Volume I - Annexes 1-50

List of Annexes Accompanying the Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
Submitted by the United States of America
August 23, 2019
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
IRAN
MEMORIAL
ANNEX
1 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276
U.N.T.S. 3
2 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40 (June 6, 2003)
3 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/63 (Aug. 26, 2003)
4 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 10, 2003)
5
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Bd. of Governors Res., Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77 (Sept.
24, 2005)
6
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Bd. of Governors Res., Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15 (Feb.
27, 2006)
7
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Bd. of Governors Res., Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4,
2006)
8 Laurent Fabius, “Inside the Iran Nuclear Deal: A French Perspective,” Wash. Quarterly,
Fall 2016
9 S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006)
10 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/64 (Nov. 14, 2006)
11 S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006)
12 S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007)
13 S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008)
14
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835(2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2009/74 (Nov. 16, 2009)
15
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2010/10 (Feb. 18, 2010)
16 S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010)
17 “Iran Vows Not to ‘Retreat One Iota’ in Nuclear Pursuit,” CNN, Feb. 22, 2007
18
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Bd. of Governors Res., Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2013/6 (Feb. 21,
2013)
List of Annexes Accompanying the Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
Submitted by the United States of America
August 23, 2019
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
IRAN
MEMORIAL
ANNEX
19
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2014/43 (Sept. 5, 2014)
20
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65 (Nov. 8, 2011)
21
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2012/55 (Nov. 16, 2012)
22 Executive Order 13382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38467 (July 1, 2005)
23
U.S. Dep’t of State, “Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act” (2011)
24
The White House, “Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic
of Iran’s Nuclear Program” (2013)
25 Joint Plan of Action (Nov. 24, 2013)
26 S.C. Res. 2231, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2231 (July 20, 2015) IM Annex 10
27 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (July 14, 2015) IM Annex 10
28
European External Action Serv., “Information Note on EU Sanctions to Be Lifted under
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (Jan. 16, 2016)
29
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic Missile
Procurement for Iran” (Jan. 17, 2016)
30 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “Treasury Takes Action to Target Serious Human Rights
Abuse in Iran” (Apr. 13, 2017)
31
U.S. Dep’t of State & U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “Guidance Relating to the Lifting of
Certain U.S. Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on
Implementation Day” (Jan. 16, 2016) IM Annex 24
32
Executive Order 13716, 81 Fed. Reg. 3693 (Jan. 21, 2016) (including the Executive
Orders it rescinds: Executive Order 13590 (2011), Executive Order 13622 (2012),
Executive Order 13645 (2013), Executive Order 13628 (2012))
33
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, OFAC, General License H (Jan. 16, 2016), revoked June 27,
2018
IM Annex 25
33
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, OFAC, Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related
to the Export or Re-Export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts
and Services (Jan. 16, 2016), revoked May 8, 2018
IM Annex 26
33
OFAC Rule Amending the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg.
3330 (Jan. 21, 2016)
IM Annex 27
List of Annexes Accompanying the Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
Submitted by the United States of America
August 23, 2019
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
IRAN
MEMORIAL
ANNEX
33
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, OFAC, General License I (Mar. 24, 2016), revoked June 27,
2018
IM Annex 29
34 Executive Order 12613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41940 (Oct. 30, 1987)
35
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) (relevant portions), 31 C.F.R.
Parts 560.314, 560.530, 560.532, 560.533
36 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)
37 Executive Order 13846, 83 Fed. Reg. 38939 (Aug. 7, 2018)
38
Letter from U.S. Sec’y of State Rex W. Tillerson to Hon. Paul D. Ryan, Speaker of the
House of Representatives (Apr. 24, 2017)
39
Letter from U.S. Sec’y of State Rex W. Tillerson to Congress (Oct. 13, 2017) (printed in
Non-Proliferation, 2017 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW)
40 U.N. Secretary-General, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), S/2017/1030 (Dec. 8, 2017)
41 Loveday Morris & Karen DeYoung, “Israel Says It Holds a Trove of Documents From
Iran’s Secret Nuclear Archives,” Wash. Post., Apr. 30, 2018
42 Press Statement from Sec’y of State Michael R. Pompeo (Apr. 30, 2018)
43 Letter from President Donald J. Trump to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate (Aug. 6, 2018)
44
Presidential Memorandum on Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking
Additional Action to Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a
Nuclear Weapon (May 8, 2018) IM Annex 31
45
Christopher A. Ford, Assistant Sec’y of State for Int’l Security and Nonproliferation,
Remarks at the DACOR Bacon House, Moving American Policy Forward in the
Aftermath of the Iran Nuclear Deal (July 25, 2018)
46
Joint Statement from Prime Minister May, Chancellor Merkel and President Macron
Following President Trump’s Statement on Iran (May 8, 2018)
47
Hearing on Iran’s Recent Actions and Implementation of the JCPOA Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Under Sec’y of State
Thomas A. Shannon)
48
President Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (May 8,
2018)
49
UN Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, Report of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994)
List of Annexes Accompanying the Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
Submitted by the United States of America
August 23, 2019
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
IRAN
MEMORIAL
ANNEX
50 UN Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, Supplement No. 3, U.N. Doc.
E/1996/23, E/CN.4/1996/177, Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
51 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001)
52
Hearing on Understanding the Role of Sanctions Under the Iran Deal Before the Senate
Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of the
Honorable Juan C. Zarate, Chairman and Co-Founder of the Financial Integrity Network
Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for
Combatting Terrorism, Former Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing
and Financial Crimes)
53 Ben Riley-Smith, “Iran-linked terrorists caught stockpiling explosives in north-west
London,” The Telegraph, June 9, 2019
54 Matthew Levitt, “The Origins of Hezbollah,” The Atlantic, Oct. 23, 2013
55 “In first, Hezbollah confirms all financial support comes from Iran,” Al Arabiya English,
June 25, 2016
56 “Iranians Train Taliban to Use Roadside Bombs,” The Nation Pakistan, Mar. 21, 2010
57 “Captured Taliban Commander: ‘I received Iranian Training,’” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (Aug. 23, 2011)
58 U.N. Secretary-General, Second Report on the Implementation of Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), U.N. Doc. S/2016/1136 (Dec. 30, 2016)
59 Press Release of the Council of the European Union, Iran: Council adopts conclusions
(Feb. 4, 2019)
60 U.N. Secretary-General, First Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), U.N. Doc. S/2016/589 (July 12, 2016)
61 U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, U.N.
Doc. S/2018/594 (Jan. 26, 2018)
62 U.N. Secretary-General, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), U.N. Doc. S/2017/515 (June 20, 2017)
63 U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Chapter Three: Iran (July 2017)
64 Barbara Starr, Nicole Gaouette & Veronica Stracqualursi, “Iran Test-Fires Medium Range
Ballistic Missile, US Official Says,” CNN, July 26, 2019
65 “U.S. Confirms Iran Tested Nuclear-capable Ballistic Missile,” Reuters, Oct. 16, 2015
66
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/48 (Aug. 30, 2007)
67
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and
1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2008/4 (Feb. 22, 2008)
List of Annexes Accompanying the Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
Submitted by the United States of America
August 23, 2019
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
IRAN
MEMORIAL
ANNEX
68
U.N. Panel of Experts Assisting the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, Final Report of the
Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010), U.N. Doc. S/2012/395
(July 12, 2012)
69 Third Six-Month Report of the Facilitator on the Implementation of Security Council
Resolution 2231 (2015), U.N. Doc. S/2017/537 (June 22, 2017)
70 “France says Iran ballistic test provocative and destabilizing,” Reuters, Dec. 3, 2018
71 Statement of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran-Iranian rocket launch on
January 15, 2019 (Jan. 16, 2019)
72 Letter from the Permanent Representative of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
to the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2019/177 (Feb. 20, 2019)
73 Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Iran confirms missile test in defiance of U.S.,” Reuters, Dec. 11,
2018
74 “Iran Wants to Expand Missile Range Despite U.S. Opposition,” U.S. News & World
Report, Dec. 4, 2018
75
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/40/67 (Jan. 30, 2019)
76 Human Rights Watch, Iran: Targeting of Dual Citizens, Foreigners Prolonged
Detention, Absence of Due Process (Sep. 26, 2018)
77 U.S. Dep’t of State, 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran (Mar. 13,
2019)
78
U.N. Human Rights Council, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its Seventy-Ninth Session, 21-25 August 2017: Opinion No. 49/2017
Concerning Siamak Namazi and Mohammed Baquer Namazi (Islamic Republic of Iran),
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2017/49 (Sept. 22, 2017)
79
U.N. Human Rights Council, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its Eighty-Second session, 20–24, August 2018: Opinion No. 52/2018
Concerning Xiyue Wang (Islamic Republic of Iran), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2018/52
(Sept. 21, 2018)
80
Statutory Sanctions of Relevance to the Case: Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, National
Defense Authorization Act FY 2012 Section 1245 (22 U.S.C. § 8513a), Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2012
81 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA),
22 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq. (2010) Annex 16
82 Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42
MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958)
83 Herman Walker, Jr., The Post-War Commercial Treaty Program of the United States, 73
POL. SCI. Q. 57 (1958)
List of Annexes Accompanying the Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
Submitted by the United States of America
August 23, 2019
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
IRAN
MEMORIAL
ANNEX
84 KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THE FIRST BILATERAL INVESTMENTS TREATIES: U.S. POSTWAR
FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION TREATIES 57-60, 311 (2017)
85 Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign
Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP.L. 229 (1956)
86 Wolfgang Saxon, “Herman Walker, 83, Professor and U.S. Foreign Officer, Dies” N.Y.
Times, May 13, 1994
87 Memorandum from Willard Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, to Jack K.
McFall, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs (Dec. 29, 1951)
88 Commercial Treaties with Iran, Nicaragua, and The Netherlands: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong. (1956)(statement of Thorsten V. Kalijarvi,
Dep’t of State)
89 Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United Sates and
Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Greece: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
On Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong. (1952) (statement of Harold F. Linder, Dep’t of State)
90 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United States of America and Iran,
signed at Tehran on August 15, 1955 (January 12, 1956)
91 Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks to the Media (Oct. 3, 2018)
92 Christian Tomuschat, Article 36, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY(3d ed. 2019) 792-793 (Andreas Zimmermann & Christian J.
Tams, eds.)
93 Report of the Sixth Committee, Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice,
U.N. Doc. A/8568 (Dec. 10, 1971)
94 “Complaint Against US To Prove Iran’s Legitimacy; Hague’s Ruling Not Binding,” Mehr
News Agency (Tehran), Aug. 29, 2018
95 Robert Kolb, General Principles of Procedural Law, in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY (3d ed. 2019) 997-1002 (Andreas
Zimmermann & Christian J. Tams eds.)
96 Yuka Fukunaga, Abuse of Process under International Law and Investment Arbitration,
33 ICSID REV. 181 (2018)
97 Negotiations with Iran: Blocking or Paving Tehran’s Path to Nuclear Weapons?, Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong. 39 (March 2015) (statement of
Antony Blinken, then-Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State)
98 Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581
(2005)
99 Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. (2005)
100 Letter from M. Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to
the United Nations (May 10, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/72/869-S/2018/453
List of Annexes Accompanying the Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
Submitted by the United States of America
August 23, 2019
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
IRAN
MEMORIAL
ANNEX
101 Letter from Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the Heads of
State of the Remaining Participants of the JCPOA (May 2019)
102 Letter from M. Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to
Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy (May 2019)
103 Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Remarks at Cabinet Meeting
(May 8, 2019)
104 Javad Zarif @JZarif, TWITTER (July 10, 2019)
105 Javad Zarif @JZarif, TWITTER (July 7, 2019)
106 Javad Zarif @JZarif, TWITTER (July 1, 2019)
107 Iran, Non Paper, Iran’s Decision to Exercise its Rights Under Paragraphs 26 and 36 of
the JCPOA (May 2019)
108 Statement by the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran (May
2019)
109 Malcolm N. Shaw, ROSENNE’S LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: 1920-
2015, Vol. II, 906-907 (5th ed. 2015)
110 WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R
(Apr. 5, 2019)
111 CHARLES H. SULLIVAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,STANDARD DRAFT TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP,
COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND 302-309 (1981)
112 Second Session of the Prep. Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment
(E/PC/T/W/23) (U.S. Delegation) (May 6, 1947)
113 Hearing on the Proposed Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Italian Republic, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 30, 1948) (Statement of
William Thorp)
114 Jonathan B. Schwartz, Controlling Nuclear Proliferation: Legal Strategies of the United
States, 20 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (1988)
115 R.R. WILSON, US COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL Law 153-54 (1960)
116 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Statement by John W. Evans, Vice Chairman of
the Delegation of the United States, GATT/CP.3/38 (June 2, 1949)
117 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Summary Record of the 22nd Meeting,
GATT/CP.3/SR.22 (June 8, 1949)
118 Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif (July 14, 2015)
119 Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif (Apr. 2, 2015)
120 U.S. Dep’t of State, “Press Availability on Nuclear Deal with Iran” (July 15, 2015)
121 Telegram No. 1561 from U.S. Dep’t of State to U.S. Embassy Tehran (Feb. 15, 1955)
List of Annexes Accompanying the Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
Submitted by the United States of America
August 23, 2019
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
IRAN
MEMORIAL
ANNEX
122 Dispatch No. 238 from the U.S. Embassy in The Hague to U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 15,
1954)
123 Hearing before the Senate on the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States of America and Israel, 99th Cong. (July 21, 1953)
124 Dispatch No. 2254 from U.S. High Commission, Bonn to U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 17,
1954)
125 Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations on a Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States of America and the
Republic of China, 80th Cong. 2d Sess., (Apr. 26, 1948) (statement of Charles Bohlen,
Dep’t of State)
126 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Treaty between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Bahrain
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment with Annex and
Protocol, Signed, at Washington on September 29, 1999 (Apr. 24, 2000)
127 R.R. WILSON, U.S. COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-23 (1960)
128 Executive Order 12957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14615 (Mar. 15, 1995)
129 U.N.S.C., 7488thMeeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6442 (July 20, 2015) (Explanation of Vote by
Ambassador Samantha Power of the United States of America)
130 President Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Iran” (Jan. 17, 2016)
131 Jacob J. Lew, Sec’y of the Treasury, “Statement by Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew on
Reaching Implementation Day under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding
Iran’s Nuclear Program” (Jan. 16, 2016)
132 Borzou Daragahi, “Iranian-Backed Militias Set Sights on U.S. Forces,” Foreign Policy
(Apr. 16, 2018)
133 Matthew Levitt, “Iran’s Deadly Diplomats,” CTC Sentinel, Aug. 2018
134 Michael Eisenstat, “Managing Escalation Dynamics with Iran in Syria – and Beyond,”
Washington Institute, July 5, 2017
135 Joint Statement by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, Feb. 27,
2018
136 U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley, Remarks to the Security Council (Aug. 2, 2017)
137 U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley, Remarks to the Security Council (June 29, 2017)
138 U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley, Remarks to the Security Council (May 9, 2017)
139 Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” Remarks
at the Heritage Foundation (May 21, 2018)
140 President Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Iran Strategy (Oct. 13, 2017)
141 President Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the JCPOA (May 8, 2018)
List of Annexes Accompanying the Preliminary Objections in the Case Concerning Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
Submitted by the United States of America
August 23, 2019
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
IRAN
MEMORIAL
ANNEX
143 U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/34/65 (Mar. 17, 2017)
144 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of
Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum
Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)” (May 8, 2018; updated
Aug. 6, 2018)
146 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “May 2018 Guidance on Re-imposing Certain Sanctions with
Respect to Iran” (Nov. 5, 2018)
148 U.S. Dep’t of State & U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “Guidance Relating to the Lifting of
Certain U.S. Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on
Implementation Day” (Jan. 16, 2016)
IM Annex 24
149 U.S. Dep’t of State, “Waiver Determinations and Findings” (Oct. 18, 2015) IM Annex 23
150 U.S. Dep’t of State & U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “Frequently Asked Questions Related
to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) on Implementation Day” (Jan. 16, 2016; updated Dec. 15, 2016)
151 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions”
152 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, “Publication of Updates to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons List and 13599 List Removals” (Nov. 5, 2018)
153 Executive Order 13599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012)
155 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America
and Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 93
IM Annex 1
156 Herman Walker Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50
AM. J. INT’L L. 373 (1956)
157 H.P. Connell, United States Protection of Private Foreign Investment through Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 9 BD. NO. 3 (Sept.
1961)
158 Robert Wilson, Property Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 45
AM. J. INT’L L. 83 (1951)
159 Herman Walker Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign
Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP.L. 229 (1956)
160 CHARLES H. SULLIVAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,STANDARD DRAFT TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP,
COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND 229-230 (1981)
161 CHARLES H. SULLIVAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,STANDARD DRAFT TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP,
COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND 267-268 (1981)
162 Executive Order 13059, 62 Fed. Reg. 44531 (Aug. 21, 1997)
163 Kyle Rempfer, “Iran killed more US troops in Iraq than previously known, Pentagon
says,” Military Times, Apr. 4, 2019
STATUTE
Annex 1
{4 #} IA E A _jdh international Atomic Energy Agency
STATUTE
AS AMENDED UP TO 28 DECEMBER 1989
05-13411 Page 1.indd 1 28/06/2005 09:11:07
Annex 1
tA, {' IA E A i l ~asratonal Atomic eneroy Agney
Annex 1
The Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Ageney, which was
held at the Headquarters of the United Nations. It came into force
on 29 July 1957, upon the fulfilment of the relevant provisions of
paragraph E of Article XXI
The Statute has been amended three times, by application of the
procedure laid down in paragraphs A and C of Article XVIII. On
I January I963 some amendments to the first sentence of the then
paragraph A.3 of Article VI came into force; the Statute as thus
amended was further amended on I June 973 by the coming into
force of a number of amendments to paragraphs A to D of the same
Article (involving a renumbering of sub-paragraphs in paragraph A);
and on 28 December I989 an amendment in the introductory part of
paragraph A.I came into force. All these amendments have been
incorporated in the text of the Statute reproduced in this booklet,
which consequently supersedes all earlier editions.
Annex 1
CONTENTS
Article Title Page
I Establishment of the Agency 5
II Objectives ...• 5
Iii Functions. 5
IV. Membership ...... 9
v. General Conference ........»...... 10
VI. Board of Governors ... 13
vI. S1aff ................................. 16
vm. Exchange of information ....... 18
IX. Supplying of materials. 19
X. Services, equipment, and facilities .......22
XI Agency projects ... 22
XII. Agency nfeguards ........................... 25
XIII. Reimbursement of members ...8..80»»... 29
XIV. Finance 29
Xv. Privileges and immunities. 32
XVI Relationship with other organizations .... 33
XVII Settlement of disputes ......88888.88...... 34
xvm. Amendments and withdrawals ....»»...,, 34
XIX. Suspension of privileges ....... 36
XX. Definitions . .................................... 37
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XXI. Signature, acceptance, and entry into
force 38
XXII. Registration with the United Nations ..... 39
XXIII. Authentic texts and certified copies ....., 40
ANNEX Preparatory Commission ......8.8.8..8.+0.., 4l
Index 43
Annex 1
ARTICLE I
STATUTE
Establishment of the Agency
The Parties hereto establish an International Atomic Energy
Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") upon the
terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
ARTICLE II Objectives
The Ageney shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution
of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its
supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further
any military purpose.
ARTICLE II Fuunctions
A. The Agency is authorized:
• To encourage and assist research on, and development
and practical application of, atomic energy for
peaceful uses throughout the world; and, if requested to
do so, to act as an intermediary for the purposes of
securing the performance of services or the supplying of
5
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materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the
Agency for another; and to perform any operation or
service useful in research on, or development or practical
application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes;
2. To make provision, in accordance with this Statute,
for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet
the needs of research on, and development and practical
application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
including the production of electric power, with due
consideration for the needs of the under-developed areas
of the world;
3. To foster the exchange of scientific and technical
information on peaceful uses of atomic energy;
4. To encourage the exchange and training of scientists
and experts in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy;
5. To establish and administer safeguards designed to
ensure that special fissionable and other materials,
services, equipment, facilities, and information made
available by the Agency or at its request or under its
supervision or control are not used in such a way as to
further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at
the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral
arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that
State's activities in the field of atomic energy;
6. To establish or adopt, in consultation and, where
appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of
6
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the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned,
standards of safety for protection of health and
minimization of danger to life and property (including
such standards for labour conditions), and to provide for
the application of these standards to its own operations as
well as to the operations making use of materials,
services, equipment, facilities, and information made
available by the Agency or at its request or under its
control or supervision; and to provide for the application
of these standards, at the request of the parties, to
operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement,
or, at the request of a State, to any of that State's
activities in the field of atomic energy;
7, To acquire or establish any facilities, plant and
equipment useful in carrying out its authorized functions,
whenever the facilities, plant, and equipment otherwise
available to it in the area concerned are inadequate or
available only on terms it deems unsatisfactory.
B. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall:
I. Conduct its activities in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote
peace and international co-operation, and in conformity
with policies of the United Nations furthering the
establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and
in conformity with any international agreements entered
into pursuant to such policies;
7
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2. Establish control over the use of special fissionable
materials received by the Agency, in order to ensure that
these materials are used only for peaceful purposes;
3. Allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure
efficient utilization and the greatest possible general
benefit in all areas of the world, bearing in mind the
special needs of the under-developed areas of the world;
4. Submit reports on its activities annually to the
General Assembly of the United Nations and, when
appropriate, to the Security Council: if in connexion with
the activities of the Agency there should arise questions
that are within the competence of the Security Council,
the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ
bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and may also take the
measures open to it under this Statute, including those
provided in paragraph C of article XII;
5. Submit reports to the Economic and Social Council
and other organs of the United Nations on matters within
the competence of these organs.
C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make
assistance to members subject to any political, economic,
military, or other conditions incompatible with the provisions
of this Statute.
D. Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms
of agreements concluded between a State or a group of States
8
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and the Agency which shall be in accordance with the
provisions of the Statute, the activities of the Agency shall be
carried out with due observance of the sovereign nights of
States.
ARTICLE IV Membership
A. The initial members of the Agency shall be those States
Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized
agencies which shall have signed this Statute within ninety
days after it is opened for signature and shall have deposited
an instrument of ratification.
B. Other members of the Agency shall be those States,
whether or not Members of the United Nations or of any of
the specialized agencies, which deposit an instrument of
acceptance of this Statute after their memberhip has been
approved by the General Conference upon the recommendation
of the Board of Governors. In recommending and
approving a State for membership, the Board of Governors
and the General Conference shall determine that the State is
able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership
in the Agency, giving due consideration to its ability and
willingness to act in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
C. The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its members, and all members, in order to
9
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ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligation assumed
by them in accordance with this Statute.
ARTICLE V General Conference
A. A General Conference consisting of representatives of all
members shall meet in regular annual session and in such
special sessions as shall be convened by the Director General
at the request of the Board of Governors or of a majority of
members. The sessions shall take place at the headquarters of
the Agency unless otherwise determined by the General
Conference.
B. At such sessions, each member shall be represented by
one delegate who may be accompanied by alternates and by
advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegation shall be
borne by the member concerned.
C. The General Conference shall elect a President and such
other officers as may be required at the beginning of each
session. They shall hold office for the duration of the session.
The General Conference, subject to the provisions of this
Statute, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each member
shall have one vote. Decisions pursuant to paragraph H of
article XIV, paragraph C of article XVIII and paragraph B
of article XIX shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the
10
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members present and voting. Decisions on other questions,
including the determination of additional questions or
categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds
majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present
and voting. A majority of members shall constitute a
quorum.
D. The General Conference may discuss any questions or
any matters within the scope of this Statute or relating to the
powers and functions of any organs provided for in this
Statute, and may make recommendations to the membership
of the Agency or to the Board of Governors or to both on any
such questions or matters.
E, The General Conference shall:
I. Elect members of the Board of Governors in
accordance with article VI;
2. Approve States for membership in accordance with
article IV;
33. Suspend a member from the privileges and rights of
membership in accordance with article XIX;
4. Consider the annual report of the Board;
5. In accordance with article XIV, approve the budget
of the Agency recommended by the Board or return it
with recommendations as to its entirety or parts to the
Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;
II
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6. Approve reports to be submitted to the United
Nations as required by the relationship agreement
between the Agency and the United Nations, except
reports referred to in paragraph C of article XII, or return
them to the Board with its recommendations;
7. Approve any agreement or agreements between the
Agency and the United Nations and other organizations as
provided in article XVI or return such agreements with its
recommendations to the Board, for resubmission to the
General Conference;
8. Approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise
of borrowing powers by the Board, in accordance with
paragraph G of article XIV; approve rules regarding the
acceptance of voluntary contributions to the Agency; and
approve, in accordance with paragraph F of article XIV,
the manner in which the general fund referred to in that
paragraph may be used;
9. Approve amendments to this Statute in accordance
with paragraph C of article XVIII;
10. Approve the appointment of the Director General in
accordance with paragraph A of article VII
F. The General Conference shall have the authority:
I. To take decisions on any matter specifically referred
to the General Conference for this purpose by the Board;
12
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2. To propose matters for consideration by the Board
and request from the Board reports on any matter relating
to the functions of the Agency.
ARTICLE VI Board of Governors
A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:
1. The outgoing Board of Governors shall designate for
membership on the Board the ten members most advanced
in the technology of atomic energy including the production
of source materials, and the member most
advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the
production of source materials in each of the following
areas in which none of the aforesaid ten is located:
(I) North America
(2) Latin America
(3) Western Europe
(4) Eastern Europe
(5) Africa
(6) Middle East and South Asia
(7) South East Asia and the Pacific
(8) Far East.
2. The General Conference shall elect to membership
of the Board of Governors:
(a) Twenty members, with due regard to equitable
representation on the Board as a whole of the
members in the areas listed in sub-paragraph A.I of
13
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this article, so that the Board shall at all times include
in this category five representatives of the area of
Latin America, four representatives of the area of
Western Europe, three representatives of the area of
Eastern Europe, four representatives of the area of
Africa, two representatives of the area of the Middle
East and South Asia, one representative of the area
of South East Asia and the Pacific, and one representative
of the area of the Far East. No member in
this category in any one term of office will be
eligible for re-election in the same category for the
following term of office; and
(b) One further member from among the members in the
following areas:
Middle East and South Asia,
South East Asia and the Pacific,
Far East;
(c) One further member from among the members in the
following areas:
Africa,
Middle East and South Asia,
South East Asia and the Pacific
B. The designations provided for in sub-paragraph A-I of
this article shall take place not less than sixty days before
each regular annual session of the General Conference. The
elections provided for in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article
shall take place at regular annual sessions of the General
Conference
14
Annex 1
C. Members represented on the Board of Governors in
accordance with sub-paragraph A-I of this article shall hold
office from the end of the next regular annual session of the
General Conference after their designation until the end of
the following regular annual session of the General
Conference.
D. Members represented on the Board of Governors in
accordance with sub-paragraph A-2 of this article shall hold
office from the end of the regular annual session of the
General Conference at which they are elected until the
end of the second regular annual session of the General
Conference thereafter.
E. Each member of the Board of Governors shall have one
vote. Decisions on the amount of the Agency's budget shall
be made by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting,
as provided in paragraph H of article XIV. Decisions on
other questions, including the determination of additional
questions or categories of questions to be decided by a twothirds
majority, shall be made by a majority of those present
and voting. Two-thirds of all members of the Board shall
constitute a quorum.
F. The Board of Governors shall have authority to carry out
the functions of the Agency in accordance with this Statute,
subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference as
provided in this Statute.
Annex 1
G. The Board of Governors shall meet at such times as it may
determine. The meetings shall take place at the headquarters
of the Agency unless otherwise determined by the Board.
H. The Board of Governors shall elect a Chairman and other
officers from among its members and, subject to the
provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of
procedure
I. The Board of Governors may establish such committees
as it deems advisable. The Board may appoint persons to
represent it in its relations with other organizations.
J. The Board of Governors shall prepare an annual report to
the General Conference concerning the affairs of the Agency
and any projects approved by the Agency. The Board shall
also prepare for submission to the General Conference such
reports as the Agency is or may be required to make to the
United Nations or to any other organization the work of
which is related to that of the Agency. These reports, along
with the annual reports, shall be submitted to members of the
Agency at least one month before the regular annual session
of the General Conference.
ARTICLE VII Suaff
A. The staff of the Agency shall be headed by a Director
General. The Director General shall be appointed by the
16
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Board of Governors with the approval of the General
Conference for a term of four years. He shall be the chief
administrative officer of the Agency.
B. The Director General shall be responsible for the appointment,
organization, and functioning of the staff and shall be
under the authority of and subject to the control of the Board
of Governors. He shall perform his duties in accordance with
regulations adopted by the Board.
C. The staff shall include such qualified scientific and
technical and other personnel as may be required to fulfil the
objectives and functions of the Agency. The Ageney shall be
guided by the principle that its permanent staff shall be kept
to a minimum.
D, The paramount consideration in the recruitment and
employment of the staff and in the determination of the
conditions of service shall be to secure employees of the
highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and
integrity. Subject to this consideration, due regard shall be
paid to the contributions of members to the Agency and to the
importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical
basis as possible.
E. The terms and conditions on which the staff shall be
appointed, remunerated, and dismissed shall be in accordance
with regulations made by the Board of Governors,
subject to the provisions of this Statute and to general rules
17
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approved by the General Conference on the recommendation
of the Board.
F. In the performance of their duties, the Director General
and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any
source external to the Agency. They shall refrain from any
action which might reflect on their position as officials of the
Agency; subject to their responsibilities to the Agency, they
shall not disclose any industrial secret or other confidential
information coming to their knowledge by reason of their
official duties for the Agency. Each member undertakes to
respect the international character of the responsibilities of
the Director General and the staff and shall not seek to
influence them in the discharge of their duties.
G. In this article the term "staff includes guards.
ARTICLE VIII Exchange of information
A. Each member should make available such information as
would, in the judgement of the member, be helpful to the
Agency.
B. Each member shall make available to the Agency all
scientific information developed as a result of assistance
extended by the Agency pursuant to article XI.
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C. The Agency shall assemble and make available in an
accessible form the information made available to it under
paragraphs A and B of this article. It shall take positive steps
to encourage the exchange among its members of information
relating to the nature and peaceful uses of atomic energy and
shall serve as an intermediary among its members for this
purpose.
ARTICLE IX Supplying of materials
A. Members may make available to the Agency such
quantities of special fissionable materials as they deem
advisable and on such terms as shall be agreed with the
Agency. The materials made available to the Agency may, at
the discretion of the member making them available,
be stored either by the member concerned or, with the
agreement of the Agency, in the Agency's depots.
B. Members may also make available to the Agency source
materials as defined in article XX and other materials. The
Board of Governors shall determine the quantities of such
materials which the Agency will accept under agreements
provided for in article XIII
C. Each member shall notify the Agency of the quantities,
form, and composition of special fissionable materials,
source materials, and other materials which that member is
prepared, in conformity with its laws, to make available
19
Annex 1
immediately or during a period specified by the Board of
Governors.
D. On request of the Agency a member shall, from the
materials which it has made available, without delay deliver
to another member or group of members such quantities of
such materials as the Agency may specify, and shall without
delay deliver to the Agency itself such quantities of such
materials as are really necessary for operations and scientific
research in the facilities of the Agency.
E. The quantities, form and composition of materials made
available by any member may be changed at any time by the
member with the approval of the Board of Governors.
F. An initial notification in accordance with paragraph C of
this article shall be made within three months of the entry into
force of this Statute with respect to the member concerned.
In the absence of a contrary decision of the Board of
Governors, the materials initially made available shall be for
the period of the calendar year succeeding the year when this
Statute takes effect with respect to the member concerned.
Subsequent notifications shall likewise, in the absence of a
contrary action by the Board, relate to the period of the
calendar year following the notification and shall be made no
later than the first day of November of each year.
G. The Agency shall specify the place and method of
delivery and, where appropriate, the form and composition,
20
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of materials which it has requested a member to deliver from
the amounts which that member has notified the Agency it is
prepared to make available. The Agency shall also verify the
quantities of materials delivered and shall report those
quantities periodically to the members.
H. The Agency shall be responsible for storing and protecting
materials in its possession. The Agency shall ensure that
these materials shall be safeguarded against () hazards of the
weather, (2) unauthorized removal or diversion, (3) damage
or destruction, including sabotage, and (4) forcible seizure.
In storing special fissionable materials in its possession, the
Agency shall ensure the geographical distribution of these
materials in such a way as not to allow concentration of large
amounts of such materials in any one country or region of the
world.
I. The Agency shall as soon as practicable establish or
acquire such of the following as may be necessary:
I. Plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt,
storage, and issue of materials;
2. Physical safeguards;
3. Adequate health and safety measures;
4. Control laboratories for the analysis and verification
of materials received;
5. Housing and administrative facilities for any staff
required for the foregoing.
Annex 1
J. The materials made available pursuant to this article shall
be used as determined by the Board of Governors in accordance
with the provisions of this Statute. No member shall
have the right to require that the materials it makes available
to the Agency be kept separately by the Agency or to
designate the specific project in which they must be used.
ARTICLE X Services, equipment, and facilities
Members may make available to the Agency services, equipment,
and facilities which may be of assistance in fulfilling
the Agency's objectives and functions.
ARTICLE XI Agency projects
A. Any member or group of members of the Agency desiring
to set up any project for research on, or development or
practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes
may request the assistance of the Agency in securing special
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, and
facilities necessary for this purpose. Any such request shall
be accompanied by an explanation of the purpose and extent
of the project and shall be considered by the Board of
Governors.
22
Annex 1
B. Upon request, the Agency may also assist any member or
group of members to make arrangements to secure necessary
financing from outside sources to carry out such projects. In
extending this assistance, the Agency will not be required to
provide any guarantees or to assume any financial responsibility
for the project.
C. The Agency may arrange for the supplying of any
materials, services, equipment, and facilities necessary for
the project by one or more members or may itself undertake
to provide any or all of these directly, taking into consideration
the wishes of the member or members making the
request.
D. For the purpose of considering the request, the Agency
may send into the territory of the member or group of
members making the request a person or persons qualified to
examine the project. For this purpose the Agency may, with
the approval of the member or group of members making the
request, use members of its own staff or employ suitably
qualified nationals of any member.
E. Before approving a project under this article, the Board
of Governors shall give due consideration to:
I. The usefulness of the project, including its scientific
and technical feasibility;
2. The adequacy of plans, funds, and technical
personnel to assure the effective execution of the project;
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3. The adequacy of proposed health and safety
standards for handling and storing materials and for
operating facilities;
4. The inability of the member or group of members
making the request to secure the necessary finances,
materials, facilities, equipment, and services;
5. The equitable distribution of materials and other
resources available to the Agency;
6, The special needs of the under-developed areas of
the world; and
7, Such other matters as may be relevant.
F. Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an
agreement with the member or group of members submitting
the projeet, which agreement shall:
I. Provide for allocation to the project of any required
special fissionable or other materials;
2. Provide for transfer of special fissionable materials
from their then place of custody, whether the materials be
in the custody of the Agency or of the member making
them available for use in Agency projects, to the member
or group of members submitting the project, under
conditions which ensure the safety of any shipment
required and meet applicable health and safety standards;
3. Set forth the terms and conditions, including charges,
on which any materials, services, equipment, and
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facilities are to be provided by the Agency itself, and, if
any such materials, services, equipment, and facilities are
to be provided by a member, the terms and conditions as
arranged for by the member or group of members
submitting the project and the supplying member;
4. Include undertakings by the member or group of
members submitting the project: (a) that the assistance
provided shall not be used in such a way as to further any
military purpose; and (b) that the project shall be subject
to the safeguards provided for in article XII, the relevant
safeguards being specified in the agreement;
5. Make appropriate provision regarding the rights and
interests of the Agency and the member or members
concerned in any inventions or discoveries, or any patents
therein, arising from the project;
6. Make appropriate provision regarding settlement of
disputes;
7, Include such other provisions as may be appropriate.
G. The provisions of this article shall also apply where
appropriate to a request for materials, services, facilities, or
equipment in connexion with an existing project.
ARTICLE XII 4gency safeguards
A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement
where the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to
25
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apply safeguards, the Agency shall have the following rights
and responsibilities to the extent relevant to the project or
arrangement
L. To examine the design of specialized equipment and
facilities, including nuclear reactors, and to approve it
only from the view-point of assuring that it will not
further any military purpose, that it complies with
applicable health and safety standards, and that it will
permit effective application of the safeguards provided for
in this article;
2. To require the observance of any health and safety
measures prescribed by the Agency;
3, To require the maintenance and production of
operating records to assist in ensuring accountability for
source and special fissionable materials used or produced
in the project or arrangement;
4. To call for and receive progress reports;
5. To approve the means to be used for the chemical
processing of irradiated materials solely to ensure that this
chemical processing will not lend itself to diversion of
materials for military purposes and will comply with
applicable health and safety standards; to require that
special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a
by-product be used for peaceful purposes under continuing
Agency safeguards for research or in reactors,
existing or under construction, specified by the member
or members concerned; and to require deposit with the
26
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Agency of any excess of any special fissionable materials
recovered or produced as a by-product over what is
needed for the above-stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling
of these materials, provided that thereafter at the
request of the member or members concerned special
fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency shall
be returned promptly to the member or members
concerned for use under the same provisions as stated
above.
6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or
States inspectors, designated by the Agency after consultation
with the State or States concerned, who shall have
access at all times to all places and data and to any person
who by reason of his occupation deals with materials,
equipment, or facilities which are required by this Statute
to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source and
special fissionable materials supplied and fissionable
products and to determine whether there is compliance
with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any
military purpose referred to in sub-paragraph F4 of
article XI, with the health and safety measures referred to
in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article, and with any other
conditions prescribed in the agreement between the
Agency and the State or States concerned. Inspectors
designated by the Agency shall be accompanied by
representatives of the authorities of the State concerned,
if that State so requests, provided that the inspectors shall
not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise
of their functions;
27
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7, In the event of non-compliance and failure by the
recipient State or States to take requested corrective steps
within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate
assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment
made available by the Agency or a member in furtherance
of the project.
B. The Agency shall, as necessary, establish a staff of
inspectors. The Staff of inspectors shall have the responsibility
of examining all operations conducted by the Agency
itself to determine whether the Agency is complying with the
health and safety measures prescribed by it for application to
projects subject to its approval, supervision or control, and
whether the Agency is taking adequate measures to prevent
the source and special fissionable materials in its custody or
used or produced in its own operations from being used in
furtherance of any military purpose. The Agency shall take
remedial action forthwith to correct any non-compliance or
failure to take adequate measures.
C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility
of obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in subparagraph
A-6 of this article and of determining whether
there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in subparagraph
F-4 of article XI, with the measures referred to in
sub-paragraph A-2 of this article, and with all other conditions
of the project prescribed in the agreement between the
Agency and the State or States concerned. The inspectors
shall report any non-compliance to the Director General
28
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who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of
Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or
States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds
to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance
to all members and to the Security Council and General
Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of failure of the
recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within
a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both of the
following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of
assistance being provided by the Agency or by a member,
and call for the return of materials and equipment made
available to the recipient member or group of members. The
Agency may also, in accordance with article XIX, suspend
any non-complying member from the exercise of the
privileges and rights of membership.
ARTICLE XIII Reimbursement of members
Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of
Governors and the member furnishing to the Agency
materials, services, equipment, or facilities, the Board shall
enter into an agreement with such member providing for
reimbursement for the items furnished.
ARTICLE XIV Finance
A. The Board of Governors shall submit to the General
Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of
29
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the Agency. To facilitate the work of the Board in this
regard, the Director General shall initially prepare the budget
estimates. If the General Conference does not approve the
estimates, it shall return them together with its recommendations
to the Board, The Board shall then submit further
estimates to the General Conference for its approval.
B. Expenditures of the Agency shall be classified under the
following categories:
I. Administrative expenses: these shall include:
(a) Costs of the staff of the Agency other than the staff
employed in connexion with materials, services,
equipment, and facilities referred to in subparagraph
B-2 below; costs of meetings; and expenditures
required for the preparation of Agency
projects and for the distribution of information;
(b) Costs of implementing the safeguards referred to in
article XII in relation to Agency projects or, under
sub-paragraph A-S of article II, in relation to any
bilateral or multilateral arrangement, together
with the costs of handling and storage of special
fissionable material by the Agency other than
the storage and handling charges referred to in
paragraph E below;
2. Expenses, other than those included in subparagraph
I of this paragraph, in connexion with any
materials, facilities, plant, and equipment acquired or
established by the Agency in carrying out its authorized
30
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functions, and the costs of materials, services, equipment,
and facilities provided by it under agreements with one or
more members.
C. In fixing the expenditures under sub-paragraph B-1 (b)
above, the Board of Governors shall deduct such amounts as
are recoverable under agreements regarding the application
of safeguards between the Agency and parties to bilateral or
multilateral arrangements.
D, The Board of Governors shall apportion the expenses
referred to in sub-paragraph B-I above, among members
in accordance with a scale to be fixed by the General
Conference. In fixing the scale the General Conference shall
be guided by the principles adopted by the United Nations in
assessing contributions of Member States to the regular
budget of the United Nations.
E. The Board of Governors shall establish periodically a
scale of charges, including reasonable uniform storage and
handling charges, for materials, services, equipment, and
facilities furnished to members by the Agency. The scale
shall be designed to produce revenues for the Agency
adequate to meet the expenses and costs referred to in subparagraph
B-2 above, less any voluntary contributions
which the Board of Governors may, in accordance with
paragraph F, apply for this purpose. The proceeds of such
charges shall be placed in a separate fund which shall be used
to pay members for any materials, services, equipment, or
facilities furnished by them and to meet other expenses
31
Annex 1
referred to in sub-paragraph B-2 above which may be
incurred by the Agency itself.
F. Any excess of revenues referred to in paragraph E over
the expenses and costs there referred to, and any voluntary
contributions to the Agency, shall be placed in a general fund
which may be used as the Board of Governors, with the
approval of the General Conference, may determine
G. Subject to rules and limitations approved by the General
Conference, the Board of Governors shall have the authority
to exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the Agency
without, however, imposing on members of the Agency any
liability in respect of loans entered into pursuant to this
authority, and to accept voluntary contributions made to the
Agency.
H. Decisions of the General Conference on financial
questions and of the Board of Governors on the amount of the
Agency's budget shall require a two-thirds majority of those
present and voting.
ARTICLE XV Privileges and immunities
A. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each member
such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the exercise of its functions.
32
Annex 1
B. Delegates of members together with their alternates and
advisers, Governors appointed to the Board together with
their alternates and advisers, and the Director General and
the staff of the Agency, shall enjoy such privileges and
immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of
their functions in connexion with the Agency.
C. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to
in this article shall be defined in a separate agreement or
agreements between the Agency, represented for this purpose
by the Director General acting under instructions of the
Board of Governors, and the members.
ARTICLE XVI Relationship with other organizations
A. The Board of Governors, with the approval of the General
Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or
agreements establishing an appropriate relationship between
the Agency and the United Nations and any other organizations
the work of which is related to that of the Agency.
B. The agreement or agreements establishing the relationship
of the Agency and the United Nations shall provide for:
I. Submission,by the Agency of reports as provided for
in sub-paragraphs B-4 and B-5 of artiole III;
2. Consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating
to it adopted by the General Assembly or any of the
33
Annex 1
Councils of the United Nations and the submission of
reports, when requested, to the appropriate organ of the
United Nations on the action taken by the Agency or by
its members in accordance with this Statute as a result of
such consideration.
ARTICLE XVII Settlement of disputes
A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Statute which is not settled by negotiation
shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in
conformity with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties
concerned agree on another mode of settlement.
B. The General Conference and the Board of Governors are
separately empowered, subject to authorization from the
General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on
any legal question arising within the scope of the Agency's
activities.
ARTICLE XVIII Amendments and withdrawals
A. Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any
member. Certified copies of the text of any amendment
proposed shall be prepared by the Director General and
34
Annex 1
communicated by him to all members at least ninety days in
advance of its consideration by the General Conference.
B. At the fifth annual session of the General Conference
following the coming into force of this Statute, the question
of a general review of the provisions of this Statute shall be
placed on the agenda of that session. On approval by a
majority of the members present and voting, the review will
take place at the following General Conference. Thereafter,
proposals on the question of a general review of this Statute
may be submitted for decision by the General Conference
under the same procedure.
C. Amendments shall come into force for all members when:
(i) Approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds
majority of those present and voting after consideration
of observations submitted by the Board of
Governors on each proposed amendment, and
(ii) Accepted by two-thirds of all the members in
accordance with their respective constitutional
processes. Acceptance by a member shall be effected
by the deposit of an instrument of acceptance
with the depositary Government referred to in
paragraph C of article XXI
D. At any time after five years from the date when this
Statute shall take effect in accordance with paragraph E of
article XXI or whenever a member is unwilling to accept an
amendment to this Statute, it may withdraw from the Agency
Annex 1
by notice in writing to that effect given to the depositary
Government referred to in paragraph C of article XXI,
which shall promptly inform the Board of Governors and all
members.
E. Withdrawal by a member from the Agency shall not affect
its contractual obligations entered into pursuant to article XI
or its budgetary obligations for the year in which it
withdraws.
ARTICLE XIX Suspension of privileges
A. A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the
payment of its financial contributions to the Agency shall
have no vote in the Agency if the amount of its arrears equals
or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the
preceding two years. The General Conference may,
nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied
that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control
of the member.
B. A member which has persistently violated the provisions
of this Statute or of any agreement entered into by it pursuant
to this Statute may be suspended from the exercise of the
privileges and rights of membership by the General Conference
acting by a two-thirds majority of the members present
and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors.
36
Annex 1
ARTICLE XX Definitions
As used in this Statute:
I. The term "special fissionable material" means
plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the
isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more
of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as
the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine;
but the term " special fissionable material" does not
include source material.
2. The term "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or
233" means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233
or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the
sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the
ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in
nature
3, The term "source material" means uranium containing
the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature;
uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of
the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical
compound, or concentrate; any other material containing
one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the
Board of Governors shall from time to time determine;
and such other material as the Board of Governors shall
from time to time determine
37
Annex 1
ARTICLE XXI Signature, acceptance, and entry into
force
A. This Statute shall be open for signature on 26 October
1956 by all States Members of the United Nations or of any
of the specialized agencies and shall remain open for
signature by those States for a period of ninety days.
B. The signatory States shall become parties to this Statute
by deposit of an instrument of ratification.
C. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and
instruments of acceptance by States whose membership has
been approved under paragraph B of article IV of this Statute
shall be deposited with the Government of the United States
of America, hereby designated as depositary Government.
D. Ratification or acceptance of this Statute shall be effected
by States in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes.
E. This Statute, apart from the Annex, shall come into force
when eighteen States have deposited instruments of ratification
in accordance with paragraph B of this article,
provided that such eighteen States shall include at least three
of the following States: Canada, France, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Instru38
Annex 1
ments of ratification and instruments of acceptance deposited
thereafter shall take effect on the date of their receipt.
F. The depositary Government shall promptly inform all
States signatory to this Statute of the date of each deposit of
ratification and the date of entry into force of the Statute. The
depositary Government shall promptly inform all signatories
and members of the dates on which States subsequently
become parties thereto
G. The Annex to this Statute shall come into force on the first
day this Statute is open for signature.
ARTICLE XXII Registration with the United Nations
A. This Statute shall be registered by the depositary
Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
B. Agreements between the Agency and any member or
members, agreements between the Agency and any other
organization or organizations, and agreements between
members subject to approval of the Agency, shall be
registered with the Agency. Such agreements shall be
registered by the Agency with the United Nations if
registration is required under Article 102 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
39
Annex 1
ARTICLE XXIII Authentic texts and certified copies
This Statute, done in the Chinese, English, French, Russian
and Spanish languages, each being equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the depositary Government. Duly
certified copies of this Statute shall be transmitted by the
depositary Government to the Governments of the other
signatory States and to the Governments of States admitted
to membership under paragraph B of article IV.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have
signed this Statute
DONE at the Headquarters of the United Nations, this
twenty-sixth day of October, one thousand nine hundred and
fifty-six.
40
Annex 1
ANNEX
PREPARATORY COMMISSION
A. A Preparatory Commission shall come into existence on the first
day this Statute is open for signature. It shall be composed of one
representative each of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America, and one
representative each of six other States to be chosen by the International
Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. The Preparatory Commission shall remain in existence until
this Statute comes into force and thereafter until the General
Conference has convened and a Board of Governors has been
selected in accordance with article VI,
B, The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a
loan provided by the United Nations and for this purpose the
Preparatory Commission shall make the necessary arrangements
with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations, including
arrangements for repayment of the loan by the Agency. Should these
funds be insufficient, the Preparatory Commission may accept
advances from Governments. Such advances may be set off against
the contributions of the Governments concerned to the Agency.
C. The Preparatory Commission shall:
L. Eleet its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedure,
meet as often as necessary, determine its own place of meeting
and establish such committees as it deems necessary;
2. Appoint an executive secretary and staff as shall be necesSary,
who shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as
the Commission may determine;
4l
Annex 1
3. Make arrangements for the first session of the General
Conference, including the preparation of a provisional agenda
and draft rules of procedure, such session to be held as soon as
possible after the entry into force of this Statute;
4. Make designations for membership on the first Board of
Governors in accordance with sub-paragraphs A-I and A-2 and
paragraph B of article VI;
5. Make studies, reports, and recommendations for the first
session of the General Conference and for the first meeting of the
Board of Governors on subjects of concern to the Agency
requiring immediate attention, including (a) the financing of the
Agency; (b) the programmes and budget for the first year of the
Agency; (c) technical problems relevant to advance planning of
Agency operations; (d) the establishment of a permanent Agency
staff; and (e) the location of the permanent headquarters of the
Agency;
6. Make recommendations for the first meeting of the Board
of Governors concerning the provisions of a headquarters agreement
defining the status of the Agency and the rights and
obligations which will exist in the relationship between the
Agency and the host Government;
7.(a) Enter into negotiations with the United Nations with a
view to the preparation of a draft agreement in accordance with
article XVI of this Statute, such draft agreement to be submitted
to the first session of the General Conference and to the first
meeting of the Board of Governors; and
(b) make recommendations to the first session of the Conference
and to the first meeting of the Board of Governors
concerning the relationship of the Agency to other international
organizations as contemplated in article XVI of this Statute.
42
Annex 1
INDEX
A
Acceptance of the Statute _.
Accountability for source and special
fissionable materials for safeguards
purposes .»...
Administrative expenses •
Admission of members
Approval by the General Conference
Recommendation by the Board
Requirements
Advisers
pewileges and Immunities of
To delegates to the General Conference ....
To members of the Board
Africa
Representation on the Board
Agency projects ......
Agency Safeguards .•
Agreements
Between Member States (registration)
Between the Agency and a State or group
of States .oooooo
43
Articles
see Statute
XIL.A.3 and 6, and C
see Contributions
IV.B, V.E.2
IV.B
Iv.B
XV.B and C
v.B
XV.B
VIA.I and 2
see Projects
see Safeguards
XXL.B
111.D
Annex 1
Between the Agency and one or more
members
On Agency projects .»»0....
Registration ......,
Between the Agency and the United
Nations or other organizations
Approval by the General Conference
or return to the Board ...
Conclusion by the Board ...8088888+,
Mandatory clauses •
Registration .o»+»
Defining legal capacity of the Agency
On Agency projects ....808088880+....%
On reimbursement of members ....
Registration with the Agency ••..
Registration with the United Nations •.
Violation of
Aerates
Privileges and immunities
To delegates to the General Conference
To members of the Board •
Amendments to the Statute ..,
Appointment of staff .....»08+0800+oooo+
Areas, Representation on the Board •.•...
Assistance
Curtailment, suspension or termination
for nor-compliance with safeguards
undertakings.
In setting p projects, see also Projects ••
Not to be subject to political, economic,
military or other considerations
44
XL.F
XXIL.B
V.E.7
XVLA
XVI.B
XXII.B
xv.€
XI.F
XIII
XXJI.B
XXII.B
XIX.B
XV.Band C
v.B
Xv.B
see Statute
VIL.B and E
VLA. and 2
XILA.7 and €
XL.A
I.C
Annex 1
Not to be used to further any military
purpose.
Atomic energy
Contribution to world peace, health
and prosperity
Peaceful uses of ..•..
8
Board of Governors
Acceptance of voluntary contributions
Borrowing powers
Chairman, Election of the ..•
Committees of
Composition of
Decisions, Voting on
Designation of members •
Time-limits for
Election
Of Officers ......
Of the Chairman ..•
Election of members .....•.
Date of ......
Re-election, Eligibility for
Functions .
Loans entered into by .•
Meetings
Costs.
Date and Place
45
II, IIL.A.S, XL.F.4,
XILA.I, XII A.6
and B
II
IIL.A.1, 2.3 and 4,
B.2, VIL.C
XIV.G
V.E.8, XI.G
VLH
VI.I
VL.A.I and 2
VIE and XIV H
VLA.I and B
VIB
VIH
VL.H
VILA.2
VI.B
VIA.2
VLF
V.E.8. XIV.G
XIV.B.I(a)
VI.G
Annex 1
Members most advanced in the
technology of atomic energy ..
Members producers of source material
Privileges and immunities of members ...
Projects, Consideration and approval of ...
Quorum
Recommendation to the General Conference
On amendments to the Statute ...
On staffing questions ....
On suspension of membership rights
and privileges ...»+Regional
representation .......,
Relationship agreements with the United
nations and other organizations
Reports
On Agency projects
Time-limit for submission
To the General Conference .•.
To the United Nations and other
organizations
Representation with other organizations
Requests
Foe advisory opinion of International
Court of Justice ....
Foe convening special sessions of the
General Conference
Responsibility to the General Conference
Rules of procedure
Source materials, determination of
quantities to be accepted by the Agency
Term of office of members ....++Voting
On decisions in general
On the amount of the budget
Voting rights in
Suspension of .•••
46
VLA.I
VLA.I
XV.B and C
XL.E
VIE
XVIII.C()
VIL.E
XIX.B
VL.A.I and 2
XVIA
VLJ
VLJ
VL.J
VLJ
VI.I
XVII.B
V.A
VL.F
VLH
IX.B
LC and D
VIE
XIV.H
VIE
XIX.A
Annex 1
Budget
Amount, to be decided by the Board
Estimates, to be approved by the General
Conference •.••
Estimates prepared by the Director
Gcntnl .
Estimates returned to the Board ..ooooo++
Estimates submitted by the Board to the
General Conference ..08888080%.
Budgetary obligations ......»......
C
Chairman of the Board, Election of .•
Charges for storage and handling of
materials supplied to members ..
Chanter of the United Nations
Chemical processing of irradiated materials.
Committees of the Board ...oooooooo..
Composition of the Board ......•..•.
Confidential information not to be
disclosed by Agency staff
Contractual obligations
47
VL.E and XIV.H
V.E.5
XIV.A
V.E.Sand XIV.A
XIV.A
VI.H
XIV.E
see United Nations
XILA.5
VI
VLA
VIL.F
see Obligations,
contractual
Annex 1
Contributions to the regular budget
(administrative expenses)
Arrears in payment, consequences
Assessment principles ....
Contributions, voluntary .....
Convening of meetings
Board
General Conference •..
Costs ...
D
Dates
Of Board meetings
Of entry into force of amendments to
the Statute ....
Of entry into force of the Annex to the
Statute .•...
Of entry into force of the Statute
Of opening the Statute for signature
Decisions
Of the Board
By simple majority.
By a two-thirds majority ..
On additional questions to be decided
by a two-thirds majority
48
XIX.A
XIV.D
see Voluntary
contributions
VI.G
V.A
see Expenditures and
under appropriate item
VI.G
XVII C
XXL.G
XXIE
XXL.A
VI.E
VIE, XIV.H
XIV.H
Annex 1
On the amount of the budget ..++++...
Of the General Conference
By simple majority ...»8++...,
By a two-thirds majority .•..•
On additional questions to be decided
by a two-thirds majority ..»+++++.....
On amendments to the Statute ..+80++....
On financial question$ .+0++++++++8080
On suspension of membership privileges
and riJhts ............••...••..••.•.••...•...•
Definitions
Of "source material
Of special fissionable material" ...80»...
Of uranium enriched in the isotopes
235 or 23)" .
Delegates
Privileges and immunities of .+0+++0,
To the General Conference.
Depositary Government
Deposit of the Statute in the archives of •..
Designation of ......+880ooooooooooooo
Notifications to be sent to signatories
and members
Deposit of instruments
Of acceptance of amendments to the Statute
Of acceptance of the Statute ..»»....
Of ratification of the Statute ..+oo%so»»++»
Deposit of the Statute in the archives of
the depositary Government ....,
49
XIV.H
v.€
V.C XIV.H,
XVIII.C() and XIX.B
v.€
XVIII.C(
XIV.H
XIX.B
XX.3
XX.
XX.2
XV.B and C
v.B
XXIII
XXI.C
XXL.F
XVIII.C(
IV.B, XXL.C, E and F
IV.A, XXLB. C. E
and F
XXII
Annex 1
Designation of members of the Board by
the outgoing Board ........•
Date of •
Members technologically most advanced •
Members producers of source materials ..•
Term of office of designated members •••
Deector General
Administrative grade
Approval of appointment by the General
Conference ++++89+888oooo+
F11nc1io,u ..•.............•..•.......•.
International character of responsibilities .•
Privileges and immunities ....6008++8+%%%
Responsibility to the Board ..••
Term of office .60880+......
Disarmament, worldwide
Dispute$ ..........•.......•.........•...........••..•
E
Eastern Europe,
Representation on the Board .•
Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations
Reports by the Agency to ••..•
Resolutions to be considered by the
Agency
50
VIA.I
VI.B
VLA.I
VLA.
I.c
VIL.A
V.E.I0 and VIL. A
VIL.B
VIL.F
Xv.Band C
VI.B
VIL.A
111.B.1
see Settlement of
disputes
VLA.I and 2
I1B.5
XV1B.2
Annex 1
Elections
Of officers of the Board
Of officers of the General Conference
Of the Chairman of the Board .
Of the President of the General Conference
To the Board
Dace .
Equitable geographical distribution ..
Re-election ••.
Term of office of elected member¢
Eatry into force
Of the Annex to the Statute
Of the Statute ..••
Date (to be communicated by the
depositary Government) .•
Equipment ...•
Esablishment of the Agency.
Exchange and training of scientists and
upe:ru .
Echange of scientific and technical
information ....,
Expenditures of the Agency
Administrative (Regular budget
Apportionment among members
Definition
Financing
Fling ••
Classification
Non-administrative (operational budget)
Definition
51
VI.H
VC
VvJ..H
VIB
VLA.2
VIA.2
VI.D
XXLG
XXI.E
XXI.F
see Materials
IIL A.4
111.A.3. VIII C
XIV.D
XIV.B.I
XIV.D
XIV.C
XIV.B.I and 2
XIV.B.2
Annex 1
Financing
On Agency projects
On distribution of information
On materials handling and storage ....
On meetings of the General Conference
and Board
On safeguards.
On staff
Experts (sent to examine projects) •
F
Facilities
Far East, representation on the Board
Finance
Apportionment of administrative expenses
among members ........
Budget; Annual budget estimates
Contributions to the regular budget
Contributions, voluntary
Decisions on financial questions, Voting on
In the Board, on the amount of the
budget •...
In the General Conference
Expenses
52
XIV.E and F
XIV.B.I
XIV.B.Ia)
XIV.B.1() and E
XIV.B.I(a)
XIV.B.1()
XIV.B.I and 2
XL.D
see Materials
VL.A.I and 2
XIV.D
XIV.A
see Contributions to
the regular budget
see Voluntary
contributions
XIV.H
XIV H
see Expenditures
Annex 1
Financing of Agency projects
Financing of expenses.
Fund (for revenue from storage and
handling charges in connection with
supply of materials etc. to members)
General Fund. Establishment and use of
Liability not to be incurred
By members in respect of loans entered
into by the Board
By the Agency in respect of projects
undertaken by members
Loans entered into by the Board ....•....
Materials, Cost of.
Reimbursement of members for materials
or services furnished.
Safeguards
Costs of
Amounts recoverable under safeguards
agreements to be deducted from nonadministrative
expenses
Scale of charges for storage and handling
of materials etc. furnished to members
fuel elements ...».....
Functions
Of the Agengy
Of the Board of Governors.
Of the Director General .•..
Of the General Conference.
Fund
General, Establishment and use of
Separate (for revenue from storage and
handling charges in connection with
supply of materials etc. to members)
XLB, EA4 and F.3
see Expenditures
XIV.E
V.E.8 and XIV.F
XIV.G
XIB
V.E.8, XIV.G
XIV B.2
XII
XIV.B.1(b)
XIV.C
XIV.E
see Materials
IIL. A
VLF and J
VI1B
V.E and F
V.E.8 and XIV.F
XIV.E
Annex 1
G
General Assembly of the United Nations
General Conference
Competence of
Composition of
Election of
Members of the Board
Officers of •
The President of
Functions of
Approval of
Admission of new members
Agreements with the United Nations or
other organizations ......
Amendments to the Statute ........
Appointment of Director General ...
Budget ..•...
General Fund, use of
Reports to the United Nations ....
Review of the Statute
Rules for the acceptance of voluntary
contributions ++Rules
for the exercise of borrowing
powers by the Board ..+988888+++..
Consideration of the Board's annual
report
Decision on matters referred to it by
the Board
Suspension of members from privileges
ad rights of membership .....8+8++....
Meetings of ....•••
Cost of meetings ..•
Proposals and requests to the Board
54
see United Nations
v.D
V.A
V.E.I, VIA.2and B
v.c
v.c
VE2andIV.B
V.E.7and XVL.A
V.E.9 and XVII.C()
V.E.IO and VIL.A
V.E.5 and XIV.A
V.E.8 and XIV.F
V.E.6
XVI1LB
V.E.8
V.E.8and XIV.G
V.E4
V.F.I
V.E.3 and XI
V.A
XIV.B.I(a)
V.F.2
Annex 1
Recommendations to
Members of the Agency
On questions within the scope of
the Statute
The Board
On agreements with other organizations
On questions within the scope of the
Statute
On reports to the United Nations ....
On the draft budget_
Request to the International Court of
Justice for advisory opinions
Sessions of
Convening of ....+
Cost of attendance at
Place of
Regular and special ..
Representation at •..
Voting
By simple majority
By two-thirds majority
On additional questions to be decided
by two-thirds majority ..........,
On amendments to the Statute ......
On financial questions .•.
On suspension of privileges and rights
of membership
Voting rights, suspension of
Permission to vote granted in certain
circumstances ...
General Fund
Establishment of
Use of .•
Guards, To be included under "star
55
VD
V.E.7
v.D
V.E.6
V.E.5
XVII B
V.A
v.B
V.A
V.A
V.B
v.c
V.C. XIV.H,
XVIII C(), XIX.B
v.c
XVIIL.C()
XIV.H
XIX.B
XIX.A
XIX.A
XIV.F
V.E.8 and XIV.F
VIL.G
Annex 1
H
Handling of materials.
Health and safety standards
Adequacy for Agency projects
Application to
Agency projects •....
A State's activities
Operations using materials, services, etc.
pplied by or through the Agency.
Operations under bilateral or multilateral
arrangements ....,
The Agency's own operations
The transfer of special fissionable
materials •..•
Establishment or adoption in consultation
and collaboration with the United
Nations
I
Information
Accessibility of, to Agency inspectors ••.
Collection and distribution of ....•.•
Confidential information not to be
disclosed by staff
Exchange of information to be fostered ..•
Safeguards against misuse of ..
Supply of, by members ........
56
see Storage of
materials
XL.E.3
XIE.3 and F.2
IIL.A.6
IILA.6
IILA.6
IIL.A.6
XIE.2
IIL.A.6
XIL.A.6
IIL.A.3 and VIII.C
VILF
IILA.3 and VIII.C
IILA5S
VIll.A and B
Annex 1
Inspectors
Access to places, data and persons
Establishment of a staff of .....
Functions of _.coo»+
Reports by, in the event of non-compliance
Sending of, to recipient States
State representatives to accompany
inspectors
Instruments
Intermediary, the Agency's role as, in
Securing financing for projects ....»........
Securing the performance of services or
the supply of materials etc. among
members •
Supplying materials etc. for projects •..•....
The exchange and training of scientists
and experts .0++%0%%%
The exchange of information .....»»+....,
International character of the responsibilities
of the Director General and the staff •...
International Court of Justice
Advisory opinions of .•
Arbitration by .»+ooooo+++
Inventions or discoveries, Rights in
radiated materials, Chemical processing of
XIL.A.6
XII.B
XIL.B and C
XL.C
XIL.A.6
XIL.A.6
see Deposit of
instruments
XL.B
IIL. A.I
XI.C
[IL.A.4
VIII
VIL.F
XVII.B
XVIL. A
XL.F.5S
XIL.A.5
Annex 1
L
Laboratories for verification of materials
received
Labour conditions, Safety standards for.
Languages of the Statute
Latin America, representation on the Board
Legal capacity of the Agency .•
To be defied in agreements ....Liability.
Loans entered into by the Board •.•••
M
Materials, facilities, equipment and services
Furnished by or through the Agency ...
Allocation to projects ••.
Charges and other conditions
Delivery ..».++ooooooo++
Equitable distribution of .•
Safeguards to be applied to
(see also Safeguards)
IX.LA
IL.A.6
XXII
VLA I and 2
XV.A and C
xv.C
see Finance and
Responsibility
V.E.8. XIV.G
IIL A.I and 2,
IX.D. XI
XL.F.L
XI.F.3
IX.D and G
XL.E.5
ILA.5
Annex 1
Storage and handling of
Charges for ..•
Cost of ...
Irradiated materials, chemical
processing of
Made available to the Agency
Delivery of
Health and safety measures in respect of
Notification of
To members.
To the Agency
Quantities, form and composition of
Receipt of
Reimbursement of members for •
Safe custody of .....
Staff required for storage, etc
Cost of .o»so+Housing
and administrative
facilities for
Storage of..
Cost of ......,,
Use of .
Verification of quantities of •..
Withdrawal and return of
Safeguarding of nuclear materials ...
Source materials (see also Materials
furnished by or through the Agency and
Materials made available to the Agency)
Definition ..
Special fissionable materials (see also
Materials furnished by or through the
Agency and Materials made available to
the Agency)
Control over the use of
(see also Safeguards)
Definition
59
XIV.E
XIV.E
XILA.5
IX.D and G
IX.I3
IX.G
IX.C and F
IX.C, E and G
IX.G and 1.1
XIII
IX.H and L2
XIV.B.2
IX.LS
IX.A, Hand L.I
XIV.B.I(b)
IX.J
IX.G and I4
XIL.A.T and C
see Safeguards
XX.3
II1.B.2
XX.I
Annex 1
Lange amounts not be concentrated
in one country or area
Transfer of ...
Meetings, Convening of
Of the Board
Of the General Conference
Members of the Agency
Initial members •
Obligations ....
Other than initial members •.
Requirements for membership
Suspension of privilege ......Voting
nights ..........••
Withdrawal from membership
Obligations not affected by
Members of the Board
Designated by the Board
Date of designation
Term of office
Elected by the General Conference.
Date of election ..0.......
Reelection, Eligibility for ....+......,
Term of office
Privileges and immunities.
Voting rights ..••...•
Middle East and South Asia,
Representation on the Board
Military purpose, Assistance not to be
used for any ...0+...
60
IX.H
XL.F.2
VIG
V.A
IV.A
see Obligations of
membership
Iv.B
Iv.B
XIX
see Voting rights
XVIIID
XVIILE
VLA.I
VI.B
VI.C
VLA.
VI.B
VLA.2
VL.D
XV.Band C
VLE and XIX.A
VL.A.I and 2
IL. IILA.S, XL.F.4,
XIL.A.I and 6 and B
Annex 1
N
ion-compliance with undertakings
In regard to contributions .....
In regard to safeguards.
Resulting from the Statute ..•
North America, Representation on the
Board .
Nuclear power.
0
Objectives of the Agency
Obligations, Budgetary
Not affected by withdrawal from the
Agency .•
Obligations, Contractual
Eary into ....•
Not affected by withdrawal from the
Agency
Obligations of membership
In respect of the Charter of the United
Nations
In respect of statutory obligations
Supply of information helpful to the
Agency
Supply of scientific information resulting
from assistance received ..•
61
XIX.A
XILA.7, B and C
XIXB
VLA.I
IIL. A.2
II
XVIII.E
XI
XVII.E
Iv.B
Iv.€
VIIL. A
VIIL.B
Annex 1
Otters of the Board. Election of ......»»+Oqgeers
of the General Conference
Election and term of office of ....+
Operating records •.•....
Operational budget
Organs provided for in the Statute
Powers and functions
p
Peifie ...oooo».
Patents in regard to inventions or
discoveries arising from Agency projects
Peaceful uses of atomic energy ..o»++
Puce of meetings
Of the Board ..
Of the General Conference ..++8+»88888....
Prant .....•........•...••.....
Powers and functions of organs provided
for in the Statute ..» ooooo+
62
VLH
v.c
see Records
see Expenditures,
non-administrative
v.D
see South East Asia
and the Paeifie
XL.F.5
ILA.I, 2. 3 and 4,
B.2, VIII.C
VI.G
V.A
see Materials
v.D
Annex 1
Preparatory Commission ...
President of the General Conference,
Election of ..o+Principles
of the Agency
Assistance not to further military
purposes •...
Atomic energy, contribution to peace,
health and prosperity
Equitable distribution of resources
(for projects) .....
Equitable geographical distribution in
the staff
Equitable regional representation on the
Board
Peaceful application of atomic energy
Permanent staff to be kept to a minimum .•
Peace and international co-operation •
Sovereign equality of members ......,,
Sovereign rights of members, respect for
World-wide disarmament
Peileges and immunities
Definition in agreements.
Of delegates, alternates and advisers
Of members of the Board. alternates
and advisers .•...
Of the Agency ..•
Of the Director General and staff
63
Ann
v.c
II, IILA.S, XL.F.4,
XIL A.I and 6 and B
II
XL.E.5
VII.D
VLA2
IIL.A.1, 2. 3 and 4,
B.2, VIII.C and
XIL.A.6
VII.C
III.B.I
Iv.C
lll.D
111.B.1
xv.€
XV.Band C
Xv.Band C
XV.A and C
XV.B and C
Annex 1
Pileges and rights of membership
Suspension for non-compliance with
safeguards undertakings ....0+%+Suspension
for violation of the Statute
or agreements ..,
Suspension of voting rights .•.
Projects of the Agency
Adequacy of plans, funds and personnel ••
Agreements on, Mandatory clauses ...,
Allocation of materials ..0+++888888
Disputes, settlement of ..
Patent rights in inventions and
ii4overs ~ooooooo+
Terms and conditions of supply .....,
Transfer of materials 0+++++++00088.+%%%
Undertaking regarding military purposes
Undertaking regarding safeguards ........
Consideration by the Board ..oooooo++
Equitable distribution of resources ...+».%
Financial guarantees or responsibility not
to be assumed by the Agency ...fieeing
.660++0+00866600++++%+
Health and safety standards ...++++8++++..
Materials necessary for the project ...•...•
Materials counting ..6++++0+++0+++++++
Missions to examine projects ...oo%+°
Requests in connection with existing
projects ......
Requests to be accompanied by explanatory
statement$ 0»+++++++
Safeguards, Application of ..
Suspension or termination of assistance
for non-compliance with safeguards
obligations ...
Under-developed areas, Needs of ....+.....
64
xn.c
V.E.3 and XIX.B
XIX.A
XIE.2
XL.F
XL.F.L
XL.F.6
XL.F.5
XL.F.3
XI.F.2
XL.F.4
XL.F.4
XLA and E
XL.E.5
XLB
XL.B and E.4
XLE.3 and F.2
XI A and C
XIL.A.3 and 6, and C
XI.D
XL.G
XL.A
XL.F.4
XIL.A.7, B and €
XL.E.6
Annex 1
Q
Quorum
In the Board •.••..
In the General Conference .....
R
Ratification of the Statute
Recommendations
Of the Board to the General Conference
On amendments to the Statute ...».+%,
On staff questions
On suspension of rights and privileges •.
Of the General Conference
To members of the Agency
On questions within the scope of the
Statute ..•
To the Board
On agreements with other organizations
On draft budget estimates
On questions within the scope of the
Su1u1c .
On reports to the United Nations ....,,
Records (Operating records required in
connection with safeguards) ....0.,
Recruitment of staff
Re election of members of the Board
65
VLE
v.€
see Statute
XVIII.C()
VIL.E
XIX.B
v.D
V.E.7
V.E.5
V.D
V.E.6
XIL.A.3
VII.D
VL.A.2
Annex 1
Regional representation of the Board •.....•..
Registration
Of agreements
Of the Statute
Regular budget.
Regulations, Staff Regulations and Rules .••
Reimbursement of members for items
fumit.hed .
Relationship with other organizations
Agreement ++++98oooooo
Mandatory clauses (of agreement with
the United Nations) , .0+0+880+..
Representation of the Board ....o»»oooooo++
Remuneration of staff
Reports
By the Agency
Approval by the General Conference •.•.
To the Economic and Social Council
Te the General Assembly 0+80808+...
To the Security Council ..•..
To United Nations organs.
By the Board
Tie-limit for submission to members ...
To the General Conference, annual report
To the General Conference, on Agency
projects .
To the United Nations and other
organizations ....+.,
VLA.I and 2
XXIL.B
XXIL.A
see Expenditures,
administrative
VIL.B and E
XIII and XIV.E
XVL.A
XVI.B
VL.I
VIL.E
V.E.6
I1.B.5
III.B.4 and VI.J
II.B.4 and XII.C
II1B.5
VLJ
V.E.4 and VLJ
VLJ
VLJ and XIL.C
Annex 1
By the Inspectors.
Progress reports (in connection with
safeguards)
Representation in the General Conference
epresentation of the Board in relations
with other organizations.
Requests
To the Agency
For application of health and safety
standards •.
For application of safeguards ..••
For assistance in setting up projects
(see also Projects).
For materials etc. needed for projects
For special sessions of the General
Conference ..» •.
To the International Court of Justice for
advisory opinions ..•.
Resolutions of the General Assembly or
Councils of the United Nations to be
considered by the Agency
Responsibility
Of members not engaged in respect of
loans .••
Of the Agency for storing and protecting
materials in its possession .»++++
Of the Agency not engaged in connection
with projects ...+Of
the Board to the General Conference ...
Of the Director General to the Board
67
XII.C
XIL.A.4
V.A and B
VI.I
IIL.A.6
ILA.S
XL.A
XL.G
V.A
XVIL.B
XVI.B.2
XIV.G
IX.H
XI B
VLF
VIL.B
Annex 1
Revenue ..•
Review of the Statute ....
Rights and privileges of membership
Rules of procedure
Of the Board
Of the General Conference
s
Safeguards
Accounting for source and special
fissionable materials .....
Action in the event of non-compliance
with obligations ..»..Application
to bilateral or multilateral
arrangements
Application to the activities of a State
Approval of means for the chemical
processing of irradiated materials
Diversion of materials •
Establishment and administration of
Examination and approval of plant design.
Excess quantities of special fissionable
materials to be deposited with the
Agency •.•..
Expenditure on
Health and safety measures ....
68
see Contributions,
Scale of charges,
Voluntary
contributions
XVIIL.B
see Privileges and
rights of membership
VI.H
v.c
XIL.A 3 and 6 and C
XIL.A., B and C
IIL.A.S
ILA.5
XIL.A.S
XIL.A.S and C
IIL.A.5S
XIL A.
XIL.A.5
XIV.B.1(b)
XILA.1, 2,5,6
and 7, and B
Annex 1
ln11peCtors .
Operating records ...8++»+0+»+oo
Progress reports ......••........•..............
Rights and responsibilities of the Agency .•
Safeguards, Physical ....0».........
Safety ••
Safety standards for labour conditions ••••
Salaries of wff .
Scale of charges for materials storage and
luindlin& ......................•...•......••.
bale of contributions to the regular
budget (administrative expenses)
Principles to be used in fixing ..0+».,
Secrets, Industrial secrets not to be
disclosed .oooo++
Security Council (of the United Nations)
Consideration by the Agency of
resolutions of
Notification of questions within its
competence .
Notification of non-compliance with
safeguards undertakings ..0+++»++ooo»++
Reports by the Agency to ..8+.00+....
beparate fund (for revenue from storage
and handling charges).
69
XIL.A.6
XILA.3
XIL.A.4
XIL. A
Ix L.2
see Health and
safety standards
IIL.A.6
VIL.E
XIV.E
XIV.D
VIL.F
XVI.B.2
ILL.B.4
xn.c
111.B.4
XIV.E
Annex 1
beparation from service •
Service
Sessions of the General Conference
Settlement of disputes
Arbitration, negotiation or other means
provision to be made in project agreements
Signature of the Statute .....+++++++o++
Date of opening for ..o»»»»+++
Time-limit for
Simple majority
Decisions in the Board by
Decisions in the General Conference by •
Source materials (see also Materials
furnished by or through the Agency and
Materials made available to the Agency)
Definition ..o+.
South Asia .•.....................•......•..........•
South East Asia and the Pacific
Representation on the Board •
Sovereign equality of members •
Sovereign rights of States, Observance of
Satf
Appointment
Conduct in the performance of duties
70
VIL.E
see Materials
V.A
XVIL.A
XL.F.6
XXL.A
XXL.A
IV.A and XXL.A
VI.E
V.C and XVIL.B
XX.3
see Middle East and
South Asia
VIA.I and 2
Iv.c
m.D
VIL.B and E
VIL.F
Annex 1
Director General ..0888++.
Expense$ ,0++88ooooo
Guards to be included under "staff ~....
International character of responsibilities ...
Principles
Of geographical distribution ....
Of keeping permanent staff to a
fnintnfn ooooooo
Privileges and immunities ...•.....
Recruitment •
Regulations and Rules ....,
Salaries •
Termination o»+++o++o++++
Use on missions, for examining projects
Staff of inspectors ...o»»»+
State
Acceptance
Deposit of instruments
In accordance with constitutional
procedures .,
Amendments to
Acceptance of.
Approval of proposals for ......
Certified copies of proposals for,
communication to members .+++
Entry into force of
Non»acceptance by a member
Submission of proposals for .•..
Tiee-limit for communication of
proposals for ..+s..
Voting on ..•
Authentic text$ 0f .0+88++.88++ooooooooo
Certified copies, Communication of ...
Of amendments to the Statute ..»+....
71
see Director General
XIV.B.I
VIL.G
VIL.F
VIL.D
VI.C
XV.B and C
VIL.D
vIL.B and E
VIL.E
VIL.E
XL.D
see Inspectors
IV.B, XXLC, E and F
XXL.D
xVIL.C6
V.E.9
XVIIL.A
XVIII.C
XVIII.D
XVIIL.A
XVIIL. A
XVIII.B and C
XXII
XXIII
XVIIL. A
Annex 1
Of the Statute
Deposit
Of instruments of acceptance
Of instruments of ratification
Of the Statute in the archives of the
depositary Government
Entry into fonce of
Languages of
Ratification of
Deposit of instruments •
In accordance with constitutional
procedures
Notification of members of deposit of
instruments •
Registration with the United Nations ......•
Review of
Settlement of disputes concerning
interpretation or application ....
Signature
Date of opening for .....».......
Tie-limit for ....•
Violation of •.•
Storage of materials ..•
Scale of charges for ...0...
Suspension from privileges and rights of
membership
foe non-compliance with safeguards
undertakings ...
For persistent violation of the Statute
or agreements ...
Suspension of voting rights
72
XX1I
IV.B, XXIC, E and F
IV.A. XXL.B. C. E
and F
XXII
XXLE and F
XXIII
IV.A. XXLB. C. E
and F
XXL.D
XXL.F
XXIL.A
XVIL.B
XVIL.A
XXL.A
IV.A and XXL.A
XIX.B
IX.A. Hand I
XIV.E
XII.C
XIX.B
XIX.A
Annex 1
T
Term of office
Of the Director General ••.•••
Of the members of the Board
Of the President and officers of the
General Conference ....+..
Termination of staff •
Terms and conditions of supply for
Agency projects
Tice-limits
Date after which a member may withdraw
For communication of proposed
amendments of the Statute ......++..
For designation of members of the Board
For notification of initial offers of
materials •...
For signature and ratification of the Statute
For submission of reports to members
Two-thirds majority
Decisions in the Board by
Decisions in the General Conference by •..
u
nder-developed areas
Consideration to be given to special
needs
73
VIL.A
VI.C and D
v.c
VIL.E
XL.F.3
XVIL.D
XVIIL.A
VI.B
IX.F
IV.A and XXL.A
VI.J
VLE and XIV.H
V.C, XIV.H. XVIII.C
and XIX.B
IIL A.2 and B.3
and XL.E.6
Annex 1
United Nations
Authorization by General Assembly to
request advisory opinions of the
International Court of Justice ...»»+%%Chanter
Article 102 (Registration of agreements
and the Statute) •.
Ability of members to act in accordance
with the purposes and principles of ...•
Conduct of activities in accordance with
the United Nations' policy of world-wide
disarmament and principles of peace and
international co-operation 00+88+8+.,
Consideration of resolutions of the
General Assembly or the Councils of
Consultation and collaboration in
establishing or adopting health and
safety standards ..+»...
Contributions to regular budget assessed
on the basis of the principles of the
United Nations ..++++++0++o++++
Notification of the General Assembly and
Security Council of non-compliance
with safeguards undertakings •.
Registration
Of agreeements with members, between
members or with other organizations _.,
Of the Statute by the depositary
Government ..•..•.............•....•...•.....
Reports by the Agency
Approval by the General Conference ..•.
On non-compliance with safeguards
undertakings ++o%%
Preparation by the Board ...0++08++,,
To the Economic and Social Council
To the General Assembly •.
74
XVII B
XXIL.A and B
IV.B
II.B.I
XVI1B.2
IIL.A.6
XIV.D
XII.C
XXI.B
XXIL. A
V.E.6
XI.C
VLJ
11.B.5
IIL.B.4
Annex 1
To the Security Council
To United Nations Organs
United States of America, Depositary
Government ..•
Uranium enriched in the isotopes 25 or
233, Definition
V
Violation of the Statute or agreements,
consequences of .•
Voluntary contributions
Acceptance by the Board
Approval of rules for acceptance by the
General Conference ....
Deduction from sum required for nonadministrative
costs •
Establishment of a General Fund for .....
Use of
Voting
In the Board
By simple majority
By two-thirds majority
On the amount of the budget
To determine additional questions to be
decided by two-thirds majority .•
In the General Conference
By simple majority .....•
111 B 4
I1.B.5
XXI.C
XX.2
XIX.B
XIV.G
V.E.8
XIV.E
XIV F
V.E.8 and XIV.F
VIE
VLE, XIV.H
XIV.H
VL.E
v.C and XVIII.B
Annex 1
by two-thirds majority .»+»+ooooooo++
On amendments to the Statute ....+...
On financial questions ....+....
On general review of the Statute •...••.
On suspension of rights and privileges .•
To determine additional questions to be
decided by two-thirds majority ....+..
Voting rights
In the Board ••....
In the General Conference ..++++006++%.,
Suspension for non-payment of
contributions
Permission to vote granted in certain
ciKUrnsiances ····•·······••··••••••·••·•••
w
Western Europe
representation on the Board ....,
Withdrawal from membership .•.•
Date after which a member may withdraw
Obligations not affected by ....++888+00+..,
Withdrawal of materials etc. for noncompliance
with safeguards undertakings.
We4d-wide disarmament ..,
76
V.C, XIV.H,
XVIL.C() ad
XIX.B
XVIII.C()
XIV.H
xVII1.B
XIX.B
v.€
VI.E
v.€
XIX.A
XIX.A
VL.A.I and 2
XVIIL.D
XVIII.D
XVIIL.E
XIL.A.T
IL.B.L
Derestricted 19 June 2003
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 19 June 2003)
Board of Governors
GOV/2003/40
Date: 6 June 2003
Original: English
For official use only
Item 7 (b) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2003/32)
Implementation of the
NPT safeguards agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
A. Introduction
1. At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 17 March 2003, the Director General reported on
discussions taking place with the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) on a number
of safeguards issues that needed to be clarified and actions that needed to be taken with regard to the
implementation of the Agreement between Iran and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in
connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Safeguards
Agreement)1. This report provides further information on the nature of the safeguards issues involved
and the actions that need to be taken, and describes developments in this regard since March. More
general reporting of safeguards implementation in Iran is not addressed in this document, but in the
Safeguards Implementation Reports.2
B. Recent Developments
2. At the September 2002 regular session of the IAEA General Conference, Vice President of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), H.E. Mr.
R. Aghazadeh, stated that Iran was “embarking on a long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants
with a total capacity of 6000 MW within two decades”. He also stated that such a sizeable project
entailed “an all out planning, well in advance, in various field of nuclear technology such as fuel cycle,
safety and waste management”.
___________________________________________________________________________
1 The Safeguards Agreement, reproduced in document INFCIRC/214, entered into force on 15 May 1974.
2 The Agency has been applying safeguards at a range of facilities in Iran since the mid-1970s pursuant to
its Safeguards Agreement. The list of facilities under safeguards is set out in the Annex to this report.
Annex 2
GOV/2003/40
Page 2
3. During the General Conference, the Director General met with the Vice President, and asked that
Iran confirm whether it was building a large underground nuclear related facility at Natanz and a
heavy water production plant at Arak, as reported in the media in August 2002. The Vice President
provided some information on Iran’s intentions to develop further its nuclear fuel cycle, and agreed on
a visit to the two sites later in 2002 by the Director General, accompanied by safeguards experts, and
to a discussion with Iranian authorities during that meeting on Iran’s nuclear development plans.
4. The visit to Iran was originally scheduled for October 2002, but finally took place from
21 to 22 February 2003. The Director General was accompanied by the Deputy Director General for
Safeguards (DDG-SG) and the Director of the Division of Safeguards Operations (B).
5. During his visit, the Director General was informed by Iran of its uranium enrichment programme,
which was described as including two new facilities located at Natanz, namely a pilot fuel enrichment
plant (PFEP) nearing completion of construction, and a large commercial-scale fuel enrichment plant
(FEP) also under construction. These two facilities were declared to the Agency for the first time
during that visit, at which time the Director General was able to visit both of them. Iran also confirmed
that the heavy water production plant3, referred to in paragraph 3 above, was under construction in
Arak.
6. During the visit, the Director General was informed that Iran would accept modifications to its
Subsidiary Arrangements, as requested by the Board of Governors in 19924, which would henceforth
require the early provision of design information on new facilities and on modifications to existing
facilities, as well as the early provision of information on new locations outside of facilities where
nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs). This was confirmed to the Agency in a letter dated
26 February 2003 (see paragraph 15 below).
7. In addition, in response to the Agency’s enquiry about certain transfers of nuclear material to Iran,
only recently confirmed by the supplier State in response to repeated Agency enquiries, Iran
acknowledged the receipt in 1991 of natural uranium, which had not been reported previously to the
Agency, in the form of UF6 (1000 kg), UF4 (400 kg) and UO2 (400 kg), which was now being stored at
the previously undeclared Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) located at the Tehran
Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC). Iran also informed the Agency that it had converted most of the
UF4 into uranium metal in 2000 at JHL. This information was subsequently confirmed by Iran in a
separate letter to the Agency dated 26 February 2003.
8. During the discussions in Iran in February between DDG-SG and the Iranian authorities, reference
was made by the Agency to information in open sources on the possible conduct of enrichment
activities at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. The Iranian authorities
acknowledged that the workshop had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but
stated that there had been no operations in connection with its centrifuge enrichment development
programme involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any
other location in Iran. According to the Iranian authorities, all testing had been carried out using
simulation studies. While a centrifuge component production facility is not a nuclear facility required
to be declared to the Agency under Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran was requested, in light of
its stated policy of transparency, to permit the Agency to visit the workshop and to take environmental
samples there to assist the Agency in verifying Iran’s declaration and confirming the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities. The request was initially declined. The Iranian authorities
___________________________________________________________________________
3 Heavy water production facilities are not nuclear facilities under comprehensive NPT safeguards
agreements, and are thus not required to be declared to the Agency thereunder.
4 GOV/2554/Att.2/Rev.2; GOV/OR/777, paras. 74-76.
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told the Agency that Iran considered such visits, and the requested environmental sampling, as being
obligatory only when an Additional Protocol was in force. However, they subsequently agreed to
permit access to the workshop (to limited parts of the location in March, and to the entire workshop in
May), and have recently indicated that they would consider permitting the taking of environmental
samples during the visit of the Agency’s enrichment experts to Iran scheduled to take place between
7 and 11 June 2003 (see paragraph 11 below).
9. On 26 February 2003, a list of additional questions and requests for clarification was submitted to
Iran regarding its centrifuge and laser enrichment programmes and its heavy water programme, and a
written reply requested. A written response was received from Iran on 4 June 2003, and its contents
will be followed up with the Iranian authorities.
10. In a letter dated 5 May 2003, Iran informed the Agency for the first time of its intention to
construct a heavy water research reactor at Arak (the 40 MW(th) Iran Nuclear Research Reactor IR-
40). Iran also informed the Agency of its plan to commence construction in 2003 of a fuel
manufacturing plant at Esfahan (FMP).
11. During a meeting between the Vice President and the Director General on 5 May 2003, the
Director General reiterated the Agency’s earlier request for permission to send Agency inspectors to
the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, and to take environmental samples. The
Director General also referred to an earlier proposal the Agency had made in April for a group of
Agency experts to visit Iran to discuss the centrifuge research and development programme to seek to
assess how the current status of the project could have been achieved without using any nuclear
material during tests. Iran agreed to consider the proposal for an expert mission, and subsequently
agreed that the mission could take place from 7 to 11 June 2003.
C. Implementation of Safeguards
12. Article 8 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement requires Iran to provide the Agency with information
“concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities
relevant to safeguarding such material.”
13. As provided for in Article 34(c) of the Safeguards Agreement, nuclear material of a composition
and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, and any nuclear material
produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is subject to all of the safeguards procedures
specified in the Agreement. These procedures include, inter alia, requirements for Iran to report to the
Agency changes in the inventory of nuclear material through the submission of inventory change
reports (ICRs).5 Certain inventory changes entail additional reporting requirements. These include the
import of nuclear material in quantities in excess of one effective kilogram, which, in accordance with
Article 95 of the Safeguards Agreement, requires reporting to the Agency in advance of the import.
___________________________________________________________________________
5 Inventory changes, as defined in Article 98.J of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, include, for example,
imports, exports, domestic receipts and shipments, production of nuclear material in a reactor, loss of nuclear
material due to its transformation into other elements or isotopes as a result of nuclear reactions, accidental
losses of nuclear material and the generation of waste from processing which is deemed to be unrecoverable for
the time being but which is stored.
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14. To enable the Agency to verify the inventory and flow of nuclear material, Iran is also required to
provide design information on facilities (as defined in Article 98.I of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement),
and information on LOFs. Pursuant to Article 42 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the time limit for
the provision of design information on new nuclear facilities is to be specified in the Subsidiary
Arrangements, but in any event it is to be provided “as early as possible before nuclear material is
introduced into a new facility”. Article 49 requires that information on LOFs be provided “on a timely
basis”.
15. The Subsidiary Arrangements General Part in force with Iran from 1976 to 26 February 2003
included what was, until 1992, standard text which called for provision to the Agency of design
information on a new facility no later than 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into
the facility, and the provision of information on a new LOF together with the report relating to the
receipt of nuclear material at the LOF. With the acceptance by Iran on 26 February 2003 of the
modifications to the Subsidiary Arrangements proposed by the Agency, the Subsidiary Arrangements
General Part now requires Iran to inform the Agency of new nuclear facilities and modifications to
existing facilities through the provision of preliminary design information as soon as the decision to
construct, to authorize construction or to modify has been taken, and to provide the Agency with
further design information as it is developed. Information is to be provided early in the project
definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.
C.1. Imported Nuclear Material
16. The UF6, UF4 and UO2 imported by Iran in 1991 are materials that, as provided for in Article 34(c)
of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, are subject to all of the safeguards procedures specified in the
Agreement, including, in particular, the requirement to report inventory changes. Therefore, Iran was
obliged to have reported the import of the material in question at the time of import. Equally, Iran was
obliged to have reported design information as soon as possible before nuclear material was
introduced to the receiving facility, and a Facility Attachment concluded for that facility.
17. In its letter of 26 February 2003 confirming its receipt of the material in question, Iran stated that
its interpretation of Articles 34(c) and 95 of the Safeguards Agreement had been that no reporting to
the Agency was required since the total amount of uranium did not exceed one effective kilogram.
However, as indicated in paragraph 13 above, all material referred to in Article 34(c) of the Safeguards
Agreement must be reported to the Agency. Article 95 simply imposes an additional requirement, that
of advance notification, with respect to imports of material in excess of one effective kilogram.
18. Iran submitted on 15 April 2003 an ICR with regard to the import of the nuclear material, and, on
5 May 2003, preliminary design information for JHL, where most of the material is currently being
stored.
C.1.1. Processing of UF6
19. The Iranian authorities have stated that the imported UF6 has not been processed, and specifically
that it has not been used in any enrichment, centrifuge or other tests. The one large and two small UF6
cylinders declared as containing the imported UF6 were shown to the Agency in February. The
cylinders were made available for Agency verification at JHL in March, at which time, after the
Agency inspectors noted that one of the small cylinders was lighter than declared, the State authorities
explained that a small amount of the UF6 (1.9 kg) was missing due to leaking valves on the two small
cylinders. It was explained during the subsequent inspection in April that the leaks had only been
noticed a year before. Final evaluation will be completed when destructive samples have been taken,
environmental samples have been analysed, and supporting documentation provided by the operator
has been examined.
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C.1.2. Processing of UF4
20. Iran has informed the Agency that most of the imported UF4 was converted to uranium metal at
JHL. While the equipment for the conversion process has been dismantled and stored in a container
(shown to the Agency during the February visit), Iran is now refurbishing that part of the facility as a
uranium metal processing laboratory. The uranium metal, together with the remaining UF4 and the
related waste, has been presented for Agency verification. Final evaluation will be done when the
results of destructive analysis become available, and supporting documentation provided by the
facility operator has been examined. The role of uranium metal in Iran’s declared nuclear fuel cycle
still needs to be fully understood, since neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water
reactors require uranium metal for fuel.
C.1.3. Processing of UO2
21. During the February 2003 discussions, the Agency was informed by Iran that some of the
imported UO2 had been used at JHL for the testing of uranium purification and conversion processes.
The experiments involved the dissolution of UO2 with nitric acid, and the use of the resulting uranyl
nitrate for testing a pulse column and ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC) production processes
envisioned for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), a facility declared to the Agency in 2000 and
currently under construction at Esfahan. In April, in response to Agency enquiries, the Iranian
authorities informed the Agency that some of the UO2 had also been used for isotope production
experiments, including the undeclared irradiation of small amounts of the UO2, at the Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR). In addition, they informed the Agency that another small amount of UO2 had been
used in pellets to test the chemical processes of the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope
Production Facility (MIX Facility). The unused UO2 has been presented for Agency verification at
JHL.
22. Most of the UO2 used in the UCF-related experiments has been presented for Agency verification
as liquid waste at Esfahan; the remaining waste has been disposed of at a location near Qom and
cannot be verified. The whereabouts of the AUC produced during the UCF-related experiments is
being discussed. Final evaluation of the accountancy will be completed when the results of destructive
analysis become available, and the supporting documentation provided by the facility operator has
been examined.
23. With respect to the isotope production experiments, Iran has stated that small amounts of the
imported UO2 were prepared for targets at JHL, irradiated at TRR, and sent to a laboratory belonging
to the MIX Facility in Tehran for separation of I-131 in a lead-shielded cell. Iran has informed the
Agency that the remaining nuclear waste was solidified and eventually transferred to a waste disposal
site at Anarak. The operators at TRR and the MIX Facility have provided supporting documentation,
which is being examined. The Agency is still awaiting relevant updated design information for the
MIX Facility and TRR. Plans are in place to visit the waste site at Anarak in June.
24. With respect to the UO2 to test the chemical processes of the MIX Facility, the material, including
the resulting waste, has been presented for Agency verification at JHL. Final evaluation will be
completed when the results of the destructive analysis become available, and supporting
documentation provided by the facility operator has been examined.
C.2. Uranium Enrichment Programme
25. During the visit of the Director General in February 2003, the Vice President informed the Agency
that over 100 of the approximately 1000 planned centrifuge casings had already been installed at the
pilot plant and that the remaining centrifuges would be installed by the end of the year. In addition, he
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informed the Agency that the commercial scale enrichment facility, which is planned to contain over
50 000 centrifuges, was not scheduled to receive nuclear material in the near future.
26. The Agency has been informed that the pilot enrichment plant is scheduled to start operating in
June 2003, initially with single machine tests, and later with increasing numbers of centrifuges. The
Iranian authorities have also informed the Agency that the commercial enrichment plant is planned to
start accepting centrifuges in early 2005, after the design is confirmed by the tests to be conducted in
the pilot enrichment plant. Iran has also stated that the design and research and development work,
which had been started about five years ago, were based on extensive modelling and simulation,
including tests of centrifuge rotors both with and without inert gas, and that the tests of the rotors,
carried out on the premises of the Amir Khabir University and the AEOI in Tehran, were conducted
without nuclear material.
27. In May 2003, Iran provided preliminary design information on the enrichment facilities under
construction in Natanz, which are being examined by the Agency. Since March 2003, Agency
inspectors have visited facilities at Natanz three times to conduct design information verification and
to take environmental samples at the pilot enrichment plant. A first series of environmental and
destructive analysis samples has been taken at a number of locations. Additional samples are expected
to be taken in the near future. Iran has co-operated with the Agency in this regard. The Agency has
presented to the Iranian authorities a safeguards approach for the pilot enrichment plant.
28. As indicated above, on 26 February 2003, the Agency forwarded a number of questions regarding
Iran’s research and development on centrifuges, including the chronology of its enrichment
programme, with a view to assessing, inter alia, Iran’s declaration that it had been developed without
the centrifuges having been tested with UF6 process gas. Similar questions and concerns have been
raised by the Agency in relation to the UO2, UF4 and UF6 production at the large scale conversion
facility UCF, which is stated to have been constructed without any testing, even on a small scale, of
key processes.
29. The Agency is also pursuing enquiries into Iran’s laser programme. Iran has acknowledged the
existence of a substantial programme on lasers, and Agency inspectors have visited some locations
said to have been involved in that programme. However, Iran has stated that no enrichment related
laser activities have taken place.
C.3. Heavy Water Programme
30. According to information provided by the Iranian authorities (see Section B above), the Iranian
heavy water reactor programme consists of the heavy water production plant currently under
construction at Arak; the 40 MW(th) IR-40, construction of which is planned to start at Arak in 2004;
and the FMP at Esfahan, construction of which is planned for 2003, commissioning for 2006 and
commencement of operation for 2007.
31. The stated purposes of the IR-40, which will use natural UO2 fuel and heavy water (both as a
coolant and as a moderator), are reactor research and development, radioisotope production and
training. The stated purpose of the FMP is fabrication of fuel assemblies for the IR-40 and for the
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP).
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D. Findings and Initial Assessment
32. Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting
of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities
where the material was stored and processed. These failures, and the actions taken thus far to correct
them, can be summarized as follows:
(a) Failure to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991, and its subsequent transfer
for further processing.
On 15 April 2003, Iran submitted ICRs on the import of the UO2, UF4 and UF6. Iran
has still to submit ICRs on the transfer of the material for further processing and use.
(b) Failure to declare the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of the
imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material,
where appropriate, and the production and transfer of waste resulting therefrom.
Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal, uranyl nitrate, ammonium
uranyl carbonate, UO2 pellets and uranium wastes. Iran must still submit ICRs on
these inventory changes.
(c) Failure to declare the facilities where such material (including the waste) was
received, stored and processed.
On 5 May 2003, Iran provided preliminary design information for the facility JHL.
Iran has informed the Agency of the locations where the undeclared processing of the
imported natural uranium was conducted (TRR and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology
Centre), and provided access to those locations. It has provided the Agency access to
the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and has indicated that access would be provided
to Anarak, as well as the waste disposal site at Qom.
(d) Failure to provide in a timely manner updated design information for the MIX Facility
and for TRR.
Iran has agreed to submit updated design information for the two facilities.
(e) Failure to provide in a timely manner information on the waste storage at Esfahan and
at Anarak.
Iran has informed the Agency of the locations where the waste has been stored or
discarded. It has provided the Agency access to the waste storage facility at Esfahan,
and has indicated that access will be provided to Anarak.
33. Although the quantities of nuclear material involved have not been large6, and the material would
need further processing before being suitable for use as the fissile material component of a nuclear
explosive device, the number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in
question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement is a matter of
concern. While these failures are in the process of being rectified by Iran, the process of verifying the
correctness and completeness of the Iranian declarations is still ongoing.
___________________________________________________________________________
6 The total amount of material, approximately 1.8 tonnes, is 0.13 effective kilograms of uranium. This is,
however, not insignificant in terms of a State’s ability to conduct nuclear research and development activities.
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34. The Agency is continuing to pursue the open questions, including through:
(a) The completion of a more thorough expert analysis of the research and development
carried out by Iran in the establishment of its enrichment capabilities. This will require
the submission by Iran of a complete chronology of its centrifuge and laser enrichment
efforts, including, in particular, a description of all research and development activities
carried out prior to the construction of the Natanz facilities. As agreed to by Iran, this
process will also involve discussions in Iran between Iranian authorities and Agency
enrichment experts on Iran’s enrichment programme, and visits by the Agency experts
to the facilities under construction at Natanz and other relevant locations.
(b) Further follow-up on information regarding allegations about undeclared enrichment
of nuclear material, including, in particular, at the Kalaye Electric Company. This will
require permission for the Agency to carry out environmental sampling at the
workshop located there.
(c) Further enquiries about the role of uranium metal in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle.
(d) Further enquiries about Iran’s programme related to the use of heavy water, including
heavy water production and heavy water reactor design and construction.
35. The Director General has repeatedly encouraged Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol. Without
such protocols in force, the Agency’s ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of
undeclared nuclear activities is limited. This is particularly the case for States, like Iran, with extensive
nuclear activities and advanced fuel cycle technologies. In the view of the Director General, the
adherence by Iran to an Additional Protocol would therefore constitute a significant step forward. The
Director General will continue to keep the Board informed of developments.
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Annex
Page 1
LIST OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS
LOCATION AS IN SEPTEMBER 2002 NEW FACILITIES AS OF
JUNE 2003
TEHRAN Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon
Radioisotope Production
Facility (MIX Facility)
Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose
Laboratories (JHL)
BUSHEHR Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
(BNPP)
ESFAHAN Miniature Neutron Source
Reactor (MNSR)
Light Water Sub-Critical
Reactor (LWSCR)
Heavy Water Zero Power
Reactor (HWSPR)
Fuel Fabrication Laboratory
(FFL)
Uranium Chemistry Laboratory
(UCL)
Uranium Conversion Facility
(UCF)
Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor,
decommissioned (GSCR)
Fuel Manufacturing Plant
(FMP)
NATANZ Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
(PFEP)
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
ARAK Iran Nuclear Research
Reactor (IR-40)
Annex 2
Board of Governors GOV/2003/63
Date: 26 August 2003
Original: English
For official use only
Item 5 (b) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2003/44)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
A. Introduction
1. On 6 June 2003, the Director General submitted to the Board of Governors for its consideration a
report (GOV/2003/40) on a number of safeguards issues that needed to be clarified and actions that
needed to be taken in connection with the implementation of the Agreement between the Islamic
Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in
connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214) (the
Safeguards Agreement).
2. In that report, the Director General stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its
Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material imported into Iran and the
subsequent processing and use of the material, and the declaration of facilities and other locations
where the material was stored and processed. He described these failures and the actions being taken
by Iran to correct them. In his report, the Director General also referred to the Agency’s ongoing
activities to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations and the safeguards
measures the Secretariat intended to take in order to pursue questions that remained open.
3. At the conclusion of the Board’s consideration of the Director General’s report, the Chairperson
summarized the Board’s discussion. In the summary, the Chairperson stated that the Board shared the
concern expressed by the Director General at the number of past failures by Iran to report material,
facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations, and noted the actions taken by Iran
thus far to correct these failures. The Board urged Iran promptly to rectify all safeguards problems
identified in the Director General’s report and to resolve questions that remained open. The Board
welcomed Iran’s reaffirmed commitment to full transparency and expressed its expectation that Iran
would grant the Agency all necessary access. The Board encouraged Iran, as a confidence-building
measure, not to introduce nuclear material at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) located at Natanz
Derestricted 12 September 2003
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 12 September 2003) International Atomic Energy Agency
Annex 3
(s6.) AEA
GOV/2003/63
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pending the resolution of related outstanding issues. The Board called on Iran to co-operate fully with
the Agency in its on-going work, and took note of the introductory statement of the Director General,
in which he called on Iran to permit the Agency to take environmental samples at the workshop of the
Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. The Board welcomed Iran’s readiness to look positively at
signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol, and urged Iran promptly and unconditionally to conclude
and implement such a protocol, in order to enhance the Agency’s ability to provide credible assurances
regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities, particularly the absence of undeclared
material and activities. Finally, the Board of Governors requested the Director General to provide a
further report on the situation whenever appropriate.
B. Chronology since June 2003
4. As foreseen in GOV/2003/40, an Agency team of centrifuge technology experts visited Iran from
7 to 11 June 2003 to discuss Iran’s centrifuge enrichment research and development (R&D)
programme. On 24 June 2003, the Agency submitted to Iran for comments a summary report
reflecting the results of those discussions and the findings of the Agency’s centrifuge technology
experts, and proposed a follow-up meeting with the Agency experts in July. That meeting ultimately
took place from 9 to 12 August 2003 as indicated below.
5. On 11 June 2003, the Agency provided to the Permanent Mission of Iran in Vienna “talking
points” on the results of environmental samples taken from the chemical traps of PFEP at Natanz
indicating the presence of high enriched uranium particles, which was not consistent with the nuclear
material declarations made by Iran. The Agency emphasized the need to clarify this issue promptly,
and suggested that it be addressed during the proposed centrifuge technology expert meeting.
6. On 9 July 2003, the Director General, accompanied by the Deputy Director General for
Safeguards and the Director of the Division of Safeguards Operations (B), visited Iran to discuss
safeguards implementation issues. He met with the President, H.E. Mr. M. Khatami; the Foreign
Minister, H.E. Mr. K. Kharrazi; and Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI), H.E. Mr. R. Aghazadeh. During these meetings, the Director General
emphasized the importance of the urgent resolution of outstanding safeguards issues, such as those
raised by the results of environmental sampling at PFEP and the findings by the Agency’s centrifuge
technology experts, and in that connection, the need for full transparency by Iran. He also stressed the
importance of the conclusion of an Additional Protocol by Iran to enable the Agency to provide
comprehensive and credible assurances about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The
President of Iran assured the Director General of the readiness of Iran to co-operate fully with the
Agency and reiterated Iran’s positive attitude towards the conclusion of an Additional Protocol, but
indicated that some technical and legal aspects needed to be clarified. It was agreed that technical
discussions should follow the Director General’s visit, and that the Agency should dispatch a team to
clarify technical and legal aspects related to the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)).
7. During the follow-up technical discussions, which were held from 10 to 13 July 2003 in Iran, the
Agency team raised again the issue of the results of the environmental sampling at PFEP, and
reiterated the Agency’s request that, in fulfilment of Iran’s stated commitment to full transparency,
Iran permit the Agency to take environmental samples at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric
Company in Tehran. The team also inquired as to whether, in accordance with that policy, Iran would
permit the Agency to visit two locations near Hashtgerd (Lashkar Ab’ad and Ramandeh) at which it
had been alleged, according to recent reports in open sources, that nuclear related activities were being
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or had been conducted. The Iranian authorities indicated that they were not yet ready to discuss the
findings of the Agency’s centrifuge technology experts, nor were they willing at this stage to permit
the Agency to take environmental samples at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company or to
accede to the Agency’s request to visit the two locations near Hashtgerd. The Iranian authorities
indicated that they would like to propose a comprehensive solution to all of the enrichment related
issues, but that it would take some time on their side. During the discussions, the specific issues that
needed to be resolved were identified, and the Iranian side agreed to propose at an early date a
timetable for resolving those issues.
8. In response to Iran’s request for the clarification of aspects of the Additional Protocol, a team of
Agency legal and technical experts participated in a meeting held in Tehran on 5 and 6 August 2003
with officials from a number of ministries of the Iranian Government. During the meeting, the Agency
provided clarification of the Model Additional Protocol, and responded to detailed questions raised by
the Iranian officials.
9. On 23 July 2003, the Agency received from the AEOI Vice President of Nuclear Safety and
Safeguards a letter proposing a timetable for actions to be taken by 15 August 2003 in relation to
urgent outstanding issues. In its reply of 25 July 2003, the Agency agreed to send to Iran a team of
technical experts, with the understanding that the team would: (a) discuss the results of the
environmental samples taken at Natanz; (b) take environmental samples at the workshop of the Kalaye
Electric Company; (c) discuss the findings of the Agency centrifuge technology experts; and (d) visit
the sites near Hashtgerd. This mission took place from 9 through 12 August 2003.
10. In a letter dated 19 August 2003, the AEOI provided additional information on the issues
identified in the timetable, including Iran’s heavy water reactor programme, Iran’s use of previously
imported UO2 in experiments to produce UF4, “bench scale” conversion experiments and Iran’s past
interest in laser fusion and spectroscopy.
11. In a letter dated 24 August 2003, the Resident Representative of Iran to the Agency informed the
Director General that Iran was “prepared to begin negotiation with the [IAEA] on the Additional
Protocol” and expressed the hope that, “in this negotiation the concerns of [Iran] and the ambiguities
on the Additional Protocol are removed”.
C. Implementation of Safeguards
C.1. Uranium Conversion
12. In GOV/2003/40, the Director General identified a number of corrective actions by Iran which
were necessary to enable the Agency to verify the previously unreported nuclear material declared to
have been imported by Iran in 1991. These actions included:
(a) The submission of inventory change reports (ICRs) on the transfer of the imported
UO2, UF4 and UF6 for further processing and use.
(b) The submission of ICRs on the production of uranium metal, uranyl nitrate,
ammonium uranyl carbonate, UO2 pellets and uranium wastes from the imported
material.
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(c) The provision of design information on the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and the
granting of access to that facility as well as to Anarak and Qom, where waste resulting
from the processing of the imported material is stored or has been disposed of.
(d) The submission of updated design information for the Molybdenum, Iodine and
Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility and for the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) to reflect activities involving the imported nuclear material.
13. Since the June report of the Director General, Iran has provided ICRs on the transfer of the
imported natural uranium for its further processing and use, as well as physical inventory lists (PILs)
and material balance reports (MBRs) reflecting its use in the production of uranium metal, uranyl
nitrate, UO2 pellets and wastes (Iran has stated that no ammonium uranyl carbonate was produced
from that material). In addition, Iran provided updated design information for MIX and TRR on the
use of the imported material in experiments at those facilities. Iran has also provided information on
the storage of waste at Esfahan, and has granted Agency inspectors access to that location and to the
waste sites at Anarak and Qom.
14. Iran stated on a number of occasions between February and July 2003 that no R&D using nuclear
material, even on a laboratory scale, had been conducted on the conversion and production of any
other nuclear material at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) (specifically, UO2, UF4 and UF6).
The Agency was told that the basic design of the UCF processes, and test reports for those processes,
had been obtained from abroad. According to the AEOI, this information was sufficient to permit Iran
to complete indigenously the detailed design and manufacturing of the equipment for UCF.
15. In a letter dated 19 August 2003, however, the Iranian authorities acknowledged that, in the early
1990s, there had been “bench scale” uranium conversion experiments. Iran has indicated that more
time will be needed to find the people involved in these experiments and to trace any other closed
down facilities. The Iranian authorities have indicated that they are currently preparing a response to
the Agency questionnaires on closed down and decommissioned facilities in Iran and on Iran’s nuclear
fuel cycle, and that further information on the conversion experiments will be included in that
response.
16. Drawing on this information, the Agency will continue with the verification of the imported
nuclear material and its subsequent processing. In addition to physical verification activities and the
evaluation of the ICRs, PILs and MBRs, this task involves the auditing of source documents on the
shipment and subsequent processing of the nuclear material at various installations. Since some of the
experiments took place a number of years ago and some of the imported material has been mixed with
other nuclear material, the auditing and verification process is expected to be difficult and time
consuming.
C.1.1. Processing of Imported UF6
17. In March 2003, the Agency took environmental samples from the surfaces of all three of the
cylinders said to have contained the imported UF6 (two small S-type cylinders and a large 30B-type
cylinder). The results of the analysis of those samples are now available and are consistent with the
declaration by Iran that the material contained in them was natural uranium.
18. As previously reported to the Board of Governors (GOV/2003/40, para. 19), the Iranian
authorities have stated that none of the imported UF6 had been processed, and, specifically, that it had
not been used in any centrifuge tests. It was observed during Agency verification in March 2003,
however, that some of the UF6 (1.9 kg) was missing from the two small cylinders. The Iranian
authorities have stated that this might be due to leakage from the cylinders resulting from mechanical
failure of the valves and possible evaporation due to their storage in a place where temperatures reach
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55o C during the summer. On 18 August 2003, the Agency took environmental samples at the locations
where Iran indicated that the small cylinders had been stored; these samples will need to be analysed
and the results assessed. Investigation of this issue is continuing.
19. Verification of the contents of the large cylinder entail the weighing of the cylinder, nondestructive
analysis (NDA), and destructive analysis of samples taken from the contents of the
cylinder. While the weighing and NDA have been carried out, the taking of samples for destructive
analysis can only be carried out when the equipment necessary for UF6 transfer and sample taking has
been installed at Natanz.
C.1.2. Processing of Imported UF4
20. As described in the previous report (GOV/2003/40, para. 20), most of the imported natural UF4
had been converted to uranium metal. As further noted therein, the Secretariat was seeking more
information about the role of uranium metal in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle.
21. This matter was discussed further in the technical meetings held on 10–13 July in Iran. In a letter
to the Agency dated 23 July 2003, the Iranian authorities stated that 113 experiments had been carried
out at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) using the imported UF4 with a view to
optimizing reaction conditions and parameters for producing uranium metal. In that same letter, Iran
stated further that, “In the early [90’s] when the country decided to reconsider its nuclear program, we
were not sure whether it will consist of CANDU reactors, Magnox reactors1 or light water reactors.
Therefore it was decided to include a U-metal production line in the Uranium Conversion Facility
(UCF) which could also be used to produce shielding material. However, as the picture is now more
clear, uranium metal experiments could be considered as a process to gain know-how in nuclear
material production”. The Secretariat is pursuing this matter further with the Iranian authorities in
light of the construction at JHL of a uranium metal purification and casting laboratory.
22. Recent results from the destructive analysis referred to in the previous report (GOV/2003/40,
para. 20) indicated the presence of depleted uranium in a UF4 sample taken from JHL. The Agency
requested Iran to explain the source of that material, since no such material is reflected in the declared
inventory of Iran. The Agency also reiterated its request that Iran investigate further whether any
experiments on the conversion processes had been conducted using nuclear material.
23. In its letter of 19 August 2003, Iran stated that, after intensive investigations, it had been found
that, “around the 1990’s”, some laboratory scale experiments had been carried out in the
radiochemistry section of the NRC (the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre) to produce UF4 using
depleted UO2 imported by Iran in 1977, but that neither the laboratory nor the radiochemistry section
still existed.
C.1.3. Processing of Imported UO2
24. The report in GOV/2003/40 described (paras 21–24) experiments said by Iran to have been
carried out using the imported natural UO2. These involved the testing of processes envisioned for
UCF, isotope production experiments at TRR, and the use of pellets for testing chemical processes for
the MIX Facility. Waste from these experiments was said to have been transferred to Esfahan, Anarak
and Qom.
25. During the 9–12 August 2003 meeting with Iranian authorities, the Agency referred to earlier
discussions which had taken place with Iran on samples taken at the hot cells of TRR and at the MIX
__________________________________________________________________________________
1 A reactor type that uses uranium metal.
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Facility which indicated the presence of depleted uranium, material which is not included in Iran’s
declared nuclear material inventory. Iran was provided with a summary of these sampling results. It
was suggested by Iran that the presence of depleted uranium could, in some cases, have originated
from shielded containers received from other countries (identified by Iran during that meeting). The
Agency has investigated the matter further through a comparison of the recent sample analysis results
with analytical results of environmental samples taken in those other countries, and it has concluded
that the depleted uranium particles could have originated from the imported containers.
26. As anticipated in the Director General’s June report, Agency inspectors have now visited the
waste disposal site at Qom and the waste storage location at Anarak where uranium bearing wastes
from some of the experiments have been stored. Iran has informed the Agency that the waste currently
located at Anarak will be transferred to JHL. Based on explanations provided by Iran, the nuclear
material in the waste transferred to and disposed of at Qom is considered to be measured discard.
C.2. Uranium Enrichment
C.2.1. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Programme
27. The Agency is continuing its analysis of Iran’s enrichment R&D programme. This process has
included thus far a visit by Agency centrifuge technology experts to Iran in June 2003 and subsequent
technical discussions with the Iranian authorities. The primary focus of these discussions has been to
seek clarification of the statement made by the Iranian authorities in February 2003 that the design and
development work, which had been started in 1997, had been based on information from open sources
and extensive modelling and simulation, including tests of centrifuge rotors both with and without
inert gas, and that the tests of the rotors, carried out on the premises of the Amir Khabir University and
the premises of the AEOI in Tehran, had been conducted without nuclear material.
