Volume II

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE CONCERNING
ARBITRAL AWARD OF 3 OCTOBER 1899

CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA
v.
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA

MEMORIAL OF GUYANA

VOLUME II

19 NOVEMBER 2018

VOLUME II
ANNEXES
Annex 1
Early Drafts of the Geneva Convention (undated)
Annex 2
Award of the President of the United States under the Protocol
concluded the eighteenth day of August, in the year one thousand eight
hundred and ninety-four, between the Government of the Kingdom of
Italy and the Government of the Republic of Colombia, UNRIAA, Vol.
XI, p. 394 (2 Mar. 1897)
Annex 3
Letter from the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United Kingdom to the
Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs (7 Oct. 1899)
Annex 4
Government of the United States, State of the Union Message to the
United States Congress of President William McKinley (5 Dec. 1899)
Annex 5
Award by His Majesty King Edward VII in the Argentine-Chile
Boundary Case, UNRIAA, Vol. IX, p. 37 (20 Nov. 1902)
Annex 6
Award of His Majesty The King of Italy with Regard to the Boundary
Between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Brazil,
UNRIAA, Vol. XI, p. 21 (6 June 1904)
Annex 7
Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Venezuela, to the U.K. Ambassador to Venezuela, No. CO 111/564 (12
Mar. 1908)
Annex 8
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Treaties and
International Agreements, Vol. III (1920-1925) (1927)
Annex 9
Speech by the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States to the PanAmerican
Society
of
the
United
States
(1944)
Annex 10
Government of United Kingdom, Foreign Office, Minute by C.N.
Brading, No. FO 371/38814 (3 Oct. 1944)
Annex 11
Letter from the Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Venezuela, to
J.V.T.W.T. Perowne, U.K. Foreign Office (3 Nov. 1944)
Annex 12
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Treaties and
International Agreements, Vol. V (1933-1936) (1945)
Annex 13
Treaty of amity, commerce and navigation between Japan and the
Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of the Philippines, 1001
U.N.T.S. 296 (9 Dec. 1960)
Annex 14
U.N. General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 16th Session, 1252nd
Meeting, Agenda item 39: Information from Non-Self-Governing
Territories transmitted under Article 73 of the Charter, U.N. Doc
A/C.4/SR.1252 (18 Dec. 1961)
Annex 15
Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to
the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (15
Jan. 1962), reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, Fourth Committee,
16th Session, Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories
transmitted under Article 73 of the Charter, U.N. Doc A/C.4/520 (16
Jan. 1962)
Annex 16
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, No.
741D.00/1-1562 (15 Jan. 1962)
Annex 17
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (14 Feb. 1962), reprinted in
U.N. General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 16th Session, Information
from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 of
the Charter, U.N. Doc A/C.4/536 (15 Feb. 1962)
Annex 18
Letter from J. Cheetham, U.K. Foreign Office, to D. Busk, U.K.
Ambassador to Venezuela, No. AV 1081/38 (21 Feb. 1962)
Annex 19
Statement made by the Representative of Venezuela at the 1302nd
meeting of the Fourth Committee on 22 February 1962, reprinted in
U.N. General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 16th Session, Information
from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 of
the Charter, U.N. Doc A/C.4/540 (22 Feb. 1962)
Annex 20
Government of the Republic of Venezuela, Chamber of Deputies,
Agreement of 4 April 1962 (4 Apr. 1962), reprinted in Republic of
Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba:
Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 21
Foreign Service Despatch from C. Allan Stewart, U.S. Ambassador to
Venezuela, to the U.S. Department of State (15 May 1962)
Annex 22
Letter from R.H.G. Edmonds, U.K. Foreign Office, to D. Busk, U.K.
Ambassador to Venezuela (15 May 1962)
Annex 23
Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, 17th Session, Question of
Boundaries Between Venezuela and the Territory of British Guiana,
U.N. Doc A/5168 and Add.l (18 Aug. 1962)
Annex 24
Statement made by the Representative of the United Kingdom at the
349th meeting of the Special Political Committee on 13 November
1962, reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, Special Political Committee,
17th Session, Question of Boundaries between Venezuela and the
Territory of British Guiana, U.N. Doc A/SPC/72 (13 Nov. 1962)
Annex 25
U.N. General Assembly, Special Political Committee, 17th Session,
350th Meeting, Agenda item 88: Question of boundaries between
Venezuela and the territory of British Guiana, U.N. Doc A/SPC/SR.350
(16 Nov. 1962)
Annex 26
United Kingdom, Department of External Affairs, Memorandum:
Venezuelan Claim to British Guiana Territory, No. CP(64)82 (25 Feb.
1964)
Annex 27
Republic of Venezuela, Official Map: Claim of Esequibo Territory
(1965)
Annex 28
Government of the United Kingdom, Record of Discussions between
the Foreign Secretary, the Venezuelan Minister for Foreign Affairs and
the Premier of British Guiana at the Foreign Office on 9 December,
1965, No. AV 1081/326 (9 Dec. 1965)
Annex 29
Government of the United Kingdom, Draft Agreement for the
Establishment of a Mixed Commission (14 Jan. 1966)
Annex 30
Telegram from the Governor of British Guiana to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies of the United Kingdom, No. 93A (3 Feb. 1966)
Annex 31
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the United Kingdom, and Prime Minister of British Guiana, Joint
Statement on the Ministerial Conversations from Geneva on 16 and
17 February 1966 (17 Feb. 1966) reprinted in Republic of Venezuela,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents
1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 32
Note Verbale from the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom to the
U.K. Ambassador to Venezuela, No. AV 1081/116 (25 Feb. 1966)
Annex 33
Statement by Dr. I. Iribarren Borges, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Venezuela, to the National Congress of Venezuela (17 Mar. 1966),
reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim
of Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 34
Letter from F. Brown, U.K. Mission to the United Nations, to R. du
Boulay, U.K. Foreign Office, No. 1082/77/66 (21 Mar. 1966)
Annex 35
Republic of Venezuela, Law Ratifying the Geneva Agreement (13 Apr.
1966) reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 36
Airgram from the United States Department of State to the Embassy of
the United States in Venezuela, No. A-798 (18 Apr. 1966)
Annex 37
Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to
the United Nations to Secretary-General of the United Nations (21
Apr. 1966)
Annex 38
Letter from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom
and Venezuela to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc A/6325 (3 May 1966)
Annex 39
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement (6 Sept.
1966), reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 40
Note Verbale from the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs
of Guyana to the Minister of Foreign Relations of Venezuela, No.
CP(66)603 (21 Oct. 1966)
Annex 41
United Kingdom, Ministry of External Affairs, First Interim Report of
the Mixed Commission (30 Dec. 1966)
Annex 42
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Communiqué (14
May 1968)
Annex 43
Note Verbale from the Ministry of External Affairs of Guyana to the
Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in Guyana (19 July
1968)
Annex 44
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332 (23
May 1969)
Annex 45
Government of the Republic of Guyana and Government of the
Republic of Venezuela, Minutes of certain matters dealt with by the
Minister of State of Guyana and the Minister of External Relations of
Venezuela in conversations held at Port-of-Spain (June 1970)
Annex 46
Protocol to the Agreement to resolve the controversy between
Venezuela and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland over the frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana signed
at Geneva on 17 February 1966, 801 U.N.T.S. 183 (18 June 1970)
Annex 47
Government of the Republic of Venezuela, Exposition of Motives for
the Draft Law Ratifying the Protocol of Port of Spain (22 June 1970),
reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim
of Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 48
United Kingdom, Research Department, Venezuela-Guyana Frontier
Dispute, Nos. DS(L)692, RRN 040/360/1 (10 May 1976)
Annex 49
Declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Venezuela (10 Apr. 1981), reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981
(1981)
Annex 50
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement (2 May
1981) reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 51
Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Venezuela to the President of the World Bank (8 June 1981)
Annex 52
Letter from the Vice President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana
to the President of the World Bank (19 Sept. 1981)
Annex 53
U.N. General Assembly, 36th Session, Agenda item 9, U.N. Doc. A/36/
PV.12 (24 Sept. 1981)
Annex 1
Early Drafts of the Geneva Convention (undated)
Annex 1
CONFIDENTIAL
In its final Report the Mixed Commission
shall refer to
the Government or Guyana and the Government of Venezuela any
outstanding qu e s tio ns. The two Governments shall thereupon
decide whic h of trie pl'o cedul'es r ef erred
t o in Article 33
of the Charter o f' t h e United Nations
is the most appropriate
procedure
for se t tli ng any su ch quest i ons. I f the two
Governments are unable within 6 months of the receipt
of the
Report to decide upon an appropriate
procedure
the decision
as to the ap pr opriate proce dure shall be submitted
to an
international
organisation
upon which they both agree or,
failing
su ch agreement,
to the Uni t ed Nations.
00 NF IDE NT IAL
Annex 1
j
'I'h e n ove1" nmen t of' the Un.ited. Kingdom
of' O:re u t i.iritain
,i,mf.'.i ::iort J-,tJrn !relund
, in cmu _rul t r*ti on w1 th the Government of
-Sritifllh (Juis.n a , r:tn .. I the Goverr wwnt of Venezue:la;
Ta .King
r n to a cco ,.'.n t the:~ forthcoming
indepen dence of
1),ri t1sh n ubna;
Recognisin g r;ls; o th~t c1o f:1er coop ~rP.,tion in economic
end other tiel cts batween Br iti ah 0 u i MnA an J Venezuela c ould
bring benufit to hoth eountrie R;
c onvinced thr i t JJJ.ny contx•ovt;rsy
bet'\iileen tbe Unit ed
!Zingdom :irnd flrri ti sb f''.:uiano on t.he ono h:.,md aiid Venez uela
011 the otller v,o ·i.LLd preju c.dce
tl:.e :t'urt.het" t,l,nce o f such ooopc1rt:.­
tlon 0.-ncl should
t Lere!'ox•e "be a:'TI.icably r ea ol ved in a mam ,er
a cce p table to both ps rties;
h uvli ,g r~ftl'fHld u pon 0.n j;_genda f'or t he eont.1rm r., tio n ~t
·:i;inh ,t e r•:1.al lt ::vel o f governmental
conversations
concerni ng
the eoutroveray
bet~1tam Venezuela u:nd t he United Ki ngdom
ove :r t he f ront.i e r with \~ritish
f:hliAna , in :f.l.Ccordo..nce with
t he joint commun1qu6 of 7 Nove mbez•, 1963;
in UH~ l ig h t of' su ch c(mv era 1&tion e s-1.t
L'esil•ing,
level held in L mv1on on 9 imd 10 Dece mber, 1965
Mi rd istor1al
"'!id continue d in ,Jene va on 16 und 17 1-'ebruary, 1966, t.o put
on er.d to t h e co r1 troveray;
Eave a.greed ss follows:•
-
Annex 1
(l)
Ir, orae1• to fac:111t,a.te the greatest
possible measure or
cooper&tion and mutui:11 u ndersttmding,
nothin.g contained
in
this agreement s hall be 1n ter 1,':l1•ete;d :~o i,1 renunei~tion
or
diminution
by tt1e United K i n gdo in, Hriti('!h Guiana or Venezuela
of' ,.uly basis
or. c1t1i m to tarri tnr inl sovereignt.,y
1n t.he
terr1 to1 .. ies of Venezuela
o:x.· BJ:•i tieh G-uittna,
or of' any
p ruviou.aly asserted
rigbt ts of 01· cleima to such territorial
aovei-eignt:,,
ox• ae prejudicir.g
tlrnir
;,oa1 t1on aa regards
their reco gnition
or non-1•ecogn1 tion of a right
of, clt1.im or
b~ai 6, or claim by nmy of them to euch territorial
sovereignty.
(2) Mo act5 or activities
tmldng plno.e whUe this Agreement
is in fo1•ce uhall consti tu·te :&1. basis for a.sserting,
supporting
or dtmying & el11:t.im to te:rritorial
aove1•e1gnty in the territories
of Venezuel:!l\ or i::1•:ttie h Guiana or 01:~e~te imy 1•i.gbts o.r
~ove1 .. fiiignty
in tt-u:rne territories,
except in li\O f'ar ea such s.ctu
or nc ti vi t1 os re$Ul t t'ro r.n ~-tlY ~
greement reached by th0 M ixcd
Gom.rnh'Hi\1on Jitnd. aeoepted. in WPi ting by the Oovernraent of Guyana
amd the HoviEn~nmtmt of V;,me~uela. No new claim, or e1usrgo ment
of' ar. exiet1 ng claim,
to t u,r:r-1 torie .l soveroignty
in those
ter:r1 .torie8
sh!i.ll be asserted while t r-:.ta Agreement is 1n to:roe,
nor sh .s.11 eny cl nim whli tiaoevor 'bfl m1Hierted otherwi.ae
t.h.an in the
ril:txed Comm1ee1o:n while tt~ i t Comdsdon h 111 being.
Annex 1
( 1) In order to fFici1it.S11te t:.he tstreatest p o1ssfble measure of'
cooperation
and mutusl unc.lerst.anding, nothing contained
in
this
/,greement shall be interpreted
as:
( a)
s x•&ntmchtion
b.;r the United n.ingdom, Brl t1sh
Guiana or Venezuela of' previously asserted rights of
or cl~ims to terr1torisl
sovereignty
in the
ter:ri tories
o:f Venezuela or Br1 t1sh (lu1ana;
(b) H x~ennnoiation
or diminution
by the United
Kingdom , l'3ritish
0uian,u or Venezuela
of any
btaais of cla.im to terri toria ,l sovereignty
in
thone territories,
or
( e) prejud Joing the position
01.· the United Kingdom,
Bx•i tiah Guiana or Venezu~la as regards
i ta
reoogni t.ion or• non-recogni t1on of a right of,
or claim or baeie o:t· claim by ~ny of them to
ter . i tox•ial aovereignt y in those ter1•1 tories.
(2) No a.ots or r{ctivi ties t.aldng plaoe while this f..greement
is in rorce shall conetttute
a basis tor asserting, supporting
or denying a. claim to territorial
sovereignty in the territories
of Venezuela or Hri tiab Gubna or create any rights
o:f'
sovereignty
in t.hose terri toriee. No new claim, or enlargement
of an existi:n g claim,
to tex•ri torial sovereignty
in those
t.err1 tor1es E~hall be as ~:ierted while this Agreement
is 1n force,
:nor shall ~ny claim wha teoevor be asserted otherwise, than~be
i.11~.ed Com:1:i1Sriion v.'hil e that Commission is in being .
Annex 1
1. The PrJ.rties 1:i gree to establisl
1 B. Mi:x•::;d Co.mtnission with the
t ask of seeldng
t\e.tisf· Hctory f.rnlutioru3 f'or the practical
settlement
of the con trove1•sy bet ween Venezueln Hnd t.h.e Uni tcd Kingdom ~
tbe fr.;:r.Uet· with bri't'ish ~:uUina, which hsa arisen as the result
~ ~ Z> ~ ~
L °1 ,s ~
of' the / enezuelan
cmnt.ention
t:ht;itt the
:\wurd of 1899 is null ~:1nd
~
/\
void.
z. The Mb:.ed Commission will pretHmt interim re ports at intervals
of' td:x: months f'z•ora th~ date o:r its
t'ir-st meeting.
.r
3.
~
If the Corrunission, within n maximum li ·iYi t of' one yea~rom
--
tlie elate of the present agreement should not ht1ve arrived
a.t an
)
a greerrrent for the solution or the controversy,
the Parties
shall
c:noose one of' the me!l'Bn.s or pea.eefu.1 settlemQrt: provided
in
~,rticle 33 o:f the United Nations Charter.
4.
If the Pru:•ties shouJ.d not have rea.ched. an agreement within
choice
a period of 3 months rega .rding the/111i.na
of' one of the ,nethods
p rovided in Art .1c~.r
the l~1 ted Nations C~hsr r. tJ:1ey will
<) .;,---
'7' ~
L-
( Cl--» ---
.... 'L
~'
uest jhe Intern~tional
Court o'i: Justice
to choose o e o'f the
/"""
~~/\I
c .J{?-?
id methods of' peace:ful settlement.~the
met~
the Court sho uld not e.llow a solution
of' the controversy
to be
11.,rx•ived at, the said Court shall choose anottier of the methods
stipulated
in ,ti,rt1cle 33 of the ChBrter,
and so on successively,
until
the controversy
shall have been resolved,
or until
all the
methods of' peace:f"-ul settlement
there contemplated
shall have
been exhr:1us tod •
Annex 1
taa k o~ seeking n~tisf~ctory
o~lutions tor the pr~ct1cal
s ett la ~i:mt ot" t h~ cc,;::.t:roversy 'botween 'v'enezuela . and. tb.e iin1 tea
contenti.o n that
ti .e • wtn·cl o.t· 1899 ftl;;bout the !'ro:nt1er between
British Guiana imd Venezu elBt ia null ~md void.
inte:rV .!$:la oi' sh rnonthe from the a.ate o!' its first r11eet1ng.
3.
If t h e :H:xt~d ·~ommissio
r. , within
a l1 m1t of 5 yea.re :f'rom t.be
for the solution
oC the co r::t1"oversy 1t shnll.
in its final x•aport.
The Pfl l"titH3 shall
4.
It'• witbin
3 mont11e of' reoeiv:i. ng t.he :f"1nnl. report,
the
of' 1
::,ne ot· th@ me.ane of {1ettle
:rtent yr ov1ded in .~.rt i cle 33 or the
golution of the controversy
the said . organ or, oa the cmisc, may be,
the Ur1i ted Nntionu
t>h&ll choose another o f' the
'.(1.eana sti1rnlat.ed.
in · rtiole 33 01" the ~hn:rter of the Uni. ted !i1ationa and r~o on until
the controversy
hos bee n r.•esolved 01~ until
t¾ll t.he means of"
Annex 2
Award of the President of the United States under the Protocol concluded the eighteenth day of
August, in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, between the Government of the
Kingdom of Italy and the Government of the Republic of Colombia, UNRIAA, Vol. XI, p. 394
(2 Mar. 1897)
Annex 2
REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL AW ARDS
RECUEIL DES SENTENCES
ARBITRALES
VOLUME XI
l- S I T E D :'\ .--\ T I O :\" S - NAT I ONS UN I ES
Annex 2
DOCUMENT ADDITIONNEL
Award of the President of the United States under the Protocol con­
cluded the eighteenth day of August, in the year one thousand eight
hundred and ninety-four, between the Govenunent of the Kingdom of
Italy and the Government of the Republic of Colombia. Washington,
2 March 1897
1
This protocol, concluded August 18, 1894, between the Kingdom of Italy
and the Republic of Colombia, was entered into for the purpose of putting an
end to the subjects of disagreement between the two governments growing out
of the claims of Signor Ernesto Cerruti against the Government of Colombia
for losses and damages to his property in the State (now Department) of Cauca
in the said republic during the political troubles of 1885, and for the further
purpose of making a just disposition of said claims. By the terms of the protocol
each government agreed to submit to arbitration the matters and claims above
referred to for the purpose of arriving at a settlement thereof as between the
two governments, and they joined in asking me, Grover Cleveland, President
of the United States of America, to accept the position of arbitrator in the case
and discharge the duties pertaining thereto as a friendly act to both governments,
vesting in me full power, authority, and jurisdiction to do and perform and to
cause to be done and performed all things without any limitation whatsoever
which, in my judgment, might be necessary or conducive to the attainment in
a fair and equitable manner of the ends and purposes the agreement is intended
to secure.
Pursuant to the terms of the said protocol, the two governments, and the
claimant, Signor Ernesto Cerruti, as one of the two parties interested in the suit,
have submitted to me within the time specified in said protocol the documents
and evidence in support of their several asserted rights.
Now, therefore, be it known, that I, Grover Cleveland, President of the
United States of America, upon whom the functions of arbitrator have been
conferred as aforesaid, having duly examined the documents and evidence
submitted by the respective parties pursuant to the provisions of said protocol,
and having considered the arguments addressed to me in relation thereto, do
hereby decide and award:
I. That the claims made by Signor Ernesto Cerruti against the Republic of
Colombia for losses of and damages to the real and personal property owned
by him individually in the said State of Cauca, and the claims of said Signor
Ernesto Cerruti for injury sustained by him by reason of losses of and damages
to his interest in the firm of E. Cerruti and Ct>mpany, are proper claims for
international adjudication.
2. That the claim submitted to me by Signor Ernesto Cerruti for personal
damages resulting from imprisonment, arrest, enforced separation from his
1
American Journal of International Law, vol. 6, 1912, p. 1015.
Annex 2
AFFAIRF. CERRlITI
395
family, and sufferings and privations endured by himself and family is disallowed.
I therefore make no award on account of this claim.
3. The claim of Signor Ernesto Cerruti for moneys expended and obligations
incurred for legal expenses in the preparation and prosecution of this claim,
including former and present proceedings, i, disallowed by me.
4. I award for losses and damages to the individual property of Signor
Ernesto Cerruti in the State of Cauca, and to his interest in the copartnership
or E. Cerruti and Company, of which he was a member, including interest,
the net sum of sixty thousand pounds nerling, of which sum ten thousand having
been paid, the Government of the Republic of Colombia will, in addition, pay
to the Government of the Kingdom of Italy, for the use of Signor Ernesto
Cen uti, ten thousand pounds sterling thereof within sixty days from the date
hereof, and the remainder, being forty thousand pounds, within nine months
from the date hereof, with interest from the date of this award at the rate of six
per cent per annum, until paid, both payments to be made by draft, payable
in London, England, with exchange from Bogota at the time of payment.
.J. It beinis my judgment that Signor Cerruti is, as between himself and thf'
Government of the Republic of Colombia, which I find has by its acts destroyed
hi, means for liquidating the debts of the copartnership of E. Cerruti and Com­
pany for which he may be held personally liable, entitled to enjoy and be pro­
tected in the net sum awarded him hereby, I do, under the protocol which
im·est,mewithfull
po,.,..er, authority, and jurisdiction to do and to perform and
to cause to be done and performed all things without any limitation whatsoever
\\hich in my judgment may be necessary or conducive to the attainment in a
fair and equitable manner of the ends and purposes which the protocol is
intended to secure, decide and adjudge to the Government of the Republic of
Colombia all rights, legal and equitable, of the said Signor Ernesto Cerruti in
and to all propt:rty, real, personal, and mixed in the Department of Cauca
and \\ hich has been called in question in this proceeding, and I further adjudge
and decide that the Go\'ernment of the Republic of Colombia shall guarantee
and protect Signor Ernesto Cerruti against any and all liability on account of
the debts of the said copartnership, and shall reimburse Signor Ernesto Cerruti
to the extent that he may be compelled to pay such bo11a Ji.de copartnership
debt, duly l"Stablished against all proper defenses which could and ought to have
been made and such guaranty and reimbursement shall include all necessary
expemes for properly contesting such partnership debts.
I:--TE,TIM0NY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed.
DoNE in duplicate at the city of Washington on the second day of March,
in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven, and of the Inde­
pendence of the United States the 121st.
[Seal of the United States]
Grover CLEVELAND
By the President:
Richard OLNEY,
Secretary of Stale.
Annex 3
Letter from the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United Kingdom to the Venezuelan Minister of
Foreign Affairs (7 Oct. 1899)
Annex 3
Annex 3
Annex 4
Government of the United States, State of the Union Message to the United States Congress of
President William McKinley (5 Dec. 1899)
Annex 4
The American Presidency Project
(https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/)
WILLIAM MCKINLEY
(/PEOPLE/PRESIDENT/WILLIAMMCKINLEY)
Third Annual Message
December 05, 1899
To the Senate and House of Representatives:
At the threshold of your deliberations you are called to mourn with your countrymen
the death of Vice-President Hobart, who passed from this life on the morning of
November 21 last. His great soul now rests in eternal peace. His private life was pure
and elevated. while his public career was ever distinguished by large capacity, stainless
integrity, and exalted motives. He has been removed from the high o�ce which he
honored and digni�ed, but his lofty character, his devotion to duty, his honesty of
purpose, and noble virtues remain with us as a priceless legacy and example.
The Fifty-sixth Congress convenes in its �rst regular session with the country in a
condition of unusual prosperity, of universal good will among the people at home, and
in relations of peace and friendship with every government of the world. Our foreign
commerce has shown great increase in volume and value. The combined imports and
exports for the year are the largest ever shown by a single year in all our history. Our
exports for 1899 alone exceeded by more than a billion dollars our imports and
exports combined in 1870. The imports per capita are 20 per cent less than in 1870,
while the exports per capita are 58 per cent more than in 1870, showing the enlarged
capacity of the United States to satisfy the wants of its own increasing population, as
well as to contribute to those of the peoples of other nations.
1
Annex 4
In the Turkish Empire the situation of our citizens remains unsatisfactory. Our e�orts
during nearly forty years to bring about a convention of naturalization seem to be on
the brink of �nal failure through the announced policy of the Ottoman Porte to refuse
recognition of the alien status of native Turkish subjects naturalized abroad since
1867. Our statutes do not allow this Government to admit any distinction between the
treatment of native and naturalized Americans abroad, so that ceaseless controversy
arises in cases where persons owing in the eye of international law a dual allegiance
are prevented from entering Turkey or are expelled after entrance. Our law in this
regard contrasts with that of the European States. The British act, for instance, does
not claim e�ect for the naturalization of an alien in the event of his return to his native
country, unless the change be recognized by the law of that country or stipulated by
treaty between it and the naturalizing State.
The arbitrary treatment, in some instances, of American productions in Turkey has
attracted attention of late, notably in regard to our �our. Large shipments by the
recently opened direct steamship line to Turkish ports have been denied entrance on
the score that, although of standard composition and unquestioned purity, the �our
was pernicious to health because of de�cient “elasticity” as indicated by antiquated
and untrustworthy tests. Upon due protest by the American minister, and it appearing
that the act was a virtual discrimination against our product, the shipments in
question were admitted. In these, as in all instances, wherever occurring, when
American products may be subjected in a foreign country, upon specious pretexts, to
discrimination compared with the like products of another country, this Government
will use its earnest e�orts to secure fair and equal treatment for its citizens and their
goods. Failing this, it will not hesitate to apply whatever corrective may be provided by
the statutes.
The International Commission of Arbitration, appointed under the Anglo-Venezuelan
treaty of 1897, rendered an award on October 3 last, whereby the boundary line
between Venezuela and British Guiana is determined, thus ending a controversy which
has existed for the greater part of the century. The award, as to which the arbitrators
were unanimous, while not meeting the extreme contention of either party, gives to
Great Britain a large share of the interior territory in dispute and to Venezuela the
entire mouth of the Orinoco, including Barima Point and the Caribbean littoral for
some distance to the eastward. The decision appears to be equally satisfactory to both
parties.
Venezuela has once more undergone a revolution. The insurgents, under General
Castro, after a sanguinary engagement in which they su�ered much loss, rallied in the
mountainous interior and advanced toward the capital. The bulk of the army having
sided with the movement, President Andrade quitted Caracas, where General Castro
set up a provisional government with which our minister and the representatives of
other powers entered into diplomatic relations on the 20th of November, 1899.
23
Annex 5
Award by His Majesty King Edward VII in the Argentine-Chile Boundary Case, UNRIAA, Vol.
IX, p. 37 (20 Nov. 1902)
Annex 5
REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL AWARDS
RECUEIL DES SENTENCES
ARBITRALES
The Cordillera of the Andes Boundary Case (Argentina, Chile)
20 November 1902
VOLUME
IX pp. 37-49
NATIONS UNIES - UNITED NATIONS
Copyright (c) 2006
Annex 5
37
AW ARD BY HIS MAJESTY KING EDWARD VII IN THE ARGENTINE­
CHI LE BOUNDARY CASE, 20 NOVEMBER 1902
1
WHEREAS, by an Agreement dated the 17th day of April 1896, the Argentine
Republic and the Republic of Chile, by Their respective Representatives,
determined:
THAT should differences arise between their experts as to the boundary-line
to be traced between the two States in conformity with the Treaty of 1881 and
the Protocol of I 893, and in case such differences could not be amicably settled by
accord between the two Governments, they should be submitted to the decision
of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty;
AND WHEREAS such differences did arise and were submitted to the Govern­
ment of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria;
AND WHEREAS the Tribunal appointed to examine and consider the differences
which had so arisen, has - after the ground has been examined by a Com­
mission designated for that purpose - now reported to Us, and submitted to
Us, after mature deliberation, their opinions and recommendations for Our
consideration;
Now, WE, EDWARD, by the grace of God, King of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas King,
Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India, etc., etc., have arrived at the following
decisions upon the questions in dispute, which have been referred to Our
arbitration, viz.:
1. The region of the San Francisco Pass;
2 . The Lake Lacar basin;
3. The region extending from the vicinity of Lake Nahuel Huapi to that of
Lake Viedma; and
4. The region adjacent to the Last Hope Inlet.
Article I. - The boundary in the region of the San Francisco Pass shall be
formed by the line of water-parting extending from the pillar already erected
on that Pass to the summit of the mountain named Tres Cruces.
Article II. - The basin of Lake Lacar is awarded to Argentina.
Article III. - From Perez Rosales Pass near the north of Lake Nahuel Huapi,
to the vicinity of Lake Viedma, the boundary shall pass by Mount Tronador,
and thence to the River Palena by the lines of water-parting determined by
certain obligatory points which We have fixed upon the Rivers Manso, Puelo,
Fetaleufu, and Palena (or Carrenleufu); awarding to Argentina the upper
basins of those rivers above the points which We have fixed, including the
Valleys of Villegas, Nuevo, Cholila, Colonia de 16 Octubre, Frio, Huemules,
and Corcovado; and to Chile the lower basins below those points.
From the fixed point on the River Palena, the boundary shall follow the
River Encuentro to the peak called Virgen, and thence to the line which
1 Descamps-Renault, Recueil international des traites du XX• siecle, annee 1902,
p. 372.
Annex 5
38
ARGENTINA/CHILE
We have fixed crossing Lake General Paz, and thence by the line of water­
parting determined by the point which We have fixed upon the River Pico,
from whence it shall ascend to the principal water-parting of the South American
Continent at Loma Baguales, and follow that water-parting
to a summit
locally known as La Galera. From this point it shall follow certain tributaries
of the River Simpson (or southern River Aisen), which We have fixed, and
attain the peak called Ap Ywan, from whence it shall follow the water-parting
determined by a point which We have fixed on a promontory from the northern
shore of Lake Buenos Aires. The upper basin of the River Pico is thus awarded
to Argentina, and the lower basin to Chile. The whole basin of the River
Cisnes (or Frias) is awarded to Chile, and also the whole basin of the Aisen,
with the exception of a tract at the head-waters of the southern branch including
a Settlement called Koslowsky, which is awarded to Argentina.
The further continuation of the boundary is determined by lines which We
have fixed across Lake Buenos Aires, Lake Pueyrredon (or Cochrane), and
Lake San Martin, the effect of which is to assign the western portions of the
basins of these lakes to Chile, and the eastern portions to Argentina, the
dividing ranges carrying the lofty peaks known as Mounts San Lorenzo and
Fitzroy.
From Mount Fitzroy to Mount Stokes the line of frontier has been already
determined.
Article IV. - From the vicinity of Mount Stokes to the 52nd parallel of
south latitude, the boundary shall at first follow the continental water-parting
defined by the Sierra Baguales, diverging from the latter southwards across
the River Vizcachas to Mount Cazador, at the south-eastern extremity of
which range it crosses the River Guillermo, and rejoins the continental water­
parting to the east of Mount Solitario, following it to the 52nd parallel of south
latitude, from which point the remaining portion of the frontier has already
been defined by mutual agreement between the respective States.
Article V. - A more detailed definition of the line of frontier will be found
in the Report submitted to Us by Our Tribunal, and upon the maps furnished
by the experts of the Republics of Argentina and Chile, upon which the
boundary which We have decided upon has been delineated by the members
of Our Tribunal, and approved by Us.
Given in triplicate under Our hand and seal, at Our Court of St. James'.
this twentieth day of November, one thousand nine hundred and two, in the
Second Year of Our Reign.
(Signed) EDWARD R. AND I
Annex 5
39
REPORT OF THE TRIBUNAL APPOINTED BY THE ARBITRATOR,
DATED 19 NOVEMBER 1902
1
I. May it please Your Majesty,
We, the Undersigned, members of the Tribunal appointed by Her late
Majesty Queen Victoria to examine, consider, and report upon the differences
which have arisen between the Governments of the Republics of Argentina
and Chile, with regard to the delimitation of certain portions of the frontier-line
between those two countries - which differences were referred (by a Protocol
signed at Santiago (Chile) on the 17th April.1896), to the Arbitration of Her
Majesty's Government, beg humbly to submit the following report to Your
Majesty:
2. We have studied the copies of the Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, and
documents which have been furnished for the use of the Tribunal by the Ministers
of the Republics of Argentina and of Chile in this country.
3. We have sat as a Tribunal at the Foreign Office on several occasions, and
have heard oral statements and arguments.
4. We invited the Representative, of the respective Governments to furnish
us with the fullest information upon their respective contentions, and with
maps and topographical details of the territory in dispute, and we have been
supplied with copious and exhaustive statements and arguments in many
printed volumes, illustrated by maps and plans, and by large numbers of
photographs indicating pictorially the topographical features of the country.
5. ,ve desire to take this opportunity of acknowledging our indebtedness to
the Representatives and the experts appointed by both Governments for their
laborious researches, for the extensive surveys which they have executed in
regions hitherto but little known, and for the historical and scientific information
which they have laid before us relating to the controversy; and we wish to
express our high appreciation, not only of their skill and devotion, but also of
the very courteous and conciliatory manner in which they have approached
subjects from their nature necessarily contentious.
6. After a preliminary consideration of this voluminous information, we
arrived at the point at which it became advisable that an actual study of the
ground - as provided for in the Agreement of 1896 - should be undertaken;
and upon our suggestion Your Majesty's Government nominated one of our
members, Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich of the Royal Engineers, a Vice-President
of the Royal Geographical Society, to proceed as Commissioner to the disputed
territory, accompanied by an experienced staff.
7. Sir Thomas Holdich and his officers were received with great cordiality
and friendliness by the Presidents of the two Republics, and were given every
assistance and facility by the officials and experts of both Governments.
8. The Technical Commission so appointed visited all the accessible points
in the territory in dispute which were material to a solution of the question,
and acquired a large ~tock of additional information upon questions which
presented certain difficulties. Their Reports haYe been laid before the Tribunal,
and the information contained in them, supplementing as it does that afforded
1 Descamps-Renault, Recueil des traitis du xx, sierle, annee 1902, p. 372.
Annex 5
40
ARGENTINA/CHILE
by the respective Representatives,
is in our opinion sufficient to enable us to
make our recommendations.
9. Before setting forth the conclusions at which we have arrived, we shall
briefly review the essential points upon which the two Governments were unable
to arrive at an agreement.
10. The Argentine Government contended that the boundary contemplated
was to be essentially an orographical frontier determined by the highest
summits of the Cordillera of the Andes; while the Chilean Government main­
tained that the definition found in the Treaty and Protocols could only be
satisfied by a hydrographical
line forming the water-parting between the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, leaving the basins of all rivers discharging into
the former within the coast-line of Argentina, to Argentina; and the basins of
all rivers discharging into the Pacific within the Chilean coast-line, to Chile.
11. We recognized at an early stage of our investigations that, in the abstract,
a cardinal difference existed between these two contentions. An orographical
boundary may be indeterminate
if the individual summits along which it
passes are not fully specified; whereas a hydrographical line, from the moment
that the basins are indicated, admits of delimitation upon the ground.
12. That the orographical and hydrographical lines should have been accept­
ed as coincident over such a long section of the frontier as that which extends
from the San Francisco Pass to the Perez Rosales Pass (with the exception of the
basin of Lake Lacar), may not improbably have given rise to the expectation
that the same result would be attained without difficulty in the more southern
part of the continent, which, at the date of the Treaty of 1881, was but imperfect­
ly explored.
13. The explorations and surveys which have lately been carried out by Ar­
gentine and Chilean geographers have, however, demonstrated that the confi­
guration of the Cordillera of the Andes between the latitudes of 41 ° south and
52° south, i.e., in the tract in which the divergencies of opinion have mainly
arisen, does not present the same continuities of elevation, and coincidences of
orographical and hydrographical lines, which characterize the more temperate
and better known section.
14. In the southern region the number of prominent peaks is greater, they
are more widely scattered, and transverse valleys through which rivers flow
into the Pacific are numerous. The line of continental water-parting occasion­
ally follows the high mountains, but frequently lies to the eastward of the
highest summits of the Andes, and is often found at comparatively low elevations
in the direction of the Argentine pampas.
15. In short, the orographical and hydrographical
lines are frequently
irreconcilable; neither fully conforms to the spirit of the Agreements which we
are called upon to interpret. It has been made clear by the investigation carried
out by our Technical Commission that the terms of the Treaty and Protocols
are inapplicable to the geographical conditions of the country to which they
refer. We are unanimous in considering the wording of the Agreements as
ambiguous, and susceptible of the diverse and antagonistic interpretations
placed upon them by the Representatives of the two Republics.
16. Confronted by these divergent contentions we have, after the most
careful consideration, concluded that the question submitted to us is not simply
that of deciding which of the two alternative lines is right or wrong, but rather
to determine - within the limits defined by the extreme claims on both sides -
the precise boundary-line which, in our opinion, would best interpret the
intention of the diplomatic instruments submitted to our consideration.
Annex 5
ANDES BOUNDARY CASE
41
17. We have abstained, therefore, from pronouncing judgment upon the
respective contentions which have been laid before us with so much skill and
earnestness, and we confine ourselves to the pronouncement of our opinions
and recommendations on the delimitation of the boundary, adding that in our
view the actual demarcation should be carried out in the presence of officers
deputed for that purpose by the Arbitrating Power, in the ensuing summer
season in South America.
18. There are four distinct subjects upon which we are called upon to make
recommendations,
viz.:
(I) The region of the San Francisco Pass in latitude 26°50' S., appoximately,
(2) The Lake Lacar basin, in latitude 40°10' S., approximately,
(3) The region extending from the Perez Rosales Pass, in latitude 41° S.,
approximately, to the vicinity of Lake Viedma,
(4) The region of Last Hope Inlet to the fifty-second parallel of south latitude.
19. Our recommendations upon I hese four subjects are as follows
1
:
The San Francisco Pass
20. The initial point of the boundary shall be the pillar already erected on
the San Francisco Pass.
From that pillar the boundary shall follow the water-parting which conducts
it to the highest peak of the mountain mass, called Tres Cruces, in latitude
27°3'45" S.; longitude 68°49'5" W.
Lake Lacar
21. From the point of bifurcation of the two lines claimed as boundaries
respectively by Chile and Argentina, in latitude 40°2'0" S., longitude 71°40'36"
W., the boundary shall follow the local water-parting southwards by Cerro
Perihueico to its southern termination in the valley of the River Huahum.
From that point it shall cross the river in longitude 71°40'36" W., and
thenceforward shall follow the water-parting, leaving all the basin of the
Huahum above that point, including Lake Lacar, to Argentina, and all below
it to Chile, until it joins the boundary which has already been determined
between the two Republics.
Perez Rosales Pass lo Lake Viedma
22. The southern termination of the boundary already agreed upon between
the two Republics, north of Lake Nahuel Huapi, is the Perez Rosales Pass
connecting Lago de Todos los Santos with Laguna Fria. Here a pillar has been
erected.
From this pillar the boundary shall continue to follow the water-parting
southward to the highest peak of Mount Tronador. Thence it shall continue
to follow the water-parting which separates the basins of the Rivers Blanco and
Leones (or Leon) on the Pacific side from the upper basin of the Manso and
its tributary lakes above a point in longitude 7 I
0
52' W., where the general
direction of the river course changes from north-west to south-west.
Crossing the river at that point, it shall continue to follow the water-parting
dividing the basins of the Manso above the bend, and of the Puelo above Lago
1
All co-ordinate values expressed in terms of latitude and longitude are approxi­
mate only, and refer to the Maps attached to this Report. Altitudes quoted in the
text are in metres. Where the boundary follows a river tht" " thalweg" dett"rmines
the line.
Annex 5
42
ARGENTINA/CHILE
Inferior, from the basins of the lower courses of those rivers, until it touches a point
midway between Lakes Puelo and Inferior, where it shall cross the River Puelo.
Thence it shall ascend to, and follow, the water-parting of the high snow­
covered mountain mass dividing the basins of the Puelo above Lago Inferior,
and of the Fetaleufu above a point in longitude 71°48' W. from the lower
basins of the same rivers.
Crossing the Fetaleufu River at this point, it shall follow the lofty water­
parting separating the upper basins of the Fetaleufu and of the Palena (or
Carrenleufu or Corcovado) above a point in longitude 71°47' vV., from the
lower basins of the same rivers. This water-parting belongs to the Cordillera
in which are situated Cerro Conico and Cerro Serrucho, and crosses the Cordon
de las Tobas.
Crossing the Palena at this point, opposite the junction of the River En­
cuentro, it shall then follow the Encuentro along the course of its western
branch to its source on the western slopes of Cerro Virgen. Ascending to that
peak, it shall then follow the local water-parting southwards to the northern
shore of Lago General Paz at a point where the Lake narrows. in longitude
71°41'30" w.
The boundary shall then cross the Lake by the shortest line, and from the
point where it touches the southern shore it shall follow the local water-parting
southwards, which conducts it to the summit of the high mountain mass
indicated by Cerro Botella Oeste (1,890 m.), and from that peak shall descend
to the Rio Pico by the shortest local water-parting.
Crossing that river at the foot of the water-parting, in longitude 7 I
0
49' W.,
it shall ascend again in a direction approximately south and continue to follow
the high mountain water-parting separating the upper basin of the Rio Pico
above the crossing from the lower basin of the same river, and from the entire
basin of the Rio Frias, until it effects a junction with the continental water­
parting about the position of Loma Baguales, in latitude 44°22' S., longitude
71°24' W.
From this point, it shall continue to follow the water-parting dividing the
basins of the Frias and Aisen Rivers from that of the Senguerr until it reaches a
point in latitude 45°44' S., longitude 71°50' W., called Cerro de la Galera in
the Map, which marks the head of an affluent flowing south-eastwards into the
main stream of the Rio Simpson or southern branch of the Aisen. It shall
descend this affluent to its junction with the main stream, and from this junction
shall follow the main stream upwards to its source under the mountain called
Cerro Rojo (I, 790 m.) in the Map. From the peak Cerro Rojo it shaII pass by
the local water-parting to the highest summit of the Cerro Ap Ywan (2,310 m.).
From Cerro Ap Ywan it shall foIIow the local water-parting determined by
the promontory which juts southwards into Lago Buenos Aires in longitude
7}0
46' W.
From the southern extremity of this headland the boundary shall pass in a
straight line to the mouth of the largest channel of the River Jeinemeni, and
thenceforward follow that river to a point in longitude 71°59' W., which marks
the foot of the water-parting between its two affluents, the Zeballos and the
Quisoco. From this point it shall follow this water-parting to the summit of
the high Cordon Nevada, and shall continue along the water-parting of that
elevated cordon southwards, and thence follow the water-parting between the
basins of the Tamango (or Chacabuco) and of the Gio, and ascend to the summit
of a mountain known locally as Cerro Principio, in the Cordon Quebrado.
From this peak it shall follow the water-parting which conducts it to the
southern extremity of the headland jutting 5outhward into Lago Pueyrredon
(or Cochrane), in longitude 72°1' W.
Annex 5
ANDES BOUNDARY CASE
43
From this headland it shall cross the Lake passing direct to a point on the
summit of the hill, in latitude 47°20' S., longitude 72°4' W., commanding the
southern shore of the Lake. From this summit it shall follow the lofty snow­
covered water-parting, which conducts it to the highest peak of Mount San
Lorenzo (or Cochrane), (3,360 m.). From Mount San Lorenzo it shall pass
southward along the elevated water-parting dividing the basin of the River
Saito on the west from that of the River San Lorenzo on the east, to the highest
peak of the Cerro Tres Hermanos.
From this peak it shall follow the water-parting between the basin of the
Upper Mayer on the east, above the point where that river changes its course
from north-west to south-west, in latitude 48° 12' S., and the basins of the
Coligue or Bravo River and of the Lower Mayer, below the point already
specified, on the west, striking the north-eastern arm of Lago San Martin at
the mouth of the Mayer River.
From this point it shall follow the median line of the Lake southwards as
far as a point opposite the spur which terminates on the southern shore of the
Lake in longitude 72°47' W., whence the boundary shall be drawn to the foot
of this spur and ascend the local water-parting to Mount Fitzroy and thence to
the continental water-parting to the north-west of Lago Viedma. Here the
boundary is already determin!"d between the two Republics.
Region of Last Hope Inlet
23. From the point of divergence of the two boundaries claimed by Chile
and Argentina respectively in latitude 50°50' S., the boundary shall follow the
high crests of the Sierra Baguales to the southern spur which leads it to the
source of the Zanja Honda stream. Thence it shall follow that stream until it
reaches existing Settlements. From this point it shall be carried southward,
having regard, as far as possible, to existing claims, crossing the River Viz­
cachas and ascending to the northern peak of Mount Cazador (948 m.). It
shall then follow the crest-line of the Cerro Cazador southwards, and the
southern spur which touches the Guillermo stream in longitude 72° 17'30" W.
Crossing this stream, it shall ascend the spur which conducts it to the point
marked 650 m. on the Map. This point is on the continental water-parting,
which the boundary shall follow to its junction with the fifty-second parallel
of south latitude.
24. All which we beg humbly to submit for Your Majesty's gracious
consideration.
Signed, sealed, and delivered at the Foreign Office, in London, this nine­
t!"enth day of November, one thomand nine hundred and two.
(Signed) [L. S.J MACNAGHTEN,
Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, and a Member of
Your Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council
(Signed) [L. S.J John C. ARDAGH,
Major-General, and a Member of Council of
the Royal Geographical Society
[L. S.J T. HUNGERFORD HOLDICH,
Colonel of the Royal Engineers. and a Vice-President of
the Royal Geographical Society
[L. S.J E. H. HILLS,
lvlajor of the Royal Engi,1eeis, head of the Topographical Sectzon of the Intelligence
Division, Secretar_y to the Arbitration Tribunal
Annex 5
44
ARGENTINA/CHILE
1
SCHEDULE OF MAPS
I. San Francisco Pass.
2. Lake Lacar.
3. Perez Rosales to Lake Buenos Aires.
4. Lake Buenos Aires to Mount Fitzroy.
5. Last Hope Inlet.
I Not reproduced in this volume.
Annex 5
45
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS
a) Boundary Treaty signed in Buenos Ayres on the 23rd July 1881
1
In the name of Almighty God! The Governments of the Argentine Republic
and of the Republic ofChili, animated by the purpose ofresolving in a friendly
and dignified manner the boundary-controversy
that has existed between both
countries, and in fulfilment of Article 39 of the Treaty of April 1856,2 have
decided to conclude a Boundary Treaty and named to that effect their pleni­
potentiaries, to wit:
His Excellency the President of rhe Argentine Republic Doctor Bernardo
de Irigoyen, Minister and Secretary of State in the Department of Foreign
Affairs, and His Excellency the President of the Republic ofChili Mr. Francisco
de B. Echeverria, Consul General of said Republic.
Who, after having produced their full powers and finding them sufficient
for the performance of this act have agreed upon the following articles:
Article 1. - The boundary between the Argentine Republic and Chili from
North to South as far as the parallel of latitude 52° S., is the Cordillera of the
Andes.-The
frontier line shall run in that extent along the most elevated
crests of said cordilleras that may divide the waters and shall pass between the
slopes which descend one side and the other.-The
difficulties that might arise
from the existence of certain valleys formed by the bifurcation of the cordillera,
and in which the watershed may not be apparent, shall be amicably settled by
two experts, one to be named by each party. Should they not come to an under­
standing, a third expert, named by both governments, shall be called upon to
decide. A record, in duplicate, of the operations carried out by them, embody­
ing the points upon which they may have agreed, shall be drawn up and signed
by the two experts, and besides by the third one as regards the points decided
by him. This record, once signed by them, shall produce full effect and shall
be held firm and valid without necessity of further formalities or proceedings.
A copy of the record shall be presented to each of the two governments.
Article 2. - In the southern part of the continent, and to the north of the
Straits of Magellan, the boundary between the two countries shall be a line,
which starting from Point Dungene5s, shall be prolonged overland as far as
Mount Dinero; thence it shall continue we5tward, following the highest eleva­
tions of the chain of hills existing there, until it strikes the height of Mount
Aymont. From this point the line shall be prolonged up to the intersection of
meridian 70° W., with parallel 52° S. and thence it shall continue westward
l Emilio Lamarca, Bo1111da~y Agreemerzts in force between the Argentine Republic and
Chzli, Buenos Aires, 1898, Index, p. 5.
2
Art. XXXIX. - Both the contracting parties acknowledge as boundaries of
their respective territories, those they possessed as such at the time of separating
from the Spanish dominion in the year 1810, and agree to postpone the questions
which may have arisen or may arise regarding this matter in order to discuss them
later on in a peaceful and amicable manner, without ever resorting to violent
measures, and in the event of not arriving at a complete arrangement, to submit the
decision to the arbitration of a friendly nat10n.
Annex 5
46
ARGENTINA/CHILE
coinciding with this latter parallel as far as the divortium aquarum of the Andes.
The territories lying to the north of said line shall belong to the Argentine
Republic, and to Chili those which extend to the south, without prejudice to
the provisions of Art. 3d concerning Tierra de! Fuego and the adjacent islands.
Article 3. - In Tierra de! Fuego a line shall be traced which, starting from
the point named Cape Espiritu Santo in latitude 52°, 40' S., shall be prolonged
southward coinciding with meridian 68°. 34' W. Greenwich, until it strikes
Beagle Channel.
Tierra de! Fuego, divided in this manner, shall be Chilian on the western
and Argentine on the eastern side. As regards the islands, Staten Island, the
islets in close proximity to same, and the remaining island lying in the Atlantic
to the east of Tierra de! Fuego and of the eastern coasts of Patagonia, shall
belong to the Argentine Republic; and all the islands south of Beagle Channel
down to Cape Horn, as well as those lying to the west of Tierra de! Fuego, shall
belong to Chili.
Article 4. -The same experts referred to in Art. 1st shall fix on the ground
the lines indicated in the two previous articles. and shall proceed in the same
manner a5 therein established.
Article 5. -The
Straits of Magellan are neutralized for perpetuity, and their
free navigation is secured to the flags of all nations. With the view of securing
said libercy and neutrality, no fortifications nor military defences which may
thwart that purpose shall be erected on the coasts.
Article 6. -The governmems of che Argentine Republic and of Chili shall
exercise full dominion and for perpetuity over the territories which respectively
belong to them according to the present arrangement. Any question which
might unfortunately arise between the two countries, whether it be on account
of this transaction, or owing to any other cause, shall be submitted to the
decision of a friendly power, the boundary established in the present arrange­
ment to remain at all events immovable between the two republics.
Article 7.
1
- The ratifications of this treaty shall be exchanged within the
term of sixty days, or sooner if possible, and the exchange shall take place in
the city of Buenos Aires or in that of Santiago, Chili.
In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of the Argentine Republic and of
the Republic of Chi Ii signed and sealed with their respective seah, in duplicate,
the present treaty in the city of Buenos Aires on the twenty third day of July
in the year of our Lord 1881.
[L. S.] Bernardo DE IRIGOYEN
[L. S.] Francisco DE B. ECHEVERRIA
b) Additional and Explanatory Protocol of the Boundary Treaty of 1881
signed in Santiago on the 1st May 1893
2
In the city of Santiago, Chili, on the first of May 1893, Mr. Norberto Quirno
Costa, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Argentine
Republic, and the Minister of War and Marine Mr. Isidoro Errazuriz in his
character of Plenipotentiary ad hoe, having met in the Department of Foreign
I A Protocol was signed at Buenos Ayres on the 15th St'ptember 1881, extending
for 30 days the limit of time fixed by Article VII for the exchange of the ratifications
of this Treaty, such extension to date from the 22nd September 1886.
2
Emilio Lamarca, Boundary Agreements i11 f01ce between the Argentl1/e and Chih,
Buenos Aires, 1898, Index, p. 25.
Annex 5
ANDES BOUNDARY CASE
47
Affairs, after having considered the present state of the work of the experts
entrusted with the demarcation of the delimitation between the Argentine
Republic and Chili, in accordance with the boundary treaty of 1881, and
animated by the desire of removing the difficulties which have embarrassed
or might embarrass them in the fulfilment of their commission, and of estab­
lishing between both States a complete and cordial understanding in harmony
with the antecedents of brotherhood and glory common to both, and with
the ardent wishes of public opinion on either side of the Andes, have agreed as
follows:
FIRST - Whereas Article l of the treaty of 23 July 1881 provides that" the
boundary between Chili and the Argentine Republic from north to south as
far as parallel of latitude 52° S. is the Cordillera of the Andes " and that " the
frontier line shall run along the most elevated crests of said Cordillera that
may divide the waters, and shall pass between the slopes which descend one
side and the other ", the experts and the subcommissions shall observe this
principle as an invariable rule of their proceedings. Consequently all lands
and all waters, to wit: lakes, lagoons, rivers and parts of rivers, streams, slopes
situated to the east of the line of the most elevated crests of the Cordillera of
the Andes that may divide the waters, shall be held in perpetuity to be the
property and under the absolute dominion of the Argentine Republic; and all
lands and all waters, to wit: lakes, l;1goons, rivers and parts of rivers, streams,
slopes situated to the west of the line of the most elevated crests of the Cordillera
of the Andes to be the property and under the absolute dominion of Chili.
SECOND - The undersigned declare that, in the opinion of their respective
governments, and according to the spirit of the boundary treaty, the Argentine
Republic retains its dominion and sovereignty over all the territory that extends
from the east of the principal chain of the Andes to the coast of the Atlantic,
just as the Republic of Chili over the western territory to the coasts of the
Pacific; it being understood that b)' the provisions of said treaty, the sover­
eignty of each State over the respective coast line is absolute, in such a manner
that Chili cannot lay claim to any point toward the Atlantic, just as the Argen­
tine Republic can lay no claim to any toward the Pacific. If in the peninsular
part of the south, on nearing parallel 52° S. the Cordillera should be found
penetrating into the channels of the Pacific there existing, the experts shall
undertake the study of the ground in order to fix a boundary line leaving to
Chili the coasts of said channels; in consideration of which study, both govern­
ments 5hall determine said line amicably.
THIRD - In the case foreseen in rhe second part of the first article of the
treaty of 1881, where difficulties might arise "from the existence of certain
valleys formed by the bifurcation of the Cordillera, and in which the watershed
may not be apparent"
the experts shall endeavour to settle them amicably,
seeing that a search be made on the- ground for this geographical condition
of the demarcation. For that purpose, of joint accord, they shall draw up with
the assistant engineers a map which may help them to resolve the difficulty.
FOURTH - The demarcation of Tierra del Fuego shall commence simulta­
neously with that of the Cordillera, and shall start from the point called Cape
Espiritu Santo. At that point, visible from the sea, there are three heights or
hills of medium elevation, of which the central or intermediary one, which is
the highest, shall be taken a5 point of departure, and on its summit shall be
placed the first landmark of the line of demarcation. which shall continue
towards the south in the direction of the meridian.
Annex 5
48
ARGENTINA/CHILE
FIFTH - The work of demarcation on the ground shall be undertaken next
spring simultaneously in the Cordillera of the Andes and in Tierra de! Fuego
in the direction previously agreed upon by the experts, that is to say, starting
from the northern region of the former, and from the point denominated Cape
Espiritu Santo of the latter. To that effect the commissions of assistant engineers
shall be ready to commence the work on the fifteenth next October. On that
date the experts shall also have prepared and signed the instructions which the
aforesaid commissions shall bear, according to article four of the convention
of the twentieth August one thousand eight hundred and eighty eight. These
instructions shall be framed in accordance with the agreements set forth in the
present protocol.
S1xTH - For the purpose of demarcation, the experts, or in their stead the
commissions of assistant engineers who act under the instructions given them
by the former, shall seek on the ground the boundary line, and fix the demar­
cation by means of iron landmarks of the kind previously agreed upon, placing
one in each pass or accessible point of the mountain which may be situated on
the boundary line, and shall draw up a record of the operation, specifying the
fundamental reasons of same, and the topographic indications for recognizing
at all times the point fixed, although the landmark might have disappeared by
the wear of time or atmospheric action.
SEVENTH - The experts shall direct the commissions of assistant engineers
to collect all the necessary data to design on paper, of joint accord, and with
all possible accuracy, the boundary line as they may demark it on the ground.
To that effect, they shall indicate the changes of altitude and azimuth which
the boundary line may suffer in its course, the beginning of the streams or
quebradas that descend one side and the other, writing down the names of
same whenever it were possible to know them, and shall distinctly fix the points
on which the boundary landmarks are to be placed. These maps may contain
other geographical accidents, which without being actually necessary in the
demarcation of boundaries, such as the visible course of rivers when descending
into the neighbouring valleys, and the high peaks that rise on one side and the
other of the boundary line, are easily indicated in the places as signs of location.
The experts in the instructions given to their assistant engineers shall point out
such facts of a geographical character as it may be useful to collect, provided
that this does not interrupt nor delay the demarcation of boundaries, which is
the main object of the commission of experts, and upon which speedy and
amicable operation both governments are intent.
EIGHTH - The Argentine expert having manifested that, in order to sign
with full knowledge of the matter the record of 15th April 1892, by which a
mixed Chilian-Argentine commission fixed on the ground the point of departure
of the demarcation of boundaries in the Cordillera of the Andes, he considered
it indispensable to make a fresh reconnaissance of the locality in order to verify
or rectify said operation, adding that this reconnaissance would not delay the
progress of the work, which could be simultaneously continued by another sub­
commission, and the Chilianexpect having on his part manifested that, although
he believed that the operation had been carried out in strict conformity with
the treaty, he had no objection to acquiesce in the wishes of his colleague as a
proof of the cordiality with which this work was being performed - the
undersigned have agreed that a revision be made of what had been done, and
that in the event of errors being found, the landmark shall be transferred to the
point in which it should have been fixed according to the terms of the boundary
treaty.
Annex 5
ANDES BOUNDARY CASE
4-9
NINTH - With the desire of expediting the work of demarcation, and
believing that this can be attained through the employment of three sub­
commissions instead of the two which up to the present have been working,
without the need of increasing the number of assistant engineers, the under­
signed agree that henceforward, as long as the creation of others should not
be decided on, there shall be three subcommissions, each one composed of
four persons, two on the part of the Argentine Republic and two on the part
of Chili, and of the auxiliaries which by mutual agreement might be considered
necessary.
TENTH - The tenor of the preceding stipulations does not in the least
impair the spirit of the boundary treaty of 1881, and consequently it is hereby
declared that the conciliatory means provided by Arts. I and 6 of same for
obviating any difficulty subsist in full force.
ELEVENTH - The undersigned ministers understand and declare that, given
the nature of some of the foregoing stipulations, and in order to invest with a
permanent character the solutions arrived at, the present protocol shall be
previously submitted to the consideration of the Congresses of both countries,
which shall be done in the next ordinary sessions, keeping it reserved in the
meanwhile.
The undersigned ministers, in the name of their respective Governments,
and duly authorized, sign the present protocol in duplicate, one for each party
and affix their seals to same.
[L. S.] N. QUIRNO COSTA
[L. S.] Isidoro ERRAZURIZ
Annex 6
Award of His Majesty The King of Italy with Regard to the Boundary Between the Colony of
British Guiana and the United States of Brazil, UNRIAA, Vol. XI, p. 21 (6 June 1904)
Annex 6
REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL AW ARDS
RECUEIL DES SENTENCES
ARBITRALES
VOLUME XI
l- S I T E D :'\ .--\ T I O :\" S - NAT I ONS UN I ES
Annex 6
A WARD OF HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IT ALY WITH
REGARD TO THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE COLONY
OF BRITISH GUIANA AND THE UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL.
GIVEN AT ROME, JUNE 6, 1904
1 2
Determination de l'etendue du territoire qui peut etre a bon droit reclamee par
quelqu'une des deux Parties, et fixation de la ligne frontiere entre la colonie de la
Guyane anglaise et des Etats-Unis du Bresil-Application a l'affaire de certains
principes du droit international regissant !'acquisition de la souverainete sur un
terri toire nullius.
We, Victor Emmanuel, by the grace of God and the will of the people,
King of Italy, Arbitrator in the matter of deciding the question of the frontier
between British Guiana and Brazil.
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
Emperor of India, and the President of the United States of Brazil, having, in
the Treaty concluded between them· in London on the 6th November, 190 I,
decided to invite Us as Arbitrator, to settle the question of the frontier of
British Guiana and Brazil, We have accepted the task of defining the limits
of the frontier.
The High Contending Parties having undertaken, in the above-mentioned
Treaty which was ratified at Rio de Janeiro on the 28th January, 1902, to
accept our arbitral decision as a complete, perfect, and definitive settlem~nt
of the question referred to Us, We, wishing to act in a manner corresponding
to the trust reposed in Us by the said Parties, have examined carefully all the
memoranda and all the documents produced to Us, and have weighed and
duly considered the rea.mns on which each of the High Contracting Parties
founds its claim.
Having taken due note of everything, We have considered:That

the discovery of new channels of trade in regions not belonging to any
State cannot by itself be held to confer an effective right to the acquisition of
the sovereignty of the said regions by the State whose subjects the persons who
in their private capacity make the discovery may happen to be;
__
That to acquire the sovereignty of regions which are not in the dormmon of
any State, it is indispensable that the occupation be effected in the name of the
State which intends to acquire the sovereignty of those regions;
_
That the occupation cannot be held to be carried out except by effective,
uninterrupted, and permanent possession being taken in the name of the State,
and that a simple affirmation of rights of sovereignty or a manifest intention
to render the occupation effective cannot suffice;
_
That the effective possession of a part of a region, although it may be hel~ to
confer a right to the acquisition of the sovereignty of the whole of a ~e~10n
which tonstitutes a single organic whole, cannot confer a right to the acqms1t1on
1
Parliamentary Paper, Brazil No. I (1904).
2
Brzt1sh and Foreign Stale Papers, Vol. XCIX, p. 930.
Annex 6
22
BRAZIL/GREAT BRITAIS
of the whole of a region which, either owing to its size or to its physical con­
figuration, cannot be deemed to be a single organic whole de facto:
That consequently, all things duly considered, it cannot be held that Portugal
in the first instance, and Brazil subsequently have effectively taken possession
of all the territory in dispute, but that it can only be recognized that they have
possession of some places in the same, and have there exercised their sovereign
rights.
On the other hand, We have had under our consideration That

the arbitral Judgment of the 3rd October, 1899,1 delivered by the
Anglo-American Tribunal, which, when deciding the boundary between
Great Britain and Venezuela, adjudged to the former the territory which
constitutes the subject of the present dispute, cannot be cited against Brazil,
which was unaffected by that Judgment;
That, however, the right of the British State as the successor to Holland, to
whom the Colony belonged, is based on the exercise of rights of jurisdiction by
the Dutch West India Company, which, furnished with sovereign powers by
the Dutch Government, performed acts of sovereign authority over certain
places in the zone under discussion, regulating the commerce carried on for a
long time there by the Dutch, submitting it to discipline, subjecting it to the
orders of the Governor of the Colony, and obtaining from the natives a partial
recognition of the power of that official;
That like acts of authority and jurisdiction over traders and native tribes
were afterwards continued in the name of British sovereignty when Great
Britain came in to possession of the Colony belonging to the Dutch;
That such effective assertion of rights of sovereign jurisdiction was gradually
developed and not contradicted, and, by degrees, became accepted even by
the independent native tribes who inhabited these regions, who could not be
considered as included in the effective dominion of Portuguese, and later on of
Brazilian, sovereignty;
That in virtue of this successive development of jurisdiction and authority
the acquisition of sovereignty on the part of Holland first, and Great Britain
afterwards, was effected over a certain part of the territory in dispute;
That it does not appear from the documents produced to Us, which have
been weighed and duly considered, that there are historical and legal claims
on which to found thoroughly determined and well-defined rights of sovereignty
in favour of either of the contending Powers over the whole territory in dispute,
but only over certain portions of the same;
That not even the limit of the zone of territory over which the right of
sovereignty of one or of the other of the two Parties may be held to be established
can be fixed with precision;
That it cannot either be decided with certainty whether the right of Brazil
or of Great Britain is the stronger.
In this condition of affairs, since it is our duty to fix the line of frontier between
the dominions of the two Powers, We have come to the conclusion that, in the
present state of the geographical knowledge of the region, it is not possible to
divide the contested territory into two parts equal as regards extent and value,
but that it is necessary that it should be divided in accordance with the lines
traced by nature, and that the preference should be given to a frontier which,
while clearly defined throughout its whole course, the better lends itself to a
fair decision of the disputed territory.
For these reasons, We decide:-
1
Ibid., Vol. XCII, p. 160.
Annex 6
GUIANA BOUNDARY CASE
23
The frontier between British Guiana and Brazil is fixed by the line leaving
Mount Yakontipu; it follows eastwards the watershed as far as the source of
the Ireng (Mahu); it follows the downward course of that river as far as its
confluence with the Takutu; it follows the upward course of the Takutu as far
as its source, where it joins again the line of frontier determined in the Declara­
tion annexed to the Treaty of Arbitration concluded in London by the High
Contending Parties on the 6th November, 1901.
In virtue of this declaration every part of the zone in dispute which is to the
east of the line of frontier shall belong to Great Britain, and every part which is
to the west shall belong to Brazil.
The frontier along the lreng (Mahu) and Takutu is fixed at the " thalweg "
and the said rivers shall be open to the free navigation of both conterminous
States.
Wherever the watercourse may be divided into more than one branch, the
frontier shall follow the " thalweg " of the most eastern branch.
G1vEN at Rome on the 6th June, I 904.
VICTOR EMMA!'.l"EL.
Annex 7
Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Venezuela, to the U.K.
Ambassador to Venezuela, No. CO 111/564 (12 Mar. 1908)
Annex 7
'
'
.‘
'
1'
1
i
'
‘
i
;
‘
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1
,
.
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.
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(Wm—OT“)
IE
REPRQDucm.“PHQTQGIAPHI‘ChiL
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urw'"'"—v

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“kc?
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x
CARACAS,
3;.-_9_-.__5__APR
08
i
\*
March
16th
1908.
(1,1904%
\
‘
aim-
I
have
the
honour
to
forward
herewith
copy
and
trams
lation
of
a
note
which
I
have
received
from
Dr.
Paul
in
reply
to
my
note
of
the
25th
ultimo
(copy'
of
which
was
forwarded
to
you
in
my
deepetch
No.19
‘of
the
same
date)
informing
me
that
the
Venezuelan
Government
adhere
to
the
terms
of
their
note
of
September
4th
lest;
which
ratifies
the
deci
eion
of
the
Commissioners
for
the
delim-
itetion
of
the
Guyene.
frontier
oniy
in
so
far
as
it
is
in
accord
With
the
terms
of'the
Paris
award.
I
have
&c.
,-
"
(Signed)
'Vincent
Corbett.
§
in
3'
Grey,
Bert.,
M,
&c.
Annex 7
rUBLlC
RECORD
OFFICE

C0-

PHOTOGRAPHICALLY
IT

66:""I-'
pr.
J:
de
J.
Paul
to
Sir
Vincent
Corbett.
CARACAS,
March
12th
1908.
n
c—w
v“
Age—i,
4
!
i
I
I
\
b
‘
Sirf-
‘3,
y
of
your
In
acknowledging
receipt
to
Your
Excellenc
nder
date
esteemed
of
February
note
25th
u
last
relative
to
the
ratification
accorded
by
the
Federal
Executive
5
of
the
Commissions
to
the
for
labour
the
delimitation
of
the
frontier
between
Venezuela
and
British
Guyana
3
I
tirely
restricted
to
that
part
Which
is
and
which
is
en
ith
the
Paris
award
of
October
6th
1899,_;
in
confornity
W
g
to
the
deviation
of
the
line
recom-
l
I
without
extendin
I
have
the
honour
to
inform
A
1‘-
instructions
to
rely
to
the
note
of
this
Ministry
of'
refer
myself
anti
A~V
1907
No.954
and
to
confirm
to
your
Lega-
September
4th
ion
therein
made
on
the
subject
by
tion
the
declarat
this
Office-
'Iwml&m,
.\
(signed)
J.
de
J.
Paul.
Annex 8
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Treaties and International
Agreements, Vol. III (1920-1925) (1927)
Annex 8
601
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN FORCE (*)
_____

[…]
The Acts of the Mixed Boundary Commission that constitute an international
agreement.—(1880).
Protocols on Limits.—December 9, 1905.

[…]
Annex 8
.
.

(501
Gül

TRATADOS
TRATADOS Y ACUERDOS INTERNACIONALES EN
VI~OR (*)
Y
ACUERDOS
INTERNACIONALES
EN
VIGOR
(*)
Alemania.—Conveni0
sobre
Marcas
dc
Fabrica
y
de
Comer-
cio.—11
de
julio
de
1883.
Alemania .- onYenio obre Marcas de Fábrica y de Comer­
cio.-11 <le julio de 1883.
Tratado
de
Comercio
y
Navegacién.—26
de
enero
de
1909.
Bélgica-—C0nvenio
sobre
situacion
legal
de
las
sociedades
.anénimas
y
de
las
otras
asociaciones
co-merciales,
in-

dustriales
y
financieras.——25
de
mayo
de
1882.
Convenio
sobre
Marcas
do
Fabrica
y
de
Comercio.—25
de
mayo
de
1882.
Tratado
de
Amistad,
Comercio
y
Nay/“egackSIL—lQ
de
marzo
de
1884.

‘
Tratado
dc
Extradicion.——-13
de
marzo
de
1884.
Tratado de Comercio y avegación.-26 de enero de 1909.
Bélgica.-Con venio sobre situación legal de las sociedades
anónimas y de las otras asociaciones comerciale , in­
dustriale:; y financieras.-25 de mayo de 1882.
Convenio sobre Marcas de Fábrica y de Comercio.-25
de mayo de 1882.
Tratado de Amistad, Comercio y avegación.-1 ° de
marzo de 1884.
Tratado de Extradición.-13
de marzo de 1884.
Bolivia.—Tratado
dc
Paz,
Amistad,
Comercio
y
N
avegacion.—
14
do
setiembre
de
1883.
Tratado
de
Extradicion.—21
do
setiembre
do
1883.
Bolivia.-Trataclo de Paz, Amistad, Comercio y Navegación.14

de setiembre de 1883.
Tratado de Extradición.-21
de setiembre de 1883.
Convencion
Consular.—27
de
setiembre
de
1883
.
Convención Consular.-27
de setiembre de 1883 .
Tratado
General
de
Arbitraje.——12
de
abril
de
1919.
Tratado General de Arbitraje.-12
de abril ele 1919.
Convenio
sobre
servicio
de
Valijas
diplomaticas.—16
de
abril
de
1923.
BrasiL—Tratado
dc
Limites
y
Navegacién
Fluvia1.—5
de
ma-
Convenio sobre servicio de Valijas diplomática s.-1 6 de
abril de 1923.
Brasil.-Tratado
de Límites y Navegación Fluvial.-5 de ma­
yo
do
1859.
yo de 1859.
Actas
de
la
Comisién
Mixta
dc
Limites
que
implican
Actas de la Comisión Mixta de Límites que impli can
acuerdo
internacional.———(1880).
acuerdo internacional.-(
1880).
Protocolos
sobre
Limites.—-—9
dc
diciembre
do
1905.
Protocolos sobre Límites.-9
de diciembre de 1905.
Convencion
de
Arbitr.aje.——3O
de
abril
de
1909.
Convención de Arbitraje.-30
de abril de 1909.
Convenio,
por
cambio
do
notas,
sobre
servicio
de
Vali-
jas
diplométicas.
(1909).
Protocolo
para
la
colocacién
dc
algunos
postes
en
cierta
parte
de
la
frontera.—29
de
febrero
de
1912.
Convenio, por cambio de notas, sobre servicio de Valijas

diplomáticas. (1909).
Protocolo para la colocación de algunos po tes en cierta
parte de la frontera.-29
de febrero de 1912.
(1)
Para
cl
19
de
mayo
de
) Para el 1
1927.
Se
ha
formado
9
de mayo de 1927. Se ha formado esta lista, previo
esta
lista,
previo
Studio
.
'
-
.
mmucmso
de
los
expedxentes.
No
obstante
cl
culdado
puesto
minucioso de lo expedientes. No obstante el cuidado puesto
1*“
ese
eghulb.
1-
IO
.
tudio, la 1i ta queda ujeta en todo caso a rectificación. Lo
Annex 9
Speech by the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States to the Pan-American Society of the
United States (1944)
Annex 9
Annex 9
Annex 10
Government of United Kingdom, Foreign Office, Minute by C.N. Brading, No. FO 371/38814
(3 Oct. 1944)
Annex 10
Annex 10
Annex 10
Annex 11
Letter from the Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Venezuela, to J.V.T.W.T. Perowne, U.K.
Foreign Office (3 Nov. 1944)
Annex 11
Annex 11
Annex 11
Annex 12
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Treaties and International
Agreements, Vol. V (1933-1936) (1945)
Annex 12
– 548 –

[…]
Agreement on the point of convergence of the borders of Venezuela, Brazil and
British Guiana, concluded by exchange of notes.—October 17 and November 3,
1932. (V. IV, p. 360).

[…]
Annex 12
'
'
TRATAD’OS
Y
ACUERDOS
INTERNACIONALES
EN
VIGOR
Alemania
(*).——-Convenio
sabre
Marcas
dc
Fébrica
-y
de
Comercio..—11
de
julio
de
1883.
(V.
L,
p.
370).
Tratado
de
Comercio
y
Navegacién.——26
de
enero
de
1909
(V
II,
p.
386).
Convenio
sobre
clasificacién
de
las
visitas
dc
buques
dc
guerra
alemanes
a
pinertes
vgnezolanos
y
vi’ceversa,
gconcluido
par
cambio
dc
notas.~—Enero
de
1932.
(V.
IV,
p.
296).
Convenio
pct
cambio
dc
notas,
relativo-
al
cobro
dc
derechos
com
sulares
por
-el
visto
en
los
p-asaportes.——23
dc
diciembre
de
1937
y
15
de
marzo
de
1938.
(V.
VI,
p.
37).
Bélgica.——Convenio
sobre
s-ituacién
legal
de
las
sociedades
anénimas
y
dc
Ias
otras
asociacion'es
come-rciales,
industriales-
y
finan-
pieras.—25
de
mayo
de
1882.
(V.
I,
p.
368).
Convenio
sobre
Marcas
dc
Fébrica
y
de
Comércio.—-ZS
de
mayo
de
1882.
(V.
I,
p.
369).
Tratado
dc
Amistad,
Comer-cio
y
Navegacién.—-1°
de
marzo
de.
1884.
(V.
I,
p.
414).
Tratado
dc
Extradicién.——l3
de
marzo
de
1884.
(V.
I,
p.
425).
Bolivia‘.~—Tratado
dc
Paz,
Amistad,
Comercio
y
Navegacién.—14
dc
setiembre
de
1883.
(V.
I,
p.
391).
Tratado
General
de
Arbitraje.——12
dc
abri'l
de
1919
(V.
II,
p.
580)
Convenio
sabre
servicio
de
Val-ijas
diplomaticas.—16
de
abril
de
1923.
(V.
III,
p.
63).
Brasil.—~Tratado
dc
Limites
y
Navega'cién
fiu‘vial‘.—5
de
mayo
1859'.
(V.
I,
p.
224-).
Actas
de
la
Comisién
Mixta
dc
Limites
qua
implican
acuerdo
in-
terna-cional.—(1880).
(V.
lII,'p..
3411).
Protocolo
sabre
Limites.—-—9
dc
diciembre'de
1905.
(V.
II,
p.
53).
Protocolb
para
la
colocacién
dc
algunos
postes<
en
eier‘ta
parte
de
la
frontera.——-29
de
febrero
de
1912.
(V.
II,
p.
474).

