United Nations S/RES/1373 (2001)
Security Council Distr.: General
28 September 2001
01-55743 (E)
*0155743*
Resolution 1373 (2001)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on
28 September 2001
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of
12 September 2001,
Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which
took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001,
and expressing its determination to prevent all such acts,
Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism,
constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368
(2001),
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist
acts,
Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of
terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism,
Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist
acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the
relevant international conventions relating to terrorism,
Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by
taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all
lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,
Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its
declaration of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security
Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every State
has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
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S/RES/1373 (2001)
1. Decides that all States shall:
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or
indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the
funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry
out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate
in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf
of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons
and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories
from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other
related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who
commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of
terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities
or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of
members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts,
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist
acts, or provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from
using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their
citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought
to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such
terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and
regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist
acts;
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support
of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession
necessary for the proceedings;
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border
controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and
through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity
papers and travel documents;
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3. Calls upon all States to:
(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational
information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or
networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or
sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the
threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;
(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law
and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts;
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements
and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against
perpetrators of such acts;
(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;
(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions
1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);
(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of
national and international law, including international standards of human rights,
before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker
has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;
(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not
abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims
of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the
extradition of alleged terrorists;
4. Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism
and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal armstrafficking,
and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other
potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance
coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in
order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to
international security;
5. Declares that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing,
planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations;
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of
the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of
appropriate expertise, and calls upon all States to report to the Committee, no later
than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to
a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to
implement this resolution;
7. Directs the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme
within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support it
requires, in consultation with the Secretary-General;
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8. Expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure
the full implementation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities
under the Charter;
9. Decides to remain seized of this matter.
Annex 51
The Honorable Juan C. Zarate
Chairman and Co-Founder
Financial Integrity Network
Former Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy National Security Advisor for Combatting Terrorism
Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes
Testimony before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs
Understanding the Role of Sanctions Under the
Iran Deal
May 24, 2016
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Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member Brown, and distinguished members of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, I am honored to be with you today to
discuss the role and significance of sanctions in the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is an ongoing and unfolding agreement, with significant
implications for how the United States continues to leverage its economic and financial influence
to affect Iranian behavior and counter its nefarious activity. This is an important moment for the
United States to examine Iranian activity around the globe soberly and determine how best to
proceed with the agreement and against the Iranian threat.
When the JCPOA was being debated, I expressed deep concerns and reservations about its
structure, demands, and effects on U.S. interests, especially in anticipation of increased Iranian
belligerence and adventurism. In detailed testimony before both this Committee and the Senate
on Foreign Relations Committee, I explained that the JCPOA was fundamentally flawed, in part
because it would empower and enrich the regime and ultimately constrain our ability to use the
most effective financial and economic tools of isolation to counter dangerous Iranian behavior.
With strategic patience, Iran can march toward a weaponized program with greater capabilities,
breakout capacity, and more economic resources, resilience, and connectivity to the global oil
markets and commercial system. Even if Iran complies with all elements of this deal, Tehran will
end up with an unfettered opportunity to break out and weaponize its nuclear program, overtly or
covertly, along with an ability to arm itself and its allies more openly and aggressively. The end
state of the agreement takes us far afield from the declared goal of successive administrations at
the start of negotiations.
The structure, processes, and nature of this agreement give Iran the benefit of the doubt that it is
pursuing a peaceful program, when the onus should remain on Iran to prove the peaceful nature
of its program, as constructed in the prior, relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).
Ultimately, what we negotiated and promised was Iran’s reintegration into the global economic
system. The JCPOA sacrifices the ability of the United States to use its financial and economic
power and influence to isolate and attack dangerous and problematic Iranian activity – beyond
the nuclear program. Beyond simple sanctions relief, we negotiated away one of our most
important tools of statecraft – the very financial and economic coercion that helped bring the
Iranian regime to the table. Though “non-nuclear” sanctions were supposedly off the table, the
spirit and letter of the agreement neuters Washington’s ability to leverage one of its most
powerful tools – its ability to exclude rogue Iranian actors and activities from the global financial
and commercial system.
As I explained last year, promising Iranian reintegration into the global system was not possible
unless we were willing to defang our sanctions regime and ignore Iranian behavior; rehabilitate
the perception of the Iranian regime ourselves; and take the most effective tools of financial
isolation off the table.
This is a critical point as Iran continues the range of dangerous activities that have been the
subject of sanctions and international opprobrium. In the wake of the JCPOA implementation,
these activities have included the following:
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1. Iran has conducted repeated ballistic missile tests in violation of UN resolutions,
including earlier this month according to Iranian news reports, and promises further tests.
The launch in March also coincided with Vice President Biden’s visit to Israel.
2. Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Qods
Force, traveled twice to Moscow in contravention of international travel bans to
coordinate military cooperation with the Russian government, to include the delivery of
the S-300 system to Iran and defense of the Assad regime in Syria.
3. Iran remains the leading state sponsor of terror and has continued its direct support to
terrorist proxies throughout the region, to include Hizballah’s activities in Lebanon and
Syria, as well as Iraqi Shi’ite militias who were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of
Americans in Iraq and are now deployed in Syria to fight for the Assad regime. Iran’s
support of terrorist proxies is intended to destabilize regional governments allied with the
United States, and the Gulf States have uncovered and interdicted Iranian arms shipments
to militias. In recent months, international naval forces have interdicted Iranian arms
shipments likely headed to Houthi rebels in Yemen.
4. Iran has deployed troops – regular and from the IRGC – to Syria to fight for and defend
the Assad regime, with reports of thousands on the ground. Qassem Soleimani continues
to appear at key battlefronts throughout Syria, and the Iranians help funnel Iraqi, Afghani,
and Pakistani Shi’ite militias into the battlefield.
5. Iran has continued to engage in human rights abuses and the restriction of democratic
norms. In the run up to recent parliamentary elections, Iran disqualified thousands of
individuals from running1 and continues to hold the leaders of the Green Movement
under house arrest.
6. Iran detained two Iranian-American citizens, a father and son, in October 2015 and
February 2016, and continues to hold them. In addition, Robert Levinson remains
missing after disappearing on Kish Island on March 9, 2007.
7. On January 12, 2016, Iranian naval forces arrested American sailors at gunpoint,
broadcasting the video of their detention, and subsequently mocking the sailors through a
reenactment at a rally commemorating the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. The
Iranians detained the American sailors days before the implementation of the JCPOA,
and hours before the President’s State of the Union address.
8. Iran continues to develop its cyber capabilities and has engaged in malicious cyberattacks
against U.S. government sites, the U.S. private sector, and specific individuals. In March
2016, the Department of Justice indicted seven individuals who worked for the IRGC and
1 Sam Wilkin, “Iran excludes most candidates in elite assembly election,” January 26, 2016.
(http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-candidates-idUSKCN0V419V)
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carried out attacks on forty-six (46) American banks (including JPMorgan Chase, Bank
of America, Capital One, and PNC Bank), the New York Stock Exchange, AT&T, and
the Bowman Dam in a suburb of New York. In February 2014, Iran launched a
cyberattack against the Las Vegas Sands Corporation.
Much of this activity is not a surprise, but it cannot be dismissed as simply the bad behavior of a
recalcitrant IRGC or extremists within the Iranian system. In the Iranian system, these actions are
blessed by the Supreme Leader, designed to promote the interests of the regime, and calculated
to test the will of the West.
Importantly, the nature of the regime, its control of the economy, and its willingness to use the
financial system to pursue all its goals internally and externally has not changed. The Iranian
system is corrupt, lacks transparency at all levels, and is centrally controlled by the regime. This
– along with the uncertainty of how the JCPOA will unfold – ultimately creates enormous risk
for legitimate international actors and companies considering doing business in or with Iran. This
explains why there has not been a wave of Western businesses investing aggressively or
operating directly in Iran. It further explains why the Iranian leadership continues to complain
that the United States has not satisfied its side of the bargain.
Exposing the Risky Nature of the Iranian Regime
The risks are real for the international business and banking communities, given the nature of the
regime, the opacity of its economy, its continued dangerous and threatening activities, and
remaining sanctions.
The constriction campaign that brought Iran to the negotiating table was premised on the
suspicion of Iran’s behavior and use of its financial and commercial system for illicit and
dangerous purposes. The U.S. Treasury targeted Iran’s banks by using Iran’s own conduct – its
proliferation activity, support for terrorist groups and Shi’ite militias, and lack of anti-moneylaundering
controls, as well as the secretive and corrupt nature of the regime itself – as the
cornerstone of the campaign. Iran’s suite of suspect activities and attempts to avoid
international scrutiny spurred the private sector to stop doing business with Iran. No reputable
bank has wanted to be caught facilitating Iran’s nuclear program or helping it make payments to
Hizballah terrorist cells around the world. If they did, they would be caught and sanctioned,
with enormous reputational and business consequences. These concerns continue.
This produced a virtuous cycle of isolation that reduced Iranian access to the international
financial system more and more over time. The more the Iranians tried to hide their identities or
evade sanctions, the more suspect their transactions would appear and the riskier it would
become for banks and other financial institutions to deal with them. Over time, bank accounts,
lines of credit, and correspondent accounts were shut down. Iran’s own actions to avoid
scrutiny and obfuscate transactions led to greater financial constriction.
The Iranians deepened their greatest vulnerability. They blended legitimate business
transactions with illicit ones by funneling them through similar conduits. The Iranian regime
often tried to hide the nature of its transactions and the identities of the government entities
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involved. They used front companies, cut-outs, and businessmen to acquire items and goods
abroad that were hard to purchase, sanctioned, or tied to their nuclear ambitions or their
weapons programs.
At the same time, the Iranian military was taking greater control of the nation’s economy.
Importantly, the predominant economic player was Iran’s IRGC, the elite military and security
unit founded in 1979. The IRGC has gained more power and influence over time as the
protector and exporter of the revolution and reports directly to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei.
The IRGC is an economic juggernaut, with responsibilities related to the development of
weapons of mass destruction, missile systems, and overseas operations. It is deeply involved in
the Iranian nuclear program, and its international arm, the Qods Force (IRGC-QF), is
responsible for providing support to terrorist proxies and exporting the Iranian Revolution.
Between them, the IRGC and its Qods Force are responsible for all the activities – weapons
proliferation, terrorist support, and militant activity – for which Iran was sanctioned in the past.
The IRGC – with its vast network – has embedded itself into more industries within Iran,
ultimately building what has been called a veritable business empire.2 The regime and the
IRGC’s control of “charitable” foundations – known as bonyads – with access to billions of
dollars of assets in the form of mortgages and business interests for veterans of the Iranian
military – served as the baseline of its economic power, along with its ability to construct
infrastructure through a corps of engineers. The reach of the IRGC’s economic empire now
extends to majority stakes in infrastructure companies, shipping and transport, beverage
companies, and food and agriculture companies.3
In 2006, the IRGC acquired control of the Iranian telecommunications sector, and it began to
control more elements of the nation’s energy sector, including the development of pipelines and
the valuable South Pars oil field. This allowed the IRGC to exclude competition and make it
more difficult for legitimate international businesses to operate. Some estimates note that the
IRGC controls between 25 and 40 percent of Iran’s gross domestic product (GDP).4 The IRGC
is deeply involved in building Iran’s infrastructure, pursuing projects such as deep-water ports
and underground facilities important to Iran’s defense and economy. These projects and
industries give the IRGC political power and access to profits and capital.
The IRGC intervenes in Iran’s economy through three principal channels: The IRGC
Cooperative Foundation (its investment arm), the Basij Cooperative Foundation, and Khatam
al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters. The Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA), a massive IRGC
conglomerate, was designated by the United States as a proliferator of weapons of mass
2 Frederic Wehrey, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, & S. R.
Bohandy, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2009).
3 Emanuele Ottolenghi, The Pasdaran: Inside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Washington,
DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2011), pages 44–45.
4 Ibid, page 43.
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destruction.5 It is Iran’s biggest construction firm and, according to some estimates, “may be its
largest company outright, with 135,000 employees and 5,000 subcontracting firms.”6 The value
of its current contracts is estimated to be nearly $50 billion, or about 12% of Iran’s gross
domestic product.7 KAA has hundreds of subsidiaries in numerous sectors of Iran’s economy
including its nuclear and defense programs, energy, construction, and engineering. The
company is also involved in “road-building projects, offshore construction, oil and gas
pipelines and water systems.”8 EU sanctions against the company will be lifted after eight
years, whether or not the IAEA concludes that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful.
These three companies are direct shareholders of almost three hundred known businesses. My
colleagues at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies have created a database of these
companies and board members and provided it to the U.S. government.9 As a result of the
IRGC’s control of the economy – control that has grown over time – together with sanctions
relief, the risk of regime control over the economy will grow. In addition, the reality and risks
of Iranian sanctions evasion, money laundering, the lack of transparency, and other financial
crimes – the subject of international concern and U.S. regulatory action against Iran under the
USA PATRIOT Act Section 311 – will increase, not decrease over time.
With the IRGC in control of an increasing share of the Iranian economy, including its
infrastructure, telecommunications, and oil sector, risks of doing business in and with Iran will
increase. The regime will continue to use its control of the economy not only to further enrich
itself but also to suppress internal opposition brutally and ensconce its rule. The concerns over
human rights abuses and regime kleptocracy will grow.
As I have noted in the past, sanctions relief will increase risks over time, and Iran’s foreign
policy will continue to challenge and threaten U.S. interests.
From the U.S. perspective, the blend of IRGC and regime activities created the ultimate
vulnerability, particularly the blurred lines between legitimate industry and support for Iran’s
nuclear program and terrorist groups. Wire transfers to terrorist groups and front companies
flooding money into the coffers of the Revolutionary Guard were actions seen to threaten not
only international security but also the integrity of the financial system. The nefarious nature of
5 Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for
Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” October 25, 2007. (http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94193.htm)
6 Parisa Hafezi & Louis Charbonneau, “Iranian Nuclear Deal Set to Make Hardline Revolutionary Guards Richer,”
Reuters, July 6, 2015. (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/06/us-iran-nuclear-economy-insig…);
Emanuele Ottolenghi & Saeed Ghasseminejad, “The Nuclear Deal’s Impact on
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, July 17, 2015.
(http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/emanuele-ottolenghi-the-nuclea…)
7 Benoît Faucon & Asa Fitch, “Iran’s Guards Cloud Western Firms’ Entry After Nuclear Deal,” The Wall Street
Journal, July 21, 2015. (http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-guards-cloud-western-firms-entry-afte…-
1437510830)
8 Ibid.
9 Iranian Official Journal, accessed July 20, 2015. (http://www.gazette.ir/)
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the activities, tied with the IRGC’s attempts to hide its hand in many of its economic dealings
and operations, made Iran’s financial activity inherently suspect. This has not changed.
As part of past efforts to exclude Iran from the financial system, the U.S. Treasury made the
argument directly to banks and companies around the world that it was too risky to do business
with Iran, since no one really knew who was lurking behind corporate veils, pulling the strings,
and accessing bank accounts and funding in Tehran. Would banks be willing to risk their
reputations by doing business, even inadvertently, with the IRGC or the Qods Force? Could
their compliance officers guarantee that they knew who was behind their Iranian customers and
transactions? Was trade with Iran worth the risk of access to American markets and banks?
All of this was amplified by parallel national legislation, UNSCRs, greater scrutiny from
authorities around the world, and enforcement actions, led by the United States. The United
States created a layered sanctions regime, with overlapping Executive Orders, designations, and
eventually legislation, focused on the key elements of the Iranian regime and economy
facilitating illicit and dangerous behavior. Each U.S. action spurred private sector and allied
responses. The effects of this suspicion and isolation – driven by the private sector’s risk
calculus and government actions – had a real world impact.
Iranian banks, including its central bank, could no longer access the international financial
system; its shipping lines could not traverse ports easily or obtain insurance to operate; and –
thanks to congressional and international action – its oil sales and revenues were suspended.
Iran had to create workarounds, evasion schemes, and bartering arrangements to continue to do
business.
The Central Bank of Iran (CBI) itself has been designated in part because of broader sanctions
evasion facilitation on behalf of the Iranian banking system. Treasury issued a finding in
November 2011, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act that Iran, as well as its entire
financial sector including the CBI, is a “jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern.”10
Treasury cited Iran’s “support for terrorism,” “pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,”
including its financing of nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and the use of “deceptive
financial practices to facilitate illicit conduct and evade sanctions.”11 The country’s entire
financial system posed “illicit finance risks for the global financial system.”12 Those concerns
persist and are not alleviated by the JCPOA or any Iranian nuclear commitments or actions.
The concerns about the integrity of the Iranian financial system are international in nature. The
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global standard setting and assessment body for antimoney
laundering, counter-terrorist financing, and counter-proliferation financing, has labeled
Iran – along with North Korea – “a high risk and non-cooperative jurisdiction.” FATF has
10 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Finding That the Islamic Republic of Iran is a Jurisdiction
of Primary Money Laundering Concern,” November 18, 2011. (http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/
Documents/Iran311Finding.pdf)
11 Ibid.
12 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Fact Sheet: New Sanctions on Iran,” November 21,
2011. (http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1367.aspx)
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called on its members to “apply effective counter-measures to protect their financial sectors
from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from Iran.”13
As recently as February 19, 2016, FATF issued a statement warning that Iran’s “failure to
address the risk of terrorist financing” poses a “serious threat … to the integrity of the
international financial system.”14 The international community recognizes that Iran – regardless
of the status of its nuclear program – poses a real and serious threat to the integrity of the global
financial system.
This financial and economic isolation was premised on the actions and nature of the Iranian
regime itself. Since the announcement of the JCPOA, neither has changed. On the contrary, Iran
has demonstrated its desire to continue its aggressive activities and support to causes and
groups directly antithetical to U.S. interests.
The risks from Iran are real and will increase in an environment of sanctions unwinding under
the JCPOA for a variety of reasons.
In the first instance, the unfettered return of funds to the Iranian regime will allow Tehran the
flexibility to fund its allies and proxies and flex its muscles in the region. Regardless of
amounts available to the regime or percentage used to support terrorist proxies, there will be an
infusion of terrorist financing into the global system. The administration has acknowledged that
some of the unfrozen funds will go to support terrorist and militant groups, like Hizballah,
HAMAS, Iraqi Shi’ite militias, and the Houthis in Yemen. This is certainly the expectation of
Iran’s allies. Iran could even use its capital to support the Taleban and al Qaida, with which Iran
has maintained a relationship and provided support in the past.
With Iran expanding its reach and presence throughout the Middle East, and IRGC commanders
and proxies positioned from the Golan to Yemen, there will be more concern about Iran’s
misuse of the economy, the benefits of sanctions relief, and the international financial and
commercial system for dangerous and illicit activities. The infusion of cash as a result of
sanction relief will relieve budgetary constraints for a country that had only an estimated $20
billion in fully accessible foreign exchange reserves prior to November 201315 but was
spending at least $6 billion annually to support Assad.16
The regime itself, and its core institutions like the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC, will
benefit most immediately and deeply. Iran is a theocratic regime that controls the key elements
of the economy. The mullahs have used their control of the economy – through bonyads and the
13 The Financial Action Task Force, Public Statement, “FATF Public Statement 19 February 2016,” February 19,
2016. (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisd…-
2016.html)
14 Ibid.
15 Mark Dubowitz & Rachel Ziemba, “When Will Iran Run Out of Money?,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies
& Roubini Global Economics, October 2, 2013.
16 Eli Lake, “Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad,” Bloomberg, June 9, 2015.
(http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-09/iran-spends-billions-t…)
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Supreme Leader’s vast financial network, known as Setad or EIKO, and which is worth tens of
billions of dollars, to enrich themselves and exert more control over the country.
Despite the notion that the JCPOA resolves all “nuclear-related” concerns, it does not address
real concerns over continued Iranian proliferation, to include missile and arms trade. With the
allowance for an Iranian nuclear program, infrastructure, and research, the deal will likely
increase (not decrease) the risk of proliferation – with potential Iranian trade and exchange with
rogue third countries like North Korea.
The dangers, challenges, and risks from Iran on a regional and global scale will only increase
over time. In the wake of the JCPOA, Secretary of State Kerry stated that we will need to “push
back” against Iran’s provocative and dangerous policies and tactics. CIA Director John Brennan
said that the United States will “keep pressure on Iran” and “make sure that it is not able to
continue to destabilize a number of the countries in the region.”17
Indeed, the United States will need to push back, especially against increasing risks and threats
from Iran. This has been evident in the wake of the JCPOA Implementation Day. To do this, the
United States will want to use its financial and economic tools and strategies to make it harder,
costlier, and riskier for Iran to threaten the U.S. and our allies. This will mean devising and
deploying aggressive strategies to exclude key elements of the Iranian regime and the IRGC,
Qods Force, and Ministry of Intelligence from the global financial and commercial system.
The Risks of Doing Business in Iran
On January 16, 2016, the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and other
countries unwound a substantial number of sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran as part of
their obligations under the JCPOA. Most notably, many EU and UN sanctions, as well as many
U.S. “secondary” sanctions, will no longer remain in force. “Primary” U.S. sanctions programs
barring almost all U.S. persons from doing Iran-linked business remain.18
In the wake of Implementation Day and with remaining sanctions and financial crime concerns,
important questions exist regarding what doing business in or with Iran now means and how to
evaluate and manage such risk.
As Iran attempts to reintegrate into the world economy, many challenges remain for companies
considering doing business in the Islamic Republic, with Iranian counterparties, or supporting
customers operating in Iran. Dealing with the spectrum of risk – financial crime, regulatory,
17 “CIA Director Says US Will Keep Pressure on Iran over Nuclear Capabilities No Matter Outcome of Ongoing
Talks,” Fox News, March 23, 2015. (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/03/23/cia--director--says--us--
will--keep--pressure--on--iran--over--nuclear--capabilities/)
18 Primary sanctions are those that apply directly to (1) the activities of U.S. persons (including persons located in
the United States), (2) non-U.S. persons who cause U.S. persons to violate U.S. sanctions regulations, (3) activities
taking place within the United States, and (4) transfers of U.S.-regulated goods, services, and technologies.
Secondary sanctions apply to non-U.S. persons where the United States lacks jurisdiction to impose primary
sanctions. Such sanctions often include privileging a company’s access to U.S. markets on compliance with U.S.
sanctions regulations.
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reputational, and policy – in the Islamic Republic will require that U.S., European, Asian, Middle
Eastern, and other firms clearly understand the patchwork of sanctions that will remain in place
on the country, as well as many of the systemic issues, such as corruption, impacting various
Iranian business sectors. Companies must also factor into their business decisions the risk that
sanctions may “snap back” in the medium or long term.
The risks are amplified by Iran’s long history of sanctions evasion, illicit finance and corruption,
and opaque financial and commercial practices. In 2015, Emanuele Ottolenghi produced a
report19 for the Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies detailing the various illicit and suspicious methods used by the Iranian regime to
operate in the global financial and commercial system – including the establishment of
sophisticated procurement networks and use of gatekeepers to facilitate financing.
This complicated risk environment has dissuaded most legitimate companies from re-entering
and investing in the Iranian economy. While Iranian markets may appear attractive, companies
considering transacting with persons in Iran or doing business in Iran are proceeding with
caution. The recent parliamentary elections in Iran have not altered this analysis or trajectory
fundamentally. Companies considering doing business in Iran or with Iranian persons must
contend with at least eight sanctions and financial crimes-related risks:
1. Primary U.S. Sanctions. Most U.S. primary sanctions, which broadly prohibit U.S.
persons from conducting transactions in Iran, with persons resident in Iran, or with the
Government of Iran, will remain in force. These U.S. primary sanctions pose significant
risks for any multinational company considering doing business in Iran. U.S. jurisdiction
is broad and U.S. regulators can use it to target transactions that may not initially appear
to touch U.S. markets or involve U.S. persons.
U.S. jurisdiction applies to all U.S. individuals (including U.S. citizens and permanent
resident aliens, wherever located, as well as persons located in the United States) and
entities (including any entity located or operating in the United States, organized under
the laws of the United States, as well as foreign branches of U.S. entities). Further, the
United States may impose penalties (civil or criminal) on any foreign person who causes
a U.S. person to violate sanctions regulations.20
For example, if a Middle Eastern, European, or Asian financial institution conducts
transactions on behalf of an Iranian company and the transaction involves a U.S. bank or
a correspondent account located in the United States, U.S. regulators will likely have
jurisdiction over the transaction and can impose penalties on the non-U.S. financial
institution. Similarly, if a Middle Eastern exporting company with U.S. offices relies on
those offices for back office functions for transactions related to Iran or with an Iranian,
the U.S. offices providing back office support will be engaged in the prohibited
exportation of services to Iran (and can be subject to OFAC penalties). Where the Middle
19 Report available upon request.
20 See 50 U.S.C. § 1705.
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Eastern entity caused the U.S. offices to provide the services without knowledge of the
Iranian nexus, U.S. regulators could impose fines on that Middle Eastern entity for
causing the U.S. offices to violate the sanctions.
Even those U.S. companies taking advantage of the new General License H – which
permits foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to engage in certain activities in Iran –
will face significant sanctions-related risks. While these subsidiaries may be allowed to
conduct those activities, if the U.S. parent company is involved in any Iran-related
business or transactions, it will likely be exposed to U.S. primary sanctions.21
Multinational companies must build a firewall between U.S. parents and any foreign
subsidiary doing business with Iranian persons or in Iran, which may be difficult to
effectively do in practice
Because the breadth of U.S. jurisdiction is expansive, companies based in Europe and
Asia must be aware that any engagement with Iran may still expose them to remaining
U.S. sanctions. Companies, particularly ones operating across borders, have to pay
careful attention to whether they may be subject to U.S. jurisdiction, which might pose
one of the most pressing regulatory risks that any company considering entering Iranian
markets will face.
2. Remaining U.S. Secondary Sanctions. Foreign businesses considering doing business in
Iran will continue to face the risk of violating remaining “secondary sanctions” on Iran,
which prohibit foreign financial institutions and other non-U.S. headquartered companies
from doing certain business with Iran. While many of the secondary sanctions imposed
since 2010 have been unwound,22 non-U.S. persons are still at risk for violating
remaining U.S. secondary sanctions if they engage in transactions with any one of more
than 200 people and entities listed as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) including
the IRGC and its affiliates.
21 Note that U.S. parent companies are permitted to establish policies and procedures that allow these foreign
subsidiaries to conduct business in Iran and with Iranian persons, though after the initial decision to re-engage in
Iran-related business and the establishment of procedures for doing so, U.S. persons cannot be involved in the
activities of their foreign subsidiaries relating to transactions with Iranian persons or in Iran. Similarly, U.S.
companies can make their automated computing, accounting, and communications systems available for their
subsidiaries conducting permitted activities in Iran. In effect, this permits foreign subsidiaries doing permitted
business in Iran to continue to use the same computer systems as their parent companies. Note however that
provision does not allow U.S. parents to otherwise be involved in those activities in any way.
22 Following Implementation Day, non-U.S. entities can now conduct certain transactions with:
The financial and banking industry in Iran, including maintaining correspondent accounts for non OFACdesignated
Iranian financial institutions, the provision of financial messaging services, dealing in the rial
and in Iranian sovereign debt, and issuing credit cards for Iranians;
Insurance-related activities consistent with the JCPOA, including payment of claims to non-U.S. persons;
The energy industry;
Shipping, shipbuilding, and port operations;
Precious and raw/semi-finished metals dealers; and
The automotive industry, insofar as non-U.S. goods, technology, and services are involved.
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These restrictions pose additional and significant risks because under U.S. law, entities
owned or controlled 50% or more by designated persons – so-called “shadow SDNs” –
are by law also considered SDNs. For example, if a foreign financial institution processes
transactions on behalf of an entity that is owned or controlled by the IRGC (whether or
not that entity is listed on national or international lists of designated parties), it could be
subject to U.S. secondary sanctions. This creates significant risk for financial institutions
and other companies wishing to do business in Iran, given that the IRGC controls a
significant portion of the economy.23 This risk is further exacerbated by Iranian attempts
to create a “gold rush” psychology in the marketplace and to muddy the waters regarding
what restrictions may apply to specific transactions. We should expect Iranian customers
and counterparties to alter ownership interests, names of entities, and ownership
structures in an attempt to hide links to designated parties. This would match past
practices of sanctions evasion and obfuscation of financial transactions in the past.
Determining whether a customer, partner, or counterparty is owned or controlled by a
designated person will be a challenging task, further complicated by the fact that the
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the United States Department of the
Treasury has provided limited guidance on how companies looking to do business in Iran
can determine whether they are inadvertently doing business with the IRGC. OFAC
recommends only that “a person considering business in Iran or with Iranian persons
conduct due diligence sufficient to ensure that it is not knowingly engaging in
transactions with the IRGC or other Iranian or Iran-related persons on the SDN List and
keep records documenting that due diligence.” Businesses looking to enter the Iranian
market must make their own determinations about what constitutes “sufficient” due
diligence without more precise guidance and while the structure of civil and criminal
penalties for sanctions violations remains in place.
Further, non-U.S. persons still need to be aware of remaining U.S. export controls. For
example, restrictions still apply regarding the facilitation of Iranian acquisition or
development of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, transfers of certain potential
dual-use materials must be approved via the procurement channel established by the
JCPOA. U.S. origin goods, technology, and services also are subject to the Export
Administration Regulations, which retain prohibitions on exports and re-exports to Iran.
3. Remaining EU and UN Sanctions. While most EU and UN sanctions on Iran have been
unwound, a number of important restrictions remain in place.24 Under EU law, trade
23 Estimates vary on how much of the Iranian economy is controlled by the IRGC, with many analysts suggesting
the IGRC controls as much as 35%.
24 Under EU law, several engagements previously prohibited, including associated services, are now allowed so long
as they avoid dealing with listed Iranian persons:
Financial, banking, and insurance measures involving Iranian entities—including the provision of insurance
to Iranian oil and gas shipments—are now permitted by EU law and do not require prior authorization;
The import, purchase, swap, and transport crude oil and petroleum products, gas, and petrochemical
products from Iran, and the export of equipment to Iran for use in the energy industry are now permitted;
Engagements with the Iranian shipping, shipbuilding, and transport sectors are no longer restricted;
Trade with Iran involving gold, other precious metals, banknotes, and coinage is now permissible;
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restrictions on the sale, export, provision, or servicing of goods deemed to be “internal
repression equipment,” or used for “telecommunications surveillance and interception,”
remain in place. Likewise, the EU will continue to impose asset freezes and prohibitions
on business and trade with individuals and entities designated for committing human
rights abuses and restrictions on the trade of certain items related to nuclear proliferation.
UN Security Council Resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program
were terminated on Implementation Day. Thus, the United Nations no longer imposes
limits on providing insurance and reinsurance products to Iranian entities, and no longer
prohibits the opening of new Iranian bank branches or subsidiaries outside Iran (nor is
there a mirrored prohibition on entities from UN member states doing the same within
Iran). However, a UN arms embargo and UN sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile
program remain in place. Further, some individuals designated by the UN for
participating in nuclear and ballistic missile programs remain designated.25 The recent
missile tests and Iranian promises for more simply exacerbate the risk that additional
sanctions will be applied.
4. Likely Additional Sanctions. Businesses interested in entering Iran should be aware that
additional designations and sanctions are likely as the United States Congress continues
to focus on illicit Iranian behavior and as Iran continues with activities such as ballistic
missile testing and the provision of support to terrorist groups. Congress has explored
additional sanctions legislation, in particular related to more stringent sanctions tied to
the IRGC and its ownership and control interests. Though the administration will resist
actions that appear to re-impose lifted sanctions, both the House of Representatives and
the Senate appear interested in pursuing legislation that directly or indirectly impacts
Iran, including the recent legislation imposing additional sanctions on Hizballah.
The administration has wanted to demonstrate its willingness to sanction non-nuclear
Iranian behavior, both to stave off additional congressional action and address Iranian
threats to U.S. interests. It has not wanted, however, to impose sanctions or financial
measures that would allow Iran to claim that the United States had violated the terms of
the JCPOA. Since Implementation Day, the Treasury Department has twice used ballistic
While the sale or transfer of certain graphite and raw/semi-finished metals to any Iranian entity is no longer
prohibited, such activity is subject to an authorization regime; and
While the sale or transfer of Enterprise Resource Planning software to any Iranian entity for use in
activities consistent with the JCPOA is no longer prohibited, such activity is subject to an authorization
regime.
Like the United States, the EU has also delisted certain entities that are thus no longer subject to its asset freeze,
prohibition to make funds available, and visa ban. However, certain financial institutions such as Ansar Bank, Bank
Saderat Iran, Bank Saderat PLC, and Mehr Bank remain listed by the EU.
25 Pursuant to the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 (2015) (which endorsed the
JCPOA), all prior United Nations Security Council Resolutions mandating sanctions on Iran— namely, UNSCR
1696 (2006), 1737 (2007), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015) — were formally
terminated upon receipt of the IAEA’s report verifying that Iran has met its nuclear-related obligations under the
JCPOA. Through UNSCR 2231, the UN continues to impose certain restrictions on nuclear, conventional arms, and
ballistic missile-related activities involving Iran.
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missile-related designations – in January 2016, designating 11 entities and individuals
involved in procurement on behalf of Iran’s ballistic missile program, and then again in
March 2016, designating additional parties tied to the missile program. Companies are
aware that additional Iranian individuals, companies, and related networks could be
designated, effectively requiring an end to any financial or commercial relationship.
This risk increases as Iran engages in activities that spur additional U.S. and possibly EU
sanctions. In addition to its support to terrorist groups and the Assad regime, its ballistic
missile program, and human rights abuses, there are other risks attendant to doing
business with Iran. Iran’s link with North Korea, and in particular its cooperation on
proliferation and ballistic missile-related issues, increases the likelihood that the United
States and the European Union will impose additional sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
For example, in late January, France requested the European Union consider imposing
additional sanctions on Iran for its continued ballistic missiles activities.
5. Iran’s Potential Cheating on the JCPOA. If the United States or other members of the
P5+1 conclude that Iran is cheating on its obligations under the JCPOA, they can snap
back many of the sanctions into place. In the context of any potential snapback, OFAC
has made clear that there will be no “grandfather” clause for pending transactions,
meaning foreign companies doing business in Iran would need to very quickly wind
down their operations, potentially at a significant loss. While the Obama Administration
will be unlikely to push for a comprehensive snapback of sanctions unless there is a
serious, material breach of the JCPOA, Treasury Department officials have made it clear
that they have developed more limited snap back mechanisms in the case that Iran pushes
the envelope and engages in activities that violate its obligations. Similarly, depending on
the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November 2016, candidates have
expressed a desire to re-impose sanctions on Iran. Such action could pose serious risks
for foreign companies doing business in the Islamic Republic.
6. Sanctions Violations Enforcement Posture. The United States Department of the
Treasury has indicated it will continue to aggressively enforce regulations remaining in
place. For example, acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence Adam Szubin noted, following Implementation Day, that “[w]e have
consistently made clear that the United States will vigorously press sanctions against
Iranian activities outside of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – including those
related to Iran’s support for terrorism, regional destabilization, human rights abuses, and
ballistic missile program.” Indeed, the day after JCPOA Implementation Day, the U.S.
government imposed sanctions on entities and individuals in the Middle East and Asia for
supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program. These types of sanctions will be used to help
demonstrate to Iran and U.S. allies that Washington remains prepared to use economic
measures to enforce existing sanctions. In addition, Iran’s history of using a variety of
financial and commercial measures to hide its hand to evade sanctions and the scrutiny of
the international community adds additional risk that sanctions may be applied.
7. Regulatory Risk from Multiple Enforcement Agencies. From a regulatory and
enforcement perspective, it is important to note that the Treasury Department and OFAC
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are not the only arbiters of sanctions violations and requirements. The United States
Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, state prosecutors, and
various New York authorities, such as the Department of Financial Services, will all play
a significant role in how existing sanctions regulations and related laws are enforced.
Local authorities may elect to take a more aggressive enforcement posture with respect to
sanctions violations, which would fall outside of the federal government’s control. Any
company considering doing business in Iran or with Iranian individuals or entities will
need to pay close attention to the regulatory and enforcement postures taken by these
other government agencies.
8. Financial Crimes Risks in Iran. Though the recent business attention on Iran has
understandably focused on sanctions-related issues, banks and businesses must remember
that other financial crimes concerns in the Islamic Republic remain pervasive. In
particular, the nature of the Iranian economy and the role of the government within the
economy present serious risks related to bribery and corruption, money laundering, and
illicit financing. Iran ranked 130 of 175 countries in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index as of 2015.
In 2011, the U.S. identified Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern
pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. The FATF first raised concerns over
Iran’s lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering/countering the financing of
terrorism (AML/CFT) framework in 2007, and it still urges Iran to meaningfully address
AML/CFT deficiencies and will consider urging stronger counter-measures later this
year. OFAC also has made it clear that activity inconsistent with a wide range of
Executive Orders imposing sanctions on Iran (including for providing support to
terrorism, undermining the stability of Yemen, and other behaviors) could still subject
U.S. and non-U.S. persons to sanctions. Now, the Iranian government has indicated that it
will begin to target “financial corruption,” and has sentenced Iranian billionaire Babak
Zanjani, who helped the regime evade oil-related sanctions, and two others to death for
corruption. Attention on the issue of corruption will now grow, as Iran attempts to do
business with the world. Any companies looking to do business in Iran must be acutely
aware of serious financial integrity risks beyond those posed by remaining sanctions.
As some of the sanctions on Iran are unwound, many European, Asian, and Middle Eastern
companies understandably want to re-engage in the Iranian economy. The risk appetites of
companies will likely vary by sector, with large oil, aerospace, auto, infrastructure, and
equipment companies likely more willing to enter Iranian markets more quickly and with a
higher tolerance for risk. For example, Airbus has already agreed to sell Iran 114 airplanes, and
Boeing has obtained a license from OFAC to begin commercial discussions with Iranian airlines.
In contrast, other sectors will have a more conservative risk approach. Shipping insurers have
already recommended a greater degree of caution. For example, the London Protection and
Indemnity Club, a member of the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, the
main association of global tanker insurers, has recommended shipping insurers not enter
contracts or fixtures involving previously sanctioned Iranian trade or entities without performing
extensive due diligence. Similarly, financial institutions will be more reluctant to re-enter Iranian
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markets, given recent enforcement actions targeting their activities and the stricter financial
crime compliance environment globally.
A significant challenge will be how financial institutions wary of the risks of doing business in
Iran respond to pressure from clients with greater risk appetites to provide financial services for
activities in Iran. Iran has already complained that European banks have remained reluctant to
engage in commercial activity with Iran, and is now asking the IMF to help assuage such
concerns with a report slated for release in 2018. Additional pressure and statements from
Iranian leadership, including the Iranian Central Bank Governor, are echoing the charge that the
United States is not fulfilling its obligations under the “spirit and letter” of the nuclear deal. The
Iranian charge is that the U.S. sanctions and narrative of Iranian risk are still scaring away
investment and financial dealings.
The desire in and from Tehran to see the fruits of the nuclear negotiations, especially with more
banking activity with the West, will add pressure to those institutions that remain cautious. For
example, some financial institutions, including at least one major Japanese bank, have begun
processing non-dollarized transactions for clients operating in the Islamic Republic. Others have
begun to flirt with the Iranian market, with South Korean commercial bank, Woori Bank,
indicating it wants to turn its Tehran presence into a branch office, and Austrian Raiffeisen Bank
International (RBI) signing a memorandum of understanding with Iran’s Department of
Environment. Importantly, it appears that the Iranians realize that in order to do business
legitimately with the West, they must meet the standards demanded in the Western banking
world for transparency and accountability. But the Iranians are intent to force the United States
and Europe to resolve this issue for them and to mark this as an essential part of JCPOA
implementation.
Keeping the Burden of Persuasion and Reform on Iran
In implementing the deal, the United States should not fall into the trap of helping Iran
rehabilitate itself. Throughout this deal, the onus should remain solely on Iran to alleviate
concerns about its activities, lack of transparency, and failure to meet heightened global
standards of financial integrity in the banking and commercial worlds. Iran should not get a free
pass on the reforms, modernization, and accountability necessary for acceptance as a legitimate
actor in the world – diplomatically and economically. This posture should force the Iranians to
turn inward to determine how they can meet international expectations, instead of trying to
compel the United States and Europe to alter their standards or dictate to the private sector where
and with whom they should do business.
Unfortunately in the desire to appear to be complying with the deal, some U.S. actions have
created the impression that the United States and European governments have assumed the
burden of reintegration of the Iranian economy into the global system. There are some examples
worth noting:
1. There have been reports that the United States might offer Iran the ability to access
offshore dollar-clearing facilities, to allow for dollar-denominated transactions and ease
Iran’s ability to trade internationally. Though such a maneuver would not allow Iran
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direct access to dollar clearing in the United States, it could be structured in a manner to
create the same effect. Iranian trade would then be facilitated in a way not contemplated
in the JCPOA. The United States should not be offering special exemptions or measures
to assist Iran with access to dollars while Iran remains a leading state sponsor of terror,
subject to serious sanctions, and designated as a “primary money laundering concern.”
In addition, if the United States were to provide Iran with access to U.S. dollars for
offshore transactions, then the United States would lose the ability to threaten this
access in response to a range of Iranian provocations in the future. In effect, by
couching access to the Western financial system and the U.S. dollar as part of the
nuclear deal, the United States would no longer be able to cut Iran off from this benefit
if it significantly increased its support for terrorism, as Iran would claim that such an
attempt at coercion would violate the letter of the nuclear agreement. This would further
give away coercive financial leverage without any bargained-for concession by Iran.
Iran’s underlying conduct outside of the nuclear issue was not on the table during
negotiations. The United States and the international community should not open the
door to broad benefits of relief from financial exclusion that the Iranians neither
negotiated nor deserve.
2. The U.S. government has been sending delegations around the globe to clarify existing
sanctions and obligations and apparently to explain how business may be undertaken with
the Iranian regime. Though regulatory clarity is important, the United States should not
be launching road shows attempting to dampen concerns about the risks of doing
business in or with Iran, especially when those risks are increasing. The burden instead
should fall on Iran to demonstrate to governments, the private sector, and the markets that
its activities, policies, and use of its financial and commercial system are legitimate,
transparent, and meet international standards. Iran should be concentrating on necessary
reforms, hard policy decisions, and its own road shows to prove that it can be trusted as a
responsible international player. Until then, Iran will be seen as a risky jurisdiction in
which to invest and do business. It should not be the responsibility of the United States or
Europe to prod businesses and banks to enter the Iranian market.
3. The United States has announced that it plans to buy heavy water from the Iranian
nuclear system, thus enabling Iran to produce more heavy water than it needs and
facilitating the economic uses of a nuclear program built in violation of previous
international sanctions. This also legitimates Iran’s nuclear program in a way that is not
obligated in the JCPOA and promotes Iran’s expanded nuclear program. Aside from not
encouraging and promoting the Iranian nuclear program beyond what is required in the
JCPOA, the United States should not be serving as Iran’s market safety valve for the sale
of heavy water, displacing existing supplies to the United States from legitimate suppliers
like Canada and Argentina. As with any Iranian economic activity, Iran should be forced
to deal with the international markets on its own, meeting relevant market and regulatory
demands directly. The United States should not usher Iran into the global economy
artificially, especially not in the nuclear markets, and allow Iran benefits that were not
negotiated in the JCPOA and for which the international community has not received
consideration.
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4. It has been important that the U.S. Treasury and other U.S. government officials have
reiterated the commitment to enforcing existing sanctions vigorously and maintaining the
ability to use the tools of financial coercion to affect Iranian behavior. These
commitments, however, are undercut when the United States modifies its messaging to
suggest that our sanctions regime should not constrain or affect the risk calculus of the
private sector. Though intended to demonstrate that the United States is upholding its end
of the JCPOA bargain, softened language appears to suggest that the United States is
already backing away from its willingness to use existing sanctions against Iran.
Recently, Secretary Kerry met with European banks and noted that European businesses
should not use the United States as an excuse not to invest in Iran. European businesses
should be encouraged to listen to and account for U.S. regulatory, enforcement, and
policy concerns – not ignore longstanding and legitimate concerns.
The United States cannot alter this commitment to enforce sanctions, weaken its call for
heightened global standards for financial integrity, or jump every time Iran complains
about its inability to access the global financial system. The United States cannot mute
itself or its willingness to use some of our most effective financial and economic tools
against dangerous Iranian activity. Unfortunately, the United States has quieted its voice
too often in the face of Iranian aggression and violations in the hopes of a nuclear deal –
from the deafening silence as the Green Movement was crushed brutally to current
vacillation on whether recent ballistic missile tests violate the letter and spirit of the
JCPOA and the related UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
The United States cannot be in the position of rehabilitating the Iranian economy and image.
This proves highly problematic and undermines U.S. credibility and power internationally if
this is done without concern for the underlying issues and conduct that drove its isolation in the
first place – proliferation, support for terrorism, human rights violations, and development of
weaponry and programs of concern controlled by the IRGC. It is the threat to the international
financial system of the illicit and suspect flows of money that is the baseline for Iran’s
isolation. Iran should be forced to deal with these risks directly.
The Strategic Use of Sanctions Moving Forward and Targeted Unwinding
The United States should treat the JCPOA and its implementation as an ongoing process, where
sanctions and sanctions unwinding form a strategic part of U.S. and international efforts to
enforce the deal, maintain economic and financial leverage, push back on dangerous Iranian
activity, and force the Iranians to make hard decisions about their role in the world. Sanctions
and financial measures in this regard are not just tools that were used to get Iran to the table, but
are essential levers of influence moving forward. Indeed, how sanctions are deployed and
unwound could affect the internal dynamics of Iran in furtherance of U.S. and allied interests.
In the first instance, the United States should not shy away from the use of sanctions against
Iranian behavior and underlying conduct that is already subject to sanctions. The U.S.
government has the authority and ability to apply sanctions for the full suite of nefarious Iranian
behavior – to include human rights violations and malicious cyber activity. This includes
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enforcement of existing sanctions and application of new measures to constrain Iranian
behavior and discipline the international system. The United States retains the power and
credibility to do this. The effects of U.S. actions are global and set the international norms for
acceptable behavior. Absent U.S. action, attention, and enforcement, Iranian provocations will
likely not be met with credible international push-back. If U.S. financial and economic
measures are based on facts and can be explained credibly as furthering U.S. legal requirements
and international norms, the impact will remain global and the effect real.
In addition, the United States should not diminish its ability to use targeted unwinding tools to
force Iran to make hard choices about its behavior in the international system. If
implementation of the JCPOA is viewed as an ongoing and long-term process, then the United
States should be thinking creatively about how to use these targeted unwinding measures to
effectuate its strategic goals.
The JCPOA attempts to unwind sanctions tied to the nuclear file, but the unwinding is difficult
and complicated given the interconnected nature and effects of such sanctions. In some
instances, the unwinding can be managed. In many other cases, the unwinding schedule and
some of the scheduled delistings implicate actors and activities beyond the nuclear file,
complicating our ability to easily unwind sanctions and threatening our ability to impose
coercive leverage in the case of Iranian malfeasance beyond the nuclear file. The delisting of
some key Iranian entities that have facilitated a range of Iranian illicit activities and the
cessation of sanctions prohibitions against them, especially terrorism financing, raises serious
challenges to U.S. ability to affect Iranian behavior of concern.
There is no question trying to unwind any effective and global sanctions regime is difficult.
Unwinding intertwined, conduct-based sanctions for a regime that uses its economy for various
dangerous and nefarious activities of international security concern is incredibly challenging.
But tearing down sanctions bluntly – particularly when pulling down the nuclear sanctions also
threatens to pull down U.S. leverage related to issues of missile proliferation and terrorism –
without addressing that underlying and related conduct creates real risks and does damage to
the ability to use the very same tools against Iranian individuals and entities in the future.
In light of the risks of doing business with Iran, the reintegration of Iranian banks into the
global financial system, including via the SWIFT bank messaging system, presents perhaps the
most concerning issue. For example, Bank Sepah was designated under U.S. authorities not
simply because of its facilitation of the Iranian nuclear program and procurement but also its
role in financing arms and missile deals, activities that should remain a concern and are subject
to UN sanctions.
The JCPOA explicitly called for the lifting of sanctions on “[s]upply of specialized financial
messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities … including the Central Bank of
Iran and Iranian financial institutions.”26 The European Union lifted SWIFT-related sanctions
for the Central Bank of Iran and all Iranian banks27 originally banned from SWIFT.28
26 “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” Vienna, July 14, 2015, paragraph 19(iv).
Annex 52
Juan Zarate May 24, 2016
Financial Integrity Network
19
By allowing most of the Iranian banks back into the international financial order without
dealing with their underlying conduct or controls, the United States and the international
community assumed the good faith of the Iranian regime. This has heightened the risk that the
Iranian banking system would be used by the regime to finance and facilitate other issues of
significant national security concern.
Instead, we should consider a process of targeted unwinding that meets our strategic goals – and
could even provide Iran relief if it is willing to abide by international rules and norms regarding
transparency and accountability of its financial system. For Iranian banks, this would mean a
stricter, monitored reentry into the financial system, given continued concerns about their
facilitation of illicit and dangerous activities by the regime. This could be effectuated through a
program – led by the European Union – to create a monitoring system through SWIFT (akin to
the Terrorist Financing Tracking Program) to monitor all Iranian cross-border transactions and
allow for the tracking and analysis of suspect Iranian banking activities. Instead of the blunt
unwinding measure of plugging all Iranian banks (minus a few) back into the global banking
messaging system, an aggressive monitoring program could provide a “halfway” house for
reintegration of Iranian banks over time while managing the risk of more Iranian money
traversing the banking system.
This type of system might actually force the Iranian regime to make some hard choices about not
using its banks to facilitate illicit or dangerous activities that would be subject to monitoring and
exposure. A system of targeted unwinding could advance the strategic goal that Iran not misuse
its economy and financial system to benefit terrorists, proxies, and accelerate its nefarious
international ambitions and capabilities. If such a system could prove effective, it might spur
responsible reform within Iran as it tries to reintegrate into the global system. This in turn would
give global banks and businesses some assurance that the Iranian banking system is maturing and
under some degree of scrutiny. Scrutiny over such financial activity and reforms could help
alleviate concerns by legitimate banks that they are being exposed to dangerous risk, especially if
legitimate and trusted governments agencies (like financial intelligence units) are involved in the
monitoring. This, in turn, could blunt Iranian claims that the United States was de facto
continuing the imposition of sanctions by scaring Western banks away from doing business in
Iran or with businesses interested in doing business in Iran.
(http://eeas.europa.eu/statements- eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf)
27 On Implementation Day, the EU lifted sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and Bank Mellat, Bank Melli, Bank
Refah, Bank Tejarat, Europaische-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH), Export Development Bank of Iran, Future Bank,
Onerbank ZAO, Post Bank, and Sina Bank. Separately, the EU also lifted sanctions on Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah
International. On Transition Day, the EU will also lift sanctions on Ansar Bank, Bank Saderat, , and Mehr Bank.
See Attachment 1, parts 1 and 2 and Attachment 2, parts 1 and 2. (http://eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/
docs/iran_agreement/annex_1_attachements_en.pdf)
28 The Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 Concerning
Restrictive Measures against Iran and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010,” Official Journal of the
European Union, March 24, 2012. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/?qid=1406807228342&uri=CELEX:32012R0267)
Annex 52
Juan Zarate May 24, 2016
Financial Integrity Network
20
The current tension with Iran over the unwinding of sanctions underscores that the
implementation of the JCPOA and “negotiations” with Iran will be ongoing. In this regard, we
should take full advantage of the leverage we have and devise new mechanisms to ensure we
meet our strategic goals. We should be reinforcing this power and capability, not undermining it.
Faulty Assumptions
The current state of sanctions unwinding reveals certain misconceptions about the state of play
regarding the JCPOA and the position of the United States to strike a better bargain. There are
many assumptions articulated at the time that need to be questioned, and there are a few that are
clearly incorrect. It is important that this be clarified as the JCPOA unfolds and expectations
and precedents are formed.
At the time of the negotiations, the financial and economic pressure campaign was not faltering,
and the U.S. was not at risk of losing its ability to squeeze and influence Iran in the short term.
The regime and the economy were affected by cascading isolation and falling oil prices. During
the period of the negotiations, the pressure was increasing – belying the notion that the United
States was facing a cracking sanctions coalition and system. Quite the opposite was occurring.
The ayatollahs’ concern over the strangulation of the Iranian economy – in concert with
lingering fears of the ghosts of the Green Movement – is ultimately what brought them to the
negotiating table and launched them on the charm offensive that allowed them to turn the tables
on the West. The sanctions pressure was not sustainable for the regime. President Rouhani
admitted that these measures threatened to drive Iran into an economic “Stone Age.”
The regime needs access to capital, new technologies, and connectivity to the oil markets and
the global economy to maintain and sustain itself. That is what it lost over the past decade. It is
what the Iranians negotiated to regain in the JCPOA. This is now the source of Iran’s most
significant complaint.
There was also never a neat divide between “nuclear” and “non-nuclear” sanctions when the
constriction campaign launched in 2005. This campaign was intended to use the illicit,
dangerous, and illegitimate nature of Iranian activity as the driver for unplugging Iran from the
global financial and commercial system. This is something I tried to articulate in my testimonies
before the Senate last year. The sanctions were focused on the fact that the Iranians were
leveraging their own economy to profit the regime and allow the construction of a suspect
nuclear infrastructure and ballistic missiles, support terrorists and militias, strengthen Assad in
Syria, engage in financial obfuscation, and perpetrate massive human rights abuses. Other than
the nuclear issues, the underlying conduct was not on the table during the JCPOA negotiations.
Without resolution of those issues, the triggers for financial isolation remain. Thus, we are
witnessing the difficulty of unwinding sanctions that have been triggered by underlying Iranian
conduct that has yet to change.
Moreover, the JCPOA has not resulted in the diplomatic unity promised or rewards for good
behavior. Russia has quickly made its own deals and pacts with Iran – expanding coordination
and cooperation in Syria and Iraq and signing deals for weapons systems. The United States has
Annex 52
Juan Zarate May 24, 2016
Financial Integrity Network
21
been forced to assuage skeptical allies in the Gulf and Israel and mend diplomatic wounds.
European countries are engaging at different levels and pace with Iran, sending mixed messages
about what is expected by the international community. With the varied sanctions regimes,
American companies are disadvantaged by the commercial opening provided to European
companies. Legitimate companies concerned about real and reputational risks sit on the sidelines
while less responsible actors dive into the Iranian market. Our closest allies are worried, and the
responsible actors are losing market opportunities.
Finally, it is not clear that the JCPOA has opened a channel through which Iran can
constructively engage with the international community and address the other serious concerns
about its dangerous policies and behavior. On the contrary, Iran appears intent and willing to
exacerbate those risks and tensions across the board. The JCPOA may have emboldened the
regime to take more aggressive steps, exacerbating concerns among U.S. allies that Iran is being
given free rein to expand its influence and threaten their interests. Just as important, the United
States seems not to have a plan as to how to use the JCPOA implementation to drive broader
strategic goals of constraining Iranian adventurism and sparking internal reforms.
The Iranians need to decide that they are willing and able to address those issues of concern and
change their behavior – to include issues of financial transparency, terrorist financing, and
corruption. The Iranians must find tangible ways to demonstrate that necessary reforms are
possible before they can expect to be treated as legitimate actors in the financial and commercial
systems. This is the source of their isolation.
Conclusion
In the short term, the aversion to the risks of doing business in and with Iran will continue,
especially if Iran continues to demonstrate an unwillingness to stop its provocative and
dangerous activity. More importantly, Iran will not be in a position to join the international
community completely, if it does not demonstrate clearly that it can engage as a trusted and
transparent actor in the financial system. The onus to prove this should be on Iran’s shoulders.
Any complaints about lack of access to capital, markets, or investment should be posed to the
clerical regime. Iran has to decide whether it will abide by international standards, norms, and
obligations. Absent this, it will remain a risky environment in which to do business, no matter
how attractive the opportunities.
The United States must be willing to use its financial and economic toolkit to constrain
dangerous Iranian behavior and encourage responsible Iranian activity. This means forcing Iran
to deal with the demands of the international market place on its own and addressing the
underlying conduct that has proven problematic and risky. The United States must continue to
isolate rogue Iranian activity – and that of its proxies – through the use of sanctions and financial
measures that exclude such actors from the global financial and commercial system. The United
States cannot abandon its use of these tools, especially as the JCPOA unfolds and Iran continues
to test the bounds of U.S. will. The United States will need to rely on sanctions and financial
measures even more in the future, and we should be doing everything we can to reinforce the
strength and endurance of these powers – against Iran and other rogue actors in the international
system.
Annex 52
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Iran-linked terrorists caught stockpiling explosives in north-west
London
By Ben Riley-Smith, US EDITOR
9 JUNE 2019 • 10:03PM
Hezbollah fighters parade in Lebanon in 2010 CREDIT: HUSSEIN MALLA/AP
Follow
Annex 53
Terrorists linked to Iran were caught stockpiling tonnes of explosive materials on the
outskirts of London in a secret British bomb factory, TheTelegraph can reveal.
Radicals linked to Hizbollah, the Lebanese militant group
(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/09/europe-has-not-faced-threat…), stashed
thousands of disposable ice packs containing ammonium nitrate - a common ingredient in
homemade bombs.
The plot was uncovered by MI5 and the Metropolitan Police in the autumn of 2015, just
months after the UK signed up to the Iran nuclear deal. Three metric tonnes of ammonium
nitrate was discovered - more than was used in the Oklahoma City bombing that killed 168
people and damaged hundreds of buildings.
Police raided four properties in north-west London - three businesses and a home - and a
man in his 40swas arrested on suspicion of plotting terrorism.
The man was eventually released without charge. Well-placed sources said the plot had
been disrupted by a covert intelligence operation rather than seeking a prosecution.
The discovery was so serious that David Cameron and Theresa May, then the prime
minister and home secretary, were personally briefed on what had been found.
Annex 53
Iran-linked terror incidents in Europe
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Annex 53
Yet for years the nefarious activity has been kept hidden from the public, including MPs
who were debating whether to fully ban Hizbollah, until now.
It raises questions about whether senior UK government figures chose not to reveal the
plot in part because they were invested in keeping the Iran nuclear deal afloat.
(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/05/09/europe-rejects-iran-ultimat…)
The disclosure follows a three-month investigation by The Telegraph in which more than
30 current and former officials in Britain, America and Cyprus were approached and court
documents were obtained.
One well-placed source described the plot as “proper organised terrorism”, while another
said enough explosive materials were stored to do “a lot of damage”.
Ben Wallace, the security minister, said: “The Security Service and police work tirelessly to
keep the public safe from a host of national security threats. Necessarily, their efforts and
success will often go unseen.”
The Telegraph understands the discovery followed a tip-off from a foreign government. To
understand what they were facing, agents from MI5 and officers from Metropolitan
Police’s Counter Terrorism Command launched a covert operation.
Palestinian militants from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine walk next to a poster of Hezbollah leader Sheikh
Hassan Nasrallah during an anti-Israel rally CREDIT: WAEL HAMZEH/EPA-EFE/REX
Annex 53
It became clear, according to well-placed sources, that the UK storage was not in isolation
but part of an international Hizbollah plot to lay the groundwork for future attacks
(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/03/15/britain-eu-risk-iranian-ter…).
The group had previously been caught storing ice packs in Thailand. And in 2017, two
years after the London bust, a New York Hizbollah member would appear to seek out a
foreign ice pack manufacturer.
Why ice packs?
Ice packs provide the perfect cover, according to sources - seemingly harmless and easy to
transport. Proving beyond doubt they were purchased for terrorism was tricky.
But the most relevant case was in Cyprus, where a startlingly similar plot had been busted
just months before the discovery in London. There, a 26-year-old man called Hussein
Bassam Abdallah, a dual Lebanese and Canadian national, was caught caching more than
65,000 ice packs in a basement. During interrogation he admitted to being a member of
Hizbollah’s military wing, saying he had once been trained to use an AK47 assault rifle.
Abdallah said the 8.2 tonnes of ammonium nitrate stored was for terrorist attacks. He
pleaded guilty and was given a six-year prison sentence in June 2015.
In Abdallah’s luggage police found two photocopies of a forged British passport. Cypriot
police say they were not the foreign government agency that tipped Britain off to the
London cell.
But they did offer assistance when made aware of the UK case, meeting their British
counterparts and sharing reports on what they had uncovered.
Annex 53
Hizbollah
Hizbollah emerged in Lebanon during the early 1980s. Literally meaning “the Party of
God”, it was formed after Israel invaded the country in 1982.
The Shia militia group was created with the backing of Iran, with whom it is still aligned.
From the early years it has had two stated enemies - Israel and the US.
Hizbollah has been linked to numerous deadly terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish
targets since its inception, including in Europe.
The US has long considered Hizbollah an Iranian proxy group and designated it a foreign
terrorist organisation in 1997.
But Britain and other European countries for years drew a distinction between the
group’s militant and political wings. In part that is because Hizbollah has elected
representatives in Lebanon and has secured positions in the country’s government.
Britain proscribed Hizbollah’s military wing in 2008 but for more than a decade refused
to ban the group entirely despite pressure from MPs.
In February 2019 the UK government eventually classified the whole of Hizbollah a
terrorist organisation, meaning being a member is now a crime.
Iran continues to support Hizbollah, giving an estimated $700 million in funding a year
according to the US State Department.
MI5's intelligence investigation is understood to have lasted months. The aim was both to
disrupt the plot but also get a clearer picture what Hizbollah was up to.
Such investigations can involve everything from eavesdropping on calls to deploying
covert sources and trying to turn suspects.
The exact methods used in this case are unknown. Soon conclusions begun to emerge. The
plot was at an early stage. It amounted to pre-planning. No target had been selected and no
attack was imminent.
Well-placed sources said there was no evidence Britain itself would have been the target.
And the ammonium nitrate remained concealed in its ice packs, rather than removed and
mixed - a much more advanced and dangerous state. On September 30, the Met made their
move.
Annex 53
Officers used search warrants to raid four properties in north-west London - three
businesses and one residential address. That same day a man in his 40swas arrested on
suspicion of terrorism offences under Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006.Neither his
name nor his nationality have been disclosed.
His was the only arrest, although sources told The Telegraph at least two people were
involved. The man was released on bail. Eventually a decision was taken not to bring
charges.
The exact reasons why remain unclear, but it is understood investigators were confident
they had disrupted the plot and gained useful information about Hizbollah’s activities in
Britain and overseas.
A UK intelligence source said: “MI5 worked independently and closely with international
partners to disrupt the threat of malign intent from Iran and its proxies in the UK.”
The decision not to inform the public of the discovery, despite a major debate with
Britain’s closest ally America (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2019/05/09/britain-must-stand-
Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Lebanon's militant Shiite movement Hezbollah, gives a televised address CREDIT: AFP
Annex 53
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united-states-against-ayatollahs-iran/) about the success of the Iran nuclear deal, will raise
eyebrows.
Keeping MPs in the dark amid a fierce debate about whether to designate the entire of
Hezbollah a terrorist group - rather than just its militant wing - will also be questioned.
The US labelled the entire group a terrorist organisation in the 1990s. But in Britain, only
its armed wing was banned. The set-up had led senior British counter-terrorism figures to
believe there was some form of understanding that Hizbollah would not target the UK
directly.
Hizbollah was only added to the banned terrorist group list in its entirety in February 2019
- more than three years after the plot was uncovered.
A spokesman forthe press department of the Iranian Embassy in Londonsaid: "Iran has
categorically rejected time and again any type of terrorism and extremism, has been victim
of terrorism against its innocent people, and is in the forefront fighting this inhuman
phenomenon.
"Any attempt to link Iran to terrorism, by claims from unknown sources, is totally
rejected."
Commentary: Europe has not faced up to the threat of Hizbollah
(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/09/iran-linked-terrorists-caug…-
west/)
Annex 53
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Annex 53
GLOBAL
The Origins of Hezbollah
Smoke from the 1983 bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut could be
seen from miles away. (Wikimedia Commons)
Thirty years ago, three spectacular attacks in Beirut over an 18-month period
announced the debut of a potent new force in Lebanon—the Shiite Hezbollah militia—
and defined its relationship with the United States for years to come. The October 1983
bombings of Multinational Force bases took the lives of 241 Americans and 58 French.
Beirut, a city battered by war, was experiencing a period of relative calm in fall
1983. U.S. diplomats and soldiers were still coming to terms with the suicide
bombing that struck the U.S. embassy in April, and U.S. Marines wore their combat
uniforms everywhere they went—even to social events and diplomatic functions.
30 years ago, deadly bombings in Beirut forged a powerful new militant group.
MATTHEW LEVITT OCT 23, 2013
Annex 54
But to the U.S. Marine commander on site, the threat environment seemed to have
eased somewhat. The embassy bombing was seen as an outlier event. Marines
were free to roam the city and were interacting with Lebanese children in public
without fear of ambush. Beirut was under a cease-fire, and hopes were high for
Syrian reconciliation talks. It was the quiet before the storm.
In the early hours of October 23, 1983, a young Lebanese man from a Shi’a family
awoke, said his morning prayers, and drank tea. In a suburb overlooking the marine
barracks, his superiors shared a few final thoughts with him, after which a senior
cleric blessed him before he drove off in a yellow Mercedes truck. At 6:22 a.m., he
rammed the explosive-laden truck through the guard post at the entrance to the
U.S. Marine Battalion Headquarters Building in Beirut. The blast decimated the
four-story, concrete, steel- reinforced structure—considered one of the strongest
buildings in Lebanon at the time. A dense, gray ash cloud engulfed the area as
emergency vehicles rushed to the scene. Those soldiers lucky enough to escape
serious injury quickly mobilized to rescue their fellow marines, sifting through
“dust-covered body parts, moaning wounded and dazed survivors.” Seconds later,
a nearly identical attack targeted the French Multinational Force (MNF) building
less than four miles away.
Lebanon’s devastating civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, hardened
divisions among the country’s various sectarian communities. Against this
backdrop, the 1982 Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of southern
Lebanon created the space in which Iranian diplomats and agents could help
fashion the unified entity Hezbollah from a motley crew of Shi’a militias and
groups. Another turning point in the 1980s involved militants targeting not only
fellow Lebanese but also the international forces dispatched as peacekeepers to
provide the war-torn country with a measure of security. Over time, Hezbollah and
Iran’s interests in driving foreign forces out of Lebanon would expand from attacks
targeting Western interests in Lebanon to attacks on Western interests abroad.
Over a nine-month period in 1985, the CIA calculated, Iran’s Lebanese proxy
groups were responsible for at least 24 international terrorist incidents. Such
targets were popular given Iran’s efforts to dissuade countries from arming and
supporting Iraq in its ongoing, costly war against the Islamic Republic. Heeding
Iran’s call to carry out attacks beyond Lebanon’s borders, Hezbollah would engage
in plots throughout the Middle East. By February 1985, the CIA would warn that
Annex 54
“Iranian-sponsored terrorism” presented the greatest threat to U.S. personnel and
facilities in the region. Inevitably some of the Hezbollah operatives sent to conduct
attacks in places like Kuwait were caught, leading Hezbollah to plot bombings,
hijackings, and other operations in places as diverse as Germany and the Republic
of the Congo in an effort to secure the release of jailed comrades.
In Lebanon, three spectacular attacks targeting U.S. interests over an 18-month
period defined the group’s relationship with the United States for years to come.
The U.S. embassy was bombed on April 18, 1983, killing 63, including 17
Americans. The driver of the explosive-filled van entered the embassy compound,
slowed to navigate a sharp left turn down a cobblestone lane, and then accelerated
and crashed into the embassy’s front wall. The seven-floor embassy complex was
engulfed in clouds of black smoke that hid the bodies of Lebanese security guards
and American government workers torn apart by the blast. Among the dead were
the top American intelligence officials stationed in Lebanon, including the CIA’s
chief Middle East analyst, Robert C. Ames.
Then came the nearly simultaneous attacks of October 23, 1983, targeting the U.S.
Marines and French army barracks, both compounds under the aegis of the Beirutbased
Multinational Force sent to Lebanon as peacekeepers to oversee the
evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut. Those
attacks left 241 Americans and 58 French dead. Less than a year later, on
September 20, 1984, the U.S. embassy annex was bombed, killing 24.
The U.S. government had little doubt about who was behind the 1984 attack, even
before crime-scene analysis and sensitive source reporting began to flow in.
Writing just days after the second embassy bombing, the CIA noted that “an
overwhelming body of circumstantial evidence points to the Hizb Allah, operating
with Iranian support under the cover name of Islamic Jihad.” For one thing, the
suicide vehicle bomb employed had become a trademark of the group. And, the
CIA added at the time, “Shia fundamentalists are the only organized terrorists in
Lebanon likely to willingly sacrifice their lives in such an attack.” Following the
bombing, two callers claimed responsibility in the name of Hezbollah’s Islamic
Jihad Organization (IJO). Several times in the year to follow, the CIA noted,
anonymous callers in Beirut warned that the IJO planned to continue attacking
U.S. interests. FBI forensic investigators determined that the marine barracks
bombing was not only the deadliest terrorist attack then to have targeted
Annex 54
Americans, it was also the single-largest non-nuclear explosion on earth since
World War II. Composed of at least 18,000 pounds of explosives— the equivalent
of six tons of dynamite— the bomb demolished the four-story building on the
fringe of the Beirut Airport campus, leaving behind a crater at least 13 feet deep and
30 feet wide. So many marines, sailors, and soldiers perished that day that the base
ran out of body bags. At the French MNF building, the deaths of 58 French
paratroopers marked the French military’s highest death toll since the Algerian war
ended in 1962. The eight-story building where the paratroopers were staying was
literally upended by the blast.
Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah operational leader and terrorist mastermind, and
his brother-in-law and cousin, Mustapha Badreddine, reportedly not only watched
the marine barracks bombing through binoculars from a perch atop a nearby
building overlooking their neighborhood but also coordinated it. In February 1998,
Lebanon’s highest court announced plans to try Hezbollah’s first secretary-general,
Subhi al-Tufayli, for his role in the marine barracks bombing, among other crimes.
At the time, the CIA assessed that Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah would likely help
Tufayli escape so he could not “implicate them in a variety of illegal activities,
including terrorist operations against U.S. citizens.” He was never tried. Another
suspect was Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, a leader of the Lebanese Shi’a
community often described as one of Hezbollah’s founding spiritual figures.
In 1986, the CIA reported that Fadlallah “has long been recognized as the spiritual
leader of and political spokesman for Lebanon’s Shia Hezbollah.” Fadlallah’s
stature, the CIA added, grew “along with Hizballah’s political and military
influence.” Fadlallah “benefited from and contributed to the growing extremism in
the Shia community by his bold sermons attacking Israel and, later, the presence of
the Multinational Force in Lebanon.” Lebanese Shi’a were inspired by the Iranian
revolution to seek an Islamic state in Lebanon, and Fadlallah valued his ties to Iran,
in large part because of the significant military, financial, and political assistance
Tehran provided to Hezbollah. This assistance helped forge a powerful and potent
militant Shi’a group out of several smaller groups.
But over time Fadlallah’s relationship with Iran changed. Fadlallah never fully
embraced the Iranian revolutionary concept of velayat-e faqih (rule of the
jurisprudent), which, according to a 1986 U.S. intelligence report, “virtually
equates Khomeini with the Mahdi— the 12th Imam who is in occultation.” As much
Annex 54
ABOUT
as Fadlallah sought an Islamic state in Lebanon, U.S. intelligence analysts
concluded he also recognized the need to maintain the country’s religious diversity
within an Islamic context. But other, more radical voices within Hezbollah, like the
up-and-coming security official Hassan Nasrallah, the CIA warned, promoted a
maximalist program in which an Islamic republic in Lebanon would presage a pan-
Islamic movement spanning the entire Muslim world. “In our view,” the analysts
wrote in 1988, “Nasrallah does not represent the mainstream of the movement.”
Four years later Nasrallah would rise to the leadership of Hezbollah, moving the
group’s mainstream sharply to the right.
This post is adapted from Matthew Levitt's
Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God.
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to [email protected].
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Annex 54
In first, Hezbollah confirms all
financial support comes from Iran
Nasrallah: “We are open about the fact that Hezbollah’s budget, its income, its
expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the
Islamic Republic of Iran.” (Photo: screengrab)
In a speech broadcast on Friday, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader
of Lebanese militant group Hezbollah scoffed at the recent US
sanctions stating that these sanctions will not impact his group
whatsoever due to the fact that Hezbollah receives full financial
and arms support from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
He pointed out that “We do not have any business projects or
investments via banks…” Nasrallah added that “We are open
How are we doing?
Annex 55
about the fact that Hezbollah’s budget, its income, its expenses,
everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come
from the Islamic Republic of Iran,” and he emphasized that his
group “will not be affected” by any fresh sanctions.
Speaking in a speech to mark 40 days after the death of a high
level Hezbollah commander Mustafah Bedreddine in the Syrian
capital Damascus, Nasrallah stated that: “As long as Iran has
money, we have money… Just as we receive the rockets that
we use to threaten Israel, we are receiving our money. No law
will prevent us from receiving it…”
First public confirmation
It has been long known to political observers that the Islamic Republic played a key role in giving birth to the Lebanese
Shiite militant group in 1982. For over three decades, Iran’s financial, military, intelligence, logistical, and advisory
assistances to Hezbollah have been well known. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite force, the
Quds force, transformed Hezbollah to be one of Iran’s most important and powerful regional and international proxies.
Nevertheless, what highlights the significance of Nasrallah’s speech is the fact that this is the first time in which he is
announcing and publicly confirming that his group is receiving full monetary and arms support from the Iranian
government.
The United States has long listed Hezbollah as a global terrorist group (since 1995) and accused it in several attacks
such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, that killed 241 US marines, the April 1983 US embassy bombing, and the
1984 US embassy annex bombing.
How are we doing?
Annex 55
On Dec. 18, 2015, the US president signed the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act. The US Congress
voted to impose fresh sanctions on Hezbollah by targeting those banks that are “knowingly facilitating a significant
transaction or transactions for" Hezbollah and those financial institutions that "knowingly facilitating a significant
transaction or transactions of a person identified on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked persons."
Nasrallah pointed out in his recent speech: “We totally reject this [United States] law until the Day of Judgment ... Even
if the law is applied, we as a party and an organizational and jihadist movement, will not be hurt or affected,” He added:
"We have no money in Lebanese banks, neither in the past nor now … We don't transfer our money through the
Lebanese banking system."
How this plays out in Washington
On the other hand, since Hezbollah is receiving full funding and arms support from Iran, according to Nasrallah, the US
is now seemingly playing a critical role in assisting and facilitating the ways through which Hezbollah receives this
significant aid from the Iranian government.
The Obama administration and Hassan Rowhani’s government were two key players in getting the nuclear agreement
signed. When the nuclear terms started being implemented, the Obama administration began immediately transferring
billions of dollars to Iran's Central Bank. One of the payments included 1.7 billion dollars transferred, in January 2015.
Two of the major primary beneficiaries of these sanctions reliefs and flow of money are Hezbollah and the IRGC. Iran
also immediately increased its military budget by $1.5 billion from $15.6 billion to $17.1 billion. Iran also began
witnessing the flow of money due to the lifting of international sanctions.
Nasrallah’s speech also indicates that the US money transfer to Iran’s bank and the sanctions reliefs appear to have
empowered and emboldened both the Iranian government and the Hezbollah leader.
Previously, when sanctions were imposed on Iran, Tehran had to reduce Hezbollah and its TV’s (Al-Manar channel)
funding from the approximately $200 million a year. However, thanks to Washington, the money that Iran is receiving
from the US or the market is again going on its way to Hezbollah, the major benefactor.
President Obama had given hope to world powers that engaging with Iran and the nuclear deal with Tehran would more
likely force the Iranian government to moderate its behavior. Obama pointed out in an interview with NPR’s Steve
Inskeep that as a result of the nuclear agreement Iran would start “different decisions that are less offensive to its
neighbors; that it tones down the rhetoric in terms of its virulent opposition...”
Hezbollah’s confirmation of receiving money and arms from Iran is intriguing. Almost all signs indicate that the
continuation of sanctions relief, and US transfer of billions of dollars to Iran militarily and financially assisting and ending
up in the hands of Iran’s primary proxy, Hezbollah as well as Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Quds force.
Last Update: Saturday, 25 June 2016 KSA 20:23 - GMT 17:23
How are we doing?
Annex 55
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(https://nation.com.pk/Reporter/ourstaff-
reporter)
Our Staff Reporter (https://nation.com.pk/Reporter/our-staffreporter)
10:48 AM | March 21, 2010
THE Taliban fighters scurried up the craggy mountainside. As they neared the top, their 30-strong
platoon split into three sections and they launched a ferocious assault on an enemy fort, opening
fire from numerous positions. The bullets they sprayed at the forts mud-coloured walls were blank,
however. They merely pretended to fire their rocket-propelled grenades. When they reached the
desert at the foot of the mountain, they did not race away on motorbikes, but filed into sandcoloured
tents to refresh themselves with tea and naan. The attack was a training exercise
overseen by Iranian security officials in plain clothes. The Taliban do not know whether they were
police officers, soldiers or secret service agents. What they can say is that in camps along the
Annex 56
8/5/2019 Iranians train Taliban to use roadside bombs: report
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border between Afghanistan and Iran, Taliban recruits are being taught how to ambush British,
American and other Nato troops using guns and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). They are
learning to attack checkpoints as well as mountain bases. Iranian instructors are also giving them
target practice on desert ranges with Kalashnikov assault rifles. In the past, Shiite Iran has opposed
the Sunni Taliban. But western officials say Iran now wants to expand its influence within the Taliban
movement. A Taliban commander who has been trained in Iran said last week: Our religions and our
histories are different, but our target is the same we both want to kill Americans. In recent months,
senior American officials have accused Iran of playing a double game by training and arming the
Taliban while supporting the Afghan government. Taliban leaders interviewed by The Sunday Times
last week provided the first direct evidence of how Iran is training insurgents on its own soil.
According to one Taliban source, emissaries travelled to Iran early last year to discuss a training
programme with Iranian officials. The training began during the winter. Working through local
mediators, this newspaper persuaded two Taliban commanders who had attended the programme
in Iran to travel to Kabul, the Afghan capital, to tell their stories. The men, interviewed separately in
a partially constructed concrete building on the edge of the city, were both extremely nervous. How
do I know you are not spies and that you will not follow me when I leave? said one before the
interview began. At times, their voices dropped to whispers as they spoke about their role in the
insurgency and drank cups of tea on dirty cushions. One of the commanders, from the central
province of Wardak, described how he travelled to Iran with 20 of his men. His journey took him
south into Pakistan, then west to the border with Iran and on to Zahedan, a city of 600,000 people in
southeast Iran. The second Taliban commander, from Ghazni province in southern Afghanistan,
took a group of his men on a five-day drive to Nimroz, in the southwest. From there, he crossed into
Irans Sistan and Baluchestan province, a hotbed of drug smuggling and tribal rivalry. The militants
paid a $500 fee to Afghan people-smugglers using routes usually taken by refugees looking for
work in Iran. They crossed the border at night in cars with the help of Baluch traffickers who guided
the groups along dirt tracks to avoid checkpoints. After stopping to rest in the mountains, they
headed out again at first light. Finally, they were met by their Iranian instructors in white Toyota pickup
trucks and were taken to a village on the outskirts of Zahedan, an hours drive from the training
camps. There they were placed in basic compounds, each housing up to 30 Taliban fighters, mostly
from the south and southeast of Afghanistan where the insurgency against British and American
forces is fiercest. Battered buses and pick-up trucks ferried the militants back and forth between the
village and the camps every morning and night. Iran paid for the whole trip. We paid the travel fees
to begin with and once we got to Iran they refunded us. They paid for our food, our mobile phone
cards, any expenses, said the Ghazni commander. At one camp, a cluster of low tents erected in
the shadow of a mountain, the Taliban fighters conducted live firing exercises, physical training and
mountain assaults under the watchful eye of the plain-clothes Iranians, the commander said. During
a course lasting three months, the Iranian instructors worked in groups of two to five men. Their
programme was split into three parts, each taking a month to complete. For the first month, the
recruits were taught how to launch complex ambushes on moving convoys. They learnt where to set
up firing positions, when to trigger the ambush and how to escape before the enemy had time to
respond. They were strong on the planning side. We would sit in the tents and they would take us
through things like where the best escape routes were, making sure we had good cover and where
Annex 56
8/5/2019 Iranians train Taliban to use roadside bombs: report
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to place our lookouts, the commander said. The second month was spent learning how to plant the
roadside bombs that are responsible for most of the deaths of British soldiers in Helmand province.
The insurgents were taught to use carefully positioned secondary and tertiary devices to kill or
wound rescuers organising medical evacuations. During the third month, the instructors taught the
Taliban how to storm fixed enemy positions, climbing mountains in formation to launch attacks on
checkpoints and bases. We were told ambushing was a very useful tool compared with a
straightforward attack. They taught us how to select a good hiding position and how to limit the
enemys response to our attacks by laying well- positioned mines, said the commander. We can kill
a lot of our enemies this way. Both commanders said Iran also supplied them with weapons, often
paying nomads to smuggle ammunition, mines and guns across the desert and mountain passes
between Iran and Afghanistans western provinces. The nomads used donkeys, camels and horses
to carry the military supplies into provinces such as Ghazni and Wardak, the commanders said.
Although the commanders believed that, after years on the battlefields of Afghanistan, they already
possessed some of the skills that were taught in Irans camps, they agreed the training had
improved their ability to launch more sophisticated attacks. I found some elements of the training in
Iran very useful, especially the escape and evasion techniques I was taught, said the commander
from Wardak as he showed me video footage of his men patrolling on motorbikes with AK-47s and
rocket-propelled grenade launchers slung over their shoulders. The commanders gave no indication
of precisely who was behind the training. Late last year General Stanley McChrystal, the US
commander of foreign troops in Afghanistan, accused Irans al-Quds force an elite wing of the
Revolutionary Guard of undermining the efforts of the Afghan government and Nato forces. The
problem with dealing with the Iranian regime is knowing to what extent these initiatives are
conducted by local commanders and to what extent they are backed by the government, said a
western defence source. He added that, although he had seen no direct evidence, the accounts of
Taliban training camps in Iran were credible. American officials believe Irans support for the Taliban
has reached troubling proportions, although it is not on the same scale as its backing for Shiite
insurgents in Iraq. The commanders accounts suggest the number of Taliban fighters trained in Iran
may already have reached the hundreds. Taliban militants still receive much of their training in
neighbouring Pakistan. Elements of the ISI, Pakistans secret service, are known to train, equip and
fund the Taliban. But a recent crackdown on Taliban safe havens in Pakistan has forced many
insurgents to look to Iran for support. The military is pressuring the Taliban in Pakistan. It is certainly
harder to reach places that were once easy to get into. I think more of my fighters will travel to Iran
for training this year, said the Ghazni commander. Two weeks ago Robert Gates, the US defence
secretary, said of the Iranians: They want to maintain a good relationship with the Afghan
government. They also want to do everything they possibly can to hurt us, or for us not to be
successful. Days later, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran insisted he wanted to rebuild
Afghanistan and criticised the presence of foreign troops. The Taliban commander from Ghazni
province said he had no doubt Iranian police and intelligence services knew about the training
camps, however. The government is not sleeping, he said. You just have to wiggle your ears in Iran
and they will know about it. (The Sunday Times)
Annex 56
FROM OUR BUREAUS
Captured Taliban Commander: 'I Received Iranian Training'
August 23, 2011 12:56 GMT
FARAH, Afghanistan -- A Taliban commander captured in southwestern Afghanistan
claims to have received military training in Iran to target a major dam in the region.
The claim was made by Mullah Dadullah, who was captured recently in the Lash-e Zoveyn
region of Farah Province, close to the Iranian border.
"I was trained in Iran for three months. Our trainers were a mix of Pakistanis, Iranians,
and Arabs," Dadullah, the head of a group of some 150 Taliban fighters, told journalists
under police supervision on August 23 in the provincial capital, Farah.
"Ali Talibi and Hussein Rezai were two of my Iranian instructors. They taught me to fire
rockets and to plant mines," he added. "I was trained in setting up remote-controlled
mines and planting antitank mines. Even developed countries would have been unable to
discover the mines I planted."
Senior U.S. and Afghan ocials have long accused Iran of supporting Afghan insurgents.
But Tehran has consistently denied such accusations.
Dadullah claimed to have been involved in insurgent attacks in the southwestern
provinces of Farah, Helmand, and Nimroz during the past three years.
He said that recently Iranian ocials oered him $50,000 in return for destroying the
Kamal Khan Dam in Nimroz Province, east of Farah.
Farah's provincial police chief, Gahussudin, said that Dadullah was tasked with sabotaging
major infrastructure projects in the region.
"He was trained for blowing up the Kamal Khan Dam. He was also tasked to attack other
Annex 57
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty © 2019 RFE/RL, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
major infrastructure projects in the provinces bordering Iran," Gahussudin said.
"Fortunately, he was arrested by the police" before he could act on his plans.
The Kamal Khan Dam is located in the Char Borjak district of Nimroz Province. After
completion it will significantly reduce water flow to the neighboring regions of
southeastern Iran, which already face severe water shortages.
Afghans also accuse Tehran of attempting to slow down the construction of Salma Dam in
western Herat province which borders northeastern Iran.
Annex 57
United Nations S/2016/1136
Security Council Distr.: General
30 December 2016
Original: English
16-22137 (E) 130117
*1622137*
Second report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
I. Introduction
1. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council, in its resolution 2231 (2015), endorsed
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action concluded by China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
United States of America and the European Union, with the Islamic Republic of
Iran.
2. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested that I submit a report on
the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) every six months.
The present report is the second submitted in fulfilment of that request and the
request of the President of the Security Council that I submit a report on the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), with findings and recommendations
(S/2016/44, para. 7).1
3. The provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) entered into force on
16 January 2016, upon submission by the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a report confirming that the Islamic Republic of
Iran had taken a series of initial nuclear-related actions as called for in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and in resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/57, annex).
4. Annex B includes provisions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic
missile-related transfers, and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic
of Iran, as well as the asset freeze and travel ban provisions. All those provisions
will apply for set periods of time or until the date on which IAEA submits its report
indicating the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of
Iran remains in peaceful activities (the “broader conclusion” report),2 whichever is
earlier.
__________________
1 The first report of the Secretary-General was issued on 12 July 2016 (S/2016/589).
2 In paragraph 6 of resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council requested that as soon as IAEA
has reached the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran
remains in peaceful activities, the Director General of IAEA will submit a report confirming that
conclusion to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council.
Annex 58
S/2016/1136
2/9 16-22137
II. Key findings and recommendations
5. Since 16 January 2016, I have not received any report on the supply, sale,
transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear-related items
undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Since
my first report (S/2016/589), five additional nuclear-related proposals were
submitted through the procurement channel, three of which have already been
approved by the Security Council. All the necessary operational linkages between
the Council and the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action are in place and functioning fully for the processing of such proposals,
with due regard given to information security and confidentiality.
6. Since 12 July 2016, no information regarding Iranian ballistic missile activity or
ballistic missile-related transfers undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015) were brought to my attention or that of the Security Council.
7. I received one new report on an arms transfer alleged to have originated in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and to have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of
annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). On 5 July 2016, France informed the Security
Council and me that, in March 2016, it had seized an arms shipment in the northern
Indian Ocean. France concluded that the arms shipment originated in the Islamic
Republic of Iran and was likely bound for Somalia or Yemen. In addition, the
Secretariat was recently provided with information (by the Combined Maritime
Forces and Australia) on an arms seizure in February 2016 by the Royal Australian
Navy, off the coast of Oman, which the United States of America assessed as having
originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. I look forward to the opportunity for the
Secretariat to examine those weapons and previously seized weapons, in order to
corroborate the information provided and independently ascertain the origin of the
shipments.
8. On 24 June 2016, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated
in a televised speech that it receives all its weapons and missiles from the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Any Iranian arms transfer to Hizbullah would have been
undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) should
they have taken place after 16 January 2016.3
9. On 21 November 2016, Israel drew my attention to information it possessed
regarding the alleged use of commercial flights by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps to transfer arms and related materiel to Hizbullah. The information was also
provided to the Security Council in identical letters from the Permanent
Representative of Israel, dated 21 November (S/2016/987). The Islamic Republic of
Iran, in identical letters dated 22 November 2016 (S/2016/992), asserted that the
claims were baseless and unsubstantiated accusations. I wish to remind all Member
States of their obligations under resolution 2231 (2015) to prevent, except as
decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply,
sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
__________________
3 Any Iranian arms transfer to Hizbullah between the adoption of resolution 1747 (24 March 2007)
and 16 January 2016 would have constituted a violation of paragraph 5 of that resolution. The
provisions of resolution 1747 (2007) and those of other previous Security Council resolutions on
the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated on 16 January 2016.
Annex 58
S/2016/1136
16-22137 3/9
10. On the basis of information provided by both the Permanent Missions of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and of Iraq, I have concluded my review of the
participation of Iranian entities in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition. While no
further action will be taken by the Secretariat in relation to this matter, I wish to
reiterate my recommendation that the Council clarify whether the provisions of
annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) on arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic
Republic of Iran apply to all supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel,
including temporary transfers, regardless of change of ownership (see S/2016/589,
para. 10).
11. Since my previous report, Iranian and other media outlets reported that Major
General Qasem Soleimani and Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi have
engaged in foreign travel. I call upon all Member States to take the necessary
measures to prevent the entry or transit through their territories of individuals
presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
12. In the course of the Secretariat's contact with the Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to seek clarification on the statement by the Secretary-
General of Hizbullah and the foreign travels of Major General Soleimani and
Brigadier General Naqdi, the Islamic Republic of Iran underlined “that measures
undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran in combating terrorism and violent
extremism in the region have been consistent with its national security interests and
international commitments”.
III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
13. In preparing the present report on the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231
(2015), I note that in September and November 2016, IAEA issued quarterly reports
on its verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of
resolution 2231 (2015), (S/2016/808 and S/2016/983). In addition, on 6 December
2016, IAEA provided an update on developments in relation to the Iranian stockpile
of heavy water since its last quarterly report. The Agency reported that it was
continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its
evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for
the Islamic Republic of Iran were ongoing. The Agency also reported on its
verifying and monitoring of the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of
its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and
that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional
Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and the
transparency measures contained in the Plan.