28. During the Agency’s June visit, AEOI officials stated that the enrichment factor used in Iran’s
calculations had been obtained from some original centrifuge drawings, not from experiments. The
Agency requested to be shown the original drawings. In August 2003, the AEOI presented redrawn
copies of those documents, which included a design of a 164-machine cascade. The Iranian authorities
have yet to show the Agency the originals.
29. In their summary report prepared after that visit, the experts judged that:
(a) Machines at PFEP at Natanz can be recognized as an early European design; and
(b) It is not possible to develop enrichment technology, to the level seen at Natanz, based
solely on open source information and computer simulations, without process testing
with UF6.
30. These findings were provided to Iran, and were discussed with Iranian officials during the
meetings that took place on 9–12 August 2003. In that discussion, in contrast to earlier information
provided about the launch dates of the programme and its indigenous nature, AEOI officials stated that
the decision to launch a centrifuge enrichment programme had actually been taken in 1985, and that
Iran had received drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign intermediary around 1987. The officials
described the programme as having consisted of three phases: activities during the first phase, from
1985 until 1997, had been located mainly at the AEOI premises in Tehran; during the second phase,
between 1997 and 2002, the activities had been concentrated at the Kalaye Electric Company in
Tehran; during the third phase, 2002 to the present, the R&D and assembly activities were moved to
Natanz.
31. The Iranian authorities also explained that during the first phase, components had been obtained
from abroad through foreign intermediaries or directly by Iranian entities, but that no help had been
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received from abroad to assemble centrifuges or provide training. Efforts were concentrated on
achieving an operating centrifuge, but many difficulties had been encountered as a result of machine
crashes attributed to poor quality components. According to the AEOI officials, no experiments with
inert or UF6 gas were conducted. Iran indicated its willingness to make available for interview key
scientists responsible for that phase of the enrichment programme. According to Iranian officials, from
1997 through 2002, the activities were concentrated at Kalaye Electric Company, and involved the
assembly and testing of centrifuges, but again without inert or UF6 gas.
32. During their 9–12 August 2003 visit to Iran, Agency inspectors were permitted to take
environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, with a view to assessing the role of
that company in Iran’s enrichment R&D programme. The results of the analysis of these samples are
not yet available. It was noted by inspectors that there had been considerable modification of the
premises since their first visit in March 2003. Iranian authorities have informed the Agency that these
modifications are attributable to the fact that the workshop is being transformed from use as a storage
facility to its use as a laboratory for non-destructive analysis. This modification may impact on the
accuracy of the environmental sampling and the Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s declarations about
the types of activities previously carried out there.
33. On 25 June 2003, Iran introduced UF6 into the first centrifuge for the purpose of single machine
testing, and on 19 August 2003 began the testing of a small ten-machine cascade with UF6. Iran
continues to co-operate with the Agency in implementing safeguards measures now in place at PFEP
for monitoring single machine and small cascade testing.
34. In accordance with its standard practice, the Agency took baseline environmental samples at
PFEP at Natanz before nuclear material was introduced in the facility. This baseline sampling
campaign was conducted during inspections carried out between March and June 2003, and samples
were taken at many locations within the facility. While the Agency has already received the results
from some of the samples (see below), which have been provided to Iran, other samples are still being
analysed by a number of laboratories that participate in the Agency’s Network of Analytical
Laboratories.
35. Iran has stated that it has not carried out any enrichment and that no nuclear material was
introduced to the PFEP prior to the Agency’s having taken its first baseline environmental samples
there. However, the sampling results which were provided to Iran on 11 June 2003, revealed particles
of high enriched uranium. During the 10–13 July and 9–12 August 2003 technical meetings, more
complete environmental sampling results were provided to Iran and the matter was discussed further.
36. The PFEP environmental sample results indicate the possible presence in Iran of high enriched
uranium, material that is not on its inventory of declared nuclear material. During the August meeting,
Iranian authorities indicated that they had carried out extensive investigation with a view to resolving
this question, and had come to the conclusion that the high enriched uranium particles which had been
detected must have resulted from contamination originating from centrifuge components which had
been imported by Iran.
37. At that meeting, Agency inspectors explained that subsequent environmental sample analysis
revealed the presence of two types of high enriched uranium, and noted that there had been differences
among the samples taken from the surfaces of the centrifuge casings installed for the single machine
tests. The Agency asked the Iranian authorities to investigate whether there were differences in the
manufacturing history of those pieces of equipment. To investigate this matter further, the Agency
took two additional samples from centrifuge components which were said to have been imported and
those said to have been produced domestically. The results are not yet available.
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38. Conceptually, it is possible to envisage a number of possible scenarios to explain the presence of
high enriched uranium in environmental samples at Natanz. As part of the Agency’s ongoing detailed
plan of investigation each scenario will be considered carefully by Agency experts.
39. The Agency also intends to follow up with Iran information about other sites at which unreported
nuclear activities allegedly are being or have been carried out.
C.2.2. Laser Programme
40. Iran has a substantial R&D programme on lasers. Iran has stated that it currently has no
programme for laser isotope separation.
41. In May 2003, the Agency requested additional information about two sites near Hashtgerd owned
by the AEOI which had been referred to in open source reports as locations allegedly engaged in laser
and centrifuge uranium enrichment activities. The Agency was permitted to visit those locations on
12 August 2003.
42. One of the locations was Ramandeh, which belongs to the AEOI and is part of the Karaj
Agricultural and Medical Centre. This location is primarily involved with agricultural studies said to
be unrelated to nuclear fuel cycle activities. The other location visited was a laser laboratory at
Lashkar Ab’ad belonging to the Research and Development Division of the AEOI. During that visit,
Iranian officials stated that the laboratory had originally been devoted to laser fusion research and
laser spectroscopy, but that the focus of the laboratory had been changed, and the equipment not
related to current projects, such as a large imported vacuum vessel, had been moved. Among other
activities observed by the Agency were the production and testing of copper vapour lasers of up to 100
watts. However, there appeared to be no activities directly related to laser spectroscopy or enrichment
being carried out at the laboratory. The Iranian authorities were asked to confirm that there had not
been in the past any activities related to uranium laser enrichment at this location or at any other
location in Iran. The Agency has requested permission to take environmental samples at the
laboratory, which the Iranian authorities have undertaken to consider.
43. In the letter from Iran dated 19 August 2003, the Agency was informed that, in the past, apart
from planned co-operation in laser fusion and laser spectroscopy which never materialized, there had
been a research thesis on laser spectroscopy of SF6 prepared by a university student in co-operation
with the laser division of AEOI. While such a study could be seen as relevant to laser enrichment, the
underlying experiments appear not to have involved nuclear material.
C.3. Heavy Water Reactor Programme
44. On 13 July 2003 the Iranian authorities made a presentation on some technical features of the
40 MW(th) heavy water reactor (the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, IR-40), construction of which is
planned to start in 2004. The reactor, which Iranian officials have stated is based on indigenous
design, is currently moving from the basic design phase to the detailed design phase. Iranian officials
have further stated that Iran had tried unsuccessfully on several occasions to acquire from abroad a
research reactor suitable for medical and industrial isotope production and for R&D to replace the old
research reactor in Tehran. Iranian officials had concluded, therefore, that the only alternative was a
heavy water reactor, which could use the UO2 produced in UCF and the Zirconium Production Plant in
Esfahan. According to the Iranian authorities, to meet the isotope production requirements, such a
reactor should have a neutron flux of 1013 to 1014 n/cm2/s, which would require power on the order of
30–40 MW(th) when using natural UO2 fuel.
45. The Agency was provided on 4 August 2003 with an updated DIQ, which is currently being
reviewed. The DIQ does not contain any references to hot cells, contrary to what would be expected
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given the radioisotope production purposes of the facility. Iran has been asked to look into this matter
further, particularly in light of recent open source accounts of alleged efforts by Iran to import remote
manipulators and windows that would be suitable for use in hot cells.
46. In its 19 August 2003 letter, the AEOI provided information on the heavy water reactor
programme, stating that a decision to start the R&D had been taken in the early 1980s. It further stated
that, in the mid-1980s, laboratory scale experiments to produce heavy water had been conducted in the
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre, and that a decision to construct a heavy water reactor had been
taken in the mid-1990s. The letter provided additional information on the amount of heavy water
initially needed for the IR-40, and on the design capacity of the heavy water production plant under
construction at Khondab near Arak. According to the information provided in the letter, Iran plans to
start the production of heavy water next year.
D. Findings, Assessments and Next Steps
47. In connection with the nuclear material imported by Iran in 1991, Iran has submitted ICRs, PILs
and MBRs, as well as relevant DIQs. The Agency has verified nuclear material presented to it and is
currently auditing relevant source data. The issue of depleted uranium in the UF4 remains to be
resolved, and the environmental samples taken in connection with the UF6 cylinders need to be
analysed. To confirm that the pellet irradiation experiments have been solely for radioisotope
production, the Agency has taken samples from the hot cells and lead shielded cells at the laboratories
of the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre. The analytical results are not yet available.
48. In its letter of 19 August 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had carried out uranium conversion
experiments in the early 1990s, experiments that Iran should have reported in accordance with its
obligations under the Safeguards Agreement. Iran has stated, however, that it is taking corrective
action in that regard. The Agency will continue its evaluation of the uranium conversion programme.
49. As regards enrichment, and as mentioned earlier, during the meeting of 9–12 August 2003, the
Agency team received new information about the chronology and details of Iran’s centrifuge
enrichment programme. Agency evaluation of the new information will require, inter alia, an
assessment of the various phases of the programme and analysis of environmental samples taken at the
Kalaye Electric Company workshop.
50. Additional work is also required to enable the Agency to arrive at conclusions about Iran's
statements that there have been no uranium enrichment activities in Iran involving nuclear material.
The Agency intends to continue its assessment of the Iranian statement that the high enriched uranium
particles identified in samples taken at Natanz could be attributable to contamination from imported
components. As agreed to by Iran, this process will involve discussions in Iran with Iranian officials
and staff involved in the R&D efforts and visits by Agency inspectors and enrichment technology
experts to facilities and other relevant locations. In that connection, Iran has agreed to provide the
Agency with all information about the centrifuge components and other contaminated equipment it
obtained from abroad, including their origin and the locations where they have been stored and used in
Iran, as well as access to those locations so that the Agency may take environmental samples. It is also
essential that the Agency receive information from Member States either from which nuclear related
equipment or other assistance relevant to the development of Iran’s nuclear programme has been
exported to Iran, or which have information on such assistance.
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51. In connection with the Agency’s investigation of Iran’s heavy water reactor programme, the
Agency is currently evaluating design information provided on the heavy water reactor.
52. Since the last report was issued, Iran has demonstrated an increased degree of co-operation in
relation to the amount and detail of information provided to the Agency and in allowing access
requested by the Agency to additional locations and the taking of associated environmental samples.
The decision by Iran to start the negotiations with the Agency for the conclusion of an Additional
Protocol is also a positive step. However, it should be noted that information and access were at times
slow in coming and incremental, and that, as noted above, some of the information was in contrast to
that previously provided by Iran. In addition, as also noted above, there remain a number of important
outstanding issues, particularly with regard to Iran’s enrichment programme, that require urgent
resolution. Continued and accelerated co-operation and full transparency on the part of Iran are
essential for the Agency to be in a position to provide at an early date the assurances required by
Member States.
53. The Director General will inform the Board of additional developments for its further
consideration at the November meeting of the Board, or earlier, as appropriate.
Annex 3
Board of Governors GOV/2003/75
Date: 10 November 2003
Original: English
For official use only
Item 3 (b) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2003/71)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. This report on safeguards issues in the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran)
responds to paragraph 7 of the Board of Governors’ resolution GOV/2003/69 of 12 September 2003. It
covers relevant developments from the time of the Director General’s visit to Iran on 20-21 February
2003 and Iran’s acknowledgement of its centrifuge enrichment programme, but concentrates on the
period since his last report (GOV/2003/63 of 23 August 2003). This report begins with the background
to the issues in question (Section A) and a chronology of recent events (Section B). Information on the
Agency’s verification activities is summarized in Section C, organized according to the various
technical processes involved (the details of which are set out in Annex 1). Section D provides a
summary of the Agency’s findings, while Section E sets out its current assessment and next steps.
Annexes 2 and 3 to this report contain, respectively, a list of the locations identified to date as relevant
to the implementation of safeguards in Iran, and a map showing those locations. Annex 4 is a list of
relevant abbreviations and terms used in the text of the report.
A. Background
2. At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 17 March 2003, the Director General reported on
discussions taking place with Iran on a number of safeguards issues that needed to be clarified and
actions that needed to be taken in connection with the implementation of the Agreement between Iran
and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214) (the Safeguards Agreement).
3. On 6 June 2003, the Director General submitted to the Board of Governors a report
(GOV/2003/40) providing further information on the nature of the safeguards issues involved and the
actions that needed to be taken, and describing developments in that regard since March 2003. In that
report, the Director General stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material imported into Iran and the subsequent
International Atomic Energy Agency
Derestricted 26 November 2003
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 26 November 2003)
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(~AEA
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processing and use of the material, and the declaring of facilities and other locations where the
material had been stored and processed. He described these failures and the actions being taken by
Iran to correct them.
4. On 18–19 June 2003, the Board considered the above report of the Director General. In its
conclusions, the Board noted its concern about the number of past failures by Iran to report material,
facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations, and noted the actions taken by Iran to
correct those failures. The Board urged Iran to rectify promptly all of the safeguards problems
identified in the Director General’s report and to resolve questions that remained open. It welcomed
Iran’s reaffirmed commitment to full transparency and expressed its expectation that Iran would grant
the Agency all necessary access. The Board encouraged Iran, as a confidence building measure, not to
introduce nuclear material at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) located at Natanz pending the
resolution of related outstanding issues. The Board called on Iran to co-operate fully with the Agency
in its ongoing work. It welcomed Iran’s readiness to look positively at signing and ratifying an
Additional Protocol, and urged Iran to promptly and unconditionally conclude and implement such a
protocol, in order to enhance the Agency’s ability to provide credible assurances regarding the
peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities, particularly the absence of undeclared material and
activities.
5. On 26 August 2003, the Director General submitted to the Board for its consideration a further
report (GOV/2003/63) on relevant developments since June 2003. The report included: a summary of
the state of the Agency’s understanding of Iran’s nuclear programme at that time; the Agency’s
findings and assessments, including the identification of some additional failures to report and the
issues that needed to be clarified (particularly with regard to enrichment); and the corrective actions
that needed to be taken. In the report, the Director General noted an increased degree of co-operation
by Iran, while noting that some of the information and access were at times slow in coming and
incremental, and that some of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran.
6. At its meeting on 12 September 2003, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution
(GOV/2003/69) in which it, inter alia:
• Called on Iran to provide accelerated co-operation and full transparency to allow the Agency to
provide at an early date the assurances required by Member States (GOV/2003/69, para. 1).
• Called on Iran to ensure that there were no further failures to report material, facilities and
activities that Iran is obliged to report pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement (GOV/2003/69,
para. 2).
• Called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment related activities and, as a confidence
building measure, any reprocessing activities, pending provision by the Director General of the
assurances required by Member States and pending satisfactory application of the provisions of
the Additional Protocol (GOV/2003/69, para. 3).
• Decided that, in order to ensure Agency verification of non-diversion of nuclear material, it was
essential and urgent that Iran remedy all failures identified by the Agency and co-operate fully
with the Agency by taking certain specified actions by the end of October 2003 (GOV/2003/69,
para. 4).
• Requested all third countries to co-operate closely and fully with the Agency in the clarification of
open questions on the Iranian nuclear programme (GOV/2003/69, para. 5).
• Requested that Iran work with the Secretariat to sign, ratify and fully implement the Additional
Protocol promptly and unconditionally, and as a confidence building measure to act henceforth in
accordance with the Additional Protocol (GOV/2003/69, para. 6).
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7. The Board also asked the Director General to submit a report to the Board, in November 2003 or
earlier if appropriate, on the implementation of the Board’s resolution, enabling it to draw definitive
conclusions.
B. Chronology since September 2003
8. Between 14 and 18 September 2003, the Agency conducted a safeguards inspection at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) and at the PFEP in Natanz. The inspection activities at TRR included
physical inventory verification and design information verification, as well as a number of activities to
follow up on issues related to the natural uranium imported in 1991, including further examination of
the cylinders from which imported UF6 gas was said to have leaked (see GOV/2003/63, para. 18).
9. On 16 September 2003, the Agency met representatives of Iran to discuss the results of the
analysis of the environmental samples taken at the Kalaye Electric Company in August 2003, which
had revealed the presence of high enriched uranium (HEU) particles and low enriched uranium (LEU)
particles which were not consistent with the nuclear material in the declared inventory of Iran. Also
discussed were the results of the environmental sampling taken at PFEP, which had revealed the
presence of other types of HEU particles, as well as LEU and other particles, not of a type on Iran’s
inventory.
10. The Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG) and the Director of Safeguards
Operations Division B (DIR-SGOB) travelled to Iran on 2–3 October 2003 to discuss the most urgent
safeguards implementation issues that remained open. Following these discussions, a technical team of
the Agency visited Iran from 4 to 12 October 2003 in order to carry out activities related to the
verification of Iran’s activities in the areas of uranium conversion and laser and gas centrifuge
enrichment. Following up on recent open source reports of enrichment activities being undertaken at
an industrial complex in Kolahdouz in western Tehran, the team was permitted on 5 October 2003 to
visit three locations which the Agency had identified as corresponding to those mentioned in the
reports. While no work was seen at those locations that could be linked to uranium enrichment,
environmental samples were taken.
11. In a letter to the Agency dated 9 October 2003 from Mr. E. Khalilipour, Vice President of the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Iran provided information that had not been provided
earlier on research activities carried out on uranium conversion processes, including acknowledgement
of laboratory and bench scale experiments. Specifically, Iran confirmed that, between 1981 and 1993,
it had carried out at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) bench scale preparation of UO2
and, at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC), bench scale preparation of ammonium uranyl
carbonate (AUC), UO3, UF4 and UF6.
12. Between 13 and 22 October 2003, an Agency inspection team conducted safeguards inspections
at PFEP and other facilities in Esfahan and Tehran. These inspections included follow-up activities
related to the HEU and LEU particles found at the Kalaye Electric Company and at Natanz and to the
newly acknowledged existence of nuclear material resulting from uranium conversion experiments.
13. On 16 October 2003, at the invitation of the Iranian Government, the Director General met in
Tehran with H.E. Dr. H. Rohani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, to
discuss the open issues requiring urgent resolution. These issues related to the use of nuclear material
in the testing of centrifuges (including the presence of LEU and HEU particles at the Kalaye Electric
Company and at Natanz); the testing of conversion processes; the purpose of uranium metal
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production; the existence of laser isotope enrichment; and details of Iran’s heavy water reactor
programme. At this meeting, Dr. Rohani stated that a decision had been taken to provide the Agency,
in the course of the following week, with a full disclosure of Iran’s past and present nuclear activities.
He also expressed Iran’s readiness to conclude an Additional Protocol and, pending its entry into
force, to act in accordance with the Protocol and with a policy of full transparency.
14. Upon the request of the Iranian authorities, a meeting was held on 18–19 October 2003, also in
Tehran, between legal, policy and technical staff of the Agency and Iranian officials to discuss issues
related to the conclusion by Iran of an Additional Protocol.
15. As a follow-up to the 16 October 2003 meeting, in a letter to the Director General dated
21 October 2003 and received on 23 October 2003, H.E. Mr. R. Aghazadeh, Vice President of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the AEOI, reaffirmed that “the Islamic Republic of Iran
ha[d] decided to provide a full picture of its nuclear activities, with a view to removing any
ambiguities and doubts about the exclusively peaceful character of these activities and commencing a
new phase of confidence and co-operation in this field at the international level.” Mr. Aghazadeh
stated further in his letter that Iran was prepared “to provide, in full transparency, any additional
clarifications that the Agency may deem necessary.”1
16. In that letter, Iran acknowledged that: between 1998 and 2002 it had carried out some testing of
centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company using UF6 imported in 1991; between 1991 and 2000 it
had had a laser enrichment programme, in the course of which it had used 30 kg of uranium metal not
previously declared to the Agency; and between 1988 and 1992 it had irradiated 7 kg of UO2 targets
and extracted small quantities of plutonium. Attached to the letter was significant additional
information with respect to those activities, as well as information concerning Iran’s conversion and
heavy water reactor programmes.
17. Between 27 October and 1 November 2003, a technical team from the Agency, led by
DIR-SGOB and including centrifuge technology experts, visited Iran to follow up on these and other
issues, including, in particular, the source of HEU and LEU contamination.
18. On 10 November 2003, the Agency received from the Government of Iran a letter of the same
date in which Iran conveyed its acceptance of the draft text of the Additional Protocol based on the
Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) Iran indicated that it was prepared to sign the
Additional Protocol, and that, pending its entry into force, Iran would act in accordance with the
provisions of that Protocol.
19. On the same day, the Iranian Government informed the Director General that it had decided to
suspend, with effect from 10 November 2003, all enrichment related and reprocessing activities in
Iran2, and specifically: to suspend all activities on the site of Natanz, not to produce feed material for
enrichment processes and not to import enrichment related items.
__________________________________________________________________________________
1 In his letter, Mr. Aghazadeh also referred to his Government’s expectation that the Agency would “take cognizance, in
preparing its report, of Iran’s concerns and constraints for the full disclosure of detailed information about these activities in
the past, notably the concern about expansion of illegal sanctions to prevent Iran from exercising its inalienable right to
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes stipulated in Article IV of the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons].”
2 It should be noted also that, on 21 October 2003, the Iranian Government and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany
and the United Kingdom issued in Tehran an agreed statement on Iran’s nuclear programme. In that statement, Iran indicated
that it had “decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.”
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C. Verification Activities
C.1. Uranium Conversion
20. The Agency received preliminary design information on the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
under construction at ENTC in July 2000, and has been carrying out continuous design information
verification (DIV) since then. In that design information, the facility was described as being intended
for the conversion of uranium ore concentrate into UF6, for enrichment outside Iran, and for the
subsequent conversion (at UCF) of the enriched UF6 into low enriched UO2, enriched uranium metal
and depleted uranium metal. Following its declaration of the enrichment facilities at Natanz in
February 2003, Iran acknowledged that it intended to carry out the enrichment activities domestically
using UF6 to be produced by UCF.
21. At the time of the Director General’s last report to the Board of Governors (GOV/2003/63),
questions remained about the completeness of Iran’s declarations concerning the chronology and
details of its uranium conversion activities, in particular in light of its previous assertion that it had
designed UCF without having used nuclear material to test the most difficult conversion processes.
22. While Iran acknowledged in February 2003 having used some of the natural uranium imported in
1991 for testing certain parts of the conversion process (i.e. uranium dissolution, purification using
pulse columns and the production of uranium metal), it denied having tested other processes (e.g.
conversion of UO2 to UF4 and conversion of UF4 to UF6), stating that they had been developed based
on the supplier’s drawings. In a letter dated 19 August 2003, Iran further acknowledged that it had
carried out UF4 conversion experiments on a laboratory scale during the 1990s at the Radiochemistry
Laboratories of TNRC using imported depleted UO2 which had previously been declared as having
been lost during processing (process loss). This activity was acknowledged by Iran only after the
Agency’s July 2003 waste analysis results indicated the presence of depleted UF4.
23. On 9 October 2003, Iran further acknowledged that, contrary to its previous statements,
practically all of the materials important to uranium conversion had been produced in laboratory and
bench scale experiments (in kilogram quantities) between 1981 and 1993 without having been
reported to the Agency. These activities were carried out at TNRC and ENTC.
24. The information provided in Iran’s letter of 21 October 2003 reveals that, in conducting these
experiments, Iran had used nuclear material imported by Iran in 1977 and 1982, some of which had
been exempted from safeguards, as well as safeguarded nuclear material which had been declared to
the Agency as a process loss. Iran also declared that, using nuclear material imported in 1991 and
reported to the Agency in February 2003, experiments had been carried out on the conversion of some
of the UF4 to UF6, and on the conversion of UO2 to UF4. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit
all relevant inventory change reports (ICRs) and design information to cover these activities.
25. In addition to the issues associated with the testing of UCF processes, the Agency had previously
raised with Iran questions related to the purpose and use of nuclear material to be produced at UCF,
such as uranium metal. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that the uranium metal had
been intended not only for the production of shielding material, as previously stated, but also for use in
the laser enrichment programme (as discussed below).
C.2. Reprocessing Experiments
26. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged the irradiation of depleted UO2 targets at
TRR and subsequent plutonium separation experiments in a hot cell in the Nuclear Safety Building of
TNRC. Neither the activities nor the separated plutonium had been reported previously to the Agency.
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27. In the meetings held 27 October–1 November 2003, Iran provided additional information about
these experiments. According to Iranian officials, the experiments took place between 1988 and 1992,
and involved pressed or sintered UO2 pellets prepared at ENTC using depleted uranium that had been
exempted from safeguards in 1978. The capsules containing the pellets had been irradiated in TRR in
connection with a project to produce fission product isotopes of molybdenum, iodine and xenon. The
plutonium separation was carried out at TNRC in three shielded glove boxes, which, according to Iran,
were dismantled in 1992 and later stored in a warehouse at ENTC along with related equipment. Iran
stated that these experiments had been carried out to learn about the nuclear fuel cycle, and to gain
experience in reprocessing chemistry.
28. According to Iran, a total of about 7 kg of UO2 was irradiated, 3 kg of which was processed to
separate plutonium. The small amount of separated plutonium was stored in a laboratory of Jabr Ibn
Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL), while the remaining 4 kg of unprocessed irradiated UO2
targets was placed in containers and stored at the TNRC site, and the wastes disposed of at the Qom
salt marsh.
29. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all nuclear material accountancy reports, and design
information for ENTC and JHL, covering these activities. On that date, Iran also presented the
separated plutonium and the irradiated unprocessed targets to Agency inspectors at JHL. Verification
of the material, as well as of possible nuclear material hold-up in the dismantled glove boxes, is
foreseen to take place during the 8–15 November 2003 inspection.
C.3. Uranium Enrichment
C.3.1. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment
30. In February 2003, Iran acknowledged the existence of two centrifuge enrichment plants under
construction at Natanz: PFEP and a large commercial-scale Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). In February
2003, Iran also acknowledged that the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran had been
used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no testing of these
components involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any
other location in Iran. According to Iran, its enrichment programme was indigenous and based on
information from open sources.
31. During the visit of 2–3 October 2003, the Agency was shown, for the first time, the centrifuge
drawings previously requested by it (see GOV/2003/63, para. 28).
32. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that “a limited number of tests, using small
amounts of UF6, [had been] conducted in 1999 and 2002” at the Kalaye Electric Company. In a
meeting with enrichment technology experts held during the 27 October–1 November 2003 visit,
Iranian authorities explained that the experiments that had been carried out at the Kalaye Electric
Company had involved the 1.9 kg of imported UF6, the absence of which the State authorities had
earlier attempted to conceal by attributing the loss to evaporation due to leaking valves on the
cylinders containing the gas (see GOV/2003/63, para. 18).
33. During that visit, the Agency was able to meet with the individual who had been in charge of the
centrifuge research and development work during the period 1992–2001 with a view to clarifying
issues associated with these activities. Iran has agreed to provide the relevant ICRs and design
information, and to present the nuclear material for Agency verification during the inspection
scheduled for 8–15 November 2003.
34. As mentioned above, environmental samples taken by the Agency at PFEP and at the Kalaye
Electric Company revealed particles of HEU and LEU indicating the possible presence in Iran of
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nuclear material that had not been declared to the Agency. The Iranian authorities attributed the
presence of these particles to contamination originating from centrifuge components which had been
imported by Iran. In connection with its efforts to verify that information, the Agency requested, and
Iran provided in October 2003, a list of imported and domestically produced centrifuge components,
material and equipment, and an indication of the batches of items that Iran claims to have been the
source of the contamination. The Agency carried out another sample-taking campaign in October
2003, at which time all major imported and domestically produced components, as well as various
pieces of manufacturing equipment, were sampled.
35. In a meeting on 1 November 2003, the Iranian authorities stated that all nuclear material in Iran
had been declared to the Agency, that Iran had not enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-235 using
centrifuges and that, therefore, the contamination could not have arisen as a result of indigenous
activities. The Agency has now obtained information about the origin of the centrifuge components
and equipment which Iran claims to be the source of HEU contamination. The Agency will continue
its investigation of the source of HEU and LEU contamination, including through follow up with other
relevant parties.
C.3.2. Laser Enrichment
36. As reflected in GOV/2003/63 (para. 41), Iran permitted the Agency to visit in August 2003 a
laboratory located at Lashkar Ab’ad, which was described by Iran as originally having been devoted to
laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, but whose focus had been changed to research and
development and the manufacture of copper vapour lasers (CVLs). In its 19 August 2003 letter to the
Agency, Iran stated that it had had a substantial research and development programme on lasers, but
that it currently had no programme for laser isotope separation.
37. During discussions which took place in Iran from 2 to 3 October 2003, in response to Agency
questioning, the Iranian authorities acknowledged that Iran had imported and installed at TNRC laser
related equipment from two countries: in 1992, a laser spectroscopy laboratory intended for the study
of laser induced fusion, optogalvanic phenomena and photoionization spectroscopy; and in 2000, a
large vacuum vessel, now stored at Karaj, for use in the spectroscopic studies referred to in the
previous paragraph.
38. On 6 October 2003, Agency inspectors were permitted to take at Lashkar Ab’ad the
environmental samples requested by the Agency in August 2003. The inspectors also visited a
warehouse in the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Centre of the AEOI, where a large imported vacuum
vessel and associated hardware were stored. The Iranian authorities stated that the equipment had been
imported in 2000, that it had never been used, and that it had now been packed for shipment back to
the manufacturer, since the contract related to its supply had been terminated by the foreign partner in
2000. The inspectors were informed that later during their visit to Tehran the equipment related to the
laboratory imported in 1992 would be made available for examination and environmental sampling
and the individuals involved in the projects would be available for interviews. However, these
interviews and the presentation of the equipment were deferred by Iran.
39. In its letter dated 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that, starting in the 1970s, it had had
contracts related to laser enrichment with foreign sources from four countries. These contracts are
discussed in detail in Annex 1 to this report.
40. During the inspectors’ follow-up visit to Iran between 27 October and 1 November 2003, Iran
provided more information on Lashkar Ab’ad and acknowledged that a pilot plant for laser enrichment
had been established there in 2000. The project for the establishment of the plant consisted of several
contracts covering not only the supply of information, as indicated in Iran’s letter of 21 October 2003
to the Agency, but also the delivery of additional equipment. Iran also stated that uranium laser
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enrichment experiments had been conducted between October 2002 and January 2003 using
previously undeclared natural uranium metal imported from one of the other suppliers. According to
Iranian authorities, all of the equipment was dismantled in May 2003 and transferred to Karaj for
storage together with the uranium metal. The equipment and material were presented to Agency
inspectors at Karaj on 28 October 2003.
41. In the meeting of 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all of the relevant ICRs and design
information, and to present the nuclear material for Agency verification during the inspection
scheduled for 8–15 November 2003.
C.4. Heavy Water Reactor Programme
42. On 12 July 2003, the Iranian authorities made a presentation on the technical features, said to
have been based on indigenous design, of the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) to be constructed
at Arak. The purpose of the reactor was declared to be research and development and the production of
radioisotopes for medical and industrial use. Iran explained that it had tried to acquire a reactor from
abroad to replace the old research reactor in Tehran (TRR), but that those attempts had failed, and that
Iran had concluded, therefore, that the only alternative was a heavy water reactor which could use
domestically produced UO2 and zirconium. In order to have a sufficient neutron flux, a reactor with
power on the order of 30–40 MW(th) was said to be required.
43. During their visit in July 2003, Agency inspectors were provided with drawings of the IR-40.
Contrary to what would have been expected given the declared radioisotope production purpose of the
facility, the drawings contained no references to hot cells. The Agency raised this issue during that
visit, particularly in light of open source reports of recent efforts by Iran to acquire from abroad heavy
manipulators and leaded windows designed for hot cell applications. The Agency indicated to the
Iranian authorities that, given the specifications of the manipulators and windows which were the
subject of those reports, a design for hot cells should have existed already and that therefore the hot
cell, or cells, should already have been declared, at least on a preliminary basis, as part of the facility
or as a separate installation.
44. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that two hot cells had been foreseen for this
project. However, according to the information provided in that letter, neither the design nor detailed
information about the dimensions or the actual layout of the hot cells was available yet, since they did
not know the characteristics of the manipulators and shielded windows which they could procure. On
1 November 2003, Iran confirmed that it had tentative plans to construct at the Arak site yet another
building with hot cells for the production of radioisotopes. Iran has agreed to submit the relevant
preliminary design information with respect to that building in due course.
D. Findings
45. Iran’s nuclear programme, as the Agency currently understands it, consists of a practically
complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and milling, conversion,
enrichment, fuel fabrication, heavy water production, a light water reactor, a heavy water research
reactor and associated research and development facilities.
46. Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge
enrichment programme, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme. In that context, Iran has
admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes,
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and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities
involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.
47. Based on all information currently available to the Agency, it is clear that Iran has failed in a
number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the
declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored. In his June and August
2003 reports to the Board of Governors (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63), the Director General
identified a number of instances of such failures and the corrective actions that were being, or needed
to be, taken with respect thereto by Iran.
48. Since the issuance of the Director General’s last report, a number of additional failures have been
identified. These failures can be summarized as follows:
(a) Failure to report:
(i) the use of imported natural UF6 for the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric
Company in 1999 and 2002, and the consequent production of enriched and
depleted uranium;
(ii) the import of natural uranium metal in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in
laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the
loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer of
resulting waste;
(iii) the production of UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6 and AUC from imported depleted UO2,
depleted U3O8 and natural U3O8, and the production and transfer of resulting
wastes;
(iv) the production of UO2 targets at ENTC and their irradiation in TRR, the
subsequent processing of those targets, including the separation of plutonium, the
production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed
irradiated targets at TNRC;
(b) Failure to provide design information for:
(i) the centrifuge testing facility at the Kalaye Electric Company;
(ii) the laser laboratories at TNRC and Lashkar Ab’ad, and locations where resulting
wastes were processed and stored, including the waste storage facility at Karaj;
(iii) the facilities at ENTC and TNRC involved in the production of UO2, UO3, UF4,
UF6 and AUC;
(iv) TRR, with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets, and the hot cell facility
where the plutonium separation took place, as well as the waste handling facility
at TNRC; and
(c) Failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of
safeguards, through concealment.
49. As corrective actions, Iran has undertaken to submit ICRs relevant to all of these activities, to
provide design information with respect to the facilities where those activities took place, to present all
nuclear material for Agency verification during its forthcoming inspections and to implement a policy
of co-operation and full transparency.
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E. Assessment and Next Steps
50. The recent disclosures by Iran about its nuclear programme clearly show that, in the past, Iran
had concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation to comply
with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. Iran’s policy of concealment continued until last
month, with co-operation being limited and reactive, and information being slow in coming, changing
and contradictory. While most of the breaches identified to date have involved limited quantities of
nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including
enrichment and reprocessing. And although the materials would require further processing before
being suitable for weapons purposes, the number of failures by Iran to report in a timely manner the
material, facilities and activities in question as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement
has given rise to serious concerns.
51. Following the Board’s adoption of resolution GOV/2003/69, the Government of Iran informed
the Director General that it had now adopted a policy of full disclosure and had decided to provide the
Agency with a full picture of all of its nuclear activities. Since that time, Iran has shown active cooperation
and openness. This is evidenced, in particular, by Iran’s granting to the Agency unrestricted
access to all locations the Agency requested to visit; by the provision of information and clarifications
in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components; and by making individuals available
for interviews. This is a welcome development.
52. The Agency will now undertake all the steps necessary to confirm that the information provided
by Iran on its past and present nuclear activities is correct and complete. To date, there is no evidence
that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a
nuclear weapons programme. However, given Iran’s past pattern of concealment, it will take some
time before the Agency is able to conclude that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful
purposes. To that end, the Agency must have a particularly robust verification system in place. An
Additional Protocol, coupled with a policy of full transparency and openness on the part of Iran, is
indispensable for such a system.
53. In that context, Iran has been requested to continue its policy of active co-operation by answering
all of the Agency’s questions, and by providing the Agency with access to all locations, information
and individuals deemed necessary by the Agency. One issue requiring investigation as a matter of
urgency is the source of HEU and LEU contamination. The Agency intends to pursue the matter with a
number of countries, whose full co-operation is essential to the resolution of this issue.
54. The recent announcement of Iran’s intention to conclude an Additional Protocol, and to act in
accordance with the provisions of the Protocol pending its entry into force, is a positive development.
The draft Additional Protocol is now being submitted to the Board for its consideration.
55. Iran’s decision to suspend its uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities is also
welcome.3 The Agency intends to verify, in the context of the Safeguards Agreement and the
Additional Protocol, the implementation by Iran of this decision.
56. The Director General will inform the Board of additional developments for its further
consideration at the March 2004 meeting of the Board, or earlier, as appropriate.
__________________________________________________________________________________
3 It should be noted that Iran introduced UF6 into the first centrifuge at PFEP on 25 June 2003, and, on 19 August 2003,
began testing a small ten-machine cascade. On 31 October 2003, Agency inspectors observed that no UF6 gas was being fed
into the centrifuges, although construction and installation work at the site was continuing.
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DETAILED TECHNICAL CHRONOLOGY
Uranium Conversion
The Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
1. According to Iran, UCF was originally based on a design provided by a foreign supplier in the
mid-1990s. The plant was supposed to have been constructed by the supplier under a turnkey contract,
but the contract was cancelled in 1997 and, according to Iran, the supplier did not provide any
equipment to Iran. The AEOI has acknowledged having received from the supplier the blueprint of the
facility, including equipment test reports and some design information on the equipment, but has
stated that all the parts and equipment for the plant were manufactured domestically based on detailed
designs developed without external assistance. Construction of the plant was begun in 1999.
2. Preliminary design information on UCF was submitted to the Agency on 31 July 2000. The
Agency has performed DIV at UCF since then on a regular basis with a view to monitoring progress in
construction and equipment installation, and to develop a safeguards approach. The proposed
safeguards approach was given to the Iranian authorities in February 2002.
3. The design information provided to the Agency in July 2000 described the purpose of this facility
as the conversion of uranium ore concentrate (UOC or U3O8) into natural UO2, UF6 and uranium
metal. The production design capacity was said to be 200 t of UF6 annually. The facility was described
as having the following process lines: conversion of natural UOC into UF6; conversion of low
enriched UF6 into UO2 (30 t per year of UO2 enriched to 5% U-235); conversion of depleted UF6 to
UF4 (170 t per year of depleted UO4); conversion of low enriched UF6 LEU metal (30 kg per year of
uranium metal enriched to 19.7% U-235), and the conversion of depleted UF4 to depleted uranium
metal. According to information provided by Iran, commissioning of the first line (for the conversion
of U3O8 to ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC)) is expected to begin in November 2003.
4. While conducting a DIV at the facility in 2002, inspectors noticed that the depleted uranium
metal line had been changed to a line for natural uranium metal production. The updated design
information, which was provided to the Agency on 9 April 2003, now includes an additional line for
conversion to natural UO2 and a line for conversion to natural uranium metal. In a letter dated 19
August 2003, Iran stated that the uranium metal production line could be used to produce shielding
material, and that the natural UO2 line was envisaged to meet the needs of the heavy water reactor
programme.
Uranium Conversion Experiments and Testing
5. The explanations by Iran that it had not conducted any tests using nuclear material on certain
parts of the conversion process and that those processes had been based on the supplier’s drawings and
test reports, raised questions, particularly given that the simpler steps of the conversion process (such
as U3O8 dissolution and uranium purification using pulse columns) had undergone extensive testing.
According to Agency experts, such an approach would be inconsistent with the normal practice of first
validating the processes and carrying out pilot scale production before proceeding to the final design
and construction of a commercial conversion plant.
6. As indicated in GOV/2003/63, Iran acknowledged in August 2003 that it had carried out some
bench scale uranium conversion experiments in the early 1990s, experiments that Iran should have
reported in accordance with its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement.
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7. On 9 October 2003, the Agency received acknowledgement that, contrary to Iran’s previous
communications, practically all of the materials important to uranium conversion (AUC, UO3, UF4 and
UF6) had been produced in laboratory and bench scale experiments (kilogram quantities) conducted
between 1981 and 1993 without having been reported to the Agency. On 1 November 2003, Iran
explained that, due to foreign involvement in the design and construction of UCF, it was decided in
1993 to terminate domestic research and development on UF4 and UF6. Iran further explained that the
facilities related to the UF4 and UF6 experiments had been dismantled, and that the equipment had
been moved to waste storage at Karaj. This is being evaluated by the Agency.
8. For ease of reference, a summary of major processing experiments by Iran using imported
uranium, based on information currently available to the Agency, is provided in Table 1.
TABLE 1: Major Processing Experiments by Iran Using Imported Uranium
Year
of
Import
Material
Type &
Quantity
Use by Iran
20 kg U3O8
(depleted)
• At Iran’s request the U3O8 was exempted from safeguards in 1978 (de-exempted in 1998).
• Processing activities were carried out between 1981 and 1993 and reported to the Agency in
1998. 5.2 kg U3O8 was declared a process loss from the experiments.
1977
50 kg UO2
(depleted)
• At Iran’s request the UO2 was exempted from safeguards in 1978 (de-exempted in 1998).
• Fuel fabrication research was carried out between 1985 and 1993 at FFL and reported to the
Agency in 1998; 13.1 kg depleted UO2 was declared as a process loss from these experiments.
• Lab-scale experiments using UO2, reported in 1998 as a loss, were used between 1989 and 1993
to produce UF4 at TNRC.
• UO2 targets were produced from 1988 to 1992 at ENTC using about 6.9 kg UO2, previously
declared as a process loss in 1998, subsequently irradiated at TRR; the resulting plutonium
separated at TNRC was stored together with the irradiated unprocessed targets at TNRC.
1982 531 t U3O8
concentrate
(natural)
• Processing of 85 kg U3O8 between 1982 and 1993 was carried out at UCL and reported to the
Agency in 1998; 45 kg was declared as a process loss from these experiments.
• Between 1982 and 1987 about 12.2 kg UO2 was produced using U3O8 declared in 1998 as a loss.
This UO2, combined with some other materials, was used between 1989 and 1993 to produce
about 10 kg UF4 at TNRC.
1005 kg
UF6
(natural)
• 1.9 kg UF6 was used for testing of centrifuges at Kalaye Electric between 1999 and 2002.
402 kg
UF4
(natural)
• 376.6 kg UF4 was converted to U metal in 113 experiments at JHL; and about 9.4 kg UF4, which
had been declared earlier in 2003 as a process loss, was used to produce 6.5 kg UF6 at TNRC
between 1991 and 1993.
1991
401.5 kg
UO2
(natural)
• 44 kg UO2 was used in testing of pulse columns and pellet production at JHL.
• 1-2 g UO2 was irradiated in experiments in TRR and processed at JHL.
• 2.7 kg UO2 was used to produce UF4.
1993 50 kg
uranium
metal
• 8 kg uranium metal was used for AVLIS experiments from 1999 to 2000 at TNRC.
• 22 kg uranium metal was used for AVLIS experiments from October 2002 to February 2003 at
Lashkar Ab’ad.
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9. In 1977, Iran imported 20 kg of depleted U3O8 and 50 kg of depleted UO2. Upon request by Iran
in 1978, these materials were exempted from safeguards. In 1982, Iran imported 531 t of natural U3O8
concentrate, which it reported to the Agency in 1990.
10. In 1981 and 1984, respectively, Iran commissioned with a foreign supplier the construction at
ENTC of a Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL) and a Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL). The
existence of these laboratories was disclosed to the Agency during a visit of the then DDG-SG in
1993, and formally reported to the Agency in 1998. Between 1981 and 1993, Iran carried out at UCL
and FFL unreported activities involving the exempted depleted U3O8, the exempted depleted UO2, and
the U3O8 concentrate (see paras. 11 and 12 below). These activities were only reported to the Agency
in 1998 after lengthy discussions between the Agency and Iranian officials. The material was
de-exempted in 1998, and what remained of it was stored at ENTC. In 1998, Iran declared that UCL
had been closed down since 1987. FFL is still in operation.
11. Between 1981 and 1993, processing activities involving the 20 kg of exempted depleted U3O8
and some of the 531 t of natural U3O8 concentrate were carried out at UCL. Of the original 20 kg of
depleted U3O8, 5.2 kg was reported in 1998 as process losses by Iran. Iran also reported in 1998 that it
had processed 85 kg of the 531 t of U3O8 concentrate, of which 45 kg was declared as process losses.
12. During the period 1985 through 1993, FFL was used for research in fuel fabrication, the main
activity having been the manufacture of sintered pellets using the imported 50 kg of exempted
depleted UO2. Iran reported the existence of FFL, and the processing of the nuclear material there, in
1998, at which time it declared that 13.1 kg of the material had been lost during processing.
13. In a letter dated 19 August 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had carried out UO2 to UF4
conversion experiments on a laboratory scale during the 1990s at the Radiochemistry Laboratories of
the TNRC using some of the imported depleted UO2 referred to in the previous paragraph. Until
August 2003, Iran had claimed that it had carried out no UF4 production experiments. This activity
was acknowledged by Iran only after the July 2003 waste analysis results of samples taken to verify
experiments using nuclear material imported in 1991 indicated the presence of depleted UF4 mixed
with natural UF4. Iran acknowledged that the UO2 which had been used had been part of that
previously declared by Iran as having been lost during experiments at FFL.
14. On 9 October 2003, Iran provided further details on these UF4 experiments, stating that, between
1987 and 1993, there had been bench scale production of UF4 at the Radiochemistry Laboratories.
This information was further amplified in Iran’s letter dated 21 October 2003 and in a subsequent
meeting on 1 November 2003. According to that information, the UF4 production experiments
included testing of wet and dry production methods. Between 1982 and 1987, approximately 12.2 kg
of natural UO2 was produced at UCL using imported U3O8 concentrate that had been reported as a
process loss in 1998 (see para. 11 above). This material, together with 1 kg of the UO2 imported in
1991, and 1.23 kg of depleted UO2 that had been reported in 1998 as a process loss at UCL (see para.
12 above), was used for the production of UF4 at the Radiochemistry Laboratories through the wet
method. In addition, 2.5 kg of UF4 was produced with the dry method, using UO2 imported in 1991 as
the source material.
15. Between 1991 and 1992, 0.2 kg of UO3 and 4.45 kg of AUC were produced in the
Radiochemistry Laboratories using, as source material, some of the U3O8 concentrate imported in
1982.
16. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed, as a corrective measure, to submit ICRs for UCL, FFL, JHL
and the waste storage facility at Karaj, as well as design information for the waste storage facility.
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17. Final evaluation of the information provided on these conversion experiments will depend on the
results of the destructive and environmental sample analysis and the assessment of the experiment
reports provided by Iran.
18. Following the import in 1991 of natural uranium (1005 kg of UF6, 402 kg of UF4 and 401.5 kg of
UO2), Iran carried out a number of experiments, on a laboratory scale, at JHL located at TNRC. The
import of the nuclear material in question was only acknowledged by Iran in March 2003. The status
of the imported material, as currently declared, is as follows:
• Of the 1005 kg of UF6, 1.9 kg was found to have been missing from two cylinders in which
the material is said to have been delivered. This loss was originally attributed by Iran to
evaporation of the material due to high temperatures during storage of the material. Iran has
now acknowledged that it used that material for testing centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric
Company, as described below.
• Of the 402 kg of UF4, 376.6 kg was converted to uranium metal. The conversion was declared
by Iran in March 2003, and in June 2003, it was described as having been achieved through
113 experiments carried out at JHL in the early 1990s. In October 2003, Iran also
acknowledged having used 9.43 kg of the UF4 for conversion to UF6, as described below.
• Of the 401.5 kg of UO2, 44 kg was used in testing pulse column process and pellet production
experiments at JHL. In addition, between June 1987 and February 1999, small amounts (1 to
2 g) of UO2 were irradiated in TRR in about 50 experiments and sent to the Molybdenum,
Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility) for separation of I-131. In
October 2003, Iran acknowledged having used 2.7 kg of the UO2 in conversion experiments to
produce UF4.
19. Iran has provided ICRs on its import of the material referred to in the preceding paragraph, as
well as on its subsequent processing. Iran has also submitted physical inventory listings (PILs) and
material balance reports (MBRs) reflecting the current status of nuclear material at JHL, including
uranium metal, uranyl nitrate, UO2 pellets and waste containing uranium.
20. JHL, where many of these experiments are declared to have been carried out, consists of several
rooms where conversion activities took place using the nuclear material imported in 1991. The facility
was declared to the Agency in March 2003. In May 2003, design information for JHL was received,
and verification thereof commenced. Iran has been informed that the design information is not yet
complete, and has been requested to provide an update.
Production and use of UF6
21. Until recently, the Iranian authorities repeatedly asserted that the UF6 imported in 1991 had not
been processed, and specifically that it had not been used in any centrifuge, enrichment or other tests.
The State authorities explained that the small amount of UF6 (1.9 kg) missing from the two smaller
cylinders in which the material had been imported might have been due to leaking valves, an
explanation challenged by the Agency on the basis of its technical assessment and verification
activities. In the information submitted on 23 October 2003, however, Iran acknowledged that it had
used 1.9 kg of the imported UF6 to test centrifuge machines at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop
between 1999 and 2002, before the dismantling of the test facility at the end of 2002. This material is
currently declared as hold-up in the dismantled equipment currently stored at PFEP.
22. The remaining container of the UF6 imported in 1991, a large 30 B-type cylinder currently stored
at Natanz, was presented to Agency inspectors, and appeared to have been intact. However,
destructive analysis sampling of its contents need to be performed. This will be done as soon as the
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necessary equipment is installed. In the meantime, environmental samples and non-destructive
measurements have been taken in order to confirm the presence of natural uranium.
23. In contrast to its earlier declarations that it had not used nuclear material to test the production of
UF6, Iran acknowledged in its letter dated 21 October 2003 that, between 1987 and 1993, it had carried
out in the Radiochemical Laboratories at TNRC bench scale preparation of UF6 using as feed 9.43 kg
of the UF4 which had been imported in 1991. The laboratory equipment has since then been
dismantled. On 12 October 2003, the equipment was presented for Agency verification in a container
at the Karaj Nuclear Research Centre for Medicine and Agriculture, together with a number of
cylinders containing approximately 6.5 kg of UF6. Final evaluation will depend on the results of
environmental sampling and assessment of experiment records provided by Iran.
24. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit ICRs for JHL, PFEP and the waste storage facility at
Karaj and to provide design information for those facilities.
Production of uranium metal
25. In March 2003, Iran informed the Agency that most of the natural UF4 imported in 1991 had been
converted to uranium metal at JHL between 1995 and 2000 in the course of 113 experiments. Neither
the experiments nor the facility where these experiments were conducted were declared to the Agency
at the time the experiments were conducted. The nuclear material resulting from these experiments
was verified by the Agency during its May 2003 inspection, and Iran has submitted the relevant ICRs,
PILS and MBRs, as well as updated design information for JHL.
26. In its letter dated 21 October 2003, Iran admitted that the uranium metal production capabilities
had also been intended for use in Iran’s laser enrichment programme (see discussion below).
Reprocessing Experiments
27. In March 2003, Iran stated that some of the UO2 imported in 1991 had been used for pellet
fabrication experiments. In April 2003, Iran informed the Agency that some of the UO2 had also been
used in isotope production experiments involving irradiation at TRR of the natural UO2 targets and the
subsequent separation of molybdenum, xenon and iodine. The liquid uranium-containing waste
resulting from these experiments is said by Iran to have been sent to Esfahan.
28. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged the irradiation of depleted UO2 targets at
TRR and subsequent plutonium separation experiments in a hot cell in the Nuclear Safety Building of
TNRC between 1988 and 1992. Neither the activities nor the separated plutonium had been reported to
the Agency previously.
29. In the meetings held 27 October–1 November 2003, additional information was provided about
the experiments involving the depleted uranium. Iran stated that they had been carried out to learn
about the nuclear fuel cycle, and to gain experience in reprocessing chemistry. The experiments took
place between 1988 and 1992, and involved 7 kg of pressed or sintered UO2 pellets prepared at ENTC
using depleted uranium that had been exempted, at the request of Iran, in 1978. In 1997, this material
was reported as a process loss at FFL. The capsules containing the pellets were irradiated typically for
two weeks in TRR in connection with a project to produce fission product isotopes of molybdenum,
iodine and xenon. The plutonium separation, based on the Purex process, was carried out on the site of
TNRC, on a laboratory scale, in three shielded glove boxes, which, according to Iran, were dismantled
in 1992 and later stored in a warehouse at ENTC along with related equipment.
30. The Agency was informed that a total of about 7 kg of UO2 was used, of which 3 kg had been
irradiated and processed to separate plutonium. The remaining 4 kg of irradiated UO2 targets was
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placed in containers and stored on the TNRC site; the separated plutonium was stored in a laboratory
of JHL following the dismantling of the glove boxes; and the wastes were disposed of at Qom.
31. In August 2003, Agency inspectors visited the waste storage location at Anarak where the waste
referred to in paragraph 27 above had been stored. Iran has agreed to transfer that waste to JHL.
32. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all nuclear material accountancy reports from 1988
through the present covering the manufacture of the UO2 targets, their irradiation and subsequent
processing and the storage of the remaining nuclear material and wastes. In addition, Iran has agreed
to submit design information covering these activities and nuclear material at ENTC and JHL.
33. On 1 November 2003, Iran presented both the separated plutonium and the irradiated
unprocessed targets to Agency inspectors at JHL. Verification of that material, as well as possible
hold-up in dismantled glove boxes, is foreseen to take place during the forthcoming inspection.
Uranium Enrichment
Gas Centrifuge Enrichment
34. In February 2003, in response to inquiries by the Agency, Iran acknowledged the existence of
two centrifuge enrichment plants under construction at Natanz: PFEP and the large commercial scale
FEP. In February 2003, Iran also acknowledged that the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in
Tehran had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no
operations in connection with its centrifuge enrichment development programme involving the use of
nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any other location in Iran. According to
Iran, all testing had been carried out either in vacuum or using simulation studies. Iranian officials
stated that the enrichment programme had been started in 1997 and that it was indigenous and based
on information available from open sources, such as scientific publications and patents.
35. A team of Agency centrifuge technology experts met on 7–11 June 2003 with Iranian officials to
seek clarification about Iran’s centrifuge enrichment programme, in particular about its statement that
the design and development, which was said to have been begun in 1997, had been based on
information from open sources and extensive modelling and simulation, and that the tests of centrifuge
rotors at the Amir Khabir University and on the premises of the AEOI in Tehran had been conducted
without nuclear material. This meeting was followed by a round of technical discussions in Tehran in
July 2003, and further meetings of the centrifuge technology experts with Iranian officials in Iran on
9–12 August 2003, 4–9 October 2003 and 27 October–1 November 2003.
36. Following up on recent open source reports of enrichment activities being undertaken at an
industrial complex in Kolahdouz in western Tehran, the Agency was permitted on 5 October 2003 to
visit three locations which the Agency had identified as corresponding to those mentioned in the
reports. Iran stated that there were no nuclear related activities being carried out at this site. While no
work was seen at those locations that could be linked to uranium enrichment, environmental samples
were taken.
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The Natanz Facilities
37. At the time Iran disclosed the construction of PFEP, in February 2003, over 100 of the
approximately 1000 planned centrifuge casings had already been installed. Iran informed the Agency
that the remaining centrifuges were scheduled to be installed by the end of 2003. Iran also informed
the Agency that the commercial scale FEP, which is planned to contain over 50 000 centrifuges, was
scheduled to start accepting centrifuges in early 2005, after the design is confirmed by the tests to be
conducted in PFEP, but that FEP was not scheduled to receive nuclear material in the near future.
38. The Agency took baseline environmental samples at PFEP on several occasions between March
and May 2003 before nuclear material was introduced in the facility, the results of which revealed
particles of HEU indicating the possible presence in Iran of nuclear material that had not been declared
to the Agency. In June 2003, the results were provided to Iran for comments. In August 2003, the
Iranian authorities attributed the presence of HEU particles to contamination originating from
centrifuge components that had been imported by Iran.
39. Subsequent environmental samples revealed the presence in Iran of natural uranium, LEU and at
least two other types of HEU particles. It was also noted that there had been differences among the
samples taken from the surfaces of the centrifuge casings installed for the single machine tests. The
Agency asked the Iranian authorities to investigate whether there were differences in the
manufacturing history of those pieces of equipment.
40. In August 2003, the IAEA was allowed to take swipe samples of imported components stored at
Natanz, as well as of some of the newly machined components that had been produced in Iran. At the
request of the Agency, Iran provided a list of imported and domestically produced centrifuge
components and equipment in October 2003.
41. Agency inspectors were told in early October 2003 that all of the centrifuges from the Kalaye
Electric Company had been scrapped, and therefore were not available for inspection, whereas it
became clear later that the centrifuges had in fact been stored at another location in Tehran and were
finally shown to the inspectors at Natanz on 30–31 October 2003, at which time Agency experts
examined the centrifuges and associated equipment, and took environmental samples. All major
imported and domestically produced components, as well as various pieces of manufacturing
equipment have now been sampled. The results of the sample analyses are not expected to be available
before December 2003. The nuclear material held in this equipment will be verified during the
forthcoming inspections. The Agency has now also obtained information about the source of the
components that Iran claims to have been contaminated.
42. On 25 June 2003, Iran introduced UF6 into the first centrifuge at PFEP for the purpose of single
machine testing. On 19 August 2003, Iran began the testing of a small ten-machine cascade at PFEP
with UF6. As of October 2003, some single machine testing using UF6 had been carried out at PFEP
and the installation of a 164-machine cascade was being finalized. Agency inspectors visited PFEP on
31 October 2003, and observed that no UF6 gas was being fed into the first centrifuges of the
164-centrifuge machine cascade. However, construction and installation work at the site was
continuing.
Kalaye Electric Company
43. In March 2003, during an Agency visit to the workshop at the Kalaye Electric Company, the
Iranian authorities refused Agency access to one of the workshop buildings, claiming that the building
was used for storage and that no keys to the building were available.
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44. During their 9–12 August 2003 visit to Iran, Agency inspectors were permitted to take
environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, with a view to assessing the role of
that company in Iran’s enrichment research and development programme. During that visit, the
inspectors noted that there had been considerable modification of the premises since their visits in
March and May 2003, which the Iranian authorities attributed to the transformation of the workshop
from use as a storage facility to its use as a laboratory for non-destructive analysis. As reflected in the
Director General’s previous report to the Board, this could impact on the accuracy of the
environmental sampling and the Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s declarations about the types of
activities previously carried out there.
45. On 16 September 2003, the Agency informed representatives of Iran of the results of the analysis
of the environmental samples taken at the Kalaye Electric Company in August 2003, which had
revealed the presence of HEU and LEU particles which were not consistent with the nuclear material
in the declared inventory of Iran.
46. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that “a limited number of tests, using small
amounts of UF6, [had been] conducted in 1999 and 2002” at the Kalaye Electric Company. The
equipment used between 1999 and 2000 at Kalaye Electric Company was suitable for pilot scale
uranium isotope separation. As an isotope separation plant is defined in Article 98.I.(a) of the
Safeguards Agreement as a facility, the existence of this facility should have been declared to the
Agency.
Enrichment research and development activities
47. As indicated in the Director General’s previous report, in contrast to the initial information
provided about the chronology of the enrichment programme and its indigenous nature, Iran informed
the Agency in August 2003 that the decision to launch a centrifuge enrichment programme had
actually been taken in 1985, and that Iran had received drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign
intermediary around 1987. Iranian officials further described the programme as having consisted of
three phases: the first phase, from 1985 until 1997, during which related activities had been located
mainly at the AEOI premises in Tehran (with laboratory work at the Plasma Physics Laboratories of
TNRC); the second phase, between 1997 and 2002, during which the activities had been relocated and
concentrated at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran and Iran was able to make all components had
some success in mechanically testing centrifuges and decided to construct the enrichment facilities at
Natanz; and the third phase, 2002 to the present, when the research and development and assembly
activities were moved to Natanz.
48. According to information provided by Iran in August 2003, during the first phase, about 2000
components and some subassemblies had been obtained from abroad through foreign intermediaries or
directly by Iranian entities, but no help was received from abroad in the assembly of centrifuges or in
training, nor were any completed centrifuges imported. Efforts had been concentrated on achieving an
operating centrifuge, but many difficulties were encountered as a result of machine crashes attributed
to poor quality components. Iran described the second phase of activities as having involved the
assembly and testing of centrifuges, but again without inert (e.g. xenon) or UF6 gas.
49. In pursuit of its verification of Iran’s statement that it had not tested any centrifuges using nuclear
material, the Agency’s team of centrifuge technology experts inquired of Iran how it had developed
the ‘enrichment factor’4 and ‘separative output’5 used in the relevant calculations. The Agency was
__________________________________________________________________________________
4 The “enrichment factor” of a centrifuge is the ratio of the amount of U-235 in the product to the amount of U-235 in the
feed.
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told that they had been obtained from an original centrifuge ‘sketch’, supported by theoretical
calculations using open literature, and not from experiments.
50. The Agency’s centrifuge technology experts remained of the view that, based on all information
available to them, Iran’s assertion that no UF6 or any simulation gas had ever been introduced into a
centrifuge machine in Iran was inconsistent with other countries’ experience, and they still could not
conclude that the then current status of the centrifuges installed at Natanz could have been achieved
solely on the basis of open source information and computer simulations without additional
confirmation through the use of UF6 in laboratory testing.
51. No new information was provided by Iran with respect to the issue of testing of centrifuges using
nuclear material until October 2003. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that, in order
to ensure the performance of centrifuge machines, a limited number of tests using small amounts of
UF6 imported in 1991 had been carried out at the Kalaye Electric Company. According to Iran, the
first test of the centrifuges was conducted in 1998 using an inert gas (xenon). Series of tests using UF6
were performed between 1999 and 2002. In the course of the last series of tests, an enrichment level of
1.2% U-235 was achieved.
52. In a meeting with enrichment technology experts held during the 27 October–1 November 2003
visit, Iran provided additional information about its gas centrifuge programme. The authorities
explained that the experiments which had been carried out at the Kalaye Electric Company had
involved the 1.9 kg of imported UF6 the absence of which the State authorities had earlier attributed to
evaporation due to leaking valves on the cylinders containing the gas. The individual who had been in
charge of the actual research and development work during the period 1992–2001 was made available
for discussions with the Agency. Although there were no detailed technical or nuclear material
accountancy reports available, the individual interviewed by the Agency was able to provide, as
supporting documentation, his personal notebooks.
53. On 1 November 2003, the Iranian authorities stated that all nuclear material had been declared to
the Agency and that Iran had not enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-235 using centrifuges, and that,
therefore, the contamination could not have arisen as a result of indigenous activities. In the course of
these investigations and interviews of individuals involved in the nuclear programme, the Agency has
obtained information on the origin of the centrifuge components and equipment which Iran claims to
be the source of HEU, LEU and other particle contamination at the Kalaye Electric Company and at
PFEP. The Agency will continue to investigate this matter.
54. As a corrective measure, Iran has agreed to submit ICRs for JHL and for PFEP, and to provide
updated design information for PFEP.
Laser Enrichment
55. During the Agency’s 12 August 2003 visit to the laser laboratory located at Lashkar Ab’ad, the
Iranian authorities described the laboratory as originally having been devoted to laser fusion research
and laser spectroscopy, but stated that its focus had been changed and the equipment unrelated to the
site’s current projects, including a large vacuum vessel imported by Iran in 2000, had been moved.
The Agency requested that Iran confirm that there had not been in the past any activities related to
uranium laser enrichment at this location or at any other location in Iran, and requested permission to
take environmental samples at the laboratory.
___________________________________________________________________________
5 The “separative output” of a centrifuge defines the amount of enrichment achieved by the centrifuge. The “separative
output” multiplied by the number of centrifuges in an enrichment plant defines the total output achievable by the plant.
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56. In response to that request, in its 19 August 2003 letter to the Agency, Iran stated that, in the past,
apart from planned co-operation in laser fusion and laser spectroscopy which never materialized, there
had been a research thesis on laser spectroscopy of SF6 prepared by a university student in
co-operation with the laser division of AEOI. As indicated in the Director General’s previous report to
the Board, Iran stated that it had a substantial research and development programme on lasers, but that
it currently had no programme for laser isotope separation.
57. During discussions which took place in Iran from 2 to 3 October 2003, the Iranian authorities
informed Agency inspectors that Iran had received from a foreign source, in 1992, a laser
spectroscopy laboratory intended for the study of laser induced fusion, optogalvanic phenomena and
photoionization spectroscopy, and from another foreign source, in 2000, the large vacuum vessel
referred to above, but that the equipment had been only for spectroscopic studies. It was agreed that
the Agency would be shown the equipment and permitted to take environmental samples, as had been
requested by the Agency on 12 August 2003.
58. On 6 October 2003, Agency inspectors were permitted to take environmental samples at Lashkar
Ab’ad. The inspectors also visited a warehouse in the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Centre of the
AEOI, where a large imported vacuum vessel (approximately 5 m long, 1 m in diameter) with
associated hardware were stored. The Iranian authorities stated that it was the equipment which had
been imported in 2000, that it had never been used, and that it had now been packed for shipment back
to the manufacturer, since the contract related to its supply had been terminated by the foreign partner
in 2000. The inspectors were informed that the individuals involved with the projects would be made
available for interviews, but that the interviews would take place later in Tehran, where the equipment
related to the laboratory imported from another country in 1992 would be made available for
examination and environmental sampling. However, these interviews and the presentation of the other
equipment were deferred by Iran until the end of October 2003.
59. In its letter dated 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that, starting in the 1970s, it had had
contracts related to laser enrichment using atomic vapour laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and
molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) techniques with foreign entities from four countries:
(a) 1975 – a contract for the establishment of a laboratory to study the spectroscopic
behaviour of uranium metal, which had been abandoned in the 1980s as the laboratory
had not functioned properly. The laboratory had also contained two mass
spectrometers, purchased from the same source in 1976, which had been used to
analyse samples of nuclear material obtained from enrichment experiments at Kalaye
Electric Company, TNRC and Lashkar Ab’ad. While the import of the nuclear
material used in that project had been reported to the Agency, the laboratory where the
laser equipment had been installed (at TNRC) was not. None of these activities
involving the nuclear material had been reported to the Agency.
(b) Late 1970s – a contract with a second supplier to study MLIS, under which four 5 μm
CO lasers and four vacuum chambers were delivered, but which was ultimately
terminated due to the political situation prevailing at that time.
(c) 1991 – a contract with a third supplier for the establishment of a laser laboratory,
consisting of two parts: the “Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory” (LSL), for the
spectroscopic study of uranium metal; and the “Comprehensive Separation
Laboratory” (CSL), at which enrichment would be carried out on a milligram scale.
The contract also provided for the supply to Iran of 50 kg of natural uranium metal
(which was imported in 1993). The equipment was able to enrich uranium up to the
contracted level of 3% U-235, and even slightly beyond, in the course of the
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experiments. It was used until October 2002, when the laboratories, and the nuclear
material, were moved from TNRC to Lashkar Ab’ad. None of these activities
involving nuclear material were reported to the Agency.
(d) 1998 – a contract with a fourth supplier to obtain information related to laser
enrichment, and the supply of relevant equipment. However, due to the inability of the
supplier to secure export licences, only some of the equipment was delivered (to
Lashkar Ab’ad).
60. The equipment imported in connection with the above mentioned AVLIS and MLIS projects was
presented to the Agency inspectors in October 2003, and the inspectors were able to discuss the
projects with individuals who had been involved with them and to take environmental samples. Final
assessment must await evaluation of the recently available information and the environmental
sampling results.
61. In October 2003, Iran provided more information on Lashkar Ab’ad, and acknowledged that it
had in fact contained a pilot plant for laser enrichment using AVLIS techniques, which had been
established in 2000 pursuant to a project involving the fourth country. As indicated above, this
contract was not fully implemented, since export licences were not obtained for all of the equipment.
The project had consisted of several contracts covering not only the supply of information, as
indicated in Iran’s letter of 21 October 2003 to the Agency, but also delivery of more powerful copper
vapour lasers (CVLs) up to 150 kW. Since the delivery of the CVLs was blocked due to the lack of
export licences, the equipment at LSL and CSL was moved to Lashkar Ab’ad in October 2002, and,
taking advantage of the CVL and dye lasers from these laboratories and the large vacuum chamber and
associated equipment imported in 2000 and already located there, experiments were conducted from
October 2002 through January 2003 using 22 kg of the 50 kg of imported natural uranium metal.
According to Iranian authorities, the uranium metal was located at Lashkar Ab’ad from December
2002 through May 2003. The equipment was dismantled in May 2003 and transferred together with
uranium metal to Karaj, where they were presented to Agency inspectors on 28 October 2003. The
Agency took environmental samples from the equipment and nuclear material presented to it.
62. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran also informed the Agency that it had used for separation
experiments at LSL and CSL at TNRC 8 kg of the 50 kg of natural uranium metal imported in 1993.
63. The equipment received in 1992 and 1999 was suitable for pilot plant scale operations of uranium
isotope separation using AVLIS. As an isotope separation plant is defined in Article 98.I.(a) of the
Safeguards Agreement as a facility, the existence of these facilities should have been declared to the
Agency, and information provided on an as-built basis at Lashkar Ab’ad, and its subsequent transfer to
Karaj.
64. Iran had failed to report the receipt and use of uranium metal and to provide design information
for LSL, CSL and Lashkar Ab’ad. In the meeting of 1 November 2003, Iran agreed, as a corrective
measure, to submit the relevant ICRs concerning the use of the uranium metal, which will be presented
for Agency verification during the inspection scheduled for 8–15 November 2003. Iran also agreed to
submit design information for a new storage facility at Karaj, where the waste from the laser
enrichment programme is being stored along with the dismantled equipment, and to amend the design
information for JHL to cover the mass spectrometer and laser laboratories as well as some waste tanks
containing nuclear material.
65. Final assessment is pending evaluation of the new information, the verification results from the
November 2003 inspection and the results of environmental and other sample taking.
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Heavy Water Reactor Programme
66. In response to Agency enquiries in September 2002, Iran confirmed in February 2003 its
construction of a Heavy Water Production Plant at Arak. In explaining the need for such a plant,
Iranian officials said that they had not known whether their uranium enrichment programme would
succeed, and that, therefore, they had considered in the 1980s the possibility of constructing a natural
uranium nuclear power plant using heavy water as the moderator and coolant. They further explained
that, now that the enrichment programme had succeeded, there was no need for heavy water
production, and they were not sure whether the plant would be completed. On 26 February 2003, the
Agency submitted a number of questions to Iran about its heavy water reactor programme, requesting
that it provide further information, in particular on any plans Iran had to build heavy water reactors.
Design and Purpose of the IR-40
67. The Agency was first informed of Iran’s construction of a heavy water reactor in a letter from
Iran dated 5 May 2003. In that letter, Iran stated that it intended to construct a 40 MW(th) heavy water
reactor, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak. Enclosed with the letter was only
preliminary design information on the reactor, in which the reactor power output of 40 MW(th) was
confirmed; it did not include information on the fuel or the reactor design. At the same time, Iran
provided preliminary information on a facility intended to manufacture fuel for IR-40, namely the Fuel
Manufacturing Plant (FMP) to be built on the Esfahan site.
68. During a technical visit to Iran by the Agency on 10–13 July 2003, the Iranian authorities made a
presentation on some of the technical features of the IR-40, and informed the Agency that the
construction was planned to start in 2004. According to statements made in the course of this
presentation, Iran had decided to replace TRR because, after 35 years of operation, it was reaching the
safety limits for which it had been designed and because of its location within what had become the
suburbs of the city of Tehran. However, as it had tried, unsuccessfully, on several occasions to import
a research reactor suitable for medical, industrial isotope production and for research and
development, Iran had decided in the mid-1980s to construct its own reactor. The only alternative was
a heavy water reactor which could use UO2 and zirconium produced in Esfahan. According to the
Iranian authorities, to meet its isotope production requirements, such a reactor should have a neutron
flux of 1013 to 1014 n/cm2/s, based on a power of the order of 30-40 MW(th) when using natural UO2
fuel.
69. During the presentation, the Iranian authorities informed the Agency that the facility was based
on indigenous design, and that it was currently in the detailed design phase and would be built in the
Khondab area near Arak. The core fuel assemblies would be made from natural UO2 and supplied by
FMP, the feed for which would be supplied by UCF, currently under construction at Esfahan. The
Agency was informed that the construction of FMP would begin in 2003 and be completed in 2006,
and that operations were planned to start in 2007. Iran provided updated design information on the
IR-40 on 26 July 2003, and preliminary design information on FMP in 2003.
70. In a letter to the Agency dated 19 August 2003, the AEOI provided more information on Iran’s
heavy water reactor programme, stating that a decision to start the research and development had been
made in the early 1980s.
71. As indicated above, Iran previously stated that the IR-40 was of indigenous design. According to
the information provided by Iran in its letter of 21 October 2003, however, foreign experts had been
consulted in the development of some parts of the design of the reactor. When asked, Iranian
Annex 4
GOV/2003/75
Annex 1
Page 13
authorities stated that they had conducted extensive reactor core calculations for the fuel management
strategies and to control the excess reactivity6 of the core. In that letter, Iran stated further that the
reactor design had been 90% completed by the end of 2002, and the detailed design was expected to
be completed by the end of 2005.
72. On 29 October 2003, Iran informed the Agency that the production of both “short lived” and
“long lived” isotopes had been considered for this project, and that the exact amount and type of these
isotopes would be decided upon during the detailed design stage of the project.
Hot Cells
73. During its July 2003 visit to Tehran, the Agency was provided with drawings of the reactor.
Contrary to what would have been expected given the declared radioisotope production purpose of the
facility, the drawings contained no references to hot cells. The Agency raised this issue during that
visit, particularly in light of open source reports of recent efforts by Iran to acquire from abroad heavy
manipulators and leaded windows designed for hot cell applications. The Agency indicated to the
Iranian authorities that, given the specifications of the manipulators and windows which were the
subject of those reports, a design for hot cells should exist already and that, therefore, the hot cell, or
cells, should already have been declared, at least on a preliminary basis, as part of the facility or as a
separate installation. On 4 August 2003, the Agency was provided with updated design information on
the IR-40 which did not contain any references to hot cells. Later in August, Iran informed the Agency
that, as Iran had not been certain about the success of its procurement efforts, the design of the hot
cell(s) had not been included in the preliminary drawings of the IR-40 Research Reactor.
74. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that two hot cells had been foreseen for this
project. However, according to the information provided in that letter, neither the design nor detailed
information about the dimensions or the actual layout of the hot cells were available at the present
time, since they did not know the characteristics of the manipulators and shielded windows for the hot
cells which they could procure. Iran indicated in that letter that manipulators would be needed for: 4
hot cells for the production of medical radioisotopes, 2 hot cells for the production of Co-60 and Ir-
192 sources, 3 hot cells for waste processing, and 10 back-up manipulators. The 21 October 2003
letter included a drawing of a building which Iran said would contain hot cells for the production of
isotopes. In the meeting on 1 November 2003, upon further Agency inquiry, Iran confirmed that there
were tentative plans to construct at the Arak site an additional building with hot cells for the
production of radioisotopes. Iran stated that that first building was to contain hot cells for the
production of “short lived” isotopes, and that it intended to construct the other building to produce
“long lived” radioisotopes. Iran agreed to provide preliminary design information for the second
building.
75. Agency experts will examine in detail all of the available information with a view to making a
technical assessment of the explanations provided by Iran concerning the prospective use of the hot
cells at Arak and the associated equipment and manipulators.
Heavy water production capacity and inventory
76. According to Iranian statements, the estimated annual need for heavy water at the IR-40 is less
than 1 t. In a 19 August 2003 letter to the Agency, Iran provided additional information on the amount
of heavy water initially needed for the reactor (approximately 80–90 t), and on the design capacity of
__________________________________________________________________________________
6 Excess reactivity is the maximum deviation from criticality attainable at any time by adjustment of the reactor’s control
rods.
Annex 4
GOV/2003/75
Annex 1
Page 14
the heavy water production plant under construction at Khondab near Arak (8 t of heavy water per
year with expansion capabilities to twice its design capacity). According to the information provided
in that letter, Iran plans to start the production of heavy water in 2004. In that letter, Iran stated further
that laboratory scale experiments to produce heavy water had been conducted in Esfahan in the 1980s
using electrolysis techniques.
77. In a meeting held on 29 October 2003, Iran confirmed that the construction of a second
production line, with a production capacity of 8 t, had been started. It was further stated that the
Khondab facility was actually a pilot plant, and that no laboratory or other experiments using the
Girdler-Sulphide method (to be used at the Arak facility) had been carried out in the past in Iran.
Annex 4
GOV/2003/75
Annex 2
Page 1
LIST OF LOCATIONS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
AGENCY SAFEGUARDS
LOCATION AS OF NOVEMBER 2003 STATUS
TEHRAN NUCLEAR
RESEARCH CENTRE Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) Operating
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon
Radioisotope Production Facility
(MIX Facility)
Constructed, but not
operating
*Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose
Laboratories (JHL) Operating
*Waste Handling Facility (WHF) Operating
TEHRAN *Kalaye Electric Company Dismantled pilot enrichment
facility
BUSHEHR Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
(BNPP) Under construction
ESFAHAN NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY CENTRE
Miniature Neutron Source Reactor
(MNSR) Operating
Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor
(LWSCR) Operating
Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor
(HWSPR) Operating
Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL) Operating
Uranium Chemistry Laboratory
(UCL) Closed down
Uranium Conversion Facility
(UCF)
Under construction, first
process units being
commissioned for operation
Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor
(GSCR) Decommissioned
*Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) In detailed design stage,
construction to begin in 2004
NATANZ *Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
(PFEP) Operating
*Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) Under construction
Annex 4
GOV/2003/75
Annex 2
Page 2
KARAJ *Radioactive Waste Storage Under construction, but
partially operating
LASHKAR AB’AD *Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment
Plant Dismantled
ARAK *Iran Nuclear Research Reactor
(IR-40) In detailed design phase
*Hot cell facility for production of
radioisotopes In preliminary design stage
*Heavy Water Production Plant
(HWPP)
Under construction
Not subject to Safeguards
Agreement
ANARAK *Waste storage site Waste to be transferred to
JHL
* Locations declared in 2003
Annex 4
GOV/2003/75
Annex 3
Page 1
MAP OF IRAN
Annex 4
••
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IRAN
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GOV/2003/75
Annex 3
Page 2
ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS
AEOI Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
AUC ammonium uranyl carbonate
AVLIS atomic vapour laser isotope separation
BNPP Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Bushehr
CO carbon monoxide
CSL Comprehensive Separation Laboratory, TNRC and Lashkar Ab’ad
CVL copper vapour laser
DIV design information verification
ENTC Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre
FEP Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz
FFL Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, ENTC
FMP Fuel Manufacturing Plant, ENTC
GSCR Graphite, Sub-Critical Reactor, ENTC
HEU high enriched uranium
HWPP Heavy Water Production Plant, Arak
HWSPR Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor, ENTC
ICR inventory change report
IR-40 Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, Arak
JHL Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories, TNRC
LEU low enriched uranium
LSL Laser Separation Laboratory, TNRC and Lashkar Ab’ad
LWSCR Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor, ENTC
MBR material balance report
MIX Facility Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Facility, TNRC
MLIS molecular laser isotope separation
MNSR Miniature Neutron Source Reactor, ENTC
PFEP Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz
PIL physical inventory listing
Annex 4
GOV/2003/75
Annex 3
Page 3
SF6 sulphur hexafluoride
TNRC Tehran Nuclear Research Centre
TRR Tehran Research Reactor, Tehran
UCF Uranium Conversion Facility, ENTC
UCL Uranium Chemistry Laboratory, ENTC
UF4 uranium tetrachloride
UF6 uranium hexafluoride
UO2 uranium dioxide
UO3 uranium trioxide
U3O8 urano-uranic oxide
UOC uranium ore concentrate
WHF Waste Handling Facility, TNRC
WSF Waste Storage Facility, Karaj
Annex 4
Board of Governors GOV/2005/77
Date: 24 September 2005
Original: English
For official use only
Item 6(d) of the agenda
(GOV/2005/70)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005
The Board of Governors,
(a) Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Board on 11 August 2005 (GOV/2005/64),
29 November 2004 (GOV/2004/90), 18 September 2004 (GOV/2004/79), 18 June 2004
(GOV/2004/49, 13 March 2004 (GOV/2004/21), 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81) and on
12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69), the statement of the Board of 19 June 2003
(GOV/OR.1072) and the Chairman of the Board’s conclusions of March 2005 (GOV/OR.1122)
and of June 2005 (GOV/OR.1130),
(b) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,
(c) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial
efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues
in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,
(d) Recalling Iran’s failures in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet
its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 214) with respect to the
reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities
where such material had been processed and stored, as reported by the Director General in his
report GOV/2003/75 dated 10 November 2003 and confirmed in GOV/2005/67, dated
2 September 2005,
(e) Recalling also that, as deplored by the Board in its resolution GOV/2003/81, Iran’s policy
of concealment has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with its Safeguards
Agreement,
International Atomic Energy Agency
Derestricted 24 September 2005
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 24 September 2005)
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Page 2
(f) Recalling that the Director General in his report to the Board on 2 September 2005 noted
that good progress has been made in Iran’s correction of the breaches and in the Agency’s
ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran’s current declarations,
(g) Noting that, as reported by the Director General, the Agency is not yet in a position to
clarify some important outstanding issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and
investigation and that Iran’s full transparency is indispensable and overdue,
(h) Uncertain of Iran’s motives in failing to make important declarations over an extended
period of time and in pursuing a policy of concealment up to October 2003,
(i) Concerned by continuing gaps in the Agency’s understanding of proliferation sensitive
aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme,
(j) Recalling the emphasis placed in past resolutions on the importance of confidence building
measures and that past resolutions have reaffirmed that the full and sustained implementation of
the suspension notified to the Director General on 14 November 2004, as a voluntary, non
legally binding confidence building measure, to be verified by the Agency, is essential to
addressing outstanding issues,
(k) Deploring the fact that Iran has to date failed to heed the call by the Board in its resolution
of 11 August 2005 to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities including
the production of feed material, including through tests or production at the Uranium
Conversion Facility,
(l) Also concerned that Iran has to date failed to heed repeated calls to ratify the Additional
Protocol and to reconsider its decision to construct a research reactor moderated by heavy water,
as these measures would have helped build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran’s nuclear programme,
(m) Noting that the Director General reported that the Agency “continues to follow up on
information pertaining to Iran’s nuclear programme and activities that could be relevant to that
programme” and that “the Agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear
weapons related activity is limited” (GOV/2005/67),
(n) Endorsing the Director General’s description of this as a special verification case, and
(o) Noting that the Agency is still not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
1. Finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards
Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of
the Agency’s Statute;
2. Finds also that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director
General’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s
verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of
confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to
questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;
Annex 5
GOV/2005/77
Page 3
3. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement this and previous Resolutions
and to report again, including any further developments on the issues raised in his report of
2 September 2005 (GOV/2005/67) to the Board. The Board will address the timing and content of the
report required under Article XII.C and the notification required under Article III.B.4;
4. In order to help the Director General to resolve outstanding questions and provide the necessary
assurances, urges Iran:
(i) To implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General in his report,
which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional
Protocol, and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use
equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations;
(ii) To re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity, as in
GOV/2005/64, and reprocessing activity;
(iii) To reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
(iv) Promptly to ratify and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
(v) Pending completion of the ratification of the Additional Protocol to continue to act in
accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, which Iran signed on 18 December
2003;
5. Calls on Iran to observe fully its commitments and to return to the negotiating process that has
made good progress in the last two years;
6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement the Agency’s Safeguards
Agreement with Iran, to implement provisionally the Additional Protocol to that Agreement, and to
pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to reconstruct the history
and nature of all aspects of Iran’s past nuclear activities, and to compensate for the confidence deficit
created; and
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 5
Board of Governors GOV/2006/15
Date: 27 February 2006
Original: English
For official use only
Item 5(c) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2006/8)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. A meeting of the Board of Governors was held from 2 to 4 February 2006 to discuss the
implementation of the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran)
and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.1 The meeting was called in response to the announcement by
Iran of its decision to resume from 9 January 2006 “R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy
programme which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding
suspension.”2
2. On 4 February 2006, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14) in
paragraph 1 of which it, inter alia, underlined that outstanding questions can best be resolved and
confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme by Iran responding positively
to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context
deemed it necessary for Iran to:
• re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities,
including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
• reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
• ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
• pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional
Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
• implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in
GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement
__________________________________________________________________________________
1 INFCIRC/214.
2 See GOV/2006/11.
International Atomic Energy Agency
Derestricted 8 March 2006
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 8 March 2006)
Annex 6
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and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to
procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and
development as the Agency may require in support of its ongoing investigations.
3. As requested by the Board in paragraph 2 of that resolution, on 4 February 2006, the Director
General reported to the Security Council of the United Nations that the steps set out in paragraph 1 of
the resolution were required of Iran by the Board and reported to the Security Council all IAEA
reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue.
4. In paragraph 8 of GOV/2006/14, the Board also requested the Director General to report on the
implementation of that resolution, and previous resolutions, to the next regular session of the Board,
for its consideration, and immediately thereafter to convey, together with any resolution from the
March Board, that report to the Security Council.
5. This report is being submitted to the Board in response to its request in paragraph 8 of
GOV/2006/14.3 It provides an update on the developments that have taken place since
November 2005, and an update of the Agency’s September 2005 overall assessment, in connection
with the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran and on the Agency’s verification of
Iran’s voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities.
A. Developments since November 2005
A.1. Enrichment Programme
6. As detailed in the Director General’s report of 18 November 2005 (GOV/2005/87), during
meetings that took place in October and November 2005, the Agency requested Iran to provide
additional information on certain aspects of its enrichment programme. Responses to some of these
requests were provided during discussions held in Tehran from 25 to 29 January 2006 between Iranian
officials and an Agency team headed by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG).
Another Agency team visited Iran from 12 to 14 February 2006 to further discuss, inter alia, the
outstanding issues related to both uranium enrichment and the plutonium experiments. On
26 February 2006, the DDG-SG visited Iran again to discuss with Iranian authorities issues related to
the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) and the so-called Green Salt Project (see paras 33–39 below).
A.1.1. Contamination
7. As part of its assessment of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations concerning its
enrichment activities, the Agency is continuing to investigate the source(s) of low enriched uranium
__________________________________________________________________________________
3 The initial report to the Board of Governors on this matter was provided by the Director General orally at the Board’s
meeting on 17 March 2003. The Director General has since then submitted 16 written reports to the Board: GOV/2003/40,
dated 6 June 2003; GOV/2003/63, dated 26 August 2003; GOV/2003/75, dated 10 November 2003; GOV/2004/11, dated
24 February 2004; GOV/2004/34, dated 1 June 2004, and Corr.1, dated 18 June 2004; GOV/2004/60, dated
1 September 2004; GOV/2004/83, dated 15 November 2004; INFCIRC/648, dated 1 August 2005; GOV/2005/61, dated
8 August 2005; GOV/2005/62, dated 10 August 2005; GOV/2005/67, dated 2 September 2005; GOV/INF/2005/13, dated
2 November 2005; GOV/2005/87, dated 18 November 2005; GOV/INF/2006/1, dated 3 January 2006; GOV/INF/2006/2,
dated 10 January 2006; and GOV/INF/2006/3, dated 6 February 2006. In addition, the Deputy Director General for
Safeguards made oral statements to the Board on 1 March 2005 (GOV/OR.1119), 16 June 2005 (GOV/OR.1130) and
2 February 2006.
Annex 6
GOV/2006/15
Page 3
(LEU) particles, and some high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, which were found at locations
where Iran has declared that centrifuge components had been manufactured, used and/or stored.4
8. As reported by the Director General in November 2005,5 the analysis of the environmental
samples collected at a location in a Member State where, according to Iran, the centrifuge components
had been stored by the procurement network in the mid-1990s prior to their shipment to Iran, did not
indicate any traces of nuclear material. This could be explained, for example, by the fact that the
storage locations had changed ownership and been renovated over the past decade, and the
components had mainly been stored in their original packing.
9. To further understand the source of some of the contamination found in Iran, the Agency sampled
in December 2005 a centrifuge which had been received by a Member State from the procurement
network. The results of the analysis of those samples, together with earlier findings,6 tend, on balance,
to support Iran’s statement about the foreign origin of most of the HEU contamination. However, the
origin of some HEU particles, and of the LEU particles, remains to be further investigated. The
Agency is awaiting additional information from another Member State from which contaminated
components originated.
10. Due to the fact that it is difficult to establish a definitive conclusion with respect to the origin of all
of the contamination, it is essential to make progress on the scope and chronology of Iran’s
experiments with UF6 in its centrifuge enrichment programme.
A.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 centrifuge technology
11. As previously reported to the Board,7 the Agency was shown by Iran in January 2005 a copy of a
handwritten one-page document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign
intermediary. The document concerned the possible supply of a disassembled centrifuge (including
drawings, descriptions and specifications for the production of centrifuges); drawings, specifications
and calculations for a “complete plant”; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document
also made reference to: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment; a complete set of workshop
equipment for mechanical, electrical and electronic support; and uranium re-conversion and casting
capabilities. Iran has declined the Agency’s request for a copy of the one-page document.
12. On 25 January 2006, Iran reiterated that that document was the only remaining documentary
evidence relevant to the scope and content of the 1987 offer, attributing this to the secret nature of the
programme and the management style of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) at that time.
Iran stated that no other written evidence exists, such as meeting minutes, administrative documents,
reports, personal notebooks or the like, to substantiate its statements concerning that offer.
13. Iran has maintained that only some components of one or two disassembled centrifuges, and
supporting drawings and specifications, were delivered by the network, but that a number of other
items of equipment referred to in the document were purchased directly from other suppliers.8
14. During the Agency’s visit to Iran between 12 and 14 February 2006, Iran provided some
clarification of supporting documentation previously shown to the Agency concerning items procured
__________________________________________________________________________________
4 GOV/2005/67, paras 9–12.
5 GOV/2005/87, para. 3.
6 GOV/2005/67, para. 12.
7 GOV/2005/67, para. 14.
8 GOV/2005/87, paras 5–6.
Annex 6
GOV/2006/15
Page 4
by Iran. Iran also showed the Agency delivery documents for most of the items said to have been
purchased directly by Iran from other suppliers, which tend to confirm the Iranian statement
concerning its acquisition of those items.
15. As previously reported to the Board,9 according to Iran, there were no contacts by Iran with the
network between 1987 and mid-1993. Statements made by Iran and key members of the network about
the events leading to the mid-1990s offer are still at variance with each other. In this context, Iran has
been requested to provide further clarification of the timing and purpose of certain trips taken by
AEOI staff members in the mid-1990s.
16. Iran has said it is unable to supply any documentation or other information about the meetings that
led to the acquisition of 500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s. The Agency is still
awaiting clarification of the dates and contents of the shipments.
17. During the Agency’s 12–14 February 2006 visit to Iran, no additional information related to the
timing of the mid-1990s trips, or to the chronology or contents of the shipments, was made available
by Iran. Iran agreed, however, to provide the Agency with further clarifications in writing regarding
the latter issue.
A.1.3. Acquisition of P-2 centrifuge technology
18. Iran still maintains that, as a result of the discussions held with the intermediaries in the
mid-1990s, the intermediaries supplied only drawings for P-2 components containing no supporting
specifications, and that no P-2 components were delivered by the intermediaries along with the
drawings or thereafter. Iran continues to assert that no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges during
the period 1995 to 2002, and that at no time during this period did it ever discuss with the
intermediaries the P-2 centrifuge design, or the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge components. In light
of information available to the Agency indicating the possible delivery of such components during that
period, which information was shared with Iran, Iran was asked in November 2005 to check again
whether any deliveries of P-1 or P-2 components had been made after 1995. Iran reiterated to the
Agency during its 12–14 February 2006 visit that there had been no such deliveries after 1995.
19. In connection with the research and development (R&D) work on a modified P-2 design, said by
Iran to have been carried out by a contracting company between early 2002 and July 2003, Iran has
confirmed that the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased, magnets suitable for the P-2
centrifuge design. During the Agency’s mid-February 2006 visit, Iran provided some additional
clarification about the types of P-2 magnets it had received, but maintained that only a limited number
of magnets had been delivered. In response to Agency questioning about Iran’s inquiries into the
delivery of larger quantities of magnets (900 pieces) from a foreign entity in mid-2003, Iran stated that
it had never ordered or received such magnets. The Agency is still awaiting clarification of all of
Iran’s efforts to acquire such magnets.
A.2. Uranium Metal
20. As reported to the Board in the Director General’s report of November 2005,10 among the
documents shown by Iran to the Agency, said to have been the centrifuge enrichment related
drawings, specifications and supporting documentation provided by the intermediaries, was a 15-page
document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal in small quantities, and
__________________________________________________________________________________
9 GOV/2005/87, para. 11.
10 GOV/2005/87, para. 6.
Annex 6
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for the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of
nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for
machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document was provided on the initiative
of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI, but it is not able to establish when Iran received the
document. Iran has declined the Agency’s request to provide it with a copy of the document, but did
permit the Agency, during its visit in January 2006, to examine the document again and to place it
under Agency seal. During the visit in mid-February 2006, the Agency again requested a copy of the
document in order for the Agency to complete its assessment of the document, which Iran again
declined to provide.
21. As described in the Director General’s report of November 2004, during the period between 1995
and 2000, Iran conducted a series of experiments to produce uranium metal from UF4.11 Based on the
results of the Agency’s investigations, it appears that Iran’s motivation for conducting uranium
reduction experiments was initially to make uranium metal for its laser programme and, later, to
develop an alternative process for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF).12 While Iran also made a
few simple attempts at casting and machining, neither these nor the reduction experiments appear to
have followed the procedures outlined in the 15-page document referred to above.
22. Although there is no indication about the actual use of the document, its existence in Iran is a
matter of concern. It is related to uranium re-conversion and casting which was part of the original
1987 offer by the intermediaries but which was not, according to Iran, pursued. However, the Agency
is aware that the intermediaries had this document, as well as other similar documents, which the
Agency has seen in another Member State. Therefore, it is essential to understand the full scope of the
offer made by the network in 1987.
A.3. Plutonium Experiments
23. As indicated earlier,13 the Agency has been following up with Iran information provided by Iran
concerning its plutonium separation experiments.
24. In order to clarify differences between findings by the Agency and statements made by Iran, a
number of plutonium discs were brought by the Agency to Vienna for further analysis to determine the
exact isotopic composition of the plutonium. The Agency’s analysis showed, in particular, that the
Pu-240 content measured on eight of the discs was significantly lower than the Pu-240 content of the
solution from which the plutonium deposited on the discs was said to have originated.
25. In August 2005, the Agency also conducted detailed verification of unprocessed irradiated UO2
targets stored in containers in Iran. The results of these non-destructive and destructive analysis
measurements indicate that the duration of irradiation was longer than the duration derived from the
irradiation parameters provided by Iran.
26. On 6 February 2006, the Agency provided Iran with a summary report of the results of the
Agency’s analysis of all data available to it as of that date and requested further clarifications in light
__________________________________________________________________________________
11 GOV/2004/83, paras 13–22.
12 The Agency has noted in past reports that the role of uranium metal in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle still needed to be fully
understood. Iran has told the Agency that its rationale for such work was the use of uranium metal: for Iran’s possible future
Magnox reactors; for the production of radiation shielding; as feed material for its laser enrichment programme; for radiation
shielding; and to gain know-how in nuclear material production. The rationale given by Iran for the production of depleted
uranium metal was to reduce the storage requirements for depleted UF6. See GOV/2003/40, paras 20 and 34; GOV/2003/63,
paras 20–21; GOV/2003/75, para. 25; GOV/2004/11, para. 15; and GOV/2004/83, para. 20.
13 GOV/2005/67, paras 21–25.
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of the above inconsistencies. During its 12–14 February 2006 visit to Iran, the Agency met with
Iranian officials to discuss the Agency’s findings; in the course of the discussion, Iran agreed to
provide such clarifications. In a letter dated 15 February 2006, Iran provided some clarifications in
connection with the issue referred to in paragraph 25 above, which the Agency is now assessing.
A.4. Other Implementation Issues
27. There are no new developments to report with respect to Iran’s uranium mining activities14 or with
respect to Iran’s activities involving polonium and beryllium,15 which the Agency is still assessing.
28. On 19 February 2006, the Agency visited the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak to
carry out design information verification, and confirmed that the civil engineering work was still
ongoing. However, according to Iran, the commissioning date for the reactor is likely to be postponed
until 2011.
29. On 9 October 2005, the Agency also carried out a design information verification visit at the Fuel
Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan. The civil engineering construction of the plant is ongoing;
however, the Agency was informed that the commissioning date of 2007, as indicated in the design
information provided by Iran, was likely to be postponed.
A.5. Voluntary Implementation of the Additional Protocol
30. Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency
and, until 6 February 2006, implemented the Additional Protocol as if it were in force, including by
providing, in a timely manner, the requisite declarations and access to locations. Since
November 2005, the Agency has conducted complementary access at three locations.
31. On 6 February 2006, Iran informed the Agency, inter alia, that:16
“1. As stipulated in Para 7 of INFCIRC/666, from the date of this letter, our
commitment on implementing safeguards measures will only be based on the
NPT Safeguards Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
Agency (INFCIRC/214).
2. From the date of this letter, all voluntarily suspended non-legally binding
measures including the provisions of the Additional Protocol and even
beyond that will be suspended.
Therefore based on the above mentioned, it is requested the following measures
be taken by the Agency:
a. The Agency’s inspector presence in the Islamic Republic of Iran for
the verification activities should be scheduled only on the basis of the
Safeguards Agreement.
b. All the Agency’s containment and surveillance measures which were
in place beyond the normal Agency safeguards measures should be
removed by mid February 2006.
__________________________________________________________________________________
14 GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31.
15 GOV/2005/67, para. 34.
16 GOV/INF/2006/3.
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c. From now on, the regular channels of communication (code 1.1 of the
Subsidiary Arrangement) should only be through the Permanent
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA in Vienna.”
A.6. Transparency Visits and Discussions
32. On 1 November 2005, the Agency was given access to a military site at Parchin where several
environmental samples were taken.17 The Agency did not observe any unusual activities in the
buildings visited, and the results of the analysis of environmental samples did not indicate the presence
of nuclear material at those locations.
33. Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional information and clarifications related to
efforts made by the PHRC, which had been established at Lavisan-Shian,18 to acquire dual use
materials and equipment that could be used in uranium enrichment and conversion activities. The
Agency also requested interviews with the individuals involved in the acquisition of those items,
including the former Head of the PHRC.
34. In that connection, on 26 January 2006, Iran presented to the Agency documentation on efforts by
Iran, which it has stated were unsuccessful, to acquire a number of specific dual use items (electric
drive equipment, power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye laser). Iran stated that,
although the documentation suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had actually been
intended for a laboratory at a technical university where the Head of the PHRC worked as a professor.
Iran declined to make him available to the Agency for an interview. The Secretariat reiterated its
request to interview the professor, explaining that it was essential for a better understanding of the
envisioned and actual use of the equipment in question, as well as other equipment that could be
relevant to uranium enrichment (balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets and fluorine
handling equipment).
35. As indicated by the DDG-SG in his February 2006 statement to the Board, in January 2006, the
Agency presented to Iran a list of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to see
the equipment in situ, and to be permitted to take environmental samples from it. Some of the
equipment on the Agency’s list was presented to the Agency at a technical university, and
environmental samples were taken from it, the results of which are still pending. The Agency
subsequently wrote to Iran requesting additional clarifications regarding the procurement efforts of the
PHRC and the relationship between the PHRC and the technical university. During the Agency’s visit
in mid-February 2006, Iran declined to discuss this matter further.
36. On 26 February 2006, the Agency met in Iran with the former Head of the PHRC, referred to
above. He stated that the electric drive equipment, the power supply equipment, the laser equipment
and the vacuum equipment had been used for R&D in various departments of the university. The
professor explained that his expertise and connections, as well as resources available at his office in
the PHRC, had been used for the procurement of equipment for the technical university. He was not
aware, however, of the type of research in which other professors at the university were engaged. To
the best of his knowledge, the vacuum equipment referred to above had been ordered for the physics
department of the university. In this connection, Iran stated that this equipment had been used for
vacuum coating, and was currently being utilized for nano technology applications. The Agency is
__________________________________________________________________________________
17 GOV/2005/87, para. 16.
18 According to Iran, the PHRC was established at Lavisan-Shian in 1989, inter alia, to “support and provide scientific advice
and services to the Ministry of Defence” (see GOV/2004/60, para. 43).
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assessing this information. Iran also agreed to provide the requested clarifications in relation to the
balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment.
37. As also indicated by the DDG-SG in his February 2006 statement to the Board, in January 2006,
Iran provided additional clarification of its efforts in 2000 to procure some other dual use material
(high strength aluminium, special steel, titanium and special oils), as had been discussed in January
2005. High strength aluminium was presented to the Agency, and environmental samples were taken
therefrom. Iran stated that the material had been acquired for aircraft manufacturing, but that it had not
been used because of its specifications. Iran agreed to provide additional information on inquiries
concerning the purchase of special steels, titanium and special oils. Iran also presented information on
Iran’s acquisition of corrosion resistant steel, valves and filters, which were made available to the
Agency on 31 January 2006 for environmental sampling. The results of the environmental samples are
still pending.
38. On 5 December 2005, the Secretariat repeated its request for a meeting to discuss information that
had been made available to the Secretariat about alleged studies, known as the Green Salt Project,
concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (often referred to as “green salt”), as well as
tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could involve
nuclear material and which appear to have administrative interconnections. On 16 December 2005,
Iran replied that the “issues related to baseless allegations.” Iran agreed on 23 January 2006 to a
meeting with the DDG-SG for the clarification of the alleged Green Salt Project, but declined to
address the other topics during that meeting. In the course of the meeting, which took place on
27 January 2006, the Agency presented for Iran’s review a copy of a process flow diagram related to
bench scale conversion and a number of communications related to the project. Iran reiterated that all
national nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the allegations were baseless and that it
would provide further clarifications later.
39. On 26 February 2006, the DDG-SG met with Iranian authorities to discuss the alleged Green Salt
Project. Iran repeated that the allegations “are based on false and fabricated documents so they were
baseless,” and that neither such a project nor such studies exist or did exist. It stated that all national
efforts had been devoted to the UCF project, and that it would not make sense to develop indigenous
capabilities to produce UF4 when such technology had already been acquired from abroad. According
to information provided earlier by Iran, the company alleged to have been associated with the socalled
Green Salt Project had, however, been involved in procurement for UCF and in the design and
construction of the Gchine ore processing plant.
40. The Agency is assessing this and other information available to it, and is waiting for Iran to
address the other topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, as mentioned above.
A.7. Suspension
41. In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to resume, as from
9 January 2006, “those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which ha[d] been suspended
as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension”.19 On 7 January 2006, the
Agency received a letter from Iran requesting that the Agency remove seals applied at Natanz,
Farayand Technique and Pars Trash for the monitoring of suspension of enrichment related
__________________________________________________________________________________
19 GOV/INF/2006/1.
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activities.20 The seals were removed by Iran on 10 and 11 January 2006 in the presence of Agency
inspectors.
42. Since the removal of the seals, Iran has begun substantial renovation of the gas handling system at
the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz. Iran has also informed the Agency that quality
control of components, and some rotor testing, was being carried out at Farayand Technique and at
Natanz. Due to the fact that no centrifuge related raw materials and components are under Agency
seal, the Agency is unable effectively to monitor the R&D activities being carried out by Iran except at
PFEP, where containment and surveillance measures are being applied to the enrichment process. On
29 January 2006, the two cylinders at PFEP containing UF6 from which seals had been removed on
10 January 2006 were again placed under Agency containment and surveillance.
43. On 8 February 2006, updated design information for PFEP and for the Fuel Enrichment Plant
(FEP) were received by the Agency. Equipment such as process tanks and an autoclave are currently
being moved into the FEP; commencement of the installation of the first 3000 P-1 machines at FEP is
planned for the fourth quarter of 2006.
44. On 11 February 2006, Iran started enrichment tests by feeding a single P-1 machine with UF6 gas.
At that time, other single P-1 machines were ready for operation and a 10-machine cascade was
undergoing vacuum tests. The feeding of the 10-machine cascade was begun on 15 February 2006,
and, on 22 February 2006, a 20-machine cascade was subjected to vacuum testing. The enrichment
process at PFEP is covered by Agency safeguards containment and surveillance measures.
45. In the letter received from Iran on 6 February 2006, referred to in paragraph 31 above, Iran stated,
inter alia, that the implementation of safeguards measures would only be based on its NPT Safeguards
Agreement and requested that “[a]ll the Agency’s containment and surveillance measures which were
in place beyond the normal Agency safeguards measures should be removed by mid February 2006.”21
Accordingly, on 12 February 2006, the Agency modified the containment and surveillance measures at
UCF. The UF6 filling stations, all filled UF6 cylinders and all UF6 produced at UCF, however, remain
under Agency safeguards containment and surveillance measures. The uranium conversion campaign
which was begun at UCF in November 2005 is continuing and is now expected to end in April 2006.
Since September 2005, approximately 85 metric tons of UF6 has been produced at UCF.
B. Current overall assessment
46. A detailed overall assessment of Iran’s nuclear programme and the Agency’s efforts to verify
Iran’s declarations with respect to that programme was provided by the Director General in November
200422 and again in September 2005.23 As indicated in those reports, Iran has made substantial efforts
over the past two decades to master an independent nuclear fuel cycle, and, to that end, has conducted
experiments to acquire the know-how for almost every aspect of the fuel cycle. Many aspects of Iran’s
nuclear fuel cycle activities and experiments, particularly in the areas of uranium enrichment, uranium
conversion and plutonium research, had not been declared to the Agency in accordance with Iran’s
__________________________________________________________________________________
20 GOV/INF/2006/2.
21 GOV/INF/2006/3.
22 GOV/2004/83, paras 106–114.
23 GOV/2005/67, paras 42–52.
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obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. Iran’s policy of concealment continued until October
2003, and resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with that Agreement, as summarized
in the Director General’s report of September 2005.24
47. Since October 2003, Iran has taken corrective actions with respect to those breaches. The Agency
has been able to confirm certain aspects of Iran’s current declarations, in particular in connection with
uranium conversion activities, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and the heavy water research reactor
programme, which the Agency has been following up as routine implementation matters under Iran’s
Safeguards Agreement and, until 6 February 2006, its Additional Protocol.
48. Two important issues were identified in the Director General’s November 2004 report as relevant
to the Agency’s efforts to provide assurance that there are no undeclared enrichment activities in Iran,
specifically: the origin of LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran; and
the extent of Iran’s efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs.
49. With respect to the first issue — contamination — as indicated above, based on the information
currently available to the Agency, the results of the environmental sample analysis tend, on balance, to
support Iran’s statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination. It is still
not possible at this time, however, to establish a definitive conclusion with respect to all of the
contamination, particularly the LEU contamination. This underscores the importance of additional
information on the scope and chronology of Iran’s P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes, which could
greatly contribute to the resolution of the remaining contamination issues.
50. With respect to the second issue — the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes — although some
progress has been made since November 2004 in the verification of statements by Iran regarding the
chronology of its centrifuge enrichment programme, the Agency has not yet been able to verify the
correctness and completeness of Iran’s statements concerning those programmes. While Iran has
provided further clarifications, and access to additional documentation, concerning the 1987 and mid-
1990s offers related to the P-1 design, the Agency’s investigation of the supply network indicates that
Iran should have additional supporting information that could be useful in this regard. Iran has also
been asked to provide additional details on the process that led to Iran’s decision in 1985 to pursue
centrifuge enrichment and on the steps leading to its acquisition of centrifuge enrichment technology
in 1987. However, Iran maintains that no information, other than that already provided to the Agency,
exists.
51. No additional information or documentation has been provided with respect to Iran’s statement
that it did not pursue any work on the P-2 design between 1995 and 2002. As indicated above, Iran has
been requested to search for more information, and any supporting documentation, relevant to the P-2
programme, in particular with regard to the scope of the original offer in connection with the P-2
centrifuge design and Iran’s acquisition of items linked to that programme. Iran, however, maintains
that no such information exists.
52. The Agency continues to follow up on all information pertaining to Iran’s nuclear programme and
activities. Although absent some nexus to nuclear material the Agency’s legal authority to pursue the
verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited, the Agency has continued to seek
Iran’s cooperation as a matter of transparency in following up on reports related to equipment,
materials and activities which have applications both in the conventional military area and in the
civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area. In this regard, Iran has permitted the Agency to
visit defence related sites at Kolahdouz, Lavisan and Parchin. The Agency did not observe any
__________________________________________________________________________________
24 GOV/2005/67, paras 4–8.
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unusual activities in the buildings visited at Kolahdouz and Parchin, and the results of environmental
sampling did not indicate the presence of nuclear material at those locations. The Agency is still
assessing the available information, and awaiting other additional information, in relation to the
Lavisan site and the PHRC.
53. As indicated to the Board in November 2004, and again in September 2005, all the declared
nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for. Although the Agency has not seen any diversion of
nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Agency is not at this point
in time in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.
The process of drawing such a conclusion, under normal circumstances, is a time consuming process
even with an Additional Protocol in force. In the case of Iran, this conclusion can be expected to take
even longer in light of the undeclared nature of Iran’s past nuclear programme, and in particular
because of the inadequacy of information available on its centrifuge enrichment programme, the
existence of a generic document related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, and the lack
of clarification about the role of the military in Iran’s nuclear programme, including, as mentioned
above, about recent information available to the Agency concerning alleged weapon studies that could
involve nuclear material.
54. It is regrettable, and a matter of concern, that the above uncertainties related to the scope and
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme have not been clarified after three years of intensive Agency
verification. In order to clarify these uncertainties, Iran’s full transparency is still essential. Without
full transparency that extends beyond the formal legal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and
Additional Protocol — transparency that could only be achieved through Iran’s active cooperation —
the Agency’s ability to reconstruct the history of Iran’s past programme and to verify the correctness
and completeness of the statements made by Iran, particularly with regard to its centrifuge enrichment
programme, will be limited, and questions about the past and current direction of Iran’s nuclear
programme will continue to be raised. Such transparency should primarily include access to, and
cooperation by, relevant individuals; access to documentation related to procurement and dual use
equipment; and access to certain military owned workshops and R&D locations that the Agency may
need to visit in the future as part of its investigation.
55. The Agency will pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran’s
nuclear programme, and the Director General will continue to report to the Board as appropriate.
Annex 6
Board of Governors GOV/2006/14
Date: 4 February 2006
Original: English
For official use only
The adopted agenda
(GOV/2006/13)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006
The Board of Governors,
(a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on Iran's nuclear programme,
(b) Recalling also the Director General’s reports,
(c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,
(d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial
efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues
in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,
(e) Recalling the Director General’s description of this as a special verification case,
(f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the Director General noted that after nearly
three years of intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some
important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
(g) Recalling Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT
Safeguards Agreement and the absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is
exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear
activities, the nature of those activities and other issues arising from the Agency’s verification
of declarations made by Iran since September 2002,
(h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that Iran's full transparency is indispensable
and overdue for the Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/67),
International Atomic Energy Agency
Derestricted 4 February 2006
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 4 February 2006)
Annex 7
(s,) 1AEA .4
GOV/2006/14
Page 2
(i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's cooperation in following up on reports
relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications in the conventional
military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the
Director General in GOV/2005/67),
(j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran
possesses a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to metal
in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium
metal into hemispherical forms,
(k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, and agreeing that an
extensive period of confidence-building is required from Iran,
(l) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the
Iranian nuclear issue, and
(m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to global nonproliferation
efforts and to realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass
destruction, including their means of delivery,
1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to the calls for
confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context deems it
necessary for Iran to:
• re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
• reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
• ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
• pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional
Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
• implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in
GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement
and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to
procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and
development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations;
2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these
steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and
resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;
3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important
issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in its possession a
document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this
process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and, noting that the decision to put
this document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran to maintain this document under
Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency;
4. Deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board for the maintaining of the suspension
of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities which the Board has declared essential to
addressing outstanding issues, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on
8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006;
Annex 7
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Page 3
5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of confidence in Iran’s intentions in seeking to
develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran's record on safeguards
as recorded in previous Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its position in relation to
confidence-building measures, which are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a
constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can result in increased confidence;
6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency, which the Director General
deems indispensable and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify possible activities
which could have a military nuclear dimension;
7. Underlines that the Agency’s work on verifying Iran’s declarations is ongoing and requests the
Director General to continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with
Iran, to implement the Additional Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with a view
to providing credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in
Iran, and to pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to resolve
outstanding issues and reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities;
8. Requests the Director General to report on the implementation of this and previous resolutions
to the next regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and immediately thereafter to convey,
together with any Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security Council; and
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 7
􀀭􀀙􀀛􀀛􀀃􀀮􀀜􀀏􀀢􀀈􀀃􀀯􀀃􀀫􀀌􀀝􀀋􀀍􀀆􀀍􀀌􀀝􀀈􀀃􀀌􀀰􀀃􀀤􀀠􀀠􀀜􀀈􀀈􀀃􀀤􀀝􀀋􀀃􀀙􀀈􀀜􀀃􀀠􀀤􀀝􀀃􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀰􀀌􀀙􀀝􀀋􀀃􀀤􀀆
􀀅􀀆􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀊􀀨􀀨􀀨􀀎􀀆􀀤􀀝􀀋􀀰􀀌􀀝􀀛􀀍􀀝􀀜􀀎􀀠􀀌􀀢􀀊􀀤􀀠􀀆􀀍􀀌􀀝􀀊􀀥􀀌􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀤􀀛􀀱􀀝􀀰􀀌􀀏􀀢􀀤􀀆􀀍􀀌􀀝􀀲􀀥􀀌􀀙􀀏􀀝􀀤􀀛􀀫􀀌􀀋􀀜􀀳􀀏􀀨􀀤􀀴􀀗􀀒
􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀆􀀋􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀉􀀒􀀎􀀇􀀒􀀓􀀔
􀀕􀀖􀀖􀀗􀀘􀀃􀀙􀀚􀀛􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀛􀀙􀀝􀀃􀀞􀀟􀀒􀀋􀀌􀀎􀀠􀀃􀀚􀀡􀀜􀀙􀀄􀀢􀀚􀀣􀀣􀀃􀀞􀀤􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀌􀀇􀀠􀀃􀀥􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀃􀀆􀀏􀀦􀀇􀀧􀀉􀀍􀀇􀀘􀀃􀀆􀀎􀀎􀀧􀀊􀀘􀀨􀀨􀀩􀀩􀀩􀀪􀀎􀀉􀀌􀀫􀀬􀀏􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀌􀀇􀀪􀀭􀀏􀀦􀀨􀀓􀀏􀀋􀀨􀀒􀀩􀀉􀀮􀀯􀀙
􀀕􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀫􀀇􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀕􀀒􀀉􀀌􀀃􀀰􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀘􀀃􀀉􀀃􀀱􀀒􀀇􀀌􀀭􀀆􀀃􀀟􀀇􀀒􀀊􀀧􀀇􀀭􀀎􀀋􀀲􀀇
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Annex 8
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Laurent Fabius
Inside the Iran Deal: a
French Perspective
The Iranian nuclear crisis, a major challenge for regional security as
well as global efforts to limit nuclear proliferation, began in August 2002 with
the revelation of the ongoing construction of two covert Iranian facilities: the
Natanz uranium enrichment plant and the plutonium-production reactor in
Arak. Three European countries—France, Great Britain, and Germany—initially
attempted to manage this problem. In 2006, the United States, Russia, and China
joined them in a two-pronged strategy of dialogue and pressure through sanctions.
This grouping of countries came to be known as the E3+3, or known as the P6 or
P5+1 in the United States (for the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council, plus Germany). Their strategy led to repeated efforts to undertake negotiations
with Iran, which were unproductive due to Iran’s reservations concerning
the first agreements reached (in May 2005) and its failure to demonstrate any
genuine will to negotiate in the following years.
At the same time, Iran continued to increase its capacity, both declared (at
Natanz, after it had been discovered in 2002) and undisclosed (at Fordow, a
uranium enrichment facility discovered in 2009), while limiting cooperation
with the International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAEA). The United Nations
applied ever-more stringent sanctions, as did the European Union and the
United States unilaterally. In May 2012, just after the French presidential elections
and as I became Foreign Minister, the Iranian nuclear question was at a diplomatic
impasse—the array of sanctions in place and the disquieting state of
advancement of the Iranian nuclear program justified the fear of military intervention
to shut it down.
Laurent Fabius is the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development
(2012–16) and former Prime Minister (1984–1986). He is currently the President of the Constitutional
Council and can be reached at [email protected].
