Volume IV - Annexes 135-158

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean
(Somalia v Kenya)
COUNTER-MEMORIAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA
VOLUME IV
18 DECEMBER 2017
Annex 135
Post-1992 maritime delimitations between States with adjacent coasts
(other than those enumerated in the text of the Counter-Memorial).
Treaty Series
Treaties and international agreements
registered
or filed and recorded
with the Secretariat of the United Nations
VOLUME 1709
Recueil des Traitis
Traitis et accords internationaux
enregistris
ou classes et inscrits au repertoire
au Secretariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
United Nations 9 Nations Unies
New York, 2001
No. 29574
OMAN
and
YEMEN
International Boundary Agreement (with annexes, joint letter
dated 25 December 1992 and maps). Signed at San'a on
1 October 1992
Authentic text: Arabic.
Registered by Oman and Yemen on 4 February 1993.
OMAN
et
YEMEN
Accord international de de1imitation (avec annexes, lettre
commune en date du 25 d6cembre 1992 et cartes). Sign6
i Sana'a le ier octobre 1992
Texte authentique : arabe.
EnregistrJ par 1'Oman et le Ygmen le 4 fivrier 1993.
Vol. 1709, 1-29574
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429
430 United Nations - Treaty Series * Nations Unies - Recueil des Traitis 1993
[TRANSLATION - TRADUCTION]
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AGREEMENT' BETWEEN THE
SULTANATE OF OMAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
The Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen, proceeding from the fraternal
links and the common interest that unite their two countries and peoples, in
pursuance of the noble Islamic Shariah, prompted by the desire to strengthen the
existing bonds of brotherhood and the relationship of neighbourliness between the
two fraternal countries,
And in view of the desire of each of the two countries to establish the boundary
between them in a definitive manner, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The boundary line separating the territory of the Sultanate of Oman and the
territory of the Republic of Yemen shall be that described in article 2 of this Agreement
and based on geodesic system 84.
Article 2
The boundary line between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen
begins from the principal point at Ra's Darbat Ali (the Rock), numbered as point
No. 1, at the intersection of the geographical coordinates of parallel 16 degrees
39 minutes 3.83 seconds north and meridian 53 degrees 6 minutes 30.88 seconds east,
and ends at the principal point numbered as point 8 at the geographical alignment of
the intersection of parallel 19 degrees north with meridian 52 degrees east, and the
boundary line extends between the two principal points whose coordinates are set
forth above passing through points 2, 3, 4, 4a, 4b, 5, 6 and 7, in accordance with the
following coordinates:
Point No. 2 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees 17 minutes 7.91 seconds
north with meridian 52 degrees 48 minutes 44.22 seconds east.
Point No. 3 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees 17 minutes 40 seconds
north with meridian 52 degrees 44 minutes 45 seconds east.
Point No. 4 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees 18 minutes 6.93 seconds
north with meridian 52 degrees 44 minutes 33.50 seconds east.
Point No. 4a, ancillary to point number 4, is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees
18 minutes 8.87 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees 44 minutes 34.24 seconds
east.
Point No. 4b, ancillary to point number 4, is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees
18 minutes 8.42 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees 44 minutes 35.57 seconds
east.
I Came into force on 27 December 1992 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which took place at
Muscat, in accordance with article 9.
Vol. 1709. 1-29574
1993 United Nations - Treaty Series * Nations Unies - Recueil des Traitks 431
Point No. 5 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees 18 minutes 15 seconds
north with meridian 52 degrees 45 minutes 5 seconds east.
Point No. 6 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees 18 minutes 21 seconds
north with meridian 52 degrees 45 minutes 2 seconds east.
Point No. 7 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees 20 minutes 59.04 seconds
north with meridian 52 degrees 46 minutes 55.83 seconds east.
Article 3
The extension of the separating boundary line continues from the extremity of
the principal point on the shore (Ra's Darbat Ali) in the direction of the territorial
waters until the limit of the economic zone. This extension shall be demarcated in
accordance with the rules of international law and the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.'
This demarcation of the land and maritime boundary line separating the two
countries shall be considered final and definitive.
Article 4
A Joint Technical Commission shall be formed of the survey authorities of the
two countries and its task shall be:
(a) To survey and establish on the ground the boundary points and the boundary
line set forth in article 2 and to prepare in a definitive manner the detailed maps
and related data necessary for that purpose so that those maps - after signature by
representatives of the two parties - shall be the official maps showing the boundaries
between the two countries and shall be annexed to this Agreement as an integral
part hereof.2
(b) To supervise the emplacement of markers (pillars) along the agreed boundary
line separating the territories of the two countries, and to reach agreement on
what distance shall separate one marker (pillar) from another.
Article 5
All issues arising out of the demarcation of the boundary line and any issues
emerging thereafter shall be settled by amicable means through direct contact between
the two Parties on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage
and the absence of prejudice to the interests of either Party.
Article 6
In the event of the discovery of common natural resources, agreement shall
be reached on the manner of their exploitation and division in accordance with
the established international norms and customs and the principles of justice and
fairness.
Article 7
The border authorities and rights to grazing, movement and the use of water
resources in the boundary zone shall be regulated in accordance with the two Annexes
appended to this Agreement. Use of the property of residents in the border
I United Nations, Treaty Series, vols. 1833, 1834 and 1835, No. 1-31363.
2 See insert in a pocket at the end of this volume.
Vol. 1709, 1-29574
432 United Nations - Treaty Series * Nations Unies - Recueil des Traitis 1993
zone shall also be regulated in accordance with a special annex to be agreed upon by
the two Parties.' All of the annexes mentioned in this article shall be considered an
integral part of this Agreement.
Article 8
This Agreement and its Annexes were drawn up in two original copies in the
Arabic language, each State retaining one copy.
Article 9
This Agreement shall enter into force after ratification in accordance with the
procedures followed in each of the contracting countries and the exchange of instruments
of ratification by the two States.
Article 10
This Agreement was done at San'a on 3 Rabi' II A.H. 1413, corresponding to
1 October A.D. 1992.
For the Government
of the Sultanate of Oman:
[Signed]
THUWAYNI BIN SHIHAB AL SAID
Special Representative
of His Majesty the Sultan
For the Government
of the Republic of Yemen:
[Signed]
HAIDER ABUBAKER AL-ATTAS
Prime Minister
I Not available.
Vol. 17091, -29574
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia
Report Number 8-14
Treaty on the State Border Between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina
Done: 30 July 1999
Entered into force: Provisionally in force only
Published at: Unpublished
PRELIMINARY REPORT
On 30 July 1999 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia signed in Sarajevo a treaty on
the state boundaries between the two countries. The treaty, which includes a preamble
and 23 articles, is based on the boundary situation existing at the time of
the cessation of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991). The
treaty has not yet entered into force, but is provisionally applied from the date of
its signature (article 22, para. 1).
The main purpose of the treaty is the delimitation of the land boundary, which
is drawn on 86 sheets of maps (scale 1 :25,000) annexed to the treaty. It is however
provided that the expert bodies of the two countries shall elaborate a detailed
description of the land and maritime boundary and a list of coordinates.
One provision (article 4, para. 3) relates to the maritime boundary, stating as
follows: "The state boundary at sea is a median line betwel~n the land territories
of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The boundary at sea is shown on the topographical
map 1:25,000 and on the navigational charts and maps" (unofficial translation
from the original Serb-Croatian language). This is the first maritime boundary agreed
upon by two of the successor States of the former Yugoslavia.
I.I. Charney and R. W. Smith (eds.), Intt!rnational Maritime Boundaries, 2887-2900.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
2888 Report Number 8-14
The maritime delimitation is to be understood in the light of the very particular
geographic situation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Adriatic Sea. This country
exercises sovereignty over a narrow strip of about 20 kilometers (kIn.) of coastline,
the Neum corridor (called from the name of a small city located there), which is
enclosed between two parts of the Croatian coastline. More precisely, the maritime
areas adjacent to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina are composed of the waters
of the Bay of Klek-Neum, a deep indentation closed by the small peninsula of Klek
(belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina), and part of the waters located between the
peninsula of Klek and the much bigger and longer peninsula of Peljesac (belonging
to Croatia). The width of the waters located between the two peninsulas ranges from
1.5 to 2 kIn.
The waters adjacent to the peninsula of Peljesac, both on the landward and the
seaward side of it, fall within the straight baselines system established by the former
Yugoslavia in 1948 and confIrmed, with some modifIcations, by the successor State
of Croatia (article 19 of the Maritime Code of 27 January 1994).1 It follows that
the maritime boundary established by the 1999 treaty possibly delimits two distinct
legal regimes: the internal waters of Croatia from the territorial sea of BosniaHerzegovina.
2
In regard to the method of delimitation, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, which
are both parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
rely on equidistance. Article 4, paragraph 3, of the bilateral treaty expIicity recalls
the "median line" as a method which is "in accordance" with the UNCLOS. In fact,
there is no provision in the UNCLOS dealing with the very peculiar case of a
delimitation involving internal waters. However, article 15 of the UNCLOS (Delimitation
of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts),
which could be applied by analogy, is based on the rule of equidistance combined
with the exception of historic title or other special circumstances.
No bilateral agreement has so far been concluded with regard to the access to
and from the waters of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the surrounding Croatian internal
waters. However, under another bilateral agreement Croatia has granted to Bosnia-
42 LOS BULL. 31 (2000).
2 However, it seems that Bosnia-Herzegovina bas so far made no official enactment or statement with
regard to the legal status of the waters adjacent to its tenitory. See, for instance, the summary of national
claims to maritime zones annexed to the report of the U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law
of the Sea, U.N. Doc. AJ56/58, p. 118 (9 March 2001), where no information is given on the breadth
of the territorial sea of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This may be because, due to geography, Bosnia-Herzegovina
cannot realize a territorial sea to the full 12 nautical mile distance from its coastline.
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2889
Herzegovina free and unimpeded transit through the port of Plo<;e, located in Croatia
north of the coastline of Bosnia-Herzegovina.3
REFERENCES
Mladen Klemencic, The Border Agreement between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
in 7 BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN 96 (No.4, 1999-2(00)
Maja Sersic, The Adriatic Sea: Semi-Enclosed Sea in a Semi-Enclosed Sea
(paper presented at the Conference "D Mediterraneo e il diritto del mare
all'alba del XXI secolo," Naples, 2001).
Prepared by
Tullio Scovazzi
(Legal Analysis)
Giampiero Francalanci
(Technical Analysis)
3 Agreement on Free Transit through the Territory of the Republic of Croatia to and from the Port of
Pl~e and through the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Neum, signed 22 November 1998, Letter
dated 24 November 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UNGA Doc. A/53n02, Annex II (pp. 8-12)
(25 Nov. 1998).
•
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Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2891
Treaty on the State Border between
the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
The Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (later: ''the Parties"),
Starting from the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the
Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Respecting the immutability of their mutually recognized borders,
Beginning with the provisions of the General Framework Peace Accords for Bosnia
and Herzegovina, signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris and the Opinion No.3
of the Arbitration Committee of the Conference on the former Yugoslavia;
Guided by a desire to regulate together all the issues pertaining to the identification,
marking, maintenance and ensuring the visibility of the common state border;
In accordance with the decision of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and
the Central Commission for the Identification and Marking of the State Border of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting with the authorization of the Council of the Ministers
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regarding the identification, marking, maintenance
and ensuring the visibility of the common state border, and based on the work of
the Committee;
have agreed to the following:
Article 1
The state border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (later:
"the state border") is a plane which transverses vertically the border line on the
surface of the Earth and divides the land, the sea and interior bodies of water, as
well as the air space and underground space of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
Unofficial translation by the United States Department of State.
2892 Report Number 8-14
Article 2
(1) The state border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
is determined on the basis of the state of the borders at the time of the end of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the mutual recognition
of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, identified on
the topographic map 1 :25,000 and, in practice, on the basis of the borders
between border land-registry municipalities, on the basis of the border towns
and villages at the time of the 1991 Census and on the basis of the dividing
line which divided the authorities of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(2) The state border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
stretches from the Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian-Yugoslav three-border
point in the North-East to the Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian-Yugoslav
three-border point in the South-East.
(3) The data on the identification and marking of the border line, as well as on the
shape, size and location of the border markings are to be found in the following
documents on the border issues:
(a) The description of the border line on the state border between the Parties
presented graphically in TK 25 (topographical map 25);
(b) The list and technical background (the situational plan, the list of surfaces,
the list of coordinates) of the modifications of the stretch of the state line
between the Parties;
(c) The list of the coordinates of the marked and determined break points on
the state border between the Parties;
(d) The border plan on the state border between the Parties.
(4) The Interstate Diplomatic Committee for the Identification, Marking and Maintenance
of the state border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina shall appoint expert panels authorized to produce a document
mentioned in Paragraph 3. of this Article, as well as set deadlines to finalize
their tasks and submit a report to be approved by the Interstate Diplomatic
Committee.
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2893
(5) After the border documents are produced in accordance with Paragraph 2. of
this Article and approved in accordance with the legislatures of the Parties, they
shall be considered an integral part of this Treaty.
Article 3
(1) The Parties can agree to change the state border in order to facilitate and
improve the living conditions of people living close to the border, as well as
for other reasons. Any changes of the state border shall be included in the
documents on border issues mentioned in Paragraph 3, Article 2 of this Treaty.
(2) The documents on border issues mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the Article shall
come into effect as stipulated in Paragraph 5, Article 2 of this Treaty.
Article 4
(1) The Parties have agreed that the state border remain within the mutually defined
coordinates, regardless of the man-made or natural changes in the terrain.
(2) The state border on international navigable rivers with the regulated navigation
course stretches along the kinet of the navigation course. Any changes to the
kinet of the navigation course shall be approved by authorized agencies of the
Parties.
(3) The state border on the sea stretches along the median line of the sea between
the territories of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance
with the 1982 UN Convention on Sea Rights. The border line on the sea
is represented in the topographical map 1 :25,000 as well as on sea charts and
plans.
Article 5
(1) The border line on the Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian border is marked
by:
2894 Report Number 8-14
border pyramids on the three-state Croatian-Bosnian and HerzegovinianYugoslav
border point;
- border posts which directly or indirectly (by the roads, rivers, streams, canals
and other characteristic locations) mark the break points in the border line;
- border boards placed on bridge railings and other appropriate objects.
(2) The coordinates of the marked and determined break points in the border line
are to be found in the documents on border issues listed in Paragraph 3, Article
2 of this Treaty.
Article 6
The Parties shall maintain the border line in a good visible condition and undertake
necessary steps to prevent damaging, destruction or unauthorized change of location
of border markings.
Article 7
(1) The Parties shall provide for the visibility of the state border and border
markings in accordance with the Instructions on the Maintenance of the State
Border and the Border Zone.
(2) The Parties shall not authorize any construction within 2 meters on the both
sides of the land border line. This ban does not include existing objects and
facilities, as well as object and facilities the construction of which is authorized
by the relevant agencies of the Parties.
(3) The Parties can conduct activities defined in the Instruction mentioned in Paragraph
1 of this Article on their own territory at any time, but must inform the
other Party as least ten days prior to the beginning of work.
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2895
Article 8
(1) The obligations with respect to measuring the common state border, identification
and marking of the border line, and maintenance, renovation and control of
border markings (later: border work), as well as all costs resulting from honoring
the above obligations, shall be divided between the parties on an equal basis.
(2) Installation, maintenance, renovation and control of three-state border markings
on the three-state Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian-Yugoslav border point
shall be carried out on the basis of an understanding of the relevant authorities,
in the presence of representatives of the Parties and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
(3) Repairs and renovations of border markings on the territory of one of the Parties,
which were damaged or destroyed through unauthorized destructive activities
from the territory of the other Party, shall be paid for by the Party from the
territory of which the unauthorized destructive activity was carried out.
Article 9
The Parties shall every five years after the completion of border work, defined in
the Instruction on the maintenance of the border line and border zone, conduct a
joint inspection of the border line, renovate and fill in the gaps in border markings
and, if needed, install additional markings on the border line.
Article 10
(1) Owners of real estate and other persons or entities with power of attorney
regarding real estate close to the state border must allow border work, defined
in the Instruction on the maintenance of the border line and border zone, to be
carried out on the state border.
(2) The Parties shall in a timely manner inform owners of real estate and other
persons or entities with power of attorney regarding real estate close to the
border of the work to be carried out on their real estate. The parties shall carry
out border work respecting the interests of owners of real estate and other
2896 Report Number 8-14
persons or entities with power of attorney regarding real estate close to the
border, on whose real estate the work is being carried out.
(3) Damage claims regarding real estate close to the border and related to border
work shall be settled according to the regulations of the Party on the territory
of which the real estate in question is situated.
Article 11
(1) To implement the provisions of this Treaty, the Government of the Republic
of Croatia and the Central Commission on the Identification and Marking of
the Border of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting with the authorization of the
Council of Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have founded the Interstate Diplomatic
Committee for the Identification, Marking and Maintenance of the State
Border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (later:
the Interstate Diplomatic Committee). The Interstate Diplomatic Committee
consists of a delegation of the Republic of Croatia and a delegation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Each delegation has a chairman and five members.
(2) The functioning and composition of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee are
regulated by the Regulations for the Conduct of Work of the Interstate Diplomatic
Committee, composed in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
Article 12
(1) The tasks of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee are the following:
conduct a measuring of the Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian state border;
produce new or supplemental documents on border issues in accordance with
Paragraph 3, Article 2 of this Treaty;
carry out other work jointly assigned to it by the relevant authorities of the
Parties.
(2) For the direct work on the stated tasks the Interstate Diplomatic Committee
creates: the Joint Expert Work Group for the Documentation and Identification
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2897
of the Border Line and the Joint Expert Work Group for the Marking and
Maintenance of the Border Line. The Interstate Diplomatic Committee can also,
if needed, create other work groups.
(3) The functioning and composition of the Joint Expert Work Groups shall be
regulated by the Instructions on the Functioning of Joint Expert Work Groups
formulated by the Joint Expert Work Groups and approved by the Interstate
Diplomatic Committee in accordance with this Treaty.
Article 13
(1) The Interstate Diplomatic Committee shall conduct its work in sessions, in the
field and by exchanging letters.
(2) The Interstate Diplomatic Committee shall meet according to the agreement
between the leaders of the delegations of the two Parties. The meetings shall
be held alternately on the territory of one and then the other of the Parties.
(3) The leader of each delegation can call for an emergency meeting or a field trip
of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee or a Joint Expert Work Group.
Article 14
(1) The Parties shall inform one another in writing and through diplomatic channels
of the appointment and acquittal of duty of the delegations in the Interstate
Diplomatic Committee.
(2) The leaders of the delegations of the Parties shall inform one another of the
appointment and acquittal of duty of other members of the delegations in the
Interstate Diplomatic Committee.
Article 15
(1) The Interstate Diplomatic Committee shall reach its decisions and conclusions
by agreement. If there are differences between the two delegations, their points
of view shall be recorded in the proceedings.
2898 Report Number 8-14
(2) Issues that cannot be resolved by reaching an agreement shall, with prior agreement
of the chairmen of the two delegations, be submitted for resolution to the
relevant authorities of the Parties.
Article 16
The Interstate Diplomatic Committee shall conduct negotiations and produce documents
in the official languages of the Parties.
Article 17
The delegation of each of the Parties in the Interstate Diplomatic Committee can
use the official seal with the state coat-of-arms of its country and the name of the
delegation.
Article 18
Each Party shall bear the costs of the participation of its delegation in the Interstate
Diplomatic Committee, in joint expert work groups and all other work groups, as
well as the costs of participating in auxiliary work forces and other personnel
employed to perform duties outlined in the Instructions on the Maintenance of the
Border Line and the Border Zone.
Article 19
(1) Members of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee, joint expert work groups and
all other work groups, as well as auxiliary personnel can, during their duties
duly announced to the other Party, in accordance with Paragraph 3, Article
7 of this Treaty, and with adequate identification, cross the state border at any
point.
(2) Identification mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be issued by the
adequate authorities of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
at the suggestion of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee.
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2899
Article 20
(1) Members of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee, joint expert work groups and
all other work groups, as well as auxiliary personnel of one of the Parties cannot,
while carrying out their duties on the territory of the other Party, be detained
and deprived of their personal belongings, personal identification, technical data
carriers, materials, tools and vehicles. All the mentioned articles are exempt
from customs and other fees, but the authorized personnel must declare them
to customs officers and, with the exception of the articles used up on duty, return
all of them to the territory of their country.
(2) The Parties shall provide all the necessary help with respect to the transportation,
lodging and access to communications equipment to the members of the Interstate
Diplomatic Committee, joint expert work groups and all other work groups,
as well as auxiliary personnel in order to facilitate their work.
(3) Members of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee, joint expert work groups and
all other work groups, as well as auxiliary personnel can during their duties
on the border wear official uniform, but cannot be armed.
Article 21
(1) All disputes regarding the interpretation and implementation of this Treaty shall
be resolved by the Interstate Diplomatic Committee.
(2) If the Interstate Diplomatic Committee is not able to resolve a dispute from
Paragraph 1 of this Article through settlement, the said disputes shall be referred
to the adequate authorities of the Parties.
Article 22
(1) This Treaty shall be temporarily implemented as of its signing date.
(2) This Treaty shall be in effect indefinitely.
(3) Each Party can cancel this Treaty at any time with prior written notice to the
other Party sent through diplomatic channels. In that case, the Treaty shall
2900 Report Number 8-14
become void six months after the date of the receipt of the notice on the cancellation
of the Treaty by the other Party.
Article 23
This Treaty comes into effect on the day of the receipt of the last written notice
sent through diplomatic channels by which the Parties inform each other that all
the conditions set forth by their legislatures regarding the coming into effect of this
Treaty have been met.
Written in Sarajevo, on July 30, 1999 in two originals, both in the official languages
of the Parties. Both texts are equally valid.
For the Republic of Croatia
(signed)
For Bosnia and Herzegovina
(signed)
Israel-Jordan
Report Number 8-12
Maritime Boundary Agreement between the Government of the
State of Israel and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Signed: 18 January 1996
Entered into force: 17 February 1996
Published at: 32 LOS BULLETIN 97 (1996)
This agreement between Israel and Jordan in the GulfofAqaba establishes the maritime
boundary as the equidistant line . It begins at Boundary Pillar 0 on the seashore
and follows a stra ight line for 2.84 kilometers where it meets the equidistant line and
proceeds seaward on that line. The agreement calls for the establishment of a Joint
Team of Experts (JTE) to delimit the maritime boundary by geographic coordinates.
At the time this report was written the JTE had not issued its report. Furthermore, the
exact coordinates of Boundary Pillar 0 are not known. Thus, the location, direction
and nature of the straight 2.84 kilometer line cannot be ascertained at this time.I
The delimitation was expected to be completed by the end of 1996. Until the
location of Boundary Pillar 0 and the delimitation by the JTE are known it is difficult
to make a detailed analysis ofthe agreement. In fact, the short agreem ent is more
in the nature of an agreement to agree. The land boundary between Israel and Jordan
at the shore is located at the northern end ofthe Gulf. From this point the Gulf is long
and narrow running south to the Red Sea. Based upon the limited information available
and the geographical circumstances it appears that due to the generally even
shoreline and the sharp curvature in the vicinity of the Israel-Jordan boundary; an
equidistant line would not have any unusual characteristics. The straight line from
Boundary Pillar 0 for the relatively short distance probably was designed to make
the boundary easy to locate in the near shore area and to avoid any irregularities that
might be created by minor variations in the shoreline .
Egypt and Saudi Arabia also have coastlines on the Gulf of Aqaba and a maritime
delimitation between Israel as well as Jordan will also be necessary to complete
the maritime boundaries in this water body. The Egypt-Israel land boundary also is
located in the northern part of the Gulf. Israel has the shortest coastline among these
Letter to Jonathan I. Charney from David Kornbluth, Director of International Law of the Sea and
Israel i Law Division , Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem , dated 30 July 1996.
Ll. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries. 2457-2461.
© 1998 The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands .
2458 Report Number 8-/2
states on the Gulf. Jordan's is somewhat longer with the coastlines of Egypt and
Saudi Arabia comprising most of the coastline along the western and eastern shores,
respectively. A tri-junction of the Egyptian-Israeli-Jordanian maritime boundaries
may very well be located in the northern sector, if and when the maritime boundary
between Egypt and Israel is established. Thus, it would appear that Israel's maritime
zone in this water body will not be as substantial as the others if the Egyptian-Israeli
maritime boundary also is an equidistant line.
Interestingly, the Israeli shoreline is located on a concave coast and is flanked by
Jordan on one side and Egypt on another. Thus, the situation is much like that of the
shoreline Federal Republic ofGermany in its relation to those ofthe Netherlands and
Denmark on the North Sea that was addressed in the judgment of the International
Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (FRG v. Den., FRG v.
Neth.), 1969 LC.J. Rep. 3 (29 February) . That judgment called for a maritime boundary
delimitation that is more generous to the state in the middle (Israel in this situation)
than equidistance. It is notable that Israel has here accepted an equidistant line. On
the other hand, recognition of such an Israeli maritime zone in the Gulfhas polit ical
connections to the current peace process and Israel's insistence on navigational and
other rights in the Gulf.
RELATED LAW IN FORCE
Law ofthe Sea Conventions
Israel:
Jordan:
neither a signatory nor party to the 1982 LOS Convention
party to the 1982 LOS Convention, 27 November 1995.
Prepared by Jonathan I. Charney
<OAmerican Society oi lntem ano nal Law. 1996
o 1 2 3
! I
Nautical miles
JORDAN
.EI 'Aqa ba
35'£
ISRAEL
34°55'£
\
\
\
\
\
\
\.
\
Maritime boundary
Land boundary
Area where the terminu s of the maritime
boundary is still uncertain
Marit ime Bound ar y
ISRAEl-JORDAN
Bound ar y Rep or t 8-12
A
EGYPT
Gulf
of
Aqaba
2460 Report Number 8-12
Maritime Boundary Agreement between the Government of the
State Of Israel and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
PREAMBLE
The government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan:
Bearing in mind the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan of the 26 October
1994;
Reaffirming their faith in their wish to live in peace with each other, as well as
with all States, within secure and recognized boundaries;
Desiring to develop friendly relations and cooperation between them in accordance
with the principles of international law governing international relations in time
of peace;
In fulfillment ofArticle 3.7 of the Treaty of Peace between them on the delimitation
of their maritime boundary in the Gulf ofAqaba;
Have agreed as follows:
Article J
I. The maritime boundary in the Gulf ofAqaba between the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan and the State of Israel begins at Boundary Pillar 0 on the seashore and
follows a straight line for 2.84 Kilometers where it meets the medial line of the Gulf.
Thence the maritime boundary follows the medial line of the Gulf southwards
until the last point of the maritime boundary between the two countries.
2. The Joint Team of Experts shall, as soon as possible after the date of the signature
ofthis Agreement, jointly agree upon and document the methodology for defining
the median line, and the procedure to fix the maritime boundary co-ordinates.
The list of maritime boundary coordinates shall be in geographic and UTM co-ordinates
based on IJBD-94 and shall be measured by GPS.
3. This list ofco-ordinates shall be binding and take precedence with regard to the
location of the maritime boundary.
Article 2
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect, or be affected by, the position of either Party
with regard to the location of either Party 's maritime boundary in the Gulf ofAqaba
with another state.
Israel-Jordan 2461
Article 3
This Agreement shall enter into force thirty days from the date of its signature.
This Agreement shall be transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations
for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
Done at Aqaba this day of 18 January 1996, which corresponds to the day of 26
Tevet, 5756 and to the 24th day of Sha'ban, 1416, in two original copies in the
Hebrew, Arabic and English languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of
divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
For the Government of the
State of Israel
For the Government of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Belgium-Netherlands
Report Number No 9-21
(1) Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands relating to the DeUmitation of the Territorial Sea
(2) Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands relating to the DeUmitation of the Continental Shelf
Signed: 18 December 1996
Entered into force: 1 January 1999
Published: 42 LOS BULL. 170 (2000)
I SUMMARY
These two agreements, which were negotiated, signed and approved together,
establish a continuous, two-part, maritime boundary between two adjacent states
which face the southern North Sea. The boundary extends for total distances of
approximately 15 nautical miles (n.m.) through the territorial sea and approximately
28 n.m. across the continental shelf, making a total length of about 43 n.m. The
boundary runs generally north-westwards from the terminus of the land frontier to
an endpoint situated on the agreed boundary between the British and Dutch continental
shelves (Netherlands-United Kingdom (1965 and 1971) No. 9-13). The territorial
sea boundary is based on the principle of equidistance between the normal baselines
of the two states. Its course was simplified on an area-compensated basis. Certain
historic claims made in the past by the Netherlands appear to have been tacitly
renounced by the agreement. The continental shelf boundary is a single line drawn
on a similar basis, but with the difference that a Dutch basepoint, situated on a lowtide
elevation, was accorded only one quarter weight vis-a-vis the Belgian basepoint
(harbor works on the coast) in order to achieve an equitable result. An informal
administrative accord, which had been observed in practice for some time, albeit
without removing all differences between the two governments, was replaced by
i.I. Charney and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 2921-2939.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
2922 Report Number 9-21
two new boundaries defined in two treaties. Special arrangements were made for
the continuation of some sand and gravel concessions previously granted by the
Netherlands in areas lying on the Belgian side of the new boundaries. The two
agreements appear to have resolved some long-standing maritime differences between
Belgium and the Netherlands going back to the creation of Belgium in 1830, differences
which had prevented the reaching of agreement during the 1960s.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
Belgium and the Netherlands are closely bound politically and economically in
groupings such as the Benelux, the European Union (of which they were founding
members), and NATO. These close relations no doubt facilitated the conclusion
of the two agreements, which finally put an end to long-standing differences which
had existed for as long as the Kingdom of Belgium.
A political factor on the side of Belgium was its constitution. In recent years,
Belgium became a federal state and the entire coast lies in the Region of Flanders.
The authorities in that Region have competence over certain activities in the territorial
sea and on the continental shelf and they were, no doubt, especially interested
in achieving a favorable outcome to the outstanding boundary questions. For the
Kingdom of Belgium, the negotiations with The Hague were conducted by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in view of the constitutional aspects, representatives
of the Region of Flanders were associated with the talks. There was no comparable
situation on the part of the Netherlands.
The waters off the coasts of the two states are used extensively by international
shipping in transit to and from Northern Europe or calling at major ports such as
Antwerp and Rotterdam. Sea lanes have been agreed within the International Maritime
Organization in these waters, but the sea lanes were not taken into account
in drawing the boundaries.
Two historical issues were considered during the negotiations between the two
governments, one relating to the territorial sea and the other to the continental shelf.
The first such issue arose from the fact that the land frontier between Belgium and
the Netherlands reaches the sea near the mouth of a wide river known as the Western
Scheidt, a waterway at this point under the sovereignty of the Netherlands. The
Netherlands had for many years asserted historic rights to a channel of deeper water
running out seawards from the Western Scheidt and in a sense representing a natural
Belgium-Netherlands 2923
continuation or marine extension of the Western Scheldt.1 This channel, known
as the Wielingen, ran within 3 n.m. of the Belgian coast. The channel had strategic
significance in former times and is still used by shipping entering the Western
ScheIdt in order to reach points in the Netherlands, as well as Antwerp. If Belgium
had accepted the asserted Dutch historic rights over the Wielingen, the result would
have been a boundary running much closer to the Belgian coast than an equidistant
line. These rights were asserted by the Netherlands on two main grounds. First,
the terms of the Treaty of Munster of 1648 had closed the ScheIdt to the Belgian
provinces to the benefit of the Netherlands. When, following pressure from France
and England, the waterway was later opened to shipping, it was nevertheless agreed
in the Treaty of London of 1839 that the Netherlands and Belgium would supervise
navigation jointly, thereby accepting some Dutch interest in the waterway. 2 Second,
the Netherlands contended that the Wielingen formed part, that is to say, a seaward
extension of the Western ScheIdt waterway and was thus under Dutch sovereignty.
At the end of the maritime boundary negotiations, the historic claim of the Netherlands
had been renounced, according to a report presented to the Belgian Senate
during its consideration of the agreement.3 The agreed boundary appears to be
clearly inconsistent with the continuance of Dutch claims to historic rights or title.
The second historical issue concerned an informal understanding reached in 1965
between officials of the two Governments. Following the entry into force of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf in 1964, the Netherlands held bilateral talks
with all its neighbors about the delimitation of the Dutch continental shelf. The
contacts with Belgium, an adjacent state, related to both the continental shelf and
the territorial sea in view of the linkage between the two boundaries. These contacts
resulted in an understanding upon a line of delimitation across the continental shelf
starting at the limit of the territorial sea, which at that time was 3 n.m. for both
states. This understanding did not represent a treaty or international agreement in
the formal sense. Nonetheless, a text was agreed at official, as opposed to Minister-
See, for example, the response of the Netherlands to the circular inquiry from the League of Nations
in preparation for the Codification Conference held at The Hague in 1930, in Bases de discussion,
Vol. II: Eaux territoriales, League of Nations doc. C.74.M.39 (1929). The Dutch reply argued that
the rights of a coastal state over the belt of sea in front of its coast could be limited or excluded by
special rights of a neighbor, giving the example of the Wielingen on the twin grounds of historic rights
and navigational interests, whilst noting that Belgium contested them. For detailed accounts of Belgian
and Dutch practice, see Erik Franckx, Belgium and the Netherlands settle their last frontier disputes
on land as well as at sea, 1998 REv. BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 338 (No.2).
2 A. PEARCE HIGGINS & c. JOHN COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 150-152 (1943).
Parliamentary Papers, Senate (Session of 1997-1998) Report 1-843/2. During consideration of the
agreements in the Dutch Parliament, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the Weilingen would
form partially part of the Belgian territorial sea: see the account in Erik Franckx' La Frontiere maritime
recemment etablie entre la Belgique et les Pays-Bas, 1997 ANN. DU DROIT DE LA MER 118, at 145.
2924 Report Number 9-21
ial, level for the delimitation of the continental shelf. Furthermore, a draft text was
drawn up for the delimitation of the territorial sea, but this text was expressly subject
to Dutch reservations concerning historic rights. No texts were presented to the
respective Legislatures for approval. On the side of Belgium, this was because the
Netherlands maintained the claim to the Wielingen, a claim which Belgium continued
to contest. In other words, in 1965 there was still some disagreement over the
delimitation of the territorial sea.
The line of delimitation was a technical elaboration of the principle of
equidistance accepted by both sides. Over many years, this informally agreed line
across the continental shelf was generally (but not uniformly) followed in practice
by both governments in several important ways. Thus, the leader of the Belgian
delegation for the delimitation of the continental shelf between Belgium and the
Netherlands had sent a diplomatic letter in 1967 to the leader of the Netherlands
delegation for use by the latter in the International Court of Justice in connection
with the North Sea Continental Shelf cases which were then pending before the
Court.4 This letter, dated 8 December 1967, asserted the principle of the 'median
line' (la ligne mediane) between the nearest points on the baselines for measuring
the breadth of the territorial sea and specified the coordinates of eight points to be
joined by arcs of great circles in order to constitute the delimitation between Belgium
and the Netherlands, all subject to the approval of the Belgian Parliament.s In
subsequent years, Belgium twice enacted legislation based on that position: first
in 1969 relating to the continental shelf, and then in 1978 relating to fisheries. The
Law of 1969 referred expressly to Belgium's three outstanding delimitations of the
continental shelf with France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and indicated
that the principle of equidistance would be determinative in each case.6 The Law
of 1978 employed the equidistant line to define limits towards Belgium's three
neighbors7 and a Parliamentary Report set out as the boundary with the Netherlands
the same eight points which had been informally listed in the understanding relating
to the continental shelf.8
4 North Sea Continental Shelf (FRGlDen.; FRGlNeth.), 1969 ICJ REP. 3 (20 February).
S See North Sea Continental Shelf (FRGlDen.; FRGlNeth.), ICJ PLEADINGS, vol. I, at 546.
6 Article 2 of the Loi sur le plateau continental de la Belgique, 13 June 1969, MONITEUR BaGE 9479-80
(10 October 1969). Belgium did not become a party to the Convention on the Continental Shelf for
reasons to do with the open-ended definition of the concept and its negative impact on Belgian interests
in sedentary fisheries. See Erik Franckx, Maritime Bowulary Agreements: The Case of Belgium, 1991
REv. BaGE DE DROIT INT'L 390, at 408 (No.2).
7 Loi portant etablissement d'une zone de piche de la Belgique, 10 October 1978, MONITEUR BELGE
15992-93 (28 December 1978).
8 Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des affaires etrangeres et de la cooperation au developpement,
Doc. ParI. Charnbre No. 263-2, at 3 (1977-1978).
Belgium-Netherlands 2925
For its part, the Netherlands also acted on the basis of the understanding with
Belgian officials. Thus, the Netherlands granted certain concessions for the taking
of sand and gravel which extended towards the line of delimitation drawn up by
the officials and across the more northerly line eventually agreed between the two
governments.9 The Netherlands also concluded the agreement with the United
Kingdom on the delimitation of the continental shelf of 1965 which defined a
boundary extending to a tripoint which was equidistant between the nearest points
in Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Article 2(1) of this agreement
expressly describes the southern termination point as "The point of intersection of
the dividing lines between the Continental Shelves of the United Kingdom ... ,
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Belgium." ((1965) No 9-13,
at 1867).
In 1987, Belgium extended the breadth of its territorial sea from 3 n.m. to 12
n.m., following a similar extension by the Netherlands two years earlier. At some
stage prior to the opening of negotiations with The Hague, the Belgian government
concluded that the administrative accord on delimitation reached with the Netherlands
in 1965 was no longer acceptable. In 1991, Belgium formally notified the United
Kingdom, upon signing their bilateral agreement delimiting their continental shelves
«1991) No. 9-17, letter of 29 May 1991 from Mark Eyskens, Belgian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, to British Ambassador Robert James O'Neill), of its intention to
claim north-eastwards of the tripoint where the Belgian, British and Dutch continental
shelves met according to the above-cited agreement of 1965 (No. 9-13). In other
words, Belgium did not regard itself as bound, as a third state, by the Anglo-Dutch
treaty.
During the new rounds of negotiations instigated by Belgium with the Netherlands
in 1994, Belgium asserted in the alternative, first, that there had been no
agreement on the delimitation in 1965 and, second, that the informal line should
not be followed because of the evolution of international law after that date towards
acceptance of considerations of equity. In this context, Belgium cited article 83 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, which had entered
into force on 16 November 1994, the day preceding the opening of the first round
of talks. (At that stage both Belgium and the Netherlands were moving towards
ratification of the Convention and the related Implementation Agreement of July
1994.)
9 These concessions fonned the subject of an exchange of letters at the time of signature of the agreements,
according to which Belgium in effect took over the concessions. See Erik Francn, loc.cit.
footnote I, 387-92.
2926 Report Number 9-21
For its part, the Netherlands was at first disinclined to open talks, since the Dutch
authorities regarded the delimitation of 1965 as final. When talks did begin, the
Netherlands argued that the delimitation had subsisted for many years and could
not be put in question, having regard to the principle of estoppel. Accordingly, the
Netherlands considered that the negotiations should be confined to two matters:
first, the delimitation of the territorial sea and second, the repercussions for the
starting point of the continental shelf delimitation of 1965 arising from the extensions
in 1985 and 1987, respectively, of the breadth of the territorial sea from 3 to 12
n.m.1O During the course of the ensuing talks, the Netherlands did not insist on
the point of view and, on this second historical point, Belgium's approach also
prevailed. As a result, the agreed line for the continental shelf is different from that
defined in 1965.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
Separate agreements were concluded for the territorial sea and for the continental
shelf. Different solutions were adopted in the two agreements and slightly different
methods were used. This approach of dealing separately with the territorial sea and
the continental shelf was also adopted by Belgium in its agreements with France
«(1990) No. 9-16) and by the Netherlands in those with Germany «(1962, 1964,
1967, and 1971) No. 9-11).
The agreement relating to the continental shelf provides that if one of the parties
decides to establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the coordinates of the agreed
continental shelf boundary shall be used for the lateral delimitation of the zone
(article 2). Prior to the opening of negotiations in 1994, both states had created
fishery zones extending beyond the territorial sea to the greatest possible extent,
but no fisheries boundary had been agreed. Both states had participated in the
adoption of the Paris Declaration of 1992 on Coordinated Extension of Jurisdiction
in the North Seall and during the period of the talks they were committed in principle
to creating EEZs in the North Sea. In the event, both Belgium and the Netherlands
created EEZs in 1999 and the effect of article 2 of the continental shelf
agreement is that the agreed line serves also as the boundary between the two EEZs.
10 This summary of the argumenlS is taken from the Expose des Motifs submitted by Ministers to the
Belgian Senate. See document 1-843/1(Session of 1997-1998) of 15 January 1998.
11 Report No.9-20, III INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 2527, at 2529. Northern and Western
Europe Update, Principal Events in the Region, Sec. 4 Use oj Agreed Boundaries for Additional
Purposes. (1998)
Belgium-Netherlands 2927
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
The area of this delimitation is important from the economic point of view in the
sense that it is a busy area for merchant shipping. There is also fishing, including
shrimping, and dredging for sand and gravel. From the environmental point of view,
on the Belgian and southern Dutch coasts there are extensive sandy beaches which
are much used by tourists and wildlife, especially sea birds. The water is shallow,
making the coastal area especially vulnerable to oil spills. In 1993, a joint counterpollution
exercise in the off-shore areas of the two states showed that the absence
of a precise boundary constituted a serious obstacle to effective intervention by
rescue and safety services. None of those considerations, however, affected the actual
course of the negotiations or the agreed boundaries. The area is not important for
access to oil or gas resources. However, at the time of the negotiations, there was
active exploitation of continental shelf sand and gravel, by both parties, for the
building and construction industries in Belgium and the Netherlands. In particular,
the Netherlands had granted a concession to a Belgian company for the dredging
of sand and gravel in an area close to the line agreed informally by officials of the
two governments in 1965. This area became Belgian as a result of the agreement
on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the concession formed the object
of an exchange of letters attached to the agreement. According to these letters,
Belgium was committed to respecting the concession for five years after the entry
into force of the agreement and then to grant a concession to the same company
under similar conditions under Belgian law. Clearly, the existence of these specific
economic interests did not affect the course of the actual line agreed in the negotiations,
being the subject of a type of 'grandfathering' provision. Such arrangements
are not always easy to achieve and in this instance they testify to the close, friendly
relations existing between the two governments.
4 Geographic Considerations
A relevant factor in the negotiations was the overall geographical situation of
Belgium, which has relatively short and generally straight and featureless coasts
facing the southern North Sea. Its boundaries with France and the United Kingdom
had been agreed «(1990) No. 9-16 and (1991) No. 9-17, respectively) and it was
apparent from a glance at the map that Belgium's continental shelf was hemmed
in on all sides. To the north-east of the terminus of the land frontier between
Belgium and the Netherlands, the peninsula of WaIcheren produces something of
a change in the general direction of the two coasts. This change in direction gave
2928 Report Number 9-21
the impression that the Belgian coasts, lying between those of France to the southwest
and the Netherlands to the north-east, were slightly concave.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
Whilst there are no islands, rocks, or reefs in the relevant area, an important feature
in the negotiations was the sandbank, constituting a low-tide elevation, known as
Rassen. This feature, lying approximately three kilometers (less than two n.m.) off
the westernmost point of the peninsula of Walcheren, is a legitimate basepoint for
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea of the Netherlands. According to the
latest charts published in Belgium at the time of the negotiations, Rassen was about
600 meters from east to west at low water. (Its extent at low water could have been
affected by sand and gravel dredging.) Despite its not having been marked on some
older charts as a low-tide elevation, Belgium accepted Rassen as a valid low-tide
elevation at the time of the negotiations, so long as the basepoint was on the actual
low water line and not on the 2 meter isobath which lay 1.8 n.m. further west.
Rassen's position is such that it represents the Dutch basepoint for constructing a
strict equidistant line with Belgium across the outer part of the territorial sea, as
well as the entire continental shelf. In other words, it is the principal Dutch basepoint
for constructing the greater part of the entire boundary.
Rassen is mentioned expressly in article 2 of the Agreement on the Delimitation
of the Territorial Sea, but not in the Continental Shelf Agreement. Rassen was given
full weight in the Territorial Sea Agreement and one quarter weight in the Continental
Shelf Agreement.
It may be recalled that low-tide elevations had also been significant in Belgium's
earlier negotiations with both France and the United Kingdom «(1990) No. 9-16
and (1991) No. 9-17). In particular, Belgium had taken the initial position in the
negotiations with France that low-tide elevations, being relevant to the measurement
of the territorial sea, should not be used as basepoints in delimiting the continental
shelf, but had reached a compromise «(1990) No. 9-16, at sec. 5 Islands, Rocks,
Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations). It would appear that Belgium made
a similar compromise over Rassen in regard to the continental shelf.
6 Baseline Considerations
The relevance of baselines is shown by article 2 of the Territorial Sea Agreement
which includes the following: "The boundary ... is based on principle of equidistance
Belgium-Netherlands 2929
from the normal baseline, that is to say, the low water line along the coast" (translation).
Both states have adopted for the normal baseline the line of mean lower
low water springs. However, two baseline issues arose during the negotiations. First,
the Netherlands had adopted legislation in 1985 whereby a line was drawn across
the mouth of the Western ScheIdt between Westkappelle on Walcheren and Zwin
close to the point where the land frontier reaches the sea. In drawing this line, the
Netherlands invoked the rule in article 13 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone of 1958 and article 9 of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (regarding the closing mouths of rivers), although some commentators
have expressed the view that the river does not flow directly into the sea since it
forms an estuary. Belgium considered that this baseline should not be taken into
account in delimiting the territorial sea since it deviated from the general direction
of the Dutch coasts and the terminus of the land frontier was used as the end-point
of the baseline, rather than the southern bank of the river. It is apparent that the
baseline was not used in any way in the agreement on the delimitation of the
territorial sea.
The second issue concerned the permanent harbor works on the Belgian coast
at the port of Zeebrugge. Article 11 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
provides that such works are to be regarded as forming part of the coast for the
purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. In 1965, harbor works had
been accepted by the officials of the two states as forming an integral part of the
coast for the purpose of drawing the equidistant line. Sometime between that year
and 1994, the works had been extended seawards by the construction of new breakwaters
more than 1.6 n.m. from the coast. In the agreement of 1996, the Netherlands
accepted that the new western breakwater should be used as a Belgian basepoint
in drawing an equidistant line. Indeed, that point and the low water line on Rassen
form the basepoints for constructing the greater part of the boundary in the territorial
sea and the whole of the continental shelf boundary. Somewhat unusually, the
method of delimitation and the key basepoints are mentioned in the terms of the
agreement. Thus, article 2 of the Territorial Sea Agreement reads: "Account has
been taken of the seaward extension of the port of Zeebrugge in Belgium and the
low-tide elevation of 'Rassen' off the Netherlands coast." No comparable statement
was included in the continental shelf agreement.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
There is no geological break in the area under consideration. A geomorphological
feature does exist, the channel known as the Wielingen representing the seaward
2930 Report Number 9-21
extension of the River ScheIdt; but this feature was not used in constructing the
boundary. Further offshore are many elongated sandbanks running approximately
south-west to north-east and thus, approximately, parallel to the general direction
of the Dutch and Belgian coasts or at right angles to the agreed boundaries. In other
words, geological considerations were not used at all in drawing the boundaries.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
In constructing both the territorial sea boundary and that for the continental shelf,
the method of equidistance was used in a modified form, albeit in different ways
and with different results. The method was specified in the territorial sea agreement
(article 2), but not in that on the continental shelf.
The territorial sea boundary was created by first drawing a strict equidistant
line between the basepoints of the two states and then by simplifying it on an areacompensated
basis. The resulting line can be characterized as a simplified equidistant
line. The initial exact equidistant line had two terminal points and 10 turning points,
some of which were very close together, especially in the area situated about five
to seven n.m. from the coast where Rassen and the harbor works at Zeebrugge first
become the respective basepoints. The line was simplified so that there were just
three turning points plus the start and end points, making five points in all.
In the case of the continental shelf boundary, the method of equidistance was
used; but, in this instance, it was simply a first step in a process which continued
with the application of equitable principles. Belgium invoked the decision of the
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases to the effect
that the method of equidistance was not a rule of international lawY Belgium
argued that its geographical situation between France and the Netherlands was akin
to Germany's concave coast lying between the Netherlands and Denmark. Belgium
also pointed to article 83 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and argued
that equitable principles should be taken into account in order to reach an equitable
result.
In a spirit of compromise and good neighborliness, the Netherlands agreed to
an adjustment of the equidistant line. Throughout its length, this line was based
on the low water lines on the western breakwater at Zeebrugge and on Rassen. The
adjustment was made by according Rassen one quarter weight and full weight to
the Belgian basepoint. For this purpose, two points were identified on the agreed
12 North Sea Continental Shelf (FRGlDen.; FRGlNeth.), 1%9 leI REp. 3, at 36, 45·46, paras. 56,82
(20 Feb.).
