INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean
(Somalia v Kenya)
COUNTER-MEMORIAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA
VOLUME III
18 DECEMBER 2017
Annex 77
United Nations General Assembly draft resolutions sponsored by Somalia, 1991
UNJTED
NATJONS
General Assembly
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14 October 1991
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ORIGINAL: FRENCH
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 28
QUESTION OF THE COMORXAN ISLAND OF MAYOTTE
ia. Bahrain.. Bena.n , Botswana. Burkina. Faso. Co mores, . .
Cuba.1 Guinea. Gabon= Gambia. Guinea.
9 'n _ * .
Jamahzr.r va.= Madacr . .
ascar. M~us. Morocco. Oman. Qatar, . Sao Tome and Print inc. Seneaal. Somalia. Suda n. Ua anda,
. .
United Arab Emarates. United Reoublrc c f Tanzania. Yemen
* . afwlutia
&q&&@g. its resolutions S514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
and 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, containing the programme of action for the
full implementation of the Declaration,
m . its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions
3161 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, 3291 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974, 3114 of
21 October 1976, 3217 of 1 November 1977, 34169 of 6 December 1979, 35143 of
28 November 1980, 361105 of 10 December 1981, 37165 of 3 December 1982, 38113
of 21 November 1983, 39148 of 11 December 1984, 40162 of 9 December 1985,
41/30 of 3 November 1986, 42/17 of 11 November 1987, 43114 of 26 October 1988,
4419 of 18 October 1989 ana 45/11 of 1 November 1990, in which, inter alia, it
affirmed the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros,
Recallinq, in particular, its resolution 3385 (W) of ?2 November 1975
on the admission of the Comoros to membership in the Uritecl I'ations, in which
it reaffirmed the necessity of respecting the unity and territcltial integrity
of the Comoro Archipelago, composed of the islands of Anjouan, Grande-Comore,
Mayotte ancl Moheli,
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Recallrna. that, in accordance with the agreements between the
Comoros and France, signed on 15 June 1973, concerning the accession of the
Comoros to independence, the results of the referendum of 22 December 1974
were to be considered on a global basis and not island by island,
m that a just and lasting solution to the question of Mayotte is
to be found in respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of
the Comoro Archipelago,
wed also that a speedy solution of the problem is essential for the
preservation of the peace and security which prevail in the region,
wrba in mind the wish expressed by the President of the French
Republic to seek actively a just solution to that problem,
s . of the repeated wish of the Government of the Comoro8 to
initiate as soon as possible a frank and serious dialogue with the French
Government with a view to accelerating the return of the Comorian island of
Mayotte to the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros,
Takina note of the report of the Secretary-General,
. fnd the decisions of the Orgauization cf African Unity,
the Movement of Ron-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference on this question,
1. Reaffb the sovereignty of the Islamic Federal Republic of the
Comoros over the island of Mayotte;
2. w the Government of France to honour the commitments entered
into prior to the referendum on the self-determination of the Comoro
Archipelago of 22 December 1974 concerning respect for the unity and
territorial integrity of the Comorosr
3. ~&J&S for the translation into practice of the wish expressed by the
President of the French Republic to seek actively a just solution to the
question of Mayottet
4. w the Government of France to accelerate the process of
negotiations with the Government of the Comoro8 with a view to ensuring the
effective and prompt return of the island of Mayotte to the Comoros;
5. Reuue.f& the Secretary-General of the United Nations to maintain
continuous contact with the Secretary-General of the Organisation of African
Unity with regard to this problem and to make available his good offices in
the search for a peaceful negotiated solution to the problem;
6. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on this matter to the
General Assembly at its forty-seventh session;
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7. Deciaea to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-seventh
session the item entitlea "Question of the Comorian island of Mayotta".
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16 October 1991
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Forty-sixth session
THIRD COMMITTEE
Agenda item 93
RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION
pp w ChJ.e , Co lombia, Costa Rh
DjiboCfi. Ecuador. Iran (Islamic Renubl'c of). ~&a&
Mqla. vsaa, Mauritania. Morocco. Oman. P&star., Papua New mea. Qatar. Samoa. Saudi Arabia, Seneaal. Sierra Leone,
Sinoaoore. So.R&i_- cr,_SuBan,ThJ.laad -es ni
and Vanuatu: draft resQhlbtioq
Universal realkzation of the rioht of oeooles
&o self-determinati-
The Wral Assembly,
Reaffirminq the importance, for the effective guarantee and observance of
human rights, of the universal realisation of the right of peoples to
self-determination enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and embodied
in the International Covenants on Human Rights, 21 as well as in the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
welcoming the progressive exercise of the right to self-determination by
peoples under colonial, foreign or alien occupation and their emergence into
sovereign statehood and independence,
PeeDlv concerne@ at the continuation of acts or threats of foreign
military intervention and occupation that are threatening to suppress, or have
11 See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
91-34281 36632 (E) / . a .
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already suppressed, the right to self-determination of an increasing number of
sovereign peoples and nations,
EHpressina arave concern that, as a consequence of the persistence of
such actions, millions of people have been and are being uprooted from their
homes as refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizing the urgent need for
concerted international action to alleviate their condition,
Recalling the relevant resolutions regarding the violation of the right
of peoples to self-determination and other human rights a3 a result of foreign
military intervention, aggression and occupation, adopted by the Commission on
Ruman Rights at its thirty-sixth, 21 thirty-seventh, 91 thirty-eighth, 41
thirty-ninth, s/ fortieth, h/ forty-first, 71 forty-second, B/ forty-third, 91
forty-fourth, LQ/ forty-fifth, u/ forty-sixth 121 and forty-seventh
sessions, XV
21 See Qfficial Records of the Economic and Social Council,mQ,
Sunolement No, 3 and corrigendum (E/1980/13 and Corr.l), chap. XXVI, sect. A.
91 Ibid., .l981. Suoolement No. 5 and corrigendum (E/1981/25 and
Corr.l), chap. XXVIII, sect. A.
41 Ibid., 1982. SunDlement No. 2 and corrigendum <E/1982/12 and
Ccrt.l), chap. XXVI. sect. A.
91 Ibid., 1983. Suoalement No. 3 and corrigendum (E/1983/13 and
Corr.l), chap. XXVSI, sect. A.
61 Ibid., 1984. Suonlement No. 4 and corrigendum (E/1984/14 and
Corr.l), chap. II, sect. A.
71 Ibid., 1985, Suvrrlement NO. 2 (E/1985/22), chap. II, sect. A.
w Ibid., m6, Suwlement No. 2 (E/1986/22), chap, II. sect. A.
91 Ibid., 1987, and corrigenda (E/1987/18 and Corr.1
and 2), chap. II. sect. A.
LQ/ Ibid., 1988. Sunolement No. 2 and corrigendum (E/1988/12 and
Corr.l), chap. II. sect. A.
&&/ Ibid.. 1989. Sunnlement No. 2 !E/1989/20~. chap. II. sect.. A.
x2/ Ibid., 1990, Suwlement No. 2 and corrigendum (E/1990/22 and
Corr.l), chap. II, sect. A.
La/ Ibid., 1991, Suovlerne&tt_&& (E/1991/22), chap. II, sect. A.
/ a . ,
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Reiteratinq its resolutions 35/35 B of 14 November 1980. 36110 of
28 OctobQr 1981, 37142 of 3 December 1982, 38/16 of 22 November 1983, 39118 of
23 November 1984, 40124 of 29 November 1985, 41/100 of 4 December 1986, 42194
of 7 December 1987, 43/105 of 8 December 1998, 44180 of 8 December 1989 and
45/lfl of 14 December 1990,
Takina no- of the report of the Secretary-General,
1. Reaffirms that the universal realisation of the right of all
peoples, including those under colonial, foreign and alien domination, to
self-determination is a fundamental condition for the effective guarantrses and
observance of human rights and for the preservation and promotion of such
rights;
2. mclares its firm 0nnositAon to acts of forsign military
intervention, aggression and occupation, since these have resulted in the
suppression of the right of peoples to self-determination and other human
rights in certain parts of the world;
3. Calls uvon those States responsible to cease immediately their
military intervention and occupation of foreign countries and territories and
all acts of repression, discrimination, exploitation and maltreatment,
particularly the brutal and inhuman methods reportedly employed for the
execution of these acts against the peoples concerned;
4. peolores the plight of the millions of refugees and displaced
persons who have been uprooted as a result of the aforementioned acts, and
reaffirms their right to return to their homes voluntarily in safety and
honcur;
5. &suesta the Commission on Human Rights to continue to give special
attention to the violation of human rights, especially the right to
self-determination, resulting from foreign military intervention, aggression
or occupation:
6. Ewsts the Secretary-General to report on this issue to the
General Assembly at its forty-seventh session under the item entitled "Right
of peoples to self-determination".
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1 November 1991
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Forty-sixth session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item 63
ISRAELI NUCLEAR ARMAMENT
-ia, Bahrain, Djibouti, JordaA_Ru+!aij& Lebanon. Libyan Arab
Jamahiri y a . Ma uritania, Morocco, Oman, Oatar, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates and Yemen: draft resolution
The General Assembly,
Bearina in mind its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament, the
latest of which is resolution 45/63 of 4 December 1990,
Recalling its resolution 441108 of 15 December 1989, in which,
inter alis, it called for placing all nuclear facilities in the region under
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, pending the establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,
Recallin? also that the Security Council in its resolution 487 (1981) of
19 June 1981 called upon I srael urgently to place all its nuclear facilities
under the Agency safeguards.
Notina with qrave concerq Israel's persistent refusal to commit itself
not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, despite repeated calls by the
General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy
Agency,
Taking note of resolution GC (XXXV) REW570 of 20 September 1991 adopted
by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Takina into cons&j818tian the final document on international security
and disarmament adopted by the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or
GoverMlont of Hoon-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to
91-36669 37542 (Ei) / l .*
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7 September 1989, 11 in paragraph 12 of which Israel was condemned for
continuing to develop its nuclear military programmes and weapons of mass
destruction and for its refusal to implement the resolutions of the United
Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard,
&eeply alarmed by the information with regard to the continuing
production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel and its
testing of their delivery systems in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, thus
threatening the peace and security of the region, and equally alarmed by
reports of Israel' s placing on alert tts nuclear arsenal during conflicts in
the Middle East,
Awar- of the grave consequences that endanger international peace and
security as a result of Israel's development and acquisition of nuclear
weapcns and Israel's collaboration with South Africa to develop nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems,
peeplv concerned that Israel has not committed itself to refrain from
attacking or threatening to attack safeguarded nuclear facilities,
1. &iterates its condemnation of Israel's refusal to renounce any
pcssession of nuclear weapons:
2. Reiterates also its condemnation of the cooperation between Israel
and South Africa in the military nuclear field;
3. Expresses its deep concern regarding the information on Israel's
continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and
testing of their delivery systems:
4. Reaffirms that I: raal should promptly apply Security Council
resolution 487 (1981), in which the Council, int_ar alia, requested it to place
all nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and
to refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities:
5. Calls .um ali States and organisations that have not yet done so
not to cooperate with or give assistance to Israel that could enhance its
nuclear-weapons capabiiity:
6. &quests the Incernatiocal Atomic Energy Agency to inform the
Secretaxy-General of any steps Israei may take to place its nuclear facilities
under Agency safeguards:
7. R..e- a*u e._s t.s_ .- the Secretary-General to foilow ciosely Israeli nuclear
activities and to report ti.ereon to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh
session:
z1/ See A/44/551-S/20870, annex.
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0. IIIs!&p to include in the p'~visional agenda of its forty-seventh
session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".
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Forty-sixth session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item 60 (1)
GENERAL AUD COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REGIONAL DISAR?.IAXE:;T
Re.calli.ng its resolution 45158 P of 4 December 1990 on regional
disarmament,
B&i-~~&g that the efforts of the international community to move towards
the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the inherent human
desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war
and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful
pursuits,
A.f-&ng the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of
their international relations,
91-36663 37582 (El / . . .
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No_t.ifiI?rJ tiiac cssenLi2.l quidelines for proqress tow‘irds qoncr~~l and
complete disarmament were atioptcd 3t the tenth syeciai sessioc OE the Genur.11
Assembly, 11
PJe_lc_ogJg the prospects of qenuine progress in the field of: dis0i‘mament
engendered in recent years as a result of. ncqotiatioas be'_wucn the two
super-Powers,
T&k&ng._n_ot.Q of the recent pro~ssals for disarmnment and nuclear
non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels,
pecognjgt_nq the importance of confidence-building measures for reyional
and international ?ezce and security,
Co_n_vjgx? that entieavocrs by countries to promote regional disarmament,
taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in
accordance with the principle of undiminished secnrity at the lowest level of
armaments, would enhance the security of smaller States and would thus
contribute to international peace and security by reducing the risk of
regional conflicts,
1. Stresses that sustained efforts are needed, within the framework 01
the Conference on Disarmament acd under the umbrella of the United Nations, ::J
make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues;
2. A-fffi_t@s that global and regional approaches to disarmament
complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to
promote regional and international peace and security:
3. Calls up~_n States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for
nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at
regional and subregional levels;
4. Welcomes the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear
non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional
and subregional levels;
5. ~p~~t.s_~lc?-~-~co!!r-~s~~ efforts aimed at promoting
confidence-buildinq measures at. reqionA1 a~.#? subreqicnal leveis in order t.o
ease regional tensjons and to furt?lrr ~?iis.~rm~m.c:r:t. ,lnc:i n:;cit~ar
non-proliferation measures at. reqiona? il;:d su!~reiJional lrveis:
6. Decides to inc3r;de in the prnvi;;ioc.*: nqcndlJ of its fort'/-sFvl~nt!\
session the item ent.itled "RPqlonL! c!i sarr:.:~.t::;t" ,
I/ Resolution S-1012.
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Forty-sixth session
SECOND COMMITTEE
Agenda item 04 (b)
SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE:
SPECIAL PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Afahanistan. Bangladesh, China. Cuba, Czechoslovakia. Djibouti,
t. Iran (Islamic Reoublic of), Jordan. Lebanon. Libvan Arab
va. Mauritania, Peru. Philiovines, Somalia. Syrian Arab
Reoublic: draft resolution
Soecial assistance to Yemen
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 451193 and 451222 of 21 December 1990, Economic
and Social Council resolution 1991/62 of 26 July 1991 and decisions 91119 and
91120 of 25 June 1991 of the Governing Council of the United Nations
Development Progranxne, &/
Noting the return of approximately one million Yemeni expatriates to
their country as result of the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in addition
to the flows of tens of thousands of refugees and returnees from the Horn Of
Africa because of the recent developments in that region,
&&f~ly concerned at the grave economic and social consequences of the
considerable flows of returnees, taking place at a time when Yemen is
afflicted by stringent economic crises,
___-_..--_--
$1 See Qff.icis! ~~t?~q~~s~pf the. EconomiC:..a.ncl_.Social.._C_quncL.I_,_1891,
Suppl.empn~LW~ .13 (E/1991/34), annex I.
91-38090 37962 (E) / . . .
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1. Calls UDOq States, United Nations organizatioos, governmental
organizations, international non-governmental organizations and international
financial institutions to extend their assistance to Yemen to enable that
cowtry to deal with the effects of the flows of refugees and returnees;
2. &+rruests the Secretary-General to assist in mobilizing resources and
to prepare a comprehensive programme to assist Yemen in finding a solution to
the serious situation created by these flows;
3. peauests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the
implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its
forty-seventh session.
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Forty-sixth session
SECOND COMMITTEE
Agenda item R4 (b)
SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE:
SPEClAL PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Alaeria, Argentina. Australia, C?ma Colombia,
choslovakia. EavDt. GmY&nala. Iran (Islamic Republic
. pf), wn, Kuwait. Malaysia, Panama. Peru, Ph%lia
Poland, Romania, Sinaaoore, Somalia, Soain. Uge@&-S&&D
Q# Soviet Socialist ReubliC& United Reggblic of T-aav
and Vanuatu8 draft resolut&R
Rmeraencv aid to the Ph$&g&im
General Assa.&ly I
mtiucr with concern the great loss of life and property caused by the
most recent disasters in the Philippines, namely an earthquake, a volcanic
eruption, typhoons, floods and a massive mudflow,
wina further decision 93122 of 25 June 1991 of the Governing Council of
the United Nations Development Programme on emergency aid to the Philippines,
mawledaing that the earnest efforts made by the Government of the
Philippines to achieve economic growth and development have been hampered by
those calamities,
1. Commends the organs and organizations of the United Nations system
for their prompt action in givinq emerqency aid to the Philippines:
2. Qq_uest.s the Secretary-General, within his mandate, to further
assist to the maaimwn extent possible the rehabilitation efforts of t.hr
Philippines;
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3. Mqtests all States and international organizations to extend
further support to the Philippines in ways that would dleviate, for the
duration of the emergency and the ensuing r?habilitatLon process, the economic
and financial burden borne by the Philippine people.
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Forty-sixth session
SECOND COMMXTTEE
Agenda item 84 (b)
SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE:
SPECIAL, PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Alaeria. Bahrain. Banaladesh. Barbados, Cape Verde. Chile,
Eomoros. Diibouti. Em&or, Qy&. France, Iran (Islamic
Reuublic of). Italv. Jordan. Kuwait. Madaaasca
.Mua r r ine
. . Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sinaavore. Somalia, ; xl Turk nda nd
Yemen: draft resolution
Emeraencv &ace fo humanitarian relaef and #g
economic and social r-rehabilitation of Somalia
Becalling its resolutions 431206 of 20 December 1988, 441178 of
19 December 1989 and 45/229 of 21 December 1990 and the resolutions of the
Economic and Social Council on the subject,
wina al8Q the appeal for urgent humanitarian assistance for Somalia
and other countries in Africa made by the Secretary-General at the
twenty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the Organisation of African Unity, held at Abuja from 3 to
5 June 1991,
Notina with satisfaction the measures taken by the Secretary-General to
mobilize international assistance to Somalia,
Deeol.ncerned at the massive displacement of the population in the
affected regions of Somalia, the extensive damage and destruction of villages,
towns and cities, the heavy damage inflicted by the civil conflict on the
country's infrastructure and the widespread disruption of public facilities
a--d services,
91 38492 38152 (E) /...
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T&i.naAote of the report of the Secretary-General on emergency
assistance to Somalia, _1/ and the statement made before the Second Committee
of the General Assembly on 31 October 1991 by the Under-Secretary-General for
Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonixatioa and
Trusteeship on the Special Emergency Frogramme for the Horn of Africa, 21
Dse@y-mreciative of the humanitarian assistance rendered by a number
of Member States to ameliorate the hardship and suffering of the affected
population,
Noting that many areas and regions are safe and accessible enough to
allow immediate and urgent humanitarian assistance to be provided to all of
the affected population,
&sting with areat satisfac.tim the humanitarian efforts being deployed by
the various entities of the United Nations system and by national and
international non-governmental organieations,
1. Expregsxits aratitude to the Member States and the
intergovernmental and non-governmental orqanizations that have responded to
the appeals of the Secretary-General and others by extending emergency
assistance to Somalia;
2. Enmesses its annreciation to the Secretary-General for measures
taken to mobilize emergency assistance to the affected poprrlation in Somalia;
3. ms to all States and relevant intergovernmental and
non-governmental organisations to continue to extend emergency assistance to
Somalia, taking into account the statement on the Special Emergency Programme
for the Horn of Africa: 21
4. m the pertinent specialized agencies and other organisations of
the United Nations system, in particular the United Nations Development
Prograwe, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations
Children’s Fund, World Health Orqanization, Pood and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, World Food Programme, United Nations Centre for Human
Settlements and United Nations Environment Programme, to resume their
assistance programmes in their respective fields of competence on the most
urgent basis in order to alleviate the suffering of all the affected
population in accessible areas;
5. &pe*.j.s to all parties concerned to engage in a national
reconciliation process also with a view to facilitating the relief and
rehabilitation efforts;
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6. Calls UOQP the Secretary-General to continue to mobilise
international humanitarian assistance fo Somaliaz
7. Bequests the Secretary-General, in view of the critical situation
prevailing in Somalia, to take all necessary measures for the implementation
of the present resolution, to apprise the Economic and Social Council at its
regular session of 1992 of the progress made and to report to the General
Assembly at its forty-seventh session.
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Forty-sixth session
THIRD COMMITTEE
Agenda item 97
REPORT OF TXE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
QUESTIONS RELATING TO REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS AND
BUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS
&atria. Bahrain. Belaium. Canada. Central African Republic.
Chile. China. C&e d'kvcire, Denmark. Diibouti.
Reaubllc. . Eovnt, Ethi$@z&. France. Germanv. Gh ana,
@eece,
J,;bermwa. Madamat. blf&ySia. Morocco.
s. Norwav. Phil-. Sonaglia, Sudan. Swe&
kev, United Arab Emirates. I&j ted Kinsdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. United Sf;ateS of America and
* . aft resolution
persons in Africa
Recall- its resolution 451139 of 14 December 1990 entitled "Emergency
humanitarian assistance to Liberian refugees and displaced persons", as well
as its resolutions 451154 entitled "Assistance to refugees in Somalia". 451156
entitled "Assistance to voluntary returnees and displaced persons in Chad",
451157 entitled "Humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in
Djibouti", 451159 entitled *'Assistance to refugees and displaced persons in
Malawi", 45/166 entitled "Situation of refugees in the Sudan", 45/161 entitled
“Assistance to refugees and returnees in Ethiopia", 45/171 entitled
"Assistance to student refugees in southern Africa”, all of 18 December 1990,
and resolution 45/137 entitled "International Conference on the Plight of
Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in Southern Africa" of
14 December 1990,
91-38519 38202 (E) / . . .
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red the reports of the Secretary-General JJ an% the United
Nations Bigh Commissioner for Refugees, 21
. ma in mind that the affected countries are least developed countries,
Convid of the necessity to strengthen the capacity within the United
Nations system for the implementation and the overall coordination of relief
programmes for refugees, returnees and displaced persons,
Ww the prospects for voluntary repatriation and durable solutions
across the continent,
Recoanizinq the need for States of origin to create conditions conducive
to voluntary repatriation.
. .
Notig(lWith the commitment of the countries concerned to do
their utmost to facilitate the provision of assistance to the affected
populations and to take the necessary measures in this regard,
&&j.&~q the importance of assisting the host countries, in particular
those countries which have been hosting refugees for a longer time, to remedy
environmental deterioration and the negative impact on public services and the
development prOCessr
moonisinq the catalytic role the High Commissioner plays, together with
the international community and development agencies in the promotion of
humanitarian aid and development with a view to finding durable and lasting
solutions for refugees, returnees an% displaced persons,
peeolv concw about the critical humanitarian situation in the Horn of
Africa and other African countriBs, caused by drought, conflict and population
movements.
W&c- the establishment by the Secretary-General of an office for a
Special Emergency Programme for the XiOrn of Africa and its efforts to
coordinate needs assessment an% to mobilise resources,
TakinqdILlo account the consoli%ate% inter-agency appeal for the special
Emergency Programme for the ROrn of Africa,
w in mind the necessity to facilitate the work of humanitarian
organizations in the Horn of Africa, in particular the supply of food,
medicine and health care to refugees, returnees and displaced persons,
.u
A/46/57i, A/lciiilti, ALiiO- /r.).L--Y , A/46/4jO, A/4tj/43i, A/46/4JZ,
A/46/433, A/46/434 and A/46/471.
and addendum (A/46/12 and Add.1).
/ .‘.
A/C.3/46lL.30
English
Page 3
pae~lv concerned by the incessant inflow of externally displaced persons
and refugees which has added considerably to the burden already being carried
by Djibouti in respect of rofugees in the country, and whose combined figure
now stands at over 90,000,
Nu that according to the situation report No. 1 of 1 October 1991
issued by the office for the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of
Africa, in Djibouti, the ratio of refugees to nationals is nearing one to
four, thereby posing a considerable burden on the country, in terms of
security, a drain on economic resources and pressure on Social aervice8, given
the alarming number of externally displaced persons and refugees and the size
of the country and its population,
Bearina in mind also that the majority of externally displaced persons
and refugees in Djibouti are concentrated in the country’s main urban centres
with all the implications that this may pose,
&cog&&g the influxes of refugee0 and voluntary returnees and the
presence of displaced persons in Ethiopia,
Deel>lvw about the massive presence of refugees, voluntary
returnees ard %splaced persons in Ethiopia and the enormous burden this has
placed on the country’s infrastructure and meagre resources8
&~$?,&v concerned ~15~ about the grave consegueeces this has entailed for
Ethiopia’s capability to grapple with the effects of the prolonged drought and
rebuilding the country’s economy,
m of the heavy burden placed on the Government of Ethiopia and of the
need for immediate and adequate assistance to refugees, voluntary returnees,
displaced persons and victims of natural disasters,
m of the burden placed on the Government of Renya because of the
recent influx of refugees from Semalia and Ethiopia,
B the efforts that have been made by the Go.;ternment of Kenya
with the assistance of the 3ffice of the High Commissioner and other bilateral
donors to deal with this emergency situation, and the need for further
assistance to over 40,000 refugees still in Kenya,
paeOlv c- about the tragic impact which the civil war in Somalia
has had on the lives of its population, affecting 4 to 5 million people who
are either refugees in neighbouring countries or internally displaced, and are
in need of urgent humanitarian assistance,
g=lCa ttG Bkjh A~u--w-l ero~~uirri-' -* - D- iiriLi&i ~C+iriaiion pian and being
aware that thouaands of Somali refugees at present in other neigbouring
countries and nternally displaced persons who wish to return to their homes
of origin requ+re a planned and integrated international assistance programme
designed to cover their basic needs,
/ . . .
AIC.31461L.30
English
Page 4
um about the plight of Ethiopian refugees remaining in
Somalia who utqently need international assistance for their voluntary
repatriation to their country of origin,
that it is urgently necessary that humanitarian
assistance to Somali refugees, returnee8 and displaced persons be mobilized
and delivered without delay in view of the gravity of the situation,
mrecxi&.& n that the Sudan is hosting, over an oxtended
more than 780,000 refugees, and received an additional influx
of nearly 100,000 Ethiopian refugees in May 1991, 21 notwithstanding the
consequent heavy burden shouldeted by the people and the Government of the
Sudan and in spite of the prevailing economic difficulties of the COuntry,
v the effort8 of the Government of the Sudan, the Government of
Ethiopia and the Office of the High Commissioner for orqanizinq the voluntary
repatriation of the Ethiopian refugees despite the deterrent financial and
logistical problems,
m the need to help refugees by accomplishing the projects for
refugee aid and development in refugee-affected areas of the Sudan in
accordance with resolution 45/X60,
!&&&&g that the repatriation and reinsertion of returnees and
relocation of displaced persons , aggravated by natural disasters, poses
serious humaaitarian, social and economic problems to the Government of Chad,
Cormissnt of the appeal to Member atates and intergovernmental and
non-governmental orqanizationa to continue to provide the necessary assistance
to the Government of Chad to alleviate its problems and improve its abilities
to implement the programme of repatriation, reinsertion and relocation of
voluntary returnees and displaced persons,
vwjth the continuing mediatory efforts of the Economic
Community of West African States to find a peaceful solution to the Liberian
crisis and important decision8 reached at the meeting held at Yamasukto, C&e
d'Ivoite, on 29 October 1991, which could lead to a final settlement,
in mind the findings and recommendations contained in the report
of the Secretary-General, particularly the need to continue emergency relief
operations pending a comprehensive needs-assessment mission to all parts of
Liberia which will result in a unified appeal and a concetted plan of action
for the relief and rehabilitation of Liberia,
mcoonizing the increasing number of voluntary teturneee to Liberia and
the enormous burciea this imu yiGcci 0ti the CGs;ttiy'Z itCraztrzcth:t :&?
fragile economy,
11 Report of the Secretary-General A/46/431.
/ . . .
A/C.3/46/L.30
English
Page 5
EoncergeP that despite the efforts made to provide the necessary material
and financial assistance for the Liberian refugees and relocation of displaced
persons, the situation still remains preca:ious and has serious implications
for the long-term development process of Liberia as well as those West African
countries hosting Liberian refugees,
nle.r ng. the heavy burden placed on the people and Government of
Malawi and the sacrifices they are making in caring for the refugees, given
the country’s limited social services and infrastructure, and the need for
adequate international assistance to enable them to continue their efforts to
provide assistance to the refugees,
velv concerned about the continuing serious social and economic imp..ct
of the massive presence of these refugees and displaced persons, as well as
its far-reaching consequences for the country's long-term development process,
mrina in mind the findings and recommendations of the Inter-Agency
Mission to Malawi, particularly on the need to strengthen the country’s
socio-economic infrastructure in order to enable it to provide for the
immediate humanitarian relief requirements of the refugees, as well as the
long-term national development needs of the country,
Bac99eip& the need to view refugee-related development projects within
local and national development plans,
mpnviad also that there is 8n urgent need for the international
community to extend maximum and concerted assistance to southern African
countries sheltering refugees, returnees and displaced persons and also to
highlight tire plight of these persons,
1?9 lcomina with aooreciation that the High Commissioner has continued in
1990 and 1991 to organise and implement progrannnes for educational ana other
appropriate assistance for student refugees in the southern African region,
uessina its appreciation to the Governments of Botswana, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Swaoiland, Zambia and Zimbabwe for the cooperation that they have
extended to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on matters
concerning the welfare oE student refugees,
1. Ta&es note of the reports of the Secretary-General A/ and the Righ
Commissioner for Refugees; 21
2.. jZx v r 88888 its aooreciat ion to the Secretary-General, the High
Commissioner, donor countries and intergovernmental and non-governmental
organisations for their ascistance in mitigating the plight of the large
number of refl-qees, returnees and displaced persons:
3, Commendg the Governments concerned for providing assistance to
refugees, returnees and displaced persons and their efforts in promoting
voluntary repatriation and other measures taken in order to find appropriate
and lasting solutions;
/ *..
A/C.3/46/L.30
English
Page 6
4. -es deco coac$w~ at the serious and far-reaching consequences
of the massive presence of refugees and displaced persons in the countries
concerned and the implications for their long-term socio-economic development:
5. m that additional resources will be made available
for general refugee programmes to keep pace with refugee needs;
6. ADDeal to Member States, international organisations and
non-governmental organisations to provide adequate material, financial and
technical assistance for relief and rehabilitation programmes for the large
xxmber of refugees, voluntary returnees and displaced persons and victims of
natural disasters;
7. w UDQ~ the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner to
continue their efforts to mobilise humanitarian assistance for the relief,
repatriation, rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees, returnees and
displaced persons;
8. m the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to mobilise
adequate financial and material assistance for the full implementation of
ongoing projects in rural and urban areas affected by the presence of
refugees, returnees and displaced persons;
9. &&so reow the High Commissioner to continue her efforts with the
appropriate United Nations agencies and intergovernmental, governmental and
non-governmental organisations in order to consolidate and increase essential
services to refugees, returnees and displaced persons:
10. Wer ream the Secretary-General to study and assess the
environmental socio-economic impact of the prolonged presence of refugees in
the host countries with a view to rehabilitating those areas:
11. m the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive and
consolidated report on all aspects of the present resolution to the General
Assembly at its forty-seventh session, through the Economic and Social
Council, on the implementation of the present resolution under the sub-item
"Questions relating to refugees, returnees and displaced persons".
UNITED
NATIONS A
General Assembly Distr.
LIMl'TED
A/C.2/46/L.48
13 November 1991
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Forty-sixth session
SECOND COMMITTEE
Agenda item 84 (b)
SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE:
SPECIAL PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
$1a na ades h . Jordan, Somalia, Sudan and Uaa nda: d raft resolution
ce to the Sudan an!& Oneration Lr.f eline Sudazl
-General
&calling its resolutiona 43/8 of 18 October 1988, 43152 of
6 December 1988, 44/12 of 24 October 1989 an3 451226 of 21 December 1990, on
aaaistance to the Sudan,
- the continuilrg negative impact of p6raistent
aatur&f Uirartetr ancl arnW conflict in the Sudan, which have resulted in the
destruction of the mcio-economic infrastructure of that country and generated
large numbers of displaced persons, and the erpected aerioua conaequencea of
the moat recent drought - namely, crop failures and food shortages,
Recoaniziag that the Sudan continues to require, as a complement to its
own efforts, strong and continued international solidarity and humanitarian
support to meet the urgent requirements of relief, rehabilitation and
reconstruction,
Rating that the food and non-food requirements of emergency assistance to
the Sudan are spelt out in the Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for the
Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa, issued in September 1991,
Also $-q,cJ.ng with regre.t that the other party to the conflict in the Sudan
has continued to obstruct the conclusion of an agreement on Operation Lifeline
Sudan, phase III, and the smooth flow of emergency relief, as agreed,
91-38428 38082 (E) 1. s #
A/C.2/46/L.48
English
Page 2
1. attaches imoortance to the established principles governing United
Nations emergency programmes in conflict situations, including the principle
that humanitarian assistance should be provided through agreed corridors of
tranquillity;
2. Exoresses its deep aratitude and aBoreciation to the States and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations that are providing
assistance to the Government aud the people of the Sudan in their relief,
rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, in the context of the Sudan
Emergency Operation and Operation Lifeline Sudan:
3. EXPreSSeS its full aooreciatioc to the Secretary-General and the
organisations of the United Nations system for effective resource
mobilisation, successful coordination and support for the Sudan Emergency
Operation and Operation Lifeiine Sudan:
4. Reauests the Secretary-General, in close coopgratioa with the
Government of the Sudan, to CoBtinue to coordinate the efforts of the United
Nations system to help the Sudan in its emergency, rehabilitation and
reconstruction programmes, to rnobilize resources for the implementation of
those progr%iraes and to keep the internaticnal community informed of the needs
of that country;
5. Calls ‘J DO n do Bor CO-m to contribute generously to the relief
and rehabilitation requirements of displaced persons:
6. mer Cal& upon donor countries to respond generously to the
appeal made in the Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for the Horn of Africa;
7. wartieq involved to offer all feasible assistance,
including the movement of relief supplies and petsoa~el, to guaraatee maximum
success of the Emergency Operation in all parts of the country;
6, ?&ZLQlVr*CiatiQll Of the report of the Secretary-General
on emergeBcy assistance to the Sudan and Operation Lifelife Sudan, 21 and
requests him to continue to asses E the progress of evolution of the emergency
situation and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session,
through the Economic and Social Council, on all matters connected with the
implementation of emergeucy and relies operations in the Sudan and to offer
briefings in the appropriate forums during the intervening period.
1.1 A/46/452.
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A/C.1/46/L.24/Rev.l
13 novembre 1991
FRANCAIS
ORIGINAL : ANGLAIS
Quarante-sisrikne session
PREMIERE COMMISSION
Point 63 de l'ordre du jour
ARMMRNT NUCLEAIRE D'ISRAEL
. . rabxe. saoudrte., Bahrein..* Di.i b. outi, Egyp&z , .
Emirats arabes U~S~ . Jana hiriva arabe . lx-. . , t. Liban. Maroc. Mauritanie.. Oman, ue aabe svrienne, Somalre. Soudan ,
et Yémen : nroiet de re,g glutioa . rev. lse. .
l , m. ses résolutions précédentes sur l'armement nucléaire
israélien, dont la plus récente est la résolution 45163 du 4 décembre 1990,
m sa résolution 44/108 du 15 décembre 1989, dans laquelle elle a
notamment demandé qu'en attendant la création d'une zone exempte d'armes
nucléaires au Moyen-Orient toutes les installations nucléaires de la région
soient soumises aux garanties de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie
atomique,
pavnelant aus& que, dans la résolution 487 (1981). le Conseil de
sécurité a demandé à Israël de placer d'urgence toutes ses installations
nucléaires sous les garanties de l'Agence,
Notant a
vec une viv. e nreo. ccupatiog qu'Israël refuse toujours de s'engager
à ne pas fabriquer ni acquérir d'armes nucléaires, en dépit des appels répétés
de l'Assemblée générale, du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Agence internationale
de l'énergie atomique,
prenant note de la résolution GC(XXXV)/RES/570 adoptée le
20 septembre 1991 par la Conférence générale de l'Agence internationale de
l'énergie atomique,
91-30399 17642 (F) / . . .
A/C.l/46/L.24/Rev.l
Français
Page 2
en cou . . le document final sur la sécurité internationale
et le désarmement, adopté par la neuvième Conférence des chefs d'Etat ou de
gouvernement des pays non alignes tenue à Belgrade du 4 au
7 septembre 1989 11, en particulier son paragraphe 12, qui concerne la
capacité nucléaire d'Israël,
rofowt . el& par les informations indiquant qu'Israël continue de
fabriquer, de mettre au point et d'acquérir des armes nucléaires et qu'il
continue de procéder à des essais de vecteurs en Méditerranée et ailleurs,
menaçant ainsi la paix et la sécurité de la région, et également alarmée
d'apprendre qu'Israël mettrait st état d'alerte son arsenal nucléaire lors des
conflits au Moyen-Orient,
Sachant les graves et dangereuses conséquences qu'entraînent pour la paix
et la sécurité internationales la mise au point et l'acquisition par Israël
d'armes nucléaires et la collaboration d'Israël avec l'Afrique du Sud pour
mettre au point leurs vecteurs,
l ent Dr& par le fait qu'Israël ne se soit pas engagé à
s'abstenir d'attaquer ou de menacer d'attaquer des installations nucléaires
soumises aux garanties,
1. Qévlore le refus d'Israël de renoncer à posséder des arme5
nucléaires;
2. Se de. clare aravement vreo. ccuv C& par la coopération entre Israël et
l'Afrique du Sud dans le domaine nucléaire militaire;
3. Se de. clare v rofondem, ent P&CCUV~Q par les informations selon
lesquelles Israël continue de fabriquer, de mettre au point et d'acquérir des
armes nucléaires ainsi que de procéder a des essais de vecteurs:
4. wfirmo qu'Israël doit appliquer sans délai la résolution
487 (1981) dans laquelle le Conseil de securite lui d demandé notamment de
placer d'urgence toutes ses installations nucléaires sous les garanties de
l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique et de s'abstenir d'attaquer ou
de menacer d'attaquer des installations nucléaires;
5. Ensase tous les Etats et toutes les organisations qui ae l’ont pas
encore fait à s’abstenir de coopérer avec Israël et de lui préter une
assistance lui permettant a0 renforcer sa capacité d’armement nucléaire:
6. && l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique d'informer le
Secrétaire général de toute mesure qu'Israël pourrait prendre aux fins de
soumettre ses installations nucléaires aux garanties de l'Agence:
1/ Voir A/44/551-W20870, annexe.
/ . . *
A/C.1/46/L.24/Bev.l
Français
Page 3
7. && le Secrétaire général de suivre de près les activités
nucléaires d'Israël et ae lui en rendre compte lors de sa quarante-septième
session;
8. &$J&& d'inscrire à l'ordre du jour provisoire de sa
quarante-septième session la question intitulée “Armement nucléaire d'Israël*'.
Assemblée gQn&ale Distr.
LIMITEE
AX.21461L.481Rev.l
20 novembre 1991
FRANCAIS
ORIGINAL : AVGLAIS
Quarante-sixième session
DEUXIEME COMMISSION
Point 84 b) de l'ordre du jour
ASSISTANCE ECONOMIQUE SPECIALE ET SECOURS EN CAS DE CATASTROPHE :
PROGRAMMES SPECIA?lX D'ASSISTANCE ECONOMIQUE
r.o ore. . Jamahiriva arabe libvenne.
Jordanie. Liban. Ouaanda. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Somalie,
Suriname et Yémen : Droiet de résolution
&pnelaat ses résolutions 4318 du 18 octobre 1988, 43152 du
6 décembre 1988, 44/1.2 du 24 octobre 1989 et 451226 du 21 décembre 1990,
relatives à l'assistasce au Soudan,
. .
Profondement orwxG.wQR' par les effets persistants de catastrophes
naturelles sucessives et du conflit armé au Soudan, notamment la destruction
de l'infrastructure socio-économique du pays et le déplacement d'un grand
nombre de personnes, ainsi que par les graves conséquences probables de la
dernière période de s&herease,
alimentaire,
à savoir de mauvaises récoltes et une pénurie
Estimant que pour soutenir les efforts du Soudan, la communauté
internationale devrait continuer à lui manifester sa solidaritd en lui
fournissant un appui humanitaire substantiel afin de répondre aux besoins
urgents de secours et d'aide au relèvement et à la reconstruction du pays,
&&Q& que le8 besoins alimentaires et autres au titre de l'aide
d'urgence au Soudan sont décrits dans l'appel géndral interorganisations lancé
en septembre 1991 pour le Programme spécial d'urgence en faveur de la corne de
[email protected]. -e-r'~l"-..-sr
91-39419 18232 (PI / . . .
A/C.2/46/L.48/Rev.l
Français
Page 2
1. RxDrime sa Drofonde aratitude aux Etats et aux organisations
intergouvernementales et non gouvernementales qui, au titre de l'opération
d'urgence et de l'opération Survie au Soudan, aident le Gouvernement et le
peuple soudanais dans leurs activités de secours, de relèvement et de
reconstruction:
2. Sait tout Darticulièrement sre au Secrétaire général et aux
organismes des Nations Unies d'avoir appuyé et coordonné avec succès les
activités entreprises au titre de l'opération d'urgence et de l'opération
Survie au Soudan et d'avoir réuni les ressources nécessaires à cette fin:
3. Eua le Secrétaire général de continuer, en étroite coopération avec
le Gouvernement soudanais, à coordonner l'action des Nations Unies en vue
d'aider le Soudan dans l'exécution de ses programmes de secours, de relèvement
et de reconstruction. à obtenir des ressources à cette fin et à tenir la
communauté internationale informée des besoins de ce pays;
4. Jnvite les pays donateurs à continuer de contribuer généreusement
aux opérations de secours et de relèvement en faveur des personnes déplacées:
5. Invite en outre les pays donateurs à répondre généreusement aux
demandes d'aide formulées dans l'appel général interorganisations pour le
Programme spécial d'urgence en faveur de la corne de l'Afrique;
6. Fxhorte toutes les parties concernées à fournir toute l'assistance
possible, notamment en facilitant l'acheminement des secours et les mouvements
du personnel qui les transporte, afin de garantir le plein succès de
l'opération d'urgence au Soudan dans l'ensemble du pays;
7. Prend acte en l'aoprécianf du rapport du Secrétaire général sur
l'aide d'urgence au Soudan et l'opération Survie au Soudan a/ et le prie de
continuer à évaluer l'évolution de la situation d'urgence, de lui rendre
compte à sa quarante-septième session, par l'intermédiaire du Conseil
économique et social, de toutes les questions liées à la conduite des
opérations de secours d'urgence au Soudan et de tenir, dans l'intervalle, des
réunions d'information dans les instances appropriées.
A/ A/46/452.
UNITED A
NATIONS
--.
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A/C.2/46/L.71
22 November 1991
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Forty-sixth session
SECOND COMMITTEE
Agenda item 77 (e)
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION:
ENVIRONMENT
Alaeria, Araentina, Bahrain, Banaladesh. Benin. Botswan&,
Bulaaria. Burkina Faso. Burundi, Cameroon. Caoe Verde. Chile&
co o OS, Conao. Costa Rica. C&e d'Ivoire, Cyprus,.,
&f;oslovakia. Democratic Peoole's Reoublic of Kqrea,
Diibouti. Dominican ?oublic, Ecuador. Euvot. El Salvador.
$stonia, Grenada, Guxnea, Guinea-Bissau. Haiti, Honduras,
India. Iran (Islamic Reoublic of). Kenva, Kuwait. Latvia.
Lebanon, Lesotho. Madaaascar, Maldives, Mauritania, Monaolia,
Morocco, Namibia. Neoal, Nicaraaua. Niger. Oman, Pakistan.
Philiooines, Poland. Oatar, Romania. Rwanda. Saudi Arabia,
Seneaal, Sinaaoore. Solomon Islands. Somalia. Thailand. Toao&
Tunisia. Turkey. United Arab Emirates, United Reoublic of
Tanzania and Zaire% draft resolution
International coooeration to mitigate the environmental
wseauences on Kuwait and other countries in the reaion
Fesultina from the situation between Iraa and Kuwait
The General Assembly,
Aware of the disastrous situation caused in Kuwait and neighbouring areas
by the torching and destruction of hundreds of its oil wells and of the other
environmental consequences on the atmosphere, land and marine life,
Havina teken note of the report of the Secretary-General to the Security
Council describing the nature and extent of the environmental damage suffered
by Kuwait, J/
11 See S/22535.
91-39957 38932 (E) I.. .
A!C.2/46/L.l1
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Page 2
Havina also taken note of decision 16/11 A of the Governing Council of
the United Nations Environment Programme, 2/
Profoundlv concerned at the deterioration in the environxent as a
consequence of the damage, especially the threat posed to the health and
well-being of the people of Kuwait and the inhabitants of the region, and the
adverse impact on the economic activities of Kuwait and other countries of the
region, including the effects on livestock, agriculture and fishing, as well
as on wildlife,
Acknowledainq the fact that dealing with this catastrophe goes beyond the
capabilities of the countries of the region and, in that regard, recognizing
the need for strengthened international cooperation to deal with the issue,
Takina note with appreciation of the appointment by the Secretary-General
of an Under-Secretary-General as his Personal Representative to coordinate
United Nations efforts in this field.
Also takina note with anoreciation of the efforts already undertaken by
the Member States of the region, other States, the organizations of the United
Nations system, and governmental and non-governmental organizations to study,
mitigate and minimize the consequences of this environmental catastrophe,
!%BIing in min@ the effective work of the Regional Orgaaization for the
Protection of the Marine Environment and the inter-agency task force
established especially for the environmental situation in the region under the
leadership of the United Nations Environment Programme,
Exoressina its soecial aunreciation to the Governments which have
extended financial support to the two trust funds established for the purpose
by the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization and the
Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme,
Kmohasizinq the need tQ continue to take comprehensive measures to study
and mitigate these environmental consequences within a framework of sustained
atid coordinated international cooperation,
1. UraentlV aDDealS to all States Members of the United Nations,
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, scientific bodies and
individuals to provide assistance for programmes aimed at the study and
mitigation of the environmental deterioration of the region, and for
strengthening the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine
Environment and its role in coordinating the implementation of these
programmes;
21 See A/46/25, annex; to he issued subsequently as Qff icial Re.c.grds. C!
the General Assemb!y,..Forty- sixth.SB55ion,..S!!L~pp!e_ment .No, .25 (A/46/25).
/ . . .
A/C.2/46/L.71
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2. Calls upon the organizations and programmes of the United Nations
system, in particular the International Maritime Organisation and the United
Nations Environment Programme, to pursue their efforts to assess and
counteract; the short-term as well as long-term impact of the environmental
deterioration of the region:
3. peauests the Secretary-General, through his Personal Representative,
to render assistance to the mewhers of the Regional Organization for the
Yrotection of the Marine Environment in the formulation and implementation of
a coordinated and consolidated programme of action comprising costed project
profiles, to help identify and mobilise possible resources for the programme
of action and, inter alia, for strengthening the environmental capacities of
the members of the Regional Organisation for the Protection of the Marine
Environment to surmount the problem, and to allocate the minimum resources
required to enable his Personal Representative to continue to help coordinate
the activities of the United Nations system to that end;
4. Also reauests the Secretary-General to submit to the General
Assembly at its forty-seventh session, through the Economic and Social
Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-seventh
session an item entitled ti International cooperation to mitigate the
enx;ironmental consequences on Kuwait and other countries in the region
resulting from the situation between Iraq and Kuwait".
Assemblée génhle Distr.
LIMITEE
A/C.2/46/L.45/Rev.l
27 novembre 1991
FRARCAIS
ORIGINAL t ANGLAIS
Quarante-sixième session
DEUXIEME COMMISSION
Point 64 b) de l'ordre du jour
ASSISTANCE ECONOMIQUE SPECIALE ET SECOURS EN CAS DE CATASTROPHE :
PROGRAMMES SPECIAUX D'ASSISTANCE ECONOMIQUE
. 8. Arabie Saoudite. Bahreïn. Banaladesh. Barbade,
ç av -v ert. Ch ili . Ch in 8. Comores. Costa Rica, Diihouti,
. 8. Euuateur. France, fraa eoubliuue islamiaue d'). Italie, Jordanie. Eowe'&,
Madaaascar, Maroc. Mauritanie, Nicaraaua, Niaéria. . Or.n a, w&!. Pakistan. Pérou. Philioninesl O&ari Reoubliw
arabe svrienne. Sierra Leon& Sinaaoour, Somalie. Soudpn,
.
relèvement économiaue et social de la Somalig
. . ne. ralg,
%@pelsnt ses résolutions 431206 du 20 ddcembre 1988, 441178 du
19 décembre 1989 et 451229 du 21 décembre 1990 ainsi que les résolutions et
décisions du Conseil économique et social sur l'assistance d'urgence à la
Somalie,
ant e,a alement l'appel lancé par le Secrétaire général lors de la
vingt-septième session ordinaire de la Conférence des chefs d'Etat et de
gouvernement de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine, tenue à Abuja du 3 au
5 juin 1991, pour qu’une aide humanitai..e soit fournie d'urgence à la Somalie
et à d'autres pays d'Afrique,
Natant avec sat&factiog les mesures prises par le Secrétaire général
pour qu'une assistance internationale soit accordée à la Somalie,
91-46160 19OBz (F) / .*.
A/C.2/46/L.45/Rev.l
Français
Page 2
ore.o c- par les déplacements massifs de population dans
les régions touchées de la Somalie, par l'utendue des dommages et des
destructions causés aux villes et aux villages, par la désintégration de
l'infrastructure du pays résultant de la guerre civile et par la perturbation
généralisée des services publics,
Soulignant qu'il importe au plus haut point de mettre fin à la guerre
civile dans les plus brefs délais grâce à la participation active de toutes
les parties,
Prenant ac& du rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'assistance d'urgence
à la Somalie 11 et de la déclaration faite le 31 octobre 1991 à la Deuxième
Commission de l'Assemblée générale par le Secrétaire général adjoint aux
questions politiques spéciales, à la coopération régionale, à la
décolonisation et à la tutelle au sujet du programme spécial d'urgence pour la
corne de l'Afrique 2/.
oreac w va.v ew l'assistance humanitaire fournie par un certain
nombre d*Etats Membres pour alldger le sort et les souffrances de la
population touchée,
&&a& que de nombreuses sones et régions sont sûres et suffisamment
accessibles pour qu'une assistance humanitaire d'urgence puisse être fournie
immédiatement à toute la population touchée,
.
Dotant avec une vive sataefaction l'action humanitaire des divers
organismes des Nations Unies et des organisations non gouvernementales
nationales et internationales,
1. Eg&uw sa ar&iJa& aux Etats Membres et aux organisations
intergouvernementales et non gouvernementales qui ont répondu aux appels du
Secrétaire g6néyaL entre autres , en fournissent une assistance d'urgence à la
Somalie3
2. Sait & au Secrétaire général des mesures qu'il a prises pour
organiser une assisience d'urgence en faveur de la population touchée en
Somalie3
3. &k9p~9& h tous les Etats et aux organisations
intergouvernementales et non gouvernementales compétentes pour qu'ils
continuent de fournir une assistance d'urgence a 1s Somalie, en tenant compte
de la déclaration sur le Programme spécial d’UrgeBC0 pour la corne de
l'Afrique 211
A/ A/46/457.
2/ Voir A/C.2/46/SR.26.
A/C.2/46/L.45/Rev.l
Français
Page 3
4. Demande auz institutions spécialisées et auz autres
organismes concernés des Nations Unies, en particulier le Programme des
Nations Unies pour le développement, le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies
pour les réfugiés, le Fonds des Nations Unies pour l’enfance, l'Organisation
mondiale de la santé, l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et
l'agriculture, le Programme alimentaire mondial, le Centre des Nations Unies
pour les établissements humains et le Programme des Nations Unies pour
l'environnement, de reprendre de toute urgence leurs programmes d'assistance
dans leurs domaines de compétence respectifs afin de soulager les souffrances
de toute la population touchée dans les zones accessibles8
5. ug à toutes les parties concernées pour qu'elles mettent fin
auz hostilités et engagent un processus de réconciliation nationale qui
permette de rétablir la paix, l'ordre et la stabilité et aussi de faciliter
les activités de secours et de relèvements
6. X)m au Sec&taire général de continuer à susciter une assistance
humanitaire internationale en faveur de la Somalie;
7. &&Q le Secrétaire général. compte tenu de la gravité de ia
situation en Somalie, de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer
l'application de la présente résolution, d'informer le Conseil économique et
social, à sa session ordinaire de 1992, des progrès réalisés et de faire
rapport à ce sujet à l'Assemblée générale lors de sa quarante-septième session.
Assemblée génthle Distr.
LIMITEE
A/C.2/46/L.48/Rev.2
3 décemb-re 1991
FRARCAIS
ORIGINAL : ANGLAIS
Quarante-sixième session
DEUXIEMR COMMISSION
Point 84 b) de l'ordre du jour
ASSISTANCE ECONOMIQUE SPECIALE ET SECOURS EN CAS DE CATASTROPHE :
PROGRAMMES SPECIAUX D'ASSISTANCE ECONOMIQUE
Ranaladesh, Chine. Egyote. Ethionie. Irao, Jamahiriva arabe libvenng,
Jordanie. Liban, Mali. Oman. Ouganda. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Somal_i-B,
.
Soudan= Surln~e= Toao et Yémen : oroiet de résolution révis($
Mg .
L'Ass~&lée aénérale,
m ses résolutions 43/8 du 18 octobre 1988, 43152 du
6 décembre 1988, 44112 du 24 octobre 1989 et 451226 du 21 décembre 1990,
relatives b l'assistance au Soudan,
Pe e par les effets persistants de catastrophes
naturelles sucessives et du conflit armé au Soudan, notamment la destruction
de l'infrastructure socio-économique du pays et le déplacement d'un grand
nombre de personnes, ainsi que par les graves conséquences de la dernière
période de sécheresse, à savoir de mauvaises récoltes et une pénurie
alimentaire,
Estimant que pour soutenir les efforts du Soudan, la communauté
internationale devrait continuer & lui manifester sa solidarité en lui
fournissant un appui humanitaire substantiel afin de répondre aux besoins
urgents de secours et d'aide au relèvement et à la reconstruction du pays,
Rotant que les besoins alimentaires et autres au titre de l'aide
d'urgence au Soudan sont décrits dans l'appel général interorganisations lancé
en septembre 1991 pour le Programme spécial d'urgence en faveur de la corne de
l'Afrique,
1. $st consciente qu'il importe d'assurer la liberté de mouvement du
personnel qui apporte des secours à tous ceux qui en ont besoin;
91-46878 1930s (FI / . . .
A/C.2/46/L.48/Rev.2
Frangais
Page 2
2. Bnorime sa nrofonde aratituh aux Etats et aux organisations
intergouvernementales et non gouvernementales qui, au titre de 1'0pération
d'urgence et de l'opération Survie au Soudan, aident le Gouvernement et le
peuple soudanais dans leurs activités de secours, de relèvement et de
reconstruction;
3. Sait tout oarticulièrement art$ au Secrétaire général et aux
organismes des Nations Unies d'avoir appuyé et coordonné avec succès les
activités entreprises au titre de l'opération d'urgence et de l'opération
Survie au Soudan et d'avoir réuni les ressources nécessaires à cette fin;
4. w le Secrétaire général de continuer, en étroite coopération avec
le Gouvernement soudanais, à coordonner l'action des Nations Unies en vue
d'aider le Soudan dans l'exécution de ses programmes de secours, de relèvement
et de reconstruction, à obtenir des ressources à cette fin et à tenir la
communauté internationale informée des besoins de ce pays:
5. InVitQ la communauté internationale à continuer de contribuer
généreusement aux opérations de secours et de relèvement en faveur des
personnes déplacées:
6. Invite aussi la communauté internationale à répondre généreusement
aux demandes d'aide formulées dans l'appel général interorganisations pour le
Programme spécial d'urgence en faveur de la corne de l'Afrique;
7. SxhortQ toutes les parties concernées & fournir toute l'assistance
possible, notamment en facilitant l'acheminement des secours et les mouvements
du personnel qui les transporte, afin de garantir le plein succès de
l'opération d'urgence au Soudan dans l'ensemble du pays;
8. Prend acte en l'annréciant du rapport du Secrétaire général sur
l'aide d'urgence au Soudan et l'opération Survie au Soudan A/ et prie le
Secrétaire général de continuer à évaluer l'évolution de la situation
d'urgence, de lui rendre compte à sa quarante-septi&me session, et d'informer
le Conseil économique et social, de toutes les questions liées à la conduite
des opérations de secours d'urgence au Soudan et de tenir, dans l'intervalle,
des réunions d'information dans les instances appropriées.
.&/ A/46/452.
UNITED
NATIONS A
General Assam bly Distr.
LIMITED
A/46/L.29/Add. 1
6 December 1991
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 34
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
Envpt, Iraa, Jordan. Kuwait
Arab Jarnnabfrtva, . Mauritania, Morow. Oman, mublic, Tun. iaLa, s an8 Yemen: draft m
Add Somal& to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution.
-----
91-47652 40052 (E)
i’ I ,_L
____..I_ ...ll.rP .,s---. *-“-*.- - -. I ,.._ .__,’, . _.,*n
Assemblée gt5nérals Disk.
LIMITEE
A/C.2/46/L.71/Rev.l
9 décembre 1991
FRANCAIS
ORIGINAL : ARGLAIS
Quarante-sixième session
DEUXIEME COMMISSION
Point 77 e) de l'ordre du jour
DEVELOPPEMENT ET COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE INTERNATIONALE :
ENVIRONNEMENT
Aloerie. Arabie Saoudite. Araentine. Bahreïn. Ranaladesh,
Bénin. Botswana, Rulaarie. Burkina Faso. Burundi,
Cameroun, Cau-Vert. Chili, Chine. Ch-ypre. Comores. COnoo.
Costa Rica. Côte d'ivoire. Diibouti. Eavpte. El Salvador,
Imitata arabes unis, Eouateur. Estonie. Grenade, Guinée,
Guinée-B
is5au. Rar. t.i . Honduras. IlesSalomon, Inde. Iran
L Koweït. Lesotho,
Lettonie. Liban. Madaaascar. Malaisiea Maldives, Mali,
pfaroc. Mauritanie..-Mongolie. lamibie. ~Nénal.~~Nicaragua,
flfaer. Oma- Pakistan. Philinoines, Poloane. Oatar,
. mbliaue arabe svrien SJ& RéouQliaue de Corée. Rénubliaue
dominicaine, Rq. pbliaue vovulaire démocratiaue de Corée, e. publiaue-Dnie de Tan-nie. Roumanie. Rwanda, S~~CW
Sénéaal. Sinaanou r, Somalie. Sri Lanka, Tche,c oslovaauie,
we. . . :
.
on intermtionale en vue d ‘a ttenwl les co nséaue ce5
&. oaiauee. qour l.e Kowei.t . et le8 autres vava de . . la réa&,
& la situation entre l'Iraa et le KJ~~F&&
Çpgsciente de la situation catastrophique 0U 88 trouvent le Koweït et les
régions avoisinantes du fait de l'incendie et de la destruction de centaines
de puits de pétrole koweïtiens et de5 autres dommage5 écologiques ainsi causés
à l'atmosphère ainsi qu'à la faune et à la flore terrestre5 et marines,
*--YîL 1. ,.----1- . LC-.Y-CY-C- OI lo= réaol.~tfc=n -rti===t== A,~ P--~--n-P--o (l A--~
sécurité, en particulier la section E de le r%olution 607 (1991) du
3 avril 1991,
91-48074 1960s (FI / . . .
A/C.2/46/L.71/Rev.l
Français
Page 2
du rapport présenté au Conseil de sécurité par le
Secrétaire général, où sont exposées la nature et l'ampleur des dommages
écologique5 subis par le Koweït JJ,
Avant vris note e. aale ment de la décision 16/11 A du Conseil
d'administration du Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement, en date
du 31 mai 1991 z/,
Profondément Préoccu& par la détérioration de l'environnement résultant
des dommage5 subis, notamment par la menace qui pèse sur la santé et le
bien-être de la population koweïtienne et des populations de la région, ainsi
que par les conséquences indésirables pour les activités économiques du Koweït
et d'autres pays de la région, notamment ler effets sur le bétail,
l'agriculture et la pêche, ainsi que sur la faune et la flore sauvages,
Sachant que les me ures è prendre à la suite de cette catastrophe
dépassent les possibilités des pays de la région et, consciente à cet égard de
la nécessité de renforcer la coopération internationale pour faire face à la
situation,
Notant avec satisfaction que le Secrétaire général a désigné un
secrétaire général adjoint comme son représentant personnel et l'a chargé de
coordonner l'action des Nations Unies dans ce domaine,
.
Potant eaalement avec satiU&%im l'effort que font déjà les Etats
Membres de la région, d'autres Etats, les organismes des Nations Unies 8t des
organisations gouvernementales et non gouvernementales pour étudier, atténuer
et limiter les conséquences de cette catastrophe écologique,
Avant à l'esorit l'oeuvre efficace accomplie par l'Organisation régionale
pour la protection du milieu marin et par 1'Equipe spéciale interorganisations
constituée spécialement, sous l'égide du Programme des Nations Unies pour
l'environnement, aus fins d'étudier la situation écologique dans la région,
ainsi que le plan d'action,
Kemerciant sne.c ialement les gouvernements qui ont versé des contributions
financières aux deux fond5 d'affectation spécàale créés à cette fin par le
Secrétaire général de l'Organisation maritime internationale et le Directeur
exécutif du Programme des Kations Unies pour l'environnement,
Soulionant. qu'il faut continuer à agir dans tous les domaines pour
étudier et atténuer ces conséquences écologiques, dans le cadre d'une
coopération internationale soutenue et coordonnée,
A/ Voir W22535.
a/ Voir A/46/25, annexe; le rapport sera publié en tant que Suonlément:
Ko 25 des pgCuments officiels de l'Assemblée générale. auarante-sixième
3essioq (A/46/25).
/ ..*
A/C.2/46/L.7l/Bev.l
Français
Page 3
1. Demande.sta. lmnent à tous les Etats Membres de l'organisation des
Nations Unies, aux organisations intergouvernementalez et non
gouvernementales, aux institutions scientifiques st aux partkuliers da
fournir une aide pour soutenir les programmes visant à étudier et attbuer la
degradation dcologique dans la région, et pour renforcer l'Organisation
régionale pour la protection du milieu marin et sa capacité de coordonner
l'exécution de ces programmes:
2. Demande aux organismes et programmes des Nations Unies, notamment à
l'Organisation maritime internationale et au Programme des Nations Unies pour
l'environnement, de poursuivre leurs efforts pour évaluer et neutraliser les
répercussions, à court et à long terme, de la dégradation &ologique de la
région1
3. m le Secrétaire général, par l'intermédraire de son représentant
personnel, de prêter assistance aux membres de l'Organisation régionale pour
la protection du milieu marin dans l'élaboration et l'exécution d'un programme
d'action coordonné et concerté comportant des aperçus de projets chiffrés,
d'aider à identifier toutes les ressources qui pourraient être mobilisées pour
ce programme d'action. en particulier afin de renforcer les moyens écologiques
dont disposent les meffbres de I'Organication régionale pour surmonter ce
problème, et d'allouer, dans les limites des ressources disponibles, les
ressources indispensables pour que son représentant personnel puisse continuer
à aider à coordonner à cette fin les activités des organismes des
Nations Unies:
l 4. Prie egalement le Secrétaire général de lui présenter à sa
quarante-septième session, par l'intermédiaire du Conseil économique et
social, un rapport sur l'application de la présente résolution;
5. Décide d'inscrire à l'ordre du jour provisoire de sa
quarante-septième session une question subsidiaire intitulée "Coopération
internationale en vue d'atténuer les conséquences écologiques, pour le Roweït
et d'autres pays de la région, de la situation entre l'Iraq et le KoweïtO', au
titre de la question intitulée "Developpement et coopération économique
internationale".
UNITED
NATIONS
A
-- -I_.-- ---_ --
General Assembly Distr.
LIMITED
A/C.2:46/L.120
10 December 1991
ORIGINAL: !SNGLISH
Forty-sixth session
SECOND COMMITTEE
Agenda item 12
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Aloeria, Bahrain, Eaypt. Iraa, Jordan. Lebanonlibyan Arab
Jamahiriva, Mauritania. Morocco, Pakistan, Oatar, Saudi
Arabia. Somalia. Sudan. Svrian Arab Reoublic, Tunisia.
United Arab Emirates, Viet lam. Yemen and Zambia: draft
resolution
Adverse economic effects of Israeli settlements in the
pccunied Palestinian territory, iacludina Jerusalem,
and oht r e Arab territories occuoied since 1967
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 497 (1981) of
17 December 1981,
Recalling Security Council resolution 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980, General
Assembly resolution 45174 of 11 December 1990 an8 the other relevant
resolutions affirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, 11 to
the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Exoressins its concern at the ongoing establishment by Israel, the
occupying Power, of settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory and
other Arab territories occupied since 1967, and the settlement of new
immigrants therein,
L/ United Nations, WV Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
91-48505 40292 (E) / . . .
A/C. 21461L.120
English
Page 2
1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General; 2/
2. DeDloreg the establishment of settlements by Israel in the
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the other Arab territories
occupied since 1967, and regards those practices as unlawful and therefore
without any legal effect:
3. Secoanixes that the continuing establishment of settlemunts and
their ongoing eclargemant in the Palestinian territory and the other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and the settlement of rlew immigrants
have adverse consequences for the economic and social development of the Arab
population of these territories;
4. StrOnolv deDlOreS Israel's practices in the occupied Palestinian
territory and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, in particular its
extensive confiscation of land, its diversion of water resources, its
depletion of the natural and economic resources of the occupied territories
and its displacement and deportation of the population of those territories:
6. PSaffirmS the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the
population of the Syrian Golan to their natural and economic resources, and
regards any infringement thereof as being without any legal validity:
6. Beauesta the Secretary-General to submit a report on the economic
and social consequences of the establishment of settlements by Israel in the
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the Syrian Golan to the
General Assembly at its forty-seventh session through the Economic and Social
Council.
21 A/46/263.
Annex 78
United Nations General Assembly draft resolutions sponsored by Somalia, 1992
UNITED
NATIONS
Genergl Asset bly Distr.
LIMITED
A1461L.661Add.l
2 March 1992
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 20
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO TEE UNITED NATIONS
Albania. Algeria. Austraa, . Austria. Bahrain. Ba rbadog,
Bemu
Colombia. Comoros, Cosuca, Cwrus. Czechoslovakia,
Denmark. El Salvador. w, France. @bon. Germanv,
Greece. Guatemab Honduras. Nrv- Ice. &and. Xndfac Indonesia. Ire3and. Israel. Italv. Jamarca. Jaw, Jordan<
va. Lao People I s Democratic Renubla.c . Latv ia. Lebanon.
tiec win. Lithuania, Luxemboura. Malta. Meurita n ia.
pg1s nB.
Federation. Sar.n t Kl.t ts and Nevis- Saint Vincent and QQ
Sin sui da n Ukraine,
d Kinadom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
es of America. Vanuatu. Venezuela and Yeman:
draft resolution
Admisalo. nofthc e 0 f San Marino to membership
in the United Nations
Addendum
m the folrowing countries to the list of sponsors Qf the draft
resolution
Afghanistan, Bahamas, Banaladesh. Burundi. Cane Verde. Conao, Democrat&
pc op 1e' s Re oub i1 c of Korea. Djibouti. Ecuador, Fiii, Guinea-Bissau.
W*?w?jc_. M+nnaypr. MnlAivass. Marshall Islands, Micm sia [Federated
States of). Oman, Philinnines, Qatar, Sagame and Princi~!Somalia,
Thailand, Uruaus and Yusoslavia
%L* . . - . 92-09651 41742 (E) 030392 I--
UNITED
NATIONS
General Assembly
Diett.
L1M1TED
A/46/L.71
21 May 1992
ORIGSNAL: ENGLSSH
Forty-sixth session
l Agenda item 20
ADbUSSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE DNITED NATIONS
Au- Bencrladsah.
8. Oermanv,_.Oteece,
!&in-* HonBuras, IceNtnLAaLm
-Israel.V. J=‘aa. Jo-
--- ew 2ealanB. . Pol+Jg&
RI &g&&&&&
SD&&J. sUdan._.luriname,
of Great
Ire-ted S-8 of
Bgmiaeion of the Repvblic of W to s
Havina received the recommendation of the Security Council of 18 May 1992
that the Republic of Slovenia ahould be admitted to membership in the United
Nations, 11
L/ A/46/92C.
92-21969 42282 (E) 21.0592 / . . .
A/&i/L.71
English
Page 2
.
v the application for umbership of the Republic of
Slovenia, 21
E?&&a to admit tho Republic of Slovenia to membership in the Unite6
blations.
-----
.
--
Q/ A/46/9134/23885.
UNlTED
NATIONS
General Assembly Distr .
LIMITED
A/46/L.73
21 Mq? 1992
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
-
Forty-sinth session
Agenda item 20
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Al-a. Australfa, Austtia,n. BanalaBesh.
BulwDe Verde. Cv
msts= Democtatic Peotie . s ReDublic ot .
IQ?-a= Denmatk,* DomSca f%aLlkL
Guatemala. Guinea.-
a. Iran lfalamic Reoublic
bf),IrelenB._far8el,talv= Jordan= KuwW
Morpcco. NeQ
Romagia. Rus-&k-&?
lit of Boaina tQ
in the
Assemblv,
v . the recommendation of the Security Council of 20 May 1992
that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be admitted to membership
in the United Nations, 21
-_--
J../ A/46/922.
92-21976 42262 (E) 210592 210592
, .
. .
-1 A/46/L,73
English
Page 2
V the application for memberebip of tbe Republic of
Booonia %nd Beraegovila%, g/
w to admit tbe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to memberahfp in
tba United lJationr.
-w--m
.
iv A/46/9214/23971.
UNITED
NATIONS
General Assm blly Distr.
LIMITED
A/46/L. 74
21 May 1992
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 20
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Hunaarv4 Iceleftd,
-Itelaall,rszael,Italv,Ja*ar;. L~wib
omap. Paon.
@&L&au&
of tieat Britail Northern
United SW of wca. Uruauav an8 Yew:
&&&gion og&he ReDw of Crou to mw&ersh&Q
ted Natieggi
H&!&m received the recommendation of the Security Council of 18 May 1992
that the Republic of Croatia should be admitted to membership in the United
Nations, A/
2.1 A/46/919.
92-21982 42272 (E) 2LO592 / . . .
Annex 79
United Nations Economic and Social Council draft resolutions sponsored by Somalia, 1993-
1995
Distr.
LIMITED
E/CN.4/1993/L.2
12 February 1993
Original: ARABIC/ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 4
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED
ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PALESTINE
Afghanistan*, Algeria*, Bahrain*, Bangladesh, Cuba, India, Indonesia,
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq*, Jordan*, Kuwait*, Lebanon*,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco*, Oman*,
Pakistan, Qatar*, Saudi Arabia*, Senegal*, Somalia*, Sudan,
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates*
and Yemen*: draft resolution
1993/... Human Rights in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Commission on Human Rights,
Deeply concerned at the suffering of the population of the Syrian and
other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and the continued Israeli
military occupation, and that the human rights of the population continue to
be violated,
Recalling Security Council resolution 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981, in
which the Council, inter alia, decided that the Israeli decision to impose its
laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan was null
and void and without international legal effect, and demanded that Israel
should rescind forthwith its decision.
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 36/226 B of 17 December 1981,
ES-9/1 of 5 February 1982, 37/88 E of 10 December 1982, 38/79 F of
15 December 1983, 39/95 F of 14 Deceember 1984, 40/161 F of 16 December 1985,
* In accordance with rule 69, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure of
the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council.
GE.93-10673 (E)
A/CN.4/1993/L.2
page 2
41/63 F of 3 December 1986, 42/160 F of 8 December 1987, 43/21 of
3 November 1988, 43/58 F of 6 December 1988, 44/2 of 6 October 1989,
45/74 F of 11 December 1990, 46/47 F of 9 December 1991 and 47/70 F of
14 December 1992,
Recalling also General Assembly resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975
and other relevant resolutions in which the Assembly, inter alia, demanded the
immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from the Arab
territories occupied since 1967,
Recalling further General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of
14 December 1974, in which it defined an act of aggression,
Reaffirming once more the illegality of Israel's decision of
14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the
occupied Syrian Golan, which has resulted in the effective annexation of that
territory,
Reafrirming that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible
under the principles of international law and under the Charter of the
United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the
General Assembly, and that all territories thus occupied by Israel must be
returned,
Taking note with deep concern of the report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian
People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/47/509) and, in this
connection, deploring Israel's constant refusal to cooperate with and to
receive the Special Committee,
Expressing its grave alarm, after considering the above-mentioned report
of the Special Committee, over Israel's flagrant and persistent violations of
human rights in the Syrian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967,
despite the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly which
repeatedly called upon Israel to put an end to such occupation,
Reaffirming its previous relevant resolutions, the most recent being
resolution 1992/1 of 14 February 1992,
Guided by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with particular reference to
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949, and the relevant provisions of The Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907,
1. Strongly condemns Israel, the occupying Power, for its refusal to
comply with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the
Security Council, particularly resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council,
inter alia, decided that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction
and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan was null and void and without
international legal effect, and demanded that Israel, the occupying Power,
should rescind forthwith its decision;
E/CN.4/1993/L.2
page 3
2. Condemns the persistence of Israel in changing the physical
character, demographic composition, institutional structure and legal status
of the occupied Syrian Golan, and emphasizes that the displaced persons of the
population of the occupied Syrian Golan must be allowed to return to their
homes and to recover their properties;
3. Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and
actions taken or to be taken by Israel, the occupying Power, that purport to
alter the character and legal status of the Syrian Golan are null and void,
constitute a flagrant violation of international law and of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949, and have no legal effect;
4. Strongly condemns Israel for its attempt to impose forcibly Israeli
citzenship and Israeli identify cards of the Syrian citizens in the occupied
Syrian Golan and for its practices of annexaiton, establishment of
settlements, confiscation of lands and diversion of water resources and
imposing a boycott on their agricultural products; and calls upon Israel to
desist from its settlement designs and policies aimed against academic
institutions with the goal of distorting the historical facts and serving the
objectives of occupation, and to desist from its repressive measures against
the poplulation of the occupied Syrian Golan;
5. Calls once again upon Member States not to recognize any of the
legislative or administrative measures and actions referred to in paragraph 4
of the present resolution;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution
to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs,
the specialized agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations and
international humanitarian organizations and to give it the widest possible
publicity, and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its
fiftieth session;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its
fiftieth session, as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Question of
the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including
Palestine".
- - - - -
Distr.
LIMITED
E/CN.4/1993/L.2
12 February 1993
Original: ARABIC/ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 4
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED
ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PALESTINE
Afghanistan*, Algeria*, Bahrain*, Bangladesh, Cuba, India, Indonesia,
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq*, Jordan*, Kuwait*, Lebanon*,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco*, Oman*,
Pakistan, Qatar*, Saudi Arabia*, Senegal*, Somalia*, Sudan,
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates*
and Yemen*: draft resolution
1993/... Human Rights in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Commission on Human Rights,
Deeply concerned at the suffering of the population of the Syrian and
other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and the continued Israeli
military occupation, and that the human rights of the population continue to
be violated,
Recalling Security Council resolution 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981, in
which the Council, inter alia, decided that the Israeli decision to impose its
laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan was null
and void and without international legal effect, and demanded that Israel
should rescind forthwith its decision.
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 36/226 B of 17 December 1981,
ES-9/1 of 5 February 1982, 37/88 E of 10 December 1982, 38/79 F of
15 December 1983, 39/95 F of 14 Deceember 1984, 40/161 F of 16 December 1985,
* In accordance with rule 69, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure of
the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council.
GE.93-10673 (E)
A/CN.4/1993/L.2
page 2
41/63 F of 3 December 1986, 42/160 F of 8 December 1987, 43/21 of
3 November 1988, 43/58 F of 6 December 1988, 44/2 of 6 October 1989,
45/74 F of 11 December 1990, 46/47 F of 9 December 1991 and 47/70 F of
14 December 1992,
Recalling also General Assembly resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975
and other relevant resolutions in which the Assembly, inter alia, demanded the
immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from the Arab
territories occupied since 1967,
Recalling further General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of
14 December 1974, in which it defined an act of aggression,
Reaffirming once more the illegality of Israel's decision of
14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the
occupied Syrian Golan, which has resulted in the effective annexation of that
territory,
Reafrirming that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible
under the principles of international law and under the Charter of the
United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the
General Assembly, and that all territories thus occupied by Israel must be
returned,
Taking note with deep concern of the report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian
People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/47/509) and, in this
connection, deploring Israel's constant refusal to cooperate with and to
receive the Special Committee,
Expressing its grave alarm, after considering the above-mentioned report
of the Special Committee, over Israel's flagrant and persistent violations of
human rights in the Syrian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967,
despite the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly which
repeatedly called upon Israel to put an end to such occupation,
Reaffirming its previous relevant resolutions, the most recent being
resolution 1992/1 of 14 February 1992,
Guided by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with particular reference to
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949, and the relevant provisions of The Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907,
1. Strongly condemns Israel, the occupying Power, for its refusal to
comply with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the
Security Council, particularly resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council,
inter alia, decided that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction
and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan was null and void and without
international legal effect, and demanded that Israel, the occupying Power,
should rescind forthwith its decision;
E/CN.4/1993/L.2
page 3
2. Condemns the persistence of Israel in changing the physical
character, demographic composition, institutional structure and legal status
of the occupied Syrian Golan, and emphasizes that the displaced persons of the
population of the occupied Syrian Golan must be allowed to return to their
homes and to recover their properties;
3. Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and
actions taken or to be taken by Israel, the occupying Power, that purport to
alter the character and legal status of the Syrian Golan are null and void,
constitute a flagrant violation of international law and of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949, and have no legal effect;
4. Strongly condemns Israel for its attempt to impose forcibly Israeli
citzenship and Israeli identify cards of the Syrian citizens in the occupied
Syrian Golan and for its practices of annexaiton, establishment of
settlements, confiscation of lands and diversion of water resources and
imposing a boycott on their agricultural products; and calls upon Israel to
desist from its settlement designs and policies aimed against academic
institutions with the goal of distorting the historical facts and serving the
objectives of occupation, and to desist from its repressive measures against
the poplulation of the occupied Syrian Golan;
5. Calls once again upon Member States not to recognize any of the
legislative or administrative measures and actions referred to in paragraph 4
of the present resolution;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution
to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs,
the specialized agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations and
international humanitarian organizations and to give it the widest possible
publicity, and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its
fiftieth session;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its
fiftieth session, as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Question of
the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including
Palestine".
- - - - -
Distr.
GENERAL
E/CN.4/1993/L.3
15 February 1993
Original: ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 27
SITUATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY OF
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Afghanistan*, Albania*, Bahrain*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Indonesia, Iran
(Islamic Republic of), Jordan*, Kuwait*, Malaysia, Oman*, Pakistan, Qatar*,
Saudi Arabia*, Senegal*, Slovenia*, Somalia*, Sudan, Turkey*,
United Arab Emirates* and Yemen*: draft resolution
Abuse and rape of women and children in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia
The Commission on Human Rights,
In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, international law
and all the relevant human rights instruments, in particular the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and
international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977 and
General Assembly resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of 3 December 1973,
* In accordance with rule 69, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure of
the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council.
GE.93-10701 (E)
E/CN.4/1993/L.3
page 2
Appalled at the recurring and substantiated reports of widespread abuse
and rape of women and children, in particular their systematic use by Serbian
forces against Muslim women and children in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
Convinced that these heinous practices constitute a deliberate weapon of
war in fulfilling the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing which, as stated in
General Assembly resolution 47/121 of 17 December 1992, is a form of genocide,
Recalling the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the
General Assembly which, inter alia, condemned the savage and abhorrent
practice of rape,
1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the repugnant practices of abuse
and rape of women and children in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and
especially their use by the Serbian forces as a weapon of war against Muslim
women and children as an integral part of the policy of ethnic cleansing in
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
2. Appeals to all Member States and United Nations bodies to provide the
victims with all necessary assistance for their physical and mental
rehabilitation;
3. Urges all States Members of the United Nations to take all necessary
measures, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, aimed at
putting an end to these despicable practices;
4. Demands that, in accordance with international law and bearing in mind
the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, that the States Members of the United Nations individually and
collectively bring to justice all those individuals involved directly or
indirectly in these outrageous crimes;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation
of the present resolution to the members of the Commission on Human Rights not
later than 30 June 1993.
- - - - -
Distr.
LIMITED
E/CN.4/1993/L.90
5 March 1993
ENGLISH
Original: ARABIC
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 12
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLONIAL AND
OTHER DEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
Afghanistan*, Algeria*, Bahrain*, Bangalesh, Burundi, Cuba, India,
Indonesia, Iraq*, Jordan*, Kuwait*, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia,
Mauritania, Morocco*, Oman*, Pakistan, Qatar*, Saudi Arabia*, Somalia,
Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates*, Yemen*,
and Zambia: draft resolution
The human rights situation in southern Lebanon
The Commission on Human Rights,
Gravely concerned at the ongoing practices of the Israeli occupation
forces in southern Lebanon, which constitute a violation of the principles of
international law pertaining to the protection of human rights, and
particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in addition to their
flagrant violation of the relevant provisions of international humanitarian
law as set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 13 August 1949 and the Fourth Hague
Convention of 1907,
* In accordance with rule 69, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure of
the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council.
GE.93-11800 (E)
E/CN.4/1993/L.90
page 2
Deeply regretting Israel’s failure to implement Security Council
resolutions 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982,
Deeply disturbed at Israel’s deportation of 415 Palestinians to the
occupied territory of southern Lebanon, which constitutes a further violation
of Lebanese sovereignty, and at Israel’s refusal to implement Security Council
resolution 799 (1992) demanding the immediate return home of the Palestinian
deportees,
Affirming Israel’s full responsibility for the Palestinian deportees,
Reaffirming that the continued occupation and the practices of the
Israeli forces constitute violations of the Security Council resolutions, of
the will of the international community and of the conventions in force in
this regard,
Hoping for a continuation of the peace negotiations with a view to a
settlement of the conflict in the Middle East through the achievement of a
just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the region, and affirming that
Israel’s continued violations of human rights are hampering the steps and
endeavours that are being taken to achieve peace in the Middle East,
Gravely concerned at the fact that the International Committee of the
Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations are being prevented from
fulfilling their humanitarian tasks in the occupied territory of southern
Lebanon, and particularly from investigating the reports received concerning
ill-treatment of detainees at the Khiyam and Marjayoun detention centres,
Reaffirming its resolution 1992/70 of 4 March 1992 and expressing its
deep regret at Israel’s failure to implement that resolution,
1. Condemns the ongoing Israeli violations of human rights in
southern Lebanon consisting, in particular, in the arbitrary detention of
civilians, the demolition of their homes, the confiscation of their property,
their expulsion from the occupied territory, the bombardment of civilian
villages and areas, and other practices which violate human rights;
2. Demands that Israel put an immediate end to those practices and
implement the two above-mentioned Security Council resolutions calling for
Israel’s immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal from all Lebanese
territory and respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity;
E/CN.4/1993/L.90
page 3
3. Demands that Israel put an immediate end to the policy of forced
deportation and implement Security Council resolution 799 (1992) of
18 December 1992;
4. Also demands that the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power
in southern Lebanon, comply with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, particularly
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War;
5. Further demands that the Government of Israel, as the occupying
Power in southern Lebanon, facilitate the humanitarian task of the
International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations
in this region and, in particular, permit those organizations to visit the
detention centres at Khiyam and Marjayoun and examine the situation of the
persons detained there;
6. Requests the Secretary-General:
(a) To inform the Government of Israel of this resolution and call upon
it to provide information concerning the extent of its compliance therewith;
(b) To report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session, and
to the Commission on Human Rights at its fiftieth session, on the results of
his endeavours in this regard;
7. Decides to continue the consideration of this question at its
fiftieth session.
-----
Distr.
LIMITED
E/1993/L.43
27 July 1993
Original: ENGLISH
Substantive session of 1993
Geneva, 28 June - 30 July 1993
Agenda item 6 (a)
SPECIAL ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE: SPECIAL
PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Algeria*, Cuba, Iraq*, Lebanon*, Malaysia, Morocco, Senegal*, Somalia,
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia*, and Yemen*: draft resolution
Assistance to the Palestinian people
The Economic and Social Council,
Recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft
resolution:
"Assistance to the Palestinian people
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling its resolution 47/170 of 22 December 1992,
"Taking into account the intifadah of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory against the Israeli occupation, including
Israeli economic and social policies and practices,
"Rejecting Israeli restrictions on external economic and social
assistance to the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian
territory,
__________________________
* In accordance with rule 72 of the rules of procedure of the Economic
and Social Council.
GE.93-70505 (E)
E/1993/L.43
page 2
"Concerned about the economic losses sustained by the Palestinian
people as a result of Israeli closures and isolation of the Palestinian
territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967,
"Affirming that the Palestinian people cannot develop their
national economy as long as the Israeli occupation persists,
"Taking into account developments in the peace talks and their
implications for the Palestinian people,
"Welcoming the convening of the United Nations seminar on
assistance to the Palestinian people in Paris during the period
26-29 April 1993 in response to General Assembly resolution 47/170,
"Aware of the increasing need to provide economic and social
assistance to the Palestinian people,
"1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General;
"2. Expresses its appreciation to the States, United Nations
bodies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that have
provided assistance to the Palestinian people;
"3. Requests the international community, the United Nations
system and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to
sustain and increase their assistance to the Palestinian people, in close
cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization;
"4. Calls for treatment on a transit basis of Palestinian exports
and imports passing through neighbouring ports and points of exit and
entry;
"5. Also calls for the granting of trade concessions and concrete
preferential measures for Palestinian exports on the basis of Palestinian
certificates of origin;
"6. Further calls for the immediate lifting of Israeli
restrictions and obstacles hindering the implementation of assistance
projects by the United Nations bodies and others providing economic and
social assistance to the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian
territory;
"7. Reiterates its call for the implementation of development
projects in the occupied Palestinian territory, including the projects
mentioned in its resolution 39/223 of 18 December 1984;
"8. Calls for facilitation of the establishment of Palestinian
economic and social institutions in the occupied Palestinian territory;
E/1993/L.43
page 3
"9. Suggests to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
Rights of the Palestinian people to consider, in its future programmes,
convening seminars concerning economic and social assistance to the
Palestinian people, taking into account their assistance needs in the
light of the development in the region;
"10. Requests the Secretary-General to seek ways and means of
mobilizing and coordinating assistance to the Palestinian people, taking
into account the outcome of the Paris seminar;
"11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
General Assembly at its forty-ninth session, through the Economic and
Social Council, on the progress made in the implementation of the present
resolution."
-----
Distr.
LIMITED
E/CN.4/1994/L.4
11 February 1994
Original: ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 4
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES INCLUDING PALESTINE
Afghanistan*, Algeria*, Bahrain*, Cuba, India, Indonesia,
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq*, Kuwait*, Lebanon*,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar*, Malaysia, Mauritania,
Morocco*, Oman*, Pakistan, Qatar*, Saudi Arabia*, Senegal*,
Somalia*, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates*, Viet Nam* and Yemen*:
draft resolution
Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Commission on Human Rights,
Deeply concerned at the suffering of the population of the Syrian and
other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and the continued Israeli
military occupation, and that the human rights of the population continue to
be violated,
* In accordance with rule 69, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure of
the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council.
GE.94-10881 (E)
E/CN.4/1994/L.4
page 2
Recalling Security Council resolution 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981, in
which the Council, inter alia, decided that the Israeli decision to impose its
laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan was null
and void and without international legal effect, and demanded that Israel
should rescind forthwith its decision,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 36/226 B of 17 December 1981,
ES-9/1 of 5 February 1982, 37/88 E of 10 December 1982, 38/79 F of
15 December 1983, 39/95 F of 14 December 1984, 40/161 F of 16 December 1985,
41/63 F of 3 December 1986, 42/160 F of 8 December 1987, 43/21 of
3 November 1988, 43/58 F of 6 December 1988, 44/2 of 6 October 1989, 45/74 F
of 11 December 1990, 46/47 F of 9 December 1991, 47/70 F of 14 December 1992
and 48/41 D of 10 December 1993,
Recalling also General Assembly resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975
and other relevant resolutions in which the Assembly, inter alia, demanded the
immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from the Arab
territories occupied since 1967,
Recalling further General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of
14 December 1974, in which it defined an act of aggression,
Reaffirming once more the illegality of Israel’s decision of
14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the
occupied Syrian Golan, which has resulted in the effective annexation of that
territory,
Reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible
under the principles of international law and under the Charter of the
United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the
General Assembly, and that all territories thus occupied by Israel must be
returned,
Taking note with deep concern of the report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian
People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/48/557) and, in this
connection, deploring Israel’s constant refusal to cooperate with and to
receive the Special Committee,
Expressing its grave alarm, after considering the above-mentioned report
of the Special Committee, over Israel’s flagrant and persistent violations of
human rights in the Syrian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967,
E/CN.4/1994/L.4
page 3
despite the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly which
repeatedly called upon Israel to put an end to such occupation,
Reaffirming its previous relevant resolutions, the most recent being
resolution 1993/1 of 19 February 1993,
Guided by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with particular reference to
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949, and the relevant provisions of the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907,
1. Strongly condemns Israel, the occupying Power, for its refusal to
comply with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security
Council, particularly resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council, inter alia,
decided that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and
administration on the occupied Syrian Golan was null and void and without
international legal effect, and demanded that Israel, the occupying Power,
should rescind forthwith its decision;
2. Condemns the persistence of Israel in changing the physical
character, demographic composition, institutional structure and legal status
of the occupied Syrian Golan, and emphasizes that the displaced persons of the
population of the occupied Syrian Golan must be allowed to return to their
homes and to recover their properties;
3. Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and
actions taken or to be taken by Israel, the occupying Power, that purport to
alter the character and legal status of the Syrian Golan are null and void,
constitute a flagrant violation of international law and of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949, and have no legal effect;
4. Strongly condemns Israel for its attempt to impose forcibly Israeli
citizenship and Israeli identity cards on the Syrian citizens in the occupied
Syrian Golan and for its practices of annexation, establishment of
settlements, confiscation of lands and diversion of water resources and
imposing a boycott on their agricultural products; and calls upon Israel to
desist from its settlement designs and policies aimed against academic
institutions with the goal of serving the objectives of occupation, and to
desist from its repressive measures against the population of the occupied
Syrian Golan;
E/CN.4/1994/L.4
page 4
5. Calls once again upon Member States not to recognize any of the
legislative or administrative measures and actions referred to in the present
resolution;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to
the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, the
specialized agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations and
international humanitarian organizations and to give it the widest possible
publicity, and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-first
session;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first
session, as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Question of the
violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including
Palestine".
_____
Distr.
LIMITED
E/CN.4/1994/L.5
11 February 1994
Original: ARABIC AND ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 4
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED
ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PALESTINE
Algeria*, Bahrain*, China, Cuba, Indonesia, Jordan*, Malaysia,
Mauritania, Morocco*, Oman*, Pakistan, Qatar*, Saudi Arabia*,
Senegal*, Somalia*, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates* and Yemen*: draft resolution
A
The Commission on Human Rights,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, as well as by the provisions of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,
Guided also by the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,
Taking into consideration the provisions of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949, and the provisions of Additional Protocol I thereto, and the
Hague Convention IV of 1907, as well as the principles of international law
* In accordance with rule 69, para. 3, of the rules of procedure of the
functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council.
GE.94-10899 (E)
E/CN.4/1994/L.5
page 2
affirmed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946,
95 (I) of 11 December 1946, 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 and 2391 (XXIII) of
26 November 1968,
Recalling the relevant Security Council resolutions,
Recalling also the General Assembly resolutions on Israeli violations of
human rights in occupied Palestine, since 1967 and until now,
Recalling further the provisions of the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993,
Taking note with appreciation of the report of the Special Rapporteur,
Mr. René Felber, regarding his mission undertaken in accordance with
Commission resolution 1993/2 A (E/CN.4/1994/14),
Taking note also of the reports of the Special Committee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and
Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories submitted to the General Assembly
since 1968,
Noting with great concern the continued Israeli refusal to abide by the
resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Commission
on Human Rights,
Welcoming the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Government of Israel on 13 September 1993, whereby violations of human rights
will end through the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied
Palestinian territories,
Recalling all its previous resolutions on the subject,
1. Deeply regrets the continued violations of human rights in the
occupied Palestinian territory since the signing of the Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements by the Palestine Liberation
Organization and the Government of Israel on 13 September 1993,
2. Condemns the continued violations of the human rights of the
Palestinian people in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel with
military force, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, the opening of fire
by the Israeli army and settlers on Palestinian civilians that results in
killing and wounding them; the imposition of restrictive economic measures;
the demolition of houses; the expropriation of houses; collective punishment;
arbitrary and administrative detention of thousands of Palestinians without
trial; the confiscation of property of Palestinians; the expropriation of
E/CN.4/1994/L.5
page 3
land; the prevention of travel; the closure of universities and schools; the
perpetration of crimes of torture in Israeli prisons and detention centres;
and the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian
territory;
3. Calls once more upon Israel, the occupying Power, to desist from
all forms of violation of human rights in the Palestinian and other occupied
Arab territories and to respect the bases of international law, the principles
of international humanitarian law, and its commitments to the provisions of
the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations;
4. Also calls upon Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories in accordance
with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Commission on
Human Rights;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to
the attention of the Government of Israel and all other Governments, the
competent United Nations organs, the specialized agencies, regional
intergovernmental organizations and international humanitarian organizations,
to disseminate it on the widest possible scale, and to report on its
implementation by the Government of Israel to the Commission on Human Rights
at its fifty-first session;
6. Also requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission on
Human Rights with all United Nations reports issued between sessions of the
Commission that deal with the conditions in which the citizens of the
Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories are living under the Israeli
occupation;
7. Decides to consider the question at its fifty-first session as a
matter of priority.
B
The Commission on Human Rights,
Recalling Security Council resolutions related to the applicability of
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Palestinian and other occupied Arab
territories, which call for Israel’s commitment to them,
Recalling all relevant General Assembly resolutions on the applicability
to the occupied Palestinian territory of the Convention which urge Israel’s
commitment to and respect for their provisions,
E/CN.4/1994/L.5
page 4
Recalling also the decisions of the International Conference of the Red
Cross and the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims
(Geneva, 30 August - 1 September 1993) in respect of the application of the
Convention in all circumstances and the statements of the International
Committee of the Red Cross which condemn the continuous serious violations by
Israel of the provisions of the Convention and its refusal to apply those
provisions in the occupied territories,
Recalling further the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted
by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993,
Taking into account that States parties to the Convention undertake, in
accordance with article 1 thereof, to respect, and ensure respect for, the
Convention in all circumstances,
Recalling all its previous resolutions on the subject,
1. Reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the
Palestinian and all other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
including Jerusalem, and that Israel’s long-standing refusal to apply the
Convention to those territories had led to the perpetration by the Israeli
authorities of grave violations of human rights against Palestinian citizens,
and calls upon Israel to comply with its international commitments, to respect
the Convention and to apply it in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem;
2. Urges once more all States parties to the Convention to make every
effort to ensure the Israeli occupation authorities’ respect for and
compliance with the provisions of the Convention in the Palestinian and all
other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and
to undertake the necessary practical measures to ensure the provision of
international protection for the Palestinian people under occupation, in
accordance with the provisions of article 1 and other relevant articles of the
Convention;
3. Strongly condemns once more the refusal of Israel to apply the
Convention to Palestine and the Arab territories occupied since 1967 and to
their inhabitants, Israel’s policies of perpetrating crimes of torture against
Palestinian detainees and prisoners in Israeli prisons and detention camps and
E/CN.4/1994/L.5
page 5
its continued deliberate disregard for the provisions of the Convention, in
contravention of resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and
the Commission on Human Rights;
4. Calls upon Israel to allow those who have been deported since 1967
to return to their homeland without delay in implementation of the resolutions
of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Commission on Human
Rights;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to
the attention of the Government of Israel and all other Governments, the
competent United Nations organs, the specialized agencies, regional
intergovernmental organizations, international humanitarian organizations and
non-governmental organizations, and to report on progress in its
implementation by the Government of Israel to the Commission on Human Rights
at its fifty-first session;
6. Decides to consider the question at its fifty-first session as a
matter of high priority.
-----
Distr.
LIMITED
E/CN.4/1994/L.6
11 February 1994
Original: ARABIC and ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 9
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION
AND ITS APPLICATION TO PEOPLES UNDER COLONIAL
OR ALIEN DOMINATION OR FOREIGN OCCUPATION
Algeria*, Bahrain*, China, Cuba, Indonesia, Jordan*, Malaysia,
Mauritania, Morocco*, Oman*, Pakistan, Qatar*, Saudi Arabia*,
Senegal*, Somalia*, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates*,
and Yemen*: draft resolution
* In accordance with rule 69, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure of
the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council.
GE.94-10893 (E)
E/CN.4/1994/L.6
page 2
Situation in occupied Palestine
The Commission on Human Rights,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, in particular the provisions of Articles 1 and 55 thereof,
which affirm the right of peoples to self-determination, and scrupulous
respect of the principle of refraining in international relations from the
threat or use of force, as specified in the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 2625 (XXV) of
24 October 1970, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Guided also by the provisions of article 1 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 1 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which affirm that all peoples have the
right of self-determination,
Taking into consideration the provisions of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the
General Assembly in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
Guided by the provisions of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action adopted by the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights on
25 June 1993, and in particular Part I, paragraphs 2 and 3 relating to the
right of self-determination of all peoples and especially those subject to
foreign occupation,
Noting Security Council resolutions 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963
and 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965, which affirmed the interpretation of the
principle of self-determination as laid down in General Assembly
resolution 1514 (XV),
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 181 A and B (II) of
29 November 1947 and 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, as well as all other
resolutions which confirm and define the inalienable rights of the Palestinian
people, particularly their right to self-determination without external
interference and to the establishment of their independent State on their
national soil, especially Assembly resolutions ES-7/2 of 29 July 1980 and
37/86 E of 20 December 1982,
Reaffirming its previous resolutions in this regard,
E/CN.4/1994/L.6
page 3
Bearing in mind the reports and recommendations of the Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People which, from 1976
to 1993, have been submitted to the Security Council through the
General Assembly,
Reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the relevant United Nations
resolutions and declarations, and the provisions of international covenants
and instruments relating to the right to self-determination as an
international principle and as a right of all peoples in the world,
Expressing its grave concern at the persistence of Israel in preventing
by force the Palestinian people from enjoying their inalienable rights, in
particular their right to self-determination,
Recalling that the foreign occupation by the armed forces of a State of
the territory of another State constitutes an obstacle and a grave violation
of human rights according to part I, paragraph 30 of the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action and an act of aggression and a crime against the peace
and security of mankind, according to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX)
of 14 December 1974,
Expressing its grave concern that no just solution has been achieved to
the problem of Palestine, which has constituted the core of the Arab-Israeli
conflict since 1948,
Welcoming the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Government of Israel on 13 September 1993, aimed at enabling the Palestinian
people to achieve their national rights and, principally, their right to
self-determination free of external intervention,
1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to
self-determination without external interference;
2. Calls upon Israel to comply with its obligations under the Charter
of the United Nations and the principles of international law and to withdraw
from the Palestinian and other Arab territories which it has occupied since
1967 by military force, including Jerusalem, in accordance with the relevant
United Nations resolutions, so as to enable the Palestinian people to exercise
their universally recognized right of self-determination;
E/CN.4/1994/L.6
page 4
3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the
Government of Israel and to all other Governments, to distribute it on the
widest possible scale and to make available to the Commission on Human
Rights, prior to the convening of its fifty-first session, all information
pertaining to the implementation of the present resolution by the Government
of Israel;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda for its fifty-first
session the item entitled "The right of peoples to self-determination and its
application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign
occupation" and to consider the situation in occupied Palestine under that
item, as a matter of high priority.
- - - - -
UNITED NATIONS E
Economic and Social
Council
Distr.
LIMITED
E/CN.4/1995/L.4/Rev.1
16 February 1995
Original: ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 4
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PALESTINE
Algeria, Bahrain*, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait*, Lebanon*,
Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco*, Oman*, Qatar*, Somalia*,
Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic*, Tunisia*,
United Arab Emirates*, Viet Nam* and Yemen*:
revised draft resolution
Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Commission on Human Rights,
Deeply concerned at the suffering of the population of the occupied
Syrian Golan due to the violation of their human rights since the Israeli
military occupation of 1967,
Recalling Security Council resolution 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling also all relevant General Assembly resolutions, including the
latest, resolution 49/36 D of 9 December 1994, in which the Assembly,
inter alia, called upon Israel to put an end to its occupation of the Arab
Territories,
* In accordance with rule 69, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure of
the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council.
GE.95-11073 (E)
E/CN.4/1995/L.4/Rev.1
page 2
Reaffirming once more the illegality of Israel’s decision of
14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the
occupied Syrian Golan, which has resulted in the effective annexation of that
territory,
Reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible
under the principles of international law and under the Charter of the
United Nations,
Taking note with deep concern of the report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian
People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/49/511) and, in this
connection, regretting Israel’s constant refusal to cooperate with and to
receive the Special Committee,
Guided by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with particular reference to
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949, and the relevant provisions of the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907,
Noting with satisfaction the convening at Madrid of the International
Peace Conference on the Middle East on the basis of Secruity Council
resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,
with the hope that substantial and concrete progress will be achieved on the
Syrian and Lebanese tracks for the realization of a just, comprehensive and
lasting peace in the region,
Reaffirming its previous relevant resolutions, the most recent being
resolution 1994/2 of 18 February 1994,
1. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant
resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, particularly
resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council, inter alia, decided that the
Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the
occupied Syrian Golan was null and void and without international legal
effect, and demanded that Israel, the occupying Power, should rescind
forthwith its decision;
2. Also calls upon Israel to desist from changing the physical
character, demographic composition, institutional structure and legal status
of the occupied Syrian Golan, and emphasizes that the displaced persons of the
E/CN.4/1995/L.4/Rev.1
page 3
population of the occupied Syrian Golan must be allowed to return to their
homes and to recover their properties;
3. Further calls upon Israel to desist from imposing Israeli
citizenship and Israeli identity cards on the Syrian citizens in the occupied
Syrian Golan and to desist from its repressive measures against them, and from
all other practices mentioned in the report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian
people and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories;
4. Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and
actions taken or to be taken by Israel, the occupying Power, that purport to
alter the character and legal status of the occupied Syrian Golan are null and
void, constitute a flagrant violation of international law and of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949, and have no legal effect;
5. Calls once again upon Member States not to recognize any of the
legislative or administrative measures and actions referred to in the present
resolution;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to
the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, the
specialized agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations and
international humanitarian organizations and to give it the widest possible
publicity, and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-second
session;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second
session, as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Question of the
violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including
Palestine".
-----
UNITED NATIONS E
Economic and
Social
Council
Distr.