14. Since 16 January 2016, I have not received any information regarding the
supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear-related
items undertaken contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
15. As of 30 December 2016, five additional proposals to participate in or permit
the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were
submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel
process. Two proposals submitted on 6 October 2016, for the supply of items,
material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2,
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S/2016/1136
4/9 16-22137
were approved by the Council on 17 November 2016. A proposal received by the
Council on 16 November 2016, for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods
and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, was approved on
28 December 2016. Two proposals submitted to the Council on 6 December 2016,
for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2, are currently under review by the Joint Commission.
16. One notification was submitted to the Council on 17 November 2016 in
relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technology covered by B.1
of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, intended for light-water reactors. Two further
notifications were submitted to the Council, the first on 23 December and the
second on 28 December 2016, in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of
Iran of low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 of INFCIRC/254/REV.12/Part 1,
incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements intended for light-water reactors, as
well as of equipment covered by B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part.1, intended for
light-water reactors. Such activities and certain other nuclear-related activities do
not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both
the Security Council and the Joint Commission (see resolution 2231 (2015), annex
B, para. 2).
17. In September 2016, the Joint Commission provided guidance on temporary
nuclear-related transfers. It indicated that all nuclear-related transfers in cases where
the goods in question are intended to remain in the Islamic Republic of Iran only for
a certain period of time and subsequently leave the Islamic Republic of Iran would
follow the established procedure within the procurement channel, including an end -
use certification signed by the designated Iranian national authority. The Joint
Commission also indicated that it would endeavour to expedite its review of
temporary exports for demonstration or display in exhibitions. The guidance was
reflected in amended versions of the documents offering practical information on
the procurement channel, which are available on the Security Council website
dedicated to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)4 and were brought to the
attention of all Member States through a note verbale issued by the Security Council
facilitator on 18 October 2016.
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
18. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council
called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to
ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches using such technology.
19. In addition, pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015),
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a
case-by-case basis, all States may now participate in and permit the supply, sale or
transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items,
materials, equipment, goods and technology, the provision of various services or
assistance, as well as the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in
certain commercial ballistic missile activities.
__________________
4 www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml.
Annex 58
S/2016/1136
16-22137 5/9
20. Since my first report to the Security Council, neither I nor the Security
Council have received any information regarding activity undertaken contrary to
paragraphs 3 and 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
21. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States,
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a
case-by-case basis, may now participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to
the Islamic Republic of Iran of the seven categories of arms as defined for the
purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and of related
materiel. Prior approval from the Council is also required for the provision to the
Islamic Republic of Iran of various related services or assistance.
22. As of 30 December 2016, one proposal to participate in and permit the
activities set forth in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) was
submitted to the Security Council. The proposal is still under consideration by the
Security Council.
23. The Security Council decided, in paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015), that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except
as decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply,
sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the
time of drafting of the present report, no proposal has been submitted to the Council
pursuant to that paragraph.
24. In July, I brought to the attention of the Security Council open-source
information about the participation of several Iranian entities in the Fifth Iraq
Defence Exhibition, held from 5 to 8 March 2016 at the Baghdad International
Fairground (see S/2016/589, para. 32). According to images published by the
Islamic Republic News Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting news
agency, items displayed by those entities appeared to include small arms, artillery
ammunition and rockets. The Secretariat raised this issue with the Permanent
Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations and invited
both Member States to provide further information.
25. As I reported in July, Iranian representatives considered that no prior approval
was required from the Security Council for this activity because the Islamic
Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. In addition, in October
2016, Iraqi authorities informed the Secretariat that all items exhibited by Iranian
entities during the exhibition were subsequently returned to the Islamic Republic of
Iran “in compliance with requirements stipulated in the applicable resolutions issued
by the [Security Council], ensuring legality of the process in its entirety”.
26. In view of the above, no further action will be taken by the Secretariat in
relation to this matter. Nevertheless, I wish to reiterate my recommendation that the
Security Council clarify whether paragraph 6 (b) applies to all supply, sale or
transfer of arms or related materiel, including temporary transfers, regardless of
change of ownership (see para. 10 of S/2016/589).
Annex 58
S/2016/1136
6/9 16-22137
27. On 5 July 2016, France brought to my attention information on the seizure of
an arms shipment that, in its assessment, had originated in the Islamic Republic of
Iran and was likely bound for Somalia or Yemen.5 According to information
provided, the French frigate Provence, operating as part of the Combined Task
Force 150, boarded a stateless dhow on 20 March 2016 in the northern Indian
Ocean. That action resulted in the discovery of weapons aboard the vessel that
included 2,000 AK-47 assault rifles, 64 Hoshdar-M sniper rifles, 6 type-73 machine
guns and 9 Kornet anti-tank missiles. On the basis of an analysis of available
information, including interviews with the crew and an inspection of the weapons,
France concluded that the weapons had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran
and that their transfer was being undertaken contrary to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B
to resolution 2231 (2015).
28. That report was brought to the attention of the Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations by the Security Council facilitator
for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), in July 2016. In addition, the
Secretariat has requested the opportunity to examine the arms seized and obtain
additional information.
29. In March 2016, the Combined Maritime Forces announced the seizure of a
weapons cache aboard a small fishing vessel off the coast of Oman by HMAS
Darwin of the Royal Australian Navy, also operating as part of the Combined Task
Force 150.6 Upon the request of the Secretariat, Australia and the Combined
Maritime Forces recently provided information on that arms seizure. According to
information provided, on 28 February 2016, HMAS Darwin discovered aboard a
stateless dhow, the Samer, a total of 1,989 AK-47 assault rifles, 100 RPG-7 rocketpropelled
grenade launchers, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, 39 PKM spare
barrels and twenty 60 mm mortar tubes.
30. According to the United States, that arms shipment originated in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.7 The Secretariat is still reviewing the information recently
provided by Australia and the Combined Maritime Forces, and I intend to provide
an update on the arms seizure in due course.
31. In a televised speech broadcast by Al-Manar television on 24 June 2016, the
Secretary-General of Hizbullah stated that the budget of Hizbullah, its salaries,
expenses, weapons and missiles all came from the Islamic Republic of Iran. I am
very concerned by that statement, which suggests that transfers of arms and related
materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Hizbullah may have been undertaken
contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).3 The Secretariat
raised the matter with representatives of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the United Nations in November 2016. In the course of the
Secretariat’s contact with the Permanent Mission to seek clarification on this issue,
the Islamic Republic of Iran underlined “that measures undertaken by the Islamic
__________________
5 That information was also communicated to the Security Council, the Committee pursuant to
resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea and the Committee
established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014).
6 “HMAS Darwin seizes large weapons cache”, Combined Maritime Force press release dated
6 March 2016.
7 See “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea”, United States Navy,
story number NNS160404-01, dated 4 April 2016.
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Republic of Iran in combating terrorism and violent extremism in the region have
been consistent with its national security interests and international commitments”.
32. In addition, in identical letters dated 21 November 2016 (S/2016/987), the
Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran
continues to transfer arms and related materiel to Hizbullah in order to supply
Hizbullah with the capacity to enhance its missile arsenal. According to Israel, those
arms and related materiel are shipped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
using commercial flights from the Islamic Republic of Iran either directly to Beirut
or to Damascus (the arms and related materiel being subsequently shipped to
Lebanon by land). In identical letters dated 22 November 2016, the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the information was
baseless and “without a shred of evidence” (S/2016/992).
VI. Implementation of the assets freeze provisions
33. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all
States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the
individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015)
and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available
to those individuals and entities.
34. In July 2016, I brought to the attention of the Council that an entity presently
on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015),8 the Defence Industries
Organisation, appeared to have participated in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition in
March 2016 (see para. 35 of S/2016/589). Based on the information provided by
Iraqi authorities in October 2016 (see para. 25 above), no further action will be
taken by the Secretariat in relation to this matter.
35. Since my previous report, I have not received any other information, nor am I
aware of any open-source information, related to the implementation of the
paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision
36. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are
to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their
territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231
(2015). At the time of the drafting of the present report, no travel exemption
requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to individuals
presently on the list.
__________________
8 The list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities
specified on the list established under resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of
resolution 2231 (2015), with the exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the
attachment to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), who were delisted on Implementation Day. The
Council can delist individuals or entities, and list additional individuals and entities found to
meet certain designation criteria defined by resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23
individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
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37. In my first report, I brought to the attention of the Security Council that Major
General Qasem Soleimani, Commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, may have engaged in foreign travel (see S/2016/589,
para. 37). In recent months, additional information from open sources suggests that
Major General Soleimani continues to engage in foreign travel. In late June 2016,
several Iranian media outlets (Fars News Agency, Tasnim News Agency) reproduced
pictures of Major General Soleimani visiting the former Prime Minister of Iraq,
Nouri al-Maliki. In October 2016, another Iranian media outlet (Mehr News
Agency) reproduced a picture of the General in the Iraqi Kurdistan region, visiting
the family of a Kurdish Peshmerga officer killed fighting ISIL militants in 2015. In
November 2016, the leader of the Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba militia declared that
he was in Mosul along with other Iranian military advisers (Fars News Agency). In
September 2016, the media group of the same militia, which had released the
pictures of Major General Soleimani in the “Fallujah operations room” in May 2016
(see S/2016/589, fig. V) released pictures showing him reportedly in southern
Aleppo. The following day a picture showing Major General Soleimani reportedly
with officers of the Syrian Arab Army was reproduced by various media outlets
(Fars News Agency, Al-Masdar News). In mid-December 2016, pictures showing
the General at the citadel of Aleppo were widely circulated by Iranian and other
media outlets (Fars News Agency).
38. In addition, in late July 2016, Iranian media outlets (Basij Press, Fars News
Agency) reported that another listed individual, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza
Naqdi, former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and
Industrial Research, travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic in March and July 2016.
In the following days, the same media outlets reproduced pictures of him reportedly
in the Golan region, near Qunaytirah, as well as in the Sayyidah Zainab mosque in
Damascus.
39. The Secretariat raised the travel of Major General Soleimani to Iraq with the
Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations
in June 2016. In October 2016, the Permanent Representative of Iraq informed the
Secretariat that “there [was] no means of confirmation regarding Soleimani’s entry
into Iraqi territory; Iraq has not invited Mr. Soleimani to visit Iraq and no entry visa
[was] requested by him or granted by the Foreign Ministry of Iraq”.
40. The Secretariat also raised the travels of both Major General Soleimani and
Brigadier General Naqdi to the Syrian Arab Republic with the Permanent Missions
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
in November 2016. The Syrian Government affirmed that “no visas were issued to
the above-mentioned individuals”. During the Secretariat's contact with the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to seek clarification on this
issue, the Islamic Republic of Iran underlined “that measures undertaken by the
Islamic Republic of Iran in combating terrorism and violent extremism in the region
have been consistent with its national security interests and international
commitments”.
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VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
41. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs
has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with
the facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has
also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint
Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the
Division provided induction briefings for the incoming facilitator and members of
the Security Council to assist them in their work on the implementation of
resolution 2231 (2015).
42. The Division continued to promote publicly available information on the
restrictions imposed by resolution 2231 (2015), including through the Council’s
website9 and outreach activities. Relevant documents were regularly added to the
website in all official languages. In particular, revised versions of the documents
provided by the Procurement Group of the Joint Commission offering practical
information to States on the procurement channel were uploaded in October.
43. During the reporting period, the Division responded to queries from Member
States regarding the termination of previous Security Council resolutions on the
Iranian nuclear issue and the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on
the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review
process.
__________________
9 www.un.org/en/sc/2231/.
Annex 58
Annex 59
Annex 59
United Nations S/2016/589*
Security Council Distr.: General
12 July 2016
Original: English
16-10517* (E) 020816
*1610517*
Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of
Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
I. Introduction
1. On 14 July 2015, diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United
States of America and the European Union with the Islamic Republic of Iran
culminated in agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On 20 July,
the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council endorsed
the Plan and called upon all Member States, regional organizations and international
organizations to support its implementation. On 18 October 2015, the date of
adoption of the agreement (Adoption Day), the Plan came into effect and its
participants began to take steps to implement their commitments.
2. On 16 January 2016, upon the submission by the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the IAEA Board of Governors, and,
in parallel, to the Security Council, of a report confirming that the Islamic Republic
of Iran had taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1 to 15.11 of annex V to the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (S/2016/57, annex), I welcomed the achievement
of reaching the day of implementation of the Plan (Implementation Day), a key
milestone that reflected the good-faith efforts of all parties to the agreement.
3. On the same day, in line with paragraph 7 of resolution 2231 (2015), with the
submission of this IAEA report, all provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) were
terminated1 and all the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) entered into
force. All States are now to comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 and the provisions
in paragraphs 6 (a) to (f) of annex B to the resolution for the duration specified
therein and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of annex B to the
__________________
* Reissued for technical reasons on 2 August 2016.
1 These included the proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programmes-related
embargo, the arms embargo, the travel ban and asset freeze, the various financial measures and
business restrictions and the ban on the provision of bunkering servi ces. The provisions relating
to the mandates of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and its Panel of
Experts were also terminated on Implementation Day.
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resolution.2 The Security Council requested me to report on the implementation of
those provisions every six months.
4. The present report is submitted in fulfilment of that request and the request of
the President of the Security Council that I submit a report on the implementation of
resolution 2231 (2015), with findings and recommendations (S/2016/44, para. 7).
II. Key findings and recommendations
5. Six months since Implementation Day, I am encouraged by the implementation
by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to
provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its
entry into force, and the transparency measures contained in the Plan. The Agency
reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear
material, and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared material or
activities were ongoing. Since Implementation Day, the Agency has been verifying
and monitoring the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear -
related commitments under the Plan. I call upon Member States to continue to
provide support to IAEA so that it may fulfil its mandate under the Plan. In addition,
there have been no reports of the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic
Republic of Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of
the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015).
6. The key practical arrangements for supporting the work of the Security
Council and its facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) a re in
place. In particular, the necessary operational linkages between the Council and the
Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for the processing of nuclear -
related proposals submitted by Member States under the procurement channel have
been established, with due regard given to information security and confidentiality.
Optional forms in all six official languages of the United Nations are also available
for use by Member States.
7. These positive developments notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran
brought to the attention of the Secretariat its view that it has yet to fully benefit from
the lifting of multilateral and national sanctions. The concerns raised by the country
include issues such as the United States Visa Waiver Program Improvement and
Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 and the confiscation of Central Bank assets
following a United States court order. Annex I to the present report reflects the
information obtained by the Secretariat in the course of its contacts with Iranian
__________________
2 These include provisions on nuclear-related transfers, which will apply for up to 10 years,
provisions on missile-related transfers and financial measures, including an asset freeze, which
will apply for up to 8 years, and provisions on arms-related transfers and a travel ban, which will
apply for up to 5 years. In October 2025, provided that the provisions of previous Security
Council resolutions have not been reinstated in the event of significant non -compliance with the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, all the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) will be
terminated and the Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue.
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representatives.3 Implementation challenges exist for any agreement, in particular one
as comprehensive and complex as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I call
upon all participants to remain steadfast in their commitment to the full
implementation of the agreement and work through challenges in a spirit of
cooperation and compromise, good faith and reciprocity. In that regard, I am
encouraged by the strong commitments of the European Union and the United States
to ensuring that the Plan works for all its participants, including by delivering
benefits to the Iranian people.4
8. With regard to the implementation of the provisions of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015), I am concerned by the ballistic missile launches conducted by the
Islamic Republic of Iran in March 2016. I call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to
refrain from conducting such launches, given that they have the potential to increase
tensions in the region. Whereas it is for the Security Council to interpret its own
resolutions, I am concerned that those launches are not consistent with the
constructive spirit demonstrated by the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action.
9. I am also concerned by the reported seizure of an arms shipment by the United
States Navy in the Gulf of Oman in March 2016 (see annex II). The United States
concluded that the arms had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and were
likely bound for Yemen. The Islamic Republic of Iran has informed the Secretariat
that it never engaged in such delivery (see annex I). I would like to remind all
Member States of their obligation to fully implement paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015), and I call upon them to provide reports on any arms seizures
to the Council and to my Office.
10. I wish to draw the attention of the Security Council to the participation of
Iranian entities in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition, held in Baghdad in March. No
prior approval was requested from the Council for the transfer of arms from the
Islamic Republic of Iran to Iraq. The Secretariat has sought clarification from both
countries on the issue. The Islamic Republic of Iran has indicated to the Secretariat
that, in its view, such an activity did not require prior approval of the Council, given
that it retained ownership of the items displayed (see annex I). I recommend that the
Council clarify whether paragraph 6 (b) applies to all supply, sale or transfer
regardless of change of ownership.
11. An entity on the list established under resolution 2231 (2015) 5 and maintained
by the Security Council, the Defence Industries Organisation, also appears to have
participated in the exhibition and should have been subject to action under the asset -
freeze provisions of the resolution. Likewise, I am informing the Security Council
__________________
3 See also paragraph 6 of the annex to the letter dated 20 July 2015 from the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Presi dent
of the Security Council, entitled “Statement of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the
adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) endorsing the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action” (S/2015/550).
4 See the “Statement by France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States and the High
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on post -JCPOA
business with Iran”, issued on 19 May 2016. Available from http://eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/
2016/160519_05_en.htm.
5 See www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. Individuals on the list established under resolution 2231
(2015) are subject to the asset freeze and travel ban restrictions. Listed entities are subject to the
asset freeze. There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities listed.
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that open-source information indicates that a listed individual, Major General
Qasem Soleimani, recently travelled to Iraq. The Secretariat has also sought
clarification from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq on those issues, and I intend
to report back to the Council accordingly.
12. In its response to queries on the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition and the travel
by Major General Qasem Soleimani, Iraq informed the Secretariat that it was “fully
aware of its obligations according to its understanding regarding resolution 2231
(2015) specifically, operative paragraph 7 (a) and paragraph 18 in annex A, which
clearly terminated all previous resolutions and sanctions regime set out in
resolutions adopted from 2006-2015”. Furthermore, Iraq stated that resolution 2231
(2015) was “lengthy, technical and confusing”. This demonstrates the importance of
further awareness-raising and outreach activities on the provisions of resolution
2231 (2015) and the obligations of Member States.
III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
13. In March and June 2016, IAEA issued quarterly reports on its verification and
monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231
(2015) (S/2016/250 and S/2016/535). The Agency reported that it was continuing to
verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations
regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic
Republic of Iran were ongoing. The Agency also reported verifying and monitoring
the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear -related
commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In addition, since
16 January 2016, I have not received any report, nor am I aware of any open-source
information, regarding the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of
Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the Plan and
resolution 2231 (2015).
14. In resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of a dedicated procurement channel
for the transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for
the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Plan. Through this
channel, the Council will review and decide on recommendations from the Joint
Commission established under the Plan regarding proposals by States to participate
in or permit nuclear-related activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015).
15. Provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on
a case-by-case basis, all States may now participate in and permit the supply, sale or
transfer of dual-use and nuclear items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, 6
__________________
6 The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and
INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2, as well as any other items that the State determines could contribute
to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action.
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and the provision of various related services or assistance.7 States may also permit
the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial
nuclear-related activities in another State provided that they have obtained prior
approval from the Council.8 When submitting a proposal to the Council, States are
encouraged to use the optional application form and model end-use certification
developed by the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission available on
the Council webpage dedicated to resolution 2231 (2015)9 and to submit those
forms in a machine-readable format. States are also encouraged to send proposals to
the Council facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) through
their permanent missions to the United Nations.
16. As at the date of submission of the present report, one proposal had been
submitted to the Security Council. The proposal, for a temporary export of dual-use
items to the Islamic Republic of Iran for the purpose of an exhibit, was subsequently
withdrawn.
17. Certain nuclear-related activities do not require prior approval but do require a
notification to the Security Council and the Joint Commission. Those activities are,
inter alia, those directly related to the necessary modification of two cascades at the
Fordow facility for stable isotope production, the export from the Islamic Republic
of Iran of enriched uranium in excess of 300 kg in return for natural uranium and
the modernization of the Arak reactor. Six exemption notifications were received
between July 2015 and January 2016, all in relation to the export of enriched
uranium in return for natural uranium. No notifications have been received by the
Council since Implementation Day.
18. The restrictions established under paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231
(2015) will apply until October 2025 or until the date on which IAEA submits its
report indicating the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in the Islamic
Republic of Iran remains in peaceful activities (the “broader conclusion” report), 10
whichever is earlier. Should IAEA submit such a report before October 2025, the
requirement to obtain prior approval from the Security Council for nuclear-related
activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) will be
replaced by the requirement to notify the Council and the Joint Commission at least
10 working days in advance of such activities.
__________________
7 The provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial
assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or
services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology described in paragraph 2 (a) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
8 Activity in another State involving uranium mining or production or use of nuclear materials and
technology as listed in IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and such investment in
territories under their jurisdiction by the Islamic Republic of Iran, its nationals and entities
incorporated in the Islamic Republic of Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or
entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them.
9 See www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml.
10 In paragraph 6 of resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council requested that as soon as IAEA
has reached the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran
remains in peaceful activities, the Director General of IAEA will submit a report confirming that
conclusion to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council.
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IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on Iranian ballistic missile-related activities
19. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council
called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to
ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches using such ballistic missile technology. That restriction will apply until
October 2023 or until the date on which IAEA submits its “broader conclusion”
report, whichever is earlier.
20. Early in March, during military exercises, the Islamic Republic of Iran
launched a series of ballistic missiles (see fig. I). According to official Iranian news
agencies and a report provided to me by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and
the United States, the missiles launched included the Qiam-1 short-range ballistic
missile and the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile. Images and video footage
released by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps suggest that at least one of the
missiles bore an inscription calling for the destruction of Israel. Both missiles are
based on Scud liquid-propellant technology and are both capable of delivering a
payload of approximately 700 kg, to a range of 700 km for the Qiam-1 and to a
range of 1,300 to 2,000 km for the Shahab-3.
Figure I
Various Iranian ballistic missile launches from undisclosed locations released by the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps on 9 March 2016
Source: Sepah News (official Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps online news site).
21. In identical letters dated 23 March (S/2016/279), the Islamic Republic of Iran
stressed that those launches were not inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015),
given that it had not undertaken “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed
to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”. The country underlined that it had
never sought to acquire nuclear weapons and never would, as it fully honoured its
commitment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It noted that the resolution did not prohibit
legitimate and conventional military activities and that the language of paragraph 3
of annex B to the resolution was clearly not mandatory.
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22. On 28 March, I received a letter from France, Germany, the United Kingdom
and the United States in which it was stressed that those launches were
destabilizing, provocative and that they had been conducted in defiance of
resolution 2231 (2015). Those States underscored that the phrase “ballistic missiles
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” in resolution 2231 (2015)
included all Missile Technology Control Regime Category I systems, defined as
those capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km,
which are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction. Given that the Qiam-1 and Shahab-3 are Category I missiles,
those States concluded that the launches of those missiles constituted an “activity
related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”
and “launches using such ballistic missile technology”, which the Islamic Republic
of Iran has been called upon not to undertake pursuant to paragraph 3 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015).
23. I am aware that the Security Council discussed those launches on 14 March
and 1 April. I also recognize that there was no consensus reached among Council
members as to whether those launches were covered under resolution 2231 (2015).
Whereas it is for the Council to interpret its own resolutions, we must maintain the
momentum created by the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
consistent with its constructive spirit. In that regard, I call upon the Islamic
Republic of Iran to avoid such ballistic missile launches that have the potential to
increase tensions in the region.
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
24. Since 16 January, pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231
(2015), provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council,
on a case-by-case basis, all States may participate in and permit the supply, sale or
transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items,
materials, equipment, goods and technology11 and the provision of various services
or assistance.12 Prior approval from the Council is also required for the acquisition
by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial ballistic missile -
related activities.13
25. This provision will apply until October 2023 or until the date on which IAEA
submits its “broader conclusion” report, whichever is earlier. As at the date of
__________________
11 The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile
Technology Control Regime list (S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment, goods
and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems.
12 The provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial
assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or
services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology described in paragraph 4 (a) or related to the activities
described in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
13 The acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in any commercial activity in
another State related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology described in paragraph 4 (a) or related to the activities
described in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
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submission of the present report, no proposal had been submitted by Member States
to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231
(2015). In addition, since 16 January, no information regarding the supply, sale,
transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of ballistic missile-related items
undertaken contrary to the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
and resolution 2231 (2015) has been brought to the attention of either the Security
Council or myself.
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
26. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), provided
that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case -by-case
basis, all States may now participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the
Islamic Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large -
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, or related materiel. Prior approval from the Council is also
required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of various services or
assistance relating to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of
those arms and related materiel.14
27. The Security Council also decided, in paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015), that all States were to take the measures necessary to prevent, e xcept
as decided otherwise by the Council in advance, on a case-by-case basis, the supply,
sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
28. Both provisions will apply until October 2020, or until the date on which
IAEA submits its “broader conclusion” report, whichever is earlier. As at the date of
submission of the present report, no proposals had been submitted by Member
States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 (b) of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015).
29. On 7 June, I received a report from the United States providing information on
an arms seizure that, in its assessment, had originated in the Islamic Republic of
Iran. That information was also communicated to the Security Council and to the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014).
Furthermore, open-source information indicated that Iranian entities had
participated in and had displayed arms during a foreign defence exhibition. I am
also aware of certain media reports that suggest that the Islamic Republic of Iran
has been providing arms to Hizbullah.15 During the reporting period I have received
no reports from Member States on such transfers, nor do I have independent
information to corroborate the media reports.
__________________
14 The provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technical training, financial resources or
services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture,
maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in paragraph 5 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015).
15 See, for example, “Israel’s main concern in Syria: Iran, not ISIS”, Wall Street Journal, 17 March
2016; and “Lebanese army slowly crushing extremists near Syria border”, Associated Press,
22 June 2016.
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Arms seizure: Adris
30. In its report, the United States indicated that it had seized an arms shipment
from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was likely bound for Yemen (see annex II).
According to the report, on 28 March, a United States Navy ship boarded a dhow,
the Adris, which was transiting international waters in the vicinity of the Gulf of
Oman. That action, which the United States took in accordance with customary
international law, as stated in its report, resulted in the discovery of a large weapons
cache aboard the vessel, which included 1,500 Kalashnikov variant rifles, 200 RPG-7
and RPG-7V rocket-propelled grenade launchers and 21 DshK 12.7-mm machine guns
(see fig. II). On the basis of an analysis of available information, including
interviews with the crew and a review of the arms, the United States concluded that
the arms had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and that their transfer was
being undertaken contrary to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
After the weapons were seized, the dhow and its crew were allowed to depart.
31. The representatives of the Secretariat met with members of the Permanent
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in New York on
8 June, to inform them of this report and, subsequently, wrote to the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations to seek
clarification on the shipment. The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejected
this allegation (see annex I). The Secretariat is still reviewing the informa tion
provided by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and I intend to
provide an update on this arms seizure to the Security Council in due course.
Figure II
Kalashnikov variant rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and machine guns seized on-board
the Adris on 28 March 2016
Source: United States.
Arms transfer: Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition
32. According to open-source information, several Iranian entities participated in
the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition, held from 5 to 8 March at the Baghdad
International Fairground. According to images published by the Islamic Republic
News Agency16 and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting news agency, items
__________________
16 “Baghdad exhibit featuring the Islamic Republic of Iran defence, military capabilities”, Islamic
Republic News Agency, 5 March 2016.
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displayed by those entities appeared to include small arms, artillery ammunition and
rockets (see fig. III). It is my understanding that such an arms transfer from the
Islamic Republic of Iran to Iraq should have required prior approval from the
Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
The Secretariat has raised its concerns with the Permanent Missions of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations, in New York, and has invited both
Member States to provide further information. Iranian representatives considered
that no prior approval was required from the Council for this activity because the
Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited (see annex I).
Figure III
Items displayed by Iranian entities during the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition
Source: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting news agency (left) and Islamic Republic News Agency (right).
VI. Asset freeze
33. The Security Council decided, in paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015), that all States were to freeze the funds, other financial
assets and economic resources of the individuals and entities on the list established
under resolution 2231 (2015) and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic
resources were made available to those individuals and entities. That provision will
apply until October 2023 or until the date on which IAEA submits its “broader
conclusion” report, whichever is earlier.
34. The list established under resolution 2231 (2015) includes the individuals and
entities specified on the list established under resolution 1737 (2006) and
maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the exception
of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution
2231 (2015) who were delisted on Implementation Day. As specified in that
paragraph, the Council can delist individuals or entities, and list additional
individuals and entities, found to meet certain designation criteria defined in the
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resolution.17 On 17 January, the Council decided to delist one entity, Bank Sepah
and Bank Sepah International.18
35. During the reporting period, it appears that an entity currently on the list
established under resolution 2231 (2015), the Defence Industries Organisation, may
have participated in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition, which was held in March (se e
para. 32 and fig. IV). I wish to stress that, pursuant to paragraph 6 (c) of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015), the Iraqi authorities should have frozen all of the entity’s
funds, other financial assets and economic resources on Iraqi territory at the da te of
adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or at any time thereafter. This
concern was also raised with members of the Permanent Missions of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations by the Secretariat, and both Member
States were invited to provide further information. I intend to report back to the
Security Council in due course.
Figure IV
Iranian booth at the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition and logo of the Defence
Industries Organisation
Source: Still frame of video released by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting news agency (left) and the
website of the Defence Industries Organisation (www.diomil.ir/en/home.aspx) accessed through the
Wayback Machine Internet archive (http://archive.org/web/web.php) (right).
__________________
17 Pursuant to paragraph 6 (c) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Council may designate
additional individuals and entities for having engaged in, directly associated wi th or provided
support for the proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran
undertaken contrary to its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the
development of nuclear weapons delivery systems, including through the involvement in
procurement of prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified in the
resolution; having assisted designated individuals or entities in evading or acting inconsistently
with the Plan or the resolution; having acted on behalf or at the direction of designated
individuals or entities; or having been owned or controlled by designated individuals or entities,
including through illicit means.
18 Security Council, press release of 17 January 2016, entitled “Security Council removes Bank
Sepah and Bank Sepah International from 2231 list”.
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VII. Travel ban
36. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States
are to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their
territories of the individuals on the list established under resolution 2231 (2015)
(see para. 34 above).19 That provision will apply until October 2020 or until the date
on which IAEA submits its “broader conclusion” report, whichever is earlier.
37. During the reporting period, it was brought to my attention that at least one
listed individual might have engaged in foreign travel. On 25 May, an Iranian news
agency reproduced photographs showing the Commander of the Quds Force of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major General Qasem Soleimani, in what was
referred to as the “Fallujah operations room” in Iraq (see fig. V).20 On 27 May, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that “Iranian
military advisers are in Iraq under Major General Qasem Soleimani on the request of
the legal government of Iraq”.21 On 29 May, the Deputy Head of the Iraqi volunteer
forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who appeared in the same photograph, reportedly
stated that General Soleimani’s presence in Iraq was at the request of the Government
of Iraq.22 On 6 June, during a press conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Iraq, while not denying that Major General Soleimani had visited Iraq, emphasized
that he had done so as a military adviser.23 The Secretariat has also raised the matter
with members of the Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq to
the United Nations, in New York, and has invited both Member States to provide
clarification on the issue. Similarly, I intend to report back to the Security Council in
due course.
__________________
19 This provision does not oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
Furthermore, the travel ban restriction does not apply when the Security Council d etermines, on
a case-by-case basis, that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including
religious obligations, or where the Council concludes that an exemption would otherwise further
the objectives of resolution 2231 (2015).
20 Fars News Agency, “Iran’s Gen. Soleimani in Fallujah operations room”, 25 May 2016. Available
from http://en.farsnews.com/imgrep.aspx?nn=13950304001274.
21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, “Spokesman slams Saudi FM for
anti-Iran statements”, 27 May 2016. Available from www7.irna.ir/en/News/82090143.
22 For example, see Tasnim News Agency, “General Soleimani in Iraq at Baghdad’s request:
Voluntary Force official”, 29 May 2016. Available from www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/
2016/05/29/1087056/general-soleimani-in-iraq-at-baghdad-s-request-voluntary-force-official.
23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Press conference of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq
and the Head of the Sunni Endowment Dewan, held in Amman on 6 June 2016. Available from
www.mofa.gov.iq/ab/news.php?articleid=856 (in Arabic).
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Figure V
General Soleimani in the “Fallujah operations room”
Source: Fars News Agency, published on 25 May 2016 with the following caption: “Iraqi Harakat
Hezbollah al-Nujaba media group published photos of popular forces operations room showing
Iran’s Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani discussing Fallujah battle
strategies with Badr commander Hadi Al-'Amiri, Nujaba’s Akram Al-Ka'abi and another popular
fighters’ commander, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis” (General Soleimani is featured on the
extreme left).
VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
38. Since the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council Affairs
Division of the Department of Political Affairs has devoted considerable effort to
putting into place the practical arrangements to support the work of the Council and
its facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has
also liaised with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for the
establishment of the procurement channel.
39. Since 16 January, the Division has provided support to the organization and
staffing of two informal meetings of the Security Council at the expert level and to
an open briefing to inform Member States about the implementation of resolution
2231 (2015). The Division also processed all incoming and outgoing communications
relating to implementation of the resolution. To actively promote available
information on the restrictions imposed by the Council, including the procurement
channel, on the day of the implementation, the Division launched a webpage
dedicated to resolution 2231 (2015) on the Council website.24 In February 2016,
documents provided by the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission
offering practical information to States on the procurement channel were added to
the website. Revised versions of those documents were provided by the Working
Group in May. In April, the presentations delivered by the Security Council
__________________
24 See www.un.org/en/sc/2231.
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facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and representatives of
the Working Group during an open briefing were also added.
40. In close cooperation with the Security Council facilitator for the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Procurement Working Group of
the Joint Commission, the Division established the required processes to facilitate
the timely translation of proposals and secured electronic transmission and tracking
of all proposals submitted by States and all subsequent related communications
between Member States, the Security Council and the Joint Commission. The
working language of the Joint Commission is English, but Member States may
submit proposals to the Security Council in any of the six official languages of the
United Nations.
41. The Division has responded to several queries from Member States about the
procurement channel, including the procedures for submission of proposals and the
review process, exemptions to the channel and confidentiality issues.
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Annex I
Information obtained by the Secretariat in the course of its
contacts with Iranian representatives*
A. Allegations
1. Iran’s views on resolution 2231 have been elaborated extensively in its
Statement issued following its adoption (document S/2015/550), which remains
valid in full. Accordingly, Iran continues to insist that all sanctions and restrictive
measures introduced against Iran including those applied under the pretext of its
nuclear programme, have been baseless, unjust and unlawful, hence nothing in the
JCPOA shall be construed to imply, directly or indirectly, an admission of or
acquiescence by Iran in the legitimacy, validity or enforceability of the sanctions
and restrictive measures adopted against Iran by the Security Council, the Europea n
Union or its member States, the United States or any other State, nor shall it be
construed as a waiver or a limitation on the exercise of any related right the Islamic
Republic of Iran is entitled to under relevant national legislation, international
instruments or legal principles.
2. At the same time, taking into account the fact that, by acting under
Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Council decided to terminate the provisions of all
resolutions issued in regard to the Iran’s nuclear program, all sanctions and
restrictive measures imposed by such resolutions have been removed completely.
Measures contained in Annex B of resolution 2231 do not amount to prohibitions or
sanctions and solely entail procedures for certain issues for a limited time -frame.
3. In view of the above, attention is drawn to the following:
3.1 In regard to allegation of arms delivery to Yemen, Iran categorically
rejects the allegation as it has never engaged in such delivery.
3.2 In relations to the Iraq Defense Exhibition, no supply, sale, or transfer of
arms or related materiel which may entail prior approval of the Council has taken
place, the items are only exhibited and no change of title or ownership takes place.
B. EU/US’ defective implementation of resolution 2231
Despite U.S. and EU’s clear commitments with regard to lifting of sanctions,
Iran has not been able to fully benefit from lifting of Sanctions due to a ser ies of
deficiencies and/or non-performance on the part of either U.S. or the EU. The
following are some examples of the actions taken by them in spite of the resolution
and its Annexes:
1. The US Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel
Prevention Act of 2015: Under this Act, nationals of Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
countries who have travelled to or been present in Iran from 1 March 2011 or those
who are also nationals of Iran are no longer eligible to travel or be admitted to the
United States under the VWP. It was announced later that a case by case waiver
might be issued for individuals who travelled to Iran for legitimate business-related
__________________
* The information contained herein is reproduced as received.
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purposes following the conclusion of the JCPOA (July 14, 2015). There are no
waivers for tourist trips to Iran. The new Act was adopted against several provisions
of the JCPOA, including paragraphs 26, 28 and 29. In accordance with paragraph 26
of the JCPOA, the United States is committed to prevent interference with the
realization of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II.
Under Paragraph 28 of the JCPOA, the US is committed to refrain from any action
that would undermine its successful implementation. General Provisions of the
JCPOA, Paragraph viii, The same has been stipulated in the, which goes as far as
stating that the E3/EU+ 3 will refrain from ‘imposing discriminatory regulatory and
procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by
this JCPOA. Also, paragraph 29 of the JCPOA has committed the United States to
refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the
normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran.
2. Confiscation of the Central Bank assets following a U.S. court order:
Less than 4 months after the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, around US$ 1.8 billion
of Iran Central Bank’s assets were seized following a U.S. court order. The Central
Bank does not also have access to another approximately 1.7 billion US$ of its
assets held in Clear stream, Luxemburg, under similar grounds. This unlawful and
illegitimate act is inconsistent with the spirit of the JCPOA.
3. Continuing U.S.’ State and local sanctions: In addition to many sanction
legislations existed prior to JCPOA, some States and local governments have
enacted new divestment legislations and persist in their enforcement of sanctions,
even by sending threatening correspondence to foreign banks and companies
querying them about their investment in Iranian energy sectors in the post JCPOA
era. In accordance with Para 25 of the JCPOA the US shall “actively encourage
officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in the U.S. policy
reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to refrain from actions
inconsistent with this change”. Formalistic writing of letters cannot be considered
active encouragement.
4. The US Presidential Executive Order 13645 is re-introduced inconsistent
with the JCPOA: Executive Order 13645 was supposed to be terminated as of
“Implementation Day” consistent with Paragraph 21(xix) of the JCPOA,
Paragraph 4 of its Annex II, and Paragraph 17.4 of its Annex V. Although Section l(d)
of Executive Order No. 13716 revoked that Executive Order, several parts of the
revoked Order including its section 9 to 19 are reintroduced in the Executive Order
No.13716. This is not consistent with United States commitment for termination of
the Executive Order as well as paragraph 26 of the JCPOA regarding refraining
from re-introduction or re-imposition of lifted sanctions.
5. The Inability of the Iranian Central Bank to have free access to its assets
held abroad due to the US lack of cooperation in converting those assets into
non-US currencies as well as for their transfer, despite the U.S. commitments in this
regard under paragraph 21(iv) and paragraphs and 7.2 of Annex IV of JCPOA.
6. Continuing reluctance on the part of non-American banks to do business
with Iran due to OFAC’s dissuading behavior, including through settlement
agreements that officially bar those banks from re-engaging with Iran.
7. Introducing discriminatory restriction for the sale of dual use items
(other than those items in NSG list) to Iran by the EU: A list of items that before the
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JCPOA were exported to Iran without an End User Certificate signed by an Iranian
Authority, have been added to Annex II of EU Regulation 1861 which necessitates
such procedures. This makes the export of these items more difficult than even
before the JCPOA.
8. Introduction of authorization regimes for metal and software by the
EU: Annexes VIIA and VIIB of Council regulation 1861/2015 lists metal and
software that are subject to a new authorization regime which is new restriction,
especially when it utilizes negative textual structures such as “the competent
authorities shall not grant any authorization...” and broad and obscure restrictive
terms and conditions like “... indirect benefit of IRGC” which is very restrictive.
9. Moreover, Iranian civilian aircraft passengers are not still given fuel in
some EU destinations. And still we have to wait for cumbersome US sanctions -
induced problems in order to execute our agreements and contracts with Airbus and
others to buy passenger aircrafts.
Please note that the above problems, deficiencies and defective performances
are happening despite the fact that Iran has honored its obligations in full.
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Annex II
Report dated 7 June 2016 from the United States of America
regarding the implementation of Security Council
resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015)*
The United States would like to share information with the Security Council
and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) (“Yemen
Sanctions Committee”) regarding a shipment of arms and related material from Iran,
which were likely bound for Yemen. This information may be useful to the
Facilitator for implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
(“Facilitator”), the Yemen Sanctions Committee, the Yemen Panel of Experts, and
the Secretary General in carrying out their mandates with respect to reported
violations of UN Security Council resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015).
On March 28, 2016, at 1930Z, the U.S. Navy Coastal Patrol ship USS Sirocco,
operating as part of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, encountered and boarded
a dhow transiting international waters in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman. This
action was taken in accordance with customary international law. Following
discovery of a large weapons cache found aboard the vessel, the USS Gravely was
directed to the scene by U.S. authorities to relieve the USS Sirocco. The USS
Gravely took control of the arms cargo.
Paragraph 6(b) of Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) requires Iran not to
supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals any
arms or related material until the date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or
until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader
Conclusion, whichever is earlier, absent approval in advance on a case-by-case basis
by the Security Council. Based on an analysis of available information, including
crew interviews and review of the arms aboard the vessel, the United States
concluded that the arms originated in Iran and that their transfer from Iran violated
paragraph 6(b) of Annex B of resolution 2231. Interviews with the crew revealed
strong indications that the arms were being smuggled from Iran. The United States
intends to share additional information obtained as a result of the boarding with the
Security Council Affairs Division for use in relation to the report by the Secretary -
General on the implementation of resolution 2231.
The transfer of these arms to forces acting on the behalf of or at the direction
of individuals on the UN Yemen sanctions list would be a violation of paragraph 14
of resolution 2216 (2015).
The cargo seized on board the dhow included 1,500x Kalashnikov variant
rifles, 200x RPG-7 and RPG-7V Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers (RPGs), and
21x DshK 12.7mm machine guns. The dhow and its crew were allowed to depart
once the weapons were seized.
The United States is concerned that Iran’s exports of weapons continue in
violation of Iran’s obligations under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).
Transfers to Yemen in violation of the arms embargo imposed in resolution 2216
(2015) also undermine opportunities to achieve peace in the region and reduce the
suffering of the people of Yemen.
__________________
* The information contained herein is reproduced as received.
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We trust this information will assist the Security Council in promoting
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). In light of the requests made of the
Secretary-General in resolution 2231 and S/2016/44, we therefore respectfully
request that the Secretary-General report fully and thoroughly Iran’s exports of arms
in violation of resolution 2231. The United States also encourages the Security
Council and the Yemen Sanctions Committee to raise this incident with Iran directly
and to review additional ways to improve enforcement of these measures. The
United States offers its assistance with any investigation undertaken.
Annex 60
Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen
mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to
the President of the Security Council*
The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen have the honour to transmit
herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 6 of
resolution 2342 (2017).
The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on 9 January 2018 and considered by the
Committee on 23 January 2018.
We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the
attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the
Council.
(Signed) Ahmed Himmiche
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on Yemen
mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017)
(Signed) Fernando Rosenfeld Carvajal
Expert
(Signed) Dakshinie Ruwanthika Gunaratne
Expert
(Signed) Gregory Johnsen
Expert
(Signed) Adrian Wilkinson
Expert
* Previously issued under the symbol S/2018/68.
Annex 61
Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen
Summary
After nearly three years of conflict, Yemen, as a State, has all but ceased to exist.
Instead of a single State there are warring statelets, and no one side has either the
political support or the military strength to reunite the country or to achieve victory on
the battlefield.
In the north, the Houthis are working to consolidate their hold on Sana ’a and
much of the highlands after a five-day street battle in the city that ended with the
execution of their one-time ally, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003), on
4 December 2017. In the days and weeks that followed, the Houthis crushed or
co-opted much of what remained of the former President’s network in Yemen.
In the south, the Government of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi was
weakened by the defection of several governors to the newly formed Southern
Transition Council, which advocates for an independent south Yemen. Another
challenge for the Government is the existence of proxy forces, armed and funded by
member States of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, who pursue their own objectives on
the ground. The battlefield dynamics are further complicated by the terrorist groups
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) (Da’esh), both of which routinely carry out strikes against the Houthis, the
Government and Saudi Arabia-led coalition targets.
The end of the Houthi-Saleh alliance opened a window of opportunity for the
Saudi Arabia-led coalition and forces loyal to the Government of Yemen to regain
territory. This window is unlikely to last for long, however, or to be sufficient in and
of itself to end the war.
The launch of short-range ballistic missiles, first by forces of the Houthi-Saleh
alliance and subsequently, following the end of the alliance, by Houthi forces against
Saudi Arabia, changed the tenor of the conflict and has the potential to turn a local
conflict into a broader regional one.
The Panel has identified missile remnants, related military equipment and
military unmanned aerial vehicles that are of Iranian origin and were brought into
Yemen after the imposition of the targeted arms embargo. As a result, the Panel finds
that the Islamic Republic of Iran is in non-compliance with paragraph 14 of resolution
2216 (2015) in that it failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or
indirect supply, sale or transfer of Borkan-2H short-range ballistic missiles, field
storage tanks for liquid bipropellant oxidizer for missiles and Ababil -T (Qasef-1)
unmanned aerial vehicles to the then Houthi-Saleh alliance.
The Houthis have also deployed improvised sea mines in the Red Sea, which
represent a hazard for commercial shipping and sea lines of communication that could
remain for as long as 6 to 10 years, threatening imports to Yemen and access for
humanitarian assistance through the Red Sea ports.
Yemen’s financial system is broken. There are competing central banks, one in
the north under the control of the Houthis, and one in the south under the control o f
the Government. Neither is operating at full capacity. The Government is unable to
effectively collect revenue, while the Houthis collect taxes, extort businesses and seize
assets in the name of the war effort.
Annex 61
Yemen has a liquidity problem. Salaries throughout the country often go unpaid,
meaning that medicine, fuel and food, when available, are often prohibitively
expensive. New profiteers are emerging as a result of the war and the black market
now threatens to eclipse formal transactions.
Although Ali Abdullah Saleh is now deceased, it is likely that Khaled Ali
Abdullah Saleh, acting on behalf of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005), will
continue to control the wealth of the Saleh family. There is no indication, as yet, as to
whether he will use this wealth to support acts that threaten the peace, security or
stability of Yemen.
Throughout 2017, there have been widespread violations of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law by all parties to the conflict. The
air strikes carried out by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition and the indiscriminate use of
explosive ordnance by Houthi-Saleh forces throughout much of 2017 continued to
affect civilians and the civilian infrastructure disproportionally. The Panel has seen no
evidence to suggest that appropriate measures were taken by any side to mitigate the
devastating impact of these attacks on the civilian population.
The rule of law is deteriorating rapidly across Yemen, regardless of who controls
a particular territory. The Government of Yemen, the United Arab Emirates and
Houthi-Saleh forces have all engaged in arbitrary arrests and detentions, carried out
enforced disappearances and committed torture. The Houthis have summarily executed
individuals, detained individuals solely for political or economic reasons and
systematically destroyed the homes of their perceived enemies. The Houthis also
routinely obstruct humanitarian access and the distribution of aid.
Following the missile attack on Riyadh on 4 November 2017, the Sa udi Arabialed
coalition ordered the closure of all land crossings into, and all seaports and airports
in Yemen. Entry points under the control of the Government of Yemen were quickly
re-opened, while those under the control of the Houthis, such as Hudayda h, remained
closed for weeks. This had the effect of using the threat of starvation as an instrument
of war.
Delays and unpredictability resulting from the current inspection regime for the
Red Sea ports have created additional barriers and business risks for shippers and
importers supplying Yemen. The confidence of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in the
United Nations inspection process must be improved to ensure an increased flow of
essential supplies and humanitarian aid through the Red Sea ports.
Annex 61
Contents
Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. Mandate and introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C. Programme of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
D. Cooperation with stakeholders and organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
II. Threats to the peace, security or stability of Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Challenges to the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Impediments to the cessation of hostilities and to the resumption of the political process 10
C. Security and regional dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
D. The “Southern question” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
E. Contested areas and potential fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
F. Maritime security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
III. Armed groups and military units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. Yemeni Government and Saudi Arabia-led coalition regular forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B. Saudi Arabia-led coalition proxy forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
C. Houthi forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
D. The network of Ali Abdullah Saleh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
E. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
F. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
IV. Arms and implementation of the targeted arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A. Houthi-Saleh “land missile campaign” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B. Extended-range short-range ballistic missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C. Houthi use of unmanned aerial vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
D. Waterborne improvised explosive devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
E. Sea mines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
F. Anti-tank guided missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
G. Black market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
H. Increasing the effectiveness of the targeted arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
V. Economic context and overview of finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A. Control of State economic resources by the Houthis and their affiliates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B. Money supply problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
C. Financial consequences of the conflict on the import of food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
VI. Assets freeze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Annex 61
VII. Travel ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
VIII. Acts that violate international humanitarian law and human rights law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A. Incidents attributed to the Saudi Arabia-led coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
B. Houthi and Saleh forces: violations associated with the deprivation of liberty . . . . . . . . . 49
C. Indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance against civilian populated areas . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
D. Violations by the Government of Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
E. Attacks inside hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
F. Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
IX. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A. Obstruction of deliveries of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B. Obstruction to the distribution of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Annexes* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
Annex 61
Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen
I. Introduction
A. Mandate and introduction
1. By its resolution 2342 (2017), the Security Council renewed the sanctions
measures in relation to Yemen and further extended the mandate of the Panel of
Experts on Yemen until 28 March 2018. The Panel is mandated to:
(a) Assist the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
2140 (2014) in carrying out its mandate as specified both in resolutions 2140 (2014)
and 2216 (2015), including by providing the Committee at any time with information
relevant to the potential designation at a later stage of individuals and entities who
may be engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen, as
defined in paragraph 18 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 19 of resolution
2216 (2015);
(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United
Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the
implementation of the sanctions measures and targeted arms embargo, in particula r
incidents undermining the political transition;
(c) Provide a midterm update to the Committee no later than 28 July 2017,
and a final report to the Security Council no later than 28 January 2018, after
discussion with the Committee;
(d) Assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of
individuals subject to sanctions measures, including through the provision of
identifying information and additional information for the publicly available narrative
summary of reasons for listing;
(e) Cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security
Council, in particular the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team
established by Council resolution 1526 (2004).1
2. On 1 August 2017, the Panel presented a midterm update to the Committee, 2 in
accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2342 (2017). An additional update
containing information on the obstruction of co mmercial shipping through Red Sea
ports in Yemen controlled by the Houthi-Saleh forces 3 was submitted to the
Committee on 31 March 2017, and two updates on an escalation in relation to a
missile attack against Riyadh on 4 November 2017 were submitted to the Committee
on 10 and 24 November 2017.
3. The present report covers the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017.
The Panel has also continued to investigate outstanding issues covered in its previous
report, dated 31 January 2017 (S/2017/81).
1 The Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 2253
(2015).
2 The midterm update and the additional updates provided to the Committee and to the members of
the Security Council are confidential (archived in the files of the Secretariat).
3 Houthi-Saleh forces refers to the armed units of the alliance up until its collapse on 1 December
2017.
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B. Methodology
4. In its investigations, the Panel complied with paragraph 11 of resolution 2342
(2017), which pertains to the best practices and methods recommended in the report
of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions
(S/2006/997). The Panel placed emphasis on adherence to standards regarding
transparency and sources, documentary evidence, corroboration of independent
verifiable sources and providing the opportunity to reply.4 The Panel has maintained
transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence in its investigations and has
based its findings on a balance of verifiable evidence.
5. The Panel used satellite imagery of locations in Yemen procured by the United
Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also used information
from commercial databases that record maritime and aviation data and mobile phone
records. Public statements by officials through official media channels were accepted
as factual, unless contrary facts were established. While the Panel has been as
transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would e xpose them
or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying
information in the report and assigned the relevant evidence for safekeeping in United
Nations archives.
6. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as
evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical
sources, including eyewitnesses, in order to meet the highest achievable standard of
proof.
7. The spelling of place names within Yemen is often dependent on the ethnicity
of the source or quality of translation. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach
in the report, with personal names and major place names spelled out as in previous
United Nations documents and in accordance with the standard spelli ng found in the
United Nations Terminology Reference System (UNTERM). Dates in documents
provided by Member States given according to the Islamic calendar have been
converted to the corresponding dates according to the Gregorian calendar.
C. Programme of work
8. In the course of its investigations Panel members have travelled to Belgium,
Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan,
the Netherlands, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Arab
Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United
States of America and Yemen. The Panel twice requested official visits to areas of
Yemen (Ma’rib and Mukalla) under the control of the legitimate Government: on both
occasions the response from the legitimate Government and Saudi Arabia was too late
to allow for the United Nations travel approval and security processes to be completed.
9. The Panel requested visits to territory controlled by the Houthi -Saleh alliance
(Sana’a and Ta‘izz) on three separate occasions. The Sana’a-based authorities initially
approved the first visit, but withdrew that approval 24 hours later. They did not
respond the subsequent two requests after informing the Panel that they did not wish
to cooperate with it.5
10. Oman initially agreed to a visit to the Mazyunah border crossing point with
Yemen but cancelled the visit immediately prior to the Panel’s departure for Oman.
4 Information on methodology and opportunity to reply is contained in annex 1.
5 Letter to the Panel dated 23 March 2017.
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D. Cooperation with stakeholders and organizations
1. United Nations system
11. The Panel wishes to highlight the excellent level of cooperation with the Office
of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and the United Nations
resident coordinators in the neighbouring States visited by the Panel. The United
Nations country team and United Nations agencies with a regional mandate remain
supportive of the Panel’s work. The Panel has consistently had direct access to
country team officials in Sana’a and the wider region to exchange information and
expertise.
12. In conformity with paragraph 7 of resolution 2342 (2017), the Panel has
maintained close cooperation with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and
the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, 6 the Somalia and Eritrea
Monitoring Group, 7 and the Secretariat staff working on the implementation of
resolution 2231 (2015).
2. Communications with Member States
13. The Panel has sent 192 letters to Member States and entities requesting
information on specific issues relevant to its mandate. The Panel wishes to affirm that
such requests for information do not necessarily imply that those Governments, or
individuals or entities in those States, have been violating the sanctions regime. The
Panel notes, however, that 25 per cent of requests to Member States for information
are still awaiting a response. At the time of submission of the present report, replies
are awaited from: Australia, France, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Marshall Islands,
Oman, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Togo, the United Arab Emirates,
the United Kingdom and Yemen. Furthermore, the ministry of foreign affairs, based
in Sana’a, and several other entities have not yet replied. A summary of the Panel ’s
correspondence during the reporting period is contained in annex 3 to the present
report.
3. Government of Yemen
14. The Panel met the Prime Minister of Yemen, Ahmed Bin Dagher, and other
officials of the legitimate Government of Yemen in Aden in March 2017. 8 Although
they expressed full support to the Panel, they provided information of insufficient
evidential quality.
4. Houthi-Saleh alliance
15. The Panel maintained phone contact with representatives of the Houthi
Ansarallah movement and the leaders of the General People’s Congress. The Panel
also met with some of their representatives during visits to countries in the reg ion.
6 Established by resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 2253 (2015).
7 Established by resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), and recently extended by resolution 2317
(2016).
8 In order to avoid confusion between the Government of Yemen and Houthi -Saleh alliance
authorities and appointments, and to easily distinguish between the two in the present report, for
Government of Yemen ministries and Government officials the Panel will use capitalization: for
example, “Minister of Defence” and “Ministry of Defence”. The Houthi duplicate administration
would then be referred to as, the “Sana’a based minister of defence” and the “Sana’a based
ministry of defence”. Similarly, military ranks and appointments will follow the same format, for
example, “General” and “general”, “35th Armoured Brigade” and “62nd mechanized brigade”
and so forth.
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II. Threats to the peace, security or stability of Yemen
16. In paragraph 18 of resolution 2140 (2014), the Security Council determined that
obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition, as
outlined in the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative and the implementation
mechanism agreement, poses a threat to the peace, security or stability of Yemen and
can be used as designation criterion.
A. Challenges to the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen
17. The authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen has now eroded to the
point that it is doubtful whether it will ever be able to reunite Yemen as a single
country. The Panel bases this assessment on the following four factors: (a) President
Hadi’s inability to govern from abroad; (b) the formation of a “Southern Transitional
Council”, with the stated goal of creating an independent south Yemen; (c) the
continued presence of the Houthis in Sana’a and much of the north; and (d) the
proliferation and independent operations of proxy military forces funded and armed
by members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition.
18. President Hadi remained outside Yemen for much of 2017.9 Several Governors
either resigned or were removed10 from their posts by President Hadi, including Nayif
Salim Saleh al-Qaysi (QDi.402),11 the then Governor of Bayda’, who was sanctioned
by the United Nations on 22 February 2017 for providing support to an Al -Qaida
branch in Yemen.12 The legitimate Government’s inability to pay salaries to civil
servants, soldiers and other Government employees has also undermined its authority
and diminished popular support.
1. Southern Transitional Council
19. On 11 May 2017, the former Governor of Aden, Major General Aydrus
al-Zubaydi, announced the formation of the Southern Transitional Council 13 with the
stated goal of creating an independent south Yemen. 14 On 30 November 2017 the
Council announced the names of the 303 members of a “National Assembly”.15
20. Throughout 2017, support for the Southern Transitional Council and its goal of
an independent south Yemen has grown among the population as well as within the
Yemeni Armed Forces and proxy forces. Uniformed members of the Security Belt
Forces are frequently photographed at Council rallies carrying flags of the former
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. The Panel has also identified ele ments of
the Hadrami Elite Forces posting Council logos and the flag of the former southern
State at their checkpoints.
9 Hadi’s last publicly reported visit to Yemen was in February 2017.
10 For a list of current Governors loyal to the legitimate Government see annex 4.
11 See annex 5 for the network of Nayef al-Qaysi.
12 Al-Qaysi was removed from his post as Governor on 23 July 2017.
13 Information provided in the Panels’ 2017 confidential midterm update report (paras. 9 and 10).
For the leadership of the Southern Transitional Council see annex 7.
14 South Yemen was an independent State from 1967 until unification in 1990.
15 The first meeting was held in Aden on 23 December 2017. Ahmed bin Breik was elected
president and Anis Youssef Ali Luqman as vice-president. The distribution of seats is:
Hadramawt, 100 seats; Aden, 62 seats; Shabwah, 37 seats; Lahij, 36 seats; Abyan, 31 seats;
Mahrah, 24 seats; Dali‘, 10 seats; and Socotra, 3 seats. Websites of the Southern Transitional
Council can be viewed in Arabic (http://www.southerntransitionalcouncil.net/) and English
(http://en.southerntransitionalcouncil.net/) (all hyperlinks, unless otherwise indicated, accessed
on 29 December 2017). The Council has opened local or branch offices in all eight governorates.
For a list of names see annex 7.
Annex 61
2. Houthi-Saleh alliance
21. Until its collapse in early December 2017 the Houthi-Saleh alliance, through its
joint supreme political council, continued to undertake roles and responsibilities
exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government.16 The Houthis have
now taken unilateral control of all State institutions within their territory. The longer
they remain in control, the more entrenched they will become.17
B. Impediments to the cessation of hostilities and to the resumption of
the political process
22. No real progress towards a peaceful settlement was made during 2017. The
political process has stalled as all parties to the conflict continue to believe that they
can achieve a military victory that would negate the necessity for political
compromise.
23. Since the attack on the convoy of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, in Sana’a on 25 May 2017,18 he has been
prevented from visiting Sana’a.19 The Houthis have effectively banned the Special
Envoy by refusing to accept any subsequent proposals from him.
24. The Houthis believe that they only have to survive and outlast the Saudi Arabia -
led coalition in order to “win” the war, which limits their willingness to negotiate.
The Saudi Arabia-led coalition, on the other hand, is faced with four broad choices:
(a) unilaterally cease hostilities and leave the Houthis in control; (b) mount a massive
ground invasion with no guarantee of success and certain casualties; (c) continue to
carry out airstrikes and hope for different results, although after 33 months of air
strikes the number of credible targets remaining is considered to be very low; or
(d) attempt to resurrect Saleh’s network as part of an anti-Houthi coalition. Although
the battle lines may shift slightly in the coming months, as a result of the collapse of
the Houthi-Saleh alliance, the Panel does not believe that any side is in a position to
secure an outright military victory.
25. Another complicating factor is that the political decision makers on all sides are
not bearing the brunt of the war, the Yemeni civilians are. The Houthi leadership is
largely insulated from attacks, and from the shortages of food, fuel, medicine and
water. The Saudi Arabia-led coalition relies on relatively low-risk airstrikes and a
limited number of ground troops, which reduces the domestic political fallout.
16 See S/2017/81, para. 20.
17 Houthis control Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, Ibb, Mahwit, Raymah, Sa‘dah and Sana’a. Contested
governorates are Bayda’, Hudaydah, Jawf, Ma’rib and Ta‘izz. The list of governors can be found
in annex 8.
18 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un/u-n-wants-investig…-
yemen-envoys-convoy-idUSKBN18L18I.
19 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un/houthis-ban-u-n-sp…-
for-alleged-bias-idUSKBN18W2D0.
Annex 61
Collapse of the Houthi-Saleh alliance and death of Saleh
26. Tensions between the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) spiked in
August 2017, 20 and again on 29 November 2017 when armed Houthi supporters
clashed with Saleh supporters in and around the al-Saleh mosque in Sana’a. The latter
incident sparked a five-day street war that led to the collapse of the Houthi-Saleh
alliance and the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh.
27. Although Ali Abdullah Saleh initially appeared to have the upper hand in
Sana’a, the Houthis quickly retook several military installations and sent
reinforcements into the city, while isolating Saleh from military and tribal al lies.
Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim (YEi.002) and Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, the head of the
Houthi’s revolutionary committee, were instrumental in reaching out to tribes around
Sana’a and convincing them not to support Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Panel believes
that Mohammed Ali al-Houthi meets the designation criteria owing to his involvement
in leading these events, which constitute a threat to the peace and security of Yemen.
28. On 2 December 2017 Ali Abdullah Saleh reached out to the Saudi Arabia -led
coalition, promising a “new page” in relations and calling on his supporters to take
up arms and fight.21 But without the help of tribal sheikhs and key generals, who were
either unwilling or unable to help, Saleh22 and his soldiers in Sana’a were overrun and
killed early on the morning of 4 December 2017.
20 In August 2017, Abdulmalik al-Houthi and Ali Abdullah Saleh criticized one another in
competing speeches ahead of the public celebration of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the General
People’s Congress. On 26 August 2017, a prominent Saleh supporter, Khaled Ahmed Zayd
al-Radhi, the head of foreign relations for the General People’s Congress and head of the Vulcan
Group, was killed in a clash with the Houthis in Sana’a. On 12 September 2017 Abdulmalik
al-Houthi and Ali Abdullah Saleh spoke directly in an attempt to ease the tensions. For an
account of events escalating tensions within the alliance see annex 9.
21 The Panel notes that during this time the Saudi Arabia-led coalition deployed air strikes against
exclusively Houthi targets close to Saleh’s armed supporters. Should this have been an attempt to
protect Ali Abdullah Saleh then it would be a non-compliance with para. 14 of resolution 2216
(2015) as it would equate to military support to a listed individual. The Panel continues to
investigate this matter.
22 Based on the imagery of Saleh’s body, the Panel believes he was executed at close range with a
bullet to the left side of the back of the head. The Houthis transported Saleh’s body in an SUV
outside of Sana’a, where they staged a mock ambush to make it appear as though he was kill ed
while fleeing for his life. The Panel believes this is one of the many moves that the Houthis took
in December 2017 as part of a strategy to discredit Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Annex 61
Figure I
Mohammed Ali al-Houthi and Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim in Sana’a
(December 2017)a
a Video from confidential sources: Mohammed Ali al-Houthi (left) and Abdullah Yahya
Al Hakim (right).
29. There were also widespread reports that Ali Abdullah Saleh’s nephew and senior
military commander Tariq Muhammad Abdullah Saleh23 was killed in the fighting.
The Panel is working to independently confirm this. The Panel has confirmed that
Arif al-Zuka, the Secretary-General of the General People’s Congress and the top
political aide of Ali Abdullah Saleh, was also killed. The Houthis also managed to
capture several of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s relatives.24 The Panel believes that some of
those individuals were wounded in the fighting, and that the Houthis are holding them
as leverage in the event that either Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005) or Khaled
Ali Abdullah Saleh attempt to resurrect the Saleh network.
30. Over the course of the next several days, the Houthis attempted to crush or
co-opt the remnants of Saleh’s network while simultaneously consolidating their own
rule over Sana’a and much of northern Yemen. They executed key military
commanders, who were part of Saleh’s Sanhan tribe;25 arrested prominent members
23 Tareq Saleh was the commander of Saleh’s Special Guards and de facto head of the Republican
Guard.
24 The Panel has determined that that two of Saleh’s six sons, Salah and Midyan, were captured
along with Saleh’s nephew, Muhammad Muhammad Abdullah Saleh, a key military figure and
General Supervisor of the Vulcan Group (see http://www.vulcanyemen.com/owners.htm). The
Panel also believes that the Houthis captured Tariq Saleh’s eldest son, Afash, and Yahya
Muhammad Abdullah Saleh’s eldest son, Kenan. Lists of Saleh’s sons and nephews are contained
in confidential annexes 10 and 11. For the names of Saleh’s daughters and sons-in-law, see
confidential annex 12.
25 On 5 December 2017 the Houthis executed major generals Mahdi Maqawlah, Abdullah
al-Dhabaan (commander, 35th armoured brigade and former axis commander in Ta‘izz) and
Murad al-Awbali (commander 62nd mechanized brigade).
Annex 61
of the General People’s Congress, 26 and intimidated others; 27 forcibly dispersed
protests;28 kidnapped the children of prominent families tied to Saleh;29 destroyed the
homes of Saleh supporters; and instigated a media blackout by blocking social media
sites and much of the Internet. The Houthis also announced that they were changing
the name of the al-Saleh mosque, and claimed that they found large quantities of gold,
silver and cash in Saleh’s house, which they were depositing in the Central Bank. 30
The Panel anticipates more crackdowns as the Houthis attempt to solidify their grip
on power.
C. Security and regional dynamics
1. Regional dynamics
31. Qatar was expelled from the Saudi Arabia-led coalition on 5 June 2017, and the
withdrawal of its forces began on 7 June 2017. This has had little impact from a
military perspective. However, tensions between Qatar and members of the Saudi
Arabia-led coalition have spilled over into Yemen, as coalition members and their
proxies have targeted the al-Islah party, which they see as an ally of Qatar.31
2. Areas under the control of forces allied to the legitimate Government of Yemen
32. Although the armed forces of the legitimate Government remain present
throughout the eight southern provinces, (Abyan, Aden, Dali‘, Hadramawt, Lahij,
Mahrah, Shabwah and Socotra), a number of other actors such as Al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIL, tribal opponents, the recently formed Southern
Transitional Council and proxy forces of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition challenge the
Government’s ability to govern and impose its authority. Armed forces loyal to
President Hadi are also operating in Ta‘izz and Ma’rib.
33. Forces of the United Arab Emirates in southern Yemen view the Security Belt
Forces (for the leadership and structure of the Security Belt Forces, see annex 6) as
key pillars of their security strategy for Yemen. This approach continues to
marginalize Government institutions such as the National Security Bureau and the
Political Security Organization, further undermining and reducing the legitimate
Government’s intelligence and security capabilities.
26 List of members of the General People’s Congress detained by the Houthis is contained in
annex 13.
27 In the aftermath of Saleh’s death, the Houthi television channel, al-Masirah, broadcast footage of
a meeting of the General People’s Congress in Amran, at which individuals pledged their
allegiance to the state and distanced themselves from Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Panel believes that
this is the Houthi way of illustrating they will only go after Saleh’s supporters, not the General
People’s Congress as a whole (http://www.almasirah.net/gallery/preview.php?file_id=
10509#.WihdwAa5gRg.twitter).
28 On 6 December 2017 the Houthis fired shots to disperse a protest by women demanding that the
Houthis surrender the body of Ali Abdullah Saleh for burial.
29 Armed men affiliated with the Houthis entered the house of Ruqayah al-Hijjri, the sister of one
of Saleh’s wives (see confidential annex 14), and seized at least one of her children
(http://www.almasdaronline.com/article/95978).
30 The Houthi imagery used to support this claim are stock images that originate outside Yemen
(see http://www.saba.ye/ar/news481198.htm).
31 On 11 October 2017, security forces in Aden, acting on the orders of Shallal Ali Shaye, the Head
of Security, stormed an al-Islah party building, arresting 10 individuals (see https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-yemen-security/yemen-islamist-party-members-arrested-ratcheting-up-tensionsidUSKBN1CG1J1).
Annex 61
3. Involvement of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces
34. Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces continue to provide financial, political,
military and logistic support to the Yemeni Armed Forces and a number of proxy
armed groups. The main battlefronts for the forces of Saudi Arabia are Ma ’rib and
Midi, while those of the United Arab Emirates operate largely in Aden, Abyan,
Hadramawt, Lahij, Mahrah, Mukha and Shabwah.
35. On 7 December 2017, southern resistance forces, with support from the Saudi
Arabia-led coalition under Brigadier General Abdul Salam al-Shehi, took control of
the Abu Musa al-Ashar camp outside Khawkhah and continued to push northward
towards Hudaydah city.32 As part of this security operation, southern elements under
the command of Haitham Qassem Taher launched a military offensive in the
Hudaydah governorate, meeting minimal resistance from Houthi elements north of
Mukha city on the coast of the Red Sea.
36. The United Arab Emirates continues to expand its support to proxy forces in the
south, primarily the Security Belt Forces in Abyan, Aden and Lahij, and to the
Hadrami and Shabwani Elite Forces (see paras. 55 to 58 below). The United Arab
Emirates maintains military training facilities in Shamussah and Rayyan near
Mukalla, where a number of foreign military advisers and trainers are based in support
of the Elite Forces.33
D. The “Southern question”
37. The Panel assesses that, given the length of the war, lack of military progress
and the divisions that have emerged, secession into a separate south Yemen is now a
real possibility. Furthermore, the ability of the legitimate Government to administer
and govern the eight governorates it claims to control has been significantly eroded
during 2017. The situation in Aden and Mahrah provide solid examples of the
background to this risk.
1. Aden
38. Security within the governorate has deteriorated significantly over the course of
2017. ISIL has carried out several large-scale suicide attacks and has claimed
responsibility for a number of assassinations (see para. 74 below). There have also
been several politically motivated assassinations that have not been claimed by either
AQAP or ISIL. For example, on 18 October 2017, Fahd al-Yunisi, the imam of the
Sahaba mosque in Aden, was assassinated by an, as yet, unidentified gunman. 34
39. The legitimate Government has also repeatedly failed to pay the salaries of
Government workers and appears incapable of providing basic services to the city,
including adequate electricity. On 16 November 2017, Abd al-Aziz al-Muflahi, the
Governor of Aden, submitted his resignation, citing the Government’s inability to pay
salaries.35 The Panel has seen billboards throughout Aden and other cities in the south
of the country demonizing Prime Minister bin Daghir and the legitimate Government
for their inability to provide for Yemenis.36 There appear to be no efforts by local
authorities to counter this campaign against the Government.
32 See http://adengad.net/news/291513/.
33 Evidence from Panel visits to Yemen and interviews with confidential sources.
34 See http://adengad.net/news/283179/. The Panel has identified other, politically motivated,
assassinations claimed by neither AQAP or ISIL in Yemen.
35 Appointed in April 2017, after President Hadi removed Aydarus al-Zubaydi; Al-Muflahi had also
clashed with Prime Minister bin Daghir, claiming that the latter often acted as the Governor.
36 See https://twitter.com/goldensla/status/926022844307378178.
Annex 61
2. Mahrah
40. There are growing tensions in the eastern governorate of Mahrah over the
deployment of new military forces into the region to combat smuggling. 37 On
15 November 2017, Brigadier General Abdullah Mansour Ali and the 123rd Infantry
Brigade replaced the 137th Mechanized Brigade in Mahrah. Nearly two weeks later,
on 27 November 2017, President Hadi appointed Rajih Said Bakrit as the new
Governor of Mahrah, replacing Mohammed Abdullah Kudah.38 The former Governor
remains in Mahrah, protected by armed elements of his tribe and other officials with
shared interests.39 His tribe, the Al Kudah, controls access to coastal territory east of
Ghaydah port, in Jarub and Zaghar, towards the border with Oman.
E. Contested areas and potential fragmentation
41. The events in Bayda’ and Ta‘izz also provide further indication of the very real
risks of the fragmentation of Yemen.
1. Bayda’
42. Located at the crossroads of the former north-south border, Bayda’ occupies a
highly valuable and strategic location. Of particular importance is the area of Bayhan,
in northern Bayda’, which is a primary smuggling route into Sana’a from the south,
with links to Ma’rib and the Arabian Sea coast. The Houthi presence is centred on the
city of Rada‘, while AQAP appears to be active near Dhahab and the surrounding
areas in Suma and south throughout Zahir. ISIL operates from a small enclave within
Qayfah, while resistance elements supported by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition are
confined to the lower southwest in Humaiqan, Bayda’ city and near Mukayras (see
map in annex 17).40
2. Ta‘izz
43. As described in paragraphs 28 to 33 of the Panel’s confidential midterm update
report, the city of Ta‘izz remains a flashpoint in the conflict and a humanitarian
disaster. Ta‘izz has been the focus of the most sustained fighting over the past year.
Houthi forces continue to besiege the city. Tension between local resistance elements,
Salafi militias and Yemeni Army Forces spiked in October 2017, following the
decision by the United States, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council to
sanction Abu al-Abbas, 41 a key Salafi leader. Like the Houthis in Sana’a, Abu
al-Abbas continues to hold territory inside the city and exercises rights and
responsibilities exclusive to the legitimate Government.42 Prior to 25 October 2017,
Abu al-Abbas had received significant support from the United Arab Emirates. The
Panel is investigating whether this support continues.
37 Attempts to create a Mahrahi Elite Force, similar to the Hadramawt and Shabwah Elite Forces,
appear to have been tabled for the moment.
38 See http://adengad.net/news/289730/: Kudah was named a Minister of State and a member of
President Hadi’s Council of Ministers.
39 Principal Mahrah Governorate officials are listed in annex 15. Known AQAP affiliates operating
in the governorate are listed in annex 16.
40 These resistance elements are associated with the former Governor of Bayda ’, Nayif al-Qaysi
(QDi.402), and Abd al-Wahhab al-Humayqani (see annexes 5 and 18).
41 Abu al-Abbas was sanctioned by the United States and by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition on
25 October 2017. Known associates are listed in annex 19.
42 Prior to being sanctioned, Vice-President Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar had attempted to incorporate Abu
al-Abbas and his militia into the Yemeni Armed Forces. That attempt failed.
Annex 61
44. The various Salafi militias43 that have emerged from the nearly three years of
war are not only competing, and at times clashing, with Government forces, but also
with each other. This competition has only increased in the wake of the sanctions
against Abu al-Abbas. The militias view Ta‘izz as a zero-sum game and a weakened
Abu al-Abbas has meant that several smaller militias are fighting for more territory.
In Ta‘izz, the more urban territory a group holds, the more outside support they
attract.
45. Sanctions on Abu al-Abbas may also have prompted Houthi-Saleh forces to step
up their attacks on resistance forces inside the city of Ta‘izz and in the surrounding
areas. A number of airstrikes by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition on Ta‘izz, believed to
have been targeting Houthi-Saleh forces, have resulted in civilian casualties. One
airstrike hit elements from the 22nd Armoured Brigade, loyal to President Hadi, in
the al-Aroos area of Saber mountain. 44 Such incidents have disrupted relations
between local forces and allies of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, giving Houthi-Saleh
forces the opportunity to mobilize their forces and exploit the situation to gain new
ground along various fronts in Ta‘izz.
46. Both AQAP and ISIL remain active in Ta‘izz, although both groups have
experienced defections and fragmentation (see para. 66 belo w).
F. Maritime security
47. During 2017 there was an increase in the number and type of maritime security
incidents affecting the safety and security of the strategic sea lines of communication
and approaches to the Red Sea ports. This jeopardizes the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to Yemen by sea, in violation of paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015).
Figure II illustrates the number and the distribution of maritime security incidents
within the region during 2017, including:
(a) Attacks using missiles or explosives against Saudi Arabia-led coalition
naval vessels and the Red Sea ports, including the emergence of new threats from:
(i) remote controlled skiffs containing explosives (water-borne improvised explosive
devices); and (ii) the use of a land-based anti-tank guided missiles;
(b) An attempted attack against the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker
MV Muskie very similar in modus operandi to that against the Spanish-flagged
MV Galicia Spirit;45
(c) An armed helicopter attack on 16 March 2017 by an as yet unidentified
perpetrator against a civilian vessel containing migrants that resulted in at least
42 fatalities;
(d) The use of naval and improvised sea mines (see paras. 110–114 below).
43 Other militias in Ta‘izz, include: the al-Sa’lik Brigade and those under the control of Hashem
al-Sanani, Saud Mayub, Hareth al-Izzy and Abu Saduq.
44 See http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-forces-accused-deliberately-tar…-
Ta’izz-179331116.
45 MV Galicia Spirit attack reported in S/2017/81, paras. 37 and 38 and annex 14. MV Muskie
attack reported in the Panels’ 2017 confidential midterm update.
Annex 61
Figure II
Maritime security incidents: 2017
48. While the tactics contained in the industry publication Best Management
Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP 4)46 will protect vessels,
to some degree, against attempted boarding by small groups of armed militants or
pirates, they will not provide protection against attacks involving waterborne
improvised explosive devices, anti-ship missiles, 47 land based anti-tank guided
missiles or sea mines.
III. Armed groups and military units
49. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014), and as reiterated by the
Security Council in its resolutions 2216 (2015), 2266 (2016) and 2342 (2017), the
Panel continues to investigate individuals and entities associated with armed groups
who may be engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security
or stability of Yemen.
A. Yemeni Government and Saudi Arabia-led coalition regular forces
50. Troops under the ostensible control of President Hadi routinely display the flag
of an independent south Yemen. At times, they have referred to the former Governor
of Aden and current Head of the Southern Transitional Council, Aydarus al -Zubaydi,
46 See www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4-low-res_sept_5_2011.pdf?sfvrs….
Although addressing Somalia-based piracy, the practices also apply to transit in the Red Sea, and
to protection against Yemeni-based pirates. The title is a legacy from the initial publication Best
Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP 1).
47 See S/2017/81, paras. 35 and 36, and annex 13.
Annex 61
as their “president”.48 It is the assessment of the Panel that President Hadi no longer
has effective command and control over the military and security forces operating on
behalf of the legitimate Government of Yemen. 49 One way President Hadi has
attempted to arrest the erosion of his power is through the deployment of new military
units, particularly the Ta‘izz-based 5th Presidential Protection Brigade, which is
reminiscent of the Republican Guard Brigades that former President Ali Abdullah
Saleh used to safeguard his rule.50
51. Regular military units, such as the 103rd Infantry Brigade in Abyan,51 which are
wholly or mostly dependent on the legitimate Yemeni Government for salaries and
equipment, are underequipped, often paid late or paid only in part. The problem, for
this particular Brigade, is further compounded by the fact that their camp in Abyan is
on the frontlines and a frequent target of AQAP attacks.52 In September, frustrated
soldiers of the 103rd Infantry Brigade blocked a major road in Abyan to protest the
fact that they had received only a partial salary.
52. The situation is slightly different in Ma’rib, where Vice-President Ali Muhsin
al-Ahmar53 has spent significant periods of time visiting the battlefronts in Sirwah
and Nihm. The troops in that area are better paid and better equipped, which is a direct
result of Vice President al-Ahmar’s support and patronage.
53. The most effective Yemeni security units, however, are the proxy forces formed
and supported by member States of the Saudi-Arabia led coalition, which, in turn, act
as proxies for those member States in Yemen.
B. Saudi Arabia-led coalition proxy forces
54. The Panel believes that proxy forces funded and armed by member States of the
Saudi Arabia-led coalition present a threat to the peace, security or stability of Yemen.
Unless they are brought back under direct Yemeni command and control, with all
salaries and equipment distributed through Yemeni Government channels, these
forces will do more to further the fracturing of Yemen than they will to hold the State
together.
1. Security Belt Forces
55. The Security Belt Forces, which were formed in March 2016,54 technically fall
under the Ministry of the Interior. However, in practice, they are trained, supplied and
paid for by the United Arab Emirates and operate outside the Yemeni military
48 On 25 October 2017, the official twitter account of the Hadrami Elite Forces referred to Aydarus
al-Zubaydi as al-rais, or “president.” (see https://twitter.com/NokhbaHadramout/status/
923209607174152192).
49 For a list of Yemen’s military districts and their commanders, see annex 20.
50 Formed on 17 November 2017. Commanded by Brigadier General Adnan Ruzaiq, a Salafi fighter
from the Al Qamush tribe in Shabwah, who arrived in Ta‘izz in 2015 with 160 fighters. Ruzaiq
has previously come into conflict with Security Belt Forces, who attacked his house in Aden in
January 2017, in what is another example of the fragmentation of the armed forces of the
legitimate Government. For a list of Presidential Protection Brigades see annex 21.
51 The Brigade was moved from its base in Aden to Abyan in late July 2017.
52 On 8 August 2017, an AQAP suicide bomber, Arif Adil Hassan Habib, attacked their camp,
killing 12 soldiers and wounding 28.
53 Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a relative of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who broke with him in
2011, is one of the most powerful military commanders in recent Yemeni history, and still has a
strong network of support within Yemen’s military.
54 As early as September 2015 then Governor of Aden, Nayif Bakri, was talking about forces of
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates forming a “security belt” in the south (see
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201509051026642155/).
Annex 61
command-and-control structure. Initially numbering around 10,000 soldiers, the
Security Belt Forces have grown to more than 15,000 troops and are active in the
governorates of Aden, Abyan and Lahij.55
56. At times, Security Belt Forces have clashed with Yemeni military units loyal to
President Hadi, 56 and have also been implicated in a number of violations of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law (see para. 166
below).57 Security Belt Forces have also been among the most active in combatting
AQAP and ISIL in Yemen, particularly since August 2017 (see para. 38 above).
2. “Elite Forces”
57. In early 2016, the United Arab Emirates formed and funded the Hadrami Elite
Forces ahead of a planned assault on Mukalla.58 Like the Security Belt Forces, the
Hadrami Elite Forces are better paid than their regular Yemeni army counterparts and
operate outside the Yemeni military command-and-control structure.
58. In late 2016, the United Arab Emirates also formed and funded the Shabwani
Elite Forces, using the same model. Like the Hadrami Elite Forces, the Shabwani
units are made up of local fighters who operate outside the Yemeni military command -
and-control structure. 59 The Panel estimates the Shabwani Elite Forces currently
number between 3,000 to 4,000 fighters.60 Although these forces have been active in
the fight against AQAP and ISIL in Yemen, the Panel finds them to be proxy forces
that are undermining the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen.
C. Houthi forces
59. Militarily, the Houthis are a tribal-based militia61 grafted on to, and allied with,
a professionally trained military from elements of the former Yemeni Armed Forces. 62
When the Houthis took control of Sana’a in late 2014 they needed the political and
military experience provided by the network of Ali Abdullah Saleh (se e paras. 43–45
below). By late 2017 this had ceased to be the case. Over the past year, the Houthis
have gradually eased out Saleh loyalists from key positions and replaced them with
their own supporters. This process culminated in a five-day street war in Sana’a in
late November and early December 2017 that ended with the death of Ali Abdullah
Saleh (see para. 29 above).
55 For an overview of the command structure see annex 6.
56 The Panel has identified several clashes between the two sides, for example on 16 September
2017, Hadi’s Presidential Protection Force refused to hand over a military checkpoint at Arish on
the Aden-Abyan road to the United Arab Emirates-backed security forces (see
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-clash/gunfight-erupts…-
killed-witnesses-idUSKCN1BR0M4).
57 Elements affiliated with Security Belt Forces have also been implicated in a number of
extrajudicial detentions of civilians in Aden (see annex 22).
58 The initial impetus for the creation of the Hadrami Elite Forces was to create a local face for the
efforts to retake the city of Mukalla from AQAP in April 2016 (see S/2017/81, para. 51).
59 The Panel has identified clashes in October 2017 between the Shabwani Elite Forces and the
23rd Mechanized Brigade, loyal to Vice-President Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar.
60 The Shabwani Elite Forces command structure is set out in annex 23.
61 Key security and military figures for the Houthis are listed in annex 24. Key Houthi political
figures are listed in annex 25.
62 The Houthi militia has been fighting for much of the past 13 years, first in a series of six
successive wars against then President Saleh’s Government from 2004 to 2010, and since March
2015 against the Saudi Arabian-led coalition. After the Houthis took control of Sana’a in early
2015, Yemen’s military fragmented, with several key officers joining the Houthis, others
remaining loyal to former President Saleh and others siding with President Hadi.
Annex 61
60. Although there will likely be defections from soldiers still loyal to Ali Abdullah
Saleh’s network, the Panel does not believe these defections will take place in
significant enough numbers, or be carried out in an organized enough fashion, to
threaten the Houthis’ hold on Sana’a and much of the north, at least in the near term.
In the immediate aftermath of the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh the Houthis moved
quickly to crush or co-opt what remained of his network, while consolidating their
rule through a series of brutal crackdowns, arrests and executions (see para. 29
above).
61. On 4 November 2017, the Houthis launched a short-range ballistic missile attack
on Riyadh (see para. 82 below). Saudi Arabia responded two days later by, among
other things, issuing a “wanted” list of 40 Houthis, with significant rewards for
information leading to their capture or death.63
62. With the collapse of the Houthi-Saleh alliance the Houthis may look for
international partners to offset the loss of domestic allies. Indeed, the Panel considers
that further “internationalization” of the war is likely. The more isolated the Houthis
become, the more they will look to make common cause with countries seeking to
combat the member States of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition. The Panel is aware of
media reports that the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided “advisers” to the Houthis
and it is investigating this matter.64
63. Although the Houthis continue to recruit new fighters, including children (see
paras. 185 and 186 below), the movement is at heart a family organization. 65 This
means that the most trusted commanders are those related to the leader, Abdulmalik
al-Houthi (YEi.004).66 This explains why, in April 2017, when it looked as though the
Saudi Arabian-led coalition was planning an offensive against Hudaydah, the Houthis
named Yusif Ahsan Isma‘il al-Madani67 as the commander of the 5th military district
in Hudaydah.68 The Houthis made a similar move later in 2017, transferring Abd
al-Khaliq al-Houthi (YEi.001) from the Midi front to the Nihm front near Sana ’a, to
better protect the capital.
D. The network of Ali Abdullah Saleh
64. The Panel does not believe that Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, Khaled Ali Abdullah
Saleh, or any other single individual is capable of reconstituting Ali Abdullah Saleh ’s
network. Soldiers from the republican guards and special guards are now faced with
a choice of either allying themselves with the legitimate Government forces and the
Saudi Arabia-led coalition, whom they have been fighting for most of the past three
years, or joining the Houthis, who executed Ali Abdullah Saleh and senior military
63 The Government of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh issued a similar list of 55 “wanted”
Houthis in 2009. The list issued by Saudi Arabia is in annex 26.
64 In a response to a letter from the Panel dated 28 November 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran
replied, on 6 December 2017, that “Iran has no military presence in Yemen, but has a diplomatic
representation in Sana’a, providing ’advisory assistance’ to support efforts at finding a political
solution to the current crisis”.
65 The first leader was Husayn Badr al-Din al-Houthi. When he was killed in 2004, the leadership
transferred to his father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and then to his half-brother and the current
leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi. The Houthi family tree is provided in annex 27.
66 This is also true at the political level, for example, Saleh al-Samad, head of the supreme political
council, is close to Abdulmalik al-Houthi, and studied under both Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi
and his father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi.
67 Al-Madani is related to the Houthi family by marriage. He was one of Husayn Badr al-Din
al-Houthi’s most trusted commanders in the initial Houthi war of 2004 and later married one of
Husayn’s daughters.
68 A list of Houthi military district commanders is provided in annex 28.
Annex 61
commanders in December 2017. Any attempt at full-scale resistance to the Houthis is
complicated by the fashion in which small groupings of republican guard soldiers
have been distributed to various battlefronts. This distribution of forces meant that
Saleh was unable to count on large numbers of loyal soldiers at short notice when he
needed them on 3 December 2017.
65. Given the extrajudicial executions and mass detentions carried out by the
Houthis after the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh (see para. 29 above) it is likely that
there will be a cycle of revenge killings, which may last for years. For example, in
2004, Saleh’s soldiers killed Husayn Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the first leader of the
Houthi movement. Thirteen years later, when Houthi forces killed Ali Abdullah Saleh,
their fighters claimed that this avenged Husayn’s death.69 In a televised appearance
after Saleh’s death, Abdulmalik al-Houthi was wearing Husayn’s dagger, a clear sign
that he considered his brother’s death avenged. Saleh’s family and supporters will
likely attempt to seek their own revenge against the Houthis. The key difference,
however, is that Husayn Badr al-Din al-Houthi led a movement, while Ali Abdullah
Saleh headed a network.
E. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
66. Throughout 2017 AQAP averaged slightly more than one attack every two
days.70 These attacks fell into five broad categories: (a) suicide attacks; 71 (b) mortar
attacks; (c) assassinations;72 (d) improvised explosive device attacks; and (e) smallscale
assaults. The attacks have taken place mostly in the following three
governorates: Bayda’, Abyan, and Hadramawt.73
67. AQAP is fighting a multi-front war in Yemen against three enemies: (a) the
Houthis; (b) the United States and the West; and (c) the Government of Yemen and
Saudi Arabian-led coalition forces, 74 with the ultimate goal of acquiring and
governing territory. 75 Internationally, the group continues to have two goals:
69 These chants can be heard on the video of Houthi fighters placing Saleh’s body in the back of a
pick-up truck.
70 There have been more than 200 attacks claimed during 2017 by AQAP. This is roughly similar to
the number of attacks claimed by AQAP in 2016.