Nata—Se
ha
formado
lista
a
titulo
informative,
y,
no
obstante
El
cstudio
que
se
ha
hecho
de
los
respectivos
expedientes,
dicha
lista
queda
sujeta
en
todo
caso
a
rectificacién;
Les
Tratados
y
.Acuerd'os
Interna—cionales
cele‘brad‘os
con
los
pai-
sea
marcadbs
con
un
asterisco
estén
en
suspense:
Annex 12
‘
'
'
'
..
,
‘547—»
C0
'
,.
.
nvczio,
p01
ca'rn.b1o
de
notas,
sobre
Pasaportes.—21
de
octubre
y
y
5
de
d1c1embre
de
1919.
(V,
II,
p,
621).
sobre
reduccién
de
los
derechos
For
'
visar
pasaportcs.—5
12
d
d
1937.
(V.
VI,
p.
S).
3
e
enero
e
y
eXplotacién
do
cauc'h'o
de
13
de
octubre
de
1942.
(V.
VII,
p.
Prorroga,
1301‘
ca'rnbio
de
notas,
del
Convenio
por
el
cual.
so
extiende
El
"programa
cooperativo
dc
salubridad
y
sanidad'
do
18
de
fe-
brero
do
1943.
'(V.'VII,
p.
517).
Prérroga,
por
cambio
do
notas,
del
MOdus
Vivendi
para
el
fo-mento
de
la
produccién
dc
,articlulos
alimenti-cios
en
Venezuela
de
14
de
mayo
dc
19.43;;(V.
VII,
p.
471).
Convenio
adicional,
por
cambio
(1e
notas,
a1
Modus
Vivendi
sobre

comercioy
explotaeién
do
caucho
en
Venezuela.—27
de
setiem-
bre
do
1944'
(V.
VII,3p.
52’2).
Francia—Convenio
sabre
Marcas.:de
Fabrica
y
de
Com-ercio.+3
de
ma-
yo
de
1879.
(V.
I,
p.
356).
Convencién
para
el
restablecimiento
de
1215
rela-ciones
'de
amistad.—
26
de
noviembre
de
1885.
(Subsistente
en
parte).
(V.
I:
p.
432).
Protocolo
para
el
restablecimiento
de
las
relaciones
diplomaticas.—
19
de
febrero
de
1902.,
(V.
II,
p.
3).
Convencién
‘sobre-Comercio
y
Nav-ega-cién.—19
de
febrero
do
1902.
(V.
II,
p.
7).
Declaracién
referente
a1
régimen
de
las
Capitulaciones
en.
la
zona
francesa
del
.Imperio
Jerifiano.—.78
de
“febrero
de
1916.
(V.
II,
p.
5.57),.
Gran
Bretaria.-——Tratado
de
Amistad,
C'omercio
y
Navegaci6n.——18
de
abril
de
1825.
(V.
I,
p.149).
Convencién
per
la
cual
Se
adopta
e1
Tratado
anterior.——29
dc
octu-
bre
de
1834.
(V,
I,
p.
(1)

(1)
Los
Gobiernos
de
Venezuela
y
de
Gran
Bretafia
convinieron,
na
Declaracién
I.“
oficial
(11
es
'publicada
el
27
de
simultan-eamente
marZ'o'de
1940,
en
en
sustituir
Caragas
es'te
y
Tratadopor
um
me—
on
r
vo
Tratado
de
Comercio.
Annex 12
I
‘
.
_
>
‘
,-
I
e
.
Laudéodqeuéc'tiibfe
._.
de
1899-
(v_
-.
1;,
p.
491).
yana
Inglesa.\
Mixta
dc.
Limites
we
implican
C1:
Ia
COmlSlQn
-
Aetat-Sernicional'
(190005)
(V?
III’
p.
3369'
acuerdo
in-
C
enio
sobre
Bultds
onv
Postales.——27
de
abril
de
1912.
(V.
II,
p..
.
476).
erdo
sobre
el
punto
de
Conxrergencia
de
las.
fronteras
“11;
e1
Brasil
dc
Venezue_
y
la
Guayana
Britanica,
concluido
por
Cambio
de
notas.——17
dc
cctubre
y
3
dc
noviembr-e
de
1932.
(V.
IV,
1).
360).
‘
Tratado
sobre
la
Isl-a
(lie,
Patos.——26
de
febrero
de
1942.
(V.
VI.
p.
717).
-
Tratado
s‘obre
las
Submarinas
deli
Golrfo‘
do
Paria.—26
dc
febr-ero
de
1942.
(V.
VI,
p.
719).
Guatemalar—Convenio,
per
cambio-
dc:
notas,
sobre
Valijas
diplomati-
cas.~15
y
2'8
de
marzo
die
1939'.
(V.
VI,
p.
99).
"
'ad1C1on
Y
A31sten-cia
Iud‘imal
en
Mater1a
‘23
Penal——
de
agosto
de
1930
(V
IV,
,
p
289‘)
Conzemo,
Dor
Ca'm‘bio'de
notas,
sobre
servicio
de
Valijas
diploma-
I'Cas.\10
de
febrero.
de
1935.
(V.
V,
p.
5'86)-
Acuérdo,
Der
cam
910
-
'
.
"
de
notas,
relative“
'
-
a1:
cobro
dc
derechOS
con-
SUIareS
901'
e]
'
exico
NCO
..
d'
.
u
.
I.
1
n’W‘mlo’
DOI‘
cambio
p
Omath‘an
C116
notmq
.
A
sabre
gerVICIO
(16
vaIIJaS
.
‘
Annex 13
Treaty of amity, commerce and navigation between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines
and the Republic of the Philippines, 1001 U.N.T.S. 296 (9 Dec. 1960)
Annex 13
No. 14703
JAPAN
and
PHILIPPINES
Treaty of amity, commerce and navigation (with protocol
and two series of agreed minutes - the second one con­
cerning trade between Japan and the Republic of the
Philippines-and exchanges of notes). Signed at Tokyo
on 9 December 1960
Authentic texts of the Treaty and protocol: Japanese, Pilipino and English.
Authentic texts of the agreed minutes and the exchanges of notes: English.
Registered by Japan on 14 April 1976.
JAPON
et
PHILIPPINES
Traite d'amitie, de commerce et de navigation (avec pro­
tocole et deux proces-verbaux approuves - le second
concernant le commerce entre le Japon et la Republi­
que des Philippines - et echanges de notes). Signe a
Tokyo le 9 decembre 1960
Textes authentiques du Traite et du protocole : japonais, philippin et
anglais.
Textes authentiques du proces-verbal approuve et des echanges de notes:
anglais.
Enregistre par le Japon le 14 avril 1976.
Vol. 1001, 1-14703
Annex 13
1976
United Nations - Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Recueil des Traites
297
TREATY
1
OF AMITY, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN
JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of the Philip­
pines,
Animated by the desire to maintain and strengthen the amicable relations ex­
isting between their respective countries, and
Desirous of facilitating and developing trade and commerce between the two
countries on a mutually advantageous basis,
Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation and
for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,
The Government of Japan:
Morio Yukawa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the
Republic of the Philippines
Shigenobu Shima, Deputy Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Nobuhiko Ushiba, Ambassador, Director of the Economic Affairs Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines:
J.B. Laurel, Jr., Former Speaker, House of Representatives
Lorenzo Sumulong, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Ramon P. Mitra, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives
Rogelio de Ja Rosa, Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Antonio V. Raquiza, Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives
Manuel A. Adeva, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Japan
Perfecto E. Laguio, Undersecretary of Commerce and Industry
Caesar Z. Lanuza, Career Minister, Chief of Mission, Philippine Reparations
Mission
Andres V. Castillo, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank
Enrique M. Garcia, Career Minister
Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in due
form, have agreed upon the following Articles:
Article I. Nationals of either Party shall be accorded treatment no Jess
favorable than that accorded to nationals of any third country with respect to all
matters relating to their entry into, sojourn, travel and residence within, the ter­
ritories of the other Party.
Article II. 1. Nationals and companies of either Party, within the territories
of the other Party, shall be accorded treatment no Jess favorable than that accorded
to nationals and companies of any third country with respect to all matters pertain-
1
Came into force on 27 January 1974, i.e., one month after the date of the e/lchange of the instruments of ratifica­
tion, which took place at Manila on 27 December 1973, in accordance with article IX (I) and (2).
Vol. 1001, 1-14703
Annex 13
298
United Nations - Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Recueil des Traites
1976
ing to the levying of taxes, access to the courts of justice and to administrative agen­
cies, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property, participation in
juridical entities, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional
activities.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article, each
Party reserves the right to accord special tax advantages on a basis of reciprocity or
by virtue of agreements for the avoidance of double taxation or the mutual protec­
tion of revenue.
Article Ill. 1. Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to nationals and companies of any
third country with respect to payments, remittances and transfers of funds or finan­
cial instruments between the territories of the two Parties as well as between the ter­
ritories of the other Party and of any third country.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article do not preclude either
Party from imposing such exchange restrictions as are consistent with the rights and
obligations that it has or may have as a contracting party to the Articles of Agree­
ment of the International Monetary Fund.
1
3. Neither Party shall impose restrictions or prohibitions on the importation
of any product of the other Party, or on the exportation of any product to the ter­
ritories of the other Party, unless the importation of the like product of, or the ex­
portation of the like product to, all third countries is similarly restricted or pro­
hibited.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 of the present Article,
either Party may apply restrictions or controls on the importation and exportation
of goods that have effect equivalent to exchange restrictions which the said Party
may at that time apply under the provisions of paragraph 2 of the present Article.
Article IV. 1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind im­
posed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the inter­
national transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method
of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to the application of
internal taxes to exported goods, and with respect to all internal taxes or other inter­
nal charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with imported goods, and with
respect to all laws, regulations and requirements affecting internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, distribution or use of imported goods, any advantage, favor, privi­
lege or immunity which has been or may hereafter be granted by either Party to any
product originating in or destined for any third country shall be accorded im­
mediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of the other Party.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article shall not apply to
special advantages accorded by either Party to products of its national fisheries.
Article V. The two Parties undertake to cooperate for mutual benefit with a
view to expanding trade and to strengthening economic relations between the two
countries, and to furthering the interchange and use of scientific and technical
knowledge, particularly in the interests of economic development and of the im­
provement of standards of living within their respective territories. Neither Party
1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2, p. 39.
Vol. 1001, 1-14703
Annex 13
1976
United Nations - Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Recueil des Traites
299
shall hamper the introduction into its territories of capital or technology of the other
Party which will contribute to the sound and balanced development of its national
economy on a self-sustaining basis.
Article VI. 1. Vessels under the flag of either Party, and carrying the papers
required by its law in proof of nationality shall be deemed to be vessels of that Party
both on the high seas and within the ports, places and waters of the other Party.
2. Merchant vessels of either Party shall have liberty, on equal terms with
merchant vessels of the other Party and of any third country, to come with their
passengers and cargoes to all ports, places and waters of such other Party open to
foreign commerce and navigation. Such vessels shall in all respects be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like vessels of any third country
within the ports, places and waters of such other Party, and shall be accorded treat­
ment no less favorable than that accorded to like vessels of such other Party with
respect to technical facilities of all kinds, such as the allocation of berths, the use of
loading and unloading facilities, pilotage services and supply of fuel, lubricating
oils, water and food.
3. Merchant vessels of either Party shall be accorded treatment no less favor­
able than that accorded to like vessels of any third country with respect to the right
to carry all goods and persons that may be carried by vessels to or from the ter­
ritories of the other Party; and such goods and persons shall be accorded treatment
no less favorable than that accorded to like goods and persons carried in merchant
vessels of such other Party with respect to: (a) duties and charges of all kinds, (b) the
administration of the customs, and (c) bounties, drawbacks and other privileges of
this nature.
4. Each Party may reserve to its own vessels the right to engage in the coasting
trade. Merchant vessels of either Party may, nevertheless, proceed from one port to
another within the territories of the other Party, either for the purpose of landing
the whole or part of their passengers or cargoes brought from abroad, or of taking
on board the whole or part of their passengers or cargoes for a foreign destination,
always complying with the laws and regulations of such other Party.
5. (I) In case of shipwreck, damage at sea or forced putting in, either Party
shall extend to vessels of the other Party the same assistance and protection and the
same exemptions as are in like cases accorded to its own vessels. Goods salvaged
from such vessels shall be exempt from all customs duties, unless the goods are
entered for domestic consumption; but goods not entered for domestic consumption
may be subject to measures for the protection of the revenue pending their exit from
the country.
(2) If a vessel of either Party has stranded or has been wrecked on the coasts of
the other Party, the appropriate authorities of such other Party shall notify the oc­
currence to the nearest competent consular officer of the country to which the vessel
belongs.
6. The certificates concerning tonnage measurement of vessels issued by the
competent authorities of either Party shall be recognized by the competent author­
ities of the other Party as equivalent to the certificates issued by the latter.
Article VII. The provisions of the present Treaty shall not be interpreted as
precluding either Party from adopting or executing measures relating to:
(a) the public security or national defense or the maintenance of international peace
and security;
Vol. 1001, 1-14703
Annex 13
300
United Nations - Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Recueil des Traites
1976
(b) fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(c) traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and such traffic in other
goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of sup­
plying a military establishment;
(d) the protection of public morals, and of human, animal or plant life or health;
and
(e) trade in gold or silver.
Article VIII. 1. Each Party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and
shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations
as the other Party may make with respect to any matter affecting the operation of
the present Treaty.
2. Any dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or application of
the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to
the International Court of Justice, unless the Parties agree to settlement by some
other pacific means.
Article IX. 1. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the instruments of
ratification shall be exchanged at Manila as soon as possible.
2. The present Treaty shall enter into force one month after the day of the ex­
change of the instruments of ratification. It shall remain in force for three years and
shall continue in force thereafter until terminated as provided for in paragraph 3 of
the present Article.
3. Either Party may, by giving a six-month written notice to the other Party,
terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial three-year period or at any time
thereafter.
Article X. The present Treaty shall be in the Japanese, Filipino and English
languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present
Treaty and have affixed thereunto their seals.
DONE in duplicate at Tokyo, this ninth day of the twelfth month in the thirty­
fifth year of Showa, corresponding to the ninth day of December in the fifteenth
year of the Independence of the Republic of the Philippines and to the ninth day of
December, one thousand nine hundred and sixty.
For Japan:
M. YUKAWA
s. SHIMA
N. UsHIBA
For the Republic of the Philippines:
J.B. LAUREL, Jr.
ROGELIO DE LA ROSA
ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA
MANUEL A. ADEVA
PERFECTO E. LAGUIO
CAESAR z. LANUZA
ANDRES V. CASTILLO
ENRIQUE M. GARCIA
Vol. 1001, 1-14703
Annex 13
1976
United Nations - Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Recueil des Traites
301
PROTOCOL
At the time of signing the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between
Japan and the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty"),
the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized by their respective Governments,
have further agreed on the following provisions, which shall be considered integral
parts of the Treaty:
I. It is understood that all matters relating to the permission for permanent
residence shall be outside the scope of the Treaty.
2. With reference to Article I, it is understood that neither Party shall be en­
titled to claim the benefit of those advantages relating to matters concerning pass­
ports and visas which the other Party has accorded or may hereafter accord to na­
tionals of any third country by virtue of special agreements on a basis of reciprocity.
3. As used in the Treaty, the term "companies" means corporations, partner­
ships, companies and other associations engaging in business activities for gain.
4. With reference to the provisions of Article II, paragraph I, relative to the
grant of treatment no less favorable than that accorded to any third country, either
Party may require that such treatment shall be dependent on reciprocity with respect
to the enjoyment of rights on immovable property and of the right to practice the
professions.
5. Nothing in the Treaty shall be construed so as to grant any right or impose
any obligation in respect of copyright and industrial property right.
6. It is confirmed that property of nationals and companies of either Party, as
well as property in which such nationals and companies have direct or indirect in­
terests, shall not be taken within the territories of the other Party except for a public
purpose, nor shall such property be taken without just compensation.
7. Except with respect to access to the courts of justice and to administrative
agencies, the provisions of the Treaty shall not be interpreted as precluding either
Party from denying the advantages of the Treaty to any company of the other Party
in the ownership or direction of which nationals of any third country or countries
have directly or indirectly the controlling interest.
8. The provisions of Article III, paragraph 3, shall not preclude either Party
from imposing restrictions or prohibitions on customary grounds of a non­
commercial nature, or in the interest of preventing deceptive or unfair practices,
provided that such restrictions or prohibitions do not arbitrarily discriminate against
the commerce of the other Party.
9. The Governments of the two Parties expect that the expansion of mutual
trade will be achieved without serious injury being caused or threatened to their do­
mestic producers. If, nevertheless, there is reasonable evidence that any manufac­
tured goods of either Party are being imported into the territories of the other Party
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to its domestic pro­
ducers of like or directly competitive manufactured goods, the Government of the
exporting Party shall, at the request of the Government of the importing Party,
enter into consultation, and, upon such consultation, the Government of the export­
ing Party shall adopt adequate measures within its power to prevent or remedy the
injury.
10. (1) Nothing in the Treaty shall be construed so as to entitle Japan to claim
the benefit of those rights and privileges which are or may hereafter be accorded by
the Republic of the Philippines exclusively to:
Vol. 1001, 1-14703
Annex 13
302
United Nations - Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Recneil des Traites
1976
(a) nationals and companies of the United States of America with respect to their
carrying on, within the territories of the Republic of the Philippines, business
activities such as the operation of public utilities and the disposition, exploita­
tion, development and utilization of natural resources, or
(b) products of the United States of America with respect to customs duties and
charges,
by virtue of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Trade and Related Matters, signed at Manila on July 4,
1946,' and revised at Washington on September 6, 1955,
2
or any other agreement,
treaty or convention between the two countries.
(2) Nothing in the Treaty shall be construed so as to entitle the Republic of the
Philippines to claim the benefit of those rights and privileges which are or may here­
after be accorded by Japan exclusively to: (a) persons who originated in the ter­
ritories to which all right, title and claim were renounced by Japan in accordance
with the provisions of Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city
of San Francisco on September 8, 1951,
3
or (b) the native inhabitants and vessels of,
and trade with, any area set forth in Article 3 of the said Treaty of Peace, so long as
the situation set forth in the second sentence of the said Article continues with re­
spect to the administration, legislation and jurisdiction over such area.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present
Protocol and have affixed thereunto their seals.
DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese, Filipino and English languages, at Tokyo,
this ninth day of the twelfth month in the thirty-fifth year of Showa, corresponding
to the ninth day of December in the fifteenth year of the Independence of the
Republic of the Philippines and to the ninth day of December, one thousand nine
hundred and sixty. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall
prevail.
For Japan:
M. YuKAWA
s. SHIMA
N. USHIBA
For the Republic of the Philippines:
J.B. LAUREL, Jr.
RooEuo DE LA RosA
ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA
MANUEL A. ADEV A
PERFECTO E. LAGUIO
CAESAR Z. LANUZA
ANDRES V. CASTILLO
ENRIQUE M. GARCIA
1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 43, p. 135.
2 Ibid., vol. 238, p. 264.
3 Ibid., vol. 136, p. 45.
Vol. 1001, 1-14703
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303
AGREED MINUTES
The Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of the Republic of the Philippines wish to record the
following understanding which they have reached during the negotiations for the Treaty of
Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines
(hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty") signed today:
I. It is confirmed that nationals and companies of either Party are entitled, under Arti­
cle II, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, to treatment no less favorable than that accorded to na­
tionals and companies of any third country with respect to the organization of companies and
the establishment and maintenance of branches, agencies and other offices.
It is understood that the provisions of Article III, paragraph I, of the Treaty do not
preclude either Party from adopting and enforcing relevant laws and regulations which shall
be applicable to all foreign nationals and companies alike.
3. With reference to Article II, paragraph 3, it is confirmed that import restrictions or
prohibitions that may be applied thereunder include those applied, for the purpose of protec­
ting domestic producers, to any manufactured goods as such, without reference to source.
4. With reference to Article V of the Treaty, it is understood that the competent
authorities of each Party shall, in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination, deter­
mine whether or not the introduction of any capital or technology into its territories will con­
tribute to the sound and balanced development of its national economy on a self-sustaining
basis.
5. It is confirmed that the term "merchant vessels" as used in the Treaty does not include
fishing boats, pleasure yachts and sporting boats.
For Japan:
For the Republic
of the Philippines:
M. YUKAWA
J.B. LAUREL
Tokyo, December 9, 1960.
AGREED MINUTES CONCERNING THE TRADE BETWEEN
JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
During the negotiations between the representatives of the Government of Japan
(hereinafter referred to as "the Japanese Government") and the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as "the Philippine Government") leading to the signing
of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the two countries (hereinafter
referred to as "the Treaty"), the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government have
reached, in connection with the implementation of the Treaty, the following understanding
which will be carried out within their constitutional authority:
I. Both Governments take note of the high level of trade between Japan and the
Republic of the Philippines in recent years through normal market channels and on commer­
cial terms. It is the expectation of both Governments that such level of trade will not only be
maintained but also expanded in the future.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty and of Pro­
tocol 10 (2):
(I) The Japanese Government undertakes to accord to the Republic of the Philippines the op­
portunity of competing for the total foreign exchange allocation for molasses, muscovado
sugar, centrifugal sugar, leaf tobacco, cigars, bananas and pineapples.
Vol. IOCJl.1-14703
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304
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1976
(2) The Japanese Government undertakes, subject to Japan's overall trade and foreign ex­
change policy, to retain on the Automatic Approval List any products in the exportation
to Japan of which the Republic of the Philippines has a substantial interest.
3. In considering the obstacles and uncertainties in international commodity trade which
confront primary exporting countries and the effects of these difficulties upon their economic
stability, both Governments agree that there is an urgent need to find means of producing a
greater degree of stability and predictability in international trade in primary products. Both
Governments will, therefore, give sympathetic consideration to international action designed
to improve the conditions of international trade in primary products of direct interest to either
country.
For Japan:
For the Republic
of the Philippines:
J.B. LAUREL, Jr.
M. YUKAWA
Tokyo, December 9, 1960.
EXCHANGES OF NOTES
I a
Tokyo, December 9, 1960
Excellency,
On the occasion of signing the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation be­
tween Japan and the Republic of the Philippines, I have the horror to refer to the
provisions of Article I of the Treaty, under which nationals of either Party are to be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to nationals of any third
country with respect to all matters relating to their entry into, sojourn, travel and
residence within, the territories of the other Party.
It being practically impossible to set forth the above-mentioned treatment in
concrete terms, I wish to inform Your Excellency of the understanding of my Gov­
ernment with respect to the application of the said provisions that nationals of either
Party will be entitled to the treatment set forth in the Annex to this Note, with
respect to their entry into and sojourn within the territories of the other Party. In the
event that applicable laws and regulations of either Party are revised in any manner,
the two Governments will make appropriate amendments, if necessary, to the Annex
to this Note.
I have further the horror to request Your Excellency to be good enough to con­
firm the foregoing understanding on behalf of Your Government.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
M. YUKAWA
Ambassador of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
His Excellency Mr. J.B. Laurel, Jr.
Chairman, Philippine Panel
Vol. 1001, 1-14703
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Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Re<"ueil des Traites
305
ANNEX
A. Temporary visitors of either Party entering for business purpose[s] shall be allowed,
whenever possible, the following periods of stay within the territories of the other Party:
(I) An initial period of six months from the date of entry;
(2) An additional period of six months, so long as the applicant for such additional period
maintains the status under which he. stayed during the first period.
B. Nationals of either Party entering the territories of the other Party (a) solely to carry
on trade principally between the territories of the two Parties or (b) solely to develop and
direct the operations of an enterprise in which they have invested, or in which they are actively
in the process of investing, a substantial amount of capital, and their spouses and their unmar­
ried children who have not attained their majority, shall be allowed an initial three-year period
of stay within the territories of the other Party, applications for stay beyond such initial period
being given as favorable a consideration as possible.
II a
Tokyo, December 9, 1960
Excellency,
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's
date which read as follows:
[See note I a]
The Annex to the Note reproduced above is hereto attached.
I have further the honor to confirm the understanding stated in Your Excellen­
cy's Note on behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
J. B. LAUREL, Jr.
Chairman
Philippine Panel
His Excellency Mr. Morio Yukawa
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
I b
Tokyo, December 9, 1960
Excellency,
On the occasion of signing the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation be­
tween Japan and the Republic of the Philippines, I have the honor to propose that
the Agreement between our two Governments concerning trade relations, which is
embodied in an Exchange of Notes dated January 7, 1958, be terminated on the date
of the entry into force of the said Treaty, notwithstanding the provisions of para­
graph 4 of the said Agreement.
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1976
I have further the honor to request Your Excellency to be good enough to ac­
cept the foregoing proposal on behalf of Your Government.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
M. YUKAWA
Ambassador of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
His Excellency Mr. J.B. Laurel, Jr.
Chairman, Philippine Panel
II b
Tokyo, December 9, I 960
Excellency,
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's
date which reads as follows:
[See note I b]
I have further the honor to accept the proposal stated in Your Excellency's Note
on behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
J. B. LAUREL, Jr.
Chairman
Philippine Panel
His Excellency Mr. Morio Yukawa
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
I c
Tokyo, December 9, I 960
Excellency,
Ori the occasion of signing the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation be­
tween Japan and the Republic of the Philippines, I have the honor to propose that
the Provisional Agreement between our two Governments concerning the entry of
nationals of either country into the territory of the other and their sojourn therein,
which is embodied in an Exchange of Notes dated July 24, 1958,' be terminated on
the date of the entry into force of the said Treaty.
I have further the honor to request Your Excellency to be good enough to ac­
cept the foregoing proposal on behalf of Your Government.
I United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 325, p. 103.
Vol. HJOI, 1-14703
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307
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
M. YUKAWA
Ambassador of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
His Excellency Mr. J. B. Laurel, Jr.
Chairman, Philippine Panel
II C
Tokyo, December 9, 1960
Excellency,
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's
date which reads as follows:
[See note I c]
I have further the honor to accept the proposal stated in Your Excellency's Note
on behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
J.B. LAUREL, Jr.
Chairman
Philippine Panel
His Excellency Mr. Morio Yukawa
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
Id
Tokyo, December 9, 1960
Excellency,
On the occasion of signing the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation be­
tween the Republic of the Philippines and Japan, I have the honor to inform Your
Excellency of the understanding of the Government of the Republic of the Philip­
pines that our two Governments have agreed to enter into negotiations for the con­
clusion of a Civil Air Transport Agreement which has been proposed by my Govern­
ment and a Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income which has been proposed by Your
Government, at the earliest practicable date after the signing of the Treaty of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation between the Republic of the Philippines and Japan.
I have further the honor to request Your Excellency to be good enough to con­
firm the foregoing understanding on behalf of Your Government.
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1976
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
J. B. LAUREL, Jr.
Chairman
Philippine Panel
His Excellency Mr. Mario Yukawa
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
II d
Tokyo, December 9, 1960
Excellency,
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's
date which reads as follows:
[See note I d]
I have further the honor to confirm the understanding stated in Your Excellen­
cy's Note on behalf of my Government.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
M. YUKAWA
Ambassador of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
His Excellency Mr. J. B. Laurel, Jr.
Chairman, Philippine Panel
I e
Tokyo, December 9, 1960
Excellency,
On the occasion of signing the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation be­
tween Japan and the Republic of the Philippines, I have the honor to invite Your Ex­
cellency's attention to the fact that crewmen of Japanese vessels are not permitted to
land at Philippine ports without a consular visa being affixed on the crewlist.
I wish to inform Your Excellency in this regard that crewmen of Philippine
vessels calling at Japanese ports are granted shore passes without any visa re­
quirements, and also to inquire, under instructions from my Government, if it is
agreeable to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to waive visa re­
quirements with respect to the landing of crewmen of Japanese vessels calling at
Philippine ports.
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309
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
M. YUKAWA
Ambassador of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
His Excellency Mr. J.B. Laurel, Jr.
Chairman, Philippine Panel
II e
Tokyo, December 9, 1960
Excellency,
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note dated
December 9, 1960, concerning visa requirements with respect to the landing of crew­
men of Japanese vessels.
In reply, I wish to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines is willing to waive visa requirements with respect to the landing of
crewmen of Japanese vessels calling at Philippine ports, and will take necessary steps
to give effect to such waiver as soon as possible.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
J. B. LAUREL, Jr.
Chairman
Philippine Panel
His Excellency Mr. Morio Yukawa
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines
Vol. 1001, 1-14703
Annex 14
U.N. General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 16th Session, 1252nd Meeting, Agenda item 39:
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 of the Charter,
U.N. Doc A/C.4/SR.1252 (18 Dec. 1961)
Annex 14
United Nations··
FOURTH COMMITTEE,
1252nd
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
MEETJNG
Monday, 18 December 1961,
at 11.25 a.m.
SIXTEENTH SESSION
Official Records
NEW YORK
CONTENTS
meeting had left open the question of the capacity in
which the Premier would address the Committee.
Page
Agenda item 45:
Question of the renewal of the Committee on
Information from Non-Self-Governing Ter­
ritories (concluded)
5. Mr. KHOSLA (India) asked if the United Kingdom
delegation would be prepared to let Mr. Jagan speak
as a member of that delegation or whether it would
p:r;-efer him to speak as a petitioner. In his view, it
would be preferable for the United Kingdom delegation
Draft report of the Fourth Committee . • • • 609
Request for a hearing from the Premier of
British Guiana (concluded) . . . . . • • . • • . . . 609
Agenda item 39:
Information from Non-Self-Governing
Terri­
tories transmitted under Article 73 e of the
Charter (continued)
Hearing of the Premier of British Guiana. . 611
Chairman: Miss Angie BROOKS (Liberia) ..
In the absence of the Chairman and the Vice-Chair­
man, Mr. Houaiss (Brazil), Rapporteur, took the Chair.
AGENDA ITEM 45
Question of the renewal of the Committee on Information
from Non-Self-Governing Territories (A/4785, A/C.4/
L.72n (concluded)
if Mr. Jagan spoke as a petitioner.
6. \Mr. KQSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France)agreedwith
the United Kingdom representative. The question was
one for debate, since, while it was not unknown for a
petitioner to become prime minister, noprbne minis­
ter had ever become a petitioner. He would like to
know the opinion of the United Nations Legal Counsel
as to the propriety of hearing a petitioner.from a Non.
Self-Governing

Territory.
· 7. Mr~ ACHKAR (Guinea) recalledthattheCommittee
had, at its· previous meeting, agreed in principle to
hear Mr. Jagan. Given the nature of his request, it
was probable that the · Premier wanted to speak as a
petitioner. He. r~called that the Committee had already
heard petitioners from Non-Self-Governing Terri­
tories, such as the Portuguese colonies, .and it was
therefore unnecessary to ask the opinion of the United
Nations Legal Counsel.
8. Mr. BOZOVIC (Yugoslavia) observed that it was
, for Mr. Jagan himself to decide in what capacity he
would address the Committee.
DRAFT REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE
(A/C .4/L. 727)
9. Sir Hugh FOOT (United Kingdom) said, in reply to
the Yugoslav representative, that the question had been
left open for settlement by the Committee, not by the
Premier of British Guiana. A question of principle was
raised precisely because the Premier had expressed
the desire to be heard as a petitioner.
1. The CHAIRMAN, speaking as Rapporteur, intro­
duced the Committee's draft report on agenda item 45
(A/C.4/L. 727). He pointed out that a correction was
needed in the penultimate line of paragraph 9, where
the word "recommendations" should be replaced by
the word "conclusions". The report was purely pro­
cedural in character, and he hoped that it would be
adopted unanimously.
·
The draft report (A/C.4/L.727) was adopted unani­
10. Mr. KHOSLA(India)didnotseewhytheCommittee
should refuse to hear Mr. Jagan because he was
Premier. Mr. Jagan had come to address the Com­
mittee on behalf of his people, and that procedure
raised no legal difficulty.
·
mously.
Miss Brooks (Liberia) took the Chair.
Request for a hearing from the Premier of British Guiana
(concluded)
2. · Sir Hugh FOOT (United Kingdom) expressed his
delegation's most formal reservations concerning the
hearing of the Premier of British Guiana as a peti­
tioner. Such a hearing would have the most serious
consequences. If, despite those reservations, the Com­
mittee decided to hear Mr. Jagan, his delegation must
11. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America) as•
sociated· himself with the serious reservations ex­
pressed by the United Kingdom representative con­
cerning the hearing of Mr. Jagan as a petitioner.
Except in the special case of the Portuguese Terri­
tories, when it had considered it desirable to give a
hearing to petitioners because of Portugal's refusal
to transmit information to the United Nations, the
Committee had never heard petitioners from Non­
Self-Governing Territories administered by Member
refrain from taking part in the ensuing discussion.
3. The CHAIRMAN pointed that the Committee had
already taken the decision to hear the Premier of
British Guiana.
4. Sir Hugh FOOT (United Kingdom) emphasized that
the decisi9~ taken by the Committee at the 1251st
States which had always given the Organization their
full co-operation. He aske(i the Under-Secretary
whether there was a precedent for a hearing of that
kind.
12. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) said that, since the
Committee had decided at its previousmeetingtohear
, ~,~;~~
609
A/C.4/SR.1252
Annex 14
610
General Assembly - Sixteenth Session - Fourth Committee
Mr. Jftgan, there was no point in continuing the dis­
cussion, He therefore moved the closure of the debate,
under ;rule 118 of the rules of procedure,
13 •. ~
CHAIRMAN said the Premier of British
Guiana had officially informed her that he would prefer·
to address the Committee as a petitioner.
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Philippines, Polatld, Romania, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Ar­
gentina.
14. In reply to a question from Mr.BINGHAM (United
States: of America), the CHAIRMAN said that the
Premier of British Guiana would be heard under agenda
item 39 concerning information from Non-Self-Gov­
erning Territories, which was still open.
Against: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central
African Republic, Chad, Denmark, France, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, United states of America,
Australia, Austria.
15, Sir Hugh FOOT (United Kingdom), speaking on a
point of order, asked whether the French representa­
tive's irequest would be complied with.
Abstaining: Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Fin­
16. Mr. PROTITCH (Under-Secretary for Trustee­
ship and Information from Non-8elf,..Governing Terri­
tories) said that, so far as the hearing of petitioners
from Non-Self-Governing Territories was concerned,
there had been two requests in 1953, which had been
reject~d; Y and one at the present session, concerning
Port~ese
land, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, ,Ivory Coast,
Lebanon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nigeria, Panama,
Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Upper
Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela.
The motion was adopted -by 33 votes to 21, with 21
abstentions.
Guinea, which had been_ granted (1208th
meeting). Nevertheless, a Prime Minister of a Non­
Self-Governing Territory had never yet·addressedthe
Committee as a petitioner.
21. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) recalled that at the
previous meeting his delegation .had spoken in favour
of hearing the Premier of British Guiana. In the case
of the petitioners from Portuguese Guinea, the Irish
delegation had voted in favour ofhearingthembecause
of special circumstances_, but had made it clear that
there could be no question of establishing· a precedent.
In the case of Mr. Jagan, the circumstances were
entirely different and there was no reason not to ob­
serve the provisions of the Charter. His delegation
had accordingly voted against the motion for closure
of the debate, since in its opinion the question should
be examined thoroughly •. He stressed that, while he
l,limself was in favour of hearing Mr. Jagan, he was
against granting a hearing to petitioners from Non­
Self-Governing Territories.
17. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) opposed the closure of the
debate. He observed, for the benefit of the Polish
representative, that many delegations had doubts con­
cerning the decision adopted at the 1251st meeting,
and that consequently it would be well to clarify the
situation before a vote was taken. It would be prema­
ture to close the debate, as the hearing proposed was
unlike those normally granted by the Committee. The
right of petition was granted, by the Charter, only to
inhabitants of Trust Territories. Since the case in
question was a special one and raised a basic question
of principle, it ought to be discussed thoroughly. In
any case, it had been made clear,whenthe Committee
had heard petitioners from Portuguese Guinea,· that
their hearing would not constitute a precedent.
22. Mr. RIFAI (Syria), speaking on a point of order,
said that the discussion in which the Committee was
engaged was pointless. The question had already been
settled at the 1251st meeting, when the Committee had
decided to hear the Premier of British Guiana. Rightly
or wrongly, a decision had already been taken on that
point and the Committee could do nothing, at the present
stage, but hear the petitioner.
18. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) said he
.also qpposed the closure, because the Secretariat had
not . g1.ven him · a satisfactory reply to his question.
Mr. J,>rotitch had said only that there had been the
precedent of the petitioners from Portuguese Guinea.
He recalled that, when their hearing had taken place,
' several ·delegations had stressed that it could not con­
~titute . a precedent. That was what had prompted his
delegation to ask that the United Nations l.Elgal Counsel
should state the Secretary-Generaits view as to the
interpretation of the Charter on the point in question.
'
·
23. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Committee had
yet to decide in what capacity the Premier of British
Guiana should speak.
19. 1\1:r. KUNST (Secretary of the Committee) said
that the Secretariat had nothing to add to the Under­
Secretary's statement. The problem concernednotthe
Secretariat but only the Committee, and the latter had
alreao.y taken its decision.
24. Mr. BOZOVIC (Yugoslavia) agreed with the Syrian
representative. The Committee had never before been
asked whether it wished to hear a person from a Non­
Self-Governing Territory speak· as -a -~ember of the
delegation of the Administering Member. The delega­
tion concerned had in eacll case beenfreeto associate
such persons with it. In the case under consideration,
the Committee could not impose a decision on the
petitioner.
20. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on
the Polish representative's motion for closure of the
debate.
At the request of the Tunisian representative, a vote
was taken by roll-call.
25. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) stressed that, contrary to
the assertions of the Syrian and Yugoslav representa­
tives, it had not been decided at the 1251st meeting to
Belgium, having been drawn ·by lot ~y the Chairman,
was c'ri,Jled upon to vote first.
·
In favour: Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet
.Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba,
Y See Official Records of the General As11embly, ·Eighth Session.
Fourth~•
321st and 343rd meetings.
hear the Premier of British Guiana as a petitioner.
The members of the Cominittee :\').ad reiached agree­
ment as the result of a ·proposal made· by the United
Kingdom representative, and the position in fact was,
as the Chairman had pointed out, that the Committee
must now decide in wha,t capacity the Premier of
British Guiana would be heard.
Annex 14
1252nd meeting - 18 December 1961
611
26. As for the question raised by the French repre­
sentative and the answer given to it, the issue was not
whether there had been precedents, but whether or not
it was legal under the provisions of the Charter to
grant the hearing requested. The Office of Legal Af­
fairs was certainly able to pronounce onthatquestion.
34. Sir Hugh FOOT (United Kingdom), while recalling
his intention not to participate in the discussion, said
that he fully accepted the ruling given by the Chairman.
35. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America) said
that his delegation had serious reservations to make
with regard to the procedure which had just been
adopted.
If the Office of Legal Affairs regarded the request now
before the Committee as legal, his delegation would
support that request. Failing an opinion by the Office
of Legal Affairs, it would regard that request as
illegal and would vote against i4
27. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) expressed regret that
certain delegations should deliberately seek to prolong
the confusion. Like the Syrian representative, his
delegation considered that the Committee had taken
36. Mr. FOURNIER (Spain) said that at its 1251st
meeting the Committee had agreed in principle to
grant the hearing but had not decided to hear the
Premier of British Guiana as a petitioner. The decision
which had just been taken was without precedent, and
his delegation expressed its reservations with regard
to a hearing granted contrary to the principles of the
United Nations Charter.
its decision at the 1251st meeting. If it was a matter
of hearing someone as a member of a delegation, as
in the case of the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, no
difficulty would arise. He stressed that, in any event,
the Committee would need a two-thirds majority in
order to go back on its decision to hear the Premier
of British Guiana.
AGENDA ITEM 39
lnfonnation from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted
under Article 73 e of the Charter (continued)
28. Mr. MATTOS (Uruguay) also thought that the
Committee had taken its decision at the 1251st meet­
ing, and that it could change its original decision only
by a two-thirds majority.
HEARING OF THE PREMIER OF BRITISH GUIANA
At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Cheddi Jagan,
Premier of British Guiana, took a place at the Com­
mittee table.
29. A number of delegations had asked the Premier
of British Guiana whether be would agree to be heard
as a person invited by the Committee. The Premier
of British Guiana, who had asked to be heard as a
petitioner, had rejected that solution, and the Uru­
guayan delegation believed that the Committee had no
right to impose on him a status which he did not accept.
In any case, the Premier of British Guiana was amply
qualified to be heard as a petitioner. No one could deny
that he effectively represented the population of his
country. When the time came, therefore, the Uruguayan
delegation would vote in favour of granting a hearing
to the petitioner in accordance with his request.
37. Mr. JAGAN (Premier of British Guiana) recalled
that he liad been appointed Premier when the party he
led, the People's Progressive Party, had won the
elections in August 1961. He was addressing the Com•
mittee in the name of the people of British Guiana, in
the hope that the Committee would be able to help in
bringing about the immediate political independence of
his country.
30. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the request had
already been granted. Inasmuch as she had been told
personally by the Premier of British Guiana that he
wished to be heard as a petitioner, sh~ would rule
that the Premier would be heard in that capacity.
38. The right of peoples and nations to self-deter­
mination and independence was inalienable and must be
enjoyed by all. Only independence could give a country
the necessary dynamism for rapid economic develoP­
ment. Referring to the rapid progress which had been
achieved in Ghana, India and Israel after independence,
he recalled that before independence Israel, like Bri­
tish Guiana, had had a population of about half a mil­
lion inhabitants and certain British authorities had
expressed the view that the country could not accommo­
date one additional cat; yet Israel today had over 2
million inhabitants.
31. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France), exercis­
ing his right of reply, disputed the Committee Secre­
tary's answer to the effect that the question under
discussion did not concern the Secretariat. Any dele­
gation could ask for legal opinions. The Committee's
judgement was final in respect of questions falling
within its competence, but not in respect of Charter
interpretation and of questions coming within the direct
competence of the General Assembly.
39. He had hoped that, after his visit to the United
Kingdom to discuss his country's independence, he
would not have to address the Committee. Neverthe­
less, he •had observed that the gap between rich and
poor countries was widening and that the colonialist
and imperialist Powers, wbich continued to repress
the legitimate aspirations of millions of people, were
primarily responsible. While the Committee had
recently been mainly concerned with Africa, he re­
minded members that in the Western Hemisphere there
were still colonial territories where over 3 million
people were subjected to the degrading status of
colonials by three European Powers.
32. Mr. BOZOVIC (Yugoslavia) said, in reply to the
French representative, that delegations could indeed
request legal opinions, but that the Committee had the
right .to take decisions. If the French delegation had
special reasons for concerning itself with the question
under discussion, it could propose that the question be
40. The colonial Powers, in their retreat, boasted of
included in the agenda either of the present or of the
next session.
having "granted" independence to the people who had
been under their control, as if those people had not had
to fight for freedom.
33. As for the problem of precedents, raised by the
Danish and French delegations, the Committee had not
decided to investigate whether or not such precedents
existed, but had confined itself to taking a decision on
a request brought before it.
41. British Guiana had repeatedly been told that it
was the declared policy of the United Kingdom Govern­
ment to lead the colonial peoples to freedom and in­
dependence as soon as possible. The past decade had,
Annex 14
612
General Assembly - Sixteenth Session ~ Fourth Committee
however, taught it that it could not rely on those pious
declarations and that United Kingdompolicywasbased
not on altruism but on self-interest and the desire to
protect vested interests.
·
42. In 1953 British Guiana had been
11
granted" a
46 •. British Guiana was ready for independence. More­
over, as the Gener.al Assembly itself had said in its
resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1654 (XVI), lack of prepara­
tion should never serve as a pretext for delay in
granting independence. At onetimethe United Kingdom
had referred to such criteria as a country's size,
population, literacy, economic viability and al?ility to
Constitution, which had then been regarded as one of
the m:ost advanced constitutions in the British colonial
empire. The authors of that Constitution had .assumed
that ~he democratic popular forces were too weak to
gain control of the Executive. The Constitution had been
suspended after four and a half months and the popu­
larly elected Government had been forcibly removed
from ·office, just as the Gallegos Government in Vene­
zuela, the Mossadegh Government in Iran and the
Arbenz Government in Guatemala had been in 1948,
1953
1
and 1954 respectively. He and his followers had
defend itself. British Guiana was about ten times as
large as Israel and twice as big as Cuba. Its population
was as large as that of Cyprus and larger than that of
Iceland. Its literacy rate was 82 per cent. Political
consciousness was very high; at the recent elections
almost 90 per cent of the electorate had cast their
ballots without any disorder. At the economic level,
British Guiana, though largely under-developed, had
achieved over the last decade an economic ·growth
rate of 6 per cent per annum~ Its budget, though small,
been 'subjected to the usual witch-hwt. Recently, how­
ever, he had had the satisfaction of seeing that at the
last session of the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA)Y the main recommendations for the
economic well-being of LatinAmericahademphasized
the necessity for economic planning, rapid industriali­
zation, efficient agricultural development and land
reform-all principles which had been characterized
as communist when he had advocated them ten years
earlier.
·
was balanced and a small surplus was earmarked each
year for the development plan. The national income
per caput was about $240, which was relatively higher
than that of many under-developed countries. As far
as defence was concerned, British Guiana did not be­
lieve that the armaments race was the way to inter­
national peace and security and did not intend to devote
a large part of its limited financial resources to
armaments. It wished to maintain friendly relations
with all countries and considered that its ~ember ship
of the United Nations would offer it the collective
SE:)Curity it required to protect its national sovereignty.
43. Following the suspension of the Constitution in
1953, the Colonial Office had imposed a dictatorial
regime in British Guiana, which had amounted to a
real reign of terror for the leaders of the national
movement. In 1957 elections hadbeenheldonthe basis
of a Constitution more retrograde than the one sus­
pended in 1953 and with constituencies which had been
grossly gerrymandered. The United Kingdom had thus
shown that its most previous commodities, democracy
and q.emocratic practices, were not for export.
47. Lest the details he had given should be taken as
a tribute to colonialism, he would point out that British
Guiana, despite its great natural resources, was
largely under-developed, with wide-spread poverty,
land hunger, unemployment and under-employment.
44. British Guiana now enjoyed internal self-govern­
ment but it was still a Crown colony: the United King­
dom could legislate by Orders in Council and could
suspend the Constitution at anytime. In many respects,
the Constitution inherited from the Netherlands which
had J;>een in force up to 1927 had been more liberal,
for it had not conferred such powers on the colonial
.coun~ry.
48. It might be asked why the United Kingdom Govern­
ment adopted so unrealistic an attitude towards British
Gu,iana. Three times since 1953the United Kingdom had
deliberately disregarded the freely expressed wishes
of the people because it did not believe in the cause
which the people of Guiana had proclaimed, i.e., the
cause of socialism and the struggle against colonialist
and imperialist domination ~nd exploitation. The
answer of the United Kingdom Government to the
socialist victory in the elections of 1953 had been
force and it now seemedtobetryingto de1ay the gran­
ting of independence if the popular democratic forces,
with socialism as their ideology, continued to win suc­
cessive elections.
45. On 13 December 1961 he had spoken to Mr.
Maudling, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who had
categorically refused to fix 31 May 1962 or any other
date for British Guiana's independence. The dateof31
May
1
1962, which was the date fixed for the indepen­
49. He found it difficult to reconcile the attitude of
the Colonial Office with the official declarations of the
United Kingdom Government and with the liberal senti­
ments recently expressed by President Kennedy in an
interview with the editor of Izvestia. President
Kennedy had stated that the United States Government
would maintain friendly relations with any govern­
ment, even a communist government, which had been
elected in free and fair elections; he had expressed
his pleasure that Mr. Jagan, although a Marxist, had
obtained his position by a fair election.
dence of the Federation of the West Indies, had been
proposed during the election campaign by the main
opposition party, the People's National Congress, and
supported by his own party, which together with the
People's National Congress had polled 83 per cent of
the votes. Mr. Maudling had even refused to fix a date
for a conference to discuss the question of indepen­
dence; he had simply promised to ·consult the Cabinet
and to inform him of the decision early in 1962. Ex­
perience had taught him nottoplacemuchfaith
in such
promises and he saw in Mr. Maudling's delaying·tac­
tics a threat to peace and a threat to his people's
50. In the face of the present evasion and procras­
tination, British Guiana wa-s at the end of its patience.
Only the armed might of the United Kingdom prevented
belief in the parliamentary system of government,
since an honestly elected Government would be pre­
vented by some extraterritorial Power from carrying
out its promise.
the people from declaring British Guiana an indepen­
dent State.
·
Y For the report of the Commission, ·see Official Records of the
Economic and Social Council, Thircy~second Session, Supplement No. 4
(E/3486).
51. He placed great hopes in General Assembly
resolution 1514 (XV) and in resolution 1654 (XVI),
which established a Special Committee of seventeen
members to make recommendations .9n the implemen­
tation of the Declaration on colonialism contained in
Annex 14
1252nd meeting - 18 December 1961
613
the former resolution. Since the Special. Committee
was authorized to meet away from United Nations
Headquarters
tine refugees before citing an un,suitable and doubtful
example.
·
if necessary for the discharge of its
functions, he took the opportunity to·request, through
the· Fourth Committee, that it should visit British
Guiana as soon as possible to examine the situation
there. He also called upon the United Kingdom Govern­
ment to give. full support and co-operation in the
Committee's task in order to reach agreement on a
date for British Guiana's independence. He pointed
out that in earlier years, in the Trusteeship Council,
the United Kingdom Government had opposed as un­
realistic the setting of a target date for Tanganyika's
independence. Yet Tanganyika was now an independent
and sovereign State.
60. Mr. EL SANOUSI (Sudan), exercising his right of
reply, said that he was not trying to go beyond the
question that was under discussion. In keeping with its
clearly defined position, the Sudan was supporting the
aspirations of the people of British Guiana to indepen­
dence. The Premier should not, however, have men­
tioned the case of Israel, which had not been a colony
and whose development since its creation was thus
irrelevant to the question under discussion.
61. The CHAIRMAN asked the representative of the
Sudan not to involve the Committee in a discussion
which at the present stage of its debate was likely to
take up too much of its time.
52. He paid a tribute to the Fourth Committee for its
consistent work in liquidating the vestiges of colonial­
ism and hoped that that work would be completed in
the near future.
62. Mr. SALAMANCA (Bolivia) assured the Premier
of British Guiana that it was · the ardent wish of the
Bolivian Government that the whole Latin-American
continent should become free and independent.
53. Mr. EL SANOUSI (Sudan) said that he was glad to
have had an opportunity to hear a statement in the
Committee from such a freedom fighter as the Premier
of British Guiana. The latter had, however, seen fit to
refer to the progress achieved by a certain State at
the expense of 1,200,000 Arab refugees. He thought
that it would have been better to cite other examples
than that of a State which the Security Council had
condemned as an aggressor no less than six times.
63. He asked the Premier whether, once British
Guiana was independent, it would become a member of
the Organization of American States.
64. Mr. JAGAN (Premier of British Guiana) said
that he had already announced that his country wished
to enter into closer relations with all its neighbours
in Latin America. It had been in that spirit that British
Guiana had expressed its desire to become an as­
sociate member of ECLA. Before making a request
to join the Organization of American states, British
Guiana would naturally have to make a careful study
of all that such a decision would imply.
54. Mr. RAMIN (Israel), exercising his right of reply,
considered that the representative of the Sudan was
raising issues that had no connexion with the question
under discussion, simply in order to mislead the
Committee. The representative
of the Sudan had
referred to a problem that was being discussed by
another Committee.
65. Mr. ABDO (Yemen) supported the proposal that
the full text of the statement made by the Premier of
British Guiana should be circulated. On the other hand,
his delegation considered that the Premier had quoted
a controversial example and thought that he could have
macle a wiser choice.
55. Mr. DIALLO (Mali) thanked the Premier of
British Guiana for having given the Committee par­
ticularly valuable information and requested that the
full text of his statement should be reproduced and
circulated before the end of the sixteenth session.
66. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) supported the Malian
representative's
proposal. The importance of the
statement by the Premier of British Guiana was en­
hanced by the fact that it had revealed the hypocritical
manoeuvres which were intended to prevent a Govern­
ment which had the support of the people from carry­
ing out its duties. The colonial Powers were only
happy when the Territories they administered were
under Governments devoted to the interests of those
Powers. His delegation appealed to the Committee to
refuse to countenance any development which might be
prejudicial to the interests of the people of British
Guiana.
56. He was sure that the political development of
British Guiana had reached a stage at which it was
absurd to keep that Territory under the colonial sys­
tem. Since there were several Guianas in existence,
an attempt was undoubtedly being made to oppose the
granting of independence to that Territory and to en­
mesh the Committee in outdated legalistic arguments.
The anachronism would not, however, be prolonged
indefinitely and the Special Committee set up by
General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) would have to
go to the Territory as soon as possible, in order to
satisfy the aspirations of the people.
57. Mr. ROS (Argentina) said thathewhole-heartedly
supported the wishes of British Guiana to attain in­
dependence. He associated himself with the request of
the representative of Mali that the full text of the
Premier's statement should be circulated.
6 7. He recalled his statement that, in his delegation's
view, the fact that the Committee had heard petitioners
from certain Non-Self-Governing Territories had
established a precedent. If requests for hearings were
received from petitioners from Southern Rhodesia or
from any other country, his delegation would request
the Committee to grant such hearings. Certain ten­
dentious interpretations that had been given reflected
the· position of a few delegations only and not that of
the Committee.
58. Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) said that he was glad
that the Premier of British Guiana had informed the
Committee of the true state of affairs in his country
in the political, economic, social and cultural fields,
and of the aspirations of the people. Those aspirations
were . just and the delegation of Morocco endorsed
them.
68. His delegation proposed that the Committee
59. The Premier should, however, have given more
careful conside.ration to the plight of 1,200,000 Pales-
should request that the discussion of the agenda item
on information from Non-Self-Government Territories
should not be closed and that it should remain on the
agenda at the resumed sixteenth session of the General
Assembly. For example, the Premier of British
Guiana had just invited the Special Committee set up
Annex 14
614
General Assembly - Sixteenth Session - Fourth Committee
by General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) to visit
his country; on its return, that Committee would un­
doubtedly have much useful information to submit to
the Fou,rth Committee.
His delegation hoped that all the countries of America
which were still under a colonial regime, including the
martyred people of Puerto Rico, would soon achieve
independence.
69. His delegation wished to convey its thanks and
congratulations to the Premier of British Guiana and
to assure him of its active sympathy.
70. Mr. JUARBE Y JUARBE (Cuba) said that he had
listened with regret to the debate which had preceded
the hearing of the Premier of British Guiana. He
thought it necessary to stress the fact that the Com­
mittee should be free to examine questions involving
the freedom of peoples; it should shoulder its respon­
sibilities.
73. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America). said
that he wished to point out to the Premier of British
Guiana that his delegation's attitude was based on a
question of principle and not on any question of a
personal nature. His delegation would havebeenhappy
to welcome the Premier of British Guiana as a mem­
ber of the United Kingdom delegation or as 'a distin­
guished visitor to the Committee. It had only been
because he had come as a petitioner that the United
States delegation had considered it necessary to make
reservations with regard to the hearing granted to him.
71. The petitioner just heard by the Committee was
74. The references made by the Premier of British
no ordinary petitioner: he was the Premier of British
Guiana and had been elected to his office by the will of
his people despite the repeated obstacles placed in his
path arid all the efforts made by the colonial Power to
prevent the inhabitants from freely expressing their
wishes~ The petitioner was a great defender of free­
dom; the Cuban delegation hoped that it would soon be
able to welcome him to the United Nations as the
liberator of British Guiana.
Guiana to President Kennedy's statements had been
correctly quoted; the Premier was well aware of the
friendship the United Stateshadforhimandhis
people.
75. The United states delegation hoped that British
Guiana would achieve early independence; it was con­
vinced that it would do so,for such a solution would be
in accord with the tradition in such matters estab•
lished by the United Kingdom~ His delegation would
look forward to welcoming the Premier of British
Guiana to the General Assembly when his c_ountry had
become a Member state.
72. His delegation asked the Premier of British
Guiana to convey to his people the admiration of the
Cuban Government and people for their heroic struggle
for independence. British Guiana was on the verge of
independence; all that remained was to put into opera­
tion the provisions of General Assembly resolution
1514 (XV). The aspirations of British Guiana and of its
Premier were in accordance with those of the peoples
of Latin America, as set forth in resolution XXXIII
adopted at the Conference held at Bogota in 1948.~/
76. The CHAIRMAN, recalling the request that the
text of the statement made by the Premier of British
Guiana should be circulated in full, said that in the
absence of any objection, that would be done.
It was so decided. ,y
The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.
'§/ See Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American
States (Pan-American Union, Washington, O.C., 1948) p. 47.
1/ See A/C.4/515.
Lithe in U.N.
77401-June 1962-2,525
Annex 15
Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (15 Jan. 1962), reprinted in U.N. General Assembly,
Fourth Committee, 16th Session, Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted
under Article 73 of the Charter, U.N. Doc A/C.4/520 (16 Jan. 1962)
Annex 15
Annex 16
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, No. 741D.00/1-1562 (15 Jan. 1962)
Annex 16
Annex 16
Annex 16
Annex 17
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations (14 Feb. 1962), reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 16th Session,
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 of the Charter,
U.N. Doc A/C.4/536 (15 Feb. 1962)
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 17
Annex 18
Letter from J. Cheetham, U.K. Foreign Office, to D. Busk, U.K. Ambassador to Venezuela,
No. AV 1081/38 (21 Feb. 1962)
Annex 18
Annex 18
Annex 18
Annex 19
Statement made by the Representative of Venezuela at the 1302nd meeting of the Fourth
Committee on 22 February 1962, reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 16th
Session, Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 of the
Charter, U.N. Doc A/C.4/540 (22 Feb. 1962)
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 20
Government of the Republic of Venezuela, Chamber of Deputies, Agreement of 4 April 1962
(4 Apr. 1962), reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim of
Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 20
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLAIM
OF
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA

DOCUMENTS
1962 – 1981

CARACAS, 1981

p.12
Annex 20
AGREEMENT BY THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
4 APRIL 1962

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA

Considering:

The country has presented the historical border claim with Great Britain before
the United Nations because of the territorial theft to which we were subjected;

Considering:

Venezuela has an unwaiverable right over the territory taken through the
arbitration award in 1899 which is evidently unfair and driven by the colonial
expansion in Victorian England;

Considering:

Venezuela, by purpose and principles, has been a pioneering State endorsing
the full independence of British Guiana along with all colonial territories that
still exist in America;

Agree to:

Only. – To endorse Venezuela’s policy on the border dispute between the
British possession and our country’s in terms of the territory we were deprived
of driven by colonialism; and besides, support without reservation the total
independence of British Guiana and its immediate inclusion into a democratic
system.
Distributed, signed and sealed at the Palacio federal Legislativo [Federal
Legislative Palace] in Caracas on 4 April 1962. 152 years Independence and 104
years of Federation

The President
(L.S)

Manuel Vicente Ledezma

The Secretary,

Félix Cordero Falcón

Annex 20
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
RECLAMACION
DE LA
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTOS
1962 · 1981
CARACAS, 1981
Annex 20
ACUERDO DE LA CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS
DEL 4 DE ABRIL DE 1962
,,
'
LA CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS
DE LA REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
Considerando:
Que el país ha planteado ante la Organización de Naciones Unidas la
histórica reclamación de límites con la Gran Bretaña, por el despojo territo­
rial del cual fuimos objeto;
Considerando:
Que Venezuela tiene derechos irrenunciables sobre un territorio arre­
batado por el laudo arbitral de 1899, a todas luces injusto, dictado por el
interés de expansión colonialista de la Inglaten:a victoriana;
Consideran
do:
Que Venezuela por vocación y principios ha sido Estado pionero de la
total independencia de la Guayana Inglesa así como de todas las posesio­
nes coloniales que aún subsisten en América;
Acuerda:
la política de Venezuela sobre el diferendo limí­
Unico. -Respaldar
trofe entre la posesión inglesa y nuestro país en cuanto se refiere al terri­
torio del cual fuimos despojados por el colonialismo; y, por otra parte,
apoyar sin reservas la total independencia de la Guayana Inglesa y su in­
corporación al sistema democrático de vida.
Dado, firmado y sellado, en el Palacio Federal Legislativo, en Caracas,
a los cuatro días del mes de abril de mil novecientos sesenta y dos. Años
152° de la Independencia y 104' de la Federación.
El Presidente,
Manuel Vicente Led,,zma.
(L. S.)
Félix Corde,-o Falcón.
El Secretario,
12
Annex 21
Foreign Service Despatch from C. Allan Stewart, U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, to the U.S.
Department of State (15 May 1962)
Annex 21
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Pvt.
SUB’SCV
President
Betancourt's
on
Guiana
Boundary
Platter
’
During
the
court-Io
01
several
meetings
with
President
BBTAWOURTFB
~
._—
I
pattern
of
jhinking
gm
t1_1_e
BEE-3.11.
Guiana-Venezuela
border
question
has
‘
evolved.
Bri_eily
it
is
this:
1.
The
Government
of
Venezuela
is
anxious
to
have
talks
with
the
Briti
sh
Government
0::
the
frontier
(mention.
Contrary
to
what—many-
think.
-.
i-
if
:~—
ithe
Government
911311921191?
is
serious
about
a
possible
realignment
border.
of
the
Enclosed
.5;re
.f,
a
number
or
pamphlets
which
have
been~diatributed
to
foreign
governments
on
the—Border
dispute.
"
"
:'
'“"
President
2.
Betsncourt
professes
to
be
greatly
concerned
about
an
_
independent
British
Guiana
with
Cheddi
JnGAH
as
Prime
Minister.
He
Suspects
that
Jagan
is
already
too
committed
to
ccmmunisn
and
that
his
American
wife
exercises
considerable
influence
over
him.
Her
visit
to
cube
shortly
alter
Jagan'
a
visit
to
the
United
States
was
considered
by
President
Betancourt
to
be
a
provocative
act
on
the
part
of
the
Joanna.
.T“"f’
;
"
”’
During
1961
the
political
committee
0:
Betancourt'
a
party,
Acoion
Democratica,
took
a
long
look
at
Jagan,

even
inviting
him
to
Caracas
for
~
”~*“5'4-ez
discussions
(Embtel
245
of
August
18,
1961)..
At
the
time,
two
members
of
the
comittee
told
the
Embassy
that
they
thought
Jason
was
still
salvageable‘
_
...
'
and
the
party
was
prepared
to
leek‘upon
himrbenigniy~until—his—conductnshould_iz;"j.
D
5-
.,
:
make
a
new
assessment
necessary.
Apparently
the
party
has
had
second
thoughts
I
'-
about
Jegan
and
now
views
with
alarm.
This
"elem"
may
be
slightly
simulated
V
:
_'
since
Betancourt'
a
solution
of
the
harder
dispute
presupposes-I
h°3t11°
—%
‘*Ja¢an.““nis
,
,
plan:
,,_
a
7
~
,—.
>
‘
Through
a
series
of
conferences
with
the
British
before
Guiana
is
awarded
independence
a
cordon
sanity
re
would
be
set
up
between\tho
present

boundary
line
and
one
mutually
upon
by
the.
two
countries.
Sovereignty
."
ica'Ste
[931W
"
2-;
.5
:_.
.
:l
.'
,
'.
_.
._

.1
..
._
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WORM
a.“
F5439
GPO
sxzsss
F
or
Jerunmeav.
H
Univ
To
be
Filled
In
on
Ycilow
Oridnxl
OKLY
acncmH
‘
"
'.
‘
I
I
I
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ASSIGNED
TC
'NAM:
or
on
can
_.
GATE.
.0:
qnncgnons
o
Genus.
sv’useL
‘
act-on
-'.
UthLRSSIl'
It”
to
31652.
3.;
J!
\m’gu/amjlm
-
-
-
Annex 21
-
.
7
'
.
A
-
‘
.
-

“AG—"‘5.
7
Page—“2
of
‘
-
-‘
T.
K
-.
.
.
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‘
_
.
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-
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_.
-—1~-"—"""““—"'“'f'—:~
Dcsp.
Nd)
755.!8
S!
15,1962
-
FrorTLQRLQCQS
‘—

‘*
of
{HIE
srlce
of
351113?
Ju:.anc
mould
pass
to
Venezuela
but
a
carefully

worded”
agreernsnt
won.‘
d
give
preference
to
British,
Venezuelan
and
U
S.
capital
to
dev
elon
the
zone.
are
vc--1_el:ns
are
convinced
that
the
area
contiguous
t0
the
Prcseat
boundary
aboundf
in
mineral
resources,
includ1ng
bauxite,
“’

53:
:rivatc
CL‘“ital
co:1d
deselop
C'wnt°"Pevsly.
Presi
cent
Ez=tancourt
Spec;;ically
stated
taut
152
corven
mould
be
reserved
for
development‘by
private
investment
funds.2£f€§§32t,
the
present
9011??
Of
the
Venezuelan
Government
to
retain
ownership
of
its7miueral
wealth
and
participate-in
ventures7would
not
pertain
in
the
cordon
sanitaire.