LIMITED
E/1995/L.41
21 July 1995
ENGLISH
Original: ARABIC
Substantive session of 1995
Geneva, 26 June-28 July 1995
Agenda item 5 (a)
SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: REPORTS OF
SUBSIDIARY BODIES, CONFERENCES AND RELATED QUESTIONS: SPECIAL
ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE
Algeria*, Bahrain*, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, Gabon, Honduras*, Jordan*,
Kuwait*, Lebanon*, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar*, Morocco*, Oman*,
Philippines, Qatar*, Romania, Somalia*, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic*,
Tunisia*, United Arab Emirates* and Yemen*: draft resolution
Assistance for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly decision 48/450 of 21 December 1993 on
assistance for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon,
Recalling the resolutions of the Economic and Social Council in which the
Council called upon the specialized agencies and other organizations and
bodies of the United Nations system to expand and intensify their programmes
of assistance in response to the urgent needs of Lebanon,
* In accordance with rule 72 of the rules of procedure of the Economic
and Social Council.
GE.95-63060 (E)
E/1995/L.41
page 2
Reaffirming its resolution 1994/35 of 29 July 1994,
Aware of the magnitude of the requirements of Lebanon resulting from the
extensive destruction of its infrastructure, which is impeding national
rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts and adversely affecting economic and
social conditions,
Reaffirming the pressing need to continue to assist the Government of
Lebanon in the reconstruction of the country and the recovery of its human and
economic potential,
Expressing its appreciation of the efforts of the Secretary-General in
mobilizing assistance for Lebanon,
1. Appeals to all Member States and all organizations of the
United Nations system to intensify their efforts to mobilize all possible
assistance for the Government of Lebanon in its reconstruction and development
efforts;
2. Calls upon all organizations and programmes of the United Nations
system to intensify their assistance in response to the urgent needs of
Lebanon, especially in the technical and training fields;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council at its
substantive session of 1996 of the progress achieved in the implementation of
the present resolution.
-----
Annex 80
Somalia’s consistent assertion of a 200-nautical mile territorial sea before the United
Nations, Law of the Sea Bulletins, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office
of Legal Affairs, 1993-2010
- 126 -
Territorial Sea
Contiguous
Zone
Exclusive
Economic Zone
Fisheries Zone
Continental Shelf
(indicates parties to 1982
Convention or, where the State
is not a party to it, parties to
1958 Convention, and their
outer limit claims)
STATE
UNCLOS Ratification,
Accession
Does the legislation
provide for straight
baselines?
Does the State claim
archipelagic status?
Breadth of the zone in nautical miles Party to: Outer limit
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 01/10/1993 Yes 12 24 200 1982 N/A
Samoa 14/08/1995 Yes 12 200 1982 N/A
Sao Tome and Principe 03/11/1987 Yes 12 200 1982 N/A
Saudi Arabia 24/04/1996 Yes 12 18 1982 Limits not
specified.
Senegal 25/10/1984 Yes 12 24 200 1982 CM/200
Seychelles 16/09/1991 Yes 12 24 200 1982 CM/200
Sierra Leone 12/12/1994 12 24 200 1982 200
Singapore 17/11/1994 3 1982 N/A
Slovenia 16/06/1995 1982 N/A
Solomon Islands 23/06/1997 Yes 12 200 1982 200
Somalia 24/07/1989 Yes 200 1982 N/A
South Africa 23/12/1997 Yes 12 24 200 1982 CM/200
Spain 15/01/1997 Yes 12 24 200 40 þ 41 1982 N/A
40 In the Atlantic Ocean.
41 In the Mediterranean Sea.
- 144 -
Territorial Sea
Contiguous Zone
Exclusive Economic
Zone
Fisheries Zone
Continental Shelf (see
introductory note): Parties
to 1982 Convention or,
where the State is not a
party to it, parties to 1958
Convention | Outer limit
claims as reflected in
legislation3
STATE
UNCLOS Ratification,
Accession
Does the legislation
provide for straight
baselines? 1
Does the State claim
archipelagic status? 2
Breadth of the zone in nautical miles3 Party to: Outer limit
Serbia and Montenegro 12/03/2001 Yes 12 1982 DLM
Seychelles 16/09/1991 Yes 12 24 200 1982 CM/200
Sierra Leone 12/12/1994 12 24 200 1982 200
Singapore 17/11/1994 3 1982 N/A
Slovenia 16/06/1995 1982 N/A
Solomon Islands 23/06/1997 Yes 12 200 1982 200
Somalia 24/07/1989 Yes 200 1982 N/A
South Africa 23/12/1997 Yes 12 24 200 1982 CM/200
Spain 15/01/1997 Yes 12 24 200 43 44 1982 N/A
Sri Lanka 19/07/1994 Yes 12 24 200 1982 CM/200
Sudan 23/01/1985 Yes 12 18 1982 200m/EXPL.
Suriname 09/07/1998 12 200 1982 N/A
Sweden 25/06/1996 Yes 12 DLM 1982 200m/EXPL.
Syrian Arab Republic Yes 12 24 200 CM
43 In the Atlantic Ocean.
44 In the Mediterranean Sea, defined by coordinates of points.
LAW OF THE SEA
BULLETIN
No. 63 2007
DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS
91
Territorial Sea
Contiguous
Zone
Exclusive
Economic
Zone
Fisheries Zone
Continental Shelf (see
introductory note): Parties to
1982 Convention or, where the
State is not a party to it, parties
to 1958 Convention | Outer limit
claims as reflected in legislation3
STATE
UNCLOS
Ratification,
Accession
Does the
legislation provide
for straight
baselines? 1
Does the State
claim archipelagic
status? 2
Breadth of the zone in nautical miles3 Party to: Outer limit
Solomon Islands 23/06/1997 Yes 12 200 1982 200
Somalia 24/07/1989 Yes 200 1982 N/A
South Africa 23/12/1997 Yes 12 24 200 1982 CM/200
Spain 15/01/1997 Yes 12 24 200 49 50 1982 N/A
Sri Lanka 19/07/1994 Yes 12 24 200 1982 CM/200
Sudan 23/01/1985 Yes 12 18 1982 200m/EXPL.
Suriname 09/07/1998 12 200 1982 N/A
Sweden 25/06/1996 Yes 12 DLM 1982 200m/EXPL.
Syrian Arab Republic Yes 12 24 200 CM
Thailand Yes 12 24 200 1958 N/A
Timor-Leste 12 24 200 CM/200
Togo 16/04/1985 30 200 1982 N/A
Tonga 02/08/1995 Yes 12 200 1982 N/A
Trinidad and Tobago 25/04/1986 Yes 12 24 200 1982 CM/200
Tunisia 24/04/1985 Yes 12 24 DLM 51 1982 N/A
Turkey 6 52 200 53 N/A
49 In the Atlantic Ocean.
50 In the Mediterranean Sea, defined by coordinates of points.
51 Up to 50-m isobath - Off the Gulf of Gabès.
52 Six nautical miles in the Aegean Sea, 12 nautical miles in the Black Sea.
53 In the Black Sea.
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea
Office of Legal Affairs
asdf
Law of
the Sea
United Nations
New York, 2010
Bulletin No. 73
68
MARITIME ZONES
Territorial Sea
Contiguous Zone
Exclusive Economic
Zone
Fisheries Zone
Continental Shelf,
including submissions
to the CLCS
(see introductory
note)
STATE
UNCLOS Ratification,
Accession Date
Does the legislation provide
for straight baselines? 1
Does the State claim
archipelagic status? 2
Breadth of the zone in nautical miles3 Outer limit Sub.
Slovenia 16/06/1995 ● 12/DLM 85 DLM
Solomon Islands 23/06/1997 ● 12 200 CM/200 ● 86
Somalia 24/07/1989 ● 200 CM/200 p/i
South Africa 23/12/1997 ● 12 24 200 CM/200 ● 87, 88
Spain 15/01/1997 ● 12 24 200 89 COORD90 CM/20091 ● 92, 93
Sri Lanka 19/07/1994 ● 12 24 200 CM/200 ●
Sudan 23/01/1985 ● 12 18 200m/EXPL
Suriname 45 09/07/1998 12 200 CM/200 ●
85 See “Ecological Protection Zone and Continental Shelf of the Republic of Slovenia Act” adopted on 4 October 2005. The delimitation of the ecological
protection zone shall be effected by agreement with the neighbouring States. The Act provides for its provisional outer limits.
86 In respect of the joint submission by the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands - concerning the Ontong Java Plateau.
87 In respect of the mainland of the territory of the Republic of South Africa.
88 Joint submission by France and South Africa - in the area of the Crozet Archipelago and the Prince Edward Islands.
89 In the Atlantic Ocean.
90 In the Mediterranean Sea.
91 With the exception of the Mediterranean Sea.
92 Joint submission by France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - in the area of the Celtic Sea and the Bay of Biscay.
93 In respect of the area of Galicia.
Annex 81
M. Odido, Marine Science Country Profiles: Kenya, IOCINCWIO-IV/Inf.5, UNESCO, IOC
and Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association, 1998, Extracts
INTERGOVERNMENTAL OCEANOGRAPHIC COMMISSION
&
WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN MARINE SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Marine Science Country Profiles
Kenya
MIKA ODIDO
IOCINCWIO-IV/Inf. 5
page 3
PREFACE
The Marine Science Country Profile (MSCP) is a tool designed to assist individuals, local and
international organisations and governments, in making informed decisions regarding allocation
of funds to marine sciences programmes, and identification of programmes to be undertaken. It
provides an overview of infrastructure in terms of facilities, training and education which may
be required to support proposed programmes. In short, the MSCP is supposed to reveal the true
picture of the marine sciences in a country, with respect to the available resources (e.g. personnel,
facilities, etc.) as well as strengths and deficiencies in the national marine sciences capabilities.
The MSCP provides the following:
I. a general outline of the main productive activities and sea-related infrastructures within
the country’s economy, as well as relevant national institutions and policies, particularly
those concerned with research and education in marine science and technology;
II. an objective view of national capabilities in marine science and technology, including
institutional aspects, scientific and technical personnel, infrastructures, laboratories and
working facilities at sea, common support services, etc.
III. an assessment of available information and data with a view to determining bottlenecks
and other constraining factors.
The Kenya Marine Science Country Profile is produced within the framework of
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) - Western Indian Ocean Marine Science
Association (WIOMSA) co-operation and as a contribution to the International Oceanographic
Data and Information Exchange (IODE) programme. The MSCP has also been prepared for the
following other countries in the WIO region; Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Comoro,
Seychelles and Mauritius. These profiles contain information that has been gathered through
library research and interviews with responsible individuals of various organisations. The
multidisciplinary approach has been used during the preparations of these documents, since they
cover physical and biological characteristics of the coastal resources and their contribution to the
economy; social and economic aspects of the coastal communities; human resources, the role of
various institutions in the management and development of coastal resources, and
national/priorities in terms of management and development of coastal and marine resources.
We would like to acknowledge the assistance provided by Kennedy Ochego of RECOSCIX-WIO
who extracted information required from WIODIR, and the catalogue of holdings of Marine
Science Libraries in Western Indian Ocean (WIOLIB).
We would also like to express our thanks to Ms Eunice Onyango who assisted in preparation of
the document.
IOCINCWIO-IV/Inf. 5
page 27
2.3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN MARINE AFFAIRS
Kenya participates in the marine related activities of various international organisations. These
include:
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO where Kenya Marine and
Fisheries Research Institute is the focal point. Kenya holds the Vice Chairmanship of the
organisation. Programmes of IOC in which Kenya participates actively include GLOSS, IODE,
TEMA, IGOSS.
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of United Nations. Kenya actively participates in the
fisheries programmes of FAO where it is represented by the Fisheries Department and KMFRI.
Kenya is also a member of the Aquatic Science and Fisheries Abstract (ASFA) Board and
KMFRI is an ASFA Input Centre.
International Maritime Organisation: Kenya is a member of the organisation and is represented
by the Kenya Ports Authority.
World Meteorological Organisation: Kenya is represented by the Kenya Meteorological
Department and is also the regional centre for Africa and hosts the Regional Institute for
Meteorological Training and Research.
Kenya is also a member of several regional bodies involved in marine science activities
including:
IOC’s Regional Committee for Co-operative Investigations in the North and Central Western
Indian Ocean (IOCINCWIO) where KMFRI represents Kenya. Kenya is vice chairman of the
organisation.
Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Commission (IOMAC): Kenya is a member and is represented by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation.
2.3.1 International Organisation Located in Kenya with interest in Marine Activities
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya.
The UNEP Water Branch deals with coastal and marine science activities and is also the
implementing agency for the Nairobi Convention for Protection, Management and Development
of the Coastal Environment of the Eastern Africa Region.
The World Conservation Union (IUCN) also has a regional office in Nairobi. IUCN has projects
dealing with marine biodiversity and Integrated Coastal Area Management.
The UNESCO Regional Office for Science and Technology in Africa (ROSTA) is also located
in Nairobi. The activities of ROSTA include co-ordination of marine science programmes of
UNESCO and IOC including the Regional Project for Research and Training on Coastal Marine
Systems in Africa (COMARAF).
The Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations also has a regional office in
Nairobi which has been involved in fisheries research and development activities in the region.
IOCINCWIO-IV/Inf. 5
page 41
ANNEX III: STATUTES RELATING TO
COASTAL ZONE AND ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES
ISSUE/CONCERN LEGISLATION ENFORCEMENT/
IMPLEMENTATION
Security Maritime Zones Act
Continental Shelf Act
Kenya Navy
Land Tenure Government Lands Act
Land Titles Act
Registration of Titles Act
Land (Group Representatives Act)
Trust Land Act Local Govt. Authorities
Mazrui Land Trust Act
Registered Land Act
Land Planning Act Physical Planning Dept.
Commissioner of Lands
Water Use and
Conservation National Water Conservation Reclamation, Regional &
Water Act
Pipeline Corporation Act Water Development/
Ministry of Land
NWCPC
Environment and
Conservation, including Local Government Act Municipal, Town, County
pollution Kenya Ports Authority Act Kenya Ports Authority
Chief's Act
Public Health Act Ministry of Health
Factories Act Ministry of Labour
Fisheries Act Fisheries Department
Wildlife Management and KWS, Ministry of
Conservation Act Tourism and Wildlife
National Museums Act NMK
Petroleum Act
Provincial Administration
Tourism Tourist Industry Act
Tourist Development Corporation Wildlife/KTDC
Act
Ministry of Tourism and
Industrial Development Coast Development Authority Act
Factories Act Ministry of Labour
Export Processing Zones Act EPZA
Land Planning Act Physical Planning dept
Town Planning Act Municipal, Town, County
CDA
Shipping Kenya Ports Authority Act
Merchant Shipping Act. Transport and
Carriage of Goods at Sea Act. Communications
KPA/ Ministry of
IOCINCWIO-IV/Inf. 5
page 42
Agriculture Agriculture Act
Crop Production and Livestock and Livestock
Development Act Development
Plants Protection Act
Seeds and Plants Varieties Act
Coconut Preservation Act
Irrigation Act
Pests Control Act
Ministry of Agriculture
Forestry Forestry Act Ministry of Environment
and Natural Resources
Research Science and Technology Act Ministry of Research
Technical Training and
Technology/ Research
Institutes.
Fisheries Fisheries Act Fisheries Department.
Annex 82
G. Saetersdal et al, The Dr. Fridtjof Nansen Programme 1975-1993. Investigations of Fishery
Resources in Developing Regions. History of the Programme and Review of Results. FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 391., Rome, FAO. 1999, Extracts
FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER 391
The Dr. Fridtjof Nansen Programme 1975–1993
Investigations of fishery resources in developing regions
History of the programme and review of results
by
Gunnar Sætersdal
Gabriella Bianchi
Tore Strømme
Institute of Marine Research
Bergen, Norway
Siebren C. Venema
Fisheries Department
FAO
INSTITUTE OF MARINE RESEARCH BERGEN NORWAY
NORWEGIAN AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
2
The designations employed and the
presentation of material in this publication
do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations concerning the legal status of any
country, territory, city or area or of its
authorities, or concerning the delimitation
of its frontiers or boundaries.
M-43
ISBN 92-5-104377-9
All rights reserved. No part of this
publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying or otherwise, without the
prior permission of the copyright owner.
Applications for such permission, with a
statement of the purpose and extent of the
reproduction, should be addressed to the
Director, Information Division, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Viale delle Terme di Caracalla,
00100 Rome, Italy.
9
Foreword
Norwegian development co-operation has mainly been aimed at alleviating poverty in the
poorest developing countries. Support to fisheries development, and particularly to
fishery research and management, has been an important item in Norwegian
development co-operation during the last thirty years. There are two main reasons for
this. In the early 1970s, many developing countries, wanting to develop their fishing
industry based on marine resources, found that they had very little knowledge about the
abundance of these resources. This created great uncertainty as regards the possibility
for increased fish production. The need for support in fishery research was even more
strongly felt in the late 1970s, with the extension of the national jurisdiction and the
establishment of EEZs in most coastal countries. The second reason relates to the fact
that Norway itself is a coastal country with important fishery resources, and has a
longstanding experience in marine fisheries research as a tool for managing its marine
fish resources. It was felt that this experience should be shared with the developing
world.
This work could only have been carried out because the Institute of Marine Research in
Bergen, Norway, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) took upon themselves the task of
coordinating and implementing this programme. The main instrument in this work has
been the research vessel “Dr. Fridtjof Nansen”, first funded by Norway in 1974. The
vessel has been able to carry the UN flag throughout this period, facilitating its
deployment in many different countries.
In 1991 Norway approved a continuation of the Nansen Programme, with two extended
aims, i.e. to assist developing coastal countries in strengthening their capability of
managing their marine fish resources, and to assist in improving the information basis for
monitoring the marine environment. In principle, this was a decision to continue financing
this work for another 15-year period, because it involved building a new research vessel.
Monitoring the most important fish resources and advising in resources management
and fisheries management has become the focus of the new programme.
This new programme is more geographically focused, as Norway's partner countries in
development have been given priority so far. Furthermore, national institution building
has become a main item in the new programme, while such activities had a more modest
role in the previous periods of the programme. The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries
has become another pillar of the new programme, providing competence in fisheries
management in the broader sense of the word. It is our hope that the co-operation
between the Norwegian institutions involved and the institutions in cooperating countries
will enhance the knowledge base and the sustainable management of the marine fish
resources in these countries.
During the period of reporting as laid out in this book, the late Prof. Gunnar Sætersdal of
the Institute of Marine Research has been most instrumental in bringing forward the
needs of developing countries in this area, having himself been in charge of the cooperation
involved. The combination of being a front figure in fishery research, strongly
promoting the utilisation of fishery research as a basic tool for fisheries management,
and his deep political engagement and understanding of the problems that developing
nations were facing, have played a key role in shaping present Norwegian development
aid in the field of fisheries.
Norway is proud to have been a part of this programme for so many years, and wishes
the reader a good journey into this book summarising the results and outcomes of the
first phase of a programme that still continues.
18
Figure 1.2 Map of the areas covered by the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN, 1975–93
Table 1.1 lists areas or countries covered in approximately 18 years of vessel
operations, a more detailed list is presented in Appendix II. Figure 1.2 provides an
overview of all areas covered. About half the time was spent in the Indian Ocean for
which, by the mid-1970s information on the fishery resources was scarce. The first twoyear
survey of the northwest Arabian Sea had the largely exploratory objective of testing
whether this region, known to be very promising from the viewpoint of basic biological
productivity, held fish resources similar to those from other highly productive regions
such as the eastern boundary current upwelling regions off West Africa and the west
coasts of the Americas.
Table 1.1 Summary of survey assignments of the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN by major
sea areas and years
Area (countries) Years Relevant
chapter
Arabian Sea and adjacent Gulfs
(Pakistan, Iran, Oman, Yemen, Somalia, and Djibouti*)
1975–79
1981,
1983,
1984
3
Eastern Indian Ocean and South China Sea
(Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia and the Maldives*)
1978–80
1983 4
Southwest Indian Ocean
(Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Seychelles* and
Madagascar*)
1977–78
1980,
1982–83
1990
5
Red Sea and Mediterranean* (Ethiopia*, Egypt*, Tunisia*
and Algeria*)
1981 -
Atlantic Ocean off northwest Africa
(Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea- Bissau,
Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo*,
Benin*, Nigeria*, Cameroun*, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé e
Principe and Cape Verde Islands*)
1981–82
1986
1992
6
Atlantic Ocean off southwest Africa
(Gabon, Congo, Angola, Namibia)
1985–86
1989–93 7
Pacific Ocean off Central America
(Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Guatemala and Mexico)
1987 8
Caribbean Sea off northern South America
(Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela and
Colombia)
1988 9
*) Resources of these countries and area have not been reviewed in this report
Most of the subsequent assignments in the Indian Ocean had a character of providing
inventories by countries. This period coincided with that of the establishment of EEZs by
19
many coastal States and there was a great interest in obtaining descriptions of the
resources found in these zones. These surveys were detailed and comprehensive and in
most cases repeated in order to confirm main findings and to study seasonal variations.
Another type of survey in the Indian Ocean was related to one of the main findings of the
first exploratory surveys of the northwest Arabian Sea: the very high abundance in a part
of the region of mesopelagic fish, mainly Myctophidae. To study these fish in more detail,
special surveys were mounted in the Gulfs of Oman and Aden in 1979, 1981 and 1983.
The objectives in the two years of surveys off the Americas, on the shelves of the
Eastern Central Pacific and of the north coast of South America respectively, were to
provide detailed information on the resources as a basis for further development of
mostly existing fisheries.
The background was different for the assignments on the West African shelf, Morocco to
Ghana, Angola and later Namibia. In these upwelling regions, there was a history of both
fisheries and fisheries research and the task of the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN programme
was to provide up-to-date information on the state of the stocks for purposes of
management of the resources as well as for further fisheries development.
IMR was responsible for the tactical planning of the assignments, a responsibility shared
with the co-operating scientific institutions in the countries of operation. Representatives
of FAO's Fisheries Department and of existing field projects often assisted in this
process, especially in the case of regional programmes when formal meetings were
called for planning purposes.
IMR's responsibility included the technical operation of the vessel, which was crewed
from Norway, but often complemented with fishermen/deckhands from the region of
operation; this also served training purposes. Technical breakdowns at times caused
problems in regions where shipyards and dock facilities were scarce. From 1981, a new
mode of operation was adopted involving two months of continuous operation followed
by a one month's lay-up. This facilitated repair and maintenance and saved crew costs
while maintaining an annual operational period in excess of 200 days.
The annual operational costs of the vessel started at about NKr 15 million (recalculated
to the 1995 price index level). There was some increase after the early years, and since
1980 the cost level was NKr 17–18 million (US$ 3.4 million at the 1995 exchange rate)
with no trend, but with variations caused by major refits. The main component (50–60%)
was, however, crew wages, social insurance and travel. Scientific management and
execution, together with reporting, meetings, scholarships, etc., represented a
considerable additional cost estimated at some NKr 4 million (US$ 630,000).
The IMR scientific survey staff consisted of about five persons. In addition in each
assignment arrangements were made for participation in the survey of a contingent of
scientists and technicians from the countries included in the programme. They were
selected and appointed by the respective government authorities and represented
fisheries research institutions and sometimes universities. Their role in the work was of
utmost importance and served several purposes. These include: to be made acquainted
with the techniques and methods used in the survey and with the fish fauna in the area,
to be trained in these aspects, to assist in the overall activities on board, especially
sampling, logging and first analysis of data and, after the completion of the assignment,
to help the authorities in recognising and understanding the reported findings. About five
scientists/technicians from the relevant counterpart agency participated in survey
execution and data processing on a rotation basis (see Appendix III). Professional cooperation
also included scholarships for leading scientists from the counterpart
institutions both at IMR and at the University of Bergen.
Review of evaluations - the extended programme
43
special need which existed for more information on its fishery resources and also
demonstrated the expectations as to its development potentials.
Figure 3.1 shows the geographical coverage of DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN surveys in the
Indian Ocean: most of the Indian Ocean's coastal areas were included, except those of
India, Australia and most of Indonesia. The southwest coast of India was already
covered by a survey programme with similar objectives, the FAO/UNDP Pelagic Fishery
Project (IND/69/593) in the period 1971–76 and its successor (Pelagic Fishery
Investigations on the Southwest Coast - Phase II (IND/75/038) (FAO, 1982).
Figure 3.1 Location of the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN surveys in the Indian Ocean and
South China Sea, 1975–84
During the first two years (1975 and 1976), the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN surveys
differed from later assignments in having an exploratory character, investigating wide
and largely unknown areas in order to obtain a first appreciation of the distribution,
composition and the magnitude of the pelagic fish stocks in these waters. In retrospect,
this first exploratory phase could be considered unnecessarily long, and a change to
more detailed investigations of specific areas could have been made after only one year.
The situation after the completion of one pre-monsoon and one post-monsoon coverage
was, however, one of considerable uncertainty (IMR, 1976b). Although survey results
confirmed the occurrence of small pelagic fish in the known highly productive inshore
areas, their estimated abundance was nowhere as high as expected. On the other hand,
the very high abundance of mesopelagic fish over the whole survey area was an
unexpected finding. There was thus a need to confirm these general results and check
on possible inter-annual variations. The character of the work and main objectives were
therefore maintained in the continued survey, although there was some redistribution of
survey intensity with more attention being given to the most promising parts.
Subsequent assignments were based on a different approach as regards both the
general organization of the surveys and their objectives. Even though still operating
under the umbrella of the IOP until its termination in 1979, each assignment was now
planned and executed in closer co-operation with authorities of the countries concerned
and the survey period was estimated to allow detailed repeated investigations of all the
resources which could be targeted by the methods used as well by environmental
studies.
In the late 1970s there was considerable interest in fishery research among the coastal
countries of the Indian Ocean. FAO, through IOFC and IOP, had made the countries
aware of the potentials for fishery development. In addition most States in the region had
44
by the late 1970s established EEZs in accordance with the provisionally agreed text of
the Law of the Sea Convention and were conscious of a need for more information on
the fishery resources within their EEZs.
The sequence of new DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN assignments did not follow a long-term
plan, but was adjusted to meet priorities set in part by FAO/UNDP, and in part by
NORAD. In many cases assignments were renewed in a region or coastal zone already
covered. The objective was then to confirm and supplement previous work and to study
interannual fluctuations of the composition, distribution and abundance of the resources.
The IOP's original plan for a pelagic fish assessment survey of the North Arabian Sea
included the whole shelf and adjacent ocean from Somalia to Cape Comorin (the
southern tip of India) (Midttun et al., 1973). In order to provide a more complete overview
of the pelagic resources of the entire North Arabian Sea reference will also be made to
the findings from the almost contemporary (1971–75) survey programme off the
southwest coast of India, the FAO/UNDP Pelagic Fishery Project (IND/69/593). This
project was not part of the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN programme, but IMR was involved
in its scientific execution and there was an important intercalibration between the project
vessels RASTRELLIGER and DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN. In order to maintain a time
sequence in the review, this project will be presented first (see Section 3.2).
Section 3.3 deals with the first exploratory period of the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN which
covered the highly productive northwest Arabian Sea from Pakistan to Somalia in 1975–
76. Relevant findings of the Pakistan assignment of January-June 1977 are also
included.
The joint findings of these surveys represented at that time the first, and in retrospect
apparently fairly conclusive, replies to the important questions concerning the fish
potentials of the Arabian Sea and adjacent Gulfs for which such high expectations had
been held out.
The mesopelagic fish, which in their high abundance are restricted to the slope of the
continental shelf and the adjacent oceanic parts of the northwest Arabian Sea, are
described separately in a section which includes the special follow-up surveys mounted
for these species in 1979, 1981 and 1983 (Section 3.4).
Section 3.5 describes the follow-up surveys for small pelagic and demersal fish from
Pakistan to Somalia from 1983 to 1984 on a country-by-country basis.
Other parts of the Indian Ocean are dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.2 PELAGIC FISHERY INVESTIGATIONS OFF SOUTHWEST
INDIA, 1971–75: RESULTS OF THE FAO/UNDP PROJECT
IND/69/593
Project objectives and effort
The southwest coast of India (Malabar coast) is included in this review for reasons of
completeness. This will allow comparisons between the upwelling system off the
Somalia-Arabian coast and that off the Malabar coast. The survey methods used were
more or less identical to those of the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN programme, a result of
IMR's involvement in both programmes.
The project resulted from a request from the Government of India to UNDP/FAO in 1967.
The background was the experience of wide fluctuations in the yields of the important
inshore fisheries for oil sardine (Sardinella longiceps) and mackerel (Rastrelliger
kanagurta) on the coast from Cochin to Goa resulting in shifts between seasons of glut
and years of failing fisheries with extremely low landings. It was envisaged that an
169
5 SURVEYS IN THE SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the development of marine fisheries in countries bordering
the Southwest Indian was of great interest to donor agencies, such as NORAD and
UNDP. After the termination of the strong co-operation with FAO and UNDP in the
Arabian Sea, NORAD decided to deploy the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN in Mozambique,
where it supported a number of long-term fisheries development programmes.
After the initial surveys in Mozambique, an interest was developed to also cover the
adjacent states, usually in co-operation with FAO and local FAO/UNDP or NORAD
projects.
A total of 16 surveys were conducted in the period 1977–90, of which seven in
Mozambique, with 13 complete or partial coverages of the shelf areas, four in Kenya,
three in Tanzania and one each in Madagascar and the Seychelles.
The survey in the Seychelles was incomplete, while the one off Madagascar was mainly
for oceanographic purposes, covering only the southern part of the island. The results of
the surveys in Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique are described and discussed below.
5.1 KENYA, 1980–83
Survey objectives and effort
Surveys of the shelf of Kenya was part of the DR. FRIDTJOF NANSEN's East African
Coast programme in the early 1980s to investigate small pelagic fish with acoustic
methods and demersal fish with bottom trawling. The four surveys in Kenya, in
December 1980, August and December 1982 and May 1983 covered together all
trawlable parts of the shelf and the slope from about 10 m to 500 m. The shallow, more
productive part of the shelf was covered in each of the surveys. The results were briefly
described in cruise reports (IMR, 1982d; Nakken, 1981; Iversen, 1983) and summarized
in a special report for the “NORAD-Kenya Seminar on the Marine Fish Stocks and
Fisheries in Kenya” held in Mombasa in 1984 (Iversen, 1984; Iversen and Myklevoll,
1984b).
Table 5.1 shows the operational data of the four surveys. The degree of coverage for the
acoustic investigations, was generally high and particularly so for the August 1982
survey. The trawl stations are those recorded as successful swept-area hauls, available
in the NANSIS data bank with the exception of those from the 1980 survey.
Table 5.1 Details of the surveys in Kenya
Number
Date
I
Dec 1980
II
Aug 1982
III
Dec 1982
IV
May 1983
Survey distance (nmi) 1,300 2,360 1,040 810
Survey area (nmi2) 6,000 4,500 3,500 2,300
Degree of coverage 17 35 17 17
No. of trawl stations 47 47 27 27
Figure 5.1 shows the shelf of Kenya, the sub-areas used in the trawl survey programme
and the coverage in the August 1982 survey. Table 5.2 shows the areas of the depth
strata by subarea (Iversen, 1984). Most of the southern area is very deep and this part
was only covered in the December 1980 survey. The North Kenya Bank is narrow with a
steep slope. The Malindi Bank-Ungama Bay area has the widest shelf with a generally
smooth trawlable bottom. The bottom trawl investigations in the 1982/83 surveys were
mostly confined to this area and to the southern part of the North Kenya Bank.
394
Senegal 1981–92
Bonbacar Ba
Abibou Faye
L. le Reste
Birane Samb
Moustapha Seck
Sierra Leone 1981–86
I.E. Bangura
R. Jones
P.A.T. Showers
Somalia 1984
Abdi Ismail Abdi
Omar Haji Ahmed Dubad
Sri Lanka 1978–80
A. de Alwis
G.H.P. de Bruin
P. Dalpadado
K.P. Jinasena
P.G. Pereira
A. Ratnasekera
J.R. Samarasinghe
M. Siddeek
Suriname 1988
Yolanda Echteld
J.A. Emanuels
Chanderalth Gajadin
Heidi Jessurun
Rene Lieveld
Tanzania 1982–83
Peter K. Chisara
Omar Shaame Faki
Winfired V. Haule
Egid F.B. Katunzi
Sadock P.N. Kimaro
George D. Msumi
Magnus A.K. Ngoile
Harishchandra B. Pratap
Jim Yonazi
Thailand 1980
Rabieb Jangsilapa
Likit Noopetch
Weera Pokapunt
Dhummasakdi Poreeyanond
Dheerasah Wasuthapitah
Trinidad & Tobago 1988
Sammy Alleyre
Alan Aruato
Erol Caesar
Ronald Chan-A-Shing
Boris Fabres
Leo Heilemann
Sherry Heilemann
Annex 83
U.N. Doc A/55/PV.16, United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-fifth
session, 16th plenary meeting, 15 September 2000, Address by Mr. Salim Abdikassim Salad
Hassan, President of the Somali Republic
United Nations A/55/PV.16
General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
16th plenary meeting
Friday, 15 September 2000, 10 a.m.
New York
Official Records
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of
speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original
languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature
of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room
C-178. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.
00-64432 (E)
`````````
President: Mr. Holkeri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Finland)
The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.
Agenda item 9 (continued)
General debate
The President: I first give the floor to His
Excellency The Honourable Sir John Kaputin, Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Papua New Guinea.
Sir John Kaputin (Papua New Guinea): On
behalf of the people and Government of Papua New
Guinea, I join previous speakers in congratulating you,
Sir, on your election to your prestigious post. Your
unanimous election as President of the General
Assembly at the dawn of the new millennium shows
the high esteem in which the international community
holds both you personally and your country, Finland.
We are confident that you will guide the historic fiftyfifth
session to a successful conclusion.
The skill with which your predecessor, Mr. Theo-
Ben Gurirab of Namibia, cooperated to develop the
theme of the recent Millennium Summit, and presided
over the drafting of the outcome document and ensured
the smooth management of the Summit earned our
sincere appreciation for a job very well done. We also
congratulate him on his very positive contribution to
our collective deliberations during the previous year.
May I also take this opportunity, through you, Sir,
to heartily congratulate the heads of State of both
Finland and Namibia on their magnanimous
stewardship and successful conclusion of the recent
unprecedented large assembly of approximately 150
heads of State and Government in New York, which
paved the way for the pursuit of our common vision
and security into the twenty-first century.
Beyond the millennium celebrations, this is a
time for reflection and looking ahead. The Millennium
Summit took place on the eve of the twenty-fifth
anniversary of Papua New Guinea’s independence. The
same anniversary also marks the first quarter century of
my country’s membership of the United Nations. It is
therefore an apt occasion both for reflecting on
experience and for looking ahead.
My particular focus is on the changing character
of, need for and potential for international cooperation.
The conjunction of the millennium with Papua New
Guinea’s silver anniversary invites us to take a number
of different time perspectives: the short, medium and
long terms. For those of us who have been privileged to
play an active part in public life during this period, it
also provides the opportunity to compare the ambitions
we had 25 years ago with the challenges we face now.
As the Secretary-General recently reminded us in
the very title of the document (A/54/2000) he prepared
to guide and stimulate the Millennium Summit, the
United Nations was formed in the name and with the
objective of furthering the common purposes of “We
the peoples of the United Nations”. In similar fashion,
the Constitution that came into effect when my country
became independent was made and adopted in the
name of “We the people of Papua New Guinea”.
21
A/55/PV.16
In these four decades, our people have resisted
acts ranging from political pressures and attempts at
diplomatic isolation to the most insidious lying
campaigns, from subversion and terrorism to
assassination attempts on its main leaders, from
biological warfare to the most ruthless blockade and
economic war and from the promotion of armed bands
to military invasion and the threat of nuclear
extermination. Today, on behalf of that same generous
and courageous people, we can once again say to our
third world brothers and to all those who anywhere in
the world defend our right to life and development that
revolutionary socialist Cuba will never cease to
struggle for everyone’s dreams.
Address by Mr. Salim Abdikassim Salad Hassan,
President of the Somali Republic
Mr. Salim Abdikassim Salad Hassan, President of
the Somali Republic, was escorted into the
General Assembly Hall.
The President: Before giving the floor to His
Excellency Mr. Abdikassim Salad Hassan, President of
the Somali Republic, I would like to welcome the
President, who has recently participated in the United
Nations Millennium Summit. I am pleased to note that
Somalia is participating again in the deliberations of
the General Assembly after a long absence. As
members of the Assembly are well aware, participants
at the Djibouti peace process agreed on a Transitional
National Assembly which then elected President
Abdikassim Salad Hassam and he was sworn in at a
ceremony held in Djibouti on 25 August.
On behalf of the General Assembly, I have the
honour to welcome to the United Nations His
Excellency Abdikassim Salad Hassan, President of the
Somali Republic, and to invite him to address the
Assembly.
President Salad Hassan: It is a singular honour
and privilege for me to be here today to address this
session of the General Assembly. On this auspicious
occasion, I would like to take this opportunity to
congratulate you, Mr. President, on your unanimous
election to this eminent position. Taking into account
your Excellency’s wide experience in international
affairs, I am confident that you will successfully
contribute to the work and deliberations before this
Assembly.
Permit me also, Mr. President, to pay special
tribute to your predecessor, His Excellency Mr. Theo-
Ben Gurirab, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Namibia, who conducted the affairs of the
Assembly in a most successful manner during his term
of office.
Our profound gratitude also goes to our able and
dynamic Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Kofi
Annan, who has shown exemplary leadership and
demonstrated efficiency in managing the activities of
our Organization. Indeed, he has played a pivotal role
in the enhancement of the Organization’s aims and
objectives, and in furthering peace, stability and
international cooperation the world over.
I am highly honoured to address this Assembly
today in the presence of my colleague and brother, His
Excellency Mr. Ismail Omar Guelleh, President of the
Republic of Djibouti. In this regard, I would like to pay
special tribute for the exceptional role played by His
Excellency, his Government and the people of Djibouti
in our recently concluded national reconciliation
conference, held in Arta, a resort town near Djibouti.
In contrast to the previous 12 Somali
reconciliation conferences, held in the past 10 years in
various capitals, the Arta reconciliation conference was
unique and more focused. While the previous
reconciliation conferences were based on attempts to
reconcile the personal differences and rivalries between
power-seeking faction leaders, the Arta conference, on
the other hand, concentrated essentially on the
constructive engagement and the interaction of the
various components of Somali society, such as
traditional clan elders and sultans, religious leaders,
intellectuals, politicians and representatives of the
various sectors of Somali civil society. More than
2,000 delegates from inside and outside the country
attended the conference, the deliberations of which
continued for more than five months.
It was in the context of this transparent process
that a consensus was reached on the agenda and criteria
for participation in the conference, based on the
balanced and equitable representation of the various
clans in the country. In pursuance of this innovative
approach, the conference conducted its business. This
led to the general agreement on the adoption of a
Transitional Charter. The Charter, inter alia, provided
for the establishment of the basic constitutional organs
of the Third Republic of the Somali State: the National
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Assembly, the President, the Council of Ministers and
an independent judiciary. In accordance with these
transitional measures, the first organ the conference
established was the National Assembly. In turn, the
National Assembly elected the President in a fair and
free manner in the presence of observers and
representatives of the international community.
The outcome of the Arta reconciliation
conference received an overwhelming endorsement of
the Somali people within the country and in the
diaspora. Strong messages of support and pledges
poured into Arta from all regions of the country and
from Somali communities abroad.
In contrast to anarchy and civil war, which
prevailed in Somalia for the past 10 years, the creation
of the National Assembly and the election of a
President ushered in a new era for peace and stability
and constituted the first step of restoring order and
central authority to the country. This was indeed
translated into reality during my recent visit to
Mogadishu and Baidoa. The spontaneous reaction of
the hundreds of thousands of people who welcomed us
in both cities demonstrated vividly that they wanted to
leave years of civil war behind and open a new era of
peace, tranquillity, good governance, restoration of the
rule of law and national unity.
In this connection, let me emphasize the fact that
the majority of the Somali people in the regions that we
were not able to visit, including the regions in the
northwest and northeast of the country, uphold a shared
commitment and optimism for the unity and future
progress of the country.
With regard to the warlords and individuals who
still remain outside the reconciliation process, we
express our full preparedness to engage with them in
peaceful dialogue, and we call upon them to review
their positions, hear the voice of reason, and respect the
legitimate aspirations of the Somali people to achieve
national unity, social and economic development and
durable peace throughout the country.
The challenges that the Somali Republic faces
today are monumental. My Government is prepared to
meet those challenges with a realistic approach. We
understand that our country stands today in the midst
of a crisis of serious proportions. We shall exercise
care, compassion and objectivity to manage that crisis
and overcome it in the end.
There has been large-scale destruction of the
physical infrastructure and resources in both urban and
rural areas. Generations of children have not gone to
school for almost two decades. A good number of highlevel
managerial staff and skilled technicians have left
the country. The role of the international community in
assisting us in peace-building, rehabilitation and
reconstruction is therefore of pivotal importance for us.
There should be no relaxation by the international
community in the overall effort to provide
humanitarian and developmental assistance to the
Somali Republic.
We will engage Somali professionals and
technical experts inside and outside the country to be
actively involved in all reconstruction programmes and
projects. We will also give indigenous and international
non-governmental organizations and relevant United
Nations agencies all the necessary assistance to be able
to contribute effectively to the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of the country.
I would like to emphasize that my Government
will place particular emphasis in the immediate future
on the following priority areas: first, restoration of
peace, stability and national unity, and the formation of
an effective security force to consolidate them;
secondly, disarmament of the militias and their
encampment, subsequent rehabilitation and training in
all the regions of the country; and, thirdly, maintenance
of law and order through the creation of effective law
enforcement agencies and professional courts of law.
Within the framework of that policy, my Government
will promote and consolidate peace, security and unity
in the country at large.
At the international level, we reaffirm our
unqualified support for the principles and objectives of
the United Nations and pledge to cooperate with
relevant regional and subregional organizations,
namely, the Organization of African Unity, the League
of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic
Conference and the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development. We shall also maintain and strengthen
our relations with the European Union. We would like
to open up new vistas of cooperation and economic ties
with other organizations, such as the Gulf Cooperation
Council and the Association of South-East Asian
Nations.
My Government will promote strong links of
cooperation with the countries of the Horn of Africa
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A/55/PV.16
and the Red Sea based on the principles of mutual
respect, sovereign equality of States and noninterference
in the internal affairs of other States, as
provided in the Charter of the United Nations. We will
promote economic partnership, open borders and
common port services among the countries of the Horn
of Africa.
In conclusion, my delegation requests the
Assembly to facilitate the adoption of a resolution
under the title “Assistance to the Somali Republic”
relating to the following areas of need: first, urgent
assistance from Member States for the rehabilitation
and reconstruction of Somalia; secondly, resumption of
sustained economic cooperation with the international
community in general and with Member States of the
United Nations in particular; and, thirdly, a call on
relevant United Nations agencies and organizations to
redouble their efforts in providing financial and
material assistance to the people of Somalia.
Finally, I extend my profound appreciation to the
United Nations for the commendable role it has played
in the efforts to alleviate the plight of the Somali
people during the last 10 years. We also wish to
express our appreciation for the efforts of the world
body in its continued search for a solution to our
political crisis throughout the decade, and for its
continued humanitarian support and assistance to the
Somali people. I am confident that the United Nations
will continue to provide support for the realization of
the aspirations of the Somali people to stability, peace
and development.
The President: On behalf of the General
Assembly, I wish to thank the President of the Somali
Republic for the statement he has just made.
Mr. Abdikassim Salad Hassan, President of the
Somali Republic, was escorted from the General
Assembly Hall.
Agenda item 9 (continued)
General debate
The President: I now give the floor to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of New
Zealand, His Excellency The Honourable Phil Goff.
Mr. Goff (New Zealand): I begin by joining
others who have congratulated you, Mr. President, on
your election. I also assure you of the New Zealand
delegation’s full cooperation as you carry out your
important duties.
I also welcome the admission last week of our
neighbour and friend Tuvalu into the United Nations.
The admission of four new Pacific nations in the space
of a year contributes to the truly universal character of
the Organization.
This general debate is taking place at the start of
a new century and a new millennium. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan has called upon the Member
States of the United Nations to harness the symbolic
power of the millennium to meet the real and urgent
needs of people in every part of the world. This is an
appropriate time to recommit ourselves to the beliefs,
the values and the principles that led to the birth of the
Organization 55 years ago.
Like many other Members of the Organization,
New Zealand is a small country that tries to take a
principled and independent view of the world. In 1945,
in San Francisco, we played an active part through the
Labour Prime Minister of the day, Peter Fraser, in
framing the Charter in which heads of State and
Government reaffirmed their faith here last week.
We have always viewed the maintenance of
international peace and security, and the practical task
of peacekeeping, as key roles of the United Nations.
We are currently making our largest-ever contribution
to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in East
Timor. This commitment underlines our full support for
the central role of the United Nations in building a
stable, democratic and economically viable East Timor
in partnership with its people. So do the non-military
personnel and development assistance we have
provided to help the East Timorese create essential
services.
Just over a year ago, the East Timorese people
voted overwhelmingly for an independent future, and I
had the privilege of being part of the United Nations
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) group that oversaw
that electoral process. We recall the horrors which
followed as pro-integration militias laid waste to the
territory, slaughtered innocent people and forced
thousands of East Timorese into West Timor.
Relative calm and stability has been restored in
most of East Timor, and we remember here today the
sacrifices made by peacekeepers from Australia,
Bangladesh, Nepal and my own country who in recent
Annex 84
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia,
S/2000/1211, 19 December 2000
United Nations S/2000/1211
Security Council
Distr.: General
19 December 2000
Original: English
00-78522 (E) 211200
*0078522*
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia
I. Introduction
1. Members of the Security Council, in their
statement of 27 May 1999 (S/PRST/1999/16),
requested me to submit periodic reports on the
situation in Somalia. The present report is submitted
pursuant to that request and covers events since my last
report, submitted on 16 August 1999 (S/1999/882).
II. Political developments
A. Peacemaking efforts
2. In the interval between the publication of my
previous report and the initiative launched by President
Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti in September 1999,
Somali leaders and interested Governments continued
their efforts to find a solution to the problem of
Somalia. On 23 August 1999, a group of Somali
leaders who had formed the “Somali Peace Alliance”
(SPA) travelled to Djibouti to brief President Guelleh
and also travelled to Addis Ababa for similar meetings
with Ethiopian authorities. The leaders forming SPA
included those of “Puntland”, the “Somali Consultative
Body”, the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) and the
Somali National Front (SNF).
3. Another group of faction leaders, including
Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid and Osman Hassan Ali
“Atto”, assembled in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in
early September 1999 in an attempt to resolve
differences. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf of “Puntland”
also arrived in the country several days later. Mohamed
Ibrahim Egal of “Somaliland” declined to attend.
Colonel Yusuf refused to meet the other leaders and
returned to Somalia through Addis Ababa and Djibouti,
where he met President Guelleh. The Aidid group also
travelled to Addis Ababa in late October 1999, and Mr.
Aidid reportedly agreed to withdraw support from
groups considered to be a security threat to Ethiopia.
Soon thereafter, Mr. Aidid announced that he had
disarmed elements of the Oromo Liberation Front who
were in Somalia.
4. President Guelleh, in his address to the General
Assembly at its fifty-fourth session, on 22 September
1999, said that he was prepared to lead a new attempt
to bring peace and reconciliation to Somalia and
establish structures of governance. Lamenting the
failure of the Somali warlords to live up to the
promises they had made in previous negotiations,
President Guelleh stressed that any future process
should be linked to Somali civil society. He also
declared that warlords should be charged with crimes
against humanity, and international sanctions should be
imposed on those obstructing the peace process.
5. President Guelleh’s address received positive
reactions from Somalis both within and outside the
country. There were demonstrations in a number of
Somali towns and cities in support of his initiative.
Initial responses from Somali leaders were also
positive. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of “Somaliland”
welcomed the initiative. However, the subsequent
deterioration in the relationship between his
administration and Djibouti led to the former closing
the border at the end of the year. The dispute was
resolved in January 2000. Mr. Egal subsequently paid a
visit to Djibouti and reaffirmed his support for the
Djibouti peace initiative.
6. In January 2000, my Special Representative for
Somalia visited Baidoa, Hargeisa and Garowe to
consult Somali leaders on the Djibouti initiative. David
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S/2000/1211
Stephen met the leaders of “Somaliland”, “Puntland”
and RRA, among others, who expressed support for the
initiative but felt that there was a need for certain
concepts and issues to be clarified. A similar position
was put forward by a group of leaders in Mogadishu in
a statement issued in January. Mr. Egal told my
Representative that the Djibouti initiative would
provide the “south” of Somalia with a leadership with
which he could negotiate.
7. Even though the initiative remained in outline
form, it received support from external actors. The
Standing Committee on Somalia of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
endorsed the Djibouti proposal on 30 September 1999
and the IGAD Partners Forum did likewise on 19
October. IGAD itself, at its summit meeting in Djibouti
on 26 November, welcomed and endorsed the Djibouti
initiative in principle. Formal endorsement was given
by an IGAD ministerial meeting in Djibouti on 27
March 2000. At the meeting of the Partners Forum
Liaison Group on Somalia in Djibouti on 7 February,
the Djibouti authorities presented a plan of action for a
Somali national peace conference. On the whole, the
Liaison Group reacted positively to the plan.
8. The first formal move to implement the Djibouti
initiative was the holding of the Technical Consultative
Symposium, hosted by the Government of Djibouti in
March 2000. President Guelleh emphasized that the
Symposium was not a decision-making body but a
means of providing advice to the Government of
Djibouti in its preparations for the conference. The
Symposium was attended by about 60 Somalis, invited
in their individual capacities, from all parts of the
country and from the diaspora. My Special Adviser,
Mohamed Sahnoun, represented the United Nations.
9. The Symposium recommended, inter alia, that the
process should be made as inclusive as possible by
allowing the participation of faction leaders who
desired peace and by enhancing the role of civil society
within Somalia and in the diaspora. On the future
structure of government, the Symposium recommended
a decentralized arrangement as well as consolidation of
peace in areas in which peace had been restored; the
establishment of a human rights commission to monitor
violations of the peace process; the departure of
Somalis occupying the lands and properties of others;
the reaffirmation of Mogadishu as the capital of
Somalia, with the possibility of establishing a
temporary capital for a future provisional government;
and the rehabilitation of militia members, with the
conversion of some of them into a national army. If
necessary, the transitional government could call for an
international force to assist in matters of security. The
delegates also recommended stricter enforcement of
the Security Council arms embargo on Somalia,
stressed the need for international support for a future
agreement by Somalis and called upon Djibouti to send
delegations to Somalia to prepare for the Somali
National Peace Conference.
10. During March and April 2000, the Government of
Djibouti consulted further with Somalis from all clans
and walks of life. A delegation of representatives of the
Islamic courts from Mogadishu told my Representative
that their organizations fully supported the Djibouti
peace proposal. A group of influential Somali
businessmen visited Djibouti in March 2000 and
pledged moral and material support for the Conference.
11. On 2 May 2000, the first phase of the Somali
National Peace Conference, a meeting of traditional
and clan leaders, was formally opened in the town of
Arta, which is located approximately 40 kilometres
north of Djibouti. Participants included elders from
most of Somalia’s clans and from all parts of the
country. The first phase of the Conference concluded
on 13 June. In addition to working on reconciliation
issues among the clans, the Conference prepared for
the second phase by drawing up an agenda and lists of
delegates representing clans. The delegates included
political, business and religious leaders, as well as
representatives of civil society. President Guelleh
formally inaugurated the second phase on 15 June. The
total number of delegates was 810, made up of four
delegations of 180, each including 20 women,
representing the four main clan families, plus 90
minority alliance representatives, including 10 women.
The elders who had participated in the first phase of
the Conference were allowed to attend as members of
delegations, but without a vote. On 17 June, delegates
and traditional leaders unanimously elected as cochairmen
a former mayor of Mogadishu and the then
Secretary-General of RRA. Four vice-chairpersons,
including one woman, were also appointed.
12. After deliberating in committee and plenary
sessions for a month, the delegates approved the
Transitional National Charter for governance in a
transition phase of three years, culminating in
elections. The Charter provides for regional autonomy,
based on the 18 regions that existed at the end of the
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S/2000/1211
Siad Barre regime. It also sets out structures for
executive, legislative and judicial powers, as well as
the rights of individuals. These include, for the first
time in Somali history, a specific requirement that 25
seats in parliament be set aside for women. A
representation of 24 seats for minority clans was also
agreed upon. The Charter will be the supreme law until
a definitive federal constitution for Somalia is adopted
at the end of the transition period. It also provides for
the election of a 225-person Transitional National
Assembly.
13. In early August, in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter and on the basis of
nominations from clans, delegates selected the 225
members of the Assembly. This proved to be an
arduous process, since serious differences emerged
about the number of seats to be allotted to each clan.
The Somali National Peace Conference later gave
President Guelleh the right to use his own discretion to
select a further 20 parliamentarians. This was seen as a
way of defusing tensions.
14. The Transitional National Assembly convened for
the first time on 13 August and a few days later elected
Abdalla Deerow Issaq as its Speaker. When
nominations for the presidential elections closed, there
were 45 candidates, 16 of whom entered the electoral
contest on 25 August. The election was won by
Abdikassim Salad Hassan on 26 August, and the next
day he was inaugurated as President at a ceremony
held at Arta. Those present included the Presidents of
Djibouti, Eritrea, the Sudan and Yemen and the Prime
Minister of Ethiopia. In addition to the diplomatic
community accredited in Djibouti, senior officials from
France, Italy, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and
Saudi Arabia, as well as senior representatives of the
Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab
States and IGAD witnessed the inauguration. My
Representative read a message on my behalf.
B. Activities of the Transitional National
Assembly and the Transitional
National Government
15. In an address to the delegates to the Somali
National Peace Conference on 28 August, Mr. Hassan
called upon those with weapons to surrender them and
stated that his Government would provide
rehabilitation for former militiamen, some of whom
would be incorporated into the new Somali army. On
30 August, Mr. Hassan visited Mogadishu and Baidoa
together with members of the Transitional National
Assembly and was welcomed by large crowds.
16. Mr. Hassan proceeded to Cairo, where he
addressed the ministerial meeting of the League of
Arab States and met with Egyptian officials. He then
flew to New York and participated in both the
Millennium Summit and the general debate of the
General Assembly. Mr. Hassan, or his Prime Minister,
has since visited the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Yemen,
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Mr. Hassan also
participated in the summit meeting of the League of
Arab States, held at Cairo on 21 and 22 October, and
the summit conference of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, held at Doha from 12 to 14
November 2000.
17. At the IGAD summit meeting, held at Khartoum
on 23 and 24 November, Mr. Hassan was the first
Somali leader since 1991 to be re-admitted to the seat
of Somalia in the organization. The acceptance of the
Transitional National Government by Somalia’s
immediate neighbours represents an important
development in the country’s return to the community
of nations.
18. On 8 October, Mr. Hassan announced the
appointment of Ali Khalif Galaydh as Prime Minister.
Soon thereafter, Mr. Galaydh named Ismail Mohamed
Hurreh “Buba” as Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Members of the Transitional National Assembly
returned to Mogadishu during the first two weeks of
October and the President and Prime Minister returned
on 14 October. The following week, Mr. Galaydh
announced the appointment of a deputy prime minister
and 22 ministers. The appointees, all of them men,
included representatives of all major clans, and one
from an ethnic minority group. A week later, the Prime
Minister announced the appointment of 45 assistant
ministers, 5 ministers of state and the Governor of the
Benadir region (Greater Mogadishu). Of these, 4 were
women.
19. Mr. Hassan is giving priority to the security
situation in Mogadishu. A security committee has been
established. Demobilization and disarmament of the
various militias is reportedly taking place. A police
force is being established and is being financed, for the
time being, by contributions from Somali businessmen.
On 17 October, Mr. Hassan appointed the Chairman of
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the National Demobilization Authority, who was killed
the next day by gunmen allegedly associated with one
of the warlords opposed to the Transitional National
Government.
20. Following the call by Mr. Hassan for interested
entities to assist in reconciling the Transitional
National Government with those who had stayed away
from the peace process, the Government of Italy sent
envoys to consult with the leaders of “Somaliland” and
“Puntland”. They have reported their findings to
Mr. Hassan in Mogadishu. President Ali Abdallah
Saleh of Yemen has twice received some of the faction
leaders from Mogadishu. From 18 to 22 November, Mr.
Hassan was in Yemen. In late November, Mr. Hassan
visited the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Reports indicated
that the Libyan leader offered to assist in the
reconciliation process.
C. Reactions of Somali leaders to the
Djibouti initiative
21. In early February, subsequent to Mohamed
Ibrahim Egal’s endorsement of the Djibouti initiative
(subsequently known as the Arta peace process) and
after he had visited President Guelleh on 28 January,
60 “Somaliland” parliamentarians denounced the
initiative and reportedly passed a law declaring that
any “Somalilander” attending the Conference would be
considered a traitor and liable to the death penalty. Two
“Somalilanders” were imprisoned in Hargeisa after
visiting Djibouti. On 28 August, the Egal
administration issued a decree giving sweeping powers
to a “national” security committee empowered, inter
alia, to suspend habeas corpus and ban public
demonstrations. On 17 September, a court in Berbera
sentenced a senior traditional leader of the Dulbahante
clan from the Sool region to seven years in prison for
attending the Arta Conference. The leader was
subsequently pardoned by Mr. Egal. A representative of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights was present at the trial. In similar fashion, Mr.
Egal detained Sultan Abdul Kadir and five others who
had participated in the Arta Conference and, on 19
November, pardoned them as well.
22. Djibouti sent a delegation to “Somaliland” on 14
April to brief Mr. Egal and seek his participation, but
the delegation was not allowed to disembark at
Hargeisa airport. Reacting to the election of Mr.
Hassan as President, Mr. Egal stated that he would
enter into negotiations only with someone who could
claim legitimacy over the southern regions of Somalia.
After the adjournment of the Somali National Peace
Conference, a delegation led by the “foreign minister”
of “Somaliland”, travelled abroad, including to New
York, to explain the position of “Somaliland”.
23. On 23 March, Colonel Yusuf stated that
“Puntland” was withdrawing its support for the Arta
peace process. Among other things, he objected to what
he claimed was the hand-picking of delegates to the
Technical Consultative Symposium; unwillingness on
the part of Djibouti to accept advice on the legitimacy
of a building blocks approach; the holding of meetings
in secret; and the imposition of decisions. Following
the statement by Colonel Yusuf, there were
demonstrations in a number of major towns in
“Puntland” in favour of the peace process. The
Government of Djibouti denied the claims of the
“Puntland” authorities and reiterated that the process
belonged to all Somalis.
24. On 18 April, the Government of Djibouti
dispatched a delegation to Garowe to brief “Puntland”
elders and the administration. Eventually, Colonel
Yusuf agreed that the elders could proceed to Djibouti
to attend the first phase of the Conference. Some of the
“Puntland” elders returned to Garowe, ostensibly to
brief their constituencies, but did not return to Arta. On
17 June, Colonel Yusuf announced that the “Puntland”
delegation had withdrawn from the Somali National
Peace Conference and stated that those remaining did
not have the mandate of the people. After the Arta
Conference, he maintained that “Puntland” had not
participated in it and that it would not recognize its
outcome. However, he assured the United Nations
Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) that he would
not resort to force unless Mr. Hassan’s forces attacked
him.
25. Although representatives of various sub-clans
took full part in the Arta Conference, a number of the
faction leaders from Mogadishu stayed out of it. On
several occasions the Government of Djibouti sent
delegations to Mogadishu. Subsequently, Mogadishu
faction leaders, including Hussein Aidid and Ali
“Atto”, rejected the outcome of the Arta Conference.
Some threatened that Mr. Hassan would be prevented
from entering Mogadishu. In a statement issued on 30
October, six Mogadishu faction leaders accused
Mr. Hassan of taking steps that could provoke
catastrophic war. The signatories of the statement
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claimed that they were people of peace who did not
intend to fight in Mogadishu unless they were forced to
do so. They deplored the importation of banknotes by
Mogadishu businessmen and said that only an allinclusive
government could open the Mogadishu
seaport.
26. On 25 and 26 October, at a meeting in Garowe,
the leaders of “Puntland”, RRA and the Somali
Patriotic Movement declared that Somalia should be a
federal state made up of “Puntland” state,
Northwestern state (“Somaliland”), Central state and
Southwestern state, the latter consisting of the Lower
Shabelle, Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Lower and Middle
Juba regions. The group called for a national
reconciliation conference and for a technical committee
to draft a charter. They also called on interested
countries and organizations to assist both existing
“regional states” and those to be set up.
D. Role of the United Nations
27. On 1 September and 3 December 1999 and 24
April 2000, the Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs convened ambassadorial meetings of external
actors on Somalia in New York. The representative of
the Government of Djibouti briefed the meetings on the
Somali National Peace Conference. The ambassadors
who spoke at the meeting generally supported the
efforts of Djibouti and called upon others to do the
same.
28. UNPOS has continued to monitor the political
situation in Somalia and to encourage Somali leaders
and the international community to work together to
restore peace in the country. At my request, my
Representative travelled to Djibouti on 1 February
2000 to assist and support the Djibouti efforts. He
remained there until the conclusion of the process.
Colleagues from the United Nations Somalia team,
including the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator
and the Human Rights Officer, joined the UNPOS team
from time to time throughout the process.
29. Prior to the launching of the Djibouti plan of
action, UNPOS convened in Nairobi on 16 November
1999 a forum that brought together over 500 Somalis
of different backgrounds, including faction leaders and
representatives of civil society and minority groups.
Members of the diplomatic community and the
Government of Djibouti were also represented. The
forum provided an opportunity for Somalis to express
their views in the presence of representatives of the
international community. Although some of the Somali
speakers were critical of certain aspects of the Djibouti
proposal, the vast majority welcomed the new
initiative.
30. The specialized agencies of the United Nations
system contributed to the peace process by offering
technical support in their areas of competence, thus
also fostering regional confidence-building. The
Programme for Education for Emergencies and
Reconstruction (PEER) of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) supported a Djibouti non-governmental
organization, l’Association pour le développement et
l’animation culturelle, which staged the first Regional
Musical Festival for the Horn of Africa (FEST’HORN)
in Djibouti from 5 to 10 May 2000 as part of a
celebration of the culture of peace, dedicated to
Somalia. Artists from Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Somalia and the Sudan performed at the Palais du
peuple in Djibouti and also for the conference
delegates at Arta. United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) provided technical assistance for
various aspects of the Conference itself.
31. In the course of the Djibouti process, my
Representative made several attempts to engage the
“Somaliland” administration. He visited Hargeisa on 8
March 2000 for talks with senior ministers, which were
inconclusive. In July, he was successful in establishing
direct talks between President Guelleh and Mr. Egal.
Unfortunately, the talks did not lead to the participation
of the Egal administration in the Arta Conference. In
September, he tried to encourage dialogue between
Messrs Egal and Hassan. Mr. Egal told my
Representative that he would not talk to Mr. Hassan as
long as the latter claimed to be the President of all of
Somalia.
32. Concern has been expressed by the independent
expert appointed by the Secretary-General in
connection with the question of human rights in
Somalia about threats of punishment by the
administrations of “Somaliland” and “Puntland”
against individuals from the two regions attending the
Arta Conference. In a press release issued on 10 July,
the independent expert drew attention to the action of
the “Somaliland” authorities in arresting and seeking to
deport back to “Puntland” 25 persons on their way to
Djibouti to take part in the Conference. The
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independent expert has also raised the question of the
killing in “Somaliland” of an army officer, allegedly
for opposing the forcible deportation of Majerten
leaders who had wished to travel to Arta.
33. I have been in touch with President Guelleh
during the course of the Somali National Peace
Conference and he has shared with me his assessment
of the progress achieved at Arta. He has asked me to
garner support for the peace effort, including financial
assistance. I would like to express my gratitude to
Iceland, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, which have responded
positively to my appeal, as of the date of the present
report.
III. Security situation
34. The security situation in north-western and northeastern
Somalia remains relatively calm, with
occasional incidents of banditry and other criminal
acts. In the central and southern parts of the country,
the security situation continues to be uncertain and
sometimes extremely tense. Extended parts of coastal
areas, such as the area between Galcayo and Adado,
are not under the control of any effective regional
authority. They continue to be dominated by pirates
and the risk for the personal safety of international
staff is very high. Some parts of the country, including
the area around Kismayo, can be described as anarchic.
There have also been sporadic local skirmishes in other
areas. They involved intra-Marehan clan fights in the
Gedo region, conflicts between RRA and the Digil
Salvation Army and Habr-Gedir militia in the Lower
Shabelle region.
35. Banditry is rampant in Mogadishu. There is no
single authority for the maintenance of law and order.
Significant parts of the city continue to be under the
control of the different militias, including the seaport
and the airport, which remain closed, the former
government blocks and the main city market. The
Transitional National Government has only limited
control of the Greater Mogadishu area. A member of
the Transitional National Assembly was killed on 12
November at his residence in Mogadishu, in what was
apparently a political assassination.
36. Several Somali aid workers have lost their lives
during the period under review. On 19 August 1999,
Qasim Aden Egal, an employee of the World Health
Organization (WHO), was killed in Hargeisa Yarey
Village in Middle Juba. On 13 September, the Somali
administrator of the Dutch non-governmental
organization Memisa, Farah Ali Gurhan, was shot and
killed in his office at Garbaharey by SNF gunmen (a
total of 10 people were killed during the fighting). On
15 September, Somali bandits ambushed a vehicle of
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) being
used to transport senior health officials and local staff
members, killing Dr. Ayub Sheikh Yarrow Abdiyow
and wounding five others, one of whom subsequently
died in hospital. The incident took place near Jowhar in
Middle Shabelle. On 18 October, two national officers
of the World Food Programme (WFP) were fired upon
at El Bur, in the Galgadud region. They were
withdrawn safely from the area.
37. On 11 September 1999, a British citizen, Alan
MacLean, was killed, allegedly by pirates, while
sailing off the north-east coast of Somalia. On 6 June
2000, Dieter Krasemann, a German national working
for the German Technical Cooperation Agency was
killed at Burao, “Somaliland”. On 8 June, an aircraft
used by the humanitarian programmes of the European
Commission was fired upon and struck in the wing as it
landed at Merka. On 15 June, a grenade was tossed into
the Merka compound of an Italian non-governmental
organization, Cooperazione Iternazionale per lo
Sviluppo. According to some reports, this was an
attempt by Islamic “fundamentalist” elements to
prevent the celebration of the Day of the African Child.
No one was hurt.
38. On 26 July, a French national, Françoise Deutsch,
and a British national, John Ward, both staff members
of the Paris-based international non-governmental
organization Action contre la faim, were kidnapped and
held hostage in Mogadishu. They were released on 18
September after negotiations that reportedly involved
Mr. Hassan and his security advisers. Although it was
reported that no ransom had been paid, reports
reaching UNPOS indicated that the release was
negotiated and financed by local businessmen.
39. In August 1999, President Daniel arap Moi of
Kenya, announced a ban on all air travel between
Kenya and Somalia. The land borders had been sealed
previously. Although President Moi eventually lifted
the bans, he suggested that they had been put in place
in reaction to an increased flow of arms from Somalia
into Kenya. On 4 October, Mr. Hassan expressed
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concern about the flow of arms into Somalia from an
unnamed neighbouring country.
IV. Humanitarian conditions
40. Following the severe drought that lasted from the
end of 1999 through the first quarter of 2000,
humanitarian needs have decreased significantly across
most of Somalia. This change has occurred since June,
primarily owing to favourable environmental
conditions. As a result, the estimated number of
Somalis facing food insecurity has declined from
750,000 to below 400,000. In response, United Nations
agencies are now developing assistance strategies to
promote the mid-term recovery of the livelihood of
poor and displaced populations. While it is still too
soon to declare an end to the cycle of crises rendering
the lives of millions of Somalis vulnerable to uncertain
climatic, economic and security conditions, the lull in
relief requirements enables aid agencies to focus on
emergency prevention and support for local,
community-based emergency preparedness and coping
initiatives.
41. During the long dry season from December 1999
to April 2000, the Gedo, Bakool and northern Hiran
regions were considered the most drought-affected
areas of Somalia. Numerous nutritional surveys
conducted in southern Somalia reported global
malnutrition rates of over 20 per cent, whereas 15 per
cent global malnutrition is generally accepted as the
threshold for declaring an emergency. In response,
WFP has succeeded in improving the quantity and
timing of distributions to match better the district-level
food-need estimates provided by the Food Security
Assessment Unit of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the
UNICEF nutrition assessments. Similarly, FAO has
successfully distributed seeds and tools to assist in
building the productive capacity of rain-fed and
irrigated farming. Further, given that malnutrition in
Somalia is not caused simply by lack of food,
intersectoral assistance to address related factors, in
particular sanitary conditions, access to water and the
availability of medical care, became the focus of
United Nations coordination activities and UNICEF
supplementary feeding programmes.
42. Three weeks of heavy rainfall from the end of
April through the second week of May led to good crop
establishment, improved access to water and pasture
regeneration in most areas. In August, field reports
confirmed these generally positive results. Seasonal
crop production (estimated at 214,000 metric tonnes)
was good when compared to the average post-war
production (175,000 metric tonnes) but remains poor
when compared to pre-war production (350,000 metric
tonnes). By September, the harvest had lowered market
food prices in most areas. Nonetheless, concern
remained about some areas that had received less than
average rainfall, particularly the Lower Juba, Middle
Juba and Gedo regions. The future status of
populations resident in these areas depends heavily on
the success of the short rainy season in November
2000. The reported flooding in Middle and Lower
Shabelle since late November could be a precursor to a
major emergency.
43. While humanitarian concerns may have lessened
on the national level, pockets of vulnerability remain.
As of October, field reports indicated that the bumper
harvest might provide only temporary respite for many
communities in southern Somalia. Without further
improvements in their livelihood, many communities
will face more food and water insecurity in the coming
months. Long-term processes of destitution, including
land alienation, internal displacement, economic
collapse and the destruction of productive
infrastructure, have not affected all households equally.
These processes have stratified livelihood conditions
between rich and poor households within Somali
communities and generated grave disparities in the
distribution of humanitarian need. The dispersion of
displaced persons and other destitute groups amid
populations with more assets and higher living
standards renders their plight less visible to the
international community and decreases the perceived
urgency of humanitarian responses.
44. An example of varying humanitarian conditions
even within the same geographical location was
illustrated in June by Action contre la faim, which
conducted a nutritional survey of the internally
displaced populations in Mogadishu. The survey
accessed 60 per cent of the internally displaced
population on all sides of the “green lines”. A total of
12.9 per cent global malnutrition, including 2 per cent
severe malnutrition, was observed. This is a significant
reduction since the last survey in 1995, which
identified a global rate of 26 per cent. Casual
observation indicates that the situation in south
Mogadishu is worse than on the north side of the city.
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It is expected that conditions are generally better for
the city’s non-internally displaced resident population
but worse for those internally displaced populations
that the survey (and hence aid agency activities) could
not reach.
45. Following the first-ever recorded outbreak of Rift
Valley fever in the Middle East, the imposition of an
embargo on the importation of livestock from the Horn
of Africa was announced by the Government of Saudi
Arabia on 19 September. All other countries on the
Arabian peninsula followed the Saudi initiative,
banning the importation of both live animals and
processed meat. To date, no cases of Rift Valley fever
have been identified in either livestock or human
populations in Somalia. Since this ban on the
importation of livestock from the Horn area is more
comprehensive than the previous ban in 1998,
involving more countries and all livestock species, the
implications for food security and economic
development are very grave. As of October, reports
indicated sharp declines in livestock prices in northern
and central regions. By restricting trade opportunities,
the ban will inevitably reduce employment
opportunities and affect access to other important
income sources throughout the economy.
46. Cholera, which is endemic in Somalia, with
outbreaks occurring annually since 1994, returned to
Somalia in December 1999. The epidemic peaked
between 15 and 21 April 2000, when 1,022 cases and
145 deaths were recorded. Case fatality rates were high
this year, particularly in the Bay region, where the
Dinsoor district reported a rate of 25.8 per cent.
Following the heavy rains in April and May, morbidity
decreased across central and southern Somalia, until all
cholera treatment centres were closed by June. During
the 1999-2000 cholera epidemic, 9 of Somalia’s 18
regions reported outbreaks. In the areas where
international non-governmental organizations with
strong medical expertise are located, the strength of
cholera preparedness and response measures were
evidenced by low case fatality rates. Fortunately, the
most populous regions that are regularly affected by
cholera (e.g. Mogadishu and Kismayo) were covered
by these agencies. In areas with either non-medical
international non-governmental organizations or no
non-governmental organizations at all, preparedness
was minimal and case fatality rates were high. This
was the case in rural areas, where cholera outbreaks
have been explosive but short-lived. In response to
future cholera outbreaks, agreement was reached
within the Somalia Aid Coordination Body to provide
training for key international and national staff from
less experienced agencies and to form a team of healthcare
professionals to assist in initiating control
measures in areas without any aid presence. WHO and
UNICEF undertook such initiatives in the Gedo and
Bay regions in 2000, although conflict in some areas
impeded access.
47. Health surveillance by United Nations agencies
and partners of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body
confirmed in July that a Kala Azar epidemic was
affecting much of southern Somalia. Kala Azar, an
immuno-suppressant disease, proves fatal in 95 per
cent of cases within six months. Owing to the vague
clinical presentation of the disease, Kala Azar
symptoms are often confused with tuberculosis, AIDS,
malaria and other diseases. Although the extent of the
epidemic cannot be confirmed given the limited
resources and access conditions, dozens of cases have
been detected from Lower Juba and Gedo to Bakool.
Médecins sans frontières has taken the lead in
conducting evaluations and laboratory tests and
supplying drugs. Treatments have been provided by the
“Gedo group” of international non-governmental
organizations and Médecins sans frontières in Bakol.
UNICEF and WHO are supporting these efforts
through the procurement of new testing materials and
the training of field health staff.
48. Other than the annual outbreak of cholera and the
onset of the Kala Azar epidemic, no new diseases were
reported in Somalia over the past year. Nonetheless,
there is continuing concern over the prevalence of
tuberculosis and measles. In response, UNICEF and
WHO immunization programming has been increased.
In addition to preventing outbreaks, these agencies are
targeting health assistance to support household
resource bases by increasing access to public services,
such as water, education and health, and reducing
essential household expenditures. Among other
activities in the water and environmental sector,
UNICEF has continued to increase community access
to clean water and improved sanitation by
rehabilitating urban water systems, repairing boreholes
and hand-dug wells, constructing latrines for primary
schools and working with water and sanitation
committees across the country to undertake sanitation
and hygiene control.
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49. Long-term development efforts have remained
concentrated in the north-west (“Somaliland”) and
north-east (“Puntland”). Through various projects,
United Nations agencies have helped the two northern
administrations to promote good governance and
strengthen their capacity for planning, public
administration, economic management, law
enforcement, demining and urban planning. The
efficient management of Somalia’s important trade
infrastructure — airports, seaports and
telecommunications — is an important element of
economic recovery, as well as the primary revenue
source for the local administrations. United Nations
agencies have provided technical assistance to increase
the efficiency of these key facilities and to identify the
specific development needs for bilateral donor
consideration. In this respect, the United Nations has
worked closely with the local authorities and with
other international actors to provide an enabling
environment for business growth, thereby seeking to
reduce unemployment and supporting continued peace
and stability. United Nations agencies have helped the
private and public sectors to promote the expansion of
trade and transportation links to regional markets.
50. In addition, United Nations agencies have
strengthened participatory approaches and preliminary
rehabilitation in southern Somalia. On average, only 1
in 10 children of primary school age is enrolled in
school. During the past year, UNICEF rehabilitated 70
schools, thus expanding access to education for over
12,000 children. In addition, UNICEF, UNESCO and
the United Nations Development Fund for Women
(UNIFEM) have been instrumental in organizing and
supporting local resources for peace, with special
emphasis on women’s organizations.
51. Alongside the improved food security conditions,
Somali populations are looking to benefit from the
establishment of the Transitional National Government
following the conclusion of the Somali National Peace
Conference at Arta. United Nations agencies have
initiated a planning process through the consolidated
appeal for 2001 and intensive consultations with
partners of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body to
develop strategies to support both immediate
livelihood needs and the continuing transition towards
peace, stability and respect for human rights. Although
the security situation remains fragile, there have so far
been no developments that affect the general
humanitarian situation in Somalia. Nevertheless,
security conditions do continue to hinder aid agency
access in many parts of southern Somalia.
52. In view of Somalia’s long-standing conflict,
economic collapse, lack of media coverage and donor
fatigue, the response to previous appeals for
humanitarian assistance has been limited. The
consolidated appeal for 2000 to date has received
contributions covering some 60 per cent of the
requested funding. Mid- and long-term programmes
needed to sustain and rehabilitate livelihoods remain
poorly funded. The aid assistance required to act as a
buffer against future emergencies, such as
rehabilitation of water sources, repair of river
embankments, education programmes, eradication of
female genital mutilation, prevention of HIV/AIDS
infection and protection of assets for pastoral
communities, has not been forthcoming.
V. Observations
53. The Djibouti initiative for peace in Somalia was a
welcome development that was launched in the
absence of any other viable peace process in the
country and that President Guelleh took forward with a
mandate from and the support of IGAD member
Governments. The United Nations, the Organization of
African Unity, the League of Arab States, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference and the
European Union also supported the initiative.
54. The Djibouti process was intended to have a
broader basis and greater legitimacy than previous
peacemaking efforts. Somali elders from all parts of
the country, representatives of clans and, for the first
time, Somali women were involved actively in
discussions on how to embark on the road to peace in
Somalia. This is the major asset for the Transitional
National Government as it moves to the next stage of
the process.
55. The Transitional National Government is now
located in Mogadishu. It has begun the process of
establishing itself on Somali soil and expanding the
areas under its influence. It has three years, until 2003,
in which to prepare for the installation of permanent
governance arrangements. During that period, basic
political, economic and development challenges will
have to be addressed by the new authorities. They will
have to complete the task of creating a government of
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unity and reconciliation. They will also have to prepare
for democratic elections.
56. At the same time, massive challenges of
reconstruction and development confront Somalia. No
country has ever been so long without central authority.
According to the UNDP Special Human Development
Report on Somalia, 1998, socio-economic indicators
for 1997 and 1998 place Somalia at the very bottom of
the human development index rankings worldwide. The
destruction caused by the cycle of civil war, state
collapse and anarchy is total. To recover from a decade
of statelessness and conflict will involve not only the
remaking of political society but also the total
reconstruction of the country’s basic infrastructure.
57. The absence of some Somali politicians and
leaders from the Djibouti process has posed two
immediate challenges for the new authorities: how to
incorporate into the peace process those who are
opposed to it and to its outcome, some of whom are
heavily armed; and how to work out relations with the
authorities in “Somaliland” and “Puntland” without
jeopardizing the relative peace and stability in those
two regions. As regards the latter, the basic challenge is
to work out, in a spirit of mutual respect, practical
arrangements between the Transitional National
Government and those authorities.
58. I welcome Mr. Hassan’s commitment to
achieving progress by peaceful means. I hope that
Somalis on all sides will do everything possible to
solve the remaining issues in a peaceful and
constructive way and in the interest of the common
good. The United Nations and the international
community in general should be prepared to assist the
people of Somalia in the realization of this goal.
59. It will clearly take time for the Transitional
National Government to prepare a comprehensive
development plan and seek international financial
support for it at an international pledging conference.
However, even in advance of such a conference, there
is an immediate need for urgent assistance, especially
in the areas of demobilization, disarmament and
rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. The repatriation
of Somali refugees — hundreds of thousands of whom
are in neighbouring countries — will be both a
challenge and an opportunity.
60. United Nations agencies are working on plans to
assist in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of
Somalia in their respective areas of responsibility.
“First steps”, an operational plan to support
governance and peace-building in Somalia for the
period from September to December 2000, was
launched in Nairobi in the autumn. It was prepared by
all the United Nations agencies resident in Nairobi
under the auspices of the United Nations Regional and
Humanitarian Coordinator, in full consultation with the
Somalia Aid Coordination Body, an umbrella
partnership of donor Governments, United Nations
agencies and intergovernmental organizations
concerned about the situation in Somalia. I appeal to
the potential donors to contribute without delay the
resources needed for implementation of the plan.
61. As I stated in my previous reports on Somalia
(S/1997/135 and S/1999/882), the establishment of a
trust fund for Somalia could be an important indicator
of the commitment of the international community to
support the search for peace in Somalia. It is my
intention, therefore, in anticipation that political and
financial support will be forthcoming from Member
States, to put in place a trust fund for peace-building in
Somalia.
62. In my last report (S/1999/882), I urged the
international and national financial institutions as well
as donor Governments to propose creative mechanisms
to engage Somalia. Then, there were no established
state institutions. Today, the situation is changing. The
Transitional National Government provides the Bretton
Woods institutions with the opportunity of forging
partnerships in the rebuilding of state and private
institutions. It is my hope that the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund will take up the
challenge.
63. In the light of the request made by President
Guelleh on 14 September 2000, the Security Council
may wish to consider what action might be appropriate
to enhance the success of the Djibouti peace process by
consolidating its achievements. I stand ready to prepare
a proposal for a peace-building mission for Somalia. A
key function of such a mission, which I expect to be
based inside Somalia, would be to assist in the
completion of the peace process. The Office of the
United Nations Security Coordinator would be closely
involved in the elaboration of options on the relocation
of the United Nations in Somalia.
64. Given the current security situation, locating
United Nations staff in the capital would be possible
only after a single — and effective — authority for
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security in the city has been established. It would be a
good sign if full operations for all traffic were restored
in both the seaport and airport and if free and safe
access to all districts of the city were guaranteed, with
no “green lines” to cross.
65. As the people of Somalia tackle the challenges I
have outlined, they will need the sympathetic
understanding and support of the international
community. The search for peace and prosperity in
Somalia will not be smooth; nor will peace be achieved
quickly. As a result of the Djibouti process, a major
step forward has been taken in the search for peace in
Somalia. The priority now, for Somalis and for the
international community, is to ensure that the process
continues and advances.
66. I wish to recognize and pay warm tribute to the
enormous efforts and sacrifice of the Government and
people of Djibouti in helping to bring peace and
reconciliation to Somalia. It has placed a heavy burden
on a small State — one that has been carried willingly
and with great distinction. I also wish to acknowledge
the sustained efforts of my Representative for Somalia,
David Stephen, to support the Djibouti initiative and
indeed the positive role played by the whole of UNPOS
and the United Nations team in Somalia.
Annex 85
Letter dated 21 March 2001 from the Prime Minister of Somalia addressed to the President of
the Security Council, S/2001/263, 23 March 2001
United Nations S/2001/263
Security Council Distr.: General
23 March 2001
Original: English
01-30329 (E) 230301
*0130329*
Letter dated 21 March 2001 from the Prime Minister of Somalia
addressed to the President of the Security Council
A rather belated congratulations for holding the Presidency of the Security
Council during the month of March. You deserve this important and prestigious post
and your great country deserves the recognition.
Since our delegation had the pleasure to meet with the Security Council on 11
January 2001, the Transitional National Government of Somalia has been
aggressively pursuing its policy of constructive and peaceful dialogue with the
groups that are outside the Arta process in order to bring about national
reconciliation.
Building upon the Arta outcome is, and will continue to be, our single most
important national objective. We have succeeded in engaging two out of the five
factions based in Mogadishu that are not supportive of the Arta Conference.
Mohamed Qanyare Afrah holds a Cabinet post in the Transitional National
Government and close associates of Hussein Haji Bod have also joined the Cabinet.
Given a chance, we are confident that the Transitional National Government and the
remaining groups that are outside the Arta framework can work out acceptable and
honourable agreements. Given a chance, the Somali people have it in them to
negotiate seriously and resolve these apparently intractable differences. Given a
chance, the Transitional National Government and the Somali people will not let
down the Security Council, which has been steadfast in supporting the unity,
territorial integrity and political independence of Somalia. If only we are given that
chance.
Our neighbour, Ethiopia, is not prepared to give us that chance. On the
contrary, Ethiopia is determined to destroy our chance to restore peace, stability,
democratic governance and political independence to Somalia. Ethiopia is not
opposed merely to the election of President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan and the
composition of the Transitional National Government and Transitional Parliament;
Ethiopia is vigorously opposed to the very idea of a reconstituted independent
Somali State. Ethiopia’s actions, not the lip-service it pays to the resolutions of the
United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), pose a clear and present
danger to our unity, territorial integrity and political independence. We would like to
submit to you and to the other members of the Security Council that Ethiopia’s
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unalloyed aggressive actions are a threat to peace in Somalia, the subregion and the
international community. Without exaggeration, we in Somalia are alarmed and are
forced, therefore, to share with you our grave concern.
Some of the recent actions of Ethiopia provide the basis of our deep concern:
1. The Transitional National Government invested heavily in engaging the
remaining three groups based in Mogadishu that were opposed to the
Arta process, and we were very close to cutting deals with two of the
three. Ethiopia knew perfectly well of the developments and embarked
upon an obstructionist policy of beckoning them audaciously to Addis
Ababa.
2. The three groups based in Mogadishu joined a few more individuals who
have already had close relationships with the government of the Tigray
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). A dozen or so characters in search of a
Pirandello are currently being hosted by the Ethiopians. Their objective
is to fulfil the Ethiopian strategy of obstructing the reconstitution of an
independent Somali State. The pursuit of a “building bloc” approach is a
smokescreen to blunt the Arta peace process and simultaneously to
negate the emergence of even an Ethiopian-sponsored viable alternative.
3. If Ethiopia is genuinely interested in a credible peace and national
reconciliation in Somalia, it is a secret known only to her. We believe
that the Security Council, the Secretary-General, OAU and even IGAD
are not briefed properly about the “secret plan”. The only plan we
observe is a sinister one of a dissembling stance bent on the destruction
of a present or a future Somali State.
4. Ethiopia has blatantly occupied the towns of Dolow, Bulo Hawo and
Lugh in Gedo since August 1996. Ethiopia has similarly occupied towns
in the Bay and Bakol regions since 1999. The Ethiopian military presence
in Somalia has always been known and documented in the humanitarian
circles serving Somalia, including United Nations agencies, international
non-governmental organizations and donor and diplomatic missions
based in Kenya. The World Food Programme, the United Nations
Children’s Fund, the Free State Agricultural Union, Trocaire, the African
Medical and Research Foundation, Intersos, Terra Nuova and Care were
some of the independent witnesses of the overwhelming military
presence of Ethiopia in the Gedo, Bay and Bakol regions. The
Transitional National Government has used diplomatic channels to reason
with Ethiopia and to request the removal of Ethiopian forces from Somali
territory. President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan has privately pleaded with
the Ethiopian political leadership to remove the occupying forces from
our country. Despite the protestations of the TPLF government that it was
markedly different from the imperial and Mengistu regimes, it has
justified ominously, on the one hand, the illegal occupation of Somali
territory on the imperatives of its own national security needs and, on the
other hand, blamed Somalia, the victim, for publicizing the presence of
troops deep inside Somali territory.
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5. The Addis Ababa leadership has accused the Transitional National
Government of using Ethiopia as a scapegoat and has termed our discreet
and peaceful efforts to free our people of oppression as a campaign to
discredit Ethiopia and to obtain financial assistance from external
sources.
6. It dawned on Ethiopia that its policy of blaming the victim was no longer
tenable and that the standard imperial policies were no longer sufficient
to contain the anger and liberation activities of the citizens of the
occupied areas, and the pressure of the international community was
proving to be unbearable. Under the cover of darkness Ethiopia pulled
out its troops on Sunday night, 4 February 2001. Ethiopia, however, still
occupies the border towns of El Barde and Qura Joome in Bakol and
Dolow in Gedo. Ethiopian forces are still being used frequently in
patrolling operations deep in our territory. These operations are against
the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security
Council and are a threat to international peace and security. More
pertinently, these operations are instruments to terrorize our people and
to destabilize the Transitional National Government.
7. Ethiopia is pursuing its dangerous policy of recruiting, training, arming
and supporting “friendly militias” in Gedo, Bay Bakol, Hiran, Galgadud
and other regions close to the border. The creation and support of these
militias are examples of the blatant Ethiopian interference in our internal
affairs. They are a clear and present danger to our unity, territorial
integrity and political independence. Ethiopia claims to prefer a “building
bloc” approach to peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. Ethiopia
claims to be mandated by IGAD, in the absence of a national
government, to play a leading role in bringing about national
reconciliation, peace and stability to Somalia. The Somali people have
spoken and have decided that the Arta peace process is the only way out
of the civil strife, lawlessness and contraction of the human spirit. Even
if viable at some stage, the “building bloc” approach is no longer
credible. There is a broadly defined peace process and the needed
transitional National Charter and transitional national institutions are in
place. The Somali people are yearning to get on with the difficult task of
reconstituting a new Somali State that is committed to a culture of peace,
democratic governance, reconstruction and recovery. We believe that the
Ethiopian-created and supported “friendly militias” are nothing but
wrecking squads that are programmed to destabilize Somalia, to brutalize
our people, to obstruct the unfolding peace process and to destroy the
hopes and aspirations of the Somali people.
8. Ethiopia is campaigning vigorously to discredit and destroy the Arta
peace process. Instead of the broadly based and supported process,
Ethiopia is determined to anoint a few individuals as the leaders of
Somalia. The TPLF government in Addis Ababa has vociferously
claimed not to be imperial in its orientation. The corralling of few
individuals from the political wilderness is truly imperial but lacks at
least the expected finesse. The selection of these individuals as the
leaders of the Somali people is bound to be futile. They were unable to
hold their small meeting inside the country. The people of Baidoba
4
S/2001/263
rejected that outright and the people of the north-east have stated most
emphatically that Garowe was out of bounds for the Ethiopian-inspired
scheme. The spokesperson for the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry then stated
that Addis Ababa was a safe and neutral venue for the blighted meeting.
Indeed.
These are some of the ongoing activities that the Ethiopian Government is
carrying out openly and arrogantly against Somalia and its people. These activities
are blatant interferences in our internal affairs and pose a serious threat to the unity,
territorial integrity and political independence of Somalia. My Government would
like the Security Council to take note of these dangerous policies that are being
executed by Ethiopia. These executed policies are of grave concern to Somalia and
its people.
Somalia is bracing itself now for an onslaught of destabilization programmes
that are being hatched by the Ethiopian Government and its anointed leaders.
Ethiopia has been supplying weapons to its “friendly militias”. Of particular concern
is one of the Mogadishu-based warlords. He has been provided deadly landmines in
the recent past and we have no assurance that would stop in the future. On the
contrary, the planting of different types of landmines, the assassination of prominent
citizens and other sabotage activities are expected to be carried out in Mogadishu
and its environs. A reign of terror visited upon the inhabitants of Mogadishu, who
are yearning for peace and stability, is not something to cherish. The prospect of an
Ethiopian onslaught of destabilization is present, real and dangerous.
Yet another testimony to the Ethiopian determination to preclude a united and
independent Somalia is the de facto recognition of the north-west. Ethiopia is the
only country that is accepting the “passports” issued by the administrative entity in
the north-west of Somalia. Ethiopia is placing contingents of its forces in Da’ar
Budhug and Arabsiyo. These foreign troops are supposedly going to protect the
Berbera-Hargeisa-Jigjiga corridor. Ethiopian Airlines is about to start twice weekly
services between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa. Further, an agreement has been
reached to allow an Ethiopian bank to operate in Hargeisa. The cumulative effect of
these activities, which are focused on the north-west, is to negate the re-emergence
of a unified, peaceful and independent Somalia.
The Security Council has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia.
Somalia has assumed its rightful place in the United Nations, OAU, IGAD, the
League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The
Transitional National Government is deeply grateful to the Security Council and the
Secretary-General for their principled support of Somalia. The security situation of
Mogadishu has improved significantly. All 14 police stations in Mogadishu are
manned by the reconstructed police force of the Transitional National Government
and there are neither green lines nor checkpoints run by the warlords. The level of
political violence is almost non-existent in Mogadishu now, but as stated earlier, we
are bracing up for destabilization activities engineered by our neighbour.
The Transitional National Government and the Somali people would like to
alert the Security Council that it should remain seized of the matter of Ethiopian
interference in our internal affairs.
5
S/2001/263
We should be grateful if you would circulate this letter as a document of the
Security Council.
(Signed) Ali Khalif Galaydh
Prime Minister, Somali Republic
Annex 86
Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations
Population Fund, Assistance to Somalia (2002-2004), Note by the Administrator,
DP/2002/29, 8 August 2002
United Nations DP/2002/29
Executive Board of the
United Nations Development
Programme and of the
United Nations Population Fund
Distr.: General
8 August 2002
Original: English
Second regular session 2002
23 - 27 September 2002, New York
Item 5 of the provisional agenda
Country programmes and related matters
Assistance to Somalia (2002-2004)
Note by the Administrator
Elements of a decision
The Executive Board may wish to:
(a) take note of the current situation in Somalia and its implications for the need for and
delivery of humanitarian and developmenta ssistance to the Somali people;
(b) endorse the strategic approach of the country office to promoting peace and security
by concentrating on the three areas:
(i) the rule of law and security;
(ii) governance, public administration and civil society; and
(iii) poverty reduction.
(c) encourage UNDPto continue in its efforts to mobilize resources and establish
strategic partnerships, including through the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
process, direct donor support and in the framework of the United Nations Department
of Political Affairs Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia; and
(d) authorize the Administrator to continue to approve projects consistent with
the strategic approach on a case-by-case basis.
02-51258 (E) 150802
IIIIII II II II II II II II 111II1I1 II 1II lUl
DP/2002/29
Contents
Paragraphs Page
Introduction ........................................................ 1 3
I. Development situation from a sustainable human development perspective ...... 2-8 3
II. Results and lessons of past assistance ................................... 9-13 4
III. Objectives, programme areas and expected results ......................... 14-28 5
A. Rule of law and security ........................................... 15-17 5
B. Governance, public administration and civil society .................... 18-21 6
C. Poverty reduction ................................................. 22-26 7
D. Cross-cutting themes .............................................. 27-28 8
IV. Management arrangements ............................................. 29-35 9
DP/2002/29
Introduction
1. In its decision 99/7, the Executive Board took note of the report on assistance to Somalia (DP/1999/11) and
authorised the Administrator to continue to approve projects in Somalia on a case-by-case basis. In accordance
with that decision, the present note outlines the proposed UNDPp rogrammef or 2002-2004 for Somalia. The note
has been formulated taking into account the programme review, the re-profiling mission conducted in November
2001 and the inter-agency security mission fielded at the request of the Security Council in January 2002.
I. Development situation from a sustainable human development perspective
2. Development in Somalia continues to be subject to ongoing internecine warfare and widespread insecurity.
The country has now been without a unified central government since the end of 1990, resulting in localized
factional rivalry and fighting and the non-existence of the rule of law in many areas. The fighting and
emergencies have caused the loss of an estimated 300 000 lives and the displacement of some 10 per cent of the
population - 300 000 internally and a further 246 000 to neighbouring countries (NHDR2 001, page 199).
Violence and suffering have affected populations in almost all parts of the country, with women, children, the
elderly and marginalized groups being particularly hit hard. In the limited areas of the country that have managed
to achieve relative peace and stability, local populations have initiated reconstruction of their communities and
are achieving some progress in development, with little external support.
3. On the initiative of the Government of Djibouti and the regional Inter-Governmental Authority for
Development (IGAD), a Somali national peace conference was held in Djibouti in April and May 2000. This
culminated in the formation in September 2000 of a Transitional National Government (TNG) in the Somali
capital, Mogadishu. As of June 2002 however, the TNG had not yet been able to establish full authority in or
beyond the capital. Separate administrations remain in other parts of the country. Of these the self-proclaimed
state of Somaliland in the northwest has been the most successful so far, with fragile but functioning systems of
governance and administration. A fragile peace, with intermittent outbreaks of factional fighting, is holding in
the northeast (the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland) and in the southwest around Baidoa. Elsewhere
insecurity remains high.
4. While the fighting and fragmentation of authority have led to widespread destruction of economic
infrastructure, new economic and political structures have emerged in more stable areas. The national human
development report (NHDR) 2001 for Somalia noted that in the absence of central state authorities the main
economic and human development in Somalia has been occurring at the grass-roots level. This has led to the
emergence in places of a private sector characterized by its energy and innovation. The private sector however,
has been left almost entirely without institutional support to facilitate its development and/or regulate its
activities. Moreover, the economy and a large proportion of the population remain vulnerable to external shocks.
The capacities and reach of public administration and civil society organizations must be strengthened to deal
effectively with many broader development challenges facing Somalia, ranging from the securing of any
sustained peace agreements, to the response to environmental degradation (a cause of subsidiary conflicts in the
country).
5. The achievement of peace and stability is therefore of paramount importance. External support for peace
has so far focused mainly on the efforts of the regional IGAD, which aims to establish a political and consultative
framework to facilitate Somali reconciliation and national reconstruction. The United Nations Political Office for
Somalia is also providing support for the peace and reconciliation process. Meanwhile, United Nations
organizations have continued humanitarian and development operations in the country, focusing as appropriate on
areas of relative calm with functioning authorities. These operations have an important role to play in building
peace from the grass-roots level up and complement United Nations support to the efforts of IGAD (or other
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parties) to bring about peace through political negotiations. In support of this, in March 2002 the United Nations
Security Council requested that the Secretary-General coordinate ongoing peace-building activities and provide
for their incremental expansion and establish a Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia that would support
preparatory activities on the ground and supplement the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for
Somalia.
6. The NHDR2 001 found that Somalia had an overall human development index (HDI) of 0.284, which places
the country among the five least developed countries in the world. This low HDI nonetheless represents a slight
improvement over previous years, giving a glimmer of encouragement that some of the more positive economic
and social developments in the past five years have been having an impact on overall development. Chapter 5 of
the NHDR20 01 provides all the development indicators for Somalia covered in this section.
7. While life expectancy indicators are comparable to neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya, education and health
indicators are considerably worse. It is estimated that some 49 per cent of the population live without access to
sanitation and 77 per cent without access to safe water. In 1990 it was estimated that 60 per cent of the
population was living below the poverty line. Available data suggest that this proportion remains as high today, if
not higher. There are significant development inequities between urban and rural areas and between women and
men. For example, the adult literacy rate for rural and nomadic populations is estimated at 10 per cent whereas
the urban rate is 35 per cent. Female adult literacy is estimated to be only 52 per cent of the male rate and the
female primary school enrolment ratio similarly is only 53 per cent of the male rate.
8. The attainment of the Millennium development goals (MDGs) in Somalia is a distant prospect. While the
reversal of the decline in some development indicators suggests that private Somali initiatives and coping
mechanisms do have a positive impact, the absence of firm governance structures and the continuing conflict
makei t difficult to address most MDGta rgets.
II. Results and lessons of past assistance
9. UNDP programming between 1997 and 2001 achieved positive results in the areas of civil protection,
governance capacity-building and poverty reduction. Particular examples include: a) more than 2000 police were
trained in northwest and northeast Somalia and Mogadishu and two police training centres were refurbished and
staff retrained; b) some 2000 farms in the Gabiley region in north-west Somalia were surveyed to enable clear
land ownership titles to be drawn up and registered, making each farm the legal property of its owner and
acceptable as collateral for credit; c) in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United
Nations (FAO), a series of initiatives were undertaken to resolve the ban in several Gulf countries on the import
of chilled meat and livestock from Somalia. As a result, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen reopened
their markets for chilled meat and livestock from Somalia and import licences were introduced and granted to
abattoirs in Galkayo and Mogadishu.
10. Valuable support was also provided in civil aviation and port services: a) the Civil Aviation Caretaker
Authority for Somalia (CACASw) as established to managea ir traffic control services, rehabilitate basic services
in selected airports and run a flight information centre in Nairobi, which serves as the substitute for the
Mogadishu air control tower; b) over 400 Somalis were trained in specific areas of civil aviation and ground
services have been re-established at several airports inside Somalia; c) UNDP, with the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTADa)n d the financial support of the Governments of Sweden and
the United States, completed a project on ports and trade efficiency and focused on improving the efficiency of
Somali ports and facilitating trade diversification.
11. A further key result was the publication of the NHDRfo r 2001, the second for Somalia.
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12. A number of lessons have emerged from the UNDP programme in the past four years, in particular through
the reprofiling mission and programme review in November 2001. Overall, it is clear that the programme
suffered from being too dispersed in its activities and intended outcomes. This is in part the result of the
exceptional difficulty of the operating environment in Somalia (complete absence of a central government,
fluctuations in security levels and inability to maintain a stable operating presence inside the country). In
addition to these contextual difficulties, it was found that the lack of focus in the past programmere sulted partly
from over-ambitious planning, inadequate monitoring and evaluation of programme activities and projects and
failure to follow up on initial assessments with concrete results on the ground.
13. In light of this, the following key recommendations have been made for the coming period:
(a) The overall programme should build upon existing successful programmes and aim to contribute
peace-building through development. The programme should continue to invest primarily in human capacity
rather than physical infrastructure;
(b) Priority should be given to programmes less vulnerable to political insecurity and disruptions and
programmesw hich can reinforce political efforts to achieve stability and security, with care in all cases given to
maintain UNDPn eutrality;
(c) Increased attention must be given to implementation and delivery;
(d) Measures must be taken to ensure that the work of the United Nations Coordination Unit adequately
serves both the resident coordinator and the humanitarian coordinator and that development activities are not
neglected. This applies similarly to the consolidated inter-agency appeal process (CAP).
III. Objectives, programme areas and expected results
14. In view of the humanitarian and developmental situation in Somalia, the above recommendations and the
global mandate of UNDPto work for the reduction of poverty, the country office is framing its programmet o
contribute to peace-building through development. The programme will work in three overall and inter-related
thematic areas: (a) the rule of law and security; (b) governance, public administration and civil society; and
poverty reduction. These three programme areas represent essential building blocks for achieving overall peace
and stability. Improved rule of law and security will increase stability in Somalia and facilitate rehabilitation of
individual livelihoods. Strengthened governance institutions, public administration and civil society will provide
a framework for enabling development across a broader range of dimensions - economic, human and social - and
will facilitate dialogue for peace. The implementation of policies and activities for poverty reduction will
provide both a means for improving the lives of the most disadvantaged in Somalia and a framework for longerterm
economic and human development. In all its activities, UNDP will seek to ensure sustainability in
programme outputs through local partners, existing authorities and non-governmental and civil society
organizations. It will also remain alert for any opportunities that emerge for linkages with national bodies
capable of replicating successful field undertakings.
A. Rule of law and security
15. Recognizing that the fluid and unstable situation currently prevailing in Somalia has severe consequences
for development prospects from the level of the individual to the level of the country as a whole, the objective of
this area of the programmew ill be to work for the restoration of the rule of law and a reduction in the sources of
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insecurity in the country. Funding (including in-kind contributions) has been pledged from the European Union
and the Governments of Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. The strategy will
focus on the following two outcomes.
16. Improved judiciary and law enforcement capacities, with increased respect for human rights. As part of a
multi-agency project on the rule of law and civil protection, UNDPw ill provide assistance for the organization of
legal systems in Somalia and provide capacity-building and training for new judiciary workers. UNDPw ill
continue with an existing law enforcement initiative, which provides training for police forces and prison staff in
international policing standards and human rights. Initiatives will also be carried out to improve human rights
knowledgei n the judiciary and police forces, as well as in the public at large. UNDwP ill also seek to support the
establishment of human rights institutions and mechanisms for increasing access to justice. Target outputs
include: (a) law school(s) or training centre(s) established to provide legal and human rights training to new
existing workers in the Somali judiciary system(s); (b) police forces trained in policing standards and human
rights; and (c) establishment of legal advisory and/or humanr ights institutions (e.g. ombudsmanf)a cilitated
UNDP.
