then found himself accused of working with the former
Governor Molondo and of being an enemy of the UPC. Maitre Honore fled the region in November 2002 but
142 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February, 2003 .
143 Large shipping containers are often re-used in central Africa as prisons.
144 Human Rights Watch interview, Arua, February 2003.
145 Ibid.
146 Internal MONUC correspondence, September and October 2002.
147 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
148 He had previously been arrested by RCD-ML authorities for having given an interview on Voice of America about human
rights abuses they had committed.
Human Rights Watch 29 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
UPC authorities raided his organization, Justice Plus, on February 5, 2003 after he gave an interview on
international radio about human rights in Ituri. Finding the Justice Plus office empty, the UPC authorities then
went on to the office of Bunia Business Communications, which is owned by Maitre Honore. There they arrested
two workers and seized a satellite phone and computer equipment. The two workers were later released without
charge but fearing similar treatment, other members of Justice Plus went into hiding. 149
When Human Rights Watch researchers raised this case with UPC President Lubanga and UPC Foreign Minister
Jean Baptiste Dhetchuvi, they responded that the equipment had been seized because it was being used for
"negative propaganda." They had taken the equipment, they said, to "make them think and calm them down,"
adding that human rights activists were "creating dangers for themselves."150 Within a day of this meeting, the
equipment of Justice Plus was returned.
A foreign journalist, Gabriel Khan, drew the ire of UPC leaders when he reported in early 2003 on international
television about the plight of more than 100 Lendu who had taken refuge in an abandoned house in Bunia. In an
interview with Human Rights Watch, Lubanga labeled Khan an unrepentant "criminal" and blamed him for
"having turned Ituri into an explosive area." He accused him of having "given false information to the public
which is worse than using firearms or machetes."151 UPC authorities particularly resented Khan's having
broadcast a statement by a Lendu man who said he did not want Ugandan soldiers to leave because he feared the
Hema would kill him if they did.
As of this writing, it appears that UPC authorities have investigated none of these abuses nor have they held
anyone accountable for them. Many of those involved in the human rights abuses continue to hold senior
positions in the UPC. ·
Massacres and Other Abuses by the APC and by Lendo and Ngiti Armed Groups
Lendu and Ngiti combatants massacred civilians of the Hema, Gegere and sometimes the Bira groups in late
2002. Among the cases documented by Human Rights Watch researchers were the slaughter at Komanda in
August and early September 2002; at Nyakunde on September 5, 2002; at Nizi on October 11, 2002; and at
Blukwa and Logo in October 2002. Often seeing themselves as victims, the Lendu and Ngiti combatants
apparently believed their attacks to be justified reprisals against previous instances of Hema violence. Supported
by the RCD-ML of Mbusa Nyamwisi, and through it by the DRC Government, the Lendu and Ngiti groups have
at times carried out joint operations with APC troops. In response to the rise to power of the Hema group through
the UPC, the Ngiti and Lendu have also established their own political parties including the Front for National
Integration (FNI) and the Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (FRPI), which work closely together. FRPI is
often seen as the military arm of the FNI. Some of the leaders of these massacres later played important roles in
these parties.
Nyakunde Massacre
In response to the UPC attacks on Songolo described above, the Ngiti Colonel Khandro and an APC Commander
called Faustin launched a reprisal attack on Nyakunde on September 5. Over a ten day period these forces
systematically massacred at least 1,200 Hema, Gegere, and Bira civilians in the town and in the Center Medical
Evangelique (CME), a church-supported hospital. 152
During the attack, Commander Faustin reportedly told the hospital staff that Ngiti combatants wanted to attack the
hospital, one of the largest medical facilities and training centers in eastern DRC and one staffed by several
expatriate doctors. They saw the attack as a way of attracting international attention to their cause. He claimed
that he personally opposed this plan. In accord with RCD-ML leader Nyamwisi, he wanted to focus the attack on
149 Human Rights Watch interviews, Bunia and Kampala, February 2003.
150 Human Rights Watch interview with Thomas Lubanga, Bunia, February 14, 2003.
151 Ibid.
152 This figure is based on information collected from a variety of sources, including eyewitnesses and others who collected
bodies for burial. Many of the victims were buried in mass graves in Nyakunde. It is likely that the number killed is actually
much higher.
Human Rights Watch 30 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
defeating UPC soldiers and capturing Nyakunde as a prelude to retaking Bunia. Commander Faustin said that he
and the Ngiti had finally agreed to attack the UPC camp and kill the Hema found there and then to loot the
commercial center, but to leave the hospital untouched. 153
If there were such an agreement, some Ngiti combatants showed immediately that they would not observe it. A
witness related:
I saw a column of Ngiti coming down the mountain. As the groups entered town they went into different
directions in quite an organized way. One group went to the left and another to the right to surround the
airstrip. A few moments later we heard shots from three different directions like a signal. Then a second
group came down the road towards the center of town. I heard the commander shout "Do not touch the
hospital". Then a third group appeared a few moments later. Their commander also shouted at them not
to touch the hospital but they disobeyed him straight away and entered the hospital grounds where they
started to kill people. I witnessed their killing a Bira woman whom they left to die at the crossroads. I
saw another woman shot by arrows. After the third group, came another group. The arrival of these four
groups, in what seemed like waves, took less than one hour. There was a battle near the UPC camp which
lasted for a few hours, though it was only the first group that carried out this battle. All the others entered
the hospital grounds and started to kill people.154
The APC and Ngiti combatants destroyed the UPC camp in the first hours of the attack. But they continued the
operation, switching to a systematic search for Hema, Bira and Gegere civilians. According to witnesses the Ngiti
combatants called it "Operation Polio", implying a house-to-house search similar to a vaccination campaign. They
continued the killing for at least ten days.
The Ngiti militia, wearing civilian clothes and fetishes, were armed mostly with traditional weapons such as
machetes, spears, knives and axes. A smaller number carried firearms. A woman said:
I was in the market selling fruit and vegetables. We saw people coming from the hills, shouting. We
didn't know what was happening. They came to the hospital and killed anyone they could find. They
wanted to kill my mother. I shouted that my mother was not a Hema. They killed two women, MarieLouise
and Fran~oise, aged between twenty and twenty-five, both Bira, and two children, including my
own eight-month-old girl. Seven Ngiti combatants slaughtered them in front of me. The other child was
a one-year-old boy. 155
A man who had been at the hospital said:
Through the window of one of the hospital rooms I saw them break through the fence. There were many
of them and they broke into the building that I was in and started to kill people. They would cut their
throats and take the hearts or bits from the throat. Sometimes they would cut the meat off the people's
thighbones and put this into their bags. They asked people what group they were from as they were
looking for Hema, Bira and Gegere. That first day I saw them kill sixteen people. 156
Some assailants knew their intended victims and searched for them, calling out their names.
A witness said:
153 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003 .
154 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
Human Rights Watch 31 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
When it began I was in the hospital and heard cries. People were running everywhere. I heard them call
people's names. One of them came running into my room terrified and I hid the person under the sewing
machine and covered her with blankets. 157
One of those targeted related:
I hid in the ceiling of the intensive care ward with some others, but the attackers tried to get in. They
used big stones to force the door and then started to kill. In the male surgery ward, they killed twelve
people, all of them Hema patients. They just threw their bodies in the latrine. 158
The assailants forced people of other ethnic groups and hospital staff to help them find the victims. Another
targeted person said:
I hid in the ceiling of the Operating Room with Pastor Solomon !serve, his family and others. We spent
four days there coming down just to get water and then going back up. It was very hot and there was no
food. There were fourteen of us there - some were staff, some were students, some were women. On
Tuesday [ September 10, 2002], the APC and Ngiti went to see the doctor and told him that if he didn't
give up the Hema hiding there, they would kill him. The doctor pleaded with them but they insisted. He
was forced to open the operating room where we were hiding. We had to climb down. They wrote down
our names and the administrator handed over the list. The fourteen of us included Hema, Gegere, Lendu,
and Alur. They released two women, one Alur and one Lendu. They kept the Hema and the Gegere. The
soldiers said we should keep calm and they would give us food, but if we ran away, there would be
problems for the doctor. They gave us lots of food but we couldn't eat much.
They came back a few hours later to get us. They tied us to each other with ropes around our wrists,
except Pastor Solomon who had his arms tied behind his back and then was tied to the others .... They
searched all the hospital and took out lots of people who had been hiding, making us all sit in the corridor.
The APC and Ngiti combatants were guarding us and beating us. They made us put our hands on our
heads. They said if we put our hands down, they would beat us. They searched every room. They beat
us and asked us our ethnic groups. They said: "if you tell us the truth, it may save you. If you lie, you
will die." We didn't know what to say. They asked me and I said Hema. They said: "You're telling the
truth". The combatants said they would kill us. They took my shirt and watch. They hit me with
flashlights and punched me and kicked me. I said nothing.
At about 10:00 p.m., they told us to line up. We walked with Ngiti combatants on one side and APC on
the other, not knowing where we were going. Together there were more than seventy of us, including
some women who had just given birth and patients on intravenous drips .... They made us go into a
house in the nurses' compound. We spent one night there. It was very small and crowded. We just
prayed. The soldiers and the Ngiti combatants were standing guard outside and coming in and checking.
They beat us.
In the room where we were, a two-week-old baby died. His body was thrown into the latrine. His mother
had no milk to feed him. People were crying, urinating and defecating in there. 159
A member of the hospital staff related how they tried to appeal to the Ngiti commander. He said:
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
We went to Colonel Khandro to ask if we could see the people who had been taken from the hospital the
night before. He allowed us to talk with them through a small window in the side of the building they
were using as a prison. We managed to speak with Pastor Solomon who told us that there were about
Human Rights Watch 32 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
seventy of them in the building and that many were tied. He said he was there with his family - his wife
and young baby. We could see some people sitting and others standing. It was very crowded. He asked
for water for everyone as they had had nothing to drink since they had been taken the night before. We
returned to Colonel Khandro to ask if we could have permission to bring the people water. He refused
and said it was none of our business. We felt completely defeated and made the decision that we should
do everything possible to leave Nyakunde. There was no hope anymore. 160
After days of negotiations the remaining hospital staff was eventually allowed to leave late on September 12.
With an escort of eight APC soldiers and carrying a few belongings, a small amount of equipment, and medicines,
a few hundred of the medical staff made a ten-day journey on foot southwards towards Oicha. They left behind a
destroyed hospital, hundreds dead, and some of their friends and colleagues held prisoners. "As we walked out,
the Ngiti combatants carefully looked over the whole group still searching for the enemy," said one person who
made the trek. "On the road we saw the body of a man whose throat had just been slit. It was a sad reminder of
what could happen to us. We were all so quiet and sad." 161
The Ngiti combatants and the APC interrogated the remaining prisoners and released those who were not Hema,
Bira, or Gegere. A few others managed to escape. The remaining prisoners were separated into groups according
to their strength. A witness recounted:
160 Ibid.
In the morning at 6.40 a.m., they came and untied the ropes of the women as we had slept tied up. They
separated the stronger women and took us away, about sixty of us. A similar number of about sixty men
and weaker women, including the Pastor Solomon's wife, stayed behind. They gave us loads to carry of
the things they had looted. I was made to carry roofing. They said: "we're going to take these to our
village, Singo." We carried them many kilometers uphill, beyond the river Talolo. On the hill, there was
a plain and we saw a troop of fighters. They made us go there.
When we got to Singo [twelve miles away] I heard that an earlier group had already arrived there and
been killed. We were the second group. They put us in a house like a prison. It was very crowded and
suffocating. Children were crying. We couldn't breathe or even sit down.
On Saturday [September 14, 2002] the third group of prisoners arrived. These were the men, including
Pastor Solomon. He was exhausted from carrying ammunition and hadn't eaten. He had collapsed along
the way. The Ngiti said he was a politician and should be killed. Some of the others disagreed and said
they should wait for Colonel Khandro to arrive before killing him. They went back to get the Pastor who
had fallen and brought him back. I saw him. He was just wearing a pair of brown shorts. They carried
him and leaned him against another man. Then they "tried" him. They accused him of calling Hema
militia from Bunia to kill Lendu and of playing politics against the Ngiti. He denied talking with Hema
militia. They hit him. He denied being involved in politics. Then they "tried" other people. Each of
these trials lasted about ten minutes but the Pastor was the only one accused of being involved in politics.
The others were just told that they were causing problems because they were Bira or Hema. Then they
took them away to two other prisons.
The next morning, an Ngiti combatant announced that the pastor was dead. He said, "The pastor has died
before his time." Someone else told me that he had been killed because of his involvement in politics.
His body was cut up and the pieces thrown into the latrine.
At about S :00 p.m. on Sunday [September 15, 2002] Colonel Khandro arrived. He was angry because we
were all still being held as prisoners. He said all the people in the prisons should be killed. 162 One of the
161 Human Rights Watch Interview, Erengeti, February 2003.
162 Other persons, speaking separately with Human Rights Watch researchers, reported the same information. Human Rights
Watch interviews, Bunia, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch · 33 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. l 'l (A)
prisoners was a Rwandan Hutu girl, Kasima, aged about eighteen. Khandro was very cross. He said:
"Why are you still holding the hostages?" He whipped the guards, and then killed Kasima himself with a
double-edged knife. I saw him kill her. I ran away.
At about 6 p.m. that evening, Khandro gave the order to kill those remaining in the prison. The people in
the second and third groups were taken into the bush and killed there. I think there were about sixty
people in each group. I saw as the Ngiti combatants came back with their knives and spears covered in
blood and with the clothes of the prisoners. They killed them quickly. I was hiding and was very
scared. 163
By the second day, the APC and Ngiti combatants had set up roadblocks to ensure that no Hema, Gegere, or Bira
escaped from Nyakunde. Witnesses said:
We were stopped by the APC and Ngiti just outside Nyakunde. They asked us our ethnic group and
asked for our identity cards. They separated people into groups: those from Kivu on one side and the
Hema and Bira on the other. The Bira pretended they were from other groups. Some Bira said they didn't
have a card. The APC told us that if we were hiding Bira or Hema, they would kill us. The APC were
manning the roadblocks while the Ngiti were looting. They said if they found any Hema, they would kill
them. 164
During these days of killing APC commander Hilaire from the 131
h battalion was sent from Komanda to assess the
situation at Nyakunde. He told Human Rights Watch researchers that he saw no civilian bodies during his visit but
only the bodies of UPC combatants. He did not stay long and escorted the medical staff out ofNyakunde, leaving
behind many other civilians who could have been saved. 165
Both commander Hilaire and commander Faustin apparently reported the events to the APC chief of staff. RCDML
President Nyamwisi himself admitted knowing of the Nyakunde massacre. He told Human Rights Watch
researchers, "I know about the events but we didn't give orders for this to happen," he said. 166 The APC troops
"were outnumbered and taken hostage by the Ngiti," he continued and added that he had "no control over them at
the time of the events in Nyakunde."167 According to witnesses, some APC troops did on occasion try to stop the
killings, but were unable to restrain the Ngiti combatants.
Assuming the RCD-ML disapproved of the Nyakunde massacre, it is remarkable that it has launched no
investigation into the conduct of APC troops and their allies, far less made any arrests for participation in the
massacre. Commander Faustin is currently in jail in Beni but he is charged with letting soldiers under his
command desert the APC, not with any actions he might have committed in Nyakunde. 168 Colonel Khandro was
reportedly killed just days after the massacre by an individual in his own ranks. One of his deputies, Commander
Germain who had also participated in the massacre, took control and is currently a key commander in the newly
formed FRPI political armed group with links to the RCD-ML and the DRC govemment.169 He was in charge of
significant elements of the Ngiti and Lendu fighters who fought in Bunia in May 2003; a battle that resulted in the
deaths of more than 400 civilians.
MONUC, with its severely limited resources and mandate was in no position to avert this massacre or to halt it
once it had begun. In July a high-level delegation from the CME hospital warned MONUC that the risk of
violence was high and that the hospital was threatened. The MONUC team sent a brief report back to
163 Human Rights Watch Interview, Bunia, February 2003.
164 Human Rights Watch Interview, Oicha, February 2003.
165 Human Rights Watch interview, Commander Hilaire, Beni, February 12, 2003. Witness refused to give his fuJI name.
166 Human Rights Watch interview, President Mbusa Nyamwisi, Beni, February 11, 2003
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Human Rights Watch interviews, Beni and Kampala, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch 34 July 2003, Vol. 1 S,No. 11 (A)
headquarters in Kinshasa, but did nothing more. At the hospital, the staff despaired, with one saying, "The
Congolese are dying but the UN says nothing."170
Information on the kind and extent of the massacre was available at the beginning of the second day when
expatriate staff were evacuated. A subsequent e-mail message courageously sent on September 7 from Nyakunde
entitled "Nyakunde - Fire and B1ood"171 also alerted many to the scale and ethnic nature of the killings. The email
was addressed to a number of church organizations who reportedly passed it on to others, including the
MONUC delegation in Bunia, but the UN force did not come to assist the victims. 172
The MONUC Bunia team reported back to Kinshasa headquarters on September 19, two weeks after the
massacre, that more than 150 people had been killed in Nyakunde, 173 an astonishing underestimate of the death
toll. While it may have been difficult at first to confirm information about the massacre, MONUC has not to our
knowledge conducted any later investigations into this massacre.
Lendu and Ngiti Summary Executions Tolerated by RCD-ML Authorities
Lendu and Ngiti militia kiiled individuals of opposing ethnic groups just as they attacked large communities of
such people. When RCD-ML authorities were in control of Mongbwalu, militia abused and sometimes killed
Hema for no reason except their ethnic affiliation. Many Hema feared beatings or worse and left town. One
witness related the killing of a newborn boy taken from the maternity ward of the hospital because both his
mother and father were Hema. Had his father been of another ethnic group, the baby would not have been killed
because ethnic affiliation is passed through the father's line according to the witness. 174
A witness to the killing of a Hema woman in another incident said:
One day in October they arrested a woman who was accused of being a witch. But she was Hema and
that was the real reason. There were about ten Lendu combatants with machetes and knives. They took
her from her house, stripped her and then cut her all over- they cut off her arms and then cut her genitals.
Then they killed her near the central market place and burned her body. About fifteen of us witnessed
this. The authorities eventually intervened and the APC Commander Papy stopped it. They tried to get
the Lendu notables to calm the situation down but they didn't arrest anyone. 175
In this case, the soldiers attached to the RCD-ML were ready to prevent further such crimes-at least in the
immediate future-but were also ready to tolerate impunity for the crime just committed.
In Mongbwalu APC Commander Kongolo publicly tried one of his soldiers, Pierre Ukila Wadhum, accused of
killing a popular Lendu combatant. After considerable threats, Wadhum confessed to the crime, but his guilt was
not otherwise established. Kongolo proposed arresting Wadhum and sending him to Beni, but the Lendu
combatants refused and demanded that he be handed over to them to be killed, Kongolo gave in to their demand.
A witness to the October 2, 2002 mob killing said:
Kongolo failed in his negotiations, as did others, and they finally said to the Lendu, "If this is what you
have judged, then take him." They took him to the central area of Mongbwalu and called everyone to
come and see. Pierre [Wadhum] was tied up and completely nude. They made him sit on the ground and
then a Lendu fighter sat on a chair behind him, holding the man's head between his legs. He cut the
soldier's throat with quick cut of his knife. Another Lendu fighter came with a big machete and cut open
his chest and took out his heart. They gave the heart to their Chief - Maitre Kiza - who took the heart
and washed it in a bowl of water they had prepared. He then placed the heart on the fire. He put a little
170 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003.
171 CME Hospital staff member, "Nyakunde en feu et en sang", September 7, 2003.
172 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni February 2003; electronic correspondence, June 2003.
173 Internal MONUC correspondence, September and October 2002.
174 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003.
175 Ibid.
Human Rights Watch 35 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
bit of salt and oil on the heart and then roasted it. They had two large bowls of cassava ready near the
fire. As the heart cooked, the other Lendu combatants took the remainder of the body and placed it on hot
wood and then placed other hot pieces of wood on the top so the body was roasting as well. The Chief
and his entourage then ate the heart with the cassava while the rest of the Lendu fighters ate the body.
They even offered the crowd some o~the meat. The APC soldiers at first watched but then went away as
they saw their comrade being eaten. Whatever wasn't eaten was then burned. This whole ceremony took
over two hours.
There were many of us who witnessed this. They told us not to take any pictures and if anyone did there
would be trouble. 176
Two days later Maitre Kiza and Kung Fu, another Lendu fighter, were sent to Beni where they were reportedly
judged by military officials. They returned to Mongbwalu a few days later. They called another meeting at the
same place and told the population there would be no more such executions. Maitre Kiza became a key figure in
the Lendu political armed group, the FNI, who have links with the RCD-ML.177 He was reportedly killed in
fighting in Ituri in early June 2003.
As with the Nyakunde case, RCD-ML authorities appeared willing to let serious human rights abuses, mob justice
and cannibalism go uninvestigated and unpunished, but sought to deter further cases of such crimes.
Abuses by the MLC and RCD-N
The MLC had been involved in Ituri during the short-lived agreement of the Front for the Liberation of Congo
(FLC), a platform of the MLC, RCD-N and the RCD-ML, sponsored by Uganda under the leadership of Jean
Pierre Bemba. But Nyamwisi refused to accept Bemba's leadership in Ituri and his forces pushed Bemba and the
MLC troops out of Beni and Bunia. In the last months of 2002, the MLC tried to fight its way back into Ituri with
the support of Roger Lumbala's RCD-N, claiming that Nyamwisi had violated the Lusaka Accord. In doing so,
their combatants committed violations of international humanitarian law including the deliberate killing of
civilians, numerous cases of rape, looting and some acts of cannibalism. Some of these violations may have been
directed at the Nande ethnic group, targeted for their connection with Nyamwisi, himself a Nande.
