Volume III (Annexes 20-59)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPEAL RELATING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE ICAO
COUNCIL UNDER ARTICLE II, SECTION 2, OF THE 1944
INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT
THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN,
THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT,
AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
v.
THE STATE OF QATAR
COUNTER-MEMORIAL OF THE STATE OF QATAR
VOLUME III
25 FEBRUARY 2019

ICAO CORRESPONDENCE AND DOCUMENTS
Annex 20 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 17: Security (10th
ed., Apr. 2017)
Annex 21 Letter from Abdulla Nasser Turki Al-Subaey, Chairman of Qatar Civil
Aviation Authority, to Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General (5 June 2017)
Annex 22 Letter from Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General, to Abdulla Nasser
Turki Al-Subaey, Chairman of Qatar Civil Aviation Authority,
Reference No. AN 13/4/3/Open-AMO66892 (7 June 2017)
Annex 23 ICAO Council, 211th Session, Ninth Meeting: Summary of Decisions,
ICAO Doc. C-DEC 211/9 (21 June 2017)
Annex 24 ICAO Council, 211th Session, Summary Minutes of the Tenth Meeting,
ICAO Doc. C-MIN 211/10 (23 June 2017)
Annex 25 ICAO Council, 211th Session, Tenth Meeting, Summary of Decision,
ICAO Doc. C-DEC 211/10 (23 June 2017)
Annex 26 ICAO Council, First ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting For
Qatar, Summary of Discussions, ICAO Doc. ACCM/1 (6 July 2017)
Annex 27 ICAO Council, Third ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting for
Qatar, Summary of Discussions, ICAO Doc. ACCM/3 (5-6 Sept. 2017)
Annex 28 Letter from John V. Augustin to Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General (5
Oct. 2017)
Annex 29 Letter from President of ICAO Council to Representatives of the
Council, ICAO Doc. PRES OBA/273 (9 Feb. 2018)
Annex 30 Letter from Essa Abdulla Al-Malki, Permanent Representative of
Qatar, to Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General (12 Mar. 2018)
VOLUME III
ANNEXES
Annex 31 Letter from Aysha Alhameli, Representative of UAE to ICAO Council
to Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General, UAE-DEL/L-13-2018 (19 Mar.
2018)
Annex 32 Letter from Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General, to Essa Abdulla Al-
Malki, Agent for the State of Qatar (20 Mar. 2018)
Annex 33 ICAO, Interactive Map, “Cairo FIR”, available at https://gis.icao.int/
icaoviewernew/#/41.3577/23.5481/6 (data updated: 17 Apr. 2018)
Annex 34 ICAO Council, Fourth ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting for
Qatar, Summary of Discussions, ICAO Doc. ACCM/4 (28 April 2018)
Annex 35 Letter from President, First Vice-President and Secretary General of
ICAO Council to Representatives on the Council, ICAO Doc. PRES
OBA/2771 (15 May 2018)
Annex 36 Letter from Ahmed H. Mostafa Khedr, Representative of the Arab
Republic of Egypt before ICAO, to Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General
(12 June 2018)
Annex 37 ICAO Council, 215th Session, Working Paper: Post-Employment
Activities of ICAO Personnel, ICAO Doc. HR-WP/56 (22 Aug. 2018)
QATARI GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Annex 38 Letter from Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al-Ziyani, GCC Secretary General,
to Khalid Bin Mohamed Al Ativa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
State of Qatar (19 May 2014)
Annex 39 Letter from Muhammad Bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, to Abdulatif Bin Rashid Al Zayani,
GCC Secretary General (7 Aug. 2017)
Annex 40 Letter from Mohamed Bin Abdul Rahman Bin Jassim Al Thani,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, to Abdul Latif Bin Rashid
Al-Ziyani, Secretary-General of GCC (19 Feb. 2017)
Annex 41 State of Qatar, Ministry of Interior, National Counter Terrorism
Committee, National Terrorist Designation Lists, Designation Order
No. 2 (21 Mar. 2018)
Annex 42 State of Qatar, Ministry of Justice, “Qatar Doubles Contribution
to Global Community Engagement & Resilience Fund” (30 May
2018), available at https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/
details/2018/05/30/qatar-doubles-contribution-to-global-communityengagement-
resilience-fund
Annex 43 State of Qatar, Ministry of Interior, National Counter Terrorism
Committee, National Terrorist Designation Lists, Designation Order
No. 4 (28 Aug. 2018)
QATARI LEGISLATION
Annex 44 State of Qatar, Law No. 4 of 2010 on Combating Money Laundering
and Terrorism Financing (18 Mar. 2010)
Annex 45 State of Qatar, Decree No. 11 of 2017 to Amend Law No. 3 of 2004
(13 July 2017)
OTHER GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Annex 46 U.S. Department of State, Global Counterterrorism Forum Co-Chairs:
About the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (23 Sept. 2014),
available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/fs/fs/232003.htm
Annex 47 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering
Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 4:
Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report) (2017), available at
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282849.htm
Annex 48 “The Kingdom severs diplomatic and consular relations with Qatar”,
Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (6 June 2017), available at https://
www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/
MinistryNews/Pages/ArticleID201765134958689.aspx
Annex 49 U.S. Department of State, Press Availability with Qatari Foreign
Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani (11 July
2017), available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/
remarks/2017/07/272522.htm
Annex 50 Ministry of Defence of United Kingdom, Defence Secretary hosts
Qatari counterpart at historic Horse Guards (16 Jan. 2018), available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-hostsqatari-
counterpart-at-historic-horse-guards
Annex 51 U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement of the Inaugural United
States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue (30 Jan. 2018), available at https://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/01/277776.htm
Annex 52 U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the UAE, Meeting of the Terrorist
Financing Targeting Center Member States Convenes in Kuwait
(6 Mar. 2018), available at https://ae.usembassy.gov/meetingterrorist-
financing-targeting-center-member-states-convenes-kuwaitmarch-
6-2018/
Annex 53 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with Qatari
Foreign Minister Al Thani (26 June 2018), available at https://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283519.html
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS
Annex 54 Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office
in Geneva, Switzerland, HE the Foreign Minister delivers a statement
before the 36th Session of the Human Rights Council (11 Sept. 2017),
available at http://geneva.mission.qa/en/news/detail/2017/09/17/
he-the-foreign-minister-delivers-a-statement-in-front-of-the-36thsession-
of-the-human-rights-council
Annex 55 UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, Address by His
Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Amir of the State of
Qatar (19 Sept. 2017)
Annex 56 UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, Statement of H.E.
Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt (19 Sept.
2017)
Annex 57 UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, Statement by His
Highness Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates
(22 Sept. 2017)
Annex 58 UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, H.E. Mr. Shaikh
Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Bahrain (22 Sept. 2017)
Annex 59 UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, H.E. Mr. Adel
Ahmed Al-Jubeir, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia,
Summary of Statement (23 Sept. 2017)
Annex 20
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 17: Security (10th ed., Apr. 2017)