Belgium-Netherlands 2931
boundary between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the ftrst giving full
weight to the western breakwater and Rassen and the second full weight to the
breakwater and the westernmost point on Walcheren (and thus zero weight to
Rassen). The agreed endpoint lies one quarter of the distance between the two points,
starting from the point generated by Walcheren. The change in the bearing of the
line, as compared with the delimitation of 1965, is about 4 degrees.
Overall, the Netherlands relinquished areas in both the territorial sea and the
continental shelf which had been treated as Dutch after 1965. Together, these areas
total about 386 square kilometers.
9 Technical Considerations
The boundary line in the territorial sea boundary is deftned by reference to ftve
points:
from 1 to 2, the distance is 0.53 n.m.;
from 2 to 3, the distance is 4.76 n.m.;
from 3 to 4, the distance is 3.79 n.m.; and
from 4 to 5, the distance is 6.34 n.m.
The total length exceeds 12 n.m. because the line is not straight. The boundary line
for the continental shelf is a single arc from point 5 to point 6 which is 28.1 n.m.
in length. The lines joining the agreed turning points are stated to be arcs of great
circles. The points are deftned by coordinates of latitude and longitude on European
Datum (First Adjustment, 1950). This is made clear by article 1 of both agreements.
The boundary lines were depicted, but simply by way of illustration, on charts
annexed to the two agreements.
Although Belgium and the Netherlands both use the chart datum of Mean Lower
Low Water Springs, they use slightly different deftnitions of that datum, producing
slightly different results. However, the differences were successfully resolved
between hydrographic experts.
10 Other Considerations
At the time of its negotiations with Belgium, the Netherlands was also engaged
in negotiations with Germany about their territorial sea boundary in the North Sea
in which Germany was maintaining certain historic claims of relevance to that
delimitation.
2932 Report Number 9-21
The delimitation of the continental shelf ends at a point on the boundary line
agreed between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in 1965, but not at the
southern terminal point. As a result, small adjustments to two existing boundaries
are required. These are the boundaries between Belgium and the United Kingdom
(an adjustment expressly foreshadowed in the Belgian Minister's letter addressed
to the British Ambassador at the time of signature of the agreement) and between
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The former boundary will grow in length
and the latter will shorten.
ill CONCLUSIONS
These two connected agreements illustrate two different roles for the method of
equidistance: first, in providing the actual solution for the delimitation of the territorial
sea (subject only to simplification of the resulting line for the sake of practical
convenience) and, second, as constituting the first stage of drawing a line in a twostage
process prior to the adjustment of the line in order to achieve an equitable
result. Thus, for the purposes of delimiting the territorial sea, the two key basepoints
(the harbor works at Zeebrugge and Rassen) can be seen as being roughly in balance,
in that they were both situated about the same distance (1.6 n.m.) away from the
principal coast. Then, in the delimitation of the continental shelf, the adjustment
of the initial equidistant line partially discounted the low-tide elevation of Rassen
in order to take account of the overall situation of Belgium on the southern shores
of the North Sea.
From a wider perspective, this delimitation was the last major boundary outstanding
for the entire North Sea continental shelf. All the other boundaries had previously
been settled. However, the terms of the settlement for the continental shelf required
small adjustments to be made to two existing agreements and, these adjustments
not having been made at the time of writing (August 2000), the major task of
boundary-making for the North Sea continental shelf which began in the mid-1960s
remains, technically, incomplete. At the same time, the agreement of 1996, by
anticipating the creation of EEZs by the parties, defined an EEZ boundary which
took effect in the summer of 1999 as one of the first such boundaries in Northern
and Western Europe.
Belgium-Netherlands 2933
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A. Law of the Sea Conventions
Belgium: Party to the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, but not a party to the Convention on the
Continental Shelf. Became a party to the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea in 1998.
The Netherlands: Party to the Geneva Conventions on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone and on the Continental Shelf. Became a party
to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996.
B. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Belgium: 12 n.m. territorial sea (1987); continental shelflegislation 1969;
fisheries legislation 1978.
The Netherlands: Territorial Sea Demarcation Act 1985 (6 LOS BULL. 16 (1985».
12 n.m. territorial sea; continental shelf and fisheries legislation.
C. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Belgium: An EEZ was established by a Law which entered into force on
20 July 1999. The Law set out the outer limits of the zone in
the form of lines joining a series of points defined by coordinates
of latitude and longitude corresponding to points in the present
agreement, as well as points in the agreements with France (No.
9-16) and the United Kingdom (No. 9-17), apart from point 3.
The Netherlands: An EEZ was established by an Act of Parliament of 27 May
1999. The outer limits are to be set by Decree. The Government
expressed the preference to Parliament that the limits coincide
with continental shelf boundaries. This was already provided
for in the agreement with Belgium.
2934 Report Number 9-21
V REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READING
Belgium: Parliamentary Papers, Senate (Session of 1997-1998) Report 1-84312 (http:!
!www.senate.beldocsllexl1l1-843!1 ).
Netherlands: 25 KAMERSTUKKEN, TwEEDE KAMER (Parliamentary Papers, Second
Chamber) 1997-1998, at 684.
LA. Elema, Bepaling van Grenzen op Zee, in 1999 GEODESIA 181 (No.4) (in
Dutch).
Ina Elema and Kees de Jong, The Law of the Sea at the North Sea (Paper read at
the Conference held by the Advisory Board on the Law of the Sea of the International
Hydrographic Organization, September 1999).
Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundary Agreements: The Case of Belgium, 1992 REVUE
BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 390 (No.2).
Erik Franckx, La Frontiere maritime recemment etablie entre la Belgique et les
Pays-Bas, n ANN. DU DROIT DE LA MER 1997, at 117.
Erik Franckx, Belgium and the Netherlands Settle Their Last Frontier Disputes on
Land and at Sea, 1998 REv. BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 338 (No.2).
Ph. Gautier, Le Plateau continental de la Belgique et sa delimitation, in, COLLOQUE
SUR LA BELGIQUE ET LA NOUVELLE CONVENTION DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LE
DROIT DE LA MER 108 (Jean Salmon and Erik Franckx eds. 1995).
Alex. G. Oude Elferink, Belgium/I'he Netherlands Delimitation of Maritime Zones,
12 INT'L J. MAR. & COASTAL L. 548 (1997).
E. Somers, The Problem of the Wielingen, 3 INT'L J. EsTUARINE & COASTAL L.
19 (1988).
Prepared by D. H. Anderson
(with technical analysis by C. M. Carleton)
,
! •
•
•
•
•·
t
! •
2936 Report Number 9-21
(1) Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of
the Netherlands relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea
The Kingdom of the Netherlands and The Kingdom of Belgium,
Desiring in the framework of good-neighbourly relations to achieve a solution
acceptable to both Contracting Parties concerning the lateral delimitation of the
continental shelf,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. The boundary between the continental shelf of the Kingdom of Belgium and
the continental shelf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is formed by the great
circle joining the following points expressed in terms of their coordinates in the
sequence given below:
Point 5: 51° 33'06"N; 03° 04'53"E
Point 6: 51° 52'34,012"N; 02° 32'21.599"E
2. The positions of the points in this article are defined by latitude and longitude
on European Datum (1st Adjustment, 1950).
3. The dividing line defined in paragraph 1 has been drawn by way of illustration
on the chart annexed to this Agreement.
Article 2
In the event that one of the Contracting Parties decides to create an exclusive
economic zone, the coordinates given in article 1 shall be used for the lateral
delimitation of such a zone.
Belgium-Netherlands 2937
Article 3
This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second month
following the date on which the Contracting Parties notify each other in writing
of the completion of the procedures required by their domestic legislation for
the entry into force of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto
by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.
DONE at Brussels on 18 December 1996 in duplicate in the French and
Dutch languages, both texts being equally authoritative.
FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS:
[Signed]
H.A.F.M.O. VAN MIERLO
Minister for Foreign Affairs
FOR THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM:
[Signed]
E.DERYCKE
Minister for Foreign Mfairs
2938 Report Number 9-21
(2) Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of
the Netherlands relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
The Kingdom of the Netherlands and The Kingdom of Belgium
Desiring to establish the lateral boundary of the territorial sea between the
Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. The boundary between the territorial sea of the Kingdom of Belgium and
the territorial sea of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is formed by the great
circles joining the following points, expressed in terms of their coordinates, in
the sequence given below:
Point 1: 51° 22'25"N; 03° 21 '52.5"E
Point 2: 51° 22'46"N; 03° 21'14"E
Point 3: 51° 27'00"N; 03° 17'47"E
Point 4: 51° 29'05"N; 03° 12'44"E
Point 5: 51° 33'06"N; 03° 04'53"E
2. The positions of the points in this article are defined by latitude and longitude
on European Datum (1st Adjustment, 1950).
3. The dividing line defined in paragraph 1 has been drawn by way of illustration
on the chart annexed to this Agreement.
Article 2
The boundary formed by the points listed in article I is based on the principle
of equidistance from a maximal baseline, namely the low-water mark along the
coast. The extension out to sea of the port of Zeebrugge in Belgium and the
"Rassen" shallows off the coast of the Netherlands have been taken into account.
Belgium-Netherlands 2939
Article 3
This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second month
following the date on which the Contracting Parties notify each other in writing
of the completion of the procedures required by their domestic legislation for
the entry into force of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto
by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.
DONE at Brussels on 18 December 1996 in duplicate in the French and
Dutch languages, both texts being equally authoritative.
FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS:
[Signed]
H. A. F. M. O. VAN MIERLO
Minister for Foreign Affairs
FOR THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM:
[Signed]
E.DERYCKE
Minster for Foreign Affairs

Georgia-Turkey
Report Number 8-10 (5)
Protocol Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of Georgia on the Conill"D1ation of the Maritime Boundaries
Between Them in The Black Sea
Done: 14 July 1997
Entered into Force: 22 September 1999
Published at: T.e. Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 20 October 1997,
No. 23146
43 LOS BULL. 112 (2000)
Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics delimited their adjacent territorial
sea boundary in the Black Sea on 17 April 1973 by a protocol signed at Ankara
«1973) (No. 8-10(1)). The parties later, by a protocol signed at Tbilisi on 11
September 1980, agreed to illustrate the existing territorial sea boundary on a
11100,000 scale chart on the bases of the 1973 Protocol. In addition, they also agreed
by this protocol to build two direction signals to be located on land and a light to
be constructed at the shore marking the initial point of the sea of this territorial
boundary (41 0 31' 18.39" N. Lat., 41 0 32' 55.06" E. Long.) to enable mariners to
locate the boundary.
The two states concluded an agreement on 23 June 1978 at Moscow to delimit
their continental shelf maritime boundary «(1978) (No. 8-10(2)). Later, in a verbal
note of 23 December 1986, Turkey proposed that the continental shelf boundary
line be used also to delimit their exclusive economic zone. The USSR agreed to
this proposal in a note dated 6 February 1987 ((1986 & 1987) No. 10-8(3)).
J.l. Charney and R. W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 2865-2868.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
2866 Report Number 8-10 (5)
After the disintegration of the USSR, the members of the Soviet Commonwealth
of Independent States by the Minsk and Alma-AtalKiev Agreements,l declared their
succession to the existing agreements of the USSR and the stability of existing land
and maritime boundaries absent mutual agreements to change them. In addition to
this legal commitment, the Russian Federation on 17 September 1992 and Ukraine
on 30 May 1994 unilaterally confirmed to Turkey their succession to the maritime
boundary agreements that had previously been concluded only between Turkey and
the former USSR ((1994) No. 8-10(4».
Turkey and Georgia concluded an agreement at Thilisi on 14 July 1997 concerning
their maritime boundaries that confirmed the validity, among themselves, of
the above-mentioned maritime boundary agreements ((1973, 1978, 1986 & 1987)
Nos. 8-10(1)-(3» which had been previously concluded between Turkey and the
former USSR. This bilateral agreement between Turkey and Georgia came into force
on 22 September 1999 and establishes a single maritime boundary between the two
states for all purposes.
Prepared by Yuksel [nan
Armenia-Azerbaijan-Belarus-Kazakbstan-Kyrgy:zstan-Moldova-RussianFederation-Tajikistan-Turkmenistan-
Uzbekistan-Ukraine: Agreements Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, done
at Minsk, 8 December 1991, and Alma Alta, 21 December 1991, 31 ILM 138 (1992); Armenia-BelarusKazakhstan-
Kyrgyzstan-Russia-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan: Agreement on the Protection of the State
Boundaries and Maritime Economic Zones of the States Participants of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, done at Kiev, 20 March, 1992,31 ILM 495 (1992).
Georgia-Turkey 2867
Protocol Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of Georgia on the ConfIrmation of the Maritime Boundaries
Between Them in The Black Sea
The Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of Georgia,
hereinafter referred to as Parties,
Having regard to the good-neighbourly relations between the Parties,
Desiring to confIrm the maritime boundaries between them through their commitment
to the following agreements concluded between the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the Republic of Turkey:
- Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the establishment
of the Maritime Boundary between the Soviet and Turkish Territorial Waters
in the Black Sea, signed on 17 April 1973;
- Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the
delimitation of the Continental Shelf between them in the Black Sea, signed
on 23 June 1978;
- Protocols and other relevant documents between the Government of the
Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics concerning the demarcation of the Maritime Boundary, signed
on 11 September 1980;
Exchange of letters between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated
subsequently 23 December 1986 and 6 February 1987 confIrming the exclusive
economic zone frontier as the previously delimited continental shelf
frontier,
and other existing related delimitation Agreements concluded between the
Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics,
2868 Report Number 8-10 (5)
have agreed to conftrm, in accordance with the foregoing legal instruments, the
maritime boundaries between the Turkish and Georgian territorial waters in the Black
Sea,
This Protocol shall be ratified in conformity with the national legislation of each
Contracting Party and enter into force on the date the exchange of the instruments
of ratification through diplomatic channels.
DONE at Tbilisi on 14 July 1997 in the Turkish, Georgian and English
languages, being equally authentic.
(Signed)
For the Government of the Republic of Turkey
(Signed)
For the Government of Georgia
Lithuania-Russia
(Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf)
Report Number 10-18 (1)
Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation on
the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf in
the Baltic Sea
Signed: 24 October 1997
Entered into force: Not yet in force
Published at: STATE NEWS (Official Lithuanian Gazette), No. 100-2892
(1999)1
39 LOS BULL. 26 (1999)
I SUMMARY
The present report has to be read together with Lithuania-Russia (1997), No.
10-18(2). The latter concerns a treaty, concluded on the same day between the same
parties on the delimitation of the state boundary. A small part of that agreement
defines the territorial sea.2 Both agreements have much in common, especially
regarding the delimitation of the maritime zones. Many matters, developed in the
first report consequently apply to the second report.
This is the fourth agreement concluded during the second half of the 1990s in
the southeastern Baltic Sea that is directly related to the disintegration of the former
Unofficial translation to be found in Erik Franckx, Two More Maritime BowuJary Agreements Concluded
in the Eastern Baltic Sea in 1997, 13 INT'L 1. MAR. & COASTAL L. 274, at 282-83 (1998).
2 In the Lithuanian official gazette this treaty on the state border, of which the territorial sea forms part,
is of course, given its importance, treated in first order before the treaty on the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf. In a study on maritime boundaries, however, a reversed order
is to be preferred.
1.1. Charney and R. W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 3057-3075.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
3058 Report Number 10-18 (1)
Soviet Union.3 It establishes a maritime boundary in the southeastern Baltic Sea
where none had existed before and therefore very much resembles on this point
the agreement concluded between Estonia and Latvia (Estonia-Latvia (1996), No.
10-15, Part I). Together with the 1996 Estonia-Finland Agreement (No. 10-16) and
the 1997 Estonia-Latvia-Sweden Agreement (No. 10-17), these four agreements
just referred to introduce a new, fourth chronological group in the over-all Baltic
Sea delimitation effort,4 which is in substance clearly distinguishable from the
previous ones.5
The agreement establishes a single maritime boundary, dividing the EEZ and
the continental shelf. The boundary extends over a distance of about 62.5 nautical
miles (n.m.) and consists of two segments involving three turning points. The
western terminal point remains undetermined, awaiting trilateral negotiations.
The geographical configuration of the coasts in the boundary area is complicated
by the small Kursiu promontory6 that screens the mainland coast of the two parties
and encloses the Kursiu lagoon.7 The lagoon has only one natural outlet to the sea
at the north in front of the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda. Otherwise, the coasts are
concave.
Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation on the Delimitation of the
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf in the Baltic Sea, 24 October 1997, STATE NEWS,
No. 100-2892 (1999); Franckx, supra note 1. This treaty has not yet entered into force. Hereinafter
Lithuania-Russia Treaty. For the frrst three such agreements concluded in the area, see in chronological
order: Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15; Estonia-Fmiand (1996), No. 10-16; and Estonia-Latvia-Sweden
(1997), No. 10-17.
4 Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic Sea: Post-1991 Developments, 28 GA. J. INT'L &
COMPo L. 249, 256 (2000). It concerns agreements directly related to the dissolution of the former
Soviet Union.
The previous periods run from 1945-1972, 1973-1985, and 1985 to the beginning of the 1990s
respectively. See Erik Franckx,lntemational Cooperation in Respect of the Baltic Sea, in nm CHANGING
POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF EUROPE: ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245, 255-61 (R. Lefeber,
M. Fitzmaurice, & E. W. Vierdag eds., 1991), as later supplemented in Erik Franckx, Maritime
Boundaries in the Baltic Sea: Past, Present and Future, 2 MARITIME BRIEFING 6-10 (lBRU, No.2,
1996) and Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Baltic Sea, in nm BALTIC SEA: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN NATIONAL POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 167, 169-73 (Renate"
Platztkier & Philomene Verlaan eds., 1996). See also, Erik Franckx, Frontieres maritimes dans la mer
Baltique: passe, present etfutur, 9 ESPACES ET RESSOURCES MARITIMES 92, 97-103 (1995) and Erik
Franckx, Les delimitations maritimes en mer Baltique, 5 REVUE DE L'INDEMER 37, 50-58 (1997).
6 Terminology used in the present report to indicate the geographical feature called Kursiu Nerija in
Lithuanian and Kurshskaia Kosa in Russian. The latter corresponds with Kurshskaya Kosa according
to the spelling approved by the US Board on Geographic Names.
7 Terminology used in the present report to indicate the geographical feature called Kursiu Marios in
Lithuanian and Kurshskii Zaliv in Russian. The latter corresponds with Kurshskiy Zaliv according
to the spelling approved by the US Board on Geographic Names.
Lithuania-Russia 3059
IT CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
Not less than 17 rounds of negotiations, spread over four years were necessary for
the parties to reach an agreement on the land and maritime boundary. 8 The maritime
boundary proved to be especially difficult.9
The two boundary agreements are the first such agreements signed by the
Russian Federation with a former Soviet republic. The choice of Lithuania is
especially noteworthyl0 since this country was selected by the former Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic in January 1991 to serve as an example to undercut
separatist tendencies by others through an attack on the Vilnius television station.11
By signing an agreement on the bases of their interstate relations in 1991, a
few months after this incident, the parties established that they would respect the
inviolability of the new state and its boundaries.12 It is therefore not surprising
that the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in its decree on the ratification
of this agreements instructed the Russian government to give first and foremost
attention, inter alia, the concrete questions of the delimitation and demarcation of
the interstate boundaries and their regime.13 Even though little guidance can be
derived from the 1991 agreement, its provisions, nevertheless, were explicitly taken
as point of departure for the present delimitation treaty. 14
Negotiations started in July 1993 and met with success on 24 October 1997, at the occasion of a meeting
of President A. Brazauskas and B. El'tsin in Moscow. For a detailed overview of these protracted
negotiations, see Erik Franckx & Ann Pauwels, Lithuanian-Russian Boundary Agreement of October
1997: To Be or Not To Be? in LmER AMICORUM GONTHER JAENICKE - ZUM 85. GEBURTSTAG 63,
65-75 (Volkmar Gtstz, Peter Selmer & RUdiger Wolfrum eds., 1998) and further references to be found
there (see especially note 4).
9 Or as stated by the Russian newspaper 1ZVEsTnA, 24 October 1997, at 3, col. 2: Both sides settled
the land border rather quickly, but got stuck on the water boundaries.
10 As stressed by id., at 3, col. 1. No bilateral agreements of any significance had moreover been concluded
during the four preceding years between Lithuania and Russia. As remarked in IzVESTI1A, 21 October
1997, at I, col. 1.
11 Leaving 14 people dead and 110 injured. See THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIA AND THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION 139 (Archie Brown, Michael Kaser & Gerald S. Smith eds., 1994).
12 Agreement on the Bases of the Interstate Relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic and the Lithuanian Republic, 29 July 1991, art. 1. This agreement entered into force on 4 May
1992.
13 Decree No. 2201-1 of 17 January 1992, On the Ratification of the Agreement on the Bases of the
Interstate Relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Lithuanian
Republic, sub 3.
14 Lithuania-Russia Treaty, Preamble.
3060 Report Number 10-18 (1)
The legal status of Klaipeda was of particular political importance. 15 When
it became clear that a high level meeting would take place in Moscow between A.
Brazauskas and B. El'tsin during the month of October 1997, with as main agenda
item the signing of the border agreement (see infra Economic and Environmental
Considerations, in fine), the lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly adopted
a decree in which a direct appeal was made to the President indicating the danger
of a possible loss of Russian territorial rights to the Klaipeda, or Memel territory,
by entry into force of the agreement.16 The Appeal contained a clear threat to the
President. In that case the members of the Duma would certainly take these circumstances
into consideration if the agreement were to be presented to them for ratification.
17 Since the President did sign the two treaties a month later, that threat became
part of reality and apparently remains an obstacle to Russian ratification, preventing
entry into force,18 even though the Lithuanian Parliament, the Seimas, ratified the
boundary treaties in October 1999.19
15 This is only part of the territorial disputes in this area. These include the Russian claims to the Memel
territory, and lithuanian claims to Kaliningrad (Ktmigsberg). See Erik Franckx, Baltic Sea Update
(Report Number 10-14), at 2560.
16 Decree on the Appeal of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation "to the
President of the Russian Federation concerning the intended signature of the treaty on the state boundary
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Lithuania," CODE OF LAws OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, 20 October 1997, No. 42, item 4736. The text of the Appeal itself was appended to this
decree. For an unofficial English translation by the present author of the decree as well as the appended
Appeal, see Franckx & Pauwels, supra note 8, at 92 and 93-95 respectively.
17 The decree was supported by a rare occasion of quasi-unanimity in the State Duma, with 299 deputies,
all blocs voted in favor with the exception of Iabloko. BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 24 November 1997,
available at <gopher:lljods.latnet.lv> (15 December 1997).
18 For a more in depth evaluation of this appeal and its influence on the present boundary agreement,
see Franckx & Pauwels, supra note 8, at 75-85. On 18-21 March 2001, Russian Duma's inter-parliamentary
group for contacts with lithuania led by Alexander Chuyev visited lithuania. On that occasion
the latter stated that he believed a majority of Russian members of parliament favored ratification and
he expected that the ratification process would move forward after the official visit of the lithuanian
president to Moscow later that month. Available at <http://www.urm.ltldatalI51EF228133653_nf652.
htm#RUSSIAN%20DUMA%20DELEGATION%20VISITS%20LITHUANIA> (1 May 2001). This
visit took place on 29-31 March 2001. At that occasion ajoint statement by both presidents was issued
on 30 March 2001, which contained the following passage: "The Parties note the great significance
of the Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation Concerning the State Border
between lithuania and Russia and the Treaty Concerning Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic
Zone and the Continental Shelf in the Baltic Sea, which were signed on 24 October 1997. The Russian
Party will make efforts to complete the ratification process of these documents." Available at <http://
www.president.ltlenlone.phtml?id =1981> (1 May 2001).
19 Law No. VIII-1364 of 19 October 1999, On the Ratification of the Treaty between the Republic of
Lithuania and the Russian Federation on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the
Continental Shelf in the Baltic Sea, STATE NEWS, No. 100-2886 (1999).
Lithuania-Russia 3061
2 Legal Regime Considerations
The treaty that is the focus of this report delimits the EEZ and continental shelves
of the parties. With respect to the Russian Federation this poses no particular
problems. The Soviet Union had not only been the first country in the Baltic to
claim a 200-mile zone,20 i.e. a fishery zone which became operational on 1 April
1978.21 It was also the first Baltic state to establish an EEZ in 1984,22 which
logically also applied to the Baltic.23
Concerning Lithuania, the situation is not that clear. Even though its constitution
states that Lithuania "shall have the exclusive ownership right to the airspace over
its territory, its continental shelf, and the economic zone in the Baltic Sea,,,24 it
seems to have not formally established an EEZ.25 Nevertheless, its law on fisheries
of June 2000 states that it applies to the internal waters, the territorial sea as well
as to the EEZ.26 The Lithuanian situation consequently still seems to lead to the
conclusion that, even though some legislation uses the term exclusive economic
zone, no fundamental legislation establishing such a zone exists.27
The present treaty remains silent on this issue. It simply starts from the premise
that both states have such a zone. In the Baltic the normal practice thus far has been,
if two countries did not claim the same kind of zones this distinction is noted in
20 Edict of 10 December 1976, On Provisional Measuresfor the Preservation of the Living Resources
andfor the Regulation of Fishing in Marine Areas Adjacent to the Coast of the U.S.S.R., 50 VEDOMOSTI
VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA S.S.S.R. (Communications of the Supreme Soviet of the U .S.S.R.) 728 (1976).
For an English translation, see 15 ILM 1381 (1976).
21 A special enactment was issued for this purpose, namely the Decree of 24 March 1978, as mentioned
by A. Volkov and K. Bekiashev, LAW OF THE SEA AND FISHERIES (in Russian) 215 (1980).
22 Edict of 28 February 1984, On the Economic Zone of the U.S.S.R., 9 VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO
SOVETA S.S.S.R. (Communications of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) 137 (1984). For an English
translation, see United Nations, The Law of the Sea: National Legislation on the Exclusive Economic
Zone, the Economic Zone and the Exclusive Fishery Zone (U.N. Sales No. E.85.V.lO) 314-21 (1986).
23 See KazimierzGrzybowski, The New Soviet Law of the Sea, 32 OSTEUROPA RECHT 163,174 (1986).
24 Lithuanian Constitution, 25 October 1992, art. 47, available at <http://www3.lrs.ltlcgi-bin/preps2?
Conditionl=21892&Condition2=> (1 May 2001).
25 As listed in 39 LOS BULL. 52 (1999).
26 Law on Fisheries, 27 June 2000, art. 1 (3), available at <http://www3.lrs.ltlc-binlenglpreps2?Conditionl=
113091&Condition2=> (1 May 2001).
27 This conclusion was already arrived at on the basis of a thorough analysis of the Lithuanian legal
framework which existed prior to the establishment of the just mentioned law on fisheries of June
2000 (supra note 26). See the report written by the present author as legal consultant for the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, project number TPC/LIT/4452. Erik Franckx,
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF LITHUANIA ON THE ELABORATION OF APPROPRIATE
FIsHERIES LEGISLATION, Rome, Food and Agriculture Organization, at 16 and 63 (preliminary version,
21 May 1995).
3062 Report Number 10-18 (1)
the delimitation agreement.28 Such differences have not hindered the conclusion
of agreements in the Baltic region.29 The fact that the present treaty expressly states
that it delimits the EEZ and continental shelf of both parties, therefore further
strengthens the argument that Lithuania claims a 200 n.m. EEZ.
Finally, it appears noteworthy to stress that when the negotiations started in
1993, neither Lithuania nor Russia were a party to the 1982 LOS Convention. Only
a few months before the present treaty was signed did Russia ratify the LOS Convention.
30 Nevertheless, the treaty includes a preamble reporting that they were
"guided" by the LOS Convention and took into account "the existing international
practice to delimit marine areas in order to arrive at an equitable result.'o3l
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
The oil deposits which are believed to be located seaward of the Kursiu lagoon lie
at the heart of the present delimitation agreement. Ever since Lithuania regained
its independence during the early 1990s, every time the Russian Federation declared
its intention to explore or exploit the presumed oil fields it triggered a strong
Lithuanian reaction.32
The so-called Kravtsovskoye (D-6) oil field, located rather close to the coast,
proved to be a difficult obstacle to overcome throughout the negotiations.33 The
28 This is done either by specifically stating which country is claiming what kind of zone (see for instance
Sweden-Soviet Union (1988), No. 10-9; or Finland-Sweden (1994), No. 10-13), by simply placing
the different maritime zones claimed next to one another (see for instance Poland-Soviet Union (1985),
No. 10-8; or Finland-Soviet Union (1985), No. 10-4(4», or by simply taking a generic term in the
title of the agreement covering all zones concerned (see for instance Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15;
or Estonia-Finland (1996), No. 10-16). See in all these reports under Part 11.2, Legal Regime Considerations,
for further details.
29 Erik Franckx, Finland and Sweden Complete Their Maritime Boundary in the Baltic Sea, 27 OcEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 291, 300 (1996).ln one case parties even foresaw the establishment of an EEZ, even
though none of the parties signing the agreement claimed such a zone at that time. See German
Democratic Republic-Poland (1989), No. 10-6(1), art. 5(2).
30 Russia ratified the 1982 LOS Convention on 12 March 1997.
31 Lithuania-Russia Treaty, Preamble.
32 See for instance IzVESTllA, 1 March 1994, at 3, cols. 3-6 and F'INANSOVYE IzVESTllA, 12 September
1995, at 2, col. 1.
33 A Russian newspaper described this oil field as being located 15 km in front of the coast, with an
estimated capacity of 10 million tonnes. Exploitation would be realized through the construction of
an artificial island of 150 by 100 meters. See F'INANSOVYE IzVESTllA, 12 September 1995, at 2, col. 1.
The depth of the waters in the area is around 30 meters. See BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 21 August 1995,
available at <gopher:llnamejs.latnet.lv> (30 March 1996). A map indicating the exact location of the
oil field was kindly obtained on 3 May 2001 from the Lukoil-Kaliningradmomeft company. Map on
file with the author.
Lithuania-Russia 3063
period until early 1996 was characterized by the fact that negotiations were held
in the shadow of Russian initiatives to establish a consortium with foreign partners
in order to start the exploitation of the D-6 oil field.34 But when the head of Lukoil
announced during the month of April 1996 that his company planned to finance
the exploitation of the D-6 oil field with its own funds, the situation changed since
it meant that development would not be further delayed by the need to obtain foreign
capital.ls And even though the presidential elections in Russia during the month
of June 1996 seem to have burdened the whole process, the negotiations gained
momentum once again preceding an official visit of Lithuanian President A. Brazauskas
to MoSCOW.36
Press reports suggest that Lithuania finally relinquished its claims to "a promising
oil deposit in an undelimitated section of the Baltic Sea shelf not far from the coastal
resort of Nida.'037 The understanding that Lithuania had renounced claims it might
have had to this particular area facilitated the conclusion of the negotiations.38
Indeed, the Russian newspaper lzvestiia inferred from unofficial sources that the
quid pro quo was to grant Lithuania a sea corridor of about 1.1 n.m. to the middle
of the Baltic Sea.39 It avoided the threat of enclosure by the adjacent maritime
34 For a detailed account of the negotiations held during this period, see Erik Franckx, Maritieme
ajbakening in de oostelijke Baltische Zee: Internet en het wetenschappelijk onderzoek (Maritime
Delimitation in the Eastern Baltic Sea: Internet and Scientific Research), in OoST-EUROPA IN EUROPA:
EENHEID EN VERSCHEIDENHEID 283-85 [Huldeboek aangeboden aan Frits Gorle] (Pieter De Meyere,
Erik Franckx, Jean-Marie Henckaerts, & Katlijn Malfliet eds., 1996).
3S For more details of this period, see Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic, in BOUNDARIES
AND ENERGY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 275, 286-87 (Gerald Blake, Martin Pratt, Clive Schofield
& Janet Allison Brown eds., 1998). Previous constructions had given the foreign partner a majority
participation. See for instance the consortium plans between KalinigradmomeJtegaz, RosneJt, and two
German partners, namely RWE-DEA and Veba Oil, where the division would have taken place according
toa 15-25-30-30 per cent ratio respectively. BALTIC BusINESS WEEKLY, 22-28 January 1996, available
at <gopher:llnamejs.latnetlv> (30 March 1996).
36 For a detailed account of the events starting from June 1996 and finally leading up to the conclusion
of the treaty, see Franckx & Pauwels, supra note 8, at 66-72.
37 See BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 17 September 1997, available at <gopher:llnamejs.latnet.lv> (15 December
1997).
38 See Franckx & Pauwels, supra note 8, at 74-75. In later press reports one can read: "Russia's mass
media regularly report that the oil deposit D-6 near Nida has been given to Russia, since Lithuania,
according to Sidlauskas, has no claims on the site." See BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 27 October 1997,
available at <gopher:llnamejs. latnet.Iv> (15 December 1997). As also suggested in the Russian press,
see IzVESTIlA, 24 October 1997, at 3, col. 1,3.
39 IzVESTIlA, 24 October 1997, at 3, col. 3. This information was neither confirmed nor denied by the
Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs according to that same source (id., col. 4). The State Border
Delimitation and Demarcation Commission of that same ministry later confirmed that Lithuania had
argued for a wider access to the Swedish maritime zones. With respect to the 0-6 oil field, it was
stated that Lithuania did not directly influence the boundary as it became evident that no matter what
method would have been used, the D-6 oil field would still have fallen outside of the Lithuanian sector.
3064 Report Number 10-18 (1)
zones of Latvia and Russia, by securing Lithuania an opposite maritime boundary
with Sweden.
Because of the possibility that gas and oil deposits might be found in the area
delimited by the present treaty, this was the first treaty concluded during the fourth
chronological group of agreements in the over-all Baltic Sea delimitation effort4O
containing a unity of deposits clause. In the over-all Baltic Sea practice, this clause
is the exception, not the rule.41 Compared to the other unity of deposits clauses
in maritime boundary agreements in the Baltic Sea,42 the formulation used in the
present treaty is somewhat unique. It does not mention that negotiations can be
initiated by either party, nor that they should be held prior to any exploitation.43
The parties are only called upon to "strive to agree to settle any problems." Other
formulas of a more mandatory nature can be found in other Baltic agreements.
Fishery considerations did not influence the boundary. These aspects were dealt
with by means of a separate agreement concluded in 1999.44
4 Geographic Considerations
The coasts of both states in the area to be delimited are adjacent and characterized
by the long and rather small Kursiu promontory. This is a typical feature of the
southeastern Baltic Sea caused by the soft morainic composition of the coastline
in combination with the mainly westerly winds and currents flowing eastward in
Fax of 3 May 2001, on file with the author.
40 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41 Erik Franckx, Baltic Sea Maritime Boundaries (Region X), supra at 363.
42 See in chronological order: Finland-Sweden (1972), No. 10-3, attached Protocol; German Democratic
Republic-Sweden (1978), No. 10-7, art. 3; Denmark-Sweden (1984), No. 10-2, art. 6; Denmark-German
Democratic Republic (1988), No. 10-11, art. 3.
43 lbis requirement of prior consultations is to be found in the German Democratic Republic-Sweden
and Denmark-German Democratic Republic agreements, supra note 42. The Denmark-Sweden agreement
does not contain such a requirement, it is true, but it should be remembered that this was the only
instance so far where an actual dispute over a particular zone that was the subject of a license arose
before the conclusion of the maritime boundary. As stressed in Franckx, supra note IS, at 2561. The
inclusion of a similar requirement would therefore not have been very logical. lbis is not the case
for D-6 oil field where exploitation is only planned to begin in 2003. F"mally, as far as the last agreement
mentioned in the previous note is concerned, namely the one between Finland and Sweden, the
importance of such a clanse appears minimal given the fact that the probability of ever running into
such deposits in that area of the Baltic Sea are minimal at best. See Finland-Sweden (1972), No. 10-3,
Part 11.3, Economic and Environmental Considerations.
44 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Russian
Federation on the Co-operation in the Field of Fisheries, 29 June 1999, STATE NEWS, No. 15-386
(2000).
Lithuania-Russia 3065
the area.4S For example, a similar feature is present inside the Gulf of Gdansk area.
When the former Soviet Union delimited its territorial sea during the late 1950s,
and about a decade later its continental shelf with Poland in that region (PolandSoviet
Union (195811969), No. 10-8), the Bay ofWislany did not influence these
agreements since the Baltiiskaya Kosa/Mierzeja Wislana formed the relevant coastline
from which the delimitation was to be drawn.46 Consequently, when the
Russian Federation and Lithuania delimited their maritime areas, the Kursiu lagoon
did not influence these negotiations, since the terminal point of the land boundary
was apparently determined to be located on the Kursiu promontory.47
As in the Gulf of Gdansk area, therefore, the parties considered the promontory
as the relevant coastline for the delimitation. Given the smooth curving nature of
these geographical features in the southeastern Baltic Sea, the relevant coastline
is quite symmetrical for both parties concerned.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
No islands, rocks, reefs, or low-tide elevations are present. The only special geographic
feature in the area is the Kursiu promontory which the parties considered
to represent the relevant coastline for the delimitation (see supra, Part 11.4, Geographic
Considerations).
6 Baseline Considerations
Systems of straight baselines did not influence the maritime boundary delimitation.
The Russian Federation had not established a system of straight baselines in the
Kaliningrad region.48 Because of the general smooth curves of the coastlines in
45 VICTOR PREsCOTT, THE MARITIME PoLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 227 (1985).
46 On this promontory the terminal point of the Polish-Soviet state frontier was located. See Protocol
between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Concerning the Delimitation of Polish and Soviet Territorial Waters in the Gulf
of Gdansk of the Baltic Sea, 18 March 1958, art. 1, reprinted in Poland-Soviet Union (1958), No.
10-8.
47 Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(2), Part 11.2, Legal Regime Considerations.
48 The former Soviet system of straight baselines in the Baltic Sea, as established in 1985, stopped well
north of the area here under consideration, namely at Ovisi lighthouse, Latvia. See Decree of 15 January
1985, On the Confirmation of a List of Geographic Coordinates Determining the Position of the Baseline
in the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic Sea and Black Sea from which the Width of the Territorial Waters,
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of the U.S.S.R. is Measured, 1 (Annex) IzVESHCHENIIA MOREPLAVATELIAM
37 (1986) (itconcems point 32). See in Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15, at Part 11.6,
3066 Report Number 10-18 (l)
this southeastern part of the Baltic Sea, the Soviet system of straight baselines did
not include the Lithuanian coast. Nevertheless, when Lithuania regained its independence,
a law on the state boundary was promulgated in which it was stated that the
"extent of the territorial sea shall be measured from the straight line drawn between
the two outermost points of the shoreline.'>49 A governmental decision of 1994
subsequently defined these two outermost points of the shorelines by providing
concrete coordinates, i.e. the coast near Palanga in the north and the terminal point
of the land border with Russia on the west coast of the Kursiu promontory on the
other.50 This line did not, however, influence the present boundary agreement.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
No particularly significant seabed features are found in the area that might have
justified consideration in the delimitation. The Lithuanian and Russian coasts are
not markedly different in extent and broadly similar in their relation to that shelf.
Since the latter is moreover a geological continuum in the area, no geological
distinctions could be made.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
The delimitation was guided by the equidistance method. Because the Kursiu
promontory forms almost a perfect arc of a circle, the parties seem to have relied
on construction lines in order to determine the general direction of the coast. The
relevant starting points of these construction lines were not located on the Kursiu
promontory but rather on the Lithuanian and Russian mainland coasts proper. Since
the parties had different views on how to determine the general direction of the
coast, two such construction lines were apparently relied upon. A first such construction
line (hereinafter line A), closest to the terminal point of the land border, appears
to have been drawn between the mainland coast of Lithuania opposite the northern
Baselines Considerations, and Part 11.1, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations.
49 Law on the State Border of the Republic of Lithuania, 25 lune 1992, art. 4, available at <http://www3.
lrs.ltlc-bin/englpreps2? Conditionl=21157&Condition2=> (1 May 2001). This article further stated:
''The geographical coordinates of these points shall be approved by the Government of the Republic
of Lithuania. An international agreement of the Republic of Lithuania may establish a different limit
of the territorial sea of the Republic of Lithuania."
50 Decision No. 162 of 10 March 1994, On the Establishment of the Territorial Sea of the Republic of
Lithuania, STATE NEWS, No. 20-327 (1994). The following coordinates are provided: For the northern
point 55"55'12.8" N and 21"03'01.1" E, and for the southern point 55"16'51.6" Nand 20"57'21.9" E.
Lithuania-Russia 3067
extremity of the Kursiu promontory near Klaipeda and Cape Gvardeiskii51 on the
Russian one. A second such line (hereinafter line B) apparently was drawn further
out at sea, linking the salient feature of the coast near Palanga on the Lithuanian
mainland coast with Cape Taran on the Russian one. On the bases of the lines so
constructed, two perpendiculars seem to have been drawn starting from the respective
midpoints of lines A and B.
If line A is more advantageous for Lithuania, line B tends to allocate more
maritime space to Russia. These lines do not run parallel to one another and tend
to diverge more further out at sea. The segment between points 1 and 2 rather
follows the same general direction as that of the perpendicular of line B. The general
direction of the second segment, i.e. between points 2 and 3, in turn is linked to
that of the perpendicular constructed on the basis of line A.
These remarks corroborate the underlying compromise that governed this delimitation,
namely that Lithuania gained maritime areas further out at sea in return
for not pressing its claim conceming the D-6 oil field closer to shore (see supra,
Part II.3, Economic and Environmental Considerations).
Contrary to the bilateral state practice of Estonia and Latvia (Estonia-Latvia
(1996), No. 10-15, Part II.8, Method of Delimitation Considerations), and the later
one by Latvia and Lithuania (Latvia-Lithuania (1999), No. 10-20, Part II.8, Method
of Delimitation Considerations), the terminal point of the last segment close to
Sweden's economic zone is simply provided without giving any express indication
of the direction to be taken from there.
9 Technical Considerations
The lines connecting the different turning points are loxodromes, i.e. straight lines.
Two sets of coordinates are provided for the three turning points, one using the
World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84) relied upon by Lithuanian charts, and the
other using the so-called system of coordinates of 1942, on which the Russian
maritime charts are still based.52 This is the only exception to the settled practice
in the Baltic Sea that all maritime boundary agreements concluded since the 1990s
have used WGS-84 as a single common standard (Estonia-Sweden (1998), No. 10-19,
Part II.9, Technical Considerations). Only Russia continues to rely on an older
system, requiring the use of two sets of coordinates as well as two different charts.
51 TIlis terminology corresponds with Cape Gvardeyskiy according to the spelling approved by the US
Board on Geographic Names.
52 It is assumed that the datum referenced in the treaty is the Pulkovo 1942 datum.
3068 Report Number 10-18 (1)
But, both sets of geographical coordinates define the same location on the earth's
surface.
The charts appended to the agreement form an integral part to the treaty. This
is rather exceptional when compared with the other delimitation agreements recently
concluded in this area.53 The present treaty, as well as the one on the land border
concluded on the same day, might have been characterized in the press by their
rather succinct nature, they were also said to have been accompanied by many
maps.54 This partly explains the enhanced value attached to these charts. Nevertheless,
the treaty also provides that if a discrepancy were to occur between the line
determined according to the geographic coordinates on the one hand, and the line
depicted on the charts on the other, the one based on the text of the agreement will
prevail.
10 Other Considerations
This is only the second agreement belonging to the fourth chronological group in
the overall Baltic Sea delimitation effort,55 which has only been drawn up in the
respective languages of the parties.56 All the others have included an English
language official text which is to prevail in case of a divergence of interpretation.57
The official text of the agreement only became part of the public domain during
the month of October 1999, when Lithuania included this treaty in its parliamentary
papers when completing its ratification procedure.58
This is only the second time in the Baltic Sea state practice since the Second
World War, that a dispute settlement provision was included in a maritime delimita-
53 All the agreements concluded in the Baltic Sea area since 1990 to which charts were appended, i.e.
all except the tripoint agreements, refer only to the latter document for illustrative purposes. See in
chronological order: Finland-SWeden (1994), No. 10-13; Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15; EstoniaFmland
(1996), No. 10-16; Estonia-Sweden (1998), No. 10-19; Latvia-Lithuania (1999), No. 10-20;
at Part 11.9, Technical Considerations.
54 See Franckx & Pauwels, supra note 8, at 73.
55 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
56 For the other agreement, see Estonia-Finland (1996), No. 10-16.
57 See Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15; Estonia-Latvia-Sweden(1997), No. 10-17; and Estonia-Sweden
(1998), No. 10-19; Latvia-Lithuania (1999), No. 10-20; and Fstonia-Fmland-Sweden (2001), No. 10-21,
. Part 11.10, Other Considerations. The latter was even exclusively drafted in the English language.
58 See supra notes 1 and 19 and accompanying text. Even though the parties had taken the position that
they would only reveal the exact content of the treaty at the time of ratification (see Franckx & Pauwels,
supra note 8, at 72), a Lithuanian newspaper was nevertheless able to published it on 13 December
1997 as the result of a leak attributed to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lithuanian Seimas.
See Franckx, supra note I, at 279.
Lithuania-Russia 3069
tion agreement.59 Contrary to the previous one, however, it only specifically mentions
consultations and negotiations without any reference to other possible means
of peaceful settlement provided by international law.
III CONCLUSIONS
This agreement establishes a single maritime boundary between the parties dividing
their EEZ and continental shelves. Following a longstanding practice in the Baltic
Sea, the western tripoint is left unresolved by the parties. It is expected that this
remaining point will be settled by means of direct trilateral negotiations in the future
with Sweden.
It is the first maritime boundary agreement concluded after the dissolution of
the former Soviet Union in which non-living natural resources formed the crux of
the problem. The latter is reflected in the presence of a unity of deposits clause in
the treaty. Nevertheless, considerations related to these resources have only indirectly
influenced the location of the maritime boundary, for the latter was based on an
equidistant line. Because the Russian Federation was primarily interested in the rapid
exploitation of the Kravtsovskoye oil field located close to the coast, the first
segment of the boundary seems to have been guided by the Russian method of
drawing the perpendicular to the general direction of the coast. Lithuania, on the
other hand, strongly sought a corridor to the middle of the Baltic Sea without being
enclosed by the maritime zones of Latvia and Russia. The second segment created
this corridor by relying on the Lithuanian view on how the perpendicular to the
general direction of the coast was. It therefore appears to be located south of the
hypothetical equidistant line, especially at its western extremity. Despite this latter
fact, the terminal point of the present treaty was still considered by Latvia at that
time to run into a zone which formed the object of conflicting claims between this
country and Lithuania.60
Fishery considerations, on the other hand, were resolved by means of a special
agreement, concluded about two years later. As is reported in Latvia-Lithuania
59 For the first such agreement. see Estonia-Latvia (1996). No.1 0-15. Part II. 10, Other Considerations.
Abstraction is made of the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Mutual Relations in the Fishery Sector
in the Area Formerly Disputed in the Baltic Sea, 18 April 1988. art. 2. see Sweden-Soviet Union (1988).
No. 10-9. supra. at 2068, 2072. The latter agreement was indeed a fishery agreement, which was
attached to a maritime delimitation agreement concluded on the same day.
60 See Franckx, supra note 4. at 264.
3070 Report Number 10-18 ( 1)
(1999), No. 10-20, this proved to be an important precedent on which Lithuania
could rely in its relations with Latvia.
The entry into force of this agreement, together with the one on the state border
concluded the same day (Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(2)), caused significant
problems in Russia. The Russian Duma has so far not ratified the treaty. Even
though positive signs exist at present that this situation might well change, it cannot
be denied that this contrasts sharply with the constant practice since World War
II in the Baltic Sea that maritime delimitation agreements enter into force at the
latest during the year following their signature. This concerns more that 20 agreements
over-all. Only one single exception exists to this rule prior to the conclusion
of the present treaty,61 namely the 1965 Protocol relating to the continental shelf
adjacent to the coasts of the Baltic Sea to the Agreement between the Kingdom
of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Delimitation,
in Coastal Regions, of the Continental Shelf of the North Sea (Denmark-Federal
Republic of Germany (1965), No. 10-1, Part 11.1, Political, Strategic, and Historical
Considerations), which only entered into force in 1977. It remains to be seen whether
the present agreement will take that long to enter into force.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A. Law of the Sea Conventions
Lithuania: Acceded only to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone on 31 January 1992; not a party to the 1982 LOS
Convention.
Russia: Ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf on 22 November 1960;
ratified the 1982 LOS Convention on 12 March 1997.
61 As already alluded to. See Franckx. supra note 41. at 347. note 7. This covers the period until 1990.
For later developments. see Reports 10-13 and 10-15 to 10-17 which all conform to this practice. Report
10-14. it should be remembered, concerns a regional update. It should nevertheless be noted that the
next agreement to be signed in the Baltic Sea would form a second exception to this rule. be it of
a lesser extent: Having been signed on 20 November 1998. that agreement only entered into forced
on 26 July 2000. See Estonia-Sweden (1998). No. 10-19. Also of the agreement concluded between
Latvia and Lithuania in 1999 it can already be stated with certainty that it will form another exception.
since this agreement had not yet entered into force at the time of writing (May 2001). See LatviaLithuania
(1999). No. 10-20.