Summary Executions and Looting at Mambasa
Mambasa, a district in the western part oflturi, was relatively untouched in the early years of the conflict between
the Hema and the Lendu. Although officially part of the former territory of Ituri, it remained in the hands of the
RCD-ML after the fall of Bunia to the UPC in August 2002. As the killings continued in eastern areas of lturi,
many civilians fled west towards Mambasa and Komanda. By the beginning of November, a reported 5,200
displaced people from other parts of Ituri were being given assistance in Mambasa. 178
In early October, the MLC and RCD-N launched their attacks near the town of Mambasa and then attempted to
move further south towards the RCD-ML capital of Beni in the "effacer le tableau" [Wipe the Slate] campaign
which would eventually end with the ceasefire signed in Gbadolite on December 31, 2002. In the area of
Mongbwalu, UPC troops attacked jointly with the MLC forces, as described above, and the UPC was rumored to
be seeking an alliance with the MLC. 179
When the MLC and RCD-N troops arrived in Mambasa on October 12, 2002, most residents fled to the forest.
The troops sought out residents in the bush, trying to identify at least some of them by ethnic group. A witness
said:
176 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003 .
177 Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, February 2003.
178 Human Rights Watch interview Beni, February 2003.
179 Ibid.
Human Rights Watch 36 July 2003, Vol. 1 S,No. 11 (A)
We had fled there but they found us. They asked us our names. If they sounded like Nande names, they
took people away. I was captured along with my older brother. They tied our arms behind our backs
with rope and took us to the Mambasa cemetery .... They made us lie on the ground. They said: "You're
Nande and we're against Nande. Therefore you should be eliminated." There were twenty-five soldiers
who took us there. They were well-armed with guns. They said they were going to kill us. We were
lucky because after about ten minutes, some APC soldiers appeared, and the MLC soldiers fled. We ran
away, still with our arms tied.180
Bemba's MLC and RCD-N troops also killed four people because of their supposed political loyalties. One
witness said:
Days after they came into Mambasa they took my brother-in-law from the house. They had APC
uniforms and claimed to be his friends, but they were really the Effacer. They asked him and a group of
eight others how they viewed the Effacer. The people responded that they were very bad and they had
looted everything from the population. The effaceurs then took four of the nine people and killed them,
including the chef de quartier of central Mambasa. They buried them behind the St Anouarite Church in
the center of town. The others were allowed to go. 181
Another witness who saw the corpses said that their arms and ears had been cut off. Of the four victims, he had
known two, Daniel Kahindo and Francois. 182
The troops reportedly shot Gerard of Mandima because he refused to tell them where to find the driver of his
truck, which they wanted to steal. 183
Local Red Cross officials report that in the district of Mambasa, including the town and surrounding areas of
Teturi, Lwemba, and Byakato, some 185 victims of violence were buried from the violence between October and
December 2002. 184 It is unclear how many of those were killed by MLC combatants and how many died in other
ways.
MLC and RCD-N soldiers, many of them drunk or drugged, systematically looted the town. Some were barechested,
others had uniforms or headbands with US. flags. One soldier told the residents of a house he had
entered, "Don't resist because for four days we can do whatever we want. That is the agreement."185 They forced
residents to transport the loot to their camp.186 Colonel Freddy Ngalimo who commanded the operation for the
MLC explained the looting to community leaders as normal. "Even the Palestinians do it," he reportedly said. 187
To quiet community protest, the troops made a pretence of returning the loot, but in fact gave back only a few of
the less valuable items.
The Kinshasa government and its ally, the RCD-ML, were outraged at Bemba's attempts to muscle into new
territory and may have prompted publicity about abuses by MLC forces. Bemba reacted to the substantial national
and international criticism by having MLC Lieutenant-Colonel Freddy Ngalimo and twenty-six others tried for
"extortion, rape, assassination, looting and disobeying orders."188 Under Common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions, the MLC had legal authority to prosecute and punish its own soldiers by a regularly constituted
court, but the trials failed to meet internationally recognized standards for fairness. The judges were neither
independent nor impartial and the prosecution had done no real investigation nor offered serious examination of
180 Human Rights Watch interview in Mangina, February 2003.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003 .
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 UN IRIN, Interview with Jean-Pierre Bemba by IRIN, February 6, 2003.
Human Rights Watch 3 7 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
the charges. The trial, held in February 2003, appeared to have been a public relations exercise with the aim of
shielding Bemba and his main officers from more serious prosecutions. It resulted in a number of convictions,
with the lower ranking officers sentenced to harsher punishments than their commanders. The most serious
sentence of life imprisonment went to Corporal Katembo Kombi and Lt. Jose Zima for murder. Colonel Freddy
Ngalimo, who had been in charge of the military operation with direct control over events, was found guilty only
of permitting insubordination by troops under his control, and was sentenced to three years imprisonment.
Sixteen combatants received sentences ranging from six months to three years for crimes of desertion,
disobedience, or rape, and seven others received only "internal sanctions" for indiscipline. For actions that might
have amounted to crimes against humanity, these trials made a mockery of justice.
Assassination of Governor Joseph Enecko
To gain wider acceptance for their movement, the UPC appointed an Alur, Joseph Enecko, as Governor oflturi in
August 2002. Governor Enecko had been a well-respected Alur community leader and surprised many in his own
constituency when he accepted the position. Some even viewed him as a traitor for having joined forces with the
UPC. From the beginning things did not go according to plan. A high level delegation sent to Aru to make the
official announcement of his nomination were surprised-some were reportedly even shocked--when the newly
appointed Governor stated publicly he would accept the position, but that he should not be considered as member
of the UPC.189
The governor delayed his departure to Bunia in order to resolve some matters in Aru and Mahagi, an action which
may have increased UPC concerns about his attitude. He talked openly of his mission for peace and met with
various groups in the north of Ituri, including Roger Lumbala of the RCD-N, Lendu leaders in Kpandruma, and
some local Hema leaders in Fataki. He visited the Lendu before the Hema prompting rumors that he was proLendu.
The UPC sent a delegation headed by Kisembo Bahemuka, the Chief of Staff of the UPC army, to oblige
Governor Enecko to come to Bunia.
Before leaving for Bunia Governor Enecko set out on November 21 for Mahagi to install a new territorial
administrator in his post. Just before he left, the UPC commander in Aru changed the governor's bodyguards and
driver. En route, near Simbi, the local people stopped the governor's car and informed him that APC troops and
Lendu militia had been fighting the UPC on the road ahead earlier in the day. Night was falling but the Governor
was determined to go on. A local source reported:
Around five miles from Mahagi the delegation saw three bodies on the road. The driver stopped, saying
they should go back, but the Governor insisted they should go on. Then a person stepped out into the
road wearing a military jacket. The bodyguards tensed and wanted to shoot, but the Governor restrained
them. They shouted that they were with the Governor. The soldier responded, "Which governor - is it
the one killing us here?" and then gave the order to shoot. Within minutes all the passengers were killed
except two bodyguards who were in the back of the vehicle and managed to escape. Governor Enecko, his
driver, his secretary, the Chief of the Public Office and five other guards were killed. 190
People from the nearby village heard the shooting and went to investigate the following morning. "I walked up
the road to see what had happened. I saw all the bodies and was really scared," said a witness. "I didn't know at
that time that it was the governor. Then the UPC arrived and started to destroy the houses in my village. I don't
know why. They made people come with them to the scene and bury four UPC soldiers but not the ones near the
car. They were very nervous and made them do it quickly as they wanted to leave straight away."191
189 Human Rights Watch interview, Arua, February 2003.
190 Ibid.
191 Human Rights Watch interview, Nebbi, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch ' 3 8 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
The following day, before any more formal investigation had been done, UPC authorities announced that the two
survivors had identified APC soldiers as the killers. At the time of the Human Rights Watch mission to Ituri, the
two survivors were under UPC surveillance motivated, it was said, by a concern for their lives. 192
Witnesses and local residents who lived near the ambush site claim that UPC soldiers attacked the Governor's car.
One said:
At around 6:00 p.m. there were a lot of shots in the Nzii area not far away where the APC were fighting
with the UPC. I fled about half a mile away along with others. The shooting stopped at about 6:30 and I
returned to my house. Near my place I saw APC soldiers on the road walking away from the place where
the fighting had been. They heard a car approaching and so they hid on the edge of the road. After it
passed some of them came out and shouted "APC, APC let's go" and then many of them came out and
carried on walking down the road in the direction opposite to that taken by the car .. .. A few moments
later I heard shots again in the direction the car had taken which lasted for about 15 minutes. I stayed
alone in my house that night and saw no more soldiers pass that evening. 193
A few days later UPC soldiers raided the Governor's house in Bunia and looted everything inside.
At the time of writing, no official investigation has been carried out and no one has been charged with the murder
of the most senior local authority in Bunia.
Blocking Humanitarian Aid and Targeting Humanitarian Workers
Armed groups in Ituri began intimidating humanitarian workers and blocking the delivery of assistance to "rival"
areas in late 1999. All parties to the conflict have been guilty of this violation of international humanitarian law,
the incidence of which increased and became more serious over time. In the last year alone, there have been more
than thirty cases where humanitarian workers have been arrested, threatened, beaten, or expelled from the area.
UPC authorities have been responsible for the majority of these recent cases, often charging the agencies and their
workers of being complicit with the Lendu. Such was the case when UPC soldiers imprisoned two aid workers in
November 2002. In other cases, UPC soldiers have arrested aid workers who have refused to provide them with
food or medicines. 194 In a statement on September 1, 2002 UPC Foreign Minister Jean Baptiste Dhetchuvi
deplored the "negative attitude" of humanitarian agencies and accused them of having helped the Lendu cut the
water pipes that provided clean water to Bunia, ignoring the fact that those agencies had been the ones to install
the pipes. 195
In early 2003 UPC authorities expelled the Belgian priest, Mark Deneckere of the White Fathers of Africa, for
having helped a group of displaced Lendu, the same group whose story drew the wrath of the authorities on
journalist Khan in the incident described above. Father Deneckere had worked in Ituri for over 40 years. He said:
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
In August the UPC burned many houses in Bunia and that night the Lendu came to us with what little
they had, asking for assistance. They took refuge in an empty house nearby. I was later accused of taking
these people hostage - all 120 of them. How could I possibly have done that? Of course I helped them.
How could I not? They were people in need and as a priest I could not ignore that.
Then a journalist did a story on the situation in Bunia that really angered the UPC. On February 9 the
UPC took me into the house where the Lendu had taken refuge and claimed that they did not know these
people were there. This was of course impossible as they had visited many times and often the soldiers
would look over the wall. I was told I had to come for an interrogation. On February 11, 2003 I was
officially summoned to their office and they asked me many questions. They accused me of helping the
194 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003 .
195 Jean Baptiste Dhetchuvi, /turi: What Future?, September 1, 2002.
Human Rights Watch 39 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
Lendu, of giving them weapons, and wanted to know why I had opened my doors to them. It was
absurd. 196
On February 14, 2003 the UPC gave Father Deneckere 48 hours to leave Ituri. The expulsion order gives the
reason as "secretly hosting displaced people with the intention of tarnishing the UPC movement and of being in
contact with negative forces against peace and reconciliation."197
UPC soldiers threatened and actually attacked priests and aid workers in other areas as well. On January l S,
2003, the UPC attacked the parish in Nioka where a feeding center for malnourished children had been set up
with the assistance of an international nongovernmental organization. They arrested and beat the priests, accusing
them of helping the Lendu. They looted the parish and then destroyed the warehouse where the food for the
feeding center was kept. A witness said:
There were four UPC soldiers who came with a Hema civilian called Jabu. They accused us of being
with the APC and having weapons. They said they were could do anything they wanted to us. They beat
me for nearly thirty minutes. They accused me of being with the Lendu and said they would kill me like
they were killing the Lendu. They took some of the Lendu from the village, men named Njangu and
Kpatchuma, and they executed them behind the prison. I had to sleep outside all night long.
They looted the parish, shot into the ceiling and tied up Father Mario, one of the white priests. They
accused him of helping the Lendu because he was working at the feeding center for malnourished
children. They took him to the prison in Nioka and asked him for money. They beat him. They made
another priest carry water for them all day long. He was kept for two days and hit with a stick. I
managed to escape to the forest where I stayed for four days.
All we were doing was helping starving children - Lendu and others as well. Now all that is finished
which is exactly what they wanted. 198
The increase of attacks by armed groups has caused humanitarian agencies to reduce their activities in the area,
despite the desperate need of tens of thousands of people for assistance. According to a relief worker, the results
have been catastrophic, "Thousands of people will have died because of political games." 199
UPC authorities have also intimidated and in one case expelled UN personnel. On November 23, 2002, UPC
President Lubanga declared persona non grata a UN officer from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) who had protested against the arrest and intimidation of humanitarian workers. The official
reasons for his expulsion were "arrogance, malicious intervention, spreading of false rumors and discourteous
language to UPC officials," charges which Lubanga declared to be "very serious for the security of the territory
controlled by the UPC." 200 Another OCHA representative and a MONUC staff member had previously left
Bunia after intimidation by Hema leaders.
The Murders of ICRC Staff
The most serious attack on humanitarian workers in Ituri was the murder of six staff members (four Congolese
and two expatriate) of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) on April 26, 2001.201 Local police
began investigating the killings under the authority of the Congolese Liberation Front (FLC) which controlled
196 Human Rights Watch interview, Father Mark Deneckere, Kampala, February 20, 2003.
197 Process Verbal de Refoulement against Marc Deneckere, signed by Saba Aimable, UPC Judicial Officer, February 14,
2003.
198 Human Rights Watch interview, Paidha, February 2003.
199 Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, February 2003 .
200 Process Verbal de Refoulement, signed by Saba Musanganya, UPC General Administrator of Security, November 23,
2002.
201 They were Aduwe Boboli, Julio Delgado, Rita Fox-Stuecki, Jean Molokabonge, Veronique Saro and Unen Ufoirworth.
Human Rights Watch 40 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
Ituri briefly in 200 I. Since the collapse of the FLC, apparently no official has pursued the investigation despite
repeated appeals for action from the international humanitarian community.
Human Rights Watch had access to information gathered by the police and was able to independently verify some
of it. The evidence suggests a conspiracy to kill international aid workers carried out by local Hema community
leaders, some of whom were members of the UPC, and Ugandan soldiers.
On April 26, 2001, a team from the ICRC was attacked in the early afternoon shortly after leaving Fataki, in the
Djugu territory of Ituri, and heading towards Bunia. All six ICRC staff members were killed and the two cars
burned. The bodies were discovered shortly afterwards by others on the road who raised the alarm, and a team of
Ugandan military and local police came from the nearby town of Djugu. A witness said:
Behind the second vehicle there were five bodies in a row. The sixth body was a little further away. It
looked like the bodies may have been arranged after they died. They all had cuts and spear marks on
them and one had a spear mark in the back of his head. Some of the bodies had drag marks and it looked
like they had been moved afterwards. The bodies were collected and taken to Djugu and shortly
afterwards to Bunia by the military under the escort of Ugandan army Sector Commander Colonel
Muzoora.202
According to witnesses, the Ugandan army Major David, usually posted at Fataki, had been in Fataki the morning
of the murders and arrived in Djugu at about 5:30 p.m. having apparently traveled a longer road, perhaps to avoid
being near the place of attack. He was accompanied by three well-known Hema extremists named Loringa, Assau
and Tharcisse. That night Major David, Ugandan soldiers, and the three Hema civilians went to the crime scene,
but refused to allow local police to accompany them.203
Two days later an official inquiry team including police investigators and some ministers arrived from Bunia.
Thomas Lubanga was among them, although his job responsibilities at the time as Minister of Youth, Sport and
Leisure did not include criminal investigations. There were also a large number of Ugandan soldiers attached to
the team despite reservations concerning their presence expressed by the Minister of Justice.204
A witness told the team that he had seen five men leaving the scene of the crime, three in uniform and carrying
backpacks and two in civilian dress. This witness changed his statement a few days later and said the men were
not in uniform. 205 Despite requests from the Assistant Administrator of the Territory, the Ugandan army did not
provide protection to this witness and he later disappeared.
Several days after the crime, the Ugandan army allegedly conducted a "clean-up" exercise in which they encircled
the area called Likopi near the crime scene and killed some twenty-five people, including a judge named Jicho
who lived three miles from where the ICRC murders had taken place.206 Civilian police were afraid to investigate
these latest killings.
Soon after the Ugandan army arrested a Lendu man named Dongo Tchudja, whom they accused of committing
the murders along with other Lendu bandits. According to the Ugandan army, Mr Dongo confessed to the
murders. The accused, however, repeatedly changed his statement and got many details wrong in his
"confession," such as the date, color of the cars, and number of people he killed.207 The Ugandan army guarded
the "perpetrator" at a container in their military camp at the Bunia airport and refused to hand him over to the
civilian judicial authorities. A MONUC observer who spoke with Dongo said that he appeared "unbalanced".208
202 Human Rights Watch interview, Arua, February 2003.
203 Bunia Police files, 200 l.
204 Human Rights Watch interview, Arua, February 2003.
205 Bunia Police files, 200 I.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, 2001.
Human Rights Watch 41 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
The suspect continued to be held without charge and in January 2002 the magistrate sent a letter to the new
prosecutor complaining about the continued interrogation of Dongo.209 According to local sources, Ugandan
soldiers then took Dongo to Kampala without asking the consent of local judicial authorities or even informing
them of it. His fate is unknown.
The Ugandans and the FLC announced that the killer of the ICRC team had been apprehended before the official
enquiry was completed. Local police tried to continue their investigation and summoned men from Pataki for
questioning, including those named Mohindo, Tharcisse, Assau, Adidace, and Loringa. When those summoned
failed to appear, the police found no way to compel them to come. At one point, they asked the vice-governor for
backing and he refused, saying, "It is not my affair".210
Lubanga sought access to the local police files, as did senior officers of the Ugandan army. Eventually the
Ugandan army sent an officer to take the files from the prosecutor, saying that a plane was due to arrive from
Kampala to take the information to President Museveni. The Ugandan officer was given some of the documents,
but not the whole file. 211
Those familiar with Hema politics believe that a number of Hema community leaders may have held meetings
several months before to plan the crime. As one insider explained to Human Rights Watch researchers, "I believe
the Hema leaders planned to kill the people from ICRC. I heard people talking about it before it happened and
they told me they were going to carry out an ambush .... They didn't want the ICRC to help the Lendu and they
were very much against them."212
According to diplomatic sources, the Government of Uganda set up a military investigation into the ICRC killings
in mid-2002, but no results have been published and, to our knowledge, no arrests have been made.
Inhumane Acts - Cannibalism and Deliberate Mutilations of Corpses
Members of the most important armed groups in Ituri have carried out inhumane acts, such as cannibalism and
deliberate mutilation of corpses. Following a MONUC press release charging that Bemba's MLC forces had
committed cannibalism, the international press focused on these acts, repulsive by their nature. But they affected a
relatively small number of people. Journalists accorded these crimes far more attention than the more usual acts of
killing that had been devastating the region on a far larger scale. The Human Rights Watch mission to Ituri
followed in the wake of this publicity and found that acts of cannibalism were not unique to the MLC forces in
Mambasa, but had been carried out also by other armed groups in the conflict since l 999 including the Ngiti and
Lendu militias and Hema forces of the UPC. Victims included people of several ethnic groups.
Perpetrators in these cases may have consumed human flesh as part of a larger political and ritual context, as has
happened elsewhere in the DRC and in the world.213 Cannibalism is sometimes linked to the belief that those who
consume the flesh of a person acquire his strength. The appearance of this practice at this time in Ituri may
indicate that peoples subjected to constant threat over a period of years have become cannibals as a way of
strengthening themselves and assuring their survival. It may also mean that perpetrators have found that fear of
cannibalism terrorizes victims more effectively into compliance with their orders than does the simple fear of
death, so frequently faced in daily life.
209 Letter from Jerome Lutimba Hussein to Monsieur le Procureur on January 5, 2002. Ref No 001/JLU/PIR/2002.
210 Bunia Police files, 200 I.
211 Human Rights watch interview, Kampala and Arua, February 2003.
212 Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, February 2003.
213 There are also reports of cannibalism by the Mai Mai in the Kivus in DRC, see IRIN-CEA Weekly Round-up 161,
February 8 - 14, 2003. Eating the flesh or internal organs of the enemy has been reported in a number of armed conflicts in
recent years. See, e.g. "You'll Have to Learn Not to Cry": Child Combatants in Colombia, Human Rights Watch,
forthcoming July 2003; Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone, Human Rights Watch, July 1998, p. 12;
Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch: New York, March 1999, p. 255; Vigilantes in the
Philippines: A Threat to Democratic Rule, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: New York, 1988, p. 44.
Human Rights Watch 42 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
In the last three months of 2002, MLC and RCD-N troops raped, killed, and cannibalized Pygmies, hunters and
gatherers who live in the forest. They sought thus to terrorize the Pygmies into helping them as guides through the
dense forest so that they could avoid travel on the main roads where they would be subject to attack. Some of the
combatants who engaged in this practice may have hoped to acquire strength from their victims.