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
Annex 17
For information regarding the applicability of the Standards and Recommended Practices, see Foreword.
This edition supersedes, on 3 August 2017, all previous editions of Annex 17.
Safeguarding International Civil Aviation
Against Acts of Unlawful Interference
Tenth Edition, April 2017
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation
Security
International Standards
and Recommended Practices
Annex 20
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
Annex 17
For information regarding the applicability of the Standards and Recommended Practices, see Foreword.
This edition supersedes, on 3 August 2017, all previous editions of Annex 17.
Safeguarding International Civil Aviation
Against Acts of Unlawful Interference
Tenth Edition, April 2017
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation
Security
International Standards
and Recommended Practices
Annex 20
Published in separate English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish editions by the
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
999 Robert-Bourassa Boulevard, Montréal, Quebec, Canada H3C 5H7
For ordering information and for a complete listing of sales agents
and booksellers, please go to the ICAO website at www.icao.int
First edition 1975
Ninth edition 2011
Tenth edition 2017
Annex 17, Security —
Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference
Order Number: AN 17
ISBN 978-92-9258-191-6
© ICAO 2017
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, without prior
permission in writing from the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Annex 20
(iii)
AMENDMENTS
Amendments are announced in the supplements to the Products and Services
Catalogue; the Catalogue and its supplements are available on the ICAO website at
www.icao.int. The space below is provided to keep a record of such amendments.
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS AND CORRIGENDA
AMENDMENTS CORRIGENDA
No.
Date
applicable
Date
entered
Entered
by No.
Date
of issue
Date
entered
Entered
by
1–15 Incorporated in this Edition 1 19/11/18 19/11/18 ICAO
16 16/11/18 — ICAO
Annex 20
ANNEX 17 (v) 3/8/17
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD ......................................................................................................................................................... (vii)
CHAPTER 1. Definitions .................................................................................................................................... 1-1
CHAPTER 2. General principles ......................................................................................................................... 2-1
2.1 Objectives ........................................................................................................................................... 2-1
2.2 Applicability ....................................................................................................................................... 2-1
2.3 Security and facilitation ...................................................................................................................... 2-1
2.4 International cooperation .................................................................................................................... 2-2
2.5 Innovation, research and development ............................................................................................... 2-2
CHAPTER 3. Organization ................................................................................................................................. 3-1
3.1 National organization and appropriate authority ................................................................................ 3-1
3.2 Airport operations ............................................................................................................................... 3-2
3.3 Aircraft operators ................................................................................................................................ 3-2
3.4 Quality control and qualifications ....................................................................................................... 3-3
3.5 Air traffic service providers ................................................................................................................ 3-4
CHAPTER 4. Preventive security measures ........................................................................................................ 4-1
4.1 Objective ............................................................................................................................................. 4-1
4.2 Measures relating to access control .................................................................................................... 4-1
4.3 Measures relating to aircraft ............................................................................................................... 4-2
4.4 Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage ................................................................... 4-2
4.5 Measures relating to hold baggage ..................................................................................................... 4-3
4.6 Measures relating to cargo, mail and other goods .............................................................................. 4-3
4.7 Measures relating to special categories of passengers ........................................................................ 4-4
4.8 Measures relating to the landside ........................................................................................................ 4-5
4.9 Measures relating to cyber threats ...................................................................................................... 4-5
CHAPTER 5. Management of response to acts of unlawful interference ............................................................ 5-1
5.1 Prevention ........................................................................................................................................... 5-1
5.2 Response ............................................................................................................................................. 5-1
5.3 Exchange of information and reporting .............................................................................................. 5-2
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Table of Contents
3/8/17 (vi)
ATTACHMENT TO ANNEX 17
Extracts from Annex 2 — Rules of the Air ............................................................................................................. ATT-1
Extracts from Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft,
Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes ................................................................. ATT-2
Extracts from Annex 8 — Airworthiness of Aircraft ............................................................................................. ATT-4
Extracts from Annex 9 — Facilitation ................................................................................................................... ATT-6
Extracts from Annex 10 — Aeronautical Telecommunications,
Volume IV (Surveillance and Collision Avoidance Systems) ......................................................................... ATT-10
Extracts from Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services .................................................................................................... ATT-11
Extract from Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation ............................................................... ATT-13
Extracts from Annex 14 — Aerodromes, Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations ................................. ATT-13
Extracts from Annex 18 — The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air ........................................................ ATT-17
Extracts from Doc 9284 — Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air .............. ATT-18
Extracts from the Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Air Traffic Management (Doc 4444) .................... ATT-18
Extracts from the Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations (Doc 8168),
Volume I — Flight Procedures ...................................................................................................................... ATT-22
_____________________
Annex 20
ANNEX 17 (vii) 3/8/17
FOREWORD
Historical background
The material included in this Annex was developed by the Council pursuant to the following two resolutions of the Assembly:
Resolution A17-10: Implementation by States of Security Specifications and Practices adopted
by this Assembly and further work by ICAO related to such Specifications and Practices
. . . . . .
THE ASSEMBLY:
. . . . . .
(3) REQUESTS the Council, with the assistance of the other constituent bodies of the Organization, to develop and
incorporate, as appropriate, the material in the Appendices to this Resolution as Standards, Recommended Practices and
Procedures in existing or new Annexes or other regulatory documents or guidance material of the Organization.
Resolution A18-10: Additional Technical Measures for the Protection of the Security of
International Civil Air Transport
. . . . . .
THE ASSEMBLY:
(1) REQUESTS the Council to ensure, with respect to the technical aspects of air transportation security, that:
(a) the subject of air transportation security continues to be given adequate attention by the Secretary General, with a
priority commensurate with the current threat to the security of air transportation;
. . . . . .
Following the work of the Air Navigation Commission, the Air Transport Committee and the Committee on Unlawful
Interference, and as a result of the comments received from Contracting States and interested International Organizations, to
whom draft material had been circulated, Standards and Recommended Practices on Security were adopted by the Council on
22 March 1974, pursuant to the provisions of Article 37 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and designated as
Annex 17 to the Convention with the title “Standards and Recommended Practices — Security — Safeguarding International
Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference”.
Table A shows the origin of subsequent amendments together with a list of the principal subjects involved and the dates on
which the Annex and the amendments were adopted by the Council, when they became effective and when they became
applicable.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Foreword
3/8/17 (viii)
Introduction
In order that a comprehensive document may be available to States for implementation of the security measures prescribed by
this Annex, an Attachment hereto reproduces extracts from other Annexes, Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of
Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284), PANS-ATM and PANS-OPS bearing on the subject of action to be taken by States to
prevent unlawful interference with civil aviation, or when such interference has been committed.
Guidance material
The Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 — Restricted) provides detailed procedures and guidance on aspects of aviation
security and is intended to assist States in the implementation of their respective national civil aviation security programmes
required by the specifications in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
Comprehensive aviation security training material to assist States in achieving civil aviation security objectives is contained in
the ICAO Training Programme for Aviation Security comprising a series of Aviation Security Training Packages (ASTPs).
Action by Contracting States
Applicability. The provisions of the Standards and Recommended Practices in this document are to be applied by
Contracting States.
Notification of differences. The attention of Contracting States is drawn to the obligation imposed by Article 38 of the
Convention, by which Contracting States are required to notify the Organization of any differences between their national
regulations and practices and the International Standards contained in this Annex and any amendments thereto. Contracting
States are invited to keep the Organization currently informed of any differences which may subsequently occur, or of the
withdrawal of any difference previously notified. A specific request for notification of differences will be sent to Contracting
States immediately after the adoption of each amendment to this Annex.
Contracting States are also invited to extend such notification to any differences from the Recommended Practices
contained in this Annex, and any amendment thereto, when the notification of such differences is important for the safety of air
navigation.
Attention of States is also drawn to the provisions of Annex 15 related to the publication of differences between their
national regulations and practices and the related ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices through the Aeronautical
Information Service, in addition to the obligation of States under Article 38 of the Convention.
Promulgation of information. Information relating to the establishment and withdrawal of and changes to facilities,
services and procedures affecting aircraft operations provided according to the Standards and Recommended Practices
specified in this Annex should be notified and take effect in accordance with Annex 15.
Use of the text of the Annex in national regulations. The Council, on 13 April 1948, adopted a resolution inviting the
attention of Contracting States to the desirability of using in their own national regulations, as far as practicable, the precise
language of those ICAO Standards that are of a regulatory character and also of indicating departures from the Standards,
including any additional national regulations that were important for the safety or regularity of air navigation. Wherever
possible, the provisions of this Annex have been written in such a way as would facilitate incorporation, without major textual
changes, into national legislation.
General information
An Annex is made up of the following component parts, not all of which, however, are necessarily found in every Annex; they
have the status indicated:
16/11/18
No. 16
Annex 20
Foreword Annex 17 — Security
(ix) 3/8/17
1.— Material comprising the Annex proper:
a) Standards and Recommended Practices adopted by the Council under the provisions of the Convention. They are
defined as follows:
Standard: Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, matériel, performance, personnel or
procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity of international
air navigation and to which Contracting States will conform in accordance with the Convention; in the event of
impossibility of compliance, notification to the Council is compulsory under Article 38 of the Convention.
Recommended Practice: Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, matériel, performance,
personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as desirable in the interests of safety,
regularity or efficiency of international air navigation, and to which Contracting States will endeavour to conform
in accordance with the Convention.
b) Appendices comprising material grouped separately for convenience but forming part of the Standards and
Recommended Practices adopted by the Council.
c) Definitions of terms used in the Standards and Recommended Practices which are not self-explanatory in that they
do not have accepted dictionary meanings. A definition does not have an independent status but is an essential
part of each Standard and Recommended Practice in which the term is used, since a change in the meaning of the
term would affect the specification.
2.— Material approved by the Council for publication in association with the Standards and Recommended Practices:
a) Forewords comprising historical and explanatory material based on the action of the Council and including an
explanation of the obligations of States with regard to the application of the Standards and Recommended
Practices ensuing from the Convention and the Resolution of Adoption.
b) Introductions comprising explanatory material introduced at the beginning of parts, chapters or sections of the
Annex to assist in the understanding of the application of the text.
c) Notes included in the text, where appropriate, to give factual information or references bearing on the Standards
or Recommended Practices in question, but not constituting part of the Standards or Recommended Practices.
d) Attachments comprising material supplementary to the Standards and Recommended Practices, or included as a
guide to their application.
This Annex has been adopted in six languages — English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish. Each
Contracting State is requested to select one of those texts for the purpose of national implementation and for other effects
provided for in the Convention, either through direct use or through translation into its own national language, and to notify the
Organization accordingly.
The following practice has been adhered to in order to indicate at a glance the status of each statement: Standards have
been printed in light face roman; Recommended Practices have been printed in light face italics, the status being indicated by
the prefix Recommendation; Notes have been printed in light face italics, the status being indicated by the prefix Note.
Any reference to a portion of this document which is identified by a number includes all subdivisions of that portion.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Foreword
3/8/17 (x)
Table A. Amendments to Annex 17
Amendment Source(s) Subject(s)
Adopted
Effective
Applicable
1st Edition Council action in pursuance
of Assembly Resolutions
A17-10 and A18-10
— 22 March 1974
22 August 1974
27 February 1975
1 Council action in pursuance
of Assembly Resolution
A21-23
Change in status of 3.1.2 and 5.1.2 to a Standard; compilation and
dissemination of information related to an aircraft being subjected to an act of
unlawful interference.
31 March 1976
31 July 1976
30 December 1976
2 Proposals of some States
and Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A22-17
Transfer of specifications appearing in Chapter 9 of Annex 9 — Facilitation
(Seventh Edition) to Annex 17; new provision in Chapter 5 concerning
measures to be taken to control transfer and transit passengers and their cabin
baggage; and amplification of the note to 5.2.4 (Annex 17, Chapter 5) on
measures and procedures to prevent unauthorized access to specified areas on
an aerodrome.
15 December 1977
15 April 1978
10 August 1978
3 Proposals of some States
and the Secretariat and
Council action in pursuance
of Assembly Resolution
A22-17
Specifications were added on the review of the level of threat by States, the
development of training programmes, the isolation of security processed
passengers, the inspection of aircraft for concealed weapons or other
dangerous devices and the adoption of measures for the safety of passengers
and crew of unlawfully diverted aircraft. A number of specifications were
amplified and the status of one was changed to a Standard, related to the
segregation and special guarding of aircraft liable to attack during stopovers.
13 December 1978
13 April 1979
29 November 1979
4
(2nd Edition)
Proposals of some States
and an international
organization and
Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A22-17
A specification was added on the transportation of persons in custody, and two
specifications revised to provide for aircraft which were leased, chartered or
interchanged. The status of a specification dealing with the safety of
passengers and crew of an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference
was changed to a Standard; the provisions of a specification dealing with the
prevention of sabotage were amplified and Chapter 1 — Applicability,
deleted.
15 June 1981
15 October 1981
26 November 1981
5 Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
and Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A22-17
The note to Chapter 1 — Definitions was deleted. A specification setting out
the action required for the transportation of weapons on board aircraft by law
enforcement and other duly authorized persons was modified. A specification
on the carriage of weapons in all other cases was added and the note to a
specification dealing with the safeguarding of unattended aircraft was
clarified.
30 November 1984
14 April 1985
21 November 1985
6
(3rd Edition)
Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
an Ad Hoc Group of
Experts — Unlawful
Interference and
Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A22-17
On the instruction of the Council this amendment was undertaken as a matter
of urgency by the Committee on Unlawful Interference with the assistance of
an Ad Hoc Group of Experts on aviation security which had been appointed on
the instruction of the Council. As a consequence 11 new specifications were
introduced into the Annex and 19 specifications were adopted as Standards.
Special effective and applicable dates for 5.1.4 are shown in the adjacent
column.
The Council recommended that those States that are able to implement the
substance of 5.1.4 do so as soon as it is feasible and practicable before the
applicable date.
19 December 1985
19 March 1986
19 May 1986
19 October 1987
19 December 1987
Annex 20
Foreword Annex 17 — Security
(xi) 3/8/17
Amendment Source(s) Subject(s)
Adopted
Effective
Applicable
7
(4th Edition)
Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
the Aviation Security
Panel and Council
action in pursuance of
Assembly Resolution
A26-7
This amendment includes: a) a reorganization of the chapters of the Annex
directed at a rationalization of the sequence of objectives, obligations and
necessary actions relating to organization, preventive security measures and
management of response; b) the introduction of important new provisions to
reflect developments and assist States in confronting new situations which
arose from grave acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, since the
last revision of Annex 17 in 1985; and c) the amendment or fine tuning of
existing provisions consequential to a) and b), as well as to reflect the
experience gained in the implementation of such measures.
22 June 1989
30 October 1989
16 November 1989
8
(5th Edition)
Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
the Aviation Security
Panel (AVSECP) and
Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A27-7
This amendment includes the introduction of important new provisions in
relation to the comprehensive security screening of checked baggage, security
control over cargo, courier and express parcels and mail, variations to
procedures relating to security programmes, pre-flight checks of international
aircraft, and measures relating to the incorporation of security consideration
into airport design for the purpose of assisting States in the consistent and
uniform implementation of such measures.
11 September 1992
16 December 1992
1 April 1993
9
(6th Edition)
Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
the Aviation Security
Panel (AVSECP) and
Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A31-4
This amendment includes the introduction of new provisions in relation to the
pre-employment checks and capabilities of persons engaged in implementing
security controls, baggage accountability and authorization, measures to be
applied to catering supplies and operators’ stores and supplies, tests for
programme effectiveness, and need for notification to the State of known or
presumed destination of aircraft under a seized condition.
12 November 1996
31 March 1997
1 August 1997
10
(7th Edition)
Proposals of the Aviation
Security Panel (AVSECP)
and Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A33-1
This amendment includes the introduction of various definitions and new
provisions in relation to the applicability of this Annex to domestic operations,
international cooperation relating to threat information, appropriate authority,
National Aviation Security Committee, national quality control, access
control, passengers and their cabin and hold baggage, in-flight security
personnel and protection of the cockpit, code-sharing/collaborative
arrangements, Human Factors and management of response to acts of
unlawful interference. The status of a number of specifications was
changed to Standards.
7 December 2001
15 April 2002
1 July 2002
11
(8th Edition)
Proposals of the Committee
on Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
the Aviation Security Panel
(AVSECP) and Council
action in pursuance of
Assembly Resolution
A35-9
This amendment includes provisions to further clarify the wording of
existing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) to facilitate both
their common interpretation by Contracting States and their ease of auditing
under the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP). The
amendment addresses the following: applicability of Annex 17; reinforcement
of national civil aviation security control programme provisions; in-flight
security officers (IFSOs); general aviation and aerial work; one-stop security
concept for passengers and baggage; risk assessment concept; security for
all-cargo operations; and definitions.
30 November 2005
10 April 2006
1 July 2006
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Foreword
3/8/17 (xii)
Amendment Source(s) Subject(s)
Adopted
Effective
Applicable
12
(9th Edition)
Proposals of the Committee
on Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
the Aviation Security Panel
(AVSECP) and Council
action in pursuance of
Assembly Resolution
A36-20
This amendment includes provisions to further strengthen Standards and
Recommended Practices in order to address new and emerging threats to civil
aviation. The amendment includes the following: deployment of security
equipment; security of air traffic service providers; training programmes and
instructor certification system; random and unpredictable security measures;
supply chain security; security for all-cargo operations; cyber threats; and
definitions.
17 November 2010
26 March 2011
1 July 2011
13 Proposals of the Committee
on Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of the
Aviation Security Panel
(AVSECP), the
recommendations of the
2012 High-level
Conference on Aviation
Security, and Council action
in pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A37-17.
This amendment includes a revision to access control measures with respect to
persons other than passengers. The amendment also introduces a definition of
and security requirements for transfer cargo and high-risk cargo, and
establishes common baseline measures for cargo carried on passenger and
all-cargo aircraft.
13 November 2012
15 March 2013
15 July 2013
14 Proposals of the Committee
on Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of the
Aviation Security Panel
(AVSECP), and Council
action, in pursuance of
Assembly Resolution
A38-15.
This amendment includes a definition of unpredictability in relation to the
implementation of security controls. It also includes a new Standard on
appropriate screening methods for cargo and mail, and new Recommended
Practices on international cooperation, landside security, security awareness
training, oversight of external security service providers, and critical
information and communications technology systems.
26 February 2014
14 July 2014
14 November 2014
15
(10th Edition)
Proposals of the 27th
Meeting of the Aviation
Security Panel
(AVSECP/27) with the
assistance of the Working
Group on Annex 17
(WGA17).
This amendment includes a definition of behaviour detection in relation to the
implementation of security controls. It also includes new/revised provisions on
landside security, behaviour detection, innovation in aviation security and
Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). In addition, the wording of
existing provisions related to the conduct of risk assessments and measures
relating to cyber threats have been revised for added clarity and improved
readability.
23 November 2016
3 April 2017
3 August 2017
16 Proposals of the 28th
Meeting of the Aviation
Security Panel
(AVSECP/28) with the
assistance of the Working
Group on Annex 17
(WGA17)
This amendment includes a reference to Aviation Security Training Packages.
It also includes new/revised provisions on information sharing, measures
relating to passengers and cabin baggage, measures relating to cargo, mail and
other goods, and cyber threats.
14 March 2018
16 July 2018
16 November 2018
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Annex 20
ANNEX 17 1-1 3/8/17
CHAPTER 1. DEFINITIONS
Acts of unlawful interference. These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation, including but
not limited to:
• unlawful seizure of aircraft,
• destruction of an aircraft in service,
• hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
• forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility,
• introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal
purposes,
• use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the
environment,
• communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of
passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.
Aerial work. An aircraft operation in which an aircraft is used for specialized services such as agriculture, construction,
photography, surveying, observation and patrol, search and rescue, aerial advertisement, etc.
Aircraft security check. An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may have had access and an inspection
of the hold for the purposes of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles and
substances.
Aircraft security search. A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for the purpose of discovering
suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances.
Airside. The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof, access to which is controlled.
Background check. A check of a person’s identity and previous experience, including where legally permissible, any criminal
history, as part of the assessment of an individual’s suitability to implement a security control and/or for unescorted access
to a security restricted area.
Behaviour detection. Within an aviation security environment, the application of techniques involving the recognition of
behavioural characteristics, including but not limited to physiological or gestural signs indicative of anomalous behaviour,
to identify persons who may pose a threat to civil aviation.
Cargo. Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or mishandled baggage.
Certification. A formal evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate authority for aviation security that a
person possesses the necessary competencies to perform assigned functions to an acceptable level as defined by the
appropriate authority.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Chapter 1
3/8/17 1-2
Commercial air transport operation. An aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for
remuneration or hire.
Corporate aviation. The non-commercial operation or use of aircraft by a company for the carriage of passengers or goods as
an aid to the conduct of company business, flown by a professional pilot employed to fly the aircraft. (Note that corporate
aviation is a subset of general aviation.)
Disruptive passenger. A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on board an aircraft or to follow the
instructions of the airport staff or crew members and thereby disturbs the good order and discipline at an airport or on board
the aircraft.
General aviation operation. An aircraft operation other than a commercial air transport operation or an aerial work operation.
High-risk cargo or mail. Cargo or mail presented by an unknown entity or showing signs of tampering shall be considered high
risk if, in addition, it meets one of the following criteria:
a) specific intelligence indicates that the cargo or mail poses a threat to civil aviation; or
b) the cargo or mail shows anomalies that give rise to suspicion; or
c) the nature of the cargo or mail is such that baseline security measures alone are unlikely to detect prohibited items that
could endanger the aircraft.
Regardless of whether the cargo or mail comes from a known or unknown entity, a State’s specific intelligence about a
consignment may render it as high risk.
Human Factors principles. Principles which apply to design, certification, training, operations and maintenance and which
seek safe interface between the human and other system components by proper consideration to human performance.
Human performance. Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety, security and efficiency of
aeronautical operations.
In-flight security officer. A person who is authorized by the government of the State of the Operator and the government of the
State of Registration to be deployed on an aircraft with the purpose of protecting that aircraft and its occupants against acts
of unlawful interference. This excludes persons employed to provide exclusive personal protection for one or more specific
people travelling on the aircraft, such as personal bodyguards.
Known consignor. A consignor who originates cargo or mail for its own account and whose procedures meet common security
rules and standards sufficient to allow the carriage of cargo or mail on any aircraft.
Regulated agent. An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who conducts business with an operator and provides security
controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect of cargo or mail.
Screening. The application of technical or other means which are intended to identify and/or detect weapons, explosives or
other dangerous devices, articles or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.
Note.— Certain dangerous articles or substances are classified as dangerous goods by Annex 18 and the associated
Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284) and must be transported in accordance
with those instructions. In addition, the Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 — Restricted) provides a list of prohibited items
that must never be carried in the cabin of an aircraft.
Security. Safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This objective is achieved by a combination of
measures and human and material resources.
Annex 20
Chapter 1 Annex 17 — Security
1-3 3/8/17
Security audit. An in-depth compliance examination of all aspects of the implementation of the national civil aviation security
programme.
Security control. A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances
which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference can be prevented.
Security inspection. An examination of the implementation of relevant national civil aviation security programme
requirements by an airline, airport, or other entity involved in security.
Security restricted area. Those areas of the airside of an airport which are identified as priority risk areas where in addition to
access control, other security controls are applied. Such areas will normally include, inter alia, all commercial aviation
passenger departure areas between the screening checkpoint and the aircraft, the ramp, baggage make-up areas, including
those where aircraft are being brought into service and screened baggage and cargo are present, cargo sheds, mail centres,
airside catering and aircraft cleaning premises.
Security survey. An evaluation of security needs including the identification of vulnerabilities which could be exploited to
carry out an act of unlawful interference, and the recommendation of corrective actions.
Security test. A covert or overt trial of an aviation security measure which simulates an attempt to commit an unlawful act.
Transfer cargo and mail. Cargo and mail departing on an aircraft other than that on which it arrived.
Unidentified baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage tag, which is not picked up by or identified with a
passenger.
Unpredictability. The implementation of security measures in order to increase their deterrent effect and their efficiency, by
applying them at irregular frequencies, different locations and/or with varying means, in accordance with a defined
framework.
_____________________
Annex 20
ANNEX 17 2-1 3/8/17
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
2.1 Objectives
2.1.1 Each Contracting State shall have as its primary objective the safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the
general public in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.
2.1.2 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization and develop and implement regulations, practices and
procedures to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference taking into account the safety, regularity and
efficiency of flights.
2.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that such an organization and such regulations, practices and procedures:
a) protect the safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public in all matters related to safeguarding
against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation; and
b) are capable of responding rapidly to meet any increased security threat.
2.1.4 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure appropriate protection of aviation security
information.
2.1.5 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should employ security equipment, where appropriate, to the extent
operationally, technically and financially practicable, to achieve civil aviation security objectives.
2.2 Applicability
2.2.1 Each Contracting State shall apply the Standards and shall endeavour to apply the Recommended Practices
contained in Annex 17 to international civil aviation operations.
2.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that measures designed to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference are
applied to domestic operations to the extent practicable, based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant
national authorities.
2.3 Security and facilitation
Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should whenever possible arrange for the security controls and procedures to
cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to the activities of, civil aviation provided the effectiveness of these controls and
procedures is not compromised.
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2.4 International cooperation
2.4.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that requests from other Contracting States for additional security measures in
respect of a specific flight(s) by operators of such other States are met, as far as may be practicable. The requesting State shall
give consideration to alternative measures of the other State that are equivalent to those requested.
2.4.2 Each Contracting State shall cooperate with other States in the development and exchange of information
concerning national civil aviation security programmes, training programmes and quality control programmes, as necessary.
2.4.3 Each Contracting State shall establish and implement procedures to share with other Contracting States threat
information that applies to the aviation security interests of those States, to the extent practicable.
2.4.4 Each Contracting State shall establish and implement suitable protection and handling procedures for security
information shared by other Contracting States, or security information that affects the security interests of other Contracting
States, in order to ensure that inappropriate use or disclosure of such information is avoided.
2.4.5 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should share, as appropriate, and consistent with its sovereignty, the
results of the audit carried out by ICAO and the corrective actions taken by the audited State if requested by another State.
2.4.6 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should include in each of its bilateral agreements on air transport a
clause related to aviation security, taking into account the model clause developed by ICAO.
2.4.7 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should make available to other Contracting States on request a
written version of the appropriate parts of its national civil aviation security programme.
2.4.8 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should notify ICAO where it has shared information under 2.4.5.
2.4.9 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should consider entering into collaborative arrangements in order
to increase the sustainability of the aviation security system by avoiding unnecessary duplication of security controls. The
arrangement should be based on verification of equivalence of the security outcome ensured by the application of effective
security controls at origin.
2.5 Innovation, research and development
2.5.1 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should promote research and development of new security
equipment, processes and procedures which will better achieve civil aviation security objectives and should cooperate with
other Contracting States in this matter.
2.5.2 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that the development of new security equipment takes
into consideration Human Factors principles.
2.5.3 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should consider implementing innovative processes and
procedures to allow operational differentiation of screening and security controls based on clearly defined criteria.
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Annex 20
ANNEX 17 3-1 3/8/17
CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATION
3.1 National organization and appropriate authority
3.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish and implement a written national civil aviation security programme to
safeguard civil aviation operations against acts of unlawful interference, through regulations, practices and procedures which
take into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights.
3.1.2 Each Contracting State shall designate and specify to ICAO an appropriate authority within its administration to be
responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the national civil aviation security programme.
3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall keep under constant review the level and nature of threat to civil aviation within its
territory and airspace above it, and establish and implement policies and procedures to adjust relevant elements of its national
civil aviation security programme accordingly, based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national
authorities.
3.1.4 Each Contracting State shall establish and implement procedures to share, as appropriate, with its airport
operators, aircraft operators, air traffic service providers or other entities concerned, in a practical and timely manner, relevant
information to assist them to conduct effective security risk assessments relating to their operations.
3.1.5 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to define and allocate tasks and coordinate activities
between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, airport and aircraft operators, air traffic service
providers and other entities concerned with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the national civil
aviation security programme.
3.1.6 Each Contracting State shall establish a national aviation security committee or similar arrangements for the
purpose of coordinating security activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, airport and
aircraft operators, air traffic service providers and other entities concerned with or responsible for the implementation of
various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme.
3.1.7 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to ensure the development and implementation of a
national training programme for personnel of all entities involved with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects
of the national civil aviation security programme. This training programme shall be designed to ensure the effectiveness of the
national civil aviation security programme.
3.1.8 Each Contracting State shall ensure the development and implementation of training programmes and an instructor
certification system in accordance with the national civil aviation security programme.
3.1.9 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the appropriate authority arranges for the supporting resources and
facilities required by the aviation security services to be available at each airport serving civil aviation.
3.1.10 Each Contracting State shall make available to its airport and aircraft operators and air traffic service providers
operating in its territory and other entities concerned, a written version of the appropriate parts of its national civil aviation
security programme and/or relevant information or guidelines enabling them to meet the requirements of the national civil
aviation security programme.
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3.1.11 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that personnel of all entities involved with or
responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme and those authorized to
have unescorted access to airside areas receive periodic security awareness training.
3.2 Airport operations
3.2.1 Each Contracting State shall require each airport serving civil aviation to establish, implement and maintain a
written airport security programme appropriate to meet the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme.
3.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that an authority at each airport serving civil aviation is responsible for
coordinating the implementation of security controls.
3.2.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that an airport security committee at each airport serving civil aviation is
established to assist the authority mentioned under 3.2.2 in its role of coordinating the implementation of security controls and
procedures as specified in the airport security programme.
3.2.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that airport design requirements, including architectural and
infrastructure-related requirements necessary for the implementation of the security measures in the national civil aviation
security programme, are integrated into the design and construction of new facilities and alterations to existing facilities at
airports.
3.3 Aircraft operators
3.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport operators providing service from that State have
established, implemented and maintained a written operator security programme that meets the requirements of the national
civil aviation security programme of that State.
3.3.2 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that each entity conducting general aviation
operations, including corporate aviation operations, using aircraft with a maximum take-off mass greater than 5 700 kg, has
established, implemented and maintained a written operator security programme that meets the requirements of the national
civil aviation security programme of that State.
3.3.3 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that each entity conducting aerial work operations
has established, implemented and maintained a written operator security programme that meets the requirements of the
national civil aviation security programme of that State. The programme shall contain operations features specific to the type
of operations conducted.
3.3.4 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should take into account the ICAO model as a basis for operators’
or entities’ security programmes under 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
3.3.5 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should require operators providing service from that State and
participating in code-sharing or other collaborative arrangements with other operators to notify the appropriate authority of
the nature of these arrangements, including the identity of the other operators.
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3-3 3/8/17
3.4 Quality control and qualifications
3.4.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons implementing security controls are subject to background
checks and selection procedures.
3.4.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons implementing security controls possess all competencies
required to perform their duties and are appropriately trained according to the requirements of the national civil aviation
security programme and that appropriate records are maintained up to date. Relevant standards of performance shall be
established and initial and periodic assessments shall be introduced to maintain those standards.
3.4.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons carrying out screening operations are certified according to the
requirements of the national civil aviation security programme to ensure that performance standards are consistently and
reliably achieved.
3.4.4 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to develop, implement and maintain a national civil
aviation security quality control programme to determine compliance with and validate the effectiveness of its national civil
aviation security programme.
3.4.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the implementation of security measures is regularly subjected to
verification of compliance with the national civil aviation security programme. The priorities and frequency of monitoring shall
be determined on the basis of risk assessment carried out by the relevant authorities.
3.4.6 Each Contracting State shall arrange for security audits, tests, surveys and inspections to be conducted on a regular
basis, to verify compliance with the national civil aviation security programme and to provide for the rapid and effective
rectification of any deficiencies.
3.4.7 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the management, setting of priorities and organization of the national civil
aviation security quality control programme shall be undertaken independently from the entities and persons responsible for the
implementation of the measures taken under the national civil aviation security programme. Each Contracting State shall also:
a) ensure that the personnel carrying out security audits, tests, surveys and inspections are trained to appropriate
standards for these tasks in accordance with the national civil aviation security programme;
b) ensure that the personnel carrying out security audits, tests, surveys and inspections are afforded the necessary
authority to obtain information to carry out these tasks and to enforce corrective actions;
c) supplement the national civil aviation security quality control programme by establishing a confidential reporting
system for analysing security information provided by sources such as passengers, crew and ground personnel; and
d) establish a process to record and analyse the results of the national civil aviation security quality control programme,
to contribute to the effective development and implementation of the national civil aviation security programme,
including identifying the causes and patterns of non-compliance and verifying that corrective actions have been
implemented and sustained.
3.4.8 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful interference shall require its appropriate authority to
re-evaluate security controls and procedures and in a timely fashion take action necessary to remedy weaknesses so as to
prevent recurrence. These actions shall be shared with ICAO.
3.4.9 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that each entity responsible for the implementation of
relevant elements of the national civil aviation security programme periodically verifies that the implementation of security
measures outsourced to external service providers is in compliance with the entity’s security programme.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Chapter 3
3/8/17 3-4
3.5 Air traffic service providers
Each Contracting State shall require air traffic service providers operating in that State to establish and implement appropriate
security provisions to meet the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of that State.
_____________________
Annex 20
ANNEX 17 4-1 3/8/17
CHAPTER 4. PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES
4.1 Objective
4.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to prevent weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices,
articles or substances, which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of which is not
authorized, from being introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged in civil aviation.
4.1.2 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should promote the use of random and unpredictable security
measures. Unpredictability could contribute to the deterrent effect of security measures.
4.1.3 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should consider integrating behaviour detection into its aviation
security practices and procedures.
4.2 Measures relating to access control
4.2.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the access to airside areas at airports serving civil aviation is controlled in
order to prevent unauthorized entry.
4.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that security restricted areas are established at each airport serving civil
aviation designated by the State based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.
4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that identification systems are established in respect of persons and vehicles in
order to prevent unauthorized access to airside areas and security restricted areas. Identity shall be verified at designated
checkpoints before access is allowed to airside areas and security restricted areas.
4.2.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that background checks are conducted on persons other than passengers
granted unescorted access to security restricted areas of the airport prior to granting access to security restricted areas.
4.2.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the movement of persons and vehicles to and from the aircraft is supervised
in security restricted areas in order to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft.
4.2.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that persons other than passengers, together with items carried, prior to entry
into airport security restricted areas serving international civil aviation operations, are subject to screening and security
controls.
4.2.7 Each Contracting State shall ensure that vehicles being granted access to security restricted areas, together with
items contained within them, are subject to screening or other appropriate security controls in accordance with a risk assessment
carried out by the relevant national authorities.
4.2.8 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that identity documents issued to aircraft crew
members provide a harmonized and reliable international basis for recognition and validation of documentation to permit
authorized access to airside and security restricted areas by conforming to the relevant specifications set forth in Doc 9303,
Machine Readable Travel Documents.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Chapter 4
3/8/17 4-2
4.2.9 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that checks specified in 4.2.4 be reapplied on a
regular basis to all persons granted unescorted access to security restricted areas.
4.3 Measures relating to aircraft
4.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that aircraft security checks of originating aircraft engaged in commercial air
transport movements are performed or an aircraft security search is carried out. The determination of whether it is an aircraft
security check or a search that is appropriate shall be based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national
authorities.
4.3.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that measures are taken to ensure that any items left behind by passengers
disembarking from transit flights are removed from the aircraft or otherwise dealt with appropriately before departure of an
aircraft engaged in commercial flights.
4.3.3 Each Contracting State shall require its commercial air transport operators to take measures as appropriate to ensure
that during flight unauthorized persons are prevented from entering the flight crew compartment.
Note.— Provisions for security of the flight crew compartment of aircraft engaged in commercial air transportation are
contained in Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13, Section 13.2.
4.3.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that an aircraft subject to 4.3.1 is protected from unauthorized interference
from the time the aircraft search or check has commenced until the aircraft departs.
4.3.5 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that security controls are established to prevent acts
of unlawful interference with aircraft when they are not in security restricted areas.
4.3.6 Each Contracting State, in accordance with the risk assessment carried out by its relevant national or local
authorities, shall ensure that appropriate measures on the ground or operational procedures are established to mitigate possible
attacks against aircraft using Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) and other weapons representing a similar threat
to aircraft at or near an airport.
4.4 Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage
4.4.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating passengers of commercial air transport
operations and their cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft departing from a security restricted area.
4.4.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure the use of appropriate screening methods that are capable of detecting the
presence of explosives and explosive devices carried by passengers on their persons or in cabin baggage. Where these methods
are not applied continuously, they shall be used in an unpredictable manner.
4.4.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer passengers of commercial air transport operations and their cabin
baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft, unless it has established a validation process and continuously implements
procedures, in collaboration with the other Contracting State where appropriate, to ensure that such passengers and their cabin
baggage have been screened to an appropriate level at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized
interference from the point of screening at the originating airport to the departing aircraft at the transfer airport.
4.4.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that passengers and their cabin baggage which have been screened are protected
from unauthorized interference from the point of screening until they board their aircraft. If mixing or contact does take place,
the passengers concerned and their cabin baggage shall be re-screened before boarding an aircraft.
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4.4.5 Each Contracting State shall establish at an airport measures for transit operations to protect transit passengers and
their cabin baggage from unauthorized interference and protect the integrity of the security of the airport of transit.
4.4.6 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that practices are established at airports and on
board aircraft to assist in the identification and resolution of suspicious activity that may pose a threat to civil aviation.
4.5 Measures relating to hold baggage
4.5.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage is screened prior to being
loaded onto an aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations departing from a security restricted area.
4.5.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that all hold baggage to be carried on a commercial aircraft is protected from
unauthorized interference from the point it is screened or accepted into the care of the carrier, whichever is earlier, until
departure of the aircraft on which it is to be carried. If the integrity of hold baggage is jeopardized, the hold baggage shall be
re-screened before being placed on board an aircraft.
4.5.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport operators do not transport the baggage of persons
who are not on board the aircraft unless that baggage is identified as unaccompanied and subjected to appropriate screening.
4.5.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer hold baggage is screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft
engaged in commercial air transport operations, unless it has established a validation process and continuously implements
procedures, in collaboration with the other Contracting State where appropriate, to ensure that such hold baggage has been
screened at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized interference from the originating airport to the
departing aircraft at the transfer airport.
4.5.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport operators transport only items of hold baggage
which have been individually identified as accompanied or unaccompanied, screened to the appropriate standard and accepted
for carriage on that flight by the air carrier. All such baggage should be recorded as meeting these criteria and authorized for
carriage on that flight.
4.5.6 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should establish procedures to deal with unidentified baggage in
accordance with a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.
4.6 Measures relating to cargo, mail and other goods
4.6.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that appropriate security controls, including screening where practicable, are
applied to cargo and mail, prior to their being loaded onto an aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations.
4.6.2 Each Contracting State shall establish a supply chain security process, which includes the approval of regulated
agents and/or known consignors, if such entities are involved in implementing screening or other security controls of cargo and
mail.
4.6.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that cargo and mail to be carried on a commercial aircraft are protected from
unauthorized interference from the point screening or other security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.
4.6.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that enhanced security measures apply to high-risk cargo and mail to
appropriately mitigate the threats associated with it.
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4.6.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that operators do not accept cargo or mail for carriage on an aircraft engaged in
commercial air transport operations unless the application of screening or other security controls is confirmed and accounted
for by a regulated agent, or an entity that is approved by an appropriate authority. Cargo and mail which cannot be confirmed
and accounted for by a regulated agent or an entity that is approved by an appropriate authority shall be subjected to screening.
4.6.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that catering, stores and supplies intended for carriage on commercial flights
are subjected to appropriate security controls, which may include a supply chain security process or screening, and thereafter
protected until loaded onto the aircraft.
4.6.7 Each Contracting State shall ensure that merchandise and supplies introduced into security restricted areas are
subjected to appropriate security controls, which may include a supply chain security process or screening.
4.6.8 Each Contracting State shall ensure that cargo and mail that has been confirmed and accounted for shall then be
issued with a security status which shall accompany, either in an electronic format or in writing, the cargo and mail throughout
the secure supply chain.
4.6.9 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer cargo and mail has been subjected to appropriate security controls
prior to being loaded on an aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations departing from its territory.
4.6.10 Each Contracting State shall ensure that, where screening of cargo and mail is conducted, screening is carried out
using an appropriate method or methods, taking into account the nature of the consignment.
4.6.11 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should establish appropriate mechanisms to confirm that transfer
cargo and mail entering its territory has been subjected to appropriate security controls.
4.7 Measures relating to special categories of passengers
4.7.1 Each Contracting State shall develop requirements for air carriers for the carriage of potentially disruptive
passengers who are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings.
4.7.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that operators providing service from that State include in their security
programmes, measures and procedures to ensure safety on board their aircraft when passengers are to be carried who are
obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings.
4.7.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the aircraft operator and the pilot-in-command are informed when
passengers are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings, in order that
appropriate security controls can be applied.
4.7.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the carriage of weapons on board aircraft, by law enforcement officers and
other authorized persons, acting in the performance of their duties, requires special authorization in accordance with the laws of
the States involved.
4.7.5 Each Contracting State shall consider requests by any other State to allow the travel of armed personnel, including
in-flight security officers, on board aircraft of operators of the requesting State. Only after agreement by all States involved
shall such travel be allowed.
4.7.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the carriage of weapons in other cases is allowed only when an authorized
and duly qualified person has determined that they are not loaded, if applicable, and then only if stowed in a place inaccessible
to any person during flight time.
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4.7.7 Each Contracting State that decides to deploy in-flight security officers shall ensure that they are government
personnel who are specially selected and trained, taking into account the safety and security aspects on board an aircraft and
deployed according to the threat assessment of the competent authority. The deployment of such officers shall be coordinated
with concerned States and kept strictly confidential.
4.7.8 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the pilot-in-command is notified as to the number of armed persons and
their seat location.
4.8 Measures relating to the landside
4.8.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that landside areas are identified.
4.8.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that security measures are established for landside areas to mitigate the risk of
and to prevent possible acts of unlawful interference in accordance with risk assessments carried out by the relevant authorities
or entities.
4.8.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure coordination of landside security measures in accordance with Standards 3.1.6,
3.2.2 and 3.2.3 between relevant departments, agencies, other organizations of the State, and other entities, and identify
appropriate responsibilities for landside security in its national civil aviation security programme.
4.9 Measures relating to cyber threats
4.9.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that operators or entities as defined in the national civil aviation security
programme or other relevant national documentation identify their critical information and communications technology
systems and data used for civil aviation purposes and, in accordance with a risk assessment, develop and implement, as
appropriate, measures to protect them from unlawful interference.
4.9.2 Recommendation.—Each Contracting State should ensure that the measures implemented protect, as appropriate,
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the identified critical systems and/or data. The measures should include, inter
alia, security by design, supply chain security, network separation, and the protection and/or limitation of any remote access
capabilities, as appropriate and in accordance with the risk assessment carried out by its relevant national authorities.
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Annex 20
ANNEX 17 5-1 3/8/17
CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF RESPONSE TO ACTS OF
UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
5.1 Prevention
5.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures, when reliable information exists that an aircraft may be subjected
to an act of unlawful interference, to safeguard the aircraft if it is still on the ground and to provide as much prior notification as
possible of the arrival of such aircraft to relevant airport authorities and air traffic services of the States concerned if the aircraft
has already departed.
5.1.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure, when reliable information exists that an aircraft may be subjected to an act of
unlawful interference, that the aircraft is searched for concealed weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or
substances. Prior notification of the search shall be provided to the operator concerned.
5.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that arrangements are made to investigate, render safe and/or dispose of, if
necessary, suspected dangerous devices or other potential hazards at airports.
5.1.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that contingency plans are developed and resources made available to
safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. The contingency plans shall be tested on a regular basis.
5.1.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that authorized and suitably trained personnel are readily available for
deployment at its airports serving civil aviation to assist in dealing with suspected, or actual, cases of unlawful interference with
civil aviation.
5.1.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that its national civil aviation security programme defines processes for the
reporting of information concerning incidents of acts of unlawful interference and preparatory acts thereto, by any entity
responsible for the implementation of the national civil aviation security programme in a practical and timely manner to the
relevant authorities, as appropriate, taking into account 2.1.4.
5.2 Response
5.2.1 Each Contracting State shall take appropriate measures for the safety of passengers and crew of an aircraft, which is
subjected to an act of unlawful interference, while on the ground in the territory of the Contracting State, until their journey can
be continued.
5.2.2 Each Contracting State responsible for providing air traffic services for an aircraft, which is the subject of an act of
unlawful interference, shall collect all pertinent information on the flight of that aircraft and transmit that information to all
other States responsible for the air traffic services units concerned, including those at the airport of known or presumed
destination, so that timely and appropriate safeguarding action may be taken en route and at the aircraft’s known, likely or
possible destination.
5.2.3 Each Contracting State shall provide assistance to an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful seizure, including the
provision of navigation aids, air traffic services and permission to land as may be necessitated by the circumstances.
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5.2.4 Each Contracting State shall take measures, as it may find practicable, to ensure that an aircraft subjected to an act
of unlawful seizure which has landed in its territory is detained on the ground unless its departure is necessitated by the
overriding duty to protect human life. However, these measures need to recognize the grave hazard attending further flight.
States shall also recognize the importance of consultations, wherever practicable, between the State where that aircraft has
landed and the State of the Operator of the aircraft, and notification by the State where the aircraft has landed to the States of
assumed or stated destination.
5.2.5 Each Contracting State in which an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference has landed shall notify by
the most expeditious means the State of Registry of the aircraft and the State of the Operator of the landing and shall similarly
transmit by the most expeditious means all other relevant information to:
a) the two above-mentioned States;
b) each State whose citizens suffered fatalities or injuries;
c) each State whose citizens were detained as hostages;
d) each State whose citizens are known to be on board the aircraft; and
e) the International Civil Aviation Organization.
5.2.6 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should ensure that information received as a consequence of action
taken in accordance with 5.2.2 is distributed locally to the air traffic services units concerned, the appropriate airport
administrations, the operator and others concerned as soon as practicable.
5.2.7 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should cooperate with other States for the purpose of providing a
joint response in connection with an act of unlawful interference. When taking measures in their territory to free passengers
and crew members of an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference, each Contracting State should use, as necessary,
the experience and capability of the State of the Operator, the State of manufacture and the State of Registry of that aircraft.
5.3 Exchange of information and reporting
5.3.1 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful interference shall provide ICAO with all pertinent
information concerning the security aspects of the act of unlawful interference as soon as practicable after the act is resolved.
5.3.2 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should exchange information with other Contracting States as
considered appropriate on the management of response to an act of unlawful interference, at the same time supplying such
information to ICAO.
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Annex 20
ANNEX 17 ATT-1 3/8/17
ATTACHMENT TO ANNEX 17
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 2 — RULES OF THE AIR
CHAPTER 3. GENERAL RULES
. . . . . .
3.7 Unlawful interference
3.7.1 An aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference shall endeavour to notify the appropriate ATS unit of
this fact, any significant circumstances associated therewith and any deviation from the current flight plan necessitated by the
circumstances, in order to enable the ATS unit to give priority to the aircraft and to minimize conflict with other aircraft.
Note 1.— Responsibility of ATS units in situations of unlawful interference is contained in Annex 11.
Note 2.— Guidance material for use when unlawful interference occurs and the aircraft is unable to notify an ATS unit of
this fact is contained in Attachment B to this Annex.
Note 3.— Action to be taken by SSR-, ADS-B- and ADS-C-equipped aircraft which are being subjected to unlawful interference
is contained in Annex 11, the PANS-ATM (Doc 4444) and the PANS-OPS (Doc 8168).
Note 4.— Action to be taken by CPDLC-equipped aircraft which are being subjected to unlawful interference is contained
in Annex 11, the PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), and guidance material on the subject is contained in the Manual of Air Traffic
Services Data Link Applications (Doc 9694).
3.7.2 If an aircraft is subjected to unlawful interference, the pilot-in-command shall attempt to land as soon as practicable
at the nearest suitable aerodrome or at a dedicated aerodrome assigned by the appropriate authority unless considerations
aboard the aircraft dictate otherwise.
. . . . . .
ATTACHMENT B. UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
1. General
The following procedures are intended as guidance for use by aircraft when unlawful interference occurs and the aircraft is
unable to notify an ATS unit of this fact.
2. Procedures
2.1 If the pilot-in-command cannot proceed to an aerodrome in accordance with the rules in Chapter 3, 3.7.2, he/she
should attempt to continue flying on the assigned track and at the assigned cruising level at least until able to notify an ATS unit
or until within radar or ADS-B coverage.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-2
2.2 When an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference must depart from its assigned track or its assigned
cruising level without being able to make radiotelephony contact with ATS, the pilot-in-command should, whenever possible:
a) attempt to broadcast warnings on the VHF channel in use or the VHF emergency frequency, and other appropriate
channels, unless considerations aboard the aircraft dictate otherwise. Other equipment such as on-board transponders
and data links should also be used when it is advantageous to do so and circumstances permit; and
b) proceed in accordance with applicable special procedures for in-flight contingencies, where such procedures have
been established and promulgated in the Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030); or
c) if no applicable regional procedures have been established, proceed at a level which differs from the cruising levels
normally used for IFR flight by:
1) 150 m (500 ft) in an area where a vertical separation minimum of 300 m (1 000 ft) is applied; or
2) 300 m (1 000 ft) in an area where a vertical separation minimum of 600 m (2 000 ft) is applied.
Note.— Action to be taken by an aircraft which is intercepted while being subject to an act of unlawful interference is
prescribed in 3.8 of this Annex.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 6 — OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT
PART I — INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT — AEROPLANES
CHAPTER 13. SECURITY*
13.1 Domestic commercial operations
Recommendation.— International Standards and Recommended Practices set forth in this chapter should be applied by
all Contracting States also in case of domestic commercial operations (air services).
13.2 Security of the flight crew compartment
13.2.1 In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew compartment door, this door shall be capable of being
locked, and means shall be provided by which cabin crew can discreetly notify the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity
or security breaches in the cabin.
13.2.2 All passenger-carrying aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45 500 kg or with a
passenger seating capacity greater than 60 shall be equipped with an approved flight crew compartment door that is designed to
resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This door
shall be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot’s station.
13.2.3 In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew compartment door in accordance with 13.2.2:
a) this door shall be closed and locked from the time all external doors are closed following embarkation until any such
door is opened for disembarkation, except when necessary to permit access and egress by authorized persons; and
____________________
* In the context of this chapter, the word ‘‘security’’ is used in the sense of prevention of illicit acts against civil aviation.
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-3 3/8/17
b) means shall be provided for monitoring from either pilot’s station the entire door area outside the flight crew
compartment to identify persons requesting entry and to detect suspicious behaviour or potential threat.
13.2.4 Recommendation.— All passenger-carrying aeroplanes should be equipped with an approved flight crew
compartment door, where practicable, that is designed to resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to
resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This door should be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot’s
station.
13.2.5 Recommendation.— In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew compartment door in accordance
with 13.2.4:
a) the door should be closed and locked from the time all external doors are closed following embarkation until any such
door is opened for disembarkation, except when necessary to permit access and egress by authorized persons; and
b) means should be provided for monitoring from either pilot’s station the entire door area outside the flight crew
compartment to identify persons requesting entry and to detect suspicious behaviour or potential threat.
13.3 Aeroplane search procedure checklist
The operator shall ensure that there is on board a checklist of the procedures to be followed in searching for a bomb in case of
suspected sabotage and for inspecting aeroplanes for concealed weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices when a
well-founded suspicion exists that the aeroplane may be the object of an act of unlawful interference. The checklist shall be
supported by guidance on the appropriate course of action to be taken should a bomb or suspicious object be found and
information on the least-risk bomb location specific to the aeroplane.
13.4 Training programmes
13.4.1 The operator shall establish and maintain an approved security training programme which ensures crew members
act in the most appropriate manner to minimize the consequences of acts of unlawful interference. As a minimum, this
programme shall include the following elements:
a) determination of the seriousness of any occurrence;
b) crew communication and coordination;
c) appropriate self-defence responses;
d) use of non-lethal protective devices assigned to crew members whose use is authorized by the State of the Operator;
e) understanding of behaviour of terrorists so as to facilitate the ability of crew members to cope with hijacker behaviour
and passenger responses;
f) live situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions;
g) flight crew compartment procedures to protect the aeroplane; and
h) aeroplane search procedures and guidance on least-risk bomb locations where practicable.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-4
13.4.2 The operator shall also establish and maintain a training programme to acquaint appropriate employees with
preventive measures and techniques in relation to passengers, baggage, cargo, mail, equipment, stores and supplies intended for
carriage on an aeroplane so that they contribute to the prevention of acts of sabotage or other forms of unlawful interference.
13.5 Reporting acts of unlawful interference
Following an act of unlawful interference, the pilot-in-command shall submit, without delay, a report of such an act to the
designated local authority.
13.6 Miscellaneous
13.6.1 Recommendation.— Specialized means of attenuating and directing the blast should be provided for use at the
least-risk bomb location.
13.6.2 Recommendation.— Where the operator accepts the carriage of weapons removed from passengers, the
aeroplane should have provision for stowing such weapons in a place so that they are inaccessible to any person during flight
time.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 8 — AIRWORTHINESS OF AIRCRAFT
PART III. LARGE AEROPLANES
PART IIIA. AEROPLANES OVER 5 700 KG FOR WHICH APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATION
WAS SUBMITTED ON OR AFTER 13 JUNE 1960, BUT BEFORE 2 MARCH 2004
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 11. SECURITY
. . . . . .
11.2 Least-risk bomb location
For aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity greater than
60 and for which the application for certification was submitted on or after 12 March 2000, consideration shall be given during
the design of the aeroplane to the provision of a least-risk bomb location so as to minimize the effects of a bomb on the
aeroplane and its occupants.
11.3 Protection of the flight crew compartment
Recommendation.— In all aeroplanes, which are required by Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13 to have an approved flight crew
compartment door, and for which an application for amending the Type Certificate to include a derivative type design is
submitted to the appropriate national authority, consideration should be given to reinforcing the flight crew compartment
bulkheads, floors and ceilings so as to resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel and to resist forcible
intrusions, if these areas are accessible in flight to passengers and cabin crew.
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-5 3/8/17
Note.— Standards and Recommended Practices concerning the requirements for the flight crew compartment door in all
commercial passenger-carrying aeroplanes are contained in Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13.
11.4 Interior design
For aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity greater than
60 and for which the application for certification was submitted on or after 12 March 2000, consideration shall be given to
design features that will deter the easy concealment of weapons, explosives or other dangerous objects on board aircraft and
that will facilitate search procedures for such objects.
PART IIIB. AEROPLANES OVER 5 700 KG FOR WHICH APPLICATION FOR
CERTIFICATION WAS SUBMITTED ON OR AFTER 2 MARCH 2004
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 10. SECURITY
. . . . . .
10.2 Least-risk bomb location
For aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity greater than
60, consideration shall be given during the design of the aeroplane to the provision of a least-risk bomb location so as to
minimize the effects of a bomb on the aeroplane and its occupants.
10.3 Protection of the flight crew compartment
10.3.1 In all aeroplanes, which are required by Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13 to have an approved flight crew compartment
door, and for which an application for the issue of a Type Certificate is first submitted to the appropriate national authority on or
after 20 May 2006, the flight crew compartment bulkheads, floors and ceilings shall be designed to resist penetration by small
arms fire and grenade shrapnel and to resist forcible intrusions, if these areas are accessible in flight to passengers and cabin
crew.
10.3.2 Recommendation.— In all aeroplanes, which are required by Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13 to have an approved
flight crew compartment door, and for which an application for amending the Type Certificate to include a derivative type
design is submitted to the appropriate national authority on or after 20 May 2006, consideration should be given to reinforcing
the flight crew compartment bulkheads, floors and ceilings so as to resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel
and to resist forcible intrusions, if these areas are accessible in flight to passengers and cabin crew.
Note.— Standards and Recommended Practices concerning the requirements for the flight crew compartment door in all
commercial passenger-carrying aeroplanes are contained in Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13.
10.4 Interior design
For aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity greater than
60, consideration shall be given to design features that will deter the easy concealment of weapons, explosives or other
dangerous objects on board aircraft and that will facilitate search procedures for such objects.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-6
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 9 — FACILITATION
CHAPTER 2. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE
OF AIRCRAFT
A. General
. . . . . .
2.2 In developing procedures aimed at the efficient clearance of entering or departing aircraft, Contracting States shall
take into account the application of aviation security and narcotics control measures, where appropriate.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 3. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE
OF PERSONS AND THEIR BAGGAGE
A. General
. . . . . .
3.2 In developing procedures aimed at the efficient application of border controls on passengers and crew, Contracting
States shall take into account the application of aviation security, border integrity, narcotics control and immigration control
measures, where appropriate.
. . . . . .
3.4 Contracting States shall not extend the validity of their machine readable travel documents.
Note.— Specifications for machine readable travel documents (Doc 9303, Series) do not permit alteration of the expiration
date and other data in the machine readable zone.
. . . . . .
C. Security of travel documents
3.7 Contracting States shall regularly update security features in new versions of their travel documents, to guard against
their misuse and to facilitate detection of cases where such documents have been unlawfully altered, replicated or issued.
3.8 Contracting States shall establish controls to safeguard against the theft of their blank travel documents and the
misappropriation of newly issued travel documents.
3.8.1 Contracting States shall establish appropriate controls over the entire travel document application, adjudication and
issuance processes to ensure a high level of integrity and security.
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-7 3/8/17
3.9 Recommended Practice.— Contracting States should incorporate biometric data in their machine readable
passports, visas and other official travel documents, using one or more optional data storage technologies to supplement the
machine readable zone, as specified in Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents. The required data stored on the
integrated circuit chip is the same as that printed on the data page, that is, the data contained in the machine-readable zone
plus the digitized photographic image. Fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) are optional biometrics for Contracting States
wishing to supplement the facial image with another biometric in the passport. Contracting States incorporating biometric data
in their Machine Readable Passports are to store the data in a contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC
14443 and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO.
3.9.1 Recommended Practice.— Contracting States issuing or intending to issue eMRTDs should join the ICAO Public
Key Directory (PKD) and upload their information to the PKD.
3.9.2 Recommended Practice.— Contracting States implementing checks on eMRTDs at border controls should join
the ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) and use the information available from the PKD to validate eMRTDs at border
controls.
3.10 Contracting States shall promptly report accurate information about stolen, lost, and revoked travel documents,
issued by their State, to INTERPOL for inclusion in the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database.
3.10.1 Recommended Practice.— Each Contracting State should, as far as practicable, query, at entry and departure
border control points, the travel documents of individuals travelling internationally against the INTERPOL Stolen and Lost
Travel Documents (SLTD) database.
. . . . . .
I. Inspection of travel documents
3.33 Contracting States shall assist aircraft operators in the evaluation of travel documents presented by passengers, in
order to deter fraud and abuse.
3.34 Recommended Practice.— Contracting States should consider making arrangements with other Contracting
States to permit the positioning of liaison officers at airports in order to assist aircraft operators to establish the validity and
authenticity of the travel documents of embarking persons.
3.35 Aircraft operators shall take necessary precautions at the point of embarkation to ensure that persons are in
possession of the documents prescribed by the States of transit and destination for control purposes as described in this chapter.
3.35.1 The public authorities of each Contracting State shall seize fraudulent, falsified or counterfeit travel documents.
The public authorities shall also seize the travel documents of a person impersonating the rightful holder of the travel document.
Such documents shall be removed from circulation immediately and returned to the appropriate authorities of the State named
as issuer or to the resident Diplomatic Mission of that State.
3.35.2 Contracting States shall not require aircraft operators to seize documents referred to in Standard 3.35.1.
3.35.3 Contracting States shall not require an aircraft operator to carry a passenger from a point of departure or transit, to
the intended final destination, when the travel document presented by that passenger is determined by the State to be fraudulent,
falsified or counterfeit, or is held by a person other than to whom the document was legitimately issued.
Note.— Nothing in this provision is to be construed so as to prevent the return of inadmissible passengers whose travel
document(s) are fraudulent, falsified or counterfeit or held by an imposter, and have been seized by a Contracting State, in
accordance with Standard 3.35.1 and who are travelling under a covering letter issued in accordance with Standard 5.7.
. . . . . .
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-8
K. Entry procedures and responsibilities
. . . . . .
3.48 Each Contracting State that introduces an Advance Passenger Information (API) system under its national
legislation shall adhere to international recognized standards for the transmission of Advance Passenger Information.
. . . . . .
N. Identification and entry of crew and
other aircraft operators’ personnel
. . . . . .
3.66 If Contracting States issue Crew Member Certificates, then these shall be issued only in the form of machine
readable cards in accordance with the specifications of Doc 9303, Part 5.
. . . . . .
3.68 CMCs shall be issued only after a background check has been carried out by or on behalf of the relevant public
authority. In addition, adequate controls such as a certification of employment status of an applicant prior to issuance, controls
on blank card stock, and accountability requirements for issuing personnel, shall be placed on the issuance of CMCs.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 4. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE
OF CARGO AND OTHER ARTICLES
A. General
. . . . . .
4.6 Contracting States shall not normally require the physical examination of cargo to be imported or exported and shall
use risk management to determine which goods shall be examined and the extent of that examination.
4.7 Where practicable, in order to improve efficiency, modern screening or examination techniques shall be used to
facilitate the physical examination of goods to be imported or exported.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 5. INADMISSIBLE PERSONS
AND DEPORTEES
. . . . . .
B. Inadmissible persons
. . . . . .
5.8 Contracting States that have reason to believe that an inadmissible person might offer resistance to his removal shall
inform the aircraft operator concerned as far in advance as possible of scheduled departure so that the aircraft operator can take
precautions to ensure the security of the flight.
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-9 3/8/17
. . . . . .
C. Deportees
. . . . . .
5.19 Contracting States, when making arrangements with an aircraft operator for the removal of a deportee, shall make
available the following information as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 24 hours before the scheduled time of
departure of the flight:
a) a copy of the deportation order, if legislation of the Contracting State allows for it;
b) a risk assessment by the State and/or any other pertinent information that would help the aircraft operator assess the
risk to the security of the flight; and
c) the names and nationalities of any escorts.
Note.— In order to ensure coordination of facilitation and security standards, attention is drawn to the applicable
provisions of Annex 17, Chapter 4.
5.19.1 The aircraft operator and/or the pilot-in-command shall have the option to refuse to transport a deportee on a
specific flight when reasonable concerns relating to the safety and security of the flight in question exist.
Note.─ Reference is made to the ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 — Restricted), paragraphs 12.2.1.3 and
12.2.1.6.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 6. INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS —
FACILITIES AND SERVICES FOR TRAFFIC
. . . . . .
A. General
6.1.4 Each Contracting State, in consultation with airport operators, shall ensure that facilities and services provided at
international airports are, where possible, flexible and capable of expansion to meet traffic growth, an increase in security
requirements arising from increased threat, or other changes to support border integrity measures.
Note.— With respect to aviation security requirements, attention is drawn to the relevant specification in Annex 17,
Chapter 2, 2.3.*
. . . . . .
B. Airport traffic flow arrangements
. . . . . .
III. Outbound passengers, crew and baggage
6.16 Recommended Practice.— Each Contracting State should allow airport and aircraft operators to provide
off-airport check-in facilities, so long as all necessary security measures and other control requirements are met.
* The specification reads as follows:
Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should whenever possible arrange for the security controls and
procedures to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to the activities of, civil aviation provided the
effectiveness of these controls and procedures is not compromised.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-10
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
VOLUME IV (SURVEILLANCE AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS)
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL
. . . . . .
2.1 SECONDARY SURVEILLANCE RADAR (SSR)
. . . . . .
2.1.4 Mode A reply codes (information pulses)
. . . . . .
2.1.4.2.1 Code 7700 to provide recognition of an aircraft in an emergency.
. . . . . .
2.1.4.2.3 Code 7500 to provide recognition of an aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference.
2.1.4.3 Appropriate provisions shall be made in ground decoding equipment to ensure immediate recognition of Mode A
codes 7500, 7600 and 7700.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 11 — AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL
. . . . . .
2.24 Service to aircraft in the event
of an emergency
2.24.1 An aircraft known or believed to be in a state of emergency, including being subjected to unlawful interference,
shall be given maximum consideration, assistance and priority over other aircraft as may be necessitated by the circumstances.
Note.— To indicate that it is in a state of emergency, an aircraft equipped with an appropriate data link capability and/or
an SSR transponder might operate the equipment as follows:
a) on Mode A, Code 7700; or
b) on Mode A, Code 7500, to indicate specifically that it is being subjected to unlawful interference; and/or
c) activate the appropriate emergency and/or urgency capability of ADS-B or ADS-C; and/or
d) transmit the appropriate emergency message via CPDLC.
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-11 3/8/17
. . . . . .
2.24.2 When an occurrence of unlawful interference with an aircraft takes place or is suspected, ATS units shall attend
promptly to requests by the aircraft. Information pertinent to the safe conduct of the flight shall continue to be transmitted and
necessary action shall be taken to expedite the conduct of all phases of the flight, especially the safe landing of the aircraft.
2.24.3 When an occurrence of unlawful interference with an aircraft takes place or is suspected, ATS units shall, in
accordance with locally agreed procedures, immediately inform the appropriate authority designated by the State and exchange
necessary information with the operator or its designated representative.
Note 1.— A strayed or unidentified aircraft may be suspected as being the subject of unlawful interference. See 2.25.1.3.
Note 2.— Procedures relating to the handling of strayed or unidentified aircraft are contained in 2.25.1.
Note 3.— The PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), Chapter 15, 15.1.3 contains more specific procedures related to unlawful
interference.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 5. ALERTING SERVICE
5.1 Application
5.1.1 Alerting service shall be provided:
. . . . . .
c) to any aircraft known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference.
. . . . . .
5.2 Notification of rescue
coordination centres
5.2.1 Without prejudice to any other circumstances that may render such notification advisable, air traffic services units
shall, except as prescribed in 5.5.1, notify rescue coordination centres immediately an aircraft is considered to be in a state of
emergency in accordance with the following:
. . . . . .
b) Alert phase when:
. . . . . .
except when evidence exists that would allay apprehension as to the safety of the aircraft and its occupants, or when
4) an aircraft is known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference.
. . . . . .
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-12
5.5 Information to the operator
5.5.1 When an area control or a flight information centre decides that an aircraft is in the uncertainty or the alert phase, it
shall, when practicable, advise the operator prior to notifying the rescue coordination centre.
Note.— If an aircraft is in the distress phase, the rescue coordination centre has to be notified immediately in accordance
with 5.2.1.
5.5.2 All information notified to the rescue coordination centre by an area control or flight information centre shall,
whenever practicable, also be communicated, without delay, to the operator.
5.6 Information to aircraft operating in the vicinity of an aircraft in
a state of emergency
5.6.1 When it has been established by an air traffic services unit that an aircraft is in a state of emergency, other aircraft
known to be in the vicinity of the aircraft involved shall, except as provided in 5.6.2, be informed of the nature of the emergency
as soon as practicable.
5.6.2 When an air traffic services unit knows or believes that an aircraft is being subjected to unlawful interference, no
reference shall be made in ATS air-ground communications to the nature of the emergency unless it has first been referred to in
communications from the aircraft involved and it is certain that such reference will not aggravate the situation.
EXTRACT FROM ANNEX 13 — AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
CHAPTER 5. INVESTIGATION
. . . . . .
ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION
. . . . . .
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE
CONDUCTING THE INVESTIGATION
. . . . . .
Informing aviation security authorities
5.11 If, in the course of an investigation it becomes known, or it is suspected, that an act of unlawful interference was
involved, the investigator-in-charge shall immediately initiate action to ensure that the aviation security authorities of the
State(s) concerned are so informed.
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-13 3/8/17
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 14 — AERODROMES,
VOLUME I — AERODROME DESIGN AND OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 3. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
. . . . . .
3.14 Isolated aircraft parking position
3.14.1 An isolated aircraft parking position shall be designated or the aerodrome control tower shall be advised of an area
or areas suitable for the parking of an aircraft which is known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference, or which for
other reasons needs isolation from normal aerodrome activities.
3.14.2 Recommendation.— The isolated aircraft parking position should be located at the maximum distance
practicable and in any case never less than 100 m from other parking positions, buildings or public areas, etc. Care should be
taken to ensure that the position is not located over underground utilities such as gas and aviation fuel and, to the extent
feasible, electrical or communication cables.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 5. VISUAL AIDS FOR NAVIGATION
. . . . . .
5.3 Lights
. . . . . .
5.3.24 Apron floodlighting
(see also 5.3.17.1 and 5.3.18.1)
Application
5.3.24.1 Recommendation.— Apron floodlighting should be provided on an apron, on a de-icing/anti-icing facility and
on a designated isolated aircraft parking position intended to be used at night.
Note 1. — Where a de-icing/anti-icing facility is located in close proximity to the runway and permanent floodlighting
could be confusing to pilots, other means of illumination of the facility may be required.
Note 2. — The designation of an isolated aircraft parking position is specified in 3.14.
Note 3. — Guidance on apron floodlighting is given in the Aerodrome Design Manual (Doc 9157), Part 4.
. . . . . .
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-14
CHAPTER 8. ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
8.1 Electric power supply systems for air navigation facilities
. . . . . .
Application
. . . . . .
8.1.10 Recommendation.— The following aerodrome facilities should be provided with a secondary power supply
capable of supplying power when there is a failure of the primary power supply:
. . . . . .
e) essential security lighting, if provided in accordance with 9.11;
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 9. AERODROME OPERATIONAL SERVICES, EQUIPMENT AND INSTALLATIONS
9.1 Aerodrome emergency planning
General
Introductory Note.— Aerodrome emergency planning is the process of preparing an aerodrome to cope with an emergency
occurring at the aerodrome or in its vicinity. The objective of aerodrome emergency planning is to minimize the effects of an
emergency, particularly in respect of saving lives and maintaining aircraft operations. The aerodrome emergency plan sets
forth the procedures for coordinating the response of different aerodrome agencies (or services) and of those agencies in the
surrounding community that could be of assistance in responding to the emergency. Guidance material to assist the
appropriate authority in establishing aerodrome emergency planning is given in the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137),
Part 7.
9.1.1 An aerodrome emergency plan shall be established at an aerodrome, commensurate with the aircraft operations and
other activities conducted at the aerodrome.
9.1.2 The aerodrome emergency plan shall provide for the coordination of the actions to be taken in an emergency
occurring at an aerodrome or in its vicinity.
Note 1.— Examples of emergencies are: aircraft emergencies, sabotage including bomb threats, unlawfully seized aircraft,
dangerous goods occurrences, building fires, natural disaster and public health emergencies.
. . . . . .
9.1.3 The plan shall coordinate the response or participation of all existing agencies which, in the opinion of the
appropriate authority, could be of assistance in responding to an emergency.
Note 1.— Examples of agencies are:
— on the aerodrome: air traffic control units, rescue and firefighting services, aerodrome administration, medical and
ambulance services, aircraft operators, security services, and police;
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-15 3/8/17
— off the aerodrome: fire departments, police, health authorities (including medical, ambulance, hospital and public
health services), military, and harbour patrol or coast guard.
. . . . . .
9.1.4 Recommendation.— The plan should provide for cooperation and coordination with the rescue coordination
centre, as necessary.
9.1.5 Recommendation.— The aerodrome emergency plan document should include at least the following:
a) types of emergencies planned for;
b) agencies involved in the plan;
c) responsibility and role of each agency, the emergency operations centre and the command post, for each type of
emergency;
d) information on names and telephone numbers of offices or people to be contacted in the case of a particular
emergency; and
e) a grid map of the aerodrome and its immediate vicinity.
. . . . . .
Emergency operations centre and command post
9.1.7 Recommendation.— A fixed emergency operations centre and a mobile command post should be available for use
during an emergency.
9.1.8 Recommendation.— The emergency operations centre should be a part of the aerodrome facilities and should be
responsible for the overall coordination and general direction of the response to an emergency.
9.1.9 Recommendation.— The command post should be a facility capable of being moved rapidly to the site of an
emergency, when required, and should undertake the local coordination of those agencies responding to the emergency.
9.1.10 Recommendation.— A person should be assigned to assume control of the emergency operations centre and,
when appropriate, another person the command post.
Communication system
9.1.11 Recommendation.— Adequate communication systems linking the command post and the emergency operations
centre with each other and with the participating agencies should be provided in accordance with the plan and consistent with
the particular requirements of the aerodrome.
Aerodrome emergency exercise
9.1.12 The plan shall contain procedures for periodic testing of the adequacy of the plan and for reviewing the results in
order to improve its effectiveness.
Note.— The plan includes all participating agencies and associated equipment.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-16
9.1.13 The plan shall be tested by conducting:
a) a full-scale aerodrome emergency exercise at intervals not exceeding two years; and partial emergency exercises in the
intervening year to ensure that any deficiencies found during the full-scale aerodrome emergency exercise have been
corrected; or
b) a series of modular tests commencing in the first year and concluding in a full-scale aerodrome emergency exercise at
intervals not exceeding three years; and
reviewed thereafter, or after an actual emergency, so as to correct any deficiency found during such exercises or actual
emergency.
Note 1.— The purpose of a full-scale exercise is to ensure the adequacy of the plan to cope with different types of
emergencies. The purpose of a partial exercise is to ensure the adequacy of the response to individual participating agencies
and components of the plan, such as the communications system. The purpose of modular tests is to enable concentrated effort
on specific components of established emergency plans.
. . . . . .
9.10 Fencing
Application
. . . . . .
9.10.2 A fence or other suitable barrier shall be provided on an aerodrome to deter the inadvertent or premeditated access
of an unauthorized person onto a non-public area of the aerodrome.
Note 1.— This is intended to include the barring of sewers, ducts, tunnels, etc., where necessary to prevent access.
Note 2.— Special measures may be required to prevent the access of an unauthorized person to runways or taxiways which
overpass public roads.
9.10.3 Suitable means of protection shall be provided to deter the inadvertent or premeditated access of unauthorized
persons into ground installations and facilities essential for the safety of civil aviation located off the aerodrome.
Location
9.10.4 The fence or barrier shall be located so as to separate the movement area and other facilities or zones on the
aerodrome vital to the safe operation of aircraft from areas open to public access.
9.10.5 Recommendation.— When greater security is thought necessary, a cleared area should be provided on both
sides of the fence or barrier to facilitate the work of patrols and to make trespassing more difficult. Consideration should be
given to the provision of a perimeter road inside the aerodrome fencing for the use of both maintenance personnel and security
patrols.
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-17 3/8/17
9.11 Security lighting
Recommendation.— At an aerodrome where it is deemed desirable for security reasons, a fence or other barrier
provided for the protection of international civil aviation and its facilities should be illuminated at a minimum essential level.
Consideration should be given to locating lights so that the ground area on both sides of the fence or barrier, particularly at
access points, is illuminated.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 18 — THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF
DANGEROUS GOODS BY AIR
CHAPTER 2. APPLICABILITY
. . . . . .
2.2 Dangerous Goods Technical Instructions
2.2.1 Each Contracting State shall take the necessary measures to achieve compliance with the detailed provisions
contained in the Technical Instructions. Each Contracting State shall also take the necessary measures to achieve compliance
with any amendment to the Technical Instructions which may be published during the specified period of applicability of an
edition of the Technical Instructions.
2.2.2 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should inform ICAO of difficulties encountered in the application of
the Technical Instructions and of any amendments which it would be desirable to make to them.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 10.
TRAINING PROGRAMMES
10.1 Establishment of training programmes
Initial and recurrent dangerous goods training programmes shall be established and maintained in accordance with the
Technical Instructions.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 13. DANGEROUS GOODS
SECURITY PROVISIONS
Each Contracting State shall establish dangerous goods security measures, applicable to shippers, operators and other
individuals engaged in the transport of dangerous goods by air, to be taken to minimize theft or misuse of dangerous goods that
may endanger persons, property or the environment. These measures should be commensurate with security provisions
specified in other Annexes and the Technical Instructions.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-18
EXTRACTS FROM DOC 9284 — TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY AIR
Part 1. GENERAL
. . . . . .
Chapter 4
TRAINING
Parts of this Chapter are affected by State Variations AE 2, BR 7, CA 11, HK 1, VE 5, VE 6; see Table A1
. . . . . .
4.1 DANGEROUS GOODS TRAINING PROGRAMMES
4.1.1 Establishment and maintenance
Initial and recurrent dangerous goods training programmes must be established and maintained by or on behalf of:
. . . . . .
g) agencies engaged in the security screening of passengers and crew and their baggage and/or cargo or mail; and
. . . . . .
EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES —
AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (DOC 4444)
CHAPTER 5. SEPARATION METHODS AND MINIMA
. . . . . .
5.2 PROVISIONS FOR THE SEPARATION OF CONTROLLED TRAFFIC
. . . . . .
5.2.1.3 Larger separations than the specified minima should be applied whenever exceptional circumstances such as
unlawful interference or navigational difficulties call for extra precautions. This should be done with due regard to all relevant
factors so as to avoid impeding the flow of air traffic by the application of excessive separations.
Note — Unlawful interference with an aircraft constitutes a case of exceptional circumstances which might require the
application of separations larger than the specified minima, between the aircraft being subjected to unlawful interference and
other aircraft.
. . . . . .
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-19 3/8/17
CHAPTER 15. PROCEDURES RELATED TO EMERGENCIES,
COMMUNICATION FAILURE AND CONTINGENCIES
15.1 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
15.1.1 General
15.1.1.1 The various circumstances surrounding each emergency situation preclude the establishment of exact detailed
procedures to be followed. The procedures outlined herein are intended as a general guide to air traffic services personnel. Air
traffic control units shall maintain full and complete coordination, and personnel shall use their best judgement in handling
emergency situations.
Note 1.— Additional procedures to be applied in relation to emergencies and contingencies while using an ATS
surveillance system are contained in Chapter 8, 8.8.1.
Note 2.— If the pilot of an aircraft encountering a state of emergency has previously been directed by ATC to select a
specific transponder code and/or a specific ADS-B emergency mode, that code and/or mode will normally be maintained unless,
in special circumstances, the pilot has decided or has been advised otherwise. Where ATC has not requested a code or
emergency mode to be set, the pilot will set the transponder to Mode A Code 7700 and/or the appropriate ADS-B emergency
mode.
Note 3.— Some aircraft equipped with first generation ADS-B avionics have the capability to transmit a general
emergency alert only, regardless of the code selected by the pilot.
Note 4.— Some aircraft equipped with first generation ADS-B avionics do not have the capability of squawking IDENT
while the emergency and/or urgency mode is selected.
15.1.1.2 When an emergency is declared by an aircraft, the ATS unit should take appropriate and relevant action as
follows:
a) unless clearly stated by the flight crew or otherwise known, take all necessary steps to ascertain aircraft identification
and type, the type of emergency, the intentions of the flight crew as well as the position and level of the aircraft;
b) decide upon the most appropriate type of assistance which can be rendered;
c) enlist the aid of any other ATS unit or other services which may be able to provide assistance to the aircraft;
d) provide the flight crew with any information requested as well as any additional relevant information, such as details
on suitable aerodromes, minimum safe altitudes, weather information;
e) obtain from the operator or the flight crew such of the following information as may be relevant: number of persons on
board, amount of fuel remaining, possible presence of hazardous materials and the nature thereof; and
f) notify the appropriate ATS units and authorities as specified in local instructions.
15.1.1.3 Changes of radio frequency and SSR code should be avoided if possible and should normally be made only
when or if an improved service can be provided to the aircraft concerned. Manoeuvring instructions to an aircraft experiencing
engine failure should be limited to a minimum. When appropriate, other aircraft operating in the vicinity of the aircraft in
emergency should be advised of the circumstances.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-20
Note.— Requests to the flight crew for the information contained in 15.1.1.2 e) will be made only if the information is not
available from the operator or from other sources and will be limited to essential information.
15.1.2 Priority
An aircraft known or believed to be in a state of emergency, including being subjected to unlawful interference, shall be given
priority over other aircraft.
15.1.3 Unlawful interference and aircraft bomb threat
15.1.3.1 Air traffic services personnel shall be prepared to recognize any indication of the occurrence of unlawful
interference with an aircraft.
15.1.3.2 Whenever unlawful interference with an aircraft is suspected, and where automatic distinct display of SSR
Mode A Code 7500 and Code 7700 is not provided, the controller shall attempt to verify any suspicion by setting the SSR
decoder to Mode A Code 7500 and thereafter to Code 7700.
Note.— An aircraft equipped with an SSR transponder is expected to operate the transponder on Mode A Code 7500 to
indicate specifically that it is the subject of unlawful interference. The aircraft may operate the transponder on Mode A Code
7700, to indicate that it is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance. An aircraft equipped
with other surveillance system transmitters, including ADS-B and ADS-C, might send the emergency and/or urgency signal by
all of the available means.
15.1.3.3 Whenever unlawful interference with an aircraft is known or suspected or a bomb threat warning has been
received, ATS units shall promptly attend to requests by, or to anticipated needs of, the aircraft, including requests for relevant
information relating to air navigation facilities, procedures and services along the route of flight and at any aerodrome of
intended landing, and shall take such action as is necessary to expedite the conduct of all phases of the flight.
15.1.3.3.1 ATS units shall also:
a) transmit, and continue to transmit, information pertinent to the safe conduct of the flight, without expecting a reply
from the aircraft;
b) monitor and plot the progress of the flight with the means available, and coordinate transfer of control with adjacent
ATS units without requiring transmissions or other responses from the aircraft, unless communication with the aircraft
remains normal;
c) inform, and continue to keep informed, appropriate ATS units, including those in adjacent FIRs, which may be
concerned with the progress of the flight;
Note.— In applying this provision, account must be taken of all the factors which may affect the progress of the
flight, including fuel endurance and the possibility of sudden changes in route and destination. The objective is to
provide, as far in advance as is practicable in the circumstances, each ATS unit with appropriate information as to the
expected or possible penetration of the aircraft into its area of responsibility.
d) notify:
1) the operator or its designated representative;
2) the appropriate rescue coordination centre in accordance with appropriate alerting procedures;
Annex 20
Attachment Annex 17 — Security
ATT-21 3/8/17
3) the appropriate authority designated by the State;
Note.— It is assumed that the designated security authority and/or the operator will in turn notify other parties
concerned in accordance with pre-established procedures.
e) relay appropriate messages, relating to the circumstances associated with the unlawful interference, between the
aircraft and designated authorities.
Note.— These messages include, but are not limited to: initial messages declaring an incident; update messages
on an existing incident; messages containing decisions made by appropriate decision makers; messages on transfer of
responsibility; messages on acceptance of responsibility; messages indicating that an entity is no longer involved in
an incident; and messages closing an incident.
15.1.3.4 The following additional procedures shall apply if a threat is received indicating that a bomb or other explosive
device has been placed on board a known aircraft. The ATS unit receiving the threat information shall:
a) if in direct communication with the aircraft, advise the flight crew without delay of the threat and the circumstances
surrounding the threat; or
b) if not in direct communication with the aircraft, advise the flight crew by the most expeditious means through other
ATS units or other channels.
15.1.3.5 The ATS unit in communication with the aircraft shall ascertain the intentions of the flight crew and report those
intentions to other ATS units which may be concerned with the flight.
15.1.3.6 The aircraft shall be handled in the most expeditious manner while ensuring, to the extent possible, the safety of
other aircraft and that personnel and ground installations are not put at risk.
15.1.3.7 Aircraft in flight shall be given re-clearance to a requested new destination without delay. Any request by the
flight crew to climb or descend for the purpose of equalizing or reducing the differential between the outside air pressure and
the cabin air pressure shall be approved as soon as possible.
15.1.3.8 An aircraft on the ground should be advised to remain as far away from other aircraft and installations as
possible and, if appropriate, to vacate the runway. The aircraft should be instructed to taxi to a designated or isolated parking
area in accordance with local instructions. Should the flight crew disembark passengers and crew immediately, other aircraft,
vehicles and personnel should be kept at a safe distance from the threatened aircraft.
15.1.3.9 ATS units shall not provide any advice or suggestions concerning action to be taken by the flight crew in
relation to an explosive device.
15.1.3.10 An aircraft known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference or which for other reasons needs
isolation from normal aerodrome activities shall be cleared to the designated isolated parking position. Where such an isolated
parking position has not been designated, or if the designated position is not available, the aircraft shall be cleared to a position
within the area or areas selected by prior agreement with the aerodrome authority. The taxi clearance shall specify the taxi route
to be followed to the parking position. This route shall be selected with a view to minimizing any security risks to the public,
other aircraft and installations at the aerodrome.
Note.— See Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 3.
Annex 20
Annex 17 — Security Attachment
3/8/17 ATT-22
EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES —
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS (DOC 8168), VOLUME I — FLIGHT PROCEDURES
PART III. AIRCRAFT OPERATING PROCEDURES
SECTION 3. — SECONDARY SURVEILLANCE RADAR (SSR)
TRANSPONDER OPERATING PROCEDURES
Chapter 1
OPERATION OF TRANSPONDERS
. . . . . .
1.4 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
The pilot of an aircraft in a state of emergency shall set the transponder to Mode A Code 7700 unless ATC has previously
directed the pilot to operate the transponder on a specified code. In the latter case, the pilot shall continue to use the specified
code unless otherwise advised by ATC. However, a pilot may select Mode A Code 7700 whenever there is a specific reason to
believe that this would be the best course of action.
. . . . . .
1.6 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT
1.6.1 If there is unlawful interference with an aircraft in flight, the pilot-in-command shall attempt to set the transponder
to Mode A Code 7500 in order to indicate the situation. If circumstances so warrant, Code 7700 should be used instead.
1.6.2 If a pilot has selected Mode A Code 7500 and has been requested to confirm this code by ATC (in accordance with
1.1.5), the pilot shall, according to circumstances, either confirm this or not reply at all.
Note.— If the pilot does not reply, ATC will take this as confirmation that the use of Code 7500 is not an inadvertent false
code selection.
— END —
Annex 20
Annex 21
Letter from Abdulla Nasser Turki Al-Subaey, Chairman of Qatar Civil Aviation Authority, to
Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General (5 June 2017)

Annex 21
6',i!:;J£JII~ aaklti i.44IJ
~ CIVIL AVIAT ION AUTHORITY
Dr Fang Liu
Secretary General
International Civil Aviation Organization
999 University Street
Montreal, Quebec
Canada H3C 5H7
QCAA/ANS .02/502/ 17
05 June 2017
Subject: Subject: Unilateral action taken by Bahrain. Egypt. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates (UAEl in closing their respective Flight Information Regions (FIR) for all
flight to/fr om the State of Qatar. breaching the spirit of the Chicago Convention.
Dear Madam,
We were surprised to note the unilateral action taken by concerned States regarding the
closure of Bahrain, Cairo, Jeddah and UAE Flight Info rmation Regions for traffic to/from Qatar,
including Qatar Airways flights landing to/or overflying the respective FIRs. This has resulted in
practically isolating the State of Qatar to the outside world.
It is to be noted that the State of Qatar has delegated provision of services above its territorial
airspace to Bahrain. Qatar lies within Bahrain FIR and we control tra ffic within our Terminal
Control Area (TMA) up to Flight Level 245 (FL 245). We need urgent decision from ICAO on
provision of services from Qatar over the high seas airspace.
The action taken by the concerned States in not in accordance with the Spirit of the Chicago
Convention and will have major impact on safety and efficiency of international air transport in
the region and we fail to understand the rationale behind this drastic approach.
We are accordingly working with the ICAO Regional Office to develop continge ncy plans
passing through internation al airspace for traffic to/from Qatar.
We would invite you to consider bringing this issue to the atten tion of the ICAO Council, with a
view make an appeal in accordance with the "Settlement of Dispute" mechanism in
conform ance with Article 84 of t he Chicago Convention.
Accept Madam, the assurances of our highest consideration.
Sincerely,
~---+~-
( ~rki NI-Subaey
Chairman Civil Aviation
1
Authority
Copy: 1. President of the /CAO Council
2. Regional Director /CAO Middle East office

Annex 22
Letter from Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General, to Abdulla Nasser Turki Al-Subaey, Chairman of
Qatar Civil Aviation Authority, Reference No. AN 13/4/3/Open-AMO66892 (7 June 2017)