Lithuania-Russia 3071
B. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Lithuania: 12 n.m. territorial sea; 200 n.m. EEZ (implicit in the agreement).
Russia: 12 n.m. territorial sea; 200 n.m. continental shelf and/or the outer edge
of the continental margin; 200 n.m. economic zone.
C. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Lithuania: No change.
Russia: No change.
V REFERENCES AND ADDmONAL READINGS
Erik Franckx, Maritieme ajbakening in de oostelijke Baltische Zee: Internet en het
wetenschappelijk onderzoek (Maritime Delimitation in the Eastern Baltic Sea:
Internet and Scientific Research), in OOST-EUROPA IN EUROPA: EENHEID EN
VERSCHEIDENHEID 275 [HULDEBOEK AANGEBODEN AAN FRITs GORLE](pieter
De Meyere, Erik Franckx, Jean-Marie Henckaerts, & Katlijn Malfliet eds., 1996).
Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic, in BOUNDARIES AND ENERGY:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 275 (Gerald Blake, Martin Pratt, Clive Schofield,
& Janet Allison Brown eds., 1998).
Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic: Post-1991 Developments, 28 GA.
J. lNT'L. & COMPo L. 249 (2000).
Erik Franckx, Two More Maritime Boundary Agreements Concluded in the Eastern
Baltic Sea in 1997, 13 lNT'L J. MAR. & COASTAL L. 274 (1998).
Prepared by Erik Franckx

Lithuania-Russia 3073
Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation on
the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
in the Baltic Sea
[Unofficial translation]
The Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as
the Parties,
Guided by the desire to deepen and broaden the good-neighbourly relations between
them in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations Organization and affirming the adherence to the obligations undertaken
in the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Proceeding from the provisions of the Treaty on the Bases on Interstate Relations
between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic of 29 July 1991 and the Agreement between the Republic of Lithuania
and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on the Cooperation with respect
to the Economic and Socio-cultural Development of the Kaliningrad Region of the
RSFSR of 29 July 1991, i
Considering the mutual aspiration of the Parties to secure the protection and the
rational use on the natural resources as well as other interests in the maritime areas
adjacent to their coasts in accordance with international law,
Guided by the United Nations Convention on the Law on the Sea of 1982.
Aspiring to delimit the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf between the
Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation,
Taking into account the existing international practice to delimit marine areas in
order to arrive at an equitable result,
Have agreed the following:
3074 Report Number 10-18 (1)
Article 1
The line of delimitation on the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation starts from the
junction point of the outer limit of the territorial sea of the Parties and continues
to the junction point of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of
a third party by means of straight lines (loxodromes) that join points whose sequence
and geographical coordinates are indicated in article 2 of the present Treaty.
The geographical coordinates of the points of the above-mentioned line are calculated
in the World Geodetic System of coordinates of 1984 (WGS 84), applied on
Lithuanian maritime chart No. 82001, published in 1996, and in the system of
coordinates of 1942, applied on the Russian maritime chart No. 22055, published
in 1997.
The above-mentioned maritime charts with the plotted line of delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf between the Republic of Lithuania
and the Russian Federation are appended to the present Treaty and are an integral
part of it.
Article 2
The geographical coordinates of the points mentioned in article 1 of the present
Treaty are the following:
In the system of coordinates WGS 84 the points:
1. 55° 23,040'N. lat.
2. 55° 38,175'N. lat.
3. 55° 55,420'N. lat.
20° 39,227'E. long.
19° 55,466'E. long.
19° 02,805'E. long.
In the system of coordinates 1942 the points:
1. 55° 23,053'N. lat.
2. 55° 38,189'N. lat.
3. 55° 55,435'N. lat.
20° 39,243'E. long.
19° 55,583'E. long.
19° 02,923'E. long.
Lithuania-Russia 3075
The geographical coordinates of the junction point of the line mentioned in article
1 of the present Treaty, with the boundary of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of a third party, will be defined with the latter's participation.
If a discrepancy occurs between the line determined according to the geographic
coordinates established in the present article and the line depicted on the charts,
appended to the present Treaty, the Parties will be guided by the above-mentioned
geographic coordinates.
Article 3
If the line delimiting the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf intersects
an oil and/or gas deposit, the Parties shall strive to agree to settle any problems
arising out of such deposits according to generally recognized international law rules
and principles based on the rights of each Party to the natural resources of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.
Article 4
Any dispute between the Parties arising out of the implementation of the present
Treaty shall be settled by consultations or negotiations according to international
law.
Article 5
The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the
day on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.
DONE at Moscow on 24 October 1997 in duplicate in the Lithuanian and Russian
languages, each text being equally authentic.
For the Republic of Lithuania For the Russian Federation
Bulgaria-Turkey
Report No. 8-13
Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria
on the Determination of the Boundary in the Mouth Area of the
MutluderelRezovska River and Delimitation of the Maritime Areas
Between the Two States in the Black Sea.
Done: 4 December 1997
Entered into force: 4 November 1998
Published at: T.C. Resml Gazete (Official Gazette), No. 23409 of 21
July 1998 (Turkish and English)
38 LOS BULL. 62 (1998)
I SUMMARY
The agreement delimited the maritime boundary in the Begendik/Rezovo Bay and
beyond that the territorial sea, the continental shelf, and the exclusive economic
zone boundaries of the contracting states. Seaward of the bay the lateral maritime
boundary is a simplified equidistant line.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
The Bulgarian-Turkish land boundary to the mouth of the MutluderelRezovska River
was delimited by the Istanbul Peace Agreement1 and this was confirmed by the
Istanbul Peace Agreement, 29 September 1913,7 Oiistur Tertip-i SBni (Laws and Rules of the Ottoman
Empire) 25, reprinted in NIHAT BRIM, DEVLETLERARASI HUKUK VE SIYASI TARIH METlNLBRI, CILT
I (Osmanli Imparatotlugu Andlasmari), Ankara 1953, at 457.
J.I. Charney and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 2871-2886.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
2872 Report Number 8-13
Lausanne Peace Agreement.2 At the mouth of the river the land boundary ends
at a point equidistant from the two states' shores. That serves as the initial point
for the maritime boundary. But, due to accretion and avulsion of the shores, for
decades the parties could not agree on the location of that point. The location of
this point and the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the area was made more
difficult due to changes in the claim to territorial seas by the parties from 3 to 12
nautical miles (n.m.) (Bulgaria in 1951 and Turkey in 1964) and in other maritime
zones.
After the dissolution of the communist regime in Bulgaria, the parties established
close and sincere relations which resulted in the conclusion on 6 May 1992 of The
Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness, Co-operation and Security.3 That led
to the negotiation of the maritime boundary agreement of 1997 to further develop
the existing spirit of co-operation between the parties and to establish a precise and
equitable delimitation of their respective maritime areas (territorial sea, continental
shelf, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Black Sea.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
Bulgaria's claim to a 12 n.m. territorial sea in the Black Sea was first made in 1951.
Turkey's claim to a 12 n.m. territorial sea for the Black Sea was made in 1964.4
It should be noted that Turkey also claims a territorial sea of 12 n.m. off its Mediterranean
coastline, but limits its territorial sea to 6 n.m. in the Aegean.s
The parties established the initial boundary point at the mouth area of the
MutluderelRezovska River. From this point to an agreed closing line at the mouth
area of the BegendiklRezovo Bay, the parties established geodetic straight lines
to delimit their respective internal waters within the Bay. The initial point of the
territorial sea boundary is located at 41 058' 48.5" N., 280 02' 15.8" E. on the closing
line delimiting the internal waters of the Bay from the sea. Seaward of the Bay
2 Treaty of Lausanne, 24 July 1923,28 L.N.T.S. 12, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 4 (Supp. 1924).
3 T.C. Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), No. 22252 of 8 April 1995.
4 Law No. 476 of 15 May 1964, T.e. Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), No. 11711 of 24 May 1964,
reprinted in National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Territorial Sea, The Contiguous Zone,
The Continental Shelf, The High Seas and Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
Sea, UN Doc. STILEG/SER.BI15, at 128-29 (1970).
5 Law No. 2674 of 20 May 1982, T.C. Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), No. 17708 of 29 May 1982,
reprinted in The Law of the Sea, National Legislation on the Territorial Sea, The Right of Innocent
Passage and Contiguous Zone, UN Sales No. E.95.V.7, at 385 (1995); and Decree No. 814742 of 29
May 1982, T.C. Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), No. 17708 Supp. of 29 May 1982, reprinted in The
Right of Innocent Passage and Contiguous Zone, supra at 386.
Bulgaria-Turkey 2873
closing line, the boundary line continues through a geodetic line to the co-ordinates
of 410 58' 52.8" N., 280 02' 25.2" E. and then, through loxodromes, it follows the
geographical parallel 41 058' 52.8"N. until it meets the terminal point, 41 058' 52.8"
N., 280 19' 25.8" E., at the 12 n.m. limit of the two states' territorial sea. Seaward
of that terminal point of the territorial seas, the 1997 agreement delimits the maritime
boundary of Bulgaria's and Turkey's continental shelves and exclusive economic
zones by a single line. Thus, the boundary line continues in a north-east direction
by geodetic lines joining the turning points of the agreed co-ordinates.
Through this agreement the parties not only ended a long-standing dispute, but
also displayed a spirit of co-operation and good-neighbourliness. In addition they
also agreed to settle disputes that might arise from the interpretation or implementation
of this agreement through the peaceful methods identified in article 33 of the
UN Charter.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
The parties established a common navigation sector within the BegendiklRezovo
Bay to enable ships flying their flag to navigate easily to and from the river mouth.
As agreed by the parties, ships that cross the boundary line within the established
sub-sectors are not considered to have violated this agreement. For the same reason,
the maritime area at the north-eastern part of the bay, that remains under Bulgarian
sovereignty as internal waters, not only serves the goal of equity but also permits
easy navigation through the Bulgarian internal waters.
In general, the coastal waters of the two states in the delimited area contain
. valuable living natural resources that will become even more valuable if they are
not polluted by the waters of the Danube. But the location of valuable living and
non-living natural resources within the delimited area did not in principle playa
role in the location of the boundary line.
4 Geographic Considerations
The land territory has changed by accretion or avulsion at the mouth area of the
MutluderelRezovska River. This changed the length of the coasts of the riparian
states and the natural configuration of the BegendiklRezovo Bay, and as a result
affected the delimitation within the Bay.
The lateral boundary was delimited between the parties in the concave coast
of BegendiklRezovo Bay. The coastlines within the Bay are relatively even and
2874 Report Number 8-13
there are no islands or islets within it and no major protrusions exist on either state's
coastline. Consequently, an international maritime boundary line based on equidistance
was likely to produce equitable results, without calling for any significant
adjustment in the line or application of other methods of delimitation.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
There are no islands or similar features in the region.
6 Baseline Considerations
A closing line is used at the Begendik/Rezovo Bay using the entrance points of
Rezovo Cape, in the north, and Begendik Cape in the south. This closing line is
approximately 1.2 n.m. in length, and closes the internal waters of the Bay from
the territorial sea of the two parties.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
The waters in the western part of the Black Sea are not as deep as in those in the
east and for this reason the natural prolongation of the continental shelf is relatively
larger than the prolongation of the shelf from the countries in the eastern part of
the Black Sea. But, despite this geological and geomorphological reality, the boundary
of the continental shelf immediately beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea
runs through waters whose depths are 1,000 meters and later 2,000 meters and more.
Geological and geomorphological considerations do not appear to have
influenced the location of the boundary line.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
The delimitation within the Begendik/Rezovo Bay, taking into account the length
and the general configuration of the coast, is based on the principle of equity and
equitable delimitation. The boundary of the territorial sea, the continental shelf and
the EEZ - which are based on a single boundary line - is based in principle on
a simplified equidistant line to produce a just and equitable delimitation in the Black
Sea.
Bulgaria-Turkey 2875
In principle, during delimitation, emphasis is given to equity and to using an
equidistant line for reaching an equitable settlement. The acceptance of the geographical
parallel 41° 58' 52.8" N. as the lateral boundary line of the 12 n.m.
territorial sea until it meets with co-ordinates of 41 ° 58' 52.8" N., 28° 19' 25.8"
E., is against the interests of Turkey. By agreeing to this boundary line, Turkey
seems to accept the Bulgarian practice based on Act No. 2210. The loss of territory
by Turkey in this territorial sea area is compensated at the continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone boundary by the area lying between the co-ordinates of
42° 14' 28" N., 29° 20' 45" E.; 42° 26' 24" N., 29° 34' 20" E.; and 42° 29' 24" N.,
29° 49' 36" E.
9 Technical Considerations
The boundary in the BegendiklRezovo Bay is shown on a map mutually adopted
in 1983, at the scale of 1:10,000, and attached to the agreement as Annex 4. The
boundary lines of the territorial sea, the continental shelf, and the EEZ are shown
on Bulgarian Maritime Chart No. 5001 (scale 1:500,000, ed. 1981) and on Turkish
Maritime Chart No. 10-A (Scale 1: 750,000, ed. 1993). These charts constitute
integral parts of the agreement as Annexes 5A and 5B. The lateral boundary line
of the territorial sea begins from the point 41 ° 58' 48.5" N., 28° 02' 15.8" E. and
then continues through geodetic lines up to 41° 58' 52.8" N., 28° 02' 25.2" E. Then
it follows the geographic parallel 41° 58' 52.8" N. through loxodromes until this
line meets 41° 59' 52" N., 28° 19' 26" E. at the 12 n.m. limit of the territorial sea.
The seaward limit of this maritime boundary would end at a tri-point between
Bulgaria, Turkey, and Romania. Until such time as the three reach agreement on
this point, the Bulgaria-Turkey terminal point will remain undefined.
The co-ordinates in the agreement are expressed in terms of the World Geodetic
System 1984 (WGS '84) except for the point 41° 58' 48.5" N., 28° 02' 15.8" E.,
which is the initial boundary point for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea
located on a closing line on the Mercator projection drawn between the points of
Rezova Cape in the north (41° 59' 05" N., 28° 02' 11" E), and Begendik Cape in
the south (41° 57' 45" N., 28°02' 35"E.), which are the entrance points of the BegendiklRezovo
Bay. Those were the mutually agreed points by the parties in 1983 and
were marked on a 1110,000 scale chart, based on the Krassovksy ellipsoid on the
Bulgarian side and on an ED-50 datum as the median latitude <p= 41° 59' 00".
2876 Report Number 8-13
10 Other Considerations
None.
m CONCLUSIONS
The agreement concerning the delimitation of the maritime areas between the two
adjacent countries is based on a simplified equidistant line to produce an equitable
and just delimitation.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A. Law of the Sea Conventions
Turkey: A party neither to any of the 1958 Conventions nor to the 1982 LOS
Convention.
Bulgaria: Party to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, and the 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf, since 31 August 1962. Bulgaria became a party
to the 1982 LOS Convention on 15 May 1996.
B. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Turkey: 6 n.m. territorial sea, but 12 n.m. in the Black Sea and in the
Mediterranean Sea (Law No. 2674 of 20 May 1982 and Decree No.
8/4742 of 29 May 1982).
Turkey also has an EEZ only in the Black Sea up to 200 n.m. (Decree
No. 86111264 of 5 December 1986).
Bulgaria: 12 n.m. territorial sea; 24 n.m. contiguous zone; and a continental shelf
to the limits of the natural prolongation of its land territory (Act No. 2210
of 8 July 1987). In addition, Bulgaria, with this act, approved its previous
declaration of its EEZ (Decree No. 77 of 7 January 1987) extending up
to 200 n.m.
C. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Turkey: No change.
Bulgaria-Turkey 2877
Bulgaria: Act No. 2210 of 8 July 1987 was repealed by an act adopted by the
Bulgarian Parliament on 28 January 2000, promulgated in the State
Gazette of 11 February 2000. This new act (Act No. 24/2000) did not
change the limits of the Bulgarian maritime areas.
Prepared by Yuksel [nan

Bulgaria-Turkey 2879
Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria
on the Determination of the Boundary in the Mouth Area of the
MutluderelRezovska River and Delimitation of the Maritime Areas
Between the Two States in the Black Sea.
The Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria, hereinafter referred to as
"the Parties",
Desiring to further develop the existing cooperation based on the Treaty on
Friendship, Goodneighbourliness, Cooperation and Security between the Republic
of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria, signed at Ankara on 6 May 1992,
Having decided to determine the boundary in the mouth area of the
MutluderelRezovska River between the Parties and to ensure free outflow of its
waters into the sea, and taking into account all relevant circumstances to establish
a precise and equitable delimitation of their respective maritime areas in the Black
Sea in which the Parties exercise sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction in
accordance with applicable rules of international law,
Taking into account the willingness of the Parties to achieve just and mutually
acceptable solutions to the above-mentioned issues through constructive negotiations,
and in the spirit of good-neighbourly relations,
Convinced that this Agreement will contribute to the strengthening of the
relations and encourage further cooperation between the Parties in the interest of
their peoples,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The boundary in the mouth area of the MutluderelRezovska River
1. The mouth area of the MutluderelRezovska River is defined as that between
the line joining the point x=4978m and y=7836m on the Turkish bank with the point
x=5071m and y=7842m on the Bulgarian bank and where the river flows into the
BegendiklRezovo Bay.
2880 Report Number 8-13
2. The boundary between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria
in the mouth area of the MutluderelRezovska River shall follow the median line
within the river bed/channel (measured at mean sea level), fixed after its clearing
and refashioning.
3. The initial boundary point in the mouth area of the MutluderelRezovska River
shall have the rectangular coordinates x=5025m and y=7839m, and the terminal
boundary point in the mouth of the river shall have the rectangular coordinates
x=5324m and y=8339m, determined on the Plan of the mouth area of the Mutluderel
Rezovska River, scale 1:1000, mutually adopted in September 1992 (Annex 3 to
this Agreement). The terminal boundary point in the river mouth constitutes the
terminal point of the land boundary between the Parties.
4. The Parties shall ensure the free outflow of the river water into the Bay on the
basis of a joint engineering project which shall be prepared in accordance with
provisions set up in annex 1 to this Agreement.
Article 2
The maritime boundary in the BegendiklRezovo Bay
1. The maritime boundary between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of
Bulgaria in the BegendiklRezovo Bay starts from the terminal land boundary point
in the river mouth with coordinates as determined in article 1, paragraph 3, of this
Agreement. From that point the maritime boundary continues through points with
coordinates:
Point "C"
Point "D"
Point "E"
41° 58' 43.6"N and 28° 01'53.3"E
41° 58' 41.5"N and 28° 02' 05.1"E
41° 58' 48.5"N and 28° 02' 15.8"E, which is established on
the baseline closing the internal waters of the Bay from the sea.
The Parties agree to establish a common navigation sector in the Bay and a
navigation regime in this sector which is defined in Annex 2 to this Agreement.
3. The boundary in the BegendiklRezevo Bay and the navigation sector are shown
on the map of the BegendiklRezovo Bay, scale 1:10000, mutually adopted in 1983
(Annex 4). All coordinates referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are in the
Bulgaria-Turkey 2881
coordinate system of the annexed map, with the exception of the terminal land
boundary point in the mouth of the MutluderelRezovska River.
Article 3
The lateral boundary of the territorial sea
1. The lateral boundary between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of
Bulgaria in the territorial sea begins from point "E" as established on the baseline
of the Begendik/Rezovo Bay in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1, of this
Agreement. Then the boundary continues through loxodromes to point "F' with
coordinates 41° 58' 52.8"N and 28° 02' 25.2"E and then it follows the geographic
parallel 41° 58' 52.8 until it meets the terminal point with coordinates 41° 58' 52.8"N
and 28° 19' 25.8"E established on the twelve nautical miles outer limit of the
territorial sea.
The geographical coordinates referred to in this paragraph are expressed in terms
of the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS'84), except for point "E".
2. The boundary of the territorial sea, as determined in article 3, paragraph 1, of
this Agreement, is shown on the Bulgarian maritime chart No. 5001 (ed. 1981),
scale 1 :500 000, and on the Turkish maritime chart No. 10-A (ed. 1993), scale 1 :750
000 (Annexes 5A and 5B). The coordinates are shown on the annexed charts in
their coordinate systems.
Article 4
The boundary of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone
1. The boundary of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone between
the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria in the Black Sea begins from
the terminal point of the lateral boundary of the territorial seas, determined in article
3, paragraph 1, of this Agreement, and continues in the north-east direction, through
geodetic lines joining the turning points with coordinates:
2882 Report Number 8-13
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Coordinate system
WGS'84
41° 59' 52"N and 28° 19' 26"E
42° 14' 28"N and 2~ 20' 45"E
42° 26' 24"N and 29° 34' 20"E
42° 29' 24"N and 29° 49' 36"E
42° 33' 27"N and 29° 58' 30"E
42° 48' 03"N and 300 34' lO"E
42° 49' 31"N and 300 36' 18"E
42° 56' 43"N and 300 45' 06"E
43° 19' 54"N and 31° 06' 33"E
10. 43° 26' 49"N and 31° 20' 43"E
As for the drawing of the delimitation line of the continental shelf and the
exclusive economic zone further to the north-east direction between geographic point
43° 19' 54" N and 31° 06' 33" E and geographic point 43° 26' 49" Nand 31° 20'
43"E, the Parties have agreed that such a drawing will be finalized later at subsequent
negotiations which will be held at a suitable time.
2. The boundary of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone determined
in article 4, paragraph 1, of this Agreement is shown on the Bulgarian
maritime chart No. 5001 (ed. 1981), scale 1:500 000, and on the Turkish maritime
chart No. 10-A (ed. 1993), scale 1:750000 (Annexes 5A and 5B). The coordinates
are shown on the annexed charts in their coordinate systems. A corresponding list
of the coordinates of the turning points valid for each chart will be written on the
respective charts.
The geographical coordinates referred to in article 4, paragraph I, of this Agreement
are expressed in terms of the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS'84).
Article 5
Annexes to the Agreement
All annexes to this Agreement constitute its integral part.
Bulgaria-Turkey 2883
Article 6
Registration
Upon its entry into force, this Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat
of the United Nations pursuant to Article 102 of the charter of the United Nations.
Article 7
Settlement of disputes
Any dispute between the Parties arising out of the interpretation or implementation
of this Agreement shall be settled in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter
of the United Nations.
Article 8
Entry into force
This Agreement shall be subject to ratification according to the respective
constitutional procedures of the Parties. It shall enter into force on the date of the
exchange of the instruments of ratification.
DONE at Sofia on 4 December 1997 in two original copies in the English
language.
[signed]
For the Government of the Republic of Turkey
[signed]
For the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria
2884 Report Number 8-13
ANNEX 1
JOINT ENGINEERING PROJECT REGARDING THE FREE OUTFLOW OF
THE MUTLUDERFJREZOVSKA RIVER
1. The Parties shall create conditions for the free flow of the water of the river
into the Bay and for avoiding the flooding of the river-bank areas, and for this
purpose they shall clear and refashion parts of the existing constructions in the mouth
area of the river. The clearing and refashioning shall guarantee access of both Parties
into the river-mouth area as well.
2. The parts of constructions subject to clearing and refashioning shall be the
following:
(a) On the right river bank - the three spurs (TS3, TS2 and TS1) and area around
the base point T-53 (on the spit);
(b) On the left river bank - area around the base point B-38 (against the third
Turkish spur) and area in front of the base point B-32 (in the area where the
river flows into the sea).
3. The Parties agree that the clearing and refashioning shall be effected on the basis
of a joint engineering project. The project shall be prepared according to the Plan
of the mouth area of the MutluderelRezovska River, scale 1: 1 000, mutually adopted
in September 1992 (Annex 3). The project shall be prepared not later than twelve
months following the entry into force of this Agreement and shall be submitted for
approval to the competent authorities of the Parties.
4. The joint engineering project shall be reasonable, feasible and cost-effective.
It shall ensure the free outflow of normal and flood river water. The project shall
envisage ways by which the expenses shall be financed by the Parties for its preparation
and execution.
5. The width of the river bed/channel (at altitude "_3m." below mean sea level)
in the places of the clearing and refashioning is determined at 30m. The remaining
parts of the river bed/channel, after refashioning, shall not be narrower than that
determined by the project.
Bulgaria-Turkey 2885
6. Following the clearing and refashioning of the mouth area of the river, the Parties
have the right to execute only restoration and rebuilding activities which may not
change the river bed/channel and the river boundary fixed after the mutually agreed
clearing and refashioning.
ANNEX 2
NAVIGATION REGIME IN THE COMMON NAVIGATION SECTOR IN
THE BEGENDIK/REZOVO BAY
1. The common navigation sector, referred to in article 2 of this Agreement, shall
have the form of an acute angle of 50° at point "C," and two other points, respectively,
on the Turkish and the Bulgarian banks. The Turkish and the Bulgarian
sides shall place on these points navigation signs, visible for vessels in the Bay.
The boundary in the internal waters of the Bay will be the bisectrix of this sector
which divides it into two sub-sectors, with 25° angle each, respectively in the
Turkish and the Bulgarian waters of the Bay.
2. The navigation regime in the common navigation sector in the BegendiklRezovo
Bay is established as follows:
a) Vessels flying the flag of either Party have the right, taking into account
the meteorological and other conditions for navigation in the Bay, to navigate
towards the river mouth and backward within the boundaries of the whole sector,
and to cross the boundary between the sub-sectors, which shall not be considered
a violation of the boundary between the Parties.
b) Navigation of either Party's vessels in the internal waters of the other Party
beyond the outer limits of that other Party's sub-sector will be subject to permission.
c) The nationals and vessels of each Party may perform economic and research
activity only within its sub-sector.
ANNEX 3
PLAN OF THE MOUTH AREA OF THE MUTLUDEREIREZOVSKA RIVER
(scale 1:1000, ed. 1992)
2886 Report Number 8-13
ANNEX 4
MAP OF THE BEGENDIKlREZOVO BAY
(scale 1:10 000, ed. 1983)
ANNEX5A
BULGARIAN MARITIME CHART No. 5001
(scale 1:50000, ed. 1981)
ANNEX5B
TURKISH MARITIME CHART No. 10-A
(scale 1:750000, ed. 1993)
Kazakhstan-Russia
Report Number 11-1
Seabed Boundary Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan
and the Russian Federation with Protocol
Signed: 6 July 1998 – Agreement
13 May 2002 – Protocol
Entered into force: Kazakhstan approval November 14, 2002;
Russian approval April 7, 2003
Published at: Protocol: http://president.kremlin.ru/interdocs/
2002/05/13/0000_type72066_30236.shtml?type=72066
(in Russian)
I SUMMARY
This is the first boundary delimitation in the Caspian Sea. No boundary
was established during the years when only the Soviet Union and Iran
bordered this body of water. Following the break up of the Soviet Union
in 1991, the number of independent states bordering the Caspian Sea
increased from two (Soviet Union and Iran) to five (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan). Thereafter, fundamental questions
arose among these five states as to the legal status of the Caspian Sea
and as to how boundaries should be drawn among the riparian states. To
this date, the five countries continue to discuss the legal status. However,
beginning with the Kazakhstan-Russia agreement three others have followed:
Azerbaijan – Russia (see Report Number 11-2), Azerbaijan –
Kazakhstan (see Report Number 11-3) and Azerbaijan – Kazakhstan –
Russia (see Report Number 11-4).
Kazakhstan and Russia utilized a “modified” median line in which they
have taken into account islands and geological structures. It is apparent
that exploration and development of the resources of the seabed and subsoil
were the driving forces behind the desire to conclude the seabed
delimitation. The 2002 Protocol, which constitutes an integral part of the
D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 4013-4033.
© 2005. The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
1998 Agreement, was concluded four years after the Agreement itself. The
Protocol sets out the geographic coordinates of the boundary and includes
general provisions by which hydrocarbon resources in three identified geological
fields and structures will be developed.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations
It is likely that Kazakhstan and Russia were sensitive to the fact that this
was to be the first boundary delimitation of any kind to occur in the
Caspian Sea. The 1998 Agreement was signed seven years following the
break up of the Soviet Union. Prior to that time the Caspian Sea was bordered
by only the Soviet Union and Iran. The area covered under this
boundary agreement was totally under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union.
A series of agreements concluded by Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union
with Persia (Iran), going back to the Treaty of Rasht in 1732, dealt with
navigation and fishing rights and with land boundaries, but no delimitation
of the waters or seabed of the Caspian Sea had ever been carried out. The
1921 Soviet-Persian Treaty of Friendship, for example, stated that the parties
enjoyed freedom of navigation throughout the entire sea, but it did not
create a boundary.
Nevertheless, although there was no formal maritime boundary delimitation
between the Soviet Union and Iran, there was a de facto “Astara-
Gassankuli” line drawn across the Caspian Sea connecting the two points
where the Soviet and Iranian land boundaries met the shore. North of this
de facto line with Iran, the Soviet Union created de facto administrative
boundaries between its republics, although they were never characterized
as formal boundaries nor were they marked as such in Soviet atlases. The
administrative lines in the northern Caspian Sea do not appear to have
influenced the location of the Kazakhstan-Russia seabed boundary.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
Prior to the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea essentially
was a Soviet-Iranian “lake.” Because the Caspian Sea has no direct
access to any open ocean, it was not given consideration by the interna-
4014 Report Number 11-1
tional community during the negotiations at the Third United Nations Law
of the Sea Conference in the 1970s and early 1980s, which led to the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention. Following 1991, with the number of Caspian
littoral states at five, the need to resolve the legal status of this body of
water and the determination of agreed-upon boundaries was apparent. In
the preamble to the 1998 Agreement the parties state that they were
“guided by the principles and norms of international law”; however, they
do not go on to mention either the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention or
refer to other legal status considerations.
Russia’s position on the legal status of the Caspian Sea has changed
from the early 1990s. Initially, Russia maintained that all five littoral states
shared in the Caspian resources; outside of an agreed-upon territorial sea,
the Caspian Sea should come under some type of five-state condominium
or joint-use regime. However, Russia has taken a different view since the
mid-1990s. Its new position is exemplified by this seabed delimitation
agreement with Kazakhstan. Russia now holds the position that the seabed
of the Caspian Sea should be divided into national sectors, but that the five
coastal states should agree on the status of the waters as it relates to managing
the fishery resources, navigation, and protecting the environment.
Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has been a major proponent of the view
that international law of the sea principles apply to the Caspian Sea and
that the entire Sea should be divided into national sectors. Kazakhstan’s
legal position towards the Caspian Sea has been driven largely by the
belief that the resource richness of the northern Caspian, particularly the
oil and gas reserves, are to be found in the Kazakh sector. By agreeing
with Russia to delimit only the seabed, Kazakhstan has accommodated its
position to allow for the five Caspian states to determine the legal status
of the water column.
The 1998 Agreement states that other uses of the Caspian Sea, including
navigation, over flight, the laying and use of underwater cables and
pipelines, shall be “governed by separate bilateral and multilateral agreements
among the Caspian States after the conclusion of a Convention on
the legal status of the Caspian Sea and on the basis of that Convention”
(article 5). Provisional application of the 1998 agreement was called for in
article 10. The Agreement entered into force as of the “date of the last
written notification of completion by the Parties of the internal procedures
for its entry into force.” Kazakhstan’s law ratifying the Agreement was
signed November 14, 2002; Russia’s law ratifying treaty became effective
April 7, 2003. It is believed that the Agreement (and Protocol) entered into
force on or about this latter date.
Kazakhstan-Russia 4015
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
It is clear from both the 1998 Agreement and 2002 Protocol that economic
considerations were important to both states. It is estimated that significant
oil resources are located in the northern region of the Caspian Sea. To provide
for efficient resource use, Kazakhstan and Russia incorporated into the
Agreement and Protocol provisions recognizing that geological structures
may cross the boundary. The Agreement makes general reference to this
possibility in article 2 by stating that the “Parties shall have an exclusive
right to jointly explore and develop promising structures and deposits if the
modified median line runs through them. Each Party’s share of participation
shall be determined based on current world practice. . . .”
The Protocol is more specific on how joint arrangements would work.
Two geological structures, the Kurmangazy (Kulalinskaya) and Tsentral’naya
(Central), and one field, the Khvalynskoye, in the northern
Caspian Sea are identified. The Protocol provides that Kazakhstan shall
have sovereign rights to the Kurmangazy structure (article 2), which will
be utilized in accordance with Kazakh laws but allowing joint development
with Russia (article 3). Similarly, Russia shall exercise rights over the
Tsentral’naya structure and Khvalynskoye field (articles 4 and 5) while
allowing for Kazakh participation in the development of the resources
there (article 4). The Protocol provides additional specifics on how the
joint work shall proceed.
The Russian structure and field are situated in the area identified by
boundary points 27-29. From boundary points 15 to 29 there is a definite
deviation from the median line with the boundary becoming much closer
to Kazakhstan than to Russia.
Article 1 of the Protocol states that if new geological structures are discovered
that are intersected by the seabed boundary, then the parties shall
create separate agreements to determine how the economic activities relating
to those structures should be carried out.
While the protection of the environment is acknowledged in article 6 of
the Agreement, it is believed that environmental considerations did not
influence the parties with regard to the determination of the course of the
seabed boundary.
4 Geographical Considerations
The coastlines of Kazakhstan and Russia are both adjacent and opposite to
each other. The seabed boundary begins in the delta area where the coasts
4016 Report Number 11-1
are adjacent. It should be noted that it is possible that the hypothetical
equidistant line shown on the illustrative map to this Report could be in
error due to lack of accuracy of the coastline depicted on the source material
used to develop the line.
At point 14 the boundary turns to the southwest and runs between the
opposite coastlines of Kazakhstan, to the east, and Russia, to the west.
Article 1 of the Agreement recognizes that the boundary will deviate from
a true median line “taking into account islands and geological structures,
as well as other special circumstances and geological costs incurred.” The
parties are not specific as to what constitutes the other special circumstances.
From boundary points 20 to 24 the boundary is much closer to the
Kazakhstani island Ostrov Kulaly than to the median line. From point 24
to 28 the boundary is much closer to the Kazak peninsula located to the
south of Ostrov Kulaly than to the median line. From point 29 to point 38
it appears that the line was established to create a balance between the
areas on either side of the median line. Point 39 is, in principle, the tripoint
equally distant from Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
There are no rocks, reefs or low-tide elevations in this area that influenced
how the seabed boundary was delimited. It is apparent that the parties recognized
that a “true” median line giving full effect to all islands would
have resulted in a boundary that divided known oil fields and structures.
In particular the Kazakh island Ostrov Kulaly was not given full effect nor
were several small near-shore Russian islands in the northern section of the
boundary (between points 14 and 15).
6 Baseline Considerations
Article 1 of the Agreement cites that as of January 1, 1998 the sea level
height was equal to the mark minus 27 meters as measured in the Baltic
System of Heights “relative to the Kronstadt gauge” (see discussion of this
system under Technical Considerations, below). (It is interesting to note
that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan also reference the sea level height in their
agreement, but to minus 28 meters: see Report Number 11-3.)
The parties, recognizing that applying a “true” median line taking into
account the coastlines of both countries would place certain cited geological
structures and fields on the “wrong” side of the boundary, “modified”
Kazakhstan-Russia 4017
the course of the median line. They accomplished this by discounting, to
a certain degree, several islands off each coast, most notably Kazakhstan’s
Ostrov Kulaly, in the median line determination. The mainland peninsula of
Kazakhstan, south of Ostrov Kulaly, was also not given full weight in the
median line calculation. Unlike some delimitations elsewhere where a particular
feature is given exactly one-half effect in an equidistant line calculation,
it appears that this median line boundary was altered in such a way
as to place a known geological structure or field on one side or other of the
line. No straight baselines were employed in the boundary calculation.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
The geology and geomorphology of the northern Caspian Sea clearly influenced
the parties in agreeing on the course of the seabed boundary. It was
the existence of known oil and gas fields and structures that caused the
parties to deviate from the median line. The most dramatic deviation, or
“modification”, from the median is between boundary points 20 to 29. The
Protocol to the Agreement gives details concerning the structures and field
which are to come under the sovereign rights of one or the other party (see
discussion in Economic and Environmental Considerations, above).
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
The Kazakhstan-Russia seabed boundary is based on what the parties
called a “modified” median line. Known geological structures and fields
were taken into account which caused the seabed boundary to veer away
from the median line in four areas. Agreement on the boundary was coupled
with agreement to exploit jointly geological structures that straddle
the boundary.
9 Technical Considerations
A unique aspect of this Agreement is the citation by the parties to the sealevel
height of the Caspian Sea. Article 1 of the Agreement references the
level of the Caspian Sea as of January 1, 1998 (the year the Agreement
was signed), which is equal to the “mark minus 27 meters in the Baltic
System of Heights (relative to the Kronstadt gauge).”
4018 Report Number 11-1
The Kronstadt tide gauge is one of the longest operational tidal sites in
the world, dating to 1777. The station is located within the limits of St.
Petersburg, Russia, on Ostrov Kotlin at approximately 59° 59' N, 29° 46' E.
The station was selected as the origin, or zero point, of the Russian
National System of Heights (also referred to as the Baltic Height System)
by the USSR Council of Ministers in 1946.
Heights in the Baltic System have historically been transferred by the
surveying methodology of geodetic leveling and are physically realized by
permanent survey monuments often called bench marks. The description of
the level of the Caspian Sea described in this Agreement would therefore
be –27 meters below the zero (0) point of the Kronstadt tide gauge. The
actual determination of these heights could be problematic for several reasons.
The first is that the Agreement does not define the epoch of Mean
Sea Level (MSL) at Kronstadt. MSL is typically computed on a 19-year
cycle and is defined by those dates. For example, the current U.S. National
Tidal Epoch is 1983-2001. No such epoch is provided for in the text of
the Agreement or in the Protocol. In addition, the ability to determine
accurately the level in the field is limited by the number and quality of
existing survey bench marks. Unfortunately, these marks are all too often
disturbed or destroyed over time.
An additional problem for positioning of the boundary turning points in
this agreement is the omission in both the Agreement and the Protocol of
a geodetic datum.
10 Other Considerations
Article 8 of the Agreement provides for non-compulsory dispute settlement
should there be disagreement over the interpretation or application of the
Agreement. The parties “shall consult in order to resolve the dispute
through negotiations, investigation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
legal proceedings, or such other peaceful means as they may choose.”
III CONCLUSIONS
The 1998 Agreement and its 2002 Protocol between Kazakhstan and
Russia is the first boundary delimitation of any kind for the Caspian Sea.
The delimitation pertains, however, only to the seabed; the status of the
water column remains an open question subject to continuing discussions
Kazakhstan-Russia 4019
among the five littoral states of the Caspian Sea. By late 2004 the Caspian
Sea coastal states remained far from concluding an agreement on the legal
status.
The one unfortunate aspect to this Agreement and Protocol is that while
the parties specified geographic coordinates defining the turning points of
the seabed boundary, they did not record the underlying geodetic datum on
which these coordinates are based. Future positioning disputes involving
the use of different datum by the parties could possibly arise due to this
omission.
Article 7 of the Agreement states that it shall enter into force after the
date of final written notification of its ratification. It is assumed that the
Agreement and Protocol entered into force on or about April 7, 2003.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
Kazakhstan: Not a party to any of the four 1958 Conventions nor to the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
Russia: Ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf on 22 November
1960; ratified the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on 12 March 1997.
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Kazakhstan: No maritime claims for the Caspian Sea
Russia: No maritime claims for the Caspian Sea. Off its other coasts, 12
n.m. territorial sea, 200 n.m. EEZ, 200 n.m continental shelf and/or the
outer edge of the continental margin
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Kazakhstan: No change.
Russia: No change.
Prepared by: Robert W. Smith and J. Ashley Roach
4020 Report Number 11-1
RUSSIA
KAZAKHSTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
AZERBAIJAN
RUSSIA
AZERBAIJAN
T-(B/39/1)
Ostrov
Kulaly
1
14
20
27
28
38
29
30
A
25
C a s p i a n
S e a
K A Z A K H S TA N
I R A N
AZERBAIJAN
A
R U S S I A
TURKMENISTAN
GEOR GI A
50°E 55°E
45°N
40°N
Seabed Boundary
KAZAKHSTAN-RUSSIA
Boundary Report 11-1
AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA
Boundary Report 11-2
AZERBAIJAN-KAZAKHSTAN
Boundary Report 11-3
AZERBAIJAN-KAZAKHSTAN-RUSSIA
Boundary Report 11-4
Tri-junction point of Russia, Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan seabed boundaries
Seabed boundary
Equidistant line
0 50 100
Nautical miles
©American Society of International Law, 2004
T
Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Russian Federation on Demarcation of the Seabed in the
Northern Caspian Sea for the Purpose of Exercising
Sovereign Rights to the Use of Subsoil Resources
The Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties,
Taking into account their mutual interest in establishing a legal basis
for the activities of the two Parties to develop the subsoil resources of the
Northern Caspian Sea,
Seeking to ensure favorable conditions for the exercise of their sovereign
rights in the Caspian Sea and to settle issues regarding the efficient
use of the mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil of the Northern
Caspian in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation,
Taking into account the geopolitical changes that have occurred in the
region, as well as the growing climate of cooperation, good neighborliness
and mutual understanding between the Parties,
Considering that the existing Caspian Sea legal regime does not meet
current requirements and does not fully regulate the mutual relations of the
Caspian states,
Calling upon the Caspian states to conclude as soon as possible, on the
basis of consensus, a Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea,
Guided by the principles and norms of international law and the interests
of the Parties in developing and utilizing the mineral resources of the
seabed and subsoil of the Northern Caspian Sea,
Proceeding from the understanding that in defining the legal status of
the Caspian Sea, the Parties will consider the possibility of establishing in
its waters border, customs and sanitary control zones, fishing zones within
agreed limits, and common-use zones,
Cognizant of their responsibility to current and future generations for
preserving the Caspian Sea and the integrity of its unique ecosystem,
Taking into account the importance of existing preserves for the conservation
and restoration of the biological resources of the Caspian Sea,
Recognizing the importance of joint scientific research and the need for
compliance with special environmental requirements in exploring and
developing the mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil of the Northern
Caspian Sea,
Convinced of the need to develop uniform approaches to establishing
an ecological security system, including procedures for impact assessment,
environmental assessment and monitoring,
4022 Report Number 11-1
Proceeding from the premise that the demarcation of the Caspian seabed
under this Agreement does not apply to biological resources,
Taking into account the bilateral agreements that have been reached on
issues related to the legal status of the Caspian Sea,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
While the surface of the water shall be retained for common use, to
include ensuring freedom of navigation and agreed standards for fishing
and environmental protection, the seabed of the Northern Caspian Sea and
its subsoil shall be demarcated among the Parties along a median line
modified on the basis of the principle of equity and agreement of the
Parties.
The modified median line shall be based on equidistance from agreed
baselines; it shall include sectors that are not equidistant from the baselines
and are determined taking into account islands and geological structures,
as well as other special circumstances and geological costs incurred.
The determination as to where the modified median line runs shall be
made with reference to points on the shores of the Parties, taking into
account islands and based on the level of the Caspian Sea as of January
1, 1998, which is equal to the mark minus 27 meters in the Baltic System
of Heights (relative to the Kronstadt gauge).
A geographic description of the location of the aforementioned line and
its coordinates will be produced, based on the cartographic materials and
baselines agreed by the Parties, and will be codified in a separate Protocol,
which will be an annex to and an integral part of this Agreement.
Article 2
The Parties shall exercise their sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration,
development, and management of the resources of the seabed and
subsoil of the Northern Caspian within their portions of the seabed up to
the dividing line.
The Parties shall have an exclusive right to jointly explore and develop
promising structures and deposits if the modified median line runs through
them. Each Party’s share of participation shall be determined based on current
world practice, taking into account the good-neighbor relations between
the Parties.
Kazakhstan-Russia 4023
Article 3
A Party or its juridical and natural persons (hereinafter, representatives)
that opened a hydrocarbon deposit or that identified geological structures
that are promising in terms of the accumulation of hydrocarbons in the
Northern Caspian in the zone of the modified median line before the line
was agreed by the Parties shall have a priority right to obtain a license for
exploration and development, with mandatory involvement of representatives
of the other Party.
Article 4
The Parties have agreed to interact effectively on issues related to the
development of export pipelines, use of rivers and other transport routes,
and shipbuilding capabilities, as well as in other areas.
Article 5
Issues related to freedom of navigation and flight, the laying and use of
underwater cables and pipelines, as well as other uses of the Caspian Sea
will be governed by separate bilateral and multilateral agreements among
the Caspian states after conclusion of a Convention on the legal status of
the Caspian Sea and on the basis of that Convention.
Article 6
The Parties shall protect and preserve the ecosystem of the Caspian Sea
and all its components. To this end, the Parties shall take all possible measures,
either independently or jointly, and shall cooperate in order to preserve
the biodiversity of the Caspian Sea, prevent and reduce pollution
from any source, and ensure environmental monitoring of the Caspian.
The Parties shall prohibit activities that could cause serious damage to
the environment of the Caspian Sea.
The Parties will seek early signature by all the Caspian states of an
Agreement on the preservation, restoration, and rational use of the biological
resources of the Caspian.
4024 Report Number 11-1
Article 7
This Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations deriving from
international treaties and agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, concluded
by each Party individually.
Article 8
In the event of a dispute between the Parties regarding the interpretation
or application of this Agreement, the Parties shall consult in order to
resolve the dispute through negotiation, investigation, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, legal proceedings, or such other peaceful means as they
may choose.
Article 9
This Agreement shall not hamper the achievement of consensus among the
Caspian states on the legal status of the Caspian and shall be regarded by
the Parties as a part of their overall agreements.
Article 10
This Agreement shall be applied provisionally as of the time of signature,
taking into account the Protocol provided for in Article 1 of this Agreement,
and shall enter into force as of the date of the last written notification
of completion by the Parties of the internal procedures necessary for
its entry into force.
Done at Moscow on July 6, 1998, in two copies, each in the Kazakh
and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the Republic of Kazakhstan For the Russian Federation
[s] N. Nazarbayev [s] B. Yeltsin
Kazakhstan-Russia 4025
4026 Report Number 11-1
1 Translator’s Note: The translation reproduces the manner in which latitude and longitude are written
in the Russian text.
Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan
and the Russian Federation on Demarcation of the Seabed in the
Northern Caspian Sea for the Purpose of Exercising Sovereign
Rights to the Use of Subsoil Resources of July 6, 1998
(Moscow, May 13, 2002)
The Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties,
In accordance with the Agreement Between the Republic of Kazakhstan
and the Russian Federation on Demarcation of the Seabed in the
Northern Caspian Sea for the Purpose of Exercising Sovereign Rights to
the Use of Subsoil Resources of July 6, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the
Agreement),
Considering their mutual interest in establishing a legal basis for
the activities of the two Parties to develop the subsoil resources of the
seabed in the Northern Caspian Sea,
Seeking to create a favorable environment for joint development of the
hydrocarbon resources of the Kurmangazy (Kulalinskaya) and Tsentral’naya
[Central] geological structures and the Khvalynskoye field, which
are located in the Northern Caspian Sea,
Based on the need to protect and preserve the ecological system and
biological resources of the Caspian Sea,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. This Protocol establishes the geographic coordinates of the modified median
line of demarcation of the seabed in the Northern Caspian Sea between the
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation for the purpose of
exercising sovereign rights to the use of subsoil resources.
2. The list of geographic coordinates of the turning points of the
modified median line of demarcation of the seabed in the Northern Caspian
Sea shall be an integral part of this Protocol (Annex 1).
3. The modified median line has been drawn in accordance with the list
on the chart agreed by the Parties, which shows the demarcation of the
seabed in the Northern Caspian Sea (Annex 2).
4. The initial point of the modified median line is the point with coordinates
46° 13',31 N and 49° 26',4 E.
Kazakhstan-Russia 4027
5. The end point of the modified median line is the point with coordinates
42° 33',6 N and 49° 53',3 E.
The above point may be taken as the junction point of the lines of
demarcation of the Caspian seabed, for purposes of utilization of the subsoil
resources, among the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation
and the Azerbaijani Republic, which will be recorded in a trilateral agreement
among them.
6. If new geological structures (hereinafter referred to as structure) are
discovered, whose surrounding isohypses are intersected by the modified
median line, economic activity on those structures will be carried out by
economic entities of the Parties on the basis of separate agreements in
accordance with Article 2 of the Agreement.
Article 2
The Republic of Kazakhstan shall exercise sovereign rights to the use of
subsoil resources on the Kurmangazy (Kulalinskaya) structure. The Russian
Federation shall exercise sovereign rights to the use of subsoil resources
on the Tsentral’naya structure and the Khvalynskoye field.
Article 3
1. The subsoil resources on the Kurmangazy (Kulalinskaya) structure
shall be utilized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of
Kazakhstan.
2. Each Party shall appoint an authorized organization for joint development
of the resources of the Kurmangazy (Kulalinskaya) structure.
See: Resolution No. 637a of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan
of June 13, 2002, “On Certain Issues Related to Implementation of
the Protocol”; Directive No. 1025-r of the Government of the RF of July
25, 2002, and Directive No. 1026-r of the Government of the RF of July
25, 2002.