Copyright © 2016 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly • 39:3 pp. 7–38
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1232630
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016 7
Annex 8 ---------------
Given the high stakes that this issue represented for national and regional
security as well as for nuclear nonproliferation, we decided, in full agreement
with the President of the French Republic, to engage in a policy of “constructive
firmness.” Our objective? To negotiate and conclude an agreement that would be
solid and verifiable, and that would show real progress and create confidence in the
international community toward Iran’s genuine renunciation of nuclear weapons.
Many things have been written and said about how this major agreement came
into being, some true, others less so. This is why I believe that, without waiting for
the archival materials to be made public, a precise, straightforward description of
the complex discussions as expressed by one of the participants—in this case,
myself—would be of use. It is in this spirit that I wrote the following, which
serves as a kind of first-hand account of events, and ends with some lessons
learned.
April 2012—June 2013: a Dialogue of the Deaf
Discussions on the Iranian nuclear program began again in the spring of 2012, after
an interruption since January 2011 without face-to-face meetings but marked by
“epistolary diplomacy” between the EU’s High Representative, Cathy Ashton,
and the Iranian negotiator and secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security
Council, Saeed Jalili. Negotiators were able to return to the table because Iran
had abandoned a certain number of preconditions: the right to enrichment and
the immediate lifting of sanctions. It soon brought these conditions back to the
table, however, and the discussions became pointless.
Nevertheless, this temporary opening on the Iranian side did enable a series of
consultations to take place among policy chiefs of the E3+3 and Iran at several
different times: Istanbul in April 2012, Baghdad in May (which led to the
expression “the Baghdad offer”), and Moscow in June. Experts also held their
own meetings, such as at Istanbul in July. Iran did not really engage with the
debate on the basic E3+3 proposals, which addressed the main concern of Iran
enriching uranium to 20 percent, making it highly-enriched uranium that is
used for weapons. Indeed since the end of 2011, Iran had accelerated the construction
of cascades at the Fordow site, and had begun enriching uranium to 20
percent.
The E3+3 group did advance concrete proposals for cooperation and agreed not
to adopt new resolutions on the nuclear program at the UN Security Council. The
Iranians refused to respond to the expectations of the three key demands on
enrichment: an end to the production of uranium enriched to 20 percent,
closure of the Fordow enrichment site, and removal from Iran of the stockpile
of uranium that had already been enriched to 20 percent. However, the question
Laurent Fabius
8 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
of supplying fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which had been the
subject of former proposals in the years 2009–2010, was no longer mentioned.
The Iranians in fact only proposed to gradually suspend the enrichment of
uranium to 20 percent in the context of a nine-stage plan leading to lifting all
sanctions, multilateral and unilateral. This plan, even the existence of which
was later challenged by the Iranian negotiator, had in fact been brought forward
during a follow-up meeting between Ashton’s deputy, Helga Schmid, and Jalili’s
lead associate, Ali Bagheri, on July 24, 2012, in Istanbul.
It rapidly appeared in the summer of 2012 that the Iranians had a much reduced
margin of maneuver for negotiation, given that the regime seemed to be awaiting
the results of the November 2012 U.S. presidential elections before making a
decision. Concerns further mounted that negotiations would be frozen even
longer while the United States would in turn await the results of the June 2013
Iranian presidential elections.
“More for More”
Tensions grew in the summer and fall 2012. The European Union began preparations
for a new series of financial and energy sanctions (confirmed on
October 15). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a spectacular
intervention at the UN General Assembly at the end of September, waving a
drawing of a bomb and literally laying down Israel’s line in the sand: Iranian possession
of enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to make a nuclear device could
not be allowed. The tenor of the negotiations
changed over several months, as the objective refocused
to prevent an Israeli strike rather than on
solving the basic problem of Iranian nuclear capacity.
The fear of military intervention once again raised the
question, so often asked since the beginning of the
crisis in 2002: have we tried everything to find a diplomatic
resolution to this crisis?
A ministerial meeting of the E3+3 group was
scheduled in New York for September 27, 2012.
The Russian minister, Sergey Lavrov, cancelled at
the last minute; officially, he was ill, but there is
reason to believe that he did not appreciate the E3 ministers’ September 2012
letter to the other Foreign Ministers of the EU Foreign Affairs Council calling
for new European Union sanctions on Iran.
The E3+3 ministers agreed in New York to study the possible parameters for a
revised “Baghdad offer.” This U.S. idea, which held sway at the State Department
and in think tanks, was “more for more”: ask more from Iran, but offer more in
The objective in
2012 refocused to
prevent an Israeli
strike rather than
Iranian nuclear
capacity.
Inside the Iran Deal: a French Perspective
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016 9
Annex 8 ---------------
terms of lifting sanctions. U.S. authorities initially saw this offer to be substantial,
but it was watered down progressively as the November U.S. presidential elections
approached. Once the elections were over, the United States confirmed what had
become an unambitious plan.
An initial meeting of E3+3 experts was held in London on October 10 to start
discussing the possible revised parameters of an offer. At that time, a significant
divergence of opinion emerged between Russia and China, on the one hand,
and the rest of the E3+3 on the other, as the two powers reckoned that pretty
much all sanctions should be put in the balance to make for a very attractive
offer. E3+3 policy directors met in Brussels on November 21, with their experts,
in order to move forward. Previously, during a November 15 videoconference
among the E3+3, the Americans had presented the outline of their proposal to
revise the Baghdad offer. It merely updated the three demands concerning 20
percent enrichment. It also included, in addition to the offers in the May 2012
Baghdad package, a temporary suspension of certain sanctions (gold and precious
metals, export to Iran of petrochemical products) as well as a commitment from
the EU (but not the United States, at that stage) not to adopt new sanctions following
those of October 15.
The Russians refused to consider any further demands placed on Iran. Not only
that, they suggested that the group withdraw some of its demands and offer the Iranians
more. The Russians and Chinese worked together on a new proposal, also
submitted on November 15. This draft sought the suspension of 20 percent
uranium enrichment in Iran (without dismantling Fordow or removing the stockpile),
along with a few verification measures, in exchange for recognition by the E3
+3 group of Iran’s right to enrich uranium and the suspension of the European oil
embargo.
France then began to study the idea of a “roadmap” that we could bring to our
partners, and which would meet Iran’s demands to “go beyond the 1st phase” of
confidence-building measures in regard to 20 percent enrichment. We estimated
it would take a matter of days, a maximum of two weeks, to put together a reasonable
“roadmap,” given that all the elements had long been worked on at our end.
On December 6 in Berlin, the E3+3 finally approved the update of the offer
made to Iran in Baghdad in May 2012. They agreed on a “political chapeau,”
first suggested by the British, which placed this revised offer in the context of a
possible extension beyond the first phase of confidence-building measures. The
British and Germans were disappointed by the wait-and-see attitude of the Americans.
A clear change in approach took place as of the summer of 2012 in London
(related to a change in their policy chief, from Mark Sedwill to Simon Gass, and
the Iran task force chief, who was now Ajay Sharma): the Foreign Office, and
likely the British Prime Minister’s office, explicitly wished to set possible oil sanction
relief and maintenance of uranium enrichment in Iran at the top of the
Laurent Fabius
10 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
negotiations list. Sanctions relief on oil had so far not been envisaged as a top-tier
measure. Berlin, with a long-standing position in favor of the right to enrichment,
leapt into the British breach and also called for drafting a more attractive offer. But
the Americans refused to enter the debate on what would be an acceptable state
for the Iranian nuclear program, and the issue was left to stand temporarily. The
Russians and Chinese did not press the issue, and seemed satisfied with the prospect
of renewed contacts with Iran.
Almaty
The first half of 2013 was marked by a new series of meetings held in Kazakhstan:
the E3+3 met the Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili, in Almaty on February 26 and
27, then again on April 5 and 6. Despite exchanges that were, for the first time,
quite substantial, the group in Almaty found a sizable gap between the Iranian position
and their own. Iran was only prepared to discuss very limited measures. These
would result in a status quo for the nuclear program, while the demand for recognition
of Iran’s right to enrich and for lifting the most important sanctions
remained. In these circumstances, it did not seem possible to plan a new
meeting. Negotiators agreed on a “time out” until after the June 2013 Iranian
elections.
June 2013–January 2014: from Rouhani to the Implementation of the
Geneva Agreement
The election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran
in June 2013 opened the way to renew negotiations.
His victory over the nuclear negotiator himself,
Saeed Jalili, and the fact that the issue of sanctions
relief had dominated the election campaign was a
sign that Iranian diplomacy might be changing
track. It was difficult to identify the Iranians’ real
objective: would they really accept an agreement
with a strong framework (meaning verification and
restrictive measures on sensitive aspects of the
nuclear and missile program), an agreement that would require significant
concessions?
We reminded our partners of the period when Rouhani was in charge of nuclear
negotiations (2003–2005). It is true that during that period Western diplomacy
achieved some partial successes: the Tehran agreement of October 2003 on suspension
of uranium enrichment; the Paris agreement in November 2004 on a
second suspension; a global negotiation process involving the E3/EU and Iran.
The election of
Hassan Rouhani in
June 2013 opened
the way to renew
negotiations.
Inside the Iran Deal: a French Perspective
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Annex 8 ---------------
But it was also a period marked by Iran’s duplicity and failure to truly keep their
commitments. President Rouhani’s memoirs touch on the Iranian approach to
releasing information on the covert program, and they are eloquent: dissimulation,
wasting time to avoid being brought before the UN Security Council, leading the
Europeans along, a policy of fait accompli, research on enrichment proficiency.1
President Rouhani very quickly asserted that the nuclear crisis could be solved in
three to six months. As president, he chose a Minister of Foreign Affairs who was
well known to the E3+3: Javad Zarif, former Permanent Representative of Iran to
the United Nations, very knowledgeable about the United States and Western diplomatic
codes. The Iranian minister, a pleasant man with a perpetual smile, gave an
energetic presentation in perfect English of Iran’s “new approach.” It was an attempt
to override the petitio principii of the previous team and focus on negotiating the final
state of the Iranian nuclear program. The idea was to come to mutual approval of
enrichment means within a year, in exchange for relief from all sanctions. There
was, however, a reiteration of arguments (like sanctions are illegal and Iran’s
rights must be recognized), no more discussion of any kind of commitment to
suspend particular activities (the 20 percent question was to be “addressed”
during negotiations), and the Iranian minister made no mention of the Arak
reactor.
I mention in passing that it is difficult to carry out fruitful negotiations when the
starting point is the declaration that UNSC resolutions are “illegal.” Furthermore,
developments on the ground must not contradict the basis of negotiation; yet, for
example, construction on the Arak facility continued (and indeed was of increasing
concern to international observers, who feared a repeat of the Israeli “Operation
Opera” strike which destroyed the Iraqi
Osirak nuclear plant in 1981).
Nevertheless, the E3+3 ministers welcomed
the new tone of the new Iranian leadership
overall, while underscoring the need to
review each item and the precise terms of the
Iranian proposal. When the E3+3 ministers
held their first meeting with Javad Zarif, I
began to outline two key points of the French
position: because Iran had stated that it was
not seeking to develop nuclear weapons, it
had to accept the consequences of that
policy; the E3+3 would then, in exchange, be
willing to accept Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear power capacity.
In early October, it became clear that negotiations outside the framework of the
E3+3 group would be dangerous. We began to work on the broad outlines of the
regulation of the Iranian program, covering materials (production, existing
In early October
2013, it became
clear that negotiations
outside the
E3+3 framework
would be
dangerous.
Laurent Fabius
12 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
capacity, stockpiles), militarization and, ideally, ballistic capacities (even though
we were aware from the outset that it was unlikely that we would obtain
genuine guarantees). More precisely, we were at that time seeking to stop the
enrichment of uranium to 20 percent; a suspension of R&D activities; the
closure of the Fordow site; the conversion of the Arak plutonium production
reactor into a light-water reactor; abandonment of the heavy-water plant
(which is used to enrich uranium) co-located with the reactor; removal of stockpiles
at 3.5 percent from Iran (with potential for recovery in future years, if Iran
were to develop nuclear power plants); and the application of the highest standards
of verification (using the Additional Protocol, Code 3.1, of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)).
Geneva, Act I: “the Zarif Plan”
On October 15 and 16, the policy chiefs of the E3+3, with EU High Representative
Cathy Ashton, met Zarif and his deputy minister, Abbas Araghchi, in
Geneva. The Iranian minister (suffering from back pain) gave a PowerPoint presentation
of his ideas, with the objective titled “Closing an unnecessary crisis:
Opening new horizons.” These ideas included:
. a “common objective”: ensuring that Iran’s exercise of its right to nuclear
power, including enrichment, would remain entirely peaceful—sanction relief
being a prerequisite;
. a final step using the Supreme Leader’s fatwa (a religious ruling) against Iran
building or possessing nuclear weapons, but allowing R&D and enrichment
at Natanz and Fordow according to mutually accepted terms, operation of
the Arak reactor under “proliferation-resistant” conditions, cooperation on
civilian nuclear applications with transparency and international monitoring
by the IAEA, along with relief from all sanctions;
. a first phase, which would include addressing: production and stockpiles of 20-
percent enriched uranium; the level of activities at Natanz and Fordow;
increased IAEA monitoring; purchase, transport, insurance and repatriation
of Iranian oil revenues; financial transactions; and national restrictions on petrochemical
products, automobiles, gold, and other precious metals.
Zarif did not mention the unresolved issues of the Iranian nuclear weapons
program; he simply planned on having Iran sign an agreement with the IAEA.
He emphasized that there would be no roll-back of the Iranian program.
Behind these big ideas, it nonetheless became apparent during a second, more
detailed session with Iranian Deputy Minister Araghchi alone that there were still
significant differences with Iran. Araghchi made a distinction between technology,
which Iran would continue to develop, and the production of enriched
Inside the Iran Deal: a French Perspective
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Annex 8 ---------------
uranium, which was recognized as the heart of our concern. Any gesture made by
Iran would be in reciprocity for gestures made by the P5+1, but the first phase
could include the complete suspension of enrichment to 20 percent, the conversion
or dilution of the 20-percent stockpile, a plan to convert the Arak facility
(which was not a high stake for Iran because the start-up had already been postponed),
and further measures on transparency (but not the Additional Protocol,
because of measures passed by the Iranian parliament).2
An entire session was devoted to sanctions. The E3+3 reaffirmed their position
on the first phase: suspension of sanctions on petrochemical products, gold and
precious metals, civil aviation products, and a commitment from the UNSC
and EU not to adopt new sanctions. Iran reaffirmed it sought the full suspension
of sanctions in the first phase.
The discussions in Geneva were carried out in a more constructive and fluid
atmosphere than previous encounters, confirming that Iran had modified its
approach to negotiations. But still, the Iranian positions remained imprecise and
rather far from our own. Our group held a united front, although the British,
once again, opened up many new pathways on their own. The Americans
seemed to remain very cautious, reiterating basic parameters.
Geneva, Act II:
Revelation of the Secret U.S. Diplomatic Channel and a Clash with France
Negotiations continued in Geneva on November 7, 2013. The E3+3 experts came
together without Iran to specify the first-phase parameters would last six months.
In reality, this work, which went on late into the night, was only a façade: the
main U.S. experts were absent, replaced by a second-string team. In the midst
of the discussions, U.S. policy chief Wendy Sherman handed her counterparts a
very different kind of document, secret and not fully finalized, that integrated
the three elements demanded by Iran in October’s Zarif Plan: a common objectives
or preamble, a first phase, and a last phase. On the evening of November 7, it gave
rise to a tense exchange between the French policy chief and the U.S. Undersecretary
of State, Bill Burns, with regard to a perceived
betrayal of confidence: the Americans
had not informed us of the content or even
existence of these discussions.
Nevertheless, thiswas the proposal that served
as a basis for E3+3 ministerial-level discussions
over the next two days. Because of its shortcomings,
it seemed unacceptable to me. The U.S.
document did not provide an explicit commitment
by Iran not to develop or obtain nuclear
The Americans had
not informed us of
the content or even
existence of the
secret Oman
discussions.
Laurent Fabius
14 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
weapons; did not address the question of enrichment over the long term (which Iran
sought to make unconditional); did not include a satisfactory plan for handling the
stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent (Iran demanded that, in the first sixmonth
period, allowances be made for needs linked to future research reactors); did
not limit production of centrifuges to those needed to
replace broken ones; and did not suspend all activities
associated with the construction of the Arak reactor
and the manufacture or testing of its fuel. As soon as I
arrived, at the end of the morning of November 8, I
gave my counterparts, and in particular U.S. Secretary
of State John Kerry, our demands for shoring up the
five major points of the text that we felt necessary.
At the same time, the Americans saw that Iranians
were backpedalling on certain points that they believed
had been agreed upon in Oman. The British and
German ministers stayed on the sidelines, ready to
accept any results that satisfied both the Americans and the Iranians. As of that
moment, negotiations essentially moved forward between three ministers—American,
French, and Iranian.
On Saturday November 9, I went on the radio station France Inter to explain our
demands. Tensions mounted. The U.S. delegation was annoyed, while the British
and Germans encouraged us to be more flexible, meaning to withdraw our demands.
At the end of the morning, I met with Secretary Kerry, who was impatient to
push ahead. No concessions were made. I expressed my disagreement with both
the method and substance of the proposal: France would not accept a watereddown
agreement. After a very tense debate, we finally reached an agreement on
a revised proposal addressing the five problematic points. We made our proposal
to the rest of the group when the Chinese deputy minister arrived that afternoon.
Kerry, who admitted the merits of our positions, advocated for the French
demands. After discussion, our partners endorsed the text. Sergey Lavrov, a
habitually loquacious diplomat whose contributions bore mostly on procedure,
sharply criticized the process as it had occurred—he was unhappy both with the
backchannel and with what he saw as a hasty and unprofessional way to
conduct negotiations in Geneva. But the P5+1 nevertheless approved a text to
be submitted to Javad Zarif at the end of the afternoon.
That evening, Zarif saw that the group’s position was substantively unanimous.
He had thought that the whole group would have accepted the secret agreement
with the Americans, so he expressed—or feigned—surprise at the slightly revised
text. At the end of a long exchange of ideas, it appeared that Iran was not ready to
accept the text as presented. Zarif delivered a vehement tirade against the
“changes” in the agreement that had supposedly been reached in Oman with
The U.S. draft
from the secret
Oman talks seemed
unacceptable to me
because of five
shortcomings.
Inside the Iran Deal: a French Perspective
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016 15
Annex 8 ---------------
the Americans. He even hinted at a complete end to negotiations. Ashton and the
P5+1 ministers suggested that a new meeting of policy chiefs should be scheduled
to resolve the outstanding issues, and it was set for November 20.
In the meantime, Iran fine-tuned its “narrative” about the alleged transparency of
its program and signed an agreement on November 11 with the IAEA in Tehran: a
“Framework for Cooperation” that gave the impression that the possible military
dimensions of the Iranian program would finally be seriously addressed. For my
part, I had a deep and sincere conversation with John Kerry between November
9 and 20 on the form and substance of the negotiations, to ensure that the backchannel
“process” used by the Americans in Oman would not be repeated.
Geneva, Act III: Interim Agreement
Negotiations on the ministerial level began again on November 22 at the Intercontinental
Hotel in Geneva. The method was clarified in comparison to
Geneva II: Cathy Ashton negotiated on the basis of the E3+3 mandate concerning
each of the five key issues.
Zarif prevaricated for three days, but ultimately accepted our demands. This
included a ban on fuel testing (I explained to John Kerry how important it was
to block the development of fuel for Arak, not just its production, which would
allow for a real freeze of this worrying part of the program, or “plutonium
path”), and an important footnote on the production of centrifuges was moved.
TheU.S. Secretary of State,with his usual showofwill, played theU.S. trump card
to Iran: the promise of releasing $3.6 billion in frozen Iranian assets.Astrange discussion
took place on the subject of what became known as the “billion for the pilgrims.”
The Americans first lobbied for “directing” part of the funds freed up to specific purposes,
including payment to Saudi foundations to be allocated for Iranian pilgrimages
toMecca. The Iranian minister did not take kindly to this condition. In the end, the
earmark was removed from a part of the amount, which was added to the $3.6 billion
initially offered by the Americans, moving the
total to $4.2 billion.
The parties reached the Joint Plan of Action
(JPOA), or what became known as the interim
agreement, on November 24 at dawn.
Another Month to Determine Implementation
Experts began negotiations on implementation
on December 9 in Vienna; the first meeting
went on until the 13th. While progress was
made, it quickly became apparent that the
Geneva Agreement contained many ambiguities that would affect
It quickly became
apparent that the
JPOA contained
many ambiguities
that would affect
implementation.
Laurent Fabius
16 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
implementation. In addition, Iran made a sudden declaration of the existence and
production of a new, advanced-generation centrifuge (later it became the IR-8, but
at that time it did not yet have a name) before interrupting the discussions on the
pretext of a U.S. announcement that individual Iranian companies linked to
nuclear proliferation would be subject to sanctions.
Discussions resumed from December 19–22 in Geneva before halting again, this
time because of the announcement that the new, advanced IR-8 centrifuge would be
installed at the Natanz pilot facility. The P5+1 were unanimous in their rejection of
this development, saying it was unacceptable and contrary to the spirit and the letter
of the agreement; the dispute rose up to the policy level. Substantial divergences
remained on other nuclear topics (such as the link between the schedule for dilution
of 20-percent-enriched uranium and the schedule for releasing frozen oil revenues,
the precise definition of measures associated with the Arak heavy water reactor, and
R&D issues). Discussions of sanctions relief were more constructive. The Iranians
didn’t bother to take a “good faith” attitude in negotiating the document. In fact,
the “nucleocrats” seemed to take a harder line with diplomats, with Iranian
atomic energy authorities trying to save what they could from Zarif’s concessions.
A new session was held after Christmas, until the wee hours of December 31.
The Americans moved ahead slowly on the “slices,” or monthly payments to be
made to the Iranians—releasing the $4.2 billion all at once was out of the question,
for fear of Iran “cashing in” and then not delivering on the nuclear measures.
The problem of the new centrifuge was still not resolved. It would be settled in
early January after new discussions between Helga Schmid, Abbas Araghchi, and
the IAEA yielded a “gentlemen’s agreement,” supposed to be secret. The centrifuge
could remain in place, on the condition that it was not connected to a
uranium supply. The agreement could go into effect on January 20, using a
“longest day” schedule whereby—thanks to the time difference between
Tehran, Vienna, Brussels, and Washington—Iran’s nuclear actions and the suspension
of sanctions could take place successively, but on the same day.
February-November 2014: Two Failures in the Long-term Negotiations
Long-term negotiations began in February 2014, in the Palais Cobourg hotel; the
Austrians had offered to host and finance the negotiations. These took the form of
“conversations” to “familiarize” Iranians with the main points that the group
wished to see in the agreement, known as “building blocks.” These “building
blocks” were considered to be the expression of an ambitious ideal rather than
real objectives by some of our partners.
The policy chiefs of the E3+3 held a meeting to define the framework for the
method in Geneva on January 21, 2014. On February 12 in Berlin, the experts
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Annex 8 ---------------
added technical refinements. The French positions (holding a firm line) converged
with those of the Americans. U.S. objectives were clearly stated, and
not limited to a breakout time—that is, the interval required for Iran to
produce enough fissile material for one bomb. The agreement was initially
designed to cover a 20-year period; questions on the possible military dimension
of the Iranian nuclear program (coined possible military dimension, or PMD, by
the IAEA) were stated as indispensable. The British and Germans mentioned a
more limited objective of simply extending the breakout time. Russia’s positions
were the farthest from the rest of the group. It wanted a reaffirmation of Iran’s
right to enrichment; wanted an account of the difficulties associated with decommissioning
Fordow; and had reservations in regard to the inclusion of ballistic missiles
in the negotiations.
Meetings were organized in monthly sessions by policy chiefs in Vienna, interspersed
with expert meetings to look more deeply into the policy issues raised.
There were meetings with Iranians about every two weeks. P5+1 members took
on different “building blocks”; France analysed possible military dimensions
(PMD) issues. PMD had always been an essential point for France, as it signaled
the lack of clarity of Iran’s true intentions regarding its nuclear program. PMD
cast a shadow on all other nuclear developments. A threat is always the product
of capabilities and intentions.
The launch meeting was held in Vienna from February 18–20. Discussions
remained general. Zarif complained to Ashton that the P5+1 were not lifting the
sanctions effectively and that relief was only theoretical. In reality, at least at the
outset, these problems were related to the uncertainty of the Iranian Central
Bank and the indecision of Iranian authorities about the flow and use of funds
released from sanctions. The Iranian negotiators also emphasized from the start
that certain points would not be altered by negotiation, such as their refusal to consider
“breakout time” as a relevant parameter for the discussion; importance of R&D
(presented as not covered by the JPOA); that PMD was to be handled with the
IAEA (which Iran accused of piling up endless questions on a “fabricated”
subject); their demand for sanction relief from the UNSC; and that progress in
the size of the agreement would depend on the duration of the agreement.
As soon as the next experts meeting was held, from March 5–7, 2014, the Iranians
adopted a maximalist position on enrichment. For the Arak plant, the Russians
presented a conversion model that maintained the use of heavy water but
relied on low-enriched uranium. The Americans suggested a model using light
water, with heavy water as a neutron reflector (which intensifies the nuclear
chain reaction). The Chinese advanced the possibility of civil nuclear cooperation
with the Iranians.
During the policy chiefs’ meeting on March 18 and 19, Zarif exercised his usual
willfulness: he declared that the drafting phase of the agreement should be
Laurent Fabius
18 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
scheduled for May. The U.S. policy chief, Wendy Sherman, broached the subject
of lifting sanctions in the context of a long-term agreement, offering an approach
by stages and by categories of sanctions. Araghchi
rejected this and reasserted that “nearly all” sanctions
should be lifted as of Day One. The sticking point was
once again enrichment: Iranians affirmed that the
“limits” mentioned in the JPOA were limits to expansion
of their program, and not reductions thereof. On
the subject of Arak, the Russians and Americans continued
to push for their own options, while the
Chinese added their own variant. We supported the
U.S. option, in solidarity.
The expert meetings that took place from April 3–5 were not conclusive. The
Iranian expert, under pressure from the French expert to answer the group’s questions
with precision, suggested that the Iranians had assessed the breakout time at
four years, given the current state of the program. During this meeting, the Russians,
without any prior consultation, mentioned the possibility of using some of
the Fordow centrifuges to produce stable radioisotopes, a seemingly more acceptable
application of nuclear science, but which would have the serious drawback of
keeping centrifuges in Fordow.
The policy meeting on the 8th and 9th of April was devoted to “building
blocks,” in particular with regard to Security council resolutions and PMD
(French policy chief Jacques Audibert reaffirmed our demands: clear information
on the past and the present program, and also measures like stringent verification
and restrictions for the future). Discussions on enrichment were tense, as the Iranians
insisted that they wished to expand their activities in the future. A symbolic
meeting of the joint commission was held at the end of this series, to observe the
satisfactory application of the Geneva agreement.
Consultations with E3+3 policy chiefs were held in Brussels with Cathy Ashton
on April 29 and 30, to prepare for what the High Representative expected to be
the start of the active negotiation phase. The positions of Western nations and the
Russian and Chinese were far apart, but the Russians were not opposed to using our
position as a starting point. The negotiation method remained unclear (Ashton
seemed to imagine that she would be sitting in a room alone with Zarif and a
laptop).
On May 6 and 7, there was a meeting of the E3+3 and Iranian experts on the
sidelines of the preparations for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Iranian positions were
unchanged, and in fact had regressed on certain points such as monitoring and verification.
In regard to Arak, the Iranians continued to listen politely to the successive
“improvements” in the Russian and U.S. options, while merely replying with
The sticking point
in spring 2014 was
once again
enrichment.
Inside the Iran Deal: a French Perspective
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Annex 8 ---------------
proposals for the management of spent fuel. (The Chinese, meanwhile, had their
own proposal for Arak.)
The policy chiefs continued the work from May 14–16. A strange scene played
out in a darkened room in the International Conference Centre in Vienna. Minister
Zarif, armed with a portable projector, showed a PowerPoint on the final
agreement, which he said he had put together without consulting all his deputies.
He used the term “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” which was later adopted.
This session was followed by talks between the Americans and the Iranians on
June 8 and 9 in Geneva. Helga Schmid attended. Nicolas de Rivière, who had just
replaced Audibert as French policy chief, emphasized the need to preserve the
unity of the group and to refuse the use of parallel channels. He met with the
two Iranian Deputy Ministers in Geneva on June 11, at the Iranian Ambassador’s
residence. The encounter was cordial, but there were real substantive differences.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov also met with the Iranians in
Rome on June 13 and reported no progress. A serious problem emerged with
PMD, because the Iranians had ceased cooperating with the IAEA and refused
to reengage as long as the Agency had not officially closed the issue of exploding-
bridgewire detonators (“EBW”), a technology with very limited civilian applications
that could not be documented by Iran, but with clear military implications
in that it allowed for the proper trigger of a nuclear device.
At the end of this series of consultations, the P5+1 met with Iran from June 16–
20 and delivered a presentation, in the form of an informal working document that
set forth the principal demands of the P5+1 (or E3/EU+3) without going into the
technical details.
The Setback of the July 2014 Announcement
Negotiations started again on July 2, 2014. The Americans sent Deputy Secretary
Bill Burns and adviser Jake Sullivan to Vienna: they had been part of the “Oman
Channel.” It soon appeared that no agreement would be reached before July 20—
an important date, since it marked six months after beginning the implementation
of the JCPOA—as the Iranians were not ready to make the necessary concessions.
Time passed slowly for the experts in the corridors of the Palais Cobourg in
Vienna. Meetings were called for no reason other than meeting. John Kerry was
delayed by his attendance at a diplomatic conference between the United
States and China. A ministerial meeting was finally held on July 13; we could
only observe that there was no agreement. We agreed upon the extension of
the interim Geneva text until November 24, the anniversary of the 2013
agreement.
The week of July 13–20 was spent in laborious discussions on the terms of this
extension. The Americans soon yielded to the Iranians, renewing the monthly
Laurent Fabius
20 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
release of oil revenues. Offsets obtained on the production of uranium enriched to
20 percent were superficial. During this period, the French delegation got into the
habit of walking through the Stadtpark to escape listening devices, and it was there
that a new approach to PMD was developed, known as the “restrictive list.” We
worked with our service to hone this approach throughout the summer and into
September.
The Period of “Reconfiguring” the Cascades
As in the previous September, the UN General Assembly coincided with the
renewal of negotiations. In 2014, as in 2013, President Rouhani travelled to
New York. Despite our skepticism, our partners, the Europeans in particular,
were convinced that this would be a turning point, that Rouhani was coming to
give a much-needed boost to his negotiators. The opposite occurred. President
Rouhani repeated to one and all, and in particular to the three European heads
of state and government, that his imperative was the immediate lifting of all
sanctions.
On the technical front, the New York event opened up a long period of discussion
that lasted until March 2015 in Montreux, on Lake Geneva, on the subject of
a possible “reconfiguration” of the centrifuges’ cascades
as a way to extend the breakout time. This technical
solution was an important political signal and
brought about a change in the U.S. position: the
objective clearly became to increase the breakout
time, rather that to define a number of centrifuges sufficient
for “practical purposes,” as stated in the
Geneva document. The Americans, who produced
work and models from their labs, suggested a reconfiguration
into “short-tapered” cascades. The Germans,
based on their own specialists’ experience, followed
suit and suggested a “kite-shaped” reconfiguration.
Reconfigured cascades normally are less effective to enrich at high rates (but
more so at low, “civilian” rates), and turning them back to their original configuration
is time-consuming and can harm the machines.
In France, the CEA (Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission)
analysed these different reconfigurations. We shared information with our E3 partners
and the United States on the means of calculating the breakout time. Our
conclusions were about the same as those of the Americans and the Germans,
but there was a difference with the British, whose calculations claimed that it
would take much longer to breakout and seemed to have mainly political objectives
(to technically accommodate a political narrative about the robustness of
Discussing “reconfiguration”
of the
centrifuges’ cascades
brought about
a change in the U.S.
position.
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Annex 8 ---------------
reconfiguration from a nonproliferation standpoint). Nonetheless, we did emphatically
inform the Americans that reconfiguration was a palliative, and not a substitute
for a genuine reduction of current Iranian nuclear capacity. We sent a
warning to the U.S. team, who seemed set on the symbolic figure of 6,000 centrifuges,
whereas we targeted a maximum of 4,500.
With regard to sanctions, the Americans had clearly thought about this issue
over the summer, and they presented a potential solution to the Security
Council. Their “stand alone” proposal consisted of revoking, in appearance, the
old UNSC resolutions, by way of transferring them to a separate document submitted
by the E3+3 (a sort of “loose leaf” or “stand alone” paper) that would be
binding on other states through a resolution endorsing the agreement. This was
intended to resolve the impasse because it allowed a claim that sanctions had
been removed, while not including the remaining restrictive measures in the
body of the new resolution endorsing the final agreement. We had doubts about
the legal soundness of such a plan, not to mention its political bearing, as it
seemed to us that it sent a confusing message with regard to the pursuit and applicability
of nonproliferation sanctions in as much as confidence in the exclusively
peaceful character of the Iranian nuclear
program had not been established.
After New York, the policy chiefs of the E3
+3, led by Ashton, and the Iranian delegation,
led by Zarif, met in Vienna on October 16.
This session was preceded by a trilateral
meeting on the 15th among Kerry, Ashton,
and Zarif, as well as other meetings between
the United States and Iran in other formats.
During these meetings, the Iranians agreed to
reduce their capacity to 7,800 IR-1 centrifuges
for six months before scaling up to 9,400
machines—at the time, they had around 9,200 machines fed at Natanz, with an
additional 6,400 installed but not fed with UF6. However, they showed no flexibility
with regard to sanction relief. This semblance of an agreement on a set figure
gave the Americans—and the Russians—the impression that the agreement could
be finalized by November 24.
The P5+1 then held a meeting with Iran in Oman on November 11, 2014, in
the Al Bustan Palace in Muscat. The Omanis had been very insistent about
hosting a negotiation session. The meeting followed the regular habit where the
P5+1 had a brief on the situation after a trilateral Kerry-Ashton-Zarif consultation—
in this case, on November 9 and 10 in Muscat. Two weeks before the
November 24 deadline, negotiations were stalled and even losing ground. The
Americans noted the complete lack of progress, and so during the November 11
Two weeks before
the November 24,
2014 deadline,
negotiations were
stalled and even
losing ground.
Laurent Fabius
22 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
plenary, Zarif reiterated his well-known basic principles—in particular, the
demand that the international community should accept the Iranian nuclear
program as it stood. On the technical level, the Iranians brought out new proposals
on enrichment, but these were largely contrived.
So it was with some scepticism about the chances for success that the P5+1 and
Iranian delegations met in Vienna on November 18, with the objective of reaching
a long-term agreement before the November 24 deadline established by the
Geneva agreement.
Another Deadline Missed
The next series of meetings was significant for the high level of engagement of the
E3/EU+3 ministers and Iran. The negotiation session was organized around a first
phase from Tuesday, November 18, to Friday, November 21, during which time
the P5+1 ministers and Iran felt that, on the basis of some new ideas, it would
be possible to decide on an extension of the negotiations.
As soon as the meeting began on November 18, the P5+1 took stock of the
November 11 meeting in Oman, at which time the Iranians had held a hard
line. Ashton then set the stage for the coming week by announcing Zarif’s plan
to return to Tehran on the 21st to obtain instructions necessary for unblocking
the negotiations. Discussions went forward with policy chiefs and experts all
week. When the 21st arrived, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, Kerry,
and I observed that there were still differences between our positions and Iran’s.
I suggested to Kerry that we return to Paris together to express our disapproval
of Iran’s refusal to budge.
That same day, Zarif informed the press that, because the P5+1 had not made
any proposals that were worth presenting to Tehran, he was cancelling his return
trip to Iran. Kerry met with Zarif in the afternoon and decided to stay in Vienna.
He claimed that he believed that Zarif had the political determination to succeed
in reaching an agreement, and he wished to explore some “new ideas” that had
been submitted by Iran. In the end, the P5+1 and Iran made the joint decision
to extend the negotiations until June 30, 2015, in two stages: four months (bringing
it to the end of March 2015) to agree on the policy framework and three
months to draw up the technical annexes.
I insisted on this time frame. At first, Kerry hoped for a much shorter period,
thinking that he could not keep the U.S. Congress “on hold” much longer. We,
on the contrary, thought that time was on our side because of the impact of sanctions
on Iran. I also mentioned the need to “leap frog” over the NPT Review Conference
in May. I knew the conference would be difficult because of the impasse on
the question of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East—the Americans
had not really been thinking about the importance of this particular diplomatic
Inside the Iran Deal: a French Perspective
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Annex 8 ---------------
deadline. Iran was chairing the non-aligned movement and could hold sway at the
NPT Review Conference from that position, complicating issues relating to noncompliance
that were high on the agenda of the conference. Experience of the
interim deal also showed that from policy framework to implementation details,
there were a lot of issues to be fixed that would not benefit from interference
with another diplomatic forum.
The second Viennese session concluded with a new extension, despite the fact
that it began with an Iranian reversal on the question of low-enriched uranium
stockpiles: Iran no longer wished to ship these stockpiles to Russia, as they had
announced in New York in September, but sought to keep them in-country for
transformation into fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The Iranians based
their arguments on the ambiguous language of a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) signed on November 11, 2013, by the Rosatom State Energy Coporation
of Russia and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran; they read the agreement
as enabling the production of fuel for Bushehr from uranium enriched in Iran.
Their point of view was that this supported the industrial vocation of their program.
Uncomfortable with Iran’s arguments, the Russian delegation tried to convince
us that Tehran was misinterpreting the terms. Sergey Ryabkov, the Russian policy
chief, mentioned the minimum criteria of eight power plants required to justify
production of fuel in Iran; no reference was made to the transfer of Russian intellectual
property rights on fuel to Iran, nor to the use of locally-enriched uranium.
The United States, France, and the other E3+1 countries explained to the Iranians
that this about-face on enrichment changed the calculation of the volume of
enrichment capacity that Iran would be authorized to retain. Indeed, it was in
response to the reduction of the stockpile to about 300 kg that the P5+1 had previously
accorded a higher number of centrifuges
than initially foreseen.
Faced with this firm opposition, the Iranians
qualified their positions at the end of the negotiation
session, in particular during the ministerial
sessions: if the P5+1 quickly lifted all
sanctions, the stockpiles could be reduced by
shipping them out of the country, as provided
in the option of export to Russia. If sanctions
were to be lifted at a later date, Iran would
need time to transform the stockpiles into fuel for Bushehr.
The “new ideas” that the U.S. delegation used to justify the extension of negotiations
in fact grew out of the Iranian proposals on enrichment, ideas that first
took root in the Oman meeting on November 11. These ideas were of two
sorts: first, Iran proposed to reduce enrichment capacity through the reconfiguration
of centrifuges by thirds, which we felt was an artifice and expressed in
It was clear the U.S.
delegation was
interested in the
Iranian phasing
proposal.
Laurent Fabius
24 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
imprecise terms; second, they proposed a phasing mechanism over fifteen years and
committed the Iranian program to industrial purposes, with an upper range of
80,000 SWU (Separative Work Units). Although the U.S. delegation denied it
to us, it was clear at the time that they were interested in this Iranian phasing
proposal.
Prior to the opening of this negotiation session, we organized a meeting at the
IAEA with the U.S. and British delegations to give more details to Tero Varjoranta,
Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards, on our
approach to the resolution of PMD issues in the context of a long-term agreement.
This meeting enabled us to agree on a final version of the list of required measures
for access as well as the terms for managing that access. The list was held back and
kept secret, as we agreed with the U.S. and British delegations. We would address
the concept only when an agreement seemed close to being achieved.
December 2014—July 2015: Around the Lake and Back to Vienna
The year 2015 began under the cloud of the Republican majority in the U.S. Congress,
darkening the administration’s ambitions. Republicans tabled the Kirk–
Menendez bill, followed by the Corker–Cardin bill, both related to activities
with Iran; the first called for more sanctions, and the second, less demanding,
for the submission of any agreement to Congress and the possibility of voting a
motion of disapproval. On their side, the Iranians kept up the fiction that negotiations
had almost succeeded in November, only failed because the Americans
backed off at the last moment, and that otherwise the agreement “was there.”
Javad Zarif said that, like the Americans under Republican pressure, he was
facing growing pressure in Tehran from conservatives who had taken his negotiating
team to task in the Majles (Iranian Parliament).
On January 18, the E3+3 policy chiefs and the Iranian negotiators met in Geneva.
These discussions followed three days of negotiations between the U.S. and Iranian
teams, and meetings between Kerry and Zarif on January 14 in Geneva, then January
16 in Paris. Negotiations focused on the question of enrichment, seen as the key issue
that could open the door to success. The Americans were still advocating reconfiguration
in short-tapered cascades, with an initial reduction to 5,000 IR-1 machines,
rising to 7,800 at the end of six-and-a-half years, and holding there until year 10
(a slight increase in capacity was envisioned up until year 15). The Americans
took a stronger stance on other issues: they wanted IR-1 only for R&D (eventually,
IR-2 m at the end of the agreement), the U.S. option for reconversion only possible
for the Arak facility, and the refusal of stable isotope production at Fordow. The Iranians
rejected the U.S. proposal on enrichment.
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Annex 8 ---------------
Abbas Araghchi announced another important development: with regard to
sanctions, the Iranians were no longer interested in the “stand-alone document”
option, proposed in September, for handling UNSC resolutions. And yet
neither were they in favor of the “roadmap” method, preferred by our delegation
as well as the Russians. This roadmap method involved one single resolution, presenting
the successive phases of sanction relief in step with the implementation of
Iran’s actions of engagement.
On January 26, a significant development occurred. For the first time since the
end of the Eurodif3 litigation, a meeting was held in Paris, on the CEA premises,
with a delegation from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The CEA
director of international relations welcomed his Iranian counterpart. Faced with
negotiations that were treading water on the future of Fordow, we wanted to
show our partners that we could, once again, offer proposals and bring our civil
nuclear expertise to the table. Our suggestion to install a linear accelerator—a
major piece of scientific equipment—at Fordow was more solid and more attractive
to the Iranians than the U.S. idea of setting up a center for observing
cosmic particles to replace the enrichment work. Iranian specialists seemed interested.
But they continued to advance their initial position: yes to the linear accelerator,
but they also wanted to retain other purposes for Fordow, specifically
enrichment and the production of stable isotopes. Our French preference was
for a facility devoted only to research,
without centrifuges.
The E3 met the Iranians in Istanbul on
January 29, 2015. The Iranians half-heartedly
accepted a reconfiguration in short-tapered cascades
(clearly experts from the AEOI believed
this risked damaging the machines), but they
rejected the phasing figures suggested by the
E3+3. Iranian experts said the best expectation
would be a short-term reduction to 6,000
machines and a return to 9,400 machines
(about 20 percent more than the U.S. proposal)
in two-and-a-half years (less than half the time). Negotiators Araghchi and
Ravanchi presented a longer schedule, covering ten years (3+3+4). But discussions
dried up on other issues, in particular because the Iranians insisted on having the
details of the group’s calculations on breakout time, which the E3 experts refused
to release because the information could impact proliferation.
During the Wehrkunde meeting on February 8 in Munich, I emphasized to
John Kerry, who had begun to talk in terms of a ten-year agreement, that it was
essential to hold to our objective of the longest term possible for the agreement.
Speaking with Zarif, I underscored the risks of regional proliferation if the
It was essential to
hold to the longest
term possible for
the agreement to
serve as a
precedent.
Laurent Fabius
26 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
agreement were to be perceived as weak; I reiterated this thesis regularly (“only a
robust agreement can guarantee credibility”).
Enter Messrs. Moniz and Salehi (“Ernie and Ali”)
Bilateral conversations between the United States and Iran were planned for February
20–23 in Geneva. (By that time, the United States always had a first go with
the Iranians, then the rest of the group would join in for follow-up discussions.) An
E3+1 videoconference was held beforehand. The U.S. policy chief announced
that U.S. Energy Secretary Ernie Moniz would henceforth accompany John
Kerry. Moniz, an affable scientist with a calm, pedagogical demeanor, would
have to face off with Ali Salehi, Chairman of the AEOI. They also announced
that President Obama wanted to know before the end of March if a solid basis
existed for advancing the negotiations.
The plan tabled by the Americans, which they believed agreeable to the Iranians
(as of the security conference in Munich), included increasing the
number of centrifuges from 5,000 to 7,800 over six years (with reconfiguration).
The Americans informed us that they could accept a breakout time of nine
months for years 11 to 15. U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Wendy Sherman sent an unclear message on U.S. flexibility in regard to R&D
—what type of R&D activities would the United States ultimately tolerate,
only first-generation machines or more advanced ones? As for sanctions,
Sherman announced, to our satisfaction, that there would be no more “creative
ideas” for handling UNSC resolutions beyond the “stand alone” document
already proposed.
The assessment of the Geneva consultations by the P5+1 was presented at the
EU delegation premises in Geneva on February 22. The biggest news was that
Salehi’s arrival was a sign of the abandonment of the reconfiguration formula.The
Iranians flip-flopped. We assessed that the AEOI had gained the upper hand
internally and had convinced whoever needed to be convinced that reconfiguration
would be too damaging for the centrifuges. However, for the first time, Iran
offered instead to reduce its enrichment capacity by about one-third over ten
years (6,000 IR-1 with 500 kg of UF6 at 3.5 percent, or 6,600 with 300 kg of
nuclear matter). No figure was agreed upon at the end of the session, but the P5
+1 acknowledged real progress. The rest of the enrichment “package” had not
changed: significant differences remained on R&D and the timeline for years 10
to 15. A total impasse also continued with regard to lifting UNSC sanctions.
Despite the mixed results, the Americans began to exert pressure on the French
and wanted “the PMD cards on the table” and the list sent to the Iranians of
people and sites we wanted access to.
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Annex 8 ---------------
Montreux
The P5+1 and Iran met in Montreux on March 5, 2015. The main development
was that the Iranian delegation expressed its willingness to guarantee a breakout
time of at least one year for a period of ten years, even though Iran continued
to reject the relevance of the concept. The U.S.–Iranian convergence on the
target figure of 6,104 centrifuges was confirmed—
which the policy directors agreed was
significant.
However, the Iranians backpedalled again
on the question of exporting its stockpiles of
UF6 at 3.5 percent over 300 kg. They did not
rule out export to Russia, but said they would
prefer other solutions, such as conversion into
uranium dioxide oxide (UO2) for the production
of fuel pellets (this process was not
operational in Iran), or dilution (a solution
that the P5+1 found absurd because it meant
Iran would enrich, only to immediately dilute back, which openly proved the
absence of any economic rationale for the enrichment program). Iranian
demands on R&D remained excessive: Iranians wanted to continue R&D on all
available models (IR-2 m, 4, 6, and 8) and they wanted to produce negotiable
numbers of IR-8 centrifuges, at least, starting in 2022.
The question of the future of Fordow was still not resolved. The Iranians
wanted to keep 1,300 machines in one of the two tunnels, even if they conceded
to no enrichment therein. But they did not want to decommission the facility.
Instead, it would remain under seal, ready to start up again “in case” (“an insurance
policy” in the event of an enemy attack on the fuel enrichment facility at Natanz).
In the second tunnel, the Iranians said they were interested in installing a linear
accelerator, in the context of French cooperation.
For Arak, the Americans appeared to accept the Iranian heavy-water design,
even though they had always maintained that such acceptance could only be a
final-hour concession when all the other pieces had fallen into place. But to us,
it was not a problem of substance: the Iranian design was acceptable to us with
regard to nonproliferation because it would minimize the quantity and quality of
plutonium produced.
On sanctions, the Iranians were adamant and intransigent on their position
concerning the nonproliferation resolutions of the Security Council. They said
they could not accept keeping any of the UNSC measures. Instead, they offered
measures that seemed insufficient to us for nonproliferation.
The Montreux meeting was carefully orchestrated by the Iranians. Zarif chose
to invite all the delegations to lunch at an Iranian restaurant on the shores of Lake
On March 5, Iran
was finally willing to
guarantee a breakout
time of at least
one year for ten
years.
Laurent Fabius
28 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
Geneva, followed by a lakeside stroll. Despite the efforts to produce perfect photo
opportunities, the series was disappointing due to the Iranian step backward on
enrichment (the issues of stockpiles and Fordow in particular). We left the
meeting with the impression that the UNSC sanctions had become the thorniest
obstacle. Demands for immediate relief apparently came directly from President
Rouhani (whose brother was present at Montreux), who believed that it would
not be possible to gain acceptance from conservatives in Tehran without that
concession.
Lausanne I
Negotiations were to continue in Lausanne from March 18–20. On March 15, the
Iranians met with the Americans, and on the 16th, a ministerial meeting was held
in Brussels among Iran and the E3. With only about two weeks to go before the
policy framework of a final agreement was due, the meetings were unproductive
in putting pressure on Iran. The general atmosphere was one of confusion, and
the Americans were impatient. Journalists camped out in the hotel lobby, constantly
vying for negotiators’ attention.
During this Lausanne I session, the United States made several concessions, in
particular with regard to R&D and the course of the nuclear program between
years 10 and 15. These concessions came without discussion and agreement
within the group, and consequently led to some concern from the E3—especially
in regard to R&D. On sanctions, the United States again advocated the option
of the “stand-alone document” with a “snapback” mechanism. Despite our
repeated demands, the United States did not share a precise draft of this proposal
with us.
The session, which was getting bogged down in any event, ended abruptly on
March 20 when the death of President Rouhani’s mother was announced (also the
mother of his brother, Hossein Fereidoun, member of the delegation). The Iranians
went home to Tehran for the ceremony and for the Iranian New Year’s celebration
on March 21, as no agreement seemed forthcoming.
The rest of the group at Lausanne I discovered that the United States had
worked with experts from the team of European External Action Service
(EEAS) assisting Helga Schmid on a text bearing on a mechanism for resolving
disputes in the event of an Iranian refusal of access. This text had been shared
with the Iranians, who appeared to accept the principle. It was based on the
Joint Commission’s (E3+3, High Representative of the EU, and Iran) power,
given a majority vote of five out of eight, to force Iran to grant access to a
site within a period of up to 24 days. We immediately commented on this
mechanism, which was a strange departure from the Additional Protocol’s application
of ordinary law. We sought an access mechanism that would be stronger
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Annex 8 ---------------
than the Additional Protocol, not weaker, and informed the IAEA about this
development.
With regard to the PMD action list and clarification of past activities, Ryabkov
agreed that the list could be given to the Iranians, on the condition that it was not
presented on behalf of the P5+1. Schmid handed over the list, in a scene typical of
this negotiation: Araghchi first refused to take the list, then accepted it while
stating that receiving the document in no way constituted an agreement on the
approach.
On many points during the Lausanne meeting, the United States maintained a
fuzzy position on whether or not their ideas had been approved by Iran. During our
exchanges with the Iranians (E3–Iran exchanges in particular), their delegation
sent a clear message that they considered the nuclear package nearly wrapped
up (except for years 10 to 15), and that discussions should focus on lifting all
UNSC sanctions at once.
It then became clear that the Americans, pressed by time, were looking not so
much for a very robust agreement as for an agreement that Iran would accept and
that would, in the view of the U.S. administration, be “better than what we have
now.” Sherman constantly spoke of “parameters that would certainly be desirable,
but which Iran could not accept,” and said that the United States therefore preferred
not to put them on the table. In terms of President Obama’s public declarations,
U.S. demands would be limited to maintaining breakout time to one year for
a period of ten years. Beyond that, everything was open. For the first time, the
Americans mentioned a breakout time of only seven months as of year 11. The
most disturbing points on the nuclear aspect were the reappearance of a number
IR-2m’s; the shape of the enrichment program for years 11 to 15 and the associated
breakout time; the rate of R&D over the first ten years; and uncertainty on the
effectiveness of the access procedure which was supposed to go farther than the
Additional Protocol and guarantee the quality of verification on site.
In the days following Lausanne, because of the differences in approach between
the Europeans (especially France) and the Americans, the E3 and the United
States, as well as Frederica Mogherini who had replaced Ashton on November
1, 2014, met briefly on the evening of Saturday, March 21, near a runway at Heathrow
airport. The meeting was tense. John Kerry kept a stony face while I once
again explained our positions: we wanted an agreement, but a robust one to serve
as a precedent for the region and beyond. A weak agreement would implicitly
allow a regional arms race, rather than call for de-escalation. On the nuclear
enrichment package, I reiterated that we sought a full year breakout time, if possible
through year 15. The R&D provisions seemed overly favorable to Iran, as they
allowed retention of too many capabilities. On UNSC sanctions, I repeated our
preference for maintaining the Council’s role (“roadmap approach”), underscoring
our doubts on some of the aspects of the U.S. approach, such as the feeble binding
Laurent Fabius
30 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
nature of the provisions, the option offered to Iran via the Joint Commission to
ignore its commitments, and doubts as to whether Russia (with its conservative
views on UNSC jurisdiction) would support this scheme. Finally, on the
method, I emphasized that the final phase had to be co-managed by all parties,
in particular those within the E3+1, and said that we hoped for the rapid consolidation
of a draft framework with the EEAS holding the pen. While having this
conversation, I was in constant contact with the French president.
Lausanne II
Negotiations started again on March 26 and carried on until April 2, beyond the
March 30 deadline set by the U.S. Congress. That week, many ministerial, policy,
and expert meetings in all shapes, sizes, and forms took place, also including long
sessions between the Iranians and the Americans, with the participation of Kerry
and Moniz, in the presence of a European Union representative.
I raised our demands again: not more that 5,060 centrifuges in Natanz, no
breakout time shorter than nine months, a 15-year plan, a clear path for years
11 to 15, real limits on R&D, inspections to take place (if possible) sooner than
planned by the U.S. project (24 days), a credible “snap-back.” I also raised the
question of how Iran was likely to allocate the 100 billion dollars—the commonly
agreed estimate of their frozen assets at that point—that they might receive at the
end of the first year of the agreement.
The meeting room in the basement of the Beau
Rivage hotel was a lively scene. John Kerry promised
his colleagues that an agreement with Zarif could be
reached “in two hours.” Zarif, a talented actor, did
not hesitate to admonish the P5+1 forcefully and to
single out John Kerry, as we watched in amazement.
On March 26, the Saudis launched air strikes on
Yemen, accentuating the impression that there were
high stakes at play in the region between Saudi
Arabia and Yemen, Sunnis and Shiites; the nuclear question was vital.
The meetings throughout the week were confusing. Moniz regularly came to
report on the discussions held behind closed doors with Salehi. But the conversation
was constantly changing, and the questions were very technical. Foreign Secretary
Hammond, close to our positions, addressed the British concerns, in
particular on the R&D issue (they were more and more troubled by this), but
pressure on the Americans was intense. The Chinese negotiators talked about
the “snap-back,” which was an important part of the ministerial exchanges, and
the French UNSC expertise was very useful in this regard. The mechanism that
we ultimately chose was the result of a proposal I made to Russian Foreign Minister
The meetings
throughout the
week at the end of
March were
confusing.
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Annex 8 ---------------
Lavrov, then accepted by the P5+1, which provided for sanction relief at the end
of a given period, unless a permanent member of the Security Council opposed it:
this made it possible to reinstate sanctions in the event of a violation, without the
possibility of a Russian or Chinese veto.
Mogherini, the EU High Representative, found it difficult to manage the meetings.
Nonetheless, this series of negotiations made it possible to reach a preliminary
agreement on April 2 between the P5+1 and Iran concerning the key
parameters of the agreement, even though Lavrov had left and Ryabkov had
returned to Moscow. A written document was partially approved—Kerry had
given up on a full agreement due to lack of time. The delegations shared many
working documents, even though the status of these documents and the nature
of endorsements were unclear. Everything else was left for the subsequent threemonth
period to work out the technical annexes.
The Lausanne document itself had three versions of different substance, in fact,
with the one recorded at 6:45 a.m. considered official. The document with the key
parameters of the agreement was not made public but—with a stroke of subtlety!—
the P5+1 and Iran agreed that the content could be revealed as long as no contradictions
appeared with what other parties to the negotiations were presenting.
This was the principal of non-contradiction that Kerry cherished…but the Americans
immediately chipped away at that by presenting a “fact sheet” to Congress
that put the U.S. point of view in a positive light.4
The Lausanne agreement was robust with regard to Iranian enrichment
capacities through year 10, calling for a breakout time of one year. It was also
strong on the subject of the conversion of the Arak research reactor and transparency
measures. Discussions on Iranian capacity in years 11 to 15 and on the limits
to R&D capacities of advanced centrifuges were more fraught. In the end, an
agreement was finally reached, but at the price of concessions by the P5+1.
On sanctions, conditional relief was
approved (the condition being the implementation,
verified by the IAEA, of Iran’s commitments).
Sanctions would be lifted
progressively (economic and financial sanctions
first, those linked to nonproliferation
in the next phase). The precise phasing
remained to be defined, as well as the restrictions
that would remain in effect. Nevertheless,
the Iranians seemed to accept the
reversible character of relief and the renewal of sanctions in the event of violation
of the agreement. Even if the precise definition of the methods were not
agreed upon, the principle of the “snap-back” provision was still crucial to guaranteeing
implementation.
The “snap-back”
provision was
crucial to guaranteeing
implementation.
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32 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
From Key Parameters to the Final Agreement
The P5+1 and Iran met in Vienna from April 22–24, 2015, to continue negotiating
after the Lausanne intermediary agreement of April 2. Helga Schmid, the competent
policy chief of the European Union, and the Iranian deputy ministers
Abbas Araghchi and Majid Takht-Ravanchi, began meeting on April 22. The
P5+1 experts arrived in Vienna the same day. The policy chiefs concluded this
series during bilateral meetings and a plenary session on April 24.
The Iranians came toVienna affirming that they only wanted to discuss sanctions,
mainly economic ones. Their argument was that the nuclear package had been
defined in Lausanne. They demanded guarantees from the United States and the
European Union on the effective implementation of sanction relief. They confirmed
that they considered as approved the Lausanne working documents on enrichment
capacities in years 1 to 10, as well as the “snap-back” and access conditions.
Discussions picked up in New York on April 29 and continued until May 7, on
the sidelines of the first week of the NPT Review Conference. There were two
objectives: establishing a substantive draft agreement with the EEAS and Iran,
and reviewing technical draft annexes with the EEAS and Iran with the support
of the P5+1. The French delegation and the IAEA experts present in New York
made contact in order to look into PMD, access procedures, the procurement channels
for sensitive goods that would continue to be controlled under the agreement,
and verification. Schmid and the Iranian negotiators began redrafting the main text
—abandoned since July 2014—by chapters (preamble; enrichment and stockpiles;
Arak, heavy water, and reprocessing; transparency; sanctions; implementation),
based on both the July 2014 text and the “key parameters” of Lausanne.
On May 5, a complete text, a fair amount still in brackets, was released to the
different negotiating teams. At the same time, the EEAS had worked with Iranian
experts to draft annexes on the nuclear program and sanctions. The EEAS regularly
informed the P5+1 experts of the state of advancement. A draft on Arak, heavy
water, and reprocessing was ready for release. Work continued on sanctions, and a
draft annex on implementation was produced. At the same time, E3+3 experts
held meetings to continue on unresolved issues (procurement channel, etc.).
The Iranians seemed to want to run out the clock for the end of June on the
nuclear question, dragging their feet on the annexes. In the meantime, they
tried to push us to drop those details that were necessary for a robust agreement.
On the main text, issues of substance remained including the timeline for years
11 to 13, the transition plan at Fordow, PMD and activities linked to military
uses, the procurement channel, and the arms embargo (which was a UN sanction
dating back from the very first sanctions resolutions, which we deemed necessary
to keep well into the life of the agreement). In regard to the nuclear annexes, the
Iranian refusal to take into consideration any elements outside of the Lausanne
working documents made it impossible to advance significantly.
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Discussions among the P5+1 and Iran experts on technical annexes continued
in Vienna from May 12–14. The policy chiefs arrived in Vienna on May 15 to
assess the progress of this phase. Extending the New York efforts, the group and
Iran were able to draw up the first drafts on enrichment and transparency
annexes—most of the text was in brackets. In addition to the matters of substance
that were not resolved in Lausanne, the text revealed new disagreements. There
were also divergences with the Iranian delegation in regard to the method; they
felt that any issue not covered by Lausanne could not be part of the negotiations.
At the same time, the P5+1 experts continued to prepare the next phases of the
negotiations on the procurement channel, how European and U.S. sanctions
would be lifted, and the role of the IAEA.
The Iranians took every opportunity to slow down the discussions on the substance
of nuclear issues, seeking to gain time. The Europeans sent strong messages
to try to break down this approach. The Americans were completely silent during
this negotiation session.
From June 4–6, the Iranians openly blocked any substantial progress on drafting the
main text and the annexes, while accusing the P5+1 of putting “new subjects”—not
approved in Lausanne—on the table. It was partly true that the Americans brought
some newitems, often details, although itwasnot clear if theywere reacting to pressure
from their own Congress, or if they were seeking to introduce new demands for later
negotiation. On the nuclear question, the main obstacles focused on the question of
access to military sites and PMDresolution, how to include restrictions for years 10 to
13 in the agreement, and the transition plan for Fordow (stable isotopes and removal
of inoperative centrifuges). On sanctions, discussions with the Iranians were also
laborious. The E3 received a draft proposal on the Joint Commission, drawn up by
the Americans, but no formal negotiations were held within the group.
During the session from June 10–12, negotiations
hit a wall. On the nuclear issue, the discussion
on technical annexes made no progress;
on the major disagreements (years 11 to 13,
PMD, access, Fordow, etc.), Iranians were
inflexible in their positions. It was a minicrisis.
On sanctions, the discussion on
annexes did not advance either, other than through the transmission, by the
group, of suggested wording on the effects of lifting sanctions. The Iranians
rejected the proposed resolution as submitted and insisted that Security Council
controls should end after ten years. The E3/EU+1 experts held consultations on
the methods of operation of the channel of procurement and, in the presence of
representatives of the U.S. and EU Treasury departments, on the coordination
of relief from economic and financial sanctions.
There was still a
mini-crisis in June
2015.
Laurent Fabius
34 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
June 18 and 19 were more constructive days, even if the essential differences on
substance remained. The Iranians probably felt that they had gone too far the week
before. The deadline was approaching, and the Iranians seemed to favor this kind
of “diplomacy on the brink.” The dialogue between Russia and Iran progressed on
stable isotopes at Fordow. The Iranians said that they wanted to seriously engage
with Russia on the export of uranium stockpiles. Discussions between the P5+1
and Iran on Arak moved forward slowly; China was still reluctant to accept the
project-management role, strange as it may seem, even though they proposed civilian
cooperation. The E3 policy chiefs held consultations with the head of the
Chinese delegation to offer their support to China in this regard. On PMD, the
Director General of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, mistrustful of Tehran’s intentions,
preferred to postpone his response until a new invitation to visit Iran. It seemed
that the representatives of the Iranian ministry of foreign affairs had little influence
on the AEOI nuclear experts, as Salehi was ill and unable to take part in the negotiation.
However, the Iranians pushed to advance on the sanctions part of the
agreement, in particular to obtain specifications on the effects of sanctions relief.
Over the weekend, discussions went on in Vienna. On June 22, Zarif travelled
to Luxemburg to meet the E3 ministers on the sidelines of the European Council
on Foreign Relations. A bilateral meeting between Zarif and me took place, an
opportunity to raise the points of greatest concern to us. A meeting between
the E3, Mogherini, and Zarif was also organized.
The policy chiefs returned to Vienna on June 25, where the experts had
remained, and stayed until the final agreement on July 14. These three weeks
were very intense, taking up the final arbitrages, or “trade-offs” on the nuclear
question (in particular R&D), led by Moniz, with Salehi out of hospital and
accompanied to Vienna at the beginning of July by Zarif. We paid close attention
to the Americans on the subject of acceptable parameters. PMD matters took an
unexpected turn with the renewal of a specific IAEA–Iran path (Amano went to
Iran on July 2) and the discussion concentrated on access to the single site of
Parchin—which had long been suspected of having hosted experiments on high
explosives relevant to a nuclear weapon—which became central, and which the
British and I insisted on in agreement with the IAEA. I met Amano several
times. A draft was proposed for the UNSC resolution on sanctions relief, and in
particular the policy decisions on different time frames for maintaining residual
sanctions (procurement channel, arms embargo, missiles). We also took the
initiative to write a letter signed by the three Europeans and John Kerry in
order to protect European businesses trading with Iran who feared becoming the
targets of unilateral U.S. sanctions, even after the UN sanctions were lifted.
After the successive extensions of the interim JPOA until July 7–13, Lavrov
and I exerted great pressure over the weekend of the 11th and 12th, leading
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Annex 8 ---------------
John Kerry to conclude and call on Zarif to make the final decision. I set the deadline
of July 14, France’s national holiday, in order to wrap up the negotiation.
From the July 14 Agreement to Implementation Day
In the following six months, until the announcement of Implementation Day on
January 16, 2016, we did not reduce our efforts to maintain stringent requirements
concerning the first measures of decommissioning established in the agreement.
The Iranians were anxious and wanted to mitigate some of the constraints. We
were able to guarantee the effective removal of Fordow centrifuges reasonably
quickly, obtain indispensable detail on the
characteristics of the centrifuges, and submit
to the IAEA a version of the Iranian enrichment
and R&D plan that was closer to the
final JCPOA plan. In the final version, there
were higher allowances for installation of
Iranian centrifuges in years 14 and 15, accepted
more or less implicitly by the Americans
despite the danger for the region. This is a
reminder, if needed, that we must always
remain vigilant and firm in monitoring compliance
with the agreement in the years to come.
Historic Success
All in all, the agreement signed on July 14, 2015, which can honestly be called
“historic,” came after twelve years of crisis and as a result of twenty months of
negotiation (using the dates of October 2013–July 2015; the pre-Rouhani
period was not a real negotiation and was under a different Iranian President).
It represents a success on many different fronts, among all the participants and
among the various foreign policy goals of each country.
First, this agreement is a diplomatic success.
It shows that, under certain conditions, diplomatic
action can yield spectacular results
when the participants employ willpower and
resolution. It is clear that, despite its denials,
Iran only accepted serious negotiations—after
years of fruitless discussions with the P5+1—
because the cost of sanctions had become exorbitant
and because the threat of military action,
implicit but genuine, threatened in the
This was a reminder
we must always
remain vigilant in
monitoring compliance
in the years to
come.
Iran only accepted
serious negotiations
because of the cost
of sanctions and the
threat of military
action.
Laurent Fabius
36 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
Annex 8 ---------------
background. It is also remarkable that the five permanent members of the Security
Council were able to agree on this key issue of collective security when they are
divided on so many others (Syria, Ukraine, the list goes on). The united front
that the P5 presented to Iran was a determining factor in this agreement.
It is a success for the United States. The Obama
administration wanted it, they spared no effort to
reach it, but the price was some non-negligible concessions
and uncertainties. Often, they presented
their “partners” with a fait accompli—“a done deal.”
Having managed to move the agreement through
Congress without impediment, the administration
won hands down, and established what will certainly
be recorded as the main foreign policy legacy of this
U.S. presidency.
Iran also obtained what was most essential for their
country: relief from the sanctions that were strangling
the economy, without really compromising its civil nuclear program, which will
nonetheless be significantly slowed down over the next ten years. It is a success
for international diplomacy (China, Russia, US and Europe) and for European
diplomacy: the three Europeans, who had been involved in the issue since
2002, remained—despite some tactical distractions—well united throughout the
negotiations. The successive High Representatives of the European Union,
under mandate from the UN Security Council and backed up by efficient
teams, gave a new visibility to the Union on this subject of such great importance
for international peace and security.
Specifically, France played its role by providing constructive resolve to ensure
that the final agreement was sufficiently robust and credible. In close contact with
our Head of State, I personally was deeply involved. We offered strategic vision,
political determination, and technical expertise, as well as the close cooperation
of diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CEA engineers, and intelligence
services.
The agreement will also create conditions for further development in three
areas. First, while the agreement can be considered robust for the first ten or
even thirteen years, beyond that period Iran will quickly regain its capacity to
expand its nuclear activities. Some concessions obtained during negotiations
will help them to prepare for that time, such as the possibility of carrying out
certain research and development activities on sophisticated centrifuges, progressive
increases in capacity, no limits after the thirteenth year on the production of
new centrifuges, and the lifting of measures restricting the import of sensitive
materials after eight years. The attitude of Iran in the weeks leading up to
Implementation Day, and contuing tests of its ballistic missile program, have
The agreement is a
diplomatic success,
for the United
States, for Europe,
for France, and for
Iran.
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Annex 8 ---------------
confirmed that they seek to exploit any loopholes in the agreement. We must
remain vigilant with regard to implementation, using the tools provided by the
agreement, whether via the methods for reinforced IAEA monitoring or, if necessary,
the “snap-back.”
Second, the agreement opens the path to a more cooperative attitude from Iran
on the international scene and especially in regional matters. This remains to be
confirmed by concrete tests in the short and medium term, in particular in Syria as
well as in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq. Nothing is certain. We can set our targets and
must work to achieve them through a united foreign policy.
Third, we are betting that sanctions relief and the opening up of Iran will, in the
long term, help to lead to political and social changes that will bring more freedom
and prosperity to that country. Recent election results are encouraging. Such
changes are to be applauded, even if a large uncertainty remains.
Overall, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action represents amonumental effort
froma huge number of different experts, diplomats, scientists, and other leaders. The
success of the deal—after years of intransigence, stalls, and setbacks—is an encouraging
symbol of what we can accomplish with tenacity and continued discussion. In
order to ensure that the agreement remains robust, we must continue to be exacting
and determined in our efforts to ensure the implementation of the agreement, both
with respect to Iranian nuclear obligations and effective sanctions relief.
Notes
1. Hassan Rouhani, National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy (Tehran: Center for Strategic
Research (2011).
2. See for instance declarations by the chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee of the Majlis,
Alaedin Boroudjerdi: “Regarding the Additional Protocol, Majlis has approved a law obliging
the government to suspend the voluntary implementation of this protocol which was
being carried out at a certain point,” quoted in “Majlis not to accept Additional Protocol,”
PressTV, September 30, 2013, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/326921.html.
3. Under agreements concluded in the 1970s, with pre-Revolution Iran, the government of Iran
had taken an indirect stake in Eurodif (European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium),
an enrichment company incorporated in France, in exchange of a $1 billion loan to
CEA, the French atomic energy commission.As a consequence, Iran was supposed to receive,
for a period of 10 years, enriched uraniumfor nuclear power plants it was planning on building
simultaneously (one of which was Bushehr, which has been recently completed, after much
delay, by Russia’s Rosatom). Iran breached those commitments shortly after the Revolution,
which resulted in a protracted litigation and negotiation between the two governments
(against a backdrop of state-sponsored terrorism and hostage-taking). The dispute was
settled only in 1991: Iran remained a shareholder, but lost its right to obtain enriched uranium.
4. See Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” April 2,
2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240170.htm.
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38 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016
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United Nations S/RES/1696 (2006)
Security Council Distr.: General
31 July 2006
06-45022 (E)
*0645022*
Resolution 1696 (2006)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5500th meeting, on
31 July 2006
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II
of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Noting with serious concern the many reports of the IAEA Director General
and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran’s nuclear
programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board
resolution GOV/2006/14,
Noting with serious concern that the IAEA Director General’s report of
27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns
on Iran’s nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear
dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
Noting with serious concern the IAEA Director General’s report of 28 April
2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of
Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, the
existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is
unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General’s
report of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38) Iran has not taken the steps required of it by
the IAEA Board of Governors, reiterated by the Council in its statement of
29 March and which are essential to build confidence, and in particular Iran’s
decision to resume enrichment-related activities, including research and
development, its recent expansion of and announcements about such activities, and
its continued suspension of cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional
Protocol,
Annex 9
S/RES/1696 (2006)
2 06-45022
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear
non-proliferation elsewhere,
Welcoming the statement by the Foreign Minister of France, Philippe Douste-
Blazy, on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the High Representative of
the European Union, in Paris on 12 July 2006 (S/2006/573),
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme, mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and being
determined to prevent an aggravation of the situation,
Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in
order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA,
1. Calls upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to
build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and
to resolve outstanding questions;
2. Demands, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by
the IAEA;
3. Expresses the conviction that such suspension as well as full, verified
Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors,
would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear
programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the
international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in
conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community
and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
4. Endorses, in this regard, the proposals of China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of
the European Union’s High Representative, for a long-term comprehensive
arrangement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation
with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence
in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme (S/2006/521);
5. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities
and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and
prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could
contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic
missile programmes;
6. Expresses its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA
process, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and
encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing
professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran
within the framework of the Agency, underlines the necessity of the IAEA
continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear
programme, and calls upon Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the
Annex 9
S/RES/1696 (2006)
06-45022 3
Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as
the IAEA may request in support of its ongoing investigations;
7. Requests by 31 August a report from the Director General of the IAEA
primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all
activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the above
provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the
Security Council for its consideration;
8. Expresses its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date
complied with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41
of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with
this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further
decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
9. Confirms that such additional measures will not be necessary in the event
that Iran complies with this resolution;
10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 9
Board of Governors GOV/2006/64
Date: 14 November 2006
Original: English
For official use only
Item 4(d) of the agenda
(GOV/2006/68)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 31 August 2006, the Director General reported on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2006/53). This report covers developments
since that date.
A. Suspension of Enrichment Related Activities
2. Since 31 August 2006, centrifuges in the single machine test stand, and the 10-machine, 20-
machine and first 164-machine cascades at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) have been run,
mostly under vacuum, with UF6 being fed during intermittent periods. The installation of the second
164-machine cascade was completed and, on 13 October 2006, testing of the cascade with UF6 gas was
begun. Between 13 August and 2 November 2006, a total of approximately 34 kg of UF6 was reported
by Iran as having been fed into the centrifuges and enriched to levels below 5% U-235.
3. Between 16 and 18 September 2006, the Agency performed a physical inventory verification
(PIV) at PFEP, the evaluation of which remains open pending receipt of sample results.
4. The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken by the Agency to confirm Iran’s
statement in June 2006 that it had achieved enrichment levels of 5% U-235 in a test run in the first
164-machine cascade at PFEP are still pending (GOV/2006/53, para. 5). Iran has not provided the
Agency full access to operating records concerning product and tail assays which the Agency requires
to complete its auditing activities.
5. Iran continues to decline to discuss the implementation of remote monitoring at PFEP, a proposal
made by the Agency to compensate for the fact that measures normally used for verification at
operational enrichment facilities (e.g. limited frequency unannounced access) are not feasible at PFEP
(GOV/2006/53, para. 6).
Derestricted 23 November 2006
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 23 November 2006)
Annex 10
GOV/2006/64
Page 2
6. On 5 November 2006, design information verification (DIV) was carried out at the Fuel
Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, where construction was ongoing.
B. Suspension of Reprocessing Activities
7. The Agency has been monitoring the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and
the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility, and the construction of hot
cells at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40), through inspections, DIV and satellite imagery.
There are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities at those facilities, or at any other declared
facilities in Iran.
C. Heavy Water Research Reactor
8. Since 31 August 2006, the Agency has been monitoring through satellite imagery the construction
of the IR-40 reactor, which, along with the construction of associated buildings, has been continuing.
D. Outstanding Issues
9. On 16 October 2006, the Agency wrote to Iran referring to the long outstanding verification issues
relevant to Iran’s nuclear activities, and to the fact that Iran had not addressed those issues or provided
the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated with some of its nuclear activities. In its
letter, the Agency urged Iran to provide all the necessary information and required access to facilitate
the resolution of all long outstanding verification issues. In its reply of 1 November 2006, Iran stated,
inter alia, that it “is prepared to remove ambiguities, if any, and gives access and information in
accordance with its Safeguards Agreement”. With regard to the outstanding issues, Iran referred to its
letter of 27 April 2006, in which it had “declare[d] its preparedness to resolve the remaining issues
providing timetable, within next three weeks, provided that the nuclear dossier is returned back in full
in the framework of the Agency”.
D.1. Enrichment Programme
D.1.1. Contamination
10. There has been no further progress on the resolution of the contamination issues referred to in
GOV/2006/53, para. 11 (i.e. the sources of low enriched uranium particles, and some high enriched
uranium (HEU) particles, found at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components had
been manufactured, used and/or stored). In addition, clarification is still required of the particles of
natural and high enriched uranium which were found in the samples taken from equipment at a
technical university in January 2006 (GOV/2006/53, para. 24).
D.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge Technology
11. Iran has not made available to the Agency any new information concerning Iran’s P-1 or P-2
centrifuge programme (GOV/2006/53, paras 12–13).
D.2. Uranium Metal
12. Iran has still not provided a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the
reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium
metal into hemispheres (GOV/2005/87, para. 6). The document was resealed by the Agency in August
2006.
Annex 10
GOV/2006/64
Page 3
D.3. Plutonium Experiments
13. The Agency has continued to seek clarification from Iran about its plutonium separation
experiments (GOV/2006/53, paras 15–17). Iran has not provided sufficient clarification of the
outstanding issues concerning these experiments and has stated that no other relevant information is
available.
14. As reflected in the Director General’s previous report (GOV/2006/53, para. 17), the results of the
analysis of environmental samples taken at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility (where containers which
had been used to store depleted uranium targets used in the experiments are located) indicate the
presence of HEU particles. In response to the Agency’s request of 15 August 2006 for information
about the source of the particles, and about the past use of the containers, Iran informed the Agency in
a letter dated 6 September 2006 that the containers had been used for the temporary storage of spent
fuel from TRR, which, in its view, could explain the presence of the HEU particles. Additional
samples have been taken from other containers, located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, which
had also been used to store spent fuel from TRR. The results from these samples are still pending.
15. Under cover of the Agency’s letter of 16 October 2006 (referred to in para. 9 above), Iran was
provided with a detailed assessment of the results of further analysis of the samples taken from the
containers at Karaj, and was requested to provide further clarification of the presence of the HEU
particles and clarification of an additional finding of plutonium in the samples. On 13 November 2006,
Iran provided a response to that request, which the Agency is currently assessing.
E. Other Implementation Issues
E.1. Uranium Conversion
16. In June 2006, Iran started at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) a uranium conversion
campaign involving approximately 160 tonnes of uranium ore concentrate. As of 7 November 2006,
approximately 55 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced during this campaign. All
UF6 produced at UCF remains under Agency containment and surveillance.
E.2. Other Matters
17. There are no new developments to report with respect to the other implementation issues referred
to in previous reports (GOV/2006/38, para. 14; GOV/2006/27, paras 19–20).
F. Transparency Measures
18. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s long outstanding requests for clarification concerning,
and access to carry out further environmental sampling of, equipment and materials related to the
Physics Research Centre (PHRC); nor has Iran provided the Agency with access to interview another
former Head of the PHRC.
19. Iran has not expressed any readiness to discuss information concerning alleged studies related to
the so-called Green Salt Project, to high explosives testing and to the design of a missile re-entry
vehicle (GOV/2006/53, para. 26).
G. Summary
20. Iran has been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and facilities, and
has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with such material and
facilities. However, Iran has not provided the Agency with full access to operating records at PFEP.
Annex 10
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Page 4
21. While the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, the
Agency will remain unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues,
including through the implementation of the Additional Protocol, and provides the necessary
transparency. Progress in this regard is a prerequisite for the Agency to be able to confirm the peaceful
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
22. The Agency will continue to pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant
to Iran’s nuclear activities, and the Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Annex 10
United Nations S/RES/1737 (2006)*
Security Council Distr.: General
27 December 2006
06-68142* (E)
*0668142*
Resolution 1737 (2006)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5612th meeting, on
23 December 2006
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,
and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II
of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Reiterating its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director
General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran’s nuclear
programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board
resolution GOV/2006/14,
Reiterating its serious concern that the IAEA Director General’s report of
27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns
on Iran’s nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear
dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
Reiterating its serious concern over the IAEA Director General’s report of
28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three
years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran’s nuclear
programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and
that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General’s
reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and
14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained
suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in
resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the
Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of
Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution
* Reissued for technical resons.
Annex 11
S/RES/1737 (2006)
2 06-68142
1696 (2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s
refusal to take these steps,
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear nonproliferation
elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a
negotiated solution,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with the requirements of
the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in
support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security
Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of
Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under
the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and
security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to
build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and
to resolve outstanding questions;
2. Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the
following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:
(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and
development, to be verified by the IAEA; and
(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a
research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;
3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their
nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran,
and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related,
reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, namely:
(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of
INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;
(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in
document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:
(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water
reactors;
Annex 11
S/RES/1737 (2006)
06-68142 3
(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in
assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;
(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer
of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;
(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology,
determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by
paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to
enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their
nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran,
and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology:
(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the
State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or
heavy water-related activities;
(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the
State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or
heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems;
(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the
pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed
concerns or identified as outstanding;
5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and
S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b),
3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:
(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in
documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and
(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to
verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and
(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;
and
(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the
supply, sale or transfer;
6. Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent
the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance,
investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or
services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4
above;
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4 06-68142
7. Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents
S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the
procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or
aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;
8. Decides that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA
requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve
all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon Iran to ratify
promptly the Additional Protocol;
9. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall
not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis
that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly
not contribute to the development of Iran’s technologies in support of its
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural,
medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:
(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate
end-user guarantees; and
(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or
transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated
with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for
the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that
all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their
territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein “the
Annex”), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the
Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for
Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the
prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and
under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for
activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;
11. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse
its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the
implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian
considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution,
including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
12. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and
economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this
resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or
entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities
designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by
persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or
controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this
paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such
Annex 11
S/RES/1737 (2006)
06-68142 5
time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and
decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or
economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or
by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these
persons and entities;
13. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply
to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by
relevant States:
(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent
or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and
public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and
reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services,
or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or
maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after
notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize,
where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic
resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five
working days of such notification;
(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such
determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has
been approved by the Committee;
(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or
judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources
may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement
was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a
person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been
notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in
subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the
Committee;
14. Decides that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due
on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that
arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of
this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments
continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
15. Decides that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a
designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into
prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have
determined that:
(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials,
equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance,
investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;
(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity
designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;
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6 06-68142
and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to
make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of
funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working
days prior to such authorization;
16. Decides that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under
its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other
humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the
items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical
cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities set out in paragraph 2 above;
17. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized
teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals,
of disciplines which would contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
18. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the
Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those
producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in
paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to
implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and
12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this
regard;
(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the
actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by
paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider
useful in this regard;
(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged
violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this
resolution;
(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in
paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;
(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;
(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities
subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;
(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the
implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such
guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why
any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and
any relevant identifying information;
(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and
on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and
recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the
measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;
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06-68142 7
19. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of
the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to
implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;
20. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above
as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the
IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution
that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,
underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for
such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to
re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that
such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
21. Welcomes the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the
European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and
encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were
endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term
comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and
cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;
22. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA,
strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and
encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing
professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran
within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing
its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;
23. Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA
on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities
mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all
the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this
resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council
for its consideration;
24. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in the light of the report
referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as
Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied
with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that
Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under
Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to
comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that
further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
25. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 11
S/RES/1737 (2006)
8 06-68142
Annex
A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme
1. Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Arak)
3. Kala-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)
4. Pars Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA
reports)
5. Farayand Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA
reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity,
some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme
making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in
the nuclear programme)
B. Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
2. Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
3. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate
entity of AIO)
C. Persons involved in the nuclear programme
1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)
3. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
4. Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz
5. Jafar Mohammadi, Technical Adviser to the AEOI (in charge of managing the
production of valves for centrifuges)
6. Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Director General of Mesbah Energy Company
7. Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Rector of Malek Ashtar University of
Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted
experiments on beryllium)
D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Gen Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC (Pasdaran)
2. Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the AIO
Annex 11
S/RES/1737 (2006)
06-68142 9
3. Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO
E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes
1. Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander, IRGC (Pasdaran)
Annex 11
United Nations S/RES/1747 (2007)
Security Council Distr.: General
24 March 2007
07-28140 (E)
*0728140*
Resolution 1747 (2007)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on
24 March 2007
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,
and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of
23 December 2006, and reaffirming their provisions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their
obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and
II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recalling its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as
set out in its resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),
Recalling the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2007/8) of
22 February 2007 and deploring that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to comply
with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006),
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear
non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a
negotiated solution,
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14),
which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006) and
with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of
sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such
Annex 12
S/RES/1747 (2007)
2 07-28140
time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have
been met,
Recalling the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in
carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of
Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), mindful of its primary
responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by
the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to
build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and
to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran
shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737
(2006);
2. Calls upon all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and
decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant
to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry
into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to
resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons
designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly
associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including
through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment,
materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4
of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related
to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;
3. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse
its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the
implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian
considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the
objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where Article XV
of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
4. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I
to this resolution;
5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly
from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or
related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items
from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or
not originating in the territory of Iran;
Annex 12
S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 3
6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale
or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using
their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance
or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the
transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing accumulation of
arms;
7. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter
into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and
developmental purposes;
8. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;
9. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of
resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for
exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international
community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming
to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the
IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
10. Welcomes the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a
negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006
proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were
endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and acknowledges with
appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term
comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and
cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;
11. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA,
strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and
encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing
professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the
framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA, which is
internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with
safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for
non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify
all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;
12. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the
IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities
mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian
Annex 12
S/RES/1747 (2007)
4 07-28140
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other
provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of
Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
13. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to
in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as
Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in
order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as
soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12
above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of
Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that
Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of
the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such
additional measures be necessary;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 12
S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 5
Annex I
Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition
Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution
1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s centrifuge programme. AMIG is in turn owned and
controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under
resolution 1737 (2006))
2. Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of
Iran’s (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is
involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI is designated under resolution 1737
(2006))
3. Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI, which has sought glass
fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran’s nuclear
programme)
4. Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition,
explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
5. Karaj Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEOI’s research division)
6. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has
transferred funds on behalf of AEOI to entities associated with Iran’s nuclear
programme)
7. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group)
(Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles
including cruise missiles)
8. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank Sepah provides support for
the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Shahid
Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG),
both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
9. Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment
on AIO’s behalf for the missile programme)
10. Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in
international purchases of missile equipment)
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities
1. Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
parachutes, para-gliders, para-motors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare
doctrine)
2. Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171,
used by IRGC Air Force)
3. Sho’a’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which IRGC has claimed it is using as
part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)
Annex 12
S/RES/1747 (2007)
6 07-28140
Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics,
working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)
2. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of
the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about
the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused)
3. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
4. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center,
which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company,
which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
5. Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under
resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6. Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which is designated under
resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7. Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated under resolution 1737
(2006) for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Naser Maleki is also a
MODAFL official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme.
The Shahab-3 is Iran’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)
8. Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Sepah,
which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and SBIG,
both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons
1. Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC)
2. Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
3. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground
Forces)
4. Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy)
5. Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of Bassij resistance force)
6. Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force)
7. General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)
Annex 12
S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 7
Annex II
Elements of a long-term agreement
Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with Iran, based on mutual
respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We propose a fresh
start in the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Such an agreement
would be deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
endorsed in a Security Council resolution.
To create the right conditions for negotiations,
We will:
• Reaffirm Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in
conformity with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm our support
for the development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme.
• Commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in Iran
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT.
• Agree to suspend discussion of Iran’s nuclear programme in the Security
Council upon the resumption of negotiations.
Iran will:
• Commit to addressing all of the outstanding concerns of IAEA through full
cooperation with IAEA.
• Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by
IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council,
and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
• Resume the implementation of the Additional Protocol.
Areas of future cooperation to be covered in negotiations on a
long-term agreement
1. Nuclear
We will take the following steps:
Iran’s rights to nuclear energy
• Reaffirm Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of NPT, and
cooperate with Iran in the development by Iran of a civil nuclear power
programme.
• Negotiate and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear cooperation agreement.
Annex 12
S/RES/1747 (2007)
8 07-28140
Light water reactors
• Actively support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran
through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and
NPT, using state-of-the-art technology, including by authorizing the transfer of
necessary goods and the provision of advanced technology to make its power
reactors safe against earthquakes.
• Provide cooperation with the management of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste through appropriate arrangements.
Research and development in nuclear energy
• Provide a substantive package of research and development cooperation,
including possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the
fields of radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in
medicine and agriculture.
Fuel guarantees
• Give legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances to Iran, based on:
􀆕 Participation as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide
enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to Iran’s nuclear
reactors. Subject to negotiations, such a facility could enrich all uranium
hexaflouride (UF6) produced in Iran.
􀆕 Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of
up to five years’ supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with the
participation and under supervision of IAEA.
􀆕 Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral mechanism for
reliable access to nuclear fuel, based on ideas to be considered at the next
meeting of the Board of Governors.
Review of moratorium
The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build
international confidence, contain a clause for review of the agreement in all its
aspects, to follow:
• Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by it,
including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have
been resolved;
• Confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in
Iran and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran’s civil nuclear programme has been restored.
2. Political and economic
Regional security cooperation
Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional
security issues.
Annex 12
S/RES/1747 (2007)
07-28140 9
International trade and investment
Improving Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital,
through practical support for full integration into international structures, including
the World Trade Organization and to create the framework for increased direct
investment in Iran and trade with Iran (including a trade and economic cooperation
agreement with the European Union). Steps would be taken to improve access to
key goods and technology.
Civil aviation
Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on
United States and European manufacturers in regard to the export of civil aircraft to
Iran, thereby widening the prospect of Iran renewing its fleet of civil airliners.
Energy partnership
Establishment of a long-term energy partnership between Iran and the
European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications.
Telecommunications infrastructure
Support for the modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure and
advanced Internet provision, including by possible removal of relevant United States
and other export restrictions.
High technology cooperation
Cooperation in fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed upon.
Agriculture
Support for agricultural development in Iran, including possible access to
United States and European agricultural products, technology and farm equipment.
Annex 12
United Nations S/RES/1803 (2008)
Security Council Distr.: General
3 March 2008
08-25781 (E)
*0825781*
Resolution 1803 (2008)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5848th meeting,
on 3 March 2008
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,
and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of
23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and
reaffirming their provisions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their
obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and
II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14),
which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007
(GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007
(GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and
sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy
water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747
(2007), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol,
nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied
with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and
1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s
refusal to take these steps,
Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify
design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified
Code 3.1, emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the
Agency’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right,
Annex 13
S/RES/1803 (2008)
2 08-25781
which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear
material at, a facility,
Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly
supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commending the IAEA for its
efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in the
work plan between the Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48,
Attachment), welcoming the progress in implementation of this work plan as
reflected in the IAEA Director General’s reports of 15 November 2007
(GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), underlining the importance
of Iran producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing
implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to all the
questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the implementation of the
required transparency measures, can assess the completeness and correctness of
Iran’s declaration,
Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of
resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution, that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for
exclusively peaceful purposes,
Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on
exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through
negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), and noting the
confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international
community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is
restored, it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon
State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,
Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to
assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolution 1737
(2006),
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006),
resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain
Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile
programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives
of these resolutions have been met,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of
Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), mindful of
its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by
the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to
Annex 13
S/RES/1803 (2008)
08-25781 3
build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and
to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran
shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006),
and underlines that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1
modified;
2. Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all
outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and progress made in this
regard as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008
(GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding
issues, stresses that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports the IAEA in
strengthening its safeguards on Iran’s nuclear activities in accordance with the
Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;
3. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and
decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant
to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry
into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to
resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this
resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the
Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for
Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the
prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and
under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where
such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs
3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);
4. Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse
its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the
implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian
considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the
objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007),
including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
5. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to
this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or
the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support
for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the
prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and
under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where
such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs
3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this
paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
6. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply
where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified
Annex 13
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4 08-25781
on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the
Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of
the present resolution;
7. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I
and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their
direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities
determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or
entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution,
resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);
8. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their
nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran,
and whether or not originating in their territories, of:
(a) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or
transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737
(2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1
and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to
the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such
supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the
IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737
(2006);
(b) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3
of Category II of document S/2006/815;
9. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new
commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the
granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities
involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);
10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with
Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order
to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities,
or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in
resolution 1737 (2006);
11. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities
and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea
and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and
from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated
by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods
prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);
12. Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph
above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a
Annex 13
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08-25781 5
written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds
for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results
and other relevant details;
13. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;
14. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747
(2007) and this resolution;
15. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic
efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their
offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution
of this issue which would allow for the development of all-round relations and
wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as
Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA;
16. Encourages the European Union High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of
political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant
proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;
17. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the
necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the
Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities
designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person
claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with
any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of
the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or
resolution 1747 (2007);
18. Requests within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the
IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities
mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other
provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution,
to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its
consideration;
19. Reaffirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred
to in the paragraph above, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as
Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in
order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
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6 08-25781
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as
it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that
Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the
Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as
confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied
with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and
this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these
resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions
will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex I
1. Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of
centrifuges)
2. Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl
carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
3. Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office of Exploration and
Mining Affairs)
4. Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of
99.9%)
5. Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)
6. Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research
Institute)
7. Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the heavy water research
reactor project at Arak)
8. M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated
under resolution 1747 (2007))
9. Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at the Uranium
Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)
10. Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of Armed
Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State Anti-
Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions
imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))
11. Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment
complex)
12. Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
13. Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand
Uranium Mine)
Annex 13
S/RES/1803 (2008)
08-25781 7
Annex II
A. Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)
1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
3. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)
B. Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)
1. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
2. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center,
which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement
Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
Annex III
1. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge
components)
2. Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System
companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed
in resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved
in the ballistic missile programme)
4. Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
5. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation
Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)
6. Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
7. Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile
programme)
8. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries
Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of
centrifuges components)
9. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to
manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile systems)
10. Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the
Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)
11. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the
ballistic missile programme)
12. TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the
overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established,
including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of
uranium processing, enrichment and waste)
Annex 13
Board of Governors GOV/2009/74
Date: 16 November 2009
Original: English
For official use only
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),
1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 28 August 2009, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
(Iran) (GOV/2009/35). This report covers relevant developments since that date.
A. Current Enrichment Related Activities
A.1. Natanz: FEP and PFEP
2. On 2 November 2009, Iran was feeding UF6 into the 18 cascades of Unit A24, and 6 cascades of
Unit A26, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.1 On that day, the other 12 cascades of Unit
A26 were under vacuum. Iran has continued with the installation of cascades at Unit A28; as of
2 November 2009, 17 cascades had been installed and the installation of another cascade was
continuing.2 All machines installed to date are IR-1 centrifuges with 164 machines per cascade.
Installation work at Units A25 and A27 is also continuing.
__________________________________________________________________________________
1 There are two cascade halls planned at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information
submitted by Iran, eight units (Units A21 to A28) are planned for Production Hall A (GOV/2008/38, para. 2).
2 On 2 November 2009, 3936 centrifuges were being fed with UF6 and an additional 4756 centrifuges had been installed.
Atoms for Peace
Derestricted 27 November 2009
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 27 November 2009)
Annex 14
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GOV/2009/74
Page 2
3. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 30 October 2009, 10395 kg of UF6 was
fed into the cascades and a total of 924 kg of low enriched UF6 was produced3, which would result in a
total production of 1763 kg of low enriched UF6 since the start-up of FEP. The nuclear material at FEP
(including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal
stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.4
4. The next physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP is scheduled for 22 to 30 November 2009.
As previously indicated to the Board, at that time, the Agency will verify the inventory of nuclear
material at the facility and evaluate the nuclear material balance.5
5. Between 14 August and 27 October 2009, a total of approximately 53 kg of UF6 was fed into a
10-machine IR-2m cascade and single IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant (PFEP). The nuclear material at the PFEP, as well as the cascade area and the feed and
withdrawal stations, remain subject to Agency containment and surveillance.4 The Agency is currently
evaluating the results of the PIV it conducted at PFEP between 14 and 16 September 2009.
6. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP indicate that the declared
maximum enrichment level (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at either
plant.6 Since the last report, the Agency has conducted two unannounced inspections at FEP, for a total
of 31 since March 2007.
A.2. Qom: Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
7. In a letter to the Director General dated 21 September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that
“Based on [its] sovereign right of safeguarding … sensitive nuclear facilities through various means
such as utilization of passive defense systems … [Iran] has decided to construct a new pilot fuel
enrichment plant (up to 5% enrichment)”. Iran stated that the required infrastructure for the plant had
been established and that the plant was under construction. In a letter dated 25 September 2009, the
Agency requested Iran to provide further information on the current status of its construction and
Iran’s plans for the introduction of nuclear material into the facility. The Agency also requested that
Iran submit a detailed Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and provide access to the facility as
soon as possible.
8. During a meeting with the Director General in Tehran on 4 October 2009, Iran agreed to provide
the Agency with access to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Under cover of a letter to the
Agency dated 18 October 2009, Iran also submitted a preliminary DIQ for FFEP.
9. On 26 and 27 October 2009, the Agency carried out design information verification (DIV) at
FFEP, which is located about 20 km north of the city of Qom. The Agency also held two meetings in
__________________________________________________________________________________
3 The Agency has verified that, as of 17 November 2008, 9956 kg of UF6 had been fed into the cascades and 839 kg of low
enriched UF6 had been produced since the beginning of operations in February 2007 (GOV/2009/8, para. 3). The Agency has
confirmed, through independently calibrated operator load cell readings, that, between 18 November 2008 and
30 October 2009, 10412 kg of UF6 was fed into the cascades, and a total of 814 kg of low enriched UF6 product and
9080 kg of UF6 tails and dump material was off-loaded into UF6 cylinders. The difference of 518 kg between the input and
output figures comprises natural, depleted and low enriched UF6 arising mainly from hold-up in the various cold traps and is
not inconsistent with the design information provided by Iran.
4 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are
not under containment and surveillance.
5 GOV/2009/55, para. 4.
6 Results are available for samples taken up to 12 August 2009 for FEP and up to 15 August 2009 for PFEP. These results
have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.4% U-235 enrichment), natural uranium and depleted uranium
(down to 0.37% U-235 enrichment).
Annex 14
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Tehran, on 25 and 28 October 2009, to review the DIQ and to discuss the chronology of the design
and construction of FFEP as well as its status and purpose. The Agency verified that FFEP was being
built to contain sixteen cascades with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges. Iran indicated that it
currently planned to install only IR-1 centrifuges at FFEP, but that the facility could be reconfigured to
contain centrifuges of more advanced types should Iran take a decision to use such centrifuges in the
future. Iran stated that some of the equipment located at FFEP had come from the Natanz site, and that
the Natanz site would provide functional support to FFEP, such as centrifuge assembly and
decontamination of equipment. Iran also stated that no nuclear material had been introduced into
FFEP.
10. The DIV included a detailed visual examination of all areas of the plant, the taking of
photographs of cascade piping and other process equipment, the taking of environmental samples and
a detailed assessment of the design, configuration and capacity of the various plant components and
systems. Iran provided access to all areas of the facility. The Agency confirmed that the plant
corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced
stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Centrifuge
mounting pads, header and sub-header pipes, water piping, electrical cables and cabinets had been put
in place but were not yet connected; the passivation tanks, chemical traps, cold traps and cool boxes
were also in place but had not been connected. In addition, a utilities building containing electricity
transformers and water chillers had also been erected.
11. During the meeting in Tehran on 25 October 2009, the Agency provided comments on the
preliminary DIQ submitted by Iran, and requested that a revised preliminary DIQ be submitted with
additional information, which Iran did in the course of the later meeting on 28 October. Iran informed
the Agency that it would provide further information required in the DIQ as the facility is developed.
The Agency informed Iran that, in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement, FFEP will henceforth
be subject to regular DIV by the Agency. The next DIV is scheduled for the end of November 2009.
12. Iran explained that the Fordow site had been allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
(AEOI) in the second half of 2007, and that that was when the construction of FFEP had started. Iran
subsequently confirmed that explanation in a letter dated 28 October 2009. In that letter, Iran stated
that:
“As a result of the augmentation of the threats of military attacks against Iran,
the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to establish contingency centers for various
organizations and activities …
“The Natanz Enrichment Plant was among the targets threatened with military
attacks. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Organization requested the Passive
Defence Organization to allocate one of those aforementioned centers for the
purpose of [a] contingency enrichment plant, so that the enrichment activities
shall not be suspended in the case of any military attack. In this respect, the
Fordow site, being one of those constructed and prepared centers, [was]
allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half
of 2007. The construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant then started.
The construction is still ongoing. Thus the plant is not yet ready for operation
and it is planned to be operational in 2011.”
13. During the meetings, the Agency informed Iran that it had acquired commercially available
satellite imagery of the site indicating that there had been construction at the site between 2002 and
2004, and that construction activities were resumed in 2006 and had continued to date. The Agency
also referred to the extensive information given to the Agency by a number of Member States detailing
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the design of the facility, which was consistent with the design as verified by the Agency during the
DIV. The Agency also informed Iran that these Member States alleged that design work on the facility
had started in 2006.
14. The Agency further indicated that it still had questions about the purpose for which the facility
had been intended and how it fit into Iran’s nuclear programme. The Agency also indicated that Iran’s
declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities
under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in
Iran which had not been declared to the Agency.
15. In light of the above, the Agency requested access to the FFEP project manager and those
responsible for the design of FFEP, along with access to original design documentation, such as
engineering drawings, with a view to confirming Iran’s statements regarding the chronology and
purpose of the facility.
16. Iran stated that it did not have any other nuclear facilities that were currently under construction
or in operation that had not yet been declared to the Agency. Iran also stated that any such future
facilities would “be reported to the Agency according to Iran’s obligations to the Agency”. In a letter
dated 6 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct,
or to authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which had not been declared to the Agency.
17. For reasons set out in previous reports to the Board of Governors, Iran remains bound by the
revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it had agreed in 2003,7 which
requires that the Agency be provided with preliminary design information about a new nuclear facility
as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facility is taken. The revised
Code 3.1 also requires that Iran provide the Agency with further design information as the design is
developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.8
Even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the
second half of 2007, Iran’s failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was
inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
B. Reprocessing Activities
18. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX)
Facility. The Agency carried out a DIV at TRR on 19 August 2009 and on 9 November 2009 at the
MIX Facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.
While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, the Agency
can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures of the Additional Protocol
are not currently available to it for Iran.
__________________________________________________________________________________
7 GOV/2009/55, para. 14; GOV/2008/59, para. 9; GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14.
8 GOV/2003/40, paras 6, 15.
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C. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
19. The Agency has reviewed the updated DIQ for the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan
provided by Iran on 21 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55, para. 9). Contrary to what was requested in the
Agency’s letter of 19 June 2009, the updated DIQ did not contain information on the design features
of the IR-40 fuel assembly. The Agency provided comments on the DIQ to Iran on 5 November 2009,
reiterating its request that Iran include the fuel assembly information.
20. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification
(PIV) carried out at FMP in August 2009 (GOV/2009/55, para. 10), and has concluded that the
inventory of nuclear material at FMP as declared by Iran is consistent with those results, within the
measurement uncertainties normally associated with fabrication plants of similar throughput. On
24 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at FMP. It confirmed that the status of the facility had
remained unchanged and that no further assemblies, rods or pellets have been produced.
21. On 7 November 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency
verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency has continued using satellite
imagery to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant, which seems not to have been
operating since the last report.
22. On 25 October 2009, during the DIV at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan, the
Agency observed 600 50-litre drums said by Iran to contain heavy water. In a letter dated
10 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm the number of drums and their contents, and to
provide information on the origin of the heavy water.
D. Other Implementation Issues
D.1. Uranium Conversion
23. In a letter dated 16 October 2009, the Agency requested Iran to provide information regarding the
layout, equipment and installation schedule for an analytical laboratory which, in the updated DIQ for
UCF submitted in August 2009, Iran had indicated would be installed in an underground location in
one of the UCF storage areas.
24. On 25 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF. At that time, the plant was
undergoing maintenance. No UF6 has been produced since 10 August 2009. The total amount of
uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 therefore remains 366 tonnes, some of
which was transferred to the FEP and PFEP, and which remains subject to Agency containment and
surveillance (GOV/2009/55, para. 12). Between 11 August 2009 and 25 October 2009, 92 samples of
ammonium diuranate (ADU) containing about a kilogram of uranium were received at UCF from the
Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.
D.2. Design Information
25. Iran has not yet resumed the implementation of the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements General Part on the early provision of design information, and remains the only State
with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not
implementing the provisions of the revised Code 3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such
early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards
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arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other
nuclear facilities under construction, as indicated above.
26. In December 2007, the Agency requested preliminary design information for the nuclear power
plant to be built in Darkhovin (GOV/2008/38, para. 11). In a letter dated 22 September 2009, Iran
provided the Agency with preliminary design information for the plant, citing, as it had in its letter of
21 September 2009 concerning FFEP, its desire to cooperate rather than a legal obligation. In the
preliminary design information, the Darkhovin plant is described as a 360 MWe pressurized water
reactor, the construction of which is scheduled to start in 2011, with commissioning to take place in
2015. The Agency has examined the design information and has requested Iran to provide additional
clarifications regarding, inter alia, the design of the fuel assemblies and the facility layout.
27. For reasons set out in previous Board reports,9 the Agency is of the view that the revised
Code 3.1 remains in force for Iran. Thus, as indicated above concerning the late submission of design
information for FFEP, Iran’s failure to submit design information for the Darkhovin facility until
September of this year was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its
Safeguards Agreement.
D.3. Other Matters
28. A PIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is planned for 17 November 2009.
29. On 23 September 2009, the Agency performed a DIV at the Uranium Chemical Laboratory at
Esfahan, and was able to confirm the decommissioned status of the facility (GOV/2009/55, para. 17).
30. Based on satellite imagery and supporting documentation relevant to the ADU samples received
at UCF (see para. 23 above), the Agency assesses that uranium recovery activities are continuing in
the area of the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.
E. Possible Military Dimensions
31. As detailed in the Director General’s previous reports to the Board (most recently in
GOV/2009/55, para. 18), there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and
which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear
programme. As indicated in those reports, for the Agency to be able to address these concerns and
make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran, inter alia, implement the Additional Protocol and provide the
information and access necessary to: resolve questions related to the alleged studies; clarify the
circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R&D
activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the
production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies belonging to defence
industries.
32. The Agency is still awaiting a reply from Iran to its request to meet relevant Iranian authorities in
connection with these issues.10 The Agency is also still awaiting Iran’s response to the Agency’s
repeated requests for access to persons, information and locations identified in the alleged studies
__________________________________________________________________________________
9 GOV/2009/55, para. 14; GOV/2008/59, para. 9; GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14.
10 GOV/2009/55, paras 24, 28.
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documents in order to verify Iran’s assertion that these documents are false and fabricated. Further
analysis of the information available to the Agency underscores the importance of Iran engaging with
the Agency in a substantive and comprehensive manner, and providing the requested access, so that
the remaining outstanding issues may be resolved. In this context, it would be helpful if Member
States which have provided documentation to the Agency would agree to share more of that
documentation with Iran, as appropriate.
F. Summary
33. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. While Iran
recently submitted preliminary design information on the Darkhovin reactor, it continues to assert that
it is not bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it agreed
in 2003, and which it ceased to implement in March 2007.
34. Iran has informed the Agency about the construction of a new pilot enrichment plant at Qom,
FFEP. Iran’s failure to inform the Agency, in accordance with the provisions of the revised Code 3.1,
of the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility as soon as such a decision is
taken, and to submit information as the design is developed, is inconsistent with its obligations under
the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. Moreover, Iran’s delay in submitting such
information to the Agency does not contribute to the building of confidence. While the Agency has
confirmed that the plant corresponds to the design information provided by Iran, Iran’s explanation
about the purpose of the facility and the chronology of its design and construction requires further
clarification.
35. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related
projects as required by the Security Council.
36. Contrary to the request of the Board of Governors and the requirements of the Security Council,
Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection
with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military
dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. It is now well over a year since the Agency was last able to
engage Iran in discussions about these outstanding issues. Unless Iran implements the Additional
Protocol and, through substantive dialogue, clarifies the outstanding issues to the satisfaction of the
Agency, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
37. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Annex 14
Board of Governors GOV/2010/10
Date: 18 February 2010
Original: English
For official use only
Item 6(c) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2010/1)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),
1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 16 November 2009, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of relevant Security
Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2009/74). The Director General
issued two additional reports on 8 and 10 February 2010 (GOV/INF/2010/1 and GOV/INF/2010/2,
respectively).
A. Current Enrichment Related Activities
A.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
2. In November 2003, Iran informed the Agency that it would suspend all enrichment related and
reprocessing activities in Iran. Specifically, Iran announced that it would suspend all activities on the
site of Natanz, not produce feed material for enrichment processes and not import enrichment related
items. In February 2004, Iran expanded the scope of that suspension to include the assembly and
testing of centrifuges, and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components. In June 2004, Iran
stopped implementing the expanded voluntary measures in connection with the manufacturing of
centrifuge components and the assembling and testing of centrifuges. In November 2004, Iran notified
the Agency that it had decided, “on a voluntary basis and as [a] further confidence building measure,
to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities”. In
January 2006, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to resume “R&D activities on the peaceful
nuclear energy programme which ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and
Atoms for Peace
Derestricted 3 March 2010
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 3 March 2010)
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non-legally binding suspension”, which included the activities carried out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant
(FEP) and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) located at Natanz. Iran restarted enrichment tests at
PFEP in February 2006; FEP was put into operation in February 2007.
3. There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the
design information submitted by Iran, eight units (Units A21 to A28) are planned for Production Hall
A, with 18 cascades planned for each unit. No detailed design information has been provided for
Production Hall B.
4. On 31 January 2010, Iran was feeding natural UF6 into the 17 cascades of Unit A24, and
6 cascades of Unit A26, at FEP. One cascade of Unit A24 and one cascade of Unit A26 were under
vacuum on that date. A number of centrifuges from the remaining 11 cascades of Unit A26 had been
disconnected. Sixteen cascades of Unit A28 had been installed. Of the remaining 2 cascades of Unit
A28, all centrifuges had been removed from one cascade and removal of the centrifuges from the other
cascade was ongoing.1 Installation work in Units A25 and A27 was ongoing. All centrifuges installed
to date are IR-1 machines with 164 machines per cascade. There has been no installation work on
centrifuges in Production Hall B.
5. Between 21 November 2009 and 2 December 2009, the Agency conducted a physical inventory
verification (PIV) at FEP and verified that, as of 22 November 2009, 21 140 kg of natural UF6 had
been fed into the cascades since February 2007, and a total of 1808 kg of low enriched UF6 had been
produced. The enrichment level of the low enriched UF6 product, as measured by the Agency, was
3.47% U-235. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the PIV and is discussing the results
with Iran. Iran has estimated that, between 23 November 2009 and 29 January 2010, it produced an
additional 257 kg of low enriched UF6,2 which would result in a total production of 2065 kg of low
enriched UF6 since the startup of FEP. The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and
tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency
containment and surveillance.3
6. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP as of 21 November 2009 indicate that the
maximum enrichment level as declared by Iran in the relevant Design Information Questionnaire
(DIQ) (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at that plant.4 Since the last
report, the Agency has successfully conducted 4 unannounced inspections at FEP, making a total of 35
such inspections since March 2007.
7. Between 14 and 16 September 2009, the Agency conducted a PIV at the PFEP, the results of
which confirmed the inventory as declared by Iran, within the measurement uncertainties normally
associated with such a facility. Between 28 October 2009 and 2 February 2010, a total of
approximately 113 kg of natural UF6 was fed into a 10-machine IR-2m cascade, a 10-machine IR-4
cascade, a 20-machine IR-2m cascade and single IR-1, IR-2, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges at PFEP.
__________________________________________________________________________________
1 On 29 January 2010, of the 8610 centrifuges which had been installed at FEP, 3772 centrifuges were being fed with UF6.
2 The Agency has confirmed, through independently calibrated operator load cell readings, that, between 23 November 2009
and 29 January 2010, 2516 kg of UF6 was fed into the cascades, and a total of 159 kg of low enriched UF6 product and
2098 kg of UF6 tails and dump material was off-loaded into UF6 cylinders. The difference of 259 kg between the input and
output figures comprises natural, depleted and low enriched UF6 arising mainly from hold-up in the various cold traps and is
not inconsistent with the design information provided by Iran.
3 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are
not under containment and surveillance.
4 These results have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.4% U-235 enrichment), natural uranium and
depleted uranium (down to 0.19% U-235 enrichment).
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8. On 8 February 2010, the Agency received a letter from Iran dated 7 February 2010 referring to
“the announcement made by H.E. the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the
production of the required fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor”, and in that regard, submitting a
revised version of the DIQ for PFEP. Iran informed the Agency that the “provision of production of
less than 20% enriched uranium is being foreseen in this revised version of the DIQ”. The DIQ
provides for the “production of enriched UF6 up to 20%”.5
9. On 8 February 2010 the Agency received a separate letter from Iran, dated 8 February 2010,
informing the Agency that the operator of FEP intended to transfer low enriched UF6 produced at FEP
to the feed station of PFEP, and that these activities would be performed on 9 February 2010.6 Iran
requested that the Agency be present on the site on that date.
10. On 9 February 2010, the Agency wrote to Iran seeking clarification regarding the starting date of
the process for the production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and other technical details, and
requesting that, in light of Article 45 of the Safeguards Agreement, no low enriched uranium be fed
into the process at PFEP for enriching the material up to 20% U-235 before the necessary additional
safeguards procedures were in place.
11. On 10 February 2010, when the Agency inspectors arrived at PFEP, they were informed that Iran
had already begun to feed the low enriched UF6 into one cascade at PFEP the previous evening. They
were also told that it was expected that the facility would begin to produce up to 20% enriched UF6
within a few days. As the Board was previously informed,7 there is currently only one cascade
installed in PFEP that is capable of enriching the UF6 up to 20%.
12. On 14 February 2010, Iran, in the presence of Agency inspectors, moved approximately 1950 kg
of low enriched UF6 from FEP to the PFEP feed station. The Agency inspectors sealed the cylinder
containing the material to the feed station. Iran provided the Agency with mass spectrometry results
which indicate that enrichment levels of up to 19.8% U-235 were obtained at PFEP between 9 and
11 February 2010.8
13. While the nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area and the feed and withdrawal
stations, remain subject to Agency containment and surveillance,3 additional measures need to be put
in place to ensure the Agency’s continuing ability to verify the non-diversion of the nuclear material at
PFEP. In a letter to Iran dated 9 February 2010, the Agency requested a meeting to discuss a revised
safeguards approach for PFEP.
A.2. Qom: Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
14. On 21 September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided “to construct a new pilot
fuel enrichment plant”, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. The
Agency met with Iran between 25 and 28 October 2009, at which time it carried out design
information verification (DIV) at FFEP, and held discussions with Iran on the chronology of the
design and construction of FFEP, as well as its status and original purpose. The Agency verified that
FFEP is being built to contain sixteen cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges. Iran
__________________________________________________________________________________
5 GOV/INF/2010/1.
6 On 9 February 2010, Iran transferred approximately 10 kg of low enriched UF6 to PFEP.
7 GOV/INF/2010/2.
8 The results of the environmental samples taken at PFEP from the restart of enrichment testing in February 2006 until
15 August 2009 have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.4% U-235 enrichment), natural uranium and
depleted uranium (down to 0.27% U-235 enrichment).
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indicated that it currently planned to install only IR-1 centrifuges at FFEP, but that the facility could
be reconfigured to contain centrifuges of more advanced types should Iran take a decision to use such
centrifuges in the future. On 28 October 2009, Iran provided the Agency with an updated DIQ for
FFEP.
15. In a letter dated 2 December 2009 responding to the Agency’s questions in its letter dated
6 November 2009 regarding the timing of the decision to build a third enrichment plant in Iran, other
than PFEP and FEP, Iran stated that “The location [near Qom] originally was considered as a general
area for passive defence contingency shelters for various utilizations. Then this location was selected
for the construction of [the] Fuel Enrichment Plant in the second half of 2007”. On
16 December 2009, the Agency wrote to Iran, pointing out that some of its answers had not fully
addressed the Agency’s requests for clarifications regarding FFEP. In the letter, the Agency referred
specifically to the Agency’s request that Iran confirm when the decision to construct a third
enrichment plant (other than PFEP and FEP) had been taken and reiterated the need for access to
companies involved in the design and construction of FFEP to confirm Iran’s statement regarding the
chronology and purpose of the facility. The Agency informed Iran that it had received extensive
information from a number of sources detailing the design of the facility, which was consistent with
the design as verified by the Agency during the DIV, and that these sources alleged that design work
on the facility started in 2006, i.e. at a time when Iran itself accepts that it was bound by the modified
Code 3.1 to have informed the Agency.
16. In a letter dated 22 January 2010, the Agency asked Iran for a complete DIQ for FFEP, and again
reiterated its request made in October 2009 for access to relevant design documents and to companies
involved in the design of the third enrichment plant in Iran. Iran has not yet responded to these
requests.
17. Since 26 October 2009, the Agency has conducted five DIVs at FFEP. During three of these, the
Agency took environmental samples. The results of the analyses of the samples taken on
27 October 2009 from two passivation tanks at FFEP showed the presence of a small number of
depleted uranium particles that were similar to particles found at Natanz. According to Iran, the tanks
had been brought to FFEP from the Natanz site. The results of the analyses of the later environmental
samples are pending. The Agency has verified that the construction of the facility is ongoing, but that
no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility as of 16 February 2010.