Annex 22
International
C.ivil Aviation
Org_anization
Organisation
de l'aviation civile
internationale
·rHE SEGRETARY GENERAL
Organli aci6n
Qe Aviaci6.r, Civil
Internacional
Ref .: AN 13/4.3.Open-AM066892
Mr. Abdulla Nasser Turki AI-Subaey
Chai1m.an .·
Qatar Civil Axiation Authority
P:o. Box 3000
Doha
Qatar .
Email: [email protected] .ga
a:[email protected]
Dear Mr. AI-Subaey,
Mea<AyHaPoAHas
opraHW38UlitR
fPa>KA?HCKOH
ae1.1a41i11i1
t)_»hll ~
,,.i.,.i11._,;.i.JI
7 June 2017
oo ~f-~ m
~it~ filH,q
I wish to refer to your letter dated 5 June 2017, reference QCAA/ANS.02/502/17,
regarding "the .closure of Bahrain , Cairo, Jeddah and UAE Flight Information Regions (Fffi.s) for traffic
to/from Qatar, includin_g Qatar Airways flights landing to/or overflying the respective F!Rs".
This is tci inform you that I have brought the matter t o the attention of the relevant
Representatives on the Cout).cil of IC.'\O and, with regards to international flights in the region,
emphasised tp.e impprtat1ce of the safe and effident flow of air traffic . J also highlighted th at .operation of
international scheduled flights is governed by air services agreements (ASAs) and the Internationa l Air
Services Trat1sit Agreement (Chicago, 1944), for the parties thereto. Furthermore, besicles some ASA,s,
Article 5 of the Convention o n International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944; ''.the Chicagq Convention")
governs the operation of international non-scheduled flights. I also referred to Assembly Resolution A3 8~
12, Appendix G Delimitatio,:i of air traffic services ~4T.s;J airspaces, Resi;ilving Claus(: 7 which states:
" .. the provision by a State of air traffic services within airspace over the high seas does not imply
recognition of sovereignty of that State over the airspace ~oncerned".
Concerning the provision of services from Qatar over the high seas airspace, while I am
min(lful t1i·at you are exploring potential traf(ic management options, at this juncture I have my staff
focussed exclusively on developing contingency plans to facilit ate traffic flow to/from Ham.ad
Inter:national Ai,rport-Iioha . 1 have spoken to Mr. Mohamed Rahma, ICAO Region al Direct or , Middle
East Office in Cairo, and lie and his team can assist you as required.
With refer ence to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, I am al so pleased to attach
herewith a copy of the related Rules for the Setilement of Differ ences (Doc 7782/2).
999 Robert-Bourassa Boulevard Tel .. 514-954-8041
Mootr~al, Quebec Fax.: 514-954-6077
Ca"'!d• H3C 5H7
E-man· [email protected]
www icao 1nl
Annex 22
-2-
The ongoing support of your Administration, with respect to our shared commitment to
the s•afety, security and efficiency of civi l aviation, is highly apprec;iated.
Enclosure:
Rules for t h tl Settle1nent of Differe~ces (Doc 7787/2)
cc; President of the Coun.cil oflCAO
Embassy of the State of Qatar - Ottawa
Yours sincerely,
Annex 23
ICAO Council, 211th Session, Ninth Meeting: Summary of Decisions, ICAO Doc. C-DEC 211/9
(21 June 2017)

COUNCIL—211TH SESSION
NINTH MEETING
(THE COUNCIL CHAMBER,WEDNESDAY, 21 JUNE 2017, AT 1000 HOURS)
SUMMARY OF DECISIONS
CLOSED MEETING
Settlement of Differences: Brazil and the United States (2016) – Preliminary Objection stage
(Subject Nos. 16 and 26)
1. On behalf of the Council, the President extended a welcome to Mr. Olyntho Vieira, the
Authorized Agent of Brazil, Ms. Katherine McManus, the Authorized Agent of the United States, and their
respective Delegations.
2. The Council then proceeded to consider the above case on the basis of: C-WP/14617
Restricted (with Addendum No. 1), in which the Secretary General provided an overview of the
procedure applicable to the disagreement between Brazil and the United States during the preliminary
objection stage; memorandum SG 2360/17 dated 10 April 2017, in which the Secretary General transmitted
the Statement of Preliminary Objection filed by the Delegation of the United States to ICAO in accordance
with Article 5 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782), and related memorandum
SG 2362/17 dated 23 May 2017; memorandum SG 2364/17 (with Blue rider) dated 24 May 2017, in which
the Secretary General transmitted the Comments in response to the Statement of Preliminary Objection,
including exhibits, filed on behalf of Brazil; and memorandum SG 2368/17 dated 20 June 2017, in which
the Secretary General transmitted a Note Verbale from the Delegation of the United States to ICAO dated,
and received on, 16 June 2017, submitting two documents as additional evidence and requesting their
inclusion in the record.
3. The paper presented, in paragraph 2, the Application and Memorial filed by Brazil on
2 December 2016 for the settlement, under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 2 of the Rules
for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782), of the disagreement with the United States regarding the
application of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention and Standard 3.1.1 of its Annex 2 – Rules of the Air in
the aftermath of “the collision, on September 29th 2006, of the air carrier Boeing 737-8EH operating a
regular flight GLO 1907, and air jet Legacy EMB-135BJ operating a flight by ExcelAire Services Inc.”
The four types of relief sought from the Council by Brazil, as Applicant, were also set forth in that
paragraph.
4. The Statement of Preliminary Objection submitted by the United States, as Respondent, on
27 March 2017 in accordance with Article 5 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782)
requested that the Applicant’s claim be dismissed by the Council as time-barred under the
generally-accepted international law principle of extinctive prescription.
C-DEC 211/9
28/6/17
Annex 23
C-DEC 211/9 - 2 -
5. Pursuant to Article 5 (3) of the said Rules, upon a preliminary objection being filed, the
proceedings on the merits shall be suspended and, with respect to the time-limit fixed under Article 3 (1) (c)
of the Rules as regards to the Counter-Memorial, time shall cease to run from the moment the preliminary
objection is filed until the objection is decided by the Council
6. Addendum No. 1 to the paper summarized the Comments submitted by the Applicant
(Brazil) on 19 May 2017 in response to the Statement of Preliminary Objection of the Respondent (United
States), in which the Applicant requested the Council to: reject the propositions in the Respondent’s
Preliminary Objection and reaffirm the Council’s competence to consider Brazil’s Application and
Memorial; and order that the period given to the Respondent for the filing of its Counter-Memorial shall
begin to run again immediately following the Council’s rejection of the Preliminary Objection.
7. In the executive summary of the paper, the Council was invited to hear the arguments of
the Parties relating to the Preliminary Objection and to take a decision on the matter in line with the
procedure set forth in Article 5 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782), paragraph (4) of
which specified that “If a preliminary objection has been filed, the Council, after hearing the Parties, shall
decide the question as a preliminary issue before any further steps are taken under these Rules.”. The
requirements set forth in Article 15 of the said Rules were referenced in paragraph 5.3 of the paper.
8. It was recalled that, for the case before it, the Council was sitting as a judicial body under
Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, taking its decisions on the basis of the submission of written
documents by the Parties, as well as on the basis of oral arguments. The Council’s consideration was
limited to the United States’ Statement of Preliminary Objection and to Brazil’s Comments in response
thereto, and would not address the merits of the case. The Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782)
and the Rules of Procedure for the Council (Doc 7559) served as reference documents.
9. At the invitation of the President of the Council, the Authorized Agent of the United States
presented the Statement of Preliminary Objection, which was followed by a presentation by the Authorized
Agent of Brazil of the Comments in response to the Statement of Preliminary Objection. Each Party then
responded to the other Party’s presentation of its arguments. All oral arguments were duly noted and
recorded for the minutes of the meeting.
10. On a proposal made by the Representative of the United Arab Emirates and supported by
the majority of Representatives, the Council proceeded to a vote by secret ballot, pursuant to Article 50 of
the Rules of Procedure for the Council (Doc 7559), on the question “Do you accept the Preliminary
Objection of the United States?”. Under Article 52 of the Chicago Convention, decisions by the Council
required approval by a majority of its Members. As the Council comprised 36 Members, acceptance of the
Preliminary Objection required 19 positive votes. Brazil and the United States were not entitled to vote
under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 15 (5) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences
(Doc 7782), which specified that “No Member of the Council shall vote in the consideration by the Council
of any dispute to which it is a Party”. Following the completion of the secret ballot, the three
Vice-Presidents of the Council, namely, the Representatives of the United Arab Emirates, Sweden and
Colombia, monitored and scrutinized the tallying of all of the votes cast for the purpose of ensuring its
accuracy.
11. The result of the secret ballot, in which 34 votes were cast by the Council Members eligible
to vote, was as follows:
In favour 4 votes
Against 19 votes
Abstentions 11 votes
Annex 23
- 3 - C-DEC 211/9
There were no invalid ballots or blank votes.
12. Based on this result, the President declared that the Statement of Preliminary Objection
filed by the United States, as Respondent, was not accepted by the Council.
13. Following a further exchange of views, the Council unanimously decided that as the
statements and arguments made in the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection and in the Applicant’s
Comments in response did not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary
character, they may be joined to the merits of the case and included in the Respondent’s Counter-Memorial
and any additional pleadings.
14. Notwithstanding that 11 calendar days remained for the submission of the Respondent’s
Counter-Memorial under the original time-limit established therefor under Article 3 (1) (c) of the Rules for
the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782), the Council, further to a request by the Authorized Agent of the
United States for additional time, unanimously decided to set the time-limit for the submission of the
Counter-Memorial at two weeks from the Respondent’s receipt of the Council-approved minutes of the
present meeting, which constituted the official record of the oral proceedings on the Preliminary Objection.
It was noted that the Applicant (Brazil) could also take advantage of the said minutes, and that it may, in
accordance with the said Rules, file a pleading in reply to the Counter-Memorial to provide comments in
response.
15. The Council unanimously decided to invite the two Parties to engage in direct negotiations
pursuant to Article 14 (1) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782) with a view to achieving
a satisfactory resolution of their disagreement. In accepting, the Parties indicated that prior to the present
meeting they had discussed the issue of continuing negotiations and that both were willing to do so and to
accept the assistance of the President of the Council or any other individual he might appoint whom they
found to be mutually-acceptable.
16. Accordingly, the Council unanimously decided to invite the President to be available to
provide his good offices as Conciliator during the Parties’ renewed negotiations.
17. Furthermore, the Council unanimously decided not to set a time-limit for the completion of
the negotiations in order to give both Parties full opportunity to successfully resolve their disagreement, on
the understanding that a progress report on the status of the negotiations would be presented for its
consideration during its next (212th) session in October/November 2017.
18. On behalf of the Council, the President expressed appreciation to both Parties for their
spirit of compromise, and their willingness to resolve their disagreement amicably.
19. It was noted that, on the basis of the Council’s above deliberations, the President would
prepare and circulate the draft text of the Council’s decision in the Preliminary Objection stage of the case
Settlement of Differences: Brazil and the United States (2016), which would be tabled for the Council’s
consideration and approval at its next meeting (211/10) on Friday, 23 June 2017.
— END —
Annex 23

Annex 24
ICAO Council, 211th Session, Summary Minutes of the Tenth Meeting, ICAO Doc. C-MIN
211/10 (23 June 2017)

Annex 24
International Civil Aviation Or ganization C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM)
11/7/17
COUNCIL-211TH SESSION
SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE TENTH MEETING
(THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, FRIDAY, 23 JUNE 2017, AT 1000 & 1200 HOURS)
CLOSED MEETING
President of the Council: Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu
Secretary : Dr. Fang Liu, Secretary General
PRESENT:
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Cabo Verde
Canada
China
Colombia
Congo
Cuba
Ecuador
Egypt
France
Germany
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
ALSO PRESENT:
- Mr. A.D. Mesroua
- Mr. G.E. Ainchil
- Mr. S. Lucas
- Mrs. M.G . Valente da Costa
- Mr. C. Monteiro
- Mr.M.Page
- Mr. Shengjun Yang
- Mr. A. Munoz Gomez
- Mr. R.M. Ondzotto
- Mrs. M . Crespo Frasquieri
- Mr. I. Arellano
- Mr. A. Khedr
- Mr. P. Bertoux
- Mr. U. Schwierczinski
- Mr. A . Shekhar
- Mrs . A. Smith Floch
- Mr. M .R. Rusconi
- Mr. S. Matsui
Dr. N. Luongo (Alt.) -Argentina
Mrs. M .F. Loguzzo (Alt.) -Argentina
Mr. 0. Vieira (Authorized Agent) - Brazil
Mr. L. Sacchi Guadagnin (Alt.) - Brazil
Mr. G. do Prado Lima (Alt.) - Brazil
Mr. R. da Rosa Costa (Alt.) - Brazil
Mr. D.A. Tavares Taufner (Alt.) - Brazil
Mr. Chunyu Ding (Alt.) - China
Mr. M. Millefert (Alt.) - France
Mr. N. Naoumi (Alt.) - Germany
Mr. M. Usam i (Alt.) -Japan
Mr . K.A. Ismail (Alt.) - Malaysia
Mrs. D . Valle Alvarez (Alt.) - Mexico
Mr . S. Kim (Alt.) -Republic of Korea
Mr . K. Lee (Alt.) - Republic of Korea
Mr. D. Subbotin (Alt.) - Russian Federation
Mr. M.S. Habib (Alt.) - Saudi Arabia
Mr. S. Vuokila (Alt.) - Sweden
Kenya - Ms. M.B. Awori
Malaysia - Mr . Y.-H. Lim
Mexico - Mr. D. Mendez Mayora
Nigeria - Mr. M.S. Nuhu
Panama - Mr . G.S . Oller
Republic of Korea - Mr. J . Hur
Russian Federation - Mr. A.A. Novgorodov
Saudi Arabia - Mr. S.A.R. Hashem
Singapore - Mr. T.C. Ng
South Africa - Mr. M.D.T . Peege
Spain - Mr . V.M. Aguado
Sweden - Ms. H. Jansson Saxe
Turkey - Mr. A.R. <;::olak
United Arab Emirates - Miss A. Alhameli
United Kingdom - Mr. M. Rodmell
United Republic of - Mr. R.W. Bokango
Tanzania - Mr. S. Kotis (Alt.)
United States - Mr. M. Vidal
Uruguay
SECRETARIAT:
Mrs . J. Yan
Mr. B.Djibo
Mr . J. Augustin
Mr. S. Creamer
Mr . V . Smith
Mr. A. Opolot
Mr . A. Larcos
Miss A. Tyo
- C/OSG
- D/ATB
- D/LEB
- D/ANB
- D/ADB
- LO
-ACC
- Precis-writer
Annex 24
C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM) -2-
ALso PRESENT (CONTINUED)!
Mr. 6. Dogrukol (Alt.) - Turkey
Mr. A Alnaqbi (Alt.) - United Arab Emirates
Mr. J.C. Salazar (Alt.) - United Arab Emirates
Mrs. L. Coquard-Patry (Alt.) - United Arab Emirates
Mrs. K.L. Riensema (Alt.) - United Kingdom
Ms. K. McManus (Authorized Agent) - United States
Mr. W. Voss (Alt.) - United States
Mr. J. Mendez (Alt.) - Uruguay
Re presentatives to ICAO
Chile
Cyprus
Ethiopia
Greece
Indonesia
Lebanon
Paraguay
Sudan
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic ot)
Airports Council International (ACI)
International Air Transport Association (IA TA)
European Union (EU)
Annex 24
-3- C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM)
Subject No. 16: Legal work of the organization
Subject No. 26: Settlement of disputes between Contracting States
Settlement of Differences: Brazil and United States - preliminary objection stage
1. The Council resumed consideration of this item, which had been first discussed at the
Ninth Meeting of the current session on Wednesday, 21 June 2017. In doing so, it was recalled that at the
previous meeting, the President had indicated his intention to prepare and circulate the draft text of the
Council's decision on the preliminary objection in the matter: Brazil and United States, so that it could be
considered and approved at this the Tenth Meeting of the 211th Session (C-DEC 211/9 refers). In this
connection, it was noted that the draft text of the decision had been circulated (in all languages) to
Council Representatives on the afternoon of Thursday, 22 June 2017.
2. Following consideration, the Council adopted the decision, which is reproduced in the
Attachment to this C-MIN.
3. The Representative of Brazil thanked all the delegates who took part in the settlement
process and expressed her gratitude to the Legal Affairs and External Relations Bureau (LEB) for its
excellent work in leading the parties through a very difficult situation, a task which it had undertaken
despite the demands of other important pressing assignments. She also commended the President of the
Council for his leadership role in this endeavour and availed herself of the opportunity to express her
appreciation of the constructive process that the Brazilian Delegation had had with the Delegation of the
United States. She was confident that the two Delegations would work well together in future and
congratulated the United States Delegation on the very constructive process and on the views that they
had demonstrated to her delegation since the decision.
4. The Authorized Agent of the United States (Ms. Katherine McManus) thanked the
Secretary General for her assistance and the President of the Council for his guiding hand on this matter.
Although the Council did not reach the decision that the United States Delegation had hoped for when it
filed its preliminary objection, the matter was now in a posture with which her delegation was
comfortable. She also thanked the many members of the Council who played constructive roles and
helped the parties reach this point. The United States Delegation extended its gratitude to the Secretariat,
particularly the LEB, for their excellent work in bringing about the result that the Council had now
adopted. She assured that the United States would negotiate with its Brazilian counterparts in good faith,
and it was hoped that these negotiations would come to a constructive and mutually beneficial resolution
within a reasonable time. She added that a preliminary discussion of modalities with Brazil had already
taken place, and expressed her appreciation of the off er from the President of the Council of further
assistance as needed in this regard.
5. The President of the Council congratulated the delegations of Brazil and the United
States for the spirit of compromise and consensus that had been exhibited. Both delegations had displayed
exemplary leadership in the statements presented and in their readiness to work together. The President
confirmed his availability to support the continuing process in whatever way possible, but stressed that
the key element was the determination of both sides to continue direct bilateral negotiations.
6. The Council reconvened in open session at 1015 hours to consider the remaining items on
its order of business. The closed session was then reconvened at 1200 to consider the following item.
Annex 24
C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM) -4-
Subject No. 27: Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)
Item under Article 54 n) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation
7. The Council had for consideration the Oral Report by the Secretary General on a State's
reque. t-undcr Article 54 11) of the Cum·e11ti011 011 l11ternatio11al Civil Aviation - request of Qatar.
8. Prior to commencing consideration of this item, the Council decided that despite this
matter being considered in closed session, the representatives of the European Union, International Air
Transport Association (IATA), and Airports Council International (ACI), should be permitted to attend
and observe the proceedings.
9. The Secreta ry General presented her Oral Report, as follows:
"A series of correspondence from the State of Qatar related to a request to the Council of i.Arc:.. _g ~
ICAO to consider a matter pursuant to Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention under which it is a ~ .-..I-= --k,d-mandatory
function of the Council "to consider any matter relating to the Convention which any
contracting State refers to it". Such consideration under Article 54 n) may be about a dispute but is not
part of the process for settlement of disputes provided in Article 84; in other words, the consideration of a
matter under Article 54 n) is fu11y governed by the Rules of Procedure for the Council, not by the Rules
for the Settlement of Ditforences. Consideration of a matter by the Council under Article 54 11) is not
uncommon as there were several cases over the years. In terms of outcomes, the Council approved a
variety of actions that arc recorded either in Decisions, Declarations or Resolutions.
"In a letter dated 8 June 2017 addressed to the President of the Council, the Chairman of
the Civil Aviation Authority of Qatar requested "the intervention of the ICAO Council in the Matter of
the Actions of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain to close their Airspace to aircraft registered in the State of Qatar". He
indicated Qatar's intention to make an application under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and
requested that the Council urgently consider under Article 54 n) certain actions of Bahrain.
"By letter dated 13 June 2017, the President of the Council advised the Chairman of the
Civil Aviation Authority of Qatar that the authorities of Bahrain had been duly informed of Qatar's
request under Article 54 n) but, considering that his afore-mentioned letter of 8 June addressed a range of
issues, involving several States at various degrees, the President further requested from Qatar a separate
and dedicated communication specifically on the Article 54 n) request, which would be circulated to the
Council for decision on adding this item to its Work Programme.
"Following a letter dated 15 June supplemented by supporting documentation provided
by e-mail message dated 16 June addressed to me, the Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority of Qatar,
by letter dated 17 June 2017 to the President of the Council, confirmed "the decision of the State of Qatar
to invoke Article 54 n)" of the Chicago Convention. He further requested the Council to include this
matter on a "top-urgent" basis as an item in the Work Programme of the current 211 th Session. The letter
referenced earlier correspondence from the State of Qatar which specifically requested the intervention of
the Council under Article 54 n) "in the Matter of the Actions of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom
of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to Close their Airspace to Aircraft Registered in
the State of Qatar", i.e. not only the actions of Bahrain.
Annex 24
-5- C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM)
"As regards the technical aspects of the issue. you will recall that T provided you with a
technical brief on 9 June and so l will not repeat here all those points but I wish to point out the
following:
• During the week of 5 June and subsequently, after coordination by the !CAO
Regional Office in Cairo supported by Headquarters and the Air Navigation Bureau
(ANB) with the States concerned, a number of NOTAMs promulgating restrictions
were modified, clarifying that restrictions against Qatari-registered aircraft was over
their airspace - meaning territory of the State within the Flight Information Region(s)
(FIR) concerned.
• From 12 June until today three contingency routes have been promulgated by
Bahrain, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Oman, to add to some existing air traffic
services (ATS) routes over the Gulf already being utilized for arrival and departures
to/from Qatar.
• An additional contingency route; an extension of an existing ATS route via the
Emirates FIR has been turned down for operational reasons. The ICAO Regional
Office in Cairo continues to press for more effective contingency routes and
arrangements to facilitate the traffic flow in and out of Qatar for Qatari-registered
aircraft with the support of the Headquarters and the ANB.
• On 15 June, a technical delegation from Qatar visited ICAO Headquarters in
Montreal, as well as a high-level delegation from Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
UAE. Also, the Directors General of these four States have agreed to hold a Special
Technical meeting with ICAO in Cairo on 6 July. I decided to send Chief Air
Navigation Bureau from headquarters to join the Regional Office in Cairo to
participate in this meeting."
10. The Secretary General reported as additional information not pertaining to Article 54 11)
but regarding Article 84:
• By letter dated 13 June 2017 from H.E. Jassim Bin Saif Al-Sulaiti, Minister of
Transport and Communications of the State of Qatar, it was stated that formal
applications by the State of Qatar, pursuant to Article 84, would be lodged, one
regarding the Chicago Convention and the other the International Air Services
Transit Agreement, along with their supporting memorials, which would be
submitted under separate cover.
• Such separate cover has since not been received from Qatar but meanwhile two
Applications and Memorials were hand-delivered to me on 15 June 2017 and a letter
of the same date further transmitted updates on evidence through related Appendices.
• In accordance with Article 3 (1) (a) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences,
upon receipt of an application, the Secretary General shall verify whether it complies
in form with the requirements of Article 2 of the said Rules and, if necessary, require
the applicant to supply any deficiencies appearing therein.
• Besides necessary clarification regarding any "separate cover'' from Qatar authorities
invoking Article 84 of the Chicago Convention as mentioned above, the two handdeJivered
applications and memorials were verified and deficiencies were identified.
Annex 24
C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM) -6-
Accordingly. by letter dated 21 June. I requested the Chairman of the Qatar Civil
Aviation Authority to provide necessary information so as to rectify such deficiencies.
11. The President of the Council thanked the Secretary General for providing this updated
information on the technical work that had been done and the details of the plan moving forward. He then
made the following introductory remarks:
"Further to my email dated 19 June 2017, in which I sought your comments regarding the
State of Qatar's request to include an item under Article 54 n) of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation in the current 211 th Session, please note the following:
• A majority of members on the Council were in favour of including an item in the
Work Programme of the Council. With respect to this session, a significant number
but not the majority of members accepted to include the item in the current 211 th
Session, while others, noting practical challenges, suggested that it could be dealt
with at a later session or at an extraordinary session, that is a session between this
session and next session. There were also suggestions for an informal briefing as
soon as possible.
• Many Representatives also indicated the need to Jlrepare properly for the meeting,
provide opportunities to States that have special interest to participate and make
submissions and that the focus of the meeting should be strictly on technical matters
of safety, security and regularity of air navigation.
• And finally that the Council's consideration of the item should not he seen to discuss
nor escalate any political differences."
12. The President of the Council advised that the discussion of the current meeting would
focus on how the Council would address this issue. As a first step the Council had been apprised of the
technical developments on the contingency arrangements and that ongoing consultation was taking place
between ICAO Headquarters, the Middle East Regional Office in Cairo and the States. The President then )
announced that on 30 June 2017 a detailed informal briefing by the Secretariat led by the Secretary
General, and presented by the Director of the Air Navigation Bureau (DI ANB), would inform on the ex.act
situation as of that date with respect to the issues of flights, contingency arrangements, efficiency and
safety of operations in the Region. At that stage it would be necessary to identify a period for an
extraordinary meeting by the Council to be held between its 211th Session and the scheduled start of its
212th Session.
13. The Council availed itself of the opportunity to thank the Secretary General for her Oral
Report, and the Secretariat, in particular the Middle East Regional Office in Cairo, for the prompt action
taken in response to the situation in the region in the service of international air navigation. The Council
also expressed its appreciation to the President of the Council for the efforts made in his key role in
addressing the urgent matter under consideration.
14. The Representative of Mexico supported the steps proposed by the President of the
Council and relayed his belief that this delicate topic should be addressed urgently, in good faith and in a
responsible manner, and that the differences between the States concerned be examined solely with a
view to ensuring the safety, security and regularity of air operations regardless of the registration number
of the aircraft, in line with the mandate ofICAO. Although cognizant of the urgency of the matter, he was
of the view that reliable information was needed when taking the matter under review, and the Council
should consider whether the information provided was sufficient. He suggested that the States concerned
could formally share their positions with the Council so as to support it in determining the priority of the
Annex 24
-7- C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM)
case and determining how it should be resolved. He cautioned against acting in an overly hasty manner
which could lead to an unfair or incomplete decision that could negatively impact on the safety and
continuity of air travel.
15. Conveying his respect to the State that had requested that this item be presented to the
Council, the Re presentative of Saudi Arabia agreed that the focus of tlieaiscussion should rest on safety,
security and air navigation. He noted that two communications had been presented: one addressed to the
President of the Council under Article 54 11) of the Chicago Convention that requested the submission of ! this item to the Council, and the other from the State of Qatar addressed to the Secretary General
requesting the resolution of the settlement of this difference under Article 84 of the Convention. He
opined that the Council's discussions should not address the settlement of the difference under Article 84
as he was of the view that this would be in contradiction-.--io the Chicago Convention. and the Council
could not take decisions that were contrary to the Convention. In response to the President's email request
for comments, the Delegation of Saudi Arabia had asked for an update or briefing on the current situation
so that the Council could be appraised of the safety plans and of the arrangements taken to guarantee the
safety and security of air navigation. The Representative of Saudi Arabia took the opportunity to
underline that Saudi Arabia considered air safety as a sacred subject and no State should violate or
compromise it.
16. The Representative of the United States informed the Council that his State had been
closely monitoring the situation. It was his understanding that Qatari aircraft had been restricted from
operating in certain portions of the region, and this included flights originating from and destined for
Qatar. His State had also been reviewing information shared by the Government of Qatar alleging that
these actions, including the discontinuation of a vital airway, were creating an unsafe operational
environment in already congested airspace. Over the last week, the United States Delegation had met with
special representatives and high-level officials from all parties to this dispute and had heard their concerns
concerning these extraordinary measures. The operational situation had also been discussed with experts
from both the United States Federal Aviation Administration and the ANB of ICAO. While welcoming
the informal briefings, he believed that the respective positions of the countries involved must be
considered immediately in light of ICAO's primary responsibility to ensure the safety and security of
international civil aviation in the region. He opined that the immediate concern was to ensure the safe
operation of civil aviation in the region and stressed that all steps should be taken to ensure that transit
aircraft were not placed in unsafe conditions due to the ongoing dispute between the Gulf countries. It
was incumbent on ICAO to determine if contingency routes that allowed for the safe and regular passage
of international traffic on international routes had been properly established or if additional measures
were warranted. As the delegation of administrative control of international airspace was an ICAO
responsibility, it was incumbent upon ICAO to react quickly to situations where aviation safety in these
areas might be jeopardized.
17. In light of the received complaint and disputed statements on the ability of ICAO's
Middle East Office to reach an agreement between the parties, the Representative of the United States
believed it was incumbent on the ICAO Council to address this aspect of the dispute with a sense of
urgency and called on the Council to take up this action immediately and without delay. In addition, as
these measures hindered international aviation, his delegation urged the States concerned to continue to
negotiate their differences. He advised that his State was in close communication with all parties to deescalate
and resolve the underlying irritants that had led to the airspace closures. It was critical that strong
ties be maintained among key partners to sustain the fight against terrorism and violent extremist ideology.
Such ties extended to commercial aviation activities so he reiterated that all steps should be taken to
ensure safe and secure civil aviation operations.
18. The Representative of the United Arab Emirates {UAE} supported the comments of the
Representative of Saudi Arabia and while averring that every State had the right to seek a hearing by
Annex 24
C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM) -8-
ICAO, she reminded that rules and procedures existed within the Organization and these needed to be
followed. It was necessary to distinguish between what was to be considered urgent and what needed to
follow established procedures. In particular the Secretariat of ICAO and the Middle East Regional Office
needed to advise what was occurring on the ground, what contingency plans were in place, and what
procedures were to be followed before the Council could make any assumptions about whether any • /
aspects of this case needed to be dealt with urgently. She urged the Council to consider all the facts with V
open minds and reminded lhat two articles, Article 54 n) and Article 84, were involved but that these were
separate issues.
19. The Representative of France stated that ICAO must stick strictly to its prerogatives and
not enter into political issues which fell under the mandate of other institutions. His view was that
sustainable solutions must be found quickly in order to ensure the international aviation regulations in
accordance with the Chicago Convention were respected. While he supported the Secretariat's proposal to
hold a technical meeting on 6 July 2017, as well as the proposal to hold an informal briefing on 30 June,
he felt these measures were insufficient. There was a legitimate need for the Council to listen to all parties
involved in this issue. Since a formal, urgent request relating to Article 54 n) had been presented, the
Council should abide by the provisions of the Chicago Convention. Member States that did not sit on the
Council must not be left behind. It would be regrettable for third parties not to be included, when the
President of the Council and the Secretary General had already made fruitful efforts in this regard. The
Representative of France was of the view that the deadlines needed to be tightened, and that a formal
extraordinary meeting of the Council should be held as soon as possible where all sides could present
their cases. This action would send a necessary message that ICAO was addressing the quick resolution of
the relevant measures and abiding by its mandate to ensure the highest level possible of safety in the
region.
20. Wishing to underscore that the work of ICAO was on the technical aspects of air
navigation safety only, the Representative of Egypt opined that the Organization should not delve into
political considerations or address subjects that were under the purview of other international entities. He
also emphasized his State's full respect for international conventions and treaties and for international law.
The Chicago Convention, as the legal framework that governed the work of ICAO, underlined the
sovereignty of States and in its Article 4 underlined the commitment of all Contracting States not to abuse
or misuse air navigation for other purposes. Under consideration at the current meeting were the actions
taken by certain States, including Egypt, who he stated had evidence that Qatar was misusing civil
aviation in violation of Article 4 of the Chicago Convention. He added that the recent period had borne
witness to the cooperation of civil aviation authorities with ICAO in order to guarantee the security and
safety of aviation in international airspace to ensure aviation would not be affected by the actions taken in
the region. He underlined his State's readiness to continue to cooperate with the Secretary General, either
through ANB or through the Regional Office in Cairo, in order to solve any problems and to respond to
any request to continue the flow of air traffic in international airspace. He expressed agreement with the
proposal to hold an informal briefing, in coordination with the Middle East Regional Office, so as to
enable the Council to be appraised of all aspects of the matter. He also emphasized the view that the
actions taken were exclusively related to Egyptian airspace against a country which his State considered
to have misused civil aviation for purposes inconsistent with the aims of the Chicago Convention.
21. The Representative of Turkey conveyed his sadness at witnessing this problem among
good friends in the same region and expressed the hope that political solutions would be found to this
issue as soon as possible. Because it was not ICAO's role to find a political solution, however, the
Organization needed to focus on safety, security and air navigation and to do so promptly. He added that
it would be useful for the Council to be provided with the text of the Secretary General's oral report for
further reference. He expressed support for the remarks made by the Representatives of the United States
and of France for the need to act quickly on this matter. While the informal briefing would assist in
establishing a clear vision of events taking place in the region, subsequent to that informal briefing there
Annex 24
-9- C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM)
should not be a long delay before hearing from the Qatari authorities because their demand followed from
Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention and had been accepted by the Council. He believed that the
Article 54 n) hearing should be implemented immediately after the informal briefing, and notwithstanding
the technical meeting forecast for 6 July in the Middle East Office, it was important to hear from the State
of Qatar to determine the nature of its request. He concluded with the suggestion that every attempt
should be made for the Article 54 n) Council meeting to take place as early as possible in the month of
July.
22. The request to have the Secretary General's oral report made available to the Council for
consultation was seconded by the Representative of the United Kingdom who felt it outlined aspects of
the history of the case, and it was important that the Representatives report the facts accurately to their
respective authorities. Referring to the views put forward by the Representatives of the United States,
France, and Turkey regarding the action being proposed, he agreed that the Council should have the
information to hand, and he felt it necessary to show a certain degree of urgency. In particular, as a
specific request had been received from a Contracting State of the Organization and it appeared that a
majority of Council Representatives had agreed that this matter be taken quite soon, he feared that
inaction would risk the appearance of a lack of urgency in addressing this matter which could reflect
badly on the Organization He expressed the hope that the current meeting would come to a clear decision
in that respect.
23. The Representative of Singapore expressed his appreciation for the briefing provided by
the Secretariat and to the delegations of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE for tirelessly updating the
Council on many of these issues. He advised that Singapore was also closely monitoring the
developments in the Gulf region with all concerned and, as a friend of all the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) Member States, Singapore hoped that all sides would take steps to reduce tensions. The ongoing
efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the dispute through diplomacy and dialogue and on the basis of
international law were welcomed. The Middle East countries played an important role in countering
terrorism, and it was essential for the GCC Members and the Arab countries to stay united and to work
together as this would ensure that ongoing multinational efforts, of which Singapore was a part, to combat
terrorism remained unaffected.
24. Having listened carefully to all the comments, the Representative of Singapore agreed
that the present was a complex and sensitive political issue involving more than civil aviation, and. as the
United Nations agency responsible for international aviation with clear jurisdiction over global aviation
matters, ICAO needed to look at this issue. Having listened to all parties including Saudi Arabia, the UAE
and Egypt, he was of the opinion that none on the Council would disagree on the importance of the rule of
law which was premised in international law and agreements. For over 70 years, civil aviation had been
built upon Member States individually and together upholding the rule of law. Member States had
fulfilled their commitments to international law and to the agreements that they had signed and ratified to
ensure freedom of overflight for international aviation traffic, including international agreements such as
the Chicago Convention and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, through which Member
States ensured that air navigation services were provided professionally and objectively based on
operational and technical considerations with safety being paramount. He expressed the opinion that,
looking to the future, Member States must and would continue to uphold the same commitments for civil
aviation to grow from strength to strength benefiting people around the world. He urged that more work
be done so that operational solutions could be found to ease the situation and to guarantee the unhindered
flow of air traffic in the region. He agreed with the viewpoints expressed by the Representatives of the
UAE and of Turkey that all available information be presented and expressed support for the informal
briefing set for 30 June. On procedural matters, he queried, with regard to the hearing on Article 54 n) of
the Convention, whether the governments of Qatar and of the States concerned would be required to table
working papers for the Council's consideration.
Annex 24
C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM) -10-
25. The President of the Council commented that some speakers had made clear the
requirement to provide opportunities to States to present submissions to the Council, and it was on that
basis he anticipated that those submissions to be made by the relevant States would outline what action
the Council was expected to take. Further, the President stressed that for the Council it was necessary to
differentiate the Article 54 n) process from the Article 84 resolution mechanism.
26. With regard to Article 54 11) proceedings, the Director of the Le gal Affairs and External
Relations Bureau (O/LEB) explained that there were a variety of ways that this could be brought to the
Council in tem1s of infonnation from the State, but ideally the State should provide a comprehensive,
cohesive document which clearly outlined an action item which the State would request from the Council.
In this particular case it would be important to sever the Article 54 n) proceedings from Article 84
proceedings. LEB had received numerous communications that had combined references to Article 54 n)
and to Article 84. It was not the task of the Secretariat. but rather that of the requesting State, to decide
which aspects fell under Article 54 n) and which fell under Article 84. As an example of a working paper
that had invoked Article 54 n), DILEB referenced a resolution attached to C-MIN 203/1 on the issue of
the Malaysia Airlines Flight MHl 7, the discussion of which had raised the invoking of Article 54 n) of
the Chicago Convention.
27. The President of the Council confirmed that it was his expectation that matters proceed in
accordance with the Rules of the Procedure for the Council. It was his expectation that the State
requesting consideration of Article 54 n) would be required to submit a working paper which would
contain an action item for consideration by the Council. Thereafter, it would also be important, in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure for the Council, to ensure that States with an interest in the matter
be invited, if they so wished, to submit a working paper with an action item.
28. In view of the urgency of the situation, the Re presentative of Canada supported the
position of the Representatives of France, Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom to the effect
that the Council ofICAO should address the matter as soon as possible.
29. Having listened carefully and with the greatest respect to the various contributions, the
Re presentative of Spain welcomed the comments by the Representatives of Egypt and the UAE with
regard to being faithful to the Chicago Convention and to upholding the rule oflaw. Noting that time was
passing in addressing this crisis, which was both delicate and complex, he was of the view that the
situation had possibly improved somewhat according to the latest information received. While he
expressed support for the proposal to hold an informal briefing on 30 June, nevertheless, there was a need
to distinguish between the receipt of information and the obligations of the Organization with respect to
Article 54 n). The actions taken by the Council, as guardians of the Chicago Convention, needed to
comply with the Convention and to align to ICAO's strategic objectives of safety and efficiency of air
transport. On that basis, he proposed that the Council schedule an extraordinary meeting to take place as
soon as practicable following the technical briefing set for 6 July in Cairo.
30. The Re presentative of Uru !!Ua y prefaced his comments by thanking the Representatives
of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt for the timely information provided. He was pleased to be able to
share information directly with them and with the pertinent regional groups. He agreed with previous
speakers that the focus should be on essential air navigation matters, these being the technical issues of
aviation safety and security. All parties concerned should be given the opportunity to speak directly on
this urgent matter and in particular it was important in this case to uphold international law. He agreed
with the Representative of Mexico and others on the importance of possessing reliable information upon
which the Council would make an appropriate determination. He concluded by adding that the timeframe
suggested by the Representative of Spain seemed to him to be sensible and should be given consideration.
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31. The Representative of Germany concurred with all the speakers who expressed their
concern over the situation and its impact on international civil aviation as regards safety, security and
efficiency, as well as with the views expressed that the Council should consider this matter as one of
urgency and of the highest priority. He considered this a fundamental function and responsibility of the
ICAO Council, and urgent attention was necessary to provide the urgently needed clarity on the situation
based on reliable facts in the interest of the international civil aviation.
32. Endorsing the contextual observations by the Representative of Singapore, the
Re presentative of Australia wished to emphasize that the Australian Government looked forward to a
resolution of these kind of issues from diplomatic efforts. For ICAO, procedurally it was important firstly
that information be shared and secondly that the concerns of a Member State be heard. It was also
important on this issue that the Council engage and satisfy itself as to the appropriateness of the
Organization's response. Consideration of the matter in the Council following the informal briefing
should not be delayed, and the Council's discussion should focus on ICAO's jurisdiction, being the safety
of air navigation and the measures ICAO had taken and could yet take on contingency and other planning
to ensure the safety of civil air navigation in the region.
33. Noting that previous speakers had referred to the technical work that needed to be done
by the Organization, the Representative of Argentina reminded that nonetheless it was necessary to
recognize the political dimension of the situation. International terrorism was the enemy of all and no
effort should be spared to combat it. He echoed the support of other speakers for the informal briefing to
be held on 30 June and shared the view as well that the right of a Member State to have its formal request
heard by the Council must be respected. As 'Justice delayed was justice denied", a Member State of the
Organization could not be prevented or delayed from making its case. The world would look upon ICAO,
including its Council and all its bodies, and judge it by the measures it took. He supported the timeline
proposed by the Representative of Spain, and noting the complexity of the problem and that the region
comprised a very congested air space, believed it would be helpful to relay the technical information to
the Council as quickly as possible so that the Council could meet soon after. In particular, he did not
believe that the month of July should pass without the extraordinary meeting taking place subsequent to
the technical meeting in Cairo.
34. Expressing her agreement with the majority of speakers, the Representative of Brazil
opined that information and security were important and that the Council's commitment was to see that
aviation security was upheld in civil aviation. She affirmed that the extraordinary meeting of the Council
should be held immediately after the Cairo meeting on 6 July so as to consider the way forward to help in
creating safe and secure airline traffic for all.
35. The Representative of Saudi Arabia agreed with the Representatives of Spain and
Argentina, and wished to remind that the Organization had technical committees and expert panels which
dealt with safety and security under the aegis of the Secretary General. The Cairo meeting on 6 July
would give the technical experts an opportunity to transmit their assessment to the Council. Proper
preparation for a subsequent Council meeting would entail a review of these findings. As well, following
submission by Qatar of its working paper, the Representative suggested that a two-week interval period
might be required to allow for its assessment and for the preparation of a response by the other States
concerned.
36. The views expressed by the Representative of Saudi Arabia were strongly supported by
the Re presentatives of the United Arab Emirates and of .Egyru.
3 7. In support of the timeline proposed by the Representative of Spain, the Representative of
the United States felt that any delay by the Organization in taking action risked damage to its reputation.
Therefore he called for the extraordinary meeting of the Council to be scheduled as soon as possible
Annex 24
C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM) -12-
following the Cairo technical meeting. Outside observers would not be interested in the internal
procedures of the Organization, but would want only to know what ICAO did to ensure the safety of
passengers from all countries flying through the region. He hoped that the Council's role as the only
resident Council of any United Nations technical agency and ICAO's unique structure and format would
be called into play to address this situation proactively and as soon as practicable.
38. In response to the preceding intervention, the Re presentative of Saudi Arabia emphasized
from a legal point of view, the right of all States concerned to have sufficient time to rebut the position
that Qatar might submit in its documentation.
39. Expressing support for the comments made by the Representative of the United States
and in support of the view that in accordance with the Chicago Convention, it was the right of a Member
State not represented on the Council to be given the opportunity to be heard, the Re presentative of Turke y
reminded that the matter was not open ended, and that it was important to address the issue within a
reasonable timeframe. All States concerned should be given the opportunity to present their cases to the
Council, after which the technical process could continue.
40. The President of the Council took the opportunity to remin._d all present that the Council's
consideration of the item should not be seen to discuss nor escalate any political differences and called on
all Council Members to focus on technical matters but in so doing to also ensure that opportunities he
given to all interested parties to be heard. Of the interested States, two, Qatar and Bahrain, did not enjoy
representation on the Council, and both States should be given the opportunity of a hearing. Summarizing
the discussion thus far, the President said that, first, there was clear support for the need for credible
information. He suggested that credible information was the essence of the upcoming informal briefing
wherein the Secretariat would explain the current situation. Second, it was agreed that the technical
coordination meeting in Cairo should be continued and the participation of Headquarters in that process
was welcomed. Third was the need to ensure that the Council formally consider this item as soon as
possible following the Cairo technical meeting and that the Council meeting should be properly but
expeditiously prepared.
41. It had been noted that the process regarding Article 54 n) was different from that for
Article 84, and that those two processes should not be confused. The State of Qatar had submitted three
requests, one with respect to Article 54 n), and two with respect with Article 84, and the Secretariat was
in the process of clarifying the three requests . Therefore the President advised that what still needed to be
done was for the Council to set a date for its consideration of this subject. A proposal had been brought
forth that the meeting of the Council should be held during the month of July. Rule 19 a) of the Rules of
Procedure for the Council stated that "between two consecutive sessions of the Council, the President, on
his own initiative or at the request of a Contracting State, after consulting the Members of the Council and
with the approval of the majority of the Members of the Council, shall call an extraordinary session or
change the date which the Council has set for the opening of the next session. No such action shall result
in a Council Meeting being held on less than seven days' notice." The President advised that the
extraordinary meeting would take place in July falling between the 211th and 212th Sessions. He advised
that he would consult with the Secretariat on the exact date of the Council extraordinary meeting
following the informal briefing set for 30 June. All States would be kept informed and would be given the
opportunity to prepare working papers with clear action items for the Council. States of special interest in
particular would have the opportunity to prepare their own working papers, with action items by the
Council. The President then requested that the Council decide at the current meeting to ask the Secretariat
to work expeditiously on all the operational and contingency arrangements to ensure the safety and
efficiency of international civil aviation and in that regard to undertake necessary consultations with all
States concerned.
Annex 24
-13- C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM)
42. The summary by the President of the Council was supported by the Representatives of
Congo. Ecuador, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and United Re public of Tanzania, without additional
comment.
43. The Representative of Turkey agreed with the summary outlined by the President of the
Council and on the need for expeditious action for the sake of ICAO's reputation and with regard to
public opinion. He stressed the need to uphold the Chicago Convention and the role of Article 54 n).
44. Thanking the President of the Council for his summary, the Re presentative of Spain
highlighted that it was important for the Middle East Regional Office and the ANB to progress in their
endeavours and to make the necessary arrangements for a contingency plan for the region. It should be
emphasized that this Secretariat action should not wait for the extraordinary meeting of the Council,
which should be held as soon as possible.
45. Responding to a query from the Representative of France for clarification on the status of
consultations, and a desire that, if they had not already commenced, such consultations begin immediately,
the President of the Council advised that consultation with the Secretariat had been ongoing with regard
to the request from Qatar, but subsequent to the current meeting, it was necessary to continue to review
the situation. He reiterated that the extraordinary Council meeting would take place in July, and States
would be informed accordingly.
46. The Representative of the United States voiced his appreciation for the President's
summary and wished to ensure that the proposal from the Representative of Spain to have the
extraordinary Council meeting follow immediately from the Cairo technical meeting had been noted as it
comported closely with the sense of urgency expressed by many speakers.
47. The Representative of Egypt supported the summary presented by the President and
reiterated the earlier request from the Representative of Saudi Arabia regarding the need to allow ample
time after the dissemination of the working paper from the State of Qatar in order that other delegations
might have sufficient time to prepare their comments and submit their own documentation.
48. The proposed summary from the President was supported by the Representative of the
United Arab Emirates, who also supported the preceding intervention from the Representative of Egypt.
49. The Representative of Colombia supported the summary and stated that the position of
the Council was above and beyond State disputes. In the midst of turmoil, the Council Representatives
had the obligation, because they were elected by all Member States, to ensure the stability of air transport.
Thus he appealed to all parties to set aside any differences in so far as possible and to take the fairest
possible decision as expeditiously as possible for the good of international civil aviation.
50. The Representative of Ni geria supported the President's summary and echoed the
sentiments of the Representative of Colombia that, despite any political differences, ICAO was a
technical body and the Organization needed to work for the interests of air transportation.
51. Following a query from the Re presentative of the United Kin gdom on the application of
the Rules of Procedures for the Council as regarded the extraordinary Council meeting to be held under
Article 54 n), the President of the Council confirmed that the said Rules would apply including the
requirement that all Council members receive all the working papers at least five days before the meeting.
52. Following consideration, the Council requested that an infonnal briefing on technical '
issues arising should be provided by the Secretariat and the date set for this informal briefing would be \
Annex 24
C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM) -14-
Friday, 30 June 2017 at 1500 hours. It was understood that further information regarding this informal
briefing would be circulated in due course.
53. In addition, the Council agreed that in accordance with Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure
for the Council, an extraordinary session of the Council would be scheduled as soon as practicable
following the technical meeting that would talce place in the Regional Office in Cairo on 6 July 2017, on
the understanding that the extraordinary session would occur before the end of the month of July 2017,
taking into account the need to ensure that representatives from all the parties could attend as well as the
need to prepare and circulate documentation that would form the basis for deliberations by the Council at
the said extraordinary session.
54. In advance of the extraordinary session of the Council, the Secretariat was requested to
continue to work cooperatively, diligently and expeditiously with all the parties involved in this matter.
55. Finally, the Council em hasized that in its deliberations on this item at subsequent l sessions, it would be necessary to clearly differentiate between any actions that it as a governing body
might consider taking in relation to Article 54 n) and any actions that it might consider taking in relation
to Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
56. The meeting reconvened in open session at 1430 hours to consider the remaining items
on its order of business.
Annex 24
-15-
ATTACHMENT
DECISION OF THE ICAO COUNCIL
ON THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM)
IN THE MATTER: BRAZIL AND UNITED STATES (2016)
THE COUNCIL,
ACTING under Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the Rules for the
Settlement of Differences;
COMPOSED of the following Representatives entitled to vote: Mr . A.D. Mesroua (Algeria),
Mr. G.E. Ainchil (Argentina), Mr. S. Lucas (Australia), Mr. C. Monteiro, (Cabo Verde), Mr. M. Page
(Canada), Mr. Shengjun Yang (China), Mr. A. Munoz Gomez (Colombia), Mr. R.M. Ondzotto (Congo),
Mrs. M. Crespo Frasquieri (Cuba), Mr. I. Arellano (Ecuador), Mr. A. Khedr (Egypt), Mr. P. Bertoux
(France), Mr. U. Schwierczinski (Germany), Mr. A. Shekhar (fudia), Mrs. A. Smith Floch (Ireland),
Mr. M.R. Rusconi (Italy), Mr. S. Matsui (Japan), Ms. M.B. Awori (Kenya), Mr. Y.-H. Lim (Malaysia),
Mr. D. Mendez Mayora (Mexico), Mr. M.S. Nuhu (Nigeria), Mr. G.S. Oller (Panama), Mr. J. Hur
(Republic of Korea), Mr. A.A. Novgorodov (Russian Federation), Mr. S.A.R. Hashem (Saudi Arabia),
Mr. T.C. Ng (Singapore), Mr. M.D.T. Peege (South Africa), Mr. V.M. Aguado (Spain), Ms. H. Jansson
Saxe (Sweden), Mr . A.R. <;olak (Turkey), Miss A. Alhameli (United Arab Emirates), Mr. M. Rodmell
(United Kingdom), Mr. R.W. Bokango (United Republic ofTanzania), Mr. M. Vidal (Uruguay).
THE PARTIES being: Brazil (Applicant), represented by Mr. Olyntho Vieira, Authorized Agent,
assisted by Mrs. Mitzi Gurgel Valente da Costa, Mr. Norberto Moretti, Ms. Andrezza Brandao Barbosa,
Mr. Lucio Alves Angelo Junior, Mr. Nil Castro da Silva, Mr. Luis Henrique Sacchi Guadagnin,
Mr. Guilherme do Prado Lima, Mr. Roberto da Rosa Costa, Mr. Dario Alexandre Tavares Taufuer, and
Mr. Rodrigo Henriques Godinho on the one hand; and the United States (Respondent), represented by
Ms. Katherine McManus, Authorized Agent, assisted by Mr. Samuel Kotis, Ms. Wynne Teel,
Ms. Danielle Polebaum, Mr. David Sullivan, Mr. Amen Iyi-Eweka, Mr. Carl Burleson, Mr. John Duncan,
Mr. Jeffrey Klang, and Ms. Lorrie Fussell on the other hand;
CONSIDERING that an Application and Memorial by Brazil under Article 84 of the Convention
on International Civil Aviation was filed on 2 December 2016; that a Statement of preliminary objection
of the United States was filed on 27 March 2017; and that Comments to the Statement of preliminary
objection were filed by Brazil on 19 May 2017;
HAVING HEARD the Parties in the above matter on the preliminary objection and having held its
deliberations at the ninth meeting of its 211 th Session on 21 June 20 I 7;
HAVING CONSIDERED the preliminary objection of the Respondent, namely that the Council
should dismiss the proceeding as time-barred under the generally accepted international law principle of
extinctive prescription;
CONSIDERING that the question before the Council was whether to accept the preliminary
objection of the Respondent;
DECIDES as follows:
I. The preliminary objection of the Respondent is not accepted.
Annex 24
C-MIN 211/10 (Closed-AM) - 16-
2. The statements and arguments made in the preliminary objection of the Respondent and in the
comments of the Applicant not possessing, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary
character, may be joined to the merits of the case and included in the counter-memorial and any additional
pleadings.
3. The time-limit for the Respondent to submit its counter-memorial is set at two weeks from the
date of receipt by the Respondent of the minutes of the ninth meeting of the 211 th Session of the Council,
which will include a record of the oral proceedings on the preliminary objection.
4. The Parties having accepted an invitation to continue to seek a settlement of the matter in
dispute, it is desirable for such negotiations to continue.
5. The President of the Council is invited to be available to provide his good offices as Conciliator
during such negotiations.
6. No time-limit is set for the completion of negotiations, although the Council will be informed of
the progress of the negotiations at its 212th Session.
Decision number 1, on the question whether to accept the preliminary objection of the Respondent, was
taken by a secret ballot with 4 Members voting in favor, a majority of 19 Members voting against, and
11 Members abstaining. Decisions numbers 2 to 6 were taken unanimously without a vote.
Rendered on 23 June 201 7 in Montreal.
Annex 25
ICAO Council, 211th Session, Tenth Meeting, Summary of Decision, ICAO Doc. C-DEC 211/10
(23 June 2017)