3. The Russian authorized organization shall have the right to participate
in the project for the use of the subsoil resources on the Kurmangazy
(Kulalinskaya) structure (hereinafter referred to in this article as the project)
on a non-competitive basis.
4. The authorized organizations of the Parties will sign an agreement
on the framework for joint activities – a consortium, a commercial organization
with foreign investments or any other framework for joint activities
(hereinafter referred to as the enterprise) – to include the terms for use
of the subsoil resources.
4028 Report Number 11-1
5. The Kazakhstani side’s share in the project shall be 50 percent and
the Russian side’s share in the project shall be 50 percent, subject to the
following:
(a) the Kazakhstani authorized organization’s share in the enterprise
shall be 50 percent;
(b) the Russian authorized organization’s share in the enterprise shall be
25 percent, and the option to participate in the enterprise (hereinafter
referred to as the option) allocated to the Russian side shall be 25 percent;
(c) the Kazakhstani and Russian authorized organizations will have
rights and obligations commensurate with their shares, except that, until
the option allocated to the Russian side is commercially exercised, the
Kazakhstani and Russian authorized organizations will have equal rights
and obligations.
6. The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall formally
establish the rights of the enterprise with regard to utilization of subsoil
resources. The production sharing agreement shall serve as the contract
for the use of the subsoil resources of the Kurmangazy (Kulalinskaya)
structure.
7. No later than six months after a field is opened for commercial operation,
the enterprise will make the Russian side a commercial offer regarding
the sale of the Russian side’s option. The Russian side will grant the
right to make use of the option to a Russian organization determined in
accordance with the procedure established by the Government of the
Russian Federation.
The Russian side will have the right to accept or reject the offer within
six months after the offer is made by the enterprise. If the Russian side
declines to avail itself of the option right, the enterprise shall be free to
dispose of the option as it sees fit.
The enterprise will apply the proceeds from the exercise of the option
to development of the project.
When the option is exercised, the Government of the Republic of
Kazakhstan will execute, in accordance with established procedure, the
necessary documents guaranteeing the rights of the new participant in the
enterprise.
Article 4
1. The subsoil resources on the Tsentral’naya structure shall be utilized in
accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation.
2. Each Party shall appoint an authorized organization for joint development
of the resources of the Tsentral’naya structure.
Kazakhstan-Russia 4029
3. The Kazakhstani authorized organization shall have the right to participate
in the project for utilization of the subsoil resources on the Tsentral’naya
structure (hereinafter referred to in this article as the project) on a noncompetitive
basis.
4. The authorized organizations of the Parties will sign an agreement
on the framework for joint activities – a consortium, a commercial organization
with foreign investments or any other framework for joint activities
(hereinafter referred to as the enterprise) – to include the terms for use
of the subsoil resources.
5. The Russian side’s share in the project shall be 50 percent, and the
Kazakhstani side’s share in the project shall be 50 percent, subject to the
following:
(a) the Russian authorized organization’s share in the enterprise shall be
50 percent;
(b) the Kazakhstani authorized organization’s share in the enterprise
shall be 25 percent, and the option allocated to the Kazakhstani side shall
be 25 percent;
(c) the Russian and Kazakhstani authorized organizations will have
rights and obligations commensurate with their shares, except that, until
the option allocated to the Kazakhstani side is commercially exercised, the
Russian and Kazakhstani authorized organizations will have equal rights
and obligations.
6. The Government of the Russian Federation shall formally establish
the rights of the enterprise with regard to utilization of the subsoil resources.
7. No later than six months after a field is opened for commercial operation,
the enterprise will make the Kazakhstani side a commercial offer regarding
the sale of the Kazakhstani side’s option. The Kazakhstani side will
grant the right to make use of the option to a Kazakhstani organization
determined in accordance with the procedure established by the Government
of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
The Kazakhstani side will have the right to accept or reject the offer
within six months after the offer is made by the enterprise. If the
Kazakhstani side declines to avail itself of the option right, the enterprise
shall be free to dispose of the option as it sees fit.
The enterprise will apply the proceeds from the exercise of the option
to development of the project.
When the option is exercised, the Government of the Russian Federation
will execute, in accordance with established procedure, the necessary
documents guaranteeing the rights of the new participant in the
enterprise.
4030 Report Number 11-1
Article 5
1. The subsoil resources on the Khvalynskoye field shall be utilized in
accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation.
2. Each Party will appoint an authorized organization for joint development
of the oil and gas resources of the Khvalynskoye field.
3. The Kazakhstani authorized organization shall have the right to participate
in projects for the utilization of the subsoil resources on the
Khvalynskoye field on a non-competitive basis.
4. The authorized organizations of the Parties will sign an agreement
on the framework for joint activities (a consortium, a commercial organization
with foreign investments or any other framework for joint activities),
to include the terms for use of the subsoil resources, based on an
arrangement between them, with the understanding that the Kazakhstani authorized
organization’s share can be up to 50 percent.
5. The Government of the Russian Federation shall formally establish
the rights to utilization of the subsoil resources for the new user established
by the authorized organizations of the Parties.
Article 6
During joint development of the Kurmangazy (Kulalinskaya) and Tsentral’naya
structures and the Khvalynskoye field:
1. The boundaries of the license areas under licenses and contracts
issued or concluded by the Parties in accordance with established procedure
during the period prior to signature of this Protocol shall be brought
into conformity with the modified median line of demarcation of the
seabed in the Northern Caspian Sea, established by this Protocol.
2. Within one month from the date of signature of this Protocol the
Parties will appoint the Kazakhstani and Russian authorized organizations
which, within one month from the date when they are granted appropriate
authority, will begin negotiations to prepare the relevant agreements on the
frameworks for joint activities, to include the terms for utilization of the
subsoil resources.
3. Based on the laws of the state exercising sovereign rights to the use
of subsoil resources, the Parties may enter into a production sharing agreement
with the relevant enterprise.
4. There shall be recognition of the right of an authorized organization
to assign its share (or a portion thereof) in the enterprise to other juridical
persons, with the consent of the Government of its Party.
Kazakhstan-Russia 4031
In the event of such assignment, each authorized organization will have
a priority right to acquire the share of the organization that is giving up its
share, on terms that are no less favorable than those offered by the other
juridical persons. This right shall not cover assignment to organizations
affiliated with the authorized organization, which is carried out with the
consent of the Government of its Party and with financial guarantees from
the authorized organization.
5. Authorized organizations that do not fulfill their financial obligations
provided for in the agreement on joint activities of the relevant authorized
organizations shall forfeit their respective share to the authorized organizations
that do fulfill their obligations under the terms of the above-mentioned
agreement.
6. If the authorized organizations do not find a mutually acceptable
solution within twelve months of the date of signature of this Protocol, the
Governments of the Parties will appoint other authorized organizations.
Article 7
This Protocol shall enter into force in accordance with the procedure provided
for in Article 10 of the Agreement, of which it shall be an integral
part.
Paragraphs 2 and 6 of Article 6 of this Protocol shall be applied provisionally
from the date of signature.
Done at Moscow on May 13, 2002, in two original copies, each in the
Kazakh and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev
For the Russian Federation V. Putin
4032 Report Number 11-1
ANNEX 1
To the Protocol to the
Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Russian Federation on Demarcation of the Seabed in the Northern Caspian Sea
for the Purpose of Exercising Sovereign Rights
to the Use of Subsoil Resources of July 6, 1998
List of Geographic Coordinates of the Turning Points of the Modified
Median Line of Demarcation of the Seabed in the Northern Caspian Sea
Numbers of the Turning
Points of the Modified
Median Line North Latitude East Longitude
1. 46°13',3 49°26',4
2. 46°11',6 49°30',4
3. 46°10',8 49°32',7
4. 46°10',6 49°36',0
5. 46°10',7 49°37',3
6. 46°11',2 49°42',1
7. 46°10',6 49°42',6
8. 46°09',7 49°43',6
9. 46°09',4 49°43',9
10. 46°07',1 49°46',7
11. 46°05',1 49°49',7
12. 46°04',2 49°51',0
13. 46°00',1 49°57',1
14. 45°59',1 50°01',0
15. 45°21',5 49°25',5
16. 45°21',3 49°25',0
17. 45°17',3 49°21',2
18. 45°13',5 49°17',8
19. 45°12',3 49°16',7
20. 45°05',9 49°10',5
21. 45°02',4 49°10',4
22. 44°55',1 49°09',9
23. 44°50',0 49°09',8
24. 44°40',6 49°09',3
25. 44°25',4 49°08',0
26. 44°20',0 49°05',3
27. 44°20',0 49°36',0
28. 44°04',0 49°36',0
29. 44°04',0 49°00',0
30. 43°19',2 49°00',0
Kazakhstan-Russia 4033
31. 43°17',0 49°20',1
32. 43°16',5 49°20',6
33. 43°15',8 49°21',4
34. 43°11',6 49°27',0
35. 43°10',3 49°27',9
36. 43°08',2 49°29',5
37. 43°07',8 49°29',9
38. 42°45',0 50°00',0
39. 42°33',6 49°53',3
Numbers of the Turning
Points of the Modified
Median Line North Latitude East Longitude
(cont.)
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia
Report Number 8-14
Treaty on the State Border Between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina
Done: 30 July 1999
Entered into force: Provisionally in force only
Published at: Unpublished
PRELIMINARY REPORT
On 30 July 1999 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia signed in Sarajevo a treaty on
the state boundaries between the two countries. The treaty, which includes a preamble
and 23 articles, is based on the boundary situation existing at the time of
the cessation of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991). The
treaty has not yet entered into force, but is provisionally applied from the date of
its signature (article 22, para. 1).
The main purpose of the treaty is the delimitation of the land boundary, which
is drawn on 86 sheets of maps (scale 1 :25,000) annexed to the treaty. It is however
provided that the expert bodies of the two countries shall elaborate a detailed
description of the land and maritime boundary and a list of coordinates.
One provision (article 4, para. 3) relates to the maritime boundary, stating as
follows: "The state boundary at sea is a median line betwel~n the land territories
of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The boundary at sea is shown on the topographical
map 1:25,000 and on the navigational charts and maps" (unofficial translation
from the original Serb-Croatian language). This is the first maritime boundary agreed
upon by two of the successor States of the former Yugoslavia.
I.I. Charney and R. W. Smith (eds.), Intt!rnational Maritime Boundaries, 2887-2900.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
2888 Report Number 8-14
The maritime delimitation is to be understood in the light of the very particular
geographic situation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Adriatic Sea. This country
exercises sovereignty over a narrow strip of about 20 kilometers (kIn.) of coastline,
the Neum corridor (called from the name of a small city located there), which is
enclosed between two parts of the Croatian coastline. More precisely, the maritime
areas adjacent to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina are composed of the waters
of the Bay of Klek-Neum, a deep indentation closed by the small peninsula of Klek
(belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina), and part of the waters located between the
peninsula of Klek and the much bigger and longer peninsula of Peljesac (belonging
to Croatia). The width of the waters located between the two peninsulas ranges from
1.5 to 2 kIn.
The waters adjacent to the peninsula of Peljesac, both on the landward and the
seaward side of it, fall within the straight baselines system established by the former
Yugoslavia in 1948 and confIrmed, with some modifIcations, by the successor State
of Croatia (article 19 of the Maritime Code of 27 January 1994).1 It follows that
the maritime boundary established by the 1999 treaty possibly delimits two distinct
legal regimes: the internal waters of Croatia from the territorial sea of BosniaHerzegovina.
2
In regard to the method of delimitation, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, which
are both parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
rely on equidistance. Article 4, paragraph 3, of the bilateral treaty expIicity recalls
the "median line" as a method which is "in accordance" with the UNCLOS. In fact,
there is no provision in the UNCLOS dealing with the very peculiar case of a
delimitation involving internal waters. However, article 15 of the UNCLOS (Delimitation
of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts),
which could be applied by analogy, is based on the rule of equidistance combined
with the exception of historic title or other special circumstances.
No bilateral agreement has so far been concluded with regard to the access to
and from the waters of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the surrounding Croatian internal
waters. However, under another bilateral agreement Croatia has granted to Bosnia-
42 LOS BULL. 31 (2000).
2 However, it seems that Bosnia-Herzegovina bas so far made no official enactment or statement with
regard to the legal status of the waters adjacent to its tenitory. See, for instance, the summary of national
claims to maritime zones annexed to the report of the U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law
of the Sea, U.N. Doc. AJ56/58, p. 118 (9 March 2001), where no information is given on the breadth
of the territorial sea of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This may be because, due to geography, Bosnia-Herzegovina
cannot realize a territorial sea to the full 12 nautical mile distance from its coastline.
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2889
Herzegovina free and unimpeded transit through the port of Plo<;e, located in Croatia
north of the coastline of Bosnia-Herzegovina.3
REFERENCES
Mladen Klemencic, The Border Agreement between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
in 7 BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN 96 (No.4, 1999-2(00)
Maja Sersic, The Adriatic Sea: Semi-Enclosed Sea in a Semi-Enclosed Sea
(paper presented at the Conference "D Mediterraneo e il diritto del mare
all'alba del XXI secolo," Naples, 2001).
Prepared by
Tullio Scovazzi
(Legal Analysis)
Giampiero Francalanci
(Technical Analysis)
3 Agreement on Free Transit through the Territory of the Republic of Croatia to and from the Port of
Pl~e and through the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Neum, signed 22 November 1998, Letter
dated 24 November 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UNGA Doc. A/53n02, Annex II (pp. 8-12)
(25 Nov. 1998).
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Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2891
Treaty on the State Border between
the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
The Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (later: ''the Parties"),
Starting from the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the
Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Respecting the immutability of their mutually recognized borders,
Beginning with the provisions of the General Framework Peace Accords for Bosnia
and Herzegovina, signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris and the Opinion No.3
of the Arbitration Committee of the Conference on the former Yugoslavia;
Guided by a desire to regulate together all the issues pertaining to the identification,
marking, maintenance and ensuring the visibility of the common state border;
In accordance with the decision of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and
the Central Commission for the Identification and Marking of the State Border of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting with the authorization of the Council of the Ministers
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regarding the identification, marking, maintenance
and ensuring the visibility of the common state border, and based on the work of
the Committee;
have agreed to the following:
Article 1
The state border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (later:
"the state border") is a plane which transverses vertically the border line on the
surface of the Earth and divides the land, the sea and interior bodies of water, as
well as the air space and underground space of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
Unofficial translation by the United States Department of State.
2892 Report Number 8-14
Article 2
(1) The state border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
is determined on the basis of the state of the borders at the time of the end of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the mutual recognition
of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, identified on
the topographic map 1 :25,000 and, in practice, on the basis of the borders
between border land-registry municipalities, on the basis of the border towns
and villages at the time of the 1991 Census and on the basis of the dividing
line which divided the authorities of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(2) The state border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
stretches from the Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian-Yugoslav three-border
point in the North-East to the Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian-Yugoslav
three-border point in the South-East.
(3) The data on the identification and marking of the border line, as well as on the
shape, size and location of the border markings are to be found in the following
documents on the border issues:
(a) The description of the border line on the state border between the Parties
presented graphically in TK 25 (topographical map 25);
(b) The list and technical background (the situational plan, the list of surfaces,
the list of coordinates) of the modifications of the stretch of the state line
between the Parties;
(c) The list of the coordinates of the marked and determined break points on
the state border between the Parties;
(d) The border plan on the state border between the Parties.
(4) The Interstate Diplomatic Committee for the Identification, Marking and Maintenance
of the state border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina shall appoint expert panels authorized to produce a document
mentioned in Paragraph 3. of this Article, as well as set deadlines to finalize
their tasks and submit a report to be approved by the Interstate Diplomatic
Committee.
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2893
(5) After the border documents are produced in accordance with Paragraph 2. of
this Article and approved in accordance with the legislatures of the Parties, they
shall be considered an integral part of this Treaty.
Article 3
(1) The Parties can agree to change the state border in order to facilitate and
improve the living conditions of people living close to the border, as well as
for other reasons. Any changes of the state border shall be included in the
documents on border issues mentioned in Paragraph 3, Article 2 of this Treaty.
(2) The documents on border issues mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the Article shall
come into effect as stipulated in Paragraph 5, Article 2 of this Treaty.
Article 4
(1) The Parties have agreed that the state border remain within the mutually defined
coordinates, regardless of the man-made or natural changes in the terrain.
(2) The state border on international navigable rivers with the regulated navigation
course stretches along the kinet of the navigation course. Any changes to the
kinet of the navigation course shall be approved by authorized agencies of the
Parties.
(3) The state border on the sea stretches along the median line of the sea between
the territories of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance
with the 1982 UN Convention on Sea Rights. The border line on the sea
is represented in the topographical map 1 :25,000 as well as on sea charts and
plans.
Article 5
(1) The border line on the Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian border is marked
by:
2894 Report Number 8-14
border pyramids on the three-state Croatian-Bosnian and HerzegovinianYugoslav
border point;
- border posts which directly or indirectly (by the roads, rivers, streams, canals
and other characteristic locations) mark the break points in the border line;
- border boards placed on bridge railings and other appropriate objects.
(2) The coordinates of the marked and determined break points in the border line
are to be found in the documents on border issues listed in Paragraph 3, Article
2 of this Treaty.
Article 6
The Parties shall maintain the border line in a good visible condition and undertake
necessary steps to prevent damaging, destruction or unauthorized change of location
of border markings.
Article 7
(1) The Parties shall provide for the visibility of the state border and border
markings in accordance with the Instructions on the Maintenance of the State
Border and the Border Zone.
(2) The Parties shall not authorize any construction within 2 meters on the both
sides of the land border line. This ban does not include existing objects and
facilities, as well as object and facilities the construction of which is authorized
by the relevant agencies of the Parties.
(3) The Parties can conduct activities defined in the Instruction mentioned in Paragraph
1 of this Article on their own territory at any time, but must inform the
other Party as least ten days prior to the beginning of work.
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2895
Article 8
(1) The obligations with respect to measuring the common state border, identification
and marking of the border line, and maintenance, renovation and control of
border markings (later: border work), as well as all costs resulting from honoring
the above obligations, shall be divided between the parties on an equal basis.
(2) Installation, maintenance, renovation and control of three-state border markings
on the three-state Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian-Yugoslav border point
shall be carried out on the basis of an understanding of the relevant authorities,
in the presence of representatives of the Parties and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
(3) Repairs and renovations of border markings on the territory of one of the Parties,
which were damaged or destroyed through unauthorized destructive activities
from the territory of the other Party, shall be paid for by the Party from the
territory of which the unauthorized destructive activity was carried out.
Article 9
The Parties shall every five years after the completion of border work, defined in
the Instruction on the maintenance of the border line and border zone, conduct a
joint inspection of the border line, renovate and fill in the gaps in border markings
and, if needed, install additional markings on the border line.
Article 10
(1) Owners of real estate and other persons or entities with power of attorney
regarding real estate close to the state border must allow border work, defined
in the Instruction on the maintenance of the border line and border zone, to be
carried out on the state border.
(2) The Parties shall in a timely manner inform owners of real estate and other
persons or entities with power of attorney regarding real estate close to the
border of the work to be carried out on their real estate. The parties shall carry
out border work respecting the interests of owners of real estate and other
2896 Report Number 8-14
persons or entities with power of attorney regarding real estate close to the
border, on whose real estate the work is being carried out.
(3) Damage claims regarding real estate close to the border and related to border
work shall be settled according to the regulations of the Party on the territory
of which the real estate in question is situated.
Article 11
(1) To implement the provisions of this Treaty, the Government of the Republic
of Croatia and the Central Commission on the Identification and Marking of
the Border of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting with the authorization of the
Council of Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have founded the Interstate Diplomatic
Committee for the Identification, Marking and Maintenance of the State
Border between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (later:
the Interstate Diplomatic Committee). The Interstate Diplomatic Committee
consists of a delegation of the Republic of Croatia and a delegation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Each delegation has a chairman and five members.
(2) The functioning and composition of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee are
regulated by the Regulations for the Conduct of Work of the Interstate Diplomatic
Committee, composed in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
Article 12
(1) The tasks of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee are the following:
conduct a measuring of the Croatian-Bosnian and Herzegovinian state border;
produce new or supplemental documents on border issues in accordance with
Paragraph 3, Article 2 of this Treaty;
carry out other work jointly assigned to it by the relevant authorities of the
Parties.
(2) For the direct work on the stated tasks the Interstate Diplomatic Committee
creates: the Joint Expert Work Group for the Documentation and Identification
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2897
of the Border Line and the Joint Expert Work Group for the Marking and
Maintenance of the Border Line. The Interstate Diplomatic Committee can also,
if needed, create other work groups.
(3) The functioning and composition of the Joint Expert Work Groups shall be
regulated by the Instructions on the Functioning of Joint Expert Work Groups
formulated by the Joint Expert Work Groups and approved by the Interstate
Diplomatic Committee in accordance with this Treaty.
Article 13
(1) The Interstate Diplomatic Committee shall conduct its work in sessions, in the
field and by exchanging letters.
(2) The Interstate Diplomatic Committee shall meet according to the agreement
between the leaders of the delegations of the two Parties. The meetings shall
be held alternately on the territory of one and then the other of the Parties.
(3) The leader of each delegation can call for an emergency meeting or a field trip
of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee or a Joint Expert Work Group.
Article 14
(1) The Parties shall inform one another in writing and through diplomatic channels
of the appointment and acquittal of duty of the delegations in the Interstate
Diplomatic Committee.
(2) The leaders of the delegations of the Parties shall inform one another of the
appointment and acquittal of duty of other members of the delegations in the
Interstate Diplomatic Committee.
Article 15
(1) The Interstate Diplomatic Committee shall reach its decisions and conclusions
by agreement. If there are differences between the two delegations, their points
of view shall be recorded in the proceedings.
2898 Report Number 8-14
(2) Issues that cannot be resolved by reaching an agreement shall, with prior agreement
of the chairmen of the two delegations, be submitted for resolution to the
relevant authorities of the Parties.
Article 16
The Interstate Diplomatic Committee shall conduct negotiations and produce documents
in the official languages of the Parties.
Article 17
The delegation of each of the Parties in the Interstate Diplomatic Committee can
use the official seal with the state coat-of-arms of its country and the name of the
delegation.
Article 18
Each Party shall bear the costs of the participation of its delegation in the Interstate
Diplomatic Committee, in joint expert work groups and all other work groups, as
well as the costs of participating in auxiliary work forces and other personnel
employed to perform duties outlined in the Instructions on the Maintenance of the
Border Line and the Border Zone.
Article 19
(1) Members of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee, joint expert work groups and
all other work groups, as well as auxiliary personnel can, during their duties
duly announced to the other Party, in accordance with Paragraph 3, Article
7 of this Treaty, and with adequate identification, cross the state border at any
point.
(2) Identification mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be issued by the
adequate authorities of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
at the suggestion of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee.
Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia 2899
Article 20
(1) Members of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee, joint expert work groups and
all other work groups, as well as auxiliary personnel of one of the Parties cannot,
while carrying out their duties on the territory of the other Party, be detained
and deprived of their personal belongings, personal identification, technical data
carriers, materials, tools and vehicles. All the mentioned articles are exempt
from customs and other fees, but the authorized personnel must declare them
to customs officers and, with the exception of the articles used up on duty, return
all of them to the territory of their country.
(2) The Parties shall provide all the necessary help with respect to the transportation,
lodging and access to communications equipment to the members of the Interstate
Diplomatic Committee, joint expert work groups and all other work groups,
as well as auxiliary personnel in order to facilitate their work.
(3) Members of the Interstate Diplomatic Committee, joint expert work groups and
all other work groups, as well as auxiliary personnel can during their duties
on the border wear official uniform, but cannot be armed.
Article 21
(1) All disputes regarding the interpretation and implementation of this Treaty shall
be resolved by the Interstate Diplomatic Committee.
(2) If the Interstate Diplomatic Committee is not able to resolve a dispute from
Paragraph 1 of this Article through settlement, the said disputes shall be referred
to the adequate authorities of the Parties.
Article 22
(1) This Treaty shall be temporarily implemented as of its signing date.
(2) This Treaty shall be in effect indefinitely.
(3) Each Party can cancel this Treaty at any time with prior written notice to the
other Party sent through diplomatic channels. In that case, the Treaty shall
2900 Report Number 8-14
become void six months after the date of the receipt of the notice on the cancellation
of the Treaty by the other Party.
Article 23
This Treaty comes into effect on the day of the receipt of the last written notice
sent through diplomatic channels by which the Parties inform each other that all
the conditions set forth by their legislatures regarding the coming into effect of this
Treaty have been met.
Written in Sarajevo, on July 30, 1999 in two originals, both in the official languages
of the Parties. Both texts are equally valid.
For the Republic of Croatia
(signed)
For Bosnia and Herzegovina
(signed)
Latvia-Lithuania
Report Number 10-20
Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania
on the delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf in the Baltic Sea
Signed: 9 July 1999
Entered into force: Not yet in force
Published at: STATE NEWS (Official Lithuanian Gazette), No. 100-2893
(1999).1
I SUMMARY
This is the seventh agreement concluded during the second half of the 1990s in
the southeastern Baltic Sea which is directly related to the disintegration of the
former Soviet Union.2 1t establishes a maritime boundary in the southeastern Baltic
Sea where none had existed before, exception made of a small stretch of territorial
sea boundary dating from the pre-Soviet period. This agreement forms part of the
fourth chronological group in the over-all Baltic Sea delimitation effort,3 which
Reprinted in Erik Franckx, New Maritime Boundaries Concluded in the Eastern Baltic Sea Since 1998,
16 !NT'L J. MAR. & COASTAL L. 643, 656-57 (2001).
2 Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania on the Delimitation of the
Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in the Baltic Sea, 9 July 1999, reprinted
in Franckx, supra note 1 (hereinafter Latvia-Lithuania Agreement). This treaty has not yet entered
into force. For the first six such agreements concluded in the area, see in chronological order: EstoniaLatvia
(1996), No. 10-15; Estonia-Finland (1996), No. 10-16; Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (1997), No. 10-17;
Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1); Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(2); and Estonia-Sweden
(1998), No. 10-19.
3 Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic Sea: Post-I99I Developments, 28 GA. J. INT'L &
COMPo L. 249, 256 (2000). It concerns agreements directly related to the dissolution of the former
Soviet Union.
i.I. Charney and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 3107-3127.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
3108 Report Number 10-20
is in substance clearly distinguishable from the previous ones.4 Within this fourth
group, two distinct subcategories are to be further distinguished, namely those
relating to the delimitation of maritime areas where no boundary existed before,
and those involving the more subtle questions about the legal status of previously
concluded maritime boundary agreements by the former Soviet Union in the areas
to be delimited.s The present agreement completely fits into the first category since
the status of the pre-existing territorial sea boundary, concluded between the parties
before their incorporation in the former Soviet Union, was never called into question
as a matter of principle.6
The agreement establishes a single maritime boundary, dividing the territorial
sea, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as well as the continental shelf between
the parties. The boundary extends over a distance of about 68-nautical-miles (n.m.)
and consists of only two segments: One delimiting the territorial sea between the
parties, the other the EEZ and the continental shelf. The western terminal point
remains undetermined in the agreement, awaiting trilateral negotiations. Nevertheless,
by making use of a method already employed by Latvia in its agreement with
Estonia (Latvia-Estonia (1996), No. 10-15),7 a rather precise indication is given
by the parties about the future location of this tripoint.
The boundary line starts in the east at the terminal point of the land frontier
and is supposed to terminate in the west at the outer limit of Sweden's economic
zone.
4 The previous periods run from 1945-1972, 1973-1985, and 1985 to the beginning of the 1990s
respectively. See Erik Franckx, International Cooperation in Respect of the Baltic Sea, in THE CHANaING
PoLITICAL STRUCTURE OF EUROPE: ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245, 255-61 (R. Lefeber,
M. Fitzmaurice, & E. W. Vierdag eds., 1991), as later supplemented in Erik Franckx, Maritime
Boundaries in the Baltic Sea: Past, Present and Future, 2 MARITIME BRlEFING 6-10 (mRU, No.2,
1996) and Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Baltic Sea, in THE BALTIC SEA: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN NATIONAL PoUCIES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 167, 169-73 (Renate
Platz()der & Philomene Verlaan eds., 1996). See also, Erik Franckx, Frontieres maritimes dans la mer
Baltique: passe, presentetjutur, 9 EsPACES ET REsSOURCES MARITIMES 92, 97-103 (1995) and Erik
Franckx, us delimitations maritimes en mer Baltique, 5 REVUE DE L'INDEMER 37, 50-58 (1997).
5 As already alluded to in the first regional report concerning the Baltic Sea. See Erik Franckx, Region
X: Baltic Sea Maritime Boundaries, supra at 345, 365.
6 See irifra note 20 and accompanying text In this fourth group (see supra note 3 note and accompanying
text), it bas therefore to be classified with agreements such as Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15;
lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1 & 2); and Estonia-Finland-Sweden (2001), No. 10-21. The
Estonia-Latvia-Sweden Agreement, as already mentioned, should rather be considered to be a hybrid
or mixed agreement in this respect. See Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (1997), No. 10-17, Part III, Conclusions,
in fine and the further references to be found there.
7 As stressed in Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (1997), No. 10-17, Part n.l, Political, Strategic, and Historical
Considerations.
Latvia-Lithuania 3109
The geographical configuration of the coasts in the area to be delimited is one
of adjacency. In the area immediately surrounding the land boundary terminal point
the coasts of both parties are quite symmetrical. However, from a more general
perspective, the coast of Latvia tends to be convex, whereas the mainland coast
of Lithuania is rather concave. South of Kleipeda lies the Lithuanian Kursiu promontory,
which is separated from the Lithuanian mainland. The coastline of this
promontory is only connected to the mainland in the south at the Russian province
of Kaliningrad.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
The negotiations between Latvia and Lithuania were long and difficult. 8 They lasted
from 1993 to 1999, over the course of eight different Latvian governments.9
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Latvia and Lithuania signed an
agreement in 1993 by means of which they decided to re-establish their pre-1940
boundary ,10 This was in line with the strongly held belief by the Baltic states that
they are not successor states of the former Soviet Union, but that they are successors
to the pre-World War II states bearing the same names,ll They maintain that their
annexation during the 1940s was illegal ab initio because of the secret nature of
the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.12 As a consequence, these states have sought
8 For a detailed description of the course of these negotiations, see Erik Franckx, Maritieme ajbakening
in de oostelijke Baltische Zee: Internet en het wetenschappelijk onderzoek (Maritime Delimitation in
the Eastern Baltic Sea: Internet and Scientific Research), in OosT-EUROPA IN EUROPA: EENHEID EN
VERSCHEIDENHEID 275, 280-81 and 285-96 [HULDEBOEK AANGEBODEN AAN FRITs GORLE](Pieter De
Meyere, Erik Franckx, Jean-Marie Henckaerts, & Katlijn Malfliet eds., 1996) and Erik Franckx,
Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic, in BOUNDARIES AND ENERGY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 275,
283-86 (Gerald Blake, Martin Pratt, Clive Schofield, & Janet Allison Brown eds., 1998).
9 As stressed by M. Riekstins, head of the Latvian negotiating team. See THE BALTIC TiMEs, 30 Nov.-6
Dec. 2000, at 3, col. 3.
10 Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania on the Renewal of the State
Border, 29 July 1993, STATE NEWS, No. 100-2229 (1995) (hereinafter 1993 Agreement). This agreement
entered into force on 5 July 1995.
11 See, e.g., Brigitte Stem, Aspects o/the Law o/State Succession: Rapport interimaire sur la succession
en matiere de traites constitutifs d' organisations intemationales et de traites adoptes au sein des
organisations intemationaies, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION: REPoRT OF THE SIXTYEIGHTH
CONFERENCE 616, 625 (1998).
12 Secret Additional Protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 23 August 1939, Germany-USSR, art. 1,
available at <http://www.historyplace.comlworldwar2ltimelinelpact.htm&gt;. Article 4 of that Protocol
obliged the parties to treat its content as strictly secret.
3110 Repon Number 10-20
to reinvigorate treaties that were concluded during the inter-war period by the Baltic
states.
In order to trace this pre-1940 boundary, reference must be made to the framework
convention of 14 May 1921 which served as basis for the delimitation of the
land boundary between both Latvia and Lithuania.13 The 1993 Agreement explicitly
refers back to this 1921 document.14 The most important article of the 1993 Agreement
for the present report reads as follows:
The part of the state boundary between the Parties constituting the sea border shall
be determined by separate agreement. IS
On the basis of the 1921 Agreement, the boundary commission expressly concluded
in 1927 that the land boundary continues in the Baltic Sea dividing the territorial
waters of both states.16 Even though the direction of the maritime boundary was
apparently indicated by the boundary commission, the length of that line was not
specified. 17
Taking into account the fact that these states have adopted a policy of continuing
the situation as it existed before the USSR annexation, including boundary agreements,
18 it would be reasonable to expect that the general description of the mari-
13 Convention between Latvia and Lithuania Regarding the Delimitation on the Spot of the Frontier
Between the Two States, and Also Regarding the Rights of the Citizens in the Frontier Zone, and the
Status ofImmovable Property Intersected by the Frontier Line, 14 May 1921, 17 L.N.T.S. 223 (hereinafter
1921 Agreement).
14 1993 Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1, in which the parties agreed: uTo renew the bOlmdary between
the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania as it was until 15 June 1940, based on the
Convention of 14 May 1921, between the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania on the
delimitation of the land boundary." Also the Preamble of the 1993 Agreement makes such a reference.
15 [d., art. 8.
16 Protocol of 15 October 1927. Original Latvian and Lithuanian text kindly received from the Latvian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. English translation provided by the Baltic Information Centre, Brussels.
Text on file with the author (hereinafter 1927 Protocol). This document contained in annex a detailed
description of the boundary, consisting of 614 pages of text, 22 sketches, as well as a map made up
of 113 plates (id., sub 2). The provision concerning the territorial sea is to be found in para. 1.3 of
that annex. Information kindly obtained from the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
17 The direction of the 1927 maritime boundary was determined by the direction of the last segment of
the land boundary-the line between points having the following coordinates: 56"04'53.08" N,
21"08'31.26" E and 56"04'14.77" N, 21"03'49.81" E. But according to the State Border Delimitation
and Demarcation Commission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (letter
of 12 June 2001; on file with the author), the exact wording is as follows: u[T]he border line continues
in the direction of the last two border posts up to the sea and further ... ". As will be seen infra note
53 and accompanying text, Lithuania apparently considered this wording not to determine the direction
of the territorial sea boundary. No official reference could however be provided (id.).
18 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
lAtvia-lithuania 3111
time boundary in 1927 would influence the recent negotiations}9 It is therefore
no surprise that the Preamble of the Latvia-Lithuania Agreement explicitly refers
to these "historical regulations on the delimitation of the territorial sea". 20
It also should be noted that during the negotiations leading to the present
agreement, the Lithuanian President took a rather peculiar initiative by issuing a
decree in which he stated that, until a bilateral agreement is reached:21
The following principles of negotiations with [the] Republic of Latvia are confirmed:
The border of the territorial sea of the Republic of Lithuania in the Baltic sea is a
straight line starting from the last point of the state border of Latvia and Lithuania
at the coast of the Baltic sea, the coordinates of which are N 56.04.10; E 21.03.53
to the point in the Baltic sea 12 nautical miles from the coast, the coordinates of which
are N 56.03.06; E 20.42.37.22
The President's statement also addressed the EEZ and the continental shelf:
The northern border of the economic zone and continental zone of the Republic of
Lithuania in the Baltic sea is [aJ straight line from the point in the Baltic sea the
coordinates of which are N 56.03.06; E 20.42.37 to the point where the geographical
19 Erik Franckx, The 1998 Estonia-Sweden Maritime Boundary Agreement: Lessons to be Learned in
the Area of Continuity and/or Succession of States, 31 OcEAN DEv. & INf'L L.J. 269, 271 (2000),
where it is stressed that a very similar situation occurred in the relationship between Estonia and Latvia.
In that case the parties had given a disproportionate effect to this historical boundary, which only
measured approximately 2.5 n.m., but which in reality influenced the maritime boundary between the
parties for almostten times that distance. See also Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15, Part 11.1, Political,
Strategic, and Historical Considerations. As will be seen infra, Part 11.8, Method of Delimitation
Considerations, however, the present agreement only attached a partial effect to this 1927 Protocol.
20 Latvia-Lithuania Agreement, Preamble, para. 3.
21 With this initiative, the president appears to have further developed, as well as given a more concrete
content to, a statement by the parliament three weeks earlier in which the Seimas declared: "Until
such time as the Baltic Sea delimitation between the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of lithuania
is established, the Republic of Lithuania shall not agree with any actions which violate the sovereign
rights of the Republic of lithuania to prospect, exploit, protect and manage the living and natural s~
resources south from the boundary which extends in a straight line from the point of the land border
between Latvia and lithuania on the Baltic Sea shore to the point which marks the junction of the
geographic parallel B=56'07'35" and the third state's jurisdiction boundary in the Baltic Sea." Statement
of the Seimas of the Republic of lithuania, Concerning Problems in Mutual Relations Created by the
Government of the Republic of Latvia, 23 October 1996, sub 2, available at <http://www3.lrs.1t1cbinlengfpreps2?
ConditionI=94697&Condition2=> (21 May 2(01).
22 Decree of the President of the Republic of lithuania, On the Northern Border of the Territorial Sea,
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf o[f] the Republic of Lithuania, 13 November 1996, STATE NEWS,
No. 112-2537 (1996), art. 1 (1).
3112 Report Number 10-20
parallel N 56.07.35 meets a border of the continental shelf of the third state in the
Baltic sea.23
Whether the purpose of this decree was to influence the Lithuanian negotiating team
or the Latvian government was not immediately clear. Nevertheless, the method
used to convey this kind of sensitive information appeared rather unusual and the
juridical value of the decree raised serious doubts from an international law perspective.
When compared with the Protocol of 15 October 1927, this Presidential
line ends up about 3' more to the north at a distance of 12 n.m. from the coast than
if the prolongation of the last segment of the land boundary were to be followed.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
The treaty delimits the territorial sea, the EEZ, and the continental shelves of the
parties. With respect to the territorial sea, this did not create any major difficulties
between the parties since both claimed a 12 n.m. territorial sea at the time the
negotiations started, or at least soon afterward.24 Both states moreover had already
acceded to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
by the start of the negotiations.2S
With respect to the EEZ and continental shelf, only Latvia is a party to the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf,26 but neither Latvia nor Lithuania are parties
to the 1982 LOS Convention.27
In line with the example set by Lithuania in its bilateral relations with the
Russian Federation (Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1), Part D.2, Legal Regime
23 Id., art. 1 (2). Even though the line proposed by the president is therefore more elaborated than the
one contained in the parliamentary statement, the western terminal point is identical, namely where
the geographical parallel N 56°07'35" meets Sweden's maritime boundary. See supra note 21.
24 With respect to Latvia, see Act on the State Border of the Republic of Latvia, 27 October 1994,
LATVUAS VESTNESIS, 10 November 1994, No. 134. With respect to Lithuania, see Law on the State
Border of the Republic of Lithuania, 25 June 1992, art. 4, available at <http://www3.lrs.Itlc-biniengl
preps2?Conditionl=21157&Condition2=> (21 May 2001).
2S Latvia acceded on 17 November 1992 and Lithuania on 31 January 1992.
26 This country acceded on 2 December 1992.
27 If this absence of ratification does not create any problems with respect to the continental shelf, a zone
which does not depend on any express proclamation, the situation is somewhat less clear concerning
the EEZ. Both countries have in their legislation a number of references to the EEZ, but fundamental
legislation formally establishing such a zone appears to be missing. This point has already been
developed in previous reports. With respect to Latvia, see Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15, Part 1l.2,
Legal Regime Considerations, infine; concerning Lithuania, see Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1),
Part 1l.2, Legal Regime Considerations.
Latvia-Lithuania 3113
Considerations), Latvia and Lithuania did not sidestep this apparent lack of basic
EEZ legislation by using a generic term in the title of the agreement, as Latvia had
done in its relations with Estonia.28 Instead, the agreement appears to start from
the premis that both states have an EEZ since the present treaty expressly states
that it delimits the EEZ of both parties.29 It therefore further strengthens the argument
that Latvia and Lithuania do claim an EEZ.
Even though neither Latvia nor Lithuania are a party to the 1982 LOS Convention,
both parties specified in the preamble of the present treaty that they "acknowledged"
the provisions of that convention.30 Moreover the parties explicitly indicated
that they would
take into account all the existing rules applicable to the delimitation of maritime areas,
with view to arriving at an equitable solution.3l
It is noteworthy that all the bilateral maritime boundary delimitation agreements
concluded by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, contain some kind of reference to the 1982 LOS Convention despite the
fact that none of these states was a party to that agreement at the time of signature
of these agreements.32
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
In the Baltic Sea, the southeastern part is the most promising region as far as mineral
resource potential is concerned.33 This is therefore only the second agreement in
this region concluded since the early 1990s in which oil deposits substantially
28 In this agreement the term "maritime delimitation" is to be fOlmd in the title. See Estonia-Latvia (1996),
No. 10-15.
29 It is remarkable that the agreement seems to stress this point by including the following lffinecessary
repetition in its operative part: "The boundary between the exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf of the Republic of Lithuania and the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Republic
of Latvia ... ". Latvia-Lithuania Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2 (1).
30 Id., Preamble, para. 4.
31 Id., Preamble, para. 5.
32 Excluded are thus the two tripoint agreements as well as the territorial sea boundary between Lithuania
and Russia which only concerned a small part of the over-all territorial boundary agreement.
33 G.H. Blake and R.E. Swarbrick, Hydrocarbons and International Boundaries: A Global Overview,
in BOUNDARIES AND ENERGY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 8, at 3, 6 where a map indicating
the main oil and gas fields is reproduced.
3114 Report Number 10-20
influenced the negotiations between the parties.34 Non-living resources formed
the crux of the maritime boundary dispute between the parties in this area. When
one views the course of the negotiations, it appears that the many cooling off periods
which occurred during the period 1993-1999, were often directly related to particular
actions taken by the Latvian authorities relating to the granting of licences with
respect to those resources.3S
Until 1994 the negotiations went rather smoothly with the parties affIrming that
they narrowed the disputed zone to a mere 2.7 n.m. But when the Latvian government
publicly announced later that year that an American (AMOCO) and Swedish
fIrm (OPAB) had been chosen to develop the Latvian continental shelf resources,
including areas claimed by both sides, a dispute arose. The problem flared up once
again a year later when in October Latvia signed contracts with these companies.
A letter of protest followed the fIrst event. After the second, Lithuania recalled its
ambassador for consultations. This cycle repeated itself after every later action taken
by the Latvian authorities in this respect.36
Because of the strong probability that gas and oil deposits are located in the
area delimited by the present treaty, it should not surprise that this is the second
treaty, concluded during the fourth chronological group of agreements pertaining
to Baltic Sea, that contains a unity of deposits clause.37 In the over-all Baltic Sea
practice, this is nevertheless still exceptional.38 It is drafted in a manner similar
to other unity of deposits clauses incorporated in maritime boundary agreements
in the Baltic Sea.39 It therefore does not follow the Lithuania-Russia example which
took a different approach by using less mandatory language (Lithuania-Russia (1997),
No. 10-18(1), Part 11.3, Economic and Environmental Considerations).
The only distinguishing feature of the Latvia-Lithuania unity of deposits clause
is that it specifIes that the "mineral deposit" must be interpreted in "its most general,
extensive and comprehensive sense and includes all non-living substances occurring
on, in or under the ground, irrespective of chemical or physical state."4O
34 For the other one, see Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1), Part 11. 3, Economic and Environmental
Considerations.
3S For more details, see the sources listed supra note 8. The next paragraph is based on these sources.
36 For instance when the Latvian government's Economics and Finance Committee decided to pass the
bill on oil concessions for government consideration or when a bill was passed for parliamentary
adoption to allow foreign companies to drill in the Latvian continental shelf.
37 For the Baltic Sea chronology concerning maritime boundary delimitations during the 19905, see supra
note 3 and accompanying text For the other such agreement, see Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1).
38 Erik Franckx, supra note 5, at 363.
39 See in chronological order: Finland-Sweden (1972), No. 10-3, attached protocol; German Democratic
Republic-Sweden(1978), No. 10-7, art 3; Denmark-Sweden(1984), No. 10-2, art 6; and Demnark-German
Democratic Republic (1988), No. IO-H, art. 3.
40 Latvia-Lithuania Agreement, supra note 2, art. 4 (2).
Latvia-Lithuania 3115
Fishery considerations, which had not been an issue in the negotiations and were
not taken into account in the boundary agreement,41 came to the fore mainly after
the agreement had been signed. Even though Lithuania already ratified the agreement
a few months afterwards,42 Latvian fishing groups effectively lobbied their parliament
not to ratify the agreement because they believed certain areas belonging to
Latvia before the Soviet era would be turned over to Lithuania as a result of the
agreement.43 These fishermen threatened to blockade Latvian ports if Parliament
ratified the agreement.44 This lobbying was effective, since this agreement will
be one of the very few maritime boundary agreements concluded in the Baltic Sea
since the Second World War which did not enter into force the year after which
it was signed.45 The Lithuania-Russia agreements, especially are presenting problems
in this respect.46 But with the apparent willingness of Lithuania to compromise
on this particular point in order to speed up the Latvian ratification process, the
present agreement may not take as long as the just-mentioned Lithuania-Russia
agreements.47
41 The state practice of both countries in their maritime boundary delimitations with their other respective
maritime neighbors, indicates that fishery issues were normally dealt with separately. With respect
to Latvia, see Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15, Part 11.3, Economic and Environmental Considerations;
relating to Lithuania, see Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1), Part 11.3, Economic and Environmental
Considerations.
42 Law No. VIII-1371 of 28 October 1999, On the Ratification of the Agreement between the Republic
of Lithuania and the Republic of Latvia on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic
Zone and Continental Shelf in the Baltic Sea, STATE NEWS, No. 100-2887 (1999).
43 This fishery dispute fmds its roots in a provisional arrangement arrived at in 1991 between the Ministers
of Transport of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, called Protocol concerning the EEZ. This provisional
arrangement had granted Latvian fishermen access to an area even further south than what the 1927
Protocol would have attributed to Latvia. Information kindly obtained from the Latvian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on 8 June 2001. As will be seen infra, Part 11.8, Method 0/ Delimitation Considerations,
the boundary finally agreed upon remains well north of this 1927 line.
44 THE BALTIC liMES, 30 November-6 December 2000, at 3, cols 1-2.
45 This is a point already developed in the Lithnania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1), Part III, Conclusions,
injine.
46 For the underlying reasons, see Erik Franckx & Ann Pauwels, LithUlUlian-Russian Boundary Agreement
o/October 1997: To Be or Not To Be? in LIBER AMICORUM GONTHER JAENICKE -- ZUM 85. GEBURTSTAG
63, 75-82 (Volkmar Gotz, Peter Selmer & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 1998). At the time of writing
(May 2001), these agreements (Lithnania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18 (1 & 2» had not yet entered into
force.
47 Lithuanian fishery specialists have apparently proposed representatives of Latvian fishermen to exchange
fishing quotas which would allow fishermen of both sides to fish in the territorial sea of the other
party. NEWSFILE LITHUANIA, 12-18 March 2001, available at <http://www.urm.ltldatalI51EF22114019 nf651.htm#LATVIAN%20 PRESIDENT%20PA YS%20A %2OSTA TE%20VISIT%2OTO%20 LITHU
ANIA> (21 May 2001).
3116 Report Number 10-20
4 Geographic Considerations
The coasts of both states in the area being delimited are adjacent and rather smooth.
In a symmetrical manner, the mainland coasts start out as concave in the area near
the terminal point of the land boundary but each appear in their entirety to be convex
when viewed from a broader perspective. The only special feature in the area is
the Kursiu promontory, which, as mentioned above, is not connected to the
Lithuanian mainland, but rather to Russia further down the coast (Lithuania-Russia
(1997), No. 10-18(1), Part II.4, Geographic Considerations). In their bilateral
relations, Lithuania and Russia considered this promontory to represent the relevant
coastline governing the maritime delimitation in the area (Lithuania-Russia (1997),
No. 10-18(1), Part II.S, Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations).
The length of the respective relevant coastlines, i.e. Armens Rags on the Latvian
coast to the north, and the Lithuanian-Russian state boundary to the south, appear
to be roughly equal.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
No islands, rocks, reefs, or low-tide elevations are present. Consequently, these
considerations did not influence the delimitation of the boundary. The only special
geographic feature in the area is the Kursiu promontory, which was discussed in
the previous section (see supra, Part II.4, Geographic Considerations).
6 Baseline Considerations
Because of the particularly smooth coastline of the southeastern Baltic Sea, the
Russian Federation never established a system of straight baselines in this area.48
South of Ovisi lighthouse at the Strait of Irbe, the former Soviet Union simply used
48 The former Soviet system of straight baselines in the Baltic Sea. as established in 1985. stopped well
north of the area here under consideration at Qvisi lighthouse. Latvia. See Decree of 15 January 1985.
On the Confirmation of a List of Geographic Coordinates Determining the Position of the Baseline
in the Arctic Ocean. the Baltic Sea and Black Sea from which the Width of the Territorial Waters.