Human Rights Watch researchers gathered infonnation about the case of a Pygmy named Amuzati. A witness
said:
About twenty miles from Mambasa, the MLC soldiers attacked a Pygmy camp. Amuzati, who was
hunting in the forest, heard shooting. As he wasn't far from his camp he returned to see what was
happening. About half a mile away, he heard shouts and crying and then there was silence. He came
closer and saw several soldiers. He saw the corpses of his family, including his nephew, four or five
years old, with his stomach cut open. They were cutting the flesh off the victims. Then he watched as
they ate his mother, elder brother, and two nephews. He was filled with emotion and afraid that if he
shouted, they would catch him too, so he crept away. 214
Some Lendu militia carried out deliberate mutilations and acts of cannibalism against their victims, mainly
targeting the Hema. This often involved a ritual in which the flesh of the victim was distributed to Lendu
combatants. A witness taken by Lendu militias on the road near Makofi in November 2002 said:
I was in a truck with five other people en route to Mongbwalu. Near Makofi we ran out of fuel. We
started to walk when we were attacked by the Lendu. There were many of them with guns and machetes.
They surrounded us and captured us. They started to interrogate the driver, Independent Dedjo and they
hit him. They also beat me. They asked us what tribe we were from and we said Alur. They asked us for
our identity cards. They did not believe the driver and thought he was Hema. A man who knew me and
some of the others vouched for us and said we were Alur, but he did not know the driver. They decided to
conduct a test. They rolled two eggs on the ground. If the eggs rolled back then the man was not a
Hema, if they did not, then he was. The eggs did not roll back.
They told Dedjo to run for his life. As he ran they shot at him with arrows. He fell and they cut him with
their machetes. They killed him. Then they lit a fire and grilled his body for hours. Six of the Lendu
fighters ate the meat. The rest of us saw them do this. We were held for four days and they threatened to
do the same to us. Commander Katumba was in charge of the fighters and organized all this. I think he is
now dead. Eventually we paid them with the goods from the truck and they let us go.215
Some Hema combatants of the UPC have carried out similar acts of deliberate mutilation of bodies and
cannibalism. A witness from Mongbwalu explained what he saw the Hema militia do:
The Hema didn't have any pity for people. They slashed them with machetes. They cut people's ears off
and made them eat them, then they killed them. I saw this happen in Pluto. For example, they caught a
Lendu combatant. They cut off his ear and part of his buttock and made him eat them. They killed him
with machetes.216
A witness from Boga area, south of Bunia, said:
In September 2002, the Hema intercepted some Ngiti to the south of Kyabwoke in the Boga area. A
young man, the son of Obadhia, came to me and bragged that he had killed an Ngiti woman. He had cut
off her genitals and had put the clitoris on his forehead like a trophy. He wanted to show how strong he
was.
214 Human Rights watch interview, Program d' Assistance aux Pygmees (PAP), Beni, February 9, 2003.
215 Human Rights Watch interview, Arua, February 2003.
216 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, Febru~ 2003.
Human Rights Watch 43 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
In October 2002, the Hema again attacked the Ngiti in Zungulouka. When they returned from the attack
they brought with them forty ears and one hand that they had cut off their victims. They carried them in a
stripped plastic bag like the ones that hold shopping. They called us over to look at them and I saw it
myself. They were singing victory songs. Commander Ateenyi Kagwa directed the operation. They said
they had killed many people and they looted as well. They came back with more than twenty goats. The
killing must have been horrible; even today you can still see skeletons in that place where people were
slaughtered. 217
Sexual Violence
Combatants of all armed groups have committed rape and other forms of sexual violence in Ituri.218 They have
often raped women and girls as part of a more general attack in which these forces killed and injured civilians and
pillaged and destroyed property. This was done to terrorize communities or punish them for real or supposed aid
to opposing forces. In other cases, women and girls were raped simply due to their ethnicity. In some cases,
victims were forced to leave with the rapists and have not been seen since. Some may have been killed and others
may be being held by their abductors for continuing sexual and other services. Some rapists aggravated their
crimes by other acts of extraordinary violence such as puncturing the vagina with spears or cutting off parts of the
body. Armed combatants from militia groups and regular soldiers responsible for acts of sexual violence commit
war crimes. Where these crimes are widespread or systematic, they could amount to crimes against humanity.
In the DRC a girl or woman who has been raped has been personally dishonored and, through no fault of her own,
has brought shame to her household. An unmarried woman who has been raped will have trouble finding a
husband if the crime becomes known. A ·married woman could be rejected by her husband or his family and suffer
daily humiliation, if not outright expulsion from the household. Many victims are afraid to talk about the crimes,
but groups working with women describe the situation as desperate, saying that rape is widespread even if rarely
talked about.219 Human Rights Watch researchers confirmed this conclusion during the course of their field work.
During attacks on Mambasa in October and November 2002, numerous MLC and RCD-N soldiers raped women.
Witnesses describe one case:
In Mambasa in November 2002, a young girl, aged 14, was raped by four soldiers of the MLC. She was
a virgin. They pinned her to the bed. They forced her brother to watch and said that if he left, they would
kill her. . . . After they raped her, she cried. They slapped her on her face and leg and told her to stop
crying. They said: "We can do what we want as long as we don't kill people." She bled for three days
and was sick for two months afterwards. 220
The aunt of one victim recounted another instance of rape:
One day in early November we were on the road near Mambasa when we ran into three soldiers who
seemed to be MLC. Some had camouflage uniforms and others just had green ones; some of them had
green berets. They took all our things from us including our bicycle and goats and then they took our
niece who was only fifteen years old and raped her in front of us. They spoke to us in Lingala and they
took her away with them. We have not seen her since. Her name was Marie Anzoyo and she is Logo. I
know other girls were taken as well including a girl called Therese and another called Vero.221
A witness described another case:
217 Human Rights Watch interview, Kampala, February 2003.
218 Human Rights Watch researchers and their Congolese colleagues documented a similar pattern in North and South Kivu
provinces of eastern DRC in 2002. Human Rights Watch, The War Within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and
Girls in Eastern Congo, June 2002.
219 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
220 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003.
221 Human Rights Watch interview, Mangina, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch 44 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
In October 2002, two miles from Mambasa, the daughter of a man named Ndalo was raped and then
disappeared. She was about twelve. Several soldiers raped her in the bush, and then they took her away.
It was at night. The father was present. We never saw the girl again.
The victim in yet another case said:
I was raped one night in December, at about 11 pm, in our house, by five Bemba [MLC] soldiers. My
mother-in-law was also raped. They came while we were sleeping. They were wearing military
unifonns. All five of them did it. My father-in-law was made to hold my one-year-old child and was
forced to watch. They also beat him with ropes. They said they wanted to kill all Nande and take
Mambasa. I managed to get out through the window. My father-in-law helped me climb out. He fled; I
don't know where he is now. My mother-in-law was taken by the soldiers.
In another case, a Pygmy woman was sexually assaulted by soldiers. A witness said:
In Nombi a Pygmy woman was attacked by soldiers. She had gone into the forest to search for food and
met a group of military from Mambasa. They were in civilian clothes and spoke both Lingala and
Swahili. There were many of them. They captured the woman and interrogated her. She told them she
was looking for food to trade for salt. They got out some salt they had and forced her to eat it at gunpoint.
They also made her eat a kind of meat she didn't recognize. After eating all this they shaved her head and
forced her to strip. A soldier then put his hand into her vagina. No one stopped it. They let her go but
told her she must not talk about what had happened. She was very sick from having eaten all the salt and
when she arrived back at her Pygmy camp she told the others what had happened. They tried to find
traditional medicine to help her but she is still sick in Nombi.222
Rape was a frequent part of general massacres and other ethnically targeted violence that was taking place in lturi.
In Nyakunde a witness tells of how she was raped by Ngiti combatants:
On the night they came to search out the Hema and the enemies, I was picked out with two other women
who were students. When they came to me, they said that they had previously told those who were not
enemies to leave Nyakunde. Therefore as I had stayed I must be the enemy and would have to be
tortured. They bound my hands, took me out of the room and started to beat me. They hit me repeatedly
on my head and my back.
At about 4:00 in the morning they made us walk to the nurses' compound. They made us go into the first
house and continued to hit us. There were about nine combatants - four of them had guns, others had
machetes, spears, and axes. They made us strip and then they raped us. Two men raped me, three men
raped each of the other girls - it lasted about an hour and a half. I knew the men who raped me. They
were people from Nyakunde. One said to me that he had liked me before but that my parents wouldn't let
him marry me. He said he could do whatever he wanted to me and that I didn't have a word to say about
it. He even said he could kill me if he wanted to.
After they finished raping me they said I could put on some of my clothes and that I should go to check
on my son - he was just twelve years old. My son had a Lendu father, so he is Lendu although I am
considered Hema. They started to accompany me to the hospital but then they disappeared and I fled.
The other two girls were taken to another house, but I don't know what happened to them. I looked
everywhere for my boy that night but couldn't find him. I heard they had taken him to transport their
goods to Songolo and it was only much later that I heard from a friend that he had died.
I am now five months pregnant by the men who raped me. I don't know what to do. I have no future. 223
In another case, it was Hema combatants of the UPC who raped two young Lendu women. A witness said:
222 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003.
223 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, Febru!ll)'. 2003.
Human Rights Watch 45 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
In July 2002, two young Lendu women were abducted and raped by UPC militias. They were going to
the market from Rwankole with the husband of one of the women when some UPC members identified
the women as Lendu. They took the two women and the young husband into a nearby building. They put
them in a room and beat them. They killed the husband with machetes and raped the women. Many
soldiers raped them. They stayed there for thirteen days with almost no food. A soldier sometimes gave
them water. They were held naked throughout and were raped repeatedly. They saw the husband being
buried in the compound. Another Bira boy was also killed in front of them with machetes and buried in
the same grave. The soldiers suspected him of being a Lendu combatant.224
Women who have been brutalized by sexual violence may suffer continuing physical problems or may contract
sexually transmitted diseases or be infected by HIV-virus. Most such victims receive no medical help, either
because there is no functioning medical facility near enough to visit or because they fear that seeking help will
make the crime generally known in the community. Many girls and women will never recover from the physical,
psychological, and social effects of these assaults and some will die from them.
Child Soldiers
All armed groups fighting in Ituri have large numbers of children in their ranks.225 As the war intensified, the
forced recruitment of children also increased dramatically. Children as young as seven, including girls, have been
recruited for military service.
Protocol II of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits all combatants in an internal armed conflict from
recruiting children under the age of fifteen or allowing them to take part in hostilities.226 The basic human rights
standard on the recruitment of children for the armed forces is set by article 3 8 of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC), ratified by the DRC in 1990, which restates the ban on the recruitment of under-fifteens
established in Protocol 11.227
The CRC's article 38 is an anomaly in using a fifteen-year age minimum; in all other respects, the CRC definition
of a child is any person under the age of eighteen. Other international standards have been adopted since the
drafting of the CRC that strengthen protections for children affected by armed conflict. These standards reflect a
growing international consensus that children under the age of eighteen should not participate in armed conflict.
The Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict establishes eighteen as the
minimum age for direct participation in hostilities, for compulsory recruitment, and for any recruitment or use in
hostilities by irregular armed groups. The DRC ratified the Optional Protocol in November 200 I.
Human Rights Watch researchers observed a large number of child soldiers among UPC combatants. In an
interview with Human Rights Watch researchers, UPC President Lubanga claimed to have 15,000 troops. Local
experts and observers believe that nearly 40 per cent of these are children under the age of eighteen. In February
2003, witnesses saw newly recruited children, still in their school uniforms, on the streets of Bunia. During their
visit to the president, researchers saw a number of soldiers guarding his residence who were clearly younger than
eighteen. When asked about this, Lubanga said, "The UPC does not have many children under eighteen. When
we recuperate people from the militia, we sometimes find children. We don't force anyone. It is just those who
come freely. "228
224 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
225 In this report, consistent with international legal standards, the word "children" refers to any person under the age of
eighteen.
226 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, art. 4(3)(c). Although the DRC is not a party to Protocol II, many
of its provisions are widely accepted as customary international law.
227 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(1989), entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.
228 Human Rights Watch Interview with UPC President Thomas Lubanga, Bunia, February 14, 2003.
Human Rights Watch 46 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
I
Yet there are frequent reports of the forcible recruitment of children by the UPC. On November 8, 2002 at 8:00
a.m., the UPC reportedly entered the Ecole Primaire of Mudzi Pela and forcibly rounded up the entire fifth grade,
some forty children, for military service. A similar operation was carried out in Salongo where the UPC
surrounded a neighborhood and then abducted all the children they could find. At the end of November, a school
director complained that half of his students had been lost and spoke openly against the forcible recruitment. The
Mothers Forum of lturi complained to UPC President Lubanga in late 2002 about the recruitment of children. The
UPC opened a small demobilization center, but, according to local people, this was a mere public relations
gimmick; the recruitment of children continued.229
Witnesses report that at the start of the conflict each Hema family had to give one child to the Hema militias or
had to pay to be exempt from this obligation. If parents refused, their children were taken by force. Parents with
the necessary financial means sent their children away to Kisangani, Kampala, or elsewhere to avoid their being
pressed into military service.230
Many observers described the UPC force as "an army of children". The children, some as young as seven and
including girls, were trained by the UPC at training centers in Mandro and Rwampara for one to two months
before being sent into action. A person arrested by the UPC in Bunia said he was guarded by child soldiers."
There were four children guarding the cell, all under 13," he recounted. "I asked them what they were doing
there. They said their parents were dead and they could earn something in the army. One of them said he'd done
only three years of school. They were all armed but you could tell they didn't want to be there. "231
MONUC observers reported back to headquarters in Kinshasa that an estimated twenty percent of the recruits in
Mandro camp were children.232 Other sources estimated the Mandro camp to have about 5,000 fighters, implying
there may have been nearly 1,000 child soldiers there. On September 10 and 27 MONUC officers reported to
Kinshasa that the UPC was continuing forcible recruitment of children. When MONUC staff took up the pro.blem
with UPC Commander Bosco he said that "the underage children were all orphans and that the UPC were looking
after them."233 He insisted that all recruitment was voluntary.
The UPC has even mobilized child soldiers who were demobilized by efforts of UNICEF in late 2000. MONUC
protection officers and other independent sources, including Human Rights Watch, reported that Congolese
children, mostly Hema, were being training in Uganda. After local and international pressure, the Ugandan army
admitted that it was training the Congolese recruits and gave UNICEF and other agencies access to them. The
group included 163 children. With much fanfare, these child soldiers were returned to Bunia in early 2001, a
"success" in demobilizing children. But little was done for the children after their return and the majority of
them, an estimated 130, have since been recruited again by the UPC.234
The Lendu and Ngiti militias also reportedly have children in their ranks. Witnesses said that during a number of
attacks, women and children were used as shields for combatants, but that at other times they served as a fighting
force primarily to loot but sometimes engaged in combat as well. During the Nyakunde attack described above, a
witness reported that one of the groups who attacked "was mostly made up of women, children and older people.
They were all carrying more traditional weapons like axes, arrows and spears."235 Another witness said that, "The
children were also killing. They were aged twelve and upwards. They had firearms and knives." An Ngiti
recruiter told Human Rights Watch researchers that most Ngiti militia members being trained in Bunia were
adults but that sometimes children under eighteen would also be trained.236
229 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
230 Ibid.
231 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
232 Internal MONUC correspondence, September and October 2002.
233 Ibid.
234 Human Rights Watch interview with local NGOs, Bunia, February 2003.
235 Human Rights Watch interview, Oicha, February 2003 .
236 Human Rights Watch interview, Beni, February 2003.
Human Rights Watch 47 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. I 1 (A)
VI. THE CURRENT SITUATION
In the Luanda Accords of September 6, 2002, Uganda and the DRC agreed that an Ituri Pacification Commission
(IPC) would be established as an interim structure to govern Ituri after the departure of the Ugandan army and
until a regular Congolese administration could be set up. The DRC government and the local parties were to
organize the IPC with the support of the UN, but early organizational efforts failed and fighting continued. A
number of high-level meetings raised hopes for action in February 2003 but the UPC contested the composition of
the commission, rejected any role for Kinshasa, and demanded that a more "neutral" chair replace MONUC.
According to observers, Lubanga pushed for peace on his terms or no peace at all. 237
The Ugandan army removed the UPC from power in March, making UPC objections less of an obstacle, and the
IPC was launched in early April. By April 24 it had finished its work:
• establishing a new Interim Special Assembly with an executive to be headed by a coordinator until the
new DRC transitional government takes power
• abolishing the role of governor, thereby ending the status of Ituri as a province
• setting up a Prevention and Verification Committee to look into the causes of the conflict and to prevent
further violence
• creating a consultative team from all the armed groups to restrain combatants
• establishing a human right committee to help victims and work towards educating the public on issues of
human rights.
The new structure had no real force to execute its decisions. The Ugandan army tried to install a combined
general staff with Commander Jerome from Aru at its head, but other parties refused and this proposal collapsed
within days. With the departure of Ugandan forces in early May, a MONUC force strengthened by some 200
Uruguayan troops was left with the task of trying to support the IPC. Within days of the Ugandan army
withdrawal from Bunia, fighting restarted between UPC and Lendu and Ngiti militia, killing hundreds of civilians
as each militia attacked people of the opposite group. MONUC increased its troop presence to 700, but the
Uruguayan guard units were neither capable nor equipped to deal with the scale of the fighting. They withdrew to
their compound surrounded by nearly 20,000 civilians seeking protection.
With the prospect of escalating violence, the Security Council voted on May 30, 2003 to create an Interim
Emergency Multinational Force to provide security and protection for civilians in Bunia, including members of
the interim assembly, while MONUC reinforced its pres~nce with troops due to arrive before September I.
VII. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
The armed forces and militias involved in the Ituri conflict have been responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war. The individuals and armed groups that have
carried out massacres, murders, rapes, inhumane acts such as cannibalism, and other crimes in Ituri must bear
primary responsibility for them. But armed forces and political movements under the control of governments,
namely Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC, are also responsible for having provided military and other support to
local groups with abysmal human rights records. Apart from a few exceptional cases where Ugandan or
Congolese soldiers have intervened to halt abuses, the government forces have not restrained the armed groups
over which they exercise control. Uganda bears particular responsibility among the governments for having
fuelled ethnic violence between the Hema and the Lendu for its own immediate interests. Ugandan soldiers have
themselves committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law in Ituri since 1999.
International Humanitarian Law
Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the ongoing war in the DRC, including in Ituri, is an international armed
conflict that intersects with several internal conflicts. International armed conflicts, defined as those occurring
237 Human Rights Watch interview, UN official in Kampala, February 2003
Human Rights Watch 48 ' July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
between states, are regulated by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions (Protocol I), and customary international humanitarian law. Internal armed conflicts are
those arising within the territory of a state party to the Geneva Conventions and are covered by article 3 common
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Second Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions
(Protocol II), as well as by much customary law applicable to international conflicts. The DRC ratified the 1949
Geneva Conventions in 1961 and Protocol I in 1982. Uganda ratified the Geneva Conventions in 1964, and
Protocols I and II in 1991.
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions expressly binds all parties to an internal conflict, including nonstate
armed groups, such as Lendu militias, Ngiti militias, and UPC/Hema militias, although they do not have the
legal capacity to sign the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3 requires the humane treatment of civilians and
captured combatants and prohibits violence to life and person, particularly murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity; and the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.238 Customary international
humanitarian law also prohibits armed groups from directly attacking civilians or carrying out attacks that have a
disproportionate or indiscriminate effect on the civilian population.
In violation of Common Article 3, the various armed political groups and militias, including the RCD-ML, MLC,
RCD-N, UPC/Hema militias, Lendu militias, and Ngiti militias, have committed deliberate killings of unarmed
civilians on a mass scale. They have also carried out summary killings of captured combatants, torture and
arbitrary arrests, rape and other direct assaults. Some forces have also engaged in cannibalism and deliberate
mutilation of corpses. Although in some cases the alleged perpetrators have been identified, those responsible for
countless atrocities in Ituri have not been brought to justice. This culture of impunity has further fuelled the cycle
of violence.
Where Ugandan forces exercised control or authority over the civilian population in the DRC, they were bound by
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that apply to occupied territories.239 Military commanders on the
spot must respect the fundamental rights of the civilian population.240 Specifically prohibited are physical and
moral coercion against civilians and captured combatants (article 31), corporal punishment and torture (article
32), and collective punishment, pillage and reprisals (article 33). Women shall be especially protected against any
attack, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault. Everyone shall be treated
with the same consideration by the occupying power without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race,
religion or political opinion. Private property may not be confiscated.241 Ugandan soldiers deployed in Ituri at
times engaged in one or several of these prohibited actions, such as the deliberate killing of civilians during the
attack on the governor's residence and surrounding areas in Bunia in early August 2002.
Under international humanitarian law, an occupying power has a duty to restore and ensure public order and
safety in the territory under its authority. It is responsible for protecting the population, including minority group
members, from violence and reprisals by third parties, such as armed groups.242 During the period of occupation
by Uganda, this placed a duty on their armed forces to restore and ensure public order in such places as Bunia,
Nyakunde, Mongbwalu, and Drodro. In countless cases, the Uganda army was in breach of its responsibilities
under the Geneva Conventions by not defending vulnerable populations, both Hema and Lendu, in areas under its
control.
Uganda also has the responsibility under international humanitarian law to prevent violations of international
humanitarian law by forces over which it exercises effective control. The International Court of Justice has ruled
238 Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949.
239 Under international humanitarian law, an occupying power takes on the role as a transitional administrator of a sovereign
territory. As such, it is not entitled to change the legal status of the territory, a principle that Uganda has violated by creating
the province of Ituri.
24° Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 29, and 47.
241 Hague Convention, art. 46; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 27.
242 1907 Hague Convention, art. 4 7.
Human Rights Watch 49 July 2003, Vol. I 5,No. 11 (A)
that a foreign state is responsible for the conduct of a faction in a civil war if the faction is a de facto agent of the
foreign state or the foreign state otherwise orders it to commit certain acts.243 The Ugandan authorities have had a
close relationship at different times with the UPC forces and Hema militias and with Lendu militias and others
from the former FIPI coalition, having armed and trained these groups. Uganda violated international
humanitarian law by not using its influence to stop gross violations of human rights by these groups.
Ituri is a humanitarian catastrophe: over 500,000 people have been displaced from their homes and large segments
of the population at risk do not have access to humanitarian assistance. 244 Under the Geneva Conventions,
Uganda was responsible for providing secure and unimpeded access for humanitarian agencies to vulnerable
populations and for respecting their independence and impartiality. Humanitarian personnel were also to be
respected and protected. Uganda had a special responsibility as an occupying power to maintain hospitals and
other medical service~ "to the fullest extent of the means available to it"245 which includes protecting civilian
hospitals, medical personnel, and the wounded and sick. Uganda violated their international obligations by
allowing humanitarian agencies to be blocked in Bunia for over six months in 2002 without reviewing the
restriction or exerting influence to open up access to areas where civilians were in desperate need. As a result,
thousands are believed to have died from lack of access to humanitarian assistance.
International Criminal Court
The DRC government ratified the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on March 30, 2002246 and its
cabinet drafted implementing legislation in June and October 2002, though this has still not been sent to
parliament. The draft legislation incorporates into domestic law all the ICC crimes and provides for full
cooperation between the ICC Prosecutor and Congolese judicial authorities.
With the ratification of the ICC Statute, any crime of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes247
committed after July l, 2002 on any part of DRC territory or anywhere by Congolese nationals may be subject to
ICC prosecution, if the DRC government is unable or unwilling to prosecute such cases itself.
It is highly likely that crimes committed in Ituri after July 1, 2002, will be subject to ICC jurisdiction. The
Kinshasa government does not yet have full control over Ituri and is not able to exercise judicial functions in the
territory. Any trials within the DRC for crimes committed in lturi after July 1, 2002 will not prevent the exercise
of ICC jurisdiction if the trials are shown to have been organized for political reasons and without regard to due
process.
VII. RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The major powers with an interest in Africa have long professed a desire to see an end to the war in the DRC.
They have invested diplomatic efforts and some financial resources in facilitating negotiations among the national
governments and the rebel movements with national pretensions that are the parties to the war. Members of the
UN Security Council and missions from various heads of state have toured the region, attempting to rally support
for an end to the conflict. But these efforts dealt with only the top layer of conflict and failed to address the
243 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. U.S.A (Merits)
("Nicaragua"), 1986 l.C.J. Reports; see, e.g. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgment of June 25, 1999.
244 Estimates of the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), January 2003.
245 Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 55 and 56.
246 Journal Officiel de la RDC 43eme annee, numero special, December 5, 2002, p. 169.
247 International humanitarian law has historically restricted use of the term "war crimes" to international armed conflicts.
Much of the conflict in Ituri is considered a non-international (internal) armed conflict. Increasingly, serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in non-international armed conflicts have been recognized as war crimes, such as
under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Human Rights Watch 50 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
smaller, local wars, themselves sustained by the larger war, which have killed tens of thousands of people248 and
wrecked the lives of thousands of others who have been raped, injured, and deprived of home and property. The
failure to address the conflict in Ituri finally produced a crisis that required an international intervention force.
Unless that force is adequately supported and able to ensure the protection of the civilian population in Ituri, that
conflict and others like it in the Kivus, will endanger all the carefully engineered arrangements meant to end the
war at national level.
The United Nations and MONUC
UN pronouncements about ending the DRC war notwithstanding, the UN Security Council was slow to authorize
a force to supervise the initial Lusaka Peace Accords and the force it mustered was small and inadequately
equipped. The Security Council initially authorized some 5,537 troops-including 550 UN military observers
with the rest being troops to protect them and UN installations-but it took years for the MONUC forces to reach
this level. Charged with monitoring implementation of agreements ending combat between national forces,
MONUC concentrated its first small troop deployment of fewer than 2,000 troops along the ceasefire line, where
it recorded general compliance with the terms of the treaties. But far from the front, fighting continued in the
Kivus and lturi where proxy forces and local militias picked up the guns put down by the main actors.
Information about the local war in Ituri was available both from UN agencies and from independent sources. A
UN agency with an active presence in Ituri, warned in an internal report in February 2001: "The situation in Ituri
today is highly explosive. Individuals and groups on all sides are said to be preparing new massacres, arms are
being bought and distributed within and around Bunia. If actions are not undertaken immediately to diffuse
tensions, larger-scale, more violent and uncontrollable confrontations are to be feared."249 In March 2001, the
then UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur for Congo, Roberto Garreton published a report that
described the ethnically targeted violence in Ituri and linked it with the exploitation of natural resources.250 The
final report in 2002 from the UN Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of
Wealth in the DRC depicted in more detail the link between the ethnic violence and the desire by Uganda to
exploit the natural resources oflturi.251 The Security Council invited analysts from nongovernmental associations,
including Human Rights Watch, to brief members on the local wars. In September 2002, the UN Secretary
General, in a Special Report on the Unitl!d Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC), termed the
situation "explosive."
Despite the amount of information available, some UN members and officials did not recognize the complex
connections between the local and the larger war and treated Ituri as a "tribal war," not suitable for UN action.
The Special Representative of the Secretary General · for DRC, Amos Ngongi, was cited as having said that in
Ituri, "Congolese are fighting among themselves," a conclusion that falls far short of describing the complexities
of the conflict. 252
Unwilling to get further involved in the local facet of the war, the UN acquiesced in continued Ugandan control of
lturi, whether directly or through its various surrogates. After the establishment of the IPC in September 2002,
MONUC undertook to support the new institution, but with only ten observers, it lacked the means to back the
commission and to oblige the UPC to cooperate with it
At the end of 2002, MONUC did indeed move quickly when the MLC and RCD-N advanced against the RCDML
positions in Mambasa and further south towards Beni. It denounced this violation of the ceasefire and
248 International Rescue Committee, "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey,
April 2003. According to this report estimates vary from 3.0 to 4.7 million deaths throughout the Congo since the start of the
war in 1998.
249 UN internal paper, February 2001.
25° Commission on Human Rights, Report from the Special Rapporteur on the Question of the Violation of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms in the DRC, E/CN.4/2001/40/Add.1, March 27, 2001.
251 U.N. Security Council, "Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the DRC," S/2002/1146, October 16, 2002.
252 Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN}, Special Report on Ituri, December 2002.
Human Rights Watch · 51 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
eventually brokered a new ceasefire that stopped further fighting. It then placed a MONUC team in Mambasa to
observe its implementation. Perhaps finally forced to recognize that arrangements to end the larger war would be
constantly threatened if the local wars were not addressed, the Security Council passed Resolution 1445 enlarging
the UN peacekeeping force from 5,527253 to 8,700 troops and requested the Secretary-General to place more
MONUC resources in the Ituri region, security permitting. Nearly two years after the first warnings of the
impending violence, the resolution expressed the Security Council's "deep concerns over the intensification of
ethnically targeted violence in the Ituri region," condemned the violence and incitement to violence taking place,
and called on combatant forces in the region to take immediate actions to ensure the protection of civilians and
end violations of human rights.
It proved difficult, however, to find troops for the DRC mission. No European or North American government
would contribute, nor were many African states enthusiastic about participating. While awaiting action from
headquarters, the small MONUC team in Bunia attempted where possible to defuse tensions and assist civilians.
It was an apparently impossible task, but on occasion the arrival of the MONUC observers on the scene helped
avoid confrontations. The mandate for the force authorized soldiers to protect civilians if in imminent danger of
harm. The conduct of this small team showed what a courageous interpretation of the mandate could achieve.254
In January 2003 MONUC carried out one of its first extensive human rights investigations, looking into
accusations against the MLC and RCD-N during their military activities in the last months of 2002. MONUC
reported that some of these troops had committed systematic rapes, looting, summary executions and ten
confirmed cases of cannibalism against persons of the Nande ethnic group.255 On January 15 the Security
Council condemned "in the strongest terms" the systematic massacres and violations perpetrated by Bemba's
MLC and the RCD-N. Declaring sentiments presumably shared by other council members, the US representative
expressed revulsion that members of an armed faction meant to take power in a future government could engage
in these acts of torture, rape, killing and cannibalism.256
Meanwhile both bilateral and multilateral pressure increased on Uganda to withdraw its troops from Ituri. But the
departure of Ugandan troops without an international force to replace it would create a power vacuum that could
then be filled by local armed groups. In resolution 1468 on March 20, 2003, the Security Council called on
Uganda to withdraw and expressed its concern that it had failed to leave by previous deadlines. It also stressed to
Rwanda that any return of its forces "would be unacceptable". The Council also again asked the SecretaryGeneral
to increase MONUC in Ituri and support the Ituri Pacification Commission.257
After a massacre at Drodro made headlines258 and with the Ugandan army withdrawal impending, MONUC
announced on April 23 that its troops in Ituri would be increased to 850, of whom 200 would be sent immediately
to Bunia. The Ugandan withdrawal on May 6, 2003 resulted in the power vacuum that had been feared. The
newly arrived MONUC troops consisting of Uruguayan guard units had no capacity to prevent the fighting in
Bunia as Hema and Lendu armed groups vied for control of the town throughout May. On May 30, 2003 the
Security Council authorized an Interim Emergency Multinational .Force for Ituri with a Chapter VII mandate, so
acknowledging the urgent need to protect civilians, including by the use of force if necessary. But this short-term
measure ends on September 1, 2003 when a contingent of Bangladeshi troops is due to reinforce MONUC forces
in Bunia. As of this writing there is no clear indication how MONUC, with a much weaker Chapter VI mandate,
will be able to protect civilians either in or outside of Bunia after the departure of the emergency force.
253 Although the UN Security Council had initially authorized a troop force of 5,537 this maximum figure was not reached in
initial deployment.
254 Human Rights Watch interview, Bunia, February 2003.
255 "North Kivu: MONUC Investigation", MONUC press release, February 18, 2003 .
256 Remarks by Ambassador Richard S. Williamson, United States Representative to the United Nations for Special Political
Affairs, on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Security Council, February 13, 2003 . To date the report of the
investigation has not been published.
257 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1468, March 20, 2003 .
258 The initial death toll of this massacre were widely exaggerated with reports claiming nearly 1,000 dead. Later
investigations revealed a much lower number of deaths. But it was symptomatic of the killings taking place in Ituri.
Human Rights Watch 52 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
In its March 20, 2003 resolution, the Security Council condemned the human rights violations committed in the
DRC, and particularly in Ituri. It said that members of the MLC, RCD-ML and the UPC had perpetrated these
crimes and that they would be held accountable for them. The ICC will have jurisdiction to initiate an
investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed after July 2002. Far less clear is what
mechanism - if any - will be put in place to investigate and prosecute those international crimes committed before
this date. The Security Council has requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, to make recommendations to the council on how to address the issue of justice for these
crimes.
International Donors
The Ugandan, Rwandan and the DRC governments depend heavily on donor assistance, a situation that
presumably gives major donors significant leverage in influencing their policy decisions. These donors often say
they are committed individually, as U.N. members, and as members of multilateral financial institutions to ending
the DRC war, in part because they know that the conflict and attendant military spending hampers the reduction
of poverty and the economic development that they seek to promote. Donors also know that the assistance they
give for economic development or for humanitarian relief is fungible-that is, funds given for one purpose, such
as education, frees up money that can then be spent for another purpose, such as buying weapons. Donors must
find effective ways to monitor the use of the money they deliver; otherwise they may end up funding further war
and the human rights violations that it has entailed.
In fiscal year 2000 to 2001, for example, international donors financed 55 percent of Uganda's budget, a total of
US$582.2 million. Since 2000, Uganda also received about $2 billion in debt relief from various sources. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September 2002 approved a further three-year arrangement under the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility for US$17.8 million for Uganda. At the same time as these new
commitments were being made, Uganda overspent its defense budget by more than 30 percent, according to
estimates by the International Institute of Strategic Studies. 259 It also moved expenditure from other ministries to
its defense and security budgets.260 The Defense Minister in 1999 admitted during an inquiry that the Defense
Ministry hid its spending within other budget lines to avoid pressure from donors.261
Despite their stated desire to end the DRC war, donors failed to use their leverage effectively and for years made
little progress in persuading the parties to halt the conflict. In 2002 both bilateral and multilateral donors took
stronger stands. In May the International Monetary Fund (IMF) linked resumption of aid to DRC to further
progress in the peace process (and also to progress in pursuing economic reforms). 262 The U.S. also refused to
support a Rwandan bid for renewal of its IMF assistance and, according to State Department sources, told
Rwandan authorities that their stand was a response to continued Rwandan presence in the DRC and to human
rights abuses committed by its forces there.263 The Danish government cut its aid to Uganda in early 2002 as a
result of concerns about Ugandan military activity in the DRC.264 Faced with these and presumably other
instances of increased pressure, Rwanda and Uganda withdrew their regular military units in 2003, thus meeting a
major policy objective of many donors. Both retained sufficient influence with Congolese actors to protect their
interests, both in Ituri and elsewhere.
Donors have raised human rights concerns but have used their leverage even less effectively on these issues than
for bringing an end to the war. Sufficiently well infonned about human rights abuses in the DRC by their own
embassies, by U.N. agencies, and by national and international human rights organizations, donors have not
259 IISS make estimates of military spending as opposed to using reported figures. This figure is based on estimates from
various IISS Military Balance publications, 1997 - 2001.
260 Republic of Uganda: Semi-annual Budget Performance Report FY 2001 I 02, MFPED, April 2002.
261 "Creative Accounting in Africa: Hidden skills", The Economist, October 9, 1999.
262 "IMF dangles aid carrot for Congo", BBC New Online, May l, 2002.
263 Human Rights Watch interviews, Washington, July 23 and October 8, 2002.
264 "Denmark cuts Aid to Kampala," The New Vision, Kampala, February 1, 2002.
Human Rights Watch · 53 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
succeeded in getting governments and other actors to end their abuses in the DRC nor to punish the perpetrators in
their ranks.
The European Union
Until mid-2002, the European Union (EU) proved largely ineffective in influencing developments in DRC
because leading member states were divided over which side to support: the United Kingdom-generally
supported by Germany and the Netherlands-backed Rwandan and Uganda while France-often together with
Belgium-backed the DRC government. Throughout the war the EU issued several statements denouncing
violence against civilians, including one in February 2001 that identified the role of Uganda in exacerbating the
conflict between Hema and Lendu. It noted, "the continued military presence of the Ugandan army in this part of
the DRC ... hampers the efforts to re-establish peace there."265 Yet apart from this reprimand, the EU did little
publicly to pressure Uganda for a change in behavior.
EU members subscribe to a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports that prohibits arms transfers that might "aggravate
existing tensions or armed conflicts in the country of final destination" or risk fuelling human rights abuses. Yet
they did nothing to halt the delivery of arms to the Great Lakes, a region where the plethora of arms was certainly
contributing to human rights abuses. In June 1999 an EU presidential statement reminded members of their
obligation to uphold the Code of Conduct, but a year later, in May 2000, members still failed to agree on a
suspension of arms shipments to the Great Lakes region, some arguing that any such embargo would always be
violated. But by January 22 and 23, 2001, the General Affairs Council had decided to ask relevant EU bodies to
facilitate early recommendations on "a possible embargo and its modalities to stem the flow of arms fuelling and
protracting the conflict in the DRC and the Great Lakes region."
In the past year, efforts have reportedly been made to secure a more coherent EU policy on the Great Lakes. In
January 2002, the French and British Foreign Minister made a joint mission to the Great Lakes, meant to promote
peace in the region as well as to attempt to unify EU policy on the area, with a repeat visit due in 2003. The EU
role in DRC, and specifically Ituri, got a substantial boost with the agreement that the EU would lead the Interim
Emergency Multinational Force to Ituri under its European Security and Defense Pact - the first time such a force
has been authorized outside of Europe. Although France is taking a leading role in the multinational force, the UK
will also send a small number of troops.
The United Kingdom
Prime Minister Tony Blair publicly stated in October 2001 that "The international community could ... , with our
help, sort out the blight that is the continuing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where three
million people have died through war or famine in the last decade."266 As the largest bilateral donor to Uganda
and the second largest to Rwanda, the UK appears well-placed to bring pressure to bear on those governments to
change their conduct in the DRC. Former Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short expended
considerable effort in trying to minimize tensions and avoid a possible war between Rwanda and Uganda but did
not invest similar effort in trying to bring about an end to human rights abuses in parts of the DRC controlled by
Uganda or Rwanda.
The UK government, like many other donors, has moved towards delivering assistance through balance of
payment support to the Ugandan and Rwandan governments, meaning that funds are given without being linked
to specific projects. Acknowledging the possibility that such open-ended contributions might end up covering
military expenditures, the UK urged Ugandan authorities to review defense spending and in 2001 began
examining such expenditures with a view to ensuring greater transparency. To date the outcome of this review is
unknown. Meanwhile, the British government has continued to support Uganda and Rwanda politically and
financially. British authorities generally abstained from any open criticism of either Uganda or Rwanda. If they
265 European Union, "Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Hema-Lendu conflict in northeastern
DRC," Brussels, February I, 200 l.
266 Prime Minister Tony Blair, to the Labour Party Conference, October 200 l.
Human Rights Watch 54 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
exerted private pressure to persuade them to halt human rights violations by their soldiers or groups controlled by
their soldiers in the DRC, such pressure produced little visible result.
The UK parliament has been more critical of the continuing war and its toll on civilians. In a November 2002
report, the All Party Parliamentary Group for the Great Lakes and Genocide Prevention expressed concern about
the role of Uganda in the DRC and urged that "allegations about the Ugandan army's role in resource exploitation
and human rights violations, especially in the Ituri region" be fully appraised in measuring the success of UK
assistance to Uganda.
The United States
The U.S. has long provided substantial support to Uganda, not just because of its ostensible success in economic
development and combating HIV/AIDS, but also because it offered assistance in curbing the power of the Sudan,
regarded by the U.S. as a major threat to stability in northeastern Africa. In the fiscal year 2001, the U.S.
delivered some $81 million in development assistance and food aid to Uganda; in the fiscal year 2002, U.S.
assistance totalled approximately $71 .8 million; and approximately $70 million was requested for 2003.
In December 2002, the Bush administration certified that Uganda was eligible for preferential trading status under
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a program which supposedly includes human rights
performance among its criteria for selection. In 2001 the U.S. Department of State in its annual Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices criticized Ugandan soldiers for human rights abuses in the DRC, but the next year it
said that there were "no confirmed reports" of further abuses there in 2002. The 2002 report did note that
thousands of civilians had been killed in violence between Hema and Lendu in areas under Ugandan army
influence.
In March 2003 U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter H. Kansteiner III met with President
Museveni in Uganda to discuss bilateral and regional issues but he made no public reference to abuses associated
with the Ugandan presence in DRC. Similarly the White House issued no statement critical of Ugandan actions in
the DRC after a June 2003 meeting between Presidents Bush and Museveni. According to press accounts and
other sources, however, Bush was said to have privately criticized the Ugandan role in Ituri.
In testimony about the Great Lakes before the Africa Subcommittee of the House International Relations
Committee on April 3, 2003, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles Snyder focused largely on political and
humanitarian developments in DRC. He stressed the need for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops and said only that
the U.S. has a "constant and active" engagement on human rights issues, not providing any details.
In a March 2003 document on AGOA, U.S. authorities described the Rwandan human rights record as "poor," an
assessment echoed in recent years in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices which criticized the
conduct of Rwandan troops in the DRC. In Snyder's April 2003 testimony, he called on Rwanda to cease support
for Congolese groups, including the UPC, and to keep its soldiers out of the DRC. The State Department decision
to refuse support for the renewal of IMF assistance to Rwanda would have delivered a stronger message to
Rwandan authorities had it not been undermined by a more lenient attitude towards Rwanda at the National
Security Council, the foreign policy arm of the White House. In a similar case, the State Department attempted to
suspend Rwandan participation in the International Militiary Education and Training (IMET) program run by the
U.S. military because of Rwandan activities in the DRC, but was overruled by the Bush administration. The
decision to admit Rwanda to the AGOA program despite its "poor" human rights record was also taken by the
administration.
Human Rights Watch 55 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Information presented in this report was gathered by Anneke Van Woudenberg and Carina Tertsakian, senior
researchers in the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch.
The report was written by Anneke Van Woudenberg and edited by Alison Des Forges, Senior Advisor to the
Africa Division, Peter Takirambudde, executive director of the Africa Division and Carina Tertsakian. The report
was reviewed by lain Levine, program director; Janet Fleishman, Washington Director for Africa; Pascal
Kambale, counsel in the International Justice program; Tony Tate, Researcher in the Children's Rights division;
and James Ross who provided legal review. Production assistance and coordination was provided by Jeff Scott,
Kate Fletcher, Floriane Begasse, associates in the Africa division; Patrick Minges, Publications Director; and
Veronica Mathushaj, Photo Editor and Associate Director. Anne Fonteneau translated this report into French.