COUNCIL—211TH SESSION
TENTH MEETING
(THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, FRIDAY, 23 JUNE 2017, AT 1000 HOURS)
SUMMARY OF DECISIONS
OPEN MEETING
Condolences
1. The Council observed a minute of silence and expressed its condolences at the recent
passing away on 17 June 2017 of the President of Vanuatu, Father Baldwin Lonsdale Womtelo.
CLOSED MEETING
Settlement of Differences: Brazil and United States – preliminary objection stage
(Subject Nos. 16 & 26)
2. The Council resumed consideration of this item, which had been first discussed at the
Ninth Meeting of the current session on Wednesday, 21 June 2017. In doing so, it was recalled that at the
previous meeting, the President had indicated his intention to prepare and circulate the draft text of the
Council’s decision on the preliminary objection in the matter: Brazil and United States, so that it could be
considered and approved at this the Tenth Meeting of the 211th Session (C-DEC 211/9 refers). In this
connection, it was noted that the draft text of the decision had been circulated (in all languages) to Council
Representatives on the afternoon of Thursday, 22 June 2017.
3. Following consideration, the Council adopted the decision, which is reproduced in the
Attachment to this C-DEC.
OPEN MEETING
Proposal for an ICAO Crisis Response Policy and Disaster Risk Reduction (Subject No. 45)
4. The Council resumed consideration of this item (C211/6) on the basis of C-WP/14612,
which pursuant to Assembly Resolution A39-24, Operative Clause 3, proposed an ICAO Crisis Response
Policy as well as a Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy. The Council also had for consideration an oral report
thereon from the Implementation, Strategy and Planning Group (ISPG).
5. It was recalled that in the earlier consideration of this item during the sixth meeting of the
current session, the Council had requested (C-DEC 211/6 refers) the ISPG to review the draft Crisis
Response Policy taking into account the various issues raised in the Council’s preliminary consideration,
and present a revised policy for further review by the Council at this meeting of the session. The Secretariat
was also requested to provide information to the Council regarding the organizational procedures to
implement the policy. In addition, Representatives were invited to submit any proposals they might have to
enhance the draft policy.
C-DEC 211/10
27/06/17
Annex 25
C-DEC 211/10 - 2 -
6. It was noted that the ISPG had met on 15 June 2017 to review the proposed policy and had
in principle expressed its support for the draft Crisis Response Policy. It was further noted that the ISPG had
concluded that there was insufficient time to undertake an in-depth analysis and present a revised version of
the policy to the Council before the end of the current session. In particular, the ISPG had indicated that
additional time would be required to:
a) gain an understanding of the United Nations Crisis Response Framework and how
ICAO would operate within and complement this existing structure;
b) exercise due diligence to review the policy and ensure that it is consistent with the
remit of the Organization and the available resources of the Secretariat in order to
implement the policy; and
c) clarify the overall ‘concept of operations’ envisaged for the implementation of the
policy.
7. Taking into account the conclusions reached by the ISPG, as indicated in the preceding
paragraph, the Council decided that:
a) the Secretariat should organize an informal briefing for the Council early in the 212th
Session to provide an overview of the United Nations Crisis Response Framework,
lessons learned by ICAO in responding to previous crises, overview of the proposal,
resources available to support implementation, and review of the coherence of this
proposal within the remit of the Organization;
b) following the informal briefing, the ISPG should finalize its in-depth analysis of the
proposed Crisis Response Policy and Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy, so that a
revised policy could be presented to the Council for consideration during the 212th
Session; and
c) a working paper on the proposal together with an oral report by the ISPG, should be
presented during the 212th Session.
8. The Council also took the opportunity to note the importance of appropriate discussion of
policy proposals such as this taking place in the Committees of the Council as well as relevant working
groups before they were presented to the Council. It was emphasized that this would help to facilitate more
efficient deliberations by the Council by ensuring that all such proposals were clearly understood and
thoroughly discussed in advance.
Update on work on a Global Market-Based Measure (GMBM) scheme (Subject No. 50)
9. The Council considered this item on the basis of C-WP/14620, which as part of the
capacity-building and assistance activities for the implementation of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction
Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), reported on the regional seminars that were held in five
venues throughout March and April 2017, followed by a global seminar held at ICAO Headquarters in May
2017. The document also updated on the status of the work being undertaken by the Committee on Aviation
Environmental Protection (CAEP) on the development of CORSIA-related SARPs and guidance and also
presented the proposed procedures of work for the Interim Programme Assessment Group (IPAG), which
was established by the CAEP in February 2016, with the aim of recommending to the Council programmes
(and potentially project types) whose emissions units would be eligible for early action by aircraft
operators.
Annex 25
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10. In its consideration of this item, the Council also had the benefit of an oral report by the
Advisory Group on CORSIA (AGC), which indicated that in its recent meetings held in June 2017,
discussions had focused on the results of CORSIA seminars and possible means to provide further
capacity-building and assistance, progress in the development of CORSIA-related draft SARPs and
guidance, early action and the CAEP Interim Programme Assessment Group (IPAG).
11. The Council noted that the AGC had highlighted in particular, the importance of keeping
track of the readiness of States for the implementation of CORSIA so that the Secretariat could effectively
plan and provide necessary support to States. In this regard, note was taken of concerns that had been
expressed about the lack of clarity on the availability of resources for capacity-building. In addition, the
Council took note of the suggestion that as more information became available for CORSIA-related
requirements, necessary actions for States and operators should be well-communicated and for progress to
be monitored, in cooperation with Regional Offices.
12. In taking into account the recommendations presented by the AGC in its oral report, the
Council:
a) requested the Secretariat to continue to provide capacity-building and assistance for the implementation
of CORSIA, as identified in paragraph 1.6 of C-WP/14620 and taking into account the views
articulated by the AGC as noted in the preceding paragraph above;
b) recognized the progress being made by CAEP in the development of CORSIA-related draft SARPs and
guidance, while requesting CAEP to keep the Council and the AGC informed of further progress, and
in this connection agreed that any references in SARPs to emissions units criteria should reiterate that
the Council was the responsible entity for taking such decisions;
c) agreed that further consideration should be given to the specific location of emissions units criteria in a
structured package of the CORSIA-related draft SARPs and guidance;
d) noted that while CAEP had undertaken work on early action, this task was not requested by Assembly
Resolution A39-3, so that the Council did not consider this work on early action to be a priority at this
stage and requested that priority should instead be given to the work on eligible emissions units for
CORSIA, as stipulated by Assembly Resolution A39-3, operative clauses 20 c) and d), and in addition,
requested CAEP to deliver emissions units criteria for consideration by the Council at the 212th Session;
and
e) requested CAEP, subject to the decision to be taken by the Council during the 212th Session, to further
progress work on the application of the emissions units criteria, including the informal testing of some
programmes against the criteria, with a view to providing technical input to the Council, when
requested, on the establishment of a Technical Advisory Body (TAB) and its process of work to
evaluate programmes with resultant recommendations to the Council on the eligible emissions units for
use by CORSIA in accordance with Assembly Resolution A39-3, operative clause 20 d).
13. In addition, the Council noted the importance of ensuring that CAEP also prioritizes its
work on the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system under CORSIA in order to assist
Member States in their implementation efforts in this regard.
Progress report on the ICAO web library of risk-based information (Subject No. 14)
14. The Council resumed consideration of this item (C211/5) on the basis of information paper
C-WP/14611, which reported on the implementation and progress of the modification of the ICAO Conflict
Zone Information Repository (CZIR) into a library of links to States’ websites with aeronautical
information related to risks to civil operations over or near conflict zones through a designated State focal
Annex 25
C-DEC 211/10 - 4 -
point. In doing so, it was recalled that during the fifth meeting of the 210th Session, the Council had on a
provisional basis approved this modification of the CZIR into a library of links to States’ websites where
such risk-based information would be made available.
15. While noting concerns expressed by some Representatives in relation to the perceived
intelligibility of the content of State letter SMM 1/4-17/51 that had been issued on 5 May 2017, in order to
inform States about the discontinuation of the CZIR and the establishment of the web-based library of links
relating to risk-based information, the Council nonetheless agreed that in order to avoid potential confusion,
a subsequent State letter on the same matter should not be issued. However, the Council requested the
Secretariat to liaise with Member States to ensure that there was coherence and a clear understanding on the
part of their designated focal parts as to the purpose of the web-based library of links and the importance of
ensuring that the information being provided thereon via the links should relate to risks to civil operations
over or near conflict zones. It was requested that the Secretariat provide an update on progress in this regard
at the 212th Session.
CLOSED MEETING
Item under Article 54 n) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(Subject No. 27)
16. Prior to commencing consideration of this item, the Council decided that despite this
matter being considered in closed session, the representatives of the European Union, International Air
Transport Association (IATA), and Airports Council International (ACI), should be permitted to attend and
observe the proceedings.
17. The President informed the Council that further to his e-mail message dated 19 June 2017,
in which he informed Representatives regarding correspondence that had been received from Qatar
requesting, under Article 54 n) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the inclusion of an item in
the work programme of the Council for the current 211th session, a significant number of Representatives
had indicated their agreement to this request while others had noted the option of considering the item at an
extraordinary session of the Council to be convened in accordance with Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure
for the Council.
18. The Secretary General then provided some preliminary background information on the
matter. It was explained that Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention stipulated that it was a mandatory
function of the Council “to consider any matter relating to the Convention which any contracting State
refers to it”. Such consideration under Article 54 n) is not part of the process for the settlement of disputes
provided for separately in Article 84. This meant that the consideration of a matter under Article 54 n) was
fully governed by the Rules of Procedure for the Council and not by the Rules for the Settlement of
Differences.
19. It was also elaborated that in the correspondence received from Qatar, the request for the
intervention of the Council pursuant to Article 54 n) related to “the matter of the actions of the Arab
Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to
close their airspace to aircraft registered in the State of Qatar”.
20. The Secretary General indicated that separately, in a letter dated 13 June 2017, Qatar had
stated that two formal applications along with supporting materials, would be lodged, one pursuant to
Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and the other pursuant to the International Air Services Transit
Agreement. Subsequently, two applications and memorials were delivered on 15 June 2017, which in
accordance with Article 3 (1) (a) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences, were examined by the
Secretariat to confirm whether they complied in form with the requirements of Article 2 of the said Rules.
Following this process, certain deficiencies were identified in both applications and in a letter dated 21 June
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2017, the Secretary General requested the Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority of Qatar to provide the
necessary information so as to rectify these deficiencies.
21. The Council noted that:
a) during the week of 5 June 2017 and subsequently, after coordination by the ICAO
Regional Office in Cairo with the States concerned, a number of NOTAMs
promulgating restrictions were modified, clarifying that restrictions against Qatari
registered aircraft were over their sovereign airspace – meaning over the territory of
the State within the Flight Information Regions (FIRs) concerned;
b) in the period since 12 June 2017, three contingency routes had been promulgated by
Bahrain, Islamic Republic of Iran, and Oman, to add to some existing ATS routes over
the Persian Gulf already being utilized for arrival and departures to/from Qatar;
c) an additional contingency route, an extension of an existing ATS route via the
Emirates FIR had been turned down for operational reasons while the ICAO Regional
Office in Cairo continued to press for more effective contingency routes and
arrangements to facilitate the traffic flow in and out of Qatar for Qatari registered
aircraft; and
d) on 15 June 2017, a technical delegation from Qatar visited ICAO Headquarters in
Montreal, as had a high-level delegation from Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates, while the Directors-General of Civil Aviation (DGCAs) of the
latter four States had agreed to hold a special technical meeting with ICAO in the
Regional Office in Cairo on 6 July 2017, which would also be attended by the Chief,
Airspace Management and Optimization Section (C/AMO) from the Air Navigation
Bureau.
22. Following consideration, the Council requested that an informal briefing on technical
issues arising should be provided by the Secretariat and the date set for this informal briefing would be
Friday, 30 June 2017 at 1500 hours. It was understood that further information regarding this informal
briefing would be circulated in due course.
23. In addition, the Council agreed that in accordance with Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure
for the Council, an extraordinary session of the Council would be scheduled as soon as practicable
following the technical meeting that would take place in the Regional Office in Cairo on 6 July 2017 (cf.
sub-paragraph d) above), on the understanding that the extraordinary session would occur before the end of
the month of July 2017, taking into account the need to ensure that representatives from all the parties could
attend as well as the need to prepare and circulate documentation that would form the basis for deliberations
by the Council at the said extraordinary session.
24. In advance of the extraordinary session of the Council, the Secretariat was requested to
continue to work cooperatively, diligently and expeditiously with all the parties involved in this matter.
25. Finally, the Council emphasized that in its deliberations on this item at subsequent sessions,
it would be necessary to clearly differentiate between any actions that it as a governing body might consider
taking in relation to Article 54 n) and any actions that it might consider taking in relation to Article 84 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation.
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C-DEC 211/10 - 6 -
OPEN MEETING
Elections by the Council (Subject Nos. 5, 6.3 and 46)
26. The Council considered this item on the basis of C-WP/14605, which related to the election
of the three Vice-Presidents of the Council, the Members and Alternates of the Air Transport, Joint Support,
Finance, Unlawful Interference, Technical Cooperation, and Human Resources Committees (ATC, JSC,
FIC, UIC, TCC and HRC) and the Chairpersons of these Committees; the composition of the Committee on
Relations with the Host Country (RHCC); the appointment of whose members the Council had delegated to
the President; and the election of its Chairperson; and the election of Members of the Edward Warner
(EWA) Committee.
27. The Council agreed to suspend paragraph 3 of Appendix B and that part of paragraph 2 of
Appendix E of the Rules of Procedure for the Council related to the elections taking place by secret ballot
unless waived by unanimous decision of the Members represented at the meeting. The Council also agreed
to suspend that part of Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure for the Council, which provides that the term of
office of a Vice-President shall commence from the date of election.
28. On the nomination of the Representative of Mexico, seconded by the Representative of
Kenya, the Council elected the following Representatives as its Vice-Presidents for the period 2017-2018,
with effect from the date of the extraordinary session of the Council (cf. paragraph 23 above), pursuant to
Appendix B of its Rules of Procedure:
Mr. Tee Chiou Ng (Singapore) as First Vice-President
Mr. Musa Shuaibu Nuhu (Nigeria) as Second Vice-President
Mr. Germinal Sarasqueta Oller (Panama) as Third Vice-President
29. In electing the three incoming Vice-Presidents, the Council expressed its appreciation by
acclamation to the three out-going Vice-Presidents: Ms. Aysha Alhameli (United Arab Emirates), Ms.
Helene Jansson Saxe (Sweden), and Mr. Alberto Muňoz Gómez (Colombia).
30. Pursuant to Appendix E of the Rules of Procedure for the Council, as well as the Special
Provisions of the Rules of Procedure for Standing Committees of the Council, the Council then elected the
Members and Alternates of the JSC, FIC, UIC, TCC, and HRC, appearing in Appendix B of C-WP/14605,
for the period 2017-2018, with effect from the date of the extraordinary session of the Council (cf.
paragraph 23 above).
31. The Council noted the proposed composition of the Relations with the Host Country
Committee (RHCC) for the period 2017-2018, as presented in Appendix B of C-WP/14605. In addition, the
Council noted the proposed composition of the Edward Warner Award Committee, as presented in
Appendix D of C-WP/14605.
32. On the nomination of the Representative of the United Arab Emirates, seconded by the
Representative of the Russian Federation, the Council elected the following Representatives as the
respective Chairpersons of its subsidiary bodies, for the period 2017-2018 with effect from the date of the
extraordinary session of the Council (cf. paragraph 23 above):
Mr. Saud A. R. Hashem (Saudi Arabia) as Chairperson of the ATC
Mr. Victor Aguado (Spain) as Chairperson of the JSC
Mrs. Mitzi Gurgel Valente da Costa (Brazil) as Chairperson of the FIC
Mr. Philippe Bertoux (France) as Chairperson of the UIC
Mr. Raphael Bokango (United Republic of Tanzania) as Chairperson of the TCC
Annex 25
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Mr. Iván Fernando Arellano Lascano (Ecuador) as Chairperson of the HRC
Mr. Marco Riccardo Rusconi (Italy) as Chairperson of the RHCC
33. In electing the incoming Chairpersons of the Committees, the Council expressed its
appreciation by acclamation to all the out-going Chairpersons of the Committees.
34. It was noted that the President, under authority delegated to him by the Council, was
consulting with Representatives regarding the composition of the Working Group on Governance and
Efficiency (WGGE), Implementation, Strategy and Planning Group (ISPG), and the Advisory Group on
CORSIA (AGC), and would provide the Council with updated information in this regard in due course.
35. In relation to the Air Transport Committee (ATC), in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure for Standing Committees of the Council, it was recalled that the members of the ATC had been
appointed by the Council on 17 October 2016 (C-DEC 209/1 refers) and would serve until the end of the
term of the current Council, insofar as the States that are represented continue to be Members of the Council
until the Council elects the new Committee.
CLOSED MEETING
Work Programme of the Council and its Committees for the 212th Session (Subject No. 13)
36. The Council considered this item on the basis of C-WP/14624, which presented the work
programme for the 212th Session of the Council and its Committees. The Council also had for
consideration an oral report thereon from the Working Group on Governance and Efficiency (WGGE).
37. The Council noted that the WGGE had recommended that no changes were necessary to
the work programme contained in C-WP/14624, and accordingly, the Council approved the work
programme of the Council and of its Committees for the 212th Session. It was understood that decisions
taken in the course of the current (211th) Session that affect the work programme for the 212th Session in
terms of additional items, amendments to titles of items, or deferral of items, and which were not currently
reflected in the work programme, would be incorporated in a revised version of C-WP/14624 that would be
issued in due course.
38. In relation to item 4 of Appendix B (Work Programme of the Air Transport Committee),
which related to “Compliance with Standards of Annex 9 – Facilitation”, the Council noted that although
this item was currently listed for consideration by the ATC only, it could, subject to the deliberations of the
ATC, also be presented to the Council for consideration.
39. In relation to Appendix G (Work Programme of the Human Resources Committee), the
Council noted a request by the Secretary General for an additional item concerning the review of a vacancy
notice for the post of D-2 Director, Legal Affairs and External Relations Bureau, and agreed that this be left
to further consultation with the President of the Council. Similarly, suggestions regarding the need to
review the job description and reporting lines for the Director, Legal Affairs and External Relations Bureau
in view of his/her responsibilities as Legal Adviser not only to the Secretariat but to the Council, its
President and the Assembly was further noted for possible further consideration by the HRC and decision
by the Council. Pending these further consultations, the Council approved the Work Programme of the
HRC without any changes.
40. In relation to the proposed informal briefings for the 212th Session, the Council agreed that
these should occur during the Committee phase of the 212th Session, which was scheduled from 18
September to 6 October 2017. It was noted that a range of topics were currently under consideration for this
purpose including: State of the Industry, Council-ANC relationship, and United Nations Crisis Response
Framework.
Annex 25
C-DEC 211/10 - 8 -
OPEN MEETING
Any other business
Ballistic missile launches
41. The Representative of Japan delivered a statement in which the attention of the Council
was drawn to the security threat to international civil aviation that was posed by the recent launching of
ballistic missiles by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The President undertook to provide further
information to the Council on this matter in due course.
United Nations meetings
42. The Secretary General informed the Council that a special meeting of the United Nations
Counter-Terrorism Committee was to be convened in New York on 7 July 2017 to discuss “Terrorist threats
to civil aviation”. She encouraged Representatives on the Council to join their national delegations to the
UN and attend the special meeting. It was noted that the meeting would be open to Representatives of all
Member States of the United Nations.
43. Separately, she also informed that pursuant to the adoption by the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) of Resolution 2309 (“Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts –
aviation security”, adopted on 22 September 2016), it was anticipated that the UNSC would convene to
consider issues arising on countering terrorist threats to civil aviation in September 2017, and that the ICAO
Secretary General would be invited to be present at such a meeting of the Security Council, and if so,
Representatives on the ICAO Council would be advised accordingly.
44. It was agreed that any submissions to be made by ICAO to the UNCTC or UNSC on these
matters should be jointly reviewed by the Secretary General and the President of the Council.
Rules for the Settlement of Differences
45. The Council requested the Secretariat to review the Rules for the Settlement of Differences
(Doc 7782/2), with the aim of determining whether the rules need to be revised and updated taking into
account relevant developments that had occurred since the publication of the document. The Council
further requested that this review should also take into account comparable documentation that is in use for
similar purposes elsewhere in the United Nations system as well as international governmental
organizations, and in particular the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice. In undertaking this
review, the Secretariat was specifically requested to advise on whether it would be necessary for this this
issue to be referred to the Legal Committee for consideration.
Activities during the recess
46. The Council took note of the forthcoming missions to be conducted by the President as
well as the Secretary General during the recess following the conclusion of the current session.
Farewell to Council Representatives and Alternates
47. The Council bade farewell to Dr. N. Luongo (Alternate Representative of Argentina), and
also to Mr. W. Voss (Alternate Representative of the United States).
— ——— — —— —
Annex 25
ATTACHMENT
DECISION OF THE ICAO COUNCIL
ON THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
IN THE MATTER: BRAZIL AND UNITED STATES (2016)
THE Council,
ACTING under Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the Rules for the
Settlement of Differences;
COMPOSED of the following Representatives entitled to vote: Mr. A.D. Mesroua (Algeria),
Mr. G.E. Ainchil (Argentina), Mr. S. Lucas (Australia), Mr. C. Monteiro, (Cabo Verde), Mr. M. Pagé
(Canada), Mr. Shengjun Yang (China), Mr. A. Muñoz Gómez (Colombia), Mr. R.M. Ondzotto (Congo),
Mrs. M. Crespo Frasquieri (Cuba), Mr. I. Arellano (Ecuador), Mr. A. Khedr (Egypt), Mr. P. Bertoux
(France), Mr. U. Schwierczinski (Germany), Mr. A. Shekhar (India), Mrs. A. Smith Floch (Ireland),
Mr. M.R. Rusconi (Italy), Mr. S. Matsui (Japan), Ms. M.B. Awori (Kenya), Mr. Y.-H. Lim (Malaysia),
Mr. D. Méndez Mayora (Mexico), Mr. M.S. Nuhu (Nigeria), Mr. G.S. Oller (Panama), Mr. J. Hur
(Republic of Korea), Mr. A.A. Novgorodov (Russian Federation), Mr. S.A.R. Hashem (Saudi Arabia),
Mr. T.C. Ng (Singapore), Mr. M.D.T. Peege (South Africa), Mr. V.M. Aguado (Spain), Ms. H. Jansson
Saxe (Sweden), Mr. A.R. Çolak (Turkey), Miss A. Alhameli (United Arab Emirates), Mr. M. Rodmell
(United Kingdom), Mr. R.W. Bokango (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. M. Vidal (Uruguay).
THE PARTIES being: Brazil (Applicant), represented by Mr. Olyntho Vieira, Authorized Agent,
assisted by Mrs. Mitzi Gurgel Valente da Costa, Mr. Norberto Moretti, Ms. Andrezza Brandão Barbosa,
Mr. Lucio Alves Angelo Junior, Mr. Nil Castro da Silva, Mr. Luis Henrique Sacchi Guadagnin,
Mr. Guilherme do Prado Lima, Mr. Roberto da Rosa Costa, Mr. Dário Alexandre Tavares Taufner, and
Mr. Rodrigo Henriques Godinho on the one hand; and the United States (Respondent), represented by
Ms. Katherine McManus, Authorized Agent, assisted by Mr. Samuel Kotis, Ms. Wynne Teel,
Ms. Danielle Polebaum, Mr. David Sullivan, Mr. Amen Iyi-Eweka, Mr. Carl Burleson, Mr. John Duncan,
Mr. Jeffrey Klang, and Ms. Lorrie Fussell on the other hand;
CONSIDERING that an Application and Memorial by Brazil under Article 84 of the Convention
on International Civil Aviation was filed on 2 December 2016; that a Statement of preliminary objection
of the United States was filed on 27 March 2017; and that Comments to the Statement of preliminary
objection were filed by Brazil on 19 May 2017;
HAVING HEARD the Parties in the above matter on the preliminary objection and having held its
deliberations at the ninth meeting of its 211th Session on 21 June 2017;
HAVING CONSIDERED the preliminary objection of the Respondent, namely that the Council
should dismiss the proceeding as time-barred under the generally accepted international law principle of
extinctive prescription;
CONSIDERING that the question before the Council was whether to accept the preliminary
objection of the Respondent;
DECIDES as follows:
Annex 25
A-2
1. The preliminary objection of the Respondent is not accepted.
2. The statements and arguments made in the preliminary objection of the Respondent and in the
comments of the Applicant not possessing, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary
character, may be joined to the merits of the case and included in the counter-memorial and any additional
pleadings.
3. The time-limit for the Respondent to submit its counter-memorial is set at two weeks from the
date of receipt by the Respondent of the minutes of the ninth meeting of the 211th Session of the Council,
which will include a record of the oral proceedings on the preliminary objection.
4. The Parties having accepted an invitation to continue to seek a settlement of the matter in
dispute, it is desirable for such negotiations to continue.
5. The President of the Council is invited to be available to provide his good offices as Conciliator
during such negotiations.
6. No time-limit is set for the completion of negotiations, although the Council will be informed of
the progress of the negotiations at its 212th Session.
Decision number 1, on the question whether to accept the preliminary objection of the Respondent, was
taken by a secret ballot with 4 Members voting in favor, a majority of 19 Members voting against, and
11 Members abstaining. Decisions numbers 2 to 6 were taken unanimously without a vote.
Rendered on 23 June 2017 in Montréal.
— END —
Annex 25
Annex 26
ICAO Council, First ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting For Qatar, Summary of
Discussions, ICAO Doc. ACCM/1 (6 July 2017)

- 1 -
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
FIRST ATM CONTINGENCY COORDINATION MEETING FOR QATAR
(ACCM/1)
(Cairo, Egypt, 6 July 2017)
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS
1. PLACE AND DURATION
1.1 The First ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting for Qatar (ACCM/1) was held at the
ICAO MID Regional Office, Cairo, Egypt, on 6 July 2017.
2. OPENING
2.1 The Meeting was opened by Mohamed Khalifa Rahma, ICAO Regional Director, Middle
East Office, Cairo. In his opening remarks, Mr. Rahma welcomed all delegates to Cairo and wished them a
successful meeting. Mr. Rahma highlighted the main objectives of the meeting; and underlined that safety of
civil aviation, which is considered as a continuous challenge, should be given the utmost importance and
priority. He indicated that this meeting was dedicated to the four States who imposed the restrictions on the
Qatar registered aircrafts and that the outcome of this meeting would be communicated to Qatar through an
ICAO mission to Doha on Sunday, 9 July 2017. Mr. Rahma provided an overview about the ICAO Council
Technical Briefing (Montreal, Canada, 30 June 2017), during which it was agreed that further actions would
be agreed upon based on the outcome of the ACCM/1.
2.2 On behalf of ICAO and the Secretariat, Mr. Rahma expressed appreciation on the
commitment and efforts made by the authorities of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE to participate in
the proceedings of the meeting despite the short notice. He also thanked IATA who attended the meeting in
observer status for their support and being a key role player in the contingency situation.
2.3 Mr. Rahma thanked all parties who worked closely with the MID Office for the activation of
the MID Region ATM Contingency Plan and the implementation of contingency measures and routes in a
timely manner.
3. ATTENDANCE
3.1 The meeting was attended by fourteen (14) participants from four (4) States (Bahrain,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE) and one (1) Organization (IATA). The list of participants is at
Attachment A.
4. OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAT
4.1 The meeting was chaired by Mr. Chris Dalton, Chief Airspace Management and
Optimization (AMO) Section at ICAO Headquarters, Montreal, Canada. Mr. Elie El Khoury, ICAO
Regional Officer, Air Traffic Management/Search and Rescue (RO/ATM/SAR) Middle East Office was
Secretary of the meeting, supported by Mr. Mohamed Smaoui, ICAO Deputy Regional Director, (DRD),
MID Office.
Annex 26
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5. LANGUAGE
5.1 Discussions were conducted, and documentation was provided in the English language.
6. DISCUSSIONS
6.1 The meeting adopted the following Agenda:
AI 1. Introduction/background by ICAO
AI 2. States presentations
AI 3. Qatar’s routes proposals over the high seas presented by ICAO
AI 4. Discussions on contingency measures, the way forward, etc.
AI 5. Closing
6.2 The Chairman congratulated the MID Region for its ability to cope rapidly with the
challenges affecting the Air Traffic Management (ATM) operations through the Contingency Coordination
Teams and the implementation of contingency measures in an effective and timely manner. The Chairman
provided an overview of the ICAO provisions related to the operations over the high seas. In this respect,
States were invited to consider the reasonableness of contingency route proposals in the portion over the
high seas within their respective Flight Information Regions (FIRs). The Chairman indicated that the
meeting could have gone in the same way and better if all parties concerned were present. Accordingly, he
recommended that for any potential future meetings all concerned States should be present.
6.3 The meeting noted that ICAO’s main concern is the safety of air transport, which has been
maintained through the effective implementation of contingency routes/measures. In this respect, ICAO
commended the actions undertaken by all concerned States and in particular Iran and Oman for the major
changes introduced to their ATS route structure and the traffic flows in their FIRs.
6.4 Bahrain updated the meeting on the measures implemented to accommodate the Qatar
registered aircraft rerouted away from Bahrain Airspace over the high seas within Bahrain FIR including the
implementation of contingency ATS routes: DOH-ALVEN direct to EGMT in Tehran FIR (from 5 June to
22 June 2017) and T800 starting 22 June 2017. Bahrain highlighted that no military buffer zone had been
established and the military areas T7 and T8 have been used on tactical basis, similar to activities over the
last 30 years. Moreover, no Qatari flight was grounded or had not been provided with ATS over the high
seas. Bahrain emphasized that BCAA has at all times recognised its undertakings under the ICAO
convention and the Airspace users Agreements and has focused its priority on maintaining the highest levels
of safety and the provision of the highest levels of service to all airspace stakeholders. The presentation of
Bahrain is at Appendix A.
6.5 Bahrain underlined that the ATC supervisors at Doha Radar were requesting Bahrain ACC
to vector Bahrain and Emirates registered aircraft flying to/from Bahrain Airport away from Qatar territory
without formal dissemination of aeronautical publication. In any case, the action was generating workload
for Bahrain ATCOs and could jeopardize safety. Accordingly, the meeting agreed that ICAO address the
issue with Qatar during the meeting of 9 July 2017.
6.6 Egypt indicated their willingness to support the efforts contributing to ensure the safe air
transport in the Region.
6.7 Saudi Arabia has emphasized their early active participation in the Contingency
Coordination Team and the implementation of contingency measures and informed the meeting that on the
first day of the crisis, the Letter of Agreement between Jeddah and Muscat Area Control Centres (ACCs)
was amended. FL310 was released to Oman on 5 June 2017 and later FL350 was released to accommodate
extra traffic coming from Qatar.
6.8 Saudi Arabia informed the meeting that the NOTAM issued by the Saudi NOTAM Office
on behalf of Yemen was based on the request by the Chairman of CAMA-Yemen. The NOTAM was related
to Yemen Airspace only. Accordingly, Qatar registered aircraft continued to use the routes over the high
seas within Sana’a FIR.
Annex 26
- 3 -
6.9 In their presentations, UAE highlighted the contingency measures undertaken and, in
particular, the release of FLs 310 and 350 to be used by Iran and Oman in addition to the changes in the
traffic within Emirates FIR to cope with the changes implemented by Iran and Oman. UAE clarified why the
initial route proposal provided by Qatar through L305 was not accepted due the operational requirements,
and based on an ICAO request, alternative solutions had been studied. For more details, UAE presentation is
at Appendix B.
6.10 The meeting discussed in detail the Qatar proposals related to the routes over the high seas
provided to the ICAO MID Office. The meeting concluded to the following:
6.11 Proposal 1-Egypt (for Qatar registered aircraft flights Beirut-Tunis-Beirut through Cairo
FIR): Egypt accepted the proposal in principal providing that FLs 300 and 310 would be allocated for the
route use with 10 minutes longitudinal separation. With a view to minimizing coordination and simplifying
the implementation process, it was agreed that the route should be connected to RASDA (Entry/Exist point
between Cairo and Nicosia FIRs). Accordingly, the normal route network within Nicosia FIR could be used
for the Qatari flights between Beirut and North Africa. It was noted that the route requires also coordination
with Libya and Malta. The revised route is reflected in Chart 1:
CHART 1
6.12 Proposal 2-Bahrain (additional inbound routes through KUVER and one parallel to
MIDSI): Bahrain highlighted the operational challenges in implementing the proposed routes, which, in any
case, may not provide significant efficiencies for Qatari flights, compared to the currently used routes.
Accordingly, the proposed routes were not supported by Bahrain. However, the meeting noted that Bahrain
had already implemented measures and routes over the high seas to facilitate traffic to/from Doha and is
ready to introduce further enhancements to the current contingency routes/measures, as required. The
proposed routes including Bahrain comments are reflected in Chart 2:
Annex 26
- 4 -
CHART 2
6.13 Proposal 3-UAE (inbound route via M430 and outbound route via L305): the meeting
noted the concerns raised by UAE related to the impact on traffic within Emirates FIRs and that the
proposed routes will cross the main traffic flows to/from the busiest Emirati airports. Accordingly, UAE
accepted the route proposals within Emirates FIR with the following ATM measures:
Inbound: from Tehran FIR to Doha through Emirates FIR (over the high seas)
 the proposal is realigned to ensure 12NM distance from the Emirati Islands;
 20NM longitudinal separation is implemented between Tehran ACC and Sheikh Zayed
Centre (SZC); and
 Emirates will release traffic to Doha Radar at FL 220.
Note: It would be beneficial if Doha Radar accept to additionally provide FLs 180 and
200 for inbound traffic to Doha and reduce the longitudinal separation applied with
SZC from 10 to 5NM, and consequently enhance efficiency in managing the traffic and
increase capacity.
Outbound: from Doha through Emirates FIR (over high seas) using L305:
 the proposal has been accepted on condition that Doha Radar release traffic to SZC at
FL 210;
 30NM longitudinal separation should be implemented between Doha Radar and SZC;
and
 Individual coordination for each flight would be required between SZC and Tehran
ACC.
6.14 The meeting agreed that the proposals should be coordinated with Iran and some
modifications maybe required based on Tehran ACC’s operational needs. The meeting noted that UAE is
able to implement the proposals after 48 hours from the date of the final agreement. The revised proposal is
at Chart 3:
Annex 26
- 5 -
CHART 3
6.15 The meeting recognized the need to enhance the current route structure to ensure the safety
and sustainability of air transport in and across the MID Region. In this respect, the meeting agreed that the
implemented contingency routes should be considered during the review of the MID Region ATM
Contingency Plan. The Contingency Routes over the high seas could also be included in the MID Air
Navigation Plan as temporary routes to be activated by ICAO in coordination with the concerned States.
7. CLOSING
7.1 IATA appreciated the measures implemented by all States to accommodate the changes in
the traffic flows in a very short time and thanked them for keeping the lines of communication open with the
airspace users. IATA reaffirmed that the Contingency Coordination Team established for Qatar has
successfully managed to provide a forum for sharing of information and coordination between the concerned
parties.
7.2 The participants thanked ICAO for organizing such an important meeting, and commended
the efforts and instrumental role of the MID Office.
7.3 In closing, the Chairman as well as Mr. Mohamed Khalifa Rahma expressed their
appreciation for the successful deliberations and outcome of the meeting. They complimented the
productivity of the meeting, stressed the benefit of optimal communication between all parties especially at
the technical level to safe air operations, and indicated that the outcome of the meeting will be relayed to the
Secretary General of ICAO and the President of the ICAO Council.
-----------------
Annex 26
Bahrain FIR
Airspace
Restricted
ACCM/1-SoD
Appendix A
Annex 26
Prior to 6 June 2017
Normal Operations
Annex 26
Normal Route
Annex 26
Executive Summary:
• On 5 June 2017 a political decision was made to cut diplomatic ties with Qatar
and the Airspace and territorial waters of the Kingdom of Bahrain was closed for
Qatari Registered aircraft.
• Similar measures were made by KSA, UAE and Egypt
• This is in line with Article 1 of the 1944 Chicago Convention Treaty
• Bahrain has immediately, in coordination with ICAO MID Office established
measures to ensure safe and orderly flow of air traffic in the FIR .
• Bahrain has exercised full responsibility of providing ATS to all Qatari Aircraft on
routes UT430/R659 (RAGAS/MIDSI) and later on UT800 (DASUT) outbound.
• Traffic increased by an average of 375% per day in the sector that controls RAGAS
and MIDSI. Traffic was then more evenly distributed with the addition of DASUT
• All traffic was handled safely and efficiently. During this time all international
traffic maintained normal routes in and out of Qatar .
Annex 26
Qatari Routes
Affected by
NOTAM
East Low
Sector 375%
Annex 26
6 - 11 June 2017
Annex 26
• Due to Increased traffic levels and complexity on available routes
Bahrain provided additional flight levels to Tehran to enable them to
manage the high volume inbound flows.
• In addition to FL200. FL220, FL240 and FL 260 were given to Tehran
• The two units also implemented reduced spacing requirements in
order to improve safety , increase aircraft capacity and minimise any
delays.
• Tehran was permitted to reduce LOA spacing from 20 NM in trail to
10NM in trail for inbound flows.
6-11 June 2017
Implementation Detail:
Annex 26
Normal Route
More FLs given to
TEH 260,240,220 &
200 & we accepted
10 NM instead of
20 NM radar
spacing
East Low
Sector 375%
Annex 26
• Bahrain established airspace enhancement to allow Qatar aircraft to
resume as close to a normal operation as possible.
• On 11 June 2017, only 2 working days since the closure of its Territorial
Airspace, Bahrain FIR had implemented a solution that permitted Qatar
aircraft to resume flights to European/Iraq destinations on modified flight
paths that are very similar to their normal operations.
• The Qatari aircraft flow unrestricted over the High Seas and clear of the
Territorial Airspace of Bahrain.
• This has resulted in reduced track miles for Qatar departures.
• To ensure safety and maximize capacity, FL 300 from UAE & FL 280 from
Kuwait were blocked.
6-11 June 2017
Implementation Detail:
Annex 26
Modified
Airways
Annex 26
After 11 June 2017
Annex 26
BAHRAIN PROPOSAL
Annex 26
Bahrain Proposal for new Routes in/out of Qatar
• Bahrain proposed to ICAO MID Office to establish 2 TEMP AWYs to facilitate Qatar
departures/Arrivals bound for/from Eastern and Southern (including Africa)
destinations.
• Tehran accepted to establish only the departure bound (AWY T/UT800) at this
stage to facilitate Qatar departures. It was implemented on 22 June 2017.
• It has resulted in increased capacity management in terms of throughput for
Qatar traffic within the Bahrain FIR.
• It has resulted in reduced track miles.
• Traffic on this airway departed from Doha on initial climb to FL150, transferred to
Bahrain for further climb to FL230 and then transferred to Tehran.
• In addition to facilitating Qatar traffic to depart unrestricted, Bahrain required
that all traffic from the Ankara FIR enter Bahrain at the normal entry point of
KUVER thereby relieving the congestion over MIDSI which is now accommodating
returning traffic from the Eastern and Southern destinations.
Annex 26
Bahrain Proposal
Annex 26
Current
Operation
3 Departure
Routes
2 Inbound
Routes
Annex 26
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2nd - 4th June 8th-10th June 18th-20th June 28th-30th June
ROTOX 185.4 104.3 167.4 164.1
KUVER 84.7 39.2 93.4 119.6
DASUT 0 0 0 113.3
MIDSI 31.2 268.4 170.9 153
RAGAS 64.8 285.8 186.1 82.9
Axis Title
Daily Average Movements June 2017
Annex 26
Post Implementation:
• Some inconsistencies due to some Qatar ATC are requiring GFA, EK and ETD
aircraft to be vectored clear of the Qatar Peninsular.
• Bahrain has not received any communication to keep aircraft away from
Qatar land mass but some Doha ATCOs are requiring that GFA and ETD
aircraft be vectored to offset north of track on airway UN318.
• This happens on a random basis and can be unsafe due to opposite
direction descending traffic.
• This has been raised officially to ICAO
Annex 26
Assurance:
• At no time has Bahrain established a buffer zone. T7/8 are Bahrain
military training areas that have been in operation for more than 30
years. There was never a military challenge to any civilian aircraft.
• Bahrain closed only its national airspace and territorial water. The
routes over the high seas were always available to all traffic.
• Bahrain has always provided safe and efficient service to all traffic
including Qatar Airways within the FIR.
• Bahrain has implemented extra measures to facilitate the flow of air
traffic and enhance safety. Bahrain is ready to implement further
changes to ensure minimal disruption to all traffic in the FIR as
deemed necessary.
Annex 26
T7/8 Areas
Annex 26
Central Sector
Annex 26
East Sector
Annex 26
North Sector
Annex 26
Closing:
• In summary, Bahrain has facilitated the Qatar traffic to the fullest extent
without compromising safety at any time.
• Bahrain ATMD has been continuously monitoring the situation and
conducts daily operational meetings in order to ensure safety and
operational efficiency. Senior management is always on duty and are
available 24/7 for any concerns from the Operational supervisors.
• All changes have been implemented via the normal change management
process with safety cases being conducted in all cases.
• Bahrain has at all times recognised its undertakings under the ICAO
convention and the Airspace users Agreements and has focused its priority
on maintaining the highest levels of safety and the provision of the highest
levels of service to all airspace stakeholders.
Annex 26
SHUKRAN
Questions?
Annex 26
Doha Airway Proposal
Annex 26
Current Inbound Route Landing
OTxx is segregated from OMAE
Overflying or Landing Traffic.
Proposed Route is not.
Annex 26
Current OTxx Outbound Route
is via RAGAS
Overflying Outbound Route and
OBxx, OEDF, OEDR Departures are
also via RAGAS.
Current Inbound Route via
MIDSI to OTxx, OBxx, OEDF
and OEDR.
Moving the Inbound Route West of
MIDSI – VELAM causes increased
Conflicts with Traffic Descending to
OBxx, OEDR and OEDF.
Annex 26
• Operation is stable now and the traffic are almost distributed equally
over our Sectors and within the sector load capacity.
• The proposed inbound from KUVER to TOTIS will cross all our AWYS
creating more complicity to operation and will achieve nothing from it
as there is not much difference and saving from the current route.
Current Inbound Route Landing OTxx is segregated from OMAE
Overflying or Landing Traffic, the proposed route is not.
------------------
Annex 26
UAE airspace measures on the
state of Qatar
GCAA ANS document
ACCM/1-SoD
Appendix B
Annex 26
Phase 0
Prior 6 June 2017
GCAA ANS document 2
Annex 26
GCAA ANS document
Legend
UAE FIR
Qatar arrivals
Qatar departures
Qatar departures landing in
Northern emirates
Annex 26
Phase 1
06 – 12 June 2017
GCAA ANS document 4
Annex 26
GCAA ANS document 5
Legend
UAE FIR
Qatar arrivals
Qatar departures
Annex 26
Phase 1 – UAE contribution
GCAA ANS document 6
Annex 26
TONVO
FL310; FL350
TARDI
FL310; FL350
LABBI
FL310; FL350
GABKO
FL310;
GCAA ANS document 7
Legend
UAE FIR
Qatar arrivals
Qatar departures
Annex 26
Emirates ACC measures- Phase 1
Emirates ACC measures that have contributed to the safe, efficient and
orderly flow of air traffic in and around the UAE FIR during the situation
with regards to State of Qatar aircraft restrictions:
• Activation of the UAE ATM Contingency plan as per UAE CARs and ICAO
Doc 4444
• Agreeing with ICAO MID to activate the MID Regional Contingency Plan
and the Contingency Coordination Team on the 5 June 2017
• Carried out close coordination with IATA on the 5 June 2017
GCAA ANS document 8
Annex 26
Emirates ACC measures - Phase 1
• Amending the UAE LoA with Muscat ACC twice (6 June & 12 June 2017)
to accommodate the regional contingency measures and routings
• Amending the UAE LoA with Tehran ACC on the 9 June 2017 to
accommodate the regional contingency measures and routings
• Carried out close coordination with ICAO / IATA on the 12 June 2017 to
explain development
• Carried out close coordination with Bahrain, Tehran and Muscat ACCs
GCAA ANS document 9
Annex 26
Phase 2
After 12 June 2017
GCAA ANS document 10
Annex 26
TONVO
FL310; FL350
TARDI
FL310; FL350
LABBI
FL310; FL350
GABKO
FL310;
TUMAK
FL300;
Z350
GCAA ANS document 11
Legend
UAE FIR
Qatar arrivals
Qatar departures
Annex 26
Emirates ACC measures –Phase 2
• Amending the UAE LoA with Bahrain ACC on the 21 June 2017 to
accommodate the regional contingency measures and routings
• UAE welcomes Qatar aircraft to use the UAE FIR over the high seas
(communicated to ICAO MID and Qatar ATS unit), however there is no
ATS route connectivity to allow Qatar traffic to exit the UAE FIR without
entering the UAE territorial water.
GCAA ANS document 12
Annex 26
Qatar contingency route
proposal
GCAA ANS document 13
Annex 26
Qatar contingency route proposal
• On 13 June 2017 proposal to use L305 over the high seas within
Emirates FIR for Qatar registered aircraft routing to Asia and Africa was
received from ICAO MID.
• UAE carried out safety assessment and as a result following was
highlighted
GCAA ANS document 14
Annex 26
GCAA ANS document 15
Legend
UAE FIR
Proposed route
UAE departures
Creates additional 3 conflict points with the westbound traffic towards Bahrain FIR
Annex 26
GCAA ANS document 16
Creates additional 2 conflict points with the eastbound traffic from Bahrain
Legend
UAE FIR
Proposed route
UAE Arrivals
Annex 26
GCAA ANS document 17
Creates additional two conflict points with the eastbound traffic from Tehran FIR
Legend
UAE FIR
Proposed route
UAE Arrivals
Annex 26
GCAA ANS document 18
Conflicts with the busy Northern Emirates arrival main holding pattern from the west
Legend
UAE FIR
Proposed route
DESDI hold
Annex 26
Summary
GCAA ANS document 19
• UAE considers the safety of the international air traffic and the flying
public not only in UAE airspace but worldwide as its highest priority and
should not be jeopardized.
• ICAO found that the current implemented contingency measures to
serve Qatar registered aircraft are found to be safe, fit for purpose and
provides suitable connectivity to the rest of the world.
• All international operators except Qatar registered aircraft may use the
UAE territorial airspace to operate to and from airports within Qatar.
Annex 26
Summary
GCAA ANS document 20
• All UAE airspace and airports are available for Qatar registered aircraft in
case of emergency.
• Airspace over high seas within UAE FIR is available for Qatar registered
aircraft use, subject to ATS route connectivity and successful safety
assessment.
• UAE is evaluating alternative proposals to accommodate Qatar registered
aircraft over high seas to operate safely.
Annex 26
Thank you
GCAA ANS document 21
Annex 26
ACCM/1-SOD
ATTACHMENT A
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
STATES
BAHRAIN
Mr. Hussain Ahmed Al-Shuail
Assistance Undersecretary of Aviation Safety &
Security
Bahrain Civil Aviation Affairs
P.O. Box 586
Bahrain International Airport – Ministry of
Transportation and Telecommunications
KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN
Tel: 973 17 321151
Mobile: +973 399 50005
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Saleem Mohamed Hasan Ali
Director Air Traffic Management
Bahrain Civil Aviation Affairs
P.O. Box 586
Bahrain International Airport – Ministry of
Transportation and Telecommunications
KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN
Fax: +971 17 329966
Tel: +973 17 321116/321105
Mobile: +973 39608860
Email: [email protected]
EGYPT
Mr. Alaa Eldin Mahmoud Orabi
General Director of Air Traffic Planning
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo - EGYPT
Fax: +202 2268 0627
Tel: +202 2267 8889/2265 7990
Mobile: +20100 6666128
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Amr Mokhtar Mohamed Abdallah
Manager, Aviation Safety Department
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Tel: +202 264 38289
Mobile: +2 0100 1888 495
Email: [email protected]
Annex 26
- 2 -
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Ashraf Ibrahim Khalil
Manager, International Agreements – Air Transport
Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA)
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Mobile: +2 0100 1021 989
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Essam Eldin Ahmed Kilany
Head of Aviation Information Sector
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Mobile: +2 0100 0501 948
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Khaled El-Sharkawy
Safety Manager of Cairo A.C.C
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Mobile: +2 0100 1888 304 / 0122 015 0505
Email: [email protected]
Nav. Samer Hussein Emam
General Manager of Airspace Affairs & AIS
Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA)
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Mobile: +2 0100 602 2229
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Tarek ElGhazaly Elsayed Awwad
General Manager, Area Control
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Tel: +202 2267 8883
Mobile: +2 011 4143 4204
Email: [email protected]
SAUDI ARABIA
Mr. Ibrahim B. AlJabri
Director General of ATM
Saudi Air Navigation Services (SANS)
P.O. Box 15441
Jeddah 21444 – KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
Fax: +966 12 640 2855
Tel: +966 12 640 1005
Mobile: +966 539 208 250
Email: [email protected]
Annex 26
- 3 -
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Saleh Awad Al Zahrani
Airspace Management Manager
Saudi Air Navigation Services (SANS)
P.O. Box 15441
Jeddah 21444 - KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
Tel: +966 12 671 7717 Ext 1808
Mobile: +966 55 554 9910
Email: [email protected]
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Mr. Ahmed Al Jallaf
Assistant Director General Air Navigation Services
Office
ANS – Sheikh Zayed Air Navigation Centre
General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA)
P.O. Box 666
Abu Dhabi - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Fax: +971 2 599 6883
Tel: +971 2 599 6888
Mobile: +971 50 659 9242
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Christopher Allan
Senior Airspace Coordinator
Sheikh Zayed Air Navigation Centre
General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA)
P.O. Box 666
Abu Dhabi - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Fax: +971 2 5996 836
Tel: +971 2 5996 838
Mobile: +971 50 6427 023
Email: [email protected]
ORGANIZATIONS
IATA
Mr. George Rhodes
Assistant Director Infrastructure MENA
International Air Transport Association (IATA) MENA
P.O. Box 940587
Amman 11194 - JORDAN
Fax: +962 6 593 9923
Tel: +962 6 580 4256
Mobile: +962 79 944 4252
Email: [email protected]
ICAO
Mr. Chris Dalton
Chief, Airspace Management and Optimization Section
International Civil Aviation Organization
Headquarters
Montreal - CANADA
Email: [email protected]
Annex 26
- 4 -
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Mohamed Khalifa Rahma
Regional Director
Middle East Regional Office
Ministry of Civil Aviation Complex – Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Fax: +2 02 2267 4843
Tel: +2 02 2267 4840 Ext. 4100/1/2
Mobile: +2 010 0047 0650
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Mohamed Smaoui
Deputy Regional Director
Middle East Regional Office
Ministry of Civil Aviation Complex – Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Fax: +2 02 2267 4843
Tel: +2 02 2267 4840 Ext. 4111/2
Mobile: +2 012 2248 8112
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Elie El Khoury
Regional Officer, Air Traffic Management/Search and
Rescue (ATM/SAR)
Middle East Regional Office
Ministry of Civil Aviation Complex – Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Fax: +2 02 2267 4843
Tel: +2 02 2267 4840 Ext. 4120
Mobile: +2 010 2513 3360
Email: [email protected]
- END -
Annex 26
Annex 27
ICAO Council, Third ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting for Qatar, Summary of
Discussions, ICAO Doc. ACCM/3 (5-6 Sept. 2017)