71 A list of suicide (person-borne improvised explosive device/suicide vehicle improvised suicide
device) attacks by AQAP is provided in annex 29.
72 The majority of assassination attempts by AQAP used improvised explosive devices. The Panel
differentiates between general improvised explosive device attacks and assassinations; for
example, on 3 October 2017 AQAP placed an improvised explosive device under the vehicle of
Arif Said Abdullah al-Muhammadi, a criminal investigator, in Mukalla. Al-Muhammadi survived
the attack.
73 There has also been AQAP activity and attacks in Shabwah, Ma’rib, Lahij and Aden, but the vast
majority of attacks have taken place in the three governorates listed. More than half of all attacks
claimed by AQAP in 2017 took place in Bayda’.
74 The clearest articulation of this approach came in March 2017, during an interview with the
AQAP leader Qasim al-Rimi (QDi.282), which was released on 29 April 2017 (see
https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/al-qacc84_idah-in-the-arabia…-
qacc84sim-al-raymicc8422-en.pdf).
75 AQAP has held and governed territory in Yemen, from 2011 to 2012 and agai n in 2015 and 2016;
both times it alienated the local population and chose to withdraw instead of remaining behind to
fight.
Annex 61
launching attacks against Western targets from its base in Yemen; and inspiring or
inciting individuals living in the West to carry out terrorist attacks.76
68. Although the Panel assesses that AQAP is still quite capable of launching and
inspiring attacks against international targets,77 it also believes that AQAP is currently
more vulnerable than it has been in years. The Panel bases its assessment on the
following four factors: (a) a dramatic increase in air and drone strikes by the United
States; (b) a sustained ground campaign by Yemeni and international forces; (c) the
arrests of several mid and low-level AQAP figures; and (d) internal dissension among
members of the organization.78
69. In 2017, the United States increased the number of air and drone strikes in
Yemen, which rose from 30 in 2016 to well over 120 in 2017.79 The United States has
also declared three governorates in Yemen to be “areas of active hostilities”, a
designation which authorizes target approval to be taken at a lower level. 80
70. In August 2017, Yemeni troops backed by the United Arab Emirates, with
advisers provided by the United Arab Emirates and the United States, launched a
ground offensive against AQAP targets in Shabwah, Hadramawt and parts of Abyan. 81
This offensive expanded and continued through late 2017, resulting in the death or
capture of several low and mid-level AQAP members. 82 Despite this, the core
leadership of AQAP in Yemen remains intact.83
71. On 17 August 2017, AQAP released a statement warning the tribes of Abyan not
to join the forces of the United Arab Emirates and its proxies, such as the Security
Belt Forces. Five days later, on 22 August 2017, it released a similar statement in
Shabwah,84 again warning local tribes against joining the Shabwani Elite Forces. Both
of these statements illustrate exactly how vulnerable AQAP is to tribal politics. AQAP
recruits within the tribes, but more importantly it relies on tribal non-aggression to
76 On 7 May 2017, al-Rimi released a video message, entitled “A Lone Mujahid or an Army by
Itself”, encouraging individuals in the west to carry out attacks (see http://jihadology.net/2017/05
/07/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-peninsulas-shaykh-qasim-al-raymi-aninspire-
address-1-a-lone-mujahid-or-an-army-by-itself/). On 13 August 2017, AQAP released
issue No.17 of its English-language magazine Inspire, with the title “Train Derail Operations;”
the first issue of the magazine since November 2016.
77 The Panel continues to investigate how AQAP is using the money it acquired when it had control
of Mukalla in 2015 and early 2016.
78 The Panel considers that many of these actions, particularly air and drone strikes, can have a
detrimental impact in the long term, essentially killing one terrorist today but creating two more
tomorrow, particularly if civilians are killed as collateral damage.
79 The United States carried out “multiple ground operations and more than 120 strikes” in 2017,
primarily against AQAP (see http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-
View/Article/1401383/update-on-recent-counterterrorism-strikes-in-yemen/).
80 See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/12/us/politics/trump-loosen-counterterr….
Within “areas of active hostilities” United States forces are granted latitude to conduct strikes
without explicit approval from the White House, which may explain, at least in part, the increase
in the number of strikes.
81 On 29 January 2017, the United States carried out a raid on a suspected AQAP target in Bayda ’,
which resulted in the death of one American soldier. A second American soldier, Staff Sergeant
Emil Rivera-Lopez, was killed in a helicopter crash “off the coast of Yemen” on 25 August 2017.
The United States denied that Rivera-Lopez, who was part of a special operations support unit,
was on a combat mission (see http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-
Release-View/Article/1298631/dod-declares-dustwun-soldier-deceased/).
82 The majority of those captured or killed have been mid and low-level AQAP figures, for
example, on 31 October 2017, Security Belt Forces in Abyan made a surprise raid on an AQAP
camp, capturing several individuals, including Muhammad al-‘Awadh, a former bodyguard to
Osama bin Laden (see http://www.almasdaronline.com/article/95157).
83 A list of AQAP figures of interest to the Panel is provided in annex 30.
84 A description of the AQAP relationship with the tribes in Yemen is contained in annex 31.
Annex 61
survive. If the tribes of Yemen were to turn against AQAP, the organization would not
survive.
72. On 17 September 2017, AQAP released the eighth in a series of films, this one
entitled “Repulsing the Aggression”, which, for the first time, talked more about the
role of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen than it did about the Houthis. 85 This media
focus mirrored what AQAP was doing on the battlefield. Throughout the first half of
2017 more than two-thirds of AQAP attacks were directed against Houthi targets.
Since August that trend has been reversed and AQAP now targets United Arab
Emirates-backed troops more than it does the Houthis. More international pressure
on AQAP came on 25 October 2017 when the newly formed Terrorist Financing
Targeting Center86 announced that it was sanctioning 11 Yemenis and two Yemeni
organizations for ties to AQAP and ISIS.87
73. Partly as a result of this increased pressure and partly due to fighting on so many
fronts at once, AQAP has also struggled to maintain a sense of organizational unity
across the country. In a sign of internal fissures within the organization, AQAP
released a statement in October 2017 saying that the Shariah court in Ta ‘izz was no
longer operating under its instructions. Additionally, many of the group’s media
releases in recent months have focused on surviving in times of “adversity” and
amidst “setbacks.” However, AQAP’s branch in Yemen has endured setbacks before,
most notably in 2004 and 2005 when the group was virtually eradicated. It has
managed to resurrect itself since that time. The Panel assesses that the longer the
current conflict lasts in Yemen, the more recruits AQAP will attract.
F. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
74. Although much smaller than AQAP, the ISIL affiliate in Yemen is still capable
of carrying out coordinated large-scale attacks.88 Much like AQAP, ISIL is mostly
active in Yemen’s southern and central governorates, particularly Bayda’, Abyan and
Aden.89 Indeed, some areas of Bayda’, where AQAP was active in 2016 and early
2017, are now active battle fronts for ISIL, which has led some to believe that the two
organizations are working together. The Panel has seen no evidence to suggest that
the two groups are either working together or coordinating attacks. Instead, the
evidence suggests that, at most, there is a tacit non-aggression pact between AQAP
85 See http://jihadology.net/2017/09/17/new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-th…-
repulsion-of-aggression-8/.
86 The Terrorist Financing Targeting Centre was established in May 2017 during a visit by the
President of the United States, Donald Trump, to Saudi Arabia. The United States and Saudi
Arabia are co-chairs, and the other member countries are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates (see https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages
/sm0092.aspx).
87 The names of AQAP-affiliated individuals sanctioned by the member countries of the Terrorist
Financing Targeting Centre are listed at: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases
/Pages/sm0187.aspx. Among the individuals sanctioned were the former Governor of Bayda’,
Nayif al-Qaysi (QDi.402), who was replaced on 23 July 2017. Also sanctioned was Abu
al-Abbas, a Salafi leader in Ta‘izz, who has previously received funding and support from the
United Arab Emirates (see para. 45 above).
88 On 5 November 2017, ISIL attacked a Criminal Investigation Department building in Aden: a
suicide bomber rammed his vehicle into the gates, and along with three more individuals in
suicide vests, rushed into the building. ISIL later claimed that the attack killed 69 individuals,
and it identified its four fighters as coming from the governorates of Hadramawt, Ibb, Ta ‘izz and
Shabwah.
89 In general, ISIL has carried out three types of attacks in Yemen: suicide attacks, close quar ter
assassinations and mortar attacks.
Annex 61
and ISIL based on their common enemies. the Houthis,90 and the security forces tied
to the legitimate Government and the Saudi Arabia-led coalition.
75. On 16 October 2017, the United States carried out its first direct strikes on ISIL
in Yemen, hitting two camps in Bayda’.91 Less than two weeks later, on 25 October,
the United States, Saudi Arabia and the other countries partners in the Ter rorist
Financing Targeting Center sanctioned five individuals for their ties to ISIL in
Yemen.92 Since its initial strikes in mid-October 2017, the United States has carried
out several more air and drone strikes against ISIL, all of which, to date, have ta ken
place in Bayda’.93
76. In addition to the increased pressure from the air, ISIL has also suffered from
the collapse of the group’s so-called caliphate in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.
The Panel has yet to see any evidence of an influx of ISIL fighters into Yemen. Instead
the opposite appears to be happening: low-level ISIL fighters appear to be defecting
to AQAP.94 The Panel continues to investigate whether this is related to a lack of
outside funding coming into Yemen or to other factors.
IV. Arms and implementation of the targeted arms embargo
77. Pursuant to paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2216 (2015), the Panel continues
to focus on a range of monitoring and investigative activities in order to identify if
there have been any violations of the targeted arms embargo involving the direct or
indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of individuals and entities listed
by the Committee and the Security Council.
78. There have been no changes to the options for supply chains for the delivery of
weapons and ammunition to the individuals and entities listed by the Committee and
the Security Council and those acting on their behalf or at their direction reported by
the Panel on 31 January 2017.95 There have been no reported maritime seizures of
weapons and ammunition during 2017, and only very limited seizures of arms -related
material have been identified on the main land supply route from the east of Yemen. 96
79. The Panel has now identified strong indicators of the supply of arms-related
material manufactured in, or emanating from, the Islamic Republic of Iran subsequent
to the establishment of the targeted arms embargo on 14 April 2015, particularly in
the area of short-range ballistic missile technology (see paras. 86 to 96 below) and
unmanned aerial vehicles (paras. 98 to 105 below).
90 Like AQAP, ISIL has a hierarchy of enemies with the Shia Houthis at the top. In August 2017,
the group released photographs of a Houthi commander it had crucified, identified as Abu
Murtada al-Muhatawari.
91 See http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/…
/us-forces-conduct-strike-against-isis-training-camps-in-yemen/. The two camps were named for
deceased ISIL leaders: Abu Bilal al-Harbi and Abu Muhammad al-Adnani. One week prior to the
United States strikes, on 9 October 2015, ISIL had released training photographs from t hose camps.
92 See https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0187.aspx. A list of ISIL
figures of interest to the Panel is provided in annex 32.
93 For example, the United States carried out three successive drone strikes on 10, 11, and
12 November 2017 in Bayda’, which killed five individuals.
94 However, the United States estimates that ISIL in Yemen has “doubled in size over the past year”
(see http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/…
/update-on-recent-counterterrorism-strikes-in-yemen/).
95 See S/2017/81, para. 60 and table 1.
96 See annex 33.
Annex 61
A. Houthi-Saleh “land missile campaign”
1. Overview
80. The strategic “land missile campaign” of the Houthi-Saleh alliance against
Saudi Arabia continued during 2017, although at a reduced level of intensity (64 per
cent of the level in 2016). The Houthi-Saleh alliance continues to demonstrate a
mobile short-range ballistic missile or free flight rocket97 capability to strike at Saudi
Arabia. This has a strategic impact by: (a) demonstrating a defensive weakness on the
part of Saudi Arabia to this threat, and compelling it to deploy disproportionately
costly counter-measures to protect itself from such attacks; (b) demonstrating the
vulnerability of the Saudi Arabian civilian population to such attacks; (c) countering
inaccurate Saudi Arabia-led coalition claims to have destroyed the missile stockpiles
in 2015, thus undermining the credibility of their wider media operations; and
(d) demonstrating that the Houthi-Saleh alliance is capable of directly threatening
Saudi Arabia. A summary of reported and confirmed launches of short-range ballistic
missiles and free flight rockets is contained in annex 34 to the present report.
Figure III illustrates launches of short-range ballistic missiles only.
Figure III
Launches of short-range ballistic missiles: 2015–2017
97 The free flight rockets are the improvised S-75 Dvina surface-to-air missile, referred to by the
Houthis as Qaher-1 missiles (see S/2017/81, para. 81 and annex 42).
Annex 61
81. The tactical military impact of short-range ballistic missiles is limited due to
their small numbers, inherent inaccuracy and relatively small high explosive warhead
size (less than 600 kg to 950 kg).
2. Increased regional tensions
82. At approximately 20.07 hours (local time) on 4 November 2017 remnants of a
short-range ballistic missile landed within the perimeter of King K haled International
Airport in Riyadh.98 This particular attack99 by the Houthi-Saleh alliance resulted in
an immediate escalation of regional tensions, with an announcement by the Saudi
Arabia-led coalition of the temporary closure of all ground, sea and air routes into
Yemen as of 6 November 2017.
83. The Panel travelled to Riyadh from 17 to 21 November 2017 to inspect the
remnants of the short-range ballistic missile attacks launched against Saudi Arabia by
Houthi-Saleh forces on 19 May, 22 July, 26 July and 4 November 2017. The Panel
also visited Saudi Arabia from 24 to 26 December 2017 to inspect remnants of a
further short-range ballistic missile attack on Riyadh on 19 December 2017. The
findings and conclusions of the Panel are set out below (see paras. 88–92).
3. Short-range ballistic missile capability of the Houthi-Saleh forces
84. It is certain that the pre-conflict Yemeni Missile Defense Command possessed
at least 18 SS-1 Scud-B missiles in 2004, and had also procured 90 Hwasong-6
(Scud-C type) missiles during the first decade of the 2000s.100 During hostilities in
early 2015, the 5th and 6th missile brigades aligned themselves with the Houthi -Saleh
forces.
85. The initial Saudi Arabia-led coalition air strikes failed to completely destroy the
supply of short-range ballistic missiles. The first confirmed101 Scud-C type102 shortrange
ballistic missile launch against Saudi Arabia took place on 29 June 2015, with
the last probable Scud-C type attack being on 26 July 2017.103 The Qaher-1 free flight
rocket attacks covered in the report of the Panel dated 31 January 2017 104 continued
in 2017 until the last confirmed firing on 27 March 2017.105
98 It was initially reported that this short-range ballistic missile was interdicted in flight by a
MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile before reaching its intended target. From the physical
evidence inspected, the Panel can only comment that the rocket motor assembly may have been
intercepted. The propellant tank, which is designed to separate, had no traces of fragmentation
from an interceptor missile warhead. There was also a crater at the point of impact (King Khalid
International Airport).
99 There were two previous short-range ballistic missile attacks against the Riyadh area on
5 February 2017 (Muzahimiyah) and 19 May 2017 (Riyadh governorate).
100 Including: (a) Jane’s Defence Equipment and Technology Intelligence databases; and (b) a report
of the United States Congressional Research Services (see http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin
/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521480). Twelve Scud-type missiles were discovered in transit to Yemen
on 10 December 2002, but after an initial detention the vessel was allowed to proceed to Yemen
to make the delivery as there was no legal reason to seize them at that time.
101 Letter to the Panel dated 4 October 2017 from Saudi Arabia.
102 Either Scud-B upgraded to Scud-C level, or a Hwasong-6 supplied by the Democratic People’s
Republic of North Korea.
103 Confirmed by the Panel from imagery of the warhead, which was a cluster mu nition type fitted to
Scud-C type short-range ballistic missile.
104 See S/2017/81, paras. 81–84 and annex 42.
105 There have been two unconfirmed reports of missiles been fired on 7 and 27 August 2017, which
could have been Qaher-1 type missiles.
Annex 61
B. Extended-range short-range ballistic missiles
1. Background
86. In the reporting period, there have been four confirmed attacks by short-range
ballistic missiles with an extended range substantially beyond that normally expected
of the missiles known to be in the inventory of the Houthi-Saleh alliance. The launch
of the first missile was on 19 May 2017 (see table 1).106
Table 1
Confirmed launches of extended-range short-range ballistic missiles by the Houthi-Saleh alliance in 2017a
Date Event Range (km) Remarks
19 May Impacts in Riyadh province 965 First confirmed launch
22 July Impacts on Yanbu‘, west of
Medina
900+ Approximately 2 months since previous launch
4 Nov. Missile launched towards
Riyadh
1,043b Approximately 3 months since launch of previous missile
19 Dec. Missile launched towards
Riyadh
915 Release of a video of the launch by the Houthi on
19 December 2017c
Probably intercepted in flight
a Source: letter from member State of 4 October 2017 (first two launches).
b Since it is possible that the missile flew further than 1,000 km, it could more accurately be referred to as a mediu m-range
ballistic missile. As the range overlap is so small, the Panel will continue to refer to it as a short -range ballistic missile as it is
derived from that class of missiles. The range is based on the target event report from the Patriot system. The data obtained
through the Shared Early Warning Systems places the estimated launch point one degree of longitude further north, which
would mean a range of 937 km.
c See https://mobile.almasdarnews.com/article/video-footage-houthis-long-rang….
87. A Houthi military spokesperson, major general Sharaf Luqman, admitted for the
first time on 30 March 2017 that missiles damaged by the air strikes were being
repaired and modified by Yemeni specialists.107 The Panel has also not discounted the
idea that foreign missile specialists may be providing technical advice in Yemen, 108
or that Houthi-Saleh missile specialists may have visited a third country for training.
The Houthi forces almost certainly do not have the design or engineering capability
to manufacture a new type of short-range ballistic missile.
2. Technical analysis and finding
88. The Panel initially examined the options available to extend the range of the
Scud-C type short-range ballistic missile known to be in the Houthi-Saleh inventory,
and concluded that sufficient weight savings could not be made to such missiles, nor
could the power output be upgraded sufficiently to account for an extension of range
from a known maximum of 600 km to over 1,000 km.
106 There were also unconfirmed media reports of a short-range ballistic missile landing in Riyadh
province on 5 February 2017. If confirmed, this would be the first identified launch of an
extended-range short-range ballistic missile from Yemen.
107 sputniknews.com/middleeast/201703301052137016-yeminis-repair-soviet-missiles/.
108 https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2018/01/01/Who-are-the-Irania…-
leading-Houthis-in-Yemen-.html.
Annex 61
89. Launches of short-range ballistic missiles beyond the range of 670 km were
observed in 2016, which indicates that a weight-saving programme to the Scud-C
types almost certainly took place in 2016 (see annex 35), achieving a limited range
extension of approximately 11.75 per cent for that type of missile. Evidence of this
includes the use of composite material compressed air bottles of a United States
design instead of the standard steel air bottles.109 The Houthi refer to this missile as
the Borkan-2.
90. After inspecting the remains of the “22 July” and “4 November” extended range
short-range ballistic missile in Riyadh the Panel now finds that:
(a) Many of the internal design features, 110 external characteristics 111 and
dimensions of the remnants of the missile inspected by the Panel are consistent with
those of the Iranian designed and manufactured Qiam-1 missile. This means that they
were almost certainly produced by the same manufacturer. Figure IV shows the
position of the main components inspected by the Panel in relation to a Qiam 1.
Figure V is an illustration of the Scud-C type missile, while figure VI is an
illustration, for comparison, of the extended-range short-range ballistic missile
inspected by the Panel;
Figure IV
Major components and their relative position compared to a Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missilea
a Image of the extended-range-short-range ballistic missile taken by the Panel in Riyadh on 19 and 20 November 2017 (Qiam-1
image from http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-qsK7VV6oZfc/Tq1ET0NyVdI/AAAAAAAAADo/NGlhWpeJT…).
109 The company could not trace these components owing to the large production volumes of such
bottles.
110 For example, the reversal of the positions of the fuel and oxidizer tanks in the missile body. This
configuration is only seen, within the known short-range ballistic missile systems, on the obsolete
Scud-A and the Iranian Qiam-1 missiles. Other design features of the extended-range short-range
ballistic missile include: (a) composite compressed air bottles; and (b) an upgraded guidance system.
111 For example: (a) the use of a mainly aluminium airframe; and (b) the lack of fins at the rear of
the missile. Scud-C variants have fins, the Iranian Qiam-1 does not.
Annex 61
Figure V
Illustrative main section layout of Scud-C missilea
a Panel diagram (not to scale). Valves are shown larger proportionally than on real missile to assist in identification (see
annex 36, appendix C, figure C.36.1).
Figure VI
Illustrative main section layout of an extended-range short-range ballistic missilea
a See annex 36, appendix C, figure C.36.2.
(b) A standard Qiam-1 missile has an operational range of 750 to 800 km, as
compared to the over 1,000km range of the missile examined by the Panel. The Panel
finds it is not a Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile, but a derived lighter version,
designed specifically by the manufacturers of the Qiam-1 to extend the range to over
1,000 km by reducing weight;112
(c) Variations in build quality and welding standards identified by the Panel
mean that the technology was almost certainly transferred in modular system form, 113
requiring the missile engineers of the Houthi-Saleh alliance to assemble and
functionality test the missiles prior to operational deployment;
(d) Three jet vane housings from the remnants of the 4 November 2017 missile
had markings (see figure VII) very similar in design to the company logo of Shahid
112 The Iranian designed and manufactured Shabab-3 missile has a range of 1,300 km, so this missile
was almost certainly not designed to fill in a “range gap” in the Iranian ballistic missile suite.
113 The modular system consists of: (a) warhead; (b) guidance unit; (c) fuel tank; (d) oxidizer tank;
and (e) rear section (rocket motor, actuators and pumps).
Annex 61
Bagheri Industries,114 based in the Islamic Republic of Iran (see figure VIII). A tracing
request has been sent to the authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran; 115
Figure VII
Enhanced image of Shahid Bagheri Industries logo on
a jet vane housinga
a Image taken by the Panel.
Figure VIII
Shahid Bagheri Industries logo on a trade standa
a Source: http://www.sns.co.ir/?p=327.
(e) The Houthi-Saleh alliance has obtained access to “extended-range”
missile technology more advanced than the Scud-C and Hwasong-6 short-range
ballistic missiles that the alliance was known to possess in January 2015. They refer
to this missile as the Borkan-2H, and this is the name attributed to the missile by the
Panel;
(f) It is highly probable that the route used to supply the Borkan-2H
components was the main land supply route into Houthi-Saleh-held territory
following a ship-to-shore transfer to the ports in the area of Nishtun and Ghaydah in
Mahrah governorate.116 Although concealment in cargo of vessels offloading in the
Red Sea ports is unlikely, it cannot be excluded as an option;
(g) The use of the Borkan-2H against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia is a
violation of international humanitarian law (see para. 179 below and annex 64);
(h) As of yet, the Panel has no evidence as to the identity of the supplier, or
any intermediary third party;117
(i) As the Islamic Republic of Iran has not provided any information to the
Panel of any change of custody of the components for the building of extended -range
short-range ballistic missiles, the country is in non-compliance with paragraph 14 of
resolution 2216 (2015) in that it failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the
114 Also possibly known as Shahid Bakeri Industries. This organization is a subsidiary of the Iranian
Aerospace Industries Organization.
115 Request sent in Panel letters dated 9 and 12 December 2017.
116 The Panel notes the redeployment of the 123rd Infantry Brigade to Ghaydah and the appointment
of a new Governor of Mahrah, Rajih Said Bakarit, on 27 November 2017, as part of the strategy
to improve security along this main supply route.
117 The Panel sent tracing requests to the Member State of the manufacturer on 26 November,
11 December and 14 December 2017.
Annex 61
direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of such technology to the Houthi-Saleh
forces, an entity acting at the direction of listed individuals. 118
91. The Panel’s observations and full technical analysis to support the above
findings are presented in annex 36.
3. Related case: liquid propellant oxidizer field storage tanks for short-range
ballistic missiles
92. In January 2017, a consignment of industrial process equipment was seized by
a member State of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition near Ma’rib, along the main supply
route from the Mahrah governorate. Two hazardous chemical storage tanks, which
were also seized in the shipment, are almost identical in design, configuration and
size to the oxidizer storage field tanks used for the Scud-type missile or other shortrange
ballistic missile systems (see figures IX and X for comparison).
Figure IX
Oxidizer field storage tanks seized near Ma’riba
a Source: confidential.
Figure X
Scud oxidizer field storage tanka
a Stored at Gharyan Air Defence base, Libya (2017).
Confidential source.
93. Although most of the other equipment seized is also standard for the chemical
or food processing industries, some items show artisanal crafting such as unusual
welding connectors (pipelines and flanges) and other improvised engineering
features. This proves adaptation for a purpose other than initially designed for. The
Panel finds that the equipment has military utility for the reprocessing of inhibited
red fuming nitric acid, the oxidizer for the liquid bipropellant used in short -range
ballistic missiles.
94. Tracing requests by the Panel have identified that: (a) two components were
manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran; (b) three components were supplied to
the Islamic Republic of Iran from foreign manufacturers, one of which was paid for
through a European bank account and had Farsi labelling added to it.119
95. The Panel as of yet has no evidence as to the identity of the supplier, or any
intermediary third party.120
118 The Panel wrote to the Islamic Republic of Iran on 15 December 2017, informing the authorities
of this finding and again requested any information the Government may have as to any change
in custody of these components. The Panel then visited the Islamic Republic of Iran from 15 to
17 January 2018 for further discussions. For the Islamic Republic of Iran ’s response to the
Panel’s findings, see annex 36, appendix E.
119 See full analysis in annex 36, appendix A.
120 The Panel sent tracing requests to the Member State involved on 11 December 2017.
Annex 61
96. Since it has not provided any information to the Panel of any change of custody
of the liquid bipropellant storage tanks or accounted for the presence of Iranian
manufactured components, the Islamic Republic of Iran is in non-compliance with
paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) in that it failed to take the necessary measures
to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of military equipment related
to extended-range short-range ballistic missiles to the Houthi-Saleh forces, an entity
acting at the direction of listed individuals.121
C. Houthi use of unmanned aerial vehicles
97. During 2017 the forces of the Houthi-Saleh alliance continued to make limited
use of small and medium-sized unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance,122 and in the case of the mediumsized
unmanned aerial device, explosive attacks. 123 The small unmanned aerial
vehicles are all based on commercially available systems, such as the X -8 Skywalker,
which have a military utility for surveillance and target planning.
1. Qasef-1 unmanned aerial vehicles
98. On 27 November 2016, a Dubai registered truck (Dubai/13933) was intercepted
at the al-Milh checkpoint near Ma’rib and was found to contain components for at
least six complete Qasef-1 unmanned aerial vehicles and components for up to
another 24.124 Components were also recovered by forces of the United Arab Emirates
from crashed unmanned aerial vehicles in Ma’rib (19 September 2016)125 and Aden
airport (16 November 2016).126
99. The Panel finds that the medium-sized Qasef-1 unmanned aerial vehicle is
virtually identical in design, dimensions and capability to that of the Ababil -T,127
manufactured by the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries.128 The analysis of the
Qasef-1 UAV is provided in annex 38.
100. The Panel has identified that at least two components of the system were
supplied to the Islamic Republic of Iran after the implementation of the targeted arms
embargo on 14 April 2015. The route for the funding of one of the components used
a third party broker, and an intermediary account in a third country. This is indicative
of a deliberate attempt to disguise the final destination of the components.
101. The Panel finds that, based on: (a) the design of the unmanned aerial vehicles;
and (b) the tracing of component parts, the material necessary to assemble the Qasef-1
unmanned aerial vehicles, emanated from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
121 See footnote 118 above.
122 Initially reported in the Panels’ 2017 confidential mid-term update.
123 See annex 37 for summary of explosive attacks on forces of the United Arab Emirates.
124 Information contained in a letter from a Member State: information includes Qasef -1 serial
Nos. 22-122-33, 22-122-34, 22-122-38, 22-1721-39, 22-1721-X, 22,1721-0 and 22-1722-9.
125 Letter from Member State, including Qasef-1 serial No. 22-1728.
126 Qasef-1 serial No. 22-122-39.
127 Janes’ database (see www.janes.his.com).
128 Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries is a subsidiary of the Iran Aircraft Indus tries
Organization, owned by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and is part of the
Defence Industries Organization conglomerate.
Annex 61
2. The “Rased” unmanned aerial vehicles
102. The unmanned aerial vehicles referred to as the “Rased” (surveyor) by the
Houthi-Saleh alliance is almost certainly the Skywalker X-8 unmanned aerial vehicle
(see annex 39).
3. Embargo violations
103. The Panel considers that the supply of unmanned aerial vehicles specifically
designed for military intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
or attack operations to entities acting on behalf of individuals or entities designated
by the Security Council falls within the scope of “military equipment” under
paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015).
104. As the Islamic Republic of Iran has not provided any information to the Panel
of any change of custody of the Qasef-1 or the components,129 the Islamic Republic
of Iran is in non-compliance with paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) in that it
failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or
transfer of military related equipment to the Houthi-Saleh forces, an entity acting at
the direction of listed individuals.
105. The Panel considers that since commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles
can have significant military utility for surveillance and target reconnaissance, or can
be easily modified to operate as attack drones, they should also fall within the scope
of “military equipment” under paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) when used for
military purposes.
D. Waterborne improvised explosive devices
106. The Houthi have successfully deployed waterborne improvised explosive
devices on at least two occasions: (a) an attack against a Royal Saudi Arabian Navy
frigate; and (b) in the port of Mukha. The Panel notes that the United Arab Emirates
have released information on a seizure of this type of explosive device to the United
States and a commercial armament investigative company.
107. Although the Panel has seen imagery and third-party analysis of waterborne
improvised explosive devices, it does not include any analysis or findings in the
present report as the information it has seen does not meet the criteria of transparency
and verification contained in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the best practices and methods
recommended in the report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council
on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997).
108. The Panel finds that the United Arab Emirates is in non-compliance with
paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2342 (2017), in that it did not provide
unhindered access to documents and sites, in order for the Panel of Experts to execute
its mandate. The Panel further finds that it is also in non-compliance with
paragraph 17 of Council resolution 2216 (2015), in that it did not promptly supply an
initial written report on the seizure to the Committee, nor a subsequent written report
within 30 days of the seizure.
109. The Panel cannot therefore independently confirm that the technology was
transferred to Yemen after the implementation of the targeted arms embargo on
14 April 2015 (see resolution 2216 (2015), para. 14), and continues to investigate.
129 Panel letter to Islamic Republic of Iran dated 19 December 2017.
Annex 61
E. Sea mines
110. The Panel has identified further use of sea mines during 2017. The chronology
of incidents is contained in annex 40 to the present report.
1. Iranian manufactured “bottom” sea mines
111. The United Arab Emirates reported the discovery of at least three sea mines in
the port of Mukha to the Panel.130 The recovered sea mines (see figure XI) are consistent
in shape and size to the Iranian manufactured “bottom” sea mine (see figure XII),
which was first identified at an Iranian arms fair in October 2015.
Figure XI
Sea mine recovered from Mukha (2017)
Figure XII
Sea mine at Iranian Arms fair (2015)
112. The Panel has written to Iran requesting clarification as to the nomenclature and
export status of the type of sea mine shown in figure XII but has yet to receive a
response.
2. Use of improvised sea mines by the Houthi-Saleh alliance
113. The Panel has investigated the confirmed use of improvised sea mines 131 by the
Houthi-Saleh alliance.132 One mine was recovered from Midi on 23 March 2017 (see
figure XIII) and two of a similar but not identical design from Thwaq Island 133 (see
figure XIV) on, or around, 27 May 2017. The recovery from Thwaq Island, which is
uninhabited, is evidence that these types of mines have been deployed in the Red Sea
by the Houthi. Since approximately 12 improvised mines were seen in a shore storage
area in Houthi-controlled territory in November 2016134 it is highly likely that more
than the three recovered improvised mines were deployed, and thus a threat to the sea
lines of communication in the Red Sea now exists. The length of the threat posed by
such mines is dictated by the battery life of their power source, which is dependent
on the type of AA battery used, however, it could be between 6 to 10 years.
130 Initially reported in para.61 of the 2017 confidential midterm update.
131 Reported in a letter to Committee dated 13 September 2017.
132 Initially reported in paras. 63 and 64 of the 2017 confidential midterm update.
133 Coordinates 16° 18' 42.61" N, 42° 41' 10.77" E.
134 Confidential source.
Annex 61
Figure XIII
Improvised sea mine recovered near Midi
(23 March 2017)a
Figure XIV
Improvised sea mines recovered from area of Thwaq Island
(May 2017)a
a See www.youtube.com/watch?v=6H04M4Vpif8
&feature=youtu.be.
a Imagery from a Member State and confirmed by the Panel.
The Panel would not normally use uncorroborated single source social media, but as the imagery shows a design virtually
identical to that described by a confidential eyewitness the Panel has included it.
114. Although designed to be used as moored contact mines, the design is flawed and
these mine types will not always moor as designed, or may break free of their
mooring. The recovered mines from Thwaq Island are evidence that some of these
mines have already become drifting sea mines. A detailed technical and threat analysis
is provided in annex 41.
F. Anti-tank guided missiles
115. In its report dated 31 January 2017,135 the Panel reported on the seizure and
operational use of anti-tank guided missiles with characteristics very similar to that
of the Iranian manufactured Dehleyvah. The lack of open source information at the
time prevented the Panel from confirming them as Dehleyvah missiles.
116. The Panel has now compared the markings and design features of the 9M133
Kornet and Iranian Dehleyvah missiles seized by the French naval vessel La Provence
on 20 March 2016.136 The findings, provided in annex 42 to the report, will act as a
definitive source137 for future investigations and identification.
G. Black market
1. Small arms ammunition
117. The Panel has continued to monitor the price of small arms ammunition on the
black market. Although prices have now started to rise (by 20 per cent during 2017),
as shown in annex 43, the cost of (for example) one type of 7.62 mm x 39 mm round
in Aden is now still significantly less ($0.94) than it was prior to the conflict ($1.60).
This gives a strong indication that small arms ammunition is still readily available to
all parties in Yemen, and that no external resupply is needed as yet.
135 S/2017/81, paras. 76 and77 and annex 37.
136 See S/2017/924, annex 7.2.
137 See also https://www.ihs.com/products/janes-weapons-ammunition.html.
Annex 61
2. Suspicious end user certificates
118. The Panel has obtained138 a copy of a number of end-user certificates issued by
the Houthi-Saleh administration that are designed to support the procurement of
weapons and ammunition from Bulgaria, China, the Philippines, the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Serbia and the Slovak Republic by the then Houthi-Saleh administration (see
annex 44). The Panel has contacted these Member States; Bulgaria, China, the
Philippines and the Slovak Republic have all confirmed that these end-user
certificates have not been presented for any arms purchases from them.
119. The company authorized to broker the above potential arms trades, Al Fosal Trading
(also known as Fusal), is listed as being managed by Adeeb Fares Mohamed Mana’a, the
son of designated individual, and known arms trafficker, Fares Mohammed Hassan
Mana’a (SOi.008).139 Fares Mana’a is currently a Sana’a based minister of state.140
120. The date of the documentation, 6 July 2015, is three months after the Houthi -
Saleh alliance took control of Sana’a. By that time, as reported by the Panel is its
report dated 31 January 2017, 141 the Houthi-Saleh alliance had taken control of
potentially up to 68 per cent of the national arms stockpile. It is thus unlikely that
they would have needed at that point to be exploring means of procuring the small
arms, light weapons and ammunition listed in these end-user certificates. It is more
likely that Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana’a seized an opportunity to use his contacts
in the then new Houthi-Saleh administration to obtain appropriate documentation that
could be used to support arms procurement for his regional arms business.
121. As previously reported by the Panel,142 both Fares Mana’a and Adeeb Mana’a
were involved in a separate illicit regional arms transfer during the period from 2013
to2015. The involvement of Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana’a as part of the brokering
company, and his known relationship with the Houthis, means that any future
potential regional transfer using these end-user certificates would still be to the
financial benefit of listed individuals, and thus a violation of paragraph 14 of
resolution 2216 (2015).
H. Increasing the effectiveness of the targeted arms embargo
122. The deployment of advanced extended-range short-range ballistic missiles technology
by the Houthi-Saleh forces demonstrates a vulnerability in the current inspection and
enforcement measures to well-planned shipments of non-explosive arms and arms-related
material.143 Only the Government of Yemen and the Saudi Arabia-led coalition are in a
position to improve interdiction measures to cover the land route from Mahrah.
123. The Panel has examined options for enhancing inspection rates for the United
Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) system so as to
improve the confidence of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in the process. A permanent
UNVIM presence at Hudaydah port, would: (a) serve to increase the confidence of the
Saudi Arabia-led coalition that illicit shipments through that port would be made more
138 Confidential source.
139 Listed under authority of paragraph 8 to resolution 1844 (2008) on 12 April 2010 by the Security
Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and
Eritrea.
140 Appointed on 28 November 2016.
141 See S/2017/81, para. 78 and annex 39.
142 Ibid., para. 80 and annex 41.
143 As noted in the Panel’s confidential medium-term update, the seizure of components for military
unmanned aerial vehicles from the Houthi-Saleh forces by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces
in Ma’rib in 2016 is another indicator of this vulnerability.
Annex 61
difficult; (b) act as a deterrent to any illicit shipments that may be taking place. The
deployment of a naval or fleet support vessel anchored at the entrance of Hudaydah port
under the auspices of the United Nations would negate the known problems of a
permanent shore-based presence. Such a vessel would have the necessary surveillance
and weapons systems for self-protection, with the ability to take UNVIM inspectors
ashore, when necessary. When ashore, armed naval ratings or marines from the host
vessel could provide close protection, with port security being contracted to private
security companies approved by the Houthi administration under a memorandum of
understanding. This would significantly reduce the personal risk to UNVIM inspectors
and negate the logistic and security requirements needed for a permanent shore presence,
while ensuring a neutral inspection and monitoring presence during commercial vessel
discharges. The vessel could also serve as a base for capacity- building training of a
neutral Yemeni coast guard, which would combine elements from both parties.
V. Economic context and overview of finance
124. In accordance with its mandate, the Panel has investigated the economic context
in which individuals designated pursuant to resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015)
and their networks have continued to operate in violation of sanctions measures. In
particular, the Panel has examined the flow of money, the transfer of wealth and the
establishment of new shell companies to finance operations that threaten the peace,
security or stability of Yemen.
125. The Panel finds that during 2017 the legitimate Government, local authorities,
the Houthi-Saleh alliance and other militia forces all continued to collect “State”
revenues in their respective areas with only a limited return by way of the provision
public services. Their actions have eroded the foundations of the formal economy and
created a liquidity problem, increasing the likelihood of a collapse of the Yemeni
banking and financial system. Conditions now exist that are conducive to money
laundering, an additional impediment to a peaceful political transition and recovery.
The continuing conflict has enabled new profiteers of war to emerge from Yemen,
who are gradually replacing the traditional business communities based in Sana ’a and
Ta‘izz. This will certainly create new challenges and additional spoilers.
A. Control of State economic resources by the Houthis and
their affiliates
1. Revenue collected by the Houthis from State assets
126. The Houthis continue to directly control most of the national economy in their
areas through ministers and managers loyal to them, or through deputies and
revolutionary committees who act as supervisors within their organizations.
127. The Panel has analysed non-tax revenues from the latest available State budget
(2011) in order to evaluate what could potentially be available for Houthi exploitation.
This equates to approximately 2,818 billion rials ($11.3 billion),144 of which a minimum
of 407 billion rials ($1.62 billion) might be under their control (see annex 45).
144 The official exchange rate is fixed by the Central Bank of Yemen at $1 to 250 Yemeni rials in Sana ’a
and at a floating rate of about $1 to 370 rials (since 15 August 2017); the market rate on that date.
The rate has increased continuously since then, reaching 400 rials per dollar by 31 December 2017.
The Panel, in analysing the Sana’a-based economy, has used the official rate of 250 rials to the dollar
or the market rate of 370 rials to the dollar (figures rounded to nearest $100,000).
Annex 61
128. Telecommunications companies are the main source of revenue for the Houthis
in Sana’a.145 On 21 August 2017, the Sana’a based minister of telecommunications,
Julaidan Mahmood Julaidan, 146 an affiliate of the General People’s Congress,
informed a media conference that mobile telecommunications companies have
transferred 98 billion rials ($264.8 million) during the 20 months since he took over
the ministry on 1 December 2016.147 This amount, which is not denied by the Houthis,
represents an equivalent of $159 million per annum.
129. Tobacco sales account for the second main source of revenue available to the
Houthis. For example, Kamaran Industry and Investment declared that its 2015 tax
and customs duties bill was 23.9 billion rials ($64.7 million).148 The Panel estimates
an equivalent amount from the other two producers.149
130. In order to increase custom revenues the Houthis started to collect additional
customs duties on commodities imported through the areas under the control of the
legitimate Government (see annex 46).
131. On 28 May 2016, Yahya Mohamed Abdullah al-Osta was appointed by
Mohamed Ali al-Houthi as the acting head of the Sana’a-based Yemen customs
authority.150 Since then he has overseen the implementation of illegal mechanisms for
the collection of customs duties for the benefit of entities and individuals acting on
behalf and under the control of Abdulmalik al-Houthi.
132. On 4 April 2017, the Sana’a based ministry of finance established new
permanent customs posts at the Amran and Dhamar checkpoints, 151 designed to
exploit the additional road traffic as a result of the decrease of traffic through the
Hudaydah port route.
2. Black market fuel
133. The Panel finds that the distribution of fuel and oil products remains one of the
main sources of revenue for the Houthis. The monopoly on the import and distribution
of oil products by the Yemen Petroleum Company was terminated by the Houthis o n
28 June 2015.152 They orchestrated a private bidding competition for the distribution,
which now allows them to control the sector, mainly through the use of black market
distributors under their control.
134. Data available to the Panel between May 2016 and July 2017, when the official
exchange rate was at 250 rials to $1, indicates that Houthi revenue from the black -
145 Four telecommunications companies are operating in Yemen: (a) mobile (State owned);
(b) Y Telecom (under State control); (c) Sabafon, associated with Hamed Al Ahmar; and
(d) MTN, known to be associated with Shaher Abdulhaq, although the Panel has learned that he
probably transferred his shares to MTN South Africa in exchange for shares in that company.
146 Reported as executed by the Houthis after 4 December 2017.
147 General People’s Congress-affiliated television, Al-Yemen Alyoum, 21 August 2017 (see
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RlsXBlGWvhk).
148 See http://www.kamaran.com/english/research_and_development.php.
149 Three companies associated with brands such as Pall Mall and Rothmans control the sale of tobacco
in Yemen. One being the Kamaran United Industries Company of the HSA Group. The State collects
90 per cent of the sales price for each pack sold, in addition to 18 rials for various other fees.
150 Mohamed Abdullah al-Osta was a mid-level staff member working as a legal adviser within the
ministry of finance.
151 Decision 138 of 2017 (see http://customs.gov.ye/news_show_ar.php?id=132).
152 Fuel distribution in Yemen has always included revenue gained from smuggling across the
region. Fuel in Yemen was not taxed, but subsidized, the arbitrage thus making it profit able for
smuggling across the Horn of Africa. The Houthis took Sana’a using the pretext of the removal
of fuel subsidies by the Government under the former Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa.
Currently there are no taxes or subsidies on fuel imports.
Annex 61
market sale of oil products delivered at the Red Sea ports of Hudaydah and Ra ‘s Isa153
could be as high as 318 billion rials ($1.27 billion)154 (see annex 47).155
135. The Panel noted that to date 61 companies have applied for entry clearance
through UNVIM156 for 234 tankers, of which 173 have been allowed to deliver fuel. 157
The list of consignees is provided in confidential annex 48. The Panel noted that only
11 companies have continued to import fuel during 2016 and 2017 while 12 companies
appear to have ceased importing to Yemen after 1 March 2017 and 11 new companies
have emerged since that date. This is indicative of a Houthi strategy to take cont rol
of oil imports. Further evidence includes:
(a) Only the Alhutheily Group, with a previous track record in the oil industry,
has continued to operate at the same level, (see consignee line 22 in figure XV: details
are given in annex 48, appendix 2);158
(b) The Falak Shipping Company, used by the Tawfiq Mathar brothers, which
used to import fuel to Yemen for the Yemen Petroleum Company during the Saleh era,
has ceased to operate through the Yemeni Red Sea ports;
(c) All current active oil importers are Houthi affiliated.
Figure XV
Change of fuel consignees during 2016 and 2017
136. The Panel continues to monitor the situation in order to assess if the space lost
by pre-Houthi era businessmen is a consequence of the conflict, or part of a stra tegy
to replace them with what Yemenis are calling “Generation 2017” businessmen, (in
reference to Houthi business associates in Yemen). The Panel is investigating the
change of beneficial ownership of the Vulcan Group, the most important supplier for
the Yemeni Ministry of Defence during the Saleh era.159
153 Closed since June 2017.
154 Central Bank of Yemen rate of $1 = 250 rials.
155 Data collected from: (a) UNVIM records of fuel delivered since May 2016; (b) market prices in
Yemen for fuel delivery, transport and storage; and (c) other fees corroborated wit h traders and
sources inside Yemen.
156 See https://www.vimye.org/docs/GoY Announcement of UNVIM Launch.pdf.
157 The amount delivered equals 2,358,953 tons of fuel products, as at 30 November 2017.
158 ATICO Trading and Company, registered in Yemen, is a traditional operator in the oil industry
(see http://www.alhutheily.com/index.php/contact).
159 See http://vulcanyemen.com/. The Panel has evidence indicating the owner’s (Khalid Ahmed
Alradi) involvement of previous contracts. The Houthis killed him on 26 August 2017 for being a
Saleh supporter.
Annex 61
3. Risk of the looting and trafficking of antiquities and cultural objects
137. The Panel has investigated the risks of smuggling of antiquities and cultural
objects from conflict areas in Yemen for sale abroad (see annex 49).
138. A case of artefacts seized in Switzerland between 2009 and 2010 arriving from
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, although still under a judicial process, 160 could
assist the Panel in identifying smuggling methods and networks. Although the
artefacts left Yemen before the imposition of sanctions, the Panel is investigating this
case as the objects in question were illegally exported, in violation of the Yemen Law
of Antiquities N21/1994,161 during the Saleh regime and may lead to the identification
of more of the Saleh family assets. The market value of the artefacts is estimated at
more than $1.5 million.
139. As there is no official record of Yemeni cultural heritage, the interdiction of
antiquities exported and sold for profit abroad is very difficult to ascertain. The Panel
has seen images posted on the official media sites of parties in Lahij, Sana ’a and
Ta‘izz showing precious artefacts abandoned without any protection mechanism.
Recently, al Masirah television, showed images of the house of Tawfiq Saleh Abdulla
Saleh, the former chairman of Kamaran.162
B. Money supply problems
1. Liquidity in Yemen and the Central Bank of Yemen
140. In Houthi-controlled territory, a central bank structure with private banks and
finance institutions continues to operate.163
141. In 2017 the legitimate Government managed to print 600 billion rials
($1.6 billion). 164 The printing was aimed at: (a) securing a reserve to restart the
payment of salaries; (b) improving the circulation of cash in all of Yemen as the M1165
money supply is now depleted; and (c) to replace damaged banknotes. None of these
objectives have yet been achieved.166
142. The Houthis tried to solve the liquidity problem using several approaches, which
have all failed so far, including:
(a) The corrupt use of a food voucher system by an individual reported to be
“Abu Nabil al-Qaramani”, who operates with Houthi permission for their financial
benefit (see annex 52);
(b) An attempt to use 5,000 rial promissory notes printed outside Yemen was
foiled by a seizure in the Government controlled area of Jawf, on 25 May 2017, of a
160 See http://ge.ch/justice/vestiges-archeologiques-le-ministere-public-confis…-
de-palmyre-en-syrie-du-ye.
161 Amended by Law 8/1997 of 17 February 1997.
162 See http://www.yafa-news.net/archives/263955 and http://almasirah.net/gallery/preview.php?
file_id=10481#.Wiifxroebms.whatsapp (at minute 15.36).
163 All of the 18 banks licensed to operate in Yemen have their main office in Sana ’a, apart from the
National Bank of Yemen, known as Al Ahli Bank, which has its main office in Aden (see annex 50).
164 Printing by the Russian GOZNAK Joint Stock Company (see http://goznak.ru/en/).
165 M1 is a metric that measures the most liquid components of the money supply. It includes cash
and assets that can quickly be converted to currency.
166 The M0 (or M-zero) money supply in Yemen is estimated to be 1,129.5 billion rials according to
a 2014 report issued by the Central Bank of Yemen. This could represent 50 per cent of the M1
money supply according to a Bank official (information provided to the Panel meeting in Riyadh,
June 2017). Banknotes older than six years are likely to be torn and invalidated for transactions.
Data on the annual printing of banknotes is provided in annex 51.
Annex 61
truck carrying 35 billion rials ($140 million) worth of such notes. This denomination
has not been used so far for transactions (see annex 53).
143. The Panel submitted a 5,000 Yemeni rial note for forensic analysis in order to
identify the parties behind the counterfeit as well as external entities and individuals
supporting them.
144. The Panel noted that on 20 November 2017, the Office of Foreign Assets
Control of the United States Department of the Treasury designated an Iranian
network and ForEnt Technik GmbH,167 an Iranian-owned, Frankfurt-based company,
for their involvement in the printing of the above-mentioned counterfeit Yemeni bank
notes.168 The Panel continues to investigate this matter.
2. Cross-border trafficking of money and gold
145. The Panel has investigated three cases of trafficking of finance assets for the
benefit of the Houthi-Saleh alliance acting on behalf of listed individuals (see table 2).
Table 2
Financial seizures in Mahrah: 2017
(Value given in millions of United States dollars)
Date Location Route Smugglers Item seized Value
9 May Shehen,
Mahrah
Yemen to the United Arab
Emirates
Yemeni Banknotes
7 gold bars
3.42
17 July Shehen,
Mahrah
Yemen to the United Arab
Emirates
United Arab Emiratesbased
Yemenis
7,174,700 Saudi riyals 1.91
27 July Shehen,
Mahrah
Yemen to the United Arab
Emirates
Citizens of the United Arab
Emirates
700,000 Saudi riyals
42 gold bars
0.19
146. These cases illustrate the level of smuggling activity in Mahrah governorate (see
annex 54).
C. Financial consequences of the conflict on the import of food
147. Restrictions imposed by the parties to the conflict on imports has resulted in
significant additional financial costs to importers. Many suppliers and freighters are
no longer willing to take the risk of entering into transactions with Yemeni importers.
1. Hard currency exchange problems
148. The main challenge is that hard currency is now mainly exchanged through the
underground economy, with all the associated risks linked to corruption and money
laundering. Currency transfers from Yemeni workers and the diaspora abroad has mainly
been in Saudi riyals. Prior to the current conflict, any excess of Saudi riyals accumulated
by Yemeni banks and money exchanges used to be transferred by air to Bahrain, where it
was exchanged for United States dollars and converted into letters of credit.
167 See http://forent-tech.com/index.html.
168 See https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0219.aspx.
Annex 61
2. Challenges facing the import of goods
149. The situation in Yemen would have been far worse were it not for the fact that
the outlook for the international trade in food products has been favourable to
importers. The current cost of food commodities and shipping from suppliers remain s
low compared to the pre-conflict period (see example in table 3), although some
additional shipping costs are incurred for the final leg of the journey into Yemeni
ports due to delays at sea and demurrage at the ports.169
Table 3
Cost of wheat (No.1 Hard Red Winter): 2012–2017a
(In United States dollars per ton)
a Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Market News (see
http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=wheat&months=60).
150. Delays, diversions and seizures of cargo of commercial vessels by the Saudi
Arabia-led coalition during inspections have contributed to significant financial losses
for ship owners and traders. The cost of these delays to owners and shippers, which can
reach $30,000 per day, have gradually eroded their credibility with their international
trading partners (suppliers, insurers and freighters). Details of the case study on the
confiscation of the Liberia-flagged tanker, MV Androussa, on 4 April 2017, while it
was proceeding to Ra‘s Isa, are given in confidential annex 55. The Panel visited the
tanker in Yanbu, on 25 December 2017, with Saudi Arabian officials. The Panel and the
officials of Saudi Arabia were shown some steel pipes next to a workshop that the
officials considered to be suspicious, but which the Panel estimated were most probably
for the vessel’s maintenance. Saudi Arabia has not yet submitted an inspection report,
which is required within 30 days under paragraph 17 of resolution 2216 (2015).170 The
case illustrates the loss for traders and shipping companies operating in Yemen. 171
One trader has seen three planned cargo deliveries for the remainder of 2017 cancel led
owing to the risk posed by the conflict (figure XVI).
169 Houthi ministry of transport and trade (see http://www.moit.gov.ye/moit/sites/default/files/%20%
D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A3%D9%83
%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B1.pdf).
170 UNVIM submitted an interim Member State monitoring report on 12 May 2017, covering the
inspection in Jeddah, between 8 and 16 April 2017, as well as subsequent inspections in Yanbu
port between 17 April and 11 May 2017. The report concluded that no prohibited items were
found on board the vessel, but that the inspection team had discovered a series of inconsistencies,
irregularities and misdeclarations as well as traces of high explosives in ballast tanks 3, 4 and 6.
171 The tanker, and its cargo of 41,500 tons of gas oil worth more than $23 million, was
subsequently formally confiscated on 14 September 2017 (see https://www.uqn.gov.sa/articles/
1507838892820964500/).
Annex 61
Figure XVI
Extract from a cancellation letter received by an importera
a Confidential source: Importer.
VI. Assets freeze
151. Pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 21 (b) of resolution 2140 (2014), as extended by
paragraph 5 of resolution 2342 (2017), the Panel has continued to gather, examine
and analyse information regarding the implementation by Member States of assets
freeze measures. The Panel has continued to focus on the five listed individuals and
on identifying and investigating other individuals and entities that may be acting on
their behalf or at their direction and entities owned or controlled by them.
152. Since the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the resultant inherited wealth will no
longer be within the scope of the Panel’s mandate unless: (a) those funds are made
available to Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh or any other individual acting on the latter’s
behalf, including Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh; or (b) Houthi fighters, acting on behalf
of the three Houthi listed individuals, seize Saleh assets. The Panel has sent letters to
the Government of Yemen and Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh requesting official
documentation that certifies the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh in order to allow the
Committee to update the list. The Panel met with Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh in Abu
Dhabi on 27 December 2017. He indicated that he had not yet received confirme d
information as to where his father was buried, that members of his family are still
being held by the Houthis in Yemen and that members of his family have been
dispossessed by the Houthis. He complained that his listing was unjust as he has never
been and is not involved in any act that threatens the peace, security or stability of
Yemen.
153. The status of the estimated assets owned by listed individuals of the Saleh family and
individual entities acting on their behalf traced by the Panel are shown in table 4 below.
Annex 61
Table 4
Estimated assets owned by the Saleh family that meet the assets freeze criteriaa
(Estimated in United States dollars)
Country Identified Frozen Status Remarks
France 11 350 000 To be confirmed 2 apartments owned by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh
Malaysia 780 000 Frozen Owned by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (balance in 2016)
Netherlands To be confirmed Frozen Acting on behalf of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (asset is
in France)
Oman 25 818 000 Frozen Transferred by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh from an
account in Yemen in 2012
Singapore 460 000 Securities owned by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh
Switzerland 4 431 000 Frozen Owned by Ali Abdullah Saleh
United Arab
Emirates
166 000 Frozen
Owned by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh
United Arab
Emirates
55 000 000 To be confirmed Owned by Ali Abdullah Saleh, and transferred in June
2011
United Arab
Emirates
51 720 000 To be confirmed Transferred by Trice Bloom Ltd. and Towkay Ltd. from
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation in 2014 from an
initial inward transfer of 71 493 448
United Arab
Emirates
33 472 000 Transferred by PACT Trust, Ali Abdullah Saleh, (October
2014)
United Arab
Emirates
58 140 000 Transferred by Wildhorse Investments, Ali Abdullah
Saleh (October 2014)
United Arab
Emirates
3 024 000 Transferred by Ansan Wikfs Investments Limited, a
company owned by Shaher Abdulhak
Total in the United Arab Emirates: 198 332 000
United Kingdom 3 700 000 Frozen Owned by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh; Panel notified by
United Kingdom authorities to the Civil Forum for Asset
Recovery in 2017.a This asset is in a United Kingdomregistered
bank, but in an account in another European
country
United States of
America
90 000 000b To be determined Transferred from or through banks in the United States to
banks in the United Arab Emirates for the benefit of
Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh between August 2013 and
December 2014
Subtotals 191 036 000 35 355 000
Grand total 226 391 000
a Managed by Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh.
b Part of this amount is included in funds traced in the United Arab Emirates. Once details are confirmed, reconciliation of funds
can take place between United States and United Arab Emirates data.
154. The Panel is investigating assets seizures by the Houthis for their benefit. An
order was issued on 23 December 2017 to the Sana’a based Central Bank of Yemen
by “the committee for identification and seizure of assets owned by traitors ” to seize
all bank accounts owned by 1,223 individuals (see annex 56).
155. The Panel shared information on bank accounts and account transfers in relation
to listed individuals with five Member States and awaits their replies. This lack of
information on already frozen assets constrains the Panel from tracing further
financial assets. In 2017, no information on the freezing of assets was submitted to
Annex 61
the Committee or Panel, while one notification of an intent to unfreeze was submitted
to the Committee.
Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh
156. In its report dated 31 January 2017172 the Panel identified Khaled Ali Abdullah
Saleh 173 as a financier acting on behalf and/or at the direction of his father, Ali
Abdullah Saleh, and his brother, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Panel is
investigating potential funds that could be made available by Khaled Ali Abdullah
Saleh for the benefit of listed individuals from transfers and investments equalling
$20.9 million made by Raydan Investments Limited in the United Arab Emirates (see
annex 57).
157. The Panel has received a bank statement related to a credit card
(4XXXXXXXXXXX3455) owned by Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has used two
passports from a Member State. The bank statement confirms that he travelled during
late 2016 and early 2017 to Munich, Germany, Budapest, Prague, Vienna and Zurich,
Switzerland. The Panel noted that he sought the services of Keyana Management
Consulting in Munich.174 The card was also used to support personal PayPal purchases
of potential weapons and specialized equipment prohibited by the targeted arms
embargo on Yemen on 26 December 2016 (http://www.nashq.com/) and 18 January
2017 (https://www.dmhq-shop.de/). He continues to manage the Saleh family assets
in such a way so as to circumvent the asset freeze and targeted arms embargo
sanctions measures.
VII. Travel ban
158. Pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), the Panel continues to focus
on a range of monitoring and investigative activities in order to identify whether the
individuals designated by the Committee and Security Council have violated the
travel ban. No violations have been identified.
VIII. Acts that violate international humanitarian law and human
rights law
159. In paragraph 9 of resolution 2140 (2014), the Security Council called upon all
parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including applicable
international humanitarian law and human rights law. In paragraphs 17, 18 and 21 of
that resolution and in paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015), the Council further
clarified the Panel’s responsibilities with regard to investigations of violations of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law and human rights
abuses, including investigation into obstructions to the delivery of humanitarian
assistance.
172 S/2017/81, sect. VI, paras. 42–44.
173 Born 2 August 1987.
174 See http://www.keyana-consulting.com/: the company, based in Munich, offers financial
investment services.
Annex 61
A. Incidents attributed to the Saudi Arabia-led coalition
1. Air strikes
160. During the reporting period, the Panel investigated 10 air strikes 175 that led to at
least 157 fatalities and 135 injuries, including at least 85 children. The strikes also
destroyed five residential buildings, two civilian vessels, a market, a motel and a
Government of Yemen forces location (see table 5). Detailed case studies of the first
four incidents, which include assessments of compliance with international
humanitarian law, are contained in annex 58.
Table 5
Air strikes: 2017
Appendix in
annex 58 Date Location Incident and target Type of ordnance
Civilian
casualties
A 16 March Red Sea Migrant boat Small arms ammunition 42 dead
34 injured
B 25 Aug. Sana’a Residential building High explosive aircraft bomb 16 dead
17 injured
C 2 Sept. Hajjah Residential building High explosive aircraft bomb 3 dead
13 injured
D 1 Nov. Sa‘dah Night market High explosive aircraft bomb fitted with
“Paveway” guidance unit
31 dead
26 injured
E 9 June Sana’a Residential building Mark 82 or 84 high explosive aircraft
bomb with “Paveway” guidance unit
4 dead
8 injured
F 4 Aug. Sa‘dah Residential building Mark 84 high explosive aircraft bomb 9 dead
3 injured
G 23 Aug. Arhab Motel Mark 82 or 84 high explosive aircraft
bomb with “Paveway” guidance unit
33 dead
25 injured
H 16 Sept. Ma’rib Vehicle High explosive aircraft bomb or air-toground
missile
12 dead
I 10 Nov. Sa‘dah Residential building Mark 82 or 84 high explosive aircraft
bomb with “Paveway” guidance unit
4 dead
4 injured
J 14 Nov. Ta‘izz Government forces Mark 82 or 84 high explosive aircraft
bomb with “Paveway” guidance unit
3 dead
5 injured
161. In the 10 incidents investigated the Panel finds that:
(a) The use of precision-guided weapons is a strong indicator that the intended
targets were those affected by the air strikes;
(b) In all cases investigated, there was no evidence that the civilians in, or near this
infrastructure, who are prima facie immune from attack, had lost their civilian protection;
(c) Even if in some of the cases listed in table 5, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition
had targeted legitimate military objectives, the Panel finds that it is highly unlikely
175 These and other incidents referred to in this section were selected because the available evidence
met the standards set out in annex 1, appendix B.
Annex 61
that the principles of international humanitarian law of proportionality and
precautions in attack were respected;
(d) The cumulative effect on civilians and the civilian infrastructure
demonstrates that even if precautionary measures were taken, they were largely
inadequate and ineffective.
162. On the individual case studies, the Panel finds that:
(a) Except for incident A, the only military entity capable of carrying out these
airstrikes was the Saudi Arabia-led coalition. In incident A, it is highly unlikely that
an entity other than a member State in the Saudi Arabia-led coalition could have
carried out the attack;
(b) Except for incidents B and D, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition has not
acknowledged its involvement in any of the attacks, nor clarified, in the public
domain, the military objective it sought to achieve. In incidents B and D, the Panel is
unable to concur with the justifications provided by the Saudi Arabia -led coalition
(see annex 58);176
(c) Measures taken by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in its targeting process
to minimize child casualties, if any, remain largely ineffective,177 especially when it
continues to target residential buildings.
163. The Panel requested information throughout 2017 from the Saudi Arabia -led
coalition in reference to the rationale that the coalition had applied in order to justify
the collateral damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure identified by the Panel.
The response received contained no verifiable information. In the case of the air
strikes listed in table 5, the Panel’s independent investigations could not find any
evidence of the presence of high value targets that would justify the collateral damage
at these target sites. In another incident, in which the Saudi Arabia -led coalition
admitted to killing a high value target in a strike on an alleged training camp, which
then turned out to be a school, the Joint Incident Assessment Team later denied that a
strike by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition had taken place (see annex 59).
164. The Panel also identified two cases (see table 6) where the Joint Incident
Assessment Team found that the Saudi Arabia-led coalition did not conduct strikes,
but the Panel’s independent investigations found clear evidence of air strikes. The
Panel thus concluded that the only entity capable of carrying out these two attacks
was the Saudi Arabia-led coalition (details are provided in annex 60).
Table 6
Findings of the Joint Incident Assessment Team and conclusions of the Panel
Date Incident Joint Incident Assessment Team Panel conclusions
9 Aug. 2016 Sana’a food
factory
Saudi Arabia-led coalition did not
carry out an air strike on the location
High explosive aircraft bomb used
Saudi Arabia-led coalition is
responsible
24 Sept. 2016 Ibb residential
complex
Saudi Arabia-led coalition did not
carry out an air strike on the location
Mark 82 high explosive aircraft bomb
with “Paveway” guidance unit used
Saudi Arabia-led coalition is
responsible
176 Statement of the official spokesman of the official Saudi Arabia-led coalition.
177 See S/2017/821, para. 200, for information on measures reportedly taken by the Saudi Arabia -led
coalition to reduce child casualties.
Annex 61
165. Those individuals responsible for planning, authorizing and/or executing air
strikes that disproportionately affect civilians and civilian infrastructure are likely to
fall under the designation criteria contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution
2140 (2014). The Panel continues to investigate this issue.
2. Ground operations: detentions by the United Arab Emirates
166. In 2017, the Panel investigated 12 instances of individuals deprived of their
liberty being held in detention facilities at the United Arab Emirates base in Burayqah,
at Al Rayyan airport and in the port of Balhaf (see confidential annex 61 and
annex 62). The Panel finds that:
(a) The forces of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen detained individuals in
least three places of detention in Yemen, which were administered and supervised
exclusively by the United Arab Emirates;
(b) The Government of Yemen had no authority over individuals detained in
the bases administered by the United Arab Emirates;
(c) The forces of the United Arab Emirates engaged in, or supervised, joint
arrest operations with the Hadrami and Shabwani Elite Forces;
(d) The forces of the United Arab Emirates have engaged with Yemeni
security forces in regular detainee transfers;
(e) The forces of the United Arab Emirates were responsible for: (i) torture
(including beatings, electrocution, constrained suspension and imprisonment in a
metal cell (‘the cage’) in the sun); (ii) ill treatment; (iii) denial of timely medical
treatment; (iv) denial of due process rights; and (v) enforced disappearance of
detainees, in violation of international humanitarian law and inter national human
rights law.178
167. The Panel estimates that the total number of detainees179 in the custody of the
forces of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen, as at 1 November 2017, was over 200.
168. The Panel requested, but did not receive, either from the United Arab Emirates
or Yemen, the relevant legal authority under which the United Arab Emirates, as a
foreign force, was authorized to engage in the arrest and the deprivation of liberty of
individuals in Yemen. Instead, the representatives of the United Arab Emirates denied
that the country supervises or administers detention facilities in Yemen. 180
169. The widespread and systematic nature of the arbitrary arrest, deprivation of
liberty and enforced disappearance of individuals by the United Arab Emirates in
Yemen demonstrates a pattern of behaviour that is clearly inconsistent with the
country’s obligations under international humanitarian law and international human
rights law. At the same time, the continued denial of the role of the United Arab
Emirates in arbitrary arrests and detentions contributes to violations occurring with
impunity by both United Arab Emirates forces and its Yemeni proxies. This denial
offers them protection and the ability to operate without any foreseeable consequences.
170. For the United Arab Emirates, working with Government of Yemen security
forces provides plausible deniability for violations,181 while also providing a veneer
178 A legal assessment of the situation is given in annex 62. Information provided by detainees was
verified through medical reports, testimonies of other detainees and their families and/or satellite
imagery, in accordance with Panel methodology.
179 The term detainees in this report refers to individuals deprived of their liberty, including
internees.
180 Letter from the United Arab Emirates to the Panel dated 8 November 2017.
181 Ibid.
Annex 61
of legitimacy and authority for the arbitrary arrests and consequent detentions
undertaken on their behalf.
171. Both Governments refuse to conduct credible investigations into such abuses or
to act against the perpetrators. The United Arab Emirates is in Yemen with the consent
of the legitimate Government, which has full authority to revoke, limit or to clarify
the boundaries of its consent, in order to further the compliance of the forces of the
United Arab Emirates with international humanitarian and international human rights
law. The Government of Yemen has also failed to assert effective command a nd
control over its own forces in this regard (see para. 54 above).
172. The Panel finds that those responsible for detention-related abuses in Yemen fall
within the designation criteria under paragraph 17 and/or paragraph 18 of resolution
2140 (2014).
B. Houthi and Saleh forces: violations associated with the deprivation
of liberty
173. The Panel investigated 16 cases of arbitrary arrest and the deprivation of liberty and
other violations of international humanitarian law and human rights norms committed by
Houthi-Saleh forces. Eleven individuals were identified who either committed or held
command responsibility for the violations. 182 These violations were committed by
officials of the Sana’a-based political security organization (3), the Sana’a-based
national security bureau (3) and other Houthi authorities (10). In the national security
bureau, Motlaq Amer al-Marrani (also known as Abu Emad), deputy head of the national
security bureau, was involved in all violations investigated by the Panel.
174. These violations by the members of the Sana’a-based political security
organization and the Sana’a-based national security bureau and by other Houthi
authorities involved: arbitrary arrest and deprivation of liberty; torture, (including of
a child); denial of timely medical assistance; prolonged enforced disappearances; lack
of due process; and three deaths in custody.
175. During the course of the past year, the Panel has observed that some individuals
within the detaining authorities are now profiting from detentions. The Panel
identified the release of one detainee after his family paid 1,000,000 rials ($4,000) to
officials of the Sana’a-based political security organization.
176. The Panel investigated the detention of individuals in the Dhammar Community
College, an informal place of detention.183 One of the major reasons for the continued
detention of individuals in this prison is the inability of the leaders of the Houthi -
Saleh forces and the leaders of the “resistance” forces to agree on a local prisoner
exchange. Some detainees were informed that they would be released either: (a) upon
payment of a ransom; or (b) during an exchange. Any detention of civilians, solely as
leverage for future prisoner exchanges, is hostage taking, which is prohibited under
international humanitarian law.184
Violations by Houthi authorities after 1 December 2017
177. The Panel initiated investigations into the arbitrary arrest, deprivation of liberty
and extrajudicial execution of affiliates of the General People’s Congress, including
182 A legal assessment is provided in confidential annex 63.
183 The total number of detainees in the facility vary from 25 to 100.
184 Customary international humanitarian law rule 96 on hostage-taking (see https://ihldatabases.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule96). Under the terms of international
humanitarian law, civilians are to be detained only if they pose an imminent security threat and
then, only for as long as that threat is existent.
Annex 61
incitement of violence against them. A significant deprivation of liberty took place on
2 December 2017 when 41 local journalists were arbitrarily detained. 185
C. Indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance against civilian
populated areas
178. The Panel investigated 10 incidents of the indiscriminate use of explosive
ordnance in densely populated areas such as Ta‘izz, which, together, resulted in
23 civilian deaths (see table 7). The Panel finds that in these cases, there was almost
certainly an indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance. Detailed case studies of three
of the incidents, which include assessments of compliance with international
humanitarian law, are provided in annex 64. The responsibility for all case studies,
except for case study C in table 7, is attributed to the Houthi-Saleh forces.186
Table 7
Summary of the indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in civilian populated
areas: 2017
Date Location
Incident and
target Type of explosive ordnance
Civilian
casualties
Appendix to
annex 64
18 Jan. Nur, Ta‘izz Residential
area
120 mm high explosive
mortar bomb
9 dead
8 injured
E
21 May Jahmila, Ta‘izz Residential
area
High explosive ordnance
(to be confirmed)
2 dead F
21 May Thabat, Ta‘izz Residential
area
High explosive ordnance
(to be confirmed)
3 dead
3 injured
G
21 May Humayrah, Ta‘izz Commercial
area
High explosive ordnance
(to be confirmed)
2 dead
5 injured
H
29 May Nur, Ta‘izz Residential
area
120mm high explosive
mortar bomb
1 dead
7 injured
A
30 June Jumhuri, Ta‘izz Residential
area
106 mm recoilless rifle 1 dead
9 injured
I
6 Sept. Rawdah, Ma’rib Residential
area
120mm high explosive
mortar bomb
3 injured B
21 Sept. Sinah, Tai‘zz Residential
area
Rocket-propelled
grenade-7 variant
0 J
2 Nov. Onsowa, Ta‘izz Residential
area
120mm high explosive
mortar bomb
5 dead D
11 Nov. Riyadh Civilian
airport
Short-range ballistic
missile
0 C
185 See https://rsf.org/en/news/houthis-holding-41-journalists-hostage-inside-y….
186 In the 2 November 2017 mortar attack, technical analysis demonstrates that the mortar base plate
was in an area under the control of Abu al-Abbas.
Annex 61
179. The indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance against civilian locations in
Yemen and Saudi Arabia committed by the Houthi-Saleh forces falls within
paragraph 17 and/or paragraph 18 of resolution 2140 (2014). The Panel finds that the
continued use of such weapons could not happen unless sanctioned as a policy by the
high-level Houthi leadership, including Abdulmalik al-Houthi personally.
D. Violations by the Government of Yemen
180. The Panel investigated violations of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law relating to arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced
disappearance, torture, ill-treatment and denial of timely medical assistance for
21 individuals. These individuals were in the custody of or in locations controlle d by
the Security Belt Forces in Aden and Lahij; the Special Forces in Ma’rib; the Hadrami
and Shabwani Elite Forces; Major General Shallal Ali Shaye;187 Brigadier General Ali
Abdullah Taher; 188 Ghassan al-Aqrabi; 189 Colonel Abu Mohammad Abdul Ghani
Shaalan;190 and Imam al-Nubi.191 Further information on such violations is provided
in annex 65 and confidential annex 66. Nine deaths also occurred in custody,
including that of three children.
181. Some officials maintained extrajudicial detention sites. In Aden, this included a
house under the control of Major General Shallal Ali Shaye in At -Tawahi, formerly
the Waddah nightclub. Bir Ahmed I was an extrajudicial detention site administered
by Ghassan al Aqrabi, who is affiliated with the Security Belt Forces and United Arab
Emirates forces. On 12 November 2017, the United Arab Emirates moved detainees
to Bir Ahmed II. On 13 November 2017, the Attorney General of Yemen received the
case files of the detainees. In early December 2017, following his intervention, some
detainees had family visits in Bir Ahmed II and some were released.
182. Also in November 2017, 133 detainees were reportedly transferred from
Al Rayyan airport to Mukalla Central Prison, 192 although there is inadequate
information to conclude that all detainees who were in Al Rayyan were transferred,
as some families still have not been able to gain access to their relatives who were
detained in Al Rayyan.
187 Director of General Security, Aden. The detention-related abuses investigated occurred at a house
in At-Tawahi under his control.
188 Former Security Director, Ma’rib (see https://yemensaeed.net/news.php?id=61163).
189 Supervisor of Bir Ahmed I and II.
190 Special Forces Commander, Ma’rib. Colonel Shallan was present and in control of his troops
when a child was killed.
191 Former Commander of Camp 20, Aden.
192 See http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-bc-ml--yemen-prisoners-20171113-story….
Annex 61
Figure XVII
Bir Ahmed I and Bir Ahmed II
E. Attacks inside hospitals
183. The Panel investigated two incidents, in which two seriously ill patients were
assassinated inside the Revolution Hospital on 24 March 2017 and 13 December 2017
(see confidential annex 67).
184. In Sana’a, following the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Panel is investigating
incidents in which injured persons were killed inside hospitals. Wounded, sick and
out of action personnel are protected under international humanitarian law. 193
F. Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict
185. The Panel investigated individuals and networks operating in Yemen that engage
in child recruitment. The Panel has identified two individuals who recruited a total of
five children on behalf of Houthi forces (see annex 68 and confidential annex 69).
The Panel finds, based on their analysis over the past year, that these cases are
representative of a much larger problem.
193 See common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and article 7(1) of the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non -International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).
Annex 61
186. The Panel finds that the following also contributes to the increase in the
recruitment of children:
(a) The non-payment of salaries results in children being compelled to search
for economic alternatives on behalf of their families: Houthi-Saleh forces paid newly
recruited children approximately 15,000 to 20,000 rials per month ($60 to $80);
(b) The disruption to education means that children often have little to do, thus
making them vulnerable to street level recruitment;
(c) As families continue to live in areas controlled by the Houthi-Saleh forces,
they are afraid to speak out against such recruitment, thus allowing it to continue
unchallenged;
(d) For parents with financial means, the airport closure and visa restrictions
mean that they cannot send or take their children out of the country for their own
protection.
IX. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance
187. Pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015), the Panel continues to
investigate the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen or
access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Yemen.
A. Obstruction of deliveries of humanitarian assistance
188. The Saudi Arabia-led coalition continued to obstruct the entry of humanitarian
and commercial goods to Yemen by: (a) continuing the blockade on the Sana’a airport
to commercial flights (see annex 70); (b) imposing gradual restrictions on civilian
items entering Yemen through the Red Sea ports (see confidential annex 71) and
(c) through severe restrictions on the imports of commercial and humanitarian goods
from 6 to 23 November 2017. During the latter period, over 750,600 tons of
commercial and humanitarian goods were diverted from Yemen or their entry to the
country delayed.194
189. The imposition of more access restrictions on 6 November 2017 was another
attempt by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition to use paragraph 14 of resolution 2216
(2015) as justification for obstructing entry of commodities into Yemen that are
essentially civilian in nature Obstructing the entry into Yemen of many of the
commodities listed in confidential annex 71 is contrary to the spirit of resolution 2216
(2015).
190. The blockade is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool
and an instrument of war. The Houthi forces are also using the population as a pawn
when they escalate their strikes against Saudi Arabia, knowing full well the brunt of
reprisals will be felt by the civilian population. The Houthis are relying on public
condemnation of Saudi Arabia’s reprisals to offset any liability on their part for those
actions.
191. The continued non-reporting in 2017 by Member States of inspections
undertaken in their territory means that they are in non-compliance with paragraph 17
of resolution 2216 (2015). This undermines the monitoring responsibilities of the
Committee as envisaged in paragraph 17 of resolution 2216 (2015) and undermines
194 Information from UNVIM and LogCluster data.
Annex 61
the safeguards placed to ensure that the sanctions regime is not misused to achieve
unilateral objectives.
B. Obstruction to the distribution of humanitarian assistance
192. In 2017, Houthi-Saleh forces continued to obstruct the distribution of
humanitarian assistance and prevented humanitarian access.195 The Panel investigated
obstructions, which included: (a) aid diversion; (b) delays or refusals that affect
timely distribution; (c) arrests, detentions, intimidation and torture of humanitarian
staff and confiscation of equipment; (d) interference in the selection of beneficiaries,
areas of operation and implementing partners; (e) declaration of areas as military
zones, making them inaccessible to humanitarians; (f) extortion and demands for
payment under threats of violence; (g) obstruction of the delivery of cholera response
material; (h) issues relating to customs clearance; and (i) delays in clearing the
importation of medicine from Sana’a International Airport. These obstacles are
compounded by the non-payment of public sector salaries and visa restrictions for
humanitarian workers.
193. The Panel also investigated obstructions to humanitarian access by the executive
unit (in Ta‘izz, Hajjah and Hudaydah), the Sana’a-based ministries of education and
health, and the Sana’a-based national security bureau. Some of these actors are
militarizing the distribution of aid. The Panel finds that Motlaq Amer al-Marrani (also
known as Abu Emad), the deputy head of the Sana’a-based national security bureau
was also responsible for the arbitrary arrest, detention and ill treatment of
humanitarian workers and other authorities working on humanitarian assistance. He
has also unduly used his authority and influence over humanitarian access as a
leverage to generate profit.
194. At the request of humanitarian stakeholders, the confidential information and
analysis relating to this section is provided in confidential annex 72.
X. Recommendations
195. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:
(a) Consider including in its resolution or presidential statement a call on the
member States of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition not to misuse resolution 2216 (2015)
as a justification to obstruct the delivery of essential goods and huma nitarian aid by
air or sea;
(b) As a confidence-building measure, consider authorizing the deployment
of a neutral naval vessel to the sea approaches and entrance of Hudaydah port, under
the auspices of UNVIM, thus increasing discharge rates and ensuring a neutral
inspection and monitoring presence during commercial vessel discharges in Houthi -
controlled territory;
(c) Consider including in its resolution language specifying that the
components used for the manufacture of military equipment may fall within the scope
of the targeted arms embargo;
(d) Consider commissioning an ad hoc report from the Committee, with
assistance from its Panel of Experts, and working with other relevant United Nations
bodies, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and in consultation with
international and regional organizations and entities, to examine the use and impact
195 United Nations, international and national non-governmental organization sources.
Annex 61
of commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles in conflict zones for military
purposes, and to make recommendations on appropriate counter-measures to their
transfer and use.
196. The Panel recommends that the Committee:
(a) Consider engaging with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 196
with a view to recommending that it liaise with the industry shipping group
responsible for the publication Best Management Practices for Protection against
Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4) to ensure that the protection measures set out in the
publication are still appropriate for addressing the new threats that have emerged in
the Red Sea area;
(b) Consider engaging with the Combined Maritime Forces to encourage them
to cooperate with the Panel in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 2117 (2013)
and paragraph 8 of resolution 2342 (2017), and to respond to Panel’s requests for
information;
(c) Consider reminding Member Sates of their obligation under paragraph 11
of resolution 2140 (2014) to freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and
economic resources on their territories that are owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by individuals or entities acting on behalf or at their direction of listed
individuals, or by entities owned or controlled by them, in particular the United Arab
Emirates with regard to Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh and the assets he manages that are
identified herein and in the report of the Committee dated 31 January 2017
(S/2017/81);
(d) Consider engaging with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, encouraging it to issue a communiqué informing international
auctioneers and museums that the export and sale of Yemeni artefacts is illegal and
that measures should be taken to ensure that funding raised from transactions relating
to Yemen’s cultural heritage will not be used to finance armed groups;
(e) Consider encouraging the Government of Yemen to establish mechanisms
with international financial institutions and the Saudi Arabia-led coalition to allow
those Yemeni banks with effective anti-money-laundering measures to transfer hard
currency outside of Yemen in order to raise the letters of credits necessary to support
imports;
(f) Consider engaging with the Office of the Secretary-General to examine
the development and institution, within UNVIM, of a complaints mechanism for
shippers and freight forwarders, to be made available through the UNVIM website.
196 See http://www.imo.org.
Annex 61
United Nations S/2017/515
Security Council Distr.: General
20 June 2017
Original: English
17-09630 (E) 270617
*1709630*
Third report of the Secretary-General on the implementation
of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
I. Introduction
1. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council, in its resolution 2231 (2015), endorsed
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action concluded by China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
United States of America, the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2. At the start of my tenure as Secretary-General, I am encouraged by the
continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I hope that
ongoing commitments to the Plan can provide an example of the benefits of
diplomacy, which leads to the reduction of tensions among States. I encourage al l
States to act in accordance with and support this historic agreement, and avoid
provocative actions and speech.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to verify and
monitor the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related
commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On 15 January 2017,
IAEA announced that it had verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had removed,
within one year from Implementation Day, as required by the Plan, all excess
centrifuges and infrastructure from the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and
transferred them to storage at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant under IAEA
continuous monitoring.
4. In March and June 2017, the Agency issued quarterly reports on its
verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution
2231 (2015) (S/2017/234 and S/2017/502). The Agency reported that it has been
verifying and monitoring the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its
nuclear-related commitments since Implementation Day and that the Islamic
Republic of Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its
Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and the transparency measures
contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Agency also reported that
it continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its
evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for
the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing.
5. I welcome the recent recommitment by the participants in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, in Vienna on 25 April 2017, to the full and effective
implementation of the Plan. I call upon them to continue to work together in good
faith and reciprocity to ensure that all participants benefit from the Plan. In
Annex 62
S/2017/515
2/9 17-09630
resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called upon all Member States,
regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may
be appropriate to support the implementation of the Plan. It is in the interest of the
international community, writ large, that this achievement of multilateral diplomacy
endures transitions and implementation challenges, cementing our collective
commitment to diplomacy and dialogue.
6. The present report, the third on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015),
provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings
and recommendations, since the second report of the Secretary-General, issued on
30 December 2016 (S/2016/1136). Consistent with the first and second reports, the
focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution
2231 (2015), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers,
ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic
Republic of Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.
II. Key findings and recommendations
7. Since 16 January 2016, my predecessor and I have not received any report on
the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear or dual -
use items, materials, equipment, goods or technology undertaken contrary to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
8. Since 30 December 2016, 10 additional proposals to participate in or permit
activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian end
uses were submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement
channel. Five of the proposals have been approved by the Council.
9. On 29 January 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a Khorramshahr
medium-range ballistic missile. As in the case of the ballistic missile launches by
the Islamic Republic of Iran in March 2016 (see S/2016/649, paras. 17-22), there
was no consensus in the Security Council on how this particular launch related to
resolution 2231 (2015). I call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to avoid such
ballistic missile launches, which have the potential to increase tensions. I appeal to
all Member States to redouble their efforts to promote peace and stability in the
region.
10. The Secretariat has examined the weapons and analysed the information
related to the arms shipment seized by the French frigate Provence in the northern
Indian Ocean in March 2016 (see S/2016/1136, para. 27). On the basis of the
information analysed, the Secretariat is confident that the weapons seized are of
Iranian origin and were shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
11. Iranian entities, including the Defence Industries Organisation, which is on the
list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), once again participated in the
International Defence Exhibition in Iraq. The present report also provides
information on additional travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. I reiterate my
call upon all Member States to fully implement their obligations in relation to
resolution 2231 (2015), including those regarding the travel ban and asset freeze of
individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
12. In resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment of
a dedicated procurement channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to
review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual -
Annex 62
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use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Through this channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from
the Joint Commission established under the Plan regarding proposals by States to
participate in or permit activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015).
13. Since 30 December 2016, 10 new proposals to participate in or permit the
activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were
submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 16 the total number of proposals
submitted since Implementation Day for approval through the procurement channel.
At the time of reporting, 10 proposals were approved by the Council, two were
withdrawn by the proposing States and four are currently under review by the Joint
Commission.
14. In addition, the Security Council received six new notifications pursuant to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related
activities that do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security
Council or to both the Security Council and the Joint Commission.
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran
15. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council
called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to
ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches using such ballistic missile technology.
16. On 1 February 2017, the Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran
confirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had flight-tested a ballistic missile,
while stressing that the launch did not contradict the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action or resolution 2231 (2015).1 In the same period, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that the Islamic Republic of Iran ’s
ballistic missiles “have not been designed to be capable of carrying a nuclear
weapons” and therefore were not in violation of resolution 2231 (2015).2
17. On 7 February 2017, I received a joint letter from France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States on the launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a
Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missile on 29 January 2017. Those States
underscored that the phrase “ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering
nuclear weapons” in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) included all
Missile Technology Control Regime Category I systems, defined as those capable of
delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, which are
inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. Those States considered that since the Khorramshahr is designed to be
capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, the launch of
the missile constituted an “activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be
capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and “[a] launch using such ballistic missile
technology”, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has been called upon not to
undertake pursuant to paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In the
letter it was also stated that the launch was destabilizing and provocative and that it
had been conducted in defiance of resolution 2231 (2015).
__________________
1 Fars News Agency, “Iran Confirms Missile Test”, 1 February 2017.
2 Mehr News Agency, “Iran not to hesitate in reinforcing defense capabilities”, 31 January 2017.
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18. In identical letters dated 10 February 2017 addressed to me and the President
of the Security Council (S/2017/123), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the
United Nations expressed Israel’s strong condemnation of the ballistic missile test
conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 29 January 2017. He indicated that the
Khorramshahr medium-range missile had travelled a distance of 1,000 km. He also
stated that the Khorramshahr is a Missile Technology Control Regime Category I
missile “capable of delivering a nuclear payload of 500 kilograms for a range of
over 300 kilometres”. He concluded that the test constituted “yet another flagrant
violation” of resolution 2231 (2015) and that “the development of surface-to-surface
missiles with nuclear warhead capability reveals the true intentions of Iran not to
comply with resolution 2231 (2015)”.
19. In a letter dated 9 March 2017 addressed to the President of the Security
Council (S/2017/205), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the United Nations stated that the above-mentioned letter from the Permanent
Representative of Israel was “replete with baseless speculations about the name,
range, performance and technical characteristics of a missile”. He also stated that
“Iran’s indigenous missiles are an indivisible part of its conventional deterrence and
defensive capabilities” and underlined that “no universal norm, treaty or agreement
bans or limits the development and testing of missiles equipped with conventional
capabilities for self-defence requirements”. He further stated that “nothing in
Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) prohibits Iran’s conventional missile
activities” and concluded that “in this context, any demand for the cessation of
Iran’s legitimate and conventional defence activities is groundless and
unwarranted”.
20. The Security Council discussed the Iranian ballistic missile launch on
31 January and 2 March 2017. There was no consensus among Council members on
how that particular launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). The third six-month
report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231
(2015) provides the details of Council deliberations on this issue.3
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
21. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), provided that
they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case
basis, all States may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from
the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology,4 the provision of various services or assistance,
and the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain
commercial ballistic missile-related activities. At the time of reporting, no proposal
had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.
22. In his identical letters dated 10 February 2017, the Permanent Representative
of Israel stated that the Khorramshahr missile originated from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, which had also conducted several tests of the same
kind of missile in 2016. He added that “this serves as additional proof of the
cooperation between Iran and DPRK on the development and transfer o f surface-tosurface
missile technologies”. In his letter dated 9 March 2017, the Permanent
__________________
3 Document symbol not yet assigned.
4 The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile
Technology Control Regime list (S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment, goods
and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems.
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Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the aforementioned letter
from the Permanent Representative of Israel contained “misleading information, lies
and allegations”.
23. In a letter dated 7 June 2017, the United States brought to the attention of the
Secretariat information on a shipment of ballistic missile-related items that, in its
assessment, was undertaken contrary to resolution 2231 (2015). The letter stated
that “in October 2016, an Iranian firm that supports the ballistic missile program
received a consignment of controlled carbon fiber”. The letter concluded that
“because this shipment did not receive advance, case-by-case approval as specified
in Annex B of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), this export to Iran’s
ballistic missile program was a violation of that resolution”.
24. The Secretariat has not been able to independently corroborate these reports. I
will provide a further update on these issues should additional information become
available to the Secretariat.
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
A. Restrictions on arms-related transfers to the Islamic Republic
of Iran
25. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States,
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a
case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the
Islamic Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, largecalibre
artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts. Prior approval from
the Council is also required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of
technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or
assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of
those arms and related materiel.