We wish to thank our colleagues in northeastem DRC, who risk their lives to defend the rights of others, for their
commitment and assistance. We greatly appreciate all those who took the time and courage to speak to our
researchers, in particular those who had themselves been the victims of abuse.
Human Rights Watch 56 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
Human Rights Watch
Africa Division
Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.
We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice, to prevent discrimination, to uphold
political freedom and to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime.
We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.
We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive practices and respect international
human rights law.
We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all.
The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Michele Alexander, development director; Rory Mungoven,
advocacy director; Carroll Bogert, communications director; John T. Green, operations director, Barbara
Guglielmo, finance director; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director; Patrick Minges, publications director; Maria
Pignataro Nielsen, human resources director; Joe Saunders, interim program director; Wilder Tayler, legal and
policy director; and Joanna Weschler, United Nations representative. Jonathan Fanton is the chair of the board.
Robert L. Bernstein is the founding chair.
Its Africa division was established in 1988 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized
human rights in sub-Saharan Africa. Peter Takirambudde is the executive director; Bronwen Manby is the deputy
director; Janet Fleischman is the Washington director; Alison Des Forges is the senior adviser; Suliman Ali Baldo
and Alex Vines are senior researchers; Binaifer Nowrojee and Jemera Rone are counsels; Carina Tertsakian and
Lars Waldorf are researchers; Juliane Kippenberg is the NGO Liaison; Caroline Conway, Chiwoniso Kaitano, and
Jeff Scott are associates; Corinne Dutka, Sara Rakita, and Tony Tate are consultants. Vincent Mai is the chair of
the advisory committee.
Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org
Listserv address: To receive Human Rights Watch news releases by email, subscribe to the HRW news listserv by
sending a blank e-mail message to [email protected]
Human Rights Watch 57 July 2003, Vol. 15,No. 11 (A)
Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the
human rights of people around the world.
We stand with victims and activists to prevent
discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect
people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to
bring offenders to justice.
We investigate and expose human rights violations
and hold abusers accountable.
We challenge governments and those who hold power
to end abusive practices and respect international
human rights law.
We enlist the public and the international community to
support the cause of human rights for all.
Human Rights Watch
350 Fifth Avenue 34th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10118-3299
http://www.hrw.org
ANNEX 3.6
United Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, document S/2003/566, 27 May 2003
- 79 -
United Nations S/2003/566
Security Council Distr.: General
27 May 2003
Original: English
03-35898 (E) 290503
*0335898*
Second special report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1417
(2002) of 14 June 2002, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) until 30 June 2003, and Council resolution 1468 (2003) of 20 March
2003, by which the Council, inter alia, expressed its support to the broad
orientations on the role of MONUC in support of the peace process set out in
paragraph 59 of my report of 21 February 2003 (S/2003/211), and expressed its
intention to consider my recommendations in this regard. This report also covers
major developments since my last report, until 14 May 2003.
II. Political and military developments
The Final Act of the inter-Congolese political negotiations
2. On 2 April 2003 in Sun City, South Africa, the participants in the inter-
Congolese dialogue signed the Final Act of the inter-Congolese political
negotiations that had started in October 2001, by which they formally endorsed a
package of agreements that constitute a comprehensive programme for the
restoration of peace and national sovereignty during a transition period of two years.
The agreements comprise the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed on 17 December 2002 in Pretoria,
the Transitional Constitution, the memorandum on military and security issues of 6
March 2003, and the 36 resolutions adopted by the inter-Congolese dialogue in Sun
City in March and April 2002. The signing of the Final Act marks a new and
important chapter in the process of national reconciliation and peace in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and indeed in the history of the African
continent.
Latest developments
3. Since the signing of the Final Act, the Congolese parties have taken a number
of important first steps towards the establishment of the Transitional Government.
- 80 -
2
S/2003/566
After promulgating the Transitional Constitution on 4 April, Joseph Kabila was
formally sworn in as President for the transitional period on 7 April. This was
followed by the promulgation of a decree granting amnesty for faits de guerre and
infractions politiques et d’opinion, and the abolition of the Cour d’ordre militaire
that had been widely criticized for disregarding basic international standards.
4. On 14 April, President Kabila convened in Kinshasa the first meeting of the
Follow-up Commission (Commission de Suivi) whose purpose is to prepare for the
installation of the new institutions. All of the members of the Commission attended
except the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), which
did not participate because of concerns about its security in Kinshasa, and the
political opposition, which had still not settled on its representatives. After extensive
discussions in Goma on 19 April, my Special Representative, Amos Namanga
Ngongi, developed a package of confidence-building measures — including
MONUC air transport and the deployment of MONUC troops within a limited
security zone in Kinshasa — which made possible the travel to Kinshasa of the
RCD-Goma delegation on 27 April. Upon his arrival in Kinshasa, the Secretary-
General of RCD-Goma publicly announced the end of the war and the lifting of
restrictions on the free movement of goods and people throughout the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
5. The second meeting of the Follow-up Commission on 29 April was attended
by its full membership. Two subcommittees were established, namely, the
Committee on Political and Security Affairs, chaired by the Secretary-General of
RCD-Goma, and the Committee on Logistics, chaired by the Secretary-General of
the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC). During its third meeting, on
3 May, the Commission set 23 May as the date for the swearing-in of the Vice-
Presidents, 28 May for the instalment of the Transitional Government, and 10 June
for the inauguration of the Senate and the National Assembly.
6. The meeting of Chiefs of Staff also reconvened on 3 May, with a view to
concluding the discussions begun in Pretoria on the structure of and distribution of
posts within the High Command of the integrated Congolese army. According to the
timetable adopted by the Follow-up Commission, the integrated High Command of
the new army is to be established by mid-May. Despite the negotiations that have
continued daily, the parties have not been able to make progress on this issue,
however, as they continue to insist on the previous positions. It is expected that the
Follow-up Commission will set a new deadline for the conclusion of the talks.
7. On 10 April, my Special Representative convened the first meeting of the
International Committee in Support of the Transition in Kinshasa, which has since
held regular meetings. The Committee comprises diplomatic representatives of the
permanent members of the Security Council as well as the Troika of the African
Union (Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia), Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon,
the African Union and the European Union. The Committee met President Kabila on
17 April, with a view to establishing close relations with the Follow-up
Commission. All parties agreed that the Congolese actors involved in the
Transitional Government should own and drive the peace process, the Committee
providing assistance and support.
8. Despite political progress at the national level, hostilities continued in the east,
in particular between Lendu-based and Hema-based militias in Ituri, and between
- 81 -
3
S/2003/566
RCD-Goma, Mai-Mai and other armed groups in the Kivus. These hostilities have
been marked by widespread and gross violations of human rights.
Situation in Ituri
9. MONUC multidisciplinary special investigation teams have confirmed that
massacres of both Lendu and Hema have been perpetrated in Ituri since February
2003. From 17 January to 6 March, in an attempt to take over full control of the Ituri
region, a militia group known as the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) engaged in
large-scale military operations in four localities, resulting in killings, destruction of
property and the displacement of a large number of people. Eyewitnesses stated that
around 330 civilians were killed in Bogoro, which was completely destroyed, and
reported 160 additional deaths in Mandro. In Drodro, there were killings on a scale
hitherto unknown in the area, hundreds of civilians being murdered in a series of
well-coordinated summary executions near the parish and 16 neighbouring
locations. Twenty mass graves have been identified by MONUC. MONUC, together
with forensic experts from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, dispatched a second investigative mission to this area, but its work
had to be cut short because of the deteriorating security conditions.
10. The humanitarian impact of the armed conflict for the 4.6 million inhabitants
of Ituri has been catastrophic. According to the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, between 500,000 and 600,000 internally displaced persons —
many of whom remain in hiding and cannot be accounted for — in addition to nearly
100,000 refugees from Uganda and the Sudan, are dispersed throughout the area.
Since the first major onslaught of violence in June 1999, the death toll has been
estimated at more than 60,000, and countless others have been left maimed or
severely mutilated. Of the estimated 400 health centres, 212 have been closed, and
not a single surgeon is present. It is estimated that 200 schools have been destroyed.
Moreover, the prevailing atmosphere of insecurity has obstructed the humanitarian
community’s access to sizeable areas of the region, effectively denying the provision
of aid to the most vulnerable populations.
11. On 6 March, Ugandan forces (UPDF) recaptured the town of Bunia, which had
been under the control of UPC since August 2002. Subsequently, the UPDF presence
in Ituri was significantly reinforced, and brought to the level of over 7,000 troops.
The Ugandan troops were deployed to all strategic locations in the region. Their
deployment did not stem the activities of armed militias, however. It should be
recalled that the root causes of the Ituri conflict, which relate to a power struggle
indigenous to the area over land and resources, have recently been exacerbated by
the protagonists of the wider conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As a
result of the proliferation of armed groups and their constantly shifting allegiances,
the situation in the region has become extremely volatile and unpredictable.
12. In view of rising tensions between Rwanda and Uganda over the increased
presence of the latter’s forces in the region, my Special Representative proposed a
trilateral meeting of the heads of State of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda and Uganda. The President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, hosted such a
summit on 9 April in Cape Town, South Africa, at which the Presidents confirmed
the timetable for Ugandan withdrawal from Ituri, beginning on 24 April and ending
on 14 May. This was followed up by a meeting of President Paul Kagame and
President Yoweri Museveni, hosted by the United Kingdom Government on 8 May.
- 82 -
4
S/2003/566
13. In an effort to broker a ceasefire on the ground, and establish a local political
process by which the conflict could be addressed peacefully, MONUC also
intensified its consultations with key players early in March. This led to the signing
on 18 March, of a ceasefire agreement by the Governments of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda and six armed groups (except for UPC, which
had lost virtually all of its territorial control), which paved the way for convening
the much-awaited Ituri Pacification Commission. The Ituri Pacification
Commission, comprising 177 delegates representing the main communities and
groups in Ituri, including some representatives of UPC, met at Bunia from 4 to
14 April under the leadership of MONUC. At the final plenary meeting, which was
attended by several Ambassadors of members of the Security Council, the delegates
agreed to set up an interim administration, consisting of a 32-member Special
Assembly, an 18-member Executive Organ, and three subcommissions — on
security and the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the re-establishment of
public services and the rule of law, and humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation.
These bodies commenced their work on 25 April. It has been determined that the
interim administration requires some $300,000 for the initial three months of
operation. The necessary funding has yet to be received, however. It is therefore
essential that adequate resources be provided to the administration as soon as
possible. MONUC continues to provide support to the Ituri Pacification Commission
by whatever means possible. The UPC leader also recently voiced his support for
the Commission, which was broadcast on Radio Okapi.
14. In order to provide security for an enhanced MONUC presence in Bunia aimed
at assisting the political process initiated by the Ituri Pacification Commission,
MONUC began deploying an Uruguayan guard contingent and its supporting
elements to Bunia on 23 April. To date, 720 troops have been deployed, of the
approximately 800 troops envisaged by the end of May. The tasks of the Uruguayan
guard contingent are limited, and include a presence at the Bunia airfield and
protection of United Nations personnel and facilities, as well as sites of meetings of
the Ituri Pacification Commission in Bunia. MONUC also increased the number and
strength of military observer teams in Ituri, which were deployed to Aru, Mahagi,
Mongwalu, Kaseyni, Kpandroma and Komanda, in addition to Bunia and Mambasa,
where MONUC had already established its presence. On 26 April at Komanda,
however, one military observer was killed and another wounded in a landmine
accident on a road that had previously been used by MONUC patrols. The team site
at Komanda has been evacuated for the time being because of the high volatility of
the situation and mine threats, but it will be reoccupied as soon as practicably
possible. Moreover, owing to the security threats received, teams at Mahagi,
Mongwalu, Kasenyi and Kpandroma are also being evacuated. They will be
reinstalled as soon as security conditions permit.
15. On 25 April, UPDF began withdrawing troops from Ituri. To date, MONUC
has observed the withdrawal of some 2,000 soldiers. Various supplies and equipment
were apparently left behind, however. UPDF completed their withdrawal from Bunia
on 6 May and plan to complete full withdrawal from Ituri by 19 May.
16. Immediately after the departure of UPDF from Bunia, Hema- and Lendu-based
militia groups sought to establish control over the town, resulting in violent clashes,
often near United Nations premises. The clashes were accompanied by widespread
looting, including of the premises of the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs. On 9 May, MONUC headquarters itself became a target of
- 83 -
5
S/2003/566
attack and its guards were forced to return fire to repel the aggressors. Such fighting
has panicked the population, several thousands of whom have sought refuge at the
United Nations facilities and at the airfield. On 25 April, the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo started to deploy elements of its national police,
including rapid intervention police, to Bunia. Concerns quickly emerged about their
lack of equipment, particularly vehicles, communications and resupply, unclear
command arrangements, precise role and relationship with the Ituri interim
administration. Nonetheless, MONUC conducted some joint patrols with the rapid
intervention police. When the violent clashes began, however, the 700-member
police force disintegrated as a unit.
17. On 7 May, my Special Representative met with President Kabila, who agreed
to take measures to enhance the leadership of the rapid intervention police and to
provide it with sufficient equipment. President Kabila agreed to work closely with
the local administration and accepted the responsibility for cantoning armed groups
and feeding them for a limited period. At a later meeting with my Special
Representative, on 10 May, President Kabila indicated his intention of deploying
FAC troops to Bunia to respond to the “emergency situation”. Preliminary reactions
from MLC and RCD-Goma indicated that they would support such a move if their
own police and armed forces were integrated into the force, while the local Hema
groups in Bunia have voiced their opposition to the FAC deployment. MONUC has
stressed to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo the need for
such a deployment to be effected in the context of the transitional process, and in
close coordination with all concerned.
North Kivu and South Kivu
18. Since my last report, RCD-Goma has continued to redeploy nearly all its
military force (11 out of 12 brigades) away from positions on the disengagement
line in order to conduct concurrent offensives in the Kivus and Maniema Province.
The main areas of conflict are:
• To the west and north of Goma, where RCD-Goma forces have attacked
northwards into the territory of RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération
(RCD-K/ML), apparently to establish control over the whole of North Kivu.
• To the north-east of Kindu, in the area of Kalima, where RCD-Goma forces
have been engaged with Mai-Mai and are advancing west towards Shabunda.
• To the west and south of Bukavu where, early in April, RCD-Goma eliminated
its former Mai-Mai ally — the Mudundu 40 group — from Walungu.
• Around Uvira, where RCD-Goma forces have been engaged with a
Banyamulenge militia led by Commandant Masunzu and Mai-Mai.
Fighting also broke out between the Mai-Mai and the RCD-Goma at Uvira in the
evening of 2 May, during which eight RCD-Goma soldiers were wounded. Though
fighting ceased by morning of 3 May, it erupted again on 5 May. While RCD-Goma
has claimed that it was trying to recapture territory lost upon the withdrawal of
Rwandan troops in the autumn of 2002, it has actually made advances well beyond
its former positions by encroaching on the area controlled by RCD-K/ML.
19. Consequently, the humanitarian situation in the Kivus has continued to
deteriorate. The latest RCD-Goma offensives have resulted in serious human rights
- 84 -
6
S/2003/566
violations and have triggered new waves of population displacement, forcing tens of
thousands of people to take refuge in the forest or nearby villages. The ongoing
fighting has disrupted the humanitarian community’s regular activities and rendered
it difficult to deliver assistance to the war-affected populations trapped between
opposing forces. After heavy fighting broke out in Bukavu on 6 April, some
humanitarian agencies were compelled to evacuate their non-essential staff and
suspend all activities. There have been widespread reports of rape, looting, armed
robberies and arbitrary executions by RCD-Goma troops, Interahamwe, ex-FAR
(Forces armées rwandaises), Mai-Mai and unidentified armed groups. To mobilize
assistance to the most vulnerable groups, MONUC conducted joint humanitarian
assessment missions with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
facilitated the delivery of emergency aid, and negotiated with local authorities on
issues of access in many instances.
Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
20. These persistent outbreaks of fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo have continued to hamper, disrupt and delay the operations of MONUC
to disarm, demobilize and repatriate foreign ex-combatants, the main focus of the
mission to date. MONUC has repatriated more than 1,500 Rwandans, including both
former combatants and their dependants, since October 2002, while, since the
beginning of the year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has repatriated 3,021 Rwandan refugees. Experience indicates
that the MONUC voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement
and reintegration programme can be completed successfully only in conditions of
reasonable security, and with the full cooperation of all parties concerned, including
the armed groups themselves. RCD-Goma has not offered its full cooperation, often
limiting the freedom of movement of MONUC personnel. The Mission’s Mai-Mai
interlocutors — who were thought to be useful as contacts with the Rwandan
combatants in hiding — proved to be unreliable, often demanding monetary
compensation for their cooperation.
21. Since the opening of the Lubero disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration reception centre in December 2002, MONUC has
conducted intensive discussions with representatives of the Rwandan combatants
and their dependants in the vicinity. MONUC estimates there are some 3,000 to
4,000 combatants and several thousand more dependants around Lubero. Although
the rank and file are thought to be ready to enter the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme, their hard-line leaders
continue to express misgivings, and have shown deep suspicion both of MONUC
and of the Government of Rwanda, often propagating their views in radio
programmes transmitted from abroad. Consequently, the leadership effectively
influenced the combatants not to take part in the programme. The Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, which made some progress towards dismantling
the leadership of ex-FAR/Interahamwe in accordance with its bilateral agreement
with Rwanda of 30 July 2002, has done little in this regard during the period under
review.
22. Nonetheless, through sustained personal contacts and a targeted public
information campaign, MONUC managed to persuade some representatives of the
combatants to agree to enter the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration process. Attempts were also made to persuade those
- 85 -
7
S/2003/566
States hosting some of the leaders of the movement to approach them with a view to
ending negative radio propaganda concerning the activities of MONUC relating to
the process. At the end of March, an initial group of some 200 to 300 combatants
and their dependants was gathering near Kasuo, in the vicinity of Lubero, preparing
to enter the reception centre. However, the group scattered into the forest when
RCD-Goma forces attacked and seized the nearby villages of Muhanga and
Bunyatenge. Although MONUC is continuing its efforts to contact the combatants’
representatives, the situation in the region remains insecure, and it has not been
possible to reassemble that group.
Reopening of the Congo River
23. Significant progress has been made in reopening the Congo River. Building on
the achievements of MONUC since July 2002, when regular river traffic was
established between Government and MLC areas, the first private commercial traffic
allowed by RCD-Goma arrived in Kisangani in February 2003. The entry into force
of the All-Inclusive Agreement and its provisions for full freedom of movement,
together with the statement made in Kinshasa on 27 April by the Secretary-General
of RCD-Goma on the lifting of remaining restrictions, offered new opportunities for
a complete reopening of the river. Early in May, MONUC facilitated a visit to
Kisangani and Goma by a 20-member senior commercial delegation from the
Fédération des Enterprises du Congo in Kinshasa to meet their local counterparts
and the RCD-Goma leadership. As a result of the mission, the RCD-Goma
authorities confirmed that they would accept commercial convoys to Kisangani
immediately. Until the Transitional Government is officially installed in Kinshasa,
the existing procedures for river transport will remain in place. A large commercial
convoy to Kisangani is expected to depart in 10 days. It was also agreed that a
business delegation to Kinshasa from key towns in the east (Kisangani, Goma and
Bukavu) would be organized in the coming weeks.
Adjustment of the deployment of the Mission
24. MONUC has reviewed its deployment strategy with a view to a comprehensive
readjustment of its structure, as appropriate, from that based on the Lusaka
Agreement to one that meets the needs of the changing political and military
situation. Two of the four MONUC coordination centres (Ilebo, Basankusu) are no
longer in operation and the guard units assigned to them have been reallocated to
other duties, including security arrangements in Kinshasa. The two remaining
coordination centres, Boende and Manono, will be closed in the next few months,
releasing the guards deployed there for reallocation to other priority areas. In view
of the All-Inclusive Agreement that has reunified the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, MONUC is also redeploying some 12 military observer
teams from defensive positions along the Kampala/Harare disengagement line to
more volatile areas in the east of the country. Consequently, by 30 August, MONUC
will have redeployed almost 100 military observers and more than 1,400 troops from
phase II to phase III functions. It is also closing 22 team sites in the western part of
the country.
- 86 -
8
S/2003/566
III. Implementing the transitional agreements
25. During the two- to three-year transitional period, the Transitional Government
will have to simultaneously address immediate challenges and long-term issues.
First and foremost, it will have to put in place the transitional institutions and ensure
their functioning. It will also have to lay the ground for the democratically elected
government that will be established at the end of the transition by preparing for
elections and drafting a new Constitution. At the same time, the Transitional
Government will have to address security and military matters and respond to the
population’s expectation of economic improvement.
The responsibility of the Congolese parties
26. It is clear that the successful implementation of the various agreements
reached in the course of the inter-Congolese dialogue depends directly on the
political will of the Congolese parties. Years of protracted conflict have left a legacy
of mistrust that has undermined international efforts to help the Congolese find
lasting solutions to their problems. For the transition to succeed, the Congolese
parties must, from the outset, provide strong signals of their intention to implement
the agreements they have signed.
27. In the coming weeks and months, the parties must observe a number of key
benchmarks to maintain momentum and demonstrate their commitment. These
include:
• The immediate cessation of hostilities, including cessation of inflammatory
rhetoric and propaganda
• The cessation of military support and supply to all armed groups
• The lifting of restrictions on the free movement of people and goods
throughout the country
• The liberalization of political activity in the areas under their control
• The dismantling of armed groups or their transformation into political parties
• The steps to establish the high command of the national armed forces and to
form the initial unit of the integrated police force.