17. Sustainable demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of combatants/militia, supported by
implementation of small arms control measures. UNDPw ill lead the coordination and implementation of the
Consolidated Demobilization Plan for Somalia. This plan has been adopted by 19 international nongovernmental
organizations (INGOs) and United Nations organizations and has received strong support from the
Secretary-General. With the full participation of local communities, UNDPw ill aim to demonstrate ways for the
comprehensive reintegration of ex-combatants into society and will seek to develop the capacities of local
authorities and regional "demobilization departments" to coordinate and sustain the process. Complementing
this, with the support of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), a project for small arms control
will be implemented. A first phase is already being carried out, aimed at establishing a basis for scaling up the
project over the longer term in partnership with international NGOs and with the involvement of Somali
authorities and local communities. Target outputs include: (a) a database of militias established; (b) options
developed and piloted for psycho-social assistance, vocational training and reintegration of excombatants/
militia; (c) effective strategies and policies on demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
implemented by local and/or regional authorities; and (d) legal framework(s) for small arms control established
and implemented.
B. Governance, public administration and civil society
18. The objective will be to strengthen representative governance institutions, public administration and civil
society in order to improve the ability of existing local governance institutions to fulfil their roles effectively. In
general, UNDPw ill aim to improve the administration of key public infrastructure and services that impact on
economic development. At the local level, the organization will aim to enable local authorities, civil society
organizations and local communities to play a stronger role in the management of development. The strategy will
focus on the following three outcomes.
19. Improved effectiveness of Somali (regional) institutions of representation and governance to perform their
legislative, administrative and oversight functions. Working with regional governing institutions in specific areas
such as administrative systems and financial management, UNDP will seek to reinforce democratic and
participatory approaches to governance. It will promote the establishment of effective systems for the
distribution of power between the local, regional and (where possible) national levels and through this seek
increase Somali dialogue for peace. Target outputs include: (a) regional Somali authorities and civil servants
trained in parliamentary and ministry-specific practices and standards; (b) administrative and legal frameworks
for public financial accounts, standards and accountability proposed and reviewed by regional authorities; and (c)
dialogue established between governing authorities on issues of administration, peace and security.
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20. Improved enabling environment for the development of a competitive, market-oriented private sector.
UNDPw ill focus on the administration of key public infrastructure, services and mechanismst hat can facilitate
economic growth. Building on previous results, assistance will be provided specifically to the country’s aviation
and ports authorities. At the policy level, UNDPw ill seek to assist the development of appropriate economic
policies and measures and the establishment of basic regulatory frameworks. Target outputs include: (a)
improving essential facilities and services in local Somali airports; (b) implementing measures for increased
financial self-sufficiency for Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia (CACAS), including better
collection of over-flight charges; (c) preparing and reviewing by authorities options for involvement of the
private sector in the management of Berbera and Bosasso ports and establishment of free trade zone and (d)
implementing new economic policies and measures conducive to economic growth (e.g. covering customs, tariffs,
trade regulation, information and communication technology).
21. Local authorities, civil society organizations and communities in rural and urban areas involved in the
planning and management of development activities. Sustainable recovery and development in Somalia will
depend to a large extent on the organization and involvement of local authorities and communities. Since the
breakdown of central government, many active civil society and non-governmental organizations have emerged
but with limited capacities and largely in isolation from each other. UNDPw ill provide capacity building for
local authorities and civil society organizations in selected areas of need. It will pursue ways of increasing the
involvement of local communities in issues such as land use, basic services and development planning in general.
Through this, it will also seek to foster dialogue for peace at the local level. Target outputs include: (a)
network(s) of civil society organizations created and coordination in development activities facilitated; and
measures implemented enabling civil society organizations and affected communities to participate in the
formulation and implementation of local development plans and in peace dialogue.
C. Poverty reduction
22. In this area the objective will be both to reduce poverty in specific areas - at the level of the individual and
locality - and to assist the formulation and adoption of policies that will contribute to the wider and sustained
reduction of poverty. Assistance will be provided for internally displaced persons, returning refugees and other
disadvantaged groups to reintegrate and re-establish livelihoods. Supporting activities will be carried out at the
regional and, as far as possible, national levels. This will be complemented by monitoring of poverty and
progress towards the MDGs. Four overall outcomes will be aimed for.
23. Anti-poverty strategies and action plans developed through participatory processes involving in particular
the poor and other disadvantaged groups. Through the Somalia Watching Brief Programme, co-financed by the
World Bank Post-Conflict Fund and in collaboration with Somali authorities and other development partners,
UNDPw ill work to improve capacities for collecting, monitoring and assessing poverty and gender-disaggregated
data. It will use the NHDRp rocess to promote broad and inclusive debate on poverty reduction strategies.
UNDPw ill work in consultation with the various administrative authorities in Somalia and other development
partners to prepare a poverty reduction strategy, which could serve as the basis of an interim poverty reduction
strategy paper (PRSP) for Somalia. Target outputs include: (a) preparing next NHDR, focusing on national
recovery and poverty reduction; (b) producing MDGre port(s) through collaboration between UNDP,U nited
Nations organizations and Somali authorities; and (c) Somali authorities identifying and reviewing options for
participatory formulation of an interim PRSP.
24. Development of key economic sectors facilitated and sources of income for the poor protected. Building on
established partnerships with Somali authorities, UNDPw ill aim to support the development of key economic
sectors and opportunities for diversification. Assistance will be provided for developing capacities in land
surveying. Particular attention will be given to strengthening the priority areas of remittance systems and
livestock or chilled meat exports. Target outputs include: (a) establishing mechanisms enabling local authorities
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to increase coverage of cadastral surveys; (b) formulating and implementing action plan for remittance companies
to comply with relevant international financial rules and regulations with assistance from UNDP; (c) developing
and reviewing options for remittance companies to expand their operations to commercial banking and other
financial services; and (d) Somali authorities formulating measures for improved processes and standards
livestock exports, with UNDPas sistance.
25. Sustainable recovery and reintegration of returning refugees, internally displaced persons and other conflictaffected
or marginalized populations. UNDwP ill direct its activities in this area through an initiative launched
with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCRu) nder the auspices of IGAD,
designed to facilitate the reintegration of uprooted populations in the Horn of Africa. Activities will be carried
out in collaboration with United Nations organizations, NGOsa nd Somali authorities, with UNDPp laying a lead
coordinating role. The Government of Sweden has already contributed to the project and other donors have
pledged support. Target outputs include: (a) initiatives implemented to provide basic social services
reintegrating populations; (b) pilot initiative(s) formulated for creating livelihood opportunities for reintegrating
populations and implementation begun; and (c) effective policies for recovery and reintegration and management
of the process implemented by local and/or regional authorities.
26. Increased national capacity for mine action targeted at improving access to land and livelihood resources for
the poor. Landmines and unexploded ordnance affect a wide range of aspects of Somali life, from the loss of life,
disability and insecurity of affected communities, reduced land available for livestock and cultivation, to
increased transportation costs. It is the rural poor who are most affected by the loss of productive land and the
risk of injury resulting from landmines and unexploded ordnance. Somalia lacks a comprehensive mine action
database and cannot effectively prioritize and coordinate mine action. UNDwP ill play the lead coordinating role
in the development and implementation of a Mine Action Support project, building on a preparatory phase
launched in early 2002. Target outputs include: (a) establishing a mine action centre and database; (b)
"recovering" land in pilot areas for farming use as a result of mine-marking and prioritized clearance; and (c)
setting up a mine and unexploded ordnance action plan on the basis of landmine impact surw~ys, enabling
targeted extension of activities to new areas of the country.
D. Cross-cutting themes
27. Environment, gender, HIV/AIDS and information and communication technology (ICT) will be crosscutting
themes within the programme’s three thematic areas. UNDP will explore ways of incorporating
environmental concerns into policies and practices and developing capacity in disaster prevention, preparedness
and management. UNDPw ill seek to increase the participation of womenw ithin its programme activities and
beyond in Somali society. Working with UNFPA, the United Nations Children’s Fund and the United Nations
DevelopmentF und for Womeni,t will promote their participation in activities and policy-making that concern the
re-establishment of security and the rule of law and more broadly in decision-making at all levels. In cooperation
with other United Nations organizations, UNDP will work to incorporate the combat of HIV/AIDS in all its
activities and will seek to highlight the issue of the spread of HIV/AIDiSn situations of conflict, displacement,
return and movementa long trade routes. UNDPw ill seek to build upon a project funded by the Government of
Denmark responding to identified ICT needs in educational and administrative institutions in northwest Somalia.
In this it will explore partnership opportunities with private sector companies to fill the gap left by a missing
national government framework for ICT development. Target outputs for these cross-cutting themes include: (a)
raising public awareness about the relationships between environmental management and livelihoods in order to
increase ownership of environment issues; (b) taking concrete measures for the inclusion of women in local and
regional authorities and in decision-making processes for development; (c) raising public awareness on patterns
of transmission of HIV/AIDS, especially along trade/trucking routes; and (d) improving Internet access for
educational institutions in targeted areas, with scope for extension to other users.
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28. Another key cross-cutting issue is that of security, the absence of which is a significant constraint on both
development and humanitarian programme delivery. Development programmes in particular require security as a
precondition for sustainability of results. Consequently, security will be a primary condition to the initiation of
development activities and an integral part of all development programme documents and plans. Continued close
coordination between the country office and the cost-shared United Nations Security Coordinator
(UNSECOORDte) am will ensure staff and programme security in the foreseeable future. All security
arrangements and activities will continue to be guided by the Security Plan for Somalia. The Security
Management Team, chaired by the resident representative will meet frequently to ensure that executive interagency
security managemendt ecisions remain responsive to the fluid security situation in the country.
IV. Management arrangements
29. Considerable efforts have been made to strengthen Somali participation and ownership in the programme
through consultation mechanisms such as local management~steering" committees. Monitoring, review and
evaluation systems for the provision of regular feedback and reporting with a focus on outputs and outcomes have
been put in place for all sub-programmes and projects.
30. During 2002, the country office will complete implementation of the reprofiling. New training will be
undertaken for country office staff. The country office will also aim to benefit from support resources from
headquarters, including from BCPR, as well as from other country offices as appropriate. Networking,
knowledge management and policy support will be sought from the sub-regional resource facility (SURF) for the
Arab States.
31. Since 2000, the country office has begun to implement projects using the direct execution modality in order
to take direct charge of the managemento f UNDP-fundedp rojects and improve the visibility and standing of
UNDPin Somalia. Considerable success has been achieved to date and the country office intends to continue to
use this execution modality where appropriate. The country office has already strengthened its capacity to handle
direct execution and will further strengthen it during the remainder of 2002 with direct execution training for all
staff. As new programmes are prepared, the country office will ensure, as in the past, that United Nations
organizations and international and national NGOs are identified where appropriate to implement relevant
components of each programme. The country office will also use the services of fully funded United Nations
Volunteers (UNVs) to assist in programme implementation.
32. It has become clear that the location of the country office outside Somalia is a severe limiting factor for
programme effectiveness. For this reason, UNDPh as begun to transfer programme and project monitoring
functions to Somalia. The process of transfer is incremental and is strictly subject to security considerations.
Ultimately, security permitting, it is envisaged that Nairobi will become an overall liaison office and that the
programme will operate out of four sub-offices covering broad geographical areas within Somalia: Baidoa,
Garowe, Hargeisa and Mogadishu. This will allow country office programme monitoring functions to be fully
devolved inside the country. Until then, these sub-offices will operate with a largely project-based orientation,
focusing on implementation, monitoring and evaluation of activities and outputs.
33. The country office will continue to place emphasis on raising other (non-core) resources from as wide
donor net as possible, though at the same time seeking contributions from Somali partners. Total potential donor
interest is great. In 2001, donors pledged more than $10 million to UNDPT. he principal donors already actively
supporting the UNDPp rogrammef or Somalia are Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. A new partnership has been established with the
World Bank, which since May 2002 has been co-financing the Somalia Watching Brief. In addition, countries
such as Canada, France, Germany and South Africa have expressed strong interest in the situation in Somalia and
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in UNDP-ledi nitiatives in the country. The country office will use core funds as seed moneyt o leverage third
party co-financing.
34. The country office recognizes that there is a strong need to encourage donors and the international community
to move beyond a persistent focus on short-term humanitarian emergency interventions and to become more
actively involved in long-term recovery and development activities. Drawing on practical examples of successful
development in Somalia, the country office will now seek to identify development partners for building long-term
strategic partnerships and "development coalitions" that go beyond individual projects and programmes. These
will include traditional and non-traditional donors~ international financial institutions, other United Nations
organizations, international NGOs, the private sector and regional institutions. The country office will also
continue to involve donors in the project formulation and evaluation process through respective steering
committees and the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB).
35. Since 1990, international organizations and the United Nations system in particular have borne a primary
responsibility for ensuring the effective coordination of humanitarian assistance operations and aid programmes
and collaboration with Somali regional counterparts. Since March 1995, international staff and many national
staff from United Nations and other aid organizations have withdrawn from Mogadishu, as a result of prevailing
insecurity and established temporary operation centres in Nairobi, Kenya. Other United Nations organizations
are present in Somalia only through specific development projects. The United Nations Political Office for
Somalia (UNPOS) is also temporarily based in Nairobi. The United Nations Resident/Humanitarian coordinator
facilitates coordination within the United Nations country team and in this is supported by a secretariat, the
United Nations Coordination Unit (UNCU), which includes UNDP and the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)o fficers in Nairobi and in the field. The UNCUha s now been
restructured to ensure that development activities and humanitarian imperatives are adequately coordinated and
addressed by the offices of the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator. Coordination in Nairobi
between the United Nations system, the European Union, NGOs, donors and members of the international
community is facilitated by the SACB, a voluntary aid coordination forum created in December 1993. The SACB
is an experiment aimed at consensual management of aid operations and shoulders much of the responsibility for
"coordination" of aid agencies operating in Somalia. The Resident Coordinator acts as a Vice-Chairman of the
SACB Executive Committee and chairs the Steering Committee, which leads SACB sectoral committees.
Recently, conditions have permitted United Nations, UNDPan d OCHAto set up three centres of operation inside
Somalia. They report to the Resident Coordinator and are responsible for inter-agency assessments, information
sharing and commonp lanning. United Nations organizations in Somalia are in the final stages of preparing the
Joint Action Recovery Plan (JARP), which outlines a commona ssessment of the overall situation and a common
plan to address the challenges that Somalia presents. The JARP will be completed in the third quarter of 2002
and for the time being will take the place of the common country assessment and the United Nations
Development Assistance Framework for Somalia.
10
Annex 87
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia,
S/2004/115, 12 February 2004, Extract
United Nations S/2004/115
Security Council Distr.: General
12 February 2004
Original: English
04-23968 (E) 180204
*0423968*
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia
I. Introduction
1. In its presidential statement of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30), the
Security Council requested me to submit reports, at least every four months, on the
situation in Somalia and the efforts to promote the peace process.
2. The present report covers developments since my previous report, dated 13
October 2003 (S/2003/987). Its main focus is the challenges faced and the progress
made by the Somali national reconciliation process, which has been ongoing in
Kenya since October 2002 under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), with support from the international community. The report
also provides an update on the political and security situation in Somalia and the
humanitarian and development activities of United Nations programmes and
agencies in the country.
II. Somali national reconciliation process
3. By mid-September 2003, developments at the Somalia National Reconciliation
Conference at Mbagathi, Kenya, led to an impasse over the contested adoption of a
charter (see S/2003/987, paras. 13-18). Some of the leaders, including the President
of the Transitional National Government, Abdikassim Salad Hassan, Colonel Barre
Aden Shire of the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade of the
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), Osman Hassan Ali (“Atto”) and Musse Sudi
(“Yalahow”) rejected the adoption, and returned to Somalia. On 30 September, a
group of them announced the formation of the National Salvation Council consisting
of 12 factions under the chairmanship of Musse Sudi. On 7 October, the National
Salvation Council signed a memorandum of understanding with the President of the
Transitional National Government, in which it acknowledged the continuance in
office of the Transitional National Government. The signatories also announced
their intention to convene a new national reconciliation conference separate from the
one at Mbagathi. No parallel conference has been held, however.
4. At the tenth IGAD Summit, held at Kampala on 24 October under the
chairmanship of the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, the heads of State
focused attention on ways and means to get the Somali national reconciliation
process back on track. The President of Mozambique, Joachim Chissano, Chairman
of the African Union, and Alpha Konaré, Chairperson of the Commission of the
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African Union, also participated in the Summit. My Special Adviser, Mohamed
Sahnoun, accompanied by my Representative for Somalia, Winston Tubman,
collaborated actively with IGAD leaders in efforts to re-energize the stalled
reconciliation process.
5. The IGAD heads of State decided to expand the membership of the IGAD
Technical Committee to include Eritrea, the Sudan and Uganda, in addition to
Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, and renamed it the IGAD Facilitation Committee. The
Special Envoy of the African Union for Somalia was made a member of the
Facilitation Committee. The Summit directed the Facilitation Committee to meet in
Nairobi at the ministerial level on 28 October to review the status of the Somali
national reconciliation process.
6. The ministerial meeting, chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya,
was held in Nairobi as scheduled and was attended by ministers from Djibouti,
Eritrea and Uganda as well as Ethiopian officials. The ministers agreed that Somali
leaders would be invited to a Leaders’ Consultation in Kenya on 20 November and
that phase III of the Conference would commence only after the successful
conclusion of the Leaders’ Consultation.
7. The Transitional National Government and the National Salvation Council
raised several objections to the proposed Leaders’ Consultation. The main objection
centred on the issue of representation. The group of leaders who had endorsed the
adoption of a charter in mid-September wanted the Consultation to be held as
scheduled and the participants limited to Abdikassim Salad Hassan and those leaders
who had signed the Eldoret Declaration (S/2002/1359, annex) on 27 October 2002.
On the other hand, the Transitional National Government and National Salvation
Council groups wanted a larger representation of leaders and the exclusion of the
former Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government and the Speaker of
Transitional National Assembly (see S/2003/987, para. 9). In addition, both groups
called for the postponement of the Leaders’ Consultation to observe the final days of
Ramadan.
8. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, accompanied by the Kenyan
Special Envoy for Somalia and Chairman of the Conference, Bethuel Kiplagat, held
talks with officials in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia in November to seek
support for the Somali national reconciliation process.
9. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, visited
eastern regions and the Horn of Africa from 7 to 16 November. Following in-depth
briefings by my Special Adviser and my Representative for Somalia, he held
discussions with a wide spectrum of Somali leaders, the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Kenya, Mr. Kiplagat, and members of the IGAD Facilitation Committee, the
Executive Committee of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, the United Nations
country team for Somalia and other external actors to assess the current status and
prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia, as well as planning for a future
United Nations role in the country.
10. At its second meeting on 8 December, the Facilitation Committee was obliged
once again to postpone the Leaders’ Consultation until 18 December. In a joint
communiqué, the Ministers stressed that any invited Somali leader who did not
attend the meeting “shall be deemed not to be interested in the reconciliation process
and will be treated as such”. In view of the continuing impasse, the Minister for
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Foreign Affairs of Kenya, after consultations with President Museveni, had to
postpone the Leaders’ Consultation for a third time, until 9 January 2004.
11. International observers at the Conference, including my Representative,
engaged with all Somali stakeholders, in groups as well as individually, in efforts to
reconcile divergent positions. On 4 December, the Special Envoy of the African
Union led a delegation that included Kenyan, Ugandan, Swedish and United
Kingdom representatives to meet with representatives of the Transitional National
Government and the National Salvation Council in Mogadishu in order to persuade
them to participate in the Leaders’ Consultation in Nairobi. Likewise, on 12
December, international observers held a meeting with Somali leaders of opposing
views in Nairobi and urged them to adopt a cooperative attitude that would ensure
the participation of all Somali leaders in the Leaders’ Consultation.
12. After discussions with Somali leaders in Nairobi on 8 and 9 January, President
Museveni and the President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, launched the Somali Leaders’
Consultation in Nairobi on 9 January. The former appealed to Somali leaders to
reach the necessary compromises and agreement on a permanent peace in the
country, the formation of a national army, the restoration of Somali sovereignty and
the recovery of the economy.
13. On 29 January, the Somali leaders signed a document entitled “Declaration on
the Harmonization of Various Issues Proposed by the Somali Delegates at the
Somali Consultative Meetings from 9 to 29 January 2004”. The document consisted
of proposed amendments to the transitional federal charter adopted at the plenary
meeting of the Conference on 15 September 2003. The leaders decided that the
name of the charter would be transitional federal charter of the Somali republic; the
name of the government would be transitional federal government; its term would
last five years; and that the transitional federal parliament would consist of 275
members, 12 per cent of whom would be women. In addition, the document called
for a national census to be undertaken while a new constitution was being drafted, as
well as for its approval by an internationally supervised national referendum. A
controversy subsequently arose, however, over the method of selection of the
members of parliament, and efforts are being made to overcome the problem.
14. Regarding the financing of the Conference, the IGAD facilitation announced a
severe financial crisis and renewed its appeal to donors for additional funding in
December. The facilitation estimated that costs for the Conference from February
2003 to January 2004 would amount to €11 million. While donors are reported to
have pledged €5 million, the Conference was considered to be carrying a deficit of
€5.9 million (54 per cent) by December 2003.
15. It is noteworthy that the budget of the Conference had supported the expenses
of approximately 800 Somalis at Mbagathi until November 2003. In view of the
impasse in the proceedings and the precarious financial situation, the IGAD
facilitation began a vigorous repatriation of many of the Somalis, with the exception
of the 366 accredited delegates for phase II of the Conference and 45 Somali elders.
16. Meanwhile, Italy announced a further contribution of $500,000. The United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Sweden and the League of Arab
States contributed $100,000, $50,000 and $75,000 respectively. The European
Commission remains the major contributor to the Conference.
4
S/2004/115
17. On 19 October, Sheikh Ibrahim Ali, a delegate at the Conference, his driver
and another person were found murdered in the Ngong forest in Nairobi. Another
delegate, Ahmed Rashid Sheik Mohamed, a Somali Canadian, was found dead in
Mbagathi on 6 November. While the death of the latter is considered to be from
natural causes, the Kenyan authorities are conducting an investigation into the first
incident.
III. Developments inside Somalia
18. Subsequent to the removal of Hassan Abshir Farah and Abdalla Deerow Issak
as Prime Minister and Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly, respectively
(see S/2003/987, para. 9), Mustafa Gududow was elected as the new Speaker on 4
December. Abdikassim Salad Hassan appointed Mohamed Abdi Yussuf as the new
Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government on 8 December. The latter
has since appointed a cabinet of 37 ministers.
19. Abdikassim Salad Hassan and members of the National Salvation Council held
talks with officials in Djibouti, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia and
Yemen from 13 to19 November, reportedly to seek political and financial support
for the holding of a reconciliation conference in Somalia. Reports also indicate that
the Presidents of Djibouti and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya encouraged the Somali
leaders to return to the IGAD-led Somali national reconciliation process.
20. Abdikassim Salad Hassan participated in the Organization of Islamic
Conference Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur from 16 to 18 October. He also attended
the tenth Summit of the IGAD heads of State held in Kampala on 24 October.
21. On 21 December, the “Somaliland” Parliament adopted a resolution, asserting
“Somaliland’s” authority over the Sool and Sanaag regions, which are also claimed
by “Puntland”. In a letter dated 22 December, addressed to the United Nations
Political Office for Somalia, the “Puntland” administration stated that it would not
fail to use all means at its disposal to defend the security and territorial integrity of
“Puntland”. On 27 December, forces loyal to the “Puntland” administration assumed
control of Las-Anod district in Sool region. “Somaliland” considers its borders to be
those of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, which included the two regions.
“Puntland’s” claim is based on the fact that the clans living in those regions are
mostly Darod, the dominant group in “Puntland”.
22. In view of the escalation of tension between the two administrations, the
Kenyan Foreign Minister issued a statement on 19 January 2004 on behalf of the
IGAD Facilitation Committee, calling on both parties to exercise maximum
restraint.
23. I also called on the parties to refrain from the use of force. I urged them to
seek a solution through political dialogue and reminded them of their responsibility
to protect the civilian population and ensure unimpeded access for humanitarian
assistance in their respective areas. I reiterated my call to all Somali parties to reach
agreement on national reconciliation that would put an end to the fighting and
bloodshed in the country.
Annex 88
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia,
S/2004/469, 9 June 2004
United Nations S/2004/469
Security Council Distr.: General
9 June 2004
Original: English
04-38346 (E) 170604
*0438346*
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement by the President of
the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30), in which the Council
requested me to submit reports at least every four months on the situation in Somalia
and efforts to support the peace process, including updates on the scope and
contingency planning for launching a peace-building mission for Somalia.
2. The report covers developments since my previous report, dated 12 February
2004 (S/2004/115 and Corr.1). It highlights the issues and challenges faced by the
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, which has been under way since
October 2002 in Kenya under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), with Kenya as Chairman. The report also provides an update
on developments inside Somalia, security conditions, and the humanitarian and
development activities of United Nations programmes and agencies.
II. Somali national reconciliation process
3. As previously reported (S/2004/115, para. 13), Somali leaders on 29 January
signed a document entitled “Declaration on the Harmonization of Various Issues
Proposed by the Somali Delegates at the Somali Consultative Meetings from 9 to
29 January 2004”. Although the document was signed in Nairobi in the presence of
President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya, controversy arose over the method of selection of
members of the future transitional federal parliament. Despite the concerted efforts
of the IGAD Facilitation Committee and the support of international observers, the
reconciliation process was effectively stalled from early February until it resumed
recently.
4. On 4 February, some members of the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation
Council issued a press statement contesting the validity of the Declaration.
According to them, the text regarding article 30 of the draft transitional federal
charter on the selection of the members of parliament was different from the text
they had agreed upon during the Somali Leaders’ Consultation (S/2004/115, paras.
10-12). These Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council leaders contended that
only the 24 leaders who had signed the Eldoret Declaration on the Cessation of
Hostilities (S/2002/1359, annex) and President Abdikassim Salad Hassan of the
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Transitional National Government constituted all of the political leaders entitled to
be involved in the selection of the members of parliament. Traditional leaders from
Somalia’s clans would then endorse the selection of members of parliament. They
claimed that the increase in the number of political leaders in the text of the
Declaration was meant to obtain an overrepresentation of some political groups.
This view was also supported by the former Transitional National Government
prime minister and the former speaker of the Transitional National Assembly (see
S/2003/987, para. 9, and S/2004/115, para. 7).
5. In the meantime, the Transitional National Assembly, convened by Abdikassim
Salad Hassan, endorsed the Declaration on 8 February. Five of the Somali
Restoration and Reconciliation Council leaders who withdrew their signatures on
the Declaration left Mbagathi for Jowhar in the Middle Shabelle region of Somalia.
On 23 February, the draft transitional charter (reflecting the 29 December
Declaration) received the endorsement of the Somali delegates present in a plenary
session of the Conference. However, Colonel Abdallhahi Yusuf of “Puntland” and
several other Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council leaders argued that the
plenary session had serious procedural problems. They criticized the IGAD
Facilitation Committee for conducting the plenary session with only Djibouti and
Kenya present. They insisted that unless all six IGAD country representatives were
present during conference deliberations, the conclusions reached were not binding.
6. On 11 March, the five Somali leaders in Jowhar announced the formation of
the National Organizing Council for Somalia, reportedly made up of 51 members
under the leadership of Mohamed Omar Habeeb (“Mohamed Dhere”). They stated
their intention to complete phase III of the Conference inside Somalia. In a
statement issued on 8 March, Colonel Yusuf, other Somali Restoration and
Reconciliation Council leaders remaining in Nairobi and the former Transitional
National Government prime minister and speaker also expressed a lack of
confidence in continuing the peace process in Kenya.
7. Following the approval of the charter by the plenary Conference, the IGAD
Facilitation Committee began preparations for phase III of the Conference.
However, the Committee was unable to meet at ministerial level (with Ethiopia and
Eritrea represented at the ambassadorial level) until 12 March in Nairobi to plan
phase III of the Conference.
8. A delegation composed of the African Union’s Special Envoy for Somalia, an
IGAD secretariat official, and officials from Kenya, Sweden and the United
Kingdom met with National Organizing Council for Somalia members in Jowhar on
17 March, to persuade them to return to the Conference. However, the National
Organizing Council for Somalia group asserted the validity of the charter as
endorsed on 15 September 2003 (see S/2003/987, paras. 10-16) and demanded that
no other amendments be made to the charter. They reiterated their position that the
number of political leaders to select members of parliament be limited to 24+1, that
is the 24 Eldoret signatories and Abdikassim Salad Hassan; and that IGAD should
declare that the latter could no longer act as President of Somalia. Should IGAD fail
to meet these demands, the National Organizing Council for Somalia group restated
its plan to convene phase III of the Conference inside Somalia.
9. Other Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council leaders met in Nairobi
on 25 March and decided to remain engaged in the Conference. However, Colonel
Yusuf left Nairobi on 29 March for “Puntland”, reportedly in compliance with a
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provision of the “Puntland” constitution that required the “President” not to be
absent from the territory for more than 60 consecutive days. The Chairman of the
Juba Valley Alliance, Colonel Barre Aden Shire (“Barre Hirale”), left the
Conference on 27 March, ostensibly to deal with tensions that arose from the killing
of a businessman in Kismaayo. Musse Sudi (“Yalahow”) also returned to Mogadishu
on 3 April, following the killing of a militia commander in Mogadishu. However,
these leaders continued to affirm their commitment to the IGAD-led reconciliation
process.
10. Meanwhile, the Somali delegates remaining at the Conference made efforts to
compile and harmonize the rules of procedure for phase III but did not reach
meaningful agreement. The Government of Sweden offered financial support for the
airlifting of traditional leaders, who would join phase III of the Conference, from
Somalia to Mbagathi. However, in Baidoa, airplanes dispatched for this purpose
were prevented by militia from transporting the traditional leaders. In the case of
Mogadishu, on two occasions, no traditional leaders assembled at the airport.
11. European Union Troika representatives met with the Kenyan Foreign Minister
on 16 April in Nairobi to discuss the European Union’s decision to reduce funding
for the Conference. They argued that the end of phase II should result in the
departure of delegates who had been at the Conference for that phase. They were of
the view that the number of funded delegates at the Conference be limited to 203
persons, including the traditional leaders who were expected to join the process.
12. On 22 April, the Kenyan Foreign Minister announced a road map with fixed
dates for the completion of the Conference. It required all political leaders absent
from Nairobi to return and for the traditional leaders to arrive at the Conference
venue within a stated time frame. The process would culminate in the swearing in of
a president for the transitional federal government of Somalia on 1 July. The road
map also fixed the fifth Ministerial Facilitation Committee meeting for 6 May, when
the Ministers were expected to launch phase III of the Conference.
13. The Facilitation Committee meeting took place on schedule in Nairobi from
6 to 7 May with all IGAD Ministers of Foreign Affairs in attendance. The Executive
Secretary of IGAD and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African
Union also participated in the discussions. In the joint communiqué, the Ministers
inter alia “declared their total and unreserved commitment to unite in resolving the
Somali problem once and for all”, appealed to Somali leaders to return to the
Conference by 20 May and for the Conference to conclude successfully by the end
of July 2004. The Foreign Ministers agreed to hold their next meeting in Nairobi on
20 May.
14. Furthermore, the Ministers agreed to collectively brief the Commission of the
African Union and the Security Council on the status of the Somali national
reconciliation process before the end of phase III of the Conference. They expressed
appreciation for the diplomatic and financial contribution of the European Union
and the international observers and called for further assistance for the Conference
which was operating on a 52 per cent budget deficit. International observers
welcomed the initiative taken by the IGAD Ministers.
15. Following the IGAD Ministerial meeting, the Jowhar group indicated its
intention to re-join the Conference by 20 May. However, on 6 May, the Chairman of
the National Organizing Council for Somalia group, “Mohamed Dhere” reportedly
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detained reporters of a Jowhar radio station for airing a statement urging Somali
leaders to return to the Conference. On 13 May, Abdikassim Salad Hassan was
reported to have criticized the IGAD joint communiqué as it appeared to undermine
the existence of the Transitional National Government and failed to mention the 29
January Declaration (see para. 3). He also expressed concern about the Kenyan
Government’s refusal to issue visas on Somali passports and stated that the
Transitional National Government would suspend its participation in the Conference
until Kenya rescinded its decision on Somali passports.
16. Following the sixth IGAD Ministerial Facilitation Committee meeting in
Nairobi on 22 May, the Ministers stated that they had consulted all Somali clans for
the completion of the third and final phase of the Conference. They called for the
early arrival of traditional leaders at the Conference site and for Somali political
leaders to cooperate in the process of selecting the members of the transitional
federal parliament. The Ministers warned that absent leaders would not be allowed
to hold the process hostage and that, punitive measures would be taken against those
obstructing completion of the reconciliation process.
17. My Representative and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia
remained actively engaged in the Somali national reconciliation process. My
Representative participated in the meeting of the IGAD Partners’ Forum in Addis
Ababa on 20 February. IGAD Partners’ Forum representatives concluded that a high
level of diplomatic support from the international community, particularly the
Security Council, would be needed for the successful conclusion of the Conference
and the establishment of sustainable governance structures in Somalia. My
Representative also met with senior Ethiopian officials who reiterated Ethiopia’s
commitment to the Somali national reconciliation process. In addition, the Ethiopian
officials expressed a desire for a stronger interest in Somalia to be evidenced by
members of the international community.
18. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia held consultations with the
European Community, non-governmental organizations, donors and the World Bank
concerning the realization of a common framework on peace-building and to
coordinate planning and implementation strategies. This ongoing effort commenced
with a one-day workshop on 8 April, in which some 15 countries and organizations
participated.
III. Developments inside Somalia
19. In a letter addressed to me on 7 April, the Transitional National Government
denounced Ethiopia’s alleged military interference in Somalia, claiming that
Ethiopia had been occupying parts of Somali territory and was recruiting and
training militias. The Ethiopian authorities have denied these allegations on a
number of occasions.
20. The President of “Somaliland” held talks with British officials,
parliamentarians and businessmen in the United Kingdom in mid-March. He also
visited Brussels and Addis Ababa.
21. In March, “Somaliland” authorities reiterated their intent, first announced in
September 2003, to deport “illegal immigrants” from areas under their control.
However, the deadline has been extended several times. Included in the
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classification of “illegal immigrants” are some 40,000 internally displaced persons,
mainly from southern Somalia. United Nations agencies continue to work with the
“Somaliland” authorities to assure the protection of the human rights and
humanitarian needs of these groups.
22. Meanwhile, the environment for “foreigners” in general and internally
displaced persons from southern Somalia in particular has continued to deteriorate
in “Somaliland”. Harassment, exploitation and extortion of these groups is quite
common. These conditions have forced many of those affected to flee southwards
and into “Puntland”, where they are living in squalid conditions. United Nations
agencies in Ethiopia have also reported the presence of “deportees” from
“Somaliland” in the Somali region (Zone V) of Ethiopia, where they are placing an
additional burden on the region’s limited resources. The United Nations is currently
undertaking a review of new arrivals in “Puntland” to ascertain the scope of the
influx, in order to design an appropriate response. “Puntland” already hosts some
70,000 internally displaced persons. The largest concentration of about 25,000 is
based in Bosasso, where the administration’s capacity to provide for them is limited.
23. In Bay region, reconciliation efforts led by the elders among the Rahanwein
since January have triggered the return of large numbers of internally displaced
persons to villages surrounding Baidoa. More than 2,500 internally displaced
persons fled fighting between two different clan groups within the Rahanwein
Resistance Army (RRA) in 2003. While the reconciliation talks have yet to
conclude, the area has been peaceful and access has improved considerably.
Security
24. A significant increase in threats and attacks on international and national aid
workers in Somalia has caused serious concern within the international community.
25. On 19 March, Flora Chepkemoi Cheruyiot (Kenya) of the German Agency for
Technical Assistance and a Somali driver were killed by gunmen on the road from
Hargeisa to Berbera. A German staff member also sustained neck injuries in the
attack. Members of the armed Somali escort who engaged the assailants suffered
gunshot wounds. The “Somaliland” authorities assert that the five suspects they
have arrested are Islamic militants and will be brought to trial.
26. United Nations and other aid workers also continue to face harassment from
elements within Somalia who make unjustified demands. For instance, on 24
February, a gunman in Badan in Eastern Sanaag shot at a World Food Programme
(WFP) distribution team, claiming that his clan was not getting its proper share of
food aid. On March 10, “Puntland” authorities in Las Anod accused two nongovernmental
organization international staff of misusing international humanitarian
funds and detained them for four days. The killing of a Somali driver working for
Norwegian People’s Aid in March, in Las Anod, degenerated into revenge killings
during April.
27. In Galgudud region, sporadic fighting around Heraale village between the
Marehan and Dir clans (see S/2004/115, para. 26) has continued. On 29 February, 12
people were killed and 29 wounded. In mid-March, at least 38 people were killed in
the same village.
28. On 25 April, militia looted a Kenyan-registered aircraft in Baidoa. The aircraft
had been sent to collect elders to attend phase III of the Conference and was held on
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the ground for several hours. Groups of gunmen demanded money from the pilot,
threatened him and looted his personal belongings. The aircraft later departed
following the intervention of RRA officials.
29. On 12 May, following the discovery of a large anti-tank mine on the runway of
the Dinsor airstrip in Bay region, south-west of Baidoa, the United Nations was
forced to suspend all flights into Somalia for a few days. A thorough review of
security measures was undertaken. The airstrip is used by European Commission
Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) aircraft on a regular basis and by United Nations
aircraft occasionally. An ECHO flight had been expected to land at the airstrip on 12
May.
30. In the Belet-Hawa district of Gedo region, some 3,500 people became
internally displaced persons as a result of intra-Marehan clashes for control of the
town on 8 May. Most of the people affected temporarily crossed into the Kenyan
border town of Mandera to seek protection. The fighting has subsided due to the
intervention of clan elders.
31. Tension over the banana trade among the Habr Gedir in Lower Shabbelle has
led to several violent confrontations. In one incident 17 people were killed on
17 March. On 26 April, in Bakool region, WFP staff in the International Medical
Corps were threatened in Isdohorte village by gunmen who insisted that their
children continue to receive the food rations, although they were no longer eligible.
32. A general increase in tension is reported in the Kismaayo area in the Juba
region. The Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) militia fought with the Sheikhal militia in
Haramka area. At least 13 people were reported killed and 29 wounded. A United
Nations Security Officer, Rolf Helmrich (Germany), was kidnapped and held
hostage from 29 January to 7 February and then released unharmed. While reports
indicate large-scale displacement resulting from clashes in February in Buale and
Jilib districts of the Middle Juba region, insecurity has so far prevented a full
assessment of conditions. On 5 March, a Somali staff member working with the
United Nations Polio Eradication Initiative was injured in a shooting incident south
of Buale.
33. Clan fighting in February displaced about 240 families from the west to the
east bank of the Shabelle river, in Belet Weyne in Hiran region. Reports indicate that
some 200 pastoralist families fled to Hiran region from Ethiopia in March as a result
of inter-clan clashes in Zone V in the Somali region of Ethiopia. While their needs
are so far being met by local communities, their presence is placing an undue burden
on the resident population, which is itself poor. The situation continues to be
monitored closely, and potential responses are under consideration. Again,
insecurity could hinder a full response by aid agencies.
34. The problem of crime in Mogadishu has continued unabated. This is in
addition to the occasional inter- and intra-clan fighting that continues to claim lives,
in spite of the efforts of clan elders who try to mediate. Clashes between two
Wa’eysle sub-clans in the Bermuda area on 6 April resulted in the killing of 13
people, with 29 others wounded. Warsangeli and the Waabudan sub-clan (Abgal)
clashes in Mogadishu from 9 to 13 May displaced a large number of people from
north Mogadishu and resulted in about 60 deaths, with over 200 people wounded. At
least half of the casualties were civilians. Later, Abgal clan elders defused the
tension.
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35. On the night of 10 April, a serious fire in the main Bakaara market in
Mogadishu resulted in at least 8 people killed and more than 30 wounded. Armed
looters shot indiscriminately into the crowd. The incident caused widespread
insecurity in the areas surrounding the market.
36. Ordinary Somalis continue to take risks in order to escape conditions in their
country. In April, reports indicated that at least 85 people drowned when two boats,
each carrying over 100 illegal immigrants, collided in the Red Sea off the coast of
Sanaag region. One boat sank completely. Only eight passengers and five crew
members survived. The other boat was damaged but saved by the “Puntland” coast
guard and all 105 passengers survived.
37. On 17 April, Kenyan authorities imposed a ban on the issuance of Kenyan
visas on Somali passports for entry into Kenya. This development has caused
difficulties for the operations of aid organizations as the large number of Somali
nationals who work for international programmes will not be able to travel to
Nairobi, where most coordination activities take place. On 22 April, Kenyan
authorities indicated that visas would be issued to traditional leaders upon arrival so
that they could participate in phase III of the Conference. The retaliatory response of
the “Puntland” authorities on holders of Kenyan passports in late April has also had
a negative impact on aid delivery.
38. In view of deteriorating conditions for aid workers, the security phase in
Western “Somaliland” was raised to phase 4 (Emergency Operations) and to phase 5
(Evacuation) in Kismaayo town and for parts of the western border with Kenya.
Mogadishu remains at phase 5.
39. New security measures designed to enhance the protection of aid workers have
also been adopted. In “Somaliland”, once considered the most secure region, recent
attacks forced the United Nations to lower the number of international staff
deployed. Activities of non-governmental organizations have been curtailed since
mid-March, when most abided by the European Community advisory to withdraw.
These organizations are just beginning to return in small numbers on the advice of
the European Community.
40. In April, a joint donor United Nations/non-governmental organization mission
visited “Somaliland” to initiate a dialogue with the authorities on security concerns.
As a result, additional support will be provided by the European Community to a
Special Protection Unit, comprising “Somaliland” police officers specially trained
by the United Nations Development Programme through its Rule of Law and
Security Programme. This Unit will be dedicated to the protection of aid workers.
41. Strengthened security measures are also being put in place throughout
Somalia, through revised Minimum Operating Security Standards for United
Nations staff. Donor funding is being sought for a dedicated non-governmental
organization Security Officer who will help strengthen the NGO community’s
security preparedness and risk management, in close collaboration with the Office of
the United Nations Security Coordinator. Donor support for increased security
measures is critical in ensuring the continued and smooth functioning of
humanitarian programmes in Somalia.
42. Deterioration in security for international workers since October 2003 in
“Somaliland” and in other parts of Somalia has resulted in the reduction of
international aid agency field presence and the slowing down of programmes.
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Notwithstanding these troubling developments, the United Nations and its partners
continue to implement programmes which are essential in meeting humanitarian and
development needs.
IV. Humanitarian situation
43. Four years of consecutive drought in northern Somalia in late 2003 and into
2004 have caused massive livestock deaths. In some areas up to 80 per cent of the
herds have perished, further impoverishing about 200,000 pastoralist families. At
the same time, food and water prices increased beyond the reach of most
households. As a result, many began cutting trees to sell as charcoal, causing
environmental damage and reducing fodder for camels.
44. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations responded with
short-term interventions. These include: emergency water trucking; food aid and
supplementary feeding; mobile health clinics; and veterinary services and cash
grants until the next Gu rains, which were due in May 2004, and until longer-term
interventions such as cash-for-work projects could be put in place. Those rains
started, albeit sporadically in April 2004, but rainfall has still not been sufficient to
reverse the prolonged effects of the drought, in particular in the lower Nugal and
eastern Sanaag and Sool regions. These areas continue to be in a state of
humanitarian emergency. Thus, immediate humanitarian assistance as well as
ongoing livelihood support remain critical, as funding shortfalls continue to limit
programmes.
45. Overall Deyr cereal production in 2004 was normal compared to the post-war
average. However, harvests were lower by as much as 50 per cent in the Hiran,
Lower Juba and Bakol regions due to the delayed onset and irregular distribution of
rain. Poor crop production, insecurity, economic stress and disease continued to
contribute to high levels of malnutrition of above 15 per cent among the vulnerable
populations in southern Somalia. There is increasing evidence that such high levels
of malnutrition are associated with high mortality rates in Somalia.
46. A nutritional survey is under way to help determine the underlying cause of
vulnerability, design appropriate responses, and set baseline data for future
monitoring. Also of critical concern are the communities in northern Gedo region,
where malnutrition persists in particular in the districts of Luuq, Dolow, Elwak and
Belet-Hawa. The latter areas exhibit the highest incidence of severe malnutrition,
which is caused largely by insecurity, which prevents farmers from harvesting their
crops. Only limited activities continue in this region, as more comprehensive
responses are hampered by persistent insecurity, including attacks on aid workers.
Internally displaced persons in Kismaayo and Mogadishu also continue to suffer
from chronic malnutrition.
47. During the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriated a total of 2,918 Somali refugees
from camps in Djibouti to “Somaliland”, mostly to the Awdal region. Meanwhile,
the demining of the repatriation route from Ethiopia was completed and preparations
were under way to resume voluntary returns from the Aisha camp in May.
48. UNHCR is implementing reintegration projects in Somalia with special focus
on local development activities that generate employment and promote self-reliance
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of returnees. The second priority area for this year is education and the special needs
of girls. A regional initiative, “Together for Girls”, targets Somali girls in refugee
camps in the countries of the region and their return to Somalia. UNHCR aims to
increase girls’ enrolment and retainment in schools as well as community awareness
of the importance of girls’ education.
V. Operational activities in furtherance of peace
49. The newly refurbished and reopened Mandera Police Training Academy in
“Somaliland” has received its second intake of 160 “Somaliland” trainee police
officers who will graduate at the end of July 2004. The Law Review Commission
has begun operating in “Somaliland” and a Human Rights Ombudsman has been
established as well. A legal clinic continues to operate out of the university in
Hargeysa, providing legal assistance to marginalized people in the city.
50. The “Puntland” Police Academy is under construction and basic training has
started for a limited number of police officers in “Puntland” and Jowhar in the
south. The staff of the recently established “Puntland” Mine Action Centre have
been trained and will assist in the landmine impact survey of “Puntland”, which will
take place over the next few months.
51. The Somalia National Reconciliation Conference has identified disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration as one of the six key areas for implementation by
the future transitional federal government (see S/2003/231, para. 28). However, until
recently, support for capacity-building in the area of disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration had largely been through ongoing programmes in support of the
rule of law under implementation by international agencies (Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale
Bijstand (Novib), as well as the United Nations Development Programme) with
emphasis on police and judicial training as well as reintegration and not on
demobilization and disarmament.
52. In recognition of the importance and complexity of the issues involved, the
European Community organized a preliminary discussion on disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration on 23 February in Nairobi among concerned
international donors and agencies. The meeting decided to engage international
expertise to assist in strategic planning, coordination and advice on the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.
53. The United Nations has, in close collaboration with a Somali women’s nongovernmental
organization network (SAACID), assisted in the demobilization of
300 militia, including 75 girls who recently completed a disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programme in Mogadishu. The programme is
currently preparing for the publicized destruction of weapons handed over under its
auspices.
54. Four scholarships for Somali youths to participate in the Real Madrid summer
camp have recently been created by the Spanish soccer team as part of the
celebration of the 2004 International Peace Day. Upon their return to Somalia, they
will become messengers for peace in their respective communities. The selection
process for the four scholarships will involve the first peace cup that is being
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organized by the United Nations country team in cooperation with the local
authorities in “Somaliland” and in the central and southern regions of Somalia.
55. During the first quarter of the year, child protection coordination networks
were established in Bari, Nugal, Mudug, Benadir, Lower Shabelle and Hiran
regions. Their role is to facilitate information sharing and coordination of advocacy
initiatives on behalf of child victims of violence, abuse and exploitation.
Membership is open to all civil society organizations, in particular to relevant
women and youth groups, as well as to representatives of local authorities,
professional groups and international partners. The networks have agreed on their
priorities to include help for street children, efforts towards the total eradication of
female genital mutilation and the protection of internally displaced children.
56. A team of 24 child protection advocates began work in about 40 communities
throughout Somalia in the first quarter of 2004. They have helped to organize
community-based dialogues to mobilize leadership on the issue. Thus far, the level
of involvement by community leaders has varied greatly. Successful efforts include:
access to education for disadvantaged children; commitment from business people to
provide support and care to street children; community action to protect children
against prostitution and exploitative labour; and the commitment of some militia
leaders to support children’s attendance in school.
57. The gross enrolment rate in primary schools is currently only 17 per cent and
basic school infrastructure is in need of major support. The United Nations has a
2003/2004 primary school survey under way, which provides data relating to
primary schooling in Somalia and is used to measure progress and assist in forward
planning for all groups engaged in education work in the country. The Education
Management Information System is also being revised and provides more routine
information on pupils, classes and schools. Together, these tools give a
comprehensive picture of the situation of education throughout Somalia.
58. The Socio-Economic Survey on Somalia (see S/2004/115 and Corr.1, para. 44)
provides the latest national estimates of various demographic, economic and social
statistics. During the current reporting period, regional administrative data was
published for “Somaliland” and compiled for “Puntland”. Statistics were compiled
for selected municipalities, for major ports and for consumer prices and exchange
rates in major urban centres. The first report on Millennium Development Goals for
Somalia is under preparation.
59. The United Nations has recently undertaken a project to improve financial
services based in Somalia and enhance their transparency, accountability and
credibility. It has begun work on a web site for the recently established Somali
Financial Services Association (see S/2004/115, para. 52). The project has trained
two Association board members on microfinance activities in the private sector. The
production of a compliance manual is under way which will form the basis of a
validation workshop with key stakeholders in June 2004.
60. The United Nations country team has compiled the strategic framework for
access to basic services to provide a definition of minimum standards, a clear
unified prioritization of needs and a results-based framework against which to report
progress in addressing access and provision of basic services to communities.
61. The United Nations has distributed crop and legume seeds (46 metric tons) to
7,650 households as part of the crop diversification programme in Bay, Bakool,
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Middle Juba and Gedo regions and sorghum and cowpea seeds (28.5 metric tons) to
1,900 conflict-affected households displaced following inter-clan fighting in Baidoa
district.
62. The United Nations is also procuring vegetable seeds for further distribution
and training in the growing and processing of vegetables for 9,000 households and
women’s groups, in Tayeglo, Hoddur, Wajid, Rabdurre, Baidoa, Dinsor, Qansahdere,
Lugh, Dolo, Sakow and Buále districts. It has also provided locally made farming
hand tools, motor pumps, animal draught equipment and training on animal nutrition
and welfare for approximately 21,000 households in these areas.
63. Somalia was removed from the list of polio-endemic countries in March as a
result of nearly two years without any confirmed cases of the disease in the country.
The next step in the process is obtaining polio-free status for Somalia. United
Nations and partner agencies will continue with regular national immunization days
until the disease is totally eradicated from the country. In addition to ending polio in
Somalia, vaccination campaigns have acted as a vehicle for peace-building for over
eight years, fostering cooperation among communities and achieving access to them.
United Nations agencies continue to work closely with traditional leaders, who have
been a major force behind the eradication programme, actively participating in
immunization campaigns.
64. The first comprehensive HIV/AIDS knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and practice
survey has been completed in 21 districts in Somalia. The study was undertaken to
assess the levels of knowledge among men and women aged 15 to 49 and to identify
attitudes and practices related to HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.
The study will provide inputs into subsequent policy design and programming on
HIV/AIDS for all partners. The results will also be linked to the ongoing HIV
surveillance system recently established by the World Health Organization (WHO).
VI. Observations
65. The outcome of the two recent IGAD Ministerial Facilitation Committee
meetings held in Nairobi demonstrated a renewed cohesiveness among the IGAD
Foreign Ministers on the issue of national reconciliation in Somalia. Their stated
resolve (see paras. 13-16 above) was welcomed by the international community. It is
my sincere hope that the initiative can help the Somalia National Reconciliation
Conference, which has suffered a serious impasse for several months, to conclude
with an accepted outcome.
66. A coherent regional approach is essential if the Facilitation Committee is to
provide political leadership during the proceedings of phase III and the finalization
of the Conference. Moreover, the two-month time frame, given by the IGAD
Ministers to conclude the Conference, places extraordinary pressure on the Somali
parties and the region. Somali leaders have until the end of July to reach agreement
on several contentious issues and form an inclusive transitional federal government
for Somalia. It is incumbent upon them to demonstrate the necessary political will
and make difficult decisions.
67. I would also like to reiterate the important role that the international observers
continue to play in support of the IGAD initiative and the laudable efforts of the
Government of Kenya. Once again, I commend the European Union for its financial
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assistance and political support for the Conference. The African Union and the
League of Arab States have made an important contribution in supporting peace and
national reconciliation in Somalia. I ask for their continued active engagement with
the Conference.
68. The international community, including the United Nations, must stand ready
to support these efforts as well as the subsequent efforts to implement the agreement
to be reached on the ground. For over a decade, Somalia has experienced a near total
lack of governance structures, especially at the national level. In large parts of the
country, politicians, businessmen and faction leaders have charted out armed control
over their fiefdoms. They continue to demonstrate a lack of vision and political will
to positively dialogue for peace in order to enhance national reconciliation and
development, and this could make the task of assisting in the implementation of any
agreement in Somalia particularly challenging.
69. While it is clear that the ultimate responsibility for peace in Somalia rests
squarely on the shoulders of all Somalis, in particular their leaders, it is at the same
time incumbent on the international community to rediscover the way to engage
Somalia. I would like to urge IGAD, the African Union, the League of Arab States,
the European Union and the Security Council to consider what additional measures
could be taken in support of peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. The active
engagement of the Security Council and the putting in place of the Arms Embargo
Monitoring Group could provide the much-needed impetus in this regard. The
international community will also need to encourage the recent signs of
harmonization of the divergent positions in the subregion vis-à-vis Somalia if the
peace process in Somalia is to enjoy the maximum chances of success.
70. Violence and armed conflict, as well as natural disasters, continue to
exacerbate already significant vulnerabilities in Somalia, which has some of the
lowest human development indicators in the world. While access is severely
constrained to allow for comprehensive humanitarian responses in some areas, aid
agencies have been responding to various humanitarian crises in fluid security
environments, provided they have the resources to do so.
71. Somalis, in spite of their difficulties and constraints, have shown tremendous
resourcefulness in overcoming some of the difficulties created by the absence of a
central government and governance structures, and the relative lack of international
support. They have created an informal banking system, initiated university
programmes and established education facilities, and built a modern
communications system. Improved humanitarian and development funding, in
particular to increase access to basic social services and to strengthen civil society
and the rule of law, would contribute a great deal to the efforts to build peace and
promote reconciliation within and between communities.
72. The currently revised Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia for 2004
calls for $119 million, of which available resources amount to only $27,878,685 (23
per cent), leaving unmet requirements at $91,247,614. I call on donors not only to
contribute generously to the appeal, but also to do so without delay so as to allow
the effective implementation of a full, coherent and balanced humanitarian and
peace-building programme.
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73. In conclusion, I would like to commend the efforts of my Representative for
Somalia, the staff of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, and the United
Nations country team as well as the many non-governmental organizations active in
the country for their humanitarian activities and contribution to the international
effort to help promote and support national reconciliation and peace in Somalia.
Annex 89
Information note by Turkey, concerning its objection to the Agreement between the Republic
of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic
Zone, 17 February 2003, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 54, Division for Ocean Affairs and the
Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, 2004, p. 127
- 127 -
B. Communications by States
1. Information note by Turkey, concerning its objection to the Agreement
between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation
of the Exclusive Economic Zone,
17 February 2003 1
The Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations and has the honor to submit an information note, concerning the objection of Turkey to the
agreement signed between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus on
17 February 2003 with regard to the "Delimitation of the Exclusive Zone”.
The Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations kindly requests the present text and its annex be
published in the next Law of the Sea Bulletin.
The Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.
New York, 2 March 2004
ANNEX
The agreement signed between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern
Cyprus on 17 February 2003 concerning the "Delimitation of the Exclusive Zone” has recently been published in the
Law of the Sea Bulletin Vol. 52, page 45.
It is understood from the content of the said agreement that the above-mentioned Parties delimit the EEZ
through a line defined by 8 geographical coordinates in the high seas of the Mediterranean.
Following a thorough examination of the said agreement, the Republic of Turkey has reached the view that the
delimitation of the EEZ or the continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially in areas falling beyond the
western part of the longitude 32º l6’l8”, also concerns Turkey’s existing ipso facto and ab initio legal and sovereign
rights, emanating from the established principles of international law.
It is the considered opinion of the Republic of Turkey that the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf
beyond the western parts of the 1ongitude 32º16’18” should be effected by agreement between the related states at
the region based on the principle of equity.
The Republic of Turkey, for the above stated legal reasons which arise from the established principles of
international law, does not recognize the said agreement and reserves all its legal rights related to the delimitation of
the maritime areas including the seabed and subsoil and the superjacent waters in the west of the longitude
32º 16’18”.
Finally, the Republic of Turkey wishes to reiterate that there is no single authority which in law or in fact is
competent to represent jointly the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, consequently Cyprus as a whole.
1 Note No. 2004/Turkuno DT/4739 dated 2 March 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations.
Annex 90
Yearbook of the United Nations, 2004, Volume 58, Department of Public Information,
United Nations, New York, pp. 256-7
Yearbook of the United Nations, 2004
Volume 58 Sales No. E.06.I.1
Prepared by the Yearbook Section of the Department of Public Information,
United Nations, New York. Although the Yearbook is based on official
sources, it is not an official record.
Acting Chief Editor: Elizabeth Baldwin-Penn
Senior Editors: Peter Jackson, Federigo Magherini, Jullyette Ukabiala
Editors/Writers: Lawri Moore, John R. Sebesta
Contributing Editors: Kathryn Gordon, Melody C. Pfeiffer, JuanitaB. Phelan
Contributing Writers: Luisa Balacco, Maria Carlino, Franck Carrère-
Bencimon, Ryan Daniel Kolb, Oguljeren Niyazberdiyeva, Dizery Salim
Copy Editors: Donna Culpepper, Alison M. Koppelman
Senior Typesetter: Sunita Chabra
Researcher: Rodney Pascual
Editorial Assistants: Carmelita Aquilizan, Jingbo Huang, Margaret
O’Donnell
Indexer: David Golante
Jacket design by Felicity Yost
tions to exercise pressure on the parties to ensure
full compliance with its resolutions.
Further political progress
The Secretary-General, in a 31 December
press statement [SG/SM/9661-AFR/1086], welcomed
the initialling that day by the Government of the
Sudan and SPLA of the last two agreements of the
north-south peace process: the Agreement on the
Implementation Modalities of the Protocols and
Agreements, and the Agreement on the Permanent
Ceasefire and Security Agreements Implementation
Modalities, which constituted integral
parts of a comprehensive peace agreement and
marked the parties’ commitment to end more
than two decades of civil war. The Secretary-
General looked forward to the official signing of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January
2005, ushering in a new era of peace in the Sudan,
in which the United Nations was prepared
to play a significant role.
Eritrea-Sudan
On 4 and 22 January, the Sudan accused
Eritrea of inciting, supporting and training
groups of outlaws in the Darfur region of the
country as part of its attempts to destabilize the
Sudan and the ongoing peace process [A/58/669-
S/2004/14]. It also said that, according to news reports,
an outlawgroup in eastern Sudan, the Beja
Congress, had forged an alliance with the outlaw
groups in the Darfur region, with support from
Eritrea [A/58/693-S/2004/66]. Eritrea, on 22 January
[S/2004/63], rejected those claims as attempts
to isolate Eritrea and to divert Sudanese public
attention from the country’s domestic problems.
On 10 August [S/2004/638], the Sudan again informed
the Security Council of what it called
Eritrea’s continuing hostility towards the Sudan
and its involvement in the conflict in Darfur.
Somalia
In 2004, progress was made in the national reconciliation
process of Somalia, which was based
on the outcome of the 2002 Eldoret (Kenya) Conference,
held under the auspices of IGAD, and
which led to the signing of the Declaration on
Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and
Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation
Process (the Eldoret Declaration) [YUN 2002,
p. 202]. That Declaration was signed in December
2002 by five Mogadishu faction leaders and the
Transitional National Government (TNG), established
by the Arta (Djibouti) Conference in 2000
[YUN 2000, p. 215]. It set up a national reconciliation
process, aimed at bringing the factions into
agreement on a national government. Some progress
was made in 2003 in five of the six reconciliation
committees of the process, and agreement
was reached by participating Somali leaders at a
conference in September 2003 on a transitional
federal government [YUN 2003, p. 248]. However,
the TNG President and some faction leaders rejected
the document and opposed the proposed
federal system. During the negotiations on
reconciliation, Somaliland, in the northwest,
remained outside the process.
The first sign of progress in 2004 was the signing
by Somali leaders, on 29 January, of a declaration
on agreement of issues related to the transitional
federal government. That meeting was
part of the ongoing IGAD-sponsored Somali
National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya,
which aimed to establish a viable transitional government.
In mid-2004, IGAD held a series of Ministerial
Facilitation Committee meetings on the
Conference and launched its third and final
phase, which led to the establishment of the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.
The Security Council, in July, welcomed the AU’s
decision to dispatch a reconnaissance mission
to prepare for deploying military monitors to
Somalia.
The Conference, meeting in Kenya and attended
by representatives of the numerous factions
and clans of Somalia, with the notable exception
of Somaliland, agreed to form the
Transitional Federal Parliament, with members
selected by the factions at the Conference. That
body elected the Speaker of Parliament and the
Transitional President, important steps towards
the re-establishment of stability. The peace process
produced a power-sharing arrangement for
a transitional period of five years. The inclusive
peace process involved all clans and most major
faction leaders. At the same time, fighting inside
Somalia continued.
The United Nations Political Office for Somalia
(UNPOS), led by the Secretary-General’s Special
Representative, Winston A. Tubman (Liberia),
remained involved in the peace process and
humanitarian efforts, and continued to operate
from Nairobi.
The Secretary-General, in response to a 2003
Council request, established aMonitoring Group
of four experts to investigate violations of the
arms embargo against Somalia, and to provide a
draft list of the individuals continuing to violate
it. The Group reported to the Council in August
that weapons and ammunition continued to flow
into, through and out of Somalia, in contravention
of the embargo; and that to fully investigate
violations, it required more time than specified
in its mandate. Therefore, the Council called for
the re-establishment of the Group, for a period of
256 Political and security questions
six months, to continue its functions and to
update the draft list.
The economic and social situation in Somalia
continued to suffer as a result of the chronic warfare
and drought. At times, UN activities had to
be curtailed due to insecurity in various parts of
the country. The General Assembly, in resolution
59/218(see p. 913), noted the urgent need for humanitarian
and reconstruction assistance and
urged the international community to respond
accordingly. In related action, the Executive
Board of UNDP and the United Nations Population
Fund, in decision 2004/35 (see p. 879), endorsed
UNDP’s approach in promoting security
by reducing poverty and encouraging good governance.
The Board authorized the UNDP Administrator
to approve projects consistent with
the strategic approach of promoting peace and
security on a case-by-case basis.
National reconciliation process
and security situation
Report of Secretary-General (February). The
Secretary-General, in a 12 February report on the
situation in Somalia [S/2004/115 & Corr.1], submitted
in response to the Security Council’s request
in the President’s statement S/PRST/
2001/30 [YUN 2001, p. 210], described developments
since his previous report in October 2002 [YUN
2003, p. 248].
He reported that, on 29 January, at the Somali
Leaders’ Consultation Meeting (Nairobi), organized
by IGAD under the chairmanship of the President
of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, and the President
of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, participating
Somali leaders signed a document entitled “Declaration
on the Harmonization of Various Issues
Proposed by the Somali Delegates at the Somali
Consultative Meetings from 9 to 29 January
2004”. The Declaration consisted of proposed
amendments to the transitional federal charter
adopted on 15 September 2003 [YUN 2003, p. 248].
The leaders decided that the charter would be
called the transitional federal charter of the Somali
republic, and the government, the transitional
federal government, whose term would
last for five years. The transitional federal parliament
would consist of 275 members, 12 per cent
of whom would be women. A national census
would be undertaken during the drafting of a
new constitution, which would be approved by an
internationally supervised national referendum.
A controversy subsequently arose, however, over
the method for selecting members of parliament.
The security situation at the beginning of 2004
remained serious in many Somali regions and
affected humanitarian aid delivery. In the north,
Somaliland and Puntland gave assurances of
safe access to the contested areas of the Sool and
Sanaag regions. Intense inter-clan fighting occurred
in the central region, forcing 9,000 people
to flee to surrounding towns and preventing adequate
intervention. In southern and central Somalia,
violence and armed conflict continued to
hamper access and humanitarian programming.
The Secretary-General commented that the
agreement at the leaders’ consultation marked a
breakthrough that could lead to further progress
at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference,
which had been stalled for some time. The
next and final phase of the reconciliation process
would involve the selection of members of the
transitional national parliament, whowould elect
a president to lead the country during the transitional
period. The Secretary-General stressed
that progress in the political arena should be accompanied
by efforts by the Somali leaders to improve
the security situation on the ground so as to
make it conducive to the implementation of a political
agreement, thereby according credibility to
the agreement.
Communications. On 30 January, the AU [S/
2004/88] and the EU [S/2004/112] welcomed the
signing of the Declaration. The AU Central Organ
of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution called on the Somali
factions and leaders to continue to uphold
the spirit of the 2002 Eldoret Declaration and to
refrain from action that would jeopardize the Somali
reconciliation process at Mbagathi, Kenya,
which was approaching conclusion. It called on
the authorities of Puntland and Somaliland to
desist from resorting to military means to resolve
their territorial dispute in the provinces of Sool
and Sanaag. The statement released by the EU
Presidency reiterated EU support to the IGADsponsored
national reconciliation process, to
which there was no alternative for the restoration
of effective government, peace and stability in
Somalia.
SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (February)
On 25 February [meeting 4915], following consultations
among Security Council members, the
President made statement S/PRST/2004/3 on
behalf of the Council:
The Security Council, recalling its previous decisions
concerning the situation in Somalia, in particular
the statement by its President of 11 November
2003 and welcoming the report of the Secretary-
General of 12 February 2004, reaffirms its commitment
to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of
the situation in Somalia and its respect for the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, political independence
and unity of the country, consistent with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.
Africa 257
Annex 91
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia,
S/2005/642, 11 October 2005
United Nations S/2005/642
Security Council Distr.: General
11 October 2005
Original: English
05-54415 (E) 181005
*0554415*
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of
the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30), in which the Council
requested me to submit reports on a quarterly basis on the situation in Somalia. The
report covers developments since my previous report, of 16 June 2005 (S/2005/392).
The main focus of the report is on the efforts undertaken by the international
community and, in particular, by my Special Representative, to foster inclusive
dialogue among the leaders of the Somali transitional federal institutions. The report
also provides an update on the security situation and the humanitarian and
development activities of United Nations programmes and agencies in Somalia.
II. Situation within the transitional federal institutions
2. There has been no progress in ameliorating the contention between leaders of
the transitional federal institutions on four broad issues: the relocation of the
transitional federal institutions, a national security and stabilization plan, national
reconciliation and the peace support mission envisaged by the African Union
(AU)/Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Tensions between
President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi, based
in Jawhar, on the one hand, and the Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh
Adan, and ministers based in Mogadishu on the other, have been exacerbated during
the period under review. My Special Representative for Somalia, François Lonseny
Fall, has spared no effort to convince the three leaders to reach the necessary
agreements through dialogue so that the transitional federal institutions could begin
to function effectively. While they have stated their readiness to do so, they have
reneged on a face-to-face meeting thus far (see paras. 8-19 below).
3. On 12 June 2005, President Yusuf attended a meeting of some members of
Parliament in Nairobi under the chairmanship of the First Deputy Speaker,
Mohamed Omar Dhalha, and announced a two-month recess of Parliament.
However, the Speaker, who was not at the meeting, questioned the legitimacy of the
meeting and the President’s authority to declare a parliamentary recess.
4. It will be recalled that some members of the Transitional Federal Parliament
began to return to Somalia in March and April 2005 (see S/2005/329, para. 6).
Relocation of the transitional federal institutions began in the middle of June,
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following a farewell ceremony in Nairobi presided over by President Mwai Kibaki
of Kenya.
5. A few days later, the Government of Yemen tried to mediate between the
President and the Speaker, who were both visiting Sana’a. However, the two leaders
failed to reconcile their differences. In the meantime, Prime Minister Gedi, who
arrived in Jawhar on 18 June accompanied by several ministers and members of
Parliament, has since set up his administration in that town. Other ministers and
parliamentarians relocated to their home localities.
6. Despite the fact that the Prime Minister and the Speaker were both in Djibouti
in late June, there was no dialogue between them. Upon their return to Jawhar and
Mogadishu, respectively, both leaders celebrated, separately, the Somali national
day on 1 July. The following day, the Speaker held a meeting with members of
Parliament in Mogadishu. A formal session of Parliament could not be held owing to
the lack of a quorum.
7. President Yusuf arrived in Boosaaso in “Puntland” on 3 July and on 9 July, met
in Gaalkacyo with a delegation of Ministers and officials led by the Prime Minister.
Since President Yusuf’s arrival in Jawhar on 26 July, the President and Prime
Minister have been using that city as a de facto temporary seat of the Transitional
Federal Government.
8. On the basis of the statement by the President of the Security Council of
14 July 2005 (S/PRST/2005/32), I instructed my Special Representative to intensify
his contacts with the leadership of the transitional federal institutions with a view to
fostering an inclusive dialogue. On 1 August, he visited Jawhar and presented
President Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi with a proposal for a road map for
dialogue. The road map would address the key issues of (a) an agreement on the
safe relocation of the transitional federal institutions; (b) a national security and
stabilization plan; (c) modalities for the deployment of an AU/IGAD peace support
mission; and (d) national reconciliation.
9. My Special Representative also handed over to the leaders a sequencing chart
that had been prepared by representatives of IGAD, AU and the European Union
(EU). The chart proposed that, following the successful conclusion of the dialogue,
the Council of Ministers and a full session of the Parliament should be called with a
view to establishing a national security commission. This proposed commission
would draw up the modalities for the deployment of a peace support mission. Prime
Minister Gedi informed my Special Representative that his Government was already
working on the issues outlined in the road map, especially national security.
10. On 3 August, my Special Representative visited Mogadishu, where he held
discussions with the Speaker, ministers and members of Parliament who had
relocated to the capital and presented them with a copy of the road map and the
sequencing chart. The leaders welcomed the statement by the President of the
Security Council of 14 July 2005 and expressed support for my Special
Representative’s initiative. However, they also used the occasion to voice their
concerns that President Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi might resort to an armed
confrontation with them. While committing themselves to dialogue, they
emphasized that the agenda, venue and composition of delegations for the talks had
to be agreed to in advance.
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11. Since early August, President Yusuf, Prime Minister Gedi, the Speaker and the
Mogadishu-based leaders have taken unilateral actions, none of which have
contributed to the resolution of the differences between them.
12. On 8 August, Prime Minister Gedi announced the composition of committees
on national security, economic affairs and social affairs. Although the National
Security Committee included the Minister for National Security, Mohamed Kanyare
Afrah, one of the Ministers based in Mogadishu, the latter refused to recognize the
right of the Transitional Federal Government to establish such committees without
consultations, as stipulated in the Transitional Federal Charter.
13. On 13 August, some members of Parliament met in Mogadishu under the
chairmanship of the Speaker. In a statement, they announced the establishment of a
59-member committee to restore peace and stability in Mogadishu. They also
summoned all members of Parliament to Mogadishu to participate, on 27 August, in
the establishment of parliamentary subcommittees. This meeting did not take place,
however.
14. On 27 August, Prime Minister Gedi announced to reporters that the
Government would start offering oil, gas and mineral concessions to foreign firms in
the near future. He called upon foreign companies to avoid dealings with any
authorities other than the Transitional Federal Government.
15. Hussein Aidid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, returned to
Mogadishu on 14 August after an absence of over four years. He announced that he
would try to help efforts to reconcile differences within the transitional federal
institutions. Before returning to Mogadishu, he called on my Special Representative,
who encouraged him to use all possible means to foster dialogue within the
transitional federal institutions.
16. In a joint effort, my Special Representative and the Minister for Regional
Cooperation and East African Affairs of Kenya secured the agreement of both the
Prime Minister and the Speaker to attend a meeting on 19 August in Nairobi.
However, the Speaker later informed my Special Representative that he would not
attend because the Prime Minister’s statement said that he would meet the Speaker
only if the latter was ready to cooperate with his Government. Prime Minister Gedi
announced at a press conference on the same day that his Government was open for
dialogue within the transitional federal institutions.
17. On his part, the Speaker gave an undertaking to my Special Representative not
to use any meeting of members of Parliament in Mogadishu to undermine the
prospects for dialogue within the transitional federal institutions. In a meeting with
members of the international community on 26 August, he reiterated his willingness
to enter into dialogue within the framework of the transitional federal institutions
and stressed the need to respect the Transitional Federal Charter.
18. On 13 September, Prime Minister Gedi addressed a letter to ministers of the
Transitional Federal Government, informing them of his intention, after
consultations, to begin holding meetings of the Council of Ministers in Mogadishu.
My Special Representative immediately welcomed the initiative and expressed the
hope that the meetings would be preceded by consultations and followed by a full
session of Parliament, in accordance with the Transitional Federal Charter.
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19. The Presidency of the EU issued a statement on 19 September in support of
Prime Minister Gedi’s initiative. EU urged the Mogadishu-based ministers to
respond positively as it was an important step towards resolving outstanding issues
and called upon all parties to refrain from making military preparations and
inflammatory statements and to commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of
their differences through inclusive dialogue. EU stressed that the creation of any
national Somali military force should take place in the framework of a national
security and stabilization plan and in line with the statement by the President of the
Security Council of 14 July 2005. EU also expressed support for my Special
Representative’s statement of 8 September underlining that there could be no
military solution to the problems facing the transitional federal institutions.
III. Activities of the United Nations and the international
community
20. Representatives of the international community in Nairobi continued to meet
almost every week throughout the reporting period in support of the initiative of my
Special Representative to foster inclusive dialogue within the framework of the
transitional federal institutions.
21. At its twenty-fifth meeting, held on 12 June, the IGAD Council of Ministers
reviewed the relocation of the transitional federal institutions to Somalia and
reinstated the IGAD Facilitation Committee on Somalia. My Special Representative
briefed the Ministers and emphasized the need for dialogue within the transitional
federal institutions.
22. Following the visits of my Special Representative to Mogadishu and Jawhar on
1 and 3 August, respectively, a delegation from the European Commission also
visited both cities and urged the two sides to begin a meaningful dialogue.
Delegations from the Government of Kenya, AU and the donor community also
visited Jawhar on 4 August, where a meeting of the Joint Planning Committee was
held with the Transitional Federal Government.
23. Since his arrival in Nairobi on 27 May 2005, my Special Representative has
impressed upon leaders in the subregion and others the need to have a coordinated
approach towards Somali leaders and to urge them to engage in dialogue and refrain
from military action for the resolution of the differences within the transitional
federal institutions. On 10 June, he met in Kampala with President Yoweri
Museveni of Uganda, and on 29 June he held talks with President Ismail Omar
Guelleh of Djibouti and the Executive Secretary of IGAD in Djibouti.
24. On 24 June, he travelled to Addis Ababa, where he had discussions with State
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tekeda Alemu, AU Chairman Alpha Oumar Konaré
and AU Peace and Security Commissioner, Said Djinnit. He returned to Addis
Ababa on 29 August for meetings with Chairman Konaré and the Prime Minister of
Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi. He emphasized the need to foster dialogue within the
transitional federal institutions and encouraged his interlocutors to use their
influence towards that end.
25. On 27 August, my Special Representative visited Cairo, at the invitation of the
Government of Egypt, and held talks with Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit and
the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Amre Moussa. He briefed his
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interlocutors on developments in Somalia and on his initiative to foster an inclusive
dialogue. Foreign Minister Gheit informed my Special Representative of his
Government’s readiness to undertake an initiative in support of dialogue within the
transitional federal institutions.
26. Subsequent to his travels in the subregion, my Special Representative decided
to enlist the support of European Governments to encourage dialogue within the
transitional federal institutions, and engage them in the need for the international
community to speak with one voice on this issue. He held talks with officials of
Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in
London and Stockholm, and with EU officials in Brussels. My Special
Representative stressed the need for a functional parliament as essential for the
legitimacy of the Transitional Federal Government.
27. On 29 August, Prime Minister Gedi met with the Heads of Mission of EU
countries in Nairobi and informed them of his proposal to resolve the differences
within the transitional federal institutions at three levels: the leadership (President,
Prime Minister and Speaker); the Cabinet (Ministers); and Parliament. The Heads of
Mission took the opportunity to reaffirm their support for my Special
Representative’s initiative and the statement of the President of the Security Council
of 14 July. They welcomed the Prime Minister’s intention to resolve the differences
within the transitional federal institutions and emphasized that if the transitional
federal institutions were able to resolve their differences through dialogue, more
financial assistance would be forthcoming from their countries.
28. Six projects will be funded for implementation during 2005 and 2006 under
the United Nations Trust Fund for Peacebuilding in Somalia. They include two
projects each in support of (a) reconciliation: the establishment of a national
reconciliation commission and dialogues for peace and reconciliation between
different regions of Somalia; (b) rule of law and state-building: reconstitution and
re-activation of the judiciary system and a seminar on federalism and constitutional
affairs; and (c) security and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration: the
establishment of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission and
the setting up of youth service centres for skills development and employment
creation in Mogadishu, “Puntland” and “Somaliland”.
29. On 5 September, Kenya and Somalia signed an agreement on technical and
economic cooperation, covering the education, health and security sectors. The
agreement was signed in Nairobi by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in
the presence of Prime Minister Gedi. On 7 September, AU announced the opening
of its liaison office in Jawhar, through which it would channel its support to
Somalia.
IV. Developments inside Somalia
30. In an interview with the BBC on 6 July, President Yusuf announced the
creation of a Somali national army to be assembled from various regions of
Somalia. Soon thereafter, he said that he had begun to raise a new army. The
announcement raised concerns among the leaders based in Mogadishu, prompting
some of them to threaten pre-emptive attacks against Jawhar if President Yusuf and
his supporters marched on the capital.
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31. On 10 August, President Yusuf flew from Jawhar to Gode and Mustahil in the
Somali-inhabited Region 5 of Ethiopia, with the stated purpose of promoting local
reconciliation between ethnic Somali clans living in the border region. However,
some leaders in Mogadishu accused the President of going to Ethiopian territory to
acquire weapons and troops for his future activities in Somalia. President Yusuf
refuted this accusation as baseless.
32. In early September, troops loyal to President Yusuf arrived in Jawhar. The
Mogadishu-based leaders, in response, also deployed troops from Mogadishu in the
direction of Jawhar. In a press release issued on 7 September on behalf of the
Mogadishu-based leaders, the troop movements in Jawhar were portrayed as
creating a “state of war”. The press release further warned all humanitarian agencies
and diplomats currently in Jawhar to suspend their presence in the area and
cautioned all aircraft to cease landing in Jawhar. On 8 September, the United
Nations relocated its international humanitarian personnel out of Jawhar as a
precautionary measure (see para. 46 below), a move criticized by President Yusuf.
33. Meanwhile, on 26 June, in “Somaliland”, speaking on the occasion of its fortyfifth
anniversary of independence from the United Kingdom, “President” Dahir
Riyale Kahin expressed optimism for “Somaliland” gaining international
recognition. He also reaffirmed his intention to hold parliamentary elections in mid-
September, as planned. On 10 August, in a presidential decree, he postponed the
parliamentary elections by two weeks, to 29 September, at the request of the
“Somaliland” electoral commission.
34. In preparation for that election, print and broadcast editors in “Somaliland”
drafted a new code of conduct to guide their coverage of the upcoming elections.
The new code calls for the news media to adhere to impartial reporting of the
election.
V. The role of women’s groups
35. There are many women’s advocacy groups and non-governmental
organizations across Somalia, although it is difficult to estimate the exact number in
the absence of a systematic national registration system. In the absence of an
effective central government, these groups play a vital role in providing basic social
services and literacy and vocational training to Somalis. Most of the funding for
their programmes comes from United Nations agencies and non-governmental
organizations. There are some key women’s umbrella organizations with which the
United Nations works on a regular basis. They include: Negaad, in north-western
Somalia; We are Women Activists in north-eastern Somalia; Coalition of Grassroots
Women’s Organizations; Women’s Development Organization and Save
Somali Women and Children in southern and central Somalia.
36. Women’s groups, by and large, have not formed, as yet, an effective political
organization to further their rights and issues. This is a by-product of the political
bargaining at the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference based largely on the
power of militia leaders and their clan associations. Their role is further hampered
by the current political paralysis within the transitional federal institutions and the
lack of sufficient funds available to the Transitional Federal Government to support
their activities.
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37. There are 23 women members of Parliament. The Association of West
European Parliamentarians for Africa conducted a workshop for them in 2004 in
parliamentary conduct and procedures and on their role and responsibilities as
members of Parliament. Nevertheless, the effective realization of their potential
political role is being undermined by the continuing differences within the
transitional federal institutions.
38. Women’s groups, along with other civil society and business groups, have
played a prominent role in initiating and supporting pre-disarmament encampments
in Mogadishu. They have also been successful in convincing militia leaders in both
Mogadishu and Kismayo to dismantle a large number of checkpoints and improve
the security environment in those cities to some degree.
39. Progress has also been made in “Somaliland”, where the Ministry of Social
and Family Affairs is functioning and has been funded by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), to develop a gender action plan. The Ministry of
Women and Family Affairs in “Puntland” has been given similar funding by the
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and it has also developed
a gender action plan. Furthermore, the staff are being trained on issues related to
human rights and HIV/AIDS.
40. United Nations agencies and partners have developed a gender-based violence
and psychosocial counselling training manual and conducted trainings in Hargeysa
and Boosaaso for participants from settlements for internally displaced persons in
Hargeysa and representatives of women’s organizations from “Puntland”,
“Somaliland” and south Somalia. This activity was undertaken in collaboration with
Negaad. Participants have now provided psychosocial support and HIV/AIDS
training to over 592 women in internally displaced persons camps.
41. The United Nations also provided training for the Women’s Media Association
to enable them to generate public awareness on human rights and HIV/AIDS.
Women’s organizations are now collecting and disseminating information on
violations of women’s human rights. They are also lobbying with the authorities to
establish mechanisms for the protection of the rights of women living with
HIV/AIDS, as such individuals are stigmatized and isolated by their families and
communities. The United Nations has also provided training in media and
information communication technology to women journalists and human rights
workers in Mogadishu, “Puntland” and “Somaliland”.
VI. Security
42. Insecurity remains a significant problem for aid agencies in much of the
country. There has been a number of reports of military preparations, activities and
movements that are being linked with the continuing differences within the
transitional federal institutions. According to reports, the United Nations arms
embargo continues to be violated, and the inflow of weapons into the country has
increased. In addition, particularly in the central and southern parts of Somalia,
tensions and clashes between and within clans, mostly over water, grazing, and land
disputes, result in death and injury and make humanitarian access difficult.
43. Mogadishu continues to remain insecure in spite of unprecedented efforts to
take militiamen off its streets. At least two camps have been set up in the capital
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which are housing over 2,000 militiamen from various clans inside the city. In
addition, over 100 “technicals”, or battlewagons, have been cantoned, as part of a
pre-disarmament effort. This has been carried out under pressure from the business
community and civil society, in particular women’s groups, and it is they who have
largely borne the costs of this process. Substantial financial resources from the
Hawiye diaspora have assisted in this process, but it is unlikely that the assistance in
support of encampment efforts can be sustained over a long period of time. In
addition, after considerable pressure from civil society, several checkpoints in the
city have been dismantled. In spite of such efforts, there are still concerns about
security in Mogadishu, with the presence of several factional militias as well as
those which are either freelance or associated with businessmen and the sharia
courts. The presence of extremist elements and their alleged activities have also
been a matter of concern. The reporting period has seen a number of killings and
politically-linked assassinations in Mogadishu.
44. On 5 June, a Somali reporter, Duniya Muhyadin Nur, working for the Horn
Afrik Radio station in Mogadishu, was killed at a checkpoint in Mogadishu by a
militiaman while she was trying to cover protests by a group of transporters against
checkpoints in the city. In the early morning of 11 July, unknown gunmen broke into
the house of Abdul Qadir Yahya, a long-standing peace activist and a senior member
of the Center for Research and Dialogue, and assassinated him. A day later, the head
of the militias of one of the sharia courts was killed in an ambush. On 30 July, three
assassinations were reported in Mogadishu, including a former Colonel in the police
intelligence and an imam of a mosque. On 31 August, unknown gunmen
assassinated Daqare Omar Jess, the brother of Ahmed Omar Jess, a prominent
faction leader.
45. After the arrival of troops loyal to President Yusuf and their deployment just
south of Jawhar, in early September reports followed that the Commerce Minister,
Muse Sudi Yallahow, had sent a number of “technicals” to strengthen his forces in
Balad, south of Jawhar. There are also reports that Adam Hashi Ayro, a commander
who was recently appointed head of the sharia courts militia in Mogadishu, sent a
number of his “technicals” to an unspecified location west of Jawhar.
46. Following the developments cited in paragraph 32, all international United
Nations staff based in Jawhar were relocated safely out of the city on 8 September.
Seven were flown to Nairobi while another six were relocated to Wajid. National
staff continued to come to work until 12 September, when Mohamed-Dhere, the
Governor of the Middle Shabele region and the faction leader controlling Jawhar,
ordered the effective shut-down of the offices of the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) in Jawhar. On 10 September, a clash between his militia and unidentified
gunmen left two people dead in Mir Taqwo, north of Jawhar. This was connected to
the faction leader’s attempts to assert his authority in the region and levy taxes.
47. The security situation in Kismayo has improved during the period under
review. According to reports, checkpoints have been dismantled under pressure from
civil society. In addition, a broader agreement among the clans in Kismayo and the
Juba Valley is apparently being sought to enhance security in the region. In this
regard, a reconciliation effort was launched in Brava between Mogadishu and
Kismayo in early September, involving Barre Hirale, other leaders of the Juba
Valley Alliance led by Yusuf Mire Serar and representatives of the Mogadishu-based
faction leader, Indha-aade, and those of General Mohamed Hersi “Morgan”. The
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aim of the effort was to improve security in the region, strengthen the Juba Valley
Alliance and reconcile General “Morgan” and the Alliance, who have been fighting
over territories in the Juba Valley for a number of years.
48. On 21 July, fighting erupted in Gaalkacyo in the ongoing dispute between two
sub-sub-clans of the Omar Mahamud sub-clan of the Majerteen. Although the
fighting subsided, there were unconfirmed reports of several casualties.
49. On 7 September, Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, the faction leader controlling
Baidoa, reportedly reached an understanding with his rival, Mohamed Nur
Shattigudud, who also holds the portfolio of Minister of Agriculture, to resolve their
differences peacefully. The understanding was apparently brokered by Digil-Mirifle
clan elders who were concerned that the differences between the two leaders were
causing serious rifts within the clan.
50. Inter- and intra-clan fighting has accounted for much of the violence in central
and southern Somalia during the reporting period. In the Hiraan region in central
Somalia, heavy fighting on 7 and 8 June, between the Galje’el and Jajele sub-clans
of Hawiye over land and water on the western side of Beletweyne led to the reported
deaths of 36 people and injuries to 70 people. In the Bakool region, also in central
Somalia, clashes on 10 and 11 June between militiamen from the Hadamo and
Ogaden clans in the El-Barde area resulted in at least 4 deaths and injuries to 10
people. On 15 June, at least 16 people were killed and 20 others injured in fighting
between rival militias over land and pasture rights in the same area. During the
week of 19 to 26 June in the Bay region, about 10 persons were killed and 9 others
were wounded in fighting between the Digil-Mirifle sub-clans in the area, including
the Leysan, Luway and Yantar. The fighting was related mainly to land and water
disputes. On 13 August, fighting took place in Idale between the Yantar and Huber
sub-clans of the Digil-Mirifle over control of the village and water and grazing
rights, which resulted in 12 deaths. A week later the elders of the Digil-Mirifle
intervened to mediate an end to the fighting.
51. In the Gedo region in southern Somalia, fighting from 5 to 11 June near the
border with Kenya between the Garre and the Marehan clans over the control of
Elwak town led to 13 reported deaths. The town has been contested by the two clans
over the past six months. Fighting was again reported on 22 and 23 July in Elwak
between the same clans, resulting in 32 deaths and injuries to over 60 persons. Clan
elders and the Kenyan authorities intervened in mid-August to help resolve the
dispute. Efforts aimed at reconciliation between the two sides continued into the
month of September.
52. There have been no significant incidents between “Somaliland’ and “Puntland”
in the disputed regions of Sanaag and Sool in past months, although there still
appears to be no progress towards a political solution. The issue of the exchange of
prisoners captured in the conflict in the disputed regions in 2004 is being resolved
through the facilitation of the Independent Expert of the Commission on Human
Rights on the situation of human rights in Somalia.
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VII. Humanitarian situation
53. The humanitarian situation in Somalia continues to be affected by the security
situation in the country and by climatic conditions. According to a recent
assessment, the number of people in need of urgent assistance has increased since
February 2005, with the most critical communities in need of assistance now being
in southern Somalia.
54. Between 920,000 and 950,000 people, including 370,000 to 400,000 internally
displaced persons, are in need of urgent assistance at least until early 2006.
According to a recently released report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO), around 345,000 people are in a state of livelihood crisis,
while 200,000 are experiencing a humanitarian emergency. Most of those
communities are in southern Somalia, where about 169,000 people in Gedo, Bakool,
Middle and Lower Juba are in a state of humanitarian emergency. The Juba Valley in
particular continues to be beset by high malnutrition (above 20 per cent in some
areas) and mortality rates, while Gedo is beset by chronic food insecurity. During
the recent consultations on the Consolidated Appeal for Somalia, United Nations
agencies and non-governmental organizations agreed to give priority to those
communities in 2006.
55. More than three years of drought have come to an end in the northern and
central regions due to two good consecutive rainy seasons (deyr 2004-2005 and gu
2005). This has aided the recovery of pastoral livelihoods, and the area is no longer
in a humanitarian emergency phase. Still, in the northern and central regions,
254,000 people remain in an acute livelihood crisis. It will take a considerable
amount of time before full recovery is achieved given the loss of livestock, levels of
indebtedness and severe environmental depletion caused by the prolonged drought.
In the central regions, unresolved conflicts also continue to affect livelihoods and
delay recovery.
56. Somalia continues to be vulnerable to floods. Thousands of households were
affected during the flooding that occurred in May and June 2005 due to high flows
from the Ethiopian catchments of the Shabelle and Juba rivers. Aid agencies
mobilized a response, yet the unusual gu flows highlighted the need for welldeveloped
early warning and emergency preparedness plans. Efforts are being made,
in collaboration with affected communities and local authorities to update the interagency
action plan for flood forecasting, preparedness and response for the Juba and
Shabelle Rivers in Somalia. It is anticipated that the inter-agency action plan will be
updated in time for the 2005-2006 deyr season, when flooding usually occurs.
57. Relative stability in the northern zones has continued to facilitate access in
most regions, with the exception of the contested Sool and Sanaag regions. In recent
months, the House of Elders (Guurti) has discussed the organization of a peace
conference in the Sool region, but no progress has yet been made. Any heightened
tension in this area could further impede access to needy populations.
58. In southern and central Somalia, while the prevailing security conditions
continued to negatively impact humanitarian access in most regions, recent
improvements in specific areas bode well for the reopening of those areas to
humanitarian activities. It is expected that with security improvements in Kismayo,
there will be a gradual resumption of humanitarian activities in the district,
particularly in reaching around 15,000 internally displaced persons in the town of
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Kismayo and the riverine communities hit by the 2005 gu floods. Many of the
improvements stem from localized reconciliation efforts and pressure from civil
society on leaders to ensure not only a more secure environment but also better
social services and more accountability. However, in Gedo, continued clashes
between the Garre and Marehan prevented humanitarian organizations from
reaching and providing assistance to the estimated 15,000 persons displaced by the
fighting.
59. The protective environment in Somalia, particularly in the southern and central
areas, where the bulk of 370,000 to 400,000 internally displaced persons reside is
still very weak. During the reporting period, the United Nations country team
finalized a joint strategic framework to enhance the protection of internally
displaced persons, returnees and other vulnerable populations, improve their current
living conditions and foster durable solutions.
60. In Somalia, tsunami-related activities are now fully in the
rehabilitation/recovery phase. Preparations are under way for an integrated
development project along the northern coast to provide shelter to over 2,400 people
living in the tsunami-affected town of Hafun. The project, which will help bring
basic social services and economic development to the town, will be implemented
by United Nations agencies and partners undertaking water and sanitation,
rehabilitation of schools, infrastructure and health activities. As the resumption of
the fishing season draws closer, discussions are under way with the “Puntland”
fisheries authorities to strengthen the sector so as to maximize productivity.
VIII. Operational activities to promote peace
Governance
61. The Somalia emergency budgetary support project for the Transitional Federal
Government began in April 2005 as a coordinated funding mechanism to provide
budgetary support to the transitional federal institutions, strengthen their capacities
and assist their relocation into Somalia. A total of 275 members of Parliament, along
with more than 400 other officials, have been relocated back to Somalia. The project
has also rehabilitated and equipped offices and has provided support to internal
transportation and logistical support to the Transitional Federal Government.
62. The Civil Service Institute opened in Hargeysa in August 2005. The Institute is
a public-private partnership, whose main partners include the Civil Service
Commission of “Somaliland” and the University of Hargeysa. UNDP is facilitating
the partnership process and is providing technical and budgetary support to the new
Institute. While its main focus will be on developing the capacity of the civil service
in areas such as management, planning, office skills and accounting, private
companies and non-governmental organizations will also be able to contract training
services for their staff.
63. The qualified expatriate Somali technical support project established to engage
the Somali diaspora in the rebuilding of the country has increased the number of
Somalis coming home to assist for short periods of time. The sectors of involvement
include governance and manufacturing, among others. During 2005, 15 Somalis
committed themselves to assisting organizations in “Somaliland”, “Puntland” and
South/Central Somalia in the education, agriculture and health sectors. Of the 15
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participants, 4 are female. So far, two assistance projects have been completed in
education and health.
Joint needs assessment
64. The concept note for the Somali joint needs assessment is now finalized and
has been accepted by Somali stakeholders, including the Somali Transitional
Federal Government. The concept note outlines the way forward for the Somali joint
needs assessment and includes substantial participation by Somalis in the exercise,
as both government and zonal counterparts and international experts from the
Somali diaspora. The coordination structure and mechanisms of participation in the
joint needs assessment process are now in place. They include a secretariat, an
operational oversight committee called the coordination support group, and a
strategic oversight committee called the joint planning committee. Work is currently
under way in assembling the joint needs assessment teams made up of cluster
leaders and sub-cluster experts from the United Nations, the World Bank, and
international experts, including members of the Somalia diaspora and Somali
counterparts. Further information can be found on the joint needs assessment
website http://somali-jna.org.
Human rights
65. In August 2005, the Independent Expert of the Commission on Human Rights
on the situation of human rights in Somalia undertook his fifth fact-finding mission
to the region. He was encouraged by the increasingly visible role played by civil
society in advocating for human rights. He strongly condemned the assassination of
human rights defenders and journalists during 2005 (see para. 44 above). Among the
continuing issues of concern, the Independent Expert highlighted: the conditions of
internally displaced persons and minority groups; the exploitation of the Somali
coastline, in particular, unregulated fishing activities by foreign companies and
human trafficking, which affects thousands of individuals every year; prison
conditions; oppression of peace activists and journalists; measures taken by some
countries to repatriate Somali asylum-seekers; and conflict related detainees
between “Puntland” and “Somaliland”. The Independent Expert was encouraged to
hear of the intention of the Transitional Federal Government to establish an
independent human rights commission.
Rule of law
66. The United Nations Rule of Law and Security Programme has been providing
technical and financial support for a law enforcement seminar and training
workshop for the Somali Police Force in Kampala, since August 2005. The
workshop brings together former police personnel from across the country in order
to develop a road map to guide the rebuilding of the civilian police force. As a first
step towards demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, the Programme is also
supporting demobilization efforts in and around Mogadishu through a pilot initiative
entitled “Support for peacebuilding and demilitarization” (see paras. 38 and 43
above).
67. Donors are providing support for the United Nations to facilitate the
participation of the Transitional Federal Government in the meeting of the Standing
Committees of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
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Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction. This is a preliminary step in the accession process to becoming a full
signatory of the Ottawa Treaty. The activity is part of an ongoing dialogue between
the United Nations Rule of Law and Security Programme and the Transitional
Federal Government on mine-related issues and support to processes that will ensure
it is aware of, and could consider participating in, relevant international legal
instruments.
68. In July 2005, phase 1 of the construction of the Armo Police Training
Academy in “Puntland” was completed. The first cohort is expected to begin
training in October 2005. The academy will be an important institution to implement
the new training syllabus and support the implementation of the road map for the
rebuilding of the civilian police force. The local community has contributed
substantially to the construction of the academy. Once completed, the academy is
expected to provide high-quality training to support the eventual creation of a
nationwide civilian police force.
69. The rehabilitation of a prison in Berbera was completed in July 2005. The
facility is the first of its kind, and features a proper infirmary for inmates. The
United Nations has provided support for the training of the custodial staff, which
was consistent with international human rights standards, on the treatment of
detainees.
70. A legal clinic support project at the University of Hargeysa has achieved
significant results in reducing the waiting period of remanded individuals in
“Somaliland”. The legal clinic also provides free legal representation for individuals
who are financially disadvantaged.
Water and sanitation
71. A sustainable water supply system in the tsunami-affected town of Hafun is
under construction. This will increase the coping capacity of the community in
future emergency situations. Efforts towards preventing cholera outbreaks in
Mogadishu, including the chlorination of water supplies and close collaboration
with the health sector, have been ongoing. No cholera outbreaks have taken place in
2005.
72. Two major water and sanitation programmes are under way. A rural water
programme for central and southern Somalia started in March 2005, and a
countrywide urban water and sanitation programme began in July. The rural
programme aims to achieve permanent improvement of access to water through
improved technologies and strengthened social mobilization. The urban water
programme aims to build on public-private partnership management models for
town water systems. It will be closely integrated with other urban development
activities.
Health
73. The United Nations organized a six-week data management course which
ended in June 2005 in collaboration with the Higher Institute of Public Health in
Alexandria, Egypt for 15 Somali health workers from different parts of the country
who are responsible for disease surveillance and monitoring. The participants
received training in advanced data management and analytical skills. It is hoped that
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S/2005/642
the skills and knowledge they acquired will improve the quality and utility of
surveillance information generated.
74. A national malaria control strategy is under way, and 80,000 insecticidetreated
nets have been delivered to hyper-endemic areas with further consignments
set to arrive. Insecticide-treated nets will be distributed to pregnant women during
the upcoming maternal and neonatal tetanus campaign. New malaria diagnosis and
treatment guidelines are being introduced that initiate artemesinin-based
combination therapy. Information, education and communication materials have
been developed to support those activities.
75. In an effort to ensure that polio cases in countries neighbouring Somalia do not
cross the border, additional national immunization days have taken place using
Monovalent oral polio vaccine (OPV) to pre-empt reintroduction of the polio virus.
Unfortunately, despite those efforts, the re-emergence in Mogadishu of the wild
polio virus P1 will call for more vigorous eradication activities with the support of
the international community.
HIV/AIDS
76. In June 2005, a joint United Nations mission on HIV/AIDS travelled to
“Somaliland” for the launch of the first anti-retroviral therapy project in Hargeysa,
which is being supported by several United Nations agencies and non-governmental
organizations. Most importantly, it has been endorsed by the “Somaliland”
authorities. Led by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, United
Nations agencies and partners are developing a United Nations Implementation
Support Plan for HIV/AIDS in Somalia that ensures a coordinated and effective
response to the disease.
77. A leadership advocacy toolkit for community and religious leaders is being
used to train religious and community leaders from all regions of Somalia. The
toolkit references the Koran in fighting stigma and discrimination and advocates for
HIV/AIDS awareness and care. Community leaders and local non-governmental
organizations were given training on basic counselling skills in order to develop a
cadre of psychosocial support givers in communities. Simultaneously, a counselling
needs assessment was conducted in all three regions to establish the level of
awareness of services and needs.
Education
78. The 2004-2005 annual primary school survey is under way. The survey should
be ready for distribution in November 2005. Related to this activity, new education
management and information tools have been introduced to 120 master
trainers/mentors across all regions, which will increase local capacities in
educational data management.
79. An enrolment and advocacy drive continues across the three regions, with a
special focus on girls and children in settlements for internally displaced persons.
Within a period of six months, approximately 100,000 new children were enrolled to
begin school in September. This enrolment drive involved partnerships with
educational authorities, communities and schoolchildren themselves. Primary
alternative education centres have been established throughout the country with a
total of 60,000 students, including children and youths.
15
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80. Since July 2005, mentor and teacher training campaigns have been initiated,
targeting 120 mentors and approximately 9,000 teachers across the country. The
mentors are a core group of Somali trainers who have been trained in the essentials
of pedagogy and educational management.
Child protection and youth
81. During the reporting period, three of the United Nations local partners in
Somalia have trained and recruited community-based child protection advocates and
are now actively working with vulnerable and disadvantaged communities to assist
in finding solutions to such problems. The United Nations is supporting a training
exchange for Somali psychosocial workers, enabling them to visit psychosocial
support projects in Uganda as a means of capacity development and to undertake
psychosocial support and care interventions at the community level.
82. In a follow-up to Security Council resolutions on children affected by armed
conflict, in particular resolution 1612 (2005), a strong partnership has been
established between the United Nations and the non-governmental organization
NOVIB Somalia to initiate community-based reporting and monitoring on child
rights and child protection violations.
83. During the reporting period, 33 youth peer educators underwent training for
trainers in Hargeysa. They will train youth groups in organizational development
and in youth peer skills in their home communities.
IX. Observations
84. Some progress has been made in the peace process in Somalia, particularly
with the formation and return of the transitional federal institutions back to the
country. However, the peace process remains fragile, and much remains to be done
in overcoming the current political impasse through dialogue. The effective
functioning of the transitional federal institutions is important and urgent. It is
unfortunate that, one year after the conclusion of the Somali National Reconciliation
Conference, the leaders of those institutions are still assuming rigid positions, even
against entering into a dialogue, instead of tackling the more pressing issues of a
national security plan, reconciliation and improvement of the quality of life of the
Somali people.
85. Unless the differences within the transitional federal institutions are addressed,
the current political impasse could grow into deeper divisions and undermine the
very institutions that the people of Somalia so ardently desire and the international
community and the United Nations are willing to support.
86. I am deeply concerned that the political tensions between the leaders of the
transitional federal institutions have given rise to military preparations on their part.
There are persistent reports of increased violations of the arms embargo. I call on
the Somali leaders and countries of the region, in particular, not to be part of an
exacerbation in political and military tensions. The threat of violence must be
averted by all concerned. I once again urge the Somali leaders to enter into a
comprehensive ceasefire agreement.
16
S/2005/642
87. I am compelled to draw attention to the events outlined in paragraphs 32 and
44 to 46 above that forced the relocation of international United Nations staff from
Jawhar in early September. The people of Somalia need and want the assistance of
international workers and their Somali partners who are implementing much needed
programmes in the country. Tangible improvement in the security situation on the
ground is an essential responsibility of the Somali leaders.