- 1 -
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
THIRD ATM CONTINGENCY COORDINATION MEETING FOR QATAR
(ACCM/3)
(Cairo, Egypt, 5 – 6 September 2017)
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS
1. PLACE AND DURATION
1.1 The Third ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting for Qatar (ACCM/3) was held at
the ICAO MID Regional Office, Cairo, Egypt, from 5 to 6 September 2017.
2. OPENING
2.1 The Meeting was opened by Mr. Mohamed Khalifa Rahma, ICAO Regional Director,
Middle East Office, Cairo. In his opening remarks, Mr. Rahma welcomed all delegates to Cairo and
wished them a successful meeting. Mr. Rahma highlighted the main objectives of the meeting; and
underlined that safety of civil aviation, which is considered as a continuous challenge, should be given
the utmost importance and priority. He extended his appreciation for all the States and IATA for their
commitment and participation in the meeting.
2.2 Mr. Rahma thanked all parties who worked closely with the MID Office for the
successful implementation of contingency measures and routes in a timely manner.
3. ATTENDANCE
3.1 The meeting was attended by twenty three (23) participants from eight (8) States
(Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) and one (1) Organization
(IATA). The list of participants is at Attachment A.
4. OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAT
4.1 The meeting was chaired by Mr. Chris Dalton, Chief Airspace Management and
Optimization (AMO) Section at ICAO Headquarters Montreal, Canada. M r. E lie E l K houry, I CAO
Regional Officer, Air Traffic Management/Search and Rescue (RO/ATM/SAR) Middle East Office
was Secretary of the meeting.
5. LANGUAGE
5.1 Discussions were conducted, and documentation was provided in the English
language.
Annex 27
- 2 -
6. DISCUSSIONS
6.1 The meeting adopted the following Agenda:
AI 1. Adoption of the Provisional Agenda
AI 2. Introduction by (ICAO)
AI 3. Review of Current Situation
AI 4. Next Steps
AI 5. Closing
6.2 The Chairman congratulated the MID Region for the continuous improvements of the
implemented contingency plan. He highlighted that the meeting is an evidence of the high level of
regional commitment related to safe air traffic operations across the MID Region. Mr. Dalton
reiterated that the success of the MID Contingency Coordination Team (CCT) has been recognized by
the aviation community.
6.3 The Secretariat provided an overview related to the developments since the ACCM/1
(Cairo, Egypt, 6 July 2017) and ACCM/2 (Doha, Qatar, 9 July 2017) including the outcome of the
Extraordinary Session of the ICAO Council (Montreal, Canada, 31 July 2017).
6.4 The meeting commended all States concerned for the effective implementation of
contingency routes and ATM measures despite the associated complication and challenges; in
particular Iran and Oman for the major changes introduced to their ATS route structure and the traffic
flows within their FIRs.
6.5 The meeting also thanked Cyprus and Malta for supporting the MID Region through
the implementation of the routes T424 and T565, which have not been yet used by Qatar registered
aircraft. However, Egypt reiterated its commitment to the implementation of T565.
6.6 Taking into consideration the measures undertaken for the implementation of T424
and T565, such as the agreement with Malta ACC to m onitor the segments within Tripoli FIR,
blocking the usage of FL310, etc., the meeting invited Qatar to provide the MID Office with their plan
related to the use of T424 and T565. It was agreed that the routes would be suspended in case they
will not be used in the near future.
6.7 The meeting noted the concerns raised by Iran related to their ability to accommodate
additional traffic or significant changes due to the limitation in the old ATM system, shortage of
ATCOs, hot-spots, complexity, etc.
6.8 Oman underlined that the contingency plan have produced safety risk factors
identified in the safety studies for internal airspace development initatives and projects with adjacent
FIRs. Managing the identified safety risk factors caused adjustments in the plans and lowered the
level of aspirations to benefit from the initatives.
6.9 The meeting noted that a combination of multiple changes, in traffic flows and
increasing levels of traffic in some sectors, raised serious concerns regarding sustainability and the
potential for accepting further changes or additional aircraft.
6.10 The meeting recognized that ICAO’s main concern is the safety of air transport,
which has been maintained through the effective implementation of contingency routes/measures.
6.11 Based on the above, the meeting agreed that future changes would likely be only
limited to gradual improvements and fine tuning to the currently implemented contingency
routes/measures.
Annex 27
- 3 -
6.12 The meeting reviewed and discussed the following proposal presented by Qatar:
Use of T665 for all Qatar registered aircraft flights inbound Doha from the East:
6.12.1 The meeting noted with appreciation that the agreed arrangements regarding the use
of temporary route T665 originally to be used by Qatar registered aircraft inbound to Doha only from
Muscat and Sohar airports in Oman have been expanded to include flights to/from some airports from
Africa, Asia and Slalah airport. This expansion became effective on 23 August 2017 at 00:01 UTC,
and was further enhanced on 30 August. Accordingly, the traffic on Z151 and T665 increased from
seven (7) flights to approximately forty five (45) flights per day.
6.12.2 The meeting agreed that Qatar proposal to increase traffic on T665 should be
addressed gradually. Accordingly, Qatar provided detailed tables prioritizing the flights into three
categories:
Priority 1: 17 flights via ULDUN
Priority 2: 29 flights via MESPO-KHM
Priority 3: 45 flights via ASVIB/DERBO-KHM
6.12.3 The meeting agreed that States concerned should carry out safety assessments and
provide their initial feedback on the above proposal to the ICAO MID Office by 18 September 2017
in order to reach a consensus for implementation by 25 September 2017. It was also agreed to conduct
a safety assessment after one month of Priority 1 implementation to review possibilities of achieving
Priority 2 and Priority 3 via T665.
6.12.4 The meeting noted that, due to the rerouted traffic via ULDUN, the route Z350 will
not be available in order to maintain two (2) traffic flows only in that area between Muscat and
Tehran FIRs.
6.12.5 Iran, Oman and UAE agreed that the applied longitudinal separation would be 20NM
and a study would be carried out for the possibility to add additional flight levels to FLs300, 360 and
400 that have been in use.
6.12.6 Qatar informed the meeting that in order to facilitate the traffic flows, Doha Radar
would accept traffic from Sheikh Zayed Centre (SZC)-UAE below FL240 (till FL160) with 5NM
miles in trail.
Inbound route from KHM to BAYAN
6.12.7 Bahrain highlighted that the route would cross the Points of Transfer of Control
between Bahrain ACC and SZC, which would affect the traffic flows and create additional hot-spots.
Iran also informed the meeting that it would be challenging to add inbound traffic flow to T665 and
MIDSI within that area of Tehran FIR.
Inbound route LVA-BAYAN
6.12.8 The meeting noted that the proposal has been addressed several times and the main
constraint in its implementation was due to the challenge in descending the traffic by Tehran ACC to
FL240 or below, to be accepted by Bahrain ACC. The meeting agreed that if the improvement on
T665 can be accepted by all parties, consideration would be given to the use of LVA-BAYAN or
AFNAN on a case-by-case (ad-hoc) basis.
Annex 27
- 4 -
Outbound route via ASTOG (L305)
6.12.9 The meeting recalled that the proposal has been accepted on 11 July 2017 provided
that Doha Radar release traffic to SZC at FL 270 on ASTOG with 30NM longitudinal in order to meet
Tehran ACC requirements that SZC release traffic to Teheran ACC at FL310 over SIR.
6.12.10 The meeting noted that the proposal was further discussed by Iran and UAE during
the face-to-face meeting held in Abu Dhabi (30-31 July 2017). UAE proposed that the route would be
implemented to be used by few Qatar registered aircraft flights outbound from Doha, excluding
five (5) hours per day for a thirty (30) days trial. However, Iran informed the meeting that the
coordination with the Military is still ongoing for the access to Danger Area 112; a conclusion might
be reached in two weeks’ time. The UAE indicated that this proposal will cause several crossing
points between departures and arrivals, which will associate serious safety concerns. If implemented,
it may associate firm flow restrictions and reduction of the flow on T665 to manage the extra
workload this route will generate.
6.12.11 The meeting, after listening to UAE and Tehran and based on the political, military
and operational complications this route will associate, concluded that this proposal will not be
feasible for implementation.
6.13 The meeting noted that Iran is developing procedures to be implemented in case of
communication failure.
6.14 The meeting noted with concern that the applicable longitudinal separation in a
surveillance environment between Karachi and Tehran ACCs (50 NM) is affecting the efforts to
reduce the longitudinal separation to 10 NM within the MID Region. Accordingly, the meeting
requested ICAO to follow-up with Pakistan the implementation of 20NM longitudinal separation
between Karachi and Tehran ACCs.
6.15 Considering the amount of changes implemented during the contingency situation,
the meeting recognized the need for a regional recovery plan. Accordingly, the meeting encouraged
States to initiate the development of national recovery plan based on a phased implementation
approach and support the development of an ATM Regional Recovery Plan.
7. CLOSING
7.1 IATA appreciated the measures implemented by all States to accommodate the
changes in the traffic flows in a very short time and thanked them for keeping the lines of
communication open with the airspace users. IATA reaffirmed that the Contingency Coordination
Team established for Qatar has successfully managed to provide a forum for sharing of information
and coordination between the concerned parties.
7.2 The participants thanked ICAO for organizing such an important meeting, and
commended the efforts and instrumental role of the MID Office.
7.3 In closing, the Chairman as well as Mr. Mohamed Khalifa Rahma expressed their
appreciation for the successful deliberations and outcome of the meeting. They complimented the
productivity of the meeting, which progressed smoothly and was characterized by the best traditions
of civil aviation collaboration and a willingness to give each proposal a good hearing and debate,
based on technical merit. They indicated that the outcome of the meeting will be relayed to the
Secretary General of ICAO and the President of the ICAO Council.
-----------------
Annex 27
ACCM/3-SOD
ATTACHMENT A
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
STATES
BAHRAIN
Mr. Saleem Mohamed Hasan Ali
Director Air Traffic Management
Bahrain Civil Aviation Affairs
P.O. Box 586
Bahrain International Airport – Ministry of
Transportation and Telecommunications
KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN
Fax: +971 17 329966
Tel: +973 17 321116/321105
Mobile: +973 39608860
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Richard Phillips
Manager ATC Operations
Bahrain Civil Aviation Affairs (BCAA)
Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications
P.O. Box 586
KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN
Fax: +973 17 329 966
Mobile: +973 39 523 061
Email: [email protected]
EGYPT
Capt. Hisham AbdelFattah Ibrahim
Head of Air Navigation Central Department
Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA)
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo - EGYPT
Fax: +202 2268 8232
Tel: +202 2267 7617
Mobile: +2 0100 606 8185
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
Mr. Alaa Eldin Mahmoud Orabi
General Director of Air Traffic Planning
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo - EGYPT
Fax: +202 2268 0627
Tel: +202 2267 8889/2265 7990
Mobile: +20100 6666128
Email: [email protected]
Annex 27
A-2
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Amr Mokhtar Mohamed Abdallah
Manager, Aviation Safety Department
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Tel: +202 264 38289
Mobile: +2 0100 1888 495
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Essam Eldin Ahmed Kilany
Head of Aviation Information Sector
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Mobile: +2 0100 0501 948 / +2 0100 187 3931
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Khaled El-Sharkawy
Safety Manager of Cairo A.C.C
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Mobile: +2 0100 1888 304 / 0122 015 0505
Email: [email protected]
Nav. Samer Hussein Emam
General Manager of Airspace Affairs & AIS
Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA)
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Mobile: +2 0100 602 2229
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Tarek ElGhazaly Elsayed Awwad
General Manager, Area Control
National Air Navigation Services Company (NANSC)
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Cairo International Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Tel: +202 2267 8883
Mobile: +2 011 4143 4204
Email: [email protected]
Annex 27
A-3
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Mr. Behzad Soheil
Deputy Director of ATM in Planning and Monitoring
Iran Airports and Air Navigation Company (IAC)
Mehrabad International Airport
P.O. Box 13445 – 1798
Tehran - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Fax: +98 21 44 54 4102
Tel: +98 21 44 54 4101
Mobile: +98 912 554 4193
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Masoud Nikbakht
General Director of ATM
Iran Airports and Air Navigation Company (IAC)
Mehrabad Int'l Airport
P.O. Box 13445 - 1558
Tehran - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Fax: +98 21 44 54 4101
Tel: +98 21 44 54 4102
Mobile: +98 912 3263905
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
Mr. Meisam Shaker Arani
Assistant Director for Aerodromes & ANS Oversight
Civil Aviation Organization (CAO)
Mehrabad International Airport
P.O. Box 13445 – 1798
Tehran - ISALAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Fax: +98 21 4466 5576
Tel: +98 21 6607 3534
Mobile: +98-912 645 4753
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
Mr. Mohammad Saeid Sharafi
General Director for Aerodrome and ANS Oversight
Civil Aviation Organization (CAO)
Mehrabad International Airport
P.O. Box 13445 – 1798
Tehran - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Tel: +98 21 6607 3534
Mobile: +98 91 9140 5414
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
KUWAIT
Mr. Adel Saoud H. Boresli
Director of Air Navigation
Directorate General of Civil Aviation
Kuwait International Airport
P.O. Box 17
13001 Safat -State of KUWAIT
Tel: +965 24346220
Mobile: +965 99036556
Email: [email protected]
Annex 27
A-4
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Bader Nasser Al Sadrah
Chief of Tower Operation
Directorate General of Civil Aviation
Kuwait International Airport
P.O. Box 17
13001 Safat -State of KUWAIT
Tel: +965 24762994
Mobile: +965 66638785
Email: [email protected]
OMAN
Mr. Mubarak Saleh Al Gheilani
Director Air Traffic Control Services - A/Sr. Director
Quality & Safety
Public Authority for Civil Aviation (PACA)
P.O. Box: 1, SEEB - PC: 111
Muscat - SULTANATE OF OMAN
Tel: +968 2435 4867
Mobile: +968 9507 6157
Email: [email protected]
QATAR
Mr. Ahmed Mohammed Al-Eshaq
Director of Air Navigation Department
Qatar Civil Aviation Authority (QCAA)
P.O. Box 73
Doha – QATAR
Fax: +974 4470 5300
Tel: +974 4470 5555
Mobile: +974 5555 0440
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Dhiraj Ramdoyal
SSP Coordinator
Head of ANS-Inspectorate
National Continuous Monitoring Coordinator (NCMC)
Qatar Civil Aviation Authority (QCAA)
P.O. Box 73
Doha – Qatar
Tel: +974 44656253
Mobile: +974 33932711
Email: [email protected]
SAUDI ARABIA
Mr. Ibrahim B. AlJabri
Director General of ATM
Saudi Air Navigation Services (SANS)
P.O. Box 15441
Jeddah 21444 – KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
Fax: +966 12 640 2855
Tel: +966 12 640 1005
Mobile: +966 539 208 250
Email: [email protected]
Annex 27
A-5
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Saleh Awad Al Zahrani
Airspace Management Manager
Saudi Air Navigation Services (SANS)
P.O. Box 15441
Jeddah 21444 - KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
Tel: +966 12 671 7717 Ext 1808
Mobile: +966 55 554 9910
Email: [email protected]
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Mr. Ahmed Al Jallaf
Assistant Director General Air Navigation Services
Office
General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA)
ANS – Sheikh Zayed Air Navigation Centre
P.O. Box 666
Abu Dhabi - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Fax: +971 2 599 6883
Tel: +971 2 599 6888
Mobile: +971 50 659 9242
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Omar Abdouli
Senior ATC Supervisor Coordinator
General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA)
Sheikh Zayed Air Navigation Centre
P.O. Box 666
Abu Dhabi - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Tel: +971 2 5996 910
Mobile: +971 56 688 2438
Email: [email protected]
ORGANIZATIONS
IATA
Mr. Ken Sewell
Regional Director, Safety and Flight Operations,
Middle East & North Africa
International Air Transport Association (IATA)
P.O. Box 940587
Amman, 11194 – JORDAN
Tel: +962 6 580 4200
Mobile: +962 79 1488811
Email: [email protected]
ICAO
Mr. Chris Dalton
Chief, Airspace Management and Optimization Section
International Civil Aviation Organization
Headquarters
Montreal - CANADA
Email: [email protected]
Annex 27
A-6
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Elie El Khoury
Regional Officer, Air Traffic Management/Search and
Rescue (ATM/SAR)
Middle East Regional Office
Ministry of Civil Aviation Complex – Airport Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Fax: +2 02 2267 4843
Tel: +2 02 2267 4840 Ext. 4120
Mobile: +2 010 2513 3360
Email: [email protected]
- END -
Annex 27
Annex 28
Letter from John V. Augustin to Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General (5 Oct. 2017)

Annex 28
Dr.Fang Liu
Secretary General
ICAO
Dear Dr. Liu,
5 October 2017
I refer to your IOM dated 2 October 2017 offering to extend my
contract of employment beyond the end of February 2018 for an additional six
months, as well as to our earlier discussion on the same subject
I wish to express my deep gratitude for the offer. I have given it very
careful consideration but a review of my goals, priorities and direction in life leads
me to the decision that it would be in my best interest and that of the Organization
to regretfully decline the offer. '
Moreover, the same elements require that I cease my employment
with the Organization as early as possible. Therefore, please treat this letter as the
requisite notice under Staff Regulation 9.2 for resignation effective 31 January 2018.
As you know, I shall be on annual leave from 10 to 20 October 2017.
However, I currently have in addition 64.5 days of accumulated annual leave, and a
few days will be acquired between now and 31 January 2018. Taking the balance of
my annual leave starting 23 October 2017 would take me to the first half of
February 2018. By formally separating on 31 January 2018, ICAO would be owing
me these few days of accumulated leave (Staff Regulation 9.20 refers). In short, with
a separation date of 31 January 2018, I must continue my leave from 23 October
2017 onwards and will not be returning to active duty.
It has been an honour to have served the Organization for over 28
years. My working life has been devoted to international civil aviation, and I remain
forever grateful to have been given that opportunity.
I wish you the very best in your personal life and every professional
success in the future.
Yours sincerely,
Stv.Q:~tin

Annex 29
Letter from President of ICAO Council to Representatives of the Council, ICAO Doc. PRES
OBA/273 (9 Feb. 2018)

PRES OBA/2737 9 February 2018
Ref.: LE 6/7.CONF
To: Representatives on the Council
From: President of the Council
Subject: Settlement of Differences: extension of time-limit to file Counter-memorials with
respect to Application (A) – the State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the
Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
(2017) and Application (B) – the State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt,
the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (2017)
I wish to inform you that pursuant to a request by the Arab Republic of Egypt, on behalf
of the Respondents in the above-captioned matters, the Council has decided on 9 February 2018 to extend
the 12 week time-limit for the filing of Counter-memorials by the Respondents by an additional
six weeks, i.e. until 26 March 2018.
Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu
999 Robert-Bourassa Boulevard
Montréal, Quebec
Canada H3C 5H7
Tel.: 514-954-8219
Fax: 514-954-6077
Email: [email protected]
www.icao.int
International
Civil Aviation
Organization
Organisation
de l’aviation civile
internationale
Organización
de Aviación Civil
Internacional
Международная
организация
гражданской
авиации
Annex 29

Annex 30
Letter from Essa Abdulla Al-Malki, Permanent Representative of Qatar, to Fang Liu, ICAO
Secretary General (12 Mar. 2018)

Annex 30
Ref: ICAO/QTR/2000/2018
H.E. Dr Fang. Liu
Secretary General
International Civil Aviation Organization
999 Robert-Bourassa
Montreal, Quebec
H3CSH7
Your &cellency,
Date:03/12/2018
Please be advised that Mr. John Victor Augustin has been appointed adviser in the
Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to ICAO.
Accept, Madam, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Essa Abdulla AI-Malki
Permanent Representative
700 Rue De La Gauchetlt!re Ouest, suite 2450
Quebec, Montreal, H3B SM2
Tel. : 514-329-9107 Fax. : 514-397-0304 Emall : [email protected]

Annex 31
Letter from Aysha Alhameli, Representative of UAE to ICAO Council to Fang Liu, ICAO
Secretary General, UAE-DEL/L-13-2018 (19 Mar. 2018)

Annex 31
• Umtt'd A.rob £mu au·,
DELEGATION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
ON THE COUNCIL OF !CAO
Ref: UAE-DEL/L-13-2018
Dr. Fang Liu
Secretary General
International Civil Aviation Organization
999 Boulevard Robert-Bourassa
Montreal, QC, H3C SH7
Madam Secretary General,
0~ 1 '½-!j->ll wl).,0:fl Al..9 J..l ~I u.:.s:11
..9l..5..:'::I! ('5..U
OSG
19 MAR20.1 8
19 March 2018
I wish to refer to the item: Settlement of Differences: Application of the State of Qatar to the
Council for Settlement of a Disagreement with the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of
Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - Application (A), and
Application of the State of Qatar to the Council for Settlement of a Disagreement with the
Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates -Application
(B).
On behalf of the Respondent States in the above matter , I wish to transmit attached the
following documents:
l. Preliminary Objections of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain,
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates In Re Application (A)
of the State of Qatar Relating to the Disagreement Arising under the Convention
on International Civil Aviation done at Chicago on 7 December 1944
2. Preliminary Objections of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain,
and the Unit ed Arab Emirates In Re Application (B) of the State of Qatar Relating
to the Disagreement Arising under the International Air Services Transit
Agreement done at Chicago on 7 December 1944
3. Letter of credentia ls of the Authorized Agent of the Arab Republic of Egypt,
dated 8 February 2018 signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab
Republic of Egypt
4. Letter advising the contact detail s of the Authori zed Agent of the Arab Republic
of Egypt, dated 17 March 2018, signed by the Authorized Agent, the Minister of
Civil Aviation of the Arab Republic of Egypt
5. Letter of credentia ls of the Authorized Agent of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
dated 12 February 2018 signed by the Permanent Representative of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the Council of !CAO
999 Boulevard Robert-Bourassa, Suite 14.20, Montrea l, QC, Canada, H3C 5J9 - Tel.: +1 (514) 954 5753, Fax: +1(514) 954 5826
E~mail: [email protected]
Annex 31
Unit Ni Arab [m1r0tM
DELEGATION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
ON THE COUNCIL OF ICAO
o~I ½.rtll wl).,011 "13..u ~I ~I
..9~11..s..u
6. Letter of credentia ls of the Authorized Agent of the United Arab Emirates, dated
6 February 2018 signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates
7. Letter of transmission of Preliminary Objections on behalf of the Arab Republic
of Egypt, dated 17 March 2018 signed by the Authorized Agent of the Arab
Republic of Egypt
8. Letter of transmission of Preliminary Objections on behalf of the Kingdom of
Bahrain, dated 15 March 2018 signed by the Authorized Agent of the Kingdom
of Bahrain
9. Letter of transmission of Preliminary Objections on behalf of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, dated 15 March 2018 signed by the Authorized Agent for the
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
10. Letter of transmission of Prelim inary Objections on behalf of the United Arab
Emirates dated 15 March 2018 signed by the Authorized Agent of the United
Arab Emirates
A Letter of credentials of the Authorized Agent and a Deputy Authorized Agent on behalf of
the Kingdom of Bahrain dated 6 February 2018, signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Kingdom of Bahrain, was already received by your Office on 19 February 2018 and is
therefore not included herein .
I would be gratefu l if an acknowledgement of receipt of the above documents 1. -10. could
be provided, indicating the date of receipt of these documents by your Office.
Please accept the assurances of my highest esteem and consideration.
Aysha Alhameli
Representati of the United Arab Emirates on the Council of ICAO
999 Boulevard Robert-Bourassa, Suite 14.20, Montrea l, QC, Canada, H3C 5)9 - Tel.: +1 (514) 954 S753, Fax:+ 1(514) 954 5826
E~mail: [email protected]
Annex 32
Letter from Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General, to Essa Abdulla Al-Malki, Agent for the State of
Qatar (20 Mar. 2018)

Annex 32
International
Civil Aviation
Organization
Organisation
de !'aviation civile
internationa le
Organizaci6n
de Aviaci6n Civil
Internacional
Me>K,QyHapO,QHaR
opraH11Ja411R
rpa>K,QaHCKOIII
as11a41111
c.,~I I U1o
J .J.lll ~.l.JI
@l ~~ ~ m
/lD~t ffl. t,Q
THE SECRETARY GENERAL
Ref.: LE 6/7.CONF 20 March 2018
Mr. Essa Abdulla Al-Malki
Agent for the State of Qatar
700 rue De La Gauchetiere Quest
Suite 2450
Montreal, Quebec
H3B 5M2
Dear Mr. AI-Malki,
I refer to the matters the State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of
Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (2017) -Application (A) and the
State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates
(2017) - Application (B), which are before the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO).
This is to inform you that I am in receipt of the attached letter dated 19 March 2018,
reference UAE-DEL/L-13-2018, signed by the Representative of the United Arab Emirates on the
Council ofICAO, transmitting, on behalf.of the Respondents in both Application (A) and Application (B),
the following documents:
I. Preliminary Objections of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain,
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates In Re Application (A)
of the State of Qatar Relating to the Disagreement Arising under the Convention
on International ~ivil Aviation done at Chicago on 7 December 1944
2. Preliminary Objections of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain,
and the United Arab Emirates Jn Re Application (B) of the State of Qatar Relating
to the Disagreement Arising under the International Air Services Transit
Agreement done at Chicago on 7 December 1944
3. Letter of credentials of the Authorized Agent of the Arab Republic of Egypt, dated
8 February 2018 signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of
Egypt
4. Letter advising the contact details of the Authorized Agent of the Arab Republic of
Egypt, dated 17 March 2018, signed by the Authorized Agent, the Minister of
Civil Aviation of the Arab Republic of Egypt
999 Robert-Bourassa Boulevard
Montreal, Quebec
Tel.: 514-954-8041
Fax: 514-954-6077
Email: [email protected]
www.icao.int
Canada H3C 5H7
Annex 32
- 2-
5. Letter of credentials of the Authorized Agent of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
dated 12 February 2018 signed by the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia on the Council of ICAO
6. Letter of credentials of the Authorized Agent of the United Arab Emirates, dated
6 February 2018 signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates
7. Letter of transmission of Preliminary Objections on behalf of the Arab Republic of
Egypt, dated 17 March 2018 signed by the Authorized Agent of the Arab Republic
of Egypt
8. Letter of transmission of Preliminary Objections on behalf of the Kingdom of
Bahrain, dated 15 March 2018 signed by the Authorized Agent of the Kingdom of
Bahrain
9. Letter of transmission of Preliminary Objections on behalf of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, dated 15 March 2018 signed by the Authorized Agent for the
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
10. Letter of transmission of Preliminary Objections on behalf of the United Arab
Emirates dated 15 March 2018 signed by the Authorized Agent of the United Arab
Emirates
I am transmitting, attached, copies of the above-mentioned documents (Nos. 1 to 10) as
filed by the Respondents in Application (A) and Application (B).
You may wish to provide comments on the Statements of preliminary objections filed by
the Respondents within a time-limit of six weeks from the date of receipt of this letter, fixed by the
President of the Council under Article 28,ofthe Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2).
Yours sincerely,
Fang Liu
Enclosures
cc: President of the Council
Annex 33
ICAO, Interactive Map, “Cairo FIR”, available at https://gis.icao.int/
icaoviewernew/#/41.3577/23.5481/6 (data updated: 17 Apr. 2018)

Annex 33

Annex 34
ICAO Council, Fourth ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting for Qatar, Summary of
Discussions, ICAO Doc. ACCM/4 (28 April 2018)

Revised
29/05/2018
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
FOURTH ATM CONTINGENCY COORDINATION MEETING
(ACCM/4)
(Amman, Jordan, 28 April 2018)
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS
1. PLACE AND DURATION
1.1 The Fourth ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting (ACCM/4) was held in
Amman, Jordan, on 28 April 2018, preceding the ATM SG/4 and the AIRARD TF/3 meetings that
were all kindly hosted by Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission (CARC) - Jordan.
2. OPENING
2.1 The Meeting was opened by Mr. Mohamed Khalifa Rahma, ICAO Regional Director,
Middle East Office, Cairo. In his opening remarks, Mr. Rahma welcomed all delegates to Amman and
wished them a successful meeting. Mr. Rahma highlighted the main objectives of the meeting; and
underlined that safety of civil aviation, which is considered as a continuous challenge, should be given
the utmost importance and priority. He extended his appreciation to all States and IATA for their
commitment and participation in the meeting.
2.2 Mr. Rahma thanked all parties who worked closely with the MID Office for the
successful implementation of contingency measures and routes in a timely manner.
3. ATTENDANCE
3.1 The meeting was attended by eighteen (18) participants from five (5) States (Bahrain,
Iran, Jordan, Qatar and UAE) and one (1) Organization (IATA). The list of participants is at
Attachment A.
4. OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAT
4.1 The meeting was chaired by Mr. Chris Dalton, Chief Airspace Management and
Optimization (AMO) Section at ICAO Headquarters Montreal, Canada.
4.2 Mr. Elie El Khoury, ICAO Regional Officer, Air Traffic Management/Search and
Rescue (RO/ATM/SAR) Middle East Office, was Secretary of the meeting.
5. LANGUAGE
5.1 Discussions were conducted, and documentation was provided in the English
language.
Annex 34
- 2 -
6. DISCUSSIONS
6.1 The meeting adopted the following Agenda:
AI 1. Adoption of the Provisional Agenda
AI 2. Introduction by (ICAO)
AI 3. Review of Current Situation
AI 4. Next Steps
AI 5. Closing
6.2 The Chairman welcomed the participants to the ACCM/4 and highlighted that the
meeting is an evidence of the high level commitment to ensure the safety of air traffic operations
across the MID Region. Mr. Dalton reiterated that the success of the MID Contingency Coordination
Team (CCT) has been recognized by the aviation community. He provided a brief about the ICAO
Visits to Qatar and Bahrain on 10-11 and 12 April 2018, respectively.
6.3 The meeting was apprised by Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Qatar and UAE of their feedback
on the current situation and the challenges they were facing as well as the lessons learnt.
Unfortunately, Oman delegation arrived late in the afternoon, however, coordination on the outcome
of meeting was carried, with agreement on some contingency measures related to the Muscat FIR.
6.4 The meeting commended all States concerned for the effective implementation of
contingency routes and ATM measures despite the associated complexities and challenges.
6.5 Iran underlined that the contingency plan has major impact on the pre-planned ATM
projects such as the redesign of the airspace, ACC sectorization, etc.
6.6 The meeting recognized that ICAO’s main concern is the safety of air transport,
which has been maintained through the effective implementation of contingency routes/measures.
6.7 The meeting reviewed and discussed the following proposal presented by Qatar:
Increase the Utilization of T665 (inbound route to Doha through Emirates FIR over the high seas)
6.7.1 Increase the utilization of T665 from 70 to 80 flights daily. Qatar reported that
currently the daily usage is around 50 to 60 flights only and that it was challenging to reach the agreed
70 flights due to some restrictions on traffic flows, mainly at RASKI and PARAM.
6.7.2 The meeting agreed that a new mechanism should be applied instead of the current
one based on the call sign list, which would be discussed at later stage.
6.7.3 In the meantime, however, and with a view to provide flexibility for Qatar Airways to
reach the maximum agreed daily usage, the list of call signs would be increased to 100 call signs,
which would be accepted by Iran, Oman and UAE and inserted in advance in the ATM system to
avoid filed flight plan rejection. The prerequisites to achieve the above were as follows:
 Qatar to provide a list of 100 call sign (adding 20 to the 80 list)
 Iran, Oman and UAE assess the list and add the call signs in their ATM systems
to avoid flight plans rejection
 Oman and UAE to assess the increase of the daily usage of T665 to 80 flights
instead of 70. (Iran advised that they accepted the changes as specified).
Annex 34
- 3 -
 Qatar Airways to adhere to +/- 15 minutes from the estimate time over the
boundary points.
 The list of Qatar Airways flights would be provided by Doha Radar through
OLDI to SZC-UAE. Qatar and UAE nominated the following focal points to
address the possibility for an automated mechanism for sharing of flight plans
schedule and list of call signs.
o Qatar: Mr. Andrew Bowden, Airspace Planner
([email protected])
o UAE: Muhammad Farook, ANS Research & Systems Adaptation Officer,
([email protected])
6.7.4 UAE proposed that the States concerned should work together on the implementation
of arrangements in the context of CDM/ATFM between the relevant ATS units in Iran, Oman, Qatar
and UAE for effective management of traffic through T665.
6.7.5 Based on the communication with Oman, it was proposed to reduce the longitudinal
separation at ULDUN between Muscat and Tehran ACCs from 20 NM to 10 NM and to add FL 380
to the FLAS applied on Z351/T665, which requires study and coordination with UAE.
6.7.6 Iran indicated the need for Flight Level (FL) restriction over waypoint GABKO (FLs
that will be used for ULDUN) to be imposed by UAE on the transiting traffic through Emirates FIR to
Tehran FIR, due to the distance constraint between GABKO and ULDUN.
6.7.7 In the same vein, it was proposed to establish a waypoint on the intersection Z152
and N571 to accommodate traffic coming from RASKI and PARAM to be rerouted by Muscat ACC
via ULDUN. It was agreed that Oman should provide the off-peak hours of the relevant ATC
Sector(s) servicing that area and Qatar provide a list of flights that would use ULDUN instead of
MESPO within the off-peak intervals. (the additional flights are among the 100 agreed call signs).
LVA-BAYAN FIRs (new inbound route to Doha between Tehran and Bahrain FIRs)
6.7.8 Agreed by Bahrain and Iran with the following measures:
 FL 220 at the border (Bahrain-Tehran), or FL200 as a second option with 10NM
longitudinal separation.
 Flights to start descent at SERDU to reach FL 280 or below by LVA.
 Tehran requested that traffic departing or transiting from Bahrain FIR toward the
East to enter Tehran FIR via DASUT.
Annex 34
- 4 -
 FL restriction on UAE westbound traffic through Bahrain FIR to be agreed upon
by Bahrain and UAE.
 Revision of Bahrain- Doha operational letter of agreement to include:
o All requirements and transfer control points (TCPs) identified for all routes,
including contingency routes
o FL210/230/250 inbound via RASDI
o FL160/180/200 inbound via VELAM
 Reduce the upper limit of OTR53 to at least 10000 feet.
 Qatar to provide a list of call signs that might use the route.
 Iran to select 20 flights to be rerouted via LVA-BAYAN on trial basis during offpeak
period.
 During the trial phase, additional traffic may be routed via LVA-BAYAN based
on tactical coordination between Bahrain and Tehran ACCs.
 Bahrain indicated that based on the above conditions and the results of the trial
phase the route would be operated on 24/7.
 Feedback from Iran for final approval expected by 10 May 2018.
 Tentative implementation date 31 May 2018 10:00 UTC.
 ICAO allocated the Route Designator N312 for LVA-BAYAN and the 5LNC
ELIDU (262424N 0525133E) as Bahrain/Tehran FIRs Boundary point.
TASMI-MODAD (proposal for a New route from Kuwait/Iraq Border direct to Jordan)
6.7.9 Iraq and Jordan accepted the proposal in principal waiting for the feedback from
Qatar to initiate the coordination with Kuwait for the implementation.
T800 Inbound
6.7.10 Qatar proposal to use T800, currently utilized for departures from Doha to the east,
for inbound traffic as well, during off-peak hours was not supported by Bahrain or Iran due to
operational challenges. However, it was agreed to keep the coordination ongoing on any possibility in
the future.
Annex 34
- 5 -
OLDI
6.7.11 Bahrain and Qatar agreed to initiate the coordination for the implementation of OLDI
between Bahrain ACC and Doha Radar.
7. CLOSING
7.1 All participants reassured their commitment to ensure the safety of air transport
across the MID Region and to support the ICAO’s efforts in this regard. The participants thanked
ICAO for organizing such an important meeting as well as CARC – Jordan for hosting, and
commended the efforts and instrumental role of the MID Office.
7.2 In closing, the Chairman as well as Mr. Mohamed Rahma expressed their
appreciation for the successful deliberations and outcome of the meeting. They complimented the
productivity of the meeting, which progressed smoothly and was characterized by the best traditions
of civil aviation collaboration and a willingness to give each proposal a good hearing and debate,
based on technical merit. They indicated that the outcome of the meeting will be relayed to the
Secretary General of ICAO and the President of the ICAO Council.
-----------------
Annex 34
ACCM/4-SOD
ATTACHMENT A
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
STATES
BAHRAIN
Mr. Saleem Mohamed Hasan
Director Air Traffic Management
Bahrain Civil Aviation Affairs (BCAA)
Ministry of Transportation and
Telecommunications
P.O. Box 586
KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN
Tel: +973 17 321 116/321105
Mobile: +973 39 608 860
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Richard Phillips
Senior ATC
SERCO - IAL Limited
P.O. Box 144
KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN
Mobile: +973 39 523 061
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Vinesh Dulabh
General Manager
SERCO - IAL Limited
P.O. Box 144
Manama - KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN
Tel: +973 173 21021
Mobile: +973 39 094 500
Email: [email protected]
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Mr. Ahmad Kaveh Firouz
Deputy Director of Tehran ACC
Iran Airports and Navigation Company (IAC)
IAC BLD, Meraj St. Azadi Sq.
Tehran - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Tel: +98 21 4454 4119
Mobile: +98 912 323 0447
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Behzad Soheil
Deputy General Director of ATM in Planning
and Monitoring
Iran Airports and Navigation Company (IAC)
IAC BLD, Meraj St. Azadi Sq.
Tehran - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Tel: +98 21 4454 4115
Mobile: +98 912 554 4193
Email: [email protected]
Annex 34
- 2 -
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
JORDAN
Mr. Ahmad Amireh
Chief of Flight Procedure Design Division
Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission
(CARC)
Amman Airport
P.O. Box 7547
Amman 11110 - JORDAN
Tel: +962 6 489 2282 Ext. 3420
Mobile: +962 795 0796 88
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Nayef Al-Marshoud
Director of Air Traffic Management (DATM)
Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission
(CARC)
P.O. Box 7547, 11110
Amman - JORDAN
Tel: +962 6 489 2282
Mobile: +962 79 749 8992
Email: [email protected]
QATAR
Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Al-Eshaq
Director Air Navigation Department
Qatar Civil Aviation Authority (QCAA)
P.O. Box 73
Doha – QATAR
Fax: +974 4470 5300
Tel: +974 4470 5555
Mobile: +974 55 55 0440
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Andrew Bowden
Air Traffic Control – Radar
Qatar Airspace Planner
Qatar Civil Aviation Authority (QCAA)
Falcon Compound
Abu Hamour
Doha - QATAR
Tel: +974 3020 2559
Email: [email protected]
Capt. Jassim Haroon
VPO Amiri Flight
Doha - QATAR
Tel: +974 6690 9009
Email: [email protected]
Capt. Konstantinos lliakis
A/Chief Flight OPS
Qatar Airways
Doha - QATAR
Tel: +974 3382 6911
Email: [email protected]
Annex 34
- 3 -
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Paul Lyth
Head of SMS Unit / Safety Manager
Qatar Civil Aviation Authority (QCAA)
P.O. Box 73
Doha - QATAR
Tel: +974 5504 8569
Email: paul.lyth@caa,gov.qa
Ms. Sharron Caunt
Senior Manager Navigation & Air Traffic
Management
Qatar Airways
Flight Operations, QROC,
P.O. Box 22550
Doha - QATAR
Tel: +974 66 505 230
Email: [email protected]
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Mr. Ahmed Al Jallaf
Assistant Director General Air Navigation
Services
General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA)
ANS - Sheikh Zayed Air Navigation Centre
P.O. Box 666
Abu Dhabi - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Tel: +971 2 599 6888
Mobile: +971 50 659 9242
Email: [email protected]
ORGANIZATIONS/INDUSTRIES
IATA
Mr. Alexander Smith
Regional Manager - Navigation & ATM
British Airways
Waterside, Harmondsworth, Middlesex
P.O. Box 365 - UB7 0GB
UNITED KINGDOM
Tel: +44 208 562 1405
Mobile: +44 7789 611059
Email: [email protected]
Mr. George Rhodes
Assistant Director Infrastructure MENA
International Air Transport Association
(IATA) MENA
P.O. Box 940587
Amman 11194 - JORDAN
Fax: +962 6 593 9923
Tel: +962 6 580 4256
Mobile: +962 79 944 4252
Email: [email protected]
Annex 34
- 4 -
NAME TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Jehad Faqir
Deputy Regional Director Safety & Flight
Operations
International Air Transport Association
(IATA)
P.O. Box 940587
Amman 11194 - JORDAN
Tel: +962 6 580 4200 Ext 1216
Mobile: +962 79 511 1238
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Ken Sewell
Regional Director, Safety and Flight
Operations, Middle East & North Africa
International Air Transport Association
(IATA)
P.O. Box 940587
Amman, 11194 - JORDAN
Tel: +962 6 580 4200
Mobile: +962 79 1488811
Email: [email protected]
ICAO
Mr. Mohamed Khalifa Rahma
Regional Director
Middle East Regional Office
Ministry of Civil Aviation Complex – Airport
Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Fax: +2 02 2267 4843
Tel: +2 02 2267 4840 Ext. 4100
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Chris Dalton
Chief, Airspace Management and
Optimization Section
International Civil Aviation Organization
Headquarters
Montreal - CANADA
Email: [email protected]
Mr. Elie El Khoury
Regional Officer, Air Traffic
Management/Search and Rescue (ATM/SAR)
Middle East Regional Office
Ministry of Civil Aviation Complex – Airport
Road
Cairo – EGYPT
Fax: +2 02 2267 4843
Tel: +2 02 2267 4840 Ext. 4120
Mobile: +2 010 2513 3360
Email: [email protected]
- END -
Annex 34