\
Of
courae,
theAreaéon
for
the
existence
017the
strip
of
territozyiiacCOId-
tag
to
the
PresidéEt,
is
the
danger
of
communist
infiltration
of
Venezuela-
from
British
Gui:
an
if
a
Castro-type
government
over
were
establiShed.
7'
As
a
result
of
my:discussions
with
President
Betancourt
I
suspect
that
Venezuela
will
continue
to
press
for
friendly
discussions
with
7the
British
about
the
revision
of
the
border.
Eeretofore,
there
w
3
some
belief
that
th1a
~_
_;
matter
was
being_.puroued
for
’7
internal
_ists
political
rad
to«the'£1niotry
reasons
as
a
of
sop
Defense.
t6
.the
'
nationai-
Hoiever,
with
the
Presigent
beginning
to
think
of
a
plan
which
mould
ArepresenAt
Venezuela'
8
concept
of
a
concession,
I
»'
am
now
of
the
Opinion
that
Venezuela'
3
insistence
On
discussions
will
begin
f
to
harden-.
7
_
,.7
-
77“r_-T~:~‘The
Britiah
Ambassador
has
not
taken
a
hard
line;
in
fact,
he
once
told
3-f;
{.me
the
British
h-xd
no
serious
oojections
to
staging
informal
discu53ions
f“‘
A
with
the
Venezuelana
as
long
as
E36
was
not
pressured
as
to
time
and
p17ace
'“'
01
the
meetiugs.
RECEK*IY
he
Said
he
would
query
London_
about
formal
requested
personally
by
Presiueat
Batancourt
(A-171).
Insofar
as
the
Jagan
government
is
concerned
the
Enbassy
hasA
not
heard7
01
any
movea
by
the
Venezuelans
to
bolster
the
anti-Jagan
political
groups
(Baht
e1
1254).7
Jai
Retina
81:53
was
here
recently_
to
talk
with
Venezuelans
,7,
but
it
is
doubtful
whether
he
received
any
support,
financial
or
otherwise.-¢
7-
7,744j
It
will
be
recalled
that
one
of
the
members
of
the
political
Committee
of
7'?
w—Accién
'1E7;F'.Jci}
Derocritica
sent
51§~h
to
see
me
with
an
appeal
for
u,
s,
assistancegt
"“
mw

“I‘M-
obacrlin”
~u4t
A)
"3
"518
to
P:mime
031?
a
saall
sum
of
money'to
zealst
-.
._,
Singb’
a
grOLp
{h33d
9
13320
“a?
S:
1951).
Since
that
time
AD
._,I-A-L~
.,
»1nto
two
g“
"p8
and
fininces
8:9
in
a
aesé.
It
would
seem
log1.cnl
that
r
7
f
"
'
Venezuela
will
from
BQW'Aon
pursue
the
idea
or
the
cordon
sani-taire
to
protAect
itseli
from-a
commieeliue

indepnnuent
British
Guiana
rather
_tnan-
.send_
support

C.‘A11an78tewart
u-mnth
\
'nrn:
Annex 22
Letter from R.H.G. Edmonds, U.K. Foreign Office, to D. Busk, U.K. Ambassador to Venezuela
(15 May 1962)
Annex 22
Annex 23
Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, 17th Session,
Question of Boundaries Between Venezuela and the Territory of British Guiana, U.N. Doc
A/5168 and Add.l (18 Aug. 1962)
Annex 23
UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Distr.
GENERAL I
A/5168 wL Ad.L.I
20 August 1962
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH
Seventeenth session
VENEZUELA: R.i,QUBST FOB THE INCLUSION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY
ITEM IN THE AGENDA OF THE SEVENTEEN'rH SESSION
QUESTION OF BOUNDARIES BET\/EEIT VENEZUELA AND TRE TERRITORY OF BRITISH GUIANA
Telegram, dated 18 August 1962, from Mr. An•.bal Dao, in charge of
the Ministry of Foreign Affal.rs of Venezuele,, addressed to the
SecretarJ•General
I have the honour to address you in order to request the inclusion of the
following item in the agenda of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly:
"Question of boundaries between Venezuela and the territory
of British Guiana",
The explanatory memorandum uill be delivered directly
to you by the delegation
of Venezuela to the United Nations.
(Signed) Anibal DAO
In charge of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Venezuela
Annex 24
Statement made by the Representative of the United Kingdom at the 349th meeting of the
Special Political Committee on 13 November 1962, reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, Special
Political Committee, 17th Session, Question of Boundaries between Venezuela and the Territory
of British Guiana, U.N. Doc A/SPC/72 (13 Nov. 1962)
Annex 24
UNITED NATIONS
Disti�.
GENERAL
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
A/SPC/72
13 November 1962
ORIGDfAL: ENGLISH
Seventeen�h session
SPECIAL POLITICAL CQl;U,'inT.t:E
Agenda i tern 88
G.UESTION OF BOUNDARIES BET'i-TEEN \8NEZUELA AND THE TER.'D:TORY OF
BRITISH GUIANA
Statement of M::. C.T.·Crove, Represente.tive of the United Kingdom, at the
349th meeting of the Special Political ComrnHtee qn·13 1'Tover1ber 1962
My delegation has listened with interest and ctttention to the speech made
by the Foreign Minister of Venezuela yesterday. Before I go into the substance
of this question, I should like to place on record my gratitude to the
Venezuelan Foreign 1'1inister for the courtesy with which he referred to the good
relations between his country and mine. I assure him that the feelings whicl:
he expressed are sincerely shared by Her Ma,iesty' s Govermnent. I was also glad
to observe the desire of the Venezuelan Government to do nothir.g which would
either impair or dela:r the forthcoming independence of British Guiana.
62-25382
Annex 24
2
As the Committee knows, on 22 February of thl.s year the Venezuelan representative
in the Fourth Committee raised this sa~e question during the discussion of the territory
of British Guiana and produced very similar arguments to those which we have heard
in this Cozr.m:i.tt~!e. At that time the United Kingdom representative
in the Fourth
Co!!lillittee stated the position of Her Majesty's Government very clearly.
That
positicn has not changed, but I think it essential to repeat at the outset the
views of my Government. T!:1ey are these. My Government considers that the West~rn
boundary of British Guiana with Venezuela was finally settled by the award which
the arbitral tribunal annolL~ced on 3 October 1899. The frontier was demarcated in
accordance with that award by~ bound3ry commission appointed by the British and
Venezuelan Governments and the work of the ccillltission was recorded in an agreement
signed by the British snd Venezuelan boundary commissioners en 10 January 1905.
The point which I must stress and which the Foreign Minister of Venezuela has
himself recogni~ed is that the arbitration
tribunal was set up RS a result of a
tre9ty c~ncluded between the Governments of Venezuela and Great Britain on 2 Febri.iary 1897,
a treaty known as the Pauncefote-Andrade Treaty. The composition of the tribunal
and its rules of procedure were laid down by this treaty . before 1 t started on its work
and, most important of all, under article XIII of the treaty
bott. Governments
pledged the~selves to accert the tribunal's ~ward as -- and ~hese are the actual
words --
11
a full, perfect and final settlement
11
.- Nothing could be cle:ner than
those words and, as history itself has shown, the a~ard was in fact accepted by
both Governments and a boundary commission was appointed with the agreement of both
Governments to implement the provisions of the award. ~..y Government cannot therefore
agree that there can be any dispute over the question settled by the award.
Those are the essential pd!l.ts on which the position of my Government is based.
The Foreign Minister of Venezuela yesterday made a speech in which he made a number
of detailed allegations on which this Committee will expect me to comment. I
propose accordingly to do so even though they do not afford any grounds for
re-opening the matter.
I do not propose to go into much detail of the history which led up to this
frontier settlement. The Foreign Minister of Venezuela himself recounted a certain
amount of the history leading up to the signing of the arbitration agreement in 1897.
Annex 24
3
Islnuld like to stress however that there is nothine new in these facts, and they
were all available to, and fully taken into account by , the arbitration
tribunal
when its award was made. They are therefore irrelevant
to the question before us
today. Nevertheless, in order to give the Committee the full picture I must
describe the salient historical
facts as we see them.
~he present territory of Briti 5h Guiana represents approximately the area
occupied by the Dutch settlements of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, which were
set up in the early seventeenth century. These settlements, which were formally
recognized by Spain -- despite its historical claims in the New World -- in the
Treaty of Munster in 1~48 were occupied by Great Britain in 1781 and again in 1796,
being finally recognized as British territory by the Treaty of London, which was
signed w1 th the United Netherlands in 1814. The Western bounda17 of this territory
was never defined by treaty, but was demarcated 1Jy the British in accordance with
the limits ciaimed and "!ctually held by the Dutch settlers.
This boundary remained
unchallenged for twenty-six rears, either by the Spaniards or by their successors,
the United Sta tes of Colombia, with which Venezuela merged in 1819. In 1840 the
Venezuelan Foreign Minister in London urged the British Government to enter into a
treaty of limits.
This request was followed by claims insisting upon the river
Essequibo as the bounda,:y of Venezuel~, despite the foct th1:1t there had been no
Spanish settlers in the greater part of the disputed area for over 100 years. These
claims marked the beginning of the dispute which continued for the next fifty-six years.
The Foreign Minister of Venezuela has referred to the work of Mr. Schomburgk.
It may be desirable to state here that Mr. Schomburgk was', :!.n feet, an eminent German
explorer who, in the years from 1841 to 184;, established what came to be called the
Schomburg.k Line which the award subsequently closely followed. wbile engaged. on the
work of determining this line Mr. Schcmburgk llttached great importance to establi~hing,
from actual exploration end inform.3tion obtained from the Indians no less than from
local remains and traditions,
the precise limits of the former Dutch possessions
where all trace of Spanish influence was absent. At the same time he recognized the
importance of fixing a boundary which wouJ.d be acceptable to Venezuela, and he
thtrefore proposed that Great Britain should consent to surrender its claim to a more
Annex 24
4
extended frontier inland in return for the formal recognition of its right to
Point Barima at the Great Mouth of the Orinoco, where the remains of a Dutch fort
still existed, The boundary which he suggested consequently represented a
considerable reduction of what Great Britain claimed as a matter of rtght.
From 1840 onwards all efforts to suggest ccmprol.llises or to conclude agreements
failed despite a number of concessions offered by Her Majesty's Government.
During the latter part of the period the Venezuelan representatives
in Washington
sought to interest the United
0
States Government in the dispute, and in 1895 the
United States Government offered to arbitrate.
There ensued a period of growing
tension which culminated, after further negotiations in Washington and London, in
the con~lusion of an agreement in 1S97 between Great Britain and Venezuela now
known as the Pauncetote-Andrade Treaty. This treaty provided for the boundary
q~estion to be submitted to 9rbitration.
The award of the arbitration
tribunal was
announced two years later, i~ October 1899, and, as I have said, the boun.dary
com:n:tssion subsequently appointed by the British and Venezuelan Governments to
demarcate the boundary in accordance with the award recorded the result s of its
work in.an agreement signed by the British and Venezuelan boundary commissioners
in 1905. The award did not g1 ve effect to the greater part of the Venezuelan claim;
neither, however, did the tribunal recognize any part of the substantial British
claim in the interior
-- and I should like to emphasize this latter point as the
existence of a British claim seems to have been ignored by the Venezuelan side.
The award however gave Venezuela an extremely valuable section which the Foreign
Minister himself admitted in the general debate in the plenary Assembly to have
been of great strategic importgnce. This portion incluueo Point Barima and the
Great Mouth of the Orinoco, to which _! referred earlier, as well as some 3,000
square miles of territory
in the interior.
In this way the long standing dispute
was finally settled, to the ' satisfaction
of the parties concerned.
Annex 24
5
Here it may be desirable for me to describe briefly the main features of the
Treaty of 2 February 1897, which was designed, as stated in its preamble,
nto provide for an amicable settlement of the question which has arisen
concerning the boundary between the colony of British Guiana and the
United · states of Venezuela".
The T.".'eaty is g_ui te a short document of only fourteen articles.
The first article
deals with the immediate appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Article 2 deals
with the composition of the Tribunal, which consisted of five jurists.
Articles 3 and 4 set out the Tribunal's tenns of reference and its Rules and
provided, in addition, that it should be governed by r.uch principles
of international
law, not inconsistent with the Rules, "as the Arbitrators
shall determine to
be applicable to the case". Articles 5 to 9 inclusive provide for the place and
time of the meetings, the appointment of Agents and the arrangements for the
presentation
of the Cases. Art:1.cle 10 provides for the time at which, and
the manner in which, the decision of the Tribunal is to be recorded. Articles 11
and 12 deal with records and expenses. The penultimate article,
article 13, is
short but of paramount importance aud I shall read it again in full:
"the high contracting parties engage to consider the result of the
proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration
as a full perfect and final
settlement of all the questions referred to the Arbitrators".
The fourteenth and last article makes provision for ratification
and the Treaty
was in fact ratified by both parties on 14 June 1897.
Tnat completes my brief historical
survey and my description
of the
Treaty of 2 February 1897, that is, the Arbitration Agreement itself.
The
crucial period in the narrative
is that from 1897, when the agreement was
signed between Great Britain and Venezuela, to 1905, when the boundary commissioners
recorded the results of their work. Here I would like to make a number of
comments and bring a few simple but important facts to the attention of the
Committee.
The first point is that the Treaty of 1897 ~as freely entered into by both
sides. Neither party was under any compulsion to negotiate
it, or was under any
Annex 24
6
obligation to sign it, or was under any obligation to ratify
it. Both did so
of their own free will and in their own interests.
Nor can it be doubted that in
ratifying the arbitration agreement constituted by the Treaty both parties undertook
to accept all its provisions in good faith.
The Foreign Minister of Venezuela seemed to suggest in his speech that
Venezuela was a victim of circumstance, and that as a small country was forced
to bow to the wishes of a more powerful opponent and to that extent,therefore,
Venezuela was not a free agent. But members of this Committee will remember that
on several occasions the Foreign ~linister stressed that the United States gave
full support to Venezuela to the extent of being -- and I quote his words
"on the verge of going to -war with Great Br~tain". He also said that as a
result of this dispute America emerged as a great Power. I suggest therefore
that with thi s active backing Venezuela was at no disadvantage and under no
compulsion of force majeure to sign against its will.
The second point is this. Criticism has been voiced that while there were
two British judges on the Arbitral Tribunal, there were no Venezuelans. In his
speech in the General Assembly on 1 October the Foreign Minister of Venezuela
himself said - and I quote his words:" ••• an Arbitration Tribunal was set up
that -was composed of five judges -- two British, two North Americans and, as
Chairman, a Russian professor" (A/PV.1138, page 28-30). He made much the same
point yesterday in this Committee. He left this as a statement of fact, but he
failed to go into the details of the provisions of the arbitration
treaty.
Under article 2 two members of the Tribunal were to be appointed "on the part
of Great Britain" and two "on the part of Venezuela". One of these latter was
to be nominated by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States of
America -- -which country, you will remember, was supporting the Venezuelan case
at the time -- and the Justices chose one of their own number,
The Honourable David Brewer. The second judge to be appointed on the part of
Venezuela was to be nominated by the President of Venezuela himself. And he again
showed his confidence in the Supreme Court of the United States by choosing no
less a person than the Chief Justice of the United States of America,
The Honourable Melville Fuller. There is nothing to show that the Government of
Venezuela expressed at the time any objection to these arrangements or that the
\
Annex 24
7
President's choice was anything other than a free one. On the contrary.
It is
not right, the~efore, to allege that while Britain was represented by two
judges, Venezuela was discriminated against.
It had a similar opportunity of
being represented in the way which it itself thought most appropriate and likely
to be beneficial
to its interests.
In the interest of completeness I should perhaps refer to the President of
the Tribunal who was, as the Foreign Minist~r of Venezuel?- has pointed out, a
Russian professor of international
law. Some commentators have drawn the
conclusion that the mere fact that he was a European militated from the outset
against Venezuela. In this · connexion, I think that it is only necessary to point
out that the rules provided that the President should be chosen by mutual
agreement between the arbitrators
from both sides, and that there is nothing on
record to show that his appointment was not considered to be complet~ly satisfactory
to each of them.
Thirdly, complaint is made that the provision in one qf the Rules laid
down for the Arbitrators
in Article IV of the Treaty that "Adverse holding or
prescription during a P:riod of fifty years shall make a good title" meant
that the Venezuelan claims were prejudiced by the Treaty itself before they ever
got as far as the Arbitration Tribunal.
This, in itself,
is not an unusual
provision in a treaty of this kind. The essential point here is that the
Venezuela~ Government, in becoming a party to the Treaty, freely agreed to the
inclusion of this provision. At the time of the signing of the Treaty,
therefore, they must have been content that this particular
rule should apply and
they have no r<)ason therefore to complain about it now.
Annex 24
8
T"nen, as an extension of this same point it is sometimes argued that the
award did not even recognize Venezuela's right over territory which had not been
held by the British for fifty years. But I refer again to the terms of the Treaty
itself.
The provision which I have just quoted -- that referring to title
acquired through adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years
certainly ~d not imply that territory was to be regarded as British only if
occupied by the British for fifty years. To argue this would be to maintain that
the fifty year rule was the only rule which the Tribunal had to apply in coming
to its decisions.
To show that this was not the case I will quote again, if I
may, from the Treaty itself
-- Article 4 rule (b). This gave the foll0wing
authority to the Arbitrators,
and I quote the exact wording, "to recognize and
give effect to rights and claims resting on any other ground, whatever valid
according to international
law, and on any principles of international
law which
the arbitrators may deem to be applicable to the case, and which are not in
contravention of the foregoing rule".
In failing to a-ward to Venezuela the
territories
which Great Britain had ·not occupied for fifty years, the Tribunal
did not thereby ignore Venezuela's rights to these territories,
but rather must
have considered that Venezuela had no rights to them.
Mi;' final point on ti.1is period of the history of the dispute is this.
Accusations have been made, and the Foreign Minister of Venezuela has suggested this
himself, that the Tribunal came to their decisions -without reference to the rules
of international
la-wand to the other rules which the Tribunal under the terms of
the Treaty ought to have applied. This is a most serious allegation and one which
must be emphatically rejected.
It is, furthermore, an allegation which cannot stand
up before the facts. The most effective denial of its validity rests not on legal
arguments or on the opinions oi' renowned jurists, which are necessarily of a general
nature,but on the verbatim records themselves of the meetings of the Tribunal.
There were fifty-four such meetings. The Committee will, I am sure, be relieved
to hear that I will not attempt to take them step by step through the vast pile
of documentation, though I cannot resist observing that the opening speeches of
the Counsel for both parties lasted thirteen days apiece. That is something that the
Special Political Committee has not yet been able to emulate, I am glad to say.
Annex 24
9
I -will content myself today by giving members of tM.s Committee a most
definite assurance that the experts j_n my GoveI'L.Dlent have carefully studied
thes-.~ documents end that an examination of the records of the proceedin~s show
that throughout its deliberations
the Tribunal wes very conscious of its duties
and obligations under the rules laid down in the Treaty. Not only was· the
'.I.1ribunal obviously aware of the rules applicable to the dispute , but the final
award. was clearly jus tified on the basis both of the evidence laid before and
weighed by the Tribunal and of the rules of international
law ·which in the
course of the :proceedings were shown to be relevant.
It is our firm belief that
any person who has the~time and technical lmoYledge to sift through the mass
of evidence -will co.me to the same conclusion.
Ti1at completes what I have to.say on the histo1-y of events leading up to
the arbitration
award, on the provisions of the arbitration
Treaty i tself and
on a number of criticisms -which have been made about the legnl aspe cts of the
Tribunal
I
s decision . But before ·we move on to more recent events , I would like
to draw attention
to one further fact. T'ne Foreign Minister was very insistent
that the Govern.mmt and people of Venezuela were greatly shocked by the contents
of the award. That, as I will sho~ later in my speeci1, does not accord with our
own understanding,
for a t the time certain sections both in Venezuela and the
res t of the world hailed the award as a
11
-.,rictory for Venezuela ". President McKinley
indeed said that "the de cision appears to be equally sa tisfactory
to both partie s
11
•
But if the Government of Venezuela of those days were'really
as shocked as the
Fo1•eign Minister says, surely they -would not have gone on without de.mur to set up
a boundary Commission to demarcate the frontier in accordance with the award, and
six years later to accept the Commission's report on the completion of its work.
History records no protest at this time on t~e part of the Venezuelan Government .
We can now at last move on from the year 1905. In fact , for a considerable
period of time there is little
or nothing more to say. For some forty years very
little was heard of the arbitration
award.
It appeared to have Toeen accepted
by all concerned. Indeed, in 1941 the Venezuelan Minister for Foreign
Affairs himself told His Majesty's Minister in Caracas that his Government were
definitely
of the opinion that the boundary question was a chose j~;
that the
Venezuela/British Guiana frontier -was final and well defined and that the author
Annex 24
10
of articles which had appeared in the Venezuelan press about that time questioning
the 1899 award
11
had obviously never had access to the archives of his Ministry".
And then, as the Foreign Minister of Venezuela has described, a memorandum
written in 1944, that is to say nearly forty years after the final agreement
between the boundary commissioners, by Mr. Mallet-Prevost, an American lawyer
and one of ·the Junior Counsel conducting the Venezuelan case, was published in 1949
after his death.
It is upon this memorandum that the Venezuelan case for re-opening
the whole question rests.
This has been made clear not only in the speech made
by the Foreign Minister of Venezuela in the General Assembly on l October, but
also in his statement before this Committee.
Mr. Mallet-Prevost's memorandum is interesting.
Mr. 1iallet-Prevost has
rightfully been given honour as a man of t?e highest integrity.
The question,
however, which is to be decided and which is before us today, is not concerned
' with the character of the man who dictated the memorandum in 1944. It is
whether, by what he wrote, Mr. Mallet-Prevost has established beyond reasonable
doubt that there are good and su!ficient reasons to reopen the boundary dispute.
In his paper, Mr. ~iallet-Prevost gave details of certain happenings which
he considered of great significance and in which he was personally involved some
forty-five years before at the time when the Tribunal was about to deliver its
award. The inconsistencies
and indeed, in certain respects, inaccuracies in
his memorandum have been clearly and ably pointed out in an article by another
lawyer, Mr. Clifton J. Child, which was also published in the American Journal
of International Law and which appeared during the year following the publication
of Mr. Mallet-Prevost's own paper.
I do not intend to comment in detail on ~hat
we consider to be the inaccuracies of Hr. Mallet-Prevost's memorandum. Mjy" purpos~
is to question whether in fact he successfully adduced any real evidence for his
main contention, which ~as that the arbitral award was made as a result of a
political deal between Great Britain and Russia.
Annex 24
I
11
For it is on this point that the demand for reopening the whole case
rests.
I hav~ already referred to the mass of documentation on the subject.
Mr. Clifton Child had the industry to examine the papers of my Foreign Office
fifteen bound volumes in all -- which are now lodged in our Public Record
Office and which are therefore available for study, as well as despatches and
telegrams which passed between London and St. Petersburg during the relevant
period. He also studied the verbatim records of the Tribunal. His
conclusion was this. He found in the Foreign Office papers, and I quote
his words:
"••• not one single docume~t which by the widest stretch
of the imagination could be considered to indicate a deal
between Great Britain and Russia of the sort suspected by
Mr. Mallet-Prevost."
On historical grounds, too, it is unlikely that such a deal could have
been made. At that time, in 1899, my Government's relations with Russia
were in fact strained, and it is interesting
to note that nobody has, as
far as I know, ever been able to suggest what the Russian Government
obtained from the United Kingdom in return for the so-called "deal".
There can be no doubt that Mr. Mallet-Prevost nursed grievances against
the Tribunal during the whole of his life. Both he and General Harrison
had conducted Venezuela's case not only with ability but with passion.
They would undoubtedly have wished to see the Tribwial recognize the whole
of Venezuela's claim and the fact that only part of this claim was
established was certainly a bitter blow. It is not difficult
to see, I suggest, .
how Mr. Mallet-Prevost came to the belief which he expressed so forcefully
in his memorandum. It was, I submit, his natural reaction to a decision
which had gone against his deepest conviction. A curious feature, however,
of his attitude
is that at the time of the award, he and General Harrison
in an interview with the press attacked it as being a compromise diplomatic
in its character, and yet in the same interview they hailed it as a "victory
for Venezuela". As I have said, this victory was widely applauded and
Annex 24
' )
]2
recognized both at the time, and subsequently, by many shades of opinion
throughout the world. Perhaps I might also mention that an article in the
Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya,
published. in Moscow in 1928, written
after an intensive study of imperial Russian archives for the relevant period,
spoke of the award as being "substantially
in favour of Venezuela
11
•
Here I "W'ould like to say a word abot1t the allegation that the award of the
arbitration
tribunal wus a diplomatic compromise and not a truly judicial
decision. This "W'as Mr. Mallet-Prevost
1
s contention and that of the Foreign
Minister of Venezuela.
I have dealt 'With the alleged
11
diplom~tic" aspect of
the matter. AJ3 for the question of compromise, it seems inevitable that any
unanimous decision of an arbitral tribunal is likely to involve some
reconciliation
of conflicting views and is therefore,
in this sense, a
compromise. The fact that contemporary records tend to show that there was
some adjustment of divergent views among the arbitrators
does not in any way
affect the validity of the a"W'Srd, nor does it deprive it of its judicial
character.
I vould remind members of the Committee of the task laid upon
the Tribunal by the arbitration agreement. Article 3 is clear and
unequiYocal.
It states:
"The Tribunal shall investigate and ascertain the extent
of the territories
belonging to, or that might lawfully be
claimed by, the United Netherlands or by the Kingdom of Spain
respectively
at the time of the acquisition by Great Britain
of the colony of British Guiana and. a:-hall determine the boundary
line between the colony of British Guiana and the United States
of Venezuela."
The task of the Tribunal "W'SS to determine the boundary line.
It was cl.early
preferable,
as the President of the Tribunal. pointed out, that the decision of
the Tribunal should, if possible, be unanimous. However, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that members of an arbitral tribunal having beard
evidence bssed on historical documents ranging over a period of 300 years might
come to conclusions which were not identical. in every respect.
Indeed, this is
just the view taken by Mr. Justice Brewer, one of the members of the Tribunal.
Annex 24
13
appointed on the part of Venezuela. He is, as far as I know, the only member
of the Tribrmal ever to have gone on record in connexion with the proceedings.
Justice Brewer's remarks have been quoted in an attempt to show that there had
been an unwarranted and improper compromise. My delegation considers that,
on the c_ontrary, the eminent Justice's remarks in fact support our case.
Perhaps I might repeat his words.
"Until the last moment, I believed a decision would be
quite impossible, and it vas only by the greatest conciliation
and mutual concession that a compromise was arrived at.
If
any of us had been asked to give an award, each would have
given one differing in extent and character. The consequence
of this was that we had to adjust our differing views, and
finally draw a line running between what each thought was
right."
I would draw the attention of the Committee to the use of the words
"mutual concession".
The claims of both sides wer·e far apart when they
began -- if they had not been, there would have been no need for arbitration.
Before the award was made, there was still divergence of views among the
arbitrators,as
Mr. Justice Brewer has pointed out, and it was only by
conciliation and mutual concession that agreement could be reached. There
is nothing to suggest, however, that this final adjustment of views was
contrary to international
law or to the rules of the Tribunal of which
Mr. Justice Brewer and his colleagues were members. Indeed, it seems to
my delegation that these remarks make the arbitral award even more
unassailable.
Here I will quote again from Mr. Justice Brewer in a
conversation recorded in 1899, and quoted by Mr. Childs in the ~rticle
to which I have already referred, when he expressed "great admiration for
the impartial and strict sense of justice shown by the British arbitrators
during the proceedings of the Tribunal".
This would appear to indicate that
at any rate one of the two judges appointed on the part of Venezuela had no
complaints about the legality of the award.
Annex 24
14
The Foreign Minister also quoted statements by General Harrison, most of
which appear to have been made either in the heat of the moment or in private
correspondence, expressing indignation at the award. My Government does not
deny the sincerity of these views, but cannot accept that such expressions
of opinion by interested parties provide any .evidence to warrant reopening
the case. Even the Venezuelan Government would seem to have bad doubts
about the validity of Mr. Mallet-Prevost's
and General Harrison's arguments.
Admittedly, in 1951 the Venezuelan iunister for Foreign Ai'fairs denounced
the Arbitration award in a press interview and said that it ought to be
modified. But the Venezuelan Government va.ited no less than thirteen years
after the publication of Mr. Mallet-Prevost
1
s memorandum before making .any
formal approach to my Government, requesting new negotiations about the frontier.
I hope I have said enough to explain why, in the view of my delegation,
this matter should not be reopened, and why we cannot accept that there is
a dispute. We believe that a critical study of all the evidence available
is convincing on this score.
Annex 24
15
I think it is now tine for ne to refer to the third party involved -- the
Government of British Guiana, for whose external relations my Governnent are
responsible and for whom we are, as it were, at present acting as trustees .in this
matter.
It is' unfortunate that the Venezuelan Government should have chosen the ·
closing period of British Guiana's present status in which to raise this frontier
dispute. We, and I am sure all the members of the Committee, · fully ac_cept the
Venezuelan Foreign Minister's assurances that there is no intention on the part
of his Governmnt to affect or delay in any way the independence of British Guiana.
My Government, needless to say, shares this view. British Guiana's progress
towards independence will in no way be affected by this debate. Our hope is,
however, that this Il:IB.tter can be disposed of once and for all so that British
Guiana can enter into independence without any doubts about its territory or its
frontiers.
It would be easy for my Goverruoont to agree that this matter be left
over for the British Guiana and the Venezuelan Governments to discuss after British
Guiana has obtained its independence. That would be a way out for us. But we
reject it as wrong. The British Government does not accept that there is any
frontier dispute to discuss. There is no reason ' wby the Governnent of British
Guiena should accept it either; nor do they, and we cannot urge them to discuss it.
Our hope is, therefore, that this problem can be finally disposed of now so that
British Guiana can move forward without any shadow of doubt about its frontiers.
This subject is a highly complicated one and, I believe, .largely unfamiliar
to members of the Committee. It might, therefore, be helpful if at this stage
I summarize the argwi:ents which I have deployed so far. These are the essential
points.
Sixty-five years ago an Arbitration Agreenent was concluded between two
countries.
It was freely entered into.
It conforrmd. with the principles of
international
law. An award followed from that agreenent, and a boundary
demarcation from that award. At the tine of the agreenent, at the time of the
award, at the tine of the demarcation, neither party expressed itself as dissatisfied
or considered itself otherwise than bound by the provisions of the egreelll3nt. This
state of affairs continued for forty-four years until an article appeared embodying
a posthwoous nem::>randum written by the junio:,; counsel of one of the parties.
That
article was criticized and largely refuted by enother lawyer who had access to
I
Annex 24
16
all the material dealing with the dispute. The party who had been represented
by that jU!lior counsel. felt bound to support bis views ao expressed afte~ his
death . That is not surprising. But a further thirteen years elapsed before any
official approach.was ma.de by the one party to the other claiming that the award
was unjust and required revision.
I ask members of this Committee to consi'der
w~st seriously the implications
if, after fifty-seven years from the date on which
a frontier settleioont is put into effect,
i't is allowed to be re.:opened, particularly
when there is no new evidence which has to be taken into account.
It seems to my
Government that there will be no frontier agreement in any pert of the world 'Which
cannot-be questioned on such a basis and no international agreement which cannot
be brought into doubt.
It has always been the keystone of B:ri tish policy, and I
believe of the vast majority of other Member States of the United Nations, that
respect for international
agreenents freely concluded is not only essential
to
world stability,
but axiomatic if the rule of international
law is to surVive .
If we allow a departure from these principles,
I submit that we shall soon be
inundated with claims from all over the world for the re-opening of questions
which have been regarded as settled for generations.
The problems we would then face
would be insunnount.able. Not only would it be almost impossible to find solutions
to them, but there would be no guarantee that any such solutions would be respected
for oore than a brief span. In other words, by agreeing to re-open such questions
we should destroy the very neans by which disputes can be finally resolved .
I hope that I have conVinced mambers of this Committee that if they respect
international
law and agreer.cents freely arrived at, this question of the frontier
between British Guiana. and Venezuela should not have been brought before the
United Nations.
It has been a matter of great regret to my Govern.m::nt that the
Government of Venezuela, with whom we have such friendly ties, should have wisaed
to raise the matter here . These ties go back to the beginning of the last century,
when the countries of Latin America were fighting for their independence and when
a large contingent of British soldiers were fighting under the great Sim:.:Sn Bolivar.
When to the memories of those early days a.re added the further close links of mi-e
recent years, representatives
will understand how painful it is to my delegation
to find ourselves having to oppose Venezuela in this Committee.
My Government believes, however, not only that there is no need for this
unfortunate disagreerent
to affect our friendly relations i~ any way, but also
Annex 24
17
that it has arisen as a result of a misunderstanding which can be put right.
I
have deliberately desisted from taking the Committee through the wealth of documents
relating to the dispute and through the records of the proceedings of the Tribunal.
I have, however, referred to the vast ruoount of documentation which exists. As I
said earlier, the experts of my Government have conducted a very thorough examination
of the records available to them and are completely satisfied that there is no
justification
whatsoever for re-opening this frontier question. They are also
convinced that a thorough exar:d.nation of these records cannot lead to any other
conclusion.
I am therefore authorized to say that my Government, with the full
concurrence of the Government of British Guiana, are prepared to discuss with the
Venezuelan Government, through diplomatic channels, arrangerents for a tripartite
;
Venezuela-British Guiana-United Kingdom examination of the voluminous documentary
material relevant to this question. For our part, we would naturally expect to
examine any Venezuelan records and documents too. In ma.king this offer I l'!lllst au.ke
it very clear that it is in no sense an offer to engage in substantive talks about
revision of the frontier.
That we cannot do, for we consider that there is no
justification
for it. This offer on the part of my Government simply reflects our
anxiety, having regard to our friendly ties with Venezuela, to dispel any doubts
which the Venezuelan Governmant may still have about the val.icitty or propriety
of the arbitral award. We are confident that once the Venezuelan Government have
examined our records as closely as we have they will fully understand why we cannot
entertain any claim in regard to the frontier. We believe that this offer represents
the best means of reroovi.ng once and for all the misunderstanding which has arisen
between us. We sincerely hope that the Venezuelan Governn:ent will accept the offer
in the spirit in which it has been mde and will agree that it is better to proceed
in this way than to continue -our discussions here in the United Nations.
Annex 25
U.N. General Assembly, Special Political Committee, 17th Session, 350th Meeting, Agenda item
88: Question of boundaries between Venezuela and the territory of British Guiana, U.N. Doc A/
SPC/SR.350 (16 Nov. 1962)
Annex 25
United Nations
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 350th
MEETING
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
SEYENTEENTH SESSION
Official Records
•
Friday, 16 November 1962,
at 3.25 p.m.
NEW YORK
CONTENTS
Page
Agenda item 88:
Question of boundaries between Venezuela and
the territory of British Guiana (concluded) 127
Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador>.
AGENDA ITEM 88
the United Kingdom and Venezuela have authorized
me to inform the Committee that as a result of the
conversations held by them in the last few days with
regard to the question of the boundaries between
Venezuela and the territory of British Guiana, they
have agreed, the first of the aforementioned Gov­
ernments acting with the full concurrence of the
Government of British Guiana, that the three Gov­
ernments shall examine the documentary material
available to all parties relevant to this question.
For this purpose they will proceed to make the nec­
essary arrangements through diplomatic channels.
Question of boundaries between Venezuela and the territory
of British Guiana (A/5168 and Add.1) (concluded)
"I am sure that I am interpreting the feelings of
the Committee that in view of the possibility of
direct discussions among the parties concerned, we
should not proceed further with our debate here. I
feel sure that the Committee will also wish me to
express the hope that this procedure agreed among
the three parties concerned will be fruitful.
1. Mr. FALCON BRICENO (Venezuela) said that
since the Committee's last meeting, very cordial and
conciliatory conversations had taken place between
his Government and that of the United Kingdom. The
result of those conversations had been communicated
to the Chairman. The fact that the Venezuelan dele­
gation had agreed to the procedure in question did not
in any way imply a change in its position as expressed
in his statement of 12 November 1962 (348thmeeting).
"It is my understanding that the parties concerned
will inform the United Nations about the results of
these conversations."
4. Mr. MENSHIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Re­
2. Mr. CROWE (United Kingdom) was sure that the
Committee would share his delegation's pleasure at
the acceptance by the Minister of External Relations
of Venezuela of the offer made by the Government of
the United Kingdom with the concurrence of the Gov­
ernment of British Guiana. The conversations of the
past few days had been conducted in a gratifying spirit
of friendship that was characteristic
of the relation­
publics) said that the Soviet delegation had intended
to make a detailed statement on the matter. In view
of the Chairman's statement, however, he would simply
point out that it was because British Guiana was not
an independent and sovereign State and thus was not a
Member of the Organization that the matter could not
be discussed in the United Nations. The immediate
independence of British Guiana was, therefore, an
obvious necessity.
ship between the United Kingdom and Venezuela. He
had noted that the Venezuelan's position had _not
changed; that of the United Kingdom Government re­
mained as stated to the Committee on 13 November
1962 (349th meeting).
5. Mr. BERNSTEIN (Chile) congratulated the Chair­
·man, on behalf of the Committee, on the part he had
played in the negotiations. In view of the statements
that had just been made, he suggested that the dis­
3. The CHAIRMAN then placed the following state­
ment on record:
cussion of the item should be adjourned and that the
Committee should proceed at its next meeting to the
question of Oman.
"The Committee has heard statements by the
Foreign Minister of Venezuela and by the represen­
tative of the United Kingdom in which they have set
out the positions of their Governments on this
matter. The representatives
It was so decided.
of the Government of
The meeting rose at 3.35 p.m.
127
Lithe in U.N.
77111-October 1963-2,lCJ0
A/SPC/SR.350
Annex 25
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
RECLAMACION
DE LA
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTOS
1962 · 1981
CARACAS, 1981
Annex 25
DECLARACION DEL SR. BENITEZ (ECUADOR), PRESIDENTE
DE LA COMISION POLITICA ESPECIAL, XVII9 PERIODO DE
SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE LAS NACIONES
UNIDAS EL 16 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1962.
"La Comisión ha escuchado las exposiciones del Ministro de Relacio­
nes Exteriores de Venezuela y del representante del Reino Unido en las
cuales han fijado las posiciones de sus Gobiernos sobre este asunto. Los
representantes de los Gobiernos del Reino U nido y de Venezuela me han
autorizado para informar a la Comisión que, como resultado de las con­
versaciones que han sostenido en los últimos días a propósito de la cues­
tión de límites entre Venezuela y la Guayana Brítanica, han convenido,
actuando el primero de los Gobiernos nombrados en éompleto acuerdo
con el de la Guayana Británica, en que los tres Gobiernos examinarán la
documentación en poder de todas las partes y relativa a este asunto. Con
este propósito, procederán a hacer los arreglos necesarios por la vía di­
plomática.
''Tengo la certeza de que interpreto el sentir de la Comisión al decir
que, en vista de la posibilidad de discusiones directas entre las partes
interesadas, no debemos continuar este debate. Creo asimismo que la
Comisión deseará que la Presidencia exprese la esperanza de que el pro­
cedimiento acordado entre las partes interesadas tendrá resultados fruc­
tíferos.
"Tengo entendido que las partes interesadas informarán a las Naciones
Unidas sobre los resultados de estas conversaciones".
22
Annex 26
United Kingdom, Department of External Affairs, Memorandum: Venezuelan Claim to British
Guiana Territory, No. CP(64)82 (25 Feb. 1964)
Annex 26
Annex 26
Annex 26
Annex 27
Republic of Venezuela, Official Map: Claim of Esequibo Territory (1965)
Annex 27
Annex 28
Government of the United Kingdom, Record of Discussions between the Foreign Secretary, the
Venezuelan Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Premier of British Guiana at the Foreign Office
on 9 December, 1965, No. AV 1081/326 (9 Dec. 1965)
Annex 28
,-\.. )
.,
_,.
,·
bo -
CONr•'IDENT:AI.
'1'111S l)OCI J~l"'" ''l' IS ·1· ,
✓1
•
1
""
•
Ill ~ l'IWl'ERTY <W llf :R HIUl',\NNIC M.\J EST\''S GOV EI INi\lEl''.T
AV 1081/326
Forrig n Office and Whit ehall Dfstrib11tio11
VENEZUELA
9 l>cccmbrr, 1965
Seclion I
(I)
RECORD OF DISCUSSION S BETWEEN THE FOREJGN SEC ~E TARY,
THE VENE ZUE LAN MINI STER ron FORE [( ;N AFF f, TRS AND
TIIE PR El\ll Ert OF URJTISH GUIA NA AT THE FOR EIGN OF FI CE
ON 9 DEC El\liiE R,. 1965
Present:
Th e Ri~ht Hon. Michael Stewart , M.P.
Dr. Ipnacio Iribnrrcn 8 01 r,es
The Venezuelan Ambn ssador
Dr. German Na va-Carill o
Dr. Adolfo Taylhardat
Dr. Leonardo Diaz-Go nzalez
General Marcos A. Morin
Father Pabl o Ojer
Father Herm an Gonzalez
Dr. Demelrio Broesncr
Interpreter
Mr. Forbes Burnh am
The Right Hon. Th e Lord Walston
Mr . S. S. Ramphal
Mr. L. A. Luekh oo
Sir Geoffrey Meade
Mr . W. I. J. Wallace
Mr. J. 0. Rennie
Mr. R. W. Piper
Mr. R. M . K. Slater
Mr. R. H. G. Edmonds
Mr. A. D. Watts
Mr. S. W Martin
ln lcrpreter
The Venezuela-British Guiana frontier
Mr. St ewart welcomed the Venezuelan F oreign Minister , recalled th at the
- I
Venezuelan complain( was aim ed at the validity of the 1899 Award , and summari sed
the circumstances in which we had offered in 1962 an .examination of docu ment s
concern ing this probl em. He enquired , in relation to Item 1 of the Agenda, wheth er
the examin ation of documents had served its purp oses in satisfying the Venezue lan
Government that then : was no substance in their allegations concerning the Awa rd' s
validity .
Dr . lribarr c11 read a prep ared statement . The Venezuelan Governm ent had
examin ed carefully the British experts' report and reached the firm conviction that
its conclu sions were completely unacceptable. Britain had promised to plac e at
Venezuela's disposal doc uments to show that there was no justification for reopening
the fr ontier question, but th e British experts had confined themselves to a few
observ ations on the Vr 11ezucla11s' preliminary exposition. The report 's form and
substance had surpri s,~d the Venezuelan Government: its defects fully justified
the observation in Foreign Office Note No. AV 1081/75 of 3 August, 1965, that the
report did not necessarily repres ent the considered opinion of Her Majesty's
Government on any of the matters discussed. He did not wish to enter into a long
examination of the British expert s' report , but would confine himself to a few
comments to illustrat e why Venezuela could not accept th1.: conclusions:
(a) TI1e report dirl not deal satisfactorily with the questi on of alterat ion uf maps
submitt ed hy Britain to the Tribunal : it contained the extra ordinary
assertion that this was not relevant . The British experts had confused
two entirely different mailers. the falsification of original map s and the
simple que stion of publishers' errors .
CONFIDENTIAL
20113- 33 6430- 21
A
Annex 28
2
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) Corre sponJc nce between Sir Richad Webster, Lord Salisbu ry and Mr.
Jo se1?h Cha mberlain of Jul y to October 1899 and other d ocuments
p rovu~g !hat the British Governmen t gave instruc tions for the imp osition
of a l_111e prepared thr ee month s previously in the Colonial Oflice had
been ignored .
(c) No reply had been given to the Venezuelan point that the statement by
the Go ~ern,ncnt of Grand Colombia regarding its fro ntier at the River
Esseqmbo had never been dispu ted.
(d) The Briti sh experts had quot ed unfound ed opi nions in an attemp t to refute
Venezuelan argumcRls about the 1897 Tr eaty. T he facts were:
(i) Corrc~pondence from Scpte mhcr to November nl96 ·(the decisive
period in the negotia tion of the Treaty) had been hidden from
Venezuela until 1899.
·
.
(ii) Richard Olney had assured Venezuela that the 1850 Agreeme nt was
in force, while agreeing with Britain that this question would be
left to the discretion of the Tribun al.
(iii) On the prescription clause, Britain had said that title should be
decided according to international Jaw whi le agreeing privat ely
wit h the Un ited States that title should be established by
occupa tion after 1850 by settlers later disow ned by the Brirish
Go vernment.
·
(iv) Olney and Pauncefote had agreed that no Venezuelan sho~1ld be
· · a member of the Tr ibunal. Moreo ver. Venezuela had acted under
· dure ss, being twice threatened by the Unit ed States that she wo uld
be left alone to face British power if she ,,id not sigr. the Tre a ty.
The Brit ish expert s had failed to realise that Venezuela. wh ose
ind ependence had been recognised by Britain for over 70 years.
was given treatm ent worse than that accord ed to-day to a colony.
(e) Venezuela did not accept the experts' frivolous reply tc- her imp o rtant
point that the Tribunal did not give a decision in law. T hey had been
unable to deny the reference in Block's Diar y to a deal which gave
Britain victory. C. A. Harris, on 4 Novembe r, 1899, had referred to the
Award as a "fa rce". Nor could doubt be cast on the validity of
Mallet-Prevost's Mem oran dum \:~cau se of the time which had elapsed
before it was written or because of its posthumous publica tion. In a
letter dated 26 October, 1899, to Lincoln Byrd, Mallet-Prev9st had
referred to a decision forced on the Venezuel an Arbitrat ors and to the
possibility of Russian interven tion.
(/) The impr oper pressure exerted by the President of the Trib unal on the
Venezuelan Arbitra tors could tlot be disguised by the euphemism
"stro ve hard to obtai n a unanimous verclict ". The argu ment that su-:h
behaviou r was typical of arbitrations of that time carried no conviction.
Jt was precisely to make good the serious damage s suffered by Venezuela in the
past that her Representatives had come to the conferen ce table. Th e Venezu elan
Government remained convinced of the rightness of their positio n, and the only
sa tisfact ory solu tion of the frontier problem with Brit:. h Gui ana lay in the return
of the territ ory which by right belonged to her . A legal frontier shou ld now be
established between Venezuela and British Guiana.
Mr . St ewart recalled the experts' narrow terms of reference, i.e., whether
docume ntary evidence established that the procedure of the Tribun al was impr oper
or its Award invalid. a nd refuted the allegation that Sir Geoffrey Meade's report
was frivol ous. The Foreign Mini ster had referred · to map s : these were •inevitably
inaccurate, and in any case maps did not figure in the Tr ibunal's terms of reference
nor in the Award. As for Venezuelan repre senta tion, it was clear from the evidence
that the Unit ed States were at that time hostile to Britain , and so far from Venezue la
bein g coerce d, it was Britain who was obliged to go to arbit rar ion, when Cleveland
thr ea tened to determin e the frontier unilaterally . He also ref erred to the extreme
gra vity of the charge that the British Arbit rators had trie d to subo rn the Pr esident
of the Tribun al. Such a serious cha rge would need very clear proof, if it was to be
made good . The exper ts had failed to find this proo f. The legal fr ontier had already
been duly determined by a procedu re agreecl by both par ties and it ha d been
accepted. It was imp ossible to shake this position.
CONFIDENTIAL
v uac
Annex 28
•
CONFIOENTIAl;
3
Dr. lriba'.·re11 replied llrnl Venezuela's point on the maps was that they had
b;cn falsi~ed, the Venezuelan experts had dul) prm ed this. lie also dilTereu 011
t e question or Venezuela·~ representation at the Tribunal. As for the deal.
y enezucla_ had ~!ways mainlaine~ !~at such a political deal existed, and that this
< eal had wven victory to Great Bnta111. It was not a question of a mere allegation or
~ suppos1t!on, but a fact mentioned hy t-.lallcl-Prc1 ost and in other sources. He
1
e-~n~phas1~ed that Vcnczuela had come to the confcrenc<> table, not to discuss
positions ~ilready establi~hcd aud known to each olh<'r, but with good will and in
full consciousness of the necessity to rcsoh·e the dispute. The prolongation of this
controversy could only bring damage and serious inconYenicncc to all parties
concerned.
Mr. Burnham said that after a thorough study of the various reports including
that prcpnred by Sir GeolTrcy Meade, hi5 Governm~nl were convinced that the
boundary was ftnallv determined in 1905. in accorclnnce with the Award of 1899
and the Treaty of 1897. The existence of a political deal was a mere assertion. No
c1 idence 10 support it had been produced. nor was there any information as to ils
nature. He asked Dr. lri barrcn to explain what the deal consisted of: until this was
known, there could he no quc,tion of a problem nor of finding a solution to it.
Dr. lribar/'1'11 said he thought thnt Mr. Burnham had not fully understood what
he had said about the political deal. After elaborating on this, he recalled that
liritish Guiana hnd l,ccn represented at all singes in the examination of documents
and in the subsequent conYcrsations. Venezuela had insisted on flritish Guiana
representation . Whe11 the dales for the present meeting were agreed, the need for
Mr. Burnham' s presence had been taken into account; he reaffirmed his
Government's desire to maintain friendly relations with British Guiana.
Mr. Stewart turning to ll em 2 on the Agenda, emphasised that the phra se" to
seek satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy" could
only be interpreted in the narrow context of the controversy over the validity of
t11e 1899 Award. He also referred to the clangers which could result if, by pressing
:heir claim, the Venezuelans were lo create political difficulties for Mr. Burnham .
Mr. lJumlwm then referred to statements by his predecessor in 1962, alleging
pressure on Venezuela by the United States and Great Britain. He mentioned this
as an illu\lralion of the sort of argument which those now in opposition couln
use and said it was inconceivable that his Governmc111 could be a party to any
propo sals implying thnt he was acting under pressure from Venezuela. He had to
carry the entire people of Guyana with him.
•
Dr. Iribarren referred to the demands of public opinion in his own country,
and denied categorically that Venezuela had been subjected to pressure by Britain
or the United Stntes. He olTcred Venezuelan collaboration and assistnnce in any way
pos~ible,and re .flirmcd (he duty of his Government loconti nuelo try. in the friendliest
manner and by all the means of diplomacy, to reach a solution of the territorial
problem. He challenged Mr. Stewart's interpretation of the terms of Item 2 of
the Anenda and emphasised the need for a practical settlement. When asked what
he ha~! in mind. he repeated his earlier proposal for the return of the territory
which belonged to Venezuela by right.
M r. JJ11mha111 rejected this proposal and quoted the terms of the offer to examine
document s made by Mr. Crowe in his statement in the Special Political Committee
on 13 November, 1962. Any consideration of the substantive question of the fronti er
was out of the qticstion.
Mr. Stewart aorecd thr.: the proposal was wholly unacceptable: it involved a
rejection of the 1t99 Award, for which there was no justification. Asked for a
counter-proposal he said thnt at first sight there appeared to be no alternative but
to refer back to the Un ited Nat.ions in accordance with the earlier undertaking,
unless of course Venezuela were to renounce the claim or al least to hold it in
abeyance. This would _be :in act of great statesmanship on her part. for which she
would recci,·e due credit. Mr. IJ11mha111 endorsed !IHS proposal and expr~ssed surprise
that Dr. Iribarren should prufcss such friendship while at the same time demandi ng
the cession of five-eighths of British Guiana's territory.
Dr. friharre11 said that his Government r.ei~ ted the. Britis~ proposal for
renouncing the claim for the same reasons that Bnt a111 hncl reiected his pro posal. He
wished now to propose a solution which would respect the positions of both count rie~.
CONFIDENTIAL
6430-2 1
A 2
Annex 28
4
CONFIDENTIAL
!"fei uggc
st
ed that the parties should agree to a joint administration of the territory
!n is~ute for a period of, say 10 year s, with both countries undertaking, perhaps
~n a giea ter propor t_wn for Venezuela , to provide the necessar y means for the joint
developme,n t of th!s. area. _Also: Venezuela would ag ree to collaborate in _the
evelo pmcn t of Bnli sh. Guiana itself. Venezuela . wou ld be p repared to nego tiate
suc h . an _agreen!~n~ which wou ld acknowl edge Venewelan rnve reignty over the
area m dispute. I !us was not the same prop osal as before, :is it involved ob ligation s
for Ve nezue la, who would be able to de, ·clop the area in conjunc tion with her own
developme nt prog ram me.
. Mr . B11rnl,a111 said that he could not accept the proposa l as it appeared to
mvo lve the surrender of sovereignty.
Mr. Srewar/ while praising the idea of economic collaboration, could not see
why this should be linked 10 a p0litica l questio n. He suggested that Venezuela
.shou ld set aside her terri loria l claim. so !hat jo int developm ent could go ahead.
We had already made two proposals for the solution of the politic al question;
first, to refer back to the Un ited Nat ions; secondly, that Venezuela shoiild renounce
her clai m or al least leave it in ,beyance. He umlcrlined the importance which I fer
Ma jesty's Government att ached to the peace and prosperity of former colonial
k rr ilories, e.g., in Africa: this was mo re important than questions of territor ial
extensio n.
Dr. lriharren said tha t no parallel cou ld be drawn with ~n African country;
the Essequibo territory formed part of the Venezuelan national herit age and \ms
incorporated in another country; it was as if the county of Glouceste r were occupied
by a foreign Power.
Mr. Burnham recal led that the Essequibo distric t is under the sovereignty of
Guyana and is so recognised under international law. If Venezuela challenged that
position, they must prov ide evidence to justify the ir stand. T his they had failed to
do. It was a source of great concern that a frie ndly neighbour should appear to
. ha ve expa nsionist aims. The Ve nezuela n Gov ernmen t could not deny that they were
a party to the drawing up of the frontier in i. .JOS. H e thanked Dr . I ribarren for his
offer of deve lopment assistance, bu t recalled tha t G uyana too had her ho nour and
wou ld not yield sov~reig nty as the price for buy ing economic deve lopme nt.
Dr. Iribarren expressed his Governmen t's sincere and honest desire to fi1.J a
solutio n to the prob lem whic h undeniab ly exists, and wh ich if unreso lved could
bring to both countries anti to the whole of La tin Ame ric.a serio us problems.
Th is was not a threa t, but mere ly a grasp ing of rea lity.
D r. Iribarre n then pu t forward anothe r proposa l. A mixed co mmission sh 0uld
be set up to solve the territorial controversy, to form ulate plans fo r collabo ration in
the devclop•'lcnt of Esscquiban Guyana and Br itish G uiana, and lo carry out
these plans. •If the commis sion could not reac h agree ment, they were to refer within
· thr ee mo nths to one or more mediato rs and if th ey fa iled to reach a sa tisfactory
so lution , within a pr escribed time limit, they were to have reco ur se to int ern ationa l
arbitra tion. T he T reaty setti ng up the basis for th is ar bitra tion wo uld hav e to be
concluded within 18 mo nths fro m I January, 1966. Mr. Stewart promise d to look
al this proposa l and close d the meeting.
CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 28
CONFmENTIAL
5
(2)
RECORD OF DISCUSSIOl',S BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY,
THE VENEZUELAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE PREMIER 01• BRITISH GUIANA AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE
ON 10 DECEMBER, 1965
Present:
I
I
The Right Hon. Michael Stewart, M.P.
Mr. Forbes Burnham
The Right I Ion. 'J he Lor<l Walston
Dr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges
The Venezuelan Ambassador
Dr. German Nava-Carillo
Dr. A<lolfo Taylhar<lat
Mr. S. S. Ramphal
Mr. L. A. Luckhoo
Sir Geoffrey Meade
Mr. W. I. J. Wallace
Mr. J. 0. Rennie
Mr. R. W. Piper
Mr. R. M. K. Slater
Mr. R. H. G. Edmonds
Mr. A. D. Walls
Mr. S. W. Martin
I nlerpreter
Dr. Leonardo lJiaz-Gonzale,:
General Marcos A. Morin
Father Pablo Ojer
Father Herman Connlcz
Dr. Dcrnctrio Brocsner
Interpreter
Mr . R amphal opened the meeting by recalling the circumstances leading up to
the present talks. The Agenda in prtic ular ruled out the question of discussion on
the substantive issue of the frontier, and the first question under discussion was
the validity of the 1899 Award. Discussion under Item 2 of the Agenda was
confined to this question. British Guiana could nd accept the Venezuelan
contention tl.at the 1899 Award was invalid and the propo~al put forward b:,,
Dr. Iribarre n on the preceding evening was unacceptable, as it envisaged
that a mixed commission should concern itself with ,he substantive issues which
had been specifically excluded from the scope of the present discussions arising
fro m the 1962 offer to .:xamine documents.
I
.,
Mr. Stewart recalled that the two sides had been unable to agree on the question
of the 1899 Award's validity. Venezuela had insisted that her position was right,
and Her Majesty's Government had stuck lo theirs. lie wished to look at more
constructive ideas under Hems 2 and J of the Agenda. A mixed commission to
stimulate economic development was a good idea, but such development should
not be confined to one side of the frontier. It would be better for Venezuela to leave
the argument about the Award in abeyance, and allow the parti es concerned to
concentrate on the task of economic development. He recalled that in Antarctica ,
a num ber of nations with connicting territoria l claims had agreed that these should
be frozen so that scientific work could go ahead freely and unhamp e,l!d by political
disputes .. He re~d out the terms of Article IV of the A,~tarctic Treaty. This Treaty
had received wide acceptance from a number of countries, among them , Argentina
and Chile. They had felt it consistent with their national h0nour and dignity to
leave their territorial claims aside for the time being and agree· that these would
not be prejudiced in any way by scientific activities. Our suggestion was, therefore
to take the constructive part of the Venezuelan propo sal concerning economi~
development, an? to join it with the id<':a of putting the P?lilical p1:oblem in suspense.
Furth ermore, this would preclude Guiana from prefemng a cla1111 to the territorv
which the 1899 Award had given lo Venezuela. Clear ly it would not be possible
to reach final agreement at once, and he therefore suggested that both Venezuela's
proposal and his own should be considered, and that discussions should be
continued when Lord Walston visited Caracas in January.
After a short break for private discussion Dr. Iribarren recalled that
Venezuela had come to the conference tab le to try to find a solution to the
CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 28
6
CONFrnENTJAL
~ r ~ilor\al pro~1k:111 hell,:.:cn Venezue la and the Unill'd Kin:•dom o,c 1 11rili .Ii
urnna s fr1111l1L:r. I~ wa, al?, urd lo cla i111 lha l at lliL: pr..:wnt di,c:11,, i,,11, lhL: parli •:,
sho uld lllerdy ,·on, 1~ler their 1c,p..:c1iv:.: po, i1i1>11
, . whir.;11 ,1c1L: al1•::1d) fully l, m, 1111.
~ccondly, he con, 1dc1ed lhat n:co111\c lo lhc IJnilcd Na1i1111, would hc
!napprop riatc. ·1 he prc,L:111 C<,lr,c.-.,ations had a ri,~11 from 1hc llni l(;d Na lion, and
it would be nu u~c going had ; lo 1h,·111 a,~ain. , inrc 1hc.:) had 110 powers of d,·,·i, iun.
I~ 1yould be mcirL: po\ ilil'c lo con lin11:.: cc;n,-::l'>alion~ :!n I 10 .,c~: l'.l'llllinc ,o l111io11~.
lh1 rd ly, with r~fcrc.:1,ce to lhc p1opo,a l for an /\111a1clic-1yp:,; a!J;u·111c11I. h(, cou ld
see no co nncc11011 between /\ nlan :lica and 1111~ 1!1i1i, h G uiana fronl i:.:r p1ohl.:111.
Ant arc tica was 1101 a pa rl of any nat ion·~ w, ·er,.:i•~n 1<.:nilory, while Vc11c11,cl:1\
pro '?lcm with lhe Unit<.:d K ingdo111 a111.I Hrili, h ( i11i.11w rclah'd to a parl 11f her
terri tory wron gfully occu pied by 111101 h,:: 1',1wer. ·1 his u iuld lc:"I I<• .,crio11s f1 ictinn ,
bet ween Ye11c1.ucl.1. llrili,h ( ;uia na a11d llril.iin. if no salisfaclory ~olutio n were
fou!l~l. He was sur pri,<.:d 1ha1 Mr. S11..11,111 should have s11g~•c, 1ed leaving 1h..:
pc1
hlica l prnbk m :1,idc and gi, ing allcnlion only 10 lhc q11c,1ion of 1h.:vclo,i1m:nl.
Venezuela had ,hown f!Oodwill in c11tr ri11e !he cliscu•,\ion~: I hi~ had h.::cn
sufficicnlly J<·n1011~1r:i1cd hy 1hc prop osal, which hc ha d p111 forv::ml. llut gnodll'i ll
was 11ot to be conf11~cd wilh wcak ncs, or do11bl. V.:rn.:7111.:la w,·11ld co nlinuc lo
p ress her claim. /\ uy propo~al which diJ 1101 rccognis.:: thal Vcne111cla cxlcn cbl
to th e Rh er l:~,cq11ibo would bL: un:ieceplab lc. l.ord \Vabton would hc rcccil'ed
in Caraca s as a welcome guc,1. hut he saw 110 case for cu 11lin11i11g di,c u5sio11s duri ng
his visit His own prop osal for a mixed commission pr,)\·idcd for finding solu 1in11~
by a series of conciliatn ry slagcs. and if neccs~a,y by rccou r~C' to arhitra1io11 by a n
impart ial inll.:rnalional body. Vcnczucl:i's willingness lo submit lo :in arbi tral ion
tri buna l rcpre. cnled :i great co ncession on her part.
Mr . S te1rnrt pointed oul !hat the proposal for a mixed commi ~<ion difk rcd
from his own in tha! the former em is,!gcd the complete acceplance of !he
Yene:wclan view on !he /\ward 's valiclily, whe reas hi~ propos:il mer<'ly froze cl:iims
on bolh sides. :ind did not require Vencwc la to abando n h.:r positio n. If !he
V<·newel an case were accepted it would destroy failh generally in inlcrnat io,ia l
awards and procedures. Wha l f;,ith could ther e he in lhese procedures. if awards
could be set aside becaus.: of unpro ven allega lions raised nrnny ycars aflcrwards'!
The Antarc tic Treaty w:is relevant , since there, as in British Guiana, a pra ctica l
job of work had lo be done. Collaboralion in rcmed:"ing economic backw ar dnc~s
in Brilish Gu iana was in evcryhod:-,•s inlcresl. He re;m::lt<'d 1ha1 iii~ prop cisal h,td
been turn ed down so promp 11~, and without furlhcr considcra lion in Caracas. But
if thal was thc position. wc would ha,c to inform the Unite I N.~lions. in accor ,la ncc
with o ur obligalions, that we had sough t solution s in vain. Furlh cr discL.s~ion
there •11ight 1hrow 11p ideas which would make it easier for us a ftcrn ards to resum e
our search for a sal isfaclory ~ol111ion. The serious frictions to which Dr. l riharr .;:n
had alluded were an add itional reason for keeping the United Nations informed .
Mr . /Jum lr/1111 said it had never been his undcrslandi ng thar !he terri tor ial
claim would be discussed unless the invalidity of th..: 1899 /\ward had first bcc n
cstabli ~hed. If \lcnc,:ue la though t thal the United Na tions were not compet ent
to considcr the qucs lion. why did ~he take it there in the first place? Hew .is grateful
for the offer of cconc,mi..: help. but he f<1
11nd this inco nsistent wilh the de m:.1nd for
the surrend er of five-1,;ighlhs of Brilish Guia na . There could be no peaceful relation s
between Venezuela and British Guiana in these circumstances. If talk s were to
be contin ued, he would find bolh London and Caracas unacceptable places.
Dr . Jriharren ar~ucd that some arbi tral awards co uld he defective, and th e
declaratio n of invalid ity of one such award would not undermine the validity of
others. Nor was it right to ~ay that Venezuela had dou bts ,:bqut .the usefulnes s of
the Un ited Nations. But the United Nations were not a court, a·nd th ey had 110 .
power of decision. The dispute had a lre~d¥ gone beyond that stage. He argued the
value of his proposal for a mixed comm1ss1on.
After a further interval. it was decided that the present d iscussions sho uld be
continu ed in Ge neva in !he week beginning 13 Februar y, 1966, at Min isterial level.
They would conlinue on the basis of the existing Agenda, but with out Hem I which
had already been disposed of. Th e propo sed time and place were accepted by
Mr . Burnham. JI was also agreed that other prop osals, beside tho se put forward at
these meetings, would also be presented and discussed .
Th e rest of the meeting was de voted to discussion of the joint communiqu e
(al Annex).
CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 28
C(f ' I IIH , ·1 IAJ,
7
JOI '.'{! C<J\/4 :.1H;. l<JL I.
In accor dance with what !lad been avrccrl in 1h_ joint cnmmuni 1,,·.: of
7 1:'lc_,vcmht r. 1% 3, tall \ l•H,k pla<.c in L•mrlo11 ,,n 'J ;.nd Ill (Jc,. ~mh::r h:l? ,•.:.:11 th::
M1111\lcr of l-c11c1P11 Aff:,i1•, of Vt nc111tl:t on tl,c • 1! -; i·k ;,n,; ti1c I r,rci;m Set ;l,,ry
of the Uuiled Kin;-do111 and the l' n.n,11..r ,,f Bri1i·.lt (i ..1ia 1,.i <m the 01hcr <111 the
ba:,is of the foll1,wing a;•c11rla :
A;\<·nda for lh c co•1ti 1111:1lion HI \J i11i, k rial lcn ·I ,,r g')\'Cn!l11'm tal CCHJ\V , ::ti1111\
co11c1:ru i11;: t he 1·1mtr<111·r\y IJ1·t\\ ~Cn \c 111:m :·la :111d till'
i 11it_cd
l( in;:do m cn cr Ilic fro ntier with llr ili, lt ( , 11ian:i. in acco rdance ,•,ith
t he ju i11t cCJmm1111ic1uc c,f 7 , ,n ·cmhcr, I 9(i3
(i) E, r-hanpc 11f , icw\ on the experts' report on th•. c~;,min:,1;,,11 _of
document \ :iml di,c u, , ion\ nf lhl: co n,equcnce\ rcw ltin;; thc~cfrom. :-.1:cc•,\Jl:,'
of rc\o lvin,? the di\ pulc.
(ii ) To ~eek ~ati,factm'} ,o luti<,n~ for th-:: praci it;al ~
.lli t m :nt of I :1c
controver,y which h:1, ari,cn a\ a rc, 11!t of the Venczuc!i,n c<mt::ntion that the
1899 Award b null am! void.
/iii) Concrete plan~ fnr col!almration in the de, elopment of Hriti\ h
Gui ana.
livJ Determination of 1in1c limit~ for the fulfilment of whate\'er may be
agreed with reference tn points !. 2 and 3 above.
(v) Joint 1:0111n111niquc: on the present talks.
2. Jn add ition to con\idcr ing the c:-:pert~• reports on the ,!ocumen ta ry .11alcrial
re!atin~ to the /\ rhitr:tlinn /\ ward of t::i•J9. the Ministers considered ways an d
means nf putting an end to the cont roversy which threaten, to darr.a~c: the
tra dition::!!v cordial rc:!atinn~ between Vcn~z11 la on the one h:ind and the li n;tcd
Kingdom a·nd Briti\ h uui ana oi , the other .
3. Iden~ and propo~als for a practical ~ett lcmcr t of the controv ersy were
exch:111i•ed. It wa\ a~rccd that some of these ~hou!d recehe furt her considerati on
and that the :,1ini~lcr~ ~hou!d co ntinue tl•e present discu,sions in the week sta rting
13 Fchrua ry. I % (,, al Gencva in order to consider tho,.: pro;,osals as we!! as others
tha t might h: \u ~gc\ted under the above a:;enUa. Neither side ha•:in;; been able to
accept the 1.:•melu\ iun\ of the expert, appointed by the other sidc. Item I wili
therefore not be con,idcre:1. It was further agreed that prep,,rat ory talk : between
ollicials ~hould ~tar t al an early da te.
4. The text of thi~ w mmun iquc will be made availab le to th e Secrela ry­
Genera ! of the United Na tions.
Foreign Office, l ,011do11, S .W. I,
JO lJ l'Cl'!ll her , /965.
CONFIDENTIAL
Annex 29
Government of the United Kingdom, Draft Agreement for the Establishment of a Mixed
Commission (14 Jan. 1966)
Annex 29
Annex 29
Annex 29
Annex 29
Annex 29
Annex 29
Annex 30
Telegram from the Governor of British Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies of the
United Kingdom, No. 93A (3 Feb. 1966)
Annex 30
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES
FROM BRITISH GUIANA (Sir R. Luyt)
Cypher
D. 3rd February 1966
R. 4th
11
11
11,15 hrs.
R .
_. ·, ,,, 1
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
f
•
<>·
>.
1
No, 93A
Following for Piper.
Venezuelan Boundary.
The Foreign Office draft agreement for the
establishment
of mixed commission incorporating
the Antarctic
concept of freezing
territorial
claims which it is proposed
to make available
for presentation
at the forthcoming Geneva
talks, was given to Ramphal who, for practical
purposes,
is
now in charge of Department of External Affairs.
Ramphal
was requested
to invite the Government to comment on the
draft and to consider what fall-back
position might be
adopted
if, as seemed probable the Venezuelans turned down the
Antarctic
proposal.
It was suggested to Ramphal that the
inclusion
of the second item on the agenda of the Ministerial
talks in December as an additional paragraph in Article 3 of
the draft a~reement might go some way towards satisfying
the
Venezuelans
demand for machinery to continue the search for
solutions
to the "political
controversy".
2.
I have been informed today, 3rd February,
that this
Government concurs with the proposal that a draft agreement to
implement an "Antarctic
type" solution should be available
for
presentation
at the conference and, subject to the following
qualifications,
considers
that the Foreign Office draft is
suitable
for this purpose.
3,
Preamble.
For the words
11
poli tical problems" in the
final paragraph of the preamble substitute
the word "controversy"
.
My Government considers
that this word (already agreed in the context
or item 2 of the agendai is more apt to describe the difference
of view between Venezue a and British Guiana than the expression
"political
problems".
4,
Article
2, Assuming that the agreement is signed in .
Geneva in mid-February the mixed commission must be appointed
not later than mid-April, 1966. This is approximately only six
weeks before Guyana's independence, and it is perhaps unlikely
that the commission will do any work within that period.
Nevertheless,
an arrangement under which during the period
of six weeks, there will be only one British Guiana representative
on a commission of four will not be satisfactory.
This government
,
/is
CONflDENTIAL
Annex 30
CONF IDE NTIAL
is particularly
concerned lest it leaves itself open to
criticism that for the initial period of six weeks it is
possible for proposals to be put to the commission by the United Kingdom Representative without this Government's
concurrence and for the United Kingdom Representative,
without such concurrence. to record hie agreement with propoea1 8
also
put forward by the Venezuelan representatives.
Government expects it to be the case, as in the discussions
While this
with the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, that the United Kingdom
and British Guiana representatives
will only act in accordance
with a joint brief,
it considers it to be necessary to be able
to answer the criticism that it has concurred in arrangements
which leave British Guiana in a minority position prior to
independence.
It ia proposed, therefore,
that there should be
an exchange of letters between the British Government and this
Government to be signed contemporaneously with the agreement
in which the British Government will acknowledge that prior
to Guyana's independence no proposal will be advanced before
the aixed co11D1ission by the British Government's representative
and no stand will be taken by him with respect to Venezuelan
proposal except with concurrence of the British Guiana Government
or the British Guiana representative.
This undertaking should
be mentioned at the conference and it should be agreed that the
British Guiana Government may publish or refer publicly to the
l
exchange of letters when giving publicity to the agreement.
5.
Article 3. In paragraph (a), delete -
(1) the word "Eastern" in the second line•
(11) the words "including exploration,
sur;eye, and
joint participation
in exploitation"
fourth and fifth lines.
in the third,
As indicated at the London meeting the British Guiana Government
does not wish to isolate the area claimed by Venezuela as the
area in British Guiana to be developed Thi h b
into account in the dratting ot
talc
reference to "Eastern Venezuel ,,P~ragraph a but we feel that
•
( e) ae een
en
likely to lead to a proposal ba V n
th
e paragraph might be
reference to Guyana Eeeequibo Y I~nezuelane tor corresponding
circumstances to make a joint.reterseeme
better in all the
both countries and leave it to th ence to the development ot
proposals for development ot
8
ec~tcommission to put up
it is considered that the word~ ,,
1
1
~ areaa. In addition,
and joint participation
in exploit:~
1
ud~ng eroloration,
connotations ot joint ownerehi
surveys,
on ot the area carries
O
it is important to avoid. The~e f ~~ntrol Which it is considered
'
to create political difficulties
c.
h: er words are also likely
to criticism on the ground that it re f1d expose the Government
sovereignty - even though a liter con emplated a surrender of
words does not justify this criti~i interpretation
nothing by the omission ot the wordsm. Paragraph (a) "1.oees
ot the
to eee them deleted.
8
and this GoverI1J1ent wishes
/6.
~l>CNTIAL
---
Annex 30
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
T O T HE SECRETARY OF STATE FO R THE COLONIES
6.
A fall-back
Thie Government recognises
position.
the
value of having in reserve a fall -back position
to meet a
that the mixed commission does not provide
Venezuelan contention
machinery for continuing the search for solutions
to the
11
polit1cal controversy".
It is not considered that it should go
in this regard than agreeing to an inclusion
further
in Article 3
of an additional paragraph, perhaps numbered (a) (with consequential
re-numbering),
in the following terms -
" (a) The search for satisfactory
solution for the practical
of the controversy which has arisen as a
settlement
result of the Venezuelan contention
that the 1899
award is null and void."
It will be recognised that this paragraph is in terms
of item 2 of the agenda and this Government believes
that it
should satisfy Venezuela's demand in that it provides machinery
for a continuation
of the discussions on the political
question
to those in which that question was formulated
in terms identical
for the purposes of the tripartite
meeting itself.
Further
is being given to the desirability
consideration
of overcoming
Venezuelan resistance
to the agreement by a modification
of
Article VI with a view to either reducing the period of
moratorium or departing altogether from the concept of a fixed
period . The British Guiana Government naturally favours the
former of these two alternatives,
but wishes to give further
consideration
to the question,
The Prime Minister has enquired whether there is
7,
any truth in press report that the Venezuelans will only be
sending their second 11 to Geneva. He made it clear that he
would not attend a meeting unless the Venezuelans fielded their
first team.
I have told him I feel sure the press report, the
provenance of which I cannot at present discover,
is inaccurate,
but I should be grateful
for your confirmation.
Copy sent to: Foreign

Office
Mr. S, Martin
CONPIDENTIAL
Annex 31
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom,
and Prime Minister of British Guiana, Joint Statement on the Ministerial Conversations from
Geneva on 16 and 17 February 1966 (17 Feb. 1966) reprinted in Republic of Venezuela,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 31
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLAIM
OF
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTS
1962 – 1981

CARACAS, 1981
p72
Annex 31
JOINT STATEMENT ON THE MINISTERIAL CONVERSATIONS FROM GENEVA ON 16 AND 17 FEBRUARY
1966, BETWEEN DR. IGNACIO IRIBARREN BORGES, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF VENEZUELA
AND THE HON. MICHAEL STEWART, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE
HON. L. FORBES S. BURNHAM, PRIME MINISTER OF BRITISH GUIANA.
In accordance with everything agreed upon in the Join Statement from 10 December 1965, conversation
have taken place in the Palace of the United Nations in Geneva during the 16 and 17 February between
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, on the one hand, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
of United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of British Guiana, on the other, in order to continue at a
ministerial level the governmental discussions on the relations between Venezuela and British Guiana.
An exchange of views and suggestions took place for the practical solution of the pending issues. These
discussions were of a friendly nature and showcased the understanding which has always been
characteristic of the relations between the participating Governments.
As a consequence of the deliberations an agreement was reached whose stipulations will enable a
definitive solution for these problems. The Governments have agreed to submit the text of the
agreement to the Secretary General of the United Nations.
The agreement has been welcomed by the Ministers of the three countries since it provides the means
to resolve the dispute which was harming relations between two neighbours and contains a basis of
good will for future cooperation between Venezuela and British Guiana.
Geneva, 17 February 1966.