88. I welcome the expressed willingness of the Speaker of Parliament, Sharif
Hassan Sheikh Aden, to enter into dialogue under the auspices of the United
Nations. I equally welcome the public statements of Prime Minister Ali Mohammed
Gedi in favour of dialogue within the framework of the transitional federal
institutions. His initiative to hold consultations that are to lead to cabinet meetings
in Mogadishu could open the road to agreement on outstanding issues. I urge all
Somali leaders to undertake the necessary steps towards reconciling their
differences.
89. The Somali leaders and delegates who had gathered in Nairobi for over two
years at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference and adopted the Transitional
Federal Charter attached great importance to the role of Parliament. I urge them and
the international community to help build the capacity of the Somali transitional
institutions, including the Transitional Federal Government, the Parliament and the
judiciary. An active and robust Parliament could serve as a national forum of debate
and reconciliation and is essential for the realization of a healthy democratic order
in Somalia. Likewise, the functioning of an independent judiciary is urgently needed
for the restoration of law and order and the protection of human rights in Somalia.
90. I express my appreciation to the neighbouring countries, IGAD, AU, the
League of Arab States, EU and concerned Member States for their keen interest and
persistent efforts in support of the peace process in Somalia. I urge them to use their
influence and leverage to ensure that the transitional federal institutions resolve
their differences, through an inclusive dialogue, and to move ahead on the key
issues of security and national reconciliation.
91. I would like to use this opportunity to call on all members of the international
community to support the efforts of my Special Representative, François Lonseny
Fall, to bring about an inclusive dialogue among the leaders of the transitional
federal institutions aimed at achieving peace, reconciliation and development in
Somalia. However, I once again underline that the sustained support of the
international community, speaking with one voice, to encourage the Somali leaders
to effectively begin dialogue would be crucial in overcoming the current impasse.
92. I commend the United Nations programmes and agencies and their partners for
continuing to provide humanitarian assistance and undertake innovative and much
needed operational activities in support of reconstruction and rehabilitation in
Somalia. I call on all donors to support such programmes generously.
Annex 92
Kenya’s 2005 EEZ Proclamation with Coordinates, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 61, Division
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, 2006, pp. 96-7
LAW OF THE SEA
BULLETIN
No. 61 2006
DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS
- 96 -
3. Kenya
Proclamation by the President of the Republic of Kenya, 9 June 20051
Annex
Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 55
22 July 2005
(Legislative Supplement No. 34)
Legal Notice No. 82
Whereas the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognizes the right of a coastal state
to establish beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and to exercise thereon sovereign
rights for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources whether renewable
or non-renewable, of the water column, sea-bed and subsoil.
And whereas, it is already recognized by the said convention that the extent of the area referred to as the
exclusive economic zone, aforesaid, shall not exceed two hundred nautical miles measured from the same baseline
as the territorial sea.
And whereas, it is necessary that a declaration be made establishing the extent of the said exclusive
economic zone of the Republic of Kenya.
Now therefore, I, Mwai Kibaki, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic
of Kenya, do declare and proclaim in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya:
1. That notwithstanding any rule of law or any practice which may hitherto have been observed in relation to
Kenya or the waters beyond or adjacent to the territorial Sea of Kenya, the Exclusive Economic Zone of the
Republic of Kenya shall extend across the sea to a distance of two hundred nautical miles measured from the
appropriate baseline from where the territorial sea is measured, as indicated in the map annexed to this
Proclamation. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Exclusive Economic Zone of Kenya shall:
a. In respect of its southern territorial waters boundary with the United Republic of Tanzania be
eastern latitude north of Pemba Island to start at a point obtained by the northern intersection of two arcs
one from the Kenya Light-house at Ras Kigomasha.
b. In respect of its northern territorial waters boundary with Somali Republic be on eastern latitude
South of Diua Damascian Island being latitude 1°39’34” degrees south.
2. That this Proclamation replaces the earlier Proclamation by Kenya but shall not affect or be in derogation of the
vested rights of the Republic of Kenya over the Continental Shelf as defined in the Continental Shelf Act, 1973.
3. All States shall, subject to the applicable laws and regulation of Kenya, enjoy in the Exclusive Economic Zone
the freedom of navigation and over flight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other
internationally lawful recognized uses of the sea related to navigation and communication.
1 Text transmitted through note verbale dated 11 April 2006 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The text of the Presidential
Proclamation was published in Kenya Gazette No. 55 of 22 July 2005 (Legal Notice No. 82 (Legislative Supplement
No. 34)). The First and Second Schedules, together with the illustrative Map, constitute an adjustment to and are in
replacement of the Proclamation made by the President of the Republic of Kenya on 28 February 1979.
- 97 -
4. That the scope and regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone shall be as defined in the Schedule attached to this
Proclamation.
FIRST SCHEDULE
The area of the territorial waters of the Republic of Kenya extends to a point twelve international nautical
miles from the straight baseline, hereinafter described as follows:
Diua Damasciaca 1°39’34.25344” S 41°34’44.19626” E
Kiungamwina Drying 1°46’39.55824” S 41°30’09.02159” E
Mwamba Haasani 2°07’04.15178” S 41°11’50.25051” E
Mwamba wa Punju 2°36’51.85347” S 40°37’01.06070” E
Ras Ngomeni 2°58’46.46191” S 40°14’24.69583” E
Leopard Reef 3°16’18.11141” S 40°09’42.26120” E
Jumba la Mtwana 3°56’23.60363” S 39°47’18.81358” E
Leven Reef 4°03’03.42975” S 39°43’21.75929” E
Chale Reef 4°27’37.64311” S 39°32’01.50853” E
Mwamba Kitungamwe 4°48’25.43385” S 39°21’32.85192” E
SECOND SCHEDULE
The Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Kenya is the area described by the following points and
200 nautical miles wide as measured from the baseline.
Diua Damasciaca 1°39’34.253” S 41° 34’44.196” E
E- Diua Damasciaca 1°39’36.000” S 44°54’47.520” E
E- Diua Damasciaca 1°39’36.000” S 44°54’47.520” E
E-A 2°39’36.000” S 44°43’19.092” E
E-B 3°39’36.000” S 44°15’13.896” E
E-C 4°40’53.004” S 43°20’36.204” E
T-C 4°40’55.740” S 39°36’30.240” E
T-B 4°40’52.000” S 39°36’18.000” E
T-A 4°49’56.000” S 39°20’58.000” E
B-MK 4°49’51.636” S 39°20’59.244” E
The baseline is as described under the First Schedule.
Signed and sealed with the Public Seal for the Republic of Kenya at Nairobi this 9th day of June, two
thousand and five.
Mwai Kibaki
President of the Republic of Kenya
Annex 93
FAO Fishery Country Profile: The Republic of Kenya, FID/CP/KEN, April 2007, Extract
1
FISHERY COUNTRY
PROFILE
Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations
PROFIL DE LA PÊCHE
PAR PAYS
Organisation des Nations Unies pour
l'alimentation et l'agriculture
RESUMEN
INFORMATIVO SOBRE
LA PESCA POR
Organización de las Naciones Unidas
para la Agricultura y la Alimentación
FID/CP/KEN
April 2007
THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA
1. GENERAL ECONOMIC DATA
Area: 582 650 km2
Shelf area (to 200 m): ca. 6 500 km2
EEZ: 142 400 km2
Length of coastline (Indian
Ocean):
ca. 640 km
Water area (varies with rains) 10 500 - 11 500 km2
Population (2005): 30 million
GGDP (2005): US$ 18.0 billion
GNI per caput (2005): US$ 530
Agricultural GDP (2005): 27.4% of GDP
Fisheries GDP (2005): 0.5% of GDP
Note: (1) Value of fish to the fishers plus export value.
5
conflicts. The government and other stakeholders are looking into ways of resolving the conflicts
by using the data collected to arrive at a sustainable fishing regime acceptable to all stakeholders.
The prawn fishery is not under threat, but shrimp harvesting threatens other fisheries whose
juveniles are caught as by-catch. The trawlers have over the years imposed a voluntary 4-month
(November to March) closed fishing season to protect berried shrimps. The offshore fishing
operations in 2005 and 2006 in Kenya’s EEZ involved DWFN vessels: 33 purse seiners and 30
long-liners, all foreign vessels licensed by the Kenyan government. There has been steady
increase in the number of licensed vessels since 2003, when the government took a keen interest
in illegal fishing and occasionally used the Kenya Navy to patrol the EEZ. The number of
licensed foreign fishing vessels stabilized in 2005. The country is in the process of establishing an
effective Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) system, but currently none exists, and
therefore, there is reason to believe that there are many other foreign vessels operating illegally.
Annual marine fish production from artisanal fishery in Kenya during 1980 to 2005 show a
high of 9 972 t in 1990 and a low of 4 336 t in 1993. For the most of the period, production
fluctuated between 6 000 and almost 10 000 t. Overfishing in inshore area has continued to cause
a decline in fish catches, while the deeper territorial waters remain underexploited due to lack of
deep sea fishing capacity by the local fishers. The EEZ is estimated to have an annual potential of
more than 150 000 t, according to a desk study conducted in 2002 with Commonwealth
Secretariat assistance. The actual amount harvested by DWFNs is not known, because their
activities are not monitored, due to poor MCS. A significant amount of tuna is landed by the
foreign vessels in Mombassa for either transshipment or local processing.
4.2.2 Sport fishing
Kenya enjoys a reputation as one of the world’s great big game sports fishing destinations.
Kenya’s marine waters contain most of the major target game species, primarily billfishes,
especially sailfish, swordfishes, the marlins, sharks and some tunas. Sport fishers are registered in
the several sport-fishing clubs, which coordinate the fishing activity and record data. The peak
sport fishing season is in September to March. The clubs have a large number of high quality
boats and trained crews. The popular sport fishing areas are Malindi, Watamu, Shimoni and
Lamu . In 2005, 30 sport-fishing clubs were registered.
There is also an underdeveloped but popular angling recreational activity in trout rivers in
central and western Kenya, and also in inland lakes such as Lake Naivasha. There is need to start
a stocking programme and concession some of the rivers to ensure expeditious development of
this fishery.
4.3 Inland sub sector
4.3.1 Freswater capture fisheries
Freshwater fishery accounts for about 95 per cent of Kenya’s total fish production, principally
from Lake Victoria. Kenya is endowed with extensive inland waters, covering between 10 500
and 11 500 km2 depending on rainfall, but it is the country’s 6 per cent share of Lake Victoria that
accounts for almost all (96 per cent) national freshwater fish production. Other freshwater-bodies
of commercial importance include lakes Turkana (Kenya’s largest freshwater body), Naivasha,
Baringo, Jipe and the Tana River dams. The major rivers include Tana, Nzoia, Kuja, Yala and
Athi/Sabaki.
Fishing in Kenya is mainly small scale, by artisanal fishers using small un-motorized fishing
crafts propelled by sail and paddle. Fishing gear includes gillnets, long-lines and seine nets.
Beach seines are now banned. From 1963 to the 1970s, freshwater fish production remained
below 50 000 t per year, but steadily increased from the early 1980s, reaching over 140 000 t in
1989, and then remained at 180 000 t on average until 2001. The highest recorded landed volume
was 209 438 t in 1999, after which catches fell steadily to a low of 112 720 t in 2003. The decline
6
was caused by the increase in fishing effort due to high demand, especially for Nile perch for
export. However, action was taken by the Department of Fisheries to restore the lake fisheries and
landings increased, with 127 700 t in 2004 and 139 026 t in 2005.
Lake Victoria is the second-largest freshwater body in the world, with a surface area of
68 800 km2, of which 35 088 km2 (51 per cent) is in Tanzania, 29 584 km2 (43 per cent) is in
Uganda, and 4 128 km2 (6 per cent) is in Kenya. It has a shoreline of 3 450 km, of which
1 150 km (33 per cent) is in Tanzania, 1 750 km (51 per cent) is in Uganda and 550 km (16 per
cent) is in Kenya. The lake has a catchment area of 192 890 km2 (Uganda 30 880 km2, 16 per
cent; Kenya 42 460 km2, 22 per cent; Tanzania 84 920 km2, 44 per cent; Rwanda 21 120 km2, 11
per cent; Burundi 13 510 km2, 7 per cent) with a rapidly growing population of over 30 million
people. Lake Victoria is the most important fishery in the country, earning over K Sh 4 billion
(US$ 50 million) annually in foreign exchange from the export of Nile perch products and over
K Sh 6.5 billion to the fishers.
Lake Victoria has a multi-species fishery of tilapiines and haplochromines, cichlids and more
than 20 genera of non-cichlid fish, including Mormyrus, catfish, cyprinids and lungfish. There
has been a steady decrease in fish diversity and quantity due to increase in fishing effort as a
result of commercialization of fishing in the last two decades.
The introduced species, especially Nile Perch and Nile tilapia, have been responsible for the
increasing total annual fish catches since the early 1980s. Following the increase in the Nile perch
stock in the lake, a commercial artisanal fishery developed and subsequently the fish processing
industry for export evolved. The incentive created by the ready market of the fish processing
plants fuelled a rapid increase in fishing effort. Fish landings declined in the 1990s due to
indiscriminate exploitation of the fisheries. The mean fish size has been declining steadily since
the 1980s as fishers have been progressively switching to smaller meshed gillnets, and juvenile
Nile perch are increasingly exploited through use of illegal beach seines.
From the early 1980s to 2004, species composition was dominated by Lates niloticus,
Rastrineobola argentea and Oreochromis niloticus in that order. In 2005, the species catch
composition for the first time in many years was dominated by Rastrineobola argentea,
contributing about 41 per cent while Lates niloticus contributed 38.5 per cent and Tilapia
niloticus 16 per cent. The dramatic increase in Rastrineobola argentea, in 2005 has not yet been
explained but the stringent participatory measures for management of Omena fishery, including
closed seasons, and also the notable decline in the predatory Nile perch, may have contributed.
Lake Turkana is Africa’s fourth-largest lake, with an area of 7 400 km2 lying in a low, closed
basin, 365 m above sea level in the arid northwest of Kenya. Over 90 per cent of the annual water
discharge by volume is from river Omo, originating in Ethiopia, while the rest is from the
seasonal rivers Kerio and Turkwell. The lake has many unique characteristics, such as drastic lake
level fluctuations, low fish species diversity and intermittent peak production in fish, especially
tilapia. With no surface outlet, the water budget is a balance between river- inflow and
evaporation, which imposes special physical chemical conditions, making the lake saline. The
commercial fishery is based on 12 species, namely Oreochromis niloticus, Lates niloticus,
Hydrocynus forskalii, Mormyrus spp., Labeo horie, Bagrus spp., Distichodus niloticus,
Citharinus spp., Barbus spp., Clarias lazera, Aletes spp., and Synodontis schall.
From the 1960s to the mid-1970s, nominal catches from the Kenyan part of the lake were
generally no more than 5 000 t/year. A huge increase occurred, rising to a catch of 17 044 t in
1976, and thereafter catches continued in the range of 7 000 to 15 000 t/year until 1988, when
production collapsed to the 1 000 to 4 000 t/year level until 1997. Since 1998 production has
fluctuated between 2 000 and 10 000 t/year.
A valuable fishery developed in the mid-1970s as rising water levels created ideal breeding
and feeding conditions for Oreochromis niloticus in Ferguson’s gulf. As many as 7 000 fishers
7
were operating on the lake in the early 1980s, including many migrants from Lake Victoria.
Reasonable infrastructural development was implemented in the context of the high production
levels and future expectations, including a fish processing plant and an all-weather road linking
the lake area into the national highway network 300 km to the south. Ensuing years witnessed a
gradual drying up of Ferguson’s Gulf, oil price spikes, and withdrawal of many fishers to Lake
Victoria to cash on the rapidly developing Nile perch fishery. By the early 1990s, the number of
fishers was down to around 1 500. In the 1970s and 1980s, Lake Turkana supported a lucrative
export operation of dried fish to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), through a fishers'
cooperative society. The DRC market collapsed in the late 1990s due to economic instability.
Lake Naivasha lies in a closed basin in the central rift Valley, with an area of about 115 km2,
fluctuating according to rainfall. The lake supports a small commercial fishery based on four
finfish species and one crustacean species, namely Oreochromis leucostictus, Tilapia zillii,
Microptrerus salmoides (Black bass), Cyprinus carpio (Common carp) and Procambrus clarkii
(crayfish). Barbus amphigramma and Lebistes reticulata (guppy) are also present but not
commercially exploited. Sport angling is also practised. In the latter half of the 1980s the number
of active fishers was reported to be 200 to 300, and the number of fishing craft between 50 and
100. Besides the increase in legal fishers, illegal fishers also increased, and this increased fishing
effort led to fishery collapse, forcing many fishers to abandon fishing, which had become
unprofitable. The situation began to reverse in 2002, following a paradigm shift in fisheries
management that encouraged wider stakeholder participation in management decisions. This
process saw reduction in fishing craft number, from 133 to 40, and fishers from 300 to 120; a
voluntary annual closed season from June to September each year; and improved fish production.
There was also reduction in the illegal fishers although this has remained a problem because of
the poor MCS system. Species composition in the catches has drastically changed, from tilapiines
dominating up to 2002, but common carp (an inadvertent introduction) dominant since then.
Lake Baringo is a Rift Valley lake with an area of 130 km2. The lake is shallow, with a mean
depth of about 5.6 m, and becoming shallower due to increasing siltation. The lake is fed from the
south by rivers Ndau, Chemeron, Perkerra, Molo and Arabel. All these except Molo are seasonal.
Lake Baringo fishery is based on six fish species, namely Oreochromis niloticus, Barbus
gregorii, Barbus lineomaculatus, Clarias mossambicus, Labeo cylindricus and the recently
introduced Protopterus aethiopicus. Labeo cylindricus is the only species that is not
commercially exploited. Fishing is passive, mainly by gillnetting and hand line. The steadily
declining fish catch has been attributed to poor lake productivity, mainly due to the heavy
siltation. This led to stakeholders deciding to close fishing for two years, 2002 and 2003, in the
hope that production would recover. This measure did not bear fruit as fish landings in 2004 and
2005 were 63 and 43 t, respectively, down from 468 t in 2000 and 117 t in 2001. The lake
currently supports on average 134 fishers and 66 fishing craft. Strangely, in 2001, prior to the
two-year fishing closure, there were fewer fishers (75) and craft (25).
Other lakes and rivers support minor fisheries, namely:
• Lake Victoria Basin: rivers Gucha/Migori, Mara Nzoia, Sondu and Yala;
• Rift Valley Basin: rivers Suam-Turkwel, Kerio, Ewaso Nyiro, Lessos Reservoir and Turkwel
Gorge Reservoir;
• Athi River Basin: rivers Athi/Galana/Sabaki and Voi, lakes Chala and Jipe;
• Tana River Basin: upper Tana River and impoundments including Masinga, Kamburu, Gitaru
Kindaruma reservoirs, and lower Tana River and floodplain with numerous small lakes,
including lakes Balisa and Shakababo. Several streams in the central and western highlands
have been stocked with trout and provide sports fishing opportunities.
Annex 94
Coastal Livelihoods in the Republic of Somalia, Agulhas and Somali Current Large Marine
Ecosystems (ASCLME) Project, 2010, Extracts
i
COASTAL LIVELIHOODS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The Agulhas and Somali Current Large Marine Ecosystems (ASCLME) project is focused on the two
large marine ecosystems of the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region, covering nine countries that are
directly influenced by these current systems. It is estimated that at least fifty-six million people are reliant
either directly or indirectly on the goods and services provided by these two current systems. The
ASCLME project aims to support these countries in their efforts to collectively manage the marine
resources on which their people and economies depend. Fisheries and other key coastal activities,
including various forms of tourism, aquaculture, shipping and coastal transport, the energy sector,
agriculture and forestry, are very important contributors to the economies of the countries of the WIO. In
recognition of the complexity and importance of these activities, a Coastal Livelihoods Assessment
(CLA) component was developed for the ASCLME project.
The CLA component had three main objectives:
· to collect as much existing information as possible about the main coastal activities in the nine
participating countries as a contribution to the national Marine Ecosystem Diagnostic Analyses
(MEDAs);
· to make input into ensuring that this information is stored and organised in a manner that will
allow easy access and maximum utility to multiple stakeholders, both during and after the
lifetime of the ASCLME Project;
· to review and sythesise the information collected in order to provide useful inputs to the TDA and
SAP processes.
In order to achieve these objectives, the CLA component was separated into three distinct phases, with the
first phase kicking off in May 2009. During phase one, a “desktop” review of available data was
conducted by the regional project coordinators, input was made into the design of a literature management
tool to facilitate the storage of information, and preparations were made for the in-country data gathering
process. Planning meetings were held between the core CLA team and the in-country Data and
Information (D+I) Coordinators in August 2009. The processes involved in the in-country component of
recruitment and data gathering was discussed and confirmed at this stage.
Phase two involved in-country personnel having been identified and recruited through a regionally
inclusive recruitment process. Nominations were invited and received from country focal points and D+I
Coordinators. Twenty three consultants were recruited to assist with the project. For some sectors
international experts (drawn from the region where possible) were asked to provide information for all
countries in the region while in others, where good local capacity existed, in-country consultants were
recruited. This group of consultants collected information from existing resources, such as published
articles, government reports, regional reviews, project reports and outputs, policy documents as well as a
range of other grey literature that was likely to be useful.
Phase three involved the organisation of the information into country Coastal Livelihood Reports where
individual sector reports have been assessed and the key elements from each sector extracted and
presented in a summarised format. These country reports will be reviewed by project representatives in
each country and once accepted, will be incorporated as a separate Coastal Livelihoods chapter in the
overall country MEDA documents. It is anticipated that the information collated in these reports will
allow examples of best-practice to be identified for application in other parts of the region. The objective
is to build on approaches that work rather than to duplicate efforts. Information gaps will be identified and
addressed in subsequent phases of the ASCLME, including during a Cost/Benefit Analysis (CBA)
ii
exercise designed to weigh up the costs and benefits of various development options. Key information
from these reports will feed into the CBA and hopefully provide useful guidelines for the Transboundary
Diagnostic Analysis (TDA) and the development of Strategic Action Plans (SAP) for the overall
ASCLME project.
The following country report begins with an overview of coastal livelihoods in Somalia, which provides a
concise overview of the seven sector reports and the findings of the in-country and regional consultants.
This overview ends with a conclusion which summarizes the collected information as it relates to the
coastal zone in Somalia in general. This overview is followed by the more detailed sector reports, which
represent the original contributions by the in-country and regional consultants. The sectors are organized
in the following order: Small-scale Fisheries, Tourism, Mariculture, Agriculture and Forestry, Energy,
Ports and Coastal Transport and Coastal Mining.
Each sector report has been prepared by specialists in that particular sector drawn either from the country
or internationally. Sector reports have been prepared according to a pre-determined template to ensure
that the relevant aspects of that sector were captured by the consultants. Reports include descriptive
sections on the biophysical environment, human environment, policy and governance, planning and
management, and development, trade and projects related to that sector. Each report is concluded with a
SWOT analysis which provides a summary of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
facing that sector. It is the outputs of these SWOT analyses that are of particular importance to the
strategic planning aspects of the overall ASCLME project. These reports were initially submitted to the
regional coordinators for review and have subsequently been corrected and updated by the consultants
themselves.
Finally, each sector report has a bibliography containing key references and links to relevant information.
Full details of the information resources collected during compilation of each sector report, as well as
electronic copies of literature (where available), are included in the overall ASCLME reference
management system.
OVERVIEW OF COASTAL LIVELIHOODS IN SOMALIA
I. Small-Scale Fisheries
There is an operative small-scale fishery in Somalia with approximately 50 fishing centers and an
estimated 30,000 people from coastal communities engaged. Despite rich bio-diversity and an extensive
coastline, exports of fishery products only account for around 3% of total exports and contribute about
2% to GDP. Household income in the sector also fluctuates by season, with fishers earning $1.5 USD per
day during monsoon season and an estimated $40 USD per day during fishing season.
Data, law enforcement and policy development are practically non-existent in the sector, as there is
currently no government, institutional infrastructure and regulatory capacity in the country. Despite the
variety of fish resources, poor processing facilities, poverty, old fishing gear and the isolation of fishing
communities all highlight the weaknesses prevalent in the sector. While a legitimate transitional
government has been established, security remains fragile, as both the presence of piracy and an on-going
insurgency have constricted economic development. Due to the lack of monitoring capacity, fishing and
waste disposal by foreign vessels has also become problematic along the coast.
As a whole, potential for growth in the small-scale fishery is robust, however, there are clearly numerous
constraints preventing further development. Nevertheless, opportunities, such as the development of local
market places, the provision of micro-finance, improved processing facilities and the standardization of
iii
inboard and outboard engines, all highlight the prospects prevalent in the sector. While the lack of
regulation and data in the sector could breed over-exploitation, particularly of species such as sharks, the
potential for increases in production and domestic consumption is great. The sheer scope and extent of the
country's coast and resources should accentuate these opportunities.
II. Tourism
Security in Somalia is inevitably a constraint on tourism in the country's coastal zone, however, its long
scenic coastline, rich biodiversity and favorable climate make it an ideal region for future tourism
development. The country's close proximity to the Middle East, along with its historic Islamic culture,
also make it a convenient destination for nearby travelers. All opportunities are, however, dependent on
improvements in the security situation.
Unfortunately, accompanying the current security situation are the stigmas of violence and conflict
attached to the country, which negatively affects both the marketability and the volume of tourist activity.
Similarly, weak infrastructure, limited institutional capacity and the reluctance of NGO's to operate has
severely constrained development in the sector. Again, if the security situation is improved and law and
order is reestablished, these constraints could be marginalized. Under these improved conditions
opportunities for growth and development in the sector could spur other entrepreneurial activities in the
region. Similarly, international organizations could be engaged to assist in developing the sector. Growth
in the sector could also not only sensitize the population to the importance of sustaining the country's
natural habitat, but it could also reduce the over-exploitation of natural resources by creating
opportunities for employment in the sector.
III. Mariculture
A dedicated report on mariculture has not been included in this country report due to the current difficulty
in obtaining detailed information on the potential of this sector in Somalia. It has been determined though,
that there are currently no mariculture activities taking place in the country. However, given the extensive
coastline and strong tradition of utilizing and consuming marine products in the coastal zone, there is no
reason why this kind of development should not be as attractive as it has proved to be in the other
Western Indian Ocean states, once political stability returns to Somalia.
It is important to note that according the ASCLME project representatives from Somalia, the Transitional
Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia sees activities such as mariculture in the coastal zone as
an important alternative income generating activity that has the potential of reducing over-exploitation of
coastal resources. It is recommended that at the appropriate time a dedicated assessment of the
mariculture potential in Somalia be undertaken to determine the best approach to take in the development
of this sector.
IV. Agriculture and Forestry
Accounting for an estimated 64% of GDP, agriculture and forestry is the most dominant sector in
Somalia. Despite livestock movement bans, animal exports account for about 60% of Somalia’s
employment opportunities, generating about 40% of GDP and 80% of foreign currency earnings.
Taxation of livestock trade and export is one of the major revenue sources for the regional
administrations. The main food crops are sorghum, millet, maize and rice, while the majority of cash crop
exports are bananas, sugar and cotton. Bananas were once a key export and source of foreign exchange,
however, the El Nino floods in 1998 largely collapsed the sector. Hence, as livestock is the main source
iv
of income and employment for the majority of the Somali population, droughts, fluctuating environmental
conditions and market volatility all have a great impact on the people and the economy.
Acacia and Commiphora shrub and woodland habitat are widespread in the country and are extensively
utilized for a variety of purposes. While large swaths of the resource have been cleared for agriculture, as
well as fuelwood and charcoal production, woodlands still provide numerous goods, particularly in dry
times. Deforestation is, however, a significant problem in the northern areas and the Jubba Valley. Forests
are not predominant in the coastal zone, however, mangroves remain important, valued at around $91
million USD.
While policies for coastal zone management have been promoted in Somaliland, security and governance
clearly remain predominant issues. Despite these constraints, positives can be seen. For example, IFAD is
currently providing technical expertise and funding focused on food security and livelihood opportunities
in the northern regions, while the opportunity to expand agriculture, forestry and livestock production has
been documented. Similarly, the country's extensive bio-diversity, particularly bird-life, hast potential for
attract tourism development in the future. However, for any initiatives and opportunities to be realized,
security will have to be brought under control.
V. Energy
There is little activity in oil, gas and biofuels in Somalia, with the country’s only refinery closing due to
the civil war. Although there is currently no hydrocarbon production, the country does have 200 billion
cubic feet of proven gas reserves, as well as prospective oil fields in the northern zone and in the Nuggal
and Dharoor basins. Total is the only identified agent involved in downstream activity, managing the oil
terminal in Berbera and supplying fuel to the airports in Berbera and Hargeisa. While most exploration
activities were suspended due to the onset of civil conflict, many companies have shown a renewed
interest in the sector. For example, a consortium of companies have obtained the rights to explore the
Nuggal and Dharoor basins from the Puntland government, while blocks to explore offshore of Mudug
and around the coastal area of Berbera have been conceded by the national government. The validity of
these agreements does, however, remain in question, particularly the agreements with the Puntland
government, as ownership of the resources remains ambiguous.
Numerous constraints have been identified in the sector, the most challenging being the security situation.
Not only did the civil war force the majority of companies to suspend operations, but the present security
situation has made operations very difficult. The development of operations in such an unstable
environment also increases the risk of spills and accidents. Governance and capacity also remains
constrained, which has not only facilitated conflict between different branches of government, but has led
to a lack of basic infrastructure throughout the country. Much of the country’s economic activity also
remains informal, which means the state is unable to obtain revenue to contribute to basic services. Piracy
also remains highly problematic, as it has not only become a principal coastal industry, but it is likely to
constrain offshore operations in the near future.
Some strengths and opportunities have, however, been identified in the sector. For example, an effective
government in Somaliland could potentially be conducive to sectoral development in the region, while the
prospects for oil deposits throughout Somalia are very positive. Oil sector development could also be
supportive of employment and contribute to the development of infrastructure, while the transitional
national government has shown a willingness to support the sector. Nevertheless, any future development
in the sector is largely dependent on improvements in the security situation.
v
VI. Ports and Coastal Transport
There are four major ports in Somalia, each under the control of independent local clans. Kismaayo, the
most southerly port, handles exports of charcoal and bananas from the Juba valley and receives vehicle
imports from the Gulf. Merka, which lies 100 km south of Mogadishu, has no operational infrastructure,
therefore, ships are forced to anchor offshore with cargo brought inshore by smaller vessels. The
Mogadishu port, which was rebuilt with the US and UN finance in the early 1990's, is largely controlled
by different factions and clans. The port does, however, reportedly have some adequate warehouses that
could potentially be used for imports. The port in Eyl is only noted as a stronghold for piracy. None of
these four ports are considered to be fully operational.
All these ports were formerly under the control of the Somali Ports Authority, however, the collapse of
the central government has led to fragmented control across the sector. The collapse of authority has also
recently resulted in an increase in piracy, wherein, numerous international ships have been hijacked off
the Somali coast. The waters are subsequently seen as the most dangerous in the world, which inevitably
repels most foreign vessels from docking anywhere in the country.
While road transport is still semi-operational in the country, ports and shipping remain constrained by the
present security situation. Thus, while some harbours are developed and the country does posses seafaring
skills, any growth in the sector is directly dependent on improvements in security. Under these improved
conditions, it is important to note that there is enormous potential in the ports and shipping sector, with an
estimated 25 000 vessels passing the Gulf of Aden annually.
VII. Coastal Mining
Deposits of tin-tantalum in Puntland, simpsonite in Berbera, and deposits of salt and gemstone throughout
the country, all highlight the fact that there are numerous documented opportunities for mining in the
country. Similarly, despite the lack of reliable data, a US geological survey also noted that 1,500 tons of
gypsum, 600 tons of marine salt and 6 tons of sepiolite was mined, each year, from 1998 to 2002.
Nevertheless, data for all minerals remains constrained by the present security situation.
The only reported mining activity along the coast was in cement, which was subsequently concluded in
1996. There have been no indications of mining activity in the coastal region since then. Again, similar to
inland mining, the country's security situation has inevitably constrained any mining activity in the
region.
While both Somaliland and Puntland have developed mineral decrees of their own, no environmental
policies or coastal management techniques have been developed by the Transitional Federal Government
in relation to the mining industry. Likewise, while the UN has developed a Reconstruction and
Development Programme for the country, there are no indications that it will deal with mining in the
coastal regions. In either case, the mining sector is likely to remain inoperable until the security situation
is improved.
Conclusions
There are many constraints that remain constant across sectors in Somalia, such as security,
environmental management, and infrastructure, all of which have had a widespread impact on all of the
sector's considered in the coastal livelihoods study. Given more stability, there are also some strengths
and opportunities apparent, particularly in the natural landscape of the coast, as well as the potential for
improved governance and the affects it could have on all sectors. Currently, each of the sector reports
48
V. Energy - Prepared by Mr Francois Busson, E-mail: [email protected]
1. Introduction
Somalia has a rhino-horn shaped coastline of more than 3.000km (1.684 miles), the longest in Africa,
earning the title of the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Kenya to the southwest,
the Gulf of Aden with Yemen to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east and Ethiopia to the west.
Northern Somalia was occupied by the British from 1920 and southern Somalia was conquered by the
Italians in 1927. This occupation lasted until 1941, and was replaced by a British military administration.
The union of the two regions in 1960 formed the Somali Republic. In 1991, the Somali Civil War broke
out, which facilitated the collapse of the federal government.
Since 1991, Somalia has been engulfed in anarchy.
In May 1991, northern clans declared an
independent republic of Somaliland. Although not
recognized by any government, this entity has
maintained a stable existence. The regions of Bari,
Nugaal, and northern Mudug make up the
neighboring, semi-autonomous state of Puntland,
which has been self-governing since 1998. The
state is not, however, aiming for independence.
A two-year peace process, led by the Government of Kenya under the auspices of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), concluded in October 2004 with the election of Abdullahi Yusuf
Ahmed as President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. This also produced the
formation of an interim government, known as the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). TFIs
relocated to Somalia in June 2004. In 2009, the TFI's were given a two-year extension to October 2011.
This situation was further complicated in 2007, when the “Islamic Courts Union” launched an insurgency.
The group soon controlled a large part of the country, however, they were partly repelled with the help of
Ethiopian troops. Today, the security situation is still highly unstable.
1.1 Oil and Gas Sector overview
Somalia currently has no hydrocarbon production, and the national oil refinery closed because of the civil
war.
Somalia has an estimated 200 billion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, and no proven oil reserves.
But according to geological surveys, prospects of oil fields exist in the Northern zone (oil seeps
identified), and in the North-Western zone (Nuggal and Dharoor basins). Exploration activities were
carried out by foreign firms, including Agip, Amoco, Chevron, Conoco and Phillips, in the 1980’s. The
firms were forced to suspend operations following the collapse of the central government. Exploration
companies have, however, recently renewed their attention to these fields (cf Annexe 1).
Given the complexities of the current political situation (one “official” central government with very little
power, one autonomous, and one semi-autonomous region, with ramping rivalries within each entity), it is
difficult to assess the position of the supposed players in Somalia’s exploration process.
· In 2005, Puntland’s government signed an agreement with Consort Private (Australian) for
exclusive rights to explore and drill for oil in the Nuggal and Dharoor blocks. This agreement
49
was signed against TFG government’s will, which stated that the “natural resource belonging
to the nation is the responsibility of the federal government”. Since then, Consort Private’s
exclusive rights have been sold and shared to a consortium of 3 companies, including Africa
Oil (Canadian), Range (Australian), and Lion (Canadian). Despite the “official” agreement
with the Puntland Government, the companies are facing strong opposition from local
landlords, and field operations have been delayed several times. It must also be added that the
region of Sool, which contains the majority of the Nugaal block, was invaded by Somaliland
forces in late 2007
Figure 1: Map of the Oil & Gas activities in Somalia
(adapted from Deloite 2009)
· In 2007, TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf
signed an agreement with CNOOC
(Chinese), giving the company exclusive
rights to the large offshore blocks off the
coast of Mudug. TFG Prime Minister Gedi
tried to nullify this agreement in an attempt
to give exploration rights for all of Somalia
to Indonesia’s PT Medco Energi
Internasional Tbk and the Kuwait Energy
Company. Gedi was later forced to resign.
· In 2003, Rovagold Energy Corp., UK gained
rights to explore, develop and produce oil
and gas in the coastal area of southeast
Berbera, Somaliland. This included blocks
35, 36, M-10 and M-10A, previously
operated by Amoco, a company that was
forced to suspend operations in 1989.
· In 2001, Total signed an exploration
agreement with the Transitional National
Government (TNG). The twelve-month
agreement granted Total the rights to explore
in the Indian Ocean off southern Somalia.
However, several factional leaders
denounced the agreement, and stated that the
TNG did not have the authority to sanction
the agreement, nor the power to guarantee the
safety and security of the exploration
operations.
Annex 95
Security Council Resolution 1976 (2011), S/RES/1976 (2011), 11 April 2011
United Nations S/RES/1976 (2011)
Security Council
Distr.: General
11 April 2011
11-29544 (E)
*1129544*
Resolution 1976 (2011)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6512th meeting,
on 11 April 2011
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia,
especially resolutions 1918 (2010) and 1950 (2010),
Continuing to be gravely concerned by the growing threat that piracy and
armed robbery at sea against vessels pose to the situation in Somalia and other
States in the region, as well as to international navigation, the safety of commercial
maritime routes and the safety of seafarers and other persons, and also gravely
concerned by the increased level of violence employed by pirates and persons
involved in armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,
Strongly condemning the growing practice of hostage-taking by pirates
operating off the coast of Somalia, expressing serious concern at the inhuman
conditions hostage face in captivity, recognizing the adverse impact on their
families, calling for the immediate release of all hostages, and noting the
importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage-taking,
Emphasizing the importance of finding a comprehensive solution to the
problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,
Stressing the need to build Somalia’s potential for sustainable economic
growth as a means to tackle the underlying causes of piracy, including poverty, thus
contributing to a durable eradication of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia and illegal activities connected therewith,
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence and unity of Somalia, including Somalia’s rights with respect to
offshore natural resources, including fisheries, in accordance with international law,
recalling the importance of preventing, in accordance with international law, illegal
fishing and illegal dumping, including of toxic substances, and stressing the need to
investigate allegations of such illegal fishing and dumping,
Being concerned at the same time that allegations of illegal fishing and
dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters have been used by pirates in an attempt to
justify their criminal activities,
S/RES/1976 (2011)
2 11-29544
Reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (Convention), in particular
its articles 100, 101 and 105, sets out the legal framework applicable to combating
piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities,
Further reaffirming that the provisions of this resolution apply only with
respect to the situation in Somalia and do not affect the rights and obligations or
responsibilities of Member States under international law;
Reiterating its call upon States and regional organizations that have the
capacity to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea
off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with resolution 1950 (2010) and
applicable international law, including human rights law, by deploying naval
vessels, arms and military aircraft and through seizures and disposition of boats,
vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting such use,
Underlining the importance of enhancing ongoing work to address the
problems caused by the limited capacity of the judicial system of Somalia and other
States in the region to effectively prosecute suspected pirates,
Noting with appreciation the assistance being provided by the United Nations,
including its Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and other international
organizations and donors, in coordination with the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), to enhance the capacity of the judicial and the
corrections systems in Somalia, Kenya, Seychelles and other States in the region to
prosecute suspected, and imprison convicted, pirates consistent with applicable
international human rights law,
Commending those States that have amended their domestic law in order to
criminalize piracy and facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates in their national
courts, consistent with applicable international law, including human rights law, and
stressing the need for States to continue their efforts in this regard,
Noting with concern at the same time that the domestic law of a number of
States lacks provisions criminalizing piracy and/or procedural provisions for
effective criminal prosecution of suspected pirates,
Further expressing concern over a large number of persons suspected of piracy
having to be released without facing justice, reaffirming that the failure to prosecute
persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts of the international community and being
determined to create conditions to ensure that pirates are held accountable,
Recognizing the urgent need to undertake decisive further steps to boost
anti-piracy efforts,
Expressing its gratitude for the work done by the Special Adviser to the
Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
Mr. Jack Lang in order to explore new solutions to counter more effectively piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including by more effective
prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted pirates, and noting with
appreciation the conclusions and proposals set forth in his report to the Security
Council contained in the annex to document S/2011/30,
S/RES/1976 (2011)
11-29544 3
Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia exacerbate the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security in the region,
1. Welcomes the report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on
Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the coast of Somalia;
2. Recognizes that the ongoing instability in Somalia is one of the
underlying causes of the problem of piracy and contributes to the problem of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and stresses the need for a
comprehensive response to tackle piracy and its underlying causes by the
international community;
3. Calls upon States to cooperate, as appropriate, on the issue of hostagetaking;
4. Requests States, UNODC, the United Nations Development Programme,
the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and regional organizations
to assist the TFG and regional authorities in Somalia in establishing a system of
governance, rule of law and police control in lawless areas where land-based
activities related to piracy are taking place and also requests the TFG and regional
authorities in Somalia to increase their own efforts in this regard;
5. Requests States and regional organizations to support sustainable
economic growth in Somalia thus contributing to a durable eradication of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as other illegal activities
connected therewith, in particular in priority areas recommended by the Istanbul
conference on piracy in Somalia;
6. Invites States and regional organizations to continue their support and
assistance to Somalia in its efforts to develop national fisheries and port activities in
line with the Regional Plan of Action, and in this regard emphasizes the importance
of the earliest possible delimitation of Somalia’s maritime spaces in accordance with
the Convention;
7. Recalls preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 above and operative paragraph 2
of resolution 1950 (2010), and requests the Secretary-General to report within six
months on the protection of Somali natural resources and waters, and on alleged
illegal fishing and illegal dumping, including of toxic substances, off the coast of
Somalia, taking into account the studies on this matter previously conducted by the
United Nations Environmental Programme and other competent agencies and
organizations, and expresses its readiness to keep the matter under review;
8. Urges States individually or within the framework of competent
international organizations to positively consider investigating allegations of illegal
fishing and illegal dumping, including of toxic substances, with a view to
prosecuting such offences when committed by persons under their jurisdiction;
9. Calls upon States and regional organizations cooperating with the TFG in
the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia to further increase their
coordination to effectively deter, prevent and respond to pirate attacks, including
through the CGPCS;
10. Encourages States and regional organisations cooperating with the TFG
to assist Somalia in strengthening its coastguard capacity, in particular by
S/RES/1976 (2011)
4 11-29544
supporting the development of land-based coastal monitoring and increasing their
cooperation with the Somali regional authorities in this regard, as appropriate, after
having any necessary approval from the Council’s Committee pursuant to
resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009);
11. Calls on States, regional organizations, the United Nations, IMO and
other appropriate partners to provide all necessary technical and financial support to
the implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Regional Plan of Action
for Maritime Security in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean agreed
by Ministers in Mauritius in October 2010, and the CGPCS regional needs
assessment report, recognizing the political will expressed by regional countries in
these documents to combat piracy by all means possible, including through
prosecution and imprisonment;
12. Commends the efforts of the shipping industry, in cooperation with the
CGPCS and IMO, in developing and disseminating the updated version of the Best
Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Arabian
Sea Area (BMP) and emphasizes the critical importance for the shipping industry of
applying the best practices recommended in the BMP;
13. Urges all States, including States in the region, to criminalize piracy
under their domestic law, emphasizing the importance of criminalizing incitement,
facilitation, conspiracy and attempts to commit acts of piracy;
14. Recognizes that piracy is a crime subject to universal jurisdiction and in
that regard reiterates its call on States to favourably consider the prosecution of
suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of
Somalia, consistent with applicable international human rights law;
15. Underlines the need to investigate and prosecute those who illicitly
finance, plan, organize, or unlawfully profit from pirate attacks off the coast of
Somalia, recognizing that individuals and entities who incite or intentionally
facilitate an act of piracy are themselves engaging in piracy as defined under
international law and expresses its intention to keep under review the possibility of
applying targeted sanctions against such individuals and entities if they meet the
listing criteria set out in paragraph 8 resolution 1844 (2008);
16. Invites States, individually or in cooperation with regional organizations,
UNODC and INTERPOL, to examine their domestic legal frameworks for detention
at sea of suspected pirates to ensure that their laws provide reasonable procedures,
consistent with applicable international human rights law, and also invites States to
examine domestic procedures for the preservation of evidence that may be used in
criminal proceedings to ensure the admissibility of such evidence, and encourages
the CGPCS to contribute to this work;
17. Further invites States and regional organizations, individually or in
cooperation with, among others, UNODC and INTERPOL, to assist Somalia and
other States of the region in strengthening their counter-piracy law enforcement
capacities, including implementation of anti-money-laundering laws, the
establishment of Financial Investigation Units and strengthening forensic capacities,
as tools against international criminal networks involved in piracy, and stresses in
this context the need to support the investigation and prosecution of those who
illicitly finance, plan, organize, or unlawfully profit from pirate attacks off the coast
of Somalia;
S/RES/1976 (2011)
11-29544 5
18. Underlines the importance of continuing to enhance the collection,
preservation and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and welcomes further work of
IMO, INTERPOL and industry groups to assist in providing guidance to seafarers
on preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, noting the importance for
the successful prosecution of acts of piracy of enabling seafarers to give evidence in
criminal proceedings;
19. Urges States and international organizations to share evidence and
information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring
effective prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates;
20. Requests States, UNODC and regional organizations to consider,
consistent with applicable rules of international human rights law, measures aimed
at facilitating the transfer of suspected pirates for trial, and convicted pirates for
imprisonment, including through relevant transfer agreements or arrangements, and
commends the efforts to date of the CGPCS in this regard;
21. Welcomes the readiness of the national and regional administrations of
Somalia to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted
suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to
Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable
international law including international human rights law, recognizes in this regard
the discussions between the Government of Seychelles and the national and regional
administrations of Somalia, which resulted in an agreement in principle of a legal
framework for the transfer of convicted pirates to Somalia after their prosecution
and conviction in the Seychelles, and encourages States to continue their efforts in
this regard;
22. Urges States, UNODC, based on support from donors, and regional
organizations to consolidate international assistance to increase prison capacity in
Somalia, including by constructing in the short-term additional prisons in Puntland
and Somaliland, and requests UNODC to continue to provide training for prison
staff in accordance with relevant international human rights standards and to
continue to provide monitoring of compliance with such standards;
23. Requests the TFG, with the assistance of UNODC, to elaborate and adopt
a complete set of counter-piracy laws, and in this regard, welcomes the positive
steps made in Puntland, and the progress being made in Somaliland;
24. Emphasizes the need to ensure effective coordination of anti-piracy
efforts and in that regard requests the Secretary-General to strengthen UNPOS as
the United Nations focal point for counter-piracy, including the Kampala process;
25. Supports the ongoing efforts by regional States in the development of
anti-piracy courts or chambers in the region, welcomes support by States and
international organizations, in consultation with the CGPCS, to such efforts, and
requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures to assist States and
international organizations in such activities;
26. Decides to urgently consider the establishment of specialized Somali
courts to try suspected pirates both in Somalia and in the region, including an
extraterritorial Somali specialized anti-piracy court, as referred to in the
recommendations contained in the report of the Special Adviser to the SecretaryS/
RES/1976 (2011)
6 11-29544
General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia Mr. Jack Lang
(annex to document S/2011/30), consistent with applicable human rights law, and
requests the Secretary-General to report within two months on the modalities of
such prosecution mechanisms, including on the participation of international
personnel and on other international support and assistance, taking into account the
work of the CGPCS and in consultation with concerned regional States and
expresses its intention to take further decisions on this matter;
27. Urges both State and non-State actors affected by piracy, most notably
the international shipping community, to provide support for the above-mentioned
judicial and detention related projects through the Trust Fund Supporting the
Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the coast of Somalia;
28. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 96
DOALOS Table of National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, as at 15 July 2011, p.16
Table of claims to maritime jurisdiction (as at 15 July 2011)
Introductory note: The present, unofficial table of claims to maritime jurisdiction is a reference material based on national legislation and other relevant
information obtained from reliable sources with a view to ensuring the most accurate representation of the status of claims. Despite extensive research and
periodic review, however, the table may not always reflect the latest developments, especially those which have not been brought to the attention of the Division
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations. To report any new developments or inaccuracies regarding the status of
claims, please contact the Division, Room DC2-0460, United Nations, New York, NY 10017, or send an email to: [email protected].
Concerning the approach which has been adopted with respect to the information regarding the continental shelf, the following is to be noted:
The Convention on the Continental Shelf which was adopted in Geneva on 29 April 1958 (“the 1958 Geneva Convention”) defines the term "continental
shelf" as: (a) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; and (b) the seabed and subsoil of similar
submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
Under the provisions of article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“the 1982 Convention”), the continental
shelf extends up to the outer edge of the continental margin, or up to 200 nautical miles where the outer edge does not extend up to 200 nautical miles, or up to
the line of delimitation.
The table reflects the fact that, under international law, 1 the rights of a coastal State over the shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on
any express proclamation. However, in a number of cases, discrepancies seem to exist between the limits as reflected in the national legislation, originally based
on the 1958 Geneva Convention, and the entitlements of States Parties under the 1982 Convention. That Convention, pursuant to its article 311, paragraph 1,
prevails, as between States Parties, over the 1958 Geneva Convention. As it appears, certain States that became States Parties to the 1982 Convention have not
yet completed the process of harmonization of their national legislation with its provisions. However, the entitlement of coastal States to their respective
continental shelves up to the limit allowed by international law is not affected.
In this connection, it has also to be noted that, under current international law of the sea and all legal aspects considered, the outer limits of the
continental shelf would extend, in most cases, up to 200 nautical miles or up to the line of maritime delimitation. Regarding the limits of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles, States Parties to the 1982 Convention need to make a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in order to
seek its recommendation. A considerable number of submissions have already been made and a number of other States Parties are in the process of preparing
such submissions, many of them having submitted preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles,
pursuant to SPLOS/183 - Decision regarding the workload of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the ability of States, particularly
developing States, to fulfil the requirements of article 4 of Annex II to the Convention, as well as the decision contained in SPLOS/72, paragraph (a).
This material is unofficial and for informational purposes only. The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this site do not imply
the expressing of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or
of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Publication on this site of information concerning developments relating to the law
of the sea emanating from actions and decisions taken by States does not imply recognition by the United Nations of the validity of the actions and decisions in
question..
1 Article 2, paragraph 3, of the 1958 Geneva Convention and article 77, paragraph 3, of the 1982 Convention.
MARITIME ZONES
Territorial Sea
Contiguous Zone
Exclusive Economic
Zone
Fisheries Zone
Continental Shelf,
including submissions
to the CLCS
(see introductory
note)
STATE
UNCLOS Ratification,
Accession Date
Does the legislation provide for
straight baselines? 2
Does the State claim
archipelagic status? 3
Breadth of the zone in nautical miles4 Outer limit Sub.
Seychelles 16/09/1991 ● 12 24 200*/DLM CM/200* ● 83, 84
Sierra Leone 12/12/1994 12 24 200 CM/200 p/i
Singapore 17/11/1994 12 85 85
Slovenia 16/06/1995 ● 12/DLM 86 DLM
Solomon Islands 23/06/1997 ● 12 200 CM/200 ● 87
Somalia 24/07/1989 ● 200 CM/200 p/i
South Africa 23/12/1997 ● 12 24 200 CM/200 ● 88, 89
Spain 15/01/1997 ● 12 24 200 90 COORD91 CM/20092 ● 93, 94
83 In respect of the joint submission by the Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of Seychelles - in the region of the Mascarene Plateau.
84 In respect of the Northern Plateau Region.
85 “Should the limits of its territorial sea or Exclusive Economic Zone overlap with claims of neighbouring countries, Singapore will negotiate with those countries with a view to arriving at agreed delimitations in
accordance with international law.”
86 See “Ecological Protection Zone and Continental Shelf of the Republic of Slovenia Act” adopted on 4 October 2005. The delimitation of the ecological protection zone shall be effected by agreement with the
neighbouring States. The Act provides for its provisional outer limits.
87 In respect of the joint submission by the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands - concerning the Ontong Java Plateau.
88 In respect of the mainland of the territory of the Republic of South Africa.
89 Joint submission by France and South Africa - in the area of the Crozet Archipelago and the Prince Edward Islands.
90 In the Atlantic Ocean.
Annex 97
Security Council Resolution 2067 (2012), S/RES/2067 (2012), 18 September 2012
United Nations S/RES/2067 (2012)
Security Council
Distr.: General
18 September 2012
12-51300 (E)
*1251300*
Resolution 2067 (2012)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6837th meeting, on
18 September 2012
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions on the situation in Somalia, as well as other
relevant Presidential Statements on the situation in Somalia,
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence and unity of Somalia and reiterating its commitment to a
comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia,
Recognizing that a more stable Somalia is of vital importance in ensuring
regional security,
Welcoming the significant progress that has been made over the past twelve
months with the convening of the National Constituent Assembly and its subsequent
adoption of the provisional Somali Constitution,
Further welcoming the important work of the Traditional Elders and the
Technical Selection Committee in approving the Members of Parliament, welcoming
the establishment of the new Federal Parliament of Somalia, but expressing concern
at reports of intimidation and corruption during the selection process,
Also welcoming the selection by the new Federal Parliament of its Speaker and
a new President, and considering that this represents the completion of the
Transition in Somalia and an important milestone in Somalia’s path to more stable
and accountable governance,
Expressing concern at the worrying reports of financial misappropriation,
encouraging the new Somali authorities to uphold high standards in financial
management,
Welcoming the role of regional bodies in the Transition process, including the
African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development,
Commending the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
Dr. Augustine Mahiga, for his efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia,
Commending the contribution of the African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM) to lasting peace and stability in Somalia, and noting its critical role in
improving the security situation in Mogadishu and other areas of south-central
S/RES/2067 (2012)
2 12-51300
Somalia, expressing its appreciation for the continued commitment of troops, police
and equipment to AMISOM by the Governments of Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti,
Kenya and Sierra Leone, and recognizing the significant sacrifices made by
AMISOM forces,
Reiterating its strong condemnation of all attacks on Somali institutions,
AMISOM, United Nations personnel and facilities, and the civilian population by
armed opposition groups, and foreign fighters, particularly Al-Shabaab, and stressing
that Somali armed opposition groups and foreign fighters, particularly Al-Shabaab,
constitute a terrorist threat to Somalia, and the international community, stressing
that there should be no place for terrorism or violent extremism in Somalia and
reiterating its call upon all opposition groups to lay down their arms,
Calling on the new Somali authorities, with the support of AMISOM and
international partners, to build an enhanced level of security in areas secured by
AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), underlining the
importance of building sustainable, legitimate and representative local governance
and security structures in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab,
Recalling its resolutions 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2020 (2011) and 2036
(2012), commending the efforts already undertaken by the international community,
including naval and capacity-building operations, welcoming the recent reduction in
the number of successful piracy attacks, recognizing that these gains are potentially
reversible, expressing its grave concern at the threat posed by piracy and armed
robbery off the coast of Somalia, and recognizing that the ongoing instability in
Somalia contributes to the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia,
Welcoming the increased representation of women in Parliament, commending
the Somali authorities and underlining the need to increase their role in decisionmaking
with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,
Expressing concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Somalia and its
impact on the people of Somalia, condemning any misuse of humanitarian
assistance, underlining the importance of international humanitarian support,
Reiterating the importance of adhering to obligations under international law
including the Charter of the United Nations and international human rights and
humanitarian law,
Noting the importance of the investigation of breaches of international
humanitarian law and the importance of holding those who commit such breaches to
account,
Recognizing the importance of transitional justice processes in building lasting
peace and reconciliation in addition to strong institutions to Somalia, and stressing
the role that all Somalis, including women, civil society and government actors, will
play in the reconciliation process through an inclusive and consultative dialogue,
noting the extension of the mandate of the Independent Expert on the situation of
human rights in Somalia for one year,
Looking forward to the forthcoming Secretary-General’s high-level event on
Somalia to be held on 26 September 2012, which will be an opportunity for
Somalia’s new leadership to consolidate the partnership with the international
S/RES/2067 (2012)
12-51300 3
community including on next steps in enhancing security, stability, and transparent
and accountable governance in Somalia,
1. Expresses its determination to work closely with the new institutions and
offices of the Somali authorities, and encourages the new President to expeditiously
appoint an inclusive, accountable Government, particularly a Prime Minister, and
subsequently for the Prime Minister to appoint a Cabinet that can begin the work of
peacebuilding in the country and urges the Somali actors and international
community to pledge their continued support;
2. Emphasizes the critical role of the new Somali authorities in achieving
reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in Somalia, calls on the Somali authorities
to implement all postponed elements of the 6 September 2011 road map and to
conduct government in an accountable and inclusive manner, and to conduct its
finances in a transparent manner, working constructively with the international
community;
3. Emphasizes concern at reports of irregularities and intimidation, during
the selection process for the Members of Parliament, and urges the Somali
authorities to investigate these reports and take appropriate action;
4. Stresses the importance of the new Somali authorities developing a
programme to define post-transition priorities in consultation with partners and
strengthening its relations with regional bodies and requests the Secretary-General
and relevant United Nations entities to provide assistance in this regard, and
underlines that a national referendum on the Provisional Constitution and general
elections should take place within the term of the current Parliament;
5. Underlines the Somali authorities’ responsibility to support reconciliation
and deliver effective and inclusive local administrations, and public services to the
people of Somalia, and underlines that these initiatives must be complemented by
the expansion of rule of law institutions to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab;
6. Reiterates its willingness to take measures against individuals whose acts
threaten the peace, stability or security of Somalia;
7. Expresses its concern at reports of financial misappropriation, reiterates
its call for the end of financial misappropriation urges full cooperation in the rapid
setting up and effective operation of the Joint Financial Management Board, calls on
Somali authorities to develop an effective regulatory framework to promote
economic development and requests all partners involved in the economic
reconstruction of Somalia to increase their coordination, notes the importance of
capacity-building of the relevant Somali institutions;
8. Reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution
of conflicts and in peacebuilding, and stresses the importance of their equal
participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion
of peace and security, urges the Somali authorities to continue to promote increased
representation of women at all decision-making levels in Somali institutions;
9. Recalls its resolutions 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the
protection of civilians in armed conflict, reiterates its support to AMISOM,
welcomes the progress AMISOM has made in improving security in Mogadishu and
beyond, and emphasizes the need for AMISOM, in accordance with its mandate set
out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1772
S/RES/2067 (2012)
4 12-51300
(2007), and the SNSF, with the support of partners, to continue efforts to reduce the
threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, and in this regard
urges the Somali authorities to complete the restructuring of the SNSF including
through ensuring full command and control is in place for all reintegrated personnel;
10. Welcomes support to AMISOM by the African Union’s partners,
especially through the European Union’s African Peace Facility, and calls upon all
partners, in particular new donors, to support AMISOM through the provision of
funding for troop stipends, equipment, technical assistance, and uncaveated funding
for AMISOM to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM;
11. Welcomes the signing of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan, and
reiterates the importance of the Somali authorities assuming responsibility for the
establishment of good governance, rule of law and security and justice services, and
emphasizes the importance of the early establishment of the National Security
Committee, envisaged in the Provisional Constitution, to ensure an inclusive
dialogue among the Somali people over the future security and justice architecture
and urges the international community to redouble its efforts to support the
development of the Somali security institutions and in this regard welcomes the
support to the SNSF by the European Union Training Mission;
12. Urges the international community to continue its efforts to support the
development of the Somali justice institutions and reiterates the fundamental
importance of further enhancing coordination of international support in this area,
underlines the importance of delivering on initiatives agreed at both the London and
Istanbul conferences in 2012;
13. Encourages member States to continue to cooperate with Somali
authorities and each other in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, and
calls upon States to cooperate, as appropriate, on the issue of hostage taking,
underlines the primary role of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia in accordance with the 6 September
2011 road map, and requests the Somali authorities, with assistance from the
Secretary-General and relevant United Nations entities, to pass a complete set of
counter-piracy laws without further delay, including laws to prosecute those who
finance, plan, organize, facilitate or profit from pirate attacks, with a view to
ensuring the effective prosecution of suspected pirates and those associated with
piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, the post-conviction transfer of pirates
prosecuted elsewhere to Somalia, and the imprisonment of convicted pirates in
Somalia, as soon as possible, and in addition urges the Somali authorities to declare
an Exclusive Economic Zone, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, which will promote the effective governance of waters off the
coast of Somalia;
14. Notes that the new Somali authorities assume the previous role of the
Transitional Federal Government for the purposes of paragraph 10 of resolution
1846 (2008) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1851, as renewed by paragraph 7 of
resolution 1897 (2009), paragraph 7 of resolution 1950 (2010) and paragraph 9 of
resolution 2020 (2011);
15. Emphasizes that protecting and promoting human rights, investigating
breaches of international humanitarian law and bringing those responsible for such
breaches to account will be essential for the legitimacy of the new Somali
S/RES/2067 (2012)
12-51300 5
authorities, and calls on Somalia to fulfil its obligations under international human
rights and international humanitarian law;
16. Welcomes the signing on 11 May 2012 of a Memorandum of
Understanding between the Somali authorities and the United Nations on human
rights, urges Member States to support all appropriate bodies in improving human
rights monitoring in Somalia;
17. Welcomes the 6 August 2012 signing of an action plan by the Somali
authorities and the United Nations to eliminate the killing and maiming of children,
noting that this is the first such action plan to be signed, and calls upon the Somali
authorities to vigorously implement both this action plan and the 3 July 2012 action
plan on the recruitment and use of child soldiers, and stresses that any perpetrators
of such acts must be brought to justice;
18. Strongly condemns the grave and systematic violations and human rights
abuses perpetrated by many parties and in particular by Al-Shabaab and its affiliates
against the civilian population, including violence against, children, journalists and
human rights defenders and sexual violence against women and children, and calls
for the immediate cessation of such acts, and emphasizes the need for accountability
for all such violations and abuses;
19. Reiterates its demand that all parties ensure full, safe and unhindered
access for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to persons in need of assistance
across Somalia;
20. Notes the fundamental importance of coherent and coordinated
international support to Somalia, and calls on the United Nations to coordinate
international efforts in the provision of assistance and capacity-building in Somalia
welcoming the gradual relocation of an UNPOS office to Mogadishu and urges all
United Nations entities to take further steps to rapidly achieve a more permanent
and full relocation to Somalia, in particular in Mogadishu and in areas recovered
from Al-Shabaab as soon as possible;
21. Looks forward to the Secretary-General’s inter-agency review of the
United Nations presence in Somalia, emphasizes the need to develop an integrated
strategic approach to all activities of the United Nations system in Somalia, in close
partnership with the Somali authorities and the African Union and in consultation
with regional and international partners, and requests that he presents options and
recommendations to the Security Council by 31 December 2012;
22. Reaffirms its support to finding a comprehensive and lasting settlement
of the situation in Somalia;
23. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex 98
Security Council Resolution 2077 (2012), S/RES/2077 (2012), 21 November 2012
United Nations S/RES/2077 (2012)*
Security Council
Distr.: General
21 November 2012
12-60084* (E)
*1260084*
Resolution 2077 (2012)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6867th meeting, on
21 November 2012
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia,
especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846
(2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015
(2011), and 2020 (2011), as well as the Statement of its President (S/PRST/2010/16)
of 25 August 2010,
Continuing to be gravely concerned by the ongoing threat that piracy and
armed robbery at sea against vessels pose to the prompt, safe, and effective delivery
of humanitarian aid to Somalia and the region, to the safety of seafarers and other
persons, to international navigation and the safety of commercial maritime routes,
and to other vulnerable ships, including fishing activities in conformity with
international law, and also gravely concerned by the extended range of the piracy
threat into the western Indian Ocean and adjacent sea areas and the increase in
pirate capacities,
Expressing concern about the reported involvement of children in piracy off
the coast of Somalia,
Recognizing that the ongoing instability in Somalia contributes to the problem
of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and stressing the need
for a comprehensive response by the international community to repress piracy and
armed robbery at sea and tackle its underlying causes,
Recognizing the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured
at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations,
including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who illicitly plan,
organize, facilitate, or finance and profit from such attacks, and reiterating its
concern over persons suspected of piracy having to be released without facing
justice, reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti-piracy
efforts of the international community and being determined to create conditions to
ensure that pirates are held accountable,
* Reissued for technical reasons on 15 January 2013.
S/RES/2077 (2012)
2 12-60084
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence and unity of Somalia, including Somalia’s rights with respect to
offshore natural resources, including fisheries, in accordance with international law,
recalling the importance of preventing, in accordance with international law, illegal
fishing and illegal dumping, including of toxic substances, and stressing the need to
investigate any new allegations of such illegal fishing and dumping; noting the
report of the Secretary-General (S/2012/783), which acknowledges difficulty in
providing detailed information related to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
and dumping off Somalia’s coast without adequate monitoring or reporting systems,
and states that the United Nations has received little evidence to date to justify
claims that illegal fishing and dumping are factors responsible for forcing Somali
youths to resort to piracy, and that there is currently no evidence of toxic waste
dumping on land and at sea; emphasizing that the concerns about protection of the
marine environment as well as resources should not be allowed to mask the true
nature of piracy off the coast of Somalia which is a transnational criminal enterprise
driven primarily by the opportunity for financial gain, and expressing appreciation
in this respect for the report of the Secretary-General on the protection of Somali
natural resources and water (S/2011/661) prepared pursuant to paragraph 7 of
Security Council Resolution 1976 (2011),
Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“The Convention”), sets
out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as
well as other ocean activities,
Underlining the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast Somalia and noting the several
requests from Somali authorities for international assistance to counter piracy off its
coast, including the letter of 5 November 2012, from the Permanent Representative
of Somalia to the United Nations expressing the appreciation of Somali authorities
to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their willingness to consider
working with other States and regional organizations to combat piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and requesting that the provisions of
resolution 1897 (2009) be renewed for an additional twelve months,
Commending the efforts of the European Union operation ATALANTA, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization operations Allied Protector and Ocean Shield,
Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 151 commanded by Denmark,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Turkey, Thailand and the
United States, and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with
Somali authorities and each other, to suppress piracy and to protect vulnerable ships
transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the efforts of
individual countries, including China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea,
and the Russian Federation, which have deployed ships and/or aircraft in the region,
as stated in the Secretary-General’s report (S/2012/783),
Commending the efforts of flag States for taking appropriate measures to
permit vessels sailing under their flag transiting the High Risk Area to embark
vessel protection detachments and privately contracted armed security personnel,
and encouraging States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable
international law and permit charters to favour arrangements that make use of such
measures,
S/RES/2077 (2012)
12-60084 3
Notes the request of some Member States on the need to review the boundaries
of the High Risk Area on an objective and transparent basis taking into account
actual incidents of piracy, noting that the High Risk Area is set and defined by the
insurance and maritime industry,
Welcoming the capacity building efforts in the region made through the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund
and the Trust Fund Supporting Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast
of Somalia, as well as the European Union’s planned programming under EUCAP
NESTOR, and recognizing the need for all engaged international and regional
organizations to cooperate fully,
Noting with appreciation the efforts made by the IMO and the shipping
industry to develop and update guidance, best management practices, and
recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress piracy attacks off the coast
of Somalia, including in the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean area, and
recognizing the work of the IMO, and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (CGPCS); in this regard, notes the efforts of the International Organization
for Standardization, which has developed industry standards of training and
certification for Private Maritime Security Companies when providing privately
contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high-risk areas,
Noting with concern that the continuing limited capacity and domestic
legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their
capture has hindered more robust international action against the pirates off the
coast of Somalia, too often has led to pirates being released without facing justice,
regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to support prosecution and
reiterating that, consistent with the provisions of the Convention concerning the
repression of piracy, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”) provides for parties
to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons
responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or
threat thereof or any other form of intimidation,
Underlining the importance of continuing to enhance the collection,
preservation and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and welcoming the ongoing work
of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on
preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and noting the importance for
the successful prosecution of acts of piracy of enabling seafarers to give evidence in
criminal proceedings,
Further recognizing that pirate networks continue to rely on kidnapping and
hostage-taking, and that these activities help generate funding to purchase weapons,
gain recruits, and continue their operational activities, thereby jeopardizing the
safety and security of innocent civilians and restricting the flow of free commerce,
and welcoming international efforts to collect and share information to disrupt the
pirate enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL’s Global Database on Maritime
Piracy; and noting the ongoing initiative aimed at establishing the Regional
Anti-Piracy Prosecution & Intelligence Coordination Centre, hosted by the Republic
of Seychelles,
S/RES/2077 (2012)
4 12-60084
Reaffirming international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostagetaking,
including offences contained within the International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, and strongly condemning the continuing practice of hostagetaking
by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia, expressing serious concern at
the inhuman conditions hostages face in captivity, recognizing the adverse impact on
their families, calling for the immediate release of all hostages, and noting the
importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage-taking
and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,
Commending the Kenya and the Seychelles’ efforts to prosecute suspected
pirates in their national courts, welcoming and looking forward to further
engagement of Mauritius and Tanzania, and noting with appreciation the assistance
being provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the
Trust Fund Supporting Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, and other international organizations and donors, in coordination with the
CGPCS, to support Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and other States in the region to
take steps to prosecute, or incarcerate in a third State after prosecution elsewhere,
pirates, including facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable
international human rights law, and emphasizing the need for States and
international organizations to further enhance international efforts in this regard,
Welcoming the readiness of the national and regional administrations of
Somalia to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted
suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to
Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable
international law including international human rights law,
Welcoming the report of the Secretary General (S/2012/783), as requested by
resolution 2020 (2011), on the implementation of that resolution and on the situation
with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,
Taking note with appreciation of the reports of the Secretary-General on the
modalities for the establishment of specialized Somali anti-piracy courts
(S/2011/360 and S/2012/50), prepared pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1976
(2011) and paragraph 16 of resolution 2015 (2011), and the ongoing efforts within
the CGPCS and the United Nations Secretariat to explore possible additional
mechanisms to effectively prosecute persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery
at sea off the coast of Somalia, including those ashore who incite or intentionally
facilitate acts of piracy,
Stressing the need for States to consider possible methods to assist the
seafarers who are victims of pirates, and welcoming in this regard the ongoing work
within the CGPCS and the IMO on developing guidelines for the care of seafarers
and other persons who have been subjected to acts of piracy,
Recognizing the progress made by the CGPCS, UNODC, and UNPOS in the
use of public information tools to raise awareness of the dangers of piracy, highlight
the best practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon, and inform the public of
the dangers posed by piracy,
Further noting with appreciation the ongoing efforts by UNODC and UNDP to
support efforts to enhance the capacity of the corrections system in Somalia,
including regional authorities notably with the support of the Trust Fund Supporting
S/RES/2077 (2012)
12-60084 5
Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, to incarcerate
convicted pirates consistent with applicable international human rights law,
Bearing in mind the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf
of Aden, noting the operations of the newly established information sharing centres
in Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania and the ongoing work regarding a regional maritime
training centre in Djibouti, and recognizing the efforts of signatory States, including
new signatory States South Africa and Mozambique, to develop the appropriate
regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to
patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected
pirates,
Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State
institutions, economic and social development and respect for human rights and the
rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further emphasizing that
Somalia’s long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali
authorities of the Somali National Security Forces,
Welcoming in this regard the election of the President on 10 September and the
subsequent appointment of a Prime Minister and Cabinet, considering that this
represents the completion of the Transition in Somalia and an important milestone in
Somalia’s path to more stable and accountable governance,
Noting that the joint counter-piracy efforts of the international community and
private sector have resulted in a sharp decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings
since 2011 and emphasizing that without further action, the significant progress
made in reducing the number of successful pirate attacks is reversible,
Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia exacerbate the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed
robbery against vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia;
2. Recognizes that the ongoing instability in Somalia is one of the
underlying causes of the problem of piracy and contributes to the problem of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
3. Stresses the need for a comprehensive response to repress piracy and
tackle its underlying causes by the international community;
4. Underlines the primary responsibility of Somali authorities in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and requests the
Somali authorities, with assistance from the Secretary-General and relevant UN
entities, to pass a complete set of counter-piracy laws without further delay, and to
declare an Exclusive Economic Zone in accordance with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea;
5. Recognizes the need to continue investigating and prosecuting all
suspected pirates and urges States, working in conjunction with relevant
international organizations, to intensify their efforts to investigate and prosecute key
S/RES/2077 (2012)
6 12-60084
figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who illicitly plan, organize,
facilitate, or finance and profit from such attacks;
6. Calling upon the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to
investigate and prosecute pirates and to patrol the territorial waters off the coast of
Somalia to suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, noting the importance
of strengthening Somalia’s maritime capacity, and welcomes support by the
international community for strengthening Somalia’s capacity in this regard;
7. Calls upon States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of
hostage taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
8. Notes again its concern regarding the findings contained in the 13 July
2012 report (S/2012/544, page 211) and resolution 2020 (2011) that escalating
ransom payments and the lack of enforcement of the arms embargo established by
resolution 733 (1992) are fuelling the growth of piracy off the coast of Somalia, calls
upon all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
including on information sharing regarding possible arms embargo violations;
9. Recognizes the need for States, regional organizations, and other
appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information with a view to the arrest
and prosecution of key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who illicitly
plan, organize, facilitate, or finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps
under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against such individuals or
entities if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 8 resolution 1844 (2008);
10. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that have the
capacity to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea
off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and
international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and through
seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in
the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for
which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use;
11. Commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate coordination in order to
deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in
cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities and urges States and
international organizations to continue to support these efforts;
12. Encourages Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali
authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary
role of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia, and decides that for a further period of twelve months from the
date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 10 of
resolution 1846 (2008) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1851 (2008), as renewed by
paragraph 7 of resolution 1897 (2009), paragraph 7 of resolution 1950 (2010), and
paragraph 9 of resolution 2020 (2011) granted to States and regional organizations
cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at
sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by
Somali authorities to the Secretary-General;
13. Affirms that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with
respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or
responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or
S/RES/2077 (2012)
12-60084 7
obligations, under the Convention, with respect to any other situation, and
underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing
customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been
renewed only following the receipt of the 5 November 2012 letter conveying the
consent of Somali authorities;
14. Further affirms that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution
733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425
(2002) do not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of
Member States and regional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with
paragraph 12 above or to supplies of technical assistance to Somalia solely for the
purposes set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 1950 (2010) which have been
exempted from those measures in accordance with the procedure set out in
paragraphs 11 (b) and 12 of resolution 1772 (2007);
15. Requests that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the
activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in paragraph 12 do not have
the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships
of any third State;
16. Calls on the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice
those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea and calls upon Member States to assist Somalia, at
the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary-General, to
strengthen capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities, and stresses that any
measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable
international human rights law;
17. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States,
States of the nationality of victims, and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery,
and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national
legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and
prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the
coast of Somalia, including anyone who incites or facilitates an act of piracy,
consistent with applicable international law including international human rights
law to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a
judicial process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing
disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction
and control, such as victims and witnesses and persons detained as a result of
operations conducted under this resolution;
18. Calls upon all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and
to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted,
pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and financiers
ashore, consistent with applicable international law including international human
rights law;
19. Reiterates its decision to continue its consideration, as a matter of
urgency, of the establishment of specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other
States in the region with substantial international participation and/or support, as set
forth in resolution 2015 (2011), and the importance of such courts having
jurisdiction over not only suspects captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or
intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal
S/RES/2077 (2012)
8 12-60084
networks involved in piracy who illicitly plan, organize, facilitate, or finance and
profit from such attacks, and emphasizes the need for strengthened cooperation of
States, regional, and international organizations in holding such individuals
accountable, and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in this regard;
20. Welcomes, in this context, that the report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to resolution 2015 (2011) contains detailed implementation proposals on
ways to ensure that suspected pirates are held accountable through the due process
of law in accordance with international standards, and encourages action in this field
at the federal level in Somalia;
21. Urges all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic
law to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its
proceeds;
22. Urges States, in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further
investigate international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of
Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation;
23. Commends INTERPOL for the creation of a global piracy database
designed to consolidate information about piracy off the coast of Somalia and
facilitate the development of actionable analysis for law enforcement, and urges all
States to share such information with INTERPOL for use in the database, through
appropriate channels;
24. Stresses in this context the need to support the investigation and
prosecution of those who illicitly finance, plan, organize, or unlawfully profit from
pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia;
25. Urges States and international organizations to share evidence and
information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring
effective prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates;
26. Commends the establishment of the Trust Fund Supporting the Initiatives
of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the IMO Djibouti Code
Trust Fund and urges both state and non-state actors affected by piracy, most
notably the international shipping community, to contribute to them;
27. Urges States parties to the Convention and the SUA Convention to
implement fully their relevant obligations under these Conventions and customary
international law and cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and other
international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution
of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
28. Urges States individually or within the framework of competent
international organizations to positively consider investigating any new allegations
of illegal fishing and illegal dumping, including of toxic substances, with a view to
prosecuting such offences when committed by persons under their jurisdiction;
encourages increased efforts to monitor and report on such allegations; takes note of
the report of the Secretary-General (S/2012/783), which acknowledges difficulty in
providing detailed information related to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
and dumping off Somalia’s coast without adequate monitoring or reporting systems,
and states that the United Nations has received little evidence to date to justify
claims that illegal fishing and dumping are factors responsible for forcing Somali
youths to resort to piracy, and that there is currently no evidence of toxic waste
S/RES/2077 (2012)
12-60084 9
dumping on land and at sea; and emphasizes that the concerns about protection of
the marine environment as well as resources should not be allowed to mask the true
nature of piracy off the coast of Somalia which is a transnational criminal enterprise
driven primarily by the opportunity for financial gain; and takes note of the
Secretary-General’s intention to include updates on these issues in his reports
relating to piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
29. Welcomes the recommendations and guidance of the IMO on preventing
and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, underlines the importance
of implementing such recommendations and guidance by all stakeholders,
particularly the shipping industry, and of flag States ensuring, as appropriate, the
implementation of such recommendations and guidance, and urges States, in
collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries, and the IMO, to continue
to develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and
advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of
Somalia, and further urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for
forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately
following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from
captivity;
30. Encourages flag States and port States to further consider the
development of safety and security measures onboard vessels, including, where
applicable, developing regulations for the deployment of PCASP on board ships
through a consultative process, including through the IMO and ISO;
31. Invites the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and
suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in coordination, in
particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry,
and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO’s role concerning privately
contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high-risk areas;
32. Notes the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by
sea, welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EU operation ATALANTA and flag
States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;
33. Requests States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali
authorities to inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General in nine months
of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided
in paragraph 12 above and further requests all States contributing through the
CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, including Somalia and
other States in the region, to report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish
jurisdiction and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;
34. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within
11 months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution
and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia;
35. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as
appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 12 above for
additional periods upon the request of Somali authorities;
36. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 99
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2111 (2013), S/2014/726, 13 October 2014, Annex 5.1: Illustrative overview
of contracts, pp. 192-7
United Nations S/2014/726
Security Council Distr.: General
13 October 2014
Original: English
14-60683 (E) 161014
*1460683*
Letter dated 10 October 2014 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the
President of the Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with
paragraph 28 of Security Council resolution 2111 (2013), I have the honour to
transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and
the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and
issued as a document of the Council.
(Signed) Oh Joon
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
S/2014/726
2/461 14-60683
Letter dated 19 September 2014 from the members of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the
Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
We have the honour to transmit herewith the report focusing on Somalia of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, in accordance with paragraph 28 of
Security Council resolution 2111 (2013).
(Signed) Jarat Chopra
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
(Signed) Nicholas Argeros
Finance expert
(Signed) Zeina Awad
Transport expert
(Signed) Déirdre Clancy
Humanitarian expert
(Signed) Joakim Gundel
Arms expert
(Signed) Dinesh Mahtani
Finance expert
(Signed) Jörg Roofthooft
Maritime expert
(Signed) Babatunde Taiwo
Armed groups expert
S/2014/726
14-60683 3/461
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia
Contents
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
C. Local threats to peace and security in Somalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
E. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
III. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A. Arms embargo modifications for the Federal Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
B. Arms networks connected to the Federal Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
C. Arms deliveries to Puntland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
D. Delivery of detonator cords to north-eastern Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
E. Somaliland oil protection unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
F. Delivery of military-type vehicles and weapons to Jubaland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
IV. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A. Denial of access and attacks on aid workers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
V. Violations of international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A. Targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B. Sexual and gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
C. Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
D. Forced displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
VI. Violations of the ban on charcoal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A. Methodology of investigations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B. Charcoal production, transportation and stockpiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C. Charcoal export trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
S/2014/726
4/461 14-60683
D. Charcoal imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
E. Charcoal warehousing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
F. Falsified customs documentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
G. Role of transporters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
VII. Obstruction of the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A. Government of Kenya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
B. Federal Government of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
VIII. Sanctions list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
IX. State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Annexes*
Somalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.1. Al-Shabaab areas of control in South-Central Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.2. Photograph of Abdullahi Mohamed Ahmed “Arabey”**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.3. Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu: tactics, techniques and procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.4. Al-Shabaab in Puntland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3. Local threats to peace and security in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.1. Threats to peace and security in the Sool region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2. Threats to peace and security in Lower and Middle Shabelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4. Piracy and kidnap for ransom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.1. Registered armed attacks and disruptions since October 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2. Photographs of pirate leader and financier Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje” . . . . . 97
4.3. Pirate facilitator Mohamed Aden “Tiiceey” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4. Photographs of protests against pirate arrests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.5. Photographs of pirate leader and financier Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.6. Central Air Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.7. Pirate finances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5. Misappropriation of public financial resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
5.1. Illustrative overview of contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.2. Contracting for the recovery of public overseas assets of the Federal Republic of
Somalia** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
S/2014/726
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6. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
6.1. Federal Government of Somalia compliance with modifications of the arms embargo . . 205
6.2. Leakage of Somali National Army rifles into arms markets in Mogadishu . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
6.3. Analysis of Djiboutian-supplied ammunition in Mogadishu arms markets . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
6.4. Diversion of arms by political networks connected to the Federal Government of
Somalia** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
6.5. Arms deliveries to Puntland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
6.6. Smuggling of IED equipment and associated smuggling networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
6.7. Analysis of the proposed Oil Protection Unit for Somaliland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
6.8. Delivery of military type vehicles and weapons to Jubaland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
7. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
7.1. Denial of access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
7.2. Selected practices constituting humanitarian obstruction in Puntland** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
7.3. The operation of the Special Protection Units in Somaliland and the Puntland State of
Somalia** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
7.4. Temporary seizure of humanitarian supplies by the Ethiopian National Defence
Forces**. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
7.5. Attacks on humanitarian aid workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
7.6. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
7.7. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance: measures to enhance
compliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
8. Violations of international humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
8.1. Targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
8.2. Targeting of civilians in villages around Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, and in Taleex, Sool,
November 2013** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
8.3. Sexual and gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
8.4. Sexual and gender-based violence allegations involving AMISOM personnel** . . . . . . . 320
8.5. Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
8.6. Forced displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
9. Violations of the ban on charcoal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
9.1. Charcoal production, transportation and stockpiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
9.2. Cases of known charcoal imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
9.3. Charcoal warehousing in the United Arab Emirates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
S/2014/726
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9.4. Systematic use of falsified shipping manifests and certificates of origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
9.5 Charcoal transporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and are being issued without
formal editing.
** The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
S/2014/726
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Annex 5.1: Illustrative overview of contracts
Oil and Gas sector
1. In its previous report (S/2013/413 annex 5.5), the Monitoring Group described
some of the risks associated with increasing commercial activity in the oil and gas
sector in Somalia without a resolution to constitutional and legal disputes
surrounding the control of natural resources. It also highlighted transparency and
accountability issues in the key Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) petroleum
institutions that would govern capacity building and regulation, notably the Somali
Petroleum Corporation and the Somali Petroleum Agency (SPA). During the course
of 2013 and 2014, the FGS has nonetheless continued to engage in private
negotiations with oil and gas companies and other corporations, resulting in a
number of secret contracts and cooperation agreements that in due course are likely
to exacerbate legal tensions and ownership disputes and stunt the transparent
development of Somalia’s oil and gas sectors.
Soma Oil and Gas
2. In August 2013, Soma Oil and Gas Exploration, a United Kingdom-registered
company created in 2013 and chaired by the former leader of the United Kingdom
Conservative Party, Lord Michael Howard, announced an agreement on 6 August
2013 signed with the FGS to conduct seismic surveys in Somalia’s territorial waters
and to collate and process historic seismic data, which would be placed into a data
room controlled by the FGS. In return, Soma Oil would receive the right to apply
for up to 12 oil licenses covering a maximum of 60,000 square kilometres of
territory in Somalia.1
3. The contract has never been made public, nor was it approved by the Federal
Parliament of Somalia although it was ratified by the Council of Ministers on
3 October 2013. Those involved in the architecture of the deal included
Dr. Abdullahi Haider, special advisor to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud,
and Jay Park, a Canadian lawyer who is managing partner of Petroleum Regimes’
Advisory and Park Energy Law.2 At a signing ceremony, Jay Park was accompanied
by Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, the then Minister of Natural Resources.3
4. On 3 February 2014, the company announced it had signed a seismic contract
with Seabird Exploration to cover 20,000 square kilometres of seismic data off the
coast of Somalia. On 6 June 2014, the company announced it had completed
20,500 square kilometres of seismic data acquisition and that processing of the data
would run until late 2014.
5. On 6 August 2014, Robert Shepherd and Philip Wolfe, Chief Executive Officer
and Chief Financial Officer of Soma Oil and Gas Exploration Limited wrote to the
__________________
1 Announcement on 6 August 2013 of the Oil and Gas Agreement Signed with Somalia and Soma
presentation entitled Unlocking Somalia’s Potential, 29-30 April 2014.
2 Four separate industry sources interviewed on 26 September 2013 and 12 April 2014. A former
advisor to President Hassan Sheikh on oil matters also stated he had been informed by FGS
energy ministry officials that Jay Park and Abdullahi Haider were the key architects of the deal
on the FGS side.
3 See http://som.horseedmedia.net/2013/08/somalia-federal-government-signs-oi…-
with-soma-oil-gas-exploration-limited/. The former minister has been working as a
consultant advisor to the Presidency following his departure from the FGS ministerial cabinet.
S/2014/726
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Monitoring Group to explain how they had managed the security arrangements for
the Seabird operations. They stated that Soma had “contracted Peace Business
Group, a licensed Somali security sector company to provide armed Somali
personnel” and that “each seismic vessel was supported and protected by four
support vessels and international and Somali security personnel on such support
vessels”. They stated that only Somali personnel held arms within the 12 nautical
mile limit, and “internationally operated firearms remained outside the 12 nautical
mile limit”.4
Mubadala
6. On 17 July 2014, Mubadala, the sovereign investment fund of the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) announced a cooperation agreement with the FGS aimed at
“sharing knowledge, increasing the strength of the Somalia Ministry and its staff,
and over time, developing upstream opportunities in Somalia”.5
7. Given the institutional lack of capacity of Somali petroleum institutions,
notably the SPA, the Monitoring Group is concerned that conflicts of interest could
result from the provision of technical capabilities by corporate entities that are also
seeking to secure oil acreage. If Mubadala’s provision of “capacity” is not
channelled into a transparently run SPA, which is responsible for managing a
cadastre of licenses through a process of transparent auctions, the risk is that such
“capacity” would serve to empower informal decision makers within the system
who also may have a vested interest in parceling out licenses to favoured companies
in secret deals. Seismic data, in particular, should be completely controlled by the
SPA in a secure data room so that all companies eventually bidding for licenses
would have equal opportunities to access data in a regulatory environment free from
insider dealing.
8. In this regard, notably even at this stage the Minister of Petroleum and Natural
Resources, Daud Mohamed Omar, has often been excluded from strategic decisions
made by others who exert broader informal leverage over the decision making
process related to oil licensing.6
Shell, ExxonMobil and BP
9. On 13 June 2014, Minister Omar visited the headquarters of Shell in The
Hague, Netherlands. Shell was originally awarded a concession for five oil blocks
(M3-M7) in Somalia in 1988, after which Mobil Exploration (now a unit of
ExxonMobil) joined in as a 50 per cent partner (see S/2013/413, annex 5.5.b, for a
map of where concessions lie). The companies have now begun discussions with the
Ministry to convert the existing concessions, which have been under force majeure
since 1990, to a Production Sharing Agreement, as called for by the 2008 Petroleum
Law.7
__________________
4 Security for Seabird Exploration’s activities was provided by Solace Global Maritime (based in
the United Kingdom) and Salama Fikira International (registered in Mauritius).
5 See announcement made on 17 July 2014 on http://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadalapetroleum-
signs-cooperation-agreement-somalia.
6 Diplomatic source dealing with oil sector stated that the Minister had frequently complained
about this problem, 5 May 2014. A Somali source known to the Minister also stated the same on
24 July 2014.
7 Joint Statement by the Federal Republic of Somalia and Shell, 13 July 2014.
S/2014/726
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10. While the negotiations with Shell and Exxon were widely publicized, the
Monitoring Group is nonetheless concerned that such negotiations are premature
and could spark conflict, especially since they have not been conducted in
consultation with regional authorities who may be affected. Indeed, M5 is licensed
over offshore territory claimed by Puntland. Just days after the announcement by
Shell on the new discussions, Puntland’s Director General of the Ministry of
Mineral Resources and Petroleum, Issa Mohamoud Farah, rejected the legality of
the negotiations, stating that “The Federal Government of Somalia does not govern
over Puntland and all accords should be postponed until all states agree on how to
share the country’s natural resources”.8 The 2008 Petroleum Law, which directly
contradicts constitutional provisions giving regional authorities rights to control the
licensing of their natural resources, is also yet to be approved by the Federal
Parliament.
11. On 4 August 2014, President Mohamud was reported as saying that the FGS
was also in renegotiations with BP.9 As previously shown by the Monitoring Group
(S/2013/413, annex 5.5), BP’s prior concessions in Somalia clash with current
concessions licensed out by the Somaliland authorities.
Turksom
12. The Monitoring Group has received documentation concerning efforts by
Musa Haji Mohamed ‘Ganjab’10 and Abdullahi Haider to operate a joint Turkish —
Somali company known as “Turksom” that would be involved in building and
operating a fuel distribution business and securing Turkish investments in Somalia.
13. On 25 November 2011, Musa Ganjab e-mailed a document purporting to be a
proposal letter from Turksom, thanking the Government of Turkey for its support
and requesting the company to be appointed as sole representative of all of Turkey’s
economic interests in Somalia. The letter stated that the company was registered in
both Turkey and Somalia, although the phone numbers provided for its Somalia
office are Ugandan numbers. The letter also stated that the company would be able
“to provide effective security to each and every project that Turkey Government and
private business are planning to implement in Somalia” (see annex 5.2.a for a copy
of the letter).
14. By 2012, Turksom was incorporated and in discussions with another Somali
company, Hass Petroleum, a leading oil marketing company in East Africa
originally founded by a group of Dhulbahante businessmen from Sool region in
northeastern Somalia. In an e-mail to Ganjab on 30 October 2012 entitled
“Memorandum of Understanding Between Turksom & Hass Petroleum (K) Ltd”, a
director at Hass Petroleum discussed a joint venture for the rehabilitation of petrol
stations in Mogadishu and for construction of a fuel depot and port infrastructure
with Turksom. The director requested clarification from Ganjab on how he would
like his shareholding to be structured within the joint venture. The e-mail was
__________________
8 See “Puntland rejects oil deal with Shell and ExxonMobil”, 22 June 2014, at
http://www.africareview.com/Business---Finance/Puntland-rejects-oil-dea…-
ExxonMobil/-/979184/2357968/-/f9fklwz/-/index.html.
9 See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-04/somalia-sees-oil-results-this-…-
wooed.html.
10 See annex 6.4 for Ganjab’s relations to arms embargo violations and Al-Shabaab, and annex 5.2
for his role in the recovery of Somali overseas assets.
S/2014/726
14-60683 195/461
accompanied by an attachment signed by Ganjab as CEO and Adbullahi Haider as
Director General of Turksom Somalia Inc (see annex 5.2.b for a copy of the
attachment).
15. On 6 September 2013, Ganjab received an e-mail from the address
[email protected] entitled “Oil Depo and security project Financing”
stating (unofficial translation from the Somali language as follows):
Haji Musa,
After greetings. You must have been busy yesterday. I have given your phone
number to a guy in the UK called Ahmed who is the representative of a
security company based in America (FLORIDA). Please contact them and
negotiate as they are ready.
Mr. Mike Deegan is back from Dubai. Him and Mr Deylaf has not met …
please let me know when you are ready for a conference call.
Thank you
Abdulhamid
16. Independently, the Monitoring Group has been informed that Ganjab has been
in discussions with Mohamed Deylaaf, a businessman previously named by the
Group in the context of diversion of food aid, including to Al-Shabaab
(S/2010/91).11 Deylaaf is known to have interests in the downstream fuel sector.12
The Monitoring Group has also obtained documentation that Turksom Security
Company was officially registered as an approved private security company with the
Ministry of Interior in 2013 (see annex 5.2.c), although it is not clear to what extent
this company operated and how it obtained its weaponry.
Fisheries protection and management
17. On 25 July 2013, the FGS signed a letter of appointment nominating a
company called Somalia FishGuard Limited as the sole agent and representative of
the FGS with exclusive rights to undertake the patrol, protection, management and
development of fisheries in Somalia’s waters, including in the Exclusive Economic
Zone. The contract was signed by the then Minister of Natural Resources, Abdirizak
Omar Mohamed. The company is obliged to provide and operate vessels for
fisheries protection, including through the establishment and training of a Somalia
Fisheries Protection Force, as well as prepare the provision of fishing regulations
and the management of the licensing and regulatory infrastructure of the
Government pertaining to fisheries. In return, the FGS would be obliged to provide
the company access to state infrastructure and ports and “permission to carry light
and medium sized weapons and ammunition consistent with the FPF requirements to
exercise its obligations under this contract subject to UN Security Council
resolutions”. The company would also receive military style uniforms and be
conferred with the necessary authority to detain and arrest vessels fishing illegally
in Somali waters. The Monitoring Group has been informed that FishGuard would
__________________
11 Information received by three independent Somali businessmen in Mogadishu familiar with
Ganjab’s businesses, interviewed in December 2013.
12 Somali company CEO and UN contractor who has provided services to Deylaaf, February 2014,
and a Somali source with knowledge of Deylaaf’s business affairs, May 2014.
S/2014/726
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retain 51 percent of all revenues13 derived from licensing fees, although the figures
have been deliberately blacked out in the copy of the contract obtained by the
Monitoring Group (see annex 5.2.d for a copy of the FishGuard letter of
appointment).
18. On 27 July 2013, two days after the contract was signed, Ganjab received an
e-mail from Abdi Amalo (who the Monitoring Group has investigated for conspiracy
to divert overseas assets in strictly confidential annex 5.2, which was entitled
“Info”. The text of the e-mail simply reads as follows:
Xaaji Musa,
Let’s talk brother
http://companycheck.co.uk/company/04958710/FISHGUARD-MARINELIMITED
19. In April 2014, representatives of Somalia Fishguard Limited accompanied by
President Mohamud and Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Mohamed
Olow Barow, were in Brussels to attend a fisheries meeting with Europêche and
Federpesca at the Headquarters of the European Commission. The representatives
included Chairman David Walker, Director John Church, William Oswald and
Christopher Brooke.14
20. The Monitoring Group has been informed that Somalia Fishguard Limited has
been in discussions with Saladin Security Ltd, a UK private security company,
whose representatives were introduced to President Mohamud in Mogadishu by
Abdullahi Haider (the business partner of Ganjab in Turksom, and a presidential
advisor on oil and gas) in mid May or June 2013.15 The company has operations in
Mogadishu and is the private security contractor for Kilimanjaro Capital, a private
equity firm which has farmed into an oil block awarded by the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) in 2008 to a private company, and which partly falls in Al-
Shabaab territory.16
National Theatre
21. The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of a draft contract between the
Ministry of Public Works and Reconstruction, Marine and Transport, Ports and
Energy and Sinohydro Corporation Ltd for the reconstruction of the National
Theatre in Mogadishu for a sum of USD 31 million. This contract was transmitted
by Musa Ganjab to Jeremy Schulman of the U.S. law firm of Shulman Rogers on
23 November 2013 (see annex 5.2 for investigation into the diversion of overseas
assets by Ganjab and Shulman Rogers). It is not clear whether any financial
transactions related to this contract have taken place, as no major rehabilitation
works on the National Theatre have taken place in 2013 and 2014.
__________________
13 Information obtained from a fisheries advisor to the FGS on 5 May 2014.
14 Correspondence obtained by the Monitoring Group with a list prepared by Ahmed Mohamed
Iman, Director General of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, dated 1 April 2014.
Christopher Brooke is the brother of Alan Henry Brooke, the 3rd Viscount Brookeborough, a
member of the United Kingdom House of Lords.
15 Information obtained from advisor to the FGS, 6 May 2014, and from private security source,
10 June 2014.
16 See http://www.saladin-security.com/the-companies.php and http://www.marketwired.com/
press-release/kilimanjaro-signs-somalia-security-memorandum-gxg-kcap-1909408.htm.
S/2014/726
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UNSOA
22. The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence that service contracts issued by
the United Nations Support Office for African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA)
may have been issued to companies associated with Ganjab.
23. On 26 June 2013, Nurta Sheikh Mohamud, the sister of President Mohamud
wrote to Ganjab, forwarding a memo issued by UNSOA to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation dated 20 June 2013. The memo informed the
ministry of a two day business seminar to be held by UNSOA with the purpose of
raising awareness among the Somalia business community on how to win contracts
as vendors to the United Nations.
24. In the e-mail, the President’s sister draws the attention to Ganjab to the memo
and informs him that she has set up a conglomerate known as the Trust Group of
Companies, for the express purpose of bidding for UN contracts. She requests a
meeting with Ganjab to discuss the matter further.
25. While UNSOA has not registered any contracts to any company referred to as
Trust or Trust Group, as a matter of due diligence and risk management, the
Monitoring Group would recommend a full audit of all its contracts to determine
whether there are any companies in which Ganjab has an interest, given the
evidence pertaining to Ganjab’s other illicit activities documented in strictly
confidential annex 5.2 and strictly confidential annex 6.4.
Annex 100
Kenya DOALOS Page, updated 14 October 2014
27/11/2017 KENYA
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/KEN.htm 1/2
KENYA
Updated 14 October 2014
SUBMISSION IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE DEPOSIT OBLIGATIONS
PURSUANT TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA (UNCLOS)
M.Z.N. 58. 2006. LOS of 25 April 2006: Deposit of two lists of
geographical coordinates of points, specifying the straight baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured and the outer
limits of the exclusive economic zone of Kenya, together with illustrative
map number SK 90 (edition 4), as contained in the Proclamation by the
President of the Republic of Kenya of 9 June 2005, in respect of
Kenya’s territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (Legal Notice No.
82 (Legislative Supplement No. 34) published in Kenya Gazette No. 55
of 22 July 2005).
Originals of deposited geographical coordinates of points
Relevant articles of UNCLOS: 16(2); 75(2)
LOSIC No. 23
Proclamation of 9 June 2005, including the lists of
geographical coordinates of points and the illustrative
map, reproduced in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 61
Communications received by the SecretaryGeneral
in connection
with the deposit of charts and/or lists of geographical coordinates
of points
N/A
CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES FROM
THE BASELINES FROM WHICH THE BREADTH OF THE
TERRITORIAL SEA IS MEASURED
Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
made on 6 May 2009
OTHER INFORMATION
Legislation
Territorial Waters Act of 16 May 1972, revised in 1977
Presidential Proclamation of 28 February 1979replaced
by
Presidential Proclamation of 9 June 2005
Approximate Coordinates
of Baseline Points on Map Sheet SK/74,
28 February 1979
Chapter 371The
Maritime Zones Act, 1989
Presidential Proclamation of 9 June 2005, pursuant to article 16,
paragraph 2, and article 75, paragraph 2, of UNCLOS (Law of the Sea
Bulletin No. 61)
Piracy
Merchant Shipping Act 2009
Maritime boundary delimitation agreements
and other material
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United Nations Privacy Notice
Exchange of Notes constituting an agreement on the territorial sea
boundary, 17 December 1975 9
July 1976 (entry into force: 9 July
1976; registration #: 15603; registration date: 18 April 1977; link to
UNTS)
Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the
Republic of Kenya on the delimitation of the maritime boundary of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, 23 June 2009 (see
Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 70)
with Somalia
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the
Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the
Somali Republic to Grant to Each Other NoObjection
in Respect of
Submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200
Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(entry into force: 7 April 2009, registration #: I46230;
registration date:
11 June 2009; link to UNTS) (see also Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 70)*
Other communications
Kenya: Note verbale dated 9 January 2014
Somalia: Somalia Note verbale dated 7 October 2014
* By a note verbale dated 2 March 2010, the Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to the United Nations informed
the Secretariat that the MOU had been rejected by the Parliament of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and
"is to be hence treated as nonactionable."
Annex 101
Letter from the Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group mandated pursuant
to paragraph 46 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014) to the Chair of the Security
Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia
and Eritrea, reporting the initial findings of the Monitoring Group’s investigation into the
operations of Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited (Soma), S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31, 28
July 2015
UNITED NATIONS
NATIONS UNIES
Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
REFERENCE: S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 28 July 2015
Excellency,
I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Coordinator of the Somalia and
Eritrea Monitoring Group (the Monitoring Group) mandated pursuant to paragraph 46 of
Security Council resolution 2182 (2014).
I am writing to brief you on the initial findings of the Monitoring Group’s investigation
into the operations of Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited (Soma), an extractives exploration
company that secured a lucrative contract in August 2013 with the Federal Government of
Somalia (FGS) to conduct seismic surveying off the country’s southern and central coast.1 The
contract awarded Soma the subsequent right to exploit 12 offshore oil and gas blocks (totalling
60,000 km2) of its own choosing.
/…
His Excellency
Mr. Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea
CC: H.E. Mr. Elmi Ahmed Duale, Permanent Representative of the Somali Republic to the
United Nations, New York
Mr. Abdirahman Sheikh Issa, National Security Adviser to the Somali President, Federal
Government of Somalia
H.E. Mohamed Aden Ibrahim, Minister of Finance, Federal Government of Somalia, and
Chairman of the Financial Governance Committee
Mr. Nigel Roberts, representative of the World Bank with the Financial Governance
Committee
1 Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited is a UK-registered company incorporated on 26 April 2013, and chaired by
Lord Michael Howard, former leader of the UK Conservative Party.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 2
The Group has obtained evidence2 demonstrating that Soma has been making regular
payments since June 2014 to civil servants in the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
(the Ministry), some of whom were instrumental in both securing the company’s initial contract,
and negotiating subsequent agreements. A “Capacity Building Agreement” was signed by Soma
and the Ministry mainly to channel these payments. The evidence collected by the Monitoring
Group demonstrates that this Capacity Building Agreement created a serious conflict of interest,
in a number of cases appearing to fund systematic payoffs to senior ministerial officials.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011) and paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060
(2012)3, the Monitoring Group will describe acts that undermine Somali public institutions
through corruption and will demonstrate how:
• The Capacity Building Agreement was likely part of a quid pro quo arrangement,
whereby the Ministry would protect Soma’s contract from the potential negative
consequences of a forthcoming review by the Financial Governance Committee (FGC), a
body chaired by the FGS Minister of Finance and tasked with reviewing Government
contracts;
• as a possible further quid pro quo, Ministry officials arranged to extend the offshore area
in which Soma is permitted to conduct seismic surveying (“Evaluation Area”) and later,
at Soma’s behest, began to renegotiate the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) for the
company’s future blocks – all while on Soma’s payroll;
• senior civil servants awarded themselves ‘salaries’ pursuant to spuriously drafted
contracts for positions they already held;
• at least six officials on Soma’s ‘capacity building’ payroll simultaneously drew FGS civil
servant salaries;
• Soma transferred the first instalment of ‘capacity building’ funds to the Ministry before
performing internal due diligence on the individuals who were to receive salary
payments. The company continued to transfer funds even once their identities became
known to the company and;
2 The Monitoring Group has obtained access to numerous original documents detailing agreements between Soma
and the FGS Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. The Group has also viewed extensive electronic
correspondence involving Soma and the Ministry, and has further corroborated its investigations through numerous
testimonies from present and former Ministry and other FGS officials, oil and gas experts, legal experts, members of
development agencies, members of the diplomatic community, journalists, and others. Confidential electronic
correspondence is cited below in italics.