26. On 20 January 2017, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine announced the
discovery of 17 boxes containing missile system components and aircraft parts
without accompanying documents in a cargo plane in Kyiv bound for the Islamic
Republic of Iran. In its interactions with the Secretariat, the Permanent Mission of
Ukraine to the United Nations confirmed that competent Ukrainian authorities had
prevented an unauthorized shipment of suspected military items on 19 January
2017, including possible component parts of the “Fagot” anti-tank missile system,
had initiated criminal proceedings on 30 January 2017 and were in the process of
determining whether the confiscated items were covered by paragraph 5 of annex B
to resolution 2231 (2015). On 13 June 2017, during consultations in Kyiv, Ukrainian
authorities shared additional information on the unauthorized shipment with the
Secretariat, including on the status of the judicial proceedings and classification
process of the confiscated items. I intend to report to the Security Council in due
course as additional information becomes available.
27. In a letter dated 1 June 2017, the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the
United Nations confirmed to the Secretariat that on 27 April 2017, in the port of
Zonguldak, Turkish authorities confiscated component parts of 9K111 Fagot and
9K113 Konkurs anti-tank guided missiles concealed in a truck that was transiting
from Ukraine to the Islamic Republic of Iran on board a vessel named CENK Y.
According to Turkish authorities, the Iranian truck driver stated that he had obtained
the items from another Iranian citizen in Kyiv, to be transported to the Islamic
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Republic of Iran. A criminal investigation has been launched by the Office of the
Prosecutor of Zonguldak Province. On 9 June 2017, during consultations in Ankara,
Turkish authorities confirmed to the Secretariat that judicial proceedings were
ongoing. I will report to the Security Council accordingly as additional information
becomes available, including on whether the confiscated items are covered by
paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
28. With regard to the provision of services or assistance related to the
maintenance of arms and related materiel specified in paragraph 5 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015), open-source information indicated that services had been
provided to a warship5 of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the port of
Durban, South Africa, in late 2016.6 In a letter dated 16 May 2017, the Permanent
Representative of South Africa to the United Nations confirmed to the Secretariat
that “following a distress call from the Iranian vessel Bushehr, the vessel was
allowed to enter Durban port on 15 November 2016” and “departed on 22 January
2017 following emergency repairs on its hull”. He also indicated that “its
accompanying vessel, the Alvand, requested access to the Durban Port on
19 November 2016 to support the Bushehr and departed on 10 January 2017”. The
Permanent Representative stressed that “the assistance provided to the Bushehr
related to emergency repairs undertaken in accordance with South Africa ’s
international obligations to assist a vessel in distress and was not related to ‘the
supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related
materiel’ as provided for in paragraph 5 of Annex B of UN Security Council
resolution 2231 (2015)”.
B. Restrictions on arms-related transfers from the Islamic Republic
of Iran
29. In paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council
decided that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as
decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply,
sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the
time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that
paragraph.
30. In July 2016, France brought to the attention of my predecessor information on
the seizure of an arms shipment on board a stateless dhow on 20 March 2016 in the
northern Indian Ocean. In its assessment, the arms shipment had originated in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and was likely bound for Somalia or Yemen. In January
2017, France provided to the Secretariat additional information regarding the dhow,
including its course prior to its interception, documents found on board and the
identity of some of the crew members. The Secretariat notes that the dhow was
stopped by the frigate Provence at a point on the most direct and economical route
between its home port, Konarak, Islamic Republic of Iran, and its destination off the
coast of Somalia, as declared by the crew master, an Iranian individual.
__________________
5 Warships are defined in the Register of Conventional Arms as “vessels or submarines armed and
equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 500 metric tons or above, and those
with a standard displacement of less than 500 metric tons, equipped for launching missiles with a
range of at least 25 kilometres or torpedoes with similar range”. It is the understanding of the
Secretariat that the Iranian vessel involved had a displacement of more than 500 metric tons and
was armed and equipped for military use.
6 Jeremy Binnie, “Iranian navy flotilla stuck in South Africa”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 January
2017.
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31. In March 2017, French authorities granted full access to the Secretariat to
examine the assault rifles, sniper rifles, light machine guns and anti-tank missiles
seized. The Secretariat was able to independently ascertain that the 2,000 assault
rifles and 64 sniper rifles were in new condition. Although lacking country or
factory marking, the weapons corresponded to known features of Iranianmanufactured
weapons. The 2,000 assault rifles have characteristics identical to
Iranian-produced KLS-7.62 mm,7 an assault rifle type AK-47. The 64 sniper rifles
have characteristics identical to those of the Iranian-produced SVD sniper rifle.
Furthermore, the Secretariat confirmed with the foreign manufacturer of the optical
sights fitting the sniper rifles that they were produced as recently as 2015 and were
sold to an Iranian company.
32. My predecessor and I received several letters regarding the arms shipments
seized by Australia and the United States in early 2016, information that was
already provided to the Security Council in the first and second reports on the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). They include identical letters dated
15 May 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council from the
Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations (S/2017/427), as
well as a note verbale dated 27 October 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the
United Arab Emirates to the United Nations (A/71/581). The latter brought to the
attention of my predecessor a letter dated 18 October 2016 addressed to the
President of the General Assembly from the Permanent Representatives of Bahrain,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the United
Arab Emirates and Yemen (ibid., annex).
33. In a letter dated 18 February 2017 addressed to me, the Permanent
Representative of Yemen to the United Nations stated that “multiple reports of
similar interceptions documented the seizure of considerable quantities of weapons
and ammunition” that, in the assessment of Yemen, included “Iranian-made
anti-tank missiles, assault rifles, Dragunov sniper rifles, AK-47s, spare barrels,
mortar tubes, and hundreds of rocket-propelled grenades, and RBG launchers”. He
also stated that three disassembled spy drones found concealed in a truck at the
Yemen-Oman border on 12 December 2016 by Yemeni armed forces and a spy
drone belonging to the Houthis intercepted in-flight by coalition forces in the
Al-Mokha area on 28 January 2017 were a “clear manifestation of the involvement
of Iranians in providing the Houthis with weapons and expertise”. The Government
of Yemen was invited to provide detailed information, documents and images. I will
report thereon to the Council accordingly as additional information becomes
available.
34. In a letter dated 18 May 2017, the Permanent Representative of the United
Arab Emirates to the United Nations brought to the attention of the Secretariat
information regarding arms and related materiel seized or recovered by the armed
forces of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen since 16 January 2016 that, in the
assessment of the United Arab Emirates, were Iranian-made or sourced. This
included detailed information and images of anti-tank missiles and unmanned aerial
vehicles reportedly seized or recovered by the Presidential Guard forces of the
United Arab Emirates. The Secretariat is examining the information and will
provide an update to the Council, as appropriate, in due course.
35. In the second report of the Secretary-General, information was provided that
arms and related materiel are shipped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to
Hizbullah using commercial flights from the Islamic Republic of Iran, either
directly to Beirut or via Damascus (see S/2016/1136, para. 32). In a statement dated
24 November 2016, the Chair of Rafic Hariri International Airport strongly refuted
__________________
7 The KLS is the fixed stock version of the Iranian-produced KL-7.62 mm assault rifle.
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those allegations. In identical letters dated 25 January 2017 addressed to me and the
President of the Security Council (A/71/770-S/2017/80), the Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that the letter of the
Permanent Representative of Israel dated 21 November 2016 (S/2016/987)
contained fabrications and false claims and reiterated that his Government respects
its obligations pursuant to international resolutions.
36. Information released by the organizers of the sixth International Defence
Exhibition in Iraq, held in Baghdad from 5 to 7 March 2017, indicates that several
Iranian entities participated in the exhibition for the second year in a row. According
to press coverage of the event, items displayed by those entities appear to have
included small arms, artillery ammunition, rockets, anti-tank guided missiles and
man-portable air defence systems. The Secretariat again raised the issue with the
Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations. The Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations had previously stated that it believed
that no prior approval was required from the Security Council for that activity since
the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. I intend to
report thereon to the Council in due course as additional information becomes
available.
VI. Implementation of the asset freeze provisions
37. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all
States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the
individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015)8
and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available
to those individuals and entities.
38. It appears that an entity presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015), the Defence Industries Organisation, may have participated again in
the International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, which was held in March 2017 (see
para. 36 above). Its name is on the exhibitors list released by the organizers of the
exhibition and, according to images released by the Iraqi and Iranian media, its
official company logo appears on several visual displays next to exhibited items. All
of the entity’s funds, other financial assets and economic resources on Iraqi territory
on the date of adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or at any time
thereafter should have been frozen by the Iraqi authorities. The issue was raised
again with the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations. I intend to report
thereon to the Council in due course.
VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision
39. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are
to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their
territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231
__________________
8 Available from www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. The list maintained pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under Security
Council resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the
exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231
(2015), who were delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities,
and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined in
resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained
pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
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S/2017/515
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(2015). At the time of reporting, no travel exemption requests had been received or
granted by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.
40. Since the issuance of the second report of the Secretary-General, additional
information has surfaced regarding travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. New
pictures and video showing the General in the vicinity of Aleppo, Syrian Arab
Republic, in late December 2016 were reproduced in early January 2017. In February
2017, in an interview with an Iranian media outlet (Tasnim News Agency), the
President of Iraq, in response to a question about the presence of the General in Iraq,
reportedly stated that “the presence of General Qasem Soleimani is in the context of
the presence of foreign military advisors in Iraq”. He stressed that Iranian military
advisers, including the General, had a right to be present in Iraq, as did advisers from
other countries, to provide military advice in the fight against terrorism.
41. Furthermore, in early April 2017, Iranian and Arab media outlets (Fars News
Agency, Al-Masdar News) reproduced a picture allegedly showing Major General
Soleimani in the central province of Hama in the Syrian Arab Republic for a meeting
with officers of the Syrian Arab Army. A few days later, media from the Kurdish
region of Iraq (Rudaw Media Network) reported that Major General Soleimani had
visited Sulaymaniyah, in Iraqi Kurdistan. Several Iranian and Arab media outlets (Fars
News Agency, Al-Masdar News) also reported that the General had been
photographed with Iraqi popular mobilization forces in north-western Iraq on 29 May
2017. According to those reports, Major General Soleimani was present in the area as
part of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps advisory mission during an operation of
the popular mobilization forces along the Iraq-Syrian Arab Republic border crossing.
VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
42. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs
has continued to support the work of the Security Council and of its facilitator for
the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also continued to
liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters
related to the procurement channel.
43. The Division continued to promote publicly available information on the
restrictions imposed by resolution 2231 (2015) through the Security Council website.9
Relevant documents were regularly added in all official languages to the website. The
Division also continued to use outreach opportunities to promote information on the
resolution, in particular the procurement channel, in line with paragraph 6 (e) of the
note by the President of the Security Council dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). On
18 January 2017, the Division participated in an export control seminar organized by
the Awa Aussenwirtschafts-Akademie (Foreign Trade Academy) in Frankfurt,
Germany. On 12 June 2017, the Division also participated in a public awarenessraising
seminar related to the procurement channel organized by the Vienna Centre for
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, held in Vienna.
44. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from
Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the
provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the
submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.
__________________
9 www.un.org/en/sc/2231/.
Annex 62
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Iran test-fires medium-range ballistic missile,
US official says
Updated 10:35 AM ET, Fri July 26, 2019
By Barbara Starr, Nicole Gaouette and Veronica Stracqualursi, CNN
Washington (CNN) — Iran test-fired a medium-range ballistic missile late Wednesday that traveled 1,000 kilometers
from its southern launch point into northern Iran, according to a US ocial with direct knowledge of the event.
The launch of the Shahab-3 missile did not pose a threat to shipping or US bases, the ocial said, and remained
inside Iran for the duration of its flight. Nevertheless, it served as a signal to the US and Europe and could serve to
further increase tensions in the region.
The missile was launched from Iran's southeastern coastline along the Gulf of Oman and landed in northern Iran,
the ocial said.
While analysts said Iran's missile test might be destabilizing given the volatile situation in the Persian Gulf, it doesn't
violate any United Nations resolutions — which has been a source of frustration to critics of the Iran deal.
'Certainly destabilizing'
Trump: US is 'ready for the absolute worst' with Iran 01:54
LIVE TV
Annex 64
UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Iran nuclear deal, "called upon" Iran to refrain from
activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
"The missile test is inconsistent with the Security Council resolution, and certainly destabilizing, but not a violation,"
said Mary Kaszynski, deputy policy director of the Ploughshares Fund, an anti-nuclear foundation.
Kaszynski said that "unless the specific test is a significant technological advancement, this is really more about
political messaging and part of the cycle of escalation between the Iranian regime and the Trump administration."
Wednesday's test follows a pointed exchange between Iran and the US over missiles and may be meant to
underscore that Iran will not negotiate over its missile program.
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has said that Iran must
end missile testing as one of 12 conditions he has laid out for
an end to the maximum pressure campaign the Trump
administration implemented after it left the Iran nuclear deal in
May 2018.
Trump administration ocials have repeatedly criticized the
2015 Iran nuclear deal because it did not include Tehran's
missile program or what it calls Iran's malign activity in the
region. They say they want both included in a future
agreement.
The Obama administration and other parties to the deal --
France, the UK, Germany, the EU, Russia and China -- say that
it was necessary to focus the pact on nuclear activity in order
to reach an agreement, which took years to negotiate.
In a July 15 interview with NBC, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif that if the Trump administration wants to talk
about Iran's missiles, it should first "stop selling all these weapons, including missiles, to our region," possibly a
reference to arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Not negotiable
Speaking to reporters Tuesday at a White House Cabinet meeting the next day, Trump and Pompeo seemed to
interpret that as a new sign of Tehran's willingness to negotiate.
Trump said that in addition to his belief that Iran must not develop a nuclear weapon, "they can't be testing ballistic
missiles, which right now under that agreement [the 2015 Iran nuclear deal] ... they would be able to do."
But Iran has long said it won't negotiate over its ballistic missile program, which is controlled by Revolutionary
Guard Corps who report to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
After the Cabinet meeting and media reports suggesting Tehran might be willing to negotiate over its missile
program, Iran's spokesman at the UN, Alireza Miryousefi, made clear that Zarif was only making a hypothetical
point.
"Iran's missiles are absolutely and under no condition negotiable with anyone or any country, period," Miryousefi
tweeted.
Iran's Wednesday missile test comes amid a widening crisis
between Iran and Western powers, and friction between the
US and its allies over how to deal with Iran.
Last week, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps seized a
British tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most
Related Article: Iran releases footage of
captured tanker's crew
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Annex 64
vital shipping routes, saying Iran had been "violating
international regulations." The seizure was seen as retaliation
for the British navy impounding an Iranian tanker o Gibraltar
just days earlier.
In June, Iran shot down an American drone, claiming it was
intruding on its territory, throwing the two countries into a
military stando.
More recently, the US and Europe have been at odds over
plans to secure shipping in the Persian Gulf.
The US had been urging regional and international parties to
take part in Operation Sentinel, which Washington casts as an
eort to secure freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, the
Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, crucial waterways for
the passage of global oil supplies.
The UK has announced its Navy will accompany British ships where possible and that it will participate in a
European-led eort to provide security to shipping through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic
chokepoint controlled by Iran through which 20% of the world's oil supply passes.
CNN's Joshua Berlinger, Eliza Mackintosh and Nada Bashir contributed to this report.
Related Article: Saudi Arabia and Israel
are pushing US to confront Iran. Trump
shouldn't take the bait
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WORLD NEWS
OCTOBER 16, 2015 / 11:44 AM / 4 YEARS AGO
U.S. confirms Iran tested nuclear-capable ballistic missile
Louis Charbonneau
UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - The United States has confirmed that Iran tested a mediumrange
missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, in “clear violation” of a United Nations
Security Council ban on ballistic missile tests, a senior U.S. official said on Friday.
A new Iranian precision-guided ballistic missile is launched as it is tested at an undisclosed location October 11, 2015.
REUTERS/farsnews.com/Handout via Reuters
Annex 65
“The United States is deeply concerned about Iran’s recent ballistic missile launch,” the U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, said in a statement.
“After reviewing the available information, we canconfirm that Iran launched on Oct. 10 a
medium-range ballistic missile inherently capable of delivering a nuclear weapon,” she said.
“This was a clear violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929.”
The United States is preparing a report on the incident for the Security Council’s Iran
Sanctions Committee and will raise the matter directly with Security Council members “in the
coming days,” Power said.
Council diplomats have told Reuters it was possible to sanction additional Iranian individuals
or entities by adding them to an existing U.N. blacklist. However, they noted that Russia and
China, which have opposed the sanctions on Iran’s missile program, might block any such
moves.
“The Security Council prohibition on Iran’s ballistic missile activities, as well as the arms
embargo, remain in place,” Power said. “We will continue to press the Security Council for an
appropriate response to Iran’s disregard for its international obligations.”
Ballistic missile tests by Iran are banned under Security Council resolution 1929, which was
adopted in 2010 and remains valid until a nuclear deal between Tehran and six world powers
goes into effect. Under that deal, reached on July 14, most sanctions on Iran will be lifted in
exchange for curbs on its nuclear program.
The missile test is not a violation of the nuclear deal, which focuses on Iran’s atomic program,
U.S. officials have said. Speaking to reporters in Washington, President Barack Obama
acknowledged that the nuclear deal does not fully resolve all areas of dispute with Tehran.
“So we are going to have to continue to put pressure on them through the international
community,” he said.
Annex 65
Once the deal takes effect, Iran will still be “called upon” to refrain from undertaking any work
on ballistic missiles designed to deliver nuclear weapons for a period of up to eight years,
according to a Security Council resolution adopted in July.
Countries would be allowed to transfer missile technology and heavy weapons to Iran on a
case-by-case basis with council approval.
However, in July a U.S. official called this provision meaningless and said the United States
would veto any suggested transfer of ballistic missile technology to Iran.
On Sunday, the United States, the European Union and Iran are expected to announce a series
of measures to comply with the nuclear deal that will take effect once the U.N. International
Atomic Energy Agency confirms Iranian compliance with terms of the agreement.
Additional reporting by Roberta Rampton in Washington; Editing by Richard Chang and Leslie Adler
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Annex 65
Board of Governors GOV/2007/48
Date: 30 August 2007
Original: English
For official use only
Item 7(d) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2007/38)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 23 May 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/22). The report
was submitted in parallel to the Security Council pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1696
(2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007). This report covers developments regarding the implementation
in Iran of its NPT Safeguards Agreement since May 2007.
2. On 24 June 2007, the Director General met with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security
Council of Iran (SNSC). During that meeting, it was agreed that, within the following 60 days, a plan
should be developed on modalities for resolving the remaining safeguards implementation issues,
including the long outstanding issues (GOV/2007/22, para. 9). The modalities were discussed in
meetings, led by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards and the Deputy Secretary of the SNSC,
which took place on 11–12 July 2007 and 20–21 August 2007 in Tehran, and on 24 July 2007 in
Vienna. On 21 August 2007, a plan (hereinafter referred to as the “work plan”), which includes
understandings between the Secretariat and Iran on the modalities, procedures and timelines for
resolving these matters, was finalized. A copy of that work plan (issued also as INFCIRC/711,
27 August 2007) is attached hereto.
A. Enrichment Related Activities
3. Since May 2007, Iran has continued to test single centrifuge machines, the 10- and 20-machine
cascades and one 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Between 17 March
and 22 July 2007, Iran fed 14 kg of UF6 into the single machines; there was no feeding of nuclear
material into the cascades.
4. Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 690 kg of UF6 into the cascades at the Fuel
Enrichment Plant (FEP), which is well below the expected quantity for a facility of this design. While
Iran has stated that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at FEP, the highest enrichment
level measured from environmental samples taken so far by the Agency from cascade components and
related equipment is 3.7%. Detailed nuclear material accountancy, which is necessary to confirm the
Derestricted 12 September 2007
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 12 September 2007)
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actual enrichment level, will be carried out when the product and tails are withdrawn from the
cascades. As of 19 August 2007, twelve 164-machine cascades were operating simultaneously and
were being fed with UF6; one other cascade was operating without UF6; another cascade was being
vacuum tested; and two more were under construction.
5. Since 22 March 2007, the Agency has implemented safeguards at FEP through interim
inspections, design information verification, unannounced inspections and the use of containment and
surveillance measures (GOV/INF/2007/10). To date, four unannounced inspections have been carried
out at FEP.
6. The Agency provided Iran with a draft document detailing the safeguards approach for FEP and a
draft Facility Attachment on 24 and 26 July 2007, respectively. The documents were discussed during
a technical meeting in Tehran held on 6–8 August 2007. Further discussions will be held with the aim
of finalizing the Facility Attachment by the end of September 2007.
B. Reprocessing Activities
7. The Agency has been monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the MIX
Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 reactor) through inspections and design
information verification. There are no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those
facilities.
C. Heavy Water Related Projects
8. As agreed by Iran on 12 July 2007, the Agency conducted design information verification at the
IR-40 reactor on 30 July 2007, and noted that construction of the facility was ongoing. Satellite
imagery indicates that the operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant was also continuing.
D. Outstanding Issues
D.1. Plutonium Experiments
9. As agreed in the meeting of 11–12 July 2007, the Agency provided Iran in writing on
1 August 2007 with the remaining open questions regarding plutonium separation experiments carried
out by Iran at TRR (GOV/2007/8, paras 20–21). On 7 August 2007, during a technical meeting in
Tehran, Iran provided additional information on the neutron flux distribution for the reactor core and
reflector/moderator regions, details about earlier neutron flux measurements and information on the
irradiation conditions. Using this additional information, the Agency made revised estimates of the
Pu-240 abundance that could be expected from irradiation of the targets. The revised estimates derived
from this new information were not inconsistent with the Agency’s previous findings from samples
taken during its investigations. Taking all available information into account, the Agency has
concluded that Iran’s statements concerning these experiments are consistent with the Agency’s
findings with respect to the dates, and quantities and types of material involved in the experiments
(GOV/2006/53, paras 15–16). This issue is therefore considered resolved.
10. In the meeting on 7 August 2007, the presence and origin of high enriched uranium (HEU) particle
contamination found in samples taken from the spent fuel containers at the Karaj Waste Storage
Facility (GOV/2006/53, para. 17) was addressed. Iran has maintained that the reason for the
contamination was leaking TRR fuel assemblies, which had in the past been stored temporarily in
these containers. During the meeting, Iran presented a copy of a report describing its investigations
into the fuel leakage problem at TRR, in connection with which Agency technical support had been
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provided in the early 1990s. Based on this information, the Agency has concluded that the main
sources of irradiated HEU in the coolant system likely included both leaks from the fuel itself and
irradiated HEU contamination from the surface of the fuel cladding. It can be further estimated that the
natural uranium content in the cooling water of TRR was sufficient to dilute the level of enrichment of
the HEU particles to that found in the Agency’s samples taken from the containers at Karaj. Iran also
provided information on the burnup and the uranium mass for all fuel assemblies at the time of the
intermediate and final fuel discharges. The data indicate that several control fuel assemblies had in fact
leaked, and that the stated burnup matched that calculated for a majority of the HEU particles. The
Agency has concluded, therefore, that the statements of Iran are not inconsistent with the Agency’s
findings, and now considers this issue as resolved.
D.2. Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge Technology
11. In order to complete its investigation of the scope and nature of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment
programme, the Agency needs access to additional information (GOV/2006/27, paras 10–13). This
includes information related to the acquisition of P-1 technology in 1987, and P-1 and P-2 technology
in the mid-1990s, as well as appropriate supporting documentation and clarifications by relevant
individuals. The Agency is still waiting for, inter alia: a copy of a handwritten offer made to Iran by
the network in 1987; clarification of the dates and contents of shipments in the mid-1990s; and
information concerning the purchase of magnets suitable for P-2 centrifuges. Iran has, however,
undertaken, as part of the work plan, to provide, over the course of the next two months, answers to
written questions from the Agency, as well as clarifications and access to information, such as
supporting documentation, with a target date of November 2007 for resolving this issue.
D.3. Contamination
12. As indicated previously to the Board of Governors (GOV/2007/8, paras 16–17; GOV/2006/53,
para. 24), analysis of environmental samples taken in January 2006 from equipment purchased by a
former Head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) and located at a technical university in Tehran
showed a small number of particles of natural and high enriched uranium. The Agency has requested
clarifications, permission to take samples from other equipment and materials procured by the PHRC
and access to another former Head of the PHRC (GOV/2006/53, para. 25). These requests have not yet
been acceded to by Iran. However, as reflected in the work plan, Iran has undertaken to hold further
discussions on this matter, on the basis of written questions from the Agency, following resolution of
the P-1 and P-2 issue.
D.4. Uranium Metal Document
13. To understand the full scope of the offers made by the intermediaries that provided centrifuge
enrichment technology to Iran, the Agency has requested a copy of the 15-page document describing
the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched
and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres (GOV/2005/87, para. 6). As reflected in the work plan,
Iran has now agreed to cooperate in this regard.
D.5. Polonium-210
14. As indicated in the work plan, Iran has agreed to provide the Agency, two weeks after the issue of
the provision of a copy of the uranium metal document is resolved, with explanations in connection
with the remaining questions concerning Iran’s activities involving polonium extraction
(GOV/2004/83, paras 79–84).
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D.6. Gchine Mine
15. As indicated in the work plan, Iran has agreed to provide the Agency, two weeks after the issue on
polonium-210 is resolved, with the requested explanations concerning uranium mining and
concentration activities at the Gchine mine and mill (GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31).
E. Alleged Studies
16. In order to clarify certain aspects of the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, the Agency
has requested discussions with Iran about alleged studies related to the conversion of uranium dioxide
to UF4, to high explosive testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/15,
paras 38–40). To that end, the Agency has offered to provide Iran with access to the documentation it
has in its possession regarding such studies. As indicated in the work plan, while Iran considers the
allegations “as politically motivated and baseless”, it has undertaken to review the documentation and
to inform the Agency of its assessment thereof.
F. Other Implementation Issues
F.1. Uranium Conversion
17. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV)
of nuclear material at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) carried out in March 2007, and has
concluded that the physical inventory as declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the PIV,
within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with conversion plants of a similar
throughput.
18. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007 following the
PIV, approximately 63 t of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced as of 14 August 2007, all of
which remains under Agency containment and surveillance.
F.2. Design Information
19. As indicated in the Director General’s previous report (GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14), on
29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had “suspended” the implementation of the modified
text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, concerning the early provision of design
information. In a letter dated 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision
(GOV/INF/2007/8). There has been no progress on this issue.
F.3. Inspector Designation and Visas
20. On 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to the designation of five new Agency inspectors (GOV/2007/8,
para. 23), bringing the total number of inspectors designated for Iran to 219. Iran also agreed to
provide thirteen Agency inspectors with one year multiple entry visas.
F.4. Other Matters
21. On 25 July 2007, the Agency conducted a PIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant, at which time it
verified a small quantity of natural uranium oxide powder intended as feed material for preliminary
process testing. The installation of process equipment is at an advanced stage, but the facility is not yet
operational.
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G. Summary
22. The Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has been
providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear
material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and facilities. However, the
Agency remains unable to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme. It should be noted that since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of
information that Iran had previously been providing, including pursuant to the Additional Protocol, for
example information relevant to ongoing advanced centrifuge research.
23. The work plan is a significant step forward. If Iran finally addresses the long outstanding
verification issues, the Agency should be in a position to reconstruct the history of Iran’s nuclear
programme. Naturally, the key to successful implementation of the agreed work plan is Iran’s full and
active cooperation with the Agency, and its provision to the Agency of all relevant information and
access to all relevant documentation and individuals to enable the Agency to resolve all outstanding
issues. To this end, the Agency considers it essential that Iran adheres to the time line defined therein
and implements all the necessary safeguards and transparency measures, including the measures
provided for in the Additional Protocol.
24. Once Iran’s past nuclear programme has been clarified, Iran would need to continue to build
confidence about the scope and nature of its present and future nuclear programme. Confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide
assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally important, regarding the absence
of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, through the implementation of the Additional
Protocol. The Director General therefore again urges Iran to ratify and bring into force the Additional
Protocol at the earliest possible date, as requested by the Board of Governors and the Security Council.
25. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities, having continued with the operation of PFEP, and with the construction and operation of
FEP. Iran is also continuing with its construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the Heavy
Water Production Plant.
26. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Annex 66
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Attachment
Page 1
(Issued also as INFCIRC/711)
Understandings
of
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA
on
the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues
Tehran – 21 August 2007
Pursuant to the negotiations between H.E. Dr. Larijani, I. R. of Iran's Secretary of Supreme National
Security Council and H.E. Dr. ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, in Vienna; following the
initiative and good will of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the agreement made, a high ranking
delegation consisting of the directors of technical, legal and political departments of the IAEA, paid a
visit to Tehran from 11 to 12 July 2007 during which “Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran
and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues, Tehran 12 July 2007” were
prepared.
A second meeting took place in Vienna on 24 July 2007 followed by a further meeting in Iran from 20
to 21 August 2007. The Agency's delegation had the opportunity to have meetings with H.E. Dr.
Larijani during both visits to Tehran. Following these three consecutive meetings, both Parties reached
the following understandings:
I. Latest Developments:
Based on the modalities agreed upon on 12 July 2007, the following decisions were made:
1. Present Issues:
A. Enrichment Programme
The Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate in preparing the safeguards approach for the Natanz Fuel
Enrichment Plant in accordance with Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The draft text of
the safeguards approach paper, and the facility attachment of IRN- were provided to Iran on 23 July
2007. The safeguards approach and the facility attachment were discussed during technical meetings
in Iran between the Agency and the AEOI from 6 to 8 August 2007. Further discussions will be held
with the aim of finalizing the facility attachment by the end of September 2007.
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Attachment
Page 2
B. Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak
Iran agreed with the Agency's request to visit the heavy water research reactor (IR40) site in Arak. A
successful visit took place on 30 July 2007.
C. Designation of new inspectors
On 12 July 2007, Iran accepted the designation of five additional inspectors.
D. Issue of multiple entry visas
On 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to issue one year multiple entry visas for 14 inspectors and staff of the
Agency.
2. Past Outstanding Issues:
A. Plutonium Experiments
In order to conclude and close the file of the issue of plutonium (Pu), the Agency provided Iran with
the remaining questions on 23 July 2007. During a meeting in Iran between representatives of the
Agency and Iran, Iran provided clarifications to the Agency that helped to explain the remaining
questions. In addition, on 7 August 2007, Iran sent a letter to the Agency providing additional
clarifications to some of the questions. On 20 August 2007 the Agency stated that earlier statements
made by Iran are consistent with the Agency’s findings, and thus this matter is resolved. This will be
communicated officially by the Agency to Iran through a letter.
B. Issue of P1-P2:
Based on agreed modalities of 12 July 2007, Iran and the Agency agreed the following procedural
steps to resolve the P1-P2 issue. The proposed timeline assumes that the Agency announces the
closure of the Pu-experiments outstanding issue by 31 August 2007, and its subsequent reporting in
the Director General’s report to the September 2007 Board of Governors.
The Agency will provide all remaining questions on this issue by 31 August 2007. Iran and the
Agency will have discussions in Iran on 24-25 September 2007 to clarify the questions provided. This
will be followed up by a further meeting in mid-October 2007 to further clarify the written answers
provided. The Agency's target date for the closure of this issue is November 2007.
C. Source of Contamination
Based on the agreed modalities on 12 July 2007 and given the Agency's findings which tend, on
balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of the observed HEU contamination, the
Annex 66
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Attachment
Page 3
only remaining outstanding issue on contamination is the contamination found at a Technical
University in Tehran.
Iran and the Agency agreed on the following procedural steps to address this issue, starting once the
P1-P2 issue is concluded and the file is closed. The Agency will again provide Iran with the remaining
questions regarding the contamination found at a Technical University in Tehran by 15 September
2007. After 2 weeks of the closure of the P1-P2 issue Iran and the Agency will have discussions in
Iran on this issue.
D. U Metal Document
Upon the request of the Agency, Iran agreed to cooperate with the Agency in facilitating the
comparison of the relevant sections of the document. Iran is presently reviewing the proposals already
made during the first meeting on 12 July 2007. After taking this step by Iran, the Agency undertakes to
close this issue.
II. Modalities of Resolution of other Outstanding Issues
A. Po210
Based on agreed modalities of 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to deal with this issue, once all the above
mentioned issues are concluded and their files are closed. Iran and the Agency agreed upon the
following procedural steps: regarding this issue, the Agency will provide Iran in writing with all its
remaining questions by 15 September 2007.
After 2 weeks from conclusion and closure of the issues of the source of contamination and U-metal,
reflected in the Director General's report to the Board of Governors, Iran and the Agency will have
discussions in Iran where Iran will provide explanations on the Po210.
B. Ghachine Mine
Based on agreed modalities of 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to deal with this issue, once the issue of
Po210 is concluded and its file is closed. Iran and the Agency agreed upon the following procedural
steps: regarding this issue, the Agency will provide Iran in writing with all its remaining questions by
15 September 2007.
After 2 weeks from conclusion and closure of the issue of Po210, reflected in the Director General's
report to the Board of Governors, Iran and the Agency will have discussions in Iran where Iran will
provide explanations to the Agency about Ghachine Mine.
III. Alleged Studies
Iran reiterated that it considers the following alleged studies as politically motivated and baseless
allegations. The Agency will however provide Iran with access to the documentation it has in its
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Page 4
possession regarding: the Green Salt Project, the high explosive testing and the missile re-entry
vehicle.
As a sign of good will and cooperation with the Agency, upon receiving all related documents, Iran
will review and inform the Agency of its assessment.
IV. General Understandings
1. These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that there are no other
remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities.
2. The Agency agreed to provide Iran with all remaining questions according to the above work
plan. This means that after receiving the questions, no other questions are left. Iran will provide the
Agency with the required clarifications and information.
3. The Agency's delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further
promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the
exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities.
4. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the
enrichment facilities in Iran and has therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use.
5. The Agency and Iran agreed that after the implementation of the above work plan and the
agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran will
be conducted in a routine manner.
Annex 66
Board of Governors GOV/2008/4
Date: 22 February 2008
Original: English
For official use only
Item 5(c) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2008/6)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747
(2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 15 November 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/58). This
report covers the relevant developments since that date.
2. On 11 and 12 January 2008, the Director General met in Tehran with
H.E. Ayatollah A. Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran; H.E. Mr. M. Ahmadinejad, President of
Iran; H.E. Mr. G. Aghazadeh, Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran (AEOI); H.E. Mr. M. Mottaki, Foreign Minister; and H.E. Mr. S. Jalili, Secretary, Supreme
National Security Council of Iran. The purpose of the visit was to discuss ways and means of
implementing all relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security
Council as well as accelerating implementation of the work plan agreed between Iran and the
Secretariat on 21 August 2007 aimed at the clarification of outstanding safeguards implementation
issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment).
3. During the discussions, the Iranian leadership stated that the country’s nuclear programme had
always been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there had never been a nuclear weapons
development programme. The Iranian authorities agreed to accelerate implementation of the work
plan.
Atoms for Peace
Derestricted 5 March 2008
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 5 March 2008)
Annex 67
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A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues
A.1. Source of Contamination
4. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions relating to the source of the
uranium particle contamination found on some equipment at a technical university, the nature of the
equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment and the names and roles of individuals and entities
involved, including the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) (GOV/2007/58, para. 24). This equipment
was procured by the former head of PHRC, who had also been a professor at the university. He had
also procured, or attempted to procure, other equipment, such as balancing machines, mass
spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment, which could be useful in uranium
enrichment activities (GOV/2006/27, para. 25).
5. On 10–12 December 2007 and on 15–16 December 2007, meetings took place in Tehran
between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions and the
Agency requested additional clarifications regarding the intended purpose of the equipment, the
persons and entities who had requested the items, the recipients, and the use and locations, both past
and present, of the equipment. In a follow-up letter dated 18 December 2007, the Agency provided
Iran with further details regarding the equipment.
6. In a letter dated 3 January 2008, the Agency reminded Iran that Iran needed to provide
additional clarifications to allow a full assessment of the issue of the source of contamination and
procurement efforts.
7. In a letter dated 8 January 2008, Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in
its letter of 3 January 2008.
A.1.1. Use of Equipment and Source of Contamination
8. According to Iran, vacuum equipment was procured in 1990 on behalf of the technical
university by the former Head of PHRC because of his expertise in procurement and PHRC's business
connections. The equipment was intended to be used at the Physics Department of the technical
university for the coating of items such as optical mirrors, optical lasers, laser mirrors, resistive layers
for solar cells and mirrors for use in medical operating theatres.
9. Iran stated that, upon receipt of the equipment in 1991, it was noticed that the delivery was
incomplete and that some incorrect parts had been supplied. The equipment was therefore put into
storage at the university. Iran further stated that a number of letters of complaint were written to the
supplier company at intervals until 1994, but to no avail.
10. According to Iran, some individual pieces of equipment were used both inside and outside the
university during the period 1994–2003 in research, operation and maintenance activities involving
vacuum conditions, but other parts of the consignment were never used. As its explanation of how the
contamination had come about, Iran said that, in 1998, an individual who was testing used centrifuge
components from Pakistan at the laboratory at Vanak Square for the AEOI (GOV/2004/34, para. 31)
had asked the vacuum service of the university to come and repair a pump. Iran stated that some items
of the vacuum equipment mentioned above were used for this repair activity and that, when these
items were eventually brought back to the university, they spread uranium particle contamination.
11. To assess the information provided by Iran, the Agency spoke with the individual from the
Vanak Square laboratory and the vacuum technician from the university who had carried out the
repairs. The Agency was also shown the pump that had been repaired using the equipment concerned.
The Agency made a detailed analysis of the signatures of the contamination of the equipment and
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compared them with those of the swipe samples taken from the centrifuge components in Iran which
had originated in Pakistan. The Agency concluded that the explanation and supporting documentation
provided by Iran regarding the possible source of contamination by uranium particles at the university
were not inconsistent with the data currently available to the Agency. The Agency considers this
question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its
procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify this issue as part of its
verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
A.1.2. Procurement activities by the former Head of PHRC
12. According to Iran, none of the equipment purchased or enquired about by the former Head of
PHRC (see para. 4 above) was intended for use in uranium enrichment or conversion related activities,
whether for research and development (R&D) or for educational activities in these fields.
Procurements and procurement attempts by the former Head of PHRC were said by Iran to have also
been made on behalf of other entities of Iran, as described below.
13. Iran stated that the vacuum equipment purchased by the Head of PHRC had been intended for
educational purposes in the Vacuum Technique Laboratory of the university, specifically for use in
experiments by students on thin layer production using evaporation and vacuum techniques, coating
using vacuum systems and leak detection in vacuum systems. To support its statements, Iran presented
instruction manuals related to the various experiments, internal communications on the procurement of
the equipment and shipping documents. Agency inspectors visited the Vacuum Technique Laboratory
and confirmed the presence of the equipment there.
14. Iran stated that some magnets had also been purchased by the Head of the PHRC on behalf of
the Physics Department of the university for educational purposes in “Lenz-Faraday experiments”. To
support this statement, Iran presented a number of documents: instruction manuals related to the
experiments; requests for funding which indicated that a decision had been made to approach the Head
of PHRC to order and purchase the parts; and an invoice for cash sales from the supplier. Iran stated
that the magnets were discarded after being used.
15. According to Iran, the Head of PHRC attempted twice — once successfully — to buy a
balancing machine for the Mechanical Engineering Department of the university for educational
purposes, such as in the measurement of vibrations and forces in rotating components due to
unbalancing. To support Iran’s statement, the Agency was shown laboratory experiment procedures,
requests about procurement and a letter confirming the completion of the purchase. Agency inspectors
visited the Mechanical Engineering Department and confirmed the presence of the balancing machine
there.
16. According to Iran, the Head of PHRC also attempted to purchase 45 gas cylinders, each
containing 2.2 kg of fluorine, on behalf of the Office of Industrial Interrelations of the university. Iran
stated that the intended purpose of the fluorine had been to enhance the chemical stability of polymeric
vessels. To support its statements, Iran presented a request to buy fluorine and a communication
between the Head of PHRC and the President of the university about the proposed supplier’s refusal to
deliver the goods.
17. Iran stated that the AEOI had encountered difficulties with procurement because of international
sanctions imposed on the country, and that that was why the AEOI had requested the Dean of the
university to assist in the procurement of a UF6 mass spectrometer. According to Iran, in 1988, the
Dean of the university approached the Head of the Mechanics Workshop of the Shahid Hemmat
Industrial Group (SHIG), which belonged to the Ministry of Sepah, and asked him to handle the
procurement. According to Iran, the mass spectrometer was never delivered. The Head of the
Mechanics Workshop, who was later appointed Head of PHRC when it was established in 1989, is the
same person involved in the other procurement attempts mentioned above.
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18. The Agency took note of the information and supporting documents provided by Iran as well as
the statements made by the former Head of PHRC to the Agency and concluded that the replies were
not inconsistent with the stated use of the equipment. The role and activities of PHRC will be further
addressed in connection with the alleged studies as discussed below.
A.2. Uranium Metal Document
19. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy from Iran of the 15-page document
describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the machining of enriched
uranium metal into hemispheres, which are components of nuclear weapons. Iran reiterated that this
document had been received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987 and that it had not
been requested by Iran. The Agency is still waiting for a response from Pakistan on the circumstances
of the delivery of this document in order to understand the full scope and content of the offer made by
the network in 1987 (GOV/2006/15, paras 20–22).
A.3. Polonium-210
20. Polonium-210 is of interest to the Agency because it can be used not only for civilian
applications (such as radioisotope batteries), but also — in conjunction with beryllium — for military
purposes, such as neutron initiators in some designs of nuclear weapons. On 20–21 January 2008, a
meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided
answers to the questions raised by the Agency in its letter dated 15 September 2007 regarding
polonium-210 research (GOV/2007/58, para. 26). The Agency’s questions included a request to see
the original project documentation.
21. According to Iran, in the 1980s, scientists from the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC)
were asked to propose new research activities. A project called “Production of 210Po by the
irradiation of 209Bi in the TNRC reactor” was proposed and eventually approved by the Scientific
Advisory Committee of TNRC in 1988. The project consisted of fundamental research aimed at
enhancing knowledge about this process. According to Iran, it was not aimed at a specific immediate
application. However, a potential use in radioisotope batteries, if the chemical extraction of polonium-
210 proved successful, was mentioned in the initial proposal.
22. Iran reiterated that the project was not part of any larger R&D project, but had been a personal
initiative of the project leader. According to Iran, the chemist working on the project left the country
before full chemical processing had been performed, the project was aborted and the decayed samples
were discarded as waste (GOV/2004/11, para. 30).
23. To support its statements, Iran presented additional copies of papers and literature searches that
had formed the basis for the request for approval of the project. Iran also provided copies of the
project proposal, the meeting minutes and the approval document from the Scientific Advisory
Committee of TNRC, as well as a complete copy of the reactor logbook for the entire period that the
samples were present in the reactor.
24. Based on an examination of all information provided by Iran, the Agency concluded that the
explanations concerning the content and magnitude of the polonium-210 experiments were consistent
with the Agency’s findings and with other information available to it. The Agency considers this
question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its
procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify this issue as part of its
verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
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A.4. Gchine Mine
25. On 22 and 23 January 2008, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian
officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in its letter dated
15 September 2007 (GOV/2007/58, para. 27) with a view to achieving a better understanding of the
complex arrangements governing the past and current administration of the Gchine uranium mine and
mill (GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31).
26. According to Iran, the exploitation of uranium at the Gchine mine, as well as the ore processing
activities at the Gchine uranium ore concentration (UOC) plant, have always been and remain the
responsibility of the AEOI.
27. Iran stated that, by 1989, the extent of uranium reserves at Saghand in central Iran had been
established in cooperation with Chinese experts. Considering the promising output of this region, a
contract for equipping the Saghand mine and designing a uranium ore processing plant was concluded
with Russian companies in 1995. Insufficient funding was allocated in the Government’s 1994–1998
five-year plan for the AEOI to pursue activities at both Gchine and Saghand. Since there was more
uranium (estimated 1000 tonnes) at Saghand than at Gchine (estimated 40 tonnes), it was decided to
spend the available funds on Saghand.
28. According to Iran, in the period 1993–1998, tasks such as the preparation of technical reports
and studies, and some chemical testing of ores, were performed at the AEOI Ore Processing Center
(OPC) at TNRC. The focus of some of the documentation work had been to justify funding of Gchine
in the 1999–2003 five-year plan. These efforts were successful and funding for further exploration and
exploitation at Gchine was approved in the plan. A decision to construct a UOC plant at Gchine,
known as “Project 5/15”, was made on 25 August 1999.
29. During the 22–23 January 2008 meetings, Iran also provided the Agency with supporting
documentation regarding the budget, the five-year plans, contracts with foreign entities and the
preparation of studies and reports. The Agency concluded that the documentation was sufficient to
confirm the AEOI’s continuing interest in and activity at Gchine in the 1993–1999 period.
30. Regarding the origin and role of the Kimia Maadan (KM) Company, Iran stated that the OPC, in
addition to its own staff, had hired consultants and experts for various projects, including for work
relating to Gchine. When budget approval was given in 1999 for exploration and exploitation at
Gchine, some experts and consultants had formed a company (KM) to take on a contract from the
AEOI for the Gchine plant. Supporting documentation was provided to the Agency showing that KM
was registered as a company on 4 May 2000. Iran stated that KM’s core staff of about half a dozen
people consisted of experts who had previously worked for the OPC. At the peak of activity, the
company employed over 100 people. In addition to its own staff, KM made use of experts from
universities and subcontractors to work on the project.
31. According to Iran, KM was given conceptual design information by the AEOI consisting of
drawings and technical reports. KM’s task was to do the detailed design, to procure and install
equipment and to put the Gchine UOC plant into operation. The contract imposed time constraints and
the time pressure led to some mistakes being made. After the detailed design was completed, changes
had to be made which led to financial problems for KM.
32. Iran stated that KM had had only one project — the one with the AEOI for construction of the
Gchine UOC plant on a turnkey basis. However, the company had also helped with procurement for
the AEOI because of the AEOI’s procurement constraints due to sanctions (GOV/2006/15, para. 39).
A document listing items procured for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was provided by Iran.
According to Iran, because of KM’s financial problems, the company ceased work on the Gchine
project in June 2003, when the three-year contract with the AEOI came to an end. Iran stated that KM
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was officially deregistered on 8 June 2003 and provided a document supporting this statement. After
KM stopped work, the OPC again took over work on the Gchine UOC plant.
33. Iran stated that KM had been able to progress quickly from its creation in May 2000 and to
install foundations for the UOC plant by late December 2000 because the conceptual design for the
plant had been done by the OPC. This conceptual design and other “know-how” had been supplied to
KM, which used the information for the detailed design of processing equipment. KM was therefore
quickly able to prepare drawings and issue purchase orders. Documents supporting the conceptual
work done by the AEOI were presented to the Agency by Iran.
34. Much of the supporting information provided by Iran had not been presented to the Agency
during past discussions about Gchine. The Agency concluded that the information and explanations
provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the content of which is consistent with the
information already available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer
outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and
practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and continues to verify this issue as part of verification
of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
A.5. Alleged Studies
35. The Agency has continued to urge Iran, as demanded by the Security Council, to address the
alleged studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide (UO2) into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4)
(the green salt project), high explosives testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, which
could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections,
and in view of their possible link to nuclear material (GOV/2007/58, para. 28). As part of the work
plan, Iran agreed to address these alleged studies.
36. On 27 and 28 January 2008 and from 3 to 5 February 2008, the Agency and Iran discussed the
alleged studies at meetings in Tehran. During these discussions, the Agency provided detailed
information about the allegations and asked for clarification concerning other issues that had arisen
during the implementation of the work plan, including the roles of PHRC, KM, the Education
Research Institute (ERI) and the Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) (GOV/2004/83, paras 100–101).
37. The Agency showed Iran certain documentation which the Agency had been given by other
Member States, purportedly originating from Iran, including a flowsheet of bench scale conversion of
UO2 to UF4. The documents show a capacity of the process of about 1 tonne per year of UF4. The
flowsheet has KM markings on it and refers to “Project 5/13.” The documentation includes
communications between the project staff and another private company on the acquisition of process
instrumentation. These communications also make reference to the leadership of the project
concerning the missile re-entry vehicle. The Agency also presented a sketch of a process to produce
50 tonnes of UF4 per year.
38. Iran stated that the allegations were baseless and that the information which the Agency had
shown to Iran was fabricated. However, Iran agreed to clarify its statement in detail. On 8 February
and 12 February 2008, the Agency reiterated in writing its request for additional clarifications. On
14 February 2008, Iran responded, reiterating its earlier statements and declaring that this was its final
assessment on this point. Iran stated that the only organization that had been, and was, involved in fuel
cycle activities was the AEOI and that the AEOI had had a contract with KM to develop a UOC plant
in Gchine, which was the only project in which KM was ever involved. In Iran’s view, the flowsheet
was a fabrication and the accusation baseless.
39. During the meetings on 3–5 February 2008, the Agency made available documents for
examination by Iran and provided additional technical information related to: the testing of high
voltage detonator firing equipment; the development of an exploding bridgewire detonator (EBW); the
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simultaneous firing of multiple EBW detonators; and the identification of an explosive testing
arrangement that involved the use of a 400 m shaft and a firing capability remote from the shaft by a
distance of 10 km, all of which the Agency believes would be relevant to nuclear weapon R&D. Iran
stated that the documents were fabricated and that the information contained in those documents could
easily be found in open sources. During the meetings mentioned above, the Agency also described
parameters and development work related to the Shahab 3 missile, in particular technical aspects of a
re-entry vehicle, and made available to Iran for examination a computer image provided by other
Member States showing a schematic layout of the contents of the inner cone of a re-entry vehicle. This
layout has been assessed by the Agency as quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device.
Iran stated that its missile programme involved the use of conventional warheads only and was also
part of the country’s space programme, and that the schematic layout shown by the Agency was
baseless and fabricated.
40. During the meetings of 27–28 January and 3–5 February 2008, the Agency asked Iran to clarify
a number of procurement actions by the ERI, PHRC and IAP which could relate to the abovementioned
alleged studies. These included training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of shock
waves on metal, enrichment/isotope separation and ballistic missiles. Efforts to procure spark gaps,
shock wave software, neutron sources, special steel parts (GOV/2006/15, para. 37) and radiation
measurement equipment, including borehole gamma spectrometers, were also made. In its written
response on 5 February 2008, Iran stated that ‘PAM shock’ software was enquired about “in order to
study aircraft, collision of cars, airbags and for the design of safety belts.” Iran also stated that the
radiation monitors it had enquired about were meant to be used for radiation protection purposes.
Iran’s response regarding the efforts to procure training courses on neutron calculations, and
enrichment/isotope separation, spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources and radiation
measurement equipment for borehole gamma spectrometers is still awaited.
41. During the same meetings, the Agency requested clarification of the roles of certain officials
and institutes and their relation to nuclear activities. Iran was also asked to clarify projects such as the
so-called “Project 4” (possibly uranium enrichment) and laser related R&D activities. Iran denied the
existence of some of the organizations and project offices referred to in the documentation and denied
that other organizations named were involved in nuclear related activities. Iran also denied the
existence of some of the people named in the documentation and said allegations about the roles of
other people named were baseless. Iran’s response to the Agency’s request regarding “Project 4” and
laser related R&D activities is still awaited
42. On 15 February 2008, the Agency proposed a further meeting to show additional documentation
on the alleged studies to Iran, after being authorized to do so by the countries which had provided it.
Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s proposal.
B. Current Enrichment Related Activities
43. On 12 December 2007, the first physical inventory taking was carried out at the Fuel
Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz and verified by the Agency. Since the beginning of operations in
February 2007, a total of 1670 kg of UF6 had been fed into the cascades. The operator presented, inter
alia, about 75 kg of UF6 as the product, with a stated enrichment of 3.8% U-235. The throughput of the
facility has been well below its declared design capacity. There has been no installation of centrifuges
outside the original 18-cascade area. Installation work, including equipment and sub-header pipes, is
continuing for other cascade areas. Since March 2007, a total of nine unannounced inspections have
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been carried out at FEP. All nuclear material at FEP remains under Agency containment and
surveillance.
44. On 8 November 2007, Iran stated that it “agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge
generation information” would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007 (GOV/2007/58,
para. 33). On 13 January 2008, the Director General and Deputy Director General for Safeguards
visited an AEOI R&D laboratory at Kalaye Electric, where they were given information on R&D
activities being carried out there. These included work on four different centrifuge designs: two
subcritical rotor designs, a rotor with bellows and a more advanced centrifuge. Iran informed the
Agency that the R&D laboratory was developing centrifuge components, measuring equipment and
vacuum pumps with the aim of having entirely indigenous production capabilities in Iran.
45. On 15 January 2008, Iran informed the Agency about the planned installation of the first new
generation subcritical centrifuge (IR-2) at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and provided
relevant design information. On 29 January 2008, the Agency confirmed that a single IR-2 test
machine and a 10-machine IR-2 test cascade had been installed at PFEP. Iran reported that about
0.8 kg of UF6 had been fed to the single machine between 22 and 27 January 2008. Iran has continued
to test P-1 centrifuges in one single machine, one 10-, one 20- and one 164-machine cascade at PFEP.
Between 23 October 2007 and 21 January 2008, Iran fed a total of about 8 kg of UF6 into the single
P-1 and the 10-machine P-1 cascade; no nuclear material was fed into the 20- and 164-machine
cascades. At the end of January 2008, the single P-1 machine and the 10- and 20-machine P-1
cascades were dismantled and the space was used for the new IR-2 machines. All activities took place
under Agency containment and surveillance.
46. On 5 February 2008, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards and the Director of Safeguards
Operations B visited laboratories at Lashkar Abad, where laser enrichment activities had taken place
in 2003 and earlier. The laboratories are now run by a private company, which is producing and
developing laser equipment for industrial purposes. All the former laser equipment has been
dismantled and some of it is stored at the site. The management of the company provided detailed
information on current and planned activities, including plans for extensive new construction work,
and stated that they are not carrying out, and are not planning, any uranium enrichment activities.
C. Reprocessing Activities
47. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the
MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design
information verification. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at
those facilities. In addition, Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities
in Iran, which the Agency can confirm only with respect to these facilities.
D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
48. On 5 February 2008, the Agency carried out design information verification at the IR-40 and
noted that construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency has continued to monitor the
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construction of the Heavy Water Production Plant using satellite imagery. The imagery appears to
indicate that the plant is operating.
E. Other Implementation Issues
E.1. Uranium Conversion
49. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007,
approximately 120 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced as of 2 February 2008.
This brings the total amount of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to 309 tonnes, all of which
remains under Agency containment and surveillance. Iran has stated that it is carrying out no uranium
conversion related R&D activities other than those at Esfahan.
E.2. Design Information
50. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the
implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1.
(GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14), but there has been no progress on this issue. However, Iran has
provided updated design information for PFEP.
E.3. Other Matters
51. On 26 November 2007, the Agency verified and sealed in the Russian Federation the fresh fuel
foreseen for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), before its shipment to Iran. As of February
2008, all fuel assemblies had been received, verified and re-sealed at BNPP.
F. Summary
52. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the
required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and
activities. Iran has also responded to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on the
issues raised in the context of the work plan, with the exception of the alleged studies. Iran has
provided access to individuals in response to the Agency’s requests. Although direct access has not
been provided to individuals said to be associated with the alleged studies, responses have been
provided in writing to some of the Agency’s questions.
53. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the
work plan, are consistent with its findings — in the case of the polonium-210 experiments and the
Gchine mine — or are not inconsistent with its findings — in the case of the contamination at the
technical university and the procurement activities of the former Head of PHRC. Therefore, the
Agency considers those questions no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues,
in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify
these issues as part of its verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
54. The one major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is the alleged
studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. This is a
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matter of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran’s
nuclear programme. The Agency was able to show some relevant documentation to Iran on 3–5
February 2008 and is still examining the allegations made and the statements provided by Iran in
response. Iran has maintained that these allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated.
The Agency’s overall assessment requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal
document, and clarifications concerning the procurement activities of some military related institutions
still not provided by Iran. The Agency only received authorization to show some further material to
Iran on 15 February 2008. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s request of that same date for
Iran to view this additional documentation on the alleged studies. In light of the above, the Agency is
not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. However, it should be
noted that the Agency has not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged
studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard. The Director General has urged Iran to
engage actively with the Agency in a more detailed examination of the documents available about the
alleged studies which the Agency has been authorized to show to Iran.
55. The Agency has recently received from Iran additional information similar to that which Iran
had previously provided pursuant to the Additional Protocol, as well as updated design information.
As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current declared nuclear programme has become
clearer. However, this information has been provided on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and
complete manner. The Director General has continued to urge Iran to implement the Additional
Protocol at the earliest possible date and as an important confidence building measure requested by the
Board of Governors and affirmed by the Security Council. The Director General has also urged Iran to
implement the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early
provision of design information. Iran has expressed its readiness to implement the provisions of the
Additional Protocol and the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, “if
the nuclear file is returned from the Security Council to the IAEA”.
56. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. In addition, Iran started the development
of new generation centrifuges. Iran has also continued construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation
of the Heavy Water Production Plant.
57. With regard to its current programme, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about its scope
and nature. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that
the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally
importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. With the
exception of the issue of the alleged studies, which remains outstanding, the Agency has no concrete
information about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although Iran
has provided some additional detailed information about its current activities on an ad hoc basis, the
Agency will not be in a position to make progress towards providing credible assurances about the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran before reaching some clarity about the
nature of the alleged studies, and without implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially
important in the light of the many years of undeclared activities in Iran and the confidence deficit
created as a result. The Director General therefore urges Iran to implement all necessary measures
called for by the Board of Governors and the Security Council to build confidence in the peaceful
nature of its nuclear programme.
58. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
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United Nations S/2012/395
Security Council Distr.: General
12 June 2012
Original: English
12-37171 (E) 270612
*1237171*
Note by the President of the Security Council
In paragraph 2 of resolution 1984 (2011), the Security Council requested the
Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) to provide a final
report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.
Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report dated 4 June 2012
received from the Panel of Experts (see annex).
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Annex
Letter dated 4 June 2012 from the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) addressed to the President of
the Security Council
On behalf of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1929 (2010), I have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with
paragraph 2 of resolution 1984 (2011), the final report on its work.
(Signed) Salomé Zourabichvili
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010)
(Signed) Jonathan Brewer
Expert
(Signed) Kenichiro Matsubayashi
Expert
(Signed) Thomas Mazet
Expert
(Signed) Jacqueline Shire
Expert
(Signed) Elena Vodopolova
Expert
(Signed) Olasehinde Ishola Williams
Expert
(Signed) Wenlei Xu
Expert
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Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
resolution 1929 (2010)
Summary
The present final report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution
1984 (2011) and in accordance with the mandate set forth in paragraph 29 of
resolution 1929 (2010). It contains the analysis, conclusions and recommendations of
the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) regarding
compliance by the Islamic Republic of Iran with the provisions of that and related
resolutions, in addition to information provided by Member States regarding their
implementation. The Panel draws on consultations with Member States and experts,
inspections of reported incidents of non-compliance and assessments of
implementation reports submitted by Member States under resolution 1929 (2010).
The report also contains a discussion of other work undertaken by the Panel relevant
to its mandate, including outreach activities to Member States, regional groups and
the private sector and, where appropriate, the provision of technical advice.
The sanctions measures specified in resolution 1929 (2010) and previous
resolutions are part of a coordinated and intensive effort by the international
community to persuade the Islamic Republic of Iran to resolve outstanding questions
about the nature of its nuclear programme and demonstrate that it is for purely
peaceful purposes. Sanctions remain one element of a dual-track approach to the
country, which includes diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America. These sanctions are targeted at specific activities,
institutions, entities and individuals related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s
prohibited proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of a nuclear
weapon delivery system, in addition to transfers of conventional weapons.
Sanctions are slowing the procurement by the Islamic Republic of Iran of some
critical items required for its prohibited nuclear programme. At the same time,
prohibited activities, including uranium enrichment, are continuing. The Islamic
Republic of Iran has still not complied with the requests of the International Atomic
Energy Agency for information to clarify the possible military dimensions of its
programme. In the present report, the Panel identifies the acquisition of high-grade
carbon fibre as one of a number of critical items that the Islamic Republic of Iran
requires for the development of more advanced centrifuges. The report also contains an
analysis of the country’s requirements for uranium ore in the context of its current and
future planned activities, while noting that no procurement attempts have been reported
to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006).
The Iranian ballistic missile programme continues to develop, as demonstrated
by additional launches, their prohibition under resolution 1929 (2010) notwithstanding.
In the present report, the Panel provides the conclusions of its investigation into the
June 2011 launch of the Rasad satellite, which was reported to the Committee.
The Panel takes note of the recent designations by the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea of two Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entities
and their links to the Iranian ballistic missile programme.
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The Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to defy the international community
through illegal arms shipments. Three interdictions of conventional arms or related
materiel are identified in the present report. Two of these involve the Syrian Arab
Republic, as did most of the cases inspected by the Panel during its previous
mandate, underscoring that the Syrian Arab Republic continues to be the central
party to illicit Iranian arms transfers. The Panel recommends the designation of two
entities related to these interdictions.
The Panel also takes note of information received concerning arms shipments
by the Islamic Republic of Iran to other destinations.
The Panel highlights the challenges in identifying specific transactions or
businesses involving Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps entities that could contribute
to the country’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems. It also describes the involvement of an Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps entity in a transfer of conventional arms reported to the
Committee.
The transportation sector offers unique challenges for sanctions implementation.
The report details the complex structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines, with its frequent changes in ownership, names or national flags of vessels, and
whose activities are subject to vigilance under paragraph 22 of resolution 1929
(2010). This is illustrated in the case of the Irano Hind Shipping Company, an
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines entity, which was designated under
resolution 1929 (2010) and whose vessels continue to operate.
The Panel concludes that financial sanctions have been implemented by many
Member States with rigour and welcomes the new Financial Action Task Force
standard on financing of proliferation.
The Panel underscores the growing level of awareness among Member States of
the importance of strong export controls in the implementation of sanctions. The
Panel identified small and medium-sized enterprises as an attractive target of Iranian
illicit procurement attempts, and highlighted the importance of outreach to such
enterprises for effective implementation of export controls.
Interdictions of prohibited shipments are vital for slowing the Islamic Republic
of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile activities and preventing
arms transfers from the country. The Panel recognizes the value of sharing
intelligence and cooperation among Member States in successful interdictions.
The Panel is aware of interdictions, of which only a few have been reported to
the Committee. The Panel wishes to underline that this reporting is central to its ability
to analyse patterns of procurement and illicit activity and develop recommendations.
Information regarding denials of export licences for sensitive items, or attempted
transfers identified by vigilant Customs authorities, is equally important.
During consultations with Member States, those that were not members of the
Security Council raised the issue of the availability of the Panel’s 2011 final report,
which they suggested would be useful in having a better understanding of sanctions
implementation and improving national measures.
Although there remain examples of Member States who have yet to implement
United Nations sanctions fully, the Panel is encouraged by the high level of
commitment among most of its interlocutors to the effective implementation of the
sanctions contained in Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).
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I. Introduction
1. The present report has been prepared in accordance with the Panel’s mandate
as set forth in paragraph 29 of resolution 1929 (2010), and renewed in resolution
1984 (2011) on 9 June 2011. It contains a summary of the Panel’s work over the past
11 months in the areas of inspections of reported sanctions violations, consultations
with Member States, outreach to Member States and the private sector, and
discussions with outside experts. These activities are described in further detail in
paragraphs 16 to 42.
2. The Panel consists of eight members, who were reappointed by the Secretary-
General on 30 June 2011 (S/2011/405). The Panel’s composition is as follows:
Salomé Zourabichvili (France), Coordinator; Jonathan Brewer (United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland); Kenichiro Matsubayashi (Japan); Thomas
Mazet (Germany); Jacqueline Shire (United States of America); Elena Vodopolova
(Russian Federation); Olasehinde Ishola Williams (Nigeria); and Wenlei Xu (China).
3. The Panel operates under the direction of the Security Council Committee
established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). The mandate of the Panel, as set
forth in paragraph 29 of resolution 1929 (2010), is:
(a) To assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in
paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of resolution 1929 (2010);
(b) To gather, examine and analyse information from Member States,
relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the
implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),
1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010), in particular incidents of non-compliance;
(c) To make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or
the State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;
(d) To provide a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the
termination of its mandate, with its findings and recommendations.
In its resolution 1984 (2011), the Security Council extended the mandate of the
Panel until 9 June 2012.
4. In its resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council sought to strengthen and
build upon the measures contained in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and
1803 (2008), with a view to persuading the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with
its Security Council obligations. Measures imposed by the Security Council on the
Islamic Republic of Iran include:
(a) An embargo on proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile
activities (resolution 1737 (2006), paras. 3-7 and 9; resolution 1803 (2008), para. 8;
and resolution 1929 (2010), paras. 7, 9 and 13);
(b) An arms embargo (resolution 1747 (2007), para. 5; and resolution 1929
(2010), para. 8);
(c) A travel ban (resolution 1929 (2010), para. 10);
(d) An asset freeze (resolution 1737 (2006), paras. 12-15; resolution 1747
(2007), para. 4; resolution 1803 (2008), para. 7; and resolution 1929 (2010),
paras. 11, 12 and 19);
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(e) Other business restrictions (resolution 1929 (2010), para. 22);
(f) The seizure and disposal of proscribed items, following inspections of
cargo (resolution 1929 (2010), paras. 14-17);
(g) A ban on the provision of bunkering services (resolution 1929 (2010),
para. 18);
(h) Financial-related measures (resolution 1747 (2007), para. 7; resolution
1803 (2008), paras. 9 and 10; and resolution 1929 (2010), paras. 21, 23 and 24; in
addition to the sixteenth preambular paragraph of resolution 1929 (2010));
(i) Other requests and calls to Member States (resolution 1737 (2006),
para. 17; and resolution 1929 (2010), para. 20).
A. Methodology
5. The Panel carried out its tasks on the basis of the mandate stipulated in
paragraph 29 of resolution 1929 (2010) and the directions given by the Committee,
mindful of the methodological standards contained in the report of the Informal
Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997)
and further described in the publication Best Practices and Recommendations for
Improving the Effectiveness of United Nations Sanctions, which is based on that
report.
6. In fulfilling its mandate, the Panel, as an independent expert body, sought to
meet the required high evidentiary methodological standards. The Panel endeavoured
to ensure that its findings were substantiated, and that the information contained in its
reports derived from credible sources, was as transparent and verifiable as possible
and, in the case of reported violations of sanctions, included wherever possible firsthand,
on-site observations by the experts themselves. The Panel was also mindful of
the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of sources of information, when
requested. The Panel’s decisions were arrived at by consensus and, where there were
differences in conclusions, the majority carried and dissenting views were reflected.
B. Background
7. The political and economic environment in which the international community
is implementing its obligations under resolution 1929 (2010) has undergone
significant changes over the past year. Economies are struggling to overcome
economic downturns amid rising energy prices. The Panel’s focus was to assess the
implementation of targeted Security Council sanctions and understand their impact
against that shifting background.
8. Over the same period, significant questions remained regarding the peaceful
nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. In its most recent reports, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) highlighted concerns regarding possible military
dimensions of the programmes (see GOV/2011/65, para. 53).
9. Although provocative statements and actions have at times affected the
international climate and increased tensions over the past year, there has been progress
in recent months in finding a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
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10. Negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the “E3 + 3” group of
countries (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
and the United States) have restarted. In a letter dated 19 October 2011, Catherine
Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, welcomed the Islamic Republic of Iran’s suggestion to resume talks.
The country responded positively on 15 February 2012 and talks were held in
Istanbul, Turkey, on 14 April 2012. Ms. Ashton described the talks as constructive
and useful. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Aliakbar Salehi, said that Istanbul was the beginning for ending the nuclear
dispute.1 A second round of talks took place on 23 May 2012 in Baghdad.
11. Security Council resolutions are targeted at specific activities, institutions,
entities and individuals related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s prohibited nuclear
and missile activities, and conventional arms imports and exports. It is difficult to
assess their impact, in particular measured against stronger and more comprehensive
sanctions imposed by Member States unilaterally.
12. Unilateral sanctions are an issue that Member States raise regularly with the
Panel in the context of their implementation of targeted Security Council sanctions.
A number of Member States, which implement only these sanctions, have expressed
concern to the Panel that unilateral sanctions have a negative impact on legitimate
economic activities allowed under United Nations sanctions.
13. The impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy is sometimes difficult to
distinguish from the impact of domestic economic policies, in particular the effects
of cuts to long-standing consumer subsidies initiated in 2010. There are growing
signs, however, that sanctions are having an impact, including through rising prices
and a devaluing currency. According to an announcement by the Central Bank of
Iran on 4 March 2012, the Iranian inflation rate stood at 21.5 per cent.2
14. Statements by senior Iranian officials on the impact of sanctions have shifted
over the past 12 months. Although such statements in 2011 downplayed their impact,
the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was
quoted in February 2012 as calling sanctions “painful and crippling”.3
C. Acknowledgments
15. The Panel wishes to acknowledge the high degree of cooperation received
from many Member States during the course of its work. It also acknowledges the
excellent and sometimes proactive engagement of many private-sector entities.
II. Activities of the Panel
16. The Panel’s activities were developed and carried out in conformity with its
programme of work for the period 9 June 2011-8 June 2012, as required under
__________________
1 “Several steps forward will be taken in Iran-5+1 talks in Baghdad: Salehi”, Tehran Times,
29 April 2012.
2 “Iran’s inflation rate hits 21.5 per cent”, Tehran Times, 8 April 2012.
3 Robert F. Worth and David E. Sanger, “U.N. nuclear inspectors’ visit to Iran is a failure, West
says”, New York Times, 3 February 2012.
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paragraph 3 of resolution 1984 (2011). The Panel submitted to the Committee its
midterm report on 9 November 2011, in addition to four inspection and investigation
reports and four quarterly assessments of Member State implementation reports as
required under paragraph 31 of resolution 1929 (2010) (see annex I). During its
current mandate, the Panel held consultations with 26 Member States and investigated
four reported incidents of non-compliance. A full list of the countries visited can be
found in annex II to the present report. The Panel attended informal consultations of
the Committee on 16 June 2011, 7 December 2011 and 29 February 2012.
A. Consultations
17. The Panel’s plan of visits reflected its priorities to consult members of the
Security Council, Member States involved in the diplomatic process, bordering or
regional Member States and those Member States hosting relevant international
organizations. The Panel expanded the geographic breadth of its consultations
during the current mandate to reflect the global extent of Iranian interests and
activities related to sanctions.
18. A positive development observed by the Panel in the course of its
consultations with Member States over the past year was a marked increase in
awareness regarding sanctions implementation and the need for strengthened export
controls and for vigilance over specific sectors of business activity. Although some
Member States remain without sufficient capacity to implement United Nations
sanctions fully, the Panel is encouraged by the high level of commitment among
most of its interlocutors to the effective implementation of the sanctions contained
in resolution 1929 (2010).
19. During some consultations, the Panel had the opportunity to visit major ports
and receive briefings from Customs and port authorities directly involved in the
enforcement of measures under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Such
visits included the maritime ports of Antwerp (Belgium), Constanta (Romania), Hai
Phong (Viet Nam), Jebel Ali (United Arab Emirates), Klang (Malaysia), Odessa
(Ukraine) and Singapore, and the airports of Madrid (Spain), Oslo (Norway) and
Sofia (Bulgaria). These visits deepened the Panel’s understanding of enforcement
and implementation issues related to export controls, Customs and transportation.
20. The Panel carried out its tasks in consultation with United Nations experts
belonging to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Economic
Commission for Europe, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, the
International Civil Aviation Organization and, as appropriate, experts and panels of
experts working under other Security Council resolutions, including resolutions
1540 (2004) and 1874 (2009).
21. The Panel also met representatives from other international organizations to
obtain information concerning implementation measures under the relevant Security
Council resolutions and related issues. These included the European Union, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization,
the World Customs Organization and the International Organization for Migration.
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B. Outreach and related activities
22. From the beginning of its mandate, the Panel identified outreach as a priority.
Consistent with the Committee’s direction and encouragement of such activities, the
Panel proactively contacted Member States and organizations in the private sector
relevant to sanctions implementation, in addition to individual experts and
non-governmental organizations.
23. The Panel worked with local and international think tanks to organize regional
seminars bringing together practitioners and experts to discuss the implementation
of United Nations resolutions and the challenges that they pose. Four such seminars,
supported by Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, were held during the
Panel’s current mandate. They took place as follows:
(a) In Istanbul, on 17 and 18 November 2011, organized in collaboration
with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS);
(b) In Geneva, on 15 and 16 March 2012, with the support of the Geneva
Centre for Security Policy;
(c) In Singapore, on 12 and 13 April 2012, with IISS;
(d) In Nairobi, on 22 and 23 May 2012, organized by IISS and the Institute
for Security Studies, focusing on conventional arms transfer issues in the Horn of
Africa.
24. The Panel was also invited to participate in conferences and seminars relevant
to its mandate, including the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation; the
Asian Export Control Seminar; plenary meetings of the Financial Action Task Force
and meetings of some of its working groups; a seminar on conventional weapons
transfers organized by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; a seminar
at the Australian National University; an export control seminar in Belarus; and a
conference on combating the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of
Korea. It was also invited to participate in events organized by the Stimson Center,
Chatham House, Wilton Park, the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, the Group of
Eight Non-proliferation Directors Group and the British Bankers’ Association.
25. The Panel held discussions with experts affiliated to governmental and
non-governmental think tanks and universities. These included IISS, the Institute for
Science and International Security, the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Columbia University in the City of New York, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Princeton University, RAND Corporation, King’s College London, the
Brazilian Center for International Relations, the BRICS Policy Center, the
Stockholm International Security and Peace Research Institute and the Geneva
Centre for Security Policy.
26. The Panel also met representatives of many private companies and entities in
Europe, Asia and the United States involved in the implementation of sanctions on
the Islamic Republic of Iran. These included Bluestar Fibres Company Limited,
Citigroup, Oerlikon Leybold, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, JP Morgan Chase &
Co., Zurich Insurance Group, Axa Group, INFICON Holding, Kelvin Hughes, TNT
Express, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
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(SWIFT), the International Group of P&I Clubs, the International Air Transport
Association and Maersk.
C. Assessment of implementation reports
27. As requested by the Committee in its programme of work, the Panel submitted
four quarterly assessments of implementation reports: on 29 July 2011, 31 October
2011, 31 January 2012 and 30 April 2012. These assessments showed that
approximately 60 per cent of Member States had not reported under resolution 1929
(2010). The Panel concluded that the reports would be more informative and
relevant to its work if they contained details regarding implementation in practice,
albeit on a voluntary basis.
28. The Panel stands ready to assist the Committee to hold a planned open briefing
to inform Member States of the activities of the Panel and the Committee, as agreed
by the Committee on 4 March 2011 and 7 December 2011.
D. Inspections of reported incidents
29. The Panel investigated four reported incidents of non-compliance during its
current mandate, two of which were reported to the Committee during the Panel’s
previous mandate. The Panel completed three physical inspections and one
investigation.4 Three of four reported cases concerned violations of paragraph 5 of
resolution 1747 (2007), pertaining to arms and related materiel exports from the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and one of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010). The
following provides background to and summarizes the Panel’s key findings in each
case.
30. The Panel wishes to highlight the strong cooperation that it has received from
all reporting Member States, in particular Turkey, which has reported several
violations. The Panel wishes to emphasize the positive example set by reporting
Member States.
1. International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
31. The seizure of a shipment of rockets, fuses and ammunition in southern
Afghanistan on 5 February 2011 was reported to the Committee by the United
Kingdom on 21 April 2011. Following the seizure, the bulk of the shipment was
destroyed. Samples of the rockets and fuses were shipped to the United Kingdom for
forensic examination and, on 26 September 2011, made available to the Panel for
inspection.
32. This inspection was unusual because the Panel was unable to visit the site of
the seizure, only a small part of the original shipment was available for inspection
and no documents were available. The Panel concluded, on the basis of its
investigation and the information provided by the United Kingdom, that there was a
__________________
4 Inspection teams generally consist of from two to four Panel experts. In the present report,
references are to “the Panel” and not “members of the Panel”, as all inspections and the
subsequent reports engage the Panel as a whole. References are made to “members of the Panel”
only in cases of dissenting views.
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high probability that the shipment of the 122-mm rockets constituted a violation by
the Islamic Republic of Iran of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007). To
substantiate this conclusion, the Panel continues to investigate this incident and
invites Member States to supply further relevant information.
2. Yas Air (Turkey)
33. On 19 March 2011, the Turkish authorities seized 19 crates containing assault
rifles, machine guns, ammunition and mortar shells from an Ilyushin-76 cargo
aircraft operated by an Iranian cargo airline, Yas Air. The flight originated in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and was bound for the Syrian Arab Republic. This
interdiction was reported by Turkey to the Committee on 28 March 2011 and was
supplemented by a detailed inventory of the cargo transmitted to the Committee on
7 July 2011.
34. The Panel travelled to Diyarbakir on 19 November 2011 to inspect the
shipment. It concluded that the items seized constituted a violation of paragraph 5 of
resolution 1747 (2007).
3. Safir/Rasad launch
35. Following a communication by four Member States on 15 July 2011, the Panel
investigated a launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the Rasad satellite on
15 June 2011 to determine whether the launch constituted a violation of paragraph 9
of resolution 1929 (2010).
36. The Panel noted that the Safir space launch vehicle itself was not designed to
carry a nuclear weapon. The majority of the Panel concluded that the satellite launch
was related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, based on the
space launch vehicle’s derivation from two nuclear-capable missiles (the Shahab-3
and the R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile in its second stage). Three
members of the Panel concluded that the launch was not an activity related to a
ballistic missile capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The majority of the Panel
also concluded that the Safir space launch vehicle made use of ballistic missile
technology, and therefore constituted a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929
(2010). Two members of the Panel believed that it was difficult to reach such a firm
conclusion.
4. Kilis (Turkey)
37. On 15 February 2011, the Turkish authorities seized a truck carrying explosives
originating in the Islamic Republic of Iran and bound for the Syrian Arab Republic.
The seizure was reported to the Committee on 12 January 2012. From 4 to 7 March
2012, the Panel physically inspected the seized materials and accompanying
documents at an ammunition depot in Osmaniye Province, southern Turkey.
38. The Panel concluded that the shipment constituted a violation by the Islamic
Republic of Iran of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007).
E. Challenges
39. The Panel recalls the need to report promptly to the Committee incidents of
non-compliance. Some Member States have reported that domestic legal proceedings
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conflict with their United Nations reporting obligations. Such conflicts should be
reconciled by Member States, including by sending initial confidential reports of
non-compliance to the Committee without delay.
40. The Panel is also aware of incidents, reported in the media and acknowledged
by Government officials in public statements, which may be violations. The Panel
reiterates its readiness to investigate such cases.
41. There are several reasons why interdictions may not be reported, including the
disclosure of sensitive intelligence sources and methods and requirements of local
law enforcement processes. The Panel appreciates the importance of such
considerations, while also noting that reports to the Committee provide valuable
information in support of the Panel’s mandate. They also send a strong signal to
Member States that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to violate sanctions and
that Member States are taking preventative action accordingly.
42. The issue of safe storage and disposal of interdicted items came to the
forefront during the Panel’s current mandate with the explosion of materiel stored
by a Member State following its removal from the M/V Monchegorsk. This tragic
event underscores the need for safe storage and a prompt invitation to the Panel to
carry out an inspection, thereby allowing for expeditious disposal of the interdicted
items.
III. Analysis
A. Nuclear materials and technology
1. Introduction
43. In its resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council barred the supply, sale or
transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of sensitive nuclear materials and
technology, including all items listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in addition to
the dual-use items contained in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, with the exception of
those items specified in paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006) and any further items
if the State determined that they could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing
or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems.5 The Council also decided that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not to
acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium
mining, production or use of nuclear materials or ballistic missiles.
44. In addition, the Security Council affirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran
should take the steps required by the Board of Governors of IAEA, among other
things, to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear
programme, and should cooperate fully with IAEA on all outstanding issues,
particularly those which gave rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions
of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to
__________________
5 In paragraph 13 of resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council updates the provisions of earlier
resolutions with regard to INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2. The
resolution states that, for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3 to 7 of
resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in document S/2006/814 shall be superseded by the list
of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2.
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all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by IAEA. It further required
that the Islamic Republic of Iran should comply with the application of the modified
Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangement to its safeguards agreement, and act in
accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement.
The Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol,
and reaffirmed that the safeguards agreement and its subsidiary arrangement could
not be amended or changed unilaterally by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2. Background
45. The continuing refusal of the Islamic Republic of Iran to suspend enrichment
and heavy water-related activities and to cooperate fully with IAEA in resolving
outstanding questions, in particular those related to research and development
activities with potential military applications dimensions, has been comprehensively
documented by IAEA (see GOV/2011/65 and GOV/2011/7, among others). In brief,
these allegations are described as coming from a wide variety of independent
sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts
and from information provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran itself. The information
is consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved,
and time frames. IAEA notes further that information that it obtained regarding such
activities indicates that the Islamic Republic of Iran has carried out the following
activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:
(a) Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear-related and dual-use
equipment and materials by military-related individuals and entities;
(b) Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear
material;
(c) The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and
documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network;
(d) Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon
including the testing of components (GOV/2011/65, paras. 42 and 43).
46. The Panel’s objective in the present section is to examine the impact of
sanctions on the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to maintain and expand its
uranium enrichment activities. It addresses specific challenges, in particular with
regard to Iranian efforts to procure items necessary for its nuclear programme,
which cannot be produced indigenously in sufficient quantities or quality to sustain
some Iranian nuclear activities.
3. Analysis
(a) Uranium ore production
47. The Islamic Republic of Iran is believed by a number of Member States to be
seeking new sources of uranium ore to supply its enrichment efforts, even as efforts
are under way to develop further its indigenous production of uranium ore. The
country is prohibited from importing uranium ore under paragraph 13 of resolution
1929 (2010).
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Uranium mining and processing in the Islamic Republic of Iran
48. The status of indigenous uranium mining activity in the Islamic Republic of
Iran remains opaque. The country has declared to IAEA two uranium mines: one,
Saghand, located in Yazd Province in the centre of the country, and the other, Gchine,
in the south, near Bandar Abbas. Only the Gchine mine is currently operating. The
country is constructing a yellowcake production plant in Ardakan, which will
eventually process the ore from the Saghand mine into uranium ore concentrate.
Both the Saghand mine and Ardakan facility are designed to have the capacity to
process 50 tons of uranium annually. The Gchine mine also has a co-located
yellowcake production plant with a reported annual processing capacity of 21 tons
of uranium. The combined output of these mines is inadequate for the fuelling of a
single 1,000 MW reactor, which on average requires approximately 25 tons of lowenriched
uranium per year or the equivalent of at least 220 tons of natural uranium.6
49. These facilities are not subject to IAEA safeguards inspections, although
activity at the sites can be monitored by satellite imagery. Imagery analysis indicates
that the Gchine mine and co-located yellowcake production plant are operational.
Annex III to the present report contains images of these facilities marking their
changes over recent years.
Current stocks and level of consumption of uranium ore
50. To understand the future requirements of the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms
of uranium ore, it is useful to understand its current stocks and level of consumption.
The country has produced 371 tons of uranium hexafluoride since beginning operation
of its uranium conversion facility in Esfahan in March 2004. According to IAEA,
this uranium hexafluoride was converted from a store of approximately 530 tons of
uranium ore concentrate acquired by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the early 1980s
(GOV/2004/83). No uranium hexafluoride has been produced at the Esfahan facility
since 10 August 2009, according to IAEA (GOV/2010/62, para. 24).
51. As at October 2011, the Islamic Republic of Iran had introduced almost
55.7 tons of uranium hexafluoride into its centrifuges since enrichment began in
February 2007, amounting to some 15 per cent of its stockpile (GOV/2012/9,
para. 14). The country therefore has an ample supply of uranium hexafluoride to
maintain current levels of enrichment for the foreseeable future.
52. The Islamic Republic of Iran is, however, likely to require additional sources
of uranium if enrichment is to expand along the lines that it has described.7 It will
__________________
6 A 1,000 MW reactor requires approximately 25 tons of low-enriched uranium annually to
maintain regular operation. Although at least 220 tons of natural uranium would be required to
produce 25 tons of 4 per cent low-enriched uranium, this number can be considerably higher if
the enrichment process produces a high quantity of enriched uranium in what are known as the
“tails”, as appears to be the case in the Iranian enrichment operations.
7 “Iran produces fuel for 20 power plants under construction, MP”, IRNA, 14 August 2010, and
“Iran to increase centrifuges to 50,000: Aqazadeh”, IRNA, 25 February 2009. In addition,
according to IAEA reports, the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains two cascade halls at the
Natanz fuel enrichment plant. One, for which design information has been submitted, contains
eight units, each to contain 18 cascades. Cascades have typically consisted of 164 centrifuges.
Once completed, Cascade Hall A would consist of approximately 23,600 centrifuges. No
detailed design information has yet been provided for Production Hall B (see GOV/2011/65,
para. 8).
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also eventually require additional stocks of natural uranium for the Arak heavy
water reactor. Member States have informed the Panel that emerging suppliers are
potential targets for attempted acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although
the Panel is not aware of any confirmed cases of actual transfers, it has sought
consultations with a number of Member States regarding reported agreements with
the country for the supply of uranium ore.
Other sources of uranium ore concentrate
53. While the Islamic Republic of Iran has experimented with the extraction of
uranium from phosphates, which are commonly used in fertilizers, the Panel has no
evidence that it has gone beyond laboratory-scale research into this area
(GOV/2004/83, para. 5).
(b) Procurement related to uranium enrichment
54. Sanctions targeting Iranian procurement of critical components for the country’s
gas centrifuge programme notwithstanding, it has succeeded in manufacturing,
installing and operating more than 9,500 IR-1 centrifuges since February 2007,
when installation and operation of centrifuges at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant
began (GOV/2012/9, paras. 11-26). This figure includes 8,828 IR-1 centrifuges
operating at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant, 328 at the pilot fuel enrichment plant
and 348 at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant. An additional 6,177 empty centrifuge
casings have been placed at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant, and 2,088 at the
Fordow facility. The IR-1 centrifuges, however, have a well-documented, limited
capacity for enrichment and the Islamic Republic of Iran has been eager to develop
a more advanced enrichment capacity.8 Although the Iranian enrichment programme
has experienced a measure of success using IR-1 or first-generation centrifuges, its
ability to advance its enrichment efforts has encountered difficulties, some of which
may be the result of sanctions limiting its ability to procure items necessary for its
centrifuge programme.
Reports of attempted procurement
55. During its current mandate, the Panel received information from several
Member States regarding goods and materials that the Islamic Republic of Iran
sought to procure for its nuclear programme. Examples included:
(a) Nuclear-grade graphite;
(b) High-strength aluminium;
(c) Aluminium powder;
(d) Specialized alloys (such as chrome and nickel);
(e) Maraging steel;
(f) Carbon fibre;
(g) Lubricants;
__________________
8 David Albright and others, “Preventing Iran from Getting Nuclear Weapons; Constraining its
Future Nuclear Options”, Institute for Science and International Security, March 2012, pp. 12-13.
Available from http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/
USIP_Template_5March2012-1.pdf.
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(h) Magnets;
(i) Control valves;
(j) Heat exchangers;
(k) Pressure transducers;
(l) Vacuum pumps;
(m) Gauges;
(n) Inverters;
(o) Turbines;
(p) Electrical switchboards;
(q) Helium gas detectors;
(r) Sodium perchlorate.
56. One Member State provided the Panel with detailed information regarding
Iranian attempts to procure items for sanctioned nuclear facilities through
intermediaries linked to the Iranian nuclear programme, although not necessarily
limited to the centrifuge programme. These included high-frequency converters,
electrical switchboards and related equipment needed for the operation of the
Iranian nuclear facilities. Other items identified by the Member State as sought by
the Islamic Republic of Iran in specific cases included detection equipment for
helium gas leaks, gauges, specialized valves and aluminium tubes and sheets.
(c) Role of carbon fibre in gas centrifuges
57. A number of Member States shared information on the role of carbon fibre in
the Iranian nuclear programme and as a target for procurement. The Panel explores
this issue below in greater detail. This analysis in no way suggests that the items
described above merit less vigilance by Member States with regard to procurement.
58. Carbon fibre has many properties that make it ideal for use in gas centrifuges:
it is stronger and lighter than aluminium, corrosion resistant and especially high in
tensile strength and modulus, or stiffness. Carbon fibre will resist distortion under
high centrifugal forces.9 Among the highest grades of carbon fibre, and those that
are best suited for use in centrifuge rotors and bellows (a cylindrical-shaped
connector between two segments of rotor tubes), are fibres designated as ultra-high
strength or intermediate modulus fibres.
__________________
9 Carbon fibres are extremely thin in diameter, a fraction of the size of a human hair. They are
typically wound together to form a type of “tow” (or strand), which is then moulded with resins
to form carbon fibre composites. Carbon fibre is classified according to the tensile modulus of
the fibre, measured in pounds of force per square inch (on the vertical axis) and its modulus or
stiffness (on the horizontal axis). Carbon fibre has applications in numerous industries, including
aerospace, automotive and high-end sporting goods. The Nuclear Suppliers Group controls all
carbon fibre with a modulus greater than 12.7 and tensile strength greater than 23.5. See
annex VII to the present report for more details.
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Carbon fibre components in Iranian centrifuges
59. The rotors of the Iranian IR-1 centrifuges are manufactured with aluminium
7075.10 The Islamic Republic of Iran also requires maraging steel for the IR-1 bellows.
The table in annex IV to the present report, taken from a nuclear engineering textbook,
illustrates the limitations of aluminium relative to carbon fibre in centrifuges.
60. The Islamic Republic of Iran has experimented with several models of post-
IR-1 centrifuges, in particular the IR-2m and IR-4, both of which require carbon
fibre rotors. In addition to those models, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed
IAEA in a letter dated 1 February 2012 that it intended to develop additional
models, including the IR-5, 6 and 6s (GOV/2012/9, para. 20).
61. The Iranian IR-4 centrifuge is believed by experts to be manufactured with a
carbon fibre rotor and a carbon fibre bellows (see figure I). The IR-2m is believed to
be made with a carbon fibre rotor and maraging steel bellows. Both the IR-2m and
IR-4 centrifuges are the same height and assessed to have similar enrichment capacity.