Annex 31
r
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
RECLAMACION
DE LA
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTOS
1962 · 1981
CARACAS, 1981
Annex 31
COMUNICADO CONJUNTO SOBRE LAS CONVERSACIONES MINIS­
TERIALES CELEBRADAS EN GINEBRA EL 16 Y 17 DE FEBRERO
DE 1966, ENTRE EL DR. IGNACIO IRIBARREN BORGES, MINISTRO
DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE VENEZUELA, EL HON. MI­
CHAEL STEW ART, MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DEL
REINO UNIDO, Y EL HON. L. FORBES S. BURNHAM, PRIMER
MINISTRO DE GUAYANA BRITANICA.
De conformidad con lo acordado en el Comunicado Conjunto del 10
de diciembre de 1965, se han celebrado conversaciones en el Palacio de
las Naciones, en Ginebra" los días 16 y 17 de febrero entre el Ministro
de Relaciones Exteriores de Venezuela, por una parte, y el Secretario de
Estado para Asuntos Extranjeros del Reino Unido y el Primer Ministro
de la Guayana Británica, por la otra, para continuar a nivel ministerial
las conversaciones gubernativas sobre las relaciones entre Venezuela y
Guayana Británica.
Se procedió al intercambio de ideas y propuestas para el arreglo prác­
tico de los problemas pendientes. Estas conversaciones se realizaron con
el espíritu de cordialidad y comprensión que caracteriza las relaciones
entre los Go biemos participantes en ellas.
Como consecuencia de las deliberaciones se suscribió un acuerdo cuyas
estipulaciones permitirán llegar a la solución definitiva de estos prob1emas.
Los Gobiernos han convenido en elevar el texto de dicho acuerdo al
conocimiento del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas.
El acuerdo ha sido bien acogido por los Ministros de los tres Gobier­
nos en cuanto provee los medios de resolver una disputa, que amenazaba
dañar las relaciones entre dos vecinos y cqntiene las "bases de buena
voluntad para la futura cooperación de Venezuela y Guyana.
Ginebra, 17 de febrero de 1966.
72
Annex 32
Note Verbale from the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom to the U.K. Ambassador to
Venezuela, No. AV 1081/116 (25 Feb. 1966)
Annex 32
Annex 32
Annex 32
Annex 32
Annex 32
Annex 32
Annex 32
Annex 33
Statement by Dr. I. Iribarren Borges, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, to the National
Congress of Venezuela (17 Mar. 1966), reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 33
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLAIM
OF
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTS
1962 – 1981

CARACAS, 1981
p77-101
1
Annex 33
STATEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS BY DR IGNACIO IRIBARREN BORGES, MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS ON THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, 17 MARCH 1966.
BILL RATIFYING THE GENEVA AGREEMENT
President of the National Congress
Vice-President of the National Congress
Congress attendees:
It is an honour and a privilege for me to have been offered this opportunity to address the Sovereign
Congress of the Republic on the important issue that I will set out.
I have divided my presentation into two parts:
1. Procedures previous to the Geneva Agreement.
2. The Geneva Agreement.
PROCEDURES PREVIOUS TO THE GENEVA AGREEMENT
Unilateral rejection of the Award.
The attitude of the Government and the people of Venezuela before the Arbitral Award from 3 October
1899 which claimed to mark the borderline between our country and British Guiana should not come as
news to you.
After learning of the flaws in both form and content which affected that decision, the Venezuelan
Chancellery came to the conclusion that it could legally invoke its invalidity. The painful political, economic
and military circumstances our country was going through at the time stopped our National Government
from taking their categorical rejection any further.
After the darkness of the colonial era, hope was rekindled such that one day the injustice we had been
suffering would be rectified.
For several years that hope seeped into the declarations of our Venezuelan State, each time more
categorical and clearer than before with respect to that Arbitral Award. Nonetheless, however solid and
convincing the Venezuelan argument was, United Kingdom still would not enter negotiations whose aim
would be the revision of the Award which they considered intangible.
Beginnings of bilateral negotiations
We maintained the unilateral nature of our claim until in November 1962, my predecessor in the
Chancellery, Dr Marcos Falcón Briceño, after presenting our thesis in detail before the Special Political
Committee at the General Assembly of the United Nations, managed to come to an agreement with Great
Britain to carry out a tripartite examination of the documentation related to the issue. This Agreement
2
Annex 33
was noted in the Declaration of the President of the Special Political Committee on 16 November that
same year.
The transcendental value of the agreement is undeniable as it represents the starting point of a long
bilateral process which will unfailingly lead to the revision of the so-called Award of 1899.
However, it is important to stop and observe the British position at the point at which it agreed to treat
with Venezuela on this question.
The Representative of the United Kingdom, C. T. Crowe, after trying to refute the views of the Venezuelan
Chancellor, said the following:
“I hope I have convinced the members of the Committee that if international law and freely concluded
agreements are to be respected, then the borderline issue between British Guiana and Venezuela should
not have been brought for consideration at the United Nations”.
After referring to the examination the British experts had carried out on the documentation related to the
issue which in their opinion led to conclusion that the question could not be reopened, he then concluded:
“Therefore, I have been authorised to say that my Government, fully endorsed by the Government of
British Guiana, is willing to deal with the Government of Venezuela through our respective diplomatic
channels, the arrangements for a tripartite examination, i.e. Venezuela, British Guiana and United
Kingdom, on the extensive documentation pertinent to this question”.
The British offer was accepted by Venezuela and it led to an agreement on the examination of the
documentation relating to the so-called Award of 1899.
One might wonder why Venezuela accepted the participation of the Government of British Guiana in the
discussions, the latter not yet being independent.
It must be observed that the conversations were to take place between Venezuela and United Kingdom
in consultation with British Guiana and therefore the participation of the Government of Georgetown
would not be equivalent to that of the two sovereign countries as the subjects of the dispute. On the other
hand, our Government, given its unwavering anticolonial position always favoured the presence of the
colony in those discussions affecting its territorial area. Our diplomacy was playing a clean game and so
they had nothing to fear from representatives of the colony. When diplomats turn to shady deals they try
to carry them out, as Venezuela itself suffered and sadly experienced through the Arbitral Award of 1899,
behind people’s backs, whether free or dependent.
I want to highlight the fact that since 1962 (that is since the very beginning of the diplomatic process
leading to the Geneva Agreement) these conversations have had a tripartite character in the way I
explained in the previous paragraph.
Before getting ahead, it is useful to remember that the concluded agreement in the Headquarters of the
United Nations in 1962 aimed at the examination of the documentation even though Great Britain did not
3
Annex 33
accept the examination of the essence of the problem: the revision of the decision of the Tribunal from
1899. Mr Crowe referred to this very clearly in the intervention already mentioned:
“By extending this offer, I also want to make it clear that it is not an offer to start having discussions on
the basis of the borderline revision. This cannot be done since we consider it unjustifiable”.
I conclude by saying that since said agreement did not specify the level at which the conversations were
to take place, United Kingdom tried to belittle it. The Venezuelan Government insisted on taking this
negotiation to the highest level of government in order to achieve the revision of the Tribunal’s decision.
In order to meet these goals it was deemed necessary to break the obvious reluctance of the British
Government. In March 1963 Great Britain tried to have these conversations at an academic level among
experts but Venezuela expressed clearly that it would not enter conversations unless United Kingdom
would commit beforehand to discussing the question at a ministerial level, much against all those who
thought this would be impossible. Venezuela kept adding pressure until the United Kingdom accepted
that discussions were to be split into two stages: first at an expert level and second at a high ministerial
level.
Great Britain could no longer doubt the firmness of the Venezuelan claim. The President of the Republic,
Mr. Rómulo Betancourt, in his message to the National Congress, on 12 March 1962, declared:
“The disagreement between a weak Venezuela and an arrogant Albion from the Victorian era was
resolved through an award - iniquitous and unacceptable, and always rejected by Venezuela, produced
by a political tribunal and not a legal one, through a decision on 3 October 1899. Venezuela has never, nor
will it ever, admit that such a large portion of its legitimate territory stop being part of its geography”.
First Conference in London
The first meeting between Ministers took place in London in November 1963. The Venezuelan and British
delegations were led by Dr. Marcos Falcón Briceño and Hon. R. A. Butler, respectively. Governor Sir Ralph
Grey was the representative of British Guiana. On that occasion Venezuela took the discussion to the heart
of the issue by presenting its point of view in an Aide-Memoire, dated 5 November in which after summing
up the arguments for Venezuela’s rejection of the Award of 1899, finishes with the following categorical
position:
“Historical truth and justice demand Venezuela claim the total return of the land of which it was
dispossessed, to this end it counts on the good will and cooperation of the Government of Her Majesty.”.
On the part of Great Britain, they reiterated their criteria already mentioned by their Representative Mr.
C. T. Crowe rejecting the Venezuelan arguments and considering the Award of 1899 untouchable and as
a “full, final and definitive arrangement”. These two positions have been running in parallel throughout
the current negotiation up until the opening session of the Geneva Conference.
Some progress for Venezuela can be seen in the aforementioned meeting in London in November 1963,
according to the Joint Statement. In effect, after referring to the reports that the experts were to present
4
Annex 33
to their respective Governments, it states: “These reports will be used as a basis for future discussions
between Governments”. That led us to believe that future discussions would deal with the fundamental
issue at a governmental level.
Venezuela was eager to reclaim its legitimate territory and that can be heard in the words of the then
President of the Republic, Mr. Rómulo Betancourt, who in his message to the National Congress, on 7
March 1964, taking into account the conversations that took place in London, said:
“The negotiations have resumed in order to right the wrong and repair the injustice Venezuela suffered
from and they must continue. The result should be the return of the territory which both historically and
legally never stopped being Venezuelan. This claim by Venezuela over an area which is legitimately ours
does not impede in any way the aspiration of independence of British Guiana, which we hereby fully
endorse given our proud anticolonial position dating back to the day when this Nation came out as
Sovereign shaking off its foreign tutelage”.
When the first phase of the discussions between the British and Venezuelan experts was over, with the
participation of British Guiana, during the first half of 1964 and once the reports were exchanged on 3
August 1965, the negotiations moved towards the Ministerial meeting which took place in December 1965
in London.
During that period, the Chancellery reiterated on several occasions its arguments on the nullity of said
Award from 1899, highlighting that there was a disagreement which threatened the relations of Great
Britain and Venezuela, and further added that the Ministerial conversations had to tackle the fundamental
issue. However, in several declarations of the Prime Ministers of British Guiana, Mr. Jagan and Mr.
Burnham were not willing to discuss the line of the Award as they did not recognize the border conflict
since they considered it resolved in 1899. The Venezuelan Chancellery, consistent with its claim over
Guayana Esequiba, protested some alleged concessions by the Government of British Guiana for oil
drilling in the territory west of the Essequibo River.
Consistent with the Venezuelan position with respect to the nullity of the Award from 1899, the
Chancellery took several initiatives, among which was the editing of the map of the Republic with an
indication to the “Zone under Claim” [Zona en Reclamación] and the issuing of postage stamps referring
to this issue.
These measures were contested by the British Government which kept reiterating its position over the
untouchable nature of the Award. As a result, in a note dated 4 March 1965, with reference to that map,
they said:
“The embassy has been instructed to state that the Government of Her Majesty cannot accept the
borderline marking of the Venezuelan Government or any other object which might dispute the
Sovereignty of the Government of Her Majesty over said area of British Guiana. Her Majesty´s
Government has no doubts over its sovereignty over this territory and it reserves its rights on this matter”.
5
Annex 33
In response, we reaffirmed the criteria through which “the map in question, published by the Dirección
de Cartografía Nacional [National Cartography Agency] from the Ministry of Public Works is no other than
a graphic expression of all our reiterated declarations which have been formulated publicly by the
Venezuelan Chancellery and which are well known by the British Government since we deem the award
from 3 October 1899 void and, therefore, Venezuela reserves its rights over the territory Guayana
Esequiba of which it was unjustly dispossessed.
The British position just before the exchange of the experts’ reports, i. e. on 2 August 1965, was made
clear to the Parliament by Mr. Padley, Parliamentary Secretary of the Foreign Office:
“The frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana was settled by an Arbitration Tribunal in 1899, in
accordance with the terms of a Treaty signed in 1897 between the United Kingdom and Venezuela. Under
Article XIII of this Treaty, both sides undertook to accept the Tribunal's Award as a ‘full, perfect and final
settlement’. The Venezuelan Government allege that the 1899 Award is invalid and in May, 1962, they
informed Her Majesty's Government of their intention to claim part of British Guiana. When the question
was raised at the United Nations later that year, the United Kingdom representative, while insisting that
the matter was res judicata, offered to arrange for an examination of documentary material relating to
the Award in order to satisfy the Venezuelans that they had not been the victims of injustice. This
examination of documents has now been completed and the results are to be reviewed by the
Governments. It remains the position of Her Majesty's Government that the whole question was settled
once and for all by the Arbitration Tribunal in 1899. This is also the position of the Government of British
Guiana.”.
The exchange of the experts’ reports took place on 3 October 1965. After presenting the Venezuelan
report to the British Government, the Ambassador in London expressed his satisfaction on the “fruitful
end of the technical studies” and in a note from 7 September, he also expressed the unwavering and
traditional position of Venezuela:
“The Venezuelan position with respect to the issue has been made very clear. Venezuela has declared that
it does not recognize the Arbitral Award of 1899 as a final and definitive arrangement on the issue with
United Kingdom and presented the Honourable Government of Her Majesty the desire to reconsider the
rectification of the injustice from which the Venezuelan people have suffered, at the most unfortunate
time which our people cannot forget and we hope to achieve a solution which takes into account the
legitimate interests of our country and those of the people of British Guiana”.
The British Government replied to this note to the note from 3 August and they reaffirmed once again the
initial position they had adopted in 1962 by reproducing the words of its Representative at the Special
Political Committee, previously mentioned, saying that the suggestion for the examination of the
documentation “was not an offer to enter into discussions about the basis of the borderline revision” but
“to clear any doubts that the Venezuelan Government could still have about the validity or justice of the
Arbitral Award”.
It was evident that Great Britain was reluctant to enter discussions regarding the fundamental issue of
such a serious topic. They seemingly kept describing the Venezuelan claim as unfounded and they were
6
Annex 33
only willing to engage in an academic discussion which would not be conducive to an arrangement over
the old issue. It was necessary for me to address, under the instructions of the President of the Republic,
Dr. Raúl Leoni, my country through both a radio station and TV on 16 September 1965 to declare
categorically that “if Venezuela undertook the diplomatic way, it was not with the intention of being
satisfied with an academic discussion”. Furthermore, “Our Government would not be a serious one if we
just entertained the sterile academic debate gravitating around semantics of old texts instead of looking
into this matter as a transcendental one as it is the usurpation of 150,000 square kilometres of national
territory”.
Our position was made clear then. We would not go to a Ministerial conference to deal with discussions
which would not tackle the basis of the problem: the revision of the Award of 1899.
The independence of British Guiana
Before continuing on this topic, explaining the conflicting views of the United Kingdom and Venezuela
over this dispute, I must refer to the fact, in many ways a happy one, of the coming independence of
British Guiana.
For a long time, the Chancellery had been warning against the immediacy of this event if preparations
were not taken for the internal and external order of that affected colony. It was clearly evident that our
traditional claim had to be renewed with strength as the date neared, since it was our intention to make
it very clear that our issue with United Kingdom, cause of the borderline issue, would not come to an end
through the independence of British Guiana but through a satisfactory solution for Venezuela. In this
respect, the Chancellery has issued clear statements related to the territorial issue.
We have, time after time, repeated the principle through which any change in status in the colony British
Guiana will not affect Venezuela’s territorial claim.
Furthermore, at the initiative of Venezuela, and some other countries, the following words were included
in the Washington Act, passed by the First Extraordinary American Conference celebrated in December
1964:
“The Council of the Organization will not make any decisions on an application for admission submitted
by a political entity whose territory is subject, whether totally or partially and before the date of this
resolution, to litigation or a claim between an extra-continental country and one or more Member States
of the American States up until an end is put to the issue through a peaceful procedure”.
We have also upheld the principle that our Guyanese issue entails a problem of a territory being occupied
by an external power, breaching paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) of the United Nations:
“Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”.
To this end, I formulated an explicit declaration before the United Nations on 6 October 1965:
7
Annex 33
“These territories cannot escape the corrective action of history. We must insist, as it has been done
before in the solutions reached by the Interamerican conferences, in the distinction between colonies and
occupied territories. The former must obtain their independence through the application of the
application of the principle of self-determination. However, the latter, those colonial territories which
have been stolen from other States have no other way to decolonize than the reintegration back into the
State of which it was part. Not to make this distinction would admit that one could distort the principle of
self-determination in order to enshrine a factual situation in ignorance of the fundamental principle -
respect of the territorial integrity of the State”.
On the occasion of the Conference celebrated in London in November 1965 on the Independence of
British Guiana I submitted a note for the British Government, dated 3 November, in which I expressed the
following:
“My Government wishes to place on the record that we would consider it an unfriendly act on the side of
the Government of Her Majesty if any transfer of sovereignty took place over the territory claimed by
Venezuela, a transfer which could only generate rights where ceded by the Government that legitimately
held them”.
Second Conference in London
From all of the above, one can understand the interest of the Venezuelan Government that the agenda,
which was to govern the conversations in London, included its views on the essence and nature of the
problem. After long negotiations carried out by our Ambassador in London, from October to December
1965, an agenda was agreed upon which favoured our position considerably.
In fact, even the title which defines the nature of the talks, states that their aim is “the controversy
between Venezuela and United Kingdom”.
This acknowledgement about the existence of a controversy “over the frontier with British Guiana” is
reaffirmed by admitting in the first point “the need to solve the dispute”.
Furthermore, in order to remove any doubts about the nature of the discussions which could not now be
reduced to a mere academic examination, point two of the agenda revolves around “seeking satisfactory
solutions for the practical solution of the controversy which arise as a result of the Venezuelan contention
of the Award of 1899 as null and void”.
What is more, the fourth point reinforces this interpretation by stating “the determination of deadlines”
for the solutions to be reached.
It was then clear that the British position had already changed since the start of this process in 1962. What
was agreed upon in the agenda was significantly different from the first offer formulated by its
Representative Mr. Crowe who was only willing to examine the documentation related to the Award of
1899.
8
Annex 33
In compliance with said agenda we travelled to London to discuss the current issue and try to seek a
satisfactory solution with the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Great Britain, the Hon. Michael Stewart and
the Prime Minister of British Guiana, the Hon. Forbes Burnham. Our meetings were held on 9 and 10
December 1965.
During the first session I presented the view of the Venezuelan Government on the British Experts report.
“The Venezuelan Government has examined the British Experts´ report in detail and has reached the
conclusion that its findings are unacceptable”.
Later I added:
“The flaws in both the content and form of the British experts’ report were not expected by the
Venezuelan Government. These are sufficient to justify the note of Your Excellency AV1081/75, on 3
August 1965 in which it states that said report “does not necessarily represent the opinion of the
Government of Her British Majesty on any of the points discussed”.
I listed some of the flaws in its content and form, concluding:
“Far from persuading my Government that its claim lacks basis, the report of the British experts has
convinced us of the unshakeable firmness of its position”.
And then I concluded:
“The Government of Venezuelan is convinced that the satisfactory solution to the border issue with British
Guiana consists in returning the Territory that legally belongs to her. Consequently, we consider that the
marking of the legitimate borderline must be agreed upon between Venezuela and British Guiana”.
I will not list each of the points from the discussion that arose as a result of the British rejection of the first
proposal of Venezuela, which was countered by a proposal that Venezuela should, in an “act of
statesmanship and courage”, renounce its claim. I then formulated a second Venezuelan proposal
whereby over a period of time there could be a joint administration of the territory claimed by Venezuela,
so long as our sovereignty over the territory was recognized. This proposal was also rejected. Finally, in
an attempt to seek a respectable solution to this problem I put forward a third Venezuelan proposal that
would lead to the solution for the borderline issue in three consecutive stages, each with their respective
timeframe, with the requirement that there had to be an end to the process: a) a Mixed Commission b)
Mediation c) International Arbitration.
This last proposal found the strongest resistance from Great Britain and British Guiana which persisted in
maintaining the validity of the Award of 1899 and rejected the existence of a territorial dispute between
Venezuela and United Kingdom over the frontier with British Guiana.
The British counter proposal was limited to reproducing some ideas from Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty
which applied to our matter would encourage economic development on both sides of the line of the
Award while the two neighbouring countries agreed not to pressure each other for 30 years in their
9
Annex 33
respective claims. At the same time, they insisted in that there was no other solution but to take the
question back to the United Nations and inform it of the result of the examination of the documents.
After studying that proposal, the Venezuelan delegation unanimously agreed to reject it. Once the debate
was reopened I said taking this matter to the United Nations again would have the same result as before
as they could not do anything but urge the concerned parties to resume discussions as we had been doing
all along. With respect to the Antarctic Treaty I declared:
“I find no connection between the case of the Antarctic and our issue with United Kingdom. The Antarctic
is not part of the national or territorial unity of several signatory States of that Treaty as is the case with
Great Britain. Instead, Venezuela’s problem with United Kingdom over British Guiana relates to a Territory
which is part of Venezuelan Territory. It is located on the very border of British Guiana with Venezuela, it
is not an overseas territory. Therefore, this issue cannot be solved through the Antarctic Treaty; it is an
issue which if left unsolved will continue to cause frictions between Venezuela, Great Britain and British
Guiana”.
I noted that Venezuela could not accept any attempts to circumvent this legal-political borderline issue to
treat it just as an economic problem derived from the underdevelopment of Guayana Essequiba, for which
Great Britain was specifically responsible. The position of Venezuela was made clear in the following:
“To conclude I would like to make it very clear that Venezuela has come to this conference with the best
intentions, confirmed by the proposals we have formulated, specially the one from yesterday. That good
will of Venezuela must not be confused with weakness or doubt over its firm position. Venezuela will
continue claiming with all firmness the Venezuelan Territory which reaches out to the Essequibo River.
Our country does not accept any acts or decisions that led to dispossession”.
At first sight, one could clearly appreciate the impossibility of finishing an examination of the proposals
during the remaining half a day of the Conference. However, having rejected a British proposal to continue
the discussions with Lord Walston when he was to visit Caracas in January 1966, we agreed to hold
another meeting of the same Ministerial Conference in Geneva in the coming month of February, as was
subsequently expressed in the Joint Statement of the Conference in London issued on 10 December 1965.
It must be noted that in this document, Great Britain and British Guiana recognize that the issue
“threatens to ruin the traditionally friendly relations between Venezuela on the one hand and United
Kingdom and British Guiana on the other”. Further, by eliminating the examination of the documents from
the agenda for the Conference of Geneva the discussion focused fully on “seeking satisfactory solutions
for the practical arrangement of the controversy”.
The Geneva Conference
The Parliamentary Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Lord Walston, visited Venezuela in January. In reply
to journalists’ questions he declared the position that Great Britain was to adopt at the Geneva
Conference:
10
Annex 33
“It will take a friendly and receptive position, we will discuss the problem in a diplomatic way and you can
rest assured a decision will be made in that or a future meeting on this matter” (El Universal, 11/1/1966).
After the press release, and having heard some statements from Lord Walston and other senior
functionaries, that the Geneva Conference would focus on economic help for British Guiana with no
obligation to discuss the Venezuela claim, on 4 February, I was instructed by the President of the Republic
to receive the British Ambassador to express the concern of the Chancellery in light of those statements.
They were against the commitment of their country as agreed on the signed agenda in London on 1
December and the Joint Statement from 10 in the same month and year. When our interview finished I
handed over the following piece of writing to the Ambassador:
“The Government of Venezuela deems it necessary to request an explanation from Her Majesty’s
Government since during the Geneva Conference we will be discussing the agreed points in the Agenda
including point 2 – the Venezuelan territorial claim and the search for the practical solutions. Otherwise,
the Venezuelan Government will be forced to reconsider its attendance to the meeting on 16 and 17
February”.
On 8 February the British Ambassador visited me in order to inform me about the following:
“The Deputy Parliamentary Secretary of British Foreign Affairs has been misinterpreted. Neither Lord
Walston not any other Representatives of the Government of Her Majesty have formulated said
declaration in the first paragraph of the Venezuelan Memorandum from 4 February.
As far as the Government of Her Majesty is involved, the agenda for the meeting in Geneva remains the
same as previously agreed through the Joint Statement from 10 December 1965, a copy of which is
enclosed as reference”.
It was clear that the firmness with which the Chancellery had been acting was fruitful. We received
unanimous endorsement from the Nation expressed in agreements issued by the National Congress,
hundreds of City Councils, all the political institutions, bodies as diverse as the National Academy of
History, the National Library and National Archives, Professional Associations, the Venezuelan Association
of Catholic Education, the Business Sector, Labour and Peasant Unions, The Venezuelan Federation of
Teachers, Student Associations, and particularly the Comisión Nacional Pro-Guayana Esequiba [ProGuayana
Essequiba
National
Committee].
The President of the Republic, Dr. Raúl Leoni, when delivering his New Year Message on 1 January this
year, described this moment as follows:
“We are no longer an economically-weak country, torn apart through factional fighting and barely
recuperating from the painful devastation of long and gruelling fratricidal wars and unable to defend
against any acts of aggression. In this new Venezuela there is a national consciousness around the justice
of our claim. Without abandoning our unwavering position and always favouring a friendly and peaceful
solution to the differences between nations, we are willing to put all our resources towards the proper
defence of our territorial rights”.
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Annex 33
Together with the impressive national expressions of support for our just claim came the endorsement of
friendly peoples. I must confess we felt the deepest satisfaction on learning about the declaration of the
Senate of Colombia dated 12 January 1966, the declaration of the Chamber of Representatives of the
same country dated 18 in the same month and year, the resolution of the National Assembly of Panama,
dated 24 January 1966. That support from the Legislative Bodies of Colombia and Panama is met with the
gratitude of the Venezuelan people and Government.
The sessions of the Geneva Conference took place in Room VIII in the Palais des Nations on 16 and 17
February. In the first meeting I reiterated with all clarity Venezuela’s position:
“Venezuela has affirmed and maintains that the Arbitral Award from Paris on 3 October 1899 lacks validity
and our country is not required to obey it. This Venezuelan affirmation is based on undeniable legal
reasons. The expression of the Venezuelan will is uniform as a position founded on justice.
As evidence of this, I am accompanied by different representatives from different political parties, both
those that actively participate directly in the Government and those from the opposition which will not
falter to criticize official actions from the Government.
They are all conscious of their patriotic duty and contribute with their support to uniting the national will
in pursuit of redressing the injustice which Venezuela suffered as a consequence of the Arbitral Award
from 1899 which my country considers void”.
I stressed the receptivity of Venezuela towards the search for satisfactory solutions and after referring to
the different solutions proposed by our country in the Conference in London, I invited the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Great Britain to present any later considerations that he may have prepared in reply to
the Venezuelan proposals.
Great Britain reaffirmed its position on the intangibility of the Award and in reply to my invitation,
formulated a proposal inspired by the Antarctic Treaty, a hard copy of which was delivered to the
Venezuelan Delegation.
After a break in order to consider the British proposal, our Delegation came to the conclusion that it was
unacceptable for Venezuela as it tried to bypass completely the territorial issue by means of a
development plan for both sides of the line of the Award, while at the same time demanding Venezuela
freeze its claim for thirty years.
In light of the above I categorically expressed the following to the Delegations of Great Britain and British
Guiana once the debate was reopened:
“I must inform Your Excellency that after reading the proposal presented by the British Delegation, the
Venezuelan Delegation considers it unacceptable since it does not tackle the questions, which in
Venezuela’s mind, are fundamental for the practical solution of the conflict, which is the objective of this
Conference”.
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Annex 33
In informal meetings, together with some members of our Delegation, which I had with the British
Minister and the Prime Minister Burnham, I expressed my concerns over the state of the discussions given
Britain’s poor receptiveness to confront the problem, which was the purpose of our meeting. I even
insinuated the consequences that might arise in case of a possible breakdown in conversations.
The Venezuelan Delegation was overcome with emotion when I read the cable that I had just received
from the President of the Legislative Assembly of Bolivar State, Mr. Roger González, in which I was told
about the content of the Bolivar Declaration, issued by the Convention of Legislative Assemblies of the
States and City Councils of the Federal Territories gathered in Ciudad Bolivar on 14 and 15 February on
the occasion of the 147 Anniversary of the Congress of Angostura.
After some informal discussions, our Delegation chose to leave a proposal on the table similar to that third
formula which had been rejected in London, adding to it recourse to the International Court of Justice.
The Delegations of Great Britain and British Guiana, after studying in detail the proposal, and even though
they were receptive to it by the end, objected to the specific mention of recourse to arbitration and to
the International Court of Justice.
The objection was bypassed by replacing that specific mention by referring to Article 33 of the United
Nations Charter which includes those two procedures, that is arbitration and recourse to the International
Court of Justice, and the possibility of achieving an agreement was again on the table.
It was on the basis of this Venezuelan proposal that the Geneva Agreement was reached. Far from this
being an imposition, as has been maliciously said, or a British ploy which surprised the naivety of the
Venezuelan Delegation, it is based on a Venezuelan proposal which was once rejected in London and has
now been accepted in Geneva.
Evidently, the Geneva Agreement does not constitute the perfect solution for the issue which is can be
none other than the return of its territory back to Venezuela. We did not go to the city of Lac Leman to
dictate the conditions of our adversary’s surrender by placing on the scales the weight of a victorious
bellicose sword. We attended the meeting in pursuit of a satisfactory solution to this difficult territorial
issue. As a result of diplomatic dialogue and not from the monologue of victors, the Geneva Agreement
means a new situation for the extreme positions from those demanding the return of the stolen territory
by virtue of a null Award and those who harboured no doubts about their sovereignty over the territory
and were not willing to take this matter to any tribunal.
As an essentially Venezuelan solution, the Geneva Agreement deserved the unanimous support of the
Delegation which included the delegates of three parties of the government, three of the opposition and
a senator of the independent group. They all vividly endorsed the signature which I, under the
authorization of the President of the Republic, stamped on this transcendental instrument.

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Annex 33
THE GENEVA AGREEMENT
The Agreement concluded in Geneva on 17 February 1966 comprises a preamble and 8 articles.
To understanding it properly, the Geneva Agreement must be considered as a whole. Albeit
containing substantive and procedural provisions, each one of them forms part of the general idea
underlying the instrument.
First and foremost, it must be made clear that it is an Agreement concluded between two
Sovereign States namely the Republic of Venezuela and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the latter in consultation with the Government of British Guiana. British Guiana, as of the date of
the signing of the Agreement, was not a sovereign and independent State. According to the constitutional
provisions which govern it, the government (more so than the metropolis) has certain autonomy in its
domestic matters. However, international and defence matters are conducted by the Government of
United Kingdom, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. At the same time, it must be noted that the British
Guiana, under the name of Guyana, just as it was decided during the recent conference of independence
of that colony celebrated in London in November last year, will become independent and sovereign on 26
May this current year.
We must remember that over the course of all these conversations and diplomatic action which
culminated in the Geneva Agreement, British Guiana has always been present. This is expressed as per
the Parties’ agreement in the declaration of the President of the Special Political Committee of the United
Nations issued on 16 November 1962.
In line with its anticolonial position, Venezuela has always favoured the participation of British
Guiana since the opposite would be the same as admitting that Great Britain as a colonialist power can
solve serious matters of its colony without the participation of such colony.
On the other hand, just as I indicated before, Great Britain cannot constitutionally celebrate an
Agreement which, even though it has an international scope, directly affects the domestic affairs of British
Guiana and so they are within its jurisdiction. So, its exclusion from the Geneva Agreement or the relevant
procedures beforehand would have been a serious mistake with serious consequences for Venezuela.
Notwithstanding, the agreement took this into account and article 8 makes it clear British Guiana will
become a party when it becomes independent.
As I expressed previously in this same presentation, this was a reality Venezuela was to deal with
during the Geneva Conference: the coming independence of British Guiana. Hence its explicit inclusion in
the preamble and article 8 as described before.
The last part of the preamble explicitly establishes that in order to resolve the controversy
between Venezuela and Great Britain over the border with British Guiana, an agreement has been reached
in the following articles. It is an explicit acknowledgement of the issue between Venezuela and Great
Britain over the borderline with British Guiana which is ratified in article 1 of the Agreement.
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Article 1 foresees the creation of a Mixed Commission with the purpose of seeking satisfactory
solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy “which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan
contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is
null and void”. This article comprises two important points:
1. To steer the conversations through a Mixed Commission, that is, an ad-hoc body that enables
communication quickly and permanently between the two Governments, in order to achieve a
solution for the controversy.
2. The explicit acknowledgement of the controversy arising from the Venezuelan objection to the
Arbitral Award in 1899.
It must be noted that the continuation of discussions is paramount and these can lead to a solution
that allows putting an end to the issue in a satisfactory manner without having to return to the planned
procedures contained in Article 4 in the same Agreement. Furthermore, the correct functioning of the
Commission enables direct contact permanently with British Guiana to be able to deal with any other
matters related to the issue.
Article 2, a procedural article, determines the number of representatives, the means of appointing
them and also sets rules for the correct functioning of the Mixed Commission. Venezuela will appoint two
representatives to constitute the Mixed Commission along with two more appointed by the Government
from British Guiana. It is stipulated that each of the Governments has the freedom to choose or remove
any representatives respectively and replace them at once where necessary in case of incapacity to work.
Last, the ability of the Mixed Commission, by agreement of the representatives, to choose experts that
work with them, be it in a general or specific manner.
The capacity of British Guiana, before becoming independent, to designate its two representatives for
the Mixed Committee was specifically clarified in the meeting in Geneva. It was confirmed that the two
representatives of British Guiana, regarding any time before 26 May 1966 (the day of its independence),
would be chosen by proxy and under the authorization of the Government of United Kingdom, Great
Britain and Northern Ireland which up until now by constitutional prescription has been carrying out the
foreign affairs of British Guiana. It was also made clear that by signing the Agreement, Great Britain
authorized the execution of this act by the Government of British Guiana.
If we had negotiated and concluded the Agreement with the metropolis, behind British Guiana’s back,
that would have been the same as admitting to the idea that any metropolis can manage any overseas
territories without taking into account the will of the people that inhabit them.
On the other hand, would it have been right or sensible to exclude British Guiana from discussions
where the country will shortly gain its capacity to reject the commitments, in which they had not
participated, through independence?
According to Article 1 the Commission is entrusted “with the task of seeking satisfactory solutions”. It
therefore has a wide function to conduct negotiations in agreement with its respective Governments.
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With these powers, the Commission had to be formed by the parties. The presence of an appointed
arbitrator is alien to this type of Commission.
Article 3 comprises a provision so that Governments may officially and explicitly request a report,
every six months, on the activities of the Mixed Commission. Logically, the representatives will keep in
touch and be constantly instructed by their Governments. However, a six month report is necessary since
it must be produced by the Commission together, that is, by the four representatives and will then become
a document of the Commission as such.
Article 4 sets a period of four years as the deadline for the work of the Mixed Commission. After
this period, if a complete agreement has not been arrived at to solve the controversy, the Commission
must produce a final report to inform the respective Governments of any matters upon which the parties
could not agree.
The setting of a deadline is standard practice and its determination, that is, the period it lays out,
can only be estimated according to the factors which had to be born in mind and the surrounding
circumstances that affect it. It was deemed necessary to fix a reasonable period of time taking into account
the purpose of the Mixed Commission which essentially is, as Article 1 expresses, is to seek satisfactory
solutions for the issue. This cannot be achieved in a short period of time nor was it acceptable to set too
long a period.
Another circumstance taken into account was the coming independence of British Guiana on 26
May 1966. It was agreed to give the new State a reasonable period of time for its evolution and
consolidation. Only a sufficiently experienced State can dedicate itself to work with us to try to solve the
territorial controversy.
Last, we agreed a period of 4 years even though the British initially demanded 30 years after long
discussions.
The most important point of the Geneva Agreement is the adoption of a procedure in case the
negotiations carried out by the Mixed Commission cannot solve the controversy. The following stages
have been set in that case:
1. Governments will try to reach an agreement on the choice of one of the means to resolve disputes
peacefully as foreseen in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.
2. Three months after the receipt of the final report of the Mixed Commission, where the
Governments have failed to choose the means to resolve the controversy peacefully, the decision
on the means of settlement will be referred to an appropriate international body that both
Governments agree on.
3. A lack of agreement over the choice of the international body which is to chose the means of
solution, this function will be carried out by the Secretary General of the United Nations.
4. The Secretary General of the United Nations will choose the procedures for the peaceful solution
indicated in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter “until the controversy has been resolved or
until all the means of peaceful settlement there contemplated have been exhausted.”
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Article 4 of the Geneva Agreement provides the following:
A) The only role entrusted to the Secretary General of the United Nations is to point to the parties
the means of peaceful settlement of disputes means provided in Article 33 of the UNC for them
to use.
B) The means are the following: negotiation, investigation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement and recourse to regional organs or agreements. These are explicitly the
procedures to be used up until the issue is solved or until these are depleted.
I must place it on the record that in the last discussions of the Geneva Agreement the British suggested
entrusting the General Assembly of the United Nations to choose the means for a solution comprised in
Article 33 of the Charter.
This proposal was discarded by Venezuela due to the following reasons:
1. Because it was not suitable to submit the specific role of choosing the means for the solution to
an eminently political and deliberative body as is the General Assembly of the United Nations.
This procedure could lead to disproportionate delays since the introduction of outside political
elements would be easy in what is a simple function of choosing the means of settlement;
2. Because the General Assembly of the United Nations only meets for ordinary sessions once a year,
during a period of roughly three months, to deal with previously indicated matters in the Agenda
and in extraordinary sessions by request of the majority of the members of the United Nations.
These reasons were presented by Venezuela and further suggested entrusting the International Court
of Justice with the role of choosing the means of solution as a permanent body and exempt of the
inconveniences mentioned above. Since this proposal was rejected by the British, Venezuela then
suggested giving this role to the Secretary General of the United Nations.
In conclusion, due to the Venezuelan objections accepted by Great Britain, there exists an unequivocal
interpretation that the only person participating in the selection of the means of solution will be the
Secretary General of the United Nations and not the Assembly.
Last, and in compliance with Article 4, if no satisfactory solution for Venezuela is reached, the Award
of 1899 should be revised through arbitration or a judicial recourse.
Article 5 comprises two provisions:
First: The Agreement cannot be interpreted as a waiver or loss of our territorial claim over Guayana
Esequiba; and
Second: None of the acts or activities which take place during the validity of the Agreement will constitute
a basis to assert, support or deny a claim of territorial sovereignty, except where those acts or activities
are the result of an agreement achieved by the Mixed Commission and accepted in writing by the
Governments.
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This means no act or activity in the territory claimed by Venezuela entails any undermining of our
rights nor any support for the pretensions of Great Britain or British Guiana. Venezuelan reservations over
any type of granted concession, or yet to be granted, in the territory claimed by Venezuela are recognised
here.
Article 5 also mentions the claim or basis for the claim by Great Britain over the territory of Venezuela.
Regarding this I must state:
1. The only territorial claim in the current controversy is the one formulated by Venezuela.
2. If Great Britain or British Guiana were to formulate any territorial claim to Venezuela that would
automatically be interpreted as the acceptance of the invalidity of the award of 1899.
3. Neither Great Britain nor British Guiana has a historical or legal basis to claim Venezuelan
territory. On the contrary, only Venezuela which has an irrefutable title to claim Guayana Esequiba
which the ill Award of Paris 1899 integrated into the territory of British Guiana.
4. If the nullity of the Award of 1899, be it through agreement between the concerned Parties or
through a decision by any competent international authority as per Agreement, is declared then
the question will go back to its original state. According to Venezuela it stretched up to the
Esequibo River. The maximum British claim was represented by the “Schomburgk Line” of 1840,
that is, 26 years after Great Britain received from Holland, and with definitive character, its colony
Guyana, an event which took place through the Treaty of London in 1814.
A detailed study carried out by the Chancellery on hundreds of confidential documents from the
Foreign Office and the Colonial Office in London lead to the undeniable conclusion that the only
“Schomburgk Line” recognized by the Foreign Office until 1886 and disseminated to that time as the
maximum British pretension was the one called Norte-Sur [North-South] that is the blue line in the map
in the pamphlet titled “The Schomburgk Line on the borderline between Venezuela and British Guiana”.
Since the beginning of the issue until 1886, when Great Britain officially disseminated that line as its
maximum aspiration, that line recognized the following territories as Venezuelan: Alto Barima and Alto
Barama along with the territory comprised between that blue line and Venamo. These territories, despite
being recognized as Venezuelan by Great Britain itself up until 10 years before the Arbitral Award, were
awarded to British Guiana by the Tribunal.
Therefore, with the nullity of the Award, in any procedure setting a new frontier, Venezuela should
consider out of question those territories which as I have indicated, and that Great Britain itself recognized
as Venezuelan for 46 years since the beginning of the dispute.
British Guiana will not be able to consider as its maximum aspiration the “extended Schomburgk line”
(marked red in the map of the brochure mentioned before) because it was a line derived from the
modification of the maps, even unknown to the Foreign Office up until 1886 and published for the first
time in 1887, that is, 10 years before the Arbitration Treaty.
I am able to affirm that these statements are based on irrefutable evidence.
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In light of the above it has been concluded that if the nullity of the Award is declared, the only
Venezuelan territory which could fall within the maximum British aspiration would be the narrow, yet
important area in the lower course of the Barima River on its right bank. Venezuela has no doubt about
its title over that territory and is further sure that when Great Britain included it within its claim it did not
take into account any historical or legal titles but just the territorial hunger for the Orinoco River. If in a
fully-fledged imperial and colonial era the Tribunal, which proceeded in a rather arbitrary manner, did not
dare deprive a poor, weak and tumultuous Venezuela from that small territory, I seriously doubt a Tribunal
nowadays acting in accordance with rules of law would do it.
Regarding Article 7, it is clear that by submitting this bill of ratification from the Agreement to this
Sovereign Congress this Agreement will come into force as soon as the law is ratified.
As regards Article 8, it must be noted that its interpretation must be conducted bearing the whole
Agreement in mind which reiterates the idea that the controversy concerns Venezuela and United
Kingdom over the borderline with British Guiana.
The phrasing indicating that the issue concerns Venezuela and United Kingdom appears already
in the heading of the Agreement; it then comes repeated twice in the preamble and in Article 1 which
precisely indicates that the Mixed Commission has been commissioned to seek satisfactory solutions for
the practical settlement of the issue between Venezuela and United Kingdom”.
By assuming the above, it then appears clear that according to Article 8, British Guiana becomes
part of the Agreement as a result of its independence in addition to the Governments of Venezuela and
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The Geneva Agreement poses a challenge which requires an adequate response. The creation and
performance of the Mixed Commission, along with the subsequent process if the latter would not reach
a satisfactory solution require Venezuela to gather all its strength to be able to consolidate its claim
through serious and in-depth study. The Guyana challenge requires our country, that has seen with pain
the way in which its territory has been reduced, to tackle this beautiful task that goes beyond studies, to
the recuperation of our legitimate Eastern border.
The two people chosen to represent Venezuela at the Mixed Commission will be prepared,
intelligent, hard-working and patriotic since any progress on the issue will depend on those qualities
through the channel already open which could enable a fully satisfying solution for the Republic.
In conclusion, I consider the Geneva Agreement to be highly beneficial for the interest of the
Country. Just as the President of the Republic, Dr. Raúl Leoni, said before you in his recent Message to the
National Congress “The Geneva Agreement reopens the case of Guayana Esequiba and offers Venezuela
an opportunity, like never before, to assert its rights and achieve reparation for the damage caused by the
painful Award of Paris”.
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REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
RECLAMACION
DE LA
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTOS
1962 -1981
CARACAS, 1981
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EXPOSICION AL CONGRESO NACIONAL DEL DOCTOR IGNACIO
IRIBARREN BORGES, MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES,
SOBRE EL ACUERDO DE GINEBRA EL DIA 17 DE MARZO DE 1966.
LEY APROBATORIA DEL ACUERDO DE GINEBRA
Ciudadano Presidente del Congreso Nacional
Ciudadano Vice-Presidente del Congreso Nacional
Ciudadanos Congresantes:
Es para mí un honor y un privilegio que estimo en alto grado, el
que se me haya ofrecido esta oportunidad de dirigirme al Soberano
Congreso de la República, en relación con la importante materia que paso
a exponer.
He dividido la exposición en dos partes:
!.-Gestiones anteriores al Acuerdo de Ginebra.
11.-El Acuerdo de Ginebra.
GESTIONES ANTERIORES AL ACUERDO DE GINEBRA
Rechazo unilateral del Laudo.
La actitud del Gobierno y pueblo de Venezuela. ante el arbitrario
Laudo del 3 de octubre de 1899, que pretendió fijar la frontera entre
nuestro país y la Guayana Británíca, es de ustedes ampliamente conocida.
La Cancillería venezolana, luego de conocer los vicios de fondo y forma
que afectaron aquella decisión, llegó al convencimiento de que podía en
derecho invocar su invalidez. Las dolorosas circuntanscias políticas, eco­
nómicas y militares por que las que atravesó en aquella época nuestra Patria
impidieron al Gobierno Nacional llevar hasta sus últimas consecuencias
el rechazo categórico de aquella sentencia.
Con el ocaso de la época colonialista, renació la esperanza de que
alg6n día sería reparada la injusticia de que habíamos sido víctimas.
Durante largos años, esa esperanza fue impregnando las declaracio­
nes cada vez más claras y categóricas del Estado venezolano frente a
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aquel Laudo arbitrario. Sin embargo, por más s6lida y convincente que
era la argumentación venezolana, el Reino Unido se negaba a entrar en
discusiones que tuvieran por objeto la revisión de un Laudo que él con­
sideraba intangible.
Comienzos de la negociación bilateral.
No salimos del plano unilateral de nuestra reclamación, hasta que en
noviembre de 1962, mi predecesor en la Cancillería, el doctor Marcos
Falcón Briceño, después de plantear, en exposición amplia y bien razo­
nada nuestra tesis ante el Comité Político Especial de la Asamblea Ge­
neral de las Naciones Unidas, logró concertar un acuerdo con Gran Breta­
ña para realizar un examen tripartito de la documentación relativa al
problema. Este acuerdo quedó consignado en la Declaración del Presidente
del Comité Político Especia~ el 16 de noviembre del mismo año.
Es innegable el valor trascendental de ese acuerdo, por cuanto repre­
senta el punto de partida de un largo proceso de carácter bilateral que
conducirá indefectiblemente a la revisión del llamado Laudo de , 1899.
Sin embargo, justo es que nos detengamos a observar cuál es la po­
sición británica en el momento en que acuerda conversar con Venez1,1ela
sobre la cuesti6n.
El Representante del Reino U nido, señor C. T. Crowe, luego de inten­
tar una refutación de los puntos de vista expuestos por el Canciller de
Venezuela, se expresó en los siguientes términos:
"Espero haber con~encido a los miembros de la Comisión de que si
se respetan el derecho internacional y los acuerdos libremente concer­
tados, la cuestión fronteriza entre Guayana Británica y Venezuela
no debería haber sido traída a consideración de las Naciones Unidas".
Y luego de referirse al examen que ya habían realizado los expertos
británicos de la documentación sobre el problema, examen que, a juicio
del Reino Unido, conducía a la conclusión de que no se justificaba reabrir
la cuestión, concluyó:
"Por lo tanto, estoy autorizado a decir que mi Gobierno, con pleno
consentimiento del de la Guayana Británica, está dispuesto a tratar
con el Gobierno de Venezuela, por los conductos diplomáticos corres­
pondientes, los arreglos para un examen tripartito, o sea, de Venezuela,
Guayana Británica y Reino Unido, del voluminoso material documen­
tal pertinente a esta cuestión".
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;
¡,
1
f
Tal fue la oferta británica que aceptada por Venezuela condujo al
acuerdo sobre el examen de la documentación relativa al llamado Laudo
de 1899.
Alguien podrá preguntar por qué Venezuela aceptó que tomara parte
en las conversaciones el Gobierno de Guayana Británica, no siendo to­
davía independiente.
Conviene observar que las conversaciones se habían de tener entre
Venezuela y el Reino Unido en consulta con el de la Guayana Británica,
y, por consiguiente, la participación del Gobierno de Georgetown nunca
se equipararía a la de los dos países soberanos sujetos de la controversia.
Por otra parte, nuestro Gobierno, por su indeclinable posición anticolo­
nialista, fue siempre favorable a la presencia de la colonia en discusiones
que afectaban a su ámbito territorial. Nuestra diplomacia iba a actuar
limpiamente, y, por consiguiente, nada podía temer de la participación
de los representantes de la colonia. Cuando los diplomáticos recurren a
turbios manejos, procuran hacerlos, como lo experimentó en carne propia
nuestro país en el Tribunal Arbitral de 1899, a espaldas de los pueblos,
sean éstos libres o dependientes.
Deseo subrayar el hecho que es desde 1962, o sea desde los propios
orígenes del proceso diplomático que ha conducido al Acuerdo de Gine­
bra, cuando nuestras conversaciones han tenido un carácter tripartito en
la forrna explicada en el párrafo anterior.
Antes de pasar adelante, conviene recordar que el acuerdo concertado
en el seno de las Naciones Unidas en 1962, tenía por objeto el examen
de los documentos, sin que en manera alguna aceptara Gran Bretaña
entrar al fondo del problema: la revisión de la sentencia del Tribunal de
1899. El señor Crowe expresó este punto de vista con meridiana claridad
en la mencionada intervención:
"Al hacer esta oferta, quiero indicar con toda claridad que no es en
forma alguna una oferta de pasar a conversar sobre el fondo de la
revisión fronteriza. Eso no podemos hacerlo puesto que considera­
mos que no estaría justificado".
Termino por observar que como dicho acuerdo no especificaba clara­
mente el nivel en el que se tendrían las conversaciones, el Reino Unido
trató desde el comienzo de minimizarla. Fue, por consiguiente, propó­
sito del Gobierno venezolano conducir la negociación en el más alto nivel
gubernamental y llevarla hasta la revisión de la sentencia del Tribunal.
Para cumplir estos objetivos, fue preciso quebrar la obvia resistencia
del Gobierno británico. Ya en marzo de 1963, Gran Bretaña intentó re-
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Annex 33
ducir las conversaciones al nivel de una discusi6n académica entre exper­
tos, pero Venezuela expres6 claramente su criterio que en manera alguna
entraría en esas conversaciones mientras el Reino U nido no se comprome­
tiera de antemano a discutir la cuestión a nivel de ministros contra las
advertencias de quienes vaticinaban que el Foreign Office nunca entraría
en semejante compromiso, Venezuela continuó presionando hasta que obtu­
vo la aceptaci6n por parte de Gran Bretaña de que las discusiones se ten­
drían en dos fases: primera a nivel de expertos, y segunda a alto nivel
ministerial,
No podía la Gran Bretaña abrigar duda alguna acerca de la firmeza
de la reclamación de Venezuela. El Presidente de la República, señor
Rómulo Betaneourt, en su Mensaje al Congreso Nacional, el 12 de marzo
de 1962, había declarado:
"El diferendo entre la débil Venezuela y la arrogante Albi6n de los
días de la Rejna Victoria, fue resuelto en un inicuo e inaceptable, y
siempre inaceptado por Venezuela, laudo pronunciado por un tribunal
político y no de derecho, en sentencia del 3 de octubre de 1899.
Jamás Venezuela ha admitido ni admitirá que tan extensa porci6n
de territorio legítimamente su yo deje de estar encuadrado dentro
de su geografía".
Primera Conferencia de Londres.
La primera reunión de Ministros tuvo lugar en Londres en noviem­
bre de 1963. Encabezaban las delegaciones venezolana y británica, el
doctor Marcos Fale6n Briceño y el Hon. R. A, Butler, respectivamente.
Por la Guayana Británica estuvo presente el Gobernador Sir Ralph Grey.
En esa ocasión, Venezuela llevó la discusión al fondo de la cuestión al
presentar sus puntos de vista en un Aide-Memoire, fechado el 5 de
noviembre, en el que, luego de sinteti7--ar los argumentos por los que Ve­
nezuela rechaza el llamado Laudo de 1899, termina con la siguiente cate­
górica posici6n:
"La verdad hist6rica y la justicia exigen que Venezuela reclame la
total devolución del territorio del cual se ha visto desposeída, y a este
respecto, cuenta confiadamente con la buena voluntad y la coopera•
ción del Gobierno de Su Majestad".
Por su parte, Gran Bretaña reiter6 el criterio ya citado de su Repre­
sentante el señor C. T. Crowe, en el sentido de que rechazaba los argu-
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Annex 33
roentos venezolanos y consideraba intangible el Laudo de 1899 como
"arreglo pleno, final y definitivo". Estas dos posiciones se han mantenido
paralelamente a lo largo de la presente negociación hasta la sesión inau­
gural de la Conferencia de Ginebra.
Un avance a favor de Venezuela se observa en la mencionada reu­
nión de Londres de noviembr.e de 1963, segítn el comunicado eonjunto
de la misma. En efecto, luego de referirse a los informes que los ex­
pertos habían de presentar a sus respectivos Gobiernos, dice así, "Estos
informes servirán de base para ulteriores discusiones entre los Gobier­
nos". Por consiguiente, al no calificar esas discusiones, nos permitía sos­
tener que las conversaciones a nivel de gobierno iban a tener por objeto
la discusión del fondo de la cuestión.
Que así lo entendía Venezuela con decidida voluntad de recuperar
el territorio que en derecho le pertenece, se desprende de las palabras
del entonces Presidente de la República, señor Rómulo Betancourt, quien
en su Mensaje al Congreso Nacional, el 7 de marzo de 1964, al dar cuenta
de las conversaciones que se habían celebrado en Londres, dijo:
"Las negociaciones han continuado y, en bien de la República y para
reparar una injusticia que se le hizo a Venezuela, deberán ser conti­
nuadas. El remate dé ellas debe ser la reincorporación al territorio
nacional de una zona que desde nn punto de vista jurídico-histórieo,
jamás dejó de pertenecer a Venezuela. Y no es añadidura ociosa ra­
tificar que esta reclamación de Venezuela sobre una zona de territorio
que es legítimamente suya, en nada afecta ni entorpece las aspiracio­
nes del pueblo de Guayana Británica a su independencia, que tiene
la simpatía de la nación venezolana, cuya posición anticolonial data
de los días en que ella mísma insurgió como nación soberana, sacu­
diéndose tutelas foráneas".
Cumplida la primera fase de las discusiones entre los expertos de V e­
nezuela y Gran Bretaña, con la participación de los de Guayana Británica,
en la primera mitad de 1964, e intercambiados los informes de los mis­
mos el 3 de agosto de 1965, se iniciaron las negociaciones para la reunión
ministerial que tuvo lugar en diciembre de 1965 en la ciudad. de Londres.
Durante ese lapso, la Cancillería reiteró en diversas ocasiones su cri­
terio sobre la nulidad del llamado Laudo de 1899, que había una contro­
versía que amenazaba las mutuas relaciones entre nuestro país y el Reino
Unido y la Cuayana Británica, y que las conversaciones ministeriales
habían de entrar a la discusión del fondo del problema. Así se salió al
paso de repetidas declaraciones de los Primeros Ministros de Guayaoa
¡,
1
!
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25
Annex 33
l !
Británica, los señores J agan y Burnham, en el sentido de que no estaban
disuestos a discusión alguna sobre la línea del Laudo, pues no recono­
cían el conflicto fronterizo por considerarlo solucionado en 1 g99, Por su
parte, la Canc,illería venezolana, consecuente con su reclamación a la
Guayana Esequiba, protestó unas supuestas concesiones del Gobierno de
Guayana Británica para la explotación del petróleo en el territorio al oeste
del río Esequibo.
Consecuente con la posición 'Venezolana respecto de la nulidad del
llamado Laudo de 1899, la Cancillería adoptó varias iniciativas, entre
ellas la edición del mapa de la República con indicación de la "Zona en
Reclamación", y la emisión de estampillas postales alusivas a la con­
troversia.
Estas medidas fueron protestadas por el Gobierno británico, mientras
reiteraba su posición sobre la intangibilidad del mencionado Laudo. Así,
en nota del 4 de marzo de 1965, referente a aquel mapa, se expresaba:
"La embajada ha recibido instrucciones de establecer que el Gobierno
de su Majestad no puede aceptar la demarcación del Gobierno vene­
zolano de la frontera ni de cualquier otro objeto que haga recaer dudas
sobre la soberanía del Gobierno de Su Majestad en dicha zona de
Guayana Británica. El Gobierno de Su Majestad no duda de su so­
beranía sobre ese teritoritorio, y se reserva sus derechos en este asunto".
En respuesta reafirmamos el criterio de que "el mapa en cuestión, pu­
blicado por la Dirección de Cartografía Nacional, del Ministerio de Obras
Públicas, viene a ser una expresión gráfica de reiteradas declaraciones
formuladas públicamente por la Cancillería de Venezuela, las cuales son
perfectamente conocidas del Gobierno británico, en el sentido de que el
llamado Laudo del 3 de octubre de 1899, carece de validez, y, por lo
tanto, Venezuela se reserva sus derechos al territorio guayané.s del cual fue
injustamente desposeída.
La posición británica, en vísperas del canje de los informes de los ex­
peirtos, o sea, el 2 de agosto de 1965, fue explicada al Parlamento por
Mr. Padley, Secretario Parlamentario del Foreign Office:
"La frontera entre Venezuela y la Guayana Británica fue determinada
por medio del Tribunal Arbitral de 1899, de acuerdo con los términos
del Tratado firmado el año 1897 entre el Reino Unido y Venezuela.
Bajo el artículo XIII de este Tratado, ambas partes se comprometían
a aceptar el Laudo Arbitral como "un arreglo pleno, perfecto y defini­
tivo. El Gobierno Venezolano alega que el Laudo de 1899 es inválido,
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26
Annex 33
y en mayo de 1962 informó al Gobierno de Su Majestad de su inten­
ción de reclamar parte de Guayana Británica. Cuando el asunto surgió
en las Naciones Unidas más tarde, el Representante del Reino U nido
insistió en que el asunto era "res judicata" y ofreció proceder a un
examen del material de documentación que se refería al Laudo, de
modo de satisfacer a los venezolanos de que no habían sido víctimas
de una injusticia. Este examen de los documentos ha sido comple­
tado ahora y los resultados deben ser revisados de nuevo por los Go­
biernos. Permanece igual la posición del Gobierno de Su Majestad,
que todo el asunto fue solucionado de una vez por todas, por medio
del Tribunal Arbitral de 1899. Esta también es la posición del Go­
bierno de Guayana Británica".
El canje de los informes de los expertos se produjo el 3 de agosto de
1965. Al presentar al Gobierno británico el informe de los expertos vene­
zolanos, el Embajador en Londres expresó la complacencia de Venezuela
"por la feliz terminación de la fase de estudios técnicos", y en nota del
7 de septiembre, expuso cómo continuaba siendo inamovible la tradicional
posición de Venezuela:
"La posición venezolana respecto del problema está fijada con toda
claridad. Ha declarado no reconocer el Laudo Arbitral de 1899 como
arreglo final y definitivo de su controversia con el Reino Unido, y
planteq al Honorable Gobierno de Su Majestad el deseo de conside­
rar, con ánimo desprevenido, la rectificación de la injusticia de que
fue víctima Venezuela, en una hora infortunada que nuestro pueblo
no puede olvidar, y se llegue a una solución que tome en cuenta los
intereses legítimos de nuestro país y los de la población de la Gua­
yana Británica".
Por su parte, el Gobierno británico respondió a esta nota y a la del 3
de agosto, reafirmando, una vez más, la posición inicial que había adopta­
do en 1962, al reproducir las palabras de su Representante en el Comité
Político Especial, antes citada, en el sentido de que el ofrecimiento para
examinar los documentos "no era en manera alguna una oferta para entrar
en conversaciones de fondo sobre la revisión de la frontera", sino "para
disipar cualesqufora dudas que el Gobierno venewlano pudiera aún tener
acerca de la validez o justicia del Laudo Arbitral".
Era evidente que Gran Bretaña se mostraba renuente a entrar en dis­
cusiones de fondo sobre tan grave asunto. Aparentemente seguía califican­
do de infundada la reclamación venewlana, y estaba sólo dispuesta a
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Annex 33
una discusión puramente académica que no podía conducir a ningún arre­
glo del viejo problema. Fue, necesario que con expresas instruccio­
nes del ciudadano Presidente de la República, doctor Raúl Leoni, me
dirigiera al país por cadena de radio y televisión, el 16 de septiembre de
1965, para declarar categóricamente que "si Venezuela emprendió el ca­
mino diplomático, no fue para quedar satisfecha con discusiones puramen­
te académícas". Y agregué: 'De poca seriedad se acusarla con razón a
nuestro Gobierno, si en asunto de tan grave transcendencia, como es la
usurpación de 150.000 kilómetros cuadrados de territorio nacional, admi­
tiera entretenerse en estériles debates librescos, en interpretaciones se­
mánticas de viejos textos".
Quedó, pues, clara nuestra posición de que no íbamos a ir a una
conferencia ministerial a ocuparnos_ de diScusiones que no tuvieran por
objeto el
fondo del problema: la revisión del llamado Laudo de 1899.
La independencia de Guayana Británica.
Antes de seguir adelante sobre el tema que estoy desarrollando de
las posiciones antitética., de Venezuela y el Reino U nido respecto de la
controversia debo referirme al hecho, por muchos aspectos feliz, de la
próxima independencia de Guayana Británica.
La Cancíllería desde hace muchos años venía advirtiendo la proximi­
dad de ese acontecimiento, si bien esas previsiones no se vieron antes
cumplidas por razones de orden interno y externo que afectaban a la
actual colonia. Era a todas luces evidente que nuestra tradicional recla­
má:ción debía recibir un creciente impulso conforme se fuera aproximando
aquella fecha, dado que convenía dejar muy en claro que nuestra con­
troversia con el Reino Unido, causante del problema fronterizo, no había
de terminarse con la independencia de Guayana Británica, a no ser por
una solución satisfactoria para Venezuela. En este sentido, la Cancillería
ha emitido formulaciones claras en relación con la controversia territorial.
Repetidas veces se ha reafirmado el principio de que cualquier cam­
bio de status en la colonia de Guayana Británica, no afectará a la recla­
mación territorial venezolana.
Además, por iniciativa de Venezuela y otros países; se incluyó en el
Acta de Washington, aprobada por la Primera Conferencia Extraordina­
ria Interamericana celebrada en diciembre de 1964, lo siguiente:
"El Consejo de la Organización no tomará ninguna decisión sobre
una solicitud de admisión presentada por una entidad polJtica cuyo
territorio esté sujeto, total o parcialmente y con anterioridad a la
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Annex 33
fecha de esta resolución, a litigio o reclamación entre un país extra­
continental y uno o más Estados miembros de los EstJados America­
nos, hasta que se haya puesto fin a la controversia mediante un pro­
cedimiento pacífico".
También hemos sostenido el principio de que nuestra cuestión gua­
yanesa implica un problema de territorio ocupado por una potencia ajena,
en violación del párrafo 69 de la resolución 1514 (XV) de las Naciones
Unidas:
"Toda tentativa conducente a una desintegración total o parcial de
la unidad nacional o la integridad territorial de un país es incompa­
tible con los objetivos y principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas".
En este sentido formulé una expresa declaración ante las Naciones
Unidas el día 6 de octubre de 1965:
"No pueden estos territorios escapar a la acción rectificadora de la
historia. Pero debemos insistir, como se ha hecho en las diversas re­
solucjones adoptadas por las conferencias interamericanas, en la dis­
tinción entre colonias y territorios ocupados. Si aquéllas deben obtener
la independencia mediante la aplicación del principio de la autodeter­
minación, éstos teritorios coloniales tjue han sido arrebatados a otros
Estados, no pueden tener otra forma de descolonizarse que la reinte­
gración al Estado del cual han sido desmembrados. De no hacerse
tal distinción sería admitir que se puede deformar el principio de la
autodeterminación con el fin de consagrar una situación de hecho en
la ignorancia del principio fundamental del respeto a la integridad te­
rritorial de los Estados".
11
Con ocasión de la Conferencia celebrada en Londres en noviembre de
1965 sobre la Independencia de Guayana Británica, dirigí al Gobierno
británico una nota, con fecha 3 de noviembre, en la cual expresé lo si­
guiente:
1
¡1
"Mi Gobierno desea dejar constancia de que consideraría un acto in­
amistoso de parte del Gobierno de Su Majestad si se acordara sin
1
reservas un traspaso de soberanía sobre el territorio reclamado por
I¡
Venezuela, traspaso que no podría generar más derechos que los que
posee legítimamente el Gobierno que los cede".
,,
1
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29
Annex 33
l
1
j
Segunda Conferencia de Londres
l ,¡
De lo expuesto anteriormente se comprende cómo estaba el Gobierno
de Venezuela interesado en que la agenda que había de regir las conver­
saciones de Londres recogiera sus puntos de vista sobre el objeto de las
discusiones y la naturaleza de las mismas. Tras largas negociaciones lle­
vadas a cabo por nuestro Embajador en Londres, en los meses de octubre
1
1
1
a diciembre de 1965, se vino a acordar una agenda que significó un
considerable avance en favor de nuestros puntos de vista.
En efecto, ya en el título que define la naturaleza de las conversacio­
nes, se establece que éstas tienen por objeto "la controversia entre Ve­
nezuela y el Reino Unido".
Esta admisión de que existe una controversia "sobre la frontera con
la Guayana Británica" se reafirma al admitirse en el punto primero la
"necesidad de resolver la disputa".
Más aún, para disipar c:ialquier duda sobre la naturaleza de las con­
versaciones que no podían ya reducirse al examen académico de docu­
mentos, se estipuló en el punto, segundo de la agenda que se iba a
"buscar soluciones satisfactorias para el arreglo práctico de la controversia
que ha surgido como resultado de la contención venezolana de que el
Laudo de 1899 es nulo e írrito".
Todavía más, reforzado esta interpretación, se contempla en el punto
cuarto la "determinación de los plazos" para las soluciones a las que se
llegare.
A nadie puede escapar el hecho de que la posición británica de los
comienzos de este proceso en 1962 había ya cambiado notablemente. Lo
acordado en _la agenda distaba en gran manera de aquella primera oferta
formulada por su representante señor Crowe, en el sentido de que es­
taban dispuestos únicamente a examinar los documentos relativos al Lau­
do de 1899.
En conformidad con la mencionada agenda fuimos a Londres a dis­
cutir con el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Gran Bretaña, el Hon.
Michael Stewart, y el Primer Ministro de Guayana Británica, el Hono­
rable Forbes Bumham, sobre la presente controversia, y a tratar de
buscarle una solución satisfactoria. Nuestras reuniones se tuvieron los
días 9 y 10 de diciembre de 1965.
Al iniciarse la primera sesión expuse el criterio del Gobierno vene-
zolano sobre el informe de los expertos británicos.
"El Gobierno de Venezuela ha examinado cuidadosamente el informe
de los expertos británicos, y ha llegado al firme convencimiento de
que sus conclusiones son totalmente inaceptables".
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Annex 33
Más adelante agregué:
"Los vicios de fondo y forrrui del informe de los expertos británicos
han sorprendido al Gobierno venezolano. Aquellós son tales que bien
justifican la expresión de Vuestra Excelencia en su nota A V 1081/75,
del 3 de agosto de 1965, de que dicho informe •no representa nece­
sariamente la reflexiva opinión del Gobierno de Su Majestad Británi­
ca acerca de ninguno de los puntos en discusión:.".
Pasé a enumerar algunos de esos vicios de fondo y forrria, y concluí:
"Lejos de haber persuadido a mi Gobierno de que su reclamación
carece de fundamento, el informe de los ei<pertos británicos le ha
convencido de la firmeza inconmovible de su posición".
Terminé afirmando:
"El Gobierno de Venezuela está convencido que la solución satisfac­
toria del problema fronterizo con Guayana Británica consiste en la
devolución del territorio que en derecho le pertenece. En consecuen­
cia considera que debe acordarse la fijación de la frontera legítima
entre. Venezuela y Guayana Británica".
No voy a enumerar todos los incidentes de la discusión derivada del
rechazo por Gran Bretaña de esa primera propuesta de solución formu­
lada por Venezuela, a la que se contestó con una contrapropuesta para
que Venezuela con un "acto de gran calidad de estadista y coraje", re­
f
f
!
nunciara a su reclamación. Formulé una segunda propuesta venezolana
en el sentido de convenir por un perío_do que podría discutirse, en una
administración conjunta del territorio reclamado por Venezuela, previo
reconocimiento de nuestra soberanía sobre el mismo. También esta fórmu­
la vino a ser rechazada. Por último, en un esfuerzo por buscar una salida
honorable al problema, presenté como . tercera propuesta venezolana una
fórmula que preveía la solución del problema fronterizo a través de tres
etapas consecutivas con sus respectivos plazos, con la particularidad de
que el proceso había de tener un final: a) Comisión Mixta; b) media­
ción; e) arbitraje internacional.
Esta oferta vino a estrellarse contra la intransigencia de Gran Bretaña
así como de Guayana Británica, las -cuales empecinadas en mantener la
vigencia del Laudo de 1899, rechazaban la existencia de una controversia
territorial entre Venezuela y el Reino U nido sobre la frontera con Gua­
yana Británica.
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Annex 33
La contrapropuesta británica se redujo a formular algunas ideas, cal­
cadas en el articulo IV del Tratado sobre la Antártica, que aplicadas a
nuestro problema llevarían a una solución de desarrollo económico a ambos
lados de la línea del Laudo, mientras los dos países vecinos se obligarían
a no presionar durante 30 años sus respectivas reclamaciones. Al mismo
tiempo se insistía en que no quedaba otra alternativa que devolver la
cuestión a las Naciones Unidas informando del resultado del examen de
los documentos.
Después de estudiar esa propuesta, la delegación venewlana unáni­
memente acordó rechazarla. Reabierto el debate, expuse que carecía de
sentido llevar el asunto a las Kaciones Unidas, pues éstas no podrían
hacer otra cosa que exhortar a las partes a continuar conversando como
lo estábamos haciendo en ese momento. Sobre la propuesta inspirada en
el Tratado de la Antártica declaré:
"No encuentro ninguna conexión entre el caso de la Antártica y el de
nuestro problema con el Reino Unido. La Antártica no forma parte
de la unidad nacional o territorial de varios Estados signatarios de ese
Tratado como es el caso de la Gran Bretafia. En cambio, el problema
de Venezuela con el Reino Unido en relación con la Guayana Britá­
nica se refiere a un Territorio que forma parte del Territorio vene­
zolano. Está situado en el límite mismo de la Guayana Británica con
Venezuela, no se trata de un territorio de ultramar. Por consiguiente,
este problema no puede ser resuelto de la manera del Tratado sobre
la Antártica; es un problema que de no encontrársele una solución sa- ·
tisfactoria, continuará siendo causa de fricciones entre Venezuela y la
Gran Bretaña y la Guayana Británica".
Advertí que Venezuela no podía aceptar que se intentara soslayar el
problema jurídico-político de la· cuestión fronteriza, para reducirse única­
mente a tratar de resolver el problema económico del subdesarrollo de
Guayana Esequiba, del cual era precisameute responsable la Gran Bre­
taña. La posición de Venezuela quedó claramente expresada en los
siguientes términos:
"Para terminar quiero dejar muy claro que Venezuéla ha venido a
esta mesa de conferencias con la mejor buena voluntad, la que ha
quedado suficientemente demostrada con las proposiciones que ha
formulado, especialmente la última que sometí ayer; que esa buena
voluntad de Venezuela no debe ser confundida con debilidad o duda
de su firme posición. Venezuela continuará su reclamación con toda
131'1
32
Annex 33
firmeza; el Territorio venezolano llega hasta el Esequlbo. Todo lo
que se ha actuado y decidido y que trajo como consecuencia el des­
pojo que sufrimos, no lo acepta mi país".
A simple Vista se podría apreciar la imposibilidad de agotar el estudio
de las proposiciones en el medio día que restaba a la Conferencia. Pero
habiendo rechazado una propuesta británica para continuar las discu­
siones con Lord W alston, cuando éste visitara a Caracas en enero de
1966, convinimos en celebrar una nueva reunión de la misma Conferen­
cia ministerial, en la ciudad de Ginebra, en el mes de febrero próximo,
según vino a ser expresado en el Comunicado Conjunto de la Conferen­
cia de Londres, emitido el día 10 de diciembre de 1965.
Se ha de advertir que en este documento, Gran Bretafia y Guayana
Británica reconocen que la controversia •amenaza quebrantar las tradi­
cionalmente cordiales relaciones entre Venezuela, por una parte, y el
Reino Unido y la Guayana Británica por la otra". Además, al eliminarse en
la agenda para la Conferencia de Ginebra el examen de los documentos,
se centró la discusión plenamente en la búsqueda de "soluciones satisfac­
torias para el arreglo práctico de la controversia".
La Conferencia de Ginebra
En el mes de enero visitó a Venezuela el Sub-Secretarlo Parlamenta­
rio de Relaciones Exteriores, Lord Walston. En respuesta a preguntas
de los periodistas, declaró acerca de la posición que Gran Bretafia iba
a adoptar en la Conferencia de Ginebra:
"Será cordial y receptiva, y discutiremos el problema a la altura di­
plomática y puede estar seguro de que en dicha reunión, o en otras
posteriores, habrá una decisión sobre este asunto". (El Universal,
11-1-66).
Ahora bien, habiendo publicado la prensa, como declaraciones del
mismo Lord Walston y de otros altos funcionarios, que en la Conferen­
cia de Ginebra se iba a tratar de la ayuda económica a Guayana Britá­
nica pero que no se había de
discutir el reclamo venezolano, el día 4
de febrero, por instrucciones del Presidente de la República, recibí en
mi despacho al Embajador británico para expresarle que la Cancillería
I¡'
i: ,,
veía con preocupación aquellas declaraciones, pues se hallaban en con­
tradicción con el compromiso contraído por su país de acuerdo con la
agenda firmada en Londres el 19 de
diciembre y el O,municado Con-
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33
Annex 33
7
junto del día 10 del mismo mes y año. Al final de nuestra entrevista
entregué por escrito al Embajador lo siguiente:
"El Gobierno de Venezuela estima necesario solicitar una explicación
del Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica, en el sentido de que en
Ginebra se discutirán los puntos acordados en la Agenda que incluye
en su título y bajo el N9 2, la reclamación territorial venezolana y la
búsqueda de soluciones prácticas para resolverla. De lo contrario,
el Gobierno venezolano se verá obligado a reconsiderar su asistencia
a dicha reunión los días 16 y 17 de febrero".
El día 8 de febrero me visitó el Embajador británico con el objeto
de informarme que:
"El Subsecretario de Estado Parlamentario de Relaciones Exteriores
Británico ha sido malinterpretado. Ni Lord Walston ni ningún otro
Representante del Gobierno de Su Majestad han formulado la decla­
ración citada en el primer aparte del Memorándum venezolano del
4 de febrero.
Por lo que respecta al Gobierno de Su Majestad, la agenda para la
reunión de Ginebra permanece igual de acuerdo a lo convenido en
el Comunicado Conjunto del 10 de diciembre de 1965, se anexa una
copia del mismo como referencian.
Era evidente que la firmeza mostrada por la Cancillería estaba dando
buenos resultados. Nos asistía el respaldo unánime de la Nación, e,opre­
sado en acuerdos emitidos por el Congreso Nacional, centenares de Con­
sejos Municipales, todas las organizaciones políticas, corporaciones tan
diversas como .la Academia Nacional de la Historia, la Biblioteca y el
Archivo Nacional, Colegios Profesionales, la Asociación Venezolana de
Educación Católica, los Sectores Empresariales, Sindicatos Obreros o Cam­
pesinos, la Federación Venezolana de Maestros, Agrupaciones Estudiantiles,
.l
y particularmente, la Comisión Nacional Pro-Guayana Esequiba.
J
Con palabras certeras calificó este momento nacional el señor Presi- 1
dente de la República, doctor Raúl, Leoni, cuando en su .Mensaje de
Año Nuevo, el 1 Q de enero del corriente año, señalo:
"Ya.no somos un país económicamente débil, desgarrado por la lucha
de facciones, apenas convalecientes de los dolorosos estragos de
largas y cruentas guerras fraticidas e impotente para defenderse
de actos de agresión. En esta nueva Venezuela se ha formado una
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conciencia nacional en torno a la justicia de nuestra reclamación.
Sin abandonar nuestra indeclinable posición favorable a la pacífica
y amistosa solución de las diferencias entre naciones, estamos dis­
puestos a hacer valer todos nuestros recursos para la buena defensa
de nuestros derechos territoriales".
A las impresionantes manifestaciones nacionales de apoyo a nuestra
justa reclamación, se agregó el respaldo de pueblos amigos. Así he de
manifestar la honda satisfacción que experimentamos al conocer la de­
claración del Senado de Colombia fechada el 12 de enero de 1966, la
de la Cámara de Representantes del mismo país, del día 18 del mismo
mes y año; la resolución de la Asamblea Nacional de Panamá, fechada
el 24 de enero de 1966. Tales manifestaciones de apoyo por parte de los
Cuerpos Legislativos de Colombia y Panamá comprometen la gratitud
del Gobierno y pueblo venezolanos.
Las sesiones de la Conferencia de Ginebra tuvieron lugar en el Salón
VIII del Palacio de las Naciones, los días 16 y 17 de febrero. En la
primera reunión, reiteré con toda claridad el criterio de Venezuela:
"Venezuela ha afirmado, y sostiene, que el Laudo Arbitral dictado en
París el 3 de octubre de 1899 carece de toda validez y nuestro paí,
no se considera obligado a acatarlo. Esta afirmación venezolana tiene
su apoyo en razones jurídicas irrebatibles. Fundada en una posición
de cuya justicia estamos convencidos, la expresión de la voluntad
venezolana es integral.
Como prueba inequívoca de ello me acompañan representantes de
las diferentes fuerzas políticas, tanto de las que participan activa y
directamente en la gestión de gobierno, como de las que desde la
oposición no vacilan en oriticar la acción oficial.
Todos conscientes de su deber patriótico contribuyen con su apoyo
a hacer una la voluntad nacional decidida a lograr que sea reparada
la injusticia de que fue objeto Venezuela como consecuencia del
Laudo Arbitral de 1899, el cual mi país oonsidera írrito".
Insistí en la receptividad de Venezuela respecto de la búsqueda de
soluciones satisfactorias, y luego de aludir a las diversas fórmulas de
soluciones propuestas por puestro país en la Conferencia de Londres,
invité al ,Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Gran Bretaña a exponer
las ulteriores consideraciones que hubiera preparado sobre las proposi­
ciones venezolanas.
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Gran Bretaña volvió a reafirmar su pos1c10n sobre la intangibilidad
del Laudo, y respondiendo concretamente a mi invitación, formuló una
propuesta inspirada en el Tratado sobre la Antártica, la cual fue entre­
gada a la Delegación venezolana por escrito.
Acordado un receso con el fin de que consideráramos la propuesta
británica, nuestra Delegación llegó a la conclusión de que era inaceptable
para Venezuela, pues trataba de soslayar completamente el problema
territorial por medio de un plan de desarrollo conjunto de las zonas a
ambos lados de la línea del Laudo, mientras al mismo tiempo se propo­
nía obligar a Venezuela a congelar durante treinta años su reclamación.
Así lo expresé categóricamente a las Delegaciones de Gran Bretaña
y Guayana Británica, cuando reabierto el debate declaré textualmente:
"Debo informar a Vuestra Excelencia que después de haber conside­
rado la proposición presentada por la Delegación británica, la Dele­
gación venezolana la considera substancialmente inaceptable por la
razón de no contemplar las cuestiones que, a juicio de Venezuela,
son fundamentales para la solución práctica del conflicto, que es el
objeto de esta Conferencia".
En reuniones informales que, acompañado de algnnos miembros de
nuestra Delegación, sostuve con el Ministro británico y el Primer Minis­
tro Bumham, manifesté mi preocupación por el estado en que se halla­
ban las conversaciones, dada la poca receptividad británica a afrontar
el problema que era objeto de nuestra reunión. Incluso, llegué a insinuar
las consecuencias que se derivarían de una posible ruptura de las con­
versaciones.
La Delegación venezolana no pudo ocultar su emoción cuando leí el
cable del Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa del Estado Bolívar, señor
Roger González, que acababa de recibir, en el cual se me comunicaba
el contenido de la Declaración Bolívar, emitida por la Convención d~
Asambleas Legislativas de los Estados y Concejos Municipales de los
Territorios Federales, reunidos en Ciudad Bolívar los días 14 y 15 de
febrero, con motivo del 1479 aniversario del Congreso de Angostura.
Después de varios contactos informales, nuestra Delegación optó por
dejar en mesa una fórmula semejante a la tercera propuesta venezolana
que había sido rechazada en Londres, con la adición del recurso a la
Corte Internacional de Justicia.
Las Delegaciones de Gran Bretaña y Guayana Británica, después de
estudiar detenidamente esa propuesta, aunque terminaron por mostrarse
receptivas, objetaron la mención específica del recurso al arbitraje y a
la Corte Internacional de Justicia.
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r
'
Soslayada esta objeción, sustituyendo aquella mención específica por
la referencia al artículo 33 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas que
incluye aquellos dos procedimientos del arbitraje y del recurso a la Corte
Internacional de Justicia, se vio que había una posibilidad de lograr un
acuerdo.
Fue, pues, sobre la base de la propuesta venezolana, como se vino
a lograr el Acuerdo de Ginebra. Lejos de haber sido éste, como se ha
dicho maliciosamente, una imposición, o un artilugio británico que sor­
prendió la ingenuidad de la Delegación venezolana, está basado en una
propuesta venezolana que rechazada terntinantemente en Londres ha ve­
nido a ser aceptada en Ginebra.
Evidentemente que el Acuerdo de Ginebra no constituye la solución
ideal del problema, que no es otra que la· devolución a Venezuela de su
territorio. No fuimos a la ciudad del lago Leman a dictar las condiciones
de rendición del adversario poniendo en la balanza de la disputa la
espada de una victoria bélica. Fuimos a buscar una solución satisfacto­
ria a la ardua cuestión territorial. Como fruto del diálogo diplomático,
y no del monólogo de los vencedores, el Acuerdo de Ginebra lleva a
una nueva situación las posiciones extremas de quien exige la devolu­
ción del territorio usurpado en virtud de un Laudo nulo, y la de quien
argüía que no abrigando duda alguna sobre su soberanía acerca de ese
territorio, no estaba dispuesto a llevar la causa a tribunal alguno.
Como solución substancialmente venezolana, el Acuerdo de Ginebra
mereció el apoyo unánime de la Delegación, la cual incluía los delegados
de tres partidos de gobierno, tres de la oposición y un Senador del grupo
independiente. Todos ellos respaldaron con voto emocionado la firma
que con autorización del Ciudadano Presidente de la República estampé
en el trascendental instrumento.
EL ACUERDO DE GINEBRA
El Acuerdo suscrito en Ginebra el 17 de febrero de 1966 comprende un
preámbulo y 8 artículos.
Para su debida comprensión debe ser considerado eil su conjunto,
pues si bien contiene disposiciones sustantivas y adjetivas, cada una de
ellas forma parte de la idea general que fundamenta el instrumento.
En primer término debe destacarse que se trata de un Acuerdo con­
cluido entre dos Estados soberanos que son la República de Venezuela
y el Reino Unido de la Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte. Este último
en consulta con el Gobierno de la Guayana Británica. La Guayana
Británica, para la fecha de la firma del Acuerdo, no es un Estado sobe-
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rano e independiente. De acuerdo con las disposicoines constitucionales
que lo rigen, el gobierno en sus asuntos internos tiene cierta autonomía
frente a la metrópoli, pero las cuestiones internacionales y de defensa
son conducidas por el Gobierno del Reino Unido de la Gran Bretaña e
Irlanda del Norte. Al mismo tiempo, debe tomarse en consideración el
hecho de que la Guayana Británica, bajo el nombre de Guyana, tal como
lo fue decidido por la reciente conferencia de independencia de esa colonia,
celebrada en Londres en el me; de noviembre del año pasado, advendrá a la
independencia y soberanía el próximo 26 de mayo del corriente año.
Debemos recordar que en el curso de todas estas conversaciones y
gestiones diplomáticas que cuhninaron con el Acuerdo de Ginebra, la
Guayana Británica ha estado presente. La declaración del Presidente del
Comité Político Especial de las Naciones Unidas, emitida el 16 de no­
viembre de 1962, así lo expresa como convenio ehtre las Partes.
Consecuente con su posición anticolonialista, Venezuela ha sido favo­
rablemente la participación de Guayana Británica, pues lo contrario equi­
valdría a admitir que Gran Bretaña como potencia colonial puede resolver
sobre graves asuntos de su colonia sin la participación de ésta.
Por otra parte, como lo acabo de indicar, Gran Bretaña no puede
constitucionalmente celebrar un Acuerdo que, aunque pertenec,iente a la
esfera internacional, incide directamente en los asuntos internos de Gua­
yana Británica que son de la competencia de ésta. Así pues, su exclusión
del Acuerdo de Ginebra o en las gestiones que lo precedieron, habría
sido un error de graves consecuencias para Venezuela. De tódas mane­
ras, en el Acuerdo se tomó en cuenta la circunstancia de no ser todavía
independiente; en el artículo 8 se dispone que será parte del mismo
desde su independencia.
Como ya lo he expresado anteriormente en esta misma expos1c10n,
era ésta precisamente una de las realidades que tenía que enfrentar Ve­
nezuela en la reunión de Ginebra: la próxima independencia de la Gua­
yana Británica. De aquí que se considere ese hecho expresamente en el
preámbulo y en el citado artículo 8.
En la última parte del preámbulo se establece explícitamente que
con el objeto de resolver la controversia entre Venezuela y el Reino
Unido sobre la frontera ,con Guayana Británica, se ha llegado al acuerdo
contenido en los artículos que siguen. Es un reconocimiento expreso de
la existencia de la controversia entre Venezuela y la Gran Bretaña sobre
la frontera con la Guayana Británica, reconocimiento que se ratifica en
el artículo 19 del Acuerdo.
El artículo 19 prevé el establecimiento de una Comisión Mixta con
el propósito de buscar soluciones satisfactorias para el arreglo práctico
38
Annex 33
de esa controvercia ·•surgida como consecuencia de la contención vene­
zol.ana de que el Laudo arbitral de 1899 sobre la frontera entre Vene­
zuela y la Guayana Británica es nulo e írrito". Este artículo contiene
dos puntos de gran importancia, a saber:
l . Encauzar las coversaciones a través de una Comisión Mixta, es
decir, de un órgano ad-hoc que pennite la comunicación perma­
nente y agíl entre los dos Gobiernos, con el objeto de llegar a
una solución de la controversia.
2. El reconocimiento expreso de la controversia surgida como con­
secuencia de la impugnación que ha hecho Venezuela del llamado
Laudo Arbitral de 1899.
Debe observarse que la continuación de las conversaciones es de ca­
pital importancia y que de ellas puede surgir una solución que permita
poner fin a la controversia en forma satisfactoria sin necesidad de recu­
rrir a los procedimientos previstos en el artículo 49 del mismo Acuerdo.
Además, el funcionamiento de la Comisión permite el contacto directo
y permanente con la Guayana Británica para tratar cualesquiera otros
asuntos relacionados con la controversia.
El artículo 29, de carácter adjetivo, determina el número de repre­
sentantes, la forma de designarlos y fija reglas para el funcionamiento
de la Comisión Mixta. Venezuela designará dos representantes para que
formen parte de la Comisión Mixta junto con los otros dos que nombrará
el Gobierno de la Guayana Británica. Se estipula, además, que cada
uno de los Gobiernos tiene la libre elección y remoción de sus respecti­
vos representantes, así como el deber de reemplazarlos inmediatamente
en caso de incapacidad 'para actuar. Y por último, la facultad para la
Comisión Mixta, por acuerdo entre los representantes, de designar ex­
pertos que colaboren con ella, ya en general o en relación con una
materia particular.
La facultad de la Guayana Británica, antes de llegar a su indepen­
dencia, para designar sus dos representantes en la Comisión Mixta, fue
materia de aclaratoria exhaustiva en la reunión de Ginebra. Quedó ex­
presamente definido que los dos representantes de la Guayana Britá­
nica, por lo que respecta al tiempo anterior al 26 de mayo de 1966,
fecha de su independencia, serían nombrados por delegación y con
autorización del Gobierno del Reino Unido de la Gran Bretaña e Irlanda
del Norte, el cual hasta este momento, por prescripción constitucional,
conduce los asuntos extranjeros de Guayana Británica. Se dejó aclarado
1',
1
11'
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también que, al firmar el Acuerdo, Gran Bretaña autorizaba al Gobierno
de la Guayana Británica para la ejecución de ese acto.
Si hubierámos negociado y formalizado el Convenio únicamente con la
metrópoli a espaldas de Guayana Británica, ello habría equivalido a ad­
mitir la tesis colonialista según la cual las metrópolis pueden disponer de
los territorios ultramarinos sin tomar en cuenta la voluntad de los pueblos
que los habitan.
Por otra parte ¿habría sido sensato, correcto, excluir a Guayana Britá­
nica de las conversaciones, si ese país dentro de muy breve tiempo, al
obtener su independencia, estará en capacidad de repeler aquellos com­
promisos en los cuales no hubiera tomado parte?
Según los términos del artículo 19, a la Comisión se le confía "el en­
cargo de buscar soluciones satisfactorias". Tiene por consiguiente una
amplia función para conducir las negociaciones de acuerdo con los res­
pectivos Gobiernos.
Con estas facultades, la Comisión tenía que ser paritaria. La presencia
de un comisionado árbitro es ajena al concepto mismo de-esta Comisión.
El artículo 39 contiene una disposición destinada a que los Gobiernos
dispongan oficial y expresamente de un informe, cada seis meses, de las
actividades de la Comisión Mixta. Naturalmente, que los representantes
mantendrá11 contacto y recibirán continuas instrucciones de sus respecti­
vos Gobiernos; sin embargo, no estaba de más establecer el informe se­
mestral, puesto que él debe ser elaborado por la Comisión en pleno, es
decir, por los cuatro representantes, y será así un documento de la propia
Comisión como tal.
En el artículo 49 se establece el plazo de 4 años como término de las
labores de la Comisión Mixta. Finalizado este lapso sin haberse llegado
a un completo acuerdo para la solución de la controversia, la Comisión
debe elaborar un informe final para referir a los respectivos Gobiernos las
cuestiones pendientes sobre las cuales no se haya llegado a convenirniento.
La elección de un plazo es convencional y su determinación, o sea, la
extensión del término, sólo puede ser estimada en función de los factores
que se debían tomar en cuenta y de las diversas circunstancias que inci­
den en su fijación. Era necesario señalar un término razonable, torriando
en consideración los fines específicos de la Comisión Mixta. Su propósito
esencial es, ,como lo expresa el artículo 19, buscar soluciones satisfactorias
a la controversia, labor difícil que no puede pensarse ha de rendir los
frutos deseados en un plazo demasiado corto. Tampoco era admisible
establecer un término exagerado.
Otra circunstancia que se tomó en cuenta fue la próxima independen­
cia de Guayana Británica, el 26 de mayo de 1966. Convenía conceder al
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nuevo Estado un plazo razonable para su evoluci6n y consolidaci6n. S6lo
un Estado suficientemente asentado podrá dedicar sus esfuerzos a tratar
con nosotros de solucionar la controversia territorial.
Por último, si acordamos un plazo de 4 años, fue después de arduas
discusiones con los británicos, quienes en un principio exigían 30 años.
El punto más importante del Acuerdo de Ginebra, lo constituye la
adopción de un procedimiento para el caso en que las negociaciones
conducidas por 6rgano de la Comisi6n Mixta no llegaren a solucionar el
problema. Se establecen las siguientes etapas:
1 Q - Los Gobiernos tratarán de llegar a un acuerdo sobre la elecci6n de
uno de los medios de soluciones pacíficas previstas en el artículo
33 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.
29 - Vencidos los 3 meses siguientes a la recepci6n del informe final de
la Comisi6n Mixta, sin que los Gobiernos hubiesen llegado a un
acuerdo sobre el procedimiento para solucionar la controversia, se
referirá la decisión de escoger los medios de solución a un 6rgano
internacional apropiado que ambos Gobiernos acuerden.
39 - A falta .de acuerdo sobre la elección de un órgano internacional
apropiado para escoger los medios de solución, corresponderá esa
función al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas.
49-El Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas escogerá los proce­
dimientos de soluci6n pacífica señalados en el citado artículo 33,
"hasta que la controversia haya sido resuelta, o hasta que todos los
medios de soluci6n pacífica contemplados en dicho artículo, sean
agotados".
El artículo 49 del Acuerdo de Ginebra, establece, pues, claramente, Jo
siguiente:
a) La uruca función que se confía al Secretario General de las Na­
ciones Unidas es la de ir señalando a las Partes, para que éstas los
utilicen, los medios de solución pacífica de las controversias esta­
blecidos en la citada disposición de la Carta.
b) Estos medios son los siguientes: negociación, investigación, media­
ción, conciliación, arbitraje, arreglo judicial y recurso a organismos
o a acuerdos regionales. Estos son, taxativamente, los procedimien­
tos que deberán ser utilizados hasta que la controversia sea resuelta
o hasta que aquéllos se hayan agotado.
Debo dejar constancia de que en las últimas etapas de discusión del
Acuerdo de Ginebra, los británicos propusieron que la elecci6n de los me-
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1
dios de solución previstos en el artículo 33 de la Carta, se encomendara a
la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas.
Esta propuesta fue desechada por Venezuela expresando las siguientes
razones:
Porque no convenía someter esa función específica de escoger los
1.;i. -
medios de solución a un órgano enúnentemente político y delibe­
rante como la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Este pro­
cedimiento podría conducir a desmesuradas dilaciones porque fácil­
mente se introducirían elementos políticos extraños a lá sencilla ·
función de escoger los medios de solución;
2• -Porque la Asamblea Cenera! de las Naciones Unidas sólo se reúne
en sesiones ordinari_as una vez por año, por un período de unos tres
meses, para tratar asuntos previamente señalados en la Agenda, y
en sesiones extraordinarias a solicitud del Consejo de Seguridad o
de la mayoría de los miembros de las Naciones Unidas.
Estas razones las expuso Venezuela, y propuso que se encomendara la
función de escoger los medios de solución a la Corte Internacional de J us­
ticia como· órgano permanente y exento de los inconvenientes antes señala­
dos. No habiendo sido aceptada esta propuesta por los británicos, Vene­
zuela propuso encomendar aquella función al Secretario General de las
Naciones U ni das.
En conclusión, por las objeciones venezolanas aceptadas por Gran
Bretaña, existe una interpretación inequívoca en el sentido de que en la
elección de los medios de soluc;ión, sólo intervendrá el Secretario General
de las Naciones Unidas y no la Asamblea.
Por último, de acuerdo con los términos del artículo 49, el llamado
Laudo de 1899, en el caso de no llegarse antes a una solución satisfacto­
ria para Venezuela, deberá ser revisado por medio del arbitraje o el recur­
so judicial.
En el artículo 59 se establecen dos provisiones:
Primera: Que el Acuerdo no puede ser interpretado como una renun­
cia o disminución de nuestra reclamación territorial sobre la
Guayana Esequiba; y
Segunda: Que ninguno de los actos o actividades que tengan lugar
durante la vigencia del Acuerdo constituirá fundamento para
hacer valer, apoyar o negar una reclamación de soberanía te­
rritorial, excepto cuando esos actos o actividades sean resul~
tado de convenios logrados por la Comisión Mixta y aceptados
por escrito por los Gobiernos.
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r Esto significa que ningún acto o actividad en el territorio reclamado
por Venezuela entraña menoscabo alguno de nuestros derechos ni apoyo de
las pretensiones de Gran Bretaña o de la Guayana Británica. Las reservas
venezolanas sobre todo tipo de concesiones otorgadas o que pudieren otor­
garse en el territorio reclamado quedan así reconocidas.
Se menciona también en el artículo 59 la reclamación o bases de reda­
mación por parte del Reino Unido o la Guayana Británica sobre el territorio
de Venezuela. A este respecto debo afirmar:
1 Q - La única reclamación territorial en la presente controversia es la
formulada por Venezuela.
29- Si Gran Bretaña o Guayana Británica formularan alguna reclama­
ción territorial a Venez1:ela, ello significaría automáticamente que
aceptan la invalidez del llamado Laudo de 1899.
39 -
Ni Gran Bretaña ni Guayana Británica tienen fundamento histó­
rico o jurídico para reclamar territorio venezolano. Por el contrario,
es Venezuela quien tiene títulos irrefutables para reclamar la Gua­
yana Esequiba que el mal llamado Laudo de París de 1899 incor­
poró al territorio de la Guayana Británica.
49 - El ser declarada, ya por convenio entre las Partes, o por decisión
de una autoridad competente internacional prevista en el Acuerdo,
la nulidad del Laudo de 1899, la cuestión se retrotrae ar estado
en que se hallaba la controversia en sus orígenes. Por parte de
Venezuela la reclamación se extendí.a hasta el Esequibo. La má­
xima reclamación británica estaba representada por la llamada
"linea Schomburgk" aparecida en 1840, o sea a los 26 años de
haber recibido Gran Bretaña de Holanda, con carácter definitivo,
su colonia de Guayana, hecho que tuvo lugar por el Tratado de
Londres de 1814.
Ahora bien, un estudio minucioso llevado a cabo por la Cancillería
sobre la base de centenares de documentos confidenciales del Foreign
Office y del Colonial Office de Londres, conduce a la conclusión irrebati­
ble de que la única '1ínea Schomburgk" conocida por el Foreign Office
hasta 1886 y difundida hasta esa f,echa como máxima pretensión británica,
fue la que se llamó línea Norte-Sur, o sea la línea azul del mapa en el
folleto titulado "La línea Schomburgk en la cuestión de límites entre Ve­
nezuela y Gna yana Británica".
Desde los orígenes de la controversia hasta 1886, al difundir Gran
Bretaña con carácter oficial, como su máxima aspiración, esa línea, reco­
noció como territorios venezolanos fuera de discusión los siguientes: los
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del Alto Barima y Alto Barama, así como el comprendido entre aquella
linea azul y el Venamo. Estos terrtiorios, a pesar de haber sido reconoci­
dos a Venezuela por la propia Gran Bretaña hasta 10 años antes del
Tratado Arbitral, fueron otorgados por el Tribunal a Guayana Británica.
Por consiguiente, con la nulidad del Laudo, Venezuela debe considerar
fuera de toda discusión, para los efectos de cualquier procedimiento de
fijación de la nueva frontera, esos teuitorios que como he dicho, la propia
Gran Bretaña se los reconoció durante 46 años desde los orígenes de la
disputa en 1840.
La Guayana Británica no podrá pretender como máxima aspiración la
llamada "línea Schomburgk espandida" ( roja en el mapa del mencionado
folleto), porque fue una linea derivad.a de la adulteración de mapas, des­
conocida por el propio Foreign Office hasta junio de 1886, y publicad.a
por primera vez en 1887, o sea, sólo 10 años antes del Tratado Arbitral.
Estoy en capacidad de asegurar que estas afirmaciones descansan en
pruebas irrefutables.
De lo expuesto se concluye que al ser declarada la nulidad del Laudo,
el único territorio venezolano que vendría a estar comprendido dentro de
la máxima aspiración británica, sería el estrecho, aunque importante sector
del curso inferior del Barima en su margen derecha. Acerca de sus tltu•
los a ese territorio Venezuela no abriga la menor duda, así como está
cierta de que cuando la Gran Bretaña lo incluyó dentro de su reclamación,
no tuvo en cuenta títulos histórico-jurídicos sino la simple apetencia de
dominio del Orinoco. Si en plenaépoca imperial y colonialista, el Tribunal
que tan arbitrariamente procedíó no se atrevió a arrancarle a nuestra Ve­
nezuela pobre, débil y convulsionada, ese reducido territorio, mucho menos
nos lo arrancará un Tribunal que actúe hoy de acuerdo con las normas de
derecho,
En relación con el artículo 79, es evidente que al ser sometida la ley
aprobatoria del Acuerdo a este Soberano Congreso, este Acuerdo entrará
en vigor a partir de la ratificación de aquella Ley.
Respecto del articulo 89 conviene observar que su interpretación debe
hacerse en relación con la totalidad del Acuerdo, en el cual repetidas
veces se aclara que la controversia está planteada entre Venezuela y el
Reino Unido sobre la frontera con Guayana Británica.
La fórmula de que la controversia tiene lugar entre Venezuela y el
Reino Unido aparece ya en el encabezamiento del Acuerdo; vuelve a fi­
gurar dos veces en su preámbulo, y en el artículo l 9 en el cual se señala
precisamente · que el encargo confiado a la Comisión Mixta consiste en
buscar soluciones satisfactorias para el arreglo práctico de la controversia
entre Venezuela y el Reino Unido".
100
44
Annex 33
r
'
Esto supuesto, aparece con absoluta nitidez que, según el artículo 89,
la Guayana Británica entra a ser parte del Acuerdo a raíz de su indepen­
dencia, agregándose a los Gobiernos de Venezuela y del Reino Unido de
Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del No rte.
El Acuerdo de Ginebra presenta un desafío al cual debe el país dar
una adecuada respuesta. La creación y actuación de la Comisión Mixta,
así como el proceso subsiguiente, si ésta no arribase a una solución satis­
factoria, obligan a Venezuela a poner en marcha todas sus energías para
consolidar su reclamación con serios y maduros estudios. El desafío de
la cuestión guayanesa somete a nuestro país que había visto con dolor
cómo se iba encogiendo su territorio, a la hermosa tarea que no debe res­
tringirse únicamente al estudio, orientada a la recuperación de nuestra
legítima frontera oriental.
De las personas que se designen para representar a Venezuela en la
Comisión MMa, de su preparación, ioteligencia, dedicación y patriotismo
dependerá en gran parte que la cuestión guayanesa avance, por el cauce
ya abierto, a una solución plenamente satisfactoria para la República.
Para concluir, considero que el Acuerdo de Ginebra resulta altamente
beneficioso para los intereses de la Patria. Como dijo ante ustedes el
Ciudadano Presidente de la República, doctor Raúl Leoni, en su reciente
Mensaje al Congreso Nacional, "el Acuerdo de Ginebra reabre el caso de
la Guayana Esequiba ofreciendo a Venezuela una oportunidad, como nunca
tuvo antes, para hacer valer sus derechos y conseguir la reparación del
daño que nos causara el doloso Laudo de París".
101
45
Annex 34
Letter from F. Brown, U.K. Mission to the United Nations, to R. du Boulay, U.K. Foreign Office,
No. 1082/77/66 (21 Mar. 1966)
Annex 34
Annex 34
Annex 34
Annex 35
Republic of Venezuela, Law Ratifying the Geneva Agreement (13 Apr. 1966) reprinted in
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents
1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 35
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLAIM
OF
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTS
1962 – 1981