3 In paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011), the Security Council expanded the scope of prohibited acts that threaten
the peace, security or stability of Somalia to include the misappropriation of public financial resources. This is
reiterated in paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060 (2012).
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 3
• Soma paid close to half a million dollars to an ostensibly independent legal advisor to the
Ministry, J. Jay Park.
The Monitoring Group further describes how the misuse of ‘capacity building’ in the
Soma context fits within a broader pattern of misconduct and misappropriation at the Ministry.
The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence, for example, of the Ministry’s attempts to
persuade at least one other oil and gas company to pay ‘salaries’ to its staff. Ministry staff also
diverted payments from another company into a privately held ministerial bank account in
contravention of FGS regulations – and indeed attempted to have Soma direct its funding into
this account.
The Monitoring Group’s findings reinforce the rationale for its previous calls for the
implementation of clear legal and policy frameworks governing the engagement of the
extractives industry in Somalia.4 In particular the FGS should be encouraged to apply its existing
legislation, especially the 2008 Petroleum Law, in the management of both current and future oil
and gas contracts. As required by this legislation, it is critical to establish an independent Somali
Petroleum Authority to serve as regulator for the industry. The Federal Parliament should also
approve current, future contracts and authorisations – including the draft Soma PSA currently
under consideration by the Ministry.
The Monitoring Group recognises the considerable potential of oil and gas discoveries in
Somalia and in Somali waters, but also of the threat to peace, security and stability posed by an
unregulated extractives industry. The Group has previously highlighted both the risks of
corruption in the sector, and the “shortcomings” in transparency and capacity of Somalia’s
petroleum institutions (S/2013/413 and S/2014/726). The Group will, therefore, again
recommend a moratorium on all PSAs until the necessary arrangements and institutions are in
place to manage the industry for the good of the Somali people.
Background to the Capacity Building Agreement5
4 For a background to the oil and gas sector in Somalia, see Annex 1.
5 The inclusion of capacity building programmes in agreements between extractives companies and Governments of
developing countries is relatively common. Each oil major that has signed a deal in Somalia (Royal Dutch Shell,
Total S.A., Eni S.p.A., Chevron Corp., ConocoPhillips Co., and BP plc) offers local training and scholarship
programmes in the developing countries in which it operates. However, having consulted with several independent
experts, the SEMG has been unable to identify other cases where the regular payment of senior civil servants
responsible for managing deals with oil and gas firms has been labelled “capacity building.” Analogous payment
practices, however, have been the subject of criticism: Royal Dutch Shell, Elf Aquitaine, Norsk Hydro and, most
recently, Soco International, for example, have all been accused of impropriety with respect to the making of regular
hidden payments to local security and/or Government officials in order to protect company interests. See The
Guardian, “Shell spending millions of dollars on security in Nigeria, leaked data shows,” 19 August 2012 (available
at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/19/shell-spending-security…); Global Witness, “Elf
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 4
The circumstances and chronology of events surrounding the Capacity Building
Agreement are integral to an understanding of how an ostensibly positive arrangement for
Somalia was in fact a scheme concocted by the Ministry, with Soma’s acceptance, in the
expectation of reciprocal benefits.
In a May 2013 interview, the former Minister for National Resources,6 Abdirizak Omar
Mohamed, asserted that the FGS “should wait until we have the right laws in place” before
entering into agreements with oil and gas firms.7 Three months later, on 6 August 2013, the FGS
signed a Seismic Option Agreement (SOA) with Soma, in which the latter agreed to conduct a
seismic survey within an area to be confirmed in a later “Reconnaissance Authorisation”
agreement. On 9 January 2014, with the “Evaluation Area” agreed, the FGS formally entered
into a Reconnaissance Authorisation agreement with Soma. 8
On 21 January 2014 Daud Mohamed Omar was appointed as FGS Minister of Petroleum
and Mineral Resources. Fewer than two weeks later, on 2 March 2014, the original SOA with
Soma was sent to the newly established Financial Governance Committee (FGC) for review.
On 5 March 2014 Soma made arrangements for Minister Omar, Farah Abdi Hassan, the
Director General of the Ministry, and Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed and J. Jay Park, advisors
to the Ministry, to stay at Nairobi’s Fairmont Hotel from 9-13 March 2014 in order to hold
meetings with the company.9
On 10 March 2014, Minister Omar signed a “First Amendment Agreement” to the 6
August 2013 SOA, which was subsequently transmitted to Soma on 22 March to be
countersigned.10 The Agreement included a request for “capacity assistance in connection with
the supporting work of the Government in relation to the seismic survey…” In a letter dated 15
March 2014 and also sent to Soma on 22 March, Minister Omar formally requested “that Soma
provide financial support to the Government...”
trial throws spotlight on oil and corruption,” 17 March 2003 (available at https://www.globalwitness.org/archive/elftrial-
throws-spotlight-oil-and-corruption/); Global Witness, “Statoil Hydro's Libyan “corruption” scandal shows
need for oil industry disclosure laws,” 20 November 2008 (available at
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/14446/libya_oil_scandal_points_…); Global
Witness, “Virunga: UK company bankrolled soldiers accused of bribery and violence in quest for oil in Africa’s
oldest national park,” 20 June 2015 (available at https://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/democratic-republiccongo/
soco-in-virunga/).
6 The Ministry of National Resources was subsequently split into four successor ministries in January 2014,
including the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.
7 The Financial Times, “Somalia: Oil thrown on the fire,” 13 May 2013. Available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/538e9550-b3e1-11e2-ace9-00144feabdc0.html#axz….
8 See Annex 2 for a map of Soma’s offshore Evaluation Area and Reconnaissance Authorisation Area.
9 A photograph of the Fairmont Hotel meeting is available in Annex 3.
10 See Annex 4 for a copy of the First Amendment Agreement.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 5
Specifically, Minister Omar requested support with:
a. rehabilitation of the Ministry’s offices in Mogadishu;
b. furnishing and equipping the Ministry’s office, including establishment of a data room;
c. the hiring and contracting of qualified technical staff and expert consultants and advisors,
inside and outside of Somalia, including covering the costs of:
i. salary or consulting fees;
ii. benefits;
iii. accommodation allowance; and,
iv. business related travel;
d. training programs for Ministry staff;
e. Petroleum regime development programs focused on the following objectives:
i. harmonization of Somalia’s constitutional provisions governing petroleum and
minerals issues;
ii. development of petroleum policy, petroleum law, petroleum regulations, and
model host government contracts; and
iii. conferring and developing consensus with governments of regional member
states; and
f. Other areas as may be agreed in writing by Government and Soma.11
On 27 March 2014, the Director General of the Ministry, Farah Abdi Hassan, expressed
annoyance over delays in Soma’s response to the Ministry’s request for capacity assistance,
declaring in an email addressed to the Ministry’s legal advisor, Jay Park, that the Ministry would
not stand for Soma “questioning” or “delaying” the programme. He also warned that Soma’s
contractual agreements with the FGS, both past and prospective, would be subject to review if
“assistance” were not provided: “If the SOMA questions the assistance [to] the Ministry then so
many things goes [sic] to review, while the parliament is asking to ratify the SOA agreement.”
On 17 April 2014, Director General Hassan wrote to two of Soma’s directors, CEO
Robert Sheppard and Hassan Khaire, informing them that the Natural Resources Subcommittee
of the FGS Parliament had requested a copy of the 6 August 2013 SOA for review. In the
correspondence, Hassan again suggested a link between the provision of ‘capacity building’ and
the protection of the Soma SOA from official review: “[w]hy don’t you sign the [First
Amendment Agreement] and return, because, I am sure it will protect the [SOA] agreement.”
The very same day, Sheppard sent a formal letter to Minister Omar confirming Soma’s desire to
move ahead with the agreement:
11 This letter is attached in Annex 5.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 6
“Soma Oil & Gas understands your request for support in regards to capacity building at
the Ministry. In the next few days, I will be writing a separate letter to you outlining how
Soma Oil & Gas proposes to support the Ministry in this regard.”
Three days later, on 20 April 2014, Soma followed through on its pledge, and a draft text
of the Capacity Building Agreement was sent to Director General Hassan for his review.
Three days after receipt of this draft agreement, the FGC “Confidential Assessment” of
the Soma SOA arrived at the Ministry. While specific improvements to the SOA were
recommended – alongside more general concerns raised regarding “contracting in the oil and gas
sector as a whole” – the FGC did not make recommendations that threatened the validity of the
Soma deal.12
The Capacity Building Agreement (“the Agreement”) was signed by the Minister on 27
April 2014 and by Robert Sheppard on 15 May 2014.13 In the Agreement Soma pledged to cover
the salary costs, up to USD 5,000 per month each, for a maximum of six “qualified technical
staff, consultants and advisors, inside and outside of Somalia” over a 12-month period (totalling
USD 360,000). Soma also committed to “pay the cost of office equipment, transportation, and
other working tools which shall not exceed lump sum of [USD 40,000].” The Agreement
therefore capped the total capacity support to be provided by Soma, including salary payments,
at USD 400,000. The Agreement did not include, however, any provision for funding of training
or petroleum regime development programmes, as had also been requested in the Ministry’s
letter of 15 March 2014.
Among the conditions of the Agreement was a requirement for the Ministry to submit
monthly written reports to Soma, providing the names, terms of reference, and employment
contracts for each proposed staff member. Critically, the Agreement prohibited the Ministry from
contracting any “connected person” within the framework of the programme. “Connected
person” was defined as “any person, company, other organisation or legal entity directly or
indirectly controlled by any member of the Government or who is otherwise directly or indirectly
related to or connected to any member of the Government.”
On 27 April 2015, Soma signed an extension of the Agreement with the Ministry,
prolonging the duration of the programme for an additional six months, from April to September
12 Of the eight contracts and concessions the FGC had reviewed by January 2015, Soma’s was the only contract on
which “no action” was taken. Others were “overtaken by events” (Simatech International), “withdrawn as
duplicative” (TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA), “restructured and allegedly signed” (CGG/Robertson
GeoSpec International), “considered for cancellation” (Somalia-FishGuard Ltd.), “under investigation” (AMO
Shipping Company Ltd.), or “under discussion” (Albayrak Turizm Inşaat Ticaret A.Ş and Favori LLC). Quoted from
the “FGC Reviews of Public Sector Contracts and Concessions” report, 31 December 2014.
13 See Annex 6 for a copy of the Capacity Building Agreement.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 7
2015.14 Under the extension, Soma agreed to provide further “capacity support payments” of
USD 30,000 per month, equalling a total over six months of USD 180,000.
Payments
On 22 May 2014 Soma’s CFO, Philip Wolfe, sent the Director General a template
invoice for the Ministry to submit. The next day, a USD 70,000 invoice for the first instalment of
the ‘capacity building’ funds, signed by Director General Hassan and Deputy Director General
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi – who both later received salaries themselves under the Agreement –
was returned to Soma.15
Following receipt of the first instalment of the Soma funds in the Ministry’s Central Bank
of Somalia (CBS) account, Director General Hassan attempted to persuade Soma to circumvent
the CBS when making future transfers. Such an arrangement would be in flagrant violation of
FGS Ministry of Finance directives, which require that all FGS revenue be channelled through
the Treasury Single Account at the CBS. On 29 June 2014, Hassan emailed Soma CEO Robert
Sheppard and CFO Philip Wolfe explaining,
“I am thinking to change the route or have an account from another bank. We realized
how things gets [sic] late if we didn’t get alternative way, there are number of private
companies which are easier to use and more efficient than the central bank.”
Wolfe refused the Director General’s suggestion, informing him that Soma would
continue to route ‘capacity building’ monies to the CBS for purposes of transparency.
Soma transferred a total of USD 400,000 for the Capacity Building Agreement in three
instalments to the Ministry’s CBS account. The company also transferred an additional USD
90,000 instalment in May 2015, the first payment pursuant to the extension of the Agreement on
27 April 2015:
1. USD 70,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 30 June 2014;
2. USD 150,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 17 August 2014;
3. USD 180,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 13 November 2014;
4. USD 90,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 28 May 2015.16
14 Letter dated 24 July 2015 from Soma to the Monitoring Group, in response to the Group’s email queries of 16
July 2015.
15 See Annex 7 for the first ‘capacity building’ invoice submitted by the Ministry.
16 Letter from Soma to the Monitoring Group, 24 July 2015.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 8
The Monitoring Group has obtained a ‘salary chart’ sent to the Ministry by Soma in
March 2015. This chart details the ‘capacity building’ payments Soma made (totalling USD
295,800) to 14 ministerial employees from March 2014 to the end of February 2015, with
projections of future payments continuing up to June 2015.17 The 14 employees listed on the
salary chart, and the amounts they are listed as having received, are:
Name Title(s) Received from Soma as of
February 2015
Farah Abdi Hassan Director General USD 36,000
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi Deputy Director General
Director of Administration &
Finance Department
Senior Management Advisor
USD 36,000
Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi Permanent Secretary to the
Prime Minister
Director of Planning &
Development Department
Senior Resource Economist
USD 33,000
Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar
Hussein
Director of Exploration
Department
Senior Petroleum Geologist
USD 30,000
Hussein Ali Ahmed Managing Director of the
Somalia Petroleum
Corporation
Director of Oil Management
Department
Senior Economic Advisor
USD 16,000
Yusuf Hassan Isack Head of Public Relations
Media Expert
USD 24,000
17 Soma’s ‘salary chart’ is provided in Annex 8. While the salary chart lists payments dating back to March 2014,
the first instalment of Soma’s ‘capacity building’ funds did not arrive at the Ministry until June 2014. Thus all chart
payments prior to June 2014 represent backdated amounts paid as ‘arrears’ to Ministry officials.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 9
Abdinor Mohamed Ahmed Media Coverage
Reporter
Public Relations
USD 16,000
Abdullahi Mohamed Warfaa International Relations USD 16,000
Mohamed Yousuf Ali Director of Legal Affairs
Department
Senior Legal Expert
USD 32,00018
Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad Senior Advisor
Mineralogist
USD 32,00019
Leila Ali Ahmed Administration Assistant USD 4,200
Dr. Abdullahi Haider
Mohamed
Senior expert &Team Leader
FGS Advisor on Oil & Gas
Diplomat
USD 15,000
Abdirzak Hassan Awed Personal Assistant USD 4,000
Farah Ahmed Isma’il Personal Assistant USD 1,600
Double Dipping
The Monitoring Group has been able to confirm, through information provided by the
FGS Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources itself that at least
six Ministry officials paid by Soma under the Capacity Building Agreement concurrently drew
civil servant salaries from the FGS:
1. Farah Abdi Hassan
2. Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi
3. Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi
4. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein
5. Hussein Ali Ahmed
6. Leila Ali Ahmed20
18 Mohamed Yousuf Ali claimed in correspondence with the SEMG that he only received a total of USD 4,000 of
the USD 32,000 earmarked for him.
19 Abdi Mohamed Siad similarly claimed in correspondence with the SEMG that he only received a total of USD
4,000 of the USD 32,000 earmarked for him.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 10
The Monitoring Group has been unable to find evidence that the Capacity Building
Agreement was reflected in the 2014 FGS national budget. When contacted by the Monitoring
Group, the Minister of Finance, H.E. Mohamed Aden, stated that he was unaware of a privately
funded capacity building programme in any FGS ministry, informing the SEMG that “[a]s far as
I am aware there is no private capacity injection programs. All capacity injection programs are
through multitrust and/or bilateral donors.”21 Soma did not directly respond to a question from
the Monitoring Group as to whether the company had notified the Ministry for Finance about the
Capacity Building Agreement, stating only that “Soma signed the Capacity Building Agreements
with the Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources.”22
Profiles of officials who received payments from Soma
The Monitoring Group has compiled profiles, below, of the officials who received
payments under Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement. A number of these officials – including
the Director General of the Ministry, the Deputy Director General, and the Permanent Secretary
to the FGS Prime Minister – occupy positions in which they routinely take decisions directly
bearing on the company’s financial interests in Somalia. As such, their receiving payments from
Soma represented a clear conflict of interest.
In addition, three individuals listed on Soma’s salary chart have told the Monitoring
Group that they only received a fraction of the amount allocated to them on paper. One alleged
recipient of USD 28,000 in ‘missing’ payments has asserted that he does not recognise the
signature on the payslip receipt provided to him for inspection by the Monitoring Group. It is not
yet clear to the Group who signed for or received these monies.
Farah Abdi Hassan
Director General of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Farah Abdi Hassan was appointed Director General of the then-Ministry of National
Resources in July 2013, and has retained this position since its successor ministry, the Ministry
of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, was created in January 2014. As Director General, Hassan
served as the Ministry’s primary point of contact for Soma and other oil and gas firms, affording
him a great deal of influence. An April 2014 memo from Minister Omar, seen by the Monitoring
20 The Monitoring Group notes with appreciation the cooperation of the FGS Minister of Finance, H.E. Mohamed
Aden, in supplying this information.
21 Email to the SEMG from Minister Aden, 21 May 2015.
22 S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.25/Add.4, 1 July 2015.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 11
Group, stipulated that Hassan was to be “the lead contact and the focal point of the Ministry in
all aspects of communications.”23
Hassan was present for negotiations over the First Amendment Agreement in Nairobi in
March 2014. In May 2014 Hassan co-signed, with Jabril Mahamoud Geeddi, the first invoice for
the programme. He then proceeded to sign a new contract for his existing position – formulated
by Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi (see below) and countersigned by Minister Omar – backdated to
March 2014.24
Hassan was paid USD 3,000 per month under the Capacity Building Agreement, and by
February 2015 had received a total of USD 36,000. According to the FGS Ministry of Finance,
Hassan also draws a civil servant monthly salary of USD 1,235. Over the course of one year,
therefore, Soma made monthly payments to the most senior civil servant in the Ministry
equivalent to almost triple his Government salary.
Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed
Senior expert & Team Leader
FGS Advisor on Oil and Gas
Between October 2014 and February 2015, Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed held the
position of “Senior expert & Team Leader” at the Ministry, and was paid a total of USD 15,000
through Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
The SEMG’s 2014 final report (S/2014/726) identified Haider as a special advisor to FGS
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and one of two “key architects” of the Soma deal.25 The
SEMG’s current investigation into Haider’s role corroborates this assessment. According to a
former advisor to the Ministry, negotiations over the Soma deal were conducted by Haider,
Ministry legal advisor Jay Park, and then-FGS petroleum minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed
during the Somalia conference in London in May 2013.26 In a 1 July 2015 letter to the SEMG,
23 This memo was attached in a 13 April 2014 email from Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi to Farah Abdi Hassan.
24 See Annex 9 for a copy of Farah Abdi Hassan’s Capacity Building Agreement contract.
25 See S/2014/726, annex 5.1. The 2014 report also links Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed to Musa Haji Mohamed
‘Ganjab,’ a former advisor to FGS President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud accused by the SEMG of ties to Al-Shabaab
and of the diversion of recovered overseas FGS assets. Haider served as Director General of Ganjab’s joint Turkish-
Somali company, “Turksom,” which was involved in a project to build and operate a fuel distribution business in
Mogadishu, as well as secure Turkish investments in Somalia.
26 23 September 2013 email from Patrick Molliere to an oil executive, provided to the SEMG by Molliere. Molliere
served as Special Advisor to the Government for Petroleum Affairs from October 2015 to August 2013, and was
instrumental in drafting the federal Petroleum Law of 2008.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 12
Soma acknowledged that Haider “represented the Federal Government…in the negotiations
around the Seismic Option Agreement that was signed in August 2013.”27
Haider’s influence in the Ministry extended beyond the Soma portfolio: on 9 August
2013, three days after the Soma SOA was signed, Patrick Molliere, a former oil executive and at
the time an advisor to the Ministry, received an email from the Ministry’s interlocutor at Royal
Dutch Shell plc, William Sevier: “Hope all is well. We have been advised to deal with Dr Haider
wit [sic] cc to Minister.”28
Since 2010, Haider has been referred to interchangeably as a presidential, ministerial, or
governmental advisor on oil and gas. A regional news service stated that Haider “has become de
facto the privileged interlocutor for international oil organisations.”29 Haider’s LinkedIn profile
currently identifies him as a “Senior Adviser at Commission for Petroleum & Mineral
Resources” and previously as a “Senior Adviser, Oil and Gas” from 2010-2014.30 Indicative of
his status within the FGS, Haider carries a diplomatic passport, which lists his occupation as
“Diplomat.”31
As recently as April 2015, during an oil and gas conference – after his tenure as “Senior
expert & Team Leader” at the Ministry had come to an end – Haider was again being presented
as a ‘senior advisor’ to the FGS.32 At the conference, which took place in London from 27-28
April 2015, Haider conducted side meetings with industry executives, at which the Minister was
not present.33
Prior to, during, and after the period when he received payments via the Soma Capacity
Building Agreement, Haider was in a position to exert significant influence on Government
decisions directly bearing on Soma’s business prospects in Somalia. In this context, his signing
of a contract with the Ministry to serve as “Senior expert & Team Leader” was merely a
temporary re-hatting of his already existing role, in order to facilitate his receiving payments
from Soma.
27 S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.25/Add.4, 1 July 2015.
28 Email provided to the SEMG by Patrick Molliere.
29 African Intelligence, No. 1381, 6 June 2014.
30 Available at https://www.linkedin.com/pub/abdullahi-haider/87/711/723. Accessed 24 July 2015.
31 See Annex 10 for a copy of Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed’s FGS diplomatic passport.
32 The Guardian, “Where there is oil and gas there is Schlumberger,” 18 May 2015. Available at
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/18/where-there-is-oil-a….
33 Monitoring Group’s interviews with three journalists and an oil and gas analyst who were present at the April
conference, June 2015.
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Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi
Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister
Director of Planning & Development Dept / Senior Resource Economist
Prior to joining the Ministry in April 2014, Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi served as Minister of
Planning for Galmudug regional authority. From April 2014 to February 2015, Hagi received a
total of USD 33,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement. According to the salary chart
Hagi was also due an additional USD 3,000 for the month of March 2015.
Internal ministerial correspondence shows that Hagi drafted his own employment
contract, which subsequently became the template for each subsequent contract signed by payees
of the Capacity Building Agreement. Hagi also drafted the terms of reference for his own
position, “Director of Planning and Development Department & Senior Resource Economist,” as
well as that of Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed (“Senior expert & Team Leader”).
Since at least 9 February 2015, Hagi has served as the Permanent Secretary to the FGS
Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Shermarke. However, Soma continued to pay Hagi once he
had become the prime minister’s top staffer. Hagi confirmed to the SEMG in July 2015 that he
had received ‘capacity building’ salary payments up to the end of February 2015;34 Soma’s
salary chart shows that he was due to be paid up to the end of March.
Hagi has provided the Monitoring Group with a copy of a decree marking his
appointment as Permanent Secretary, dated 9 February 2015 and signed by Prime Minister
Shermarke.35 However, an 11 January 2015 email from Director General Hassan to seven other
senior members of the Ministry makes reference to “A-Mohamed Hagi, the PS of office of the
Prime minister.” This reference suggests that Hagi may have been serving unofficially as Prime
Minister Shermarke’s Permanent Secretary as early as the beginning of January, and was
apparently regarded as such by other Ministry officials.
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi
Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Director of Administration & Finance Department / Senior Management advisor
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi has been employed at the Ministry since January 2013,
originally under the title of “Coordinator.” Geeddi’s employment contract, signed for the
purposes of receiving a Soma ‘capacity building’ salary, lists his position as “Director of
Administration & Finance Department & Senior Management advisor.” However, his curriculum
34 Email from Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi to the SEMG, 3 July 2015.
35 Email attachment from Hagi to the SEMG, 7 July 2015.
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vitae, as well as extensive internal correspondence from the Ministry on file with the Monitoring
Group, identifies him as the Deputy Director General of the Ministry.
In an email dated 30 July 2014, Geeddi provided a description, in the third person, of his
function at the Ministry: “Mr. Geddi is responsible for the administration and finance sector, of
the Ministry, and he’s full time employee who earns a standard salary of grade A from the
government plus bonus… [emphasis added].” In an interview with the Monitoring Group on 11
June 2014, Director General Hassan confirmed that Geeddi was the primary official responsible
for the financial administration of the Ministry, including the management of the Capacity
Building Agreement. As such, Geeddi was responsible for withdrawing ‘capacity building’ funds
from the Ministry’s CBS account.36
Geeddi is a close associate of Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed. At the 2013 CWC Groupsponsored
Somalia Oil and Gas Summit in London, held on 7 October 2013, Haider and Geeddi
were observed to be “leading the minister around.”37 Following the summit, a dinner took place
at principal Soma shareholder Basil Shiblaq’s London restaurant, Maroush, which both Geeddi
and Haider attended. Also present were Lord Michael Howard, the Chairman of Soma, Abdullahi
Mohamed Ali ‘Sanbololshe,’ the FGS ambassador to the UK, petroleum minister Abdirizak
Omar Mohamed, Soma CEO Robert Sheppard, CFO Philip Wolfe, Basil Shiblaq, Jay Park, as
well as other individuals intimately involved in the Soma deal.38
From March 2014 to February 2015, Geeddi received salary payments totalling USD
36,000, or USD 3,000 per month, from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement. Over the same
period, he also received an FGS civil servant salary of USD 1,135 per month.
Hussein Ali Ahmed
Managing Director of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation
Director of Oil Management Department / Senior Economic Advisor
Between July 2014 and February 2015, Hussein Ali Ahmed occupied the position of
“Director of Oil Management Department & Senior Economic Advisor” in the Ministry. Both
prior to and during his time on Soma’s payroll, Ahmed served as Managing Director of the
Somalia Petroleum Corporation (SPC),39 the national oil company that he was instrumental in
establishing in 2007.
36 For a sample of withdrawal slips with Geeddi’s signature, see Annex 11.
37 Monitoring Group’s interview with a source who was present at the October summit, 4 June 2015.
38 Monitoring Group’s interview with a source that was present at the dinner, 4 June 2015. The source provided the
SEMG with a photograph alleged to have been taken during the dinner.
39 For a more detailed discussion of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation, see Annex 1.
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Ahmed held a series of prominent positions prior to heading up the SPC; from 2004-
2007, he served as special advisor on oil and gas to former Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed
Gedi, and as mayor of Mogadishu from 2001-2004. In 2007, Ahmed also headed the Somalia
Petroleum Law Team, which was responsible for drafting the 2008 Petroleum Law, legislation
that still remains in force.
Similar to other officials on Soma’s payroll, therefore, Ahmed has a lengthy history of oil
and gas postings in the Somali Government. While being paid by Soma as “Director of Oil
Management Department & Senior Economic Advisor” to the Ministry, he concurrently held the
title of SPC Managing Director, a position of influence with direct impact on Soma’s interests in
Somalia.
Between July 2014 and February 2015, Ahmed received a total of USD 16,000 from
Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement. According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring
Group, as well as his employment contract with the Ministry, Ahmed was to receive an
additional USD 8,000 up to June 2015. According to the FGS Ministry of Finance, Ahmed
receives a civil servant salary of USD 1,135 per month.
Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein
Director of Exploration Department / Senior Petroleum Geologist
Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein joined the Ministry in May 2014. Hussein possesses a
Master’s of Science degree in Engineering Geology and Geotechnics, and his employment
contract with the Ministry lists his position as “Director of Exploration Department and Senior
Petroleum Geologist.”
Hussein received USD 30,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement between May
2014 and February 2015. According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, he
was due to be paid an additional USD 6,000 up to April 2015.
In an interview with the Monitoring Group held on 11 June 2015, Director General
Hassan confirmed that Hussein is a key member of a “negotiation team,” responsible for
reaching an agreement on production sharing with Soma (see discussion of the “Draft Production
Sharing Agreement (PSA)” below), a function he exercised whilst receiving payments from
Soma.
An email dated 27 April 2015 from Hussein to various members of the Ministry provided
an outline of the agenda for the “Exploration Department,” of which he is the director. One of
the agenda items he listed, to be completed by September 2015, was “[e]valuating PSAs
submitted by farm-out partners of Soma Oil and Gas and signing them.”
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Abdullahi Mohamed Warfaa
Personal Assistant to the Minister
‘International Relations’
While Abdullahi Mohamed Warfaa’s employment contract defines his role at the
Ministry as relating to “International Relations,” in correspondences dated October and
December 2014 he is referred to as the “personal assistant” to the Minister.
Between July 2014 and February 2015, Warfaa received a total of USD 16,000 through
Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement. According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring
Group, as well as his employment contract with the Ministry, Warfaa was due an additional USD
8,000 up to June 2015.
Leila Ali Ahmed
Administration Assistant
Leila Ali Ahmed was employed as an “Administration Assistant” under the Capacity
Building Agreement from July 2014 to February 2015, receiving a total of USD 4,200 according
to the salary chart. However, from 8 August 2014 onwards Ahmed concurrently drew an FGS
civil servant salary of USD 735 per month.
Possible Ghost Workers
The Monitoring Group has identified four officials on Soma’s salary chart as possible
ghost workers. Three of these individuals claim to only have worked at the Ministry for a
fraction of the time indicated in the salary chart; the Group has been unable to confirm the very
existence of a fourth.
Mohamed Yousuf Ali
Director of Legal Affairs Department / Senior Expert
Mohamed Yousouf Ali holds a Masters of Law degree, and his ‘capacity building’
employment contract designates his position within the Ministry as “Director of legal affairs
Department & Senior expert.” From July 2014 to February 2015, according to the salary chart,
Ali collected USD 32,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
On 13 October 2014 Director General Hassan suspended Ali’s contract with the Ministry,
citing the latter’s inability to be present in Mogadishu due to personal reasons. Nonetheless,
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according to Soma’s salary chart, Ali’s salary payments continued until February 2015, despite
the fact that he had not been physically present in Mogadishu since late August 2014.40
Ali informed the SEMG that he had only received one salary payment of USD 4,000
before the suspension of his contract, and that the Ministry never paid him an additional two
months’ salary owing.41 If true, after July 2014 Ali became effectively a ghost worker at the
Ministry, with the remaining USD 28,000 owing in his contract collected by an unknown third
party. The SEMG has yet to determine who countersigned for Ali on his payslips, or where the
funds subsequently ended up.
Abdi Mohamed Siad
Senior Advisor for the Ministry and Mineralogist
Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad is a senior lecturer at the University of the Western Cape in the
Republic of South Africa. He holds a PhD in Applied Geochemistry, making him the only
technical expert whose employment under the Capacity Building Agreement does not represent a
conflict of interest.
From July 2014 to February 2015, according to the salary chart, Siad collected USD
32,000 while serving in the position of “Senior Advisor for the Ministry and Mineralogist.”
However, Siad informed the Monitoring Group that he returned from Mogadishu to South Africa
in August 2014, and subsequently gave notice of his resignation to Minister Omar and Director
General Hassan on 14 October 2014.42 According to Siad, he was sent one month’s salary from
Hassan in the amount of USD 4,000, but received no subsequent payment.
The Monitoring Group sent Siad a ‘capacity building’ payslip dated 30 November 2014,
allegedly displaying his signature; Siad confirmed that the signature was not his. The SEMG has
yet to determine who forged Siad’s signature on his payslips, or who collected the USD 28,000
remaining on his contract.43
Abdirizak Hassan Awed
Personal Assistant for the Ministry
From November 2014 to February 2015, Abdirizak Hassan Awed was employed under
the Capacity Building Agreement in the position of “Personal Assistant for the Ministry,”
40 Email from Mohamed Yousuf Ali to the SEMG, 29 June 2015.
41 Email from Ali to the SEMG, 29 June 2015.
42 Email from Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad to the SEMG, 9 July 2015. Siad also forwarded his 14 October 2014
resignation email to the Group.
43 See Annex 12 for a copy of this forged payslip.
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collecting USD 4,000. According to the salary chart, he was also slated to receive an additional
USD 2,000 from March to April 2015.
In an email in the Somali language, Awed informed the Monitoring Group that he had
been employed by the Ministry from November 2014-April 2015, but that the final two months
of his salary payments had been “embezzled.”44
Farah Ahmed Isma’il
Personal Assistant for the Director General’s Office
According, to the salary chart, Farah Ahmed Isma’il received USD 1,600 from November
2014 to February 2015 under the Capacity Building Agreement, and was due another USD 800
from March-April 2015. As of 5 March 2015, the Ministry had not submitted Isma’il’s
curriculum vitae, employment contract, or passport copy to Soma, as required by Soma’s internal
due diligence mechanism (see “Due Diligence,” below). The Monitoring Group has found no
communications from or to Isma’il within the Ministry correspondence it has viewed. As a
result, the Group has so far been unable to substantiate Isma’il’s existence.
Abdinor Mohamed Ahmed and Yusuf Hassan Isack
The Monitoring Group continues to investigate the involvement of the two remaining
officials on Soma’s salary chart, Abdinor Mohamed Ahmed and Yusuf Hassan Isack.
Due Diligence
In order to perform internal due diligence on the individuals being paid under the
Capacity Building Agreement, Soma required the Ministry to provide a set of documents for
each payee: curriculum vitae, employment contracts, passport copies, and signed payslips. Soma
began transferring the ‘capacity building’ funds in June 2014, however, before it had received
any of this documentation.45 The Ministry began submitting the required documents in early
August 2014, definitively revealing to Soma the identities of senior officials being paid, if the
company had not already been aware.46
44 Email from Abdirizak Hassan Awed to the SEMG, 13 July 2015.
45 Correspondence between Soma and the Ministry dated June 2014 and seen by the Monitoring Group.
46 Farah Abdi Hassan and Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi, respectively the Director General and Deputy Director General
of the Ministry, were first to receive salaries from Capacity Building Agreement. According to Hassan, Soma was
aware that both individuals would be on the company’s payroll before the transfer of funds commenced. SEMG
interview with Hassan, 11 June 2015.
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As of late as March 2015 – 11 months after the date of the Capacity Building Agreement
– Soma’s representative in Nairobi was still requesting the Ministry to deliver the remaining
documents the company had demanded.
The Monitoring Group has found no evidence demonstrating that Soma questioned the
Ministry’s choice of payees, despite the fact that the Capacity Building Agreement explicitly
prohibited the contracting of “connected persons” defined in the Agreement as “any person,
company, other organisation or legal entity directly or indirectly controlled by any member of
the Government or who is otherwise directly or indirectly related to or connected to any member
of the Government.” Instead, Soma proceeded to transfer the remaining ‘capacity building’ funds
to the Ministry in two further instalments, accepting the Ministry’s continued and absolute
discretion in selecting the payees without prior notification. In response to the Monitoring
Group’s inquiries, Soma claimed that “no connected persons ever received payment pursuant to
Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement,” despite being aware that both the Director General and
Deputy Director General of the Ministry were on the company’s payroll.47
Soma failed to provide the Monitoring Group with the names, positions, and other
requested details of the individuals who received salary payments from its Capacity Building
Agreement. In its response to the Monitoring Group’s direct request, Soma provided the
following:
“Soma Oil & Gas has put in place a robust Anti Bribery & Corruption Policy and
Procedures. On this basis we have reviewed the passports, curriculum vitae and contracts
of all the individuals who receive salary payments from the Ministry of Petroleum &
Mineral Resources under the Capacity Building Programme, as well as reviewing the
monthly payroll information.”48
Soma’s Statements Relating to the Capacity Building Agreement
Soma has acknowledged the existence of its Capacity Building Agreement on multiple
occasions. In a press release dated 24 September 2014, Soma announced that the programme
“will see the Company cover the salaries of a small number of experts, including geologists and
geoscientists for a one-year period.”49 Soma’s public relations firm, FTI Consulting Inc., further
acknowledged the existence of the programme and payments on 22 October 2014:
47 Letter dated 24 July 2015 from Soma to the Monitoring Group, in response to the Group’s email queries of 16
July 2015.
48 S/AC.29/201mern5/NOTE.25/Add.4, 1 July 2015.
49 Available at http://somaoilandgas.com/news/12.
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“The $400,000 commitment from Soma will enable the Ministry to employ 12 qualified
geologists, geoscientists and other professionals for a one year period – these are
individuals who will be trained at internationally recognised institutions and are
committed to making a contribution to their own country’s development through the
opening up of the hydrocarbons industry.”50
Only three51 of the 14 ministerial officials paid by Soma possess advanced degrees in the
fields of geology or geoscience. Two of these three were already on the FGS civil servant payroll
during the period they received ‘salaries’ from Soma; the third, Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad, held a
position at the Ministry for barely a month before returning home (see “Abdi Mohamed Siad,”
above).
In an email response dated 23 September 2014 to an inquiry about capacity building from
The Wall Street Journal, Director General Hassan wrote the following: “In April 2014, H.E.
Minister Daud Mohamed Omar signed a capacity building paper with Soma (see picture on
Ministry website)52 - they will help us with some office equipment and some salaries of expert
staff at the Ministry for one year.” The text of Hassan’s response had been drafted by Soma CFO
Philip Wolfe, following a 22 September 2014 email in which the former requested Wolfe’s
assistance: “Pls consult what to answer? I knew that they [The Wall Street Journal] have already
some hints…”
In summary, Soma’s official representations of its Capacity Building Agreement to
journalists and the public are in stark contrast to the events described by and documentary
evidence obtained by the Monitoring Group. Instead of being an assistance package to facilitate
hiring a limited number of technical experts, Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement amounted in
many cases to extra ‘salaries’ paid to top ministerial officials who had already been on the FGS
payroll prior to the programme’s launch.
Agreement Amendments Following the Capacity Building Agreement
Shortly after the signing of the Capacity Building Agreement, the FGS and Soma began
negotiating a further territorial allowance for Soma’s seismic exploration, as well as a draft
agreement that would grant Soma a larger share of profits from potential production (“Evaluation
Area Extension” and “Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)”). The Monitoring Group has
50 Written response to a journalist’s query.
51 Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad, Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein, and Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed.
52 The Monitoring Group has been unable to locate this photo – or indeed any reference to Soma’s Capacity
Building Agreement – on the Ministry’s website (http://mopetmr.so/), accessed 24 July 2015.
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identified these concessions to Soma as potential quid pro quos related to the Capacity Building
Agreement.
Evaluation Area Extension
On 8 May 2014, the Minister signed a letter extending the offshore area available to
Soma to survey (Evaluation Area Extension).53 “In light of [Soma’s] progress, it is the desire of
the Ministry that the Evaluation Area…as agreed between the Ministry and Soma be expanded to
include a larger area. The Ministry hereby requests that Soma include within its exploration
Program (as defined in the SOA) a 2D seismic survey that extends to the JORA block as outlined
in the attached map.”54 The letter ends: “Also, the JORA Block will become part of the area in
respect of which Soma may serve a Notice of Application for a Production Sharing Agreement
pursuant to Article 2.2. of the SOA.”55
The timing of the signing of the Evaluation Area Extension suggests that it may have
represented a quid pro quo between the Ministry and Soma. The Minister signed the Evaluation
Area Extension on 8 May 2014, fewer than two weeks after agreeing the terms of the Soma
Capacity Building Agreement. A week later, on 15 May 2014, Soma countersigned the Capacity
Building Agreement.
Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)
On 28 November 2014, Soma CEO Robert Sheppard addressed a letter56 to the Minister,
stating Soma’s case for revising the production sharing terms.57 The rationale presented by Soma
for renegotiating the PSA included the fact that “much of the basin is in deep or ultra deep
water,” the unproven nature of the reserves, and the collapsing global price of oil. The letter also
set forth Soma’s wish to also include explicit fiscal terms for gas in the revised PSA.58
Subsequently in December 2014 a draft PSA agreement was sent to the Ministry for
approval. The terms of this draft PSA have since been criticised for being highly unfavourable to
the FGS, particularly following the publication of a Bloomberg article that first revealed the
53 See Annex 13 for a copy of this letter.
54 Ownership of the Jora block is currently subject to a maritime border dispute between the governments of Kenya
and Somalia.
55 The Ministry later offered production sharing rights for the Jora block to another company in exchange for a
similar ‘capacity building’ arrangement to Soma’s, Allied Petroleum (SO) Corp. (see “Pattern of Corruption,”
below).
56 See Annex 14 for a copy of this letter.
57 The original PSA was set forth in an annex of the 6 August 2013 SOA.
58 The primary impetus for the revised PSA may have been that Soma’s seismic survey had revealed larger gas
deposits than previously expected. Interview with a Western embassy official based in Nairobi, 24 March 2015.
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parameters of the proposed deal.59 In a copy of the draft PSA seen by the Monitoring Group,
Soma’s share of revenue is stipulated to be as high as 90% in some cases. Furthermore, the draft
PSA grants the company a four-year royalty holiday for oil and gas found fewer than 1,000
metres below the sea’s surface, as well as a decade-long moratorium on paying taxes to the FGS.
Following publication of the Bloomberg article, the Ministry issued a statement in which
it denied having received any draft PSA from Soma, further announcing that “Somalia is not
accepting PSA deals at the moment.”60 However, in a meeting with the Monitoring Group on 11
June 2015, Director General Hassan acknowledged that the Ministry had received the draft PSA
from Soma, though he denied having personally seen it. Hassan further claimed that negotiations
on the PSA had not yet begun, although he made reference to a “negotiation team,” to which Dr.
Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein belongs. Contrary to Hassan’s statements, internal Ministry
correspondence seen by the Monitoring Group shows that Hussein sent a copy of the draft PSA
to Hassan on 29 January 2015. Both Hassan and Hussein, as previously noted, have been paid
‘salaries’ by Soma.
Correspondence seen by the Monitoring Group shows that negotiations over the draft
PSA with Soma have been taking place since at least late April 2015. In an email dated 30 April
2015, Peter Roberts, a lawyer representing the Ministry from the Houston-based firm Andrews
Kurth LLP, wrote to another Ministry representative:
“Soma - we had a cordial meeting and we promised to send to their lawyers next week a
table of key issues and concerns regarding the PSA draft, with a view to discussing it
with their lawyers week commencing 11 May. Going well so far.”
The current FGS Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar,
told the Monitoring Group in June 2015 that the Ministry would not sign any PSA before a
resource-sharing framework had been established with Somalia’s regional authorities. He also
told the Monitoring Group that The African Legal Support Facility, a public international
institution hosted by the African Development Bank, was in the process of assigning a legal
consultant to assist the Ministry in developing a model PSA for Somalia.61
59 Bloomberg, “Somalia May Pay 90% Oil Revenue to Explorer Under Draft Deal,” 29 May 2015. Available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-28/somalia-may-pay-90-of….
60 AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring, 31 May 2015. Available at http://somaliamediamonitoring.org/june-1-2015-
morning-headlines/.
61 SEMG interview with H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, 29 June 2015.
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Data Room
Negotiations with Soma have taken place in a context of fundamental disparity, in which
only one side, Soma, has access to the seismic survey data.62
Under the terms of the 6 August 2013 SOA, Soma was required to turn over the data
obtained from its offshore seismic survey to the FGS “within a reasonable time.” Although the
survey was completed by June 2014, the company has yet to fulfil this obligation. Soma has
justified the delay by referencing the lack of a data room at the Ministry, where the data may be
stored properly.
In a letter dated 17 October 2014, signed by Director General Hassan, Soma agreed to
pay the costs of “rebuilding and refurbishment of that part of the Ministry Building that will
house the data room in Mogadishu” up to a total of USD 100,000. The Ministry confirmed
receipt of these funds into its CBS account on 18 December 2014. In February 2015, Soma
requested an update from the Ministry on how the company’s funds had been disbursed. A 3
March 2015 letter to Soma, signed by Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi, reported that “the funds are still
in the above mentioned account as we have not yet began working on the project as the site for
construction is currently occupied by Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).”63
When interviewed by the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2015, Director General Hassan
acknowledged that no further progress had been made towards establishing a data room on the
Ministry’s premises. Hassan further stated that he lacked “a concept of what kind of room we
need for data.” Hassan could not account for the USD 100,000 transferred by Soma and referred
the SEMG to Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi. Geeddi has not responded to the Group’s request for an
interview.
Pattern of Corruption
The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence suggesting that requests for ‘capacity
building’ may form part of a pattern of corruption within the Ministry.
The Group has in its possession a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),64 dated 24
November 2014, between the Ministry and Allied Petroleum (SO) Corp., a Dubai-based
petroleum exploration company “supported by Middle Eastern Sovereign Wealth Funds and
62 A London-based oil and gas analyst interviewed by the Monitoring Group on 3 June 2015 referred to this state of
affairs as “unconscionable.”
63 A copy of this letter is provided in Annex 15.
64 The Allied Petroleum MOU is attached in Annex 16.
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major US Banks.”65 Former Minister Daud Mohamed Omar met with Allied Petroleum CEO
Justin Dibb and COO Andrew Robinson in Abu Dhabi on 5 May 2014. At that meeting, the
company expressed its interest in signing PSAs for four blocks in the Jora region, proximate to
the Kenya-Somalia border. Before agreeing to any PSA terms, Director General Hassan insisted
that Allied Petroleum provide ‘capacity building’ support to the Ministry.
Subsequent to that meeting, Hassan sent the text of a proposed MOU to Allied Petroleum.
The Allied Petroleum MOU bore many similarities to the Soma MOU, with a number of same
clauses. For instance, the MOU stipulated that Allied Petroleum would pay the salaries of eight
“consultants, advisors, or employees engaged by the Ministry,” to a maximum of USD 5,000
each per month over a 24-month period. It also stipulated that Allied Petroleum was to pay for
“the establishment of a data room,” a project towards which Soma had already committed USD
100,000. The MOU also identified an International Bank of Somalia (IBS) account to receive the
‘capacity building’ funds, thereby bypassing the Central Bank.66
The terms of the MOU make it clear that the proposed Capacity Building Agreement was
intended to be a quid pro quo for the Ministry’s granting of offshore PSA rights to Allied
Petroleum; paragraph 11 states: “The Commencement Date of the MoU shall be the date, being
90 days following signature of PSA’s covering Offshore Jor[a] A, B, C, D.” Per the terms of the
Evaluation Area Extension agreement with Soma, however, the Ministry had already granted
exploration rights of the entire Jora region to Soma on 8 May 2014.
Although Director General Hassan and CEO Justin Dibb signed the MOU with Allied
Petroleum on 24 November 2014, it appears that it was never implemented.
The Ministry also approached Royal Dutch Shell plc with demands for ‘capacity
building.’ In multiple emails dating back to May 2014, Director General Hassan repeatedly
reminded Shell of its capacity building obligations – including granting scholarships to Somali
students – as stipulated in the pre-civil war Somali Government’s 1988 Concession Agreement
with Pecten Somalia Co. (a subsidiary of Shell). In a 20 November 2014 email to Menno
DeRuig, an Exploration Manager for Shell covering Sub-Saharan Africa, Hassan wrote:
“We repeatedly ask you issue [sic] a letter for sponsoring of university students, I don’t
[know] what is [sic] the difficulties you have and you didn’t come back to us… The
attached is [sic] the eligibility letters for some of the students so please you either
directly communicate to the university and ask to proceed convincing [sic] that you are
sponsoring or simply issue letter to sponsor to [sic] deal with them.”
65 Quoted from Allied Petroleum’s company profile.
66 See Annex 17 for details of the Ministry’s IBS account.
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Attached to the email were admission letters from USCI University in Kuala Lumpur for
four Somali students: Abdirahman Farah Abdi, Asho Osman Abdi, Rakia Farah Abdi, and
Salman Osman Abdi. All four are children of Director General Hassan. Examination of email
correspondence by the SEMG has revealed that each student’s admission to USCI University had
been arranged through the intercession of Polaris Energy Sdn Bhd, a Malaysian oil company
with which Hassan and other members of the Ministry had held meetings in Kuala Lumpur in
September 2014.
On 24 November 2014 DeRuig responded to Hassan with an extensive list of
documentation requirements, and also informed him that Shell would be unable to fund training
programmes longer than one year in duration. The Monitoring Group is unaware of any
subsequent attempts by Hassan to arrange for Shell to fund his children’s education.
Soma’s Payments to an FGS Legal Advisor
The Monitoring Group has confirmed that Soma made payments to a long-standing FGS
legal advisor, the Canadian lawyer J. Jay Park, QC, between 3 June 2013 and 6 August 2013.
The FGS’ relationship with Park long pre-dated the existence of the Capacity Building
Agreement and the signature of the Soma SOA on 6 August 2013. Between 2007 and August
2012, Park served as an oil and gas advisor for the Somali Transitional Federal Government
(TFG), during which time he was a member of the Petroleum Law Team responsible for drafting
the 2008 legislation. In early 2013, Park was implicated in a petroleum bribery scandal in Chad
two years earlier, where he had allegedly facilitated the transfer of USD 2 million to the wife of a
diplomat.67 In April 2013, Park announced his retirement from his firm, Norton Rose Canada
LLP. In June 2013 he founded his own entity, Petroleum Regimes Advisory Ltd. (PRA), and
continued as an official advisor to the FGS, a role he exercised during the SOA negotiations with
Soma. In its 2014 report (S/2014/726), the Monitoring Group identified Jay Park, along with Dr.
Abdullahi Haider Mohamed, as a “key architect” of the Soma deal on the FGS’ side.68 In 2013,
one of Soma’s own representatives told an international consulting firm that Park had a role “to
protect all interests” – both those of the FGS and Soma – during the SOA negotiations.69
67 The Globe and Mail, “Bay Street law firms advised Griffiths on Chad deal,” 26 January 2013. Available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-law…-
on-chad-deal/article7890162/.
68 See S/2014/726, annex 5.1.
69 2013 interview with Adam Smith International for the first draft of its report titled “Needs Assessment for the
Extractives Industry in Somalia.” A more detailed discussion of this report is presented in Annex 1.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 26
In a letter to the SEMG dated 1 July 2015, Soma acknowledged that it had paid Park’s
fees during the SOA negotiation process, despite the apparent conflict of interest doing so
entailed:
“It was of the utmost importance for Soma Oil & Gas and the Federal Government, that
both parties had independent legal advice during the negotiations. As the Federal
Government was unable to pay for this advice which transpired late in the negotiations,
the Federal Government asked if Soma would cover its legal expenses. The Company’s
board took extensive independent legal advice before proceeding to do so.”70
Park acknowledged that his firm PRA had received USD 494,564.85 from Soma, through
the then-Ministry of National Resources, for legal services rendered from 3 June 2013 to 6
August 2013.71 Park informed the SEMG that on 6 August 2013 – the same day the SOA was
signed – then-Minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed “issued a written direction to Soma to pay the
fees associated with our work for the FGS in relation to Soma.”72
Soma failed to provide a response to the Monitoring Group’s inquiry regarding the size of
the payment the company had made to Park.73 However, both Soma and Park confirmed that the
company had issued payment to PRA on 18 December 2014.74 Between 6 August 2013 and 18
December 2014 Park continued to legally advise the Ministry on numerous matters, including the
Capacity Building Agreement. PRA remains on retainer with the Ministry to the present day,
though Park told the Monitoring Group that the last legal request he had received from the
Ministry was in March 2015.75
Engagement with Soma and FGS officials
The Monitoring Group contacted each of the Ministry officials profiled above, informing
them of its investigations and that their names will appear in this communication to the
Committee. As of 24 July 2015, Farah Abdi Hassan, Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi, Dr. Abdi
Mohamed Siad, Abdirizak Hassan Awed, Jay Park, and Mohamoud Yousuf Ali had been
interviewed by the Group.
70 S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.25/Add.4, 1 July 2015.
71 Letter from Jay Park to the SEMG, 19 July 2015.
72 Letter from Jay Park to the SEMG, 19 July 2015. Park’s account was confirmed by Soma in the company’s 24
July 2015 letter to the Group.
73 Letter from Soma to the SEMG, 24 July 2015.
74 Letter from Jay Park to the SEMG, 19 July 2015; letter from Soma to the SEMG, 24 July 2015.
75 Letter from Jay Park to the SEMG, 19 July 2015.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 27
In a June 2015 interview with the Monitoring Group, H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, FGS
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, categorised Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement
as furnishing “basic support salaries for these individuals that we need at the Ministry, but cannot
afford to employ.” He also assured the Group that Soma had received no benefit, and would
receive none in future, as a result of payments the company had made to the Ministry. Minister
Mukhtar further stated that he would entertain “no discussion…that those who were paid had, or
will have, any influence on oil deals.”76
On 18 June 2015, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to Soma CEO Robert Sheppard,
requesting that the company provide information on a number of the matters discussed above.77
Soma sent a reply to the Monitoring Group on 1 July 2015 and another on 24 July in response to
the Group’s follow-up questions, much of the content of which has been cited in the preceding
discussion.
Findings and Recommendations
The Monitoring Group considers that the circumstances described above constitute both
misappropriation, and facilitation of misappropriation of public resources by officials of the FGS
and by Soma in violation of paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011) and paragraph 2 (c) of
resolution 2060 (2012). The Monitoring Group has had indications that the Ministry intends to
sign a revised PSA with Soma as early as August 2015, which influenced the Group’s decision to
submit the following recommendations to the Committee prior to the submission of its final
report in October. The Monitoring Group therefore recommends that the Chair address a letter,
on behalf of the Committee to the FGS:
(i) Urging the FGS to investigate and undertake prosecutions, where appropriate, of
individuals and entities found to have been engaged in misappropriation of public
resources in violation of the sanctions regime, where this conduct also constitutes
violation of applicable national laws;
(ii) Urging the FGS to take steps to ensure that the requirements of Somali national law
are fulfilled with respect to the Soma agreements described above, including as
regards their publication, review and presentation for discussion and assent by the
Federal Parliament;
(iii) Encouraging Soma and the FGS to work together to ensure that the data collected in
Soma’s offshore seismic survey, which rightfully belongs to the people of Somalia, is
76 SEMG interview with H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, 29 June 2015.
77 S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.23, 18 June 2015.
SOMALIA
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31 28
transferred as soon as possible into the possession of the FGS, including through the
construction of the appropriate data room.
More broadly, the findings of this investigation reinforce the Group’s previous calls for
the implementation of clear legal and policy frameworks governing the engagement of the
extractives industry in Somalia. In particular the FGS should be encouraged to apply its existing
legislation, particularly the 2008 Petroleum Law, in the management of both current and future
oil and gas contracts. As required by this legislation, it is critical to establish an independent
Somali Petroleum Authority to serve as regulator for the industry.
Finally, in light of the material presented above, and against the background of the
Security Council’s call to the FGS “to mitigate properly against the petroleum sector in Somalia
becoming a source of increased tension in Somalia,”78 the Monitoring Group recommends that
the Committee consider the Group’s longstanding recommendation of a moratorium on oil and
gas agreements in Somalia until a federal resource-sharing framework is in place, and viable
federal and regional institutions are established to govern the extractives sector effectively.
The Monitoring Group is continuing its investigation into Soma Oil & Gas Holdings
Limited, to be presented in its final report on Somalia. In the meantime, the Group remains
available to the Committee to provide additional details as may be required or to answer any
questions the Committee may have.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Christophe Trajber
Coordinator
Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
Security Council resolution 2182 (2014)
78 Preamble, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014).
SOMALIA
Annex 102
Somalia DOALOS Page, updated 10 April 2017
27/11/2017 SOMALIA
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/SOM.htm 1/2
SOMALIA
Updated 10 April 2017
SUBMISSION IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE DEPOSIT OBLIGATIONS
PURSUANT TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS)
M.Z.N. 106. 2014. LOS of 3 July 2014: Deposit of a list of
geographical coordinates of points
Originals of deposited geographical coordinates of points
Relevant articles of UNCLOS: 75(2), 84(2)
Law of the Sea Bulletin: No. 85
Communications received by the SecretaryGeneral
in connection
with the deposit of charts and/or lists of geographical coordinates
of points
Djibouti: Note Verbale dated 31 January 2017: French | English
(pending)
Yemen: Communication dated 25 July 2014
Yemen: Communication dated 10 December 2014
OTHER INFORMATION
Legislation
Law No. 37 on the Territorial Sea and Ports, of 10 September 1972
(transmitted by a letter dated 20 December 1973 from the Permanent
Representative of Somalia to the United Nations addressed to the
SecretaryGeneral)
Law No. 5 dated 26 January 1989 approving the Somali Maritime
Law of 1988 (not available)
Law No. 11 dated 9 February 1989 relating to the ratification of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (not available)
Decree No. 14 dated 9 February 1989 relating to the instrument of
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Proclamation by the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia,
dated 30 June 2014
Outer Limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Federal Republic
of Somalia, dated 30 June 2014
Maritime boundary delimitation agreements
and other material
with Kenya
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the
Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the
Somali Republic to Grant to Each Other NoObjection
in Respect of
Submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200
Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(entry into force: 7 April 2009, registration #: I46230;
registration date:
11 June 2009; link to UNTS) (see also Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 70) *
Additional relevant material
Somalia: Letter dated 17 February 2015 from the SecretaryGeneral
addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2015/122
27/11/2017 SOMALIA
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/SOM.htm 2/2
* By a note verbale dated 2 March 2010, the Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to the United Nations informed the
Secretariat that the MOU had been rejected by the Parliament of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and "is
to be hence treated as nonactionable."
Annex 103
East African Standard extracts, 21, 23 and 24 September, 5 and 6 October 1970
Annex 104
P. Giorgio Scorcelletti and B. M. Abbott, Petroleum Developments in Central and Southern
Africa in 1978, The American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin V. 63, No. 10, pp.
1689-1742, October 1979, p. 1694
The Amertcarr Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin
V. 63, No. 10 (October IV79), P. 1689-1742, 32 Figs., 57 Tables
Petroleum Developments In Central and Southern Africa in 1978'
p. GIORGIO SCORCELLETTI and B. M. ABBOTT^
Abstract This review presents (developments on petroleum
exploration and production activity during
1978 in 45 countries of central and soutfiern Africa.
Petroleum was produced in 7 countries with a cumulative
production of 851,285,310 bbl (2.33 million b/d),
an 8.6% decrease from the 1977 production level. Production
increases were reported in Cameroun (93%),
where the Ekoundou field went on stream at the end of
1978, and Congo (25%). Ghana recorded its first production
from the Saltpond field in October 1978. These
increases were offset by larger decreases in Angola
(21%), Gabon (6%), Nigeria (9%), and Zaire (20%)
Total annual gas production decreased 15% to 510.
600 MMcf (1,399 MMCFGD).
Surface exploration work increased 34% to 210.75
party-months, including 185.1 party-months of seismic,
13.6 gravity, 10.05 magnetometer, and 2 geology
A total of 252 wells was drilled, an increase of 7
wells (3%) from 1977, Exploratory drilling was 114, the
same as in 1977; 48 of the exploratory wells were discoveries,
a success rate of 42%.
New-field discoveries were reported in Nigeria (22),
Cameroun, Gabon, Angola, Chad, Ivory Coast, Congo,
Ghana, and Zaire. A total of 66 unsuccessful wildcats
was drilled in 10 countries.
Development drilling amounted to 138 wells in Nigeria
(69), Congo, Cameroun, Gabon, Angola, and Ghana,
with a 91% compounded success rate. Total wildcat
and development footage was 2,084,694 (635,417
m). At year end 34 rigs were operating.
HIGHLIGHTS (Figs. 1-3; Tables 1-6)
Petroleum exploration permits were in force in
28 of the 45 countries covered by this review. Relinquishment
of acreage held under concession
occurred in Angola, Cameroun, Central African
Empire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast,
Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal, Somali,
and Tanzania.
New permits and concessions were granted in
Angola, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea
Conakry, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, and Seychelles.
Oil companies acquired interests in existing
permits in Cameroun, Gabon, Ivory Coast,
Mali, and Zaire.
Surface exploration was performed in 11 countries.
Total geologic and geophysical exploration
added up to 210.75 party-months, an increase of
34% compared with 1977. Seismic activity, mostly
in Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroun, Chad, Ivory
Coast, and Niger, amounted to 185.1 partymonths,
an increase of 35% from 1977. Gravity
surveys were conducted in Niger, Gabon, Cameroun,
and Congo. Magnetometer surveys were performed
in Niger, Gabon, Seychelles, and Cameroun.
Seismograph and magnetometer activity
increased from the previous year.
The volume of driUing activity in 1978 reached
a high level at 252 wells total for central and
southern Africa versus 245 wells in 1977. Most of
the drilling effort was reported from Nigeria with
104 wells in the exploratory and development categories.
Considerable drilling activity also took place in
Cameroun (27 oil, 3 gas, 12 dry), Gabon (17 oil, 2
gas, 16 dry), Congo (24 oil, 5 dry), and Angola (5
oil, 8 dry). The compounded success rate was 69%
compared with 68% in 1977.
The total number of exploratory wells was 114,
the same as 1977: oil well completions totaled 41,
gas wells 7 (versus 36 and 7, respectively, in 1977).
Development drilling activity increased to 138
units, or 5% greater than 1977. Nigeria again was
the most active country with 69 wells drilled, of
which 65 were successful.
Considerable development activity also occurred
in Congo (23 oil, 0 dry), Cameroun (19 oil,
2 dry), and Gabon (13 oil, 2 dry). The success rate
for development wells was 91% compared with
94% in 1977.
Wildcat and development footage increased to
2,084,694 (635,415 m) or 7% more than 1977. Average
well depth was 8,273 ft (2,521 m), compared
with 7,951 ft (2,423 m) in 1977.
At year end, 34 rigs were operating compared
with 39 for 1977.
Annual oil production was 851,285,310 bbl, a
decrease of 8.6% from 1977. The change resulted
from decreased production in Angola, Gabon,
Nigeria, and Zaire as a result of natural field depletion,
but also owing to allowables, market demand,
and operational circumstances. This decrease
offset local increases in Cameroun, Congo,
and Ghana, where new fields were placed on proiC'Copyright
1978. the American Association of Petroleum
Geologists. All rights reserved.
AAPG grants permission tor a single photocopy of this article
for research purposes. Other photocopying now allowed by the
1978 Copyright Law is prohibited. For more than one photocopy
of this article, users should send request, article
identification number (see below), and $3.00 per copy to
Copyright Clearance Center. Inc. One Park Ave., New York,
NY 10006.
IManuscripl received and accepted. June 18. 1979.
2Gulf Oil Exploration and Production Co.-International.
Houston. Texas 77001.
Article Identification Number
0149-1423/79,-'B010-0004$03.00 n
1689
1694 P. Giorgio Scorceiietti and B. IVI. Abbott
each by Agip, Elf, and Gulf; and 1 by Texaco)
and 1 was a gas discovery (by Shell-BP). The
wildcat success rate was 63%, or 15% higher than
in 1977. Of a total 69 development wells, 60 were
oil and 5 were gas wells (33 oil and 5 gas wells by
Shell-BP, 12 oil wells by Gulf, 8 oil wells by Agip,
5 oil wells by Mobil, and 1 each by Elf and Pan
Ocean). The development success rate was 94%,
or 1% higher than 1977.
Although much of the drilling was onshore, as
in the previous year, the exploration drilling program
in 1978 was notable for venturing beyond
the better known main part of the delta into the
outlying, relatively poorly known fringe areas and
the deeper water shelf. Examples of delta-fringe
tests are Shell Pologbene-1 in OML 1 (a discovery)
and 2 others in OML 1 and OML 5 in the
northern Niger delta margin, still being drilled at
year end. Not far from Pologbene-1, Gulf discovered
a new field, Opuekeba-lX, just southwest in
the OML 49 swamp area. In the deeper shelf offshore.
Gulf spudded Obokun-lX in OML 89 (a
discovery) which was still being drilled at year
end. Mobil discovered oil in similar water depth
in OML 70 with well Nkuku-1.
In general hydrocarbons were found in all
types of environments, from continental to paralic
and marine, in sandstones ranging in age from
Pleistocene to Cretaceous. Typical structural entrapment
is the rollover anticline associated with
growth faulting.
In-field drilling was reported in 49 fields, including
25 Shell-BP fields. Footage drilled was
687,207 (209,461 m) for development, and 381,
245 (116,203 m) for exploration, totaling 1,068,
452 (325,664 m). About 15 oil rigs were operating
as of December 1978.
Crude oil production decreased in the first half
of the year, but started increasing toward year
end because of the Iranian production shutdown.
Average production was 1,910,349 b/d in
1978 versus 2,100,074 b/d in 1977. However, in
December 1978, the daily average was 2,383,091
bbl.
NNPC and her joint-venture partners plan to
drill 54 exploratory, 59 development, and 24 appraisal
wells in the Niger delta areas. Thus, a total
of 137 wells would be drilled in the offshore,
swamp, and land locations in 1979.
SAO T 0 M £ AND PRINCIPE (Fig. 26)
Ball and Collins continue to be the sole right
holder on the 2 islands. No exploration activity
was carried out by them during 1978, and the permit
boundaries remain unchanged.
SENEGAL (Fig. 15)
Pecten and Esso have both withdrawn from the
area leaving the new group of Shell Senrex and
Deminex. Three permits were relinquished by the
Shell group, leaving only 2 offshore permits in
force. No exploration activity was reported for
1978.
SEYCHELLES (Fig. 27)
The Burmah group was granted an extension to
the area it already held under their exploration
agreement to bring their total area to approximately
17,700 sq km. The Burmah group carried
out a seismic survey of unknown extent during
December but no drilling activity was undertaken.
The Oxoco group conducted a 160-km seismic
survey (0.5 party months) across their acreage.
No drilling activity was reported.
Siebens' activity in the Seychelles was confined
to the acquisition of approximately 1,400 km of
seismic data and associated marine magnetometer
work. Following the interpretation of this
data, 4 blocks (37/11, 39/18, 84/11, and 85/8)
were relinquished.
Owing to the poor response from the industry,
the deadline for the second round of applications
in 1978 was extended indefinitely.
A second phase of detailed seismic work was in
progress at year end. On this basis, Siebens could
make a commitment to drill in 1979.
SIERRA LEONE
No agreements on awarding permits and no exploratory
activities were reported in 1978.
SOMALI REPUBLIC (Fig. 28)
Elf-Aquitaine reUnquished its remaining permits
on May 19, 1978. There are no petroleum
rights in force in the Somali Republic. No exploration
activity has been reported.
SOUTH AFRICA (Fig. 29; Tables 50-52)
Soekor's onshore exploration activity in the
northern Karoo was completed as of February
1978, when borehole HFl/77 reached a total
depth of 361.23 m. The well was abandoned as
dry and no further exploration is envisaged. Preparatory
work was undertaken during 1978 prior
to the spudding of the Melville 308 stratigraphic
test in the Port Elizabeth area. Four dry holes
were drilled by local concession holders; SCH
2/77 by Black Gold Petroleum, PP 1/77 and GP
1/77 by A. J. Jonker, and AA 1/77 by A. E.
Schafer.
Soekor drilled 4 wells on the Agulhas Bank,
using the Sedco K semisubmersible. A fifth well
was spudded at year end. Of these wells, GA-E2
encountered minor gas on test, Hb-Cl was dry,
Annex 105
P. B. Gupte, Somalia Calls for Talks with Ethiopia, New York Times, 30 June 1981
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June 30, 1981
SOMALIA CALLS FOR TALKS WITH ETHIOPIA
By PRANAY B. GUPTE, Special to the New York Times
NAIROBI, Kenya, June 29— President Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia said here today that he
was prepared to meet immediately with the Ethiopian leader, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, to hold
''peace negotiations'' over the disputed territory of the Ogaden.
''Let us talk without any preconditions, let us finally have a dialogue of real sincerity,'' the 62-year-old
President said in an interview here. ''We have been antagonists for too long. We seek now a peaceful
solution to the problem.''
The Somali leader, who attended a five-day meeting of the Organization of African Unity that ended
yesterday, also said in the interview that he would try to exert his influence on the guerrilla
organization that is fighting to free the Ogaden region from Ethiopia and persuade the group to cease
its hostilities. Mr. Siad Barre said that although his Government provided ''moral, political and
diplomatic support'' to the guerrilla group, known as the Western Somali Liberation Front, Somalia
did not and would not give the rebels weapons or training. No Comment From Ethiopia
Colonel Mengistu, who attended the O.A.U. meeting, left Nairobi yesterday and was unavailable for
comment. Ethiopian diplomats based in Nairobi, when informed of some of President Siad Barre's
remarks, withheld comment and said any official reaction would have to come from Addis Ababa, the
Ethiopian capital.
In the past, the regime of Colonel Mengistu has not responded to signals from Somalia concerning a
settlement. President Siad Barre also said Somalia was seeking ''accommodation'' with Kenya, with
whom Somalia has had a border dispute for many years.
''Somalia is not seeking any territorial gain from Kenya,'' Mr. Siad Barre said. ''We are for
accommodation. We are not seeking any territory from Kenya.''
The area in question is settled mainly by ethnic Somali tribes whose territory was divided up by
Africa's colonial powers. Kenya says that Somalia wants to annex the area, known as the Northeastern
province, and there has been heavy fighting there in recent months.
Mr. Siad Barre said that he had met privately with President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya to discuss the
subject and that there would be more such meetings to resolve the dispute. ''We are trying to reach an
understanding and remove the obstacles,'' the Somali leader said. He went on, ''But our relations with
Kenya won't be brotherly unless this is settled.''
The Somali President stressed in the interview that both Ethiopia and Somalia had incurred great
military and economic losses because of their disputes.
28/11/2017 SOMALIA CALLS FOR TALKS WITH ETHIOPIA - The New York Times
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''We need cooperation with Ethiopia in a brotherly way,'' President Siad Barre said, speaking in
English. ''Now is the time to find a way out. After our long, long struggle, there should now be
reflection.''
Although Mr. Siad Barre did not directly say that Somalia would give up its claims to the Ogaden
region, he said in response to a question about the territory, ''Somalia already has a very big territory.
We don't want expansion.''
President Siad Barre pointed out that the dispute with Ethiopia, which has gone on for more than six
years, had drained his country's economic resources to a point where funds for economic development
were scarce. Somalia spends more than a fourth of its annual gross national product of $425 million
on the military, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.
The Somali leader said that he would ''greatly welcome'' initiatives from any of the Western powers,
the United Nations and other African and Arab countries to get the process going for negotiations with
Ethiopia.
Somalia has said that as a result of the Ogaden crisis, more than 1.5 million refugees have entered its
territory and placed even greater strain on its economy.
''With the Soviets on their side, the Ethiopians have been intransigent,'' President Siad Barre said. ''We
both have many similarities in culture. If we both had been wise, we would have agreed a long time ago
and directed our efforts in a joint cooperation.''
He continued, ''So let's find a way for a fair, long-lasting political solution. Let's finally get together.''
Illustrations: photo of Guerrillas training with Russian-made AK-47 automatic rifles
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Annex 106
Demonstrators Protest Exploration Deal in Somalia, World Oil, March 2001
Annex 107
T. Griffiths, Woodside’s Kenya Deal Raises Hopes: Is East Africa the Next Big Thing?,
African Energy, June 2003, pp. 4-6
So far East African exploration has attracted
mainly smaller companies, but the Kenya farmin
by Australia’s Woodside Energy suggests there
may be more to the region than previously thought.
And just as it has been in frontier areas of West Africa,
the exploration is being led by risk-hungry Australian
companies.
The East African Petroleum Conference held in
Nairobi in March raised several companies’ interest in
the region. Aminex is spudding a well off Tanzania in
August, and France’s Maurel & Prom, Royal
Dutch/Shell and Brazil’s Petrobras are on the verge of
signing for acreage off Tanzania after lengthy
negotiations (AE 56/7). Canada’s Antrim Energy has
completed phase one of its Tanzania programme, and
Malaysia’s Petronas is exploring the Zambezi Delta in
Mozambique.
Woodside has taken a 40% operating stake in
Dana’s four blocks in the Lamu basin, saying it hopes
to reproduce its success offshore Mauritania.
Woodside will operate blocks L5, L7, L10 and L11,
which cover 47,500km2 in water depths of up to 3,000
metres. This acreage includes some onshore areas
and coastal waters.
Woodside’s commitment under the farm-in is
limited to the acquisition of 5,000km of 2D seismic in
2003-04 at a cost of $3m. After two years, the joint
venture has the option of entering a second
exploration phase, which would include drilling of one
exploration well in each of the blocks renewed.
Dana’s interest in the blocks will be 40% with the
remaining 20% continuing to be held by Star
Petroleum International (Kenya), a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Brisbane-based Global Petroleum, which
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in November.
Woodside public issues manager Rob Millhouse
told African Energy the deal’s attraction was that it
provided a low-cost entry point for Woodside to
develop its knowledge of the region’s geology, with an
easy exit if necessary before the company had to
commit to any drilling programme.
The contract for seismic work is being finalised.
Millhouse expected the survey to be done by end-year.
“If we find it does not support viable drilling
prospects, we can walk away,” he said.
Shell’s enduring interest
Shell, which owns 34% of Woodside, has been
interested in the region for some time. Director of
new ventures Agu Kantsler said a study of East Africa
by Woodside had identified a variety of geological
features with a range of leads of 50m to 1bn barrels.
“Our review identified East Africa as an underexplored
frontier province that has the potential to
replicate Woodside’s successful exploration strategy in
Mauritania,” Kantsler said in a statement. “Kenya’s oil
and gas exploration industry has been virtually
inactive since the early 1980s and this opportunity
provides Woodside with a relatively low-cost entry to
a very large area which we can mature by using our
strong technical skills and leveraging from our success
in deep water off Mauritania.”
Between the 1950s and 1971, Shell and BP drilled
11 wells off Kenya, without finding hydrocarbons. In
the 1970s and 80s, companies including Chevron,
Total, Amoco, Petro-Canada and Texas Pacific drilled
another 17 wells. Shell drilled another two wells off
Mombasa in the early 1990s that had oil shows. Star
Petroleum brought in Dana as a farm-in partner in
2001, and in 2002, British Virgin Islands-registered
Afrex signed for blocks L6, L8 and L9, alongside
Australia’s Pancontinental Oil & Gas (AE 55/16).
During the negotiations for the acreage, Afrex was
acquired by Black Rock Oil & Gas, another Australian
junior.
“It’s a frontier region, relatively unexplored, and
we see some analogies with West African geology,”
said Millhouse.
The region presently imports almost all of its fuel
needs. Kenya has proposed building an oil pipeline
from Sudan, although the high cost of such a venture
makes it unlikely in the short term. An increase in
regional exploration activity could benefit firms such
as Otterbea International, the logistics business
acquired by DiamondWorks last year.
Improved energy supply could provide a valuable
boost to the Kenyan economy, and to the government
of President Mwai Kibaki, which faces the Herculean
task of bringing about a recovery after decades of
corruption and stagnation. Millhouse said the early
signs of reform were encouraging.
4 AFRICAN ENERGY • JUNE 2003
Analysis
Woodside’s Kenya deal raises hopes: is East Africa
the next big thing?
New studies, and new exploration contracts, suggest there may be oil off the coast of East Africa after all.
Can it be that East Africa really is the next big thing for oil companies, asks Thalia Griffiths.
East African oil
Report highlights hopes for region
UK consultants Jebco Seismic and Global Exploration
Services (GES) have completed a report on the East
African margin, and are negotiating contracts for
multi-client seismic with governments in the region.
“It really is the year of East Africa,” Jebco’s Chris
Matchette-Downes told African Energy.
East African exploration success so far has been
limited to gas, which is being harnessed for power in
projects such as Tanzania’s Songo Songo, and Sasol’s
project in Mozambique to pipe gas from the Pande
and Temane fields. “Company after company has
gone in over the past two or three decades and
dismissed it as gas prone at best, but now we’re seeing
there’s plenty of evidence of oil potential,” said
Matchette-Downes.
The authors re-examined the logs from a well
drilled by Phillips in May 2000 in the Durban basin
and found a lot of evidence of hydrocarbons that had
not been reported, perhaps because the quantities
were not commercial and the partners did not want
the expense of a second well.
“There’s not enough to claim a commercial
discovery, but it does provide evidence of a major
source-rock structure,” Matchette-Downes said.
Until now, East Africa has been seen as a region
with limited hydrocarbons prospectivity. The region
lacks exposed, quality source rocks and dry holes
drilled in the past have been assumed to prove the
lack of a source. Yet its supporters note that there are
as many oil and gas seeps in East Africa as in West
Africa, and new ones are still being found.
Western Madagascar hosts one of the world’s
largest heavy oil accumulations – larger than many of
the West African basin-margin asphalts.
The Jebco-GES report reviews previous studies by
Western Geco of deep-water Tanzania in 2000 and by
Exploration Consultants of Mozambique’s Pande and
Temane gas fields in 2001, as well as considering why
Madagascar has so far failed to fulfil its apparent
potential.
It uses satellite-derived gravity maps to divide the
East Africa offshore, from southern Somalia to
northern South Africa, together with western
Madagascar, into segments for which the prospectivity
is assessed and regionally ranked.
Drift section potential
According to the report, whose main author is GES’s
Nick Cameron, the most favourable areas for reservoir
development are those where the drift section is
thickest and contains the best quality sand
developments. These are associated with either main
river mouths or with clusters of smaller rivers, and
are positioned along the hanging wall of the
continental hinges in deep-water settings. Sand
delivery and the overall sediment supply volume
increased in the younger Tertiary, but there are also
multiple Cretaceous depocentres, many with
reservoir quality sands.
The report predicts oil-prone source rocks in the
deep-water Somali and Mozambique basins from the
mid-Jurassic rift-drift transition upwards into the drift
section and possibly in beds as young as Turonian.
The source sequence is predicted to be of regional
extent in the Somali Basin, and may also be more
widespread in the Mozambique Basin.
GES says excellent quality and richness
characterise the rift-drift transition source sequences
of Tanzania and Madagascar, and predicts an end-
Jurassic to probably Turonian source section for the
Durban Basin, where oil-prone sources are expected
in present-day deep-water settings.
The report says that basin modelling shows the oil
window is preserved where the section is overpressured
beneath a thicker section and extends
further out into the deep water than indicated by
conventional time-temperature models. In addition to
the deep-water sand opportunities, footwall traps
positioned along the hinge line present attractive
targets for charges released following the failure of
over-pressured cells. Ongoing tectonism related to the
growth of the East Africa Rift and the reactivation of
the Davie Fracture Zone has created multiple
opportunities for this method of hydrocarbons
delivery.
Mozambique activity
Ambitious independent Vanco Energy Company has
carried out two 2D seismic surveys on Madagascar’s
Majunga Offshore Profond block.
Mozambique has yielded only gas so far, but
Malaysia’s Petronas has an E&P contract for the
offshore Zambezi Delta block.
Tanzania potential
Tanzania has seen slightly more activity than the rest
of the region in recent years. As well as the Songo
Songo gas field development, exploration is starting to
pick up, with Shell finalising a production-sharing
contract with Tanzania Petroleum Development
Corporation for Blocks 9-12.
Canada’s Antrim Energy lifted force majeure on its
Pemba Zanzibar concession in April 2002 and plans
seismic and one well in a new four-year contract
period likely to focus on exploration of the North
Pemba prospect.
London-based Aminex, which took over Australian
firm Tanzoil’s Tanzanian interests in 2002, has
secured an F200 rig from Romania’s Dafora Group for
AFRICAN ENERGY • JUNE 2003 5
East African oil Analysis
a drilling programme on the Nyuni offshore licence,
comprising two wells with an option for two more.
Nyuni-1 is due to spud in early August and drilling
of a second well on a separate structure is expected to
continue into early 2004. Estimated cost of the initial
two wells is $10m. Romania’s Petrom farmed into the
licence, which lies adjacent to the Songo Songo gas
field, in December 2002, taking 30%.
Aminex said Nyuni-1 would be the first offshore
well to be drilled in Tanzania for 12 years. “We believe
that enormous oil and gas potential exists along the
East African margin, which has only been very lightly
drilled to date, and that it presents great
opportunities,” said chief executive Brian Hall.
6 AFRICAN ENERGY • JUNE 2003
Analysis East African oil & US strategy
Annex 108
Woodside Concise Annual Report, 2005, p.16
16
Africa
In Africa, Woodside is active as operator
in the proven provinces of Libya and
Mauritania, and Algeria as a nonoperator.
In the frontier areas of Kenya and
Liberia, Woodside operates several
leases, while in Sierra Leone and the
Canary Islands it is active as a nonoperator.
During 2005, Woodside further
developed its Africa businesses, moving
towards first oil from Chinguetti in
February 2006. As Woodside’s first
international project as operator,
Chinguetti established the company’s
credentials within Africa and
internationally, with the project
progressing from discovery to
anticipated production in less than five
years.
In 2005, Woodside was awarded
offshore acreage in Libya’s EPSA IV
round one and in Liberia’s first offshore
licensing round, providing exploration
opportunities and building Woodside’s
presence within Africa.
Woodside plans to drill 10 to 14 wells in
Africa in 2006.
Algeria
Ohanet Operations
Woodside Interest 15%
Operator BHP Billiton
Produces LPG and condensate
Location Onshore Illizi Basin in
southern Algeria
Production Start October 2003
In 2005, the Ohanet joint venture
received its full revenue entitlement of
$71.2 million (gross), which equates to
1,355,449 barrels of condensate and
110,336 tonnes of LPG (calculated using
a 10-year average price of US$24 per
bbl).
Algeria Exploration
Block 401d
Title ALG-401d
Woodside Interest 26.25%
Operator Repsol YPF
Location Onshore, Berkine Basin,
Algeria
Interest Acquired June 2002
Woodside plans to drill at least one well
onshore in ALG-401d during 2006.
Ksar Hirane
Titles ALG-408a, 409
Woodside Interest 37.50%
Operator BHP Billiton
Location Onshore, Touggourt
Uplift Basin, Algeria
Interest Acquired September 2004
Mauritania
Chinguetti Oil Project
Title Block 4 in Area B
Woodside Interest 47.384%
Operator Woodside
Location Offshore about 80 kms
from the Mauritania
coast
Water Depth ~800 metres
Project Approval May 2004
First Oil February 2006
First oil from the Chinguetti oil field is
anticipated in February 2006, which will
mark the first hydrocarbons produced in
Mauritania.
Production is expected to peak at 75,000
barrels a day and the estimated field life
is about 10 years. Oil is produced
through wells on the seabed connected
by flowlines to the floating production
storage and offloading facility, Berge
Helene, which will be permanently
moored over the field.
Mauritania Exploration
Titles Areas A, B, C2, C6,
Blocks 7, Ta11 and Ta12,
Chinguetti EP#
Woodside Interest Area A and Area B –
53.846% in each,
Area C2 – 41.75%
Area C6 – 37.58%,
Block 7 – 15.00%,
Blocks Ta11, Ta12 – 75%
Chinguetti EP# –
47.384%
Operator Woodside
Location Offshore and onshore
Mauritania
Water Depth 0 to 2,200 metres
PSCs Signed 1998 and 2004
# EP – Exploitation Perimeter
Woodside drilled five exploration and
appraisal wells in Mauritania in 2005
resulting in two discoveries, Tevét-2 and
Labeidna-1 (commerciality is to be
determined), one successful appraisal
and two dry holes.
The Sotto-1 (2005), Espadon-1 (2005)
and Zoulé-1 (January 2006) wells were
plugged and abandoned after no
significant hydrocarbons were
encountered. Acquisition of the Block 7
seismic survey was completed during
the year.
Woodside plans to drill up to four
exploration wells in Mauritania in 2006.
Kenya
Kenya Exploration
Titles Blocks L-5, L-7
Woodside Interest 50.00%
Operator Woodside
Location Offshore Kenya
Water Depth 0 to 3,000 metres
Interests Acquired 2003
Woodside operates two blocks in Kenya
covering 20,725sqkm. During 2005,
Woodside continued to high-grade its
portfolio withdrawing from one block and
increasing its equity in the two
remaining blocks. Acquisition of the
Pomboo 2-D seismic survey was
completed in early 2005 and
interpretation continues.
Woodside is working to secure an
offshore rig to drill a well in its Kenyan
exploration permits before the end of
2006.
Libya
Libya Exploration
Titles Blocks NC205 to 210,
35, 36, 52, 53
Woodside Interest NC205 to 210 45.00%,
Block 35, 36, 52, 53
55.00%
Operator Woodside
Location Onshore Sirte Basin in
northern Libya with
NC210 the Murzuq Basin
in west Libya
EPSA Signed November 2003,
March 2005
Woodside was a successful participant
in the Exploration and Production Sharing
Agreement IV round one and was
awarded four offshore blocks, Block 35,
Block 36, Block 52 and Block 53.
Woodside’s onshore and offshore
acreage in Libya totals about
60,000sqkm.
A
Annex 109
Woodside Spuds Offshore Well; Kenya’s Oil Future to be Determined in 2007, IHS Same-
Day Analysis, 12 May 2006
2017-6-7 Woodside Spuds Offshore Well; Kenya's Oil Future to Be Determined in 2007
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Woodside Spuds Offshore Well;
Kenya's Oil Future to Be Determined
in 2007
SameDay
Analysis
Published: 12/5/2006
Kenya's first offshore well for 28 years has been spudded; the next
12 months should give a clear indication of whether Kenya will
become an oilproducing
country
Global Insight Perspective
Significance Woodside Petroleum has
spudded a deepwater well in
Block L5 offshore Lamu on the
Kenyan coast. China is also
set to prospect for oil in the
country, having signed a deal
earlier this year
Implications Residents of Lamu already
believe they will be shortly
enjoying huge oil riches;
however, even if commercial
oil deposits are discovered,
this will not lead to local
employment opportunities as
the Lamu workforce is
unskilled.
Outlook Kenya's upstream activities
will also determine the scale
of investment and the future of
the country's downstream
sector, with Mombasa's
refinery either set to be
expanded or shut down and
turned into a mass storage
facility for imported products.
The next 12 months will
determine Kenya's future as
an oil producing nation.
Drilling Begins for Oil in Kenya
Related Content
Energy Industry Analysis,
Forecasts, and Data
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Offshore drilling has begun in Kenya as Australia's Woodside
Petroleum spudded the Pomboo1
exploration well in deepwater
Block L5. By the end of next year, when other test wells have been
drilled, analysis of initial results should tell whether the country has
the commercial deposits to become an oilproducing
nation.
Woodside leads a consortium of independent exploration
companies and is the operator in Block L5 with a 30% stake, Dana
Petroleum (30%), Repsol (20%), and Global Petroleum (20%) are
the other partners (see Kenya: 10 August 2006: Dana, Woodside
and Global Petroleum Get Ready to Sink Exploratory Wells in
Kenya).
Woodside has said that it will spend more than US$90 million to drill
a single well in Blocks L5 and L7 in the Indian Ocean. Woodside
has previously stated that the Kenyan coast is "the most prospective
part of East Africa with several large geological structures hosting
multiple targets similar to those found on Australia's NorthWest
Shelf". Dana Petroleum has also said that it believes that the blocks
could contain over one billion barrels each. The first well is being
drilled in 2,200 metres of water to a planned total depth of 5,005
metres. The drilling will be undertaken by the Japanese deepwater
drilling vessel MV Chikyu.
Oil Deposits Will Not Bring Employment Opportunities
The drilling is taking place about 135 km off Lamu, but residents
have already started believing that a future living off the riches of
petrodollars is only a short time away. Mary M'Mukindia the
managing director of Kenya's National Oil Co. (NOCK) is therefore
having to calm the levels of excitement by organising seminars and
public rallies to educate the local population. Even if commercial oil
deposits are discovered in the Lamu basin, revenue is not expected
to start rolling in until 201114.
Another problem that the residents of
Lamu are set to experience is that oil production would not increase
the employment opportunities as the local workforce is largely
unskilled and most jobs would be contracted out.
There is also the need for an independent environmental impact
assessment as Lamu's waters represent the livelihood of its
fisherman and despoliation of the environment would be a
catastrophe for them and for the vital tourism sector. A National
Environment Management Authority (NEMA) investigation is being
carried out, but NEMA represents the government, which has a
vested interest in oil being found in Lamu's deepwaters.
China to Prospect for Oil in Kenya
In April 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao flew to Kenya to meet
President Mwai Kibaki and conclude a deal for the China National
Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) to prospect for oil in mainly offshore
areas (see Kenya: 27 April 2006: Chinese President Agrees to
Offshore Oil Exploration Deal During State Visit to Kenya). Fu
Chengyu chief executive of CNOOC Ltd, announced last week that
the company’s subsidiary, CNOOC Africa Ltd, would take on six
productionsharing
contracts (PSCs) in Kenya. These six PSCs
cover Blocks 1, 9, 10A, L2, L3, and L4 in three basins of Lamu,
Anza, and Mandera, with a total area of 115,343 sq. km. This marks
the first time that CNOOC has explored in East Africa (see SubSaharan
Africa: 1 May 2006:China Increases Security of Supply
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with Energy Deals in Nigeria and Kenya). The agreement
appears to be a lowrisk
investment for Kenya, with China taking on
all exploration costs. While Kenya is seen as a highly prospective
region, China's deal with Kenya can be seen as an insurance policy
for its government, which is desperate to protect its investment in
neighbouring Sudan, which ships the majority of its oil to Chinese
markets. Most of Sudan’s oilfields are in the centre or south of the
country and the Kenya Pipeline Corp. (KPC) has offered to build a
pipeline transporting oil from southern Sudan to the port of Lamu.
This could protect Sudanese marketing routes in the event that the
south of the country decides to secede under the terms of its sixyear
interim peace agreement with the government in the Sudanese
capital, Khartoum.
KPC managing director George Okungu told officials from southern
Sudan that Kenya's position on the eastern coast of Africa and its
experience in pipeline management would best enable Sudan to
exploit its proven oil reserves (see Kenya: 8 April 2006: Kenya
Pipeline Corporation Wants to Build Pipeline from Southern
Sudan to Kenyan Coast). However, it is believed that a pipeline
connecting south Sudan to the Kenyan coast would cost around
US$1.4 billion, which makes the idea very much a longterm
project.
Outlook and Implications
Next year will be crucial in determining whether Kenya has a future
as an oilproducing
country. Woodside, which has already spent 852
million Kenya shillings (US$12 million) in exploration work and
seismic data since 2003, is committed to drilling at least two wells
over the next 12 months, and it will sink 13 wells throughout Africa
in the next year.
Kenya will be hoping the test results show hydrocarbon deposits,
not least because its neighbour Uganda proved this year it has
commercial amounts of oil and is set to become an oilproducing
country by 2009. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has stated
his government will launch an "Early OilProduction
Scheme" that
will see the creation of a minirefinery
next year that will produce
diesel, kerosene, and heavy oil by 2009. At a later date, the country
will be able to produce gasoline (see Uganda: 10 October
2006:President Museveni Says Uganda Will Begin Producing
Oil in 2009).
The question of whether Kenya discovers oil through its exploratory
activities also has downstream implications. The Kenya Petroleum
Refineries Ltd (KPRL) needs around 21 billion Kenya shillings
(US$300 million) to redevelop the country's Mombasa refinery; in its
current state it is a burden on the economy. The inefficient refinery
costs the taxpayer 5 billion Kenya shillings a year as a result of its
poor performance; any upgrade to the refinery would need to enable
it to produce environmentally friendly low sulphur diesel as the
current refinery does not contain a desulphurisation
plant. Also, by
modernising the Mombasa refinery, one of the government's aims—
of increasing Kenya’s production of liquid petroleum gas—could be
achieved. If drilling results show a future as an oilproducing
nation,
this could lead to a much larger expansion and investment in the
Mombasa refinery.
However, if over the next 12 months no commercial oil deposits are
discovered in Kenya it could lead to the refinery being shut down
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and transformed into a mass storage facility for imported refined
products. George Wachira general manager at the Petroleum
Institute of East Africa said that it cost 23
Kenya shillings per litre
more to refine a litre of fuel compared with importing refined
products from the Middle East, where large and efficient refineries
take advantage of economies of scale. (see Kenya 1 November
2006: Inefficient Kenyan Refinery a Burden on Economy). With
Uganda already saying that it will construct a mini refinery on the
basis of its known crude reserves, this could place Uganda in
control of the East Africa fuels market.
Now the first well has been spudded in Kenya—the first offshore
well for 28 years—the country has stepped up its programme to
determine whether Kenya has a future as an oilproducing
nation.
This has been accompanied by the country's Energy Minister Kiraitu
Murungi publishing a gazette of 38 exploration blocks in the country,
in total covering 115,242 sq. km. Kenyans and energy industry
observers will gain a clearer in 2007 as to whether the country will
join Sudan and Uganda in having proven hydrocarbon reserves.
Copyright © 2017 IHS Markit. All Rights Reserved
Annex 110
Woodside Controlled Document, Pomboo-A Well Proposal, Block L-5 Deepwater, Kenya
East Africa, June 2006, Extracts
Title: POMBOO-A WELL PROPOSAL, BLOCK L-5 DEEPWATER, KENYA EAST AFRICA, JUNE 2006.
Uncontrolled When Printed
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Date Printed 05/09/06 Page 6 of 89
1 PROSPECT SUMMARY SHEET
Well: Pomboo-A
Well Type: Vertical exploration well
Exploration Permit: Block L-5
Well Location: UTM Zone: 37S Datum: WGS84
(Pomboo Surface) Easting: 827222 mE Latitude: 01° 57' 16.28"S
Northing: 9783679 mN Longitude: 41° 56' 27.83"E
Seismic Reference: Line: W03KEN0049 Shotpoint: 2575
Trajectory: Vertical
Primary Objective: Maastrichtian basin floor fan sandstones,
Top @ 4805m ± 200mTVDSS
Secondary Objective: Maastrichtian – Palaeocene basin floor fan/toe of slope sandstones,
Top @ 3615m ± 100mTVDSS
Potential H/C Type: Oil and/or gas
Closure Area: ~28 km2 (primary objective 350) ~30km2 (secondary objective 330)
Closure Height: ~400 m
Trap: Structural – 4-way dip closure over blind thrust
Reservoir: Deepwater basin floor fan / toe-of-slope sandstones
Seal: Deepwater shales
Chance of Success: Probability of Success (POS): 12%
Hydrocarbon Volumes: Mean Success Volume (MSV) = 353 MMbbls recoverable
Key Risk: Charge (source presence and maturity), reservoir presence/effectiveness
Target Tolerance: Surface: 50m radius
Sub-surface: 320 Level – polygon (200x130x70), 350 Level - 200m
Water Depth: 2203m ± 25m (LAT)
Proposed TD: 4805m ± 200mTVDSS (Maastrichtian - Campanian)
Budgeted Well Cost: TBA
Offset Wells: Simba-1, Kofia-1, Maridadi-1, DSDP 241
Drilling Hazards: Frontier environment, strong currents, offset wells long distance from
proposed location.
Environmental: Environmental Project Report (Low Level EIA) approved by National
Environmental Management Authority with some conditions. No
significant Issues identified
Technical Assurance Process:
75% Peer Review 05/12/2005 DRIMS #2268928
Volumetric Review 05/12/2005 DRIMS #2282094
Risk Review 05/12/2005 DRIMS #2282094
Title: POMBOO-A WELL PROPOSAL, BLOCK L-5 DEEPWATER, KENYA EAST AFRICA, JUNE 2006.
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Date Printed 05/09/06 Page 8 of 89
3 INTRODUCTION
3.1 General
The Pomboo prospect is located in Block L-5, offshore Kenya, 80km from the Kenyan coast,
in a water depth of approximately 2203m (Figure 1). Pomboo is proposed as the first well to
be drilled in Block L-5. This will fulfill the work program commitment of the 1st additional
exploration term in Block L-5.
3.2 Permit Details
Kenya lies on the Eastern margin of the African Craton adjacent to the countries of Somalia
and Tanzania. Block L-5 is located in the Lamu Basin, offshore Kenya (Figure 1). Water
depths within this permit ranges from shallow water <50m to ultra-deep water > 3000m with
the majority of the permits being in water depths of 1500-2500m. The original permit was
awarded to Star Petroleum in October 2000 who subsequently farmed out equity to Dana
Petroleum. Woodside acquired its initial interest in May 2003 and was elected operator. The
joint venture has elected to enter into the first additional exploration term in Block L-5 and
relinquished 25% of the original permit area in this block. Block L-5 currently covers an area
of 8700km2. There are currently no well penetrations in the deepwater area of the permit.
3.3 Well Objectives
The technical objectives of Pomboo-A well are to:
· Discover economically extractable hydrocarbons
· Establish reservoir thickness, quality and deliverability through sampling and high quality
logs
· Quantify rock properties through sampling and high quality logs
· Establish hydrocarbon column heights (gas and oil) through logs and pressure data
· Obtain uncontaminated hydrocarbon samples to understand the regional source rock, PVT
analysis and Fluid properties.
The strategic objectives of the well are to:
· Prove the presence, and delineate the extent of a working petroleum system offshore
Kenya
· Determine the present day heat flow of the subsurface and the type and quality of any
hydrocarbons present
· Determine the value of the Pomboo prospect
· Further reduce the risk uncertainty of the remaining prospect inventory by testing a prospect
trap type which does not really on fault closure and will serve to constrain the
presence/maturity of a source rock in the area.
· Reduce uncertainty in the value of Block L-5
Title: POMBOO-A WELL PROPOSAL, BLOCK L-5 DEEPWATER, KENYA EAST AFRICA, JUNE 2006.
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3.4 Exploration History
Initial exploration onshore began in 1954 by a BP-Shell consortium which drilled a total of 10
wells with no significant success. Small amounts of gas were recovered from a couple of
wells. The next phase of onshore exploration took place during 1971 – 1975 in response to
high oil prices, again with no success.
The focus switched to the offshore Lamu Basin where seismic data was acquired by Shell in
1972/73. Further seismic was acquired around the same time by Total and three wells were
drilled by Total (Simba-1) and a Marathon/Union consortium (Maridadi-1 & Kofia-1) between
1976 and 1985. Results were disappointing although the Simba-1 well proved the presence
of deep-marine clastic reservoirs in the Offshore Lamu Basin and the seismic acquired by
these companies appeared to show the presence of large structures on the continental slope
but these were in water depths too great for drilling at that time.
After a long period of quiescence, exploration continued in the onshore in response to
commercial successes in the Sudan rift system. From 1985 to 1996, Amoco and Total drilled
ten exploration wells with only some containing oil and gas shows and no significant success.
Little hydrocarbon exploration has been carried out in the years from 1996 until Star
Petroleum negotiated PSC’s for blocks L5, 7, 10 and 11 with an effective date 11th October
2000.
Dana Petroleum farmed into these PSC’s and took operatorship. During 2003 Woodside
farmed in to all seven offshore blocks in Kenya and took Operatorship. After acquisition of
7900sqkm 2D data and a detailed technical review, Woodside then exited blocks L6, 8, 9
(Pancon/Afrex) and 10 & 11 (Dana/Global) and currently have 50% interest in blocks L5, 7.
Title: POMBOO-A WELL PROPOSAL, BLOCK L-5 DEEPWATER, KENYA EAST AFRICA, JUNE 2006.
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Figure 1 Location map of Blocks L-5 and L-7 offshore Kenya
Block L-5
Block L-7
Annex 111
Kenya Offshore Exploration Drilling Blocks L-5 and L-7, Environmental Audit Report,
Woodside, March 2007
Annex 112
Unlocking Somalia’s Potential, Eastern African Oil, Gas – LNG Energy Conference, Soma
Oil & Gas Presentation, Nairobi, Kenya, 29-30 April 2014
Eastern African Oil, Gas -
LNG Energy Conference
29 - 30 April 2014, Nairobi, Kenya
Unlocking Somalia’s Potential
This presentation may contain forward-looking statements which are made in good faith and are based on current expectations or beliefs, as well as
assumptions about future events. By their nature, forward-looking statements are inherently predictive and speculative and involve risk and uncertainty
because they relate to events and depend on circumstances that will occur in the future. You should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking
statements, which are not a guarantee of future performance and are subject to factors that could cause the actual information to differ materially from those
expressed or implied by these statements. The Company undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements contained in this presentation,
whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.
Nothing in this presentation shall constitute or form part of, and should not be relied upon in connection with, any offer or invitation to sell, underwrite, acquire
or solicit, or any other offer to purchase or subscribe for shares or any other securities, nor may it or any part of it, or the fact of it being made available to any
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presentation. No representation, warranty or undertaking, express or implied, is made as to the fairness, accuracy or completeness of the information or
opinions in this presentation, by or on behalf of the Company (including, without limitation, its directors, officers, employees, partners, agents, representatives,
members, affiliates and advisers) and (to the fullest extent permitted under law) no liability or responsibility, is accepted by such persons for: (i) the accuracy,
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Disclaimer
Company Overview
► Focussing on offshore Somalia
Soma Oil & Gas is focused on exploring for hydrocarbons offshore in the Federal Republic of Somalia
Led by a Board and Management team with extensive experience in oil and gas, finance and international politics
► First mover in last offshore frontier in Africa
Located in East Africa, a highly active oil and gas regions globally
Access to acreage with high significant resource potential
Limited exploration has been conducted to date in Somalia, but the acreage is potentially highly prospective
► A geopolitical inflection point
Somalia has been on a path to greater stability since the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in September 2012
Government is first to gain international recognition following two decades of state failure and enjoys particularly strong support
from the UK, US, EU, UN and African Union
► Signed unique Seismic Option Agreement
Commits Soma Oil & Gas to invest in the gathering and digitisation of all available geological information, the reprocessing of
existing seismic data
Acquisition and processing of new seismic data offshore Somalia across 122,000 km2 Evaluation Area
In return, Soma Oil & Gas has the right to apply for concession areas of up to 60,000 km2 based on an agreed form template
Production Sharing Agreement
− Former leader of Britain's Conservative Party
− Former Home Secretary in Conservative Government
− Previous cabinet positions held include Secretary of State for Employment and Secretary of
State for the Environment
− Lord Howard also sits on the Board of a number of companies
Strong Board & Management
Lord Howard of Lympne CH, QC
Non Executive Chairman
Robert Sheppard
Chief Executive Officer
Philip Wolfe
Chief Financial Officer
− 40 plus years' oil & gas experience with BP and Amoco
− Currently Senior Adviser to BP, non Executive Director at BlackRock Emerging Europe plc and
Director of DTEK (Ukraine)
− Former TNK-BP board member
− Former Chief Executive Officer of Sidanco, President of Amoco Egypt and Argentina
− 23 years' experience in oil & gas corporate finance
− Advised various IOCs, independents and NOCs on strategic transactions, IPOs and other
financings
− Previously Head of EMEA Oil & Gas at UBS, Global Head of Oil & Gas at HSBC; Deutsche
Bank and Merrill Lynch oil & gas teams
− 45 years' experience in finance focussing in Oil & Gas and Mining
− One of the early investors in both Fusion Oil & Gas plc and Ophir Energy plc
− Founder of a number of private companies focussed on energy trading as well as oil & gas and
mineral exploration
− Previously at Merrill Lynch, Kidder Peabody and Credit Suisse First Boston in the Middle East
and London
Basil Shiblaq
Executive Deputy Chairman and
Founder
Strong Board & Management
Hassan Khaire
Executive Director, Africa
− Over 14 years’ of experience at Norwegian Refugee Council
− Held senior positions as Regional Director of Horn of Africa and Yemen and Country Director of
Somalia and Kenya
− Somali and Norwegian National
− BA at University of Oslo, MBA at Edinburgh Business School
Mohamad Ajami
Non-Executive Director
− Over 35 years’ of investing experience in the oil and gas and mineral resources sectors
− Founder of the Levant Group a firm focussed on investments in oil & gas and minerals
− Previously at Morrison Knudsen Corporation, a civil engineering and construction company
(now part of URS Corporation)
Georgy Djaparidze
Non-Executive Director
− He started his career as an attorney, specializing in mergers and acquisitions, finance, and
international transactions in the oil and gas industry
− Currently runs an private investment fund and practices law, as Of Counsel
− Educated in Russia and the United States and currently resides in London
The Earl of Clanwilliam
Non-Executive Director
− Chairman of Eurasia Drilling Company since October 2007
− He is a director of NMC Healthcare plc and sits on the Advisory Board of Oracle Capital and
Milio International
W. Richard Anderson
Non-Executive Director
− Over has 32 years’ experience in oil and gas industry related finance and management.