28. At the same time, the neighbouring States have the important responsibility to
play a positive and constructive role, and assist the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in pursuing a path of peace and national reconciliation. They should respect
the provisions of the All-Inclusive Agreement and the decision of the Congolese
parties to establish a Transitional Government of national unity. Continuing
interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo can no
longer be tolerated. The legitimate security interests of neighbouring States should
be taken up with the Transitional Government through peaceful means.
IV. The role of the United Nations and the Mission
29. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1468 (2003), by which the
Council endorsed the preliminary vision of the role of MONUC during the
transition, as outlined in my thirteenth report (S/2003/211), there have been
- 87 -
9
S/2003/566
extensive consultations with the Congolese parties and international partners,
including consultations undertaken by a special planning team of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations sent to the country. As a result, a broad outline has
emerged of the role MONUC could play and the assistance it could provide for the
transitional period. Subject to the concurrence of the Security Council, the Mission’s
currently mandated priorities would be readjusted, and would consist of the
following elements: (a) to provide political support to the transition by assisting the
Congolese parties in the implementation of their commitments, leading to the
holding of elections, which will be one of the important elements in the Mission’s
exit strategy; (b) to contribute to local conflict resolution and the maintenance of
security in key areas of the country; (c) to continue with its mandated task of the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign
armed groups while contributing to the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of Congolese combatants; (d) to serve as a catalyst for the coordination
of international political and donor efforts concerning the core issues of the
transition; and (e) to contribute to confidence-building between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the neighbouring States. At the same time, ongoing
MONUC activities in vital areas such as human rights, humanitarian affairs, child
protection and gender affairs would continue.
A. Immediate priorities
30. In the coming weeks and months, the following immediate priorities require
the attention of MONUC: helping the parties to establish the Transitional
Government; contributing to the security arrangements in Kinshasa; assisting in
sustaining the peace and reconciliation initiatives in Ituri; contributing to local-level
conflict resolution; and continuing the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration of armed groups in the Kivus.
31. In order to assist in providing immediate support to the preparatory
mechanisms of the transition, a Transition Support Unit has been created within
MONUC from its existing resources to support my Special Representative in his
capacity as convener of the International Committee. The Unit will also monitor the
political process, liaise with the parties to the All-Inclusive Agreement and facilitate
coordination with other national and international actors. As the transition proceeds,
the capacity of MONUC will need to be strengthened accordingly, to include its
possible presence and facilitation in important provincial capitals.
32. At the same time, in view of the additional responsibilities envisaged for
MONUC, its leadership structure — both civilian and military — would need to be
considerably strengthened. To this end, the position of second Deputy Special
Representative has already been added, as have other important senior-level posts.
The military leadership structure is still in need of enhancement, specifically the
establishment of the forward mission headquarters in Kisangani to achieve the
appropriate span of command and control; given the size of the country, the
increased number of MONUC troops and the complexity of managing several
politically sensitive and risky military operations require that the Force Commander
and Deputy Force Commander positions be upgraded, and that a Forward Force
Commander post be created.
- 88 -
10
S/2003/566
Security arrangements in Kinshasa
33. In the All-Inclusive Agreement, the Congolese parties requested the assistance
of the international community in establishing a credible, confidence-building,
security system in the initial stages of the formation of the Transitional Government,
as some leaders of the transition do not feel confident that the existing structures can
provide sufficient security. In particular, under the Agreement, the parties requested
the assistance of the international community in providing a “neutral force” for the
purpose of general security, while the parties would also provide their own
bodyguards.
34. Given that the Congolese themselves are ultimately responsible for the security
of the leaders and the institutions, the role of the international community should be
limited to assisting them in crafting an effective and immediate means of dealing
with the security concerns. With regard to the parties’ request for the deployment of
a “neutral force”, it is considered that any international assistance provided by
military units or police should come under the command of MONUC to avoid the
presence of two separate peacekeeping missions operating in the same theatre under
separate chains of command.
35. With these considerations in mind, and on the basis of the threat assessment
conducted by MONUC and other international specialists, the following multilayered
confidence-building security system is being proposed:
(a) The existing Congolese police structures (national police, including rapid
intervention police, traffic police and territorial police units), which would continue
to carry out normal law and order functions in the city;
(b) The close protection corps, comprising personal bodyguards (who
operate under the control of an integrated central command) for a limited number of
political leaders, which would be reinforced by a newly formed integrated police
unit;
(c) A MONUC military contingent consisting of some 740 personnel.
The activities of the proposed security system should be coordinated through a Joint
Security Operations Centre, comprising senior-level representatives from all the
entities that would be discharging security tasks. Any elements of the Congolese
Armed Forces currently deployed in Kinshasa would be garrisoned, in accordance
with the agreement reached at the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff in Pretoria in
March 2003, and monitored by the military observers of MONUC.
36. It is crucial that the training of a newly formed integrated police unit of a
future Congolese integrated police force is pursued at the same time, having in mind
the need to make the unit operational within six months after the establishment of
the Transitional Government. At that time, the unit is expected to be ready to take
over the relevant security tasks from MONUC.
37. Before the formation of the Transitional Government, MONUC intends to use
its guard company already present in Kinshasa and to redeploy, from elsewhere in
the country, two guard units to the capital. These troops will be assisted by some 30
military police personnel, who will serve as an additional layer of confidence in a
specially designated security zone in the capital. The security zone will be limited to
the Ndjili airport, specified routes between the airport and the Gombe district, the
city centre and the Gombe district itself. MONUC guard units would reassure the
- 89 -
11
S/2003/566
parties with a visible presence in the security zone, both static positions and mobile
patrols and armed escorts. MONUC will also have a limited capability to extract
threatened persons from the zone. The United Nations activities in this regard will
be facilitated by MONUC civilian police officers, who will provide liaison and
technical advice to their Congolese interlocutors. In addition, MONUC civilian
police officers will advise, monitor and report on the conduct of the various
Congolese entities discharging security responsibilities. Such an arrangement is
based on the present security assessment and the expectation that the requirement
will last for six to nine months. While MONUC would be able to fulfil the
requirement for military resources for these tasks by redeploying elements within its
currently authorized strength, in the event that the threat level rises considerably or
persists longer than envisaged, there will be a requirement to augment the United
Nations presence by adding extra guard units and/or, possibly, formed police units.
38. To carry out the new tasks in support of security arrangements in Kinshasa
described in paragraphs 35 to 37 above, MONUC would require the following
civilian police personnel: 15 civilian police officers, including experts in
administration, planning, strategic management and coordination; 55 personnel to
serve as liaison officers, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to the Joint Security
Operations Centre, Congolese police elements and close protection arrangements;
and 34 officers to serve as security technical advisers to various Congolese police
and security entities as well as the MONUC military contingent charged with
security tasks in Kinshasa.
39. The modalities, mechanisms and funding for the creation and initiation of the
integrated police unit must be set up without delay. The Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and other parties, and eventually the Transitional
Government, are expected to provide offices for the Joint Security Operations
Centre as well as salaries, accommodation and equipment for the close protection
corps and the integrated police unit. The regular payment of salaries will be an
essential prerequisite for the entire security structure, which the Congolese parties
must address rapidly and as a matter of priority. At the same time, some bilateral
donors have shown commendable interest and are assessing the possibility of
training police personnel, providing a communications system in Kinshasa for the
new security structure and rehabilitating the training centres for the integrated police
unit.
Training of an integrated police unit
40. To quickly form and train the integrated police unit, the best option would be a
project to be undertaken by one or more bilateral donors, directly with the
Congolese, that would train and equip 1,200 officers for the unit within a period of
six months, refurbish the necessary training facilities and provide the
communications system to allow the unit to function within the overall Kinshasa
security mechanisms. The MONUC civilian police component, together with other
United Nations entities, could complement such efforts by providing training
assistance on international policing standards in various thematic areas, with a
special emphasis on the rule of law and fundamental rights. This option would
require six additional MONUC civilian police trainers/coordinators.
41. Should this option be unavailable within the required time limit, a second
option would be a combination of direct bilateral assistance to train and equip a
- 90 -
12
S/2003/566
group of 600 integrated police unit officers in Kinshasa, while MONUC would
support the training in Kisangani of another group of 600 officers, in a mentoring
programme involving Congolese trainers. This mixed training option would require
24 civilian police trainers/mentors. If neither of these options is quickly available,
the MONUC civilian police component would undertake the responsibility of
training the 1,200 integrated police unit officers, in Kinshasa and in Kisangani, in a
mentoring programme involving Congolese trainers. Forty-eight civilian police
trainers/mentors would be required for this option. Refurbishment of the training
centres, training equipment, further basic operational equipment and
communications would be required in all options. The views of bilateral donors are
urgently requested to determine the most viable option.
Reconfiguration of the civilian police component
42. In view of the new phase of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the MONUC civilian police component is being reconfigured. The
current pilot training programme in Kisangani will be suspended, in anticipation of
the formation of a future integrated police force. Instead, the focus of the civilian
police component will be as follows: (a) assisting in the security arrangements in
Kinshasa; (b) contributing to the training of an integrated police unit; and
(c) continuing the assessment and planning of its future role in key strategic areas,
such as Ituri and some locations in the Kivus. The following structure is envisaged:
headquarters staff, including the newly created Kinshasa sector (35), civilian police
advisers/liaison officers/monitors to assist the security arrangements in Kinshasa as
noted in paragraph 38 above (89); and regional planners/liaison officers to be
deployed to Bunia, Goma and Gbadolite (10). Hence, 134 police officers would be
needed, 34 more than the currently authorized strength, to meet the basic
requirements. From 6 to 48 additional officers will also be required, depending on
the training option for the unit to be followed (see paras. 40 and 41 above).
Peace initiative in Ituri
43. Ituri has become one of the most volatile and lawless areas in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (see paras. 9-17 above). At this time of hope for
comprehensive peace, Ituri continues to have the potential to derail progress made at
the national level. It should be noted that the prevailing volatility and ongoing
manipulation by various players, and the security risks from well armed, but unpaid,
rival militias and from other elements are considerable.
44. The Ituri Pacification Commission process, which was facilitated by MONUC,
offers a real chance of comprehensive peace and reconciliation in the area, which
must be followed up vigorously. The immediate challenge is to create the conditions
of security and confidence for members of the Commission and international
personnel present in the region to assist this fledging and still fragile process. While
the integration of Ituri within national government structures is the ultimate goal,
achieving this will require sustained and determined international and national
engagement.
45. To that end, and as security conditions permit, the overall MONUC presence in
Ituri would be considerably enhanced by the establishment of the Ituri Pacification
Commission Support Unit, which would be staffed by a United Nations multidisciplinary
team and provide comprehensive support to the Ituri interim
- 91 -
13
S/2003/566
administration. All MONUC substantive components (political affairs, human
rights, humanitarian affairs, child protection, public information and others) will be
represented in the Unit. In view of the need to assist the people of Ituri in setting up
temporary local administration — in anticipation of the extension of the authority of
the Transitional Government — United Nations civilian affairs officers would also
be deployed.
46. MONUC could also establish a small civilian police cell to begin planning
assistance, which could be provided by the international community either through
MONUC or bilaterally, in the formation of an integrated police element to be
introduced to Ituri. A strong human rights presence would also be essential to ensure
investigation of violations, to monitor and support the new human rights bodies and
to help the judiciary fight the culture of impunity. Military observer teams would
also be strengthened and deployed to monitor the withdrawal of UPDF troops, liaise
with armed groups and observe their activities, and monitor key population centres
and designated airstrips, where possible. That effort would be reinforced by the
Mission’s proactive public information programme, including the establishment of a
radio studio in Bunia, as well as conflict resolution projects using media tools. In
view of the massive proliferation of arms in the area, MONUC, in cooperation with
the subcommittee on armed groups of the Ituri Pacification Commission, may assist
the interim administration in developing a limited local disarmament initiative, for
which donor support will be required.
47. MONUC would also work closely with the humanitarian and development
community, which is designing a strategy for this long-inaccessible region.
Immediate needs include the delivery of emergency humanitarian relief to areas
affected by insecurity and fighting; assistance in housing repair in areas devastated
by the war; restoration of health and medical services and social support in areas
affected by recent massacres; income-generating activities such as road and
infrastructure repair to be conducted by the estimated 25,000 militia members and
other ex-combatants; assistance for the demobilization and reintegration of child
soldiers; and quick-impact projects in areas where United Nations personnel would
be deployed.
48. In order to provide protection to United Nations personnel and assets in
various locations in Ituri and to establish a framework of security in support of the
ongoing political process, it is assessed that, at a minimum, a brigade-size formation
consisting of three infantry battalions with appropriate support (logistics, utility
helicopters, engineering) and totalling up to 3,800 personnel would be necessary.
Even a force of that strength would not be able to provide comprehensive security
throughout Ituri or secure all major roads or the border with Uganda. In addition to
protecting United Nations personnel and assets and other vital installations in Bunia,
the brigade force will secure a United Nations logistical base at Bunia airfield and
the immediate environs of the town, support the United Nations military observer
teams in accessing the more remote areas, and provide limited support to
humanitarian operations in selected locations. By extending its operations beyond
Bunia, initially along an axis towards Djugu and Mahagi, the brigade force would
expand its security framework and, as the situation further permits, gradually reach
airfields, towns and other areas in Ituri.
49. The present deployment to Bunia of the Mission’s reserve battalion (supplied
by Uruguay) is a limited, interim and emergency measure to ensure that the
- 92 -
14
S/2003/566
momentum of the Ituri Pacification Commission peace process can be maintained in
the rapidly changing security situation in the area. The battalion will not be able to
extend its presence outside Bunia to other areas of Ituri. By the end of May, the total
strength of the Uruguayan contingent in Bunia will be close to 800, including the
logistic support elements and engineers. This force will clearly be well below the
minimum required to assume full security tasks in the town, and its deployment can
only be temporary, as it comes at the expense of sacrificing the fundamental
principle of maintaining a Mission reserve battalion for contingencies. The
Uruguayan contingent will be needed to reconstitute that reserve as soon as possible.
50. It should be noted that the Uruguayan deployment is the minimum that is
militarily acceptable to establish security for United Nations operations at the Bunia
airfield, protect United Nations personnel and resources at locations in Bunia,
support the Ituri Pacification Commission process and make necessary preparations
for the follow-on deployments, as well as logistic sustainment. Of the nearly 800
Uruguayans, just under 450 are infantry troops whose primary roles are to provide a
company reserve force to respond to contingencies in Bunia, 24 hours a day, to
provide point security at up to eight United Nations and Commission locations in
the town (including the airport entrance and sector headquarters), to guard military
engineers (who are charged with making necessary road repairs, demining and
building accommodations), to escort military observer teams in the vicinity of
Bunia, to occasionally patrol Bunia itself and, as may be required, to provide a local
escort for United Nations and humanitarian convoys within the town.
51. To provide anything beyond the current deployment in Bunia, and particularly
to address the problems in Ituri more widely, the minimum requirement will be a
brigade-size formation (Ituri Brigade Force). The Department of Peacekeeping
Operations is examining how such a force could be structured and identifying
potential contributors of the forces that could be assembled quickly to form the
proposed force. The most immediately available element is the 1,700 strong multifunctional
battalion group initially envisaged for Kisangani, which includes one
infantry battalion, supported by transport helicopters, engineers, airfield service
units, military police and an air medical evacuation team. Attack helicopter assets to
be deployed to support phase III MONUC operations would support the Ituri
Brigade Force as the main priority. Potential troop contributors for the initial
elements of the Force have already indicated preliminary concurrence with such a
deployment, and a reconnaissance mission was undertaken during the first two
weeks of May. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is also in touch with the
potential troop contributors regarding offers for the two additional infantry
battalions required to complete the force. These additional battalions (approximately
1,050 personnel each) will provide MONUC with the operational reach and
responsiveness that it needs to be successful in this remote and extremely volatile
region.
52. Once deployed, the battalion group must gradually assume the Bunia security
tasks currently performed by the Uruguayan contingent, which will eventually be
relieved and return to its normal duties. Even with a slightly enhanced ability to
provide security in the town, the capacity of MONUC to support monitoring
operations or respond to violence in the remote areas would remain very limited.
Only once the security situation in Bunia improves can MONUC begin to extend its
operations, primarily in the vicinity of Bunia. Only when the full Ituri Brigade Force
- 93 -
15
S/2003/566
is formed will MONUC have the ability to gradually expand its operations to
include a more comprehensive range of security framework tasks in Ituri.
53. The current lack of a sufficiently credible MONUC force in Ituri would likely
result in MONUC operations being confined to Bunia, and an increased level of risk
and the probability that the United Nations military presence would be exposed to
provocations. Inevitably, this raises the prospect that such a force may not be
sufficient to fulfil its limited objectives. This is a risk that will be present, in any
case, until such time as the brigade force is deployed and operationally effective, but
it is a risk that can be reduced considerably if all parties are aware that the initial
deployments are part of a realistic longer-term approach.
54. The duration of the limited military deployment of MONUC in Bunia and of
the larger military force proposed in paragraphs 48 to 53 will depend on how
quickly and successfully the political process in the area can achieve normalization
and reconciliation. It is hoped that a Congolese integrated police unit, once formed,
could gradually take over security responsibilities from the MONUC brigade force.
In view of the extremely volatile environment in the region, MONUC, together with
the United Nations Security Coordinator, has developed an evacuation plan which
covers both MONUC and United Nations agencies personnel. Non-governmental
organizations that have concluded memoranda of understanding with the Office of
the Security Coordinator would be included in the evacuation plan.
The Kivus and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration
55. Even in the face of numerous and competing priorities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the importance of the Kivus cannot be overlooked. Two
recent wars in the country began there, and the region remains a pivotal ingredient
of the overall peace process. The Kivus border three key eastern neighbours of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The conflicts
that have afflicted these neighbouring countries have had a direct impact on security
in border communities in the Kivus, be it as a result of refugee movements or the
cross-border activities of rebel groups fighting the Governments of their countries of
origin. The region has also grappled with issues of ethnicity, inequitable land
allocation and fighting over the control of natural resources. In this context,
MONUC intends to pursue a two-pronged approach: (a) continuing the
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign
armed groups operating out of North Korea and South Kivu and (b) promoting local
peace and reconciliation mechanisms.
Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
56. As indicated above, MONUC activities related to disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration have recently been
obstructed by the operations of armed groups in the east. This notwithstanding, the
reception centre at Lubero, the transit points at Goma and Bukavu and a number of
austere temporary assembly areas will be maintained by the United Nations in
anticipation of the resumption of large-scale disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration in those areas, as circumstances permit.
At the same time, MONUC experience so far with this process has permitted a
further refinement of methods, an improvement in information-gathering and
- 94 -
16
S/2003/566
analysis techniques, enhanced collaboration with the Multi-Country Demobilization
and Reintegration Programme, led by the World Bank, and with concerned
specialized agencies and United Nations entities, such as UNICEF. For its part,
UNHCR will also continue to promote returns of Rwandan refugees to their country
by taking a more proactive approach to reaching pockets of Rwandan refugees
countrywide.
57. With the deployment of the first United Nations task force to the Kivus (the
main base being in Kindu), MONUC would be able to establish a United Nations
presence in vital locations — including those hitherto inaccessible to MONUC
military observers — and provide necessary support to disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration. The robust and mobile
nature of the task force — which will be equipped with armoured personnel carriers
and helicopters — will permit the simultaneous deployment of MONUC
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration teams to
some of the remote groups in the region. The mobility capabilities will also bring a
quick response capacity that has been lacking to date. This outreach approach will
be a joint effort of the various MONUC components, including vital military
support. Most importantly, it is hoped that this credible United Nations presence will
give the groups an increased level of confidence in the disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme by offering protection from
harassment, as well as speedy movement to the resettlement camps across the
border.
Local peace and reconciliation mechanisms
58. While the establishment of the Transitional Government and the full
implementation of the All-Inclusive Agreement should eventually bring unification
and peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it is likely that localized
conflicts, particularly in the Kivus, will continue in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, a transitional period may be rather tumultuous and could generate
conflicts which, if uncontained, could destabilize the whole national process and
could even provide a pretext for external intervention. It is therefore necessary for
the international community to assist the Congolese people at the local level in
developing interim mechanisms for peace and reconciliation.
59. The situation in the east is currently characterized by a patchwork of primarily
local armed groups competing with each other and suspicious of one another’s
motives. The disintegrated governance structures, ethnic heterogeneity, economic
mismanagement and illegal exploitation of natural resources, tensions between
different generations of migrants and refugees, land disputes and proliferation of
weapons contribute to the instability in the region. There is a clear need to address
the root causes and trigger factors of existing conflicts, and to contain new ones.
The international community can play a vital supporting role in creating peaceful
solutions to local conflicts. To this end, MONUC has already produced policy
guidelines for its personnel based on the following approach: (a) crisis management
to address acute security concerns between different groups; (b) post-conflict
measures aimed at building confidence; and (c) conflict prevention initiatives to
avoid the recurrence of violence.
60. In pursuing that approach, MONUC would attempt to serve as a catalyst for
international support and assist the initiatives undertaken by local religious
- 95 -
17
S/2003/566
institutions, Congolese grass-roots organizations or international non-governmental
organizations with a proven track record. MONUC intends to pursue these activities
in the context of the transitional institutions that are being established under the All-
Inclusive Agreement, in particular those aimed at promoting reconciliation. The
Mission would work closely with the national transitional authorities and with its
United Nations partners, especially UNDP, which is developing a strategy for
rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery at the community level. In order to play
such a facilitating and mediating role, MONUC will enhance its civilian presence in
the Kivus.