CARACAS, 1981
p102

Annex 35
LAW RATIFYING THE GENEVA AGREEMENT
The Congress of the Republic of Venezuela enacts the following ratifying Law of the “Agreement
signed in Geneva on 17 February 1966 by the Governments of the Republic of Venezuela and United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, in
order to solve the issue between Venezuela and United Kingdom over the borderline with British
Guiana”.

Only Article: Every single part and all parts of the Agreement signed in Geneva on 17 February
1966 by the Governments of the Republic of Venezuela and United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, in order to solve the issue
between Venezuela and United Kingdom over the borderline with British Guiana have been approved
for any relevant legal purposes. The text is the following:
Submitted, signed and sealed in the Palacio Federal Legislativo [Legislative Federal Palace] in Caracas on
13 April 1966, 156 years after the Independence and on the 108 anniversary of the Federation.
The President,
(L.S.)

LUIS B. PRIETO F.
The Vice President,

DIONISIO LÓPEZ ORIHUELA.
The Secretaries,
Antonio Hernández Fonseca
Félix Cordero Falcón
At Palacio de Miraflores [Miraflores Palace], in Caracas, on 15 April 1966, 156 years after the
Independence and on the 108 anniversary of the Federation.
Fulfilled
(L.S.)

RAÚL LEONI
Countersigned.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs,
(L. S.)

IGNACIO IRIBARREN BORGES
[Picture on page 103]
[Caption] The Mixed Committee and advisers, with the Mayor or Georgetown.

Annex 35
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
RECLAMACION
DE LA
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTOS
1962 · 1981
CARACAS, 1981
Annex 35
7
LEY APROBATORIA DEL ACUERDO DE GINEBRA
El Congreso de la República de Venezuela decreta la siguiente Ley
aprobatoria del "Acuerdo Firmado en Ginebra el día 17 de febrero de
1966 por los Gobiernos de la República de Venezuela y el Reíno Unido
de la Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, en consulta con el Gobierno de
la Guayana Británica, para resolver la controversia entre Venezuela y el
Reino U nido sobre la frontera con la Guayana Británica".
Artículo U nico. - Se aprueba en todas y cada una de sus partes, a los
fines legales consiguientes, el Acuerdo firmado en Ginebra el día 17 de
febrero de 1966 por los Gobiernos de la República de Venezuela y el del
Reino Unido de la Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, en consulta con el
Gobierno de la Guayana Británica:, para resolver la controversia entre
Venezuela y el Reino Unido sobre la frontera con la Guayana Británica,
y cuyo texto es el siguiente:
Dada firmada y sellada en el Palacio Federal Legislativo, en Caracas,
a los trece días del mes de abril de mil novecientos sesenta y seis. - Año
1569 de la Independencia y 1089 de la Federacíón.
El Presidente,
(L.S.)
LUIS B. I'RmTO F.
El Vice-Presidente,
Dr0NISIO LóPEZ ORllIUELA.
Los SecretariOs,
Antonio H ernáru:kz F onseca.
Félix Cordero Falcón.
Palacio de Miraflores, en Caracas, a los quince días del mes de abril
de mil novecientos sesenta y seis. - Año 1569 de la Independencia y 1089
de la Federación.
Cúmplase,
(L.S.)
RAUL LEONI
Refrendado.
El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,
(L.S.)
lGNACIO IRIBARREN BoRGES
102
Annex 36
Airgram from the United States Department of State to the Embassy of the United States in
Venezuela, No. A-798 (18 Apr. 1966)
Annex 36
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Annex 37
Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations to
Secretary-General of the United Nations (21 Apr. 1966)
Annex 37
Annex 38
Letter from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and Venezuela to the United
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U.N. Doc A/6325 (3 May 1966)
Annex 38
UNITED NATIONS
Distr.
GENERAL
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
A/6325
3 May 1966
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/SPANISH
Twenty-first
~ession
LETTER DATED 2 MAY 1966 FROM 1EE PEPMANENT REPRESENTA'r1VES
OF THE UN1TED KINGIOl>i OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERJ°I IRELAND
AND VENEZUELA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADI:RESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL
We have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency with this ~etter the text
of an Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom, in consultation
·with the Goverri.ment of British Guiana., and Venezuela) concerning the frontier
between British Guiana and Venezuela, signed in Geneva, on 17 February 1966, by
His Excellency the Minister of External. Relations of the Government of Venezuela,
,
His Excellency the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
and His Excellency the Prime Minister of British Guiana.
The Agreement has been approved by the Congress of Venezuela and it has been
published in the United Kingdom as 2 White Paper. The House of Assembly of
British Guiana has also formally approved it.
The Governments of Venezuela and British Guiana have already appointed
their representatives
in the Mixed Commission in accordance with article
II of
the Agreement snd the Commission will shortly begin its work.
In Your Excellency's
to the Permanent Representatives
letters
of the United
Kingdon: and Venezuela dated 4 April, Your Excellency was good enough to state
that you considered the responsibilities
which might fall to be discharged by the
of the United Nations under article IV (2) of the Agreement to
Secretary-General
be of a nature which might appropriately
be discharged by the Secretary-General
of' the United Nations .
'.+a should be grateful
if Your Excellency wou.ld arrange for this letter and
the text of the Agreement to be circulated
as a document of the General Assembly,
in ewcordance with the undertaking by the Governments of the United Kingdom and
66-12097
I ...
Annex 38
A/6325
English
Page 2
Venezuela to inform the United Nations about the results of their conversations
concerning this Question, as contained in the statement of the Chairman of the
Special Political
Corilllittee of the General Assembly ac its 350th meeting, on
16 November :,962, 2nd incorporated
in the report of the Special Political
CornmitteeY approved by the General Assembly.
(Signed)
Pedro ZULOAGA
R. W. JACKLDIG
""::_/ Offic~al Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenttc Session, Annexes,
agenda ite,c, 88, docuriienCi\/5313, para. 4.
Annex 38
A/6325
Englioh
Page 3
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelar,d,
in consultation
with the Government
of British
Guiana) and the Government
of
Venezuela;
Taking into account che forthcoming independence
of British Guiana;
Recognizing
that closer co-operation
between British Guiana and Venezuela
could bring benefit
to both countries;
Convinced that any outstanding
controversy between the United Kingdom and
British Guiana on the one hand and Venezuela on the other would prejudice
the
furtherance
of such co-operation
and should therefore
be amicably resolved
in a
manner acceptable
to both parties;
In conformity with the agenda that was agreed for the governr.:ental
conversations
concerning the controversy between Venezuel2 and the United Kingdom
over the frontier
with British
Guiana, in accordance
with the joint communique
of 7 November 1963, have reached the following agreement to resolve the present
controversy:
ARTICLE I
A Mixed Commission shall be established
with the task of seeking sa-:cisfactory
solutions
for the practical
settlement
of' the controversy
between Venezuela and
the United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention
that the Arbitral Award of l899Y about the frontier between British Guiana and
Venczucln
iG null and void"
ARTICLE II
(1) Within two months of the entry into force of this Agreement, two
representatives
shall be appointee, to the Mixed Connnission by the Governmem; of
British Guiana and two by the Government of' Venezuela.
(2)
1
I'he Government appointing
a representative
:0.ay at any time replace himJ
and shall do so immediately
should one or ·coth of :..ts represer..tstives
be unable to
act through illness
or death or any other cause.
(3) The Mixed Commission may by agreement between the representatives
appoint experts to assist
the Mixed Connnission, either generally
or in reletion
to any individual
matter under consideration
by the Mixed C01mnission.
5./ British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 92, p. 160. See also "Treaty Series
No. 5 ( 1897) ", G. 8439, for text of Treaty of 2 February 1897.
I ...
Annex 38
A/6325
English
Page 4
ARTICLE III
The !v\ixed Commission shall present interim rei;orts
at intervals
of six months
from the date of' its first
meeting.
ARTICLE IV
( 1) If, within a period of' four years from the dete of this Agreement, the
f1lixed Com.mission should not have arrived
at a full egreement
fol' the solution
of
the controversy
it shall,
in its final report,
refer to the Government of Guye.nu
and the Government of Venezuela any outstanding
questions.
T'hose Goverm1ents shall
without delay choose one of the means of peaceful settlement
provided in Article 33
of the Charter of the United Nations )_/
(2)
If, within three months of receiving
the final report,
the Government
of Guyane and the Government of Venezuela ,should not have reached agreement
regarciJ.ng the choice of one of the means of settlement
provided in Art:Lcle 33 of
the Charter of the United Nations, they shall refer the decision
as to the means
of settlement
to an appropriate
international
organ u-:gon ·which they both agree or,
failing agreement on this point,
to the Secretary-General
of the United N2tions.
If the means so chosen do not lead to a solution
of the controversy,
the oa:td
organ or, ao the case may be; the Secretary-General
of the United Nations shall
choose ,mother of the means stii;ulated
in Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations; and so on until the controversy
h0s been resolved or until
all tne ~eans
of peaceful settlement
there contee1plated have been exhnusted.
ARTICLE V
(1) In order to facilitate
the greate,Jt rossible measure of co-opecation
and mutual understanding,
nothing contained
in this Agreement shnll be interpreted
as a renunciation
or dirr:inution by tte United Kingdom, British Guiana or Venezuela
of any basis of claim to territorial
sovereignty
in the territories
of Venezuela
or British Guiana, or: of any previously
asserted
rights of or clai,ns to se1cJ:;_
territorial
sovereigntyJ
o:r as prejudicing
their position
as regards the:Lr
recognition
or non-recogr:.ition
of a right
of, clair.'l or basis of clsim by ar;y~
of them to such territorial
sovereignty.
2/ Treaty Series No. 67 (1946), Crnnd. 7015.
I ...
Annex 38
A/632;
Pe.ge 5
(2) No acts or activities
takL:1g place whjle this Agreement
is in :t'orce
shal.l co:csti tute a basis for asser-ting,
s'.J.pporting or denying & c1nirn to terr:2_ torinl
sovereignty
in the terri torieE~ of Venezuele
or British Gui2na er cre2te any right □
of sovereignty
in those territories_,
except i:1 so faT as such acts OI' activit:.es
result from any agreement reached ·cy the lViixed Commtssion e.:r::d occe1)ted
j_r: v1riting
by the Government of Guyana and the Government of' Venezuelu.
No -new c2-air,1J o:c­
enlargement of an existing claim_, to territorial
sovereie;nty in those territories
ste.11 be asserted
while this Azreec,_ent is in force,
no:t shall any claiu1 1IhStf]Gever
be asserted
otherwise
than
it:. the ~vli.xed_ Commission ·while tho.-c Commissioc
is in
being.
AliTICLE VI
The Ivlixed Commission sha~'._l hold its fi:rot meeting
at a da-~e 3nJ place to be
agreed between the Governr.:ents of British
Guio.na 2cd Venezuelc.
T~1is meeting
shall take :place as soon a,s -possible
after
its members have been appointed.
~rheresfter
the Mixed Comm~ssion shall neet as and wher 2;greed betw:::en the
representatives.
A!iTICI,E VII
This Agreement
shall enter into force on the d&te o:f' its sign,ru;,.1re.
ARTICLE VEI
Upon the attainrnent
of independence
by Britisf'~ Guia:-1s) the Guvernmon-t of
Guyana shall thereafter
be a pa::::'ty to this Agreement:;
in addition
t,c_::., the GDv·er12::~ent
of' the United Kingdo:-:1 of Great Br-i.tain and Northern
ITeland cr_d -lJ e Governmt:i::1t ci
Venezuela"
In ,.,,;ri tr:i.ess whereof
being duly &uthor:~zed -::=.hef·e~-:;o >:l ti:"iei.r
7 the undersigned..,
respective
Governments; have signed this Agreement •
.rone in duplicate
at Geneva this 17th day of Feb::'ue:ry 7 1966 >' in t/--it: :Snc;lL;h
an.d Spanish langue.ges)
Coth texts being equally
av_thori ts.ti ve.
Annex 38
A/6325
~ng'lish
Page 6
Fer the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
IreJand:
MICHAEL STEWART
Secretary of State f'or Foreign Affairs
L.F.S. BURNHAM
Prime Minister of British Guiana
For the Government of' Venezuela:
IGNACIO IRIBARREN :BORGES
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Annex 39
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement (6 Sept. 1966), reprinted in
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents
1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 39
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLAIM
OF
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTS
1962 – 1981

CARACAS, 1981
p116, 118-9.
Annex 39
DECLARATIONS FROM THE VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE ADMISSION OF
GUYANA INTO TO OAS, PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1966
Venezuela will not impose a veto on the admission of the State of Guyana into the Organization
of American States. However there exists, in the Washington Act which established the admission
process of new members into the OAS, a provision stating “the application for admission from a country
that has a claim from a current member of the OAS over the totality or part of its territory cannot be
considered up until the issue has been solved in a pacific way” declared yesterday the Chancellor
Iribarren Borges after being asked by the journalists on the information from a cable which announced
the veto of our country on the entrance of Guyana into the OAS.
“That article opposes” he continued “the admission of Guyana into the OAS unless the
Venezuelan claim is definitively resolved over the territory of Guayana Essequibo. And if Guyana makes
its application, Venezuela will just ask for that article to be applied”.
What if other countries ask for its admission to be considered?
“Venezuela will limit itself to the text of the article which clearly provides for the admission of
new members into the OAS”.
What will be the position of Venezuela on the admission of Guyana into the United Nations?
“We will vote in favour as there is no act, protocol, provision or regulation there as there are in
the OAS which limits the admission of new members. The application for admission from Guyana into
the UN was already considered as it was announced in the press. As you know, Venezuela asked the
Security Council to let them speak there and supported its admission making a reservation of our
territorial claim. We will present the same reservation when that is finally considered at the General
Assembly of the United Nations”.

Annex 39
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
RECLAMACION
DE LA
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTOS
1962 -1981
CARACAS, 1981
Annex 39
DECLARACIONES DEL SEl'lOR MINISTRO DE RELACIONES
EXTERIORES DE VENEZUELA SOBRE LA ADMISION DE
GUYANA EN LA OEA, PUBLICADAS EN LA PRENSA DEL 6
DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1966.
No es un veto lo que impondrá Venezuela al ingreso del Estado de
Guyana en la Organización de Estados Americanos, sino que existe en el
~.eta de Washington, que estableció el proceso de ingreso de nuevo•
miembros en la OEA, una disposición en la cual se establece que "no se
considerará la solicitud de ingreso de un país que tenga una reclamación
de un miembro actual de la Organización sobre la totalidad o parte de
su territorio, hasta tanto esa controversia no haya sido solucionada por
medios pacíficos", declaró ayer el Canciller lribarren Borges al ser con­
sultado por los periodistas en tomo a una información cablegráfica que
anunciaba el veto de nuestro país a la entrada de Guyana en la OEA.
"Ese artículo se opone, contim.~ó diciendo, al ingreso de Guyana en
la OEA mientras no sea definitivamente solucionada la reclamación ve­
nezolana sobre el teritorio de la Guayana del Esequibo. Y en caso de
que Guyana haga su solicitud, Venezuela sólo pedirá que se aplique ese
artículo".
¿ Y si otros países piden que sea considerado su ingreso?
"Venezuela se limitará al texto del artículo que señala claramente la
admisión de nuevos miembros en la OEA".
¿Cuál será la posición de Venezuela frente al ingreso de Guyana en
las Naciones Unidas?
«Daremos nuestro voto favorable, pues allí no existe un acta, protocolo,
disposición o reglamentación como en la OEA, que limita la entrada de
nuevos miembros. Ya fue considerado, como se anunció en la prensa, la
solicitud de ingreso de Guyana en la ONU. Como ustedes saben Vene­
zuela pidió al Consejo de Seguridad dejar oír su voz allí y apoyó su
ingreso, haciendo una reserva de nuestra reclamación territorial que te­
nemos planteadas. La misma reserva haremos cuando eso sea considerado
en forma definitiva en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas.
116
Annex 40
Note Verbale from the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of Guyana to the Minister
of Foreign Relations of Venezuela, No. CP(66)603 (21 Oct. 1966)
Annex 40
Annex 40
Annex 41
United Kingdom, Ministry of External Affairs, First Interim Report of the Mixed Commission
(30 Dec. 1966)
Annex 41
Annex 41
Annex 41
Annex 41
Annex 41
Annex 41
Annex 42
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Communiqué (14 May 1968)
Annex 42
ADVERTI SEMENT
COMMUNIQUE FROM THE
VENEZUELAN MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Vcnezuelon Governmenc, chrough an
official statement Issued by t he Department of
Geology and Mines (Ml11lstry of Forestry, Lands
and Mines) of the Guyana Government, has learnt
that w ith the help, In equ ipment and /e rsonnel,
of the Unlted Nations and the Unit e States of
America, mine e xp loraclons have recentl y been
Intensified In various parts of the Esequlvo Guiana.
In view of che fact thac the Eiequlvo Guiana Is
claimed by our count ry, as by right belongs t o It,
the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
publicly and categorically once more state that
they do not recognize any type of such supposed
concessions, either granted or to be granted by
the Guyana Government over the territory
stretc hing co the W est of the Esequlvo River,
from Its sources to Its mouth, and In this respect
they reiterate the Commun ique Issued by said
Ministry and published Jn the press on the 2St h
May, I 96 S, as well as the statement on th is
mat te r containe d In the addre ss given by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ignacio Iribarren
Borges, on the 16th September or that same year .
These and other re servations w hich deri ve from
the unwavering Venezuelan right over the
Esequlvo Guiana, wer e upheld by the Geneva
Agrecment(Artlc le V), off the 17th February , 1966 .
Caracas, 14:th May, 1968
Annex 42
Annex 43
Note Verbale from the Ministry of External Affairs of Guyana to the Embassy of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela in Guyana (19 July 1968)
Annex 43
Annex 43
Annex 43
Annex 44
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332 (23 May 1969)
Annex 44
No. 18232
MULTILATERAL
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (with annex).
Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969
Authentic texts: English, French, Chinese, Russian and Spanish.
Registered ex officio on 27 January 1980.
MULTILATERAL
Convention de Vi~nne sur le droit des traites (avec annexe).
Conclue a Vienne le 23 mai 1969
Textes authentiques : anglais, franrais, chinois, russe et espagnol.
Enregistree d'ojjice le 27 Janvier 1980.
Vol. 1155, 1-18232
Annex 44
332
United Nations - Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Recueil des Traites
1980
VIENNA CONVENTION
1
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Considering the fundamental role of treaties in the history of international rela­
tions,
Recognizing the ever-increasing importance of treaties as a source of interna­
tional law and as a means of developing peaceful co-operation among nations,
whatever their constitutional and social systems,
Noting that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt
servanda rule are universally recognized,
Affirming that disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes,
should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law,
Recalling the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties
can be maintained,
Having in mind the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations, such as the principles of the equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, of the sovereign equality and independence of all States, of non­
interference in the domestic affairs of States, of the prohibition of the threat or use of
force and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all,
I Came into force on 27 January 1980, i.e., on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instru­
ment of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in accordance with article 84 (I):
Date of deposit
Dute of deposit
of the instrument of
of the instrument of
State
ratification or accession (a)
State
ratification or accession (a)
Argentina• ......
. 1,,. . . . . . . . . . 5 December 1972
Morocco•
... . V.. • . . • . . . . . . . . 26 September 1972
Australia ... v.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 June
1974 a Nauru .. 4.., • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5 May
1978 a
Austria
..... v..............
30 April
1979 a New Zealand .... V...........
4 August
1971
Barbados .. !<'... ... . . . . . . . . . . 24 June
1971
Niger ..•.......
Y...........
Canada* ..•... 1,(............ 14 October
27 October
1971 a
1970 a Nigeria ... V::................
Central African Republic . .V... 10 December 1971 a Paraguay ...... 1.::..........
31 July
1%9
3 February 1972 a
Cyprus ·•:II'.................
28 December 1976 a Philippines ...... A..<';........ 15 November 1972
Denmark
.......
.y. . . . . . . . .
I June
1976
Republic of Korea .... /,,. . . . . . . 27 April
1977
Finland* ......
y;............
19 August
1977
Spain ......
. 1,.·:.............
16 May
1972 a
Greece ... . v:...............
30 October
1974. a Sweden .. v:.................
4 February 1975
Holy See ... •/................
25 February 1977
Syrian Arab Republic• .. .v..... 2 October
1970 a
Honduras ....•. V.:........... 20 September 1979
~:~fsi~•.:: i,;~::::::::::::::
~~:aic~ .. ::: :~✓.::::::::::::: ~ ~~\~
:~;6 United Kingdom of Great Britain
28 December 1979 a
23
June
1971 0
Kuwait* ...... \r.............
11 November 1975 a
and Northern Ireland* ... \,.. 25 June
1971
Lesotho ......
~-...........
3 March
Mauritius ........ '<:. . . . . . . . . . I 8 January
1972 a United Republic of Tanzania• v. 12 April
1976 a
1973 a Yugoslavia ._. 1,.<--:. • • • • • • • • • • • • 27 August
1970
Mexico .... .',-'...............
25 September 1974
Zaire ... ✓,................. 25 July
1977 a
Subsequently, the Convention came into force for the following State on the thirtieth day following the date of
deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in accordance with
article 84 (2):
Dute of deposit of the
Siute
instrument of accession (a)
Rwanda ..........................................................
.
3 January 1980 a
(With effect from 2 February 1980.)
• For the texts of the reservations and declarations made upon ratification or accession, seep. 501 of this volume.
Vol. 1155, 1-18232
Annex 44
1980
United Nations - Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Recueil des Traites
333
Believing that the codification and progressive development of the law of
treaties achieved in the present Convention will promote the purposes of the United
Nations set forth in the Charter, namely, the maintenance of international peace and
security, the development of friendly relations and the achievement of co-operation
among nations,
Affirming that the rules of customary international law will continue to govern
questions not regulated by the provisions of the present Convention,
Have agreed as follows:
PART r. INTRODUCTION
Article 1. SCOPE OF THE PRESENT CONVENTION
The present Convention applies to treaties between States.
Article 2. UsE OF TERMS
1. For the purposes of the present Convention:
(a) "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instru­
ment or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation;
(b) "Ratification", "acceptance", "approval" and "accession" mean in each
case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international
plane its consent to be bound by a treaty;
(c) "Full powers" means a document emanating from the competent authority
of a State designating a person or persons to represent the State for negotiating,
adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, for expressing the consent of the State
to be bound by a treaty, or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty;
(d) "Reservation" means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named,
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of
the treaty in their application to that State;
(e) "Negotiating State" means a State which took part in the drawing up and
adoption of the text of t~e treaty;
(j) "Contracting State" means a State which has consented to be bound by the
treaty, whether or not th~ treaty has entered into force;
(g) "Party" means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and
for which the treaty is in force;
·
(h) "Third State" means a State not a party to the treaty;
(i) "International organization" means an intergovernmental organization.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present
Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms or to the meanings which
may be given to them in the internal law of any State.
Article 3. INTERNATIONAL AGREEM!::NTS NOT WITHIN THI:: SCOPE
OF THE PRESENT CONVENTION
The fact that the present Convention does not apply to international agreements
concluded between States and other subjects of international law or between such
other subjects of international law, or to international agreements not in written
form, shall not affect:
Vol.1155, 1-18232
Annex 44
334
United Nations - Treaty Series • Nations Unies - Recueil des Traites
1980
(a) The legal force of such agreements;
(b) The application to them of any of the rules set forth in the present Convention
to which they would be subject under international law independently of the
Convention;
(c) The application of the Convention to the relations of States as between them­
selves under international agreements to which other subjects of international
law are also parties.
Article 4. NoN-RETROACTIVITY OF THE PRESENT CONVENTION
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Con­
vention to which treaties would be subject under international law independently of
the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by
States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such States.
Article 5. TREATIES CONSTITUTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND TREATIES ADOPTED WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
The present Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument
of an international organization and to any treaty adopted within an international
organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization.
PART n. CONCLUSION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF TREATIES
SECTION I. CONCLUSION OF TREATIES
Article 6. CAPACITY OF STATES TO CONCLUDE TREATIES
Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties.
Article 7. FULL POWERS
1. A person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting
or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of
the State to be bound by a treaty if:
(a) He produces appropriate full powers; or
(b) It appears from the practice of the States concerned or from other cir­
cumstances that their intention was to consider that person as representing the
State for such purposes and to dispense with full powers.
2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the
following are considered as representing their State:
(a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for
the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty;
(b) Heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty
between the accrediting State and the State to which they are accredited;
(c) Representatives accredited by States to an international conference or to an in­
ternational organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of adopting the
text of a treaty in that conference, organization or organ.
Article 8. SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION OF AN ACT
PERFORMED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION
An act relating to the conclusion of a treaty performed by a person who cannot
be considered under article 7 as authorized to represent a State for that purpose is
without legal effect unless afterwards confirmed by that State.
Vol. 1155, I- 18232
Annex 44
1980
United Nations - Treaty Serles • Nations Unies - Recueil des Traites
335
Article 9. ADOPTION OF THE TEXT
1. The adoption of the text of a treaty ta]<es place by the consent of all the
States participating in its drawing up except as provided in paragraph 2.
2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes
place by the vote of two. thirds of the States present and voting, unless by the same
majority they shall decide to apply a different rule.
Article JO. AUTHENTICATION OF THE TEXT
The text of a treaty is established as authentic and definitive:
(a) By such procedure as may be provided for in the text or agreed upon by the
States participating in its drawing up; or
(b) Failing such procedure, by the signature, signature ad referendum or initialling
by the representatives of those States of the text of the treaty or of the Final Act
of a conference incorporating the text.
Article II. MEANS OF EXPRESSING CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY A TREATY
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature,
exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, or by any other means if so agreed.
Article 12. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY A TREATY EXPRESSED BY SIGNATURE
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature
of its representative when:
(a) The treaty provides that signature shall have that effect;
(b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that signature
should have that effect; or
(c) The intention of the State to give that effect to the signature appears from the
full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) The initialling of a text constitutes a signature of the treaty when it is established
that the negotiating States so agreed;
(b) The signature ad referendum of a treaty by a representative, if confirmed by his
State, constitutes a full signature of the treaty.
Article 13. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY A TR"ATY EXPRESSED
BY AN EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS CONSTITUTING A TREATY
The consent of States to be bound by a treaty constituted by instruments ex­
changed between them is expressed by that exchange when:
(a) The instruments provide that their exchange shall have that effect; or
(b) It is otherwise established that those States were agreed that the exchange of in­
struments shall have that effect.
Article 14. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY A TREATY EXPRESSED
BY RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE OR APPROVAL
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification
when:
(a) The treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification;
(b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that ratification

should be required;
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(c) The representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification; or
(d) The intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from
the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.
2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or
approval under conditions similar to those which apply to ratification.
Article 15. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY A TREATY EXPRESSED BY ACCESSION
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by accession when:
(a) The treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by that State by means
of accession;
(b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that such con­
sent may be expressed by that State by means of accession; or
(c) All the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be expressed by
that State by means of accession.
Article 16. EXCHANGE OR DEPOSIT OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION,
ACCEPTANCE, APPROVAL OR ACCESSION
Unless the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession establish the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty upon:
(a) Their exchange between the contracting States;
(b) Their deposit with the depositary; or
(c) Their notification to the contracting States or to the depositary, if so agreed.
Article 17. CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY PART OF A TREATY
AND CHOICE OF DIFFERING PROVISIONS
1. Without prejudice to articles 19 to 23, the consent of a State to be bound by
part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty so permits or the other contracting States
so agree.
2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty which permits a choice be­
tween differing provisions is effective only if it is made clear to which of the provi­
sions the consent relates.
Article 18. OBLIGATION NOT TO DEFEAT THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE
OF A TREATY PRIOR TO ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and pur­
pose of a treaty when:
(a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its in­
tention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into
force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly
delayed.
SECTION 2. RESERVATIONS
Article 19. FORMULATION OF RESERVATIONS
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
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(b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) In cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incom­
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Article 20. ACCEPTANCE OF AND OBJECTION TO RESERVATIONS
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subse­
quent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the
object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety be­
tween all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound
by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization
and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the compe­
tent organ of that organization.
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty
otherwise provides:
(a) Acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserv­
ing State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the treaty
is in force for those States;
(b) An objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude
the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States
unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State;
(c) An act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a
reservation is effective as soon as at least one other conti:acting State has ac­
cepted the reservation.
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise pro­
vides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised
no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was
notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be
bound by the treaty, whichever is later.
Article 21. LEGAL EFFECTS OF RESERVATIONS
AND OF OBJECTIONS TO RESERVATIONS
1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with
articles 19, 20 and 23:
(a) Modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the provi­
sions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reserva­
tion; and
(b) Modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations
with the reserving State.
2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other
parties to the treaty inter se.
3. When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force
of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reser­
vation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.
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Article 22. WITHDRAWAL OF RESERVATIONS
AND OF OBJECTIONS TO RESERVATIONS
1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation may be withdrawn at any
time and the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation is not required for
its withdrawal.
2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, an objection to a reservation may be
withdrawn at any time.
3. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, or it is otherwise agreed:
(a) The withdrawal of a reservation becomes operative in relation to another con­
tracting State only when notice of it has been received by that State;
(b) The withdrawal of an objection to a reservation becomes operative only when
notice of it has been received by the State which formulated the reservation.
Article 23. PROCEDURE REGARDING RESERVATIONS
1. A reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation and an objection to a
reservation must be formulated in writing and communicated to the contracting
States and other States entitled to become parties to the treaty.
2. If formulated when signing the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, a reservation must be formally confirmed by the reserving State when ex­
pressing its consent to be bound by the treaty. In such a case the reservation shall be
considered as having been made on the date of its confirmation.
3. An express acceptance of, or an objection to, a reservation made previously
to confirmation of the reservation does not itself require confirmation.
4. The withdrawal of a reservation or of an objection to a reservation must be
formulated in writing.
SECTION 3. ENTRY INTO FORCE AND PROVISIONAL APPLICATION OF TREATIES
Article 24. ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may pro­
vide or as the negotiating States may agree.
2. Failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon
as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating
States.
3. When the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is established on a date
after the treaty has come into force, the treaty enters into force for that State on that
date, unless the treaty otherwise provides.
4. The provisions of a treaty regulating the authentication of its text, the
establishment of the consent of States to be bound by the treaty, the manner or date
of its entry into force, reservations, the functions of the depositary and other matters
arising necessarily before the entry into force of the treaty apply from the time of the
adoption of its text.
Article 25. PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
1. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into
force if:
(a) The treaty itself so provides; or
(b) The negotiating States have in some other manner so agreed.
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2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating States have other­
wise agreed, the provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty with respect
to a State shall be terminated if that State notifies the other States between which the
treaty is being applied provisionally of its intention not to become a party to the treaty.
PART 111. OBSERVANCE, APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION
OF TREATIES
SECTION
I. OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES
Article 26. "PACTA SUNT SERVANDA"
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith.
Article 27. INTERNAL LAW AND OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.
SECTION 2. APPLICATION OF TREATIES
Article 28. NoN-RETROACTIVITY OF TREATIES
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established,
its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or
any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty
with respect to that party.
Article 29. TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF TREATIES
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a
treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.
Article 30. APPLICATION OF SUCCESSIVE TREATIES RELATING
TO THE SAME SUBJECT-MATTER
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and
obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter
shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered
as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty
prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty
but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the
earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those
of the later treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the
earlier one:
(a) As between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
(b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the
treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights
and obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the ter­
mination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any ques-
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tion of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application
of a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards
another State under another treaty.
SECTION 3. INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
Article 31. GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
Article 32. SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Article 33. INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES AUTHENTICATED
IN TWO OR MORE LANGUAGES
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is
equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree
that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the
text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so pro­
vides or the parties so agree.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each
authentic text.
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1,
when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.
Vol. 1155, 1-18232
Annex 45
Government of the Republic of Guyana and Government of the Republic of Venezuela, Minutes
of certain matters dealt with by the Minister of State of Guyana and the Minister of External
Relations of Venezuela in conversations held at Port-of-Spain (June 1970)
Annex 45
Annex 45
Annex 45
Annex 45
Annex 46
Protocol to the Agreement to resolve the controversy between Venezuela and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over the frontier between Venezuela and British
Guiana signed at Geneva on 17 February 1966, 801 U.N.T.S. 183 (18 June 1970)
Annex 46
•I
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No. 11410
GUYANA,
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN mELAND
and VENEZUELA
Protocol . to the Agreement to resolve the controversy between
Venezuela and the· United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland over the frontier between Venezuela and
British Guiana signed at Geneva on 17 February 1966
(" Protocol of Port of Spain "). Signed at Port of Spain on
18 June 1970
Authentic texts: English and Spanish.
Registered by Guyana on 19 November 1971.
GUYANE,
ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE
ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD
et VENEZUELA
Protocole a I' Accord tendant a regler le differend entre le
Venezuela et le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande
du Nord relatif a la frontiere entre le Venezuela et la Guyane
britannique signe a Geneve le 17 fevrier 1966 ( « Protocole de
Port of Spain » ). Signe a Port of Spain le 18 join 1970
Textes authentiques: anglais et espagnol.
Enregistre par la Guyane le 19 novembre 1971.
Annex 46
184
United Nations - Treaty Series
1971
PROTOCOL OF PORT OF SPAIN
1
The Government of Guyana, the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Venezuela,
Having received on this date the Final Report dated 18th June, 1970 of
the Mixed Commission established by the Agreement between the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in consultation
with the Government of British Guiana, and the Government of Venezuela,
signed at Geneva on 17th February, 1966 2, hereinafter referred to as the
Geneva Agreement;
Convinced that the promotion of mutual confidence and positive and
friendly intercourse between Guyana and Venezuela will lead to an impro­
vement in their relations befitting neighbouring and peace-loving nations,
have agreed as follows:
Article I
So long as this Protocol remains in force and subject to the following
provisions the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela shall
explore all possibilities of better understanding between them and between
their peoples and in particular shall undertake periodical reviews, through
normal diplomatic channels, of their relations with a view to promoting their
improvement and with the aim of producing a constructive advancement of the
same.
Article II
(1) So long as this Protocol remains in force no claim whatever arising
out of the contention referred to in Article I of the Geneva Agreement shall
be asserted by Guyana to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela
or by Venezuela to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Guyana.
1
Came into force on 18 June 1970 by signature, in accordance with article VI.
2
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 561, p. 321.
No. 11410
Annex 46
186
United Nations - Treaty Series
1971
(2) In this Article, the references to the territories of Guyana and the
territories of Venezuela shall have the same meaning as the references to the
territories of British Guiana and the territories of Venezuela respectively in the
Geneva Agreement.
Article III
So long as this Protocol remains in force the operation of Article IV of
the Geneva Agreement shall be suspended. On the date when this Protocol
ceases to be in force the functioning of that Article shall be resumed at the
point at which it has been suspended, that is to say, as if the Final Report
of the Mixed Commission had been submitted on that date, unless the Govern­
ment of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela have first jointly declared
in writing that they have reached full agreement for the solution of the con­
troversy referred to in the Geneva Agreement or that they have agreed upon
one of the means of peaceful settlement provided for in Article 33 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Article IV
(1) So long as this Protocol remains in force Article V of the Geneva
Agreement (without prejudice to its further operation after this Protocol
ceases to be in force) shall have effect in relation to this Protocol as it has
effect in relation to that Agreement, subject to the substitution for the words
" British Guiana " wherever they occur in that Article of the word " Guyana ",
and subject to the deletion from paragraph (2) of that Article of the following
phrases:
(a) " , except insofar as such acts or activities result from any agreement
reached by the Mixed Commission and accepted in writing by the Govern­
ment of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela "; and
(b) ", nor shall any claim whatsoever be asserted otherwise than in the Mixed
Commission while that Commission is in being ".
(2) The signing and the continuance of this Protocol shall not be inter­
preted in any way as a renunciation or diminution of any rights which any
of the parties may have of the date on which this Protocol is signed or as a
recognition of any situation, practice or claim existing at that date.
Article V
(1) This Protocol shall remain in force for an initial period of twelve
years, renewable thereafter, subject to the provisions of this Article, for succes­
sive periods of twelve years each.
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(2) Before the expiration either of the initial period or of any period
of renewal the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela
may by agreement in writing decide that with effect from the end of any such
period this Protocol shall continue in force for successive periods of renewal
each less than twelve years but not less than five years.
(3) This Protocol may be terminated at the expiration of the initial
period or of any period of renewal if, at least six months before the date on
which it may be terminated, either the Government of Guyana or the Govern­
ment of Venezuela gives to the other Governments parties to this Protocol
a notice in writing to that effect.
(4) Unless terminated in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article,
this Protocol shall be deemed to have been renewed at the end of the initial
period or at the end of any period of renewal, as the case may be, in accordance
with the provisions of this Article.
Article VI
This Protocol to the Geneva Agreement shall be referred to as the Protocol
of Port of Spain and shall come into force on the date of its signature.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by
their respective Governments, have signed this Protocol.
DONE in triplicate at Port of Spain, Trinidad and Topago, this 18th day
of June, 1970, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally
authoritative.
For the Government of Guyana:
[Signed - Signe]
1
Minister of State
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland:
[Signed- Signe]
2
High Commissioner for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland in Trinidad and Tobago
For the Government of Venezuela:
[Signed - Signe]
3
Minister of External Relations
1
Signed by Shridath S. Ramphal - Signe par Shridath S. Ramphal.
8
Signed by R. C. C. Hunte - Signe par R .C. C. Hunte.
• Signed by Aristides Calvani - Signe par Aristides Calvani.
No.11410
Annex 47
Government of the Republic of Venezuela, Exposition of Motives for the Draft Law Ratifying
the Protocol of Port of Spain (22 June 1970), reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 47
Exposición de Motivos del Proyecto de Ley Aprobatoria del Protocolo de Puerto España.
República de Venezuela, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Reclamación de la Guayana
Esequiba (Caracas 1981) p133-138

[Unofficial Translation]

Exposition of Motives for the Draft Law Ratifying the Protocol of Port of Spain.
Arístides Calvani
Caracas, 22 June 1970

1. On the 17
th
February 1966 the Government of Venezuela and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in consultation with the then-named colony of
British Guiana, concluded the Geneva Agreement, which entered into force on
signature and was subsequently ratified by Congress on 15 April 1966.
2. In conformity with the provisions of Article I of the Agreement, a Mixed Commission
was constituted – formed of two representatives from Venezuela and two from Guyana,
responsible for ‘seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the
controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen as the result
of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier
between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void.’
3. This Mixed Commission held 16 sessions in different cities and concluded the period
of its mandate without having achieved its goal as set out in the Agreement as, from its
inception and during its meetings, there was disagreement between the Venezuelan and
Guyanese representatives over the mandate of the institution they formed. In effect, the
Venezuelan representatives maintained at all times that, in light of the letter and spirit
of Article I, their mandate was only and exclusively to ‘seek satisfactory solutions for
the practical settlement of the controversy’, while the Guyanese representatives
maintained the criterion that the determination of the legality of the Award of 1899 was
a prior question that had to be dealt with preferably before examining any practical
arrangements.
4. In conformity with Article IV of the Geneva Agreement ‘If, within a period of four
years from the date of this Agreement, the Mixed Commission should not have arrived
at a full agreement for the solution of the controversy it shall, in its final report, refer to
the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela any outstanding
questions. Those Governments shall without delay choose one of the means of peaceful
settlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.’ This means
that, in the absence of suspending the legal force of Article IV, the possibility existed
that three months after the submission of the Final Report of the Mixed Commission,
an issue of such vital importance for Venezuela as the determination of the means of
dispute settlement, would have left the hands of the two directly interested Parties, to
be decided by an international institution chosen by them, or failing that, by the
Secretary General of the United Nations.
Annex 47
5. When the Government of Venezuela saw this eventuality approach, it carefully studied
the situation in which the two countries found themselves, and the general picture of
international affairs, in how this might affect our aims, and came to the conclusion that
it was not the right time to enter into this new phase of proceedings.
In effect, the Government of Venezuela considered that given the lack of any
progress at the Mixed Commission - and the sad but unquestionable deterioration in
relations between Venezuela and Guyana - it was difficult if not impossible to hope that
the mechanism of the Geneva Agreement might fulfil its function of finding a
satisfactory solution to resolve the dispute in a practical manner, given that the aim of
that solution necessarily presupposes the exercise (in the means of resolution discussed)
of a willingness of both parties for mutual understanding.
6. In these circumstances the Government of Venezuela, having already moved ahead
with its analysis of the issue through its institutions and specialist civil servants,
considered it necessary to expand these studies and add to them well-qualified
Venezuelans, known for their legal skills, political and administrative experience, and
knowledge of international issues. They consulted people from different groups,
including political leaders, former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Members of the
National Congress, and other experts in law and international relations. At the same
time, expert opinions from foreign specialists of renowned repute were gathered.
All possible alternatives were considered with the greatest of care and the
conclusion was reached that the most convenient (though at the time appeared to be the
most difficult) was to seek a negotiated path with Guyana. The National Government
directed its efforts in this direction. Notwithstanding the initial great differences in
positions, which may have seemed irreconcilable at the start, the meaningful
willingness of Guyana to negotiate was ascertained. The desire for understanding on
the part of both parties made possible the eventual formation of the text of the Protocol
which is now submitted for legislative approval, and which protects rights and interests
and paves the way to create the outcomes necessary to find a peaceful, honourable, and
equitable solution to the dispute.
In reaching a successful outcome in the negotiations, the friendly cooperation
of the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago had particular success, his Excellency
Mr Eric Williams, who made every effort to come to a satisfactory agreement as much
for Venezuela as for Guyana.
It is proper to recognise also the spirit of openness and collaboration that
motivated the Government of Guyana during the negotiations that have led to this happy
outcome, notwithstanding the air of tension and suspicion towards Venezuela that had
previously existed.
7. When negotiations began, the Government of Guyana put forward a period of
suspension (that was too long in the view of the Government of Venezuela) based on
the view that it was best for a new generation to examine the entirety of the problem.
Venezuela, for its part, proposed a period that the Government of Guyana considered
too short. In this manner, the period of 12 years on which agreement was found,
represents a compromise between the extreme proposals, but closer to Venezuela’s
original proposal than that of Guyana.
8. The essential advantages that the Protocol of Port of Spain offers Venezuela, and in
particular the 12 year period mentioned in the previous paragraph, are:
Annex 47
a. Maintains the validity of our claim over the territory that was taken from us by
the Award of 1899;
b. Avoids our border dispute with Guyana from leaving (in a very short period,
possibly three months) direct negotiations between the interested Parties to
passing into the hands of third parties;
c. Opens a sufficiently long period for the two Governments, as set out in article I
of the Protocol, to exploit all opportunities to improve understanding between
them and between their peoples, and in particular, through normal diplomatic
channels, to begin to improve relations and produce constructive advances
through the periodic adjustment of relations;
d. Foresees the possibility that by the end of the period, more suitable
circumstances may exist which (within the terms of the Geneva Agreement and
the international situation prevailing at the time) could lead to a solution of the
dispute or a decision over the means to resolve it;
e. During those 12 years it is possible that Venezuela, through an intelligent and
well organised project of cultural, economic, and other forms of collaboration,
not only reduces the tensions existing today but considerably improves the
current image that the Guyanese people have of Venezuela, which is obviously
not one that corresponds to its history and glorious tradition in the American
world;
f. While in force, the Protocol allows the creation of a favourable environment
that will permit, at the end of 12 years, to continue the process foreseen in
Article IV of the Geneva Agreement, in better circumstances for the completion
of its objective: the achievement of practical solution, acceptable to the parties.
8. It is evident that the term ‘freezing’ that has been used by some commentators of the
Protocol, does not correspond to either the true meaning or intention of it, as the period
of 12 years will not be a period of inactivity but rather during this time, as foreseen in
Article I, the Parties are obligated to make effective efforts to create a genuine
atmosphere of understanding, that paves the way to tackle the resolution of the dispute,
as Article III foresees.
9. The fact that under to Article II of the Protocol neither side may pursue territorial claims
while it is in force does not mean that the rights on which such claims might be based
upon could be reduced or lose their force, in accordance with ordinal 2 of Article IV of
the Protocol. In this manner, all that the Geneva Agreement may contain that is in
Venezuela’s interests is untouched. Further, the Protocol carefully follows the Geneva
Agreement in all references relating to territorial claims, being as it is a treaty in force
duly approved by the Sovereign Congress.
10. Article III of the Protocol protects the totality of the rights that might exist in
Venezuela’s favour at the moment of the signature of the Final Report of the Mixed
Commission. In effect, on the date on which the Protocol no longer applies, the
mechanism of Article IV of the Geneva Agreement restarts at the point of suspension,
that is, as if the Final Report of the Mixed Commission were presented at that moment.
As a matter of fact, the conclusion of the Protocol and the fact of its entry into force
will not be able to be interpreted in any way as a renunciation or reduction of the any
rights that Venezuela might have on the date of its signature, nor as recognition of any
situation, use or claim that might exist by then.
Annex 47
11. Article IV of the Protocol of Port of Spain establishes that while in force, Article V of
the Geneva Agreement will have effect in relation to the Protocol in the same way as it
has in relation to the Agreement. Logically, it was necessary to remove from the Article
references to ‘British Guiana’ replacing it with ‘Guyana’. Equally, it was necessary to
remove references to the ‘Mixed Commission’ now that it has ceased to exist. It was
considered preferable to incorporate the text of the Geneva Agreement to the Protocol
rather than attempt to draft a new article, in order to avoid any risk of changing the legal
‘status quo’.
12. Article V of the Protocol states that it will have an initial duration of 12 years. This
period is renewable for equal or lesser periods, if that is what the Governments of
Venezuela and Guyana agree.
If at the end of the initial period, the National Government considers it
appropriate to suspend the applicability of the Protocol, it only needs to notify the other
parties’ Governments of its decision in writing, providing six months’ notice. If on the
other hand, it considers that a prorogation would be beneficial for Venezuela, it is
enough not to notify. If it considers it preferable, it can agree with the Government of
Guyana a renewal of a period of less than 12, but not less than 5, years.
In any case, it is important to stress the right of Venezuela to terminate the
Protocol at the end of its period of application.

***

The enduring conviction that it is essential to maintain and defend the rights of nationals
with regard to Venezuelan territory taken by virtue of the so-called Award of 1899, and
the clear awareness that the efforts of the Venezuelan people and Government should
always be aimed at rectifying this injustice, is found in all acts of the Government of
Venezuela on this matter. On this there can be no doubts nor hesitation. Our conduct
should be judged, in the final analysis, in light of the responsible and effective advance
towards achieving this primordial goal.
In the opinion of the National Government, the Protocol of Port of Spain opens
new and positive prospects. One should not search in it the victory of one party over
another, nor should one expect such a result from a text that has been carefully
negotiated. It does represent an achievement of the willingness of understanding and a
new stage in the search for a solution to the controversy, not only because it avoids
inconvenient or inopportune steps, but particularly because it puts the emphasis on the
constructive work of creating ties of collaboration and trust between Venezuela and
Guyana. As far as this work continues during the term of the Protocol, it will have made
possible progress toward the satisfaction of Venezuela’s desire for justice in a manner
consonant with its historical legacy, the purity of which we must be jealous defenders.