− On the board of Eurasia Drilling Company, where he has been CFO since July 2008
− Chairman of the board of Vanguard Natural Resources LLC and he was President and Chief
Executive Officer of Prime Natural Resources, Inc. from 2002 until 2007
Corporate Governance & Advisers
Technical Support Auditors & Tax Adviser
Anti Bribery & Corruption Adviser
Financial PR & Strategic Communications Adviser
Legal Adviser
Professional Services
► Soma Oil & Gas has a zero tolerance approach
Anti-bribery and Corruption policy, procedures and implementation are being developed and complies with all applicable laws and
regulations of the countries in which it operates
Both the SOA and the PSA include termination rights for the Government in the event that the SOA or any PSA have been
attained in violation of corrupt practices, law or regulation
All employees of Soma Oil & Gas and its affiliates are required to comply with the Group’s Anti-bribery and Corruption policy
Anti-bribery and Corruption Policy
"Soma Oil & Gas is committed to upholding high standards of ethics, transparency and
accountability in the oil and gas industry and fully supports and promotes an extractive
sector free of corruption. We have decided to build a long term sustainable business in
Somalia and intend to invest both in its ethical infrastructure and in the communities in
which it works. From inception, we will build a corporate culture based on fundamental
values including fairness, ethics and integrity in its business dealings, which is compliant
with the highest standards of relevant legislation in the world. A zero tolerance policy
towards bribery and corruption will form the basis of Soma Oil & Gas compliance
framework which will be designed to protect its brand, its employees, its third party
business associates and its stakeholders from the risks associated with bribery,
corruption and extortion“
Lord Howard of Lympne CH, QC, Chairman of Soma Oil & Gas
Rationale for Hydrocarbon Exploration Offshore Somalia
7
► Significantly under-explored due to historic security issues – all PSCs in Force Majeure since 1990-91
Only 6 offshore wells along the entire length of the eastern offshore basin
Only 1 offshore well near Soma Oil & Gas offshore area of interest, drilled by Exxon in 1982 in shallow water
Deep water entirely unexplored; existing seismic mainly limited to water depths of less than 1,000m, while Soma Oil & Gas Area
of Interest extends to approximately 3,000m water depth
► Hydrocarbon plays – source and reservoir rocks – proven in adjacent sedimentary basins
Jurassic plate reconstruction places Somalia offshore immediately next to Madagascar where Jurassic sources are proven
USGS estimate Undiscovered Resources of 16 billion barrels of oil and 260 tcf gas in three provinces bordering South Somalia
offshore – Tanzania/Kenya, Madagascar and Seychelles
Tullow Oil, Eni, BG, Ophir Energy, Anadarko and Statoil have added considerable valuable from recent finds in East Africa
► Recent aggressive acreage licensing by Anadarko, Total and Eni in adjacent Kenya offshore
Likely to indicate strong technical interest in southern parts of Somalia offshore
Anadarko, Total and Eni all entered adjacent Kenya offshore as well as Mozambique
.
India
Madagascar
Kenya
Seychelles
Seychelles
Mid Jurassic Plate
Reconstruction
Somalia Plate Reconstruction in Jurassic
► Mid Jurassic plate reconstruction places Somalia immediately
opposite northeast Madagascar and Seychelles during the critical
period of hydrocarbon source rock deposition
► Present day
positioning of
continents and
age of ocean
crust
8
USGS Estimated Undiscovered Resources (2012)
Source: http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/AssessmentsData/WorldPetroleumAssessment/…
► USGS estimate total Undiscovered Resources of 16 billion barrels of oil
and 260 tcf gas in provinces bordering Soma Oil & Gas Offshore
Evaluation Area in Somalia offshore waters
► Plate reconstruction to Jurassic – time of deposition of hydrocarbon
source rocks – emphasises the relevance of the adjacent data
Morondava
10.8 Bbo +
170 Tcf
Tanzania
2.8 Bbo +
70 Tcf
Seychelles
2.4 Bbo +
20 Tcf
Soma Oil & Gas
Offshore
Evaluation Area
10.8 Bbo
+ 170 Tcf
2.8 Bbo +
70 Tcf
2.4 Bbo +
20 Tcf
>100 Tcf already
discovered
Jurassic Plate
Reconstruction
Soma Oil & Gas
Offshore
Evaluation Area
9
South Somalia Offshore vs North Sea
10
Soma Oil & Gas
Offshore Evaluation
Area
c. 122,000 km2
Soma Oil & Gas
Offshore Evaluation
Area is comparable
in size to productive
areas of North Sea
Hydrocarbons in South Somalia & Adjacent Areas
Offshore oil slick
Coriole-1 (1960)
2 MMcf/d + 100 bopd
36 API from Palc.
2 bopd from Eocene
Merca-1 (1958)
Gas shows &
Bitumen in
Eocene
Afgooye Discovery (1965)
353 MMboe
4 MMcf/d + 42 bopd from U.
Cret & Palc
Galcaio-2 (1962)
Oil shows, U. Jurassic
El Hamurre-1 (1961)
Oil shows, Eocene
► Historic drilling in South Somalia
Most wells date from1956 to 1970
Only 8 exploration wells since 1970
Last well: 1990
Gira-1 (1956)
Oil shows U. Cretaceous
Soma Oil & Gas Offshore Evaluation Area
Meregh-1 1982 (Esso)
Only well near Soma Oil & Gas Offshore Area
of Interest
Calub & Hilala Fields
2.7 Tcf
Duddamai-1 (1959)
Gas shows
11
Industry Activity in Offshore Kenya
Kubwa-1, Anadarko 2013, WD >2000m. Non
commercial oil shows in reservoir quality sands
Mbawa-1, Apache 2012, WD 1000m,
Cretaceous gas discovery
Kiboko-1, Anadarko 2013, WD c. 2500m,
result not known
Pomboo-1, Woodside 2007, WD >2000m,
Reservoir present but no shows
► Recent offshore Kenya licensing
Anadarko L-5, 7,11,12 PSC, 2009
Total farmin for 40% in 2012
Total L-22; PSC, Sept. 2011
Eni L-21, 23, 24. PSC, July 2012
► Early drilling results
Oil and gas shows in many wells
► Recent offshore Kenya drilling
Seismic Option Agreement
Somali Minister of National Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed shakes hands with
Lord Howard of Lympne CH, QC after signing the Seismic Option Agreement in
Mogadishu on August 6, 2013
► Soma Oil & Gas will undertake an Exploration Programme in Somalia lasting for 18 - 24 months including
Gathering and digitisation of all available geological information and the reprocessing of seismic data
The acquisition and processing of new 2-D seismic data over an agreed Evaluation Area offshore Somalia
Data will be assembled in a Dataroom for the Somali Ministry of National Resources
► In consideration for the Exploration Programme Soma Oil & Gas has the right to apply for concession
areas of up to an aggregate of 60,000 km2 and negotiate upto 12 individual PSAs of 5,000 km2 each
Signing of the Seismic Option Agreement
Lord Howard of Lympne CH, QC with Robert Sheppard during the signing of the
Seismic Option Agreement in Mogadishu on August 6, 2013
Soma Oil & Gas signs SOA
Funding Agreement - January 2014
► On 13 January 2014, Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited announced that it has secured an equity investment of
US$50 million from a private investment company, Winter Sky
► In conjunction with the funding agreement, three individuals connected to Winter Sky have joined the Soma Oil &
Gas Holdings Limited board as Non Executive Directors
► This additional funding is sufficient to see the Company through the initial stages of the exploration programme
and satisfy its obligations to the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia under the Seismic Option
Agreement
Seismic acquisition programme - February 2014
► On 3 February 2014, Soma Oil & Gas announced that it has signed a contract with Seabird Exploration, a global
provider of marine acquisition for 2D and 3D seismic data for the oil and gas industry
► Under the terms of the agreement, Seabird will acquire up to 20,000 km of 2D seismic data off the coast of
Somalia for Soma Oil & Gas. It is expected that the survey will commence in mid-February and take
approximately 90-100 days. Two survey vessels, the Northern Explorer and Hawk Explorer, will be used to
acquire the data
► The Company is also in the process of collating and reprocessing historic seismic data using modern techniques,
and will prepare an evaluation of Somalia’s petroleum potential. Soma Oil & Gas will create a data room for the
Federal Government of Somalia, into which all available data will be placed, including the newly acquired data
from the Seabird seismic survey
► Seismic acquisition has now commenced
Northern Explorer Hawk Explorer
In Summary
► Inflection Point of Growing Prospectivity & Political Stability
Potential hydrocarbon revenues to support the infrastructure of the government thereby enhancing stability
Underpinning economic growth to help move on from the international aid cycle
► Positive impact of the Oil & Gas Sector in Somalia
Employment and training
Encourage other companies to explore for hydrocarbons in Somalia
► Social benefits to Somalia
Annex 113
Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia, The Heritage Institute for
Policy Studies, February 2016, Extract
4
Introduction
This report analyzes the main challenges facing
AMISOM as it seeks to implement a successful
exit strategy. Like all peace operations, AMISOM
was never intended to be a permanent fixture of
the Somali landscape but the mission is now
nearly nine years old. AMISOM will leave Somalia;
the questions are how and when? The official
answers are set out in the mission’s exit strategy.
We define an exit strategy as the process of
generating the resources needed for the mission
to leave the host country. Successful exit
strategies involve a mission leaving its host
having achieved all or most of its stated
objectives.
When it was first authorized in December 2006,
AMISOM’s original exit strategy was to transition
to a UN peacekeeping operation after just six
months. When this plan failed, AMISOM’s
strategy and tactics had to evolve as local
conditions and international circumstances
changed. This report provides an overview of the
different ways in which peace operations can
come to an end, and how AMISOM’s exit
strategies have evolved from its initial
deployment in March 2007 through to January
2016.
Now is an important time to analyze AMISOM’s
exit strategy. First, to our knowledge, this report
represents the first independent effort to
comprehensively study the challenges raised by
AMISOM’s exit. Despite being nearly nine years
old, and the AU’s largest ever peace operation,
AMISOM has rarely been subjected to
independent scrutiny. Second, AMISOM now
costs approximately US$900 million per year.
Hence, there are questions about its financial
sustainability, especially after the recent EU
decision to cut its funding to pay for AMISOM
allowances by 20 percent, starting in January
2016. Third, AMISOM has also been one of the
most deadly peace operations ever undertaken,
causing an unknown number of fatalities among
the peacekeepers and, probably, many more
among its principal enemy (al-Shabaab) and
Somali civilians.3 Fourth, the Federal Government
of Somalia’s (FGS) inability to hold national
elections in 2016 as originally envisaged under
“Vision 2016” has, once again, required AMISOM
to adapt to new circumstances and alter its
planned timetable.4
Finally, AMISOM’s departure has become the
subject of increasing debate and controversy.
These debates have taken place among the
troop-contributing countries, most notably in
Burundi and Kenya, but probably most intensely
among Somalis. As any survey of AMISOM’s
presence on social media will attest, increasing
numbers of Somalis are making known their
negative views about the mission. Some point to
serious misconduct by AMISOM personnel,
including killing civilians, engaging in sexual
exploitation and abuse and selling mission
resources such as fuel and rations. Others claim
the mission has become a money-making
enterprise for its contributing countries, leaving
them with little incentive to defeat al-Shabaab.
Others see AMISOM as legitimizing unwanted
interference in Somali politics by its neighbors,
especially Ethiopia and Kenya. Even AMISOM’s
supporters are increasingly calling for more
international support to focus on creating
effective Somali national security forces.
During nearly nine years of operations,
AMISOM’s evolution has reflected both the
changing political context in Somalia and
international responses to the country’s many
problems. In its first few years, AMISOM was
widely viewed as a struggling mission. However,
especially after AU and Somali soldiers pushed
the majority of al-Shabaab forces out of
3 For a discussion, see Paul D. Williams, “How many
fatalities has the African Union Mission in Somalia
suffered?” The Global Observatory, 10 September 2015,
http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-africanunion-
somalia-peacekeeping/
4 See AbdirashidHashi, “Somalia’s Vision 2016: Reality check
and the road ahead,” Heritage Institute for Policy Studies,
May 2015, http://www.heritageinstitute.org/somaliasvision-
2016-reality-check-and-the-road-ahead/
5
Mogadishu in August 2011, AMISOM has been
credited with various successes. For example, US
President Barack Obama has lauded AMISOM as
supporting a successful US “strategy of taking out
terrorists who threaten us, while supporting
partners on the front lines.”5 Senior AMISOM
officials have regularly argued that their recent
operations have liberated 80 percent of southcentral
Somalia from al-Shabaab, implying that
the job is nearly finished but ignoring the fact
that al-Shabaab retains freedom of movement
across most of south-central Somalia.6 And in his
departing interview, the head of the UN
Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), credited
AMISOM with playing a crucial role in reducing
the threat from al-Shabaab and transitioning
Somalia from a “failed” state to a “fragile but
recovering” one.7
And yet AMISOM still faces considerable
problems and limitations. This report focuses on
five major challenges:
1. AMISOM still faces considerable internal
problems including a lack of key enablers such
as military helicopters and engineering units;
problems in its command, control and
coordination structures between its troopcontributing
countries; its inability to roll out
effective stabilization programs in recovered
settlements; and various forms of misconduct
by some of its personnel.
2. Al-Shabaab is a diminished political force, but
it has proved adaptable and remains a deadly
foe with a range of violent tactics at its
disposal. It retains an ability to strike even the
most secure of targets and has significantly
5 “Statement by the President on ISIL,” The White House,
10 September 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-
office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1
6 For example, “PSC Interview: The high cost of defeating
Al-Shabaab,” ISS, 6 February 2015,
https://www.issafrica.org/pscreport/addis-insights/pscinterview-
the-high-cost-of-defeating-al-Shabaab
7 “UN Envoy: Somalia Momentum Toward Peace
‘Unstoppable’,” Voice of America, 30 December 2015,
http://www.voanews.com/content/somalia-momentumtoward-
peace-unstoppable/3124257.html
increased its operational tempo beyond
Somalia, most notably in Kenya.
3. AMISOM’s principal local partner, the Somali
National Army (SNA), has not developed
according to plan. Among the SNA’s most
pressing problems are destructive clan
dynamics; numerous technical and
infrastructural limitations; and problems
related to command and control and political
leadership.
4. AMISOM is facing intensifying criticisms from
Somalis that are challenging the mission’s
credibility as well as its effectiveness.
5. Perhaps most fundamentally of all, AMISOM
has been forced to operate in a context of
regular political infighting between Somalia’s
leaders that took the focus away from
fighting al-Shabaab. The subsequent lack of a
political settlement between Somalia’s
bickering elites presented AMISOM with a
wide range of problems and undermined its
ability to effectively implement its mandated
tasks.
7
Structure of the Report
To address these issues, this report is organized
into seven sections. Section 1, AMISOM: A Very
Brief Overview, summarizes how the AU mission
has evolved since its initial deployment and
sketches the main international partnerships that
have kept it running.
Section 2, Exit Strategies in Theory, then briefly
recaps some of the general conclusions about
exit strategies for peace operations that emerge
from the academic literature. It also lists the most
common mechanisms used to bring peace
operations to an end, namely, deadlines or
predetermined timetables, cut and run,
expulsion, sequenced withdrawals, achieving
benchmarks and successor operations.
Section 3, Exit Strategies in Practice, then briefly
reviews the practical modes of exit used by nine
different foreign military operations in Somalia
between 1992 and 2015. Its objective is to draw
out any potential patterns or lessons that might
be relevant for AMISOM.
Section 4 turns from the history of previous
operations in Somalia to examine how AMISOM’s
Theory of Exit has evolved since the mission was
established in early 2007. Drawing on AMISOM’s
internal documents and several international
reviews of the mission, this section shows how
AMISOM’s principal focus has been assessing
whether conditions on the ground in Somalia
were appropriate to transition into a UN-led
peacekeeping operation, and, more recently, an
emphasis on building the capacity of local Somali
security forces. In recent years, AMISOM has set
out a range of different benchmarks to evaluate
whether transitioning to a UN peacekeeping
operation remains a viable way out of Somalia.
This option is looking less and less likely.
Section 5, Practical Challenges to AMISOM’s Exit,
turns from the theory of AMISOM’s exit
strategies to analyze the main ongoing practical
challenges facing the mission as it looks for a way
out. For analytical purposes, these are grouped
into five categories but in reality the issues
overlap and interrelate in important ways. The
challenges discussed are: the continued threat
from al-Shabaab; internal problems within
AMISOM; building an effective set of Somali
national security forces, especially the SNA; the
lack of a political settlement between the Federal
Government and the regions, and the rise of
negative local perceptions about AMISOM. If
AMISOM is to chart a successful exit from
Somalia that preserves its hard-won gains, all
these challenges must be overcome.
Section 6, Future Scenarios and AMISOM’s Exit
Options, sketches six scenarios that might be
useful for thinking about AMISOM’s potential
modes of exit as well as highlighting some of the
potentially influential actors and issues that
might hasten or prolong AMISOM’s withdrawal.
Finally, Section 7, Policy Considerations, offers
some proposals for moving forward to address
some of AMISOM’s main challenges.
Annex 114
Unlocking Somalia’s Potential, Soma Oil & Gas, Company Presentation, Q2 2016, Slide 4
Company Presentation
Q2 2016
Unlocking Somalia’s Potential
Oil & Gas Industry in Somalia
• Prior to 1991, BP (Amoco, Sinclair), Chevron (Texaco), Conoco, Eni, Shell, ExxonMobil, Total and 5
others had signed rights to exploration blocks in Somalia
• By 1991, all operators claimed force majeure due to civil war
• All historical regional geological & geophysical data & knowledge lost due to civil war
• Oil & gas sector primary focus for TFG and FGS for rebuilding the economy
• Petroleum Law enacted by the TFG in 2008
• FGS approached 12 licence holders in 2012/13 to end force majeure - all declined
• FGS contacted 8 other oil companies – who also declined
4
TFG: Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)
FGS: Federal Government of Somalia
Annex 115
J.T. Juxon Barton, “Report on the Bajun Islands” (1922) 17 Journal of the East Africa and
Uganda Natural History Society p. 24.
24 REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS
mixture, as it is believed that the wounded animal will not
then be able to cross a path without falling dead.
Some black substance found in the liver of a crocodile is
finally added, as it is believed that by this means the wounded
animal will at once fall dead if he should stop to drink water
by the way.
A mysterious hidden force seems to be recognised, and is
called • Wak,' the same word being used by the Galla and the
Duruma. The word is not used by the Giryama, who use
, Mulungu '; Mulunguni denoting the heavens.
The pottery found was all in the Giryama style. A honey
barrel, which was beautifully fashioned, was found to be
without mark of ownership. A small wooden drum with
bottom and cover made of skin is a universal receptacle of the
Alangulo for all kinds of food, and is carried by means of a
strip of hide passing over the forehead. These are similar
in appearance to the Kithembi of the Akamba.
The crops in the neighbourhood looked at least as flourishing
as those of the Agiryama.
The Alangulo in the neighbourhood of Mlango Moro,
where I camped, seemed very shy, and those whom I met
invariably fled into the bush. It is hoped next time, through
the medium of some friendly Giryama, to establish better
relations, and obtain some more information about these
interesting people.
REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS
By J. T. JUXON BARTON
I. PEOPLE
The Bajun (Ar. Ba-gun, a white tribe), Wa-Gunya (KiSwahili,
Ku-Gawanya, to divide), i.e., a fractious people, a
term of reproach applied by the Southern Wa-Swahili to the
Northern and by the Northern to the Southern, or Wa-Tikuu
(Ki-Swahili, contracted from nt'i kuu, the mainland), are said
to represent the oldest form of civilisation on the coast; their
language, the most archaic form of Swahili.
REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS 25
They inhabit the islands on the east coast of Africa lying
between Lamu and Kismayu. These islands are divided into
two groups, the northern group being known as the Dundas
Islands.
It is submitted that the inhabitants of the northern
islands are of a different origin from those of the south.
Their origin has been variously stated as Phamician,
Himyaritic, and Hamitic. The fact that coast dwellers of aU
nations can hardly claim descent from one stock seems to have
been lost sight of, and an unreasonable antiquity argued from
the ruins on the islands and on the mainland opposite to the
islands.
Sir Harry H. Johnston, K.C.B., stated that at about the
same time as the Bantu race movement, some 8000 years ago,
the Arab-Sab15ans came voyaging down the east coast of
Africa, until they ultimately settled in the Sofala district
south of the Zambesi, leaving as witnesses of their venture
the Zimbabwe and other ruins. Phoonicians also explored
the east coast, founding stations as far south as Mozambique:
one expedition, in the employ of the Egyptian King Necho,
is said to have circumnavigated Africa about 600 B.C.
Later the pre-Islamic settlements of Arabs from Southern
Arabia were revived by militant traders and missionaries of
Islam establishing themselves at Mozambique, Kilwa, Zanzibar,
Mombasa, and various ports on the Somali coast.
A colony of Mohammedan Persians (Shirazi) joined them
in the tenth century at Lamu, and Persian as well as Arab
influence began to be apparent in the architecture on the
east coast.
Until the settlement of the coast towns by the Portuguese
in the sixteenth century, these Arab states were sparsely
colonised by Himyaritic or South Arabian Arabs from the
Hadramaut, Yemen, and Aden.
A development amongst the Arabs of Muscat drove the
Portuguese from that territory, and, following up their success
at home, these Arabs attacked them on the east coast of
Africa, the Muscat Arab becoming the predominant type.
In this connection may perhaps be mentioned the traditional
arrival of two hundred and fifty Portuguese at Tula Island,
26 REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS
with an equal number of women who were, so the tradition
runs, driven out of Arabia by the Arabs. A Portuguese grave
is to be seen to this day on Tula Island.
Thoij.gh immaterial, the higher type of features so noticeable
amongst the population of Faza, Patte, and Siu in the Lamu
Archipelago, is stated by the Bajuns to indicate European
blood; and in further support of this opinion, the Bajuns of
Tula amusingly instance the Faza custom of hanging washing
to dry on a line, and taking the clothing down with a tearing
motion, instead of laying on the beach with stones as weights,
and carefully folding in the native fashion.
A rough chronology of the coast would seem to be :
B.C. 600. Pharaoh Necho of Egypt sends a Phamician
expedition, which is said to have circumnavigated
Africa in three years.
A.D. 720. First Islamic settlement.
1497. Vasco da Gama rounds the Cape and visits the towns
on the coast.
1584. Portugal is in possession and defeats Turkey, who
attempts to wrest from her the Zanzibar coast.
1698. By this date the rising of Arab power of 'Oman
has driven Portugal out of all her possessions
north of Mozambique.
1752. The Portuguese, having finally lost Mombasa in
1730, recognised the Muscat Imamate of the
coast.
1888. The Imperial British East Africa Company receive
a charter.
1894. The LB.E.A. Company is withdrawn, the territory
becoming a protectorate.
The maps of Africa, according to Herodotus, 450 B.C., and
Eratosthenes, 200 B.C., do not extend south below what is
now Cape Guardafui.
• The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea,' circa A.D. 80, is a
navigation guide of the east coast of Africa to about the
latitude of Zanzibar.
Ptolemy, in about A.D. 140, marks the coast of Jubaland
and Italian,Somaliland as simply' Barbaria,' the interior as
REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS 27
'Azania,' Kismayu 'Parvum Littus,' Port Durnford or
thereabouts 'Magnum Littus.' Al Idris, in 1154, follows
Ptolemy in ' Barbaria,' marking islands off the coast.
Martin Behaim, in 1492, leaves the coast a blank.
Diego Ribero of Seville, in 1529, showing Lamu, Patte, the
Bajun Islands, the mouth of Juba River almost accurately,
embellishes the coast and interior with drawings of elephants.
Pigafetta, in 1591, shows what may be the Tana River,
Barkao, the mouth of the Juba, and islands.
Jacob van Meurs, in 1668, shows a town at Kismayu called
'Liongo,' and marks the vicinity of the Juba River' Barenboa,'
calling an island, with a town on the mainland opposite, , Tetile '
(Tula).
H. Moll, in 1710, calls the coast of Jubaland 'Barra Boa,'
and the interior ' Quilimia.'
Smith's New Map of Africa, 1815, shows a town on the
Juba mouth and the country between the Juba and the Tana
as' Galla.'
, Liongo ' was a semi-mythical Swahili hero, vulnerable
only in his navel to a copper needle, the subject of many poems,
who lived in the neighbourhood of Lamu and who was buried
at Ozi. Lamu and Patte are, however, shown in Jacob van
Meurs' map, while Liongo occupies the place of Kismayu.
, Barenboa,' , Barra Boa' : the Bajuns, the Gallas, and the
Somali use the word 'Barobaro' to denote an unmarried
youth of the warrior class. Possibly also the word may be
derived from' barra' (Ki-Swahili, Arabic, ' the interior ').
, Quilimia ' (Ki-Swahili, Kilimia, ' the Pleiades ').
In attempting to deduce an origin of these people, the
Himyaritic element pervades the coast; to a lesser, much
lesser, degree the Persian; the Portuguese, with the early
crusading zeal of Roman Catholicism, are little likely to have
mixed their blood, on pain of purgatory.
The Persian element p.ersists in a lesser degree, in that
this tenth-century settlement of Shirasi adventurers would
seem to have definitely limited itself to Lamu, where the
prevailing type to this day is in marked distinction from the
-Bajuns, and it is to be remembered that until, and after, the
arrival of the English, internecine war was rife.
28 REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS
There remains, then, what may perhaps be called the
Hamitic theory. This seems to have received little consideration,
despite the traditions of the Bajuns, and despite
the obviously Hamitic features of many of the islanders.
In brief, the Bajun tradition is that they came from the
north-east and occupied the present Garreh country, north
of Dolo; were driven south-east by the Galla invasion; settled
at Afmadu; were driven by the Galla to the coast at Kismayu,
and thence to seek refuge in the islands.
They claim to have dug the so-called wells at Afmadu, and
to have possessed camels.
A further point in estimating their origin which does not
seem to have been mentioned is that the Bantu Nyika (KiSwahili,
, desert ') tribes (Digo, Duruma, Rabai, Ribe, Kambe,
Jibana, Chonyi, Kauma, and Giryama) occupied the Shungwaya
or Burkao (Port Durnford) country, and were driven south
by the Gallas. These people now occupy the littoral from the
Tana River to the, until recently, Anglo-German boundary.
The Bantu dialect spoken is akin to Ki-ngozi or Ki-ngovi,
the old language upon which modern Ki-Swahili is based ..
The Persian and Portuguese elements seem justly negligible.
There then remain the Southern Arabian, the Hamite,
and the Bantu as progenitors.
(1) The Arab.-The Arab, driven by trade, pestilence, or
famine, left his country and established stations along the
coast. Were pestilence the reason, the disease would have
followed; were famine, he would not have chosen the arid
coral rag of the islands, open to the winds, with an inhospitable
mainland, to give him sustenance. The factor was probably
trade; and gold mines were worked near the Zambesi early in
the history of man. Moreover, harbours near to food centres
were necessary, and he chose Lamu and Mombasa as his home.
(2) The Hamite.-The Bajun claims what almost may be
called 'Somali' descent. He was driven from Garreh to
Afmadu, from Afmadu to Kismayu, and from Kismayu to the
islands by the Galla, and the Galla occupied Jubaland until.
fifty years ago.
He states he dug the wells at Afmadu: these wells are
almost horizontal caves, not the work of Arab craftsmen.
REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS 29
He did not build with stone at Garreh, nor at Afmadu,
nor Kismayu; but on the islands he built with stone in the
Saracenic style--and work in stone is not learned in ten generations,
and now the Arab element has disappeared he no longer
uses stone.
The ruins on the islands have been stated to be of great
age: all the evidence would seem to be to the contrary. The
style is Saracenic, which style gave to Europe the battlements
and portcullis of the medieval castle, and this style has
undergone few if any modifications since its inception. The
material used was coral rag and lime, and one has not to go
far afield to see the result of but a year's neglect on such
buildings on less exposed sites.
The people of Burkao (Port Dumford) claim kinship with
the Rendile, and state that when accompanying the late Mr.
Reddie, then District Officer, Port Dumford, on his journey
to RendiJe, they found lost relatives and brothers. The
Rendile are of ' Somali ' origin.
Bwana Hamudi, late Headman at Port Durnford, was of
pure Garreh descent.
(3) The Bantu.-The place of origin of the Nyika tribe is
the Jubaland littoral. Odd survivors owning stock as Somalis
are still to be found, and, still more curiously, Bajuns (Tula.
Island) have spontaneously stated the former neighbourhood
of the Wa-Nyika.
The Wa-Nyika were possibly agriculturists in the fertile
watered valley between the Anole and Burkao creeks, now
the Herti-Magharbul grazing. They were obviously hunters,
nomads if necessary; undoubtedly subject to slave raids,
equally undoubtedly to Mohammedan concubinage; and
harassed from the coast by slavers, from the interior by the
Ga.lla., they sought refuge from their oppressors in comparatively
recent times, and crossed the river Tana, as did the
Galla. in their turn when harried by the Somali. If this is,
then, the parentage of the Bajun it is submitted that their
story should run as follows :
The great migration of Hamites, increasingly obvious in
the southern .movement of the Somali tribes of the present
day, began in the mother country of middle Egypt and Arabia.
80 REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS
One branch, the Gallas, reaching Abyssinia, passing, driving
before it all weaker tribes, mingling with its captives, drove
the so-called Bajun (nomads also) from well to well until a
sure refuge was found on the islands. The coast and hinterland
was occupied by the Nyika tribes, and with these the islanders
mixed: the struggle with the Gallas still continued, the
islander and the Bantu being attacked as the former tried to
regain and the latter to retain his hold upon the mainland.
And so the struggle continued until and after the coming of
the Arab from the south. The Arab came as a trader in
ivory and slaves, and by barter with the Galla and the help
of the Bajun, secured both the ivory and the slaves.
Mixing with the Bajun and Bantu, he built houses and
mosques 1where no real prosperity promised (for the supply of
ivory and humanity could not last, since both beast and man
run from fear), and where but the scantiest crops could be
grown, so that he brought grain from Lamu and the south in
dhows. He waS at his greatest prosperity in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth century, when even the Galla, pressed by
famine, sold his children, and so until the middle nineteenth
century, when the Galla hunter disappeared into the dense
Tana bush before the Somali coming by sea and land.
With the advent of government, the abolition of slavery and
the preservation of ivory, the Arab returns south, leaving his
houses, his mosques, and a people of mixed Hamitic, Bantu,
and Arab blood using his buildings until the action of the
winds and sea crumbled them away, and returning to their
previous state of bare sustenance.
The Bajuns are light coloured, intelligent, and unwarlike.
They are Mohammedans of a devout type, in marked
contrast with the Pharisaical Somali. They are miserably
poor, extremely thrifty, but spend lavishly when in funds.
The average monthly earnings of the Bajun may perhaps
reach seven rupees.
They have some knowledge of agriculture, and, what is
1 A venerable and ruined mosque, now unused, on Koyama Island shows
h d& 2 h· A.H. tete 1 24 A.H. w loh, by use of the formula: A.H. - 3 100 + 621 =A.D.,
give. the year 1808.
REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS 31
more important, the will to work: they obtain small crops
from the most impossible soil.
They are courteous and obliging to strangers, and
exceedingly friendly to government.
They possess a certain amount of low cunning, which is
naturally more obvious in the markedly Hamitic type, but are
otherwise honest in their dealings. They borrow extensively
from Indian (Kismayu) traders, loans sometimes reaching
Rs. 4000, which is evidence of their integrity or of an ivory
trade, for they can give no security.
Their houses are built of wattle and daub, the palm for
the roof coming from Lamu. Shelves and crude ornamental
devices are sometimes contrived in the walls of the rooms.
The houses are well-built. Bajuns are unable to build in
stone, and probably they never knew the craft. The wells are
all of some age.
The upanga is carried by the man, and is often ornamented
with silver; this sword is a cutlass, and different from the Arab
weapon.
Their dances are the usual advancing lines of men and
girls; married women should not dance.
Two dances are performed exclusively by men, the one a
sword-dance, the dancers prancing around one another, cutting
at head and foot, a cloth being held in the free hand as a shield
with sometimes another cloth in the teeth; the other is the
old English quarter-staff, save that damage is rarely done.
To this, drums and brass trays are beaten. The former is the
Hazua, the latter the Kirimbizi.
Women and girls have also dances, no man being present.
This is the Msondo, or school of love, presided over by a Somo,
an adept in the art of attraction, the pupil being called Mwari.
The original purpose of the Msondo was undoubtedly to
prepare girls for the housewife's duties, the present practice
is best imagined. A polite custom of the islands dissuades a.
man returning at night from landing and entering his house.
The women possess long hair which they wear in a coif,
the ears are pierced for Arab ear-rings, the lobes often distended
for the introduction of coloured paper rolls; the use of
ornaments is lavish. Both sexes chew snuff mixed with
82 REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS
magadi (soda). Comely women are confined to their houses;
this is by no meane general, and the shapeless blue buibui is
not worn.
The threefold divorce is rarely used, the first formula being
regarded as ~u:fficient.
Fish is the staple diet: there are, however, clans who eat
no fish. Most shell-fish, other than oysters, are prized; both
men and women string cowries for the Indian market. Corn
. is sold at 12 lb. (two pishis) for the rupee. Seaweed is eaten.
Buni (unhusked coffee) is as necessary a drug to the Bajun
as to the Somali and Galla.
A few goats and cattle are to be found on the islands.
Fishing dhows are made of Msindi wood, which has the
disadvantage of not rising to the surface after immersion, the
planks being bound with fibre rope and rendered seaworthy
with shark fat. Very few large dhows are to be seen, and these
represent bad debts of Indian merchants in Kismayu. The
coastal carrying trade will be in time entirely in Indian hands.
Small white pennons are flown on the bowsprit to propitiate
the elements. A person on his first voyage must tie some
article of clothing to the mast until the journey's end, and
redeem it at a price.
The boating songs are exceedingly tuneful, and would be
worth collection.
The method of catching the turtle by the Koyama people
is worth recording. The taza, a slender sucking fish, about
two feet or so in length, is caught. When a shoal of turtles
(kasa) is seen, this fish is thrown into the water attached to
a line. The taza almost' hunts' his enormous victim, fastens
himself to the under portion of the throat, sucking its blood,
and the turtle is drawn towards the boat, from which the
fisherman dives to fasten an iron ring, with a rope attached,
to the turtle's flapper. This mode of fishing would seem to be
unique.
The Bajun is a dying race: with some help and fosterage
from Government they might be saved: their economic value
is undoubtedly greater than that of the Somali, and their
loyalty is not in question.
REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS SS
II. THE ISLANDS
(1) Koyama Island.--This island is situated some 211 miles
down the coast from Kismayu, its greatest length being 31
miles, its breadth 2 miles.
There are two villages on the island, the village on the
shore being known as Koyama, the village on the hilI a mile
or so away, Koyamani. The inhabitants of this island are
markedly Hamitic in features. They regard themselves as a
distinct tribe, and seem the most feeble and dispirited of the
islanders.
The island possesses about four mosques in varying states
of repair; a venerable ruin gives the date A.H.1224=A.D.1808.
Tombs of a more intricate design than those of other islands
are to be seen on the foreshore. China plates are cemented
into the mosque walls around the Kibla.
A cloth slightly different from that of Benadir is stilI
made.
Coco-nuts, tobacco, and some grain is grown. The people
possess a few sheep and goats. The turtle is esteemed as a
delicacy and caught in a manner already described. The wells
are extremely brackish.
Some fifty years ago, when Jubaland was in the possession
of the Gallas (an old man states), two boats' crews, fifteen souls
in all, from one of Her Majesty's ships arrived, the vessel
ha ving foundered. These survivors were fed by the inhabitants,
giving written bills in exchange for meat and grain: they
camped on the highest point and remained two months when
a ship was sighted which rescued them. Their debts were
paid in full, and the late Headman possessed a letter of
commendation from a shipwrecked officer.
On one occasion Somali traders from the Benadir had put
into Tula Island and captured four children: all the slavers
were killed, and the Bajuns returned by the English.
Bajun tradition states that the islands were populated by
a race crossing from the mainland at Koyama, each section
cutting its mark on a baobab tree opposite the island. These
marks are very like the cattle and other brands of known
Hamites.
D
84 REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS
The life of the baobab may exceed a thousand years: the
tree in question is of great age.
(2) Ngumi lsland.-This island is close to Koyama, its
greatest length being 41 miles and breadth 1 mile. It is
uninhabited save by two or three fishermen. Water is obtained
from Koyama. The island possesses considerable ruins of a
walled-in village. It is of no interest save with reference to
the legend associated with the mosque.
The inhabitants traded in ivory and slaves with a white
race: the tusks were packed in the long matting-bags
used for grain. On one occasion a cargo was taken, but
the bags contained but one tusk each and were packed
with camel and other bones. The traders sailed, and
on their return bombarded the village, destroying all the
inhabitants.
One woman ran for sanctuary to the mosque, praying
that she might be saved from the raiders; her answer was her
transformation into stone. The stone has now disappeared,
but is stated to have stood near the Kibla : it has been reported
as still existent, but its whereabouts kept secret. From
this legend Astarte worship has been argued, somewhat
unwarranta bly.
Men desirous of children burn incense before the ruined
shrine.
The Bajuns are unwilling to clean the old stone wells in
that each well demands a life.
(3) Chovai lsland.-Chovai is the correct Ki-Tikuu name
for this island, which is called Towala by the Arabs. The
island is the most populous of the Dundas group.
It possesses very few stone ruins. The existing mosques
have been repaired recently.
Some attempt at agriculture is made on the mainland~
Sheep and goats are grazed. The water is moderate.
The inhabitants seem the most wealthy of the islanders,
are markedly Hamitic, and are divided amongst themselves.
Chovai creek on the mainland is a harbour for native
craft; the creek, penetrating some miles inland, is fringed with
mangroves.
Ivory is probably smuggled.
REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS 85
(4) Tula Island.-This island is second in point of population:
it is 57 miles from Kismayu, is 11 miles in breadth,
8t miles in length. The water is the sweetest on the islands.
There are two villages on this island, the one Tula, the
other a mile or so distant, M'doa.
Coco-nuts grow extremely well, and with some encouragement
would become profitable.
The island possesses a large tomb, said to be Portuguese,
made with a cement the secret of which has been lost. The
decorations are not Islamic.
Legend has it that five hundred Portuguese men and
women landed on the island, having been driven out of Arabia:
more probably they were expelled from Mombasa or Lamu
by the Arabs in the eighteenth century.
A house, the interior decorations of which are singularly
delicate, is shown as of great age. It was built with slave
labour by the great-aunt of a living inhabitant. This woman
was of the Defarad clan of the Tunni tribe and the Barawa
people of the Benadir coast. The Tunni and Rehawen fought
with the Somalis at Gium bo and were driven north.
The three stone mosques are in good repair: the interiors
are decorated with plates: in many cases the design of this
china is modern.
On the mainland a few hundred yards from the shore, at
Kituni, is the ruin of a considerable mosque, the interior of
which is decorated with the 114 Suras of the Koran carved
in the plaster.
On the right-hand bank, at the mouth of the Anole Creek,
are more ruins, likewise on the left-hand side at Kudai.
It is submitted that these mainland settlements were in
their conception custom-houses, and, as relations with the
Galla or Wa-Nyika were established, became villages. The
custom is well known; the grain was placed some distance
away, the tusk was brought: if either the price or the article
did not suffice, the dissatisfied warned away the other by hostile
demonstration. Manifestly the islander could not barter in
safety on his island.
(5) J(udai Village.-This is a small settlement on the
mouth of the Anole Creek, inhabited by a few Bajuns, who eke
36 REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS
out a wretched living by fishing and attempts to grow crops.
It is marked' Kituni' on the latest maps.
(6) Anole Village.-This is a small village of natives of
various Bantu tribes who have moved from place to place
until they have reached the head of Anole Creek, some
twenty-five to thirty miles from the sea.
Their condition is miserable, and they are in constant
dread of raids by Rer Abdulla youths aspiring to the white
feather.
The soil round this village is suitable for sham bas on an
extensive scale; corn, sim-sim, manico (muhogo), and tobacco
a.re grown.
The neighbourhood is the Jilal grazing of the Herti and
Magharbul Somalis, with whom their relations are friendly.
The water, from shallow wells, is abundant, clear, and sweet.
This stretch of fertile country extends for a considerable
distance, as far as Busbushli on the Burkao Creek.
A road is said to have been cut by Mr. Haywood, District
Commissioner, from the head of Anole Creek to Kudai. It is
not visible, and the camel track followed through thick bush
is a nine to ten hours' march. (European.)
(7) Tosha Village.-This is a small and insignificant
village some two miles from Kudai on the mainland. The
water is moderately good.
(8) Sheh Village.-This village, some five miles south of
Tosha on the mainland, has been abandoned. No water is to
be found, and mosquitoes with sand-flies in the mangroves
render camping impossible.
(9) Port Durnford Village.-This is marked as Burkao on
maps; it is called' Birikavo ' by the Bajuns.
Formerly a Government station was maintained, and a.
considerable village was built, trade being with the Abdulla
and Magharbul Somalis. It has since been abandoned.
There are ruins of an old village at Port Durnford and of
a pIer.
The water is impossible even for native consumption, and
for Europeans the rain-tanks must be supplemented with
water brought in dhows from Busbushli, some twenty miles
up the creek.
REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS 87
The harbour is suitable for large vessels; boats drawing
four to five feet can enter the creek some nineteen miles, which
is navigable a further sixteen miles, as far as Wayore, by craft
drawing nine inches or so.
Busbushli, where a large supply of fresh water is to be
found, is the grazing of the Rer Abdulla section of the Ogaden
Somalis during the month of January.
The Mohamed Zubeir Ogadens claim a vague suzerainty
over this section.
Busbushli would seem a natural basis for operations
against the Rer Abdulla.
The Administration house at Port Durnford is a large and
commodious building, erected by the late Mr. Reddie, when
District Officer.
It is now sadly in need of repair in every particular. The
roof beams have fallen in some places, the windows and doors
are broken, the floor has cracked, the verandah is a mass of
rubble. The house has been in the occupation of a Police
Post.
The inhabitants of Port Durnford wish to move to Ras
Mnarani, some six hours distant down the coast, owing to the
suitability of that place for shambas, water and grazing, and
the impossibility of the water at Port Durnford.
(10) Ras Mnarani.-This can scarcely be called a village
as yet. The inhabitants of Port Durnford, however, are
desirous of moving thither, where water, grazing and some
oultivation is possible.
Ras Mnarani is six hours' march from Port Durnford.
III. THE COAST
The coast-line of Jubaland from the river Juba to Ras
Kiambone is about 120 miles long, a practically continuous
line of sand-hills.
There are three tidal creeks-Chovai, Anole, and Burkao.
The creeks are fringed with mangroves, mwea, mkandaa
and mutu trees, all of some commercial value :-
(1) Chovai Creek.-This creek lies opposite to Chovai
Island, and is suitable for coasting craft.
88 REPORT ON THE BAJUN ISLANDS
(2) Anole Creek.-This creek is suitable for boats drawing
three to four feet for about five miles. Canoes and small
fishing-boats can be punted or sailed for this distance, and
can proceed a further twenty to twenty-five miles in the dry
season.
The journey to Anole village at the head of the creek
should not be attempted by Europeans by land or water in
one day.
(3) Burkao Creek.-Port Durnford, a sub-port, is a sheltered
anchorage of about six fathoms. A steamboat has ascended
the creek for about twenty miles in the dry season to Busbushli.
Dhows drawing four to five feet can reach Busbushli
at any time, and canoes, Wayore, a further sixteen miles.
The rumours of tsetse-fly would seem to be an obstructive
Somali (Herti) myth.
This tribe grazes its cattle along the coast-line to Port
Durnford, and what is more, along the Chovai and Anole
creeks, the rank vegetation of which should harbour all manner
of insects.
IV. COMMUNICATIONS
(1) By Sea.-Journeys by sea are naturally subject to
the N.E. and S.E. monsoons. The former blows roughly
from April to August, the latter from September to March.
During both monsoons the current is stronger near the land;
despite this, the more speedy mode of travel against the
monsoon would seem to be poling along the shore. The time
taken between island and island is a matter of circumstance.
(2) By Land.-The owners of boats on each island take it
in turn to keep a ten days' watch. A fire is lit on the mainland,
and tra\"ellcrs are ferried across to the island, where water can
be obtained.
Chovai Creek has no ferry.
V. TRADE, PRODUCTS, ETC.
The Bajuns would seem to do a great deal of the coastal
carrying trade. In reality this business is rapidly becoming
a purely Indian concern.
NOTES ON EAST AFRICAN MAMMALIA 89
Fishing is engaged in mainly as a means of livelihood.
Cowries and dried sharks' flesh are bought by Kismayu
traders.
Pearling might become profitable, but the Bajuns do not
possess the power of deep diving.
Coarse' carriage' sponges are to be found.
Ambergris and turtle shell are rarities.
The question of grain for food deserves special consideration.
The Juba river fltl'ip is in the hands of Arabs financed by
Indians: the Bajuns on the islands consequently starve.
~he coral rag of the islands is not fit for agriculture: an
attempt is ma,de to grow crops on the mainland a few yards
from the shore: this is but little better.
The only arable land adjoining would seem to be the almost
well-watered valley or 'tug' stretching from Mtoni at the
head of Anole Creek to Busbushli, twenty miles up the Birikou
Creek. ~he Chore or Joreh country is also watered.
Coco-nuts grow well on Tula Island, and would do well
at Kudai and Port Durnford.
Trees of commercial value are to be found at Chovai, Anole,
and Birikou creeks. These are ' borities '; 'mweah,' small
borities used in the construction of native huts; 'mkandieh,'
a. wood used for burning lime; 'mutu,' a tree used for making
native beds, chairs, etc., and burning lime.
Wild rubber is to be found in the vicinity of Port Durnford.
NOTES ON EAST AFRICAN MAMMALIA (OTHER THAN
HORNED UNGULATES) COLLECTED OR KEPT IN
CAPTIVITY 1915-1919. PART II.
By ARTHUR LOVERIDGE
One day .1 tossed the still warm body of a newly-killed rat
to her to see what she would do. First seizing the tail in her
mouth she defied anyone to take it from her, then she subjected
it to a critical examination, opening the mouth and looking inside,
licked the blood from its nose, examined its fur minutely
Annex 116
D. Anzilotti, Cours de droit international (Sirey 1929) p. 347.
Annex 119
R. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester University Press
1963) p. 45.
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE MELLAND SCHILL LECTURES
delivered at the University of Manchester
and published by the University Press
The Law of International Institutions in Europe,
by A. H. Robertson, B.C.L., S.J.D. Spring, 1961
The Role of InternationalL aw in the Elimination of War,
by Professor Quincy Wright, Winters 1961
'TJHE ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
by
R. Y. JENNINGS
Whewell Professor of International
Law in the University of Cambridge
MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS
U.S.A.: OCEANA PUBLICATIONS INC.
@ 1963. Manchester University Press
Published by the University of Manchester at
THE UNIvERsiTY PRESS
316-324 Oxford Road, Manchester, 13
U.S.A.
OCEANA PUBLICATIONS INC.
60 Fourth Avenue, New York, 3, N.Y.
Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London
Chapter III
RECOGNITION, ACQUIESCENCE
AND ESTOPPEL
IN this lecture I want to consider the place of recognition, acquiescence
and estoppel in questions of title to territorial sovereignty.
Obviously there is an important difference between recognition
and acquiescence, even though it may not always be easy in practical
situations to distinguish the one from the other especially where an
implied or tacit recognition is in point. Whereas recognition, even
though it be tacit, is the adoption of a positive acknowledgment on
the part of a State, acquiescence may arise from a mere omission to
protest against a situation where a right to protest existed and its
exercise was called for.'. Both recognition and acquiescence, however,
are manifestations of a legally operative consent on the part of a
State. In what ways, then, are these different forms of acknowledgment
by States relevant to the acquisition of a title to territorial
sovereignty?
One does not need to look very far before discovering that both
in the practice of States and the jurisprudence of international tribunals,
these manifestations of consent have been regarded as important
elements in the make-up of territorial titles. But it is by no
means a simple matter. In order to understand it we must first
attempt to classify the different situations where consent of third
States may be relevant. It may be useful to think of the problem as
being partly at least one of the relativity of rights: how far is the
consent of a State necessary in order that a right may be available
in international law against that State; how far is the consent of
one or more States required to constitute a title enforceable erga
omnes ?
The situation where a new State has arisen on territory formerly
I 'Acquiescence thus takes the form of silence or absence of protest in circumstances
which generally call for a positive reaction signifying an objection': see
MacGibbon, British Year Book of International Law, vol. 31 (1954), p. 143.
2 This aspect of the problem is very helpfully discussed in Charpentier, La
Reconnaissance internationale et l'Evolution du Droit des Gens (1956), chap. 11.
36
RECOGNITION, ACQUIESCENCE AND ESTOPPEL
subject to another sovereignty is one to which we have already had
occasion to refer in the first lecture. It is a situation where recognition
plays a primary and perhaps decisive role in the constitution
of a territorial title. In such a situation it is ordinarily impracticable
to separate out from the process of the creation of the new State the
single element of title to sovereignty over its territory; for each is a
constituent of the other.
How far in this situation the function of recognition may be constitutive
of the title depends obviously upon one's view of the nature
of recognition; a question which would require too great a digression
to enter upon here. But in so far as the new State's title to its territory
may be regarded as a product of the mere fact of its existence in the
territory, there is clearly an affinity with those modes by which title
may be changed from one existing State to another by reason of the
fact of its apprehension and exercise. There is this difference, however:
in the case of a new State there is no room for lapse of time as
an element in title. However gradual may be the development of an
entity to the full stature of Statehood there must be some moment of
time at which that full personality is judged to have been attained,
and this moment of time at which independent Statehood is attained
is unavoidably to be regarded as a root of title to territory. It is true
that the operation of this regime may depend upon a series of recognitions
which occur at different times and this, even in spite of the
retroactivity of recognition, must result in a fragmentation of title
which seems foreign to the very notion of title. There is in fact room
for a process of consolidation, but one in which the mere passage of
time plays no part. This fragmentation of the elements of title is no
doubt inelegant but unavoidable so long as recognition lacks any
collective machinery.
It is to be observed, however, that even where a new person of the
law is created-a new sovereign State-international law does not
allow that it begins its legal life with a tabula rasa. International law
has established a principle of State succession and to this principle of
succession the succession to territory is obviously a key. Thus we are
told that even a new State will inherit real rights or obligations
attaching to the territory even if its title to the territory may in one
sense be a new and an original one. And by the same token it would
seem to follow that, if it inherits a parcel of territory the frontiers of
which are themselves controversial, it inherits subject so to speak to
the dispute: in other words that a third State's claim to a part of the
territory is not defeated merely because the territory passes to a
37
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
new State; for a title to sovereignty-if the claim be a valid one-is
the 'real' right par excellence. This is assuming, of course, that the
claimant State has not itself recognized the title of the new State to
the territory. Yet this can presumably apply only to questions of the
relatively minor frontier class. For if the new State, to take the case
at the other extreme, is established with the disputed territory as its
sole territory, and its Statehood is recognized, it would seem that
another claim to sovereignty over the territory is defeated. In short it
is only where there is room for doubt or ambiguity in the definition of
the new State's territory that a claim against the territory will survive.
A sufficient number of recognitions of the new State clearly implying
recognition of its title to the disputed territory would presumably
destroy the claim.
Leaving aside now the question of the emergence of a new State,
the question remains what part recognition may play in the acquisition
of territorial sovereignty by an already existing State?
In the first place it is, of course, obvious that all forms of acknowledgment
of a legal or factual position may be of great probative or
evidentiary value even when not themselves an element in the substantive
law of title. Recognition-and also acquiescence-is likely,
therefore, for that reason alone, to have a prominent place in territorial
questions. That it does do so is clear enough. One need look no
further than the Eastern Greenland case to see both the anxiety of
Denmark to collect recognitions from third States of her pretensions
over Greenland, and the importance which the Court was willing to
attach to them. The question remains how far if at all it is itself a root
of title or at least an ingredient in a root of title and not merely
evidence. Admittedly the distinction may be a nice one but it is
nevertheless important. First, let us consider this question in relation
to what may be called the orthodox modes of acquisition.
If occupation, or cession, for example, are indeed modes by which
the law allows territorial sovereignty can be acquired, the presumption
is that they are in themselves sufficient for that purpose; that
whatever assistance recognitions may be in proving title by occupation-
or cession-recognition is not a condition for the acquisition
of title. And this is surely the true position. If a State effectively
occupies a territory which is res nullius, it acquires an immediate
title opposable to the whole world. In so far as recognition of that
title may be required it is able legally to demand it. To say that
recognition constitutes the title is to put the cart before the horse.
Indeed, in the case of occupation it is doubtful whether even pub-
38
RECOGNITION, ACQUIESCENCE AND ESTOPPEL
lication of the claim is required, let alone its recognition. There is, it
is true, some authority for the view that publicity of an alleged occupation
is a requirement of international law;' and the analogy of
municipal laws, which have tended always to require publicity of
conveyances of land, argues to the same effect. But the major opinion
seems to be that publicity is not a requirement of international law .2
The conclusion seems to be, therefore, that recognition and questions
of acquiescence are strictly irrelevant to title by occupation .
When we turn to consider any form of prescription, however, we
find quite another situation. In prescription proceeding from an
adverse possession at least, an acquiescence on the part of the State
prescribed against is of the essence of the process. And as far as
recognition goes, if that State were to recognize the claimant's
title then cadit quaestio. Recognition or acquiescence on the part of
third States, however, must strictly be irrelevant in this situation.
They cannot have any locus standi in the matter, except perhaps in so
far as recognition by third States may be relevant evidence showing
that the State prescribed against must have been aware of the prescribing
State's claim: for some measure of publicity is here an
essential ingredient, since the holding must be nec vi, nec clam, nec
precario.
But there are two situations in which the attitude of States generally-
and not merely of a particular claimant State-is more directly
relevant to an issue of title. Firstly, where the question at issue is not
title to a parcel of land territory but to a portion of what is alternatively
claimed to be high seas, the attitude of all States, whether
demonstrated in recognition or forms of acquiescence, is certainly
relevant. For here the object of the prescription is not one State's
territory but a res communis. It is in this situation therefore that the
'1See e.g. Westlake, International Law, Part 1 (1904), pp. 100-1, who also cites
Lord Stowell in The Fama, 5 C. Rob., at p. 115.
2 See the categorical statements in Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1,
8th ed., by Lauterpacht (1955), p. 559: 'No rule of the Law of Nations exists
which makes notification of occupation to other States a necessary condition of
its validity. As regards all future occupations on the African coast the parties
to the General Act of the Berlin Congo Conference of 1885 stipulated that
occupation should be notified to one another. But this Act has been abrogated
so far as the signatories of the Convention of St. Germain of September 10,
1919, are concerned.'
3 To the same effect, see Charpentier, op. cit., pp. 70-4, where he examines
the precedents and concludes: 'Toute cette pratique peut etre rinumin en une
phrase: l'exercise effect~f des compe'tences gouvernementales sur un territoire sans
maitre est immidiatement opposable aux Etiats tiers sans leur assentiment' (original
italics).
39
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
notion of a consolidation of a historic title is peculiarly appositeand
it is in this situation be it noted that the idea was articulated in
the Norwegian Fisheries case.
Secondly, the attitude of third States is directly relevant, even in
an issue strictly between two claimant States, and where there is no
question of prescription against a res communis, if the process involved
is of what may be called the immemorial possession rather
than the adverse possession kind. For here obviously general
'repute' is indeed of the essence of the process of acquisition.
Now of course it must immediately be added that although we can
for the purposes of a theoretical discussion draw a distinction between
occupation, prescription and historic title, a moment's reflexion
shows that this distinction may well be blurred in any actual
case: not only the legal interpretation of the facts but the facts
themselves may be both disputed and unclear; in many actual cases,
occupation, prescription or historic title may be alternative and even
complementary legal interpretations of the same facts. For our
present purposes it is enough to note that it means that in a real
situation, recognition and also indeed acquiescence are almost
always prima facie relevant considerations, and factors to be taken
into consideration by any international tribunal faced with a dispute
over territorial sovereignty of this kind;'- and we must therefore
always be on guard against thinking as if international law has ever
known anything having the remotest resemblance to forms of action.
It is this situation that the notion of a historic consolidation goes
some way to explaining; though, as we have seen, some of its
implications are still far from clear.
It must be emphasized again, however, that it is only in a context
of effective possession that recognition of a situation by third States
can be a mode of consolidation of title . 2 It may, so to speak, assist
I See MacGibbon, loc. cit., p. 143: 'Rights which have been acquired in clear
conformity with existing law have no need of the doctrine of acquiescence to
confirm their validity. However, the line which divides conduct which international
law permits from that which it prohibits is in many cases not susceptible
of precise delimitation. A course of action which in one period may have been
expressly prohibited may, by dint of its continued repetition coupled with the
consent of other States, be acceptable under rules obtaining in a later period.
It is not surprising that, in a system of law which is not fully developed, the
extent to which a novel practice may be regarded as being in conformity with
existing law should be unpredictable. In the absence of a satisfactory compulsory
procedure for authoritative judicial ascertainment the legality of such practices
may depend upon the measure in which they enjoy the express approval of other
States, or, in the course of time, their acquiescence.' For an application of this
idea see p. 62 below. I See above at p. 26.
40
RECOGNITION, ACQUIESCENCE AND ESTOPPEL
and accelerate a process for which the condition sine qua non is an
existing effective possession; there is no evidence from practice to
suggest that recognition by third States can by itself operate to create
a title to territory not in possession.'
ESTOPPEL
It is tempting to express these effects of recognition and even of
acquiescence in terms of estoppel or, if you prefer, the principle of
preclusion. That such a principle is accepted in international law
is surely now beyond doubt: as McNair puts it, 'It is reasonable to
expect that any legal system should possess a rule designed to prevent
a person who makes or concurs in a statement upon which another
person in privity with him relies to the extent of changing his position,
from later asserting a different state of affairs.'12
The first thing to be said is that the principle of estoppel in international
law must be approached with some caution; for once loosed
from the many technical shackles that severely limit its operation in
the common law, from which it is after all by analogy derived, it is in
danger of seeming to be applicable to almost any situation in which a
State has expressly or tacitly adopted some attitude towards a legal
question. This tends only to obscure the actual legal questions and
principles involved. An impressive warning against the temptation to
put more weight upon estoppel than it can rightly bear is to be found
in the separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in the
Temple case. 3 This is so important that I shall beg your leave to
quote an extensive passage in full.
I'See Dr. Schwarzenberger, in American Journal of International Law, vol. 51
(1957), at p. 317: 'Subject to one reservation, recognition of the territorial claims
of another State cannot affect adversely the legal position of the effective occupant
[here there is a reference to 2 Int. Arb. Awards 829 at 846 et. seq. Also ibid., 8681.
The proviso which must be made is that such a recognition of the claims of
another State deprives the State which is in actual control of the territory of the
chance of obtaining recognition of its own rights.'
2 The Law of Treaties (1961), p. 485.
3I.C.J. Reports, 1962, at p. 63. See also the neat definition of this aspect of
estoppel in M. Paul Reuter's argument in the oral hearings of the same case
(4/5 March, 1962): 'on peut d~flnir l'estoppel tel qu'il semble regu en droit international
comme une exception, oppos~e A une all6gation qui, bien que conforme
peut-etre i la r~alit& des faits, est contraire A une attitude ant~rieure d'une des
parties. Sans avoir -i entrer ici dans toutes les finesses, qui sont grandes, de
l'analyse juridique anglo-saxonne, il faut simplement relever que dans les
relations internationales la doctrine fait de l'estoppel un m6canisme r~pondant au
picipe g n~ral de la bonne foi et au besoin de s6curit6 qui r~git les soci&ts
huaines.
D 41
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
However, in those cases where it can be shown that a party has, by conduct
or otherwise, undertaken, or become bound by, an obligation, it is
strictly not necessary or appropriate to invoke any rule of preclusion or
estoppel, although the language of that rule is, in practice, often employed
to describe the situation. Thus it may be said that A, having accepted a
certain obligation, or having become bound by a certain instrument, cannot
now be heard to deny the fact, to 'blow hot and cold'. True enough, A
cannot be heard to deny it; but what this really means is simply that A is
bound, and, being bound, cannot escape from the obligation merely by
denying its existence. In other words, if the denial can be shown to be false,
there is no room or need for any plea of preclusion or estoppel. Such a
plea is essentially a means of excluding a denial that might be correctirrespective
of its correctness. it prevents the assertion of what might in
fact be true. Its use must in consequence be subject to certain limitations.
The real field of operation, therefore, of the rule of preclusion or estoppel,
stricto sensu, in the present context, is where it is possible that the party
concerned did not give the undertaking or accept the obligation in question
(or there is room for doubt whether it did), but where that party's conduct
has been such, and has had such consequences, that it cannot be allowed
to deny the existence of an undertaking, or that it is bound.
Now it is, of course, true that the precise limits of estoppel in international
law are and must remain a question of some doubt until
at least there has developed a much more considerable jurisprudence
on the subject; but this fact merely emphasizes the importance of
proceeding cautiously, especially in questions of title. It is doubtful
whether estoppel or preclusion can ever be itself a root of title to
sovereignty. It may assist in the determination of a title based on
some other ground but there probably is no such thing as a title by
estoppel. 1
ESToPPEL AND RECOGNITION
Let us consider first how far an estoppel worked by recognition
may affect a question of territorial title. Dr. Schwarzenberger, in an
important article on the-subject, puts the matter in a striking way.
The pliability of recognition as a general device of international law makes
recognition an eminently suitable means for the purpose of establishing
the validity of a territorial claim in relation to other States. However weak
a title may be, and irrespective of any other criterion, recognition estops
the State which has recognized the title from contesting its validity at any
future time. 2
Subject possibly to a qualification which will be indicated in a
moment, this statement is, with respect, unexceptionable. The estoppel,
if it operates at all, will operate irrespective of any actual weak-
1Cf. however n. 3 on p. 50 below.
2American Journal of International Law (1957), p. 316.
42
RECOGNITION, ACQUIESCENCE AND ESTOPPEL
ness, or even the existence, of the title recognized for, as we have just
learned from Judge Fitzmaurice, an estoppel 'is essentially a means of
excluding a denial that might be correct-irrespective of its correctness'.
But before we can understand the relevance of this statement we
have to ask the further question how far the opinion of the State
subject to the estoppel may or may not be relevant to the establishment
of a particular title. If the recognizing State be the only other
possible claimant, the recognition may be decisive. One need seek
no further than the Eastern Greenland case for authority. It will be
remembered that the Court attached great weight to certain treaties
between Norway and Denmark containing exclusion clauses by
which Norway had in effect recognized the Danish claim over
Eastern Greenland. The court said:
In accepting these bilateral and multilateral agreements as binding upon
herself, Norway reaffirmed that she recognized the whole of Greenland as
Danish; and thereby she has debarred herself from contesting Danish
sovereignty over the whole of Greenland, and, in consequence, from proceeding
to occupy it.'
And, as Lord McNair says of this passage: 'If you are not going to
call that estoppel, you must find another name for it.'2
I'P.C.LJ. Reports, Series A, No. 53, at p. 68.
2 The Law of Treaties (1962), p. 487. Lord McNair is here discussing the
question how far the conception of estoppel on being admitted into international
law must be the same as the common law conception. 'In particular,' he continues,
'it is questionable whether the common law requirement of action by one
party to his detriment on the faith of a statement made by the other party will
or should be regarded by international law as a necessary element. No such
factor can be said to be present-except by somewhat strained reasoning-in the
illustration cited above by the Eastern Greenlandjudgment. Yet can it be doubted
that the Court was entitled to hold that the two treaties which described "Greenland"
as Danish territory debarred Norway from making an assertion to the
contrary, in spite of the fact that it is difficult to say that Denmark acted upon
these statements to her detriment?'
On this particular question, however, see now Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
in the Temple case, loc. cit., at p. 63 where he says the following: 'The essential
condition of the operation of the rule of preclusion or estoppel, as strictly to be
understood, is that the party invoking the rule must have "relied upon" the statements
or conduct of the other party, either to its own detriment or to the other's
advantage. The often invoked necessity for a consequent "change of position"
on the part of the party invoking preclusion or estoppel is implied in this. A
frequent source of misapprehension in this connection is the assumption that
change of position means that the party invoking preclusion or estoppel must
have been led to change its own position, by action it has itself taken consequent
on the statements or conduct of the other party. It certainly includes that: but
what it really means is that these statements, or this conduct, must have brought
about a change in the relative positions of the parties, worsening that of the one,
or improving that of the other, or both.'
See also Bowett, British Year Book of International Law, vol. 33, 1957, p. 193.
43
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
On the other hand, where the recognition in question is on the part
of a third State having itself no possible title to the territory, the
position, as we have already seen, is quite different. The recognition
of the third State cannot affect the title unless perhaps when a considerable
number of other States have likewise recognized title, in
which case the cumulative effect of the recognitions may presumably
form an ingredient of a process of consolidation. What is in question,
perhaps, is whether any useful purpose is served by regarding this
process as estoppel.'- A series of recognitions of an alleged title has
certainly some probative value, 2 and a refusal of recognition on the
other hand may seriously jeopardize a claim. It may be the case, as
Dr. Schwarzenberger asserts, that 'the device of recognition can be
employed as an independent root of title'. 3 What is open to doubt,
however, is how far it is useful or even accurate to think of the function
of recognition in this regard as an estoppel. For it is the actual
recognition of an alleged title by a third State that is the operative
factor; not the further and independent proposition that in certain
circumstances the recognizing State may later find itself estopped
from denying the validity of the title. The question of estoppel is
indeed only a way of asking how far and in what circumstances a
recognition can be denied or withdrawn. It does not describe its
effect.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that Recognition always does
work an estoppel. There is a view which, whilst not uncontroverted,
has strong authority to support it, that a defacto recognition is by
its very nature tentative, certainly less committal than a de jure
recognition, and therefore that it may at any rate in certain circumstances
be withdrawn . 4 This is as much as to say that in these cir-
1 For the proposition that an estoppel will normally only have effect as such
between parties to the statement and their privies, see Bowett, op. cit., p. 182.
2 A true estoppel, however, is to be distinguished from admissions, representations
and so on that merely have some probative value. An estoppel, if it operates
at all, is peremptory. See Bowett, British Year Book of International Law, vol. 33
(1957), at p. 195. For an example of such an admission see Minquiers and Ecrehos
case, I.CJ. Reports, 1953, at p. 71.
3 Loc. cit., p. 318.
"Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947), pp. 349-57, where it is
also suggested indeed that, within limits, de jure recognition may also be withdrawn.
There is in fact a case of the withdrawal of a de jure recognition of an annexation
of territory, when in 1940 it was stated that the ' de jure recognition by His
Majesty's Goverrnent of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia had been withdrawn'.
See Azash Kebbeda Tesema v. Italian Government, Annual Digest, 1938-40, Case
No. 36. It is also cited and commented upon in Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 356,
where he says: 'In so far as the recognition of new titles has, in contradistinction
44
RECOGNITION, ACQUIESCENCE AND ESTOPPEL
cumstances a recognition de facto does not work an estoppel in any
case.'
ESTOPPEL AND ACQUIESCENCE
That there may be a certain relationship between an acquiescence
that operates in law and an estoppel is apparent,2 though the two are
nevertheless quite distinct concepts. Thus, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in
the Temple case,3 says: '[the principle of preclusion] is quite distinct
theoretically from the notion of acquiescence. But acquiescence
can operate as a preclusion or estoppel in certain cases, for instance
where silence, on an occasion where there was a duty or need to
speak or act, im~plies agreement, or a waiver of rights, and can
be regarded as a representation to that effect.' An apt illustration of
this position is to be found in a territorial claim: the Costa Rica-
Nicaragua Boundary case,4 where Nicaragua argued that a treaty of
1858 which defined the frontier was not binding because a third
State, San Salvador, had not ratified it in its capacity of guarantor.
The arbitrator rejected this contention, pointing out that Nicaragua
had in fact acquiesced in the validity of the treaty for ten or twelve
years. He said:
But the Government of Nicaragua was silent when it ought to have spoken,
and so waived the objection now made. It saw fit to proceed to the exchange
of ratifications without waiting for San Salvador.... Neither may
now be heard to allege, as reasons for rescinding this treaty, any facts
which existed and were known at the time of its consummation.
An estoppel of this kind may then, in certain circumstances, proceed
from acquiescence and may therefore affect a question of territorial
title depending for example on the interpretation of a treaty5
fixing a boundary, or a treaty of cession, or depending upon prescription
of whichever kind. As with recognition, much depends upon the
nature of the right claimed. In a frontier dispute involving two States
to other forms of recognition, the character of a contractual arrangement, the
British action cannot be regarded as arbitrary.'
I'Cf. also the Tinoco case where it was held that non-recognition of a government
did not necessarily work an estoppel. See American Journal of International
Law, vol. 18 (1924), p. 147.
2 On this subject see especially Dr. Bowett's illuminating article cited above.
3 LCJ. Reports, 1962, p. 62.
4Cited by Bowett, loc. cit. See also Moore's International Arbitrations, vol. 2,
p. 1945.
See the Temple case, loc. cit., for example.
45
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
an estoppel to which they are both parties may be decisive; on the
other hand if the claim is, as in the Norwegian Fisheries case, a claim
to sovereignty over what must alternatively be res communis, an
estoppel against one State cannot be conclusive, for it is the acquiescence
of States generally that is here in point. For this reason the
notions of estoppel and acquiescence ought perhaps to be kept distinct,
as also the concept of prescription. As Dr. Bowett says of the
distinction between acquiescence and estoppel: 'The confusion of
these two notions will only serve to lessen the burden of proving the
acquisition of title by prescription and, since no requirement of good
faith demands such result, it would seem that the use of the doctrine
of estoppel in circumstances where prescription ought to be relied
on is inadmissible in international law."l
Yet this is something of a counsel of perfection and it may be
doubted how far it is very likely to be realized in practice; for this is
not the way the judicial mind works when presented with the need
for decision in a particular case. It is possible, indeed, that the general
idea of consolidation-vague as it is-with estoppels making
a weighty contribution to the process, will tend to become more
attractive to Courts than prescription properly so-called. There is a
suggestive passage from the argument of M. Reuter before the Court
in the Temple case:
... it is our firm conviction that, in a general way, international case law
has not thought it necessary to describe the formal processes which confirm
the consolidating effect of lapse of time. It is certain that arbitrators
' See also Sir Percy Spender's dissenting opinion in the Temple case, LC.J.
Reports, 1962, p. 131:
'There is a close affinity between prescription, preclusion, recognition, acquiescence
and absence of protest. The principle of preclusion is, however, in my
view, quite distinct from the concept of recognition (or acquiescence), though
the latter may, as any conduct may, go to establish either prescription of preclusion.
'To accord to the concept of recognition by a State of any fact or situation,
without more, the legal consequence of a preclusion, not only finds, in my
opinion, despite the views of certain writers, no authority as a principle of international
law under Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, but provides an invitation
to apply to the determination of a case in which recognition of a fact or of
a situation is relied upon, considerations which are scarcely distinguishable from
considerations ex aequo et bono.
'The concepts of recognition and acquiescence are important elements of
international law. They are not likely to add to their usefulness if pushed beyond
their proper content.
'In the present case any recognition by Siam of Annex I and the line of frontier
shown thereon, or any acquiescence by Siam therein, is in my view of evidentiary
value only.'
46
RECOGNITION, ACQUIESCENCE AND ESTOPPEL
have hesitated to apply in international law any theory of acquisitive prescription
and have raised the question, for instance, whether, in certain
cases, the theory of estoppel would not provide some factors that could be
of use in a territorial litigation [des iliments utilisables dans un litiffe territorial].
The lamented Sir Hersch Lauterpacht pointed this out in his work
Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law. He showed how,
in the Alaska Boundary Dispute in 1903 (p. 235), estoppel had seemed to be
an alternative or a substitute for prescription. The same remark was true
to a lesser degree in regard to the Behring Sea Arbitration (p. 224). It could
be shown without difficulty and without labouring the point that though
international case law has always attached much weight to facts showing
the effective exercise of sovereignty, it does not readily resort to the
vocabulary of prescription.'
TBE TEMPLE CASE
Finally, we may not leave estoppel without a rather closer look at
the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Temple case:
a decision on a question of territorial title in which estoppel, acquiescence
and recognition all played a prominent role. It will be
remembered that the dispute was one between Cambodia and Thailand,
each claiming to be sovereign over a small area of frontier
territory containing the ruins of an ancient sanctuary and shrine
called the Temple of Vihear, situated on an escarpment rising in high
cliffs above the Cambodian plain. A treaty of 1904 between Siam
(now Thailand) and France (Cambodia having been at that time
French Indo-China) provided for the delimitation of the frontier in
this area by a frontier commission. A frontier was, it seems, surveyed
and fixed, but the evidence was inconclusive as to the question
of the line of the frontier at Preah Vihear. Cambodia relied, however,
and in the event relied successfully, on the production of a map
of 1907, produced by the French authorities at the request of the
Siamese, which clearly showed the Temple area as a part of French
Indo-China, now Cambodia. It was strenuously and indeed persuasively
argued by Thailand that the map was in error with respect
to this part of the frontier, because it was not, they said, consonant
with the method of fixing the frontier laid down for the commission
in the 1904 Treaty. The point, however, on which the Court seized,
was that this map, mistaken or no, was accepted by the Thailand
Government without protest or even comment. Indeed, the Siamese
Prince Damrong thanked the French for the maps and requested
another fifteen copies.
'Distr. 62/50, p. 73.
47
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
It was said for Thailand that there was no requirement upon her to
protest the error in the map and that a failure to do so could not
affect a change of sovereignty. But to this the Court said:
It is clear that the circumstances were such as called for some reaction,
within a reasonable period, on the part of the Siamese authorities, if they
wished to disagree with the map or had any serious question to raise in
regard to it. They did not do so, either then or for many years, and thereby
must be held to have acquiesced. Qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui
debuisset ac potuisset. I
And again some importance was attached to what is in effect
another series of incidents of which the most important was in 1930
when Prince Damrong paid a state visit to the Temple, where he was
received officially by the French Resident for the adjoining Cambodian
Province, and with the French flag flying.
The Prince [said the Court] could not possibly have failed to see the implications
of a reception of this character. A clearer affirmation of title on the
French Indo-Chinese side can scarcely be imagined. It demanded a reaction.
Thailand did nothing. Furthermore, when Prince Damrong on his
return to Bangkok sent the French Resident some photographs of the
occasion, he used language that seems to admit that France, through her
Resident, had acted as the host country.... Looking at the incident as a
whole, it appears to have amounted to a tacit recognition by Siam of the
sovereignty of Cambodia (under French Protectorate) over Preah Vihear,
through a failure to react in any way, on an occasion that called for a reaction
in order to affirm or preserve a title in the face of an obvious rival
claim.2
There was much else in the facts of what was indeed a very intricate
case. But it was essentially on the considerations of fact that
we have just been considering that the Court built its decision. The
decision rested squarely on the ground of preclusion, or estoppel,
coupled with recognition. Thus:
The Court will now state the conclusions it draws from the facts as above
set out.
Even if there were any doubt as to Siam's acceptance of the map in
1908, and hence of the frontier indicated thereon, the Court would consider,
in the light of the subsequent course of events, that Thailand is now
precluded by her conduct from asserting that she did not accept it. She
has, for fifty years, enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 1904 conferred on
her, if only the benefit of a stable frontier. France, and through her Cambodia,
relied on Thailand's acceptance of the map. Since neither side can
plead error, it is immaterial whether or not this reliance was based on a
11I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 23.
48
-Ibid., pp. 30-1.
RECOGNITION, ACQUIESCENCE AND ESTOPPEL
belief that the map was correct. It is now not open to Thailand, while continuing
to claim and enjoy the benefits of the settlement, to deny that she
was ever a consenting party to it.
The Court however considers that Thailand in 1908-1909 did accept the
Annex I map as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation, and
hence recognized the line on that map as being the frontier line, the effect
of which is to situate Preali Vihear in Cambodian territory.'
This was not all, however. There was another clear, and indeed
extremely neat, example of an estoppel found by the Court. One of
Thailand's contentions was that she had since the promulgation of
the map in 1908, and at any rate up to the time she made her own
survey in 1934-5, believed that the line on the map and the watershed
line laid down in the 1904 Treaty, coincided. Consequently, if
she accepted the map line, she had only done so in the mistaken belief
that the map line was the line of the watershed. But she also
pleaded that the Temple area was Thailand territory as a result of
acts of sovereignty that she had performed in the area. The two arguments
were evidently inconsistent. If she had really believed that the
map indicated the watershed line she must really have believed that
the area was Cambodian, in which case her acts on the ground could
only be regarded as attempted violations of Cambodian sovereignty.
'The conclusion is,' said the Court, 'that Thailand cannot allege that
she was under any misapprehension in accepting the Annex I line, for
this is wholly inconsistent with the reason she gives for her acts on
the ground, namely that she believed herself to possess sovereignty
in this area.'12 This is a very neat example of the rule that a party
may not blow hot and cold in the same case, thus operating an
estoppel by conduct to prevent Thailand from profiting from an
allegation irrespective of whether it represented the truth of the
matter or not.
It is evident that principles of estoppel or preclusion weighed
heavily with the Court. What is not clear from the judgment is
whether preclusion was regarded as one among other self-sufficient
reasons for decision; or whether it was merely an adjunct of a kind
of process of prescription (and certainly considerable weight was
attached to the length of time during which Thailand failed to object
to the map line); or whether it was regarded as being merely of
assistance in a question basically one of treaty interpretation.1
Ibid., p. 32. 2 Ibid., p. 33.
The latter, for example, is suggested by this passage (p. 35): 'The indication
of the line of the watershed in Article I of the 1904 Treaty was itself no more
than an obvious and convenient way of describing a frontier line objectively,
49
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Indeed, looking simply to the majority judgment one is hard put to it
not to lump all together in an omnibus concept of 'consolidation of
title by lapse of time'.' What is immediately striking about the case
is the exiguous assistance that the Court derived from acts of either
party on the ground-acts which indeed by themselves merely indicated
a situation of ambiguity.
There is a further question concerning estoppel on which the
Temple case sheds some new light. Is the rule of estoppel a rule of
procedure or evidence merely, or is it a rule of substance? And I take
it that the purport of the question is this: if estoppel is an adjectival
rule, relevant only to questions of proof, it can only affect an issue
of title in the context of a particular dispute before a competent tribunal;
but if it be a rule of substance then it will presumably affect
title in an absolute sense, irrespective indeed of whether any issue
is formulated before a tribunal or not. This is a question, clearly of
the first importance, but on which, in the past, different opinions
have been expressed . 2 Little help is to be derived on this point from
the Judgment of the Court in the Temple case; but in the separate
opinions there is formidable authority for the view that it is clearly a
rule of substantive law.3 And if this view is correct it is clear that
estoppel, where it does operate, can in effect operate itself to shift a
title. Indeed this possibility is expressed with some acidity by Sir
though in general terms. There is, however, no reason to think that the Parties
attached any special importance to the line of the watershed as such, as compared
with the overriding importance, in the interests of finality, of adhering to the
map line as eventually delimited and accepted by them. The Court, therefore,
feels bound, as a matter of treaty interpretation, to pronounce in favour of the
line as mapped in the disputed area.'
11T he actual phrase is culled from M. Reuter's pleading, though here it was
suggested as an alternative to both estoppel and prescription: 'On pourrait
aussi, en dehors de l'estoppel et de la prescription acquisitive, se placer sur un
autre plan et parler de consolidation d'un titre par le temps; iI s'agirait alors
d'un m~canisme que l'on serait tent6 de qualifier de coutum-ier.' See loc. cit.,
p. 73.
2 For references see Bowett, loc. cit., p. 176, notes 1 and 2.
3 See Vice-President Alfaro, p. 41: 'In my judgment, the principle is substantive
in character. it constitutes a presumption furis et de jure in virtue of
which a State is held to have abandoned its right if it ever had it, or else that
such a State never felt that it had a clear legal title on which it could base opposition
to the right asserted or claimed by another State. In short, the legal effects
of the principle are so fundamental that they decide by themselves alone the
matter in dispute and its infraction cannot be looked upon as a mere incident
of the proceedings.
'The primary foundation of this principle is the good faith that must prevail
in international relations. ..
Also Judge Fitzmaurice at p. 62 and Sir Percy Spender at p. 143.
50
RECOGNITION, ACQUIESCENCE AND ESTOPPEL
Percy Spender in his weighty dissent in this case, when he concludes
as follows:
With profound respect for the Court, I am obliged to say that in my judgment
as a result of misapplication of these concepts and an inadmissible
extension of them, territory, the sovereignty in which, both by treaty and
by the decision of the body appointed under treaty to determine the frontier
line, is Thailand's, now becomes vested in Cambodia.1I
This is indeed an impressive warning of the dangers of too facile an
acceptance of estoppel as a device for the determination of title. But it
is fair to add that, in the passage just cited, Sir Percy is assuming the
correctness of his own interpretation of the facts and documents, and
that in this interpretation he is at variance with his colleagues who
voted the other way. If it were indeed clear that this disputed territory
was on the Thai side of the frontier, it would unquestionably be a
new and surprising departure if that sovereignty could then be shifted
by an estoppel. As the Court saw the facts and documents, however
-and a perusal of the pleadings lends weight to their view-the situation
was one of considerable dubiety, in that the treaty of 1904 and
the records of the boundary commission gave no certain answer to
suggest the precise run of this part of the frontier. And it is surely
in precisely this kind of dubious situation that there is room for
estoppel to work. Thus, as it seems to me, although the case confirms
that estoppel may assist, and even assist with decisive effect, in
the interpretation of facts, and instruments and acknowledgments
relative to the vesting of a title, it still remains true to say that
estoppel is not itself a root of title.
I I. C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 146.
51
Annex 120
Speech by H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, to
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 31 October 2001.
SPEECH BY HIS EXCELLENCY JUDGE GILBERT GUILLAUME,
PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
TO THE SIXTH COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
31 OCTOBER 2001
Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a privilege and an honour for me to be given this second opportunity to address your
Committee in my capacity as President of the International Court of Justice.
Last year I chose to speak to you about a question of ongoing concern to the international
legal community: the proliferation of international judicial bodies and its impact on international
law. The extensive reaction to that presentation from diplomats, academics, journalists and legal
practitioners shows that this concern is widely shared and is cause for much questioning.
There has been no improvement in the situation in this respect since last year. Quite to the
contrary: the risks of forum shopping have worsened, as could be seen in connection with the
swordfish stocks dispute between Chile and the European Union and the Bluefin Tuna case in
which the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea found that it had prima facie jurisdiction,
but the Arbitral Tribunal set up by Australia, Japan and New Zealand ultimately came to the
opposite conclusion.
The risks of conflicting case law have also grown and the International Court of Justice has,
for example, recently been seised of an Application by Liechtenstein instituting proceedings
against Germany concerning a case certain aspects of which have previously been dealt with by the
European Court of Human Rights.
I remain convinced that the proliferation of international judicial bodies could jeopardize the
unity of international law. I therefore continue to believe that international lawmakers and courts
must in the future exercise great caution in this area. I fear, however, that such caution is not
enough and that procedures ought possibly to be established to allow the International Court of
- 2 -
Justice to rule on such preliminary questions as specialized international courts might wish to
submit to it. I shall not however return to that point today.
Nor shall I speak to you about the current position of the Court, which was the subject of my
presentation to the General Assembly yesterday. Despite our Court’s sustained activity, there are
still 22 cases on its List. We have thus been obliged to request a modest increase in our budget;
we thank the Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) for the
understanding it has shown of our position and hope that its report can be quickly approved by the
Fifth Committee and by the General Assembly.
*
Mr. Chairman,
The Court handed down several significant judgments last year; notably, on 16 March 2001
it decided a territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain concerning sovereignty over certain
islands and the maritime delimitation to be established between the two States.
On that occasion it enlarged upon several points of its jurisprudence on the law of the sea,
and I therefore thought it worthwhile to speak to you today concerning the contribution made by
our Court to this law.
That contribution is both manifold and of long standing; the International Court of Justice
has played, and continues to play, a vital role in this domain, having been seised of a total of some
20 international disputes involving this area. Indeed, it is significant that cases involving the law of
the sea were the first contentious matters dealt with by both the Permanent Court of International
Justice and the International Court of Justice: namely, the S.S. “Wimbledon” case1 for the first and
the Corfu Channel case2 for the second.
1P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 5, 1923.
2Judgment of 9 April 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4.
- 3 -
The Court’s jurisprudence over that long history has concerned a wide range of areas of that
law: freedom of the high seas, rights of passage through straits and through the territorial sea3,
nationality of ships4, jurisdiction over those ships and their crews5, fishing rights, etc.
But I shall confine myself today to one question alone: the law governing the delimitation of
maritime areas.
* *
Delimitation of those areas was long considered a secondary question, involving the fixing
of the boundaries between narrow territorial seas. Extension of State jurisdiction to the high seas
and technological developments have made this into one of the main territorial issues of the last
30 years.
From the beginning, two methods were recommended for making these delimitations. Some
looked to the “equidistance method”, pursuant to which the maritime boundary between States
must follow “the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points” on the
coasts. Others pointed out that, while the equidistance method appeared generally acceptable for
the delimitation of the territorial seas between States with opposite coasts which were comparable
in length, it could yield inequitable results in other circumstances. They thus advocated maritime
delimitations based on equitable principles or producing equitable results. After a long period of
development, in which the Court played a leading role, today’s law of the sea distinguishes
between the delimitation of territorial seas, on the one hand, and of the continental shelf and fishing
zones or exclusive economic zones, on the other. However, the Court has now formulated similar
rules applicable to both types of cases.
* *
3In respect of the first, see the Corfu Channel case, cited above; in respect of the second, see the case concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 14.
4Case concerning Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion of 8 June 1960, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 150.
5“Lotus”, Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10.
- 4 -
The delimitation of territorial seas
The boundary between the territorial sea and the high seas was traditionally fixed at 3 miles
from the coast. More often than not, it has now been increased to 12 miles. But which coasts are
to be taken into account in fixing this boundary in order to ensure that the subsequent delimitation
is appropriate? That is the first problem having confronted the Court.
There are two methods for identifying the starting points of the territorial sea: the normal
baseline method and the straight baseline method.
The normal baseline ordinarily used for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the
low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal
State.
However, the International Court of Justice, in its Judgment of 18 December 1951 in the case
concerning Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries6, preferred another method, that of straight baselines, to the
traditional one. True, it noted that the method of normal baselines could be applied “without
difficulty to an ordinary coast, which is not too broken”7. But it added that where “a coast is
deeply indented and cut into, as is that of Eastern Finnmark, or where it is bordered by an
archipelago such as the ‘skjaergaard’ along the western sector of the coast here in question, the
base-line becomes independent of the low-water mark, and can only be determined by means of a
geometrical construction”8. Thus, for those situations the Court adopted the method of straight
baselines, which later was to be incorporated into the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
then into Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Montego Bay Convention, providing:
“1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is
a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”
Article 7, paragraph 3, adds:
6In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, the Court handed down an oft-quoted, fundamental dictum concerning
the fixing of the seaward boundaries of maritime areas: “The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect;
it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that
the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the
validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law”. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom
v. Norway), Judgment of 18 December 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 132.
7Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of 18 December 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 128.
Specifically, this comment concerned the tracé parallèle method, based on the normal baselines.
8Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of 18 December 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 129.
- 5 -
“The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the régime of internal
waters.”
In its Judgment of 16 March 2001 (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between
Qatar and Bahrain), the Court had its first opportunity to apply these provisions, which it deemed
to be a part of customary law.
Bahrain contended that the various maritime features lying off the eastern coast of its main
islands “may be assimilated to a fringe of islands which constitute a whole with the mainland”. It
concluded from this that it was entitled to draw straight baselines connecting these features.
The Court did not agree with Bahrain on this point. While it recognized that the maritime
features in question were part of Bahrain’s overall geographical configuration, it observed that they
were not part of a “deeply indented” coast, that they could not be characterized as a “fringe of
islands” and that the situation was therefore different from the one analysed in the case of Norway
and described in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It added that in the case
before it the method of straight baselines would have been applicable only if Bahrain had declared
itself to be an archipelagic State under the Montego Bay Convention. That, however, was not the
case. Bahrain was therefore not entitled to draw straight baselines. As a result, the equidistance
line between Bahrain and Qatar which the Court must use subject to possible subsequent
adjustment in order to fix the maritime boundary between the two States had to be drawn by
reference to normal baselines. Bahrain’s internal waters were reduced accordingly and the waters
lying between the main islands and the Hawar Islands were territorial waters, in which the right of
innocent passage was recognized9.
*
The judgment rendered in that case goes beyond simply clarifying the rules enabling the
external limits of territorial seas to be fixed. It also addresses the question of the delimitation of the
territorial waters of neighbouring States.
9Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Judgment of 16
March 2001, paragraphs 210-216 and paragraph 223.
- 6 -
This question is governed by customary law as codified by the Geneva Conventions and the
Montego Bay Convention. Article 15 of the latter lays down the principle that territorial seas must
be delimited in accordance with the equidistance method. But it adds that:
“The above provision [on equidistance] does not apply, however, where it is
necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the
territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.”
In actual fact, the delimitation of territorial seas in accordance with this equidistance/special
circumstances rule is most often effected through bilateral agreements. For the first time, however,
in the case between Qatar and Bahrain, the Court was called upon to rule on such a delimitation
and applied the rule of customary law thus enshrined by the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea.
It accordingly proceeded in two stages: first, drawing the equidistance line; second,
identifying any special circumstances.
As regards the drawing of the equidistance line, the Court, confirming its case law, refused
to apply the method of mainland-to-mainland calculation. It identified each of the maritime
features having an effect upon the course of the equidistance line and fixed that line by reference to
the appropriate baselines and basepoints. To this end, it identified the islands and islets coming
within the sovereignty of each of the States.
However, it was faced with a new difficulty, as a result of the presence in the area of
low-tide elevations.
You will recall that, under the relevant provisions of the Conventions on the Law of the Sea,
which reflect customary international law, “a low-tide elevation” is a naturally formed area of land
which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide10.
According to these provisions, when a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a
distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the
low-water line of that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of
the territorial sea, it has no territorial sea of its own.
10Art. 11, para. 1, of the Convention of 1958 on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Art. 13, para. 1, of the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- 7 -
The case between Qatar and Bahrain, however, raised a particular problem, in so far as
certain low-tide elevations were situated in the area where the territorial seas of the two States
overlapped. In principle, therefore, each of them had a right to use the low-water line of these
low-tide elevations for measuring the breadth of its territorial sea. For the purposes of delimitation,
the competing rights of both States appeared to cancel each other out.
Nevertheless, Bahrain contended that it had taken possession of the majority of these
low-tide elevations, which accordingly came within its sovereignty, and that it alone was permitted
to take them into account for purposes of fixing the equidistance line.
The Court did not accept that argument. It held that the law of the sea distinguished in a
number of respects between islands and low-tide elevations and that a State could not acquire
sovereignty by appropriation over a low-tide elevation situated within the limits of its territorial sea
where the same low-tide elevation was also situated within the limits of the territorial sea of
another State11. It accordingly concluded that these low-tide elevations could not be used for
determining the basepoints and drawing the equidistance line12.
Once this line has been determined, in accordance with the rules as thus stated, it remains to
investigate in each particular case the existence of historic title or other special circumstances. In
this respect, the Court held that a disproportionate effect should not be attributed to certain
insignificant maritime features13. In the past, it had already, for these reasons, discounted any
influence of the deserted islet of Filfla on the maritime delimitation to be effected between Libya
and Malta14. Further, in the instant case, it noted that Qit’at Jaradah was a very small island,
uninhabited and totally devoid of vegetation. It did recognize Bahrain’s sovereignty over this
minute feature, 12 by 4 metres, with an altitude of 0.4 metres at high tide15, but it considered that
there is “a special circumstance in this case warranting the choice of a delimitation line passing
11Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahrain), Judgment of 16 March 2001, paras. 200-209.
12Conversely, the Court held that in such cases sovereignty over the territorial sea determined sovereignty over
low-tide elevations. In other words, the delimitation of territorial waters must be effected without regard to low-tide
elevations and each State has sovereignty over the low-tide elevations located in the zone attributed to it, ibid, para. 210.
13Ibid., para. 215.
14Case concerning Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 43,
para. 54.
15Ibid., para 197.
- 8 -
immediately to the east of Qit’at Jaradah”16 and thus conferring upon it a modest influence only on
the delimitation of the territorial seas.
* *
The delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone
As regards the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, the
Court has also gradually established a case law which is now authoritative, and to which it put the
definitive touches in the case between Qatar and Bahrain.
As you know, in 1969, in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the Court initially inclined
towards a delimitation of that shelf in accordance with “equitable principles, and taking account of
all the relevant circumstances”17. Next, in the case between Tunisia and Libya concerning a similar
delimitation, it recalled that the delimitation must be achieved on the basis of equitable principles18.
The same approach was adopted in the Gulf of Maine case19. These decisions were not without
influence on the solution adopted by the Conference on the Law of the Sea. Thus, the Montego
Bay Convention, in Articles 74 and 83, provides for “States to effect delimitation by agreement on
the basis of international law . . . in order to achieve an equitable solution”.
At this stage, case law and treaty law had become so unpredictable that there was extensive
debate within the doctrine on whether there still existed a law of delimitations or whether, in the
name of equity, we were not ending up with arbitrary solutions. Sensitive to these criticisms, in
subsequent years the Court proceeded to develop its case law in the direction of greater certainty.
That development was begun in the Continental Shelf case between the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya and Malta, in which the Court took the equidistance line as the point of departure for
16Ibid., para. 219.
17Case concerning the North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and The
Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, p. 53, para. 101.
18Case concerning Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment of 24 February 1982, I.C.J.
Reports 1982, p. 4.
19Case concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States
of America), 12 October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 300, para. 112.
- 9 -
delimitation and moved it northwards, having regard to the equitable principles to be applied in the
case, namely, the general configuration of the coasts and their different lengths. Thus, equidistance
was reinstated as a provisional line open to possible correction in order to achieve an equitable
result20.
A new stage was then reached with the Judgment delivered on 14 June 1993 in the case
between Denmark and Norway concerning the maritime delimitation in the area between
Greenland and Jan Mayen.
In that case, the delimitation of the continental shelf fell to be effected in accordance with the
1958 Geneva Convention (equidistance/special circumstances), whereas the fishing zones were to
be effected in accordance with customary law (equitable solution, having regard to relevant
factors). The Court stressed that, in both cases, an equitable result must be reached. It added that,
as regards the fishing zones, delimitation had to proceed on the basis of equitable principles. In
order to achieve this, it held that it was appropriate to start from the equidistance line, subsequently
making all the necessary corrections to it, having regard to the relevant factors. Finally, it stated
that these factors were comparable to the special circumstances envisaged by the 1958 Convention.
On that basis, the Court, with a view in particular to taking account of the length of the coasts of
both parties and of the zone’s fishery resources, arrived at a single delimitation line for the
continental shelf and the fishing zone and drew this line to the east of the median line.
Thus, the law on maritime delimitations was completely reunified. Whether it be for the
territorial sea, the continental shelf or the fishing zone, it is an equitable result that must be
achieved. Such a result may be achieved by first identifying the equidistance line, then correcting
that line to take into account special circumstances or relevant factors, which are both essentially
geographical in nature.
This solution of principle, arrived at in the case concerning Jan Mayen/Greenland, was
applicable thenceforth with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fishing zones
of States with opposite coasts. It remained to be seen whether the same applied in the case of
adjacent coasts.
20Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment of 3 June 1985, I.C.J.
Reports 1985, p. 13.
- 10 -
The Court ruled affirmatively on the matter in the case between Qatar and Bahrain. In that
case, the parties had conferred on the Court the task of drawing a single maritime line
simultaneously dividing both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. In order to do
so, but on this occasion dealing with adjacent rather than opposite coasts, the Court again decided
that an equidistance line should first be provisionally drawn, consideration then being given as to
whether there were relevant circumstances leading to an adjustment of that line21.
In the event, it ruled out a number of circumstances invoked by the parties and retained one
only, concerning a maritime feature known as Fasht al Jarim, which constituted a “projection of
Bahrain’s coastline in the Gulf area, which, if given full effect, would distort the boundary and
have disproportionate effects”. “In the view of the Court, such a distortion, due to a maritime
feature located well out to sea and of which at most a minute part is above water at high tide, would
not lead to an equitable solution which would be in accord with all other relevant factors.”
Consequently, “in the circumstances of the case considerations of equity require that Fasht al Jarim
should have no effect in determining the boundary line”22.
* *
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,
We are all aware that international law is constantly developing, and the law of the sea is not
immune in this regard.
However, it is encouraging to note that the law of maritime delimitations, by means of these
developments in the Court’s case law, has reached a new level of unity and certainty, whilst
conserving the necessary flexibility.
Thus, the Court declared in its recent Judgment: “the equidistance/special circumstances
rule” applicable to the delimitation of the territorial sea and “the equitable principles/relevant
circumstances rule, as it has been developed since 1958 in case law and State practice with regard
21Case concerning the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahrain), Judgment of 16 March 2001, para. 230.
22Ibid., paras. 247 to 249.
- 11 -
to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, are closely
interrelated”23.
In all cases, the Court, as States also do, must first determine provisionally the equidistance
line. It must then ask itself whether there are special or relevant circumstances requiring this line to
be adjusted with a view to achieving equitable results.
The legal rule is now clear. However, each case nonetheless remains an individual one, in
which the different circumstances invoked by the parties must be weighed with care.
As a result of these developments, the Court has, in my opinion, managed to reconcile law
and equity. In the case between Qatar and Bahrain, the parties thanked us for achieving this and
that was most welcome to us.
The Court still has before it other cases of the same type, notably between Cameroon and
Nigeria and between Honduras and Nicaragua. The international community may rest assured that
those cases will be adjudicated in the same spirit.
___________
23Ibid., para. 231.
Annex 121
R. Kolb, Case Law on Equitable Maritime Delimitation: Digest and Commentaries (Martinus
Nijhoff 2003) p. 13.
Annex 122
C. Mugnier, “Republic of Kenya” (June 2003) Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote
Sensing pp. 593–7.
PHOTOGRAMMETRIC ENGINEERING & REMOTE SENSING J u n e 2 0 0 3 593
Grids & Datums
Republic of Kenya
The coast of Kenya was long dominated by
Arabs and was seized in the 16th century by
the Portuguese. The Europeans were expelled
by the Omanis; the coast then came
under the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and
later leased in 1867 to the British East Africa
Association. The British extended their holdings
into the interior and fixed an initial
southern boundary with the German East
Africa Company in 1886. Kenya is bordered
on the north by Ethiopia ( PE&RS, March 2003)
(861 km), on the east by Somalia (682 km),
on the southeast by the Indian Ocean (536
km), on the south by Tanzania (769 km), on
the west by Uganda (933 km), and on the
northwest by Sudan (232 km). The lowest
point in Kenya is the Indian Ocean, and the
highest point is Mount Kenya at 5,199 m.
Comprised of the Nairobi Area and seven
provinces — Central, Coast, Eastern, North
Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley, and Western —
Kenya is slightly larger than twice the size
of Nevada. The former Colony of British East
Africa gained independence on 12 December
1963.
Thanks to Morgan W. Davis, “The history
of surveying in East Africa begins with the
domination of those lands by European powers
in the late 1800s. The British entered
into a number of agreements defining
spheres of influence in 1886, 1890, 1891,
and 1894. The present day boundaries between
Kenya and its neighbors are a result
of legal descriptions hashed out in negotiations
and subsequent triangulation and
boundary surveys. Negotiations between the
United Kingdom and Germany in 1886 and
1890 established spheres of influence north
and south respectively, of a line beginning
at the Indian Ocean near Vanga and extending
to the eastern shore of Lake Victoria:
‘The line of demarcation starts from the
mouth of the River Wanga or Umbe (Umba),
runs direct to Lake Jipe, passes thence along
the eastern side and round the northern side
of the lake and crosses the Lumi River …
After which it passes midway between
the territories of Taveita and
Chaga, skirts the northern base of
the Kilimanjaro range, and thence is
drawn direct to the point on the eastern
side of Lake Victoria Nyaza (Lake
Victoria) which is intersected by the
1st degree of south latitude.’
The line between the Indian Ocean and
Lake Jipe was surveyed by plane table. Most
of the mapping in East Africa between 1890
and 1910 was a result of the boundary commissions.
Basic topographic mapping of varying
quality was accomplished along the narrow
zones of the surveyed boundaries. There
was little opportunity to extend mapping to
the interiors of the colonies. An important
outcome of this early phase was the consolidation
of the War Office as the authority on
boundary surveys and maps in Africa. Both
the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office
relied heavily on the expertise of the War
Office on technical matters related to surveying
and mapping, as well as for help in
wording legal descriptions in negotiations.
The Topographic Section of the General Staff
of the War Office played a crucial role, as
well in the policies and activities of survey
departments in the colonies.
The colonial Survey Committee was created
in an attempt to organize the mapping
effort in the British East African colonies.
The first meeting was held on 14 August
1905. They recommended that there be two
survey departments, standardized topographic
map scales at 1:62,500, 1:125,000,
1:250,000, and 1:1,000,000. In a 1907 meeting,
they adopted the Clarke 1858 ellipsoid
for Africa. They decided on the spelling of
place names on maps. The Committee continued
to be an important governing body
up to the World War II years. Major E. H.
Ellis was appointed Inspecting Officer to the
departments in the Uganda and East Africa
Protectorates (Kenya) in order to help expedite
work. He submitted a comprehensive
report in February 1907 in which he noted
that a topographic section had not been constituted.
He insisted that a full section of 2
officers and 6-8 surveyors be formed. He
recommended map sheets covering 45' longitude
and 30' latitude or 30' x 30', at
1:125,000 scale for developed areas, and 1½º
longitude by 1º latitude in undeveloped areas,
utilizing the rectangular polyconic projection.
(This was the same specification utilized
during the same era by the British Survey
of India. – CJM)
In late 1908 one officer, three NCOs and a
civilian were assembled to begin fieldwork
on 1:125,000 sheets for Kijabe and Nairobi,
and a special 1:62,500 sheet for Nairobi.