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of the U.S.S.R. is Measured. 1 (Annex) IzVESHCHENllA MOREPLA
V ATELIAM 37 (1986) (it concerns point 32). As already discussed in Estonia-Latvia (1996). No. lO-
15. Part 11.6. Baseline Considerations. as well as Part II.1. Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations.
Latvia-Lithuania 3117
the normal baseline, i.e. the low-water line along its coast. Latvia, following a similar
logic, does not claim a system of straight baselines in the area. Nevertheless, when
Lithuania regained its independence, the law on the state boundary stated that the
"extent of the territorial sea shall be measured from the straight line drawn between
the two outermost points of the shoreline.,,49 A governmental decision of 1994
subsequently defined these two outermost points of the shorelines by providing
concrete coordinates at the coast near Palanga in the north and at the terminal point
of the land boundary with Russia on the west coast of the Kursiu promontory on
the south.50 As was the case with respect to the delimitation with Russia (LithuaniaRussia
(1997), No. 10-18(1 & 2), Part II.6, Baseline Considerations), however, this
Lithuanian baseline does not appear to have directly influenced the location of the
maritime boundary (see infra, Part II.8, Method of Delimitation Considerations).
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
No particularly significant seabed features are found in the area that might have
justified consideration in this delimitation. Since the continental shelf in the area
is moreover a geological continuum Latvia and Lithuania appear to be located on
the same continental shelf.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
Despite the fact it could have been expected that the historical territorial sea boundary
between the parties would have exercised a very substantial influence on the
course of the territorial sea boundary line, this has not really been the case.51 In
fact, this line was not even given full effect for the first 3 n.m.-the breadth of the
49 Law on the State Border of the Republic of Lithuania, 25 June 1992, art. 4, available at <http://www3.
lrs.ltlc-binlengfpreps2? Conditionl=21157&Condition2=> (21 May 2(01). This article further states:
"The geographical coordinates of these points shall be approved by the Government of the Republic
of Lithuania. An international agreement of the Republic of Lithuania may establish a different limit
of the territorial sea of the Republic of Lithuania."
50 Decision No. 162 of 10 March 1994, On the Establishment of the Territorial Sea of the Republic of
Lithuania, STATE NEWS, No. 20-327 (1994). The following coordinates are provided: For the northern
point 55"55'12.8" N and 21"03'01.1" E, and for the southern point 55"16'51.6" Nand 20"57'21.9" E.
51 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text, where itis moreover stressed that Latvia, in its maritime
boundary relations with Estonia, had given the pre-Soviet territorial sea boundary a prominent place.
3118 Report Number 10-20
territorial sea claimed by the parties in 1927.52 The reference to the "historical
regulations on the delimitation of the territorial sea" in the Preamble, appears to
be merely cosmetic especially from the Lithuanian point of view, since this country
apparently considered that the exact wording of the 1927 Protocol left the method
of delimitation of the territorial sea untouched.53
The first segment of the boundary line, measuring 12 n.m., delimits the territorial
sea. It is an adjusted equidistant line, mainly measured from the land boundary
terminus and the respective coastlines about 2 n.m. each side of this terminus.
Point II, representing the outer limit of the territorial sea, lies somewhat south of
the terminal point of the territorial sea unilaterally claimed by the Lithuanian
president,54 but nevertheless proportionally more north of the prolongation of the
last segment of the Latvian-Lithuanian land boundary as referred to in the historical
territorial sea boundary of 1927.55 A particular stumbling block was created by
the Sventoji mole, located rather close to the terminal point of the land boundary
on the Lithuanian side. With respect to this otherwise rather symmetrical concave
coastline, the parties believed this manmade construction to generate a different
effect: For Latvia no effect should be given to it, whereas Lithuania believed it to
generate full effect.
The second part of the boundary, seaward from 12 n.m. to Sweden's economic
zone, was delimited by means of an azimuth of 270·. It is a loxodrome starting at
the outer limit of the territorial sea boundary and running parallel to the parallels
of longitude. This line reaches Sweden's economic zone several minutes south of
the line unilaterally claimed by the Lithuanian president,56 but about three times
as far from the simple prolongation of the 1927 sea boundary line, as initially put
52 With respect to Latvia, see for instance GILBERT GIDEL, 3 I.E DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA
MER 110 (1934).
53 For the exact wording relied upon by the Lithuanian side, see supra note 17. Based on the argument
that in most cases countries did not seek delimitation of their territorial waters in the prewar practice,
this country is apparently of the opinion that the direction of the last segment only determines the
boundary line up to the sea, but not beyond. See State Border Delimitation and Demarcation Commission
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (letter of 12 June 2001; on file
with the author).
54 See supra 22 note and accompanying text.
55 For the exact coordinates indicating the direction of the pre-Soviet territorial sea boundary, see supra
note 17.
56 See supra 23 note and accompanying text.
Latvia-Lithuania 3119
forward by Latvia.57 This line appears to be a perpendicular to a line representing
the general direction of the coast.58
At a point on the boundary about 14 n.m. from the coast a hypothetical equidistant
line would bend to the southwest "in front" of the Lithuania's coastline. This
would be due to the fact that while each coastline is somewhat symmetrical, Latvia's
convex coast (about 10 n.m. north ofthe land boundary terminus) extends slightly
further seaward than Lithuania's convex coast (situated about 10 n.m. to the south
of the land boundary terminus).
Latvia has so far been the only country which has consistently relied on the
use of azimuths to delimit the outer segments of its maritime boundaries. It had
previously used this method in its delimitation with Estonia (see Estonia-Latvia
(1996), No. 10_15).59 The use of an azimuth makes it possible to avoid locating
a terminal point in the immediate vicinity of tripoints which remain to be negotiated.
As far as the third state is concerned, however, such a method does not leave much
leeway for negotiations since it reduces the trilateral negotiations to the mere
technicality of fixing of the exact coordinates of the tripoint. As was the case with
respect to the Estonia-Latvia maritime boundary (Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (1997),
No. 10-17, Part II.l, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations), Sweden
probably will not object to this approach since it sustains the theoretical position
that the 1988 delimitation agreement it concluded with the former Soviet Union
remains in force.60
57 If the latter line were allowed to directly abut on the Polish EEZ.
58 See information kindly obtained from the State Border Delimitation and Demarcation Commission
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (letter of 12 June 2001; on file with
the author), indicating that this line was influenced by the Kursiu promontory and the Lithuanian straight
baseline, as well as the information kindly obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia
(telephonic conversation of 8 June 2(01), rather emphasizing that despite the initial positions of the
parties (direction indicated by the 1927 Protocol up to Sweden's economic zone for Latvia, and the
Kursiu promontory for Lithuania) this general direction was primarily generated by the short segment
surrounding the land boundary.
59 In the over-all delimitation effort in the Baltic Sea, this country therefore almost stands out in isolation,
since no other agreement concluded since the Second World War explicitly mentions the degree of
a possible azimuth involved. The only comparable practice is to be found in the 1 %8 agreement
between the former German Democratic Republic and Poland. It provides that the tripoint would be
arrived at by an extension of the last segment determined by the agreement. But this description was
replaced by a set of new coordinates in 1989 and merely retained that from the northern terminal point
the line would continue in a northeasterly direction; this is totally different from the west-northwest
direction of the last segment of that new agreement (see German Democratic Republic-Poland (1968),
No. 10-6(1».
60 Marie Jacobsson, Sweden and the Law of the Sea, in 1HE LAW OF THE SEA: THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND ITS MEMBER STATES 495, 510 (Tullio Treves & Laura Pineschi eds., 1997).
3120 Report Number 10-20
In the Latvia-Lithuania boundary delimitation, Latvia seems to have been willing
to downgrade its understanding of the 1927 Protocol, in order to secure a greater
area beyond the territorial sea at the locations where it was negotiating with foreign
oil companies to explore and exploit mineral resources believed to be located there.
Lithuania, on the other hand, secured a direct outlet to the middle of the Baltic Sea
in view of the delimitation line reached with Russia two years earlier (LithuaniaRussia
(1997), No. 18-10(1), Part ll.3, Economic and Environmental Considerations).
9 Technical Considerations
The lines connecting the different turning points are straight lines. Only with respect
to the second segment, delimiting the EEZ and the continental shelf, is it specified
that this line represents a loxodrome.
The parties opted for the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84) as system
of reference, further confirming a fixed practice in the Baltic Sea region since the
199Os.61 In its bilateral relations with Russia, nevertheless, Lithuania had to accept
that two sets of coordinates for every point mentioned in the maritime boundary
were included because the Russian Federation continues to rely on an older system
for determining coordinates in this area (Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1),
Part 0.9, Technical Considerations). In the agreement containing the territorial sea
boundary, WGS-84 even totally disappeared, since only the Russian coordinate
system of 1942 was relied upon (Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(2), Part 0.9,
Technical Considerations).
A map is annexed to the agreement but solely for illustrative purposes. In this,
once again, the agreement follows a set practice in the Baltic developed since the
early 1990s.62
61 As reported in Franckx, supra note 19, at 274, all the delimitation agreements concluded in the Baltic
Sea since 1990 make use of the World Geodetic System 1984. See in chronological order: FmlandSweden
(1994), No. 10-13; Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15; Estonia-Finland (19%), No. 10-16;
Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (1997), No. 10-17; Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1); Latvia-Lithuania
(1999), No. 10-20; and Estonia-Finland-Sweden (2001), No. 10-21, at Part II.9, Technical Considerations.
62 All the agreements concluded in the Baltic Sea area since 1990 to which charts were appended (that
is all except the tripoint agreements) refer to the map for illustrative purposes only. See in chronological
order: Fmland-Sweden (1994), No. 10-13; Estonia-Latvia (19%), No. 10-15; Estonia-Finland (1996),
No. 10-16; Estonia-Sweden (1998), No. 10-19; Latvia-Lithuania (1999), No. 10-20; at Part 11.9,
Technical Considerations. The only exception so far to this rule has been the agreements concluded
between Lithuania and Russia (Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1 & 2), Part 11.9, Technical
Considerations), where the charts received a more prominent place.
lAtvia-Lithuania 3121
10 Other Considerations
This is the fourth agreement concluded in the Baltic Sea which added English to
the languages of the parties as an authentic language.63 As such, it gives further
proof of an exception to the well-established rule in the Baltic Sea that maritime
delimitation agreements have, until recently, always been produced solely in the
respective languages of the parties, being equally authentic. Moreover, as is the case
in the other agreements that include English as an authentic language, if a problem
of interpretation among the three different authentic languages should arise, the
agreement stipulates that the English version shall prevail.
It is also the third time in the Baltic Sea state practice since the Second World
War that a dispute settlement provision has been included in a maritime delimitation
agreement.64 It appears noteworthy to stress that all of them relate to agreements
concluded during the fourth chronological group in the over-all Baltic Sea delimitation
effort.65 The clause contained in this agreement is identical in substance to
the one agreed upon by Latvia in its bilateral relations with Estonia (Estonia-Latvia
(1996), No. 10-15).66 Whether these provisions entail compulsory third party settlement
in case diplomatic means fail, is not crystal clear.67
63 For the other agreements following a similar approach, see Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15; EstoniaLatvia-
Sweden (1997), No. 10-17; and Estonia-Sweden (1998), No. 10-19, Part n.lO, Other Considerations.
A later agreement was even exclusively drafted in the English language. See Estonia-FinlandSweden
(2001), No. 10-21, Part 11.10, Other Considerations.
64 For the other agreements containing such a provision, see Estonia-Latvia (1996), No. 10-15; and
Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1), Part 11.10, Other Considerations.
65 About this fourth chronological group, see supra note 3 and accompanying text. This submission does
not take into account the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Mutual Relations in the Fishery Sector
in the Area Formerly Disputed in the Baltic Sea, 18 Apri11988, art. 2, Sweden-Soviet Union (1988),
No. 10-9, supra, at 2068,2072. This agreement was indeed a fishery agreement, which was attached
to a maritime delimitation agreement concluded on the same day.
66 Instead of restricting those possible means to consultations and negotiations, as was the case in the
agreement between Lithuania and the Russian Federation (see Lithuania-Russia (1997), No. 10-18(1),
Part 11.10, Other Considerations), the present agreement also explicitly makes reference to other means
of peaceful settlement of disputes provided by internationallaw.
67 Art. 5 states: "Any dispute between the Parties arising out of the interpretation or implementation of
this Agreement shall in the first instance be settled by consultations or negotiations, or using other
means of peaceful settlement of disputes provided by international law." Whether the last segment
of this article, introduced by "or using ... ", further complements the first phase by referring to other
diplomatic means such as good offices, mediation, conciliation and others, or rather to a second phase
in which arbitration or judicial settlement would be aimed at leading to a binding decisions, is not
immediately clear.
3122 Report Number 10-20
ill CONCLUSIONS
By means of the present agreement, Latvia and Lithuania delimit their territorial
sea, as well as their EEZ and continental shelves. Even though the western terminal
point with Sweden requires further trilateral negotiations, little remains to be settled
by the trilateral agreement since Latvia and Lithuania have already determined the
exact direction of the line delimiting their EEZ and continental shelves.
It is the second maritime boundary agreement concluded after the dissolution
of the former Soviet Union in which non-living natural resources played a crucial
role. The latter is reflected in the presence of a unity of deposits clause in the treaty.
Even though no exploitation had yet commenced, the internal Latvian process of
granting a licence to an American-Swedish consortium created significant difficulties
in the negotiations. Nevertheless, considerations related to non-living resources only
seem to have generated an indirect influence on the actual course of the boundary
line in as far as these considerations scaled down the initial Lithuanian claims further
out at sea.
Even though an historical territorial sea boundary seems to have existed between
the parties, this element did not generate full effect. Fishery considerations, which
had received no attention when the parties negotiated the present agreement, finally
caused Latvian fishermen to pressure their parliament (Saeima). As a consequence,
ratification of the present agreement did not follow the standard practice in the Baltic
Sea of entry into force the year after signature.
The delimitation of the territorial sea is a modified equidistant line. The azimuth
which delimits the EEZ and continental shelf boundary, on the other hand, represents
a perpendicular to a line which the parties agreed to represent the general direction
of their coasts. The latter seems moreover to have been arrived at in such a manner
that Lithuania secured an area of maximum reach, extending to Sweden's economic
zone, while at the same time taking into account Latvia's interests in the non-living
resources in the area.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A. Law of the Sea Conventions
Latvia: Acceded to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone on 17 November 1992 and to the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf on 2 December 1992; not a party to the 1982 LOS
Convention.
Latvia-Lithuania 3123
Lithuania: Acceded only to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone on 31 January 1992; not a party to the 1982 LOS
Convention.
B. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Latvia: 12 n.m. territorial sea; 200 n.m. EEZ (implicit in the delimitation
agreement).
Lithuania: 12 n.m. territorial sea; 200 n.m. EEZ (implicit in the delimitation
agreement).
C. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Latvia: No change.
Lithuania: No change.
V REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
Ionas I. Bergkhol'tsas, Uchastie Latvii v delimitatsii morskikh prostranstv: politikopravovye
i istoricheskie aspekty (The Participation of Latvia in the Delimitation
of Maritime Zones: Political, Legal and Historical Considerations), 3 MOSKOVSKll
ZHURNAL MEZDUNARODNOGO PRAVA 189 (1998).
Erik Franckx, Maritieme ajbakening in de oostelijke Baltische Zee: Internet en het
wetenschappelijk onderzoek (Maritime Delimitation in the Eastern Baltic Sea:
Internet and Scientific Research), in OOST-EUROPA IN EUROPA: EENHEID EN
VERSCHEIDENHEID 275 [HULDEBOEK AANGEBODEN AAN FRITs GOIuE](Pieter
De Meyere, Erik Franckx, Jean-Marie Henckaerts, & Katlijn Malfliet eds., 1996).
Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic, in BOUNDARIES AND ENERGY:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 275 (Gerald Blake, Martin Pratt, Clive Schofield,
& Janet Allison Brown eds., 1998).
Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic: Post-I991 Developments, 28 GA.
J. INT'L. & COMPo L. 249 (2000).
Erik Franckx, New Maritime Boundaries Concluded in the Eastern Baltic Sea Since
1998, 16 INT'L J. MAR. & COASTAL L. (2001).
Prepared by Erik Franckx

Latvia-Lithuania 3125
Agreement between the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Latvia
on the delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf in the Baltic Sea
The Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Latvia hereafter referred to as the
Parties;
Desiring to establish the line delimitating the territorial exclusive sea economic zone
and continental shelf of the Republic of Lithuania and those of the Republic of
Latvia in the Baltic Sea;
Recalling the Agreement between the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of
Latvia on the re-establishment of the State frontier of 29 June 1993 as well as
historical regulations on the delimitation of the territorial sea;
Acknowledging the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea and general principles of international law as the basis for this maritime
delimitation;
Taking into account of all the existing rules applicable to the delimitation of maritime
areas, with view to arriving at an equitable solution;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The boundary between the territorial sea of the Republic of Lithuania and the
territorial sea of the Republic of Latvia shall be a straight line joining the points
defined as follows by means of their co-ordinates:
Latitude North
Point I 56° 04' 08.90"
Point II 56° 02' 43.5"
Longitude East
21 ° 03' 51.47"
20° 42' 35.0"
3126 Report Number 10-20
Article 2
1. The boundary between the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of
the Republic of Lithuania and the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf
of the Republic of Latvia shall be a straight line (loxodrome) in the azimuth
of 270 (two hundred seventy degrees) running from the point II defined in the
Article 1 towards the boundary of the exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf of the third State.
2. The tripoint between the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf appertaining respectively to the Parties and to the third State
shall be established by trilateral agreement between the States concerned.
Article 3
1. The positions of points specified in this Agreement are defined by co-ordinates
of latitude and longitude on World Geodetic System 1984 datum (WGS84).
2. The lines defined in Articles 1 and 2 have been drawn solely by way of
illustration on the map annexed to this Agreement.
Article 4
1. Where mineral deposits located on the seabed or in the subsoil extend on both
sides of the boundary of the territorial sea and continental shelf, and where those
mineral deposits can be wholly, or in part exploited from the territorial sea or
continental shelf of the other Party, the Parties shall, at the request of either
of them and prior to such exploitation, enter into negotiations and make an
agreement on the conditions for the exploitation of these deposits.
2. In this Article the term "mineral deposits", is used in the most general, exp[a]nsive
and comprehensive sense and includes all non-living substances occurring
on, in or under the ground, irrespective of chemical or physical state.
Latvia-Lithuania 3127
Article 5
Any dispute between the Parties arising out of the interpretation or implementation
of this Agreement shall in the first instance be settled by consultations or negotiations,
or using other means of peaceful settlement of disputes provided by international
law.
Article 6
The Agreement shall be subject to ratification [and] shall enter into force on the
exchange of the instruments of ratification.
Article 7
This Agreement is concluded for an indefinite period of time.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized hereto by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE in duplicate at Palanga this 9 day of July 1999 in the Lithuanian, Latvian
and English languages, each text being authentic. In cases of any divergence of
interpretation the English texts shall prevail.
On behalf of the
Republic of Lithuania
On behalf of the
Republic of Latvia
Saudi Arabia-Yemen
Report Number 6-16
The Final and Permanent Border Treaty between the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Republic of Yemen
Signed: 12 June 2000
Entered into force: 9 July 2000
Published at:]
I SUMMARY
The Jeddah Agreement of 12 June 2000 between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and
the Republic of Yemen establishes the maritime boundary between Saudi Arabia
and Yemen in the Red Sea. The maritime boundary, by implication, also attributes
sovereignty over various small offshore islands to one party or the other: to Yemen,
to the south of the boundary and to Saudi Arabia to the north. Thus, the maritime
boundary also resolves a long-standing disagreement between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen over these various small uninhabited islands offshore of the land boundary
and puts to rest notions of wider island claims to major islands in the Farasan Island
group held in the past by some quarters in Yemen.
This maritime boundary (and island) agreement is part of a comprehensive
settlement of boundary differences between Saudi Arabia and Yemen set forth in
the Jeddah Agreement. The Jeddah Agreement also establishes the geographic
The text of the agreement was published in various Arabic language newspapers and an English
translation appeared in 43 MIDDLE EAST EcONOMIC SURVEY at 01-D3 (No. 27, 3 July 2000). It should
be noted that Annex III of the agreement, which is the maritime boundary portion of the agreement,
is garbled in these texts and is not the final version as submitted to the United Nations by the parties
pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The English translation included with this report
is an accurate translation of the final text
1.1. Charney and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 2797-2807.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
2798 Report Number 6-16
coordinates of the 292 boundary marker locations previously agreed and set forth
in the Boundary Commission Reports which were annexed to the 1934 Treaty of
Taif in 1937, which delimited the land boundary from the Red Sea coast to Jabal
al-Thar, a mountain southeast of the Saudi city of Najran.2 The Jeddah Agreement
also establishes the previously undelimited land boundary from the eastern end of
the 1934 Treaty of Taif line, at Jabal al-Thar, to Oman at the junction of the SaudiOmani
and Yemeni-Omani land boundary agreements.
The maritime boundary is recorded in Annex ill to the Jeddah Agreement. The
maritime boundary is a three-segment boundary line. From east to west, the maritime
boundary ftrst extends west from the coast on the latitude of the land boundary
terminus; in the short, second segment, the maritime boundary is a line bearing
southwest; then, in its third segment, it is again a line oflatitude reaching westward
to the end of the maritime boundary between the two countries, the point of which
remains to be deftned. The maritime boundary is thus a negotiated line that serves
to attribute sovereignty to small islands previously in dispute between the Parties.
While the maritime boundary is based upon a combination of methods, its utility
as a precedent in other similar delimitation situations is questionable in light of its
attribution of sovereignty and political accommodation characteristics.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
The Jeddah Agreement marks an historical turning point in the neighborly relationship
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Often obscured by polite and brotherly
comments by spokesmen for both countries, the fact is that the boundary differences
between the two countries were substantial and difficult.
In 1934, following the emergence of both states internationally, Saudi Arabia
and Yemen fought a war which, basically, was over the southern boundary of the
Saudi province of Asir and the area around Najran. This war led to the 1934 Treaty
of Taif which appears to have been intended to restore the status quo insofar as
the boundary relationship was concerned. Article IV of this treaty described a
boundary in general terms running inland from the Red Sea coast. It also established
a Boundary Commission to demarcate the boundary set forth in the general terms
of Article IV. This Boundary Commission worked in 1935 and 1936 and demarcated
2 An English translation of the 1934 Treaty of Taif can be found in 20 ARABIAN BOUNDARY DISPlITES
92 (Richard Schofield ed., 1992).
Saudi Arabia-Yemen 2799
the boundary extending from the Red Sea coast, at a point between the Saudi town
of Muwassim and the Yemeni town of Medi,3 to Jabal al-Thar. The boundary points
were named and listed in reports annexed to the 1934 Treaty of Taif, but they were
never surveyed.4
East of Jabal al-Thar, in the hinterland of the Arabian Peninsula, the boundary
remained undefined. In the period of the 1934 Treaty of Taif, the British were in
Aden and there was a Saudi-British dispute concerning the Saudi Arabia-Aden
Protectorate boundary. Furthermore, there was a Yemen-British boundary dispute
as well between Yemen and the Aden Protectorate, which overshadowed historic
claims of Yemen to the area of the Aden Protectorate. The 1934 Treaty of Taif also
did not deal with the allocation of small uninhabited offshore islands in the Red
Sea nor did it address the maritime boundary. Also, from time to time, some
elements In Yemen would challenge the continuing validity of the basic boundary
established by Article IV of the Treaty.s
Between the mid-1930s and the mid-1990s, the boundary relationship between
the two countries became complex and difficult. Over time, the boundary markers
placed by the 1935-36 Boundary Commission were lost, their precise position being
unknown. Saudi Arabia emerged as a rich and powerful oil-producing country.
Yemen struggled with internal instability. It opposed British presence in Aden, dealt
with the upheaval before and after Britain's departure therefrom, and engaged in
the struggle to unite North Yemen and South Yemen into a modern unified State.6
Throughout all of this, accusations of improper influence by one country within
the other were rife. It will be recalled that in the 1960s internal revolt in North
Yemen brought intervention there by Egyptian forces and Saudi support for Royalist
forces, all of which led to a small United Nations force along the 1934 Treaty of
TaifLine to deter the movement of arms and other supplies. Later, Yemen's support
for Iraq during the Gulf War, and the subsequent expulsion of Yemeni workers from
Saudi Arabia, only added to the differences between the two countries.
3 The English translation of the name of this point is "Ras al-Mu'awij Shami jetty at the Radif Qarad
inlet."
4 An English translation of the Boundary Commission Reports as aunexed to the 1934 Treaty of Taif
can be found in 20 ARABIAN BOUNDARY DISPlITES 647 (Richard Schofield ed., 1992).
S These arguments were based upon a provision in the 1934 Treaty of Taif that referred to the means
by which the Treaty could be renewed or modified after 20 years. Whatever may have been the merits
of this argument, "when a boundary has been the subject of agreement, the continued existence of that
boundary is not dependent upon the continuing life of the treaty under which the boundary is agreed."
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), 1994 ICJ REP. 6, at 37, para. 73 (Feb. 3).
6 The Republic of Yemen was established on 22 May 1990 with the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic
(Sanaa) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden).
2800 Repon Number 6-16
In this somewhat turbulent history, the maritime boundary issues and questions
of island sovereignty were somewhat secondary. Whereas in the 1930s there was
some thought that oil would be discovered in the Farasan Islands, that never proved
to be the case. The incidents in the offshore area normally were limited to the
occasional arrest of local fishermen leading sometimes to diplomatic protest.
In 1995, Saudi Arabia and Yemen began a major political effort to resolve the
long-standing boundary problem. They agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding,
dated February 26, 1995.7 Pursuant thereto, they established various negotiating
committees, including one to address the island and maritime boundary question,
one to address the location of the 1934 Treaty of Taif Line boundary markers and
one to deal with the land boundary east of Jabal al-Thar. These Committees engaged
in an active negotiating process in the following years in spite of many difficulties
and obstructions created by incidents-some serious and some less s~along the whole
of the undetermined boundary line. These included several military incidents,
including at least one incident on one of the disputed islands. Ultimately, this work
culminated in the Jeddah Agreement which cut through various historical and legal
arguments and established the entire Saudi-Yemeni boundary in a spirit of accommodation
and on a strictly political basis.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
Both countries are Party to the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.
Under their respective domestic laws, both countries have claimed and established
12-nautical-mile (n. m.) territorial seas. Yemen has claimed a 200 n.m. EEZ. Saudi
Arabia has not done so but has claimed fisheries and continental shelf jurisdiction
in the Red Sea. The maritime boundary portion of the Jeddah Treaty creates an allpurpose
maritime boundary. There are no provisions in the Jeddah Agreement insofar
as the maritime boundary is concerned which relate to dispute settlement or other
forms of cooperation in the maritime field.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
There is no reason to believe that specific economic or environmental considerations
played a role with regard to the actual location of the maritime boundary line.
7 An English translation of the Memorandum of Understanding can be found in 38 MIDDLE EAST
EcONOMIC SURVEY at A-IO and A-II (No. 23, 6 March 1995).
Saudi Arabia-Yemen 2801
4 Geographic Considerations
This maritime boundary delimitation between the adjacent coasts of Saudi Arabia
and Yemen occurs on the eastern side of the Red Sea. The Red Sea is elongated
in shape and, as noted by the Eritrea-Yemen arbitration tribunal (see (1999) Report
No. 6-14), its central axis lies at an angle to the vertical trending from northwest
to southeast. The maritime boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen must necessarily
pass between numerous small offshore islands as it extends westward from
the coast. In this context the boundary line serves to allocate sovereignty to these
islands (see Section 5 below). While there might have been any number of ways
to do this, including an island-by-island determination of sovereignty, and then
recourse to the equidistance method to determine the maritime boundary, it is
possible that the parties, within the framework of political settlement and compromise
in which they were dealing, simply adopted a line of latitude as the simplest
way to attribute sovereignty and to create a maritime boundary.
A full extension of the maritime boundary as a line of latitude from the land
boundary terminus, however, would have had the effect of leaving the entrance of
the maritime passage way, known as the Pearly Gates, between Marrak and
Dawharab islands, under Yemen's control, as either Yemeni territorial sea or internal
waters. This is a strategic route for Saudi Arabia, leading to Farasan al Kabir, and
it is an important alternative route to Jizan. Thus, it may be speculated that the
southwesterly jog in the boundary line may have been created to leave the deepwater
passage north of Dawharab Island in Saudi hands, and that the return of the
boundary to a line of latitude in the central Red Sea was in recognition that the
departure from the line of latitude was for a specific purpose.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevation Considerations
The maritime boundary is not based upon the equidistance method; thus, the question
of appropriate equidistant base points did not arise in its creation. The maritime
boundary, as noted above, serves as a line of attribution between islands, reefs and
low-tide elevations previously disputed between the two countries. In its immediate
vicinity, the boundary leaves on the Yemeni side Duwaimah Island, the smaller
of the 'Ashiq Islands, Hashish Reef, Sayl Ruba, Murayn and Dawharab Island, all
of which lie immediately to the south of the maritime boundary. Immediately north
of the maritime boundary are the Saudi islands, including the larger' Ashiq Islands,
2802 Report Number 6-16
Sayl as Siya, Boddufer and Zurt Islands, Rumayn and Marrak.8 Further to the north
are the larger islands of the Farasan Island group. Because of the use in the first
segment of the boundary of a straight line of latitude that does not "go around"
islands, the boundary may in some places pass over low-tide elevations or even
over the low-water line of an island, leaving the island above the high-water line
on one side of the boundary and some portion of its low-water line on the other
side. This appears to be the case with Saudi Arabia's Rumayn Island, at least when
the boundary line is plotted on large-scale U.S. nautical charts. It is important,
however, not to reach a judgment on such questions without reference to a modem
survey of this area due to the potential lack of accuracy of the placement and
depiction of these features on available nautical charts. It may be noted, insofar
as the author is aware, that no recent maritime survey has been made of this maritime
boundary area. Guide-books for small vessels navigating in the area caution
against reliance on nautical charts.
6 Baseline Considerations
Saudi Arabia and Yemen's national laws both make provision for the establishment
of a straight baseline system, but neither country has established a specific system
of straight baselines. Baseline considerations appear to have had no effect on the
final maritime boundary. However, as noted in Section 4, it is possible that the
reason for the departure from a line of latitude in the second boundary segment
related to concerns about the legal regime that might be enclosed within a straight
baseline system.
7 Geological and Georrwrphological Considerations
For approximately the first half (about 45-nautical miles), this maritime boundary
extends from east to west through shallow shoal waters. In the second half, after
passing north of Dawharab Island, it reaches toward the equidistant line between
the opposite coasts of the Red Sea above the deep Red Sea Rift Zone. These geo-
8 The listed names are as they appear on U.S. Nautical Chart No. 62271, 5th. ed. "Jaza'ir Farasan and
Approaches to Jizan." Duwaimah Island is a coastal barrier island just south of the land boundary
terminus; it is usually unuamed on even large-scale charts; however, the low-tide line on the west
side of the island often appears on charts and is labeled Oreste Point or Oreste Shoal.
Saudi Arabia-Yemen 2803
logical and geomorphological factors, however, appeared to have played no role
in the placement of the maritime boundary.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
This maritime boundary is the ultimate negotiated boundary line. It does not use
the equidistance method. The boundary follows first a line of latitude, second a
southwesterly bearing line that leaves a key deep-water passage on the Saudi side
of the boundary line, and finally a line of latitude again. In these geographical
circumstances, the line of latitude does not approximate a perpendicular to the
general direction of the coast. Perhaps the best explanation for the use of this method
is that this maritime boundary functions also, by implication, to attribute sovereignty
over previously disputed islands, and it is part of an overall settlement of the Saudi
Arabia-Yemen boundary in the Jeddah Agreement in which the maritime sector
was a relatively small part. See Section 4 above.
9 Technical Considerations
The technical details of the maritime boundary line, other than the geographic
coordinates themselves, are not recorded in the Jeddah Agreement.
10 Other Considerations
The latitude of the western segment of the Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary is
approximately 34 nautical miles north of the northern end point of the line determined
by the Yemen-Eritrea arbitration tribunal (see (1999) Report No. 6-14).9
Thus, Yemen and Eritrea will need to extend their maritime boundary northward
to the latitude of the Saudi-Yemeni agreement. The Saudi-Yemeni boundary line
will end where the jurisdiction of Eritrea is reached. Exactly where this will occur
9 The northern end point of the Eritrea-Yemen boundary determined by the ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal
is at 15·43'10" north latitude; the western segment of the Saudi-Yerneni maritime boundary lies on
16·17'24" north latitude.
2804 Report Number 6-16
has not been determined. Whether Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Eritrea will establish
a tripoint by a three-way agreement is not known. to
ill CONCLUSIONS
This maritime boundary is one part of a comprehensive resolution of the long~
standing boundary differences between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The maritime
boundary in fact attributes islands (which were previously in dispute) to the two
States, and it follows a combination of methods to create a maritime boundary that
both sides believe opens the door for future cooperation on marine environment
and associated issues in the Red Sea.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A. Law of the Sea Conventions
Saudi Arabia: Party to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24
April 1996.
Yemen: Party to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21
July 1987.
B. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia claims a 12 n.m. territorial sea pursuant to Royal
Decree 33 of February 16, 1958; an exclusive fishing zone by
decree in 1974; and continental shelf jurisdiction, specifically
with reference to Red Sea continental shelf resources by Royal
Decree No. M-27 of September 7, 1968.
Yemen: Yemen claims a 12 n.m. territorial sea; a contiguous zone extending
to 24 n.m. from the baseline; and a 200 n.m. EEZ and
continental shelf in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 37
of 1991.
to At the latitude of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary in the center of the Red Sea, it appears that the divergence
of an equidistant line developed from opposite mainland coasts and from an equidistant line developed
from opposing offshore islands, is somewhere between two-to-four n.m. For a discussion of tripoint
agreements in State practice, see David Coison, The Legal Regime o/Maritime Boundary Agreements,
I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, at 41,621993.
Saudi Arabia-Yemen 2805
C. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Saudi Arabia: No change.
Yemen: No change.
V REFERENCES AND ADOmONAL READINGS
John Roberts, The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Treaty, 8 BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL.
70 (No.2, Summer 2000).
Prepared by David A. Colson
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Saudi Arabia-Yemen 2807
The Final and Permanent Border Treaty between the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Republic of Yemen
Translation
Annex Number (3)
The Maritime Boundary Line Between
The Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
1- The line begins from the land point at the sea shore "Rasif al-Bahr
Tamaman Ra's al-Mu'awwaj Shami li-Manfadh Radif Qarad" whose
coordinates are as follows:
(160 24' 14.8") North, (420 46' 19.7") East.
2- The line proceeds in a straight line parallel to the latitudes until it meets
with a point whose coordinates are (160 24' 14.8") North, (420 09' 00")
East.
3- The line bends in a southwesterly direction until the point whose
coordinates are as follows:
(160 17' 24") North, (41 0 47' 00") East.
4- From there [it proceeds]ll in a straight line parallel to the latitudes in the
direction of the west until the terminus of the maritime boundaries between
the two countries.
II The words between brackets do not appear in the original text and are added for clarification.
Mexico-United States
Report Number 1-5 (2)
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States on the DeUmitation of the
Continental Shelf In the Western Gulf of Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical
Miles
Signed: 9 June 2000
Entered into force: 17 January 2001
Published at: 44 LOS BULL. 71 (2001)
U.S. Senate Treaty Doc. 106-39, 106th Congo 2nd Sess.
(2000)
I SUMMARY
This is the third maritime boundary treaty Mexico and the United States have
concluded. The first treaty was signed in 1970 and delimited their maritime area
seaward to 12 nautical miles (n.m.) in the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific Ocean. The
second treaty was signed in 1978 and extended their maritime boundary from the
12-n.m. limit out to 200 n.m. in both bodies of water (see Report No. 1-5). The
second treaty followed an exchange of notes effecting agreement on the Provisional
Maritime Boundary signed on 24 November 1976.
The 1978 treaty created two "gaps" in the Gulf of Mexico which are beyond
200 n.m. from the respective coastal states' baselines. An "eastern gap" contains
the continental shelves of Mexico, United States, and Cuba, but this area was not
the subject of these negotiations. The "western gap", which this present treaty
addresses, contains the continental shelves of Mexico and the United States .. The
treaty discussed in this report only delimits the continental shelf and does not affect
the juridical status of the water column above it.
I.I. Charney and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 2621-2633.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
2622 Report Number 1-5 (2)
Unique for both countries are treaty provisions that address the possibility of
transboundary oil and gas reservoirs. The treaty creates a buffer zone, named the
"area", which is 1.4 n.m. wide on each side of the boundary. Within this "area"
the United States and Mexico agree to a lO-year moratorium on commercial oil
and gas exploitation. There was agreement that each side, in accordance with national
laws and regulations, would share geological and geophysical data in the "area."
Should transboundary reservoirs be identified, the parties have agreed to reach
agreements for the efficient and equitable exploitation of such reservoirs.
The 135-n.m. continental shelf boundary is an equidistant line taking into account
all territory, including islands.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
This treaty represents the continuation of cooperation between two historically
friendly neighbors. The negotiations of this agreement began in early 1998, only
a few months following the entry into force ofthe 1978 agreement (13 November
1997). The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its report supporting the
1978 treaty, urged the Clinton Administration to proceed with the negotiations on
this area when it stated: 1
Delimitation of the western gap has become increasingly important to U.S. interests
as petroleum exploration has moved into deeper waters. The Department of Interior
is now receiving bids for exploration in this area. Several new drilling vessels capable
of operating in water depths of up to 10,000 feet are under construction .... The Committee
urges the Executive Branch to commence negotiations on the western gap
without delay, once this [1978 treaty] enters into force.
The period of time between the date of signature, 9 June 2000, and when the treaty
entered into force, 17 January 2001, was remarkably short. The speed with which
the ratification process occurred in each capital was due, in large measure, to the
fact that the terms of the respective presidents were coming to an end. On the
Mexican side, the government completed its ratification process in late November,
just prior to the departure of President Zedillo. President Clinton left office on
January 20, 2001, three days following the exchange of instruments of ratification.
S. Exec Report 105-4, 1051h Cong., 1st Sess., at 5-6 (22 Oct. 1997).
Mexico-United States 2623
2 Legal Regime Considerations
This treaty pertains to separating jurisdiction over an area beyond 200 n.m. from
the respective baselines, in an area underlain by continental shelf. In the early rounds
of talks both sides presented evidence supporting the fact that the entire "western
gap" was continental shelf under international law, specifically Article 76 of the
LOS Convention. The juridical status of the waters above the boundary is unaffected.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
The future exploration and exploitation of oil and gas clearly was a motivating factor
for both sides to begin negotiations. Other than the provisions in the treaty associated
with the possible transboundary oil and gas reservoirs, economic and environmental
considerations did not playa direct role in determining the course of the boundary.
4 Geographic Considerations
The coasts of Mexico and the United States are opposite each other in the Gulf of
Mexico where this boundary was delimited. The parties viewed these negotiations
as a continuation of the 1978 talks. Thus, they agreed that the geography of the
coastlines that would determine the boundary line was in balance based on
equidistance. Since no special circumstances existed, the equidistant line was deemed
to be an equitable solution. As noted elsewhere in this report, some concern was
expressed about the accurate depiction of certain coastal areas. This concern was
disposed of by a bilateral technical group which conducted positioning surveys.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
In the 1978 maritime boundary treaty, the parties agreed to delimit the boundary
out to 200 n.m. based on an equidistant line measured from all points on the normal
baseline, including islands. It was agreed that the same methodology would apply
in determining the continental shelf boundary. Some of the same features that were
factors in the equidistant line calculation for the 1978 delimitation were used in
this delimitation as well. An issue concerning the location of accurate island and
rock positions was raised by the Mexican delegation. They raised concerns that some
2624 Report Number 1-5 (2)
of its offshore islands and rocks lacked modem surveys which may result in incorrect
calculations.
Both sides agreed to establish a technical working group that would use modem
survey techniques to verify key coastal areas on both coasts. During the summer
of 1998, a bilateral working group took three trips to coastal areas to conduct
positioning surveys using the global positioning system (GPS). On the U.S. side,
the teams visited Raccoon Island in the Isles Derniere chain, south of New Orleans,
and the area adjacent to the mouth of the Rio Grande. The Mexican coastal area
adjacent to the Rio Grande was also surveyed, as were the islands and adjacent rocks
and low-tide elevations of Arrecife Alacran, and Cayos Arenas, north of the Yucatan
Peninsula. Following these excursions, the data were processed and reviewed, and
agreement was reached by the technical experts of both sides. The results of this
positioning work did reveal some differences between "real" positions of some of
the islands and rocks and how they were charted. The equidistant boundary line
was calculated on the basis of these survey data. Nevertheless, neither side "gained"
any significant quantity of area as a result of these new data. A technical report
was submitted to the heads of delegation.
6 Baseline Considerations
The baseline from which each side measures its territorial sea was used to determine
the equidistant line. Neither side claims systems of straight baselines along the Gulf
of Mexico coasts. As noted in section 5, new surveys were needed to verify the
true positions of key baseline areas.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
A key motivation to reach agreement on this continental shelf boundary was the
belief that significant oil and gas reserves may exist in this deep water area in the
Gulf of Mexico. But little was known at the time of the negotiations of the specific
geology and geomorphology of the boundary area. Thus, while these considerations
did not influence the course of the boundary, the lack of certainty about where
potential oil reservoirs may exist resulted in unique provisions being written into
the treaty. Specifically, the Parties agreed to create a 1.4 n.m. buffer, labeled the
"area", on each side of the boundary. Knowledge of existing Gulf of Mexico reservoirs
influenced the decision to choose this breadth. It was felt that this breadth
reflected what possibly would be the largest reservoir. The goal was to create a
Mexico-United States 2625
buffer broad enough to keep any reservoir exploited outside the "area" from crossing
the boundary.
The Parties also agreed to a 10-year moratorium on leasing in their respective
1.4 n.m. bands. Articles IV and V of the treaty contain provisions that address the
possibility that oil and natural gas reservoirs may extend across the continental shelf
boundary (called "transboundary reservoirs"). A framework is created by which
the Parties can exchange information that is gathered in the "area".
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
Both sides viewed this delimitation as a continuation of the 1978 treaty. Consistent
with the approach used in the 1978 treaty, the United States agreed that it would
not claim or exercise for any purpose sovereign rights or jurisdiction over the seabed
and subsoil south of the new boundary line, while Mexico made a similar commitment
north of the boundary. In this regard, no method of delimitation other than
the one based on equidistance was ever tabled. Similar to the 1978 boundary, all
territory, including islands, was given full weight in determining the course of the
equidistant line. The equidistant line divided the "western gap" area such that the
United States renounced possible claims to about 4,100 square n.m., or 62% of the
area, and Mexico renounced possible claims to approximately 2,536 square n.m.,
or 38% of the area.
9 Technical Considerations
All the survey work and boundary calculations were performed with the understanding
that the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84) and the North American
Datum 1983 (NAD 83) were identical for the purposes of this agreement. The
boundary segments developed in the 1978 agreement had been established on the
North American Datum 1927 (NAD 27). The terminal points of the continental shelf
boundary are identical to the 200 n.m. points of the 1978 agreement, which define
the beginning/end points of the "western gap." To maintain geodetic consistency,
the 1978 boundary end points were transformed to WGS 84INAD 83 geographic
coordinates. The bilateral technical team reached agreement on this transformation
and made a recommendation to the respective heads of delegation. This transformation
is mentioned in the treaty.
2626 Report Number 1-5 (2)
10 Other Considerations
None.
ill CONCLUSIONS
The negotiations of this continental shelf boundary should be viewed as a continuation
of the overall Mexico-United States boundary process. Unique to these negotiations
was the fact that only continental shelf jurisdiction was at issue and the
water column was to remain high seas. Certain provisions of the treaty reflect the
fact that the area being delimited is situated in deep water where the resource
potential is subject to speculation. The continental shelf which underlies the "eastern
gap" involving Mexico, the United States, and Cuba remains to be delimited.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
Mexico: Acceded to all four 1958 Geneva Conventions in 1966 (did not
sign any in 1958); ratified 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
United States: Party to all four 1958 Geneva Conventions.
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Mexico: 12 n.m. territorial sea (1969),200 n.m. exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) (1976).
United States: 12 n.m. territorial sea (1988), 200 n.m. EEZ (1983).
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Mexico: No change.
United States: No change.
Mexico-United States 2627
V REFERENCES AND ADDmONAL READING
Treaty with Mexico on Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, U.S. Senate Treaty
Doc. 106-39, l06th Congo 2nd Sess. (2000).
Treaty with Mexico on Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, S. Ex. Rep. No. 106-
19, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2000).
Prepared by Robert W. Smith
_ ... - MEXICO-UNITED STATES (Gulf of Mexico)
Ioundwy Report 1-5 (2)
- COnhn.- "'*' ~
TerritoriaI_ and M8ritime boundary
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Mexico-United States 2629
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the
government of the United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf or Mexico beyond 200 Nautical
Miles
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Mexican States (hereinafter "the Parties").
Considering that the maritime boundaries between the Parties were determined on
the basis of equidistance for a distance between twelve and two hundred nautical
miles seaward from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean by the Treaty on Maritime
Boundaries between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,
signed on May 4, 1978 (the "1978 Treaty on Maritime Boundaries").
Recalling that the maritime boundaries between the Parties were determined on the
basis of equidistance for a distance of twelve nautical miles seaward from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured by the Treaty
to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and
Colorado River as the International Boundary between the United States of America
and the United Mexican States, signed on November 23, 1970.
Desiring to establish, in accordance with international law, the continental shelf
boundary between the United States of America and the United Mexican States in
the Western Gulf of Mexico beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,
Taking into account the possibility that there could exist petroleum or natural gas
reservoirs that extend across that continental shelf boundary, and the need for
cooperation and periodic consultation between the Parties in protecting their respective
interests in such circumstances; and
Considering that the practice of good neighborliness has strengthened the friendly
and cooperative relations between the Parties;
Have agreed as follows:
2630 Report Number 1-5 (2)
Article I
The continental shelf boundary between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States in the Western Gulf of Mexico beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be determined
by geodetic lines connecting the following coordinates:
1. 25° 42' 14.1" N. 91 ° 05' 25.0" W.
2. 25° 39' 43.1" N. 91° 20' 31.2" W.
3. 25° 36' 46.2" N. 91 ° 39' 29.4" W.
4. 25° 37' 01.2" N. 91° 44' 19.1" W.
5. 25° 37' 50.7" N. 92° 00' 35.5" W.
6. 25° 38' 13.4" N. 92° 07' 59.3" W.
7. 25° 39' 22.3" N. 92° 31' 40.4" W.
8. 25° 39' 23.8" N. 92° 32' 13.7" W.
9. 25° 40' 03.2" N. 92° 46' 44.8" W.
10. 25° 40' 27.3" N. 92° 55' 56.0" W.
11. 25° 42' 37.2" N. 92° 57' 16.0" W.
12. 25° 46' 33.9" N. 92° 59' 41.5" W.
13. 25° 48' 45.2" N. 93° 03' 58.9" W.
14. 25° 51' 51.0" N. 93° 10' 03.0" W.
15. 25° 54' 27.4" N. 93° 15' 09.9" W.
16. 25° 59' 49.3" N. 93° 26' 42.5" W.
Article II
1. The geodetic and computational bases used to determine the boundary set forth
in Article I are the 1983 North American Datum ("NAD83") and the International
Earth Rotation Service's Terrestrial Reference Frame ("ITRF92").
2. For purposes of Article I:
(a) NAD83 and ITRF92 shall be considered to be identical; and
(b) Boundary points numbers I and 16 are, respectively, boundary points GM.E-1
(25° 42' 13.05" N., 91° 05' 24.89" W.) and GM.W-4 (25° 59' 48.28" N., 93°
26' 42.19" W.) of the 1978 Treaty on Maritime Boundaries. These points,
which were originally determined with reference to the 1927 North American
Datum-NAD27, have been transformed to the NAD83 and ITRF92 datums.
Mexico-United States 2631
3. For the purpose of illustration only, the boundary line in Article I is drawn
on the map that appears as Annex 1 to this Treaty.
Article III
South of the continental shelf boundary set forth in Article I, the United States of
America shall not, and north of said boundary, the United Mexican States shall not,
claim or exercise for any purpose sovereign rights or jurisdiction over the seabed
and subsoil.
Article IV
1. Due to the possible existence of petroleum or natural gas reservoirs that may
extend across the boundary set forth in Article I (hereinafter referred to as
"transboundary reservoirs"), the Parties, during a period that will end ten (10)
years following the entry into force of this Treaty, shall not authorize or permit
petroleum or natural gas drilling or exploitation of the continental shelf within
one and four-tenths (1.4) nautical miles of the boundary set forth in Article
I. (This two and eight-tenths (2.8) nautical mile area hereinafter shall be
referred to as "the Area".)
2. For the purpose of illustration only, the Area set forth in paragraph 1 is drawn
on the map that appears as Annex 2 to this Treaty.