[Signed] Arístides Calvani
Caracas, 22 June 1970

Annex 47
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
RECLAMACION
DE LA
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTOS
1962 · 1981
CARACAS, 1981
Annex 47
EXPOSICION DE MOTIVOS
DEL PROYECTO DE LEY APROBATORIA
DEL PROTOCOLO DE PUERTO ESPAÑA
1.- El 17 de febrero de 1966 se celebró en Ginebra un Acuerdo entre
el Gobierno de Venezuela y el Reino U nido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del
Norte, en consulta con el Gobierno de la entonces colonia llamada Gua­
yana Británica, que entró en vigencia en el momento de su firma y fue
aprobado posteriormente por el Congreso el 15 de abril de 1966.
2 .- De conformidad con lo previsto en el artículo I del citado Acuerdo,
se constituyó una Comisión Mixta formada por dos representantes de
Venezuela y dos de Guyana, encargada de "buscar soluciones satisfactorias
para el arreglo práctico de la controversia, surgida como consecuencia
de la contención venezolana de que el Laudo Arbitral de 1899 sobre
la frontera entre Venezuela y Guayana Británica es nulo e írrito".
3 .- La mencionada Comisión Mixta celebró 16 reuniones en dife­
rentes ciudades y concluyó el período de su mandato sin haber logrado
realizar el cometido que se Je encomendó por el Acuerdo, debido a que,
desde el comienzo mismo de sus actuaciones y durante todas las reuniones
que celebró, hubo desacuerdo absoluto entre los representantes venezo­
lanos y guyaneses acerca del mandato del organismo que ellos integraban.
En efecto, los representantes venezolanos sostuvieron en todo tiempo
que, a la luz de la letra y del espíritu del Artículo I, ese mandato era
única y exclusivamente el de "buscar soluciones satisfactorias para el
arreglo práctico de la controversia", en tanto que los representantes guya­
neses mantuvieron _el criterio de que la determinación de la nulidad o
validez del Laudo de 1899 era una cuestión previa que debía tratarse
preferentemente antes de analizarse cualquier arreglo práctico o de hecho.
4.- De conformidad con el Artículo IV del Acuerdo de Ginebra "si
dentro de los Jres meses siguientes a la recepción del Informe final el
Gobierno de Venezuela y el Gobierno de Guyana no hubieren llegado a
un acuerdo con respecto a la elección de uno de los medios de solución
previstos en el Artículo 33 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, referirán
133
Annex 47
la decisión sobre los medios de solución a un órgano internacional apro­
piado que ambos Gobiernos acuerden o, de no llegar a un acuerdo sobre
este punto, al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas". Esto significa
que, de no haberse suspendido la vigencia del artículo IV, existía la posi­
bilidad de que, tres meses después de la entrega del Informe Final de
la Comisión Mixta, un asunto de tan vital importancia para Venezuela,
como es la determinación del medio de solución de la controversia, ha­
bría salido de manos de las dos Partes directamente interesadas, para
ser decidido por un organismo internacional elegido por éstas o, en su
defecto, por el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas.
5.- Cuando el Gobierno de Venezuela vio acercarse esa eventualidad,
examinó cuidadosamente la situación en que se encontraban las relaciones
entre los dos países, así como el cuadro general de la política interna­
cional, en lo que éste pudiera repercutir en nuestras aspiraciones, y llegó
a la conclusión de que el momento no era propicio para entrar en esta
nueva fase del procedimiento.
En efecto, estimó el Gobierno de Venezuela que, dada la falta de
todo progresó en la Comisión Mixta y dado el hecho lamentable pero
innegable del deterioro de las relaciones entre Venezuela y Guyana, era
difícil si no imposible esperar que el mecanismo del Acuerdo de Ginebra
pudiera cumplir su función de procurar una solución satisfactoria para
el arreglo práctico de la controversia, ya que el logro de esa solución
presupone necesariamente el ejercicio, en los medios de solución previs­
tos, de una voluntad de entendimiento de parte y parte.
6.- En estas circunstancias, el Gobierno de Venezuela, que ya venía
adelantando el análisis del asµnto por sus organismos y funcionarios espe­
cializados, consideró necesario ampliar esos estudios e incorporar a ellos
calificados venezolanos, destacados por su criterio jurídico, su experiencia
política y administrativa y sus conocimientos de las cuestiones interna­
cionales. Fueron consultadas personalidades pertenecientes a distintos
sectores de opinión, entre ellos dirigentes políticos, los ex Ministros de
Relaciones Exteriores, Miembros del Congreso Nacional y otros expertos
en derecho y en relaciones internacionales. Se procedió igualmente a re­
cabar dictámenes de especialistas extranjeros de reputación .consagrada.
Se ponderaron con el mayor cuidado todas las posibles alternativas y
se llegó a la conclusión de que la más conveniente, aun cuando en vista
del ambiente que para el momento existía parecía la más ardua, con­
sistía en la búsqueda de una vía negociada con Guyana. A este fin en­
caminó el Gobierno Nacional sus esfuerzos. No obstante la amplia di­
vergencia inicial de las posiciones, que al comienzo pudieron parecer
134
Annex 47
irreconciliables, se comprobó la existencia de una efectiva voluntad de
negociación de parte de Guyana. Este deseo de entendimiento por ambas
partes hizo posible eventualmente llegar al texto del Protocolo que hoy
se somete a la aprobación legislativa y que deja a salvo sus derechos e
intereses y abre el camino para crear las conclusiones necesarias para
hacer posible una solución pacífica, honorable y equitativa ,de la con­
troversia.
En el buen éxito de las negociaciones fue particularmente eficaz la
amistosa colaboración del Primer Ministro de Trinidad y Tobago, Ex­
celentísimo señor Eric Williams, quien hizo todos los esfuerzos a su
alcance para lograr un entendimiento satisfactorio tanto para Venezuela
como para Guyana.
Justo es reconocer también, desde luego, el espíritu de receptividad
y colaboración que animó al Gobierno de Guyana durante las negocia­
ciones que condujeron a este feliz resultado, no obstante el clima de
tensión y de suspicacia hacia Venezuela que había existido en el pasado.
7 .- Cuando comenzaron las negociaciones, el Gobierno de Guyana pro­
puso un plazo de suspensión demasiado largo a juicio del Gobierno de
Venezuela, basado en el criterio de que convenía dejar a una nueva ge­
neración el examen completo del problema. Venezuela, por su parte, pro­
puso un plazo que el Gobierno de Guyana consideró demasiado breve.
Así, pues, el término de doce años a que se llegó, representa una fórmula
de compromiso entre las proposiciones extremas, pero más cercana a la
propuesta inicial de Venezuela que a la de Guyana.
8 .- Las ventajas esenciales que ofrece para Venezuela el Protocolo
de Puerto España y, en particular, el plazo de doce años a que se refiere
el número anterior son:
a) mantiene vigente nuestra reclamación sobre el territorio que nos
fue arrebatado por el Laudo de 1899;
b) evita que nuestro litigio fronterizo con Guyana salga en breve
plazo, que podría inclusive ser de tres meses, del ámbito de las
negociaciones directas entre las Partes interesadas y pase a ma­
nos- de terceros;
c) abre un período suficientemente largo para que los dos Gobiernos,
como lo establece el artículo I del Protocolo, puedan explotar
todas las posibilidades de mejorar el entendimiento entre ellos y
entre sus pueblos y en particular emprender a través de los
canales' diplomáticos normales revisiones periódicas de sus rela­
ciones con el propósito de promover su mejoramiento y con el
objeto de producir un adelanto constructivo de las mismas;
135
Annex 47
d) contempla la eventualidad de que al finalizar ese período puedan
existir circunstancias más apropiadas que1 dentro de los términos
del Acuerdo de Ginebra y según la situación internacional que
prevalezca en ese rnomenlo, se traduzcan en una solución del
diferendo o en la determinación de un medio de resolverlo;
e) durante esos doce años le es posible a Venezuela, mediante una
inteligente y bien organizada labor de colaboración cultural, eco­
nómica y de todo orden, no sólo disminuir las tensiones actual­
mente existentes, . sino mejorar considerablemente la imagen que
actualmente tiene de Venezuela el pueblo guyanés y que no es,
evidentemente, la que le corresponde por su pasado y su gloriosa
tradición en el mundo americano;
f) el Protocolo hace posible crear durante el período de su vigencia,
un ambiente propicio que permita, al cabo de doce años, conti­
nuar el procedimiento pautado en el Artículo IV del Acuerdo
de Ginebra, en comliciones más favorables para el cumplimiento
de su objetivo: la obtención de una solución práctica, aceptable
para las partes.
8.- Es evidente que cl término "congelación" empleado por algunos
intérpretes del Protocolo, no corresponde al verdadero sentido ni a la
intención de éste, ya que el plazo de doce años no va a ser un período
de inactividad, sino, por el contrario, durante ese tiempo según lo pre­
visto en el Articulo I se obligan las Partes a realizar esfuerzos efectivos
para crear un clima de real entendimiento, que abra el camino para
abordar la solución de la controversia, como lo contempla el articulo III
del mismo.
9 .- El hecho de que, según el Artículo II del Protocolo, no pueden
liacerse valer durante la vigencia de ésta reclamaciones territoriales por
una .u otra Parte, no significa, desde luego, que en manera alguna dis­
minuyan o pierdan vigencia los derechos en que tales reclamaciones
puedan basarse, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el ordinal 2 del artículo IV
del Protocolo en referencia. De este modo, queda incólume todo lo que
el Acuerdo de Ginebra puede contener de positivo para los intereses vene­
zolanos. Por lo demás, el Protocolo sigue cuidadosamente · en todas las
referencias relativas a reclamaciones territoriales el texto del Acuerdo
de Ginebra, por ser éste un tratado vigente debidamente aprobado por
el Soberano Congreso.
10.- El Artículo III del Protocolo salvaguarda la totalidad de los
derechos que en favor de Venezuela pudieren existir en el momento de
136
Annex 47
t·
la firma del Informe Final de la Comisión Mixta. En efecto, en la fecha
en que el Protocolo deje de tener vigencia, el mecanismo del Artículo
IV del. Acuerdo de Ginebra se reanudará en el punto de la suspensión,
es decir, como si el Informe Final de la Comisión Mixta hubiere sido
presentado en ese momento.
Por lo demás, la celebración del Protocolo y el hecho de su vigencia
no podrán interpretarse en ningún caso como renuncia o disminución
de d.erecho alguno que Venezuela pueda tener para la fecha de la firma
del mismo~ ni como reconocimiento de ninguna situación, uso o preten­
sión que puedan existir para entonces.
11.- El Artículo IV del Protocolo de Puerto España establece que,
durante su vigencia, el Artículo V del Acuerdo de Ginebra tendrá efecto
en relación con el Protocolo en la misma forma en que la tiene en rela­
ción con dicho Acuerdo. Lógicamente, fue preciso eliminar las referen­
cias que dicho Artículo hacia a "Guayana Británica" sustituyéndola por
"Guyana". Igualmente fue necesario suprimir las menciones referentes
a la "Comisión Mixta", ya que ésta había dejado de existir. Se consideró
preferible incorporar al Protocolo el texto mismo del Acuerdo de Ginebra,
en lugar de intentar la redaeeión de un nuevo artículo, a fin de evitar
tocio riesgo de alteración del "statu quo" jurídico.
12.- El Artículo V del Protocolo establece que éste tendrá una duración
inicial de doce años. Este plazo es renovable por períodos iguales o infe­
riores, sí asl lo acordaren los Gobiernos de Venezuela y de Guyana.
Si al finalizar el perodo inicial, el Gobierno Nacional considera con­
veniente que termine la vigencia del Protocolo, simplemente tiene que
notifi~ar por escrito, con seis meses de anticipación, a los demás Gobiernos
Partes en el mismo, su decisión al respecto. Si por el contrario, considera
que una prórroga es beneficiosa para Venezuela, le basta con abstenerse
de dar esa notificación. Puede además, si lo considera más conveniente,
acordar con el Gobierno de Guyana la renovación por un pla,.,() inferior
a doce, pero no menor de cinco años.
En todo caso, es de importancia destacar el derecho que a Venezuela
corresponde de dar por terminado el Protocolo al concluir el plazo de
vigencia.
En todos los actos del Gobierno de Venezuela en esta materia está
presente la pennanente convicción de que es esencial el mantenimiento
y la defensa de los derechos nacionales resp,c-cto del territorio venezolano
137
Annex 47
arrebatado por el llamado Laudo de 1899 y la conciencia plena de que
el esfuerzo del pueblo y del Gobierno venezolanos deben estar siempre
orientados hacia la rect]ficación de esa injusticia. Respecto de esto no
pueden existir ni dudas ni vacilaciones. Nuestra conducta deberá juz­
garse, en último análisis, a la luz del adelanto responsable y eficaz que
logremos hacia ese objetivo primordial.
A juicio del Gobierno Nacional, el Protocolo de Puerto España abre
perspectivas nuevas y positivas. No debe buscarse en él una victoria de
una parte sobre la otra, ni puede esperarse tal resultado de un texto
cuidadosamente negociado. Representa, sí, un éxito de la voluntad de
entendimiento y una nueva etapa en la búsqueda de la solución de la
controversia, no sólo porque evita pasos inconvenientes o ·inoportunos,
sino especialmente porque pone el énfasis en la labor constructiva de la
creación de vínculos de colaboración y confianza entre Venezuela y Gu­
yana. En la medida en que esa labor progrese durante la vigencia del
Protocolo, se habrá hecho posible el progreso hacia la satisfacción del
deseo de justicia de Venezuela en forma cónsona con su legado histórico,
de cuya pureza tenemos que ser celosos defensores.
Caracas, 22 de junio de 1970.
(Fdo.) Arístides Calvani
138
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United Kingdom, Research Department, Venezuela-Guyana Frontier Dispute, Nos. DS(L)692,
RRN 040/360/1 (10 May 1976)
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Annex 49
Declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Venezuela (10 Apr. 1981),
reprinted in Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba:
Documents 1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 49
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CLAIM
OF
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTS
1962 – 1981
CARACAS, 1981
P144-145
1
Annex 49
DECLARATION OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DR. JOSE ALBERTO ZAMBRANO VELASCO
The National Government has made public, on 4 April 1981, the decision of President Herrera
Campíns, not to extend the Protocol of Port of Spain. This is a transcendental decision which
makes our position towards our just claim over the Essequibo territory very clear. That is why,
continuing the debate over whether or not to denounce the Protocol of Port of Spain, or if it
should have been signed eleven years ago is a sterile and unnecessary discussion. The decision
of the Government does not lend itself to interpretation: while appreciating the historical
significance of the Protocol of Port of Spain, its validity will not be renewed. The Government
considers that new ways must be explored in order to materialize our claim and further deems it
necessary to interpret, with this decision, as part of our national sentiment.
Any opinions about the advantages and opportunities related to the Protocol belong to the past.
Nor do I intend to debate its legal value. It is certain that Article stipulates it will come into force
since its signing and that the lack of formal response of the National Congress on the approval of
the Treaty introduces legal particularities. It is also certain that an examination of the legal
scope of all these aspects stands out as purely academic and useless, particularly when all its
provisions have been respected for nearly eleven years and when the President of Venezuela
has announced that there is no desire from us to extend this situation.
The immediate consequence of the termination of the Protocol of Port of Spain is the full
reactivation of the procedures indicated in the Geneva Agreement from 1966. That Agreement,
which gathered some solid support in the National Congress, stipulates that Venezuela and
Guyana must find a satisfactory solution for the practical settlement of the issue.
Thus, the most constructive thing to do for the country at this moment is to focus our attention
and reflections on the Geneva Agreement. We must assess whether Guyana and Great Britain
have complied in good will with the obligations derived from the Agreement. We must itemize
the procedures in the Agreement in order to select, within the goals assigned by the concerned
Parties, the one that suits the country’s best interest.
Under these circumstances it is fundamental for the Venezuelan position to be an expression of
national will not to de diluted into small and sterile issues. The unity of Venezuela is critical in
order to express with greater clarity that, within the respect we feel for our neighbouring State
and friend, we are determined to make them respect our position. To respect the ethical and
legal reasoning for our claim and redress the injustice driven by imperial colonialism and from
which we suffered. To respect the commitment Venezuela, Great Britain and Guyana made in
1966 towards seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the issue.
The chances of making the procedures of the Geneva Agreement work, increase as the unity in
the country becomes higher to this effect. That unity will be equally necessary to make Guyana
and the International Community understand that Venezuela considers unacceptable, still
2
Annex 49
awaiting the satisfying solution to the issue, that by unilateral decisions some acts involving the
claimed territory may take place which could have a serious impact on it and which would
ignore our rights. In the specific case of the dam in Alto Mazaruni it must remain clear, for the
International Community, that its construction in the current circumstances and conditions is
unacceptable for Venezuela. Consequently, we are not willing to recognize any rights that could
have been invoked since the alleged execution of said project.
The strength of the Venezuelan position demands a provision that considers the future of the
issue and not to waste our political and intellectual efforts in unfruitful debates. The National
Government will make a great effort to unite the will and action of the Nation and its
representing sectors to this purpose and hopes that the tone of this debate matches what
History demands from us all at this moment.
Caracas, 10 April 1981
3
Annex 49
r
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
RECLAMACION
DE LA
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTOS
1962 · 1981
CARACAS, 1981
4
Annex 49
DECLARACION DEL MINISTRO DE RELACIONES 'EXTERIORES,
Dr. )OSE ALBERTO ZAMBRANO VELASCO
El Gobierno Nacional ha hecho pública, por comunicado de fecha
4 de abril de 1981, la decisión del Presidente Herrera Campíns de no
prorrogar el Protocolo de Puerto España. Esta es, sin duda, una determi­
nación trascendental, que sitúa en una clara perspectiva nuestra justa
reclamación sobre el Territorio Esequibo. Por eso, continuar la contro­
versia sobre si debe o no denunciarse el Protocolo de Puerto España;
o si debió o no firmarse hace once años, parece innecesario y aun estéril.
La decisión del Gobierno no se presta a interpretaciones: sin detenerse
a valorar el significado histórico del Protocolo de Puerto España, es lo
cierto que dicho instrumento no se renovará. El Gobierno juzga que
deben explorarse nuevos caminos para materializar nuestra reclamación,
y estima interpretar, con su decisión, el sentir nacional.
Así como el juicio sobre la conveniencia y oportunidad del Protocolo
pertenecen a la historia, tampoco tiene sentido debatir sobre el valor
jurídico de dicho instrumento. Si bien es cierto que el artículo 6 dispone
que entrará en vigencia desde su firma, y que la falta de pronunciamiento
formal del Congreso Nacional sobre la aprobación de ese Tratado, intro­
duce particularidades específicas en el orden jurídico, no es menos cierto
que· luce puramente académico e inútil, un ejercicio sobre el alcance
jurídico de todoS estos aspectos, cuando se han respetado sus disposicio­
nes por casi once años, y cuando el Presidente de Venezuela ha anun­
ciado que no existe, por nuestra parte, disposición alguna para prorrogar
esa situación.
La consecuencia inmediata de la extinción del Protocolo de Puerto
España, es la plena reactivación de los procedimientos señalados por
el Acuerdo de Ginebra de 1966. Ese Acuerdo, que tuvo en su oportu­
nidad un respaldo sólido en el Congreso Nacional, dispone que Vene­
zuela y Guyana: deben encontrar una solución satisfactoria para el arre­
glo práctico de la controversia.
144
5
Annex 49
De ahí que lo más constructivo para el país, en este momento, sea
concertar nuestra atención y nuestras reflexiones en el Acuerdo de Gi­
nebra. Debemos valorar si Guyana y Gran Bretaña han cumplido de
buena fe las obligaciones que se derivan del mismo. Debemos desmenuzar
los procedimientos que establece ese Tratado, a fin de seleccionar aquel
que, dentro de los objetivos que las partes le asignaron, convenga mejor
al interés del país.
En estas circunstancias es fundamental que la posición venezolana sea
expresión de una voluntad nacional, que no se diluya en pequeñas polé­
micas estériles. La unidad de los venezolanos es decisiva para que se
entienda con mayor claridad que, dentro del respeto que tenemos por
la existencia de un Estado vecino y amigo, tenemos también la firme
determinación de hacer respetar nuestra posición. De que se respete el
fundamento ético y jurídico de nuestra reclamación a obtener una re­
paración por el atropello del que fuimos víctimas por la acción de los
imperios coloniales. Y de que se respete igualmente el compromiso que
adquirieron Venezuela, Guyana y Gran Bretaña en 1966 de encontrar
soluciones satisfactorias para un arreglo práctico de la controversia.
Las posibilidades de hacer funcionar positivamente los procedimientos
del Acuerdo de Ginebra aumentan en la medida en que haya mayor
unidad del país alrededor de estos asuntos. Esa unidad será igualmente
necesaria para hacer comprender a Guyana y a la Comunidad Interna­
cional que para Venezuela es inaceptable, pendiente aún la solución
satisfactoria de la controversia, que por decisión unilateral se produzcan
actos de disposición sobre el territorio reclamado, que podrían afectarlo
gravemente y que pretenderían desconocer nuestros derechos. En el
caso concreto de la represa del Alto Mazaruni debe quedar claro, en el
ámbito internacional, que su construcción en las condiciones actuales
es inadmisible para Venezuela y que en consecuencia no estamos dis­
puestos a reconocer ningún derecho que pretendiera invocarse a partir de
la hipotética ejecución de dicho proyecto.
La fuerza de la posición venezolana exige una disposición a ver el
asunto de cara al futuro y a no desperdiciar nuestro trabajo intelectual
y político en debates infructuosos. El Gobierno Nacional se propone un
gran esfuerzo para sumar la voluntad y la acción de la Nación y de sus
sectores representativos en este propósito, y espera que el tono del debate
se adecue a lo que la Historia nos exige a todos en este momento.
Caracas, 10 de abril de 1981
1
145
6
Annex 50
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement (2 May 1981) reprinted in
Republic of Venezuela, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Claim of Guyana Esequiba: Documents
1962-1981 (1981)
Annex 50
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLAIM
OF
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA

DOCUMENTS
1962 – 1981

CARACAS, 1981
P146-148
1
Annex 50

REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cabinet Minister
DECLARATION
The decision of the National Government not to continue to apply the Protocol of Spain after it
has come to an end, expressed to Mr Burnham on the occasion of his visit to Caracas results in
the provisions in Article IV of the Geneva Agreement coming into full force.
The Geneva Agreement is an International Treaty, concluded in 1966 by Venezuela, Great Britain
and Guyana, the latter, at the time, being close to becoming independent. The commitment in
the Agreement stipulated that Venezuela and Guyana were to seek satisfying solutions for the
practical arrangement of the issue. To that end a Mixed Commission was created, and it was
foreseen, as can be seen in Article IV that should the Mixed Commission not produce concrete
results, the return to the means for a peaceful settlement of the issue found in Article 33 of the
United Nations Charter. That is why our National Government, in the current perspective and
reconsidering our territorial claim in terms as per the Geneva Agreement, deems it necessary to
state before the country:
1. The Geneva Agreement was approved, at that time, by determining the national consensus,
which was expressed by a landslide majority after being submitted for consideration to the
Congress and ratified by the Head of State at that moment, Dr. Raúl Leoni. It is true that
then, just like now, some sectors and individuals expressed respectable arguments against
the Agreement. However, it is also certain that the Agreement, after being approved by the
Congress, became a Law of the Republic and it is an international commitment for
Venezuela.
At all moments, Venezuela has worked hard to follow the provisions of the Agreement,
convinced that if the two concerned Parties committed to complying with it in good faith
then its goal will be achieved, i.e. find a satisfactory solution for the practical settlement of
the issue. That is why, and without ignoring the value of some critics poured against that
Treaty, the Government will insist in asserting its provisions to find a solution to our claim.
Obviously, if the planned means towards a solution in the Geneva Agreement were depleted
and the issue still remained unresolved, or that there was more evidence that the other
concerned Party lacked the intention to fulfill its provisions by refusing to negotiate
satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the territorial issue, then it could be
necessary to reconsider the procedures towards obtaining that owed redressing from
Guyana. Consequently, if according to the recent declarations by the Government of
Guyana, the territorial issue between our two countries is restricted to the Treaty of 1897
and the Award of 1899, it is obvious that they want to disregard the Geneva Agreement.
2
Annex 50
Refusing to negotiate in compliance with what was agreed is not only ignoring the injustice
carried out against Venezuela but also refusing to comply with international commitments.
2. The Geneva Agreement imposes a duty on the concerned Parties to seek satisfactory
solutions for the practical settlement of the issue. That is why, Venezuela, from the
beginning, has been willing to consider all the problems related to this matter, whether
marine, political, cultural, economic or social and not to restrict it to just the examination of
the nullity of the inexistent Award of 1899 as Guyana seems to try. Venezuela considers that
a practical settlement is not possible without approaching first all the surrounding
circumstances to the issue as a whole and further considers that any behaviour against this
constitutes a breach of the obligation to negotiate a satisfactory solution as it was agreed in
the Geneva Agreement.
3. It is convenient for all Venezuelans to remember when Venezuela supported with its
recognition the new State of Guyana on the occasion of its independence. Venezuela did so
with the explicit reservation over all the Essequibo territory up so long as no practical
settlement of the issue was in place. The terms of that reservation are the following:
“Venezuela recognizes as the new State’s territory that starting East from the right
bank of the Essequibo River and reiterates before the new country and before the
international community, that it reserves its rights of territorial sovereignty over the
whole area from the left bank on from the Essequibo River. As a consequence, the
Guayana Esequiba, the territory over which Venezuela reserves its sovereign rights,
neighbours East with the new State of Guyana through the line of the Essequibo
River, the latter being taken from its source to its mouth at the Atlantic Ocean”.
(Extract from the Recognition Note on the State of Guyana, 26 May 1966).
4. Venezuela is willing to find, in compliance with the provisions of Article IV of the Geneva
Agreement, an appropriate means to find a satisfactory solution for the practical settlement
of the issue. That same willingness is a necessary condition to turn to the means for
peaceful solutions contained in International Law. Thus, Venezuela is concerned about the
behaviour of the Guyanese Government or certain actions during its mandate, which seem
to run counter to the goal of seeking a peaceful solution of our issue.
This explains why a considerable part of the diplomatic procedures which we are now
presenting is destined to make that position very clear. In order to achieve that, we need
the help of our foreign office along with any extraordinary means such as visits or direct
contact with high representatives from other States. However, they also demand a high
degree of cooperation among the different sectors in the country. It is necessary to keep
expressing this position before Guyana, Great Britain and the International Community with
clarity and determination since it represents our national sentiment.
Caracas, 2 May 1981
3
Annex 50
r
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
RECLAMACION
DE LA
GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
DOCUMENTOS
1962 · 1981
CARACAS, 1981
4
Annex 50
l
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Gabinete del Ministro
DECLARACION
La decisión del Gobierno Nacional de no continuar aplicando más
allá de su término el Protocolo de Puerto España, comunicada al señor
Burnham en la oportunidad de su visita a Caracas, trae como conse­
cuencia que recobren plenamente su vigor las disposiciones del Artículo
IV del Acuerdo de Ginebra.
El Acuerdo de Ginebra es un Tratado Internacional, suscrito en 1966
por Venezuela, Gran Bretaña y Guyana, país éste que estaba, para la
época, en vísperas de obtener su independencia. El compromiso asumido
por el Acuerdo era que Venezuela y Guyana buscaran soluciones satis­
factorias para el arreglo práctico de la controversia. Para ello, se esta­
bleció una Comisión Mixta, y se previó, justamente en el Artículo IV
y p;;i.ra el
caso de que esa Comisión no obtuviera resultados concretos,
recurrir a los medios de solución pacífica de las controversias recogidos
en el Artículo 3 3 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. Por ello, en la
perspectiva presente, que replantea nuestra reclamación terrítoríal, en
los términos del Acuerdo de Ginebra, el Gobierno Nacional cree con­
veniente precisar ante el país:
1) El Acuerdo de Ginebra fue aprobado, en su momento, por un
determinante consenso nacional, que se expresó en una abrumadora ma-'
yoria al ser sometido a consideración del Congreso y ratificado por quien
entonces era el Jefe del Estado, Doctor Raúl Leoni. Es cierto que enton­
ces, como ahora, algunos sectores e índívídualídades expresaron res­
petables argumentos contra dicho Acuerdo. Pero también es cierto que
el mismo, al ser aprobado por el Congreso, se convirtió en Ley de la
República y constituye un compromiso internacional de Venezuela.
En todo momento Venezuela se ha esmerado en observar rigurosa­
mente los preceptos de dicho Acuerdo, convencida de que si las dos Partes
se proponen cumplirlo de buena fe, se obtendrá con toda seguridad su
146
5
Annex 50
propósito, esto es, h¡illar una solución satisfactoria para el arreglo prác­
tico de la controversia. Por ello, sin desconocer el valor que tienen al­
gunas de las críticas que se han hecho a ese Tratado, el Gobierno insis­
tirá en hacer valer sus disposiciones para encontrar una solución a
nuestra reclamación.
Obviamente, para el caso de que se agotaran los medios de solución
previstos en el Acuerdo de Ginebra, sin que la controversia haya quedado
resuelta, o que se continuara evidenciando que la otra Parte carece de
intención de cumplir con sus disposiciones, negándose a negociar las
soluciones satisfactorias para el arreglo práctico de la controversia terri­
torial, podría ser necesario replantear la orientación de las gestiones
encaminadas a obtener la reparación debida a Venezuela. En conse­
cuencia, si según las recientes declaraciones del Gobierno de Guyana,,
el problema territorial entre nuestros dos países se restringe al Tratado
de 1897 y al Laudo de 1899, es obvio que lo que se pretende es pres­
cindir del Acuerdo de Ginebra. Negarse a negociar de conformidad con
lo pactado es no sólo desconocer la injusticia cometida contra Vene­
zuela; sino rehusarse a cumplir los compromisos internacionales con­
traídos.
2) El Acuerdo de Ginebra impone a las Partes el deber de buscar
soluciones satisfactorias para el arreglo práctico de la controversia. Por
ello, desde el primer momento, Venezuela ha estado dispuesta a con­
siderar todos los problemas implicados en esta materia, sean éstos poli­
ticos, marítimos, culturales, económicos o sociales, y a no limitarse al
mero examen de la nulidad del inexistente Laudo de 1899, como parece
pretender Guyana. Venezuela considera que un arreglo práctico no es
posible sin abordar esta temática en su conjunto y que toda conducta
distinta constituye una violación de la obligación de negociar una solu­
ción satisfactoria, tal como fue convenido en el Acuerdo de Ginebra.
3) Es conveniente que todos los venezolanos recuerden que cuando
Venezuela otorgó el reconocimiento al nuevo Estado de Guyana con
ocasión de su independencia, lo hizo con expresa reserva sobre todo el
territorio esequibo, mientras no se obtenga un arreglo práctico de la
controversia. Los términos de esa reserva son tan claros como los Si­
guientes:
"Venezuela reconoce como territorio del nuevo Estado el que se
sitúa al Esté de la margen derecha del río Esequibo, y reitera
ante el nuevo país, y ante la comunidad internacional, que se
reserva expresamente sus derechos de soberanía territorial sobre
147
6
Annex 50
toda la zona que se encuentra a la margen izquierda del pre­
citado río; en consecuencia, el territorio de la Guayana Ese­
quiba sobre el cual Venezuela se reserva expresamente sus dere­
chos soberanos, limita al Este con el nuevo Estado de Guyana,
a través de la línea media del río Esequibo, tomado éste desde
su nacimiento hasta su desembocadura en el Océano Atlántico".
(Extracto de la Nota de Reconocimiento del Estado de Guyana, de fecha
26 de mayo de 1966).
4) Venezuela tiene la mejor disposición de hallar, dentro de las
previsiones del Artículo IV del Acuerdo de Ginebra, un medio apto para
encontrar una solución satisfactoria para el arreglo 'práctico de la con­
troversia. Esa disposición previa es una condición necesaria para recu­
rrir a los medios de solución pacífica recogidos por el Derecho Inter­
nacional. De allí que Venezuela vea con preocupación ciertas actitU.des
del gobierno guyanés o cumplidas bajo su amparo, que parecen contra­
dictorias con el propósito de encontrar un medio de solución pacífica
para nuestra controversia.
De allí que buena parte de la gestión diplomática que actualmente
adelantamos está destinada a dejar claramente sentada esta posición.
Para ello son necesarios los medios ordinarios de nuestro servicio exterior,
así como los extraordinarios que se cumplen con ocasión de visitas o
contactos directos con altos funcionarios de otros Estados. Pero exigen
también un alto grado de cooperación de los distintos sectores del país.
Es preciso continuar transmitiendo ante Guyana, Gran Bretaña y la Co­
munidad Internacional, esta posición clara y decidida como expresión
del sentir nacional.
Caracas, 2 de mayo de 1981
148
7
Annex 51
Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Venezuela to the President of the
World Bank (8 June 1981)
Annex 51
Annex 51
Annex 51
Annex 52
Letter from the Vice President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana to the President of the
World Bank (19 Sept. 1981)
Annex 52
GUYANA'S UPPER-MAZAR UNI
HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECT
Guyana's answer to a
Venezuelan representation
to the World Bank
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC
PLANNING ANO FINANCE
GUYANA
Annex 52
{
GUYANA'S UPPER-MAZARUNI
HYDRO-ETECTRIC PROJECT
LETTER FROM VICE-PRESIDENT
HUGH DESMOND HOYTE
OF GUYANA TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE WORLD BANK
ANSWERING CERTAIN REPRESENT A TI ONS
MADE TO THE BANK
BY FOREIGN MINISTER
DR· J.A · ZAMBRANO VELASCO
OF VENEZUELA.
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC
PLANNING AND FINANCE
SEPTEMBER , 1981 .
Annex 52
letter from Vice-President Hugh Desmond Hoyte of
Guyana to the President of the World Bank
answering certain representations made
to the Bank by Foreign Minister
Dr. J .A. Zambrano Velasco of
Venezuela .
...
Office of the Vice President,
(Economic Planning and Finance),
Avenue of the Republic,
Georgetown, Guyana.
September 19, 1981.
Mr. A. W. Clausen,
President,
The World Bank,
1818 "H" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433.
Dear Mr. President,
On behalf of the Government of the Co-operative Republic
of Guyana, I wish to place on record its views on certain re,
presentations which were made in a communication dated June 8,
1981, addressed to your predecessor by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Venezuela, Dr. Jose Alberto Zambrano
Velasco. In that communication, the Minister raised what pur ported
to be an objection by his Government to the involvement of the
World Bank in the realisation of the Upper Mazaruni Hyd ro-electr ic
Project in Guyana - a project on which the Government of Guyana
3
Annex 52
and the Bank have been in consultation for some time. The
Venezuelan authorities gave maximum publicity to the document
by facilitating the reproduction of its text in Venezuelan national
newspapers, circulating copies to the representatives of member
states of the Bank and otherwise ensuring world-wide distribution.
In a communique issued in Caracas on the same date, the
Venezuelan Foreign Ministry described the document as "an
ultimatum to the World Bank". That a member state could boast
of having threatened the Bank is surely a matter for sacl~ess -,d
regret.
2. Before dealing with the contents of the said c, 1muni-
cation, may I first of all discharge a more pleasant and agreeable
duty and, on behalf of the Government and people of Guyana,
congratulate you on your appointment as President of the Bank
and extend to you best wishes for a successful and rewarding
tenure of office. I do so with keen appreciation of the qualities of
leadership and the wide experience you have brought to your high
office; and I am confident that these assets will be of in .. c;timable
value to the Bank in the fulfilment of its mandate under the nro­
visions of its charter. May I take this opportunity, also, t express
the desire of my Government that the relationship of co-operation
and understanding which has characterised its association with the
Bank will be deepened and enhanced during your administration.
3. (a) In the communication under reference, the
Venezuelan Foreign Minister hazarded a number of arguments in
his attempt to justify his Government's declared hostility to the
Bank's participation in the Upper Mazaruni Hydro-electric Project.
These can be conveniently summarised under two broad heads:
first, that Venezuela is asserting a claim to that part of Guyana s
territory in which the hydro-electric facility will be located; and,
second, that the development priority of the project has not been
demonstrated.
(b) Let me immediately dispose of the proposition
advanced under the second head: in the submission of the Govern­
ment of Guyana, it is irrelevant. It is not within the comrE>tence of
the Government of Venezuela to decide on or dictate the develop­
ment priorities of Guyana; nor has the Government of Guyana
found any provision in the Bank's charter that requires the Bank
to satisfy the Government of Venezuela about the development
priorities of a member country before it can participate in a project
in that coun try. Moreover, it is manifest absurdity for the
Government of Venezuela to suggest that the Bank would become
4
Annex 52
•
involved in the financing of a project without first establishing its
feasibility. Further on this point, I would merely add that the
Venezuelan Foreign Minister is under a misconception when he
asserts that the feasibility of the project depends upon the purchase
of electricity by Venezuela. This statement is completely divorced
from fact. The project has been independently assessed by the
World Bank, among others as being technically and economically
feasible, in circumstances which do not involve or require
Venezuelan participation in any shape or form .
4. Of graver import, however, is the objt!ction based on the
assertion by Venezuela of a claim to five-eighths of the land mass
of our country. I wish at the outset to state Guyana's position on
this matter. The Government and people of Guyana do not accept
the validity of any claim by Venezuela to any part of their territory
and reject any such claim in its entirety as having no legal or moral
foundation. This claim poses a serious.threat to peace and stability
in the region. But more germane to the Bank's business are the
serious implications of the Venezuelan Foreign Minister's com
­
munication for the non-political character of the institution and
its objectivity and independence in the _administration of its affairs.
As the Government of Guyana understands it, Mr. President, the
Bank's charter requires it to qpply only economic considerations
in arriving at its decisions. What the Venezuelan Government is
attempting to do, in this particular case, is to interfere in the
Bank's modus operandi and introduce a political dimension into
its decision-making processes. The Bank has always resisted efforts
at political intervention in its affairs, and the Government of
Guyana is sure that under your distinguished leadership it will
continue to rebuff those who seek to use it as a tool to promote
their partisan objectives. Indeed, it would be remarkable if the
mere assertion by one country of a claim to the territory of
another country were to be deemed a sufficient ground for the
Bank to abdicate its responsibilities under its charter and decline
to participate in the development of the latter country.
5.
I consider
it unnecessary and inappropriate, Mr.
President, to burden you with a seriatim refutation of the specious
arguments advanced by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister. Those
arguments derive from a selective and tendentious appeal to facts
and history and are inevitably vitiated by misinformation, mis­
representation and misinterpretation . Fortunately, the facts relating
to the historical and legal issues alluded to by the Venezuelan
Foreign Minister are not matters for speculation: they have been
definitively established and cannot be altered or wished away by
5
Annex 52
mere rhetoric, however repetitious or strident. In the circumstances,
I have taken the liberty of enclosing with this letter, for your
information and the Bank's archives, the following publications
which document these facts in their legal and historical setting and
expose the absurdity of Venezuela's claim:
(1) Memorandum on the Guyana/Venezuela Boundary:
(2) Documents on the Territorial Integrity of Guyana:
and
(3) Documents concerning the Visit to Venezuela of
the President of the Co-operative Republic of
Guyana: April 2 - 3, 1981.
Against this background, I will now make summary reference to
cert ain aspects of the representations made in the said
communication.
6. (a) T he bounda ry between Guyana and Venezuela was
legally sett led in 1899 by an International Arbitral Tribunal
consti tuted pursuant to the Treaty of Washington of 1897, which
had been concluded by Great Britain and Venezuela for that
specific issue. The Governments of the two countries solemnly
bound themselves by the said Treaty to accept the award of the
T ribunal as a "full, final and perfect settlement". The award of
1899 was formally accepted by both parties and duly acted upon.
Immed iately thereafter, Great Britain and Venezuela set up a
Mixed Bou ndary Commission to survey and demarcate the
boundary on the grou nd. The Commission concluded its work in
190 5, and signed and submitted a unanimous joint report along
with th e relevant maps, and these were unreservedly accepted by
the Governments of the two countries. The boundary between
Guyana and Venezuela was thus definitively established and
then cefo rward acknowledged and respected by the international
community , inclu ding Venezuela. It was on the basis of this
establish ed bou ndary that Guyana acceded to independence in
1966 and became a member of the Bank in the same year.
(b) For six decades, notwithstanding the Venezuelan
Foreign Minister 's asseverations to the contrary, Venezuela
fulfi lled her obligations un der international law with respect to the
common bo undary with Guyana as determined by the Arbitral
Award of 1899. However, in 1962 as Guyana was about to gain
her ~nde pende nce as a sovereign state, Venezuela repudiated the
6
Annex 52
Arbitral Award as being null and void and advanced a claim to
some five-eighths of our country. The substantial basis of this in­
credible proposition was a memorandum allegedly dictated in
1944 by a junior member of the team of lawyers who had re­
presented Venezuela before the Arbitral Tribunal in 1899. The
story of this memorandum is intriguing. In January, 1944, the
Venezuelan Government had decorated this lawyer - Mallet­
Prevost, with Venezuela's highest honour, the Order of the
Liberator. He died in 1949, fully half a century after the arbitral
proceedings of 1899 and, at the time of his death, had been the last
of the principal actors who had taken part in these events. Shortly
after his death, there was published a document which his law
partner claimed to have found among Mallet-Prevost's papers. This
document - the famous memorandum - was dated 9th February,
1944, recorded that it had been "dic tated" by Mallet-Prevost, and
contained the following direction: "not to be made public except
at his (i.e. the law partner's) discretion after my death".
(c) The gravamen of this memorandum - a bald, two­
page document - was that the award of 1899 was the result of
fraud and collusion among the distinguished jurists who had parti­
cipated in the work of the tribunal. It was on the basis of the
general averment contained in this document that the Venezuelan
Government boldly proclaimed that the "full, final and perfect
settlement" of 1899 was null and void and, mirabi/e dictu, that
Venezuela was automatically entitled to five-eighths of the territory
now comprising the State of Guyana. When the memorandum was
published and the preposterous contention based upon its contents
was first advanced, Mallet-Prevost was conveniently beyond the
pale of human interrogation.
(d) The Venezuelan claim to Guyana's territory is
,
founded on this dubious and self-serving document. Over the years,
the Venezuelan Government has never even attempted to discharge
the heavy on~s of proof which it must accept to establish its case
based on the memorandum. The general allegation comes down to
this: that the eminent jurists who had constituted the Arbitral
Tribunal of 1899 had all conspired to give a perverse award and
corruptly deprive Venezuela of territory rightfully hers. These
jurists were the Honourable Melville Weston Fuller, Chief Justice
of the United States of America, and his colleague, the Honourable
David Josiah Brewer, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States of America;the Right Honourable Lord Russell of Killowen,
the Lord Chief Justice of England, and his colleague, the
7
Annex 52
Honourable Sir Richard Henn Collins, a Justice of Her Britannic
Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature; and Frederic de Martens,
a respected Russian jurist who had been unanimously chosen by
the other arbitrators as the fifth member and President of the
tribunal. Chief Justice Fuller had been nominated personally by
the President of Venezuela, and the other members had been
selected in accordance with procedures agreed between Great
Britain and Venezuela and incorporated in the provisions of the
Treaty of Washington of 1897.
(e) But the allegation is even more unfortunate, for
the Venezuelan Government's contention of necessity impugns the
integrity of Venezuela's leading counsel at the arbitration proceed­
ings; namely, General Benjamin Harrison, a former President of
the United States of America, and General Benjamin Tracy, a
former United States Secretary for War, both of whom sub­
sequently acclaimed the award as a triumph for Venezuela and a
vindication of her rights. But more than that: the Venezuelan case
had been championed by the United States Government which,
through President Grover Cleveland, had invoked the Monroe
doctrine and threatened war to force a reluctant Great Britain to
agree to submit the dispute to arbitration. On the promulgation of
the award, President Cleveland and the United States Government
had also hailed it as a victory for Venezuela. The Venezuelan case,
therefore, also involves the pleading that the United States
President and Government lent their immense prestige and
authority to the approval of an award which denied justice to a
country whose case they had championed. The tenuous nature of
the Venezuelan Government's allegation needs no further
demonstration. Not a scintilla of evidence has ever been adduced
to justify the assault contained in the memorandum upon the
integrity of those distinguished jurists who, during their lifetime,
had served their countries - and Venezuela - with honour and
distinction.
7. (a) Conscious of the frailty of a case which rested on
the so-called Mallet-Prevost memorandum, Venezuela drummed up
alternative arguments relating principally to the negotiations pre­
paratory to the signing of the Treaty of Washington of 1897 and
the fact that the Tribunal did not record reasons for its decision.
But the material upon which the alternative arguments have been
founded has always been in the full knowledge of Venezuela: yet,
she positively affirmed the validity of the boundary for six
decades. For this and other reasons which cannot conveniently be
elaborated here, the alleged alternative grounds are without merit.
8
Annex 52
(b} But even if, for the sake of argument, we were to
concede the Venezuelan contention that both the Award of 1899
and the boundary laid down pursuant to it were invalid, the land
claimed by Venezuela would not automatically go to her. The
matter would then be at large, and there would devolve on Guyana.
the original British claim to the Amakura, Barima and Cuyun i
areas which were lost to Venezuela as a result of the Award. The
British had asserted sovereignty to, and had in fact exercised
sovereignty over, these areas which in the case of the Amakura and
the Barima extended as far as the mouth of the Orinoco River.
8. Against the background of the established historical
facts, it is difficult to understand how the Venezuelan Foreign
Minister could refer to the 1899 Arbitral Award as being "non­
existent". In the context of the Venezuelan Government's appea l
to the United States of America to champion and represent its
cause (which appeal was accepted by the United States
Government), the Venezuelan Foreign Minister's complaint that
Venezuelan citizens did not participate (and were not allowed to
participate) in the proceedings as arbitrators or counsel is perplex­
ing. Venezuela freely chose to have her interests represented by
her powerful sponsor, the. United States of America. The
Honourable Melville Weston Fuller, Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, was chosen personally by the President of
Venezuela; and the Venezuelan Government of its own volition re­
tained General Harrison and General Tracy as its leading counsel.
For the Venezuelan Foreign Minister to assert that Venezuela has
"never recognised" the Arbitral Award of 1899 is to do violence
to the meaning of words and to ignore the palpable and irrefutable
evide nce of history. I need only refer to the fact that between
1901 and 1905, a Venezuelan/British Mixed Commission
demarcated the present boundary and that in 1932 Venezuela,
Brazil and Guyana (represe nted by Great Britain), collaborated in
surveying, determining and marking the tri-junction point where
the boundaries of the three countries meet at Mt. Roraima.
9. (a) I now turn to the references which were made in
the communication aforesaid to the Geneva Agreement of 17th
February, 1966, and the Protocol of Port-of-Spain of 18th June,
1970, signed by the representatives of the Governments of Great
Britain, Guyana and Venezuela. The Venezuelan Foreign Minister
seems to be urging the proposition that the said Agreement and
Protocol constitute a recognition of the validity of the Venezuelan
claim to our territory and that the Government of Guyana is pr e­
cluded by their existence or their provisions from proceeding with
9
Annex 52
the development of the whole of the country. The construction
which he so seeks to put upon the documents is not warranted or
supported by the text or spirit of the documents and has no
substance in law. They in no way constitute an acknowledgment
or recognition of the validity of Venezuela's claim; nor do they in
any way inhibit Guyana from developing any part of her territory.
Guyana would never consent to any arrangement having such an
effect.
(b) It may be usef ul to explain the background to the
Geneva Agreement and the Protocol. I have already remarked that
as Guyana approached independence the Government of Venezuela
sought to thwart that process by formally denouncing the Arbitral
Award of 1899 as null and void in 1962 and fabricating a claim to
Guyana's territory. As a gesture of goodwill and in order to permit
a smooth transition of our country to independence, the Govern­
ment of the United Kingdom, at that time the administering
colonial power, agreed to allow the Venezuelan .Government to
examine all the records in its archives relating to the arbitration
proceedings . The United Kingdom Government was admant,
however , that its offer was not a recognition of the validity of
Venezuela's claim. The British representative stated his Govern­
ment's position with categorical firmness in these words:
In making this offer, I must make it very clear that it is
in no sense an offer to engage in substantive talks about
the revision of the frontier. That we cannot do; for we
consider that there is no justification for it.
The Venezuelan Government accepted the offer and through a
panel of experts examined all relevant documents between 1963
and 1965. The Venezuelan experts failed to turn up any evidence
which was supportive of their Government's contention. This fact,
however , did not persuade Venezuela to abandon her opposition
to Guyana's accession to independence.
(c) In the continued spirit of goodwill, on February
17, 1966 (when Guyana was just four months away from inde­
pendence) the representatives of the United Kingdom and Guyana
signed the Geneva Agreement with Venezuela. This Agreement
provided for the establishment ·of a Guyana/Venezuela Mixed
Commission , the stated object of which was to seek "sat isfactory
solutions for the practical settlement of the con~roversy between
f
Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen over the
Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 . .. is null
10
Annex 52
and void". Th e Agreement ia no way constituted any acknowledg­
ment or recogni t ion of the validity of Venezuela's claim: it merely
sought to establish mechanisms for resolving the said controversy.
(d) The Mixed Commission was du ly appointed in
1966. However, it was unable to proceed with the work within its
terms of reference for the simple reason that the Venezuelan
commissioners did not approach their task as the Agreement
required from the point of view of examining the Venezuelan
contention about the nullity of the 1899 Award. They wished,
instead, to proceed on the assumption that the contention had
l
been established and that all that was necessary was for Guyana to
agree to a realignment of the bounda ry in acco rdance with
Venezue lan demands. Guyana of course categorically rejected the
Venezuelan positio n as being inconsistent with the Commission's
terms of reference and therefore unacceptable. In accordance with
t he relevant provisions of the Agreement, the life of the Commission
came to an end early in 1970.
(e) Thereafter, the Governments of Guya na and
Venezuela duly consulted and agreed to suspend the application of
Article 4 of the Geneva Agreement which prescribed additional
modalities for dealing with the said controversy. In terms of and
pursuant to those consultations, the Protocol of Port-of-Spain was
signed on 18th June, 1970, by the representatives of the Govern­
ments of Guyana, the United Kingdom and Venezuela. The
Protocol put the controversy in abeyance for twelve years, in the
first instance, and expressly prohibited the assertion of territorial
sovereignty by either country to the territory of the other during
this period of moratorium. The Protocol contained provisions for
its automatic or consensua l renewal or for its termination. In April
of this year, the Government of Venezuela publicly announce d its
intention not to renew the Prot ocol. If it does in fact exe rcise its
right to terminate the Protocol, then, th e Governmen t of Guyana
will reserve its right to exerc ise any of th e op tions ope n to it under
intern ational law.
(f) In the light of the foregoing the Venezue lan
Foreign Minister's communication has demonstrated contempt by
the Venezue lan Government for the sanctity of treaties, agreements
and understandings freely entered into and solemnly concluded. It
is clea r that by asserting a claim to Guyana's territory and by
see king to frustrate the economic development of the cou ntry
and, more specifically , the realisation af the Upper Mazaruni
Hydro-electric project , the Venezuelan Government has been in
11
Annex 52
breach not only of the Treaty of Washington of 1897 and the
Arbitral Award of 1899, but also of the Geneva Agreement of
1966 by which it now appears to lay so much store and the
Protocol of Port-of-Spain of 1970 which expressly prohibits it
from asserting any claim to any part of Guyana during the life of
the Protocol. The Proto col, of course, is still in force.
s
10. It is not at this stage open to the Government of
Venezuela to plead any interpretation of the Geneva Agreement or
the Protocol of Port-of-Spain in justification of its efforts to thwart
the development of Guyana or any of its regions. Indeed, to guard
0
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10
1/t
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pal
anc
against this possibility and to make the matter abundantly clear ,
the then Foreign Minister of Guyana, Mr. Shridath Ramphal , and
the then Foreign Minister of Venezuela, Dr. Aristedes Calvani, at
the time of signing the Protocol of Port-of-Spain of 18th June,
1970, addressed their minds specifically to this matter when they
dealt with certain other related matters and arrived at definite
understandings. Among these matters was the question of economic
development in the Essequibo region of Guyana. The Government
of Guyana had raised this issue for good reason; because, two
years before, the Government of Venezuela had placed an
advertisement in the "Times" newspaper of London seeking to
discourage investors and international agencies from assisting in
the development of the resources of the Essequibo region of
Guyana. The Government of Guyana naturally wanted to ensure
that the Government of Venezuela would in future keep within
the bounds of propriety and refrain from attempting to hinder the
development of Guyana on any pretext whatsoever. As a result of
the understandings reached between the Foreign Ministers, and in
order to prevent a recurrence of mischief of the kind perpetrated
by the ~foresaid newspaper advertisement, the two Foreign
wh
Ministers agreed "that each Government would abstain from any
statement, publication or other acts which could be detrimental to
ho•
to I
the economic development and progress of the other's State." The
present campaign which the Government has mounted to retard
Guyana's development is a violation of those understandings also.
17,
per
sigr
pro
Cot
11. It is clear, Mr. President, that the Government of
Venezuela has embarked upon a course of economic terrorism
against Guyana calculated to stultify the development and growth
of the country. The objective is to intimidate and coerce the
soil
Ver
Ver
Guyanese Government and people into surrendering the richest
part of the country to an avaricious neighbour. With total disrega,d
for the sanctity of treaties and agreements and the solemn
10
12
Annex 52
•
obligations accepted thereunder, the Venezuelan Government has,
even now, been dispatching its emi-ssaries abroad to persuade
Governments and private corporations in various parts of the world
not to participate in the economic development of Guyana. It is
perhaps of more than passing interest to note that the Venezue lan
repudiation of the Arbitral Award of 1899 and the prosecution of
its claim to the Essequibo region coincided with the publication of
the results of the first seismic study in Guyana which had been
commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP). The study indicated the strong probability of oil being
present in the Essequibo region of Guyana. The present resu rgence
of Venezuela's campaign against Guyana has coincided with the
current attempt to drill for oil in that region.
(12) (a) Mr. President, the efforts of the Venezuelan
Government to prevent the development of the Upper Mazaruni
Hydro-electric Project have implications which are wider and more
serious than the national concerns of Guyana. These implications
are international in scope. It is now accepted generally that energy
is a world issue and that "energy must become the shared
responsibility of the whole world community". The initiatives of
the Government and people of Guyana to develop the Upper
Mazaruni Hydro-electric Project accord perfectly with the general
world strategy for the development of new and renewable sources
of energy. Any activities calculated to obstruct this development
will affect not merely against the immediate economic prospects
of Guyana, but also the wider interest which the world community
has in the enlargement of energy resources. Indeed, since present
projections are that by the end of the century Venezuela herself
may become an importer of oil, her attempt to stop this develop­
ment in our region may well be short-sighted and self-defeating.
{b) It may be apposite to record that, motivated by a
spirit of good neighbourliness and within the context of regional
,
'
programmes for energy development and economic co-operation
under OLADE and the Treaty of Amazonic Co-operation (to both
of which Gu} ana and Venezuela subscribe), the Government of
Guyana has from the outset made it public that Venezuelan
participation in the project was possible under agreed and clearly
defined circumstances. In the Government of Guyana's view, such
participation, though, as earlier mentioned, not essential to the
viabili°ty of the project, could have included arrangeme nts for
Venezueh to purchase power for her own development purposes.
These were constructive initiatives on the part of the Guyana
Government, consistent with the efforts and policies of the World
13
Annex 52
Bank, United Nations and other multilateral agencies to promote
feasible programmes for the development of alternative sources of
energy.
(c) The present Venezuelan posture involves a remark­
able inconsistency. For over eight years, Guyana has been pursuing
the development of this project in an open manner and with the
full knowledge of Venezuela and, indeed, the world. During this
period the Guyanese people at great sacrifice spent mill ions of
dollars on the technical economic studies, preliminary engineering
designs, infrastructure and other necessary prepar.atory ac~ivities.
During this period too, in the spirit of the Geneva Agreement which
recognised that "closer co-operation between {Guyana) and
Venezuela cou!d bring benefits to both countries", Guyana
Government representatives held discussions with Venezuelan
counterparts at various technical and political levels in pursuance
of Guyana's policy that the benefits of the project should be made
available to neighbouring countries also, including Venezuela.
These discussions had always been amicable and, we had believed,
constructive.
{d) Indeed, during a state visit to Guyana in 1978, the
then President of Venezuela at a press conference held at the
Pegasus Hotel, Georgetown, on Friday, 20th November, 1978,
expressed Venezuela's general support for the project. Among
other sti\tements on this issue he said the following:
Venezuela has decided to study the possibility of linking
the present and future systems of the two countries and
purchasing electricity from Guyana on the completion
of the hydro-power project ... We will give all we can
to help develop this complex.
No words can be clearer. Indeed, a large part of the official
discussions during the presidential visit centred on the economics
and the logistics of the supply by GJyana and the purchase by
Venezuela of electric power from the Project. One firm decision
was that the two countries would do further technical work on the
cost and modalities of such an arrangement. Hitherto, Venezuela
has never indicated any opposition to the Project. The Venezuelan
Foreign Minister's communication of 8th June, 1981, contained
the first ever expression of opposition by Venezuela that the
Government of Guyana is aware of. The manner in which the
opposition was indicated was, to say the least, regrettable; but it is
14
Annex 52
-
passing strange that it should have occurred at this time when we
are on the verge of concluding arrangements which will great ly
enhance the prospects of realising th,.e necessary financing for the
Project.
14. (a) The Upper Mazaruni Hydro-electric Project is vital
to the economic development of Guyana. When completed, it will
for all practical purposes solve Guyana's energy problem for the
rest of this century. At present, we are totally dependent on
imported fossil fuel, the continuous escalation in the price of
which has been strangling our economy . The adverse impact of the
cost of oil imports in our economy w II easily be understood from
the following figures: In 1970, the cost of our oil imports was
equivalent to 5% of our GDP; in 1975, it was 10%; in 1980, 29%.
In 1970, the cost of oil represented 8% of the -.alue of nu1 total
imports; in 1975, it was 13% and in 1980, 36%. In 1970, oil
imports absorbed 9% of our total exp ort earnings; in 1975, 12%
and in 1980, 35%.
(b) The present Venezuelan regime has analysed this
problem very carefully and knows quite well that the economic
salvation of Guyana hinges critically on the development of its
hydro-electric resources. The perception of the Government of
Guyana is that the regime is attempting to prevent the development
of these 1->ydro-electricity resources in the hope that Guyana's
continue, dependence on imported oil would agrravate its current
economic problems and render it vulnerablee to the regime's
expansionist and colonial designs In the circumstances the
Government of Guyana interprets the communication of 8 June,
1981, as an undisguised attempt by the Venezuelan Government
to manipulate the Bank and use it as an instrument f >r achieving
its ulterior political ends.
15. Finallv, Mr. President, I wish to confirm that, notwith­
,
standing the pn:tensions of rhe present Venezuelan regime, the
Governmen!. and people of Guyana continue to place an absolute
priority on the development of their hydro-electric resources and,
more particularly, on the Upper Mazaruni Hydro-electric Project.
They will persist in the most strenuous and disciplined efforts to
ensure the implementation of the Project at the earliest practicable
date. Guvana sets a high value on its membership of the Bank and
the good relations it has established with it over the years. As the
Government anJ people of Guyana pursue their own developmenta l
objectives, they look forward to strengthening those relations as
15
Annex 52
•
-- ·
the Bank, for its part, continues to address the complex and
challenging issues of world development in the discharge of its
mandate and the fulfilment of its purposes.
Please accept, Mr. President, assurances of my highest
consideration.
~1/f!ujl-
H.D. Hoyte
Vice-President
Economic Planning and Finance
and
Governor for Guyana
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16
Annex 53
U.N. General Assembly, 36th Session, Agenda item 9, U.N. Doc. A/36/PV.12 (24 Sept. 1981)
Annex 53
\
United Nations
12th
GENERAL
PLENARY MEETING
ASS~MBL¥.
Thursday, 24 September 1981,
THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION
at 3.30 p.m.
Official Records
NEW YORK
CONTENTS
Page
Agenda item 9:
General debate (continued):
Republic of Germany, who, as President of the thirty-fifth
session, only recently concluded, applied unremittingly
his talents and his energies to the achievement of consen­
sus in the Assembly.
Speech by Mr. Reid, Prime Minister of the Republic of
Guyana .......
,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
193
Speech by Mr. Andrei (Romania). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
199
Speech by Mr. Malmierca (Cuba)....................
204
Speech by Mr. Perez Llorca (Spain) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
209
7. We must specially commend him for his untiring
efforts to see launched a global round of negotiations on
international economic co-operation as desired by the
vast majority of Member States.
Speech by Mr. Ullsten (Sweden) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
213
Speech by Mr. van der Stoel (Netherlands)............
217
Speech by Mr. Rolandis (Cyprus) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
221
President: Mr. Ismat T. KITTANI (Iraq).
8. Equally, I wish to extend to the Secretary-General
our deep appreciation for his own consistent and steadfast
work directed towards the fulfilment of the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
AGENDA ITEM 9
9. With the admission of Vanuatu to m!r midst, the Or­
ganization takes orie more step towards its goal of univer­
sality of membership. Today we join with others in wel­
General debate (continued)
coming this new Member to our ranks. Guyana is
convinced that this Republic will make a positive contri­
bution to our work.
1. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): The
Assembly will now hear a statement by the Prime Minis­
ter of the Republic of Guyana, Mr. Ptolemy A. Reid.
2. On behalf of the General Assembly, I have great
pleasure in welcoming and inviting him to speak.
3. Mr. REID (Guyana): My first words, Sir, from this
podium are addressed to, you in expression of our sincere
congratulations on your election to the high office of Pres­
10. It was with particular pleasure that Guyana took
note of the unanimous decir.ion of the Security Council to
recommend acceptance of the application for admission
submitted by the newly independent Government of the
sister Caribbean country of Belize. The struggle by the
Belizean people for their freedom and independence has
been long and arduous. Yet even at the very last hour
attempts were still being made to frustrate Belize's move­
ment to independence. The Assembly has given constant
and unyielding support to the people of Belize in achiev­
ing their independence and making secure their territorial
.integrity. It will be a moment of great joy for the people
of Guyana when Belize joins the Organization.
ident of this the thirty-sixth session of the General As­
sembly. Your own long and distinguished service in the
field of diplomacy and international relations is a matter
of public record. You have served not only in the interests
of your own country but also in pursuit of the noble ob­
jectives of international endeavour.
·
11. The thirty-sixth session of the Assembly is being
4. I recall with particular pleasure the honour we in
Guyana had of welcoming you in 1972 as a representative
of the Secretary-General to the Conference of Foreign
Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries. Since your return to
the service of your country you have contributed to the
strengthening of the bonds of friendship between the par­
ties, the Governments and the peoples of Guyana and
Iraq-a friendship which is enhanced by our joint and co­
operative activities as members of the -Group of 77, the
non-aligned movement and this Organization.
5. The business of this session promises to be challeng­
ing, if not perplexing. We are confident, however, that
your skill, your experience, your aplomb and your dedica­
tion to the search for just and equitable solutions to the
held at what may well be a historic crossroads for human­
ity. It is a moment for reflection on the real valu~s and
the present needs of mankind. It is equally a moment to
make a projection as to where we go from here, for we
seem caught up in the contradiction of extremes. Each
hour that we meet, the number of hungry and starving
people on this small planet of ours increases. While Sat.
urn

and Venus and other distant planets are being ex­
plored through the use of a technology which is a wonder
indeed, there are people on this earth who spend days to
get from one place to another on foot, sometimes in harsh
conditions, in search of basic necessities like food, water
and fuel. There are enormous extremes of wealth among
nations. There are those who are luxuriously housed
while others take shelter from the rain in the flimsiest
problems which at present beset mankind will be tactfully
hovels. There are others who remain illiterate while th~
and maturely applied, to the benefit of the. Organization
and the peoples here represented:
bounds of knowledge expand continually. And each mo­
ment the preparations for war. escalate.
6. Let me take this opportunity to express a,s well our
thanks and gratitude to Mr. von Wechmar of the Federal
12. The spectre or deformation and death due to hungeQ
and malnutrition, that of disease and deprivation through
\
b:
193
A/36/PV.12 and Corr. I
Annex 53
--------~--~-"'""""~_______,__...._,_,.
4:.:~
... -.ccl"J!M,lfl!l!W!,
_______
_
194
General Assem:.ly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
lack of adequate housing, and that of decimation and de­
struction by conventional and nuclear warfare, even in­
voked in self-defence, combine to imperil the survival of
mankind.
13, At this particular juncture, we are all aware of se­
rious begative trends and tendencies in international rela­
tions; Increasing turbulence within the international sys­
tem has led to a pervasive deterioration in political and
economic relations. Developments over the past two dec­
ades, which had encouraged the hope that principles such
as sovereign equality, mutual respect, peaceful coexis­
tence and the right of each State to pursue its own path of
political, economic and social development were achiev­
ing universal acceptance, are now challenged by postures
and policies of confrontation, with resultant mistrust.
succeeding generations from the scourge of war .. The over­
all result is that the world is slowly inching further away
from the goal of a secure and lasting peace . which the
Charter envisages and which is particularly needed in. our
day. In these circumstances, the second special session of
the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled
to be held in 1982, assumes an important and urgent
character. It is our sincere hope. that optimum use will be
made by other States, particularly the nuclear-weapon
States, of the negotiating machinery provided for within
the United Nations. It is. also our hope that the negotia­
tions will be approached in a positive and constructjve
spirit, one that will best facilitate the achieyement of gen­
uine disarmament. But there are certain crisis situations
which antedate the dangers inherent in the present trends
and tendencies and remain in need of urgent solutions.
.
i\
14. The non-aligned movement gave a warning about
20. In the decisions taken at the recently - concluded
the possibility of the present circumstances at the Sixth
Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non­
Aligned Countries, held at Havana in 1979, and more re­
cently at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs
of Non .. Aligned Countries, held this year at New Delhi.
eighth emergency special session of the General -Assem­
bly, devoted to the· question of Namibia, we recorded our
determination to maintain the momentum in the march to­
wards universelity. In anticipation of the adoption of those
appropriate measures as provided for under the Charter, at
the present session the Assembly must seek to advance
further the cause of Namibian freedom and independence.
We must demand that those Members of the Organization
that, in one form or another,. give succour to South Africa
in its continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its acts
of aggression against neighbouring States join the main­
stream of international riejection of the Pretoria racists and
their apartheid policies.
15. Today there is a generalized mood of fear and fore­
boding. At the root of this ·outlook is the recrudescence,
in virulent form, of confrontation and conflict, which
some believe derive from ideological differences. It is a
sad commentary on man's sense of values that, even as
international political and economic relations have wors­
ened and the plight of many peoples-simple men,
women and children-has become ~ore desperate, there
can be an intensification in the preparations for war and
an increase, both globally and within some nations, in the
allocatior1 of resources for such preparations.
~
21. The situation in southern Africa remains a clear
threat to international peace and security. In this regard
we must not relent in our desire to dismantle the structure
of apartheid in South Africa itself.
16. The drums of war are beating everywhere. As yet; it
is largely a war that is conducted through rhetoric by the
world's powerful nations. But in some lesSi powerful coun­
tries the war dead are being mourned. However, elaborate
preparations involve policies which include not only the
fabrication and acquisition of even more sophisticated
components for an already overstocked war system, but
also the threat which stems from the possession of such
instruments of war and the determination to use them.
22. The search for a lasting solution to the situation in
the Middle East requires the reactivation, of a more than .
peripheral involvement of the United Nations. The stra­
tegic consensus which the Organization must achieve and
implement is one which would ensure for the Palestinians
an independent State of their own and allow all States in
the region to live in security and peace.
23. Likewise, in Korea the present apparent stalemate
17. The question arises wnemer there are States in the
must not lead to the reality of permanent division. The
various regions of the world which, egged on by the pres­
ent circumstances, can feel secure in the belief that a re­
course to lawlessness wHI go unpunished or, at worst,
will be received with acquiescence by the international
community.
wishes of the Korean people for their peaceful reunifica­
tion on the basis of principles which are well known, in­
cluding the 10-point programme of the Democratic Peo­
ple's Republic of Korea presented by its President Kim II
Sung, at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of
Korea, must be realized without delay.
18. Already, the pursuit of such policies has threatened
to render asunder the fragile fabric of detente so la­
boriously constructed. True, it was a detente that was lim­
ited in both its geographical application and its substan­
tive scope. But it represented a beginning and was an
eJement in the process of the relaxation of tension and the
democratization of international relations. It kept alive the
prospect of building relationships of equality and mutual
24. In Cyprus, the intercommunal talks must be· encour­
aged, but always within the comprehensive framework
which was· devised by this Organization and others in
1974 and subsequently.
25. Parallel to the turbulence in global political rela­
benefit and of expanding the opportunities for global con­
sensus on the solutions of problems which are global in
nature.
tions, to which I have already alluded, is an international
economic system in deep-rooted crisis. It is a crisis from
which no individual nation can insulate itself; it is a crisis
with fundamental destabilizing consequences for .all, es­
pecially the already battered economies of many develop­
ing countpes. These countries continue to confront the
twin dilemma of a long-term deterioration in the purchas­
19. These developments threaten to negate the efforts
which the -United Nations has b~en so laboriously exert­
ing over · the years in the field of disarmament to save
ing power of their commodity exports and a volatility in
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
195
the prices . they obtain from such products on the worlJ
market. At the same time, the import pri.:es for essential
manufactured • and industrial goods from the developed
countries show a consistent upward movement.
26. Those of us who attempt to break out of this vicious
circle of commodity trade by industrializing face the pro­
tectionist barriers that are erected. And some developed;::,
countries are attempting to shift from multilateral co-oper­
ation •.;to bilateral exchanges, with deleterious conse­
quences . for the· capacity of international financial institu­
tions to promote· development.
ment-for informal exchanges on the world economic sit­
uation. Guyana hopes that the Cancan meeting will,
through the manifestation of the necessary political will,
help to give impetus to the search by the international
community as a whole for solutions to the problems be­
setting the world economy, including the launching of the
global round of negotiations, and that it will enhance the
prospects for international economic co-operation in all its
dimensions. We recognize that it presents the international
community with an opportunity to demonstrate a breadth
of vision and the political will to impart impetus and to
lend authoritative direction to the global dialogue on eco­
nomic relations.
27. Compounding these difficulties is the increasing loss
of. skilled· manpower from the developing countries to
those,parts of the world that are already highly developed.
According to a conservative estimate by UNCTAD, over
the decade and a half from 1960 to the mid-1970s, up­
wards of 420,000 skilled personnel moved from the de­
veloping to the developed countries. The skilled personnel
that were lost included physicians, scientists, engineers,
agricultural experts and other critical professional catego­
ries, all trained at immense cost and whose loss has con­
siderably weakened our efforts to develop.
32. It must certainly be to our advantage that this meet­
ing will be taking place against the background of an in­
creasing realization and acknowledgement of the interde­
pendent nature of the world in which we live. Let me
hasten to add, however, that the interdependence I speak
of is not the one that was born and nurtured in the sys­
temic context of subordination and dependent relation­
ships, for that was an interdependence between the ex­
ploiter and the exploited, between the rich man and
Lazarus, one which saw the distribution of the results of
that relationship s}sewed in favour of the powerful.
28. . There are some, moreover, who would wish to
blame •·the: ills of the poor on i9eological preferences, and
particularly the choice· a country makes between a capital­
ist or a socialist path to development. There are those,
also, who would wish to base their willingness to assist
the developing countries according to the latters' choice in
a so-called global ideological struggle.
33. A present danger is a lingering desire on the part of
some to maintain such a patently unjus~ relationship. The
emerging interdependence, and certainly the one to which
we aspire, must be based on the principles of equality. and
justice and on an equitable distribution of the gains de­
rived from it. We have a dynamic conception of an inter­
de,endent world, an interdependen~e which is symmetri­
cal and based on mutual benefit and mutual respect.
29. I ask: can we with genuine sincerity confront the
harsh . circumstances of today and the new reality of an
interdependent world with the same old dreams, the same
old illusions and the same old deceptions? We think not.
The positive changes beckoning mankind cannot be Gon­
tained, nor can we respond by merely clinging to the old
economic order.
34. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea has now completed its tenth session. Throughout
the years of negotiations, all States have bad the oppor­
tunity of full participation and have contributed to the sig­
nificant progress which has been made. Indeed, we are at
the threshold of concluding a comprehensive treaty. This
is why Guyana is concerned that there can be attempts at
this late stage to upset a balance so patiently wrought. It
is Guyana•~. 1ope that all States will participate in the
signing ceremony at Caracas in 1982.
30. It is within this context that Guyana expresses regret
at the continuing impasse in the North-South dialogue.
Indeed, the expressed hope of the vast majority m· p.,,fo'•n­
bers of the Organization for the launching of a gh;bal
round of negotiations has remained just that-a hope, We
have ·not advanced much since the near unanimity o.n the
procedures that was achieved at the eleventh special ses­
sion only last year. We must seek at this session to over­
come such barriers as remain to the launching of the
global round of negotiations. While such negotiations can
lead ultimately to the solution of problems which are
structural in ni:i.ture, many of us are faced with economic
problems of botµ short- and medium-term dimensions.
These problems require urgent solutions.
35. in the finely balanced life-support system of this
planet, the two most critical areas are those of food and
energy. Food production and food security are now mat­
ters of universal c:oncem. In his statement before the
Committee on World Food Security at Rome in April of
this year, the Director-General of FAO, in alluding to the
precarious nature of the global food situation, said that we
have to be prepared for the worst-not only for this year,
but also in the years to come. Indeed, for two successive
seasons, as the Director-General reminded us, the world
has consumed more cereals than it has produced. For us,
therefore, it seems eminently reasonable to seek interna­
tional support at all levels for promoting agricultural de­
velopment, more especially in the developing countries.
31. Yet. ·even as lack of progress in the North-South di­
alogue is lamented, there may be a ray of hope on the
horizon of economic relations at the global level. I have
in mind in particular two developments. In May of this
year the High-Level Conference on Economic Co-opera­
tion among Developing Countries was held in Venezuela.
That conference resulted in substantive decisions of an ac­
tion-oriented nature designed to strengthen ,the bases of
such co-operation. And there is to be held at-,Cancun in
October of this year a meeting at the highest . political
. level of a grou!) of developed and developing. countries­
. the International Meeting on Co-operation and Develop-
36. We in Guyana have long been embarked on a pro­
gramme of self-sufficiency in food. We have not yet
achieved this, but last year, along with Zimbabwe,
Guyana was a net exporter of food within the Common­
wealth. We intend to accelerate this process. We therefore
regard as contradictory, to say the least, the recent posi­
tions taken in one of the international institutions, the In-
Annex 53
196
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
ter-American Development Bank, oy which Guyana was
denied financial resources for increasing its capacity for
food production. We cannot understand how there can be
on the one hand an expression of an interest in preventing
hunger and on the other the adoption of positions which .
perpetuate that same condition. Guyana remains ready and
detern'iined to exploit its potential for agricultural develop­
ment for the benefit not only of the Guyanese people but
also of the people of the Caribbean and even beyond.
socuil development, free from all forms of e.itternal inter­
ference, coercion, intimidation or pressure. Equally, we of
the Caribbean call for scrupulous respect for the wishes of
our peoples for the Caribbean area to be respected as a
zone of peace.
·
42. There are, however, situations arising within ,our re­
gion itself, some of which · contai'n · a 'clear potential· for
threatening and indeed disturbing · international peace and ·
security. One such situation stems from the present nature ·
of our relations with Venezuela. ·
37. Guyana has a similar deter~.1.ination in the field of
energy. Whereas eight years ago it required less than 10
per cent of Guyana's export earnings to pay for our im­
ported energy needs, today we expend more than 30 per
cent of those earnings, and this despite the fact that we
have embarked on programmes of conservation and have
begun to use again alternative but once discarded sources
·
43. · Several years ago the· agenda of the General Assem­
bly included an item entitled· "Question of boundaries be- ·
tween Venezuela and the terri'tory of· British 'Quiana";
The request for the inclusion of that iterri was made by
the Government of Venezuela in 1962,' four years before
of energy. We 1n Guyana have been beneficiaries of the
generous oil facility established by the sister Caribbean
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. We pay a tribute to the
Government of that country for instituting such a pro­
gramme and express our thanks for the assistance. In this
regard, we also wish to commend Venezuela and Mexico,
which have established an oil facility for the benefit of a
number of Central American and Caribbean countries.
my country became independent. The purpose of that re­
quest was for Venezuela to assert a claim to over two
thirds of the territory of my country. It is apposite to note
that, four months before taking such action, Venezuela
had raised the question in the Fourth Committee/ when
the independence of my country was engaging the · atten­
tion of the Organization, then, as now, in resolute pursuit
of the goal of total decolonization. Although at that time
Venezuela denied that the. assertion of its claim was in
conflict with its professed support for,the independence .of
my country, the manner in which Venezuela prosecuted
its case was tantamount to its making a settlement of its
demands a pre-condition to the attainment of freedom and ·
independence by the Guyanese people. Simply put, an at­
tempt was made to weaken Guyana's urge for indepen­
dence. With the full and active support of the Organiza­
tion, however, our objective of independence was
achieved on 26 May 1966.
38. Everyone knows that energy is critical in the process
of development. That is why Guyana particin~ted fully in
the United Nations Conference on New arid Renewable
Sources of Energy, held recently at Nairobi. Tha~ is why
Guyana is resolved to bring into use its potential for
hydro-power and other forms of renewable sou:-ces of en­
ergy and will resist all attempts, for whatever reason, to
frustrate our development in that respect. Guyana will
support whole-heartedly all States pursuing similar pol­
icies.
44. Early this year the Government of Venezuela reas­
serted its claim to over two thirds of the territory of
Guyana. In prosecutiug this claim, Venezuela embarked
on a carefully orchestrated campaign aimed at the retarda­
tion of our economic development and the dismember­
ment of my country. I was born and bred in a village in
the area of Guyana that Venezuela claims. I look forward
to retiring there in peace and tranquillity. It is a part of
Guyana which is rich in resources-mineral, . forest, agri­
cultural, including fish and livestock-and hydro-power,
39. There have been other recent developments in my
region, Latin America and the Caribbean. Our area has
not escaped the vicissitudes and dangers which beset the
international community elsewhere: In the quest for inde­
pendence, its maintenance and consolidation, in the pur­
suit of economic and social development, change is inev­
itable in Latin America and the Caribbean, as it is
elsewhere. That process takes different forms and moves
in different directions, reflecting the difference in history,
culture and political norms and experience. As elsewhere,
and in which more than one third of our population re­
too, there are external attempts to dictate unilaterally the
nature of change and to fit it into a prism often at vari­
ance with the wishes of t'he peor,·!~ themselves and detri­
mental to th,'!m. We see some of these processes now at
work in our region. Let the Assembly not be seen to be
equivocating on the right of the people of our region to
fashion their own societies without outside interference.
sides. As I stand before the Assembly, I face the prospect
of one day becoming an alien in my own village, _a colo­
nial once again, after our uncompromising and successful
struggle for independence, or a refugee from the place of
my birth. Thousands of people in my country face this
spectre, this terrible prospect of a return to the condition
of colonialism or of exile from their place of birth.
40. More generally, the people of Latin America and the
Caribbean have increasingly been designing their own re­
gional and subregional institutions with a view to advanc­
ing co-operation among themselves. Our attitudes are not
autarchic. Ne seek to build bridges of friendship and co­
operation not only within our region but also with other
peoples and regions. The recent Caribbean Basin initiative
can conceivably contribute to the realization of these ob­
jectives.
45. I do not wish to burden the Assembly· with a de­
tailed analysis of the Venuzuelan claim, or the absutdity
of its nature; nor, indeed, do I intend to chronicle at this
time the legal, historical, political and moral justification
for Guyana's position. In brief, towards the end of the last
century Venezuela sought and received the support of the
Govetnment of the United States of America in placing
before an international arbitraticn tribunal the question of
the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. Act­
ing fully in accordance with the rules and norms of inter­
national law, Venezuela and the United Kingdom in 1897
41. The development of these mutual relations must of
course be based on respect for the sovereign right of each
of our States to pursue its own political, economic and
signed in Washington a treaty3 which contained their
agreement to submit the matter to arbitration procedures
/
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
197
as a full, perfect and final settlement. Suffice it to say
that the Tribunal met and delivered its unanimous judge­
ment on 3 October 1899 in Paris.
51. As our independence approached 1n· · w6o,arul · fa
4
order to facilitate the development of friendly relations
with Venezuela, the Un~ted Kingdom, Venezuela and
Guyana concluded an agreement in Geneva.
6
That agree­
46. It is on the basis of that award that the boundary
between Venezuela and Guyana was finally determined.
Indeed, working assiduously between 1901 and 1905,
ment provided mechanisms for ourselves and Venezuela
to continue to examine the latter's contention of nullity of
the 1899 arbitral award and to find a practical solution to
the controversy which had arisen as a result of that con­
tention. But the ink from the signatures on the Geneva
Agreement had hardly dried before Venezuela unleashed a
campaign of hostility and aggression against us·.
Venezuelan and British commissioners spared lllO effort to
ensure that the boundary on the ground corresponded in
every relevant detail to the arbitral award of 1899. It is
that boundary which has given Guyana its present geo­
graphic form; we have lived on the basis of that boundary
ever since. Incidentally, in 1932 Venezuela participated
with the United Kingdom and Brazil in settling the tri­
junction · point where the boundaries of Venezuela,
Guyana and Brazil meet.
I
52. In three successive years, 1967, 1968 and 1969, in
the general debate of this Assembly, Guyana had occasion
to draw to the attention of the international community
repeated acts of pressure, intimidation, subversion and ag­
gression by Venezuela against us. Let me recall two ex­
47. In t962, Venezuela presented its claim to the Orga­
nization, contending that the arbitral award of 1899 was
null and void. The weight of Venezuela's evidence rested
at that time, as it still does, on the recollections of one of
the junior participants in the Paris proceedings, recorded
some 50 years after the event and a few months after he
had received a decoration at Caracas, and when all the
· major participants in the arbitration process, had died.
There must be speculation as to the true significance of
the request by that junior participant that those recolkc­
tions of his should remain a closely guarded secret until
after his death, when he was beyond the reach of ques~
tions.
amples: in 1966, only a few months after the conclusion
of the Geneva Agreement, Venezuela, through the use of
her ~ed forces, occupied the Guyanan part of an island
through which our common bouridary runs; and -vene- ·
zuela today illegally occupies that part of 0~1r territory. In
1968, even as we were engaged in discussion within the
framework of the Geneva Agreement, Venezuela, in
flagrant disregard of it, sought publicly and privately to
discourage investment for development in the region of
our country which it claims. And there are many other
examples.
·
~
53. It will, therefore, come as no surprise to th-: Assem­
bly when I report, & ~
do now, that during the four years
48. As the records confirm, in keeping with the time­
honoured traditions of the Organization, Venezuela was
given a full hearing in the Special Political Committee at
the seventeenth session of the General Assembly [348th
and 350th meetings]. As a result of the deliberations in that
Committee, agreement was reached between Venezuela
and the United Kingdom, with the concurrence of the
then Government of British Guiana, that in order to dispel
any doubt as to the validity of the 1899 award, experts
from Venezuela and the United Kingdom should examine
the documentary material relating to that awa.rd. At that
session, the General Assembly limited its action to taking
note of what had been agreed on by the parties [/ 19th
plenary meeting, para. 40).
whid1 the Geneva Agreement provided for the purpose,
Venezuela did not produce any evidence of nullity of the
1899 award. Instead, Venezuela demanded, and sought by
all means open to it, a revision of the frontier.
54. Venezuela claims that the 1899 award is null and
void, and now denies its very existence. In many formal
and official statements, as, for example, a recent letter to
the former President of the International Bank for Recon­
struction and Development, opposing the involvement of
that bank in the development of a hydro-electric project,
the Fvreign Min:ster of Venezuela described the 1899
award as "non-existent".
.
55. The Venezuelan record of breaches of the · Geneva
49. When that consensual position was reached, there
was no ambiguity about what was agreed upon, or the
nature of the exercise to be undertaken. To make this
point pellucid, let it be recalled that the United Kingdom
representative said at that time:
. :•1~
making this offer I must make it very clear that
Agreement is a dismal one. That record notwithstanding,
the Government of Guyana did not abandon the search for
an end to the controversy, nor efforts to develop friendiy
and harmonious relations with the people and Government
of Venezuela. Thus, in demonstration of our goodwill and
our desire to live in peace and harmony with our territory
intact, we agreed with Venezuela, in 1970, bv the conclu­
sion of a protocol to the Geneva Agreement....:..the Protocol
of Port-of-Spain
1t 1s m no sense an offer to engage in substantive talks
about revision of the frontier. That we cannot do, for
we consider that there is no justification for it. "
7
-on an initial moratorium of 12 years
5
during which period there was to be no claim by either
party to the territory of the other. Further, it was th~
jointly expressed hope that there should be intensive
efforts to develop and strengthen relations of friendship
between the two countries. That development was re­
In recent months, the Government of the United Kingdom
has reaffirmed in the British Parliament its position that
the arbitral award of 1899 is valid.
ported to the Assembly at its twenty-fifth session [1876th
meeting .. paras. 68-69).
50. '.J'he exam!nation of the voluminous ,documentary
!Ilatenal took place between the years 1963 and 1965. We
m Guyana remain satisfied that there is not oi:le scintilla
of t:vidence to support the Venezuelan contention of Lie
nullity of the award of 1899. Yet Venezuela maintains its
contention.
56. It is Guyana's view that by and large the Protocol of
Port-of-Spain worked. well. Although provision has been
macie in that Protocol for the automatic renewal of the
moratorium, it also contains provisions whereby either
lliliii........
Annex 53
....
198
... eneral Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
Guyana or Venezuela could terminate it. Venezuela re­
cently announced its intention to do so.
which amply describes Guyana's po~ition. The delegation
of Guyana will, through the established procedures, have
that memorandum circulated as an· official document of
the General Assembly.
57. When the Protocol of Port-of-Spain comes to an end
on. 18 June next year, the parties concerned should return
within the ambit of the Geneva Agreement and activate
the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
8
64. The Government and people of Guyana earnestly
desire a speedy end to this controversy. We have no other
wish than that of establishing a regime of peace, harmony
and friendship with the people of Venezuela, with whom
we share aspirations for a just and satisfying life and with
whom we can together make a contribution to our cJ~vel­
opment and that of our region and our continent. lf the
Government of Venezuela is of a like mind, then the Gen­
eva Agreement, i( henceforth scrupulously respected by
Venezuela, can provide such an opportunity. It is oil that
basis, and using that approach-an approach which I am
sure this Assembly will endorse-that the Government of
Guyana is willing to engage in discussions with Vene­
zuela.
58. Unfortunately, in signalling its intention not to re­
new the Protocol, the Government of Venezuela simul­
taneously embarked on the studied campaign of hostility,
pressure and intimidation to which I earlier made refer­
ence. Venezuela has also belligerently revived its claim to
over two thirds of my country, and has communicated
publicly thatr,it will oppose any major effort on our part
to develop the resources, particularly a hydro-power facil­
ity in the Upper Mazaruni, located in the region of
Guyana which Venezuela now claims. In doing so, Vene­
zuela is in dear breach of the provisions of the Protocol
of Port-of-Spain.
65. The implications ot' the Venezuelan claim are se­
rious as much for the future of the relations between
Guyana and Venezuela as they are for the future of sev­
eral States in Latin America, and indeed beyond our re­
gion in Africa and in Europe.
59. In this connection, at the Un'ited Nations Con­
ference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy held at
Nairobi, Venezuela advised the international community
that it would not recognize any form of co-operation
which would be given for the development of Guyana if
such developmeQt included the area claimed by it. The
Government of Venezuela has also urged the European
Community to withhold its participation in the develop­
ment of the region.
66. As a result of the· award of 1899, Guyana los.t terri­
to,y to Venezuela. I ask this rhetorical question: if Vene­
zuela's contention of nullity is valid, is it prepared under
those circumstances to entertain on an equal footing a
claim by Guyana to territory which is now regarded as
part_ of Venezuela?
60. There is a position which Venezuela persistently but
erroneously adopts. It is that the Geneva Agreement and
the Protocol of Port-of-Spain, both of which Venezuela
has repeatedly violated, hgally inhibit us from actively
pursuing major develoµment in the area of Guyana
claimed by it. That position is juridically untenabie. We
will not succumb to such pressure. No one can reasonably
ask the Guyanese people and their Government to place
constraints on their development.
67. Vene.:.uela brought the question of our boundary to
the United Nations in 1962, at a time when our indepen­
dence was being considered. We bring it bck t" the Or­
ganization in 1981 to help us maintafr. our indep.;·ndence
and to have our territorial integrity respected.
68. We have given notice t0 the 'Assembly of the dan­
gers inherent in the prosecution by Venezuela of its claim.
There can be a threat to peace and security, and we have
alerted this Assembly to it. Guyana reserves the right to
reql!es!, if it becom nece~~ • y, consideration by the
United Nations of ttv threat which the claim and the
manner of its promotion pose. However, we now appeal to
61. Indeed, Venezuela has reneged on an agreement
reached on the occasion of the conclusion of the Protocol
of Port-of-Spain in 1970. Under that agreement there was
the understanding that each Government v.. ~mid abstain
from making any statement, issuing any publication, or
committing other acts which would be detrimental to the
economic development and progress of each other's State.
Guyana has scrupulously adhered to that agreement.
the Organization and each and every one of its Members
to prevail upon Venezuela to abandon the ill-conceived
course of action on which it has embarked for too long.
62. The history of Venezuela's behaviour on the ques­
tion of the frontier with Guyana gives us little cause for
optimism. What causes further concern are other policies
being pursued by the present Government of Venezuela in
that regard. Thus, allied with the desire of that Govern­
ment to acquire new and sophisticated weapons of war,
including F-16 fighter aircraft, there are increasingly
clamant calls within Venezuela for a military solution to
the controversy. I would remind the Assembly that the
planes used to bomb the nuclear reactor in Iraq were of
69. The complexity of the political and economic crises
facing the international community. today, and the vast
scope of the day-to-day concerns of the world's peoples
place the Organization, I suggest, before a challenge
which exceeds anything conceived at the time of its crea­
tion. The Organization is not perfect. Yet it has effec­
tively. over the years helped to mute and contain confron­
tation in specific areas. Equally, it has played a positive
role not only in promoting those principles of a universal
character which should guide the actions of Member •
States, but also in enhancing the prospects and devising
appropriate mechanisms for international co-operation on
matters of global concern.
the same vintage as the F-16s which are being purchased
by Venezuela. Thus, the purpose of the Venezuelan pos­
ture in this regard is to maintain ~
regime of pressure to
bend us to their will.
. 63. I have deliberately refrained from making this pres­
entation. detailed. We have· produced a memorandum
70. The range of problems of increasing concern to in­
dividual States, particular regions or groups of States has
narrowed. In any event, the interrefa:tionship of issues and
the necessity for the successful resolution of conflicts and
/
.~ .............
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
199
controversies point to the increasingly global nature of
problems and the concomitant imperative of a global ap­
proach to solutions. The capacity of the Organization to
contribute to these solutions would clearly be enhanced if
major Powers and those which act in their image would
make their recourse to it less selective and self-serving.
78. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): On
behalf of the General Assembly, I thank Mr. Reid, Prime
Minister of the. Republic of Guyana, for the important
statement he has just made.
79. Mr. ANDREI (Romania) (interpretation from
French): Mr. President, it is a particular pleasure for me
to convey to you my warm congratulations on your as­
sumption of the important responsibility of presiding over
the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly and to
greet you as a distinguished representative of Iraq, a coun­
try with which Romania is developing close relations of
friendship and co-operation.
71. I believe that now more than ever we need to opti­
mize the use of the Organization for the fulfilment of its
primary purposes. Foremost among these must be, in the
words of the Charte1, "to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war". We must resolve to tum back
the tide, which is heaciing towards a holocaust of unprece­
dented dimensions. We must resolve to embark unremit­
tingly on a programme of general and complete disarma­
ment.
80. The present session begins its work in circum­
stances of continuing tension in international life, which
gives rise to profound and legitimate concern among all
peoples. The international climate is marked by an inten­
72. The second purpose is the provision of security of
food, clothing and shelter for the masses of the world's
peoples.
sification of the imperialist policy of force and diktat, of
73. Finally, there is the dire necessity to create the con­
ditions for a regime of genuine peace and security. We are
increasingly an interdependent world in which survival is
dependent on mutual support and on collective action for
mutual benefit.
consolidation and a further division of spheres of influ­
ence and domination, by the maintenance of hotbeds of
conflict and war in various parts of the world, by the
sharpening of the contradictions between States and
groups of States, by the escalation and renewal of the
arms race and by the widening of the gaps between the
poor and the rich countries, against the background of the
most profound economic crisis since the Second World
War.
74.· The non-aligned movement has been in the van­
guard of international action for the achievement of these
goals. It continues to fulfil its. vocation as an independent
non-bloc factor in international relations, free from com­
petition for spheres of influence and from hegemony and
domination. The role of the movement as a force for
positive and constructive change in the international sys­
tem is universally acknowledged. There is now no ques­
tion of the authenticity of our positions or the legitimacy
of our cause.
81. All peoples and the United Nations are now con­
fronted with urgent tasks requiring extraordinary responsi­
bility. The President of Romania has in this regard
pointed out that in the present international circumstances
the most pressing need today consists in bringing about
unity and ever closer co-operation of peoples, of progres­
sive forces everywhere, for the purpose of putting an end
to the exacerbation of the international situation and re­
suming and continuing the policy of detcnte, indepen­
dence and peace in order to stop the arms race and em­
bark on disarmament, first of all nuclear disarmament.
75. So successful have we been that instead of the deri­
sio1.1 which we have attracted in the past there is now the
adoption of not-so-subtle strategems for infiltrating the
movement and diverting it to purposes which are not of
our making or in our interests. We need to continue to
resist these efforts'. Now more than ever we in the move­
ment need to adhere to our principles and to be resolute
in our determination- to pursue the policy of non-align­
ment. To those ends the people and Government of
Guyana remain irrevocably committed.
82. In the spirit of these imperatives, Romania has been
taking an active part in international life and is acting to
promote the settlement, in the interest of all peoples, of
the major problems confronting mankind. In his frequent
political contacts, as well as in international forums, the
head of the Romanian State, President Nicolae Ceausescu,
has been promoting assiduously and on the basis of prin­
ciple the ideals of co-operation and understanding· among
States, mutual respect, uniting the efforts of all nations
for the complete elimination from inter-State relations of
the use or threat of force and interference in the internal
affairs of other States, for the defence of the freedom and
independence of peoples and for the strengthening of in­
ternational peace and security.
76. Gt!yana believes that when a better world is created
by us all through our co-operation and concerted efforts it
must be managed by us all in keeping with the standards
and qualities befitting our humanity. Even the mightiest
and most sophisticated implements of war cannot achieve
this. Such armaments can only achieve what they were
created for-destruction, not only of the weak but also of
the powerful and strong.
83. We are developing broad relations of friendship and
co-operation witlt all socialist States. We are expanding
our relatio~s with the developing countries and with the
non-aligned nations and, in th~ spirit of peaceful coexis­
tence, we are promoting relations of co-operation with all
77. The developing countries must be encouraged to use
the resources, both human and natural, that are available
to them for the benefit of their peoples. The development
process should be geared towards producing self-reliant
nations which can benefit from the reality, of indepen­
dence, not by patterning their development' styles after
~ther nations but by a global effort for mutual co-opera­
tion and true partnership.
States of the world, regardless of their social system.
84. Romania bases its relations with all countries on the
principles of full equality of rights, respect for national
independence and sovereignty, non-interference in the in­
ternal affairs of States, mutual advantage and non-use of
force or the ~at of force, and is \/orking actively to
Annex 53
200
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
'◄
bring about a generalization of tnose principles throughout
international life, convinced as it is that this is the only
appropriate basis for developing relations among States
and for promoting detente, security and peace.
weapons in general, from our continent. Romania bi­
lieves that all European States }Vith a vital interest in this
question should take part in those negotiations.
90. We vigorously oppose. the p!'oduction of the neutron
bomb, which is in fact also. intended for Europe. Gener­
ally speaking, we consider it an illusion to believe that
security can be achieved through the constant accumula­
tion of new arms, since experience itself has shown that
weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, bring only insecu­
rity.
85. In tlle present circumstances, the key to the resump·
tion