Annex 35
Letter from President, First Vice-President and Secretary General of ICAO Council to
Representatives on the Council, ICAO Doc. PRES OBA/2771 (15 May 2018)

Annex 35
Annex 35
Annex 35

Annex 36
Letter from Ahmed H. Mostafa Khedr, Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt before
ICAO, to Fang Liu, ICAO Secretary General (12 June 2018)

Annex 36

Annex 37
ICAO Council, 215th Session, Working Paper: Post-Employment Activities of ICAO Personnel,
ICAO Doc. HR-WP/56 (22 Aug. 2018)

Annex 37
{iA, International Civil Aviation Organization
WORKING PAPER
<t·•~.,~
COUNCIL - 215TH SESSION
Subject No. 7: Organization and personnel
Subject No. 7.4: Conditions of service
POST-EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES OF ICAO PERSONNEL
(Presented by the Secretary)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
HR-WP/56
22/8/18
(Information paper)
English only
At the twelfth meeting of its 214th Session, the Council requested the Human Resources Committee
(HRC) to consider the implications and feasibility of regulating post-employment activities of ICAO
personnel. This paper presents the results of the review by the Secretariat on this matter.
Strategic This paper relates to Supporting Implementation Strategies - Management and
Objectives: Administration: Human Resources
Financial Not applicable
implications:
References: C-WP/14771, C-DEC 214/12
Doc 7350, The /CAO Service Code
Annex 37
HR-WP/56 -2-
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 At the twelfth meeting of its 214th Session, the Council requested the Human Resources
Committee to consider the implications and feasibility of regulating post-employment activities of ICAO
personnel. This working paper presents the results of the review by the Secretariat on this matter.
2. REVIEW BY THE SECRETARIAT
2.1 The Secretariat consulted with other organizations in the United Nations common system
to ascertain if they imposed any kind of post-employment limitations on their personnel. Of those
organizations which replied, none impose restrictions on staff members other than rules related to nondisclosure
of confidential information which are in line with those established in The !CAO Service Code
(Doc 7350), Staff Regulation 1.8 as well as Annex I, paragraph 17, on the ICAO Framework on Ethics.
There is therefore no cooling-off period preventing employees from joining any type of government
service after their separation from UN service.
2.2 In addition to the above, many staff members are released by their national
administrations to join ICAO and these staff members may return to their administrations upon separation
from the Organization to continue their career. It is therefore not feasible for ICAO to impose
post-employment restrictions which would prevent government employees to return to their national
administrations.
3. CONCLUSION
3.1 In view of the foregoing, it is not recommended for ICAO to regulate the
post-employment activities of its personnel in order to prevent them from joining (or re-joining) any
government service after their separation from the Organization.
-ENDAnnex
38
Letter from Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al-Ziyani, GCC Secretary General, to Khalid Bin Mohamed
Al Ativa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar (19 May 2014)

[Page I of X]
In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful
[TN: In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful, Logo of the Cooperation Council
for the Arabian Sates of the Gulf)
The Cooperation Council for the Arabian Sates of the Gulf -
The General Secretariat
Office of the Secretary General
His Highness Brother Dr. / Khalid Bin Mohamed Al Atiya - May Allah preserve him
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Doha - State of Qatar
May the Peace, mercy and blessing of Allah be upon you,
I am pleased to send to your respected Highness my sincere brotherly greetings along with my
best of wishes of good health and well-being.
I would like to enclose - for your Highness - the second report by the committee for the follow-up
mechanism of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement which was convened at the General Secretariat’s
headquarters in Riyadh on Thursday 16 Rajab 1435 AH (corresponding to: May 15, 2014 AD). I am also
attaching to it the minutes of the first meeting of the permanent team for follow-up on the mechanism of
implementation of the Riyadh Agreement which was held at the headquarters of the General Secretariat
on May 14, 2014. Also, I am enclosing the Standardized Guidance List of the names of the internal and
external groups, entities, and organizations which constitute threats to the security and stability in the
Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, including the groups in Yemen, Syria, or any other areas
of conflict.
This is for the review of your respected Highness,
Please accept my utmost respect and reverence,
Signed,
[TN: Hand drawn Signature]
Dr. Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al-Zayani
The Secretary General
The number: A. T. 1 / 2 / 4 / 14 / 26 - date: 20 / 7 / 1435 AH, - Corresponding to: 19 /
5 / 2014 AD
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - P. O. Box 7153 - Riyadh 11462 - Phone number: 482 6808 – Fax
Number: 482 8008
Annex 38
[Page II of X]
Top Secret
The Second Report of the Committee
for the follow-up mechanism of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement
16 Rajab 1435 AH - Corresponding to: May 15, 2015
The General Secretariat
Acting upon the decisions of their Highnesses and their Excellences the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council in their second meeting which was held
specifically for the mechanism of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement on 4 Rajab 1435 AD
(corresponding to: May 3, 2014) in the city of Jeddah, said decisions include the following:
First: The Committee for the follow-up mechanism of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement is
considered as a permanent committee which holds its meetings whenever needed. The Committee
has the right to create task forces as it deems necessary and to submit its reports to the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs through the General Secretariat.
Second: The Committee for the follow-up mechanism of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement
is tasked to set the standards upon which names will be included on the lists. The lists submitted
must include the type(s) of abuse or violation, level of danger, date(s), evidence, and required proof.
Third: The committee for the follow-up mechanism of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement
shall prepare a Standardized Guidance List for the internal and external groups, entities, and
organizations which constitute threats to the security and stability of the Member States in the Gulf
Cooperation Council, including the groups in Yemen, Syria, or any other areas of conflict. The list
should be submitted to their Highnesses and their Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
The follow-up Committee has convened in its seventh meeting at the headquarters of the General
Secretariat in Riyadh on Thursday 16 Rajab 1435 AH which corresponds to May 15, 2014 with the
presence of delegations from the Member States (a list of the attendees’ names is attached).
At the beginning of the meeting, the Secretary General delivered a welcome speech to the
participating delegations and expressed his appreciation and gratitude for the efforts exerted by the
delegations under the framework of the authorized mission of the Committee. Also, he conveyed the
regards of their Highnesses and Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as their
appreciation for the exceptional efforts carried out by the follow-up Committee and for the results it has
achieved, which confirm the sincere intention of everyone towards the implementation of the Riyadh
Agreement, which is considered an historic and an important achievement. The Secretary General has
affirmed that the recommendations of the Committee
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1 of 5
[Page III of X]
Annex 38
Top Secret
have been raised to the Foreign Ministers and they concurred with them. Also, the Foreign Ministers have
given specific guidance regarding the work progress of the Committee and they underscored the
compliance with the mechanism of implementation.
Also, the Secretary General expressed his gratitude and appreciation for the good effort which
was made by the permanent follow-up team of the Committee and for the results that the Committee has
achieved.
The Secretary General also briefed the delegations of the participating countries about the
guidance of their Highnesses and Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in their special second
meeting in Jeddah on May 3, 2014. Also, he told them about the results of work by the permanent followup
Committee in its first meeting.
The meeting was dominated by a spirit of constructive cooperation, and it was distinguished by
high levels of professionalism, transparency, clarity, and candor. This of course reflected positively on the
progress of the work by the Committee, and on what has been achieved of results which realize what was
stated in the Riyadh Agreement and the articles of its implementation mechanism.
The committee underscored the importance of the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement and
its mechanism to achieve the collective security and stability in the Member States of the Gulf
Cooperation Council.
The Committee then deliberated on the items on its agenda and agreed upon to the followings:
First: the minutes of the first meeting of the permanent follow-up team:
The Committee reviewed the minutes of the first meeting of the permanent follow-up team which was
convened at the headquarters of the General Secretariat on Wednesday 15 Rajab 1435 AH (which
corresponds to May 14, 2014). The Committee decided to approve the minutes of the meeting (minutes of
the meeting attached) and underscored the following points:
a) It approves the Standardized Guidance List of the internal and external groups, entities, and
organizations which constitute threats to the security and stability in the Member States of the
Gulf Cooperation Council, whether in Yemen, Syria, or any other areas of conflict. The list has
been put together by the permanent follow-up team on the mechanism of implementation of the
Riyadh Agreement. The list shall be considered open for the Member States to add any new name
to be submitted first to the team and then to the follow-up Committee to decide whether to
include the new name on the list or not.
b) If it has been proven that any abuse existed against any Member State of the Gulf Cooperation
Council or against any key personality from these Member States and the abuse continued after
April 17, 2014, and there is danger present from a person or persons who are not citizens of the
Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council and they reside in one of the Council’s Member
States, then the country where the person or persons are residing shall take the necessary
measures to bring said abuses to an end. This is applicable to the list which is submitted to the
permanent follow-up team.
Top Secret
2 of 5
[Page IV of X]
Annex 38
Top Secret
c) As regards the subject of the former Yemeni President, Ali Abdullah Saleh; if the accusations
against him by the State of Qatar have been proven, in terms of him being involved in and
supporting the assassination attempt against the Qatari Consul General in Sana’a, then a joint
Gulf action has to be taken in order to deal with that situation in the manner or method their
Highnesses and Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign Affairs deem fit.
d) Regarding individuals other than the citizens of the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation
Council who commit abuses and have continued to do so after 17 / 04 / 2014, and who constitute
a danger against any Member State of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and it is proven that they are
not residents of any of the Member State of the Gulf Cooperation Council, in that case, the
country shall not bear responsibility for any statement or abuses committed by said individuals.
This also applies to individuals on the list sent to the permanent follow-up team.
e) To adhere to the guidance issued by their Highnesses and Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs in their meeting which was convened in Jeddah on May 3, 2014, in which it was decided
that if it is proven that someone is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, he gets removed from
the list prepared by the follow-up committee. But as regards the others, the situation shall be
evaluated based on the danger of the abuse regardless of the date and whether the abuse has
continued or not.
f) To underscoring the importance of collective action in response to what is being reported in the
media of all types and means regarding any insults to the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, their key personalities, and citizens, in implementation of the Riyadh Agreement after 17
/ 04 / 2014 AD.
g) Regarding the others (non-Gulf States’ citizens), the delegations of the participating countries
have confirmed that they have taken the necessary measures to deny support or shelter for those
who are involved in activities against any of the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council
whether it is those in current leadership positions, former leaders, or any others. These individuals
shall not be allowed to have safe heaven inside any country or to harm any other Gulf
Cooperation Council Member States. The situation shall be evaluated according to the list and
based on the danger of the abuse regardless of the date or whether the abuse committed against
any of the Gulf States has continued or not.
Second: The Standards
The committee has studied the guidance of their Highnesses and their Excellencies the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs regarding establishing the base standards according to which names shall be added to the
list. The committee decided to bring the following standards to their Highnesses and Excellencies the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs for approval:
a) Type of abuse or violation
b) The level of its danger to the security and stability of any of the Member States of the
Council
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[Page V of X]
Annex 38
Top Secret
c) Date of the abuse or violation and whether it has continued
d) Continuation of the danger
e) The evidence and proof
Also the committee has concluded that it shall recommend the following suggestions to their
Highnesses and Excellencies the Ministers of Foreign Affairs:
1) To approve the second report of the follow up Committee.
2) To direct the Ministers of Information in the Gulf Council Member States to take the required
measures to put an end to the abuses which are committed by the media and social media
according to what has been stated in the mechanism of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement,
which was signed on April 17, 2014.
3) To refer the new lists which were introduced by the United Arab Emirates regarding the Muslim
Brotherhood and the lists introduced by the State of Qatar on Centers of Research and Study to
the permanent follow up team (attached herein) in order to be studied and discussed in its
upcoming meeting.
Top Secret
Annex 38
[Page VI of X]
Top Secret
Signatures of their Highnesses and Excellencies on the report of the committee for the follow-up
mechanism of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement in its second meeting on the
mechanism of implementation of the Riyadh Agreement held on 16 Rajab 1435 AH,
corresponding to: May 15, 2014
The General Secretariat
The Honorable Dr. / Abdul Rahim Bin Yusif Al Awadi: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for
legal Affairs / The United Arab Emirates
Signed: (TN: Hand drawn signature)
His Excellency the Shaikh / Khalifa Bin Abdullah Al Khalifa: The Secretary General of the
Supreme Defense Council, the Advisor to his Royal Highness, the King, for National Security Affairs
/ The Kingdom of Bahrain
Signed: (TN: Hand drawn signature)
His Highness Dr. / Nizar Bin Ubayed Madani: The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs / The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Signed: (TN: Hand drawn signature)
His Excellency Ambassador Dr. / Ali Bin Ahmad Al Isa’i: The Chief of Department of
Cooperation Council at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs / The Sultanate of Oman
Signed: (TN: Hand drawn signature)
The Honorable Mr. / Muhammad Bin Abdullah Al Rumaihi: Assistant to the Foreign Minister for
Foreign Affairs / State of Qatar
Signed: (TN: Hand drawn signature)
His Excellency Ambassador / Nasir Hajji Al Mazyn: Director of the Directorate of Cooperation
Council Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs / The State of Kuwait
Signed: (TN: Hand drawn signature)
His Excellency Dr. / Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al Zayani: The Secretary General of the Gulf
Cooperation Council
Signed: (TN: Hand drawn signature)
Top Secret
Page 5 of 5
Annex 38
[Page VII of X]
List of the names of the delegations participating in the seventh meeting of the Committee for the follow-up
mechanism for the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement
The General Secretariat
The United Arab Emirates:
1- The Honorable Dr. / Abdul Rahim Al Awadi - Assistant to the Foreign Minister for Legal Affairs
2- Mr. / Salim Rashid Al Shihhi - General Manager of the office of the Minster of State for Foreign Affairs
3- Mr. / Fadhil Hamad Al -Nu’aimi - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4- Mr. / Muhammad Hilal Al Shami - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5- Mr. Khamis A-Shumayli - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Kingdom of Bahrain:
1- His Highness Shaikh / Khalifa Bin Abdallah Al Khalifa - The Secretary General of the Supreme Defense
Council and the Advisor of His Highness the King for National Security Affairs.
2- The Excellency Shaikh / Hamud Bin Abdallah Al Khalifa - Ambassador of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
3- Shaikh / Ahmad Bin Abdul Aziz Al Khalifa - Office of his Highness the Minister of Foreign Affairs
4- Shaikh / Abdallah Bin Ahmad Al Khalifa - Acting General Director for Communications to the Supreme
Defense Council
5- Mr. Mahmud Al Dawi - Office Director of His Highness the General Secretary of the Supreme Defense
Council
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
1- His Highness Dr. / Nizar Ubayed Madani - The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
2- The Honorable / Abdallah Bin Muhammad Al -Shamrani - The Director General of the General Directorate
for the Cooperation Council
3- Colonel / Abdallah Bin Sa’id Al Qahtani - Assistant Director General for General Intelligence for
International Cooperation
4- Colonel / Sultan Bin Muhammad Abu Malhama – of International Cooperation
5- Colonel / Fawaz Bin Muhammad Al - Ziyadi - of the Administration of Operations
6- Major / Mut’ib Bin Shadid Al Hammash - of International Cooperation
7- Captain / Nasir Bin Sa’ad Al Qahtani - of International Cooperation
8- Captain / Walid Bin Yahya Safwah - of International Cooperation
9- Mr. Talal Bin Dari Al Rashid Attaché to the Administration of the Cooperation Council
Sultanate of Oman:
1- The Honorable Ambassador Dr. / Ali Bin Ahmad Al-Aysa’i - Chief of Department of Cooperation of the
Arab Gulf States Cooperation Council
2- The Honorable Dr. / Ahmad Bin Hilal Al Busayidi - The Ambassador of the Sultanate of Oman to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
1
Annex 38
[Page VIII of X]
3- Brigadier General / Muhammad Bin Khalifa Al Shaqsi - Ministry of the Sultan’s Office
4- Mr. Ahmad Bin Salim Al -Balushi - Second Secretary at the Administration of the Gulf Cooperation
Council
State of Qatar:
1- The Honorable / Muhammad Bin Abdallah Al Rumaihi - Assistant to the Foreign Minister for Foreign
Affairs
2- The Honorable / Hamad Bin Ahmad Al Muhanadi - The Secretary General for the Ministerial Council
3- The Honorable Ambassador / Yusif Issa Al Jabir - Director of the Cooperation Council Directorate
4- Mr. Jamal Al Ka’abi - The Ministry of Interior
5- Shaikh / Sayf Bin Ahmad Al Thani - of the International Cooperation
6- Mr. Khalid Bin Zabin Al Dawsari – Office of the Assistant to the Minister
7- Mr. Jassim Al Muhammad - The Ministry of Interior
8- Mr. Muhammad Al Muftah – The Ministry of Interior
9- Mr. Nawaf Al Salyti - The Ministry of Interior
10- Mr. Ali Al Kawari – The Ministry of Interior
11- Mr, Jassim Al Tamimi – The Ministry of Interior
State of Kuwait:
1- The Honorable Ambassador / Nasir Hajji Al Mazyan – Director of Affairs of the Cooperation Council
2- Major General / Issam Salim Al Naham – The General Director of the General Directorate of Information
(State Security Services)
The General Secretariat:
1- His Excellency Dr. / Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al - Zayani – The General Secretary
2- The Honorable Dr. / Sa’ad Bin Abdul Rahman Al Ammar – Assistant Secretary General for Political
Affairs
3- The Honorable Ambassador / Hamad Bin Rashid Al Marri – Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs
4- Mr. Hamad Bin Ali Al Manna’i – Press Advisor for his Excellency the Secretary General
5- Mr. Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Shubay’an – The General Director of the General Directorate for Coordination
and Follow-up
6- Mr. Talal Bin Abdul Salam Al Ansari – The General Supervisor of the General Directorate for Protocol
7- Mr. Muhammad Bin Ibrahim Al Suhaibani – Director of Protocol – the General Directorate of Protocol
8- Mr. Tariq Bin Abdallah Al Fadil – Chief of the Department of Documentations at the General Directorate
of Coordination and Follow-up
2
Annex 38
[Page IX of X]
The Standardized Guidance List for the internal and external groups, entities, and
organizations which pose a threat to the security and stability in the Member States of the Gulf
Cooperation Council, including the ones in Yemen, Syria, or any other areas of conflict.
1- Al Qaida Organization (International)
2- Al Qaida Organization (Maghreb, Northern Africa)
3- Al Qaida Organization (The Arabian Peninsula)
4- Organization of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (Daesh / ISIS)
5- Al Nusrah Front (Syria)
6- Dawud Brigade (Syria)
7- Jayesh Al Muhajireen (The Army of Immigrants) / (Syria)
8- Harakat Sham Al-Islam (Islamic Levant Movement) / (Syria)
9- Ansar Al Sharia (Supporters of Islamic Law) / (Tunisia)
10- Ansar Al - Sharia (Supporters of Islamic Law) / (Libya)
11- Mujahideen Youth Movement (Somalia)
12- Abdullah Azzam Brigades (International)
13- Ansar Al Deen (Supporters of the Religion) (Mali)
14- Ansar Bait Al Maqdis (Supporters of the Holly Shrine in Jerusalem) / (Egypt)
15- Boko Haram (Nigeria)
16- Hezbollah the Shia’te (International)
17- Asa’ib Ahl Al Haq (League of the Righteous) / (Iraq and Syria)
18- Abu Al-Fadl Al-Abbas (Iraq and Syria)
19- Quwat Al Quds (Al Quds Forces) (Iran and International)
20- Al Qaida Organization (North Caucasus)
21- Jund Al Sham Organization (Soldiers of the Levant) / (Lebanon)
3
Annex 38
[Page X of X]
22- Al Majlas Al Ulama’i (Council of the Scholars) / (Kingdom of Bahrain)
23- Haq Movement (Right Movement) / (Kingdom of Bahrain)
24- Harakat Khalas (Salvation Movement) (Kingdom of Bahrain)
25- Tayar Al Wafa (Trend of Loyalty) / (Kingdom of Bahrain)
26- Al Tayar Al Shirazi (The Shirazi Trend) / (Kingdom of Bahrain)
27- Markaz Karbala (Karbala Center) / (Sa’da, Yemen)
28- Coalition of 14 February (Kingdom of Bahrain)
29- Jaysh Al Imam (Al Imam Army) / (Kingdom of Bahrain)
30- Saraya Al Muqawama Al Sha’biya (Brigades of Popular Resistance) / (Kingdom of Bahrain)
31- Saraya Al-Ashtar (Al Ashtar) / (Kingdom of Bahrain)
32- Talaya Al Taghyir Al Bahrainniya (Bahraini Vanguards of Change) / (Kingdom of Bahrain)
33- Hezbollah (Iraq)
34- Al Tayyar Al Sadri (Sadr Trend)
35- Jayesh Al Islam (Islam Army)
36- Suqoor Al Sham (Falcons of the Levant)
37- Al Houthyeen (The Huthis)
38- Ansar Al Sharia (Supporters of Islamic Law) in Yemen
39- Extremist Battalions of Foreign Fighters (Harakat Sham Al Islam Movement of the Islamic
Levant), the Brigade / and Battalions of Immigrants from Libya, Jayesh Al Muhajirin wa Al
Ansar (The Army of Migrants and Supporters), “Different from the Dar’a group, Kata’ib Balaqa’
Al Sham (The Brigades of Bal’qaa’ of the Levant), “Balaqa’ Al Sham is a rural nomadic area in
Syria”, Jayesh Al Khalafa Al Islamyia (Islamic Kalifate Army), Jund Al Sham (The Levant
Soldiers), Jund Al Khalafa (The Islamic Kalifate Soldiers), Kata’ib Al Iman and Al-Katiba Al-
Khadra’ (Brigades of Faith and the Green Battalion)
Annex 38
Annex 38
Annex 38
Annex 38
Annex 38
Annex 38
Annex 38
Annex 38
Annex 38
Annex 38
Annex 38
MURRAR Inc.,
Language Services
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meaning and style of the original text and constitutes in every aspect a correct and true
translation of the original document(s).
This is to certify the correctness of the translation only. We do not guarantee that the originals
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no liability for the way in which the translation is used by the customer or any third party,
including end users of the translation.
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Signature:
Name: Abulgasem Gadem
Signature:
Annex 38

Annex 39
Letter from Muhammad Bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of
Qatar, to Abdulatif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, GCC Secretary General (7 Aug. 2017)

[Page I of III]
Logo of the State of Qatar - Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Minister of Foreign Affairs
Date: 15 / 11 / 1438 AH
Corresponding to: 07 / 08 / 2017 AD
His Highness Dr. / Abdulatif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, the respected
The Secretary General of the Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf States
The General Secretariat
Riyadh
Warmest Greetings, and then,
Let it be known that the current crises through which the Arab Gulf region is going, and
the dangerous results that have ensued because of it, threaten the future of our countries and our
Gulf States’ peoples. It all started without any prior warning to the State of Qatar in the aftermath
of a certain entity supported with high technology managing to hack a website and several
electronic forums of the Qatar News Agency at exactly 12:14 in the morning of Wednesday, the
24th of May 2017, and then publishing fake and made-up statements attributed to His Highness
Shaikh / Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani - The Amir of the State of Qatar, “may Allah preserve
him.”
As you know, the State of Qatar denied those false statements on the spot, making sure to
clarify that what was published had no truthful basis. Despite that, some media outlets of the
Gulf and Arab countries have published those statements; particularly Al Arabiya Channel and
Sky News in Arabic, and they continued to publish them and comment about them. This proves
that there was a clear and premeditated plot against the State of Qatar, targeting its independence
and sovereignty and interfering in its internal affairs.
The State of Qatar has put forth serious efforts trying to limit the dangerous repercussions
of the electronic hacking crime which was carried out against it, in order to maintain the
brotherly relationships among the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and in
consideration of the complex circumstances and political crises that surround the Arab region in
general and the Member States of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council in particular. Yet, the State
of Qatar was surprised by the announcement of each of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain
Annex 39
[Page II of III]
Logo of the State of Qatar - Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Minister of Foreign Affairs
severing their diplomatic and consular ties with the State of Qatar, closing their land, air and
maritime borders with it, and imposing a comprehensive siege on Qatar and on its people. They
justified that by reasons that had no cognizable or legitimate proof, and violated the bases of
International Law. Moreover, those reasons are in contradiction with the standards of foreign
policy of the State of Qatar. And, in this context, the State of Qatar would like to assert that it
spares no effort - as an active member of the Gulf Cooperation Council - in adhering to the
GCC’s Charter and fulfilling all of its obligations based on the GCC’s agreements and decisions.
The State of Qatar respects the sovereignty of other countries and does not meddle in their
internal affairs; the State of Qatar also carries out its duties on all levels, local, regional and
international in the war against terrorism and the financing of terrorism.
The countries of the siege have taken unjustified measures towards the escalation of this
crisis, and have continued to follow hostile policies in the media in contradiction to the truth in
order to achieve their political goals which aim at defaming the State of Qatar; and that
materialized in the thirteen demands presented to the State of Qatar which were totally rejected
by the international community and the Arab Peoples as illegitimate demands and as being in
contradiction with the Charter of the United Nations and the basic tenets of human rights. This
was followed by the issuance of lists by these states labeling individuals and entities as terrorists
without any basis on any international legal standards. The lists were not based on facts or
objectivity, and stood in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, specifically the mission
of the United Nations Security Council, and the Charter of regional organizations in which the
State of Qatar and the countries of the siege are members.
And despite the fact that the above-mentioned demands are illegitimate, as they aim to
place the State of Qatar under custody, Qatar cooperated, and is still cooperating, with the
initiative of His Highness Shaikh / Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jabir Al Sabah - the Amir of the sister
State of Kuwait, “may Allah preserve him,” and a detailed response was given to the demands.
In its effort to expose the truth about the electronic hacking crime, the State of Qatar
formed an international nonaligned team to investigate the crime of piracy of the Qatar News
Agency website, and
[Page III of III]
Annex 39
Logo of the State of Qatar - Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Minister of Foreign Affairs
the results of the probe confirmed that piracy was done by installing malware in the news
Agency’s website on the 21st of last April, and then the fabricated statements were published. It
has been proven by compelling evidence that some of the countries of the siege were involved in
committing this crime.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain
still base their illegal stances against the State of Qatar on an electronic hacking crime which was
carried out against the State of Qatar. This heinous crime was used as a pretense by the countries
of the siege to adopt illegal measures which those countries tried to justify by making false
accusations against the State of Qatar. Those false accusations were not discussed by the
countries of the siege with the State of Qatar, nor did they notify Qatar of them prior to the
piracy crime against Qatar News Agency. This proves that the current crisis in the region was
staged by the countries of the siege and that all of the measures adopted by those countries
against the State of Qatar are to be considered a grave violation of international covenants.
The State of Qatar asserts its utmost care for the continuous preservation of brotherly ties
among the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the continuation of rights and
care to all the residents in Qatar who are citizens of those countries, and guarantees that it has
taken all procedures necessary to secure the implementation of that. The State of Qatar also
affirms that it is adhering to all of the agreements within the framework of the Cooperation
Council of the Arab Gulf States and the bilateral agreements it made with the Council’s Member
States, as well as other agreements in which the State of Qatar is a party, since that serves the
materialization of the supreme interests of the Member States of the Council.
And finally, we are looking forward to your Highness’s publication of this letter to all
their Highnesses and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of GCC Member States and ask you to
deem this correspondence a formal document of the General Secretariat of the Council.
Please accept my utmost regards,
Signed
[TN: Hand drawn Signature]
Muhammad Bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani
The Minister of Foreign Affairs
Annex 39
Annex 39
Annex 39
Annex 39
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meaning and style of the original text and constitutes in every aspect a correct and true
translation of the original document(s).
This is to certify the correctness of the translation only. We do not guarantee that the originals
are genuine documents, or that the statements contained therein are true. Further, we assume
no liability for the way in which the translation is used by the customer or any third party,
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Name: Khalid Murrar
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Signature:
Annex 39

Annex 40
Letter from Mohamed Bin Abdul Rahman Bin Jassim Al Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
State of Qatar, to Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al-Ziyani, Secretary-General of GCC (19 Feb. 2017)

[PDF Page III of VII]
14 Annex 72
In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate the Most Merciful
The Gulf Cooperation Council - The General Secretariat
(Logo of the Gulf Cooperation Council; In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate the Most
Merciful)
Confidential
His Excellency Sheikh / Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, may Allah
preserve him,
The Minister of Foreign Affairs - The President of the Current Term of the Ministerial
Council
Manama – The Kingdom of Bahrain
May the Peace, mercy and blessing of Allah be upon you,
I am pleased to send to your respected Highness my sincere brotherly greetings along with the
best of my wishes of good health and wellbeing.
Also, it is of my pleasure to enclose the self explanatory letter which I have received from your
brother, his Excellency Sheikh / Mohamed Bin Abdul Rahman Bin Jassim Al Thani, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs for the State of Qatar, bearing number 132-5 and dated on 19 February 2017.
This is for the review of your respected Highness,
Please accept my utmost respect and reverence
Signed,
Your Highness’s devotee
[TN: Hand written signature]
Dr. Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al Zayani
The General Secretary
Number: A - T 1 / 2 / 4 / 17 / 1 - Date: 25 / 05 / 1438 AH - Corresponding to 22 / 02 / 2017 AD
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, P O Box: 7152 Riyadh, 11462 - Phone: 482 6808 - Fax: 482 8008
1851
Annex 40
Annex 72
1869
Annex 40
[PDF Page IV of VII]
Annex 72
(Logo of Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Minister of Foreign Affairs [TN: Illegible words follow; low quality scanned image]
[BARCODE]
N umber 2017 - 88 - 00132 - 5
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs – Confidential
Date: 22 / 05 / 1438 AH - Corresponding to: 19 / 02 / 2017 AD
“Confidential”
His Highness Brother Dr. / Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, the respected
The Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council
General Secretariat - Riyadh
May the Peace, mercy and blessing of Allah be upon you,
It is my pleasure to send to your Highness my sincere greetings and respect, wishing you continued good
health and well-being.
It is of my pleasure to refer to the State of Qatar’s unwavering and unequivocal commitment to all signed
agreements within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In this context, I am referring to the
Riyadh agreement which has been signed by their Highnesses; the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, on 19 / 01 / 1435 AH (corresponds to 23 / 11 / 2013 AD) with the purpose of enhancing the
unity of the GCC Member States and [serving their] interests for the future of their peoples. That meeting
was convened amid international and regional conditions which demanded the conclusion of this
agreement in order to serve the higher interests of the GCC Member States.
As the GCC Member States have spared absolutely no effort in the implementation of the Riyadh
Agreement and the mechanism of its execution; therefore, the subject matter of this Agreement has been
exhausted. Consequently - according to the applicable rules governing international agreements - this
agreement should be terminated due to the exhaustion of its purpose.
Since the GCC Charter and its other mechanisms constitute the basis for relations between the GCC
Member States, relying on the Riyadh Agreement and abandoning the GCC Charter and its other
mechanisms do not achieve the interests or the goals of the GCC.
Therefore, the GCC Member States are called upon to agree on the termination of the Riyadh Agreement
as said Agreement has been mooted by international and regional events, and because its purpose has
been exhausted. On the other hand, it may be necessary that the GCC Member States take necessary
measures to amend the GCC Charter
1852
Annex 40
[PDF Page VI of VII]
Annex 72
(Logo of Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Minister of Foreign Affairs [TN: Illegible words follow; low quality scanned image]
in line with their aspirations, to face any issues that may require the joint Gulf action, and
regional and international developments in the various aspects.
In conclusion, we look forward to your Highness’s publication of the contents of this letter to the
brothers in the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council and to deem this correspondence
a formal document of the General Secretariat of the Council.
Please accept my utmost respect and regards to your Highness,
Signed
[TN: Hand drawn Signature]
Muhammad Bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani
The Minister of Foreign Affairs
( 2 )
1854
Annex 40
1870
Annex 72
Annex 40
1872
Annex 72
Annex 40
Language Services
If you can speak it, we
English < Arabic > English
Interpretation, Translation, Quality Control, Editing,
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Translation of “
We, Khalid Murrar and Abuelgassim
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document(s) and that, in our best judgement, the translated text truly reflects the content,
meaning and style of the original text and consti
translation of the original document
This is to certify the correctness of the translation only.
are genuine documents, or that the statements contained therein are true. F
no liability for the way in which the translation is used by the customer or any third party,
including end users of the translation.
A Copy of the translation is attached to this certification.
Name: Khalid Murrar
Signature:
Name: Abulgasem Gadem
Signature:
MURRAR Inc.,
can deliver it in the other language instantaneously
3340 River Meadows Ct,
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Annex 72” from/into Arabic- English
Gadem, qualified professional Translator
, we have translated the above
constitutes in every aspect a correct and true
document(s).
We do not guarantee that the original
, Further,
573-3732
Translators and
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tutes originals
urther, we assume
Annex 40

Annex 41
State of Qatar, Ministry of Interior, National Counter Terrorism Committee, National Terrorist
Designation Lists, Designation Order No. 2 (21 Mar. 2018)

Annex 41
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Home About the Committee Efforts and Achievements National Terrorist Designation Lists Media Center Contact Us ~pzl l
Designation Order No.2, Date (21/03/2018)
By virtue of the decree of His Excellency the Attorney General No. 26of2018
A- Individuals
Place of Birth Nationality Passport No
MohamedSheryan
Al Kaabi
IbrahimEisaHaj i
Mohamed Al Bakr
Mubarak Mohamed
Mosed All Aleji
01/ 01/ 1954
15/ 02/1972
28/ 09/ 1973
12/07 / 1977
04/ 11/ 1988
04/10 / 1978
Rashid Mohamed 13/ 05/ 1975
AboQiba
Saleh Salem Rashid
MohamedAboQiba
25/ 09/ 1976
16/ 05/1974
22/08 / 1988
31/ 08/ 1983
12 ShakirShamsAldin 26/01 / 1992
15 Mustafa Mustafa 02/03/1983
Senjer
AhmedSamir
16 MohamedAlhabib 01/ 11/ 1989
Alten iger
Ahmed Eid Salem
Alhejjawi
20 Yousuf Osman
Abdelsalam
B- Entities
01/02 / 1976
20/ 01/ 1992
13/ 07/ 1989
06/ 01/1984
c. Al Thahabiya for Tents
Alihasan Charity
Egyptian
Egyptian
Egyptian
Egyptian
Iraq
Tanzeem DaeshW ilaiatSeenaa (ISISSina ii state organi zation )
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in2014 )
K475336 (explred)
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designated also in the
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designated also in the
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Financing terro rism
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Al Sailiyya Financing terro rism
Fareeq Al
Sudan
Financing te rro rism
Financing terrorism
Al Sailiyya Financing terrorism
Azeeziya
Syria until
Financing terrorism
Financing terrorism
Join ing a group
established in violat ion
of the law, witha reso lve
of committ ing a terror ist
F'nanc·ngterror'smand
Joining a group
established in violation
of the law,w itha reso lve
of committ ing a terror ist
Financing terrorism
Financing terro rism
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Annex 42
State of Qatar, Ministry of Justice, “Qatar Doubles Contribution to Global Community
Engagement & Resilience Fund” (30 May 2018), available at https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/allmofa-
news/details/2018/05/30/qatar-doubles-contribution-to-global-community-engagementresilience-
fund

Qatar Doubles Contribution to Global Community
Engagement & Resilience Fund
Lausanne, Switzerland / Information Office / May 30
The State of Qatar has doubled its contribution to the Global Community Engagement & Resilience Fund (GCERF) to reach
$10 million, after pledging an additional $5 million during its participation in the eighth meeting of the GCERF Governing
Board held in Lausanne, Switzerland.
At its meeting which began today and will continue on Thursday, Qatar was represented by HE Ambassador Dr Mutlaq bin
Majid Al Qahtani, the Foreign Ministers Special Envoy for Combating Terrorism and Mediation in Conflict Resolution, a
member of the Board of Directors of the Fund.
The move is in line with Qatar's position as one of the founding members, key players and supporters of the GCERF, as well as
the only GCC and Arab country to contribute to the fund, along with the United States of America, Switzerland, the European
Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, France, Japan, Sweden and Norway.
The State of Qatar, which has become the biggest contributor to the GCERF, called on all other countries, especially the
countries of the region, to follow the example of Qatar and participate in this global fund as the only fund in the world
dedicated to supporting local communities to confront violent extremism leading to terrorism.
Qatar's contribution to the GCERF aims to support the financing of projects to combat violent extremism and build peaceful
societies in various regions of the world, including Mali, Nigeria, Kenya, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Kosovo, as well as other
countries supported by the GCERF including Tunisia, the Philippines, Somalia and Afghanistan.
Annex 42
The Geneva-based GCERF was established in 2014 to serve as the first global effort to support local, community-level
initiatives aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas. Operating at the nexus of security and
development, GCERF is committed to working in partnership and consultation with governments, civil society, and the
private sector in beneficiary countries to support national strategies to address the local drivers of violent extremism.
The State of Qatar hosted the seventh meeting of the GCERF Governing Board on 5 and 6 December 2017, and that meeting
came out with critical recommendations and decisions being implemented by all of its players.
Wednesday, May 30, 2018
Annex 42
Annex 43
State of Qatar, Ministry of Interior, National Counter Terrorism Committee, National Terrorist
Designation Lists, Designation Order No. 4 (28 Aug. 2018)

Annex 43

Annex 44
State of Qatar, Law No. 4 of 2010 on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
(18 Mar. 2010)