Figure I
Carbon fibre centrifuge components
Source: Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
62. It is important to note that the development by the Islamic Republic of Iran of
its next-generation centrifuges dates to an early stage of its overall gas centrifuge
programme. According to IAEA, the country acquired design documents for the P-2
from a clandestine supply network in 1994 (GOV/2004/83, para. 23). Its decision to
develop carbon fibre components appears to date to 2002 when a subcontractor
__________________
10 One of the limitations of aluminium 7075 for centrifuge enrichment is its maximum speed of
approximately 350 metres per second. This, along with other design limitations in the IR-1, may
be a factor in the machine’s relatively high failure rate. Centrifuges made from carbon fibre can
achieve much higher speeds depending on the quality of the material and other potentially
limiting factors (see Manson Benedict and others, Nuclear Chemical Engineering, 2nd ed. (New
York, McGraw-Hill, 1981), p. 855).
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decided that, since in his view the Islamic Republic of Iran was not capable of
manufacturing maraging steel cylinders with bellows, work should proceed with a
shorter, sub-critical carbon composite rotor (GOV/2004/83, para. 44).
63. The figures in annex V to the present report illustrate the relatively slow
development of the Iranian next-generation centrifuges, especially when compared
to the far more rapid pace of installation for the IR-1 centrifuge. In 2008, the very
first IR-2 centrifuges were installed at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant. That
model was phased out in 2009 in favour of the IR-2m and IR-4. Although installation
of the IR-2m recently increased, installation of the IR-4 remains at a relatively low
level. This may indicate difficulties with the operation of a centrifuge containing two
critical components made from carbon fibre (as noted above, the IR-2m centrifuge is
made using a carbon fibre rotor and maraging steel bellows). Other variables,
including design and manufacturing limitations, or a shortage of other necessary
materials, may also explain delays in the deployment of advanced centrifuges.
Indigenous production
64. The Panel’s analysis of the deployment by the Islamic Republic of Iran of
centrifuges to date, in addition to discussions with experts and Member States,
indicates that the country lacks the technology and equipment to produce high-grade
carbon fibre indigenously. The Panel’s analysis is described in more detail in
annex VI to the present report. In brief, the carbon fibre produced in an Iranian
facility, which can be viewed in an online video clip, is not assessed by experts in
carbon fibre production and manufacturing to be suitable for use in Iranian
centrifuges. The country is therefore likely to continue to rely on foreign
procurement to support its next-generation centrifuge development efforts.
Procurement of carbon fibre from abroad
65. One report received by the Panel from a regional multilateral organization
highlighted the continued interest of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the procurement
of high-grade carbon fibre. According to another Member State, the Islamic Republic
of Iran is continuing its attempts to procure high-grade carbon fibre necessary for
the development of its more advanced centrifuges. This State had knowledge of an
attempted procurement of two tons of high-grade carbon fibre. The Panel is also
aware of one incident of carbon fibre interdicted by a Member State en route to the
Islamic Republic of Iran in the past year. The Panel has no information regarding
the potential use of this material in prohibited nuclear activities, or its technical
specifications, and is in contact with the State to obtain additional information.
66. The Panel has also seen high-grade carbon fibre made available for sale on
Internet trading platforms. In the report referenced in paragraph 65, the accessibility
of such fibre was highlighted and it was noted that such websites were likely to be
used by Iranian procurers to contact prospective intermediaries to procure carbon
fibre supplies. Experts familiar with developments in the industry observe that the
significant growth in demand in recent years for higher grades of carbon fibre,
brought on in part by expansion in the aerospace and automotive sectors, has led to
surpluses in the supply chain. Some Member States that the Panel consulted
described outreach programmes to industry to ensure that surplus carbon fibre did
not find its way into a secondary market for possible procurement by the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
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Ensuring control of carbon fibre under existing sanctions
67. The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System maintained by
the World Customs Organization provides an internationally recognized and
standardized system for classifying goods. The Panel notes that the classification
number 681510 does not distinguish carbon fibres of different specifications. This
raises the question of whether carbon fibre falling at or above thresholds established
by export control regimes could be assigned a different number or whether an
alternative categorization system could be applied.
(d) Implementation of sanctions and procurement relevant to a nuclear
explosive device
68. The Panel takes note of information reported by IAEA regarding procurement
and attempted procurement by the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment, materials
and services that, although having other civilian applications, would be useful in the
development of a nuclear explosive device. These include high-speed electronic
switches and spark gaps (useful for triggering and firing detonators); high-speed
cameras (useful in experimental diagnostics); neutron sources (useful for calibrating
neutron-measuring equipment); radiation detection and measuring equipment
(useful in a nuclear material production environment); and training courses on
topics relevant to nuclear explosives development (such as neutron cross-section
calculations and shock wave interactions/hydrodynamics) (GOV/2011/65, annex,
paras. 25 and 26). No incidents of such procurement or training courses were
reported to the Panel during its mandate.
4. Conclusions
69. On the basis of the Panel’s consultations with Member States, outside experts
and analysis of IAEA findings, the Panel continues to find evidence to suggest that
sanctions are slowing the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to expand some
aspects of its fuel cycle activities.
70. The country’s reported current and projected domestic production of uranium
ore is insufficient to support the fuel requirements of a nuclear power programme.
Although the existing Iranian stockpile of uranium hexafluoride is adequate for its
current level of enrichment activity, this may change with expanded enrichment, as
envisaged by the country, or with the completion of a reactor using natural uranium
as fuel.
71. Member States, in particular those with significant phosphate exports, should
be alert to the potential risk of diversion of such exports should the Islamic Republic
of Iran decide to develop further its resources in this area.
72. While no reports were received by the Panel of interdictions of dual-use items
for use in a nuclear programme with military dimensions, vigilance by Member
States to guard against possible procurement of such items by the Islamic Republic
of Iran continues to be important.
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B. Ballistic missiles
1. Introduction
73. In paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council decided that the
Islamic Republic of Iran was not to undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic
missile technology, and that Member States were to take all measures necessary to
prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to the Islamic Republic of
Iran related to such activities. In paragraph 7 of that resolution, the Council decided
that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not to acquire an interest in any commercial
activity in another State involving, among other things, technology related to
ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
74. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), Member States are obliged
to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or
indirectly of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, referred to in
document S/2006/815 that could contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. In paragraph 13 of resolution
1929 (2010), the Security Council decided that the list of items contained in
document S/2006/815 was to be superseded by the list of items contained in
document S/2010/263.
75. In the present section, the Panel provides a brief summary of recent
developments related to ballistic missile activity over the past year. These include
information reported by IAEA regarding the potential military dimensions of the
Iranian nuclear programme, including a nuclear payload for a missile, a series of test
launches of ballistic missiles, the introduction of the Qiam missile, the disclosure of
missile silos and the launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran of two satellites using the
Safir space launch vehicle. The Panel also addresses information provided by Member
States concerning continuing procurement efforts related to ballistic missiles.
2. Background
76. The Iranian arsenal of ballistic missiles is widely recognized as one of the
largest in the region. The table in annex VIII to the present report provides an
overview of the number and type of ballistic missiles. Two in particular are judged
to be potentially nuclear capable: the liquid propelled Shahab-3 and the solid-fuelpropelled
Sejil (also referred to as the Sajjil or the Ashura). The Islamic Republic of
Iran is not judged to have an operational intercontinental ballistic missile.
77. While the Islamic Republic of Iran is actively producing its own missiles, it
remains reliant on foreign suppliers for components, materials and equipment.
According to some experts, there is no evidence that the Islamic Republic of Iran
possesses the technology necessary to manufacture the large-diameter, flow-formed
pressure tanks and large, composite pressure vessels necessary to construct larger,
long-range missiles. It also appears that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to
import whole engines, or at least critical engine components, for its liquid-fuelled
missiles, and requires components for guidance systems.11
__________________
11 Miles A. Pomper and Cole J. Harvey, “Beyond missile defense: alternative means to address
Iran’s ballistic missile threat”, Arms Control Today, October 2010, citing “Iran’s Ballistic Missile
Capabilities: A Net Assessment”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 7 May 2010.
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78. In November 2011, IAEA stated that, since 2002, it had become increasingly
concerned about the possible existence in the Islamic Republic of Iran of
undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations,
including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile,
about which it had regularly received new information (see GOV/2011/65, para. 38,
and previous reports).
79. IAEA describes work that took place before 2004 as a structured and
comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a
new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted
in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab-3 missile. In addition, according to
documentation provided by a Member State, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted
computer modelling studies of at least 14 progressive design iterations of the
payload chamber and its contents to examine how they would stand up to the
various stresses that would be encountered on being launched and travelling on a
ballistic trajectory to a target (GOV/2011/65, annex, paras. 59 and 60).
80. IAEA has described the information on which its assessments are based as
coming from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of
Member States, from its own efforts and from information provided by the Islamic
Republic of Iran itself (GOV/2011/65, para. 42).
3. Recent developments
81. Missile launches. In late June 2011, the Islamic Republic of Iran held a
military exercise known as “Great Prophet Six”. On 28 June 2011, the commander
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force, Amir Ali Hajizadeh,
announced on Iranian State television that, on the second day of the exercise, the
country had fired Zelzal rockets, the Shahab-1 and -2 and the Ghadr (a modified
version of the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile).12
82. Qiam missile. The only test of this missile reported in the media took place in
August 2010. The Iranian Minister of Defence, Ahmad Vahidi, highlighted the
missile’s lack of stabilizer fins, which he claimed would increase the missile’s speed
and allow it to be launched from a silo.13 He also claimed that the liquid-fuelled
ballistic missile was entirely indigenously produced. In May 2011, he announced the
delivery of the missile to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (see figure II).
One Member State assessed the Qiam to be based on the Shahab-2, with a range of
between 500 and 1,000 km. Some experts have raised questions about the missile’s
lack of apparent testing. Missiles are known to require extensive flight-test
programmes before they can be fully operational.
__________________
12 Farhad Pouladi, “Iran fires medium range missile in war game”, Agence France Presse, 28 June
2011. Jonathan’s Space Report No. 643, 5 July 2011, SpaceRef International Group. Available
from www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=37608.
13 “New ballistic missile delivered to IRGC”, Day.AZ, 23 May 2011.
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Figure II
Qiam missile
83. Underground silos. On 27 June 2011, as part of the “Great Prophet Six”
exercises, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps also unveiled an underground
missile silo from which ballistic missiles would be able to be launched. The Iranian
spokesperson for the exercises, Asghar Ghelichkhani, claimed that the technology
for building the silos was completely indigenous.14 Iranian officials have been
quoted publicly claiming that the silos provide a swift reaction unit and the ability
to confront unequal enemies and defend the Islamic Republic of Iran.14 The Iranian
missile silos, which have been reported for a number of years, are not confirmed to
be operational.
(a) Reported satellite launch
84. Over the course of the Panel’s current mandate, the Islamic Republic of Iran
launched two satellites: the Rasad-1, on 15 June 2011, and the Navid, on 3 February
2012. These launches followed its first successful launch of a satellite, the Omid, in
February 2009. Both launches were reported to the Committee by France, Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United States; the first in a communication dated
15 July 2011 and the second on 28 February 2012.
85. On the basis of those reports to the Committee, the Panel investigated the
Rasad-1 launch and reported to the Committee on 6 November 2011. On the basis of
the provisions of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010), the Panel sought to
ascertain whether the launch could be considered an activity related to ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and whether the launch was using
ballistic missile technology.
__________________
14 William Broad, “Iran unveils missile silos as it begins war games”, New York Times, 27 June
2011.
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86. According to information shared with the Panel and widely circulated
photographic images of the launch vehicle published by Iranian news agencies, the
satellite was launched by a two-stage liquid-fuelled Safir launch vehicle.15 The two
engines in the upper stage of the Safir are assessed by Member States and experts
consulted by the Panel to most closely resemble the vernier engines found on the
R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile, also known as the SS-N-6. These provide
low thrust to the second stage, and their steerable nozzles allow adjustments to the
flight path through thrust vector controls (see figure III).
87. The Panel reached a consensus that both ballistic missile and space launch
programmes shared a great deal of similar materials and technology, including
systems for propulsion, control and navigation. The Panel also noted that, although
some examples existed of ballistic missiles programmes developed from space
launch programmes, in general there were more examples of the reverse — space
launch programmes developed on the basis of ballistic missile programmes.
88. The Panel agreed that the Safir space launch vehicle was not designed to carry
nuclear weapons.
89. Five members of the Panel concluded that the launch was clearly related to
missiles capable of delivering such weapons based on their established relationship
to two nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Three members of the Panel concluded that
the launch of the Rasad-1 was not an activity related to ballistic missiles capable of
delivering nuclear weapons. With regard to the question of whether the launch was
using ballistic missile technology, six members of the Panel concluded that the
launch did use such technology, while two members believed that it was difficult to
reach such a firm conclusion.
Figure III
Safir space launch vehicle and the Shahab-3
Safir space launch vehicle first stage Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile
__________________
15 The Safir reportedly has a length of 22 m, a core diameter of 1.25 m and a launch weight of
26,000 kg. The first stage of the Safir is derived from the Ghadr-1 missile, a variant of the
Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile. It is believed to be 13.5 m long, with a mass of
18,000 kg. The Safir’s second stage is estimated to be 8.5 m in length with a mass of 8,000 kg.
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Safir second stage Safir second stage
(vernier engines more visible)
90. The Navid satellite launch was not the subject of a separate investigation by
the Panel. It was reported to weigh approximately 50 kg and was reportedly built by
Iranian students at the Sharif University of Technology as a weather satellite, which
would remain in orbit for 18 months. It was launched by a modified Safir space
launch vehicle, including a modified Shahab-3 ballistic missile comprising the first
stage.16
(b) Procurement related to ballistic missiles
91. The Panel received no reports of alleged procurement attempts related to
ballistic missiles during its current mandate. A number of Member States, however,
shared information concerning procurement priorities and items meriting extra
vigilance. Among those were production equipment for missile purposes (including
metal processing machines), precise inertial gauges, testing equipment (including
vibration testing equipment), fuel-related material (aluminium powder), valves,
turbines and frequency converters. Gyroscopes and related technology for guidance
systems were also highlighted as one of the procurement priorities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and for which it was especially dependent on foreign suppliers.
92. One Member State informed the Panel that it was implementing sanctions by
working to strengthen controls over various types of steel and construction material
that could be used for manufacturing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. A special
commission had been established to evaluate specific types of steel that could be
used in the production of ballistic missiles and thereby contribute to proliferation
risks.
93. The Panel notes the designations announced on 2 May 2012 of two Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea entities, the Korea Heungjin Trading Company (which
the Committee suspects has been involved in supplying missile-related goods to the
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group of the Islamic Republic of Iran) and Amroggang
Development Banking Corporation (which has been involved in ballistic missile
transactions from the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation to the Shahid
Hemmat Industrial Group) (S/2012/287). The Security Council designated the
__________________
16 Stephen Clark, “Observing satellite launched by modified Iranian missile”, Spaceflight Now,
3 February 2012.
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Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group in resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in
the Iranian ballistic missile programme.
94. According to a report by Yonhap News Agency, a delegation of 12 Iranian
officials from the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group travelled to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to observe the 13 April launch.17
4. Conclusions
95. With the exception of the Rasad and Navid satellite launches, the Panel
received no reports of alleged violations related to ballistic missile launches.
96. Its growing manufacturing and technical competence notwithstanding, the
Islamic Republic of Iran continues its attempts to procure essential technology and
components. Preventing the supply of crucial missile components is an important
aspect of successful implementation of sanctions.
C. Conventional arms and related materiel
1. Introduction
97. In paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), the Security Council decided that the
Islamic Republic of Iran was not to supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly
from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or
related materiel, and that all Member States were to prohibit the procurement of
such items from the Islamic Republic of Iran by their nationals, or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
98. Member States are required under paragraph 8 of resolution 1929 (2010) to
prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran
any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat
aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the
purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel,
including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the
Committee. Member States are to prevent the provision to the Islamic Republic of
Iran of relevant training and financing, and are called upon to exercise vigilance and
restraint over the supply of all arms and related materiel.
99. In the present section, the Panel provides its analysis on the basis of three
inspections of reported incidents of conventional arms interdictions and emerging
connections among these and previous reported interdictions investigated by the
Panel with the aim of identifying trends in the illegal transfer of conventional arms
by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2. Recent inspections
100. During its current mandate, the Panel inspected three reported incidents of
non-compliance as reported by Member States to the Committee and submitted
reports as required.
__________________
17 Danielle Demetriou, “Iranian officials ‘observed North Korean rocket launch’”, Telegraph,
16 April 2012.
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101. The Panel notes the continuation of a trend reported previously in which most
of the incidents referred to the Panel for inspection involved conventional arms and
related materiel. The table in annex IX to the present report contains a complete
accounting of the arms and related materiel inspected by the Panel, in addition to
information derived from documents, in particular shipment consignor and
consignee information. These inspections are summarized below.
(a) Yas Air (Turkey)
102. On 19 March 2011, the Turkish authorities seized 19 crates containing assault
rifles, machine guns, ammunition and mortar shells from an Ilyushin cargo aircraft
operated by the cargo airline Yas Air (formerly known as Pars Aviation Services
Company, as described in para. 231). It was found to be carrying 60 AK-47 assault
rifles, 14 BKC/Bixi machine guns, 560 60-mm mortar shells and 1,288 120-mm
mortar shells from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Syrian Arab Republic.
103. In a 19 November 2011 inspection, the Panel examined and confirmed the
arms and ammunition as inventoried by the Turkish authorities, in addition to
documents provided establishing the origin and destination of the shipment. The
Panel concluded that that shipment constituted a violation by the Islamic Republic
of Iran of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007).
(b) Kilis (Turkey)
104. On 15 February 2011, the Turkish authorities seized a truck carrying
explosives originating in the Islamic Republic of Iran en route to the Syrian Arab
Republic. The interdiction took place at Turkey’s border with the Syrian Arab
Republic. The contents of the truck were clearly described on shipping documents
and are summarized as follows:
(a) Two boxes of gunpowder M9, for a total weight of 890 kg;
(b) Two boxes of propelling charge;
(c) Two boxes of slow-burning material, for a total weight of 40 kg;
(d) One box of sensitive materials (detonators);
(e) Six pallets of solid rockets;
(f) Two pallets of RDX explosives for a total weight of 1,700 kg.
105. The Panel inspected the items and found them to be materials for military
purposes, while noting that the detonators and RDX explosive had both military and
non-military applications. Documents examined by the Panel, including an invoice
issued by the consignor of the shipment, SAD Import Export Company, and the TIR
carnet, further established the nature, origin and destination of the cargo.
106. Parchin Chemical Industries and 7th of Tir Industries, both entities designated
by United Nations sanctions as subordinates of the Iranian Defence Industries
Organization, were identified in documents found with the shipment. The contract
referenced in the invoice had been concluded in 2006 for a series of 20 shipments.
The Panel concluded that that shipment constituted a violation by the Islamic
Republic of Iran of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007).
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(c) International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
107. The United Kingdom authorities reported on 21 April 2011 a seizure by the
International Security Assistance Force on 5 February 2011 of a shipment of rockets
and ammunition near Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. The shipment was reported
to include 48 122-mm rockets, 49 fuses and 1,000 7.62-mm ammunition rounds.
108. Following the seizure, much of the shipment was destroyed in situ and the rest
transferred to the United Kingdom for forensic analysis to provide additional
evidence of its origin. Tests included X-ray examination, metallurgy sampling, and
chemical and comparative analysis. The United Kingdom also possessed
intelligence suggesting that the shipment of rockets originated in the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Many of the characteristics of the rockets matched Iranian rockets
found elsewhere.
109. The Panel inspected some of the remains of the rockets in the United Kingdom
on 26 September 2011. The Panel carried out its investigation on the basis of
evidence provided by the United Kingdom authorities, independent research and
consultations with experts.
110. The Panel concluded that there was a high probability that the rockets had
originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Panel invited relevant Member States
to provide further evidence that would enable confirmation of that finding, and
consulted experts from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels in search of
relevant evidence. The Panel continues its investigation and seeks further information.
3. Analysis
Nature of the transfers
111. Whereas in previous inspections the Panel had found only ammunition and no
arms, the current cases include a greater diversity of items. In the Yas Air case, arms
and ammunitions were both present; in the Kilis case, detonators and explosives
were identified. The Panel also observed that, previously, systematic attempts had
been made to conceal shipments physically through erased markings or packaging,
but the current cases reflected no such attempts. This may reflect confidence on the
part of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the transfers might proceed undetected, a
greater time pressure for the shipments or operational errors on the part of the
Iranian authorities.
Transportation
112. Although the current cases inspected by the Panel include examples of arms
transfers using ground and air transport, it cannot be excluded that the Islamic
Republic of Iran continues to use maritime avenues to transport shipments of arms and
related materiel. This issue is discussed further in paragraphs 150 to 181. One
Member State alerted the Panel that the Islamic Republic of Iran might be using mixed
passenger-cargo flights to transfer arms illicitly. The Panel has not further
corroborated this information.
Iranian origin of items
113. The Panel found documentary evidence in two of the three cases linking the
shipments to the Islamic Republic of Iran as the sender. Documents found with the
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shipment of high explosives (Kilis case) connect the items to Parchin Chemical
Industries and 7th of Tir Industries. Both are subsidiaries of the Iranian Defence
Industries Organization and all three entities are designated under Security Council
resolutions: the Defence Industries Organization and 7th of Tir Industries are
designated under annex I to resolution 1737 (2006), while Parchin Chemical
Industries is designated under annex I to resolution 1747 (2007). The Yas Air case
raises the issue of an existing designation under a previous name and the need for a
new designation based on the interdiction. This matter is discussed further in
paragraph 231.
Syrian destination of items
114. The Panel found documentary evidence in two of the three cases linking the
shipments to the Syrian Arab Republic as the recipient. The shipments contained
information pointing to specific consignees in the country for a series of 20
shipments dating from 2006, including a commercial invoice with a reference to the
Central Bank in the letter of credit.
Common elements among interdictions
115. The Panel has identified connections linking current and previous
interdictions. The Panel notes that the labels on wooden boxes containing mortar
shells found in the Francop (Israel) case appeared identical to those found in the Yas
Air (Turkey) interdiction. In both cases, the label read “Ministry of Sepah”, while in
the Yas Air case, a crude attempt had been made to cross off the word “Sepah”.
116. The Panel also identified connections between the recent Kilis (Turkey) case
and two earlier cases: the M/V Monchegorsk (Cyprus) and Hansa India (Malta)
interdictions. The consignor and consignee in both the Kilis and M/V Monchegorsk
cases were identical, and both shipments included increment charges for 120-mm
mortar shells and black powder. The invoice issued by the consignor of the shipment
seized in the Kilis (Turkey) case, SAD Import Export Company, indicates that the
consignment was related to prior maritime shipments to “Lattakia or Tartous Ports”.
Some of the contents of the M/V Monchegorsk shipment, as described in a letter to
the Committee dated 3 February 2009, appeared to be identical to those found in the
Hansa India interdiction, including bronze brass plates and bullet casings packed in
blue metallic barrels. Papers found on the blue metallic barrels on the Hansa India
identified Lattakia or Tartous ports as destinations.
Additional information from Member States
117. Alleged arms transfers from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Member States
have been reported in the media.18 One Member State reported that in 2011 the
Islamic Republic of Iran delivered military equipment and spare parts to the Sudan,
in addition to providing military technical assistance. Another Member State
informed the Panel of arms transfers to Yemen. The Panel is following up, as
appropriate, to encourage the necessary reporting to the Committee. The Panel
stands ready to receive from Member States additional information regarding these
reported transfers.
__________________
18 Eric Schmitt and Robert Worth, “With arms for Yemen rebels, Iran seeks wider Mideast role”,
New York Times, 15 March 2012.
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4. Conclusions
118. During the Panel’s current mandate, there were no violations involving
transfers of conventional arms and related materiel to the Islamic Republic of Iran
reported to the Committee.
119. Inspections indicate that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to transfer
arms, ammunition and dual-use items necessary for the production of explosive
ordnance. Such transfers occur by all available means of transportation: air, land and
sea.
120. The Syrian Arab Republic continues to be the central party to illicit Iranian
arms transfers, as demonstrated by the two additional cases inspected by the Panel
to date.
D. Export control
1. Introduction
121. In resolution 1737 (2006), the Security Council decided that all States were to
take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of all items,
materials, equipment, goods and technology (listed in documents S/2006/814 and
S/2006/815) that could contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s enrichmentrelated,
reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Council decided
that the list of items in document S/2006/814 was to be superseded by the list of
items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and the list of
items contained in document S/2006/815 by the list of items contained in document
S/2010/263.
122. In resolution 1737 (2006), the Council decided that States were to take
measures to prevent the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any technical
assistance or training, and called upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent
specialized teaching or training of disciplines which would contribute to the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and to the development
of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
123. In the present section, the Panel addresses the role played by export controls in
preventing procurement by both Government authorities and the private sector of
the items described above. It also describes some challenges and makes conclusions.
2. Analysis
124. Many Member States attach great importance to implementing their Security
Council obligations concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran in the area of export
controls. At the same time, the continuing prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile
procurement efforts by the Islamic Republic of Iran pose challenges for all Member
States, in particular those with less-developed export control systems, in terms of
identifying dual-use items and implementing catch-all provisions.
(a) Implementation measures by Governments
125. Member States consulted by the Panel provided detailed descriptions of export
licensing procedures and requirements, in addition to policies to ensure the
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extension of export controls to catch-all items not included on the control lists
referenced in the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Panel was impressed by
the high level of attention to detail shown by many Member States to both the spirit
and letter of sanctions provisions regarding export controls.
126. Most Member States provided information regarding their internal procedure
for incorporating Security Council resolutions into national legislation, relevant
institutions and export control procedures. Many described special interministerial
or inter-agency coordinating mechanisms established explicitly for the purpose of
implementing the export controls related to the Islamic Republic of Iran contained
in the relevant resolutions.
127. It remains that the export controls of some Member States with regard to the
Islamic Republic of Iran need further strengthening, especially where legislation,
institutions or enforcement mechanisms are deficient. Reasons for less effective
export controls in this context may include: lack of awareness of export control
obligations because of the absence of relevant industries or production; limited trade
with the Islamic Republic of Iran; geographic remoteness; and lack of resources,
experience and expertise to exercise effective export controls.
Information sharing
128. Information regarding export denials and suspicious enquiries would help the
Panel better to understand patterns of procurement or attempted procurement of
sensitive items. The Panel has received such information on an ad hoc basis from
some Member States and encourages other Member States also to submit
information.
129. The United Kingdom shared with the Panel information regarding denials of
export licences in the context of its membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
These denials, pertaining to dual-use equipment and technology sought by the
Islamic Republic of Iran, were based on catch-all provisions. This information is
valuable to the Panel, as it provides insight into Iranian procurement priorities. The
Panel would welcome similar sharing of information by other Member States.
(b) Customs authorities and control
130. Customs authorities play a key role in enforcing sanctions. The Panel held
discussions with relevant officials during consultations with Member States and
inspections of reported violations, and visited Customs facilities, ports and airports.
131. The Panel noted a high standard of technical equipment, in particular
automatic systems enabling electronic processing of data, electronic profiling and
risk management. The Panel observed the operation of such equipment, including
radiation monitoring and X-ray scanning. Many Customs services had testing
centres or laboratories to carry out technical testing for verification of specific
items, or could call upon such facilities.
132. The Panel was informed that, while the overall policy of Customs authorities
was to facilitate trade, if officials determined that a consignment was suspicious, the
general practice was not to clear the shipment until there was proper identification
of the goods in question, proof of purpose, origin, destination and relevant parties
involved.
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133. Customs administrations cooperate at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Such
cooperation, including information exchange, is facilitated by the World Customs
Organization through its global network of regional intelligence liaison offices,
although this is not used specifically for sanctions implementation.
(c) Implementation by the private sector
Outreach to industry
134. The private sector is at the forefront of effective export control
implementation, and outreach to industry by Member States plays a critically
important role in helping to achieve this objective. It raises awareness of national
and international obligations, provides current information regarding changes in
regulations, promotes internal compliance, reduces the incidence of inadvertent
transfers and encourages industry to exercise due diligence over customers.
135. While most Member States consulted by the Panel maintain some level of
outreach to local industry, other countries are only just beginning to implement such
practices. The Panel continues to emphasize the importance of outreach to the
private sector in its consultations.
136. Outreach methods include seminars, training courses, Government
publications, websites, press releases, social media, industry-specific briefings and
field visits by export control officials.
137. Outreach efforts organized by non-governmental organizations can
complement those of Governments. In some Member States, non-governmental
organizations play an important role in assisting Governments to raise private-sector
awareness of the importance of effective export controls.
Internal compliance programmes
138. Suspicious enquiries point to the need for heightened awareness and vigilance
by suppliers. Firms consulted by the Panel routinely require due diligence on the
part of sales agents to screen enquiries against sanctions lists, check on end users,
exercise caution when dealing with middlemen and consult Government authorities
when questions arise. Member States consulted by the Panel report that companies,
especially large established firms, are wary of the reputational risk involved with
transactions with the Islamic Republic of Iran and regularly avoid them, even in the
case of permissible, non-sanctions-related trade.
139. Internal compliance programmes help producers and traders to exercise
discipline and vigilance over sensitive dual-use exports. Many Member States
promote the establishment of such procedures, in addition to certifying and even
monitoring them. Several private-sector producers of sensitive dual-use goods
shared with the Panel possible indicators for identifying suspicious enquiries. These
included:
(a) Reluctance by the purchasing agent to provide information about the end
use and end users;
(b) Inability to answer commercial or technical questions regarding the item
sought;
(c) Unconvincing explanation as to why the item is required;
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(d) Unusually favourable terms of payment offered;
(e) Requests for unusual shipping, packaging or labelling arrangements;
(f) Requirements for confidentiality regarding final destinations, customers
or specifications of items;
(g) Requests for excessive quantities;
(h) Similar enquiries received from multiple agents;
(i) Enquiries received based on common lists with characteristic
misspellings;
(j) Request for post-sale modifications to uncontrolled items that would
result in the item falling within controls if exported as such;
(k) Changes of consignee address shortly before shipment.
Controls on teaching or training
140. The Panel has raised with Member States the issue of specialized teaching or
training in sensitive areas, and observed that a wide range of practices existed to
implement those provisions. Some Member States have established working groups
with universities to ensure that advanced graduate work by Iranian students is
monitored in accordance with Security Council obligations; other Member States are
beginning to establish such procedures. Many Member States have a policy to deny
student visa requests from the Islamic Republic of Iran for advanced graduate study
in sensitive areas, and monitor closely any changes in courses of study.
(d) Iranian procurement efforts
141. The Panel was informed by a number of Member States and one regional
multilateral organization that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to seek items
through illicit procurement to support prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile
programmes. Among the items cited most frequently were vacuum pumps,
perfluoropolyether lubricants and carbon fibre (see paras. 57-67 for greater detail
regarding the last-mentioned issue). As noted above, one State provided the Panel
with information regarding denials of licences for export issued under catch-all
requirements. Examples included process controllers, heat exchangers, flow meters
and accessories, and carbon steel tubes.
142. According to the same regional multilateral organization, the Islamic Republic
of Iran undertakes this procurement directly and indirectly. Its procurement methods
include making direct bids to foreign commercial partners to procure materials with
technical documentation, acquiring foreign licences and patents, copying material,
conducting mergers of or absorbing foreign companies or purchasing company
securities allowing access to technologies, and sending technicians to foreign
suppliers for training.
143. The Islamic Republic of Iran is also believed to use indirect strategies for
procurement, including:
(a) Making use of front companies;
(b) Concealing the end use or end user and final destination;
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(c) Falsifying technical documentation for materials ordered;
(d) Reaching out to multiple suppliers for the same item;
(e) Making use of the Iranian diaspora to facilitate procurement.
3. Challenges
144. Small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises
are more vulnerable than their larger counterparts to weaknesses in export control
systems. They may lack resources, expertise, experience and knowledge of their
national and international obligations. Investment in internal compliance
programmes can be costly for small firms or seen as excessively burdensome. Small
and medium-sized enterprises may also be wary of export controls, which are
perceived to hamper business opportunities. Such firms may not have the same
aversion to reputational risk as larger firms. Internal compliance programmes are
more difficult to implement for small and medium-sized enterprises than for larger
firms. Outreach initiatives targeting small and medium-sized enterprises should
make it a priority to help such firms to establish internal compliance programmes.
145. Identification difficulties. Special expertise is necessary to identify
proliferation-sensitive dual-use exports at two stages of the export control process.
The first stage is at the time of licensing, when exporters, in particular those who
are unfamiliar with their national export control legislation and procedures, may
export items without understanding licence requirements. The second stage is at the
border, where such expertise is necessary for identifying sensitive exports.
146. Control lists. Several Member States consulted by the Panel noted that the
lists identified in paragraph 122 had been modified since the adoption of resolution
1929 (2010), and requested that the Panel should recommend the updating of those
lists. The current versions of these lists are contained in INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2,
INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 1 and document S/2012/235.
4. Conclusions
147. Member States are implementing export controls with greater awareness of
their obligations under United Nations sanctions. While most have well-established
mechanisms to coordinate and implement the export licensing process, including of
catch-all items falling below established thresholds, some may need assistance to
strengthen such programmes and their implementation.
148. Small and medium-sized enterprises are an attractive target for illicit
procurement. Outreach to small and medium-sized enterprises engaged in the
production and export of sensitive items is critical to the effective implementation
of sanctions and, more generally, export controls.
149. Internal compliance programmes have proved an effective tool to help the
private sector to implement export controls, although not all companies have such
programmes in place.
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E. Shipping and transportation
1. Introduction
150. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council called upon all States to
inspect all cargo to and from the Islamic Republic of Iran and to cooperate in
inspections on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, if there was
information that provided reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was carrying
items, the supply, sale, transfer or export of which was prohibited. The Council also
decided that States were to prohibit the provision of bunkering services to Iranianowned
or -contracted vessels if they had information that provided reasonable
grounds to believe that they were carrying prohibited items.
151. Three Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines entities are designated under
resolution 1929 (2010): Irano Hind Shipping Company, IRISL Benelux NV and
South Shipping Line Iran (SSL), together with persons or entities acting on their
behalf or at their direction and entities owned or controlled by them.
152. In paragraph 20 of resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council requested all
Member States to inform the Committee of transfers of business and activity by the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines to other companies, including renaming or
re-registering of vessels or ships. The same information is requested from Member
States in connection with Iran Air’s cargo division.
2. Background
153. According to Iranian official statements over the past year, international trade
has increased, the sanctions notwithstanding.19 By contrast, many Member States
reported to the Panel significant decreases in trade with the Islamic Republic of
Iran, citing such factors as difficulties completing financial transactions, finding
carriers and freight forwarders for transporting Iranian-related cargo and obtaining
marine insurance coverage. Unilateral sanctions may be a factor in these
developments.
154. The Panel was also informed that some shipping companies and freight
forwarders had adopted policies to refrain from business with the Islamic Republic
of Iran, including transporting cargo to Iranian ports.20 A number of large cargo
transportation firms announced over the past year a suspension or limitation in
shipments involving Iranian ports. These include CMA CGM (September 2011),
Hapag-Lloyd (November 2011) and Maersk (February 2012).21 According to an
international maritime insurance association consulted by the Panel, marine
insurance, including third-party liability insurance, connected with business with the
Islamic Republic of Iran is difficult to obtain.22 The International Air Transport
Association suspended the access of two Iranian airlines, including Iran Air, to its
__________________
19 “UAE official: trade ties with Iran unaffected by sanctions”, Fars News Agency, 21 August 2011.
“Dubai-Iran trade grows in goods exempt from sanctions”, Tehran Times, 22 August 2011.
“Iran: minister dismisses effectiveness of sanctions against Iran”, Thai News Service, 31 August
2011.
20 “Sanctions blowback crippling Iran’s shipping trade”, Reuters, 1 December 2011.
21 “Maersk suspends oil tanker trade deals with Iran”, Reuters News, 8 February 2012.
“French shipper CMA CGM stops exporting from Iran”, Reuters News, 30 November 2011.
22 Some of the issues relevant to protection and indemnity cover are discussed in www.igpandi.org/
downloadables/news/news/Iran%20FAQs%208%2002%202012.pdf.
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payment settlement system for member airlines and travel agents. Two bordering
Member States announced limitations in air cargo overflights or the grounding and
inspection of all such flights.
3. Analysis
155. The Panel inspected three incidents of non-compliance reported by Member
States, two of which involved transport by road and one transport by air. The details
of these inspections can be found in paragraphs 100 to 110.
(a) Air transport
156. The Yas Air (Turkey) interdiction was undertaken following a technical stopover
imposed by Turkey in response to a series of flight plans submitted by Yas Air and
information provided by another State. The incident illustrates the importance of
effective, timely and tested inter-agency coordination mechanisms in carrying out
successful interdictions of air shipments. These are particularly important because
information on overflights with suspicious cargoes may be available with limited
notice and decisions may need to be taken by the authorities at the last minute.
157. Yas Air’s corporate registration history and the issue of its proposed
designation under United Nations sanctions are discussed in more detail in
paragraph 231. One of the patterns of circumvention by the Islamic Republic of Iran
illustrated in this case involves the renaming of a cargo airline.
(b) Overland transport
158. In the case of the International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan), in
which arms and related materiel were interdicted close to the border in southern
Afghanistan, the methods and route used for transporting the prohibited goods
resembled smuggling or illicit trafficking of contraband. Experts in border security
in this region have noted that the capacity of Customs is limited on both sides of the
border and the volume of cross-border trade very high, making it more vulnerable to
smuggling.23
159. The case of Kilis (Turkey) consisted of arms-related materiel carried by a
truck that was legally registered for international road transport. No attempt had
been made to physically conceal the shipment or to falsify the documents. The Panel
notes that a related shipping document stated that the shipment was part of a
contract including 20 such shipments.
(c) Maritime transport
160. No State reported violations involving marine transport during the Panel’s
current mandate.
161. The Panel visited seven ports during its current mandate to gather relevant
information about the implementation of sanctions. Practices vary by State as to the
precise role played by port authorities. The Panel notes that there is significant value
in coordinating the responsibilities of port authorities with those tasked with the
detection of prohibited commodities for the purpose of sanctions implementation or
__________________
23 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat
Assessment (Vienna, July 2011).
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export controls. For example, information held by port authorities on vessels
entering ports, such as International Maritime Organization numbers, could be
shared with the authorities in charge of implementing relevant Security Council
resolutions. Inspection tools used by port authorities, even though not designed to
detect suspicious cargo, could help relevant authorities to detect suspicious ship
operations, including carriage of banned goods.24
(d) Measures taken by the private sector
162. The Panel notes that many transport companies are sensitive to the need to
comply with sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran and have adopted additional
measures to reduce the risk of violating relevant Security Council resolutions. These
include creation of internal compliance units; enhanced internal compliance
procedures, including senior management responsibility for decisions over business
with an Iranian connection; advanced risk profiling systems; specialized training of
employees; development of internal blacklists of suspicious or risky customers;
scanning of all cargo bound for the Islamic Republic of Iran; and mandatory
confirmation from business counterparts that their contract is not connected to
Iranian prohibited activities. By contrast, some entities have withdrawn from the
Iranian market altogether.
4. Transfer, renaming and reflagging of vessels related to the Islamic Republic of
Iran Shipping Lines25
163. The measures concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
contained in the relevant resolutions go beyond the designations of the three entities
related to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines in paragraph 19 of resolution
1929 (2010). States are also called upon to be vigilant over the activities of the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines in resolutions 1803 (2008) and
1929 (2010). They are obliged under paragraph 22 of resolution 1929 (2010) to
require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in
their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, to exercise vigilance when doing
business with entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, if they have
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could
contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities
or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
164. These measures are difficult to implement because of actions by the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, following the adoption of resolution 1803 (2008),
to modify regularly its corporate ownership structure and the names and flags of its
vessels. Currently, over 130 vessels related to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines are operated by approximately 75 companies, most of which operate just one
or only a few vessels. The Panel understands from discussions with shipping
industry representatives that such operating practices are uncommon, especially
among major shipping lines.
__________________
24 Hugh Griffiths and Michael Jenks, “Marine transport and destabilizing commodity flows”,
Stockholm International Security and Peace Research Institute Policy Paper, No. 32 (Solna,
2012). Available from books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP32.pdf.
25 The assessment in the present subsection is based on information from States and the Panel’s
own research using commercial sources (Lloyd’s List’s Seasearcher and IHS Fairplay).
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165. These activities, although not in themselves illegal, have introduced a complex
and amorphous structure to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines that serves
to obscure its activities as a whole and the identities of individual vessels.26 The
more complex the overall structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines,
the more difficult and time-consuming the identification of ships related to it.
166. The following is a preliminary assessment of trends. It is intended to provide
basic information regarding the activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines to assist the Security Council and the Committee. It is also intended to assist
Member States in exercising effective vigilance over the activities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines in accordance with the relevant Security Council
resolutions. Pertinent information from Member States would assist the Panel to
develop further its analysis of this issue.
Transfers of vessel ownership
167. At the time of the adoption of resolution 1803 (2008), the first reference to the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines in a Security Council resolution, the
company was the beneficial owner of more than 110 vessels. Following resolution
1803 (2008), it began transferring vessels to two related companies: the Hafiz Darya
Shipping Company and the Sapid Shipping Company (see figure IV).
Figure IV
Ownership structure of vessels related to the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines
Source: Lloyd’s List’s Seasearcher.
__________________
26 For an analysis of corporate and financial structures that could be used for hiding corrupt
transactions, see Emile van der Does de Willebois and others, The Puppet Masters (Washington,
D.C., World Bank, 2011).
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168. From 2008 until the adoption of resolution 1929 (2010), the Islamic Republic
of Iran Shipping Lines and its related companies carried out more than 110 changes
to the beneficial and registered owners of their vessels. Following the adoption of
resolution 1929 (2010), a further more than 110 changes took place.
169. As at 28 April 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines was the
beneficial owner of 50 vessels, of which 14 were registered as directly owned by it
and another 36 by 14 different companies owned in turn by it. In addition, from 35 to
40 vessels are registered to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, although they
are either under construction, on construction orders or pending operation.
170. Very few vessels were directly registered to the Hafiz Darya Shipping
Company or the Sapid Shipping Company as at 28 April 2012. The eight vessels of
the former were registered to seven different companies that it owned. The
47 vessels of the latter were registered to 39 different companies that it owned. Only
two vessels were registered to the Sapid Shipping Company itself. Approximately
20 other vessels were related to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, the
Hafiz Darya Shipping Company or the Sapid Shipping Company, bringing to more
than 130 the number of vessels related to the three companies (including vessels
related to the Irano Hind Shipping Company). In many cases, companies under
ownership of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, the Hafiz Darya Shipping
Company or the Sapid Shipping Company possessed only one or two vessels.
171. More than 60 of the approximately 130 vessels are currently operated by a
single Iranian third party operator, the Rahbaran Omid Darya Ship Management
Company. In addition, more than 50 vessels are managed by a single Iranian
technical manager, the Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Company.
Renaming of vessels
172. Vessels under the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and its related
companies change names frequently, in most cases from those easily identified as
Iranian-related to those not indicating any Iranian origin. When resolution 1803
(2008) was adopted, most vessels owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines carried a name containing “Iran”. As at 28 April 2012, however, the name
“Iran” was found in fewer than 10 of more than 130 vessels related to the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, the Hafiz Darya Shipping Company and the Sapid
Shipping Company. Since the adoption of resolution 1803 (2008), more than 150
name changes of vessels owned or controlled by the three companies have taken
place.
Reflagging of vessels
173. Following the adoption of resolution 1803 (2008), the flag States of more than
90 vessels related to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, the Hafiz Darya
Shipping Company and the Sapid Shipping Company have been changed.
174. Approximately 25 per cent of these changes happened recently. Since February
2012, 12 vessels belonging to the Sapid Shipping Company or the Irano Hind
Shipping Company have changed their flags to a Latin American State. Since March
2012, eight vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines or the
Hafiz Darya Shipping Company have shifted their flag to an African State and three
vessels belonging to the Hafiz Darya Shipping Company or the Sapid Shipping
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Company have changed flags to another African State. The beneficial and registered
owners of some of these vessels are unconfirmed.
175. Some of these flag changes were also accompanied by vessel name changes.
Vessels with relatively large container capacity changed their names, flags and
owners at the same time.
Related services providers
176. Changes in ownership, names and flags can be carried out only by third parties
with expertise in legal and procedural issues, such as registration brokerage
companies, law firms or corporate services providers. One State informed the Panel
that transfers of vessel ownership were apparently obscured by the use of bearer
shares provided by such a third party.
5. Conclusions
177. The frequent changes of ownership, name and flag of vessels by the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines go beyond standard business practice and are suited
to obscuring the identity of vessels. Vigilance over the company’s activities, in
particular monitoring vessels’ International Maritime Organization numbers,
continues to be important.
178. Vigilance by providers of related services, including ship registration and
corporate formation, is also needed.
179. The absence of reported incidents notwithstanding, it is likely that maritime
shipments of prohibited items are continuing.
180. Border States are potential targets for illicit transfers or transit of arms and
related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
181. Coordination among port, airport and air traffic control authorities with
enforcement agencies enhances the effectiveness of sanctions implementation and
their enforcement. In maritime ports and airports, coordination of technical
inspections with border control and Customs authorities can enhance
implementation of sanctions. Sharing of information routinely obtained by all
relevant authorities, including vessels’ International Maritime Organization numbers
and flight plans of aircraft, is important.
F. Financial and business restrictions
1. Introduction
182. The relevant Security Council resolutions contain two categories of financial
restrictions. The first, targeted financial sanctions, require freezing of funds and other
assets of designated entities and individuals (resolution 1737 (2006), paras. 12-15;
resolution 1747 (2007), para. 6; resolution 1803 (2008), para. 7; and resolution 1929
(2010), paras. 11, 12 and 19). The designated individuals and entities are listed in the
annex to resolution 1737 (2006), annex I to resolution 1747 (2007), annexes I and III
to resolution 1803 (2008) and annexes I to III of resolution 1929 (2010). Two Iranian
financial institutions are designated: Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International
(resolution 1747 (2007)) and First East Export Bank (resolution 1929 (2010)).
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183. The second category of restriction is activity-based sanctions, which impose
restrictions on financial or business dealings with the Islamic Republic of Iran under
specific conditions. The restrictions are as follows:
(a) Preventing the transfer of financial resources or services related to the
supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items (resolution 1737
(2006), para. 6; and resolution 1929 (2010), paras. 8 and 13);
(b) Preventing the provision of financial services and transfer of financial
assets or resources that could contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems (resolution 1929 (2010), para. 21);
(c) Prohibiting Iranian banks from initiating new business activities in
Member States if related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems
(resolution 1929 (2010), para. 23);
(d) Prohibiting financial institutions of Member States from initiating new
business in the Islamic Republic of Iran if related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems (resolution 1929 (2010), para. 24).
184. The activity-based sanctions of resolution 1929 (2010) build on those set out
in resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1803 (2008). Two Iranian financial institutions are
named in paragraph 10 of resolution 1803 (2008), in which the Security Council
calls upon States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in
their territories with all banks domiciled in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in
particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries
abroad. Vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central
Bank of Iran, was also called for in the sixteenth preambular paragraph of resolution
1929 (2010).
185. Member States are also obliged to require their nationals, persons subject to
their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their
jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, including those of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (resolution 1929 (2010), para. 22).
186. In the present section, the Panel discusses the implementation by Member
States of United Nations financial sanctions, responses to financial sanctions,
practices of entities in response to sanctions requirements and challenges arising
from the implementation of financial sanctions.
2. Analysis
(a) Implementation of financial sanctions
187. The Panel consulted Member States to learn about how implementation was
carried out in practice and to receive information on sanctions circumvention by the
Islamic Republic of Iran. The Panel participated in outreach seminars for
Governments and the private sector and sought views from private-sector entities
during meetings.
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188. To implement financial sanctions, Member States require mechanisms to
identify and freeze assets of designated entities and individuals, and to monitor and
regulate financial and business transactions with the Islamic Republic of Iran. A
high standard of communication and coordination between regulatory authorities
and the private sector is needed.
189. While many Member States noted that they had such systems in place, only a
few shared information regarding suspicious transaction reports, violations or
attempted violations. For example:
(a) One State bordering the Islamic Republic of Iran said that it had revoked
the licence of a money transfer company in 2008;
(b) One State informed the Panel that its financial intelligence unit had
received and investigated several suspicious transaction reports in connection with
transactions involving Bank Saderat during the period 2006-2007. It could not be
ascertained that those were relevant to United Nations resolutions. The financial
intelligence unit had also carried out checks on the basis of information received
from other Member States during 2007, but no information had been found related
to United Nations sanctions;
(c) One State said that on-site inspections of Bank Mellat had identified two
examples of failure to follow proper procedures;
(d) One State noted that transactions from banks in one Middle Eastern State
with Iranian shareholders had been blocked based on intelligence received from
foreign sources.
190. There is no general understanding of the definition of “vigilance” in the
context of paragraph 22 of resolution 1929 (2010). Member States reported various
mechanisms to comply with this requirement, such as:
(a) Some regulatory authorities closely supervised business with the Islamic
Republic of Iran;
(b) Some authorities required notification or authorization in advance for
transfers of funds involving an Iranian person or entity over specific thresholds. One
State reported a requirement for non-personal financial transactions to be licensed
on a case-by-case basis. Other Member States had systems in place to license
individual financial transactions, or to license a class of financial transactions;
(c) Some Member States reported that they simply generally supervised
business to ensure that no prohibited activities took place.
191. The Panel received no reports that the Islamic Republic of Iran had
successfully developed significant new channels for transactions following the
adoption of resolution 1929 (2010), although some Member States shared
information that it remained interested in doing so. One State noted that monitoring
Iranian-related transactions through banks in some third countries was difficult. One
State bordering the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Panel of Iranian requests
to open new financial institutions. Those requests were not pursued, apparently
because of that State’s burdensome legislation. Another State, on another continent,
disclosed similar requests. Another State said that the Islamic Republic of Iran had
requested information about procedures for opening financial institutions using
Iranian or mixed capital. In most cases, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not pursue
these enquiries.
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192. The compliance department of one large international financial institution
stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran was known to be seeking to develop covert
relationships with existing institutions, and new relationships in jurisdictions with
weak regulations. A representative of another large international financial entity also
noted that Iranian banks were creative in seeking to circumvent sanctions, including
by opening new branches.
193. The Financial Action Task Force issued revised standards in February 2012,
including a new standard on implementation of targeted financial sanctions related
to proliferation. Member States may need to put in place mechanisms to meet this
standard. The inclusion of this standard in future mutual evaluation reviews could
provide the Panel with useful information regarding the implementation of United
Nations targeted financial sanctions.
(b) Responses to financial sanctions
194. Member States informed the Panel that Iranian entities and citizens not
designated under sanctions were deploying measures to deal with the effects of
sanctions, in particular unilateral ones, some of which might be intended only to
protect legitimate transactions, such as:
(a) An increasing number of Iranian-related financial transactions involved
non-sanctioned Iranian banks with correspondent accounts with foreign banks, or
money transfer businesses based in the Islamic Republic of Iran with access to
foreign banks. Some of those transactions might have been initiated by sanctioned
banks;27
(b) An increase in cash transfers between Iranians resident overseas and their
friends and relatives inside the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was notable in
Member States with many Iranian residents. One State, which monitors all crossborder
financial transactions, reported a several-fold increase over the past two
years in cash transfers to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The State suggested that
sanctions had made electronic transfers more difficult. Another factor was the
increasing regulation of money transfer businesses, which were now required to
register as financial institutions. The media also reported an increase in cash
transactions;28
(c) One State said that hawala transactions had increased in recent years in
inverse proportion to the reduction of bank transactions with the Islamic Republic of
Iran;
(d) One border State reported that barter transactions were a growing
component of trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Barter arrangements were
also reported by the media;29
__________________
27 See also media reports, such as Benoît Faucon and Margaret Coker, “Willing banks find profits
in legal trade with Iran”, Wall Street Journal, 8 April 2012.
28 Michael Lipin, “Western sanctions on Iran’s banks make trade harder”, Voice of America News,
3 April 2012.
29 Valerie Parent and Parisa Hafezi, “Iran turns to barter for food as sanctions cripple imports”,
Reuters, 9 February 2012. Indira Lakshmanan and Pratish Narayanan, “India and China skirt
Iran sanctions with ‘junk for oil’”, Bloomberg, 30 March 2012.
“Pakistan, Iran holding talks on barter trade”, Tehran Times, 22 April 2012.
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(e) Some Member States reported cases of companies set up for the purpose
of transferring funds to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, the Panel
was informed of the case of a small non-financial firm led by an expatriate Iranian
that had transformed itself into a company involved in transferring funds received
from a non-sanctioned Iranian bank to recipients throughout the world. Some
$11 billion had been processed over 18 months.
195. Understanding whether and how the above-described methods could be used
for financing procurement for sanctioned nuclear and ballistic programmes is
challenging. These programmes are industrial in scale and require sources of
financing for procurement that are large and reliable.
(c) Practices of financial entities
196. The Panel held discussions with representatives of several international
financial institutions, insurers, banking associations and legal entities in Europe,
Asia and North America.
197. For the purposes of implementing United Nations targeted sanctions, many
large financial institutions said that they relied on commercial software providers
for systems to screen transactions. Screening against individuals designated by the
United Nations was often complicated by a lack of sufficient identifying detail.
Most institutions required screening to be able to identify possible non-compliance
under all relevant jurisdictions in which they operated. Some providers offered
screening services against additional, proprietary criteria. Most institutions said that
they deployed many staff and expended significant resources to ensure that adequate
due diligence was carried out.
198. The Panel was informed by many institutions and regulatory authorities that
they took a highly risk-averse approach to compliance with sanctions on the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Many regarded possible penalties for violating unilateral sanctions
(in addition to negative publicity and reputational damage) as of greater concern
than possible violations of United Nations sanctions, and formulated corporate
compliance procedures accordingly. Some entities reported that they had decided
that resources needed for adequate compliance with all relevant sanctions regimes
were too costly where business was connected with the Islamic Republic of Iran and
had decided to do no such business at all.
199. Channels for transactions with some Iranian banks have been blocked
following the termination of financial messaging services to these banks in response
to unilateral financial sanctions.30
200. The Panel observed that the practices of many financial institutions were
widening the scope of United Nations financial sanctions. For example, two large
insurance entities informed the Panel that company policy was to turn down almost
all business connected with the Islamic Republic of Iran because of the burdensome
nature of necessary due diligence and potential complexities should a claim arise.
Many protection and indemnity clubs have terminated third-party liability cover for
Iranian vessels because of unilateral sanctions. The Panel was informed that Iranian
insurance companies might provide alternative cover. It is unclear whether the
compliance policies of international banks would allow transactions to be processed
should Iranian insurance companies pay out against a claim.
__________________
30 Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, www.swift.com/news/
press_releases/SWIFT_disconnect_Iranian_banks (accessed 7 May 2012).
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3. Challenges
(a) Asset freezes
201. Only a few Member States reported that assets had been frozen in response to
Security Council resolutions. Most Member States informed the Panel that no assets
had been frozen because no relevant assets had been present. Two said that business
related to the Islamic Republic of Iran had already scaled back significantly by the
time that United Nations asset freezes were put in place.
202. There are several possible reasons for the lack of reports of assets frozen under
the relevant United Nations resolutions. Some Member States may lack mechanisms
to freeze assets in connection with the resolutions, or may have failed to take action
swiftly to ensure that no funds were removed from their jurisdiction before such
freezes took effect. Some Member States may require assistance or advice in the
implementation of asset freezes. For example, one State enquired about procedures
followed elsewhere with regard to property subject to asset freezes.
203. A banking association reported to the Panel in writing that its members were
concerned about the ability of the competent authorities to respond to enquiries and
licensing requests in a timely manner. Many competent authorities struggled with
the lack of precision in the language of United Nations resolutions (such as the
definition of “acting on their behalf”).
(b) Unilateral sanctions
204. The issue of unilateral financial sanctions is not within the Panel’s mandate.
The issue is, however, raised often by Member States in the course of the Panel’s
consultations regarding United Nations financial sanctions. In addition to United
Nations sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran, a number of jurisdictions have
imposed their own financial sanctions regimes (referred to here as “unilateral
sanctions regimes”). Such regimes and sanctions have increased over the past year.
Some Member States reported that they sought to comply with both United Nations
sanctions and unilateral regimes, and others that they complied only with United
Nations sanctions.
205. One example of the difficulties imposed by unilateral sanctions on legitimate
transactions is illustrated by an enquiry from an international humanitarian
organization to the United Nations regarding the transfer of funds from the Islamic
Republic of Iran. The Committee, assisted by the Panel, subsequently recommended
that the humanitarian organization should seek advice from Member States that had
jurisdiction over their activities regarding restrictions imposed by sanctions regimes,
and, where necessary, request such Member States to seek an exemption from the
Committee in connection with the transfer of items, financial resources or assets to
or from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
206. One State reported that it had been approached by an international
humanitarian organization for advice on transferring funds to the Islamic Republic
of Iran following the imposition of unilateral sanctions. The State responded that it
could not influence the policies of individual banks.
207. The media also reported difficulties with humanitarian transactions.31
__________________
31 Arshad Maohammed, “Of diapers and drugs, Iran’s trouble paying bills”, Reuters, 21 March 2012.
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4. Conclusions
208. The Panel finds a high level of awareness among Member States and the
private sector of United Nations financial sanctions. Many Member States are
implementing sanctions through their financial regulatory bodies with rigour.
209. Understanding whether and how Iranian circumvention of United Nations
financial sanctions could be used for financing procurement for sanctioned nuclear
and ballistic missile programmes is challenging. These programmes are industrial in
scale and require sources of procurement financing that are large and reliable.
210. Legitimate trade may be hindered by the practices for financial transactions
followed by some entities in response to unilateral sanctions.
G. Designation of entities and individuals
1. Introduction
211. Designated entities and individuals are subjected to asset freezes set forth in
paragraphs 11, 12 and 19 of resolution 1929 (2010) and previous resolutions. They
are also subject to travel ban measures under paragraph 10 of resolution
1929 (2010). The travel ban is discussed further in paragraphs 232 to 247 of the
present report.
212. Consolidated lists of designated individuals and entities can be found on the
Committee’s website.32 The current list falls into three categories: those concerning
other individuals and entities involved in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear or
ballistic missile activities; designations related to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”); and
those related to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.
213. In the present section, the Panel discusses the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps, the Irano Hind Shipping Company and the entities and individuals that have
come to the Panel’s attention as a result of inspections carried out of reported
violations.
2. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
214. Although the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a whole is not designated
under the relevant resolutions, a number of key figures have been identified by the
Security Council as involved in nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and are
subject to asset freeze measures. Officers, including the Corps’ Commander-in-
Chief and Joint Chief of Staff, in addition to the commanders of the air force,
ground force and navy, are all designated. Furthermore, three entities identified in
annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) and Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters
and 14 entities related thereto are designated in annex II to resolution 1929 (2010).
215. Activities related to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps are also made
subject to vigilance exercised by States and their nationals, persons and firms if they
have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business
could contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. Such vigilance
__________________
32 See www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/pdf/1737ConsolidatedList.pdf.
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over business activities extends to entities and individuals acting on behalf of the
Corps or at its direction, and entities owned or controlled by it, including through
illicit means.
216. The consultations with many Member States showed the difficulty of
identifying specific transactions or businesses involving the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps that could contribute to Iranian proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. Part of the
problem lies in the lack of information regarding the structure of the Corps and its
activities, both inside the Islamic Republic of Iran and abroad.
217. This lack of information means that foreign entities seeking to carry out
legitimate trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran run the risk of becoming
unwittingly involved in the above-mentioned prohibited activities of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, and thus violating relevant Security Council
resolutions. To avoid such risks, which could result in significant legal penalties and
reputational damage, many entities decide to withdraw from any business that might
be connected with the Islamic Republic of Iran or Iranian elements, regardless of the
legitimate nature of such business.
(a) Economic activities by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
218. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is an overwhelmingly important
actor in the Iranian economy and has expanded into various sectors, mainly through
its civilian arms. Although experts find it difficult to determine the extent of its
influence on the economy, conservative estimates suggest that it exercises control of
between 25 and 40 per cent of the Iranian gross domestic product.33
219. For example, the construction wing of the Corps, Khatam al-Anbiya
Construction Headquarters, which is designated under resolution 1929 (2010), is
engaged in numerous projects, including dams, buildings, roads, tunnels and
underground structures, ports, oil installations, telecommunications, transportation,
energy and transmission lines for oil, gas, water and sewage. It has dozens of
subsidiaries and partners. One estimate even suggests that it has more than 800
subsidiaries34 and, according to the entity itself, it has completed hundreds of
projects.35 The position of its Director is traditionally occupied by influential
officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The current Minister of Oil,
Rostam Qasemi, is a former Director.36 Other major projects, such as airport
operations, are carried out by other construction entities under the control of the
Corps.
220. Some Member States have informed the Panel that the Corps also controls
informal economic channels. In particular, some Iranian charitable organizations
(foundations) controlled by the Corps are believed to support the Corps’ economic
activities, including provision of informal channels for business transactions. Such
foundations include the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Cooperative
__________________
33 Elliot Hen-Tov and Nathan Gonzalez, “The militarization of post-Khomeini Iran: Praetrorianism
2.0”, The Washington Quarterly, winter 2011.
34 “New Iran sanction target Revolutionary Guards”, Time Magazine, 10 June 2010.
35 See Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters website, “Ghorb at a glance” (http://khatam.com/
?part=menu&inc=menu&id=98) (accessed 22 April 2012).
36 The Director was reportedly replaced by Abolqasem Mozaffari Shams in August 2011, after his
predecessor was appointed and confirmed as Minister of Oil.
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Foundation (Bonyad-e Taavon-e Sepah) and the Foundation of the Oppressed
(Bonyad-e Mostazafan), both of which include incumbent and/or former officers of
the Corps as board members. Both foundations operate extensive businesses; for
example, the Foundation of the Oppressed recently announced that 20 holding
companies and 173 companies were operating under it, in a range of industries,
including the agriculture, shipping, finance and beverages industries.37
(b) Leadership of the Corps
221. Although it appears that individuals were designated by the Security Council
according to the leadership positions that they occupied within the Corps,
subsequent personnel changes have taken place in the leadership of the Corps. These
are not reflected in the list of designated individuals on the Committee website. The
changes are reflected in the table below.
Changes in Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps leadership
Designated individual Position Current commanders
MG Yahya Rahim Safavi Commander of the Corps MG Mohammad Ali Jafari
BG Morteza Rezaie Deputy Commander of
the Corps
BG Hossein Salami38
BG Mohammad Reza Zahedi Commander of the
Ground Force
BG Mohammad Pakpour
BG Hossein Salami Commander of the Air
Force39
BG Amir Ali Hajizadeh
RA Morteza Safari Commander of the Navy RA Ali Fadavi
BG Mohammad Hejazi Commander of the Basij
Resistance Force
BG Mohammad Reza
Naqdi40
BG Qasem Soleimani Commander of the Qods
Force
(Promoted to MG)
Abbreviations: MG, Major General; BG, Brigadier General; RA, Rear Admiral.383940
222. Some designated individuals who have moved from the positions that they
occupied when they were originally designated continue to hold influential
positions. These include Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi (currently a military
adviser to the Supreme Leader) and Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Head of
Logistics and Industrial Research in the Joint Staff of the armed forces).
__________________
37 See the website of the Foundation of the Oppressed: economic activities (www.irmf.ir/activity/
Introduce/economic.aspx) (accessed 22 April 2012).
38 Designated as Air Force Commander under resolution 1737 (2006).
39 The air force was renamed as the “aerospace force” as a result of restructuring in late 2009.
40 Designated as a former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial
Research under resolution 1803 (2008).
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3. Designated entity related to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines: the
Irano Hind Shipping Company
223. The Irano Hind Shipping Company is designated in accordance with
paragraph 19 of resolution 1929 (2010), and its funds, assets and economic
resources are to be frozen by Member States. The Panel received information that
assets of the Irano Hind Shipping Company in one Member State were frozen.
224. On the basis of the Panel’s analysis, which is based on information from
Member States and the Panel’s own research using commercial sources (Lloyd’s
List’s Seasearcher and IHS Fairplay), it appears that the company’s vessels continue
to operate. The Panel has identified at least seven vessels — three crude oil tankers
and four bulk carriers — that have been controlled by the Irano Hind Shipping
Company since the time of its designation. There may also be an additional crude oil
tanker registered by the Irano Hind Shipping Company but not yet in operation.
These seven vessels are registered and operated by seven separate companies, each
owning and operating just one vessel. These companies, and an additional five
companies that do not appear to operate any vessels, are owned by the Irano Hind
Shipping Company and share the same address. An official website of a State also
suggests that all these companies are subject to United Nations/European Union
sanctions.41
225. In April 2012, companies controlled by the Irano Hind Shipping Company
changed the flags of all three crude oil tankers belonging to the Company’s fleet,
from that of Malta to that of the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The Director of the
Bolivian International Ship Registry stated on 18 April that, if any of the ships were
in breach of sanctions imposed by the United Nations, or other group of countries,
its registration would be cancelled.42 This reflagging coincides with other
reflagging activities described in paragraphs 174 to 176.
226. The Irano Hind Shipping Company fleet currently includes no container
carriers. The fleet previously included two container carriers, the registrations of
each of which were transferred, before the adoption of resolution 1929 (2010), to
different owners in one State. The beneficial ownership of both was transferred to an
owner in a third State. These two container carriers appear to be in operation mainly
in Europe and South America. A list of the above-mentioned companies and vessels
can be found in annex X to the present report.
227. The continued operation of the Irano Hind Shipping Company vessels may
reflect several factors:
(a) Some Member States may not interpret the resolutions as requiring them
to detain vessels owned or controlled by the designated entities;
(b) There may not be a common understanding of terms such as “acting on
behalf of Irano Hind and at its direction” or “owned or controlled” by the Irano
Hind Shipping Company;
(c) Member States may lack sufficient legal grounds to enable or justify
action;
__________________
41 See http://rocsupport.mfsa.com.mt/pages/default.aspx.
42 Daniel Fineren, “Bolivia poised to de-flag Iranian ships”, Reuters, 18 April 2012.
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(d) Member States may be unable to identify vessels operating in their
territorial waters as being controlled by the Irano Hind Shipping Company.
4. Entities involved in violations: proposed additional designations
228. The Panel notes that the Committee’s recent decision to add two individuals
and one entity to the list of designations will send a strong message that the
resolutions are subject to updating as circumstances dictate.
229. The Panel proposes that the following entities be brought to the Committee’s
attention:
(a) Yas Air. The airline was found by the Panel to be in violation of
paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007) for transporting prohibited arms and related
materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Syrian Arab Republic. One
Member State provided the Panel with information that Yas Air was an Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps entity and a successor to Pars Aviation Services
Company, which was designated under resolution 1747 (2007). Open-source
information shows that Yas Air is a civilian arm of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps and that two of the four cargo aircraft that it possesses were
transferred from the Corps;43
(b) SAD Import Export Company. The company was found by the Panel to
be in violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007) for its role as a trading
agent of prohibited arms and related materiel. Documentary evidence showed that
the entity was found to have attempted to transport prohibited items connected with
two entities designated under the relevant Security Council resolutions (7th of Tir
Industries and Parchin Chemical Industries). Documentary evidence found during
the inspection suggests that transport of similar items might continue in the future;
(c) Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group. The group
was identified on papers found in a crate seized in the Kilis (Turkey) case. It is a
parent entity of Parchin Chemical Industries, which is a designated entity under
resolution 1747 (2007), and was identified as the producer of increment charges
seized by the Turkish authorities in the Kilis case. The Defence Industries
Organization website suggests that the Chemical Industries and Development of
Materials Group is producing a range of explosive materials, including propellants
and strong explosives for military use, such as RDX and HMX.44 The Panel notes
that in many of the prior violation cases that it inspected the Defence Industries
Organization was found to be engaged in the export of arms and related materiel in
violation of the relevant resolutions.
5. Conclusions
230. Further sharing of information among Member States regarding the structure,
affiliates and cooperatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps would help to
understand which of their economic activities could contribute to activities
prohibited under the relevant Security Council resolutions.
__________________
43 See AeroTransport Data Bank (www.aerotransport.org).
44 See www.diomil.ir/en/cidmg.aspx.
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231. The designation of the Irano Hind Shipping Company notwithstanding, its
vessels are continuing to operate, which raises questions regarding the practical
impact of this designation.
H. Travel ban
1. Introduction
232. The Security Council designates individuals and entities for being directly
involved with or providing support for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s proliferationsensitive
nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010). In
paragraph 10 of resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council decided that all States
were to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their
territories of individuals designated in the relevant Security Council resolutions or
by the Security Council or the Committee in accordance with paragraph 10 of
resolution 1737 (2006), with the exceptions stipulated in paragraph 6 of resolution
1803 (2008) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1929 (2010).
233. In the present section, the Panel focuses on challenges reported by Member
States in the implementation of the travel ban and developments that may affect the
efficacy of travel ban measures.
2. Background
234. The Islamic Republic of Iran issues passports in accordance with international
guidelines on machine-readable travel documents. In July 2007, it announced that it
had begun issuing diplomatic and service passports containing biometric
information, extending that to ordinary passports in February 2011.
235. According to a public database on visa restrictions, the number of countries
and territories that can be entered by an Iranian citizen without a visa, usually for
relatively short visits, increased from 25 (in September 2008) to 36 (in August
2011).45
236. Significant progress has been made over the past decade in the implementation
of immigration controls, such as deployment of advanced passenger information
systems and biometric data. Only four Member States have yet to begin issuing
machine-readable travel documents to their citizens. Such systems and instruments
are effective tools in the implementation of the travel ban.
3. Analysis
Implementation by Member States
237. The legal frameworks within which Member States implement travel ban
obligations vary considerably. Many Member States implement the travel ban
through administrative measures based on existing laws, in effect relying on
__________________
45 Henley & Partners Visa Restrictions Index — Global Ranking, available on its website
(www.henleyglobal.com/citizenship/visa-restrictions/). The International Air Transport
Association explains in its website that the global ranking is produced in collaboration with the
Association, i.e. the methodology developed by Henley & Partners for the global ranking is
applied to data provided by the Association’s visa information database.
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agencies responsible for visa or entry/transit screening to incorporate new
information about designated individuals into existing databases. Some make
amendments to existing immigration laws, while others implement the travel ban
through specific sanctions legislation.
238. Member States implement the travel ban by means of both visa restrictions and
border or immigration control measures. The Panel notes that Member States rely on
various databases for visa and entry/transit screening. These may include national
databases or those common to a regional body, such as the Schengen Information
System among European Union States.
239. No reported violations of the travel ban were submitted to the Committee
during the Panel’s current mandate.
240. The Panel was informed by a State that members of the Qods Force of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, including its commander Qasem Soleimani
(who is designated in resolution 1747 (2007)), recently visited the Syrian Arab
Republic. The Panel is seeking to confirm this information. Another State informed
the Panel of one case of a designated Iranian individual being denied entry.
241. There may be several reasons for the lack of reports to the Committee
regarding travel ban violations. Member States may lack sufficient capacity to
implement, monitor and report violations of the travel ban, or it is possible that
designated Iranians may not travel outside the country, or may travel with
documents issued under other names.
4. Challenges
242. Insufficient identifying information. Many Member States, in particular
those that deployed computerized screening, reported that their visa, entry and
transit procedures required more information than is typically contained in
resolutions (which include in most cases only names, places of work and/or job
titles).
243. Difficulties with names. The Panel notes the following difficulties in
identifying designated individuals:
(a) Naming practices in the Islamic Republic of Iran and its surrounding
region may involve frequent and repeated use of very common names and surnames;
(b) Variable transliterations of Farsi names into English;46
(c) Use of aliases.
244. Use of additional passports. One State recently consulted by the Panel
suggested that some Iranian nationals have obtained passports from another Member
State. The Panel is aware that some Member States legally offer a second citizenship
and passport to nationals of a third country, including Iranians who are residing
outside their territories, usually in return for a certain amount of investment.
Following enquiries from the Panel, information provided by a State showed a fourfold
increase in applications from Iranian nationals for passports during the period
2010-2011. The State also reported that it was suspending the acceptance of
__________________
46 In this regard, the Panel notes that names indicated on Iranian passports are not based on a
uniform transliteration rule, as indicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic
Republic of Iran on its website (see www.mfa.gov.ir/NewsShow.aspx?id=817&menu=199&lang=en).
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applications from Iranian nationals residing in the Islamic Republic of Iran to
prevent potential misuses.
245. Host nation obligations. One State reported potential challenges in
connection with its obligations to host international organizations. In accordance
with host country agreements with international organizations, such Member States
are obliged to facilitate the entry into their territory, and to place no impediment in
the way of the departure from it, of persons, including representatives of States
members of the international organizations that they are hosting. The State noted
that it might encounter a situation in which a bilateral agreement with an
international organization obliged it to accept the entry of designated Iranian
individuals, even if the Security Council did not approve an exemption to the travel
ban imposed on such individuals.
5. Conclusions
246. Additional biographical information, such as place and date of birth, passport
numbers and parents’ names, are necessary for the effective enforcement of travel
ban provisions. Additional useful information could include alternative spellings of
names, noms de guerre, known addresses, photographs and biometric data.
247. One State reported a four-fold increase in applications for second passports by
Iranian citizens. This practice is common to several countries and should be brought
to the attention of Member States.
IV. Recommendations
248. The Panel recommends to the Security Council and the Committee, in
accordance with existing practice, the designation of the following two entities
found to be in violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747: Yas Air, for the
transport of prohibited arms and materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran as
described in the Yas Air (Turkey) case, and SAD Import Export Company, for
its role as a trading agent of prohibited arms and related materiel as described
in the Kilis (Turkey) case. Both recommended designations are supported by
strong documentary and factual evidence.
249. In addition, the Panel draws the attention of the Security Council and the
Committee to the Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group.
250. The Panel recommends that the Security Council and the Committee
remind Member States of their duty to report incidents of non-compliance and
interdictions. The Panel further recommends that Member States be requested
to share information, as appropriate, regarding attempts to circumvent
sanctions. The Panel welcomes information, in particular regarding designated
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines entities, including information from flag States accepting Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines registrations.
251. The Panel recommends that the Committee encourage Member States
hosting industrial facilities producing dual-use items necessary for prohibited
nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, such as high grades of carbon fibre,
to undertake an organized outreach effort to the manufacturing industry to
alert its member companies of possible avenues for procurement by the Islamic
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Republic of Iran. Information regarding such outreach efforts should be shared
with the Panel, as appropriate.
252. The Panel recommends that the Committee encourage Member States to
undertake outreach initiatives targeting in particular small and medium-sized
enterprises, with the aim of establishing appropriate compliance procedures in
order to meet obligations under Security Council resolutions.
253. The Panel recommends that the Committee remind Member States of the
need to maintain a high degree of vigilance over goods transported to and from
the Islamic Republic of Iran, whether by sea, air or overland, including rail and
road transport. Such vigilance could include requesting technical stopovers for
the purpose of inspecting suspicious cargoes when granting overflight rights to
and from the Islamic Republic of Iran. This vigilance should not be restricted
to zones geographically adjacent to the Islamic Republic of Iran given the
global reach of Iranian activities.
254. The Panel recommends that the Committee draw the attention of Member
States to the new Financial Action Task Force standard on financing of
proliferation, in particular when implementing targeted financial sanctions on
the Islamic Republic of Iran.
255. The Panel recommends that the Committee clarify the measures expected
of Member States in implementing sanctions against designated Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines entities, in particular with regard to “financial
assets and economic resources”, and whether this includes the obligation to
seize vessels.
256. The Panel recommends that the Committee address discrepancies between
the lists of individuals designated under resolution 1929 (2010) and previous
resolutions, and those who now hold the positions identified in these
designations.
257. The Panel recommends that the Committee seek from Member States, on
a voluntary basis, additional identifying information regarding designated
individuals in order to allow more accurate identification of such individuals
and to eliminate false matches.
258. The Panel requests that the Committee consider updating the lists
referred to in paragraph 13 of resolution 1929 (2010).
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Annex I
Reports submitted to the Committee
Midterm report: S/AC.50/2011/COMM.87
Inspection and investigation reports:
Space launch vehicle: S/AC.50/2011/NOTE.43
International Security Assistance Force: S/AC.50/2011/NOTE.44
Yas Air (Turkey): S/AC.50/2011/NOTE.47
Kilis (Turkey): S/AC.50/2012/NOTE.10
Quarterly assessments of national implementation reports:
July 2011: S/AC.50/2011/COMM.7/Add.2
October 2011: S/AC.50/2011/COMM.7/Add.3
January 2012: S/AC.50/2012/COMM.8
April 2012: S/AC.50/2012/COMM.36
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Annex II
List of countries visited
Armenia
Australia
Bahrain
Belarus
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
India
Israel
Kenya
Malaysia
Morocco
Norway
Oman
Romania
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Viet Nam
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Annex III
Uranium mining and processing in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Gchine Mine and Mill — 2009
Source: GeoEye via Google Earth.
Gchine Mine and Mill — 2012
Source: DigitalGlobe — Institute for Science and
International Security.
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Saghand Mine — October 2009
Source: GeoEye via Google Earth.
Saghand Mine — March 2012
Source: DigitalGlobe — Institute for Science and International Security.
Indications of some tunnelling activity, but no evidence of open
stockpiling of ore. There are more buildings and paved roads
compared to 2009.
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Ardakan Yellowcake
Production Plant — May 2009
(not operational)
Source: GeoEye via Google Earth.
Source: DigitalGlobe — Institute for Science and
International Security.
Ardakan Yellowcake
Production Plant — 2012
(not operational)
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Annex IV
Physical properties and operating limits of possible
centrifuge materials
Source: Manson Benedict and others, Nuclear Chemical Engineering, 2nd ed. (New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1981), p. 855.
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Annex V
Advanced centrifuges
IR-1 centrifuges
Source: GOV/2012/9 and previous IAEA reports.
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Annex VI
Iranian carbon fibre production
The Panel’s insight into indigenous carbon fibre production capacity of the
Islamic Republic of Iran is limited to a single media report including a severalminute-
long video tour of its production facilities, including the operation of its
oxidation oven, furnace and spool-winders.a In the report, it is noted that the
Iranian-produced carbon fibre is intended for the country’s aerospace and energy
sectors. The following describes the multi-step process of producing carbon fibre in
the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s facilities reviewed in the present report.
The Panel consulted two independent industry experts in the production of carbon
fibre in its assessment of the media report.
In the first stage of the production process, carbon fibre consists of palecoloured
or white, fine, fibrous strands on rolls known as creels; the fibres are
unspooled as they feed into an oxidation oven where they turn progressively darker
shades of amber and eventually black. Problems can occur at this stage if the fibres
twist or become uneven and broken, as they appear to in the video of the Iranian
production line. According to one of the experts consulted by the Panel, the oven
appears to run more slowly than a more modern oxidation oven, but is judged to be
in reasonable condition. The Panel notes that oxidation ovens can be purchased
without licences from many suppliers. It is also not known whether the Islamic
Republic of Iran has access to the precursor chemical, polyacrylonitrile, for the
production of high-grade carbon fibre.
In the second stage of the production process, the now black fibres go through
the process of carbonization, in which they are processed through a series of
furnaces, from low to high temperature, to 2,000° C (in more sophisticated carbon
fibre production, there would be a third, ultra-high-temperature furnace, which is
subject to stringent export controls). The Iranian furnaces appear to be some 30
years old. This step in the process produces hydrogen cyanide, a dangerous chemical
for which monitors or detectors are needed.
In the third step of the process, the surface of the fibres is treated with a
chemical abrasion process to make it rough and more receptive to a coating applied
in the next stage. The Iranian chemical abrasion equipment was judged not to be
modern but capable of doing the job.
A glue-like treatment, referred to sizing, is applied to the surface of the fibres
in the next stage, after which the fibres are dried and rewound on spool-winders.
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s spool-winders appear to be used and not of recent
vintage.
The carbon fibre produced in the facility viewed in this clip is assessed by
experts in carbon fibre production and manufacturing not to be suitable for use in
Iranian centrifuges.
__________________
a See www.youtube.com/watch?v=tP_2HakdKCA.
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Annex VII
Export controls and carbon fibre
In its resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council barred the transfer to the
Islamic Republic of Iran of items contained in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2.
With regard to carbon fibre, this document defines as sensitive:
“Fibrous or filamentary materials” and prepregs, as follows:a
a. Carbon or aramid “fibrous or filamentary materials” having either
of the following characteristics:
1. A “specific modulus” of 12.7 x 106m or greater; or
2. A “specific tensile strength” of 23.5 x 104m or greater;
b. Glass “fibrous or filamentary materials” having both of the
following characteristics:
1. A “specific modulus” of 3.18 x 106m or greater; and
2. A “specific tensile strength” of 7.62 x 104m or greater;
c. Thermoset resin impregnated continuous “yarns”, “rovings”, “tows”
or “tapes” with a width of 15 mm or less (prepregs), made from
carbon or glass “fibrous or filamentary materials” specified in
Item 2.C.7.a. or Item 2.C.7.b.
__________________
a Item 2.C.7.a. does not control aramid “fibrous or filamentary materials” having 0.25 per cent or
more by weight of an ester-based fibre surface modifier.
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Annex VIII
Iranian rockets and missiles
Missile Fuel type Estimated range Payload
Fajr-3 Solid 45 km 45 kg
Fajr-5 Solid 70-80 km 90 kg
Fateh-110 Solid 200 km 500 kg
Ghadr-1 Liquid 1 600 km 750 kg
Iran-130/Nazeat Solid 90-120 km 150 kg
Nazeat-6 Solid 100 km 150 kg
Nazeat-10 Solid 140-150 km 250 kg
Oghab Solid 40 km 70 kg
Qiam 1 Liquid 500-1 000 km 500 kg
Sejil/Ashura Solid 2000-2 500 km 750 kg
Shahab-1 Liquid 300 km 1000 kg
Shahab-2 Liquid 500 km 730 kg
Shahab-3 Liquid 800-1 300 km 760-1 100 kg
Zelzal-1 Solid 125 km 600 kg
Zelzal-2 Solid 200 km 600 kg
Source: Information provided by Member States and “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net
Assessment”, IISS, 2010.
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Annex IX
Incidents inspected by the Panel in 2011-2012
Incident Item
United
Nations item
number
United
Nations class Quantity Weight Country of origin Country of seizure
Country of
destination
Mode of
transportation
122-mm
rockets
n/a n/a 48 Approx.
64 kg
Fuses n/a n/a 49 0.68-
0.70 kg
Seizure by the
International Security
Assistance Force on
5 February 2011 of
missiles in Southern
Afghanistan, reported
to the Committee in a
letter dated 21 April
2011
7.62-mm
ammunition
n/a n/a 1 000 n/a
Highly
probable
Islamic
Republic of
Iran
(continuing
investigation
by the Panel)
Afghanistan Afghanistan Truck
AK-47
assault rifles
n/a n/a 60 n/a
BKC (Bixi)
machine
guns
n/a n/a 14 n/a
BKC/AK-47
ammunition
n/a n/a 7 920 n/a
60-mm
mortar shells
n/a n/a 560 n/a
Seizure by the Turkish
authorities on 19 March
2011 of arms and
ammunition, reported
to the Committee in a
letter dated 28 March
2011
120-mm
mortar shells
n/a n/a 1 288 n/a
Islamic
Republic of
Iran
Turkey Syrian Arab
Republic
Aeroplane
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Incident Item
United
Nations item
number
United
Nations class Quantity Weight Country of origin Country of seizure
Country of
destination
Mode of
transportation
Powder M9 27 1.1D 2 boxes 890 kg
Propelling
charge
160 1.3C 2 boxes 1 400 kg
Slow-burning
material
1325 4.1 1 box 30 kg
Sensitive
material
121 1.1G 1 box 10 kg
Rocket fuel 186 1.3C 6 pallets 2 643 kg
Seizure by the Turkish
authorities on 15
February 2011 of arms
and related materiel,
reported to the
Committee in a letter
dated 12 January 2012
RDX 483 1.1D 2 pallets 1 700 kg
Islamic
Republic of
Iran
Turkey Syrian Arab
Republic
Truck
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Annex X
Vessels and entities controlled by the Irano Hind
Shipping Company
List of vessels and registered owners (R/O)
Vessel Flag
International Maritime
Organization No. Registered owner
Country of
registered owner
Teen Malta 9101649 BIIS Maritime
Limited
Malta/Panama
Attar Malta 9074092 ISIM ATR
Limited
Malta
Sattar Malta 9040479 ISIM Sat
Limited
Malta
ISI Olive Bolivia 9003237 ISIM Olive
Limited
Malta
Amin Bolivia 9422366 ISIM Amin
Limited
Malta
Sinin Malta 9274941 ISIM Sinin
Limited
Malta
Tour Bolivia
(Plurinational
State of)
9364112 ISIM Tour
Limited
Malta
Taj Mahal Malta 9459046 Irano Hind
Shipping
Company
Islamic Republic
of Iran (not in
operation)
List of other companies related to the Irano Hind Shipping Company
ISI Maritime Limited
ISIM Taj Mahal Limited
ISIM Sea Chariot Limited
ISIM Sea Crescent Limited
Imir Limited
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List of container carriers previously controlled by the Irano Hind
Shipping Company
Vessel Flag
International
Maritime
Organization No. Registered owner R/O Registered
Neri Malta 9148491 Bai Handelas Limited Malta
Melish Malta 9148518 Bai Lai Limited Malta
Note: Bai Handelas Limited and Bai Lai Limited are owned by Transatlantik Denizcilik Limited
(registered in Turkey).
Annex 68
United Nations S/2017/537
Security Council Distr.: General
27 June 2017
Original: English
17-09527 (E) 270617
*1709527*
Letter dated 22 June 2017 from the Security Council Facilitator
for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the
President of the Security Council
I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of
the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my sixmonth
report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from
16 January to 15 June 2017.
I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued a s a
document of the Security Council.
(Signed) Sebastiano Cardi
Security Council Facilitator for the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
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Third six-month report of the Facilitator on the
implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
I. Introduction
1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016
(S/2016/44) set forth the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council for
carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015),
particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B
to that resolution.
2. In the note, it was established that the Security Council should select, on an
annual basis, one member to serve as its facilitator for the functions specified
therein. On 3 January 2017, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of
resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2017
(see S/2017/2/Rev.1).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other
members of the Security Council on his or her work and the implementation of
resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the
Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 16 January to 15 June 2017.
II. Summary of the activities of the Council in the “2231 format”
5. On 18 January 2017, the Security Council was briefed by the Under -Secretary-
General for Political Affairs on the second report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/1136), by me on the work of the
Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/49) and by the
Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her
capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (see S/PV.7865).
6. On the same day, a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General was
received by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/51). The letter transmitted
the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the second report of the Secretary-
General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/1136). It was
circulated to the representatives of the “2231 format” of the Security Council on the
same day.
7. On 31 January, the Security Council held informal consultations to consider
the ballistic missile launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 29 January. Following
the informal consultations, a letter dated 7 February, containing a report regarding
the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), was addressed to me by the
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, on
behalf of France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States. The letter also contained a proposal that the
discussion of the launch, and of an appropriate response to it, take place within the
“2231 format”. Subsequently, on 2 March, the Council held a meeting in the “2231
format” to further consider the launch (see para. 17 below). As agreed within the
“2231 format”, I subsequently briefed the Security Council during the informal
consultations held on 25 April.
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8. On 17 March, the Security Council held a meeting in the “2231 format” to
hear a briefing from the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint
Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The
Coordinator gave an overview of the procurement channel and of the work of the
Procurement Working Group in terms of its functions, the activities covered, the
processing of proposals and various benchmarks. The Secretariat, through the
Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs, also
provided an update on the support provided to the Council for the processing of
proposals through the procurement channel. Prior to his briefing, I had met with the
Coordinator to discuss the functioning of the procurement channel, receiving further
confirmation of the smooth cooperation between the Council and the Joint
Commission.
9. During that same meeting, the representatives also agreed to technically adjust
the reporting schedule on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in the
programme of work of the Security Council to June and December, in order to give
Facilitators the opportunity to brief the Council on their work after six months into
and at the end of their tenure.
10. During the reporting period, there were no changes to the list maintained
pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), which, at present, comprises 23 individuals and
61 entities.
III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
11. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted two quarterly reports, in
February and June 2017, to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the
Security Council, on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic
Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/234 and
S/2017/502).
12. In the February report, the Agency recalled that, on 15 January 2017, it had
verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken the actions specified in
paragraph 15.12 of annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, namely the
removal of all excess centrifuges and infrastructure from the Fordow Fuel
Enrichment Plant and their transfer to storage at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant
under continuous Agency monitoring. In addition, the Agency indicated that, on
21 January 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran, under Agency verification and
monitoring, had begun feeding natural UF6 into a single IR-8 centrifuge for the first
time.
13. In both quarterly reports, the Agency affirmed that the Islamic Republic of
Iran had not pursued construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor
(IR-40 reactor) based on its original design; that it had no more than 130 metric tons
of heavy water; that no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges remained installed in
30 cascades at the Natanz plant; that it had not enriched uranium above 3.67 per
cent U-235; and that, throughout each reporting period, it had not conducted any
uranium enrichment or related research and development activities at the Fordow
plant and there had not been any nuclear material at the same plant.
14. The Agency also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to
permit the Agency to use online enrichment monitors and electronic seals, which
communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate
the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed
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measurement devices; that it had issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors
designated for the Islamic Republic of Iran as requested by the Agency, provided
proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of
working space at locations near nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
that it had accepted additional Agency inspectors designated for the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
15. The Agency further reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion
of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities, and locations outside facilities
where nuclear material is customarily used, declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran
under its Safeguards Agreement; that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to
provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement; and that
the Agency was continuing its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through
the conduct of complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to sites and
other locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Ballistic missile launch
16. By means of a letter dated 7 February 2017 from the Permanent
Representative of the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the
United States submitted a report to the Security Council on the ballistic missile
launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 29 January. On 10 February, the
Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed a letter to the
President of the Security Council concerning the launch (S/2017/123). Both letters
were circulated within the “2231 format” of the Council.