B. Reprocessing Activities
18. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX)
Facility. The Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at TRR on 11 November 2009, and on
23 January 2010 at the MIX Facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related
activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related
activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures
of the Additional Protocol are not currently available to it for Iran.
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C. Heavy Water Related Projects
19. In resolution 1737 (2006), the Security Council decided in operative paragraph 2 thereof that Iran
was to suspend certain activities, including “work on all heavy water-related projects, including the
construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA”. In that
resolution, the Council also decided, inter alia, that Iran “shall provide such access and cooperation as
the IAEA requires to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all
outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports”.
20. As indicated in GOV/2009/74, during a DIV carried out at the Uranium Conversion Facility
(UCF) at Esfahan on 25 October 2009, the Agency observed a large number of drums said by Iran to
contain heavy water. In a letter dated 10 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm the
number of drums and their contents, and to provide information on the origin of the heavy water. In its
letter dated 18 November 2009 responding to the Agency, Iran stated that “the origin of the heavy
water is the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
21. In light of the request of the Security Council that the Agency verify the suspension by Iran, inter
alia, of all heavy water related projects, and to report on whether Iran has established full and
sustained suspension thereof, the Agency needs to be able to confirm the contents of the drums, and
the origin of the heavy water said to be contained in the drums. To that end, in a letter dated
7 January 2010, the Agency informed Iran that, during the DIV at UCF scheduled for
17 January 2010, it planned to take samples of the heavy water for destructive analysis. In a letter
dated 14 January 2010, Iran objected to the taking of such samples, stating that there was no provision
in the Safeguards Agreement for the sampling of non-nuclear material for destructive analysis. During
the 17 January 2010 DIV, the Agency counted 756 50-litre drums said by Iran to contain heavy water,
and weighed a small number of randomly selected drums, but was not permitted to take samples of the
heavy water to confirm the contents of the drums.
22. On 13 January 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP). It
confirmed that no new process equipment had been installed at the facility and that no new assemblies,
rods or pellets had been produced since May 2009. On 18 January 2010, the Agency received a
revised DIQ for FMP which included information originally requested by the Agency in June 2009 on
the design features of the fuel assembly verified by the Agency during its May 2009 inspection at
FMP.
23. On 8 February 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency
verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. However, as previously indicated to the
Board, in light of Iran’s refusal to permit the Agency access to the Heavy Water Production Plant
(HWPP), the Agency has had to rely on satellite imagery to monitor the status of that plant. Based on
recent images, the HWPP seems to be in operation again. However, it has to be noted that these
images can only provide information on what was happening at the time the images were taken. In
accordance with the Security Council’s request that the Agency verify the suspension of heavy water
related projects in Iran, and particularly in light of the presence at UCF of what Iran has described as
Iranian origin heavy water, the Agency needs direct access to the HWPP.
24. In a letter dated 15 February 2010, the Agency reiterated its requests that Iran make the necessary
arrangements to provide the Agency, at the earliest possible date, with access to: the HWPP; the heavy
water stored at UCF for the purpose of taking samples for destructive analysis; and any other location
in Iran where heavy water related projects are being carried out.
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D. Other Implementation Issues
D.1. Uranium Conversion
25. According to the design information provided by Iran and revised as of 12 November 2009, UCF
will eventually include the following process lines:
• production of natural UF6 from uranium ore concentrate for further enrichment (completed and
operational);
• production of natural UO2 from uranium ore concentrate for the IR-40 reactor fuel (expected to be
completed by March 2010);
• production of natural uranium metal ingots from UF4 for research and development (R&D)
purposes (completed but not yet in operation);
• production of low enriched UO2 (maximum 5% U-235 enrichment) from UF6 for light water
reactor fuel (building under construction);
• production of low enriched uranium metal (maximum 19.7% U-235 enrichment) from UF6 for
R&D purposes (no equipment installed yet);
• production of depleted UF4 powder from UF6 for further conversion process to uranium metal
(building under construction);
• and production of depleted uranium metal from UF4 for storage and shielding purposes
(construction not yet started).
Under cover of a letter dated 11 February 2010, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF which
included a reference to an additional R&D activity on the conversion of depleted UF6 to depleted
U3O8.
26. In October 2009, the Agency requested Iran to provide information regarding the layout,
equipment and installation schedule for an analytical laboratory which Iran had indicated would be
installed in an underground location in one of the storage areas of UCF. Under cover of a letter dated
13 December 2009, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF which included, inter alia, the layout of
the laboratory. On 9 February 2010, the Agency provided comments on the DIQ to Iran, reiterating its
request that Iran include information related to the equipment and installation schedule for the
laboratory.
27. On 17 January 2010, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at UCF. At that time, the
plant was undergoing maintenance. No UF6 has been produced since 10 August 2009; however, since
that date, five tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 which had been previously produced but were
held up in the process were discharged from the process on 15 November 2009. The total amount of
uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 therefore is 371 tonnes (some of
which has been transferred to FEP and PFEP), which remains subject to Agency containment and
surveillance. Currently, there are 42 tonnes of uranium in the form of uranium ore concentrate (UOC)
stored at UCF.
D.2. Design Information
28. In a letter dated 29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to suspend the
implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, which Iran
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had accepted in 2003. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision.9 The
Agency reiterated that request in a letter dated 16 October 2008.
29. The modified Code 3.1, to which Iran agreed in 2003, provides for submission to the Agency of
design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction
of, a new facility has been taken. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of further
design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design,
construction and commissioning phases.
30. In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement,10 agreed Subsidiary
Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement
for the suspension of a provision agreed to in Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified
Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force for Iran.
31. Both in the case of the Darkhovin facility11 and FFEP, Iran did not notify the Agency in a timely
manner of the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facilities, as required in the
modified Code 3.1, and has provided only limited design information. Iran’s actions in this regard are
inconsistent with its obligation under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement, and
raise concerns about the completeness of its declarations.
32. In a letter to Iran dated 6 November 2009 referring to Iran’s decision to build FFEP, the Agency
asked Iran, inter alia, to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct or to authorize
construction of any other nuclear facilities, and that there were currently no such facilities in Iran
which have not been declared to the Agency. In its reply dated 2 December 2009, Iran stated that,
“The Islamic Republic of Iran will inform the Agency, as it has been done before, on the existence of
any other nuclear facility in Iran in accordance to the Safeguards Agreement with the Agency
(INFCIRC/214)”.
33. In a letter dated 2 December 2009, the Agency referred to Iran’s public announcement of its
intention to build ten new uranium enrichment facilities and to statements reportedly made by Iran that
the location of five sites had already been decided and that five other plants would be built throughout
the country, and asked Iran whether the information contained in these reports was correct. The
Agency further requested that, if a decision to construct new enrichment facilities has been taken by
Iran, Iran provide the Agency with further information regarding the design and scheduling of the
construction of such facilities. In its reply dated 17 December 2009, in which Iran referred to its letter
of 29 March 2007 suspending the implementation of the modified Code 3.1 and reverting to the
implementation of the version reflected in the Subsidiary Arrangements dated 12 February 1976, Iran
stated that it would “provide the Agency with the required information if necessary”.
34. Article 45 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement requires that the Agency be provided with design
information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for
the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary. An increase in the maximum declared
enrichment level from 5% U-235 to up to 20% U-235 is clearly relevant for safeguards purposes, and,
accordingly, should have been notified to the Agency with sufficient time for the Agency to adjust the
existing safeguards procedures at PFEP.
__________________________________________________________________________________
9 GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14.
10 Article 39 of the Safeguards Agreement provides, inter alia, that the Subsidiary Arrangements “may be extended or
changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency …”.
11 GOV/2009/74, para. 26.
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35. Iran has not yet resumed implementation of the modified Code 3.1. It remains the only State with
significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not
implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such
early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards
arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other
nuclear facilities.
D.3. Other Matters
36. On 8 December 2009, at the request of Iran, seals were detached from 31 containers at the
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) so that a technical examination of the fuel assemblies imported
from the Russian Federation for use at the BNPP could be carried out. Upon completion of the
technical examination, the fuel assemblies will be re-verified by the Agency, and placed again under
seal.
37. On 9 January 2010, the Agency conducted a DIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research
Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran, during which the Agency was informed that pyroprocessing R&D
activities had been initiated at JHL to study the electrochemical production of uranium metal. In a
letter dated 3 February 2010, the Agency requested Iran to provide more information regarding these
activities.
38. Based on satellite imagery, the Agency assesses that uranium recovery activities are continuing
in the area of the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.
39. Since early 2008, the Agency has requested that Iran provide access to additional locations
related, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment and uranium
mining and milling (GOV/2008/15, para. 13). Particularly in light of recent developments in, and
statements by, Iran regarding the planned construction of new nuclear facilities, the Agency requests
Iran to grant the Agency access to these locations as soon as possible.
E. Possible Military Dimensions
40. In order to confirm, as required by the Safeguards Agreement, that all nuclear material in Iran is
in peaceful activities, the Agency needs to have confidence in the absence of possible military
dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the
outstanding issues and the actions required of Iran,12 including, inter alia, that Iran implement the
Additional Protocol and provide the Agency with the information and access necessary to: resolve
questions related to the alleged studies; clarify the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium
metal document; clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies
that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear related equipment and components
by companies belonging to the defence industries.
41. The information available to the Agency in connection with these outstanding issues is extensive
and has been collected from a variety of sources over time. It is also broadly consistent and credible in
terms of the technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the people and
__________________________________________________________________________________
12 A summary of the issues was provided to the Board in Section E of GOV/2008/15, and most recently in GOV/2009/74,
para. 31.
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organizations involved. Altogether, this raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or
current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. These
alleged activities consist of a number of projects and sub-projects, covering nuclear and missile related
aspects, run by military related organizations.
42. Among the activities which the Agency has attempted to discuss with Iran are: activities
involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives
and missile re-entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of UO2 to UF4, known as “the
green salt project”; and various procurement related activities. Specifically, the Agency has, inter alia,
sought clarification of the following: whether Iran was engaged in undeclared activities for the
production of UF4 (green salt) involving the Kimia Maadan company; whether Iran’s exploding
bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes; whether Iran
developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert
knowledgeable in explosives technology; whether the engineering design and computer modelling
studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear
payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military
organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment.
43. The Agency would also like to discuss with Iran: the project and management structure of alleged
activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged
projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and
experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons. Addressing these issues is important
for clarifying the Agency’s concerns about these activities and those described above, which seem to
have continued beyond 2004.
44. Since August 2008, Iran has declined to discuss the above issues with the Agency or to provide
any further information and access (to locations and/or people) to address these concerns, asserting
that the allegations relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme are baseless and
that the information to which the Agency is referring is based on forgeries.
45. With the passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of information, it is
important that Iran engage with the Agency on these issues, and that the Agency be permitted to visit
all relevant sites, have access to all relevant equipment and documentation, and be allowed to
interview relevant persons, without further delay. Iran’s substantive engagement would enable the
Agency to make progress in its work. Through Iran’s active cooperation, progress has been made in
the past in certain other areas where questions have been raised; this should also be possible in
connection with questions about military related dimensions.
F. Summary
46. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran
has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in
Iran is in peaceful activities.
47. Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the Board of
Governors and the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, which are
essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to
resolve outstanding questions. In particular, Iran needs to cooperate in clarifying outstanding issues
which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, and to
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implement the modified text of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on the early
provision of design information.
48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
continued with the operation of PFEP and FEP at Natanz, and the construction of a new enrichment
plant at Fordow. Iran has also announced the intention to build ten new enrichment plants. Iran
recently began feeding low enriched UF6 produced at FEP into one cascade of PFEP with the aim of
enriching it up to 20% in U-235. The period of notice provided by Iran regarding related changes
made to PFEP was insufficient for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures before Iran
started to feed the material into PFEP. The Agency’s work to verify FFEP and to understand the
original purpose of the facility and the chronology of its design and construction remain ongoing. Iran
is not providing access to information such as the original design documentation for FFEP or access to
companies involved in the design and construction of the plant.
49. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and related heavy water activities. The
Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not
been provided with access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.
50. The Director General requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its
Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Additional
Protocol.
51. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Annex 15
United Nations S/RES/1929 (2010)
Security Council Distr.: General
9 June 2010
10-39679 (E)
*1039679*
Resolution 1929 (2010)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, on
9 June 2010
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions
1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887 (2009)
and reaffirming their provisions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their
obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and
II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14),
which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February
2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006
(GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007
(GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48),
15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008
(GOV/2008/115), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008
(GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35),
28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February
2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and
sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy
water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the
Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining
issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military
dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council
Annex 16
ma.&}
2
resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are
essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,
Reaffirming that outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built
in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme by Iran responding
positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have
made on Iran,
Noting with serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic
Revolution”), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1737 (2006),
Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this resolution, in Iran’s
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems,
Noting with serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at
Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and
that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 2009, which is inconsistent
with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,
Also noting the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82),
which urges Iran to suspend immediately construction at Qom, and to clarify the
facility’s purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls upon Iran to
confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a decision to construct, or
authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been
declared to the IAEA,
Noting with serious concern that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and
did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing
safeguards procedures,
Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify
design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified
Code 3.1, and emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the
IAEA’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which
is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material
at, a facility,
Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly
supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and commending the IAEA for
its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme,
Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of
resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for
exclusively peaceful purposes,
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes and noting in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards
an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a
confidence-building measure,
Annex 16
3
Emphasizing also, however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of
Iran addressing the core issues related to its nuclear programme,
Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on
exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through
negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June
2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and noting the confirmation by these countries that
once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner
as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to
assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1737
(2006) and 1803 (2008), and recalling in particular the need to exercise vigilance
over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as
to prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities,
or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,
Recognizing that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable
growth and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran’s
revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferationsensitive
nuclear activities, and further noting that chemical process equipment and
materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those
required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,
Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,
Recalling that the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean
activities,
Calling for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by
Iran at an early date,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007)
and 1803 (2008) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s
development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile
programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives
of these resolutions have been met,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme and mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or
actions exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or the
threat of force,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Affirms that Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA
Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007) and 1803 (2008);
Annex 16
4
2. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which
are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear
programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address the serious concerns
raised by the construction of an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its
obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, further
affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph
2 of resolution 1737 (2006);
3. Reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding
issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military
dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access
without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the
IAEA, and stresses the importance of ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary
resources and authority for the fulfilment of its work in Iran;
4. Requests the Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the
Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in Iran;
5. Decides that Iran shall without delay comply fully and without
qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the
application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards
Agreement, calls upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the
Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on
18 December 2003, calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and
reaffirms that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement, including
modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and notes
that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the
provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement;
6. Reaffirms that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under previous
resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related
activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment,
reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing
construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related
facility;
7. Decides that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity
in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials
and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uraniumenrichment
and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technologyrelated
to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further
decides that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their
jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its
jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or
by entities owned or controlled by them;
8. Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or
transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals
subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not
originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
Annex 16
5
missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as
determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides further that all States shall
prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of
technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or
assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance
or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to
exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision,
manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;
9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic
missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the
transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;
10. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex C, D
and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I of
resolution 1803 (2008) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security
Council or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006),
except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to
Iran of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) in
accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), underlines that nothing in
this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory,
and decides that the measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the
Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the
grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the
Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of
this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
11. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in
Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or
at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through
illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the
Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions
of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803
(2008) or this resolution;
12. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”)
individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals or entities
acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by
them, including through illicit means, and calls upon all States to exercise vigilance
over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems;
13. Decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3,
4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be
superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and
Annex 16
6
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and any further items if the State determines that they
could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related
activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and further
decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items contained in S/2006/815 shall be
superseded by the list of items contained in S/2010/263;
14. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national
authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law
of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from
Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the
supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of
resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of
resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of
ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
15. Notes that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law
of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of
the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items
the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of
resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of
resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of
ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
16. Decides to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and
dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring
to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the
supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of
resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of
resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in
inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is
not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council
resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties
to the NPT, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;
17. Requires any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to
paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an
initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the
inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was
provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, further requires such States
to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing
relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the
transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if
this information is not in the initial report;
18. Decides that all States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or
from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or
other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or -contracted vessels, including
chartered vessels, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to
believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is
prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of
Annex 16
7
resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9
of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian
purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed
of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal
economic activities;
19. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in Annex III and to any person or entity acting
on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them,
including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to
have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of,
resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;
20. Requests all Member States to communicate to the Committee any
information available on transfers or activity by Iran Air’s cargo division or vessels
owned or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) to other
companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions of, or in
violation of the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or
this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and
requests the Committee to make that information widely available;
21. Calls upon all States, in addition to implementing their obligations
pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution,
to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or
the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities
organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial
institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they
have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services,
assets or resources could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by
freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that
hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that
hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or
activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in
accordance with their national authorities and legislation;
22. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to
their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their
jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in
Iran or subject to Iran’s jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and
any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities
owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could
contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;
23. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their
territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of
Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint
ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining
correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision
Annex 16
8
of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to
believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
24. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial
institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening
representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services
could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
25. Deplores the violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution
1747 (2007) that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of
resolution 1747 (2007), and commends States that have taken action to respond to
these violations and report them to the Committee;
26. Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the
measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this
resolution, and recalls that the Committee may designate individuals and entities
who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in
violating the provisions of, these resolutions;
27. Decides that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full
implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this
resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance,
investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the
Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution;
28. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of
resolution 1737 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution 1803 (2008),
shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to receive
reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;
29. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year,
in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of
Experts”), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the following tasks:
(a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of
resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and
analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested
parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of
non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the
Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant
measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than
90 days after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than
30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and
recommendations;
30. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested
parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular
by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the
measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this
resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;
Annex 16
9
31. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and
24;
32. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic
efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with
Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions, most recently in their meeting with
Iran in Geneva on 1 October 2009, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, longterm
and proper solution of this issue on the basis of the proposal made by China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States on 14 June 2008, which would allow for the development of relations and
wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with Iran on the basis of the
June 2008 proposal, and acknowledges with appreciation that the June 2008
proposal, as attached in Annex IV to this resolution, remains on the table;
33. Encourages the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of
political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant
proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks,
and encourages Iran to respond positively to such proposals;
34. Commends the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009
proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the
Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for
Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of
Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, regrets that Iran has not responded
constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and encourages the IAEA to
continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in
furtherance of the Council’s resolutions;
35. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the
necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the
Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities
designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person
claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with
any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of
the measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and
this resolution;
36. Requests within 90 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA
on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities
mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with
other provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and of this
resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council
for its consideration;
Annex 16
10
37. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to
in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90 days, and: (a) that it shall suspend
the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichmentrelated
and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified
by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and
mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2,
4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of
resolution 1803 (2008), and in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report
referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations
under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of
the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with
resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, adopt further
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of
the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such
additional measures be necessary;
38. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex 16
11
Annex I
Individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic
missile activities
Entities
1. Amin Industrial Complex: Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature
controllers which may be used in nuclear research and operational/production
facilities. Amin Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of,
the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which was designated in resolution 1737
(2006).
Location: P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage
Rd., Seyedi District, Mashad, Iran; Kaveh Complex, Khalaj Rd., Seyedi St.,
Mashad, Iran
A.K.A.: Amin Industrial Compound and Amin Industrial Company
2. Armament Industries Group: Armament Industries Group (AIG)
manufacturers and services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including
large- and medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority
of its procurement activity through Hadid Industries Complex.
Location: Sepah Islam Road, Karaj Special Road Km 10, Iran; Pasdaran Ave.,
P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
3. Defense Technology and Science Research Center: Defense Technology and
Science Research Center (DTSRC) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of,
Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees
Iran’s defence R&D, production, maintenance, exports, and procurement.
Location: Pasdaran Ave, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
4. Doostan International Company: Doostan International Company (DICO)
supplies elements to Iran’s ballistic missile program.
5. Farasakht Industries: Farasakht Industries is owned or controlled by, or act
on behalf of, the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which in turn is owned or
controlled by MODAFL.
Location: P.O. Box 83145-311, Kilometer 28, Esfahan-Tehran Freeway, Shahin
Shahr, Esfahan, Iran
6. First East Export Bank, P.L.C.: First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or
controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank
Mellat has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian
nuclear, missile, and defense entities.
Location: Unit Level 10 (B1), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan,
Jalan Merdeka, 87000 WP Labuan, Malaysia; Business Registration Number
LL06889 (Malaysia)
7. Kaveh Cutting Tools Company: Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is owned or
controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.
Annex 16
12
Location: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, Iran; Km 4
of Khalaj Road, End of Seyedi Street, Mashad, Iran; P.O. Box 91735-549,
Mashad, Iran; Khalaj Rd., End of Seyyedi Alley, Mashad, Iran; Moqan St.,
Pasdaran St., Pasdaran Cross Rd., Tehran, Iran
8. M. Babaie Industries: M. Babaie Industries is subordinate to Shahid Ahmad
Kazemi Industries Group (formally the Air Defense Missile Industries Group) of
Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO controls the missile
organizations Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri
Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution 1737 (2006).
Location: P.O. Box 16535-76, Tehran, 16548, Iran
9. Malek Ashtar University: A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL.
This includes research groups previously falling under the Physics Research Center
(PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been allowed to interview staff or see documents
under the control of this organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible
military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program.
Location: Corner of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran
10. Ministry of Defense Logistics Export: Ministry of Defense Logistics Export
(MODLEX) sells Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world in
contravention of resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits Iran from selling arms or
related materiel.
Location: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran; located on the west side of
Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran
11. Mizan Machinery Manufacturing: Mizan Machinery Manufacturing (3M) is
owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SHIG.
Location: P.O. Box 16595-365, Tehran, Iran
A.K.A.: 3MG
12. Modern Industries Technique Company: Modern Industries Technique
Company (MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy
water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the construction of
the IR-40 heavy water reactor.
Location: Arak, Iran
A.K.A.: Rahkar Company, Rahkar Industries, Rahkar Sanaye Company,
Rahkar Sanaye Novin
13. Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine: The Nuclear
Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research
component of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which was
designated in resolution 1737 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI’s center for the
development of nuclear fuel and is involved in enrichment-related activities.
Location: P.O. Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran
A.K.A.: Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine; Karaji
Agricultural and Medical Research Center
Annex 16
13
14. Pejman Industrial Services Corporation: Pejman Industrial Services
Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.
Location: P.O. Box 16785-195, Tehran, Iran
15. Sabalan Company: Sabalan is a cover name for SHIG.
Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
16. Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO): SAPICO is a
cover name for SHIG.
Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
17. Shahid Karrazi Industries: Shahid Karrazi Industries is owned or controlled
by, or act on behalf of, SBIG.
Location: Tehran, Iran
18. Shahid Satarri Industries: Shahid Sattari Industries is owned or controlled
by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.
Location: Southeast Tehran, Iran
A.K.A.: Shahid Sattari Group Equipment Industries
19. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries: Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries
(SSSI) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.
Location: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway,
Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran; Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835,
Iran; Babaei Highway — Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran
20. Special Industries Group: Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of
DIO.
Location: Pasdaran Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
21. Tiz Pars: Tiz Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2007, Tiz
Pars attempted to procure a five axis laser welding and cutting machine, which
could make a material contribution to Iran’s missile program, on behalf of SHIG.
Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
22. Yazd Metallurgy Industries: Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is a
subordinate of DIO.
Location: Pasdaran Avenue, Next To Telecommunication Industry, Tehran
16588, Iran; Postal Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran; P.O. Box 89195-678, Yazd,
Iran; Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran
A.K.A.: Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries,
Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries
Individuals
Javad Rahiqi: Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Center (additional information: DOB: 24 April 1954; POB:
Marshad).
Annex 16
14
Annex II
Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps
1. Fater (or Faater) Institute: Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA) subsidiary. Fater has
worked with foreign suppliers, likely on behalf of other KAA companies on IRGC
projects in Iran.
2. Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem: Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem is owned or
controlled by KAA.
3. Ghorb Karbala: Ghorb Karbala is owned or controlled by KAA.
4. Ghorb Nooh: Ghorb Nooh is owned or controlled by KAA
5. Hara Company: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
6. Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute: Owned or controlled by, or acts
on behalf of, KAA.
7. Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters: Khatam al-Anbiya
Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an IRGC-owned company involved in large
scale civil and military construction projects and other engineering activities. It
undertakes a significant amount of work on Passive Defense Organization projects.
In particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction of the
uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
8. Makin: Makin is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a
subsidiary of KAA.
9. Omran Sahel: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
10. Oriental Oil Kish: Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on
behalf of KAA.
11. Rah Sahel: Rah Sahel is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
12. Rahab Engineering Institute: Rahab is owned or controlled by or acting on
behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
13. Sahel Consultant Engineers: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
14. Sepanir: Sepanir is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
15. Sepasad Engineering Company: Sepasad Engineering Company is owned or
controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
Annex 16
15
Annex III
Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)
1. Irano Hind Shipping Company
Location: 18 Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Valie-
Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; 265, Next to Mehrshad, Sedaghat St., Opposite of
Mellat Park, Vali Asr Ave., Tehran 1A001, Iran
2. IRISL Benelux NV
Location: Noorderlaan 139, B-2030, Antwerp, Belgium; V.A.T. Number
BE480224531 (Belgium)
3. South Shipping Line Iran (SSL)
Location: Apt. No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th Alley, Gandi Ave., Tehran, Iran;
Qaem Magham Farahani St., Tehran, Iran
Annex 16
16
Annex IV
Proposal to the Islamic Republic of Iran by China, France,
Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and
the European Union
Presented to the Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran
Possible Areas of Cooperation with Iran
In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian
nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building
further upon the proposal presented to Iran in June 2006, which remains on the
table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China,
France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined
by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably
suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and
OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect
Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China,
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European
Union High Representative state their readiness:
to recognize Iran’s right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;
to treat Iran’s nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear
Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored.
Nuclear Energy
– Reaffirmation of Iran’s right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful
purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.
– Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran’s
peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical
cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.
– Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.
– Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually
restored.
– Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
– Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Political
– Improving the six countries’ and the EU’s relations with Iran and building up
mutual trust.
– Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.
– Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international
affairs.
Annex 16
17
– Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security
and stabilization issues.
– Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building
measures and regional security.
– Establishment of appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms.
– Support for a conference on regional security issues.
– Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.
– Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
– Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight
against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of Afghan
refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan;
cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.
Economic
Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving
Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical
support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade
Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran
and trade with Iran.
Energy Partnership
Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy:
establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between
Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical
applications/measures.
Agriculture
– Support for agricultural development in Iran.
Facilitation of Iran’s complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in
modern technology.
Environment, Infrastructure
– Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection, infrastructure,
science and technology, and high-tech:
– Development of transport infrastructure, including international transport
corridors.
– Support for modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure,
including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions.
Annex 16
18
Civil Aviation
– Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on
manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran:
– Enabling Iran to renew its civil aviation fleet;
– Assisting Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety
standards.
Economic, social and human development/humanitarian issues
– Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran’s economic and social development
and humanitarian need.
– Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to Iran:
– Supporting Iranians to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such
as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;
– Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g. public
health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public administration,
history and philosophy.
– Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency response
capabilities (e.g. seismology, earthquake research, disaster control etc.).
– Cooperation within the framework of a “dialogue among civilizations”.
Implementation mechanism
– Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of a future
agreement.
Annex 16
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Iran vows not to 'retreat one iota' in nuclear pursuit
TEHRAN, Iran (CNN) -- The Iranian president scoffed Wednesday at a U.N. Security Council demand that the Islamic republic halt its uranium-enrichment program.
"Iran will not retreat one iota in its path to nuclear victory," President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in a speech Wednesday, according to the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency.
He added, "Today, there are those who are against Iran's access to peaceful nuclear technology and are trying to put obstacles in our nuclear path in order to prevent us from exercising our
rights with the grace of the God," IRNA reported.
Ahmadinejad's remarks come the day before a report on Iran's nuclear activities is scheduled to be circulated to the Security Council in New York.
Tehran has insisted that its nuclear program is for civilian energy purposes only, but Western powers have said Iran has its eye on nuclear weaponry.
Iran's position on the matter has remained static since well before July, when the United Nations gave Iran an August 31 deadline to halt its nuclear program.
Ahmadinejad told reporters as that deadline passed, "Access to peaceful nuclear energy and power is the right of the Iranian people. We've chosen our right and under international law we
want to use our right. Nobody can prevent us from it."
On December 23, the 15-member Security Council unanimously approved a resolution imposing sanctions on Iran. Russia and China, two veto-wielding members of the Security Council,
voted in favor of the resolution despite previously expressing their aversion to imposing sanctions.
Under Resolution 1737, the council requested that International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei report within 60 days on whether Iran has suspended its
nuclear activities.
It was initially reported that the deadline expired Wednesday -- 60 days after the December 23 resolution passed -- but an IAEA official told CNN the deadline is Friday. ElBaradei is
scheduled to deliver his report Thursday, the official said.
ElBaradei said in Monday's Financial Times that he expected to report that Iran had not complied with the resolution. However, ElBaradei noted, the Security Council will not take any action
until he reports to the IAEA board of governors next month.
"Even if my report is coming out this week, I can still add and reverse judgments there until the sixth of March," ElBaradei told the London-based newspaper. The board of governors is
scheduled to meet in Vienna, Austria, March 5-9.
After the December 23 vote, Iran defiantly vowed to continue with its nuclear program, which included the production of 3,000 centrifuges at its nuclear complex in Natanz. Iran said the
work would be done under IAEA supervision.
ElBaradei told The Financial Times that Iran was still months from having those centrifuges running smoothly. Presently, the IAEA chief said, Iran is operating at least one 164-centrifuge
cascade to enrich uranium.
Experts say thousands of centrifuges are needed to produce weapons-grade uranium, and ElBaradei told the newspaper Monday that Iran's operation "is still small scale, so whatever they
have, what we have seen today, is not the kind of capacity that would enable them to make bomb."
Assurances offered
Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ari Larijani, who met with ElBaradei in Vienna, Austria, on Wednesday, told IRNA that Iran was willing to offer assurances that its nuclear program was aimed
at energy production, not bombmaking.
One of the proffered assurances, according to Reuters, is an Iranian pledge to refine uranium no higher than the 4-5 percent level, well below the 80 percent threshold needed for nuclear
bombs.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the final say in Iran's nuclear matters. According to Reuters, Ali Akbar Velayati, a Khamenei aide, told a French newspaper that Iran was
flexible on negotiating a deal,"but one cannot dictate the solution in advance."
The Iranian nuclear issue will be discussed over a breakfast meeting among U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, European Union Foreign
Policy Chief Javier Solana and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
Israel also has a stake in the negotiations as Ahmadinejad has questioned the United States' "blind support for the Zionists" and called for Israel to be "wiped off the map."
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called on the international community Wednesday to step up its pressure on the Islamic republic. He also questioned Iranian assertions regarding the progress
of the nation's nuclear program.
"A lot more has to be done, but I think that the Iranians are not as close to the technological threshold as they claim to be, and unfortunately they are not as far [away] as we would love
them to be," he said. "So there is a lot that still can be done and ought to be done. And the sooner it will be done the better it will be."
He continued with remarks addressing Ahmadinejad, "It is incumbent upon the international community not only to take practical measures to stop these threats but also to take practical
measures that will indicate the extent of the disapproval of his language, of his attitude and of his approaches."
CNN's Liz Neisloss and Michal Zippori contributed to this report.
Find this article at:
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/02/21/iran.nuclear/index.html
Check the box to include the list of links referenced in the article.
• The U.N. Security Council is scheduled to receive a report on Iran on Thursday
• Iran says it's willing to assure the West it will never move toward nuclear weapons
• President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran won't halt enrichment
• Security Council won't take action before March 9, leaving time for more dialogue
Annex 17
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© 2008 Cable News Network
Annex 17
Board of Governors GOV/2013/6
Date: 21 February 2013
Original: English
For official use only
Item 5(d) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2013/3)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of
Security Council resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
A. Introduction
1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security
Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement1 and relevant provisions of
Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).
2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its
resolutions2 are binding on Iran.3 The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council
__________________________________________________________________________________
1 The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.
2 The Board of Governors has adopted 12 resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran:
GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49
(18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005);
GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009); GOV/2011/69
(18 November 2011); and GOV/2012/50 (13 September 2012).
3 In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps
required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran’s obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on
all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian
nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards
Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to
act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (paras 1–6).
Derestricted 6 March 2013
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 6 March 2013)
Atoms for Peace
Annex 18
()eA a
GOV/2013/6
Page 2
resolutions4 were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in
accordance with the terms of those resolutions.5
3. This report addresses developments since the Director General’s previous report (GOV/2012/55,
16 November 2012), as well as issues of longer standing. It focuses on those areas where Iran has not
fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to
establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
B. Clarification of Unresolved Issues
4. In November 2011, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2011/69, in which, inter alia, it stressed
that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution
of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues,
including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In
that resolution, the Board also called on Iran to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks
aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme. In light of this, between January and the beginning of September 2012, Agency and
Iranian officials held six rounds of talks in Vienna and Tehran, including during a visit by the Director
General to Tehran in May 2012. However, no concrete results were achieved.6
5. On 13 September 2012, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2012/50, in which, inter alia, it
decided that Iranian cooperation with Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues
was essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature
of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Board also stressed that it was essential for Iran to immediately
conclude and implement a structured approach for resolving outstanding issues related to possible
military dimensions to its nuclear programme, including, as a first step, providing the Agency with the
access it had requested to relevant sites. Immediately following the adoption of that resolution, the
Agency took steps to engage Iran in further talks.7
6. Since the Director General’s November 2012 report, Agency and Iranian officials have held three
further rounds of talks in Tehran – on 13 December 2012, 16 and 17 January 2013 and
13 February 2013 – aimed at finalizing the structured approach document.8 While the Secretariat’s
commitment to continued dialogue is unwavering, it has not been possible to reach agreement with
Iran on the structured approach or to begin substantive work on the outstanding issues, including those
related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
__________________________________________________________________________________
4 The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006);
1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).
5 By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations (INFCIRC/11, Part I.A), the Agency is required to
cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security. All Member States of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council and, in this respect, to take actions which are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations
Charter.
6 GOV/2012/37, para. 8.
7 GOV/2012/55, para. 6.
8 The current focus of the document is on the issues outlined in the Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report.
The other outstanding issues will need to be addressed separately.
Annex 18
GOV/2013/6
Page 3
C. Facilities Declared under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
7. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 16 nuclear facilities and nine
locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).9 Notwithstanding that
certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant
resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency
continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material at these facilities and LOFs.
D. Enrichment Related Activities
8. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
not suspended its enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below. All of these
activities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades and the feed
and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.10
9. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF6 up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its
nuclear facilities11 and that the purpose of enriching UF6 up to 20% U-235 is the manufacture of fuel
for research reactors.12
10. Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities:
􀁸 8271 kg (+660 kg since the Director General’s previous report) of UF6 enriched up to
5% U-235, of which 5974 kg remain in the form of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-23513 and the
rest has been further processed (as detailed in paras 19 and 25–27 below); and
􀁸 280 kg (+47 kg since the Director General’s previous report) of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235,
of which 167 kg remain in the form of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-23514 and the rest has been
further processed (as detailed in para. 45 below).
D.1. Natanz
11. Fuel Enrichment Plant: FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched
uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is
divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to design information submitted by
Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit, which totals
approximately 25 000 centrifuges in 144 cascades. Iran has yet to provide the corresponding design
information for Production Hall B.
__________________________________________________________________________________
9 All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.
10 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material (e.g. some waste and samples) may not be
subject to containment and surveillance.
11 As declared in Iran’s design information questionnaires (DIQs) for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.
12 GOV/2010/10, para. 8; as declared in the DIQ for the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP).
13 This comprises nuclear material in storage, as well as nuclear material in the cold traps and still inside cylinders attached to
the enrichment process.
14 This comprises nuclear material in storage, nuclear material in the cold traps and still inside cylinders attached to the
enrichment process, and nuclear material in cylinders attached to the conversion process.
Annex 18
GOV/2013/6
Page 4
12. As of 19 February 2013, Iran had fully installed 74 cascades in Production Hall A, partially
installed three other cascades and completed preparatory installation work for the other 67 cascades.15
On that date, Iran declared that it was feeding 53 of the fully installed cascades with natural UF6.
13. In a letter dated 23 January 2013, Iran informed the Agency that IR-2m centrifuges “will be
used” in one of the units of Production Hall A.16 At the request of the Agency, Iran, in a letter dated
6 February 2013, provided additional information on the planned cascade configuration for the unit
that would comprise IR-2m centrifuges and provided other related technical information. On
6 February 2013, the Agency observed that Iran had started the installation of IR-2m centrifuges and
empty centrifuge casings. This is the first time that centrifuges more advanced than the IR-1 have been
installed in FEP.
14. As a result of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out by the Agency at FEP between
20 October 2012 and 11 November 2012, the Agency verified, within measurement uncertainties
normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on
21 October 2012.
15. The Agency has confirmed that, as of 21 October 2012, 85 644 kg of natural UF6 had been fed
into the cascades since production began in February 2007, and a total of 7451 kg of UF6 enriched up
to 5% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 22 October 2012 and
3 February 2013, a total of 9106 kg of natural UF6 was fed into the cascades and a total of
approximately 820 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 was produced, which would result in a total
production of 8271 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 since production began.
16. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since
February 2007,17 and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has
operated as declared by Iran in the relevant design information questionnaire (DIQ).
17. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant: PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot
LEU production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade
hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated by Iran for the
production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated by Iran for
R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).
18. Production area: As of 12 February 2013, Iran was continuing to feed low enriched UF6 into two
interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6) containing a total of 328 IR-1 centrifuges.
19. As previously reported,18 the Agency has verified that, as of 15 September 2012, 1119.6 kg of
UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 produced at FEP had been fed into the cascades in the production area
since production began in February 2010, and that a total of 129.1 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20%
U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 16 September 2012 and 12 February 2013,
a total of 145.5 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 produced at FEP was fed into the cascades in the
production area and that approximately 20.8 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced. This
would result in a total production of 149.9 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP since
production began.
__________________________________________________________________________________
15 As of 19 February 2013, 12 669 IR-1 centrifuges (+2255 since the Director General’s previous report) and, in two
cascades, 180 IR-2m centrifuges and empty centrifuge casings were installed in FEP.
16 GOV/INF/2013/3, 30 January 2013.
17 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 7 August 2012.
18 GOV/2012/55, para. 18.
Annex 18
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20. R&D area: Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has installed two new types of
centrifuge (IR-6 and IR-6s) and has been intermittently feeding natural UF6 into them as single
machines. Iran has also been intermittently feeding natural UF6 into IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges,
sometimes into single machines and sometimes into cascades of various sizes.19
21. Between 12 November 2012 and 12 February 2013, a total of approximately 469.2 kg of natural
UF6 was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails
were recombined at the end of the process.
22. In an updated DIQ dated 6 February 2013, Iran informed the Agency that it planned to start
withdrawing from Cascades 4 and 5 the product and the tails separately, rather than recombining them
at the end of the process as it had done previously. The Agency and Iran are discussing how
safeguards measures will need to be modified as a result of the changes in the operation of these
cascades. Iran has agreed not to start operations until such safeguards measures are in place.
23. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP,20 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in
the relevant DIQ.
D.2. Fordow
24. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant: FFEP is, according to the DIQ of 18 January 2012, a
centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of
UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235. Additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this
facility, particularly in light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the
purpose for which it is now being used.21 The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011,
is designed to contain up to 2976 centrifuges in 16 cascades, divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2. To
date, all of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines.22 Iran has yet to inform the Agency which of
the cascades are to be used for enrichment up to 5% U-235 and/or for enrichment up to 20% U-235.23
25. As of 17 February 2013, Iran was continuing to feed four cascades (configured in two sets of two
interconnected cascades) of Unit 2 with UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235;24 none of the other 12 cascades
had been fed with UF6.25
26. Between 17 November 2012 and 3 December 2012, the Agency conducted a PIV at FFEP and
verified that, as of 17 November 2012, a total of 769 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 produced at
FEP had been fed into cascades at FFEP since production began in December 2011, and that 101.2 kg
of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. As a result of this PIV, the Agency verified,
__________________________________________________________________________________
19 On 19 February 2013, there were 29 IR-4 centrifuges, six IR-6 centrifuges and two IR-6s centrifuges installed in
Cascade 2, nine IR-2m centrifuges and two IR-1 centrifuges installed in Cascade 3, 164 IR-4 centrifuges installed in
Cascade 4 and 162 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 5.
20 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 22 October 2012.
21 GOV/2009/74, paras 7 and 14; GOV/2012/9, para. 24. To date, Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three
revised DIQs. Each of the DIQs has stated a different purpose for the facility.
22 As of 17 February 2013, 2710 centrifuges were installed at FFEP (–74 since the Director General’s previous report).
23 In a letter to the Agency dated 23 May 2012, Iran stated that the Agency would be notified about the production level of
the cascades prior to their operation (GOV/2012/23, para. 25).
24 The number of centrifuges being fed (696) remains unchanged from that reflected in the Director General’s previous report
(GOV/2012/55, para. 23).
25 As of 17 February 2013, all eight cascades in Unit 1, and three of the four remaining cascades in Unit 2, had been
subjected to vacuum testing and made ready for feeding with UF6. The fourth cascade in Unit 2 was incomplete.
Annex 18
GOV/2013/6
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within measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear
material as declared by Iran on 17 November 2012.
27. Iran has estimated that between 18 November 2012 and 10 February 2013, a total of 210.1 kg of
UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 was fed into cascades at FFEP, and that approximately 28.7 kg of UF6
enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced. This would result in a total production of 129.9 kg of UF6
enriched up to 20% U-235 since production began, 125.3 kg of which have been withdrawn from the
process and verified by the Agency.
28. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP,26 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in its
most recent DIQ for FFEP.
D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities
29. Iran has not provided a substantive response to Agency requests for further information in
relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment
facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided.27 Nor has Iran provided
information, as requested by the Agency, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010
that it possessed laser enrichment technology.28 As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those
issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.
E. Reprocessing Activities
30. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is
obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.29 Iran has stated that it “does not have
reprocessing activities”.30
31. The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR)31 and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.32 The
Agency carried out an inspection and design information verification (DIV) at TRR on
12 February 2013, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 13 February 2013. It is only with respect to TRR,
the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the Agency can confirm
that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.
__________________________________________________________________________________
26 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 28 October 2012.
27 ‘Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites’, Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.
28 Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at
http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255.
29 S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1;
S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.
30 Letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008.
31 TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of
targets and for research and training purposes.
32 The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium,
irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.
Annex 18
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F. Heavy Water Related Projects
32. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the ongoing construction of the
heavy water moderated research reactor at Arak, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor),
which is under Agency safeguards.33
33. On 11 February 2013, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed
that the installation of cooling and moderator circuit piping was almost complete. As previously
reported, Iran has stated that the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is expected to commence in the first
quarter of 2014.34
34. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency has
not been provided with further access to the plant. As a result, the Agency is again relying only on
satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the plant appears to continue
to be in operation. To date, Iran has not permitted the Agency to take samples of the heavy water
stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF).35 Since the Director General’s previous report, the
Agency has reiterated its requests to Iran for access to HWPP and for the taking of samples of the
aforementioned heavy water. Iran has again not provided the requested access.
G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication
35. Although Iran is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related
projects, it is conducting a number of activities at UCF, the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) and the
Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of
those obligations, notwithstanding that the facilities are under Agency safeguards.
36. Since Iran began conversion and fuel fabrication at its declared facilities, it has, inter alia:
􀁸 Produced 550 tonnes of natural UF6 at UCF,36 of which 107 tonnes have been transferred to
FEP;
􀁸 Fed into the R&D conversion process at UCF 53 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.34% U-235 and
produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of UO2;37
􀁸 Fed into the conversion process at FPFP 111 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (+28.3 kg
since the Director General’s previous report) and produced 50 kg of uranium in the form of
U3O8; and
􀁸 Transferred to TRR five fuel assemblies containing uranium enriched up to 20% U-235 and two
fuel assemblies containing uranium enriched to 3.34% U-235.
__________________________________________________________________________________
33 S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4;
S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.
34 GOV/2012/55, para. 29.
35 GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and 21.
36 GOV/2012/37, para. 33.
37 GOV/2012/55, para. 35.
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37. Uranium Conversion Facility: As a result of the PIV carried out by the Agency at UCF in
March 2012 and following the receipt of further information from Iran,38 the Agency verified, within
measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material
as declared by Iran on 2 March 2012.
38. Since the previous report, Iran has informed the Agency that it intends to conduct R&D
conversion activities involving the use of natural UF6 for the production of UO2.39
39. According to Iran, as of 3 February 2013, it had produced 9056 kg of natural uranium in the form
of UO2 through the conversion of uranium ore concentrate. As of 5 February 2013, the Agency had
verified that Iran had transferred 3823 kg of this UO2 to FMP.
40. Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has informed the Agency that it has recovered
– in the form of liquid scrap, sludge and solid waste – the majority of the nuclear material that spilled
onto the floor of the facility when a storage tank ruptured last year.40 The Agency is currently
assessing Iran’s declaration.
41. Fuel Manufacturing Plant: As a result of the PIV carried out by the Agency at FMP between
4 and 6 September 2012, the Agency verified, within measurement uncertainties normally associated
with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 4 September 2012.
42. On 26 November 2012, the Agency verified a prototype IR-40 natural uranium fuel assembly
before its transfer to TRR for irradiation testing.
43. On 9 and 11 February 2013, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and
confirmed that the manufacture of pellets for the IR-40 Reactor using natural UO2 was ongoing.
44. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant: As a result of the PIV carried out by the Agency at FPFP
on 29 September 2012, the Agency verified, within measurement uncertainties normally associated
with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on that date.
45. On 27 September 2012, Iran suspended converting UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8 at
FPFP. Iran has estimated that, between 2 December 2012, when it resumed such conversion activities,
and 11 February 2013, 28.3 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were fed into the conversion process
at FPFP and 12 kg of uranium were produced in the form of U3O8. This would bring the total amount
of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 which had been fed into the conversion process to 111 kg and the
total amount of uranium in the form of U3O8 which had been produced to 50 kg.41
46. On 12 and 13 February 2013, the Agency verified seven fuel assemblies and 95 fuel plates
present at the facility.
__________________________________________________________________________________
38 GOV/2012/55, para. 33.
39 Iran had previously conducted similar R&D conversion activities using UF6 enriched up to 3.34% U-235
(GOV/2012/55, para. 35).
40 GOV/2012/55, para. 36.
41 GOV/2012/55, para. 38. In addition, approximately 1.6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 have been blended with
natural UF6 at PFEP (GOV/2012/23, para. 19).
Annex 18
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H. Possible Military Dimensions
47. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible
military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.42 Since
2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of
undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities
related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. Iran has dismissed the Agency’s
concerns, largely on the grounds that Iran considers them to be based on unfounded allegations.43
48. The Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed
analysis of the information available to the Agency, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that
are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information is assessed by the
Agency to be, overall, credible.44 Since November 2011, the Agency has obtained more information
which further corroborates the analysis contained in the aforementioned Annex.
49. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligations to take the steps
required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to
cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to
concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing
access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.45 As
indicated in Section B above, since the publication of the Director General’s November 2011 report,
although the Board has adopted two resolutions addressing the urgent need to resolve outstanding
issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude
the existence of possible military dimensions, it has not been possible to finalize the structured
approach document or to begin substantive work in this regard.
50. Parchin: As stated in the Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report,46 information
provided to the Agency by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives
containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments;47 such experiments would be
strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development. The information also indicates that the
containment vessel was installed at the Parchin site in 2000. The location at the Parchin site of the
vessel was only identified in March 2011, and the Agency notified Iran of that location in January
2012.
51. As previously reported, satellite imagery available to the Agency for the period from
February 2005 to January 2012 shows virtually no activity at or near the building housing the
containment vessel (chamber building). Since the Agency’s first request for access to this location,
however, satellite imagery shows that extensive activities and resultant changes have taken place at
__________________________________________________________________________________
42 See, for example: GOV/2011/65, paras 38–45 and Annex; GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment;
GOV/2010/10, paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and
Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35–42.
43 GOV/2012/9, para. 8.
44 GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section B.
45 S/RES/1929, paras 2 and 3.
46 GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 49.
47 GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 47.
Annex 18
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Page 10
this location.48 The Agency has reiterated during each round of talks with Iran its request for access to
the location at the Parchin site, but Iran has not acceded to that request.
52. Among the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location since the
Director General’s report in November 2012 are:
􀁸 Reinstatement of some of the chamber building’s features (e.g. wall panels and exhaust
piping);
􀁸 Alterations to the roofs of the chamber building and the other large building;
􀁸 Dismantlement and reconstruction of the annex to the other large building;
􀁸 Construction of one small building at the same place where a building of similar size had
previously been demolished;
􀁸 Spreading, levelling and compacting of another layer of material over a large area; and
􀁸 Installation of a fence that divides the location into two areas.
53. As previously reported, Iran has stated that the allegation of nuclear activities at the Parchin site
is “baseless” and that “the recent activities claimed to be conducted in the vicinity of the location of
interest to the Agency, has nothing to do with specified location by the Agency”.49 To date, Iran has
only provided an explanation for the soil displacement by trucks, which it stated was “due to
constructing the Parchin new road”.50
54. In light of the extensive activities that have been, and continue to be, undertaken by Iran at the
aforementioned location on the Parchin site, when the Agency gains access to the location, its ability
to conduct effective verification will have been seriously undermined. While the Agency continues to
assess that it is necessary to have access to this location without further delay, it is essential that Iran
also provide without further delay substantive answers to the Agency’s detailed questions regarding
the Parchin site and the foreign expert,51 as requested by the Agency in February 2012.52
I. Design Information
55. Contrary to its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the
Security Council, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.53 It is important to note that the absence
of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards
__________________________________________________________________________________
48 For a list of the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location between February 2012 and the
publication of the Director General’s November 2012 report, see GOV/2012/55, para. 44.
49 GOV/2012/37, para. 43.
50 INFCIRC/847, 20 December 2012, para. 58.
51 GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 44.
52 GOV/2012/9, para. 8.
53 In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed
unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the
Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General’s reports (see, for example,
GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by
operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to “comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1”.
Annex 18
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arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other
nuclear facilities.54
56. Contrary to Iran’s obligations under the modified Code 3.1, Iran has not provided the Agency
with an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor since 2006. The lack of up-to-date information is having
an adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the design of the facility and to
implement an effective safeguards approach.55
57. Iran’s response to Agency requests that Iran confirm, or provide further information regarding, its
stated intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the
required information in “due time” rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.56
J. Additional Protocol
58. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is
not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible
assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran
provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional
Protocol.57
K. Other Matters
59. The Agency and Iran continue to discuss the discrepancy between the amount of nuclear material
declared by the operator and that measured by the Agency in connection with conversion experiments
carried out by Iran at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) between 1995 and
2002.58
60. On 12 February 2013, three fuel assemblies that had been produced in Iran and which contain
nuclear material that was enriched in Iran up to 3.5% and up to 20% U-235 were in the core of TRR.59
61. On 26 and 27 November 2012, the Agency conducted a PIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
(BNPP) and verified that the fuel assemblies that previously had been transferred to the spent fuel
__________________________________________________________________________________
54 GOV/2010/10, para. 35.
55 GOV/2012/37, para. 46.
56 GOV/2011/29, para. 37; GOV/2012/23, para. 29.
57 Iran’s Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003,
although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003
and February 2006.
58 GOV/2003/75, paras 20–25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32, and Annex, paras 10–12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, and
Annex, paras 1–7; GOV/2011/65, para. 49.
59 On 12 February 2013, the core of TRR comprised a total of 33 fuel assemblies.
Annex 18
GOV/2013/6
Page 12
pond had since been reloaded into the reactor core.60 During an inspection conducted by the Agency at
BNPP on 16 and 17 February 2013, Iran informed the Agency that the reactor was shut down.
L. Summary
62. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the
nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing
the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is
unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in
Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.61
63. Iran has started the installation of more advanced centrifuges (IR-2m) at FEP for the first time.
64. Contrary to the Board resolutions of November 2011 and September 2012 and despite the
intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012 in nine rounds of talks, it has not
been possible to agree on the structured approach. The Director General is unable to report any
progress on the clarification of outstanding issues, including those relating to possible military
dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
65. It is a matter of concern that the extensive and significant activities which have taken place since
February 2012 at the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has repeatedly requested
access will have seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to undertake effective verification. The
Agency reiterates its request that Iran, without further delay, provide both access to that location and
substantive answers to the Agency’s detailed questions regarding the Parchin site and the foreign
expert.
66. Given the nature and extent of credible information available, the Agency continues to consider it
essential for Iran to engage with the Agency without further delay on the substance of the Agency’s
concerns. In the absence of such engagement, the Agency will not be able to resolve concerns about
issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude
the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
67. The Director General continues to urge Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its
Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations and to engage with the Agency to achieve concrete
results on all outstanding substantive issues, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of
Governors and the mandatory Security Council resolutions.
68. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
__________________________________________________________________________________
60 GOV/2012/55, para. 52.
61 The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which
corresponds to Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the
non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in
the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49 and GOV/OR.865, paras. 53-54).
Annex 18
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Page 2
A. Introduction
1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security
Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement1 and relevant provisions of
Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). It contains information, inter alia,
regarding the implementation of measures under the “Joint Statement on a Framework for
Cooperation” (the Framework for Cooperation) and the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), as extended.2
2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its
resolutions3 are binding on Iran.4 The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council
resolutions5 were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and are mandatory, in
accordance with the terms of those resolutions.6 The full implementation of Iran’s obligations is
needed in order to ensure international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear
programme.
3. As previously reported, on 11 November 2013 the Agency and Iran signed a “Joint Statement on
a Framework for Cooperation” (GOV/INF/2013/14). In the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency
and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the
Agency to resolve all present and past issues, and to proceed with such activities in a step by step
manner. The practical measures agreed to date in relation to the Framework for Cooperation are listed
in Annex I.
4. As previously reported, in a separate development, on 24 November 2013 China, France,
Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (E3+3)
agreed on the JPA with Iran. The JPA, inter alia, stated that the “goal for these negotiations is to reach
a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will
be exclusively peaceful”.7,8 According to the JPA, which took effect on 20 January 2014, the first step
would be time-bound (six months) and renewable by mutual consent. As requested by the E3+3 and
Iran, and endorsed by the Board of Governors (subject to the availability of funds), the Agency
undertook the necessary nuclear-related monitoring and verification activities in relation to the JPA,
involving activities additional to those already being carried out pursuant to Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions.
5. On 24 July 2014, the E3/EU+3 and Iran informed the Agency of the extension of the JPA until
24 November 2014 and requested it to continue to undertake the necessary nuclear related monitoring
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
1 The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.
2 GOV/INF/2014/18.
3 Between September 2003 and September 2012, the Board of Governors adopted 12 resolutions in connection with the
implementation of safeguards in Iran (see GOV/2013/56, footnote 2).
4 Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).
5 GOV/2013/56, footnote 4.
6 Part I.A of the Agency’s Relationship Agreement with the United Nations (INFCIRC/11).
7 GOV/2014/2, para. 2.
8 The JPA also stated that a Joint Commission would work with the Agency to “facilitate resolution of past and present issues
of concern”.
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and verification activities in relation to the JPA, “including monitoring of fuel fabrication” for the
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), and downblending of Iran’s UF6 “enriched up to 2%”.9
6. Based on the endorsement by the Board of Governors, at its meeting on 24 January 2014, of the
Agency undertaking monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in
the JPA, the Agency will continue to implement such monitoring and verification in relation to the
JPA, as extended. In this regard, an additional sum of one million euros was required for the
continuation of the Agency’s monitoring and verification activities in relation to the extension
of the JPA.10 As of the beginning of September 2014, approximately 0.3 million euros had
been pledged.
7. This report addresses developments since the Director General’s previous report (GOV/2014/28),
as well as issues of longer standing.11
B. Clarification of Unresolved Issues
8. The Board of Governors, in its resolution of November 2011 (GOV/2011/69), stressed that it was
essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all
outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues,
including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In its
resolution of September 2012 (GOV/2012/50), the Board of Governors decided that Iranian
cooperation with Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues was essential and
urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme.
9. Since the Director General’s previous report and as requested by the Agency, Iran has provided
some additional clarifications in respect of the practical measure in the second step of the Framework
for Cooperation that relates to exploding bridge wire (EBW) detonators (see para. 65 below). On the
basis of its analysis of the information provided by Iran in relation to the other six practical measures
in the second step, the Agency currently has not identified any outstanding issues in relation to that
information.
10. As part of the effort to advance high-level dialogue and to further cooperation between the
Agency and Iran, the Director General held meetings in Tehran on 17 August 2014 with the President
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, H.E. Hassan Rouhani, the Vice-President and Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, H.E. Ali Akbar Salehi, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mohammad Javad Zarif. In these meetings, the Director General stressed the importance of the
timely implementation of the Framework for Cooperation. The Director General noted Iran’s
statement of its firm commitment, expressed at a high level, to the implementation of the Framework
for Cooperation. The Director General further noted Iran’s stated willingness to accelerate the
resolution of all outstanding issues.
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
9 GOV/INF/2014/18, para. 1.
10 GOV/INF/2014/18, para. 4.
11 The Director General continues to provide the Board of Governors with monthly updates on Iran’s implementation of
“voluntary measures” undertaken in relation to the JPA, the seventh of which was provided in GOV/INF/2014/19.
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11. In relation to EBW detonators, the Director General noted that Iran had provided information and
explanations to the Agency on Iran’s decision in early 2000 to develop safe detonators. He noted that
Iran had also provided information and explanations to the Agency on Iran’s work after 2007 related
to the application of EBW detonators in the oil and gas industry which was not inconsistent with
specialized industry practices. The Director General further noted that the Agency would need to
consider all past outstanding issues, including EBW detonators, integrating all of them in a “system”
and assessing the “system” as a whole.
12. During technical meetings in Tehran on 16 and 17 August 2014, Iranian and Agency officials
discussed how to move ahead with the existing practical measures, including the five practical
measures in the third step of the Framework for Cooperation agreed in May 2014. The Agency also
proposed discussions on new practical measures, to be taken up as the next step in the Framework for
Cooperation.
13. On 25 August 2014, the Agency wrote four letters to Iran aimed at moving the process forward.
The Agency proposed, inter alia, that a meeting be held in Tehran before the end of August to allow
Iran and the Agency to address the five practical measures in the third step of the Framework for
Cooperation. The Agency also invited Iran to propose new practical measures to address the concerns
expressed by the Agency in the Annex to GOV/2011/65.
14. Iran has implemented three of the five practical measures agreed with the Agency in the third
step of the Framework for Cooperation, two of which were implemented after the agreed deadline of
25 August 2014, as follows:
􀁸 Provided mutually agreed information and arranged a technical visit to a centrifuge research
and development centre (on 30 August 2014).
􀁸 Provided mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops,
centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities (the most recent of which took
place on 18, 19 and 20 August 2014).
􀁸 Concluded the safeguards approach for the IR-40 Reactor (on 31 August 2014).
The Agency confirms that Iran has implemented these practical measures in the third step of the
Framework for Cooperation and the Agency is analysing the information provided by Iran.
15. In a letter dated 28 August 2014, Iran, inter alia, indicated its readiness to host a technical
meeting with the Agency in Tehran on 31 August 2014. At this meeting, Iran began discussions with
the Agency on the other two practical measures in the third step of the Framework for Cooperation
relating to the initiation of high explosives and to neutron transport calculations (see Annex I). It was
agreed that another technical meeting would be convened.
16. In its aforementioned letter of 28 August 2014, Iran also proposed that a road map be developed
before any new measures are identified. In its reply dated 4 September 2014, the Agency reiterated its
invitation to Iran (see para. 13 above) to propose new practical measures in relation to the Framework
for Cooperation, in order to address the concerns expressed by the Agency in the Annex to
GOV/2011/65, without further delay. New practical measures have yet to be proposed.
17. Iran’s engagement with the Agency, including the provision of information, and the Agency’s
ongoing analysis are helping the Agency to gain a better understanding of Iran’s nuclear programme.
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C. Facilities Declared under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
18. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 18 nuclear facilities and nine
locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs)12 (Annex II).
Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are
contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated
below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at these facilities
and LOFs.
D. Enrichment Related Activities
19. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
not suspended all of its enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below.
However, since 20 January 2014, Iran has not produced UF6 enriched above 5% U-235 and all of its
stock of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 has been further processed through downblending or
conversion. All of the enrichment related activities at Iran’s declared facilities are under Agency
safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades, and feed and withdrawal stations at
those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.13
20. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF6 up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its
nuclear facilities.14 Iran has also stated that the purpose of enriching UF6 up to 20% U-235 is the
manufacture of fuel for research reactors.15
21. Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities:
􀁸 12 772 kg (+795 kg since the Director General’s previous report) of UF6 enriched up to
5% U-235, of which 7765 kg (–710 kg since the Director General’s previous report)16 remain
in the form of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-23517 and the rest has been further processed
(see Annex III); and
􀁸 Up to the point at which it stopped producing UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, 447.8 kg of
such nuclear material, all of which has been further processed through downblending or
conversion into uranium oxide18 (see Annex III).
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
12 All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.
13 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material (e.g. some waste and samples) may not be
subject to containment and surveillance.
14 As declared by Iran in its design information questionnaires (DIQs) for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.
15 GOV/2010/10, para. 8; and as declared by Iran in its DIQ for the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP).
16 These figures include 115.6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 that has been produced from the downblending of UF6
enriched up to 20% U-235.
17 This comprises nuclear material in storage as well as nuclear material in the cold traps and inside cylinders still attached to
the enrichment process.
18 Apart from 0.6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, which is under Agency seal at Iran’s declared enrichment facilities
where the nuclear material had been used as reference material for mass spectrometry.
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D.1. Natanz
22. Fuel Enrichment Plant: FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched
uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is
divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted
by Iran, eight units, each containing 18 cascades, are planned for Production Hall A, which totals
approximately 25 000 centrifuges in 144 cascades. Currently, one unit contains IR-2m centrifuges;
five contain IR-1 centrifuges; and the other two units do not contain centrifuges. Iran has yet to
provide the corresponding design information for Production Hall B.
23. In the unit containing IR-2m centrifuges, as of 13 August 2014, the situation remained
unchanged from the Director General’s previous report: six cascades had been fully installed with
IR-2m centrifuges;19 none of these cascades had been fed with natural UF6; and preparatory
installation work had been completed for the other 12 IR-2m cascades in the unit.
24. In the five units containing IR-1 centrifuges, as of 13 August 2014, the situation remained
unchanged from the Director General’s previous report: 90 cascades had been fully installed,20 of
which 54 were being fed with natural UF6.21 As previously reported, preparatory installation work had
been completed for 36 IR-1 cascades in the two units not containing centrifuges.
25. As of 12 August 2014, Iran had fed 141 513 kg of natural UF6 into the cascades at FEP since
production began in February 2007 and produced a total of 12 464 kg of UF6 enriched up to
5% U-235.
26. On 17 August 2014, Iran informed the Agency that it would downblend about 4118 kg of
UF6 enriched up to 2% U-235 to natural uranium.22
27. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP,23 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in
the relevant design information questionnaire (DIQ).
28. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant: PFEP is a pilot LEU production, and research and development
(R&D) facility that was first brought into operation in October 2003. It can accommodate six
cascades, and is divided between an area designated by Iran for the production of UF6 enriched up to
20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated by Iran for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).
29. Production area: As indicated in the Director General’s previous report, Iran has ceased feeding
Cascades 1 and 6 with UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 and is feeding them with natural UF6 instead.24
On 8 February 2014, Iran provided an update to parts of the DIQ in which it stated that it had taken
measures “due to change in level of enrichment” and that the measures “are temporarily taken during
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
19 The number of IR-2m centrifuges installed at FEP (1008) was also unchanged.
20 The number of IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (15 420) was also unchanged.
21 GOV/2014/10, para. 22. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that no
more than the 54 IR-1 cascades (containing 9156 centrifuges) are being fed with nuclear material at FEP.
22 This relates to one of Iran’s undertakings in the JPA. The nuclear material originates from the tails produced by the
enrichment of UF6 up to 20% U-235 and from nuclear material evacuated from the cascades producing UF6 enriched up to
5% U-235, and is not included in the amount of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 indicated in para. 25.
23 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 14 May 2014.
24 As of 26 August 2014, Cascades 1 and 6 contained a total of 328 IR-1 centrifuges (unchanged).
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the first step implementation of the JPA”.25 Since the JPA took effect, Iran has not operated
Cascades 1 and 6 in an interconnected configuration.26
30. As of 20 January 2014, when it ceased production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, Iran had fed
1630.8 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into Cascades 1 and 6 since production began in
February 2010 and had produced a total of 201.9 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, all of which
has since been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency. Between 20 January 2014 and
18 August 2014, Iran fed 519.2 kg of natural UF6 into Cascades 1 and 6 at PFEP and produced a total
of 49.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235.
31. R&D area: Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding
natural UF6 into IR-6s centrifuges as single machines and into IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges,
sometimes into single machines and sometimes into cascades of various sizes.27 The single installed
IR-5 centrifuge has yet to be fed with UF6. As previously reported, the Agency confirms that a
“casing” remains in place but without connections.28
32. Between 6 May 2014 and 18 August 2014, a total of approximately 397.8 kg of natural UF6 was
fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails were
recombined at the end of the process.
33. Between 20 January 2014 and 20 July 2014, Iran downblended 108.4 kg of its inventory of UF6
enriched up to 20% U-235.29
34. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at PFEP,30 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in
the relevant DIQ.
D.2. Fordow
35. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant: FFEP is, according to the DIQ of 18 January 2012, a
centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of
UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235.31 The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011, is
designed to contain up to 2976 centrifuges in 16 cascades, divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2. To date,
all of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. On 8 February 2014, Iran provided an update to
parts of the DIQ in which it stated that it had taken measures “due to change in level of enrichment”
and that the measures “are temporarily taken during the first step implementation of the JPA”.32
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
25 Iran and the E3/EU+3 have since agreed to extend the JPA.
26 GOV/2014/10, para. 28. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that
Cascades 1 and 6 are not interconnected.
27 On 26 August 2014, there were 14 IR-4 centrifuges, seven IR-6 centrifuges, one IR-5 centrifuge, one IR-2m centrifuge,
three IR-1 centrifuges and no IR-6s centrifuges installed in Cascade 2; 14 IR-1 centrifuges and ten IR-4 centrifuges installed
in Cascade 3; 164 IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 4; and 162 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 5.
28 GOV/2014/10, para. 30.
29 By 20 July 2014, in line with the JPA, the downblending process had been completed.
30 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 9 April 2014.
31 GOV/2009/74, paras 7 and 14; GOV/2012/9, para. 24. Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised
DIQs with different stated purposes for FFEP. In light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and
the purpose for which it is now being used, additional information from Iran is still required.
32 Iran and the E3/EU+3 have since agreed to extend the JPA.
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36. As indicated in the Director General’s previous report, Iran has ceased feeding UF6 enriched up
to 5% U-235 into the four cascades of Unit 2 previously used for this purpose and is feeding them with
natural UF6 instead. Since the JPA took effect, Iran has not operated these cascades in an
interconnected configuration.33 None of the other 12 cascades in FFEP had been fed with UF6.34
37. As a result of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out by the Agency at FFEP
between 18 January and 2 February 2014, the Agency verified, within measurement uncertainties
normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on
20 January 2014.
38. As of 20 January 2014, when it ceased production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, Iran had fed
1806 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the cascades at FFEP since production began in
December 2011 and had produced a total of 245.9 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, all of which
has since been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency. Between 20 January 2014 and
17 August 2014, Iran fed 1349.7 kg of natural UF6 into the cascades at FFEP and produced a total of
142.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235.
39. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP,35 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in
the relevant DIQ.
D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities
40. Iran continues to provide the Agency with regular managed access to centrifuge assembly
workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.36 Such access, as well as
associated mutually agreed information, was also provided by Iran pursuant to one of the practical
measures agreed in relation to the Framework for Cooperation (see para. 14 above). As part of this
managed access, Iran has also provided the Agency with an inventory of centrifuge rotor assemblies to
be used to replace those centrifuges that fail. The Agency has analysed the information provided by
Iran and, upon request, has received additional clarifications. Since the JPA took effect, based on
analysis of all the information provided by Iran, as well as the managed access and other verification
activities carried out by the Agency, the Agency can confirm that centrifuge rotor manufacturing and
assembly are consistent with Iran’s replacement programme for damaged centrifuges.37
41. Pursuant to one of the practical measures agreed in relation to the third step of the Framework for
Cooperation (see para. 14 above), Iran provided mutually agreed information and arranged a technical
visit by the Agency to a centrifuge research and development centre, which the Agency carried out on
30 August 2014.
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
33 GOV/2014/10, para. 36. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures at FFEP to confirm
that only the four IR-1 cascades are used to enrich UF6 and that they are not interconnected.
34 The number of centrifuges installed at FFEP (2710) was also unchanged.
35 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 19 May 2014.
36 This relates to one of Iran’s undertakings in the JPA.
37 This relates to one of Iran’s undertakings in the JPA.
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E. Reprocessing Activities
42. Iran is required, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security
Council, to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.38 As previously reported, Iran stated in
January 2014 that “during the first step time-bound (six months), Iran will not engage in stages of
reprocessing activities, or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing”.39 In a letter to the
Agency dated 27 August 2014, Iran indicated that this “voluntary measure” had been extended in line
with the extension of the JPA.
43. The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR40 and the Molybdenum, Iodine
and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.41 The Agency carried out a PIV and a design
information verification (DIV) at TRR on 12 August 2014, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 13
August 2014. The Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities with
respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access in Iran.
F. Heavy Water Related Projects
44. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
not suspended work on all heavy water related projects.42 However, since the JPA took effect, Iran has
neither installed any major components at the IR-40 Reactor nor produced nuclear fuel assemblies for
the IR-40 Reactor at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) (see para. 57 below).
45. IR-40 Reactor: The IR-40 Reactor, which is under Agency safeguards, is a 40 MW heavy water
moderated research reactor designed to contain 150 fuel assemblies containing natural uranium in the
form of UO2.
46. On 11 August 2014, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor and observed that, since
the Director General’s previous report, none of the reactor’s remaining major components had been
installed.43 Pursuant to one of the practical measures agreed in relation to the Framework for
Cooperation, as indicated earlier (para. 14 above), on 31 August 2014 Iran concluded with the Agency
a safeguards approach for the IR-40 Reactor.
47. Heavy Water Production Plant: The Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) is a facility for
the production of heavy water with a design capacity to produce 16 tonnes of reactor-grade heavy
water per year.
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
38 GOV/2013/56, footnote 28.
39 This relates to one of Iran’s undertakings in the JPA.
40 The TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types
of targets and for research and training purposes.
41 The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium,
irradiated at TRR.
42 GOV/2013/56, footnote 32.
43 GOV/2013/56, para. 34.
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48. As previously reported, although the HWPP is not under Agency safeguards, the plant was
subject to managed access by the Agency on 8 December 2013.44 During the managed access, Iran
also provided the Agency with mutually agreed relevant information. In addition, access to the heavy
water storage location at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan has enabled the Agency
to characterize the heavy water.45
G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication
49. Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF, EUPP, FMP and the Fuel Plate Fabrication
Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of its obligations to suspend
all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, notwithstanding that the facilities are
under Agency safeguards.
50. Since Iran began conversion and fuel fabrication at its declared facilities, it has, inter alia:
􀁸 Produced 550 tonnes of natural UF6 at UCF, of which 163 tonnes have been transferred to
FEP.
􀁸 Transferred four tonnes of natural UF6 from UCF to EUPP.46 In addition, 4.3 tonnes of UF6
enriched up to 5% U-235 have been transferred from FEP to EUPP.
􀁸 Fed into the conversion process at EUPP 1505 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235.
􀁸 Fed into the R&D conversion process at UCF 53 kg of UF6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 and
produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of UO2.47
􀁸 Fed into the conversion process at FPFP 337.2 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (+34.0 kg
since the Director General’s previous report) and produced 162.3 kg of uranium in the form of
U3O8.
51. Uranium Conversion Facility: UCF is a conversion facility for the production of both natural
UF6 and natural UO2 from uranium ore concentrate (UOC). It is planned that UCF will also produce
UF4 from depleted UF6, and uranium metal ingots from natural and depleted UF4.
52. On 26 July 2014, Iran informed the Agency that Iran would conduct R&D activities at UCF on
uranium recovery from liquid and solid scrap resulting from conversion activities at UCF.
53. Between 17 and 21 May 2014, the Agency conducted a PIV at UCF, the results of which are
being evaluated by the Agency.
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
44 GOV/2014/10, para. 13.
45 GOV/2013/56, para. 39.
46 GOV/2013/40, footnote 44.
47 GOV/2012/55, para. 35.
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54. Iran has declared that, as of 10 August 2014, it had produced 13.8 tonnes48 of natural uranium in
the form of UO2 through the conversion of UOC.49 The Agency has verified that, as of the same date,
Iran had transferred 13.2 tonnes50 of natural uranium in the form of UO2 to FMP.
55. Enriched UO2 Powder Plant: EUPP is a facility for the conversion of UF6 enriched up to
5% U-235 into UO2 powder.51 As indicated in the Director General’s previous report, Iran began
commissioning the facility in May 2014 using natural uranium. As part of the commissioning, as of
30 August 2014, Iran had fed a total of 2790 kg of natural UF6 into the conversion process and
produced 167 kg of uranium in the form of UO2. In July 2014, the plant began operations, since which
time Iran has fed 1505 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process for the
production of UO2.52
56. Fuel Manufacturing Plant: FMP is a facility for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for
power and research reactors (see Annex III).
57. On 16 and 17 August 2014, the Agency conducted an inspection and a DIV at FMP and verified
that Iran had continued its cessation of production of nuclear fuel assemblies using natural UO2 for the
IR-40 Reactor and that all of the fuel assemblies that had been produced previously remained at FMP.
58. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant: FPFP is a facility for the conversion of UF6 enriched up to
20% U-235 into U3O8 and the manufacture of fuel assemblies made of fuel plates containing U3O8
(see Annex III).
59. As previously reported, Iran stated in January 2014 that “during the first step of time-bound (six
months), Iran declares that there is no reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide enriched up to
20% U-235 back into UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235”.53 In a letter to the Agency dated
27 August 2014, Iran indicated that this “voluntary measure” had been extended in line with the
extension of the JPA. On 18 and 19 August 2014, the Agency conducted an inspection and a DIV at
FPFP during which it confirmed that there was no process line at the plant for the reconversion of
uranium oxide into UF6.
60. The Agency has verified that, as of 17 August 2014, Iran had fed a total of 337.2 kg of UF6
enriched up to 20% U-235 (227.6 kg of uranium) into the conversion process of FPFP and had
produced 162.3 kg of uranium in the form of U3O8.54 The Agency also verified that 44.0 kg of uranium
were contained in solid and liquid scrap. The remainder of the uranium that was fed into the process
remains in the process and in waste.
61. The Agency has verified that, as of 17 August 2014, Iran had produced at FPFP one experimental
fuel assembly and 27 TRR-type fuel assemblies. Twenty-six of these fuel assemblies, including the
experimental assembly, had been transferred to TRR.
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
48 Unchanged from the figure indicated in the Director General’s previous report.
49 This amount only refers to nuclear material qualified for fuel fabrication.
50 Unchanged from the figure indicated in the Director General’s previous report.
51 GOV/2013/40, para. 45.
52 Pursuant to Iran’s undertaking under the JPA to convert into oxide “UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the six-month
period”.
53 This relates to one of Iran’s undertakings in the JPA.
54 65.2 kg of this nuclear material has been used for the production of fuel items for TRR.
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H. Possible Military Dimensions
62. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible
military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.55 The
Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related
activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a
nuclear payload for a missile. Iran is required to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding
issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s
nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and
documents requested by the Agency.56
63. The Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed
analysis of the information available to the Agency at that time, indicating that Iran has carried out
activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information is
assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible.57 The Agency has obtained more information since
November 2011 that has further corroborated the analysis contained in that Annex.
64. In February 2012, Iran dismissed the Agency’s concerns, largely on the grounds that Iran
considered them to be based on unfounded allegations.58 In a letter to the Agency dated
28 August 2014, Iran stated that “most of the issues” in the Annex to GOV/2011/65 were “mere
allegations and do not merit consideration”.
65. As indicated above (para. 9), one of the seven practical measures agreed in the second step of the
Framework for Cooperation on 20 May 2014 was the provision by Iran of “information and
explanations for the Agency to assess Iran’s stated need or application for the development of
Exploding Bridge Wire detonators”.59 In this regard, as indicated in the Director General’s previous
report, Iran provided the Agency with information and explanations in April 2014 and additional
information and explanations in May 2014, including showing documents, to substantiate its stated
need for the development of EBW detonators and their application. At a technical meeting in Tehran
on 16 August 2014, the Agency asked for additional clarifications, certain of which Iran provided.
66. During the technical meetings on 16 and 17 August 2014, the Agency and Iran also held
discussions on the practical measures relating to the initiation of high explosives and to neutron
transport calculations. As indicated above (para. 15), at the technical meeting in Tehran on
31 August 2014, the Agency and Iran began discussions on these two practical measures and agreed
that another meeting would be convened.
67. Since the Director General’s previous report, at a particular location at the Parchin site, the
Agency has observed through satellite imagery ongoing construction activity that appears to show the
removal/replacement or refurbishment of the site’s two main buildings’ external wall structures. One
of these buildings60 has also had a section of its roof removed and replaced. Observations of deposits
__________________________________________________________________________________
55 For example: GOV/2011/65, paras 38–45 and Annex; GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10,
paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4,
paras 35–42.
56 Security Council resolution 1929, paras 2 and 3.
57 GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section B.
58 GOV/2012/9, para. 8.
59 GOV/2014/10, para. 14.
60 GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 49.
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of material and/or debris, and equipment suggest that construction activity has expanded to two other
site buildings. These activities are likely to have further undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct
effective verification.61 It remains important for Iran to provide answers to the Agency’s questions62
and access to the particular location in question.63
68. As indicated in the Director General’s previous report and as reiterated by the Director General
following his meetings in Tehran on 17 August 2014, the Agency needs to be able to conduct a
“system” assessment of the outstanding issues contained in the Annex to GOV/2011/65. This will
involve considering and acquiring an understanding of each issue in turn, and then integrating all of
the issues into a “system” and assessing that system as a whole.
I. Design Information
69. Under the terms of its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors
and the Security Council, Iran is required to implement the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the
Subsidiary Arrangements General Part concerning the early provision of design information.64
J. Additional Protocol
70. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is
not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible
assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran
provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional
Protocol.65
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
61 For a list of the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location between February 2012 and the
publication of the Director General’s May 2013 report, see GOV/2012/55, para. 44; GOV/2013/6, para. 52; and
GOV/2013/27, para. 55.
62 GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section C; GOV/2012/23, para. 5.
63 The Agency has information provided by Member States indicating that Iran had constructed a large explosives
containment vessel (chamber) at this location in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. Such experiments would be
strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development (GOV/2011/65, Annex, paras 49–51).
64 In a letter dated 29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had suspended implementation of the modified Code 3.1
of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement (GOV/INF/2007/8). In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s
Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the
Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified
Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative para. 5 of Security Council
resolution 1929 (2010).
65 Iran’s Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on
18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol
between December 2003 and February 2006.
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K. Other Matters
71. On 12 August 2014, the Agency confirmed that 12 fuel assemblies which had been produced in
Iran and which contain uranium that was enriched in Iran up to 20% U-235 were in the core of TRR.66
On the same date, the Agency observed that the Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly was in the storage
pool.67
72. As of 13 August 2014, the Agency confirms that one fuel plate, containing a mixture of U3O8 (up
to 20% enriched) and aluminium, remains at the MIX facility, having been transferred from FPFP, and
was being used for R&D activities aimed at optimizing the production of 99Mo, 133Xe and 132I
isotopes.68
73. On 16 and 17 August 2014, the Agency conducted an inspection and a DIV at the Bushehr
Nuclear Power Plant, at which time the reactor was operating at 100% of its nominal power.
74. The visa for one member of the Agency team to visit Iran for the technical meeting in Tehran on
31 August 2014 was not issued. This is the third occasion on which this individual has been unable to
participate in technical meetings in Tehran as a result of Iran not issuing a visa. For the Agency to be
able to address the outstanding issues effectively, it is important that any staff member identified by
the Agency with the requisite expertise is able to participate in the Agency’s technical activities in
Iran.
L. Summary
75. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the
nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not in a
position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities
in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.69
76. Iran has: implemented one of the five practical measures that it agreed with the Agency in the
third step of the Framework for Cooperation by the agreed deadline; implemented two of the five
measures after the deadline; and begun discussions with the Agency on the other two practical
measures.
77. New practical measures to be taken up in the next step in relation to the Framework for
Cooperation have yet to be proposed by Iran.
78. The Director General notes Iran’s statement of its firm commitment, expressed at a high level, to
the implementation of the Framework for Cooperation and of its willingness to accelerate the
__________________________________________________________________________________􀀃
66 On 12 August 2014, the core of TRR comprised a total of 33 fuel assemblies.
67 GOV/2013/40, para. 64.
68 GOV/2013/40, para. 65.
69 The Board of Governors has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that para. 2 of
INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to
seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of
undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49 and GOV/OR.865,
paras 53–54).
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resolution of all outstanding issues. The timely implementation of the Framework for Cooperation is
essential to resolve all outstanding issues.
79. The Agency continues to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related
measures set out in the JPA, as extended.
80. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
􀀃 􀀃
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Annex I
􀀃
Practical Measures agreed to date by the Agency and Iran in relation to the
Framework for Cooperation
􀀃
FIRST STEP: Six (Initial) Practical Measures, agreed on 11 November 2013
1. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in
Bandar Abbas.
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Heavy Water
Production Plant.
3. Providing information on new research reactors.
4. Providing information with regard to the identification of 16 sites designated for the
construction of nuclear power plants.
5. Clarification of the announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities.
6. Further clarification of the announcement made by Iran with respect to laser enrichment
technology.
SECOND STEP: Seven Practical Measures, agreed on 9 February 2014
1. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Saghand mine in
Yazd.
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Ardakan
concentration plant.
3. Submission of an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor.
4. Taking steps to agree with the Agency on the conclusion of a Safeguards Approach for the
IR-40 Reactor.
5. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and arranging for a technical visit to Lashkar
Ab’ad Laser Centre.
6. Providing information on source material, which has not reached the composition and purity
suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, including imports of such
material and on Iran’s extraction of uranium from phosphates.
7. Providing information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran’s stated need or
application for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators.
THIRD STEP: Five Practical Measures, agreed on 20 May 2014
1. Exchanging information with the Agency with respect to the allegations related to the
initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large scale high explosives
experimentation in Iran.
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and explanations related to studies made
and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and
calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.
3. Providing mutually agreed information and arranging a technical visit to a centrifuge research
and development centre.
4. Providing mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly
workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.
5. Concluding the safeguards approach for the IR-40 Reactor.
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Annex II
List of Declared Nuclear Facilities and LOFs in Iran
Tehran:
1. Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
2. Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility
3. Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)
Esfahan:
4. Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)
5. Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)
6. Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)
7. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
8. Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
9. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)
10. Enriched UO2 Powder Plant (EUPP)
Natanz:
11. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
12. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)
Fordow:
13. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)
Arak:
14. Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor)
Karaj:
15. Karaj Waste Storage
Bushehr:
16. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)
Darkhovin:
17. 360 MW Nuclear Power Plant
Shiraz:
18. 10 MW Fars Research Reactor (FRR)
LOFs:
Nine (all situated within hospitals)
􀀃 􀀃
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Annex III
Table 1: Summary of UF6 Production and Flows
Date Quantity Enrichment
Produced at UCF 10 August 2014 550 000 kg Natural
Fed into FEP, PFEP and FFEP August 2014 143 382 kg Natural
Produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP August 2014 12 656.4 kg Up to 5%
Produced by downblending 20 July 2014 115.6 kg Up to 5%
Fed into PFEP 20 January 2014 1630.8 kg Up to 5%
Produced at PFEP 20 January 2014 201.9 kg Up to 20%
Fed into FFEP 20 January 2014 1806.0 kg Up to 5%
Produced at FFEP 20 January 2014 245.9 kg Up to 20%
Table 2: Inventory of UF6 Enriched up to 20% U-235
Produced at FFEP and PFEP 447.8 kg
Fed into conversion process 337.2 kg
Downblended 110.0 kg*
Stored as UF6 0.6 kg**
* The figure includes 1.6 kg that was previously downblended (GOV/2012/55, para. 10).
** See footnote 19 of this report.
Table 3: Conversion at UCF
Conversion process Quantity produced Transferred to FMP
UF6 (~3.4% U-235) into UO2 24 kg U 24 kg U
Natural UOC into UO2 13 792 kg U* 13 229 kg U
* Uranium content in material qualified for fuel fabrication.
Table 4: Conversion of UF6 Enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8 at FPFP
Feed quantity Quantity produced
337.2 kg of UF6 (227.6 kg U) 162.3 kg U
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Table 5: Conversion of UF6 into UO2 at EUPP
Feed quantity Quantity produced
2790 kg of natural UF6 (1883 kg U) 167 kg U*
1505 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 (1016 kg U) - *
* The rest of the nuclear material is in different stages of the process.
Table 6: Fuel Manufacturing at FMP
Item Number
produced Enrichment Item mass
(g U)
Number
irradiated
Test fuel rod for IR-40 Reactor 3 Natural uranium 500 1
Test fuel rod 2 3.4% 500 -
Fuel rod assembly 2 3.4% 6 000 1
Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly 1 Natural uranium 10 000 1
IR-40 prototype fuel assembly 36 Natural uranium 35 500 Not applicable
IR-40 fuel assembly 11 Natural uranium 56 500 -
Table 7: TRR Fuel Fabrication at FPFP
Item Number
produced Enrichment Item mass
(g U)
Present
at TRR Irradiated
TRR test plate (Natural Uranium) 4 Natural
uranium 5 2 1
TRR test plate 5 19% 75 5 2
TRR control fuel assembly 8 19% 1 000 8 5
TRR standard fuel assembly 18 19% 1 400 17 8
Test assembly (with 8 plates) 1 19% 550 1 -
Annex 19
Board of Governors GOV/2011/65
Date: 8 November 2011
Original: English
For official use only
Item 5(c) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2011/63)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of
Security Council resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
A. Introduction
1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security
Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement1 and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).
2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its
resolutions2 are binding on Iran.3 The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council
resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in
accordance with the terms of those resolutions.4
__________________________________________________________________________________
1 The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.
2 The Board of Governors has adopted ten resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69
(12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004);
GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77
(24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); and GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).
3 In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required
by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran’s obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all
outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear
programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement,
including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in
accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (operative paras 1–6).
4 The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007);
1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).
Derestricted 18 November 2011
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 18 November 2011)
Atoms for Peace
Annex 20
( 8 )AEA 􅑸
GOV/2011/65
Page 2
3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations,5 the Agency is required to
cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security. All Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council,6 and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent
with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.
4. In a letter dated 26 May 2011, H.E. Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of Iran and Head of the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), informed the Director General that Iran would be prepared
to receive relevant questions from the Agency on its nuclear activities after a declaration by the Agency
that the work plan (INFCIRC/711) had been fully implemented and that the Agency would thereafter
implement safeguards in Iran in a routine manner. In his reply of 3 June 2011, the Director General
informed Dr Abbasi that the Agency was neither in a position to make such a declaration, nor to conduct
safeguards in Iran in a routine manner, in light of concerns about the existence in Iran of possible military
dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. On 19 September 2011, the Director General met Dr Abbasi in
Vienna, and discussed issues related to the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and other
relevant obligations. In a letter dated 30 September 2011, the Agency reiterated its invitation to Iran to reengage
with the Agency on the outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear
programme and the actions required of Iran to resolve those issues. In a letter dated 30 October 2011,
Dr Abbasi referred to his previous discussions with the Director General and expressed the will of Iran “to
remove ambiguities, if any”, suggesting that the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG),
should visit Iran for discussions. In his reply, dated 2 November 2011, the Director General indicated his
preparedness to send the DDG-SG to “discuss the issues identified” in his forthcoming report to the Board
of Governors.
5. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2011/54, 2 September 2011), as well
as issues of longer standing, and, in line with the Director General’s opening remarks to the Board of
Governors on 12 September 2011, contains an Annex setting out in more detail the basis for the Agency’s
concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. The report focuses on those
areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these
obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s
nuclear programme.
B. Facilities Declared under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
6. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 15 nuclear facilities and nine
locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).7 Notwithstanding that
certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant
resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues
to implement safeguards at these facilities and LOFs.
__________________________________________________________________________________
5 The Agreement Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and the IAEA entered into force on 14 November 1957,
following approval by the General Conference, upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, and approval by the General
Assembly of the United Nations. It is reproduced in INFCIRC/11 (30 October 1959), Part I.A.
6 The Charter of the United Nations, Article 25.
7 All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.
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C. Enrichment Related Activities
7. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not
suspended its enrichment related activities in the following declared facilities, all of which are
nevertheless under Agency safeguards.
C.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
8. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP): There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and
Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for
Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has yet been provided
for Production Hall B.
9. As of 2 November 2011, 54 cascades were installed in three of the eight units in Production Hall A,
37 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with UF6.8 Whereas initially each installed cascade
comprised 164 centrifuges, Iran has subsequently modified 15 of the cascades to contain 174 centrifuges
each. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. As of 2 November 2011, installation work in
the remaining five units was ongoing, but no centrifuges had been installed, and there had been no
installation work in Production Hall B.
10. Between 15 October and 8 November 2011, the Agency conducted a physical inventory verification
(PIV) at FEP, the results of which the Agency is currently evaluating.
11. Iran has estimated that, between 18 October 2010 and 1 November 2011, it produced 1787 kg of low
enriched UF6, which would result in a total production of 4922 kg of low enriched UF6 since production
began in February 2007.9 The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all
installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and
surveillance.10 The consequences for safeguards of the seal breakage in the feed and withdrawal area11 will
be evaluated by the Agency upon completion of its assessment of the PIV.
12. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 200712
and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by
Iran in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ).
13. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP): PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a
pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility, which was first brought into operation in
October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area
designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area
designated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).
14. In the production area, Iran first began feeding low enriched UF6 into Cascade 1 on 9 February 2010,
for the stated purpose of producing UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for
__________________________________________________________________________________
8 The 54 installed cascades contained approximately 8000 centrifuges; the 37 cascades declared by Iran as being fed with UF6 on
that date contained 6208 centrifuges. Not all of the centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UF6 may have been
working.
9 The Agency previously verified that, as of 17 October 2010, a total of 3135 kg of low enriched UF6 had been produced since the
start of operations in February 2007 (GOV/2011/29, para. 9).
10 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not
subject to containment and surveillance.
11 GOV/2011/29, para. 10.
12 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 6 March 2011.
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Page 4
the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).13,14 Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UF6 into
two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6), each of which consists of 164 IR-1 centrifuges.15
15. Between 13 and 29 September 2011, the Agency conducted a PIV at PFEP and verified that, as of
13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of low enriched UF6 had been fed into the cascade(s) in the production area
since the process began on 9 February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235
had been produced. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the results of the PIV. Iran has
estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of 44.7 kg of UF6 enriched at
FEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades and that approximately 6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20%
U-235 were produced.
16. The preliminary results of the PIV show an improvement to the operator’s weighing system. Once
the assessment of the PIV has been completed, the Agency will be able to determine whether the
operator’s better sampling procedures have resulted in a more accurate determination of the level of U-235
enrichment.16
17. In the R&D area, as of 22 October 2011, Iran had installed 164 IR-2m centrifuges in Cascade 5,17 all
of which were under vacuum, and 66 IR-4 centrifuges in Cascade 4, none of which had been fed with UF6.
In Cascades 2 and 3, Iran has been feeding natural UF6 into single machines, 10-machine cascades and
20-machine cascades of IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges.
18. Between 21 August 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of approximately 59.8 kg of natural UF6 was
fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails are
recombined at the end of the process.
19. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP18 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the
DIQ.
C.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
20. In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment
Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. In its DIQ of 10 October 2009, Iran stated that the purpose of
the facility was the production of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235, and that the facility was being built to
contain 16 cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.19
21. In September 2010, Iran provided the Agency with a revised DIQ in which it stated that the purpose
of FFEP was to include R&D as well as the production of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235.
22. As previously reported, Iran provided the Agency with another revised DIQ in June 2011 in which
the stated purpose of FFEP was the production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, as well as R&D. Iran
informed the Agency that initially this production would take place within two sets of two interconnected
cascades, and that each of these cascades would consist of 174 centrifuges. Iran was reported to have
__________________________________________________________________________________
13 GOV/2010/28, para. 9.
14 TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets
and for research and training purposes.
15 GOV/2010/28, para. 9.
16 GOV/2011/29, para. 14; GOV/2011/54, para. 15.
17 Iran had previously indicated its intention to install two 164-centrifuge cascades (Cascades 4 and 5) in the R&D area
(GOV/2011/7, para. 17).
18 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 5 March 2011.
19 GOV/2009/74, para. 9.
Annex 20
GOV/2011/65
Page 5
decided to “triple its (production) capacity”, after which Iran would stop the “20% fuel production” at
Natanz.20
23. On 17 October 2011, as anticipated in its letter to the Agency dated 11 October 2011, Iran transferred
from FEP to FFEP one large cylinder containing LEU in the form of UF6 and one small cylinder
containing depleted uranium (DU) in the form of UF6. According to Iran, the LEU will be used for feeding
and the DU will be used for line passivation. On 24 October 2011, the Agency detached the seal on the
cylinder containing the DU, and the cylinder was immobilized at the feeding station. At the request of
Iran, the Agency will detach the seal on the cylinder containing the LEU on 8 November 2011, and the
cylinder will be immobilized at the feeding station.
24. During an inspection on 23 and 24 October 2011, the Agency verified that Iran had installed all 174
centrifuges in each of two cascades, neither of which had been connected to the cooling and electrical
lines, and had installed 64 centrifuges in a third cascade. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1
machines. Iran informed the Agency that the main power supply had been connected to the facility. No
centrifuges had been installed in the area designated for R&D purposes.
25. The Agency continues to verify that FFEP is being constructed according to the latest DIQ provided
by Iran. As previously reported, although Iran has provided some clarification regarding the initial timing
of, and circumstances relating to, its decision to build FFEP at an existing defence establishment,
additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility.21
26. The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 27 April 2011 did not
indicate the presence of enriched uranium.22
C.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities
27. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further
information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium
enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided, and the construction
of one of which was to have begun by the end of the last Iranian year (20 March 2011) or the start of this
Iranian year.23,24 In August 2011, Dr Abbasi was reported as having said that Iran did not need to build
new enrichment facilities during the next two years.25 Iran has not provided information, as requested by
the Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it
possessed laser enrichment technology.26 As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those issues, the
Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.
__________________________________________________________________________________
20 Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, ‘Iran to Triple Production of 20%-Enriched Uranium’, Fars News Agency, 8 June 2011.
21 GOV/2011/29, para. 20.
22 The results did show a small number of particles of depleted uranium (GOV/2010/10, para. 17).
23 ‘Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites’, Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.
24 GOV/2010/46, para. 33.
25 ‘Iran atomic chief says fuel swap talks over: IRNA’, Agence France Press article of 31 August 2011, citing remarks made by
Dr Abbasi during an interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency.
26 Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at
http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255 .
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D. Reprocessing Activities
28. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is
obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.27 In a letter to the Agency dated
15 February 2008, Iran stated that it “does not have reprocessing activities”. In that context, the Agency
has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon
Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.28 The Agency carried out an inspection and design information
verification (DIV) at TRR on 15 October 2011, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 16 October 2011. It is
only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the
Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.
E. Heavy Water Related Projects
29. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not
suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water
moderated research reactor, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is subject to
Agency safeguards.29
30. On 17 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that
construction of the facility was ongoing and the coolant heat exchangers had been installed. According to
Iran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence by the end of 2013.
31. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency, in a
letter to Iran dated 20 October 2011, requested further access to HWPP. The Agency has yet to receive a
reply to that letter, and is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on
recent images, the HWPP appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not provided the Agency access to
the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order to take samples.30
F. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication
32. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects,
Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan
which, as described below, are in contravention of those obligations, although both facilities are under
Agency safeguards.
33. Uranium Conversion Facility: On 18 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF during
which the Agency observed the ongoing installation of the process equipment for the conversion of UF6
enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8. During the DIV, Iran informed the Agency that the initial tests of
__________________________________________________________________________________
27 S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1;
S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.
28 The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium,
irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.
29 S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4;
S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.
30 GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and 21.
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this conversion line, originally scheduled to start on 6 September 2011, had been postponed and would not
involve the use of nuclear material.
34. As previously reported, Iran informed the Agency in July 2011 that it would start R&D activities at
UCF for the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO2. During the aforementioned DIV, Iran
informed the Agency that 6.8 kg of DU in the form of UF6 had been processed and that Iran had produced
113 g of uranium in the form of UO2 that met its specifications. According to Iran, this UO2 has been sent
to FMP to produce test pellets. Iran has also started using UF6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 to produce UO2.
During the DIV, Iran further informed the Agency that this UO2 would also be sent to FMP to produce
fuel pellets, which would then be sent to TRR for “performance test studies”.
35. In a letter dated 4 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency of the postponement of the production of
natural UF6, involving the use of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium
Production Plant, originally scheduled to restart on 23 October 2011. In a letter dated 11 October 2011,
Iran informed the Agency that, from 11 November 2011, it intended to use UOC produced at the Bandar
Abbas Uranium Production Plant for the production of natural uranium in the form of UO2. During the
DIV on 18 October 2011, the Agency took a sample of this UOC. During the same DIV, Iran informed the
Agency that, since 23 July 2011, it had fed into the process 958.7 kg of uranium in the form of UOC31 and
produced about 185.6 kg of natural uranium in the form of UO2, and further indicated that some of the
product had been fed back into the process. In a letter dated 8 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency
that it had transferred about 1 kg of this UO2 to the R&D section of FMP in order to “conduct research
activities and pellet fabrication”.
36. Fuel Manufacturing Plant: As previously reported, in a DIQ for FMP dated 31 May 2011, Iran
informed the Agency that a fresh fuel rod of natural UO2 manufactured at FMP would be shipped to TRR
for irradiation and post-irradiation analysis. On 15 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and
a DIV at TRR and confirmed that, on 23 August 2011, Iran had started to irradiate a prototype fuel rod
containing natural UO2 that had been manufactured at FMP. In a letter dated 30 August 2011, Iran
informed the Agency that “for the time being” it had no plans to conduct any destructive testing on the rod
and that only non-destructive testing would be conducted at TRR.
37. On 22 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that Iran
had started to install some equipment for the fabrication of fuel for TRR.32 During the inspection, the
Agency verified five fuel plates containing natural U3O8 that had been produced at the R&D laboratory at
FMP for testing purposes.
G. Possible Military Dimensions
38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible
military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.33 Since
2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed
nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the
development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new
information.
__________________________________________________________________________________
31 This was taken from Iran’s stockpile of imported UOC (GOV/2003/75, Annex I, para. 8).
32 GOV/2010/46, para. 26.
33 GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38,
paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35–42.
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39. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency on
the resolution of all outstanding issues in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to
Iran’s nuclear programme.34 In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligations
to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82,
and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to
concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing
access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.35 Since
August 2008, Iran has not engaged with the Agency in any substantive way on this matter.
40. The Director General, in his opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011,
stated that in the near future he hoped to set out in greater detail the basis for the Agency's concerns so that
all Member States would be kept fully informed. In line with that statement, the Annex to this report
provides a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency to date which has given rise to
concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
41. The analysis itself is based on a structured and systematic approach to information analysis which the
Agency uses in its evaluation of safeguards implementation in all States with comprehensive safeguards
agreements in force. This approach involves, inter alia, the identification of indicators of the existence or
development of the processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.
42. The information which serves as the basis for the Agency’s analysis and concerns, as identified in the
Annex, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information comes from a wide variety of
independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts and from
information provided by Iran itself. It is consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and
organizations involved, and time frames.
43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the
development of a nuclear explosive device:
􀁸 Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by
military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
􀁸 Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex,
Section C.3);
􀁸 The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a
clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
􀁸 Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of
components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).
44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications,
others are specific to nuclear weapons.
45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a
structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a
nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.
__________________________________________________________________________________
34 Most recently in GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).
35 S/RES/1929, paras 2 and 3.
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H. Design Information
46. The modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision
to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The
modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed
early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains
the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive
safeguards agreement but which is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.36 The
Agency is still awaiting receipt from Iran of updated design information for the IR-40 Reactor, and further
information pursuant to statements it has made concerning the planned construction of new uranium
enrichment facilities and the design of a reactor similar to TRR.37
47. As reported previously, Iran’s response to Agency requests for Iran to confirm or provide further
information regarding its statements concerning its intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it
would provide the Agency with the required information in “due time” rather than as required by the
modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.38
I. Additional Protocol
48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not
implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance
about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the
necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.39
J. Other Matters
49. In August 2011, the Agency carried out a PIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research
Laboratory (JHL) to verify, inter alia, nuclear material, in the form of natural uranium metal and process
waste, related to the conversion experiments carried out by Iran between 1995 and 2002.40,41 The Agency’s
measurement of this material was 19.8 kg less than the operator’s declaration of 270.7 kg. In a letter dated
__________________________________________________________________________________
36 In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally;
nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General’s reports (see e.g. GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified
Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council
resolution 1929 (2010) to “comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the
application of modified Code 3.1”.
37 GOV/2010/46, para. 32.
38 See para. 27 of this report and GOV/2011/29, para. 37.
39 Iran’s Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003,
although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and
February 2006.
40 This material had been under Agency seal since 2003.
41 GOV/2003/75, paras 20–25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32, and Annex, paras 10–12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, and
Annex, paras 1–7.
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2 November 2011, Iran provided additional information on this matter. The Agency is working with Iran
to try to resolve this discrepancy.
50. As previously reported, in a letter dated 19 June 2011, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to
“transfer some of spent fuel assemblies (HEU [high enriched uranium] Control Fuel Element (CFE) and
Standard Fuel Element (SFE)) from spent fuel pool (KMPE) to reactor core (KMPB) in order to conduct a
research project”. As of 15 October 2011, this activity had yet to begin.
51. On 2 and 3 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant,
during which the Agency noted that the reactor was in operation. Iran subsequently informed the Agency
that the reactor has since been shut down for routine maintenance.
K. Summary
52. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear
facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the
necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to
provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and
therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.42
53. The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear
programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency
finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the
end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be
ongoing.
54. Given the concerns identified above, Iran is requested to engage substantively with the Agency
without delay for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s
nuclear programme as identified in the Annex to this report.
55. The Agency is working with Iran with a view to resolving the discrepancy identified during the
recent PIV at JHL.
56. The Director General urges Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and
mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards
Agreement and its other obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional
Protocol; implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its
Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; suspension of heavy water related
activities; and, as referred to above, addressing the Agency’s serious concerns about possible military
dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
57. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
__________________________________________________________________________________
42 The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which
corresponds to Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the nondiversion
of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State
(i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).
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ANNEX
Possible Military Dimensions to Iran’s Nuclear Programme
1. This Annex consists of three Sections: Section A, which provides an historical overview of the
Agency’s efforts to resolve questions about the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, in
particular regarding concerns about possible military dimensions; Section B, which provides a general
description of the sources of information available to the Agency and its assessment of the credibility of
that information; and Section C, which reflects the Agency’s analysis of the information available to it in
the context of relevant indicators of the existence or development of processes associated with
nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.
A. Historical Overview
2. Since late 2002, the Director General has reported to the Board of Governors on the Agency’s
concerns about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Such concerns coincided with the appearance in
open sources of information which indicated that Iran was building a large underground nuclear related
facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak.1
3. Between 2003 and 2004, the Agency confirmed a number of significant failures on the part of Iran
to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material,
the processing and use of undeclared nuclear material and the failure to declare facilities where the nuclear
material had been received, stored and processed.2 Specifically, it was discovered that, as early as the late
1970s and early 1980s, and continuing into the 1990s and 2000s, Iran had used undeclared nuclear
material for testing and experimentation in several uranium conversion, enrichment, fabrication and
irradiation activities, including the separation of plutonium, at undeclared locations and facilities.3
4. In October 2003, Iran informed the Director General that it had adopted a policy of full disclosure
and had decided to provide the Agency with a full picture of its nuclear activities.4 Following that
announcement, Iran granted the Agency access to locations the Agency requested to visit, provided
information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components and made
individuals available for interviews. It also continued to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the
Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, to which it agreed in February 2003, which provides for the
submission of design information on new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to construct or to
authorize construction of such a facility is taken.5 In November 2003, Iran announced its intention to sign
an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement (which it did in December 2003 following Board
approval of the text), and that, prior to its entry into force, Iran would act in accordance with the
provisions of that Protocol.6
5. Between 2003 and early 2006, Iran submitted inventory change reports, provided design
information with respect to facilities where the undeclared activities had taken place and made nuclear
__________________________________________________________________________________
1 GOV/2003/40, para. 3.
2 GOV/2003/40, para. 32; GOV/2003/75, para. 48; GOV/2004/83, paras 85–86; GOV/2005/67, para. 4.
3 GOV/2003/75, Annex 1; GOV/2004/83, paras 85–86.
4 GOV/2003/75, paras 13 and 15.
5 GOV/2003/40, para. 6. Iran stopped implementing the modified Code 3.1 in March 2007 (GOV/2007/22, para. 12).
6 GOV/2003/75, para. 18. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003, and signed on
behalf of Iran and the Agency on 18 December 2003 (GOV/2004/11, para. 5). In February 2006, Iran notified the Agency that it
would no longer implement the provisions of the Additional Protocol (GOV/2006/15, para. 31).
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material available for Agency verification. Iran also acknowledged that it had utilized entities with links to
the Ministry of Defence in some of its previously undeclared activities.7 Iran acknowledged that it had had
contacts with intermediaries of a clandestine nuclear supply network in 1987 and the early 1990s, and that,
in 1987, it had received a handwritten one page document offering assistance with the development of
uranium centrifuge enrichment technology, in which reference was also made to a reconversion unit with
casting equipment.8 Iran further acknowledged that it had received a package of information related to
centrifuge enrichment technology that also included a 15 page document (hereafter referred to as the
“uranium metal document”) which Iran said it did not ask for and which describes, inter alia, processes for
the conversion of uranium fluoride compounds into uranium metal and the production of hemispherical
enriched uranium metallic components.9
6. The Agency continued to seek clarification of issues with respect to the scope and nature of Iran’s
nuclear programme, particularly in light of Iran’s admissions concerning its contacts with the clandestine
nuclear supply network, information provided by participants in that network and information which had
been provided to the Agency by a Member State. This last information, collectively referred to as the
“alleged studies documentation”, which was made known to the Agency in 2005, indicated that Iran had
been engaged in activities involving studies on a so-called green salt project, high explosives testing and
the re-engineering of a missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a new payload.10 All of this information,
taken together, gave rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
7. In August 2007, Iran and the Agency agreed on “Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues” (generally referred to as the
“work plan”) (INFCIRC/711). By February 2008, the four items identified in the work plan as “past
outstanding issues”, and the two items identified as “other outstanding issues”, had been determined by
the Agency to be either closed, completed or no longer outstanding11. The remaining issues which needed
to be clarified by Iran related to the alleged studies, together with other matters which had arisen in the
course of resolving the six other issues and which needed to be addressed in connection with the alleged
studies, specifically: the circumstances of Iran’s acquisition of the uranium metal document, procurement
and research and development (R&D) activities of military related institutes and companies that could be
nuclear related; and the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to
defence industries.12
8. Between February and May 2008, pursuant to the work plan, the Agency shared with Iran
information (including documentation) on the alleged studies, and sought clarifications from Iran.13 In
May 2008, Iran submitted to the Agency a 117 page assessment of that information. While Iran confirmed
the veracity of some of the information which the Agency had shared with it (such as acknowledgement of
names of people, places and organizations), Iran’s assessment was focused on deficiencies in form and
format, and dismissed the allegations as having been based on “forged” documents and “fabricated”
data.14
9. The Agency continued to receive additional information from Member States and acquired new
information as a result of its own efforts. The Agency tried without success to engage Iran in discussions
__________________________________________________________________________________
7 GOV/2004/11, para. 37.
8 Iran has stated that the intermediaries offered the reconversion unit with casting equipment on their own initiative, not at the
request of the AEOI. Iran also stated that it did not receive the reconversion unit (GOV/2005/67, para. 14).
9 GOV/2005/87, para. 6; GOV/2007/58, para. 25. Pakistan confirmed, in response to an Agency inquiry, that an identical
document existed in Pakistan (GOV/2008/15, para. 24).
10 GOV/2006/15, para. 38.
11 GOV/2007/58, paras 18, 23, 25; GOV/2008/4, paras 11, 18, 24, 34.
12 GOV/2008/15, paras 14–15, 25.
13 GOV/2008/15, para. 16.
14 GOV/2008/38, para. 15.
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about the information, and finally wrote to Iran in October 2010 to inform it about this additional
information.15
10. Between 2007 and 2010, Iran continued to conceal nuclear activities, by not informing the Agency
in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorize construction of a new nuclear power plant at
Darkhovin16 and a third enrichment facility near Qom (the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant).17,18 The
Agency is still awaiting substantive responses from Iran to Agency requests for further information about
its announcements, in 2009 and 2010 respectively, that it had decided to construct ten additional
enrichment facilities (the locations for five of which had already been identified)19 and that it possessed
laser enrichment technology.20
11. The Agency has continued to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible military
dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As additional information has become available to the Agency,
the Agency has been able, notwithstanding Iran’s lack of engagement, to refine its analysis of possible
military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.21
B. Credibility of Information
12. As indicated in paragraph 6 above, among the information available to the Agency is the alleged
studies documentation: a large volume of documentation (including correspondence, reports, view graphs
from presentations, videos and engineering drawings), amounting to over a thousand pages. The
information reflected in that documentation is of a technically complex and interconnected nature,
showing research, development and testing activities over time. It also contains working level
correspondence consistent with the day to day implementation of a formal programme. Consistent with the
Agency’s practice, that information has been carefully and critically examined. The Agency has also had
several meetings with the Member State to clarify the information it had provided, to question the Member
State about the forensics it had carried out on the documentation and the information reflected in it, and to
obtain more information on the underlying sources.
13. In addition to the alleged studies documentation, the Agency has received information from more
than ten Member States. This has included procurement information, information on international travel
by individuals said to have been involved in the alleged activities, financial records, documents reflecting
health and safety arrangements, and other documents demonstrating manufacturing techniques for certain
high explosive components. This information reinforces and tends to corroborate the information reflected
in the alleged studies documentation, and relates to activities substantially beyond those identified in that
documentation.
14. In addition to the information referred to in paragraphs 12 and 13 above, the Agency has acquired
information as a result of its own efforts, including publications and articles acquired through open source
research, satellite imagery, the results of Agency verification activities and information provided by Iran
in the context of those verification activities.22 Importantly, the Agency has also had direct discussions
with a number of individuals who were involved in relevant activities in Iran, including, for example, an
interview with a leading figure in the clandestine nuclear supply network (see paragraph 35 below). The
information obtained by the Agency from the discussions with these individuals is consistent with the
__________________________________________________________________________________
15 GOV/2010/62, paras 34–35.
16 GOV/2008/38, para. 11.
17 GOV/2009/74, paras 7–17.
18 GOV/2010/10, para. 31; GOV/2010/28, para. 31; GOV/2010/46, para. 31.
19 GOV/2010/10, para. 33. In August 2010, Iran informed the Agency that the construction of one of these facilities was to start at
the end of the current Iranian year (March 2011) or the beginning of the next year (GOV/2010/46, para. 33).
20 GOV/2010/46, para. 18.
21 GOV/2011/54, para. 43.
22 Further specific examples are described below in Section C of this Annex.
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information provided by Member States, and that acquired through its own efforts, in terms of time frames
and technical content.
15. As indicated in paragraph 8 above, Iran has acknowledged certain information reflected in the
alleged studies documentation. However, many of the answers given by Iran to questions posed by the
Agency in connection with efforts to resolve the Agency’s concerns have been imprecise and/or
incomplete, and the information has been slow in coming and sometimes contradictory. This, combined
with events such as the dismantling of the Lavisan-Shian site in late 2003/early 2004 (see paragraph 19
below), and a pattern of late or after the fact acknowledgement of the existence of previously undeclared
parts of Iran’s nuclear programme, have tended to increase the Agency’s concerns, rather than dispel
them.
16. As indicated above, the information consolidated and presented in this Annex comes from a wide
variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own
efforts and from information provided by Iran itself. It is overall consistent in terms of technical content,
individuals and organizations involved and time frames. Based on these considerations, and in light of the
Agency’s general knowledge of the Iranian nuclear programme and its historical evolution, the Agency
finds the information upon which Part C of this Annex is based to be, overall, credible.
C. Nuclear Explosive Development Indicators
17. Within its nuclear programme, Iran has developed the capability to enrich uranium to a level of up
to 20% U-235, declared to be for use as fuel in research reactors. In the absence of any indicators that Iran
is currently considering reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel to extract plutonium,23 the Agency has, to
date, focused its analysis of Iran’s nuclear programme on an acquisition path involving high enriched
uranium (HEU). Based on indicators observed by the Agency in connection with Iran’s nuclear activities,
the Agency’s work has concentrated on an analysis pertinent to the development of an HEU implosion
device.
C.1. Programme management structure
18. The Agency has been provided with information by Member States which indicates that the
activities referred to in Sections C.2 to C.12 were, at least for some significant period of time, managed
through a programme structure, assisted by advisory bodies, and that, owing to the importance of these
efforts, senior Iranian figures featured within this command structure. From analysis of this information
and information provided by Iran, and through its own endeavours, the Agency has been able to construct
what it believes to be a good understanding of activities undertaken by Iran prior to the end of 2003. The
Agency’s ability to construct an equally good understanding of activities in Iran after the end of 2003 is
reduced, due to the more limited information available to the Agency. For ease of reference, the figure
below depicts, in summary form, what the Agency understands of the programme structure, and
administrative changes in that structure over the years. Attachment 1 to this Annex provides further
details, derived from that information, about the organizational arrangements and projects within that
programme structure.
__________________________________________________________________________________
23 Nevertheless, there are, and have been in the past, activities in Iran relevant to the production of plutonium.
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Departments
Ministry of Defence Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Education Research Institute (ERI)
Created in 1989/90 to coordinate Defence R&D
Scientific Committee with office at ERI
Physics
Research
Centre
(PHRC)
AMAD Projects
Plan Centres
Section for
Advanced
Development
Applications &
Technologies
(SADAT)
Complexes
Pardis Tehran
Malek Ashtar
University
(MUT)
Organisation of
Defensive
Innovation and
Research
(SPND)
Orchid Office,
Orchid Scientific
Research Centre
Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
1989 1998/99 2002 2004 2006 Aug 2008 2010 Feb 2011
19. The Agency received information from Member States which indicates that, sometime after the
commencement by Iran in the late 1980s of covert procurement activities,24 organizational structures and
administrative arrangements for an undeclared nuclear programme were established and managed through
the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), and were overseen, through a Scientific Committee, by the Defence
Industries Education Research Institute (ERI), established to coordinate defence R&D for the Ministry of
Defence Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Iran has confirmed that the PHRC was established in 1989
at Lavisan-Shian, in Tehran. Iran has stated that the PHRC was created with the purpose of “preparedness
to combat and neutralization of casualties due to nuclear attacks and accidents (nuclear defence) and also
support and provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defence”. Iran has stated further that
those activities were stopped in 1998.25 In late 2003/early 2004, Iran completely cleared the site.26
20. According to information provided by Member States, by the late 1990s or early 2000s, the PHRC
activities were consolidated under the “AMAD Plan”. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (Mahabadi) was the Executive
Officer of the AMAD Plan, the executive affairs of which were performed by the “Orchid Office”.27 Most
of the activities carried out under the AMAD Plan appear to have been conducted during 2002 and 2003.
21. The majority of the details of the work said to have been conducted under the AMAD Plan come
from the alleged studies documentation which, as indicated in paragraph 6 above, refer to studies
conducted in three technical areas: the green salt project; high explosives (including the development of
exploding bridgewire detonators); and re-engineering of the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 missile
re-entry vehicle.
__________________________________________________________________________________
24 GOV/2004/83; GOV/2003/75, Annex 1.
25 At which time, according to Iran, the centre was changed to the Biological Studies Centre. Iran also stated that, in 2002, the
Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) was also located at that site, and that, although some of the biological activities continued there,
the main objective was to use the capabilities of universities in Iran (in particular at the Malek Ashtar University near Esfahan) for
the education and R&D needs of the Ministry of Defence (GOV/2004/83, paras 100–101).
26 According to Iran, the site was cleared in 2003/2004 in order to return the land to the local municipality (GOV/2004/60,
paras 42–46; GOV/2004/83, paras 96–105).