of the policy of detente, confidence and co-operation
6etween nations is the undertaking of effective and sub­
stantive disarmament measures, which is the radical
means of eliminating the main sources of confrontation
and the danger of war, and relieving the peoples of the
heavy burden of military expenditures. It is also the way
to allocate vast resources for solving problems relating to
the progress of each country and for substantially increas­
ing the assistance •given to the developing countries. It is
the basic means of achieving a healthier political climate
in the world, accelerating economic and social develop­
91. Romania attaches particular importance to a suc­
cessful outcome of the current Madrid meeting that would
lead to free and extensive economic, technological, scien­
tific and cultural co-operation on the basis of respect for
the social system of each country and the independence
ment, ancl increasing the well-being of all peoples.
86. Mankind is understandably disappointed at the ster­
ility of so many of the negotiations which have taken
place in recent years and which have resulted in resolu­
tions on disarmament, while the arms race itself, far from
slowing down, has been given new and powerful momen­
tum. Military budgets are at record levels, and the new
types and systems of weapons that are being perfected
introduce additional elements of destabilization. All this ·
feeds the infernal cycle of action and reaction, increases
the risks of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict and compli­
cates negotiations on the limitation of armaments and on
disarmament.
87. It is only too obvious that the arms escalation has
brought mankind to an impasse and that to escape from it
requires a new, courageous appro,ach that will lead to the
achievement of a military balance, not through the piling
up of armaments but through a continuing and sy~tematir,;
reduction of military expenditures, armed forces and ar­
maments, through resolute measures for disarmament un­
der effective control and, above all. through the final
elimination of nuclear weapons. The peoples of the world
are convinced that the unprecedented accumulations of
arms is not directed to the defence of peace, but in fact
represents preparations for war. If there is a genuine wish
for peace, and for stability and confidence to prevail in
the world, the efforts of all must be constantly subordi­
nated to the urgent need to enter without delay into effec­
tive negotiations for the cessation of the arms race and
disarmament, and first and foremost, nuclear disarma­
ment.
88. As a European country, Romania is particularly
concerned at the accumulation on our continent of the
most powerful arsenal of military forces and modem
armaments ever recorded, including nuclear weapons. It
and sovereignty of every people and would help to forge
a united Europe in which every nation could develop
freely, without any aggression or interference from out­
side. At the same time, we must ensure the continuity of
the process of building security and developing co-opera­
tion on the continent. It is precisely in taking into account
the existing situation in Europe, and the fact that about 80
per cent of world armament expenditures are accounted
for by States signatories of th1t Final Act of the Con­
ference on Security 1md Co-operation in Europe, signed at
Helsinki, that Romania believes it is of the utmost impor­
tance for the Madrid meeting to agree on convening a
conference devoted to the strengthening of confidence and
to disarmament in Europe, a conference which would be­
come an essential element in an effective disarmament
process.
92. In the present international circumstances, Romania
believes that ·the most urgent and important task is the
freezing and reduction of military expenditures, on the
basis of appropriate agreements and under adequate inter­
national control. To that end, Romania has proposed that
principles be worked out to govern the reduction of mili­
tary expenditures, a proposal which is already before the
Disarmament Commission. In our view, the formulation
and adoption of such principles as soon as possible would
facilitate the negotiation of specific agreements to reduce
military hurlgets. The Romanian Government believes that
it would be a particularly positive step if at this session
an understanding were reached on the freezing of military
expenditures at the 1981 level.
93. In the debate and in the resolutions that will be
adopted at this session, priority should be given to the
problems of nuclear disarmament. Romania believes that
we must make every effort to unblock the present situa­
tion, and that the Geneva Committee on Disarmament
should begin without delay effective negotiations on the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of
nuclear weapons.
is in Europe that the two military alliances are confront­
ing each other, anc many of the contradictions and con­
flicts existing in the world today have their origin on the
European continent.
94. Romania regards as well-founded and just the pro­
posal made by tne Soviet delegation from the rostrum of
the Assembly [7th meeting, para. 116] that anyone who
89. Europe, which is already saturated with armed
forces and armaments, is inescapably caught up in the
whirlwind of the arms race. Consequently, Romania be­
lieves that it is particularly important for the General As­
sembly to come out finnly against the deployment and
development of new medium-range nuclear missilesf and
for a beginning to be made as soon as possible on spe.
cific

negotiations to banish those mis~les, and nuclear
is the first to use atomic weapons would be declared a
criminal. Anyone who makes preparations for .the use of
atomic weapons against other States i~ in fact pursuing a
policy against mankind, a criminal policy. Such a policy
must, be resisted with the utmost vigour by all peoples
and should be considered a crime against mankind. The
peoples of the world must take action now, before_ it is
Annex 53
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12th meeting-24 Septtii,ber 1981
201
too· late, to stop the progress _towards the use. of that
weapon. Romania therefore considers that everythmg pos­
sible should be done to put an end to the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, which represents a serious danger to
peac~ and man~ind.
gaps between the developed and developing countries
constantly grow wider and the state of underdevelopment
is perpetuated, which breeds serious economic anomalies
at the world level, and mistmst, animosity .and tension in
international life.
95. · Rbmania believes that the second special session of
the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held
in 1982;-'is• of p'articular importance. At that session the
Assembly· will have the task of adopting a comprehensive
disarmament programme and of bringing about a radical
change in the situation in the field of disarmament nego­
tiations.
96. Th~ supreme duty of the Governments of all States
is to Iieed . the voice of the peoples, a voice which is
being "r~i~i\i ever more firmly against the danger of war
102. In these circumstances, the present economic, en­
ergy, monetary and financial crises are having a profound
· effect on development and world economic and ·political
stability, exerting a very powerful negative effect on the
economy of all States, particularly the developing coun­
tries. As has been stressed during the course of the
present debate by high-level representatives of other States
who have preceded me at this rostrum, an important role
in the perpetuation and aggravation of this situation is
being played by the unprecedented increases in the cost of
international credit and by exchange rate policies. Ar­
tificially inflated interest rates have had a powerful nega­
and is· <;lerrianding an end to the accumulation of arma­
ments and the production and deployment in their coun­
trie.s of new nuclear weapons. It is our duty to tell the
peoples of the world openly the whole truth, and not to
permit the creation of any illusion that one can live in
tranquillity and security as long as the vast accumulations
of ttie means of destruction continue to grow. The un­
precede,nted dimensions of the arms race pose a particu­
larly grave threat to world peace and to the.security and
life of ,the peoples of the world, making it necessary for
all ~t~tes to1
tive impact, above all on the economies of the developing
countries, aggravating the dimensions of their .external
debt, diminishing their already limited possibilities for de­
velopment and undermining their efforts to overcome un­
derdevelopment. Furthermore, those excessively high in­
terest rates are affecting developed countries as well,
causing the stagnation of production, investments and ex­
ports, as well as an increase in unemployment and a de­
cline in the standard of living of the masses.
show responsibility, lucidity and realism.
97. In the interest of civilization, the safeguarding of
life on earth and present and ~future generations, we must
tum from words to deeds and act before it is too late fo
call a halt to this dangerous development, and we must
do everything in our pow~r _to sfop the arms race and
embark resolutely on disarmament, above all, nuclear dis­
armament. Let us see to it that human genius, science
and technology-as was stressed, incidentally, at the re­
cent international scientific meeting "Scientists and
Peace", in Bucharest-are used not for creating weapons,
not for destructive ends, but exclusively for peaceful pur­
poses, to accelerate the development of the least devel­
oped countries, to solve energy and food problems and
for the economic and social progress of all peoples.
98. The statesmen of our time will win for themselves a
worfhy · place in history not .by an irrational armaments
policy, but by the courage and determination with which
103. The international community must act with the
utmost determination to put an end to these practices of
force, plunder, oppression and exploitation which, in ef­
fect, are expressions of neo-colonialism, pursuing in new
forms, more refined but as painful as the old ones, per­
petuation of the exploitation of the weak by the strong
and the enrichment of advanced States at the expense of
the others. It is imperative, in our view, to introduce the
practice of reasonable interest rates, bearing in mind that
widening the existing gaps is detrimental to the rich
States themselves, since it causes the world market to
shrink, endangers general progress in which all States
have a vital interest, creates instability and makes even
sharper already existing international contradictions. In
Romania's view, we must bring about an international un­
derstanding that the ceiling of interest rates will not ex­
ceed 8 per cent. For developing countries, that ceiling
should be about 5 per cent; and the least developed coun­
tdes should be granted credits without interest, or with a
maximum interest rate of 2 to 3 per cent.
they act to bring about the cessation of the arms race and
by their contribution to solving this crucial problem that
is facing .ma~kind.
·
99. In view of the grave political and soc,7!'! problems
facing mankind as a result of the persi.si:ence of the phe­
nomenon of underdevelopment and th~ many structural
crises affecting the world economy, a firm commitment
by mankind to an effective reversal of present tendencies
in order to ensure the limitation of armaments, and the
adoption of specific measures of disarmament, emerges as
a task of particular urgency.
104. In proposing a maximum interest rate of 8 per
cent, we realize that this is particularly high when com­
pared with the normal return on economic projects and, at
the same time, that financial relations and international
credit should not constitute an obstacle to the progress of
each country and of international co-operation but, rather,
should be a powerful instrument for the stimulation of
material production, the expansion of commercial ex­
change and the promotion of economic, technological and
scientific co-operation among nations. Considering the
special role played in economic life by international credit
and the gravity of the problem of the external debt of
100. In strict solidarity with other developing countries
and as a developing country, Romania continues to work
for the establishment of a new intematitmal economic
order.
· ·
10!, Unfortunately, so far very little has beeri· done to
satisfy this aspiration of the majority of mankind. The
developing countries, the General Assembly at this ses­
sim~ should issue an appeal to all the Governments of
dev,:loped countries and to international financial co-oper­
ation organizations urgently to take measures to ensure
the implementation of a reasonable system of interest
rates within the limits I have mentioned.
Annex 53
202
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Pleilary Meetings
105. The Romanian uovemment believes that in order
to implement the new international economic order it is
essential to establish new principles of equality and eco­
nomic co-operation, to eliminate all forms of inequality
and oppression, to eliminate the neo-colonialist practices
which have the effect of perpetuating the exploitation of
pe.t>ples, to ensure equitable exchange and to give more
substantial support to the least developed countries for the
development of the forces of production in both agricul­
ture and industry. At the same time, there must be better
access to modem technology and to the con~uest of sci­
ence, in advantageous conditions for the developing coun­
tries; we must abandon the trend towards using tech­
nological and scientific monopolies to institute new forms
of exploitation and dependence, and to exert political and
economic pressures in international relations. The efforts
of each pe~ple-an essential factor in an accelerated eco­
110. The intensification ofefforts to bring about ~e set­
tlement by exclusively peaceful means of all disputes be­
tween States is a fundamental pi:erequisite for peace and
detente and for the relaxation of tensions. Recourse to
arms, force or the threat of force in dealing with disputes
between States causes great damage and' suffering to the
peoples concerned and, at the same time, poses ·immense
dangers to world peace. There is no denying, and experi­
ence has often confirmed this, that the use of force auto­
matically engenders force. The time will · never return
when peoples of the world could be brought to their
knees without resistance, when world public opini.on re­
mained passive in the face of acts of force committed by
the strong against the weak. The recourse to. military
means or to other kinds of force in any part' of the world
creates tension and anxiety and gives rise to reactio,;is on
the part of all countries.
· : :. ·
nomic and social development--must be blended harmo­
niously with broad international co-operation, primarily
among the developing countries.
111. The Romanian Government is firmly convinced
that there is no problem or controversy anywhere in the
world that could not be settled by political means, ,
through negotiations conducted in a spirit of understand­
ing and mutual respect. As stated by President Ceausescu:
106. Furthermore, problems of underdevelopment and of
the new international economic order cannot be solved by
superficial measures. Without courage and the will to
make decisive progress and advance rapidly towards that
goal, mankind will not be able to overcome the grave
crisis it is suffering fmm at present. The solution of these
problems necessitates fundamental changes in interna­
tional economic relations and the allocation of substantial
sums for economic and social development, funds which
can be obtained primarily by the reduction of military ex­
penditures.
"There is no reason for peoples to have recoulse to
arms in order to settle differences. On the contrary, the
interests of all p~oples and the general interests of
peace itself require that all disputes between States be
settled solely through negotiation There is '·only one
reason that can justify recourse to arms: a people's need
to defend its national independence and its right to a
free life. We must do herything possible to ensure that
. nobody can attempt any longer to quell the independence

of peoples or subjug;ate them."
107. The cessation of the arms race and the inauguration
of disarmament would make it possible to save vast finan­
cial resources which ~ould be allocated to economic and
social development, to assist 9eveloping countries and to
improve the well-being of peoples. Romania's President
has already made specific proposals along those lines
with regard to the gradual reduction of military expendi­
tures over the next four or five years by at least 10 per
cent to 15 per cent. Half of the sums saved in that way
could be used for the economic and social development of
the countries which have made those savings and the
other half for the progress of the developing countries.
112. We. consider that in the present international cir­
cumstances the United Nations should give priority to ac­
tion against recourse to force or the threat of fofCe, .to
ensure the complete renunciation of 'the use of military
means for the settlement of international problems.
113. In proposing, at the thirty-fourth session, the in­
clusion in the agenda of the General Assembly of an item
entitled "Settlement by peaceful means of disputes be­
tween States" [item 122], Romania was in fact proceeding
from the need to exploit the possibilities provided by the
108. The Romanian Government believes that, in the
United Nations and the Charter for more· vigorous and
process of eliminating underdevelopment and establishing
normal functioning of the world economy, the developed
countries have a legal "and moral obligation to support the
progress of the developing countries. This obligation
stems primarily from the fact that during the long period
of colonial domination vast riches found their way to the
metropolitan countries. Furthermore, as Romania sees it,
it is in the interest of the rich States themselves to partici­
pate in the liquidation of underdevelopment, since it is
only in that way that the stability of the world economy
and their own future progress can be achieved.
effective action to prevent and settle conflicts between
States on a just and lasting basis. We appreciate wha,t has
been done so far with a view to producing the declaration
on the peaceful settlement of disputes and· believe that the
timeliness and important political significance of such. a
declaration require a continuation of efforts in order to
accelerate its implementation.
,
114. The Romanian initiative concerning the develop­
ment and strengthening of good-neighbourliness between
States, which was included in the agenda of this· session
as item 57, also falls under the heading of the strengthen­
ing of international security and the prevention of dis­
agreements and tension between States. I wish to stress in
this regard too Romania's ceaseless efforts to develop re­
lations of cc-operation and friendship with all Balkan
States, and to transfom1 the Balkans into ·a nuclear­
weapon-free zone, a zone of friendship,• peace and good­
neighbourliness which would contribute to the security of
the European continent and to the peace of . the entire
world.
109. In our view, the United Nations is the most appro­
priate framework for unde.:taking firm and effective meas­
ures to improve the state of the world economy and assist
the efforts of developing countries. The prompt initiation
within the framework of the United Nations of the global
negotiations proposed by the Group of 77 remains an ob­
jective of fundamental importance which could both meet
the short-term and long-term, interests of world economic
stability and ensure the development of all countries.
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
,203
115.. . Romania · wishes to stress the active. role. that
shoulc.t be played by the United Nations in eliminating
hotbeds of tension and conflict which more than once
have endangered world peace and security.
these fields. In our opinion, the concern in these areas,
within the framework of the United Nations, should focus
on solution of the fundamental problems of manki.nd and
on ensuring essential rights-the elimination of exploita­
tion and of major social differences, the equitable dis­
tribution of income among the various social classes, the
guaranteeing of the right to work and to equitable wages,
particularly in circumstances of chronic unemployment in
many countries, as well as the guaranteeing of the right to
education and the best possible living conditions for all
citizens.
116. The Romanian Government believes that all dis­
putes that still exist in the Middle East, South-East Asia,
South-West Asia, Africa and other parts of the world
should be settled by negotiation, with respect for the free­
dom and independence of each people and its sacred right
to independent development through progress and civiliza­
tion, without any outside interference.
122. In our view, the effective achievement of human
rights implies the elimination of domination of one people
1 ! 7. Our country favours a comprehensive political set­
tlement of the Middle. East conflict and the establishment
of a just and lasting peace in the area, on the basis of the
withdrawal by Israel from the Arab territories occupied as
by another, the abolition of colonialism, of the imperialist
policy of force or threat of force, and the creation of a
world of peace without anns or wars. The danger of a
conflagration which could lead to the destruction of life
J result of the 1967 war; the solution of the problem of
the Palestinian people by recognizing its legitimate rights,
including its right to self-determination and the creation of
its own independent State; and the guaranteeing of the
independence and sovereignty of all States of the region.
The continuation of the tension in the Middle East, aggra­
vated by Israel's recent military actions on the territory of
Lebanon, as well as by its bombardment of the Iraqi nu­
clear research centre near Baghdad, is an impediment to
the peaceful settlement of the conflict.
on our planet emphasizes the elementary truth that the
right to life, security and peace, the right to live in free­
dom away from the threat of aggression, represents a fun­
damental right of all peoples.
123. Romania believes that particular attention should
'
be paid to the growing concern of the United Nations
about the problems of young people in the light of their
role in the life of modem society and in determining the
future of civilization in tomorrow's world.
ll 8. Romania believes that the General Assembly must
endorse effective measures to ensure a. lasting peace in
the Middle East and the convening of an international
conference under the auspices and with the active par­
ticipation of the United Nations, in which all· countries
concerned, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organiza­
tion [PW], the Soviet Union and the United States would
take part, along with other States which can make a posi­
tive contribution to a comprehensive settlement of the sit­
uation in that part of the world and to a solution of the
Palestinian problem.
124. It is imperative that young people in all co~ntries
should be guaranteed the right to education and the right
to work so that they can use· their knowledge in activities
useful to society, as well as the right to play a full part in
th~ social and political life of their countries. The Organi­
zation and all Governments have a duty to educate the
youth of the worl<l in the spirit of the ideals of freedom
and social justice, friendship and mutual respect and of
the common struggle for the cause of peace and progress,
and at the same time to protect the younger generations
from the adverse influence of neo-Fascist and racist cir­
cles and the degrading impact of what have becom~ full­
scale enterprises of the subculture, propagating and fo­
menting hatred and violence.
119. We give every support to the constant and con­
structive efforts and proposals of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea to fulfil the legitimate aspirations of
the Korean nation to,. live in a free, united, independent,
democractic and prosperous country, which is the wish of
the whole Korean people, and to create the Democratic
125. The Romanian Government therefore feels that the
period of preparation for the International Youth Year, . to
Confederal Republic . of Koryo.
be held in 1985, should be used for stepping up the
efforts of Governments to solve the specific problems of
the younge:r generation. In this regard, we believe that the
draft programme of measures and activities drawn up by
the Advisory Committee for the International Youth Year
120. There is an imperative need today for the urgent
and final elimination of the vestiges of colonialism. neo­
coloniaH~m and racism. Romania gives its unstinting sup­
port to the struggle of the Namibian people, under the
leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization
[see A/36/215, annex, sect. IV, part .d~ -~n.t;~.t<l4t!.~ision
1 (/)] is comprehensive and represents a real strategy for
contributing to the identification and solution of the· fun­
damental problems which are of concern today to the
younger generation, and for exploiting its creative poten­
tial. We are convinced that this draft programme will re­
ceive the endorsement of the General Assembly.
[SWAPO], to abolish the illegal occupation of Namibia
and to achieve, ·without delay, its sacred right freely to
choose the path of its future development, in accordance
with its .own legitimate aspirations and interests. The Ro1,manian
Government

resolutely condemns the policy of
racism and apartheid of those in power in Pretoria to­
wards the African population, as well as their armed at­
tacks against neighbouring African countries and. their ag­
gression against Angola. We demand that all military
126. The solution of the complex problems confronting
mankind today requires the democratization of interna­
tional relations, the creation of conditions for the par­
actions against the independence and sovereignty of the
People's R~public of Angola be halted 'i.mconditionally.
ticipation in international life, on a basis of full equality,
of all States, regardless of their size or social system.
121. We are p&rticularly attentive to the prob~ms of so­
cial development, human rights and freedoms, the human
condjtion in general and international co-operation in
127. At l'1e .present time we must act to strengthen co­
operation and solidarity among the developing and non­
aligned countries, and. the small and medium-sized coun-
Annex 53
2t4
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
tries in ge~ral, in order for them to take an active part in
the settlement · of existing conflicts through negotiations,
the bringing aQdUt of a new international economic order
and the inauguration of a genuine process of disarma­
ment. The United Nations today offers the most appropri­
ate framework· and opportunity for finding, jointly and in
alspirit of responsibility, solutions to the major problems
confronting mankind.
134. Swine fever, blue mould. in tobacco, . sugar-cane
rot; haemorrhagic dengue and, more recently, when we
were still in the process of fighting off 'tliat~ _fast. dlse·ase,
haemorrhagic conjunctivitis. We are convinced; that the
imperialists, the agencies of the Unitecl S,t~tes Govern­
ment, are using biological weapons agaih~t"the, people of
Cuba. We all knpw-and it has been · published even in
. ; . United States official publicat!on~~t.h~~ th.~ l!~i!ed_, S~ates
· has for many years been developntg a very wrde ana so­
phisticated · arsenal of weapons of this type and ~iurying
out many tests for their possible :use.
128. The United Nations is made up of all its Member
States, all of us. It is therefore up to us to act in concert
and with determination to strengthen the role of the Or­
ganization in international life, so that the United Nations
can estaLli..:h its world political priorities and the most
important objectives, as well as the practical means of
achieving ~em, so that the aspirations of peoples will no
longer be disappointed through false hopes and through
grievances. The United Nations should adopt concrete
measures which would be conducive to the systematic and
lasting solution of the problems confronting mankind,
with the participation of all States on a basis of full
equality.
· · · · · ·
-c·
,
r
135. We all know also that th~ Unit~d Stare~. has used
these weapons, particularly during its war ; against the
people of Viet Nam, and many are.the,~nit(?d 'St~~~s·vet­
erans of that war who are still suffenilg· in ··t~e· tJnited
States from the effects of exposure •in·· areas' i;iear:places
~here such weapons were used.
·
· · ·
136. In the case of the haemon:hagic· dengue epidemic,
this is a disease produced by the dengue vinis No. 2~. The'
thorough, serio~1s and detailed s.tudies carried · ~ut by
Cuba's technical and scientific personnel, who have also
had the aid and co-operation of highly qualified experts
from othtr countries, have led to the conclusion· that this
virJs was deliberately introduced into Cuba.
129. Experience has shown t,jat it is not possible for
major international problems to be settled in a small
group of States, however big and powerful they may be.
That is why we believe that the strengthening of the role
of the United Nations and the improvement and democra­
tization of its activities, in accordance with the require­
ments of international life today. are of major importance
if international peace and security and the deve?opment of
co-operation among all nations are to be ensured.
.._
J.37. As a ~suit o! a £yste~atic and exh~u~ti~~ ~rw1ysis
of all the avatlable mformat1on from health agen~1~s: and
institutions as well as from other sources, w~ have ver­
ified that when the hac;morrhagic dengue epidemic ap­
peal"ed in Cuba no epidemic outbreaks of the dengue virus
No. 2 had taken place in any of the African or South-East
Ashm countries with which we have relations. Our health
authorities have determined that no Cuban or foreign cit­
izen coming from those regions or from other areas had
suffered from the disease produced by that virus.
130. . The overcoming of major difficulties in interna­
tional life and of grave situations of tension and conflict,
the resumption and continuance of the policy of detente,
national independence, security and peace, all require
efforts supported by all States and an active and responsi­
ble contribution on the part of all nations.
138. Nor were there outbreaks of dengue virus No. 2 in
Latin Amer!ca or in the Caribbean basin. The last cases
registered th~re date from 1978. On the other hand, we
know that the research centres of the United States dedi­
cated to the development of biological weapons have de­
voted special attention to dengue virus No. 2.
131. The Romanian delegation, along with all other del­
egations. is determined to make its ow11 contribution to
the search for just and equitable solutions to the problems
facing the United Nations, so that this session of the Gen­
eral Assembly may fulfil the expectations of peoples
throughout the world and contribute to the improvement
139. We are firmly convinced that,. to. the long list. of
of the international situation, to the· resumption and con­
tinuance of the policy of detente, independence and
aggressions of all sorts agairist our people__:.military; eco­
nomic and political aggressions committed . by the Re­
publican and Democratic · Administrations that have . sµc­
ceeded one another during 22 years-the United· Sta,tes
has now added the use of biological weapons.·
peace, to the cessation of the arms race and the adoption
of measures of disarmament, partkularly nuclear disarma­
ment, and to the strengthening of international peace, se­
curity and co-operation.
132. Mr. MALMIERCA (Cuba) (interpretation from
140. The President of the Council of State and of the
Council of Ministers of Cuba, Commander~in-Chief Fi4el
Castro, in speeches on 26 July and 15 September of' this
year, has denounced the perpetration of this unspeakalile
new aggression against our people by the United S~~tes
Government. We have requested the distribution· to'. all
Spanish): Any court of law, any responsible forum, con­
demns murder. International law also condemns aggres­
sion. The killing of children is in particular even more
revolting. Ninety-nine children hav~ died in Cuba. They
were victims of the haemorrhagic dengue epidemic that
those here present of these speeches, which contain nu­
merous references to and much evidence of the admission
in official documents of the United States Senate· and
took a toll of 156 lives. This epidemic broke out simul­
other bodies that, on various occasions, as part of the
taneously in various parts of the country when there had
been no news of any cases in other States of the area.
activities aimed at the overthrow of the Revolutiomiry
Government of Cuba, the preparation of the use of biolog­
ical w~apons was mentioned.
133. In less than three years our country has suffered
the scourge of five grave plagues and epidemics, which
have hit our cattle, our plantations and now our people.
141. These facts have not been· denied by the responsi­
bl~ authorities of the United States Government, in spite
Annex 53
..
12th meeting-24 September 1981
205
of the fact that President Fidel Castro has challenged them
to .state before wodd public opinion whether or not they
have' authorized the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] to
perpetuate such acts.
142. For more than 20 years we have suffered from all
types of aggression from the United States imperialists,
and we have accumulated a vast amount of painful experi­
ence. But, as President Fidel Castro has stated, "we do
not fear the imperialists' threats. They may perhaps know
when to start a conflict against us, but what nobody
knows is when and how it will end".
countries that have gained their independence and sov­
ereignty when one might think that an international order
founded on the principles and purposes of the Charter
would by now be given pennanent. shape, it must be
pointed out that the United States Government has cast
aside even minimal respect for the norms of peaceful· co­
existence and the desire for sovereignty of the majority of
the States and has laid claim to unacceptable supremacy
in all areas of international life, particularly military su­
premacy, which jeopardizes the carefully wrought struc­
ture of peace and international law created in the after­
math of the defeat of the Rtscist and Nazi forces in the
Second World War.
143. It particularly pleases the delegation of Cub.;: to see
you, M,t. Kittani, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iraq,
ass~me the pre_sidency at this thirty-sixth session of the
General, Assembly. Your recognized ability and experi­
ence · will enable you to guide our work at this session,
which we are sure will be no easy task, for the session is
Mr. Martynenko (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic),
Vice-President~ took the Chair.
149. Mr. Reagan's Government is striving to impose its
being held in an international climate of tension and tur­
moil in which the policy of blackmail and imperialist ag­
gression threatens to put an end to the precarious and un­
certain peace in which we live today. Fraternal bonds of
friendship and co-operation link us with your country, and
I can assure you that you will not lack the support of the
Cuban delegation.
hegemony on the entire world and arrogantly claims a
special place for the United States that would enable it to
decide all questions posed · in international relations in
favour of United States imperialist interest& and its trans­
national corporations. Not even Washington's closest allies
escape ill treatment at the hands of the new United States
administration, whose policies affect their ecanomic situa­
tion and endanger their territories and peoples with no
concern for the misgivings of the gQvernments of those
aUies, nor for the protests or opinions of their popula­
tions.
144. We. extend our warm congratulations to the Re­
publi~ or Vanuatu on its independence, to which we gave
our support within the Special Committee on the Situation
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on
the Graµting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, and on its having become a full Member of the
United Nations.
145. On 1 September of this year, the twentieth anniver­
sary of the non-aligned movement was c .:•nmemorated.
150. The facts are irrefutable. The opinions of the ma~
jorities irritate the self-proclaimed champions of democ­
racy. Those who arrogate for themselves the right to des­
cribe as terrorist the leaders of other countries and the
prestigious national liberation movements apply terrorism
with their military forces all over the world and place
themselves beyond the pale of international legality.
Its vitality, continuity and fidelity to the cause of national
liberation, peace, disannament, anti-imperialism, anti­
colonialism, and anti-neo-colonialism, its struggle against
racism, zionism and apartheid and its struggle for a just
and equitable international economic order have provided
the movement with a solid basis for unity and have en­
abled it to put its stamp of approval on the majority of the
most important decisions taken by the Organization.
..
151. With respect to the legal order to be established on
the oceans and the importance of rapidly concluding an
agreement as a step towards a new international economic
order, after eight,. years of lengthy negotiations at the
Third United Na1
.ions Conference on the Law of the Sea,
the international community has seen with bafflement and
indignation how the new United States Administration has
~46. We reiterate our salute to the 20 years of existence
rejected the draft convention, ignoring the_ negotia~ions al­
of the movement. To those who would ·split or destroy it
we say that they will fail, that they will find instead that
the movem_ent is a powerful instrument of solidarity for
the coug~es of what is known as the third world.
ready concluded with the participation of the United
States delegation and the commitments made, on the pre­
text of reviewing the text, thus unnecessarily prolonging
the work of the Conference.
147. We recall with sorrow that it has not been possible
to put an end to the distressing conflict between Iraq and
Iran. Cuba and its President, Fidel Castro, have endeav­
oured, since_ the first days of the war and even before its
outbreak, to contribute to a peaceful, political, honour.

able and just solution, Recently, these efforts have been
conducted jointly with other ministers of the non-aligned
movement, and it is our firm determination to continue to
persist in trying to bring about the desired solution to this
152. The participating States now r:ecognize more
clearly, in view of the arrogance and aggressiveness of the
Government of the United States, as shown by the recent
provocations ag~inst the sovereignty of the Socialist Peo­
ple's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the immediate need for a
convention on the sea-whether the United States is a
party to it or not and even if everyone's aspirations to
universality are not achieved-an .agreement that would
sanction internationally the rights proclaimed by many
conflict.
countries over their territorial waters and that would pre­
vent incidents such as that of the Gulf of Sirte.
1.48. . At this, the mid-point of the fourth,decade in the
hfe of the· United Nations, when one might-, think about
the triumphs achieved in the implementation ·of the Char­
ter, as shown especially by the increase in the number of
Members of the Organization, that is, the number of
153. Recen_tly, at the open~ng of the Inter-Parliamentary
Conference m Havana, the President of the Council of
State of Cuba, ·Fidel Castro, affirmed:
--
Annex 53
General Asse~bly..:Thirty=~:d~ Session-Plenary Meetings
...
"The United States system is not Fascist, but I am
pie are ·employed today by Begin against tlie heroic Palestinian

people.
firmly convinced that the group constituting the main
core of the current United States Administration is Fas­
cist; its thinking is Fascist; its arrogant rejection of
every human rights policy is Fascist; its foreign policy
is· Fascist; its contempt for world peace is Fascist; its
intraQsigent refusal to seek formulas for honourable co­
existence among States is Fascist; its arrogance, its
conceit, its arms build-up, its pursuit of military superi­
ority at all costs, its relish of violence and domination,
its methods of blackmail and terror; its alliance with
Pinochet and with the most brutal regimes of this hemi­
sphere, whose methods of repression, terror, torture and
disappearances have taken the lives of tens of thou­
sands of people, often without their relatives even
knowing where their bodies lie; and its shameless al­
liance with South Africa and apartheid are clearly Fas­
cist; its threalening language and its lies are Fascist.
·
158. We are certain that the heroic struggle being waged
by the Palestinian people, led by the PLO, its sole legiti­
mate representative, will be victorious and that nothing
can prevent that people from establishing its own indepen­
dent State in acc"'~rdance with its inalienable rights.
Hi9. The bombings of Lebanon, the aggression against
the peaceful nuclear research. centre in Iraq, a deed un­
precedented in peacetime, the threats against the Syri~
Arab Republic and Jordan-events which have all taken
place in the few short months since t}le -inaugurat.ion of
•th.e new Yankee Administration-these are indic.atiops of
•the consequences of the strategic agreement recently con­
cluded in Washington by Reagan and Begin, aimed at
confirming the role of Israel as a pivot of Yankee world
Never will I say that the people of the United States are
Fascist, nor·theit legislative institutions, nor their press,
nor their many creative social organizations, nor their
strongly enduring, noble democratk conditions and
love of freedom.
"Our hopes are founded on the convL: • • m that fas­
cism can succeed neither in the United States nDr in the
world, although it is true that at present a Fascist lead­
ership has established itself in the United States over
the structure of an imperialist bourgeois democracy;
and this is extremely dangerous."
154. The results of the actions of the current United
strategy.
160. · In the Caribbean and Central America, the United
States; in addition to using bacteriological methods
against the population, the crops and the cattle in Cuba
and giving the green light to the CIA to renew and step
up its plots against the lives of the main leaders. of the
Cuban Revolution and its subversive and destabilizing ac­
tions, has intensified its interventionist and genocidal acts
in El Salvador, arming and advising a terrorist Govern­
ment that has murdered over 20,000 children of that noble
and heroic people.
161. Through its vast propaganda machinery, Yankee
States Administration have already been felt in all their
severity in southern Africa, in the Middle East and in the
Caribbean, among other regions. Who can deny that
South Africa dared to attack Angola because it is certain
of support from the United States?
·.
imperialism, resorting systematically to the most brazen
and shameless lies, accuses Cuba of being the cause of
the instability in Central. America. It is not Cuba but
Yan~ee imperialism that has imposed and protected. un­
popular and obnoxious Governments whose only Virtue
has been to protect the system of ecoqomic exploitation of
the peoples of the region. It is imperialism, with its _direct
or indirect military intervention through reactionary. re­
155. The visit of Under-Secretary Crocker to South Af­
rica and the meeting between Reagan .and Botha, which
received such widespread publicity in the United States,
as well as the statements rej~cting the defence of human
rights and the marked interest in making the Pretoria ra­
cists feei they are part of a strategic alliance with the
United States, made it possible for them to step up their
gimes, which must assume the responsibility for the ab­
sence of peace in Central America.
military and subversive actions against the front-line
162. The Government of Cuba has publicly denied that
some of the weapons delivered to it by the Soviet Union
are being redistributed in Central America.. It has af­
States and particularly against Angola and Mozambique.
firmed that it is a lie to say that Cuba is supplying an.y
other weapons or ammunition to the Salvadoran 1ntriots
156. Who can deny that the United States veto of the
condemnation of the aggressors against Angola and of
sanctions against them constitutes proof of its encourage­
ment and support of the illegal and hateful apartheid re­
gime? The aggression against Angola seeks to extend
and that there are or have been Cuban advisers in Ei Sal­
vador. These are the facts and, as facts; they are irrefuta­
ble, which · does riot imply · eith~r a commitment or a
moral judgement on the right to give military ttid tJ the
forces struggling in El Salvador against the junta, forces
whose political representativ(}ness has been recognized by
France and Mexico and has just been· proclaimed, by · an
overwhelming vote, by the countries participating in the
68th Inter-Parliamentary Conference.
apartheid's frontiers. It is an aggression not only against
An~ola but against the whole of black Africa and es­
pecially against the countries of southern Africa. The ra­
cists must withdraw from southern Angola and stop their
acts of hostility against the rest of the front-line States.
157. Israel is another fundamental link in the strategic
alliance advocated by Washington. As in-the case of Pre­
toria, the Zionist authorities felt that, with Reagan's ac­
cession .to the White House~ their finest hour had arrived
and they decided to take advantage of it promptly. The
Zionists' main objective is still the same: the genocide of
the Pdlestinian people and its disappearance as a nation.
The.. Nazi methods suffered yesterday by the Hebrew peo-
163. What is not a lie and cannot be denied by the
United States leaders is that military and police ~dvisers
from the Governments of the United States and Venezuela
are training the genocidal forces of the Christian . Demo­
cratic Junta of Et Salvador; that the Salvadoran military is
being taught the , techniques of repression by Pinochet's
Fascists in Chile; and that it is with Yankee helicopters;
Yankee airctaft, Yankee weapons and Yankee bullets that
the Salvadoran people are being murdered.
·
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
207
164. In a cry for justice based on the principles of inter­
national law and the interests of the nations and peoples
of the world in search of peaceful solutions to the hotbeds
of tension that poison the international atmosphere, the
Governments of Mexico and France agreed to recognize
the representativeness of the patriots of the Natio~al Liber­
ation Front and £he Democratic Revolutionary Front, thus
trying to reach a negotiated and political solution to this
bloody drama. · Showing its real interve11tionist intents and
purposes, the United States reacted violently against the
Franco-Mexican initiative and, using its allies in the Gov­
ernment of Venezuela, compelled these pseudo-democrats
to join the worst tyrannies of the continent in a condem­
~atory statement. Pinochet, Stroessner, Herrera Campins,
172. Cuba supports the Govef!1ment and the people of
Panama in its struggle for the implementation of the
agreements on the Canal and supports the Guatemalan
people, which has risen up in arms against the cruel ty­
ranny imposed on it since the United States intervention
of 1954.
173. Cuba likewise supports the efforts of the people of
Cyprus to preserve its independence, sovereignty and ter­
ritorial integrity as a united and non-aligned republic.
174. In South-East Asia, we believe that only a negoti­
ated solution can put. an end to the existing tensions.
Cuba has fully supported the proposals of Viet Nam,
La~s and Kampuchea to hold a regional conference for
that purpose, with the participation of the other States of
the region. At the same time, we emphasize our unswerv­
aH in the. same bag, with Reagan leading them by the
hand, are trying to obstruct the search for a negotiated
and political settlement to the civil war in El Salvador.
ing recognition of the sole legitimate representative of the
165. We whole-heartedly hail Belize's accession to inde­
pendence after a long struggle to thwart the annexationist
intentions of the oppressors of the Guatemalan people and
we are pleased to see that in a few hours, Belize will
become a full Member of the United Nations.
Kampuchean people: the People's Government of Kam­
puchea.
175. As Chairman of the movement of non-aligned
countries, Cuba has lent its good offices-and today re­
news its willingnesi; to continue to do so-in the search
for a negotiated political solution to the situation in
South-West Asia. Such a solution should, in our opinion,
entail the end of intervention and interference in the Dem­
ocratic Republic of Afghanistan, together with the neces­
sary international guarantees, and the creation of condi­
tions permitting the normalization of relations among all
States in . the area on the basis of the principles and pur­
poses of non-alignment.
166. In Puerto Ricci the clamour for an end to that is­
land's colonial statu~, is increasing. The vast majority of
the Puerto Rican political organizations, not· only those
seeking independence, demand that the General Assembly
consider Puerto Rico's case at its thirtr•seventh session,
as was· appmved at the recently concluded session of the
deco!iJnization Committee. Cuba supports the right of this
bror.her people to independence and is sure that, in the
fulfilment of its obligations, the Assembly will not deny
to the Puerto Rican people the right to have its tragic
situation considered.
16i. Cuba has always supported the legitimate aspira­
tion of the Argentine people to see the Malvinas Islands
come under their national sovereignty, as well as the just
demand of the Bolivian people to have an outlet to the
sea.
168. We also support the right of the people of East
Timor to self-determination.
176. The second special session of the General Assem­
bly devoted to disarmament will be held in 1982. We all
remember that, at the time of the first special session, the
heads of State of the countries of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization [NATO] met in Washington and, un­
der pressure from the United States Government, pro­
claimed their l'eadiness to increase their arsenals. This in­
auspicious sign allowed us to foresee that progress in the
implementation of the decisions adopted by the tenth spe­
cial session of the General Assembly would be meagre.
Since then, the United States has continued to take steps
to achieve military superiority, although it becomes
clearer every day that its NATO partners are resisting this
169. In Western Sahara, the Sahraoui people has
through its heroism earned the respect and admiration of
the whole world. We support its unshakable will to
achieve self-determination and independence.
170. As a consequence of colonialism, Mayotte has
been artificially withdrawn from Comorian sovereignty
and Madagascar has not yet recovered its rights over the
Malagasy islands of Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Europa
and Bassas da India. We trust that the speediest solution
can be found for these anachronistic situations.
Yankee pressure for political and economic reasons.
177. The increase of war expenditures to unprecedented
levels, the reduction of the budget for social expenses,
applying the painful practice of less butter and more
guns, the creation of rapid deployment forces, the deci­
sion to install 572 medium-range missiles in Europe, the
production of the neutron bomb and of the MX missile
system, the increase in the number of nuclear aircraft car­
riern and Trident submarines, the reactivation of large war­
ships, all are actions which serve to unleash an arms race
whose end is impossible. to predict ..
171. Just as the self-determination of a people cannot be
prevented, so a nation cannot be kept artificially divided.
The presence in and virtual occupation of South Korea by
the United States prevents peaceful reunific~tion and the
end of foreign interference in Korea. The Korean people
has built a prosperous and happy country iti . the north
under the leadership of its President, Kim II Sung, and is
imbued with the noblest ideals of reunification of the di­
178. We are sure that the United States will try its
utmost to prevent the convening of the forthcoming spe­
cial session devoted to disarmament. Even if it is held,
the prospects for United States co-operation and contribu­
tion to its success are dim.
179. In June of this year, the People's National Assem­
bly of Cuba expressed its strong and resolute support for
vided homeland.
the appeal made by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet
......__~-·
Annex 53
208
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
Union to all parliaments and peoples of the world con­
cerning the critical international situation, aggravated as it
has been by the dangerous increase in the arms race. It
was reiterated in that decision that "peace is essential in
the struggle for deyelopment, since the struggle for peace
is tantamount to the struggle for development and implies
the uprooting of the deep inequalities still extant as a re­
sult of colonial and neo-colonial domination, racial dis­
crimiifation, racism, zionism and apartheid•'.
counmes trom fulfilling their obligations to the develop­
ing countries? No, these have not been the causes of the
failure of the international economic negotiations. · This
failure has stemmed and still stems from the narrow and
intransigent policies and practices of a group of deveioped
capitalist countries which, headed by' the United States,
persist in maintaining the privileges and bonuses they
have enjoyed for centuries in their relations with the de­
veloping countries at the expense of the exploitation and
poverty of the latter.
180. The non-aligned countries, who took the initiative
to convene the forthcoming special session, will strive for
the success of this new session of the Assembly. Cuba
promises to contribute to that cause and hopes that that
session will become a battleground for universal peace
and the renewal of detente.
187. Never before in the history of mankind have the
underdeveloped countries seen themselves submitted to
such merciless exploitation and such a marked econmpic
penetration as at the present time. The leaders of the de­
veloped capitalist countries have· endeavoured to transfer
to the developing countries the effects of the crisis gener­
181. My delegation also supports the import411t pror,osal
submitted to the Assembly by the Soviet Union on the
prevention of a nuclear catastrophe through a solemn
commitment by all States possessing nuclear weapons,
and their leaders, not to be the first to use them in case of
conflict.
182. I should like now to refer to one of the most trans­
cendental problems confronting the world today, namely,
the international •economic situation.
ated by their own structures. The dependency of the de­
veloping countries on the economies of the western
metropolises has increased to an unprecedented level,
through the spiral of external debt, through the continued
generation and exacerbation of unfair trade flows, through
limiting the access of the third-world countries to the mar.:
kets of the world and to the technology and the resources
available to the capitalist West, through the preservation
of unfair and disorderly international monetary relations,
and through promoting in the economies of the countries
of the developing world an increasing penetration by
transnational corporations, which add iniquitous financial
profits to practices and policies harmful to the sov­
ereignty, stabi!ity and integrity of the countries in whic'n
they operate.
183. Cuba has upheld and upholds the view that peace
and development are indivisible elements of international
relations. We can talk about peace, disarmament and in­
ternational security; we can take action to limit arms or to
ban certain weapons; hut we will not really have attained
an effective and lasting solution to the tensions, conflicts
and contradictions that threaten the world until we find a
way of guaranteeing the complete and permanent elimina­
tion of inequality among nations through the establish­
ment of a new system of international relations, one that
will allow the beginning of a just and equitable new inter­
national economic order.
188. The policy followed~ by the Government of the
United States cll"!arly exemplifies what I have just stated.
The high interest rates decreed by the Reagan Administra­
tion, besides being ineffective in solving the structural
crisis of the American economy and harming even the
western allies of the United States, impose a new and
heavy burden on the underdeveloped countries, raising to
unsuspected heights the already unbearable cost of servic­
ing their colossal debts. Furthermore, the United States.
advocates as a policy a considerable increase of foreign
private investments in the developing countries as a sort
of magic wand to solve their economic problems.
184. The situation now facing the majority of the devel­
oping countries is not new; it has been progressively
deteriorating !or more than 20 years. However, now, in
the middle of the greatest crisis that the capitalist system
has suffered in the post-war period, that deterioration has
become increasingly swift and far-reaching.
189. Nothing could be further from the truth, as the fol­
lowing figures show: between 1970 and 1978, United
States investments in the third world reached a total of
$8. 7 billion, while in the same period the profits of that
country from those investments were of the order of some
$39. 7 billion, representing a profit of $4.5 on each newly
invested dollar.
185. The international agencies, and in particular the
ones belonging to the United Nations system, have out­
lined innumerable plans, adopted many resolutions and
convened several conferences to deal with the problems of
economic and social development. In all of them, the
problems which afflict the countries of the so-called third
world have been clearly identified, and in some of them
measures have been suggested which, although they do
not fully solve these problems, would certainly contribute
to lessening their effects. However, in spite of the efforts
made, these ideas and initiatives have not made it possi­
ble to advance towards a real restructuring of international
relations.
190. These dollars, then, contribute nothing towards
paying the debts of the countries of the developing world;
they do nothing to help feed the hungry, cure the sick,
educate the illiterate or give work to th~ unemployed.
Their sole use is to fill the bottomless vaults of the trans­
national corporations and the Federal Government of the
United States.
·
191. Is that the way to fight underdevelopment and all
186. Has this perhaps been because of the incapacity of
the international organizations involved or the negligence
of the developing countries, for whom the effective im­
plementation of a new international economic order is a
matter of life and death, or because of the shortage of
resources at a global level which. prevents the developed
its consequences? No. Actually, that is an inverse transfer
of resources, from the developing countries to the devel­
oped market economy countries, the effect of which is
the ever-increasing enrichment of opulent societies and the
increasing~y abject poverty of the underdeveloped countries!
·
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
.209
192 •. 1hus, there are ~tOllay in the developing world 570
million 'undernourished people, 800 million illiterate
adults, 1.5 billion 'people w.ith no access to medical care,
1.3 billion people with a yearly income of less than $90,
1.7 billion with a life expectancy of less than 60 years,
1,030 million living in inadequate housing, 250 million
children who do not attend any school and 1.1 billion
unemployed. And this situation is not improving; it is de­
teriorating.
peace without yielding an inch, backed by the mobil­
ization of the peoples, including those of the Uni_ted
States, and by the immense power of world opinion and
the universal conscience, as shown during Viet Nam's
heroic struggle; by the current correlation of forces be­
tween socialism and imperialism, which the latter
vainly seeks to tilt in its favour; by the people's capac­
ity and determination to fight and resist any imperialist
aggression; by international solidarity, which can and
should be expressed in a thousand different new
ways."
193. At the thirty-fourth session of the General Assem­
bly, in October 1979 [31st meeting], Commander-in-Chief
Fidel Castro, President of the Council of State and the
Council Ministers of Cuba and Chairman of the move­
ment of non-aligned countries, presented formulas to pro­
vide a solution to the unfair situation of the under­
developed countries .. In addition to the cancellation of the
external debt of the least developed countries, he pro­
posed the establishment of an additional fund of not less
than $300 billion, at 1977 real value, to be distributed
from the first years in annual sums of not less than $25
billion. This aid should be in the form of donations and
long-term, low-interest soft credits, and other forms of
participation.
199. Mr. PEREZ LLORCA (Spaiq) (interpretation from
Spanish): The time-honoured practice of congratulating
the President of the General Assembly and expressing
great satisfaction at his election is in this instance easy to
do, for the Assembly is presided over by a most dis­
tinguished person, the representative of Iraq, a country
with which Spain has enjoyed and continues to enjoy
close relations.
200. I must also thank Mr. von Wechmar for the skill
and effectiveness with which he conducted the business of
the last session of the General Assembly, thanks to his
personal attributes and those of his country.
194, The real implement2!ion of this proposal would in­
deed represent-in spite of the self-seeking doubts of
those who characterize it as unrealistic-benefits for the
underdeveloped countries and . a true contribution to the
eradication of poverty, illiteracy, unsanitary conditions
and other consequences of underdevelopment, which have
been aggravated by the crises of the capitalist structures.
However, in order to carry out a significant battle against
underdevelopment, it is essential to have an international
political climate governed by pear e, detente and full re­
spect for the security of all.
201. My gratitude goes also to the Secretary-General,
who directs the work of the Secretariat so skilfully, so
appropriately and with such tenacity, giving it the neces­
sary stimulus.
202. I W13h too to welcome Vanuatu, a new Member
whose admission will strengthen the universality of the
Organization.
203. It is with satisfaction that we see that the State of
Belize will soon join us. We share the most ancient his­
torical roots with Belize, and we wish it in its indepen­
dence a prosperous peace in union with its neighbours.
195. For these reasons we must oppose the arms race,
the manufacture of neutron bombs, the deployment of the
572 medium-range missiles in Europe, the production of
the MX missile systems at a cost of tens of billions of
dollars, of new strategic bombers, of nuclear aircraft car­
riers, of Trident submarines, the reactivation of big war­
ships from the Second World War, the investment of
$1,500,9()0,000,000, in military expenditures in the next
five years, and the greatest arms race in history, as en­
gineered by the United States.
204. In order to establish the Spanish position before
the Assembly I must base myself on two tenets of analy­
sis and action. One is the unequivocal option of Spain in
favour of a Euro-Western political concept, certain that
the pluralistic democratic system, which is its ethical ref­
erence, has greater social flexibility and a greater capacity
for adaptation to the needs and requirements of peoples.
This is an indivisible process, both in the field of convic­
tions and in the practical field of their internal and inter­
national institutionalization. The Spanish State is ready to
accept the consequences thereof.
196. These enormous military expenditures, which can
only serve to aggravate the world economic crisis, will
have negative repercussions on the living and working
conditions of the working class and can only lead man­
kind to an unprecedented catastrophe.
197. The threat of war is real. It is no secret that the
brazen,. adventurist policy of the imperialist Government
of the U.nited States has pushed the world to the brink of
the abyss.
205. As I said last year, the form our democracy has
chosen to take to exercise the right to defend the mainte­
nance of international peace and security-as an inher­
ently Spanish decision-does not allow of any inter-.
ference without serious infringement of the fundamental .·
rules of international law and the very principles of the
Charter of the United Nations.
198. As was stated by President Fidel Castro in his
o~nipg,. sp~ecb to the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Con­
ference:
~'We. must face these real dangers serenely and cou­
rageously. We cannot afford to be pessilllistic, for then
the battle for peace would be lost beforeliand. We can­
not be cowardly, for then dignity as well as peace
would be lost beforehand. We can and shouh:l preserve
206. We are sure that the Members of the United Na­
tions, with all of which we wish to have peaceful and
cordial relations, will not attempt any interference­
which would be intolerable-or any confused and base­
less conjectures. Spain is not, nor does it wish to be, a
threat to anyone. On the contrary, in any forum in which
it participates it will maintain a constant position of
striving for real peace.
.
Annex 53
'"
210
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
207. The second tenet concerns credibility. In this re­
gard Spain has in the United Nations shown undeniable
consistency, as is easily verifiable. On the questions of
the Middle East, Lebanon and Palestine, the Sahara,
apartheid, Namibia, human rights, terrorism, the battle
against racial discrimination and intolerance, peace-keep­
ing operations, the crises of Afghanistan and Kampuchea
anE! :the Cypriot conflict, and on matters of disarmament
ancl ·bevelopment, the attitude of the Spanish democracy
has remained constant.
is an essential feature of our foreign _policy. It is n_ot a
policy that was adopted simply because there was no al­
ternative, but a policy that was selected and given preference

over all others.
.
· · ·
215. We are at a stage when everybody has become
aware of the duty to increase. specific projects,;,establish
machinery to make them effective and, to -the common
benefit, give new life to our ancient ties. We have to give
new energy to this· relationship, which has gone through
periods of rhetorical inaction imposed by certain historical
circumstances;
208. In these difficult times, in which peace is pre­
carious, Spain has responded from positions of principle,
has entirely resisted tne pressures coming from interested
parties ar,d has clung to an independent foreign policy
conditional only upon the interests of the Spanish people
and die desire for co-operation in establishing a more just
and harmonious international order.
i",
216. We can only regret that some Central American
countries have suffered cruel afflictions in the social
sphere. Those peoples have the solution in their own
hands, and any interference can only complicate the inter­
mil situation, which •is caused oy: necessary 'changes.
Spain feels the tragedy of those brother peoples deeply,
and it is as if it were ourselves who were undergoing it.
209. Special and immediate reference must be made to
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,
which after 10 months has postponed its Madrid meeting
until next October. Spain has a dual role as host and par­
ticipant. As host, we are ready to receive the Conference
in Madrid with the same satisfaction as before. As one of
the 35 participating States, we shall redouble our efforts
in favour of .security and peace.
217. Spain reaffirms· as one of the objectives of its pres­
ent foreign policy its intention to multiply and diversify '
its relationship with African countries. Our attitude will
be based, bilaterally and in the sphere of parliamentary
diplomacy, on decisive s\lpport for efforts to put an end
to colonialism, apartheid anci racial discrimination, and to
co-operate, as far as we are able, in the socio-economic
development of that neighbour continent.
210. We must revive the pofaical decision to negotiate
and recommence meetings with 8'. new impetus and a
willingness to resolve the .major problems of human
rights, information and the military aspects of security;
218. Our geographical position places us in contact with
the Arab coast of the Mediterranean and in a· very. close
relationship with western Africa. We can see the reality of
those two worlds without interference and we have justifi­
able hope that the Euro-Arab and Euro-African dialogue,
in which we shall participate increasingly as time goes by,
will bring . about new forms of effective i:o-operation.
211. The Madrid declaration must develop the principles
of the Final Act of Helsinki and fulfil its ambitious objec­
tives to improve the international climate, without illu- ·
sions or complacency, which would be extremely dan­
gerous. Thus shall we contribute to the revitalization in
Europe of peace and security, which are constantly in
question.
212. I already had occasion at the last session [4th
meeting, para. 138] to say that through the Lisbon Decla­
ration, adopted in April 1980,
9
the Spanish and British
219. Because of our closeness to and our particular in­
terest in anything that affects the Arab nation, we con­
tinue to attach special importance to the situation in the
Maghreb. We hope that as soon as possible terision be­
tween brother countries will disappear and that there will
be an understanding that will allow for the development
of inter-Maghreb relations, which would benefit greatly
the peace and prosperity of all.
Governments have taken an important step forward, how­
ever preliminary, towards _ resolving the conflict between
Spain and the United Kingdom concerning the colonial
situation of Gibraltar, I said then that we were dealing
with a task that was not easy and events have borne that
out, although it is important to maintain the convergence
of political wills and to be ready to embark upon a path
which may final!y lead'· to settlement of the dispute, so
that there will never again be any obstacle between Spain
and the United Kingdom.
·
220. We have never failed to· avail ourselves of this op­
portunity in the United Nations to stress the concern and
attention demanded by the question of Western· Sahara.
Our position has been characterized by unswerving firm­
ness of principle and support for a solution based on an
agreement accepted by all the parties, which should take
into account the principles and recommendations put for­
ward by international bodies, and in particular the ex­
pression of the_ will of the people.
213. The United Nations has shown the path to follow,
as is recognized in the joint Lisbon Declaration, which
states that both parties have committed themselves to re­
solving the problem of GibiL'altar in a spirit of friendship
in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United
Nations.
221. The Spanish Government favoured -the · initiative
taken by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco·-anhe
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Or­
ganization of African Unity in Nairobi, when he sup­
ported the idea of the referendum referred to in resolution
214. · Spain's relations with the peoples of Latin America
are at a propitious stage. In the foreign policy of demo­
cratic Spain the close links of history, background and
language are an element that strengthens our decision to
find new means of drawing closer to the American contin­
ent and co-operating with its ,peoples. That relationship
AHG/Res.103 • (XVIII) [see A/36/534, annex II] and the
implementation of recommendations made by' the African
Heads of State who are members of the Ad Hoe Commit­
tee. That is a matter of capital importance which gives
grounds for fresh hope with respect to finding a just solu­
tion by peaceful means, within the terms of recent corn-
Annex 53
12th meetlng-24 September 1981
211
mitments entered intQ ,at the meetings of the Organization
o~ African Unity [OAU].
229. In Lebanon the tension curve is reaching new
heights. There are various factors in that country which
set the zone alight and threaten the integrity and very ex­
istence of the country. In the Security Council, Spain ex­
erted every effort in support of the establishment of a
cease-fire, after which the position could be stabilized
and an impetus given to national reconciliation, preserv­
ing the independence, national integrity and sovereignty
of Lebanon under the authority of its legitimately estab­
lished Government. · The work of UNIFIL, to which I
wish to pay a well-deserved tribute, must be extended and
strengthened as much as necessary to make it more effec­
tive. It should be fully supported so that it may be re­
spected by all the parties to the conflict.
222. Our policy of co-operation acquires special impor­
tance with reference to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.
Our actioo will always be guided by the principle of non­
interference and by the desire to see Equatorial Guinea
regain its rightful place in the regional context of the Af­
rican community. We are prepared to strengthen our co­
operation with the people of Equatorial Guinea and its
Government to the extent that that Government freely de­
sires. We feel that during this past year a broad network
of co-operation has been put into effect and consolidated,
which will give impetus, within the general framework of
economic regeneration, to the national reconstruction of
Equatorial Guinea.
223.- The independence of Namibia is almost within
230. It is necessary to put an end to armed actions
which continually endanger an unstable truce. The Span­
ish Government, on learning of the attack carried out by
the Israeli air force against the nuclear research facility in
reach. The Namibian people has a right to self-detennina­
tion and immediate sovereignty over all its territory. The
Spanish Government feels that only through the imple­
mentation without let or hindrance of the plan set forth in
Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)
can any progress by made on this matter. We must trust
that the efforts being made at this very moment will lead
to the resumption of the negotiating process and to
Namibian independence.
Iraq, issued a communique strongly condemning that in­
admissible act of force, which was a serious violation of
the basic rules of international law. The Security Council
condemned that action in resolution 487 (1981), consider­
ing that Iraq has a right to proper compensation for
damage which Israel has admitted causing. Spain hopes
that Israel will carry out the obligations which it bears as
a Member of the Organization under Article 25 of the
Charter and wm respect that resolution. Spain, as it said
again in the Security Council, also recognizes the sov­
ereign and inalienable right of all · States-including
Iraq-to establish technological and nuclear programmes
for peaceful purposes.
224. Perseverance is necessary in these endeavours, and
the South African Government must be required to desist
from ,any further counterproductive delaying tactics and
from its indescribable acts of intimidation. Incursions into
bordering countries are acts of force, in violation of the
basic rules of international law, and simply increase the
danger of global confrontations.
231. The Spanish Government is still firmly con­
vinced-and this conviction seems to have been shared
by the States who attended the meeting in Venice in 1980
of the European Council of the European Communities­
that the Middle East conflict cannot be understood or
solved without the participation of the Palestinian peopie.
225. In this regard, the work carried out by the United
Natious Council for Namibia should be commended. Dur­
ing foe visit of that council to Spail\ a few months ago,
we ,;;ere able to appreciate the similarity of our positions
with respect to the past and t.he future of Namibia, in
particular with regard to recognition of the legitimacy of
the representation conferred by the United Nations on
SWAPO in its struggle, for freedom and independence.
226. With respect to apa,:tl,eid, we must repeat our total
rejection of the policy as a violation of human rights and,
indeed, as an affront to man's reason. The existence of
apartheid is a tragedy which is felt anew every day .and it
is a blight on all mankind.
.
232. This year the situation has simply worsem;d, for
pea<:e cannot be envisaged as long as the legitimate na­
tional rights of the Palestinian people are not recognized.
The illegal settlements in the occupied territories, con­
tinue, maki!lg any prospect of a solution difficult. A p,ol­
itical negotiating m~h;nery must be set up whereby Is­
rael and the Palestinian people can both be represented
and where they can mutually accept each other as valid
negotiators. The legitimate representative of the Pales­
tinian people, as many General Assembly resolutions
show, is the PLO.
227. Concerning.,this question and the tn';JiC situation of
refugeest Spain has trucen part in two conferences organ­
ized jointly by the United Nations and the OAU; one,
the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in
Africa, held at Oeneva, and the other, the International
Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, held in
Paris. · We believe that co-operation among international
orgaQi.zations is a productive means of international ac­
tion. S_uch co-operation has proved c;ffective in both
cases,. apartheid and assistance to African refugees.
233. An over-all agreement must be reached by which,
based on the premise of the withdrawal from all Arab
territories occupied since 1967, the enforcement of Pal­
estinian national rights would be obtained through self­
determination. That would allow all present and future
States in the region to achieve peace within safe and rec­
ognized frontiers. Only within such a framework will it
be possible to achieve the coexistence and co-operation
we would all like to see as a tangible reality.
234. In this respect, as I have had occasion to point out,
it is our view that the plan for a just and global peace,
recently put forward by His Highness Crown Prince Fahd
of Saudi Arabia,
228. With respect to the Middle East, almost everything
possible has been said in the past 33 years. Today more
than ever we are aware that this is not a knot that can be
cut.with a.sword. Unfortunately, in the course of the past
12 months force has again been used, in distegard of rea~
10
is a very positive contribution which
~-
'
must be given the consideration it deserves. These pro­
posals are based on principles and criteria put forward in
Annex 53
.,.....,..
212
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
the Organization on many occasions, and Spain has re­
peatedly supported them. As long as the political road is
barred for the Palestinian people, we can never have
peace.
rules of international conduct, that such violation is a
cause of instability and international insecurity and that
all such acts are to be condemned. All those premises are
supplemented by the unavoid~ble demand for an objective
appraisal and determination of violations of human rights.
This is a viewpoint which does not allow of any blind
spots. This is not an asymmetrical concept which can be
235. As for Afghanistan, more than a year and a half
ag~ Soviet aggression was perpetrated against t~1e Afghan
~p)e, an act of aggression which has resulted 10 the loss
of many lives, the destruction of the country and the in­
ability of the inhabitants freely to choose thoir political
structures. Almost two years after the invasion there is no
glimmer of a solution to that foreign armed intervention,
which we have repeatedly condemned. We therefore feel
that international pressure in favou.r of Afghan liberation
should be kept up.
applied in one continent and not another at will, or in
order to take advantage of the distress of people whenever
it can be used for some monstrous reason of State, Human
rights