17. On 2 March 2017, the Security Council held a meeting in the “2231 format”,
during which a briefing was offered by the delegation of a Member State. The
experts observed that the medium-range ballistic missile, a Khorramshahr, tested by
the Islamic Republic of Iran on 29 January, was designed to carry a payload greater
than 500 kg to a range over 1,000 km. According to the briefers’ assessment, these
characteristics indicated that the missile was inherently capable of delivering
nuclear weapons. In that context, the experts noted that “500 kg has been the
approximate mass required to carry a first-generation nuclear weapon and 300 km is
an internationally accepted range of strategic significance”. The experts concluded
that, in their view, the test constituted an activity related to ballistic missiles
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and was inconsistent with
resolution 2231 (2015).
18. Following the briefing, the issue of the particular sensitivity of the launch was
discussed with regard to its regional implications and its relation to resolution 2231
(2015), as raised by some representatives. Some representatives concurred that the
recent missile launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran was inconsistent with
resolution 2231 (2015) and, together with others, expressed concerns about the test,
which they considered to be destabilizing and as having the potential to increase
tensions in the region. Some expressed the need for more information and
investigations prior to making any conclusions.
19. A representative emphasized that resolution 2231 (2015) did not provide a
definition as to which types of missiles were constructed in such a manner as to be
capable of delivering nuclear weapons. That representative also noted the lack of
evidence that the missile had been developed with the intent to deliver nuclear
weapons. Other delegations said that resolution 2231 (2015) concerned intrinsic
capability rather than intent. Since the launch involved a system that was, by design,
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, its use was therefore inconsistent with
resolution 2231 (2015). A representative said that, because resolution 2231 (2015)
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did not expressly prohibit, but only “calls upon”, the Islamic Republic of Iran not to
conduct launches of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear
weapons, the missile launch did not constitute a violation of resolution 2231 (2015).
Some representatives emphasized that the Islamic Republic of Iran had denied its
intention of obtaining nuclear weapons. Others underlined that the Islamic Republic
of Iran was in compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action as verified by the International Atomic Energy
Agency in the Director General’s latest report to the IAEA Board of Governors
(S/2017/234).
20. Some representatives stressed the importance for the credibility of the Security
Council that the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), including those
related to the transfer of ballistic missile technology to or from the Islamic Republic
of Iran, be implemented in a robust and comprehensive manner. Other
representatives emphasized that the full implementation of Security Council
resolution 2231 (2015) would create a conducive atmosphere for the successful
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Several representatives
also stressed the importance, for all relevant parties, of maintaining dialogue and of
remaining committed to the full implementation of the Plan for its full duration.
21. Some representatives called upon the Secretary-General to report fully and
thoroughly on the launch in his next report to the Security Council on the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and encouraged Member States to share
information on the launch with the Secretariat. A representative objected to the need
for the Secretary-General to report on the launch, asserting that it was not
inconsistent with the resolution and that the Secretariat had neither the mandate nor
the capabilities to investigate.
22. In the light of the views expressed by delegations, I noted that there was no
consensus on how that particular launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). I stressed
that it was essential that the Security Council act with unity in that field, so as to
assist in the effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also proposed
that, in the framework of my regular contact with interested parties, including the
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I would underline the
importance, for all parties, of continuing to maintain an attitude conducive to
building trust and of continuing to implement the terms of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015).
23. On 9 March, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council concerning the launch
(S/2017/205). The letter was circulated within the “2231 format” of the Security
Council on 10 March.
IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions
24. Since Implementation Day, a total of 16 proposals to participate in or permit
the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have
been submitted to the Security Council by four Member States from three different
regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action. This reflects the growing confidence of Member
States in the procurement channel. I am also pleased to note that, on average, the
proposals were processed through the procurement channel in less than 46 calendar
days. In order to ensure the proper functioning of the procurement channel process,
I wish to recall the importance of abiding by the various timelines set out in
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for the submission of transfer or
exemption notifications.
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25. The Joint Commission provided a recommendation of approval for the two
proposals that had been submitted to the Security Council in December 2016 and
were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report. The two
proposals were subsequently approved by the Council.
26. During the reporting period, 10 new proposals for the supply of items,
material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2
were submitted to the Security Council, including 2 for temporary export for the
purposes of demonstration and display in an exhibition. Five of those proposals
have been approved, one has been withdrawn and four are currently under review by
the Joint Commission.
27. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), certain nuclearrelated
activities do not require approval but do require a notification to be
submitted to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commissio n.
28. In that regard, since my previous report, one notification was submitted to the
Security Council in January in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran
of natural uranium in exchange for enriched uranium in excess of 300 kg removed
from the Islamic Republic of Iran in December 2015. Three notifications were also
submitted to the Council in February and March, in relation to the transfer to the
Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment covered by annex B, section 1, of
INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 intended for light water reactors. In addition, one
notification was submitted to the Council in April for an activity related to the
necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope
production. Lastly, one notification was submitted to the Council in June in relation
to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of items set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 for exclusive use in light water reactors.
29. On 14 February, I received a letter from the Coordinator of the Procurement
Working Group of the Joint Commission requesting that the Security Council share
with the participants in the Procurement Working Group, through its Coordinator,
the notifications of the supply, sale or transfer proposals that are approved by the
Security Council. On 23 February, I informed the Coordinator that the Council had
agreed to his request.
30. On 12 June, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to
me the third six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2017/495), in accordance
with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
V. Other approval and exemption requests
31. Since 16 January 2016, no proposal has been submitted by Member Sta tes to
the Security Council to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 4
of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
32. A proposal to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 5 of
annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) was submitted by a Member State on
23 November 2016 and brought to the attention of the Security Council the next
day. On 24 February 2017, the Member State provided additional information to the
Council on its proposal. On 28 February, I informed the Member State that, as a
result of thorough consultations with respect to its specific request for approval, the
Council had reached no agreement and returned its request.
33. Since 16 January 2016, no proposal has been submitted by Member States to
the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231
(2015).
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34. Exemptions to the asset freeze provisions and to the travel ban provisions are
contained in paragraphs 6 (d) and 6 (e), respectively, of annex B to resolution 2231
(2015). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in
relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained
pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance
35. Eighteen months after Implementation Day, transparency, practical guidance
and outreach remain a priority. In this regard, I plan on engaging in new outreach
activities on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) during the second part of
my tenure. Further outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note
mentioned in paragraph 1 above (S/2016/44), could form an additional instrument
for fostering awareness of resolution 2231 (2015).
36. The website on resolution 2231 (2015), managed and regularly updated by the
Secretariat, plays a key role in providing relevant information on resolution 2231
(2015). During the reporting period, the number of page views was more than
57,000, for a total of more than 194,000 since the creation of the website. I invite
the Secretariat to regularly maintain, update and improve the website on resolution
2231 (2015).
37. I also held several bilateral consultations with Member State representatives,
including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).
Annex 69
WORLD NEWS
DECEMBER 3, 2018 / 10:36 AM / 8 MONTHS AGO
France says Iran ballistic test provocative and destabilizing
PARIS (Reuters) - Iran’s test of a medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple
warheads is a provocative and destabilizing act, France’s foreign ministry said on Monday.
“France is concerned about Iran’s mid-range ballistic missile test last Saturday. It condemns
this provocative and destabilizing action,” Ministry spokeswoman Agnes von der Muhll said in
a statement.
She said the test did not comply with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 and called on
Tehran to immediately stop all its ballistic missile-related activities designed to carry nuclear
weapons.
Reporting by John Irish; editing by Michel Rose
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Annex 70
Iran has claimed to have conducted a satellite launch. France strongly condemns this launch which is not in compliance with
UNSCR 2231.
Indeed, UNSCR 2231 calls on Iran to refrain from conducting activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons, including launches. Space launch vehicles use technology that is very similar to that used for ballistic
missiles, in particular for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
This launch follows the firing of short-range ballistic missiles into Syria on September 30 and the firing of a medium-range ballistic
missile on December 1. These missile launches were also not in compliance with UNSCR 2231.
The Iranian ballistic missile program is a source of concern for the international community and France. We call on Iran to refrain
from conducting any further launches of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including space
launch vehicles, and urge Iran to comply with its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
Useful links
Links
More information on the website of the ministry (in French)
Embassy of France in Iran (https://ir.ambafrance.org/)
Embassy of Iran in France (http://www.mfe.org/Default.aspx?SID=12292&DYN_VIEW=DETAIL&PAYS=IRAN)
All rights reserved - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs - 2019
France Diplomatie
Iran - Iranian rocket launch on January 15, 2019
(16 January 2019)
Annex 71
Letter dated 22 February 2019 from the Permanent
Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President
of the Security Council
I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 20 February 2019 from the
Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom addressed
to the Secretary-General (see annex). I would be most grateful if you would circulate
the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.
(Signed) Karen Pierce
Annex 72
Annex to the letter dated 22 February 2019 from the Permanent
Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President
of the Security Council
France, Germany and the United Kingdom wish to bring to the attention of the
Security Council recent actions taken by Iran which are inconsistent with paragraph 3
of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
As the Security Council is aware, in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231
(2015),
Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using
such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action adoption day or until the date on which the
International Atomic Energy Agency submits a report confirming the Broader
Conclusion, whichever is earlier.
The phrase “ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear
weapons” in paragraph 3 includes Missile Technology Control Regime category I
systems. By definition, Missile Technology Control Regime category I systems,
which are those capable of delivering at least a 500-kilogram payload to a range of at
least 300 kilometres, are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
On 15 January 2019, Iran conducted the third flight test of its Simorgh satellite
launch vehicle. The Iranian Government said that the satellite launch vehicle failed
to successfully place a satellite in orbit due to a failure of the vehicle ’s final stage,
which is used to finalize the satellite’s orbital position. Although the launch failed,
the test will have proven the operation of the satellite launch vehicle ’s first and second
stage propulsion systems, which are based on technologies shared with Iran’s ballistic
missile programme. Significantly, the first stage is a cluster of four Shahab-3 mediumrange
ballistic missile engines and the second stage incorporates technology of the
Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missile. Both the Shahab-3 and the
Khorramshahr meet the criteria of Missile Technology Control Regime category I
missile systems and are therefore inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the technologies necessary for the conception, fabrication and
launch of a satellite launch vehicle are closely related to those requi red for the
development of a long-range ballistic missile or an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Actual launches of satellite launch vehicles provide Iran with empirical results that
can be used to optimize capabilities related to the development of such missile
systems.
We therefore re-emphasize our assessment that Iran’s programme to develop
ballistic missiles continues to be inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015). Iran’s ballistic missile activity, including the launch of the
Simorgh satellite launch vehicle, is a matter of deep concern, as it has a destabilizing
effect on the region and increases existing tensions.
Annex 72
We trust that this information will assist the Security Council in promoting the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) by all States. In light of the requests made
of the Secretary-General in resolution 2231 (2015), we therefore respectfully request
that the Secretary-General report fully and thoroughly Iran’s ballistic missile activity
inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015) in his next report.
(Signed) François Delattre
Permanent Representative of France
(Signed) Christoph Heusgen
Permanent Representative of Germany
(Signed) Karen Pierce
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
Annex 72
WORLD NEWS
DECEMBER 11, 2018 / 4:37 AM / 8 MONTHS AGO
Iran confirms missile test in defiance of U.S.
Babak Dehghanpisheh
GENEVA (Reuters) - A senior Iranian military commander has confirmed that Tehran recently
carried out a ballistic missile test, to the anger of the United States, the Fars news agency said
on Tuesday.
FILE PHOTO: A display featuring missiles and a portrait of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is seen at
Baharestan Square in Tehran, Iran September 27, 2017. Picture taken September 27, 2017. Nazanin Tabatabaee
Yazdi/TIMA via REUTERS
Annex 73
The Revolutionary Guards official’s comment came after U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo’s assertion earlier this month that Iran had test-fired a missile capable of carrying
multiple warheads and reaching the Middle East and Europe.
“We will continue our missile tests and this recent action was an important test,” Guards
aerospace division head Amirali Hajizadeh was quoted as saying by the semi-official Fars news
agency.
“The reaction of the Americans shows that this test was very important for them and that’s
why they were shouting,” he added, without specifying what type of missile had been tested.
The U.N. Security Council met last week to discuss the test, which the United States, Britain
and France said flouted U.N. restrictions on Tehran’s military program.
U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of an international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program in May and reimposed sanctions on Tehran. He said the deal was flawed because it did
not include curbs on Iran’s development of ballistic missiles or its support for proxies in Syria,
Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq.
Iran has ruled out negotiations with Washington over its military capabilities, particularly the
missile program run by the Guards. It says the program is purely defensive and denies missiles
are capable of being tipped with nuclear warheads.
Hajizadeh said Iran holds up to 50 missile tests a year.
“The issue of missiles has never been subject to negotiations and nothing has been approved or
ratified about its prohibition for the Islamic Republic of Iran in (U.N.) resolution 2231,”
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said on Tuesday, according to the Tasnim news
agency.
Annex 73
“Our defense doctrine is basically founded upon deterrence.”
Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which enshrined the nuclear deal in 2015, Iran
is “called upon” to refrain from work on ballistic missiles designed to deliver nuclear weapons
for up to eight years.
Some states argue the language does not make it obligatory.
Last month, Hajizadeh said U.S. bases in Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, and
U.S. aircraft carriers in the Gulf were within range of Iranian missiles.
The head of the Guards, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, said on Tuesday the United
States was becoming weaker.
“American power is declining,” Jafari said, according to Fars. “The enemies don’t dare bring up
the issue of overthrowing the Islamic Republic and they will take this wish to the grave.”
In October, the Revolutionary Guards fired missiles at Islamic State militants in Syria after the
Islamist group said it was responsible for an attack at a military parade in Iran that killed 25
people, nearly half of them Guards members.
Reporting by Babak Dehghanpisheh; Editing by Richard Balmforth and Andrew Cawthorne
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Annex 73
CIVIC
Iran Wants to Expand Missile Range Despite U.S. Opposition
Dec. 4, 2018
FILE PHOTO: A display featuring missiles and a portrait of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is seen at
Baharestan Square in Tehran, Iran September 27, 2017. Nazanin Tabatabaee Yazdi/TIMA via REUTERS
GENEVA (REUTERS) - IRAN wants to increase its missiles' range, a senior military ocial was
quoted as saying on Tuesday, a move that would irk the United States which views Tehran's
weapons program as a regional security threat.
U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of an international nuclear agreement in May and
reimposed sanctions on the Islamic Republic, criticizing the deal for not including curbs on
Iran's development of ballistic missiles.
REUTERS
Annex 74
"One of our most important programs is increasing the range of missiles and ammunition," said
the head of the Iranian air force, Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh, according to the semio
cial Fars news agency.
"We don't see any limitations for ourselves in this eld."
Iran's military has cited 2,000 km (1,240 miles) as the current missile range, and said U.S. bases
in Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, plus U.S. aircraft carriers in the Gulf, were
within range.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif also defended the missile program in a Twitter
post on Tuesday, in which he said the U.N. Security Council resolution which endorsed the
nuclear agreement did not ban Tehran from working on missiles.
"Making a mockery of the UNSC won't obscure failure to fulll obligations & to hold US to
account over non-compliance. Esp when even US admits that UNSCR2231 does NOT prohibit
Iran's deterrent capabilities. Rather than undermining 2231, better to work towards its
adherence by all." Zarif wrote.
Nasirzadeh did not give details on how far Iran would like to increase that range, according to
the Fars report.
Tehran insists its missile program is purely defensive but has threatened to disrupt oil
shipments through the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf if Washington tries to strangle its exports.
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Annex 74
At the weekend, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo condemned what he described as Iran's
testing of a medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple warheads as a violation
of the agreement on Tehran's nuclear program.
Iran has repeatedly said its missile program is not up for negotiation.
(Reporting By Babak Dehghanpisheh; Editing by Andrew Cawthorne and Gareth Jones)
Copyright 2018 Thomson Reuters.
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Annex 74
GE.19-01422(E)
Human Rights Council
Fortieth session
25 February–22 March 2019
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
the Islamic Republic of Iran*
Summary
The present report, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 37/30,
comprises two parts.
In the first part, the Special Rapporteur describes how the protests in the Islamic
Republic of Iran reflect long-standing grievances related to human rights. An amendment to
the drug trafficking law has led to a decline in executions. Nevertheless, increasing economic
challenges have intensified grievances, which may be exacerbated following the
reimposition of unilateral sanctions. Discontent has been expressed through disparate
protests by different groups across the country. The Government has introduced some
measures aimed at addressing economic challenges, but the arrests of lawyers, human rights
defenders and labour activists signal an increasingly severe State response.
In the second part, the Special Rapporteur describes how the execution of child
offenders in the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued over decades in violation of the
country’s international human rights obligations. Girls can be sentenced to death as young
as 9 and boys as young as 15. Despite amendments to the Penal Code and practical efforts
aimed at reducing the executions, at least 33 child offenders have been executed since 2013.
The Special Rapporteur makes a number of targeted recommendations to the Parliament and
the judiciary with a view to ending such executions.
* Agreement was reached to publish the present report after the standard publication date owing to
circumstances beyond the submitter’s control.
United Nations A/HRC/40/67
General Assembly Distr.: General
30 January 2019
Original: English
Annex 75
A/HRC/40/67
2
I. Introduction
1. The present report, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 37/30, is
divided into two parts. The first part describes a number of pressing human rights concerns
in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The second part examines the execution of individuals who
were children (persons below 18 years of age1) at the time of the alleged commission of the
relevant offence (hereinafter referred to as “child offenders”2) in the country.
2. Since his appointment, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran has met with numerous victims of alleged violations, relatives of
victims, human rights defenders, lawyers, and representatives of civil society organizations,
including in Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The
Special Rapporteur travelled to Geneva and to New York to present his most recent report3
to the General Assembly. During these missions, he met with representatives of the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations and other
interlocutors. The Special Rapporteur has reviewed written submissions and information
submitted, and government statements and reports, legislation, media reports, and reports of
international human rights mechanisms. The Government has provided comments on the
Special Rapporteur’s reports. The Special Rapporteur thanks all interlocutors and officials
for the cooperation extended and information submitted.
3. In 2018, special procedures of the Human Rights Council issued 14 communications,
3 of which were replied to by the Government. In order to further engagement, the Special
Rapporteur reiterates his request to visit the Islamic Republic of Iran.
II. Human rights situation
4. The current human rights situation has been characterized by the Government’s
response to increasing economic challenges, sanctions, and long-standing human rights
concerns. Widespread protests in December 2017 and January 2018 morphed into disparate
protests driven by falling living standards, high inflation, perceived misallocation of public
funds, delays in the payment of salaries, and challenges in accessing water, among other
issues. The reimposition of sanctions heightened tensions.
5. The Special Rapporteur is disturbed by indications of an increasingly severe response
to the protests, amidst patterns of violations of the right to life, the right to liberty and the
right to a fair trial. An increasing number of human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and
labour activists are being arrested or harassed. The Head of the Judiciary publicly described
the protests as “sedition” aimed at “dragging people to the streets to target the very foundation
of the Islamic Republic”.4
A. Right to life
6. The Special Rapporteur remains concerned at the extensive use of the death penalty,
despite positive developments. From January to October 2018, 207 persons were reportedly
executed, in comparison to 437 for the same period in 2017.5 The decline largely resulted
from an amendment to the drug trafficking law in November 2017, which reduced executions
related to drug offences. As a result, punishments for certain drug offences were retroactively
amended from the death penalty or life imprisonment to a maximum prison term of 30 years.
The quantity of drugs required for a death sentence to be imposed was also increased.
1 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has consistently recommended that States make necessary
legal amendments to establish the definition of the child as persons below the age of 18 years. See
CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4, para. 28.
2 This terminology is in line with Committee on the Rights of the Child general comment No. 10
(2007) on children’s rights in juvenile justice.
3 See A/73/398.
4 See www.mizanonline.com/fa/news/472402.
5 See https://iranhr.net/en/articles/3514/.
Annex 75
A/HRC/40/67
3
Following the adoption of the amendment, the judiciary was instructed to review the cases
of those already sentenced to death for drug-related offences. The lack of transparency on
death penalty cases has made it difficult to assess the review process, but in October 2018,
the Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Consultative Assembly Judiciary Commission
reportedly stated that the death sentences of 15,000 individuals had been commuted. 6
Concerns remain, however, about the availability of legal assistance to those eligible for
review, the lack of opportunity to appeal the outcome of the review, and the retention of the
mandatory death penalty for some drug offences.
7. Other concerns persist. According to article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has ratified, States parties that have
not yet abolished the death penalty should only impose it for the “most serious crimes”, a
term confined to crimes involving intentional killing.7 However, the Islamic Republic of Iran
continues to apply the death penalty for numerous acts that do not entail intentional killing.
Concerns were raised following the establishment of special courts in August 2018 to try
“economic crimes” which carry the death penalty.
8. A further long-standing concern relates to the execution of individuals convicted of
murder in the context of qisas (retribution in kind). In such cases, the application of absolute,
equivalent retaliation in the form of the death penalty is available to the next of kin of the
victim. Such executions accounted for nearly three quarters of reported executions in 2018.8
As an alternative, the next of kin of the victim can pardon the defendant with or without
accepting diya (compensation known as “blood money”). Qisas is an offence which entails
a mandatory punishment. No consideration can be given to mitigating factors such as the
offender’s age or character or the circumstances of the crime.
9. In 2006, the then Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions observed, inter alia, that while diya saved lives to the extent that it avoided
executions, it could violate the guarantees of non-discrimination, because the request to pay
diya discriminated against those who were not in a position to buy their freedom.9 The Penal
Code also stipulates that diya for murdering a woman is half that of a man. Furthermore,
while Iranian law has been amended to provide the equal application of qisas punishments
and diya for the murder of Muslims and constitutionally recognized religious minorities, this
does not apply to non-recognized groups. Additionally, when a pardon in exchange for diya
has not been granted, it leads to violations of the right to seek pardon or commutation from
the State.10
10. Reports indicate that ethnic and religious minority groups constitute a
disproportionately large percentage of persons executed or imprisoned.11 Many are also on
death row. Concerns have been raised, for example, about the situation of Hedayat
Abdollapour, a Kurdish Iranian, whose death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court
upon its second review in October 2018 amidst reports that he had been subjected to torture
in detention and had been denied access to a lawyer of his choice.
11. The right to life has been violated by non-State actors. On 22 September 2018, an
attack on a military parade in Ahvaz led to the death of at least 24 persons and injury to
numerous others.12 Another attack in December 2018 in the city of Chabahar reportedly led
to the death of two people and numerous injuries.13 The Special Rapporteur expresses his
deepest condolences to the victims and their families, and to the Government and people of
the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Special Rapporteur unreservedly condemns the attacks, and
recalls the State’s obligation to hold the perpetrators accountable, in compliance with
international human rights law, including the right to a fair trial. Following the Ahvaz attack,
6 See http://kerman.farsnews.com/news/13970725000810.
7 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life.
8 See https://iranhr.net/en/articles/3514/.
9 A/61/311, para. 60.
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6 (4).
11 See https://ipa.united4iran.org/en/prisoner/.
12 See Security Council press statement available at www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13523.doc.htm.
13 See www.irna.ir/en/News/83125141.
Annex 75
A/HRC/40/67
4
the Special Rapporteur received reports indicating that at least 300 members of Ahwazi Arab
minority groups had been detained incommunicado.14 The authorities later confirmed that 22
people had been arrested, 15 and then later denied that they had been executed. 16 In its
comments, the Government stated that investigations were continuing. The Special
Rapporteur reiterates the right to a fair trial of those detained, and the need for information
on their whereabouts.
B. Right to a fair trial and liberty
12. The extensive use of the death penalty is alarming given the numerous reported cases
of violations of the right to a fair trial. Many cases highlight violations of the right to defend
oneself through legal assistance of one’s own choosing and the right to not to be compelled
to testify against oneself or to confess guilt, which are guaranteed under article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Islamic Republic of Iran has
ratified.
13. According to article 35 of the Constitution and article 48 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, individuals are guaranteed the right to be represented by their chosen lawyer.
However, in articles 48 and 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is stated that if
individuals are accused of offences punishable by death, life imprisonment or amputation, or
of “political or press crimes”, their choice of legal representation during the investigation
stage is restricted to lawyers on a list approved by the Head of the Judiciary. The Special
Rapporteur is particularly disturbed by these restrictions, given the reports received and
information obtained during interviews indicating a pattern of torture and other ill-treatment
conducted to compel confessions during the investigation stage. The Special Rapporteur
notes that according to the Penal Code, confessions extracted under duress or torture are
prohibited and inadmissible before the courts,17 and perpetrators are subject to punishment.
However, in article 171 of the Penal Code it is also stated that “if an accused person confesses
to the commission of an offence, his or her confession shall be admissible and there is no
need for further evidence”. Furthermore, it is stated in article 360 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure that convictions can be issued on the basis of voluntarily given confessions alone.
As such, the Special Rapporteur is concerned that there is a strong institutional expectation
to extract confessions, which does not facilitate an environment conducive to fair trials. In its
comments, the Government described the conditions that must be met before – under the
Penal Code – a confession can be introduced, which include that the accused must be
“recognized to be reasonable, mature, and impartial and free during confession”.
14. Discrimination in the administration of justice has been illustrated by the
disproportionate number of arrests and convictions of members of minority groups. The
Special Rapporteur received numerous reports in this respect, consistent with information
obtained during interviews conducted with members of the Baha’i, Azerbaijani Turkish,
Kurdish and Baloch communities among others. The Special Rapporteur also reviewed a list
of 83 imprisoned members of the Baha’i community. In February 2018, special procedure
mandate holders noted that they were aware of several reported cases in which members of
the Christian minority had received heavy sentences after being charged with threatening
national security, either for converting people or for attending house churches.18
15. The Special Rapporteur reviewed reports of violations of the right to a fair trial and
liberty of dual and foreign nationals detained in the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the basis of
ongoing reports, information reviewed and interviews conducted, the Special Rapporteur
considers that there is a pattern involving the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of dual nationals
and foreign nationals in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as identified by the Working Group on
14 See www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/11/iran-fears-mounting-for-detained…-
of-secret-executions/.
15 See https://bit.ly/2EZ3MWK.
16 See www.irna.ir/fa/News/83096589.
17 See arts. 168–169.
18 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22629&LangID=E.
Annex 75
A/HRC/40/67
5
Arbitrary Detention.19 The Special Rapporteur concurs with the Working Group’s assessment
that many of the cases follow a familiar pattern, which includes, inter alia, arrest and
detention outside of legal procedures, lengthy pretrial detention, denial of access to legal
counsel, prosecution under vaguely worded criminal offences with inadequate evidence to
support the allegations, torture and ill-treatment, and denial of medical care.20 The patterns
identified point to an urgent need for the Government to address the situation of all dual and
foreign nationals detained in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including Ahmadreza Djalali,
Kamran Ghaderi, Robert Levinson, Saeed Malekpour, Siamak and Baquer Namazi, Xiyue
Wang, Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and Nizar Zakka. The Working Group has issued opinions
calling for the release of a number of the aforementioned individuals,21 including Ahmadreza
Djalali who has been sentenced to death. The Special Rapporteur is further alarmed by reports
indicating that a number of them need urgent and appropriate medical care, and calls upon
the Government to address such concerns. In its comments, the Government denied that Mr.
Levinson was detained and stated it had “initiated investigations, on the basis of its legal
obligations toward the missing allegation, and the case is still open and under further
investigation”. The Government further described national security-related charges against
the other aforementioned individuals.
C. Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association
16. Reports received indicate a curtailment on the enjoyment of the right to freedom of
association and assembly over the year, which has affected various groups, including workers,
teachers, students, minority groups, and women.
17. Workers at the Haft Tapeh sugar mill protested about unpaid wages in July 2017,
August 2018 and November 2018. In November 2018, the authorities reportedly detained
approximately 18 workers and labour activists.22 Twelve persons were reportedly released,
while protests calling for the release of the remaining detainees continue at the time of writing.
18. In March 2018, 10 workers at the Iran National Steel Industrial Group in Ahvaz were
detained for several days owing to their alleged involvement in a strike over wages and work
conditions.23 In June, “dozens” more were reportedly arrested after protesting about unpaid
wages.24 A strike resumed in November in the absence of a response to their demands.
19. Truck drivers have conducted strikes across many provinces since May 2018 in protest
against low wages in light of increasing inflation. Over 150 drivers were later reportedly
detained after they resumed their strike in September,25 including in Qazvin Province.
20. Teachers protested against low wages and underfunding in October and November
2018. Some were detained or summoned to courts.26 In May 2018, Mohammad Habibi, a
member of the Iranian Teachers’ Trade Association of Tehran, was arrested. He was
convicted on national security-related charges in August27 amidst concerns that he had been
denied medical care despite sustaining injuries caused by ill-treatment during his arrest.28 In
its comments, the Government stated that Mr. Habibi had received 27 visits for medical
reasons and had been sent to medical centres three times.
21. Protests related to access to water have been reported, with demonstrations in
Khuzestan Province, Bavi, Khorramshahr, Abadan, Kut-e-Abdollah and Ahvaz. Fifteen
19 See the Working Group’s opinions No. 49/2017, para. 44; and No. 52/2018, para. 82.
20 See the Working Group’s opinion No. 52/2018, para. 86.
21 See the Working Group’s opinions Nos. 52/2018, 92/2017, 49/2017, 50/2016 and 28/2016.
22 See www.tuc.org.uk/tuc-writes-iranian-ambassador-regarding-arrests-haft-tap….
23 See www.industriall-union.org/iran-10-detained-after-protests-over-unpaid-w….
24 See www.hra-news.org/2018/hranews/a-15727/.
25 See www.itfglobal.org/en/news-events/press-releases/2018/october/itf-statem….
26 See www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/22/iran-mounting-crackdown-teachers-labor-acti….
27 Ibid.
28 See www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/uaa17418.pdf.
Annex 75
A/HRC/40/67
6
farmer representatives were arrested when 200 farmers protested against water diversions to
the Governorate of Kohgiluyeh va Boyer Ahmad Province.29
22. Consistent with the pattern of discrimination observed, minority groups have been
affected. In July 2018, 80 persons from the Azerbaijani Turkish community were reportedly
arrested before and during a cultural celebration at Babak Fort in East Azerbaijan Province.30
Most were released amidst reports that those detained had been subjected to ill-treatment. In
August, 40 persons from the community were temporarily detained during a gathering in
Meshgin Shahr in Ardabil Province amidst reports of excessive force by security forces.
Concerns have also been raised about the fate and whereabouts of eight Gonabadi dervishes
who allegedly held a sit-in protest in August 2018 at the Great Tehran Penitentiary.31 In its
comments, the Government stated that the aforementioned persons were imprisoned with
access to telephone calls.
23. The Special Rapporteur is further troubled by the arrests of women protesting against
compulsory veiling (the hijab). While most were released on bail, some were sentenced to up
to two years in prison on the charge of “encouraging moral corruption”.32 Women who do
not wear the hijab can be sentenced to up to two months in prison or fined, in violation of
their right to take part in cultural life without discrimination.33
D. Right to freedom of expression and opinion
24. The Special Rapporteur observes increasing limitations placed upon the rights to
freedom of opinion and expression. In April 2018, popular social media website Telegram
was banned for allegedly “disrupting national unity” and “allowing foreign countries to spy”
on the Islamic Republic of Iran.34 In November, the Government proposed a bill which
introduced new offences associated with the use of banned online applications. 35 In its
comments, the Government stated that active social networks such as Telegram “are obliged
to register only with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance”.
25. The Special Rapporteur is further disturbed by the trend of human rights defenders,
including women human rights defenders, being arrested and imprisoned in connection with
their activities, and the increasing numbers of arrests of lawyers and labour activists.
26. In June 2018, prominent human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh was arrested. Hoda
Amid, a lawyer who had represented women in vulnerable situations, was arrested in
September and subsequently released on bail pending trial.36 Lawyer Zeinab Taheri was
arrested and later released on bail pending charges.37 In one welcome development, human
rights lawyer Abdolfattah Soltani was released on conditional parole in November.38
27. In November 2018, special procedure mandate holders raised concerns about the
arrest of Nasrin Sotoudeh, her husband Reza Khandan, and Farhad Meysami, following their
advocacy in support of women’s rights.39 Women’s rights defenders Najmeh Vahedi and
Rezvaneh Mohammadi were arrested and then reportedly released on bail in November
pending trial.40
29 See www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-628251.
30 See www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1388892018ENGLISH.PDF.
31 See https://iranhumanrights.org/2018/10/great-tehran-penitentiary-imposes-i…-
sufi-detainees-held-in-solitary-confinement/.
32 See https://bit.ly/2EV0xzs.
33 A/72/155, para. 76.
34 See https://rsf.org/en/news/iranian-court-imposes-total-ban-telegram.
35 See www.isna.ir/news/97082813960/.
36 See www.en-hrana.org/womens-rights-activist-hoda-amid-released-on-bail.
37 See www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/release-on-bail-of-zeinab….
38 See www.irna.ir/fa/News/83108418.
39 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23947&LangID=E.
40 See www.iranhumanrights.org/2018/09/three-detained-womens-rights-activists-…-
released/.
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28. Other individuals remain imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of opinion
and expression. Alternative health practitioner Mohammad Ali Taheri was imprisoned
following a conviction for “spreading corruption on earth”. The Special Rapporteur reiterates
the call of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for his release.41
29. The Special Rapporteur is alarmed by the health situation of numerous imprisoned
human rights defenders. Farhad Meysami began a hunger strike in August 2018 in protest at
his lack of access to a lawyer of his choice and the charges against him. Arash Sadeghi is in
need of specialist medical care and remains imprisoned despite calls for his release from the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in April.42 Soheil Arabi is in urgent need of medical
attention. He was due for release in 2018, but was instead charged with additional offences
and was sentenced to 10 years and 8 months of additional imprisonment. In November,
concerns were raised about the worrying health situation of Narges Mohammadi, who is in
need of appropriate medical care. She remains imprisoned despite the call of the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention in 2017 to release her.43 The health situation of prisoners was
highlighted in December 2018, following the death of Vahid Sayyadi-Nasiri, a prisoner who
had begun a hunger strike in November. The Special Rapporteur urges the Government to
conduct a prompt, independent, impartial and effective investigation into the circumstances
of the death of Mr. Sayyadi-Nasiri, and to ensure that all those detained in need of medical
attention are afforded it urgently. In its comments, the Government stated that Mr. Sadeghi
was under the continuous supervision of a specialist and had access to medical clinics outside
of the prison.
30. The Special Rapporteur received reports of arrests and intimidation of journalists and
media workers within the country. Journalists outside of the country have also been targeted,
such as the staff of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Persian Service. A collective
criminal investigation and a purportedly temporary asset-freezing injunction initiated in 2017
against over 150 staff still remains in place. In some cases, staff members’ families based in
the Islamic Republic of Iran have been interrogated and harassed. Staff have also been
threatened and defamatory news stories have been circulated on social media about them.
The Special Rapporteur reiterates his predecessor’s concerns at such actions and calls upon
the Government to cease all legal actions44 and harassment against journalists, including the
BBC Persian Service staff. In its comments, the Government stated that a number of BBC
staff had been acquitted with respect to the asset-freezing injunction while other cases
remained open.
E. Impact of sanctions
31. The violations of civil and political rights described must be examined in the context
of renewed economic challenges for the Islamic Republic of Iran. These challenges
intensified with the reimposition of sanctions in 2018 following the decision by the United
States of America to cease its participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the
nuclear deal).45
32. In October 2018, the International Court of Justice indicated provisional measures
pending further proceedings and its final decision on proceedings brought by the Islamic
Republic of Iran against the United States on the alleged violation of the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the two States. 46 It considered that
assurances by the United States regarding humanitarian exemptions were “not adequate to
address fully the humanitarian and safety concerns raised” by the Islamic Republic of Iran,
and therefore it is of the view that there remains a risk that measures adopted by the United
41 See www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16292&LangID=E.
42 See the Working Group’s opinion No. 19/2018.
43 See the Working Group’s opinion No. 48/2017.
44 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22314&LangID=E.
45 See www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ceasing-u-s-participation-jcpoa…-
counter-irans-malign-influence-deny-iran-paths-nuclear-weapon/.
46 International Court of Justice press release dated 3 October 2018, available at https://www.icjcij.
org/files/case-related/175/175-20181003-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf.
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States may entail irreparable consequences.47 The Court’s provisional measures mandate the
United States to ensure that sanctions allow for humanitarian exemptions, including
medicines and medical devices; foodstuffs and agricultural commodities; and spare parts,
equipment and services necessary for the safety of civil aviation. 48 The United States
announced it was terminating the Treaty.49
33. In October 2018, the United States Secretary of State said “existing exceptions,
authorizations, and licensing policies for humanitarian-related transactions and safety of
flight will remain in effect”.50 The United States Department of the Treasury has issued
guidance in this respect, including for third-country financial institutions.51 In the guidance,
it is noted that United States sanctions law “contains explicit exceptions that allow foreign
financial institutions to conduct or facilitate transactions for the sale of agricultural
commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices” to the Islamic Republic of Iran “without
penalty, as long as the transaction does not involve a designated entity or otherwise
proscribed conduct”.52 Given that most Iranian banks are on the Department of the Treasury’s
Specially Designated Nationals List, financial transactions – even for non-sanctionable trade
– might prove difficult in practice. Furthermore, given the ambiguity around the application
of secondary sanctions and the complexity of applying them as part of the exemptions,
foreign companies and banks are likely to remain cautious in fear of repercussions by the
United States.53 According to reports,54 companies exporting medical supplies to the Islamic
Republic of Iran face challenges in accessing non-sanctioned banking services as well as
shortages of foreign currency in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which limit the possibility of
payments to foreign companies.
34. Following declarations 55 that the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) could be subject to sanctions, SWIFT indicated its decision to
suspend some Iranian banks. Non-sanctioned Iranian financial institutions were allowed to
remain on SWIFT to conduct limited transactions involving food and medicine.56
35. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that by preventing financial transfers to the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the aforementioned secondary sanctions, which target third parties,
are likely to hinder the production, availability and distribution of essential medical and
pharmaceutical equipment and supplies, which could potentially increase mortality rates.
Similar concerns were expressed in the context of previous sanctions.57 In September, the
Syndicate of Pharmaceutical Industries noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran imported more
than half of the raw material required for the production of medicines. 58 According to
members of the Parliament’s Health Commission, the Islamic Republic of Iran was short of
80 pharmaceutical items59 and hospitals were experiencing shortages of medicines, medical
equipment and consumer goods. 60 The Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of
unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights stated: “The current system
47 International Court of Justice, Request for the indication of provisional measures, Order,
paras. 91–92, dated 3 October 2018, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-
20181003-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf.
48 Ibid.
49 See www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286417.htm.
50 Ibid.
51 “Clarifying guidance on humanitarian assistance and related exports to the Iranian people”, 6
February 2013, available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/
hum_exp_iran.pdf.
52 Ibid., p. 4.
53 See www.economist.com/business/2018/11/08/european-companies-will-struggle-…-
iran.
54 See www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_iran_the_case_for_protecting_humanitaria….
55 See www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/11/287090.htm.
56 See www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-02/trump-s-iran-bank-cutoff-…-
u-s-sanctions-hurt.
57 See A/67/327.
58 See http://fna.ir/a0ws79.
59 See www.isna.ir/news/97061105121/.
60 See www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-673055.
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creates doubt and ambiguity which makes it all but impossible” for the Islamic Republic of
Iran to import “these urgently needed humanitarian goods. This ambiguity causes a ‘chilling
effect’ which is likely to lead to silent deaths in hospitals as medicines run out, while the
international media fail to notice.”61
III. Execution of child offenders
A. Introduction
36. The execution of child offenders is prohibited by international law, regardless of the
age of the accused when the execution takes place. This prohibition is enshrined within the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and customary international law. In 2003, the Commission on Human Rights affirmed
that international law established that the execution of child offenders was in contravention
of customary international law.62
37. Numerous human rights mechanisms have called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to
stop sentencing children to death, including the Committee on the Rights of the Child,63 the
Human Rights Committee, 64 the General Assembly, 65 the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights66 and special procedure mandate holders.67 Successive
Secretaries-General of the United Nations have raised this issue, in 10 previous reports on
the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as in public statements.68 During universal periodic
reviews, numerous States have recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran end the
executions. In 2010, the recommendation to “consider the abolition of juvenile execution”
was supported by the Government,69 and in 2014 the recommendation to “ban executions of
juvenile offenders, while at the same time providing for alternative punishments in line with
the new Iranian Penal Code” was partially supported. 70 The Islamic Republic of Iran
explicitly accepted the obligation to prohibit such executions through its ratification of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
38. The Special Rapporteur deeply regrets, however, that the Islamic Republic of Iran
continues to sentence children to death “far more often than any other State”.71 Girls as young
as 9 and boys as young as 15 can be sentenced to death. Information received indicates that
at least 61 child offenders have been executed since 2008.72 At least six child offenders were
executed in 2018. All were aged between 14 and 17 at the time of the alleged commission of
the crime, and all were executed on the basis of qisas for the crime of murder. According to
previous reports, 5 child offenders were executed in 2017,73 5 in 2016, 74 4 in 201575 and 13
in 2014.76 Credible information received indicates that there are at least 85 child offenders
61 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23469&LangID=E.
62 See Commission on Human Rights resolution 2003/67.
63 CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4, para. 36.
64 CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3, para. 13.
65 See General Assembly resolution 73/181.
66 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23689&LangID=E.
67 See www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23216&LangID=E.
68 United Nations, “Secretary-General, concerned at worrying trend of executions in Iran, reaffirms
United Nations opposition to death penalty”, 19 October 2015, available at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm17247.doc.htm.
69 A/HRC/14/12, para. 90 (40).
70 A/HRC/28/12, para. 138.156; and A/HRC/28/12/Add.1, para. 7 (b).
71 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22664&LangID=E.
72 Six executions were documented in 2018. Fifty-five executions were reported from 2008 to 2017. See
Iran Human Rights and Ensemble contre la peine de mort, annual report 2017, p. 27, available at
https://iranhr.net/en/articles/3258/.
73 See A/HRC/37/68, para. 19.
74 See A/HRC/34/40, para. 18.
75 See A/71/418, para. 21.
76 See A/HRC/28/70, para. 15.
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currently on death row in the Islamic Republic of Iran and that 21 children have been
sentenced to death since 2013.
39. In 2013, the Government amended the Penal Code to give judges the discretion to
exempt children from the death penalty if the judge assesses that the child did not realize the
nature of the crime or if there is uncertainty about his or her mental development. It stated
that its policy was to seek to avoid executions through mediation when possible. In comments
provided, it also highlighted the importance of restorative justice and juvenile rehabilitation.
The Special Rapporteur encourages the Government to continue to review existing policies
with a view to prohibiting the execution of child offenders, in line with its international treaty
commitments. The present report seeks to support such efforts.
B. Legal framework
1. International legal framework
40. In 1975, the Islamic Republic of Iran ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights without reservation. In article 6 (5) of the Covenant, it is stated that the
“sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen
years of age …”. In 1994, the Islamic Republic of Iran ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, which stipulates in its article 37 (a) that “neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by
persons below eighteen years of age”. In both cases, the explicit and decisive criterion is the
age at the time of the alleged commission of the offence. The Human Rights Committee has
stated that if there is no reliable and conclusive proof that the person was not below the age
of 18 at the time that the crime was committed, he or she will have the right to the benefit of
the doubt and the death penalty cannot be imposed.77
41. Upon ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Islamic Republic
of Iran made a reservation stating that it “reserves the right not to apply any provisions or
articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the international
legislation in effect”. Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of 1969,
provides that reservations should not be incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty. In 2016, the Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that the Islamic
Republic of Iran withdraw it accordingly,78 in the light of article 51 (2) of the Convention in
which it is specified that “a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the
present Convention shall not be permitted”. In response, the Government noted that the
provisions of the Convention are “legally binding in the country”.79
42. The prohibition of imposing the death penalty on children is widely considered to
form part of the jus cogens category of norms of international law. No derogation or deviation
from such peremptory norms is permissible. This jus cogens character is reflected by almost
complete unanimity in calls to end the practice, which continues in only a few States. In its
comments, the Government disagreed that the prohibition formed part of jus cogens.
2. National legal framework
(a) Age of criminal responsibility
43. Substantial inconsistencies exist within Iranian legislation and the Iranian justice
system which mean that girls aged 9 and boys aged 15 can be sentenced to death for certain
crimes, whereas children aged up to 18 are sentenced to correctional measures for other
crimes.
77 See the Committee’s general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life.
78 CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4, paras. 9–10.
79 Supplementary response of the National Body on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, para. 1,
available from https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/
Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCRC%2fCOB%2fIRN%2f23480&Lang=en.
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44. According to the Civil Code, the age of “maturity” for girls is 9 lunar years, and for
boys 15 lunar years.80 Maturity in this context is assessed according to the child’s physical
development according to some traditional rulings in Islamic jurisprudence. Articles 146 and
147 of the 2013 revised Penal Code also specify the age of criminal responsibility at 9 lunar
years for girls and 15 lunar years for boys.
45. Criminal responsibility for crimes punishable by hudud (punishments fixed by God)
or qisas is maintained at the same age of maturity, that is, 9 lunar years for girls and 15 lunar
years for boys. These crimes carry mandatory punishments such as death, flogging and
amputation, giving no discretion to the court as to what sentence is appropriate based on
individual circumstances, age, and mitigating factors. All child offenders executed in 2018
were executed on the basis of qisas.
46. In contrast, the age of responsibility for the frequently less serious ta’zir crimes
(crimes for which the judge has discretion as to the sentence imposed) is 18 years for all
children. In such circumstances, convicted children are sentenced to correctional measures.
47. The Special Rapporteur notes further inconsistencies within the legal framework. In
the 2017 amendment to the drug trafficking law, the death penalty was retained for any
individual who “has exploited children or juveniles under the age of 18…for the commission
of the crime”.81 Article 35 continues to sanction “anyone who forces children and juveniles
under the age of 18 … to use drugs”. These provisions indicate a clear acknowledgment that
individuals below the age of 18 years have less “maturity” or “mental development” than
those above the age of 18 years.
48. Other legislative provisions reflect a similar understanding. Article 1 of the Protection
of Children and Adolescents Act, of 2002, defines a child as every human being below the
age of 18 years old. Furthermore, only an individual over 18 years old can obtain a passport,82
vote,83 or obtain a driving licence.
49. In the light of the inconsistencies described, the Special Rapporteur reiterates the
recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child to the Islamic Republic of Iran
to revise its legislation to increase the age of maturity to 18 years.84 In its comments, the
Government noted that “the minimum age for criminal liability has been determined through
taking into account of the mental and psychological development of children and juveniles,
and considering of geographical, cultural, social, religious and racial conditions. When an
age is recognized as the minimum age for criminal liability, it indicates that the juvenile, at
this age, has reached the level of emotional, mental and psychological maturity that may
recognize his/her liability against his/her behaviours. Therefore, the recognition of the
minimum age is associated with consideration of the mental maturity of juveniles.”
(b) Legislative developments
50. In 2013, the Penal Code was amended. Article 91 of the amended Code exempts
children aged below 18 years and above the age of maturity from the death penalty if it is
assessed that they “do not realize the nature of the crime committed or its prohibition, or if
there is uncertainty about their full mental development, according to their age”. Article 91
also stipulates that “the court may ask the opinion of forensic medicine or resort to any other
method that it sees appropriate in order to establish the full mental development”.85 Following
the amendment, child offenders on death row began to apply to the Supreme Court for retrials.
Some applications were successful but others were refused. This led to the issuance of a
“unifying judicial precedent” by the Supreme Court in 2014 which confirmed that
applications for retrials were admissible. In submissions to the Committee on the Rights of
the Child, the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that “the retrial of all adolescents who were
80 Article 1210, note 1.
81 Art. 45.
82 Passport and Immigration Law, sect. 1, art. 18.
83 Election Law, art. 36.
84 CRC/C/15/Add.254, para. 23; and CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4, paras. 27–28.
85 See https://iranhrdc.org/english-translation-of-books-i-ii-of-the-new-islam….
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under 18 at the time of committing the crime is accepted and their previous verdicts have
been annulled by the Supreme Court”.86 However, as will be elaborated on, child offenders
face numerous hurdles in relying upon the provisions of article 91 and the executions
continue.
C. Efforts and position of the State
51. A number of measures have been put in place relating to child offenders. Most
recently, a bill on the protection of children and adolescents was approved by Parliament. It
is pending approval by the Guardian Council. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for
the establishment of children’s and adolescents’ courts, comprised of a specialist judge and
a qualified adviser with knowledge of child development.87 However, if children above the
age of maturity (9 lunar years for girls and 15 lunar years for boys) are accused of qisas or
hudud crimes or certain ta’zir crimes, they instead face the First Criminal Court’s special
adolescents’ division.88 Credible information received indicates that in practice this means
that the child is tried in the same physical courtroom in which adults are tried.
52. All child offenders executed in 2018 were executed pursuant to a conviction for
murder on the basis of qisas. In comments received, the Government stated that extensive
efforts were made to satisfy the next of kin of the victim through mediation in order to convert
qisas to diya. It further noted that its “principled policy… is to encourage compromise even
with … cash assistance to realize the payment of the diyeh” and “this is the prevailing trend
and main course of dealing with this group of offenders”. The Government also referred to
the establishment of a reconciliation commission, and a task force consisting of officials,
psychologists, social workers, corrections officials, lawyers, and members of civil society
which supports mediation with the next of kin of the victim. In addition, conflict resolution
council branches and the Women and Children and Protection Office of the judiciary
intervene in cases. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also support mediation and
fundraising for payments of diya. Notwithstanding such efforts, the Special Rapporteur has
received reports that relevant actors are reluctant to intervene in cases of hudud crimes such
as adultery, same-sex relationships, or murder crimes also involving rape.
53. In comments received, the Government justified the continuing executions, on the
basis that “the duty of the State in this case is merely to examine and deliberate the murder,
and execution of the sentence is only possible on the basis of the request of the owners of the
blood”. In 2009, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
noted that no other State in which Islamic law was applicable saw the need to make such an
argument to justify the executions of child offenders.89 He further noted that article 37 (a) of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and article 6 (5) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights bound the Government to extend the abolition of execution of child
offenders to qisas crimes.90 Furthermore, as noted, this practice deprives the child of his or
her right to seek pardon or commutation from the State as enshrined in article 6 (4) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
D. Vulnerability and treatment of children in the criminal justice system
54. Child offenders continue to be executed in the Islamic Republic of Iran amidst
violations concerning the right to a fair trial, torture and other ill-treatment, and a lack of
consideration given to each child’s individual circumstances.
86 See CRC/C/IRN/3-4/Add.1.
87 Code of Criminal Procedure, arts. 289 and 408.
88 Ibid., art. 315.
89 A/HRC/11/2, paras. 35–36.
90 Ibid.
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1. Patterns of convictions based upon confessions
55. The sentencing of children to death is particularly alarming, given their specific
vulnerability as children amidst documented patterns of violations related to the lack of
access to a lawyer and the reliance on confessions obtained through coercion or torture in
judicial proceedings.91 The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights require that a child cannot be compelled to confess
guilt or acknowledge guilt.92 The Committee on the Rights of the Child further states that
children may be led to a confession that is not true because of their age, their development,
the length of the interrogation, their lack of understanding, the fear of unknown consequences,
or the suggested possibility of imprisonment, as well as the promise of possible release or
lighter sanctions.93 The inherent vulnerability of children is further increased because if they
are charged with crimes involving the death penalty they cannot choose their own lawyer
during the initial investigation phase. They are instead limited to a lawyer approved by the
Head of the Judiciary. Information received indicates that numerous children have been
convicted on the basis of confessions compelled during this phase. In 2018 for example,
Zeinab Sekaanvand was reportedly coerced into confessing that she had killed her husband
when she was 17 years old.94 She recanted her confession but was nevertheless executed.
Alireza Tajiki was executed in 2017, after confessing to murder at the age of 15 after
reportedly being tortured. He also later recanted his confession but no investigation was
undertaken into his claims.95
2. Practices amounting to torture and other ill-treatment
56. The treatment of children on death row is of deep concern. Government
representatives have claimed that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not execute children.96 In
practice, this means that the State imprisons the convicted child on death row for years until
they reach the age of 18 and executes them thereafter. Reports received also indicate that the
executions of numerous child offenders were repeatedly postponed, often at the last minute.97
In this respect, in June 2018 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights raised
the case of Abolfazi Chezani Sharahi, a child offender whose execution was postponed four
times before his eventual execution.98 Similarly, the executions of Alireza Tajiki and Omid
Rostami were postponed four times. They were executed in 2017 and 2018 respectively after
spending numerous years on death row. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that the
combination of circumstances, with respect to repeated postponements, the practice of
waiting until the child reaches the age of 18, and the inherent vulnerability of the child given
his or her age, inevitably leads to severe mental trauma and physical deterioration.99 The
Special Rapporteur accordingly contends that the policy and practice of sentencing children
to death in the Islamic Republic of Iran amounts to a pattern of torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment contrary to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Islamic Republic of
Iran is a party. The Special Rapporteur emphasizes that the way to address this is to
immediately prohibit the sentencing of children to death and to commute the death sentences
of all child offenders on death row.
3. Circumstances of children sentenced to death
57. Reports received indicate that many children sentenced to death on the basis of qisas,
along with their families, have lower levels of economic and social standing, education, and
91 See para. 13 above.
92 Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 40; and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 14.
93 See the Committee’s general comment No. 10 (2007) on children’s rights in juvenile justice, para. 57.
94 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23689&LangID=E.
95 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21958&LangID=E.
96 See the statement made by the Head of the Judiciary in 2014, available at https://bit.ly/2LE4dGY.
97 A/67/279, para. 48.
98 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23279&LangID=E.
99 See A/67/279, pp. 9–14 on the “death row phenomenon”.
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support networks. 100 Girl child offenders have in some cases faced extreme situations,
including forced marriage and domestic violence. However, there is no legislative scope that
allows the court to take into account mitigating factors related to the background and
circumstances in which the child is living or the conditions in which the offence has been
allegedly committed. Two individuals who had married as children were executed in 2018.
Mahboubeh Mofidi, who was married at the age of 13, allegedly murdered her husband when
she was aged 17.101 Zeinab Sekaanvand, who was married at the age of 15, allegedly
murdered her husband when she was aged 17.102 Ms. Sekaanvand was executed despite no
investigation being undertaken into allegations of domestic violence during her marriage.
The Special Rapporteur reiterates the recommendation of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child that the minimum age of marriage of 13 years for girls and 15 years for boys should be
increased to 18 years.103
58. The Special Rapporteur notes that the background of the accused child and the
circumstances in which the offence was allegedly committed are critical, not only because
they should be taken into account by the court, but also because they can hinder attempts to
avoid execution by paying for diya. Children who have grown up in poverty, for example,
are unlikely to be able to afford the diya requested (which has no upper limit for qisas crimes).
The child’s life therefore depends upon his or her family being able to attract the attention of
NGOs that can help to raise enough money. Such organizations are not present in every
province, and poorer families in more remote provinces with less influence, education and
awareness face serious challenges. The Special Rapporteur contends that these factors
explain why most executed child offenders originate from poorer backgrounds and
economically less advantaged provinces.
59. In its comments, the Government stated that according to article 286 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the preparation of a “personality file” which considered the conditions
at the time of offence was mandatory at the time of issuing the verdict. It also stated that the
file was prepared separately from the criminal file and included a social worker’s report on
the defendant’s physical, family and social status, as well as medical and psychiatric reports.
It further noted that for the purposes of paying diya, the “destitution” of the accused was
taken into consideration, and that NGOs and social institutions contributed financially.
E. Implementation of article 91 of the Penal Code
1. Overview
60. As noted, the enactment of article 91 of the Penal Code in 2013 allowed judges to
exempt children from the death penalty if the judge assessed that the child did not “realize
the nature of the crime committed or its prohibition, or if there is uncertainty about their full
mental development, according to their age”. In its submission to the Committee on the
Rights of the Child in 2015, the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the previous verdicts of
all child offenders would be annulled, pending retrials.104 In its comments on the present
report, the Government stated that “the provisions of the Islamic Penal Code have been
effective in reducing the execution of adults under the age of 18 years”. Recent reports
indicate that the sentences of at least six child offenders were commuted in 2017 following
retrials.105 Executions have however continued. Since article 91 entered into force in 2013,
the Special Rapporteur estimates that at least 33 child offenders have been executed,106 and
according to credible information received at least 21 children were sentenced to death on
the basis of qisas. In 2016, the Committee on the Rights of the Child deplored the fact that
100 See, for example, Amnesty International, Growing Up on Death Row (2016), p. 53, available at
www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/growing_up_on_death_row_-
_the_death_penalty_and_juvenile_offenders_in_iran_final.pdf.
101 See www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/07/iran-three-child-offenders-executed.
102 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23689&LangID=E.
103 CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4, paras. 27–28.
104 CRC/C/IRN/Q/3-4/Add.1, para. 33.
105 A/72/322, para. 68.
106 See para. 38 above.
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the executions had continued despite the amendment107 and in 2017 some special procedure
mandate holders described ongoing executions as “conclusive proof of the failure of the 2013
amendments to stop the execution of individuals sentenced to death as children”.108 In the
present section, the Special Rapporteur seeks to explain why article 91 has not been effective
in stopping the executions.
2. Inconsistent and arbitrary assessments
61. In 2016, the Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed “serious concern” that
decisions to exempt children from death sentences on the basis of article 91 assessments “are
under the full discretion of judges”, and strongly urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to remove
such discretion from the courts.109 The discretion given is particularly problematic because
the criteria used for assessing “mental development” is undefined and subjective. In some
cases, judges reportedly asked simple questions focused on whether the child knew that it
was wrong to kill. In other cases, judges considered the child to be “mentally developed” as
long as there was no evidence of mental health issues. Judges have also used measures such
as assessing whether the defendant has grown body hair to confirm mental development.110
62. In its comments, the Government stated that “the lack of understanding on the side of
the defendant, of the nature of the committed crime or existence of doubt in his/her maturity
and wisdom are stipulations and the terminology referred to in article 91 shall be carefully
observed at the time of the judicial proceedings …”. The Government further noted that “the
legislator, in article 91, approached the acceptance of criminal liability maturity and in a way,
it has admitted that adolescent people under the age of 18 could have not reached mentally
maturity and do not understand the nature of their act; there is doubt on their growth and
perfection of mind; and thus, they may not be subject to hadd or qisas. Therefore, the
reference of the law [to] those terms is important, because it helps the judge to reason on this
basis and, instead of imposing severe penalties, such as hadd or qisas, determine, as per case
and their age, the prescribed punishments.”
3. Inconsistent use and provision of expert advice
63. Article 91 of the Penal Code provides that “the court may ask for the opinion of
forensic medicine or resort to any other method it sees appropriate in order to establish the
full mental development”. The Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed serious
concern that judges “are allowed but are not mandated to seek forensic expert opinion”.111 In
some cases where expert opinion has not been requested, the child has been assessed by the
judge as being mentally developed. For example, Omid Rostami, who was convicted of
killing someone when he was 16 years of age, was executed in 2018 despite the failure of the
District Court and the Supreme Court to request an expert opinion to assess his mental
development.
64. When expert advice has been requested, an opinion has been sought from doctors
working for the Iranian Legal Medicine Organization, a State institution. On numerous
occasions, the Iranian Legal Medicine Organization has undertaken the assessment long after
the crime was allegedly committed. Fatemeh Salbehi was convicted of killing her husband in
2008, when she was aged 17. She was sentenced to death and then afforded a retrial pursuant
to article 91 in 2013. During the retrial, the Iranian Legal Medicine Organization concluded
that she was mentally developed at the time of the crime, which had taken place five years
earlier. She was executed. Similarly, child offender Abolfazl Sharahi was assessed as being
mature one year after the alleged commission of the offence, and was subsequently executed.
The Special Rapporteur suggests that it is impossible for a credible assessment to be made in
such circumstances. The Special Rapporteur observes that there is a need to highlight the
107 CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4, para. 35.
108 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21547&LangID=E.
109 CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4, paras. 35–36.
110 Joint alternative report by civil society organizations, “Rights of the child in Iran”, March 2015,
available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CRC/Shared%20Documents/IRN/
INT_CRC_NGO_IRN_19809_E.pdf.
111 CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4, paras. 35–36.
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extensive evidenced-based research supporting the view that individuals under the age of 18
have a lower level of mental development than adults. Further evidence is available to support
this view in Iranian legislation itself, as already noted. 112 The Special Rapporteur also
observes that article 91 allows for a child offender to be exempted from the death penalty if
there is “uncertainty about their full mental development”. This indicates that if there is any
doubt whatsoever then the child cannot be sentenced to death.
4. Inconsistent follow-up
65. In some cases, even when the judge has assessed that there is uncertainty as to the
mental development of the child, the assessment has been overturned upon appeal and the
child has been subsequently sentenced to death. For example, Mohammad Kalhori was
initially assessed as not mentally developed at the time of the crime and was sentenced to
imprisonment. However the Supreme Court later overturned his sentence and he was
sentenced to death during a retrial.113
5. Inconsistent implementation of retrials
66. Information received by the Special Rapporteur indicates that article 91 has not been
effective in sparing children already on death row from execution. One reason for this is that
article 91 does not provide for an automatic review of cases. Child offenders on death row or
their families must instead submit an application for retrial. As noted, many have lower levels
of economic and social standing, education, and support networks, and lower levels of
familiarity with their legal rights. In such circumstances, they may not be aware of the
possibility of applying for a retrial or may not have the means to do so. In other cases,
applications for retrials have been rejected. This trend was highlighted by the predecessor to
the current Special Rapporteur, who described how the requests of Zeinab Sekaanvand and
three other child offenders had been rejected by the Supreme Court without explanation.114
67. Even when requests for retrial have been accepted, some child offenders have been
resentenced to death. The Committee on the Rights of the Child and the predecessor to the
current Special Rapporteur expressed concerns in this respect in 2016 115 and 2017 116
respectively.
6. Assessment of the implementation of article 91
68. The Special Rapporteur has described some fundamental and serious limitations
related to the implementation of article 91, while acknowledging that in some cases child
offenders have been exempted from the death penalty. The assessment of mental
development at the time of the crime is arbitrary and inconsistent, and at the sole discretion
of the judge, who can choose whether to seek medical advice or not. The credibility of such
assessments is further undermined by the use of inconsistent criteria, particularly when they
were conducted years after the crime in question. In some cases the findings of the assessment
have been overturned upon appeal in any event. Some requests under article 91 for retrials
for child offenders on death row have been rejected. In other cases where retrials have been
granted, the child offender has been found to be mentally developed and the death sentence
has been upheld.
IV. Conclusions and recommendations
A. Human rights situation
69. The Special Rapporteur observes that the protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran
which began in December 2017 reflect long-standing grievances related to human rights,
112 See paras. 46–49 above.
113 See www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23216&LangID=E.
114 A/72/322, para. 67.
115 CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4, paras. 35–36.
116 A/72/322, para. 68.
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in particular the enjoyment of economic, cultural and social rights. Positive
developments have been noted, such as the amendment to the drug trafficking law
which led to a substantial decline in executions. Nevertheless, increasing economic
challenges have intensified the grievances. These grievances may be further
exacerbated due to the recent reimposition of unilateral sanctions. Discontent has been
expressed through disparate protests by different groups across the country. The
Government has introduced some measures aimed at mitigating the economic impact
but has also increased the limits placed upon the rights to freedom of opinion,
expression, assembly, and association. In parallel, ominous developments signal an
increasingly severe State response, illustrated by the arrests of lawyers, human rights
defenders and labour activists. Their imprisonment undermines the protection of all
rights, including the right to a fair trial. This is worrying, given the pattern observed of
ill-treatment to coerce confessions during the initial investigation stage and the denial
of access to a chosen lawyer during this stage for serious offences. In the meantime, the
death penalty continues to be used extensively, including for crimes that do not entail
intentional killing.
70. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government and Parliament:
(a) Pending abolishment, remove from the scope of the death penalty any
offence other than the “most serious crimes”, which are confined to intentional killing,
and ensure that all those sentenced to death for other offences have their sentences
commuted. Amend legislation to ensure that any person sentenced to death, including
on the basis of qisas, can seek pardon or commutation from the State;
(b) Ensure that prisoners are protected from all forms of torture and other
ill-treatment. Ensure that confessions obtained through such treatment are never
admitted as evidence against the accused;
(c) Amend the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to ensure that
confessions alone are not sufficient for admission of guilt;
(d) Ensure that medical care is urgently provided to those individuals in
detention who need it, including those identified in the present report, in light of the
imminent threat to life or serious deterioration of their health. Ensure that all
individuals in custody receive adequate, prompt and regular health care, including
specialist care as needed, on the basis of their informed consent;
(e) Ensure that deaths in custody, and allegations of violations of due process
and of ill-treatment are promptly, independently, impartially and effectively
investigated by an independent competent authority with a view to bringing those
suspected of criminal responsibility to justice in compliance with their right to a fair
trial;
(f) Ensure that all persons accused of any crime are assured access to a
lawyer of their choosing during all stages of the judicial process, including during the
initial investigation and interrogation stage, and are provided with legal aid as needed;
(g) Ensure that all prisoners with health conditions for whom staying in
prison would mean an exacerbation of their condition are not detained in prison, and
issue alternative sentences if there is no prospect of recovery through the full
implementation of article 502 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(h) Protect the rights of all persons belonging to religious and ethnic
minorities and address all forms of discrimination against them, and release all those
imprisoned for having exercised their right to freedom of religion or belief;
(i) Ensure that all those arrested for the peaceful exercise of their rights to
freedom of opinion, expression, assembly and association are released. Promptly report
to the families the whereabouts and situation of individuals taken into custody;
(j) Ensure that human rights defenders, including women human rights
defenders, and lawyers and journalists are not threatened with or subjected to
intimidation, harassment, arbitrary arrest, deprivation of liberty or other arbitrary
sanction, and release all those detained in connection with their work;
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(k) Implement the recommendations reflected in the opinions of the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, and address patterns of violations highlighted by the
Working Group with respect to dual and foreign nationals;
(l) Take all measures necessary to mitigate some of the effects of economic
sanctions, and to meet its obligations under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, including on the protection of vulnerable groups. Establish
a transparent financial mechanism to ensure that trade in medicines and other essential
humanitarian items continues.
71. The Special Rapporteur recommends that sanctions-imposing countries take all
steps to ensure that sanctions in the Islamic Republic of Iran do not undermine human
rights, including by ensuring that humanitarian and procedural safeguards and
exemptions prevent a harmful impact on the enjoyment of human rights.
B. Execution of child offenders
72. The Special Rapporteur notes that the execution of child offenders has continued
over decades in violation of the international human rights obligations of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Girls as young as 9 and boys as young as 15 can be sentenced to death.
The Government’s support for mediation efforts to obtain forgiveness for qisas crimes,
and the enactment of article 91 of the Penal Code, have meant some children have
avoided the death penalty. Despite this, at least 21 children have been sentenced to death
and 33 child offenders have been executed since the enactment of article 91. These
numbers confirm that the content of article 91 is not sufficient and its implementation
has not been effective. In numerous cases, the assessment of mental development
provided for by article 91 has been conducted years after the crime in question was
allegedly committed. Information reviewed indicates that many children sentenced to
death have lower levels of economic and social standing, education, and support
networks, and in some cases have faced extreme situations including forced marriage
and alleged domestic violence. However, the legislation does not allow the court to take
into account mitigating factors when considering the death sentence. Furthermore, if
diya is agreed, children whose families are not as wealthy are less able to “buy” their
freedom and depend upon others to find the money to save their lives. Hence the
executions continue unabated.
73. The Special Rapporteur recommends that Parliament:
(a) Urgently amend legislation to prohibit the execution of persons who
committed a hudud or qisas crime while below the age of 18 years and as such are
children. Urgently amend the legislation to commute all existing sentences for child
offenders on death row;
(b) Withdraw the general reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child given that such a general reservation is not compatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention;
(c) Amend the Penal Code to increase the age of criminal responsibility for
qisas and hudud crimes to 18 years for all children, and ensure that all children are
treated equally and without discrimination within the criminal justice system.
74. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the judiciary:
(a) Urgently halt the planned execution of all child offenders, and commute
the death sentences imposed on the basis of qisas and hudud crimes for all child
offenders;
(b) Pending legislative review, urgently issue a circular which requires all
judges not to sentence children to death on the basis of qisas or hudud crimes, and which
requires presiding judges to order retrials for all child offenders on death row without
recourse to the death penalty.
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75. Pending implementation of the aforementioned recommendations, and without
prejudice to the binding obligation enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to not sentence
children to death and to not execute child offenders, the Special Rapporteur
recommends that the judiciary:
(a) Require courts to comprehensively assess mental development in all cases
in line with article 91 of the Penal Code, and to always seek expert advice from the
relevant child development, psychology, psychiatry, and social service fields as well as
from the Iranian Legal Medicine Organization, with a view to ensuring that the child is
exempted from the death penalty;
(b) Ensure that any article 91 assessment is conducted on the prima facie basis
that there is uncertainty about the mental development of the child, and as such a death
sentence cannot be imposed. Ensure that the burden of proof is always on the
prosecution to establish complete certainty about the full mental development of the
child, in line with article 91. Furthermore, ensure that the child is afforded the benefit
of the doubt if the assessment is not undertaken immediately after the crime;
(c) Undertake a prompt, effective and transparent review of all child
offenders on death row and ensure that they are afforded legal representation and
financial and other needed support to exercise their right to a retrial as provided for by
article 91 of the Penal Code;
(d) Ensure that children who have been detained or arrested are interviewed
only in the presence of their chosen lawyer, are immediately granted legal aid if needed,
and are granted access to a family member of their choice at all times regardless of the
offence they are accused of;
(e) When assessing the quality and veracity of testimony or confession offered
by the child, ensure that the judge considers all circumstances of interrogation,
especially the age of the child as well as the length of detention and interrogation and
the presence of legal or other representatives and parents during questioning;
(f) Require that all those who deal with children in the criminal justice system,
especially judges, prosecutors, medical examiners, police interrogators and other law
enforcement professionals, undergo specialist, ongoing and systematic training on the
rights of the child. Such training should inform participants about how to take into
account the child’s physical, psychological, mental and social development in a manner
consistent with the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran under international
human rights law;
(g) Establish specialist and separate child courts to consider cases involving
children, for all crimes including qisas and hudud crimes, in the first instance and on
appeal, in all provinces. Ensure that the judges who preside over such courts, and the
prosecutors who are able to bring cases before such courts, have a minimum level of
professional qualifications and expert training in child sociology, child psychology and
behavioural sciences;
(h) Ensure that the court takes into account the circumstances in which the
child is living and the conditions in which any offence has allegedly been committed,
including through the preparation, introduction and full consideration of pre-sentence
reports. Ensure that the court is informed about all relevant facts about the child, such
as social and family background, wealth, education and circumstances of marriage.
Ensure that adequate social services capacity has been established to be able to provide
such reports and is mandated to provide such advice;
(i) Ensure that detention pending trial is only used as a measure of last resort
and for the shortest possible period of time for children accused of any crime, including
qisas and hudud crimes;
(j) Provide the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights and the Special Rapporteur with a list of all child offenders on death row.
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76. Pending abolition of the death penalty for child offenders, the Special
Rapporteur recommends that the Iranian Legal Medicine Organization, and other
expert bodies called upon to conduct article 91 assessments:
(a) Conduct assessments that provide a scientific, evidence-based assessment
as to whether there is total certainty about the mental development of the child offender
at the time of the offence in line with article 91 of the Penal Code. Ensure that such an
assessment reflects the findings of assessments by experts from all relevant fields,
including the relevant child development, psychology, psychiatry, and social service
fields;
(b) Afford the child offender the benefit of the doubt and deliver a finding of
uncertainty when absolute certainty cannot be scientifically established, including if the
assessment is not conducted immediately after the alleged offence. Establish and
publish a methodology to conduct the assessment.
Annex 75
[From top left] Siamak Namazi, Baquer Namazi, Nazanin Zaghari-
Ratcliffe, Xiyue Wang and his family, and Nizar Zakka.
© 2018 Private
SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 12:00AM EDT
Iran: Targeting of Dual Citizens, Foreigners
Prolonged Detention, Absence of Due Process
(Beirut) – Iran’s security apparatus has escalated
its targeting of Iranian dual citizens and foreign
nationals whom they perceive to have links with
Western academic, economic, and cultural
institutions, Human Rights Watch said today.
Human Rights Watch has documented and
reviewed the cases of 14 dual or foreign
nationals whom Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Intelligence Organization
has arrested since 2014. In many cases courts
have charged them with cooperating with a
“hostile state” without revealing any evidence.
People interviewed about the cases said they
believed that in the cases of those targeted, authorities perceived these individuals shared an ability to facilitate
relationships between Iran and Western entities outside the control of Iranian security agencies.
“At a time when Iran was getting ready to open its door to international trade and cultural exchanges, security
authorities were apparently throwing in prison some of the people best suited to rebuild relationships with the
international community,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “This targeted
campaign against foreign and dual nationals sends a threatening message to Iranian expatriates and foreigners
interested in working in Iran, that their knowledge and expertise are a liability if they visit the country.”
In May and June 2018, Human Rights Watch interviewed 10 people with close knowledge of the 14 cases
documented, including former detainees, lawyers, family members, and Iran policy experts. Human Rights Watch
also reviewed Persian-language videos featuring these cases on Iran’s state TV, statements of Iranian officials, and
submissions made on behalf of Iranian cases to the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
Annex 76
Based on this evidence, it is apparent that Iranian authorities have violated detainees’ due process rights and
carried out a pattern of politically motivated arrests. The exact number of those detained since 2014 is most likely
considerably higher than the 14 cases Human Rights Watch confirmed. On November 9, 2017, Reuters reported
that authorities had detained at least 30 dual nationals in Iran since 2015.
While detainees have ranged from academics to art curators, during interrogations, intelligence personnel accused
detainees of spying or espionage based simply on their affiliations with Western public institutions, as opposed to
any specific action or document that could raise the possibility of wrongdoing. The supposed incriminating videos
Iranian state media broadcast also mirror the interrogators’ questions, highlighting detainees’ affiliations with
various legitimate institutions and accusing them of espionage without offering any evidence.
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has ruled that the arrests and detentions in several of these cases
were arbitrary, and that authorities targeted people based on their “national or social origin” as dual nationals or
foreign nationals. It also noted that there was an emerging pattern of Iran detaining dual nationals.
The detention of these individuals is marked by serious due process violations. Iranian authorities systematically
deny people charged with national security crimes access to lawyers of their choosing during the investigation
phase. Sources familiar with detention of dual and foreign nationals have said that many of them did not have
access to any legal counsel during investigation.
Branch 15 of Tehran’s revolutionary court has tried and sentenced a majority of the accused in these cases under
article 508 of the Islamic penal code, which states that “any person or group who cooperates with hostile states in
any shape or form… if not deemed Mohareb [a sentence which involves the death penalty], will be sentenced to 1
to 10 years in prison.” The revolutionary court verdicts, however, do not align with a 2014 opinion of Iran’s
Supreme Court that stated, “Iran is not in conflict with any country and the phrase ‘hostile state’ does not refer to
political differences with countries.”
Some Iranian media outlets close to the rights-abusing intelligence agencies, including the Islamic Republic of
Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) news agency, play an important role in undermining fair trial rights and the presumption
of innocence by shaping public opinion about detainees’ alleged offenses. The outlets broadcast smear-campaign
“documentaries” claiming that the accused are part of Western attempts to “infiltrate” the country. Some of the
broadcasts include film of the accused making apparently coerced confessions.
Dual nationals who were detained and later released were usually not acquitted but released on what authorities
have often called “humanitarian grounds.” Since the prisoner exchange between Iran and the United States in
2016, there have been several indications that Iranian authorities might be willing to again release detained dual
and foreign nationals in return for bilateral agreements with the detained people’s countries.
“Having citizens with deep connections to other cultures and countries is an asset, not a criminal offense,”
Whitson added. “But Iran’s security apparatus has apparently made the despicable decision to use these
individuals as bargaining chips to resolve diplomatic disputes.”
Annex 76
Expanding Role of the Revolutionary Guards’ Intelligence Organization
As Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has increased its role and influence, it has become the leading
security agency targeting dual nationals and foreigners. In reaction to former President Mohammad Khatami’s
attempts to achieve limited accountability for the serial assassinations of dissidents in the late 1990s, several
groups began to develop parallel intelligence institutions outside the control of his presidency. Under the
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, those intelligence institutions retained and expanded their power outside
the Intelligence Ministry’s oversight. An article published in the Fars News website on October 2106 reported
that16 intelligence organizations were operating in Iran.
While Ahmadinejad’s Intelligence Ministry arbitrarily arrested hundreds of activists across the country, it was
seen by other parts of the security establishment as incapable of dealing with the anti-government demonstrations
that broke out following the June 2009 elections. Esmaeel Ahmadi Moghadam, the former head of Tehran’s
police, told Shargh newspaper on August 23, 2015 that the Intelligence Ministry was weak because reformist
forces created its structure: “During the 2009 sedition [i.e., Green Movement election protests] we felt that the
ministry staff at large were good people… but there were tendencies [toward reformists] and these people will not
do their best to cut the roots of the sedition.”
Hardliner intelligence forces went a step further in 2009, when on October 7, IRNA news agency reported that the
status of the Revolutionary Guards’ Intelligence Unit was upgraded to the IRGC Intelligence Organization,
designating it a major intelligence institution with broad powers. When President Hassan Rouhani’s term began in
2013, his intelligence minister attempted to facilitate coordination among intelligence institutions by regularly
convening meetings of the Council to Coordinate Intelligence.
Despite this effort, the ministry became even more marginalized under Rouhani, to the point that that the IRGC
Intelligence Organization arrested several activists close to the government and had met with Seyed Mahdmoud
Alavi, the intelligence minister, at the end Rouhani’s first term. Since 2013, the IRGC has also arbitrarily arrested
dozens of Iranian journalists, activists, and academics on vaguely defined national security charges accusing them
of being connected to Western entities and kept them in solitary confinement for months, among them dual and
foreign nationals.
On October 11, 2017, a court sentenced Abdol Rasoul Dorri Esfehani, a dual Canadian-Iranian citizen and a
member of Iran’s nuclear negotiations team arrested by Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence, to five years in prison
for “espionage.” Intelligence Minister Alavi then said that he did not consider Dorri Esfahani a spy and that it is
the Intelligence Ministry that makes such determinations. Mizan Online News Agency, the judiciary’s news
agency, published an article the next day saying that other intelligence agencies, such as the Revolutionary
Guards, have similar mandates.
The Intelligence Ministry continues to target people on vaguely defined espionage charges, but the IRGC
Intelligence Organization, led by Hossein Taeb, appears to have established itself as the leading security agency in
Annex 76
repressing dissent and perceived threats to the autocratic control of the Islamic Republic’s unelected political
bodies, extending its reach to foreign and dual nationals.
On September 2, Javad Karimi Ghodussi, a Parliament member from the city of Mashahd, released a
“documentary” that, without providing any evidence, accused Dorri Esfahani of cooperating with American and
British intelligence. The video, allegedly produced by people close to Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence, directly
attacked the intelligence minister’s statement that he did not consider Dorri Esfahani a spy.
Arrests of Dual Nationals, Foreigners under Presidents Khatami and Ahmadinejad
Zahra Kazemi, an Iranian-Canadian journalist, was among the most prominent victims of these parallel security
institutions during the Khatami presidency. Iranian security forces detained Kazemi at Tehran’s Evin prison for
photographing in a restricted area in front of the same prison in July 2003. She died in detention just a few days
later, but the authorities have not provided a clear answer about the circumstances her death.
Under Ahmadinejad, the authorities arrested and intimidated several Iranian dual nationals, in particular scholars
who worked on civil society issues, on allegations of working to “build networks” or planning a “color
revolution” in Iran. In April 2006, authorities arrested Ramin Jahanbegloo, an Iranian-Canadian philosopher and
the director of contemporary studies at the Cultural Research Bureau, a private institution in Tehran. Iran’s
Intelligence Minister at the time, Mohseni Ejeyi, accused Jahanbegloo of working towards the US goal of
instigating a “color Revolution in Iran,” and authorities detained him for four months.
On May 8, 2007 Intelligence Ministry authorities arrested Haleh Esfandiari, the Iranian-American director of the
Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, DC, and accused her of
“furthering the interests of foreign powers,” “espionage,” “planning the soft overthrow of the government,” and
“acting against national security.”
On May 11, Intelligence Ministry agents arrested Kian Tajbakhsh, a scholar with Iranian and US nationality, on
similar charges of “furthering the interests of foreign powers,” “espionage,” “planning the soft overthrow of the
government,” and “acting against national security.” The government apparently focused on Tajbakhsh because of
his ties with foreign institutions, namely the Soros Foundation, for which he worked as a consultant.
On July 18 and 19, Iranian state television broadcast Esfandiari and Tajbakhsh’s “confession” in a program called
“In the Name of Democracy.” During the program, Esfandiari, Tajbakhsh, and Jahanbegloo were allegedly
coerced to appear in front of the camera to describe their efforts in creating relationships between Iranian and
American policymakers in academic settings. Authorities ultimately released Tajbakhsh and Esfandiari in
September 2007 and allowed Esfandiari to leave the country.
Around the same period, in May 2007, authorities arrested another Iranian-American, Ali Shakeri, a founding
board member of University of California Irvine's Center for Citizen Peacebuilding, and temporarily confiscated
the passports of two journalists, Parnaz Azima, an Iranian-American, and Mehrnoush Solouki, a French-Iranian,
Annex 76
preventing both from leaving Iran. The authorities released Shakeri in September 2007 with no further
explanation.
In the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential elections, authorities targeted dual nationals and Iranians
connected to Western Embassies, apparently as part of Iranian efforts to frame their narrative of the protests being
plotted by the West. Tajbakhsh, whom authorities arrested again, Maziar Bahari, an Iranian-Canadian reporter for
Newsweek, Nazak Afshar, an Iranian employee of the French Embassy in Tehran, Hossein Rassam, an Iranian
employee of the British embassy in Tehran, and Clotilde Reiss, a French academic working in Iran, were among
the dozens of individuals who appeared in televised mass trials after the elections. Authorities accused arrested
diplomatic staff of instigating protests and released them on bail, after which they left the country.
Tajbakhsh said during his trial that the 2009 unrest was the result of years of American planning as part their
effort to carry out a “soft overthrow” of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He also said he considered himself a victim
of Western propaganda. Dozens of people who appeared in the same televised trials have said that they were
tortured and coerced into making false confessions.
In October, the court sentenced Tajbakhsh to 12 years in prison on charges of acting against national security. The
“evidence” included membership on a mailing list, links to anti-regime figures, and accepting a consultancy from
George Soros. The Court of Appeal reduced his sentence to five years. In May 2010, Branch 26 of Tehran’s
Revolutionary Court sentenced Bahari, who had left Iran, to 13 years in prison. After leaving Iran, Bahari wrote in
a letter that he had been tortured into confessing that he had intended to “overthrow the government.”
In August 2011, authorities arrested Amir Mirzaei Hekmati, a former US Marine, who his family said was visiting
relatives in Iran. Iranian authorities accused him of espionage. On December 18, Iranian state television aired a
confession by Hekmati in which he said he had infiltrated Iran to establish a CIA presence in the country. After
serving in the US Marine Corps from 2001 to 2005, in 2006 Amir Hekmati started his own company, Lucid
Linguistics, doing document translation that specialized in Arabic, Persian, and “military-related matters,”
according to its website.
Hekmati had also worked for Kuma Games, which enabled players to participate in military confrontation games
based on real events. Among its games was one in 2005 that involved an imagined American military attack on
Iran.
On January 9, 2012, a revolutionary court sentenced Hekmati to death for espionage. The Supreme Court granted
his appeal in March 2012 and in April 2014, the court sentenced him to 10 years in prison.
In July 2012, authorities arrested Saeed Abedini, an Iranian-American Christian pastor and a convert from Islam
while he was building an orphanage in Iran. A court charged Abedini with acting against national security by
establishing home churches and sentenced him to eight years in prison. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme
leader, had warned in October 2010 about the “enemy’s effort to promote promiscuity, false mysticism, Baha’i
Annex 76
faith and expansion of house churches.” Hekmati and Abedini remained in prison until January 2016, then were
released in a prisoners’ swap with the US.
Rouhani and the Post-Nuclear Agreement Era (2014-2018)
After the nuclear negotiations with Europe and the US resulted in an agreement, Ayatollah Khamenei and other
leading government figures expressed concerns about Western intentions to influence Iranian politics through
engagement. In October 2015 Khamenei explicitly advised against negotiating further with the US as it could
open doors for cultural, economic, political, and security infiltration. The phrase “infiltration” became the
watchword for intelligence agencies in defining domestic enemies they claimed were national security “threats.”
Ahmad Jannati, the head of Iran’s Guardian Council, said that the “JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]
was the first step… They [the West] will come for other things, and if the people and government don’t refuse,
tomorrow they will ask us to recognize Israel, to equalize men and women’s rights, to abolish Qisas, to legalize
gay marriage and cut ties with Hezbollah, Syria, and Iraq.”
Since November 2015, the newspaper, Kayhan, seen as close to the intelligence apparatus, has published
numerous articles on the West’s supposed infiltration attempts into Iran, including start-up and environmental
activities. These articles have mentioned several people by name, including dual nationals, accusing them without
proof of cooperating with the West. Many of those named have been arrested and detained.
Dual, Foreign Nationals Detained by the Revolutionary Guards Since 2014
Jason Rezaian, 42, Washington Post correspondent in Tehran. Arrested on July 22, 2014.
Following Rezaian’s arrest, news websites close to security forces published several accusations against him,
calling him an American spy but offering no clear evidence. On August 5, Vatan-e Emrooz news website ran a
profile on Rezaian, accusing him of links to lobby groups that pursue the “Western human rights case” to increase
external pressure on Iran.
On October 11, 2015, Hojatoleslam Mohseni Ejeyi, the judiciary spokesman, announced that a revolutionary court
had sentenced Rezaian to prison, without revealing his sentence or the specific charges for which he had been
convicted. On October 19, Fars News agency, which is close to the Republican Guard, published an article
quoting Karimi Ghodussi, a parliament member, saying that according to the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence
officials, Rezaian had a close relationship with members of the Iranian government establishment, including the
Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry.
Karimi Ghodussi claimed that one of the goals of the network Rezaian was a part of was “to lay a red carpet [for]
Americans [to] return to Iran and the revival of American policies before the Islamic Revolution.” On January 16,
2016, the day the nuclear agreement went into force, Rezaian was released as part of a prisoners’ swap between
Iran and the US.
Annex 76
Siamak Namazi, 46, the head of strategic planning at Dubai-based Crescent Petroleum. Arrested on October
13, 2015.
Namazi, a dual Iranian-American citizen, was first interrogated by intelligence officials when he landed at the
Imam Khomeini airport from Dubai on July 18, 2015.
For the next three months, the Revolutionary Guards summoned and interrogated Namazi numerous times and
accused him of spying for Western countries. On October 13, authorities arrested him and transferred him to 2-
Alef ward of Evin prison, which is under the Revolutionary Guards’ control. The UN working group reported that
the authorities did not allow Namazi to have a lawyer during the investigation phase, telling him that he could
only choose a lawyer from an approved list, but he was never even provided this list despite his repeated requests.
On October 18, 2016, Mizan Online News Agency reported that Branch 15 of Tehran’s revolutionary court had
sentenced Namazi to 10 years in prison based on article 508 of the Islamic Penal Code. On August 28, 2017, Jared
Genser, the lawyer of Namazi’s family, told media that an Appeal’s court had upheld the sentence. Since Namazi’s
arrest, state-sponsored media outlets have produced several video clips, and articles accusing him of working to
advance Western interests but had offered no evidence of wrongdoing.
On October 16, 2016, Mizan Online News Agency published a video titled, “Latest Humiliation,” which showed
authorities arresting Namazi. The video shows copies of Namazi’s passport and a United Arab Emirates residency
card. Subsequent videos produced by pro-hardline institutions accused the Namazi family of plotting the 2009
“unrest” and working toward Iran-US rapprochement by providing policy briefs and talks at various institutions in
Washington, DC, as well as providing logistical support for Iran’s growing start-up sector through Atiyeh Bahar, a
consultancy firm based in Iran.
On April 21, 2018 during his most recent trip to the US, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif who was asked
about the possibility of a prisoner swap negotiations said, “It is a possibility, certainly from a humanitarian
perspective, but it requires a change in attitude [from the US government],” he said.
On August 28, Genser, the Namazi family’s lawyer, said that the Namazis’ Iranian lawyers had filed an appeal
with Iran’s Supreme Court in response to Iran suing the US at the International Court of Justice or ICJ) for
breaching the 1955 Amity treaty between the two countries. The treaty, which Iran is arguing still applies to the
US and Iran, is in apparent tension with the charge against Namazi of “cooperating with a hostile country” [i.e.,
the US].
Nizar Zakka, Lebanese information technology expert. Arrested on September 18, 2015.
Zakka, a Lebanese citizen with US permanent residency who lives in Washington, DC, is an advocate for internet
freedom and leads a nonprofit group that has worked for the US government. He was arrested after he had
traveled to Iran on September 18, 2015, to participate in a conference on entrepreneurship at the government’s
invitation. Zakka did not have access to legal counsel during pretrial detention. On October 18, 2016, Mizan
Online News Agency reported that Branch 15 of Tehran’s revolutionary court had sentenced Zakka to 10 years in
Annex 76
prison for cooperating with a foreign enemy state. An appeals court upheld the sentence. In November 2015,
Mashregh news website, close to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, published articles accusing Zakka of being part of
“the US project for Iran post-JCPOA.” On September 14, in response to a question from Associated Press about
Zakka’s arrest, Shahindokht Mowlverdy, Rouhani's advisor for citizens right said that “We did all we could to stop
this from happening, but we are seeing that we have failed to make a significant impact.
Matthew Trevithick, 32, researcher. Arrested in December 2015.
Trevithick went to Iran in mid-September 2015 to study Persian and was arrested in December. Authorities
pressured Trevithick to appear on state television and accused him of “trying to overthrow the Iranian
government,” he told CNN during an interview. On January 16, 2016, he was released as part of the US-Iran
prisoner swap.