Law No. (4) of Year 2010
on
Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
We, Tamim Bin Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, Deputy Emir of the State of
Qatar,
After having perused the Constitution; and
The Law No.(28) of 2002 on Anti-Money Laundering as amended by Decree
Law No. (21) of 2003; and
The Customs Law issued by Law No. (40) of 2002; and
The Law No.(3) of 2004 on Combating Terrorism; and
The Penal Code issued by Law No. (11) of 2004 and its amending laws; and
The Code of Criminal Procedure issued by Law No. (23) of 2004 as amended
by law No. (24) of 2009; and
The draft Law put forward by the Council of Ministers; and
After having consulted the Advisory Council, have decreed the following:
Annex 44
Article (1)
The Law on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, enclosed
with this Law, shall be effective.
Article (2)
The Law No.(28) of 2002 on Combating Money Laundering as amended by
Decree Law No. (21) of 2003, shall be repealed.
Article (3)
All competent authorities, each within its own competence, shall execute this
law which will be published in the Official Gazette.
Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani
Deputy Emir and Heir Apparent of the State of Qatar
Issued at the Emiri Diwan on: 2/4/1431 A.H
Corresponding to: 18/03/2010 AD
Annex 44
Law on Combating Money Laundering
and Terrorism Financing
Chapter 1
Definitions
Article (1)
In the application of this law, the following words and phrases shall have the
meanings shown against each of them, in accordance with concepts
prevailing in the banking business, unless the context indicates otherwise:-
Competent
Authority:
Every administrative or law enforcement authority
concerned with combating money laundering and
terrorism financing, including the Unit and any
supervisory authority.
Supervisory
Authority
A competent authority responsible for licensing or
supervising financial institutions, DNFBPs and nonprofit
organizations or for ensuring their compliance
with requirements to combat money laundering and
terrorism financing.
The Committee: The National Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism
Financing Committee.
The Unit: The Financial Information Unit.
Predicate offence: One of the asset-generating offences stipulated
under Article (2), paragraph (1) of this law.
Instrumentalities: Everything used or intended to be used, in any
manner, in whole or in part, for committing one or
more crimes stipulated in Articles (2), (4) of this law.
Proceeds of crime: Any funds derived or obtained, directly or indirectly,
from one of the crimes stipulated in Article (2/1), or
converted or transformed in whole or in part, into
other properties or investment yields.
Annex 44
Funds: Assets or properties of every kind, whether tangible
or intangible, movable or immovable, liquid or fixed,
and all the rights attached thereto, and all legal
documents or instruments in any form, including
electronic or digital copies evidencing any of the
above, whether existing inside or outside of the State.
They include but are not limited to national currency,
foreign currency, commercial notes, bank credits,
travellers’ cheques, money orders, shares, securities,
bonds, bills, letters of credit, and any interest,
dividends or other income on or value accruing from
or generated by such assets.
Money Laundering: Any of the following acts:
1) The conversion or transfer of funds, by any person
who knows, should have known or suspects that such
funds are the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of
concealing or disguising the illicit origin of such funds
or of assisting any person who is involved in the
commission of the predicate offence to evade the
legal consequences of his actions.
2) The concealment or disguise of the true nature,
source, location, disposition, movement or ownership
of or rights with respect to funds by any person who
knows, should have known or suspects that such
funds are the proceeds of crime.
3) The possession, acquisition, or use of funds by
any person who knows, should have known or
suspects that such funds are the proceeds of crime.
Terrorist Act: 1) An act which constitutes an offence according to
the following agreements: Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970),
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971),
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents (1973), International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979),
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (1980), Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988),
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Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988),
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Shelf (1988), and the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (1997).
2) any other act intended to cause death or serious
bodily injury to civilians, or to any other person not
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a Government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
Terrorist: Any natural person who commits any of the following
acts:
1) commission or attempting to commit, terrorist acts,
intentionally, by any means, either directly or
indirectly,
2) participation as an accomplice in terrorist acts.
3) organizing terrorist acts, or directing others to
commit such acts.
4) contributing to the commission of terrorist acts with
a group of persons acting with a common purpose
where the contribution is made intentionally and with
the aim of furthering the terrorist act or with the
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a
terrorist act.
Terrorist
Organization:
Any group of terrorists that:
1) commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts, by
any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and
wilfully.
2) acts as an accomplice in the execution of terrorist
acts.
3) organises or directs others to commit terrorist acts.
4) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts with
a group of persons acting with a common purpose
where the contribution is made intentionally and with
the aim of furthering the terrorist act or with the
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a
terrorist act.
Terrorism
Financing:
An act committed by any person who, in any manner,
directly or indirectly, and willingly, provides or collects
funds, or attempts to do so, with the intention to use
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them or knowing that these funds will be used in
whole or in part for the execution of a terrorist act, or
by a terrorist or terrorist organization.
Freezing: Prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition,
movement, or transport of funds on the basis of, and
for the duration of the validity of, a decision of a
judicial or other competent authority.
Seizing: Prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition,
movement, or transport of funds on the basis of, and
for the duration of the validity of, a decision of a
competent judicial authority.
Confiscation: The permanent deprivation of funds based on a court
judgment.
Financial Institution: Any person or entity who conducts as a business one
or more of the following activities or operations for or
on behalf of a customer:
(1) accepting deposits and other repayable funds
such as private banking services.
(2) lending.
(3) financial leasing.
(4) transferring money or things of value.
(5) issuing or managing means of payment, such as
credit and debit cards, cheques, traveller’s
cheques, money orders, banker’s drafts and
electronic
money.
(6) financial guarantees and commitments.
(7) trading in money market instruments, such as
cheques, bills, certificates of deposit and derivatives,
foreign exchange, exchange instruments, interest
rate, index instruments, transferable securities, and
commodity futures trading.
(8) participating in securities issues and providing
financial services related to securities issues.
(9) undertaking individual or collective portfolio
management.
(10) safekeeping or administering cash or liquid
securities on behalf of other persons.
(11) investing, administering or managing funds or
money on behalf of other persons.
(12) underwriting or placing life insurance and other
investment-related insurance, whether as insurer or
insurance contract intermediary.
(13) money or currency changing.
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(14) any other activity or operation prescribed by
resolution issued by the Prime Minister upon the
proposal of the Committee.
Designated Non-
Financial
Businesses and
Professions
(DNFBPs):
(1) Real estate brokers, if they act in transactions for
customers in relation to buying or selling of real
estate, or both.
(2) Dealers in precious metals or stones, if they
engage with their customers in cash transactions
equal to a minimum of 55,000 Riyals.
(3) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal
professionals, or accountants, whether sole
practitioners, partners or employed specialists in
specialist firms, if they prepare, execute, or conduct
transactions for clients in relation to any of the
following activities:
(a) buying or selling real estate.
(b) managing client money, securities or other assets.
(c) managing bank, savings or securities accounts.
(d) organising contributions for the creation, operation
or management of companies or other entities.
(e) creating, operating or managing legal persons or
legal arrangements.
(f) buying or selling business entities.
(4) Trust Funds and Company Service Providers, if
they prepare, or conducts transactions for customer
on commercial basis in relation to any of the
following activities:
a) acting as a founding agent of legal persons.
b) acting as, or arranging for another person to
act as, a director or secretary of a company, a
partner of a partnership, or a similar position in
relation to other legal persons.
c) providing a registered office, a business
headquarter, or correspondence address or an
administrative address, for one of the companies,
partnerships or any other legal person or legal
arrangement.
d) acting as, or arranging for another person to
act as, a trustee for a direct trust fund.
e) acting as, or arranging for another person to
act as, a nominee shareholder on behalf of
another person.
(5) any other business or profession prescribed and
regulated by a resolution issued by the Prime Minister
upon the proposal of the Committee.
Non-profit Any legal entity or organization which collects, or
disposes of funds for charitable, religious, cultural,
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organization: educational, social, or fraternal purposes, or to do
any other kind of charitable activities.
Legal arrangements: Express trust funds or any similar legal
arrangements.
Financial Bearer
Negotiable
Instruments:
Monetary instruments in bearer form such as
travellers cheques; negotiable instruments, including
cheques, promissory notes, and money orders that
are either in bearer form, endorsed without restriction,
made out to a fictitious payee, or otherwise in such
form that title thereto passes upon delivery;
incomplete instruments including cheques,
promissory notes and money orders signed, but with
the payee’s name omitted.
Beneficial Owner: The natural person who owns, or exercises effective
control, over the customer, or the person on whose
behalf, the transaction is conducted, or the person
who exercises effective control over a legal person,
or legal arrangement.
Politically exposed
persons:
Persons who are or have been entrusted with
prominent public functions in a foreign country or
territory, or any one of their’ family or one of their
closely related partners.
Shell Bank: A bank that has no physical presence in the country or
territory in which it is incorporated and licensed and is
not affiliated with a regulated financial services group
that is subject to effective consolidated supervision.
“Physical presence” in a country or territory is a
presence involving meaningful decision-making and
effective management and not merely the presence of
a local agent or low level staff.
Correspondent
Banking
The provision of banking services by a bank (the
“correspondent”) to another bank (the “respondent”).
Business Any relationship of a commercial aspect, including the
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Relationship: relationship between a non-profit organization and the
persons from or to whom it receives or provides funds.
Customer: Any person dealing with financial institutions, DNFBPs
and non-profit organization, including the person from
or to whom non-profit organizations receive or provide
funds.
Law Enforcement
Authority:
Judicial Officers, stipulated under article (27) of the
afore-mentioned Code of Criminal Procedure.
Legal Person: Corporate Person, i.e. company, partnership,
corporation or association, or any similar body that
can establish a permanent business relationship with
a financial institution or can own property.
Chapter 2
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
Article (2)
It shall be prohibited to launder any funds generated from:
(1) All types of felonies.
(2) Crimes covered under the International Conventions, signed and
ratified by the State.
(3) Swindling, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances, fraud, forgery, extortion, robbery, theft, trafficking in stolen
and other goods, counterfeiting and piracy of products, smuggling,
sexual exploitation, environmental crime, tax evasion, sale and trade in
archaeological movables, market manipulation and insider dealing.
It is prohibited to participate through association, aiding, abetting, facilitating,
counselling in, cooperation, contribution, or conspiracy to commit, or attempt
to commit any of the forms of the Money Laundering crime mentioned in this
law.
Predicate offences also include offences committed outside the State if they
constitute offences as per the law of the State where they were committed
and constitute an offence as per the law of the State.
A conviction with the predicate offence is not a condition to prove the illicit
source of crime proceeds.
The Money Laundering crime is considered as an independent crime from the
predicate offence. The punishment of the person who committed the predicate
offence does not prevent his punishment on the Money Laundering crime.
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Article (3)
Anyone who intentionally commits one of the following acts is considered to
have committed an offence associated with Money Laundering or Terrorism
Financing:
(1) a financial institution which enters into, or continues, a correspondent
banking relationship with a shell bank.
(2) a financial institution which enters into, or continues, a correspondent
banking relationship with a financial institution in a foreign country,
unless the financial institution has satisfied itself that the foreign
financial institution does not permit its accounts to be used by shell
banks.
(3) failure to maintain adequate, accurate and updated information on the
beneficial ownership and organizational structure of legal persons and
legal arrangements as required pursuant to this law;
(4) failure, as required by this law, to take the following measures:
(a) to identify a customer or verify the customer’s identity.
(b) to make enquiries in relation to a customer or collect relevant
information.
(c) to identify the beneficial owners of a customer or verify their
identity.
(d) to exercise ongoing due diligence with respect to business
relationships, to examine transactions carried out under a business
relationship, or to ensure that documents, data or information collected
under customer due diligence measures are kept up to date and
relevant.
(e) to take measures to address specific risks of money laundering
or terrorism financing.
(f) to have risk management systems.
(g) to meet a requirement in relation to a correspondent banking
relationship or wire transfers.
(h) to pay special attention to a transaction, pattern of transactions
or business relationships.
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(i) to develop or implement programs for the prevention of money
laundering and terrorism financing.
(5) failure to maintain relevant records, in accordance with the provisions
of this law or conceal, destroy or disguise such records.
(6) failure to provide or to facilitate access to information or records in a
timely fashion when requested by the competent authorities or the
supervisory authorities in accordance with the provisions of this law.
(7) failure to submit a report to the Unit as required pursuant to this law.
(8) opening or facilitating the opening of an account for an unidentified
customer, in violation to the provisions of this law.
Article (4)
It is prohibited to commit any terrorism financing act.
It is prohibited to participate through association, aiding, abetting, facilitating,
counselling in, cooperation, contribution, or conspiracy to commit, attempt to
commit any of the forms of the Terrorism Financing crime mentioned in this
law.
The offence is considered as committed irrespective of any occurrence of a
terrorist act, the place where it was committed, or whether the funds have
actually been used to commit such act as required pursuant to this law.
Article (5)
A person commits a money laundering or terrorism financing crime when he
receives information related to a money laundering or terrorism financing
crime, and does not take the specified legal measures to inform the
competent authorities of such crime.
Chapter 3
Disclosure to Customs
Article (6)
Any traveller, upon entering or leaving the State must, upon the request of a
customs officer, make a disclosure regarding being in possession of any
currency, bearer negotiable instruments, or precious metals or stones.
The customs authorities may request further information from the traveller
regarding the origin of the currency, bearer negotiable instruments, or
precious metals or stones or their intended use. In this case, he must provide
this information.
This information, including a true certified copy of the declaration form, shall
be sent to the Unit who shall enter the information in its database.
Article (7)
The customs authorities may take necessary action, to retain his identification
data or seize the currency, bearer negotiable instruments, precious metals or
stones in his possession in order to ascertain whether evidence of money
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laundering or terrorism financing may be found where there is a suspicion of
money laundering or terrorism financing or where there is a false disclosure or
failure to disclose the required information.
The customs authorities may refer matters to the Public Prosecution and may
also request the Public Prosecution to apply cautionary measures with regard
to suspected money laundering or terrorism financing crimes, in accordance
with the provision of Article (126) of the aforementioned Code of Criminal
Procedure.
Article (8)
The customs officers are required to keep confidential the information
obtained within the scope of their duties, even after the cessation of those
duties. Such information may only be used for the purposes provided for in
accordance with this law.
Article (9)
The customs authorities may cooperate with related authorities both nationally
and internationally with regard to the matters listed in this section and to the
information related to the discovering of an unusual movement of precious
metals or stones through customs departments.
The customs authorities may issue resolutions, directives or guidelines for
implementing the provisions of this section.
Chapter 4
The National Anti Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
Article (10)
A committee named “The National Anti Money Laundering and Terrorism
Financing” shall be formed at Qatar Central Bank, under the presidency of
Qatar Central Bank Deputy Governor, and the membership of:
1. Two representatives of the Ministry of Interior, one of them to be
chosen among the directors of the ministry’s competent departments
and to be appointed Vice-Chairman of the Committee.
2. Head of the Unit.
3. Two representatives of the Ministry of Economy & Finance, one of
them to be chosen from the General Directorate of Customs.
4. Representative of the Ministry of Business & Trade.
5. Representative of the Ministry of Sٍocial Affairs.
6. Representative of the Ministry of Justice.
7. Representative of the State Security Bureau.
8. Representative of the Qatar Central Bank.
9. Representative of the Public Prosecution.
10. Representative of the Qatar Financial Markets Authority.
11. Representative of the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority.
12. Representative of the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers.
Each body shall nominate its own representative, provided that its grade shall
not be lower than head of department or an equivalent grade. The Chairman,
the vice-chairman and the members shall be appointed by a resolution issued
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by the Prime Minister who may also appoint other representatives from other
bodies, upon the proposal of the Committee.
The Committee shall have a secretary, and a number of Qatar Central Bank
employees to accomplish secretarial tasks, and whose names to be
mandated, functions and remunerations to be prescribed by a resolution by
the QCB governor.
Article (11)
The Committee shall have the following powers:
1. Set the national anti-money laundering and terrorism financing strategy
for the State.
2. Facilitate coordination among the Ministries and authorities
represented in the Committee.
3. Study and follow the international developments in fighting against
money laundering and terrorism financing, and issue recommendations
to the relevant government authorities regarding the improvement of
the regulatory instructions and controls issued by the supervisory
authorities in the State and suggest legislative amendments in line with
those developments.
4. Monitor the implementation by competent authorities of the fighting
against money laundering and terrorism financing legal and institutional
framework.
5. Coordinate and host national training programs on anti-money
laundering and terrorism financing.
6. Take part in anti-money laundering and terrorism financing
international meetings and conferences.
7. Coordinate with the National Counter Terrorism Financing Committee,
formed under the Council of Minister Resolution No. (7) of 2007, with
regard to all what is related to international, regional and bilateral
terrorism financing conventions and treaties and with regard to
developing proper mechanisms for enforcement of the United Nations
resolutions related to combating terrorism financing.
8. Coordinate with the National Committee for Integrity and Transparency
issued by Emiri decree No. (84) of 2007, with regard to the committee’s
activities.
9. Prepare and submit an annual report to the Governor of the Central
Bank regarding the activities and efforts deployed by the Committee
and the national, regional and international developments in the antimoney
laundering and terrorism financing field and the Committee’s
proposals to strengthen control systems and regulations inside the
State.
Article (12)
The Committee shall be convened by its Chairman whenever needed. The
meetings shall be held at non-official working hours, however meetings may
be held at official working hours, if necessarily required.
The meetings shall not be considered valid without the presence of the
chairman or the vice-chairman. The Committee issues its recommendations
by majority of votes present. In case of tie vote, the Chairman shall cast the
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deciding vote. The vice-chairman will deputize for the chairman in his
absence.
The committee shall put in place its work system, including the rules required
for the exercise of its functions.
The Committee may select workgroups among its members or other
members, or delegate any of its members to address specific tasks falling
under its competences. It may also have recourse to experts selected from
among the government’s employees or any other experts to assist the
Committee in performing its duties.
Chapter 5
Financial Information Unit and Reporting Requirements
Article (13)
The “Financial Information Unit” shall be an independent unit, with a legal
personality and an independent budget affiliated to the State’s public budget.
It shall be located in the city of Doha.
The Head of the Unit shall be appointed by a resolution issued by the
Governor of Qatar Central Bank, upon the proposal of the Committee.
Sufficient number of qualified and trained employees shall be appointed to
join the Unit in addition to an adequate number of experts and specialists in
the fields relating to the implementation of the provisions of this law.
Article (14)
The Unit shall serve as a central national body which shall be responsible for
receiving, requesting, analyzing and disseminating information concerning
suspected proceeds of crime, potential money laundering or potential
terrorism financing operations, as provided for by this law.
The Unit shall have a database of all available financial data and information
and the Unit may disseminate data and information to judicial and law
enforcement authorities for investigation or action when there are grounds to
suspect money laundering or terrorism financing operations.
Article (15)
The Unit has the authority to obtain from any entity or person subject to the
reporting obligation in this law, any information it deems useful for the
accomplishment of its functions. The information requested shall be provided
within the time limits set and the form specified by the Unit, taking into
consideration the professional obligations limits stipulated under the Advocacy
Law, issued by Law No. (23) of 2006.
The Unit may request, directly or indirectly, in relation to any report it has
received, any additional information it deems useful for the accomplishment of
its functions from competent authorities, supervisory authorities, and
enforcement authorities.
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Whenever the Unit determines that a financial institution, non-profit
organization, or any DNFBP is not complying or has not complied with the
obligations set out in this law, it may notify the relevant supervisory authority
accordingly.
Article (16)
The Unit may, spontaneously or on request, share information with any
foreign counterpart agency that performs similar functions and is subject to
similar confidentiality obligations, regardless of the nature of the agency,
subject to reciprocity or pursuant to the provisions of international or bilateral
treaties.
The information provided shall be used only for the purposes of combating
predicate offences, money laundering, and terrorism financing and shall be
disclosed to another party only with the consent of the Unit.
Article (17)
The staffs of the Unit are required to keep confidential any information
obtained within the scope of their duties, even after the cessation of those
duties within the Unit. Such information may only be used for the purposes
provided for in accordance with this law.
Article (18)
The financial institutions, DNFBPs and non-profit organizations and their
personnel, shall report promptly to the Unit any suspicious financial
transactions or any attempts to perform such transactions, regardless of the
amount of the transaction, when they suspect or have reasonable grounds to
suspect that these transactions include funds that are proceeds of a criminal
activity or are linked or related to, or to be used in terrorist acts or by terrorist
organizations or those who finance terrorism.
Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals have no obligation to
report information they receive from or obtain through a client, in the course of
determining the legal position for their client or performing their task of
defending or representing that client, or information concerning judicial
proceedings, including advice on instituting or commencing proceedings,
whether such information is received or obtained before, during or after such
proceedings.
Article (19)
The Unit, in coordination with the supervisory authorities, shall issue directives
and guidelines to assist financial institutions, non-profit organizations and
DNFBPs on implementing and complying with their respective anti-money
laundering and terrorism financing requirements and with regard to filing
suspicious transaction reports.
Article (20)
The Unit shall report to the Public Prosecution the findings of its examination
and analysis when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that money
laundering or terrorism financing acts have been committed.
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The Unit may request the Public Prosecution to apply preventive measures
with regard to suspected proceeds of crime, potential money laundering, or
potential terrorism financing in accordance with the provision of Article (126)
of the aforementioned Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article (21)
The Unit shall prepare an annual report describing its activities in combating
money laundering and terrorism financing field and providing an overall
analysis and evaluation of the reports received and of money laundering and
terrorism financing trends. The annual report shall be submitted to the Council
of Ministers after being perused by the Committee.
Chapter 6
Preventive Measures
Article (22)
Adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial owner,
ownership and organizational structure of legal persons incorporated or
otherwise established in the State shall be maintained by the competent
commercial register systems.
Competent authorities and supervisory authorities shall have the right of
access to such information.
Article (23)
(1) Financial institutions, non-profit organizations and DNFBPs shall identify
their customers whether permanent or occasional, and whether natural or
legal persons or legal arrangements, verify their identities using reliable,
independent source documents, data or information, when establishing
business relationships, during a domestic or international transfer of funds;
when doubts exist about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained
customer identification documents, data or information; when there is a
suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing; when carrying out
occasional transactions, with a value equal to or above 55 000 Riyals, or an
equivalent amount in a foreign currency, or a lesser amount as set out by the
supervisory authorities, whether conducted as a single transaction or several
transactions that appear to be linked. If the amount of the transaction is
unknown at the time of the operation, the identification shall be done as soon
as the amount becomes known or the threshold is reached.
Financial institutions and DNFBPs shall enquire about the anticipated
purpose and the nature of the business relationship and collect all relevant
information.
They shall also identify the beneficial owner of the customer and take all
reasonable measures to verify his identity using reliable, independent source
documents, data or information until they are satisfied that they know who the
beneficial owner is. In the event that the customer is a legal person or legal
arrangements, these measures must include taking additional reasonable
measures to recognise and monitor the beneficial owner of the ownership of
that person or arrangement as well as the one who has control thereof.
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Article (24)
For the purposes of implementation of the requirements provided for in the
preceding article, identification of natural persons and verification of their
identity shall include the full name, as well as national identification number
for Qatari citizens and residents and the passport number for expatriates.
Identification of legal persons shall include obtaining and verifying information
concerning the corporate name, registered office business address, proof of
incorporation or similar evidence of their legal status, legal form, the names of
executives, and articles of association, as well as verifying that the person
purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised, and to identify
and verify the identity of that person.
Identification of legal arrangements that are express trusts shall include
identifying and verifying the identities of the trustees, the settlers, and major
beneficiaries.
Article (25)
Supervisory authorities may prescribe, by regulation, the circumstances in
which the verification of identity can be completed at a later stage provided:
(1) this is necessary in order not to interrupt the normal course of
business.
(2) there is little risk of money laundering or terrorism financing and these
risks are effectively managed.
(3) this is completed as soon as practicable after contact is first
established with the customer.
Article (26)
Financial institutions and DNFBPs shall put in place the following measures:
1- Exercise ongoing due diligence with respect to each business relationship
with a customer and scrutinise the transactions carried out under the business
relationship in order to ensure that they are consistent with their knowledge of
their customer, his business and risk profile and, where required, the source
of his income and wealth. A particular care shall be given to due diligence
measures related to higher risk customers, transactions, and business
relationships.
2- Ensure that documents, data and information collected under the customer
due diligence processes are kept up to date and relevant by undertaking
reviews of existing records, particularly for higher risk categories of customers
and business relationships.
3- Take specific and adequate measures to address the risks of money
laundering and terrorism financing, in the event they conduct business
relationships or execute transactions with a customer that is not physically
present for purposes of identification.
4- Put in place appropriate risk management systems to determine if a
customer or a beneficial owner is or is not a politically exposed person, and, if
so:
a- obtain approval from senior management before establishing a business
relationship with the customer.
b- take all reasonable measures to identify the source of wealth and funds
and identify the beneficial owner.
c- provide enhanced and ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.
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Article (27)
With respect to cross-border correspondent banking relationships, financial
institutions shall:
1- identify and verify the identification of respondent institutions.
2- collect information on the nature of the respondent institution’s business.
3- based on available information, evaluate the respondent institution’s
reputation and the nature of supervision to which it is subject.
4- obtain approval from senior management before establishing a
correspondent banking relationship.
5- assess the controls implemented by the respondent institution with respect
to anti-money laundering and terrorism financing, and ensure that they are
appropriate and effective.
6- in case of a correspondent payable through account, ensure that the
respondent institution has verified its customer’s identity, has implemented
mechanisms for ongoing monitoring with respect to its customers, and is
capable of providing relevant identifying information on request.
Article (28)
If financial institutions, and DNFBPs cannot fulfil their obligation of due
diligence described in Articles (23) through (27) of this law, they shall not
establish or maintain the business relationship.
Where appropriate, they shall submit a report to the Unit in accordance with
this law.
Article (29)
Financial institutions, and DNFBPs, each in its own competency, shall fulfil the
obligations described in Articles (23) through (27) of this law, with regard to
every customer with whom they have a business relationship or a crossborder
correspondent banking relationship which was already existing on the
commencement day of this law, during a period not exceeding six months
starting the commencement day.
Article (30)
Financial institutions whose activities include domestic and external wire
transfers of a value exceeding (4000) Riyals, or an equivalent value in other
currencies, shall obtain and verify the following information about the
originators of the transfers:
(1) full name.
(2) account number or, if there is no account number, a unique reference
number.
(3) address, Identity Card (ID) Number, or customer identification number,
or date and place of birth.
The information shall be included in the message or payment form
accompanying the transfer.
Supervisory authorities may issue directives with measures to be taken with
regard to some forms of wire transfers, including for transactions executed as
batch transfers and domestic transfers and credit or debit card transactions.
Institutions referred to in paragraph (1) of this article, and upon receipt of wire
transfers that do not contain the complete originator information, shall take
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measures to obtain and verify the missing information from the ordering
institution or the beneficiary. Should the institutions fail to obtain the missing
information, they shall decline the transfer and report it to the Unit.
Article (31)
In case of non-suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing, and
based on an assessment of the risks represented by customer, product,
business relationship or transactions, supervisory authorities may prescribe
by regulation, the simplification of customer due diligence obligations
established in this law with regard to the identification and verification of the
identity of the customer or the beneficial owner.
Article (32)
In case of non-suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing,
supervisory authorities may, by regulation, authorise financial institutions to
rely on measures conducted by others for the customer as required by this
section.
In all cases, financial institutions remain responsible for the proper conduct of
prescribed measures as required by this chapter and ongoing monitoring for
their customers.
Article (33)
Financial institutions and DNFBPs shall pay special attention to the following
matters:
1- Verification of the background and purpose in regards to all complex,
unusual large transactions and all unusual patterns of transactions, which
have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose.
2- Verification of the background and purpose in regards to business
relationships and transactions with persons, including legal persons and legal
arrangements which are subject to legal systems that do not apply or that do
not sufficiently apply the relevant international standards to combat money
laundering and terrorism financing.
3- Have policies and procedures in place to address risks arising from
products and transactions that favour anonymity.
Financial institutions and DNFBPs shall set forth in writing the specific
information regarding transactions as referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of
this article and the identity of all parties involved. They shall maintain it as
specified in this law and shall be made available if requested by the Unit, the
supervisory authorities or other competent authorities.
Article (34)
Financial institutions and DNFBPs shall maintain records of the following
information:
(1) copies of documents verifying the identities of customers, beneficial
owners, obtained in accordance with the provisions in this chapter, account
files and business correspondence for a minimum of five years after the
business relationship has ended or longer if requested by the competent
authority in specific cases.
(2) information obtained in accordance with the provisions in this chapter, to
enable the tracing of transactions, attempted or executed by customers and
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the written reports established in accordance with the provisions of this law for
a minimum of five years following the attempt or execution of the transaction
or longer if requested by the competent authority in specific cases.
Financial institutions and DNFBPs shall ensure that the records and
underlying information are readily available to the Unit and other competent
authorities.
Article (35)
Financial institutions and DNFBPs shall develop and implement programs for
the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing. Such programs
shall include the following:
(1) internal policies, procedures, systems and controls, including sound
implementation of program management arrangements, and appropriate
employee screening procedures to ensure that they are appointed accordingly
with the highest standards.
(2) ongoing training for officers and employees to assist them in recognizing
transactions and activities that may be linked to money laundering and
terrorism financing and inform them of the procedures to be followed in such
cases.
(3) audit arrangements to check compliance with and effectiveness of the
measures taken to apply this law.
Article (36)
Financial institutions and DNFBPs shall designate an officer at the level of
department leadership to be responsible for overseeing implementation of this
law within the institution.
Article (37)
The relevant supervisory authorities may by regulation determine the type and
extent of measures to be taken by financial institutions, NPOs and DNFBPs,
having regard to the requirements of this chapter.
Article (38)
Financial institutions shall require their foreign majority owned subsidiaries
and branches to implement the requirements of this section except to the
extent that local applicable laws and regulations prevent this. If the laws of the
country where the majority owned subsidiary or branch is situated prevent
compliance with these obligations, the financial institution shall so inform its
supervisory authority.
Article (39)
Under no circumstance shall financial institutions, NPOs and DNFBPs, and
their personnel disclose to their customer or a third party that information was
provided to the Unit or that a report concerning suspected money laundering
or terrorism financing will be, is being or has been submitted to the Unit or that
a money laundering or terrorism financing investigation is being or has been
carried out.
This shall preclude disclosures or communications regarding suspicious
money laundering or terrorism financing between and among their directors,
officers and employees, legal departments and appropriate competent
authorities, while performing their duties.
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Article (40)
Save the professional obligations stated in the Advocacy Act, issued by Law
No. (23) of 2006, professional secrecy or requirements shall not be invoked
as a ground not to provide information or documents, when requested, in
accordance with the provisions of this law.
Chapter 7
Supervisory Authorities
Article (41)
A supervisory authority may issue or make regulations, directives, rules,
guidelines, recommendations or other instruments, for the implementation of
the provisions of this law and for the purpose of fighting against money
laundering and terrorism financing.
Article (42)
The supervisory authorities shall supervise compliance by financial
institutions, NPOs and DNFBPs with the requirements stipulated in this law.
They shall:
(1) adopt necessary measures to establish fit and proper criteria for owning,
controlling, or participating, directly or indirectly, in the directorship,
management or operation of financial institutions.
(2) regulate and supervise financial institutions, NPOs and DNFBPs for
compliance with the obligations set out in this law, including through on-site
examinations, and the request of documents, information, or records.
(3) cooperate and share information with competent authorities, and provide
assistance in evidence collection, prosecutions or proceedings relating to
predicate offences, money laundering, and terrorism financing.
(4) develop in cooperation with the Unit, standards applicable to the reporting
of suspicious transactions that shall take into account pertinent national and
international standards.
(5) ensure that financial institutions and their foreign branches and majority
owned subsidiaries adopt and enforce measures consistent with this law
except to the extent that local laws and regulations prevent this.
(6) report promptly to the Unit any information concerning suspicious
transactions or information that could be related to money laundering or
terrorism financing.
(7) provide prompt and effective cooperation to counterpart agencies
performing similar functions in other States, including exchange of
information.
(8) maintain statistics concerning measures adopted and sanctions imposed
in the context of enforcing this law.
Article (43)
No one may operate as a DNFBP without prior registration by the relevant
supervisory authority, taking into consideration legal regulations specific to
each business and profession.
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Article (44)
A supervisory authority, in case of a violation of the obligations established
under this law by a financial institution, NPO, or DNFBP, made intentionally or
by gross negligence, is evidenced, may impose one or more of the following
measures and sanctions:
(1) ordering regular reports on the measures it is taking.
(2) ordering compliance with specific instructions.
(3) sending written warnings.
(4) replacing or restricting the powers of managers, board members, or
controlling owners, including the appointing of ad hoc administrator.
(5) barring individuals from employment within a business, profession or
activity , either permanently or for a provisional period.
(6) imposing supervision, suspending license, restricting or withdrawing any
other form of permission and prohibiting the continuation of a business,
profession or activity.
(7) imposing financial penalty in an amount no greater than 10 million Rials.
(8) any other measures.
The supervisory authority shall inform the Unit of the measures and sanctions
imposed.
Chapter 8
Investigation Procedures and Provisional Measures
Article (45)
Investigation in money laundering crimes may be carried out independently
from predicate offences.
Article (46)
The Public Prosecutor, or the authorised General Advocates, may issue an
order to the financial institutions, DNFBPs, or NPOs to disclose or provide any
information or data on any accounts, deposits, trusts, funds or other
transactions that may assist in revealing the facts of any possible money
laundering or terrorism financing crimes, or any related predicate offence.
Article (47)
The Public Prosecutor, or authorised General Advocates, may issue an order
to seize all types of letters, printed materials, mail boxes, and telegrams and
to control all communication means and record any activities taking place in
public or private places if this assists in revealing the facts of any possible
money laundering or terrorism financing crime, or any related predicate
offence.
In all cases, the seizure order or the recording order shall be grounded on
reasons and it shall not exceed ninety days. This term may only be extended
pursuant to an order issued by the competent court.
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Article (48)
Without prejudice to the authority of the Public Prosecutor set out in this law,
in cases where there is a concern about the disposal of money laundering
proceeds held at Financial Institutions, or where there is suspicion that funds,
balances or accounts are being used in terrorism financing, the Governor of
the Central Bank, may order the freezing of the suspected funds, balances or
accounts for a period not exceeding ten business days. The Public Prosecutor
shall be notified of such an order within three business days of its issuance,
otherwise it shall be treated as void ab initio. The Public Prosecutor may
cancel the freezing order or renew it for a period not exceeding three months.
The freezing order may not be renewed beyond the three months limit
referred to except by order of the competent court at the request of the Public
Prosecutor and the renewal shall be for a similar period or periods until a final
judgment is passed in the criminal case.
In all cases, every party concerned may lodge a grievance against the
freezing order or the renewal thereof before the competent court within 30
days from the date of his knowledge thereof, and the court ruling thereon shall
be final.
Article (49)
Without prejudice to the rights of third parties acting in good faith, the Public
Prosecutor may, at his discretion, impose temporary measures including
freezing or seizing, intended to preserve the availability of funds,
instrumentalities used or intended to be used in the commission of a predicate
offence, a money laundering crime, or a terrorism financing crime, or any
properties of corresponding value.
Such measures may be lifted at any time by the competent court at the
request of the Public Prosecutor, or at the request of the suspects or persons
claiming rights to these properties.
Article (50)
The Public Prosecutor shall issue the necessary orders for freezing the funds
of terrorists, those who finance terrorism and terrorist organizations,
designated by the United Nations Security Council acting pursuant to Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, or designated by a resolution issued by the
Combating of Terrorism Committee, formed under the Council of Ministers
Resolution No.(7) of 2007, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution (1373)
of 2001 or subsequent resolutions.
The Public Prosecutor’s decision shall define the terms, conditions and time
limits applicable to the freezing, and shall be published in the Official Gazette.
The financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and
professions, or any other person holding such funds shall immediately freeze
them and report the freezing to the Unit or any competent authority.
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Article (51)
Frozen funds shall remain the property of persons which had interest therein,
when the freezing was imposed. The financial institution may continue the
management thereof.
Seized funds shall remain the property of persons which had interest therein,
when the seizure was signed, provided that they are managed by the
competent judicial authority.
Chapter 9
International Cooperation
Section: One
General Rules
Article (52)
The competent authorities shall provide help to their competent counterpart
authorities in other States for purposes of extradition and mutual legal
assistance in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings related
to money laundering and terrorism financing, according to the rules set by the
aforementioned Code of Criminal Procedure, the bilateral or multilateral
agreements, that Qatar is party thereto, or the reciprocity principle, and in
such a way that does not contradict the basic principles of the State’s legal
system.
The request for criminal extradition or legal assistance shall only be executed,
based on this law, unless the law of the requesting State and the laws of the
State of Qatar penalize the crime, which is the subject of extradition request,
or a similar crime. Dual criminality shall be deemed to have been fulfilled
irrespective of whether the laws of the requesting State place the offence
within the same category of offences or denominate the offence by the same
terminology as in the State, provided the conduct underlying the offence for
which request is presented is a criminal offence under the laws of the
requesting States.
Article (53)
The Public Prosecutor has the authority and power to receive requests for
mutual legal assistance or extradition requests sent by competent foreign
authorities with respect to money laundering and terrorism financing, and he
shall either execute them or refer them to the competent authorities for
execution as soon as possible.
In urgent cases, such requests may be sent through the International Criminal
Police Organization (ICPO/Interpol) or directly by the competent foreign
authorities to the judicial authorities of the State. In such cases, the authority
receiving the request shall notify the Public Prosecutor.
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Requests and answers should be sent either by post or any other faster
means that makes a written record or its equivalent obtainable under
conditions allowing the State to establish authenticity.
In all cases, requests and their annexes shall be accompanied by a
translation into Arabic.
Article (54)
Requests for legal assistance or extradition requests shall include the
following:
1) the identity of the authority requesting the measures.
2) the name and function of the authority conducting the investigation, or
prosecution.
3) the requested authority.
4) the purpose of the request and any relevant contextual remarks.
5) the facts supporting the request.
6) any known details that may facilitate identification of the person concerned,
particularly his name, his marital status, his nationality, his address, his
location and his occupation.
7) any information necessary for identifying and tailing the persons, tracking
instrumentalities, funds or properties in question.
8) the legal text incriminating the act or, if required, a statement of the law
applicable to the offence and any indication of the penalty that can be
imposed against the offender.
9) the details of the assistance required and any specific procedures that the
requesting State wishes to be applied.
In addition, to the preceding data, the request shall include in some specific
cases, the following particulars:
1) a description of the measures sought in case of requests for provisional
measures.
2) a statement of the relevant facts and arguments to enable the judicial
authorities to order the confiscation under the law, this shall be sought in case
of requests for the issuance of a confiscation order.
3) in case of requests for the enforcement of orders relating to provisional
measures or confiscations:
a) a certified copy of the order, and a statement of the grounds for issuing the
order if they are not indicated in the order itself.
b) a document certifying that the order is executable and is incontestable by
the normal path of appeal.
c) an indication of the extent to which the order is to be enforced and the
amount to be recovered from the value of properties.
d) any information concerning third-party rights in the instrumentalities,
proceeds, properties or other things in question if such information is possible
and appropriate.
e) the original copy of the judicial judgment, or a certified copy thereof or any
other document indicating the conviction of the person accused and the
sentence imposed, the fact that the sentence is enforceable and the extent to
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which the sentence remains to be served, this is in case of requests for
extradition of a person convicted of committing a crime.
Article (55)
The Public Prosecutor or the concerned competent authority may, out of its
own motion or based on the request of the Public Prosecutor, request
additional information from the competent foreign authority if such information
is necessary to execute or facilitate the execution of the request.
Article (56)
It must be adhered to the confidentiality of the request if a condition to that
effect is stipulated therein, and if that is not possible, the requesting authority
shall be promptly informed thereof.
Article (57)
The Public Prosecutor may delay the referral of the request to the competent
authorities responsible for the execution of the request if the measure or order
sought is likely to substantially interfere with an ongoing investigation or a
pending case. Consequently, the requesting authority shall immediately be
informed of such delay.
Section: Two
Mutual Legal Assistance
Article (58)
If a foreign State requests mutual legal assistance in connection with money
laundering or terrorism financing, the request shall be executed in accordance
with the principles set out in this chapter. The mode of mutual legal
assistance, in particular, may include the following:
1) obtaining evidence or statements from persons.
2) assistance in making detained persons, voluntary witnesses or others
appear before the judicial authorities of the requesting State in order to give
evidence or assist in investigations.
3) delivering of judicial papers.
4) executing searches and seizures.
5) examining objects and sites.
6) providing information, evidentiary items and experts reports.
7) providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records,
including government, bank, financial, companies and business records.
8) identifying or tracking the proceeds of crime, funds or property or
instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary or confiscation purposes.
9) confiscation of assets.
10) execution of freezing and other provisional measures.
11) any other form of mutual legal assistance which is not contrary to the
laws in force in the State.
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Article (59)
A request for mutual legal assistance shall not be refused except in the
following cases:
1) If it was not made by a competent authority according to the law of the
requesting State, or if it was not sent in accordance with applicable laws or if
its contents are in substantial non-conformity with Article (54) of this law.
2) If its execution is likely to prejudice the security, sovereignty, public order or
fundamental interests of the State.
3) If the offence to which the request relates is the subject of criminal case,
which is pending or has already been adjudicated upon by a final judgment in
the State.
4) If there are substantial grounds for believing that the measure or order
being sought is directed at the person in question solely on account of that
person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinions, gender or
status.
5) If the offence referred to in the request is not provided for under the laws of
the State or does not have features in common with an offence provided for
under the law of the State; however, assistance shall be otherwise granted if it
does not entail coercive measures.
6) If it is not possible to issue an order to take or execute the measures
requested by reason of the rules of prescription applicable to money
laundering or terrorism financing under the legislation of the State or the law
of the requesting State.
7) If the order whose execution is being requested is not enforceable under
the law.
8) If the decision rendered in the requesting State was issued under
conditions that did not afford sufficient protections with respect to the rights of
the accused.
Article (60)
No request for mutual legal assistance shall be refused on the basis of unduly
restrictive conditions, or on the basis of confidentiality provisions which bind
the financial institutions, or for the sole ground that the offence involves fiscal
matters.
The decision passed by a court, in relation to a request for mutual legal
assistance shall be subject to appeal, in accordance with prescribed legal
rules.
In case of refusal to execute the request, the Public Prosecutor or the
competent authority in the State shall promptly inform the foreign competent
authority of the grounds for refusal.
Article (61)
Requests for Investigative measures shall be undertaken in conformity with
the procedural rules of the State, unless the competent foreign authority has
requested specific procedures which are not contrary to such rules to be
followed.
A public official authorised by the competent foreign authority may attend the
implementation of the measures.
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Article (62)
Requests for taking provisional measures shall be executed in accordance
with the above-mentioned Code of Criminal Procedure. If the request is
worded in general terms, the most appropriate measures provided by law `
Should the requested measures are not provided for in the aforementioned
Code of Criminal Procedure, the competent authority may substitute those
measures with measures provided for in that Code, which have effects
corresponding most closely to the requested measures.
The provisions relating to the lifting of provisional measures as stipulated in
this law shall be applicable. Before lifting the provisional measures, the
requesting State should be informed thereof.
Article (63)
In case of a request for mutual legal assistance seeking a confiscation order,
the competent authorities shall recognize the confiscation order made by a
court of the requesting State or refer the request to the Public Prosecution for
issuing the confiscation order and the execution thereof if such order has
been issued.
The confiscation order shall apply to the funds referred to in the confiscation
provisions of this law, and existing in the territory of the State.
Where the competent authorities recognize and enforce a confiscation order,
they shall be bound by the findings of facts on which the order is based.
Article (64)
Without prejudice to the rights of a bonafide owner, the State shall have
power of disposal of properties confiscated on its territory at the request of
foreign authorities, unless an agreement concluded with the requesting State
provides otherwise.
Article (65)
The competent authorities of the State may enter into bilateral or multilateral
agreements or arrangements, in relation to matters that are the subject of
investigations or proceedings in one or more States, in order to set up joint
investigative teams and conduct joint investigations.
In the absence of such agreements or arrangements joint investigations may
be undertaken on a case by case basis.
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Section : Three
Criminals’ Extraditions
Article (66)
Money laundering and terrorism financing shall be considered as an
extraditable offence.
For the purposes of this law, money laundering and terrorism financing shall
not be regarded as political offences, or offences connected with a political
offence, or offences inspired by political motives.
Article (67)
Extradition shall not be granted in the following cases:
1) If there are substantial grounds to believe that the request for extradition
has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on
account of that person's sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political
opinions or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that
person’s position for any one of these reasons.
2) If a final judgment has been rendered in the State in respect of the offence
for which extradition is requested.
3) If the person whose extradition is requested has, under the legislation of
either country, become immune from prosecution or punishment for any
reason, including elapse of time or amnesty.
4) If there are substantial grounds to conclude that the person whose
extradition is requested has been or would be subjected to torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or if that person has not received or would
not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, pursuant to
international standards in that regard.
5) the person whose extradition is requested is a Qatari citizen.
Extradition shall not be refused on the sole ground that the offence is
considered to entail fiscal matters.
Article (68)
Extradition may be refused if:
1) a prosecution in respect of the offence for which extradition is requested is
pending in the State against the person whose extradition is requested.
2) the offence for which extradition is requested has been committed outside
the territory of either country and the legislation of the State does not provide
for jurisdiction over offences committed outside its territory for the offence
which gave rise to the request.
3) the person whose extradition is requested has been sentenced for the
conduct which gives rise to the request or would be liable to be tried or
sentenced in the requesting State by an irregular or fundamentally unfair
extraordinary or ad hoc court or tribunal.
4) the State, while also taking into account the nature of the offence and the
interests of the requesting State, considers that, in the circumstances of the
case, the extradition of the person in question would be incompatible with
humanitarian considerations in view of the age, health or other personal
circumstances of that person.
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5) the extradition is requested pursuant to a final judgment rendered in the
absence of the convicted person who, for reasons beyond his control, has not
had sufficient notice of the trial or the opportunity to arrange for his defence
and he has not had or will not have the opportunity to have the case retried in
his presence.
6) the State has assumed jurisdiction over the offence.
Article (69)
If extradition is refused on either of the grounds stated in this law, the case
shall be referred to the competent authorities in order to institute criminal
proceedings against the person concerned in respect of the offence which
gave rise to the request.
Article (70)
With regard to money laundering and terrorism financing, the State may assist
in extradition after receipt of a request for provisional arrest by the requesting
State, provided that the person whose extradition is requested explicitly
consents before a competent authority.
Chapter 10
Penalties
Article (71)
The money laundering crime does not fall within the provisions of Article (85)
of the afore-mentioned Penal Code.
Article (72)
Without prejudice to a more severe punishment prescribed under any other
law:
1- Any one who commits, or attempts to commit one of the terrorism financing
crimes stipulated in Article (4) of this law shall be sentenced to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding ten years and a fine not exceeding 2.000.000 Riyals.
2- Any one who commits, or attempts to commit one of the money laundering
crimes stipulated in Article (2) of this law shall be sentenced to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding seven years and by a fine not exceeding 2.000.000
Riyals.
3- Any one who violates the provisions of Articles (3), (5), and (39) of this law
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and
by a fine not exceeding 500,000 Riyals.
The penalties stipulated under the previous paragraphs shall be doubled if the
criminal was assisted in the commitment of his crime by one or more persons
or by an organised criminal gang, or through a terrorist organization; or if the
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crime was committed as part of other criminal acts; or if it is associated with
other criminal activities; or if the criminal committed the crime by abusing his
authority or powers in a financial institution, NPO or DNFBP, or by abusing
the facilities offered through his job position or his professional or social
activity; or if the criminal has taken part in the predicate offence from which
the funds of the money laundering crime derive, whether as committer or
partner, or for the intention to hinder the investigation of the money laundering
and terrorism financing crime.
In addition to the penalties mentioned in the above two paragraphs, the
perpetrator of a crime may be barred from employment within a business,
profession or activity, which contributed in presenting the opportunity to
commit a crime provided for in this article, either permanently or for a
provisional period.
Article (73)
Without prejudice to a more severe punishment prescribed under any other
law, any one who breaches the provisions of Article (6), paragraphs (1) and
(2), and Article (17) of this law shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding three years and a fine not exceeding 500,000 Riyals.
Article (74)
Without prejudice to a more severe punishment prescribed under any other
law, any one who breaches the provision of Article (8) of this law shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and a fine not
exceeding 100,000 Riyals.
Article (75)
Without prejudice to a more severe punishment prescribed under any other
law, a legal person, on whose behalf or for whose benefit money laundering
or terrorism financing has been committed by any natural person, acting either
individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading
position within it, based on a power of representation of the legal person, an
authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person, or an authority to
exercise control within the legal person, acting in such capacity, shall be
punished by a fine not less than 5 million Riyals or equivalent to the total
value of the instrumentalities and the proceeds of the crime, irrespective of
the conviction of the natural person as perpetrator of the offence.
The above does not prevent the punishment of the natural person, perpetrator
of the crime with the corresponding sanction prescribed by the law.
A legal person may additionally be barred permanently or for a provisional
period from directly or indirectly carrying on certain business activities, placed
under court supervision; ordered to close, permanently or for a provisional
period, its premises which were used for the commission of the offence;
wound up; or ordered to publicise the judgment issued in relation thereto.
Article (76)
Without prejudice to a more severe punishment prescribed under any other
law, every financial institution, or DNFBP shall be punished by a fine not
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exceeding 1.000.000 Riyals, if it violates the provision of Article (50) of this
law.
Article (77)
In the event of a conviction for a predicate offence, a money laundering or a
terrorism financing crime, or an attempt to commit such an offence, without
prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, an order shall be issued by
the court for the confiscation of:
1) funds constituting the proceeds of crime, including properties intermingled
with such proceeds or derived from or exchanged for such proceeds, or
properties the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds.
2) funds forming the object of the offence.
3) funds constituting income and other benefits obtained from such funds or
properties, or proceeds of crime.
4) instrumentalities of the crime.
5) funds referred to in this article that have been disposed of and transferred
to any party, unless the court finds that the owner acquired them by paying a
fair price or in return of services corresponding to their value or on any other
legitimate grounds, and that he was unaware of its illicit origin.
If, in cases where an offence is established by the provisions of this law, the
perpetrator thereof has not been convicted because he is unknown, or he
died, the Public Prosecution may nevertheless submit the file to the
competent court to order the confiscation of the seized funds if sufficient
evidence is adduced that they constitute proceeds of crime.
In all cases, the confiscation order shall specify the relevant funds and contain
the necessary details to identify and locate these funds.
Article (78)
Without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, a contract,
arrangement, or any other legal instrument, shall become null and void if its
parties or any party becomes aware or believes that the purpose of the
contract is to avoid confiscation of the instrumentalities, returns or proceeds
related to either a money laundering or a terrorism financing crime.
Article (79)
Unless otherwise provided for in this law, confiscated funds shall accrue to the
State Treasury. Such funds shall remain encumbered, up to their value, by
any rights lawfully established in favour of third parties acting in good faith.
Article (80)
An office for seizure and confiscation shall be established and directly
affiliated to the Public Prosecutor. It shall be responsible for identifying and
tracing funds that may be subject to seizure and confiscation. It shall collect
and maintain all data associated with its mission in accordance with the law. It
shall also manage seized assets.
Article (81)
The office for seizure and confiscation shall be responsible for the
administration or management of seized assets in accordance with the
feasible means available to it, with a view to returning or confiscating such
assets in a condition reasonably comparable to their condition at the time of
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the seizure. The Public Prosecutor may authorise the sale of funds or
properties likely to incur significant depreciation as a result of management or
for which the cost of preservation is unreasonably disproportional to its value.
In such case, the value of the sale shall remain subject to the seizure.
The office for seizure and confiscation shall manage the sums of money
seized unless they were already entrusted to a financial institution or private
manager or were seized or withheld there.
Article (82)
Every person, who reports, in good faith, any suspicious transaction covered
under the provisions of this law or submits any information or data on
suspicious transactions is exempted from criminal or civil liability for breach of
professional secrecy requirements.
No criminal action for money laundering or terrorism financing shall be
brought against financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and
professions, NPOs or their personnel in connection with the execution of a
suspicious transaction where reports of suspicions were made in good faith in
accordance with this law.
Article (83)
A perpetrator of money laundering or terrorism financing crime shall be
exempted from the punishments of imprisonment and fine payment stipulated
under this law if he notifies the competent authorities of any information
related to the crime and involved persons, before they become aware of the
crime.
If the notification takes place after the competent authorities have become
aware of the crime and the involved persons, which led to the detention of the
remaining criminals and the confiscation of the instrumentalities and the
proceeds, the court may issue a judgment suspending the imposition of the
punishment.
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Annex 45
State of Qatar, Decree No. 11 of 2017 to Amend Law No. 3 of 2004 (13 July 2017)

7
Decree Law no. (11) of 2017
On Amendment of Some Provisions of Law no. (3) of the year 2004
On Combating Terrorism
We, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani Amir of the State of Qatar,
Having perused the Constitution; and
Law no. (10) of the year 2002 on the General Prosecution, as amended by Law no. (4) of the year 2005;
and
Law no. (3) of the year 2004 on Combating Terrorism; and
The Penal Code promulgated by Law no. (11) of the year 2004 and the laws promulgated in amendment
thereto; and
The Code of Criminal Procedure promulgated by Law No. (23) of the year 2004 and the laws
promulgated in amendment thereto; and
The Law on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism promulgated by Law no. (4) of the
year 2010; and
Based on the recommendation of the Minister of Interior, and
The draft law presented by the Council of Ministers,
Have enacted the following Law:
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Article (1)
The text of Articles (1) and (2) of the afore‐referenced Law no. (3) of the year 2004 shall be replaced
by the following:
Article (1):
“In applying the provisions of this Law, the following words and terms shall have the meanings
ascribed thereto as shown opposite each word or term, unless the context requires otherwise:
1. Crimes of terrorism: Every crime provided in this Law and every felony provided in the Penal
Code or any other law that is committed using one of the means of
terrorism or with the aim of executing or carrying out an act of terrorism
or to call to or threaten with the commission of any of the above crimes.
2. Act of terrorism: Any use of force, violence, threat, or intimidation inside or outside the
country with the aim of disabling the provisions of the Constitution or
the law, to violate the public order, expose the safety or security of
society to danger, or do damage to the national unity, if such use leads
or may lead to harming or frightening people or exposing their lives,
freedoms, or security to threats; causing harm to the environment,
public health, the national economy, public or private utilities, facilities,
or property or seizing or hindering the operation thereof; preventing
the public authorities from or hindering them in the performance of
their duties; or in accordance with the agreements and treaties ratified
by the State.
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3. Terrorist: Every natural person who commits, attempts to commit, or incites,
threatens, or plans the commission of a terrorist crime inside or outside
the country by any means whatsoever, whether solely or within the
framework of a common terrorist project; facilitates the travel of
individuals to another state for the purpose of committing a terrorist
act; prepares for, participates in, or provides or receives training for
terrorist acts; assumes leadership, command, or management of or
founds or becomes a member of or finances any terrorist entity; or
knowingly participates in the activity of a terrorist entity.
4. Terrorist entities: Organizations, groups, gangs, or other groups, whatever their legal or
real form, that engage in, or whose purpose is to encourage, by any
means, inside or outside the country, the commission or attempted
commission of terrorist crimes.
5. Funds: Assets, property, or economic resources of any kind, whether tangible
or intangible, movable or immovable, and rights thereto; liquid financial
assets; and all legal instruments whatever their form, including bonds,
shares, or digital or electronic copies of any of the above, whether inside
or outside the State.
6. Freezing: Prohibition of transfer, exchange, or disposition of funds, or movement
or transport of the same, based on a listing decision issued by the
Prosecutor General throughout the period of validity of the said
decision.
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7. Financing of terrorism: Collecting, receiving, possessing, supplying, transporting, or providing
funds, weapons, ammunition, explosives, supplies, machines, data,
information, materials, or safe harbor to one or more terrorists, and any
person who finances any such terrorist through one of the above means
or otherwise, directly or indirectly, in any way whatsoever; or
attempting to do so, with the intent of using some or all such financing
in the commission of a terrorist crime or with the knowledge that such
financing will be used in the commission of a terrorist act or by a
terrorist or terrorist group.”
Article (2):
“The terrorist crimes provided for in the previous Article shall be punishable by the following penalties
instead of the established penalties therefor:
1. Death, if the established penalty for the crime is life imprisonment;
2. Life imprisonment, if the established penalty for the crime is imprisonment for a period of not less
than fifteen years;
3. Imprisonment for a period of not less than fifteen years, if the established penalty for the crime
is imprisonment for a period of not less than ten years; or
4. The maximum penalty established for the crime if the penalty is imprisonment for a period of less
than ten years.”
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Article (2)
The following shall be added to the afore‐referenced Law no. (3) of the year 2004:
Article (21 bis):
Two lists shall be created which shall be named the “Terrorist List” and the “Terrorist Entities List.”
Article (21 bis/1):
The Prosecutor general shall list, in the two lists referred to in the previous Article, the following:
a. Every person against whom, and entity against which, a final court judgment has been issued that
applies thereto the criminal description provided for in Article (1) of the Law;
b. Every person and entity listed in the lists of terrorist persons and entities by decision of the Security
Council in application of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;
c. Every person and entity, at the request of the competent authorities, in any of the following cases:
1. If documented security or intelligence information is available that indicates that the person or
entity has committed terrorist or associated acts or threatened to commit such acts; planned,
sought, promoted, or incited the commission of such acts; trained or facilitated the travel of
individuals to another state for the purpose of committing, arranging, preparing, or participating
in terrorist acts; or financed terrorism;
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12
2. If the person or entity commits an armed or unarmed terrorist act against the State or its interests
abroad; or
3. If the person or entity confesses to or publicly claims responsibility for, threatens, incites to, or
promotes a terrorist crime.
Article (21 bis/2):
Listing in either of the two Lists referred to in the cases provided for in Items (1), (2), and (3) of Article
(21 bis/1) shall be for a period not longer than three years. If this period expires without the issuance of a
final judgment to apply the criminal attribute provided for in Article (1) of this Law to the listed person or
entity, the Prosecutor General shall present the matter to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeals,
which shall be convened in the Consultative Chamber, to consider extending the listing for one or more
identical periods; otherwise, he must remove the name from the list from the date on which such period
expires.
The Prosecutor General, during the listing period, may remove the name of a listed person or entity
from the list if significant evidence exists that the reason for such listing is invalid.
Every concerned party shall be informed of the relevant decisions for listing, extension, and removal
of listing.
Article (21 bis/3):
The relevant parties may challenge the decision issued with respect to listing, extension of listing, or
removal of the name in either of the two aforementioned lists before the Criminal Division of the Court
of Cassation within sixty days from the date of notice in accordance with the established procedures for
filing challenges before it.
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Article (21 bis/4):
The following effects shall arise from the listing decision and shall continue throughout the duration
of its effectiveness:
I. For terrorist persons:
1. Listing on the travel ban list and arrival watch list, or prevention of non‐Qataris from entering the
State unless wanted by the official bodies and authorities therein;
2. Withdrawal or cancellation of passports or denial of issuance of new passports;
3. Disqualification from assuming public or prosecutorial positions or posts; and
4. Freezing of the terrorist’s funds.
II. For terrorist entities:
1. Prohibition of the terrorist entity;
2. Closure of the places allocated thereto and prohibition of its meetings;
3. Prohibition on direct and indirect financing and raising funds and objects for the entity;
4. Freezing of the funds and property owned by the entity or its members; and
5. Prohibition of joining or recruiting for, promoting, or using the slogans of the entity.
In all cases where the nature of the frozen assets requires the appointment of an administrator, the
court judgment shall specify the person who shall be the administrator, after consulting with the
Prosecutor General.
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Article (3)
The competent authorities, each within its area of competence, shall implement this Law, which shall
be in effect on the day following its publication in the Official Gazette.
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Amir of the State of Qatar
Promulgated at the Amiri Diwan on 19/10/1438H
Corresponding to 07/13/2017G
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This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true
and accurate translation from Arabic into English of the attached Decree Law no. (11) of 2017.
Sworn to and subscribed before me
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Geotext Translations, Inc.
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Annex 46
U.S. Department of State, Global Counterterrorism Forum Co-Chairs: About the Global
Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (23 Sept. 2014), available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/fs/
fs/232003.htm