61. Finally, mechanisms aimed at normalizing cross-border relations should be
developed. While this is among the priorities to be addressed by the Transitional
Government and with the neighbouring countries, preliminary initiatives could
begin on a pilot basis. Joint economic initiatives and cross-border community
projects could be considered, for example. When the new national armed forces are
formed, joint patrols — monitored by MONUC — could be undertaken with the
armed forces of the neighbouring countries in specified zones along the borders. In
due course, the Security Council will be provided with additional recommendations
about the expanded role of MONUC in the Kivus. These border issues should also
take centre stage in the envisaged international conference on peace and
development in the Great Lakes region.
Human rights and transitional justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
62. It remains clear that without strong national human rights protection structures
in place and an end to the widespread reign of impunity in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, there cannot be any real reconciliation or the building of the
foundation of long-term, sustainable peace. MONUC, working closely with the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, intends to
strengthen its capacity to support the building up of national human rights
infrastructures as well as the setting up of transitional justice arrangements. The
added focus on human rights investigations will be accompanied by close attention
to strengthening — and coordinating the international effort concerning — the
ability of national institutions, including the National Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the National Observatory for Human Rights (the creation of which
is envisaged under the terms of the All-Inclusive Agreement), to adequately address
the concerns of the Congolese people. In this context, it would be important to
ensure that attention is paid to child protection issues.
Facilitating humanitarian assistance
63. It is also vital to continue and indeed expand the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. More than 3.5 million people are estimated to have died since 1998
directly or indirectly as a result of the conflict. Despite the need to plan for future
recovery and development opportunities, there are still enormous unmet needs that
require immediate life-saving assistance. The main obstacle to this assistance has
been the lack of access to populations in need and the insecurity created by the acts
of the parties to the conflict.
64. The humanitarian objectives of MONUC will continue to focus on facilitating
and ensuring access to vulnerable populations for the delivery of much-needed
assistance, in close coordination with the Office for the Coordination of
- 96 -
18
S/2003/566
Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.
It will do this in three ways: (a) it will initiate and participate in joint humanitarian
assessment missions with the intention of facilitating access to previously
inaccessible areas and facilitating the delivery of target assistance where it is most
needed; (b) it will systematically engage with belligerents to negotiate a safe and
secure access for humanitarian workers, as has been the case in North Kivu where a
forum for dialogue with a local Mai-Mai alliance is under way; and (c) it will
actively engage non-governmental organization partners in linking demining efforts
with planned humanitarian activities, especially in areas where the presence of
mines has hindered humanitarian activity.
Responding to mine threats
65. The serious mine incident reported in paragraph 14, the second such incident
since the inception of MONUC, illustrates the requirement for MONUC to maintain
a capacity to provide mine risk education to Mission personnel and the communities
in which they work, in collaboration with UNICEF and other local partners. The
Mission also requires the capability to collect, analyse and disseminate information
about mine and unexploded ordnance contamination, and to respond with a
clearance capability when required. The Mission will also advocate that all parties
stop the use of landmines and provide information on mined areas.
66. The Mine Action Coordination Centre is an integral part of the Mission, and
manages a database on contaminated areas for the benefit of the Mission and
humanitarian organizations. The Centre’s personnel provide expert advice to the
Mission and other components of the United Nations system, coordinate the
deployment of mine action operators and conduct threat assessment missions in
support of MONUC. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
which recently acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel
Mines, has requested the Centre to also coordinate the provision of external support
for mine action programmes throughout the country. Consequently, it is proposed
that the Centre be strengthened by the provision of three additional experts and
resources for its operations. At the same time, the Mine Action Service of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations is actively seeking voluntary contributions
from donors to develop an operational capability in support of humanitarian
requirements. Such a capability could also be provided, in part and in direct support
of MONUC, through the deployment of appropriately qualified units from troopcontributing
countries.
B. Long-term priorities
67. Clearly, assisting the transition process in a country as large and as devastated
as the Democratic Republic of the Congo will present a vast challenge to all
concerned. It will require a comprehensive approach in which the United Nations
system, the Bretton Woods institutions, and bilateral and multilateral donors plan
and coordinate their activities to an almost unprecedented degree. The political
arrangements underlying the transition process are complex, the country lacks a
strong and efficient public administration, and many of the political actors have
little direct experience in democratic practices. Basic mechanisms for the
functioning of a modern State (such as a State-wide banking system) are often non-
- 97 -
19
S/2003/566
existent. Consequently, support to the transitional process has to be extensive and
imaginative.
68. As outlined in my last report, in addition to the immediate priorities identified
in paragraphs 30 to 66 above, the United Nations — in cooperation with
organizations of the United Nations system, Bretton Woods institutions and other
international partners — will assist the Transitional Government in meeting longerterm
goals with regard to elections, the establishment of the rule of law and security
sector reform, in particular the disarmament and demobilization of Congolese
groups. The transition period could also serve as a bridge between the ongoing
humanitarian programmes and expanding development initiatives.
Support for elections
69. The holding of free, fair and transparent elections towards the end of the twoyear
transition period can become one of the key elements in the exit strategy of
MONUC. Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo pose a monumental
challenge. The country has never held democratic polls since gaining independence
43 years ago, and no legal framework for the electoral process currently exists. The
conditions for organizing the referendum and presidential and legislative elections
would therefore need to be specified in an electoral law adopted by the transitional
parliament. In a country the size of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with its
relatively poor communication and logistical links, the elections will be very costly,
and will require a major cooperative effort between the transitional authorities, the
United Nations and bilateral donors.
70. Following preliminary discussions between the United Nations and
international representatives in Kinshasa, it could be envisaged that MONUC could
provide technical and logistics assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission
and facilitate its work through coordination of international support to this end. The
precise contribution of MONUC will however depend on the views of the
Transitional Government when it is established. As soon as this occurs, a feasibility
assessment mission will be dispatched. In the interim, MONUC will have to
establish a small electoral cell to commence further planning and liaison.
Rule of law
71. The situation throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
characterized by a pervasive culture of impunity and extremely poor governance.
The strengthening of the rule of law is one of the fundamental challenges to be
overcome, to break the vicious circle of violence, eradicate impunity, combat the
root causes of the conflict and lay the foundation of a democratic society. The
responsibility and political will of the transitional authorities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo must be paramount in this regard. As I outlined initially in
my thirteenth report to the Security Council (S/2003/211, para. 59), MONUC could
assist in the sector of the rule of law by coordinating the overall international effort
in the areas of civilian police, human rights, the judiciary and correctional facilities.
To enable it to do so, and ensure the harmonization of initiatives, the close support
and collaboration of bilateral donors and multilateral and other agencies will be
required. My Special Representative intends to establish a multi-disciplinary task
force on the rule of law to ensure internal and external coordination of effort. While
emphasizing Congolese ownership in all steps of the transition, MONUC is well
- 98 -
20
S/2003/566
placed to provide facilitation and coordination, technical and training advice and
structures that could contribute to the establishment of a functional police and to
respect for human rights, and to assist in the reform of the judiciary and correctional
services.
72. To achieve such goals, a detailed assessment of the rule of law sector will be
necessary. Towards this end, representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, MONUC, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and UNDP met for preliminary consultations, at Geneva on 6 May,
with other United Nations and international actors in this field. Such consultations
will be actively followed up, and will also include the Transitional Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular, the Ministries of Justice, the
Interior and Human Rights, once such a government is installed, as well as those
bilateral donors interested in actively providing assistance in this vital sector.
Subsequently, a multidisciplinary team will have to conduct a comprehensive
assessment of this sector and recommend a framework in which each actor
interested in providing assistance can be identified, taking into account the wishes
of the new Government and the advice of various national players in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, including civil society.
73. At the United Nations country team level, a thematic group on human rights
and justice has also commenced preparations for a comprehensive programme of
support to the Transitional Government. The main areas of United Nations system
assistance, in close collaboration with and in support of other actors, have been
identified as: reform and strengthening of the legal framework and judicial system;
reform, rehabilitation and development of an integrated national police service with
particular emphasis on the rule of law and human rights issues; reform and
strengthening of the correctional system; training the armed forces on the rule of law
and human rights issues; support to the national human rights institutions; support to
the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and introduction of
measures to promote democratic and participatory governance. Measures to monitor,
address and redress violations of human rights will need to be given top priority.
74. As regards the support that may be required for the creation of a national
integrated police force, in addition to assisting the formation of the integrated police
unit in Kinshasa, and possibly in Ituri, the objectives for the international
community and MONUC would include contributing to improvements in
professional competence, organizational capacity and institutional integrity; public
awareness of the role of the police in a democratic society; and the cooperation
between the police, the judiciary and the correctional system. These objectives can
be achieved through advisory, training and development roles supported by the
provision of some material and financial assistance for equipment and facilities
including the possible rehabilitation of former training facilities, in five regional
centres — Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani, Gbadolite and Bukavu. While some
Member States have already offered bilateral assistance in equipping and training
the national police, a special multi-donor mission should be dispatched to further
study this vital area of activities and provide recommendations to the international
community.
75. International assistance in police training will however need to be linked to a
number of benchmarks to be implemented by the Congolese authorities, including
regular payment of adequate salaries, transparency in recruitment, promotion and
- 99 -
21
S/2003/566
discipline, deployment of personnel based on the type of training received,
development and implementation of internal accountability mechanisms, and a
maintenance programme financed by the authorities for buildings refurbished by the
international community. All efforts in support of the police must include concurrent
efforts in support of the judiciary and the correctional services, and the necessary
budgetary appropriations should be well coordinated with the Bretton Woods
institutions.
Security sector reform/disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
Congolese combatants
76. A main objective during the transition period will be security sector reform. It
will be vital for new national, integrated security institutions to be established in a
transparent manner if they are to play a legitimate and democratically accountable
role in providing security for all Congolese people. As indicated above, the creation
of an integrated police force that will be responsible for internal security is an
immediate priority. The earliest possible formation of the professional national
armed forces is also essential. Some bilateral donors have indicated preliminary
interest in a possible role in assisting the Transitional Government in these areas.
77. The establishment of a national army and the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of combatants will be a vital aspect of any security sector reform.
MONUC has explored with UNDP, the World Bank-led Multi-Country
Demobilization and Reintegration Programme and United Nations agencies the
possible follow-up to the proposal in my last report (S/2003/211, para. 60) that the
expertise of MONUC in disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration could be extended to the disarmament of Congolese combatants and
the coordination of the activities of bilateral donors.
78. Any action MONUC would take in this respect, subject to the agreement of the
Security Council, would support the process of creating unified national Congolese
armed forces. MONUC activities in the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of Congolese combatants could include (a) providing information on
Congolese armed groups, using its already established database; (b) building on its
already established contacts to sensitize non-signatory Congolese armed groups, as
well as Mai-Mai, about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; (c) assisting
in the public information campaign; and (d) providing the necessary technical
assistance to the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme
to be developed. Additional recommendations concerning a possible role for
MONUC in the disarmament of Congolese combatants would be provided to the
Security Council at a later stage.
79. In response to a formal request from President Kabila in September 2002, and
following consultations within the United Nations country task force, UNDP was
designated as the lead agency for the coordination of international efforts for the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Congolese forces. This
decision was endorsed by the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration
Programme in February 2003. UNDP has developed an interim strategy for the
development of a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
programme for the next three to six months, which was discussed during a recent
meeting of the Multi-Country Programme in Paris in April. This interim strategy is
based on four simultaneous approaches, namely, (a) a dialogue between the principal
- 100 -
22
S/2003/566
political actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the structure and
management of a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
programme which should have the active support of all components of the
Transitional Government; (b) the planning of a large and logistically complex
national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme; (c) the
development of a rapid response mechanism to address these issues pending the full
establishment of a national programme; and (d) current efforts led by UNICEF for
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, as well as
UNDP support for disabled ex-combatants, which will continue and be incorporated
into a national programme.
Child protection and gender affairs
80. Many of the Mission’s currently mandated tasks, in particular those that it has
been unable to fulfil completely because of fighting and insecurity, will be even
more relevant in the transition period. During this period, MONUC will monitor the
integration of child protection issues into new or reformed institutions and
legislation to ensure that needs are fully addressed. The disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers is likely to increase tremendously
once the national programme is implemented and conditions are favourable. The
challenge remains enormous given the high numbers of child soldiers still on the
front lines or in military camps throughout the country, and the precarious security
conditions in some areas, which make reintegration difficult and the risks of rerecruitment
high. MONUC will also continue to monitor violations of children’s
rights in order to evaluate the impact of the transition on children. The already
robust involvement of the MONUC gender affairs component with civil society and
political parties will also be instrumental in capacity-building to allow women
leaders and women’s organizations to play a greater role in the democratic process.
Towards a comprehensive approach to support the peace process
81. The work of MONUC, as outlined above, is designed to be carried out in the
framework of its partnerships within the United Nations system and the wider
international community. Even so, its work will be limited and the needs of the
transition will be great. The immediate priorities are the rehabilitation of
infrastructure and the provision of technical support for the efficient functioning of
the new governmental structures. Even at this early phase, however, there is a need
for a comprehensive package aimed at setting the stage for good governance and
consisting of both short-term and long-term activities. With respect to infrastructure,
the immediate need is for office space for the additional institutions and positions
created. The Government has requested the help of UNDP, the World Bank and the
European Union to mobilize the necessary resources for the rehabilitation of
existing governmental buildings. An assessment of needs is under way, and once
finalized will be presented to the donor community. The presentation should be
made by the Follow-up Commission and could well be cast as the first phase of
donor support for governance in the transition, which would culminate in support for
the preparation and organization of the elections.
82. To complement the support in the rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure,
other needs will be addressed, namely the need for training and provision of
technical support for the efficient functioning of the new structures, taking into
consideration the time limitation of their mandate. The role to be played by the
- 101 -
23
S/2003/566
United Nations system should be catalytic. UNDP and other partners have started
work on a public service reform programme and on an interim capacity-building
strategy. The support of the United Nations system will be further extended to
include the administrations in the provinces, with a view to promoting the unity of
the national administration and laying the ground for the organization of the
elections at the end of the transitional period.
83. In the medium term, the unification of the territory and complete freedom of
movement is a priority for humanitarian and development actors. Insecurity is the
major constraint at present; the wider deployment of MONUC in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo could help to alleviate the situation, although the
onus clearly rests with the parties to cease all military activities. At the same time,
enhanced mobility will require significant improvements to the country’s
transportation infrastructure, which is virtually non-existent. Discussions are already
under way to join efforts with bilateral donors in the rehabilitation of roads and
other transport links and facilities. In the meantime, the United Nations system and
implementing parties will continue to rely on the Mission’s transportation
capabilities.
84. With regard to the effective management of natural resources, new legislative
and regulatory frameworks have already been established with the assistance of the
World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. A
process of validation of existing titles and concessions is foreseen as part of the
transition process, pursuant to a decision to this effect of the Economic Working
Group of the inter-Congolese dialogue. It would be important to start the process of
validation quickly, as the current uncertainty over many titles and concessions will
delay all productive investments in this important sector. At the same time, it is
essential that the different parties start cooperating urgently on enforcement of
legislation, to prevent a sudden burst of uncontrolled exploitation — especially of
the forest — with potentially very negative environmental consequences. UNDP and
the Global Environment Facility are involved in the environmental management of a
number of sites throughout the country. The international community could provide
valuable assistance, via the Congo Basin initiative, as well as by involving reputable
non-governmental organizations in the monitoring of logging activities.
85. On the issue of longer-term reconstruction and rehabilitation, the Emergency
Humanitarian, Social and Cultural Programme adopted during the inter-Congolese
dialogue at Sun City provides a viable framework. The Congolese parties should
develop a mechanism for strategy formulation and donor coordination, so as to
maximize donor involvement and the speed of implementation. The key process in
this context is that of the poverty reduction strategy paper, which was endorsed at
Sun City. In addition, it is important to follow up on the decisions made at the
meeting of the Consultative Group for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
Paris in December 2002. Those include the acceptance by the Government and all
donors of the Emergency Multi-Sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Programme as the framework for financing public investment and reconstruction,
and the decision that, as soon as feasible, a multi-donor effort would work to extend
the framework to cover the entire country. It is essential that the extension of that
Programme be harmonized with the important humanitarian programme coordinated
by the United Nations system, so as to ensure a smooth transition from humanitarian
assistance (especially in the east) to recovery and reconstruction and longer-term
- 102 -
24
S/2003/566
development. In addition, it is important that the work be focused not only on
physical reconstruction but also on governance and reconciliation.
86. A first step to achieving this could be the constitution of technical-level
national working groups on a few issues which are universally viewed as urgent.
Experience in other post-conflict situations shows that such technical-level
cooperation can be an important element in confidence-building. To this end,
coordination should be well established between the political and technical decisionmaking
institutions — the Follow-up Commission and the International Committee
on one side and the United Nations agencies and Bretton Woods institutions on
another. MONUC, which is involved in the political process, could serve as a link.
The success of the activities of the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions
would very much depend on the establishment of reliable coordination mechanisms
(the above-mentioned technical-level national working groups) and the efficient use
of existing ones (United Nations regional coordinator and country team, regional
initiatives and others). Three initial topics could be disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration, currency and HIV/AIDS. As a second step, a multi-donor mission
in June could serve to render more visible the efforts of the international community
to translate the transition into concrete results for the population. This could be
followed by a high-level multi-donor mission late in the summer, which would lead
to important resource mobilization at the next Consultative Group meeting in the
autumn.
V. Financial and administrative aspects
87. The General Assembly, by its resolution 56/252 C of 27 June 2002,
appropriated an amount of $581.9 million for the maintenance of MONUC for the
period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003. As at 30 April 2003, unpaid assessed
contributions to the MONUC special account amounted to $108,752,465. The total
outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date
amounted to $1,375,914,354. Since its establishment in October 1999, the Trust
Fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has
received voluntary contributions amounting to $1,124,980, with expenditures
authorized to date in the full amount.
88. So far, the Mission’s logistics resources, including aviation, have been planned
for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
operations, primarily in the areas of Kindu and Kisangani. Owing to the poor
internal infrastructure throughout the country, the Mission continues to rely heavily
on air assets and has requested the deployment of the second Mi-26 helicopter. A
military airfield service unit has been identified for the deployment, and an ICAO
airfield rehabilitation project is expected to be under way shortly, focusing on
important airfields in the east. The deployment to Ituri and the sustainment of the
force there will pose a considerable unforeseen logistical challenge. MONUC will
have to develop a supportable logistics infrastructure to sustain a military and
civilian force of up to 3,800 in Ituri. The main costs will arise from the requirement
for additional medium and heavy transport aircraft, repairs to the Bunia airstrip and
the rehabilitation of the surface transport infrastructure for long-term support. This
will require considerable investment.
- 103 -
25
S/2003/566
89. In view of the limited accessibility to the Ituri region, it is envisaged that
logistics support will be provided using a combination of sea, road, rail and air
transport through Uganda for the deployment of the forces and the sustainment of
the MONUC military and civilian presence. Uganda has useable airports and a
reasonably good road infrastructure leading to the border with the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The road network in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
leading to Bunia is in poor condition and will require extensive rehabilitation. As
this will take some time, resupply of the military contingents will primarily be
conducted by air for the foreseeable future.
VI. Observations
90. After nearly five years of continuous fighting, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo finds itself at an intersection of peace and war. The definitive and successful
conclusion of the inter-Congolese dialogue is a crucial milestone that constitutes the
commitment by the Congolese parties to finally pursue a path of peace and
reconciliation. The Congolese leaders must fulfil their obligations to the Congolese
people, who have been waiting too long for their suffering to end. I wish to
congratulate the Congolese parties in taking this step and to thank Sir Ketumile
Masire, the neutral facilitator, and my Special Envoy for the inter-Congolese
dialogue, Moustapha Niasse, for their tireless and determined efforts to complete
this process. I would also congratulate the African Union, in particular its current
Chairman, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, for the extensive support and
assistance rendered throughout the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
91. This is also a milestone for the United Nations. Since August 1999, the
primary role of MONUC has been to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement and supplementary bilateral agreements that provided the
framework for addressing the military dimension of the conflict. Despite slow and
partial compliance by the parties, there have been major achievements, including the
disengagement of foreign armed forces and their allies to defensive positions, the
withdrawal of the majority of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and initial progress in the ad hoc disarmament, demobilization and
repatriation of Rwandan armed groups. I wish to pay special tribute to the men and
women of MONUC, especially my Special Representative, Amos Namanga Ngongi,
and the Force Commander, General Mountaga Diallo, for their courageous and
indispensable efforts in advancing the peace process.
92. The peace process has now moved beyond the Lusaka framework and begun a
new chapter that, more than ever, will require the comprehensive engagement and
assistance of the United Nations and the international community at large. The
magnitude of the challenges should not be underestimated: the country is still
divided, military hostilities continue in the east, the population is traumatized by
years of conflict, the country is poverty stricken and State services and
infrastructure are non-existent.
93. MONUC is well, if not uniquely, placed to play a central catalytic role in
assisting the parties through the transition period. For this reason I believe that the
main focus of MONUC should now shift to facilitating and assisting the transitional
process, and that the Mission should be reconfigured and augmented accordingly.
- 104 -
26
S/2003/566
The immediate priority is to assist in the establishment of the Transitional
Government. In the All-Inclusive Agreement, and in a letter dated 4 May from
President Kabila, the United Nations has been requested to deploy a force to
participate in the proposed multi-layered confidence-building security system to
give confidence to transitional leaders in Kinshasa, outlined in paragraphs 33 to 38
of this report. I recommend that the Council agree to these requests by approving the
proposed involvement of MONUC.