Baquer Namazi, 81, Retired UNICEF Staff. Arrested on February 22, 2016.
On or about February 21, 2016, Baquer Namazi, Siamak’s father, received a call from Evin prison informing him
that special permission had been granted for him to visit his son, but that the permission was valid only for
February 24. IRGC Intelligence Organization authorities arrested him on February 22, after he landed in Tehran
from the UAE, and detained him in 2-Alef Ward of Evin prison. They accused him of espionage and collusion
with an enemy state, but presented no evidence.
On February 26, Fars News and Mashregh news agencies, both close to Revolutionary Guard forces, accused
Namazi of being a “key element in network-building for change in Iran.” In a case similar to the one against his
son, in October 2016, a revolutionary court sentenced Namazi to 10 years in prison for cooperating with a foreign
enemy state. The appeals court has upheld the sentence.
In determining that the continued detention of Siamak and Baquer Namazi, is arbitrary, the UN Working Group
said that they had been targeted on the basis of their “national or social origin” as dual nationals, which was part
of an emerging pattern in Iran. On August 27, 2018, Mehrdad Ghorbani Sarabi, the Namazis’ lawyer in Iran, told
the Iranian Labor News Agency that Baquer Namazi has been on a medical furlough since January.
Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, 40, a manager at the Thomson Reuters Foundation. Arrested on April 3, 2016.
Zaghari-Ratcliffe, a British-Iranian national who was visiting her family in Iran, was arrested at the Tehran
Airport when she was boarding a plane with her 2-year-old daughter to return to the United Kingdom. In June
2016, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Kerman province issued a statement accusing her of “participating in
designing and carrying out media and cyber projects aimed at the soft overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
On September 6, her family announced that Branch 15 of Tehran’s revolutionary court had sentenced her to five
years in prison on vague national security charges, in connection with her past work at the BBC Media Action
and Thomson Reuters Foundation. Iran’s Supreme Court upheld the verdict on April 24, 2017.
Annex 76
On November 24, 2017 the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) online news agency published a video
accusing Zaghari-Ratcliffe of having ties to the British intelligence service through SOAS University. Zaghari-
Ratcliffee did not attend the SOAS university. The IRIB video also accused her of working to instigate unrest in
Iran by training journalists and bloggers on internet security, showing several email exchanges allegedly involving
Zaghari-Ratcliffe, as well as a copy of her old paycheck, which appeared to have been taken from her personal
devices.
In August 2016, the UN Working Group ruled that the detention of Zaghari-Ratcliffe was arbitrary. The opinion
considered that the source of the complaint had established a prima facie case showing that her arrest and
detention was motivated by a discriminatory factor, namely her status as a dual Iranian-British national.
On July 23, 2018 the Zaghari-Ratcliffe family announced that an Iranian Judge confirmed that she will not be
released temporarily, given parole, or shown clemency on humanitarian grounds, until UK government debt is
repaid to Iran.
The UK’s debt to Iran dates from the 1970s, before Iran’s 1979 revolution, when Iran purchased tanks and other
vehicles. In November 2017, Hamid Baeedinejad, Iran’s ambassador to the UK, announced that “an outstanding
debt owed by the U.K. to Tehran... has nothing to do with Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s case.” The UK government
also denied any linkage between the two issues.
On August 23, authorities granted Zaghari-Ratcliffe a three-day furlough but returned her to prison after three
days.
Homa Houdfar, 68, anthropology professor at Concordia University. Arrested in early June 2016.
Over the previous three months, authorities had confiscated the Iranian-Canadian professor’s passport and
interrogated her several times. On June 24, Jafari Dolatabadi, Tehran’s prosecutor, said in news conference that
Hoodfar was arrested for “feminist activities” and national security crimes. On June 24, the Young Journalist Club
(YJC) news agency accused Hoodfar of being part of an American infiltration plot. On July 11, Mizan Online
News Agency reported that Hoodfar’s case had been submitted to a court. On September 26, Iran released
Hoodfar on humanitarian grounds.
Karen Vafadari and Afarin Neyssari, art curators. Arrested on July 20, 2016.
The Revolutionary Guards arrested the Iranian-American Zoroastrian couple, who owned a well-known art
gallery, Aun, in Tehran airport. Vafadari’s family said the couple were interrogated for various trumped-up
charges ranging from being a dual national and having alcoholic beverages at their house to associating with
foreign diplomats, labelling their home a center of vice (prostitution), being spies, and collaborating with the
enemies of the state. As well as attempting to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran, recruiting and signing up
spies through foreign embassies, and assembly, and collusion against national security.
On January 30, 2018, Vafadari announced in a letter that the court had sentenced him to 27 years in prison and his
wife to 16 years. Vafadari wrote: “Unfortunately, my international activities [in the art world] raised the
Annex 76
suspicions of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization…Fortunately, the initial, baseless security accusations that led
to our arrest were dropped, but our gallery, office, warehouses and home remained locked and our cars, computers
and documents were confiscated, followed by accusations and interrogations that indicated a deeper plot.” On
July 22, authorities temporarily released the couple on bail.
Xiyue Wang, doctoral student at Princeton University. Arrested on August 8, 2016.
The American doctoral student at Princeton University had been conducting research for his dissertation on the
history of the Qajar dynasty, Iran’s ruling monarchy that ended in the early 20th century, in Iran’s public national
archive. Princeton University said that before traveling to Iran, Wang explained his research plan to the Iranian
Interest Section at the Pakistani embassy in Washington, DC, which issued his visa, and to the libraries in Iran that
he planned to visit. The Mizan Online News Agency reported on July 16, 2017 that a revolutionary court had
sentenced Wang to 10 years in prison on charges of “cooperating with an enemy state.” In September, a court of
appeal upheld the sentence.
On November 26, 2017, the IRIB broadcasted a video in which it claimed that Xiyue Wang had traveled to Iran to
obtain documents from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, National Library, and parliament on behalf of the US
government. IRIB did not mention that documents in these archives are accessible by the public. Wang also
appeared in the video saying that “the more the US has more information about Iran, the better they can set the
policies.”
On August 23, the UN Working Group on Arbitary Detention asserted that Wang’s continued detention is
arbitrary, concluding that that his “detention was motivated by the fact that he is a United States citizen.”
Abdolrasoul Dorri Esfahani, accountant. Arrested in August 2016.
Dorri Esfahani, an Iranian-Canadian member of Iran’s nuclear negations delegation, was accused of espionage in
August 2016. While the intelligence minister rejected the allegations, in May 2017, branch 15 of Tehran’s
revolutionary court sentenced him to five years in prison for espionage charges including “collaborating with the
British secret service.” On September 2, 2018, Karimi Ghodussi, a parliamentarian from Mashad, posted a
“documentary” film, “Toronto 521” on his website that accused Esfahani of working with American and British
intelligence services but provided no evidence.
Kavous Seyed Emami, 65, professor at Imam Sadegh University. Arrested on January 24 or 25, 2018.
Seyed Emami, a prominent Iranian-Canadian environmentalist, was arrested during a wave of detentions of
environmentalists on January 24 and 25. On February 10, Ramin Seyed Emami, his son, wrote on social media
that authorities had summoned his mother the day before to inform her that her husband, who was detained in 2-
Alef ward of Evin prison, had “committed suicide” in detention.
On February 15, Iranian state TV aired a program that that falsely accused Kavous Seyed-Emami and other
detained environmentalists of using surveys of endangered Asiatic cheetahs as a pretext for spying in strategically
sensitive areas without any evidence. The video state media broadcast showed nothing but Seyed Emami’s family
photos and videos of family parties, while accusing him of working to collect military intelligence for foreigners.
Annex 76
Morad Tahbaz, businessman. Arrested on January 24 or 25, 2018.
Tahbaz, an Iranian-American businessman and an environmental activist who also holds British citizenship, was
arrested during the crackdown on environmentalists in late January. The charges against Tahbaz and other
environmentalists in Evin prison remain unclear, but several news outlets close to the Revolutionary Guards have
accused Tahbaz of being the central figure in an espionage plot but provided no evidence for such a grave
accusation.
Abbas Edalat, professor at the Imperial College of London and an activist. Arrested on April 15, 2018.
Edalat is an Iranian-British professor who campaigned against economic sanctions on Iran. Mashregh news has
accused him of being part of the UK’s infiltration network
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Annex 76
July 31, 2019 News Release
Lebanon: Festival Cancels Mashrou’ Leila Concert
July 30, 2019 News Release
Mauritania: Blogger in ‘Blasphemy’ Case Freed After 5 Years
Source URL: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/26/iran-targeting-dual-citizens-foreig…
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Annex 76
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%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D8%B8%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA
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%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-
%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AE%D8%B5%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-
%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-
%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%85-
%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-
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%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9-
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%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9-
Annex 76
%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF
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%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%A8%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-
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Annex 76
IRAN 2018 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Islamic Republic of Iran is an authoritarian theocratic republic with a Shia
Islamic political system based on velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist or
governance by the jurist). Shia clergy, most notably the rahbar (supreme jurist or
supreme leader), and political leaders vetted by the clergy dominate key power
structures.
The supreme leader is the head of state. The members of the Assembly of Experts
are in theory directly elected in popular elections, and the assembly selects and
may dismiss the supreme leader. The candidates for the Assembly of Experts,
however, are vetted by the Guardian Council (see below) and are therefore selected
indirectly by the supreme leader himself. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has held the
position since 1989. He has direct or indirect control over the legislative and
executive branches of government through unelected councils under his authority.
The supreme leader holds constitutional authority over the judiciary, governmentrun
media, and armed forces, and indirectly controls internal security forces and
other key institutions. While mechanisms for popular election exist for the
president, who is head of government, and for the Islamic Consultative Assembly
(parliament or majles), the unelected Guardian Council vets candidates and
controls the election process. The supreme leader appoints half of the 12-member
Guardian Council, while the head of the judiciary (who is appointed by the
supreme leader) appoints the other half. Candidate vetting excluded all but six
candidates of 1,636 individuals who registered for the 2017 presidential race. In
May 2017 voters re-elected Hassan Rouhani as president. Restrictions on media,
including censoring campaign materials and preventing prominent opposition
figures from speaking publicly, limited the freedom and fairness of the elections.
Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces.
In response to nationwide protests that began in late December 2017 and continued
throughout the year, the government used harsh tactics against protesters. Human
rights organizations reported at least 30 deaths of protesters during the year,
thousands of arrests, and suspicious deaths in custody.
The government’s human rights record remained extremely poor and worsened in
several key areas. Human rights issues included executions for crimes not meeting
the international legal standard of “most serious crimes” and without fair trials of
Annex 77
individuals, including juvenile offenders; numerous reports of unlawful or arbitrary
killings, forced disappearance, and torture by government agents; harsh and lifethreatening
prison conditions; systematic use of arbitrary detention and
imprisonment, including hundreds of political prisoners; unlawful interference with
privacy; severe restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including
censorship, site blocking, and criminalization of libel; substantial interference with
the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, such as overly
restrictive nongovernmental organization (NGO) laws; egregious restrictions of
religious freedom; restrictions on political participation; widespread corruption at
all levels of government; unlawful recruitment of child soldiers by government
actors to support the Assad regime in Syria; trafficking in persons; harsh
governmental restrictions on the rights of women and minorities; criminalization of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) status or conduct; crimes
involving violence or threats of violence targeting LGBTI persons; and outlawing
of independent trade unions.
The government took few steps to investigate, prosecute, punish, or otherwise hold
accountable officials who committed these abuses, many of which were
perpetrated as a matter of government policy. Impunity remained pervasive
throughout all levels of the government and security forces.
The country materially contributed to human rights abuses in Syria, through its
military support for Syrian President Bashar Assad and Hizballah forces there; in
Iraq, through its aid to certain Iraqi Shia militia groups; and in Yemen, through its
support for Houthi rebels and directing authorities in Houthi-controlled areas of
Yemen to harass and detain Bahais because of their religious affiliation.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated
Killings
The government and its agents reportedly committed arbitrary or unlawful killings,
most commonly by execution after arrest and trial without due process, or for
crimes that did not meet the international threshold of “most serious crimes.”
Media and human rights groups also documented numerous suspicious deaths
while in custody or following beatings of protesters by security forces throughout
the year.
Annex 77
Following the January protests, according to a Center for Human Rights in Iran
(CHRI) report, at least two detainees died in detention--Sina Ghanbari in Evin
Prison, and Vahid Heydari in the 12th Police Station in Arak. According to the
report, the bodies of the detainees were quickly buried without an investigation or
autopsy, and officials claimed the deaths were suicides. Witnesses reportedly saw
evidence of a severe blow to Heydari’s skull, as though struck by an axe. The
government made few attempts to investigate allegations of deaths that occurred
after or during torture or other physical abuse, after denying detainees medical
treatment, or during public demonstrations. In August Human Rights Watch
(HRW) reported at least 30 persons had been killed in protests since January.
HRWreported there was no indication that officials conducted impartial
investigations into those deaths or, more broadly, into law enforcement officials’
use of excessive force to repress protests.
As noted by the late UN special rapporteur (UNSR) on the situation of human
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Asma Jahangir, and documented by
international human rights observers, Revolutionary Courts continued to issue the
vast majority of death sentences in the country, and trials lacked due process.
Legal representation was denied during the investigation phase, and in most cases,
no evidence other than confessions, often reportedly extracted through torture, was
considered. Judges may also impose the death penalty on appeal, which deterred
appeals in criminal cases. According to the NGO Human Rights Activists in Iran,
the government does not disclose accurate numbers of those executed during a
year, and as many as 60 percent of executions are kept secret.
The NGO Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) reported there were
215 executions as of mid-November, while the government officially announced
only 73 executions in that time period. For many of those executions, the
government did not release further information, such as names, execution dates, or
crimes for which they were executed.
The Islamic penal code allows for the execution of juvenile offenders starting at
age nine for girls and age 13 for boys, the legal age of majority. The government
continued to execute individuals sentenced as minors as well as individuals
accused of committing offenses that do not meet the international legal standard of
“most serious crimes.” According to the former UN high commissioner for human
rights, Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein, 85 juvenile offenders were on death row as of June.
The government executed at least five juvenile offenders during the year, including
Abolfazi Chezani Sharahi, who was executed in June. Sharahi was arrested in
Annex 77
2013 at age 14 and sentenced to death for allegedly stabbing his friend. A CHRI
report noted serious concerns with the handling of Sharahi’s case.
According to human rights organizations and media reports, the government
continued to carry out some executions by torture, including hanging by cranes.
Prisoners are slowly lifted from the ground by their necks and die slowly by
asphyxiation. In addition, adultery remains punishable by death by stoning,
although provincial authorities have reportedly been ordered not to provide public
information about stoning sentences since 2001, according to the NGO Justice for
Iran.
Authorities continued to carry out executions for crimes not meeting the
international legal standard of “most serious crimes.” Although the majority of
executions were reportedly for murder during the year, the law also provides for
the death penalty in cases of conviction for “attempts against the security of the
state,” “outrage against high-ranking officials,” moharebeh (which has a variety of
broad interpretations, including “waging war against God”), fisad fil-arz
(corruption on earth, including apostasy or heresy), rape, adultery, recidivist
alcohol use, consensual same-sex sexual conduct, and “insults against the memory
of Imam Khomeini and against the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.”
Prosecutors frequently used “waging war against God” as a capital offense against
political dissidents and journalists, accusing them of “struggling against the
precepts of Islam” and against the state that upholds those precepts. Authorities
expanded the scope of this charge to include “working to undermine the Islamic
establishment” and “cooperating with foreign agents or entities.” The judiciary is
required to review and validate death sentences.
The overall number of executions decreased in comparison with 2017, reportedly
as a result of an amendment passed in August 2017 by parliament to the 1997 Law
to Combat Drugs to raise the threshold for the death penalty for drug-related
offenses. The law went into effect in November 2017. Under the amended law,
capital punishment applies to the possession, sale, or transport of more than
approximately 110 pounds of natural drugs, such as opium, or approximately 4.4 to
6.6 pounds of manufactured narcotics, such as heroin or cocaine. According to the
previous law, capital punishment applied to similar offenses involving slightly
more than 11 pounds of natural drugs or two-thirds of a pound of manufactured
drugs. Capital punishment, however, still applies to drug offenses involving
smaller quantities of narcotics, if the crime is carried out using weapons,
employing minors, or involving someone in a leadership role in a trafficking ring
Annex 77
or someone who has previously been convicted of drug crimes and given a prison
sentence of more than 15 years.
In January Judiciary Chief Sadegh Larijani ordered judges to halt the death
sentences of drug offenders potentially affected by this change to the law while
their cases were reviewed. In July state media quoted Tehran’s Prosecutor General
Abbas Jafari-Dolatabadi announcing that of the 3,000 requests the government had
received from death-row prisoners and from those sentenced to life imprisonment,
1,700 sentences had been reviewed and most of those sentences had been reduced,
while 1,300 cases remained to be reviewed.
Mohammad Salas, a Gonabadi Sufi bus driver, was executed by hanging at Rajai
Shahr Prison on June 18. Salas was convicted of killing three police officers
during clashes between members of the Gonabadi Sufi dervishes and security
forces in Tehran in February. Salas and his supporters maintained his innocence
throughout a trial that Amnesty International called “grossly unfair,” stating he had
been tortured into a forced confession and that key defense witnesses who could
have testified that Salas was already in custody at the time of the police officers’
deaths were dismissed.
International and national media reported on a terrorist attack on a military parade
in Ahwaz, the capital of Khuzestan Province, on September 22. According to
reports, at least 29 military personnel and civilians were killed in the attack, with
more than 70 wounded. A separatist group called the Ahwaz National Resistance,
as well as the Islamic State, claimed responsibility for the attack.
b. Disappearance
There were reports of politically motivated abductions during the year attributed to
government officials. Plainclothes officials often seized journalists and activists
without warning, and government officials refused to acknowledge custody or
provide information on them. In March NGO PEN International reported the
enforced disappearance of poet Mohammad Bamm following his arrest by security
forces in December 2017. According to the report, Bamm was released on March
19 after being held in solitary confinement and allegedly tortured in Ahwaz Prison
while his whereabouts were unknown. He was accused of causing harm to public
order and security, participating in the leadership of illegal demonstrations, and
insulting the supreme leader.
Annex 77
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
Although the constitution prohibits all forms of torture “for the purpose of
extracting confession or acquiring information,” use of physical and mental torture
to coerce confessions remained prevalent, especially during pretrial detention.
There were credible reports that security forces and prison personnel tortured and
abused detainees and prisoners throughout the year.
Commonly reported methods of torture and abuse in prisons included threats of
execution or rape, forced tests of virginity and “sodomy,” sleep deprivation,
electroshock, burnings, the use of pressure positions, and severe and repeated
beatings. Former UNSR Jahangir highlighted reports of prisoners subjected to
physical abuse, as well as to blackmail.
Human rights organizations frequently cited some prison facilities, including Evin
Prison in Tehran and Rajai Shahr Prison in Karaj, for their use of cruel and
prolonged torture of political opponents, particularly Wards 209 and Two of Evin
Prison, reportedly controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
In September the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reported the
case of at least seven detainees subjected to torture by the IRGC’s Saravan
Intelligence Unit. Saravan, located in Sistan va Baluchestan Province, is home to
the Baloch ethnic minority community. According to the report, the prisoners
were religious seminary students who were lashed with electrical wires and
shocked with electricity, causing them to be unable to walk. IRGC-run detention
centers reportedly used a technique called the “miracle bed,” which includes tying
detainees to a bed frame and repeatedly flogging and electrocuting them until they
“confess.”
NGOs reported that prison guards tortured Sunni Muslim prisoners at Ardabil
Prison for their religious beliefs; numerous inmates at the prison were Sunni
Muslims, while the guards were predominantly Shia. Guards also reportedly
retaliated against prisoners there for “security issues” that occurred elsewhere in
the country. According to reports, torture at Ardabil included severe beatings,
being tied to flag poles for prolonged durations of time, and being forced to watch
executions of fellow prisoners.
Authorities also allegedly maintained unofficial secret prisons and detention
centers outside the national prison system where abuse reportedly occurred.
Annex 77
Judicially sanctioned corporal punishments continued. These included flogging,
blinding, stoning, and amputation, which the government defends as “punishment,”
not torture. At least 148 crimes are punishable by flogging, while 20 can carry the
penalty of amputation.
In January Amnesty International reported that authorities amputated the hand of a
man sentenced for stealing livestock. The amputation by guillotine, which
Amnesty characterized as “unspeakably cruel,” took place at the central prison in
Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan Province.
In July Amnesty International reported the public flogging of a man in Niazmand
Square, Kashmar, Razavi Khorasan Province, for a sentence he had received 10
years before for consuming alcohol at a wedding when he was 14-15 years old.
National media outlets posted a picture showing the man roped to a tree, lashed by
a masked man and his back covered in blood, with a crowd of persons watching.
Extrajudicial punishments by authorities involving degrading public humiliation of
alleged offenders were also frequently reported throughout the year. For example,
Maedeh Hojabri was arrested for posting videos of herself dancing on social
media, and authorities compelled her to confess to this “crime” on state television.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Prison conditions were harsh and potentially life threatening due to food shortages,
gross overcrowding, physical abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions and
medical care. Prisoner hunger strikes in protest of their treatment were frequent.
Physical Conditions: Overcrowding remained a problem in prisons with many
prisoners forced to sleep on floors, in hallways, or in prison yards. The human
rights NGO United for Iran, which closely monitored prison conditions, reported in
2017 that the prisoner population was three times the capacity of the country’s
prisons and detention centers. State-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA)
reported that the head of the general court of Ardabil said the number of prisoners
in Ardabil Prison was at three times its capacity.
There were reported deaths in custody. In March HRWreported at least five
deaths in custody since December 2017. The government ruled three of the
deaths--of Sina Ghanbari, Vahid Heydari, and Kavous Seyed-Emami, a prominent
Annex 77
Iranian-Canadian environmentalist--to be suicides, claims the deceased’s family
members and human rights groups strongly contested (see section 1.d.).
According to IranWire and human rights groups, guards beat both political and
nonpolitical prisoners during raids on wards, performed nude body searches in
front of other prisoners, and threatened prisoners’ families. In some instances,
according to HRANA, guards singled out political prisoners for harsher treatment.
Prison authorities often refused to provide medical treatment for pre-existing
conditions, injuries that prisoners suffered at the hands of prison authorities, or
illnesses due to the poor sanitary conditions in prison. Human rights organizations
reported that authorities also used denial of medical care as a form of punishment
for prisoners and as an intimidation tool against prisoners who filed complaints or
challenged the authorities. In March CHRI reported that dozens of political
prisoners were denied medical treatment and leave despite visible symptoms of
their deteriorating health. The report mentioned specifically the cases of Vahed
Kholousi, an education rights activist held in Rajai Shahr Prison since 2015;
Alireza Golipour, held in Evin Prison since 2012 and suffering from worsening
seizures and heart problems; and Mohammad Saber Malek-Raeisi, a Baluchi Sunni
Muslim reportedly in critical condition from repeated severe beatings by guards in
Ardabil Prison.
Medical services for female prisoners were reported as grossly inadequate. Human
rights groups highlighted the case of children’s rights activist Atena Daemi,
serving a seven-year sentence for meeting with the families of political prisoners,
criticizing the government on Facebook, and condemning the 1988 mass
executions of prisoners in the country. In January Daemi was beaten and
transferred from Evin Prison to Shahr-e Rey Prison (also known as Gharchak
prison) in the city of Varamin, south of Tehran, which held 1,000 female prisoners
in cramped, unsanitary conditions. Human rights organizations reported that
prison authorities refused to allow Daemi and other prisoners access to necessary
medical care.
According to Amnesty International, at least 10 Gonabadi Sufi dervish women
were unjustly detained in Shahr-e Rey Prison since February. The women were
routinely denied urgently needed medical care and kept in unsanitary, inhuman
conditions. The report noted that prison doctors verbally abused the women and
guards physically mistreated them.
Annex 77
The human rights community and international media reported on frequent water
shortages, intolerable heat, unsanitary living spaces, and poor ventilation in prisons
throughout the country.
UNSR Jahangir and others condemned the inhuman, life-threatening conditions of
Rajai Shahr Prison in Karaj following the hunger strike of numerous political
prisoners that began at the end of July 2017. Prisoners had protested the sudden
transfer of more than 50 political prisoners, including at least 15 Bahais, whom
authorities moved without notice from Ward 12 to the prison’s high security Ward
10.
Authorities reportedly deprived prisoners of medicine, adequate medical treatment,
and personal belongings, and sealed prisoners’ cells with iron sheets that limited
air circulation. Jahangir expressed deep alarm at the deteriorating medical
conditions of the political prisoners and at reports of their continued torture
following the transfer. In March CHRI reported that political prisoners at the
prison continued to be subjected to inhuman living conditions as punishment for
their hunger strike.
Authorities occasionally held pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners. Also,
according to HRANA, juvenile detainees were held with adult prisoners in some
prisons, including Saghez Central Prison in Kurdistan Province. Authorities held
women separately from men.
In 2017 Mohammad Javad Fathi, a member of parliament’s judicial committee,
was quoted in media saying that 2,300 children lived in prisons with their
incarcerated mothers. Fathi urged the Prisons Organization to provide transparent
statistics on the number of imprisoned mothers. IranWire reported that multiple
prisons across the country held older children who lived with their incarcerated
mothers without access to medical care or educational and recreational facilities.
There were numerous reports of prisoner suicides throughout the year in response
to prison conditions or mistreatment. In August HRANA reported on the suicide
attempts of five prisoners on the same day at Sanandaj Central Prison. The five
prisoners tried to kill themselves either by taking pills or hanging, all reportedly in
response to prison conditions and the mistreatment of the prisoners and their
family members by officials. In April HRANA reported that Vahid Safarzehi, held
in the Central Prison of Zahedan, ingested a razor to commit suicide after his
repeated requests for furlough to accompany his sick mother to the hospital were
denied. He had previously attempted suicide by drinking acid.
Annex 77
In August CHRI shared the report of a journalist who had been detained in the
Great Tehran Penitentiary, the largest detention facility. The journalist recounted
the inhuman conditions of the prison as beyond the limits of human tolerance.
According to the journalist, dozens of new prisoners were admitted to the prison a
day and initially kept for days in a “sewer”-like quarantine unit without ventilation
or washing facilities. More than 80 percent of the prisoners in quarantine were
reportedly homeless drug addicts requiring immediate medical attention; they
could hardly stand, and their vomit covered the floor.
Prisoner hunger strikes occurred frequently in prisons throughout the country, and
reports on prisons’ inhuman conditions continued. These included infestations
with cockroaches and mice, chronic overcrowding, poor ventilation, prisoners
being forced to sleep on the floor with little bedding, and insufficient food and
water.
The political prisoner Vahid Sayyadi-Nasiri died on December 12 after being on
hunger strike since October 13. Sayyadi-Nasiri went on hunger strike to protest
inhumane prison conditions at Iran’s Langroud Prison in Qom and government
authorities’ denial of his right to counsel.
Administration: According to reports from human rights NGOs, prison authorities
regularly denied prisoners access to visitors, telephone, and other correspondence
privileges. As noted above, prisoners practicing a religion other than Shia Islam
reported experiencing discrimination while incarcerated.
Authorities did not initiate credible investigations into allegations of inhuman
conditions or suspicious deaths in custody. Prisoners were able to submit
complaints to judicial authorities but often faced censorship or retribution in the
form of slander, beatings, torture, and denial of medication or furlough requests.
Families of executed prisoners did not always receive notification of their
scheduled executions, or if they did, it was often on very short notice. Authorities
frequently denied families the ability to perform funeral rites or families’ request
for the findings from an impartial autopsy.
Independent Monitoring: The government did not permit independent monitoring
of prison conditions. Prisoners and their families often wrote letters to authorities
and, in some cases, to UN bodies to highlight and protest their treatment. UNSR
Jahangir reported that authorities sometimes threatened prisoners after accusing
them of contacting her office.
Annex 77
For more information on treatment of political prisoners, see section 1.e., Political
Prisoners and Detainees.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
Although the constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, the practices
occurred frequently during the year. President Rouhani’s 2016 “Citizen’s Rights
Charter” enumerates various freedoms, including “security of their person,
property, dignity, employment, legal and judicial process, social security and the
like.” The government did not implement these provisions. Detainees may appeal
their sentences in court but are not entitled to compensation for detention.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus
Several agencies shared responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order,
including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and law enforcement forces
under the Interior Ministry, which report to the president, and the IRGC, which
reports directly to the supreme leader. The supreme leader holds ultimate authority
over all security agencies.
The Basij, a volunteer paramilitary group with local organizations across the
country, sometimes acted as an auxiliary law enforcement unit subordinate to
IRGC ground forces. Basij units often engaged in repression of political
opposition elements or intimidation of civilians accused of violating the country’s
strict moral code, without formal guidance or supervision from superiors.
Impunity remained a problem within all security forces. Human rights groups
frequently accused regular and paramilitary security forces, such as the Basij, of
committing numerous human rights abuses, including acts of violence against
protesters and participants in public demonstrations. According to Tehran
Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari-Dolatabadi, the attorney general is responsible for
investigating and punishing security force abuses, but the process was not
transparent, and there were few reports of government actions to discipline
abusers. In a notable exception, in November 2017 authorities sentenced former
Tehran prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi to two years in prison for his alleged
responsibility for the torture and death of protesters in 2009. Media reported that
Mortazavi, after initial reports that he had disappeared, was taken to prison in April
to commence his sentence.
Annex 77
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
The constitution and law require a warrant or subpoena for an arrest and state that
arrested persons should be informed of the charges against them within 24 hours.
Authorities, however, held some detainees, at times incommunicado, for days,
weeks, or months without charge or trial and frequently denied them contact with
family or timely access to legal representation.
The law obligates the government to provide indigent defendants with attorneys for
certain types of crimes. The courts set prohibitively high bail, even for lesser
crimes, and in many cases, courts did not set bail. Authorities often compelled
detainees and their families to submit property deeds to post bail, effectively
silencing them due to fear of losing their families’ property.
The government continued to use house arrest without due process to restrict
movement and communication. At year’s end former presidential candidates
Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, as well as Mousavi’s wife Zahra
Rahnavard, remained under house arrest imposed in 2011 without formal charges.
Security forces continued to restrict their access to visitors and information.
Concerns persisted over Karroubi’s deteriorating health, reportedly exacerbated by
his treatment by authorities.
Arbitrary Arrest: Authorities commonly used arbitrary arrests to impede alleged
antiregime activities. Plainclothes officers arrived unannounced at homes or
offices, arrested persons, conducted raids, and confiscated private documents,
passports, computers, electronic media, and other personal items without warrants
or assurances of due process.
Individuals often remained in detention facilities for long periods without charges
or trials, and authorities sometimes prevented them from informing others of their
whereabouts for several days. Authorities often denied detainees’ access to legal
counsel during this period.
International media and human rights organizations documented an increase in
detentions of dual nationals--individuals who are citizens of both Iran and another
country--for arbitrary and prolonged detention on politically motivated charges.
One of the environmentalists detained, Iranian-Canadian Kavous Seyed-Emami,
died in custody in February in Evin Prison, in what authorities called a suicide (see
section 1.c.). Dual nationals, like other citizens, faced a variety of due process
Annex 77
violations, including lack of prompt access to a lawyer of their choosing and brief
trials during which they were not allowed to defend themselves.
In September, Human Rights Watch documented the cases of 14 dual or foreign
nationals whom the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization has arrested since 2014.
Several of those were American citizens, including Xiyue Wang, a doctoral student
at Princeton University, who was arrested in August 2016. Wang had been
conducting research for his dissertation on the history of the Qajar dynasty. In July
2017, Iranian state media reported that a Revolutionary Court had sentenced Wang
to 10 years in prison on charges of “cooperating with an enemy state.”
Revolutionary Court Judge Abolqasem Salavati presided over the case. In August
2018, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention said Wang’s detention was
arbitrary and “motivated by the fact that he is a United States citizen,” and
recommended the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Wang immediately.
Spiritual leader Mohammad Ali Taheri, founder of the spiritual doctrine
Interuniversalism and the Erfan-e Halgheh group, had been in prison--mostly in
solitary confinement--since his arrest in 2011. He was sentenced to five years in
2011 for “insulting the sanctities” and then was sentenced to death in 2015 for
“corruption on earth.” In August 2017 Taheri was sentenced to death for a second
time. The Supreme Court subsequently rejected Taheri’s death sentence and
ordered him retried. At year’s end Taheri was serving a second five-year prison
sentence handed down in March. According to media and NGO reports, the IRGC
also detained dozens of Taheri’s followers.
Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detention was often arbitrarily lengthy, particularly in
cases involving alleged violations of national security law. In other cases
authorities held persons incommunicado for lengthy periods before permitting
them to contact family members. Instances of unjust and arbitrary pretrial
detention were commonplace and well documented throughout the year involving
numerous prisoners of conscience, particularly following the countrywide protests
beginning in December 2017. According to HRW, a judge may prolong detention
at his discretion, and pretrial detentions often lasted for months. Often authorities
held pretrial detainees in custody with the general prison population.
According to HRW, since January the IRGC’s intelligence organization had
arbitrarily arrested at least 50 environmental activists across the country and
imprisoned them without bringing formal charges or evidence. These included
several environmentalists affiliated with the Persian Wildlife Heritage Foundation
who were arrested in January for espionage. They were accused of using
Annex 77
environmental projects as a cover to collect classified information. In July family
members of Houman Jokar, Sepideh Kashani, Niloufar Bayani, Amirhossein
Khaleghi, Sam Rajabi, Taher Ghadirian, Abdolreza Kouhpayeh, and Morad
Tahbaz demanded their release in a published open letter, saying the
environmentalists had been imprisoned for six months without a “shred of
evidence.”
Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court:
Detainees may appeal their sentences in courts of law but are not entitled to
compensation for detention and were often held for extended periods without any
legal proceedings.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The constitution provides that the judiciary be “an independent power” that is “free
from every kind of unhealthy relation and connection.” The court system was
subjected to political influence, and judges were appointed “in accordance with
religious criteria.”
The supreme leader appoints the head of the judiciary. The head of the judiciary,
members of the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor general were clerics.
International observers continued to criticize the lack of independence of the
country’s judicial system and judges and maintained that trials disregarded
international standards of fairness.
Trial Procedures
According to the constitution and law, a defendant has the right to a fair trial, to be
presumed innocent until convicted, to have access to a lawyer of his or her choice,
and to appeal convictions in most cases that involve major penalties. These rights
were not upheld.
Panels of judges adjudicate trials in civil and criminal courts. Human rights
activists reported trials in which authorities appeared to have determined the
verdicts in advance, and defendants did not have the opportunity to confront their
accusers or meet with lawyers. For journalists and defendants charged with crimes
against national security, the law restricts the choice of attorneys to a governmentapproved
list.
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When postrevolutionary statutes do not address a situation, the government advised
judges to give precedence to their knowledge and interpretation of sharia (Islamic
law). Under this method judges may find a person guilty based on their own
“divine knowledge.”
The constitution does not provide for the establishment or the mandate of the
Revolutionary Courts. The courts were created pursuant to the former supreme
leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s edict immediately following the 1979 revolution,
with a sharia judge appointed as the head of the courts. They were intended as a
temporary emergency measure to try high-level officials of the deposed monarchy
and purge threats to the regime. The courts, however, became institutionalized and
continue to operate in parallel to the criminal justice system. Human rights groups
and international observers often identify the Revolutionary Courts, which are
generally responsible for hearing the cases of political prisoners, as routinely
employing grossly unfair trials without due process, handing down predetermined
verdicts, and rubberstamping executions for political purposes. These unfair
practices reportedly occur during all stages of criminal proceedings in
Revolutionary Courts, including the initial prosecution and pretrial investigation,
first instance trial, and review by higher courts.
The IRGC and Intelligence Ministry reportedly determine many aspects of
Revolutionary Court cases. Most of the important political cases are referred to a
handful of branches of the Revolutionary Courts, whose judges often have
negligent legal training and are not independent.
During the year human rights groups and international media noted the absence of
procedural safeguards in criminal trials. On September 8, three Kurdish men--
Zaniar Moradi, Loghman Moradi, and Ramin Hossein Panahi--were executed at
Rajai Shahr Prison following what Amnesty International called “grossly unfair”
trials in which the men were denied access to lawyers.
Courts admitted as evidence confessions made under duress or torture. UNSR
Jahangir stated that the government relied on physical and mental torture to coerce
confessions from prisoners during pretrial detention and interrogations. Based on
reports from numerous media and human rights groups, there was a noticeable
increase during the year in the authorities’ use of torture, as well as forced
videotaped confessions that the government later televised. A forced confession of
a teenage girl, Maedeh Hojabri, was shown on state television on July 7, in which
the girl confessed to the “crime” of posting a video of herself dancing on
Instagram.
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The Special Clerical Court is headed by a Shia Islamic legal scholar, overseen by
the supreme leader, and charged with investigating alleged offenses committed by
clerics and issuing rulings based on an independent interpretation of Islamic legal
sources. As with the Revolutionary Courts, the constitution does not provide for
the Special Clerical Court, which operated outside the judiciary’s purview.
Clerical courts were used to prosecute Shia clerics who expressed controversial
ideas and participated in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as
journalism or reformist political activities.
In March Ayatollah Hossein Shirazi, son of Grand Ayatollah Sadeq Shirazi, was
arrested in Qom for criticizing “governance by the jurist,” the foundational
principle underpinning the supreme leader’s power, and calling the supreme leader
“the pharaoh” during a lecture. The Special Clerical Court initially heard Shirazi’s
case and, according to reports in the media, sentenced him to 120 years in prison.
Following the eruption of protests inside the country and among Shia communities
outside the country, the court reportedly withdrew the sentence and released
Shirazi on bail.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
Official statistics regarding the number of citizens imprisoned for their political
beliefs were not available. According to United for Iran, on average there were an
estimated 800-900 prisoners of conscience held in the country at any given time
during the year, including those jailed for their religious beliefs.
The government often charged political dissidents with vague crimes, such as
“antirevolutionary behavior,” “corruption on earth,” “siding with global
arrogance,” “waging war against God,” and “crimes against Islam.” Prosecutors
imposed strict penalties on government critics for minor violations.
The political crimes law defines a political crime as an insult against the
government, as well as “the publication of lies.” Political crimes are those acts
“committed with the intent of reforming the domestic or foreign policies of Iran,”
while those with the intent to damage “the foundations of the regime” are
considered national security crimes. The court and the Public Prosecutor’s Office
retain responsibility for determining the nature of the crime.
The political crimes law grants the accused certain rights during arrest and
imprisonment. Political criminals should be held in detention facilities separate
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from ordinary criminals. They should also be exempt from wearing prison
uniforms, not subject to rules governing repeat offenses, not subject to extradition,
and exempt from solitary confinement unless judicial officials deem it necessary.
Political criminals also have the right to see and correspond with immediate family
regularly and to access books, newspapers, radio, and television.
Many of the law’s provisions have not been implemented, and the government
continued to arrest and charge students, journalists, lawyers, political activists,
women’s activists, artists, and members of religious minorities with “national
security” crimes that do not fall under the political crimes law. Political prisoners
were also at greater risk of torture and abuse in detention and often were mixed
with the general prison population. The government often placed political
prisoners in prisons far from their families, denied them correspondence rights, and
held them in solitary confinement for long periods. Human rights activists and
international media also reported cases of political prisoners confined with accused
and convicted violent criminals, and with criminals carrying contagious diseases
such as HIV or hepatitis. Former prisoners reported that authorities often
threatened political prisoners with transfer to criminal wards, where attacks were
more likely.
The government reportedly held some detainees in prison for years on unfounded
charges of sympathizing with real or alleged terrorist groups.
The government issued travel bans on some former political prisoners, barred them
from working in their occupations for years after incarceration, and imposed
internal exile on some. During the year authorities occasionally gave political
prisoners suspended sentences and released them on bail with the understanding
that renewed political activity would result in their return to prison. The
government did not permit international humanitarian organizations or UN
representatives access to political prisoners.
A revolutionary court in Tehran sentenced prominent human rights defender and
journalist Narges Mohammadi, arrested in 2016, to 16 years in prison. The court
charged Mohammadi with “propaganda against the state,” “assembly and collusion
against national security,” and establishing the illegal Step by Step to Stop the
Death Penalty organization, allegedly harming national security. Prison authorities
granted Mohammadi limited medical attention for significant health problems
during the year but continued to deny her family visitation and telephone calls,
according to media reports. The government repeatedly rejected Mohammadi’s
request for judicial review.
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Seven Bahai leaders were arrested in 2008, convicted of “disturbing national
security,” “spreading propaganda against the regime,” as well as “engaging in
espionage,” and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Their sentences were
subsequently reduced to 10 years. The last individual member of the group in
prison, Afif Naeimi, was released on December 20.
Lawyers who defended political prisoners were often arrested. The government
continued to imprison lawyers and others affiliated with the Defenders of Human
Rights Center advocacy group. As of September the government had arrested at
least eight prominent human rights attorneys during the year.
Authorities arrested human rights attorney Nasrin Sotoudeh on June 13 on national
security charges, claiming she had been issued a five-year prison sentence in
absentia for representing political prisoners and women who protested against the
country’s compulsory hijab law. Sotoudeh was previously arrested in 2010 and
sentenced to a six-year prison term for her human rights work representing
activists and journalists, until receiving a pardon in 2013.
International human rights organizations reported the arrest of several other human
rights lawyers during the year because of their work. On August 31, government
agents arrested Payam Derafshan and Farrokh Forouzan. Earlier in the year, Arash
Keykhosravi and Ghasem Sholeh Saadi were also unjustly detained. Zaynab
Taheri was arrested on June 19 after publicly advocating for her client, Mohammad
Salas (see section 1.a.).
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
Citizens had limited ability to sue the government and were not able to bring
lawsuits through the courts against the government for civil or human rights
violations.
Property Restitution
The constitution allows the government to confiscate property acquired illicitly or
in a manner not in conformity with Islamic law. The government appeared to
target ethnic and religious minorities in invoking this provision.
f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
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The constitution states that “reputation, life, property, [and] dwelling[s]” are
protected from trespass, except as “provided by law.” The government routinely
infringed on this right. Security forces monitored the social activities of citizens,
entered homes and offices, monitored telephone conversations and internet
communications, and opened mail without court authorization. The government
also detained the family members of activists as a form of intimidation and
reprisal.
According to international human rights organizations, the government arrested
and intimidated BBC employees’ family members based in Iran. Separately, the
government also compelled family members of journalists from other media
outlets abroad to defame their relatives on state television.
Nasrin Sotoudeh’s husband, Reza Khandan, was arrested in September for publicly
expressing his support for his detained wife, according to media reports.
g. Abuses in Internal Conflicts
Syria: Iran recruited Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shia fighters to support the
Assad regime and thus prolonging the civil war, leading to the deaths of hundreds
of thousands of Syrian civilians. According to HRW, the IRGC since 2013
allegedly recruited thousands of undocumented Afghans living in Iran to fight in
Syria, threatening forced deportation in some cases.
Child Soldiers: In an October 2017 report, HRW asserted that the IRGC had
recruited Afghan children as young as age 14 to serve in the Fatemiyoun Brigade,
reportedly an Iranian-supported Afghan group fighting alongside government
forces in Syria, and noted that at least 14 Afghan children had been killed fighting
in the Syrian conflict. Another HRW report in November 2017 documented an
interview by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) agency with a 13-
year-old Afghan boy from Iran, conducted in the Syrian border city of Abu Kamal.
During the interview the boy called himself a “defender of the shrine” and
expressed his desire to fight in Syria.
Iraq: Iran directly supported certain Iraqi Shia militias, including designated
foreign terrorist organization Kata’ib Hizballah, which reportedly was complicit in
summary executions and other human rights abuses of civilians in Iraq.
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Yemen: Since 2015 Iran provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support to the
Houthi rebels in Yemen and proliferated weapons that exacerbated and prolonged
the conflict. Also, according to a Bahai International Community report in April,
Iranian authorities were directing authorities in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen
to harass and detain Bahais because of their religious affiliation.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Expression, Including for the Press
The constitution provides for freedom of expression, including for the press, except
when words are deemed “detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the
rights of the public.” According to the law, “anyone who engages in any type of
propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran or in support of opposition groups
and associations shall be sentenced to three months to one year of imprisonment.”
Article 26 of the 2016 Charter on Citizens’ Rights acknowledges the right of every
citizen to freedom of speech and expression. The charter grants citizens the right
freely to seek, receive, publish, and communicate views and information, using any
means of communication, but it has not been implemented.
The law provides for prosecution of persons accused of instigating crimes against
the state or national security or “insulting” Islam. The government severely
restricted freedom of speech and of the press and used the law to intimidate or
prosecute persons who directly criticized the government or raised human rights
problems, as well as to bring ordinary citizens into compliance with the
government’s moral code.
Freedom of Expression: Authorities did not permit individuals to criticize publicly
the country’s system of government, supreme leader, or official religion. Security
forces and the judiciary punished those who violated these restrictions, as well as
those who publicly criticized the president, cabinet, and parliament.
The government monitored meetings, movements, and communications of its
citizens and often charged persons with crimes against national security and of
insulting the regime, citing as evidence letters, emails, and other public and private
communications. Authorities threatened arrest or punishment for the expression of
ideas or images they viewed as violations of the legal moral code.
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Press and Media Freedom: The government’s Press Supervisory Board issues
press licenses, which it sometimes revoked in response to articles critical of the
government or the regime, or it did not renew them for individuals facing criminal
charges or incarcerated for political reasons. During the year the government
banned, blocked, closed, or censored publications deemed critical of officials.
The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Ershad) severely limited and
controlled foreign media organizations’ ability to work in the country. The
ministry required foreign correspondents to provide detailed travel plans and topics
of proposed stories before granting visas, limiting their ability to travel within the
country, and forced them to work with a local “minder.”
Under the constitution private broadcasting is illegal. The government maintained
a monopoly over all television and radio broadcasting facilities through IRIB, a
government agency. Radio and television programming, the principal source of
news for many citizens, particularly in rural areas with limited internet access,
reflected the government’s political and socioreligious ideology. The government
jammed satellite broadcasts as signals entered the country, a continuous practice
since at least 2003. Satellite dishes remained illegal but ubiquitous. Those who
distributed, used, or repaired satellite dishes faced fines up to 90 million rials
($2,100). Police, using warrants provided by the judiciary, launched campaigns to
confiscate privately owned satellite dishes throughout the country.
Under the constitution the supreme leader appoints the head of the audiovisual
policy agency, a council composed of representatives of the president, judiciary,
and parliament. The Ministry of Culture reviews all potential publications,
including foreign printed materials, prior to their domestic release and may deem
books unpublishable, remove text, or require word substitutions for terms deemed
inappropriate.
Independent print media companies existed, but the government severely limited
their operations.
Violence and Harassment: The government and its agents harassed, detained,
abused, and prosecuted publishers, editors, and journalists, including those
involved in internet-based media, for their reporting. The government also
harassed many journalists’ families.
Reporters without Borders (RSF) reported that the government arrested an
estimated 10 citizen-journalists for covering the nationwide protests that began in
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December 2017. According to RSF, several citizen journalists were beaten and
arrested while recording renewed protests in Tehran on June 25-26. Authorities
banned national and international media outlets from covering the demonstrations
in an attempt to censor coverage of the protests and to intimidate citizens from
disseminating information about them.
In February, RSF reported that several employees of the Sufi news website
Majzooban Nor were arrested while covering clashes between security forces and
Gonabadi Dervishes. Majzooban Nor was the only independent website covering
the dervishes, and most of the arrested journalists were reportedly severely beaten
by police and militia members. In July and August, Majzooban Nor journalists
were sentenced for lashes and prison terms of up to 26 years in connection for their
work covering the dervishes’ protests.
According to CHRI, in August the Mizan News Agency, which functions as the
official news website of the judiciary, published statements that human rights
activists interpreted as a call for vigilante violence against BBC journalists and
their families. The BBC had filed a complaint at the UN Human Rights Council in
March against Iranian authorities for their campaign of harassment against BBC
Persian staff.
Censorship or Content Restrictions: The law forbids government censorship but
also prohibits dissemination of information the government considers “damaging.”
During the year the government censored publications that criticized official
actions or contradicted official views or versions of events. “Damaging”
information included discussions of women’s rights, the situation of minorities,
criticism of government corruption, and references to mistreatment of detainees.
In September media reported that General Prosecutor Mohammad Jafar Montazeri
ordered the closure of Sedayeh Eslahat, a reformist newspaper, on charges of
insulting Shia Islam. According to reports, the newspaper had published an article
on female-to-male sex reassignment surgery, titling the article, “Ruqayyah became
Mahdi after 22 years.” Ruqayyah was the daughter of Hussein, a revered Shia
Imam, while Mahdi, according to Shia beliefs, is the name of the 12th Shia Imam.
Montazeri also called for the punishment of the newspaper’s editor.
Officials routinely intimidated journalists into practicing self-censorship. Public
officials often filed criminal complaints against newspapers, and the Press
Supervisory Board, which regulates media content and publication, referred such
complaints to the Press Court for further action, including possible closure,
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suspension, and fines. IRNA determined the main topics and types of news to be
covered and distributed topics required for reporting directly to various media
outlets, according to the IHRDC.
Libel/Slander Laws: The government commonly used libel laws or cited national
security to suppress criticism. According to the law, if any publication contains
personal insults, libel, false statements, or criticism, the insulted individual has the
right to respond in the publication within one month. By law “insult” or “libel”
against the government, government representatives, or foreign officials while they
are on Iranian soil, as well as “the publication of lies” with the intent to alter, but
not overthrow, the government are considered political crimes and subject to
certain trial and detention procedures (see section 1.e.). The government applied
the law throughout the year, often citing statements made in various media outlets
or on internet platforms that criticized the government, in the arrest, prosecution,
and sentencing of individuals for crimes against national security.
Internet Freedom
The government restricted and disrupted access to the internet, monitored private
online communications, and censored online content. Individuals and groups
practiced self-censorship online.
The Ministries of Culture and of Information and Communications Technology are
the main regulatory bodies for content and internet systems in the country. The
Supreme Leader’s Office also includes the Supreme Council of Cyberspace,
charged with regulating content and systems. The government collected personally
identifiable information in connection with citizens’ peaceful expression of
political, religious, or ideological opinion or beliefs.
According to the International Telecommunication Union, 60 percent of the
population used the internet in 2017. According to the Ministry of Culture, 70
percent of youth between the ages of 15 and 29 used the internet. NGOs reported
the government continued to filter content on the internet to ban access to
particular sites and to filter traffic based on its content. The law makes it illegal to
distribute circumvention tools and virtual private networks, and Minister of
Information and Communications Technology Jahromi was quoted in the press
stating that using circumvention tools is illegal.
The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance must approve all internet service
providers. The government also requires all owners of websites and blogs in the
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country to register with the agencies that compose the Commission to Determine
the Instances of Criminal Content (also referred to as the Committee in Charge of
Determining Unauthorized Websites or Committee in Charge of Determining
Offensive Content), the governmental organization that determines censoring
criteria. These agencies include the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance,
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, the Intelligence
Ministry, and the Tehran Public Prosecutor’s Office.
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology regulations prohibit
households and cybercafes from having high-speed internet access. The
government periodically reduced internet speed to discourage downloading
material.
According to media reports, former minister of information and communications
technology Mahmoud Vaezi announced in 2017 that the government had improved
methods to control the internet and had shut down a number of online platforms.
The government’s decade-long project to build a National Information Network
(NIN) resulted in its launch in 2016. The NIN enabled officials to allow higher
speed and easier access on domestic traffic, while limiting international internet
traffic. RSF reported that the NIN acted like an intranet system, with full content
control and user identification. Authorities may disconnect this network from
global internet content, and they reportedly intended to use it to provide
government propaganda and disrupt circumvention tools. During nationwide
protests in December 2017, authorities used NIN technology to cut off access to
the global internet for 30 minutes.
Authorities continued to block online messaging tools, such as Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter, although the government operated Twitter accounts under
the names of Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Rouhani, Foreign Minister
Zarif, and other government-associated officials and entities.
Government organizations, including the Basij “Cyber Council,” the Cyber Police,
and the Cyber Army, which observers presumed to be controlled by the IRGC,
monitored, identified, and countered alleged cyberthreats to national security.
These organizations especially targeted citizens’ activities on officially banned
social networking websites such as Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and
Flickr, and they reportedly harassed persons who criticized the government or
raised sensitive social problems.
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According to a report by CHRI, in May the Judiciary (the prosecutor of Branch 2
of the Culture and Media Prosecutor’s Office in Tehran) blocked the popular
messaging app Telegram. Telegram, used by approximately half the population as
a platform for a wide variety of personal, political, business, and cultural content,
had become a primary internet platform. As a foreign-owned company with
servers outside the country, Telegram was not under the control of national
censors. Many officials blamed Telegram for the spread of protests in December
2017. After the ban on Telegram, the Ministry of Information and
Communications Technology began to disrupt access to circumvention tools used
to access blocked applications or sites.
RSF reported that several bloggers and online journalists were arrested during the
year for their expression. Blogger Hengameh Shahidi was arrested in May for
tweets about her previous detention. Mohammad Hossien Hidari, the editor of the
Dolat e Bahar news website, was arrested in May. His families and lawyers did
not know what he had been charged with, and his website was inaccessible after
his arrest. Amir Hossein Miresmaili, a journalist with the daily newspaper Jahan
Sanat (Industry World), was sentenced to 10 years in prison on August 22 for a
tweet criticizing a mullah in Mashhad. Miresmaili’s sentence also included a twoyear
ban on journalistic activity on social networks after his release from prison.
According to his lawyer, Miresmaili was charged with “insulting the sacredness of
Islam,” “insulting government agents and officials,” “publishing false information
designed to upset public opinion,” and “publishing immoral articles contrary to
public decency.”
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The government significantly restricted academic freedom and the independence of
higher education institutions. Authorities systematically targeted university
campuses to suppress social and political activism by banning independent student
organizations, imprisoning student activists, removing faculty, preventing students
from enrolling or continuing their education because of their political or religious
affiliation or activism, and restricting social sciences and humanities curricula.
According to a July HRW report, following the protests of December 2017 and
January 2018, intelligence officers arrested at least 150 students and courts
sentenced 17 to prison terms. Many of the arrested students did not participate in
the protests but were preemptively detained, according to reports. HRW reported
that as of mid-July, revolutionary courts had sentenced at least eight student
protesters from universities in Tehran and Tabriz to prison sentences of up to eight
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years. Some students were banned from membership in political parties or
participating in media, including social media, for two years.
Authorities barred Bahai students from higher education and harassed those who
studied through the unrecognized online university of the Bahai Institute for
Higher Education. According to a HRANA report in September, more than 50
Bahai college applicants had been denied enrollment for their religious affiliation
(see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/).
The government maintained controls on cinema, music, theater, and art exhibits
and censored those productions deemed to transgress Islamic values. The
government censored or banned films deemed to promote secularism, non-Islamic
ideas about women’s rights, unethical behavior, drug abuse, violence, or
alcoholism.
According to the IHRDC, the nine-member film review council of the Ministry of
Culture and Islamic Guidance, made up of clerics, former directors, former
parliamentarians, and academics, must approve the content of every film before
production and again before screening. Films may be barred arbitrarily from
screening even if all the appropriate permits were received in advance.
According to media reports, renowned film director Jafar Panahi was banned again
from traveling to the 2018 Cannes film festival. Panahi has been barred from
traveling since 2010, when he was charged with generating “propaganda against
the Islamic Republic.”
Officials continued to discourage teaching music in schools. Authorities
considered heavy metal and foreign music religiously offensive, and police
continued to repress underground concerts and arrest musicians and music
distributors. The Ministry of Culture must officially approve song lyrics, music,
and album covers as complying with the country’s moral values, although many
underground musicians released albums without seeking such permission.
According to media reports in February, Benyamin Bahadori, a pop singer and
composer, cancelled a concert in Kerman after female members of his music group
were banned from appearing on stage. In April, according to media reports, the
head of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in Mashhad was arrested for
undermining public decency and disrespecting laws when videos surfaced on
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social media networks showing young men and women dancing at a concert at a
shopping center in the city.
b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The government severely restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and
association.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
The constitution permits assemblies and marches of unarmed persons “provided
they do not violate the principles of Islam.” In order to prevent activities it
considered antiregime, the government restricted this right and closely monitored
gatherings such as public entertainment and lectures, student and women’s
meetings and protests, meetings and worship services of minority religious groups,
labor protests, online gatherings and networking, funeral processions, and Friday
prayer gatherings.
According to activists, the government arbitrarily applied rules governing permits
to assemble, with proregime groups rarely experiencing difficulty, while groups
viewed as critical of the regime experienced harassment regardless of whether
authorities issued a permit.
The government cracked down on small protests that began in the city of Mashhad
in December 2017 and continued into 2018. These protests subsequently spread
across the country and included broader economic and political grievances with the
nation’s leadership. International media and human rights organizations widely
covered the government’s crackdown on protests. According to media reports, at
least 20 protesters were killed as of January, and thousands more were arrested
throughout the year. Official government sources cited 4,970 arrested, 90 percent
of whom were younger than 25 years old. Over the year, as protests arose across
the country among various groups and by individuals expressing diverse
grievances and demands, actions by security forces resulted in hundreds of
additional arrests and further alleged deaths.
CHRI reported that authorities denied detainees access to attorneys and threatened
them with charges that carried the death penalty if they sought counsel. There
were multiple reports of detainees beaten while in custody. Several human rights
organizations, including CHRI, reported that detainees were given pills of
unknown substance, including methadone, to portray them as drug addicts.
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According to CHRI, at least two detainees died under suspicious circumstances
while in detention, while the death of a third detainee was labeled a “suicide” (see
section 1.a.).
In February security forces violently cracked down on a group of Gonabadi Sufi
dervishes in Tehran who were protesting to demand the release of a 70-year-old
fellow Sufi, Nematollah Riahi, who protesters believed was unjustly detained
because of his religious affiliation. According to CHRI and reports from Sufi news
sites, at least 300 hundred Gonabadi Sufis were arrested and imprisoned in the
Great Tehran Penitentiary and Qarchak Prison, with numerous deaths reported at
the hands of security forces. Reports indicated that the government’s crackdown
continued in various cities throughout the country and that Sufis were subjected to
torture and forced confessions in detention centers prior to their transfer to prisons.
According to an August HRW report, revolutionary courts sentenced at least 208
Gonabadi Sufi dervishes, from the hundreds detained, in unfair trials to prison
terms ranging from four months to 26 years, flogging, internal exile, travel bans,
and a ban on membership in social and political groups. Authorities did not allow
the defendants to choose their legal representation and repeatedly insulted and
questioned their faith during trials that lasted as little as 15 minutes. More than 40
dervishes received sentences in absentia.
In August Great Tehran Penitentiary authorities conducted a “brutal” attack,
according to CHRI, on Gonabadi Sufis prisoners who were peacefully protesting
the harsh treatment of female Gonabadi Sufi prisoners at Qarchak Prison.
According to the report, several detainees were badly injured and suffered broken
bones, while female prisoners in Qarchak Prison were reportedly subjected to
torture and beatings by prison officials.
Freedom of Association
The constitution provides for the establishment of political parties, professional
and political associations, and Islamic and recognized religious minority
organizations, as long as such groups do not violate the principles of freedom,
sovereignty, national unity, or Islamic criteria, or question Islam as the basis of the
country’s system of government. The government limited the freedom of
association through threats, intimidation, the imposition of arbitrary requirements
on organizations, and the arrests of group leaders and members.
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The government barred teachers from commemorating International Labor Day
and Teachers’ Day. Several prominent teachers and union activists either
remained in prison or were awaiting new sentences, including Mahmoud Beheshti
Langroudi and Esmail Abdi (see section 7.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
d. Freedom of Movement
The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration,
and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights, with some
exceptions, particularly concerning migrants and women. The government
cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
with regard to refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq.
In-country Movement: Judicial sentences sometimes included internal exile after
release from prison, which prevented individuals from traveling to certain
provinces. Women often required the supervision of a male guardian or chaperone
to travel and faced official and societal harassment for traveling alone.
Foreign Travel: The government required exit permits for foreign travel for all
citizens. Citizens who were educated at government expense or received
scholarships had to either repay the scholarship or receive a temporary permit to
exit the country. The government restricted the foreign travel of some religious
leaders, members of religious minorities, and scientists in sensitive fields.
Several journalists, academics, opposition politicians, human and women’s rights
activists, and artists remained subject to foreign travel bans and had their passports
confiscated during the year. Married women were not allowed to travel outside the
country without prior permission from their husbands.
Exile: The law does not provide for forced exile abroad. Many citizens practiced
self-imposed exile to express their beliefs freely or escape government harassment.
Protection of Refugees
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According to UNHCR, the government had granted registration to 950,142 Afghan
and 28,268 Iraqi refugees under a system known as amayesh, through which
authorities provide refugees with cards identifying them as legally registered
refugees. The cards enable refugees to access basic services and facilitate the
issuance of work permits. In addition to registered refugees, the government
estimated it hosted 450,000 Afghans who hold Afghan passports and Iranian visas
and 1.5 million undocumented Afghans.
HRW and other groups reported that the government continued its mistreatment of
many Afghans, including physical abuse by security forces, deportations, forced
recruitment to fight in Syria (see section 1.g.), detention in unsanitary and inhuman
conditions, forced payment for transportation to and accommodation in deportation
camps, forced labor, forced separation from families, restricted movement within
the country, and restricted access to education or jobs.
Refoulement: According to activist groups and NGOs, authorities routinely
arrested Afghans without amayesh cards and sometimes threatened them with
deportation. According to the International Organization for Migration, from the
beginning of the year to August, more than 219,254 undocumented Afghans
returned to Afghanistan, with many claiming they were pressured to leave. In
addition more than 273,089 were deported there throughout the year.
Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status
to qualified applicants. While the government reportedly has a system for
providing protection to refugees, UNHCR did not have information regarding how
the country made asylum determinations. According to HRW, the government
continued to block many Afghans from registering to obtain refugee status.
Afghans not registered under the amayesh system who had migrated in the past
decades of conflict in their home country continued to be denied access to an
asylum system or access to register with the United Nations as refugees. NGOs
reported many of these displaced asylum seekers believed they were pressured to
leave the country but could not return to Afghanistan because of the security
situation in their home provinces.
Freedom of Movement: Refugees faced restrictions on in-country movement and
faced restrictions from entering certain provinces, according to UNHCR.
Employment: Only refugees with government-issued work permits were able to
work. NGO sources reported that amayesh cards were difficult to renew and were
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often prohibitively expensive for refugees to maintain due to steep annual renewal
fees.
Access to Basic Services: Amayesh cardholders had access to primary education
and received primary health care, including vaccinations, prenatal care, maternal
and child health, and family planning from the Ministry of Health. They also
benefited from a universal basic health insurance package for hospitalization and
paraclinical services (medicine, doctor’s visits, radiology, etc.) similar to citizens,
and those with qualifying “special diseases” received comprehensive coverage.
In 2017 more than 112,000 vulnerable refugees enrolled in the Universal Public
Health Insurance scheme providing coverage for 12 months, and in 2018 92,000
vulnerable refugees were expected to benefit from subsidized premium support
from UNHCR.
The government claimed to grant refugees access to schools. More than 420,000
refugee children were enrolled in primary and secondary school, out of whom
103,000 were undocumented Afghan children. According to media reporting,
however, Afghans continued to have difficulty gaining access to education. The
government sometimes imposed fees for children of registered refugees to attend
public schools.
There were barriers to marriage between citizens and displaced Afghans.
Authorities required Afghans to obtain documentation from their embassy or
government offices in Afghanistan to register their marriage in the country,
according to media reporting. The law states, “Any foreigner who marries an
Iranian woman without the permission of the Iranian government will be sentenced
to two to five years in prison plus a cash penalty.” Furthermore, authorities
considered children born from such unions eligible for citizenship only if the
child’s father is a citizen and registers the child as his, potentially leaving many
children stateless.
Most provinces’ residency limitations on refugees effectively denied them access
to public services, such as public housing, in the restricted areas of those
provinces.
Stateless Persons
There were no accurate numbers on how many stateless persons resided in the
country. Stateless persons included those without birth documents or refugee
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identification cards. They were subjected to inconsistent government policies and
relied on charities, principally domestic, to obtain medical care and schooling.
Authorities prohibited stateless persons from receiving formal government support
or travel documents.
Women may not directly transmit citizenship to their children or to noncitizen
spouses. Only children born to Iranian mothers and non-Iranian fathers who reside
in Iran for 18 years and whose parents’ marriage is officially registered with the
government are eligible to apply for citizenship. According to media reports,
between 400,000 and one million persons lacked Iranian nationality despite having
an Iranian citizen mother, due to limitations on citizenship transmission (see
section 6, Children).
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
The constitution provides citizens the ability to choose the president, as well as
members of the Assembly of Experts and parliament, through elections based on
universal suffrage. Candidate vetting conducted by unelected bodies, however,
abridged this right in all instances. Reported government constraints on freedom
of expression and the media; peaceful assembly; association; and the ability to
freely seek, receive, and impart information and campaign also limited Iranians’
right to freely choose their representatives in elections.
The Assembly of Experts, which is composed of 86 popularly elected clerics who
serve eight-year terms, elects the supreme leader, who acts as the de facto head of
state and may be removed only by a vote of the assembly. The Guardian Council
vets and qualifies candidates for all Assembly of Experts, presidential, and
parliamentary elections based on criteria that include candidates’ allegiance to the
state and adherence to Shia Islam. The council consists of six clerics appointed by
the supreme leader and six jurists nominated by the head of the judiciary (who is
appointed by the supreme leader) and approved by parliament.
There is no separation of state and religion, and certain clerics had significant
influence in the government.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: Presidential and local council elections were held in May 2017.
The country’s electoral system continued to fall short of international standards for
free and fair elections because of the Guardian Council’s controlling role in the
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political process, including determining which individuals could run for office, and
in certain instances, arbitrarily removing winning candidates.
In 2017 the Guardian Council approved six Shia male candidates for president
from a total candidate pool of 1,636 individuals (0.37 percent of total applicants).
Voters re-elected Hassan Rouhani as president. The Interior Ministry announced
that Rouhani won 57 percent of the votes, with a 73 percent turnout of eligible
voters.
Candidates for local elections were vetted by monitoring boards established by
parliament, resulting in the disqualification of a number of applicants. Observers
asserted that reformist candidates such as Abdollah Momeni, Ali Tajernia, and
Nasrin Vaziri, previously imprisoned for peacefully protesting the 2009 election,
were not allowed to run due to their political views.
CHRI reported that on July 21, the Expediency Council, the country’s highest
arbiter of disputes between state branches, voted by a two-thirds majority to amend
the Law on the Formation, Duties, and Election of National Islamic Councils, thus
affirming the right of constitutionally recognized religious minorities to run in
local elections. As a result of this ruling, Sepanta Niknam, a member of the
Zoroastrian faith, was able to reclaim his city council seat in Yazd, from which he
was suspended in 2017 because of his religion. Niknam had been re-elected to the
Yazd city council in May 2017 but was forced to step down in September 2017
after the local court ruled that Niknam, as member of a religious minority, could
not be elected to a council in a Muslim-majority constituency.
Political Parties and Political Participation: The constitution provides for the
formation of political parties, but the Interior Ministry granted licenses only to
parties deemed to adhere to the “governance of the jurist” system of government
embodied in the constitution. Registered political organizations that adhered to the
system generally operated without restriction, but most were small, focused around
an individual, and without nationwide membership. Members of political parties
and persons with any political affiliation that the regime deemed unacceptable
faced harassment and sometimes violence and imprisonment. The government
maintained bans on several opposition organizations and political parties. Security
officials continued to harass, intimidate, and arrest members of the political
opposition and some reformists (see section 1.e.). In her August 2017 report,
UNSR Jahangir noted a number of arrests and detentions of members of opposition
parties in the months before the May 2017 elections.
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Participation of Women and Minorities: Women faced significant legal, religious,
and cultural barriers to political participation. According to the Guardian
Council’s interpretation, the constitution bars women, as well as persons of foreign
origin, from serving as supreme leader or president, as members of the Assembly
of Experts, the Guardian Council, or the Expediency Council, and as certain types
of judges.
The Guardian Council disqualified all 137 women who registered as candidates for
the May 2017 presidential election. Almost 18,000 female candidates, or 6.3
percent of all candidates, were permitted to run for positions in the 2017 local
elections.
All cabinet-level ministers were men. A limited number of women held senior
government positions, including that of Vice President for Legal Affairs and Vice
President for Women and Family Affairs.
Practitioners of a religion other than Shia Islam are barred from serving as supreme
leader or president, as well as being a member in the Assembly of Experts,
Guardian Council, or Expediency Council. The law reserves five seats in
parliament for members of recognized minority religious groups, although
minorities may also be elected to nonreserved seats. The five reserved seats were
filled by one Zoroastrian, one Jew, and three Christians. There were no non-
Muslims in the cabinet or on the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government
implemented the law arbitrarily, sometimes pursuing apparently legitimate
corruption cases against officials while bringing politically motivated charges
against regime critics or political opponents. Most officials continued to engage in
corrupt practices with impunity. Many expected bribes for providing routine
services or received bonuses outside their regular work, and individuals routinely
bribed officials to obtain permits for otherwise illegal construction.
Endowed religious charitable foundations, or bonyads, accounted for a quarter to a
third of the country’s economy, according to some experts. Government insiders,
including members of the military and clergy, ran these tax-exempt organizations,
which are defined under law as charities. Members of the political opposition and
international corruption watchdog organizations frequently accused bonyads of
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corruption. Bonyads received benefits from the government, but no government
agency is required to approve their budgets publicly.
Numerous companies and subsidiaries affiliated with the IRGC engaged in trade
and business activities, sometimes illicitly, including in the telecommunications,
mining, and construction sectors. Other IRGC entities reportedly engaged in
smuggling pharmaceutical products, narcotics, and raw materials. The domestic
and international press reported that individuals with strong government
connections had access to foreign currency at preferential exchange rates, allowing
them to exploit a gap between the country’s black market and official exchange
rates.
Corruption: In August IRNA reported that Ahmad Araghchi, an Iran Central Bank
deputy in charge of foreign currency affairs, was arrested, along with six others, as
part of an investigation into financial corruption. IRNA quoted Judiciary
spokesperson Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei saying the arrests were part of the
country’s ongoing crackdown on graft and corruption in the foreign currency
sector. According to the Mizan News Agency, at least 67 persons had been
arrested as of August, accused of fraud and trying to undermine the banking
system. Mohseni Ejei was quoted saying several of the individuals arrested had
direct ties to the government and, charged with “corruption on Earth,” could face
the death penalty. He stated more than 100 government employees had been
barred from leaving the country. According to the same report, Supreme Leader
Khamenei approved a request from the head of the judiciary to set up special
revolutionary courts to try individuals for economic crimes, seeking maximum
sentences for those who “disrupted and corrupted” the economy. Khamenei was
quoted saying that punishments for those accused of economic corruption,
including government officials and those from the military, should be carried out
swiftly. According to a BBC report, at least three businessmen were executed for
corruption after trials that human rights groups said lacked due process protections.
According to media reports, in July parliamentarian Amir Khojasteh, president of
the parliament’s anticorruption caucus, claimed during an open session of
parliament that $44 billion had been allocated for goods that were never imported
and that $60 billion in goods were hoarded in warehouses.
Financial Disclosure: Regulations require government officials, including cabinet
ministers and members of the Guardian Council, Expediency Council, and
Assembly of Experts, to submit annual financial statements to the government
inspectorate. Little information was available on whether the government
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effectively implemented the law, whether officials obeyed the law, or whether
financial statements were publicly accessible.
In an August televised interview, President Rouhani asserted his intent to ramp up
anticorruption efforts, stating the government had no “red lines” when it came to
fighting corruption. According to media reports, Rouhani earlier directed all
government ministries to publish the names of individuals and entities that had
received hard currency at the official exchange rate. In June the Ministry of
Information and Communication Technology published the names of entities that
had received foreign exchange at the official rate to import mobile phones, while
the Central Bank of Iran published a similar list of entities that had received
currency at the official exchange rate.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
The government restricted the operations of and did not cooperate with local or
international human rights NGOs investigating alleged violations of human rights.
The government restricted the work of domestic activists and often responded to
their inquiries and reports with harassment, arrests, online hacking, and monitoring
of individual activists and organization workplaces.
By law NGOs must register with the Ministry of Interior and apply for permission
to receive foreign grants. Independent human rights groups and other NGOs faced
continued harassment because of their activism, as well as the threat of closure by
government officials following prolonged and often arbitrary delays in obtaining
official registration.
During the year the government prevented some human rights defenders, civil
society activists, journalists, and scholars from traveling abroad. Human rights
activists reported intimidating telephone calls, threats of blackmail, online hacking
attempts, and property damage from unidentified law enforcement and government
officials. The government summoned activists repeatedly for questioning and
confiscated personal belongings such as mobile phones, laptops, and passports.
Government officials sometimes harassed and arrested family members of human
rights activists. Courts routinely suspended sentences of convicted human rights
activists, leaving open the option for authorities to arrest or imprison individuals
arbitrarily at any time on the previous charges.
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In her March report, UNSR Jahangir expressed concern about the arrest, arbitrary
detention, and sentencing of human rights defenders, student activists, journalists,
and lawyers. She noted acts of intimidation and reprisals in detention, including
torture and mistreatment, as well as reports of reprisals against human rights
defenders for engaging the UNSR and cooperating with other UN mechanisms.
According to NGO sources, including HRWand Amnesty International, the
government’s rights record and its level of cooperation with international rights
institutions remained poor. The government continued to deny requests from
international human rights NGOs to establish offices in or to conduct regular
investigative visits to the country. The most recent visit of an international human
rights NGO was by Amnesty International in 2004 as part of the European Union’s
human rights dialogue with the country.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies: During the year the
government continued to deny repeated requests by the UNSR on the situation of
human rights in Iran to visit the country.
On November 15, for the sixth consecutive year, the UN General Assembly
adopted a resolution expressing serious concern about the country’s continuing
human rights violations. The resolution repeated its call for the country to
cooperate with UN special mechanisms, citing the government’s failure to approve
any request from a UN thematic special procedures mandate holder to visit the
country in more than a decade. It drew attention to the government’s continued
failure to allow the UNSR into the country to investigate human rights abuses
despite repeated requests. The most recent visit by a UN human rights agency to
the country was in 2005.
Government Human Rights Bodies: The High Council for Human Rights, headed
by Mohammad Javad Larijani, is part of the judicial branch of the government and
lacks independence. The council continued to defend the imprisonment of highprofile
human rights defenders and political opposition leaders, despite domestic
and international pressure. Larijani continued to call for an end to the position of
the UNSR. There was no information available on whether the council challenged
any laws or court rulings during the year.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Women
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Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape is illegal and subject to strict penalties,
including death, but it remained a problem. The law considers sex within marriage
consensual by definition and, therefore, does not address spousal rape, including in
cases of forced marriage. Most rape victims likely did not report the crime because
they feared official retaliation or punishment for having been raped, including
charges of indecency, immoral behavior, or adultery, the last of which carries the
death penalty. Rape victims also feared societal reprisal or ostracism.
For a conviction of rape, the law requires four Muslim men or a combination of
three men and two women or two men and four women, to have witnessed a rape.
A woman or man found making a false accusation of rape is subject to 80 lashes.
In June international media reported on the kidnapping and gang rape of at least 41
women and girls in the city of Iranshahr, Sistan va Baluchistan Province, which
has a predominantly Baluchi population. According to the reports, authorities
initially tried to deny the cases, leading to local protests. Reports indicated that
some of the alleged perpetrators had ties to local security forces. Social media
users expressed their anger and sought support for the victims online through an
#Iranshahr girls campaign. Some of the social media participants, including
Abdollah Bozorgzadeh, were reportedly harassed and arrested for their online
activism.
The law does not prohibit domestic violence. Authorities considered abuse in the
family a private matter and seldom discussed it publicly.
A 2017 CHRI report referenced a study presented at the nongovernmental Imam
Ali Foundation’s May 2017 conference in Tehran on violence against women in
the country, according to which 32 percent of women in urban areas and 63 percent
in rural areas had been victims of domestic violence. A government official was
quoted in the report saying that 11,000 cases of domestic abuse had been registered
by the National Welfare Organization. In January, according to media reports, the
state-run Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) apologized after an alleged
relationship expert and marriage counselor advised domestic violence victims
during a television broadcast to kiss their husband’s feet, leading to a large social
media backlash in the country. Some users reportedly mocked the advice and
characterized it as “nonsense” and “scary.”
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The law criminalizes FGM/C and
states, “the cutting or removing of the two sides of female genitalia leads to diyeh
(financial penalty or blood money) equal to half the full amount of diyeh for the
woman’s life.”
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Little current data was available on the practice inside the country, although older
data and media reports suggested it was most prevalent in Hormozgan, Kurdistan,
Kermanshah, and West Azerbaijan Provinces.
Other Harmful Traditional Practices: There were no official reports of killings
motivated by “honor” or other harmful traditional practices during the year,
although human rights activists reported that such killings continued to occur,
particularly among rural and tribal populations.
The law reduces punitive measures for fathers and other family members who are
convicted of murder or physically harming children in domestic violence or “honor
killings.” If a man is found guilty of murdering his daughter, the punishment is
between three and 10 years in prison rather than the normal death sentence or
payment of diyeh for homicide cases.
Sexual Harassment: The law addresses sexual harassment in the context of
physical contact between men and women and prohibits physical contact between
unrelated men and women. There was no reliable data on the extent of sexual
harassment, but women and human rights observers reported that sexual
harassment was the norm in many workplaces. There were no known government
efforts to address this problem.
Coercion in Population Control: There were no reports of coerced abortion or
involuntary sterilization.
Discrimination: The constitution provides for equal protection for women under
the law in conformity with its interpretation of Islam. The government did not
enforce the law, and provisions in the law, particularly sections dealing with family
and property law, discriminate against women. Judicial harassment, intimidation,
detention, and smear campaigns significantly challenged the ability of civil society
organizations to fight for and protect women’s rights.
Women may not transmit citizenship to their children or to a noncitizen spouse.
The government does not recognize marriages between Muslim women and non-
Muslim men, irrespective of their citizenship. The law states that a virgin woman
or girl wishing to wed needs the consent of her father or grandfather or the court’s
permission.
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The law permits a man to have as many as four wives and an unlimited number of
sigheh (temporary wives), based on a Shia custom under which couples may enter
into a limited-time civil and religious contract, which outlines the union’s
conditions.
A woman has the right to divorce if her husband signs a contract granting that
right; cannot provide for his family; has violated the terms of their marriage
contract; or is a drug addict, insane, or impotent. A husband is not required to cite
a reason for divorcing his wife. The law recognizes a divorced woman’s right to
part of shared property and to alimony. These laws were not always enforced.
The government actively suppressed efforts to build awareness among women of
their rights regarding marriage and divorce. According to a CHRI report, in
September the IRGC Intelligence Organization arrested Hoda Amid, a human
rights attorney, and Najmeh Vahedi, a prominent sociologist and women’s rights
activist, three days before they were supposed to host a workshop about the
country’s marriage laws, which they had organized with a legal permit. One of the
purposes of the workshop was to teach women how to expand their rights with
legally binding prenuptial contracts.
The law provides divorced women preference in custody for children up to age
seven, but fathers maintain legal guardianship rights over the child and must agree
on many legal aspects of the child’s life (such as issuing travel documents,
enrolling in school, or filing a police report). After the child reaches the age of
seven, the father is granted custody unless he is proven unfit to care for the child.
Women sometimes received disproportionate punishment for crimes such as
adultery, including death sentences. Islamic law retains provisions that equate a
woman’s testimony in a court of law to half that of a man’s and value a woman’s
life as half that of a man’s. According to the law, the diyeh paid in the death of a
woman is half the amount paid in the death of a man, with the exception of car
accident insurance payments.
Women have access to primary and advanced education. According to 2017 media
reports, women gaining admission to universities nationwide outnumbered men by
13 percent. Quotas and other restrictions nonetheless limited women’s admissions
to certain fields and degree programs.
As domestic media reported during the year, women’s participation in the job
market remained as low as 16 percent. Women reportedly earned 41 percent less
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than men for the same work. Unemployment among women in the country was
twice as high as it was among men.
Women continued to face discrimination in home and property ownership, as well
as access to financing. In cases of inheritance, male heirs receive twice the
inheritance of their female counterparts. The government enforced gender
segregation in many public spaces. Women must ride in a reserved section on
public buses and enter some public buildings, universities, and airports through
separate entrances.
The law provides that a woman who appears in public without appropriate attire,
such as a cloth scarf veil (hijab) over the head and a long jacket (manteau), or a
large full-length cloth covering (chador), may be sentenced to flogging and fined.
Absent a clear legal definition of “appropriate attire” or of the related punishment,
women were subjected to the opinions of various disciplinary and security force
members, police, and judges.
Throughout the year government and security forces cracked down on peaceful
nationwide protests against dress restrictions.
In January several women in Tehran and Isfahan protested the compulsory hijab
law by standing on platforms, publicly removing their headscarves, and waving
them like flags. They were following the example of Vida Movahed, who
performed a similar act of defiance in December 2017 on Revolution Street in
Tehran. Pictures of Movahed--who disappeared for a month during detention by
security forces at an unknown location--performing the act went viral online.
According to reports, Movahed was sentenced in March to 24 months in prison but
was released on bail.
In February authorities arrested 29 women in Tehran for peacefully protesting the
mandatory dress law. Prosecutor General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri was quoted
downplaying the significance of the protests, calling them “childish,” “emotionally
charged,” and fomented from outside the country. One of the protesters, Narges
Hosseini, a sociology student, was arrested and in March sentenced to two years in
prison. Maryam Shariatmadari, a computer science student, was sentenced to one
year in prison for “encouraging corruption by removing her hijab.” According to
media reports and Amnesty International, Shaparak Shajarizadeh fled the country
after being arrested on multiple occasions, subjected to torture and beatings, and
released on bail in April; she reportedly was sentenced in absentia to 20 years in
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prison for peacefully protesting. According to reports, other women and some men
were arrested throughout the country for similar activities.
In March, according to an HRWreport, police arrested approximately 35 women
who had gathered outside Azadi Stadium in Tehran seeking to watch a soccer
match. In June, however, authorities allowed women and men into the same
stadium to watch a live streaming of the national football team competing at the
World Cup, and in October close to 100 women were allowed to attend a live
match.
As noted by the former UNSR and other organizations, female athletes have been
traditionally barred from participating in international tournaments, either by the
country’s sport agencies or by their husbands. There were, however, cases
throughout the year of female athletes being permitted to travel internationally to
compete.
Children
The country established the National Body on the Convention on the Rights of the
Child in 2012 to promote the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which it is
a signatory. The Ministry of Justice oversees the body, which reviews draft
regulations and legislation relating to children’s rights.
The country last underwent a periodic panel review by the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child in 2016. The review noted many concerns, including
discrimination against girls; children with disabilities; unregistered, refugee, and
migrant children; and LGBTI minors.
There is a separate juvenile court system. Male juvenile detainees were held in
separate rehabilitation centers in most urban areas, but female juvenile detainees
and male juvenile detainees in rural areas were held alongside adults in detention
facilities, according to NGO reports presented to the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child. (See section 1.c. for the situation of children held in prison with their
incarcerated mothers.)
Birth Registration: Only a child’s father conveys citizenship, regardless of the
child’s country of birth or mother’s citizenship. Birth within the country’s borders
does not confer citizenship, except when a child is born to unknown parents. The
law requires that all births be registered within 15 days.
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Education: Although primary schooling until age 11 is free and compulsory for
all, media and other sources reported lower enrollment in rural areas, especially for
girls.
Children without state-issued identification cards are denied the right to education.
In her March report, UNSR Jahangir noted that in Sistan va Baluchistan Province,
the Cabinet of Ministers requested the Ministry of Education to issue a special card
for children without birth certificates so they could attend school. As a result,
more than 20,000 children who had received such cards registered for school and
19,000 were allowed to attend.
Child Abuse: There was little information available on how the government dealt
with child abuse. The law states, “Any form of abuse of children and juveniles that
causes physical, psychological, or moral harm and threatens their physical or
mental health is prohibited,” and such crimes carry a maximum sentence of three
months in confinement or 10 million rials ($235).
Early and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age of marriage for girls is 13, but
girls as young as nine years old may be married with permission from the court and
their fathers. In 2017 UNICEF reported that 17 percent of girls in the country were
married before reaching age 18 and that approximately 40,000 were married before
15. In her March report, UNSR Jahangir stated this number was likely higher, as
thousands of underage marriages were not reported. The UNSR also previously
cited statistics from the Tehran-based Association to Protect the Rights of
Children, according to which 17 percent of all marriages in the country involved
girls married to “old men.”
Sexual Exploitation of Children: The legal age requirements for consensual sex
are the same as those for marriage, as sex outside of marriage is illegal. There are
no specific laws regarding child sexual exploitation, with such crimes either falling
under the category of child abuse or sexual crimes of adultery. The law does not
directly address sexual molestation nor provide a punishment for it.
In July, according to media reports, a supervisor at a private boys’ school in
Tehran was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 80 lashes for sexually abusing
students at the school. Tehran Prosecutor Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi was reported by
the press saying the parents of 15 students had complained that their children were
raped or otherwise sexually abused.
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According to the CHRI, the legal ambiguity between child abuse and sexual
molestation could lead to child sexual molestation cases being prosecuted under
adultery law. While no separate provision exists for the rape of a child, the crime
of rape, regardless of the victim’s age, is potentially punishable by death.
Displaced Children: There were thousands of Afghan refugee children in the
country, many of whom were born in Iran but could not obtain identity documents.
These children were often unable to attend schools or access basic government
services and were vulnerable to labor exploitation and trafficking.
In its 2016 report, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted continued
“allegations of abuse and ill treatment of refugee and asylum-seeking children by
police and security forces.” UNHCR stated that school enrollment among refugees
was generally higher outside camps and settlements, where greater resources were
available.
International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the
Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-
Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data.html.
Anti-Semitism
The law recognizes Jews as a religious minority and provides for their
representation in parliament. According to the 2011 census, the Jewish community
numbered approximately 8,700. Government officials continued to question the
history of the Holocaust, and anti-Semitism remained a pervasive problem. In
November President Rouhani called Israel a “cancerous tumor” and a “fake
regime.”
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at
www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
Persons with Disabilities
In March parliament adopted the Law for the Protection of the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities. According to HRW, the law increases pensions and extends
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insurance coverage to disability-related healthcare services, but the new law does
not explicitly prohibit discrimination. No information was available regarding
authorities’ effectiveness in enforcing the law. The law prohibits those with visual,
hearing, or speech disabilities from running for seats in parliament. While the law
provides for government-funded vocational education for persons with disabilities,
domestic news reports noted vocational centers were located only in urban areas
and unable to meet the needs of the entire population.
As HRWreported, persons with disabilities remained cut off from society. They
continued to face stigma and discrimination from government social workers,
health-care workers, and others. Many persons with disabilities remained trapped
in their homes, unable to live independently and participate in society on an equal
basis. The law provides for public accessibility to government-funded buildings,
and new structures appeared to comply with these standards. There were efforts to
increase access for persons with disabilities to historical sites. Government
buildings that predated existing accessibility standards remained largely
inaccessible, and general building accessibility for persons with disabilities
remained a problem. Persons with disabilities had limited access to informational,
educational, and community activities. CHRI reported that refugees with
disabilities, particularly children, were often excluded or denied the ability to
obtain the limited state services provided by the government. CHRI also reported
that, according to the director of the State Welfare Organization, 60 percent of
persons with disabilities remained unemployed.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The constitution grants equal rights to all ethnic minorities, allowing minority
languages to be used in the media. Article 101 of the Charter on Citizens’ Rights
grants the right of citizens to learn, use, and teach their own languages and dialects.
In practice minorities did not enjoy equal rights, and the government consistently
barred use of their languages in school as the language of instruction.
The government disproportionately targeted minority groups, including Kurds,
Ahwazis, Azeris, and Baluchis, for arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention,
disappearances, and physical abuse. In its 2016 panel review on the country, the
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child reported “widespread discrimination
against children of ethnic minorities,” as well as “reported targeted arrests,
detentions, imprisonments, killings, torture, and executions against such groups by
the law enforcement and judicial authorities.”
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These ethnic minority groups reported political and socioeconomic discrimination,
particularly in their access to economic aid, business licenses, university
admissions, job opportunities, permission to publish books, and housing and land
rights.
Another widespread complaint among ethnic minority groups during the year,
particularly among Ahwazis, Azeris and Lors, was that the government diverted
and mismanaged natural resources, primarily water, often for the benefit of IRGCaffiliated
contractors. According to reports from international media and human
rights groups, these practices had devastated the local environment on which
farmers and others depended for their livelihoods and well-being, resulting in
forced migration and further marginalization of these communities. Throughout
the year the government forcefully cracked down on environment-related protests
that were largely centered in these ethnic minority communities. According to
international media reports, in July the government forcefully suppressed protests
over the scarcity of clean water in Khorramshahr, Khuzestan Province. Hundreds
were arrested and at least four protesters were reported killed after security forces
opened fire on the crowd.
The law, which requires religious screening and allegiance to the concept of
“governance by the jurist,” not found in Sunni Islam, impaired the ability of Sunni
Muslims (many of whom are also Baluch, Ahwazi, or Kurdish) to integrate into
civic life and to work in certain fields.
Human rights organizations observed that the government’s application of the
death penalty disproportionately affected ethnic minorities. Authorities reportedly
subjected members of minority ethnicities and religious groups in pretrial detention
repeatedly to more severe physical punishment, including torture, than other
prisoners, regardless of the type of crime for which authorities accused them.
The estimated eight million ethnic Kurds in the country frequently campaigned for
greater regional autonomy. The government continued to use the law to arrest and
prosecute Kurds for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and
association. The government reportedly banned Kurdish-language newspapers,
journals, and books and punished publishers, journalists, and writers for opposing
and criticizing government policies.
Authorities suppressed legitimate activities of Kurdish NGOs by denying them
registration permits or bringing security charges against persons working with such
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organizations. Authorities did not prohibit the use of the Kurdish language in
general.