3. The Parties, by mutual agreement through an exchange of diplomatic notes,
may modify the period set forth in paragraph 1.
4. From the date of entry into force of this Treaty, with respect to the Area on
its side of the boundary set forth in Article I, each Party, in accordance with
its national laws and regulations, shall facilitate requests from the other Party
to authorize geological and geophysical studies to help determine the possible
presence and distribution of transboundary reservoirs.
5. From the date of entry into force of this Treaty, with respect to the Area in
its entirety, each Party, in accordance with its national laws and regulations,
shall share geological and geophysical information in its possession in order
to determine the possible existence and location of transboundary reservoirs.
2632 Report Number 1-5 (2)
6. From the date of entry into force of this Treaty, if a Party has knowledge of
the existence or possible existence of a transboundary reservoir, it shall notify
the other Party.
Article V
1. With respect to the Area in the entirety, during the period set forth in paragraph
1 of Article IV:
(a) as geological and geophysical information is generated that facilitates the
Parties' knowledge about the possible existence of transboundary reservoirs,
including notifications by Parties in accordance with paragraph 5
of Article IV, the Parties shall meet periodically for the purpose of identifying,
locating and determining the geological and geophysical characteristics
of such reservoirs;
(b) the Parties shall seek to reach agreement for the efficient and equitable
exploitation of such transboundary reservoirs; and
(a) the Parties shall, within sixty days of receipt of a written request by a Party
through diplomatic channels, consult to discuss matters related to possible
transboundary reservoirs.
2. With respect to the Area in its entirety, following the expiry of the period set
forth in paragraph 1 of Article IV:
(a) a Party shall inform the other Party of its decisions to lease, license, gmnt
concessions, or otherwise make available, portions of the Area for petroleum
or natural gas exploration or development and shall also inform the
other Party when petroleum or natural gas resources are to commence
production; and
(b) a Party shall ensure that entities it authorizes to undertake activities within
the Area shall observe the terms of the Treaty.
Mexico-United States 2633
Article VI
Upon written request by a Party through diplomatic channels, the Parties shall
consult to discuss any issue regarding the interpretation or implementation of this
Treaty.
Article VII
The continental shelf boundary established by this Treaty shall not affect or prejudice
in any manner the positions of either Party with respect to the extent of internal
waters, of the territorial sea, of the high seas or of sovereign rights or jurisdiction
for any other purpose.
Article VIII
Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be
resolved by negotiation or other peaceful means as may be agreed upon by the
Parties.
Article IX
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date
of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, having been duly authorized by their
respective Governments, have signed this Treaty.
DONE at Washington, D.C., this ninth day of June, 2000 in duplicate, in the English
and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR TIlE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Madeleine K. Albright
Secretary of State
FOR TIlE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED MEXICAN STATES:
Rosario Green
Secretary of Foreign Relations
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia
Report Number 7-12
Agreement between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Regarding the Submerged Zone Contiguous to the Partitioned Zone
Signed: 2 July 2000
Entered into force: 30 January 2001
Published at:} 473 KUWAIT AL-YAWM 1-3 (30 July 2000)
36 LOS BULL. 84 (2001)
I SUMMARY
The Agreement of 2 July 2000 between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State
of Kuwait resolves a number of long-standing issues concerning the limits of the
Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Offshore Neutral Zone. The land portion of the Neutral Zone,
referred to by the parties in the subject Agreement as "the Partitioned Zone," lies
on the western side of the Persian! Arabian Gulf nestled between Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia proper. The maritime area offshore from the Partitioned Zone, what the
parties refer to in the subject Agreement as the "submerged zone contiguous to the
Partitioned Zone," has long been a major area of petroleum production but, except
for its southern limits, the other limits of the Offshore Neutral Zone were not agreed.
Under prior arrangements between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the resources of
the Neutral Zone and the Offshore Neutral Zone are owned in common. Thus, in
The text of the Agreement was published in various Arabic language newspapers at the time of
signature. An English translation was published in 73 MIDDLE EAST EcONOMIC SURVEY, at All-12
(No. 29, 17 July 2000). The English translation published with this report is an informal translation
received from the United Nations. It will be noted that this report and its accompanying map may
use different terminology than may be found in this translation. In the author's opinion, the terminology
used in the report and on the map more closely correspond to terminology that has been part of the
historical debate associated with this matter.
I.!. Charney and R. W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 2825-2840.
© 2002, The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
2826 Report Number 7-12
the abstract in relation to delimitation considerations, there was a natural interest
for each country to maximize the offshore area under its exclusive jurisdiction,
Kuwait to the north and Saudi Arabia in the south, at the expense of the area
pertaining to the Offshore Neutral Zone in the middle. Likewise, there was a natural
interest for each country to maximize Offshore Neutral Zone interests as against
the area exclusively belonging to the other country.
In 1963, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reached an understanding concerning the
southern limit of the Offshore Neutral Zone, dividing it from the offshore area
exclusively belonging to Saudi Arabia. Until the 2 July 2000 Agreement, however,
there was no agreement on the northern limit of the Offshore Neutral Zone, dividing
it from the offshore area exclusively belonging to Kuwait. Furthermore, there was
no agreement as to the status of two islands-Qaru and Umm al Maradim-which
lie within the Offshore Neutral Zone, nor was there agreement on what effect those
islands should have on any internal division (or partition) of the Offshore Neutral
Zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
The 2 July 2000 Agreement resolves these issues and opens the way (1) for
negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, on the one hand, and Iran, on the
other hand, to establish the maritime boundary between the Offshore Neutral Zone
and Iran's maritime jurisdiction and (2) for negotiations between Kuwait and Iran
on their maritime boundary.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zone was established by the two countries in
1922 in the Uqair Agreement.2 This agreement established the land boundary
between the two countries and carved out an area in which they would "share equal
rights." The Uqair Agreement does not use the phrase "Neutral Zone" to denominate
this area of "equal rights," but it became known as such over the years.
Over time, the land portion of the Neutral Zone was precisely delimited in
keeping with the general description in the Uqair Agreement. Furthermore, the parties
determined to partition the land portion of the Neutral Zone for purposes of administrative
ease, without prejudice to the over-arching principle of common ownership
2 The Kuwait-Nejd Boundary Convention was signed on 2 December 1922. See Records a/Saudi Arabia:
1918-1926, at 489-90 (Penelope Tuson and Anita Burdett eds., 1992); 10 ARABIAN BOUNDARY
DISPUTES 37 (Richard Schofield ed., 1992).
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 2827
of the resources of the Neutral Zone. The resolution of the boundary issues in the
land portion of the Neutral Zone was accomplished in a series of agreements in
the 1960s.3
As exploitation of the petroleum resources in offshore areas became feasible
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the common-ownership-of-resources principle
of the Uqair Agreement was assumed and applied to the area "offshore" from the
Neutral Zone by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by the oil companies concerned and by
the British and United States governments who were actively involved in promoting
various interests in the region. However, questions surfaced from an early date, (1)
as to the southern boundary of the Offshore Neutral Zone with Saudi Arabia; (2)
as to the northern boundary of the Offshore Neutral Zone with Kuwait; (3) as to
the eastern boundary of the Offshore Neutral Zone with Iran; (4) as to the status
of Qaru and Umm al Maradim islands-whether they were part of the Neutral Zone
as claimed by Saudi Arabia, or were they exclusively under Kuwaiti sovereignty
as claimed by Kuwait and (5) following the partition of the land portion of the
Neutral Zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the 1960s, whether and how
to partition the Offshore Neutral Zone.
The ftrst of these questions to be resolved was the southern limit question. It
was dealt with in 1963 prior to the completion of the Saudi Arabia-Iran continental
shelf agreement in 1968. (See 1968, Report Number 7-7.4) Resolution of the southern
limit was motivated by the discovery of the large Safaniya oil fteld offshore
from Saudi Arabia and the need to deftne the northern limit to which Aramco would
work (on the Saudi continental shelf) and the southern limit of the Offshore Neutral
Zone where the Arabian Oil Company consortium would work.s The other issues,
however, remained open and unresolved even through the period of the Gulf War
when Iraq occupied large portions of the land area of the Neutral Zone including
3 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement for the partition of the Neutral Zone on 7 July 1965,
which entered into force on 25 July 1966. A Supplemental Agreement Approving the Demarcation
of the Median Line of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone was signed 18 December 1969; the Supplemental
Agreement entered into force in early 1970. It maybe found in 13 MIDDLE EAST ecONOMIC SURVEY
1 (No. 32,5 June 1970).
4 The curious line segment between Point 13 and Point 14 in the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement is explained
as corresponding to the southern limit of the Offshore Neutral Zone. See map accompanying Report
Number 7-7.
S The southern limit is generally regarded as being marked by coordinates set forth in a Saudi ArabiaARAMCO
agreement of 24 March 1963 pertaining to relinquishment of certain ARAMCO obligatious.
See 2 ARABIAN BOUNDARIES 19-26 (1963).
2828 Report Number 7-12
the islands of Qaru and Umm al Maradim,6 and even though the unresolved limits
hindered oil and gas exploration and exploitation around the islands and near the
contested limits.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The
Council has made it a priority for member States to settle the boundary differences
between themselves. This imperative, together with the momentum gained from
the resolution of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary in the Jeddah Agreement of 12 June
2000 (see Report No. 6-16), and the exploratory drilling conducted under Iran's
authorization in the Dorra Field earlier in the year 2000,' all, presumably, stimulated
both countries and contributed to the political environment in which Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait could take the decisions necessary to bring about a final negotiated
settlement.
The essence of the settlement embodied in the 2 July 2000 Agreement is that
Saudi Arabia deferred to Kuwait's position concerning the status of the islands of
Qaru and Umm al Maradim and the position of the northern limit, but Kuwait agreed
that these Saudi concessions were without cost to Saudi Arabia's economic interests.
Thus, Kuwait agreed that the principle of common resource ownership would
nonetheless still apply to Qaru and Umm al Maradim and to a northern area defined,
basically, by two lines reflecting the past positions of both countries concerning
the placement of the northern limit.
6 Saudi Arabia found itself in a legal bind during the Gulf War. Traditional definitions of Kuwait arise
out of the 1913 Ottoman-British Convention which lists certain islands, including Qaru and Umm
al Maradim, as appertaining to Kuwait. That Convention never entered into force and, in all events,
predates the 1922 Uqair Agreement. The Uqair Agreement did not conform to the Ottoman-British
Convention insofar as the southern boundary of Kuwait was concerned. Subsequently, however, in
the diplomatic history between Iraq and Kuwait, in which Saudi Arabia did not participate, the old
Ottoman-British definition of Kuwait was used over and over. Thus, SlRes/687 (1991) of the U.N.
Security Council, ending the Gulf War, referred to Kuwait and the inviolability of its borders in terms
which trace back to this old definition. Since the essence of SIResl687 was to put an end to Iraq's
challenge to the validity of that old definition, Saudi Arabia, it may be assumed, quite naturally in
the circumstances did not wish to raise its own objections to that old definition to protect its legal
argument regarding Qaru and Umm al Maradim.
7 Kuwait Protests Iranian DriUing in Disputed Dorra Offshore Gas Field, 43 MIDDLE EAST EcONOMIC
SURVEY, at A4-A6 (No. 19,8 May 2(00); Saudi Arabia Protests to Iran Over DriUing in Disputed
Waters, 43 MIDDLE EAsT EcONOMIC SURVEY at A3-4 (No. 20, 15 May 2000); Dorra Tension Eases,
but Iranian, Saud~ and Kuwaiti Claims in North GulfRemLlin Unresolved, 43 MIDDLE EAST EcONOMIC
SURVEY, at AlO-ll (No. 21, 22 May 2(00).
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 2829
2 Legal Regime Considerations
While both countries are party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait relationship in the Neutral Zone and in its
offshore area is unique. The 2 July 2000 Agreement resolved a number of the open
questions in favor of Kuwait, but did so in a way so as not to affect Saudi Arabia's
basic economic interest in the outcome. Article 1 of the Agreement establishes the
line which partitions the Offshore Neutral Zone into two sections. Article 2 establishes
a northern boundary which, in effect, reflects past Saudi positions as to the
location of the northern limit. Article 3 then adjusts the northern boundary to have
it conform with past Kuwaiti positions. These three Articles make clear that they
are subject to the Annex to the Agreement. This Annex reaffIrms that the natural
resources of the Offshore Neutral Zone are to be "jointly shared," including on the
islands of Qaru and Umm al Maradim, and in the area between the lines established
by Articles 2 and 3. In general, the lines established by the 2 July 2000 Agreement
are based on the equidistance method, but in some cases they are simplifIed equidistant
lines and in other cases are equidistant lines developed from only selected
basepoint features.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
The 2 July 2000 Agreement opens the way for substantial economic investment
and environmental cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the Offshore
Neutral Zone, an area that is a prime petroleum-producing area, and, more particularly,
opens opportunities to develop the gas reserves in the area.8 Certainly, economic
considerations were motivating factors toward fInalizing this Agreement; however,
it cannot be said that any specifIc economic factor influenced the placement of one
of the delimitation lines.
4 Geographic Considerations
In general, the Neutral Zone coast, the adjoining Saudi coast to the south and the
Kuwaiti coast to the north are characterized by shallow, scalloped-shaped coastal
indentations or concavities. The headlands along this coast are positioned such that
they are the controlling basepoint features for any lateral delimitations based on
See 43 MIDDLE EAST EcONOMIC SURVEY, at A-I0 (No. 29, 17 July 2000).
2830 Repon Number 7-12
the equidistance method, apart from island and low-tide elevation considerations.
From south to north, Ras al Mishab and Ras Khafji are placed to influence the
location of the southern limit; Ras Bard Halq and Ras az Zawr influence the partition
dividing line and Ras az Zawr and Ras al Qubayah influence the northern limit.
Furthermore, in the vicinity of these headlands, the low-water line along the
mainland has changed in configuration over the years, at least as represented on
nautical charts. The author understands that, generally, the parties have used the
low-water line of the mainland in their boundary practice, but not low-tide elevations.
Also, generally, the parties have not used small offshore islands. Thus, although
the small Kuwaiti island of Kubbar, located outside the Offshore Neutral Zone, is
located in a position to affect any equidistant line used for the northern limit and
even though Qaru and Urnm al Maradim could affect an equidistant line used for
the partition dividing line, the parties chose to disregard such small islands as
equidistance basepoints.
The same, however, cannot be said for Kuwait's Failaka island, which Kuwait
argued should be used as an equidistance basepoint while Saudi Arabia argued it
should not. This debate was resolved as discussed in Section 2 above. Specifically,
the northern limit was established as desired by Kuwait-using Failaka as a basepoint
(see Article 3)-but by virtue of Article 2 and the Annex to the Agreement, Saudi
Arabia shares equally the resources in the more northerly area with a northern limit
created by not using Failaka as a basepoint.
The final geographical feature of importance is Iran's Kharg Island. While Kharg
Island obviously has no effect on any lateral delimitation pertaining to Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait regarding the Neutral Zone, it is safe to assume that Iran would argue
that Kharg Island should have at least as much effect on a delimitation between
Iran and the Offshore Neutral Zone, or Iran and Kuwait, as has been given to Failaka
in Kuwait's practice with Saudi Arabia.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
It is notable that the 2 July 2000 Agreement resolves the issue of sovereignty over
the islands of Qaru and Urnm al Maradim in favor of Kuwait. The 2 July 2000
Agreement does not, however, suggest that these islands receive a belt of waters
which also falls under Kuwait's jurisdiction. The parties do not address this issue,
possibly because it is largely irrelevant in the circumstances. These circumstances
include the fact that for resource purposes there is no distinction between these
islands, their surrounding waters (whatever they may be), and other waters of the
Offshore Neutral Zone because of the clear indication of the Annex that all these
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 2831
areas are to be treated the same for economic purposes. The other circumstance
is that the line which partitions the offshore into Saudi and Kuwaiti sections places
both of these islands on the Kuwaiti side of the line, and it is this line which matters
as between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for administrative purposes, not whether there
is a belt of waters to be associated with each island independently of the partition
dividing line. Just how this result is intended to relate to the rights of the international
community to navigate within these waters pursuant to basic law of the
sea principles is not clear.
The question of Failaka's effect on the delimitation of the northern limit has
long been a major stumbling block to agreement. The problem, however, is not
complicated. Assuming the use of the equidistance method, if Failaka is not used
as a basepoint, the Offshore Neutral Zone's northern limit is placed north of where
it would be if Failaka is used as a basepoint. The former is to Saudi Arabia's
advantage and the latter favors Kuwait. In such circumstances, a possible negotiation
compromise would have been to create a half-effect equidistant line. The parties
chose not to do so, however. Instead, they created the arrangement discussed in
section 2 above. The area between the line not using Failaka (Article 2), and the
line using Failaka (Article 3), is to be regarded as outside the Offshore Neutral Zone
but, for resource-sharing arrangements, it is included as part of those arrangements.
The reason for the unique resolution of the northern limit issue may have been
because the two parties wished not to prejudge in this Agreement the effect Failaka
should have in any delimitation with Iran. Using Failaka as a basepoint will obviously
assist Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in negotiations with Iran, but one can only assume
that Iran will seek to ensure that Failaka is given no more weight than Kharg Island
receives in the forthcoming delimitations involving Iran.
Along the mainland coast, the changing characteristics of the mainland low-water
line as depicted on charts of various nations based on different surveys at different
times, and on different scales, have often led to different assessments of some of
the boundary questions associated with the Saudi-Kuwaiti limits relating to the
Offshore Neutral Zone. The parties have always disregarded small, near-shore islands
and low-tide elevations in their delimitation practice.
6 Baseline Considerations
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in their bilateral relationship, have adopted the practice
that lateral equidistant lines should be determined from the low-water line along
the mainland coast. In effect, the line described in Article 1 of the 2 July 2000
Agreement. which is the partitioning line of the Offshore Neutral Zone, is such a
2832 Report Number 7-12
line; Article 2 makes clear that the equidistant line it establishes is to be detennined
from the low-water line along the mainland coast. It is the author's understanding
that this is the same method used to detennine the northern limit of the Saudi
Aramco concession which marks the southern limit of the Offshore Neutral Zone,
although the calculation of the equidistant line, at the time that was done in 1963,
was constructed on charts of the era; that line was also simplified.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Consideration
The Saudi-Kuwaiti Offshore Neutral Zone lies in the shallow waters of the northwestern
Gulf. No specific geological or geomorphological considerations were taken
into account in the placement of the delimitation lines. However, Iran's drilling in
the Dorra field undoubtedly reminded the parties of the potential of that area and
of their interest in ensuring that all or part of that area appertains to the Offshore
Neutral Zone or to Kuwait and not to Iran.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
a. The Southern Limit
Article 4 of the 2 July 2000 Agreement states that the southern limit of the Offshore
Neutral Zone "is the line currently in effect.,,9 This line is a rough approximation
of a simplified equidistant line developed from the mainland low-water line and
not using low-tide elevations or islands as basepoints, and developed using manual
techniques on charts of the 1950s and early 1960s.
b. The Partitioning Line
Article 1 of the 2 July 2000 Agreement divides or partitions the Offshore Neutral
Zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This line starts at point G on the coast,
established in the 1969 Supplemental Agreement partitioning the Neutral Zone, and
then extends eastward in four segments. In general, this is an equidistant line
developed from the low-water line using only mainland basepoints. The line is
diverted around Umm al Maradim Island, leaving it and Qaru Island on the Kuwaiti
side. From the eastward-most point listed in Article 1, "the line dividing the offshore
9 This euphemism is often used by the parties to refer to the southem limit, in reference to lines found
in various agreements with oil companies dating from the 1960s and 1970s.
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 2833
area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone extends to the end of this line in an easterly
direction."
c. The Northern Limit
Article 2 of the 2 July 2000 Agreement establishes the northern limit, which is then
modified by Article 3. The line established by Article 2 is an equidistant line
developed from the "low-water line on the shore without the islands or shoals having
effect." This line is consistent with past statements of the Saudi position and is
consistent with the method of delimitation used for the southern limit and the
partition dividing line of the Offshore Neutral Zone.
Article 3 of the 2 July 2000 Agreement adjusts the northern boundary by
applying the equidistance method but giving Kuwait's Failaka Island full effect.
This line is consistent with past statements of the Kuwaiti position. The Annex to
the Agreement makes clear that the area between the lines described by Articles
2 and 3 is subject to the principle of common resource ownership.
9 Technical Considerations
The 2 July 2000 Agreement does not record specific technical information. However,
Article 6 refers to a completed modem marine survey; the author is aware that this
was done at the request of the parties and that it has been completed. Article 6
indicates that the company which conducted this survey will calculate the two
northern limits referred to by Articles 2 and 3 and produce maps which, when
signed, will be an integral part of the Agreement. Presumably these maps will
establish, or be based upon, relevant technical criteria.
10 Other Considerations
The southern limit of the Offshore Neutral Zone ties in to the northern end of the
Saudi Arabia-Iran continental shelf boundary leaving no loose ends in that direction.
Northward, however, the boundary between the opposing coasts of the Saudi-Kuwaiti
Neutral Zone and Iran must be established, and north from there will be a delimitation
between the opposing Kuwaiti and Iranian coasts. Article 7 of the 2 July 2000
Agreement provides: "The State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will
become one negotiating party at the time of the demarcation of the eastern boundary"
of the Offshore Neutral Zone.
2834 Report Number 7-12
The 2 July 2000 Agreement also notes that the two countries will agree on
procedures and arrangements relating to recreational fishing in the Offshore Neutral
Zone. For some time the necessary arrangements for dealing with oil exploration
and exploitation in the Offshore Neutral Zone have been in place, worked out
between the authorities in the two countries and the oil companies concerned.
m CONCLUSIONS
The 2 July 2000 Saudi-Kuwaiti Agreement brought to an end the dispute between
these countries as to the limits, particularly the northern limit, of the Offshore
Neutral Zone. Now the parties must tum to negotiations with Iran to determine the
seaward limit of the Offshore Neutral Zone. Also to be addressed is the bilateral
negotiation between Kuwait and Iran. The practice in the region is to use the
equidistance delimitation method, but giving varying effect to offshore features.
The area delimited, and that area which remains to be delimited at the northern end
of the Gulf, are rich in petroleum resources. It is also an area where Iraq has made
its presence felt in the past. Iraq has protested the 2 July 2000 Saudi-Kuwaiti
Agreement. 10
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A. Law of the Sea Conventions
Kuwait: Party to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
2 May 1986.
Saudi Arabia: Party to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
24 April 1996.
B. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Both states claim a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and fisheries and continental shelf
jurisdiction.
10 WASH. TIMES, 19 July 2000, at A-14.
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 2835
C. Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Kuwait: No change.
Saudi Arabia: No change.
V REFERENCES AND ADDmONAL READINGS
EDWARD H. BROWN, THE SAUDI ARABIA-KUWAIT NEUTRAL ZONE (1963).
Prepared by David A. Colson

Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 2837
1. Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of
Kuwait Concerning the Submerged Area Adjacent to the Divided Zonel
In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait
concerning the submerged area adjacent to the divided zone.
Strengthening and reinforcing the ties of faith and brotherhood between the
fraternal peoples of the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
Mfirming the unshakeable and deeply rooted relationship and bonds of love
and affection between the two fraternal countries;
In view of the desire of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd
Bin Abdul-Aziz AI Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, and his brother His Highness Sheikh
Jaber AI-Ahmad AI-Jaber AI-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait, to determine the
line dividing the submerged area adjacent to the divided zone in a manner that will
serve the interests of the two fraternal countries and respect their regional rights,
and pursuant to the Agreement on the partition of the neutral zone between the two
countries signed on 9 Rabi' I A.H. 1385 (7 July A.D. 1965) (hereinafter referred
to as the divided zone) and the Agreement concerning the designation of the median
line of that neutral zone between the two countries signed on 9 Shawwal A.H. 1389
(18 December A.D. 1969),
The two fraternal countries have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. The line dividing the submerged area adjacent to the divided zone, which
represents the border between the two countries, begins on the coast at point G at
geographical coordinates 28° 32' 02.488" north and 48° 25' 59.019" east and passes
through four points with the following geographical coordinates:
Point Latitude north Longitude east
1 28° 38' 20" 48° 35' 22"
2 28° 39' 56" 48° 39' 50"
3 28° 41' 49" 48° 41' 18"
4 28° 56' 06" 49° 26' 42"
Translated from Arabic. Original text communicated by the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to
the United Nations on 27 October 2000. Registered: 29 March 2001, No. 37359.
2838 Report Number 7-12
From Point 4, the line dividing the submerged area adjacent to the divided zone
continues in an easterly direction.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article do not prejudice the provisions
of Annex 1 to this Agreement.
Article 2
The northernmost limit of the submerged area adjacent to the divided zone, beginning
on the coast at point No.1, at geographical coordinates 28° 49" 58.7" north
and 48° 17' 00.188" east, shall be determined on the basis of the principle of equal
distance from the low-water mark. With due regard for the provisions of article 8
of the Agreement on the partition of the neutral zone, the islands, shoals and reefs
shall have no effect on this limit.
Article 3
The northernmost limit fixed in accordance with article 2 of this Agreement shall
be amended by taking fully into account the Faylakah group of islands, while not
prejudicing the provisions of Annex 1 to this Agreement.
Article 4
The southernmost limit of the submerged area adjacent to the divided zone shall
be the line between the two countries currently in use, which starts at point No.
5 on the coast, at geographical coordinates 28° 14' 05.556" north and 48° 36' 06.916"
east.
Article 5
The agreement between the two Contracting States concerning ownership of the
natural resources in the submerged area adjacent to the divided zone is contained
in Annex 1 of this Agreement, of which it is an integral part.
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 2839
Article 6
The company commissioned by the two countries to survey and prepare maps of
the submerged area adjacent to the divided zone shall determine the coordinates
of the northernmost limit in accordance with articles 2 and 3 of this Agreement
and prepare the maps in their final form. Those maps shall be signed by the representatives
of both countries and considered an integral part of this Agreement.
Article 7
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait shall be considered as a
single negotiating party with regard to the designation of the eastern limit of the
submerged area adjacent to the divided zone.
Article 8
The competent authorities in each country shall agree upon the measures and
arrangements concerning recreational fishing in the submerged area adjacent to the
divided zone.
Article 9
The provisions of this Agreement do not prejudice the provisions of the Agreement
on the partition of the neutral zone between the two countries signed on 9 Rabi'
1 A.H. 1385 (7 July A.D. 1965) or of the Agreement concerning the designation
of the mid-point of that neutral zone between the two countries signed on 9 Shawwal
A.H. 1389 (18 December A.D. 1969).
Article 10
This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by both countries and shall enter
into force from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.
DONE in the city of Kuwait in two original copies on the thirty-first day of
the month of Rabi'l in year A.H. 1421 (2 July A.D 2000).
2840 Report Number 7-12
On behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Saud AI-Faisal
Minister for Foreign Affairs
On behalf of the State of Kuwait
Sabah AI-Ahmad AI-Jaber AI-Sabah
First Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Annex 1
Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait
Concerning the Submerged Area Adjacent to the Divided Zone
The two countries have agreed that the natural resources in the submerged area
adjacent to the divided zone shall be owned in common. Those resources shall
include the islands of Qaruh and Umm al-Maradim and the area lying between the
northernmost limit referred to in article 2 of the Agreement and the northernmost
limit as amended in accordance with article 3 of the Agreement.
On behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Saud AI-Faisal
Minister for Foreign Affairs
On behalf of the State of Kuwait
Sabah AI-Ahmad AI-Jaber AI-Sabah
First Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan
Report Number 11-3
Seabed Boundary Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan
and the Republic of Kazakhstan and Protocol
Signed: Seabed Boundary Agreement: 29 November 2001
Protocol: 27 February 2003
Entered into force: Kazakhstan approval of Agreement and Protocol
2 July 2003; Azerbaijan approval of Agreement and
Protocol 9 December 2003
Published at:
I SUMMARY
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are states with opposite coastlines in the northcentral
portion of the Caspian Sea. They have reached agreement on a
seabed boundary, based on a median line, extending approximately 79 n.m.
The boundary runs in a northwest to southeast direction from the tri-junction
point with Russia, in the north, to the tri-junction point with Turkmenistan,
in the south. The agreement does not pertain to the water column. A
Protocol sets forth the geographic turning points defining the boundary.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations
This agreement was signed in 2001 ten years after the 1991 break up of
the Soviet Union. Prior to that time, the Caspian Sea was bordered by only
the Soviet Union and Iran and the area covered by this boundary agreement
was totally under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union. While the
D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 4042-4054.
© 2005. The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan 4043
Soviet Union created de facto administrative lines between its republics, it
is not believed such administrative lines in the northern Caspian Sea influenced
the location of the Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan seabed boundary.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
Prior to the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea essentially
was a Soviet-Iranian “lake”. Because the Caspian Sea has no direct
access to any open ocean, it was not given consideration by the international
community during the negotiations at the Third United Nations Law
of the Sea Conference in the 1970s and early 1980s, which led to the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention. Following 1991, with the number of Caspian
Sea littoral states at five, the need to resolve the legal status of this body
of water and to determine boundaries was apparent.
Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have been major proponents of the
view that international law of the sea principles should apply to the
Caspian Sea and that the entire sea should be divided into national sectors.
Both legal positions towards the Caspian Sea have been driven largely by
the belief that the resource richness of the north central Caspian Sea, particularly
the oil and gas reserves, are to be found in their respective sectors.
However, it is apparent by this agreement that delimits only the
seabed that both Parties recognize that all five Caspian states must reach a
consensus on the legal status of the water column. One of the introductory
paragraphs in the agreement calls upon all the Caspian states “to quickly
sign the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, based on their
unanimous consent.”
The agreement takes into consideration that a future event or events
could cause the Parties to modify the agreement. Article 6 states that the
agreement “may be amended or modified through separate protocols that
shall be an integral part of this Agreement.” This suggests that even the
course of the boundary could be modified.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
It is unlikely that any specific economic or environmental consideration
affected the course of this seabed boundary. However, the Parties recognize
the possibility that there could be transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs
4044 Report Number 11-3
and they have made a general provision in the agreement on how to deal
with that occurrence. Article 3 states that “issues of exploring and developing
promising structures and deposits through which the median line
passes will be subject of additional agreements between the Parties.”
4 Geographical Considerations
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are opposite states on the Caspian Sea. The
starting point of the seabed boundary in the north is the tri-junction point
with Russia; the boundary terminates in the south at the tri-junction point
with Turkmenistan. The Kazak coastline east of the boundary is indented
while the Azeri coastline has a smooth northwest-southeast general direction.
Nonetheless, there is a geographic balance to the relationship between
both coastlines which results in a median line that does not veer much
from the center of the Caspian Sea. The boundary consists of 25 turning
or terminal points that extends for 79 n.m.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
There are no rocks, reefs or low-tide elevations in this area that influence
the course of the seabed boundary. Article 1 of the agreement provides that
the boundary is a median line “drawn equidistant from initial reference
points on the shoreline and islands.” Annex 2 of the Protocol gives a listing
of the contributing coastal points for each state; six on the Kazakh
side, nine along the Azeri coast. If any of these points are on islands they
are very near to the mainland coasts.
6 Baseline Considerations
There are no baseline considerations affecting the course of the seabed
boundary. Neither state claims straight baselines. There is a geographic balance
between the opposite coastlines which makes the equidistance method
an appropriate delimitation method.
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan 4045
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
There were no specific geological or geomorphological considerations referenced
by the Parties in this delimitation.
8 Delimitation Considerations
The seabed boundary is a median line. The geographic coordinates for the
basepoints affecting the course of the median line are given in annex 2 to
the Protocol.
9 Technical Considerations
Article 1 defines the starting point of the boundary as being determined
“based on the sea-level datum for the Caspian Sea equal to a level of
minus 28 meters on the Baltic System of Elevations.” It is interesting to
note that in the Kazakhstan-Russia seabed boundary agreement reference
is also made to the Baltic System, but at minus 27 meters, and reference
is made in that agreement to the “Kronstadt tide gauge” (Report Number
11-1).
Kronstadt tide gauge is one of the longest operational tidal sites in the
world, dating to 1777. The station is located within the limits of St.
Petersburg, Russia, on Ostrov Kotlin at approximately 59° 59' N, 29° 46' E.
The station was selected as the origin, or zero point, of the Russian
National System of Heights (also referred to as the Baltic Height System)
by the USSR Council of Ministers in 1946.
Heights in the Baltic System historically have been transferred by the
surveying methodology of geodetic leveling and are physically realized by
permanent survey monuments often called bench marks. The description of
the level of the Caspian Sea described in this agreement would therefore
be –28 meters below the zero (0) point of the Kronstadt tide gauge.
The actual determination of these heights could be problematic for several
reasons. The first is that the agreement does not define the epoch
of Mean Sea Level (MSL) at Kronstadt. MSL is typically computed on a
19-year cycle and is defined by those dates. For example, the current U.S.
National Tidal Epoch is 1983-2001. No such epoch is provided for in the
text of the agreement nor in the Protocol. In addition, the ability to determine
accurately the level in the field will be limited by the number and
4046 Report Number 11-3
quality of existing survey bench marks. Unfortunately, these marks are all
too often disturbed or destroyed over time.
An additional problem for positioning of the boundary turning points in
this agreement is the omission in both the agreement and the Protocol of
a geodetic datum.
10 Other Considerations
Article 4 provides that any differences in the interpretation and application
of the provisions in the agreement “shall be resolved through negotiation
and other peaceful means chosen by the Parties.”
III CONCLUSIONS
This seabed delimitation is a median line. The coordinates of turning
points and basepoints are given in the annexes to the Protocol. Unfortunately,
no geodetic datum is given in the agreement which possibly could
lead to misinterpretation as users, such as oil companies, apply the boundary.
It is not clear the exact date this agreement and protocol entered into
force as Article 7 states that the agreement will enter into force “after the
date of final written notification of its ratification” by the Parties. Given
that ratification procedures were completed by Kazakhstan on 2 July 2003
and by Azerbaijan on 9 December 2003, it is assumed that entry into force
occurred on or about this latter date.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
Azerbaijan: Not a party to any of the four 1958 Conventions nor to the
1982 LOS Convention.
Kazakhstan: Not a party to any of the four 1958 Conventions nor to the
1982 LOS Convention.
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Azerbaijan: No maritime claims for the Caspian Sea
Kazakhstan: No maritime claims for the Caspian Sea
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan 4047
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Azarbaijan: No change
Kazakhstan: No change
Prepared by: Robert W. Smith and J. Ashley Roach
4048 Report Number 11-3
Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijani
Republic on Delimitation of the Caspian Seabed between the
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijani Republic
(Moscow, November 29, 2001)
Ratified by the Republic of Kazakhstan in accordance with RK Law No.
457-11 of July 2, 2003.
See the Protocol to the Agreement
The Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijani Republic, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties,
Seeking to ensure a favorable environment for exercising their sovereign
rights on the Caspian Sea, and in the spirit of mutual understanding
and cooperation, to settle issues associated with the effective use of seabed
and sub-seabed mineral resources of the Caspian Sea;
Taking into account that the current legal regime of the Caspian Sea
does not meet current requirements and does not fully regulate the relationships
of the Caspian Sea littoral states;
Calling upon the Caspian Sea littoral states to quickly sign the Convention
on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, based on their unanimous
consent;
Guided by the principles and standards of international law, the interests
of the Parties when developing and exploiting the seabed and subseabed
mineral resources of the Caspian Sea, and existing practice on the
Caspian Sea;
Proceeding from the fact that delimitation of the Caspian seabed by this
Agreement does not apply to biological resources and the use of the
Caspian Sea for navigation;
Taking into account bilateral agreements that have been reached on the
legal status of the Caspian Sea,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The seabed and sub-seabed of the Caspian Sea shall be delimited between
the Parties along a median line drawn equidistant from initial reference
points on the shoreline and islands. The coordinates of the initial reference
points shall be determined based on sea-level datum for the Caspian Sea
equal to a level of minus 28 meters on the Baltic System of Elevations.
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan 4049
Article 2
A geographical description of the median line and its coordinates will be
identified based upon cartographic materials and initial reference points agreed
upon by the Parties and documented in a separate Protocol, which will
become an attachment to this Agreement and an integral part of it.
Article 3
Within their seabed sectors the Parties shall exercise their sovereign rights
to explore, develop and manage seabed and sub-seabed resources of the
Caspian Sea, to lay underwater cables and pipelines along the Caspian
seabed, to create artificial islands, berms, dams, piers, platforms and other
engineering structures, and to perform other lawful economic activity on
the seabed.
Issues of exploring and developing promising structures and deposits
through which the median line passes will be the subject of additional
agreements between the Parties.
Article 4
Differences in the interpretation and application of the provisions of this
Agreement shall be resolved through negotiation and other peaceful means
chosen by the Parties.
Article 5
This Agreement shall not prevent the Caspian Sea littoral states from
reaching unanimous consent on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and
may be viewed by the Parties as part of their overall agreements.
Article 6
By mutual consent of the Parties this Agreement may be amended or
modified through separate protocols that shall be an integral part of this
Agreement.
Article 7
This Agreement shall enter into force after the date of final written notification
of its ratification.
4050 Report Number 11-3
Done at Moscow on November 29, 2001, in two original copies, each
in the Kazakh, Azeri and Russian languages, all texts being equally authentic.
If differences arise in the interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement,
the Parties will be guided by the text in Russian.
For the Republic of Kazakhstan For the Azerbaijani Republic
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan 4051
Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and
the Azerbaijani Republic on Delimitation of the Caspian Seabed
between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijani Republic
(Baku, February 27, 2003)
Ratified by the Republic of Kazakhstan in accordance with RK Law No.
457-11 of July 2, 2003.
The Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijani Republic, hereinafter
referred to as the Parties,
Based on the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Azerbaijani Republic on Delimitation of the Caspian Seabed between the
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijani Republic of November 29,
2001 (hereinafter the Agreement),
For the purpose of identifying geographic coordinates of a median line
of delimitation of the seabed and sub-seabed areas of the Caspian Sea;
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
With this Protocol the Parties establish the geographic coordinates of the
median line of delimitation of seabed and sub-seabed areas of the Caspian
Sea between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijani Republic (Catalog
of Geographic Coordinates of the Median Line of Delimitation – Annex 1).
This line is drawn equidistant from initial reference points on the shoreline
and islands (Catalog of Geographic Coordinates of Initial Reference Points –
Annex 2).
Article 2
The initial point of the median line of delimitation is the point with coordinates
42° 33',6 N and 49° 53',3 E, which is the junction point of the
delimitation lines for the seabed and sub-seabed areas of the Caspian Sea
between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Azerbaijani Republic, and the Russian
Federation
The end point of the median line of delimitation is the point with coordinates
41° 32',4 N and 50° 56',6 E, which may be taken as the junction
point of the delimitation lines for the seabed and sub-seabed areas of the
Caspian Sea between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Azerbaijani Republic,
and Turkmenistan, which should be recorded in a tripartite agreement
between them.
4052 Report Number 11-3
Article 3
The median line of delimitation is drawn on a Median Line Diagram of
Delimitation of Seabed and Sub-seabed Areas of the Caspian Sea between
the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijani Republic (Annex 3), which
has been approved by the Parties.
Article 4
This Protocol shall enter into force in accordance with the procedure provided
for in Article 7 of the Agreement, of which it shall be an integral
part.
Done at Baku on February 27, 2003, in two original copies, each in the
Kazakh, Azeri, and Russian languages, all texts being equally authentic.
For the purpose of interpreting the provisions of this Protocol, the Parties
shall refer to the Russian text.
For the Republic of Kazakhstan For the Azerbaijani Republic
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan 4053
ANNEX 1
To the Protocol to the Agreement between
the Republic of Kazakhstan and
the Azerbaijani Republic on
the Delimitation of the Caspian Seabed
between the Republic of Kazakhstan and
the Azerbaijani Republic
Catalog of Geographic Coordinates of the Median Line of Delimitation
Numbers of the Turning North Latitude East Longitude
Points of the Median Line
Initial Point 42°33',6 49°53',3
1 42°25',8 50°00',3
2 42°24',5 50°01',7
3 42°22',3 50°03',8
4 42°20,9 50°05',4
5 42°20',2 50°06',4
6 42°19',7 50°06',9
7 42°17',0 50°10',1
8 42°16',4 50°10',8
9 42°11',1 50°17',5
10 42°10',4 50°18',5
11 42°06',5 50°23',6
12 42°05',2 50°25',4
13 41°57',9 50°36',0
14 41°57',4 50°36',8
15 41°56',6 50°38',0
16 41°55',8 50°38',7
17 41°53',2 50°41',2
18 41°51',3 50°41',9
19 41°50',6 50°42',2
20 41°47',8 50°43',1
21 41°39',1 50°50',4
22 41°37',0 50°52',3
23 41°35',3 50°53',8
24 41°33',4 50°55',5
Point 25 (end point) 41°32',4 50°56',6
4054 Report Number 11-3
ANNEX 2
To the Protocol to the Agreement between
the Republic of Kazakhstan and
the Azerbaijani Republic on
the Delimitation of the Caspian Seabed
between the Republic of Kazakhstan and
the Azerbaijani Republic
Catalog of the Geographic Coordinates of the Initial Reference Points
Republic of Kazakhstan
No. North Latitude East Longitude
1 43°09',1 51°16',2
2 43°09',1 51°16',6
3 42°50',1 51°54',3
4 42°05',0 52°25',4
5 41°46',6 52°26',5
6 41°46',1 52°26',7
Azerbaijani Republic
No. North Latitude East Longitude
1 41°45',6 48°42',4
2 41°35',8 48°51',9
3 41°32',2 48°55',8
4 41°28',0 48°59',6
5 41°22',7 49°04',4
6 41°21',8 49°05',0
7 41°18',9 49°06',7
8 40°35',7 50°04',3
9 40°29',3 50°19',9
ANNEX 3
To the Protocol to the Agreement between
the Republic of Kazakhstan and
the Azerbaijani Republic on
the Delimitation of the Caspian Seabed
between the Republic of Kazakhstan and
the Azerbaijani Republic
Diagram of the Delimitation of Seabed and Sub-seabed Areas of the Caspian Sea
between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijani Republic
[not included]
RUSSIA
KAZAKHSTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
AZERBAIJAN
RUSSIA
AZERBAIJAN
T-(B/39/1)
Ostrov
Kulaly
1
14
20
27
28
38
29
30
A
25
C a s p i a n
S e a
K A Z A K H S TA N
I R A N
AZERBAIJAN
A
R U S S I A
TURKMENISTAN
GEOR GI A
50°E 55°E
45°N
40°N
Seabed Boundary
KAZAKHSTAN-RUSSIA
Boundary Report 11-1
AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA
Boundary Report 11-2
AZERBAIJAN-KAZAKHSTAN
Boundary Report 11-3
AZERBAIJAN-KAZAKHSTAN-RUSSIA
Boundary Report 11-4
Tri-junction point of Russia, Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan seabed boundaries
Seabed boundary
Equidistant line
0 50 100
Nautical miles
©American Society of International Law, 2004
T
Azerbaijan-Russia
Report 11-2
Seabed Boundary Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan
and the Russian Federation
Signed: 23 September 2002
Entered into force: Azerbaijan approval May 16, 2003;
Russia approval June 25, 2003
Published at: http://president.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2002/09/30520.
shtml (in Russian)
I SUMMARY
This boundary delimits the seabed between Azerbaijan and Russia in the
north central portion of the Caspian Sea. It is the third seabed boundary
agreement to be reached among the Caspian Sea littoral states, following
the Kazakhstan-Russia agreement (see Report Number 11-1) and the
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan agreement (see Report Number 11-3). This boundary
begins at the terminus of the land boundary and extends in one
straight-line segment northeast until it terminates at the Azeri-Kazakh-
Russian tri-point approximately 72 n.m. from the coast. According to the
agreement, the boundary is based on a median line.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations
This agreement was signed eleven years following the break up of the
Soviet Union. Prior to that time the Caspian Sea was bordered by only the
Soviet Union and Iran and the area covered by this boundary agreement
was totally under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union. While the Soviet
D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 4034-4041.
© 2005. The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
Azerbaijan-Russia 4035
Union created de facto administrative lines between its republics, it is not
believed such administrative lines in the northern Caspian Sea influenced
the determination of the location of the Azerbaijan-Russia seabed boundary.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
Prior to the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea essentially
was a Soviet-Iranian “lake.” Because the Caspian Sea has no direct
access to any open ocean, it was not given consideration by the international
community during the negotiations at the Third United Nations Law
of the Sea Conference in the 1970s and early 1980s, which led to the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention. Following 1991, with the number of Caspian
Sea littoral states at five, the need to resolve the legal status of this body
of water and to determine agreed boundaries was apparent.
Russia’s position on the legal status of the Caspian Sea has changed
from the early 1990s. Until the mid-1990s it maintained that all five littoral
states shared in the Caspian Sea’s resources and that outside a territorial
sea belt to be agreed, that the Caspian Sea should come under some
type of five-state condominium or joint-use regime. Russia’s new position
is exemplified by its willingness to complete seabed boundary agreements
with both its Caspian Sea neighbors, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Russia
now holds to the position that the seabed of the Caspian Sea should be
divided into national sectors, but that the five coastal states should agree
on the status of the waters as it relates to managing the fishery resources,
navigation, and the protection of the marine environment.
Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has been a major proponent of the view
that international law of the sea principles apply to the Caspian Sea and
that the entire sea should be divided into national sectors. Azerbaijan’s
legal position towards the Caspian Sea has been driven largely by the
belief that the resource richness of the north central Caspian Sea, particularly
the oil and gas reserves, are to be found in the Azeri sector. By agreeing
with Russia to delimit only the seabed, Azerbaijan has adjusted its
position to allow for the five Caspian Sea states to determine the legal status
of the water column. In fact, article 5 of the agreement provides that
this seabed boundary agreement “is not an obstacle to reaching a common
agreement among the Caspian Sea littoral states on the legal status of the
Caspian Sea. . . .”
4036 Report Number 11-2
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
It is unlikely that any specific economic or environmental consideration
affected the course of this simple seabed boundary. However, the Parties
recognize the possibility that there could be transboundary hydrocarbon
reservoirs and they have made general provision in this agreement on how
to deal with that event. Article 2(2) provides that the exploration of mineral
resources from structures that cross the seabed boundary shall be carried
out by authorized organizations “based on international practice
applied for the development of transboundary fields.” The procedures by
which this would occur are not given in detail as article 2(4) merely provides
that these authorized organizations, with the consent of the Parties,
“shall sign agreements on cooperation.”
4 Geographical Considerations
Azerbaijan and Russia share a land boundary and are adjacent states on the
Caspian Sea. The starting point of the seabed boundary is the land boundary
terminus. The coastline at the land boundary terminus is relatively
smooth and trends in a southeast-northwest direction; the seabed boundary,
which is said to be an equidistant line, is essentially perpendicular to this
general trend of the coastline.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
There are no rocks, reefs or low-tide elevations in this area that influence
the course of the seabed boundary.
6 Baseline Considerations
There are no baseline considerations affecting the course of the seabed
boundary. Neither state claims straight baselines in the Caspian Sea and
there is a geographic balance of the coastlines adjacent to the land boundary
terminus.
Azerbaijan-Russia 4037
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
There were no specific geological or geomorphological considerations referenced
by the Parties in this delimitation.
8 Delimitation Considerations
The seabed boundary is based on what the Parties term a “modified”
median line. Although the hypothetical equidistant line depicted on the
illustrative map to this report shows a deviation from the seabed boundary,
it is quite possible that the coastline data used by the Parties is more accurate
than what was used to construct the line for this map.
9 Technical Considerations
Article 1(3) defines the starting point of the boundary as the point where
the land boundary intersects the Caspian Sea at 41°50.5' N, 48°35.6' E as
depicted on topographic chart K-39-XIX, published in 1979 with a scale
of 1:200,000. However, there is no geodetic datum cited either on this
topographical sheet nor in the seabed boundary agreement.
10 Other Considerations
Article four of the agreement provides that any discrepancy in the interpretation
of provisions in the agreement “shall be settled through negotiations
and other means at the Parties choice.” Also, provisional application
of the agreement, pending ratification procedures, is provided for in
article 7.
III CONCLUSIONS
This is a simple seabed delimitation consisting of one segment connecting
the land boundary terminus to the tripoint with Kazakhstan. Unfortunately,
no geodetic datum is given in the agreement which possibly could lead to
misinterpretation as users, such as oil companies, apply its boundary line.
It is not clear the exact date this agreement entered into force as Article 7
4038 Report Number 11-2
states that the agreement will enter into force “from the date of the last
written notification by the Parties on the completion of internal procedures
necessary for its entry into force.” Given that ratification procedures were
completed by Azerbaijan on May 16, 2003 and by Russia on June 25, 2003
it is assumed that entry into force occurred on or about this latter date.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
Azerbaijan: Not a party to any of the four 1958 Conventions nor to the
1982 LOS Convention.
Russia: Ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf on 22 November
1960; ratified the 1982 LOS Convention on 12 March 1997.
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Azerbaijan: No maritime claims for the Caspian Sea.
Russia: No maritime claims for the Caspian Sea. Off its other coasts, 12
n.m. territorial sea, 200 n.m. EEZ, 200 n.m. continental shelf and/or the
outer edge of the continental margin.