94. With respect to the institutions of the transition, I welcome the initial positive
steps such as the formation of the Follow-up Commission and the participation of all
its members, and the establishment of the International Committee in Support of the
Transition that is convened by my Special Representative. The new Transition
Support Unit in MONUC has already been instrumental in facilitating the
preparatory phase of the implementation of the All-Inclusive Agreement. I intend to
supplement it by establishing a small electoral assistance cell to commence planning
the possible United Nations role in support of elections.
95. Many other challenges, especially the brutal conflicts in Ituri and in the Kivus,
stand on the path to the transition. The ongoing strife in Ituri is a humanitarian
catastrophe that threatens to derail the overall peace process. Supporting the
representative, interim administration that was established on 14 April by the Ituri
Pacification Commission is the only viable strategy for achieving peace in this
troubled area. Uganda’s withdrawal from Ituri is welcome, but it and all other
external actors must recognize their accountability for the actions of those armed
groups they helped create and must cease to supply them or give them succour.
96. In the current situation of instability and violence, and in the context of the
Ituri Pacification Commission and the All-Inclusive Agreement, there can be no
justification for supplying weapons to any group. I therefore recommend that the
possibility of imposing an arms embargo be considered in Ituri as well as in the
Kivus, with an exemption for the equipment of members of the future integrated
armed and police units.
97. MONUC, through its enhanced presence backed up by the deployment of a
brigade-size force as described in paragraphs 45 to 54, has a vital role to play in
support of the still fragile Ituri political process. I am extremely concerned about the
Mission’s current limited presence in Ituri, especially in view of the immense gap
between its capabilities and the high expectations of the population. The
international community has a collective responsibility to address the rapidly
deteriorating security situation in Bunia. I appeal to the Security Council to urgently
approve the deployment of a task force to Bunia, as well as the concept of
operations for a MONUC brigade-size force as described in paragraphs 51 to 54
above.
98. At the same time, the deployment of such a force would not be possible before
the end of July even under the best of circumstances, leaving a dangerous interim
gap in this highly volatile area. I therefore call on the Security Council to urgently
consider the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well equipped force,
under the lead of a Member State, to provide security at the airport as well as other
vital installations in that town and protect the civilian population, as a temporary
bridging arrangement before the possible deployment of a reinforced United Nations
presence. Such a deployment — for a limited period of time — should be authorized
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
- 105 -
27
S/2003/566
Neighbouring States and any other actors concerned should refrain from interfering
in the ongoing developments in Ituri.
99. The ongoing military offensives in the Kivus continue to cause widespread
suffering and undermine disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration activities, and entail the risk of the direct re-engagement of
neighbouring States. I call on all those involved in the fighting — RCD-Goma,
various Mai-Mai groups and other local militias — to cease hostilities immediately.
Arms supplies and other military support to all groups should also cease without
delay. But these measures alone would not be enough. MONUC has a role to play in
encouraging and assisting local and international partners in conflict resolution
efforts by expanding the presence of its civilian personnel and military observers in
the Kivus. I call on donors to contribute to a special fund for local peacemaking to
be used by my Special Representative. Resources provided to such a fund could be
used as seed money to supplement MONUC quick-impact projects in support of
local grass-roots initiatives.
100. The disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
of foreign armed groups must remain an important goal of the international
community, as that process lies at the heart of the Great Lakes conflict. There is
growing recognition, however, that a successful disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme is not the prerequisite to a
lasting peace process, but its by-product. The work of the Third Party Verification
Mechanism established pursuant to the agreement of 30 July 2002 between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, has been a useful instrument for
accelerating the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the disarmament,
demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of Rwandan armed
groups. Having accomplished its overall mission, the Mechanism is expected to
conclude its work shortly. The full deployment during this month of the first task
force in the Kivus will put the current ad hoc disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration activities of MONUC on a firmer
footing. I call on all concerned to cooperate with MONUC so that it can carry out
this important task. I also encourage the Transitional Government of Burundi,
together with all armed groups, to establish a disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration programme there, so that those Burundian armed groups identified by
MONUC in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo may be repatriated to
their country of origin within an established structure.
101. Equally important for the transition process in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese armed and
irregular forces. Further to the suggestion I made in my last report, I propose to the
Security Council that the mandate of MONUC be expanded to assist the Transitional
Government, at its request, to plan the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of Congolese combatants. This should be done in the context of the
creation of unified national Congolese armed forces, and in close collaboration with
the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, bilateral donors
and United Nations agencies. I shall revert to the Council in due course with any
operational recommendations that may be necessary in this regard.
102. I am appalled by the egregious level of gross human rights violations that
continue to be committed throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo, some
of which have been documented extensively by MONUC. I appeal to the transitional
- 106 -
28
S/2003/566
Congolese leaders to make the protection of human rights one of the highest
priorities of the new Transitional Government. MONUC and the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights will work closely with the
transitional institutions in this regard.
103. The immediate priorities, especially those related to the security arrangements
in Kinshasa and peace initiatives in Ituri, clearly require further resources for
MONUC. Taking into account the major operational readjustments that have been
undertaken, I recommend that the mandate of MONUC be extended for another year,
until 30 June 2004, and that the authorized military strength of MONUC be
increased to 10,800 all ranks. I also recommend that the number of civilian police
personnel be increased from the current level of 100 to 134 police officers. It should
be noted that 6 to 48 additional officers will also be required, depending on the
training option for the integrated police unit to be followed (see paras. 41 and 42
above). Other specialized personnel to support the immediate priorities of MONUC
(see sect. IV.A) will also have to be augmented. While the troop level will be kept
under constant review, it should be noted that the current requirements are based on
the present threat assessments and that, should the situation deteriorate, additional
resources may be required. I shall revert to the Security Council with specific
recommendations for longer-term objectives, which are described in paragraphs 67
to 86 of the report.
104. A United Nations peacekeeping operation relies on cooperation with other
partners to consolidate a hard-won peace. I call on all concerned to coordinate their
efforts to harmonize initiatives, aimed at maximizing results in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. I am pleased to note that the World Bank and other donors
are already increasing their assistance to the country.
105. Despite the best will of the United Nations and its partners, the peace process
cannot move forward without the demonstrated commitment of the Congolese
leaders. There are a number of key benchmarks that the parties must observe in the
coming weeks to maintain momentum and demonstrate their commitment. They
include the immediate cessation of hostilities and of inflammatory rhetoric and
propaganda; the lifting of restrictions on the free movement of goods and people
throughout the country; the liberalization of political activity in the areas under their
control; the disbandment of armed groups or their transformation into political
parties; and taking steps to establish the high command of the integrated national
armed forces and to form an initial unit of integrated police.
106. The illicit exploitation of natural resources has criminalized the conflict in
some areas, making it all the more difficult to stop, as well as depriving the
Congolese people of their heritage and livelihood. The Transitional Government
must produce, in a transparent manner, a budget with provisions for key State
services. To this end, the Government should be held accountable for the effective
management of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
necessary assistance should be provided towards this end.
107. The challenge at hand is enormous. It is up to the Congolese themselves to
keep the peace process vibrant, dynamic and successful. The international
community, including MONUC, will follow their lead and provide the necessary
assistance in translating the vision of peace into a reality.
- 107 -
ANNEX 3.7
IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], Nairobi, 3 March 2000
- 108 -
o@
The inside story on emergencies
Aid and Policy Conflict Environment and Disasters Migration More v
FEATURED TOPICS: NIGFRIA EMAIL ALERTS MIDDLE EAST MOST READ FXCI.USIVE. RLUE NII E FRONTLINF
Feature
Politics and Economics
IRIN Special Report
on the Ituri clashes -
[part one]
NAIROBI, 3 March 2000
Introduction
Bloody ethnic clashes in the lturi district of
northeastern DRC, which broke out in June last year,
drew international attention to an ongoing conflict
between the Hema and Lendu people in the area.
The clashes resulted in the deaths of some 4,000-
7,000 and an estimated 150,000 displaced people.
Hundreds of survivors have been left seriously
maimed, and local hospitals are stretched to the
limits of their skills and resources to care for patients
with gruesome machete injuries and traumatic
amputations. Villages have been razed to the
ground, homes burnt, crops and land abandoned,
and vital possessions including seeds, agricultural
tools and clothes destroyed.
No peace agreement between the hostile parties
Share this report
Most Popular
EXCL
USIVE
Inside
Saudi
Arabi
a's
Yeme
n war
rooms
8
Septemb
2016
Lots
of
peace
talk
has yet been reached, and the rebel
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratieMouvement
de liberation {RCD-ML), which controls
the area, calls the present lull in the fighting no more
than "hopeful". As a "test of sentiment", according to
RCD-ML leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the
authorities are encouraging people to return to their
abandoned and destroyed villages. But many of the
displaced fear to return to villages where there is
inadequate security and no structure has been put
in place for returnees.
Since the beginning of February, hospitals have
admitted new victims attacked on an individual basis
when attempting to go home. Nominal security -
sometimes only two or three soldiers - is provided in
the villages by the Ugandan army, which occupies
northeastern Congo and backs the RCD-ML.
Humanitarian agencies complain extremist
sentiment from both the Lendu and Hema camps is
obstructing a basic response to the crisis that was
deemed "acute" last October.
Origin of the conflict
Hostility between the Lendu and Hema communities
is rooted in unequal acquisition and access to land,
education, and local government. Although neither
community originated in the area, the settlement of
the Bantu Lendu agriculturists pre-dated the 19th
century arrival of the Nilotic cattle-herding Hema.
Both sides have differing interpretations of the
original history and pattern of settlement, but it is
generally recognised that the minority Hema
benefited disproportionately from the departing
Belgian colonialists. They inherited plantations,
farms and fertile lands, and became a land-owning
class. The Lendu were employed to work on the
land, and see the Hema are acquisitive "outsiders"
who migrated from areas in Uganda and Sudan. The
comparative wealth of the Hema gave them more
access to education and greater representation in
but
little
new
hope
for
Myan
mar
displa
ced
9
Septemb
2016
Top
Picks:
Mass
atrocit
ies,
make
shift
refine
ries,
and
migra
nt
childr
en
9
Septemb
2016
advertisement
administration and local government despite having
a minority status.
Other tribes are involved in the conflict, also woven
into this relationship of inequality. The Alur, for
example, used the Lendu for cultivation and service
"like slaves", according to one local player. The area
is actually a patchwork of many different tribes, of
which the Lendu and Hema are only part. According
to RCD-ML representatives, out of a population of 1.4
million in the main Djugu area of lturi, some 450,000
are Lendu and about 250,000 are Hema.
This local construction of communities fits into a
larger political context in the Democratic Republic of
Congo where the state has tended to lend
"authenticity" to Bantu groups. More recently, Nilotic
groups like the Hema have been associated with the
occupying armies of Rwanda and Uganda. There
were hostile flashpoints between the Lendu and
Hema before the current conflict - notably 1975 and
1991 - although nothing comparable to the present
massacres. Lendu and Hema representatives say
previous conflicts were stopped during former
president Mobutu Sese Seko's regime through the
mechanisms of local administration, security and
intelligence, as well as successful mediation and
traditional agreements.
Theories put forward as to why the massacres
began tend to focus on expansionism by the Hema
and unequal land access, which provoked attacks by
the Lendu, then spiralled into counter-attacks. The
"trigger" event that turned an inequality - typical on
the continent - into mass killings is not known. It has
been variously attributed to evictions and
manipulated borders as well as planned retribution.
In 1998 there were some incidents of Hema
manipulation and Lendu looting that have been
retrospectively related to the build-up of hostilities.
But inequality of land and representation did not
make the killings inevitable. Research in the area of
Jene suis pas fou.
mediamarkt.be
Bloncheporte4
La mode pour toutes les
femmes
blancheporte.be
Voyagez en bus a partir de 5€
ouibus.com
conflict shows that initial attacks were far more
sophisticated than spontaneous grievances, and
paperwork kept in the administration files of Blukwa
- a flashpoint of the clashes - demonstrate an
element of planning and execution in the absence of
any real authority. There is also the possibility of a
wider political dynamic, though this remains
speculative, involving former soldiers and
factionalism. All camps make references to a
"hidden hand", implying a political strategy behind
the conflict. Ugandan soldiers claim former Mobutu
soldiers are masterminding some of the attacks.
While there is no evidence of state participation in
the Lendu-Hema conflict, the ethnic focus, the
method of attack and the sheer numbers killed has
led to accusations of "genocide". The UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights has called the killings
"possible crimes against humanity".
The first round of violence
According to displaced Lendu and Hema, the first
mass machete attacks were launched by the Lendu
from the Pitsi collectivity against Hema villages in
the Djugu and Blukwa areas in June 1999. This
coincided with the appointment of district governor,
Adele Lotsove, a Hema, roundly criticised for her
attempts to increase the economic and political
standing of her own people, and her partisan
handling of subsequent peace talks.
Concern among international and local observers to
apply the concept of "balance" to a conflict that has
seen vast numbers of both Lendu and Hema killed,
has emphasised historical grievances and counterkillings.
This tends to obscure the pattern and origin
of the killings. Apart from complaints about their
immediate circumstances, recent attacks and
traditional grievances, Lendu and Hema victims
concur that extremists in the Pitsi collectivity initiated
mass killings. The planned assaults took the Hema
unaware, and aimed to remove the Hema from land
considered Lendu. Both Lendu and Hema victims
point out, also, that it would have taken lengthy
planning to make the enormous numbers of arrows
used in mass attacks. In the absence of any real
authority, killings escalated when the Hema
launched counter-attacks and used Ugandan
soldiers in a defensive strategy. Subsequently, the
scale of tit-for-tat attacks over the last few months
has resulted in thousands dead on both sides,
gruesome injuries, and rendered meaningless
notions of "attacker" and "defender".
A displaced Lendu man in Bunia described how a
Lendu village, Buli, was attacked early one morning
by Lendu extremists. His daughter broke her leg in
the rush to find sanctuary in the Catholic church,
where they waited for three hours before Ugandan
soldiers arrived. Extremists have put pressure on
Lendu communities, he says. "They want us all to
join the fight. When they come to us, the message is
clear - let's go and fight Hema and soldiers together
with machetes. If you don't, you will also be killed."
The strategy
Attacks were preceded by written warnings sent out
in May from chiefs from the Pitsi locality that Hema
should vacate the land and leave their livestock and
crops behind. Blukwa administration has kept notes
sent out by the Lendu chiefs of Bamgusu and Mukpa
(Pitsi grouping) to the population of Uchubu and
Juza to vacate by 18 June. According to villagers
and the administration in Blukwa, houses were burnt
on 18 June, then the attacks moved onto Blukwa
itself on 22 June.
Copies of the threats from Pitsi are kept in official
files held by the Blukwa administration. Written in
Swahili, the note to Blukwa translates:
"Today, today, today, visitors who are living here in
these hills, you are ordered to leave. Those who
have cattle, goats and sheep should hand them over
and leave our hills forever. The fifth day is your last
day. After that, it will be as you have heard. Leave
and get out."
Once received, original copies were attached to
official letters from the administration requesting
protection and increased security. Urgent alerts
were sent to the security committee, commander of
the army, and commander of the police in Bunia and
Djugu, in June, but without response. The letters
bear the official stamps indicating the date they
were sent and the date received.
Representatives of the Hema community claim
Lendu extremists are using an organisation formed
around 1993 as a political vehicle - the 'Liberation of
the Oppressed Race of lturi', or LORI. In the KiLendu
language, "lori" means "the place where things are
settled". According to its detractors, LORI has senior
leaders based in Kinshasa. In February,
representatives of LORI in Bunia told international
journalists that the organisation was a cultural
association and played no part in the killings.
Mass killings over the next few months, initiated by
these extremists, included attacks on moderate
fellow Lendu. The latter typically continued to live
among the Hema and avoided active participation in
the attacks. They make up a large proportion of the
displaced in urban and trading centres like Bunia,
Djugu and Drodro.
With the escalation of counter-attacks by Hema,
there must be concern about the continued ability of
the displaced to exist together. To date, displaced
Hema and Lendu mix successfully in the centres and
hospitals. But as the conflict continues, increased
polarisation makes resentment follow purely ethnic
lines, so that, for example, displaced moderate
Lendu, are finding it increasingly difficult to find
survival work in the fields.
Initial attacks by Lendu extremists included assaults
on other tribes, such as the Ndo Okebo and Alur,
seen to share interests or territory with the Hema.
These attacks were not small or incidental. The Ndo
Okebo lost many people and villages in the Djugu
area and, along with the Alur and Mambisa, are a
crucial part of the peace talks currently underway.
The Hema began to use their comparative wealth
and influence to hire Ugandan soldiers for counter
attacks. Although the Ugandan army had no clear
instructions on how to handle the conflict at this
stage, soldiers admit there was a "sympathy" for the
Hema, not just as victims of the first attacks, but
because they were derided as having Ugandan
origins. In the absence of policy, the "special
relationship" between the Hema and the Ugandan
soldiers added a deadly dynamic, based partly on
socio-political factors, and partly on wealth and
resources. Some individual officers took the
opportunity to accumulate wealth by protecting the
Hema, acting like mercenaries.
Method of attack
Initial attacks on targeted villages caught victims
unaware, and there was a wholesale slaughter by
machetes and arrows of hundreds of villagers, and a
comprehensive destruction of houses. An unknown
number of bodies -possibly thousands - were buried
in mass graves or left in the bush for scavengers.
Unable to return to occupied and destroyed villages,
many families from both sides have failed to
properly bury their dead. Counter-attacks followed a
similar modus operandi. These are descriptions of
attacks by some of the victims:
"They came dressed in sports shirts early in the
morning, and some had animal skins round their
heads. They carried a lot of arrows. There were
hundreds of fighters. They started first in the village
with machetes and burnt houses. If you ran into the
bush, you would be hit with arrows. Some of us
managed to get back later and bury the dead but
some of the bodies had been burnt in the houses,
and some had been cut up. They take the heart, the
sex, the tongue and the hands of the dead."
[Displaced Hema interviewed in Drodro, after Lendu
attack on Buyi village in July 1999].
"The attackers came early on Sunday morning and
killed more than 80 people in two villages, using
machetes and arrows. There were hundreds of
Hema with Ndo Okebo. First they sent a letter
saying they will attack us. They started the attack by
encircling the village and blowing horns. Many were
injured and we brought people to hospital, but we
have no medicine." [Lendu survivor interviewed in
Saliboko, describing a 15 January 2000 Hema
attack].
Ugandan soldiers concur that thousands of fighters
group together for an attack. Mostly the attackers
are adult male, but include boys as young as ten and
occasionally women. Victims are often trapped in
their houses early in the morning and killed as they
run for the bush, or tracked down in the bush with
arrows and machetes. Many victims describe how
the attackers bang on the doors of houses shouting
an alert, then kill as people run out of the house.
The number dilemma
There are no reliable figures of dead or injured on
each side. A UN assessment mission to Djugu in
October estimated over 100,000 displaced and said
estimates of the dead ranged from 5,000-7,000.
More massacres have taken place - on a monthly
basis - up to February since that figure was
established as the upper estimate.
That figure and allegations of "genocide" provoked
a reaction from RCD-ML authorities in January, who
Share this report
said no more than 2,000 had been killed. But leader
Ernest Wamba dia Wamba admitted in February that
"numbers were estimates", and "around 4,000" had
been killed. Some humanitarian representatives in
the field said 7,000 was now an accepted figure, and
the number of dead could be greater.
Although there are no reliable figures on the
numbers of dead on each side, there are certain
patterns of hospitalisation and injuries. The vast
majority of victims presently hospitalised with gross
machete wounds and traumatic amputations are
Hema. Hospital staff do not keep records, but say
that the early victims were overwhelmingly Hema.
Bunia hospital, on the other hand, has received
more Lendu victims with bullet wounds. There are
six such cases since January 2000, including small
children, attributed to attacks by security forces.
One international humanitarian organisation warns
that Lendu victims may not be brought into town and
are more likely, particularly with bullet wounds, to
remain in the bush.
end part one
Get latest reports in your inbox.
Subscribe to email alerts
Join the discussion advertisement
O Comments Sort by Oldest
Add a comment...
fl Facebook Comments Plugin
advertisement
Cartouche Cartouche
C525/5268/CL pour PG5/CL8CLRXL pour
CANON Pixma MG5 ...
21,64 €
I Acheter 11
Get the inside story
Enter your email address to sign up for
updates with our latest news and reports.
CANON MP 510
12,97 €
Acheter
Cartouche T180140
pour EPSON
Expression Home X ...
10,60 €
11 Acheter
Carto1
P3KE718/C
EPSON.. . .C
17,8
II AchE
Enter your email address Sign up
The inside story on Themes Regions Follow us
emergencies
Aid and Policy Africa
About us Conflict Americas
Meet the team Environment and Asia-Pacific
Our partners Disasters Europe
Most popular Food Middle East
Health Global Issues
9 All Rights Reserved Human Rights
2016 Migration
Privacy Politics and
Reprints Economics
ANNEX 3.8
Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à
l’autodétermination du peuple congolais”, 31 August 1999
[Annex not translated]
[The text appearing as Annex 3.8 in the version filed by the DRC is in fact the following:
Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des Alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au 10 juin 2000) et
le droit à la paix”, 30 June 2000, which can also be found at Annex 4.10d. The text entitled
“La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à l’autodétermination du peuple congolais” may be
found at Annex 4.10c.]
___________
- 109 -