27 Possibly so named because one of the locations used by the AMAD Plan was on Orchid Street in Tehran.
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22. According to the Agency’s assessment of the information contained in that documentation, the
green salt project (identified as Project 5.13) was part of a larger project (identified as Project 5) to
provide a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme. The product of this
programme would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile
re-entry vehicle studies (identified as Project 111). As of May 2008, the Agency was not in a position to
demonstrate to Iran the connection between Project 5 and Project 111. However, subsequently, the
Agency was shown documents which established a connection between Project 5 and Project 111, and
hence a link between nuclear material and a new payload development programme.
23. Information the Agency has received from Member States indicates that, owing to growing
concerns about the international security situation in Iraq and neighbouring countries at that time, work on
the AMAD Plan was stopped rather abruptly pursuant to a “halt order” instruction issued in late 2003 by
senior Iranian officials. According to that information, however, staff remained in place to record and
document the achievements of their respective projects. Subsequently, equipment and work places were
either cleaned or disposed of so that there would be little to identify the sensitive nature of the work which
had been undertaken.
24. The Agency has other information from Member States which indicates that some activities
previously carried out under the AMAD Plan were resumed later, and that Mr Fakhrizadeh retained the
principal organizational role, first under a new organization known as the Section for Advanced
Development Applications and Technologies (SADAT) 28, which continued to report to MODAFL, and
later, in mid-2008, as the head of the Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT) in Tehran.29 The
Agency has been advised by a Member State that, in February 2011, Mr Fakhrizadeh moved his seat of
operations from MUT to an adjacent location known as the Modjeh Site, and that he now leads the
Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research.30 The Agency is concerned because some of the
activities undertaken after 2003 would be highly relevant to a nuclear weapon programme.
C.2. Procurement activities
25. Under the AMAD Plan, Iran’s efforts to procure goods and services allegedly involved a number of
ostensibly private companies which were able to provide cover for the real purpose of the procurements.
The Agency has been informed by several Member States that, for instance, Kimia Maadan was a cover
company for chemical engineering operations under the AMAD Plan while also being used to help with
procurement for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).31
26. In addition, throughout the entire timeline, instances of procurement and attempted procurement by
individuals associated with the AMAD Plan of equipment, materials and services which, although having
other civilian applications, would be useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device, have either
been uncovered by the Agency itself or been made known to it.32 Among such equipment, materials and
services are: high speed electronic switches and spark gaps (useful for triggering and firing detonators);
high speed cameras (useful in experimental diagnostics); neutron sources (useful for calibrating neutron
measuring equipment); radiation detection and measuring equipment (useful in a nuclear material
production environment); and training courses on topics relevant to nuclear explosives development (such
as neutron cross section calculations and shock wave interactions/hydrodynamics).
__________________________________________________________________________________
28 The information indicates that SADAT consisted of at least seven centres, each responsible for carrying out specific R&D work.
The activities were established as overt work applicable to conventional military activities, some with possible nuclear
applications. The work in the SADAT Centres drew on resources at Iranian universities which had laboratories available to them
and students to do the research.
29 The information indicates that, in his new role, Mr Fakhrizadeh merged the SADAT Centres into complexes within MUT,
known as “Pardis Tehran”.
30 Known from its Farsi initials as “SPND”.
31 GOV/2008/4, para. 32; GOV/2006/15, para. 39.
32 GOV/2008/4, para. 40.
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C.3. Nuclear material acquisition
27. In 2008, the Director General informed the Board that: the Agency had no information at that time
— apart from the uranium metal document — on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear
material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on
related nuclear physics studies,33 and that it had not detected the actual use of nuclear material in
connection with the alleged studies.34
28. However, as indicated in paragraph 22 above, information contained in the alleged studies
documentation suggests that Iran was working on a project to secure a source of uranium suitable for use
in an undisclosed enrichment programme, the product of which would be converted into metal for use in
the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies. Additional information
provided by Member States indicates that, although uranium was not used, kilogram quantities of natural
uranium metal were available to the AMAD Plan.
29. Information made available to the Agency by a Member State, which the Agency has been able to
examine directly, indicates that Iran made progress with experimentation aimed at the recovery of uranium
from fluoride compounds (using lead oxide as a surrogate material to avoid the possibility of uncontrolled
contamination occurring in the workplace).
30. In addition, although now declared and currently under safeguards, a number of facilities dedicated
to uranium enrichment (the Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and the
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom) were covertly built by Iran and only declared once the Agency
was made aware of their existence by sources other than Iran. This, taken together with the past efforts by
Iran to conceal activities involving nuclear material, create more concern about the possible existence of
undeclared nuclear facilities and material in Iran.
C.4. Nuclear components for an explosive device
31. For use in a nuclear device, HEU retrieved from the enrichment process is first converted to metal.
The metal is then cast and machined into suitable components for a nuclear core.
32. As indicated in paragraph 5 above, Iran has acknowledged that, along with the handwritten one
page document offering assistance with the development of uranium centrifuge enrichment technology, in
which reference is also made to a reconversion unit with casting equipment, Iran also received the
uranium metal document which describes, inter alia, processes for the conversion of uranium compounds
into uranium metal and the production of hemispherical enriched uranium metallic components.
33. The uranium metal document is known to have been available to the clandestine nuclear supply
network that provided Iran with assistance in developing its centrifuge enrichment capability, and is also
known to be part of a larger package of information which includes elements of a nuclear explosive
design. A similar package of information, which surfaced in 2003, was provided by the same network to
Libya.35 The information in the Libyan package, which was first reviewed by Agency experts in
January 2004, included details on the design and construction of, and the manufacture of components for,
a nuclear explosive device.36
34. In addition, a Member State provided the Agency experts with access to a collection of electronic
files from seized computers belonging to key members of the network at different locations. That
collection included documents seen in Libya, along with more recent versions of those documents,
including an up-dated electronic version of the uranium metal document.
__________________________________________________________________________________
33 GOV/2008/15, para. 24.
34 GOV/2008/38, para. 21.
35 The same network was also the source of an unsolicited offer to Iraq in 1990 for the provision of information dealing with
centrifuge enrichment and nuclear weapon manufacturing (GOV/INF/1998/6, Section B.3).
36 GOV/2004/11, para. 77; GOV/2004/12, paras 30–32.
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35. In an interview in 2007 with a member of the clandestine nuclear supply network, the Agency was
told that Iran had been provided with nuclear explosive design information. From information provided to
the Agency during that interview, the Agency is concerned that Iran may have obtained more advanced
design information than the information identified in 2004 as having been provided to Libya by the
nuclear supply network.
36. Additionally, a Member State provided information indicating that, during the AMAD Plan,
preparatory work, not involving nuclear material, for the fabrication of natural and high enriched uranium
metal components for a nuclear explosive device was carried out.
37. As the conversion of HEU compounds into metal and the fabrication of HEU metal components
suitable in size and quality are steps in the development of an HEU nuclear explosive device, clarification
by Iran is needed in connection with the above.
C.5. Detonator development
38. The development of safe, fast-acting detonators, and equipment suitable for firing the detonators, is
an integral part of a programme to develop an implosion type nuclear device. Included among the alleged
studies documentation are a number of documents relating to the development by Iran, during the period
2002–2003, of fast functioning detonators, known as “exploding bridgewire detonators” or “EBWs” as
safe alternatives to the type of detonator described for use in the nuclear device design referred to in
paragraph 33 above.
39. In 2008, Iran told the Agency that it had developed EBWs for civil and conventional military
applications and had achieved a simultaneity of about one microsecond when firing two to three
detonators together,37 and provided the Agency with a copy of a paper relating to EBW development work
presented by two Iranian researchers at a conference held in Iran in 2005. A similar paper was published
by the two researchers at an international conference later in 2005.38 Both papers indicate that suitable
high voltage firing equipment had been acquired or developed by Iran. Also in 2008, Iran told the Agency
that, before the period 2002–2004, it had already achieved EBW technology. Iran also provided the
Agency with a short undated document in Farsi, understood to be the specifications for a detonator
development programme, and a document from a foreign source showing an example of a civilian
application in which detonators are fired simultaneously. However, Iran has not explained to the Agency
its own need or application for such detonators.
40. The Agency recognizes that there exist non-nuclear applications, albeit few, for detonators like
EBWs, and of equipment suitable for firing multiple detonators with a high level of simultaneity.
Notwithstanding, given their possible application in a nuclear explosive device, and the fact that there are
limited civilian and conventional military applications for such technology, Iran’s development of such
detonators and equipment is a matter of concern, particularly in connection with the possible use of the
multipoint initiation system referred to below.
C.6. Initiation of high explosives and associated experiments
41. Detonators provide point source initiation of explosives, generating a naturally diverging detonation
wave. In an implosion type nuclear explosive device, an additional component, known as a multipoint
initiation system, can be used to reshape the detonation wave into a converging smooth implosion to
ensure uniform compression of the core fissile material to supercritical density. 39
42. The Agency has shared with Iran information provided by a Member State which indicates that Iran
has had access to information on the design concept of a multipoint initiation system that can be used to
__________________________________________________________________________________
37 GOV/2008/15, para. 20.
38 The authors of the papers have affiliations to Malek Ashtar University and the Air Defence Industries Group of Tehran.
39 “Supercritical” density is one at which fissionable material is able to sustain a chain reaction in such a manner that the rate of
reaction increases.
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initiate effectively and simultaneously a high explosive charge over its surface.40 The Agency has been
able to confirm independently that such a design concept exists and the country of origin of that design
concept. Furthermore, the Agency has been informed by nuclear-weapon States that the specific
multipoint initiation concept is used in some known nuclear explosive devices. In its 117 page submission
to the Agency in May 2008, Iran stated that the subject was not understandable to Iran and that Iran had
not conducted any activities of the type referred to in the document.
43. Information provided to the Agency by the same Member State referred to in the previous
paragraph describes the multipoint initiation concept referred to above as being used by Iran in at least one
large scale experiment in 2003 to initiate a high explosive charge in the form of a hemispherical shell.
According to that information, during that experiment, the internal hemispherical curved surface of the
high explosive charge was monitored using a large number of optical fibre cables, and the light output of
the explosive upon detonation was recorded with a high speed streak camera. It should be noted that the
dimensions of the initiation system and the explosives used with it were consistent with the dimensions for
the new payload which, according to the alleged studies documentation, were given to the engineers who
were studying how to integrate the new payload into the chamber of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle
(Project 111) (see Section C.11 below). Further information provided to the Agency by the same Member
State indicates that the large scale high explosive experiments were conducted by Iran in the region of
Marivan.
44. The Agency has strong indications that the development by Iran of the high explosives initiation
system, and its development of the high speed diagnostic configuration used to monitor related
experiments, were assisted by the work of a foreign expert who was not only knowledgeable in these
technologies, but who, a Member State has informed the Agency, worked for much of his career with this
technology in the nuclear weapon programme of the country of his origin. The Agency has reviewed
publications by this foreign expert and has met with him. The Agency has been able to verify through
three separate routes, including the expert himself, that this person was in Iran from about 1996 to about
2002, ostensibly to assist Iran in the development of a facility and techniques for making ultra-dispersed
diamonds (“UDDs” or “nanodiamonds”), where he also lectured on explosion physics and its applications.
45. Furthermore, the Agency has received information from two Member States that, after 2003, Iran
engaged in experimental research involving a scaled down version of the hemispherical initiation system
and high explosive charge referred to in paragraph 43 above, albeit in connection with non-nuclear
applications. This work, together with other studies made known to the Agency in which the same
initiation system is used in cylindrical geometry, could also be relevant to improving and optimizing the
multipoint initiation design concept relevant to nuclear applications.
46. The Agency’s concern about the activities described in this Section derives from the fact that a
multipoint initiation system, such as that described above, can be used in a nuclear explosive device.
However, Iran has not been willing to engage in discussion of this topic with the Agency.
C.7. Hydrodynamic experiments
47. One necessary step in a nuclear weapon development programme is determining whether a
theoretical design of an implosion device, the behaviour of which can be studied through computer
simulations, will work in practice. To that end, high explosive tests referred to as “hydrodynamic
experiments” are conducted in which fissile and nuclear components may be replaced with surrogate
materials.41
48. Information which the Agency has been provided by Member States, some of which the Agency has
been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran has manufactured simulated nuclear explosive
components using high density materials such as tungsten. These components were said to have
__________________________________________________________________________________
40 GOV/2008/15, Annex, Section A.2, Document 3.
41 Hydrodynamic experiments can be designed to simulate the first stages of a nuclear explosion. In such experiments,
conventional high explosives are detonated to study the effects of the explosion on specific materials. The term “hydrodynamic” is
used because material is compressed and heated with such intensity that it begins to flow and mix like a fluid, and “hydrodynamic
equations” are used to describe the behaviour of fluids.
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incorporated small central cavities suitable for the insertion of capsules such as those described in Section
C.9 below. The end use of such components remains unclear, although they can be linked to other
information received by the Agency concerning experiments involving the use of high speed diagnostic
equipment, including flash X ray, to monitor the symmetry of the compressive shock of the simulated core
of a nuclear device.
49. Other information which the Agency has been provided by Member States indicates that Iran
constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The
explosives vessel, or chamber, is said to have been put in place at Parchin in 2000. A building was
constructed at that time around a large cylindrical object at a location at the Parchin military complex. A
large earth berm was subsequently constructed between the building containing the cylinder and a
neighbouring building, indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber. The Agency has
obtained commercial satellite images that are consistent with this information. From independent
evidence, including a publication by the foreign expert referred to in paragraph 44 above, the Agency has
been able to confirm the date of construction of the cylinder and some of its design features (such as its
dimensions), and that it was designed to contain the detonation of up to 70 kilograms of high explosives,
which would be suitable for carrying out the type of experiments described in paragraph 43 above.
50. As a result of information the Agency obtained from a Member State in the early 2000s alleging
that Iran was conducting high explosive testing, possibly in association with nuclear materials, at the
Parchin military complex, the Agency was permitted by Iran to visit the site twice in 2005. From satellite
imagery available at that time, the Agency identified a number of areas of interest, none of which,
however, included the location now believed to contain the building which houses the explosives chamber
mentioned above; consequently, the Agency’s visits did not uncover anything of relevance.
51. Hydrodynamic experiments such as those described above, which involve high explosives in
conjunction with nuclear material or nuclear material surrogates, are strong indicators of possible weapon
development. In addition, the use of surrogate material, and/or confinement provided by a chamber of the
type indicated above, could be used to prevent contamination of the site with nuclear material. It remains
for Iran to explain the rationale behind these activities.
C.8. Modelling and calculations
52. Information provided to the Agency by two Member States relating to modelling studies alleged to
have been conducted in 2008 and 2009 by Iran is of particular concern to the Agency. According to that
information, the studies involved the modelling of spherical geometries, consisting of components of the
core of an HEU nuclear device subjected to shock compression, for their neutronic behaviour at high
density, and a determination of the subsequent nuclear explosive yield. The information also identifies
models said to have been used in those studies and the results of these calculations, which the Agency has
seen. The application of such studies to anything other than a nuclear explosive is unclear to the Agency.
It is therefore essential that Iran engage with the Agency and provide an explanation.
53. The Agency obtained information in 2005 from a Member State indicating that, in 1997,
representatives from Iran had met with officials from an institute in a nuclear-weapon State to request
training courses in the fields of neutron cross section calculations using computer codes employing Monte
Carlo methodology, and shock wave interactions with metals. In a letter dated 14 May 2008, Iran advised
the Agency that there was nothing to support this information. The Agency has also been provided with
information by a Member State indicating that, in 2005, arrangements were made in Iran for setting up
projects within SADAT centres (see Section C.1 and Attachment 1), inter alia, to establish a databank for
“equation of state” information42 and a hydrodynamics calculation centre. The Agency has also been
provided with information from a different Member State that, in 2005, a senior official in SADAT
solicited assistance from Shahid Behesti University in connection with complex calculations relating to
the state of criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives.
__________________________________________________________________________________
42 An “equation of state” is a thermodynamic equation describing the state of matter under a given set of physical conditions (such
as temperature, pressure, volume or internal energy).
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54. Research by the Agency into scientific literature published over the past decade has revealed that
Iranian workers, in particular groups of researchers at Shahid Behesti University and Amir Kabir
University, have published papers relating to the generation, measurement and modelling of neutron
transport.43 The Agency has also found, through open source research, other Iranian publications which
relate to the application of detonation shock dynamics to the modelling of detonation in high explosives,
and the use of hydrodynamic codes in the modelling of jet formation with shaped (hollow) charges. Such
studies are commonly used in reactor physics or conventional ordnance research44, but also have
applications in the development of nuclear explosives.
C.9. Neutron initiator
55. The Agency has information from a Member State that Iran has undertaken work to manufacture
small capsules suitable for use as containers of a component containing nuclear material. The Agency was
also informed by a different Member State that Iran may also have experimented with such components in
order to assess their performance in generating neutrons. Such components, if placed in the centre of a
nuclear core of an implosion type nuclear device and compressed, could produce a burst of neutrons
suitable for initiating a fission chain reaction. The location where the experiments were conducted was
said to have been cleaned of contamination after the experiments had taken place. The design of the
capsule, and the material associated with it, are consistent with the device design information which the
clandestine nuclear supply network allegedly provided to Iran.
56. The Agency also has information from a Member State that work in this technical area may have
continued in Iran after 2004, and that Iran embarked on a four year programme, from around 2006
onwards, on the further validation of the design of this neutron source, including through the use of a nonnuclear
material to avoid contamination.
57. Given the importance of neutron generation and transport, and their effect on geometries containing
fissile materials in the context of an implosion device, Iran needs to explain to the Agency its objectives
and capabilities in this field.
C.10. Conducting a test
58. The Agency has information provided by a Member State that Iran may have planned and
undertaken preparatory experimentation which would be useful were Iran to carry out a test of a nuclear
explosive device. In particular, the Agency has information that Iran has conducted a number of practical
tests to see whether its EBW firing equipment would function satisfactorily over long distances between a
firing point and a test device located down a deep shaft. Additionally, among the alleged studies
documentation provided by that Member State, is a document, in Farsi, which relates directly to the
logistics and safety arrangements that would be necessary for conducting a nuclear test. The Agency has
been informed by a different Member State that these arrangements directly reflect those which have been
used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon States.
C.11. Integration into a missile delivery vehicle
59. The alleged studies documentation contains extensive information regarding work which is alleged
to have been conducted by Iran during the period 2002 to 2003 under what was known as Project 111.
From that information, the project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive
programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing
payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.
__________________________________________________________________________________
43 The modelling of neutron transport refers to the study of the motions and interactions of neutrons with materials which are used
to see where they are and in what direction and at what speed they are going.
44 For example, the shaped (hollow) charge studies said by Member States to have been carried out by the Centre for Research and
Development of Explosion and Shock Technology, also known as “METFAZ”, have conventional military applications (such as
for developing armour piercing projectiles), but can also be used to develop computer codes which can then be adapted to model
nuclear explosives.
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60. According to that documentation, using a number of commercially available computer codes, Iran
conducted computer modelling studies of at least 14 progressive design iterations of the payload chamber
and its contents to examine how they would stand up to the various stresses that would be encountered on
being launched and travelling on a ballistic trajectory to a target. It should be noted that the masses and
dimensions of components identified in information provided to the Agency by Member States that Iran is
alleged to have been developing (see paragraphs 43 and 48 above) correspond to those assessed to have
been used in Project 111 engineering studies on the new payload chamber.
61. During these studies, prototype components were allegedly manufactured at workshops known to
exist in Iran but which Iran refused the Agency permission to visit. The six engineering groups said to
have worked under Project 111 produced many technical reports, which comprise a substantial part of the
alleged studies documentation. The Agency has studied these reports extensively and finds that they are
both internally consistent and consistent with other supporting information related to Project 111.
62. The alleged studies documentation also shows that, as part of the activities undertaken within
Project 111, consideration was being given to subjecting the prototype payload and its chamber to
engineering stress tests to see how well they would stand up in practice to simulated launch and flight
stresses (so-called “environmental testing”). This work would have complemented the engineering
modelling simulation studies referred to in paragraph 60 above. According to the information reflected in
the alleged studies documentation, within Project 111, some, albeit limited, preparations were also being
undertaken to enable the assembly of manufactured components.
63. Iran has denied conducting the engineering studies, claiming that the documentation which the
Agency has is in electronic format and so could have been manipulated, and that it would have been easy
to fabricate.45 However, the quantity of the documentation, and the scope and contents of the work
covered in the documentation, are sufficiently comprehensive and complex that, in the Agency’s view, it
is not likely to have been the result of forgery or fabrication. While the activities described as those of
Project 111 may be relevant to the development of a non-nuclear payload, they are highly relevant to a
nuclear weapon programme.
C.12. Fuzing, arming and firing system
64. The alleged studies documentation indicates that, as part of the studies carried out by the
engineering groups under Project 111 to integrate the new payload into the re-entry vehicle of the
Shahab 3 missile, additional work was conducted on the development of a prototype firing system that
would enable the payload to explode both in the air above a target, or upon impact of the re-entry vehicle
with the ground. Iran was shown this information, which, in its 117 page submission (referred to above in
paragraph 8), it dismissed as being “an animation game”.
65. The Agency, in conjunction with experts from Member States other than those which had provided
the information in question, carried out an assessment of the possible nature of the new payload. As a
result of that assessment, it was concluded that any payload option other than nuclear which could also be
expected to have an airburst option (such as chemical weapons) could be ruled out. Iran was asked to
comment on this assessment and agreed in the course of a meeting with the Agency which took place in
Tehran in May 2008 that, if the information upon which it was based were true, it would constitute a
programme for the development of a nuclear weapon. Attachment 2 to this Annex reproduces the results
of the Agency’s assessment as it was presented by the Secretariat to the Member States in the technical
briefing which took place in February 2008.
__________________________________________________________________________________
45 GOV/2008/15, para. 22.
Annex 20
GOV/2011/65
Attachment 1
Annex 20
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GOV/2011/65
Attachment 2
Attachment 2: Analysis of Payload
BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL HIGH
EXPLOSIVE E M P SATELLITE NUCLEAR
Applicable Mass
and Dimensions
Contains a HV
generator box
Airburst <3000'
Multiple
Detonators
Present
No Capability for Release
of Chamber from Capsule
or Load from Chamber and
no Antenna(s)
Presence of 400m
Shaft in Test
Sketch
Total Package
Taken as a Whole
LIKELY POSSIBLE UNLIKELY IMPOSSIBLE
Annex 20
􅑸-􅑸 1 􅑸􅑸 I _
Board of Governors GOV/2012/55
Date: 16 November 2012
Original: English
For official use only
Item 5(d) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/2012/54)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of
Security Council resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
A. Introduction
1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security
Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement1 and relevant provisions of
Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).
2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its
resolutions2 are binding on Iran.3 The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council
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1 The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.
2 The Board of Governors has adopted 12 resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran:
GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49
(18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005);
GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009); GOV/2011/69
(18 November 2011); and GOV/2012/50 (13 September 2012).
3 In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps
required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran’s obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on
all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian
nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards
Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to
act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (paras 1–6).
Derestricted 30 November 2012
(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 30 November 2012)
Atoms for Peace
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resolutions4 were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in
accordance with the terms of those resolutions.5
3. In line with the request of the Board of Governors in resolution GOV/2012/50
(13 September 2012),6 this document provides a comprehensive report on substantive implementation
of that resolution and of resolution GOV/2011/69 (18 November 2011), especially with respect to the
possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme. It also addresses developments since the
Director General’s previous report (GOV/2012/37, 30 August 2012), as well as issues of longer
standing. It focuses on those areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the
full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
B. Clarification of Unresolved Issues
4. As previously reported, in resolution GOV/2011/69, the Board, inter alia, stressed that it was
essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all
outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues,
including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In
that resolution, the Board also called on Iran to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks
aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme. In light of this, from January 2012 onwards, Agency and Iranian officials held several
rounds of talks in Vienna and Tehran, including during a visit by the Director General to Tehran in
May 2012. However, no concrete results were achieved.7 In particular, there was no agreement on a
structured approach to resolving outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s
nuclear programme and no agreement by Iran to the Agency’s request for access to the Parchin site.
5. In resolution GOV/2012/50, the Board, inter alia, stressed that it was essential for Iran to
immediately conclude and implement a structured approach, including, as a first step, providing the
Agency with the access it had requested to relevant sites.8 In that resolution, the Board also decided
that Iranian cooperation with Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues was
essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran’s nuclear programme.9
6. In light of resolution GOV/2012/50, and immediately following the September 2012 Board
meeting, the Agency took steps to engage Iran in further talks, including at a meeting on
17 September 2012 between the Director General and H.E. Mr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of
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4 The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006);
1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).
5 By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations (INFCIRC/11, Part I.A), the Agency is required to
cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security. All Member States of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council, and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations
Charter.
6 GOV/2012/50, para. 6.
7 GOV/2012/37, para. 8.
8 GOV/2012/50, para. 4.
9 GOV/2012/50, para. 4.
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Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. On 24 October 2012, the Agency wrote to
Iran reaffirming the Agency’s commitment to dialogue, and suggesting that a senior level meeting be
held on 13 and 14 November 2012 aimed at finalising the structured approach document, agreement
on which would allow the Agency and Iran to start substantive work on the outstanding issues. In a
letter dated 1 November 2012, Iran reaffirmed its commitment to dialogue with the Agency and
invited an Agency delegation to Tehran in mid-December 2012 in order to “discuss the modality for
the resolution of the allegations, based on principles elaborated in the meeting between H.E. Dr. Jalili,
the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council and the Director General on 30 May 2012”. It was
subsequently agreed that the Agency and Iran would meet in Tehran on 13 December 2012.
C. Facilities Declared under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
7. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 16 nuclear facilities and nine
locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).10 Notwithstanding that
certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant
resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency
continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material at these facilities and LOFs.
D. Enrichment Related Activities
8. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
not suspended its enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below. All of these
activities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades and the feed
and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.11
9. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF6 up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its
nuclear facilities12 and that the purpose of enriching UF6 up to 20% U-235 is the manufacture of fuel
for research reactors.13
10. Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities
approximately:
􀁸 7611 kg (+735 kg since the Director General’s previous report) of UF6 enriched up to
5% U-235, of which: 5303 kg is presently in storage; 1226 kg has been fed into the Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and 1029 kg has been fed into the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
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10 All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.
11 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material (e.g. some waste and samples) may not be
subject to containment and surveillance.
12 As declared in Iran’s Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.
13 GOV/2010/10, para. 8; H.E. Mr Fereydoun Abbasi reportedly made a statement to the effect that Iran plans to build four to
five new reactors in the next few years in order to produce radioisotopes and carry out research (‘Iran will not stop producing
20% enriched uranium’, Tehran Times, 12 April 2011). He was also quoted by the Iranian Student’s News Agency as saying
“To provide fuel for these (new) reactors, we need to continue with the 20 per cent enrichment of uranium” (‘Iran to build
new nuclear research reactors – report’, Reuters, 11 April 2011).
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(FFEP) for enrichment up to 20% U-235; and 53 kg has been fed into the Uranium Conversion
Facility (UCF) for conversion to UO2;
14 and
􀁸 232.8 kg (+43.4 kg since the Director General’s previous report) of UF6 enriched up to
20% U-235, of which: 134.9 kg is presently in storage; 1.6 kg has been downblended; and
96.3 kg has been fed into the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) for conversion to U3O8.15
D.1. Natanz
11. Fuel Enrichment Plant: FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched
uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is
divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to design information submitted by
Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit and a total of about
25 000 centrifuges. Iran has yet to provide the corresponding design information for Production
Hall B.
12. As of 10 November 2012, Iran had fully installed 61 cascades in Production Hall A, 54 of which
were declared by Iran as being fed with natural UF6. Iran had also partially installed one other cascade.
Preparatory installation work had been completed for another 28 cascades, and was ongoing in relation
to 54 others. All of the centrifuges installed in Production Hall A are IR-1 machines.16
13. Between 20 October 2012 and 11 November 2012, the Agency conducted a physical inventory
verification (PIV) at FEP and verified that, as of 21 October 2012, 85 644 kg of natural UF6 had been
fed into the cascades since production began in February 2007, and a total of 7451 kg of UF6 enriched
up to 5% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 22 October 2012 and
9 November 2012, a total of 1576 kg of natural UF6 was fed into the cascades and a total of
approximately 160 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 was produced, which would result in a total
production of 7611 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 since production began.
14. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since
February 2007,17 and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has
operated as declared by Iran in the relevant design information questionnaire (DIQ).
15. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant: PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot
LEU production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall
that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of
LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated for R&D
(Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).
16. As a result of the PIV carried out by the Agency at PFEP between 15 September 2012 and
1 October 2012, the Agency verified, within measurement uncertainties normally associated with such
a facility, the inventory as declared by Iran on 15 September 2012.
17. Production area: As of 6 November 2012, Iran was feeding low enriched UF6 into two
interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6) containing a total of 328 IR-1 centrifuges.
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14 The figures referring to the UF6 fed into the enrichment and/or conversion processes include UF6 contained in the cylinders
attached to the processes, as well as nuclear material held up in the process and present in waste.
15 See footnote 14.
16 As of 10 November 2012, 10 414 centrifuges were installed at FEP (+991 since the Director General’s previous report).
17 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 24 June 2012.
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18. The Agency has verified that, as of 15 September 2012, 1119.6 kg of UF6 enriched up to
5% U-235 produced at FEP had been fed into the cascades in the production area since production
began in February 2010, and that a total of 129.1 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 had been
produced. Iran has estimated that, between 16 September 2012 and 11 November 2012, a total of
57.4 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 produced at FEP was fed into the cascades in the production
area and that approximately 8.2 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced. This would
result in a total production of 137.3 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP since production
began.
19. R&D area: Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding
natural UF6 into IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into
small or larger cascades.18 Iran has yet to install three new types of centrifuge (IR-5, IR-6 and IR-6s)
as it had indicated it intends to do.19, 20
20. Between 22 August 2012 and 11 November 2012, a total of approximately 198.6 kg of natural
UF6 was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails
were recombined at the end of the process.
21. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP,21 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in
the relevant DIQ.
D.2. Fordow
22. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant: FFEP is, according to the DIQ of 18 January 2012,22 a
centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of
UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235. Additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this
facility, particularly in light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the
purpose for which it is now being used.23 The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011,
contains 16 cascades, equally divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2, with a total of 2784 centrifuges. To
date, all of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. Iran has yet to inform the Agency which of the
cascades are to be used for enrichment up to 5% U-235 and/or for enrichment up to 20% U-235.24
23. Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has installed 644 centrifuges at FFEP, thereby
completing the installation of centrifuges in all eight cascades in Unit 1, none of which it was feeding
with UF6. Iran had installed all eight cascades in Unit 2, four of which (configured in two sets of two
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18 On 6 November 2012, there were 32 IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 2, 14 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 3,
144 IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 4, and 162 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 5.
19 GOV/2012/9, para. 20.
20 On 6 November 2012, the Agency observed the presence of two empty casings for IR-6 centrifuges at PFEP. According to
Iran, when originally received at PFEP, these centrifuges had been complete, but the rotors had subsequently been removed
for testing somewhere other than PFEP.
21 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 10 June 2012.
22 To date, Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised DIQs (GOV/2012/9, para. 24).
23 GOV/2009/74, paras 7 and 14.
24 In a letter to the Agency dated 23 May 2012, Iran stated that the Agency would be notified about the production level of
the cascades prior to their operation (GOV/2012/23, para. 25).
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interconnected cascades) it was feeding with UF6 enriched up to 5% U-23525 and four of which,
having been subjected to vacuum testing, were ready for feeding with UF6.
24. Iran has estimated that, between 14 December 2011, when feeding of the first set of two
interconnected cascades began, and 10 November 2012, a total of 693 kg of UF6 enriched up to
5% U-235 was fed into cascades at FFEP, and that approximately 95.5 kg of UF6 enriched up to
20% U-235 were produced, 73.7 kg of which has been withdrawn from the process and verified by the
Agency.
25. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP,26, 27 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in its
most recent relevant DIQ.
D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities
26. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further
information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new
uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided.28 Iran
has not provided information, as requested by the Agency, in connection with its announcement on
7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.29 As a result of Iran’s lack of
cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.
E. Reprocessing Activities
27. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is
obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.30 Iran has stated that it “does not have
reprocessing activities”.31 The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR)32 and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX)
Facility.33 The Agency carried out an inspection and design information verification (DIV) at TRR on
11 November 2012, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 12 November 2012. It is only with respect to
TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the Agency can
confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.
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25 The number of centrifuges being fed (696) remains unchanged from that reflected in the Director General’s previous report
(GOV/2012/37, Figure 7).
26 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 11 June 2012.
27 GOV/2012/37, para. 26.
28 ‘Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites’, Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.
29 Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at
http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255.
30 S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1;
S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.
31 Letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008.
32 TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of
targets and for research and training purposes.
33 The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium,
irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.
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F. Heavy Water Related Projects
28. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the ongoing construction of the
heavy water moderated research reactor at Arak, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor),
which is under Agency safeguards.34
29. On 10 November 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed
that the installation of cooling and moderator circuit piping was continuing. During the DIV, Iran
stated that the operation of the IR-40 Reactor was now expected to commence in the first quarter of
2014.35
30. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency has
not been provided with further access to the plant. As a result, the Agency is again relying on satellite
imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the plant appears to continue to be in
operation. To date, Iran has not permitted the Agency to take samples from the heavy water stored at
UCF.36
G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication
31. Although Iran is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related
projects, it is conducting a number of activities at UCF, the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) and
FPFP at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of those obligations, notwithstanding
that the facilities are under Agency safeguards. Iran has stated that it is conducting these activities in
order to make fuel for research reactors.37
32. According to the latest information available to the Agency:
􀁸 Iran has produced at UCF: 550 tonnes of natural UF6, 99 tonnes of which has been sent to FEP;
and
􀁸 Iran has transferred to TRR the following fuel items produced at FMP and FPFP: ten containing
uranium enriched up to 20% U-235, four containing uranium enriched to 3.34% U-235 and
five containing natural uranium.
33. Uranium Conversion Facility: As previously reported, the Agency carried out a PIV at UCF in
March 2012. In order to finalise its evaluation of the PIV results, the Agency has requested that Iran
provide further information.
34. In the DIQ for UCF dated 13 October 2012, Iran informed the Agency of an increase in its
capacity to produce natural UO2 at UCF from 10 tonnes per year to 14 tonnes per year.
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34 S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4;
S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.
35 GOV/2012/23, para. 32.
36 GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and 21.
37 As declared in Iran’s DIQs for FPFP.
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35. The Agency has verified that, as of 5 November 2012, Iran had produced 24 kg of uranium in the
form of UO2 during R&D activities involving the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 3.34% U-235. Iran
subsequently transferred 13.6 kg of uranium in the form of UO2 to FMP.38 As of 6 November 2012,
Iran had resumed these R&D activities, but had not produced additional uranium in the form of UO2
from the conversion of UF6 enriched to 3.34% U-235. As of the same date, Iran, through the
conversion of uranium ore concentrate, had produced about 6231 kg of natural uranium in the form of
UO2, of which the Agency has verified that Iran transferred 3100 kg to FMP.
36. During a DIV carried out at UCF on 6 November 2012, Iran informed the Agency that, due to the
rupture of a storage tank, a large quantity of liquid containing natural uranium scrap material had
spilled onto the floor of the facility. Agency inspectors confirmed that the spillage had taken place.
The Agency is discussing with Iran the accountancy of the nuclear material that has spilled from the
tank.
37. Fuel Manufacturing Plant: Between 4 and 6 September 2012, the Agency carried out a PIV at
FMP, the results of which it is still evaluating. On 7 November 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV
and an inspection at FMP and confirmed that the manufacture of pellets for the IR-40 Reactor using
natural UO2 was ongoing. Iran informed the Agency that it had completed the manufacture of dummy
fuel assemblies for the IR-40 Reactor.39 As of 7 November 2012, Iran had not commenced the
manufacture of fuel assemblies containing nuclear material. On the same date, the Agency also
verified two prototype fuel rods made of UO2 enriched to 3.34% U-235 prior to their transfer to TRR.
38. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant: The Agency carried out a PIV at FPFP on 29 September 2012 and
verified that, between the start of conversion activities on 17 December 2011 and 26 September 2012,
82.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 had been fed into the conversion process and 38 kg of
uranium had been produced in the form of U3O8 powder40 and fuel items. Iran has declared that,
between 27 September 2012 and 10 November 2012, it did not convert any more of the UF6 enriched
up to 20% U-235 contained in the cylinder attached to the process. On 11 November 2012, the Agency
verified a new fuel assembly prior to its transfer to TRR and verified the presence of 46 fuel plates. On
12 November 2012, the Agency and Iran agreed to an updated safeguards approach for FPFP.
H. Possible Military Dimensions
39. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible
military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.41 Since
2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of
undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities
related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.
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38 GOV/2012/23, para. 35.
39 A dummy assembly is similar to a fuel assembly except that it contains non-nuclear material.
40 A small quantity of U3O8 enriched to 20% U-235 was converted into UO2 and downblended with natural UO2 to produce
standard pellets at three different levels of enrichment (1.6%, 2.6% and 3.9%).
41 See, for example: GOV/2011/65, paras 38-45 and Annex; GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment;
GOV/2010/10, paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and
Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35–42.
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40. The Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed
analysis of the information available to the Agency, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that
are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information, which comes from a
wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s
own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall,
credible. The information indicates that, prior to the end of 2003 the activities took place under a
structured programme; that some continued after 2003; and that some may still be ongoing. Since
November 2011, the Agency has obtained more information which further corroborates the analysis
contained in the aforementioned Annex.
41. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligations to take the steps
required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to
cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to
concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing
access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.42 In its
resolution GOV/2011/69, the Board of Governors, inter alia, expressed its deep and increasing concern
about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to
be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions. As indicated above, in its
resolution GOV/2012/50, the Board of Governors decided, inter alia, that Iranian cooperation with
Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues was essential and urgent to restore
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
42. As indicated in Section B above, since the November 2011 Board, the Agency, through several
rounds of formal talks and numerous informal contacts with Iran, has made intensive efforts to seek to
resolve all of the outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme, especially with respect to
possible military dimensions, but without concrete results. Specifically, the Agency has:
􀁸 Sought agreement with Iran on a structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding
issues (referred to in paragraph 4 above), focusing on the issues outlined in the Annex to
GOV/2011/65. Agreement has yet to be reached;
􀁸 Requested that Iran provide the Agency with an initial declaration in connection with the issues
identified in Section C of the Annex to GOV/2011/65. Iran’s subsequent declaration dismissed
the Agency’s concerns in relation to these issues, largely on the grounds that Iran considered
them to be based on unfounded allegations;
􀁸 Identified, as part of the structured approach, thirteen topics, consistent with those identified in
the Annex to GOV/2011/65, which need to be addressed;
􀁸 Provided Iran with clarification of the nature of the Agency’s concerns, and the information
available to it, about Parchin and the foreign expert,43 and presented Iran with initial questions
in this regard, to which Iran has not responded; and
􀁸 Requested on several occasions, from January 2012 onwards, access to the Parchin site.
Contrary to Board resolution GOV/2012/50, Iran has still not provided the Agency with access
to the site.
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42 S/RES/1929, paras 2 and 3.
43 GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 44.
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43. Parchin: As stated in the Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report,44 information
provided to the Agency by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives
containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments;45 such experiments would be
strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development. The information also indicates that the
containment vessel was installed at the Parchin site in 2000. As previously reported, the location at the
Parchin site of the vessel was only identified in March 2011, and the Agency notified Iran of that
location in January 2012. Iran has stated that “the allegation of nuclear activities in Parchin site is
baseless”.46
44. As previously reported, satellite imagery available to the Agency for the period from
February 2005 to January 2012 shows virtually no activity at or near the building housing the
containment vessel. Since the Agency’s first request for access to this location, however, satellite
imagery shows that extensive activities and resultant changes have taken place at this location. Among
the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location since February 2012 are:
􀁸 Frequent presence of, and activities involving, equipment, trucks and personnel;
􀁸 Run off of large amounts of liquid from the containment building over a prolonged period;
􀁸 Removal of external pipework from the containment vessel building;
􀁸 Razing and removal of five other buildings or structures and the site perimeter fence;
􀁸 Reconfiguration of electrical and water supply infrastructure;
􀁸 Shrouding of the containment vessel building and another building; and
􀁸 Initial scraping and removal of considerable quantities of earth at the location and its
surrounding area, covering over 25 hectares, followed by further removal of earth to a greater
depth at the location and the depositing of new earth in its place.
45. In light of the extensive activities that have been, and continue to be, undertaken by Iran at the
aforementioned location on the Parchin site, when the Agency gains access to the location, its ability
to conduct effective verification will have been seriously undermined. While the Agency continues to
assess that it is necessary to have access to this location without further delay, it is essential that Iran
also provide without further delay substantive answers to the Agency’s detailed questions regarding
the Parchin site and the foreign expert, as requested by the Agency in February 2012.47
I. Design Information
46. Contrary to its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the
Security Council, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
__________________________________________________________________________________
44 GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 49.
45 GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 47.
46 GOV/2012/37, para. 43.
47 GOV/2012/9, para. 8.
Annex 21
GOV/2012/55
Page 11
Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement,48 which provides for the submission to
the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize
construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also
provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project
definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State
with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards
agreement that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1. It is important to note
that the absence of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the
necessary safeguards arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in
the absence of other nuclear facilities.49
47. Contrary to Iran’s obligations under the modified Code 3.1, Iran has not provided the Agency
with an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor since 2006. The lack of up-to-date information is having
an adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the design of the facility and to
implement an effective safeguards approach.50
48. Iran’s response to Agency requests that Iran confirm or provide further information regarding its
stated intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the
required information in “due time” rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.51
J. Additional Protocol
49. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is
not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible
assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran
provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional
Protocol.52
__________________________________________________________________________________
48 In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed
unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the
Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General’s reports (see, for example,
GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by
operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to “comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1”.
49 GOV/2010/10, para. 35.
50 GOV/2012/37, para. 46.
51 GOV/2011/29, para. 37; GOV/2012/23, para. 29.
52 Iran’s Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003,
although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003
and February 2006.
Annex 21
GOV/2012/55
Page 12
K. Other Matters
50. The Agency and Iran have continued to discuss the discrepancy between the amount of nuclear
material declared by the operator and that measured by the Agency in connection with conversion
experiments carried out by Iran at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL)
between 1995 and 2002.53
51. As previously reported, Iran is now using in the core of TRR a number of fuel assemblies that
were produced in Iran and which contain nuclear material that was enriched in Iran up to 3.5% and up
to 20% U-235.54
52. As indicated in the Director General’s previous report,55 on 29 and 30 July 2012, the Agency
conducted an inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) while the reactor was operating
at 75% of its nominal power. In a letter dated 15 October 2012, Iran informed the Agency that “fuel
assemblies will be transferred from the core to spent fuel pond” from 22 to 29 October 2012. On
6 and 7 November 2012, the Agency conducted an inspection at BNPP and verified that the fuel
assemblies were in the spent fuel pond.
L. Summary
53. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the
nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing
the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is
unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in
Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.56
54. Contrary to the Board resolutions of November 2011 and September 2012, and despite the
intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012, no concrete results have been
achieved in resolving the outstanding issues, including Iran having not concluded and implemented the
structured approach. The Director General is, therefore, unable to report any progress on clarifying the
issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
55. It is a matter of concern that the extensive and significant activities which have taken place since
February 2012 at the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access will
have seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to undertake effective verification. The Agency
reiterates its request that Iran, without further delay, provide both access to that location and
substantive answers to the Agency’s detailed questions regarding the Parchin site and the foreign
expert.
__________________________________________________________________________________
53 This material had been under Agency seal since 2003; GOV/2003/75, paras 20–25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32,
and Annex, paras 10–12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, and Annex, paras 1–7; GOV/2011/65, para. 49.
54 GOV/2012/37, para. 50.
55 GOV/2012/37, para. 51.
56 The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which
corresponds to Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the
non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in
the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).
Annex 21
GOV/2012/55
Page 13
56. Given the nature and extent of credible information available, the Agency continues to consider it
essential for Iran to engage with the Agency without further delay on the substance of the Agency’s
concerns. In the absence of such engagement, the Agency will not be able to resolve concerns about
issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude
the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
57. The Director General continues to urge Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board
of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full
implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, and to urge Iran to engage with
the Agency to achieve concrete results on all outstanding substantive issues.
58. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Annex 21
Friday,
July 1, 2005
Part V
The President
Executive Order 13382—Blocking
Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferators and Their Supporters
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Annex 22
Presidential Documents
38567
Federal Register
Vol. 70, No. 126
Friday, July 1, 2005
Title 3—
The President
Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 2005
Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferators and Their Supporters
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies
Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United
States Code,
I, George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, in order
to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency described
and declared in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, regarding
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering
them, and the measures imposed by that order, as expanded by Executive
Order 13094 of July 28, 1998, hereby order:
Section 1. (a) Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and
(4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), or in regulations, orders,
directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior
to the effective date of this order, all property and interests in property
of the following persons, that are in the United States, that hereafter come
within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession
or control of United States persons, are blocked and may not be transferred,
paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:
(i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order;
(ii) any foreign person determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and other relevant
agencies, to have engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions
that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially
contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their
means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons),
including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport,
transfer or use such items, by any person or foreign country of proliferation
concern;
(iii) any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and other relevant
agencies, to have provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material,
technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of,
any activity or transaction described in paragraph (a)(ii) of this section,
or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to this order; and
(iv) any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and other relevant
agencies, to be owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act
for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.
(b) Any transaction or dealing by a United States person or within the
United States in property or interests in property blocked pursuant to this
order is prohibited, including, but not limited to, (i) the making of any
contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the
benefit of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked
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Annex 22
38568 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 126 / Friday, July 1, 2005 / Presidential Documents
pursuant to this order, and (ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision
of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
(c) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States
that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts
to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
(d) Any conspiracy formed to violate the prohibitions set forth in this
order is prohibited.
Sec. 2. For purposes of this order:
(a) the term ‘‘person’’ means an individual or entity;
(b) the term ‘‘entity’’ means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization; and
(c) the term ‘‘United States person’’ means any United States citizen,
permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States.
Sec. 3. I hereby determine that the making of donations of the type of
articles specified in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) by,
to, or for the benefit of, any person whose property and interests in property
are blocked pursuant to this order would seriously impair my ability to
deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, and
I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by section 1 of this order.
Sec. 4. Section 4(a) of Executive Order 12938, as amended, is further amended
to read as follows:
‘‘Sec. 4. Measures Against Foreign Persons.
(a) Determination by Secretary of State; Imposition of Measures. Except
to the extent provided in section 203(b) of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)), where applicable, if the Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, determines
that a foreign person, on or after November 16, 1990, the effective date
of Executive Order 12735, the predecessor order to Executive Order 12938,
has engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have
materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery
(including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts
to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such
items, by any person or foreign country of proliferation concern, the measures
set forth in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section shall be imposed
on that foreign person to the extent determined by the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the implementing agency and other relevant agencies.
Nothing in this section is intended to preclude the imposition on that
foreign person of other measures or sanctions available under this order
or under other authorities.’’
Sec. 5. For those persons whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to section 1 of this order who might have a constitutional
presence in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer
funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures
to be taken pursuant to this order would render these measures ineffectual.
I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as amended,
there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant
to section 1 of this order.
Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation
of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President
by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.
The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to
other officers and agencies of the United States Government, consistent
with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are
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Annex 22
Federal Register /Vol. 70, No. 126 / Friday, July 1, 2005 / Presidential Documents 38569
hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to
carry out the provisions of this order and, where appropriate, to advise
the Secretary of the Treasury in a timely manner of the measures taken.
Sec. 7. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to determine, subsequent to the issuance
of this order, that circumstances no longer warrant the inclusion of a person
in the Annex to this order and that the property and interests in property
of that person are therefore no longer blocked pursuant to section 1 of
this order.
Sec. 8. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any
party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities,
or entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
Sec. 9. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on
June 29, 2005.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in
the Federal Register.
W
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 28, 2005.
Billing code 3195–01–P
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Annex 22
38570 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 126 / Friday, July 1, 2005 / Presidential Documents
ANNEX
Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation
Tanchon Commercial Bank
Korea Ryonbong General Corporation
Aerospace Industries Organization
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
Scientific Studies and Research Center
[FR Doc. 05–13214
Filed 6–30–05; 9:31 am]
Billing code 4810–25–P
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Annex 22
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act (CISADA)
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Go to the current State.gov website for up-to-date information. (http://www.state.gov/)
Fact Sheet
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC, ENERGY AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS
May 23, 2011
Energy Sanctions of CISADA
Summary
On July 1, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA.) The Act amends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) which requires sanctions be imposed or waived for companies
that are determined to have made certain investments in Iran’s energy sector. CISADA expands significantly the energy-related
activities that are sanctionable and adds new types of sanctions that can be imposed. These new authorities address the potential
connection between Iran’s energy sector and its nuclear program that was highlighted in UNSCR 1929. They support an effort to
increase pressure on Iran to return constructively to diplomatic negotiations to address the international community’s concerns
about Iran’s non-compliance with its international obligations (including those under the relevant UNSCRs, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.) The United States is resolved to make full use of ISA and the other
authorities in CISADA as additional tools in our efforts to convince the Iranian Government to change its strategic calculus, comply
with its full range of nuclear obligations, and engage in constructive negotiations on the future of its nuclear program.
Sanctionable Activities under the Iran Sanctions Act, as Amended by CISADA
ISA requires the President to impose sanctions on persons that are determined to have engaged in a wide variety of activities in
Iran’s energy sector. Activities that can trigger sanctions include:
Making an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop its
petroleum resources, of
$20 million or more; or
$5 million per investment, totaling $20 million or more in a 12-month period.
Selling, leasing, or providing goods or services (//2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/esc/iransanctions/docs/160710.htm#1) that
could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of Iran’s domestic production of refined petroleum
products (//2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/esc/iransanctions/docs/160710.htm#2), with
1
2
Annex 23
Fair market value of $1 million or more; or
Aggregate fair market value of $5 million or more in a 12-month period.
Selling or providing Iran with refined petroleum products, with
Fair market value of $1 million or more; or
Aggregate fair market value of $5 million or more in a 12-month period.
Providing goods or services that could directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to import
refined petroleum products, including
Insurance or reinsurance services;
Financing or brokering services; or
Ships and shipping services, with
Fair market value of $1 million or more; or
Aggregate fair market value of $5 million or more in a 12-month period.
Sanction Provisions
Three or more out of nine possible sanctions shall be imposed on any person determined to have engaged in sanctionable
activities. The nine sanctions would prohibit:
Export assistance from the Export-Import Bank of the United States (//2009-
2017.state.gov/e/eb/esc/iransanctions/docs/160710.htm#3);
Licenses for export of U.S. military, "dual use," (//2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/esc/iransanctions/docs/160710.htm#4) or
nuclear-related goods or technology;
Private U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in any 12-month period;
If the sanctioned person is a financial institution, designation as a primary dealer in USG debt instruments or service as a
repository of USG funds;
Procurement contracts with the United States Government;
Foreign exchange transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction;
Financial transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction;
Transactions with respect to property subject to U.S. jurisdiction;
Imports to the United States from the sanctioned person.
Waivers
ISA does provide for certain waivers. These waivers may be applied on a case-by-case basis with respect to a sanctionable person
depending on the facts and U.S. interests in each case. The President may waive sanctions for either energy or weapons-related
activity if the President determines it is "necessary to the national interest." In addition, the President may waive the application of
the energy-sanctions provisions with respect to a person for six months if "vital to the national security interests of the United
States" or for twelve months if "vital to the national security interests" and the government with primary jurisdiction over the person
is closely cooperating with the United States in multilateral efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or
advanced conventional weapons.
Financial Provisions of CISADA
Summary
On Thursday, July 1, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act. The Act mandates the imposition of significant new sanctions with respect to foreign financial institutions. The Act builds upon
and gives effect to the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions on Iran, most notably UNSCR 1929.
Financial Sector Provisions
The law includes mandatory banking sanctions targeted at foreign banks that knowingly facilitate: Iranian WMD transactions;
transactions related to Iran’s support for terrorism; the activities of persons sanctioned under Iran-related UNSCRs; significant
3
4
Annex 23
transactions with the IRGC or its affiliates; or significant transactions with Iranian-linked banks designated by the United States.
Treasury must issue regulations within 90 days to prohibit or impose strict conditions upon U.S. banks’ maintenance of
correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions that knowingly:
facilitate a significant transaction or transactions or provide significant financial services for:
the IRGC or any of its agents or affiliates (e.g., Khattam al Anbiya, Sepanir, and Ghorb Nooh) that are blocked under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"); or
any financial institution that is blocked under IEEPA in connection with Iran’s proliferation of WMD or in connection
with Iran’s support for international terrorism (includes the following banks: Bank Sepah, Bank Melli, Arian Bank,
Kargoshaee Bank, Bank Mellat, Persia International Bank PLC, Future Bank (Bahrain), Export Development Bank of Iran,
Banco Internacional de Desarollo (Venezuela), First East Export Bank, Post Bank, and Bank Saderat), Europäisch-
Iranische Handelsbank (EIH);
facilitate the activities of an individual or entity designated under UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929, or successor
resolutions;
facilitate Iran’s pursuit of WMD or Iran’s support for terrorism; or
facilitate the efforts of the Central Bank of Iran or any other Iranian bank to carry out the above.
Treasury must also issue regulations within 90 days to prohibit any entity owned or controlled by a U.S. financial
institution (i.e., foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks) from knowingly engaging in transactions with or benefitting the IRGC
or any of its sanctioned agents or affiliates.
Waiver Provisions
The Secretary of the Treasury may waive the application of the financial sector provisions noted above on or following 30 days
after the Secretary determines that such a waiver is necessary to the national interest of the United States and submits a report
describing the reasons to the appropriate congressional committees.
Other sanctions-related measures in CISADA
Human Rights
The President must submit to Congress a list of Iranian officials or those acting on behalf of the Government of Iran who are
responsible for, or complicit in, committing serious human rights abuses against Iranian citizens or their family members on or after
June 12, 2009. Those persons are subject to a visa ban for travel to the United States and economic sanctions, including the
blocking of their property subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
United States Government Procurement Contracts
CISADA requires that any firm or individual seeking a USG contract must certify that it, as well as subsidiaries, is not engaged in
sanctionable energy or weapons-related activity. This provision will apply to USG contracts for which solicitations are issued after
the effective date of new regulations (which must be issued within 90 days after July 1, 2010, or by September 29, 2010). The
President may waive this requirement on a case-by-case basis.
Diversion Concerns
CISADA also requires the President to designate a country as a "Destination of Diversion Concern" if he determines that the
government of the country allows substantial diversion to Iranian end users or intermediaries of certain goods, services, or
technology. If a country is named a "Destination of Diversion Concern," a U.S. export license will be required to export to that
country the types of items being diverted, with the presumption that the license application would be denied. The President may
waive the licensing requirement if he determines that a waiver is in the national interest.
Annex 23
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State Department.
External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies
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Note: documents in Portable Document Format (PDF) require Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or higher to view, download Adobe Acrobat
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Procurement Ban for Exporters of Certain Sensitive Technology
Persons that export to Iran sensitive technology that the President determines is to be used specifically to restrict the free flow of
unbiased information in Iran or disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of the people of Iran are barred from USG
procurement contracts. There is waiver authority, as well as an exemption authority with respect to certain countries or
instrumentalities designated under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
Goods or services include goods, services, technology, information, or support.
Refined petroleum products include diesel, gasoline, jet fuel (naphtha and kerosene-types), and aviation gasoline.
Export-Import Bank assistance: guarantees, insurance, and extensions of credit.
Technologies that have both civilian and military uses.
1
2
3
4
Annex 23
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       
HOME BRIEFING ROOM ISSUES THE ADMINISTRATION PARTICIPATE 1600 PENN
En Español Accessibility Copyright Information Privacy Policy USA.gov
Annex 24
􀏭􀀃
Geneva, 24 November 2013
Joint Plan of Action
Preamble
The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that
would ensure Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no
circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution
would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the
resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its
obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment
programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the
programme. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is
agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-bystep
process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as
well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme.
There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including,
among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward
bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council's consideration of this matter. The
E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term
measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran
will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues
that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint
Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of
concern.
Elements of a first step
The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent,
during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.
Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:
• From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide
for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%.
No reconversion line.
• Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.
Annex 25
􀏮􀀃
• Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel
Enrichment Plant1, Fordow2, or the Arak reactor3, designated by the IAEA as IR-40.
• Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran
has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period,
as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.
• No new locations for the enrichment.
• Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D
practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.
• No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
• Enhanced monitoring:
o Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran's plans
for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a
description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified
nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on
source material. This information would be provided within three months of the
adoption of these measures.
o Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as
the IR-40, to the IAEA.
o Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the
reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
o Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of
Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical
Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to
offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.
o IAEA inspector managed access to:
􀂃 centrifuge assembly workshops4;
􀂃 centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and,
􀂃 uranium mines and mills.
1 Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install
additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of
the same type.
􀏮 At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not
feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades.
Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.
3 Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the
reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor
or install remaining components.
4 Consistent with its plans, Iran's centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines.
Annex 25
􀏯􀀃
In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:
• Pause efforts to further reduce Iran's crude oil sales, enabling Iran's current customers to
purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed
amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on
associated insurance and transportation services.
• Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:
o Iran's petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services.5
o Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.
• Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran's auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services.
• License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil
aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well
as associated services.6
• No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.
• No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.
• The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the
Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.
• Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran's domestic needs using
Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions
involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses
incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated
Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel.
o This channel could also enable:
􀂃 transactions required to pay Iran's UN obligations; and,
􀂃 direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students
studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.
• Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed
amount.
5 "Sanctions on associated services" means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the
underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and
required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.
6 Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.
Annex 25
􀏰􀀃
Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution*
The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and
commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:
• Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.
• Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards
Agreements.
• Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related
sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on
a schedule to be agreed upon.
• Involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters
consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment
activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to
be agreed upon.
• Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
• Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and
implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President
and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).
• Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring
modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply
of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.
Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full
duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear
weapon state party to the NPT.
* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that "nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed" applies.
Annex 25
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16.01.2016
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SN 10176/1/17 REV 1
Information Note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
Brussels, 16 January 2016
Last updated on 03 August 2017
Annex 28
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2
1. Introduction
1.1. Background and outline
This Information Note1 is published in accordance with the voluntary commitment contained
in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic
Republic of Iran to issue relevant guidelines on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures
which are to be lifted under the JCPOA.2
The purpose of this Information Note is to provide practical information to all interested
parties on the commitments contained in the JCPOA concerning the lifting of the sanctions,
the measures adopted at the EU level to meet those commitments and the various practical
stages in this process.
The information provided for in this Information Note is based on the assumption that the
commitments under the JCPOA will be complied with by all the Parties.
The United States (hereinafter: U.S.) have also issued equivalent U.S. Guidelines with respect
to the lifting of U.S. sanctions under the JCPOA.
This Information Note is organised as follows:
􀁸 Section 1 introduces the structure of the JCPOA.
􀁸 Section 2 describes the timelines for the implementation of the sanctions-related
commitments under the JCPOA (Implementation plan).
􀁸 Section 3 presents a detailed description of the sanctions lifted under the JCPOA on
Implementation Day.
􀁸 Section 4 contains an overview of the relevant EU legislative framework.
􀁸 Section 5 details the EU sanctions or restrictive measures that remain in place after
Implementation Day. This section also includes an outline of the procurement channel.
1 It is noted that this Information Note is not legally binding and produced for illustrative purposes only.
2 In the EU legal acts the term restrictive measures is used instead of sanctions. For the purpose of the present Information
Note the terms "sanctions" and "restrictive measures" are used indistinctively.
Annex 28
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3
􀁸 Section 6 presents EU non-nuclear related sanctions that remain in place as they are
not concerned by the JCPOA.
􀁸 Section 7 is to address practical issues with regard to the JCPOA through questions
and answers. Input for this section was provided by EU Member States, business
community and other interested parties.
􀁸 Section 8 lists the main reference documents and provides relevant links.
1.2. Introduction to the JCPOA
On 14 July 2015, the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran reached an agreement
on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The full implementation of this JCPOA
will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.
The JCPOA will produce a comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as
well as multilateral3 and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme. The JCPOA
reflects a step-by-step approach and includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in the
agreement and is endorsed by the UN Security Council.4
UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) endorses the JCPOA, and urges its full
implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA. It calls upon all Members States,
regional organisations and international organisations to take such actions as may be
appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions
commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and the resolution and by
refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA.
1.3. Structure of the JCPOA
The JCPOA contains a general section addressing the main content of the agreement:
preamble and general provisions, nuclear, sanctions, implementation plan and dispute
3 For the purposes of the JCPOA and this Information Note, the term 'multilateral sanctions' is meant to cover EU restrictive measures.
4 UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), adopted by the Security Council on 20 July 2015.
Annex 28
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4
resolution mechanism and is supplemented with five Annexes.5 For this Information Note
Annex II (Sanctions) and Annex V (Implementation Plan) are essential: Annex II stipulates
exactly which sanctions will be lifted and Annex V describes the timing of the
implementation of the JCPOA and points out on which event/moment in time the lifting of
sanctions will occur.
Annex IV is devoted to the role of the Joint Commission established to monitor the
implementation of the JCPOA and to carry out the functions as provided for in the JCPOA.
The Joint Commission will also address issues arising from the implementation of the
JCPOA. On the basis of Annex IV a Procurement Working Group and a Working Group on
the Implementation of Sanctions Lifting were established. The High Representative acts as the
coordinator of the Joint Commission and of both working groups.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has an essential and independent role and is
requested to monitor and verify the implementation of the voluntary nuclear-related measures
as detailed in the JCPOA. The IAEA will provide regular updates to the Board of Governors
and the UN Security Council.
5 Annex I: Nuclear-related measures, Annex II: Sanctions-related commitments, Annex III: Civil Nuclear Cooperation,
Annex IV: Joint Commission and Annex V: Implementation Plan.
Annex 28
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5
2. Timelines
Annex V of the JCPOA contains the Implementation plan describing the sequence and the
steps to be carried out under the provisions of the JCPOA. There are five main events to
distinguish in this process: Finalisation Day, Adoption Day, Implementation Day, Transition
Day and UN Security Council resolution Termination Day.
2.1. Finalisation Day
This event took place on 14 July 2015 when the negotiations on the JCPOA were successfully
concluded and endorsed by E3/EU+3 and Iran. Following this event the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 2231(2015) on 20 July 2015. The Council of the European Union
expressed its full support for UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015) on the same day
with the adoption of Conclusions.6
2.2. Adoption Day
On Adoption Day, which occurred on 18 October 2015, the JCPOA came into effect. Iran
started the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments. The European Union and the
United States began to make the necessary preparations for the lifting of nuclear-related
sanctions as laid down in the JCPOA.
The European Union adopted the necessary legal acts to lift all EU economic and financial
sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme7 as laid down in the
JCPOA.8 The EU legislative package adopted on 18 October 2015 only came into effect on
Implementation Day (16 January 2016).9
6 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/07/20-fac-i…
7 More information on EU legal acts is to be found in Section 4 on the legislative framework.
8 As specified in section 16.1 of Annex V of the JCPOA.
9 More information on EU legal acts is to be found in Section 4 on the legislative framework.
Annex 28
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6
2.3. Implementation Day
Implementation Day occurred on 16 January 2016, the day on which the IAEA verified the
implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures10 and simultaneously, the E3/EU+3
took the actions11 to which they have committed under the JCPOA.
On Implementation Day, the Director-General of the IAEA presented a report to the IAEA
Board of Governors and to the United Nations Security Council which confirmed that Iran
had taken the measures specified in paragraphs 15.1 to 15.11 of Annex V to the JCPOA, EU
economic and financial sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme12
were lifted. On that same day, the European Union published in the Official Journal of the
European Union a legal act and related notice intended exclusively to confirm that the
legislation adopted on Adoption Day should apply.13 The details of the sanctions lifted are
described in section 4 of this Information Note.
On Implementation Day, the limited sanctions relief provided to Iran under the 2013-interim
agreement (JPOA)14 was superseded by the lifting of all economic and financial sanctions
taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme in accordance with the JCPOA.
2.4. Transition Day
Transition Day is in 8 years after Adoption Day (18 October 2023) or at an earlier moment
based upon a report from the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors
and in parallel to the UN Security Council stating that the IAEA has concluded that all
nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities (Broader Conclusion). On this day, the
EU will lift proliferation–related sanctions15, including arms and missile technology sanctions
10 As specified in paragraph 15 of Annex V of the JCPOA.
11 As specified in paragraph 16 and 17 of Annex V of the JCPOA.
12 As specified in Sections 16.1 -16.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA.
13 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.1, see Article 2 of Decision (EU) 1863/2015.
14 As part of the Joint Plan of Action the EU suspended on 20 January 2014 sanctions on petrochemicals, gold and precious
metals, the prohibitions on the provision of insurance and transport in relation to Iranian crude oil sales as well as vessels.
The thresholds for authorising financial transfers to and from Iran were increased.
15 As specified in sections 20.1-20.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA.
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7
and related designations. All provisions in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP suspended on
Implementation Day will be terminated on Transition Day.
2.5. UN Security Council resolution Termination Day
UN Security Council resolution Termination Day will occur 10 years from Adoption Day. On
Termination Day all the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015) will
terminate and the UN Security Council will conclude consideration of the Iranian nuclear
issue; the EU will lift all remaining nuclear-related restrictions and terminate the legal acts. 16
2.6. Dispute Resolution Mechanism
The JCPOA provides for a consultation process if one of the participants in the JCPOA
believes that the agreed commitments have not been met. The participants in the JCPOA will
try to resolve the issue according to the procedures set out in the JCPOA.17 If at the end of the
process the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant
and that participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance of the
obligations under the JCPOA, it can notify the UN Security Council thereof.
The UN Security Council will – in accordance with its procedures – vote on a resolution to
continue the sanctions lifting. If this resolution is not adopted within 30 days of the
notification, then the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions18 will be reimposed
("snapback"), unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise.
In the event of a reintroduction of measures, paragraph 37 of the JCPOA and paragraph 14 of
UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) stipulates that the application of UN Security
Council provisions will "not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any
party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of the application, provided
that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with the
JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions."
16 These restrictions include the procurement channel as described in section 5.2 of this Note.
17 As specified in paragraph 36 and 37 of the JCPOA.
18 UN Security Council resolutions 1696(2006), 1737(2006), 1747(2007), 1803(2008), 1835(2008), 1929(2010) and
2224(2015).
Annex 28
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Last update: 03.08.2017
8
Referring to the provisions of the JCPOA19, it should be noted that all parties to the JCPOA
are determined to avoid any behaviour which could be qualified as non-performance and to
avoid a re-imposition of sanctions by engaging in the Dispute Resolution Mechanism.
􀁸 Reintroduction of EU sanctions ("EU snapback")
In the event of a significant non-performance by Iran of its commitments under the JCPOA
and after having exhausted all recourse possibilities under the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,
the European Union will reintroduce the lifted EU sanctions ("EU snapback"). An "EU
snapback" will take the form of a decision by the Council of the European Union, based on a
recommendation by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Such a decision will reintroduce
all the EU sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme that have been
suspended and/or terminated consistent with Council declaration of 18 October 201520 and in
accordance with regular EU procedures for the adoption of restrictive measures.
Sanctions will not apply with retroactive effect. In the event of the reintroduction of EU
sanctions, the execution of contracts concluded in accordance with the JCPOA while
sanctions relief was in force will be permitted consistent with previous provisions when
sanctions were originally imposed, in order to allow companies to wind down their
activities.21 Details about the period of time allowed for the execution of prior contracts will
be specified in the legal acts providing for the reintroduction of EU sanctions.
For example, the reintroduction of sanctions on investment activities would not retroactively
penalise investment made before the date of snapback, and the execution of investment
contracts concluded before the reintroduction of sanctions will be permitted consistent with
previous provisions when sanctions were originally imposed.
Contracts that were permitted when the sanctions regime was still in place will not be targeted
by the reintroduction of sanctions.
19 See paragraph 28 of the JCPOA.
20 Official Journal of the European Union C 345/01, Pb C 345, 18.10.2015, p 1.
21 Activities allowed while sanctions relief was in force, as further detailed in Section 3 of this Information Note.
Annex 28
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9
3. Description of sanctions lifted on Implementation Day
3.1. Sanctions lifted by the European Union on Implementation Day
On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the EU lifted all its economic and financial
sanctions22 taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme. As a consequence of the
lifting of these sanctions, the following activities, including associated services, are allowed
as of Implementation Day.23
􀁸 Financial, banking and insurance measures
The prohibition of financial transfers to and from Iran (including the notification and
authorisation regimes) is lifted. Consequently, transfers of funds between EU persons, entities
or bodies, including EU financial and credit institutions, and non-listed Iranian persons,
entities or bodies, including Iranian financial and credit institutions24, are permitted as of
Implementation Day and the requirements for authorisation or notification of transfers of
funds are no longer applicable.
Banking activities, such as the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and
the opening of branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of non-listed Iranian banks in
Member States are permitted. Non-listed Iranian financial and credit institutions are also
allowed to acquire or extend participation, or to acquire any other ownership interest in EU
financial and credit institutions. EU financial and credit institutions are allowed to open
representative offices or to establish branch or subsidiaries in Iran; to establish joint ventures
and open bank accounts with Iranian financial or credit institutions.
The supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, is allowed for
Iranian natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, including Iranian financial institutions and
22 As specified in Sections 16.1 -16.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA.
23 For the exact details of the permitted activities reference is made to Annex II of the JCPOA. This section describes
permitted activities following the lifting of sanctions on Implementation Day (16 January 2016). It does not cover other
activities that were permissible while the sanctions regime was in place and thus continue to be permitted after
Implementation Day.
24 With the exception of Iranian natural or legal persons, entities of bodies, including financial and credit institutions still
subject to restrictive measures after Implementation Day, as set out in Attachment 2 to Annex II of the JCPOA.
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the Central Bank of Iran that are no longer subject to restrictive measures as of
Implementation Day.25
The provision of financial support for trade with Iran such as export credit, guarantees or
insurance is permitted as of Implementation Day. The same applies for commitments for
grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran. Other allowed
activities in this context are provision of insurance and reinsurance to Iran and transactions in
public or public-guaranteed bonds with Iran.
􀁸 Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors
Import, purchase, swap and transport of crude oil and petroleum products, gas and
petrochemical products from Iran is allowed as of Implementation Day. EU persons are able
to export equipment or technology, and provide technical assistance, including training, used
in the sectors of the oil, gas and petrochemical industries in Iran covering exploration,
production and refining of oil and natural gas, including liquefaction of natural gas, to any
Iranian person, in or outside Iran, or for use in Iran. Investing in the Iranian oil, gas and
petrochemical sectors, by the granting of any financial loan or credit to, the acquisition or
extension of a participation in, and the creation of any joint venture with, any Iranian person
that is engaged in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors in Iran or outside Iran is permitted as
of Implementation Day.
􀁸 Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors
Sanctions related to shipping and shipbuilding sectors and certain sanctions related to the
transport sector, including the provision of associated services to these sectors, are lifted on
Implementation Day.
Consequently, the following activities are allowed: sale, supply, transfer or export of naval
equipment and technology for ship building, maintenance or refit, to Iran or to any Iranian
persons engaged in this sector; the design, construction or the participation in the design or
construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers for Iran or for Iranian persons; the provision of
vessels designed or used for the transport or storage of oil and petrochemical products to
25 Persons and entities as set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II of the JCPOA.
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Iranian persons, entities or bodies; and the provision of flagging and classification services,
including those pertaining to technical specification, registration and identification numbers of
any kind, to Iranian oil tankers and cargo vessels.
All cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or originating from Iran have access to the
airports under the jurisdiction of EU Member States.
Inspection, seizure and disposal by EU Member States of cargoes to and from Iran in their
territories no longer apply with regard to items which are no longer prohibited.
Provision of bunkering or ship supply services, or any other servicing of vessels, to Iranianowned
or Iranian-contracted vessels not carrying prohibited items is allowed; and the
provision of fuel, engineering and maintenance services to Iranian cargo aircraft not carrying
prohibited items is permitted.
􀁸 Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage
Sale, supply, purchase, export, transfer or transport of gold and precious metals as well as
diamonds, and provision of related brokering, financing and security services, to, from or for
the Government of Iran, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, or the Central Bank of
Iran is allowed.
Delivery of newly printed or minted banknotes and coinage for the Central Bank of Iran is
permitted.
􀁸 Metals
Sale, supply, transfer or export of certain graphite and raw or semi-finished metals to any
Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran is no longer prohibited but subject to an
authorisation regime as of Implementation Day.26
􀁸 Software
Sale, supply, transfer or export of Enterprise Resource Planning software, including updates,
to any Iranian person, entity or body, or for use in Iran, in connection with activities
26 For details on the authorisation regime and the list of goods subject to it, see section 5.2 on the sanctions that remain in
place after Implementation Day.
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consistent with the JCPOA is no longer prohibited but subject to an authorisation regime as of
Implementation Day if the software is designed specifically for use in nuclear and military
industries.27
􀁸 De-listing of persons, entities and bodies
As of Implementation Day, certain persons, entities and bodies are delisted and consequently
no longer subject to the asset freeze, prohibition to make funds available and visa ban. This
covers UN listings and EU autonomous listings. For more information on the persons and
entities that are delisted it is advised to consult Council Implementing Regulation (EU)
2015/1862 of 18 October 2015 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/74 of 22
January 2016, implementing Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures
against Iran.28
3.2. U.S. Sanctions
For the details and consequences of the lifting of sanctions in the U.S. it is recommended to
consult the U.S. Guidelines with Respect to the Lifting of Sanctions on Implementation Day
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the E3/EU+3 and the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the FAQs.29
27 For details on the authorisation regime, see section 5.2 on the sanctions that remain in place after Implementation Day.
28 See also section 4 on EU legislative framework.
29 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/iran….
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4. Legal framework
This section contains an overview of the relevant legal framework implementing the lifting30
of sanctions as specified in the JCPOA.
4.1. UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015)
UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015) was adopted on 20 July 2015. It endorsed the
JCPOA, urged its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA31, and
defined the schedule and commitments to be undertaken by all parties to lead to the
termination of UN sanctions against Iran.
􀁸 On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), all provisions of previous UN Security
Council resolutions32 on the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated, subject to reimposition
in the event of significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA
commitments, and specific restrictions, including restrictions regarding the transfer of
proliferation sensitive goods, apply.
􀁸 On UN Security Council resolution Termination Day, all the provisions of UN
Security Council resolution 2231(2015) will terminate and the UN Security Council
will conclude its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue and the item will be
removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized.
4.2. EU legislative framework
It is through the adoption of legal acts providing the legislative framework for the lifting of
EU sanctions that the European Union implements UN Security Council resolution
2231(2015) in accordance with the JCPOA. Although the lifting of the abovementioned
sanctions took effect on Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the EU committed under the
JCPOA to prepare and adopt the necessary legislation on Adoption Day (18 October 2015),
but with delayed application.
30 In the present Information Note the "lifting" of restrictive measures refers equally to the suspension and implementation of
those measures, as appropriate.
31 Annex V of the JCPOA.
32 UN Security Council resolutions 1696(2006), 1737(2006), 1747(2007), 1803(2008), 1835(2008), 1929(2010) and
2224(2015).
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The restrictive measures lifted in accordance with the JCPOA are those that have been
imposed by the European Union in relation to Iran nuclear-related activities as set out in
Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP33 and Council Regulation (EU) 267/201234. The
implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015) in accordance with the JCPOA
is mainly35 accomplished through the following EU legal acts:
􀁸 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015 amending Council Decision
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran36
This Decision provides for the suspension of the articles of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP
concerning all EU economic and financial sanctions as specified in the JCPOA
simultaneously with the implementation by Iran, and verified by the IAEA, of the agreed
nuclear measures. The Decision also suspends the application of asset freeze (including the
prohibition to make funds and economic resources available) and visa ban measures for
persons and entities as specified in the JCPOA. Furthermore, this Decision also introduces an
authorisation regime for reviewing and deciding on certain nuclear-related transfers and
transfers of certain metals and software. The Decision is implemented by two Regulations
(see below), which are directly applicable in all Member States.
􀁸 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Regulation (EU)
267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran37
This Regulation provides for the deletion of the corresponding articles of Council Regulation
(EU) 267/2012 concerning all EU economic and financial sanctions as specified in the
JCPOA, simultaneously with the implementation by Iran, of the agreed nuclear measures and
verified by the IAEA (16 January 2016). Furthermore, this Regulation also implements the
prior authorisation regime for reviewing and deciding on certain nuclear-related transfers and
33 Official Journal of the European Union L 195, 27.07.2010, p.39 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2010.195.01.0039.01.ENG)
34 Official Journal of the European Union L 88, 24.03.2012, p.1.
35 Referring to the sanctions to be lifted on Implementation Day (16 January 2016). The lifting of remaining sanctions on
Transition Day will require separate EU legal acts, see paragraph 2.4.
36 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.174.
37 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.1.
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transfers of certain metals and software. Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1861 also implements
provisions on the proliferation-related prohibitions, like missile technology sanctions, that
remain in force.
Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1861 is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all EU
Member States.38
􀁸 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1862 of 18 October 2015 implementing
Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran39
This Regulation implements Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 in so far as it lifts the
restrictive measures applying to individuals and entities set out in Annexes V (UN listings)
and VI (autonomous listings) to Decision 2010/413/CFSP simultaneously with the IAEAverified
implementation by Iran of agreed nuclear-related measures. These individuals and
entities are removed from the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures, set
out in Annexes VIII (UN listings) and IX (autonomous listings) to Regulation (EU) 267/2012
simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of agreed nuclear-related
measures (16 January 2016).
􀁸 Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/37 of 16 January 2016 concerning the date of
application of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP
concerning restrictive measures against Iran40
􀁸 Notice: Information concerning the date of application of Council Regulation (EU)
2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning
restrictive measures against Iran and Council Implementing Regulation (EU)
2015/1862 of 18 October 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning
restrictive measures against Iran41
38 See Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1861. Declaration No 17 attached to the EU Treaties provides that: "in accordance
with well-settled case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, the treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the
Treaties have primacy over the law of the Member States (...)".
39 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.161.
40 Official Journal of the European Union L 11I, 16.01.2016, p.1.
41 Official Journal of the European Union C 15I, 16.01.2016, p.1.
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When the Council of the EU noted that the Director-General of the IAEA had presented a
report to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the United Nations Security Council which
confirmed that Iran had taken the measures specified in JCPOA, the Council Decision,
Regulation and Implementing Regulation lifting all EU economic and financial sanctions
came into effect on the same day. A legal act and related notice intended exclusively to
confirm that the legislation adopted on Adoption Day42 shall apply were published in the
Official Journal of the European Union43.
Finally, the Council of the EU issued a Statement44 noting that the commitment to lift all EU
nuclear-related sanctions is without prejudice to the dispute resolution mechanism specified in
the JCPOA and to the reintroduction of EU sanctions in the case of significant nonperformance
by Iran of its commitments under the JCPOA. However, all parties involved in
the JCPOA process will engage in ensuring that the JCPOA is successfully implemented and
sustained.
􀁸 Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/78 of 22 January 2016 implementing
Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran45
This Decision suspended the application of the asset freeze (including the prohibition to make
funds and economic resources available) for two entities which had been delisted by the UN
Security Council on 17 January 2016.
􀁸 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/74 of 22 January 2016 implementing
Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran46
This Regulation implements Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/78 by lifting the
asset freeze measures applying to two entities following a decision by the UN Security
Council to delist them on 17 January 2016.
42 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.1.
43 See Article 2 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015.
44 Official Journal of the European Union C 345/01, Pb C 345, 18.10.2015, p 1.
45 Official Journal of the European Union L 16, 23.1.2016, p.25.
46 Official Journal of the European Union L 16, 23.01.2016, p.6.
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􀁸 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1375 of 29 July 2016 amending
Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran47
This Regulation facilitates the implementation of Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 by allowing a
better identification of the items listed in Annexes I and III of Regulation (EU) 267/2012 by
reference to existing identifying codes as applied under Annex I to Council Regulation (EC)
No 428/2009. It also introduces certain technical amendments in Annex VIIB.
􀁸 Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/974 of 8 June 2017 amending Decision
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran48
This Decision addresses two practical difficulties encountered in the implementation
of the JCPOA related to:
i.) End-use verification
In accordance with Council Decision 2017/974 it is no longer required to obtain from Iran the
right to verify the end-use and end-use location for exports to Iran of items on Annex II of
Regulation 267/2012, as amended. This Decision replaces the previous requirement49, with an
obligation that Member States should obtain information on the end-use and end-use location
of any supplied item. The Regulation provides further details in that regard (see below).
ii.) Prior approval by the Joint Commission of certain imports from Iran into EU Member
States
This amendment removes the requirement50 that the procurement from Iran of, inter alia,
items contained in Annex I to Regulation 267/2012, as amended, should be subject to prior
approval by the Joint Commission. Instead the revised legislation now stipulates that such
procurement must only be notified to the Joint Commission and therefore no prior approval is
required. National competent authorities are still required to grant prior approval.
47 Official Journal of the European Union L 221, 16.8.2016, p.1.
48 Official Journal of the European Union L 146, 9.6.2017, p.143.
49 See Article 26d, paragraphs (3) and (5)(f), together with Article 26d(1) of Decision 2010/413/CFSP.
50 See Article 26c (7) in combination with Article 26c (1) (a) of Decision 2010/413/CFSP.
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This amendment does not affect Iran's obligations to obtain prior approval by the Joint
Commission for a period of 15 years for the "export of any enrichment or enrichment related
equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment or
enrichment related activities " as provided by the JCPOA51.
􀁸 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/964 of 8 June 2017 amending Regulation No 267/2012
concerning restrictive measures against Iran52.
Council Regulation (EU) 2017/964 further explains the amendments made by Council
Decision (CFSP) 2017/97453. In particular, with regard to the end-use verification of items
listed in Annex II exported to Iran, the Regulation provides that it shall be made by means of
an end-use certificate provided to the national competent authorities by the exporter,
containing inter alia information on the end-use and, as a basic principle, end-use location of
the exported items and the commitment by the importer that it will only use the goods in
question for peaceful purposes. An EU template, based on the existing template used for dualuse
goods exports under Regulation 428/2009, is contained in Annex IIa. However, competent
authorities can also accept equivalent documents.
The amendments concerning notification to the Joint Commission of the procurement of items
listed in Annex I are contained in Article 2a, paragraph 5.
51 As specified in paragraph 73 of Annex I of the JCPOA .
52 Official Journal of the European Union L 146, 9.6.2017, p.1.
53 See Articles 3a, paragraphs 6 and 6a; 3c, paragraphs 2 and 2a; and 3d, paragraphs 2(b) and 2a, of Regulation (EU)
267/2012 for the end-use verification; and Article 2a, paragraph 5 for the notification to the Joint Commission.
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5. Proliferation-related sanctions and restrictions remaining in place after
Implementation Day
This section describes the proliferation-related sanctions and restrictions that remain in place
after Implementation Day (16 January 2016). These concern the arms embargo, sanctions
related to missile technology, restrictions on certain nuclear-related transfers and activities,
provisions concerning certain metals and software which are subject to an authorisation
regime, as well as related listings which remain in force after Implementation Day.
Measures concerning inspection of cargoes to and from Iran and those related to the provision
of bunkering or ship supply services continue to apply after Implementation Day in relation to
items which continue to be prohibited.
5.1. Proliferation-related sanctions
􀁸 Arms embargo
A prohibition to sell, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, or procure arms and related
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment,
paramilitary equipment and spare parts for such arms and related materiel; and the provision
of associated services continues to apply after Implementation Day. The EU arms embargo
covers all goods included in the EU common military list.54
The EU arms embargo stays in place until Transition Day.55
􀁸 Missile technology sanctions
A prohibition to sell, supply, transfer, export or procure, directly or indirectly, the goods and
technology listed in Annex III to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive
measures against Iran, as modified by subsequent regulations, including Council Regulation
2015/186156 (hereafter: Council Regulation 267/2012 (as amended)), and any other item that
the Member State determines that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, and the provision of associated services continues to apply. Annex III lists
54 Link to the UE CML.
55 As specified in Annex V, paragraph 20.1, of the JCPOA.
56 Official Journal of the European Union L 274, 18.10.2015, p.15.
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all goods and technology contained in the Missile Technology Control Regime list. For more
information on the Missile Technology Control Regime lists, it is recommended to consult the
Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime.57
It is to be noted that in case an item whose specific technical characteristics or specifications
fall within the categories covered by both Annex I and Annex III to Council Regulation
267/2012 (as amended), the item is considered to fall within Annex III, meaning that a
prohibition always applies in this situation.58
EU missile technology sanctions stay in place until Transition Day.59
􀁸 Remaining individuals and entities subject to restrictive measures
Certain persons and entities (UN and EU listings) remain subject to an asset freeze, visa ban
and prohibition on the provision of specialised financial messaging services (SWIFT) until
Transition Day.60
5.2. Proliferation-related restrictions (authorisation regimes including the Procurement
Channel)
􀁸 Nuclear transfers and activities
As of Implementation Day, proliferation-sensitive transfers and activities concerning certain
goods and technology, including associated services, such as technical and financial
assistance and related investments are subject to prior authorisation to be granted on a caseby-
case basis by the competent authorities of the Member State.61
The lists of goods and technology subject to prior authorisation are to be found in Annexes I
and II to Council Regulation 267/2012 (as amended).
57 http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidelines.html
58 According to the introductory note in Annex I to Council Regulation 2015/1861.
59 As specified in Annex V, paragraph 20.1, of the JCPOA.
60 Persons and entities as set out in Annexes VIII (UN listings) and IX (autonomous listings) to Regulation (EU) 267/2012.
61 Competent authorities of each Member Sate are identified in Annex X to Council Regulation 267/2012 concerning
restrictive measures against Iran.
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Annex I contains the goods and technology listed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group lists. For
more information on the Nuclear Suppliers Group list, it is recommended to consult the
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers of the Nuclear Supplier Group.62
In the case of goods and technology listed in Annex I, any transfer or related activity falls
within the procurement channel as described in the JCPOA63 and UN Security Council
resolution 2231(2015)64. Consequently, the national competent authority will have to submit a
request for authorisation to the UN Security Council. The Procurement Working Group of the
Joint Commission will make a recommendation to the UN Security Council on every request
for authorisation. Each E3+3 State and Iran participate in the Procurement Working Group
and the High Representative serves as the Coordinator.
For more information on the functioning of the Procurement Working Group, it is
recommended to consult the Procurement Working Group guidelines.65
Another group of goods and technology subject to prior authorisation on a case-by-case basis
by the competent authorities of Member States is listed in Annex II to Council Regulation
267/2012 (as amended). Annex II contains other dual-use goods and technology that could
contribute to reprocessing, enrichment-related, heavy water-related or other activities
inconsistent with the JCPOA. In this case the authorisation is granted by the national
competent authority only in accordance with the EU legal framework.
􀁸 Metals and Software
The sale, supply transfer or export of Enterprise Resource Planning software, designed
specifically for use in nuclear and military industries, as described in Annex VIIA to Council
Regulation 267/2012 (as amended), and the provision of associated services is subject to prior
62 http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/guidelines
63 Annex IV of the JCPOA.
64 Exceptions may apply in relation to certain goods for light-water reactors or in respect of transactions necessary to
implement Iran's nuclear-related commitments specified in the JCPOA or required for the preparation for the implementation
of the JCPOA. For further details, consult Council Regulation 267/2012 (as amended).
65 http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/proliferation-nuclear-activities.shtml
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authorisation to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the competent authorities of the
Member State.66
The sale, supply, transfer or export of certain graphite and raw or semi-finished metals and the
provision of associated services is subject to prior authorisation to be granted on a case-bycase
basis by the competent authorities of the Member State.67 The list of goods covered by
this restriction can be found in Annex VIIB to Council Regulation 267/2012 (as amended).
66 Competent authorities of each Member Sate are identified in Annex X to Council Regulation 267/2012 concerning
restrictive measures against Iran.
67 Competent authorities of each Member Sate are identified in Annex X to Council Regulation 267/2012 concerning
restrictive measures against Iran.
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6. Non-nuclear proliferation-related sanctions and restrictive measures
Sanctions imposed by the EU in view of the human rights situation in Iran, support for
terrorism and other grounds are not part of the JCPOA, and remain in place.
Measures adopted by the EU in relation to concerns on human rights violations include an
asset freeze and visa ban on 82 persons and one entity responsible for grave human rights
violations, as well as a ban on exports to Iran of equipment which might be used for internal
repression and of equipment for monitoring telecommunications.68
Iranian persons who are also listed under EU terrorism and Syria sanctions regimes (or any
other EU sanctions regime)69 continue to be subject to restrictive measures under these
regimes which are outside the scope of the JCPOA.
68 Please consult Annexes III and IV to Council Regulation (EU) 359/2011 of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive measures
directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran as subsequently amended..
69 EU measures to combat terrorism: Common Position 2001/931 and Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001.
Sanctions regime in view of the situation in Syria: Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) 36/2012.
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7. Questions and Answers
This section contains a description of practical issues raised by EU Member States or third
States and the business community. The aim of this section is to serve as a practical tool on
the implementation of the JCPOA and the uniform application of the aforementioned legal
acts within the EU. Therefore, this section could be updated in light of experience on the
implementation of the JCPOA and relevant legal acts. The questions are divided by main
categories.
General questions
1. When is Implementation Day scheduled to occur according to the JCPOA?
Implementation Day occurred on 16 January 2016 when the IAEA verified the
implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures as described in the
relevant paragraphs of the JCPOA, and simultaneously the E3/EU+3 lifted
sanctions as described in the relevant paragraphs of the JCPOA.
2. What sanctions were lifted on Implementation Day and is there a list of the
sanctions that were lifted?
On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the EU lifted all its economic and
financial sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme.
Details on sanctions which were lifted on Implementation Day are to be found in
section 3 of this Information Note.
3. What sanctions remain in place on Implementation Day?
Proliferation-related sanctions which remain in place are described in section 5
of this Information Note. Restrictive measures not related to nuclear issues or
proliferation, such as those related to human rights and support for terrorism, as
described in section 6 of this Information Note, remain in place as they are not
covered by the JCPOA.
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4. What exports to Iran are permitted?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), all exports to Iran are permitted,
with the following exceptions:
- Prior authorisation to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the
competent authority of the relevant Member State is needed for the export
of goods and technology in Annexes I, II, VIIA and VIIB to Council
Regulation 267/2012, as modified by subsequent regulations, including
Council Regulation 2015/1861;
- A prohibition is maintained on the export of arms as detailed in the EU
Common Military List and missiles-related goods and technology as
detailed in Annex III (Missile Technology Control Regime list) to Council
Regulation 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, as
modified by subsequent regulations, including Council Regulation
2015/1861;
- In addition, it remains prohibited under the Iran human rights sanctions
regime to export equipment which might be used for internal repression
and equipment for monitoring telecommunications since this is outside the
scope of the JCPOA;
- Finally, any export to or for the benefit of any person or entity listed under
any EU sanctions regime shall remain prohibited (prohibition to make
economic resources available to listed persons or entities)
5. Are there any export control rules that apply to exports to third countries?
Any export control rules that apply independently from the sanctions taken in
connection with the Iranian nuclear programme continue to apply. Any such
controls apply to exports to any country outside the EU. In addition, goods and
technology in Annexes I, II, VIIA and VIIB to Council Regulation 267/2012, as
modified by subsequent regulations, including Council Regulation 2015/1861 are
subject to specific authorisation regimes if they are for an Iranian person, entity
or body in or outside Iran.
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6. What does the term "associated services" mean when used in Annex II of the
JCPOA?
For the purposes of Annex II of the JCPOA the term "associated services" means
any service – including technical assistance, training, insurance, re-insurance,
brokering, transportation or financial service – necessary and ordinarily incident
to the underlying activity for which sanctions have been lifted pursuant to the
JCPOA.70 It is noted that the EU legal acts provide further clarity regarding the
scope of lifting of sanctions on associated services for each measure.
7. Does the lifting of sanctions also include the lifting of restrictions currently in
place on Iranian students?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), Member States are no longer under
a UN or EU imposed obligation to prevent specialised teaching or training of
Iranian nationals of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's proliferationsensitive
nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.71
However, other international obligations and commitments including UN Security
Council resolution 1540 and commitments of Member States under the
international export control regimes concerning intangible transfer of controlled
technology related to Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation as well as nonassistance
obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological
Weapons Convention continue to apply. Member States may also have additional
national approval schemes that remain in place.
8. What will happen if Iran does not comply with the provisions of the JCPOA?
If Iran or the E3/EU+3 believes that the commitments under the JCPOA are not
met, the issue could be referred to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission
would try to solve the issue through the dispute resolution mechanism described
in the JCPOA. If at the end of the process the complaining participant believes the
issue still has not been resolved to its satisfaction, and if the complaining
70 Footnote 3 in Annex II of the JCPOA.
71 Annex II, paragraph 1.5.1, of the JCPOA.
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participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, it can notify
the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant nonperformance
of the obligations under the JCPOA. The UN Security Council will
vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting and if this resolution has not
been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN
Security Council resolutions72 will be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council
decides otherwise.
In such an event, the European Union, following the necessary Council decision,
will reintroduce ("snapback") EU sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian
nuclear programme that have been suspended and/or terminated.
9. Is it possible that new sanctions on Iran will be introduced by the UN/EU/U.S.?
The EU and the U.S. will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing sanctions
that have been lifted under the JCPOA or from imposing new nuclear-related
sanctions, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under
the JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions,
without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under the
JCPOA.
10. What kind of support is established for evaluating and determining if an activity is
consistent with the JCPOA?
The Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran is established to
monitor the implementation of the JCPOA and carries out the functions specified
in Annex IV of the JCPOA.73
For the review and recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers
to or activities with Iran the Joint Commission is assisted by the Procurement
Working Group. As regards the lifting of sanctions the Joint Commission is
assisted by a Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting. The High
72 UN Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224
(2015).
73 Annex IV, paragraph 2.1.1 to 2.1.16, of the JCPOA.
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Representative serves as the coordinator of the Joint Commission and both
working groups.
Financial, banking and insurance measures
11. Is it permissible to access financial and banking services in Iran?
The restrictions on accessing financial and banking services in Iran (as contained
in EU Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation 267/2012) are
lifted as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016).
12. Does the lifting of measures on banking allow the reopening of correspondent
banking accounts?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), banking activities including the
establishment of new correspondent banking relationships with Iranian banks are
allowed, provided that the Iranian financial institution is not a listed entity.
13. Can an EU person or entity use any Iranian bank for its business and engage in
banking transactions? Or are there still Iranian banks listed?
Certain Iranian banks remain listed (Ansar Bank and Mehr Bank). Hence, due
diligence should be performed to ensure that the Iranian bank is not listed as
activities and transactions with these banks remain prohibited. Banking
transactions or relationships with non-listed Iranian banks are permissible.
14. Is there any limitation to opening a new bank account or entering into a
correspondent banking relationship with non-listed financial institutions
domiciled in Iran or their branches or subsidiaries?
All restrictive measures concerning financial, banking and insurance measures
are lifted and, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permissible to
open a new bank account or to enter into correspondent banking relationships
with credit or financial institutions domiciled in Iran (or their branches or
subsidiaries), provided that they are not listed.
15. Is there any limitation to opening branches, subsidiaries or representative offices
of Iranian banks in EU Member States or of European banks in Iran?
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As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), non-listed Iranian banks are
allowed to open branches, subsidiaries or representative offices in EU Member
States. EU financial institutions are then permitted to open branches, subsidiaries
or representative offices in Iran.
16. What sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other listed Iranian
financial institutions will remain?
The CBI and certain other listed Iranian financial institutions were delisted and
therefore sanctions related to these entities are no longer applicable.
17. Is there any limitation for the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) to access its funds and
economic resources?
The CBI was delisted on Implementation Day (16 January 2016), hence sanctions
related to this entity are no longer applicable as of that day and any funds or
economic resources that have been frozen pursuant to its listing were released.
18. Is there any limitation for financial institutions supplying financial messaging
services for the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other non-listed financial
institutions?
The prohibition for financial institutions to supply specialised financial messaging
services used to exchange financial data applies in relation to listed entities. The
CBI and certain other listed Iranian financial institutions were delisted.
Therefore, financial institutions can supply financial messaging services for the
CBI and other non-listed financial institutions.
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19. Will financial institutions be exposed to U.S. sanctions for transacting with
Iranian financial institutions if those Iranian financial institutions have banking
relationships with Iranian persons on the SDN list?
This question addresses the U.S. sanction regime and for an accurate response
reference is made to the U.S. Guidelines and FAQs on the OFAC website.74
20. Are Iranian banks allowed to reconnect to SWIFT?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), Iranian banks which are no longer
included in the list of persons and entities subject to EU restrictive measures are
allowed to reconnect to SWIFT75. Persons and entities delisted on Implementation
Day are included in the Annex to Council Implementing Regulation (EU)
2015/1862 of 18 October 2015, implementing Regulation (EU) 267/2012
concerning restrictive measures against Iran. Additional entities delisted on 22
January 2016 are included in the Annex to Council Implementing Regulation
(EU) 2016/74 of 22 January 2016, implementing Regulation (EU) 267/2012
concerning restrictive measures against Iran
Against this background reference is made to a statement published by SWIFT76,
that banks delisted by the Implementing Regulation will automatically be able to
reconnect to SWIFT on Implementation Day, following the completion of SWIFT's
normal connection process (i.e. administrative and systems checks, connectivity
and technical arrangements).
21. Is it permissible for EU financial institutions to clear transactions involving nonlisted
Iranian persons or entities after Implementation Day?
Yes, EU financial institutions are permitted to clear transactions with non-listed
Iranian persons or entities. EU financial institutions will have to ensure, however,
74 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/iran…
75 The following Iranian banks remain listed: Ansar Bank and Mehr Bank. See annexes VIII (UN listings) and IX
(autonomous listings) to Regulation (EU) 267/2012.
76
http://www.swift.com/about_swift/shownews?param_dcr=news.data/en/swift_…
ml
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that they do not clear transactions through other financial systems, or with other
entities, where such activity is not allowed. 77
22. Is it permissible to transfer funds to and from Iran?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the prohibition to transfer funds
with non-listed Iranian banks is lifted. Consequently, all limitations to transfer
funds to or from Iran applicable to non-listed Iranian banks, financial institutions
and bureaux de change, as well as any subsidiary or branch, cease to apply.
23. Is it still necessary to file notifications and requests for authorisations relating to
the transfer of funds pursuant to Articles 30, 30a of Council Regulation 267/2012
as currently applicable? Is there any limitation in relation to the amount of funds
that can be transferred?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), there is no requirement to file
notifications and requests for authorisations relating to the transfer of funds to
and from Iran as these articles are removed from Council Regulation 267/201278.
Equally, restrictions linked to the amount of funds to be transferred no longer
apply in accordance with the JCPOA.
24. Is it permissible to transfer funds to and from Iran for foodstuffs, healthcare,
medical equipment, or for agricultural or humanitarian purposes?
According to the restrictions on transfer of funds to and from Iran in place before
Implementation Day the transfer of funds regarding foodstuffs, healthcare,
medical equipment, or for agricultural or humanitarian purposes were permitted
under certain conditions. However, as of Implementation Day, the provisions
regarding transfer of funds to and from Iran are lifted and the limitations to
transfer funds cease to apply with the exception of transfer of funds or economic
resources to listed persons or entities.
77 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/iran…
78 Article 1 (15), Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Council Regulation 267/2012.
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25. Is it permissible for listed person and entities to use frozen funds for extraordinary
expenses?
Those persons and entities that are removed from the list have immediate access
to their funds on that same day. The persons and entities remaining listed do not
have access to their funds. However, exemptions to take account of in particular
basic needs of targeted persons, legal fees, and extraordinary expenses remain in
force and listed persons can request an authorisation from the competent
authorities of Member States in order to use their funds where a valid derogation
applies.
26. Is there any limitation for Iranian banks and financial institutions, bodies and
entities to access their funds and economic resources?
Non-listed Iranian banks and financial institutions are not subject to any asset
freeze measures by the European Union. Therefore, their funds in the EU are not
frozen. On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), a number of listed Iranian
banks and financial institutions were delisted followed by additional Iranian
banks on 23 January 2016. Consequently, delisted Iranian banks and financial
institutions had access to their frozen funds in the EU. However, a limited number
of Iranian banks and financial institutions remain listed (Ansar Bank and Mehr
Bank) and not able to access their funds in the EU, unless specifically provided
for in Council Regulation 267/2012 as modified by subsequent regulations,
including Council Regulation 2015/1861.
27. How does the lifting of sanctions provided under the EU legal acts in accordance
with the JCPOA affect the provision of insurance and reinsurance for transactions
involving Iran?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permitted to provide insurance
and reinsurance to Iran or the Government of Iran or any non-listed Iranian
person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction.79
79 Annex II, paragraph 3.2.3 of the JCPOA.
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28. Is the purchase or sale of Iranian issued sovereign debt allowed?
The sale or purchase of public or public-guaranteed bonds issued by, for example,
the Government of Iran or the Central Bank of Iran, or Iranian banks and credit
or financial institutions, and providing related services thereto, is permitted as of
Implementation Day (16 January 2016). The same applies to any natural or legal
person entity or body acting on behalf or owned and controlled by them.
29. Are there any limitations on the provision of financial support for trade with Iran,
including export credits, guarantees or insurance?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), EU Member States are no longer
prohibited from entering into new commitments to provide financial support for
trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance,
to EU nationals or entities.
30. Is there any limitation for persons to enter into new commitments for grants or
concessional loans to the Government of Iran?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), EU Member States are no longer
prohibited from entering into new commitments for grants, financial assistance
and concessional loans to the Government of Iran, including through their
participation in international financial institutions.
31. Is there any limitation to financial institutions opening a new representative office
or establishing a new branch or subsidiary in Iran?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), EU financial institutions are able
to open representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran. It is also
permissible to establish new joint ventures with Iranian financial institutions.
However, EU financial institutions cannot engage in banking activities with those
Iranian banks that remain listed under EU sanctions.
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Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors
32. Are petrochemicals covered by the lifting of sanctions?
Yes, activities related to Iranian petrochemicals are covered by the lifting of
sanctions on Implementation Day (16 January 2016).80
33. Is it permissible to purchase, acquire, sell or market petroleum products,
petrochemical products and natural gas to or from Iran?
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permissible to purchase,
acquire, sell or market petroleum products, petrochemical products and natural
gas to or from Iran and to provide associated services.81
34. Does the lifting of sanctions on Iranian crude oil, petroleum products,
petrochemical products and liquefied natural gas also cover the provision of
transport?
The transport of Iranian oil and petrochemical products, and the provision of
insurance and re-insurance, including protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance,
are permissible. As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the transport of
Iranian petroleum products and liquefied natural gas, and the provision of
insurance and re-insurance, including protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance,
are also permissible. As of Implementation Day, other activities and transactions
related to Iranian oil and natural gas such as the provision of financing are also
allowed.82
35. Are sanctions on entities such as the National Iranian Oil Company lifted?
All entities removed from the list are no longer subject to restrictive measures. As
of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the National Iranian Oil Company, as
well as its listed subsidiaries and affiliated companies, are removed from the list
80 Annex II, paragraph 3.3.1, of the JCPOA.
81 Annex II, paragraphs 1.2.2. and 1.2.5, of the JCPOA.
82 Annex II, paragraph 3.3.1, of the JCPOA.
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of listed entities and as a consequence the sanctions on these entities are lifted
and transactions are allowed.
36. Is it permissible to invest in Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors?
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permissible to invest in
Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors.83
37. The JCPOA provides that on Implementation Day the application of efforts to
reduce Iran's crude oil sales are ceased, including limitations on: the quantities of
Iran crude oil sold; the countries that can purchase Iranian crude oil and the use of
Iranian oil revenues. What will this entail?
This question addresses the U.S. sanction regime and for an accurate response
reference is made to the U.S. Guidelines and FAQ’s on the OFAC website.84
38. Is it prohibited for an EU person to conduct business with an Iranian entity in
which a natural person or entity listed by the EU retains a minority or noncontrolling
interest?
EU persons are prohibited from making available funds or economic resources to
listed persons or entities directly or indirectly. The criteria to establish control or
ownership and whether funds or economic resources are made indirectly
available to designated persons and entities are to be found in the 'Guidelines on
implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the
framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy'.85
83 Annex II, paragraph 1.2.4, of the JCPOA.
84 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/iran…
85 See link to ´New elements on the notions of ownership and control and the making available of funds or economic
resources´ in section 8 on reference documents.
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Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors
39. Is it permissible to provide vessels designed for the transport of Iranian oil and
petrochemical products?
Yes, it is permissible to supply vessels designed for the transport or storage of oil
and petrochemical products to non-listed Iranian persons or entities as well as to
any person or entity for the transport of Iranian oil or petrochemical products.86
40. Is it permissible to export naval equipment and technology for shipbuilding to
Iran?
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permissible to export
naval equipment and technology for shipbuilding, maintenance or refit, to Iran or
to non–listed Iranian or Iranian-owned enterprises engaged in this sector.87
41. Is it permissible to construct and repair Iranian vessels?
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is allowed to sell, supply,
transfer or export naval equipment and technology for ship building, maintenance
or refit, to Iran or to any Iranian persons engaged in this sector such as NITC and
IRISL. The participation in the design, construction and repair of cargo vessels
and oil tankers for Iran or for non-listed Iranian persons or Iranian-owned
enterprises engaged in this sector such as NITC and IRISL is also allowed as of
Implementation Day.88
42. Is it permissible to provide flagging and classification services to vessels owned
or controlled by Iranian persons?
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the provision of flagging and
classification services, including those pertaining to technical specification,
registration and identification numbers of any kind, to Iranian oil tankers and
86 Annex II, paragraphs 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, of the JCPOA.
87 Annex II, paragraph 3.4.1 of the JCPOA
88 Annex II, paragraph 3.4.1. of the JCPOA.
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cargo vessels owned or controlled by non–listed Iranian or Iranian-owned
enterprises engaged in the shipping and shipbuilding sectors such as NITC and
IRISL is allowed.
43. Is it permissible to provide bunkering or ship supply services to Iranian owned or
Iranian contracted vessels?
Yes, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is permitted to provide
bunkering or ship supply services to Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels,
including chartered vessels, not carrying prohibited items.89
Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage
44. Is it permissible to mint coins for Iran or deliver newly printed or unissued Iranian
dominated banknotes to the Central Bank of Iran?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the delivery of newly minted
coinage and newly printed or unissued Iranian dominated banknotes to or for the
benefit of Central Bank of Iran is allowed.90
45. Is it permissible to export diamonds to Iran?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the sale, purchase, transportation
or brokering of diamonds to Iran is allowed.91
46. Is it permissible to supply, sell, purchase, transfer, export or import gold and other
precious metals to and from Iran, the Government of Iran, its public bodies,
corporations and agencies, any person, entity or body owned or controlled by
them?
Yes, it is permissible to sell, supply, purchase, export, or transfer gold and
precious metals, to provide related brokering, financing and security services to,
or from or for the Government of Iran, its public bodies, corporations and
89 Annex II, paragraph 3.4.4 of the JCPOA
90 Annex II, paragraph 1.4.1, of the JCPOA
91 Annex II, paragraph 1.4.1, of the JCPOA
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agencies or the Central Bank of Iran its public bodies, corporations and agencies,
any person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction, or any
entity or body owned or controlled by them.
Metals / Software
47. Are all restrictions on the export of software lifted?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the export of software to Iran is
permitted, with the following exceptions:
- Prior authorisation to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the
competent authority of the relevant Member State is needed for the sale,
supply, transfer or export of Enterprise Resource Planning software,
designed specifically for use in nuclear and military industries as set out
in Annex VIIA to Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by subsequent
regulations, including Council Regulation 2015/1861, and the provision of
associated services;
- Prior authorisation to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the
competent authority of the relevant Member State is needed for the sale,
supply, transfer or export of software related to nuclear equipment and
technologies as set out in Annexes I and II to Council Regulation
267/2012, as modified by subsequent regulations, including Council
Regulation 2015/1861;
- On the contrary, the sale, supply, transfer or export of software related to
ballistic missiles as set out in Annex III to Council Regulation 267/2012,
as modified by subsequent regulations, including Council Regulation
2015/1861, is still subject to a prohibition.
48. What metals are still subject to restriction on the sale, supply or export to Iran?
As of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), the export of metals to Iran is
permitted with the following exception:
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- Prior authorisation to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the
competent authorities of the Member State is needed for the sale, supply,
transfer or export of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals and the
provision of technical assistance or training, financing or financial
assistance. The list of items covered by this restriction can be found in
Annex VIIB to Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by subsequent
regulations, including Council Regulation 2015/1861.
49. Is an entity allowed to invest in the production or in a production facility in Iran
for the production of metals covered by an export authorisation regime?
Yes, the JCPOA does not preclude investment in Iran in sectors related to goods
the sale, supply, transfer or export, of which remain subject to an authorisation
regime.
50. Is the sale or export of aluminium oxide (alumina) to Iran subject to prior EU
authorisation?
The list of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals subject to prior authorisation
to be granted on a case-by-case basis by the competent authority of the relevant
Member State92 can be found in Annex VIIB to Council Regulation 267/2012, as
modified by subsequent regulations, including Council Regulation 2015/1861.
51. Is it permissible to sell, supply, transfer, export or to provide technical and
financial assistance related to software to an Iranian person body or entity?
Sale, supply, transfer or export of Enterprise Resource Planning software93,
including updates and provision of associated services, to any Iranian person,
entity or body, or for use in Iran is no longer prohibited as of Implementation Day
(16 January 2016) but is subject to prior authorisation to be granted on a caseby-
case basis by the competent authorities of the Member States.
92 Competent authorities of each Member Sate are identified in Annex X to Council Regulation 267/2012 concerning
restrictive measures against Iran.
93 Described in Annex VIIA to Council Regulation 267/2012 as modified by Council Regulation 2015/1861.
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Nuclear proliferation-related measures
52. Where can the list of dual-use goods which can be exported to Iran be found?
The list of dual-use goods which can be exported to Iran – subject to prior
authorisation – are to be found in Annexe I (Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) list,
Parts I and II) of Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by subsequent
regulations, including Council Regulation 2015/1861. Annex II (EU autonomous
list) contains goods of a comparable nature94 to dual-use ones, which may also be
exported subject to prior authorisation. In addition to this, export licenses for
other dual-use goods listed in Annex I of Regulation (EC) 428/2009 can be
applied for in line with the provisions of that regulation.
53. Is it permissible to apply for a license to export dual-use goods to Iran?
Yes, licenses to export dual-use goods should be requested from the competent
authority in the relevant Member State. A list of the national competent
authorities is to be found in Annex X of Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified
by Council Regulation 2015/1861.
54. Is an authorisation for the export of dual-use goods granted by an EU Member
State valid in other EU Member States?
Yes, authorisations for the export of dual-use goods granted by the competent
authorities of the Member State where the exporter is established shall be valid
throughout the Union.
55. How much time will it take to obtain a licence?
This is a matter for the relevant competent authority responsible for issuing
licenses.
94 Goods and technology, other than those included in Annexes I and III to Regulation 267/2012, that could contribute to reprocessing or
enrichment-related or heavy-water related or other activities inconsistent with the JCPOA.
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56. Article 2d(3)(b) Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by Council Regulation
2015/1861, states that Member States shall notify the IAEA of supplied products
included in the NSG list: Is a reference to both lists (NSG Part I and II) intended?
Notification obligation concerns both lists – Part I and II - of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) and is to be found in Annex I to Council Regulation
267/2012, as modified by subsequent regulations, including Council Regulation
2015/1861.
56a. What are the requirements concerning end-use statement when exporting items
listed in Annex II of Regulation 267/2012 to Iran?
As per Articles 3a(6), 3c(2), 3d(2)(b), the exporter shall submit an end-use
statement signed by the Iranian end-user or consignee (the 'end-use statement'),
either by means of the template established in Annex IIa of Council Regulation
267/2012, as modified by Council Regulation 2015/1861, or through an
equivalent document. This should be done at the time of the application for
authorisation.
The end-use statement shall not be necessary for temporary exports of the
relevant items, because there is no end-use of the items in the country of
destination. In all other cases, an end-use statement signed by the Iranian enduser
or consignee is mandatory.
56b. What is a temporary export of items listed in Annex II of Regulation 267/2012 to
Iran?
The notion of "temporary exports" in Articles 3a(6), 3c(2), 3d(2)(b) refers to the
situation whereby the items exit the customs territory of the Union and/or territory
of a Member State on a temporary basis and return in their original state within a
relatively short, pre-defined period of time. This mainly covers situations where
the items are displayed in a fair, exhibition or congress.
As per the specifications of the Union General Export Authorisation EU004
referred to in Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) 428/2009, “exhibition or fair”
means commercial events of a specific duration at which several exhibitors make
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demonstrations of their products to trade visitors or to the general public.
"Congress" refers to a scientific event involving similar demonstrations or
presentations. Applicants for a temporary export must guarantee the return of the
relevant items into the customs territory of the European Union in their original
state, without the removal, copying or dissemination of any component or
software, within 120 days of the temporary export.
56c. Is it permissible to export items listed in Annex II of Regulation 267/2012 when
the end-use location of those in Iran is not known? Under which circumstances?
Articles 3a(6), 3c(2), 3d(2)(b) of Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by
Council Regulation 2015/1861, provide that details on the end-use location of the
items shall be supplied as a basic principle. The template for an end-use statement
in Annex IIa of that Regulation clarifies that this information may be omitted in
the specific situations in which the consignee of the items is a trader, retailer,
whole- or re-seller, and thus the end-user and its location are not yet known at the
time of the application for a prior authorisation.
In such specific situations, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances,
the competent authority retains the possibility to either (i) authorise the
transaction in the absence of information on the end-use location of the supplied
items, if it deems that the rest of the information provided is sufficient to ascertain
that the items will be used in accordance with the Regulation, or (ii) deny the
authorisation, if that is not the case.
56d. Can a national competent authority request information on the end-use location of
the exported items listed in Annex II of Regulation 267/2012 after the license was
granted?
If a competent authority authorises a transaction in the absence of information on
the end-use location of the supplied items (that is, for the specific situations in
which the consignee of the items is a trader, retailer, whole- or re-seller, and thus
the end-user and its location are not yet known at the time of the application for a
prior authorisation), Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by Council
Regulation 2015/1861, provides in Articles 3a(6a), 3c(2a) and3d(2)(b) that such
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information needs to be provided later on, when it becomes known, if the
competent authority so requests. Failure to provide this information if requested
by the competent authority should be taken into account by the latter when
assessing subsequent applications for an authorisation by the same exporter or to
the same consignee, in particular as regards the existence of reasonable grounds
to determine that the items would contribute to reprocessing- or enrichmentrelated,
heavy water-related or other nuclear related activities inconsistent with
the JCPOA, in the sense of Article 3a(4) .
Arms & ballistic missiles
57. Are arms exports also subject to prior authorisation in the procurement channel?
The EU arms embargo was not lifted on Implementation Day (16 January 2016).
Sanctions related to arms, including the provision of associated services, remain
in place until Transition Day.
Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban)
58. Is it permissible to do business with anybody in Iran? Or are there still persons
and entities listed?
Yes, in general terms, as of Implementation Day (16 January 2016), it is
permissible to do business with Iranian persons or entities, with the exception of
those that remain listed until Transition Day or are listed under a different
sanctions regime and thus remain subject to the asset freeze measures, including
the prohibition to make funds or economic resources available. It is advised to
consult these lists before engaging in a business relationship. A central register of
persons and entities that are subject to EU sanctions is available online.95
59. How to verify if an entity or individual is on the sanctions list?
95 http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list/index_en.htm
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It is the responsibility of every person or entity within the European Union, and
EU nationals anywhere in the world to conduct due diligence checks to ensure
that they are not making funds or economic resources available to a listed person.
A central register of persons and entities that are subject to EU sanctions is
available online.96
60. Does the JCPOA allow new sanctions to be imposed against Iranian persons or
entities for providing support to the Government of Iran after Implementation
Day?
In accordance with the JCPOA, the EU will refrain from imposing new sanctions
against Iranian persons or entities exclusively on the grounds of providing
support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the Government of
Iran.
Reintroduction of sanctions
61. What would trigger the reintroduction of EU economic and financial sanctions?
In the event of a significant non-performance by Iran of its commitments under
the JCPOA and having exhausted all the steps under the dispute resolution
mechanism, the European Union shall reintroduce EU sanctions ("snapback")
that have been lifted. It should be noted that all parties to the JCPOA are
determined to avoid any behaviour which could be qualified as non-performance
and to avoid a re-imposition of sanctions by engaging in the Dispute Resolution
Mechanism.
62. How will EU sanctions be reintroduced in case of snapback?
A decision by the Council of the European Union, based on a recommendation by
the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, will reintroduce all EU
sanctions taken in connection with the Iranian nuclear programme that have been
suspended and/or terminated. Reintroduction of EU sanctions in case of
96 http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list/index_en.htm
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significant non-performance by Iran of its commitments under the JCPOA will be
done consistent with previous provisions when sanctions were originally imposed.