Mapping continued until the outbreak of
WWI. The Africa Series GSGS 1764 in 33
sheets at 1:250,000 scale covered both
Uganda and the East Africa Protectorates.
The maps were published in monochrome,
principally between 1905 and 1907. These
were provisional sheets with a paucity of
detail. The maps were later also published in
color. Each sheet covered 1½º longitude and
1º latitude with a graticule spacing of 30'.
They were reprinted in 1939-1941 during
the East African Campaign. It was not until
1953 and thereafter that Series GSGS 1764
was replaced at the same scale by Series
GSGS 4801 and subsequently Series Y503.
After WWI, the War Office was no longer
available to do work in the African colonies.
German East Africa had been assigned to
Great Britain as a mandate from the League
of Nations in 1919 and was renamed
Tanganyika. The Arc of the 30th meridian was
proposed as the foundation of triangulation
in the East African colonies. Observations
on a portion of the arc in western Uganda
had been taken prior to 1914, and the triangulation
net in Uganda was tied to it. Surveying
on the arc had been done in northern
Rhodesia, and it was felt that it was important
to close the gap in the arc in Tanganyika.
Martin Hotine surveyed the arc of the 30th
meridian in Tanganyika between 4½° and 9°
South during the years 1931-1933. Depletion
of funds in late 1933 left a gap in the arc
between 1½° and 4½° South. From July 1936
to August 1937, a survey was conducted
wholly within Tanganyika to fill the gap, consisting
of observation angles and some azimuths.
Uganda had withdrawn from the
project due to fears that if their portion of
the arc was connected to South Africa, they
would be forced to recompute their already
completed surveys on a new projection and
grid system.
This leads to a major theme of discussion
during the years between the two great wars
– that of a common datum and projection for
all of British Africa. Debate raged over this
topic until the exigencies of war during the
Second World War permitted the British
military to force a solution. In a memorandum
circulated in 1926, it was assumed that
a common datum could be chosen, utilizing
a meridional orthomorphic projection from
Khartoum to Cape Town. The Clarke 1880
ellipsoid was suggested. During the second
Conference of Empire Survey Officers (1931),
it was assumed that all colonial governments
would adopt the Transverse Mercator projection
because it was already accepted by
Egypt, South Africa and two of the West African
territories. The width of the zones could
not be agreed upon. Kenya saw little prospect
in adopting the proposal because its
cadastral work was computed on Clarke 1858
and the Cassini projection. Extension and
continued on page 595
PHOTOGRAMMETRIC ENGINEERING & REMOTE SENSING J u n e 2 0 0 3 595
Grids & Datums
continued from page 593
re-computation of its triangulation was more
urgent than conversion of its completed surveys
to a new datum. In January 1934, GSGS
proposed a coordinated projection and grid
zone embracing South Africa, South Rhodesia,
Sudan, Egypt, and the Central and East
African territories. They recommended the
Clarke 1880 ellipsoid and the Transverse
Mercator projection on a 6-degree grid. The
same parameters were recommended in a
meeting of a sub-committee of the Colonial
Survey Committee on 3 October 1935.
Brigadier M. N. MacLeod insisted on the
adoption of the meter as the map unit. Each
time a new recommendation would be put
forward for a common set of map parameters,
one or more colonial governing bodies
would shoot it down for various reasons.
Lord Hailey wrote An African Survey (1938)
after his tour of Africa in 1935. His views
were taken up by the Colonial Survey Committee
in 1939, at which time they once
again recommended a 6-degree grid and the
adoption of the meter. Whittingdale replied
that a 2-degree system was more appropriate
for topographic mapping and military
surveys. Huntley showed the military advantages
of the 2-degree grid (artillery), and
that it was inconvenient for cadastral surveyors
to apply the corrections that a 6-
degree grid would necessitate. (The same
reason for practicality continues to this day
for NOT using the UTM grid for civil GIS and
surveying applications. – CJM) South Africa
totally opposed the change from 2-degree
to 6-degree zones. There was general agreement
on the adoption of the meter on map
grids.
A policy for military mapping was defined
in July 1940, which utilized the Clarke 1880
ellipsoid and the Transverse Mercator projection
with 5-degree zones. The central
meridians were placed at 32° 30’E, 37° 30’E,
and 42° 30’E. A scale factor reduction of
0.05% was introduced to provide correct
scale on two parallel meridians approximately
1° 49' on either side of the central
meridian. The scale error at the central meridian
was about 1:2,000, and it was about
1:2,200 at the edges of the grid zones. The
grid was originally in yards, but was later
changed to meters. This became known as
the East African War System, and it was
eventually applied to an area bounded by
19°N, 15°E, 12°S and the Indian Ocean. The
Directorate of Colonial Surveys was born on
1 March 1946, with Brigadier Martine Hotine
as it first (and only) Director. An allowance
of £2 million was approved for this centralized
organization of geodetic and topographic
surveys. For the first time in the eastern
African colonies, two problems, which had
plagued the survey effort from the earliest
days, were addressed: lack of funds and the
lack of a centralized organizing body. In 1947,
fieldwork for basic topographic mapping was
commenced. The first 1:50,000 scale sheets
of Series Y731 were produced for the Kenya
Ethiopia Boundary Commission. At least 470
sheets were produced, virtually all of which
were contoured, and 64 sheets along the
Ethiopian border.
The 1:100,000 scale sheets of Series Y633
were produced between 1958 and 1968,
mainly by the Survey of Kenya and the Directorate
of Military Survey. A general map
series at 1:250,000 (Y503) has been derived
from the 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 scale sheets.
The Survey of Kenya produced 42 of the 50
sheets needed to cover the country. Kenya
is covered by 7 sheets of the 1:1,000.000
International Map of the World. The most
commonly used geodetic parameters for
maps produced by the Kenyan authorities
are: Arc Datum 1960 referenced to the Clarke
1880 (modified) ellipsoid, Transverse
Mercator projection with coordinates on the
UTM grid.
In the 1970s, first-order EDM traverses
were run between stations adjusted on the
Arc 1960 Datum and Clifford triangulation. In
1972-1973 the Survey of Kenya, in conjunction
with the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency
and the Directorate of Military Survey of the
U.K. made the first experimental Doppler satellite
survey in Kenya. Recently the Kenya
Institute of Surveying and Mapping (KISM)
took GPS observations on existing control
points. A. S. Lwangasi of the University of
Nairobi reported the results of a datum
transformation carried out on 25 control points
from Arc 1960 Datum to WGS 84 Datum:
DX = –179.1 m ±0.7 m, DY = –44.7 m ±0.7 m,
DZ = –302.6 m ±2.2 m.”
In a letter dated 20th July 1989, J. R. R.
Aganyo wrote for the Director of Surveys of
the Survey of Kenya that the old Cassini-
Soldner used in Kenya has the following parameters:
grid name: Cassini-Soldner; years
used: since introduction of cadastral surveys;
central meridians: 33°, 35°, 37°, 39° East;
unit: English Foot where 1 foot = 0.30480
International metres, exactly; ellipsoid:
Clarke 1858 where a = 20,926,348 English
feet and 1/f = 294.26.
In January 2000, Russell Fox of the U.K.
Ordnance Survey sent a memo to me that
was written by the famous H. F. Rainsford on
28 September 1961 with the (then) Directorate
of Overseas Surveys:
“Since there appears to be some
confusion of thought about the ‘origin’
of the trigonometric data lists
produced by this Directorate, the
purpose of this paper is to clarify the
position so far as possible.
Up to the present date, all trig.
Lists have included in the preamble
the words – ‘New 1950 Arc Datum.’
This denotes that the results in the
list are based on the Arc of the 30th
meridian, which was computed by
the D.O.S., from South Rhodesia to
Uganda, in the 1950 (circa). The values
of the stations accepted as a
starting point in South Rhodesia had
been computed continuously from
South Africa. These Arc results have
been held fixed since 1950, and it is
hoped that they will remain so for
as long as possible in the future,
since they are used not only by the
D.O.S., but also by the Congo and
Portuguese Africa, and they provide
a uniform system from the Cape to
the Equator.
The South African datum is an arbitrary
one, as at no station were
the Astronomic and Geodetic latitude,
longitude and Azimuth made
coincident. On the Arc itself the (AG)
values vary (sometimes quite
abruptly) between: -
latitude +20" and –30"
longitude +12" and –10"
azimuth +15" and –08"
The only astronomic elements
that have been held fixed on the Arc
adjustment are – in South Africa one
latitude, longitude and azimuth (but
each at a different station) and an
astronomic azimuth at Kicharere in
Uganda, just south of the Equator.
The Year 1950 was used in the title
as a convenient epoch mainly to distinguish
from previous systems such
as the “1935 Arc Datum.” (original
emphasis in color)
Tanganyika was the first East African
territory in which geodetic
trig. control was computed based
on the Arc and used for control of
topographic surveys. It was known
that some of this trig. was not up to
primary standards, but it was the
only work available and it was hoped
that recomputation based on the Arc
would produce results of sufficient
accuracy for the purpose required.
Since Laplace Azimuths had not
been available for the Arc computacontinued
on page 597
PHOTOGRAMMETRIC ENGINEERING & REMOTE SENSING J u n e 2 0 0 3 597
continued from page 595
tion nor in Tanganyika, the
Tanganyika trig. was computed without
holding fixed any azimuths,
which were, in any case, of doubtful
value. When the trig. computation
reached Malindi in Kenya from the
Arc it was found that the (A-G) azimuth
was approximately 20".
It was then decided that a new
approach was necessary. Put in new
primary circuits based on the Arc,
and observe frequent astronomic
stations and tellurometer lengths,
much closer together than the old
measured bases. The trig. circuits
(were) to be adjusted to the fixed
(or nearly fixed) scale and azimuth
checks. This policy has been carried
out and results have already been
circulated for: -
The Lake Circuit
Uganda Primary
Kenya Primary
All these results have been
headed, as before, ‘New 1950 Arc
Datum’, because the fundamental
datum, which is the Arc, has not been
changed. Whenever the new coordinates
differ from the previous; this
is due to a recomputation (including
new observations) of part of the trig.
system.
To avoid any further misunderstanding
in the future it is proposed
to change the heading of trig. lists
now to ‘New 1960 Arc Datum.’ Most
of the Tanganyika main trig. has still
to be recomputed and a letter will
be sent to each territory indicating
the particular trig. chains which have
already been recomputed and circulated
under the 1950 heading.
The Figure of the Earth used is the
Modified Clarke 1880, for which a =
6378249.145 and r = 293.465 in International
Metres. The geodetic tables
used are Latitude Functions Clarke
1880 Spheroid, Army Map Service, but
most D.O.S. computations are now
done on the Electronic Computer,
which computes its own geodetic factors
‘ab initio’. Co-ordinates are also
produced on the U.T.M. projection.”
Thanks go to Washington Abuto wherein
his letter of 24 November 1997 for the Director
of Surveys of the Survey of Kenya
enclosed a paper detailing much of Kenya’s
history of Grids and Datums. That paper,
authored by Mahinda, served as the basis of
much of the specific geodetic history quoted
in Davis’ graduate-level term paper of 1999.
Cliff Mugnier teaches Surveying, Geodesy,
and Photogrammetry at Louisiana State University.
He is the Chief of Geodesy at LSU’s
Center for GeoInformatics (Dept. of Civil and
Environmental Engineering), and his geodetic
research is mainly in the subsidence of
Louisiana and in Grids and Datums of the
world. He is a Board-certified Photogrammetrist
and Mapping Scientist (GIS/LIS), and
he has extensive experience in the practice
of Forensic Photogrammetry.
The contents of this column reflect the views of the
author, who is responsible for the facts and accuracy of
the data presented herein. The contents do not necessarily
reflect the official views or policies of the American
Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing
and/or the Louisiana State University Center for GeoInformatics
(C4G).
ò
Grids & Datums
Annex 123
P. Nugent, Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History, (2nd edn., Palgrave
Macmillan 2012) p. 105.
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Annex 124
T. Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation (CUP 2015) pp. 236–52.
EQUITABLE PRINCI P LES OF
MARITIME BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION
Equity emerged as a powerful symbol of aspired redistribution in
international relations. Operationally, it has had limited impact in the
Westphalian system of nation states – except for maritime boundary
delimitations. This book deals with the role of equity in international
law, and offers a detailed case study on maritime boundary delimitation in
the context of the enclosure movement in the law of the sea. It assesses
treaty law and the impact of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. It depicts the process of trial and error in the extensive case law
of the International Court of Justice and arbitral tribunals and expounds
the underlying principles and factors informing the methodology both
in adjudication and negotiations. Unlike other books, the main focus is
on equity and its implications for legal methodology, in particular offering
further guidance in the field of international economic law.
thomas cottier is a full professor of European and International
Economic Law at the University of Bern, Switzerland, and former
Managing Director of the World Trade Institute. Much of his professional
work has been dedicated to international economic law, in particular
international trade regulation, working in the field both as an academic
and a negotiator and chair and member of WTO panels.
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EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES OF
MARITIME BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION
The Quest for Distributive Justice
in International Law
THOMAS COTTIER
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University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.
It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107080171
© Thomas Cottier 2015
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2015
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Cottier, Thomas, author.
Equitable principles of maritime boundary delimitation : the quest
for distributive justice in international law / Thomas Cottier.
pages cm
ISBN 978-1-107-08017-1 (hardback)
1. Maritime boundaries. I. Title.
KZA1450.C68 2015
341.4048–dc23
2014035077
ISBN 978-1-107-08017-1 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of
URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication,
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
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5
State practice
I. Unilateral acts (proclamations and legislation)
In the process of claims and responses, unilateral practice and acts of
states are of importance in assessing the status of methods of
delimitation. This chapter analyses the period from 1942 to 1992,
comprehensively covering the formative stage of the continental shelf
doctrine and of the EEZ. This prepares the ground for assessing state
practice and customary international law in Chapter 7, taking into
account the record of judicial settlement discussed in Chapter 6.
A. Continental shelf
Unilateral practice and acts reflect two of the three models discussed
prior to UNCLOS III. While many documents do not explicitly address
the principles and methods of delimitation applied, others refer to the
models of equitable principles and the concept of equidistance–special
circumstances, albeit with different weight and significance.1 In no case
1 For state practice on maritime boundary law see generally the seminal five-volume work
initiated by Jonathan I. Charney: Jonathan I. Charney et al. (eds.), International Maritime
Boundaries, 5 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993–2005), vols. I and II
(Charney and Alexander (eds.), 1993), vol. III (Charney and Alexander (eds.), 1998), vol.
IV (Charney and Smith (eds.), 2002), vol. V (Colson and Smith (eds.), 2005) (containing
the most comprehensive analysis and evaluation of approximately 180 agreements concluded
between 1942 and 2004); see also, National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the
Law of the Sea, United Nations Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/19 (1980); ST/LEG/SER.
B/16 (1976); National Legislation on Treaties Relating to the Territorial Sea, the
Contiguous Zone, the Continental Shelf and the High Seas and to Fishing Conservation
of the Living Resources of the Sea, United Nations Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/2, 2
vols. (1951); Robin Churchill et al. (eds.), New Directions of the Law of the Sea (London:
Oceana Publications, 1973–1977), vols. I–VI; Myron Nordquist et al. (eds.), New
Directions in the Law of the Sea (London: Oceana Publications, 1980–1981), vols.
VII–XI; Kenneth R. Simmonds (ed.), New Directions in the Law of the Sea (London:
Oceana Publications, 1983 and subsequent supplements), vols. XII ff.;
Benedetto Conforti and Giampiero Francalanci (eds.), Atlante dei Confini Sottomarini –
236
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was the concept of the legal vacuum (ex aequo et bono) found to be
formally applied.
(i) Given the early uncertainty of the law on maritime boundary
delimitation during the 1950s, it is hardly surprising that most of
the post World War II proclamations on the shelf did not address
the issue of boundary delimitation at all, or merely referred to
settlement by agreement. They did not indicate any standards of
delimitation. The 1964 declaration of the Federal Republic of
Germany on the continental shelf is an example it point. It refers
to international agreement2 and thus implicitly to general international
law to the extent that boundaries will be settled in court.
(ii) Several states, although notmany, explicitly referred to equidistance or
themedian line. Iraq is an example in point.3 Norway claimed rights of
exploration and exploitation of the soil and the subsoil ‘within as well
as outside the maritime boundaries otherwise applicable, but not
beyond the median line in relation to other States’.4 Another form of
reference to the median line was used in terms of a residual rule by
Italy to be applied pending agreement.5 This approach was adopted by
all states whose proclamations or laws explicitly referred to Article 6 of
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.6
(iii) Several early texts took up the concept of equitable principles,
founded by the 1945 Truman Proclamation.7 One example includes
Atlas of the Seabed Boundaries, Part I (Milan: Giuffrè, 1979); Benedetto Conforti et al.
(eds.), Atlante dei Confini Sottomarini – Atlas of the Seabed Boundaries, Part II (Milan:
Giuffrè, 1987); Faraj Abdullah Ahnish (ed.), The International Law of Maritime
Boundaries and the Practice of States in the Mediterranean Sea (Oxford University Press,
1994); Edward Duncan Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal
Regime, 3 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), vol I: The Continental Shelf.
2 ‘1. . . . The detailed delimitation of the German continental shelf in relation to the
continental shelf of foreign states shall be subject of agreement with those States.’
National Legislation and Treaties related to the Law of the Sea, United Nations
Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/15, 351 (1970).
3 Proclamation of 10 April 1958, ‘adherence to international practice . . . and to the principle
of equidistance’. See ST/LEG/SER.B/15, n. 2, p. 369.
4 Act of 21 June 1963 Relating to Exploration and Exploitation of Submarine Natural
Resources. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, n. 2, p. 363.
5 Act No. 613 of 21 July 1967, Article 1(3). ST/LEG/SER.B/15, n. 2, p. 370.
6 Declaration of 23 October 1968, p. 772. See also United Nations Legislative Series, ST/
LEG/SER.B/18, pp. 153–4 (1976), including the German Democratic Republic, Denmark,
Poland and the USSR on the Baltic Sea.
7 ‘Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources
of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 28 Oct. 1945’, reprinted in Marjorie
M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law (Washington DC: Government Printing Office,
state practice 237
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the British sponsored 1949 Proclamation by the Arabian Gulf
States.8 This document, however, substantially differs from the
United States’ precedent to the extent that delimitation was not to
be settled by agreement. Instead, it was to be settled unilaterally, as
the Abu Dhabi Proclamation said, ‘on equitable principles by us
after consultation with the [Bahrain] neighbouring states’.9 One of
the proclamations employed the term ‘just principles’,10 which is
related to the model of equity. The term was later equally used in
proclamations by Iran11 and the Philippines.12
B. Fisheries and exclusive economic zones
The problem of boundary delimitation and the standards applicable more
frequently were addressed in proclamations and laws relating to the establishment
of the EEZ or exclusive fishing zones up to 200 nm. These
proclamations and laws reflect an increasing experience in the field, particularly
accelerated by the rulings of the ICJ and debates at UNCLOS III
during the 1970s. Again, the review reveals a great variety of different
approaches. They are no longer limited to the three models discussed
prior to UNCLOS III. There are also examples invoking international law
as a basis for delimitation. While most proclamations and laws rely upon
delimitation by agreement, there are still a number of cases calling upon
unilateral determination. The following groups may be distinguished:
(i) Texts calling for a solution by negotiations and agreement,
yet without indicating any guiding principles or methods
of delimitation. Examples include the economic zone
declared by France,13 the Federal Republic of Germany,14
1965), vol. IV, pp. 740, 756. For the twin-proclamation on fisheries see ibid., 954, United
Nations Legislative Series ST/LEG/SER.B, 38 (1951).
8 See proclamations by Saudi Arabia, Ajman, Bahrain, Dubai, Kuwait, Qatar, Ras al
Khaimah, all using ‘equitable principles’. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, n. 2, pp. 22–27. For analysis
see e.g. Ali A. El Hakim, The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea (Manchester
University Press, 1979), p. 31 ff.; Husain M. Al-Baharna, The Arabian Gulf States, Their
Legal and Political Status and their International Problems (Beirut: Librairie du Liban,
1975), p. 278 ff.
9 ST/LEG/SER.B/15, n. 2, p. 22.
10 Proclamation by Bahrain, ST/LEG/SER.B/15, n. 2, p. 25.
11 Delimitation ‘conformément aux règles de l’équité’, ST/LEG/SER.B/15, n. 2, p. 366.
12 Determination ‘in accordance with legal and equitable principles’, ST/LEG/SER.B/15, n.
2, p. 422.
13 Decree No. 77–130 of 11 February, 1977, Churchill et al., New Directions, vol.V, n. 1, p. 303.
14 Proclamation of 21 December 1976, ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 211–12.
238 the new boundaries
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Mexico15 and Venezuela.16 Closely related to this model are texts
that refer to the United Nations Charter, or regional instruments, in
order to stress the need for peaceful settlement, yet again without
indicating any substantive principles or methods to be applied. This
approach was utilized by the Declaration of Santa Domingo17 and
during the African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea.18
(ii) Texts defining the boundary unilaterally by means of co-ordinates of
longitude and latitude. This approach, without indicating any principles
of delimitation, has been applied by a number of states, using
different methods of definition: Canada,19 Ireland,20 the United
States (in the Gulf of Maine area),21 Maldives22 and Mexico.23 The
Seychelles defined their boundary by reference to charts,24 and Kenya
unilaterally made its delimitation by using a parallel of latitude.25
(iii) Texts referring to the equidistance or the median line to
be applied as a mandatory rule. Such cases include:
15 Art. 27 of the Mexican Constitution, as amended by Decree of 26 January 1976, ST/LEG/
SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 232, 234.
16 Law Establishing a 200 Nautical Miles Outer Limit of the Territorial Sea of Venezuela, 26
July 1978, Article 2(2). Nordquist et al. (ed.), New Directions, vol. VIII, n. 1, p. 29; ST/
LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, p. 261.
17 Declaration on the Continental Shelf, para 4; Churchill et al., New Directions, n. 1, vol. I, p.
247.
18 Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the Law of
the Sea, Yaounde, 20–30 June 1972, paras. 6 and 7; Churchill et al., New Directions, n. 1,
vol. I, p. 250.
19 Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 6) Order (1976), (1976) 15 ILM, 1372 ff, including
the Gulf of Maine; see Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Canada v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, 284, para. 71; Arctic
Pollution Prevention Act (1970), ST/LEG/SER.B/16, n. 1, p. 183.
20 Maritime Jurisdiction (Exclusive Fishery Limits) Order (1976) (corresponding, according
to Art. 4 to an ‘equitable equidistant line’), ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, p. 213.
21 Federal Register of 4 November 1976; see ICJ Reports 1984, p. 284, para. 70.
22 Law No. 30/76 of 5 December 1976 relating to the Exclusive Economic Zone of the
Republic of Maldives, Art. 11, ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 230–1. The agreement between
India and the Maldives was signed later, on 28 December 1976. See Appendix I, Table A.1,
No. 60, in Charney et al., International Maritime Boundaries, n. 1, vol. II (Charney and
Alexander), Report Number 6-8.
23 Decree of 4 June 1976 Establishing the Outer Limit of the EEZ of Mexico, ST/LEG/SER.B/19,
n. 1, p. 235. The maritime boundary Agreement between Cuba and Mexico was only signed
later, on 26 July 1976. See Appendix I, Table A.1, No. 58, in Charney et al., International
Maritime Boundaries, n. 1, vol. I (Charney and Alexander), ReportNumber 2-8.
24 The Exclusive Economic Zone Order 1978, ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 230–1.
25 Proclamation by the President of the Republic of Kenya of 28 February 1979, Article 1(a)
and (b), ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 228–9.
state practice 239
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Fiji,26 Norway,27 Morocco,28 New Zealand29 and the Soviet Union,
specifying particular geographical areas of application.30
(iv) Texts referring to equidistance or the median line to be applied as a
residual rule, pending or failing agreement to the contrary. Such
cases include: Barbados,31 Comoros,32 Denmark,33 Guyana,34
German Democratic Republic,35 Iceland,36 India,37 Japan,38
Nigeria,39 Portugal,40 Spain41 and Yemen.42 These states follow
the model of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.
26 The Fiji Marine Space Act of 1977, Art. 3(3) and (4). Nordquist et al. (eds.), New
Directions, vol. VII, n. 1, p. 391.
27 Law No. 91 of 17 December 1976, Relating to the Economic Zone of Norway, Art. 1(2),
ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, p. 241(‘not beyond the median line’).
28 Moroccan Law (Dahir) No. 1–81, 8 April 1981, Art. 11; referred to by Judge ad hoc
Jens Evensen, dissenting opinion, Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1982, p. 285, para. 7.
29 New Zealand Territorial Sea and Exclusive Zone Act, No 28, 1977, Sec. 9(2)(a), Nordquist
et al. (eds.), New Directions, vol. VII, n. 1, p. 440; ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, p. 240.
30 Decision No. 1963 of 24 February 1977 of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the
Introduction of Provisional Measures to Protect the Living Resources and Regulate
Fishing in the Areas of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans Adjacent to the Coast of the
USSR, ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, p. 255 (an exception was made for the historical boundaries
based on the Russian–American Treaty of 18 (30) March 1867 in the Bering and
Chukotsk Seas and the Arctic Ocean).
31 Marine Boundaries and Jurisdiction Act 1978–3, Art. 3(3) and (4), Nordquist et al. (eds.),
New Directions, vol. VII, n. 1, p. 337.
32 Ordinance No. 76–038 of 15 June 1976, Art. 3, ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 15–16.
33 Act No. 507 of December 1976, Art. 1(2), ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, p. 192 (‘failing
agreement to the contrary’).
34 Maritime Boundaries Act, No. 10, June 1977, Art. 35, ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, p. 41.
35 Decree of 22 December 1977 (concerning the Baltic Sea), Art. 2(1), ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n.
1, p. 206.
36 Law No. 41 of 1 June 1979 concerning the Territorial Sea, the Economic Zone and the
Continental Shelf, Art. 7, ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 43, 45. See also ‘Iceland: Law
Concerning the Territorial Sea, The Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf’ (1979)
18 ILM, 1504.
37 The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime
Zones Act 1976, Art. 9(1); Churchill et al., New Directions, vol V, n. 1, pp. 305, 313; ST/
LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 47, 52.
38 Law No. 31 of 2 May 1977, Art. 3(2) and (3), ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, p. 215.
39 Exclusive Economic Zone Decree 1978, No. 28, Art. 1(2), Nordquist et al. (eds.), New
Directions, vol. VII, n. 1, p. 474.
40 Act No. 33/77 of 28 May 1977, Art. 2(2), Nordquist et al. (eds.), New Directions, vol. VIII,
n. 1, p. 19, ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, p. 93.
41 Law 15/1978 of 20 February, Art. 2; Nordquist et al. (eds.), New Directions, vol. VIII, n. 1,
p. 19, ST/LEG/SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 250–1.
42 Act No. 45 of 17 December 1977, sec. v. Art. 17; Nordquist et al. (eds.), New Directions,
vol. VII, n. 1, p. 57, ST/LEG/SER.B/19 n. 1, pp. 21, 25.
240 the new boundaries
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(v) Texts referring to equitable principles as the foundation of delimitation
to be applied. The only document found, however, which explicitly
restated that model was the 1983 Reagan Proclamation on the
Exclusive Economic Zone, that reaffirmed the approach of the 1945
Truman Proclamation as the modern approach in the United States:
In cases where the maritime boundary with a neighboring state remains to
be determined, the boundary of the Exclusive Economic Zone shall be
determined by the United States and the other States concerned in
accordance with equitable principles.43
In the light of the prominence of this model in international law, it is
remarkable that proclamations did not use it more frequently.
(vi) Texts referring to international law in general as a basis for delimitation.
This model was chosen by Kenya in its draft articles on the
EEZ (in combination with a reference to the United Nations Charter
and regional organizations).44 It was also employed by the
Bahamas45 and Vietnam (including a reference to the respect of
independence and sovereignty as a basis for settlement).46
In conclusion, unilateral state practice both on the shelf and the EEZ
predominantly shows a preference for delimitation by agreement. The
model of legal vacuum has never been invoked. Where substantive rules
are mentioned, unilateral state practice developed, in quantitative terms,
a preference for the model of equidistance–special circumstances
(residual or mandatory) while examples that use the concept of equitable
principles remained a minority. No support could be found in the period
under review for the concept of delimitation based on international
law in order to achieve an equitable solution. Since the predominant
references to equidistance–special circumstances were made prior to the
adoption of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOS Convention, they cannot
be read as supporting a customary adoption of that model in state
practice; such a process was frustrated by the adoption of the model of
equitable solution in the multilateral negotiations of UNCLOS III.
43 Proclamation No 5030, entitled ‘Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of
America’ (10 March 1983) (1983)77 American Journal of International Law, 619, 622,
(1983) 22 ILM 461.
44 UN Doc. A/AC. 138/S/C/II/L.10. (1972), Art. VIII; (1973) 12 ILM 33.
45 Bahamas Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) Act 1977, Sec. 11, ST/LEG/
SER.B/19, n. 1, pp. 179, 184.
46 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Statement on the Territorial Sea, The Contiguous Zone, the
Exclusive Economic Zone, and the Continental Shelf of Vietnam, 12 May 1977; para. 7,
Nordquist et al. (eds.), New Directions, vol. VIII, n. 1, p. 36.
state practice 241
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II. Maritime boundary delimitation agreements
The following analysis relies upon a sample of 120 long-distance maritime
boundary agreements (excluding territorial sea or contiguous zone delimitations,
as well as the establishment of purely joint or common zones),
which were concluded between 1942 and 1992. They establish a total of 132
boundaries and are listed in Appendix I of the present study.47 Subsequent
agreements are not systematically taken into account in this study.48 The
period and numbers available are believed to be sufficiently representative
for the forming stage of customary international law.
Fifty-eight of these agreements exclusively relate to the continental
shelf. Forty-two agreements relate to the water column, including fishing
zones or EEZs. Finally, twenty-one agreements delimitate an all-purpose,
overall maritime boundary, which includes the soil and the water column,
providing that an EEZ had been declared.49 With the development
of the EEZ, agreements increasingly opted to adopt such all-purpose
boundaries.50 In the 2001 Qatar/Bahrain case, the ICJ observed that the
concept of a single maritime boundary stems from state practice.51 This
trend is likely to continue for the reasons already discussed.52
47 The sample of agreements is based on the compilation presented by Canada at the ICJ in the
1984 Gulf of Maine case. Annexes to the Reply submitted by Canada, Pleadings, vol. I, State
Practice, 12 December 1983, a collection presented by counsel for Libya in the 1984 Libya–
Tunisia Continental Shelf case, Pleadings, as well as Conforti and Francalanci, Atlas of the
Seabed Boundaries, Part I, n. 1 andConforti et al., Atlas of the Seabed Boundaries, Part II, n. 1;
and Limits in the Seas (The Office of the US Geographer, ed. 1969); and Charney et al.,
International Maritime Boundaries, n. 1.
48 For an updated list of Agreements cf. Wikipedia, List of Maritime Boundary Treaties,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_maritime_boundary_treaties (last accessed
February 2012).
49 It may be remembered that the EEZ, unlike the continental shelf zone, requires an act of
will to be established, see Chapter 2(III).
50 All-purpose boundaries were often negotiated between the United States and its neighbours,
the Gulf of Maine boundary being the most prominent example. See Mark
B. Feldman and David A. Colson, ‘The Maritime Boundaries of the United States’
(1981) 75 American Journal of International Law, 729, 742; Edward J. Collins and
Martin Rogoff, ‘The International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ (1982) 34
Maine Law Review, 1, 14–24.
51 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 93, para. 173.
52 Anderson observed in 2005 that ‘[s]ome older agreements relating solely to the continental
shelf remain in force, but the only new ones having this limited scope relate to
areas beyond the 200 n.m. limit’ (David H. Anderson, ‘Developments in Maritime
Boundary Law and Practice’ in Charney and Alexander, International Maritime
Boundaries, n. 1, vol. V (Colson and Smith), pp. 3197, 3210). However, states still
242 the new boundaries
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Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 flow from an analysis of the agreements
from 1942 to 1992 from three perspectives. With a view toward assessing
the practical importance and impact of different models and methods
of delimitation, indications in agreements as well as effective
applications are considered. Also, the impact of the 1958 Shelf
Convention is examined.
A. Indications in agreements
Table 5.1 shows a quantitative distribution of models and methods called
upon in the sample agreements: 98 of the 120 agreements contain an
explicit indication of a particular model (positive indication); 36 treaties
remain silent (negative indication); 14 agreements contain two different
references.53 Altogether, 134 indications (positive and negative) were
found.
refer to the EEZ and the continental shelf when they establish single maritime boundaries
up to 200 nm as separate regimes (Cissé Yacouba and Donald McRae, ‘The Legal
Regime of Maritime Boundary Agreements’, in Charney et al., ibid., pp. 3285–7). This
may be due to caution on behalf of states, whichmight have future claims of continental
shelves beyond 200 nm in mind, since the definition of the continental shelf in Art. 76
UNCLOS refers to ‘the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
the territorial sea’, including thereby the area within 200 nm as well as the area outside
200 nm.
53 The difference between the number of agreements (120) and number of indications
(134, positive and negative) is explained by the fact that 14 agreements contain 2
indications (see Appendix I, Table A.1, Nos. 21, 29, 36, 42, 57, 63, 65, 81, 83, 85, 90,
95, 100, 114).
Table 5.1. Principles or methods indicated in 120 agreements
None 36 (26.9%)
Equidistance (incl. minor modifications) 23 (17.2%)
Median line (incl. minor modifications) 22 (16.4%)
Equity 20 (14.9%)
Parallel of latitude 12 (10%)
Straight line/Azimuth 11 (8.2%)
Perpendicular to coastal line 1 (0.7%)
Others (ad hoc constructions) 9 (6.7%)
Total indications 134 (100%)
state practice 243
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The absence of any indication of method in almost one-third of
all agreements does not imply the absence of a particular method applied.
Agreements may simply contain the results of the negotiations, and
parties may well have worked on the basis of an agreed-upon method.
Table 5.1 indicates that equidistance and the median line are clearly
the most prominent methods invoked, together used in a total of 45
agreements (33.6 per cent). These are followed by equity or equitable
principles in 20 agreements (14.9 per cent). The latter have been referred
to mostly in the more recent years under review, presumably due to the
educational process of UNCLOS III. Between 1978 and 1991, 16 of
53 agreements (30.2 per cent) call upon equity in one form or another.
However, recourse to equity is not necessarily meant to exclude
delimitation on the basis of equidistance, if this method would produce
an equitable result.54 Since equity or equitable principles are a broader
concept than equidistance, and may include it, indications in agreements
are not conclusive for the determination of the actual use of the different
approaches. It nevertheless shows that if states chose to indicate a
method, they most frequently named the median or equidistance line,
leaving equity in an increasingly important minority. Other methods
clearly appear less frequently.
B. Models and methods applied
More important and significant than the principles and methods
invoked by the agreements are the results achieved and effected by
them. The analysis in Table 5.2 based on the maps reproduced in
Appendix II shows the distribution and application of different legal
models and methods applied in 120 sample agreements. Given the fact
54 See e.g. The French–Tonga Agreement of 11 November 1980, Conforti et al., Atlas of the
Seabed Boundaries, Part II, n. 1, p. 119; Charney et al., International Maritime
Boundaries, n. 1, vol. I (Charney and Alexander), Report Number 5-8, which states in
the preamble:
Le Gouvernement de Tonga ayant proposé que cette délimitation soit
effectuée selon la méthode de l’équidistance; le Gouvernement français ayant
accepté cette proposition, conforme dans le cas présent à l’application de
principes équitables.
See also the French-Santa Lucia agreement of 4 March 1981, Charney et al., International
Maritime Boundaries, n. 1, vol. I (Charney and Alexander), Report Number 2-10 (with the
two governments: ‘Considérant que l’application de la méthode de l’équidistance constitue
dans ce cas un mode équitable de delimitation’).
244 the new boundaries
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that 10 agreements apply 2 models55 and 1 agreement applies to
3,56 a total of 131 applications resulted.
Table 5.2 shows that equidistance was applied (either strictly or in a
modified form) in more than half of all the delimitations effected (61 per
cent). Fifty-one agreements (39 per cent) relied on non-equidistant
delimitations. Attention should be paid to the fact that non-equidistant
methods clearly prevail over equidistance in geographical configurations of
adjacent coasts. The sample suggests that equidistance has been
most successful in opposite and mixed configurations, employed
respectively in 69 per cent and 65.7 per cent of all cases. Simultaneously,
non-equidistant methods prevailed in 68 per cent of all adjacent cases, and
showed a considerable presence in mixed configurations (34.3 per cent).
Taken together, these results suggest that delimitation with adjacent or
mixed coastal constellations often requires particular solutions that cannot
rely upon the mathematics of equidistance.
C. The impact of the 1958 Shelf Convention equidistance–special
circumstances rule
It may be of some interest to evaluate the impact of Article 6 of the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf for the parties to that agreement.
Looking at 111 agreements concluded among the parties since the
Convention entered into force on 10 June 1964, 42 agreements delimitating
45 boundaries were completed. This amounts to a total of 40.5 per
cent of all maritime boundary agreements and to 77.6 per cent of the
58 agreements of the sample strictly relating to the continental shelf.
Table 5.2. Methods applied and effected in 120 sample agreements
effecting 131 applications of methods
Method Opposite Adjacent Mixed Total
Equidistance 27 (38%) 4 (16%) 20 (57.1%) 51 (38.9%)
Equidistance (mod.) 22 (31%) 4 (16%) 3 (8.6%) 29 (22.1%)
Non-equidistant 22 (31%) 17 (68%) 12 (34.3%) 51 (39.0%)
Total 71 (100%) 25 (100%) 35 (100%) 131
55 Nine of the sample agreements establish two different boundaries (see Appendix I, Table
A.1, Nos. 29, 59, 70, 101, 102, 105, 107, 108 and 113); one of them applies to different
segments of the line (see No. 42).
56 See Appendix I, Table A.1, No. 112.
state practice 245
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Table 5.3 indicates that the combined equidistance–special circumstances
rule of the 1958 Convention is of considerable importance, but that it has
not clearly emerged as the dominant factor in maritime boundary delimitation.
Between 1964 and 1992, equidistance (strict or modified) under the
Convention has been applied in 51.7 per cent of all continental shelf
delimitations and in 27 per cent of all maritime boundary agreements
(including EEZ and all-purpose boundaries).57 Although conceived merely
as a residual rule, equidistance was applied in two-thirds of all delimitations
under the 1958 Convention. This fact shows that states can indeed achieve
negotiated settlements under particular rules of international law in a considerable
number of scenarios. Further, it is evident that the 1958
Convention also served as an example to states that were not parties to the
instrument. It certainly stimulated the use of equidistance, which served in
80 out of a total 131 cases (61 per cent) of delimitation, as Table 5.2 indicates.
D. Assessment and former studies
The present evaluation, of course, does not achieve more than a rough
approximation. Models and methods applied cannot be coded and
Table 5.3. Application of Article 6 of the 1958 Shelf Convention
Method 1 2 3 4
Strict equidistance 22 48.9% 19.8% 37.9%
Equidistance modified 8 17.8% 7.2% 13.8%
Agreed, non-equidistance 15 33.3% 13.5% 25.9%
Total 45 100% 40.5% 77.6%
1. Percentage of agreements concluded under the Convention.
2. Percentage of total of 111 boundary agreements concluded since the entry into
force of the Convention (1964–1991).
3. Percentage of all maritime boundary agreements since the entry into force of the
Convention (1964–1991).
4. Percentage of total of 58 agreements exclusively related to shelf delimitation
since the entry into force of the Convention (1964–1991).
57 The indications of percentage result from additions of positions 1 and 2 of col. 3, col. 2
and col. 1, respectively, of Table 5.3. A relatively small overall impact of Art. 6 of the 1958
Shelf Convention was also found by S. P. Jagota, ‘Maritime Boundary’ (1981) 171 Recueil
des cours II, 85, 131–2; Sang-Myon Rhee, ‘Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary
Dispute between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine’ (1981) 75 American
Journal of International Law, 590, 605–6.
246 the new boundaries
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evaluated very precisely in quantitative terms: firstly, because a considerable
number (one-third) of all settlements are purely negotiated
solutions, which do not indicate any principles or methods applied;
and secondly, because what appears on the map to be an application of
a particular method may in fact be a purely negotiated solution, a result of
a quid pro quo based on political expediency, as the history of the 1978
US–Mexican agreement indicates.58 Most negotiations are, at least for
academic purposes, off the record. The intentions of states are therefore
difficult to assess.
Given the imponderable nature of these uncertainties, it may be useful
to compare results achieved here with previous studies of the subject.
They generally show a higher percentage of agreements based on
equidistance than this study. Compared to each other, however, assessments
vary considerably. This is not only due to the fact that the problem
of imponderables always exists. Variations are also due to the different
samples and time periods chosen. Nevertheless, overall, the findings of
others reaffirm the results found above.
A review of fifty agreements on the continental shelf by Rüster,
published in 1977, concluded that some forty agreements examined
rely on the median or equidistance line (80 per cent). Only ten were
‘negotiated’ solutions (20 per cent).59
Gounaris concluded in the same year that from a total of sixty-six
continental shelf boundary agreements, twenty-eight (42.4 per cent)
applied equidistance and twenty-two (33.3 per cent) apply modified
equidistance methods, while only three agreements (3.5 per cent) rely
upon equity, twelve agreements (18.2 per cent) used other methods, and
one treaty was without any positive indication.60 The same author found
in 1980 a total of seventy-three agreements, of which thirty (41.1 per
58 The agreement favoured the United States in the Pacific by using US islands as base
points. Mexico is favoured in the Gulf of Mexico by using small Mexican islands as base
points. The Treaty, signed 4 May 1978, ‘Mexico–United-States: Four Bilateral
Agreements’ (1978) 17 ILM, 1056; Charney et al., International Maritime Boundaries,
n. 1, vol. I (Charney and Alexander), Report Number 1-5, however, was later withdrawn
from consideration by the US Senate, and a new study on hydrocarbon resources in the
Gulf was ordered, Feldman and Colson, n. 50, 743–4.
59 Bernd Rüster, Die Rechtsordnung des Festlandsockels (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot,
1977), p. 399 et seq.
60 Emmanuel Gounaris, ‘Die Aufteilung des Festlandsockels unter dem Adriatischen und
Ionischen Meer zwischen Griechenland und Italien vom 24.5.1977 und die Internationale
Praxis’ (1978) 31 Revue hellénique de droit international, 191.
state practice 247
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cent) relied on equidistance, 22 (30.1 per cent) on modified equidistance,
and seventeen agreements (23.3 per cent) relied on other methods.61
In a 1985 study, Jagota concluded from a sample of seventy-five
agreements that forty-eight (64 per cent) applied equidistance, seventeen
(22.7 per cent) rely on a modified equidistance line, and only ten (13.3 per
cent) are ‘negotiated’ solutions.62 An expanded version covering a hundred
agreements (twelve of which deal with the territorial sea and four
establish joint or common zones) shows a total of sixty-four median or
equidistance boundaries, eighteen modified median lines, fourteen nonequidistant
(negotiated) solutions and four joint or common zones.63
An evaluation of state practice by Canada in the Gulf of Maine argued
in support of equidistance, showing that forty-four agreements (45.4 per
cent) rely on strict or simplified equidistance (four between adjacent,
sixteen between opposite and twenty-four in mixed constellations),
twenty-four agreements (24.7 per cent) were considered using a modified
equidistance line, with only twenty agreements (29.9 per cent) being nonequidistant.
64 The United States, in opposing a strict application of
equidistance, argued that merely 37 per cent of all agreements in force
were based exclusively upon a strict application of equidistance.65
The most comprehensive analysis, based upon detailed reports from
134 agreements effected by the project of the American Society of
International Law was presented by Leonard Legault and Blair Hankey
in 1993. The results of their analyses are summarized in Table 5.4.66
In 2006 Tanaka concluded on the basis of the same material, but short
of distinguishing strict and modified applications of the method, that 83
per cent of all continental shelf delimitation between opposite coasts are
based upon equidistance, and 46 per cent of agreements in adjacent
configurations. In hybrid cases, the method was used in 88 per cent of
cases. Single maritime boundaries in opposite configurations were found
to rely upon equidistance in 82 per cent and in adjacent configurations in
50 per cent of the agreements. In hybrid cases, he found 90 per cent of all
purpose boundary agreements to be based upon equidistance. On the
61 Emmanuel Gounaris, ‘The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf of Islands: Some
Obervations’ (1980) 33 Revue hellénique de droit international 111.
62 See Jagota, n. 57, 131. 63 See ibid., p. 122. 64 Canadian Reply, n. 47, pp. 23–34.
65 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States
of America), Counter Memorial of the United States of America, 28 June 1983, Pleadings
p. 145, para. 217.
66 Leonard H. Legault and Blair Hankey, ‘Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and
Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ in Charney et al., International
Maritime Boundaries, n. 1, vol. I (Charney and Alexander), pp. 203, 215–17.
248 the new boundaries
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whole, maritime delimitations taking into account the continental shelf
and the territorial sea amount to 83 per cent of the agreements in
opposite constellations, and 51 per cent in adjacent agreements to be
based upon equidistance.67
A comparison of the results of the different studies suggests that the
conclusions found in the present examination are roughly appropriate.
Equidistance is mainly applied in opposite and mixed configurations,
while adjacent coastal configurations are often dealt with on the basis of
different methods. For those, as well as for modified equidistance, additional
guidance is required that goes beyond the method of equidistance.
This analysis concludes that the widespread perception of a strongly
predominant, almost exclusive use of the combined equidistance–special
circumstances rule, as codified in Article 6 of the 1958 Shelf Convention,
has not been supported by state practice. There are clearly more
agreements than generally thought which refer to methods other than
equidistance.68 Whatever the percentages in detail, and regardless of
possible fluctuations, it should be emphasized that the application of
strict mathematical equidistance or median line methods did not
produce acceptable results for the coastal states in 50 to 60 per cent of
all the agreements examined. Other considerations prevailed in these
Table 5.4. Account of methods of delimitation used (Legault/Hankey)
Method General Opposite Mixed Adjacent
Equidistance 103 (77%) 55 (89%) 37 (86%) 12 (40%)
Strict/simplified 63 (47%) 28 (45%) 29 (67%) 6 (20%)
Modified 40 (30%) 27 (43%) 8 (19%) 6 (20%)
Other methods 42 (31%) 8 (13%) 13 (30%) 20 (67%)
Mixed methods 16 (14%) 8 (27%)
(Eq./parallels of lat.)
The relatively high percentage of agreements based on equidistance in this study
may be partly explained by the inclusion of territorial boundaries in several of the
134 agreements taken into account.
67 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 134–5.
68 But see e.g. Elisabeth Zoller, arguing that practically all agreements have used the model
of equidistance–special circumstances in one way or another to establish the boundary
line. Elisabeth Zoller, ‘Recherche sur les méthodes de délimination du plateau continental:
à propos de l’Affaire Tunisie/Libye’ (1982) 86 Revue generale de droit international
public, 645, 673.
state practice 249
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delimitations. Since negotiations need not rely upon principled
arguments, it often cannot be said which specific criteria governments
actually used.69
E. Protracted negotiations
Besides successfully concluded agreements, it is of equal interest to look
at state practice in difficult negotiations. There are a number of disputes
that have been pending for many years and decades. Unsettled negotiations
in Europe, for example, still include boundary delimitations
between Poland and Denmark, between Sweden and Denmark in the
Baltic Sea,70 and the case of Greece and Turkey in the Mediterranean,
despite agreed procedures for negotiations and litigation before the ICJ in
1978.71 Other negotiations were concluded after great difficulties, in
particular in the Barents Sea between Russia (the former Soviet Union)
and Norway, only settled in 2010.72 There are, of course, many different
reasons that cause the complexity, protraction, or even the failure, of
maritime boundary delimitation at great political and economic cost. The
overall relationship of the states concerned is certainly an important
factor. While friendly relations and mutual trust ease the way for
negotiated solutions of complex cases, tensions, distrust or hostility
69 The ASIL study has considerably expanded the knowledge made available to the community
on motivation and factors determining single lines in the 137 agreements.
Nevertheless, the study concluded that in particular political, strategic and historic factors
often remain undisclosed in the agreements and remain within the diplomatic process in
hidden agendas. See Charney, ‘Introduction’ in Charney et al., International Maritime
Boundaries, n. 1, vol. I (Charney and Alexander), p. xxxv; Bernard H. Oxman, ‘Political,
Strategic, and Historical Considerations’ in Charney et al., International Maritime
Boundaries, n. 1, vol. I (Charney and Alexander), pp. 3–40, in particular pp. 24, 25;
p. 13 (‘It is often difficult to discern what, if any, effect political considerations had on the
location of an agreed maritime boundary’); p. 39 (‘It is often difficult to demonstrate what
particular influence political factors have on the precise location of a specific boundary’).
70 See Erik Franck, ‘Baltic Sea Boundaries’ in Charney et al., International Maritime
Boundaries, n. 1, vol. V (Colson and Smith), p. 3508.
71 Greece–Turkey: Agreement on Procedures for Negotiation of Aegean Continental Shelf
Issue (Done at Berne, 11 November 1976) (1977) 16 ILM 13; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 3. See Chapter 12.
72 See Pål Jakob Aasen, ‘The Law of Maritime Delimitation and the
Russian–Norwegian Maritime Boundary Dispute’, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, February
2010, www.fni.no/publ/marine.html#pja (last accessed 1 February 2012). The boundary
was eventually settled by agreement on 27 April 2010, Denis Dyomkin, Gwladys Fouche,
‘UPDATE 1 – Russia and Norway reach Barents Sea border deal, 27 April 2010 Reuters,
www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE63Q14D20100427?type=marketsNews (last accessed
27 April 2010); Wikipidia, n. 48.
250 the new boundaries
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may prevent the solution even under simple geographical configurations.
73 There is some evidence that the model of equidistance, as applied
as a rule of delimitation in negotiations, plays a significant part in these
failures on a technical level. Equidistance tends to frustrate other
approaches and models, particularly schemes of co-operation, because
it tends to prejudice negotiations. States are inclined not only to start
negotiations on the basis of equidistance, but then to stick to it as a basis
for a settlement without flexibility. Typically, one party, relying on the
widespread use of equidistance in state practice, invokes this method and
then shows little readiness to discuss other approaches or substantial
modifications claimed by the other party under the title of special circumstances.
Thus, while one party sticks to the narrow line of equidistance,
the other is left without much guidance, and is therefore in a
weaker negotiating position. This tends to result in its subsequent withdrawal
from the negotiating process, as the weaker party then prefers to
leave the dispute unresolved. Examples of this dynamic are easily found
in history. In one instance it was reported that no agreement was reached
in the Baltic Sea between Norway and the Soviet Union (Russia) because
Norway insisted on applying a strict equidistance approach and the
Soviet Union claimed, under special circumstances, a more westerly
boundary due to their important naval facilities at Kola Peninsula.74
Similarly, negotiations between Greece and Turkey, pending for many
years, broke down because of Greece’s insistence on the median line,
taking full account of the Greek islands.75 In the dispute between Canada
and France over the maritime areas around the Island of St. Pierre et
Miquelon, France at first insisted on the application of strict equidistance.
It is reported that a provisional agreement was only reached in
1972, after this claim was modified in return for substantial special access
73 John R. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (London: Methuen,
2004), pp. 384–92; see also the assessments of the general relationships of any states
concerned in the reports in Charneyet al., International Maritime Boundaries, 5 vols., n. 1.
74 For a detailed account see Aason, n. 72; Kim Traavik and Willy Ostreng, ‘Security and
Ocean Law: Norway and the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea’ (1977) 4 Ocean
Development & International Law, 343; Willy Ostreng, ‘Norwegen und die Sovietunion
in der Barentsee’ (1980) 35 Europa Archiv, 711. In 1987, it was reported that Norwegian
satellite-controlled exploration buoys disappeared, allegedly removed by the
Soviet Union, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3 September 1987, No. 203, p. 3 col. 3.
75 See Prescott, n. 73, pp. 215 ff.; see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 45, para. 109.
state practice 251
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rights off the Canadian coast and in the Gulf of St Lawrence.76
Negotiations, however, failed with regard to the boundaries off the
south and west coasts, and it was necessary to revert to arbitration.
In conclusion, equidistance and the median line are successful
approaches as long as both or all of the parties involved regard their
interests to be sufficiently protected by this model, and negotiations are
limited to smaller or larger modifications of that line. However, in cases
of fundamental differences, the approaches tend to act as catalysts of
logjams and breakdowns. Thus, what is on the face of it a clear and welldefined
legal model at times rather complicates the process of maritime
boundary negotiations and settlement.77 In shaping appropriate
approaches, legal principles and rules of maritime boundary delimitation,
it will therefore be appropriate to take into account not merely
quantitative elements, but also the qualitative elements of the different
models. In addition to the findings that more than half of all agreements
somehow deviate from equidistance, due account must be given to the
primary goal that legal principles and rules should be able to assist
foremost in the solution of complex cases and protracted negotiations.
III. The functional approach in co-operation agreements
Schemes of co-operation are a significant aspect of state practice related
to the allocation of marine resources. Pioneered by the Arabian Gulf
states, the concept of co-operation in the exploitation of mineral and
living resources is more advanced in treaty practice than legal discussions
on general maritime boundary law seem to suggest.78 Agreements
76 See Clive R. Symmons, ‘The Canadian 200 mile Fishery Limit and the Delimitation of
Maritime Zones around St. Pierre and Miquelon’ (1980) 12 Ottawa Law Review, 145;
Anglo-French Channel arbitration, Chapter I, notes 39, 88, para. 77; Charney et al.,
International Maritime Boundaries, n. 1, vol. I (Charney and Alexander), Report
Number 1-2, pp. 387, 389.
77 The point is further elaborated in Chapter 6 et passim.
78 For the most part, general treatises on maritime boundaries have not dealt with cooperation
arrangements and their implementation in a very systematic manner; cf. Jagota,
n. 57; Prescott n. 73; Marques Antunes, Towards the Conceptualisation of Maritime
Delimitation: Legal and Technical Aspects of a Political Process (Leiden: Brill Academic
Publishers, 2003); see, however, Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the
Law of Maritime Delimitation, (Oxford: Hart, 2006). More specifically see Thomas
A. Mensah, ‘Joint Development Zones as an Alternative Dispute Settlement Approach
in Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ in Rainer Lagoni and Daniel Vignes (eds.), Maritime
Delimitation (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2006), p. 143; Sun Pyo Kim, Maritime
Delimitation and Interim Arrangements in North East Asia (Dordrecht: Martinus
252 the new boundaries
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Annex 125
R. Kolb, Good Faith in International Law (Hart 2017) pp. 92–5.
Good Faith in
International Law
Robert Kolb
OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON
2017
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Good Faith and Acquiescence 89
207 See correctly JD Sicault , ‘ Du caract è re obligatoire des engagements unilat é raux en droit international
public ’ ( 1979 ) 83 RGDIP , 684 : ‘ La confi ance dont il s ’ agit ici n ’ est pas, en effet, la confi ance
effective des destinataires de la promesse ( reliance ) mais la confi ance qu ’ ils doivent pouvoir avoir dans
le caract è re obligatoire de la promesse ’ .
the promise. 207 This is a judgment based on reasonableness rather than on effectiveness.
To be sure, both criteria can be useful according to the concrete legal
question posed; but the objective criterion is the one interesting us here.
The next question is which doctrine of legitimate protection applies in this context
? The stricter one centred upon estoppel, or the larger one centred directly
upon good faith ? Both legal instruments are based on the protection of legitimate
expectations, ie ultimately on the principle of good faith. But estoppel is a more
special doctrine, supposing a ‘ detrimental reliance ’ by the addressees in the specifi
c case. For the reasons exposed above, the binding force of legal acts such as
promises cannot be based on the idiosyncratic reactions of single members of the
international society. For this reason, the ICJ in the Nuclear Test cases was right to
entirely forgo the notion of estoppel and to rely on the larger notion of good faith.
Overall, it can be seen that the foundation of the binding force of unilateral
legal acts which have a law-creating effect relies importantly on the notion of good
faith-reliance. The aim of the principle is to explain the basis of the legal obligation
and also the precise extent to which such an act can be said to be legally binding.
The intention to confer a binding force to such an act is the starting point of a
positive law analysis. But this criterion has to be integrated in a larger whole, taking
into account the extent to which third states or other addressees could rely on
the assertions made. In case of incongruence between the two circles, will and reliance,
the latter shall prevail and create obligations even where the real will could
not be established. This ‘ surplus ’ of obligation is the most distinctive effect of good
faith in the context of unilateral acts. It also shows once more that it is wrong to
claim that good faith does not create obligations where there existed none before.
XI. Good Faith and Acquiescence
Legal life is dominated by innumerable facts. The legal order must establish which
of these facts have what effect. In a decentralised society such as the one regulated
by international law, where the law shifts and metabolises by a continuous
exchange of demands and responses rather than by centralised legislative acts and
regular judicial qualifi cations, the disorder created by facts is greater than in the
more signifi cantly tamed municipal legal order. In international law, ‘ facts ’ will
not normally be opposable to subjects of the law, unless accepted by them. Their
sovereignty precludes the possibility to bind states to facts which they have not
contributed to produce or which they have not recognised. In this context, the
90 Good Faith and the Sources
208 On acquiescence in international law, see notably: A Cavaglieri , ‘ Il decorso del tempo ed i suoi
effetti sui rapporti giuridici internazionali ’ ( 1926 ) 18 RDI 169ff, 184ff ; IC McGibbon , ‘ The Scope of
Acquiescence in International Law ’ ( 1954 ) 31 BYIL 143ff ; DW Bowett , ‘ Estoppel Before International
Law and its Relations to Acquiescence ’ ( 1957 ) 33 BYIL 197ff ; IC McGibbon , ‘ Customary International
Law and Acquiescence ’ ( 1957 ) 33 BYIL 115ff ; G Sperduti , ‘ Prescrizione, consuetudine, acquiescenza ’
( 1961 ) 44 RDI 3ff ; M Waelbroeck , ‘ L ’ acquiescement en droit des gens ’ ( 1961 ) 44 RDI 38ff ; KJ Partsch ,
‘ Qualifi ziertes Stillschweigen ’ in K Strupp and HJ Schlochauer (eds), W ö rterbuch des V ö lkerrechts , vol
III ( Berlin , 1962 ) 391 – 92 ; J Bentz , ‘ Le silence comme manifestation de volont é en droit international
public ’ ( 1963 ) 67 RGDIP 44ff ; J Barale , ‘ L ’ acquiescement dans la jurisprudence internationale ’ ( 1965 )
11 AFDI 389ff ; P Cahier , ‘ Le comportement des Etats comme source de droits et d ’ obligations ’ , Essays
in Honor of P Guggenheim ( Geneva , 1968 ) 237ff ; FV Kramer , ‘ Actos convencionales y no convencionales
— Ratifi caci ó n, acquiescencia y estopell ’ , Essays in Honor of E Jim é nez de Ar é chaga (El derecho
internacional en un mundo en transformaci ó n) , vol II ( Montevideo , 1994 ) 963ff ; I Sinclair , ‘ Estoppel
and Acquiescence ’ Essays in Honor of RY Jennings ( Cambridge , 1996 ) 104ff ; H Das , ‘ L ’ estoppel et
l ’ acquiescement: assimilations pragmatiques et divergences conceptuelles ’ ( 1997 ) 30 RBDI 607ff ; NS
Marques Antunes , ‘ Acquiescence ’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law , vol I ( Oxford , 2012 ) 53ff . See further: H Lauterpacht , ‘ Sovereignty over Submarine Areas ’
( 1950 ) 27 BYIL 393ff ; GG Fitzmaurice , ‘ The Law and Procedure of the ICJ, 1951 – 54 : General Principles
and Sources of Law ’ ( 1953 ) 30 BYIL 27ff ; E Suy , Les actes juridiques unilat é raux en droit international
public ( Paris , 1962 ) 61ff ; RY Jennings , The Acquisition of Territory in International Law ( Manchester ,
1963 ) 36ff ; G Venturini , ‘ La port é e et les effets juridiques des attitudes et des actes unilat é raux des
Etats ’ ( 1964-II ) 112 RCADI 374ff ; YZ Blum , Historic Titles in International Law ( The Hague , 1965 ) 38ff,
129ff ; G Zimmer , Gewaltsame territoriale Ver ä nderungen und ihre v ö lkerrechtliche Legitimation ( Berlin ,
1971 ) 31ff ; JP Jacqu é , É l é ments pour une th é orie de l ’ acte juridique en droit international public ( Paris ,
1972 ) 210ff ; W Karl , Vertrag und sp ä tere Praxis im V ö lkerrecht ( Berlin , 1983 ) 276ff ; H Thirlway , ‘ The
Law and Procedure of the ICJ (1960 – 1989) : General Principles and Sources of Law ’ ( 1989 ) 60 BYIL
29ff ; VD Degan , S ources of International Law (T he Hague, 1 997) 3 48ff; M K ohen, P ossession contesté e
et souverainet é territoriale ( Paris , 1997 ) 355 – 56 ; G Distefano , L ’ ordre international entre l é galit é et effectivit
é ( Geneva , 2002 ) 201ff ; C Tams , ‘ Waiver, Acquiescence and Extinctive Prescription ’ in J Crawford ,
A Pellet and S Olleson (eds), T he Law of International Responsibility (O xford, 2 010) 1 035ff. In the
context of good faith, see in particular: M ü ller, Vertrauensschutz 35ff; Kolb, Bonne 339ff. See also the
study of PCW Chan , ‘ Acquiescence and Estoppel in International Boundaries : Temple of Preah Vihear
Revisited ’ ( 2004 ) 3 Chinese Journal of International Law 421ff .
209 See eg Blum, op cit, 131 – 32; A Orakhelashvili , Peremptory Norms in International Law ( Oxford ,
2006 ) 398ff .
210 See eg A Cavaglieri , ‘ Il decorso del tempo ed i suoi effetti sui rapporti giuridici internazionali ’
( 1926 ) 18 RDI 188ff .
doctrine of normative acquiescence 208 has an eminent role to play as an alternative
to formal and express recognition. It creates a device for the opposability of
facts to a subject and therefore oils and smoothens the wheels of the international
legal order.
There are different concepts of acquiescence. At the lowest level, acquiescence
may simply mean an express or tacit acceptance. 209 It is then designating a real
or fi ctional expression of will. The concept here is synonymous to ‘ consent ’ or to
‘ recognition ’ . It is certainly better to avoid the term ‘ acquiescence ’ in this context
so as to prevent any confusion; the better word here is clearly consent. There are
also authors 210 considering acquiescence as part and parcel of a complex set of
presumptions of acceptance. Thus, for example, silence in the face of a mandatory
notifi cation of facts is tantamount to acceptance; if the notifi cation was merely
optional, there is no more than a rebuttable presumption of acceptance; if a state
Good Faith and Acquiescence 91
211 G Cansacchi , La notifi cazione internazionale ( Milan , 1943 ) 285 – 86 .
212 JP M ü ller and T Cottier, ‘ Acquiescence ’ in EPIL (2nd edn), vol 7, p 5. In the words of G Sperduti,
‘ Prescrizione, consuetudine e acquiescenza in diritto internazionale ’ (1961) 44 RDI 8: ‘ l ’ acquiescenza è
un comportamento pratico che si limita ad attestare l ’ assenza di volont à contraria ad un ’ altrui pretesa
o ad una certa situazione quando, tenuto conto delle circostanze del caso, ed anzitutto della pubblicit à
della pretesa e della notoriet à della situazione, era da attendersi la manifestazione … di una volont à
contraria … ’ .
213 H Lauterpacht , ‘ Sovereignty over Submarine Areas ’ ( 1950 ) 27 BYIL 395 – 96 : ‘ The far-reaching
effect of the failure to protest is not a mere artifi ciality of the law. It is an essential requirement of
stability — a requirement even more important in the international than in other spheres; it is a precept
of fair dealing in as much as it prevents States from playing fast and loose with situations affecting
others; and it is in accordance with equity in as much as it protects a State from the contingency of
incurring responsibilities and expense, in reliance on the apparent acquiescence of others, and being
subsequently confronted with a challenge on the part of those very States ’ .
214 M ü ller, Vertrauensschutz 38 – 39. See also the precise words of ML Alaimo , ‘ Natura del consenso
nell ’ illecito internazionale ’ ( 1982 ) 65 RDI 269 : ‘ Tutte le volte in cui viva è apparsa la preoccupazione
di considerare prevalente il comportamento anteriore di uno Stato rispetto a quello successivamente
tenuto … si è fatto ricorso al principio generale della buona fede, intesa nel senso oggettivo di
affi damento. L ’ esigenza della certezza del diritto nelle relazioni internazionali ha comunque indotto la
giurisprudenza a ritenere preminente la circostanza che uno Stato ha lasciato sorgere da un certo suo
comportamento l ’ affi damento di un altro Stato piuttosto che ricercare l ’ eventuale coincidenza fra quel
comportamento ed un ’ effettiva volont à ’ .
215 Corpus iuris canonici, Liber Sextus , regula iuris 43. See Dig 19, 2, 13, § 11 (Ulpien). Is, qui tacet,
non fatetur sed nec utique negare videtur ( Liber Sextus, regula 46; Dig , 50, 17, 142, Paulus).
has accidental knowledge of a fact, its acceptance of that fact by silence depends
upon the circumstances and there is at best a reasonable presumption of acceptance
in case of silence. It must however be said that there are no precise norms
of international law establishing such presumptions. 211 The system of presumptions
thus presented hardly deserves that name. It is at best a set of elements for
interpretation.
The notion of acquiescence which interests us here has been aptly defi ned in
the following terms: ‘ [proposition] of binding effect resulting from passivity and
inaction with respect to foreign claims which, according to the general practice
of States usually call for protest in order to assert, preserve or safeguard rights ’ . 212
In other words, acquiescence is a principle of law attributing certain effects to
silence when certain conditions are met, and not the mere fact of consent. It is
a doctrine of ‘ qualifi ed silence ’ , ie of silence to which legal effects are attributed.
These legal effects fl ow from the need of a proper functioning of the legal order,
and in particular from the necessity of some stability of legal relations, 213 and
most importantly also from the need of protecting legitimate expectations of the
actors of the international arena. 214 Whence: qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui
potuisset ac debuisset . 215 The reader will notice that this type of acquiescence is not
based on a legal act; it is not an expression of will. Therefore, a real will of a subject
to accept the facts at stake is not required. Rather, this type of acquiescence is
based on a legal norm which imputes to a subject the consequences which would
have fl own from its acceptance of a set of facts when this subject has remained
silent for a prolonged time once confronted with these facts and where there was
92 Good Faith and the Sources
216 Thus, if the period of time may be short, it cannot be entirely absent. There is no ‘ instant
acquiescence ’ . If there indeed is an instantaneous ‘ acquiescence ’ this is tantamount to fi nding a tacit consent.
Notice however that ‘ instantaneous acquiescence ’ has sometimes been sustained: see eg JP M ü ller
and T Cottier, ‘ Acquiescence ’ in Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn) vol 7 (1984) 6.
217 See RY Jennings , The Acquisition of Territory in International Law ( Manchester , 1963 ) 36ff ; DHN
Johnson , ‘ Acquisitive Prescription in International Law ’ ( 1950 ) 27 BYIL 347 – 48 .
a legal duty to react in order to uphold the position of non-opposability of these
facts. Acquiescence taken in this sense is consequently normative: it is a legal norm
fl owing from the principle of good faith-reliance and accepted as a free-standing
rule of international law in relevant practice. It is therefore appropriate to call it a
doctrine of ‘ normative acquiescence ’ , in contradistinction to acquiescence as a real
consent. Plainly, if the word ‘ acquiescence ’ was not frequently used to mean a form
of consent, it would be superfl uous to add the epithet ‘ normative ’ to it. Since that
is not the case, the epithet is not unnecessary.
This doctrine of ‘ qualifi ed silence ’ operates through the conjunction of three
legal elements: time (prolonged silence), knowledge of the facts and duty to speak.
A. Time
The backbone of acquiescence lies in the prolonged silence or passivity opposed
to the claims of another subject. Thus, the time-dimension is an essential element
of the principle. 216 The loss of subjective rights induced by its application is justifi
ed only because some fault can be imputed to the passive subject: it had time
to react but did not do it; there was moreover a duty to react, and it was not
honoured; the reliance and stability thus created shall not now, after considerable
time has elapsed, be disturbed. In this sense, acquiescence is often linked to legal
processes such as prescription, the consolidation of imperfect titles and the emergence
of local customary law. 217 The amount of time required for the operation
of the principle depends on the circumstances. There is a certain length of time
which must pass; but the exact amount of time required varies according to factors
such as:
(i) the frequency and intensity of the conduct to be opposed (the greater it
is, the quicker a reaction can be reasonably expected);
(ii) the nature of the legal relationship and the degree to which the need of stability,
security and confi dence is felt within that relationship (the greater
these needs and the quicker a reaction is necessary: eg close ties of cooperation
versus loose obligations of coexistence);
(iii) the importance of the interests and rights at stake (the greater their importance,
the more time may be required: eg sensitive territorial rights, eg
important amounts of investment made);
(iv) the intensity of the relationship between the parties (the closer it is and the
more quickly a protest may be necessary: eg neighbouring relations);
Good Faith and Acquiescence 93
218 On such factors, see P Reuter , ‘ Pleadings for Cambodia, Temple of Preah Vihear case ’ ( 1962 ) I ICJ
Pleadings 203 ; M ü ller, Vertrauensschutz 39; G Sperduti , ‘ Prescrizione, consuetudine e acquiescenza in
diritto internazionale ’ ( 1961 ) 44 RDI 9 .
219 G Schwarzenberger , ‘ The Fundamental Principles of International Law ’ ( 1955-I ) 87 RCADI 257 :
‘ With the passing of time, the probability that passivity means acquiescence increases ’ .
220 See Temple of Preah Vihear (1962) ICJ Reports 6ff. On this case in our context: M ü ller,
Vertrauensschutz 22ff; JP Cot , ‘ L ’ affaire du Temple de Pr é ah Vih é ar (fond) ’ ( 1962 ) 8 AFDI 217ff ;
E Pecourt Garcia , ‘ El principio del ‘ estoppel ’ y la sentencia del Tribunal Internacional de Justicia en el
caso del Templo de Preah Vihear ’ ( 1963 ) 16 REDI 153ff ; JHW Verzijl , ‘ Case Concerning the Temple of
Pr é ah Vih é ar ’ ( 1962 ) 9 NTIR 238 .
221 Norwegian Fisheries case (1951) ICJ Reports 138 – 39. In particular, the UK has not protested
against these limits from 1869 to 1933.
222 Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain (1960) ICJ Reports 203, 210ff, the period spanning
from 1906 to 1912.
223 Temple of Preah Vihear (1962) ICJ Reports 23, 27ff, the period spanning from 1908 to 1958.
224 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia, Preliminary Objections) (2007-II) ICJ
Reports 859, § 79 – 80.
(v) the effective knowledge of the facts rather than the constructive knowledge
of the fact (calling for a quicker reaction, eg when a state has been put on
notice by a diplomatic note). 218
In a curious ontogenesis, time itself becomes a relevant factor: the more it has
already elapsed, and the stronger the acquiescence argument. 219 Overall, the acid
test is whether at a given time a legitimate expectation in the consolidation of the
attitude has emerged, or alternatively whether it would now appear abusive to
allow a party which for that time had been silent to now change its attitude to the
detriment of the other party/ies. It has also to be noted that in practice most often
a set of actions and deeds is added to a set of abstentions and passivity. The deeds
may reinforce the legal meaning of passivity: eg, if a boundary is not only not
protested against, but certain offi cial visits take place, compliments are exchanged,
etc., acquiescence appears to be all the more established. 220
Some examples of the case law may now be given. First, in the Norwegian Fisheries
case (1951), the peculiar system of maritime boundaries practised by Norway had
been the object of a general tolerance for more than 60 years. 221 This state of affairs
was suffi cient to fi nd an acquiescence. Second, in the Arbitral Award Made by the
King of Spain case (1960), it was held that the validity of an arbitral award could
not be impugned after six years of silence accompanied by many acts signalling its
positive acceptance. 222 Third, in the Temple of Preah Vihear case (1962), the silence
in the face of a boundary drawn contrary to the relevant provision in the delimitation
treaty was considered to have been accepted, through a tolerance of more
than 50 years. 223 Fourth, in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case ( Nicaragua
v Colombia , Preliminary Objections, 2007), Nicaragua had been silent for more
than 50 years on the validity of a treaty. It had at the same time conducted itself
in a way which was incompatible with a belief that the treaty was void. Hence its
claim that the treaty was invalid could not be heard. 224 In the fi rst case ( Norwegian
Fisheries ), the passivity had been upheld for a very long time; thus, a legitimate
expectation in the acceptance could build up. In the second case ( King of Spain ),
94 Good Faith and the Sources
225 Expedit rei publicae, ut fi nis sit litium: Codex Justinianum , 7, 52, 2, Caracalla.
226 See eg M ü ller, Vertrauensschutz 41; J Bentz , ‘ Le silence comme manifestation de volont é en droit
international public ’ ( 1963 ) 67 RGDIP 86ff ; J Barale , ‘ L ’ acquiescement dans la jurisprudence internationale
’ ( 1965 ) 11 AFDI 402ff ; contra , with hardly convincing arguments, P Cahier , ‘ Le comportement
des Etats comme source de droits et d ’ obligations ’ , Essays in Honor of P Guggenheim ( Geneva , 1968 )
237ff . For many further references, see Kolb, Bonne 346.
227 Norwegian Fisheries case (1951) ICJ Reports 139. See also, in support of that position, Separate
Opinion Alvarez, ibid, 152 and Dissenting Opinion McNair, ibid, 171ff.
the validity of an arbitral award was at stake; the needs of stability are at their
apogee with regard to such legal acts; 225 and therefore, a relatively short period
of passivity, but also accompanying deeds, appeared to be entirely suffi cient to
allow the argument of acquiescence. In the third case ( Preah Vihear ), the passivity
was accompanied by a series of active deeds, which pointed in the same direction,
namely acceptance; thus, fi fty years seemed a time long enough to build up a legitimate
expectation, even if in this case national territory (ie a sensitive matter) was
at stake. The same is true for the fourth case ( Territorial and Maritime Dispute ).
B. Knowledge of the Facts
It is reasonable and fair to expect a reaction to facts (and also to sanction passivity)
only when a subject has knowledge of those facts. If it had not, it could not
be expected to react. This is the main meaning of the formula si loqui potuisset :
one can speak only if one knows the underlying facts. However, a subject may
not protect its rights by simply failing to take notice of the facts surrounding it.
Thus, according to a signifi cant doctrinal opinion, the silence remains imputable
to a subject if it should have known the facts by using the usual standards of due
diligence (presence of non-excusable negligence). 226 To the real knowledge of facts
is thus added the ‘ constructive knowledge ’ of facts. Both lead to an imputation of
silence and to the operation of normative acquiescence. Notice that the addition
of constructive knowledge is itself a matter of good faith: it would be preposterous
to allow a subject to plead its ignorance of the facts if that ignorance is due to
its proper fault (no one can take advantage of its own fault). Such a course would
moreover incentive the subjects not to take cognisance of international facts — a
truly inappropriate doctrine for international affairs. A precedent for constructive
knowledge can be found in the famous Norwegian Fisheries case (1951). To
the argument of acquiescence presented by Norway, the UK had responded with
the argument that it had ignored the particular system of baselines practised by
Norway. The Court had this to respond:
The Court is unable to accept this view. As a coastal State on the North Sea, greatly interested
in the fi sheries in this area, as a maritime Power traditionally concerned with the
law of the sea and concerned particularly to defend the freedom of the seas, the United
Kingdom could not have been ignorant of the Decree of 1869 which had at once provoked
a request for explanations by the French Government. 227
Good Faith and Acquiescence 95
228 Territorial Dispute (Eritrea v Yemen) ( 1998 ) 114 ILR 102.
229 ibid.
230 Such a rule has however been — rarely — upheld: see eg J Kunz , ‘ Protest ’ in: K Strupp (ed),
W ö rterbuch des V ö lkerrechts , vol II ( Berlin , 1924 ) 329 . Contra , rightly, D Anzilotti , Corso di diritto internazionale
( Rome , 1928 ) 309 .
231 See the many references in Kolb, Bonne 347. See the Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan case (2002)
ICJ Reports 650, § 48, the Court holding that the UK had no duty to react when a document had not
been offi cially communicated to it. By the same token, a state has no duty to protest against maps
deprived of probative value: see Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (2007-II) ICJ Reports 692, § 97, argument of Nicaragua. Contrariwise, silence kept
during the negotiations of a peace treaty on the issue of reparations can be interpreted as a waiver: see
P d ’ Argent , Les r é parations de guerre en droit international public ( Brussels , 2005 ) 224 , fn 757, for the
‘ 2 + 4 Treaty ’ on Germany (1990). If a state fails to object to a certain course of conduct, but indicates
that in its view the question is not yet settled, no acquiescence can be derived: Polish Postal Service at
Danzig advisory opinion (1925) PCIJ ser B, no 11, pp 31 – 32.
The due diligence standard is evidently open to contextual interpretation. Could
the standard of negligence be softened when a state is generally underdeveloped
and when it is moreover in the midst of a bloody civil war ? This had been pleaded
in the Territorial Dispute (Eritrea v Yemen) case (1998). 228 This precedent tends to
show that tribunals will be slow to lower the applicable standard, so much as there
is a need for a certain international stability. The fault of ignorance will be extinguished
only when there is some force majeure or material impossibility which
can be shown to the satisfaction of the judge or arbitrator ( ad impossibile nemo
tenetur ). An improper organisation of the state is thus not an argument for dispensing
that state from the internationally applicable legal duties. A civil war or
other events of the same type may certainly be more easily be accepted as excuses
under the mentioned standards, but as such they are not recognised as factors
inhibiting the operation of the doctrine of normative acquiescence. If no constructive
knowledge is imputed, and if there is no real knowledge of facts, the silence
will not lead to an acquiescence. Ultimately, the arbitral tribunal in the Territorial
Dispute case accepted constructive knowledge with regard to a published Petroleum
Agreement between Yemen and Shell, since ‘ with a suffi cient diligence it
could have been known to Ethiopia ’ , which however failed to issue a protest. 229 The
argument that Ethiopia was a poor country ridden by civil war did not alter this
fi nding. This precedent thus perfectly fi ts the Norwegian Fisheries jurisprudence.
C. Silence in Face of a Duty to React
There is no general rule in international law according to which each silence leads
to acquiescence. 230 In other words, acquiescence attaches legal consequences not
to silence in general, but to a ‘ qualifi ed silence ’ , ie to a silence held although there
was a legal duty to react in order to protect one ’ s own rights. 231 The silence is
relevant si loqui potuisset ac debuisset ; note the conjunctive in the past, ‘ if it could
and should have spoken ’ at the relevant time in the past (and not: si loqui debuit ac
96 Good Faith and the Sources
232 H Lauterpacht , ‘ Sovereignty over Submarine Areas ’ ( 1950 ) 27 BYIL 393ff . See the Palmas case
(1928) II RIAA 866; Honduras Boundaries ( 1933 ) II RIAA 1327ff; Pensions of Offi cials of the Saar
Territory (1934) III RIAA 1563; Venezuelan Preferential Rights ( 1904 ) IX RIAA 109; Fabiani (1905) X
RIAA 120; the Cravairola Alp case, in H La Fontaine , Pasicrisie internationale ( Bern , 1902 ) 208 .
233 See J Klabbers , An Introduction to International Institutional Law , 2nd edn ( Cambridge , 2009 )
199 – 200 .
234 ‘ [A] reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection
to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notifi ed of the reservation or
by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is the later ’ . See the
short commentary in ME Villiger , Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
( Leiden , 2009 ) 293 .
235 See, under the old art 69 of the Rules of Court of 1948, the Barcelona Traction case (New Application,
Preliminary Objections), (1964) ICJ Reports 20.
236 See the Legal Note of the Swiss Directorate of Public International Law to the Department of
Foreign Affairs, 2 December 1980, (1981) 37 ASDI 263.
237 See CW Jenks , ‘ The Interpretation of International Labour Conventions by the International
Labour Offi ce ’ ( 1939 ) 20 BYIL 133 ; CW Jenks , ‘ The Corpus Iuris of Social Justice ’ in: CW Jenks , Law,
Freedom and Welfare ( London and New York , 1963 ) 121 – 22 ; N Valticos , Droit international du travail ,
2nd edn ( Paris , 1983 ) 134 – 35 .
238 J Bentz , ‘ Le silence comme manifestation de volont é en droit international public ’ ( 1963 ) 67
RGDIP 59 .
potuit , ‘ if it could and should speak ’ now). The silence is relevant only if there is a
legal duty to oppose a claim or to react to an adverse fact by way of protest. 232 Customary
international law provides for such a duty to react in three cases. The fi rst
two cases are based on specifi c norms while the last is based on a general clause.
— F irst, the duty to react can be based on a norm contained in a treaty, eg in
opting out-systems, 233 or article 20, § 5, of the VCLT of 1969 requiring a
reaction to a reservation within 12 months if some other treaty party does
not want to accept it. 234 Similarly, under article 89, § 2, of the Rules of Court
(1978), the ICJ shall in some circumstances fi x a time-limit within which the
respondent may state whether it opposes a discontinuance of the proceedings;
if there is no objection before the expiration of that time-limit, acquiescence
will be presumed. 235 Still, article 5, § 1, of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, stipulates that absence of objection to the
multiple accreditation of a diplomat within a reasonable time is tantamount
to acquiescence. 236
— S econd, such a duty may fl ow from some generally accepted practice within
an institutional setting. Thus, the interpretations of the Secretariat of the ILO
on international conventions on labour, communicated to the member states,
are considered to have been accepted by the latter if there is no objection. 237
— Third, the duty to react can fl ow directly from general international law under
the aegis of the principle of good faith. 238 There is such a duty to react each
time, according to the circumstances, it appears to be contrary to good faith
to keep silent and thereafter to claim that certain facts cannot be opposed to
Good Faith and Acquiescence 97
239 See eg M Akehurst , ‘ Custom as a Source of International Law ’ ( 1974/75 ) 47 BYIL 40 ; L Oppenheim
( R Jennings and A Watts , eds), International Law , 9th edn ( London , 1992 ) 1195 .
240 See the Mount Fitzroy Boundary (Argentina/Chile) ( 1994 ) 113 ILR 78 – 79.
241 Temple (1962) ICJ Reports 23.
242 Thus, for example, the doctrine of acquiescence cannot be applied to the UN Security Council.
The fact that the Council does not react to an armed aggression does not mean that it acquiesces into
it; the Council may just be impeded to speak out by a veto, possibly that of the state being itself the
aggressor. See Y Dinstein , War, Aggression, Self-Defense , 3rd edn ( Cambridge , 2001 ) 272 .
oneself. There are different contextual factors to be considered in establishing
this duty:
(i) the past pattern of conduct of the concerned state, which can lead to
a legitimate expectation that in similar circumstances a similar attitude
will be followed, eg that a protest will be voiced where it had been
analogously voiced in the past;
(ii) the nature of the legal relationship, when the need of legal stability and
certainty is particularly important as for example for the validity of
arbitral awards;
(iii) the closeness of the relations of the parties between or among themselves,
which can sharpen the expectations (eg neighbourhood, alliances,
vassalage, etc);
(iv) the importance and gravity of the interests at stake for the third state,
eg when the latter engages in onerous and intense activities in the belief
of the existence of its rights;
(v) if the claim of a third entity affects the legally protected interests of
another subject of law there is a duty to react. 239
— A s can be seen, these factors correspond in part to the ones which are to be
taken into account for the computation of the relevant time-span for admitting
an acquiescence. Notice that there is no duty to react if and when the
attitude of the other subject of law remains ambiguous, unclear and uncertain.
A protest may here be entered ex abundante cautela , but there is no legal
disadvantage if none is made. A protest could not be expected in good faith
in the face of such an unclear attitude. 240
In the formula si loqui potuisset ac debuisset (which the ICJ used in the Temple case
of 1962), 241 there are two limbs: can and shall. The ‘ can ’ refers to the knowledge
of the relevant facts (see above) but also to the absence of coercion. If there is
coercion or impossibility, 242 a subject cannot speak (freely); and thus the silence
will not be imputed to that subject for the purposes of an acquiescence. It would
also be possible to say that in such cases there is simply no duty to speak out. The
second term is ‘ shall ’ . This is the truly controlling concept. It explains that we are
dealing here with a normative doctrine, not simply with a tacit but real intent.
Thus, for example, a state must not react to a writ from a municipal tribunal to
appear, since it can rely on the general understanding that it is the matter of the
territorial state to respect its jurisdictional immunities. Silence in face of the summation
to appear cannot therefore be interpreted as acquiescence. There cannot
98 Good Faith and the Sources
243 See eg H Damian , Staatenimmunit ä t und Gerichtszwang ( Berlin , 1985 ) 40 .
244 Grisbadarna ( 1909 ) XI RIAA 147ff.
245 Norwegian Fisheries (1951) ICJ Reports 139.
246 On the stability of boundaries, see G Abi-Saab , ‘ La p é rennit é des fronti è res en droit international
’ ( 1990 ) 64 Relations internationales 341ff . For a critical analysis, see G Giraudeau , Les diff é rends
territoriaux devant le juge international, Entre droit et transaction ( Leiden , 2013 ) 281ff .
247 Territorial Dispute ( 1998 ) 114 ILR 84, § 306.
248 A D ’ Amato , The Concept of Custom in International Law ( Ithaca NY , 1971 ) 195 – 96 .
249 See eg the argument of France (through A Gros) in the Minquiers and Ercrehos case, (1953) II ICJ
Pleadings 261ff (he however also quotes some protests).
250 As has been rightly noted: ‘ La concezione dell ’ acquiescenza … comporta che, se acquiescenza si
è avuta, non valga poi a privarla di effi cacia la dimostrazione che essa fu dovuta a questa o quella particolare
ragione ’ : G Sperduti , ‘ Prescrizione, consuetudine, acquiescenza ’ ( 1961 ) 44 RDI 8 .
be any legitimate expectation to that end, and international practice buttresses this
position. 243
International case law illustrates the preceding positions. In the Grisbadarna case
(1909), Sweden ’ s passivity had a particular relevance in regard of the neighbourhood
of the two concerned states and of the considerable investments on the spot made
by Norway. 244 In the Norwegian Fisheries case (1951), the long-standing maritime
power tradition of the UK and its particular interest in the fi sheries of the concerned
region founded — and also increased — the expectation of a reaction on its part. 245
In the already quoted King of Spain Award case of 1960, as well as in the Temple case
of 1962, the duty fl owed from a particular exigency of legal stability with regard to
the arbitral awards on the one side, and the stability of boundaries on the other. 246
A further interesting precedent is the Territorial Dispute arbitration between
Eritrea and Yemen (1998). The duty to react was here qualifi ed by a series of contextual
factors: 247 (i) the remoteness of the island whose sovereignty was contested,
its uninhabited character and the lack of lines of communication near the
island; (ii) the fact that patrols took place at night during darkness; (iii) the fact
that many patrols were conducted at high speed; (iv) the fact that civil hostilities
were in progress. It may be asked whether all these factors really impacted on the
duty to protest (or the signifi cance of lack of protest), or whether they should not
rather have been analysed under the heading of knowledge of the relevant facts.
There are two arguments cautioning for a limitation or for exceptions to this
overall approach on the duty to react. First, it has been argued that states sometimes
abstain from protesting because they know that their protest will be ineffective. 248
This statement manifestly begs the question. In reality, the protest may well be
wholly ineffective in the sense that it is unable to reverse the facts created by some
other entity. But it is not ineffective from the legal point of view, in that it protects
the protesting state from being considered to have acquiesced in the facts. Second,
it has been said that a protest is often omitted in order not to strain the relations
with some other state, eg a powerful ally or enemy, or some other subjectively
important state. 249 But the price to pay for such policy-considerations is the possible
loss of a right through acquiescence. 250 Good faith-reliance is stronger than
equity-considerations related to power, which remain legally elusive. The need
Good Faith and Acquiescence 99
251 PM Eisemann and V Coussirat-Coust è re , Repertory of International Arbitral Jurisprudence , vol I
( Dordrecht , 1991 ) 45 – 46 .
252 Grisbadarna ( 1909 ) XI RIAA 155ff.
253 Palmas ( 1928 ) II RIAA 866. M ü ller, Vertrauensschutz 51ff.
254 Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land ( 1959 ) ICJ Reports 209 .
255 Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain ( 1960 ) ICJ Reports 209, 213 – 14 . See also Separate Opinion
Spender, ibid, 219 – 20; Separate Opinion Urrutia Holgu í n, ibid, 222.
256 Temple of Preah Vihear (1962) ICJ Reports 23 – 24, 32 and Separate Opinion Fitzmaurice, ibid,
62 – 63. M ü ller, Vertrauensschutz 43ff.
257 Rann of Kutch ( 1968 ) 50 ILR 8ff. M ü ller, Vertrauensschutz 48ff.
258 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) ( 1982 ) ICJ Reports 83 – 84, 87 ; Separate Opinion Ago, ibid, 95ff.
259 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area ( 1984 ) ICJ Reports 304 – 05 .
260 Fileting in the Gulf of Saint-Laurent ( 1985 ) 82 ILR 619, § 37. See also Dissenting Opinion
Pharand, ibid, 652, § 47: ‘ France ’ s acceptance and compliance with the Canadian regulatory system
constitutes an acquiescence in that system ’ .
261 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) ( 1992 ) ICJ Reports 408 –
09 , and also 577 – 79, with regard to the island of Meanguera. See E Decaux , ‘ Le diff é rend frontalier
terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras) ’ ( 1992 ) 38 AFDI 409ff, 418ff .
262 See the text of the Treaty, (1960) 54 AJIL 476ff.
263 See Continental Shelf case (Tunisia and Libya) (1982) ICJ Reports 83 – 84, 87; and Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen case (1993) ICJ Reports 53 – 56. See also the
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia arbitration (Second Phase, 2002) 128 ILR 544, § 3.6. For a series of
different maritime activities and estoppel and acquiescence, see the Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago
arbitration (2006) 139 ILR 553 – 54, § 361 – 66.
for clarifi cation and reliance is pre-eminent with respect to the various possible
calculi of foreign policy which a state can make. This is borne out by international
practice, the Temple case of 1962 being authority for that.
International case law is extremely rich with regard to judgments or awards
making some place to acquiescence arguments. For example, the following cases
can be mentioned: Montijo (1875), 251 Grisbadarna (1909), 252 Palmas (1928), 253
Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (1959), 254 Arbitral Award Made by the King
of Spain (1960), 255 Temple of Preah Vihear (1962), 256 Rann of Kutch (1968), 257
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) (1982), 258 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine Area (1984), 259 Fileting in the Gulf of Saint-Laurent (1985), 260
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) (1992); 261 etc.
The norms on acquiescence are not jus cogens . Acquiescence can be altered
by a contrary treaty provision; and it can also be altered by practice of the concerned
states. Thus, article 4, § 2, of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 excludes acts
or omissions (silences) for territorial claims over that continent. The land shall
remain subjected to the regime provided for in the treaty itself. 262 By the same
token, practice has accepted that provisional de facto or modus vivendi lines in
maritime spaces, pending the fi nal delimitation of the boundary, shall not give rise
to binding obligations under the doctrine of acquiescence. If it were otherwise,
no state would any more agree to such provisional lines for fear of being thereafter
trapped. Consequently, the provisional administration and exploitation of
such areas would thus be jeopardised. An acquiescence can however operate as to
the provisional nature of such lines; but it cannot be transformed, if there are no
special circumstances, into an acquiescence as to the fi nal boundary. 263
100 Good Faith and the Sources
264 Territorial Dispute arbitration between Eritrea and Yemen (1998) 114 ILR 84, § 307.
265 ibid, 114, § 438.
266 On the notion of estoppel in international law, see: W Friede , ‘ Das Estoppel-Prinzip im
V ö lkerrecht ’ ( 1935 ) 5 Za ö RV 517ff ; DW Bowett , ‘ Estoppel Before International Tribunals and its
Relations to Acquiescence ’ ( 1957 ) 33 BYIL 176ff ; IC McGibbon , ‘ Estoppel in International Law ’ ( 1958 )
7 ICLQ 468ff ; E Menzel , ‘ Estoppel ’ , in K Strupp and HJ Schlochauer (eds), W ö rterbuch des V ö lkerrechts ,
2nd edn , vol I ( Berlin , 1960 ) 441 – 42 ; F Mosconi , ‘ La dottrina dell ’ estoppel in diritto internazionale ’
( 1962 ) 16 ( 4 ) Diritto internazionale 388ff ; E Pecourt Garcia , ‘ El principio del ‘ estoppel ’ en el derecho
internacional p ú blico ’ ( 1962 ) 15 REDI 98ff ; E Pecourt Garcia , ‘ El principio del ‘ estoppel ’ y la sentencia
del Tribunal internacional de Justicia en el caso del Templo de Preah Vihear ’ ( 1963 ) 16 REDI 153ff ;
JV Louis , ‘ L ’ estoppel devant la Cour internationale de Justice ’ ( 1965 ) 42 Revue de droit international
et de droit compar é 212ff ; M Akehurst , ‘ Le principe de l ’ estoppel en droit administratif international ’
( 1966 ) 92 JDI 285ff ; C Dominic é , ‘ A propos du principe de l ’ estoppel en droit des gens ’ , in Essays in
Honor of P Guggenheim ( Geneva , 1968 ) 327ff ; C Vall é e , ‘ Quelques observations sur l ’ estoppel en droit
des gens ’ ( 1973 ) 77 RGDIP 949ff ; A Martin , L ’ estoppel en droit international public ( Paris , 1979 ) ; YI
Youakim , ‘ Estoppel in International Law ’ ( PhD thesis , Cornell University , Michigan , 1985 ; published
1994 ) ; T N ö cker and G French , ‘ Estoppel : What ’ s the Government ’ s Word Worth? An Analysis of German
Law, Common Law Jurisdiction and of the Practice of International Arbitral Tribunals ’ ( 1990 )
24 International Lawyer 409ff ; FV Kramer , ‘ Actos convencionales y no convencionales — Ratifi caci ó n,
acquiescencia y estopell ’ Essays in Honor of E Jim é nez de Ar é chaga (El derecho internacional en un mundo
en transformaci ó n) , vol II ( Montevideo , 1994 ) 963ff ; C Brown , ‘ A Comparative and Critical Assessment
of Estoppel in International Law ’ ( 1996 ) 50 University of Miami Law Review 369ff ; I Sinclair , ‘ Estoppel
and Acquiescence ’ in Essays in Honor of RY Jennings ( Cambridge , 1996 ) 104ff ; KS O ’ Brien , ‘ Representation
in the Doctrine of Estoppel in International Law ’ ( 2011 ) 3 Irish Yearbook of International Law
69ff ; JP M ü ller and T Cottier , ‘ Estoppel ’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law , vol III ( Oxford , 2012 ) 671ff ; A Kulick , ‘ Estoppel im V ö lkerrecht : Antworten auf drei
dogmatische Fragen ’ ( 2014 ) 52 AVR 522ff ; See also Separate Opinion Alfaro, Temple of Preah Vihear
case (1962) ICJ Reports 39ff; and Concurring Opinion Can ç ado Trindade, Right to Information on
Consular Assistance advisory opinion (1999) 154, ILR 339 – 41 (IACtHR). See further: H Lauterpacht ,
Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law ( London , 1927 ) 203ff ; B Cheng , G eneral Principles
of Law — As Applied by International Courts and Tribunals ( London , 1953 ) 141ff ; H Lauterpacht ,
As a last aspect, it must be noticed that acquiescence can also be used for other
purposes than the one to bind a state to a certain legal position. Thus, the absence
of protest can be a hint that a state does not regard itself as having sovereignty over
a certain land or island, since otherwise it would in all probability have protested
adverse action. 264 Similarly, the failure to protest to some petroleum agreements
of the adverse party may be read by a tribunal as a further element in support for
a median line min the delimitation exercise. 265
Overall, acquiescence is a powerful legal tool for the stabilisation of international
legal relations. It fl ows directly from the genetic code of the principle of
reliance on good faith.
XII. Good Faith and Estoppel
Analogously to acquiescence, estoppel aims at stabilising bilateral legal relationships.
Legitimate expectations deliberately created by some conduct should not
lead to a detriment for the relying party. 266 Contrary to acquiescence, which can be
collective (the Court in the Norwegian Fisheries case of 1951 spoke of the ‘ general
Annex 127
Costa Rica–Nicaragua Boundary (“Cleveland Award”) (1888) 2 J.B. Moore, History and
Digest of the Arbitrations to which the US has been a Party 1945, p. 1961.
CHAPTER XLVII.
THE COSTA RICAIX-NICARAGUAN BOUN-DARY
TREATY OF DECEMBER 24, 1886.
By a treaty concluded December 24, 1886,
Proceeaings. the republics of Costa Rica and Nicaragua
agreed to submit to the President of the United
States. as sole arbitrator, the question which had long been
pending between them as to the validity of the "Treaty of
Limits" of April 15, 1858. The acceptance by the President
of the office of arbitrator was duly solicited by the ministers of
the two republics at Washington, by means of notes addressed
to the Secretary of- State, who on the same day informed them
of the President's compliance.
By one of the provisions of the treaty of arbitration, the
President was authorized to delegate his powers, subject to
the limitation that he should directly participate in the pronouncement
of the final decision. Under this authority the
President on January 16,1888, empowered Mr. George i. Rives,
Assistant Secretary of State, to examine the arguments and
evidence submitted on both sides, and to make thereon, as
soon as might be, a report on which his decision of the question
in dispute might rest.
For. Rel. 1887, 267-268.
The instrument by which the President delegated the authority in
question to Mfr. Rives was as follows:
" [GROVER CLEVELAN-D, President of the United States.]
"Whereas by convention of arbitration between the government of
the republics of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, signed at Guatamala City on
the 24th day of December, 1886, the high contracting parties agreed to
submit to arbitration the question pending between them in regard to the
validity of the treaty of limits of 15th April 1858, between the said governinents,
together with such other points of doubtful interpretation as
may require decision in the event of the said treaty of limits being found
valid,
"And whereas under the terms of the said convention of arbitration the
contracting parties have solicited my acceptance of the office of arbitrator
1945
1946 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
A copy of this order was communicated by Mr. Rives to the
representatives of Costa Rica and Nicaragua on the day on
which it was made.
On March 22, 1888, Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State, mclosed
to the same representatives a copy of the Presidents
award and of Mr. Rives's report; and in due course he received
from them the customary acknowledgments.
Mr. Rives's Report. The report of Mr. Rives was as follows.
"REPORT TO THE ARBITRATOR, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UJNITED STATES.
"By GEORGE L. RivEs, Assistant Secretary of State.
"To the PRESIDENT.
"Sn. On the 24th day of December 1886 the Republics of
Costa Rica and Nicaragua, by a treaty signed on that day
a-reed that the question pending between the Contracting
to decide such question or questions, and the charge has been accepted
by me;
"And whereas within the periods named in the said convention of arbitration
the parties to the arbitration have submitted to me their respective
arguments, which have been duly communicated to the opposing
parties as required by said convention, and, further, the respective replies
of each of the parties to the argument of the other have been laid before
me in due time, so that all the evidence and arguments necessary to a
decision of the point or points in dispute are before me as arbitrator thereof;
"And whereas by the final paragraph of the fifth article of the said
convention of arbitration of December 24, 1886, it is provided that ' the
arbitrator may delegate his powers, provided that he does not fail to intervene
directly in the pronunciation of the final decision'
"Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of
America, in the capacity of arbitrator as aforesaid between the governients
of the republics of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and to the end that
the fullest examination of the point or points rn dispute between those
governments shall be made to enable me to reach a just and equitable
conclusion in the premises and pronounce a final decision or award thereon,
do by this present instrument delegate my powers to George L. Rives,
Assistant Secretary of State, to the extent contemplated and permitted
by the aforesaid convention of arbitration, hereby enjoining the said
George L. Rives to use all due circumspection and diligence in examining
the arguments and evidenice submitted on both sides, and to make to me,
as soon as may be, report thereon for my consideration and upon which
my decision of the matter in contention may rest.
Given under my hand and the seal of the United States this 16th day
of January in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
eighty-eight, and the Independence of the United States the one hundred
and twelfth.
[SEAL.] " GROER CLEVELAY\D.
By the President:
"T. F BAtyRD,
",Secretary of State.
iFor. Rel. 1888, part 1, pp. 455-456.
COSTA RICANT-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY.
Governments in regard to the validity of the 'Treaty of
Limits' of the 15th April 1858 should be submitted to arbitration.
It was further agreed that the Arbitrator of that
question should be the President of the United States of
America, that within sixty days from the ratification of the
Treaty of Arbitration the Contracting Governments should
solicit of the Arbitrator his acceptance of the charge; that
within ninety days from the notification to the parties of the
acceptance of the Arbitrator, they should present to him their
allegations and documents, that the arbitrator should communicate
to the representative of each Government, within
eight days after their presentation, the allegations of the opposing
party in order that the opposing party might be able
to answer them within thirty days following that upon which
the same should have been communicated, that the decision
of the Arbitrator must be pronounced within six months from
the date upon which the term allowed for the answers to the
allegations should have expired, and that the Arbitrator
might delegate his powers, provided he did not fail to intervene
directly in pronouncing the final decision. It was further provided
that if the Arbitrator's award should determine that
the Treaty of the 15th April 1858 was valid, the same award
should also declare whether Costa Rica has the right of navigation
of the river San Juan with vessels of war or of the
revenue service; and that he should m the same manner decide,
in case of the validity of the Treaty upon all the other
points of doubtful interpretation which either of the parties
might find in the Treaty and communicate to the other within
thirty days after the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of
Arbitration.
"In accordance with the procedure thus agreed on, the
Republic of Nicaragua communicated to the Republic of Costa
Rica a statement of eleven points of doubtful interpretation
in the Treaty of the 15th April 1858 which it proposed to
submit to the decision of the Arbitrator. The Government of
Costa Rica did not communicate any corresponding statement,
and now declares that it finds nothing in that Treaty which is
not perfectly clear and intelligible.
" The two Governments having thereafter solicited your
acceptance of the charge, you were pleased, on the 30th day of
July 1887, to signify your acceptance of it, and the representatives
of both Governments were duly notified of that fact.
" On the 27th day of October 1887 both Governments presented
to you their allegations and documents. These were
duly communicated to the opposing parties, and on the 3d day
of December 1887 they both presented answers to the allegations
of their opponents. The Spanish documents were subsequently
translated and printed.
"On the 16th day of January 1888, by an instrument in
writing, you were pleased to delegate your powers as Arbitrator
to me, iu pursuance of the provisions contained in the last
sentence of Article V of the Treaty of Arbitration, and to
1947
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
direct me to examine into the questions at issue and report my
conclusions to you.
"In accordance with these directions, and after a careful
consideration of the allegations of the respective parties, of
their answers, and of the documents submitted by each, I have
now the honor to submit the following-
"REPORT.
"The questions to be passed upon by the Arbitrator, as will
be observed from the foregoing statement of the Treaty of Ar
bitration, are capable of being classified under two heads.
"First. Whether the Treaty of Limits of the 15th of April
1858 is valid.
"Second. If valid, what is its true meaning in respect of the
right of Costa Rica to navigate the River San Juan with vessels
of war or of the revenue service, and also in respect of the
eleven points submitted for decision by the Government of
NicawrguOa
"If the first of these questions is decided in the negativethat
is, if the Treaty of Limits is decided to be invalid-it will
not be necessary to consider at all the questions under the
second head.