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Azerbaijan: No change
Russia: No change
Prepared by: Robert W. Smith and J. Ashley Roach
Azerbaijan-Russia 4039
Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the
Russian Federation on Delimitation of Adjacent Areas of the
Caspian Seabed
The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred
to as the Parties, making efforts to develop good neighborhood relations,
taking into account the interests of both Parties in establishing a
legally based agreement on the Parties’ activities in the development of
mineral resources of the subsoil of the Caspian seabed adjacent areas,
Guided by universally recognized principles and norms of international
law, by the Parties’ interests in the development and use of the mineral
resources of the subsoil of the Caspian seabed adjacent areas and the practice
existing in the Caspian Sea,
Acknowledging their responsibilities before the current and future generations
for the preservation of the unity of the Caspian Sea and its unique
ecological system,
Recognizing the importance of compliance with special environmental
requirements in the exploration and development of mineral resources of
the subsoil of the Caspian seabed adjacent areas,
And taking into consideration bilateral agreements on the legal status of
the Caspian Sea,
Agree on the following:
Article 1
1. The seabed and subsoil of the Caspian Sea shall be delimited between
the Parties based on the median line method, modified with the consent
of the Parties and made proceeding from the points at equal distances,
with consideration of universally recognized principles of international
law and practice existing in the Caspian Sea.
2. The geographical coordinates of a line delimiting the adjacent areas of
the Caspian seabed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of
Azerbaijan are defined in accordance with Article 1 of this Agreement
with the view of exercising sovereign rights in respect to other legal
economic activities regarding the use of mineral resources of the subsoil
and seabed.
3. The starting point of the delimitation line of the adjacent areas of the
Caspian seabed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of
Azerbaijan is a point located at the intersection of the Caspian Sea with
the state border between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian
4040 Report Number 11-2
Federation at 41 degrees 50.5 minutes north latitude and 48 degrees
35.6 seconds east longitude as determined in the topographic chart (K-
39-XIX) published in 1979, scale 1: 200,000.
4. The last point of the delimitation line is a point with coordinates of 42
degrees 33.6 seconds north latitude and 49 degrees 53.3 minutes east
longitude. The said point may be recognized as the intersecting point of
delimitation of the Caspian seabed among the Russian Federation, the
Republic of Azerbaijan, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, and this will
be covered by a trilateral agreement.
5. The delimitation line was drawn on the chart (attached) of the Caspian
seabed adjacent areas agreed upon by the Parties.
Article 2
1. In respect to other legal economic activities related to the use of mineral
resources within their seabed sectors/zones and the use of the
seabed, the Parties shall exercise their sovereign rights up to the delimitation
line as defined in Article 1 of this Agreement.
2. The exploration of mineral resources of the structures crossed by the delimitation
line shall be carried out by the authorized organizations designated
by the Parties’ governments and based on international practice
applied for the development of trans-boundary fields.
3. The Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan
shall prescribe rights for their authorized organizations to exploit the
mineral resources of the fields intersected by the delimitation line, as
defined by Article 1 of the Agreement, within the limit of their seabed
sectors/zones up to the delimitation line.
4. The authorizing organizations of the Parties, based on internationally
recognized practice of exploring trans-border fields, by consent of the
Parties’ governments shall sign agreements on cooperation.
Article 3
The present Agreement does not affect the rights and obligations of the
Parties proceeding from other international agreements to which they were
participants before they signed this Agreement.
Article 4
Any discrepancy in the interpretation of provisions of the present Agreement
shall be settled through negotiations and other means at the Parties
choice.
Azerbaijan-Russia 4041
Article 5
This Agreement is not an obstacle to reaching a common agreement among
the Caspian littoral states on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the
Parties regard it as part of common agreements.
Article 6
The Parties shall assist in reaching a common accord by the Caspian littoral
states on delimitation of the Caspian seabed considering the provisions
of this Agreement.
Article 7
This Agreement shall be applied provisionally from the date of signing and
shall be in effect from the date of the last written notification by the Parties
on the completion of internal procedures necessary for its entry into force.
Signed in Moscow, September 23, 2002, in Russian and Azeri languages,
in two copies each. Both texts are equally authentic.
RUSSIA
KAZAKHSTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
AZERBAIJAN
RUSSIA
AZERBAIJAN
T-(B/39/1)
Ostrov
Kulaly
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I R A N
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GEOR GI A
50°E 55°E
45°N
40°N
Seabed Boundary
KAZAKHSTAN-RUSSIA
Boundary Report 11-1
AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA
Boundary Report 11-2
AZERBAIJAN-KAZAKHSTAN
Boundary Report 11-3
AZERBAIJAN-KAZAKHSTAN-RUSSIA
Boundary Report 11-4
Tri-junction point of Russia, Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan seabed boundaries
Seabed boundary
Equidistant line
0 50 100
Nautical miles
©American Society of International Law, 2004
T

Oman-Yemen
Report Number 6-21
Agreement to Mark the Maritime Borders between
The Republic of Yemen and The Sultanate of Oman
Signed: December 14, 2003
Entry into force: April 10, 2004
Published at:
I SUMMARY
This boundary extends for 347 n.m. and separates “. . . the regional seas and
economic area and the continental shelf . . .” of the two adjacent states. It
extends from Point 1 on Ra’s [Cape] Tharbat Ali, where the common land
boundary reaches the coast, to Point 17, which marks the intersection of the
200 n.m. zones established from the most seaward points in both countries.
In terms of its construction the boundary consists of two sections. The
first section extends from Point 1 to Point 5. This section is a median line
established from the smooth adjacent mainland coastline between Ra’s
Fartak in Yemen and Ra’s Sajir in Oman. Point 5 is equidistant from these
two capes and Ra’s Khawlaf on Socotra Island. This island and its smaller
associated islands are part of Yemen. They are located 190 n.m. from the
Yemeni mainland and 33 n.m. from the Horn of Africa. Socotra has an
area of 3,625 sq. km. and had a population in 2003 of 44,000. If the
boundary beyond Point 5 had continued on an equidistant course it would
have swung sharply from southeast to east in front of the coastal front projection
of Oman giving Yemen a marked advantage.
Evidently, Yemen agreed to adjust its potential claims from Socotra.
The line from Point 5 to Point 11 trends east-southeast and then the line
swings northeast to Point 17. This adjustment delivers to Oman an area of
about 5,020 sq. n.m. south of a strict line of equidistance giving full effect
to Socotra. The seabed in that area lies at depths of 1,500 metres to 3,500
metres.
D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 3900-3912.
© 2005. The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
Oman-Yemen 3901
This is a short agreement that delimits the boundary, makes a specific
provision regarding mining close to the boundary, and provides for future
discussions on any other regulations that may be necessary.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations
The delimitation of every maritime boundary involves political considerations,
but they rarely are made explicit. Usually they will involve, at least,
placing a limit on national maritime ambitions and those of the neighboring
state and securing title to a defined area of sea and seabed. Probably,
as stated in the preamble to this Agreement, in many cases states will hope
that delimitations improve cooperative relations with their neighbours.
This maritime boundary delimitation is the third for both countries.
Oman delimited part of its continental shelf boundary with Iran in 1974
(see Report Number 7-5) and its exclusive economic zone boundary with
Pakistan in 2000 (see Report Number 6-17). In contrast, Yemen has delimited
three boundaries in five years. Yemen secured its first boundary, with
Eritrea in the Red Sea, through the decision of a tribunal (see Report
Number 6-14) and its second after negotiations with Saudi Arabia in 2000
(see Report Number 6-16). In both cases these boundaries separated the
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones.
It does not seem that strategic or historical considerations played any
role in this delimitation.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
Oman and Yemen ratified the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention in 1989
and 1987, respectively. Although Article One of the Agreement refers to
“. . . the border between the regional sea and the economic area and the
continental shelf of the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman . . .”
it can be assumed that the boundary divides territorial seas 12 n.m. wide
and exclusive economic zones 200 n.m. wide. Examination of the configuration
of the continental margin of both countries indicates that it does
not extend more than 200 n.m. from their baselines, nor does this boundary
do so.
Article Two provides that if there are discrepancies regarding the location
of the boundary between the list of coordinates in Article One and the
map attached to the Agreement, the coordinates will prevail.
Article Five enables the parties to resolve any disagreement arising
from the Agreement by friendly direct communication or any other agreed
peaceful method. Further, according to Article Six, without altering the
boundary, the parties may create common committees to regulate all matters
concerning the Agreement.
Legal regime considerations do not appear to have influenced the location
of the boundary.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
Article One, paragraph 3, notes that the delimitation is final and that
neither party may claim any area of the continental shelf across the boundary.
Article Three emphasizes each country’s right to explore, use, maintain
and manage natural resources of the seabed and under the seabed and
in the water column on its side of the boundary. Article Four deals with
any trans-boundary mineral, hydrocarbon or other natural resource when
directional drilling, from either side, could tap into the resource on the
other side of the boundary. It is impermissible to drill a well if productive
sections are less than 250 metres from the boundary, unless there is agreement
by both parties. In such cases both parties will try to agree on measures
to coordinate and consolidate operations on both sides of the line.
It does not appear that economic or environmental considerations
played any role in fixing the position of the boundary.
4 Geographic Consideration
Three geographical considerations seem to have been important in delimiting
this boundary. First, the equidistant section between Points 1-5 relies
on an adjacent smooth coastal frontage of only 105 n.m. between Ra’s
Fartak and Ra’s Sajir. Beyond Point 5, Socotra and the Oman coast are
opposite to each other.
Second, it appears that both countries agreed that the location of
Socotra Island would produce an inequitable boundary if the island was
given full effect in delimiting a median line. Presumably it was agreed that
Yemen’s claims from Socotra should be partially discounted in the area
seawards of Point 5.
3902 Report Number 6-21
Oman-Yemen 3903
Third, it appears that both countries agreed that the terminus of the
boundary would be located at a point 200 n.m. from both countries. Point
17 is located at the intersection of arcs with a radius of 200 n.m. described
from the most seaward points of Oman and Yemen. The most seaward relevant
point of Oman is Gharzant Islet, which is the most seaward island
of the Juzur [Islands] al Halaniyat, that consists of a line of five islands.
Gharzant Islet is rocky with a double peak rising to 70 metres; it lies 25
n.m. from the mainland. The most relevant seaward point of Yemen is Ra’s
Radressa at the northeastern tip of Socotra. It is low and fringed with a
reef.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-tide Elevations Considerations
The only island belonging to Yemen that influenced the delimitation of this
boundary is Socotra. The detached location of Socotra, which can be considered
to be opposite the coast of Oman, increased significantly the
marine area that Yemen could claim up to a potential median line with
Oman. There is no doubt that Socotra is an island from which full claims
to maritime zones can be made. However, its location far from the coast
of Yemen, opposite the south coast of Oman, places Oman at a disadvantage
when a median line is constructed.
Apparently in recognition of this situation by both parties, Socotra
played three roles in defining the boundary. First Ra’s Khawlaf and Ra’s
Redressa on Socotra were given full effect in respectively defining Points
5 and 17, which are equidistant respectively from Oman’s basepoints on
Ra’s Sajir and Gharzant Islet. Those points were connected by a series of
line segments to create a boundary that both countries found to be equitable.
Second the coast of Socotra between Ra’s Khawlaf and Ra’s
Redressa generated Yemen’s discounted claim. Third, the maritime area
south of Points 11-17 is entirely attributable to Yemen’s claims from
Socotra rather than its mainland.
Along the relevant section of Oman’s coast there is a group of five
islands called Juzur al Halaniyat. They are aligned perpendicular to one
section of mainland coast and roughly parallel to another section. Four of
these islands are connected to each other and the mainland by straight
baselines. The straight baseline joining Hallaniya Island and Gharzant Islet
would be involved in delimiting a median line using all available points.
Gharzant Islet and Yemen’s Ra’s Radressa are the basepoints from which
the 200 n.m. arcs are drawn that intersect at Point 17.
It does not seem that rocks or low-tide elevations played any role in
the delimitation.
6 Baseline Considerations
It appears that the two countries used the normal baseline in generating the
equidistance boundary line that connects Points 1 to 5. Yemen has not
established a straight baseline system. In 1982 Oman drew straight baselines
in accordance with enabling legislation passed in 1972. The only
straight baselines defined on the coast relevant to this delimitation concerns
the Juzur al Halaniyat. There are five segments that commence in the north
at Ra’s ash Sharbatat and pass via Gharzant Islet, Hallaniya, Suda and Hasikiya
Islands to Ra’s Hasik, located at latitude 17° 24' N. These islands and the
straight baselines that join them control the location of Points 15, 16 and
17 on the delimited boundary.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
There is no evidence to suggest that geological and geomorphological considerations
played any role in fixing this boundary.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
This Agreement gives no information about the method used to delimit this
boundary. Therefore it is not possible to discover with certainty the method
or methods used by the negotiators. However, analysis of the relation of
the boundary points to the relevant coasts of both countries enables some
suggestions to be made about the techniques used. The following suggestions
are based on two procedures. The first involved a manual analysis of
the boundary on the UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) Chart 4705, published
in February 2003 at a scale of 1:3.5 millions at latitude 22° 30' N
on a Mercator projection. The second procedure involved consultation with
the Law of the Sea Division of the UKHO on the results of an analysis
using CARIS LOTS software.
On Chart 4705 a strict line of equidistance was constructed graphically
from Point 1, defined in the Agreement as the terminus of the land boundary,
to the outer edge of the 200 n.m. zone claimed by both countries. The
3904 Report Number 6-21
Oman-Yemen 3905
terminus of the land boundary at 16° 39' 03.83" N and 53° 06' 30.88" E
is about 7 n.m. west of the location shown on the chart. Then the 17 points
that delimit the boundary were plotted on the chart.
An examination of the two lines revealed the following information.
First, both lines started at Point 1 and ended at Point 17. The origin of
Point 1 has been described. Point 17 is 200 n.m. from Gharzant Islet, the
easternmost point of the Juzur al Halaniyat, which belong to Oman.
Gharzant Islet is also Point 39 on Oman’s system of straight baselines.
Point 17 is also 200 n.m. from Ra’s Radressa, the eastern point of Socotra.
Second, the boundary and the equidistant line coincided between Points
1 and 5, a distance of 130 n.m. and are derived from the mainland coast
between Yemen’s Ra’s Fartak and Oman’s Ra’s Sajir.
Third, Point 5 is equidistant between the two mainland capes and Ra’s
Khawlaf, the nearest point on Socotra.
Fourth, between Points 5 and 17 the two lines followed different
courses. The equidistant line extends for 195 n.m. following a course just
south of east and terminating at Point 17. The boundary’s departure from
the equidistance line has two parts. Between Points 5 and 11 the boundary
extends for 120 n.m. on a course east of southeast. The section between
Points 11 and 17 measures 97 n.m. and trends northeast.
Having established that the boundary consisted of a median line
between Points 1 and 5 and a non-equidistant line between Points 5 and
17, attention was turned to estimating, if possible, the discount that had
been applied to Yemen’s claim from Socotra. An area of about 5,020 sq.
n.m. is bounded by the median line and the delimited boundary. This is the
area involved in adjusting Yemen’s claim from Socotra.
In an attempt to measure the discount applied to Socotra, the following
area was identified. The eastern and western limits are straight lines joining
Ra’s Khawlaf and Point 5 and Ra’s Radressa and Point 17. The northern
limit is the strict median line giving Socotra full effect, and the south
line is the coast of Socotra joining Ra’s Khawlaf and Ra’s Radressa. An
area of about 15,020 sq. n.m. is enclosed by these lines. When the area
between the constructed line and the delimited boundary is calculated as a
percentage of the larger area the answer is 33.4 per cent. It is tempting to
argue that this calculation reveals that the method of delimitation was to
discount Socotra by one-third, but there is always the possibility that the
result was a fluke that concealed another method of delimitation.
The results from the computer program revealed the true method of
delimitation. First, they confirmed that the boundary joining Points 1 to 5
is a median line, that Point 5 is also equidistant from Ra’s Khawlaf and
that Point 17 is equidistant between Gharzant Islet and Ra’s Radressa.
Second the program determined that the boundary between Points 5 and 11
gave a half-effect to Socotra. Third the program established that the boundary
between Points 11 and 17 is 200 n.m. from points on Oman’s normal
and straight baselines. Points 15-17 are controlled by the straight baseline
joining Hallaniya Island and Gharzant Islet.
These analyses suggest that, for different sections of the boundary, the
negotiators used different methods: equidistance from the mainland coasts
from Points 1-5; half-effect for Socotra from points 5-11; and, in these
geographical circumstances, using the 200 n.m. limit from sections of the
Oman coast north of Ra’s Marbat to create the boundary with Yemen.
9 Technical Considerations
In Article One the coordinates of latitude and longitude of Point 1 (a point
on the land boundary) are set out to the nearest second decimal place of
one second of arc. This gives an accuracy of 30.8 cm. The other 16 points
are quoted to one second of arc, which is about 31 metres. All coordinates
are based on the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84). The points are
connected by geodetic lines. A geodetic line is the shortest distance
between two points on an ellipsoid.
10 Other Considerations
There do not seem to have been any other considerations.
III CONCLUSIONS
This Agreement between Oman and Yemen is short and uncomplicated,
which perhaps explains why it came into force four months after it was
signed. It defines precisely a boundary separating the territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones from the terminus of the common land boundary
to 200 n.m. from the most seaward points of their coasts. It appears
that different sections of the boundary were based on different delimitation
methods to ensure the line was equitable. The Agreement makes provisions
for mining close to the boundary and for resolving any disagreements.
Future discussions relating to the agreement are made possible by Article
3906 Report Number 6-21
Oman-Yemen 3907
Six, which permits joint-committees to prepare appendices to regulate all
matters related to it.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
Oman: Party to the 1982 LOS Convention 17 August 1989.
Yemen: Party to the 1982 LOS Convention 27 July 1987.
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Oman: 12 n.m. territorial sea (1972); 200 n.m. EEZ (1981); 24 n.m. contiguous
zone (1989).
Yemen: 12 n.m. territorial sea (1978); 200 n.m. EEZ (1978); contiguous
zone (1978)
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
No change
V REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
United States Department of State, 1992. ‘Straight baseline claims:
Djibouti and Oman’, Limits in the Seas, No. 113, Washington, DC.
H.W. Jayewardene, 1990. The regime of islands in international law,
Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, pp. 468-9.
Prepared by J.R.V. Prescott
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Rhiy di Irisal
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Gharzaut I.
Hallaniyah I.
Maritime Boundary
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Boundary Report 6-21
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Equidistant line
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©American Society of International Law, 2004
20°N
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1 Unofficial translation.
Oman-Yemen 3909
Agreement to Mark the Maritime Borders between
The Republic of Yemen and The Sultanate of Oman1
The Government of the Republic of Yemen and the Government of the
Sultanate of Oman,
assert the depth of their brotherly relationships and the common interests
that are shared by their countries and peoples,
and to strengthen the brotherly bonds and good neighbourly relationships
between the two brotherly countries,
and to facilitate for the common willingness of the two countries to mark
the maritime borders in the Arabian Sea in a final settlement,
and taking into account the international border agreement signed between
the governments of the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman in
Sana’a on the 3rd of Rabe’e II 1413H, 1st of October 1992,
The two parties agree to the following:
Article one
1- the maritime border between the regional sea and the economic area
and the continental shelf of the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate
of Oman will be marked by geodetic lines connecting its points described
by coordinates according to the international geodetic system 84
(WGS 84) as follows:
Point Latitude/North Longitude/East
1 16° 39' 03.83" 53° 06' 30.88"
2 16° 23' 02" 53° 14' 50"
3 15° 48' 42" 53° 32' 05"
4 15° 20' 44" 53° 38' 19"
5 14° 46' 12" 54° 08' 33"
6 14° 37' 35" 54° 31' 04"
7 14° 31' 39" 54° 41' 56"
8 14° 26' 26" 54° 51' 28"
9 14° 18' 22" 55° 03' 57"
(cont.)
Point Latitude/North Longitude/East
10 13° 56' 19" 55° 38' 51"
11 13° 45' 51" 55° 54' 32"
12 13° 53' 48" 56° 19' 15"
13 13° 58' 51" 56° 30' 12"
14 14° 03' 32" 56° 39' 57"
15 14° 11' 31" 56° 53' 45"
16 14° 14' 11" 57° 08' 53"
17 14° 18' 55" 57° 27' 01"
2- Point No. 1 known as (Ra’s tharbat Ali) marks the beginning of the
maritime border where the land border between the two countries
meets with the sea as per article three of the international border
agreement signed in Sana’a on the 3rd of Rabee’a II 1413H, 1st of
October 1992.
3- This marking is considered conclusive and final and neither party
has the right to claim any expanse of the continental shelf across the
borders of the other party.
Article two
1- The maritime border line in clause 1 of article one of this agreement
is clarified in the map signed by representatives of both countries
and is considered as an integral part of this agreement where each
party keeps a copy.
2- If a discrepancy arise between the coordinates of the points listed in
clause 1 of article one of this agreement and the maritime border
line illustrated on the map described in clause 1 of this article then
the coordinates of these points will be referred to.
Article three
The two parties emphasize the right of each country to exercise its sovereign
rights for the purposes of exploration, utilization, maintaining and
managing the natural resources at the sea bed and under and the waters
above in accordance with the stipulation in article one of this agreement.
3910 Report Number 6-21
Oman-Yemen 3911
Article four
In the event of the discovery of a single oil geological compound, single
oil well, single gas well or any other mineral or natural resources across
the border line listed in article one of this agreement, and it was possible
to exploit part of that compound or the field situated on one side of the
said border line partly or wholly using directional drilling from the other
side of the border line then:
1- It is not permissible to drill a well on any side of the border line
listed in article one, if any part of its productive sections lies less
than 250 metres from the said border line unless commonly agreed
by both parties.
2- If such an event arise, both parties to this agreement shall try their
utmost efforts to reach an agreement on how to coordinate and consolidate
operations on both sides of the border line.
Article five
Without altering the border line listed in this agreement, the two parties
will endeavor to resolve any disagreement that arise from the interpretation
or implementation of this agreement through friendly means by direct communication
or any other peaceful method agreed by the two parties.
Article six
Without altering the border line listed in this agreement, it is permitted if
agreed by both parties to form common committees from the two countries
to prepare appendices to regulate all matters related to this agreement.
Article seven
This agreement was written in Arabic on two original copies where each
side keeps a copy.
Article eight
This agreement will be ratified according to the legislative processes current
in each country and will be considered effective from the date of
exchange of ratified documents.
This agreement was drawn up in the city of Muscat on 20th of Shawal
1424H, 14th of December 2003.
On behalf of the Government On behalf of the Government
of the Sultanate of Oman of the Republic of Yemen
Yousif bin Alawi bin Abdullah Dr. Abu Bakr Abdullah Al-Qurbi
Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs
3912 Report Number 6-21
D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 4567-4584.
© 2011. The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
Estonia-Russia
Report Number 10-22
Treaty between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation
on the Delimitation of the Maritime areas in the Gulf of Narva and
the Gulf of Finland
Signed: 18 May 2005
Entry into force: Not Yet in Force
Published at: II Riigi Teataja (Official Estonian Gazette), 11 July 2005,
18, 591
I SUMMARY
This is the ninth agreement concluded since the second half of the 1990s in
the southeastern Baltic Sea which is directly related to the dissolution of the
former Soviet Union.2 It establishes a maritime boundary in the southeastern
Baltic Sea where none had existed before. This agreement forms part of the
fourth chronological group in the over-all Baltic Sea delimitation effort,3
which is in substance clearly distinguishable from the previous ones.4 Within
1 Unofficial French translation from the Russian original by the present author in Erik Franckx
and Maurice Kamga, L’existence éphémère du Traité de délimitation maritime entre la
République d’Estonie et la Fédération de Russie en mer Baltique, 12 ANNUAIRE DU DROIT DE
LA MER 2007 393, 421 (2008).
2 Treaty between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation on the Delimitation of the
Maritime Zones in the Gulf of Narva and the Gulf of Finland (hereinafter Maritime Boundary
Treaty), 18 May 2005. This treaty has not yet entered into force.
For the eight previous treaties concluded during this period, see in chronological order:
Estonia-Latvia (1996), Report Number 10-15; Estonia-Finland (1996), Report Number 10-16;
Estonia-Latvia-Sweden (1997), Report Number 10-17; Lithuania-Russia (1997), Report
Number 10-18(1); Lithuania-Russia (1997), Report Number 10-18(2); Estonia-Sweden (1998),
Report Number 10-19; Latvia-Lithuania (1999), Report Number 10-20; and Estonia-Finland-
Sweden, Report Number 10-21.
3 Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic Sea: Post-1991 Developments, 28 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 249, 256 (2000). It concerns agreements directly related to the dissolution of the
former Soviet Union.
4 The previous periods run from 1945-1972, 1973-1985, and 1985 to the beginning of the 1990s
respectively. See Erik Franckx, International Cooperation in Respect of the Baltic Sea, in THE
CHANGING POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF EUROPE: ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245, 255-61
(R. Lefeber, M. Fitzmaurice, & E. W. Vierdag eds., 1991), as later supplemented in Erik
4568 Report 10-22
this fourth group, two distinct subcategories are to be further distinguished,
namely those relating to the delimitation of maritime areas where no boundary
existed before, and those involving the more subtle questions about the
legal status of previously concluded maritime boundary agreements by the
former Soviet Union in the areas to be delimited.5 The present agreement
clearly fits into the first category, except possibly for a stretch of about 6.5
nautical miles (n.m.) (12 kilometers) which according to some sources was
agreed upon between Estonia and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic/Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period 1920-1923
when the border was being demarcated.6
This treaty establishes a single maritime boundary in the Gulf of Narva
and the southeastern part of the Gulf of Finland in the eastern Baltic Sea
covering all the present-day maritime claims of the Parties as well as any
such possible future claims made by the Parties in accordance with governing
international law. The boundary extends over a distance of approximately
78 n.m. and consists of nine turning or terminal points. The eastern starting
point coincides with the terminal point at sea of the land frontier between
the two countries, as agreed upon by means of a land border treaty concluded
on the same day.7 The western terminal point is rather special for the delimitation
treaty seems to fix a definite point by means of coordinates, even
though another article of the same treaty states that the tripoint with Finland
still has to be determined by a separate agreement.
Franckx, Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic Sea: Past, Present and Future, 2 MARITIME
BRIEfiNG 6-10 (IBRU, No. 2, 1996) and Erik Franckx, Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the
Baltic Sea, in THE BALTIC SEA: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN NATIONAL POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION 167, 169-73 (Renate Platzöder & Philomène Verlaan eds., 1996). See also, Erik
Franckx, Frontières maritimes dans la mer Baltique: passé, présent et futur, 9 ESPACES ET
RESSOURCES MARITIMES 92, 97-103 (1995) and Erik Franckx, Les délimitations maritimes en
mer Baltique, 5 REVUE DE L’INDEMER 37, 50-58 (1997).
5 As already alluded to in the first regional report concerning the Baltic Sea. See Erik Franckx,
Region X: Baltic Sea Maritime Boundaries at 345, 365.
6 EDGAR MATTISEN, SEARCHING FOR A DIGNIfiED COMPROMISE: THE ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN BORDER 1000
YEARS 59 (1996), where this author states: “Another 12 km section of the sea border was added
upon consent of both sides; this addition began at the border post on the shore of the Bay of
Narva and extended to the border of the territorial waters in the Gulf of Finland”. No documentary
sources are however provided to back up this statement. The same is true with respect
to the Estonian 1993 monograph, on which this book is based: EDGAR MATTISEN, EESTI-VENE
PIIR (The Estonian-Russian Border) (1993). No traces have been found that Estonia ever
pressed this point during the long negotiations.
7 Treaty between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation on the Estonian-Russian
State Border (hereinafter Border Treaty), 18 May 2005, as published at II RIIGI TEATAJA, 11
July 2005, 18, 59. This treaty has not yet entered into force. See especially Annex I, entitled
“Description of the course of the state border between the Estonian Republic and the Russian
Federation on land”.
Estonia-Russia 4569
In the area to be delimited the coast of Estonia runs in a general east-west
direction, whereas that of Russia runs roughly north-south. Many islands are
present in the area to be delimited.
This treaty is unusual because, after having been signed by both Parties
in 2005, one of them later withdrew its signature.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations
Political and historical considerations are of utmost importance for the proper
understanding of the maritime delimitation treaty and especially its presentday
status. Since the maritime boundary treaty was concluded on the same
day as the land border agreement between Estonia and Russia,8 the fate of
both treaties is intimately interlinked. After the dissolution of the former
Soviet Union a fundamental point of disagreement emerged between Estonia
and Russia as to the exact legal status of the Estonian state.
Estonia is of the opinion that after the said dissolution this country
regained the independence it had lost in 1941. The present Estonian state, in
other words, is but the continuation of the state that had existed between
1921 and 1941. Of quintessential importance for the Estonian side is the
Peace Treaty concluded at Tartu in 1921, in which the independence of
Estonia was explicitly recognized.9 Estonia consequently considers this treaty
the founding document of the present-day Estonian state, including the border
described therein.10
8 Compare supra notes 2 and 7.
9 Peace Treaty, concluded between Esthonia and Russia (hereinafter Tartu Peace Treaty),
2 February 1920, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 11, 50-70. This treaty entered into
force on 30 March 1920. Article 2 provides: “In consequence of the right of all peoples to
self-determination, to the point of seceding completely from the State of which they form part,
a right proclaimed by the Socialist and Federal Russian Republic of the Soviets, Russia unreservedly
recognizes the independence and sovereignty of the State of Esthonia, and renounces
voluntarily and for ever all sovereign rights possessed by Russia over the Esthonian people
and territory whether these rights be based on the juridical position that formerly existed in
public law, or in the international treaties which, in the sense here indicated, lose their validity
in future. From the fact that Esthonia has belonged to Russia, no obligation whatsoever will
fall on the Estonian people and land to Russia.”
10 Id., Article 3. Of special importance is the point where the border meets the Bay of Narva and
which is described in the following manner: “Starting from the Bay of Narva, one verst south
of the Fishers' House, it [i.e. the frontier] turns toward Ropscha, then follows the course of the
Rivers Mertvitskaia and Rosson . . .”. This point is located about 9.5 n.m. to the north of the
4570 Report 10-22
Russia, on the other hand, argues that by becoming part of the Soviet
Union in 1941 Estonia, as such, ceased to exist as a subject of international
law. As a result, the treaties concluded between these two countries, including
the Tartu Peace Treaty, became defunct at that time.11 And even though
it has been argued that according to a generally accepted rule of customary
international law a succession of States does not affect the boundaries established
by so-called territorial treaties,12 Russia argues that until the independence
of Estonia in 1991, the boundary between this republic and the RSFSR
was determined by Soviet legislation based on mutual consent just like for
all the other republics forming the Soviet Union. Leaving the Union simply
does not allow any of them to change their boundaries unilaterally.13 And
since with respect to Estonia the land border ended in the mouth of the river
Narva, that should be the starting point for the maritime boundary.
The Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations concluded in
1991 between Estonia and the RSFSR did not touch upon this delicate issue.14
It only provided that the boundary would be settled by separate agreement.15
But when these negotiations started in 1992 this immediately became a central
issue and remained so, not only during the numerous rounds of negotiations
spread over more than ten years, but also once an agreement was finally
reached in 2005.
These long negotiations can be divided in three main periods.16 A first
period runs between 1992 and 1994. Based on the different attitudes towards
the legal significance of the Tartu Peace Treaty, as explained above, these
negotiations soon headed towards an impasse. In 1995 the Estonian Prime
Minister and President launched the idea that if Russia would be prepared to
recognize the Tartu Peace Treaty, Estonia would be willing to take the
mouth of the river Narva and connects by means of a straight line almost due east to the
Mertvitskaia river at a place named Ropscha.
11 As stated in a declaration by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 4 July 1994, mentioned
by HÉLÈNE HAMANT, DÉMEMBREMENT DE L’URSS ET PROBLÈMES DE SUCCESSION D’ÉTATS 146
(2007). The argument for such conclusion was formulated as follows: “Une telle conclusion
est fondée sur la norme communément admise du droit international selon laquelle un Etat qui
devient partie d’un autre Etat cesse d’exister en tant que sujet de droit international. En conséquence,
les traités conclus entre ces deux Etats s’éteignent.”
12 Rein Mullerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the Former USSR
and Yugoslavia, 42 ICLQ 473, 485 (1993), specifically mentioning the Tartu Peace Treaty in
this respect.
13 Declaration by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 11.
14 Treaty between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Estonia
on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations, 12 January 1991, RIIGI TEATAJA, 14 January 1991,
2, 19. This treaty entered into force on 14 January 1992.
15 Id., Article VI.
16 For more details about these three periods, see Franckx & Kamga, supra note 1, at 401-407.
Estonia-Russia 4571
boundary as it existed at that time as the starting point for negotiating adjustments.
But after it became clear that this proved unacceptable to Russia, the
only remaining way out for the negotiators was to leave out all references to
the political history between the Parties. This finally opened the way toward
an acceptable text which both Parties were able to initial in 1996, and a
second time in 1999. This second period finally made it possible for the
Parties to place their respective signatures upon a set of agreements, one with
respect to the land border and the other with respect to the maritime boundary,
at the occasion of a ceremony held at Moscow on 18 May 2005. This
event started a third period, which is characterized by an extremely swift
action-reaction pattern in the beginning, followed by the installation of a new
stalemate which still remains operational today. Estonia was quick in completing
its internal ratification procedure. By means of a single law of
ratification dated 20 June 200517 and formal promulgation by the President
two days later, this country indicated its willingness to become bound by
these agreements. However, when ratifying both treaties, Parliament added
an introductory declaration which stressed the legal continuity of the Estonian
Republic proclaimed in 1918 and specifically referred to the Tartu Peace
Treaty and the delimitation it contains.18 The Russian Federation reacted
immediately by stating that the above addition by the Estonian Parliament
had made it impossible to submit these treaties to the Federal Assembly of
the Russian Federation for ratification,19 and, within a week, by announcing
17 Published at II RIIGI TEATAJA, 11 July 2005, 18, 59.
18 This introductory declaration, added at the initiative of the Estonian Parliament, reads:
“Proceeding from the legal continuity of the Republic of Estonia proclaimed on 24 February
1918, as it is stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, from the resolution of
the Republic of Estonia Supreme Council of 20 August 1991 ‘On the National Independence
of Estonia' and from the declaration of the Riigikogu of 7 October 1992 ‘On the Restoration
of Constitutional Power’, and keeping in mind that the Treaty referred to in Art. 1 of this Act
shall, in accordance to Art. 122 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, partially alters
the state border line established by Art. III section I of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 2 February
1920, shall not influence the rest of the Treaty and shall not determine the treatment of bilateral
issues not connected with border treaties, the Riigikogu decides [ ] [t]o ratify pursuant to
Art. 121 Clause 1 and Art. 122 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, . . .”, followed
by the titles of the annexed Border Treaty and Maritime Boundary Treaty. II RIIGI TEATAJA,
11 July 2005, 18, 59. English translation found in a case before the Supreme Court of Estonia
(see infra note 52), sub 5, which was itself translated into English.
19 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Concerning the
Ratification of the Border Treaties with Russia by the Estonian Parliament, 22 June 2005, as
available on the webpages of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at <www.mid.ru/brp_4
.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/5400e7d6355b0634c3257028003c7a52?Open
Document>.
4572 Report 10-22
that it would withdraw its signature,20 an intention which the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs materialized by means of a note verbale transmitted to its
Estonian counterpart on 6 September 2005.21 The situation has not changed
since.
Even though land boundary agreements normally precede maritime
boundary agreements, in the particular historical context of the eastern Baltic
Sea, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this is not necessarily the case,
as illustrated by the Lithuanian-Russian precedent, where the land border and
maritime boundary were also concluded on the same day.22
2 Legal Regime Considerations
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia was not bound by
any of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions because of the legal fiction of
its restored independence. It never became a Party to any of them and only
acceded to the LOS Convention a few months after the Maritime Boundary
Treaty was signed in 2005. Also its national legislation with respect to the
offshore was not well developed for the same reason at that time. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, was a Party to all of the 1958 Law of the Sea
Conventions, except for the one on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas. It also was the first country in the Baltic to
claim a 200 n.m. zone,23 i.e. a fishery zone which became operational on
20 The Moscow Times, 28 June 2005, p. 2, cols. 1-2, making reference to a statement by the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
21 A note was delivered on that day by the Russian Foreign Ministry in which this country made
its intention clear not to become a Party to the said treaties. Information available at: <www
.vm.ee/?q=en/node/93>. This note verbale was based on a Resolution of the Government of
the Russian Federation (No. 1496 of 13 August 2005), later approved by the President (Order
No. 394 of 31 August 2005). Information available respectively at: <www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/
english?OpenView&Start=6.691&Count=30&Expand=6#6> and <graph.document.kremlin.ru/
doc.asp?ID=029417>, the latter in Russian.
22 See Lithuania-Russia (1997), Report Numbers 10-18(1) and 10-18(2). The simultaneity of both
processes is even more pronounced in the Lithuania-Russia case, for the only sign of precedence
of the land border agreement has to be found in the publication sequence in the official
journal. As emphasized in Lithuania-Russia (1997), Report Number 10-18(2), note 1.
Moreover, it should be noted that the territorial sea delimitation forms part of the treaty on
the Lithuanian-Russian state border. In the present case, the land border agreement explicitly
provides that the maritime border will be determined by means of a separate treaty, indicating
a clearer substantial hierarchy between the land border and the maritime boundary. See
Border Treaty, supra note 7, Article 1(2).
23 Edict of 10 December 1976, On Provisional Measures for the Preservation of the Living
Resources and for the Regulation of Fishing in Marine Areas Adjacent to the Coast of the
Estonia-Russia 4573
1 April 1978,24 and again to establish an EEZ in 1984,25 which logically
also applied to the Baltic.26 After Estonia regained its independence, the
Russian Federation enacted a Federal Law in 1998 on the exclusive economic
zone which contained a delimitation provision,27 but by that time the
Maritime Boundary Treaty had already been initialed once by the Parties.28
Estonia adopted municipal legislation on the establishment of an exclusive
economic zone in January 1993, which was further elaborated in more
detail a few months later.29 A close reading of this Estonian legal framework
first reveals that the eastern starting point of the straight baselines as well as
the outer limit of the territorial sea is located about 9.5 n.m. north of the
mouth of the river Narva. The justification for this point, in other words, is
to be found in the Tartu Peace Treaty,30 as moreover specifically mentioned
in the law.31 Secondly, the Estonian legal framework established in 1993 also
clearly indicated that if the outer limits of the territorial sea, exclusive
U.S.S.R., 50 VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA S.S.S.R. (Communications of the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) 728 (1976). For an English translation, see 15 I.L.M. 1381 (1976).
24 A special enactment was issued for this purpose, namely the Decree of 24 March 1978, as
mentioned by A. Volkov and K. Bekiashev, LAW OF THE SEA AND FISHERIES (in Russian) 215
(1980).
25 Edict of 28 February 1984, On the Economic Zone of the U.S.S.R., 9 VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO
SOVETA S.S.S.R. (Communications of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) 137 (1984). For an
English translation, see United Nations, The Law of the Sea: National Legislation on the
Exclusive Economic Zone, the Economic Zone and the Exclusive Fishery Zone (U.N. Sales
No. E.85.V.10) 314-21 (1986).
26 See Kazimierz Grzybowski, The New Soviet Law of the Sea, 32 OSTEUROPA RECHT 163, 174
(1986).
27 Federal Act of 17 December 1998, On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation,
as available at <faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/rus27457.doc> in Russian and <www.un.org/Depts/
los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1998_Act_EZ.pdf> in English. Article
2 provides: “The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between the Russian Federation
and the States with coasts opposite or adjacent to the coast of the Russian Federation shall be
effected in accordance with the international treaties to which the Russian Federation is a party
or the generally recognized principles and norms of international law.”
28 The Parties initialed the Border Treaty and the Maritime Boundary Treaty a first time in 1996.
At the request of the Russian side this procedure was repeated in 1999 in order to be able to
include some minor technical amendments as well as to attach all the charts and maps. See
Franckx and Kamga, supra note 1, at 404 and Erik Franckx, Region X, Baltic Sea Boundaries,
at 3514.
29 Economic Zone Act of 28 January 1993. This act was published in RIIGI TEATAJA, 15 February
1993, 7, 105. English translation available at <www.legaltext.ee/text/en/V00084.htm&gt;.
According to its Article 3 the delimitation with opposite and adjacent States will be arrived at
by means of agreement, to be approved by the Riigikogu. This act was further implemented
by means of the Law on the Boundaries of the Maritime Tract, 10 March 1993, I RIIGI TEATAJA,
31 March 1993, 14, 217, reprinted at 25 LOS BULL. 55 (1994).
30 See supra note 10.
31 Law on the Boundaries of the Maritime Tract, supra note 29, at Appendix I (entitled “The
Baseline of the Territorial Sea of the Republic of Estonia”), remark under point 1.
4574 Report 10-22
economic zones and continental shelf could still be changed as a result of
negotiations with Russia, however no such caveat is to be found with respect
to the baselines.32 As mentioned above, it was only in 1995 that Estonia
decided that it would be willing to start negotiations with respect to the
maritime boundary on the basis of the starting point in the mouth of the river
Narva.33
At the time the negotiations on the maritime boundary were separated
from the over-all negotiations involving other delicate issues such as the
withdrawal of Russian troops and nuclear objects from Estonian territory; in
1994,34 both countries were on equal footing as far as concerns the maritime
zones that they each claimed. The resulting treaty is special in that it also
includes pro-actively possible future maritime zones claimed by the Parties
in accordance with international law.35
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
A closer study of the charts attached to the Maritime Boundary Treaty as
well as the Border Treaty, indicate that navigational interests seem to have
played a role in the determination of the first and second turning points.
Since the land boundary follows the thalweg of the river Narva to the point
where it empties into the Gulf of Narva, point one is not equidistant from
the banks of the river, but has rather been determined by the location of its
thalweg. Also turning point two is not equidistant and has rather to be
explained as having the function of allowing vessels of both States to enter
32 Id., at Appendix II (entitled “The Boundary of the Territorial Sea of the Republic of Estonia”),
remark under the Appendix, where it is stated: “Since the boundary of the territorial sea within
the Bay of Narva has not been determined at the negotiations between the Republic of Estonia
and the Russian Federation, the boundary of the territorial sea extending from point 1 to point
39 through 37 and 38 may change as a result of these negotiations”, and Appendix III (entitled
“The Boundary of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of the Republic of
Estonia), remark under the Appendix, where it is stated: “Since the boundary of the exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf near Vaindlo Island in the Gulf of Finland has not been
determined at the negotiations between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation,
the boundary of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf extending from point 38 to
point 70 may change as a result of these negotiations.”
33 See sub II, 1.
34 Information kindly obtained from R. Mälk, who headed the Estonian delegation from 1994
onward, at the occasion of an interview in Brussels on 3 July 2008. Hereinafter Interview R.
Mälk.
35 Maritime Boundary Treaty, supra note 2, Article 3. This is a rather exceptional and novel
practice in the Baltic Sea (see Franckx, supra note 28, at 3521) and follows the example set
by Estonia when settling its maritime boundary with Latvia. See Estonia-Latvia, Report
Number 10-15, at 3001.
Estonia-Russia 4575
the natural access route to the entrance of the river, which runs in the general
direction of the segment between turning points one and two.
Even though this part of the Baltic Sea is not particularly promising with
respect to possible future oil and gas extraction, the Parties nevertheless
included a unity of resource clause. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
all the boundaries agreed upon between the Russian Federation and its
former republics contain such clauses, with the exception of the Estonia-
Latvia delimitation agreement.36 The clause agreed upon between Estonia
and the Russian Federation is however the first in the Baltic Sea region
which includes a reference to the prevention of pollution of the marine
environment.
4 Geographic Considerations
The geographical configuration of the maritime boundary area is one of
oppositeness and adjacency alike, for the river Narva empties into the Gulf
of Finland in an area where the Estonian coast runs in a general east-west
direction, whereas the Russian coast rather in a north-south one. The area
immediately surrounding the mouth of the river Narva is concave on a
smooth coast. The length of the Estonian mainland coastline in the area to
be delimited is substantially longer than the Russian one, but this is somewhat
compensated by the presence of islands in the area and their ownership,
as will be seen next.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-tide Elevations Considerations
There are many islands in the area to be delimited, great and small, but most
of them belong to the Russian Federation. All of them were given full effect,
as explicitly indicated in the agreement.37 The islands that seem to have had
a direct impact on the delimitation line are Vaindloo on the Estonian side,
and Rodser, Maloi Tjuters, and Bolsoi Tjuters on the Russian side.
36 Franckx, supra note 28, at 3528.
37 Maritime Boundary Treaty, supra note 2, Article 1, where it is stated that the median line will
be measured between points on the low-water line along the coasts, “including islands”.
4576 Report 10-22
6 Baseline Considerations
When the Soviet Union introduced a system of straight baselines in the Baltic
Sea in 1985,38 the entire Gulf of Narva and most of the waters of the Gulf
of Finland in the area to be delimited today between Estonia and the Russian
Federation, were to be found on the inside of the relevant segments of these
baselines, determined by turning points located on the islands of Vaindloo,
Rodser and Gogland.39 Theoretically, therefore, the Parties could have
claimed in 1991 that the area surrounding the Gulf of Narva constituted
historic waters, common to both Parties. Estonia, however, had already indicated,
when similar issues were at stake in its relationship with Latvia in the
Gulf of Riga, that it strongly objected to such a legal construction, exactly
with the Gulf of Narva in mind.40
Estonia introduced its proper system of baselines in the area in 1993, as
already mentioned above.41 It is clear when analyzing the starting point of
the Maritime Boundary Treaty, which is located at the mouth of the river
Narva, that the starting point of the Estonian baseline system was not upheld,
since it is located on the Russian side of the 2005 delimitation line.
The baselines themselves do not seem to have influenced the delimitation
line. Only certain of its turning points did have such effect.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
Despite the fact that a unity of resource clause was included in the Maritime
Boundary Treaty, geological and geomorphological considerations do not
appear to have played any significant role in the bilateral negotiations between
the Parties concerned.
In the area under consideration, no marked seabed features can be found.
Depths in the area never reach 200 meters.
38 Decree of 15 January 1985, On the Confirmation of a List of Geographic Coordinates
Determining the Position of the Baseline in the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic Sea and Black Sea
from which the Width of the Territorial Waters, Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of the
U.S.S.R. is Measured, 1 (Annex) IZVESHCHENIIA MOREPLAVATELIAM 22-39 and 47 (1986) (hereinafter
1985 Decree).
39 For a visualization of the 1985 Decree, see ATLAS OF THE STRAIGHT BASELINES 200 (Tullio
Scovazzi, Giampiero Francalanci, Daniela Romano & Sergio Mongardini eds., 1989).
40 Estonia-Latvia (1996), Report Number 10-15, at 3000.
41 See sub II, 1.
Estonia-Russia 4577
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
The agreement itself indicates that the delimitation line is based on the
median line measured from the low-water mark along the mainland coasts
and those of islands. A closer study of the turning points indicates that some
of them appear to be equidistant, while others are not, indicating that areacompensation
has been applied in order to arrive at the delimitation line
described in the Maritime Boundary Treaty.
Some ambiguity exists when reading the Maritime Boundary Treaty with
respect to the manner in which the tripoint with Finland has to be arrived at.
Article 1 suggests that this point still has to be arrived at by means of a
separate agreement with Finland, whereas Article 2 fixes the terminal point
in the west by means of fixed coordinates. This probably has to be explained
by the fact that during the long negotiations at a particular moment in time,
when progress was made during the years 1995-1996, technical experts of
the three neighboring States consulted with each other with a view to arrive
at a trilateral agreement. However, due to the remaining fundamental differences
between Estonia and the Russian Federation, this did not materialize.
As a result, it might well be that point nine of the present agreement reflects
the outcome of these trilateral contacts held during the middle of the 1990s,
indicating that the three countries will have no difficulty in agreeing on the
tripoint already mentioned in Article 2.42
9 Technical Considerations
The lines connecting the different turning points are loxodromes, i.e. straight
lines. Two sets of coordinates are provided for the nine turning or terminal
points, one using the 1942 coordinate system called Karasov ellipsoid, relied
upon by the Russian charts, and the other using the World Geodetic System
1984 (ellipsoid WGS-84), used by the Estonian charts. In this respect the
Maritime Boundary Treaty resembles the Lithuania-Russia agreement concerning
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, and thus constitutes
only the third exception to the settled practice in the Baltic Sea that
all maritime boundary agreements concluded since the 1990s have used
42 For more details, see Franckx and Kamga, supra note 1, at 403 and 409, note 89.
4578 Report 10-22
WGS-84.43 The Russian Federation, in other words, is the only country
insisting on using its proper, be it older system.