63. What happens with existing contracts in the event of the reintroduction of EU
sanctions?
In the event of the reintroduction of EU sanctions, sanctions will not apply with
retroactive effect. The execution of contracts concluded while the JCPOA
sanctions relief was in force and in accordance with the EU legal framework will
be permitted consistent with previous provisions when sanctions were originally
imposed, in order to allow companies to wind down their activities. Details about
the period of time allowed for the execution of prior contracts will be specified in
the legal acts providing for the reintroduction of EU sanctions. For example, the
reintroduction of sanctions on investment activities would not retroactively
penalise investment made before the date of snapback, and the execution of
investment contracts concluded before the reintroduction of sanctions will be
permitted consistent with previous provisions when sanctions were originally
imposed. Contracts that were permitted when the sanctions regime was still in
place will not be targeted by the reintroduction of sanctions.
64. Is the moment of a snapback publicly announced?
The reintroduction of EU sanctions will imply the adoption of legal acts
terminating the suspension of articles in Council Decision 2010/413CFSP, as
amended by Council Decision 2015/1863, and reintroducing the corresponding
articles in Council Regulation 267/2012, as modified by Council Regulation
2015/1861. These legal acts will be published in the Official Journal of the
European Union and therefore publicly available.97
Procurement channel
65. How does the procurement channel function?
97 See Article 2 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015.
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The UN Security Council will respond to requests by States to export certain
goods to and perform certain activities in Iran (NSG list/Annex I to Council
Regulation 267/2012, as modified by subsequent regulations, including Council
Regulation 2015/1861) after the recommendation of the Procurement Working
Group/Joint Commission.
66. What is the role of the Procurement Working Group?
The role of the Procurement Working Group is to review and make
recommendations on behalf of the Joint Commission on proposals for nuclearrelated
transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working
Group.98
67. Who is the “Coordinator” in point 6.4.1 of JCPOA Annex IV?
The High Representative serves as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working
Group.99
68. How is confidentiality of information when sending an authorisation application
ensured? For example, on sensitive business-related information.
The operation of the Procurement Working Group is subject to the confidentiality
rules of the UN.100
69. How will the Procurement Working Group communicate its authorisation
decisions to domestic authorities?
The Procurement Working Group will review applications and make a
recommendation to the UN Security Council, which will then communicate its
decision to national competent authorities.
98 Annex IV, paragraph 6.2, of the JCPOA.
99 Annex IV, paragraph 6.3, of the JCPOA
100 Annex IV, paragraph 3.4, of the JCPOA
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8. Reference documents
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
􀁸 JCPOA
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-co…-
action_en.pdf
􀁸 JCPOA – Annex I – Nuclear-related measures
http://eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/
docs/iran_agreement/annex_1_nuclear_related_commitments_en.pdf
􀁸 JCPOA – Annex II – Sanctions-related commitments
http://eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/
docs/iran_agreement/annex_2_sanctions_related_commitments_en.pdf
Attachments Annex II
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_1_attac…
􀁸 JCPOA – Annex III – Civil Nuclear Cooperation
http://eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/
docs/iran_agreement/annex_3_civil_nuclear_cooperation_en.pdf
􀁸 JCPOA – Annex IV – Joint Commission
http://eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/
docs/iran_agreement/annex_4_joint_commission_en.pdf
􀁸 JCPOA – Annex V – Implementation Plan
http://eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/
docs/iran_agreement/annex_5_implementation_plan_en.pdf
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United Nations
􀁸 UN Security Council resolution 2231(2015)
http://daccess-ddsny.
un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/225/27/PDF/N1522527.pdf?OpenElement
􀁸 UN Security Council
http://www.un.org/en/sc/
EU legal acts
􀁸 Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures
against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/?qid=1452107576951&uri=CELEX:32010D0413
􀁸 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015 amending Decision
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1863…
􀁸 Council Regulation 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures
against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) 961/2010
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/?qid=1452107630568&uri=CELEX:32012R0267
􀁸 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Regulation
(EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran. (including annexes)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R1861…
􀁸 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1862 of 18 October 2015
implementing Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against
Iran
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R1862&qid=1452102679407&from=EN
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􀁸 Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/37 of 16 January 2016 concerning the date of
application of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP
concerning restrictive measures against Iran
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2016:011I:TOC
􀁸 Notice: Information concerning the date of application of Council Regulation (EU)
2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning
restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L 274, 18.10.2015, p. 1) and Council
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1862 of 18 October 2015 implementing
Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L 274,
18.10.2015, p. 161)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2016:015I:TOC
􀁸 Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/78 of 22 January 2016 Implementing
Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.016.01.0025.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:016:TOC
􀁸 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/74 of 22 January 2016 implementing
Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.016.01.0006.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:016:TOC
􀁸 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1375 of 29 July 2016 amending
Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
EN/TXT/?qid=1477054608679&uri=CELEX:32016R1375
􀁸 Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/974 of 8 June 2017 amending Decision
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32017D0974&qid=1497335965624&rid=1
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􀁸 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/964 of 8 June 2017 amending Regulation No
267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/
AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32017R0964&qid=1497336026549&rid=1
Other relevant EU documents
􀁸 Frequently Asked Questions on EU restrictive measures
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/frequently_asked_questions_en…
􀁸 Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures in the
framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202012%20…
􀁸 New elements on the notions of ownership and control and the making available of
funds or economic resources
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st09/st09068.en13.pdf
􀁸 EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10254-2015-INIT/en/pdf
U.S. OFAC website
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/iran…
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Press Center
Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic Missile Procurement for Iran
1/17/2016
Action Targets 11 Individuals and Entities Responsible for Supporting Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today designated 11 entities and individuals involved in procurement on behalf of Iran’s ballistic missile program. OFAC sanctioned Mabrooka
Trading Co LLC (Mabrooka Trading) – based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and its China- and UAE-based network that have been involved in procuring goods for Iran’s ballistic missile program. This network obfuscated the end user of
sensitive goods for missile proliferation by using front companies in third countries to deceive foreign suppliers. Also designated today are five Iranian individuals who have worked to procure ballistic missile components for Iran. This action is
consistent with the U.S. government’s commitment to continue targeting those who assist in Iran’s efforts to procure items for its ballistic missile program.
“Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a significant threat to regional and global security, and it will continue to be subject to international sanctions,” said Adam J. Szubin, acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “We have
consistently made clear that the United States will vigorously press sanctions against Iranian activities outside of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – including those related to Iran’s support for terrorism, regional destabilization, human rights
abuses, and ballistic missile program.”
Hossein Pournaghshband and his company, Mabrooka Trading, are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 for having provided, or attempting to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support to Navid Composite
Material Company (Navid Composite), an entity sanctioned in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile program. Navid Composite was designated in December 2013 pursuant to E.O. 13382 as an Iran-based subsidiary of U.S.- and UN-designated
Sanam Industrial Group, an entity sanctioned for its involvement in Iran's ballistic missile program. At the time of its designation, Navid Composite was contracting with Asia-based entities to procure a carbon fiber production line in order to
produce carbon fiber probably suitable for use in ballistic missile components. Since at least early 2015, Pournaghshband used his company, Mabrooka Trading, to procure materials and other equipment for Navid Composite’s carbon fiber
production plan. Pournaghshband is also being designated today pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempting to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support to Mabrooka Trading.
Chen Mingfu is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempting to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support to Navid Composite and Mabrooka Trading. Anhui Land Group Co., Limited is also being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 because it is owned or controlled by Mingfu and for having provided, or attempting to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support to Mabrooka Trading and Pournaghshband. Mingfu brokered
deals in support of Mabrooka Trading and Pournaghshband’s efforts to procure materials and equipment for Navid Composite’s carbon fiber production line. Mingfu, using Hong Kong based-Anhui Land Group Co., Limited, provided logistical
support to Mabrooka Trading and Navid Composite.
Candid General Trading is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempting to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support to Mabrooka Trading and Pournaghshband. Rahim Reza Farghadani, the
Managing Director of Candid General Trading, is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting for or on behalf of Candid General Trading. Candid General Trading has conducted financial transactions for Mabrooka Trading and
Pournaghshband for goods intended for Navid Composite.
Sayyed Javad Musavi is being designated today pursuant to E.O. 13382 because he provided or attempted to provide financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
(SHIG). SHIG was identified in the Annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 as a subsidiary of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO, which is subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), manages and
coordinates Iran’s ballistic missile program. Musavi is the SHIG commercial director and has worked directly with North Korean officials in Iran from UN- and U.S.-designated Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). SHIG also
coordinates KOMID shipments to Iran. The shipments have included valves, electronics, and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. Within the past several years,
Iranian missile technicians from SHIG traveled to North Korea to work on an 80-ton rocket booster being developed by the North Korean government.
Seyed Mirahmad Nooshin, Sayyed Medhi Farahi, and Seyed Mohammad Hashemi are also being designated today. Nooshin, the Director of SHIG, is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of
SHIG, and because he provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, SHIG. Farahi, the current Deputy of MODAFL, and Hashemi, an official in MODAFL, are also being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of MODAFL, and because they provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of,
MODAFL. Farahi and Nooshin have been critical to the development of the 80-ton rocket booster, and both traveled to Pyongyang during contract negotiations.
Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi is being designated today for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of AIO. Ketabachi is currently the Director of AIO. He was previously designated in 2008 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act
for or on behalf of Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, which was identified in the Annex to E.O. 13382 in June 2005 and is involved in Iran’s missile program.
For identifying information regarding today’s action, click here.
###
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Press Center
Treasury Takes Action to Target Serious Human Rights Abuses in Iran
4/13/2017
Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Tehran Prisons Organization and Sohrab Soleimani, a senior
official within Iran’s State Prison Organization, in connection with serious human rights abuses in Iran. This action reflects the United States’ deep concern regarding the human rights
situation in Iran.
“Today’s designations highlight our continued support for the Iranian people and demonstrate our commitment to hold the Government of Iran responsible for its continued repression of
its own citizens,” said OFAC Director John E. Smith. “We will continue to identify, call out, and sanction those who are responsible for serious human rights abuses in Iran.”
The United States maintains and will continue to vigorously exercise its sanctions authorities outside the scope of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to counter the
Iranian government’s support for terrorism, ballistic missile program, regional destabilization, and human rights abuses. The sanctions imposed today are fully consistent with U.S.
commitments under the JCPOA.
Tehran Prisons Organization and Sohrab Soleimani are designated pursuant to Executive Order 13553, which targets serious human rights abuses by officials of, and persons acting on
behalf of, the Government of Iran since the June 2009 Iranian election.
Tehran Prisons Organization is responsible for or complicit in the commission of serious human rights abuses against political prisoners housed in Evin Prison, which falls under the
authority of the Tehran Prisons Organization. Evin Prison is one of Iran’s most notorious facilities, due to the detention of many prisoners of conscience and well-documented accounts
of their mistreatment and abuse. Former prisoners of Evin Prison have reported harsh interrogations, forced confessions, psychological and physical torture, and denial of access to
medical care.
In an April 2014 incident at Evin Prison, dozens of security guards and senior prison officials attacked and severely beat political prisoners being held in Ward 350. The attack lasted
several hours and over 30 prisoners were wounded or injured. Some of the prisoners were placed in solitary confinement afterward and did not receive medical treatment, despite their
injuries.
Sohrab Soleimani was the head of the Tehran Prisons Organization during this violent event, and is being designated for having acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tehran
Prisons Organization. After the Ward 350 prisoner attack, Soleimani denied that anything had taken place, despite the numerous well-documented accounts of the incident. Soleimani
currently holds a leadership position within the State Prisons Organization, which oversees Tehran Prisons Organization. Since April 2014, attacks on prisoners and other human rights
abuses at Evin Prison have continued, including the denial of access to medical care.
For identifying information on the entity and individual designated today, click here.
####
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4
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016
Revocation of Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and
13645 With Respect to Iran, Amendment of Executive Order
13628 With Respect to Iran, and Provision of
Implementation Authorities for Aspects of Certain Statutory
Sanctions Outside the Scope of U.S. Commitments Under the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws
of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 US.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies
Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
(Public Law 104--172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195)
(22 US.C. 8501 et seq.), the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights
Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158), the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation
Act of 2012 (subtitle D of title XII of Public Law 112-239) (22 U.S.C.
8801 et seq.) (IFCA), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, have determined
that Iran's implementation of the nuclear-related measures specified
in sections 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
of July 14, 2015 (JCPOA) between the P5+1 (China. France, Germany,
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the
European Union, and Iran, as verified by the International Atomic Energy
gency, marks a fundamental shift in circumstances with respect to Iran's
nuclear program, In order to give effect to the United States commitments
with respect to sanctions described in section 4 of Annex Il and section
17.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA, I am revoking Executive Orders 13574 of
May 23, 2011, 13590 of November 20, 2011, 13622 of July 30, 2012, and
13645 of June 3, 2013, and amending Executive Order 13628 of October 9,
2012, by revoking sections 5 through 7 and section 15. In addition, in section
3 of this order, I am taking steps with respect to the national emergency
declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, to provide implementation
authorities for aspects of certain statutory sanctions that are
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EO 13716 Title 3-The President
outside the scope of the U.S. commitment to lift nuclear-related sanctions
under the JCPOA.
This action is not intended to, and does not, limit the applicability of waiver
determinations or any renewals thereof issued by the Secretary of State,
or licenses issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, to give effect to sanctions
commitments described in sections 17.1-17.3 and 17.5 of Annex V
of the [CPOA, or otherwise affect the national emergency declared in Executive
Order 12957, which shall remain in place, or any Executive Order
issued in furtherance of that national emergency other than Executive Orders
13574, 13590, 13622, 13628, and 13645.
I hereby order:
Section 1. Revocation of Executive Orders. The following Executive Orders
are revoked:
(a) Executive Order 13574 0f May 23, 2011 (Authorizing the Implementation
of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as
Amended);
(b) Executive Order 13590 of November 20, 2011 (Authorizing the Imposition
of Certain Sanctions With Respect to the Provision of Goods, Services,
Technology, or Support for Iran's Energy and Petrochemical Sectors);
(c) Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012 (Authorizing Additional Sanctions
With Respect to Iran); and
(d) Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013 (Authorizing the Implementation
of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the lran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation
Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions With Respect To lran).
Sec. 2. Amendment of Executive Order. Executive Order 13628 of October
9, 2012 (Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in
the lran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional
Sanctions with Respect to Iran), is amended by:
(a) Revoking current sections 5 through 7 and 15;
(b) Revising current section 4 by removing "section 5 of Executive Order
13622 of July 30, 2012," in subsection (a), replacing "section 12" with
"section 9" in subsection (a), and replacing "section 12" with "section 9"
in subsection (b);
(c) Revising current section 8 by inserting "and" between "2(a)." and
"3(al" and removing", and 7(a)(iv)";
(d) Revising current section 9 by inserting "and" between "2(a)," and
"3(a)" and removing ", and 7(a(iv)";
(e) Revising current section 14 by inserting "and" between "2(a)" and
3(al" and removing ", and 7(a(iv)";
(f) Renumbering current sections 8 through 14 as sections 5 through 11,
respectively; and
(g) Renumbering current sections 16 through 19 as sections 12 through
15, respectively.
Sec. 3. Provision of Implementation Authorities for Sanctions Outside the
Scope of the JCPOA.
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(a)(i) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a person the measures described
in subsection (a)(ii) of this section upon determining, pursuant
to authority delegated by the President and in accordance with the terms
of such delegation, that sanctions shall be imposed on such person pursuant
to section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA for knowingly providing significant
financial, material, technological, or other support to, or goods or
services in support of any activity or transaction on behalf of or for the
benefit of persons described in section 1244(c)(2)(C(iii) of IFCA.
(ii) With respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
in accordance with this subsection to meet the criteria set forth in
subsection (a(i) of this section, all property and interests in property that
are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States,
or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any
United States person (including any foreign branch) of such person are
blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise
dealt in.
(iii) The prohibitions in subsection (a)(ii) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
date of this order.
(b)(i) When the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant
to authority delegated by the President and in accordance with the
terms of such delegation, has determined that sanctions shall be imposed
on a person pursuant to sections 1244()(1)(4), 1245(a)(1). or 1246(a)(1)
of IFCA (including in each case as informed by section 1253(c)(2) of
IFCA) for engaging in transactions or activities outside the scope of the
waiver determinations as to IFCA issued by the Secretary of State to give
effect to sanctions commitments described in sections 17.1-17.3 and 17.5
of Annex V of the [CPOA, and any renewals thereof, such Secretary may
select one or more of the sanctions set forth below to impose on that person,
and the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, shall take the following actions where necessary to implement
the sanctions selected and maintained by the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of the Treasury:
(A) prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans
or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than
$10,000,000 in any 12-month period, unless such person is engaged in
activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided
for such activities;
(B) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has
any interest;
(C) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions
or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that
such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person;
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EO 13716 Title 3-The President
(D) block all property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person
(including any foreign branch) of the sanctioned person, and provide that
such property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported,
withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in;
(E) prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing
significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person;
(F) restrict or prohibit imports of goods, technology, or services, directly
or indirectly, into the United States from the sanctioned person;
or
(G) impose on the principal executive officer or officers, or persons
performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of a sanctioned
person the sanctions described in subsections (b(i(A)--(F) of this
section, as selected by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the
Treasury, as appropriate.
(ii) The prohibitions in subsection (b)(i) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
date of this order.
(c)(i) All property and interests in property that are in the United States,
that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person (including
any foreign branch) of the following persons are blocked and
may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:
any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with or at the recommendation of the Secretary of Stat:
(A) to have engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other
activities relating to the diversion of goods, including agricultural commodities,
food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people
of Iran;
(B) to have engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other
activities relating to the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or
resale of goods described in subsection (c)(i(A) of this section;
(G) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material.
or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support
of, the activities described in subsection (c)(i)(A) or (c)()(B) of this section
or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to subsection (c)(i) of this section; or
(D) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act
for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (c)(i) of this section.
(ii) The prohibitions in subsection (c)(i) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
date of this order.
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I l !
Sec. 4. Donations. I hereby determine that, to the extent section 2036b)(2)
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the
types of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit of any
person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national
emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such
donations as provided by subsections 3(a)(ii), 3(b)(1)(D), and 3(c)(i) of this
order.
Sec. 5. Prohibitions. The prohibitions in subsections 3(a)(ii), 3(b)(i)(D) and
3(c)(i) of this order include but arc not limited to:
(a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests
in property are blocked pursuant to this order; and
(b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
from any such person.
Sec. 6. Entry into the United States. I hereby find that the unrestricted immigrant
and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens who are
determined to meet one or more of the criteria in subsections 3(a)(i) and
3(c(i) of this order would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States, and I hereby suspend the entry into the United States, as immigrants
or nonimmigrants, of such persons as of the date of this order. Such
persons shall be treated as persons covered by section 1 of Proclamation
8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject to United Nations
Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic
Powers Act Sanctions).
Sec. 7. General Authorities. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including
the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers
granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this order, other than the purposes described in section 6 of
this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions
to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent
with applicable law.
Sec. 8. Evasion and Conspiracy. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids,
has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts
to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in
this order is prohibited.
Sec. 9. Definitions. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;
(b) the term "financial institution," as used in subsection 3(b) of this
order, includes:
(i) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(1) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act) (12 US.C. 1813(c)(1)), including a branch or
agency of a foreign bank fas defined in section 1(b)(7) of the International
Banking Act of 1978) (12 U.S.C 3101(7))
(ii) a credit union;
(iii) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer;
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EO 13716 Tue 3The President
(iv) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter; and
(v) any other company that provides financial services;
(c) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of Lran, any
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central
Bank of ran, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or
on behalf of, the Government of Iran;
(d) the term "Iran" means the Government of Iran and the territory of
Iran and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf. over which the Government of lran
claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government
of lran exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or
derives a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international
arrangements;
(e) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
(f) the term "sanctioned person" means a person that the Secretary of
State or the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to authority delegated by
the President and in accordance with the terms of such delegation, has determined
is a person on whom sanctions shall be imposed pursuant to section
1244(d)(1)(A), 1245(a)(1). Or 1246(a)(1) of IFCA (including in each case
as informed by section 1253(c)(2) of IFCA) for engaging in transactions or
activities outside the scope of the waiver determinations as to IFCA issued
by the Secretary of State to give effect to sanctions commitments described
in sections 17.1--17.3 and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, and any renewals
thereof, and on whom the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury
has imposed any of the sanctions in subsection 3(b) of this order;
(g) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institution
as defined in subsection (b) of this soction (including its foreign
branches) organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction
within the United States or located in the United States; and
(h) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen,
permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States.
Sec. 10. Notice. For those persons whose property and interests in property
are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence
in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds
or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures
to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual.
I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need be
no prior notice of an action taken pursuant to subsection 3(a(ii), 3(b)(i)(D),
or 3(c)(i) of this order.
Sec. 11. Direction to Agencies. All agencies of the United States Government
are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority
to carry out the provisions of this order.
Sec. 12. Rights. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by party against the United States, its any departments, agencies, or entities, its officers,
employees, or agents, or any other person.
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Executive Orders EO 13717
Sec. 13. Effect on Actions or Proceedings. Pursuant to section 202 of the
NEA (50 U.S.C. 1622), the revocation of Executive Orders 13574, 13590,
13622. and 13645 and the amendments to Executive Order 13628 as set
forth in sections 1 and 2 of this order, shall not affect any action taken or
proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined as of the date of
this order, or any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior
to the date of this order, or any rights or duties that matured or penalties
that were incurred prior to the date of this order.
Sec. 14. Relationship to Algiers Accords. The measures taken pursuant to
this order are in response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring
after the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended solely
as a response to those later actions.
BARACK OBAMA
The White House,
January 16, 2016.
Executive Order 13717 of February 2, 2016
Establishing a Federal Earthquake Risk Management
Standard
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws
of the United States of America, including the Earthquake Hazards Reduction
Act of 1977, as amended, and section 121(a) of title 40, United States
Code, and to improve the Nation's resilience to earthquakes, I hereby direct
the following:
Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to strengthen the scurity
and resilience of the Nation against earthquakes, to promote public
safety, economic strength, and national security. To that end, the Federal
Government must continue to take proactive steps to enhance the resilience
of buildings that are owned, leased, financed, or regulated by the Foderal
Government, When making investment decisions related to Federal buildings,
each executive department and agency (agency) responsible for implementing
this order shall seek to enhance resilience by reducing risk to the
lives of building occupants and improving continued performance of essential
functions following future earthquakes. The Federal Government recognizes
that building codes and standards primarily focus on ensuring minimum
acceptable levels of earthquake safety for preserving the lives of
building occupants. To achieve true resilience against earthquakes, however,
new and existing buildings may need to exceed those codes and
standards to ensure, for example, that the buildings can continue to perform
their essential functions following future earthquakes. Agencies are
thus encouraged to consider going beyond the codes and standards set out
in this order to ensure that buildings are fully earthquake resilient,
Sec. 2. Requirements for Earthquake Safety of New Federal Buildings, Improvements
to Existing Federal Buildings, and Federally Leased, Financed,
or Regulated Buildings.
(a) New Buildings and Alterations to Existing Buildings. Each agency responsible
for the design and construction of a new building or an alteration
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Administration of Barack Obama, 201I
Executive Order 13574--Authorizing the Implementation of Certain
Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended
May 23, 2011
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C
701 et seq.) (EEPA), the National Emergencies Aet (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), the Iran
Sanctions Aet of 1996 (Public Law 104 172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) (ISA), as amended by, inter
alia, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Aet of 2010 (Public
Law 1H1-195), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in order to take additional
steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15,
1995,
I, Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, hereby order:
Section I. (a) When the President, or the Secretary of State pursuant to authority
delegated by the President and in accordance with the terms of such delegation, which
includes consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, has determined that sanctions shall be
imposed on a person pursuant to section 5 of ISA and has selected the sanctions set forth in
section 6 of ISA to impose on that person, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions with respect to the sanctions imposed
and maintained by the President or by the Secretary of State pursuant to and in accordance
with the terms of such delegation
(i) with respect to section 6(a)(3) of ISA, prolibit any United States financial
institution from making loans or providing eredits to the ISA-sanctioned person
consistent with section 6(a)(3) of ISA;
(ii) with respect to section 6(a)(6) of ISA, prohibit any transactions in foreig
exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the
ISA-sanctioned person has any interest;
(iii) with respect to section 6(a)(7) of ISA, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments
between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the
extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and involve any interest of the ISA-sanctioned person;
(iv) with respect to section 6(a)(8) of ISA, block all property and interests in property
that are in the United States, that come within the United States, or that are or come
within the possession or control of any United States person, including any overseas
branch, of the ISA-sanctioned person, and provide that such property and interests in
property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in; or
(v) with respect to section 6(a)(9) of ISA, restrict or prohibit imports of goods,
technology, or services, directly or indirectly, into the United States from the ISAsanctioned
person.
(b) I hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C
1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the types of articles specified in such
section by, to, or for the benefit of any ISA-sanctioned person whose property and interests in
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property are blocked pursuant to subsection (a)(iv) of this section would seriously impair my
ability to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby
prohibit such donations as provided by subsection (a(iv) of this section.
(e) The prohibitions in subsection (a)(iv) of this section include but are not limited to:
(i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or
for the benefit of any ISA-sanctioned person whose property and interests in property
are blocked pursuant to this order; and
(ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any
such ISA-sanctioned person.
(d) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by
statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may he issued pursuant to this
order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to
the date of this order.
Sec. 2. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that
evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to
violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
(h) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is
prohibited.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this order.
(a) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
(b) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation,
group, subgroup, or other organization;
(e) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident
alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States;
(d) the term "financial institution" includes (i) a depository institution (as defined in
section 3(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Aet) (12 U.5.C 1813(c)(1), including a
branch or agency of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the International Banking
Aet of 1978) (12 U.S.C. 3101(7)); (ii) a credit union; (iii) a securities fir, including a broker or
dealer; (iv) an insurance company, including an ageney or underwriter; and (v) any other
company that provides financial services;
(e) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institution (including its
foreign branches) organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within
the United States; and
(f) the term "ISA-sanctioned person" means a person that the President, or the Secretary
of State pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance with the terms of
such delegation, including consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, has determined is a
person on whom sanctions shall be imposed pursuant to section 5 of ISA and on whom the
President or the Secretary of State has imposed any of the sanctions in section 6 of ISA.
Sec. 4. For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of
the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of
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measures to be taken pursuant to section (a)(iv) of this order would render those measures
ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the
national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need be no prior notice of an
action taken pursuant to section a)(iv) of this order.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby
authorized to take snch actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to
employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA and sections 6(a)(6), 6(a)(7), 6(a)(8), and
6(a)(9) of ISA, and to employ all powers granted to the United States Governent by section
6(a)(3) of ISA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the
Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United
States Governent consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States
Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to
carry out the provisions of this order.
Sec.6. Tlis order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its
departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
See7 Te measures taken pursuant to this order are in response to actions of the
Govermment of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are
intended solely as a response to those later actions.
BARACK OBAMA
The White House,
May 23, 2011.
[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 11:15 a.m, May 24, 2011]
NOTE: This Executive order was published in the Federal Register on May 25.
Categories: Executive Orders : Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended, authorization of certain
sanctions.
Subjects: Iran: U.S. sanctions.
DCPD Nuber. DCPD201100382.
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Administration of Barack Obama, 201I
Executive Order 13590--Authorizing the Imposition of Certain Sanctions
With Respect to the Provision of Goods, Services, Technology, or Support for
Iran's Energy and Petrochemical Sectors
November 20, 201I
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, including the Iterational Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Aet (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301
of title 3, United States Code, and in order to take additional steps with respect to the national
emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995,
I, Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, hereby order:
Section I. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative, and with the President
of the Export-Import Bank, the Chairman of the Board of Goverors of the Federal Reserve
System, and other agencies and officials as appropriate, is hereby authorized to impose on a
person any of the sanctions described in section 2 or 3 of this order upon determining that the
person:
(a) knowingly, on or after the effective date of this order, sells, leases, or provides to Iran
goods, services, technology, or support that has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more or
that, during a I2-month period, has an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more, and
that could directly and significantly contribute to the maintenance or enhancement of Iran's
ability to develop petroleum resources located in Iran;
(b) knowingly, on or after the effective date of this order, sells, leases, or provides to Iran
goods, services, technology, or support that has a fair market value of $250,000 or more or that,
during a 12-month period, has an aggregate fair market value of $1,000,000 or more, and that
could directly and significantly contribute to the maintenance or expansion of Iran's domestic
production of petrochemical products;
(c) is a successor entity to a person referred to in subsection (a) or (b) of this section;
(d) owns or controls a person referred to in subsection (a) or (b) of this section, and had
actual knowledge or should have known that the person engaged in the activities referred to in
that subsection; or
(e) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, a person
referred to in subsection (a) or (b) of this section, and knowingly participated in the activities
referred to in that subsection.
Sec. 2. When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section I of this
order, has determined that a person meets any of the criteria described in section I and has
selected any of the sanctions set forth below to impose on that person, the heads of relevant
agencies, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions where
necessary to implement the sanctions imposed by the Secretary of State:
(a) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank shall deny approval of the issuance
of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in an extension of credit in
connection with the export of any goods or services to the sanctioned person;
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(b) agencies shall not issue any specific license or grant any other specific permission or
authority under any statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States
Government as a condition for the export or reexport ol goods or technology to the sanctioned
person;
(c) with respeet to a sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
(i) the Chairman of the Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve System and the
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall take such actions as they
deem appropriate, including denying designation, or terminating the continuation of
any prior designation of, the sanctioned person as a primary dealer in United States
Government debt instruments; or
(ii) agencies shall prevent the sanctioned person from serving as an agent of the
United States Govemment or serving as a repository for United States Government
funds; or
(d) agencies shall not procure, or enter into a contract for the procurement of, any goods
or services from the sanctioned person.
(e) The prohibitions in subsections (a)-(d) of this section apply except to the extent
provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued
pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit
granted prior to the effective date of this order.
Sec. 3. (a) When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section I of this
order, has determined that a person has engaged in the activities described in section l and has
selected any of the sanctions set forth below to impose on that person, the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions where
necessary to implement the sanctions imposed by the Secretary of State:
(i) prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing
credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month
period unless such person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the
loans or credits are provided for such activities;
(ii) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest;
(iii) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by,
through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments
are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the
sanctioned person;
(iv) block all property and interests in property that are in the United States, that
come within the United States, or that are or come within the possession or control of
any United States person, including any foreign branch, of the sanctioned person, and
provide that such property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in; or (v) restrict or prohibit imports of
goods, technology, or services, directly or indirectly, into the United States from the
sanctioned person.
(b) I hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C
1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the type of articles specified in such section
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1' ''
by, to, or for the benefit of any sanctioned person whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to subsection (a)(iv) of this section would seriously impair my ability to deal
with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such
donations as provided by subsection (a)(iv) of this section.
(e) The prohibitions in subsection (a)(iv) of this section include, but are not limited to:
(i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or
for the benefit of any sanctioned person whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to this order; and
(ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any
such sanctioned person.
(d) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by
statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this
order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to
the effective date of this order.
Sec. 4. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that
evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to
violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is
prohibited.
Sec. 5. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
(b) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation,
group, subgroup, or other organization;
(c) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident
alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States;
(d) the term "financial institution" includes (i) a depository institution (as defined in
section 3(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Aet) (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(1)), including a
branch or ageney of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the International Banking
Aet of 1978) (12 U.$.C. 3101(7)); (ii) a credit union; (iii) a securities finn, including a broker or
dealer; (iv) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter; and (v) any other
company that provides financial services;
(e) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institution (including its
foreign branches) organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the
United States or located in the United States;
(f the tern "sanctioned person" means a person on whom the Secretary of State, in
accordance with the terms of section I of this order, has determined to impose sanctions
pursuant to section I;
(g) the tern "to develop" petroleum resources means to explore for, or to extract, refine,
or transport by pipeline, petroleum resources;
(h) the term "Iran" means the Goverment of Iran and the territory of Iran and any other
territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, over
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which the Goverment of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided
that the Governent of Iran exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives a
benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international arrangements;
(i) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of Iran, any political
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, and any person owned or controlled by, or
acting for or on behalf of, the Govemment of Iran;
(j) the term "knowingly," with respect to a conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that
the person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or
the result;
(k) the term "petroleum resources" includes petroleum, oil, natural gas, liquefied natural
gas, and refined petroleum products;
(l) the term "refined petroleum products" means diesel, gasoline, jet fuel (including
napt ha-type and kerosene-type jet fuel), and aviation gasoline; and
(m) the term "petrochemical products" includes any aromatic, olefin, and synthesis gas,
and any of their derivatives, ineluding ethylene. propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene,
xylene, ammonia, methanol, and urea.
Sec. 6, For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of
the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of
measures to be taken pursuant to section 3(a)(iv) of this order would render those measures
ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the
national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need be no prior notice of an
action taken pursuant to section 3(a(iv) of this order.
Sec. T. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby
authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to
employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of section 3 of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these
functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with
applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all
appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.
Sec. 8. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its
departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Sec. 9. Tle measures taken pursuant to this order are in response to actions of the
Government of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are
intended solely as a response to those later actions.
Sec. 10. T\is order is effective at 120l a.m. easter standard time on November 21, 2011
BARACK OBAMA
The White House,
November 20, 2011
[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 1H15 a.m., November 22, 2011]
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,
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NOTE. This Executive order was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on November
21, and it was published in the Federal Register on November 23.
Categories: Executive Orders: Iran's energy and petrochemical sectors, sanctions on goods,
services, technology, or support for.
Subjects: Iran: U.S. sanctions.
DCPD Naber DCPD201100890.
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Federal Register/ Vol. 77, No. 149/Thursday, August 2, 2012/Presidential Documents
Presidential Documents
Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012
Authorizing Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran
45897
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies
Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United
States Code,
I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, in order
to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared
in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, as relied upon for additional
steps in subsequent Executive Orders, particularly in light of the Government
of Iran's use of revenues from petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemicals
for illicit purposes, Iran's continued attempts to evade international
sanctions through deceptive practices, and the unacceptable risk posed to
the international financial system by Iran's activities, hereby order:
Section 1. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a foreign financial institution
the sanctions described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining
that the foreign financial institution has knowingly conducted or facilitated
any significant financial transaction:
(i) with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or Naftiran Intertrade
Company (NICO), except for a sale or provision to NIOC or NICO of
the products described in section 5(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Iran Sanctions Act
of 1996 (Public Law 104-172), as amended, provided that the fair market
value of such products is lower than the applicable dollar threshold specified
in that provision;
(ii) for the purchase or acquisition of petroleum or petroleum products
from Iran: or
(iii) for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran.
(b) With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with this section to meet the criteria
set forth in subsection (a)(i), (a)(ii), or (a)(iii) of this section, the Secretary
of the Treasury may prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict
conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent
account or a payable-through account by such foreign financial institution.
(c) Subsections (a)(i) and (ii) of this section shall apply with respect
to a significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign
financial institution only if:
(i) the President determines under subparagraphs (4)(B) and (C) of subsection
1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (Public Law 112-81) (NDAA) that there is a sufficient supply of
petroleum and petroleum products from countries other than lran to permit
a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum and petroleum products
purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial institutions; and
(ii) an exception under subparagraph 4(D) of subsection 1245(d) of the
NDAA from the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of that subsection
does not apply with respect to the country with primary jurisdiction
over the foreign financial institution.
(d) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply with respect to any
person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of food,
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medicine, or medical devices to Iran or when the underlying transaction
has been authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury.
(e) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 2. (a) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative.
and with the President of the Export-Import Bank, the Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and other agencies
and officials as appropriate, is hereby authorized to impose on a person
any of the sanctions described in section 3 or 4 of this order upon determining
that the person:
(i) knowingly, on or after the effective date of this order, engaged in
a significant transaction for the purchase or acquisition of petroleum or
petroleum products from lran;
(ii) knowingly. on or after the effective date of this order, engaged in
a significant transaction for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical
products from Iran;
(iii) is a successor entity to a person determined by the Secretary of
State in accordance with this subsection to meet the criteria in subsection
(a(i) or (a)(ii) of this section;
(iv) owns or controls a person determined by the Secretary of State in
accordance with this subsection to meet the criteria in subsection (a)(i)
or (a)(ii) of this section, and had knowledge that the person engaged
in the activities referred to in that subsection; or
(v) is owned or controlled by. or under common ownership or control
with, a person determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with
this subsection to meet the criteria in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this
section, and knowingly participated in the activities referred to in that
subsection.
(b) Subsection (a)(i) of this section shall apply with respect to a person
only if:
(i) the President determines under subparagraphs (4)(B) and (C) of subsection
1245(d) of the NDAA that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum
and petroleum products from countries other than Iran to permit a significant
reduction in the volume of petroleum and petroleum products purchased
from Iran by or through foreign financial institutions; and
(ii) an exception under subparagraph 4(D) of subsection 1245(d) of the
NDAA from the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of that subsection
does not apply with respect to the country with primary jurisdiction
over the person.
Sec. 3. When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section
2 of this order. has determined that a person meets any of the criteria
described in section 2 and has selected any of the sanctions set forth below
to impose on that person, the heads of relevant agencies, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions where necessary
to implement the sanctions imposed by the Secretary of State:
(a) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank shall deny approval
of the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation
in an extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods
or services to the sanctioned person;
(b) agencies shall not issue any specific license or grant any other specific
permission or authority under any statute that requires the prior review
and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export
or reexport of goods or technology to the sanctioned person;
(c) with respect to a sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
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[i) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall take
such actions as they deem appropriate, including denying designation,
or terminating the continuation of any prior designation of, the sanctioned
person as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments;
or
(ii) agencies shall prevent the sanctioned person from serving as an agent
of the United States Government or serving as a repository for United
States Government funds; or
(d) agencies shall not procure, or enter into a contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.
(e) The prohibitions in subsections (a)-(d) of this section apply except
to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations. orders. directives,
or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 4. (a) When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of
section 2 of this order, has determined that a person meets any of the
criteria described in section 2 and has selected any of the sanctions set
forth below to impose on that person. the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions
where necessary to implement the sanctions imposed by the Secretary of
State:
(i) prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans
or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than
$10,000,000 in any 12-month period, unless such person is engaged in
activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided
for such activities;
(ii) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person
has any interest;
(iii) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions
or by, through, or to any financial institution. to the extent that
such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person;
(iv) block all property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that come within the United States, or that are or come within
the possession or control of any United States person, including any
foreign branch, of the sanctioned person, and provide that such property
and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn,
or otherwise dealt in; or
(v) restrict or prohibit imports of goods, technology, or services, directly
or indirectly, into the United States from the sanctioned person.
(b) The prohibitions in subsections (a)(i)-(a)(v) of this section apply except
to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives,
or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 5. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a person the measures described
in subsection (bl of this section upon determining that the person has
materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material. or technological
support for, or goods or services in support of, NIOC, NICO, or
the Central Bank of Iran, or the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes
or precious metals by the Government of Iran.
(b) With respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
in accordance with subsection (a) to meet the criteria set forth in subsection
(a) of this section, all property and interests in property that are in the
United States, that hereafter come within the United States. or that are
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or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States
person, including any foreign branch, of such person are blocked and may
not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection {b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 6. Subsection 1(a), section 2, and subsection 5(a) of this order shall
not apply with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction
involving a natural gas development and pipeline project initiated
prior to the effective date of this order to bring gas from Azerbaijan to
Europe and Turkey in furtherance of a production sharing agreement or
license awarded by a sovereign government other than the Government
of Iran before the effective date of this order.
Sec. 7. I hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA
(50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the type
of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit of any person
whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant ta subsection
(a)(iv) of section 4 or subsection (b) of section 5 of this order would seriously
impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive
Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by subsection
(a)(iv) of section 4 and subsection (b) of section 5 of this order.
Sec, 8. The prohibitions in subsection (a)(iv) of section 4 and subsection
(b) of section 5 of this order include, but are not limited to:
(i) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests
in property are blocked pursuant to this order; and
(ii) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
from any such person.
Sec. 9. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of
evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of
the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth
in this order is prohibited.
Sec, 10. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
(b) the term "entity" means a partnership. association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;
(c) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen,
permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States;
(d) the term "financial institution," as used in sections 3 and 4 of this
order, includes (i) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(1}
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) (12 US.C. 1813(c)(1)) including a
branch or agency of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the
International Banking Act of 1978) (12 U.S.C. 3101(7)); (ii) a credit union;
(iii) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer; (iv) an insurance company,
including an agency or underwriter; and (v) any other company that provides
financial services;
(e) the term "foreign financial institution," as used in section 1 of this
order, means any foreign entity that is engaged in the business of accepting
deposits, making, granting. transferring, holding, or brokering loans or credits,
or purchasing or selling foreign exchange, securities, commodity futures
or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as principal or agent.
It includes, but is not limited to, depository institutions, banks, savings
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banks, money service businesses, trust companies, securities brokers and
dealers, commodity futures and options brokers and dealers, forward contract
and foreign exchange merchants, securities and commodities exchanges,
clearing corporations, investment companies, employee benefit plans. and
holding companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing. The
term does not include the international financial institutions identified in
22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2), the International Fund for Agricultural Development,
the North American Development Bank, or any other international financial
institution so notified by the Secretary of the Treasury;
(f) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institution
as defined in subsection (d) of this section (including its foreign
branches) organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction
within the United States or located in the United States;
(g) the term "Iran" means the Government of Iran and the territory of
Iran and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf, over which the Government of Iran claims sovereignty,
sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government
of Iran exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives
a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international arrangements;
(h) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of Iran, any
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central
Bank of Iran, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or
on behalf of, the Government of Iran;
(i) the terms "knowledge" and "knowingly," with respect to conduct,
a circumstance, or a result, mean that a person has actual knowledge, or
should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result;
(j) the term "sanctioned person" means a person on whom the Secretary
of State, in accordance with the terms of section 2 of this order, has determined
to impose sanctions pursuant to section 2;
(k) the term "petroleum" (also known as crude oil) means a mixture
of hydrocarbons that exists in liquid phase in natural underground reservoirs
and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface
separating facilities;
(I) the term "petroleum products" includes unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum
gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type
jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel
oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum
coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and miscellaneous products obtained from
the processing of: crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas, and
other hydrocarbon compounds. The term does not include natural gas, liquefied
natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non-petroleum fuels:
(m) the term "petrochemical products" includes any aromatic, olefin, and
synthesis gas, and any of their derivatives, including ethylene, propylene,
butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and urea;
(n) the terms "National Iranian Oil Company" and "NIOC" mean the
National Iranian Oil Company and any entity owned or controlled by, or
operating for or on behalf of, the National Iranian Oil Company; and
(o) the terms "Naftiran Intertrade Company" and "NICO" mean the Naftiran
Jntertrade Company and any entity owned or controlled by, or operating
for or on behalf of, the Naftiran Intertrade Company.
Sec. 11. For those persons whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence
in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds
or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures
to be taken pursuant to subsection (a)(iv) of section 4 or subsection (b)
of section 5 of this order would render those measures ineffectual. I therefore
determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national
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emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need be no prior notice
of an action taken pursuant to subsection (a)(iv) of section 4 or subsection
(b) of section 5 of this order.
Sec. 12. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation
of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President
by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of sections 1,
4, and 5 of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any
of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government
consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government
are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their
authority to carry out the provisions of this order.
Sec. 13. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by
any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities,
its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Sec. 14. The measures taken pursuant to this order are in response to
actions of the Government of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the
1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended solely as a response to those later
actions.
Sec. 15. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on July
31, 2012.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, July 30, 2012.
[FR DO¢. 2012-19055
Filed 8-1-12; 845 am
Billing code 3295-F2-P
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Presidential Documents
33945
Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013
Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set
Forth in the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of
2012 and Additional Sanctions With Respect To Iran
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies
Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111--195) (22 U.S.C.
8501 et seq.) (CISADA), the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act
of 2012 (subtitle D of title XII of Public Law 112--239) (22 U.S.C. 8801
et seq.) (IFCA), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(0)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
and in order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency
declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995,
I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, hereby
order:
Section 1. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a foreign financial institution
the sanctions described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining
that the foreign financial institution has, on or after the effective date of
this order:
(i) knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction related
to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials or a derivative, swap, future,
forward, or other similar contract whose value is based on the exchange
rate of the Iranian rial; or
(ii) maintained significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran
denominated in the Iranian rial.
(b) With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with this section to meet the criteria
set forth in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of the
Treasury may:
(i) prohibit the opening. and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the
maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payablethrough
account by such foreign financial institution; or
(ii) block all property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person (including
any foreign branch) of such foreign financial institution, and provide
that such property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant lo this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 2. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a person the measures described
in subsection (b) of this section upon determining:
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(i) that the person has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support
of. any Iranian person included on the list of Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(SON List) {other than an Iranian depository institution whose property
and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order
13599 of February 5, 2012) or any other person included on the SON
List whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
this paragraph or Executive Order 13599 (other than an Iranian depository
institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely
pursuant to Executive Order 13599); or
(ii) pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance
with the terms of such delegation. that sanctions shall be imposed on
such person pursuant to section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA.
(b) With respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
in accordance with this section to meet the criteria set forth in subsection
(a)(i) or (a(ii) of this section, all property and interests in property that
are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States,
or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United
States person (including any foreign branch) of such person are blocked
and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt
in.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 3. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a foreign financial institution
the sanctions described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining
that the foreign financial institution has knowingly conducted or facilitated
any significant financial transaction:
(i) on behalf of any Iranian person included on the SDN List (other
than an Iranian depository institution whose property and interests in
property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599) or any
other person included on the SDN List whose property and interests
in property are blocked pursuant to subsection 2(a)(i) of this order or
Executive Order 13599 (other than an Iranian depository institution whose
property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive
Order 13599); or
(ii) on or after the effective date of this order, for the sale, supply, or
transfer to Iran of significant goods or services used in connection with
the automotive sector of Iran.
(b) With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with this section to meet the criteria
set forth in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of the
Treasury may prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions
on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or
a payable-through account by such foreign financial institution.
(c) Subsection (a)(i) of this section shall apply with respect to a significant
financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution
for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran only if:
(i) the President determines under subparagraphs (4)(B) and (C) of subsection
1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (Public Law 112--81) (2012 NDAA) (22 U.S.C. 8513a) that there
is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products from countries
other than Iran to permit a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum
and petroleum products purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial
institutions; and
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(ii) an exception under subparagraph 4(D) of subsection 1245(d) of the
2012 NDAA from the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of
that subsection does not apply.
(d) Subsection (a)(i) of this section shall not apply with respect to a
significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial
institution for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of natural gas
only if the financial transaction is solely for trade between the country
with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution and Iran,
and any funds owed to Iran as a result of such trade a.re credited to an
account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign
financial institution.
(e) Subsection (a)(i) of this section shall not apply to any person for
conducting or facilitating a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities,
food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran.
(f) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 4. Subsections 2(a) and 3(a)(i) of this order shall not apply with respect
lo any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction involving a project
described in subsection (a) of section 603 of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112--158) (22 U.S.C.
8701 et seq.) to which the exception under that section applies.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the United States Trade Representative, and with the President of the
Export-Import Bank, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and other agencies and officials as appropriate, is hereby
authorized to impose on a person any of the sanctions described in section
6 or 7 of this order upon determining that the person:
(a) on or after the effective date of this order, knowingly engaged in
a significant transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran of significant
goods or services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran;
(b) is a successor entity to a person determined by the Secretary of State
in accordance with this section to meet the criteria in subsection (a) of
this section;
(c) owns or controls a person determined by the Secretary of State in
accordance with this section to meet the criteria in subsection (a) of this
section, and had knowledge that the person engaged in the activities referred
to in that subsection: or
(d) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control
with, a person determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with
this section to meet the criteria in subsection (a] of this section, and knowingly
participated in the activities referred to in that subsection.
Sec. 6. When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section
5 of this order, has determined that a person meets any of the criteria
described in subsections (a)-(d) of that section and has selected any of
the sanctions set forth below to impose on that person, the heads of relevant
agencies, in consultation with the Secretary of State, as appropriate, shall
take the following actions where necessary to implement the sanctions imposed
by the Secretary of State:
(a) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank shall deny approval
of the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation
in an extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods
or services to the sanctioned person;
(bl agencies shall not issue any specific license or grant any other specific
permission or authority under any statute that requires the prior review
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and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export
or reexport of goods or technology to the sanctioned person;
(c) with respect to a sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
(i) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall take
such actions as they deem appropriate, including denying designation,
or terminating the continuation of any prior designation of, the sanctioned
person as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments;
or
(ii) agencies shall prevent the sanctioned person from serving as an agent
of the United States Government or serving as a repository for United
States Government funds;
(d) agencies shall not procure, or enter into a contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person;
(e) the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien that the Secretary
of State determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder
with a controlling interest in, a sanctioned person; or
(f) the heads of the relevant agencies, as appropriate, shall impose on
the principal executive officer or officers, or persons performing similar
functions and with similar authorities, of a sanctioned person the sanctions
described in subsections (a)-(e) of this section, as selected by the Secretary
of State.
(g) The prohibitions in subsections (a)-(f) of this section apply except
to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives,
or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 7. (a) When the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury,
pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance with
the terms of such delegation, has determined that sanctions shall be imposed
on a person pursuant to section 1244(d)(1)(A), 1245(a)(1), or 1246(a)(1) of
IFCA (including in each case as informed by section 1253(c)(2) of IFCA)
or when the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section
5 of this order, has determined that a person meets any of the criteria
described in subsections (a)-(d) of that section, such Secretary may select
one or more of the sanctions set forth below to impose on that person,
and the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, shall take the following actions where necessary to implement the
sanctions selected and maintained by the Secretary of State or the Secretary
of the Treasury:
(i) prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans
or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than
$10,000,000 in any 12-month period, unless such person is engaged in
activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided
for such activities;
(ii) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject lo the
jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person
has any interest;
(iii) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions
or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that
such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person;
(iv) block all property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States. or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person (including
any foreign branch) of the sanctioned person, and provide that such
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property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported,
withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in;
(v) prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing
significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person;
(vi) restrict or prohibit imports of goods, technology, or services, directly
or indirectly, into the United States from the sanctioned person: or
(vii) impose on the principal executive officer or officers, or persons
performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of a sanctioned
person the sanctions described in subsections (a)(i)-{a)(vi) of this section,
as selected by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury,
as appropriate.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 8. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person (including
any foreign branch) of the following persons are blocked and may not
be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: any person
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at
the recommendation of the Secretary of State:
(i) to have engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other
activities relating to the diversion of goods, including agricultural commodities,
food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people of
lran;
(ii) to have engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other
activities relating to the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or
resale of goods described in subsection (a)(i) of this section;
(iii) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of,
the activities described in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section or
any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to this section; or
(iv) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to
act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order.
Sec. 9. I hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA
(50 US.C. 1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the types
of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit of any person
whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order
would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency
declared in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such donations
as provided by subsections 1(b)(ii), 2(b), 7(a)(iv), and 8(a) of this order.
Sec. 10. The prohibitions in subsections 1(b)(ii), 2(b), 7(a)(iv), and 8(a)
of this order include but are not limited to:
(a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to this order; and
(b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
from any such person.
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Sec. 11. I hereby find that the unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant
entry into the United States of aliens who meet one or more of the criteria
in subsection 2(a), section 5, and subsection 8(a) of this order would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend
the entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of such
persons. Such persons shall be treated as persons covered by section 1
of Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject
to United Nations Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency
Economic Powers Act Sanctions).
Sec. 12. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation
of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President
by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order,
other than the purposes described in sections 5, 6, and 11 of this order.
The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to
other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with
applicable law.
Sec. 13. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of
evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of
the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth
in this order is prohibited.
Sec. 14. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term "automotive sector of Iran" means the manufacturing or
assembling in lran of light and heavy vehicles including passenger cars,
trucks, buses, minibuses, pick-up trucks, and motorcycles, as well as original
equipment manufacturing and after-market parts manufacturing relating to
such vehicles.
(b) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;
(c) the term "financial institution," as used in sections 6 and 7 of this
order, includes:
(i) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(1) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act) (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(1)), including a branch or agency
of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the International Banking
Act of 1978) (12 0.S.C. 3101(7)):
(ii) a credit union;
(iii) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer;
(iv) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter; and
(v) any other company that provides financial services;
(d) the term "foreign financial institution," as used in sections 1 and
3of this order, means any foreign entity that is engaged in the business
of accepting deposits, making, granting, transferring. holding, or brokering
loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign exchange, securities, commodity
futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers thereof, as
principal or agent. It includes but is not limited to depository institutions,
banks, savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies, securities
brokers and dealers, commodity futures and options brokers and dealers,
forward contract and foreign exchange merchants, securities and commodities
exchanges, clearing corporations, investment companies, employee benefit
plans, dealers in precious metals, stones, or jewels, and holding companies,
affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing. The term docs not include
the international financial institutions identified in 22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2),
the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the North American
Development Bank, or any other international financial institution so notified
by the Secretary of the Treasury;
(e) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of Iran, any
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central
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Bank of Iran, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or
on behalf of, the Government of Iran;
(f) the term "Iran" means the Government of Iran and the territory of
[ran and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf, over which the Government of Iran claims sovereignty,
sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government
of Iran exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives
a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international arrangements;
(g) the term "Iranian depository institution" means any entity (including
foreign branches), wherever located, organized under the laws of Iran or
any jurisdiction within Iran, or owned or controlled by the Government
of Iran, or in Iran, or owned or controlled by any of the foregoing, that
is engaged primarily in the business of banking (for example, banks, savings
banks, savings associations, credit unions, trust companies, and bank holding
companies);
(h) the term Iranian person," as used in sections 2 and 3 of this order,
means an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran or an entity
organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction
of the Government of Iran;
(i) the terms "knowledge" and "knowingly," with respect to conduct,
a circumstance, or a result, mean that a person has actual knowledge, or
should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result;
(j) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
(k) the term "petroleum" (also known as crude oil) means a mixture
of hydrocarbons that exists in liquid phase in natural underground reservoirs
and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface
separating facilities;
(I) the term "petroleum products" includes unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum
gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type
jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel
oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum
coke. asphalt, road oil. still gas, and miscellaneous products obtained from
the processing of crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas, and
other hydrocarbon compounds. The term does not include natural gas, liquefied
natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non-petroleum fuels;
(m) the term "sanctioned person" means a person that the Secretary of
State or the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to authority delegated by
the President and in accordance with the terms of such delegation, has
determined is a person on whom sanctions shall be imposed pursuant to
section 1244(d)(1)(A), 1245(a)(1), or 1246(a)(1) of IFCA (including in each
case as informed by section 1253(c)(2) of IFCA), and on whom the Secretary
of State or the Secretary of the Treasury has imposed any of the sanctions
in section 6 or 7 of this order or a person on whom the Secretary of
State, in accordance with the terms of section 5 of this order. has determined
to impose sanctions pursuant to section 5;
(n) for the purposes of this order, the term "subject to the jurisdiction
of the Government of Iran" means a person organized under the laws of
Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran, ordinarily resident in Iran, or in Iran,
or owned or controlled by any of the foregoing;
(o) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institution
as defined in subsection (c) of this section (including its foreign branches)
organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within
the United States or located in the United States; and
(p) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen,
permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States.
I !
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Sec. 15. For those persons whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence
in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds
or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures
to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual.
I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need he
no prior notice of an action taken pursuant to subsection 1(b(ii), 2(b),
7(a)(iv), or 8(a) of this order.
Sec. 16. Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012, is hereby amended as
follows:
(a) Subsection (a)(ii) of section 1 is amended by replacing "for the purchase
or acquisition of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran" with "for
the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum
products from Iran"
(b) Subsection (a)(iii) of section 1 is amended by replacing "for the purchase
or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran" with "for the purchase,
acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from
Iran"
(c) Subsection (a)(i) of section 2 is amended by replacing "knowingly,
on or after the effective date of this order, engaged in a significant transaction
for the purchase or acquisition of petroleum or petroleum products from
ran" with "knowingly, on or after the effective date of this order, engaged
in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport,
or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran".
(d) Subsection (a)(ii) of section 2 is amended by replacing "knowingly,
on or after the effective date of this order, engaged in a significant transaction
for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical products from Iran" with
knowingly, on or after the effective date of this order, engaged in a significant
transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing
of petrochemical products from Iran".
(e) Subsection (e) of section 10 is amended by inserting the words "dealers
in precious metals, stones, or jewels," after the words "employee benefit
plans,".
Sec. 17. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed
to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the
provisions of this order.
Sec. 18. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by
any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities,
its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Sec. 19. The measures taken pursuant to this order are in response to
actions of the Government of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the
1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended solely as a response to those later
actions.
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Sec. 20. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on July
1, 2013.
THE WHITE HOUSE.
June 3, 2013.
[FR Doe. 2014--13523
Filed 6--13 1115 am
Billing code 3295-F
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Presidential Documents
62139
i
'
Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012
Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set
Forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights
Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies
Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.). the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public
Law 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended (ISA), the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law
111-195) (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), as amended (CISADA), the lran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158)
(ITRSHRA), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
as amended (8 U.S.C. 1182(0)) and section 301 of title 3, United States
Code, and in order lo take additional steps with respect to the national
emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995,
I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, hereby
order:
Section 1. (a) When the President, or the Secretary of State or the Secretary
of the Treasury pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in
accordance with the terms of such delegation, has determined that sanctions
shall be imposed on a person pursuant to ISA, CISADA, or ITRSHRA and
has, in accordance with those authorities, selected one or more of the sanclions
set forth in section 6 of ISA to impose on that person, the Secretary
of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the
following actions with respect to the sanctions selected and maintained
by the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of the Treasury:
(i) with respect to section 6(a)(3) of ISA, prohibit any United States financial
institution from making loans or providing credits to the sanctioned person
consistent with that section;
(ii) with respect to section 6(a)(6) of ISA, prohibit any transactions in
foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
and in which the sanctioned person has any interest;
(iii) with respect to section 6(a)(7) of ISA, prohibit any transfers of credit
or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial
institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the
sanctioned person;
(iv) with respect to section 6(a)(8) of ISA, block all property and interests
in property that are in the United States. that come within the United
States, or that are or come within the possession or control of any United
States person, including any foreign branch, of the sanctioned person,
and provide that such property and interests in property may not be
transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in;
(v) with respect to section 6(a)(9) of ISA, prohibit any United States
person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or
debt instruments of a sanctioned person;
(vi) with respect to section 6(a)(11) of ISA, impose on the principal execulive
officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions and with
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62140 Federal Register/ Vol. 77, NO. 198/Friday, October 12, 2012/Presidential Documents
similar authorities, of a sanctioned person the sanctions described in
sections 6(a)(3), 6(a)(6), (6)(a)(7), 6(a)(8), 6(a)(9), or 6(a)(12) of ISA, as
selected by the President, Secretary of State, or Secretary of the Treasury,
as appropriate; or
(vii) with respect to section 6(a)(12) of ISA, restrict or prohibit imports
of goods, technology, or services, directly or indirectly, into the United
States from the sanctioned person.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the
extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses
that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this
order.
Sec. 2. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person, including
any foreign branch, of the following persons are blocked and may not
be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: any person
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at
the recommendation of the Secretary of Stale:
(i) to have knowingly, on or after August 10, 2012, transferred, or facilitated
the transfer of, goods or technologies to Iran, any entity organized under
the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government
of Iran, or any national of Iran, for use in or with respect to Iran. that
are likely to be used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities, or by any other person on behalf of the Government
of lran or any of such agencies or instrumentalities, to commit serious
human rights abuses against the people of Iran;
(ii) to have knowingly, on or after August 10, 2012, provided services,
including services relating to hardware, software, or specialized information
or professional consulting, engineering, or support services, with respect
to goods or technologies that have been transferred to Iran and
that are likely to be used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities, or by any other person on behalf of the Government
of Iran or any of such agencies or instrumentalities, to commit serious
human rights abuses against the people of Iran;
(iii) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of,
the activities described in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section or
any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to this section; or
(iv) to be owned or controlled by, or lo have acted or purported to
act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the
extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses
that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this
order.
Sec. 3. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person, including
any foreign branch, of the following persons are blocked and may not
be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: any person
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at
the recommendation of the Secretary of State:
(i) to have engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran
on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise
of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit
access to print or broadcast media, including the facilitation or support
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j
of intentional frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or an
entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran that would jam
or restrict an international signal;
(ii) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of,
the activities described in subsection (a)(i) of this section or any person
whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this
section; or
[iii) to be owned or controlled by. or to have acted or purported to
act for or on behalf of. directly or indirectly. any person whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the
extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses·
that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this
order.
Sec. 4. (a) No entity owned or controlled by a United States person and
established or maintained outside the United States may knowingly engage
in any transaction, directly or indirectly, with the Government of Iran or
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran, if that
transaction would be prohibited by Executive Order 12957, Executive Order
12959 of May 6, 1995, Executive Order 13059 of August 19, 1997, Executive
Order 13599 of February 5, 2012. section 5 of Executive Order 13622 of
July 30, 2012, or section 12 of this order, or any regulation issued pursuant
to the foregoing, if the transaction were engaged in by a United States
person or in the United States.
(b) Penalties assessed for violations of the prohibition in subsection (a)
of this section, and any related violations of section 12 of this order, may
be assessed against the United States person that owns or controls the
entity that engaged in the prohibited transaction.
(c) Penalties for violations of the prohibition in subsection (a) of this section
shall not apply if the United States person that owns or controls the entity
divests or terminates its business with the entity not later than February
6, 2013.
(d) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the
extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses
that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this
order.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative,
and with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States,
the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and other agencies and officials as appropriate, is hereby authorized to
impose on a person any of the sanctions described in section 6 or 7 of
this order upon determining that the person:
(a) knowingly, between July 1, 2010, and August 10, 2012, sold, leased,
or provided to Iran goods, services, technology, information, or support
with a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more, or with an aggregate fair
market value of $5,000,000 or more during a 12-month period, and that
could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of
Iran's domestic production of refined petroleum products. including any
direct and significant assistance with respect to the construction, modernization,
or repair of petroleum refineries;
(b) knowingly, between July 1, 2010, and August 10, 2012, sold or provided
to Iran refined petroleum products with a fair market value of $1,000,000
or more, or with an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more
during a 12-month period;
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(c) knowingly, between July 1, 2010, and August 10, 2012, sold, leased,
or provided to Iran goods, services, technology, information, or support
with a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more, or with an aggregate fair
market value of $5,000,000 or more during a 12-month period, and that
could directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement of Iran's
ability to import refined petroleum products;
{d) is a successor entity to a person determined by the Secretary of State
in accordance with this section to meet the criteria in subsection {a), (b).
or (c) of this section;
(e) owns or controls a person determined by the Secretary of State in
accordance with this section to meet the criteria in subsection (a), (b),
or (c) of this section, and had knowledge that the person engaged in the
activities referred to in that subsection; or
(f is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with,
a person determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with this
section to meet the criteria in subsection {a), (b), or (c) of this section,
and knowingly participated in the activities referred to in that subsection.
Sec. 6. [a) When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of
section 5 of this order, has determined that a person meets any of the
criteria described in section 5 and has selected any of the sanctions set
forth below lo impose on that person, the heads of relevant agencies, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions
where necessary to implement the sanctions imposed by the Secretary of
State:
(i) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank shall deny approval
of the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation
in an extension of credit in connection with the export of any
goods or services to the sanctioned person;
(ii) agencies shall not issue any specific license or grant any other specific
permission or authority under any statute that requires the prior review
and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the
export or reexport of goods or technology to the sanctioned person;
(iii) with respect to a sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
(1) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall take
such actions as they deem appropriate, including denying designation,
or terminating the continuation of any prior designation of, the sanctioned
person as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments;
or
(2) agencies shall prevent the sanctioned person from serving as an agent
of the United States Government or serving as a repository for United
States Government funds; or
(iv) agencies shall not procure, or enter into a contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.
(b) The prohibitions in subsections (a)(i)-(a)(iv) of this section apply except
to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives,
or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
date of this order.
Sec. 7. (a) When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of
section 5 of this order, has determined that a person meets any of the
criteria described in section 5 and has selected any of the sanctions set
forth below to impose on that person, the Secretary of the Treasury. in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions
where necessary to implement the sanctions imposed by the Secretary of
State:
(i) prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans
or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than
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$10,000,000 in any 12-month period, unless such person is engaged in
activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided
for such activities;
(ii) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person
has any interest;
(iii) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions
or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that
such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person;
(iv) block all property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that come within the United States, or that are or come within
the possession or control of any United Stales person, including any
foreign branch, of the sanctioned person, and provide that such property
and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn,
or otherwise dealt in; or
(v) restrict or prohibit imports of goods, technology, or services, directly
or indirectly, into the United States from the sanctioned person.
(b) The prohibitions in subsections (a)(i)-(a)(v) of this section apply except
to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives,
or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
date of this order.
Sec. 8. I hereby determine that, to the extent that section 203(b)(2) of
IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of the
types of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit of
any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national
emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such
donations as provided by subsections 1(a(iv), 2(a), 3(a), and 7(a)(iv) of
this order.
Sec, 9. The prohibitions in subsections 1(a)(iv), 2(a), 3(a), and 7(a)(iv) of
this order include but are not limited to:
(a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to this order; and
(b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
from any such person.
Sec. 10. I hereby find that the unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant
entry into the United States of aliens who meet one or more of the criteria
in subsections 2(a) and 3(a) of this order would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend the entry into the
United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of such persons. Such persons
shall be treated as persons covered by section 1 of Proclamation 8693
of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject to United Nations
Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic Powers
Act Sanctions).
Sec. 11. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation
of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President
by IEEPA and sections 6(a)(6), 6(a)(7), 6(a)(8), 6(a)(9), 6(a)(11), and 6(a)(12)
of ISA, and to employ all powers granted to the United States Government
by section 6(a)(3) of ISA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these
functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government
consistent with applicable law.
Sec. 12. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of
evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of
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62144 Federal Register/ Vol. 77, No. 198/Friday, October 12, 2012/Presidential Documents
the prohibitions set forth in this order or in Executive Order 12957, Executive
Order 12959, Executive Order 13059, or Executive Order 13599 is prohibited.
(b} Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in
this order or in Executive Order 12957, Executive Order 12959, Executive
Order 13059, or Executive Order 13599 is prohibited.
Sec. 13. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;
(b) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of lran, any
political subdivision, agency. or instrumentality thereof. including the Central
Bank of lran, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or
on behalf of, the Government of Iran;
(c) the term "lran" means the Government of Iran and, the territory of
lran and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf, over which the Government of lran claims sovereignty,
sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government
of Iran exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives
a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international arrangements;
(d) the terms "knowledge" and "knowingly," with respect to conduct, a
circumstance, or a result, mean that a person has actual knowledge, or
should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result;
(e) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
(f) the term "sanctioned person" means a person that the President, or
the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to authority
delegated by the President and in accordance with the terms of such delegation,
has determined is a person on whom sanctions shall be imposed
pursuant to IEEPA, ISA, CISADA, or ITRSHRA, and on whom the President,
the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of the Treasury has imposed any
of the sanctions in section 6 of ISA;
(g) for the purposes of section 4 of this order, the term "subject to the
jurisdiction of the Government of Iran" means a person organized under
the laws of Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran, ordinarily resident in Iran,
or in lran, or owned or controlled by any of the foregoing;
(h) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institution
(including its foreign branches) organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States or located in the United
States; and
(i) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent
resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States
or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches),
or any person in the United States.
Sec. 14. For those persons whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence
in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds
or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures
to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual.
I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need be
no prior notice of an action taken pursuant to subsections 1(a)(iv), 2(a),
3(a) and 7(a)(iv) of this order.
Sec. 15. Executive Order 13622 is hereby amended as follows:
(a) Subsection (1)(c)(ii) is amended by deleting the words "with respect
to the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution."
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(b) Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is amended by deleting the words "with respect
to the country with primary jurisdiction over the person."
(c) Subsection 1(d) is amended by inserting the words "agricultural commodities."
after the words "sale of."
Sec. 16. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation
of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President
by IEEPA, as may be necessary to carry out section 104A of CISADA (22
U.S.C. 8514). The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these
functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government
consistent with applicable law.
Sec. 17. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed
to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the
provisions of this order.
Sec. 18. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by
any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities,
its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Sec. 19. The measures taken pursuant to this order are in response to
actions of the Government of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the
1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended solely as a response to those later
actions.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington. October 9, 2012.
[FR Doc. 2012-25236
Filed 10-11-12 845 am]
Billing code 3293-F3
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Executive Orders
Executive Order 12613--Prohibiting imports from Iran
Source: The provisions of Executive Order 12613 of Oct. 29, 1987, appear at 52 FR 41940, 3 CFR,
1987 Comp., p. 256, unless otherwise noted.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of
America, including section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act
of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9), and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code,
I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that the Government of Iran
is actively supporting terrorism as an instrument of state policy. In addition, Iran has conducted
aggressive and unlawful military action against U.S.-flag vessels and merchant vessels of other
non-belligerent nations engaged in lawful and peaceful commerce in international waters of
the Persian Gulf and territorial waters of non-belligerent nations of that region. To ensure that
United States imports of Iranian goods and services will not contribute financial support to
terrorism or to further aggressive actions against non-belligerent shipping, I hereby order that:
Section 1. Except as otherwise provided in regulations issued pursuant to this Order, no goods
or services of Iranian origin may be imported into the United States, including its territories and
possessions, a􀁺er the e􀁹ective date of this Order.
Sec. 2. The prohibition contained in Section 1 shall not apply to:
(a) Iranian-origin publications and materials imported for news publications or news broadcast
dissemination;
(b) petroleum products refined from Iranian crude oil in a third country;
(c) articles imported directly from Iran into the United States that were exported from Iran prior
to the e􀁹ective date of this Order.
Sec. 3. This Order shall take e􀁹ect at 12:01 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on October 29, 1987,
except as otherwise provided in regulations issued pursuant to this Order.
Sec. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby
authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate
any of these functions to other o􀁹icers and agencies of the Federal Government. All agencies of
the United States Government are directed to take all appropriate measures within their
authority to carry out the provisions of this Order, including the suspension or termination of
licenses or other authorizations in e􀁹ect as of the date of this Order.
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􅑸•NATIONAL ARCH IVES
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The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration
1-86-NARA-NARA or 1-866-272-6272
Sec. 5. The measures taken pursuant to this Order are in response to the actions of the
Government of Iran referred to above, occurring a􀁺er the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers
Accords, and are intended solely as a response to those actions.
This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.
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ELECTRONIC CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
e-CFR data is current as of August 8, 2019
Title 31 -, Subtitle B -+ Chapter V - Part 560 -» Subpart C -+ $560.314
Title 31: Money and Finance: Treasury
PART 560-IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND SANCTIONS REGULATIONS
Subpart C-General Definitions
5560.314 United States person; U.S. person.
The term United States person or U.S. person means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized
under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the
United States.
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ELECTRONIC CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
e-CFR data is current as of August 8, 2019
Title 31 -» Subtitle B + Chapter V -. Part 560 - Subpart E -+ 5560.530
Title 31: Money and Finance: Treasury
PART 560-IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND SANCTIONS REGULATIONS
Subpart E--Licenses, Authorizations, and Statements of Licensing Policy
------- --
6560.530 Commercial sales, exportation, and reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices,
and certain related software and services.
(a)(1) One-year license requirement. (i) The exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, and
medical devices that are not covered by the general licenses in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section (as set forth in
paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries
purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, shall only be made pursuant to a one-year specific license issued by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control ('OFAC") for contracts entered into during the one year period of the license and shipped
within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract. No specific license will be granted for the
exportation or reexportation of the items set forth in paragraph (a)(1(ii) of this section to any entity or individual in Iran
promoting international terrorism, to any individual or entity designated pursuant to Executive Order 12947 (60 FR 5079,3 CFR,
1995 Comp.. p. 356), Executive Order 13224 (66 FR 49079, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 786), or Public Law 104-132, to any
narcotics trafficking entity designated pursuant to Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995 (60 FR 54579,3 CFR, 1995
Comp., p. 415) or the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1901-1908), or to any foreign organization, group,
or persons subject to any restriction for its or their involvement in weapons of mass destruction or missile proliferation.
Executory contracts entered into pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section prior to the issuance of a one-year license
described in this paragraph shall be deemed to have been signed on the date of issuance of that one-year license (and,
therefore, the exporter is authorized to make shipments under that contract within the 12-month period beginning on the date of
issuance of the one-year license).
(ii) For the purposes of this part, "agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices that are not covered by the
general licenses in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section" are
(A) The excluded agricultural commodities specified in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section;
(B) The excluded medicines specified in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section;
(C) The excluded medical devices specified in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section; and
(D) Agricultural commodities (as defined in paragraph (e)(1) of this section), medicine (as defined in paragraph (e)(2) of this
section), and medical devices (as defined in paragraph (e)(3) of this section) to military, intelligence, or law enforcement
purchasers or importers.
(2)(i) General license for the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities. Except as provided in paragraphs (a)
(2)(ii) and (iii) of this section, the exportation or reexportation by a covered person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of this
section) of agricultural commodities (as defined in paragraph (e)(1) of this section) (including bulk agricultural commodities
listed in appendix B to this part) to the Government of lran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries
purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, and the conduct of related transactions, including, but not limited to,
the making of shipping and cargo inspection arrangements, the obtaining of insurance, the arrangement of financing and
payment, shipping of the goods, receipt of payment, and the entry into contracts (including executory contracts), are hereby
authorized, provided that, unless otherwise authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursuant to
this general license are limited to, and consistent with, those authorized by $560.532 of this part; and further provided that all
such exports and reexports are shipped within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract for
export or reexport.
(ii) Excluded agricultural commodities. Paragraph (a)(2)() of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation
of the following items: Castor beans, castor bean seeds, certified pathogen-free eggs (unfertilized or fertilized), dried egg
albumin, live animals (excluding live cattle, shrimp, and shrimp eggs), embryos (excluding cattle embryos), Rosary/Jeq
peas, non-food-grade gelatin powder, peptones and their derivatives, super absorbent polymers, western red cedar, or $
fertilizers.
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(iii) Excluded persons. Paragraph (a)(2)() of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of agricultural
commodities to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers.
(iv) General license for related training. The provision by a covered person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of this section)
of training necessary and ordinarily incident to the safe and effective use of agricultural commodities exported or reexported
pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in lran, or to persons in a third
country purchasing such goods specifically for resale to any of the foregoing is authorized, provided that:
(A) Unless otherwise authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursuant to this general license
are limited to, and consistent with, those authorized by $560.532;
(B) Any technology released pursuant to this authorization is designated as EAR99; and
(C) Such training is not provided to any military, intelligence, or law enforcement entity, or any official or agent thereof.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(2) 0r 5560.530. Consistent with section 906(a)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7205), each year OFAC will determine whether to revoke this general license. Unless revoked, the general license
will remain in effect
(3)(i) General license for the exportation or reexportation of medicine and medical devices. Except as provided in
paragraphs (a)(3)(ii) through (iv) of this section, the exportation or reexportation by a covered person (as defined in paragraph
(e)(4) of this section) of medicine (as defined in paragraph (e)(2) of this section) and medical devices (as defined in paragraph
(e)(3) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing
specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, and the conduct of related transactions, including the making of shipping and
cargo inspection arrangements, obtaining of insurance, arrangement of financing and payment, shipping of the goods, receipt of
payment, and entry into contracts (including executory contracts), are hereby authorized, provided that, unless otherwise
authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursuant to this general license are limited to, and
consistent with, those authorized by $560.532; and further provided that all such exports or reexports are shipped within the 12month
period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract for export or reexport.
(i) Excluded medical devices. Paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of
medical devices on the List of Medical Devices Requiring Specific Authorization, which is maintained on OFAC'S Web site
(www.treasury gov/ofac) on the Iran Sanctions page.
(iii) Excluded medicines. Paragraph (a)(3)() of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of the
following medicines: non-NSAID analgesics, cholinergics, anticholinergics, opioids, narcotics, benzodiazapenes, and bioactive
peptides.
(iv) Excluded persons. Paragraph (a)(3)() of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of medicine or
medical devices to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers.
(v) General license for related training. The provision by a covered person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of this section) of
training necessary and ordinarily incident to the safe and effective use of medicine and medical devices exported or reexported
pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of this section to the Government of lran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in a third
country purchasing such goods specifically for resale to any of the foregoing is authorized, provided that:
(A) Unless otherwise authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursuant to this general license
are limited to, and consistent with, those authorized by 5560.532
(B) Any technology released pursuant to this authorization is designated as EAR99; and
(C) Such training is not provided to any military, intelligence, or law enforcement entity, or any official or agent thereof.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(3) OF 5560.530. Consistent with section 906(a)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7205), each year, OFAC will determine whether to revoke this general license. Unless revoked, the general license
will remain in effect
(4) General license for the exportation or reexportation of replacement parts for certain medical devices. (i) Except as
provided in paragraph (a)(4)(ii) of this section, the exportation or reexportation by a covered person (as defined in paragraph (e)
(4) of this section) of replacement parts to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in Iran, or to persons in third
countries purchasing specificaly for resale to any of the foregoing, for medical devices (as defined in paragraph (e)(3) of this
section) exported or reexported pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(3)() of this section, and the conduct of related transactions,
including the making of shipping and cargo inspection arrangements, obtaining of insurance, arrangement of financing =rd
payment, shipping of the goods, receipt of payment, and entry into contracts (including executory contracts), are hereb @
authorized, provided that, unless otherwise authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursu
this general license are limited to, and consistent with, those authorized by $560.532; and further provided that
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(A) Such replacement parts are designated as EAR99, or, in the case of replacement parts that are not subject to the
Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR), would be designated as EAR99 if they were located
in the United States;
(B) Such replacement parts are exported or reexported to replace a broken or nonoperational component of a medical
device that previously was exported or reexported pursuant to paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section, or the exportation or
reexportation of such replacements parts is necessary and ordinarily incident to the proper preventative maintenance of such a
medical device;
(C) The number of replacement parts that are exported or reexported and stored in lran does not exceed the number of
corresponding operational parts currently in use in relevant medical devices in lran; and
(D) The broken or non-operational replacement parts that are being replaced are promptly exported, reexported, or
otherwise provided to a non-Iranian entity located outside of Iran selected by the supplier of the replacement parts.
(ii) Excluded persons. Paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section does not authorize the exportation or reexportation of replacement
parts for medical devices to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (a)(4) 0r 5560.530. Consistent with section 906(a)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7205), each year, OFAC will determine whether to revoke this general license. Unless revoked, the general license
will remain in effect.
(5) General license for services and software necessary for the operation, maintenance, and repair of medical devices-(i)
Operational software. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(5)(iv) of this section, the exportation or reexportation by a covered
person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in lran, or to persons
in a third country purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, of software necessary for the installation and
operation of medical devices or replacement parts exported or reexported pursuant to this section, and the conduct of related
transactions, are hereby authorized, provided that such software is designated as EAR99, or in the case of software that is not
subject to the EAR, would be designated as EAR99 if it were located in the United States, and further provided that, unless
otherwise authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursuant to this general license are limited to,
and consistent with, those authorized by $560.532
(ii) Software updates. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(5)(iv) of this section, the exportation or reexportation by a
covered person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of this section) to the Government of lran, to any individual or entity in lran, or to
persons in a third country purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, of software intended for and limited to the
provision of safety and service updates and the correction of system or operational errors in medical devices, replacement
parts, and associated software that previously were exported, reexported, or provided pursuant to this part, and the conduct of
related transactions, are hereby authorized, provided that such software is designated as EAR99, or in the case of software that
is not subject to the EAR, would be designated as EAR99 if it were located in the United States, and further provided that,
unless otherwise authorized by specific license, payment terms and financing for sales pursuant to this genera license are
limited to, and consistent with, those authorized by 5560.532. Such software updates may be exported or reexported only to the
same end user to whom the original software was exported or reexported.
(iii) Maintenance and Repair Services. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(5)(iv) of this section, the exportation or
reexportation by a covered person (as defined in paragraph (e)(4) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or
entity in Iran, or to persons in a third country purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, of services necessary to
maintain and repair medical devices that previously were exported or reexported pursuant to this section, including inspection,
testing, calibration, or repair services to ensure patient safety or effective operation, and the conduct of related transactions, are
hereby authorized, provided that such services do not substantively alter the functional capacities of the medical device as
originally authorized for export or reexport, and further provided that, unless otherwise authorized by specific license, payment
terms and financing for sales pursuant to this general license are limited to, and consistent with, those authorized by $560.532.
(iv) Excluded persons. Paragraphs (a)(5)(i) through (iii) of this section do not authorize the exportation or reexportation of
software, software updates, or maintenance and repair services for medical devices to military, intelligence, or law enforcement
purchasers or importers.
(6)(i) General license for the importation of certain U.S.-origin agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices.
Except as provided in paragraph (a)(6)(i) of this section, the importation into the United States of U.S.-origin agricultural
commodities, medicine, and medical devices, including parts, components, or accessories thereof, that previously were
exported or reexported pursuant to the authorizations in this section and that are broken, defective, or non-operational, or are
connected to product recalls, adverse events, or other safety concerns, and the conduct of related transactions, are hereby
authorized.
(ii) Excluded persons. Paragraph (a)(6)(i) of this section does not authorize the importation into the United States c
origin agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices that previously were exported or reexported pursuant to the
+
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authorizations in this section as broken, defective, or non-operational, or in connection with product recalls, adverse events, Or
other safety concerns, from military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers.
(b) General license for arrangement of exportation and reexportation of covered products that require a specific license. (1)
With respect to sales authorized pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, the making of shipping arrangements, cargo
inspections, obtaining of insurance, and arrangement of financing (consistent with $560.532) for the exportation or reexportation
of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices that are not covered by the general licenses in paragraphs (a)(2)
through (4) of this section (as set forth in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or
entity in Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, are authorized.
(2) Entry into executory contracts (including executory pro forma invoices, agreements in principle, or executory offers
capable of acceptance such as bids in response to public tenders) for the exportation or reexportation of agricultural
commodities, medicine, and medical devices that are not covered by the general licenses in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of
this section (as set forth in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section) to the Government of Iran, to any individual or entity in lran, or to
persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to any of the foregoing, is authorized, provided that the performance
of an executory contract is expressly made contingent upon the prior issuance of a one-year specific license described in
paragraph (a)(1)() of this section.
(c) Instructi o ns for obtaining one-year licenses. In order to obtain the one-year specific license described in paragraph (a)
(1() of this section, the exporter must provide to OFAC:
(1) The applicant's full legal name (and, if the applicant is a business entity, the state or jurisdiction of incorporation and
principal place of business);
(2) The applicant's mailing and street address (and, so that OFAC may reach a responsible point of contact, the applicant
should also include the name of the individual(s) responsible for the application and related commercial transactions, along with
their telephone and fax numbers and, if available, email addresses),
(3) The names, mailing addresses, and, if available, fax and telephone numbers and email addresses of all parties with an
interest in the transaction. If the goods are being exported or reexported to a purchasing agent in Iran, the exporter must
identify the agent's principals at the wholesale level for whom the purchase is being made. If the goods are being exported or
reexported to an individual, the exporter must identify any organizations or entities with which the individual is affiliated that
have an interest in the transaction,
(4) A description of all items to be exported or reexported pursuant to the requested one-year license, including a
statement that the items are designated as EAR99, or would be designated as EAR99 if they were located in the United States,
and, if necessary, documentation sufficient to verify that the items to be exported or reexported are designated as EAR99, or
would be designated as EAR99 if they were located in the United States, and do not fall within any of the limitations contained
in paragraph (d) of this section; and
(5) For items subject to the EAR, an Official Commodity Classification of EAR99 issued by the Department of Commerce's
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), certifying that the product is designated as EAR99, is required to be submitted to OFAC
with the request for a license authorizing the exportation or reexportation of all fertilizers, live horses, western red cedar, or the
excluded medical devices specified in paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section. See 15 CFR 748.3 for instructions for obtaining an
Official Commodity Classification of EAR99 from BIS.
(d) Limi t ations. (1) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph
(a) of this section relieves the exporter from compliance with the export license application requirements of another Federal
agency.
(2) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section
authorizes the exportation or reexportation of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical device controlled on the United
States Munitions List established under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778); controlled on any control
list established under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or any successor statute (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.); or used to
facilitate the development or production of a chemical or biological weapon or weapon of mass destruction.
(3) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section
affects prohibitions on the sale or supply of U.S. technology or software used to manufacture agricultural commodities,
medicine, or medical devices, such as technology to design or produce biotechnological items or medical devices.
(4) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section
affects U.S. nonproliferation export controls, including the end-user and end-use controls maintained under part 744 of
Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR part 744. @
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(5) Nothing in this section authorizes any transaction or dealing with a person whose property and interests in property are
blocked under, or who is designated or otherwise subject to any sanctions under, the terrorism, proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, or narcotics trafficking programs administered by OFAC, 31 CFR parts 536, 544, 594, 595, 597, and 598, or
with any foreign organization, group, or person subject to any restriction for its involvement in weapons of mass destruction or
missile proliferation, or involving property blocked pursuant to this chapter or any other activity prohibited by this chapter not
otherwise authorized in or pursuant to this part.
(6) Nothing in this section or in any general or specific license set forth in or issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section
authorizes the exportation or reexportation of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical device that is not designated as
EAR99 or, in the case of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical device not subject to the EAR, would not be
designated as EAR99 if it were located in the United States.
(e) Covered items. For the purposes of this part, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices are defined
below.
(1) Agricultural commodities. For the purposes of this part, agricultural commodities are
(i) In the case of products subject to the EAR, 15 CFR part 774, products that are designated as EAR99, and, in the case
of products not subject to the EAR, products that would be designated as EAR99 under the EAR if they were located in the
United States, in each case that fall within the term "agricultural commodity"as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade
Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602); and
(ii) In the case of products subject to the EAR, products that are designated as EAR99, and in the case of products not
subject to the EAR, products that would be designated as EAR99 if they were located in the United States, in each case that
are intended for ultimate use in Iran as:
(A) Food for humans (including raw. processed, and packaged foods; live animals; vitamins and minerals; food additives or
supplements; and bottled drinking water) or animals (including animal feeds);
(B) Seeds for food crops;
(C) Fertilizers or organic fertilizers; or
(D) Reproductive materials (such as live animals, fertilized eggs, embryos, and semen) for the production of food animals.
(2) Medicine. For the purposes of this part, medicine is an item that falls within the definition of the term "drug" in section
201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321) and that, in the case of an item subject to the EAR, is
designated as EAR99 or, in the case of an item not subject to the EAR, that would be designated as EAR99, if it were located in
the United States.
NOTE TO 5560.530(e)(2). The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security provides a list on its Web site of medicines
that are not designated as EAR99 and therefore not eligible for any general or specific license under this section.
(3) Medical device. For the purposes of this part, a medical device is an item that falls within the definition of device" in
section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321) and that, in the case of an item subject to the EAR, is
designated as EAR99, or in the case of an item not subject to the EAR, that would be designated as EAR99 if it were located in
the United Stales.
(4) Covered person. For purposes of this part, a covered person is, with respect to the exportation or reexportation of items
subject to the EAR, a U.S. person or a non-U.S. person, and for purposes of items not subject to the EAR, a U.S. person,
wherever located, or an entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the United States.
(f) Excluded items. (1) For the purposes of this part, agricultural commodities do not include furniture made from wood;
clothing manufactured from plant or animal materials, agricultural equipment (whether hand tools or motorized equipment);
pesticides, insecticides, or herbicides; or cosmetics (unless derived entirely from plant materials).
(2) For the purposes of this part, the term medicine does not include cosmetics.
(g) Excluded transactions by U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities. Nothing in this section or in any general license set
forth in or issued pursuant to this section authorizes any transaction by an entity owned or controlled by a United States person
and established or maintained outside the United States otherwise prohibited by S560.215 if the transaction would be prohibited
by any other part of this chapter V if engaged in by a U.S. person or in the United States.
[77 FR 64666, Oct. 22, 2012, as amended at 77 FR 75849, Dec. 26, 2012, 79 FR 18993. Apr. 7, 2014, 81 FR 94257, Dec. 232C
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8/12/2019 eCFR -- Code of Federal Regulations
ELECTRONIC CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
e-CFR data is current as of August 8, 2019
Title 31 -» Subtitle B -+ Chapter V , Part 560 -» Subpart E » 5560.532
Title 31. Money and Finance: Treasury
PART 560-IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND SANCTIONS REGULATIONS
Subpart E---Licenses, Authorizations, and Statements of Licensing Policy
6560.532 Payment for and financing of exports and reexports of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical
devices, and certain related software and services.
(a) General license for payment terms. The following payment terms are authorized for sales pursuant to $560.530(a):
(1) Payment of cash in advance;
(2) Sales on open account, provided that the account receivable may not be transferred by the person extending the credit;
(3) Financing by third-country financial institutions that are not United States persons, entities owned or controlled by
United States persons and established or maintained outside the United States, Iranian financial institutions, or the Government
of Iran. Such financing may be confirmed or advised by U.S. financial institutions and by financial institutions that are entities
owned or controlled by United States persons and established or maintained outside the United States; or
(4) Letter of credit issued by an Iranian financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely
pursuant to this part. Such letter of credit must be initially advised, confirmed, or otherwise dealt in by a third-country financial
institution that is not a United States person, an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and established or
maintained outside the United States, an Iranian financial institution, or the Government of Iran before it is advised, confirmed,
or dealt in by a U.S. financial institution or a financial institution that is an entity owned or controlled by a United States person
and established or maintained outside the United States.
(b) Specific licenses for alternate payment terms. Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for payment
terms and trade financing not authorized by the general license in paragraph (a) of this section for sales pursuant to
$560.530(a).
(c)(1) No debits to blocked accounts. Nothing in this section authorizes payment terms or trade financing involving a debit
to an account blocked pursuant to this part.
(2) No debits or credits to Iranian accounts on the books of U.S. depository institutions. Nothing in this section authorizes
payment terms or trade financing involving debits or credits to Iranian accounts, as defined in 5560.320
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, no commercial exportation to Iran may be made with United States
Government assistance, including United States foreign assistance, United States export assistance, and any United States
credit or guarantees absent a Presidential waiver.
(e) Nothing in this section authorizes any transaction by an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and
established or maintained outside the United States otherwise prohibited by $560.215 if the transaction would be prohibited by
any other part of this chapter V if engaged in by a U.S. person or in the United States.
[77FR 64666, Oct. 22, 2012, as amended at 77 FR 75849, Dec. 26, 2012 81 FR 94259, Dec. 23, 2016]
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8/12/2019 eCFR -- Code of Federal Regulations
ELECTRONIC CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
e.-CFR data is current as of August 8, 2019
Tile 31 -+ Subtitle B -+ Chapter V » Part 560 -+ Subpart E -+ 5560.533
Title 31: Money and Finance: Treasury
PART 560-IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND SANCTIONS REGULATIONS
Subpart E-Licenses, Authorizations, and Statements of Licensing Policy
5560.533 Brokering sales of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices.
(a) General license for brokering sales by U.S. persons. United States persons are authorized to provide brokerage
services on behalf of U.S. persons for the sale and exportation or reexportation by U.S. persons of agricultural commodities,
medicine, and medical devices, provided that the sale and exportation or reexportation is authorized, as applicable, by a oneyear
specific license issued pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)() of 5560.530 or by one of the general licenses set forth in paragraphs
(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4) 0f 5560.530.
(b) Specific licensing for brokering sales by non-U.S. persons of agricultural commodities. Specific licenses may be issued
on a case-by-case basis to permit U.S. persons to provide brokerage services on behalf of non-U.S., non-Iranian persons for
the sale and exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities to the Government of Iran, entities in Iran, or individuals in
lran. Specific licenses issued pursuant to this section will authorize the brokering only of sales that are to purchasers permitted
pursuant to §560.530.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (b) OF 5560.533. Requests for specific licenses to provide brokerage services under this paragraph must
include all of the information described in 5560.530(c).
(c) No debits or credits to Iranian accounts on the books of U.S. depository institutions. Payment for any brokerage fee
earned pursuant to this section may not involve debits or credits to Iranian accounts, as defined in $560.320.
(d) Recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Attention is drawn to the recordkeeping, retention, and reporting
requirements of §§501.601 and 501.602 of this chapter.
[77 FR 64666, Oct. 22, 2012, as amended at 79 FR 18995. Apr. 7, 2014]
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Annex 36
Page 17T7 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE $1701
() Repealed. Pub. L. 95-223, title I, $101(0).
Dec. 28, 1977, 91 Stat. 1625.
(2) A0t of ADrHI 28, 1942 (40 U.8.€. 278);
(3) Act of June 30, 1949 (41 U.8.. 252):
(4) Sect!on 3727(a.)-(e)1) of title 31;
(5) Section 3737 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended (41 U.S.0. 15);
(6) Public Law 85-804 (ACt Of Aug. 28, 1958, 72
Stat. 972; 50 U.$.C. 1431-1435);
() Section 2304(a(1) of title 10;
(b) Each committee of the House of Representatfves
and the Senate having jurisdiction wIth
respect to any provision of law referred to in
subsection (a) of this section shall make a complete
study and investigation concerning that
provision of law and make a report, including
any recommendations and proposed revisions
such committee may have. to its respective
House of Congress within two hundred and seventy
days after September 14, 1976.
(Pub. L. 94-412, title V, $502, Sept. 14, 1976, 90
Stat. 1258; Pub. L. 95-223, title I, $101(), Dec. 28,
1977, 91 Stat. 1625; Pub. L. 96-513, title V, 45070),
Dec. 12, 1980. 94 Stat. 2919.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
At of Apr1l 28, 1942. referred to tn subsec. (a)(2), Ls
act Apr. 28. 1942. ch. 249. 56 Stat. 247, which was classfled
to sectton 278b of TIte 40, Public Buldings. Property.
And Works. and was omitted from the Code.
Act of June 30, 1949 (41 U.$.C. 252), referred to n sub»sec
(a)(3), Is act June 30. 1949. ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377, as
amended, known as the Federal Property and Admintstrative
Services Act of 1949. For complete class1fcation
of this Act to the Code. see Short Title note set out
under section 47l of Title 40 ad Tables.
Section 2304(a)XI) of title 10, referred to In subsec.
(a(7), originally authorized purchases or contracts
without formal advertising when necessary In the pubIic
interest during a national emergency declared by
Congress or the President, And as amended generally by
Pub. L. 98-369 now sets forth the competftton requirements
for procurement of property or services.
CODIFICATION
In subsec. (a4), "Section 3727a-e)1) of title 31"
substituted for "Section 3477 of the Revised Statutes,
as amended (3 U.S.C. 203) on authority oft Pub L
91-258, 4400), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1067, the first sectton
of which enacted TILle 31, Money and Finance.
AMENDMENTS
1980--Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 96-513 struck out par. (8)
which made reference to sections 3313, 6386(0), and 8313
of title 10.
1977--Subsec. (a)X1). Pub. L. 95-223 struck out par. (
which read as follows: Section 5(b) of the Act of 00tober
6, 1917, as amended (12 U.S.C. 95a: 50 U.S.C. App.
50)):".
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1980 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 96-513 effective Sept. 15, 1981,
see section 70l of Pub. L. 96513, set out as a note under
section 10 of Title 10. Armed Forces.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section Is referred to In section 1622 of this title.
CHAPTER 35INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY
ECONOMIC POWERS
Se
1701. Unusual and extraordinary threat; declarat[
on of national emergency; exercise of
Presidential authorities.
'See References tn Text note below
so tn or1ttnal The semicolon probably should be a period
Presidential authorities.
Consultation and reports.
(a) Consultation with Congress.
(b) Report to Congress upon exercise of
President!al authorities.
() Pertodle follow-up reports.
(d) Supplemental requirements.
Authority to Issue regulations.
Penalties.
Saving8 provisions.
(a) Termination of national emergencies
pursuant to National Emergencies
Act.
(b) Congressional termination of national
emergencies by concurrent resolutton.
(0) Supplemental savings provisions; supersedure
of inconsistent prov!slons.
(d) Periodic reports to Congress.
CHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This chapter is referred to In sections 2170, 2405, 2410
of the Append!x to this title; title 12 sections 3409, 3413,
4407 title 19 section 2581; title 22 section 6004; title 26
section 9ll.
$1701. Unusual and extraordinary threat; dec.
laration of national emergency; exercise of
Presidential authorities
(a) Any authority granted to the President by
section 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal
with any unusual and extraordinary threat,
which has Its source In whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United
States, If the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat.
(b) The authorities granted to the President
by section 1702 of this title may only be exercfsed
to deal with an unusual and extraordinary
threat with respect to which a national emergency
has been declared for purposes of this
chapter and may not be exercised for any other
purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to deal
with any new threat shall be based on a new deelaration
of national emergency which must be
with respect to such threat.
(Pub. L. 95-223, title II, $202, Dec. 28, 1977, 91
Stat. 1626.)
SHORT TITTLE
Section 20I of title II of Pub. L. 95-223 provided that.
T!s t!tie [enacting this chapter] may be cited as the
Internattonal Emergency Economic Powers Act'"
SEPARABILITY
Setton 208 of Pu. L, 95-223 provided that, "If any
provlston of this Act [enacting this chapter] is held Invalid,
the remainder of the Act shall not be affected
thereby."
SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA AND MONTENEORO
Pub. L. 103-160. df. A. tItIe XV, 41511, N. 30, 1993.
10 Stat 1839, provided that.
(a,) CODIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH SANCTIONS.
The sanctions Imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, as [n
effect on the date of the enactment of thts At [Nov, 30,
1993], that were Imposed by or pursuant to the followng
directives of the executive branch shall (except s
provided under subsections (d) and (o)) remain In effect
until changed by Law:
(I Executive Order 12808 of May 30, 1992 (et out
below]. as continued in effect on May 25, 1993.
Annex 36
41701 TITLE 50---WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 178
( Executive Order 12810 of Jure 5, 1992 (et out
below]
(3) Executive Order 12831 of January 15, 1993 (st
out below]
«4) Executive Order 12846 Of Apr1 25, 1993 {set out
below].
(5) Department of State Public Notice 1427. effecttve
Jaly 1l, 1991.
() Proclamation 6389 of December 5$. 1991 (56 Fed.
Register 64467).
Department or Transportation Order 92-5-38 of
May 20, 1992.
() Federal Aviation Administration action of
June 19, 1992(4 C.F.R. Part 91).
(b) PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE.No funds approprlated
or otherwise made available by law may be obgated
or expended on behalf of the government of Serbla
or the government of Montenegro.
(0) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL. INSTITUTIONS.-TEe
Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United
States executive director of each International fnanclal
Institution to use the voice and vote of the United
States to oppose any assistance from that Institution
to the government of Serbia or the government of
Montenegro, except for basic human needs.
(d) EXCEPTION,Notwithstanding any other prov!lon
of law. the President is authorized and encouraged
to exempt from sanctions Imposed against Serbia and
Montenegro that are descrtbed In subsection (a) thos
United States-supported programs. projects. or act1v!ties
that Involve reform of the electoral process. the
development of democratic Institutions or democratic
polItteal parties, or humanitarian assistance (eluding
reusee care and human rights observation)
(e) WAIVER AUTHOrTY.A) The President may
wave or modify the application, In wbole or In part. of
any sanction desorlbed In subsection (a), the prohtbtIon
in subsection (b), or the requirement In subsection
(c)
(2 Such a waiver or modification may only be effetIve
upon certification by the Pres!dent to Congress
that the President has determined that the waiver or
modification Is necessary (A) to meet emergency buman!
tartan needs, or (By to achieve a negotiated settlement
of the conflict n Bosnla-Herzegovina that is a¢ceptable
to the parties."
IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION
Pub. L 1042 84, div. A, title XVI, 00t, 23, 1992. 106
Stat. 2571, provided that:
SEC. 1601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the Iran-Iraq Arms NonProliferation
Act of 1992.
··SEC. 1602. UNITED STATES POLICY.
(a) I GENERAL.-It shall be the poltey of the Lnited
States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement
of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran Or
Iraq of any goods or technology, Including dual-use
goods or technology, wherever that transfer could matertally
contribute to either country's acquiring chemtcal,
biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and
types of advanced conventional weapons.
(b) SANCTIONS.D In the furtherance of this policy.
the President shall apply sanctions and controls w1tb
respect to Iran, Iraq. and those nations and persons
who assist them in acquiring weapons of mass destructon
In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.SC. 2151 et seq.] the Nuclear Non-Proliferatton
Act of 1978 [22 U.s.C. 3201 et seq.]. the Cemtca]
and Biololcat Weapons Control and Warfare El1mtnation
Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.]. chapter 7 of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.SC, 2797 et seq.],
and other relevant statutes, regarding the non-proIiferation
of weapons of mass destruction and the
means of their delivery
(2) The Pres!dent should also urgently seek the
agreement of other nations to adopt and institute, at
the earliest practicable date, sanctions nd controls
comparable to those the United States Is obligated to
apply under this subsection.
(e) PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION.The Coress calls on
the President to Identity publicly (In the report required
by section 1607) any country or person that
transfers goods or technology to Iran or Iraq contrary
to the policy set forth in subsection (a).
SEC 1603. APPLICATION TO IRAN OF CERTAIN
IRAQ SANCTIONS.
The sanctions against Iraq specified In paragraphs
( through t4) of section 5860() of the Iraq Sanettons
Act of 1990 (as contained In Public Law 101-513) (set out
below]. including dental of export licenses for United
States persons and prohtbittons on United States Government
sales, shall be applied to the same extent and
fn the same manner with respect to Iran.
"SEC. 16OM. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN PERSONS.
(a) PROHIBITION.If any person transfers or retransfers
goods or technology so as to contrlbute knowingly
and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or any
a@enoy or Instrumentality of either such country) to
acquire destabtitzing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons, then the sanctions described In
subsection (b) shall be Imposed.
( MANDA TORY SANCTIONS.'The sanctions to be Imposed
pursuant to subsection (a) are as follows:
( PROCUREMENT SANCTION,For a perod of two
years. the United States Government shall not procure,
or enter Into any contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.
(2) EXPORT SANCTION.For a period of two years,
the United States Government shall not Issue any IIcense
for any export by or to the sanctioned person.
SEC. 1605. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN FOREION
COUNTRIES.
(a) PROHIBITION.If the President determines that
the government of any forelgn country transfers or retransfers
goods or technology so as to contribute knOWIngly
and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or
any a&ency or Instrumentality of elther such country)
to acquire destabtztng numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons. thent)
the sanctions described In subsection tb) shall
be Imposed on such country. and
) n addition, the President may Apply, In the
discretion of the President, the sanction described In
subsection (0).
() MANDATORY SANCTIONS.-Except as provided In
paragraph (). the sanctions to be Imposed pursuant to
subsection (a)X1) are as follows:
(D SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE,-'The
Un!tad States Government shall suspend, for a period
of one Year, United States assistance to the sanotloned
country,
ID MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK ASSISTANCE.'
The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct
the United States Executive Drector to each approprlate
International financial Inst±tatton to oppose,
and vote against, for a period of one year, the exterson
by such institution of any loan or financial or
technical assistance to the sanctioned country.
(S) SUSPENSION OF CODEVELOPMENT OR COPRODUCTION
AGREEMENTS The United States shall suspend,
for a period of one year, compliance with ts obllgattons
under any memorandum of understanding with
the sanctioned country for the codevelopment or Coproduction
of any Item on the United States Munttlons
L!st (established under section 38 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.8.C. 2778)). Includtns any obLigation
for Implementation of the memorandum of
understanding through the sale to the sanctioned
country of technical data or assistance or the licensIng
for export to the sanctioned country of any component
part.
(4) SUSPENSION OF MILITARY AND DUAL-UE TECNICAL
EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS.-The United States
shall suspend, for a period of one year, compliance
Annex 36
Page 179 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE $1701
with Its obllgattons under any technical exchange
agreement involving military and dual-use technology
between the United States and the sanctioned
country that does not directly contribute to the security
of the United States, and no mflftary or dual-use
technology may be exported from the United States
to the sanctioned country pursuant to that agreement
during that period.
(5) UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST.--No Item on the
United States Mun!ttons LAst (established pursuant
to section 38 of the ArmS Export Control At) may be
exported to the sanctioned country for a perod of one
year
(c) DISCRETIONARY SANCTION.The sanction referred
to n subsection (a)(2) is as follows:
() USE OF AUTHORITIES OF INTERNATIONAL EM'ERGENCY
EOONOMIC POWERS ACT.Bxept as provided In
paragraph (2), the President may exercise, In accordance
with the provisions of that A0t (60 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.]. the author!ties of the International Emergency
Economt Powers At wIth respect to the sanctioned
country.
(2) EXCEPTION.-ParAATAph (D) does not apply with
respect to urgent humanitarian assistance.
"·SEC. 1606. WAIVER.
ope President may wave the requirement to Impose
a sanction described In section 1603, In the case of Iran,
or a sanctton described fn section 1604() or 1605(b), I
the case of Iraq and Iran, 15 days after the Pres\dent
determines and so reports to the Committees on Armed
Services and Forelgn Relations of the Senate and the
Committees on Armed Services [now Committee on Natlona]
Security] and Foreign Affairs [now Committee
on International Relations] of the House of Representatlves
that It Is essential to the national Interest of the
United States to exercise such waver authority. Any
such report shall provide a specific and detaled rationale
for such determination.
SEC. I6OT. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
"(a) ANNUAL REPORT.-Beginning one year after the
date of the enactment of this Act (Oct. 23. 1992], and
every 12 months thereafter, the Pres!dent shall submit
to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relatons
of the Senate and the Committees on Armed
Services [now Committee on National Security] and
Forein Affairs [now Committee on International RelatIons]
of the House of Reprosontat'ves A report detatlIng()
all transfers or retransfers made by any parson
or foreign government during the preceding 12-month
period which are subject to any sanction under this
title; and
(2) the actions the President Intends to undertake
or has undertaken pursuant to this title wIth respect
to each such transfer.
() REPORT ON INDIVIDUAL 'TRANSFERS.-Whenever
the President determines that a person or forelgn government
has made a transfer which ts subject to any
sanction under thts title, the President shall, within 30
days after such transfer, submit to the Committees on
Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committees on Armed Services [now Committee
on Nattonal Security] and Forelgn Affairs [now
Committee on International Relations] of the House of
Representatives a report--
(I) Identifying the person or government and providng
the detafls of the transfer; and
( deserfbtng the actions the President intends to
undertake or has undertaken under the provisions of
this title with respect to each such transfer.
(¢) FORM OF TRANSMITTAL.- Reports required by this
section may be submitted In classified as well as in unclassified
form.
"SEC. 1608 DEFINITIONS.
"or purposes of thts title:
( The term advanced conventional weapons' Includes-
(A) sch long-range precision-guided munitions,
fuel alr explosives, cruise mlssles. low observa.
bllty alrcraft, other radar evading aircraft, advanced
military aircraft, mtltary satellttes, electromagnetl
weapons, and laser weapons as the
President determines destabilize the military balance
or enhance offensive capabfifties ln destab1tzIng
ways;
() such advanced command, control, and communications
systems, electronl warfare systems,
or Intelligence collect4on systems as the President
determines destabilize the military balance or enhance
offensive capabilities In destab\llzng ways;
and
(c) such other Items or systems as the Pres!dent
may, by regulation, determine necessary for purposes
of this title.
(2 The term 'cruise missle' means guided mtssilos
that use aerodynamic Lift to offset gravity and propulslon
to counteract drA&.
() The term Roods or technology' means
(A) any article, natural or manmade substance,
matertal, supply, or manufactured product, InoludIng
Inspection and test equipment; and
(B) any nformation and know-how (whether In
tangible form, such as models, prototypes, drawInes,
sketches, diagrams, blueprints, or manuals, or
n intangtble form, such as training or technical
services) that can be used to design, produce, manufacture,
utlfze, or reconstruct goods, Including
computer software and technical data.
(4 The term 'person' means any Un!ted States or
forelgn Individual, partnershtp. corporatlon, or other
form of association, or any of their successor entities,
parents, or subsidiaries.
(5) The term 'sanctioned country' moans a country
against which sanctions are required to be Imposed
pursuant to sect4on 1605
(6) The term 'sanctioned person' means a person
that makes a transfer described In section 1604(a).
() The term 'United States assistance' meansA)
any assistance under the Forelgn Assistance
Act of 1961 [22 0.8.C. 2151 et seq other than-
() urgent humanitarian assistance or med!olne.
and
(D) assistance under chapter 1 of part I (22
U.8.C. 2295 et seq.] (as enacted by the Freedom for
Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democractes and
Open Markets Support Act 0f 1992 {see Short TItle
note set out under section 5801 of TItle 22. Fore!gn
Relations and Intercourse);
(B) sales and assistance under the ArmS Export
Control Act (22 U.8.0. 2751 et seq.J:
(C) fnaIng by the Commodity Credit Corporatton
for export sales of agricultural commodities;
and
(D financing under the Export-Import Bank Act
(or 19451 (22 U.$.C. 63 et seq.I."
Memorandum of President of tbe United States,
Sept. 27, 1994, 59 F.R. 50685, delegated to Secretary of
State, In consultation wIth heads of other departments
and agencies, all functions vested In Pres!dent under
title XVI of Pub. L. 102-484, set out above, without im!tat[
on of authority of other officials to exercise powers
heretofore or hereafter delegated to them to Implement
sanctions Imposed or acttons directed by the Secretary
pursuant to tbts delegation of authority.]
PAYMENT OP CLAIMS BY UNITED STATES NATIONALS
AGAINST IRAQ
Pub. L. 101-519, 4131, No. 5, 1990, 10M Stat. 2249. whtch
authorized President to vest title in a portion of property
in whtch transactions were blocked pursuant to
Executive Order 12722 In order to satisfy obligations
owed to United States Government and United States
nationals for which Iraq had suspended repayment, was
repealed by Pub. L 102-21, title IV, 4402(a.). Apr. 10,
1991, 105 Stat. 155. as amended by Pub. L. 102-136, $.126,
Oct. 25, 1991, 105 Stat. 643, effective Nov. 5, 1990.
IRAQ SANCTIONS
Pub. L. 101-513. title V, 44586-586J, Nov. 5, 1990, 104
Stat. 2047-2054, provided that:
Annex 36
+1701 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 180
SEC. S&6. SHORT TITLE.
Sections 586 through 586J of this Act may be cited
as the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990
"SEC. 586A. DECLARATIONS REGARDING IRAQ'S INVASION
OF KUWAIT.
·The Congress-
(I condemns Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait on August
2, 1990;
(2) supports the actions that have been taken by
the Pres\dent in response to that Invasion;
() calls for the Immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of Iraq! forces from Kuwait;
(4) supports the efforts of the United Natlons Securtty
Counctl to end this violation of international
law and threat to International peace;
(5) supports the Imposition and enforcement of
multilateral sanctions against Iraq:
(6) calls on United States allies and other courtries
to support fully the efforts of the United NAtons
Security Counotl, and to take other appropriate
actlops, to bring about an end to Iraq's occupation of
Kuwait; and
tT) condemns the brutal occupation of Kuwait by
Iraq and Its gross violations of fntarnatonally recogled
human rights In Kuwait, Including widespread
arrests. torture, summary executions, and mass
extra.judicial k1ling#
·SEC. 586B. CONSULTATIONS WITH OONORES.
The President shah] keep the Congress fully Informed,
and shall consult with the Congress, with respect
to current and anticipated events regarding the
International ortsts caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwat,
Including with respect to United States actions.
SEC. 586C. TRADE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ
(A) CONTINUATION OF EMBAROO.Except as otherwise
provided in this sect!on. the President shall continue to
mpose the trade embargo and other economic ancIons
with respect to Iraq and KuwAlt that the United
States is Imposing. An response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwatt,
pursuant to Executive Orders Numbered 12724 and
12725 [set out below] (August 9, 1990) and, to the extent
they are still In effect, Executive Orders Numbered
12722 and 12723 {set out below] (August 2, 1990). NotwIthstanding
any other provision of Jaw, no funds, credits.
guarantees, or insurance appropriated or otherwise
made available by this or any other Act for fiscal ear
199I or any flscal year thereafter shall be used to support
or administer any financial or commercial operatlon
of any United States Government department,
agenoy, or other entity. or of any person subject to the
urtsdtotton of the Un!ted States, for the benefit of the
Government of Iraq. Its agencfes or Instrumental1ties,
or any person working on behalf of the Government of
Iraq, contrary to the trade embargo and other economl¢
sanctions Imposed In accordance with this secton.
() HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.To the extent that
transactions Involving foodstuffs or payments for foodstuffs
are exempted 'In humanitarian circumstances
from the prohibitions established by the United States
pursuant to Untted Nations Security Councnl Resolutton
66l (1990). those exemptions shall be limited to
foodstuffs that are to be provided consistent with
UntaAd Nations Security Counctl Resolution 666 (1990)
and other relevant Security Councll resolutions
(C) NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF EXCEPTIONS TO AND TERMINA
TION OP SANCTIONS.(
NOTICE OF REGULATIONS Any regulations tssued
after the date of enactment of this At [Nov. 5,
1990] with respect to the economic sanctions mposed
with respect to Iraq and Kuwait by the United States
under Executive Orders Numbered 12722 and 12723
(August 2, 1990) and Executve Orders Numbered 12724
and 12725 (Aust 9, 1990) shall be submitted to the
Congress before those regulations take effect.
(2) NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF SACTIONS,'The
Pres!dent shall notify the Congress at least 15 days
before the termination, In wbole or In part, of any
sanction Imposed with respect to Iraq or Kuwait pursuant
to those Executive orders.
(d) RELATTO TO OTHER LAWS.
(I SANCTIONS LEGISLATION.'The sanctions that
are described In subsection (a) are In addition to. and
not in lieu of the sanctions provided for in section
586 of this Act or any other provision of law.
(2) NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND UNITED NAT10NS
LEGISLATION.Nothing in this section supersedes any
provision of the National Emergenctes Aet (50 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.] or any authority of the Pres!dent under
the International Emergency Economte Powers Act
(50 U.$.0. 1701 et seq] or section 5a) of the United
Nattons Participation Act 0f 1945 (22 U.8.C. 287ca)].
SEC. 586D. COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.
(a) DENIAL OF ASSISTANCE.-None of the funds approprated
or otherwise made available pursuant to this
Act [see Tables for classification] to carry out the Forelgn
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.8.C. 2151 et sea.] (ncludn
ttte IV of chapter 2 of part I [22 U.8.C. 2191 et
seq.J relating to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation)
or the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.8.C
2751 et seq.] may be used to provide Assistance to any
country that Is not In compliance with the United NAttons
Security Council sanctions against Iraq unless
the President determines and so certifies to the Congross
tbat
() such assistance ls In the national Interest of
the United States;
2 such ass1stance wt! directly benefit the needy
people in that country; or
(3) the assistance to be provided will be buman!tarian
assistance (or foreign nationals who have (led
Iraq and Kuwait.
(b) IMPORT SANCTIONS.If the Pres!dent considers
that the taking of such action would promote the effoctlveness
of the economic sanotions of the Un!ted NAtlons
and the United State Imposed wft.h respect to
Iraq and is consistent with the national Interest. the
Pres!dent may prohtbit, for such A period of time as he
considers appropriate, the importation Into the United
States of any or all products of any foreign country
that has not prohibited-
() the Importation of products of Iraq Into its customs
territory, and
2)the export of Its products to Iraq.
SEC. S86E. PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF EMBARGO.
·Notwithstanding section 20 of the International
Emerency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S 0. 1705) and
section 5(b) of the United Nations Partlclpaton Act of
1945 (22 U.S.0. 287¢0b))--
(a civil penalty of not to exceed $250,000 may be
mposed on any person who, after the date of enactment
of this ACt [No. 5, 1990), violates or evades or
attempts to violate or evade Executive Order Numbered
12722, 12723, 12724. or 12725 {set out below] or any
tcense. order, or regulation tssued under any such
Executive order. and
(2) whoever, after the date of enactment of this
Act, wilfully violates or evades or attempts to violate
or evade Executive Order Numbered 12722, 12723,
12724, or 12725 or any license, order, or regulat/on ssued
under any such Executive order--
(A shall, upon conviction, be fired not more
than $1,000,000, If a person other than a natural person;
or
() If a natural person, shall. upon conviction,
be fined not more than $1,000,000, be imprisoned tor
not more than 12 years, or both.
Any officer, director, or agent of any corporation who
knowingly participates In a violation. evasion, or attempt
deser!bed In paragraph (2 may be pan'shed by
Imposition of the fine or Imprisonment (or both) spec!fled
In subparagraph (B) of that paragraph.