are the basis and cement of the social. har­
mony and peace of States, and global defence of those
rights is the irrevocable gain of contemporary human cul­
ture, the importance of which is such that it makes it
possible to define limits in respect of the internal sphere
of the State.
236. We fully support the resolutions of the General As­
sembly conceJDing the need for the withdrawal of Soviet
troops and the re-establishment of Afghanistan as a coun­
'1'Y free from foreign domination, as the basis for a just
solution that would make it possible for the Afghan peo­
ple to recover their independence and freely. decide their
own future. In this respect, we support the resolutions of
the Islamic Conference [A/36/421 and Corr.I, annex 11],
the proposals of the European Community•
1
240. Based on these convictions, Spanish democratic
pluralism will require of itself and others the same scru­
pulous respect for human-rights, convinced that the civi­
lized survival of the human race demands ~t. Spain will
support the establishment of machinery that Nill make it
possible to control and, in the final analysis, p.-:-.,•·~nt vio­
lations of human rights, without territorial or ioeulogical
selection or discrimination.
and the joint
communique issued by the participants at the Ottawa
Summit.
12
We also deplore the attitude of the Soviet
Union towards those efforts by the international commu­
nity, as well as the threat to peace and security in the
region and indeed throughout the world represented by
that attitude.
241. Terrorism, which is a violation of the right to life,
is the most brutual violation of human rights. The terror­
ist act which shamefully deprives innocent people of their
life or· threatens the vital security of a community by
bloodshed cannot be justified. The consequences for.inter­
national order are clear: w~ cannot compromise with ter­
rorists without_ endangering· peace. No one can claim to
be persecuted for political reasons-an allegation all too
often made by the terrorist-if that person is free in a
free political society. Wherever political change can be
seught without risk through regular elections allowing
free expression of every option, none can claim to be per­
secuted for political reasons. There are no political of­
fenders in a real democracy: if it is a democracy they do
not exist; if they exist it is not a democracy.
237. Kampuchea is another problem for which a solu­
tion seems no closer than it was last year. It is quite true
that the International Conference on Kampuchea was held •
recently as requested by the General Assembly last year
in resolution 35/6, and Spain took part in it. But it rnay
also be noted that not every party to the dispute attended
the Conference, nor was a joint plan to settle the problem
agreed to. The Cambodian people are still victims of mili­
tary occupation and violence. We will spare no effort to
contribute to any valid solution, any approach allowing
Kampuchea to be free and to live in peace and recogniz­
ing the sovereignty of its people, its independence and its
territorial integrity.
242. It is abnormal to impose by force a non-existent
and brutal 'right' to kill and to seek protection outside
one's borders, claiming that political freedom is needed
when it already exists.
Mr. Kittani (Iraq) resumed the Chair.
238. One of the basic factors on which peace through­
out the world depends is respect for human rights. Since
1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was adopted, we have had a -legal model which makes it
possible to compare international conduct, and enough
time has passed since then to set up additional machinery
to safeguard such rights and to control any violations.
Democratic Spain has signed and ratified the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), annex]. A
243. Spain, like so many other European countries, is
suffering from terrorism and has a legitimate interest in
fighting for its ~radication. But it is not only a desire for
selfish security that makes us consider that international
action against terrorism is called for. Peace and interna­
tional security are directly affected. We do not live alone
and the instability of any one member can result in in­
stability for others. We must consider, as we have pro­
posed in the European region-both in the Council of Eu­
rope and in the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe-concrete measures that will effectively ex­
press the solidarity of the democratic States against terror­
ism, racism and totalitarian ideologies.
few months ago, within a regional framework, we took
yet another step and in the Council of Europe, made a
statement of acceptance of the individual recourse ·pro­
vided for in article 25 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950.
244. In the spring of 1982 there will be a second special
session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
The decade of the 1980s has been declared, most appro­
priately at this time, the 'Second Disarmament Decacle'.
However, there is undoubtedly some feeling that too many
words have been wasted on this subject. It is plain that
the world is rearming and tha~ the arms escalation is con-
239. We base ourselves on the principle that any vio­
lation of human rights by a S!ate is a violation of the
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
213
tinuing. Fresh conflicts break out, tresn invasions and acu,
of aggression, which do not augur well for any reduction
in the stockpiling and production of war material-far
from it. Promises of disarmament are belied by statistics,
and even public proposals for disarmament are merely a
smokescreen for very different measures.
State sovereignty and jurisdiction and that will real­
istically and effective1.y develop. the universally accepted
principle of the common heritage of mankind for the ex­
ploitation of the resources of the sea-bed beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction.
251. The Organization, which by reason of its univer­
sality of membership and functions accepts and deals with
every conflict, has-RS do its Members-a double duty:
to fight for human freedom and to seek peace among peo­
245. The Spanish Government is ready to help ensure
that the second special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament will have real meaning and
achieve results, opening the way to general and complete
disarmament under effective international control, cover­
ing both nuclear and conventional weapons. It accord­
ingly welcomes the American-Soviet talks announced to­
day.
ples. It also has the obligation to propose solutions that
are feasible today and to take action now.
252. We cannot afford to indulge in wishful thinking. I
do believe, however, that a firm stand on questions of
human rights, a reopening of the North-South dialogue
and of disarmament negotiations, the success of the Cou­
ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and a
246. The definition of a new international economic
order is based on an ethical requirement and a practical
premise. A large-scale crisis cannot be avoided unless we
cleaning up of the many peripheral crises can all be
help the disinherited of the earth and contribute to their
full development. In this connection, the recently held
United Nations Conference on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy and the United Nations Conference on
the Least Developed Countries are joint endeavours de­
signed to give new impetus to international solidarity.
achieved through political decisions that are within the
realm of the possible.
253. We are at a dangerou; stage. The United Nations,
as the witness of our times, must bring ·a11 of us together
so that it shall not be said of the coming year, in the
words of that sombre verse of a contemporary Spanish
poet, that "Wounded peace with its dead wings was again
covering the world".
24 7. I should like to mention the appeal made to the
world and to the United Nations by 54 Nobel.Prize win­
ners, including a Spanish poet. That group of exceptional
people called not only for cQmpassion on the part of the
rich world, but also for common sense in helping those
on whom hunger and underdevelopment inflict real suffer­
ing, and who are the victims of international political and
economic disorder. The United Nations cannot disregard
this problem or postpone its solution to a future that
many will not live to see unless proper measures are
taken now. The Spanish Government undertakes to main­
tain a sustained effort to see to it that global negotiations,
efforts to restructure the international economic order, and
the North-South dialogue should go beyond both diatribe
and rhetoric and overcome the dual obstacle of the desire
for a · miraculous utopia and the exaggerated realism of
misconceived selfish interests.
254. Mr. ULLSTEN (Sweden): Mr. President, allow me
at the outset to congratulate you on your election to the
high office of President of the thirty-sixth session of the
General Assembly. You bring to that office an uncom­
monly solid and variegated experience of work in and for·
the United Nations. I have every confidence that the As­
sembly will be most competently guided.
255. 1 wish also to join in the tributes paid by other
speakers to the outstanding and tireless work of the Presi­
dent of the thirty-fifth session, Mr. von Wechmar.
256. Our thanks and appreciation go also to the Secre­
tary-General for his tireless work in the service of the
Organization and in the pursuit of solutions to many of
the most intractable problems facing the international
community.
248. We must say that a type of modernization consis­
tent with the foreign policy of every industrial society or­
ganized as a pluralistic democracy requires the undertak­
ing of international co-operation and the informing of
national public opinion about the inevitability and collec­
tive benefit of international aid. The Spanish Government
has given clear testimony of its position by radically in­
creasing in 1981, within the limit of its resources, its co­
operation with the least developed countries.
257. . Let me also welcome the most recent Member of
the United Nations, Vanuatu. The admission of this new
nation to the Organization brings us a step closer to the
goal of complete decolonization and the United Nations
ideal of universality.
249. The Spanish Government is closely following, with
some concern, the. work of the Third United Nations Con­
ference on the Law of the Sea: closely, because the im­
portance of that effort to codify and develop international
law fully deserves such attention; with concern, because
events that have occurred at the Conference this year may
threaten its final success.
258. Since the previous session of the General Assem­
bly the international climate has deteriorated even further.
Detente has, to an increasing extent, been replaced by
distrust. Some fear1.1res of the situation certainly remind
us of the days of the cold war. Once again we see the
foreign policy of the super-Powers being dominated by the
fear that one adversary might gain, either directly or indi­
rectly, an advantage over tt~ other. Once again, they both
seem inclined to view local conflicts and problems pri­
marily in the light of the struggle for power between the
two systems they represent. Once again they both seem to
fear that the opponent is on the verge of acquiring mili­
tary superiority. Both see the actions of the opposite side
as threats to their own security. Neither sees its own ac­
tions as threats against the other side.
250. The Spanish Government has made great efforts at
accommodation in the interests of a final consensus. I
would not deny here that there are still a Jew articles of
the draft convention as it stands now which we could not
fu!ly support, but we hope that a final negotiating effort
will make it possible to achieve a text that will respect
Annex 53
214
General :Assembly-Thiny-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
259. The struggle of the super-Powers to rectffy the per­
ceived imbalances in some areas, or to compensate for
them by attempts to achieve superiority in others, leads to
increased insecurity for all of us. By reason 01 their nu­
clear arsenals, the two super-Powers hold the fate of the
entire world in their hands. Therefore, every State has the
right to demand that the super-Powers maintain a stable
pattem of contacts in order to avoid misunderstandings
and ovtr-reactions. We therefore welcome the fact that the
Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United
States are using the occasion of this session of the Gen­
eral Assembly to hold bilateral meetings.
of the strong desire of the Nordic peoples to maintain the
low level of tension in our part of the world:
.
266. My Government is in favour of. exploring the pos­
sibilities of establishing a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free
zone and the conditions under which such a zone could
improve the already existing stable pattern of Nordic se­
curity. As the Nordic countries do not have nuclear weap­
ons, such an improvement would, in the view of my Gov­
ernment, have to include concessions from thf' Soviet
Union and the United States as regards nuclear weapons
relevant to the Nordic region.
260. However, we cannot rest content with the resump­
tion of the necessary dialogue between the two super­
267. So far the United States has not been willing to
Powers. We must call upon them to review and reconsider
the course their global actions have taken, the most dan­
gerous dimension of which is the nuclear arms race. The
negotiations onrtheatre nuclear forces in Europe, which
are now scheduled to begin later this year, should have
been commenced long ago.
consider a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.
268. The Soviet Union has suggested that it subscribes
to the idea. It has also hinted that it could consider con­
cessions relating to its own . territory. However, what has
been said so far has been more than vague. If we are to
have a meaningful debate, further clarifications from the
Soviet Union are necessary as to what concessions it has
ir. mind.
261. Four years have passed since the Soviet Union
started deploying a new medium-range ballistic missile,
the SS-20, and two years since NATO decided to install
new medium-range nuclear missiles on West European
soil. It is repoi:ted that more than 300 SS-20s have al­
ready been deployed and that at least two thirds of them
may be targeted on Western Europe.
.
269. World peace is not something to be discussed ex­
clusively in closed sessions between the major Powers.
All States should be given the possibility of making their
voices heard on matters which relate to their security and
to world peace. This is. the idea behind the proposal to
convene a conference on confidence- and security-build­
ing measures and disarmament in Europe with the par­
ticipation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
262. The recent decision of the United States to produce
the neutron weapon constitutes a further dangerous esca­
lation of the nuclear arms race between the super-Powers.
It is therefore high time for the super-Powers to sit down
at the negotiating table and agree on measures to restrain
the arms race and reduce the risk of war. No category of
weapons should be excluded from negotiations, but we
urge the super-Powers in particular to resume in the near
future their talks on limitations and reductions of strategic
arms.
270. Many States-not least, neutral and non-aligned
. countries in Europe-are working hard towards this goal
at the current follow-up meeting in Madrid of the Con­
ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.
263. That demand is supported by a· wave of popular
protests in Western Europe against nuclear armaments.
All slogans are not as unbiased as they may seem and
some ideas put forward may be less realistic than others,
but in general the protests against nuclear weapons must
271. A conference on confidence-building and security­
building measures and disarmament in Europe, held in
successive stages, could remit in the adoption of new
confidence-building and security-building measures as
well as progress towards limitation of nuclear and conven­
tional weappns. Concrete, practical results of a first stage
of the conference would certainly be conducive to a situa­
tion where meaningful negotiations on disarmament
proper in Europe could be initiated. The conference could
thus also promote progress towards a military balance be­
be seen as an expression of a genuine and legitimate con­
cern about what people feel is the lunacy of the nuclear
anns race and the incapacity of political leaders to do
anything about it.
tween the two alliances at substantially lower armament
levels.
264. All human beings yearn for peace, no matter in
what country they live. The fact that there is no freedom
of expression in some countries should not diminish the
importance of popular protests in countries where such
freedom can be enjoyed. Nor should the fact that some
devote more and more attention to planning for the even­
tuality of war prevent others from dedicating themselves
to planning for peace. Every region and every country, no
matter how small, has the right and the duty to interfere
in international affairs for the sake of peace.
272. The super-Powers may have differing views on
many of these and other issues discussed at the Madrid
meeting, but they must not forget that the preservation of
the process of the Conference on Security and Co-opera­
tion in Europe is in their common interest. They must
therefore mobilize the political will for the adjustments
and compromises necessary for reaching a substantial and
balanced result in Madrid covering all fields of the Final
Act of Helsinki.
265. In the northern region of Europe the desire to up­
hold the vision of a more peaceful world has been re­
flected in the idea of establishing a Nordic nuclear­
weapon-free zone. The active discussion on this idea can
273. It is important that we develop the contents of the
Final Act of Helsinki with new initiatives. It is just as
important that we uphold respect for the principles al­
ready enshrined in that very Act. The Helsinki Act re­
affirms the right of every State to territorial integrity,
freedom and jndepend... ~e. Any interference in the inter­
nal affairs of another State, as well as any use or threat of
be seen · as an expression of strong concern over the inten­
si'.Tned nuclear arms race in Europe and as a demonstration
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
215
force, is a breach ot the principles mat direct co-operauon
between the States of Europe.
Arabs, the increased Amenca.-i and Soviet presence in the
Indian Ocean, the arms flow to that region, the social and
political unrest, the economic and strategic importance of
the Middle East and Gulf region-all these factors com­
bine to make this part of the world a powder keg. What is
274. These solemnly worded principles also apply to
Poland. During the last year we have witnessed a promis­
ing development towards the implementation of certain
fundamental democratic rights in Poland. However, at the
same time and with increasing concern, we have noted
the open and brutal demands of the Soviet Union that the
trends in Poland be turned back. We see no reason why
an internal political process in Poland should cause its
great-Power neighbour to make menacing statements. On
the contrm-y, we see strong reasons why the Poles should
be allowed to determine their own future without any for­
eign interference.
needed in that region is not more violence, not more ter­
ror, not more bombing, not more violations of the princi­
ples of the Charter of the United Nations, but more
efforts for peace.
275. The Charter of the United Nations bestows no
mandate on the great Powers to impose their will on
282. The Sov1ec armed intervention in Afghanistan con­
tinues, however, in open contempt both of massive world
opinion and of the Charter. The only results the Soviet
troops have achieved are increased international tension
and instability. Popular resistance to the invaders is as
vigorous as ever and shows that a lasting solution of the
Afghanistan problem can be found only when foreign in­
terference has ceased.
smaller nations. On the contrary, the Charter confers
greater responsibilities on the great Powers as guardians of
international peace.
283. In the Middle East two adversaries, Israel and the
PLO, stand face to face. We urge them to recognize each
other hlld start negotiating for peace. This is to say that
the PLO must recognize Israel's right to exist within se­
cure and recognized boundaries. This is also to say that
Israel must recognize the legitimate national rights of the
276. Regional conflicts throughout the world can easily
escalate to a confrontation between the supek!..Powers and
become a threat to world peace.
Palestinians, including their right to establisl., should they
so wish, a State of their own. living in peace side by side
with Israel. Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and
338 (1973), supplemented by an endcrsement of the legit­
277. In southern Africa, the. Pretoria regime, tmbold­
ened by the reg1onal strategic concepts recently put for­
ward by the United States, has escalated its attacks
against its neighbours, Angola in particular, in flagrant
violation of international law.
imate national rights of the Palestinians, remain the basis
for a peaceful solution to the Middle East problem.
278. The internal developments in South Africa are also
ominous. '!'!le vague talk of reforming the apartheid t:1ys­
tem has served only, as I see it, as an attempt to mislead
the critics of apartheid. In reality, the system has re­
mained as rigid as ever. The human degradation in which
the majority of the country's population still has to live is
surpassed only by the human, and indeed moral, degrada­
tion of the regime itself. But despite the efforts of the
regime to silence trade unions, writers, students, churches
and other civic groups, opposition is obvinusly stiffening.
Events now taking place in the country could eventually
lead to a violent show-down.
284. When Israel recently attacked Lebanon, causicg
many casualties among Palestinians as well as Lebanese,
the United States tool< · ,rompt and decisive diplomatic ac­
tion and was able to contribute to a cease-fire. However
precarious that cease-fire may be, it represents a welcome
attempt to set in motion the difficult process of peace
with the involvement of all the parties concerned.
279. Every nation devoted to d~mocratic ideals and
human rights should strive for the abolition of the
285. We also welcome the fact that further steps have
been taken in preparation for the final withdrawal in April
1982 of Israeli forces from the occupied areas of Sinai. A
dismantling of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank
and in the Gaza Strip would be a constructive next step.
Human rights in the occupied territories must be observed
in a way that is compatible with Israel's tradition of democracy

and the rule of law.
apartheid system. No democracy should support a system
which violates the very idea of democracy itself. It is now
high time that massive world opinion be reflected in firm
demands that South Africa finally co-operate in imple­
menting the United Nations plan for the independence of
Namibia endorsed by the Security Council in resolution
435 (1978). None of the five Western Powers with special
responsibility for implementing this plan must through its
own actions give Pretoria the impression that the demands
that the South African regime end its illegal occupation of
Namibia are not seriously meant.
·
286. In the Middle hast LUe price of inaction might be
very high. The mere lack of initiatives for peace con­
stitutes in itself a danger. If no progress is seen towards
solving the crucial Palestinian question, bitterness and
hostility will deepen and tension rise. In few other re­
gions of the world is it therefore as important to maintain
the momentum for peace through initiatives to implement
the resolutions of the Security Council.
287. The war between Iran and Iraq has now lasted a
whole year. Tens of thousands of people have been killed,
280. In this process the Security Council must, as Swe­
den has repeatedly stated, be prepared to impose sanctions
against South Africa. This may be the only language
South Africa understands.
281. South-West Asia is another area where tension is
reaching a dangerous level. The Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, the war between Iran and Iraq, the terror
and bloodshed in Iran, the conflict between Israel anc the
and destruction is widespread. The economic development
of both Iran and Iraq is being hindered by the continua­
tion of the conflict. The efforts of the United Nations in
sending the Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen­
eral, Mr. Olof Palme, to help lead the parties onto a
course of peaceful settlement have the whole-hearted sup­
port of the Swedish Government. The parties should ex­
plore every possibility for a negotiated settlement, based
Annex 53
216
General Asst!mbly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
on the principles of the Charter ot the United Nat10ns, via
an impartial third party.
288. In Indo-China, shattered by decades of war, peace
is being sacrificed to the attempts of some States to gain
regional power and to the strategic ambitions of the great
Powers. The Swedish Government has given its support to
295. The crying needs exist, not only because resources
are limited or not fully used, but also because the re­
sources available are expended in an unwise and unjust
way. The sums that the world spends for military pur­
poses exceed the total income of that half cif mankind
which lives in low-income countries. The per capita con­
sumption of energy in the industrialized countries, one of
the most vital world resources, is 120 times as high as in
the least developed countries.
U1Jted Nations efforts to find a political solution to the
Kampuchean problem. We regret that Viet Nam did not
choose to take part in the International Conference on
Kampuchea, since a dialogue between the parties to the
conflict could create a favourable political climate neces­
sary for a solution. Every avenue should be explored for
the bringing about of such a dialogue with the participa­
tion of all the parties concerned.
296. In a month's time a summit meeting on North­
South questions will be held in Mexico. It is not intended
to take the place of global negotiations within the f~ame­
work of the United Natiems, but Sweden hopes that the
meeting will give the necessary political impetus to break
the present deadlock and set tpe North-South dialogue in
motion. We trust that it will identify so· many areas of
289. Both the Heng Samrin regime installed by Viet
Nam and t~ earlier Pol Pot regime claim the right to rule
common interest that a global round of negotiations will
over the people of Kampuchea. Sweden regards neither of
these regimes as the legitimate representative of the Kam­
puchean people. An acceptable settlement of the conflict
must include the withLrawal of all foreign troops and the
restoration to the Kampuchean people of its right to self­
determination. In our view, it is open to question whether
the continued recognition of the Pol Pot regime by the
United Nations is not an obstacle to a solution of the
Kampuchea:n problem within the framework of the United
Nations.
be unanimously agreed upon and launched at this session
of the General Assembly ..
297. There are a few areas where mutual interests dic­
tate joint discussions.
298. The first concerns. food security. No question can
be more vital than how to work out policies and me~sures
that ensure sufficient food for all mankind. Such discus­
sions must deal with ,short-term disaster measures as well
as longer-term policies to stimulate food productior, on a
sustainable basis.
! 7J. Few peopie have fought so hard and so long for
self-determination as have the Vietnamese. It is a tragic
irony that Viet Nam now seems unable to recognize that
same fundamental right when it comes to the sorely af­
flicted people of Kampuchea.
299. Secondly, action concerning commodities, trade
and industrialization is necessary. Growth in international
trade is of mutual interest to developing and industrialized
countries. Resistance to protectionism is therefore a ne­
cessity.
29 l. Another nation urgently in need of peace is El Sal­
vador, More than 20,000 people have been killed in the
,::;vii war raging in that unfortunate country. The opposi­
tkm in El Salvador has declared that it is willing to nego­
tiate in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the con­
tlict. Sweden has long advocated the idea of a negotiated
settlement, and we note with satisfaction that this idea is
gaining in international support. A negotiated settlement
which establishes a cease-fire and a coalition Government
in control of the army and the guerrilla forces would
make peace and democracy possible.
300. Thirdly, we know that a serious international d!s­
equilibrium exists, with pressing balance-of.payments
problems for many countries. Concerted efforts are there­
fore needed which aim at curbing inflation and unemploy­
ment and at increasing the transfer of resources. The es­
tablishment of an energy affiliate attached to the World
Bank would be an important and constructive measure.
30,1. Fourthly, and finally, the United Nations Con­
ference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy has
Mr. Martynenko (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic),
recently stressed the necessity of expediting the transition
from oil to alternative sources of energy. It also pointed
to the risks of...a loo intensive exploitation of firewood and
charcoal in developing countries. Continued stimulation
of conservation and efficient use of all forms of energy
are needed. Stable and predictable market developments
are in the interest of all countries.
Vice-President, took the Chair.
292. The struggle in El Salvador is a struggle between a
prevailing oligarchy and the demands of the people for
greater justice. In the final analysis it is in this conflict
that the democracies CL ,he world have to ~hoose sides.
293. El Salvador is not only a country with a high level
of political violence. It is also one of the many poor na­
tions of the world. Just as violent upheavals in many
countries have their origins in deep. economic and social
injustices, so the widening gap between the rich and the
poor countries may ultimately lead to international conflicts.
302. The idea of having a global round of negotiations
is based on the knowledge that all countries, whether rich
or poor, would benefit from international economic co­
operation.
·
303. The demand is there. The developing countries
have an enormous need for imported goods for the devel­
opment of their resources and infrastructures. The human
resources are there. Millions of people are unemployed in
the member countries of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development. The capital is also there.
Oil production has created a vast surplus of capital in
search of a productive use.
294. One fifth of mankind is living on the margin of
existence, in hunger, unemployment and illness and with­
out adequate shelter. This is intolerable from the point of
view of human solidarity and, in the long run, incompat­
ible with world peace and st~bility.
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
217
304. What is lacking is the imagination and the political
will to utilize the potentials available and to tum the
problems into possibilities. This will can be mobilized
only if we increase the awareness among political leaders
and among the public that development co-operation is a
matter of survival, not of charity, and that the North in
the wider perspective is just as dependent on the South as
the South is on the. North. Solidarity between the two will
mean better chances of survival for both.
employment everywhere, tfie continued violations of
human rights, the disrespect for the rule of law in interna­
tional relations pose the question: in what direction is our
world heading?
311. The international political climate has further
deteriorated. The situations in Afghanistan, the Middle
East, Kampuchea, Central America and southern Africa,
in particular, show no sign of easing. Notwithstanding
various serious efforts, little real momentum towards solu­
tions has been generated.
305. In the present tense world climate it is more impor­
tant than ever that we vigorously defend the principles of
self-determination, territorial integrity, the non-use of
force or the threat of force and respect for human rights.
These principles are equally applicable to conditions in
East and West, North and South. The rights of peoples or
_indivi<iuals must be protected whether they live in
Afghanistan, El Salvador, Kampuchea, Namibia, Poland
or any other country. We cannot accept the suppression of
fundamental human rights or the erosion of the principle
of self-determination in the name of any ideology or for
the protection of any strategic interests.
312. In his report on the work of the Organization
[A/3611], the Secretary-General points to a disturbing
weakening of the international co-operative effort and an
erosion of the system of multilateral co-operation, as well
as the dangers of unilateral action which inevitably evoke
retaliatory measures. Centrifugal forces are at work within
the international system. An increasing number of interna­
tional consultations on various issues fails to produce con­
crete results. In some cases international negotiations,
which could more fruitfully have been pursued within a
recognized multilateral framework, take place outside this
Organization, thus frustrating adequate representation of
all parties.
306. In the nuclear age the risks involved in any great­
Power conflict are immeasurable. That is why we must
not let tension grow to a point where the process of esca­
lation can no longer be controlled. That is why we de­
mand a halt to the arms race between the super-Powers.
That is why we urge the super-Powers to start spending
for development instead of spending for destruction. That
is why we urge the super-Powers to reconsider the course
their actions have taken in Asia, the Middle East, south­
ern Africa and Latin America. In many of these areas the
present policies of the super-Powers combine to heighten
the risks of war. In all those areas the principles of the
Charter Jf the United Nations provide the guide-lines for
peace.
313. The Government of the Netherlands wishes to re­
affim1 its feelings of responsibility as a Member of the
Organization and its dedication to the purposes and prin­
ciples of the Charter. The system of international co-oper­
ation laid down in the Charter provides a framework for
peaceful change, a framework for which there is no alter­
native. In our times, effective use of this instrument is
essential.
314. The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington,
has on behalf of the 10 member States of the European
Community [8th meeting] clearly set out the principles
guiding their activities in the world today and their posi­
tion on a number of issues. I want to add the following
on behalf of the Government of the Netherlands.
307. Mr. van der STOEL (Netherlands): On behalf of
the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I wish
to congratulate the Assembly on having Mr. · Kittani as
President of this session. His experience and profound
knowledge of the United Nations system will give us in­
valuable guidance in our work.
315. Three issues are, in the eyes of the Netherlands
Government, of critical importance. I am thinking of
arms control and nuclear arms limitation, the combating
of poverty in the developing world and the restructuring
308. The Government of the Netherlands wishes to ex­
tend a warm welcome to the new Member of the Organi­
zation, the Republic of Vanuatu. We are also looking for­
ward to the forthcoming admission of Belize to
membership. On behalf of the Kingdom, the Prime Minis­
ter of the Netherlands Antilles was present at the indepen­
dence ceremonies.
of the economic system, and the promotion and encour­
agement of respect for human rights.
309. The thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly is
taking place in a political and econcmic context which
challenges the .purposes and principles the Organization
has embodied over the past decades. There is cause for
concern about the direction in which mankind seems to
316. The single most dangerous threat to the survival of
mankin_d is that of nuclear annihilation. Therefore, the
quest for nuclear arms control should be vigorously pur­
sued, regardless of the international climate. In a period
of mounting tension, the rationale for arms control and
disarmament should be even more apparent to all. By
their very nature, the nuclear Powers, particularly the
United States and the Soviet Union, have a special re­
sponsibility. Within and outside the framework of NATO,
be moving. This session must summon the efforts of the
whole international community to head off the dangers
with which humanity is confronted.
the Netherlands Government aims at arms control, and in
particular the reduction of the role of nuclear arms. It
310. After almost two years, the 1980s present them­
selves as a critical and dangerous decade for the survival
of mankind. The global problems of the nuclear arms
race, the. deterioration of the environment, the ever-grow­
ing mass poverty and the lack of progress in the restruc­
turing of the world economy, the alarming levels of un-
attaches the utmost importance to the forthcoming nego­
tiations between the Governments of the United States
and the Soviet Union with a view to a mutual and sub­
stantial reduction of the level of armaments, in particular
through the reduction and, if possible, elimination of cer­
tain types of long-range theatre nuclear weapons.
Annex 53
218
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Smlon-Pienary Meetings
317. The Netherlands Governm~nt considers these nego- ·
tiations, which will be pursued within the framework of
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT], to be vitally
important. This pertains also to the rest of the SALT pro­
cess. Rlilure to achieve results in that process would lead
to an unrestrained nuclear arms race. Such unrestrained
vertical proliferation could increase the danger of a
wi~ning proliferation in a horizontal sense.
324. We continue to believe that the territorial integrity
of Lebanon constitutes a prerequisite for stability in the
area. The peace-keeping activities of U:~HFIL in southern
Lebai.on, which are of paramount importance for that
country's integrity, and in which the Netherlands,has been
participating as a troop-contributing country over the last
three years, continue to be hampered. I wish to reiterate
our call on all parties concerned to enable UNIFIL to
fulfil in safety its difficult and important mandate. We
shall welcome and support any initiative in this regard. In
view of the extremely difficult circumstances :in which
UNIFIL operates, I wish to express the high esteem of the
Netherlands Government for the contingents of the United
Nations and to express our deep sympathy to the Govern­
ments and peoples of Fiji, Ireland and Nigeria on the
losses their contingents have suffered this year in the
service of peace.
318. A viable non-proliferation regime is essential for
the security and survival of us all. The threat of a steadily
growing number of potential nuclear Powers calls for the
speedy achievement of a consensus in the field of the
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, the Nether­
lands Government will continue to work actively for an
international plutonium storage system and for the im­
provement and strengthening of the safeguards regime of
IAEA.
·
• , .. 1
319. The Netherlands supports the creation of nuclear­
weapon-free zones where they are conducive to increased
stability in the regions concerned. We voted for the reso­
lutions on the establishment of such zones in the Middle
East and South Asia last year [resolutions 35/147 and
351148, respectively], and we shall do so again. We also
recognize the need for a comprehensive test ban treaty
and for security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States,
a subject on which we have recently made a contribution
in Geneva.
320. Finally, do not let us forget that there are non-nu
clear armaments which are threatening as well, and which
call for measures of control. Among these are chemical
weapons, the use of which was outlawed long ago, but
which should be made to disappear altogether as soon as
possible. The preparation of a treaty on chemical weapons
is, to my mind, one of the major tasks of the Committee
on Disarmament.
0
325. The continued Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan and the lack of implementation of the. resolu­
tions adopted by this Assembly on the situation in that
country give the Netherlands Goverpment cause for con- '
cern. The violation of the rule of law with regard to the
self-determination and sovereignty of a people cannot be
condoned. We hope that the parties involved will accept
the proposals made by the European Council to bring · an
end to foreign militaey intervention and to restore the in­
dependence and non-aligned status of that stricken coun._
try. It is, in the view of the Netherlands Government, the
responsibility of the international community t~ work for
a speedy and peaceful solution and for the alleviation of
the suffering of the Afghan people within and outside the
borders of their country.
:
321. The record of the United Nations in the vital field
of disarmament over the past 35 years has been limited,
but the international community and its constituent parts
must persevere in their efforts. My Government pledges
its active participation.
326. The principles of equal rights and self-determina­
tion of peoples and of refrahing from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity of any State are at the
very basis of our existence as a civilized international
community. These principles are embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations and they are valid all over · the
world. They are at least as relevant to the situation .in
Poland as they are to Afghanistan. They have been sol­
emnly reconfirmed in the Final Act of the Helsinki Con­
ference.
322.. A comprehensive settlement of the Middle East
conflict remains of critical importance to world peace. In
327. Persistent violations of the rule of law also con­
its meeting at Venice last year, the European Council of
the European Communities made clear the two principles
on which such a settlement should be based
13
and its pre­
paredness to play a role in reaching such a settlement.
Lord Carrington, on behalf of the European Community,
has already set out our position in regard to this conflict.
I should like to stress the urgency of reaching a negoti­
ated and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East that
is just and lasting, and that provides security for all States
in the area. There can be no just and lasting peace with­
out a solution to the Palestinian problem.
323. The continued and arduous search for a settlement
in the Middle East suffered another setback as renewed
and violent hostilities flared up once again in Lebanon,
tinue to be tragic features of the situation in southern Af­
rica. Successive. Governments of the Netherlands have
fundamentally--rejected the policy of apartheid. The re­
fusal of the Government of South Africa to abide by
United Nations resolutions on apartheid and Namibia
makes further pressure~ including economic measures, in­
evitable. My country has a positive attitude tcwards the
use of economic instruments, taking into consideration the
opinion of the international community. With due ·regard
to its international obligations, the Netherlands Govern-.
ment is urgently looking for the most effective way to
participate in the existing voluntary oil embargo against
South Africa and to institute regulations concern.ing, ~n­
vestment in South Africa and the limitation of certain im­
ports from that country.
increasing even more the sufferings of the unhappy people
in that country. The subsequent cease-fire arrangemeirnt,
on the other hand, constituted a step forward and proved
that moderation and the conciliation of all parties con­
cerned were possible; a full-scale confrontation was
avoided in the end.
328. The Netherlands Government fully implements the
arms embargo and discourages contacts with the South
African •authorities in the fields of culture, science and
sport.
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
219
329 .. We will continµ,e to render financial support, in
particular, to the front-line States and "Ye will work for an
increase in international assistance to those States. Hu­
manitarian assistance will be _given to movements that op­
pose apartheid policies. Victims of apartheid policies, in­
cluding p<>litical refugees, can -count on our support.
330. _ A peaceful solution of the question of Namibia on
337. A tragic example of the apparent powerlessness of
the international community is the conflict in and around
Kampuchea. The continuing human drama, with its dis­
regard for both the sovereignty and integrity of a nation
and the elementary human rights and freedom of the indi­
vidual, is threatening peace and stability in the area. We
regret the failure to implement last year's General Assem­
bly resolution [resolution 35/6] and the Decn"ration of the
International Conference on Kampuchea
.. the basis of self-detennination remains an essential condi­
tion of peace in southern Africa. The continuous efforts
by the Secretary-General, the group of five Western States
and the front-line States in implementing the settlement
proposal for Namibia approved by the Security Council
by resolution 435 (1978) regrettably have not led to a so­
lution. So far, South Africa's position, as demonstrated
during the pre-implementation meeting of last January,
has not permitted the achievement of this objective.
14
h~Md last July .
My Government feels that this Assembly should consider
ways and means of ensuring their implementation. We
continue to support the efforts of the countries of the As­
sociation of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN] in this re­
spect.
338. The United Nations has a central role to play in
achieving the withdrawal of all foreign forces and a politi­
cal solution aimed at allowing the Kampuchean people
331. In recent weeks the situation in southern Africa has
been further aggravated by the operations of the South
_African army insid~ the territory of Angola. The Nether­
lands Government condemns the military actions of the
Government of South _ Africa, which violate the sov­
ereignty and territorial integdty of Angola.
freely to decide upon their own future without outside in­
terference. We admire the efforts of international and non­
governmental organizations to alleviate the burden of the
Kampuchean people.
339. I call upon all parties concerned fully to utilize the
framework of the United Nations in ~~t.!king a lasting so­
lution that would end this tragic conflict.
332. Change in southern Africa has long been on the
agenda of the Assembly.· The margins for_peaceful change
have steadily narrowed, wh!le the forces of violent change
are dangerously increasing. We shall have to do our
utmost to make sure that the Qecessary changes come
about while they can still be realized in a peaceful man­
ner.
333. The. Kingdom of the Netherlands follows closely
the political, economic and social developments in Cen­
tral America and the Caribbean.
340. The promotion and encouragement of respect for
and faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men
~nd women are at the heart of the objectives of the Orga­
nization. As an organization of States, it has in essence
been designed by its founding fathers as an organization
of the peoples and for the peoples of the world. The same
idea of solidarity with human beings everywhere con­
stitutes a cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Nether­
lands. We are fully committed to the recognition of the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the oppressed and the
destitute in all parts of the world.
334. Last December the General Assembly expressed its
dismay about the climate of repression and violence pre­
vailing in El Salvador and appealed for a cessation of vio­
lence and for the establishment of full respect for human
rights in El Salvador [resolution 35/192]. This appeal has
not been heeded. Human rights violations continue as be­
341. The promotion and protection of human rights is
not the concern of Governments alone. Involvement of the
people themselves has vital significance for the struggle
for human rights. Many individuals play an invaluable
role in this struggle, acting either on their own or in the
framework of non-governmental organizations. In many
cases such organizations have taken the lead in standing
fore and are a matter of deep concern to the Government
and people of the Netherlands. The people of El Salvador
are entitled to determine their own future, free from out­
side interference, in a process of genuinely free elections.
up for the victims of discrimination and repression. lo my
But as long as terrorism by paramilitary forces and other
forms of violence continue, no free expression of the will
of the people is possible.
view, human rights activists and human rights non-:gov­
ernmental organizations are vanguards of human soli­
darity.
335. It is our sincere hope that a comprehensive politi­
cal settlement process will be initiated in which the repre­
sentative political forces will participate. Such a settle­
ment should lead to a new internal order creating the
conditions for free elections, leading to the establishment
of genuine democracy.
•
342. I want to pay a tribute here to those human rights
activists in many countries who are being penalized and
persecuted because of their exercise of rights that have
been recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful
assembly and association, inciu<ling the right to form
trade unions. Such activil-'cs have fallen victim to publica­
tion bans, to dismissal from theirjobs, to internal banish­
ment and to loss of liberty, sometimes through political
trials and sometimes without any trial, for instance, by
confinement to psychiatric institutions. In several cases
such activists have paid with their lives for their efforts in
promoting respect for human rights.
336. We give our support to the recent resolution of the
European Parliament, directly · elected by the peoples of
the European Community, calling for a settlement be­
t~een the Government on the one hand and the opposi­
tion Revolutionary Democratic Front on the other. The
Netherlands Government feels that no effort should be
spared to • facilitate the rapprochement of 't~e parties in­
volved, with a view to ending the plight of the people of
El Salvador.
· ·
343. Within the United Nations, the work to ensure the
observance of basic standards of human dignity must be
Annex 53
220
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
carried on with vigour. In many places in the world such
standards are still being trampled upon notwithstanding
their explicit formulation in United Nations declarations
and conventions. Several countries are afflicted with a ris­
ing tide of intolerance and group hatred, leading to the
torture and physical liquidation of citizens who do not
share the views of the ruling regime.
that Governments have_ the responsibility . to clevi~e pol­
icies aimed at the prevention and elimination of discrimi­
natory practices in . society.
34?. After the unanimous adoption in 1975 of the Dec­
laration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Sub­
jected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment [ General Assembly resolution
350. Political oppression, soci_al dis'crimination and eco­
nomic misery and exploitation are equally incompatible
with intrinsic human dignity. The struggle for human
rights therefore requires an integrated approach extending
to social and economic as well as· to civil and political
relationships. In this context the discussions 61:1 the
emerging concept of the right to development are• of great
importance. The Netherlands delegation is determinecf · to
participate in a constructive way in the further elaboration
of this concept.
3452(XXX), anne~], it is· an affront to international soli­
darity that torture is still being practised today and that it
is still being excused with references to exceptional cir­
cumstances, which are specifically excluded as grounds
for justification in the Declaration.
.
351. The progressive development of international law
.and its codification have always been among the impor­
tant tasks of the General· Assembly.' Over the pasf "years
345. In r~ent years the authorities of certain countries
have turned to new methods of terror designed to help
them evade their own responsibility. I am referring to the
method of having political opponents simply assassinated
by anonymous executioners and the method of having
people abducted, equally anonymously, to secret places of
detention. As to the second method, I hope that the excel­
lent work of the Working Group on Enforced or Involun­
the foundation has been laid for the drafting of a compre­
hensive convention on the law of the sea, based on the
concept of a common heritage of mankind as adopted by
the Assembly at its twenty-fifth session [resolution 2749
(XXV)]. The tenth session of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea has indicated that the
overwhelming majority of the world community of na­
tions feels that a generally acceptable regime of the seas
is now within reach.
tary Disap~arances set up by the United Nations Com­
mission on 'Human Rights will contribute to the stopping
of that detestable practice.
346. From my own experience in the Commission I am
convinced that that body still has many important contri­
butions to make to the achievement of a more just and a
more humane world. I note with satisfaction that next
year the Commission will be able to give serious attention
to the rights of indigenous peoples, whose position is in.:
creasingly being impeiilled by the expanding needs of
modem society.
352. Such a convention, scheduled to be signed next
year in Caracas, will constitute a monumental achieve­
ment. The centuries-old idea of the seas being open to all
has been moulded to the modem-world reality of widely
divergent capacities of St?tes to benefit from this open­
ness of the oceans and to the need to protect the oceans
and their resources against indiscriminate use.· Effective
international co-operation with full regard for the special
interests of developing countries is the key for the new
regime of the seas as a shared resource of all countries.
Next year the international community will· basically have
no alternative, for the law of the sea no longer has a "no­
treaty" option.
347. During this session of the Assembly there will be
an opportunity to discuss the draft optional protocol on
the abolishment of capital punishment, submitted by the
Federal Republic of Germany.
15
My Government hopes
that many delegations will be in a position to support that
initiative.
353. In 1983 we shall commemorate the birth of my
learned compatriot, Hugo Grotius, four centuries ago. He
was one of the earliest advocates of the idea that the seas
are the common heritage of mankind. I hope that the
Convention on the Law of the Sea will be a reality when
that commemoration takes place.
348. We welcome the submission by the Economic and
Social Council to the Assembly of a complete text of the
draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of In­
tolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and
Belief. Almost two decades have passed since the Assem­
bly first asked for the "elaboration of such a document. I
urge the Assembly to adopt and proclaim that Declaration
at the prasent session.
16
The subject-matter of the Declara­
tion is no less relevant today than it was 20 years ago. On
the contrary, it may be even more relevant nowadays. It is
my deep conviction that the Organization should combat
religious intolerance and discrimination as vigorously as it
has combated racial intolerance and discrimination.
354. The stagg~ring problems of mass poverty, hunger
and unemployment facing the developing cou.ntries con­
tinue to command top priority on the international
agenda. Over the past years, conditions have often deteri­
orated, particularly for the poorest countries. Recent con­
ferences, such as the United Nations conferences on the
least developed countries and on new and renewable
sources of energy, have drawn the attention Qf the interna­
tional community to specific problem areas and have ind~­
cated ways to approach the issues .. Nevertheless, we, like
others, are distressed by the over-all lack of concrete prp­
gress towards solutions for the problems facing the de\fel­
oping world.
349. The Netherlands Government attaches fundamental
importance to the continued struggle against all forms of
discrimination, and strongly supports the endeavours of
the United Nations in this field. In particular we regard
the recent entry into force of the Convention on the Elim­
ination of AH Forms of Discrimination against Women
(General Assembly resolution 34/180, annex) as a
milestone in this struggle. It is widely felt in my country
355. We are concerned to see that it has not yet been
possible to reach an agreement on the new round of
global negotiations, notwithstanding the general recogni­
tion of the need for those negotiations and notwithstand­
ing the admirable and tireless efforts of the distinguished
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
221
predecessor· of Mr. Kittani, Mr. von Wechmar, who de­
serves our special gratitude. We hope that we shall soon
364. Our commitment to the needs of the developing
countries must not falter. The question remains how best
to approach the various North-South issues, to some of
which I have just referred.
be in a position to build on the foundation he has laid for
us, and we are happy that Mr. Kittani has undertaken to
continue the work in this field.
365. It is of the highest importance that the functional
approach pursued in the appropriate specialized forums
should be adhered to in a manner which offers the best
chance for concrete and tangible result~.
356. There seems to be a need for a bold, imaginative
move to break through the present stalemate that by and
large characterizes the North-South negotiations. Con­
certed international action is required. In that context we
appreciate the proposal to convene the summit meeting at
Cancun focused on the North-South relationship, as pre­
sented in the Brandt Commission's report.
17
Such an un­
366. Given the world-wide and interrelated nature of the
problems at stake, there is also a need for a process of
negotiations that allows for an overview which provides
for over-all objectives and ensures general guidance and
progress within a specific timespan. The Netherlands is
prepared to play an active role in such a process.
precedented meeting can, and we hope will, provide the
necessary impetus to unblock the North-South negotiating
pr~ess and, through a common understanding on broad
orientations, . facilitate the substantial action that is so
urgently needed.
357. It is evident that the areas of food, finance and
energy, in particular, need immediate action.
358. As to the food issue, the overwhelming dimensions
of present and foreseeable problems provide every reason
to call for stepped-up efforts with regard to food produc­
tion, food security and food aid. It is almost shameful to
find ours~lves squabbling, over procedures and percentage
shares when the urgency of the problem does not allow
for further delay.
367. I have touched upon a number of vital problems
with which the international community is faced. At the
beginning of my statement I spoke of a dangerous dec­
ade. If we are to solve the numerous and formidable
problems facing us, we must use the Organization fully
and effectively. We must use it to attain the purposes and
principles for which it was created, and enable it to fulfil
its mission as an instrument for peaceful change. Then
the United Nations will be able to take up the challenge
of the 1980s to improve the co-operative and . decision­
making capacity of the international community, and to
meet the needs of future generations.
359. None of us will disagree that there is a necessity to
address, in an alert and effective manner, the energy is­
sues that confront us all. The interrelated problems of en­
ergy consumption, energy production and energy trade
will figure dominantly in this and coming years. With so
much to be gained all round by improving consumption
patterns and increasing and diversifying supplies, it
should be possible for us to step up efforts and agree on
joint action.
368. Mr. ROLANDIS (Cyprus): This is the time of the
year when New York is characterized by a festive atmos­
phere, caused by the numerous receptions, dinners and
other gatherings which mark the commencement of the
work of a new session of the General Assembly-thirty­
third session, thirty-fourth, thirty-fifth, thirty-sixth and so
on. The higher figure each year indicates that we are get­
ting further and further away from the calamities and trib­
ulations of the Second World War. Unfortunately, it also
indicates and reminds us that we are getting further away
from the possibility of arresting and containing an unde­
sirable vicious circle of events, which may take us back
to where we started: the world war.
360. An effective approach to energy problems will im­
ply the mobilization of additional finances. In this con­
nection I wish to reaffirm our interest in the establishment
of an energy affiliate within the framework of the World
Bank.
369. Sometimes one wonders what the reason is for the
revelry and the festivities in New York each. September.
361. In the area of finance, I hardly need to restate the
problem. We are all aware of the greatly increased need
for financial transfers to meet acute balance-of-payments
problems as well as longer-term development needs.
Do we celebrate in order to divert our attention from the
fact that we have failed to make the Organization effec­
tive and consequently worthwhile? Do we celebrate be­
cause we no longer care about the fate of this mammoth
entity which has been reduced to a cul-de-sac in which
problems enter but never emerge because they are never
resolved and settled?
362. As an expression of the continued priority given to
development co-operation, and in spite of important bud­
getary cuts in .a number of fields, the Netherlands Gov­
ernment has committed itself to keeping its official aid at
least at the same level. At present, approximately l per
cent of our gross national product is spent on official de­
velopment assistance.
370. In extending my warmest congratulations to Mr.
Kittani and in expressing my deep satisfaction at his elec­
tion as President of the thirty-sixth session of the General
Assembly, I should like to refer to the wise and correct
assessment in his opening statement:
363. We have noted recent statements stressing the im­
portance of private flows. While we agree that private
flows are crucial for many developing countries, I should
like to emphasize that private flows do not and cannot
lessen th·e need for increased public trin~fers, without
which large areas and sectors will remain bYl_)assed or neglected.
"The General Assembly is not in need of new reso­
·
lutions but rather a commftment to the resolutions it
has already adopted and to the implementation of those
resolutions by translating them into concrete actuality.
thereby contributing to the principles and purposes of
the United Nations". [ / st meeti11g. para. 60.]
Annex 53
222
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
This session should rightly, therefore, be devoted to work,
to implementation and follow-up, rather than to repetitious
and lengthy statements and resolutions.
peace-keeping would become an end in itself and would
perpetuate an unjust status quo. It would soothe the pain
without curing the trauma. Necessary for effective peace­
keeping and peace-making efforts is the implementation
of the relevant United Nations resolutions, if a situation is
to be brought to a just and lasting settlement. In connec­
tion with the aforementioned, I wish to express once
again the appreciation and gratitude of my Government to
UNFICYP, as well as to the countries contributing to the
peace-keeping operation, and repeat once again that we
sincerely hope that these valuable and praiseworthy serv­
ices will be necessary for the shortest possible period of
time.
371. The remark I have cited, the substance of which is
reflected in many reports of the Secretary-General as
well, constitutes the quintessence of the very existence of
tbe .,United Nations. Member States, and especially those
which are small, weak and undefended, should have the
opportunity to inscribe on the agenda not only their prob­
lems but also their hopes, their visions and their ambi­
tions. As things are at the moment, they only inscribe
their frustration and their scepticism about the future of
the world.
372. On this score, a proposal made by the President of
the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, for the
holding of a special session of the General Assembly on
378. Posing a major threat to international peace and
stability is the escalation of the arms race. The increased
tension in East-West relations and the doctrines of balance
of power and deterrence have triggered an unprecedented
competition, the world over, for the acquisition of arma­
the vital issue of the implementation of United Nations
resolutions may be recalled and repeated.
ments. Our goal for achieving disarmament, and in par­
ticular nuclear disarmament, as set out in the Final Docu­
ment of the Tenth Special Session of the General
Assembly, contained in resolution S-10/2, appears to be
very far from realization. We cannot afford any more set­
backs, and strenuous efforts should continue to ensure the
cessation of the arms race, nuclear disarmament, a com­
prehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and strict adherence to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
373. As I stand at the rostrum of the General Assembly,
I ask myself: are we really united in the causes we are
supposed to cherish, promote and protect? Are we really
united as far as social and economic justice, human
rights, political independence and the principles of inter­
national behaviour are concerned? Are we united in our
efforts to buttress plans for the upgrading and moral evo­
lution of man? Or are we simply united in witnessing the
predicament and misery of the human being, unable to
halt the nosedive which man has taken in his national and
international affairs and activities?
[General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), anr.:ex].
379. Today, more than $100 per annum for each and every
living person are spent world-wide on armaments. That
amount is equal to 50 per~cent of the per capita income in
many countries of the world. It is indeed paradoxical to have
to spend 50 per cent of the amount needed to preserve life
for life's destruction and extermination.
374. We are nearing the end of this year, with many of
the world problems no nearer to a solution. New and
ominous events have taken place and relations between
East and West are ever strained, thus creating a bleak
world outlook. The problems of the Middle East,
Namibia, that of my own country and many others remain
unresolved, despite the efforts of the international com­
munity through the Organization, and new acts of aggres­
sion and violations of the Charter of the United Nations
have occurred in the past year. We are further confronted
by the inabilit/ to make progress on the global disarma­
ment and economic issues, while poverty and famine con­
tinue to ravage a large part of the world population.
380. This year the United Nations' and every non­
aligned country are observing the twentieth anniversary of
the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of
Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade. We retain with
gratitude forid memories of the founding fathers of the
movement · and their broad and all-embracing vision that
has literally transformed the world scene and given a new
dimension to international relations. Great names-such
as Tito, Nehru, Nasser, our own Makarios and so many
others-are identified with the noble ideals and principles
of non-alignment, ideals and principles that account for
the unprecedented growth of the movement, which now
encompasses the. great majority of the membership of the
United Nation--S and plays a positive and constructive role
in the quest for solutions to many of the problems of the
world.
375. Beset by an atmosphere of poisoned East-West re­
lations, the international community becomes all the more
obligated to find ways for tangible progress towards solv­
ing the global issues ahd such regional conflicts, the per­
sistence of which directly affects the maintenance of inter­
national peace and security.
376. The point is pertinently reflected in the report of
the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization,
where it is stated:
"The setbacks to East-West relations and a number
of unresolved regional conflicts are a dangerous com­
bination. The main thrust of the efforts of the United
381. One of the major initiatives of the non-aligned
movement has been in connection with the efforts for the
transformation of the present unbalanced and unjust world
economic system through the establishment of a new in­
ternational economic order. In the absence of such an
order, many millions will remain in abject poverty and
the gap between the North and the South, between the
"haves" and "have-nots", will become wider. The con­
Nations has therefore been devoted to attempts to re­
solve or to contain such conflicts." [A/3611, sect. IV.]
377. In maintaining world peace and security, peace­
keeping operations play d significant, indeed vital, role.
Essential to peace-keeping is peace-making. Otherwise,
tinuation of such an unacceptable situation constitutes yet
another threat to world peace, stabi!ity and' security. Des­
pite the urgency involved, the launching of the global
round of negotiations and the implementation of the new
International Development Strategy have, regrettably, not
materialized. None the. less, we wish to commend the
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
223
constructive and persistent efforts of your predecessor, Mr.
President, and express our earnest hope that, given the
necessary political will on the part of all countries con­
cerned and especially the developed ones, the task wm be
completed under your guidance. In this :respect, we trust
that the Cancun meeting will take decisive steps towards
the launching of those negotiations.
co-operation and confidence-building in Europe and, by
extension, throughout the world.
388. Among the most serious international problems,
the perpetuation of which greatly threatens international
peace and security, are the problems of the Middle East
and Palestine. The position of my Government on these
problems has been stated time and again before the As­
sembly as well as other international forums and can be
summarized as follows:
382. Closely linked with the new international economic
,order is the establishment of the new world infonnation
and communication order, which in fact constitutes an in­
tegral part of the development strategy. The increasing
awareness of the influence which news media can exert
on the life and progress of peoples, coupled with existing
and growing disparities among nations in this area, has
led to demands, mainly by the non-aligned countries, for
the establishment of the new information order which
would provide and safeguard a free and balanced flow of
·
389. It is our firm belief that the question of P.llestine
constitutes the core of the Middle East problem, and there
can be no comprehensive, viable and just solution without
taking into account the legitimate aspirations and inalien­
able rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination,
national independence and sovereignty, the right of all ref­
ugees and displaced P.llestinians to return to their an­
information based, amoog other things, on diversity of
sources and free access to information.
cestral homes and properties and their right to establish
their own independent sovereign State in P.llestine.
383. The Programme of Action adopted by consensus at
Nairobi at the United Nations Conference on New and
Renewable Sources of Energy,
18
though not living up to
390. We recognize the PLO as the sole and legitimate
representative of the P.llestinian people, whose active par­
ticipation, on an equal footing, is indispensable in all
efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East.
Partial agreements, in their absence, in so far as they pur­
port to solve this problem, are not valid.
the developing countries' expectations, is an important
first step that, given the necessary follow-up and faithful
implementation, could lead to the beginning of the solu­
tion of one of the most acute problems facin_g the world
today. Further broadening of co-operation and more effec­
tive utilization of existing sources, as well as the transfer
of technology, are necessary prerequisites for the comple­
tion of the task, provided that adequate financing is also
secured.
391. Cyprus strongly adheres to the fundamental'princi­
ple that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissi­
ble and can never be legitimized, whether in P.llestine or
elsewhere. We therefore believe that the complete and un­
conditional withdrawal of Israel from all Palestinian and
Arab territories is imperative and long overdue.
384. The recently concluded United Nations Conference
on the Least Developed Countries has identified the need
for concerted efforts and international co-operation in
order to provide the urgently needed assistance to those
countries, which would help alleviate their plight. Here,
again, a lot more needs to be done.
392. We deplore the continuing creation of faits accom­
plis, such as the annexation of Jerusalem, and the sus­
tained policies of colonization through new settlements
aiming at altering the legal status of the occupied territo­
ries and changing their demographic characteristics. We
firmly believe that belligerency must come to an end and
that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political inde­
pendence of every State in the area must be recognized
and respected, as should be the right of all States to live
in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
385. The resumed tenth session of the Third United Na­
tions Conference on th~ Law of the Sea, held at Geneva
this year under the leadership of Mr. Koh, has somewhat
mitigated the disappointm~nt at not having a convention
on the law of the sea in 1981 and, it is hoped, brings us
closer to a convention in 1982. The Conference was thus
able to achieve positive results on the outstanding issue of
maritime boundary delimitation. It is earnestly hoped that
the remaining issues will be satisfactorily resolved at the
next session of the Conference.
393. Cyprus deplores the grave developments that have
recently taken place in Lebanon as a consequence of the
Israeli acts of aggression against civilian targets in Beirut
and southern Lebanon, which constitute a blatant vio­
lation of all norms of international law. Once again, we
reaffirm our total commitment to the sovereignty, ter­
ritorial integrity, unity and independence of Lebanon.
386. The intensive and arduous efforts of the past 15
years should not be frustrated by the reopening of sub­
stantive and difficult issues which have already been ne­
gotiated and agreed to by all delegations to the Con­
ference. Otherwise, we would be depriving mankind of
one of its vital common heritages and jeopardizing efforts
for a regulated and just regime for the seas.
387. The lack of any progress of substance at the
394. The Israeli air raid on the Iraqi nuclear installa­
tions constitutes yet another totally unjustified and unwar­
ranted act of aggression directed against the sove,;eignty
and independence of Iraq.· The Government and people of
Cyprus joined the international community in strongly
condemning that gross and flagrant violation of the princi­
ples of the Charter, which has created additional dangers
Madrid follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe is causing considerable ap­
prehension. The Conference will reconvene next month,
a~d Cyprus, together with all other participating coun­
tries-and particularly the neutral and non-a~igned:.__wm
exert every effort to achieve a breakthrougb and thus
safeguard and promote an important process for detente,
to peace in that sensitive area of the world.
395. The hostilities between Iran and Iraq, two neigh­
bouring non-aligned countries, continue to cause anxiety,
particularly to the members of the non-aligned movement.
Cyprus, together with the rest of the world, expresses the
earnest hope that sustained efforts, and particularly those
Annex 53
224
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
of the Foreign Ministers of Cuba, India, Zam01a and the
Head of the Political Department of the PW, will soon
bear fruits and the whole issue will be peacefully re­
solved. These were the considerations that prompted my
Government to offer Cyprus as a venue for preparatory
work connected with the aforesaid initiative of the non­
aligned countries. I wish to reiterate that we shall con­
tinue to offer every facility, and shall spare no effort to
assist· in the quest for achieving a settlement.
401. Our commitrr.ent is equally strong C(?ncerning the
final eradication of the abhorrent doctrine of apartheid
practised by the Pretoria regime. Cyprus strongly con­
demns the continuing terror and brutal repression in South
Africa, a recent manifestation of which was the death sen­
tences imposed on the three freedom fighters. These sen­
tences emphasize once again the urgency of the problem
and the necessity for speedy implementation of the United
Nations resolutions on South Africa.
.
.
396. Another issue which is causing grave concern is
the situation in South-East Asia, which should be solved
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, in such a way as to pre­
serve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integ­
rity of all countries concerned. It is in this respect that we
a.--e encouraged by the progress, however limited to date,
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
402. Concerning the question of Western Sahara, we
welcome the constructive and dedicated efforts of the
OAU to ensure a peaceful solution of this problem
through the exercise of the right to self-determination by
the people of that Territory. The United Nations sliould
play an active role in the implementation of t~e relevant
decision of the · OAU in order to ensure· that the referen­
dum is organized and conducted in the most proper, fair
and impartial way.
Mr. Perez dt;.. Cuellar. We express the hope that his efforts
will be crowned by complete success as soon as possible
and that, similarly, the Kampuchean problem will also be
resolved.
·
397. The situation in Namibia continues to pose a se­
rious threat to international peace and security. The pre­
sent impasse created by the constant provocation and ar­
rogance with which South Africa flouts the decisions of
the international community,· coupled with the failure of
tfte · Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions
against South Africa, leads to the escalation of an alre~~y
explosive situation in the region.
403. In the field of human rights and fundamental free­
doms, the United Nations can look bo:1.ck with pride to
what has already been achieved, especially in the domain ,
of the promulgation of binding international standards.
Much more effort is still needed in the sphere of imple­
mentation, especially in cases of mass, flagrant and con­
tinuous violations of human rights coming in the wake of
aggression from without or upheaval and oppression from
within. That is why my delegation holds the firm view
that what we need is not idealistic declarations alone;
more important, and indeed more urgent, is the need to
concentrate on ways and means for their effective and full
implementation.
398. I do not propose to reiterate the well-known posi­
tion of my Government on the question of Namibia, as I
did so only a few days ago at the sixth meeting of the .
eighth emergency special session of the General Assem­
bly. Suffice it for me to quote from the statement of the
current chairman of the group of African States, Mr. B.ed­
jaoui of Algeria, who said that that session was "a very
special phase in the mobilization of the international com­
munity for the just cause of the Namibian people" and
that the resolution adopted at that session served "to
maintain the ever-growing momentum of our solidarity
with the Namibian people's legitimate struggle for na­
tional liberation".
404. Determined and co-ordinated efforts are still
needed, but let us not forget that human rights coincided
with creation, that they fulfil the aspirations of individuals
and that the tide of the quest for their implementation
now sweeping the world cannot be stemmed by the pre­
varications or negative attitudes of individual Govern­
ments.
405. In rededicating ourselves to the defence of huQJan
rights let us all resolve to co-operate fully with interna­
tional mechanisms of implementation that we have our­
selves set up. In this connection, my delegation would
like to commend and express its satisfaction at the work
399. My country, a member of the United Nations
Council for Namibia, was among the original sponsors of
the resolution finally adopted [resolution ES-812] and will
continue to associate itself fully with all United Nations
efforts for the genuine independence of a united Namibia.
We shall continue to oppose all efforts aimed at an inter­
nal settlement in Namibia and support the implementation
of the United Nations plan, in accordance with Security
-Council resolution 435 (1978), without any prevarication,
qualification or modification. We shall similarly imple­
ment the provisions of the resolutions adopted at the ninth
special session.
done by such human rights organs as the Commission on
Human Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Ra­
cial Discrimination and the Human Rights Committee.
406. We warmly welcome the admission of the Republic
of Vanuatu and the accession to independence of Belize.
Thus have additional steps been taken towards the
achievement of universality by the United Nations and the
elimination of colonialism.
400. We strongly and vehemently condemn the large­
scale incursions of South Africa into neighbouring front­
line States, as manifested by the latest invasion of An­
gola, and wish to repeat our total supJX>rt for SWAPO,
the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian peo­
ple in their hard struggle for self-determination and inde­
pendence.
407. The question of my country, Cyprus, is part of the
long list of subjects on the agenda of the thirty-sixth ses­
sion. The just and correct remedial actions contained in
past resolutions of the Organization providing for the sov­
ereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity, non­
alignment and demilitarization of Cyprus, as well as for
the withdrawal of foreign troops, the voluntary return of
the refugees to their homes in safety and tracing and ac­
counting for the fate of the missing persons, have unfor­
tunately remained a dead letter, a dismal reminder of the
fact that this international giant has the muscles of an in-
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
225
fant on its executive. arms. The foreign occupation-and
not just "the coup and subsequent events" -is still the
·cause of the political malaise which penneates the coun·,
try.
tary-General our well-considered opinion as soon as pos­
sible in the course of the next few weeks.
414. Cyprus is one of the small countries of the world,
but its wish .and will to contribute towards the solution of
problems fa enormous. We may be physically maimed but
we are mentally and morally unbent and .unflappable. We
believe that, with hard work, perseverance, goodwill, fair­
ness of mind and devotion to principles, not only small
countries like ours but the whole world may firid the way
to more promising and prosperous ·days.
408. The problem of Cyprus was not discussed in this
forum last year. The Government of Cyprus, after exten­
sive consultations with the Governments of the non'

aligned countries and many other Governments, decided
that this was the right course of action in the circum­
stances prevailing at that time. This year the question of
Cyprus· is inscribed on the agenda, while efforts, through
negotiations, still continue. This time, however, there is
an additional factor: the 12-month-long frustrating experi­
ence of the negotiations, during which the grip of the oc­
cupying forces has not loosened. Moreover, the situation
. was,.,.not. improved in any substantive way by the Turkish
Cypriot proposals of 5 August, which were minimal and
inadequate.
415. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I
shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak
in exercise of their right of reply. Before giving tbem the
floor, I should like to remind them that, in accordance
with General Assembly decision 34/401, statements in
right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first inter­
vention and 5 minutes for the second. Delegations will
speak from their seats.
409. The Turkish Cypriot leader has alleged that he has
offered us the stars in his proposals. If he thinks that the
stars are equal to 2. 7 per cent of an occupied land, then
certainly Mr. Denkta§'s notion of the universe must be
erroneous.
416. Mr. ZAMBRANO VELASCO (Venezuela) (inter­
pretation from Spanish): Unfortunately, the rules of the
General Assembly allow only 10 minutes for the right of
reply. Hence, I shall mention only the main issues, refer­
ring representatives to the text I shall request the Presi­
dent's pennission to have distributed.
410. In view of those factors, we shall insist on a full­
scale discussion of the question of Cyprus, either during
this session or at a resumed or other session later on, if
417. It is with great regret that I am obliged to address
the General Assembly in exercise of the right of reply on
behalf of Venezuela because of references made by the
Prime Minister of Guyana in his statement about my
country. I say with great regret because Venezuela's for­
eign policy is based on solidarity and co-operation among
the countries of the third world and, in particular, among
the nations of Latin America, as was stated before the
Assembly by our President, Mr. Luis Herrera Campfns
developments necessitate such a course of action:
411. Since September last year the Secretary-General
and his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Gobbi,
have been at pains to ensure the achievement of some
progress. Mr. Waldheim worked with dedication, and his
work is commendable. The results, however, have been
trivial compared to the efforts exerted. Despite this situa­
tion and despite the very poor progress hitherto, the
Greek Cypriot side has expressed the will to continue the
dialogue, and in this context it has presented further pro­
posals which will facilitate the negotiating process.
412. In his report on the work of the Organization the
Secretary-General, in referring to Cyprus, says:
"To take advantage of this situation, I and my Spe­
cial Representative may find it necessary to make spe­
cial efforts and present some new ideas, as appropriate,
[5th meeting].
·
418. The intent of the references made to Venezuela is
to present our country as expansionist and interventionist,
as one seeking to take advantage of those who are
weaker. Intem1
;d ~pression may mean that the people of
Guyana can be kept in ignorance of the facts, but other
countries can and must be made familiar with the histor­
ical and legal bases on which Venezuela's position rests.
419. Our dispute with Guyana does not derive from liti­
gations between the Spanish and British Empires. Its
cause is to be found in the plundering by the British of a
poor, defenceless Venezuela bled white by the enormous
undertaking of liberating the continent.
to sustain the momentum of the negotiating process. I
hope that any such moves on my part will be accepted
in the spirit in which they are offered, as tools of the
negotiating process for the purpose of facilitating pro­
gress towards an agreed solution. It bears repeating that
continued delay in this effort only serves to consolidate
the status quo, which both parties have found to be
unsatisfactory." [A/36/ 1, sect. JV.]
420. Until the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain had no
possessions on the South American sub-continent. When
Napoleon invaded Holland, the Dutch king and queen
took refuge in England and the latter took under its pro­
tection the Dutch colonies of the New World, among
them Dutch Guiana. At that time, the western limit of
that colony was the Essequibo River. Once ·Napoleon was
overthrown and Holland had returned to nonnal, when the
413 ... We are at the moment meticulously considering the
possible initiative just mentioned. We trust that any pro­
posed action of the Secretary-General will be based on his
. good.offices .mandate, and they must be within the frame­
work of the United Nations resolutions relevant to the
time had come to return its colonies to its ally, England,
question of Cyprus and the high-level agreements between
in a move very typical of its imperial era, decided to keep
President Makarios and Mr. Denkta§ and President
Kyprianou and Mr. Denkt3§ which were concluded in the
Secretary-General's presence and under his ~spices.
the western part of Dutch Guiana-the settlements of
Berbice and Demerara.
111
We
are viewing· this new development with th~ seriousness it
deserves and we shall not hesitate to express to·-~e Secre-
421. From the time the British Empire reached South
America, the plunder of Venezuelan territory began. al-
Annex 53
••,a.......,,.....
226
General Assembly-Thirty-sixth Session-Plenary Meetings
though Venezuela had proclaimed its independence and
was fighting to consolidate it. Year by year, almost day
by day, Great Britain extended its incursions and its
claims west of the Essequibo until, towards the end of the
century, tlie Orinoco and Caron£ Rivers, in the very heart
-0f our country, were in danger. At that point, through an
agreement between Great Britain and the United States,
Venezuela was obliged to submit to the cynical farce of a
ua~sty of arranged arbitration with neither Venezuelan
judges nor lawyers, under threat that if it did not do so
the British advance into our territory would continue in­
definitely. Thus, it was sought to give a grotesque sem­
blance of legality to the plundering of one sixth of our
national territory.
support or to publicize alleged or non-existent backing, or
to create enmity towards Venezuela. I . condemn such ac­
tivities as machinations designed to see Venezuela fall
into the trap of an ill-considered reaction.
429. The arrogant, disobliging, provocative and even in­
sulting attitudes displayed by personages from the present
Government of Guyana towards Venezuela. are only to be
understood as their attempt to seek excuses not to carry
out their contractual obligation to negotiate satisfactory
solutions for a practical settlement of the dispute.
430. I admit that we are, for economic, demographic,
military and other reasons, in a stronger position_ than
Guyana. I am aware that the responsibility for the defence
and secudty of a growing country means better equipping
our armed forces. But I emphatically deny that-Venezuela
harbours any aggressive intentions towards Guyana.
422. In no way do we seek to blame the young nation of
Guyana for these events. Those who seized our country's
territory were the very same who enslaved and then
ruthlessly eJ,Ploited, under the colonial regime, the ances­
tors of the ·Guyanese of today. Hence Venezuela, follow­
ing a line of conduct which some might deem naive-but
one of which we Venezuelans are proud-did not allow
its just claim to serve as an excuse for hampering or de­
ferring Guyana's independence. We accepted and pro­
moted the freedom of our neighbours without selfishness
and without prior conditions.
431. Venezuela wishes above all to win the battle of
peace and brotherhood with Guyana, because we are inev­
itably neighbours and because, to a great extent, we are
423. On the contrary, in 1966 we negotiated and signed
the Geneva Agreement" to resolve the dispute with
Guyana, inherited from Great Britain, by peaceful and
civilized means. Under that Agreement, the signatory
countries were solemnly committed to seeking satisfactory
solutions for a practical settlement of the dispute.
children of the same American history. Thousands of Ven­
ezuelans are descendants of people from beyond the Esse­
quibo. Francisco Isnardi, secretary and drafter of our Act
of Independence, had, prior to coming to Car~cas, been
the owner of land in the Demerara region. Army doctors
in colonial Stabroeck, now Georgetown, came to the Ori­
noco before and during our wars of independence. But
above all, thousands of slaves from Demerara gained free­
dom by fleeing to the Orinoco Strait, to enrich the · com­
plex of races that go to make up today's Venezuelans.
First and foremost, however, we have our Amerindian ancestors

in common.
·
424. This is the core of the matter: Guyana and Vene­
zuela, freely and without pressure or threats, entered into
an obligation to seek satisfactory solutions for a practical
settlement of the territorial dispute between them.
432. Let me repeat and assure you that Venezuela
wishes to win the battle of peace, because it is within
peace and understanding that is to be found. the goal of
achieving a satisfactory solution for a practical settlement
of the dispute.
425. Unfortunately, the present Government of Guyana
has shown a tendency to accept the infamies of the past.
Venezuela's attempts at dialogue met with a wall of in­
transigence, and the stated policy of the Government of
Guyana is at all costs to make the de facto situation in the
territories under dispute such that any settlement is im­
peded or rendered impossible. The unbelievable horror of
the Jonestown massacre showed the world the evil results
of that policy.
433. Therefore I wish to conclude this statement about
Guyana with an appeal for friendship to the Government
of Guyana, so that m sincerity and with good faith it will
fulfil its responsibilities under the Geneva Agreement of
1966 and so that the Guyanese and Venezuelan peoples
together, in a spirit of responsibility and good-neighbourly
relations, can finally eradicate the unfortunate vestiges of
the crimes of colonialism of which we were both victims.
426. We Venezuelans are aware of the serious and grow­
ing economic and social difficulties afflicting the young
nation of Guyana. In so far as our modest means allow,
we have tried to offer our co-operation. None the less, we
believe that any attempt to distract the attention of public
opinion from immediate real problems and towards out­
side, non-existent threats must be resisted.
434. With reTerence to Cuba, we are exercising our right
of reply because of the Foreign Minister's rhetoric. The
delegation of a country with such mortgaged sovereignty
as Cuba cannot have anything to say about a democratic,
sovereign, fully independent and free State such as Vene­
zuela.
427. Venezuela is not asking friendly countries for any
support that would mean taking sides against Guyana, be­
cause we are aware that territorial issues cannot be prop­
erly resolved through the interference of other States in
matters not within their competence. Venezuela seeks
only understanding and study, the mote thorough the bet­
435. Fidel Castro's dictatorial regime finances, directs,
trains and supports all tile adventurism in Central Amer­
ica, South America and the Caribbean and, as the instru:­
ment of a super-Power's policy, also takes part ~n actions
ter, of ~e territorial problem between our country and
Guyana.
in other parts of the world.
436. The Assembly heard the statement of Luis Herrera
Campfns, a president who is aware of the sovereignty of
his country. The President of Venezuela talks with his
own voice. Unfortunately, Cuba cannot say as much.
428. I clearly condemn the actions and statements of the
Government of Guyana as designed to seek international
Annex 53
12th meeting-24 September 1981
227
437. · The present Constitution of Cuba, adopted under
the tyranny of Castro, is the only Constitution in the en­
tire Latin American region that pays the vassal's tribute to
a super-Power. President Castro takes part, led by the
hand by the aggressors, in the sad chorus of those who
support the invasion of non-aligned countries sucq as
Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Castro's tyranny undertakes
military adventures. in many parts of the third world.
vain-to destabilize the Government of El Salvador.
Therefore, in exercise of that right, it is solely responsible
for the bloodshed that this violent Cuban military aid has
caused in my country, as it has caused bloodshed and
continues to do so in many developing countries. Cuba is
solely responsible for the violent events which are now
occu_£ing and which will occur· in Central America.
447. Respect for the principle of non-intervention is a
victory for the Americas which dates back more than 50
years. Unfortunately, the Government of Cuba lost it
more than 20 years ago, because all its orders come di­
438. My country itself suffered in the 1960s from mili­
tary aggression on the part of Cuba. We beat it militarily
and otherwise. It was the first resounding defeat for
Cuban military interventionism. Cuba also supports ter­
rorism.
439 .. ! have t~~ ~frat~s-~ ... a~e~ti.9~. for .• t~~. pt;ople, _of
· Cub'a; ·Hut we ·.condemn the Cuban executioners.
440. Today, the voice of the executioner speaks for
Cuba, not the voice of Jose Marti.
441. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I
appeal to representatives speaking in exercise of the right
of reply to abide by the 10-minute rule.
442. Mr. GOULDING (United Kingdom): In his state­
ment in the general debate yesterday afternoon the For­
eign Minister of Honduras [10th meeting] stated, with ref­
erence to the Heads of Agreement signed by the United
Kingdom, Guatemala and Belize last March, that the
group of islands known as the Cayos Zapotillos belonged
to Honduras. My delegation has been instructed to state
that the United Kingdom does not accept that claim. The
United Kingdom had no doubt of its sovereignty over the
Cayos Zapotillos as part of the territory of Belize up to
the date of Belize's independence. On the granting of in­
dependence to Belize on 21 September this year-which
we note with pleasure has been welcomed by the Govern­
ment of Honduras-sovereignty over the Cayos Zapotillos
passed to the State of Belize. In the view of the British
Government, the Heads of Agreement, including the para­
graph that envisages that Guatemala should be given cer­
tain rights of use and enjoyment of the Cayos Zapotillos,
represent a satisfactory basis for a settlement of the dis­
pute between Belize and Guatemala.
443. Before the independence of Belize, the British
Government made this position clear to the Government
of Honduras and also expressed the hope that it would be
possible fqr Belize and Honduras to reach a mutually ac­
ceptable understanding on the matter.
444. The statement I have just made has been made
after consultation with the Government of Belize.
445. On a separate question, I should like to state that
my delegation looks forward to studying at leisure the
transcript of the interesting statement just made in exer­
cise of the right of reply by the representative of Vene­
zuela, in order to discover whether there are any points in
it on which my delegation would like to exercise its right
of reply at some later date.
rectly from the Soviet Union.
448. The large majority of Latin American countries
support the Government of El S~lwador, maintaining the
traditional principle of non-interletence in the internal or
external affairs of other States.
449. It is ridiculous for the most ferocious tyranny
known to Latin America, where human rights have no
place and where the people have no possibility of self­
expression, to set itself up as a defender of so-called free­
dom when its unavowed designs on democracy are well
known.
450. The statement made this afternoon by the Govern••
ment of Sweden indicates a crass ignorance of the prob­
lem in El Salvador, offering frank support to guerrilla and
terrorist movements which cause all the violence, which
all honest Salvadorians are determined to end by demo­
cratic and peaceful means.
451. We should like to remind Sweden that under­
development is not confined to El Salvador and neither
are the causes of internal discontent. We are aware that
there is a need for structural change, and in this regard
we have begun the most radical internal changes, which
will lead to democracy, justice and general well-being in
El Salvador.
452. It is regrettable that people uninformed about the
Ei Salvador quest:on should mclce irresponsible judge­
ments and thereby support Marxism and intervention.
453. Mr. SINCLAIR (Guyana): My delegation has lis­
tened carefully-or tried to do so-to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Venezuela speaking in exercise of the
right of reply.
454. We have received the documentation which the del­
egation of Venezuela was kind enough to make available
to members of the Assembly. I should have liked to reply
this evening to the presentation made by the Minister, but
on account of the detailed and voluminous nature of this
documentation I would at this stage merely reserve my
right to exercise my right of reply at a later stage in the
proceedings of the Assembly.
455. Mr. MAKfINEZ URDANETA (Venezuela) (inter­
pretation from Spanish): I simply want to inform the Pres­
ident on my ..::ountry's behalf that we reserve the right to
speak in exercise of the right of reply should Guyana do
so.
446. Mr. CASTRO ARAUJO (El Sclva.dor) (interpreta­
tion from Spanish): The Soviet Union's pqppet in the Car­
ibbean made a public statement here this ~temoon that
Cuba had the right to give military assistf;mce to the
groups of terrorists and guerrillas who are -,trying--in
The meeting rose at 8.45 p.m.