Both sets of geographical coordinates define the same location on the
earth’s surface and are said in the Treaty to be equivalent. The appended
charts form an integral part of the treaty. This again is rather exceptional
when compared with the other delimitation agreement recently concluded in
the area. Once again the present agreement resembles the maritime delimitation
treaty practice between Latvia and the Russian Federation.44 But if a
discrepancy were to occur between the line determined according to the geographic
coordinates and the line depicted on the charts, the former prevails.
10 Other Considerations
This is only the fourth agreement belonging to the fourth chronological group
in the overall Baltic Sea delimitation effort,45 which has been exclusively
drawn up in the respective languages of the Parties.46
At the same time it is only the fourth instance, but this time since the
Second World War, in the practice of the Baltic States that a dispute settlement
provision has been included in a maritime delimitation agreement.47 It
only specifically mentions negotiations as a means to resolve possible future
difficulties with respect to the interpretation or application of the Maritime
Boundary Treaty.48
III CONCLUSIONS
This agreement is unique in the State practice of the Baltic Sea maritime
delimitation process in that it is the first time that one of the Parties, after
43 Lithuania-Russia (1997), Report Number 10-18(1), at 3067-3068. The second agreement concluded
between these two countries on the same day, delimiting their land border and territorial
sea, even does totally away with the WGS-84 system, since only the Russian 1942 system
of coordinates is relied upon. Lithuania-Russia (1997), Report Number 10-18(2), at 3081.
44 Lithuania-Russia (1997), Report Number 10-18(1), at 3068 and Report Number 10-18(2), at
3081.
45 See supra note 3.
46 For the other agreements, see Estonia-Finland (1996), Report Number 10-16 and Lithuania-
Russia (1997), Report Numbers 10-18(1) and 10-18(2).
47 For the other agreements containing such a provision, see Estonia-Latvia (1996), Report
Number 10-15, Lithuania-Russia (1997), Report Number 10-18(1) and Latvia-Lithuania
(1999), Report Number 10-20.
48 In that it resembles the Lithuanian-Russian agreement, for the other two agreements mentioned
in the previous note also refer to other possible means of dispute resolution.
Estonia-Russia 4579
having signed a delimitation agreement, informs its counterpart that it will
not ratify the agreement. As explained before, this withdrawal of signature
can only be explained by reference to what some have qualified as an “undigested
past” between the two Parties.49
Neither the Border Treaty, nor the Maritime Boundary Treaty are therefore
at present legally binding between the Parties. Nevertheless the Parties
have been living in respect of this demarcation line for quite some time
now.50 Moreover, the head of the Russian delegation, V. Chizhov, has
expressed the view that, even if the Russian Federation insists on the fact
that negotiations have to start all over again, it lies not in the intention to
start drawing new lines.51 An attempt by some Estonian citizens to contest
the constitutionality of the Act of Ratification of the Border Treaty and the
Maritime Boundary Treaty has in the mean time been dismissed by the
Supreme Court of Estonia.52 The analysis of the present maritime boundary
may, as a consequence, not be devoid of any concrete relevance after all.53
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
Estonia: Not Party to any of the four 1958 Conventions, or to the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea at time of signature.
Russia: Party to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, as well as the Convention on
Continental Shelf (ratified 22 November 1960); Party to the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (ratified 12 March 1997).
49 Jeroen Bult, Everyday Tensions Surrounded by Ghosts from the Past: Baltic-Russian Relations
Since 1991, in GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES: A BALTIC OUTLOOK 127 (Heli
Tiirmaa-Klaar, Tiago Marques eds., 2006).
50 Interview R. Mälk, supra note 34.
51 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia is Ready to Discuss the Frontier with Estonia Once
Again (in Russian), Lenta Ru, 6 July 2005. As available at <lenta.ru/news/2005/07/06/estonia/>.
Or as stated a few day later by the A. Yakovenko, spokesman of the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs: “But we surely do not bear in mind to discuss drawing any new border
lines”. As available at <www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/995e86
ebdf9efc9ec325703c0057999a?OpenDocument>.
52 Ruling of the Constitution Review Chamber of the Supreme Court of 8 September 2005, II
RIIGI TEATAJA, 11 July 2005, 18, 59. English translation available at <www.nc.ee/?id=380&gt;.
53 As already argued by the present author elsewhere. See Franckx and Kamga, supra note 1, at
395-396 and 419-420.
4580 Report 10-22
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Estonia: 12 n.m. territorial sea; 200 n.m. EEZ.
Russia: 12 n.m. territorial sea; 200 n.m. continental shelf and/or the outer
edge of the continental margin; 200 n.m. EEZ.
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Estonia: Acceded to the 1982 LOS Convention on 26 August 2005.
Russia: No change.
V REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
Erik Franckx and Maurice Kamga, L’existence éphémère du Traité de délimitation
maritime entre la République d’Estonie et la Fédération de Russie
en mer Baltique, 12 ANNUAIRE DU DROIT DE LA MER 2007 393 (2008).
Prepared by Erik Franckx
Vrije Universiteit Brussel

4582 Report 10-22
Treaty between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation
on the Delimitation of the Maritime Areas in the Gulf of Narva and
the Gulf of Finland54
The Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to
as the Parties,
Desiring to delimit the maritime areas in the Gulf of Narva and the Gulf of
Finland based on the principles of respect for State sovereignty and territorial
integrity,
Aspiring to develop good neighborly relations between the two countries,
Taking into account the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The delimitation line of the maritime areas between the Republic of Estonia
and the Russian Federation in the Gulf of Narva and the Gulf of Finland
(hereinafter “delimitation line”) is based on the median line drawn in such a
manner that every point is equidistant to the closest point on the low-water
line along the coasts (including islands) of both States.
The starting point of the delimitation line (point 1) is located at the mouth
of the river Narva and corresponds to the land border terminal point between
the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation. The terminal point of
the delimitation line (point 9) is located at the point of intersection of the
lines delimiting the maritime areas between the Republic of Estonia, the
Russian Federation, and the Republic of Finland, to be determined by a
separate agreement between these three States.
Article 2
The delimitation line follows straight lines (loxodromes) connecting points
with the following geographic coordinates:
54 Translated into English from the original Russian version by the author.
Estonia-Russia 4583
– in the 1942 coordinate system (Karasov ellipsoid)
1) Latitude 59°28.300' N, Longitude 28°02.695' E;
2) Latitude 59°28.485' N, Longitude 28°02.577' E;
3) Latitude 59°29.154' N, Longitude 27°57.791' E;
4) Latitude 59°32.739' N, Longitude 27°48.832' E;
5) Latitude 59°39.150' N, Longitude 27°23.250' E;
6) Latitude 59°37.117' N, Longitude 27°03.333' E;
7) Latitude 59°39.750' N, Longitude 26°49.133' E;
8) Latitude 59°49.337' N, Longitude 26°37.865' E;
9) Latitude 59°59.700' N, Longitude 26°20.500' E.
The enumerated points and the delimitation line are depicted on the attached
Russian chart No. 22061 (INT 1214) scale 1:250,000, published in 1997.
– in the WGS-84 coordinate system (ellipsoid WGS-84):
1) Latitude 59°28.297' N, Longitude 28°02.564' E;
2) Latitude 59°28.481' N, Longitude 28°02.446' E;
3) Latitude 59°29.150' N, Longitude 27°57.660' E;
4) Latitude 59°32.735' N, Longitude 27°48.701' E;
5) Latitude 59°39.146' N, Longitude 27°23.118' E;
6) Latitude 59°37.112' N, Longitude 27°03.201' E
5) Latitude 59°39.745' N, Longitude 26°49.001' E;
8) Latitude 59°49.332' N, Longitude 26°37.732' E;
9) Latitude 59°59.695' N, Longitude 26°20.366' E.
The enumerated points and the delimitation line are depicted on the attached
Estonian chart scale 1:250,000 (1998 special edition).
The corresponding points on the delimitation line thus determined in the
aforementioned coordinate systems are equivalent.
The aforementioned Estonian and Russian charts that illustrate the delimitation
line constitute an integral part of this Treaty.
Within the framework of interpretation of this article, the description of the
course of the delimitation line given herein will be of decisive
importance.
4584 Report 10-22
Article 3
Each Party observes the delimitation line as the limit of its sovereignty, of
its sovereign rights and of any other form of coastal State jurisdiction that
can be exercised over maritime areas in accordance with international law.
Article 4
In the event of discovery of mineral resources (deposits) lying on both sides
of the delimitation line, the Parties will endeavor to reach agreement on the
most efficient methods of joint exploitation of the deposit, as well as on the
mineral resource extraction processes in order to ensure the adoption of
appropriate measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment, as
foreseen by the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the Baltic Sea Area of 1992 (Helsinki Convention).
Article 5
Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty will
be resolved through negotiations between the Parties.
Article 6
This Treaty is subject to ratification and will enter into force 30 days after
the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Done in Moscow on 18 May 2005 in two original versions, each in the
Estonian and Russian languages, both texts having equal authority.
For the Republic of Estonia For the Russian Federation
Benin-Nigeria
Report Number 4-14
Treaty on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation between The Federal
Republic of Nigeria and The Republic of Benin
Signed: 4 August 2006
Entry into force: Not in force
Published at: Unpublished
I SUMMARY
The Treaty provides for a boundary drawn according to modified equidistance
principles, according to which each State ceded to the other equal areas
of maritime space in order to arrive at a solution which each regarded as
equitable. The boundary is described as “partial”, but that description is
applied only to denote the fact that the southern terminus of the boundary is
dependent upon reaching agreement with a third State on a tri-point.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations
The land boundary between Nigeria and Benin runs for the most part in a
direct North-South line from the River Niger to the coast. The original
delimitation is contained in the Anglo-French Treaty of 1906, as modified in
part by a Protocol of 1912. These agreements set out the boundary between
the British and French possessions from the Gulf of Guinea to the Niger.
They were adopted by Nigeria on Independence, 1 October 1960. No specific
agreement was contained in the legal instruments concerning the maritime
boundary: in so far as there was a boundary, it was the customary line
extending three n.m. offshore.
D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 4256-4269.
© 2011. The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
Benin-Nigeria 4257
In 1968 an American oil company interested in the potential for offshore
deposits was requested by the Benin government to carry out a delimitation
exercise in order to facilitate exploration. Nigeria protested at this action and
agreement was reached to set up a Joint Boundary Commission to study and
delimit the maritime boundary. That Commission did not in fact meet until
June 1981 in Lagos, Nigeria. At the meeting it was noted that no delimitation
existed and three other items were agreed:
a) The topographic map of the Benin/Nigeria coastal region produced by
Nigeria’s Federal Surveys at a scale of 1:25,000 would be adopted as
the Commission’s initial material;
b) The median line principle as defined in Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf would be adopted in order to
delimit a boundary up to 200 n.m. offshore; and
c) A Joint Team of Experts should meet to delimit the boundary.
The Joint Commission held several meetings in 1981-1982 and a draft agreement
was prepared and presented to the respective governments in October
1982. The line that was proposed was a single straight line running slightly
east of south for 200 n.m., terminating within Nigeria’s EEZ. The Commission
met again in June 1983 and resolved that its recommendations regarding the
maritime boundary should be given legal effect. However a review of the
proposed delimitation was then undertaken by a panel of experts, who concluded
that the materials and methods used were inadequate. The technical
reports produced by the Nigerian experts were not ratified by the Federal
Government.
Then, in December 1982, the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention
was signed by 119 nations, including Nigeria, and Benin signed in 1983.
Nigeria ratified the Convention in 1986, and Benin in 1997. All further deliberations
were conducted under the aegis of the Convention. Proper Admiralty
Charts were procured and, in due course, satellite imagery and ground-truthing
exercises were carried out by experts to determine the precise course of
the coastline.
A debate also took place as to whether a median line or perpendicular
solution was more appropriate. These debates were given added force by
increasing hydrocarbon exploration activity in the area, particularly in the
Seme Field, which was adjacent to the putative boundary. Ashland Oil was
carrying out exploration on behalf of Benin, and the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation held an oil prospecting licence to the east of Seme.
4258 Report 4-14
One of the issues that had been identified on the Nigerian side was the
interdependence of the Benin boundary with Nigeria’s other potential maritime
boundaries in the Gulf of Guinea. These issues were potentially of great
importance in determining the southward reach of the delimitation, taking
into account full 200 n.m. Exclusive Economic Zones. Furthest to the east
was Nigeria’s unresolved maritime boundary with Cameroon, in respect of
which Cameroon made potentially far-reaching claims before the International
Court of Justice in the proceedings which commenced in March 1994. That
boundary was not resolved until the Court gave judgment in October 2002.
During the intervening period Nigeria embarked upon intensive negotiations
with both Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. The Court’s
Judgment and the treaties concluded by Nigeria are the subject of Report
Numbers 4-1, 4-9, and 4-10 herein.
It was apparent that the Benin-Nigeria line was always going to be subject
to a degree of ‘cut-off’ to the south. It was also apparent that Benin was
unlikely ever to be able to make a claim to extend its EEZ under Article 76
of UNCLOS. This was in fact an important consideration for Nigeria. At the
time the boundary negotiations were being conducted Nigeria was itself well
advanced in its consideration of a submission under Article 76. However, the
main factor inhibiting Benin’s desire to ‘reach open sea’ was quite simply
the natural configuration of Nigeria’s coastline once the principle of a median
line solution was accepted. Benin was always going to be bounded to the
east and south by Nigeria’s EEZ.
These and other considerations became the subject of intensive negotiations
within the Joint Commission, and a series of meetings were held, alternating
between Cotonou and Lagos commencing in 2001 and culminating in
signature of the Treaty in Abuja in August 2006.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
The Treaty was negotiated in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS
and provides for a single, all purpose boundary. For the avoidance of doubt,
the Treaty (Article 5) sets out expressly that the Federal Republic of Nigeria
shall not “claim, or exercise sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction over
the airspace, waters, seabed or subsoil” to the west of the boundary established
by the Treaty. A reciprocal obligation is imposed on Benin in respect
of such rights lying to the east of the boundary line. Article 9 of the Treaty
provides that disputes between the Parties concerning interpretation or application
of the Treaty shall be settled by negotiation between the two States,
Benin-Nigeria 4259
but that, “in the absence of a consensual agreement”, the Parties “may have
recourse either together or individually to mediation or any international
legal process”.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
As already indicated, the initial impetus for maritime boundary delimitation
between the two States stemmed from the desire of the commercial oil
companies to impose certainty on the limits for exploration and possible
future development. The offshore area was never likely to yield hydrocarbon
deposits in the prolixity to be found offshore the Niger Delta fan lying
to the east, and mainly within the area of Nigeria’s EEZ; thus, the need for
certainty was more pressing for Benin’s economic development than that of
Nigeria. Benin also felt a strong compulsion to try to push both east and
south as far as it could within the constraints of a median-line driven delimitation.
There was the added consideration, referred to further below, that
the configuration of the Togo coastline westwards from Benin is such that
a median line solution between those two States leads inevitably to a ‘pincer’
movement reminiscent of Germany’s geographical disadvantage in the
North Sea (although Togo suffers from a much more acute version of that
disadvantage, caught as it is in a concave stretch of coast between Benin
and Ghana).
The history of offshore hydrocarbon development in the area started with
the drilling of ten wells offshore Benin between 1967 and 1973, resulting in
the discovery of the Seme North Field in 1968, and Seme South in 1970. The
initial exploration and development was by Saga Petroleum of Norway.
Thereafter, the Benin Ministry of Energy took over the operation with support
from Ashland Oil. The World Bank supported a major restructuring effort in
the 1990's, and by 2000 there was sufficient interest for Benin to license a 2.5
million acre deepwater offshore block ranging from depths of 300 to 10,000
ft to Kerr-McGee Corp. of Oklahoma City. The operation had always been
regarded as economically marginal, but reserve additions in the mid-1990's
and increased investment with guaranteed gas contracts extended the field
life. It was believed by Kerr-McGee that there could be considerable exploration
potential since Benin is perceived to be on the fringes of the ‘Golden
Triangle’ of the Atlantic Margin basins which stretch from West Africa to the
Gulf of Mexico and down to Brazil.
All this interest spurred on Benin to seek a properly delimited boundary
with Nigeria.
4260 Report 4-14
4 Geographic Considerations
The smooth nature of the coastal configuration as between Nigeria, Benin
and Togo, with a gentle curve westwards bending in a more southerly direction
as it approaches Ghana was such as to produce a median line proceeding
from the most southerly boundary pillar (BN 12) at 6° 22' 28.30" N, 2° 42'
25.30" E slightly east of due south for a distance of some 150 n.m., and then,
at a point with the co-ordinates 3° 38' 14.90" N, 3° 00' 58.05" E, suddenly
shifts markedly west of south. The reason for this is the configuration caused
by the major ‘bulge’ in Nigeria’s coastline, and the lesser ‘bulge’ in Ghana’s
coastline which means that the median line “every point of which is equidistant
from the nearest base points on the baselines of the states concerned” (as per
the wording of the 1958 and 1982 Conventions) generated a line which took
a sharp turn away from the Nigerian coastline and back towards Ghana, thus
“cutting off” quite a sizeable triangle of maritime space as far as Benin was
concerned. The line thus produced is then intersected by the Togo/Ghana
line and the last 12 n.m. becomes a purely Nigeria/Ghana line as it heads
towards the outer limits of the respective Nigerian and Ghanaian EEZ’s.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-tide Elevations Considerations
There are no island, rock, reef, or low-tide elevation considerations to be
taken into account along this virtually featureless length of coastline, which
shelves gently into the so-called Bight of Benin.
6 Baseline Considerations
The straight and featureless nature of the coastline means that very small
variations in coastal points close to the boundary could have a very large
influence on the direction of the median line. As soon as the points on the
Niger Delta coast, and, latterly, the Ghanaian coast, are taken into account a
much more stable line is produced. For these reasons a very detailed coastal
survey on either side of the median line start point was undertaken, in order
to produce the most accurate baselines possible. As mentioned, a combination
of satellite imagery and ground truthing exercises were undertaken to
generate the most stable representation of the median line possible.
As a result of these surveys it became apparent that all existing charts,
including those produced by the UK Hydrographic Office, were out of date
Benin-Nigeria 4261
and in fact misrepresented the coastline as it existed by the time of the negotiations.
This was mainly because the coastline of Benin had actually receded
as the result of the extensive sand mining which had taken place since the last
set of charts had been produced, and parts of the Nigerian coast were in error
by as much as two n.m. in places. The northern part of the boundary was based
on the new survey and the southern part of the boundary was established using
a satellite image-based coastal model which Nigeria had produced.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
Apart from the near-shore discovery of the Seme Field there has been little
exploration in the western part of the Niger Delta in the region of the Benin-
Nigeria boundary. Likewise exploration in Benin has so far proved disappointing.
Although some of the geological structures are likely to extend
westwards from the main producing areas in Nigeria, the hydrocarbon potential
in the boundary region is not comparable with that in the main delta
region to the east.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
A strict median line construction of the boundary produces, as has been
noted above, a line which appears to “chop out” a triangle of maritime space
in the southern part of the delimitation. Despite the incontrovertible nature
of the median line calculation caused by the “accidents of geography” in the
area, Benin felt strongly that a more equitable result would be achieved if
there was to be a less marked “turn” of the line. Work was therefore done
to “straighten out” the most southerly section, resulting in a “gain” by Benin
of some 800 sq. km. of space. In the event, Nigeria agreed to this, but the
quid pro quo was that Nigeria should “gain” 800 sq. km. in the northern
section of the line. This was achieved by adjusting the median line marginally
to the west until Nigeria had an equivalent amount of additional space.
The resultant line thus looks not unlike a straightforward meridian drawn as
a perpendicular from the coastline, terminating at the limit of Benin’s 200
n.m. EEZ limit: only then does the line swing westwards, now at an angle
close to 90 degrees to the meridian. The line then tracks the 200 n.m. southern
limit of Benin’s EEZ, stopping one n.m. short of the putative Nigeria/
Benin/Ghana tripoint. Finalisation of the line awaits the outcome of negotiations
between Nigeria and Ghana.
4262 Report 4-14
9 Technical Considerations
Whilst the final Treaty signed by the respective Heads of State in Abuja on
4 August 2006 reflects the agreement reached by the Joint Technical
Committee at their final meeting in Abuja on 10 June 2005, it will be noted
that the graphic annexed to the Treaty, and initialled by the Heads of State
is not, in fact, a maritime chart, as described in Article 4, but a graphic. As
the rubric on the graphic states, it was produced to illustrate the proposed
Nigeria-Benin Maritime Boundary in Abuja in February 2005. As such, it
was, in fact, the graphic portrayal of the line which was to be agreed by the
Joint Technical Committee. The graphic also sets out on its face the table of
Coordinates for the six Boundary Turning Points, marked ‘A’ to ‘F’, giving
by way of additional information the coordinates of four other points used
in the construction of the line. WGS84 was used to reference the coordinates,
and it is stated that all lines are geodesics.
Reference to the wording in the Treaty however reveals the use both of
coordinates and azimuths, which is potentially confusing, as azimuths are
generally quoted with range and bearings. A geodetic azimuth would be a
valid concept for the start of a line, but geodesic lines are by nature curved,
and will change continuously along their length on a mercator chart. If the
line was to be drawn as a series of ‘geodetic azimuths’, the bearings for each
sector of the line would be as follows:
A-B 172° 48' 40.6"
B-C 175° 04' 33.5"
C-D 185° 34' 19.2"
D-E 262° 15' 18.2"
E-F 263° 54' 14.4"
F-G 264° 52' 34.8"
If the D-F section was to be changed to reflect 200 n.m. arcs (which would
be the technically correct approach), the basepoint from which to measure
those arcs would be 6° 22' 28.3" N, 2° 42' 25.3" E. By connecting D-E-F
with straight lines rather than using arcs, Benin loses about 0.5 sq. km. (0.3
sq. km. re D-E, and 0.2 sq. km. re E-F).
Technically speaking Article 2, sub-para vi of the Treaty is incorrectly
stated as the azimuth will change after point F, as indicated above: also, the
line is clearly more westerly than south westerly in direction.
With regard to the start point of the line on the coast, this is given in
Article 2 as ‘Point A’, with geographical coordinates. Those are the coordinates
of the final land boundary pillar (BN12, referred to above), not, as
Benin-Nigeria 4263
described in the Treaty, ‘the intersection of the Nigeria-Benin land boundary
and the coastline’.
The reference in Article 6 to resources “over-lapping” the boundary line
is clearly intended as a reference to potential straddling resources, in respect
of which unitisation or a joint development regime appears to be
contemplated.
10 Other Considerations
None.
III CONCLUSIONS
Agreement on the Benin-Nigeria maritime boundary took five years to reach,
despite the seemingly relatively straightforward configuration of the coastline.
It did however mark the effective culmination of a determined policy
on the part of Nigeria to delimit all her maritime boundaries in the Gulf of
Guinea. This rapidly came to the forefront of Nigeria’s foreign policy following
the return to civilian rule under Olusegun Obasanjo in May 1999
after successive years of military dictatorship. It was an impressive display
of determined political will and formed a valuable contribution to the international
rule of law. The final agreement on the line was the result of genuine
concessions being made on both sides in a true sense of African
compromise, coupled with an ingenious technical solution which was both
elegant and eminently practical.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
Nigeria: Party to the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea; Party
to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (ratified 1986).
Benin: Party to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (ratified
1997).
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Nigeria: 12 n.m. territorial sea (1998); 200 n.m. EEZ (Exclusive Economic
Zone Decree 1978, No 28).
4264 Report 4-14
Benin: 200 n.m. territorial sea (Decree 76-92: effective 2 April 1976).
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Nigeria: No change.
Benin: 12 n.m. territorial sea; 200 n.m. EEZ.
V REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
None.
Prepared by Prepared by Tim Daniel
(with the assistance of Robin Cleverly of UKHO)

4266 Report 4-14
Treaty on the Maritime
Boundary Delimitation
between
The Federal Republic of Nigeria
and
The Republic of Benin
Preamble
The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
And
The Government of the Republic of Benin
Hereinafter called “the Parties”
• Desirous to strengthen the excellent friendly relationship and cooperation
between the Parties;
• Desirous to establish, through negotiations, the common maritime
boundary;
• Taking into account the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 10th December, 1982 (Montego Bay Convention);
• Concerned about the common interests of the Parties, as immediate neighbours
and in the spirit of brotherliness and goodwill;
• Relying on the results of the different exercises of Boundary Delimitation
by the Parties.
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
CHAPTER I: Purpose of the Treaty and Description of the Maritime
Boundary
Article 1
Purpose
The purpose of this Treaty is to establish the partial maritime boundary
between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Benin and
provide for the remainder of the maritime boundary in accordance with
Article 2(vi).
Benin-Nigeria 4267
Article 2
Description of the Maritime Boundary
Starting from Point A with the geographical coordinates,
Latitude: 06º 22' 29.5"N, Longitude: 02º 42' 25.3"E situated on the intersection
of the Nigeria-Benin land boundary and the coastline, established and
accepted as the point of reference by the two countries, the boundary line
runs:
i. On the geodetic line on an azimuth of 172º 49' 37.2" up to Point B with
the geographical coordinates, Latitude: 05º 26' 44.4"N, Longitude:
02º 49' 26.3"E.
ii. From Point B, the boundary line runs on an azimuth of 175º 05' 59.8"
up to Point C, with the geographical coordinates, Latitude: 03º 34' 36.4"N,
Longitude: 02º 59' 03.1"E.
iii. From Point C the boundary line runs on an azimuth of 185º 32' 33.5" up
to Point D, with the geographical coordinates, Latitude: 03º 01' 39.9"N.
Longitude: 02º 55' 51.3"E on the 200M line of Benin EEZ.
iv. From Point D, the boundary line runs on an azimuth of 262º 12' 42.0"
on the 200M line of Benin EEZ to Point E with the geographical coordinates,
Latitude: 03º 00' 50.1"N, Longitude: 02º 49' 47.2"E.
v. From Point E it runs on an azimuth of 263º 52' 10.0" to Point F with the
geographical coordinates, Latitude: 03º 00' 15.6"N, Longitude: 02º 44'
26.0"E.
vi. Beyond Point F, the maritime boundary shall continue in a south westerly
direction along the same azimuth as the geodetic line joining Point
E and F, as far as the point at which it meets any maritime boundary to
be agreed between either of the Parties and a third State.
CHAPTER II: Reference of the Points used and the Delimitation of the
Boundary
Article 3
Datum
All the geographical positions mentioned in Article 2 are referenced to the
World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS. 84)
4268 Report 4-14
Article 4
Charting the Line
The layout of the maritime boundary between the Federal Republic of Nigeria
and the Republic of Benin, is as shown on the maritime chart attached to this
Treaty as Annexure.
CHAPTER III: Sovereignty, Jurisdiction of States and Exploitation of
Resources
Article 5
Sovereignty and jurisdiction of States
For the avoidance of doubt and subject to any other agreement on the matter
that they may come to, the Parties agree on the following:
i. To the West of the boundary established by this Treaty, the Federal
Republic of Nigeria shall not claim or exercise sovereignty, sovereign
rights or jurisdiction over the airspace, waters, sea-bed or subsoil.
ii. To the East of the boundary established by this Treaty the Republic of
Benin shall not claim or exercise sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction
over the airspace, waters, sea-bed or subsoil.
Article 6
Exploitation of Common Resources
In the case of the discovery of natural resources over-lapping the boundary
line, both countries shall work out an equitable sharing agreement.
CHAPTER IV: Miscellaneous Provisions
Article 7
i. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the extant
procedure in each of the two countries.
ii. This Treaty shall be applied provisionally, as from the date of signature,
and shall enter into force upon the exchange of the instruments of
ratification between the Parties.
iii. The annexure is an integral part of this Treaty.
Benin-Nigeria 4269
Article 8
Registration
As soon as possible after this Treaty has entered into force, it shall be registered
with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 9
Resolution of disputes
i. Disputes between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application
of this Treaty shall be settled by negotiation between the two States.
ii. In the absence of a consensual agreement, the Parties may have recourse
either together or individually to mediation or any international legal
process.
Done at Abuja this 4th day of August 2006, in two originals of French and
English, both texts being equally authentic.
H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, GCFR H.E. Dr. Boni YAYI
President of the Federal President of the
Republic of Nigeria. Republic of Benin,
Head of State,
Head of Government.
D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 4479-4487.
© 2011. The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
Norway-Russian Federation
Report Number 9-6 (2)
Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian
Federation on the Maritime Delimitation in the Varangerfjord area
Signed: 11 July 2007
Entry into force: 9 July 2008
Published at: Norway: Electronic Treaty Register http://www.lovdata
.no/traktater (2007-07-11 No. 15); Stortingsproposisjon
nr. 3 (2007-2008).1
I SUMMARY
This Agreement establishes a short all-purpose maritime boundary between
Norway and Russia in the Varangerfjord area. The boundary delimits the
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf and “other
maritime areas established in accordance with international law.” Provision
is made for the unitization of transboundary deposits in the continental
shelf.
The Agreement effectively replaces the 1957 Agreement and Descriptive
Protocol delimiting the territorial waters between Norway and the Soviet
Union.2 It updates and clarifies certain points established in the 1957
Agreement, supplements the latter Agreement and establishes the delimitation
line for the continental shelf and other areas of jurisdiction within the
mouth of the Varangerfjord and beyond the latter in a roughly northeasterly
direction into the Barents Sea. The total length of the all-purpose boundary
established by the Agreement is of 39.41 n.m. (73 km.).
1 The Norwegian parliamentary bill is available at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok
/regpubl/stprp/2007-2008/stprp-nr-3-2007-2008-.html?id=488644.
2 Report Number 9-6 in volume II of this work.
4480 Report 9-6 (2)
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations
As of April 2010, the 2007 Agreement (which effectively replaces that of
1957) is the only maritime delimitation agreement in force between Norway
and the Russian Federation. However, on 27 April 2010, Norwegian and
Russian negotiating delegations reached a preliminary agreement on the
bilateral maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. A
comprehensive Treaty concerning maritime delimitation and cooperation in
those areas is envisaged.3
During the Cold War the area covered by this Agreement marked the
boundary between two opposing alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It
was an area of considerable political and military sensitivity.4 Even with the
end of the Cold War, the area remains sensitive.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
Both Norway and Russia are Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea, and both have now enacted legislation concerning the territorial sea
(of 12 n.m.), contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf, as well as baselines. Russia had already established a territorial sea of
12 n.m. prior to the conclusion of the 1957 Agreement, while Norway’s territorial
sea had at the time a breadth of 4 n.m. As of 1 January 2004, Norway
extended its territorial sea to 12 n.m. Both Parties have also adopted legislation
concerning a 24 n.m. contiguous zone.
The 1957 Agreement had established a delimitation line for the territorial
waters in the inner part of the Varangerfjord, up to the intersection of the
Russian 12 n.m. limit and the Norwegian 4 n.m. limit. The Agreement furthermore
prohibited any extension of the Parties’ territorial waters beyond a
straight line extending from that intersection up to the median point in the
mouth of the Varangerfjord, between Cape Nemetsky and Cape Kibergnes
(Article 1, second paragraph).5
3 Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic
Ocean, signed by the Norwegian Prime Minister and the Russian President on 27 April
2010.
4 See Report Number 9-6.
5 The median point between Cape Nemetsky and Cape Kibergnes is referred to as point 4 in the
2007 Agreement.
Norway-Russian Federation 4481
The 2007 Agreement maintains the delimitation line for the territorial
waters established in 1957, which is the segment between points 1 and 2. It
supplements the 1957 Agreement by continuing the line between the Parties’
territorial seas, along the straight line referred to, through the segment
between points 2 and 3, reflecting Norway’s extension of its territorial sea to
12 n.m. in 2004. The total length of the delimitation line between the two
States’ territorial seas is thus of 22.67 n.m. (42 km.). Through the 2007
Agreement the two States furthermore supplemented the 1957 Agreement by
deciding, by common agreement, to continue 3.77 n.m. (7 km.) along that
straight line to establish the delimitation line between the Norwegian territorial
sea and the Russian continental shelf, economic zone and contiguous
zone, partly within and then beyond the mouth of the Varangerfjord. The
remaining 12.95 n.m. (24 km.) of the line constitute the delimitation line
between the Parties’ continental shelf, economic zones and contiguous
zones.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
Economic and environmental considerations do not seem to have played a
significant role as regards the boundary.
4 Geographic Considerations
The area covered by the Agreement lies in and beyond the mouth of the
Varangerfjord into the Barents Sea. Most of the marine area in question lies
between that part of the Norwegian coast forming the southern coastline of
the Varanger Peninsula (south of Vardø) and Russia’s westernmost northern
coastline (chiefly the western side of the Rybachiy Peninsula). Points 5
and 6 take the delimitation line in a northeasterly direction by approximately
15 n.m. beyond the mouth of the Varangerfjord.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-tide Elevations Considerations
As was the case with the 1957 Agreement, no such features were relevant in
this case.
4482 Report 9-6 (2)
6 Baseline Considerations
For a description of Norway’s straight baseline across the mouth of the
Varangerfjord, see Report Number 9-6.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
As was the case in 1957, geological and geomorphological considerations
were not taken into account in determining the course of the boundary.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
The method adopted in 1957 is described in Report Number 9-6. The insertion
of a new point (no. 3) into the 1957 line does not appear to affect the
course of the line to any significant degree. It marks the point where the
outer limits of the respective 12 n.m. territorial seas meet. Like point 4
(which was the last point in the 1957 Agreement), points 5 and 6 are equidistant
points: point 5 is equidistant between Cape Kibergnes (Norway) and
Cape Nemetsky (Russia); and point 6 is equidistant between the Norwegian
island of Vardø and Cape Nemetsky.
9 Technical Considerations
The coordinates are defined in the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84),
whereas those in the 1957 Agreement had used the 1932 Pulkova system.
The six points in the present Agreement include (as points 1, 2 and 4) those
defined in the 1957 Agreement. Point 3, which is new, is the point of intersection
of the outer limits of the respective 12 n.m. territorial seas of the two
Parties.
10 Other Considerations
None.
Norway-Russian Federation 4483
III CONCLUSIONS
As noted in Report Number 9-6, the 1957 Agreement was a special case in
that the boundary ran through or very close to the territorial seas of the
Parties in the mouth of a gulf. Except as regards its final point, it was not
based on equidistance, but represented a pragmatic solution. The extension
of the straight line drawn in the 2007 Agreement, by way of contrast, is
based on equidistance, which may be thought appropriate as the line moves
further from the coast and beyond the mouth of the gulf.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
Norway: Party to the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958; Party to the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (ratified 24 June 1996).
Russian Federation: Party to the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958;
Party to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (ratified 12
March 1997).
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Norway: 12 n.m. territorial sea; continental shelf; exclusive economic zone;
contiguous zone.
Russian Federation: 12 n.m. territorial sea; continental shelf; exclusive economic
zone; contiguous zone.
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
None.
V REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
None.
Prepared by Michael Wood

Norway-Russian Federation 4485
Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of
Norway on the Maritime Delimitation in the Varangerfjord area
The Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway,
desiring to maintain and strengthen the good neighbourly relations,
having regard to the Agreement between the Royal Norwegian Government
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning
the Sea Frontier between Norway and the USSR in the Varangerfjord of 15
February 1957 and the Descriptive Protocol relating to the Sea Frontier
between Norway and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the
Varangerfjord, demarcated in 1957 of 29 November 1957,
taking into account the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,
have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The line described in Article 2 of the present Agreement shall delimit the
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf and other
maritime areas established in accordance with international law between
Norway and the Russian Federation in the Varangerfjord area.
Article 2
The line referred to in Article 1 of the present Agreement shall consist of
straight geodetic lines connecting the following points, including the points
defined in the Agreement between the Royal Norwegian Government and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Sea
Frontier between Norway and the USSR in the Varangerfjord of 15 February
1957 and the Descriptive Protocol relating to the Sea Frontier between
Norway and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Varangerfjord,
demarcated in 1957 of 29 November 1957:
1. 69° 47' 41.42" N 30° 49' 03.55" E
2. 69° 58' 45.49" N 31° 06' 15.58" E
3. 70° 05' 58.84" N 31° 26' 41.28" E
4486 Report 9-6 (2)
4. 70° 07' 15.20" N 31° 30' 19.43" E
5. 70° 11' 51.68" N 31° 46' 33.57" E
6. 70° 16' 28.95" N 32° 04' 23.00" E
The geographical coordinates of the above listed points are defined in World
Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84).
Point 3 on this line is the point of intersection of the outer limits of the territorial
sea of the Russian Federation and of the territorial sea of Norway in
the Varangerfjord as established in accordance with international law on the
date of the entry into force of the present Agreement.
By way of illustration, the delimitation line and the points listed above have
been drawn on the schematic chart annexed to the present Agreement. In
case of difference between the description of the line provided for in this
Article and the drawing of the line on the schematic chart, the description of
the line in this Article shall prevail.
Article 3
If, with respect to the continental shelf delimited by the present Agreement,
the existence of a hydrocarbon deposit in the continental shelf of one of the
Parties is established and the other Party is of the opinion that the said deposit
extends to its continental shelf, the latter Party may notify the former Party
accordingly and shall submit the data on which it bases its opinion. In such
event, the Parties shall discuss the extent of the deposit. If it is confirmed
that the deposit extends on both sides of the delimitation line, the Parties
shall make an agreement on the exploitation of such transboundary deposit as
a unit. Such agreement shall include the manner in which any such deposit
shall be most effectively exploited, the appointment of operator, the manner
in which the deposit and the proceeds relating thereto shall be apportioned
between the Parties and procedures to settle any disagreement relating
thereto.
Any agreement between the Parties on exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon
deposits in the continental shelf north of Point 6 as defined in Article
2 of the present Agreement shall also apply to the hydrocarbon deposits in
the continental shelf, crossed by the delimitation line described by the present
Agreement, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
Norway-Russian Federation 4487
Article 4
The present Agreement is without prejudice to the Parties’ positions with
respect to issues that are not governed by it and with respect to the rules of
international law relating to the law of the sea. Nothing in the present
Agreement shall affect the Parties’ positions with respect to delimitation in
other maritime areas, or shall be used in any way for the purpose of such
delimitation, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
Article 5
This Agreement shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on
the 30th day after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.
Done in duplicate in Moscow on the 11th of July 2007, each in Russian and
Norwegian languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 4462-4476.
© 2011. The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
Albania-Greece
Report Number 8-21
Agreement between the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of
Albania on the Delimitation of their Respective Continental Shelf
Areas and Other Maritime Zones to which They Are Entitled under
International Law
Signed: 27 April 2009
Entry into force: Not in force
Published at: Unpublished
I SUMMARY
On 27 April 2009 the Foreign Ministers of Albania and Greece signed an
agreement relating to delimitation in the Strait of Corfu and beyond it into
the south-eastern Adriatic Sea. It would delimit the territorial sea, the continental
shelf and other potential maritime zones between the adjacent coasts
of Albania and Greece as well as between the opposite coasts of Albania and
of the Greek island of Corfu and other minor Greek islands. The negotiated
boundary line extends 64.4 n.m. and connects 150 points by 149 straight
segments. The method of delimitation is equidistance.
It is unlikely, however, that the Agreement will be ratified by Albania.
Nonetheless, the negotiated text is important and instructive on several
points.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations
А Between the Parties
On 15 April 2010 the Constitutional Court of Albania found that in the
Agreement there are procedural and substantive violations of the Constitution
and of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The Court acted under Article
Albania-Greece 4463
131 of the 1998 Albanian Constitution (“The Constitutional Court decides
on . . . b) compatibility of international agreements with the Constitution, prior
to their ratification”). The decision by the Court, composed of nine judges,
was taken unanimously. The specific reasons for this decision are not yet
known. In a press interview given immediately after the decision, the
Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the government will respect
the finding by the Court.
The negotiated line relates to the delimitation of the territorial waters in
the Strait of Corfu, a waterway connecting the Ionian and the Adriatic Sea,
and between the continental coasts of Greece and Albania, on the one side,
and the Greek island of Corfu, on the other. In a Judgment rendered on 9
April 1949 (Corfu Channel case, United Kingdom v. Albania),1 the
International Court of Justice found that the Strait of Corfu is “a useful route
for international maritime traffic”, connecting two parts of the high seas and
being used for international navigation, even if there is an alternative and
much wider route of navigation west of Corfu, between this island and the
continental coast of Italy. The case related to an accident which occurred on
22 October 1946, when two destroyers of the British Navy in transit through
the strait struck a minefield in the northern exit of the strait laid by an
unknown State. 44 British sailors died and 42 suffered injuries, while one
ship (the Saumarez) was lost and the other (the Volage) damaged. Without
elaborating about the precise maritime boundary between Albania and
Greece, the Court assumed that, due to its very short distance from the
Albanian coast, the minefield had been laid “in Albanian territorial waters”.
In fact, “the distance of the nearest mine from the coast was only 500 metres”,
“the minelayers must have passed at not more than about 500 metres from
the coast between Denta Point and St. George’s Monastery”, and “the laying
of a minefield in these waters could hardly fail to have been observed by the
Albanian coastal defences”. The Court concluded that, even if it had not laid
the mines, Albania was under an obligation to notify, “for the benefit of
shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial
waters” and to warn “the approaching British warships of the imminent
danger to which the minefield exposed them.”
The decision by the Court had a great influence on the codification of
the regime of international straits, as reflected in the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the 1982
UN LOS Convention. The text of the negotiated Agreement (Article 5) sets
forth that none of its provisions affects “the navigational rights and freedoms”,
as provided for in the 1982 UN LOS Convention. However, the
1 ICJ Reports 1949, p. 244.
4464 Report 8-21
regime applying today to the Strait of Corfu is not fully clear. It could be
transit passage, that is the general 1982 UN LOS Convention regime applying
to straits used for international navigation. But it could also be innocent
passage, if the Strait of Corfu is considered as falling under the exceptional
regime set forth by Article 38, paragraph 1, of the same Convention for
straits “formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland”.
The doubt is due to the fact that the mainland side of the strait is
bordered by two States and not only by the State to which the island of
Corfu belongs, as the provision seems to require if literally interpreted.
B Between the Parties and Third States in the Region
Terminal point No. 150 of the negotiated line, located at a distance of 21.3
n.m. from the coasts of Albania and Greece and 22.2 n.m. from the coast of
Italy, falls slightly short of the equidistant triple point between Albania,
Greece and Italy. In the text, Albania and Greece provide that “the delimitation
shall subsequently be extended until it meets the equidistant tripoint by
applying the same methods as those used to determine the limit between
points 1 and 150” (Article 1, paragraph 4). Such a wording seems in contradiction
with the fact that any agreement on whether the triple point shall be
an “equidistant” point and on how to determine it must be reached with the
participation of the third State concerned (Italy). In the 1992 agreement on
the delimitation of their continental shelves (see Report Number 8-11 in
volume III of this work), Italy and Albania stopped the boundary line before
reaching the tri-point, reserving the completion of the line to later agreements
with the third States concerned, in the north Montenegro, and in the
south Greece. While it seems that there have been diplomatic contacts
between Greece and Italy and between Albania and Italy, negotiations
between the three countries have not yet taken place.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
In the preamble and in Article 2 the signatories make a general reference to
the relevant provisions of the 1982 UN LOS Convention, which is in force
for both Albania and Greece.
In the preamble the signatories declare themselves “aware of the need
to delimit precisely the maritime spaces over which the two countries exercise
or shall exercise sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance
with international law”. Taking also into account Article 2, this
Albania-Greece 4465
general formula can be understood as meaning an all-purpose delimitation,
applying to waters, seabed and subsoil, and delimiting the existing maritime
zones (territorial sea, continental shelf). In the future it would also apply to
the other zones that Albania and Greece are entitled to establish if they
wish to do so (exclusive economic zone or, as some other Mediterranean
States have done, fishing zone or ecological protection zone).
As the width of the respective territorial seas is different (12 n.m. for
Albania, 6 n.m. for Greece) the negotiated line would presently relate to the
respective territorial seas in the areas where the distance between the basepoints
does not exceed 12 n.m., to the Albanian territorial sea and the Greek
continental shelf in the areas where this distance extends between 12 and
24 n.m. and to the respective continental shelves in the areas where this
distance exceeds 24 n.m.
Under Article 6, disputes relating to the interpretation or application of
the negotiated Agreement should be settled by diplomatic means. If the dispute
is not settled within four months, it can be submitted “at the request of
either party, to the International Court of Justice or to any international body
chosen by mutual consent”. This provision would seem to constitute a basis
for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, if the
Agreement were to enter into force.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
Article 3 includes a rather detailed provision applying if a deposit of nonliving
resources, including sand and gravel, straddles the boundary line.
Article 3.1 would require the parties to endeavour to reach an agreement on
the method of exploitation, after prior consultations with the holders of
licenses. The same procedure would apply to determine a just compensation
if the resources have already been exploited (Article 3, paragraph 2).
Previously granted licenses would remain in force only within the limits of
the boundary established (Article 3, paragraph 3).
Under Article 4, all possible measures are to be taken to ensure that the
exploration or exploitation of the continental shelf does not adversely affect
the ecological balance or unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of
the sea. This seems to be an implicit reference to activities, such as navigation
and fishing, that take place in the superjacent waters.
4466 Report 8-21
4 Geographic Considerations
The configuration of the coastline in the area where the land boundary
between Albania and Greece reaches the sea has the effect of making an
equidistant line start in a south-west direction to turn rather suddenly northwards,
as soon as Corfu Island exercises its influence. Subsequently, the
general directions of the opposite coasts of Albania, on the one side, and of
the three Greek relevant islands of Corfu, Erikoussa and Othonoi (called also
Fanos), on the other, tend to diverge, the Albanian coastline being longer
than the sum of the coastlines of the Greek islands.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-tide Elevations Considerations
Article 1, paragraph 1 specifies that the line is equidistant from the nearest
points on the baselines, “both continental and insular”. While the Albanian
basepoints are located on the continental coast, almost all the Greek basepoints
are found on islands, either of medium (Corfu, 641 km²) or of small
size, such as the islands of Erikoussa (less than 5 km²) and Othonoi (about
10 km²), both located north-west of Corfu. All the Greek islands seem to
have been granted a full effect in the determination of the equidistant line.
6 Baseline Considerations
Article 1, paragraph 1 also provides that the equidistance line will be measured
“from the nearest points on the baseline (both continental and insular)
from which the breadth of the terriorial sea is measured” (Article 1, paragraph
1), without specifying whether the low-water line or straight baselines
are used. In fact, for the purpose of determining the equidistance line, the
negotiators took into account the closing lines of juridical bays existing along
their respective coastlines, that is of those bays that meet the conditions set
forth in Article 10, paragraphs 1 to 5 of the UN LOS Convention (closing
line not exceeding 24 n.m. and the semi-circle rule). While Greece has not
claimed straight baselines for any part of its coast, Albania has established a
straight baseline system along certain parts of its coastline (Decree No. 4650
of 9 March 1970, modified by Decree No. 7366 of 24 March 1990). However,
because of geographical reasons, the Albanian straight baselines do not seem
to influence the determination of the equidistant line.
Albania-Greece 4467
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
Geological and geomorphological considerations did not influence this
negotiation.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
The preamble (“deciding that the maritime boundary shall be determined on
the basis of the principle of equidistance that is expressed by the median
line”), as well as Article 1, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4, clearly state the intention
to effect a delimitation on the basis of equidistance and refer to it as a “principle”.
The same principle was used in the 1977 agreement on the delimitation
of the continental shelf between Greece and Italy (see Report Number
8-4 in volume II of this work). It is likely that the preference by Greece for
equidistance is also due to the complex and unsettled maritime boundary
issue with Turkey where Greece upholds equidistance as a “principle” as
regards the many Greek islands involved in the delimitation.
9 Technical Considerations
While specifying the geodetic system (Article 1, paragraph 3), the text makes
no reference to a nautical chart. Due to the desire to be as specific as possible
and due to the relatively limited length of the negotiated line, the 150
turning points are located very close to one another. The average density is
of about one turning point every 740 meters. This may explain why, unlike
other boundary treaties that define the coordinates of the turning points
in degrees, minutes, seconds and tenths of seconds, this text records the
coordinates to the hundredths of seconds. The geodetic system is WGS84
(Article 1, paragraph 3).
10 Other Considerations
None.
4468 Report 8-21
III CONCLUSIONS
If the signed Agreement ever enters into force, it will be an all purpose
delimitation treaty, applying for the time being to the territorial sea and the
continental shelf and subsequently to the other maritime zones that Albania
and Greece could establish. The method of equidistance was chosen both for
the short lateral delimitation between their continental coasts and, more
extensively, for the opposite delimitation between the Albanian continental
coast and a number of Greek islands of different size.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
C Law of the Sea Conventions
Albania: Party to the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention (acceded 7
December 1974); Party to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (acceded 23 June 2003).
Greece: Party to the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention (acceded 6
November 1972 with reservation); Party to the 1982 UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (ratified 21 July 1995).
D Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Albania: 12 n.m. territorial sea (Decree No. 7366 of 24 March 1990).
Greece: 6 n.m. territorial sea (Legislative Decree No. 187 of 1973).
E Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Albania: No change.
Greece: No change.
V REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
None.
Prepared by:
Tullio Scovazzi and Irini Papanicolopulu (legal analysis)
and Giampiero Francalanci (technical analysis)