"SEC. S86F. DECLARATIONS REGARDING IRAQ'S
LONG-STANDING VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW.
ta) IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.-'The
Congress determines that--
Annex 36
Page 181 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
() the Government of Iraq has demonstrated repeated
and blatant disregard for Its obligations under
nternational law by violating the Charter of the
Urited Nations, the Protocol for the Prohtbftton of
the Use fn War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases. and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
(done at Geneva, June 17, 1925), as well as other International
treaties;
(2 the Government of Iraq is a party to the International
Covenant on Ctl and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Soctal, and
Cultural Rights and is obligated under the Covenants,
as well as the Un!versa Declaration of Human
Rights, to respect Internationally recognized human
rights;
() the State Department's Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1989 again characterizes
Iraq's human rights record as abysmal:
(4) Amnesty Iternatonal, Middle East Watch,
and other Independent human rights organizations
have documented extensive, systematic, and continuIng
human rights abases by the Government of Iraq,
Including summary executions, mass political ktllIngs,
disappearances, widespread use of torture. arb!trary
arrests and prolonged detention without trial of
thousands of political opponents, forced relocaton
and deportation, dental of nearly all civil and polttcal
rights such as freedom of association, assembly,
speech. and the press, and the Imprisonment, torture,
and erecution of chfldren:
(s) since 1987, the Government of Iraq bas intenstfed
its severe repression of the Kurdish minority of
Iraq. deliberately destroyed more than 3,000 vLla&es
and towns In the Kurdish regions, and forcibly expelled
more than 500,000 people, thus effectively depopulating
the rural areas of Iraq! Kurdistan.
(6) Iraq has blatantly violated International law
by In!tfating use of chemical weapons In the Iran-Iraq
war,
() Iraq has also violated International law by
using chemical weapons against Its own Kurdish citizens,
resulting In tens of thousands of deaths an
more than 65,000 refugees,
(8) Iraq continues to expand its chemical weapons
capabflfty, and Pres!dent Saddam Hussetn has threat
ened to use chemical weapons against other nations;
(9) persuasive evidence exists that Iraq is developIng
biological weapons In violation of International
law;
(0) there are strong Indications that Iraq has
taken steps to produce nuclear weapons and bas attempted
to smuggle from the United States, In violatIon
of United States law, components for triggering
devices used In nuclear warheads whose manufacture
would contravene the Treaty on the Non-Proltferat/
on of Nuclear Weapons, to whtch Iraq Is a party: and
(I Iraqi President Saddam Hussetn has threat
ened to use terrorism against other nations Ln violatlon
of [nternational law ad bas Increased Iraq's
support for the Palestine Ltberation Organization
and other Palestinian groups that have conducted
terrorist acts.
() HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.The Congress determines
that the Government of Iraq ls engaged n a consistent
pattern of gross violations of Internationally
recognized human rights. All provisions of law that Im.
pose sanctions Against a country whose government 1s
engaged In a consistent pattern of gross violatons of
Internationally recognized human rights shall be fully
enforced against Iraq.
(¢) SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.-(1) Th
Congress determines that Iraq Is a country which has
repeatedly provided support for acts of fnternational
terrorism, a country which grants sanctuary from prosecutton
to individuals or groups which have committed
an act of international terrorism, and a country whcb
otherwise supports International terrorism. Th pr9vL.
sons of law specified In paragraph (2) and all other provisions
of law that Impose sanctions against a country
which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism, which grants sanctuary from prosecaution
to an Individual or group which has committed
an act of International terrorism. or which otherwise
supports International terrorism shall be fully enforced
against Iraq
(2) The provisions of law referred to In paragraph (
re
(A) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Aet [22
U.s.C. 2780):
·()y section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22U $.C. 2371)
·(C sections 555 and 556 of this Aet [IO4 Stat. 2021,
2022] (and the corresponding sections of predecessor
foreign operations approprtattons Acts); and
(D) section 555 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation A0t of 1985 (99 Stat. 227].
(d) MULTILATERAL COOPERATION,-'The Congress calls
on the President to seek multilateral cooperatton(
to deny dangerous technologies to Iraq;
(2 to induce Iraq to respect Internationally recognized
human rights; and
(3) to Induce Iraq to allow appropriate international
humanitarian and human rights organzatons
to have access to Iraq and Kuwait. including
the areas In northern Iraq traditionally Inhabited by
Kurds.
SEC. 586G. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.
(a) IMPOSITION.-Except as provided In section 586H,
the following sanctions shall apply with respect to
Iraq:
"( FMS SALES.The United States Government
shall not enter Into any sale with Iraq under the
Arms Export Control Act 22 U.S.0. 2751 et seq.]
(2 COMMERCIAL ARMS SAES.--Ltcenses shall,not
be Issued for the export to Iraq of any item on the
United States Munitions List.
(3) EXPORTS OF CERTAIN GOODS AND TECHNOLOOY.The
Authorities of section 6 of the Export Admtnlstmatton
Act of 1979 (50 U.8.. App. 2405) shall be used
to prohtbit the export to Iraq of any goods or technology
listed pursuant to that section or section
50X of that Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2404(0K1)) on the
control list provided for n section 4(b) of that Act (50
USC App. 24030))
(4) NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND TECHNOL0OY.
(
A) NRC LICENSES.The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission shall not issue any License or other authortzatton
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C 20Ll and following) for the export to Iraq of
any source or special nuclear material, any production
or utilization factlity, any sensitive nuclear
technology, any component, Item, or substance determined
to have significance for nuclear explosive
purposes pursAnt to sect!on 109b. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.$.0. 21390)), or any other
material or technology requiring such license or
authorization.
(BJ DISTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR MATER.LAL8.-'The
authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 shall
not be used to distribute any special nuclear material,
source material, or byproduct material to Iraq.
(Cy DOE AUTHORIZATIONS.'The Secretary of Eengy
shall not provide a specific authorization
under section 57.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 0.8.C. 2077()2)) for any activity that would
constitute directly or Indirectly ensaene In Iraq Ln
activities that require a specific authorization
under that section.
(5) ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCLAL. LNST77UTT0NS.'
The Un!ted States shall oppose any loan
or financial or technical assistance to Iraq by International
financial Institutions In accordance with
section 70I of the International Financial Inst±tuttons
Act (22 U.8.C. 262).
(6) ASSISTANCE THROUOH THE EXPORT-IMPORT
BANK.Credits and credit guarantees through the Erport-
Import Bank of the United States shall be de
nted to Iraq.
Annex 36
41701 TITLE 50-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 182
(I) ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE COMMODITY CREDIT
CORPORATION.-Credit, credit guarantees, and other
assistance through the Commodity Credit Corporatlon
shall be dented to Iraq.
(8) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.-All forms of assistance
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2151 and following) other than emerenoy ass/stance
for medical supplies and other forms of emergency
humanitarian assistance, and under the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 and following) shall be denled
to Iraq.
() CONTRACT SANCTITY.For purposes of the export
controls imposed pursuant to subsection (a)63) the date
described In subsection (m)KI) of section 6 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405) shall be
deemed to be August 1, 1990.
"SEC. 586H. WAIVER AUTHORITY
(a) LN GENERAL.The President may wave the requirements
of any paragraph of section 5860(a) If the
President makes a certification under subsection (b) or
subsection (0).
() CERTIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN
IRAQI POLICIES AND ACTIONS .'The authority of subsection
(a) may be exercised 6 days after the President
certifies to the Congress thatl)
the Government of Iraq-
(A) has demonstrated. through a pattern of conduct.
substantial Improvement In Its respect for
Internationally recognized human tights;
() Is not acquiring, developing. or manufacturIng
(D) ballstle missiles, (If) chemical, biological, or
uclear weapons, or (Al) components for such weapons;
has forsworn the first use of such weapons; and
s taking substantial and verifiable steps to destroy
or otherwise dispose of any such missiles and reapons
It possesses; and
(C does not provide support for international
terrorism;
(2 the Government of Iraq ts In substantial compllance
wit Its obligations under International law,
Including(
A) th Charter of the United Nations; u) the International Covenant on CIvMl and Poftteal
Rights (done at New York, December 16, 1966)
and the International Covenant on Economic. Soclal,
and Cultural Rights «done at New York, December
16, 1966);
(C) the Convention on the Prevention and PunIshment
of the Crime of Genocide (done at Parls
December 9, 1948)
tD) the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
In War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases.
and of Bacteriological Methods or Warfare (done at
Geneva. June 17, 1925):
(E the Treaty on the Non-PrOlferatlon of Nuclear
Weapons (done at Washington, London, and
Moscow, July 1. 1968); and
()the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Thelr Destruction (done at Washington, London,
and Moscow, Apr1l 10, 1972); and
GS) the Pres!dent has determined that It is essent!
al to the pat/onal Interests of the United States to
exercise the authority of subsection (a)
() CERTIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN
IRAQI LEADERSHIP AND POLICIES.The authority of subsection
(a) may be exercised 30 days after the President
certifies to the Congress that--
( there has been a fundamental change In the
leadership of the Government of Iraq; and
( the new Government of Iraq has provided relt
able and credible assurance that-
(A)Lt respects Internationally recognized human
rights and It wIll demonstrate such respect through
ts conduct;
(B) it Is not acquiring, developing, or manufactaring
and it will not acquire. develop. or manufacture
() ballistic missiles. (ID) chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons. or (ll1) components for such
weapons; has forsworn the first use of such weapons;
and ts taking substantial and verifiable steps
to destroy or otherwise dispose of any such missiles
and weapons It possesses;
(0) It Is not and will not provide support for
International terrorism: and
tD) It Is and wIll continue to be In substantial
compliance with ts obligations under International
law. Including all the treaties specified In subparagraphs
(A) through () of subsection (b)(2.
(d) INFORMATION 'TO BE INCLUDED IN CERT1CATIONS.-
Any certification ander subsection (b) or (0)
shall Include the Justification for each determination
required by that subsection. The certification shall also
speclfy which paragraphs of section 586Ga) the Prestdent
wll waive pursuant to that certification.
SEC. 586I. DENIAL OF LICENSES FOR CERTAIN EXPORTS
TO COUNTRIES ASSISTING IRAS
ROCKET OR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CAPABILITY.
(a) RESTRICTION ON EXPORT LICENSES.-None of the
funds appropriated by thfs or any other Act may be
used to approve the Ilensing for export of any supercomputer
to any country whose government the Pres!dent
determines fs assisting, or whose government off1clals
the President determines are assisting, Iraq to Improve
Its rocket technology or chemical, biological. or
uclear weapons capability.
() NEGOTIATIONS.The President is directed to
begin Immediate negotiations with those governments
with which the United States has bilateral spercompater
agreements, Including the Government of the
United Kingdom and the Government of Japan, on condltions
restricting the transfer to Iraq of supercompater
or assoclated technology.
SEC 586J. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(A) STUDY AND REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL EXFORT
TO IRAQ OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND
BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY.(I) The Pres!dent
shall conduct a study on the sale, export, and third
party transfer or development of nuclear, biological,
chemical. and ballistic misstle technology to or with
Iraq Including--
(A) an identification of specific countries. as well
as companies and Individuals, both foreign and domestlo,
engaged in such sale or export of, nuclear, biolog±
cal, chemical, and ballstie missile technology:
(B) a detailed description and analysis of the
International supply. Information, support, and coproduction
network. Individual, corporate. and state,
responsible for Iraq's current capability In the area of
nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile
technology; and
(C) a recommendation of standards and procedures
against which to measure and verify a decision of the
Government of Iraq to terminate the development,
production, coproduction, and deployment of nuclear.
biological, chemical. and offensive ballistic missile
technology as well as the destruction of all exist/n$
factltles associated with such technologies.
(2 The President shall Include In the study required
by paragraph () speclflc recommendations on ew
mechanisms, to Include, but not be limited to. legal,
poltttcal, economic and regulatory, whereby the United
States might contribute, In conjunction with Its
friends. alltes, and the international community, to the
management, control. or elimination of the threat of
nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missfle proliferaton.
(3) Not later than March 30, 1991, the Prestdent shall
submit to the Committee on Appropriations and the
Committee on Fore!gn Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs [now Committee on International Relatlons]
of the House of Representatives, a report, In both
classified #rid unclassified form, setting forth the findngs
of the study required by paragraph () of thts subsection.
Annex 36
Page 183 TITLE 50 WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
() STUDY AND REPORT ON IRAQ'S OPPENSIVE MIL.ITARY
CAPABILITY.() The Pres!dent shall conduct a
study on Iraq's offensive mtlftary capability and Its effect
on the Middle East balance of power Including an
assessment of Ira's power projection capability, the
prospects for another sustained conflict with Iran, Joint
Iraq-Jordanian military cooperation, the threat Iraq's
arms transfer activities pose to United States allies in
the Middle East, and the ertenson of Ira4'$ pol!t!calmtitary
Influence Into Africa and Latin America.
(2) Not later than March 30, 1991, the President Aha1L
submit to the Committee on Appropriations and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs [now Comm!ttes on International Relatlons]
of the House of Representatives, A report, In both
classified and unclasstfed form, setting forth the fIn4.
ns of the study requtrod by paragraph ().
() REPORT ON SANCTIONS TAKEN BY OTHER NATIONS
AGAINST IRAQ-Q The President shall prepare a report
on the steps taken by other nations, both before and
after the August 2, 1990, Invasion of Kuwaft, to urtall
the export of goods. services. and technologies to Iraq
which might contribute to, or enhance, Iraq's nuclear,
biological, chemical, and ballistic misstle capability.
(2) The President shall provide a complete accountIng
of International complance with each of the sanctions
resolutions adopted by the United Nations Socurity
Counctl against Iraq since August 2, 1990, and shall
st, by name, each country which to his knowledge,
has provided any assistance to Iraq and the amount and
type of that assistance In folat/on of each United Nations
resolution.
(3) The Pre!dent shall make every effort to encourage
other nations, in whatever forum or context, to
adopt sancttons toward Iraq smAlar to those contained
In this sect!on.
(4 Not Jatr than every 6 months after the date of
enactment of this AOt [Nov. 5, 1990], the Pres!dent shall
submit to the Committee on Appropriations and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs [now Committee on International Rolattons]
of the House of Representatives, a report In both
classified and unclassified form, setting forth the findIngs
of the study required by paragraph ) of this subsection."
[Provisions similar to section 586D of Pub L. 101-513,
set out above, relating to compliance with sanctions
a8alnst Iraq were contained In the following approprlattons
acts:
(Pub. L. 103-306, title V, $588, Aug. 23, 1994, 108 Stat.
1639
(Pub. L. 103-87, title V. $539. Sept. 30, 1993, 107 Stat
957.
(Pub. L. 102-391. title V, $4573. Oct. 6, 1992, 106 Stat
1683.]
Pub. L. 101-510. dl. A, t!te XIV, $1458, No. 5, 1990.
104 Stat. 1697, provided that- "If the President considers
that the taking of such action would promote the effectiveness
of the economic sanctions of the United NA
ttons and the United States imposed with respect to
Iraq. and is consistent wIth the national Interest. the
President may prohtbt, for suoh # period of time as he
considers appropriate. the Importation into the Urited
States of any or all products of any foreign country
that has not-
(I prohtbtted-
(A) the importation of products of Iraq tnto 1ts
customs territory, and
(B) the export of ts products to Iraq; or
2 given assurances satisfactory to the President
that such Import and export sanctions will be
promptly implemented."
IRAN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT
Pub. L. 99-93, title V, Au. 16, 1985, 99 Stat. 437, provided
that:
"·SEC. SO1. RECEIPT AND DETERMINATION OF CERTAIN
CLAIMS.
() AUTHORITY OF FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION.
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
of the United States ls authorized to receive and determle
the validity and amounts of claims by nationals
of the United States against Iran which are setted en
bloc by the United States. In deciding such claims, the
Commission shall apply, In the following order- (I the terms of any settlement agreement;
t2 the relevant provisions of the Declarations of
the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Alerla of January 19, 191, giving consideratton
to Interpretations thereof by the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal: and
(3) applicable principles of internatotal law. ustice,
and equity.
Except as otherwise provided In this title, the prov!stons
of title I of the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949 (22 U.8.0. 1621 et seq.) shall apply with respect
to claims under this section. Any reference In
such provisions to this title' [translated therein as
'this subchapter'] shall be deemed to refer to those provisions
and to this sectton.
() CERTIFICATION AND PAYMENT.-The Commission
sball certify to the Secretary of the Treasury any
awards determined pursuant to subsection (a) in a¢cordance
with soctton 5 of title I of the International
Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (22 U.$.C. 1624). Such
awards shall be paid n accordance wIth sections T and
8 of such title (22U 8.C. 1626 and 1627), except that-
( the Secretary of the Treasury ls authorized to
make payments pursuant to paragraphs (D) and (2 of
section 8to) of such title In the amount of $10,000 or
the principal amount of the award, whtchever ts less:
and
(2 the Secretary of the Treasury may deduct. pur.
suant to section Tb) of such title, An amount caloulated
In accordance with section 502(a) of this Act,
Instead of 5 percent of payments made pursuant to
sectton 8(c) of such title.
SEC. 5O2. DEDUCTIONS FROM ARBITRAL AWARDS
(a) DEDUCTION FOR EXPENSES OP THE UNITED
STATES.-Except as provided In section 503, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York shall deduct from the a&gregate
amount awarded under each enumerated clatm be.
fore the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal In favor of
a United States claimant. an amount equal to 1% percent
of the fIrst $5,000.000 and 1 percent of any amount
over $5,000,000, As reimbursement to the United States
Government for expenses ncurred In connection with
the arbitration of claims of United States claimants
against Iran before that Tribunal and the maintenance
of the Security Account established pursuant to the
Declarations of the Democratic and Popular Republtc
of Alger!a of January 19, 1981. The Federal Reserve
Bank of New York shall make the deduction required
by the preceding sentence whenever the Bank receives
an amount from the Security Account In satisfaction of
an award rendered by the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal
on the enumerated claim involved.
(b) DEDUCTION 'TREATED AS MISCELLANEOUS RECETT.-
Amounts deducted by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York pursuant to subsection (a) shall be
deposited Into the Treasury of the United States to the
credit of miscellaneous recelpts.
() PAYMENT TO UNTTED STATES CLAIMANTS.NothIng
In this section shall be construed to affect the payment
to United States claimants of amounts received
by the Federal Reserve Bank o New York tn respect of
awards by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
after deduction of the amounts calculated fn accorda.
nce wIth subsection (a).
(d) EFFEOTTNVE DATE.Thts sectton shall be effective
as of June 7, 1982.
"SEC. 50. EN BLOC SETTLEMENT.
The deduction by the Federal Reserve Bank f Ne
York provided for In section 502() of this Act shall not
apply In the case of a sum received by the Bank purseant
to an en bloc settlement of any category of claims
of United States nationals aainst Iran when such sum
ls to be used for payments fn satisfaction of awards certiffed
by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
pursuant to seotton 50I(b) of this Act.
Annex 36
41701 TITLE 50-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 184
"SEO. SO4. REIMBURSEMENT TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YORK.
The Secretary of the Treasury may reimburse the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York for expenses Incurred
by the Bank In the performance of fiscal a@ency
agreements relating to the settlement or arbitration of
claims pursuant to the Declarations of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria of January 19. 1981.
·SEC. 505. CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS.
Notwithstanding section 552 0f title 5, United States
Code (commonly referred to as the Freedom of InformsIon
Act), records pertaining to the arbitration of
claims before the Iran-United States Calms Tribunal
may not be dlsclosed to the general public, except
that-
( rules, awards, and other decisions of the Tr{bunal
and claims and responsive pleadings flied at the
THbanal by the United States on Its own behalf shall
be made avallable to the public. unless the Secretary
of State determines that public disclosure would be
prejudicial to the Interests of the United States or
United States claimants In proceedings before the
Trtuna], or that public disclosure would be contrary
to the rules of the Trtbanal; and
2 the Secretary of State may determine on A
case-by-case basis to make such fnformation available
when In the Judgment of the Secretary the interests
of Justice so require."
EX. ORD. NO. 12170. BLOCKING IRANLAN GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY
EE. Ord. No. 12170, NO. 14, 1979. 44 F.R. 65729, provided
Pursuant to the authority vested in me as Pres!dent
by the Constitution and laws of the United States Including
the International Emergency Economic Powers
ACt, 50 U.S.C.A. sec, 1701 et seq.. the National Emergonctes
Act, 50 U.$.C sec. 160 et seq., and 3 U.S.C. sec.
301,
I, JIMMY CARTER. President of the United States.
find that the situation In Iran constitutes an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, forelgn
policy and economy of the United States and hereby
declare a natonal emergency to deal with that
threat
I hereby order blocked all property and interests n
property of the Government of Iran. ts Instrumentalfttes
and controlled entitles and the Central Bank of
Iran which are or become subject to the Jurisdiction of
the United States or which are In or come within the
possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdictlon
of the United States
The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to employ
all powers granted to me by the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act [thts chapter] to
carry out the provisions of this order.
This order Is effective mmediately and shall be
transmitted to the Congress and published fn the Federa]
Register.
JIMMY CARTER.
CONTINUATION OP NATIONAL EMERGECY DECLARED BY
EX. ORD. NO. 12170
Notice of President of the United States, dated Oct.
31, 1994, 59 F.R. 54785. provided:
On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order No. 12170
[set out above]. the Pres!dent declared a national emergency
to dea] with the threat to the national security,
foretgn poltoy, and economy of the United States constituted
by the situation Ir Iran. Notices of the continuaton
of this national emergency have been transmitted
annually by the Pres!dent to the Congress and
the Federal Register. The most recent notice appeared
In the Federal Resister on November 2. 1993. Because
our relations wfth Iran have not yet returned to normal,
and the process of Implementing the January I8,
19g1, agreements wIth Iran ts ttl underway, the atonal
emergency declared on November I4, 179, must
continue In effect beyond November 14, 1994. Therefore, n accordance with sectton 202d) of the Natonal Emergentes
Act (50 U.$.C 1622400)).I am continuing the nttonal
emergency with respect to Iran, Th!s notice
shall be published In the Federal Register and transmitted
to the Congress.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
Prior continuations of national emergency declared
by E. Ord. No 12170 were contained n the following:
Notice of Pres!dent of the United States, dated Nov.
1, 1993. 58 F.R. 58639.
Notice of President of the United States, dated Oct.
25, 1992. ST F.R. 48719.
Notice of Pres!dent of the Unted States, dated Nov,
12, 1991. 56 F.R. 5TT9L
Notice of the Pres!dent of the United States. dated
Nov, 9, 1990.55 F.R. 47453.
Notice of the President of the United States, dated
0et. 30. 1989. 54 F.R. 46043.
Notice of the Presldent of the United States, dated
Nov. 8, 1988, 53F R. 45750.
Notice of the President of te United States, dated
Nov. 10, 1987, 62 F.R. 43549.
Notice of the Pres!dent of the United States. dated
Nov 10, 1986, 51 F.R. 41067,
Notice of the President of the United States. dated
No. 1, 1985, 50 F.R. 45901.
Notice of the Pres!dent of the United States. dated
Nov. 7, 1984. 49 F.R. 44741.
Notice of the President of the United States, dated
Nov. 8. 1982. 47 F.R. 50841.
EX. ORD. NO. 12205 PROITTING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS
WITH IRAN
Ex. Ord. No. 12205, Apr T, 1980. 45 F.R. 24099, as
amended by Ex. Ord. N. 12211. ADI. 17, 1980. 45 F.R.
26685, provided:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, Includng
Section 203 of the International Emerency Economt¢
Powers At (50 U $.C. 1702), Sect!on 30I Or Title
3of the Unlted States Code. and Section 30I of the Natonal
Emergencies Act (30 U.$.0. 1631), In order to take
steps add[ttonal to those set forth n Executive Order
No. 12170 of November I4, 1979 (set out as a note above].
to deal w!th the threat to the national security. foretgn
poltoy and economy of the United States referred to In
that Order, and in furtherance of the objectives of
United Nat!os Security Council Resolution 461 (979)
adopted on December 3l, 1979, t Is hereby ordered as
follows:
1-I0L. he following are prohtblted effective Immedlately,
notwithstanding any contracts entered Into or
licenses granted before the date of this Order [Apr. 7.
1980]:
(a) The sale. supply or other transfer, by any person
subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States, of any
ftems, commodities or products, except food, medicine
and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and
donations of clothing Intended to be used to relieve
human suffering, from the United States, or from any
foreign country, whether or not originating In the
United States, elther to or destined for Iran. an Iranian
governmental entity in Iran, any other person or bod
In Iran or any other person or body for the purposes of
any enterprise carried on In Iran.
(b) The shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway or other
land transport of United States registration or owned
by or under charter to any person subject to the Jurisdiction
of the United States or the carriage (whether or
not in bond) by land transport factltties across the
United States of any of the Items, commodities and
products covered by paragraph (a) of this section whtch
are consigned to or destined for Iran, an Iranian govermental
entity or any person or body In Iran, Or to
ay enterprise carried on in Iran
(0) The shipment from the United States of any of the
tems, products and commodities covered by paragraph
(a) of thls section on vessels or alroraft registered in
Iran.
Annex 36
Page 185 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
(d) The following acts, when committed by any person
subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States In
connection with any transaction Involving ran, an Irantan
governmental entity, An enterprise controlled by
Iran or an Iranian governmental enttty, or any person
In Iran
(I) Makins available any new credits or loans;
(If) Makins avalable any new deposit facilities or
allowing substantial increases In non-dollar deposits
which exist as of the date of this Order [Apr. , 1980]
(1tD) Allowing more favorable terms of payment
than are customarily used fn International commercfal
transactions, or
(Iv) Falling to act In a businesslike manner in exercfstng
any rights when payments due on existing
credits or loans are not made In a timely manner.
(v) Make any payment, transfer of credit, or other
transfer of funds or other property or Interests thereIn,
except for purposes of famtly remittances.
(e) The engaging by any person subject to the Jurisdicton
of the United States in any service contract In
support of an ndustrial protect In Iran, except any
such contract entered into prior to the date of this
Order [Apr. T. 1980] or concerned with medical care.
(f) The engaging by any person subject to the furlsdiction
of the United States In any transaction which
evades or avoids, or has the purpose or effect of evading
or avoiding. any of the prohtbfttons set forth In this
section
1-102. The prohibitions In section 1-10l above shall
not apply to transactions by any person subject to the
urtsdiction of the United States whtch ts a nonbanking
assoctatton, corporation, or other organization orRazed
and doing business under the laws of any fore!gr
country.
1-103. Te Secretary of the Treasury Is delegated, and
authorized to exercise, al functions vested In the
President by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq) to carry out the purposes
of ths Order. The Secretary may redelegate any
of these functions to other officers and agenctes of the
Federal government.
1-104. The Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure tbat
acttons taken pursuant to this Order and Executive
Order No. 12170 [set out above] are accounted for as required
by Section 401 of the Natonal Emergenctes Act
(50 U.$.C. 1641).
1-105. This Order ts effective mmediately. In accord
wth Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (0
U.8.0 1641) and Section 204 of the International Emerency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), It shall be
mmediately transmitted to the Congress and published
n the Federal Register.
JIMMY CARTER.
REVOCATION OF PROHIBITIONS CONTAINED IN EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 12205
For provisions relating to the revocation of prohlb!tons
contained In Ex. Ord. No. 12205, ADE. 7, 1980, 45
F.R. 24099, as amended, which prohibited certain transacttons
with Iran, see Ex. Ord. No. 12282, Jan. 19, 1981,
46F.R. 7925. set out below.
EX. ORD. NO. 12211. PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS
WITH IRAN
Ex. Ord. No. 12211. Apr. 17, 1980. 45 F.R. 26685, ptovided:
By the authority vested n me as President by tbe
Constitution and statutes of the United States, IncladIng
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economt
Power A0t (50 U.8.0, 1702), ectton 301 of T;le
3of the United States Code, Sections 1732 and 2656 of
Title 22 of the United States Code, and Section 301 of
the National Emerendfes At (50 U.$ C. 163D), fn order
to take steps addttonal to those set forth In Executive
Order No. 12170 of November 14. 1979 (set out above)], an4
Executive Order No. 12205 of Apr!! , 1980 [set out
above], to deal with the threat to the national security,
foreign policy and economy of the United States referred
to n those Orders, and the added unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign
polloy and economy of the United States created by
subsequent events In Iran and neighboring countries,
Including the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, with respeot
to which I hereby declare a atonal emergency,
and to carry out the policy of the United States to deny
the use of {ts resources to aid. encourage or give sanctuary
to those persons Involved In directing. supporting
or partietpating in acts of International terrorism, It fs
hereby ordered as follows:
-101. Paragraph 1-101(d) of Executive Order No. 12205
[set out above] Is hereby amended by the addition of a
hew subparagraph (v) as follows:
(v) Make any payment, transfer of credit, or other
transfer of funds or other property or interests theretn,
except for purposes of famly remittances.
1-102. The following transactions are prohtbtted, notwithstanding
any contracts entered Into or licenses
ganted before the date of this Order (Apr. 17, 19801:
(a) Effective Immediately, the direct or indirect Import
from Iran Into the Un!ted States of Iran\an
goods or services, other than materials Imported for
news publication or news broadcast dissemination.
(b) Effective Immediately, any transactions with A
foreign person or forelgn entity by any citizen or permanent
resident of the United States relating to that
person's travel to Iran after the date of this Order
Apr. 17, 19601.
(0) Effective seven days from the date of this Order
(Apr. 17, 1980]. the payment by or on behalf of ans eftfen
or permanent resident of the United States who
ls within Iran of any expenses for transactions within
Iran.
The prohibitions fn paragraphs (b) and (c) of this sectIon
shall not apply to a person who ts also a citizen of
Iran and those prohibitions and the prohtblttons In sect4on
-101 shall not apply to a Journalst or other person
who ts regularly employed by a news gather!ng or
transmitting organization and who travels to Iran or 1s
within Iran for the purpose of gathering or transmitting
news, making news or documentary firs. or similar
activities.
1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury Is hereby dtrected,
effective fourteen days from the date of this
Order [Apr, 17, 1980], to revoke existing licenses for
transactions by persons subject to the Jurisdctton of
the United States with Iran AIr. the Nattonal Iran\an
0nl Company. and the National Iranian Gas Company
previously issued pursuant to regulations under Executive
Order No, 12170 set out above], or Executive Order
No. 12205 [set out above].
1-104. The Secretary of the Treasury Is delegated, and
authorized to exercise. all functions vested In the
Pres!dent by the International Emergency Economic
Powers A0t (50 U.S.C. I701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes
of this Order. The Secretary may redelegate any
of these functions to other officers and agencies of the
Federal government.
1-10. he Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure that
actions taken by him pursuant to the above provisions
of this Order. Executive Order No. 12170 (set out above]
and Executive Order No. 12205 [set out above] are a¢counted
for as required by Section 40l of the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.8.C. 1641).
1-106. The Secretary of State is delegated, and authorfed
to exercise in furtherance of the purposes of
this Order, the powers vested In the President by Sectton
2001 of the Revised Statutes (22 U $.C. 1732), Section
I of the Act of July 3, 1926 (22 0..C. 211a), and Sectton
215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1185), with respect to:
() the restriction of the use of United States passports
for travel to, In or through Iran; and
(b) the regulation of departures from and entry Into
the United States In connect!on with travel to Iran
by cttens and permanent residents of the United
States.
1-107. Except As otherwise Indicated herein. this
Order ts effective Immediately. In accord with Section
Annex 36
41701 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 186
401 of the National Emergencies At (0 US.C. 1641) and
Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.$.. 1703), It shall be immediately
transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federa
Register.
JIMMY CARTER.
REVOCATION OF PROHIBITIONS CONTAINED IN EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 12211
For provistons relatng to the revocation of prohbttons
contained In Ex. Ord. No. 12211, Apr. 17, 1980, 45
F.R. 26685, which prohibited certain transactions with
Iran. see Er. Ord. No. 12282, Jan. 19, 1981. 46 F.R. 7925,
set out below
EX. ORD, NO, 12276. RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN
IRAN DIRECTION RELA TTNG TO ESTABLISHMENT OF ESCROW
ACCOUNTS
Ex Ord. No. 12276, Jan. 19, 1981, 46 F.R. 7913, provided:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States. IncludIng
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economie
Powers Act (50 U.$.€ 1702 Section 301 of TIte
3of the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 22 of
tbe Unfted States Code, and Section 301 of the National
Emergencies At ($0 U.$.C. 1631. In view of the continuins
unusual and extraordinary threat to the natonal
security. foreign policy and economy of the
United States upon which I based my declarations of
natonal emergency In Executive Order 12170 [set out
above] Issued November I4, 1979, and In Executive
Order 1221 (set out above], issued Apr1l 17, 1980, In
order to Implement agreements with the Government
of Iran. as reflected In Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of AI&erla
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the release of U.S.
diplomats and nationals being held as hostages and to
the resolution of claims of United States nationals
against Iman, and to begin the process of normalization
of relations between the United States and Iran, It s
hereby ordered that as of the effective date of this
Order:
1-10 The Secretary of the Treasury Is authortzed to
enter Into, and to license, authorize, direct. and compel
any appropriate official and/or the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. as fiscal agent of the United States,
to enter Into escrow or related agreements with a forelgn
central bank and with the Central Bank of Algeria
under which certain money and other Assets. as and
when directed by the Secretary of the Treasury, shah
be credited by the foreign central bank to an escrow account
on Its books in the rame of the Central Bank of
Algeria for transfer to the Government of Iran if and
when the Central Bank of Aleris receives from the
Government of Algeria a certification that the 2 U.S
diplomats and nationals being held hostage In Iran
have safely departed from Iran. Such agreements shall
Include other parties and terms as determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury to be appropriate to carry
out the purposes of this Order.
1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to
tcense, authorize, direct, and compel the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of the United
States, to receive certain money and other assets In
whtch Iran or Its agencies. Instrumentalities, or controlled
entitles have an Interest and to hold or transfer
such money and other assets. and any Interest earned
thereon, In such a manner as he deems necessary to fuln
the rights and obligations of the United States
under the Declaration of the Government of the Democrate
And Popular Republic of Algeria dated January
19, 1981. and the escrow And related agreements descrbed
In paragraph 1-101 of this Order. Such more
and other assets may be held In Interest-bearing form
and where possible shall be nvested with or through
the entity holding the money or asset on the effective
date of this Order.
--103. Compliance wIth this Executive Order, any
other Executive Order icensins. authorizing. directing
or compelling the transfer of the assets referred to Lr
paragraphs 1-101 and 1-102 of this Order, or any regulatons,
Instructions. or dlrecttons issued thereunder
shall to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and
discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person
making the same. No person shall be held liable in
any court for or with respect to anything done or omitted
In good faith in connection with the administration
of, or pursuant to and In rellanee on, such orders, regulatons,
Instructions, or directions.
1--104. The Attore General shall seek to Intervene
In any litigation within the United States which arises
out of this Order and shall, among other things, defend
the legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to, each
of Its provisions.
1-105. Te Secretary of the Treasury is delegated and
authorized to exercise all functions vested In the Pres!dent
by the International Emergency Economt¢ Powers
Act (50 0.$.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of
this Order.
I-106. This Order shall be effective Immediately.
JIMMY CARTER.
EX. ORD. NO. 12277. RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN
IRAN DIRECTION TO TRANSFER IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
ASSETS
Er. Ord. N6. 12277, Ja. 19, 1981, 46 F.R. 1915, provided:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States. InoladIng
Becton 203 of the International Emergency Economte
Powers A&t (50 U.$.C. 1702, Section 30I of Tile
3 of the United States Code. Sect!on 1732 of TIle 22 of
the United States Code, and Section 30I of the NattonAl
Emerenotes A0t (50 US.C. 1631), In view of the continuing
unusual and extraordinary threat to the nattonal
security, foreign policy and economy of the
United States pon which I based my declarations of
nattonal emergency in Executive Order 12170 [set out
above]. Issued November I4, 1979, and In Executive
Order 12211 [set out above]. Issued Apr! 17, 1980, An
order to Implement agreements wIth the Government
of Iran. as reflected In Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republte of Algerta
dated Janary 19. 1981, relating to the release of U S.
dplomats and nationals being held as hostages and to
the resolution of claims of United States nationals
against Iran, and to begin the process of normaltzaton
of relations between the United States and Iran and In
whteh Iran and the United States Instruct and require
that the assets described in this order shall be transferred
as set forth below by the holders of such assets,
t ts hereby ordered that as of the effective date of this
Order:
-10L. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York Is Itcased,
authorized. directed, and compelled to transfer
to accounts at the Bank of England. and subsequently
to transfer to accounts at the Bank of England estabHshed
pursuant to an escrow agreement approved by
the Secretary of the Treasury, all gold bullion, and
other assets (or the equivalent thereof) In its custody,
of the Government of Iran, or ts agencies, InstrumentalftIes
or controlled entities. Such transfers shall be
executed when and In the manner directed by the Secretary
of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury
ts also authorized to license, authorize, direct, and
compel the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to ensage
In whatever further transactions he deems approprlate
and consistent with the purposes of this Order,
Including any transactions related to the return of
such bullton and other assets pursuant to the escrow
agreement
1-102. (a) AI licenses and authorizations for acquiring
or exercising any right, power, or privilege. by court
order. attachment. or otherwise, Including the license
contained In Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, with respect to the properties described
In Sectton -10l of this Order are revoked and
withdrawn.
() ALI rights, powers, and privileges relating to the
properties described tn section 1-I0l of thts Order and
Annex 36
Page 187 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE $1701
which derive from any attachment, Injunction, other
Itke proceedings or process, or other action in any Littcation
after November 14, 1979, At 8.10 a.m. EST, IncludIng
those derived from Sect!on 535.504 of the Iran!an
Assets Control Regulations, other than rights, powers,
and privileges of the Government of Iran and its agences,
instrumentalities. and controlled entities, whether
acquired by court order or otherwise, are pull\fed,
and all persons claiming any such right, power. or
privilege are hereafter barred from exercising the same.
(0) All persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States are prohtbfted from acquiring or exerclsIng
any right, power, or privilege, whether by court
order or otherwise, with respect to the properties (and
any Income earned thereon) referred to In Section I-101
of thts Order.
1-103. Compliance with this Order. any other Executlve
Order licensing. authorizing, directing. or compelIng
the transfer of the assets described in section I-10l
of this Order, or any regulations, Instructions, or dlrecttons
issued thereunder shall to the extent thereof be a
full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the
obligation of the person making the same. No person
shall be held Mable In any court for or with respect to
anything done or omitted In good faith In connection
wIth the administration of, or pursuant to and in rellance
on, such orders, regulations. Instructions, or dL.
rectJons
1-104. The Attorney General shall seek to Intervene
n any litigation within the United States which arises
out of this Order and shall, among other things, defend
the legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to, each
0fits prov!stons
I-105. The Secretary of the Treasury ts delegated and
authorized to exercise all functions vested In the Prestdent
by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Aet (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of
thts Order
1-106. 'This Order shall be effective Immediately.
JIMMY CARTER.
EX. ORD. NO. 12278. RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAOES IN
IRAN- DIRECTION TO TRANSFER IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
ASSETS OVERSEAS
Ex. Ord. N6. 12278, Jan. 19, 1981. 46 F.R. 7917, provided:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, tncludIng
Section 203 of the Internattona Emergency Eco.
nomtc Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702). Section 301 of Title
3of the United States Code, Section 173 f Title 22 of
the United States Code, and Section 30I of the National
Emergenctes Act (50 U.8.C. 1631), fn view of the ontruing
unusual and extraordinary threat to the natonal
security, forelsn poltcy and economy of the
United States upon which I based my declarations of
national emergency in Executive Order 12170 (set out
above], Issued November 14. 1979, and In Executive
Order 12211 [set out above], issued Apr!l 17, 1980, In
order to Implement agreements with the Government
of Iran. as reflected tn Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Al&erLA
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the release of U $.
diplomats and nationals being held as hostages and to
the resolution of clams of United States nationals
a8alnst Iran, and to begin the process of normalization
of relations between the UtAd States And Iran and 1n
which Iran and the United States Instruct and require
that the assets desertbed In this Order sball be transferred
as set forth below by the holders of such asset,
It Is hereby ordered that as of the effective date of tbis
Order:
1-10L. Any branch or office of a United States bank or
subs[diary thereof, which branch or office is located
outside the territory of the United States and which on
or after 8:10 A.m. E.S.'T. on November 14, 1979 (a) has
been or Is In possession of funds or securities legally or
beneficially owned by the Government of Iran or 1ts
agencies, Instrumental/ties, or controlled entities, or
(b) has carried or s carrying on ts books deposits
standing to the credit of or beneficially owned by such
Government, agencies, Instrumentalities, or controlled
entitles. Is Licensed. authorized, directed, and compelted
to transfer such funds. securities, and deposits.
including Interest from November 14, 1979, at commerclally
reasonable rates, to the account of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York at the Bank of England. to
be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of
the Treasury, Th Secretary of the Treasury shall determine
when the transfers required by this section
shall take place. The funds, securities and deposits described
In this section shall be further transferred as
provided for n the Declaration of the Government of
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and 1ts
Annex.
1-102. Any banking Institution subject to the Jurtsdtct/
on of the United States that has executed a set-off on
or after November 14. 1979, at 8.10 a.m. E.S.T. against
Iranian funds, securities, or deposits referred to tn sectfon
1-101 ts hereby licensed, authorized, directed, and
compelled to cancel such set-off and to transfer all
funds, securittes, and deposits which have been subject
to such set-off, including Interest from November 14,
1979, at commercially reasonable rates, pursuant to the
provfstons of section 1-101 of this Order.
1-103 If the funds, securities, and deposits desertbed
In section 1-10l are not promptly transferred to the
control of the Government of Iran, such funds, secur!ttes,
and deposts shall be returned to the banking Instituttons
holding them on the effective date of this
Order and the set-offs descrlbed In sect/on I102 shall be
In force as ff this Order had not been tssued and the
status of all such funds, securities, deposits and set-offs
shall be status quo ante.
1-104. (a) AI licenses and authorizations for acquiring
or exercising any right, power, or privilege, by court
order, attachment, or otherwise, Including the license
contained in Section 535.504 of the Iranian Asset Control
Regulations, with respect to the properties described
In Sections 1-101 and 1-102 of this Order are revo.
ked and withdrawn.
(b) All rights, powers. and privileges relating to the
properties described In Sections 1-101 and 1-102 of thjs
Order and which derive from any attachment, Injunctton,
other Ifke proceedings or process, or other action
fn any IItigatton after November 14, 1979, at 8.10 a m.
E.S.T., Includtns those derived from Sect!on 535.504 of
the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, other than
rights, powers, and privileges of the Government of
Iran and Its agencies, Instrumentalities, and controlled
entities, whether acquired by court order or otherwise,
are pulifted, and all persons olafmtng any such right,
power, or privilege are hereafter barred from exercising
the same.
(o) All persons subject to the Jurisdiction of the
United States are prohtbted from acquring or exerclsIng
any right, power, or privilege, whether by court
order or otherwise, with respect to the properties (and
any Income earned thereon) referred to In Sections
1-10 and 1-102 of this Order.
1-105. Compliance with this Order. any other Executfve
Order licensing, authorizing, directing, or compelling
the transfer of the assets described In Sections
1-101 and 1-102 of this Order, or any regulations, nstructtons,
or directions Issued thereunder shall to the
extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for
all purposes of the obligation of the person making the
same. No person shall be held Hable n any court for or
with respect to anything done or omitted fn good faith
In connection with the administration of, or pursuant
to and In reliance on, such orders, regulations, Instructtons,
or directions.
-106. The Attorney General shall sook to Intervene n any ILtigatfon within the Unttod States which arises
out of this Order and shall, among other things, defend
the legality of. and all aottons taken pursuant to, each
0fits provisions.
1-107. The Secretary of the Treasury Is delegated and
authored to exercse all functions vested In the Pres!dent
by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Annex 36
$1701 TITLE 50-WAB AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 188
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of
this Order.
1-108. This Order shall be effective Immediately
JIMMY CARTER.
EX. ORD, NO. 12279 RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN
IRAN- DIRECTION TO TRANSFER IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
ASSETS HELD BY DOMESTIC BANKS
Ex. Ord. No. 12279, Jan. 19. 1981. 46 F.R. 7919. provided:
By the authority vested In me as Pres!dent by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, Includng
Section 203 of the International Emergency Ecoomte
Powers A0t (60 U.8.0. 1702), S0ct!on 301 of Title
3of the United States Code, Section 1732 of Tile 22 of
the United States Code, and Section 30I of the NAtonal
Emergencies At (50 .8.C. 1631), In view of the cont/
puing unusual and extraordinary threat to the natonal
security. foreign polloy and economy of the
United States pon which I based my declarations of
national emergency In Executive Order 12170 [set out
above]. Issued November 14, 1979, and In Executive
Order 12211 [set ot above]. issued Apr1l 17, 1980, An
order to Implement agreements with the Government
of Iran. as reflected In Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Alger!a
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the release of U.S.
diplomats and nationals being held as hostages and to
the resolution of claims of United States nationals
against Iran, and to begin the process of normal[zatfor
of relations between the United States and Iran and In
which Iran and the United States Instruct and require
that the assets described fn thts Order shah] be transferred
as set forth below by the holders of such assets,
1t is hereby ordered that as of the effective date of this
Order:
-I0l. Any branch or office of a banking Institution
subfeot to the Jurisdiction of the United States, which
branch or office ls located within the United States and
Is, on the effective date, elther (s) In possession of
funds or securities legally or beneficially owned by the
Government of Iran or Its agencies, instrumentalities,
or controlled entities. or tb) carrying on Its books deposits
standing to the credit of or beneflctally owned by
such Government, agencies, Instrumentalities, or controlled
entities is licensed. authorized, directed and
compelled to transfer such funds, securities, and deposIts,
Including Interest from November 14, 1979, at commerctally
reasonable rates, to the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, to be held or transferred as directed
by the Secretary of the Treasury.
-102. (a) AI censes and authorizations for acquiring
or exercising any rirht, power, or privilege, by court
order, attachment, or otherwise, Including the license
contained in Section 535 504 of the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, wIth respect to the properties described
In Section 1-0l of this Order are revoked and
withdrawn.
0b) ADI rights, powers. and privileges relating to the
properties descrtbed In section 1-101 of this Order and
which derive from any attachment, Injunction, other
Ike proceedings or process, or other action In any It!atlon
after November 14, 1979, At 8.10 a.m, EST, ncludIns
those derived from Sect!on 535.504 of the Iranan
Assets Control Regulations, other than rights, powers,
and privileges of the Government of Iran and its agencfes,
Instrumentallttes, and controlled entitles. whet.her
acquired by court order or otherwise. are nu\fled,
and all persons claiming any such right, power, or
privilege are hereafter barred from exercising the same.
(c) AI persons sub'et to the Jurisdiction of the
United States are prohibited from acquiring or exerctsIng
any right, power, or prvlee whether by court
order or otherwise, with respect to the properties (and
any Income earned thereon) referred to In Section 1-101
of this Order.
I-103. Compliance wth this Order. any other Exectve
Order llcensins, authorizing, directing or compelItng
the transfer of the assets described In sect/on 1-10l
of tis Order. or any regulations, Instructions, or dLrections
Issued thereunder shall to the extent thereof be a
full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the
obligation of the person making the same. No person
shall be held table in any court for or with respect to
anything done or omitted In good faith In connect!on
with the administration of, or pursuant to and n rellace
on, such orders, regulations, Instructions, or directtons.
1-104. The Attorney General shall seek to Intervene
in any IItigatton within the United States which arises
out of this Order and shall, among other things. defend
the leatty of, and all actions taken pursuant to, each
of its provisions.
1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury Is delegated and
authorized to exercise all functions vested In the Prestdent
by the International Emergency Economic Powers
A0t (50 U.8.C. 1701 et seq) to carry out the purposes of
thts Order.
1-106. This Order shall be effective mmediately.
JIMMY CARTER.
EX. ORD, NO, 12280. RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN
IRAN--DIRECTION 'TO TRANSFER IRANIAN GOVERNMET
FINANCIAL ASSETS HELD BY NON-BANKING INSTTTUTIONS
Ex. Ord. No. 12280, Jan. 19, 1981, 46 F.R. 7921, provided:
By the authority vested In me as Pres!dent by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, IncludIng
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economie
Powers Act (50 U.S.C, 1702, Setton 30I of TIte
3of the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 22 of
the United States Code, and Sectton 30I of the National
Emergencies Act (50 US.0, 1631), In vfew of the cont/
ruing unusual and extraordinary threat to the n#tlonal
security, foreign poltoy and economy of the
United States upon which I based my declarations of
national emergency In Executive Order 12170 (set out
above]. ssued November 14. 1979. and In Executive
Order 12211 [set out above]. issued April 17, 1980. Ln
order to implement agreements with the Government
of Iran, as reflected In Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Alger!a
dated January 19, 191, relating to the release of U.S.
d'plomats and nationals being held as hostages and to
the resolution of claims of Un!ted States nationals
against Iran, and to begin the process of normalization
of relations between the United States and Iran and n
which Iran and the United States Instruct and require
that the assets descrbed n this Order shall be transferred
as set forth below by the holders of such assets,
It ls heroby ordered that as of the effective date of tis
Order:
1-101. Any person subject to the turtsdctton of the
United States which Is not a banking Inst!tut!on and Is
on the effective date in possession or control of funds
or securities of Iran or its agencies, Instrumentalities,
or controlled entitles ts licensed, authorized, directed
and compelled to transfer such funds or securities to
te Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held or
transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury,
1-102. () AI licenses and authorizations for acquiring
or exerctstng any right, power. or privilege, by court
order. attachment. or otherwise, Including the license
contained In Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
RRegulations. with respect to the properties described
In Section 1-I0I of this Order are revoked and
withdrawn (b) AI rights, powers, and privileges relating to the
properties described In section 1-101 of this Order and
which derive from any attachment. njunction, other
[fke proceedings or process, or other action In any it!Ration
after November 14, 1979, at 8.10a m. EST. cudIng
those derived from Section 535.504 of the Iranian
Assets Control Regulations, other than rights. powers,
and privileges of the Government of Iran and its agencles,
Instrumentalities, and controlled entities. wbether
acquired by ourt order or otherwise, are ultfed,
and all persons claiming any such right, power, or
privilege are hereafter barred from exercising the same.
Annex 36
Page 189 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
(o) All persons subject to the Jurtsdiction of the
United States are prohibited from acquiring or exertsIng
any right, power. or privilege. whether by court
order or otherwise, with respect to the properties (and
any Income earned thereon) referred to [n Section I-10l
of this Order.
1-103. Compliance with this Executive Order. an
other Executive Order licensing, authorizing, directing
or compelling the transfer of the assets descrtbed In
paragraph 1-10l of thts Order, or any regulations, nstructions,
or directions issued thereunder shall to the
extent thereof be a full acquittance and dischane for
all purposes of the obligation of the person making the
same. No person shall be held liable in any court for or
with respect to anything done or omitted In good faith
In connection with the administration of, or pursuant
to and in reliance on, such orders, regulations, Instructions,
or directions.
1-104. The Attorney General shall seek to Intervene
In any Itttgatton within the United States which artses
out of this Order and shall, among other things, defend
the legality of and all actions taken pursuant to, each
0f 1ts provisions.
1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury ls delegated and
authorized to exercise all functions vested n the Prestdent
by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.8.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of
tbts Order
-106. Th!s Order shall be effective immediately.
JIMMY CARTER.
EX. ORD. NO. 12281. RELEASE OP AMERICAN HOSTAOES IN
IRAN- DIRECTION TO TRANSFER CERTAIN IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
ASSETS
Ex Ord. No. 12281, Jan. 19, 1981, 46 F.R. 7923, provided.
By the authority vested fn me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States. IncludIng
Setton 203 of the International Emergency Ecoomte
Powers Act (0 U.S.C. 1702). Sectlon 30! of T;Le
3of the United States Code. Setton 1732 of Title 22 of
the United States Code. and Section 301 of the NAtonal
Emergencies Act (50 U.$.0. 1631), In view of the contruing
unusual and extraordinary threat to the natonal
security, forelgn pol!cy and economy of the
United States upon which I based my declarattons of
national emerenoy In Executive Order 12170 [set out
above]. Issued November I4. 1979, and n Executive
Order 12211 [set out above]. tssued Apr!l 17, 1980, In
order to Implement agreements wIth the Government
of Iran. as reflected In Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republte of Algeria
dated January 19. 1981, relating to the release of U.S.
diplomats and nationals being held as hostages and to
the resolution of claims of United States nationals
against Iran, and to beein the process of normalization
of relations between the United States and Iran and Ir
which Iran and the United States instruct and require
that the assets descrbed In thts Order shall be transferred
as set forth below by the holders of such assets,
it Is hereby ordered that as of the effective date of this
Order:
1-101. AII persons subject to the Jurisdiction of the
United States In possession or control of properties,
not Including funds and securities, owned by Iran or Its
agencies, Instrumentalities, or controlled entities are
licensed. authorized, directed and compelled to transfer
such properties, as directed after the effective date of
this Order by the Government of Iran. acting throagh
Its authorized agent. Except where specifically stated,
this license, authorization, and direction does not relove
persons subject to the Jursdictfon of the United
States from existing legal roqutroments other than
those based upon the International EmerenGy Ecoomto
Powers Act [thts chapter].
1-102. (a) Al tenses and authorizations for acquiring
or exercising any right, power, or pr!vllege, by court
order, attachment, or otherwise, Including the Itcense
contained In Section 535.504 of tbe Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, with respect to the properties described
In Section I-I0l of this Order are revoked and
withdrawn.
(b) All rights, powers, and privileges relating to the
properties described in section 1-10l of this Order and
which derive from any attachment, Injunction, other
Ike proceedings or process, or other action In any I1ttRation
after November I4, 1979, At 8.l0 a.m. EST, Includng
those derived from Section 535.504 of the Iranian
Assets Control Regulations, other than rights, powers,
and privileges of the Government of Iran and Its agencles.
Instrumentalities, and controlled entities, whether
acquired by court order or otherwise, are nullified,
and all persons claming any such right, power, or
privilege are hereafter barred from exercising the same.
(0) Al persons subject to the Jurisdiction of the
United States are prohibited from acquiring or exerctsIng
any right, power, or priviege, whether by Court
order or otherwise, wIth respect to the properties (and
any Income earned thereon) referred to In Section I-10l
of this Order.
1-103 Compliance wIth this Executive Order. any
other Executive Order Icenstn8, authorizing, directing
or compelling the transfer of the assets described In
paragraph 1-101 of this Order, or any regulations, Instructtons.
or directions ssued thereunder shall to the
extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for
all purposes of the obligation of the person making the
same. No person shall be held liable In any court for or
with respect to anything done or omitted In good faith
In connection wIth the admtntstration of, or pursuant
to and n reliance on, such orders, regulations, Instructions,
or directions.
1-104. The Attorney General shall seek to Intervene
In any IIttgatton within the United States which arises
out of this Order and shall, among other things, defend
the legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to, each
of its provisions.
1-105. Te Secretary of the Treasury Is delegated and
authorized to exercise all functions vested In the Pres!dent
by the International Emergency Economic Powers
A0t (50 Us.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of
this Order.
1-106. This Order shall be effective Immediately.
JIMMY CARTER.
EX. ORD. NO. 12282. RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN
IRAN REVOCATION OF PROHIBITIONS AGAINST TRANSACTIONS
INVOLVING IRAN
Ex. Ord. No 12282. Jan. 19, 1981, 46 F.R. 1925, provided:
By the authority vested In me as Presldent by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, IncludIng
Sect!on 203 of the International Emergency Economtc
Powers Act (50 U.8.C. 1702), Section 301 of TItLe
3of the United States Code, Sectton 1732 of TItle 22 of
the United States Code, and Section 30I of the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S • 1631), In view of the contnutng
unusual and extraordinary threat to the nattonal
security, foreign policy and economy of the
United States upon which I based my declarations of
nattonal emergency n Executive Order 12170 [set out
above], Issued November 14, 1979, and In Executive
Order 12211 [set out above], Issued Apr!I 17, 1980, In
order to Implement Agreements wth the Government
of Iran, as reflected In Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Aler!a
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the release of U.S.
diplomats and nationals betng held as hostage and to
the resolution of claims of United States nationals
against Iran, and to begin the process of normalization
of relations between the United States and Iran, It Is
hereby ordered that as of the effective date of this
Order:
1-101. 'The prohtblttons contained In Executive Order
12205 of Apr! 7, 1980 (set out above]. and Executive
Order 12211 0f Apr1l 17, 1980 {et out above], and Proclamatton
4702 of November 12, 1979 [amending Proe. No.
3$279, set out under section 1862 f TIte 19, Customs Duties].
are hereby revoked.
1--102. Te Secretary of the Treasury ls delegated and
authorized to exercise all functions vested In the Pres!Annex
36
41701 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 190
dent by the International Emergency Economte Powers
At (50 U.S.0. 170 et seq.) to carry out the purpose of
this Order
-103. This Order shall be effective Immediately.
JIMMY CARTER.
EE. ORD. NO. 12283. RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN
IRA-N NOX-PROSECUTION OF CLAIMS OF HOSTAGES AND
FOR ACTIONS T THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY AND
ELSEWHERE
Er. Ord. No. 12283, Jan. 19. 1981, 46 F.R. 7927, provided:
By the authority vested n me as Pres!dent by tbe
Constitution and statutes of the United States. ncludIng
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economte
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 30 of Title
3of the United States Code. Section 1732 of Title 22 of
the United States Code. and Section 30 of tbe National
Emergencies Act (50 U.$.C. 1631), In view of the conttnatng
unusual and extraordinary threat to the natonal
security, foreign pollcy and economy of the
United States upon whloh I based my declarations of
national emergency In Executive Order 12170 [set out
above]. Issued November I4, 1979, and In Executive
Order 12211 [set out above]. fssued Apr!! 17, 1980, Lr
order to Implement agreements with the Government
of Iran. as reflected In Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of ARerla
dated January 19, 198. relating to the release of U.S.
dplomats and nationals being held as hostages and to
the resolution of claims of United States nationals
a8atnst Iran, and to begin the process of normal!rat1on
of relations between the United States and Iran. It Is
hereby ordered that as of the effective date of this
Order:
1-101, The Secretary of the Treasury shall promulgate
regulations: (a) prohtb1ting any person subject to U.S.
Jurisdiction from prosecuting In any court within the
Unlted States or elsewhere any claim against the Government
of Iran arising out of events occurring before
the date of this Order relating to (D) the seizure of the
hostages on November 4, 1979, (2) their subsequent detent/
on, «3) Injury to United States property Or property
of United States nationals within the United
States Embassy compound In Tehran after November 3,
1979, or (4 Injury to United States nationals or their
property as a result of popular movement fn the
course of tbe Islamic Revolution In Iran which were not
an set of the Government of Iman: Ob) prob1bting any
person not a U.S nAtIota] from prosecuting Any such
claim In any court within the United States; (0) orderIng
the termination of any previously Instituted Jud!ctal
proceedings based upon such clams; and (d prohtbtttng
the enforcement of any fudicta] order issued n
the course of such proceedings.
1-102. The Attorney General of the United States Is
authorized and directed, Immediately upon the lssuante
of regulations In accordance with Sect!on 1-101, to
take all appropriate measures to notify al appropriate
courts of the existence of this Order and Implementing
regulations and the resulting termtnatton o Itgat/on.
1-103. Te Secretary of the Treasury Is delegated and
authorized to exercise all functions vested In the Presdent
by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 Us.C. 170 et seq.) to carry out the purpose of
this Order.
1-104. Th!s Order shall be effective immediately.
JIMMY CARTER.
EX. ORD. NO, 12284. RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAOES IN
IRAN RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER OF PROPERTY OF
FORMER SHAH OF IRAN
Ex. Ord. No. 12284. Jan. 19. 1981, 46 F.R. 7929. provided:
By the authortty vested in me as President by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, IncludIng
Sectton 203 of the International Emergency Economt
Powers Act (50 U.8.C. 1702). Section 30I of TItle
3of the United States Code, Section 1732 or Ttle 22 of
the United States Code, and Sect!on 30I of the National
Emergencies A6t (50 U.8.C. 1632). In view of the conttnulns
unusual and extraordinary threat to the attonal
security. foreign policy and economy of the
Dnlted States upon which I based my declarations of
nattonal emergency n Executive Order 12170 {set out
above], Issued November 14, 1979, and In Executive
Order 12211 [set out above]. Issued Apr 17. 1980. Lr
order to Implement agreements with the Government
of Iran. as reflected In Declarations of the Government
of the Democrat! and Popular Republic of Agra
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the release of U.S
diplomats and nationals being held as hostages and to
the resolution of clams of United States nationals
against Iran, and to begin the process of normalizatJon
of relations between tho United States and Iran, 1t 1s
hereby ordered that as of the effective date of this
Order:
1-101. For the purpose of protecting the rights of I1tiants
in courts within the United States, all property
and assets located in the United States within the control
of the estate of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the
former Shah of Iran, or any close relative of the former
Shah served as a defendant In litigation In such courts
brought by Iran seeking the return of property alleged
to belong to Iran, Is hereby bocked as to each such esfate
or person untLl all such Itlgatlon against such estate
or person ts finally terminated.
1-102 The Secretary of the Treasury ls authorized
and directed (a) to promulgate regulations requiring all
persons who are subject to the Jurisdiction of the
United States and who, as of November 3, 1979, Or As of
this date, have actual or constructive possession of
property of the kind described In Section 1-101, or
knowledge of sch possession by others, to report such
possession or knowledge thereof, to the Secretary of
the Treasury In accordance with such regulations and
(b) to make available to the Government of Iran or 1ts
designated agents all Identifying Information derived
from such reports to the fullest extent permitted by
law. Such reports shall be required as to al] Individuals
described In 1-10l and shall be required to be fled withfn
30 days after publication of a notice In the Federal
Register.
1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury fs author{zed
and directed (a) to require all agencfes wthin the Executtve
Branch of the United States Government to deIver
to the Secretary all official financial books and
records which serve to Identify any property of the
kind described In Section 1-101 of this Order, and (b) to
make available to the Government of Iran or Lt8 desgnated
aonts all identifying Information derived from
such books and records to the fullest extent permitted
by law.
I-104. The Attorney General of the Unfted States hAvIng
advised the President of his opinon that no claim
on behalf of the Government of Iran for recovery of
property of the kind described In Section 1-101 of this
Order should be considered legally barred ether by overelgn
immunity principles or by the act of state docrine,
the Attorney General is authorized and directed
to prepare, and upon the request of counsel representng
the Government of Iran to present to the approprlate
court or courts within the United States, s8estions
of Interest reflecting that such Is the poltlon of
the United States. and that It fs also the position of tbe
United States that Irantan decrees and Judgments relattns
to the Assets of the former Shah and the persons
described In Section 1-101 should be enforced by such
courts In accordance with United States law.
1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury ls delegated and
authorized to exorcise all functions vested In the Presldent
by the International Emeroncy Economic Powers
A0t (50USC. 170I et seq.) to carry out the purposes of
this Order.
1-106. 22ls Order shall be effective Immediately.
JIMMY CARTER.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12285
Ex. Ord. No. 122785. Jan. 19, 1981. 46 F.R. 7931, As
amended by Ex. Ord. N. 12307, June 4, 1981, 46 F.R
Annex 36
Page 191 TITLE 50 WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 1701
30483: Ex. Ord. No. 12317, AUR. 14, 1981, 46 F.R. 42241,
which established the Pres!dent's Commission on Hoage
Compensation and provided for Its membership
functions, etc., was revoked by Er. Ord. No. 12379, 421,
Aug. 17, 1982, 47 F.R. 36100, set out as a note under secton
14 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act In the
Append!x to TItle 5, Government Organtzatfon and Employees.
EX. ORD NO. 12294. SUSPENSION OF LITIGATION AGAINST
LRAN
Ex Ord. NO. 12294. Feb. 24, 1981, 46 F.R. 14111, provided:
By the authority vested fn me s Pres\dent by the
Constitution and statutes of the Unted States, 1ncludng
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economte
Powers A&t (50 U.8.0. 1702), Section 301 of TILe
3 of the Unltd States Code, Section 1732 of TItle 22 of
the United States Code, and Section 30 of the NaAtLoaA]
Emergencies Act (50 U.8.C. 1631), In view of the continutng
unusual and extraordinary threat to the nattonal
security, foreign policy and economy of the
United States upon which were based the declarations
of national emergency In Executive Order N. 12170, 1sued
November I4, 1979 [set out above]. and In Executtve
Order No. 12211, Issued Apr 17, 1980 {set out
above]. In light of the agreement wIth the Government
of Iran, as reflected In the Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republt¢ of Algerla
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the release of
Unted States diplomats and nationals being held as
hostages and to the resolution of claims of Un!ted
States nationals against Iran, In order to Implement
Article II of the Declaration of Alerta concerning the
settlement of claims and to begin the process of normaltzation
of relations between the United States and
Iran, t Is hereby ordered that as of the effective date
of this Order:
SECTION I. All claims which may be presented to the
Iran-United States CIA'ms Tribunal under the terms of
Article II of the Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria ConcernIng
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the
United States of America and tbe Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and all claims for equitable or
other Judicial relief n connection w1th such claims, are
hereby suspended, except as they may be presented to
the Tribunal. Daring the period of this suspension, al
such claims shall have no legal effect In any action now
pending In any court of the United States, inclading
the courts of any state or any locality thereof, the Distrit
of Columbla and Puerto Rico, or In any action
commenced in any such court after the effective date of
thts Order. Nothing In this action precludes the commencement
of an action after the effective date of this
Order for the purpose of tolling the period of 1mttations
for commencement of such act!on.
SEC, 2. Nothing fn this Order shall require dismissal
of any action for want of prosecution.
SEC. 3. Suspension under this Order of a claim or A
portion thereof submitted to the Iran-United States
Claims Tr[bnA! for adjudication shall terminate upon
a determination by the Tribunal that It does not have
Jurisdiction over such clam or such portion thereof.
SEC. 4. A determination by the Iran-United States
Claims Trfbanal on the merits that a claimant fs not
entitled to recover on a claim shall operate as a fnal
resolution and discharge of the claim for all purposes,
A determination by the Tr!banal that a claimant shall
have recovery on a claim in a specified amount shall
operate as a final resolution and discharge of the claim
for all purposes upon payment to the claimant of the
full amount of the award, Including any Interest awarded
by the Tribunal.
SEO. 5. Nothing In this Order shal apply to any claim
concerning the valdtty or payment of a standby letter
of credit, performance or payment bond or other simtlar
instrument
SEC. 6. Nothng tn this Order shall prohibit the assertfon
of a counterclaim or set-off by a Unted States pattonal
In any Judicial proceeding pending or hereafter
commenced by the Government of Iran, any political
subdivision of Iran, or any agency, Instrumentality. or
entity controlled by the Government of Iran or any pottcal
subdivision thereof.
SE0. 7, The Secretary of the Treasury Is authorized to
employ all powers granted to me by the International
Emergency Economie Powers At [this chapter] and by
220.$.0.41732 to carry out the purposes of this Order.
SEO. 8 Executive Order Nos. 12276 through 12285 of
January 19, 1981 [set out above]. are ratified.
This Order shall be effective Immediately and copies
shall be transmitted to the Congress.
RONALD REAGAN
EXECUTTVE ORDER NO. 12444
Er. Ord. N. 12444, Oct. 14, 1983, 48 F.R. 48215. which
continued effectiveness of the Export Administration
A¢t of 1979, 50 App. U.S.C. 2401 et seq.. and of orders.
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, was revoked
by Ex. Ord No. 12451, De6. 20, 1983, 48 F.R. 56563,
set out below.
EX. ORD. NO. 12451. CONTINUATION OF EXPORT CONTROL
REGULATIONS
Ex. Ord. No. 12451. De, 20, 1983. 48 F.R. 56563, provlded:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Const/tut1on and laws of the United States of Amer\Ca,
fncluding section 203 of the International Emergency
Eonomte Powers Aet (50 U.$.C. 1702) (hereinafter re(
erred to as "IEEPA"), 22 U.8.0. 287¢, and the Export
Admtntstration Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.8.C. App.
2401 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act), ft 1g
hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION I. In vfew of the extension by Public Law
9e-207 (December 5, 1983) [amending 50 App. U.8 C. 2419].
of the author!tes contained In the Aot, Executive
Order N0. 12444 of October 14, 1983, which continued fn
effect export control regulations under IEEPA, Is revoked,
and the declaration of economic emergency Is
rescinded.
SEC. 2. 'The rev0Catton of Executive Order N6. 12444
shall not affect any violation of any rules, regulations,
orders. licenses and other forms of administrative a¢tIon
under that Order which occurred during the period
that Order was In effect. All rules and regulations Issued
or continued In effect under the authority of the
IEEPA and that Order, Including those published fn
Title 15, Chapter III. Subchaptaer C, of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Parts 368 to 399 Inclusive, and all orders,
regulations, licenses and other forms of administrative
actton tssued, taken or continued In effect parsuant
thereto, shall remain In full force and effect, as
if issued, taken or continued in effect pursuant to the
Act untAl amended or revoked by the proper authority.
Nothing in this Order shall affect the continued appitcab!
Itt of the provfston for tbre administration of the
Act and delegations of authority set forth in Executive
Order No. 12002 o July 7, 1977 and Executive Order No.
12214 0f May 2, 1980 (50 App. U.$.C. 2403 note).
SEc. 3. All orders, licenses. and other forms of adminfstrative
action Issued, taken or continued In effect
pursuant to the authority of the IEEPA and Executive
Order No 12444 relating to the administration of sectton
38(e) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2778(e)) shall remain n full force and effect utLl
amended or revoked under proper authority.
SE. 4. This Order shal take effect immediately.
RONALD REAGAN.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12470
Ex Ord No. 12470, Mar. 30, 1984, 49 F.R. 13099, which
continued effectiveness of the Export Administration
At of 1979, 50 App. U.8.C. 2401 et seq. and of the orders,
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, was revoked
by Ex. Ord. No. 12525, July 12, 1985. 50 F.R. 28757,
set out below.
Continuation of emergency declared by Ex. Ord. No.
12470 was contained in Notice of the President of the
United States. dated Mar. 28. 1985, 50 F.B. 12513.
Annex 36
$170 TITLE 50-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 192
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12513
Ex. Ord. No. 12513, May 1, 1985, 50 F.R. 18629. whtch
prohblted trade and certain other transact!ons volng
Nicaragua, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No 12707, Mar
13, 1990.55F.R. 9707, set out below.
Continatlons of national emer&ency declared by Ex.
Ord. No. 12513 were contained In the following:
Notice of the President of the Unfted States, dated
Apr. 21, 1989. 54 F.R 1TTOL.
Notice of the President of the United States. dated
Apr. 25, 1988, 53 F.R. 15011.
Notice of the President of the Unfted States, dated
Apr 21, 1987,52 F.R. 13425.
Notice of the President of the United States, dated
Apr. 22. 1986. 51 F R. 15461.
EX. ORD. NO, 12525. TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY
AUTHORITY FOR EXPORT CONTROLS
Ex. Ord. N. 12525. July 12, 1985, 50 F.R. 28757, provided:
By the authority vested in me as Pres!dent by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America,
Including section 203 of the International Emergency
Economte Powers Act (50 U.8.0. 1702 (hereinafter referred
to as "IEEPA"), 22 U.S.C. 287¢. And the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended ($0 U.S.C. App.
240l et sea.) (hereinafter referred to as "the Aet") It Is
hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION I. In view of the extension by Publlc Law
99-64 (ly 12, 1985) [amending 50 App. U.S.0. 2419] of
the authorities contained in the Act, Executive Order
No. 12470 of March 30, 1984, which continued fn effect
export control regulations under IEEPA, Is revoked.
and the declaration of economic emergency ls resclnded.
SEC. 2, 'Te revocation of Executive Order No. 12470
shall not affect any violation of any rules, regulations,
orders. licenses, and other forms of administrative Act!
on under that Order tbat occurred daring the period
that Order was in effect. Al rules and regulations Issued
or continued In effect under the authority of the
IEEPA And that Order, Including those published Lr
TI±le 15, Chapter III. Subchapter C, of the Code of Federa}
Regulations, Parts $68 to 399 inclusive, and all orders.
regulations. licenses. and other forms of administrat[
ve act!on issued, taken or continued in effect parsuant
thereto, shall remain [n ful force and effect, as
If issued, taken or continued In effect pursuant to and
as authorized by the Act or by other appropriate atthority
until amended or revoked by the proper authorty.
Nothing In this Order shall affect the continued applicabflttsy
of the provision for the administration of
tbe Act and delegations of authority set forth In Executve
Order No. 12002 of July 7, 1977, and Executive Order
No. 12214 of May 2, 1980 [set out under 50 App. U.S.C
2403].
SEC, 3. AI rules. regulations. orders. lcenses, and
other forms of administrative action issued. taken or
continued In effect pursuant to the authority of the
IEEPA and Executive Order No. 12470 relating to the
administration of Section 38(¢) of the ArmS EXpOrt
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(8)) shall remain in full force
and effect until amended or revoked under proper authortty.
SE¢ 4. This Order shall take effect Lmmedlately.
RONALD REAOAN,
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12532
Ex. Ord. No. 12532. Sept. 9. 1985, 50 F.R. 36861, whtch
prohibited trade and certain other transactions Involvng
South Afr!ca. was revoked by EE. Ord. No, 12769.44,
July 10, 1991, 56 F.R. 31855, set out as a note under sectton
506l o TItle 22. Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
Continuation of national emerenoy declared by Ex.
Ord. No. 12532 was contained In Notice of the President
of the United States. dated Sept. 4, 1986. 51 F.R. 31925.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12535
Ex. Ord. N0. 12535, 0t. 1. 1985, 50 F.R. 40325, which
prohibited Importation Into United States of South African
Krugerrands, was revoked by EX Ord. No. 12769,
$4. July 10, 1991, 56 F.R. 31855, set out as a note under
section 506I of T[tle 22. Forelgn Relations and Intercourse.
EX. ORD. NO. 12543. PROHIBITING 'TRADE AND CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING LIBYA
Ex. Ord. No. 12543. Jan. 7, 1986. S1 F.R. 875, provided:
By the authority vested fn me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America.
Including the International Emergency Ecorom!¢ Powers
Act ($0 US.C. 170I et seq.), the National Emergenctes
At (50 U.$.C. 1601 et seq.), sections 504 and 505
of the International Security and Development Cooperation
Act of 1985 (Public Law 8939) (22 U.S.C.
2349a.a-8, 2349a.a-9]. sectton 1114 of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958. As amended (49 U 8.. 1514) [now 49 U.S.C.
40106(b)]. and sectton 301 of title 3 of the Untted States
Code.
I. RONALD REAGAN, Pres!dent of the United States
of America, Ind that the pollctes and actions of the
Government of Libya constitute an unusual and oxtraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign
poltoy of the United States and hereby declare a natonal
emergency to deal with that throat.
I hereby order'
SETTON L. The follow1pg are prohibited, except to the
extent provided In regulations which may hereafter be
issued pursuant to this Order:
(a) The tmport into the United States of any oods or
services of LAbyan origin, other than publications and
materials Imported for news publications or news
broadcast dissemination;
(b) The export to LfbyA of any roods. technology (Lncluding
techntoal data or other Information) or services
from the United States. ex0opt publtcattons and donattons
of articles Intended to relieve human suffering.
such as food, clothing, medicine and medical suppl!es
Intended strictly for medical purposes;
to) An transaction by a Un!tad States person relatIns
to transportation to or from Ltbya; the provision of
transportation to or from the United States by any
Ltbyan person or any vessel or aircraft of L4byan restration;
or the sale fn the United States by any peron
holding authority under the Federal Aviation Act
(of 1958. now 49 U.$.C. 4001 et seq.] of any transportat/
on by air which Includes any stop In Libya;
(d The purchase by any United States person of
goods for export from Ltbya to any country;
(e) The performance by any United States person of
any contract in support of an industrial or other commercal
or governmental project In Ltbya;
() The grant or extension of credits or loans by any
United States person to the Government of LAbya. ts
instrumentalities and controlled entitles;
(8) Any transaction by a United States person relateIng
to travel by any United States citizen or permanent
resident aten to Libya, or to activities by any such
person within LAbya, after the date of thts Order, other
than transactions necessary to effect such person's de
parture from LAbya, to perform a0ts permitted until
February 1, 1986, by Section 3 of this Order, or travel
for Journalistic activity by persons regularly employed
in such capacity by a newsgathering organization; and
h) An transaction by any United States person
which evades or avolds, or has the purpose of evading
or avoiding. any of the prohibitions set forth in this
Order,
For purposes of thts Order. the term United States
person" means any United States citizen, permanent
resident alien. Juridical person organized under the
laws of the United States or any person In the United
States.
SE. 2. In' Ight of the prohibition in Section 1(a) of
this Order, section 251 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, es amended (19 U.$.G. 1881). and sect!on 126 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended (9 U.S.0. 2136) wLlI have
no effect with respect to L1bya.
SEC. 3. This Order s effective mmedlately, except
that the prohibitions set forth n Sectton 1(a), (b), (0)
Annex 36
Page 193 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
(d) and (e) shall apply as of 120! a.m. Eastern Standard
TLme. FebruAry 1, 1986.
SEC.4. The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultatton
wIth the Secretary of State. is hereby authorized to
take such actions. Including the promulgation of rules
and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Order. Such actions may Include prohtbtttng
or regulating payments or transfers of any
property or any transactions Involving the transfer of
anything of economic ahue by any United States person
to the Government of Lfbya. Its instrumental[ties
and controlled entitles, or to any Ltbyan national or
entity owned or controlled, directly or Indirectly, by
Lfbya or Lbyan nationals. The Secretary may redelegate
any of these functions to other officers and agencles
of the Federal government. All agencies of the
Un!ted States government are directed to take all approprlate
measures within their authority to carry out
the provisions of this Order, Including the suspension
or termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect
as of the date of this Order.
This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published In the Federal Register.
RONALD REAOAN,
CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMEOENCY DECLARED BY
EX. ORD NO. 12543
Notice of President of the United States, dated Dec.
22. 1994.59 F.R. 67119, provided:
On January 7. 1986, by Executive Order N6. 12543 [set
out above], President Reagan declared a nattonal emergency
to deal with the unusual and extraordinary
threat to the atonal security and foreign poltoy of
the United States constituted by the actions and pollcies
of the Government of Ltbya. On January 8, 1986, by
Executive Order N6. 12544 [set out below), the President
took additional measures to block LIbyan assets In the
United States. The President has transmtted a notice
continuing this emergency to the Congress and the
Federal RRegister every year since 1986.
The crisis between the United States and Lbya that
led to the declaration of a national emergency on January
7, 1986, has not been resolved. The Government of
Ltbya bas continued Its actions and policies In support
of terrorism, despite the calls by the United Nations
Security Councn, In Resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992),
and 883 (1993) that It demonstrate by concrete actions
Its renunciation of such terrorism. Such Lfbyan actions
and policies pose A continuing unusual and extraordnary
threat to the national security and vital foreign
policy Interest of the United States. For these reasons,
the nattonal emergency declared on January 7, 1986,
and the measures adopted on January 7 and January 8,
1986, to deal with that emergency, must continue in etfect
beyond January 7, 1995. Therefore, n accordance
with section 202( of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.$.6. 1622()),I am continutrg the national emergency
with respect to Ltbya. This notice shall be published In
the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.
WILLIAM J. CLANTON.
Prtor continuations of national emergency declared
by Ex. Ord. No. 12543 were contained In the following:
Notice of President of the Untted States, dated Dec.
2, 1993. 58 F.R. 64361.
Notice of Pres!dent of the United States, dated Dec.
14, 1992, ST F.R. 59895.
Notice of Pres\dent of the United States, dated Dec.
26. 1991. 56 F.R. 67465
Notice of the President of the United States, dated
Jan. 2, 1991.56 F.R. 477.
Notice of the President of the United States, dated
Jan. 4, 1990,55 F.R. 589.
Notice of the President of the United States, dated
Dec. 28, 1988, 63F.R 62971.
Notice of the President of the United States, dated
Dec. 15, 1987,62 F.R. 47891.
Notice of the Pres!dent of the United States, dated
Dec. 23. 1986. 51 F R. 46849.
EX. ORD. NO, 12544. BLOCKING LIBYAN GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES OR HELD BY U.S.
PERSONS
Ex Ord. No. 12544, Jan 8, 1986, 5 F.R. 1235, provided:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Including
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.s.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50
US.. 1601 et seq.) and section 3I of title 3 of the
United States Code, In order to take steps with respect
to Lfbya additional to those set forth In Executive
Order N. 12543 of January 7, 1986 [set out above], to
deal with the threat to the national security and foregn
poltoy of the United States referred to in that
Order,
I. RONALD REAGAN, Pres!dent of the United States.
hereby order blocked all property and Interests In property
of the Government of Llbya, Its agenctes. Instrumentalities
and controlled entities and the Central
Bank of Lfbya that Are In the United States, that here.
after come within the United States or that are or
hereafter come within the possession Or Control of U.S
persons, Including overseas branches of U.S persons.
The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultatton with
the Secretary of State, is authorized to employ all powers
granted to me by the International Emer&ency Economis
[ste] Power[s] Act, 50 U S.¢. 1TOI et seq.. to carry
out the provisions of this Order.
This Order Is effective Immediately and shall be
transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federa
Register.
RONALD REAGAN.
EX. ORD. NO, 12613. PROHIBITING IMPORTS FROM IRAN
Ex. Ord. No. 12613. Oct. 29, 1987, 52 F R. 41940, provlded:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America,
Lncluding section 505 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C
2349a.a-9), and section 3o1 of TIte 3 of the United States
Code,
I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States
of America, find that the Government of Iran Is a¢tively
supporting terrorism as an Instrument of state
polloy. In add!ton, Iran has conducted aggressive and
unlawful military action against U.S.-flag vessels and
merchant vessels of other non-belligerent nations engaged
fn lawful and peaceful commerce n International
waters of the Pers!an Gulf and territorial waters of
non-belligerent natons of that region. To ensure that
United States Imports of Iranian goods and services
will not contribute financial support to terrorism or to
farther aggressive actions against non-belligerent shipping,
Ihereby order that:
SECTION I. Except as otherwise provided In regulations
Issued pursuant to this Order. no goods or servIces
of Iranian origin may be Imported Into the United
States, Including Its territories and possessions, after
the effective date of this Order.
SEO. 2. The prohtbItion contained An Section I shall
not apply to:
(a) ranan-origin publications and materials Imported
for news publications or news broadcast dissemination;
(b) petroleum products refined from Iranan crude oll
In a third country;
(0) articles Imported directly from Iran into the
United States that were exported from Iran prior to the
effective date of this Order,
SEO. 3. Tls Order shall take effect at 1201 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time on October 29, 1987, except as other.
wise provided in regulations Issued pursuant to this
Order.
SEO. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultation
wt.h the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to
take such actions, Including the promulsaton of rules
and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Order. he Secretary of the Treasury
Annex 36
$1701 TITLE 50-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 194
may redelegate any of these functions to other officers
and agencies of the Federal Government. All agencies
of the United Stat Government re directed to take
all appropriate measures within their authority to
carry out the provisions of this Order, Including the
suspension or termination of licenses or other authorlzattons
In effect as of the date of this Order.
SEC. 5, 'The measures taken pursuant to thts Order
are In response to the actions of the Government of
Iran referred to above. occurring after the conclusion of
the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are Intended solely as a
response to those actions.
Thi Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published In the Federal Register.
RONALD REAOAN.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO, 12635
Ex. Ord N. 12635, ADr. 8, 1988. 53 F.R. 12134, which
blocked property and interests In property of the Government
of Panama that were In the United States, was
revoked by Ex. Ord. NO. 12710. ADE. 5, 1990, 5 F.R. 13099,
set out below.
Continuation of natonal emergency declared by Er.
Ord No. 12635 was contained In Notice of the President
of the United States, dated Apr. 6, 1989, 54 F.R. 14197.
Ex. ORD. NO. 12707. TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY WTH
RESPECT TO NICARAGUA
Ex. Ord. No. 12707, Mar. 13. 1990. 55 F.R. 9707, proIded.
By the authority vested fn me as Pres!dent by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers
A0t (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emerenc!
es A0t (50 U.S.0. 1601 et sea.), chapter 12 of title 50
of the United States Code (50 U.S.C. 191 et seq.). and secton
30 of title 3 of the United States Code.
I. GEORGE BUSH. President of the United States of
Amer!ca, find that the February 25, 1990, democratic
election [n Nicaragua has ended the unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign
poltoy of the United States previously posed by the
poltcles and actions of the Sandinista government In
that country, and the need to continue the national
emenency declared In Executive Order No. 12513 of
May 1, 1985. to deal with that threat
I hereby revoke Executive Order No. 12513 and termnate
the national emenenoy declared in that order
with respect to Nicaragua.
Pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies
Act (50 U.S.C. 1622). termination of the national emerency
with respect to Nicaragua shall not affect an
action taken or proceeding pending and not finally concluded
or determined at the effective date of this order.
or any action or proceeding based on any act committed
prior to the effective date of this order, or any
rights or duties that matured or ponaltles that were 1ncurred
prior to the effective date of this order.
This order shall take effect immediately.
GEOROE BUSH.
EX. ORD. NO. 12710. TERMINATION OF EMEROENe WT¥
RESPECT TO PANAMA
EE. OrN. NO. 12710, ADE. 5. 1990, 55.F.R. 13099. provided:
By the authority vested in me as Presdent by the
Constitution And laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers
At (50 U.8.C. 170I et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as
·IEEPA"), the NatIOAaA! Emergenctes Act (50 U.8.C
1601 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as "the NEA"),
chapter 12 of title 50 of the United States Code (50
U.8.C. 191 et seq.). and sectton 301 of title 3 of the Unted
States Code.
I. GEORGE BUSH, Pres!dent of the United States of
America, find that the restoration of a democratically
elected government [n Panama has ended the unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, forel@
polloy, and economy of the United States prevlously
posed by the policies and actions of Manuel Anton!
o Noriega In that country, And the need to continue
the national emergenoy declared In Executive Order
No. 12635 of Apr\l 8, 1988, to deal with that threat.
I hereby revoke Executive Ordr N. 1263 and term!nate
the national emergency declared In that order
with respect to Panama.
Pursuant to section 202 of the NEA (50 U.$.C. 1622).
termination of the national emergency with respect to
Panama shall not affect any action taken or proceeding
pending not finally concluded or determined as of the
effective date of this order. or any action or proceeding
based on any act committed prior to the effective date
of this order, or any rights or duties that matured or
penalties that were incurred prtor to the effective date
of this order. Pursuant to section 27 (50 U.8.C. 1706) of
IEEPA. I hereby determine that the continuation of
prohibitions with regard to transactions Involving
property In which the Government of Panama has an
Interest Is necessary on account of clams Involving
Panama.
This order shall take effect fmmedlately.
GEORGE BUSH.
EX. ORD. NO. 12722. BLOCKING IRAQI GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY AND PROHIBITTN TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAQ
Ex. Ord. No, 12722. A&. 2. 1990. 55 F.R. 31803. provided:
By the authority vested In me as Pres!dent by the
constitution and laws of the United States of America.
ncludtng the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 US.C. 1701 et seq.). the National Emerenctes
Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 30I of
title 3 of the United States Code.
I. GEORGE BUSH, Pres!dent of the United States of
America, find that the policies and actions of the Goverment
of Iraq constitute an unusual and extraordnary
threat to the national security and foreign policy
of the United States and hereby declare a national
emergenoy to deal with that threat.
I hereby order:
SECTION L. AI property and Interests In property of
the Government of Iraq, its agencies, Instrumentalities
and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iraq
that are In the United States. that hereafter come
wthin the United States or that are or hereafter come
within the possess'on or control of United States persons,
Including their overseas branches, are hereby
blocked.
SECTION 2. The following are prohibited. except to the
extent provided In regulations which may hereafter be
tssued pursuant to this Order:
(a) The Import into the Unfted States of any goods or
services of Iraqi origin. other than publications and
other nformatonal materials;
(b) The export to Iraq of any goods, technology (Ircludtng
technical data or other Information controlled
for export pursuant to Section 5 of the Export Admtntstraton
A0t (50 U.SC App. 2404)) or services from tbe
Uzlted States, except publications and other tnform#tonal
materials, and donations of articles fntended to
relieve human suffering. such as food, clothing. med±clne
and medical supplies Intended strictly for medical
purposes;
(e) Any transaction by A Uzted States person relatIng
to transportation to or from Iraq; the provision of
transportation to or from the United States by any
Iraq1 person or any vessel or aircraft of Iraq! registratton;
or the sale In the United States by any person
holding authority under the Federal Avtatton At of
1958, as amended [now 49 U.$.0. 40101 et se4 )] (49 U.8..
15I4). of any transportation by air which Includes any
stop In Iraq:
(d The purchase by any United States person of
Roods for export from Iraq to any country;
(e) The performance by any United States pern of
any contract n support of an industrial or other commerohal
or governmental project In Iraq
(0 The mat or extenslon of aredits or loans by any
United States person to the Government of Iraq. Its instrumentalities
and controlled entities;
(g) Any transaction by a United States person relateIng
to travel by any United States citizen or permanent
Annex 36
Page 195 TITLE SO-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
resident alien to Iraq, or to activities by any such person
within Iraq, after the date of this Order, other than
transactions necessary to effect such person's departure
from Iraq, or travel for Journalistic activity by
persons regularly employed fn such capacity by a newsat.
hering organization; and
(h) Any transact!on by any United States person
which evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading
or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth In this
Order.
For purposes of this Order. the term "United States
person" means any United States citizen, permanent
resident alien, Juridical person organized under the
laws of the United States, or any person n the United
States.
SECTION 3. This Order Is effective immediately.
SECTION 4. The Secretary of the Treasury. In consultatton
with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorzed
to take such actions, Including the promulgation
of rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this Order. Such actions may 1nclude
prohibiting or regulating payments or transfers
of any property or any transactions Involving the
transfer of anything of economic value by any United
States person to the Government of Iraq, Its fnstrumentalities
and controlled entities, or to any Iraq! natonal
or entity owned or controlled, directly or tnd±rectly,
by Iraq or Iraq! nationals, The Secretary may
redelegate any of these functions to other officers and
agencies of the Federal government. All agencies of the
United States government are directed to take all approprlate
measures within their authority to carry out
the provisions of th!s Order, Including the suspension
or termination of licenses or other authorizations In effoct
as of the date of this Order.
Thi Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published In the Federal Register.
GEORGE BUSH.
Ex. Ord No. 12722 was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12724.
$6, Aug 9, 1990, 55 F.R. 33090, set out below, to the extent
Inconsistent with Ex. Ord. NO. 12724.]
CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY
EX. ORD. NO 12722
Notice of President of the United States, dated July
19. 1994, 59 F.R. 37151, provided:
On August 2, 1990, by ExCutive Order No. 12722 [set
out above]. President Bush declared a national emergenoy
to deal wIth the unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign policy of
the United States constituted by the actions and pollctes
of the Government of Iraq. By Executive Orders
Nos. 12722 of August 2, 1990. and 12724 of Aust 9, 1990
[set out below], Pres!dent Bush Imposed trade sanctlons
on Iraq and blocked Iraql government assets. Because
the Government of Ira has continued 1ts activ!ties
hostle to United States Interests In the Middle
East, the national emergency declared on August 2,
1990, and the measures adopted on A&ust 2 and August
9, 1990. to deal wIth that emergency must continue In
effect beyond August 2, 1994. Therefore, In accordance
wIth sectton 202(d) of the National Emergences Act (50
U.$.. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency
with respect to Ira.
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register
and transmitted to the Congress.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
Prior cont[nuatons of national emergency declared
by Ex. Ord. No 12722 were contained In the following:
Notice of President of the United States, dated July
20, 1993, 68 F.R. 39111.
Notice of President of the United States, dated July
21, 1992, ST F.R. 32875.
Notice of Pres\dent of the United States, dated July
26, 1991, 56 F.R. 35995.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12723
Ex. Ord. No. 12723. Au&. 2, 1990, 65 F.R. 31805. which 1rected
Secretary of the Treasury to block all property
and Interests n Kuwaiti Government property that are
tn the United States or within possess!on Or Control of
United States persons, was revoked by EX. Ord. No.
12771. Jul 25, 1991. 56 F.R. 35993, set out below.
EX. ORD. NO. 12724. BLOCKING IRAQI GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAQ
Ex. Ord. No. 12724, AS. 9, 1990, 55 F.R 33089, provided:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of Amer!ca,
Including the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.. 1701 et seq.) the National Emergenctes
Act (50 U.8.C. 1601 et seq.) section 30I of title 3
of the United States Code. and the Ur±tAd Nations Partic1patio
Act (22 U.S.C. 287 et se0.] (22 U.$.C. 2870), 1n
view of United Nat!ons Security Counell Resolution No.
661 of August 6, 1990, and In order to take additional
steps with respect to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait and the
national emergency declared In Executive Order No.
12722 {set out above]
I, GEORGE BUSH. Pres!dent of the United states of
America. hereby order
SECTION L. Exept to the extent provided In regulatfons
that may hereafter be issued pursuant to this
order. all property and Interests In property of the Government
of Iraq that are In the United States, that
hereafter come within the United States, or that are or
hereafter come within the possession or control of
United States persons, Including their overseas
branches, Are hereby blocked
SE¢ 2 The followins are prohibited, except to the extent
provided In regulations that may hereafter be fssued
pursuant to this order:
(a) The Importation Into the United States of any
goods or services of Iraq! origin. or any activity that
promotes or Is Intended to promote such importation;
(b) The exportation to Iraq, or to any entity operated
from Iraq, or owned or controlled by the Government of
Iraq, directly or Indirectly, of any goods, technology
(including technical data or other Information), or
services either (D from the United States, or (ii) requirIng
the issuance of a license by a Federal agency, or
any activity that promotes or ls Intended to promote
such exportation, except donations of articles Intended
to relieve human suffering. such as food and supplies
Intended strictly for medical purposes;
(0) An dealing by a United States person related to
property of Iraqi origin exported from Iraq after August
6. 1990. or property ntended for exportation from
Iraq to any country, or exportation to Iraq from any
country, or any activity of any kind that promotes or
s tended to promote such dealing;
(d An transacton by a Unfted States person relatIng
to travel by any United States citizen or permanent
resident alien to Iraq. or to activities by any such person
within Iraq. after the date of this order. other than
transactons necessary to effect (D) such person's depar.
ture from Iraq. (D) travel and activittes for the conduct
of the officla business of the Federal Government or
the United Nations, or (It) travel for JournaltstI activtty
by persons regularly employed In such capacity by
a news-gathering organization;
(e) Any transaction by a United States person relatIng
to transportation to or from Iraq; the provision of
transportation to or from the United States by any
Iraqi person or any vessel or aircraft of Iraqi registration;
or the sale In the United States by any per8On
holding authority under the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, as amended (49 U.8.0. 1301 et seq.) [now 49 U.8.C
4010I et sea.], of any transportation by air that Includes
any stop In Iraq:
(f The performance by any United States person of
any contract, Including a financing contract. In sapport
of an Industrial, commercial, public uttltty, or
governmental project In Iraq.
(g) Except as otherwise authorized herein, Any commtment
or transfer. direct or Indirect, of funds, or
other financial or economic resources by any Uttd
States person to the Government of Iraq or any other
person In Iraq;
Annex 36
1701 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 196
(h) Any transact4on by any United States person that
evades or avolds, or has the purpose of evading or
avoiding. any of the prohfbtttons set forth in this order.
SEC. 3. For purpOes of this order:
(a) the term "Utted States person" means any
United States cttlzen, permanent resident alen, fur1dtcal
person organized under tho laws of the United
States (including foreign branches), or any person In
the United States, and vessels of U.S. re&lstration.
(b) the term Government of Iraq" Includes the Oovernment
of Iraq, Its agencies, Instrumentalities and
controlled entities, and the Central Bank of Iraq.
SEC. 4. This order Is effective Immediately.
SEC. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultation
wIth the Secretary of State, Is hereby authorized to
take such actions. Including the promulgation of rules
and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of thts order. Such actions may Include proh1biting
or regulating payments or transfers of any
property or any transactions Involving the transfer of
anything of economic value by any United States person
to the Government of Iraq. or to any Iraq! national
or entity owned or controlled, directly or ndirectly, by
the Government of Iraq or Iraq! nationals. The Secrotary
of the Treasury may redelegate any of these
functions to other officors and aencles of the Federal
Government. All agencies of the Federal Government
are directed to take all appropriate measures within
their authority to carry out the provisions of this
order, Including the suspension or termination of Icenses
or other authorizations in effect as of the date
of this order.
SEC. 6. Executive Order N6, 12722 0f August 2, 1990 [set
out above], is hereby revoked to the extent 1nconsistent
with this order. All delegations, rules, regulations,
orders, Licenses, and other forms of administrative a¢tlon
made. Issued. or otherwise taken under Executive
Order No. 12722 and not revoked administratively shall
remain In full force and effect under this order until
amended. mod\fled, or terminated by proper authority.
The revocation of any provision of Executive Order No.
12722 pursuant to thts section shall not affect any violation
of any rules, regulations, orders, licenses, or other
forms of administrative action under that order during
the period that such proviston of that order was In offect.
This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published In the Federal Register
GEORGE BUSH.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO, 12725
Ex. Ord. N. 12725, Ag. 9, 1990, 55 F.R. 33091. which dtrected
Secretary of the Treasury to block all property
and Interests In Kuwait! Government property that are
In the United States or w;thin possession or control of
United States persons and whtch prohibited transactions
wIth Kuwalt. was revoked by EX Ord. No. 12771,
July 25, 1991, 56 F.R. 35993. set out below.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12730
Ex. Ord. N. 12730, Sept. 30, 1990, 55 F.R. 40373. whtcb
continued effectiveness of the Export Administration
A0t 6f 1979, 50 App. U.S.C. 240I et seq., and of the orders,
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, was revoked
by Ex. Ord. NO. 12867, $1, Sept. 80, 1993, 58 F.R.
51747, set out below.
Continuations of national emergency declared by Ex.
Ord. No. 12730 were contained In the following.
Notice of Pres!dent of the United States, dated Sept.
25. 1992.57 F.R. 44649.
Notice of President of the United States. dated Sept.
26. 1991. 56 F.R. 49385.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12735
Ex. Ord. No. 12735. NO. 16, 1990, 55 F.R. 48587, which
declared a natonal omerenoy to deal with threat of
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and
Imposed controls on exports that would assist a country
In developing, stockpiling, deliverins, or using
chemical or biological weapons and associated sanctions,
was revoked by EX. Ord. NO. 12938, $10, Nov. 14,
1994. 59 F.R 59099, set out below
Continuations of national emergency declared by Ex.
Ord. No. 12735 were contained In the following
Notice of President of the United States, dated Nov.
12, 1993, 58 F.R. 60361.
Notice of President of the United States, dated Nov.
11, 1992. 57 F.R. 53979.
Notice of Pres!dent of the United States, dated Nov,
14, 1991, 56 F.R. 58171.
EX. ORD. NO, I2T71. REVOKING EARLIER ORDERS WITH
RESPECT TO KUWAIT
Ex Ord. NO. L2771, July 25, 1991, 56 F.R. 35993, provided:
By the authority vested n me as President by the
Const!tutAon and the laws of the United States of
Amertoa, Including the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C.1701 et seq.), the National
Emergenctes Act (50 U,S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 301 of
title 3 of the United States Code, and United Nations
Participation Act (22 U.s0 287 et Be0.) (22 0.S.C. 287)
I, GEORGE BUSH. President of the United States of
America, flnd that the expulston from Kuwait of Iraq's
occupation forces, the restoration of Kuwait to Its cltizens.
and the reinstatement of the lawful Government
of Kuwait eliminate the need for Executive Order No.
12723 of August 2, 1990, entitled " Blocking Kuwaiti Government
Property," and Executive Order No. 12725 of
Au&uSt 9, 1990, entitled "·Bocking Kuwaiti Government
Property and Proh!biting Transactions WIth Kuwait."
Those orders were Issued to protect the assets of the
Government of Kuwait which were subject to United
States Jurisdiction, and to prevent the transfer of beneflts
by United States persons to Iraq based upon 1ts invas!
on of Kuwait, Those orders also Implemented the
foreign policy and protected the national security of
the United States, In conformity with applicable resoattons
of the United Nations Security CouncnL. Fnlng
continuation of these orders unnecessary. I hereby
order°
SECTION I. Executive Order No 12723 and Executive
Order N, 12725 are hereby revoked. This revocation
shall not affect the national emergency declared In Erecutive
Order No, 12722 [set out above] to deal wIth the
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security
and foreign poltcy of the Unfted States posed by
the poltcles and action of the Government of Iraq.
SEO. 2. This revocation shall not affect:
(a) any action taken or proceeding pending and not fally
concluded or determined on tho effective date of
thts order;
(b) any action or proceeding based on any act committed
prior to the effective date of this order; or
(0) any rights or duties that matured or penalties
that were Incurred prior to the effective date of this
order.
SE0. 3. 'Thi order shall take effect Immediately.
GEOROE BUS.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12775
Ex Ord. No 12775, Oct. 4, 1991,56 F.R. 50641, which declared
a national emergency to deal wth Republic of
Hatti, directed Secretary of Treasury to block all property
and Interests In property of Government of Halt!
that were In United States or within possess1on or contr0l
of United States persons, and prohibited transactions
wIth Halt!, was revoked. and such national
emergency terminated, by Ex. Ord. No. 12932, Oct. 14,
1994, 59 F R. 52403, set out below.
Continuations of national emergency declared by Ex.
Ord. No, 12775 were contained In the follow1ng:
Notice of President of the Unttod States, dated Sept
30, 1994. 59 F.R. 50479.
Notice of President of the United States, dated Sept.
30, 1993. 58 F.R. 51563.
Notice of President of the United States, dated Sept.
$0, 1992. 5T F.R. 45557.
Annex 36
Page 197 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12779
Ex. Ord. No. 12779, 0ct. 28, 1991. 56 F.R. 55975, which
directed Secretary of the Treasury to block all property
and Interests In property of Government of Ha1tl
that were In Un!t6d States or within possession or control
of United States persons and which prohibited
transactions with Halt! and most Imports from and exports
to Haiti, was revoked by Er. Ord. N. 12932. Oct.
14. 1994, 59 F.BR. 52403, set out below.
EX. ORD. NO. 12801. BARRING OVERFLIGHT, TAKEOFF. AND
LANDING OF AIRCRAFT FLING TO OR FROM LIBYA
Ex. Ord. No. 12801, ADE. 15, 1992, ST FR. 14319. provided:
By the author!ty vested In me as Pres!dent by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, Including the International Emergency Economte
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq.), the National
Emergencies Act (5 U.$.C. 1601, et seq ). section 1114 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. as amended (49 U.$ C.
App. 1514) [now 49 U $.C. 401060b)]. section 5 of the
United Nations Participation Act 0 1945, as amended
(22 U.S.C 2870), and section $01 of title 3 of the United
States Code, In view of United Nations Security Courell
Resolutions Nos, 73I of January 21, 1992, and 748 of
March 31, 1992, and In order to take additional steps
with respect to Ltbya's continued support for International
terrorism and the national emergency declared
n Executive Order N0. 12543 of January 7, 1986
[set out above]. It Is hereby ordered that:
SECTION L. Except to the extent provided fn regulatons.
orders, directives, authorizations. or licenses
that may hereafter be Issued pursuant to this order,
and notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations
conferred or Imposed by any International
agreement or any contract entered Into or any license
or permit granted before the effective date of this
order. the granting of permlsston to any alrcraft to
take off from. land tn, or overfly the United States. ff
the aircraft, as part of the same flight or as a contintatton
of that flight, Is destined to land In or has taken
off from the territory of LAba, Is hereby prohtbfted.
s0.2. The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultation
wIth the Secretary of Transportation, Is hereby authorzed
to take such actions. Including the promulgation
of rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of section I of this order. The Secretary
of the Treasury may redelegate the authority
set forth In this order to other officers In the Department
of the Treasury and may confer or Impose such
authority upon any other offer of the United States,
wIth the consent of the head of the department or ageno
wthin which such officer Is serving. All executive
branch agenotes of the Federal Government hereby affected
are directed to consult as appropriate on the Amplementatton
of this order and to take all necessary
measures within their authority to carry out the prov!stons
of this order, Including the suspension or termtnation
of licenses or other authorizations In effect as of
the date of this order.
SEO. 3. Nothing contalned fn this order shall confer
any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any
person or organization, enforceable against the United
States, Its Agencies or Instrumental[t/es, Its officers, or
ts employees.
SEO, 4 Th's order fs effective 11.59 p.m. eastern daysht
time, Apr1 15, 1992.
SEC. 5. This order shall be transmitted to the Congress
and published In the Federal Register.
GEOROE BUSH.
EX. ORD. NO. 12808. BLOCKING ""YUGOSLAV GOvERNMET"
PROPERTY AND PROPERTY OF GOVERNMENTS OF SERBIA
AND MONTENEGRO
Ex. Ord. N6. 12808. May 30. 1992, ST FR.R. 23299. provfded:
By the authority vested in me as Pres!dent by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America. Including the InternatIota! Emergency Eonomte
Powers Act (50 U.8.0. 1701, et seq.) the National
Emergences At (50 U.S.0. 1601. et seq.) and section 30L
of title 3 of the United States Code,
I. GEORGE BUSH. President of the United States of
America. find that the actions and policies of the Governments
of Serbia and Montenegro. acting under the
name of the Socialist Federal RRepubltc of Yugoslavia
or the Federal Republte of Yugoslavta, In thetr Involve.
ment fn and support for groups attempting to sele territory
In Croatta and Bosnia-Hercegovins by force and
violence at[ltzins, in part, the forces of the so-called
Yugoslav National Army, constitute an unusual and extraordnary
threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States. and hereby
declare a pattonal emergenoy to deal with that threat.
I hereby order:
SECTION L. Except to the extent provided in regulatons,
orders, directives. or licenses which may hereafter
be tssued pursuant to this order, all property and
Interests In property of the Government of Serbia and
the Government of Montenegro that are In the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States,
or that are or hereafter come within the possession or
control of United States persons, Including their overseas
branches. are hereby blocked.
SEC. 2. Except to the extent provided In regulations,
orders, directives, or licenses which may hereafter be
Issued pursuant to this order, all property and Interests
In property In the name of the Government of the Soclalist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that are fn
the United States, that hereafter come within the
United States. or that are or hereafter come within the
possession or control of United States persons, Inc]udIng
their overseas branches, are hereby blocked.
SBC. 3. A transact!on by any United States person
that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or
avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prob1bitons
set forth In this order Is prohibited.
SEC. 4. For the purposes of this order:
(a) The term Untted States person" means any
United States ctttzen, permanent resident alien, fur1dical
person onantzed under the laws of the United
States (Including foreign branches). or person in the
United States;
(b) The terms Government of Serbia" and "Government
of Montenegro" Include the governments of Serbla
and Montenegro, Including any subdivisions thereof
or local government therein, their respective agencies,
Instrumentalities and controlled entitles, and any persons
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any
of the foregatng, Including the National Bank of Serb!a,
the Serbian Chamber of Economy, the National Bank of
Montenegro, and the Montenegrin Chamber of Economy;
(0) The terms "Government of the Soclalist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia" An Government of the Federa]
epubll of Yugoslavia" Include the government of
the former Soctalist Federal Republt¢ of Yugoslav!a,
the government of the newly constituted Federal Re.
public of Yugoslavia, thelr respective agencies, Instrumentalttles
and controlled entities, And any persons
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any of
the foregoing. Including the National Bank of Yugoslavia,
the Yugoslav National Army. and the Yugoslav
Chamber of Economy.
SE.$.The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultation
with the Secretary of State. Is hereby authorized to
take such acttons, Including the promugaton of rules
and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to
the President by the International Emergency Economle
Powens Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et sea.I. as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this order, Such
actions may Include prohibiting or regulating payments
or transfers of any property, or any transactions
Involving the transfer of anything of economic value by
any United States person to the Government of the Socialst
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Government
of Serbia, the Government of Montenegro, any person
Annex 36
1701 TITLE 50-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 198
In Serbia or Montenegro, or any person or entity acting
for or on behalf of. or owned or controlled, directly or
Indirectly, by any of the foregoing. he Secretary of
the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to
other officers and agencies of the United States Government,
all agencies of which are hereby directed to
take all appropriate measures within their author!ty to
carry out the provisions of this order, Including suspenslon
or termination of licenses or other authorizations
In effect as of the date of thls order.
SEC. 6. Nothing contained In this order shall create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural. enforceable
by any party against the United States, Its agencles
or instrumentalities, Its officers or employees, or
any other person,
SEC. 7. (a) Thts order shall take effect at 11.59 p.m.
Eastern Daylight Tme, May 30, 1992.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress
and published in the Federal Register.
GEORGE BUSH.
CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY
EX. ORD. NO. 12808
Notce of President of the United States, dated May
25. 1994. 59 F.R. 27429. provided:
On May 30. 1992, by Executive Order No. 12808 [set out
above], President Bash declared a national emergency
to deal wIth the unusual and extraordinary threat to
the national security, forelgn policy, and economy of
the United States constituted by the actions and pollcies
of the Governments of Serbia and Montenegro,
blocking all property and interests In property of those
Governments. The President took additional measures
to prohtblt trade and other transactions with the Federa!
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serb!a and Montenegro)
by Executive Orders Nos. 12810, 12831, and 12846 [set out
below], issued on June 5, 1992, January 15. 1993. and
Apr1l 25, 1993. respectively. Because the Government of
the Federal Republl¢ of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
has continued Its actions and poltctes In support
of groups selztng and attempting to selre territory In
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by force and violence,
the national emergency declared on May $0, 1992, and
the measures adopted pursuant thereto to deal with
that emergency, must continue In effect beyond May
30, 1994. Therefore, In accordance with section 202(d) of
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.8.C. 16220). I am
continuing the national emergency with respect to the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenero)
This notice shall be published In the Federal Register
and transmitted to the Congress.
WILLIAM • CLINTON
Pr!or continuation of national emergency declared by
Ex. Ord. No. 12808 was contained In th following
Notice of President of the United States, dated May
25, 1993.58 F.R. 30693.
EX. ORD. NO. 12810. BLOCKING PROPERTY OF AND PROHIBTING
TRANSACTIONS WITH FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
Ex. Ord. No. 12810. June 5, 1992. ST F.R. 24347, as
amended by Er. Ord. No. 12831, 44, Jan. 15. 1993. 58 F.R.
5253. provided:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, Including the International Emergency Eonomte
Powers Act (50 U.SC. 170. et seq ), the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.$.C. 1601, et seq.). ectton 1114 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. as amended (49 U.S.C.
App. 1514), section 5 of the United Nations Parttc!pation
Act or 1945, as amended (22 U.8 C. 2870), and secton
30I of title 3 of the United States Code. In view of
United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 75T 0f
May 30, 1992, and in order to take additional steps with
respect to the actions and poltctes of the Federal Repubic
or Yugoslavia (Serbla And Montenegro) and the
national emergency desertbed and declared fn ExecutIve
Order No. 12808 [set out above],
I. GEORGE BUSH. President of the United States of
Amer&A, hereby order;
SECTION I. Except to tbe extent provided In regulattons,
orders, directives, or licenses which may hereafter
be Issued pursuant to thts order, and notwithstanding
the existence of any rights or obligations conferred
or Imposed by any international Agreement or
any contract entered Into or any License or permit
granted before the effective date of this order, all property
and Interests In property of the Government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
and property and interests In property held Ln
the name of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia or of the former Government of the Social1st
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that are In the
United States, that hereafter come within the United
States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession
or control of United States persons, Including
thelr overseas branches. are blocked.
SEE.2 Te following are prohibited, notwithstanding
the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or
Imposed by any International agreement or Any contract
entered into or any license or permit granted before
the effective date of thts order, except to the ertent
provided In regulations, orders. directives, or lcenses
which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this
order
(a) The Importation Into the United States of any
goods orienatIng In, or services performed n. the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
exported from the Federal Repbl of Yugoslavia (Ser.
ba ad Montenegro) after May 30, 1992, or any activity
that promotes or ts Intended to promote such 1mportat1on,
(b) The exportation to the Federal Republl¢ of Yugoslavia
(Serbfa and Montenegro), or to any entity operated
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), or owned or controlled by the Government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), directly or Indirectly, of any goods,
technology including technical data or other nformaion
controlled for export pursuant to the Export Administration
Reulatlons, 15 C.F.R. Parts 768. et seq.).
or services, elther (I) from the United States. (1D) requiring
the Issuance of a license by a Federal a@ency,
or (Ii) Involving the use of U.S -registered vessels or
alrcraft, or any activity that promotes or ls Intended
to promote such exportation;
(o) Any dealing by a United States person related to
property originating In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavla
(Serbia and Montenegro) exported from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
after May 30, 1992, or property Intended for exportation
from the Federal Republt of Yugoslavia (Serbta and
Montenegro) to any country, or exportation to the Federa
Republl of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
from any country, or any activity of any kind that promotes
or Is Intended to promote such dealing;
(d) Any transaction by a United States person, or 1nvolving
the use of U.S.-registered vessels and aircraft,
relating to transportation to or from the Federal Republic
of Yuoslavfa (Serbia and Montenegro), the provision
of transportation to or from the United States
by any person In the Federal Republf of Yugoslavia
(Serbla and Montenegro) or any vessel or aircraft regstered
In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), or the sale n the United States by
any person holding autbortty under the Federal Avaton
Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.8.0. 1301, et seq.) [now
49 U.S.C. 40101 et seq.]. of any transportation by alr
that Includes any stop n the Federal Republle of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro);
() The granting of permission to any alrcraft to take
off from. land In, or overfly the United States, If the
aircraft, as part of the same flight or as a continuation
of that flight. ts destined to land In or has taken off
from the territory of the Federal Republte of Yugoslavla
(Serbia and Montenegro);
( The performance by any Unted States person of
any contract, Including a financing contract. In supAnnex
36
Pae 199 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
port of an Industrial, commercial, public utility, or
governmental pro@ct in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro);
(g) Any commitment or transfer, direct or Indirect. of
funds, or other financial or economic resources by any
United States person to or for the bereft of the Government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serb!a
and Montenegro) or any other person In the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
) An transaction In the United States or by a
United States person related to participation In sportIng
events in the United States by persons or groups
representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbfa
and Montenegro);
(D) [Revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12831. $4, Jan. 15, 1993, 58
F.R 6253.)
SEO. 3. Nothing In this order shall apply to (D) the
transshipment through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) of commodities and
products or\inating outside the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and temporarily
present In the territory of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) only for the purpose
of such transshipment, and (ID) activities related
to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),
the Conference on Yugoslavia, or the European Community
Mon!tor Mlsslon.
SEO. 4. Any transaction by any United States person
that evades or avoids. or has the purpose of evading or
avotdtng, or attempts to violate. any of the prohtbt.tlons
set forth In this order fs prohfbfted.
SEC. 5. For the purposes of thfs order
(a) The term "United States person" means any
United States citizen, permanent resident alien, Juridtcal
person oantzed under the laws of the United
States (Including foreign branches), or any person In
the United States, and vessels and alroraft of U.S. reg1st.
rat4on;
b) The term "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)" means the territory of Serbla
and Montenegro;
(c) The term "the Government of the Federal RepubIi¢
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Includes
the government of the newly constituted Federal Republtd
of Yugoslavia, the Government of Serbl, ad
the Government of Montenegro, Including any subdlvslons
thereof or local governments theretn, their respectve
agencies, Instrumentalities and controlled entIttes.
and any persons acting or purporting to act for
or on behalf of any of the foresolng. Including the Natonal
Bank of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav National
Army, and the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy, the Nattonal
Bank of Serbia, the Serbian Chamber of Economy,
the National Bank of Montenegro, and the Montenegrin
Chamber of Economy.
SEO. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultation
with the Secretary of State, fs hereby authorized to
take such actions, Including the promulgation of rules
and regulations. and to employ all powers granted to
the President by the International Emergency Economic
Powers A0t [50 U.8.C 1701 et seq.] and the United
Nattons Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.J. as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.
Such actions may Include prohibiting or regulating
payments or transfers of any property. or any transactions
Involving the transfer of anything of economic
value by the [sic] any United States person to the Goernment
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslav!a (Serb!a
and Montenegro) any person In the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or any person Or
entity acting for or on behalf of, or owped or controlled,
directly or Indirectly, by any of the foregoing.
7he Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of
these functions to other officers and agencies of the
United States Government. all agencies of which are
hereby directed to take all appropriate measures withIn
their authority to carry out the provisions of this
order, Including suspension or termination of licenses
or other authorizattons in effect as of the date of this
order.
SEC. T. AII delegations, rules, regulattons, orders, Itcenses,
and other forms of administrative action made,
lssued. or otherwise taken under Executive Order No,
12808 (set out above] and not revoked administratively
shall remain in full force and effect under this order
until amended, modified. or terminated by proper authority
SEC. 8. Nothing cotaned In this order shall create
any right or beneflt substantive or procedural, enforceable
by any party against the United States, 1ts agencies
or Instrumentalities, Its officers or employees, or
any other person.
SE0. 9 (a) This order ls effective Immediately.
(b) This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress
ad published In the Federal Register.
GEORGE BUSH.
EX. ORD. NO. 12817. TRANSFER OF CERTAIN IRAQI
GOVERNMENT ASSETS HELD BY DOMESTIC BANKS
Ex. Ord. No. 12817. Oct. 21, 1992, ST F.R. 48433, provided.