"Before discussing the grounds urged by the Government
of Nicaragua, on the one hand, as proving the invalidity of
the Treaty of Limits, and those urged by the Government of
Costa Rica on the other as establishing its validity it will be
esseitil to consider briefly the evidence submitted to show
what were the recognized boundaries prior to the date of the
Treaty and what were the powers of the respective Governments
in regard to it. This historical enquiry it must be
remembered, is not a matter of immediate concern, nor is it
directly involved in the decision of the questions now submitted
to arbitration, but it is important as elucidating the
nature of the principal controversy and as showing the facts
upon which the parties base their respective arguments.i
The argument of Costa Rica cited, on the question of boundaries: Torres
de Mendoza, Coleccion do Documentos Ineditos do Indias ]?ublicada,
bajo los anspicios del Gobierno Espanol, IV Peralta, Costa Rica, Nicaragua
y Panama, en el siglo XVI. Madrid, 1883, Leon Fernandez, Coleccion
do Documentos pare la Historia do Costa Rica, San Jos6, 1882, II. 226-227
Herrera, Descripcion delasludias Occidentales, V. 55 Chaps. XIII. XXXI.
Archivo do Indias do Sevilla, Registro do Reales Cddulas, Cartas y Expedientes
del Presidenme y Oidores de la Audiencia do Guatemala, files for
169,1-1696, 1726-1736, 1758-1771, Descripcion del Reino do Guatemala,
printed at Guatemala, 1850; Molina, Bosquejo do Costa, Rica, New York,
1850; Spanish Manuscripts, British Museum, add. 17,566, Denosito hidrografico,
Madrid, Peralta, El Canal Interoccanico, Brussels, 1887, 61, Peralta,
The River San Juan do Nicaragua, in S. Ex. Doe. 50,49 Cong. 2 sess.
36-42; Juarros, History of Guatemala, I. part 1, ch. 3; Torquemada, ionarquia
Indiana, Peralta, Costa Rica y Colombia; Streber, Census of Costa
Rica, 1864, Walker, War in Nicaragua, Gaceta de Nicaragua, No. 15, May
28,1851, Anuario do Ambos Mundos, 'Nicaragua.-J. B. M.
1948
COSTA RICAN-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY.
"Two questions, essentially distinct in their character, were
in discussion in 1858 touching the boundary of the two Republics.
The first of these was the question whether the District
of Nicoya lawfully belonged to Costa Rica or to Nicaragua,
the second, as to the true boundary line between the Republics
from the Caribbean Sea to the borders of Nicoya. The evidence
in regard to each of these disputed questions must be
reviewed in its order.
"The District of Nicoya lies on the Pacific side of the Continent,
and-roughly speaking-is triangular in shape, its apex
lying toward the South. It is bounded on the Westward by
the Pacific Ocean, and on the Eastward by the Gulf of Nicoya
and the Rio del Salto, or Tempisque, a small stream emptying
into the head of the Gulf and having its sources not far from
the Southerly shore of Lake Nicaragua. The Northerly boundary
or base of the triangle, seems to have never been accurately
fixed, and its position is a matter of dispute between
the Governments of Costa Rica aud Nicaragua. The argument
of Nicaragua, submitted to the Arbitrator, cites the authority
of Don Antonio Alcedo and the historian Juarros to
the effect that it is bounded by the Lake of Nicaragua on the
North, which seems to imply a further boundary line running
from the Southern end of the Lake to the Pacific Ocean. The
arguments of the Costa Rican Government, on the other hand,
place the Northern boundary as far up as the La Flor River -
and the records of land titles, and the statements of Stephens
and Baily, are cited in support of this view It is wholly unimportant,
however, for the present purpose, to decide which
of these opposing views is correct. It is only needful to point
out that a diversity of opinion exists, and that there is no grant
or agreement precisely fixing the boundaries of the District.
"As to the title to the District, the facts are plainer. Nicoya,
or, as it is sometimes called, Guanacaste, was undoubtedly recognized
as a part of Nicaragua prior to 1826. It is asserted by
Costa Rica that at times Nicoya was temporarily united with
it, or placed under the control of its authorities; and some evideuce
is produced tending to show that such a change was
made in 1573, 1593, 1692, the middle of the XVIIIth century
and even as late as 1812. But'any such connection with Costa
Rica can have been but temporary and it may be regarded as
settled that at the time of the Declaration of Independence
from Spain in September 1821, Nicoya formed a part of Nicaragua.
This condition of things seems to be distinctly recognized
in the Constitution of Costa Rica, adopted 21st January
1825, in which it is stated that- the territory of the State
extends at present from West to East, from the Rio del Salto,
which divides it from licaragua, etc.
"It would seem, however, that about 1824 the inhabitants of
Nicoya, or some of them, asked to be annexed to Costa Rica.
This question was referred to the Federal Congress of Central
America, the Federal Republic of Central America having
1949
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
been theretofore formed and its Constitution adopted 22nd
November 1824, and that body on the 9th December 1825,
passed the following decree:
"' The Federal Congress of the Republic of CentraiAmerica,
taking into consideration, firstly the reiterated petitions of the
authorities and municipal bodies of the towns of the District
of Nicoya, asking for their separation from Nicaragua and
their annexation to Costa Rica, and, secondly that the said
towns and people actually annexed themselves to Costa Rica
at the tune in winch the political troubles of Nicaragua took
place; and, thirdly the topographical situation of the same
district, has been pleased to decree, and does hereby decree:
" Article 1. For the time being, and until the demarcation
of the territory of each State provided by Article VII of the
Constitution is made, the District of Nicoya shall continue to
be separated from Nicaragua and annexed to Costa Rica.
" Ar ticle 2. In consequence thereof, the District of Nicoya
shall recognize its dependence upon the authorities of Costa
Rica, and shall have, in the Legislature of the latter, such
representation as corresponds to it.
"It further appears that the Government of Costa Rica
thereupon took possession of Nicoya, and has been continuously
in possession of it ever since; and was so at the date of the
Treaty of 1858.
"The Government of Nicaragua, however, has not always
acquiesced in the validity of this act of annexation. It has,
on the contrary on several occasions protested against it, and
in its arguments, now before the Arbitrator, it contends that
the decree above referred to was not recognized at the time;
that Nicaragua was not then represented in the Federal Congress,
that the decree was, by its terms, only temporary- and
that the municipalities of Nicoya as well as the Legislature of
Nicaragua protested against the action of Congress as soon as
they were aware of it.
"CH ere again, it is not necessary for the Arbitrator to decide
the question of title. But it is clear that in 1858 Costa Rica
had been continuously in possession of the District of Nicoya,
under a claim of title, for more than thirty-two years.
4As to the boundary line between the Rio del Salto and the
Caribbean Sea, the question was purely one of fact, and it can
hardly be said that any very clear or satisfactory answer was
possible.
"The Government of Costa Rica, in the arguments submitted
to the Arbitrator, has presented an elaborate historical review
of the two Provinces of Costa Rica and Nicaragua under
Spanish rule, which, it may be assumed, contains a reference
to all the important documents bearing upon the question of
boundaries. Passing over the history of the discovery and
first settlement of this region in the early part of the XVIth
century it appears that in 1541 the Emperor Charles V decreed
that the upper fifteen leagues of the San Juan River, should
belong to the Province of Nicaragua, that the lower, or remain-
1950
COSTA RICAN-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY.
ing portion of the river, should belong to the Government of
Costa Rica, and that the use of the river and lake, for purposes
of navigation and fishing, should be common to both Provinces.
In 1561 King Philip II. appointed Licentiate Don Juan Cavallon
to be Alcalde Mlayor' of the Province of New Cartago and
Costa Rica, describing it in the preamble of the letter of appointment
as extending along the Northern 'Sea up to the
Outlet, this being included' (hasta el Desaguadero znclussve).
In 1573, by articles of agreement between the Spanish Crown
and Diego de Artieda, who was appointed Governor and
Captain-General of Costa Rica, the boundaries of that Province
were defined substantially as they continued to be down
to 1821. The limits of Artieda's jurisdiction are thus defined.
" From the Northern to the Southern Sea in widthy and in
length from the boundary of Nicaragua, on the side of Nicoya,
right to the Valleys of Chiriqui, as far as the Province of Veragna
on the Southern side; and on the Northern side, from the
mouths of the Outlet, which is towards Nicaragua (desde las
bocas del Desaguadero, que es a las partes de Nicaragua), the
whole tract of land as far as the Province of Veragua.
"No subsequent grant or decree by the Spanisn Crown is
cited, and-apart from some evidence of acts of possession by
the respective Government-there is nothing further to define
the boundaries of the two Provinces.
" Soon after the Declaration.of Independence, Costa Rica
and Nicaragua, then States of the Republic of Central Amer
ica, adopted Constitutions defining generally their respective
boundaries.
"The Constitution of Costa Rica, adopted the 21st January
1825, provides as follows.
" Article 15. The territory of the State extends at present
from West to East, from the River del Salto, which divides it
from that of Nicaragua, up to the River Chiriqm, the boundary
of the Republic of Colombia, and North and South from
one to the other sea, the limits being on the North rSea] the
mouth of the San Juan River and the Escudo de Weraguas,
and on the South [Sea] the mouth of the River Alvarado and
that of the Chiriqui.
"Nicaragua, by the Constitution adopted the 8th April 1826,
defines her boundaries thus.
"'On the East, the sea of the Antilles; on the North, the
State of Honduras; on the West, the Gulf of Conchagua, on
the South, the Pacific Ocean, and on the Southeast, the free
State of Costa Rica.
"These are the last declarations ante litom inotam. It will
be observed that all these documents leave the precise boundary
vague and undetermined. Indeed, the line to be followed
between the Rio del Salto and the mouths of the Outlet, is
nowhere laid down. Nicaragua contends that a straight line
from the mouth of the Rio del Salto to the mouth of the Colorado,
the most Southerly of the three mouths of the San Juan,
5627-Vol. 2-61
1951
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
is intended. This is met by the argument that as the Rio del
*alto was the boundary that river in its whole length, and not
the mouth or any other part of it, was the dividing line; and
that the San Juan River proper-the Northernmost of the three
channels at the mouth of that stream-formed the end of the
line on the Caribbean Sea. Costa Rica further contends that
the boundary line was not straight, but that it followed the
course of the San Juan in its whole length and the Southern
shore of Lake Nicaragua, and she alleges that she was ii possession
of the territory up to that line-an allegation not
admitted by Nicaragua.
"In my judgment the evidence establishes that the boundary
of Costa Rica, under the terms of the Spanish grants (leaving
Nicoya out of the question), began at the head of the Gulf of
Nicoya, ran northerly along the River del Salto to its source,
and thence ran to the mouth of the San Juan River at the port
of San Juan del Norte-this being, at the time, the mouth of
the principal channel or outlet of the stream. But the evidence
is not sufficient to form the basis for any satisfactory
judgment as to how this line was to be drawn between the
source of the del Salto and the mouth of the San Juan. I per
ceive no reason for thinking that it should have been a straight
line.
"No decision of this question is, however, necessary for it
is only important, for present purposes, to point out that no
precise line of demarcation can be found in any of the earlier
documents. Nor is this surprising in view of the fact, to be
inferred from the evidence, that the region through which the
line ran was a rough, densely wooded and thinly settled country
where no need was felt of any exact delimitation in the
days of the Spanish dominion.
"But with the establishment of the Federal Republic, and,
still more, with its dissolution, the questions of boundary began
to assume importance.
"The Federal Constitution seems to have provided by its
Article VIL. for the demarcation of each State; but nevertheless
nothing was done towards the establishment of the line
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua.
"In 1838 Costa Rica seems to have urged upon Nicaraguathen
assuming the rank of an independent State upon her
withdrawal from the Federation-a desire for a recognition of
the annexation of Nicoya. In 1846, 1848, and 1852 other fruitless
negotiations were undertaken with a view to settling the
boundary- and in 1858, when the Treaty of Lnmits was signed,
the question, in one form or another, had been before the two
Governments for at least twenty years.
"That the documentary evidence was slight and unsatisfactory
has been already shown, and that Costa Rica had for
nearly the same period of twenty years laid claim to more ter
ritory than she obtained under the Treaty of Limits, fully
appears from her decree of 'Basis and Guarantees' of the
1952
COSTA RICAN-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY.
8th March 1841-which asserts as the boundaries of Costa
Rica the line of the River La Flor, the Shore of Lake Nicaragua
and the River San Juan.
"I now proceed to state the history of the negotiations which
resulted in the Treaty in question, and of the executive and
legislative acts which are relied on by Costa Rica as constituting
a sufficient ratification.
"The long and bitter struggle in which Nicaragua and other
Central American States had been involved, and of which the
part played by Walker and the filibusters was the most notorious
incident, came to an end in 1857. The Republic of Costa
Rica had taken part in that struggle, and her case states as a
fact that at the close of the contest the Costa Rican troops
held military positions on both sides of the San Juan. The
argument of Nicaragua seems to imply that such possession
was not taken until after the close of the war- but the fact
itself is not in dispute. It was regarded by Nicaragua, at the
time, as constituting a casus belli, and Costa Rica having
failed to withdraw her troops, war was declared by Nicaragua
on the 25th November 1857-although negotiations for a settlement
of the difficulty still continued, but without success.
"In this posture of affairs the Republic of San Salvador
offered mediation through its Minister, Colonel Don Pedro
Romulo Negrete. Owing principally as it would seem, to
Colonel Negrete's earnest efforts, the opposing Governments
appoin ted Ministers Plenipotentiary who met with the Salva
dorian Minister at San Jos6 de Costa Rica, and there coneluded
the Treaty of Limits,-the validity of which is now
under examination.
"By that instrument, the boundary line is made to begin at
Punta de Castilla, at the mouth of the San Juan River" thence
it follows the right or Southern bank of that stream to a point
three miles below the Castillo Viejo- thence it runs along the
circumference of a circle drawn round the outworks of the Castle
as a center, with a radius of three miles, to a point on the
'In support of the validity of the Treaty of Limits, the Costa Rican
argument cited. Calve, Droit Int. I. see. 711, Convenc16n Internacional
entre los Gobiernos do Nicaragua v Costa Rica y Don Felix Belly para ]a
canalizac16n del Istmo, Managua, Imprenta del Progreso, frente al Palacio
Nacional, 1859- Code of Nicaragua, Tit. I. Book IV Documentos relativos
A las illtimas negociaciones entre Nicaragua y Costa Rica sobre limites
territorinles, Canal interoc6anico, Managua, 1872; For. Rel. of the U. S.
1873, II. 738, Gaceta do Nicaragua, No. 15, of May 8, 1858; Ayon, The
Question of Territorial Limits between the Republics of Nicaragua and
Costa Rica, Managua, 1872; Parsons on Contracts, Book I. ch. II. see. 1,
Dalloz, R6pertoiro, "Cautionnement, "Obligation, Trait6 International;"
Ayon, Consideraciones sobre l cnestion d limites territoriales,
entre las Repfiblicas de Nicaragua y Costa Rica, Managua, 1872, Imprenta
do "El Centro Americano;" Savigny, Droit Roman, l11. 126; Caivo,
Droit Int. I. see. 729.-J. B. M.
1953
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
Western side of the Castle, distant two miles from the Riverthence
parallel to the San Juan and the lake, at a distance of
two miles therefrom, to the Sapoa River- and thence in a
straight line to the center of Salinas Bay on the Pacific Ocean.
The Treaty further provides that surveys shall be made to
locate the boundary that the Bay of San Juan del Norte and
Salinas Bay shall be common to both Republics; and that Nicaragua
shall have, exclusively dominion and supreme control of
the waters of the San Juan,-Costa Rica having the right of
free navigation for the purposes of commerce in that part of the
River on which she is bounded. It was firther agreed that in
the event of war between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, no act of
hostility was to be practiced in the Port or River of San Juan,
or on the Lake of Nicara,ua, and the observance of thlis article
of the Treaty was guaranteed by the Republic of San Salvador.
"It is admitted by the parties to the present arbitration that
the Treaty was duly ratified by Costa Rica on the 16th April
1858; and that it was not ratified at all by San Salvador. It
is further established that there was some ratification by repre
sentatives of Nicaragua,-but whether or not such ratification
was sufficient is one of the points now in controversy and it is
therefore necessary to examine fully the powers and the proceedings
of the Nicaraguan authorities.
"The Republic of Nicaragua, as appears from the evidence,
was a Constitutional Government of limited powers, which were
defined by a written Constitution. Nicaragua. as one of the
States of the Central American Republic, adopted her first
Constitution on the 8th April 1826. Upon the dissolution of
the Federal Republic she assumed the rank of an independent
nation, and in 1838 adopted a new Constitution, which her
representatives now contend -was in full force and vigor at the
time of the execution of theTreaty of Limits. The full text of
the Nicaraguan Constitution of 1838 is not contained in the
arguments which have been laid before the Arbitrator- but it
sufficiently appears that power was vested ii an elective President
and a Congress. It also appears that by Article 2 (cited In
full below), the boundaries of the State were defined, and that
by Article 194, quoted in the argument of Nicaragua, a complicated
method of amendment was provided, of which the
only feature now necessary to notice is that no proposed amendment
shall take effect until it has been approved by two successive
Legislatures.
"In 1857 the necessity for a complete revision of the Constitution
of 1838 seems to have been generally recognized. The
long and exhausting conflicts which had been waged from 1851
to 1857, and the existence, during the greater part of that time,
of two hostile governments, each claiming to exercise constitutional
and supreme power throughout the country had demoistrated,
to the satisfaction of the inhabitants, the importance
of changes in the organic law Accordingly a Constituent
1954
COSTA RICAN-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY.
Assembly with ample powers, was duly elected. The due
election, and the full constituent powers of this body are facts
not disputed in the arguments now submitted on behalf of
Nicaragua.
"In November 1857, the Constituent Assembly met, and addressed
itself at once to the task of framing a new Constitution
for Nicaragua, as well as of legislating upon the ordinary
affairs of the nation.
"On the 18th of January 1858, the previous negotiations
with Costa Rica having failed, the Assembly ordered new Commissioners
to be appointed to negotiate treaties of peace, limits,
friendship and alliance between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
"On the 5th February 1858, a further and supplemental
decree on the same subject was adopted, which is as follows:
"' The Constituent Assembly of the Republic of Nicaragua,
in use of the legislative faculties with which it is invested,
decrees:
"'Article 1. For the purpose that the Executive may comply
with the decree of January 18th instant, the said Executive is
hereby amply authorized to act in the settlement of the difficulties
with Costa Rica in such manner as it may deem best for
the interest of both countries, and for the independence of
Central America, without the necessity of ratification by the
legislative power.
" Article 2. Such treaties of limits as it may adjust shall be
final, if adjusted in accordance with the bases which separately
will be given to it, but, if not, they shall be subject to the
ratification of the AssemblyI
"What were the separate bases of negotiation given to the
Nicaraguan Executive does not appear from any of the documents
submitted to the Arbitrator. But it is not distinctly
asserted by the representatives of Nicaragua that such instructions
were disregarded in the negotiation of the Treatythe
arguments relied on to prove its invalidity resting upon
entirely different grounds, which will be stated hereafter.
"On the 15th April 1858, the Treaty of Limits was signed
by the Plenipotentiaries of Costa Rica, Nicaragua and San Salvador"
and on the 26th April 1858, ratifications were personally
exchanged by the Presidents of Costa Rica and Nicaragua,
who met for the purpose on Nicaraguan territory at the City of
Rivas. The Treaty had not then been passed upon by the
Assembly the decree of ratification being by the President
alone. It is as follows.
",TomiAs MARTINEZ, the President of the Republic of Nicaragua.
"'Whereas General M6,ximo Jerez, Envoy Extraordinary
aud Minister Plenipotentiary of Nicaragua to the Republic of'
Costa Rica, has adjusted, agreed upon and signed, oi the 15th
instant, a Treaty of Limits, fully in accordance with the bases
1955
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
which, for that purpose, were transmitted I o him by way of instructions;
finding that said Treaty is conducive to the peace
and prosperity of the two countries, and reciprocally useful to
both of them, and that it facilitates, by removing all obstacles
that might prevent it, the mutual alliance of both countries,
and their unity of action against all attempts of foreign conquest;
considering that the Executive has been duly and competently
authorized, by legislative decree of February 26th
ultimo, to do everything conducive to secure the safety and
independence of the Reiublic, and by virture, furthermore, of
the reservation of faculties spoken of in the executive decree
of the 17th instant
" Does hereby ratify each and all of the articles of the
Treaty of Limits made and concluded by Don Jose Maria
Canas, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Government of Costa
Rica, and Don Maximo Jerez, Minister Plenipotentiary of the
Supreme Government of Nicaragua, signed by them oi the 15th
instant, and ratified by the Costa Rican Government on the
16th. And the additional act of the same date is likewise
ratified.
"On the 2Sth May 1858, thirty-two days after the ratification,
and forty three days after the signature of the Treaty of
Lnnits, the following decree was passed by the Constituent
Assembly-
"' The Constituent Assembly of the Republic of Nicaragua,
in the use of legislative powers vested in it, decrees:
" Sole Article. The Treaty of Limits concluded at San Jose
on the 15th of April, instant, between General Don 1lfximo
Jerez, Minister Plenipotentiary from this Republic, and General
)on Jose Maria Caiias, Minister Plenipotentiary from the
Republic of Costa Rica, with the intervention of Colonel Don
Pedro Romulo Negrete, Minister Plenipotentiary from Salvador,
is hereby approved.
"On the 19th August 1858, the Constituent Assembly
adopted the new Constitution, of which it is only needful to
cite the first article, viz.
" The Republic of Nicaragua is the same which was, in ancient
times, called the Province of Nicaragua, and, after the
independence, State ofNicaragua. Its territory is bounded on
the East and Northeast by the Sea of the Antilles; on the
North and Northwest by the State of Honduras; on the West
and South by the Pacific Ocean and on the Southeast by the
Republic of Costa Rica. The laws on special limits form part
of the Constitutmon.
"No further formal ratification of the Treaty of Limits was
ever had, but the arguments submitted by Costa Rica cite a
number of instances in which the Government of Nicaragua,
durnng the period between 1 858 and 1870, recognized the Treaty
as a valid and binding instrumnent.
"Since 1870 the Government of Nicaragua has contended
that the Treaty is invalid, and that view is now urged upon
1956
COSTA RICAN-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY.
three distinct grounds, which are stated as follows in the argument
submitted on its behalf:
" The Government of Nicaragua affirms the invalidity of
the Treaty of 1858, and insists that it ought not to be bound
thereby for the reason-
" First. That it has not received that sanction which the
Constitution of the State of Nicaragua requires to give effect
to, and validate, a treaty of its character.
" Second. It has not been ratified by the Government of
San Salvador, so as to give effect to the guarantees on behalf
of that Government of the tenth article of the Treaty
" Third. That the pretended ratifications of the Treaty were
exchanged before the Treaty had been submitted to the Congress
of Nicaragua, and it was not approved by the first Congress
of Nicaragua until after the expiration of the forty days
provided for the exchange of ratifications in Article XII.
"I shall consider each of these three reasons in order.
".
"The argument very forcibly presented on behalf of Nicaragua
to establish the first ground of objection,-the lack of such
a sanction as was required by the Constitution to give effect to,
and validate, a Treaty of the character of the one in question,-
is as follows: The Constitution of 1838 was in full force on the
15th April 1858, that Constitution fixed the boundaries of
Nicaragua, the Treaty of Limits curtailed the boundaries so
fixed by the Constitution, it was therefore, in direct and
flagrant violation of the fundamental law of the State, and to
have validity must receive the same formal ratification that an
amendment to the Constitution itself demands ;' the Constitution
provides that an amendment adopted by one Legislature
in the manner prescribed, by a two-thirds vote of both houses,
'shall not be considered as valid nor form part of the Constitution
until it has received the sanction of the next Legislature;'
the Treaty of Limits was never sanctioned by a second Legislature;
therefore it is not valid.
"This argument, it will be perceived, rests wholly upon the
fundamental assumptions that the Constitution of 1838 was in
force, and that it fixed the boundaries of Nicaragua. If, as a
matter of fact, that Constitution was not in force, or if the
boundaries were not definitely fixed by its provisions, then the
whole argument falls; for the Treaty is then a mere treaty of
limits, settling disputed boundaries, and is not one involving a
concession of territory and an amendment to the Constitution.
It is not pretended that a treaty fixing boundaries requires, on
general principles, any extraordinary sanction.
"The general doctrine that in determining the validity of a
treaty made in the name of a state, the fuidamental laws of
such state must furnish the guide for determination, has been
1957
1958 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
fully and ably discussed on the part of Nicaragua, and its correctness
may certainly be admitted. But it is also certain that
where a treaty has been approved by a government, and an
effort is subsequently made to avoid it for the lack of some
formality the burden is upon the party who alleges invalidity
to show clearly that the requirements of the fundamental law
have not been complied with. In myjidgment, Nicaragua has
failed in establishing a case under this rule.
"In the first place, it may well be doubted whether the
Constitution of 1838 can be said to have been in full force and
effect at the time of the execution of the Treaty on the 15th
April 1858. The legislative power was then vested in a Constituent
Assembly -a body it would seem, expressly chosen
for the purpose of amending the Constitution in any way it saw
fit. To say that such a body could not adopt a decree which
in effect modified the Constitution, is to deny to it the power
to carry out the very objects for which it existed.
"Koreover, the Constitution framed by the Assembly and
promulgated on the 19th August 1858, defining the boundaries
of Nicaragua, adds that the laws on special limits form
part of the Constitution. If therefore the decree of the 28th
May 1858, and the other acts of the Assembly were in any
respect insufficient as involving some unconstitutionality the
defect was supplied by practically embodying the Treaty of
Limits, and the decree approving it, in the new Constitution,-
thus giving the highest sanction possible to this legislation.
"But whether or not the Constitution of 1838 was in full
force in April and May 1858, I am clearly of opinion that it
did not definitely fix the boundaries of the State. The power
of defining absolute boundaries by a Constitution is not denied.
The question is merely whether the Constitution of 18:38 did in
fact contain such a definition of the boundaries of Nicaragua
as to preclude their adjustment by an ordinary treaty
"The provisions of that Constitution, respecting boundaries,
are as follows.
"'Article 2. The territory of.the State. is the same as was
formerly given to the Province of Nicaragua, its limits being
on the East and Northeast the Sea of the Antilles; on the
North and Northwest the State of Honduras; on the erst
and South the Pacific Ocean and on the Southeast the State
of Costa Rica. The dividing lines with the bordering States shall
be marked by a law which will make apart of the Constitition.
"Thus it appears that the dividing lines with the bordering
States' were expressly not defined. It was plainly the intention
to leave the Constitution incomplete in this respect, though a
means of completing it was provided, by allowing the passage
of an ordinary law by a single Legislature. It is not pretended
that any law marking the boundary on the side of
Costa Rica, was passed before the execution of the Treaty of
Limits. The decree approving the Treaty is the only attempt,
COSTA RIOAN-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY.
so far as appears, to comply with this provision of the Constitution.
The statement that the boundary is, 'on the Southeast,
the State of Costa Rica,' defines nothing. What were
the limits of Costa Rica in 1838, was a matter of dispute. No
precise decision was possible, and I have already expressed my
opinion that the evidence laid before the Arbitrator is altogether
too vague to afford grounds for any satisfactory judgment.
The Constitution of 1838 therefore did not fix the
boundaries of Nicaragua definitely
"These views are strengthened by a consideration of the
evidence adduced on the part of Costa Rica to prove acquiescence
by Nicaragua for ten or twelve years in the validity of
the Treaty I do not regard such acquiescence as a substitute
for ratification by a second Legislature, if such had been
needed. But it is strong evidence of that contemporaneous
exposition which has ever been thought valuable as a guide in
determining doubtful questions of interpretation.
"I conclude therefore that the first ground of objection
stated by Nicaragua is untenable.
CCII.
"The second ground of objection urged by Nicaragua to the
validity of the Treaty is that it has not been ratified by the
Government at San Salvador, so as to give effect to the guarantees
on behalf of that Government of the tenth article of
the Treaty
"It is argued, in support of this objection, that the guarantee
of the mediating Government against hostilities on the
River and Lake was of great importance to Nicaragua, that it
might well have been the controlling consideration in the mind
of the negotiator of the Treaty that led him to agree to the relinquishment
of claims to great tracts of territory- that the failure
of San Salvador to ratify this Treaty took from it one of
the chief considerations moving to Nicaragua, and that the
consideration never having taken effect, the Treaty never became
of valid or binding force. It is added that this was, in
effect, a tripartite Treaty and unless all the parties became
bound, neither of them was.
"In my opinion this argument is unsound. The Treaty was
not tripartite, but was between Costa Rica and Nicaragua
only with an independent and separable clause of guarantee,
as to a single feature of the arrangement, on the part of San
Salvador. Without the guarantee, the Treaty was complete
as between the two principals, if they saw fit to accept it in
that shape. The non-ratification by the Republic of San Salvador
was known to the Government of Nicaragua when ratifications
were exchanged with Costa Rica. It follows therefore
that Nicaragua never lost any of the considerations which
1959
1960 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
induced her to consummate, by an exchange of ratifications,
the negotiations for the Treaty
"The facts may be briefly recalled.
"On the 15th April 1858 the Treaty of Limits was signed.
In form it is a Convention agreed upon by the representatives
of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and declares that they having
exchanged their respective powers, which were examined by
Hion. Seilor Don Pedro R. Negrete, exercising the function of
fraternal mediator in these negotiations, had agreed to and
adjusted the terms of the Treaty The Treaty itself, after reciting
the desire of Costa Rica anct Nicaragua for peace, fixes
the boundary line between them, provides for a survey of the
line, and for the common use and defense of the Bay of San
Juan del Norte and Salinas Bay and of that portion of the
San Juan River on which Costa Rica borders, grants the use
in common of the Punta de Castilla until Nicaragua recovers
full possession of all her rights in the Port of San Juan del
Norte; forbids the levying of custom duties at Punta de Castilla
while San Juan del Norte remains a free port, defines the
jurisdiction over, and right of navigation on, the waters of
the San Juan River- secures existing contracts of canalization
or public transit made by the Government of Nicaragua, and
regulates the execution of future contracts; and neutralizes
the Port and River of San Juan and the Lake of Nicaragua
in the event of war between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Then
follows this.
"'Article X. The stipulation of the foregoing article (that
relating to neutrality) being essentially inportant for the proper
custody of both the Port and the River against foreign aeggression,
which would affect the general interests of the country,
the strict performance thereof is left under the special guar
antee, which in the name of the mediator Government, its
Minister Plenipotentiary herein present is ready to give, and
does hereby give, in use of the faculties vested in him for that
purpose by his Government.
"Finally Costa Rica and Nicaragua mutually give up all
claims against each other, and the two contracting parties'
waive all claims for damages which either might have against
the other.
"This instrument is plainly neither in form nor in substance,
tripartite. The two Governments, the two contracting
parties' spoken of in the Treaty are always Costa Rica and
Nicaragua, never San Salvador. San Salvador is not in form
a contracting party at all. And in substance that Government
is not a party to the agreement-the clause containing the
guarantee being entirely separable from all the rest.
"As a proposition of international law it may be regarded
as settled that a guarantee is always merely subsidiary to the
principal contract. Le traite par lequel un 6tat se porte garant
d'un traite conclu entre deux autres puissances, est un trait6
COSTA RICAN-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY.
aecessoire destin6 a assurer l'execution du trait6 principal.'
(Bluntschli, 430 note, Lardy's trans.) 'La garantie pent 6tre
comprise dans les stipulations annex~es au trait6 principal
qu'on vent garantir, et devient alors une obligation accessoire.1
(Vattel, Droit des Gens Ed. 1863, Liv II, cb. 16, §240- note by
Pradier Fod6r6, the editor.) 'Lorsque la garantie est destin6e
i assurer l'inviolabilit6 d'un trait6 elle formetoujours une obligation
et un trait6 accessoire (pactum accessorum), meme quand
elle ferait partie de Pacte principal.' (Kliber, Droit des Gens,
§158.) It follows that the clause of guarantee in the Treaty
of Limits is no part of the principal agreement, and that on
general principles the rest of the Treaty would not stand or
fall with this subsidiary or accessory contract.
"The necessity for ratification by contracting powers may
be freely admitted. But even conceding to it as high an impor
tance as the execution of deeds by individuals, the failure of
a guaranteeing state to ratify will not necessarily invalidate
a treaty which the principal contracting parties have concluded
by an exchange of ratifications as between themselves.
'The analogy of individual deeds may serve to illustrate
the point now under discussion. The case may readily be
imagined of a deed between two parties as principals with a
third party as guarantor. Leases of this character are not
infrequent. If such a deed were prepared by the agents of
the three parties, and if the two principal parties were to
sign, seal, acknowledge, and formally deliver to each other
duly executed duplicates of the deed, without waiting for the
signature of the guarantor, it is too plain for argument that
neither could subsequently object, and claim the right to
rescind, because the deed had not been executed and delivered
by the guarantor.
"4So in this case. The Presidents of Costa Rica and Nicaragua
in person, on the 26th April 1858 formally exchanged
ratifications of the Treaty, without waiting for San Salvador.
The arguments now advanced by Nicaragua, as establishing
the invalidity of the Treaty, might perhaps have been urged
as reasons for refusing to exdhange the ratifications until San
Salvador was ready to unite in the act. But the Government
of Nicaragua was silent when it ought to have spoken, and so
waived the objection now made. It saw fit to proceed to the
exebange of ratifications without waiting for San Salvador.
The Treaty was complete without Article X. To all the otheK
articles and stipulations it contained Costa Rica and Nicaragua
alone might fully bind themselves. They did so, irrevocably
by a formal exchange of ratifications; and neither may
now be heard to allege, as reasons for rescinding this completed
Treaty any facts which existed and were known at the time
of its consummation.
"I conclude therefore that the second ground of objection
stated by Nicaragua is untenable.
1961
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
"III.
"The the third ground of objection urged by Nicaragua to
the validity of the Treaty is that the pretended ratifications
of the Treaty were exchanged before the Treaty had been submitted
to the Congress of Nicaragua, and it was not approved
by the first Congress of Nicaragua until after the expiration
of the forty days provided for the exchange of ratifications in
Article XII.
"It will be remembered that on the 5th February 1858 the
Constituent Assembly of Nicaragua passed a decree by which
the Executive was 'amply authorized' to treat with Costa
Rica without the necessity of ratification by the legislative
power' and that it was further decreed that such treaties
of limits as the Executive might adjust should be final,-
if in accordance with certain separate instructions. Acting
under this grant of power, the P1resident of Nicaragua
concluded and ratified the present Treaty on the 26th April
1858, eleven days after its signature by the Plempotentiaries,
without ratification by the legislative power. On the 28th
of M1ay 1858 the Constituent Assembly adopted a decree approving
the Treaty- and this decree was signed by the President
on the 4th June 1858.
"The argument now presented by Nicaragua is twofold, and
raises two points, first, that the Treaty is invalid because ratifications
were exchanged before approval by the Assembly
and, second, that it is invalid because such approval was given
more than forty days after signature.
"As to the first of these points, it would perhaps be enough to
say that Nicaragua can not now seek to invalidate the Treaty
on any mere ground of irregularity in the order of its own proceedings.
If its Legislature did in fact approve the Treaty
that is enough for the present purpose. Whether such approval
was expressed before or after the exchange of ratifications
is an immaterial matter now -certainly so far as
Nicaragua is concerned.
"But it does not appear that there was any real irregularity
in these proceedings. The full text of the Nicaraguan Constitution
of 1838 not being contained in the arguments submitted
to the Arbitrator, it is not made clear just what restrictions
upon the treaty making power that instrument imposed.
Ratification by legislative authority is not always required,
even in constitutional governments. The necessity for legislative
ratification is not to be presumed, but must be established
as a fact. Still less can there be any presumption as to the
form and manner in which the legislative sanction is to be
expressed. In the present instance, the Constituent Assembly
a body of extensive powers, expressed in advance its approval
of any treaty of limits that might be concluded by the
Executive upon certain bases. It is not shown that the
1962
COSTA RICAN-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY. 1963
authority so given was exceeded, and it can not be said, in
the absence of an express prohibition, that this mode of dealing
with the subject was improper.
"Again, the fact of the subsequent approval of the Treaty
by the Assembly is satisfactory proof that that body approved
not only the terms of the instrument, but also the manner in
which the Executive had executed the authority conferred by
the decree of the 5th February 1858. The time and manner
of exchange of ratifications was before the Assembly and it
was fully aware that the time agreed upon for exchange had
passed. Its action, under these circumstances, shows that it
was of the opinion that the Treaty had been legally and in due
time ratified by the President, in pursuance of the special
powers conferred upon him.
"In any event, all irregularities would stem to have been
effectually cured by this subsequent approval of the Constituent
Assembly Ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato equsparatur
is a recoguizen maxim of municipal law and the reasons
of that rule may fairly be regarded as applying to cases like
the present.
" That irregularities and defects in the formalities of ratification
may be supplied and made good by subsequent acquiescence
in and approval of the treaty, is laid down by Heffter
(Droit International, § 87 fiu.)
"'Mais il est constant qu'elle (i. e., ratification) pent 6tre
supplee par des actes equivalents, et notammenb par l'ex6-
cution tacite des stipulations arr6t6es.
"And this opinion is citedt by Pradier-Fod6r6 in his translation
of Grotius (Vol. II., p. 270, note 1). See also Hall's Inter
national Law page 276.
" The second point-that the legislative sanction was not
given until after the expiration of the forty days fixed by the
Treaty for the exchange of the ratifications-seems clearly
untenable. Costa Rica, and not Nicaragua, might have complained
of this delay Assuming that subsequent legislative
approval was needed, Costa Rica might, if it had desired to do
so, have declared the negotiations at an end on the expiration
of the forty days. But it was not bound to do so. It had a
perfect right to waive this limitation of time. Either party to
a Treaty may extend the time of the other, either by express
agreement or by acts indicating acquiescence. Nicaragua cannot
be permitted to say as she does in effect say in this branch
of her argument-it is true that this Treaty was approved
unreservedly by both the executive and legislative branches of
the Government; but such approval is worthless, as it was
expressed not forty but forty-three days after the signature of
the Treaty
" Thefact of approval being established, the time of approval
is immaterial, provided the other party by its acquiescence has
seen fit to waive delay
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
"I conclude therefore that the thrd ground of objection
stated by Nicaragua is untenable.
"4And having examined in detail the three reasons urged by
Nicaragua for holding the Treaty invalid, and finding all these
reasons untenable, I conclude that the Arbitrator should decide
in favor of the validity of this Treaty "
The Award. The award of the President was as follows.
"Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, to whom
it shall concern, Greeting"
"The functions of Arbitrator having been conferred upon
the President of the United States by virtue of a Treaty signed
at the City of Guatemala on the 24th day of December one
thousand eight hundred and eighty-six, between the Republics
of Costa Rica and Nicaragua., whereby it was agreed that the
question pending between the contracting Governments in
regard to the validity of their Treaty of Limits of the 15th day
of April one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, should
be submitted to the arbitration of the President of the United
States of America, that if the Arbitrator's award should determine
that the Treaty was valid, the same award should also
declare whether Costa Rica has the right of navigation of the
River San Juan with vessels of war or of the revenue service;
and that in the same manner the Arbitrator should decide, in
ease of the validity of the Treaty upon all the other points of
doubtful interpretation which either of the parties might find
in the Treaty and should communicate to the other party
within thirty days after the exchange of the ratifications of
the said Treaty of the 24th day of December one thousand
eight hundred and eighty six,
"And the Republic of Nicaragua having duly communicated
to the Republic of Costa Rica eleven points of doubtful inter
pretation found in the said Treaty of Limits of the 15th day of
April one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, and the
Republic of Costa Rica having failed to commniumcate to the
Republic of Nicaragua any points of doubtful interpretation
found in the said last-mentioned Treaty-
"And both parties having duly presented their allegations
and documents to the Arbitrator, and having thereafter duly
presented their respective answers to the allegations of the
other party as provided ii the Treaty of the 24th day of December
one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six,
"And the Arbitrator pursuant to the fifth clause of said
last-named Treaty having delegated his powers to the Honor
able George L. Rives, Assistant Secretary of State, who, after
examining and considering the said allegations, documents
and answers, has made his report in writing thereon to the
Arbitrator-
1964
COSTA RICAN-NICARAGUAN BOUNDARY.
"9Now therefore I, Grover Cleveland, President of the
United States of America, do hereby make the following
decision and award.
"-irst. The above-mentioned Treaty of Limits signed on
the 15th day of April one thousand eight hundred and fiftyeight,
is valid.
" Second. The Republic of Costa Rica under said Treaty and
the stipulations contained in the sixth article thereof, has not
the right of navigation of the River San Juan with vessels of
war- but she may navigate said river with such vessels of the
Revenue Service as may be related to and connected with her
enjoyment of the purposes of commerce' accorded to her in
said article, or as may be necessary to the protection of said
enjoyment.
" Third. With respect to the points of doubtful interpretation
communicated as aforesaid by the Republic of Nicaragua,
I decide as follows:
"1. The boundary line between the Republics of Costa Rica
and Nicaragua, on the Atlantic side, begins at the extremity
of Punta de Castilla at the mouth of the San Juan de Nicaragua
River, as they both existed on the 15th day of April 1858.
The ownership of any accretion to said Punta de Castilla is
to be governed by the laws applicable to that subject.
"2. The central point of the Salinas Bay is to be fixed by
drawing a straight line across the mouth of the Bay and deter
mining mathematically the centre of the closed geometrical
figure formed by such straight line and the shore of the Bay
at low-water mark.
"3. By the central point of Salinas Bay is to be understood
the centre of the geometrical figure formed as above stated.
The limit of the Bay towards the ocean is a straight line drawn
from the extremity of Punta Arranca Barba, nearly true
South to the Westernmost portion of the land about Punta
Sacate.
"14. The Republic of Costa Rica is not bound to concur with
the Republic of Nicaragua in the expenses necessary to prevent
the Bay of San Juan del Norte from being obstructed,
to keep the navigation of the River or Port free and unembarrassed,
or to improve it for the common benefit.
"5. The Republic of Costa Rica is not bound to contribute
any proportion of the expenses that may be incurred by the
Republic of Nicaragua for any of the purposes above mentioned.
"6. The Republic of Costa Rica cannot prevent the Republic
of Nicaragua from executing at her own expense and
within her own territory such works of improvement,provmded
such works of improvement do not result in the occupation or
flooding or damage of Costa Rica territory or in the destruction
or serious impairment of the navigation of the said River
1965
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
or any of its branches at any point where Costa Rica is entitled
to navigate the same. The Republic of Costa Rica has
the right to demand indemnification for any places belonging
to her on the right bank of the River San Juan which may be
occupied without her consent, and for any lands on the same
bank which may be flooded or damaged in any other way in
consequence of works of improvement.
"7. The branch of the River San Juan known as the Colorado
River must not be considered as the boundary between
the Republics of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in any part of its
course.
"8. The right of the Republic of Costa Rica to the navigation
of the River San Juan with men-of-war or revenue cutters
is determined and defined in the Second Article of this award.
", 9. The Republic of Costa Rica can deny to the Republic of
Nicaragua the right of deviating the waters of the River San
Juan in case such deviation will result in the destruction or
serious impairment of the navigation of the said River or any
of its branches at any point where Costa Rica is entitled to
navigate the same.
"10. The Republic of Nicaragua remains bound not to make
any grants for canal purposes across her territory without first
asking the opinlon-of the Republic of Costa Rica, as provided
in Article VIII. of the Treaty of Limits of the 15th day of
April one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight. The natural
rights of the Republic of Costa Rica alluded to in the
said stipulation are the rights which, in view of the boundaries
fixed by the said Treaty of Limits, she possesses in the soil
thereby recognized as belonging exclusively to her- the rights
which she possesses in the harbors of San Juan del Norte and
Salinas Bay and the rights which she possesses in so much
of the River San Juan as lies more than three English miles
below Castillo Viejo, measuring from the exterior fortifications
of the said castle as the same existed in the year 1858, and
perhaps other rights not here particularly specified. These
rights are to be deemed injured in any case where the territory
belonging to the Republic of Costa Rica is occupied or flooded,
where there is an encroachment upon either of the said harbors
ijurious to Costa Rica, or where there is such an obstruction
or deviation of the River San Juan as to destroy or seriously
impair the navigation of the said River or any of its branches
at any point where Costa Rica is entitled to navigate the same.
"11. The Treaty of Limits of the 15th day of April one
thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight does not give to the
Republic of Costa Rica the right to be a party to grants
which Nicaragua may make for inter-oceanic canals; though in
cases where the construction of the canal will involve an injury
to the natural rights of Costa Rica, her opinion or advice, as
mentioned in Article VIII. of the Treaty should be more than
"advisory" or "consultative." It would seem in such cases
1966
COSTA RICAN-NICARAGUAY BOUNDARY.
that her consent is necessary and that she may thereupon
demand compensation for the concessions she is asked to
make; but she is not entitled as a right to share in the profits
that the Republic of Nicaragua may reserve for herself as a
compensation for such favors and privileges as she, in her
turn, may concede.
"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
have caused the Seal of the United States to be hereunto
affixed.
"Done in duplicate at the City of Washington, on
the twenty-second day of March, in the year one
[sEAL.] thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight, and of the
Independence of the United States the one hundred
and twelfth.
"GROVER CLEVELAND.
"By the President.
4T. F BAYARD,
"Secretary of State."
Though the foregoing award established the
Further Arbitration. validity of the Treaty of Limits of 1858, and
defined the boundary thereunder, yet, when
the contracting parties came to consider the line thus determined,
they were confronted with new difficulties. By inter
pretation of the Treaty of Limits, the President decided that
the boundary between the Republics of Costa Rica and Nicaragua
began " at the extremity of Punta de Castilla, at the
mouth of the San Juan de Nicaragua River, as they both existed
on the 15th day of April 1858," the " ownership of any
accretion to said Punta de Castilla" to be "governed by the
laws applicable to that subject." On the question thus presented
the commissioners of the two republics were unable to
agree, it being perhaps practically impossible, owing to the
shiftings of the sands, to determine where Punta de Castilla,
which bad since disappeared, actually lay in 1858. Another
difficulty arose out of the shifting of the mouth of the San Juan
River- and yet another out of the rules laid down in the award
for the determination of the center of Salinas Bay I In this
dilemma the two governments accepted the mediation of the
Government of Salvador, through whose good offices they concluded
at San Jose, April 8, 1896, a convention for the demar
cation of their boundary By this convention another arbitral
proceeding is instituted. Each of the contracting governments
engages to appoint two engineers or surveyors for the purpose
'Mr. Rodriguez to Mr. Olney, December 26, 1896, For. Rel. 1896, 371.
5627-Vol. 2- 62
1967
1968 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS.
of tracing and marking the boundary "pursuant to the provisions
of the treaty of April la, 1858, and the arbitral award
of the President of the United States. When these commissioners
may be unable to agree, it is provided that the point
or points in dispute shall be submitted to a fifth engineer,
named by the President of the United States; that this engineer
" shall have ample authority to decide any kind of dispute
that may arise;" and that "his decision shall be final as to the
operations in question." The execution of this convention
has been duly begun.
For. Rel. 1896, 100-102.
MAP OF
SOUTHERN BRAZIL,
showing that part of its territory
MAPPA DO
BRAZIL MERIDIONAL,
mostrando a parte do seo territorio reclamada
pela Republica Argentina.
claimed
by the Argentine Republic.
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EXPLANATIONS.
1, 2,3 & 4. BOUNDARY BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.
6 & 7. EASTERN LIMIT OF THE ARGENTINE CLAIM PRIOR TO 1888.
7 & 10. EASTERN LIMIT OF THE ARGENTINE CLAIM SINCE 1888.
BY THE TREATY OF SEPT. 7, 1889. THE ARBITRATOR IS INVITED TO AWARD ONE OF
THE TWO LINES: (a) 2 & 3. THE S. ANTONIO AND PEPIRY-GUA4;0, THE PRESENT BOUNDARY
OF BRAZIL; OR (b) 7 & 10, THE CHAPECO (OR PEOUIRY-GUACO) AND JANGADA (OR S. ANTONIO
GUACO) AS CLAIMED BY THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC
A. THE TERRITORY CLAIMED BY THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. FORMING THE GREATEST
PART: OF THE JUDICIAL DIVISION OF PALMAS, STATE OF PARANA, U. S. OF BRAZIL. AREA.,
991 SQ. LEAGUES, OR 11,827 -ENG. SQ. MILES. POPULATION (1890), 5793, OF WHOM 5763
ARE BRAZILIANS AND 30 FOREIGNERS. BUT NOT A SINGLE ARGENTINE CITIZEN.
B. TERRITORY OF MISIONES OCCUPIED BY THE ARGENTINES AFTER THE PARAGUAYAN
WAR.
EXPLICA¢OES.
1, 2, 3 & 4. LIMITE ENTRE 0 BRAZIL E A REPUBLICA ARGENTINA.
6 & 7. LIMITE ORIENTAL DA PRETEN4AO ARGENTINA ANTES DE 1888.
7 & 10. LIMITE ORIENTAL DA PRETEN4AO ARGENTINA DESDE 1888.
PELO TRATADO DE 7 DE SET. DE 1889. 0 ARBITRO t CONVIIDADO A PRONUNCIAR.SE FOR
UMA DAS DUAS LNHAS: (a) 2 & 3. 0 S. ANTONIO E 0 PEPIRY.GUA t. LIMITE ACTUAL DO
BRAZIL; OU (b)7 & 10, 0 CHAPEC6 (OU PEQUIRY-GUAI;O) SEJANGADA (OU S. ANTONIO GUAM,
COMO PRETENDE A REPUBLICA ARGENTINA.
A. TERRITORIO RECLAMADO PELA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA. FORMANDO A MAIOR PARTE
DA COMARCA DE PALMAS, ESTADO DO PARANA, E. U. DO BRAZIL. AREA. 901 LEGUAS Q. OU
11,827 MILHAS INGL. Q. POPUi.ACAO (1890). 5793, DOS QUAES 5763 BRAZILEIRO E 30
ESTRANGEIROS, MAS NENHUM CIDADAO ARGENTINO.
E. TERRITO U0 DE MISIONES OCCUPADO PELOS ARGENTINOS DEPOIS DA GUERRA DO
PARAGUAY.
r,o , • As.
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Annex 128
Declaration on the maritime zone (Chile, Ecuador and Peru), 18 August 1952, 1006 UNTS
325.
No. 14758
` e fi bI=b` r ^a l o
~åÇ=
mbo r
a ÉÅä~ê~íáçå=çå=íÜÉ=ã ~êáíáã É=òçåÉK=páÖåÉÇ=~í=p~åíá~Öç=çå=
NU=^ì Öì ëí=NVRO
^ ì íÜÉåíáÅ=íÉñíW=pé~åáëÜK
oÉÖáëíÉêÉÇ=Äó=` ÜáäÉI=bÅì ~Ççê=~åÇ=mÉêì =çå=NO=j ~ó=NVTSK
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Éí=
mËo l r
a ÝÅä~ê~íáçå=ëì ê=ä~=òçåÉ=ã ~êáíáã ÉK=páÖåÝÉ=Ł=p~åíá~Öç=äÉ=
NU=~çĆí=NVRO
qÉñíÉ=~ì íÜÉåíáèì É=W=Éëé~ÖåçäK
båêÉÖáëíêÝÉ=é~ê=äÉ=` ÜáäáI=äDbèì ~íÉì ê=Éí=äÉ=mÝêçì =äÉ=NO=ã ~á=NVTSK
Vol. 1006, I-14758
POS| | | | | | r åáíÉÇ=k~íáçåë=$=qêÉ~íó=pÉêáÉë= %= k~íáçåë=r åáÉë=$=o ÉÅì Éáä=ÇÉë=qê~áíÝë| | | | | NVTS
[TRANSLATION TRADUCTION]
DECLARATION1 ON THE MARITIME ZONE
1. Governments have the obligation to ensure for their peoples the necessary
conditions of subsistence, and to provide them with the resources for their economic
development.
2. Consequently, they are responsible for the conservation and protection of their
natural resources and for the regulation of the development of these resources in order to
secure the best possible advantages for their respective countries.
3. Thus, it is also their duty to prevent any exploitation of these resources, beyond
the scope of their jurisdiction, which endangers the existence, integrity and conservation
of these resources to the detriment of the peoples who, because of their geographical
situation, possess irreplaceable means of subsistence and vital economic resources in their
seas.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Governments of Chile, Ecuador and
Peru, determined to conserve and safeguard for their respective peoples the natural
resources of the maritime zones adjacent to their coasts, formulate the following
Declaration:
I) The geological and biological factors which determine the existence, conserva
tion and development of marine fauna and flora in the waters along the coasts of the
countries making the Declaration are such that the former extension of the territorial sea
and the contiguous zone are inadequate for the purposes of the conservation, development
and exploitation of these resources, to which the coastal countries are entitled.
II) In the light of these circumstances, the Governments of Chile, Ecuador and Peru
proclaim as a norm of their international maritime policy that they each possess exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea along the coasts of their respective countries to a
minimum distance of 200 nautical miles from these coasts.
III) The exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over this maritime zone shall also
encompass exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over the seabed and the subsoil thereof.
IV) In the case of island territories, the zone of 200 nautical miles shall apply to the
entire coast of the island or group of islands. If an island or group of islands belonging to
one of the countries making the declaration is situated less than 200 nautical miles from
the general maritime zone belonging to another of those countries, the maritime zone of
the island or group of islands shall be limited by the parallel at the point at which the land
frontier of the States concerned reaches the sea.
V) This declaration shall be without prejudice to the necessary limitations to the
exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction established under international law to allow
innocent and inoffensive passage through the area indicated for ships of all nations.
VI) For the application of the principles contained in this Declaration, the
Governments of Chile, Ecuador and Peru hereby announce their intention to sign
agreements or conventions which shall establish general norms to regulate and protect
hunting and fishing within the maritime zone belonging to them, and to regulate and co-
1 Came into force on 18 August 1952 by signature.
Vol. 1006, 1-14758
NVTS| | | | | r åáíÉÇ=k~íáçåë=$=Treaty pÉêáÉë= %= k~íáçåë=r åáÉë=$=o ÉÅì Éáä=ÇÉë=qê~áíÝë| | | | | | POT
ordinale th exploitation and development of all other kinds of products or natural
resources existing in these waters which are of common interest.
Santiago, 18 August 1952.
xpáÖåÉÇz= xpáÖåÉÇz= xpáÖåÉÇz
JULIO o ì áò=BOURGEOIS JORGE FERN NDBZ SALAZAR a êK=ALBERTO ULLOA
Delegate of Chile Delegate of Ecuador Delegate of Peru
xpáÖåÉÇz
FERNANDO GUARELLO
Secretary-General
%1. :006, 1-14758
Annex 129
Agreement relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone (Chile, Ecuador and Peru), 4
December 1954, 2274 UNTS 527.
No. 40521
Chile, Ecuador and Peru
Agreement relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone. Lima, 4 December 1954
Entry into force: 21 September 1967 by the exchange of instruments of ratification
Authentic text: Spanish
Registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations: Chile, 24 August 2004
Chili, Equateur et Perou
Accord relatif A une zone frontiere maritime sp~ciale. Lima, 4 decembre 1954
Entree en vigueur: 21 septembre 1967par change des instruments de ratification
Texte authentique : espagnol
Enregistrement auprs du Secretariat des Nations Unies : Chili, 24 aofit 2004
Volume 2274, 1-40521
(SPANISH TEXT- TEXTE ESPAGNOL]
CONVENIO s0111 ZONA EISPECIAL
F1ONTE11ZA mALrnTIMA
Los Gobiernos de las Rlepiblie-5 do Chile, Ecuador y Per(i, do conformidad
con lo acordado en Ia Resoluei6u NV X, de 8 de Otiubre dc 1954, so'scrita.
en Satitiago do Chile por Ia Comisi6n Permauente de fit Conferpncia sobre
Explotacitn y Con.servA.i6n de las Rique-z-s Maritimas dcl Pacifieo Sur,
Despus de conocer las proposicions %. recomcnda(iones aprobadas en
Octubre dcl aiio en curse per dicha Comisi6n Permanentc,
han nombrado a los siguientes Plcnipotenciarios:
Si Excelencia el sefior Presidente de Ia Repfdbiica de Chile, al Exemo.
sefior don Alfonso Btulnos Calvo, E'nbajador Extraordinario y Plenipoteuciario
de Chile en el Perti;
Su Excelencia el sefior i'residente de Ia epji-',le id E uder, -J E7msefior
do0t Jorge Salvador Lara, Eneiargado do Negocios a.i. del Ecuador en
el Per~i; y
Su Exeelencia el sefior Presidenle de Ia Rcpciblica del Peril, al Exemo.
sefior don David Aguilar Cornejo, linistro de Relacioucs Exteriores del
Peri,
Quienes;
CONSIDERAINDO:
Que Ia experiencia ha demostrado quo debido a Iws dificultades que encuentran
las embarcaviones de poco porte tripuladas per genie de mar con eseases
eononcimientos de ntutica o que earecen de los iistruxnentos necesarios
para determinar con exactitud su posici6n en alta mar, se producen con frecuencia,
de mode inoecnte y accidental, violaciones de ]a frontera niaritima
entre los Estados vecitios;
Que Ia aplicaci6n de sanciones en estos easos produce siempre resentimientos
entre los pe.scadores y frieciones entre los paises que pueden afectar
al espiritu de colaboraei6it y do unidad que en todo memento debe animar a
los paises signatarios de los acuerdos de Santiago; y
Que es conveniente evitar la posibilida-I do estas involuntarias infraceiones
euyas consneencias sufren principalmeute los peadoe.;
CONVIENEN :
PRIMERO: Estabhwes una Zona Esfwial, a partir (1, Ins 12 niillas mariitas
do Ia costa, d 10 millas marinas do aneho a eada lade dei paralelo
rine constituye el Finite maritimo entre los doa paises.
Volume 2274, 1-40521
SEGUNDO: La presencia accidental en ]a referida zona de las embar.
eaciones de cualquiera de los poises liraltrofes, ahudidas en cl primer con-
Aiderando, no ser4 onsiderada como violaei6a de las aguas dc la zona Inaritima,
sin que esto signifique reconocimiento de derecho alguno para ejercer
faenas de pesg. o eaza con prop&sito preconcebido en elicha Zona EspIecial.
TERCERO: La pesea o caza dentro de ls zona de. 12 Inillas marinas a
partir de la costa esti reservada.exlusivamente a los nacionales do cada
pals.
CUARTO: Todo lo establecido en el presente Convenlo se entenderA ser
parte integrante, complementaria y que no deroga Ias resoluciones y acuerdos
adoptados en la Conferenoia obre Explotaci6n y Conservaci6n de las
Riquezas Maritimas del Pacifico Sur, celebrada en Santiago de Chile, en
Agosto de •1952.
EN YE DE Lo cAL, los respectivos Representantes Pleipoteniarios de
los (obiernos de Chile, Dcuador y Perfi, firman este documento en tres
ejemplares, en Lima, a los euatro das del mes de Diciembre de mil noveientos
cincuenticiatro.
POR EL GOBIERNO DE CHILE: ( \L
1o Bu lnas Caivo.
POR EL GOBIERNO DEL ECUADOR:-
a
POR EL GODIERNO DEL PERU:
Dai
Aq
ATCreo
Is'& ze195
Volume 2274. 1-40521
[TRANSLATION - TRADUCTION]
AGREEMENT RELATING TO A SPECIAL MARITIME FRONTIER ZONE
The Governments of the Republics of Chile, Ecuador and Peru, in conformity with the
provisions of Resolution X of 8 October 1954, signed at Santiago de Chile by the Standing
Committee of the Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources
of the South Pacific,
Having noted the proposals and recommendations approved in October of this year by
the said Standing Committee,
Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
His Excellency the President of the Republic of Chile: His Excellency Mr. Alfonso
Bulnes Calvo, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Chile in Peru;
His Excellency the President of the Republic of Ecuador: His Excellency Mr. Jorge
Salvador Lara, Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of Ecuador in Peru; and
His Excellency the President of the Republic of Peru: His Excellency Mr. David Aguilar
Cornejo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru,
who,
Considering that:
Experience has shown that innocent and inadvertent violations of the maritime frontier
between adjacent States occur frequently because small vessels manned by crews with insufficient
knowledge of navigation or not equipped with the necessary instruments have
difficulty in determining accurately their position on the high seas:
The application of penalties in such cases always produces ill-feeling in the fishermen
and friction between the countries concerned, which may affect adversely the spirit of cooperation
and unity which should at all times prevail among the countries signatories to the
instruments signed at Santiago; and
It is desirable to avoid the occurrence of such unintentional infringements, the consequences
of which affect principally the fishermen;
Have agreed as follows:
I. A special zone is hereby established, at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the
coast, extending to a breadth of 10 nautical miles on either side of the parallel which constitutes
a maritime boundary between the two countries.
2. The accidental presence in the said zone of a vessel of either of the adjacent countries,
which is a vessel of the nature described in the paragraph beginning with the words
"Experience has shown" in the preamble hereto, shall not be considered to be a violation of
the waters of the maritime zone, though this provision shall not be construed as recognizing
any right to engage, with deliberate intent, in hunting or fishing in the said special zone.
3. Fishing or hunting within the zone of 12 nautical miles from the coast shall be reserved
exclusively to the nationals of each country.
Volume 2274, 1-40521
4. All the provisions of this Agreement shall be deemed to be an integral and supplementary
part of, and not in any way to abrogate, the resolutions and decisions adopted at
the Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the
South Pacific, held in Santiago de Chile in August 1952.
In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of Chile, Ecuador
and Peru have signed this Agreement in three copies at Lima on 4 December 1954.
For the Government of Chile:
ALFONSO BULNES CALVO
For the Government of Ecuador:
JORGE SALVADOR LARA
For the Government of Peru:
DAVID AGUILAR CORNEJO
Volume 2274, 1-40521
[TRANSLATION - TRADUCTION]
ACCORD RELATIF A UNE ZONE FRONTIERE MARITIME SPIECIALE
Le Gouvernement de la R~publique du Chili, le Gouvernement de l'Equateur et le Gouvernement
du Prou, confon-nment aux dispositions de la R&solution X du 8 octobre 1954,
sign6e Santiago du Chili par la Commission permanente de la Conference sur lexploitation
et la conservation des ressources maritimes du Pacifique Sud,
Ayant pris note des propositions et recommandations approuv~es en octobre de cette
ann~e par la Commission permanente,
Ayant d~sign& leurs Pl~nipotentiaires
Son Excellence le President de la R~publique du Chili : Son Excellence M. Alfonso
Bulnes Calvo, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et pldnipotentiaire du Chili au P6rou,
Son Excellence le Pr&sident de Ia R6publique de l'Equateur : Son Excellence M. Jorge
Salvador Lara, Charg& d'affaires par int6rim de lEquateur du P6rou,
Son Excellence le President de la R~publique du Prou : Son Excellence M. David
Aguilar Cornejo, Ministre des affaires 6trangeres du Perou.
qui,
Consid~rant que l'experience a montr& que la frontibre maritime entre des Etats adjacents
6tait fr~quemment viol~e de rnani~re innocente et par inadvertance parce que les
navires de petite taille dont l'quipage ne connait pas suffisamment la navigation ou qui ne
sont pas 6quip~s des instruments n6cessaires ont du mal A determiner prcis~ment leur position
en haute mer,
Considerant que l'application de peines en pareils cas cre&e toujours un malaise chez
les p&heurs et des frictions entre les pays interess6s, ce qui peut nuire A lesprit de cooperation
et d'unit6 qui devrait en tout temps regner entre les pays signataires des instruments
sign6s i Santiago,
Consid~rant qu'il est souhaitable d'6viter que ne se produisent de telles violations involontaires
dont les consequences sont principalement ressenties par les p~cheurs,
Sont convenus de ce qui suit :
1. Une zone sp&ciale est cr66e par le present Accord , une distance de 12 milles marins
de Ia c6te et avec une largeur de 10 milles marins de part et d'autre du paralldle qui constitue
la frontibre maritime entre les deux pays.
2. La presence accidentelle dans cette zone d'un navire soit d'un pays adjacent du type
decrit A lalin&a du pr&ambule du present Accord commenqant par les mots : " Considrant
que I'exp&rience a montr6" ne sera pas consid&ree comme une violation des eaux de la zone
maritime, cette disposition ne devant toutefois pas tre interprete comme reconnaissant un
droit quelconque de s'adonner dlibrment A la chasse ou Ia p~che dans cette zone sp~ciale.
3. La p&he et la chasse dans la zone de 12 milles marins A partir de la c6te sont
rdservees exclusivement aux ressortissants de chaque pays.
Volume 2274, 1-40521
4. Toutes les dispositions du present Accord sont r~put~es faire partie int~grante et
complkmentaire des r6solutions et d6cisions adopt~es A la Conference sur l'exploitation et
la conservation des ressources maritimes du Pacifique Sud tenue A Santiago du Chili en
aocit 1952 et n'approcher en aucun cas ces r~solutions et dcisions.
EN FOI DE QUOI les P1nipotentiaires respectifs du Gouvernement du Chili, du Gouvemement
de l'Equateur et du Gouvernement du P~rou ont sign6 le present Accord en trois
exemplaires d Lima, le 4 d~cembre 1954.
Pour le Gouvemement du Chili
ALFONSO BULNES CALVO
Pour le Gouvemement de l'Equateur:
JORGE SALVADOR LARA
Pour le Gouvernement du P(rou:
DAVID AGUILAR CORNEJO
Annex 130
Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union Concerning the Sea Frontier in the
Varangerfjord, 15 February 1957, JI Charney & LM Alexander (eds), International Maritime
Boundaries II (Nijhoff 1993) p. 1786.
Norway-Soviet Union
Report Number 9-6
Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union Concerning the Sea
Frontier in the Varangerfjord of 15 February 1957 and Protocol of 29
November 1957
(1) Agreement
Signed : 15 February 1957
Entered into force : 24 April 1957
(2) Descriptive Protocol
Signed: 29 November 1957
Ente red into forc e: 17 March 1958
Published at: Limits in the Seas No. 17 (1970)
I Canadian Annex 77 (1983)
II Libyan Annex No.4 (1983)
I Conforti & Francalanci 3 (1979)
I SUMMARY
This agreement established a relatively short, partial maritime boundary
between Norway and the Soviet Union. There are three agreed points and
two straight lines between them. The boundary is 24.35 nautical miles (n.m.)
long, composed of 12.6 n.m. of territorial sea boundary between the first two
agreed points and 11.75 n.m. of continental shelf boundary between the second
and third agreed points, all within the mouth of the Varangerfjord. The two
countries are never much more than 24 n.m. apart. The boundary does not
extend into the Barents Sea: negotiations about the delimitation of the Barents
Sea have been held for many years, but no agreement has been signed. The
methods of delimitation were influenced by special factor s, notably a
Norwegian baseline and the shape of the fjord's mouth. Equidistance was
used at the northernmost of the three defined points. The agreement established
a pragmatic boundary in an unusual legal and geographical situation
in the mouth of a major gulf.
J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander {eds), International Maritime Boundaries. 1781-17 89.
© 1993 The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
1782 Report Number 9-6
II CONSIDERAnONS
Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
As a result of the cession by Finland of the Petsamo area to the Soviet Union ,
the latter acquired a frontier with Norway. Norway is a member of NATO;
the Soviet Union is a member of the Warsaw Pact. The entire boundary runs
through an area which is politically and strategically sensitive. Possibly for
that reason , the maritime boundary was demarcated by reference marks . The
boundary begins at the end point (frontier mark No. 415) of the land frontier
drawn in 1947 by agreement between the two states .
2 Legal Regime Considerations
The areas delimited are, first , territorial sea and then a narrow 'neck' of continental
shelf. The legal regime was important in that a turning point was fixed
at the intersection of the Norwegian 4 n.m. territorial sea with the Soviet 12
n.m. territorial continental shelf. Provisions for the settlement of disputes
were not included, but provision was made for the establishment of a joint
boundary commission, charged with the tasks of marking the boundary. The
Commission drew up a detailed protocol, setting out calculations and known
as the 'Descriptive Protocol' in English.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
These considerations did not affect the course of the boundary. Both sides had
fishing interests in the general area but factors to do with the territorial sea,
frontiers, and baselines predominated. In January 1978, a fisheries agreement
was concluded, creating the so-called gray zone where fisheries claims overlapped
in the area to the north of Varangerfjord .
4 Geographic Considerations
The Varangerfjord is a major gulf off the Barents Sea: the Norway/Soviet
Union land frontier reaches the sea on the southern side of the fjord's wide
mouth . The coasts are straight and adjacent at Marker No. 415, which is the
end point of the land boundary, situated half a nautical mile offshore. The
Soviet coast runs east before curving around to the north, with the result that
the coasts become opposite in the vicinity of the third point. The second point
of the maritime boundary is the place where the 4 n.m. territorial sea of Norway
(measured from a straight baseline from Cape Kibergnes to Marker No. 415)
intersects with the 12 n.m. territorial sea of the Soviet Union measured from
an unnamed cape just to the east of Marker No. 415. The boundary is a straight
line between the point of intersection and Marker No. 415, running on a bearing
of 30° 04.7" . The final point of the boundary is the midpoint on a straight
Norway-Soviet Union 1783
line drawn from Cape Kibergnes (Norway) to Cape Nemetsky (Soviet Union)
where the two coasts have become opposite. This line is 27 n.m . long so that
the midpoint is joined to the center point of the boundary by a straight line,
running between opposite coasts across a narrow 'neck' or wedge of continental
shelf. Coastal configurations were not relevant in establishing the
continental shelf boundary, except to the extent that the third point lies half
way between two opposite capes.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
No such features were relevant in this case. Had the method of equidistance
been used, the question of the weight to be accorded to a Soviet island called
Kheynya-Saar might have arisen.
6 Baseline Considerations
Norway had established a straight baseline, about 30 n.m. long, across the
mouth of the Varangerfjord from Marker No. 415 to Cape Kibergnes . (Drawing
a straight baseline to the border marker may be considered unusual.) From
this baseline, Norway measured its 4- n.m. territorial sea. However, in the
southern part of the area, Norway could not claim the Soviet Union's territorial
sea, measured from the coast. The Soviet Union subsequently drew
straight baselines along its own coast. The Norwegian baseline gave the
terminus of the land boundary. The baseline was used in fixing the position
of the second point on the maritime boundary. The Soviet baseline did not
affect the agreed boundary.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
The bed of the fjord's mouth, which descends deeper than 200 meters, is featureless.
Geological and geomorphological considerations were not taken into
account in deciding upon the precise course of the boundary.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
The method used was to draw straight lines between the three agreed points:
(i) Marker No. 415; (ii) the intersection of the Norwegian 4 n.m. limit
(measured from the Norwegian baseline) with the Soviet 12 n.m. limit
(measured from the coast); and (iii) the midpoint between two capes.
The method used for establishing the line between the first two points is
unprecedented. As regards the third point, the choice of the midpoint on the
closing line amounts to a use of equidistance. However, the boundary itself
is not an equidistance line. Proportionality was not a factor, although
the boundary does not appear disproportionate from a glance at the map .
The boundary runs , broadly speaking, across the broad mouth of the gulf,
1784 Report Number 9-6
leaving plenty of water on either side for access from the fjord to the Barents
Sea.
9 Technical Considerations
The Joint Commission calculated the coordinates of the three defined points
on the 1932 Pu1kova system in the sixth six-degree zone having as its axis
the meridian of 33° E. Norwegian and Soviet charts on the scale of 1 : 100,000
were annexed to the agreement.
10 Other Considerations
None.
III CONCLUSIONS
This is a special case in that the boundary runs through or very close to the
territorial seas of the parties in the mouth of a gulf. It responds to the situation
caused by drawing a straight baseline to a previously agreed boundary
marker. The boundary is not based on equidistance, but it represents a pragmatic
solution acceptable to both sides in the circumstances which prevailed.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
None existed when the agreement was signed
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Norway: 4-n.m. territorial sea
Soviet Union: 12-n.m. territorial sea
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
No change has taken place in the breadth of the respective territorial seas;
both states have enacted legislation about the continental shelf and have
claimed exclusive economic zones of 200 n.m.
V REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READING
l .R.V. PRESCOTI. THE M ARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 264-66(1985)
Prepared by D.H. Anderson
U.S.S.R.
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1786 Report Number 9-6
Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union Concerning
the Sea Frontier in the Varangerfjord
Article 1
The sea frontier between Norway and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
in the Varangerfjord shall follow a straight line from frontier mark No. 415
(spar buoy) , which is the terminal point of the frontier drawn in 1947, to the
intersection of the outer limits of Norwegian and Soviet territorial waters. The
said frontier is indicated on the attached Soviet chart, which is drawn on the
scale 1 : 100,000.
Neither of the Contracting Parties shall extend its territorial waters beyond
the straight line extending from the intersection referred to in the first paragraph
of this article to the median point of the line between Cape Nemetsky
and Cape Kibergnes. The said straight line is indicated on the aforementioned
chart by a dotted line.
Article 2
The Contracting Parties shall establish, on a footing of equality, a Joint SovietNorwegian
Boundary Commission, which shall calculate the geographical
co-ordinates of the point of intersection of the outer limits of the territorial
waters and of the median point of the line between Cape Nemetsky and Cape
Kibergnes, which are referred to in article 1, shall set up reference marks
whereby the location of the Norwegian-Soviet sea frontier in the Varangerfjord
can be determined, and shall prepare the necessary documents.
The Joint Commission shall begin its work not later than May 1957 and
shall endeavor to complete it before the end of the same year.
All expenses incurred in connection with the said work shall be equally
apportioned between the Contracting Parties .
Norway-Soviet Union 1787
Article 3
This Agreement shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the
exchange of the instruments of ratification.
The instrument of ratification shall be exchanged at Moscow as soon as
possible.
DONE at Oslo on 15 February 1957 in two copies in the Norwegian and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic .
By authorization
of the Royal
Norwegian Government:
Peder Holt
By authorization
of the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics:
G. I. Tunkin
The Descriptive Protocol of November 29, 1957, set forth the following principles
:
The Joint Soviet-Norwegian Commission for the Demarcation of the Sea
Frontier between the USSR and Norway hereby declares that, in conformity
with the Agreement of 15 February 1957 between the Royal Norwegian
Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
concerning the sea frontier between Norway and the USSR in the
Varangerfjord, it has calculated the geographical and rectangular co-ord inates
of the point of intersection of the outer limits of the Norwegian and Soviet
territorial waters and of the median point of the line between Cape Nemetsky
and Cape Kibergnes and has also set up reference marks indicating the location
of the Norwegian-Soviet sea frontier.
The initial point of the sea frontier between Norway and the USSR in the
Varangerfjord is frontier mark No. 415 (spar buoy) , which is also the terminal
point of the Norwegian-Soviet frontier demarcated in 1947. The geographical
and rectangular co-ordinates of frontier mark No. 415 (spar buoy)
according to the documents for the demarcation of the State frontier between
Norway and the USSR signed at Moscow on December 1947 are as follows:
Latitude =69° 47' 46.14"
Longitude =30° 49' 09.85"
x =7,746,912.1
Y =6,415,943 .7
From frontier mark No. 415 (spar buoy), the sea frontier between Norway and
the USSR runs in a straight line in a north-north-easterly direction to the
terminal point of this frontier, which is the point of intersect ion between the
outer limit of the Norwegian territorial waters, situated four nautical miles to
the east of and parallel with a straight line between Cape Kibergnes and frontier
mark No. 415 (spar buoy), and the outer limit of the Soviet territorial waters,
1788 Report Number 9-6
situated twelve nautical miles from the northern extremity of the unnamed
cape on the Soviet coast east of the frontier river Grense Jakobselv (Vorema).
The geographical and rectangular co-ordinates of the terminal point of the
sea frontier, having been calculated analytically, are as follows:
Latitude = 69° 58' 50.22"
Longitude = 31° 06' 23.11"
x = 7,767,110.9
Y = 6,427,642.7
The bearing angle of the Norwegian-Soviet sea frontier from frontier mark
No. 415 (spar buoy) to the point of intersection of the outer limits of the
Norwegian and the Soviet territorial waters in the Varangerfjord (the terminal
point of the sea frontier) is 30° 04.7" or 33 g. 4199.
The length of the sea frontier is 12.6 nautical miles.
The co-ordinates of the terminal point of the sea frontier were calculated
on the basis of the co-ordinates of frontier mark No. 415 (spar buoy) , as
determined in 1947, and of the co-ordinates of Cape Kibergnes and of the
unnamed Soviet Cape, as determined by the Joint Commission in 1957.
The geographical and rectangular co-ordinates of Cape Kibergnes are as
follows:
Latitude =70° 17' 17.79"
Longitude =31° 03' 51.00"
x =7,801,466.0
Y =6,427,119.0
The geographical and rectangular co-ordinates of the unnamed Soviet Cape
are as follows:
Latitude =69° 47' 07.25"
Longitude = 30° 59' 29.92"
x = 7,745,479.8
Y =6,422,541.3
In the demarcation of the Norwegian-Soviet sea frontier in the Varangerfjord
in 1957, the Joint Soviet-Norwegian Commission also calculated the co-ordinates
of the median point of the line between Cape Nemetsky and Cape
Kibergnes. The co-ordinates of this point are as follows:
Latigude =70° 07' 19.98"
Longitude =31° 30' 27.29"
x = 7,782,476.8
Y =6,443,355.5
The co-ordinates of this point were calculated on the basis of the above-mentioned
co-ordinates of Cape Kibergnes and the following co-ordinates of Cape
Nemetsky.
Norway-Soviet Union 1789
Latitude =69° 57' 18.28"
Longitude =31° 56' 38.11"
x =7,763,488.5
y =6,459,592.0
All the geographical and rectangular co-ordinates calculated by the Joint
Commission and referred to in this Descriptive Protocol are given in the 1932
Pulkova System in the sixth six-degree zone having as its axis the meridian
thirty-three degrees east of Greenwich. If converted to other systems, these
co-ordinates will differ from the figures given here. These co-ordinates were
calculated on the same geodetic basis as was used for the 1947 demarcation .
The geographical co-ordinates are given in north latitude and in longitude east
of Greenwich. The terminal point of the sea frontier and the median point of
the line between Cape Nemetsky and Cape Kibergnes have been calculated
with a margin of error of ten meters. With regard to the calculation of the
other points the co-ordinates of which are given in this Protocol, the degree
of accuracy corresponds to that of the geodetic network on which the calculation
is based.
The annexes to this Descriptive Protocol are as follows:
(1) Norwegian and Soviet charts on the scale 1 : 100,000 showing the
sea frontier between Norway and the USSR.
(2) Protocol relating to the reference marks, together with a sketch map.
(3) Sketches of the reference marks.
(4) Photographs of the reference marks.
(5) Topographical map on the scale 1 : 10,000 of the area in which the
reference marks are situated.
(6) Description of the beacon apparatus, with a diagram of the light-sectors
of the reference marks on the reverse side.
(7) Instructions for the servicing and maintenance of the reference marks.
This Descriptive Protocol together with all the annexes thereto shall require
the approval of the Royal Norwegian Government and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and shall enter into force on the date
on which the notices of such approval are exchanged.
DONE at Moscow on 29 November 1957 in two copies in the Norwegian
and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Annex 131
Exchange of Notes between France and Portugal Regarding the Maritime Boundary between
Senegal and Portuguese Guinea, 26 April 1960, JI Charney & LM Alexander (eds),
International Maritime Boundaries I (Nijhoff 1993) p. 873.
Guinea-Bissau-Senegal*
Report Number 4-4
(1) Exchange of Notes between France and Portugal of 26 April 1960
Published at: Limits in the Seas No. 68 (1976)
I Canadian Annex 89 (1983)
II Libyan Annex No.6 (1983)
(2) Award of Arbitral Tribunal of 31 July 1989
Published at: Annex to the Application of Guinea-Bissau to the International
Court of Justice of 23 August 1989
(3) Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (GuineaBissau
v. Senegal) Request for Indication of Provisional Measures
Order
Published at: 1990 ICJ Reports 64
29 ILM 624 (1990)
I SUMMARY
The delimitation dispute between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal was submitted
to arbitration since the parties had failed to reach a negotiated settlement. They
maintained conflicting positions on the first question which they referred to
the Arbitral Tribunal; the question was whether the agreement concluded by
an exchange of letters on 26 April 1960 between France and Portugal and
which relates to the maritime frontier has the force of law in the relations
between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. This agreement establishes as the
boundary for the territorial sea, contiguous zone, and continental shelf 'a
straight line, running at 240°, starting from the intersection of the extension
of the land boundary and the low water mark.'
Guinea-Bissau was of the view that the agreement could not be invoked
* This delimitation has been included here for purposes of completeness. At the time of completion
of this summary, the case was pending before the International Court of Justice.
J.I. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds), International Maritime Boundaries, 867-874.
© 1993 The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
868 Report Number 4-4
against it, while Senegal was of the view that the agreement had the force of
law between the parties. The second question of the 'compromis' was the
following: 'in the event of a negative answer to the first question, what is the
course of the line delimiting the maritime territories appertaining to the
Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Senegal respectively?'
On 31 July 1989, the Tribunal rendered an award by a majority of two to
one that the 1960 agreement did have the force of law between the parties.
Since the first question was answered affirmatively, the Tribunal did not answer
the second question. The President, who voted in favor of the award, made a
declaration stating that he would have answered the first question of the 'compromis'
by adding that the agreement of 1960 did not have force of law with
respect to the exclusive economic zone and that such an answer would have
empowered the Tribunal to deal with the second question.
Guinea-Bissau instituted proceedings with the International Court of Justice
on 23 August 1989, asking the Court to declare the award nonexistent because
'one of the two arbitrators making up the appearance of a majority in favour
of the text of the "award" has, by a declaration appended to it, expressed a
view in contradiction with the one apparently adopted by the vote' and to
declare it also void because the Tribunal did not give a complete answer to
the questions raised and the boundary of the exclusive economic zone was
still undetermined.
II CONSIDERATIONS
1 Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
Upon the initiative of Guinea-Bissau, negotiations concerning the delimitation
of the maritime boundary between the two countries began in 1977, against
a background of conflicting national claims reflecting their different positions
on the question of applicability of the exchange of letters (agreement) of 26
April 1960 between France and Portugal. This exchange of letters established
the boundary of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, and continental shelf
demarcated by 'a straight line running at 240°, starting from' the intersection
of the extension of the land boundary and the low water mark.
Negotiations continued from 1977 and failed to yield any results. On 12
March 1985, a 'compromis' was signed by the two states submitting the dispute
to an Arbitral Tribunal which rendered its decision on 31 July 1989, agreeing
with Senegal that the treaty of 1960, establishing the said boundary, had the
force of law between the parties. The Tribunal thus answered only the first
question.
2 Legal Regime Considerations
In the award, the Tribunal recognized that in 1960, when the boundary was
established by the said agreement, the concept of the exclusive economic
Guinea-Bissau-Senegal 869
zone had not been established. Accordingly, the legal regime of the 1960
boundary only comprised territorial sea, contiguous zone , and continental
shelf.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
While economic issues were considered by the Tribunal on the basis of claims
by Guinea-Bissau asserting that the application of the 1960 boundary was a
violation of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources , the
Tribunal rejected this claim.
4 Geographic Considerations
Since the Tribunal decided that the 1960 agreement and the boundary established
had the force of law between the parties, it did not have to take into
account the geographic considerations of the two adjacent states . However,
an analysis of the 2400 azimuth used by the 1960 exchange of letters and the
coastline in the area suggests that the azimuth reflects a compromise based
upon the general direction of the coasts of the two territories. The azimuth of
2400 bisect s the angle formed by lines approximating the general direction s
of the coasts of Senegal and of Guinea-Bissau.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-TIde Elevations Considerations
Similarly, the Tribunal did not consider these questions since it only answered
the first question upholding the 1960 agreement. However, the choice of the
2400 azimuth in an area in which numerous islands are present suggests that
islands played no role in the instant delimitation even though they do affect
the location of the hypothetical equidistant line.
6 Baseline Considerations
While the Tribunal did not raise the question of baselines, the 2400 azimuth
used in the 1960 exchange of notes is not drawn by the use of baselines. Nor
do closing lines or other straight baselines appear relevant to this line.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
The Tribunal did not consider these issues. In any case, the 1960 line does
not appear to coincide with any geological or geomorphological feature.
8 Method of Delimitation Considerations
The Tribunal upheld the delimitation by the 1960 agreement which was a
straight line running at 2400
, starting from the intersection of the extension
of the land boundary and the low water mark.
870 Report Number 4-4
9 Technical Considerations
The Tribunal was of the view that the boundary line demarcated by the 1960
agreement was not geodetic, but loxodromic.
10 Other Considerations
None.
III CONCLUSIONS
Since the Tribunal only considered and answered the first question submitted
to it by the parties, concerning the applicability or non-applicability of the
agreement of 1960, the award dealt primarily with legal issues relating to
this question. Accordingly, it did not consider other issues relating to delimitation
of a maritime boundary which would have confronted it had it answered
the second question.
However, an analysis by this author of the 1960 line established by the
exchange of notes suggests that it reflects a compromise based upon a division
of the angle formed by the general direction of the coasts of the two territories.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
Guinea-Bissau: Ratified the 1982 LOS Convention
Senegal: Ratified the 1982 LOS Convention
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
Guinea-Bissau: 12-mile territorial sea, 200-mile exclusive economic zone
Senegal: 12-mile territorial sea, 200-meter depth for the outer edge of the
continental shelf
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
Guinea-Bissau: No change
Senegal: 200-mile exclusive economic zone
V REFERENCES
None.
Prepared by Andronico O. Adede
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872 Report Number 4-4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Decree No. 60-504 of May 25, 1960, Publishing the Exchange of Notes
between France and Portugal Regarding the Maritime Boundary
between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea, Signed April 26, 1960.
On the report of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Considering Articles 52-55 of the Constitution;
Considering Decree No. 53-192 of March 14, 1953, concerning the ratification
and publication of international commitments undertaken by France,
The President of the Republic hereby decrees:
Article 1
The Exchange of Notes between France and Portugal regarding the maritime
boundary between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea, signed April 26, 1960,
shall be published in the Journal Officiel of the French Republic.
Article 2
The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall be responsible
for carrying out this decree.
Done at Paris, May 25, 1960.
C. de Gaulle
By the President of the Republic:
Michel Debre
Prime Minister
Maurice Couve de Murville
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guinea-Bissau-Senegal 873
Embassy of France in Portugal
Lisbon, April 26, 1960
His Excellency
Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,
President of the Council,
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lisbon.
Mr. President:
Pursuant to the talks held in Lisbon September 8-10, 1959, with a view to
defining the maritime boundary between the Republic of Senegal and the
Portuguese Province of Guinea, taking into account the Geneva Conventions
of April 29, 1958, drafted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, I have the honor, on behalf of the French Republic and the Community,
to propose to Your Excellency the following:
To the external limit of the territorial seas, the boundary would be defined by
a straight line, running at 2400
, starting from the intersection of the extension
of the land boundary and the low-water mark, represented for that purpose
by the Cape Roxo light.
With regard to the contiguous zones and the continental shelf, the delimitation
would consist of the straight line extension in the same direction of the
territorial sea boundary.
In the spirit of friendship and neighborly relations that has always existed
between our countries, the competent authorities would favor, as appropriate,
mutual cooperation between natural or juristic persons authorized to exercise
rights on one side or the other of the line defined above.
I should be grateful if Your Excellency would inform me whether these proposals
meet with the approval of the Portuguese Government.
Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my very high consideration.
Signed: B. de Menthon
874 ReportNumber 4-4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Office of the Minister
Lisbon, April 26, 1960
Mr. Ambassador:
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note of April
26, 1960, which reads as follows:
[Same text as above note]
I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the terms of your note transcribed
above meet with the approval of the Portuguese Government, with the
understanding that the aforesaid note and this reply shall constitute the instruments
of the agreement reached on the subject between the two Governments.
I take this opportunity to present to you, Mr. Ambassador, the assurance of
my highest consideration.
A. O. Salazar
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Annex 132
Agreement between The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal, 4 June 1975, JI Charney & LM
Alexander (eds), International Maritime Boundaries I (Nijhoff 1993) p. 854.
The Gambia-Senegal
Report Number 4-2
Agreement between The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal
Signed: 4 June 1975
Entered in force: 27 August 1976
Published at: Limits in the Seas No. 85 (1979)
Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-84) 100 (1987)
I Canadian Annex 377 (1983)
II Libyan Annex No. 43 (1983)
II Conforti & Francalanci 39 (1987)
VIII New Directions 104 (1980)
I SUMMARY
This agreement establishes the northern and southern maritime boundaries of
The Gambia and Senegal. The northern boundary follows the parallel of latitude
13° 35' 36" N. The southern boundary follows, after a small curve, the parallel
of latitude 13° 03' 27" N. The parties deliberately chose to use this delimitation
method instead of the equidistance method which could have had a cut-off
effect on the Gambian exclusive economic zone.
II CONSIDERAnONS
1 Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations
There was no particular political, historical, or strategic reason which led to
the actual delimitation of the boundary in question. As indicated in the agreement,
the two governments were motivated to fix the maritime boundary
between them in an effort to establish and maintain favorable conditions for
development and cooperation between them and to preempt possible future
problems.
J.1. Charney and L.M. Alexander (eds), International Maritime Boundaries, 849-855.
© 1993 The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
850 Report Number 4-2
2 Legal Regime Considerations
The agreement establishes both the northern and the southern maritime boundaries
between The Gambia and Senegal, without distinguishing between the
different zones of jurisdiction. It may be considered as an all-purpose boundary.
No outer limit to the boundaries is specified in the delimitation.
3 Economic and Environmental Considerations
There is no evidence that specific economic or environmental considerations
influenced the decision of the parties regarding the locations of the boundaries.
4 Geographic Considerations
The coasts of The Gambia and Senegal are adjacent and, apart from the Gambia
River, the coasts of the two parties run in a roughly north-south direction.
Since Senegalese territory extends both north and south of The Gambia, two
maritime boundaries were established. To avoid a cut-off effect on the Gambian
maritime area, the equidistant line method of delimitation was not used.
5 Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations Considerations
The decision to use parallels of latitude in the delimitation in order to achieve
an equitable delimitation was intended to avoid the influence which offshore
features would have on the location of the boundary had other methods of
delimitation been used.
6 Baseline Considerations
There is no evidence that baselines other than those from which the territorial
sea is normally measured were taken into account in the delimitation of
the boundaries in question. Since the boundary was based on parallels of
latitude and not on the use of the equidistance method, no baseline controled
the course of the boundary beyond the starting point.
7 Geological and Geomorphological Considerations
If the equidistant line were used, the coastal configuration of the two adjacent
states would have dictated a delimitation that was bound to cut off the maritime
area of The Gambia close to shore. There is no evidence that known subsoil
resources influenced the choice of the delimitation method for the boundary.
The Gambia-Senegal 851
8 Methods of Delimitation Considerations
The northern boundary is a straight line following the parallel of latitude 13°
35' 36" N and is an extension of the land boundary. The southern boundary,
except for a very small portion at its beginning which constitutes a slight
curve, extends along the parallel of latitude 13° 03' 27" N.
9 Technical Considerations
The boundaries were defined on the basis of the French chart No. 6125 on
the scale of 1 : 300,500 (latitude 13° 40').
10 Other Considerations
None.
III CONCLUSIONS
This is another example of a maritime boundary delimitation negotiated by
the parties outside the context of a specific dispute. By agreeing to use the
parallels of latitude, instead of an equidistance method, which could have
resulted in a cut-off of the Gambian maritime area, the parties confirmed
their aim of achieving an equitable delimitation. The delimitation was to be
considered permanent and not to have an adverse effect on the delimitation
of the maritime boundary between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, which was the
subject of a third party procedure which also resulted in a boundary aimed at
avoiding cut-off effects ((1989) No. 4-4). It also indicates that parties may
agree to use the land boundary in the delimitation of their maritime boundary.
IV RELATED LAW IN FORCE
A Law of the Sea Conventions
The Gambia: Ratified the 1982 LOS Convention
Senegal: Party to all four 1958 Geneva Conventions; ratified the 1982 LOS
Convention
B Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed at the Time of Signature
The Gambia: 12-mile territorial sea, 18-mile contiguous zone, 100-mile fishing
zone
852 ReportNumber 4-2
Senegal : 12-mile territorial sea, 200-meter depth for the outer edge of the
continental shelf
C Maritime Jurisdiction Claimed Subsequent to Signature
The Gambia: 200-mile exclusive economic zone
Senegal: 200-mile exclusive economic zone
V REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READINGS
LIMITS IN THE SEAS No. 85 (1979)
Prepared by Andronico O. Adede
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854 Report Number 4-2
Agreement between The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal
The Government of the Republic of Senegal and The Government of the
Republic of The Gambia
Considering the ties of friendship existing between their two nations;
Being motivated by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations
and the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity;
Determined to establish and to maintain between them conditions favourable
for the development of co-operation between the Republic of Senegal and
the Republic of The Gambia;
Desiring to settle peacefully the problem of the maritime boundaries between
States;
Have concluded between them the present Treaty fixing the maritime boundaries
between the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of The Gambia, and
have agreed as follows:
Article One
The maritime boundary to the North commences from the point of intersection
of the land boundary with the coast and follows the parallel of latitude
13° 35' 36" North.
Article Two
The maritime boundary to the South commences from the point T of intersection
of the land boundary situated to the South of the River Allahein (or
San Pedro) with the coast and of which the co-ordinates are:
Latitude: 13° 03' 51" North;
Longitude: 16° 44' 49" West.
The Gambia-Senegal 855
From point T, the maritime boundary proceeds in a south-westerly direction
as far as point M of which the co-ordinates are:
Latitude: 13° 01' 21" North;
Longitude: 16° 45' 19" West.
From point M, the maritime frontier proceeds in a northerly direction as
far as point P of which the co-ordinates are:
Latitude: 13° 03' 27" North;
Longitude: 16° 45' 22" West.
From point P, the maritime frontier follows the parallel of latitude 13° 03'
27" North.
Article Three
The boundaries defined in Articles One and Two above have been delimited
on the basis of the French Chart No. 6125 on the scale of 1 : 300,500 (latitude
13° 40') agreed by the Government of the Republic of The Gambia and the
Government of the Republic of Senegal and of which an enlarged extract is
annexed to the present Treaty.
PART II - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article Four
The present Treaty will be ratified by each State according to its own constitutional
procedures.
It will enter into force from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Article Five
The Treaty will be registered at the Secretariat-General of the United Nations
Organisation at the Secretariat-General of the Organisation of African Unity
and at the Permanent Senegalo-Gambian Secretariat.
Done at Banjul, on 4th June 1975 in two original texts in the French language
and the English language, both texts being equally authentic.
On behalf of the Republic of Gambia:
Sir Dawda Kairaba JAWARA
For the Republic of Senegal:
Leopold Sedar SENGHOR.
Annex 133
Agreement concerning delimitation of marine and submarine areas and maritime co-operation
(Colombia and Ecuador), 23 August 1975, 996 UNTS 239.
No. 14582
COLOMBIA
and
ECUADOR
Agreement concerning delimitation of marine and subma
rine areas and maritime co-operation. Signed at Quito
on 23 August 1975
Authentic text: Spanish.
Registered by Colombia and Ecuador on 13 February 1976.
COLOMBIE
et
EQUATEUR
Accord relatif à la délimitation des zones marines et sousmarines
et à la coopération maritime entre les deux
Etats. Signé à Quito le 23 août 1975
Texte authentique : espagnol.
Enregistré par la Colombie et l'Equateur le 13 février 1976.
Vol. 996, 1-14582
240______United Nations — Treaty Series • Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités 1976
[TRANSLATION TRADUCTION]
AGREEMENT1 CONCERNING DELIMITATION OF MARINE AND
SUBMARINE AREAS AND MARITIME CO-OPERATION BETWEEN
THE REPUBLICS OF COLOMBIA AND ECUADOR
The Governments of the Republics of Colombia and Ecuador, having regard to
the productive friendship prevailing in relations between their two countries, and
considering:
that their identical interests in the South Pacific region make it necessary to
establish the closest co-operation between them, with a view to adopting appropriate
measures for the preservation, conservation and rationalization of the resources to
be found in the marine and submarine areas over which they currently exercise or
may in future exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or surveillance;
that it is their duty to ensure for their people the necessary conditions for sub
sistence and to provide them with means for their economic development, and that
they must therefore use the resources they possess for their benefit and prevent their
despoliation;
that it is expedient to delimit their respective marine and submarine areas;
have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
His Excellency the President of Colombia: Mr. Indalecio Li vano Aguirre,
Minister for Foreign Affairs;
His Excellency the President of Ecuador: Mr. Antonio Jos Lucio Paredes,
Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Who have agreed:
Article 1. To designate the line of the geographical parallel traversing the
point at which the international land frontier between Ecuador and Colombia
reaches the sea as the boundary between their respective marine and submarine
areas, which have been established or may be established in the future.
Article 2. To establish, beyond the twelve-mile limit from the coast, a special
zone, ten miles wide, on either side of the parallel forming the sea boundary between
the two countries, to ensure that the fortuitous presence of small private fishing
craft from either country in the aforesaid zone is not considered a violation of the
maritime frontier. This does not imply recognition of any right to engage in fishing
or hunting in the special zone.
Article 3. To recognize and respect the conditions for the current or future
exercise by each of the two States of sovereignty, jurisdiction or surveillance in the
marine and submarine areas adjacent to their coasts up to a distance of 200 miles, in
accordance with the requirements established or to be established by each country
and with the provisions of their respective laws.
Article 4. To recognize the right of each of the two countries to establish the
base lines from which the width of the territorial sea is to be measured, using the
1 Came into force on 22 December 1975 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which took place at
Bogota, in accordance with article 10.
V»!.996, t-14583
1976 United Nations — Treaty Series • Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités 241
system of straight base lines connecting the most salient points on their coasts, and
to abide by the provisions which they have adopted or may adopt fo.r that purpose,
Article 5, To develop the broadest possible co-operation between the two
countries for the protection of the renewable and non-renewable resources to be
found in the marine and submarine areas over which they exercise or may in the
future exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or surveillance and for the use of such
resources for the benefit of their peoples and for their national development.
Article 6. To afford each other all possible facilities for activities connected
with the exploitation and use of the living resources of their respective territorial sea
areas, through the exchange of information, co-operation in scientific research,
technical collaboration and encouragement of the establishment of joint enterprises.
Article 7. To co-ordinate, as far as possible, the enactment of laws and
regulations by each country in the exercise of its sovereignty, concerning the issue of
fishing licences and permits.
Article 8. To extend the fullest possible international co-operation for the co
ordination of the conservation measures applied by each State in the sea areas under
its sovereignty or jurisdiction, particularly in respect of species travelling beyond the
areas under its national jurisdiction, taking into account the recommendations of
the regional agencies concerned and the most accurate and up-to-date scientific
data. Such international co-operation shall not affect the sovereign right of each
State to adopt, within the framework of its maritime jurisdiction, such rules and
regulations as it deems appropriate.
Article 9. To extend the fullest possible co-operation to promote the expedi
tious conduct of international shipping operations in the seas under the sovereignty
or jurisdiction of each State.
Article 10, This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange
of instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Bogota.
Article 11.
authentic.
This Agreement is signed in duplicate, both texts being equally
DONE at Quito, on 23 August 1975.
For the Government
of the Republic of Colombia:
(Signed]
INDALECIO LI VANO AGUIRRE
Minister for Foreign Affairs
For the Government
of the Republic of Ecuador:
[Signed]
ANTONIO JOS Lucio PAREDES
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Vol.996, I-14582
Annex 134
Convention concerning the State frontier line established between the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania and the Kingdom of Morocco (with map), 14 April 1976, 1035 UNTS 120.
No. 15406
MAURITANIA
and
MOROCCO
Convention concerning the State frontier line established
between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the
Kingdom of Morocco (with map). Signed at Rabat on
14 April 1976
Authentic text: French.
Registered by Mauritania and Morocco on 9 February 1977,
MAURITANIE
et
MAROC
Convention relative au tracé de la frontière d'État établie
entre la République islamique de Mauritanie et le
Royaume du Maroc (avec carte). Signée à Rabat le
14 avril 1976
Texte authentique : français.
Enregistrée par la Mauritanie et le Maroc le 9 février 1977.
Vol. 1035,1-15406
120 United Nations — Treaty Series • Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités 1977
[TRANSLATION TRADUCTION]
CONVENTION1 CONCERNING THE STATE FRONTIER LINE
ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
MAURITANIA AND THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO
His Excellency the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and His
Majesty the King of Morocco,
With reference to the Advisory Opinion given by the International Court of
Justice on 16 October 1975 2 recognizing the existence of legal ties of allegiance be
tween the King of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of the Sahara
and the existence of rights, including some rights relating to land, which constituted
legal ties with the Mauritanian entity,
In conformity with the Declaration of Principles signed at Madrid on 14 No
vember 1975, 3 transferring the responsibilities and powers held by Spain over the
Sahara to the Interim Administration in which Morocco and Mauritania would
participate in collaboration with the Jemaa,
Bearing in mind the view expressed by the Jemaa meeting in special session on
26 February 1976,
Have decided to conclude this Convention and, to that end, have appointed as
their plenipotentiaries:
Mr. Hamdi Ould Mouknass, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and
Dr. Ahmed Laraki, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs,
Who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form,
have agreed as follows:
Article I. The High Contracting Parties have decided by common agreement
that the State frontier established between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and
the Kingdom of Morocco shall be defined by a straight line running from the point at
which the Atlantic coastline intersects the 24th parallel North to the point of intersec
tion of the 23rd parallel North and the 13th meridian West; the intersection of that
straight line with the present frontier of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania consti
tuting the south-eastern limit of the frontier of the Kingdom of Morocco.
From the latter point the frontier shall follow the present frontier of the Islamic
Republic of Mauritania northwards to a point represented by the co-ordinates
824/500 and 959 as shown on the initialled map annexed to this Convention.4
Article II. The State frontier between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and
the Kingdom of Morocco, as defined in article I above, shall constitute the land fron
tier and shall also represent the vertical delimitation of sovereignty over air space and
the subsoil. The continental shelf shall be delimited by the 24th parallel North.
1 Came into force on 10 November 1976 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which took place at
Rabat, in accordance with article V.
2 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, l.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12.
3 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 988, p. 257.
4 See insert in a pocket at the end of this volume.
Vol. 1035,1-15406
1977 United Nations — Treaty Series • Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités 121
Article HI. A Moroccan-Mauritanian Mixed Commission is hereby estab
lished with a view to proceeding to the demarcation on the ground of the frontier be
tween the two countries as defined in article I above.
Article IV. On the conclusion of its work, the Mixed Commission shall draw
up an instrument stating that the Moroccan-Mauritanian frontier has been marked.
The said instrument shall be annexed to this Convention.
Article V, This Convention shall enter into force on the date of the exchange
of the instruments of ratification in conformity with the constitutional procedures in
force in the two countries.
Article VI. On entry into force, this Convention shall be registered with the
Secretariat of the United Nations in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed both copies of
this Convention.
DONE at Rabat on 14 Rabii Attani 1396 (14 April 1976)
For the Islamic Republic For the Kingdom
of Mauritania: of Morocco:
[Signed] [Signed]
HAMDI OULD MOUKNASS AHMED LARAKI
Vol. 1035,1-15406
Volume III - Annexes 77-134