Amnesty International reported on the forced disappearances of five Kurdish men
in June 2017. According to the report, Ramin Hossein Panahi, an alleged member
of the Komala armed opposition group, was arrested after taking part in an armed
clash with the IRGC in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province. IRGC guards then arrested
Panahi’s brother and three other relatives, none of whom were reported to be
involved with the armed clashes. After Ramin Panahi was sentenced to death in
January 2018, he lived under the threat of an immediate execution while
imprisoned in Sanandaj Central Prison. In August CHRI reported that Panahi had
sewn his lips shut and gone on a hunger strike to protest the denial of his rights by
prison authorities. The UN’s special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary executions, Agnes Callamard, said that Panahi was denied access to a
lawyer and a fair trial and that he was mistreated and tortured in detention.
According to media reports, Panahi’s torture including severe beatings, having his
fingernails removed, and his head and body subjected to electric shocks. On
September 8, authorities executed Panahi, along with two cousins, Zaniar and
Loghman Moradi. International NGOs widely condemned the executions,
claiming the prisoners had been tortured and sentenced to death following unfair
trials based on forced confessions.
In April, according to international media reports and Kurdish rights groups, there
were widespread peaceful protests and demonstrations over the government’s
closure of the Baneh border crossing with Iraq, a vital conduit for trade with
northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region. The government had also blocked since
December 2017 the passes that Kurdish porters used to carry goods back and forth
across the border. Rights groups said a number of Iranian Kurds were arrested and
the internet was blocked during the protests.
International human rights observers, including the IHRDC, stated that the
country’s estimated two million Ahwazi Arabs, representing 110 tribes, faced
continued oppression and discrimination. Ahwazi rights activists reported the
government continued to confiscate Ahwazi property to use for government
development projects, refusing to recognize the paper deeds of the local population
from the prerevolutionary era.
In March thousands of Ahwazis gathered in Ahwaz and in cities across Khuzestan
Province to protest against state-sanctioned discriminatory policies. The protests
were in part triggered when IRIB excluded the community’s cultural identity in an
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Iranian New Year television show that was supposed to highlight the country’s
diversity. The protesters’ peaceful demands for an apology from IRIB were met
by a violent crackdown from government security forces. According to reports
from Ahwazi rights groups and eyewitness accounts, at least 400 Ahwazis were
unjustly arrested in cities across Khuzestan Province.
Ahwazi human rights groups reported that the government rounded up hundreds of
Ahwazis following the September attack on a military parade in Ahwaz (estimates
reported in November ranged from 600 to more than 800 arrests), while the staterun
Tasnim news agency reported the arrest of 22 in connection with the attack
(see section 1.a.). Ahwazi human rights groups also reported instances of torture
of detainees in the Intelligence Ministry detention center in Ahwaz.
Ethnic Azeris, who number more than 18 million, or approximately 23-25 percent
of the population, were more integrated into government and society than other
ethnic minority groups and included the supreme leader. Azeris reported that the
government discriminated against them by harassing Azeri activists or organizers
and changing Azeri geographic names.
According to international media reports and Azeri human rights groups, in July
authorities arrested at least 50 Azeris days ahead of an annual gathering at Fort
Babak in Eastern Azerbaijan Province and threatened others. According to reports,
the government has tried to prevent thousands of Iranians, mostly Azeri speaking
activists, from meeting every year at Babak Fortress to peacefully celebrate the
birthday of a historic figure, Babak Khorramdin. The annual gathering has general
overtones of Azeri nationalism.
Local and international human rights groups alleged discrimination during the year
against the Baluchi ethnic minority, estimated at between 1.5 and two million
persons. Areas with large Baluchi populations were severely underdeveloped and
had limited access to education, employment, health care, and housing, and
Baluchi activists reported that more than 70 percent of the population lived below
the poverty line.
According to activist reports, the law limited Sunni Baluchis’ employment
opportunities and political participation. Activists reported that throughout the
year, the government sent hundreds of Shia missionaries to areas with large Sunni
Baluch populations to try to convert the local population. According to Baluchi
rights activists, Baluchi journalists and human rights activists faced arbitrary arrest,
physical abuse, and unfair trials. In February Baloch Activists Campaign (BAC)
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told CHRI that law enforcement agents had shot and killed at least 20 ethnic
Baluchis and wounded 19 while allegedly pursuing suspected traffickers in Sistan
va Baluchestan Province. According to BAC, government forces acted with
impunity, with little provided in terms of justification for the deaths or means of
restitution provided to victims’ families.
See section 2.b. for information on mass arrests of Gonabadi Sufi dervishes.
Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity
The law criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual activity, which is punishable by
death, flogging, or a lesser punishment. The law does not distinguish between
consensual and nonconsensual same-sex intercourse, and NGOs reported this lack
of clarity led to both the victim and the perpetrator being held criminally liable
under the law in cases of assault. The law does not prohibit discrimination based
on sexual orientation and gender identity.
Security forces harassed, arrested, and detained individuals they suspected of being
LGBTI. In some cases security forces raided houses and monitored internet sites
for information on LGBTI persons. Those accused of “sodomy” often faced
summary trials, and evidentiary standards were not always met. The Iranian
LGBTI activist group 6Rang noted that individuals arrested under such conditions
were traditionally subjected to forced anal or sodomy examinations, which the
United Nations and World Health Organization said can constitute torture, and
other degrading treatment and sexual insults. Punishment for same-sex sexual
activity between men was more severe than between women. UNSR Jahangir
reported in March receiving reports of the continued discrimination, harassment,
arbitrary arrest and detention, punishment, and denial of rights of LGBTI persons.
The government censored all materials related to LGBTI status or conduct.
Authorities particularly blocked websites or content within sites that discussed
LGBTI issues, including the censorship of Wikipedia pages defining LGBTI and
other related topics. There were active, unregistered LGBTI NGOs in the country.
Hate crime laws or other criminal justice mechanisms did not exist to aid in the
prosecution of bias-motivated crimes.
The law requires all male citizens older than age 18 to serve in the military but
exempts gay men and transgender women, who are classified as having mental
disorders. New military identity cards listed the subsection of the law dictating the
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exemption. According to 6Rang, this practice identified gay or transgender
individuals and put them at risk of physical abuse and discrimination.
NGOs reported that authorities pressured LGBTI persons to undergo gender
reassignment surgery.
According to a May report by 6Rang, the number of private and semigovernmental
psychological and psychiatric clinics allegedly engaging in “corrective treatment”
of LGBTI persons continued to grow during the year. 6Rang reported the
increased use at such clinics of electric shock therapy to the hands and genitals of
LGBTI persons, prescription of psychoactive medication, hypnosis, and coercive
masturbation to pictures of the opposite sex. Many of these practices may
constitute torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under
international law. According to the report, one such institution is called “The
Anonymous Sex Addicts Association of Iran,” with branches in 18 provinces.
HIV and AIDS Social Stigma
Despite government programs to treat and provide financial and other assistance to
persons with HIV/AIDS, international news sources and organizations reported
that individuals known to be infected with HIV/AIDS faced widespread societal
discrimination. Individuals with HIV/AIDS, for example, continued to be denied
employment as teachers.
Section 7.Worker Rights
a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
The constitution provides for freedom of association, but neither the constitution
nor law specifies trade union rights. The law states that workers may establish an
Islamic labor council or a guild at any workplace, but the rights and responsibilities
of these organizations fell significantly short of international standards for trade
unions. In workplaces where workers established an Islamic labor council,
authorities did not permit any other form of worker representation. The law
requires prior authorization for organizing and concluding collective agreements.
Strikes are prohibited in all sectors, although private sector workers may conduct
“peaceful” campaigns within the workplace. The law does not apply to
establishments with fewer than 10 employees.
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Authorities did not respect freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining, and the government did not effectively enforce applicable laws. The
government severely restricted freedom of association and interfered in worker
attempts to organize. Labor activism was seen as a national security offense. The
law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination and does not require reinstatement
of workers fired for union activity. Antiunion discrimination occurred, and the
government imprisoned, harassed, and restricted the activities of labor activists.
The Interior Ministry; the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare;
and the Islamic Information Organization determined labor councils’ constitutions,
operational rules, and election procedures. Administrative and judicial procedures
were lengthy. The Workers’ House remained the only officially authorized
national labor organization, and its leadership oversaw, granted permits to, and
coordinated activities with Islamic labor councils in industrial, agricultural, and
service organizations with more than 35 employees.
According to CHRI, the labor councils, which consisted of representatives of
workers and a representative of management, were essentially management-run
unions that undermined workers’ efforts to maintain independent unions. The
councils, nevertheless, sometimes could block layoffs and dismissals. There was
no representative workers’ organization for noncitizen workers.
According to international media reports, security forces continued to respond to
workers’ attempts to organize or conduct strikes with arbitrary arrests and
violence. As economic conditions deteriorated, strikes and worker protests were
numerous and widespread across the country throughout the year, often prompting
a heavy police response. Security forces routinely monitored major worksites.
According to CHRI, workers were routinely fired and risked arrest for striking, and
labor leaders were charged with national security crimes for trying to organize
workers.
CHRI reported that following protests in previous months, in June more than 60
workers at the Iran National Steel Industrial Group in Ahwaz, Khuzestan Province,
were arrested for demanding their salaries, which had not been paid in three
months. The Free Workers Union of Iran characterized the actions of security
forces as a “barbaric raid” in the night.
According to a CHRI report, in August security forces violently suppressed
protests at the Haft Tappeh sugarcane company in the southeast. Haft Tappeh, the
country’s largest sugar production plant, had been the site of ongoing protests
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against unpaid wages and benefits for more than two years. Haft Tappeh’s
employees, according to media reports in August, had not received any salary since
May. According to CHRI, at least five workers were detained and charged with
national security crimes but later released on bail following negotiations between
labor representatives and judicial officials. In November, however, HRW reported
that authorities had arrested all members of Haft Tappeh’s association of labor
representatives, including Esmael Bakhshi and Mohsen Armand, two of the
group’s prominent leaders.
According to NGO and media reports, as in previous years, a number of trade
unionists were imprisoned or remained unjustly detained for their peaceful
activism. Mehdi Farahi Shandiz, a member of the Committee to Pursue the
Establishment of Labor Unions in Iran, continued serving a three-year sentence,
having been convicted of “insulting the supreme leader” and “disrupting public
order.” There were reports that Shandiz was beaten and tortured in Karaj Prison
and kept for prolonged periods in solitary confinement.
The government continued to arrest and harass teachers’ rights activists from the
Teachers Association of Iran and related unions. In November HRW reported on
the government’s mounting crackdown against teachers participating in peaceful
protests. HRW noted that the Telegram channel of the Council for Coordination
among Teachers Unions reported the arrest of at least 12 teachers and the
interrogation of 30 more. CHRI reported that IRGC agents arrested and beat
teacher and trade union activist Mohammad Habibi in front of his students at
Andisheh Technical High School in Shahriar in March. Habibi was sentenced to
10 and one-half years in prison. According to a CHRI report, Mahmoud Beheshti-
Langroudi, the former spokesman for the Iranian Teachers’ Trade Association
(ITTA), was incarcerated in Evin Prison in 2017 to begin serving a 14-year
combined sentence for charges associated with his peaceful defense of labor rights.
CHRI reported in July that Beheshti-Langroudi had commenced another hunger
strike protesting his unjust sentence, the judiciary’s refusal to review his case, and
the mistreatment of political prisoners.
According to reports from international media and human rights organizations,
truck drivers launched nationwide strikes over low and unpaid wages throughout
the year. HRANA reported that the government arrested at least 261 drivers in 19
provinces following a round of protests in September and October. The drivers
were threatened with heavy sentences, and Attorney General Mohammad Jaafar
Montazeri issued a public statement suggesting that those who initiated the protest
should be subject to the death penalty. In October the International Transport
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Workers’ Federation expressed concern over the government’s harsh crackdown
on labor action by truckers across the country, including the threat of the death
penalty against organizers.
Esmail Abdi, a mathematics teacher and former secretary general of ITTA,
continued serving a six-year prison sentence for labor rights activism. He was
arrested in 2015 and convicted in 2016 for “propaganda against the state” and
“collusion against national security.” CHRI reported in April that Abdi had written
a letter from Evin Prison criticizing the judiciary’s “arbitrary and illegal rulings”
and “widespread violations of the rights of teachers and workers in Iran.” He
decried the “criminalization of trade unions” and demanded a public trial that he
had thus far been denied.
b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor, but the government did
not effectively enforce the law and made no significant effort to address forced
labor during the year. Conditions indicative of forced labor sometimes occurred in
the construction, domestic labor, and agricultural sectors, primarily among adult
Afghan men. Family members and others forced children to work.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at
www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
The law prohibits employment of minors younger than age 15 and places
restrictions on employment of minors younger than 18, such as prohibiting hard
labor or night work. The law does not apply to domestic labor and permits
children to work in agriculture and some small businesses from the age of 12. The
government did not adequately monitor or enforce laws pertaining to child labor,
and child labor remained a serious problem.
In its 2016 concluding observations, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
cited a 2003 law that exempts workshops with fewer than 10 employees from labor
regulations as increasing the risks of economic exploitation of children. It also
noted serious concerns with the large number of children employed under
hazardous conditions, such as in garbage collection, brick kilns, and industrial
workshops, without protective clothing and for very low pay.
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There were reportedly significant numbers of children, especially of Afghan
descent, who worked as street vendors in major urban areas. According to official
estimates, there were 60,000 homeless children, although many children’s rights
organizations estimated up to 200,000 homeless children. The Committee on the
Rights of the Child reported that street children in particular were subjected to
various forms of economic exploitation, including sexual abuse and exploitation by
the public and police officers. Child labor also was used in the production of
carpets and bricks. Children worked as beggars, and there were reports that
criminals forced some children into begging rings. Reza Ghadimi, the managing
director of the Tehran Social Services Organization, was quoted by ISNA saying
that, according to a survey of 400 child laborers, 90 percent were “molested.”
In September HRANA reported a Hamedan city councilman saying 550 child
dumpster divers were active in Hamedan. They were reportedly employed by
contractors paid by the city and were expected to collect an average of 170 pounds
of recyclables daily, while deprived of all labor rights.
d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation
The constitution bars discrimination based on race, gender, disability, language,
and social status “in conformity with Islamic criteria,” but the government did not
effectively enforce these prohibitions. According to the constitution, “everyone
has the right to choose any occupation he wishes, if it is not contrary to Islam and
the public interests and does not infringe on the rights of others.”
Despite this constitutional provision, the government made systematic efforts to
limit women’s access to the workplace. An Interior Ministry directive requires all
officials to hire only secretaries of their own gender. Women remained banned
from working in coffee houses and from performing music alongside men, with
very limited exceptions made for traditional music. Women in many fields were
restricted from working after 9 p.m. Hiring practices often discriminated against
women, and the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare guidelines
stated that men should be given preferential hiring status.
e. Acceptable Conditions ofWork
In March the Supreme Labor Council, the government body charged with
proposing labor regulations, agreed to raise the minimum wage by 19.8 percent to
approximately 11 million rials ($265) per month. There were reported complaints
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that the minimum wage increase was too low in light of the plunging value of the
Iranian rial against the U.S. dollar, which is used to price day-to-day goods.
The law establishes a maximum six-day, 44-hour workweek with a weekly rest
day, at least 12 days of paid annual leave, and several paid public holidays. Any
hours worked above that total entitles a worker to overtime. The law mandates a
payment above the hourly wage to employees for any accrued overtime and
provides that overtime work is not compulsory. The law does not cover workers in
workplaces with fewer than 10 workers, nor does it apply to noncitizens.
Employers sometimes subjected migrant workers, most often Afghans, to abusive
working conditions, including below-minimum-wage salaries, nonpayment of
wages, compulsory overtime, and summary deportation without access to food,
water, or sanitation facilities during the deportation process.
According to media reports, many workers continued to be employed on temporary
contracts, under which they lacked protections available to full-time, noncontract
workers and could be dismissed at any time without cause. Large numbers of
workers employed in small workplaces or in the informal economy similarly
lacked basic protections. Low wages, nonpayment of wages, and lack of job
security due to contracting practices continued to be major drivers for strikes and
protests, which occurred throughout the year.
According to local and international media reports, thousands of teachers, truckers,
and workers from a wide variety of backgrounds and industries held largescale,
countrywide rallies and protests demanding wage increases and payment of back
wages throughout the year. Reports noted that these protests often drew a violent
response from security forces, leading to numerous arrests.
Little information was available regarding labor inspection and related law
enforcement. While the law provides for occupational health and safety standards,
the government sometimes did not enforce these standards in either the formal or
informal sectors. Workers reportedly lacked the power to remove themselves from
situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardizing their
employment.
Labor organizations alleged that hazardous work environments resulted in the
deaths of thousands of workers annually. The state-run Iran Labor News Agency
quoted the head of the Construction Workers Association, saying every year there
were 1,200 deaths and 1,500 spinal cord injuries among construction workers,
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while local media routinely reported on workers’ deaths from explosions, gas
poisoning, electrocution, or similar accidents.
Annex 77
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its seventy-ninth session, 21-25 August 2017
Opinion No. 49/2017 concerning Siamak Namazi and Mohammed
Baquer Namazi (Islamic Republic of Iran)
1. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights, which extended and clarified the Working Group’s
mandate in its resolution 1997/50. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251 and
Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The mandate of the Working Group was most recently extended for a threeyear
period in Council resolution 33/30 of 30 September 2016.
2. In accordance with its methods of work (A/HRC/33/66), on 23 May 2017 the
Working Group transmitted to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran a
communication concerning Siamak Namazi and Mohammed Baquer Namazi. The
Government has not replied to the communication. The State is a party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3. The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following
cases:
(a) When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or
her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b) When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22,
25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c) When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating
to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity
as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d) When asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or
remedy (category IV);
(e) When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of
human beings (category V).
United Nations A/HRC/WGAD/2017/49
General Assembly Distr.: General
22 September 2017
Original: English
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Submissions
Communication from the source
4. Siamak Namazi, born in 1971, is an Iranian-American dual citizen. Born in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, he was naturalized and became an American citizen in 1993. He
usually resides in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
5. The source reports that Siamak Namazi has lived in numerous countries, including
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America, and that he moved to the
United Arab Emirates in 2007. Also in 2007, he was recognized by the World Economic
Forum as a Young Global Leader. He most recently worked as head of strategic planning
for the Middle East and North Africa region at a petroleum company in Dubai from 2013 to
2015. He has reportedly never engaged in politics.
Interrogations, arrest and detention of Siamak Namazi
6. According to the source, on 18 July 2015, Mr. Namazi was intercepted on his way
into Tehran airport by officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps dressed in civilian
clothes. He intended to travel back to the United Arab Emirates after a weekend visit with
his parents in Tehran. The Revolutionary Guard officers momentarily showed him a
document that they claimed to be a search warrant and order preventing him from leaving
the country. In the few seconds that he was able to read the document, he reportedly saw
the phrase “collaboration with the Young Global Leaders”.
7. The officers reportedly escorted Mr. Namazi to a parked car in the airport car park
and forced him into the back seat. They then questioned him for several hours. All of his
electronic devices, including his laptop computer, tablet and mobile devices were
immediately confiscated, and his United States and Iranian passports were seized. When the
officers had finished their questioning, they told Mr. Namazi that they would “keep in
touch” and instructed him not to leave Tehran. They gave him a handwritten receipt of the
confiscated items.
8. The source reports that, for the following three months, Siamak Namazi was
interrogated regularly by officers of the Revolutionary Guard. He would receive an
anonymous telephone call instructing him of a time and place to present himself. The time
and frequency of the interrogations were unpredictable. At first, interrogations happened
nearly every day, then only two or three times per week. Sometimes, several days would
pass without an interrogation. The interrogations reportedly took place in private meetings
at an unmarked location, and the primary focus of the questioning was Mr. Namazi’s
association with the West. The officers reportedly accused him of being a spy for the West
and would repeatedly tell him to “prove your innocence” and “admit it”. On several
occasions, the officers reportedly staged an arrest scene to scare him. While he was being
questioned, they would arrange for screeching tyre sounds outside and would tell him he
was going to be taken to prison.
9. According to the source, Mr. Namazi had hired an attorney to represent him, but the
lawyer’s ability to defend him was severely limited. He was reportedly told that it was an
official policy that anyone accused of a crime related to national security may only be
represented by an “approved lawyer”. He repeatedly asked to see the list of approved
lawyers, but was ultimately never shown the purported list. As a result, he did not have a
lawyer who could be present with him during any of the interrogations.
10. The source reports that Mr. Namazi was arrested on 13 October 2015 by officers of
the Revolutionary Guard for alleged espionage and collusion with an enemy State without
presenting any formal evidence or warrant. He was reportedly arrested at an interrogation
location where he had been reporting regularly for the previous three months. The source
notes that, while it is possible that Mr. Namazi was briefly shown a document regarding the
purported legal basis for his arrest at the time of his indictment, his lawyers have not had
access to such a document. The indictment reportedly occurred in secret and no documents
have been made public or provided to his lawyers.
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11. According to the source, since the date of the arrest, Mr. Namazi has been held in
ward 2A of Evin Prison, which is under the control of the Revolutionary Guard. The source
reports that exact charges, with specific references to Iranian law, were not presented to his
family or lawyers during his pretrial detention. The source notes that, while it is possible
that such charges were provided to Mr. Namazi privately during his detention, this is not
likely. He has been detained since his reported conviction for “collaboration with a hostile
Government”, in reference to the United States. The legislation later applied to his
conviction was article 508 of the Islamic Penal Code, which states that anyone who
cooperates by any means with foreign States against the Islamic Republic of Iran, if not
considered a mohareb (enemy of God), shall be sentenced to 1 to 10 years’ imprisonment.
Arrest and detention of Mohammed Baquer Namazi
12. Mohammed Baquer Namazi, born in 1936, is an Iranian-American dual citizen. He
is married and is the father of Siamak Namazi. He usually resides in Tehran.
13. The source reports that Baquer Namazi had been Governor of the Iranian province
of Khuzestan under the Shah. When the Government was overthrown in 1979, he left the
Government and continued to live in the Islamic Republic of Iran for several years. Facing
mounting pressure, he reportedly fled the country in 1983 and ultimately settled in the
United States, where he was naturalized and took citizenship. He reportedly dedicated the
rest of his career to the eradication of poverty. From 1984 to 1997, he served as a
representative of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and worked in various
countries, focusing on vulnerable people and the provision of aid for women and children
affected by war. He retired from his UNICEF work in 1997, but continued to work for the
eradication of poverty as a civil society volunteer.
14. The source reports that Mr. Namazi reportedly attempted to visit his son at Evin
Prison two to three times each week after his arrest and imprisonment, but was never
granted access, even when he had letters from prison officials granting him the right to see
his son.
15. On or about 21 February 2016, while travelling to see other family members in
Dubai, Baquer Namazi’s wife received a call from Evin Prison informing her that special
permission had been granted for Baquer Namazi to visit his son, but that the permission
was valid only for a visit on 24 February 2016. At the same time, it had been reported that
Siamak Namazi had started a hunger strike. Baquer Namazi quickly changed his travel
plans to return to Tehran.
16. The source reports that Baquer Namazi was arrested at the passport control office of
Tehran airport on his arrival there on 22 February 2016. He was reportedly intercepted by
approximately seven or eight members of the Revolutionary Guard. He was then
interrogated by officers of the Revolutionary Guard and escorted to his home, which was
searched extensively.
17. According to the source, the officers of the Revolutionary Guard did not show an
arrest warrant issued by a judicial authority. While searching his house, they presented a
document that they alleged to be a search warrant and authorization to present Mr. Namazi
to a magistrate, but this could not be verified as there was no lawyer present and a copy of
the document has never been provided. Regardless, the source highlights that the document
was not an arrest warrant and, in fact, the officers guards reportedly assured Mr. Namazi
and his wife that he was not being arrested. During the search, the guards reportedly
confiscated Mr. Namazi’s personal electronic devices, his passports and various personal
photographs and documents. Days later, copies of many of the photographs were reportedly
broadcast by the Iranian State media in coverage connected to the case.
18. Throughout the search, Baquer Namazi asked about his son, but the guards
reportedly refused to give him any information. Mr. Namazi was taken to Evin Prison the
same night and brought into the same Revolutionary Guard-controlled wing as his son. A
few days after his arrest, Mr. Namazi left a message on the home answering machine — the
first contact since his arrest — wherein he asked that the family keep his arrest quiet and
conveyed that he was facing the same broad charges as his son.
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19. The source notes that, while it is possible that Baquer Namazi was verbally told that
he was being arrested on charges of collaboration with the United States, no special legal
basis was presented in writing to him at the time of the arrest or later during his detention.
20. According to the source, the authorities have subsequently imputed alleged
espionage and collusion with an enemy State as the reasons for Mr. Namazi’s arrest without
presenting any formal evidence. The authorities did not present any exact charges during
the pretrial detention. He has been detained since his reported conviction for “collaboration
with a hostile Government”, in reference to the United States, under the same article 508 of
the Islamic Penal Code.
21. At the time of the submission by the source, Mr. Namazi continued to be held in
Ward 2A of Evin Prison.
Trial and appeal
22. According to the source, the first and only hearing at the trial level occurred early in
October 2016: on 1 October for Siamak Namazi and on 5 October for Baquer Namazi. Both
hearings were reportedly secret and excluded members of the press and the public from
attending. The hearings took place before the Head of the 15th Branch of the Islamic
Revolutionary Court in Tehran, who is allegedly well known for meting out harsh sentences
on political cases.
23. Before the hearings, Messrs. Namazi had extremely limited access to legal
representation. They were reportedly only allowed to meet with their attorneys for 30
minutes a few days before the hearing, despite numerous attempts to meet beforehand. The
attorneys were only provided with access to court files and evidence a few days in advance
of the trials, making it practically impossible to prepare a meaningful defence. Furthermore,
they were only allowed to view the files and were not able to make or retain their own
copies. It is reportedly unknown whether such files were even complete.
24. According to the source, the trial hearings only lasted around two hours, during
which time Messrs. Namazis were reportedly denied fundamental due process rights. They
were not allowed to present any evidence or call witnesses and were denied the opportunity
to challenge any charges or evidence meaningfully, despite the fact that the Revolutionary
Guard had been conducting relentless interrogations for months in advance and without
allowing access to legal representation.
25. On 17 October 2016, both individuals were reportedly sentenced to 10 years in
prison on the charges of “collusion with an enemy State”, in reference to the United States.
This is reportedly the maximum possible penalty that can be imposed for those criminal
offences under article 508 of the Islamic Penal Code. No written copy of the verdicts has
been provided to the Namazis. At the same time, Revolutionary Guard-affiliated websites
and media reportedly ran a continuous negative campaign against the two men, calling
them United States “infiltrators” and showing copies of their passports and photographs,
which had been taken from the family’s house by officers of the Revolutionary Guard.
26. According to the source, Messrs. Namazis immediately appealed the convictions and
sentences, but could only do so in the most general sense as they had no access to any of
the evidence or the final verdict of the trial court.
27. The source reports that an appeal hearing took place on 1 March 2017 before the
36th Branch of the Appeals Court, during which both cases were considered. In total, the
hearing only lasted two to three hours. Siamak Namazi was reportedly brought to the
hearing late because the guards escorting him claimed they had got lost, although the
sources allege this was likely to be a deliberate attempt to undermine the appeal process.
The judge did not reschedule or extend the hearing to make up for lost time. As a result,
Baquer Namazi’s case was considered for approximately two hours, while that of Siamak
Namazi was only considered for 30 to 45 minutes.
28. According to the source, the appeal was supposed to have been heard by a panel of
three judges, but only one judge was actually present. Press and the public were also barred
from the appeal hearing. There is reportedly no indication as to when the Appeals Court
might issue a decision.
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Current conditions
29. According to the source, the Namazis are being held in Ward 2A of Evin Prison.
This is a special wing of the prison that is controlled solely by the Revolutionary Guard and
allegedly operates with no semblance of transparency or legality. Siamak Namazi has
reportedly been intimidated and has continually undergone lengthy interrogations by
officers of the Revolutionary Guard, even after his conviction. He continues to be subjected
to extended periods of solitary confinement. His cell is dark, cold and damp and lacks even
a bed, forcing him to sleep on the concrete floor. He was initially not provided with warm
clothing, even as temperatures dropped in winter. He has allegedly been tortured by the
officers and has been beaten, tazered and forced to watch government propaganda attacking
him and showing his father in prison.
30. According to information received, Mr. Namazi has also been told at times that his
father is gravely ill and has been taken to the hospital. Mr. Namazi reportedly started a
hunger strike during his incarceration and has already lost approximately 12 kilograms
during his time in detention. Despite reporting ailments to the Revolutionary Guard
officers, he has not received medical treatment. The source reports that the physical and
mental suffering intentionally inflicted on Mr. Namazi, combined with his extended
isolation, have caused his mental and physical well-being to deteriorate. His conversations
with his family members have made them seriously concerned that he may now be suicidal.
31. Baquer Namazi, who is 81 years old, has reportedly been held in similarly harsh
prison conditions, including extensive periods of solitary confinement. He suffers from
serious heart conditions, including arrhythmia, which require him to take special
medications. He has previously undergone triple bypass surgery owing to his heart
condition. He has lost at least 14 kilograms since being imprisoned and his energy is greatly
diminished. The source reports that, in a highly unusual move that demonstrates the
severity of his current condition, the Revolutionary Guard transferred Mr. Namazi to an
external hospital for a period of several days on two separate occasions since his arrest,
without providing any explanation to his family. On 8 April 2017, he had a Holter monitor
attached to him. It is reportedly possible that he requires a pacemaker owing to his
arrhythmia — which had been noted as a forthcoming medical issue by his personal
physician prior to his arrest and detention — and now requires immediate medical
attention. The family of Mr. Namazi has requested urgently that his own heart specialist be
allowed to see him, but that request has not been granted, and the Office of the State
Medical Examiner has informed the family that it may take “a few months” for them to
conduct a medical review of his case.
32. The Namazis have reportedly been detained with extremely limited access to their
family members for more than a year. They have until recently only been allowed visitors
once a month, while other detainees in the same section of the prison are reportedly allowed
to have weekly visits. Furthermore, they have only been allowed to receive visits from the
mother of Siamak Namazi, who is the wife of Baquer Namazi. The monthly visit to Baquer
Namazi has lasted roughly 45 minutes, and Siamak Namazi receives one visit per month
lasting only 15 to 20 minutes. Prior to 28 February 2017, the father and son had been
prohibited from seeing each other, despite the fact that they were being held in the same
section of the prison.
Categories of the Working Group
33. The source asserts that the detention of Messrs. Namazi constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of their liberty under categories II and III of the categories applicable to the
cases under consideration by the Working Group.
Category II
34. The source submits that the arrest and detention by the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran of the Namazis was a direct reprisal for exercising their right to freedom of
association. The source puts forward that their current detention is directly attributable to
their exercising the right to freedom of association, as the entire case against them has been
based on their association with Western organizations. Both individuals have United States
Annex 78
citizenship and have spent time working there. Siamak Namazi was educated in the United
States and has affiliations with several institutions based there. In addition, throughout the
interrogations, trial and conviction of Mr. Namazi, those affiliations were continuously
cited as a primary basis for the suspicions of the Government against him. The source
asserts that perhaps the clearest demonstration that the targeting of the Namazis stems from
their association with the West is the propaganda video posted online by the judicial news
service of the Islamic Republic of Iran roughly one year after the arrest of Siamak Namazi.
In it, images of his arrest are directly juxtaposed with an image of his United States
passport and “a montage of anti-American-themed images”.
Category III
35. The source submits that, due to the fact that the Government has violated numerous
procedural requirements under both international and domestic law in this case, the
continued detention of the Namazis is arbitrary under category III. According to the source,
the Government arrested the two men without a proper warrant; held them in harsh prison
conditions for months without charge; detained them with extremely limited access to their
family members; failed to provide an independent and impartial tribunal; failed to provide a
public hearing; interfered with their right to prepare a defence and call and examine
witnesses; and withheld all evidence from the defence. In addition, no valid or credible
evidence against them has been presented.
36. Furthermore, the Government interfered with their right to the presumption of
innocence; substantially limited their right to access to counsel; substantially limited their
right to an adequate appellate review according to law; and has continuously denied
medically appropriate detention conditions for the Namazis, constituting cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment. In that respect, the source notes that, without intervention, it is
unclear how much longer the Namazis can withstand the physical and psychological
distress imposed by the Revolutionary Guard. There is reportedly a great risk that the
suffering inflicted on the two men may cause irreversible damage to their physical and
mental health, or even death.
Response from the Government
37. On 23 May 2017 the Working Group transmitted the allegations from the source to
the Government under its regular communications procedure. The Working Group
requested the Government to provide, by 24 July 2017, detailed information about the
current situation of Mr. Siamak Namazi and Mr. Mohammed Baquer Namazi and any
comments on the source’s allegations.
38. The Working Group regrets that it did not receive a response from the Government,
nor did the Government request an extension of the time limit for its reply, as provided for
in the Working Group’s methods of work.
Discussion
39. In the absence of a response from the Government, the Working Group has decided
to render the present opinion, in conformity with paragraph 15 of its methods of work.
40. The Working Group has in its jurisprudence established the ways in which it deals
with evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of
international requirements constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be
understood to rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations (see
A/HRC/19/57, para. 68). In the present case, the Government has chosen not to challenge
the prima facie credible allegations made by the source.
41. The source has submitted that the detention of Messrs. Namazi falls under categories
II and III. The Working Group shall consider the allegations under the two categories in
turn.
42. The source has submitted that the detention of Messrs. Namazi falls under category
II as their detention was a direct reprisal for having exercised their right to freedom of
association in accordance with article 22 of the Covenant. The source has submitted that the
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affiliations of the Namazis with Western organizations was the sole reason for their arrest
and subsequent conviction as, throughout the interrogations, trial and conviction, those
affiliations were continuously cited as a primary basis for the suspicions of the Government
against them.
43. The Working Group notes that the present case follows a pattern that is evident to
the Working Group in the way that those affiliated with different pro-democracy
institutions of the West — especially those with dual nationality — are treated in the
Islamic Republic of Iran. The Working Group considers that the source has established a
prima facie case that the arrest and detention of the Namazis were motivated by a
discriminatory factor, namely, their status as dual Iranian-United States nationals and their
links with various organizations located outside of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
Working Group has considered several facts presented by the source that the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran has not disputed. First, Messrs. Namazi are being detained
on the basis of their conviction for “collaboration with a hostile Government”, in reference
to the United States, and their links with the United States and “Western organizations”
have been the main thrust of all interrogations and allegations. Second, throughout the
investigative stage of their trial, the sole focus of the authorities has been the past and
present affiliations of Messrs. Namazi with those various organizations, with specific
emphasis on their links with the United States. Third, a negative campaign was made public
by the Iranian media in October 2016 against the Namazis, stating them to be United States
“infiltrators” and showing copies of their passports and photographs, which had been taken
from the family’s house by the Revolutionary Guard.
44. The Working Group has made findings of arbitrary detention with respect to several
cases involving dual nationals in the Islamic Republic of Iran.1 In addition, the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran has referred in a
recent report to the detention of dual nationals (see A/71/418, paras. 36-38). The Working
Group considers that there is an emerging pattern involving the arbitrary deprivation of
liberty of dual nationals in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
45. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Siamak Namazi or Baquer Namazi had had a
criminal record, including in relation to national security offences, and there is nothing to
indicate that they had ever acted against the national interests of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. In fact, Siamak Namazi had been in the country for the sole purpose of visiting his
family, while Baquer Namazi was a retired resident of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
Working Group therefore considers that the Namazis were targeted on the basis of their
“national or social origin” as dual nationals. In the present case, the Working Group is not
convinced by the arguments presented by the source that the arrest of Messrs. Namazi was
based on their exercise of their right under article 22 of the Covenant. The Working Group
notes that, at the time of their arrests, neither of the men had been engaging in the exercise
of those rights and there is thus an insufficient basis for the Working Group to conclude
that the arrest and detention of Messrs. Namazi were linked to the exercise of any specific
right, and therefore falling within category II. However, there is a sufficient basis to
conclude that they have been arbitrarily deprived of their liberty according to category V
owing to the discrimination against them as dual nationals.
46. The source also submits that the arrest and subsequent detention of the Namazis fall
within category III. The source submits that the Namazis were arrested without a proper
warrant, held in harsh prison conditions for months without charge, detained with
extremely limited access to their family members, not provided with an independent and
impartial tribunal and not provided with a public hearing. The source also submits that the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran interfered with their right to prepare a defence
and call and examine witnesses, and withheld all evidence from the defence.
47. The Working Group considers that the source’s allegations disclose violations of the
right of Messrs. Namazi to a fair trial. Specifically, they have been denied their right to be
informed promptly of the charges against them under article 14 (3) (a) of the Covenant, and
their right to legal representation under article 14 (3) (b) and (d) of the Covenant. They
1 See, for example, opinions No. 7/2017, No. 28/2016, No. 44/2015 and No. 18/2013.
Annex 78
have also been denied their right to examine witnesses against them and denied proper
access to all the evidence against them, in violation of article 14 (3) (e) of the Covenant.
Furthermore, they have both been denied their right to defend themselves during the trials
as they were prevented from speaking in the court except to answer questions posed by the
judge, amounting to a violation of article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant.
48. The Working Group notes that Messrs. Namazi have not been provided with written
judgements, in violation of article 14 (1) of the Covenant, and that the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran has failed to invoke any reasons justifying this. Moreover, the
Working Group notes that the failure to provide a written judgement adversely affects the
right to appeal, in violation of article 14 (5) of the Covenant. As indicated by the Human
Rights Committee in paragraph 49 of its general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to
equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial:
The right to have one’s conviction reviewed can only be exercised effectively if the
convicted person is entitled to have access to a duly reasoned, written judgement of
the trial court, and, at least in the court of first appeal where domestic law provides
for several instances of appeal,2 also to other documents, such as trial transcripts,
necessary to enjoy the effective exercise of the right to appeal.
49. The Working Group is also of the view that Siamak Namazi had not benefited fully
from the presumption of innocence as encapsulated in article 14 (2) of the Covenant. In the
present case, the source submits that a video by the judicial news service of the Islamic
Republic of Iran was posted online in which images of the arrest of Mr. Namazi were
directly juxtaposed with an image of his United States passport and “a montage of anti-
American-themed images”. The Working Group notes that this was just before or at the
time of the trial of Mr. Namazi and that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran had
the opportunity but failed to provide an explanation to those allegations.
50. In paragraph 30 of its general comment No. 32 (2007), the Working Group
emphasized that the right to be presumed innocent as per article 14 (2) of the Covenant
means not only that public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of any
trials, but also that the media should avoid news coverage undermining the presumption of
innocence. In the present case, information that was clearly prejudicial to Siamak Namazi
was made public by the judicial news service, an official State news service. The Working
Group finds that this constituted a violation of article 14 (2) of the Covenant in relation to
Mr. Namazi.
51. Taking into account all the violations enumerated above, the Working Group
concludes that the violations of article 14 of the Covenant are of such gravity as to give the
deprivation of liberty of the Namazis an arbitrary character, falling within category III.
52. Furthermore, the Working Group wishes to record its grave concern about the
deteriorating health of Messrs. Namazi, particularly the allegations made by the source that
Baquer Namazi has not been provided with adequate medical care and that this may result
in irreparable harm to his health and indeed poses a real risk to his life. The Working Group
considers that their treatment violates their right under article 10 (1) of the Covenant, to be
treated with humanity and with respect for their inherent dignity, and falls significantly
short of the requirements of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), in particular rules 24-27, 30-31, 37, 43 and 45.
53. Finally, the Working Group notes with concern the silence on the part of the
Government in not availing itself of the opportunity to respond to the serious allegations
made in the present case and in other communications to the Working Group. 3 The
2 See communications No. 903/1999, Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, para. 6.4; No. 709/1996, Bailey v.
Jamaica, para. 7.2; No. 663/1995, Morrison v. Jamaica, para. 8.5.
3 See, for example. the opinions of the Working Group on the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 50/2016,
28/2016, 25/2016, 2/2016, 1/2016, 44/2015, 16/2015, 55/2013, 52/2013, 28/2013, 18/2013, 54/2012,
48/2012, 30/2012, 8/2010, 2/2010, 6/2009, 39/2008, 34/2008, 39/2000, 14/1996, 28/1994 and 1/1992.
In the past, the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided information to the Working Group on various
Annex 78
Working Group also refers the present case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
54. The Working Group would like to reiterate4 that it would welcome an invitation to
conduct a country visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran so that it can engage with the
Government constructively and offer assistance in addressing concerns relating to the
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. In that context, the Working Group notes that, on 24 July
2002, the Government issued a standing invitation to all thematic special procedure
mandate holders.
Disposition
55. In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Mr. Siamak Namazi and Mr. Mohammed Baquer
Namazi, being in contravention of articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and of articles 9, 10, 14 and 26 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within categories III and V.
56. Consequent upon the opinion rendered, the Working Group requests the
Government to take the steps necessary to remedy the situation of Mr. Siamak Namazi and
Mr. Mohammed Baquer Namazi without delay and bring it into conformity with the
standards and principles set forth in the international norms on detention, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
57. The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Siamak Namazi and Mr. Mohammed
Baquer Namazi immediately and accord them an enforceable right to compensation and
other reparations, in accordance with international law.
58. In accordance with paragraph 33 (a) of its methods of work, the Working Group
refers the present case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
Follow-up procedure
59. In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group
requests the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in
follow-up to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a) Whether Mr. Siamak Namazi and Mr. Mohammed Baquer Namazi have been
released and, if so, on what date;
(b) Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Siamak
Namazi and Mr. Mohammed Baquer Namazi;
(c) Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr.
Siamak Namazi and Mr. Mohammed Baquer Namazi’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the
investigation;
(d) Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made
to harmonize the laws and practices of the Islamic Republic of Iran with its international
obligations in line with the present opinion;
(e) Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
60. The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example, through a visit by the
Working Group.
communications; see opinions Nos. 58/2011, 21/2011, 20/2011, 4/2008, 26/2006, 19/2006, 14/2006,
8/2003 and 30/2001.
4 See opinions Nos. 9/2017, 7/2017, 28/2016, 25/2016 and 50/2015.
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61. The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the above
information within six months of the date of the transmission of the present opinion.
However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up to the
opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as any failure to take action.
62. The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all
States to cooperate with the Working Group and requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken. 5
[Adopted on 22 August 2017]
5 See Human Rights Council resolution 33/30, paras. 3 and 7.
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Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its eighty-second session, 20–24 August 2018
Opinion No. 52/2018 concerning Xiyue Wang (Islamic Republic of Iran)
1. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights, which extended and clarified the Working Group’s
mandate in its resolution 1997/50. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251 and
Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in Council resolution 33/30.
2. In accordance with its methods of work (A/HRC/36/38), on 31 January 2018 the
Working Group transmitted to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran a
communication concerning Xiyue Wang. The Government replied to the communication on
3 May 2018. The State is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
3. The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following
cases:
(a) When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or
her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b) When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22,
25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c) When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating
to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity
as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d) When asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or
remedy (category IV);
(e) When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of
human beings (category V).
United Nations A/HRC/WGAD/2018/52
General Assembly Distr.: General
21 September 2018
Original: English
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Submissions
Communication from the source
4. Mr. Wang is a 37-year-old naturalized citizen of the United States of America who
was born in Beijing, China. He usually resides in New Jersey, United States of America.
5. According to the source, Mr. Wang is a doctoral student in the Department of
History at Princeton University. His primary area of study is the history of Europe and
Asia. Mr. Wang received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington and a
master’s degree from Harvard University in Russian and Eurasian studies. In September
2013, he began his doctoral studies at Princeton University. At the time the Iranian
authorities detained him in Tehran, Mr. Wang was preparing to begin his dissertation by
researching local governance issues during the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods of
historical Persia.
6. In 2016, with the authorization of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the backing of his graduate programme at Princeton University, Mr. Wang made two
trips to the country on a student visa issued by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
pursue pre-dissertation research. The first trip, which Mr. Wang made to study Farsi at the
Dehkhoda Lexicon Institute and International Centre for Persian Studies, with the
permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ran from 25 January to 10 March 2016 and
passed without incident. However, the source reports that Mr. Wang became suspicious that
someone had hacked into his computer during that trip.
7. On 1 May 2016, Mr. Wang returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to
continue his language studies and to collect archival materials for potential use in his
dissertation. He planned to use the National Archives to conduct his research. The source
states that Mr. Wang was open about the purpose of his historical research and that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had approved his research plan. The Department of History of
Princeton University gave a grant to Mr. Wang to cover his travel, language classes and
living expenses while in the country. Mr. Wang also received an additional grant for the
same purpose from the Sharmin and Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Iran and Persian
Gulf Studies, a non-political academic programme supporting research on the region
attached to Princeton University.
8. According to the source, while Mr. Wang was in the Islamic Republic of Iran, he
requested permission to review two sets of historical documents pertaining to regional
governance in the late imperial period of the Qajar Dynasty. The dates of the documents
requested ranged from 1880 to 1921. Mr. Wang did not conduct any research on or request
any documents pertaining to contemporary history. None of the documents he selected for
review were classified.
9. The source reports that, in communications with his dissertation adviser and other
Princeton University officials, Mr. Wang noted that a guard at the National Archives had
expressed concern about his presence in the Archives building, and suggested that the
authorities considered him to be a spy. However, Mr. Wang believed that he was safe
because he had been authorized by the Government to pursue his studies and he was merely
a scholar studying old archival documents of no relevance to national security.
10. On 17 July 2016, Mr. Wang told Princeton University officials that he would return
to Princeton within 10 days. He had previously expressed concern that the Iranian
authorities might be monitoring his communications. On 21 July 2016, four days after Mr.
Wang notified Princeton University of his plans, the Iranian Diplomatic Police requested a
meeting with Mr. Wang and questioned him for four hours, without the presence of legal
counsel. The source alleges that, at that meeting, Mr. Wang’s laptop and passport were
confiscated and he was ordered to return to his apartment to await further instructions. The
Diplomatic Police questioned him again a week later. During this period, Mr. Wang met
with a local lawyer. He also attempted to communicate with Iranian diplomatic officials to
explain the scholarly purposes of his stay in the country.
11. On 7 August 2016, the Diplomatic Police asked Mr. Wang to meet them at the
Azadi Hotel in Tehran for further questioning. Later that day, Mr. Wang called his family
Annex 79
and informed them that the Diplomatic Police were with him at his apartment and had
instructed him to pack his belongings because they were going to take him to the airport so
that he could return to the United States. Instead, on the same day, the police detained Mr.
Wang and brought him to Ward 209 of Evin Prison. The source alleges that no warrant was
presented and it is therefore not known what authority ordered Mr. Wang’s detention. The
source also alleges that Mr. Wang was held incommunicado for seven days, and that his
family and his local lawyer did not know his whereabouts and only learned of his
incarceration after the local lawyer visited Evin Prison.
12. According to the source, Mr. Wang spent at least 18 days in solitary confinement at
Evin Prison. Moreover, even after the local lawyer learned of Mr. Wang’s whereabouts,
Mr. Wang was not permitted to meet with his lawyer until 13 September 2016 — more than
a month after his arrest — despite having submitted multiple requests to the court and the
prison.
13. The source claims that Mr. Wang was repeatedly interrogated without access to legal
counsel. The source also notes that, while both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United
States are party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Islamic Republic of
Iran did not notify either the United States or Switzerland (which represents the
Government of the United States in the Islamic Republic of Iran) that Mr. Wang had been
detained, in violation of article 36 of the Convention.
14. Furthermore, the source emphasizes that the Government waited more than five
months before indicting Mr. Wang. Between 11 and 13 December 2016, an investigating
judge held hearings during which Mr. Wang was questioned. On 22 January 2017, the
judge referred Mr. Wang’s case to Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court. At that time, the
Government formally charged Mr. Wang with espionage and collaboration with the “hostile
State” of the United States of America against the Islamic Republic of Iran under articles
501 and 508 of the Islamic Penal Code.
15. The source states that it is difficult to know what other legal provisions might have
been invoked in the indictment because it was kept secret from all but Mr. Wang’s local
lawyer. However, the indictment reportedly stated that Mr. Wang had been granted access
to government archives against the wishes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that he
had gathered 3,000 pages of sensitive documents that were not relevant to his research. The
indictment further stated that Mr. Wang had sent those documents to entities seeking to
overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran, allegedly including Mr. Wang’s dissertation adviser
at Princeton University. Finally, the indictment alleged that Mr. Wang’s dissertation adviser
paid $12,000 to Mr. Wang to compensate him for his work. The source states that all of
these allegations are false.
16. According to the source, Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court tried Mr. Wang in a
closed session in violation of his due process rights. On 29 April 2017, the presiding judge
of the Revolutionary Court found Mr. Wang guilty of espionage and collaboration and
sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. Mr. Wang’s local lawyer filed an appeal. On 14
August 2017, Branch 54 of the Revolutionary Court, sitting as a panel of three judges,
denied Mr. Wang’s appeal. The one-page opinion did not explain the Court’s reasons for
denying the appeal, other than stating that it agreed with the trial court’s sentence.
17. The source reports that Mr. Wang’s detention, trial and conviction did not become
public until 17 July 2017, almost a year after his detention, when Mizan News Agency, a
news service with alleged ties to the Iranian judiciary, published an account of the
allegations against him. Mizan News Agency alleged that American research centres had
been sending their representatives and professional spies to the Islamic Republic of Iran to
collect documents and materials under the cover of legitimate scholarly activities. A
supposed “spider web” of connections had, according to the report, deployed Mr. Wang to
sneak into the country in order to collect classified and highly classified documents.
18. The source alleges that the authorities have subjected Mr. Wang to cruel and
degrading treatment that has seriously affected his health and endangered his life. Mr.
Wang’s communications with his family while in prison reveal that he is rapidly
deteriorating mentally, emotionally and physically after over two years of detention. He has
lost weight and suffers from chest pain, severe back pain, fever, rash, headaches, vomiting,
Annex 79
stomach aches, severe tooth pain, foot injuries, arthritis, constipation, insomnia and
diarrhoea. The source refers to a telephone call between Mr. Wang and his family on 21
March 2017 in which Mr. Wang, who at that point had been detained for 227 days, reported
that he was suffering from back pain from sleeping on a hard floor and from itchy rashes all
over his body. Three weeks later, he reported that his knees were so swollen and painful
that he could not use the small toilet in his cell.
19. The source also alleges that Mr. Wang is kept indoors for extended periods of time
and does not see any natural light for up to a week at a time. Furthermore, throughout the
entire time of his detention, Mr. Wang has suffered from depression and has expressed
suicidal thoughts to his family. After holding Mr. Wang in solitary confinement and
subjecting him to continuous questioning, the authorities allegedly placed him in a series of
dirty, overcrowded and unhygienic cells on Ward 209. From March to August 2017, Mr.
Wang was forced to sleep on the floor of a 20-square-metre cell with up to 25 other
detainees.
20. According to the source, Mr. Wang has also been subjected to sudden and
unexplained transfers between prison wards. On 14 March 2017, he was transferred to
Ward 209 from Ward 4, which houses ordinary prisoners. The source notes that conditions
on Ward 209 are worse than those on Ward 4, and detainees on Ward 209 have been
subjected to extended interrogation and solitary confinement. Most recently, Mr. Wang was
unexpectedly transferred to Ward 7.
21. In addition, the source alleges that the authorities have not separated Mr. Wang from
other detainees. As a United States citizen, Mr. Wang has been forced to share a cell with
extremely hostile detainees, including one belonging to the Taliban movement. On 19 July
2017, Mr. Wang reported that he had been beaten by his cellmates. On 6 December 2017,
after a sudden transfer to Ward 7, Mr. Wang reported that a detainee belonging to the
Taliban movement had expressed his hatred of the United States and had threatened to kill
him. Although this incident was reported to the authorities, Mr. Wang remains on Ward 7.
22. The source affirms that substandard conditions in the prison, coupled with the
psychological and occasionally physical abuse that guards and fellow prisoners have
inflicted on him, have severely affected Mr. Wang’s physical and mental health. Despite his
deteriorating condition, Mr. Wang receives only occasional visits from the prison
physician, who provides limited treatment. Mr. Wang has not seen a dentist since his arrest.
On 11 September 2017, the court granted permission for Mr. Wang to be visited by a
physician who can treat the medical issues that the prison doctor has not addressed.
Nevertheless, Mr. Wang has not been granted access to specialized medical facilities
outside the prison, despite multiple requests from the Swiss Embassy and his local lawyer.
The source submits that this conduct violates the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), particularly rules 24, 25, 27 and
30.
23. The source further submits that a representative of the Swiss Embassy has been able
to make only five consular visits to Mr. Wang, and was not granted permission for such a
visit for over two weeks after his detention. Mr. Wang and his local lawyer have repeatedly
requested that Mr. Wang be allowed access to books and clothing shipped to the Islamic
Republic of Iran by his family, but have faced resistance and refusals by the prosecutor and
prison guards. Mr. Wang’s access to a telephone varies depending on the ward he is being
detained on and the discretion of prison officials.
24. The source adds that, in November 2017, the Iranian State-run Channel 2 evening
news ran a six-minute segment on the espionage accusations against Mr. Wang, alleging
that the Government of the United States had assigned him the topic for his dissertation at
Princeton University and that he had collected 4,500 pages of documents to send to United
States intelligence agencies. The segment interspersed these accusations with portions of a
recorded interrogation of Mr. Wang. The source alleges that this interrogation took place
after 18 days of solitary confinement. During the interrogation, Mr. Wang was allegedly
surrounded by prison guards and faced enormous pressure to confess.
25. Finally, the source observes that although one domestic avenue for legal redress
technically remains available — an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court of the
Annex 79
Islamic Republic of Iran — this option is not genuinely available or an effective means of
redress for a United States national such as Mr. Wang. There is no realistic possibility that
Mr. Wang could prevail in that court. Under general international law, a local remedy is
considered ineffective if the remedy does not provide a reasonable possibility of redress.
26. Mr. Wang has now been in detention for over two years since his arrest on 7 August
2016 and remains in Evin Prison. The source submits that Mr. Wang’s detention is arbitrary
according to categories I, II, III and V.
Category I: lack of legal basis for the detention
27. In relation to category I, the source argues that the authorities arrested and detained
Mr. Wang without providing a legal basis, in violation of the international obligations of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, including under the Covenant. In particular, the Government
violated articles 9 (1) and (2) of the Covenant, as the authorities did not inform Mr. Wang
of the reasons for his arrest or of any charges against him. The source concludes that the
Iranian authorities failed to provide a legal basis for Mr. Wang’s arrest, noting that formal
charges were not filed against him for five and a half months after his detention on 7
August 2016.
28. In addition, the source submits that the Government violated its obligation under
article 9 (3) of the Covenant by failing to bring Mr. Wang before a judge promptly after his
arrest and by holding Mr. Wang incommunicado for one week. Mr. Wang did not appear
before the investigating judge until 11 December 2016, more than four months after his
arrest.
29. In relation to the length of Mr. Wang’s pretrial detention, the source observes that
Mr. Wang’s case was not referred to the Revolutionary Court until 22 January 2017. His
first appearance before Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court, the court that eventually
tried and convicted him, was not until 11 March 2017, more than seven months after his
arrest. While international law does not set a strict limit on a “reasonable” period of pretrial
detention, the circumstances of this case support the finding that this protracted period of
detention was not reasonable. The source notes that the Government has never offered any
reasons for the delay in issuing formal charges and adjudicating Mr. Wang’s case.
30. The source submits that when the authorities finally indicted Mr. Wang, he was
charged with the crime of espionage, which is a vague and overly broad charge historically
used by the Government as a pretext for the detention of foreigners. This charge does not
satisfy the requirement of the Covenant that the legal basis for detention be defined with
sufficient precision to avoid overly broad or arbitrary interpretation or application.1
31. Furthermore, Mr. Wang was convicted of espionage and of cooperation with a
hostile State without a legal basis under Iranian law. According to the source, there is no
evidence that Mr. Wang committed the requisite acts that satisfy the elements of the crimes
he was charged with, as defined by articles 501 and 508 of the Islamic Penal Code. Mr.
Wang’s research requests only covered documents produced between 1880 and 1921, and
could not have contained any information relevant to national or international policies of
the modern Iranian State. In addition, the documents requested by Mr. Wang did not bear
classified stamps that would have indicated sensitive content. The majority of the
documents were newspaper clippings, so the information they contained was originally
publicly available. Similarly, Mr. Wang did not cooperate with foreign States against the
Islamic Republic of Iran, as he received no funding from the United States Government for
his research, and has never served in the United States military or otherwise been employed
by the United States Government.
Category II: exercise of fundamental rights
32. In relation to category II, the source submits that Mr. Wang’s detention directly
resulted from conduct that is protected by article 19 of the Covenant. Mr. Wang travelled to
1 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person,
para. 22.
Annex 79
the Islamic Republic of Iran to conduct dissertation research on nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century Qajar and Pahlavi governance. He was peacefully exercising his right to
seek and receive information for academic purposes in the form of historical records held
by a public body.
33. Furthermore, the source notes that, on the face of it, the records that Mr. Wang
sought to review do not implicate the national security interests of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. That is, Mr. Wang sought to review unclassified historical records from more than 100
years ago. These documents do not contain any national security information, are not
pertinent to the operations of the contemporary Government, and were not classified or
labelled as such. The application of Iranian espionage laws to Mr. Wang is not permissible
under article 19 (3) of the Covenant because it does not serve a legitimate interest, such as
the protection of national security.
Category III: due process rights
34. In relation to category III, the source submits that violations of the most basic
standards of due process were evident throughout Mr. Wang’s pretrial and post-trial
detention. Specifically, the source argues that Mr. Wang’s pretrial detention violated article
9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. The authorities arrested Mr. Wang without informing him of
the reasons for his arrest or the charges against him. No charges were filed for five and a
half months after his initial arrest, during which time Mr. Wang was held in detention,
including in solitary confinement. Mr. Wang was not immediately brought before a judge,
and was held for more than seven months before his trial began.
35. The source also submits that Mr. Wang’s trial violated article 10 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and article 14 (1) of the Covenant. Mr. Wang’s hearing was
neither fair nor public, and the court was not independent and impartial. Mr. Wang was
tried in the Revolutionary Court before a judge who is known for conducting political show
trials and suspected of ties to the intelligence community, and thus does not qualify as
impartial to a reasonable observer.2
36. Mr. Wang’s right to a public hearing was also violated as his hearing was closed to
the public. The source argues that the exclusion of the general public and Mr. Wang’s
United States-based attorneys from his trial cannot be justified by the Covenant’s national
security and public order exception, which has historically been invoked in cases of
terrorist activity, leaks of classified information and other major threats to public safety.
Mr. Wang’s local lawyer was even precluded from sharing information with Mr. Wang’s
United States-based attorneys, which hindered their efforts to assist with his trial.
Furthermore, his local lawyer was prevented from calling witnesses or speaking on Mr.
Wang’s behalf until the end of the trial.
37. The source further submits that the Government violated article 11 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and article 14 (3) of the Covenant, as the limitations imposed
by the judiciary, including extreme secrecy, made it impossible to present a proper defence.
Only Mr. Wang’s local lawyer was allowed access to the indictment and evidence against
Mr. Wang. Furthermore, without any explanation, the Revolutionary Court rejected Mr.
Wang’s request to retain experienced local counsel to assist with his defence. The source
notes that the Court may have withheld some evidence collected by the Iranian intelligence
service from Mr. Wang’s local lawyer, making it impossible for Mr. Wang to properly
contest the charges.
38. According to the source, the Iranian authorities violated article 14 (2) and (3) (g) of
the Covenant by forcing Mr. Wang to sign a self-incriminating confession. In addition, the
2 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts
and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 21. See also the Working Group’s opinion No. 44/2015, para.
13, in which the source made a similar submission relating to the same judge, noting that the judge
had been sanctioned by the European Union in 2011 for human rights violations.
Annex 79
source argues that the substandard conditions of detention negatively affected Mr. Wang’s
ability to prepare his defence.
Category V: discrimination
39. In relation to category V, the source argues that the detention of Mr. Wang was
discriminatory and violated the human rights obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran
under articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant. The prosecution of Mr. Wang, the public
statements by the Iranian judiciary, the pattern of nationality-based discrimination by the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the broader political context all indicate that Mr. Wang’s
detention was motivated by his status as a United States citizen.
Response from the Government
40. On 31 January 2018, the Working Group transmitted the allegations from the source
to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran under its regular communication
procedure. The Working Group requested the Government to provide, by 3 April 2018,
detailed information about the current situation of Mr. Wang. The Working Group also
requested the Government to clarify the legal provisions justifying Mr. Wang’s detention,
and the compatibility of his detention with the State’s obligations under international
human rights law. The Working Group called upon the Government to ensure the physical
and mental integrity of Mr. Wang.
41. On 2 February 2018, the Government requested an extension of the deadline for its
response. The extension was granted, and a new deadline of 3 May 2018 was set. The
Government submitted its response on 3 May 2018.
42. In its response, the Government states that Mr. Wang had received a study visa from
the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology to study Farsi at the Dehkhoda Institute.
However, despite having been prohibited access to the requested documents and venues,
Mr. Wang bribed some employees and illegally obtained access to archival documents in
the national library, documents of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) and the
archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs3 under the pretext of conducting academic
research.
43. According to the Government, further investigations revealed that Mr. Wang’s study
had been used as a cover for generating an ethnic crisis in the Islamic Republic of Iran. He
was questioned by the police in relation to these criminal acts. On 17 August 2016, Mr.
Wang was charged in the lobby of the Azadi Hotel and a court order (No. 950056) was
presented to him. He was able to immediately inform his family. Mr. Wang was informed
of the charges against him at the time of his arrest. The Government denies that Mr. Wang
was given permission to return to the United States. Mr. Wang was taken to Evin Prison, a
registered prison in Tehran, where he received a medical examination that revealed no
problems with his health.
44. The Government notes that an order to hold a person in solitary confinement is
issued by a judge during the investigation in a very limited number of cases in order to
prevent collusion between the suspect and accomplices. According to article 175 (4) of the
Executive Order of the Prisons Organization, imprisonment in single units for up to 20 days
is prescribed as a disciplinary punishment. A prisoner subject to such punishment enjoys
the other rights of a prisoner. The regulations define the terms of use of this punishment,
which includes its use for persons charged with terrorist offences or activities
compromising national security.
45. All of the relevant legal provisions were carefully observed in the case of Mr. Wang:
during the few days he spent in solitary confinement he was supervised by the Prisons
Organization and the confinement was ordered by a judge. Solitary confinement was
3 The Government states that these records were sought by Mr. Wang for a comparative study of the
governance of the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Empire with regard
to the Turkmen region and ethnicity, that is, a comparative study of Turkmenia in the Russian
Federation and Turkmen Sahra in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Annex 79
ordered for the completion of the investigation and to prevent collusion. During the short
period of his solitary confinement, Mr. Wang’s rights were observed, and he had access to a
television, a refrigerator, furniture and media and health facilities.
46. In addition, the Swiss Embassy in Tehran was notified by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that a United States citizen had been arrested. The attorney at the Swiss Embassy
was able to examine the progress of the case at the end of the first week of Mr. Wang’s
detention. Mr. Wang met with the attorney on 13 September 2016. The Swiss Ambassador
also met with Mr. Wang on 14 September 2016, and the Swiss authorities have met with
Mr. Wang on five occasions. All the legal requirements applicable to foreign nationals,
including access to an interpreter and consular protection, have been observed.
47. According to the Government, upon receiving a report from the police, Mr. Wang
was summoned by the judicial authorities. Due to the necessity of completing the
investigation, the order for Mr. Wang’s arrest was renewed on a monthly basis by the
judicial authorities. The Government submits that the time taken to file the case was
reasonable.
48. After the completion of the investigation on 7 January 2017, the bill of indictment
was sent to the competent court to determine a time for the hearing. The preliminary
indictment contained details of the alleged offences, including Mr. Wang’s contact with
organizations seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran. It also detailed how Mr.
Wang served those groups and received money for the collection of information and
intelligence. The Government notes that access to the records of the libraries and archives
mentioned in the source’s submission requires approval that Mr. Wang did not have, and he
was officially prohibited from using the archives. He was only able to gain access to the
documents through bribery, and his activities indicated the purposeful pursuit of acts of
espionage.
49. The court found Mr. Wang guilty and, in accordance with articles 215 and 508 of the
Islamic Penal Code, sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. Mr. Wang was required to
repay the funds that he had received for his illegal services. The Government states that the
requirements of a fair trial were met. Article 352 of the Criminal Procedure Code stipulates
that the court may, at its discretion, meet in camera, and if public security requires it. Given
that the charges against Mr. Wang involved espionage, the court held the trial in camera.
50. The decision was subsequently appealed and was confirmed by the appellate court.
On 12 August 2017, the three judges of the court of appeal stated that Mr. Wang had not
provided substantiated reasons for the appeal. The court of appeal found that the initial
judgment had been issued in accordance with the evidence and in a reasoned and
documented manner based on the same materials submitted by the defendant at trial and on
appeal. The judiciary is not required to release news of the arrest or trial of individuals, and
the conviction of a person may be made public only after the issuance of the final verdict.
51. The Government states that Mr. Wang enjoys all the amenities that other prisoners
do, including food, air conditioning, media facilities and telephone calls with his family. He
has access to the appropriate medical and therapeutic facilities. Mr. Wang’s health is
normal, apart from pre-existing skin allergies. Mr. Wang has some command of Farsi and is
allowed to communicate with other people in the prison. The Government provided a list of
dates of Mr. Wang’s contacts, visits and medical appointments.
52. The Government recalls that all prisons in the Islamic Republic of Iran are under the
direct control of prosecutors, particularly units where accused persons and those convicted
of national security offences are held. The Department of Justice of each province conducts
periodic and impromptu inspections. Furthermore, the Prisons Organization is an
independent body that operates under judicial supervision and is responsible for the
treatment of prisoners. The Prisons Organization cannot accept anyone as a prisoner
without a judicial order. In practice, a central supervisory board and provincial boards
consider complaints and take action on allegations, and prison officers receive the requisite
training in managing prisoners.
53. According to the Government, efforts are being made to improve the hygiene,
treatment and nutrition of prisoners throughout the country. Free medical services are
Annex 79
provided to prisoners and specialized medical services can be accessed outside prisons.
Medical tests are required for all prisoners at least once a month, and the Nelson Mandela
Rules are observed and, in some cases, exceeded. More specifically, Evin Prison has been
visited by delegations from inside and outside of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with 45
resident ambassadors and diplomatic representatives in Tehran visiting Evin Prison on 5
July 2017. Positive statements about the conditions of the prison were reflected in the
media. The observance of the rights of detainees on Ward 209 of Evin Prison is closely
monitored by the authorities.
54. The Government states that there has been no report of Mr. Wang suffering from
any physical or psychological illness. The Government acknowledges that tensions between
prisoners occur, and that movements between wards take place, but emphasizes that Mr.
Wang is satisfied with his conditions in Evin Prison and has thanked the prison authorities
in writing on two occasions.
55. In relation to the source’s submissions on the categories applied by the Working
Group, the Government argues that Mr. Wang’s case involves illegal actions rather than
activities protected under the Covenant that would fall within category II. In any event, the
Government refers to permissible restrictions on rights under the Covenant, such as
restrictions that are necessary for the protection of national security under article 19 (3).
56. In addition, the Government refers to its arguments on the legal basis of the charges
and on the fair and impartial process applied to Mr. Wang, and submits that the case does
not fall within category III. The Government denies the source’s allegation that Mr. Wang
was forced to make a confession. The verdict against Mr. Wang was not issued solely on
the basis of his confession, but was based on a large volume of information placed before
the courts. Furthermore, the Government submits that, since Mr. Wang’s legal
representatives were attorneys from the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, the source’s allegation
that United States lawyers were not able to participate in Mr. Wang’s defence is incorrect.
Mr. Wang’s lawyers had sufficient access to him and the contents of the case, and were
able to defend him.
57. Finally, the Government states that legal proceedings were initiated in the present
case without regard to the individual’s nationality and that there was no discrimination
involved. Iranian law is applied equally to all defendants, including United States citizens,
without exception.
Further information from the source
58. On 4 May 2018, the Government’s response was sent to the source. The source
responded on 24 July 2018.
59. The source submits that its original submission provided a comprehensive account
of Mr. Wang’s arrest, detention and wrongful conviction. Having established a prima facie
case, the burden rests with the Government to rebut these claims. Instead, the Government
has failed to explain how Mr. Wang violated the country’s espionage statutes, and has made
sweeping claims about the amenities in the national prisons, all without supporting
documents.
60. The source emphasizes that Mr. Wang is a doctoral student who travelled to the
Islamic Republic of Iran to study Farsi and to research governance issues from the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Mr. Wang clearly stated his intention to conduct
research to the Iranian authorities before his visit. The source refers to correspondence
between Princeton University and the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran
stating the purpose of Mr. Wang’s research and to a letter of support for this research from
the Dehkhoda Institute. The source points out that, far from concealing his purpose, Mr.
Wang also wrote to the British Institute for Persian Studies thanking it for putting him in
contact with senior scholars at the relevant Iranian archival and library institutions.
61. In relation to the Government’s assertion that Mr. Wang’s academic research was “a
cover for generating an ethnic crisis in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, the source notes that
Mr. Wang was only engaged in historical research and had no contact with ethnic groups
inside or outside of the country. With reference to the Government’s claims that it obtained
Annex 79
evidence that Mr. Wang was involved with groups using secret funds to overthrow the
Islamic Republic of Iran and that he received money for collecting information, if such
evidence exists, the Government could and should have submitted it, or at least a detailed
description, with its response. Mr. Wang had no contacts with secret groups, no plans to
take action against the Government, and received no money to collect information for any
person or Government.
62. The source reiterates its allegations in relation to categories I, II, III and V. In
relation to the lack of a legal basis for the arrest and detention, the source emphasizes that,
contrary to the Government’s claims, the Iranian authorities did not present Mr. Wang with
formal charges or inform his family or the Swiss Embassy of his arrest. Mr. Wang told the
Swiss Embassy that he was being taken to the airport, but he never arrived. Similarly, the
authorities did not inform Mr. Wang’s family, Princeton University, the Swiss Embassy,
the United States Department of State, or Mr. Wang’s local lawyer of his location. It was
only after his local lawyer made enquiries at Evin Prison that the authorities confirmed that
Mr. Wang was being held there, but they did not allow him to see or speak with Mr. Wang.
63. The source points to admissions made by the Government. First, the Government
conceded that Mr. Wang had been held in solitary confinement at Evin Prison, and it did
not dispute that the solitary confinement had lasted 18 days. Second, the Government
confirmed that Mr. Wang had not met with his local lawyer until 13 September 2016, more
than a month after his arrest. Third, the Government conceded that Mr. Wang had not
received a consular visit until 14 September 2016 and that Mr. Wang had only been
permitted five consular visits in two years. Fourth, the Government admitted that the
indictment had been issued in January 2017, more than five months after Mr. Wang’s
arrest.
64. According to the source, Mr. Wang was brought to trial and convicted in April 2017,
after more than eight months in prison. Although Mr. Wang and his local lawyer did not
learn of his conviction until the end of April, it appears that he was convicted on 9 April
2017, a day after the conclusion of his trial. The Government’s response notes that Mr.
Wang was convicted of violating articles 215 and 508 of the Islamic Penal Code. However,
Mr. Wang and his local lawyer were told that he had been convicted under articles 501 and
508, while the Iranian appeals court referred only to articles 215 and 508 in its judgment.4
The Government has failed to provide any evidence, either during the trial or in its
response, to support its claim that Mr. Wang violated any of these three provisions.
65. The Government alleged that Mr. Wang had been in contact with organizations and
groups that opposed the Government and had gained access to certain documents through
bribery, which indicated the purposeful pursuit of acts of espionage. However, the
Government did not show at Mr. Wang’s trial or in its response that he had been in contact
with any foreign Government or opposition group. The Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran appears to consider that Mr. Wang’s communications with his Princeton
University dissertation adviser, a scholar specializing in Russian and Eurasian history,
constituted cooperation with an opposition organization or foreign Government. Mr.
Wang’s dissertation adviser has no involvement with Iranian opposition groups or contacts
with any foreign Governments relating to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
66. Finally, the source reiterates that Mr. Wang has suffered for two years in deplorable
detention conditions. Rather than demonstrate that it complied with the Covenant and the
Nelson Mandela Rules, the Government insists that Mr. Wang receives excellent medical
treatment. The Government’s claims in relation to conditions at Evin Prison are not credible
given the widespread condemnation of that facility — the most infamous prison in the
country. Mr. Wang has been subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
throughout his detention, which hindered his ability to mount a defence and remains a
threat to his health and safety.
4 The source specifically cites article 215 of the Islamic Penal Code, noting that it appears to describe
what a court or prosecutor may do with confiscated property.
Annex 79
Discussion
67. The Working Group thanks the source and the Government for their submissions.
68. In determining whether Mr. Wang’s deprivation of liberty is arbitrary, the Working
Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary
issues. If the source has presented a prima facie case for breach of the international
requirements constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to
rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations. Mere assertions by the
Government that lawful procedures have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the
source’s allegations (see A/HRC/19/57, para. 68).
69. The source alleges that the police did not present an arrest warrant and did not
inform Mr. Wang of the reasons for his arrest on 7 August 2016. The Government denies
these allegations but has not provided any evidence to substantiate its assertions. According
to article 9 (1) of the Covenant, no one shall be deprived of liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. The Working Group finds
that Mr. Wang was arrested without an arrest warrant and without being informed at that
time of the reasons for his arrest, in violation of article 9 (1) and (2) of the Covenant.
Furthermore, as the Government confirmed, the indictment against Mr. Wang was issued in
January 2017, five months after his arrest. Mr. Wang was therefore not promptly informed
of the charges against him, in violation of article 9 (2) of the Covenant. Accordingly, given
that no arrest warrant was presented at the time of arrest, the reasons for the arrest were not
provided and Mr. Wang was not promptly notified of the charges against him, the
authorities have failed to establish a legal basis for his detention.
70. In addition, the Working Group finds that the Government violated article 9 (3) of
the Covenant by failing to bring Mr. Wang before a judge promptly after his arrest and by
holding him incommunicado for one week. The Government stated that the detention order
was renewed on a monthly basis by a judicial authority, but there is no indication that Mr.
Wang was brought before a court until 11 December 2016, more than four months after his
arrest. There is also no indication that Mr. Wang had any opportunity to bring proceedings
to challenge his detention, in violation of article 9 (4) of the Covenant. Judicial oversight of
deprivation of liberty is a fundamental safeguard of personal liberty5 and is essential in
ensuring that detention has a legal basis.
71. For these reasons, the Working Group finds that there was no legal basis for the
arrest and detention of Mr. Wang. His deprivation of liberty is arbitrary under category I.
72. The source further alleges that Mr. Wang was deprived of his liberty for peacefully
exercising his right to freedom of expression under article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and article 19 of the Covenant. The Government denies this allegation,
insisting that Mr. Wang was detained for his illegal actions.
73. While the Government provided few details as to the precise charges brought against
Mr. Wang, it appears from the appeal court judgment that Mr. Wang was convicted under
articles 215 and 508 of the Islamic Penal Code. Mr. Wang appears to have received the
maximum penalty under article 508, having been sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.
Article 508 of the Islamic Penal Code provides that:
Anyone who cooperates by any means with foreign States against the Islamic
Republic of Iran, if not considered as an enemy of God, shall be sentenced to 1 to 10
years’ imprisonment.
74. The Working Group recalls that the freedom of expression protected under
international human rights law includes the right to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds.6 In the present case, Mr. Wang travelled to the Islamic Republic of
Iran with the express purpose of conducting dissertation research on nineteenth- and early
5 See the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of
Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, para. 3.
6 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and
expression, paras. 11 and 18.
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twentieth-century Qajar and Pahlavi governance. The Government did not explain in its
response how Mr. Wang had cooperated with a foreign State (which, from the indictment,
appears to be the United States) against the Islamic Republic of Iran, nor how accessing
historical archives relating to a period of governance over 100 years ago could amount to an
attempt to overthrow the Government. Accordingly, the Working Group finds that Mr.
Wang was peacefully exercising his right to seek and receive information for academic
purposes in the form of historical records held by a public body, and that this falls within
the boundaries of the freedom of expression.
75. The Government refers to permissible restrictions on the freedom of expression
under article 19 (3) of the Covenant, particularly for the protection of national security.
However, Mr. Wang sought to review historical records, including newspaper clippings
produced between 1880 and 1921. The Government did not establish a clear connection
between this activity and contemporary national security interests protected under article 19
(3). Accordingly, the Working Group finds that the application of Iranian espionage laws to
Mr. Wang is not permissible under article 19 (3) of the Covenant because it does not serve
a legitimate interest, such as the protection of national security. Similarly, the Government
did not demonstrate why bringing charges against Mr. Wang was a necessary and
proportionate response to his alleged activities.
76. In any event, the Human Rights Council has called on States to refrain from
imposing restrictions under article 19 (3) that are not consistent with international human
rights law.7 Moreover, as the Human Rights Committee has stated, extreme care must be
taken by States parties to ensure that treason laws and similar provisions relating to national
security, whether described as official secrets or sedition laws or otherwise, are crafted and
applied in a manner that conforms to the strict requirements of article 19 (3). It is not
compatible with article 19 (3), for instance, to invoke such laws to suppress, or withhold
from the public, information of legitimate public interest that does not harm national
security or to prosecute researchers or others for having disseminated such information.8
77. The Working Group concludes that Mr. Wang has been deprived of his liberty as a
result of the peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of expression under article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 19 of the Covenant. His deprivation of
liberty is arbitrary under category II. The Working Group refers this case to the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression.
78. The Working Group considers that certain provisions of the Islamic Penal Code, and
in particular article 508, are so vague and overly broad that they could, as in the present
case, result in penalties being imposed on individuals who had merely exercised their rights
under international law. As the Working Group has stated, the principle of legality requires
that criminal laws be formulated with sufficient precision so that the individual can access
and understand the law, and regulate his or her conduct accordingly.9 In this case, the
application of vague and overly broad provisions adds weight to the Working Group’s
conclusion that Mr. Wang’s deprivation of liberty falls within category II. The Working
Group considers that, in some circumstances, laws may be so vague and overly broad that it
is impossible to invoke them as a legal basis justifying the deprivation of liberty.
79. Given its finding that the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Wang was arbitrary under
category II, the Working Group emphasizes that no trial of Mr. Wang should have taken
place. However, he was tried by Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court in March 2017 and
convicted on 9 April 2017. The Working Group considers that there were multiple
violations of his right to a fair trial, as follows:
(a) The authorities failed to inform Mr. Wang’s family and lawyer of his
whereabouts following his arrest, in violation of principles 15, 16 (1), 18 and 19 of the
7 See Council resolution 12/16, para. 5 (p).
8 Ibid., para. 30.
9 See, e.g., opinion No. 41/2017, paras. 98–99.
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Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment;
(b) The authorities failed to notify the United States or Switzerland that Mr.
Wang had been detained,10 in violation of article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. The Government asserted that it had notified the Swiss Embassy of Mr. Wang’s
arrest but had provided no further details. A representative of the Swiss Embassy has only
been permitted to make five consular visits to Mr. Wang and was not granted such a visit
for over a month after his detention, in violation of rule 62 of the Nelson Mandela Rules.
Although the Government argued that all requirements applicable to foreign nationals had
been met, it conceded that Mr. Wang had not been accorded a consular visit until 14
September 2016 and that he had only been permitted five consular visits in two years;
(c) Mr. Wang was held in pretrial detention for more than seven months until his
first appearance before the Revolutionary Court on 11 March 2017. The Government did
not challenge this allegation, arguing that the time taken to file the case was reasonable due
to the need to complete the investigation. According to article 9 (3) of the Covenant,
pretrial detention should be the exception rather than the rule, and as short as possible.
Seven months was unreasonably long, given that no alternatives to detention appear to have
been considered;
(d) Mr. Wang was held in solitary confinement for at least 18 days following his
arrest. The Government stated that all legal procedures were observed during the “few
days” that it was necessary to hold Mr. Wang in solitary confinement in order to prevent
possible collusion, but did not deny that that confinement extended to 18 days. According
to rule 45 of the Nelson Mandela Rules, the imposition of solitary confinement must be
accompanied by certain safeguards. That is, solitary confinement must only be used in
exceptional cases as a last resort, for as short a time as possible, and be subject to
independent review. These conditions do not appear to have been observed. Moreover,
prolonged solitary confinement in excess of 15 consecutive days is prohibited under rules
43 (1) (b) and 44 of the Nelson Mandela Rules;
(e) Mr. Wang’s trial was closed, in violation of his right to a public hearing
under article 14 (1) of the Covenant. The Government confirmed that the trial had been
held in camera because it involved espionage charges, noting that closed hearings were
permitted if public security required. The Government did not explain how Mr. Wang’s
trial on espionage charges posed a threat to national security so serious that it warranted a
closed hearing. Moreover, the essential findings, evidence and reasons should have been
made public in accordance with article 14 (1) of the Covenant;11
(f) The revolutionary courts that tried Mr. Wang and heard his appeal do not
meet the standards of an independent and impartial tribunal under article 14 (1) of the
Covenant;12
(g) Mr. Wang was denied access to legal counsel, in violation of article 14 (3) (b)
of the Covenant. Following his arrest, Mr. Wang was interrogated without the presence of a
lawyer and, as the Government confirmed, did not meet with his lawyer for more than a
month after his arrest. Persons deprived of their liberty have the right to legal assistance by
counsel of their choice at any time during their detention, including immediately after their
apprehension.13 Mr. Wang’s local lawyer was not permitted to share information with Mr.
Wang’s attorneys based in the United States. This restricted Mr. Wang’s ability to defend
the case, given that he had allegedly cooperated with institutions in the United States and
10 As noted in paragraph 13 above, Switzerland represents the interests of the Government of the United
States in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
11 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32, para. 29.
12 See the report of the Working Group on its visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran
(E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.2, para. 65). The Working Group considers that its finding in that report
regarding the revolutionary courts remains current (see opinion No. 19/2018, para. 34).
13 See United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of
Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, principle 9 and guideline 8.
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with the Government of the United States. Mr. Wang was not permitted to hire experienced
local legal counsel;
(h) Mr. Wang’s local lawyer was prevented from calling witnesses or speaking
on Mr. Wang’s behalf until the end of the trial, in violation of article 14 (3) (d) and (e) of
the Covenant. While the Government noted that Mr. Wang’s lawyers had sufficient access
to the contents of the case and had been able to defend him, it did not specifically deny this
allegation;
(i) Mr. Wang was forced to sign a confession following his solitary
confinement. The Government denies this allegation, and claims that the verdict against Mr.
Wang was not issued solely on the basis of his confession but was also based on other
evidence. The burden is on the Government to prove that Mr. Wang’s statement was given
freely,14 and it has not done so. The Working Group considers that a forced confession
taints the entire proceedings, regardless of whether other evidence was available to support
the verdict,15 as it violates the right to be presumed innocent under article 14 (2) of the
Covenant and the right not to be compelled to confess guilt under article 14 (3) (g);
(j) The overcrowded, unhygienic and inhuman conditions in which Mr. Wang
has been detained have hindered his ability to participate in and prepare his defence.16
80. The Working Group concludes that the violations of the right to a fair trial are of
such gravity as to give Mr. Wang’s deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character under
category III.
81. In addition, the Working Group considers that the source has established a prima
facie case that Mr. Wang was detained because of his status as a foreign national. The
Government denies this allegation, claiming that Iranian law is applied equally to all
defendants. However, there are several factors that lead the Working Group to conclude
that Mr. Wang’s detention was motivated by the fact that he is a United States citizen. First,
there is no evidence that Mr. Wang was present in the Islamic Republic of Iran for any
reason other than to pursue his dissertation research. Indeed, prior to his arrest, he had
visited the Islamic Republic of Iran from January to March 2016 without incident, and had
informed the authorities of the purpose of his research. Second, the Working Group
considers that it is no coincidence that the charges against Mr. Wang are linked to his
relationship with academic institutions in the United States.17 Third, Mr. Wang’s sentence
of 10 years’ imprisonment appears to be disproportionately heavy, as there was no evidence
that he had a criminal record, nor that he was intending to, or did in fact, conduct espionage
or cause an ethnic crisis in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
82. In its jurisprudence, the Working Group has repeatedly found a practice in the
Islamic Republic of Iran of targeting foreign nationals for detention. 18 The Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran also recently
recognized this pattern, specifically referring to Mr. Wang’s case and noting that current
estimates suggest that at least 30 foreign and dual nationals have been imprisoned since
2015.19 The Working Group considers that the present case is part of that pattern. Mr. Wang
14 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32, para. 41.
15 See opinion No. 34/2015, para. 28.
16 See opinion No. 47/2017, para. 28. See also E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.3, para. 33; and opinion No.
92/2017, para. 56.
17 The source refers to a Mizan News Agency report in July 2017 about “American research centres”
sending spies to the Islamic Republic of Iran under the cover of scholarly activities, and a Channel 2
news segment in November 2017 that alleged that the United States had chosen the topic of Mr.
Wang’s dissertation.
18 See, e.g., opinions Nos. 49/2017, 7/2017 and 28/2016. See also opinion No. 92/2017, regarding
detention of an Iranian national with Swedish residency, and Nos. 50/2016, 44/2015, 28/2013 and
18/2013, concerning detention of United States nationals, some of whom also held Iranian nationality.
19 See A/HRC/37/68, paras. 51–57. The Special Rapporteur notes that these cases are emblematic
examples of due process failings, as they commonly relate to the mere suspicion of anti-State
activities with no detailed charges. The Secretary-General has also expressed concern relating to the
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was deprived of his liberty on discriminatory grounds, that is, on the basis of his national or
social origin, in violation of articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant. His deprivation of liberty is arbitrary according to
category V.
83. Given the serious violations of Mr. Wang’s rights, the Working Group refers this
case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran.
84. The Working Group wishes to express its grave concern about Mr. Wang’s health,
which is reportedly deteriorating rapidly after two years of detention. Mr. Wang suffers
from depression, and has expressed suicidal thoughts to his family. He has not received
medical treatment that addresses his ongoing health issues. According to the source, Mr.
Wang has also been subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, including
transfers between prison wards without explanation, threats and violence from other
prisoners, intimidation and physical abuse by prison guards, detention in deplorable
conditions and denial of access to books and clothing shipped by his family. The
Government denies these allegations, insisting that Mr. Wang is in normal health and is
satisfied with the conditions in Evin Prison. The Government provided the dates of Mr.
Wang’s visits and medical appointments. Having taken into account all available
information, the Working Group considers that the Government did not provide convincing
information or evidence in support of its claims.
85. In the view of the Working Group, Mr. Wang’s treatment falls short of the standards
set out, inter alia, in rules 1, 12, 13, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31 and 42 of the Nelson Mandela Rules.
The Working Group urges the Government to immediately release Mr. Wang, and to ensure
that he is urgently transferred to a hospital. The Working Group refers this case to the
Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
86. This case is one of several cases brought before the Working Group in the last five
years concerning arbitrary deprivation of liberty in the Islamic Republic of Iran.20 The
Working Group notes that many of the cases involving the Islamic Republic of Iran follow
a familiar pattern of arrest and detention outside legal procedures; lengthy pretrial detention
with no access to judicial review; incommunicado detention and prolonged solitary
confinement; denial of access to legal counsel; prosecution under vaguely worded criminal
offences with inadequate evidence to support the allegations; a closed trial and appeal by
courts lacking in independence; disproportionately harsh sentencing; torture and illtreatment;
and denial of medical care. The Working Group recalls that, under certain
circumstances, widespread or systematic imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
liberty in violation of the rules of international law may constitute crimes against
humanity.21
87. The Working Group would welcome the opportunity to work constructively with the
Government to address arbitrary deprivation of liberty in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Given that a significant period of time has passed since its most recent country visit to the
Islamic Republic of Iran in February 2003, the Working Group considers that it is now an
appropriate time to conduct another visit. The Working Group recalls that the Government
issued a standing invitation to all thematic special procedure mandate holders on 24 July
2002, and awaits a positive response to its request to visit made on 10 August 2016.
88. As the human rights record of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be reviewed during
the third cycle of the universal periodic review in November 2019, the Government may
wish to seize the present opportunity to enhance its cooperation with the special procedures
and to bring its laws into conformity with international human rights law.
prosecution of foreign and dual nationals in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including Mr. Wang
(A/HRC/37/24).
20 See, e.g., opinions Nos. 19/2018, 92/2017, 49/2017, 48/2017, 9/2017, 7/2017, 50/2016, 28/2016,
25/2016, 2/2016, 1/2016, 44/2015, 16/2015, 55/2013, 52/2013, 28/2013 and 18/2013.
21 See, e.g., opinion No. 47/2012, para. 22.
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Disposition
89. In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Xiyue Wang, being in contravention of articles 2, 7, 9,
10, 11 (1) and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of articles 2 (1),
9, 14, 19 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is
arbitrary and falls within categories I, II, III and V.
90. The Working Group requests the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take
the steps necessary to remedy the situation of Xiyue Wang without delay and bring it into
conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
91. The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, in particular the risk of harm to Xiyue Wang’s health, the appropriate remedy would
be to release Mr. Wang immediately and accord him an enforceable right to compensation
and other reparations, in accordance with international law.
92. The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Xiyue
Wang, including his alleged assault by other prisoners, and to take appropriate measures
against those responsible for the violation of his rights.
93. The Working Group requests the Government to bring its laws, particularly article
508 of the Islamic Penal Code, into conformity with the recommendations made in the
present opinion and with the commitments made by the Islamic Republic of Iran under
international human rights law.
94. In accordance with paragraph 33 (a) of its methods of work, the Working Group
refers the present case to the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Special Rapporteur on torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
95. The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
Follow-up procedure
96. In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group
requests the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in
follow-up to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a) Whether Mr. Wang has been released and, if so, on what date;
(b) Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Wang;
(c) Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr.
Wang’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d) Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made
to harmonize the laws and practices of the Islamic Republic of Iran with its international
obligations in line with the present opinion;
(e) Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
97. The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example, through a visit by the
Working Group.
98. The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the above
information within six months of the date of the transmission of the present opinion.
However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up to the
opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
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would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as any failure to take action.
99. The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all
States to cooperate with the Working Group and requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.22
[Adopted on 23 August 2018]
22 See Human Rights Council resolution 33/30, paras. 3 and 7.
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