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America. Including the International Emergency Ecoromle
Powers Act (50 U $.C. 1701 et seq.), the NationAL
Emergencies Aet (50 US.0. 1601 et seq.), ectlo 5 of the
Untted Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended
(22U.8.C. 287e). and sectton so1 of title 3 of the United
States Code. In order to apply In the United States
measures adopted In United Nations Security Council
Resolution N6, 778 of October 2, 1992. and In order to
take additional steps with respect to the actions and
policies of the Government of Iraq and the national
emergency described and declared Executive Order
No 12722 (set out above]
I. GEORGE BUSH. President of the United States of
America, hereby order:
SECTION L, The Secretary of the Treasury Is author[
zed and directed to take all actions necessary to carry
out the provtstons of United Nations Security Council
Resolution No. 778 with respect to blocked funds and
other assets described In sectton 2 of this order. or
funds and other assets received from the United Nattons
In repayment of funds and assets transferred pursuant
to section 2 of this order. For this purpose, the
Secretary of the Treasury is delegated and authorized
to exercise all author[ties vested In the President by
sections 203 And 205 of the Internatfona] Emergency
Eonomte Powers Act (50 U.$.C 1702 and 1704) and sectton
5 of the United Nations Part!Cpat!on Act (22
U.$.C. 2876).
SEO. 2. Upon a determination by the Secretary of the
Treasury that funds or other assets In which the Government
of Ira or its agencies, Instrumental1ties, or
controlled entities have an Interest represent the proceeds
of the sale of Iraq! petroleum or petroleum produots,
paid for by or on behalf of the purchaser on or
after Aust 6, 1990, each and every United States flnanotal
institution ts directed and compelled to transfer
such funds or assets beld by it or carried on 1ts
books to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. when,
to the extent, and In the manner required by the Secretary
of the Treasury.
SEE 3. The Federal Reserve Bank Of New York, as fIscal
agent of the United States, Is authorized, directed,
and compelled to receive funds and other assets In
which the Government of Iraq or Its agencies, Instrumental!
ties, or controlled entities have an Interest, and
to hold. Invest, or transfer such funds and assets. and
any earnings thereon. when, to the extent. and In the
manner required by the Secretary of the Treasury In
order to fulfil the rights and obligations of the United
States under United Nations Security Council Resoluton
No. 778.
SBC. 4. Compliance with this order, or any regulation,
Instruction, or direction issued under this order, licensng.
authorizing, directing. or compelling the transfer
of the blocked funds and other assets described in section
2 of tbs order. or funds and other assets received
Annex 36
$1701 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 200
from the United Nations In repayment of funds and assets
transferred pursuant to section 2 of this order,
shall, to the extent thereof, be a full acquittance and
discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person
making the transfer. No person shall be held Hable
In any court for or with respect to anything done or
omitted In good faith In connect!on with the admintstratton
of, or pursuant to and In reltance on, thts order
or any regulation, Instruction, or direction Issued hereunder.
The operation of thls order shall have no effect
on rights, debts, and claims ertsting wth respect to
funds or other assets prior to their transfer to the Federal
Reserve Bank Of New York.
SEO. 5. For the purposes of this order, the term
United States financial Institution" means any
United States citizen, permanent resident alien, fur1dical
person organized under the laws of the United
States, or any person located In the United States.
which is engaged in the business of accepting deposits,
making. granting. transferring, holding, or brokering
loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign exchange
or securities, Including. but not Limited to, depository
Institutions, banks, saving banks. trust companes,
securities brokers and dealers. clearing corporations,
Investment companies. and US. holding compantes,
U.S. Affiliates, or U.S. subsidiaries of the foregoing.
This term Includes brancbes. offces. and agerctes
of foreign financial Institutions whtch are located
n the United States.
SEC. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultation
with the Secretary of State, Is authorized to take such
actions, Including the issuance of directive licenses,
rules, and regulations. as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this order The Secretary of the
Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to
other officers and agencies of the Federal Government.
Al agencies of the Federal Government are directed to
take all appropriate measures within ther authority to
carry out the provisions of this order.
SE. • Nothing contained In this order shall create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural. enforceable
by any party (other than the United States)
against the United States. Its agencies or InstrumentalltIes,
Its officers or employees, or any other person.
SEC. 8.
(a) This order Is effective Immedlately.
tb) Thls order shall be transmitted to the Congress
and published tn the Federal Register.
GEORGE BUSH.
EX. ORD. NO. 12831. ADDITIONAL, MEASURES WITH RESPECT
TO FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA
AND MONTENEGRO)
Ex. Ord. No. 12831, Jan. 15, 1993. 58 F.R. 5253, provided.
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, Including the International Emergenoy Economt¢
Powers At (50 U.S.C, 170I et seq.), the Nattonal
Emergenc!es A0t (50 U.S.0. 160 et seq.). section 5 of the
United Nations Participation Act of 1945. as amended
(22 US.0. 2870). and section 30I of title 3 of the United
States Code, in view of United Nations Security Counell
Resolutions No. 757 of May 30, 1992. And No, 787 of
November 16. 1992, and In order to take addtlonal steps
with respect to the actions and policies of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and
the national emergency described and declared In Execut[
ve Order No. 12808 (et out above] and expanded fn
Executive Order No. 12810 [set out above].
I, GEORGE BUSH, Preslent of the United States of
Amer!ca, hereby order
SECTION I, The following are prohibited, except to the
extent provided In regulations. orders, directives, or IIcenses
which may hereafter be fssuod pursuant to this
order, and notwithstanding the existence of any rights
or obligations conferred or Imposed by any Interatonal
Agreement or any contract entered Into or any
license or permit granted before the effective date of
this order:
(a) Any transaction within the United States or by a
United States person related to the transshipment of
commodities or products through the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serb!a and Montenegro): and
tb) Any transaction within the United States or by A
United States person relating to any vessel In which a
majority or controlling Interest Is held by a person or
entity in, or operating from. the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbla and Montenegro) regardless of the
flag under which the vessel sa1ls.
SEO. 2. Any vessel in which a majority or controlling
fnterest ls held by person or entity In. or operating
from, the Federal Republte of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro shall be considered as a vessel of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
regardless of tbe flag under which the vessel sails.
SC. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultation
wIth the Secretary of State, ls hereby authorized to
take such actions, tncludtne the promulgation of rules
and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to
the President by the International Emergency Economie
Powers Act (60U.s.C. 1701 et seq.] and the United
Nations Participation Act [22 U.$.C. 287 et seq.. as may
be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order
such actions may Include prohibiting or regulating
trade and financial transactions Involving any areas of
the territory of the former Soclalist Federal Republt
of Yugoslavia as to which there Is Inadequate assurance
that such transactions wll not be diverted to the berefit
of the Federal Republt of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate
the authority set forth In this order to other
officers and a#enotes of the United States Government.
all agencies of which are hereby directed to take all approprlate
measures within their author!ty to carry out
the provisions of this order, Including suspension or
termination of licenses or other authorizations n effect
as of the date of this order.
SE0. 4. Sectton 3(2() of Executive Order No. 12810 [set
out above] is hereby revoked.
sEe. $. Te defrttons contained In Sector 5 of Executive
Order No. 12810 [set out above] apply to the terms
used In this order.
SEE 6. Nothing contatned In this order shall create
any right or benefit. substantive or procedural, enforceable
by any party against the Un!ted States. Its agercles
or Instrumentalities. It offers or employees, or
any other person.
Sc. T (a) This order ls effective Immediately.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress
and published In the Federal Resister.
GEORE BUSH
Ex. ORD, NO. 1246. ADDITIONAL MEASURES WH RESPECT
TO FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA
AND MONTENEGRO)
Ex. Or. No. 12846. Apr. 25. 1993. 58 F.R. 25TTL. provided:
By the authority vested In me as Pres!dent by the
Constftutton and the laws of the United States.of
America. Including the International Emenency Economie
Powers Act ($0 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.8.0. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the
United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended
(22 U.8.C. 2870). and sectton $01 of title 3, United States
Code. tn view of United Nattons Security Counet! Resoutlon
No. 57 0f May 30. 1992. No. 78T of November 16.
1992. and No. 820 of Apr[I 17, 1993. And fn order to take
additional steps with respect to the actions and policies
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) and the national emergency described and
declared In Executive Order No 12808 [set out above]
and expanded In Executive Order No. 12810 [set out
above] and No. 12831 [set out above],
, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United
States of America, hereby order:
SECTION I. Notwithstanding the existence of any
rights or obligatons conferred or Imposed by any International
agreement or any contract entered into or any
Annex 36
Page 201 TITLE 50-WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
license or permit granted before the effective date of
this order, except to the extent provided In regulations,
orders, directives, or licenses which may hereafter be
fssued pursuant to this order.
(a) All property and Interests in property of all commercfal,
Industrial, or public utility undertakings or
entities organized or located In the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbla and Montenegro). Including. without
Imitation, the property and Interests In property
of entitles (wherever organized or located) owned or
controlled by such undertakings or entities, that are fn
the United States, that hereafter come within the
United Stat0s, or that are or hereafter come within the
possession or control of United States persons, IncludIng
their overseas branches, are hereby blocked;
(b) All expenses incident to the blocking and maintenance
of property blocked under Executive Order Nos.
12808, 12810, 12831 (set out above] or this order shall be
charged to the owners or operators of such property,
which expenses shall not be met from blocked funds.
Such property may also be sold or ILqu±dated and the
proceeds placed In a blocked Interest-bearing account
In the name of the owner;
(c) All vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft
and cargo that are within or hereafter come within the
United States and are not subject to blocking under
Executive Order Nos. 12808, 12810. 12831 or this order.
but which are suspected of a violation of United Nattons
Security Count! Resolution N8. 713, 757, 8T or
820, shall be detained pending Investigation and, upon a
determination by the Secretary of the Treasury that
they have been In violation of any of these resolutons,
shall be blocked. Such blocked conveyances and cargo
may also be sold or tqudated and the proceeds placed
fn a blocked Interest-bearing account fn the name of
the owner;
(d) No vessel registered In the United States or owned
or controlled by United States persons, other than a
United States naval vessel, may enter the territorial
waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro): and
(e) Any dealing by a United States person relating to
the Importation from. exportation to, or transshipment
through the United Nations Protected Areas In the Republic
of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of
Bosnla-Herceovina under the control of Boslan Serb
forces, or actvlty of any kind that promotes or is Intended
to promote such dealing. Is prohibited.
SE0. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultation
wIth the Secretary of State, Is hereby authorized to
take such actions, Including the promulgation of rules
and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to
the President by the International Emerenoy Economie
Powers A0t [50 U.8.G. 1701 et seq.] and the United
Nations Participation At (22 U.8.C. 287 et seq.] as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.
The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate the authorlty
set forth in this order to other officers and
agencies of the Federal Government, all agencies of
which are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures
within thelr authority to carry out the provisions
of this order, Including snspenston or termination of ILcenses
or other authorizations In effect as of the date
of this order.
SE6. 3 Nothing In this order shall apply to activities
related to the United Nations Protection Force, the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,
and the European Communtty Mon!tor Mission.
SEO. 4. The defmnfttons contained In section 5 of Executlve
Order No. 12810 [set out above] apply to the terms
used In thts order.
8BO. 5. Nothing contained In this order shall create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable
by any party against the United States, Its a&onctes
or instrumentalities, fts officers or employees, or
any other person.
SEO. 6. Thts order shall not affect the provisions or censes
and authorizations tssued pursuant to Executive
Order Nos, 12808, 12810, 12831 (set oat above] and tn force
on the effective date of this order, except as such Icenses
or authorization may hereafter be terminated,
modified or suspended by the tssuing federal agency.
SEO. T. (a) This order shall take effect at 1201 a.m.
Eastern Daylight Time, Apr1l 26, 1993.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress
and published In the Federal Register.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12853
Ex. Ord. No. 12853. June 30, 1993. 58 F.R. 35843, which
directed Secretary of the Treasury to block all property
and Interests In property of Government of Haiti
and the de facto regime in Haft! or controlled directly
or Indirectly by etther that were In United States or
within possession or control of United States persons
and which prohibited sale or supply to Halt! of petroleum
or arms and related materiel by United States
persons or from United States or using U.S.-registered
vessels or aircraft, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12932.
0et. 14, 1994,59 F.R. 52403, set out below.
EX. ORD. NO. 12865. PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO UNITTA
Ex. Ord. No. 12865. Sept. 26, 1993. 58 F.R. 51005, provlded:
By the authority vested fn me as President b the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, Including the International Emergency Economte
Powers Act (50 U.S €. 1701 et seq.). the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq ). section 5 of the
United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended
(22 U.8.C. 2870) and section 301 of title 3, United States
Code. and In view of United Nations Security Council
Resolution N, 864 0of September 15, 1993,
I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON. President of the United
States of America. take note of the United Nations Security
Councll's determination that. as a result of
UNITA's mltary actions. the situation In Angola constAtutes
a threat to International peace and security,
and ind that the actions and policies of UNITA, In continning
military actions, repeated attempts to selze addlttonal
territory and falure to withdraw ts troops
from locations that It has occupied since the resumptton
of hostilities. In repeatedly attacking United Nations
personnel working to provide humanitarian ass[
stance, n holding foretgn nationals against their wIll,
In refusing to accept the results of the democratic electtons
held In Angola In 1992, and In falling to ab\de by
the "Acordos de Paz." constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the forelgn policy of the United
States, and hereby declare a national emergency to
deal with that threat.
I hereby order:
SECTION L. The following are prohtbited, notwIthstanding
the existence of any rights or obligations conferred
or Imposed by any International agreement or
contract entered Into or any license or permit granted
before the effective date of this order, except to the extent
provided In regulations, orders, directives, or IIcenses
which may hereafter be fssued pursuant to this
order:
(a) The sale or supply by Urited States persons or
from the United States. or using U.S.-registered vessels
or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types,
Including weapons and ammunition. mflttary vehicles
and equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned.
as well as petroleum and petroleum products, regardless
of origin:
(D to UNITA
(2) to the territory of Angola. other than through
points of entry to be designated by the Secretary of
the Treasury, or any activity by United States persons
or in the United States which promotes or Is caculated
to promote such sale or supply.
(b) Any transaction by any United States person that
evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or
avoiding. or attempts to violate, any of the prohtb!tIons
set forth in this order.
8EC. 2. For purposes of this order:
Annex 36
$1701 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 202
(a) he term United States person" means any
Un!ted States cltizen. permanent resident alien, Jurt1dical
person organized under the laws of the United
States (Including foreign branches), or person In the
United States;
) The term "UNITA" Includes:
(D the Unfao Naclonal para a Independencta Total
de AngOla (UNITA), known in English as the "Natlonal
Union for the Total Independence of A&Ola;"
(2) the Forcas Armadas para a LAberacao de Angola
(FALA), known In English as the "Armed Fores for
the Lfberat!on of Angola," and
(3) an person acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of any of the foregoing. Including the Free Angola
Information Service, Inc.
SE0.3 The Secretary of the Treasury, In consultation
with the Secretary of State, ls hereby authorized to
take such actions. Including the promulgation of rules
and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to
the President by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 170 et seq.] and the United
Nations Participation Act (22 U.$.C. 287 et seq.] as may
be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. The
Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these
functions to other officers and agencies of the United
States Government.
SEO. 4. Nothing contained In the order shall be construed
to supersede the requirements established under
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.8.0. 2751 et seq.) and
the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.0. App. 2401 et
seq.) to obtain licenses for the exportation from the
United States or from a third country of any goods,
data, or services subject to the export Jurisdicton of
the Department of State or the Department of Commerce.
SEC. 5. AI Federal agencies are hereby directed to
take all appropriate measures within their authority to
carry out the provisions of this order. Including suspenslon
or termination of licenses or other authorizations
n effect as of the date of this order.
SEO. 6. Nothing contained n this order shall create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable
by any party against the United States, Its aencles
or Instrumentalities, ts officers or employees, or
any other person.
SEO. T. (a) This order shall take effect Immediately
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress
and published In the Federal Register.
WILLIAM J, CLINTON.
CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY
EX. ORD. NO. 12865
Notice of President of the United States, dated Au$
17, 1994, 59 F.B. 42749, provided:
On September 26, 1993, by Executive Order No, 12865
[set out above], I declared a natonal emergency to deal
with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the forelgn
policy of the United States constituted by the actions
and policies of the National Unton for the Total
Independence of An&Ola (UNITA"), prohibittns the
sale or supply by United States persons or from the
United States, or using U.S. registered vessels or aircraft,
of arms and related material of all types, and petroleum
and petroleum products to the terr'tory of Angola,
other than through designated points of entry.
The order also prohibits the sale or supply of such commodtles
to UNITA. Because of our continuing International
obligations and because of the prejudicial effect
that discontinuation of the sanctions would have
on the Angolan peace process, the national emergency
declared on September 26, 1993. and the measures adopted
pursuant thereto to deal with that emergency, must
continue In effect beyond September 26. I994. Therefore.
In accordance with section 202(d) of the Nat[ona! EInergenctes
Act (50 0.8.C. 1622()) I am continuing the nattonal
emergenoy with respeut to UNTTA.
This otle shall be published tn the Federal Register
and transmitted to the Congress.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
EX. ORD. NO. 12867. 'TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY
AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN EXPORT CONTROLS
Ex. Ord. No 12867, Sept 30, 1993, 58 F.R. 51747, providod:
By the authority vested n me as Pre!dent by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America. Including section 203 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.0, 1702 (the
IEEPA", the National Emergencies Act (50 U.$.C. 1601
et seq.), the Export Administration Act of 1979, As
amended (50 U.S.0. App. 2401 et seq.) (the Act"), and
section 30I of title 3 of the United States Code. It Is
hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION I In view of the extension of the Act by Pubc
Law 10--10 (March 27, 1993) [amending 50 App, U.S.C.
2419], Executive Order No. 12730 of September 30, 1990,
which continued the effect of export control relaIons
under the IEEPA, Is revoked, and the declaration
of economic emergency Is rescinded, as provided In this
order.
SEC. 2. The revocation of Executive Order No. 12730
shall not affect any violation of any rules. regulations,
orders, licenses, and other forms of administrative Acton
under that Order that occurred during the per!od
the order was In effect. Al rules and regulations Issued
or continued In effect under the authority of the
IEEPA and Executive Order No. 12735. ncluding those
codified At 15 CFR Sections 768-799 (1993), and all orders.
regulations, licenses. and other forms of admtnistratve
act!on Issued, taken. or continued in effect pursuant
thereto. shall remain in full force and effect. as
If issued. taken, or continued in effect pursuant to and
as authorized by the Act or by other appropriate authortty
until amended or revoked by the proper authortty.
Nothing In this order shah] affect the continued appicabfltty
of the prov!ston for the administration of
the Act and delegations of authority set forth In Exeoutive
Order No. 12002 of July 7, 1977, Executive Order No.
12214 0f May 2, 1980 [50 App. U.S.C. 2403 notes]. and Executive
Order No. 12735 0f November 16, 1990.
SEC. 3. All rules, regulations, orders, licenses, and
other forms of administrative act!on ssued, taken, or
continued In effect pursuant to the authority of the
IEEPA and Executive Order No. 12730 relating to the
administration of Section 38(e) of the ArmS Export
Control Act (22 U.SC 2T78(e)) shall remain In full force
and effect until amended or revoked under proper authortty.
SEC. 4. This order shall take effect immediately.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12868
Ex Ord. No. 12868, Sept. 30, 1993. 58 F.R. 51749, which
directed Secretary of Commerce to regulate activities
of United States persons to prevent participation 1n
weapons proliferation activittes. was revoked. with savIngs
prov!s!on, by Ex. Ord. No, 12930. $3, Sept. 29, 1994,
59F.R. 50475, formerly set out below.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12872
Ex. Ord. No. 12872, Oct. 18. 1993. 58 F.R. 54029, whtch
directed Secretary of the Treasury to block property of
persons obstructing democratization In Haiti, was revoked
by Ex. Ord No. 12932, O00t. 14, 1994, 59 F.BR. 52403.
set out below.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12914
Ex. Ord. No. 12914, May 7, 1994, 59 F.R. 24339, which d1rected
Secretary of the Treasury to block all funds and
financial resources of officers and employees of Halt!an
military, Including poltce, and of all major participants
In coup d'~tat In Haiti of 1991 and In Illegal governments
that followed, and which prohibited air travel
between United States territory and Haiti except resularly
scheduled commerclal passenger flights, was revoked
by Ex. Ord. No, 12932. Ot. 14. 1994, 59 F.R. 52403.
set out below.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12917
Ex. Ord No. 12917, May 21, 1994. 59 F.R. 26925. which
prohibited Imports Into United States from Hat! and
Annex 36
Page 203 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
activity by United States persons or In United States
promoting or dealing In Haitian exports, with certain
exceptions, was revoked by Ex. Ord No. 12932, Oct. 14,
1994. 59 F.R. 52403. set out below.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12920
Ex. Ord. No. 12920, June 10, 1994, 59 F.R. 30501, which
prohibited payment or transfer of funds or other flnarclal
or [nvestment assets or credits to Hatt! from or
through United States or from Haiti to or throngh
United States and the sale, suppl, or exportatlon of
goods, technology, or services to Halt! or promotion of
such activity, with certain exceptions, was revoked by
Ex Ord No. 12932, 00t. 14. 1994, 59 F R. 52403, set out
below.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO, 12922
EX. Ord. N0. 12922. June 21, 1994. 59 F.R. 32845, which
directed Secretary of the Treasury to block property
and Interests in property of Haitian national residents n Haft! and to continue blocking property of certain
other persons that were In United States or wIthtn possession
and control of United States persons, was re.
voked by Ex. Ord. No. 12932. 0ct. 14, 1994. 59 F R. 52403,
set out below.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12923
Ex Ord. No. 12923, June 30, 1994, 59 F.R. 34551, which
continued effectiveness of the Export Administration
Act 0£ 1979, 50 App. U.S.C. 240l et sea., and of the orders,
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, was revoked
by Ex. Ord. No 12924, 44. An8, 19, 1994, 59 F.R
43438. set out below.
EX ORD NO. 12924. CONTINUATION OF EXPORT CONTROL
REGULATIONS
Ex. Ord. N6. 12924, Aug. 19, 1994. 59 FR 43437, provtided:
By the authority vested in me as President by tbe
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, Including but not limited to sect1on 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(Aet") (50 U.$.0. 1702), I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
President of the United States of America, fInd tbat
the unrestricted access of foreign parties to U.S goods,
technology, and technical data and the existence of
certan boycott practices of foreign natIons, In light of
the expiration of the Export Admintstratton Act of
1979, as amended (50 U.8.C. App 2401 et seq.). constitute
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national securty,
foreign policy, and economy of the Un!ted
States and bereby declare a national emergency with
respect to that threat.
Accordingly, In order (a) to exercise the necessary
v1glance over exports and activities affecting the natonal
security of the United States: () to further signifcantly
the foretgn policy of the United States, Including
Its policy with respect to cooperation by U.S.
persons with certain foreign boycott activities, and to
fulfil Its international responsibilities, and (c) to protect
the domestic economy from the excessive drain of
scarce materials and reduce the serious economic mpact
of foreign demand, It Is hereby ordered as follows
SECTION L. To the extent permitted by law, the prov!stons
of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as
amended, and the provisions for admntstratton of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended. shall be
carried out under this order so as to continue In full
force and effect and amend, as necessary, the export
control system heretofore maintained by the Export
Administration regulations Issued under the Export
Aministration Act of 1979, as amended. Th de1.
Attons of authority set forth In Executive Order No.
12002 of July 7, 1977 (50 App. U.8.C. 2403 note]. s amended
by Executive Order No. 12755 of March 12, 1991; Executfve
Order No. 12214 of May 2, 1980 (50 App. 0.S.C. 2403
note]; Executive Order N6. 12735 of November 16, 1990 (50
U.$.C. 1701 note]; and Executive Order N. 12851 of June
11, 1993 (22 U.8.C. 2797 note], shall be incorporated In
this order and sball apply to the exercise of authorities
under this order.
Sc. 2. AII rules and regulations tssued or continued
ln effect by the Secretary of Commerce under the authority
of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as
amended (50 App. U.S.C. 2401 et sea.], including those
published In Tue 15, Subtitle B, Chapter VII, Subchapter
C, of the Code of Federal Regulations, PArt6 768
through 799, and all orders, regulations, licenses, and
other forms of administrative action issued, taken, or
continued in effect pursuant thereto, shall, antll
amended or revoked by the Secretary of Commerce, remain
in full force and effect as If Issued or taken pursuant
to this order, except that the provlslons of sections
2030b)&2) a.nd 206 of the Aet (50 U $.0. 17020b)2) and 1705)
shall control over any Inconsistent provisions In the
regulations. Nothing In this section shall affect the
continued applicabfltty of administrative sanctions
provided for by the regulations described above.
SE0. 3. Provisions for administration of section 38(e)
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.SC. 2778(e)) may
be made and shall continue In full force and effect until
amended or revoked under the authority of section 203
of the Act (50 U.$.0. 1702). To the extent permitted by
law. this order also shall constitute authority for the
Issuance and continuation fn full force and effect of all
rules And regulations by the Pres!dent or his delegate,
and all orders. lenses. and other forms of administrative
actions Issued, taken. or continued In effect pursuant
thereto, relating to the Administration of ectton
38(e)
SEO. 4. Executive Order No. 12923 of June 30. 1994, 1s
revoked, and that declaration of emergency Is rescfrded.
The revocation of Executive Order No. 12923
shall not affect any violation of any rules, regulations,
orders, licenses, and other forms of administrative acton
under that order that occurred during the period
the order was in effect.
SEC. 5. This order shall be effective as of midnight between
August 20, 1994, and A@ust 21, 1994, and shall remain
in effect until terminated.
WLL.LAM J. CLINTON.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12930
Er. Ord. No. 12930, Sept. 29, 1994, 59 F.R. 50475, which
directed Secretary of Commerce to take measures to
restrict participation by United States persons in
weapons proliferation activities, was revoked by Ex.
Ord. No 12938. 410, Nov. 14, 1994. 59 F.R. 59099, set oat
below.
EX. ORD. NO. 12932. TERMINATION OF EMEROENCY WITH
RESPECT TO HAIT
Ex Ord. No. 12932. O0t. 14, 1994. 59 F.R. 52403, protided:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitutton and laws of the United States of Amer!ca,
Including the InternatIona! Emergency Economic Powens
At (50 U.8.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emerenc1es
ACt (NEA") (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) section 5 of
the United NatlonS PartlClpatLon Act 0( 1945, as amended
(22 U.8.C. 2870). and sect'on $o1 of title 3, United
States Code, and taking into cons!deratton United Nattons
Security Connel Resolution 944 of September 29,
1994,
I. WILLIAM J CLINTON, Pres!dent of the United
States of America, fnd that the restoratton of a democratcally
elected government In Haiti has ended the
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national secutty.
foreign policy, and economy of the United States
previously posed by the policies and actons of the de
facto regime In Hat! and the need to continue the nattonal
emergency declared In Executive Order No. 12775
of October 4, 1991. to deal with that threat.
I hereby revoke Executive Order Nos. 12775, 12779,
12853, 12872. 12914, 12917, 12920, and 12922 and terminate
the national emergency declared In Executive Order
No. 12775 wfth respect to Ha!ti.
Pursuant to section 202 of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1622),
terminatton of the natonal emergency with respect to
Annex 36
$1701 TITLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 204
Hatti shall not affect any action taken or proceeding
pending not finally concluded or determined as of the
effective date of this order, or any action or proceeding
based on any act committed prior to the effective date
of this order, or any rights or duties that matured or
penalties that were Incurred prior to the effective date
of this order
Ths order shall take effect at 1201 am. eastern dayHght
time on October 16, 1994.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON.
EX. ORD. NO. 12934. BLOCKING PROPERTY AND ADDITIONAL
MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO BOSNIAN SER-CONTROLLED
AREAS OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HEREOVINA
Ex. Ord. No. 12934, Oct. 25, 1994, 59 F.R. 54117, provided.
By the authority vested In me as Pres!dent by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, Including the International Emergency Ecoomtc
Powers Act (50 US.C. 1701 et seq.), the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.8.Q. 160I et seq.), section 5 of the
Ult&d Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended
(220.s.0, 2870), and section 301 of title 3, United States
Code, In view of United Naons Security Counetl Resout!
on 942 of September 23. 1994, and in order to take
addttonal steps with respect to the crisis In the former
Yugoslav!a, I hereby expand the scope of the nat/ona
emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12808 [set
out above] to address the unusual and extraordinary
threat to the nattonal security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States posed by the actions and
poltctes of the Bosnan Serb forces and the author1ties
in the territory that they control, including their refusal
to accept the proposed territorial settlement of
the conflict In the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
L. WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United
States of America, hereby order:
SECTION L Notwtbstanding the existence of any
rights or obllgattons conferred or Imposed by any International
agreement or an contract entered Into or any
license or permit granted before the effective date of
this order, except to the extent provided n regulations,
orders, directives. or Licenses, which may hereafter be
Issued pursuant to this order. all property ard Interests n property of (a) the Bosnian Serb military and paramtltary
forces and the authorities in those areas of the
Republic of Bosnla and Herzeovna under the control
of those forces;
(b) any entity, Including any commercial, Industrial,
or publte utAltty undertaking. organtzed or located In
those areas of the RRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
under the control of Bosnian Sorb for0Os;
(c) any entity, wherever organized or located, which
Is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by any person
In, or resident In, those areas of the Republic of
Bosnla and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian
Serb forces;
(d) any person acting for or on behalf of any person
Included wtthtn the scope of paragraph (a), (b), or (0) of
this section; that are In the United States, that hereafter
come within the United States. or that are or
hereafter come wthin the possession or control of
United States persons. Including their overseas
branches. are blocked.
SEC. 2. Notwithstanding the existence of any rights or
obligatIors conferred or Imposed by any International
agreement or any contract entered Into or any lien
or permit granted before the effective date of this
order. except to the extent provided In regulations, ordens.
directives, or licenses, which may hereafter be [ssued
pursuant to this order: (a) the provision or exportatton
of services to those areas of the Republic of Bosta
and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb
forces, or to any person for the purpose of any business
carried on in those areas, etther from the United States
or by a United States person, Is prohibited; and
(b) no vessel registered In the United States or owned
or controlled by a United States person. other than a
United States naval vessel, may enter the riverine
ports of those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and
HerzeRovia under the control of Bosnian Serb forces.
SEC. 3. AnY transact!on by any United States person
that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or
avoiding. or attempts to violate. any of the prohtb!tions
set forth in this order s prob'bited
SEC. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury. In consultation
with the Secretary of State. is hereby authorized to
take such actIons, Including the promulgation of rules
and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to
me by the InternatOnA! EmergenOy EconOmi¢ Powers
Act (50 U.S.0. I70I et seq.] and the United Nations Parttcfpation
Act of 1945 [22 U.S 0. 287 et seq.]. as amended,
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this
order. The Secretary of the reaurY may redelegate
the authority set forth In this order to other officers
and agencies of the United States Government, all
agencies of which are hereby directed to take all approprlate
measures within their authority to carry out the
prov!stons of ts order, Including suspension or term!nation
of licenses or other authorizations in effect as of
the date of this order
SEC. 5. Nothing In this order shall apply to activities
related to the United Nattons Protect!on Force. the
Internattonal Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, or
the European Community Monitoring Mlsstons
SEC. 6. For the purposes of this order:
(a) The term "person" means an Individual or entity;
(by The term entity" means corporation. partnership,
association, or other organization;
(0) The term United States person" s as defined In
section 5 of Executive Order No. 12810 [set out above].
Sc. I. Nothing contained in this order shall create
any right or benefit. substantive or procedural, enforceable
by any party against the Unted States, Its agenclos
or Instrumentalities, [ts officers or employees, or
any other person.
SEC. 8 (a) Th order shall take effect at 11.59 p.m.
eastern daylight time on October 25, 1994.
(b) This order shan be transmitted to the Congress
and published In the Federal Register.
WLILLIAM J. CLINTON,
EX. ORD. NO. 12938. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
Ex. Ord. NO. 12938. Nov. 14. 1994, 59 F.R. 59099. provided:
By the authority vested In me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America. Including the International Emergency Economte
Powers A&t (50 U.S.C. 170I et seq.), the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.$.C. 160I et seq.), the Arms Export
Control Act, as amended (22 U.S.. 2751 et seq.), Execut!
ve Orders No#. 12851 [22 U.S.0. 2797 rote] and 12924
(set out above], and section 30I of title 3, Un!ted States
Code,
I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United
States of America, find that the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of
mass destruction")and of the means of delivering such
weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security. foreign policy. and
economy of the United States. And hereby declare a nattonal
emergency to deal with that threat.
Accordingly. I hereby order:
SECTION I. International Negotiations. It is tbe policy
of the United States to lead and seek mult!laterally
Coordinated efforts with other countries to control the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and tbe
means of delivering such weapons. Accordingly, the
Secretary of State shall cooperate In and lead malt±lateral
efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of del'very.
Sc. 2. Importtton of Controls. As provided herein, the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce
shah use their respective authorities, Including the
ArmS EpOrL COntrOl At [22 U.8.C. 2751 et seq.] and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act [50
Annex 36
Page 205 TTTLE 50--WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 41701
U.S.C I701 et sea.J to control any exports, to the extent
tbey are not already controlled by the Department
of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
that ether Secretary determines would assist a country
in acquiring the capabLlty to develop, produce,
stockpile, del'ver. or use weapons of mass destruction
or their means of delivery. 'The Secretary of State shall
pursue early negothatons with foresn governments to
adopt effective measures comparable to those Imposed
under this order.
SEC. 3. Department of Commerce Controls. (a) The Secretary
of Commerce shall prohibit the export of any
goods, technology, or services subject to the Secrotary's
export Jurisdiction that the Secretary of Commerce
determines, In consultation with the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other approprlate
officials, would assist a foreign country In acquiring
the capablfty to develop. produce, stockpile,
deliver, or use weapons of mass destruction or their
means of delivery. The Secretary of State shall pursue
early negotiations with foreign governments to adopt
effective measures comparable to those Imposed under
this section.
(b) Subsection (a) of this section will not Apply to exports
relating to a particular category of weapons of
mass destruction (L.e., nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons) ff their destination Is a country with whose
government the United States has entered Into a bflateral
or multilateral arrangement for the control of that
category of weapons of mass destruction-related goods
(Including delivery systems) and technology. or matntains
domestic export controls comparable to controls
that are Imposed by the United States with respect to
that category of goods and technology, or that are
otherwise deemed adequate by the Secretary of State.
(¢) The Secretary of Commerce shall require valtdated
licenses to implement this order and shall coord!ate
any license applications with the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense.
(d) The Secretary of Commerce. In consultation with
the Secretary of State, shall take such acttons, ncludIng
the promulgation of rules, regulations. and amendments
thereto. as may be necessary to continue to regulate
the activities of Un!ted States persons In order to
prevent the!r part!cipaton In activities that could contribute
to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
or their means of delfvery, as provided fn the Export
Administration Regulations, set forth In TItle 15,
Chapter VII, Subchapter C, of the Code of Federal Regulattons,
Parts 768 t 799 Inclusive.
SEO. 4. Sanctions Against Foregn Persons. (a) In add!tion
to the sanctions Imposed on fore!g persons as provided
tn the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1991 [Pub. L. 101-510. see Tables for classtfcation]
and the Chemical and Boloslca! Weapons
Control and Warfare El!mtnation Act of 1991 (22 0.S.C.
5601 et seq.]. sancttons also shall be Imposed on a forelgn
person with respect to chemical and biological
weapons proliferation If the Secretary of State determines
that the foreign person on or after the effective
date of this order or its predecessor, Executive Order
No, 12735 of November 16, 1990. knowingly and mater!ally
contributed to the efforts of any foreign country,
project, or entity to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or
otherwise acquire chemical or biological weapons.
(b) No department or agency of the United States
Government may procure, or enter Into any Contract
for the procurement of, any goods or services from any
foreign person described In subsection (a) of this secton.
The Secretary of the Treasury shall prohibit the
Importation Into the United States of products produced
by that fore!gn person.
() Sanctions pursuant to this section may be term!pated
or not Imposed agalst foreign persons If the Seretary
of State determines that there is reliable evtdence
that the foregn person concerned has ceased al
activities referred to In subsection (a)
(d) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
Treasury may provide appropriate exemptions for procurement
contracts necessary to meet DI.S, operational
military requirements or requirements under defense
production Agreements, sole source suppliers, spare
parts, components, routine servicing and maintenance
of products, and medical and humanitarian Items. They
may provide exemptions for contracts In existence on
the date of thts order under appropriate circumstances.
Sc. 5. Sanctions Against Foreign Countries. (a) In add!tton
to the sanctions Imposed on foreign countries as
provided In the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
and Warfare E[minatton At of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 560I
et seq.), sactIons also shall be Imposed on a fore!gn
country as spec1fled In subsection (b) of this section, If
the Secretary of State determines that the foreign
country has, on or after the effective date of this order
or Its predecessor. Executive Ord6r No. 12735 of November
16, 1990, (D) used chemical or biological weapons In
violation of International law; (2 made substantial
preparations to use chemical or biological weapons An
violation of International law; or (3) developed, produced,
stockpiled, or otherwise acquired chemical or bi0logical
weapons In violation of International law.
(b) The following sanctions shall be imposed on any
foreign country Identified In subsection (a)(1) of this
sect4on unless the Secretary of State determines, on
grounds of significant foreign polley or national security,
that any Individual sanction should not be applied.
The sancttons spec\fled in this section may be
made applicable to the countries [dent\fled In subsections
(aK2) or (a)63) when the Secretary of State determines
that such action will further the objectives of
this order pertaining to proliferation, The sanctions
spec\fled In subsection 0b)2) below shall be Imposed
with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury.
(D) Foreign Assistance No assistance shall be provided
to that country under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 [22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.], or any successor Act, or the
Arms Export Control Act [22 U.S.0. 2751 et sea.]. other
than assistance that Is Intended to benefit the people of
that country directly and that fs not channeled
through governmental agencies or entities of that
country.
(2) Multilateral Development Bank Assistance The
United States shall oppose any loan or financial or
technical assistance to that country by International
financial Institutions In accordance with section 70I of
the International Flanefal Institutions Act (22 U.S.C.
26200).
(3) Dental of Credit or Other Financial Assistance.' The
United States shall deny to that country any credit or
financal assistance by any department, agency, or nstrumentality
of the United States Government.
(4) Prohbttton of Arms Sales, The United States Government
shall not, under the Arms EXpOrt Control Act,
sell to that country any defense articles or defense
services or Issue any license for the export of ftems on
the United States Munitions LAst.
(5) Erports of National Securly-Sensitive Goods and
Technology No exports shall be permitted of an goods
or technologies controlled for national security reasons
under the Export Administration Regulations.
(6) Further Brport Restrictions. 'The Secretary of Commerce
shall prob'bit or otherwise substantially restrict
exports to that country of goods, technology, and servtoes
(excluding agricultural commodities and products
otherwise subject to control).
() Import Restrictions. Restrictions shall bo Imposed
on the Importation Into the United States of art4oles
(that may Include petroleum or any petroleum product)
that are the growth, product. or manufacture of that
country.
(8) Landin Rights. At the earliest practicable date,
the Secretary of State shall terminate, in a manner
consistent with International law, the authority of any
alr carrier that Is controlled in fact by the government
of that country to engage In alr transportation (as defined
in section 101010) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (49 U.8.C. App 1301010) {see 49 U.$.C. 4010205)).
SO. 6. Duration. Any sanctions Amposed pursuant to
sections 4 or 5 of this order shall remain In force until
the Secretary of State determines that lifting any
Annex 36
41702 TITLE 50 WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE Page 206
sanction ts In the forelgn policy or national security Interests
of the United States or, as to sanctions under
section 4 of this order, until the Secretary bas made
the determination nder section 4(0).
SE. 7. Implementation. The Secretary of State, the
Secretary of the Treasury. and tbe Secretary of Commerce
are hereby authorized and directed to take such
actions, Including the promulgation of rules and reguations,
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of this order. These actions, and In particular those In
sections 4 and5 of this order, shall be made in consultatIon
wIth the Secretary of Defense and, as appropriate,
other agency heads and shall be Implemented In accordance
with procedures established pursuant to Executtve
Order No. 12851 [22 U.8.C. 2797 note] The Secretary
concerned may redelegate any of these functions
to other officers In agencies of the Federal Government.
AI heads of departments and agencies of the
United States Government are directed to take all approprtate
measures within their authority to carry out
the provisions of this order. Includtns the suspension or
termination of licenses or other authorizations.
SEC. 8. Preservation of Authorities. Nothing In this
order ls intended to affect the continued effectiveness
of any rules. regulations, orders, Icenses. or other
forms of administrative action issued, taken. or contiued
in effect heretofore or hereafter under the authority
of the International Economl Emergency Powens
Act [International Emergency Economic Powers
At, 50 U.S.C. 170 et seq.) the Export Administration
Act (50 App. U.S.C. 2401 et seq.I. the Arms Export Control
Act [22 U.S.C, 251 et seq.]. the Nuclear No-proiteration
Aet [22 U.8.C. 3201 et seq.]. Executive Order
No. 12730 of September 30. 1990 (50 U.8.C. 1701 Ote]. Executire
Order N6. 12735 0f November 16, 1990, Executive
Order No. 12924 of Aust 18, 1994 (50 U.S.0. 1701 note],
and Executive Order N. 12930 of September 29, 1994.
SE. 9. Judicial Renew. This order Is not Intended to
create, nor does It create, any right or benefit, substantve
or procedural, enforceable at law by a party
a8alnst the United States. Its a&encles, officers, or any
other person.
SEC. I0. Revocation of Erecutre Orders Nos, 12735 and
12930 Executive Order N. 12735 of November 16, 1990.
and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, are
hereby revoked.
SEC. IL. Effectte Date. This order is effective 1mmedlately.
This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
published In the Federal Register.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This sector is referred to In section 1702 of this title.
$1702. Presidential authorities
(a)(I) At the times and to the extent specified
in section 1701 of this title. the President may,
under such regulations as he may prescribe, by
means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise-
(A) Investigate, regulate, or prohibit
(D) any transactions in forelgn exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between,
by. through, or to any banking Inst!tution,
to the extent that such transfers or
payments Involve any Interest of any foreign
country or a national thereof,
(1if) the Importing or exporting of currenoy
or securities; and
(B) Investigate. regulate, direct and compel.
nullify, void. prevent or prohtbit, any acquisttton,
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, Importation or exportat1on
of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions Involving. any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest;
by any person, or with respect to any property.
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(2) In exercising the authorities granted by
paragraph (1), the President may require any
person to keep a full record of. and to furnish
under oath, In the form of reports or otherwise,
complete Information relative to any act or
transaction referred to In paragraph (l) either
before, during, or after the completion thereof,
or relative to any Interest In foreign property,
or relative to any property in which any foretgn
country or any national thereof has or has had
any interest, or as may be otherwise necessary
to enforce the provisions of such paragraph. In
any case in which a report by a person could be
required under this paragraph., the President
may require the production of any books of account,
records, contracts, letters, memoranda,
or other papers, In the custody or control of
such person.
(3) Compliance with any regulation, instruction,
or direction Issued under this chapter shall
to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and
discharge for all purposes of the obligation of
the person making the same. No person shall be
held liable in any court for or with respect to
anything done or omitted In good faith in connection
with the administration of, or pursuant
to and in reliance on, this chapter, or any reglation,
Instruction, or direction issued under
this chapter.
(b) The authority granted to the President by
this section does not Include the authority to
regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly(
1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or
other personal communication, which does not
involve a transfer of anything of value;
(2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, of articles, such
as food. clothing, and medicine, intended to be
used to relieve human suffering. except to the
extent that the President determines that
such donations (A) would seriously impair his
ability to deal with any national emergency
declared under section 1701 of thts title, (B)
are In response to coercion against the proposed
recipient or donor, or (C) would endanger
Armed Forces of the United States which
are engaged in hostilities or are In a situation
where imminent Involvement In hostilities s
clearly indicated by the circumstances; or
(3) the Importation from any country, or the
exportation to any country, whether commerctal
or otherwise, regardless of format or medfum
of transmission. of any information or
informational materials. Including but not
limited to, publications, films. posters, phonograph
records. photographs. microfilms,
microfiche. tapes, compact disks, CD ROMS,
artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted
from regulation or prohibition by this
paragraph do not include those which are
otherwise controlled for export under section
2404 of the Appendix to this title, or under sectfon
2405 of the Appendix to this title to the
extent that such controls promote the nonso
fn original Te word or probably should popper
Annex 37
Federal Register
Vol. 83, No. 152
Tuesday, August 7, 2018
Title 3--
The President
38939
Presidential Documents
Executive Order 13846 of August 6, 2018
Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies
Act (SO U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended (ISA), the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public
Law 111-195) (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), as amended (CISADA), the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112--
158) (TRA), the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (subtitle
D of title XII of Public Law 112--239) (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.) (IFCA),
section 212() of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C
1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, in order to take
additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive
Order 12957 of March 15, 1995,
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, in light
of my decision on May 8, 2018, to cease the participation of the United
States in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015 (CPOA),
and to re-impose all sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the
JCPOA as expeditiously as possible and in no case later than 180 days
from May 8, 2018, as outlined in the National Security Presidential Memorandum-
11 of May 8, 2018 (Ceasing United States Participation in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and Taking Additional Action to Counter
Iran's Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon),
and to advance the goal of applying financial pressure on the Iranian regime
in pursuit of a comprehensive and lasting solution to the full range of
the threats posed by Iran, including Iran's proliferation and development
of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities,
its network and campaign of regional aggression, its support for terrorist
groups, and the malign activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
and its surrogates, hereby order as follows:
Section 1. Blocking Sanctions Relating to Support for the Government of
Iran's Purchase or Acquisition of U.S. Bank Notes or Precious Metals; Certain
Iranian Persons; and Iran's Energy, Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors and
Port Operators. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a person the measures
described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining that:
(i) on or after August 7, 2018, the person has materially assisted, sponsored,
or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods
or services in support of, the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes
or precious metals by the Government of Iran;
(ii) on or after November 5, 2018, the person has materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for,
or goods or services in support of, the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), or the Central Bank of Iran;
(iii) on or after November 5, 2018, the person has materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial, material. or technological support for,
or goods or services to or in support of:
(A) any Iranian person included on the list of Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets
Annex 37
38940 Federal Register/ Vol. 83, No. 152/Tuesday, August 7, 2018/Presidential Documents
Control (SDN List) {other than an Iranian depository institution whose
property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive
Order 13599 of February 5, 2012); or
(Bl any other person included on the SDN List whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (a) of this section
or Executive Order 13599 (other than an Iranian depository institution
whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant
to Executive Order 13599); or
(iv) pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance
with the terms of such delegation, sanctions shall be imposed on such
person pursuant to section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA because the person:
(A) is part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran;
(B) operates a port in Iran; or
(C) knowingly provides significant financial, material, technological, or
other support to, or goods or services in support of any activity or transaction
on behalf of a person determined under section 1244(c)(2)(A) of
IFCA to be a part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of
Iran; a person determined under section 1244(c)(2)(B) of IFCA to operate
a port in Iran; or an Iranian person included on the SDN List (other
than a person described in section 1244(c)(3) of IFCA).
(b) With respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
in accordance with this section to meet any of the criteria set forth in
subsections (a)(i)--(a)(iv) of this section, all property and interests in property
that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States,
or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United
States person of such person are blocked and may not be transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 2. Correspondent and Payable-Through Account Sanctions Relating to
Iran's Automotive Sector; Certain Iranian Persons; and Trade in Iranian
Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and Petrochemical Products. (a) The Secretary
of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby
authorized to impose on a foreign financial institution the sanctions described
in subsection (b) of this section upon determining that the foreign financial
institution has knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial
transaction:
(i) on or after August 7, 2018, for the sale, supply, or transfer to Iran
of significant goods or services used in connection with the automotive
sector of Iran:
(ii) on or after November 5, 2018, on behalf of any Iranian person included
on the SDN List (other than an Iranian depository institution whose property
and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to Executive
Order 13599) or any other person included on the SON List whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection 1(a) of this
order or Executive Order 13599 (other than an Iranian depository institution
whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant
to Executive Order 13599);
(iii) on or after November 5, 2018, with NIOC Or NICO, except for a
sale or provision to NIOC or NICO of the products described in section
5(a)(3)(A)(i) of ISA provided that the fair market value of such products
is lower than the applicable dollar threshold specified in that provision;
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(iv) on or after November 5, 2018, for the purchase, acquisition, sale,
transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran;
or
(v) on or after November 5, 2018, for the purchase, acquisition, sale,
transport, or marketing of petrochemical products from lran.
(b) With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with this section to meet any of
the criteria set forth in subsections (a)(i)--(a)(v) of this section, the Secretary
of the Treasury may prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict
conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent
account or a payable-through account by such foreign financial institution.
(c) Subsections (a)(ii)-{a)(iv) of this section shall apply with respect to
a significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial
institution for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from
Iran only if
(i) the President determines under subparagraphs (4)B) and (C) of subsection
1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (Public Law 112-81) (2012 NDAA) (22 U.S.C. 8513a) that there
is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products from countries
other than Iran to permit a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum
and petroleum products purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial
institutions; and
(ii) an exception under subparagraph 4(D) of subsection 1245(d) of the
2012 NDAA from the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of
that subsection does not apply.
(d} Subsection (a)(ii) of this section shall not apply with respect to a
significant financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial
institution for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of natural gas
only if the financial transaction is solely for trade between the country
with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution and Iran,
and any funds owed to Iran as a result of such trade are credited to an
account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign
financial institution.
(e) Subsections (a)(ii)-{a)(v) of this section shall not apply with respect
to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the provision
{including any sale) of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical
devices to Iran.
( The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 3. "Menu-based Sanctions Relating to Iran's Automotive Sector and
Trade in Iranian Petroleum, Petroleum Products, and Petrochemical Products.
(a) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
United States Trade Representative, and with the President of the ExportIm.
port Bank, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and other agencies and officials as appropriate, is hereby authorized
to impose on a person any of the sanctions described in section 4 or
5 of this order upon determining that the person:
(i) on or after August 7, 2018, knowingly engaged in a significant transaction
for the sale, supply. or transfer to Iran. of significant goods or
services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran;
(ii) on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaged in a significant
transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of
petroleum or petroleum products from Iran;
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38942 Federal Register/ Vol. 83, No. 152/Tuesday, August 7, 2018/Presidential Documents
(iii) on or after November 5, 2018, knowingly engaged in a significant
transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of
petrochemical products from Iran;
(iv) is a successor entity to a person determined by the Secretary of
State in accordance with this section to meet any of the criteria set
forth in subsections (a)(i)-(a)(iii) of this section;
(v) owns or controls a person determined by the Secretary of State in
accordance with this section to meet any of the criteria set forth in
subsections (a)(i)--(a)(iii) of this section, and had knowledge that the person
engaged in the activities referred to in those subsections; or
(vi) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control
with, a person determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with
this section to meet any of the criteria set forth in subsections (a)(i)-(
a(iii) of this section, and knowingly participated in the activities referred
to in those subsections.
(b) Subsection (a)(ii) of this section shall apply with respect to a person
only if
(i) the President determines under subparagraphs (4)(B) and (C) of subsection
1245(d) of the 2012 NDAA that there is a sufficient supply of
petroleum and petroleum products from countries other than Iran to permit
a significant reduction in the volume of petroleum and petroleum products
purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial institutions; and
(ii) an exception under subparagraph 4(D) of subsection 1245(d) of the
2012 NOAA from the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of
that subsection does not apply.
Sec, 4. Agency Implementation Authorities for "Menu-based" Sanctions.
When the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms of section 3
of this order, bas determined that a person meets any of the criteria described
in subsections (a)()-(a)(vi) of that section and has selected any of the sanctions
set forth below to impose on that person, the heads of relevant agencies,
in consultation with the Secretary of State. as appropriate, shall take the
following actions where necessary to implement the sanctions imposed by
the Secretary of State:
(a) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States
shall deny approval of the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension
of credit, or participation in an extension of credit in connection with
the export of any goods or services to the sanctioned person;
(b) agencies shall not issue any specific license or grant any other specific
permission or authority under any statute or regulation that requires the
prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition
for the export or reexport of goods or technology to the sanctioned person;
(c) with respect to a sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
(i) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall take
such actions as they deem appropriate, including denying designation,
or terminating the continuation of any prior designation of, the sanctioned
person as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments;
or
(ii) agencies shall prevent the sanctioned person from serving as an agent
of the United States Government or serving as a repository for United
States Government funds:
(d) agencies shall not procure, or enter into a contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person;
(e) the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien that the Secretary
of State determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder
with a controlling interest in, a sanctioned person; or
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(f) the heads of the relevant agencies, as appropriate, shall impose on
the principal executive officer or officers, or persons performing similar
functions and with similar authorities, of a sanctioned person the sanctions
described in subsections (a)-(e) of this section, as selected by the Secretary
of State.
(g) The prohibitions in subsections (a)-(f) of this section apply except
to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives,
or licenses that may be issued pursuant lo this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 5. Additional Implementation Authorities for "Menu-based' Sanctions.
(a) When the President, or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the
Treasury pursuant to authority delegated by the President and in accordance
with the terms of such delegation, has determined that sanctions described
in section 6(a) of ISA shall be imposed on a person pursuant to ISA,
CISADA, TRA, or IFCA and has selected one or more of the sanctions
set forth below to impose on that person or when the Secretary of State,
in accordance with the terms of section 3 of this order, has determined
that a person meets any of the criteria described in subsections (a)(i)(
a)(vi) of that section and has selected one or more of the sanctions set
forth below to impose on that person, the Secretary of the Treasury. in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take the following actions
where necessary to implement the sanctions selected and maintained by
the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of the Treasury:
(i) prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans
or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than
$10,000,000 in any 12-month period, unless such person is engaged in
activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided
for such activities;
(ii) prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person
has any interest;
(iii) prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions
or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that
such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person;
(iv) block all property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person of
the sanctioned person, and provide that such property and interests in
property may not be transferred, paid. exported, withdrawn, or otherwise
dealt in;
(v) prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing
significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person;
(vi) restrict or prohibit imports of goods, technology, or services, directly
or indirectly, into the United States from the sanctioned person; or
(vii) impose on the principal executive officer or officers, or persons
performing similar functions and with similar authorities, of a sanctioned
person the sanctions described in subsections (a)(i)-(a)(vi) of this section,
as selected by the President or Secretary of State or the Secretary of
the Treasury, as appropriate.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
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Sec. 6. Sanctions Relating to the Iranian Rial. (a) The Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized
to impose on a foreign financial institution the sanctions described in subsection
(b) of this section upon determining that the foreign financial institution
has, on or after August 7, 2018:
(i) knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction related
to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials or a derivative, swap, future,
forward, or other similar contract whose value is based on the exchange
rate of the Iranian rial; or
(ii) maintained significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Lran
denominated in the Iranian rial.
(b) With respect to any foreign financial institution determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with this section to meet the criteria
set forth in subsection (a(i) or (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of the
Treasury may:
(i) prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the
maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payablethrough
account by such foreign financial institution; or
(ii) block all property and interests in property that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of any United States person of
such foreign financial institution, and provide that such property and
interests in property may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn,
or otherwise dealt in.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 7. Sanctions with Respect to the Diversion of Goods Intended for the
People of Iran, the Transfer of Goods or Technologies to Iran that are
Likely to be Used to Commit Human Rights Abuses, and Censorship. (a)
The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at the recommendation
of the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to impose on a person the
measures described in subsection (b) of this section upon determining that
the person:
(i) has engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other activities
relating to the diversion of goods, including agricultural commodities,
food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people of Iran;
(ii) has engaged, on or after January 2, 2013, in corruption or other activities
relating to the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or resale of
goods described in subsection (a)(i) of this section;
(iii) has knowingly, on or after August 10, 2012, transferred, or facilitated
the transfer of, goods or technologies to Iran, any entity organized under
the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government
of Iran, or any national of Iran, for use in or with respect to Iran, that
are likely to be used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities, or by any other person on behalf of the Government
of Iran or any of such agencies or instrumentalities. to commit serious
human rights abuses against the people of Iran;
(iv) has knowingly, on or after August 10, 2012, provided services, including
services relating to hardware, software, or specialized information
or professional consulting, engineering, or support services, with respect
to goods or technologies that have been transferred to Iran and that are
likely to be used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, or by any other person on behalf of the Government
of Iran or any of such agencies or instrumentalities. to commit serious
human rights abuses against the people of Iran;
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(v) has engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran
on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise
of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran. or that limit
access to print or broadcast media, including the facilitation or support
of intentional frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or an
entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran that would jam
or restrict an international signal;
{vi) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of,
the activities described in subsections (a)(i)-(a)(v) of this section or any
person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to this section; or
(vii) is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for
or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and
interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.
(b) With respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
in accordance with this section to meet any of the criteria set forth in
subsections (a)(i)--(a)(vii) of this section, all property and interests in property
that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States,
or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United
States person of such person are blocked and may not be transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (b) of this section apply except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition.
Sec. 8. Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States Person and Established
or Maintained Outside the United States. (a) No entity owned or
controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside
the United States may knowingly engage in any transaction, directly or
indirectly, with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction
of the Government of Iran, if that transaction would be prohibited
by Executive Order 12957, Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, Executive
Order 13059 of August 19, 1997, Executive Order 13599, or sections 1
or 15 of this order, or any regulation issued pursuant to the foregoing.
if the transaction were engaged in by a United States person or in the
United States.
(b) Penalties assessed for violations of the prohibition in subsection (a)
of this section, and any related violations of section 15 of this order may
be assessed against the United States person that owns or controls the
entity that engaged in the prohibited transaction.
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply, except to
the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the
effective date of this order or, where specifically provided, the effective
date of the prohibition, except to the extent provided in subsection 20{c)
of this order.
Sec. 9. Revoking and Superseding Prior Executive Orders. The following
Executive Orders are revoked and superseded:
(a) Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012 (Authorizing the Implementation
of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran);
and
(b) Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016 (Revocation of Executive
Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645 With Respect to Iran, Amendment
Annex 37
38946 Federal Register/ Vol. 83, No, 152/Tuesday, August 7, 2018/Presidential Documents
of Executive Order 13628 With Respect to Iran, and Provision of Implementation
Authorities for Aspects of Certain Statutory Sanctions Outside the Scope
of U.S. Commitments Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of
July 14, 2015).
Sec. 10. Natural Gas Project Exception. Subsections 1(a), 2(a)(i)-(a)(v),
3(a)(ii)--(a(iii), and, with respect to a person determined by the Secretary
of State in accordance with section 3 to meet the criteria of 3(a)(ii)-{iii),
3(a)(iv)-(vi) of this order shall not apply with respect to any person for
conducting or facilitating a transaction involving a project described in
subsection (a) of section 603 of TRA to which the exception under that
section applies.
Sec. 11. Donations. I hereby determine that, to the extent section 203(b)(2)
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 17020b)(2)) may apply, the making of donations of
the types of articles specified in such section by, to, or for the benefit
of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant
to this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national
emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, and I hereby prohibit such
donations as provided by subsections 1(b), 5(a)(iv), 6(b)(ii), and 7(b) of
this order.
Sec. 12. Prohibitions. The prohibitions in subsections 1(b), 5(a)(iv), 6b)(ii),
and 7(b) of this order include:
(a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
by, to. or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to this order; and
(b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services
from any such person.
Sec. 13. Entry into the United States. The unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant
entry into the United States of aliens determined to meet one
or more of the criteria in subsections 1(a), 3(a). and 7(a) of this order
would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and the entry
of such persons into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants,
is hereby suspended. Such persons shall be treated as persons covered
by section 1 of Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry
of Aliens Subject to United Nations Security Council Travel Bans and International
Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions).
Sec. 14. General Authorities. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including
adopting rules and regulations, to employ all powers granted to me
by IEEPA and sections 6(a)(6), 6(a)(7), 6(a)(8), 6(a)(9), 6(a)(11), and 6(a)(12)
of ISA, and to employ all powers granted to the United States Government
by section 6(a)(3) of ISA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of this order, other than the purposes described in sections 3, 4, and 13
of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable
law, redelegate any of these functions within the Department of the Treasury.
All agencies of the United States shall take all appropriate measures within
their authority to implement this order.
Sec. 15. Evasion and Conspiracy. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids,
has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts
to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order or in Executive
Order 12957, Executive Order 12959, Executive Order 13059, or Executive
Order 13599 is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth
in this order or in Executive Order 12957, Executive Order 12959, Executive
Order 13059, or Executive Order 13599 is prohibited.
Sec. 16. Definitions. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term "automotive sector of Iran" means the manufacturing or
assembling in Iran of light and heavy vehicles including passenger cars,
trucks, buses, minibuses, pick-up trucks, and motorcycles, as well as original
Annex 37
Federal Register/Vol. 83, No. 152/Tuesday, August 7, 2018/Presidential Documents 38947
equipment manufacturing and after-market parts manufacturing relating to
such vehicles;
(b) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture,
corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;
(c) the term "financial institution" includes (i) a depository institution
(as defined in section 3(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) (12
U.S.C. 1813(c)(1)), including a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as defined
in section 1(b)(7) of the International Banking Act of 1978) (12 U.S.C.
3101(7)); (ii) a credit union; (iii) a securities firm, including a broker or
dealer; (iv) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter;
and (v) any other company that provides financial services;
(d) the term "foreign financial institution" means any foreign entity that
is engaged in the business of accepting deposits, making, granting, transferring,
holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign
exchange, securities, commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers
and sellers thereof, as principal or agent. It includes, but is not limited
to, depository institutions, banks, savings banks, money service businesses,
trust companies, securities brokers and dealers, commodity futures and options
brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign exchange merchants.
securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations, investment
companies, employee benefit plans, dealers in precious metals, stones, or
jewels, and holding companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing.
The term does not include the international financial institutions
identified in 22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2). the International Fund for Agricultural
Development, the North American Development Bank, or any other international
financial institution so notified by the Secretary of the Treasury;
(e) the term "Government of Iran" includes the Government of Iran, any
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central
Bank of Iran, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or
on behalf of, the Government of Lran;
(f) the term "Iran" means the Government of Iran and the territory of
Lran and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf, over which the Government of Iran claims sovereignty,
sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government
of Iran exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives
a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international arrangements;
(g) the term "Iranian depository institution" means any entity (including
foreign branches), wherever located, organized under the laws of Iran or
any jurisdiction within Iran, or owned or controlled by the Government
of Iran, or in Iran, or owned or controlled by any of the foregoing, that
is engaged primarily in the business of banking (for example, banks, savings
banks, savings associations, credit unions, trust companies, and bank holding
companies);
(h) the term "Iranian person" means an individual who is a citizen or
national of lran or an entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran;
(i) the terms "knowledge" and "knowingly," with respect to conduct,
a circumstance, or a result, mean that a person has actual knowledge, or
should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result;
(j) the terms "Naftiran Intertrade Company" and "NICO" mean the Naftiran
lntertrade Company Ltd. and any entity owned or controlled by, or operating
for or on behalf of, the Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd.;
k) the terms "National Iranian Oil Company" and "NIOC" mean the
National Iranian Oil Company and any entity owned or controlled by, or
operating for or on behalf of, the National Iranian Oil Company;
(I) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
Annex 37
38948 Federal Register/ Vol. 83, No. 152/Tuesday, August 7, 2018/Presidential Documents
(ml the term "petrochemical products" includes any aromatic, olefin, and
synthesis gas, and any of their derivatives, including ethylene, propylene,
butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and urea;
(n) the term "petroleum" (also known as crude oil) means a mixture
of hydrocarbons that exists in liquid phase in natural underground reservoirs
and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface
separating facilities;
(o) the term "petroleum products" includes unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum
gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type
jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel
oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum
coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and miscellaneous products obtained from
the processing of: crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas, and
other hydrocarbon compounds. The term does not include natural gas, liquefied
natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non-petroleum fuels;
(pl the term "sanctioned person" means a person that the President,
or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to authority
delegated by the President and in accordance with the terms of such delegation,
has determined is a person on whom sanctions described in section
6(a) of ISA shall be imposed pursuant to ISA, CISADA, TRA, or IFCA,
and on whom the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of
the Treasury has imposed any of the sanctions in section 6(a) of ISA or
a person on whom the Secretary of State, in accordance with the terms
of section 3 of this order, has decided to impose sanctions pursuant to
section 3 of this order;
(q) the term "subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran" means
a person organized under the laws of Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran,
ordinarily resident in Iran, or in Iran, or owned or controlled by any of
the foregoing;
(r) the term "United States financial institution" means a financial institution
as defined in subsection (c) of this section (including its foreign branches)
organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within
the United States or located in the United States: and
(s) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen,
permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States.
Sec. 17. Notice. For those persons whose property and interests in property
are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence
in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds
or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures
to be taken pursuant to this order would render those measures ineffectual.
I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, there need be
no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to subsections
10b), 5(a)(iv), 6(b)(ii), and 7(b) of this order.
Sec. 18. Delegation to Implement Section 104A of CISADA. The Secretary
of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized
to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, and
to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA, as may be necessary to
carry out section 104A of CISADA (22 U.S.C. 8513b). The Secretary of
the Treasury may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these
functions within the Department of the Treasury.
Sec. 19. Rights. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity
by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities,
its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
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Federal Register/ Vol. 83, No. 152/Tuesday, August 7, 2018/Presidential Documents 38949
Sec. 20. Effect on Actions or Proceedings, Blocked Property, and Regulations,
Orders, Directives, and Licenses. (a) Pursuant to section 202 of the NEA
(50 U.S.C. 1622), the revocation of Executive Orders 13716 and 13628 as
set forth in section 9 of this order, shall not affect any action taken or
proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined as of the effective
date of this order, or any action or proceeding based on any act committed
prior to the effective date of this order, or any rights or duties that matured
or penalties that were incurred prior to the effective date of this order.
(b) Except to the extent provided in statutes or regulations, orders, directives,
or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior
to the effective date of this order, the following are blocked and may not
be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: all property
and interests in property that were blocked pursuant to Executive Order
13628 and remained blocked immediately prior to the effective date of
this order.
(c) Except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or
licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, all regulations, orders,
directives, or licenses that were issued pursuant to Executive Order 13628
and remained in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this order
are hereby authorized to remain in effect-subject to their existing terms
and conditions--pursuant to this order, which continues in effect certain
sanctions set forth in Executive Order 13628.
Sec. 21. Relationship to Algiers Accords. The measures taken pursuant to
this order are in response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring
after the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended solely
as a response to those later actions.
Sec. 22. Effective Date. This order is effective 1201 a.m. eastern daylight
time on August 7, 2018.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 6, 2018.
[PR Doc, 2018-17068
Fled 8-6-18; 200 pr
Bing code 3295-F8-P
Annex 37
Annex 38
l5th Congress, let Session --------- House Document 115-32
A LEITER CERTIFYING THAT THE CONDITIONS OF
SECTION 135\d06) OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
OF 1954, AS AMENDED, HAVE BEEN MET
COMMUNICATION
PROM
THE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
TRANSMITTING
A LETTER CERTIFYING THAT THE CONDITIONS OF SECTION
1354d¥6) OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED,
INCLUDING AS AMENDED BY THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT
REVIEW ACT OF 2015 (PUBLIC LAW 114-17), HAVE BEEN MET
AS OF APRIL 18, 2017
APL 27, 2017.Referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Financial Services, the Judiciary, Oversight and Government Reform,
and Ways and Means and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
WASHINGTON ! 21T
Annex 38
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, April 24, 2017.
Hon. PAUL D. RYAN,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: This letter certifies that the conditions of
Section 135(dK6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as
amended, including as amended by the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act of2015 (Public Law 114-17), enacted May 22, 2015, are
met as of April 18, 2017.
Notwithstanding, Iran remains a leading state sponsor of terror
through many platforms and methods. President Donald J. Trump
has directed a National Security Council-led interagency review of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that will evaluate
whether suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the
JCPOA is vital to the national security interests of the United
States. When the interagency review is completed, the administration
looks forward to working with Congress on this issue.
Sincerely,
REX W. TILLERSON,
Secretary of State.
0
(!)
; I
I I I I I
i
! ! I
DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
2017
CarrieLyn D. Guymon
Editor
Office of the Legal Adviser
United States Department of State
Annex 39
787 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
This resolution calls upon Iran to not undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches
using such technology like this launch. Space launch vehicles use technologies
that are closely related to those of ballistic missiles development, in particular to
those of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.
This step follows missile launches into Syria on 18 June and the test of a
medium range ballistic missile on 4 July.
Iran’s program to develop ballistic missiles continues to be inconsistent
with UNSCR 2231 and has a destabilizing impact in the region. We call on Iran not
to conduct any further ballistic missile launches and related activities. We are
writing to the UN Secretary General with our concerns. The governments of
France, Germany and the United Kingdom are discussing these issues bilaterally
with Iran and are raising their concerns.
On October 13, 2017, Secretary Tillerson sent a letter to Congress regarding the
administration’s review of Iran policy and the JCPOA. That congressional correspondence
follows.
___________________
* * * *
As you know, President Donald J. Trump has long maintained that the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (JCPOA) is a bad deal for the United States. As I reported to you in July, Iran has
repeatedly tested the boundaries of the deal—twice exceeding the cap on its heavy water stocks,
and also pushing the number of advanced centrifuges it may operate. Outside the narrow
parameters of the nuclear deal, moreover, Iran has not moderated, but rather accelerated its
malign activities in the region and beyond, in ways that threaten our interests and our allies.
Upon entering office, the President directed his national security team to undertake a
comprehensive review of our Iran strategy and of the JCPOA’s place within that strategy. Our
review is now complete, and he has now approved a new U.S. strategy on Iran that will include
concerted efforts, with our allies, to:
􀁸 Address the threat of the Iranian regime’s destabilizing activities in the broader Middle
East, including giving various forms of support to militant proxies and terrorists;
􀁸 Rebuild our regional alliances and bolster our allies’ capacity to encourage a more stable
balance of power in the region;
􀁸 Draw attention to the malignant role played by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), both inside and outside Iran, including the use of Iran's wealth to sustain the
IRGC’s bloody and destabilizing proxy wars and support for terrorism;
􀁸 Counter the Iranian regime’s proliferation of missiles and advanced conventional
weapons that threaten Iran’s neighbors, global trade, and freedom of navigation;
􀁸 Communicate clearly with the Iranian people that their legitimate aspirations are impeded
by the actions of unaccountable regime elements whose greed, corruption, and disregard
for human rights have led them to abandon their responsibility to provide for the Iranian
people; and
􀁸 Deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear weapon.
Annex 39
788 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Given all of the regime’s malign activities outside the scope of the deal, it is clear that Iran
continues to undermine the expectation set out in the JCPOA that the deal would positively
contribute to regional and international peace and security.
However, the JCPOA itself is also flawed, most notably because key restrictions sunset
over time, eventually leaving Iran free to openly pursue industrial-scale uranium enrichment. This
would allow Tehran to decrease the amount of time it would need to make enough fissile material
for a nuclear weapon, should it choose to violate its commitments under the Non- Proliferation
Treaty and do so.
Based on these considerations, this Administration has concluded following our
comprehensive review that the sanctions relief Iran received as part of the deal is not
proportionate to the specific, limited-duration measures Iran took with respect to terminating its
illicit nuclear program. Accordingly, I am unable to certify that the condition in Section
135(d)(6)(A)(iv)(I) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, including as amended
by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) of 2015 (Public Law 114-17) is met as of
October 15, 2017.
This conclusion does not mean that it is impossible to fix the flaws of the JCPOA or that
·it is time for us to leave the deal. Rather than take up legislation under the procedures set forth in
Section 135(e) of the AEA, the President has requested that Congress instead work with the
Administration to directly address the JCPOA’s flaws by amending and strengthening the relevant
portions of the AEA, as added by INARA, while we continue to hold Iran accountable for its
current commitments. We should work together toward a solution that prevents the emergence of
a nuclear-armed Iran and prevents Iran from further developing intercontinental ballistic missiles
that undermine regional and international peace and security.
It is only right that we face the Iranian threat as Americans united across the political
spectrum and across the branches of our government. This Administration will not allow a
singular focus on Iran’s nuclear program to blind us to, or distract us from addressing, the
regime’s many other malign activities, especially its ongoing role in fomenting and perpetuating
regional conflicts. We look forward to working with Congress, as well as our allies and partners,
to address the full range of Iran's malign activities.
* * * *
c. Kazakhstan
As discussed in Digest 2015 at 822, the Agreement Continuing the International Science
and Technology Center (“ISTC”) was signed on December 9, 2015, relocating the ISTC
from Russia to Kazakhstan and broadening the scope of ISTC activities. On December 14,
2017, the final instrument of ratification of the Agreement was deposited with the ISTC
Secretariat, bringing the Agreement into force in accordance with its terms.
d. Norway
On January 19, 2017, the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway concerning
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, signed at Washington on June 11, 2016, entered into
Annex 39
United Nations S/2017/1030
Security Council Distr.: General
8 December 2017
Original: English
17-21508 (E) 141217
*1721508*
Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
I. Introduction
1. Almost two years after Implementation Day (16 January 2016), I continue to
believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is the best way to ensure the
exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and to realize the aspirations of the Iranian people. The Plan constitutes a major
achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and diplomacy in addressing issues that
could have an impact on regional and international peace and security, and it is my
hope that it will be preserved.
2. Since 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported
nine times to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran is impleme nting
its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In its
most recent quarterly reports (S/2017/777 and S/2017/994), the Agency again
reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and
that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities
for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing. The Agency also reported that the
Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to
its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to apply the transparency
measures contained in the Plan. In its latest report, the Agency further indicated that
it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the
sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.
3. Against this backdrop of diplomatic achievement, compliance and robust
verification, the decision of 13 October by the President of the United States of
America not to certify that the suspension of its national sanctions pursuant to the
agreement is “appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures
taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear programme”, and the
potential legislative actions that the Congress of the United States may take to
reimpose those national sanctions, have regrettably created considerable uncertainty
regarding the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. At present, these
national executive actions do not affect the validity of the Plan or the respective
commitments of the participants contained therein. I am reassured that the United
States has expressed its commitment to stay in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action for now.
4. I call upon all participants to remain steadfast in their commitment to the full
implementation of the agreement and to work through differences and challenges in
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a spirit of cooperation and compromise, good faith and reciprocity. It is important that
the Plan continue to work for all its participants, including by delivering benefits to
the Iranian people.
5. I encourage all Member States and regional and international organizations to
act in accordance with and support the implementation of this historic agreement,
which is in the interest of the international community at large. I welcome the
commitment of the European Union to the continued full and effective
implementation of all parts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I also welcome
the affirmative statements by China, the Russian Federation and numerous other
Member States in support of the Plan. I encourage the United States to maintain its
commitments to the Plan and to consider the broader implications for the region and
beyond before taking any further steps. Similarly, I encourage the Islamic Republic
of Iran to carefully consider the concerns raised by other participants in the Plan.
6. The present report, the fourth on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015),
provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings
and recommendations, since the issuance of the third report of the Secretar y-General
(S/2017/515), on 20 June 2017. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the
present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015),
which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missilerelated
transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as
well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.
II. Key findings and recommendations
7. Since 16 January 2016, the Secretariat has not received any reports on the
supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear or dual -use
items, materials, equipment, goods or technology undertaken contrary to paragraph 2
of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In relation to alleged inconsistent Iranian
procurement activities in Germany, the Government of Germany confirmed to the
Secretariat in November 2017 that it had no indications of any activities inconsistent
with paragraph 2 of annex B and had no evidence of any transfers or activities
inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B.
8. Since 20 June 2017, eight additional proposals to participate in or permit
activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian end
uses have been submitted to the Security Council for approval through the
Procurement Channel.1
9. On the basis of interactions that took place during outreach activities carried out
by the Secretariat, it appears that there remains a general lack of understanding of
resolution 2231 (2015), especially in the private sector. This lack of understanding,
coupled with a sense of political uncertainty, appears to have adversely affected the
decisions of some Member States and private sector entities to engage in activities
requiring prior approval from the Security Council. Member States should undertake
greater efforts to promote awareness and understanding of the specific restrictions, in
particular the Procurement Channel, the procedures for the submission of proposals
and the process for review. The Secretariat stands ready to assist Member States in such
efforts, in line with the arrangements and procedures outlined in the note by the
President of the Council dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44).
10. Regarding the emerging information on the possible transfer by the Islamic
Republic of Iran of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related technology to the
__________________
1 All nuclear-related proposals and other documents related to the Procurement Channel are treated
as confidential.
Annex 40
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17-21508 3/10
Houthis in Yemen that may have been used in the ballistic missile launches aimed at
the territory of Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017, the Secretariat has
examined the debris of the missiles launched at Yanbu‘ and Riyadh and is carefully
reviewing all the information and material available. The Security Council should
consider a joint meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 2140 (2014) and the Council in the “2231 format”, to be jointly briefed by
the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Secretariat on their respective findings at the
appropriate time.
11. The Secretariat was provided with an opportunity to examine the arms and
related materiel seized by the United States aboard a dhow in the vicinity of the Gulf
of Oman in March 2016 (see S/2016/589, paras. 29–31). The Secretariat is confident
that close to 900 of the assault rifles seized by the United States are identical to those
seized by France, also in March 2016, which the Secretariat had assessed to be o f
Iranian origin and to have been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran
(see S/2017/515, para. 10).
12. The Defence Industries Organisation, an entity on the list maintained pursuant
to resolution 2231 (2015), 2 participated in a foreign exhibition, the International
Aviation and Space Salon, held in Zhukovsky, Russian Federation, in July 2017. In
November, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
informed the Secretariat that an investigation into the issue had found no action
inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).
13. Since the issuance of my previous report, Major General Qasem Soleimani has
continued to travel to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, despite the travel ban
provision of resolution 2231 (2015) and previous reporting to the Security Council
on this issue. The Council should call upon the Government of the relevant Member
States in the region, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to take the steps necessary
to ensure proper implementation of the travel ban and other provisions of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015).
14. The list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) has not been reviewed
or updated by the Security Council since 17 January 2016. To ensure proper
implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban provisions, I recommend that the
Council review and update the list as appropriate and consider appropriate options for
delisting processes.
15. In a letter dated 28 August 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/739), the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that the
Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, signed into law on
2 August 2017, violated the terms of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015). While the allegations raised in the letter have been duly considered, it
is my assessment that this information does not fall within the scope of the present
report, unless guidance to the contrary is provided by the Security Council.
__________________
2 Available from www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. The list maintained pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under
resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the
exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231
(2015), who were delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities
and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined by
resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained
pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
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III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
16. In resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment of a
dedicated Procurement Channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to
review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual -
use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through
this Channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from the Joint
Commission established under the Plan regarding proposals by States to participate
in or permit activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
17. Since 20 June 2017, 8 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set
forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the
Security Council, bringing to 24 the total number of proposals submitted since
Implementation Day for approval through the Procurement Channel. At the time of
reporting, 16 proposals had been approved by the Council, 3 had not been approved,
and 5 had been withdrawn by the proposing States.
18. In addition, the Security Council received four new notifications pursuant to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities
that do not require approval but require a notification to the Council or to both the
Council and the Joint Commission.
19. During the reporting period, following the publication of German domestic
intelligence reports, various media outlets alleged that Iranian entities might have
attempted to procure nuclear or dual-use items, materiel, goods and technology in
Germany outside the Procurement Channel. In its interactions with the Secretariat,
including during meetings in Berlin in early November 2017, the Government of
Germany recalled the 2016 report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution according to which, as far as the Federal Office was able to verify such
evidence, it did not reveal any violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
On 27 November 2017, the Government of Germany informed the Secretariat that it
had no indications of any activities inconsistent with paragraph 2 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015) conducted in Germany by the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was
also reiterated that German authorities would continue to rigorously explore and
assess any possible activities inconsistent with paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015).
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran
20. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called
upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches
using such ballistic missile technology.
21. On 2 August 2017, I received a joint letter from France, Germany, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States on the launch
by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a Simorgh space launch vehicle on 27 July 2017.
Those States underscored that the phrase “ballistic missile designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons” in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)
included all Missile Technology Control Regime Category I systems — defined as
those capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km —
that are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
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destruction. They noted that space launch vehicles such as the Simorgh were
“inherently capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km if
configured as a ballistic missile” and “inherently capable of delivering nuclear
weapons”. Therefore, those States considered that the launch was inconsistent with
paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
22. Through a letter dated 16 August 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/720), the
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
transmitted a position paper in which it was underscored that there was “no legal
prohibition on the development by the Islamic Republic of Iran of missile and space
programmes”, as resolution 2231 (2015) contained only a call, which was “by all
means not a prohibition”, to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that
were designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It was also stated in the
paper that there was no information that Iranian ballistic missiles were specifically
designed to carry nuclear weapons and that, as verified by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, “Tehran does not possess nuclear weapons, and it does not carry out
work on the development thereof”. The Russian Federation also noted that “no
prohibition on cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran on missile -related items”
was in existence, but that there was the requirement for Member States to seek prior
approval of the Security Council for the activities set forth in paragraph 4 of annex B
to resolution 2231 (2015).
23. In a letter dated 23 August 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/731), the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran underscored that the launch of a
Simorgh space launch vehicle on 27 July 2017 was “part of a scientific and
technological activity related to the use of space technology” and that the Islamic
Republic of Iran was “determined to continue to exercise this right for its
socioeconomic interests”. He also stated that the definition of the Missile Technology
Control Regime was not an internationally agreed definition and that the “technical
characteristics and operational requirements of the satellite launch vehicles clearly
make them distinct from ballistic missile systems”. The Permanent Representative
concluded that the test launch could not be regarded as inconsistent with the
resolution.
24. The Security Council discussed the launch of the Simorgh space launch vehicle
on 8 September 2017. There was no consensus among Council members on how that
launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). The fourth six-month report of the facilitator
for the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) will provide the
details of Council deliberations on this issue.
25. In addition to the above, several launches of ballistic missiles by the Islamic
Republic of Iran were brought to my attention. In identical letters dated 28 June 2017
addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/555), the
Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations brought to my attention
information that had reportedly recently come to light regarding the flight test of a
Qiam ballistic missile on 15 November 2016 that used a Star of David as the intended
target. In the same letter, the Permanent Representative referred to the ballistic
missiles reportedly launched by the Islamic Republic of Iran at targets in the Syrian
Arab Republic on 18 and 19 June 2017. He considered that the test-firing of those
ballistic missiles, all of which were Missile Technology Control Regime Category I
systems, was in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). A joint statement by France,
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, issued on 28 July 2017, referred
to the same launches at targets in the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as to an alleged
flight test of a medium-range ballistic missile on 4 July 2017.
26. In identical letters dated 17 August 2017 addressed to me and the President of the
Security Council (S/2017/719), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic
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of Iran stated that the claim made “regarding the test launch of a ballistic missile on 15
November 2016 and the use of a specific marking as target practice is a sheer
falsehood”. He also underscored that “Iranian military capabilities, including ballistic
missiles, have not been designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and were
thus “outside the purview of the Security Council resolution”. In addition, he referred
to the terrorist attacks by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as
Da’esh) in Tehran on 7 June 2017 and to the determination of the Islamic Republic of
Iran to fight terrorism and violent extremism.
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
27. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States,
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a case -
by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the
Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology,3 the provision of various services or assistance,
and the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial
ballistic missile activities. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted
to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.
28. In identical letters dated 7 November 2017 addressed to me and the President of
the Security Council (S/2017/937), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to
the United Nations stated that the authorities of Saudi Arabia had confirmed, through
the examination of the debris of the missiles launched from within Yemeni territory
on 22 July and 4 November 2017 at Yanbu‘ and at Riyadh, respectively, “the role of
the Iranian regime in manufacturing the missiles”. He also stated that this was “a
flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015)”. In
a letter also dated 7 November 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security
Council (S/2017/936), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects such baseless and
unfounded accusations”.
29. In October and November 2017, the authorities of Saudi Arabia invited the
Secretariat to examine the debris of the ballistic missiles launched at its territory on
22 July and 4 November 2017. During those visits, the authorities of Saudi Arabia
indicated that, according to their assessment, those missiles were Iranian Qiam-1
ballistic missiles (a variant of the Scud missile). The Secretariat observed that the
diameter of both missiles was consistent with that of the Scud family and that the
missiles had similar structural and manufacturing features, which suggested a
common origin. The Secretariat noted that markings found on the missiles indicated
that the oxidizer tank was situated above the fuel tank. The Secretariat also observed
that, under the blue overpaint, the missile launched on 4 November had paint and
markings resembling those of the one launched on 22 July. The Secretariat was
informed that no tail fins had been recovered in either instance. The Secretariat
observed remnants of mounting plates on the tail unit of the missile of 22 July, which
suggest that the missile was finless. The Secretariat also observed three actuators that
bore the castings of a logo similar to that of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, an
entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) and a subordinate to
the Aerospace Industries Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to
__________________
3 The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile
Technology Control Regime list (see S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear -
weapon delivery systems.
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Saudi authorities, the actuators belonged to the missile of 4 November. The
Secretariat is still analysing the information collected and will report back to the
Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.
30. During the reporting period, following the publication of German domestic
intelligence reports, various media outlets alleged that Iranian entities might also have
attempted to procure ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods or
technology in Germany. On 27 November 2017, the Government of Germany informed
the Secretariat that it had no evidence of any transfers or activities inconsistent with
paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) conducted by the Islamic Republic
of Iran in Germany. It was also reiterated that German authorities would continue to
rigorously explore and assess any possible transfers or activities inconsistent with
paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
31. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States,
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a case -
by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic
Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as
defined for the purpose of the Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel,
including spare parts. Prior approval from the Council is also required for the
provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technical training, financial resources or
services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture, maintenance or use of those arms and related materiel. At the time of
reporting, no proposal had been approved by the Council pursuant to that paragraph.
32. In paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council
decided that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as
decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale
or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the time
of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that
paragraph.
33. In June 2016, the United States brought to the attention of my predecessor
information on the seizure, on 28 March 2016, of an arms shipment on board a dhow,
the Adris, transiting international waters in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman (see
S/2016/589, paras. 29–31). According to the assessment of the United States, the arms
shipment had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In October 2017, United
States authorities invited the Secretariat to examine the arms and related materiel
seized, consisting of 1,500 AKM type assault rifles, 200 rocket propelled grenade
launchers, 21 heavy machine guns and miscellaneous other items. The Secretariat
could independently ascertain that close to 900 of the assault rifles and the 21 machine
guns were in new condition. The 900 assault rifles were identical to those seized by
France in March 2016, which had characteristics of the Iranian-produced KLS 7.62 x
39 mm (furnishing made of dark brown synthetic material, fire selector and rear sight
markings, slanted screw-on compensator and dot-peen marking style), which the
Secretariat has assessed were of Iranian origin and shipped from the Islamic Republic
of Iran (see S/2017/515, paras. 10 and 31). In addition, the serial numbers of the
assault rifles seized by France and the United States fall within the same productio n
batch and include sequential numbers. More than 100 of the grenade launchers
appeared to have characteristics similar to Iranian-produced launchers (for example,
paint markings and heat shields). Among the miscellaneous items examined by the
Secretariat, which included gun covers, tools and cleaning kits, were two foreignmade
neodymium sirens that appeared to have been modified after sale by the addition
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of a cable, bearing markings indicating Iranian manufacture, with a military-type
electrical connector. An identical siren was also observed by the Secretariat in a
separate incident (see para. 34 below), as well as a fuse plate and a detonation device
booster identical to those seen in photographs taken on board the Adris and provided
to the Secretariat by United States authorities. The Secretariat is still analysing the
remaining information, and I will report back to the Council accordingly as additional
information becomes available.
34. During its visits to Saudi Arabia in October and November 2017, the Secretariat
received information on unmanned surface vessels laden with explosives allegedly used
against the Saudi-led coalition. Saudi authorities indicated that one such vessel had
been recovered by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates in Yemeni waters.
Reportedly, the vessel itself and the explosives were from Yemen, but parts of the
guidance and detonation systems had been supplied by the Islamic Republic of Iran. In
November 2017, the Secretariat examined parts of the detonation and guidance
systems. It observed that the computer terminal (part of the guidance system) had a
dual English/Farsi keyboard and characteristics (design and construction features,
graphical user interface and programme icon) similar to those of terminals produced
by an Iranian company. The Secretariat also observed that some of the electrical cables
bore markings indicating Iranian manufacture and that the detonation system included
a neodymium siren, a fuse plate and a detonation device booster identical to those
seized on board the dhow Adris (see para. 33 above). The Secretariat was also presented
with a selection of photographs and geographical coordinates reportedly extracted from
the guidance system computer. At the time of reporting, the Secretariat had not been
able to independently confirm the authenticity of the photographs and geographical
coordinates. The Secretariat is still analysing the available information and will provide
an update to the Council in due course.
35. Also during its visits to Saudi Arabia, the Secretariat was given the opportunity
to examine two unmanned aerial vehicles reportedly recovered in Yemen after
Implementation Day. Saudi authorities determined that one was an Iranian-made
unmanned aerial vehicle of the Ababil-II family. The Secretariat observed that the
vehicle appeared to have characteristics (for example, design and construction
features, serial number prefixes and engine) identical to those of others reportedly
seized or recovered in Yemen after Implementation Day that had been brought to its
attention by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United
Nations in letters dated 18 May 2017 (see S/2017/515, para. 34) and 8 November
2017. The Secretariat is still analysing the information provided by the Government
of Saudi Arabia and looks forward to the opportunity to examine the other unmanned
aerial vehicles reportedly seized or recovered by the Presidential Guard forces of t he
United Arab Emirates, in order to independently ascertain their origin.
VI. Implementation of the asset freeze provisions
36. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all
States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the
individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) and
ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available to
those individuals and entities.
37. It appears that the Defence Industries Organisation, an entity presently on the
list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), once again participated in a
foreign exhibition, the International Aviation and Space Salon held in Zhukovsky,
Russian Federation, in July 2017. Its name is on the list of exhibitors released by the
organizers and, according to images released by Iranian and Russian media outlets,
its official company logo appears on several visual displays next to exhibited items.
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38. The Secretariat raised this issue with the Permanent Mission of the Russian
Federation. In November, the Permanent Mission informed the Secretariat that an
investigation into the issue had found no action inconsistent with resolution 2231
(2015). The Permanent Mission indicated that no financial transactions had been
carried out with the Defence Industries Organisation because no fee had been charged
to Iranian participants by the hosts. The Permanent Mission also indicated that all
samples of Iranian-made military equipment exhibited were mock-ups that had been
returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran after the exhibition.
VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision
39. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are
to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their
territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
At the time of reporting, no travel exemption requests had been received or granted
by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.
40. Since the issuance of my previous report, additional information has surfaced
regarding travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. In mid-June, pictures of the
General on a pilgrimage to the holy shrine of Imam Husayn in the city of Karbala’,
Iraq, were published by Iraqi media outlets. In October, pictures of him visiting the
tomb of the former President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, were also
published by Iraqi media outlets. In addition, according to media from the Kurdish
region of Iraq, the General reportedly visited Iraqi Kurdistan several times in
September and October.
41. Furthermore, in mid-June, pictures showing Major General Soleimani in the
Syrian Arab Republic, allegedly with members of the Afghan militia known as the
Fatemiyoun Division along the border with Iraq, were published by Iranian media
outlets. In early November, pictures of the General, allegedly with members of the
Syrian militia known as the Baqir Brigade, in Dayr al-Zawr, Syrian Arab Republic,
were reproduced by Arab media outlets. In mid-November, the Iraqi militia known as
Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba published pictures of the General posing with militia
members in the vicinity of Albu Kamal, Syrian Arab Republic. In late November,
video footage of him in Albu Kamal after its liberation from ISIL (Da’esh) was
reproduced by Arab media outlets.
42. The Secretariat raised the topic of travel by Major General Soleimani with the
Permanent Missions of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations. In
November 2017, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic informed
the Secretariat that his Government had not granted the General any visas to enter the
territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.
VIII. List maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015)
43. During the reporting period, the Secretariat was provided with information on
an individual who may be acting in support of a designated entity on the list
maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). The Secretariat was also provided
with information indicating that another designated entity on the list had used
subsidiaries to circumvent the asset freeze provision of annex B to the resolution. The
Secretariat is seeking further information and will report to the Security Council in
due course. An updated list would facilitate the implementation of the restrictive
measures.
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IX. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
44. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs
continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the
facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division also
continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on
all matters related to the Procurement Channel. In addition, the Division provided
induction briefings for the incoming facilitator and members of the Security Council,
to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).
45. The Division continued to promote publicly available information on the
restrictions imposed by resolution 2231 (2015) through the Security Council website.4
Relevant documents were regularly added to the website and updated in all official
languages. The Division also continued to use outreach opportunities to promote
information on the resolution, in particular the Procurement Channel, in line with
paragraph 6 (e) of the note by the President of the Council dated 16 January 2016. In
October 2017, the Division participated in two forums organized by the World Export
Controls Review, held in London and Washington, D.C. Also in October 2017, the
Secretariat participated in a public awareness-raising workshop on resolution 2231
(2015) and the Procurement Channel, held in Seoul and organized by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies. The interactions of the Division with representatives of
Member States and private sector entities at these events showed that there remains a
general lack of understanding of resolution 2231 (2015), of the restrictive measures
that came into force on 16 January 2016, in particular the Procurement Channel
process, and of the respective roles of the Joint Commission, the Security Council and
its facilitator and the Secretariat. This lack of understanding, as well as a sense of
political uncertainty, appears to have adversely affected the decisions of some Member
States and private entities to re-engage with the Islamic Republic of Iran in trade
activities relating to items, materials, equipment, goods and technology requiring the
prior approval of the Security Council.
46. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from
Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the
provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the
submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.
__________________
4 See www.un.org/en/sc/2231.
Annex 40
The Washington Post
World
Israel says it holds a trove of documents from Iran’s secret
nuclear weapons archive
By Loveday Morris and
Karen DeYoung
April 30, 2018
JERUSALEM — Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Monday said Israel is in possession of tens
of thousands of documents and discs that prove that Iran lied about the history of its nuclear weapons
program when it signed the 2015 nuclear deal.
In a televised speech from Tel Aviv, Netanyahu dramatically pulled a curtain away from a shelf of files that he
said were copies of some of the 55,000 documents that Israel had obtained from Iran’s secret nuclear
archive. Most of the documents, as described, dated from 2003 and before, when Iran had a clandestine
weapons development program dubbed “Project Amad.”
The speech came at a critical time for the nuclear deal, just ahead of a May 12 deadline for President Trump to
decide whether to continue to waive statutory sanctions that were lifted as part of the agreement.
In his remarks, Netanyahu said the cache confirmed something that has not been in dispute among
signatories of the deal — that Iran has lied about its past nuclear efforts. He has waged a fierce campaign for
the pact to be changed or scrapped, often repeating the mantra “fix it or nix it” — concerned that it will enable
Israel’s archrival to come closer to developing a nuclear weapon.
Trump, speaking at a Washington news conference with the president of Nigeria, said Netanyahu’s
revelations “showed that I’ve been 100 percent right” in describing the nuclear agreement as the “worst deal”
ever signed. “We’ll see what happens,” he said of the coming deadline.
Richard Nephew, a former senior State Department official who was part of the U.S. team that negotiated the
deal implemented in January 2016, said Netanyahu’s revelations were “interesting, and important for
building a history of [Iran’s] program. But it is not a new revelation, at least in terms of where the program
was when we were negotiating.”
“To put it another way,” he said, “it is why we negotiated the JCPOA,” or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
“What he is revealing with all this detail is not news,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms
Control Association. “The fact that Iran has experimented with nuclear warhead designs, and had at one point
Annex 41
an active weapons program, makes it all the more essential that the JCPOA remains in place to prevent Iran
from quickly amassing enough fissile material for even one bomb.”
“It is ludicrous to recommend . . . that the deal should be dismantled, which would open a pathway for Iran to
pursue” a nuclear weapon, Kimball said.
Iranian officials have said that if the deal is canceled, they would quickly increase both the quantity and
quality of centrifuges, now restricted under the deal, which would allow them theoretically to produce
weapons-grade uranium.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the administration had known about the documents for “a while,”
and said “I can confirm…these documents are real…they’re authentic.”
Speaking to reporters aboard his aircraft returning from an overseas trip that included a Sunday stop in
Israel, Pompeo agreed that existence of the Iranian program Netanyahu described “has been known for quite
some time.” But, he said, the documents provided “new information” about the “scope and the scale of the
program.” He said the administration had been given a copy of the material but had not yet gone through all
of it yet.
He said that the Iranians kept the documents “for a purpose,” but did not speculate on what it was. In his
confirmation testimony in mid-April, Pompeo agreed that the International Atomic Energy Agency had so far
concluded Iran was in compliance with the terms of the deal, and that he did not believe Tehran had been, or
would be, in a “rush” to build a nuclear weapon, regardless of what Trump decided to do.
The White House, which initially issued a statement saying that the information showed Iran “has a robust,
clandestine nuclear weapons program,” quickly issued a clarification indicating the use of the present tense
was a “clerical error.” A spokesman for the National Security Council said that the Israeli presentation
described “an Iranian effort from 1999-2003 to develop nuclear weapons.”
Netanyahu’s statement “adds new and compelling details” on the past Iranian program, according to the
spokesperson, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under White House ground rules.
Annex 41
In a dramatic presentation, Netanyahu stood on a stage with a pointer. To one side was a bookcase filled with
shelves of files that he said were Iran’s secret nuclear records, apparently obtained through a covert operation
by Israeli intelligence. Next to it was a display cabinet of compact discs.
Standing in front of a screen, Netanyahu displayed slides from the files that revealed the breadth of the
Iranian nuclear program. Showing excerpts from what he said was “half a ton” of documents on a screen
behind him, Netanyahu said they demonstrated conclusively that Iran had not “come clean” on its program.
Iran has repeatedly insisted that it never has had and never would have a weapons program.
The documents indicated that Iran had been proceeding with “five key elements of a nuclear weapons
program,” he said, including designing a weapon, developing nuclear cores and building implosion systems,
preparing test sites and integrating nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles.
“These files conclusively prove that Iran is brazenly lying when it says it never had a nuclear weapons
program,” Netanyahu said. “This is just a fraction of the total material we have,” he said.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif mocked Netanyahu as the “boy who can’t stop crying wolf,”
tweeting a picture of the Israeli prime minister holding up a diagram of a cartoonlike bomb that he used to
illustrate the Iranian nuclear threat during a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in 2012.
“Trump is jumping on a rehash of old allegations already dealt with by the IAEA to ‘nix’ the deal,” Zarif added,
referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency. “How convenient.”
The timing of Netanyahu’s presentation seemed designed for maximum impact on Trump’s decision.
“I am sure this was all fully coordinated with the Trump administration,” said former U.S. ambassador to
Israel Dan Shapiro, a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He said the information was “not
new” but described the retrieval of so many files from Iran as an “intelligence coup.”
Trump has specifically cited the sunset clauses in the agreement, its monitoring and verification provisions,
and its failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile program as flaws that must be “fixed.”
European allies that signed the deal — along with Russia and China — have been negotiating with the State
Department on supplemental agreements to address Trump’s concerns without changing the nuclear
agreement itself. In visits to Washington last week, French President Emmanuel Macron and German
Chancellor Angela Merkel appealed to Trump to keep the deal in place.
Pompeo said that conversations with the Europeans were ongoing, and “we know what it is they’re hoping to
achieve.” Even if Trump decides to pull out of the deal, he said, “I’m confident that we will continue to have
good relations with our European partners.”
“I’ve been a longtime advocate of fixing” flaws in the deal rather than tearing it up, said Mark Dubowitz, CEO
of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “Today’s revelations just make that much more difficult,” he
Annex 41
said. “Not because [Netanyahu] revealed anything we didn’t know about Iran’s nuclear program. What he
revealed is that Iran took all the instructions for making a nuclear bomb and buried them deep away from the
prying eyes of the IAEA and Western intelligence”
As the May 12 U.S. deadline approaches, Netanyahu said he is sure Trump will “do the right thing for the
United States, the right thing for Israel and the right thing for the peace of the world.” His announcement was
made largely in English, a sign that he wanted his message spread to an international audience.
Tensions between Iran and Israel have significantly ratcheted up in recent weeks. The announcement came
just a day after a set of airstrikes in Syria that a monitoring group and some pro-Syrian media blamed on
Israel.
Israeli officials have declined to comment but admitted to hitting more than 100 targets inside Syria over the
course of the civil war there. Israel has said it will not allow Iran or its proxies to build a military presence in
Syria.
Shortly after Netanyahu spoke on Monday, Israel’s parliament voted to expand his powers to declare war,
allowing him to do so with only the approval of the defense minister in “extreme situations.”
DeYoung reported from Washington. Ruth Eglash in Jerusalem contributed to this report.
Loveday Morris
Loveday Morris is The Washington Post's Jerusalem bureau chief. She was previously based in Baghdad and Beirut for The
Post. Follow 
Karen DeYoung
Karen DeYoung is associate editor and senior national security correspondent for The Post. In more than three decades at
the paper, she has served as bureau chief in Latin America and in London and as correspondent covering the White House,
U.S. foreign policy and the intelligence community. Follow 
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Annex 41
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Annex 41
Press Statement
Mike Pompeo
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
April 30, 2018
For many years, the Iranian regime has insisted to the world that its nuclear program was
peaceful. The documents obtained by Israel from inside of Iran show beyond any doubt that the
Iranian regime was not telling the truth. I have personally reviewed many of the Iranian files. Our
nonproliferation and intelligence officials have been analyzing tens of thousands of pages and
translating them from Farsi. This analytical work will continue for many months. We assess that
the documents we have reviewed are authentic.
The documents show that Iran had a secret nuclear weapons program for years. Iran sought to
develop nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. Iran hid a vast atomic archive from the
world and from the IAEA — until today.
PRESS STATEMENT
MICHAEL R. POMPEO, SECRETARY OF STATE
APRIL 30, 2018
Iran Atomic Archive
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Among the flaws of the Iran nuclear deal was the whitewashing of Iran’s illicit activities related to
its military nuclear program. Iran had many opportunities over the years to turn over its files to
international inspectors from the IAEA and admit its nuclear weapons work. Instead, they lied to
the IAEA repeatedly. They also lied about their program to the six nations who negotiated the
Iran nuclear deal. What this means is the deal was not constructed on a foundation of good faith
or transparency. It was built on Iran’s lies. Iran’s nuclear deception is inconsistent with Iran’s
pledge in the nuclear deal “that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire
any nuclear weapons.”
We are therefore assessing what the discovery of Iran’s secret nuclear files means for the future
of the JCPOA. Allowing restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program to sunset was a mistake. One has to
ask: Why exactly was Iran hiding half a ton of nuclear weaponization files while implementing the
Iran deal? It is worth recalling that from 2006-2015, Iran was prohibited by Security Council
resolutions from enriching any nuclear material. Now that the world knows Iran has lied and is
still lying, it is time to revisit the question of whether Iran can be trusted to enrich or control any
nuclear material. As the President’s May 12 deadline to fix the Iran deal approaches, I will be
consulting with our European allies and other nations on the best way forward in light of what
we now know about Iran’s past pursuit of nuclear weapons and its systematic deception of the
world.
Iran Middle East Secretary of State
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Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), I
hereby report that I have issued an Executive Order (the “order”) with respect to Iran that takes
additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March
15, 1995, and implements certain statutory requirements of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public
Law 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended (ISA), the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195) (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), as
amended (CISADA), the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112
158) (TRA), and the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (subtitle D of title XII of
Public Law 112-239) (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.) (IFCA).
In Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, the President found that the actions and policies of the
Government of Iran threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States. To deal with that threat, the President declared a national emergency and imposed
prohibitions on certain transactions with respect to the development of Iranian petroleum
resources. To further respond to that threat and to provide implementation authority for Iranrelated
legislation — including ISA and certain statutory requirements of CISADA, TRA, and IFCA —
the President issued Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, Executive Order 13059 of August 19,
STATEMENTS & RELEASES
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President of
the Senate
FOREIGN POLICY
Issued on: August 6, 2018
★ ★ ★
Annex 43
mt
1997, Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010, Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011,
Executive Order 13590 of November 20, 2011, Executive Order 13606 of April 22, 2012, Executive
Order 13608 of May 1, 2012, Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012, Executive Order 13628 of
October 9, 2012, and Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013.
In order to give e􀁷ect to the commitments of the United States with respect to sanctions described
in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015 (JCPOA), the President issued Executive
Order 13716 of January 16, 2016, which revoked Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645,
amended Executive Order 13628, and continued implementation authorities for certain provisions
of IFCA that were outside the scope of the JCPOA.
On May 8, 2018, in recognition of Iran’s escalating campaign of regional destabilization, the threat
that Iran’s malign behavior continues to pose to the national security, foreign policy, and economy
of the United States, and the JCPOA’s failure to address the totality of the concerns of the United
States about Iran’s behavior, I announced my decision to cease the participation of the United
States in the JCPOA and to reimpose all sanctions li􀁸ed or waived in connection with the JCPOA.
Iran remains the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, and provides assistance to Lebanese
Hizballah, Hamas, Kata’ib Hizballah, the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and other terrorist networks. Iran also
continues to fuel sectarian tension in Iraq, and support vicious civil wars in Yemen and Syria. It
commits grievous human rights abuses, and arbitrarily detains foreigners, including United States
citizens, on spurious charges without due process of law.
It is the policy of the United States that Iran be denied all paths to develop or acquire a nuclear
weapon; that Iran’s network and campaign of regional aggression be neutralized and constrained;
to disrupt, degrade, or deny the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its surrogates access to
the resources that sustain their destabilizing activities; and to impede Iran’s aggressive
development of longer-range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, and other
asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities. I have determined that these circumstances, in
the context of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957, necessitate the exercise
of my authority under IEEPA.
Sections 1-6 of the order that I have issued reimpose and extend the sanctions that were li􀁸ed
pursuant to Executive Order 13716, including implementation authorities for IFCA. In addition,
these sections continue in e􀁷ect certain implementation authorities for ISA, CISADA, and TRA
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previously provided for in Executive Order 13628. The measures in these sections will take e􀁷ect
following a previously announced 90 day or 180-day wind down period, as appropriate.
Section 7 of the order continues in e􀁷ect authorities contained in sections 2 and 3 of Executive
Order 13628 and subsection 3(c) of Executive Order 13716 targeting the diversion of goods intended
for the people of Iran, the transfer of goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used to
commit human rights abuses, and persons who engage in censorship.
Section 8 of the order continues in e􀁷ect and extends prohibitions contained in section 4 of
Executive Order 13628 relating to entities owned or controlled by a United States person and
established or maintained outside the United States, which were required by section 218 of the
TRA.
Section 9 of the order revokes Executive Orders 13628 and 13716 and clarifies that the provisions of
the order supersede those earlier orders.
I have delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
authority to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, to employ all powers
granted to me by IEEPA and the relevant provisions of ISA, and to employ all powers granted to the
United States Government by the relevant provisions of ISA and CISADA, as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the order.
I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order I have issued.
Sincerely,
DONALD J. TRUMP
Annex 43
Remarks
Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
DACOR Bacon House
Washington, DC
July 25, 2018
As Prepared
Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you to DACOR Bacon House Foundation and its members for
the warm welcome and kind introduction. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak with you
here today, and it’s a pleasure to help offer some insight into the Administration’s views on
where we go from here with Iran.
REMARKS
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION
JULY 25, 2018
Moving American Policy Forward in the
Aftermath of the Iran Nuclear Deal
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We have been very clear about the multitude of problems that were left unsolved, exacerbated,
or even created by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal with Iran –
problems which led the President to withdraw the United States from participation. It’s useful to
recap them, however – and with a special focus upon nuclear proliferation risks – because
understanding these problems points not just to why this administration took the decision it did,
but also to the need for a more comprehensive and enduring solution.
So let me start by highlighting the degree to which the JCPOA – and the concessions it embodied
in providing legitimacy to and facilitating Iran’s provocative nuclear program – not only did not
lead to improvements in Iran’s regional behavior, but in fact led to this behavior worsening. The
lifting of sanctions and Iran’s degree of re-integration into the global economy that the deal
permitted both enriched and emboldened Iran, making it a more dangerous regional actor than
before.
Iran’s defense budget has risen significantly since 2015, and its malign activities in destabilizing
the Middle East have only increased. Iran’s sinister Qods Force became even more deeply
involved in the Syrian civil war and now serves as what is essentially an occupying force in parts
of Syria. Its development of a huge arsenal of ever more sophisticated ballistic missiles continues,
and it has been proliferating missiles and missile production technology to terrorist clients such
as Lebanese Hizbollah and the Houthis in Yemen. Its support for international terrorism has
continued, and even accelerated, and its human rights abuses at home remain unabated.
Since 2012, Iran has spent in excess of $16 billion propping up the Assad regime in Syria, and is
supporting its other destabilizing regional partners and proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
Lebanese Hizbollah receives perhaps $700 million from Iran every year, and that’s not counting
something on the order of $100 million a year to Palestinian groups such as Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Despite the earnest expectations of the Obama Administration – as
expressed in the preface of the nuclear deal itself – that “full implementation of this JCPOA will
positively contribute to regional and international peace and security,” Iran was only empowered
and emboldened in its malign activities.
Worse still, the JCPOA actually got in the way of international efforts to push back against all of
Iran’s destabilizing provocations, by limiting the degree to which sanctions that had been lifted by
the JCPOA could be reimposed against Iranian entities in response to these malign activities.
Even where sanctions pressures were not formally ruled out by JCPOA commitments to lift them,
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any suggestion of serious sanctions pushback against Iran for its behavior invariably engendered
resistance from partners who feared that efforts to punish Iran for non-nuclear provocations
would lead Tehran to pull out of the nuclear deal.
The JCPOA, in other words, both facilitated Iranian misbehavior and made it more difficult for us
to respond to these problems. As I have pointed out repeatedly, the JCPOA became – to some
extent – an altar on which were sacrificed other critical aspects of U.S. Iran strategy. The nuclear
tail, as it were, was very much wagging the Iran policy dog.
Nor, ironically, did the JCPOA even really do the one thing that its defenders advanced as its
major selling point. It conspicuously failed to permanently address Iranian nuclear proliferation
threats.
The Iranian regime began secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons at least as early as the mid-
1980s, embarking upon a weapons effort that included two prongs: (1) work specifically on
nuclear weaponization; and (2) work to produce the fissile materials that would be needed to
actually construct a weapon. According to the U.S. intelligence community, Iran suspended its
weaponization work in 2003 – at a time when our moves against Iraq seemed to send a clear
signal that engaging in such weapons of mass destruction work might be, one might say,
exceedingly unwise. Iran did not, however, stop its effort to produce fissile materials.
Indeed, despite public revelations of its previously secret fissile material production effort, Iran
doubled down. After its work was exposed, Iran simply declared to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) the uranium enrichment program that it had been caught illegally pursuing,
pretended that this made everything alright, and proceeded full speed ahead.
The international community tried to persuade Iran to stop, but it could never put sufficient
pressures on the regime in Tehran. The world did not exactly fail to respond, mind you, but it
always responded too late, and with too little. Indeed, U.S. officials had openly assessed as early
as 1991 that Iran was seeking to develop nuclear weapons, but even after Iran’s hitherto secret
enrichment program was publicly revealed in August of 2002, and Iran admitted the existence of
this effort, the first United Nations sanctions were not imposed until late 2006 – by which point
the unlawful enrichment plant at Natanz had gone from being just a big hole in the ground to
being a facility stocked with spinning centrifuges enriching uranium.
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It was not until 2015 that the JCPOA purported to offer a solution to this problem, and it wasn’t
much of an answer. Indeed, the nuclear deal accepted and legitimized the fissile material
production program that Iran had illegally undertaken in flagrant violation of its IAEA safeguards
obligations, Article II of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and multiple legally binding U.N.
Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. And the
JCPOA only temporarily constrained the size and scope of this dangerous program, expressly
phasing out all of restrictions on Iran’s enrichment capacity, enrichment purity, and uranium
stockpiles over periods ranging from 10-15 years. This was the so-called “sunset clause” problem.
The main accomplishment of the JCPOA, in other words, was merely to kick the proliferation can
a bit further down the road – just by coincidence (I hope), to a point in time just beyond that at
which President Obama’s anticipated successor Hillary Clinton would have been finishing a
presumed second term. After that, Iran would be free to build up the massive enrichment
capacity that Supreme Leader Ali Khameini has repeatedly identified as his objective, thus
positioning Iran dangerously close to extraordinarily rapid weaponization were it to resume the
work suspended in 2003. (Iran even proclaimed itself interested in developing a nuclear-powered
submarine, apparently hoping to take advantage of a provision in traditional nuclear safeguards
agreements that allows nuclear material to be removed from safeguards while it is being used
for naval propulsion.)
So this was the JCPOA’s answer to the Iran nuclear problem. We in the current administration,
however, did not see this as much of a solution – especially as it became clear that the deal
facilitated Iranian misbehavior in non-nuclear arenas and impeded efforts to punish Iran for such
malign acts.
Accordingly, we tried very hard to achieve a better answer. We reached out to partners on
Capitol Hill, working closely with them in an effort to develop legislation that would mandate the
reimposition of full sanctions if Iran expanded its nuclear capabilities beyond those to which the
JCPOA currently restricts it. And we worked with our European partners for months in an effort to
find a similar diplomatic understanding.
In neither case, however, would our interlocutors commit to taking steps to penalize Iran for
expanding its nuclear capacities and shortening the assessed “breakout time” in which the
regime in Tehran would be able to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Neither
Congress nor our British, French, and German partners would commit to placing any additional
Annex 45
restriction upon the future size and scope of the Iranian nuclear program absent agreement by
Iran to do so.
And then came the public revelation that Israel had acquired a massive collection of documents
from Iran’s past nuclear weapons work, a development that highlighted the dangers inherent in
the JCPOA’s “sunsetting” of restrictions on the size of Iran’s enrichment capacity and stocks of
fissile material. Rather than putting its past nuclear weapons program emphatically and
demonstrably behind it, it turns out that Iran had been carefully preserving documentation and
research on nuclear weapons designs.
The regime in Tehran had promised in the JCPOA that “under no circumstances will Iran ever
seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” If it had meant this, one might perhaps have
expected that Iran would have admitted its past weapons work – much of which had, in any
event, already been extensively documented by the IAEA – and destroyed or turned over all this
documentation. Instead, however, Iran seems, as it were, to have hidden its weapons research
away for a rainy day – perhaps in anticipation of a potential future decision to reconstitute fullscope
weapons development once the “sunset” of JCPOA restrictions had allowed it to amass a
large enough stockpile of enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges to permit a rapid sprint to
weaponization. Almost nothing could better highlight the problem of the JCPOA “sunset clause.”
As a result of all this, we left the JCPOA in order to start over. We now aim to use the reimposition
of full sanctions in a new “maximum pressure”-style campaign against Iran as a catalyst for
bringing international partners – and eventually Iran itself – back to the table to negotiate a
permanent solution to these problems. We need these pressures to help provide incentives to
find a negotiated answer that puts enduring limits on Iran’s nuclear capacities, rather than
temporary ones, and which thus permanently denies Iran a pathway to nuclear weapons. We
also need to address Iran’s missile development and proliferation threats, its support for
terrorism and its destabilization of its neighbors.
Secretary Pompeo spelled out the full range of our negotiating objectives in his remarks at the
Heritage Foundation on May 21. Notably, however, our approach is not just about sanctions
pressures. As Secretary Pompeo also made clear, if Iran agrees to a new and better deal that
comprehensively addresses our concerns, we would support Iran’s full reintegration, politically
and economically, into the community of nations. This would include the establishment of
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diplomatic relations, lifting all our sanctions against Iran – not just some of them, as the JCPOA
did – and supporting Iran’s reintegration into the global economy and community of nations.
Normal nations do not engage in prolonged proxy wars against their neighbors, continue
destabilizing behavior with persistent ballistic missile testing and proliferation, and posture
themselves for illegal nuclear weaponization breakout. If Iran abandons such behaviors and thus
comes to act like a normal nation, U.S. officials have indicated that they would be willing to treat it
as a normal nation in every way. That is our hope, and that is our negotiating objective.
This is a huge project, but we are fully invested and ready to put in the sustained and serious
effort required to get an outcome that provides lasting security for the region and the world. And
we’re also prepared to lean hard on our partners and the international community to get it done.
We are not naive enough to think that achieving a comprehensive new deal will be easy. It won’t.
But we are confident that friends and allies will eventually join us in demanding that Iranian
behavior and conduct be normalized and made non-threatening, so that Iran can in turn enjoy
truly normalized relations and commerce with the international community – benefitting, in the
end, the Iranian people themselves perhaps most of all.
So that, then, is what I would offer for discussion regarding our path forward. We obviously face
great challenges with Iran, but these problems demand from us an approach that seeks to reshape
the security environment and starts anew toward a comprehensive and lasting solution. If
we are realistic, creative, and diligent, I believe that such an answer is indeed possible – and I
promise you we will be working very hard to achieve it.
Thank you for your time this afternoon. I look forward to your questions.
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation
Nuclear Weapons
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