U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Global Counterterroism Forum Co-Chairs': About the Global
Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
Fact Sheet
BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM
September 23, 2014
The GCTF is an informal, multilateral counterterrorism (CT) platform that focuses on identifying critical civilian CT needs,
mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. Launched at a
ministerial meeting in New York on 22 September 2011, the Forum, with its 30 founding members (29 countries and the European
Union), regularly convenes key CT policymakers and practitioners from nations around the world, as well as experts from the
United Nations and other multilateral bodies. It has strengthened the international architecture for addressing 21st century
terrorism and is promoting a strategic, long-term approach to dealing with the threat. The Forum identifies urgent needs, devises
solutions, and mobilizes resources for addressing key CT challenges facing civilian institutions. With its primary focus on
countering violent extremism and strengthening criminal justice and other rule of law institutions that deal with terrorism, the GCTF
aims to diminish terrorist recruitment and increase countries’ capabilities for dealing with terrorist threats within their borders and
regions.
MEMBERS AND PARTNERS
The 30 founding members of the GCTF are: Algeria, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, the European Union
(EU), France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom (UK), and the
United States. Additionally, some 40 non-member states and dozens of non-member international, regional, sub-regional, and nongovernmental
organizations have participated in one or more GCTF activities.
The United Nations is a close partner of the GCTF and a regular participant in its activities. The GCTF takes as a central part of its
mission the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. More broadly, the GCTF’s work complements and
reinforces existing multilateral CT efforts, including those of the UN and relevant regional organizations.
STRUCTURE
The GCTF consists of a strategic-level Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by the United States and Turkey; five thematic and
regional expert-driven working groups; and a small administrative unit. The working groups focus on: 1) the criminal justice
sector and rule of law, co-chaired by Egypt and the United States; 2) countering violent extremism (CVE), co-chaired by the
UAE and the UK; 3) detention and reintegration, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia; 4) capacity building in the Sahel
region, co-chaired by Algeria and Canada; and 5) capacity building in the Horn of Africa region, co-chaired by the EU and
Turkey.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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• The mobilization of more than $250 million to support CT-related strengthening of criminal justice systems, including the training
of prosecutors, police, judges, and corrections officials, with a particular focus on countries in transition.
• The December 2012 launch in Abu Dhabi of Hedayah, the first-ever international center of excellence for training, dialogue,
research, and collaboration on CVE.
• The June 2014 launch of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) in Valletta, Malta, which is dedicated to
providing criminal justice officials from across North, West, and East Africa and the Middle East with human rights-compliant
training to address terrorism and related security challenges within a rule of law framework.
• The September 2014 establishment in Geneva of the Global Fund on Community Engagement and Resilience (GCERF), the
first-ever public-private global fund to support local, grass-roots efforts to counter violent extremism.
• The adoption of framework documents designed to serve as practical guides for rule of law-based CT capacity-building activities
and implementing CT good practices at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels.[1]
(file:///C:/Users/finklejj/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.Outlook/MXP47L
28/09-23-2014-Media%20Note-About%20the%20GCTF.docx#_ftn1) These framework documents address a variety of
salient CT topics including:
o Effective, human rights-compliant CT practice in the criminal justice sector;
o Preventing and denying the benefits of kidnapping for ransom by terrorists;
o Multi-sectoral approaches to CVE;
o Community engagement and community-oriented policing as tools for CVE;
o Supporting victims in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack; and
o Rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders.
• The adoption of the July 2012 GCTF Madrid Declaration on Victims of Terrorism and the December 2012 GCTF Plan of
Action on Victims of Terrorism to advance the cause of victims of terrorism, their families, and victims’ groups.
2014 – New Initiatives
The Forum has launched a number of new initiatives in 2014, including:
• An initiative aimed at identifying and developing the first-ever set of good practices to assist countries in developing a more
comprehensive and effective response to the “Foreign Terrorist Fighter” challenge;
• An “intelligence-evidence” initiative, to address complexities that the criminal justice sector addresses when considering the role
of intelligence information in criminal justice investigations and prosecutions;
• An initiative, aimed at promoting practical implementation of the Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices for Preventing and
Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists, to develop a set of highly interactive, discussion-based training
modules on kidnapping for ransom (KFR) that will be made available to any interested partner;
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• An initiative aimed at developing a draft legal and policy framework for “hot pursuit” of terrorists and other criminals across open
borders in the Sahel region;
• Developing the first-ever set of global good practices on the role of judges in handling CT cases within a rule of law framework;
and
• A joint collaboration with Hedayah to develop and implement an initiative on CVE and education, which will culminate in the
development of associated good practices and form the basis of a plan of action to explore how to implement education
approaches to CVE.
ANNEX 1 – GCTF ACTIVITIES IN 2014[2]
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28/09-23-2014-Media%20Note-About%20the%20GCTF.docx#_ftn2)
Coordinating Committee
Fifth Coordinating Committee Meeting, Rabat, Morocco, 2-3 April 2014
Sixth Coordinating Committee Meeting, New York, United States, September 2014
Countering Violent Extremism Working Group
Workshop to Develop an Action Plan for Community-Oriented Policing as a Tool for Countering Violent
Extremism, Doha, Qatar, 3-4 March 2014
Workshop on Supporting Civil Society Initiatives to Empower Women’s Roles in Countering Violent Extremism
and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism, Istanbul, Turkey, 13-14 May 2014 (jointly hosted with the
Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe)
Practitioner-Focused Workshop on Countering Violent Extremism and Education, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 18-20 May
2014 (jointly hosted with Hedayah)
Third Countering Violent Extremism Working Group Plenary Meeting, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 4 September 2014
Criminal Justice Sector and the Rule of Law Working Group
Experts Meeting on Protecting and Using Intelligence Information in Rule of Law-Based and Criminal Justice
Sector-Led Investigations and Prosecutions, Frankfurt, Germany, 8-9 January 2014
Workshop on Proactive CT Good Practices in the Criminal Justice Sector, Abuja, Nigeria, 22-23 January 2014
Second Seminar on the Role of the Judiciary in Handling Counterterrorism and Other National Security Cases
within a Rule of Law Framework, The Hague, the Netherlands, 30 June-2 July 2014
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Criminal Justice Sector and the Rule of Law Working Group
Second Experts Meeting on Protecting and Using Intelligence Information in Rule of Law-Based, Criminal
Justice Sector-Led Investigations and Prosecutions, Vienna, Austria, 7-8 July 2014 (jointly hosted with the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime)
Detention and Reintegration Working Group
First Detention and Reintegration Working Group Plenary Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, 12-13 August 2014
“Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (FTF) Initiative
Opening Meeting of the GCTF “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” Initiative, The Hague, The Netherlands, 19-20
February 2014
First Expert Meeting of the GCTF “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” Initiative, Marrakech, Morocco, 14-15 May 2014
Second Expert Meeting of the GCTF “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” Initiative, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 16-17 June 2014
(jointly hosted with Hedayah)
Sahel Capacity-Building Working Group
Second Sahel Cross-Border Workshop, Dakar, Senegal, 26-27 March 2014
Local Capacity-Building Coordination Meeting, Nouakchott, Mauritania, 22 April 2014
Local Capacity-Building Coordination Meeting, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 6 May 2014
Local Capacity-Building Coordination Meeting, Nouakchott, Mauritania, 4 August 2014
Horn of Africa Region Capacity-Building Working Group
Workshop on Countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa, Ankara, Turkey, 11 February 2014
Third Plenary Working Group Meeting, Nairobi, Kenya, 11-13 March 2014
Workshop on Improving Coordinating of CT Capacity-Building Efforts in the Horn of Africa, Brussels, Belgium,
17 July 2014
[1]
(file:///C:/Users/finklejj/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.Outlook/MXP47L
28/09-23-2014-Media%20Note-About%20the%20GCTF.docx#_ftnref1) For more information on GCTF framework
documents, please visit the GCTF website at www.theGCTF.org (http://www.thegctf.org/).
Annex 46
The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S.
State Department.
External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies
contained therein.
Note: documents in Portable Document Format (PDF) require Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or higher to view, download Adobe Acrobat
Reader (http://get.adobe.com/reader/).
[2]
(file:///C:/Users/finklejj/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.Outlook/MXP47L
28/09-23-2014-Media%20Note-About%20the%20GCTF.docx#_ftnref2) This represents those activities implemented and
planned in CY 2014. Please visit www.theGCTF.org (http://www.thegctf.org/) for additional information about all GCTF
activities since the official launch in September 2011.
Annex 46

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U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism,
Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 4: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)
(2017), available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282849.htm

state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282849.htm
Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
Country Reports on Terrorism 2017
Report
Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, under-governed, or
ill‑governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds,
communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate
governance capacity, political will, or both.
As defined by section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the U.S. Code, the term “terrorist sanctuary” or
“sanctuary” excludes the territory of a country the government of which is subject to a
determination under section 4605(j)(1)(A) of Title 50; section 2371(a) of Title 22; or section
2780(d) of Title 22– the state sponsors of terrorism. You can find information regarding the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Syria in Chapter 2, State Sponsors
of Terrorism.
TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS
AFRICA
Somalia. In 2017, terrorists used under-governed areas throughout Somalia as safe havens to
plan, conduct, and facilitate operations, including mass-casualty bombings in major urban
areas. Somali officials failed to implement critical national security reforms and pass
legislation that could help enhance the government’s capacity to secure and govern effectively
at all levels. Despite these critical gaps in its counterterrorism strategy, the Somali government
remained a committed partner and vocal advocate for U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Despite facing increased pressure from strikes and other counterterrorism operations, al-
Shabaab retained much of its safe haven throughout the country, and, in some cases, regained
ceded territory after African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces continued to
consolidate positions throughout southern Somalia in 2017. With the notable exception of
targeted operations carried out by U.S.-trained and -equipped units of Somali commandos, the
Somali National Army, as a whole, remained incapable of securing and retaking towns from al-
Shabaab independently. This critical gap allowed al-Shabaab to continue to extort local
populations and forcibly recruit fighters, some of whom were children.
In northern Somalia, ISIS-linked fighters used the limited safe haven they established in
Puntland to launch a suicide attack against regional security forces in May, killing five and
wounding several more. In the months that followed, the group failed to expand its foothold in
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the face of targeted airstrikes and other counterterrorism operations that commenced in the
latter part of 2017, as well as fierce opposition from al-Shabaab cells operating in the region.
As if to declare itself the more capable and potent threat in Puntland, al-Shabaab launched an
attack against Puntland security forces in Af Urur that killed more than 60 soldiers and
civilians.
As seen in previous years, al-Shabaab kept much of its safe haven in the Jubba River Valley as
a primary base of operations for plotting and launching attacks throughout Somalia and
northern Kenya. The group maintained control of several towns throughout the Jubaland
region, including Jilib and Kunyo Barow, and increased its base of operations in the Gedo
region to exploit the porous Kenya-Somalia border and attack targets in northeastern Kenya.
Al-Shabaab also used its safe havens in Somalia to escalate its campaign in northern Kenya,
primarily using buried improvised explosive devices and other explosives against Kenyan
security forces and civilian passenger vehicles. The Kenyan government increased its
presence throughout the border region, including in the Boni forest area best known as one of
al-Shabaab’s primary facilitation routes, but security officials continued to struggle with border
security and crisis response in the more remote areas of northeastern Kenya.
Somalia remained heavily dependent on regional and international partners to support almost
all major security functions throughout the country, making little progress on improving
interagency coordination to limit terrorist transit through the country.
According to independent sources and non-governmental organizations engaged in demining
activities on the ground, there was little cause for concern for the presence of weapons of
mass destruction in Somalia.
The Lake Chad Region. In 2017, Boko Haram and its offshoot ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA)
maintained limited safe havens in parts of Northeast Nigeria and on islands in Lake Chad, and
prevented the reestablishment of state administration, service delivery, and humanitarian relief
in broader territory surrounding Lake Chad. These safe havens are greatly reduced from the
territory Boko Haram controlled in 2014-2015. Forces from Nigeria and other members of the
Multinational Joint Task Force (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) conducted operations to
clear these safe havens, but lacked the capacity and resources to secure borders and hold and
administer liberated territory. Both Boko Haram and ISIS-WA continued to conduct asymmetric
attacks against civilians, military, and government personnel, including through suicide
bombers, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, raids, ambushes, kidnappings, and other
means. As a result of this insecurity, at year’s end over two million people in the Lake Chad
Region remained displaced and millions more remain dependent on humanitarian assistance.
No government in the Lake Chad Region was known to support or facilitate the proliferation or
trafficking of weapons of mass destruction in or through its territory.
The Trans-Sahara. In 2017, the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb,
al‑Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama’at
Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). JNIM and other groups like Movement for Unity and
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Jihad in West Africa, Ansural Islam, and ISIS in the Greater Sahara continued to stage
asymmetric attacks in the Trans‑Sahara region. These terrorist groups were able to exercise
relatively unimpeded freedom of movement in northern and central Mali and certain border
regions of Niger and Burkina Faso.
Following their degrading and scattering in 2013 by combined African and French operations,
these terrorist groups took a year to reorganize and began a campaign of asymmetric warfare
that included small raids, soft target attacks, and use of improvised explosive devices, land
mines, and suicide bombers.
The groups are no longer able to conduct major military-style campaigns as they did in 2012,
but, in 2017, these groups have once again become serious challenges to the security of the
Sahel region.
No government in the region was known to support or facilitate the proliferation or trafficking
of weapons of mass destruction in or through its territory, although the region remained prone
to arms and munitions smuggling, which can have a destabilizing effect on security.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral. The sheer expanse of the area, its numerous islands, and
substantial maritime traffic in the Sulawesi Sea and the Sulu Archipelago make it a difficult
region to secure. Traditional smuggling and piracy groups often supported terrorist networks,
including through the movement of personnel, equipment, and funds. Kidnapping-for-ransom
remained an ongoing threat and a source of funding for terrorist networks based in the
southern Philippines.
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have made concerted new efforts to control their
shared maritime boundaries. In 2016, the three countries signed a trilateral agreement that
envisions joint air and maritime patrols, information sharing, and standard operating
procedures for “hot pursuit” of criminal and terrorist elements actively conducting attacks. The
agreement took effect in June 2017, and the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia began joint
patrols to combat piracy, terrorism, and the illegal drug trade.
Southeast Asia serves as a global trade hub, with some of the highest volume transit and
transshipment ports in the world. Lack of political will, incomplete legal and regulatory
frameworks, weak strategic trade controls, inadequate law enforcement and security
capabilities, and emerging and re-emerging infectious disease and burgeoning bioscience
capacity, make Southeast Asia an area of concern for weapons of mass destruction
proliferation and transit. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore are the only countries in the
region with strategic trade control laws, and countries across Southeast Asia struggle with
controls over dual-use items, as well as end-use or “catch-all” provisions. Assisting countries
in the region to develop strong laws that meet international standards and help to build
effective targeting and risk management systems are major goals of the Department of State’s
Export Control and Related Border Security program.
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The Southern Philippines. From May to November 2017, terrorist organizations pledging
support to ISIS – including a faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Maute Group, and others –
seized and occupied Marawi City. When the siege began, President Duterte declared martial
law over the entire Mindanao region – approximately one-third of the country’s territory – and
Congress granted an extension of martial law until the end of 2018. Security forces ultimately
cleared the city and eliminated much of the terrorist leadership, but suffered many casualties
during the siege.
While the Philippine government possesses the political will to apply security measures
against terrorist threats, and has consistently partnered with the United States and other
nations to build the capacity to do so, it struggles to apply a coordinated whole-of-government
approach to prevent terrorism. Terrorist organizations’ continued ability to operate in the
southern Philippines is a reflection of the centuries-long challenge of governing effectively in
areas outside of Manila, and establishing consistent security in a region possessing a strong
separatist identity, endemic poverty, and religious differences.
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Egypt. Portions of Egypt’s Sinai region remained a safe haven for terrorist organizations in
2017, primarily for ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP). Throughout the year, ISIS-SP used this undergoverned
safe haven to plan and carry out attacks against civilian and military targets both in
the Sinai and in mainland Egypt. In November, ISIS-SP attacked the Al-Rawad Mosque in
northern Sinai, killing 311 people. In December, it attempted to assassinate the Egyptian
Minister of the Interior at the El Arish International Airport.
In response to these attacks, the Egyptian Armed Forces began planning a major offensive
against ISIS-SP, beginning with a buildup of personnel and equipment in the Sinai.
The United States supported Egypt’s efforts to combat ISIS-SP and other terrorist groups in
Egypt by providing AH-64 “Apache” helicopters, mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles,
counter-improvised explosive devices training, mobile sensor towers, and border security
training programs. The United States routinely engages in military-to-military discussions on
how it can help Egypt defeat ISIS-SP and other terrorist groups in Egypt. The United States
remains concerned about the deteriorating security situation and potential impacts on the
Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping mission in the Sinai.
Through the Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Program, the
United States worked with the Government of Egypt to enhance its border security capabilities.
It provided land, air, and maritime border enforcement and targeting and risk management
training for Egyptian Customs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of
Transportation, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. In addition, since 2009, the
Department of State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund has assisted Egypt with the
provision of passenger and cargo vehicle x-ray detection equipment with the capability to
inspect vehicular and truck traffic at fixed transportation checkpoints for weapons of mass
destruction-related materials, conventional weapons, and other illicit items.
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Iraq. Supported by the 75-member Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, the Government of Iraq
retook the remaining territory held by ISIS in 2017. Prime Minister Abadi declared on
December 9 that Iraq was fully liberated. The series of successive ISIS defeats included the
Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) liberation of Mosul, Tall Afar, Hawija, and finally al-Qaim and Rawa,
in November. As the ISF liberated territory, ISIS killed thousands of Iraqi civilians, forcing
residents to remain as human shields to discourage airstrikes and shooting those attempting
to flee. ISIS remained a terrorist threat in Iraq in 2017 and continued to carry out suicide,
hit‑and‑run, and other asymmetric attacks throughout the country.
The terrorist organization Kata’ib Hizballah continued to maintain an active presence in Iraq.
ISIS continued to use the territory under its control in 2017 to produce sulfur mustard and
improvised explosive devices filled with chlorine. The United States has proactively worked
with our allies to dismantle this chemical weapons capability, as well as deny ISIS access to
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and expertise through
interdictions and strengthening the ability of regional governments to detect, disrupt, and
respond effectively to suspected CBRN activity.
Due to security conditions in Iraq, the Export Control and Related Border Security program had
difficulty implementing its outreach activities from 2015-2017.
The United States and Iraq also continued their bilateral partnership to counter nuclear
smuggling under the framework of the 2014 Joint Action Plan on Combating Nuclear and
Radioactive Materials Smuggling.
Lebanon. Lebanon remained a safe haven for certain terrorist groups in both undergoverned
and Hizballah-controlled areas. Hizballah used areas under its control for terrorist training,
fundraising, financing, and recruitment. The Government of Lebanon did not take significant
action to disarm Hizballah, even though Hizballah maintained its weapons in defiance of
UNSCR 1701. The government was unable to limit Hizballah’s travel to and from Iraq or Syria
to fight in support of the Assad regime. The Lebanese government did not have complete
control of all regions of the country, or fully control its borders with Syria and Israel. Hizballah
controlled access to parts of the country and had influence over some elements within
Lebanon’s security services.
Ungoverned areas along the un-demarcated Lebanese-Syrian border also served as safe
havens for al-Nusrah Front, ISIS, and other Sunni terrorist groups in 2017, which operated in
mountainous, mostly uninhabited zones where the government had limited reach. In late
summer 2017, Hizballah cleared out al-Nusrah Front positions along the Syria-Lebanon border.
Separately, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) later undertook a major military offensive to
expel ISIS fighters from Lebanon. Other terrorist groups, including Hamas, the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General
Command, Asbat al-Ansar, Fatah al-Islam, Fatah al-Intifada, Jund al-Sham, Palestinian Islamic
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Annex 47
Jihad, and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, continued to operate within Lebanon primarily inside
Lebanon’s 12 Palestinian refugee camps. These groups used the Palestinian camps as safe
havens to house weapons, shelter wanted criminals, and plan terrorist attacks.
The United States worked closely with the LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to counter
terrorist threats within Lebanon and along its border with Syria by providing counterterrorism
training, military equipment, and weaponry.
Lebanon was not a source country for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components, but
its porous borders and limited controls on strategic trade made the country vulnerable for use
as a transit and transshipment hub for proliferation-sensitive transfers, particularly with the
conflict in Syria. The LAF Engineer Regiment partnered with U.S. government agencies to
detect and prevent proliferation and trafficking of WMD along the Syrian border.
The Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security program (EXBS)
provided commodity identification training for items that could be used in chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons, to keep these items from transiting through Lebanon. A
frontier border security interdiction-training program, in partnership with the Department of
Defense, strengthened LAF and ISF border security and interdiction capabilities. In addition,
the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence
equipped the Port of Beirut with radiation detection equipment to scan cargo for the presence
of radiation.
Libya. Libya’s vast, undergoverned territories constituted potential safe havens for terrorist
organizations in 2017, including Benghazi, Darnah, and the deserts in the south and the west.
U.S. airstrikes in cooperation with the GNA successfully targeted ISIS camps and drove
remaining ISIS remnants to coastal areas or locations elsewhere. Due to the difficulties of
controlling the southern and desert borders in particular, the GNA remained unable to
effectively track flows of foreign terrorist fighters in and out of its territory. Rival factions and
political stakeholders outside of the GNA, including in the House of Representatives and the
“Libyan National Army,” had also not stemmed or tracked the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.
The Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program
provided training to the Libyan Ministries of Defense, Customs, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Libyan
Airport Authority, and Libyan Intelligence Service officials. This aimed to enhance Libya’s
contribution to preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and diversion of
conventional arms and explosives to ISIS and other terrorist organizations. The country’s
history with WMD, its significant conventional stockpiles, and the continuing strength of armed
groups with independent allegiance make these priority engagements. In 2017, targeted
technical training included airport security and cargo interdiction training, basic and advanced
land border security training, counter-proliferation investigations training, and fraudulent
documentation training and counter-improvised explosive device training. These activities
encourage interagency cooperation and promote regional and international cooperation to
counter illicit trafficking in strategic items.
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Annex 47
Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on behalf of the Republic of Yemen
Government, are fighting to reclaim territory currently held by Houthi forces and al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The northwest of the country, as well as portions of the southern
coast interior are beyond governmental control, severely constraining the Yemeni
government’s ability to prevent terrorist training, funding, recruitment, and transit. AQAP and
ISIS-Yemen continued to benefit from the ongoing conflict with the Houthis, successfully
insinuating themselves among elements of the anti-Houthi coalition and exploiting the security
vacuum in large parts of the country to increase support. Under President Hadi’s leadership,
the Government of Yemen has been as cooperative with U.S., Saudi, and UAE counterterrorist
operations as its limited capacity will allow. In 2017, counterterrorism operations, led primarily
by UAE-supported forces, targeted AQAP safe havens for clearance in Abyan Shabwah and
Hadramawt Governorates.
Yemen’s political instability continued to hinder efforts to enact or enforce comprehensive
strategic trade controls to counter the flow of weapons and munitions in the region. This left
Yemen vulnerable as a transit point for destabilizing weapons. Nonetheless, the Department of
State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program provided Yemeni
authorities with training to reconstitute land border and maritime security capabilities – with a
counter-proliferation focus – through a series of training programs for border guards, customs
officers, and the coast guard.
SOUTH ASIA
Afghanistan. Terrorist and insurgent groups are active in the border region of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. The Government of National Unity (GNU) struggled to assert control over this remote
terrain, where the population is largely detached from national institutions. Afghanistan
generally cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, including participation in joint
operations against insurgents in districts bordering Pakistan.
The potential for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) trafficking and proliferation remained a
concern. In 2017, the United States and Afghanistan worked to finalize a bilateral framework
to help Afghanistan enhance its capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and
other radioactive material smuggling incidents. The Afghanistan and U.S. governments also
continued to work to implement comprehensive strategic trade controls and strengthen
Afghanistan’s border security.
The United States continued to assist the GNU in building capacity to secure potentially
dangerous biological materials and infrastructure housed at Afghan facilities, to promote
surveillance capabilities to detect and identify possibly catastrophic biological events, and to
engage Afghan scientists and engineers that have WMD or WMD-applicable expertise.
Pakistan. Although Pakistan’s National Action Plan calls to “ensure that no armed militias are
allowed to function in the country,” several terrorist groups focused on attacks outside of the
country continued to operate from Pakistani soil in 2017. These groups included the Haqqani
Network, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Pakistan continued military operations
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Annex 47

Annex 48
“The Kingdom severs diplomatic and consular relations with Qatar”, Saudi Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (6 June 2017), available at https://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/
ServicesAndInformation/news/MinistryNews/Pages/ArticleID201765134958689.aspx

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular relations with Qatar
Last updated: 6/5/2017 1:56 PM
An official source stated that the Government of Saudi Arabia, in exercising its sovereign rights guaranteed by the
international law and protecting its national security from the dangers of terrorism and extremism has decided to sever
diplomatic and consular relations with the State of Qatar, close all land, sea and air ports, prevent crossing into Saudi
territories, airspace and territorial waters, and start immediate legal procedures for understanding with fraternal and friendly
countries and international companies to implement the same procedure as soon as possible for all means of transport to and
from the State of Qatar for reasons relating to Saudi national security.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has taken this decisive decision as a result of grave violations committed by the authorities in
Doha over the past years in secret and public aiming at dividing internal Saudi ranks, instigating against the State, infringing
on its sovereignty, adopting various terrorist and sectarian groups aimed at destabilizing the region including the Muslim
Brotherhood Group, Daesh (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda, promoting the ethics and plans of these groups through its media
permanently, supporting the activities of Iranian-backed terrorist groups in the governorate of Qatif of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Kingdom of Bahrain, financing, adopting and sheltering extremists who seek to undermine the stability and
unity of the homeland at home and abroad, and enticing the media that seek to fuel the strife internally; and it was clear to
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the support and backing from the authorities in Doha for coup Al-Houthi militias even after the
announcement of the Coalition to Support the Legitimacy in Yemen.
The Kingdom has also taken this decision in solidarity with the Kingdom of Bahrain being subjected to terrorist campaigns and
operations supported by the authorities in Doha.
Since 1995 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its brothers have made strenuous and continued efforts to urge the authorities in
Doha to abide by its commitments and agreements, yet, they have repeatedly violated their international obligations and the
agreements they signed under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for Arab States to cease the hostilities
against the Kingdom and stand against terrorist groups and activities of which the latest one was their failure to implement
Riyadh Agreement.
In accordance with the decision to cut off diplomatic and consular relations, Saudi citizens are prohibited from traveling to
Qatar, residing in or passing through it, while Saudi residents and visitors have to hurry leaving Qatari territories within 14
days.
The decision, for security reasons, unfortunately prevents Qatari citizens' entry to or transit through the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and those Qatari residents and visitors have to leave Saudi territories within 14 days, confirming the Kingdom's
commitment and keenness to provide all facilities and services for Qatari pilgrims and Umrah performers.
Annex 48
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia affirms that it has long been patient despite the fact that the authorities in Doha continue to
evade their commitments and conspire against it in the interest of the Qatari people, which is a natural and genuine extension
of their brethren in the Kingdom and an integral part of their pillars. The Kingdom will continue to support the people of Qatar,
its security and stability regardless of the hostile practices being carried out by the authorities in Doha.
https://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/Minist…
Annex 48
Annex 49
U.S. Department of State, Press Availability with Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh
Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani (11 July 2017), available at https://www.state.gov/
secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2017/07/272522.htm

Annex 49
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Press Availability With Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed
bin Abdulrahman al-Thani
Press Availability
Rex W. Tillerson
Secretary of State
Foreign Ministry
Doha, Qatar
July 11, 2017
FOREIGN MINISTER AL-THANI: (In progress) (Via interpreter) -- at the trilateral level between the United States and Qatar, then
a trilateral meeting with the presence of our brothers in Kuwait to discuss the latest developments in the Gulf crisis and the
appreciated efforts by our brothers in the state of Kuwait and the help of our friends in the United States.
As for the bilateral aspect of the meetings, we have agreed on many points, and we have signed a memorandum of understanding
to – on combating financing terrorism. And this comes in the context of bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Qatar, and as a
result of the joint efforts to develop mechanisms to combat financing terrorism and exchange information and expertise to develop
this mechanism and to develop the institutions between different countries.
As for the other fields of cooperation in the – on the bilateral – at the bilateral level, we have discussed affairs relating to all political
and other aspects. But the main output was the memorandum of understanding pertaining to combating financing terrorism, which
for long the blockading countries have accused Qatar of financing terrorism. Now the state of Qatar is the first country to sign this
memorandum of understanding with the United States. We invite the other blockading countries to join signing this understanding.
SECRETARY TILLERSON: Thank you very much, Your Excellency. And thank you for welcoming us to Doha today. And we
also appreciated the time His Highness The Emir afforded us for a very good discussion upon our arrival as well.
I am here in Qatar today carrying with me the same spirit which President Trump traveled in Riyadh with in May. The United States
has one goal: drive terrorism off the face of the Earth. The President said, and I quote, “Every country in the region has an absolute
duty to ensure that terrorists find no sanctuary on their soil.” The agreement in which we both have signed on behalf of our
governments represents weeks of intensive discussions between experts and reinvigorates the spirit of the Riyadh summit. The
memorandum lays out a series of steps the two countries will take over the coming months and years to interrupt and disable terror
financing flows and intensify counterterrorism activities globally. The agreement includes milestones to ensure both countries are
accountable to their commitments.
Together, the United States and Qatar will do more to track down funding sources, will do more to collaborate and share
information, and will do more to keep the region and our homeland safe.
I applaud the leadership of His Highness The Emir of Qatar for being the first to respond to President Trump’s challenge at the
Riyadh summit to stop the funding of terrorism. And again, I want to thank His Excellency and His Highness The Emir for the time
they have given us today. Thank you.
Annex 49
MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Now we open the floor for questions and answers. Al Jazeera channel.
QUESTION: (Via interpreter) (Inaudible) from Al Jazeera. For Your Excellency, the Qatari foreign minister: What’s your response to
the leaking the agreement of Riyadh and the timing of it?
FOREIGN MINISTER AL-THANI: (Via interpreter) First of all, regarding the leaking of the Riyadh agreement last night and the
timing of this leaking, these are clear efforts to diminish the role by Kuwait and the mediation by Kuwait, and the efforts exacted by
the United States to mediate this crisis. If this leaking reflects anything, it only reflects the approach by the blockading countries,
similarly to what they did when they leaked the list of demands. This brings into question the level of trust in these countries in
international relations. Usually, commercial companies show respect for this agreement, let alone respected countries and states.
As for the campaign that accompanied this leaking and the accusation that Qatar did not respect the agreement, these are
falsifications and Qatar has committed itself and respected this agreement, and this can be proven. This is not a unilateral
agreement. This is a multilateral agreement. And the statement – the agreement does not singularly single out Qatar to adhere to
this agreement. And this is a clear violation of the blockading countries because they did not use any of the dispute settlement
mechanisms, and as a result, if there are any grievances, these shall be discussed either according to the agreement of Riyadh or
according to the charter of the GCC.
MODERATOR: A question from Bloomberg.
QUESTION: Thank you, a question for both of you. A couple of days ago, the discussion of what was happening in the Gulf was
framed by the U.S. side as something that could take months to resolve and that you were at an impasse – all of the countries
involved. Do you have an indication from the other parties in this crisis that they would be willing to sign a similar agreement with
you? And does what happened today now sort of revise your timeframe? Do you think this could be solved more quickly, or do you
still expect that this is something that will last for some time? Thank you.
SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, I think it’s important to first make sure that the proper understanding of the agreement that was
signed today is an agreement that we have been working on for quite some time. In fact, there’s elements of this work that actually
had been underway as long as a year ago. So what I think you’re seeing the culmination today is really of this reinvigoration of our
talks as a result of the Riyadh summit. And President Trump’s very strong call in Qatar, I think, has taken the initiative to move out
on things that had been discussed but had not been brought to a conclusion, and to put in place a very, very strong agreement, one
that has commitments for action immediately in a number of fronts, and in fact, several steps have already been taken and
implemented.
As it relates to the conflict that exists here in the Gulf, we had a good trilateral exchange around the conflict with His Highness The
Emir and the foreign minister, with our Kuwaiti mediator partner. And my role here is to support the efforts of the Emir of Kuwait and
the Kuwaiti mediator to bring what we can to the discussions to help both sides more fully understand the concerns of the relative
parties and also point out possible solutions to those.
So we did have a good, thorough discussion today. I think as most of you know, I’ll be traveling to Jeddah tomorrow to meet with
the parties who are on the other side of this issue, and similarly, to explore their feelings and explore options for how we might
move this forward. So I would not want to comment on any expectation for a timetable at this point because these are discussions
that are still ongoing.
FOREIGN MINISTER AL-THANI: Just to follow up what His Excellency just mentioned, this agreement which was signed, which is
being signed now, it’s a separate bilateral agreement between Qatar and the United States which has been underway and in
discussion for weeks now, and it has nothing related directly to or indirectly to the recent crisis and the blockade which is imposed
against Qatar.
Annex 49
The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S.
State Department.
External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained
therein.
Note: documents in Portable Document Format (PDF) require Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or higher to view, download Adobe Acrobat
Reader (http://get.adobe.com/reader/).
And also, we support the role which is carried out by the Kuwaiti mediator and supported by the United States, and we have been
very much positive and forthcoming in engaging in a constructive dialogue which will result for a solution, which is – which has been
the behavior of the state of Qatar from the beginning of this crisis. And we hope that the blockading countries behave in the same
manner.

Annex 50
Ministry of Defence of United Kingdom, Defence Secretary hosts Qatari counterpart at historic
Horse Guards (16 Jan. 2018), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defencesecretary-
hosts-qatari-counterpart-at-historic-horse-guards

Defence Secretary hosts Qatari counterpart at historic
Horse Guards
gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-hosts-qatari-counterpart-at-historic-horse-guards
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson and
Minister of State for Defence Affairs of
Qatar, His Excellency Dr Khalid bin
Mohammed Al-Attiyah, met horses and
soldiers from the Blues and Royals at
Horse Guards in London. Crown copyright.
The Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson
and his Qatari counterpart, His Excellency
Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah, have
reaffirmed the important long-term
relationship between the UK and Qatar during a meeting in London.
The visit follows the Defence Secretary’s trip to Qatar last December, where he signed a £6bn
deal for Typhoon jets and missiles, supporting thousands of British jobs at BAE Systems.
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said:
Qatar is a vital partner in the fight against Daesh, hosting the headquarters of the coalition air
campaign which is still coordinating strikes on targets in Syria every day.
Our two countries face the same threats from violent extremism and a mutual interest in
supporting stability in the region, which will deliver security at home.
The visit to London focussed on defence and security cooperation between the UK and Qatar
ahead of the 2022 World Cup, which is being hosted by Qatar, and lessons learned from the
military support to the London 2012 Olympics. In addition to the Defence Secretary, Al-Attiyah
also met with Security Minister Ben Wallace and the Deputy National Security Advisor Paddy
McGuiness. His Excellency also inspected the men and horses of the Blues and Royals at the
Army’s historic London Headquarters at Horse Guards Parade.
1/1
Annex 50

Annex 51
U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic
Dialogue (30 Jan. 2018), available at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/01/277776.htm

U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic
Dialogue
Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
January 30, 2018
The governments of the State of Qatar and the United States held the inaugural Strategic Dialogue in Washington D.C. on January
30, 2018. U.S. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson and U.S. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis co-chaired the opening session
jointly with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Khalid al-Attiyah and Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani. U.S. Secretary of Energy James R. Perry and U.S. Secretary of
Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Jr. participated in sessions with Qatari Minister of Energy and Industry Mohammed al-Sada and Qatari
Minister of Economy and Commerce Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani, respectively. U.S. Secretary of Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin and
Qatari Minister of Finance Ali Sharif al-Emadi co-chaired the closing ceremony.
The two countries welcomed this first Strategic Dialogue, highlighting the strength of their bilateral relationship and the mutually
beneficial opportunities for the peoples of both countries to deepen bilateral cooperation. Today, the United States and Qatar
underscored the strength of their ties and established a shared vision for the future of their strategic partnership. The two
governments took an important step to elevate the bilateral relationship by signing a Memorandum of Understanding establishing
an annual Strategic Dialogue.
In this inaugural Strategic Dialogue, the two countries discussed specific areas of partnership, including defense, counterterrorism,
combating extremism, and trade and investment. As those conversations continue, both the United States and Qatar believe their
continued mutual cooperation will benefit the interests of both countries, as well as the security and stability of the Gulf region.
Qatar and the United States discussed and welcomed enhanced cooperation, particularly, but not limited to, the areas described
below.
Political Cooperation
Qatar and the United States expressed satisfaction at the recently strengthened and expanded bilateral relationship. This
highlights their shared commitment to advance global peace and prosperity.
Qatar and the United States discussed the Gulf crisis and expressed the need for an immediate resolution which respects Qatar’s
sovereignty. The two governments expressed concern about the harmful security, economic and human impacts of the crisis.
Concern was also expressed over peace and stability in the Gulf and adherence to international law. Qatar emphasized its
appreciation for the role played by the United States in the mediation of the dispute in support of the efforts of the Emir of Kuwait.
Qatar and the United States affirmed their backing for a strong Gulf Cooperation Council that is focused on countering regional
threats and ensuring a peaceful and prosperous future for all its peoples.
Annex 51
Qatar emphasized the role of the United States in the region and the significant part it plays in countering threats of terrorism and
violent extremism. The two governments discussed regional security and stability, including joint efforts to defeat ISIS, ongoing
conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, as well as efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The United States acknowledged Qatar's generous humanitarian role bilaterally and multilaterally through the work of various UN
agencies, in supporting forcibly displaced populations, and in assisting refugees including millions of vulnerable young children and
women. The United States acknowledged recent progress and commitments made by Qatar on combating human trafficking and
advancing labor rights. The two governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding to continue progress in these areas.
The two governments intend to identify and prioritize areas for further cooperation based on the results of the inaugural dialogue
and decided to establish a working group to advance common policy priorities and political partnerships.
Defense
Qatar and the United States emphasized the vital contribution their defense partnership provides for the security and stability of the
region. This cooperation is key to successfully combating terrorism, countering violent extremism, and deterring external
aggression. U.S. officials lauded Qatar’s contributions in supporting the sizeable U.S. military presence in Qatar under the U.S.
Central Command.
The two governments issued a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, affirming the two countries’ joint commitment to
promoting peace and stability and countering the scourge of terrorism. The United States expressed its readiness to work jointly
with Qatar to deter and confront any external threat to Qatar’s territorial integrity that is inconsistent with the United Nations
Charter.
The two governments discussed the $24.7 billion Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program that currently exists between the United
States and Qatar. Since 2014, Qatar has used its national funds to purchase state of the art military systems and conduct
extensive training at U.S. facilities. The United States thanked the Qatari government for those purchases, noting they have
resulted in over 110,000 American jobs and the sustainment of critical military capabilities for the United States. Qatar highlighted
the continued opportunity for future FMS and direct commercial sales, particularly relating to the development of the Expeditionary
Amphibious Capability, which could lead to several billion dollars of future acquisitions and training in the near term, as well as an
improved ability to defend against external aggression and to better interoperate with U.S. and NATO military forces in coalition
operations.
The United States welcomed Qatar’s offer to expand critical facilities at U.S. bases in the country. Qatari funding of capital
expenditures and sustainment offers the possibility of an enduring presence, as with U.S. facilities in Europe and the Pacific. The
two governments acknowledged the strong and lasting bilateral security partnership, and look forward to further discussions on the
possibility of permanent basing.
Counterterrorism
Both sides intend to strengthen their security and counterterrorism partnership to eradicate terrorism and violent extremism. They
reviewed the positive progress made under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding on Counterterrorism signed on July
11, 2017, including with respect to information sharing, countering the financing of terrorism, aviation security, and capacity
building. The United States thanked Qatar for its action to counter terrorism and violent extremism in all forms, including by being
one of the few countries to move forward on a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with the United States.
Qatar and the United States intend to begin the Anti-Terrorism Assistance training program as soon as possible, as set forth in a
Letter of Intent signed in 2017; the program will focus on key areas such as aviation security, terrorism investigations, and the
protection of soft targets.
Annex 51
The two governments also noted the recent conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Attorney General
and his Qatari counterpart on the fight against terrorism and its financing and combating cyber-crime.
Qatar and the United States expressed the need to address violent extremism through preventive frameworks. They emphasized
the role that both countries are playing in founding and being leading donors of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and
the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF).
Trade and Investment
The two governments acknowledged the challenges facing Qatar as a result of the GCC dispute, which disrupted Qatar’s previous
trading partnerships. Qatar noted that despite the dispute, Qatar has honored its international trade obligations.
Qatar and the United States committed to boosting bilateral trade. They welcomed the role of U.S. companies in Qatar’s
development and of Qatari investment in U.S. firms and jobs. Both countries recognized the importance of bilateral investment.
The Qatari delegation described recent reforms designed to attract foreign investment in Qatar, including free trade zones,
expanding ownership for non-citizens, improvement of the banking system, consolidation of the rule of law, including the
development of a mechanism for dispute resolution.
The two governments recognized the importance of Qatar Investment Authority’s previously committed investment of $45 billion in
American firms, real estate, and jobs. Qatar Investment Authority’s chief executive described plans to increase investments in U.S.
infrastructure and to expand across the United States of America.
The two governments recognized the positive outcomes emerging from the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
(TIFA) signed in 2004. It was noted that TIFA continues to serve as a platform for increased cooperation in the fields of job
creation, property law, communications, customs, SMEs, and new markets.
Qatar and the United States signed various Memoranda of Understanding and Letters of Intent in the fields of bilateral trade,
investment, and technology. They welcomed the United States’ Commercial Law Development Program’s partnership with the
Ministry of Finance, and officials signed a Letter of Intent on cybersecurity cooperation and a Letter of Intent on smart technologies
collaboration.
The two governments welcomed a set of Understandings on civil aviation reached January 29 aimed at ensuring healthy
competition in the global aviation sector while maintaining the Open Skies framework of U.S. international aviation policy. Anchored
in the two countries’ close bilateral economic and strategic relationship, the Understandings represent important, high-level political
commitments. They affirm both governments’ intention to promote best practices for marketplace participation by their airlines,
while ensuring a continuation of the important economic, political, and cultural benefits of air services made possible by Open
Skies.
Qatar and the United States stressed the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation, of overflight, and of unimpeded lawful
commerce in accordance with international law.
The two governments expressed their mutual desire to further strengthen their bilateral relations in the energy sector, signing a
Memorandum of Understanding to enhance cooperation between Qatar and the United States.
Forward Together
This new Strategic Dialogue process underlines the commitment of Qatar and the United States to increase cooperation in fields
that are of the greatest mutual and practical benefit. Such cooperation includes the issues discussed today but also incorporates
important work in the fields of sports, education, health, arts, and culture.
Annex 51
The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S.
State Department.
External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies
contained therein.
Note: documents in Portable Document Format (PDF) require Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or higher to view, download Adobe Acrobat
Reader (http://get.adobe.com/reader/).
The two governments outlined a way forward together for the development of their partnership. They committed to
continue their dialogue and cooperation on issues including: combating regional terrorism and violent extremism;
countering the financing of terrorism; consolidating state of the art defense facilities; and expanding their trade and
investment partnerships. Qatar and the United States look forward to making progress in these areas when the Dialogue
reconvenes in Qatar in 2019. Both sides look forward to further enhancing bilateral relations during the visit of the Emir of
Qatar to Washington later this year.
Annex 51
Annex 52
U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the UAE, Meeting of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center
Member States Convenes in Kuwait (6 Mar. 2018), available at https://ae.usembassy.gov/
meeting-terrorist-financing-targeting-center-member-states-convenes-kuwait-march-6-2018/

This is the o􀃆cial website of the U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the United Arab Emirates. External links to other Internet sites should not be
construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.
U.S. Embassy & Consulate
in the United Arab Emirates
Meeting of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Member States Convenes in Kuwait
[March 6, 2018]
Co-led by the United States and Saudi Arabia, TFTC members meet in Kuwait City
KUWAIT CITY –On March 4-5, the United States and Saudi Arabia co-led a meeting of the Terrorist
Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Representatives from the seven member
countries, which include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the
United States, met and engaged in positive and constructive discussions regarding governance and
general procedures of the Center which will lay the groundwork for future multilateral efforts to combat
shared terrorist 􀃄nancing threats.
The TFTC was established in 2017 as a collaborative approach to confronting new and evolving threats
arising from terrorist 􀃄nancing. The TFTC represents a new and creative response that leverages existing
tools and formalizes cooperation between the United States, Saudi Arabia and partners in the Gulf to
counter this threat. The TFTC’s goals are to: 1) identify, track, and share information regarding terrorist
􀃄nancial networks; 2) coordinate joint disruptive actions, and; 3) pursue capacity building assistance to
counter terrorist 􀃄nancing threats.
Meeting of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Member States Convenes in
Kuwait – March 6, 2018
Annex 52

Annex 53
U.S. Department of State, Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with Qatari Foreign Minister Al Thani
(26 June 2018), available at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283519.html

U.S. Department of State
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283519.htm
Diplomacy in Action
Secretary Pompeo's Meeting With Qatari Foreign Minister Al
Thani
Readout
Washington, DC
June 26, 2018
The below is attributable to Spokesperson Heather Nauert:
Secretary Michael R. Pompeo met today with Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin
Abdulrahman Al Thani in Washington. The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for Qatar’s
strategic partnership and friendship with the United States. The Secretary commended the
Foreign Minister for Qatar’s continued efforts on counterterrorism and countering terrorism
financing. The Secretary emphasized the President’s desire to see the Gulf dispute eased and
eventually resolved, as it only benefits Iran. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister also
discussed a range of regional and bilateral topics.
.
1/1
Annex 53

Annex 54
Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland,
HE the Foreign Minister delivers a statement before the 36th Session of the Human Rights
Council (11 Sept. 2017), available at http://geneva.mission.qa/en/news/detail/2017/09/17/he-theforeign-
minister-delivers-a-statement-in-front-of-the-36th-session-of-the-human-rights-council



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Annex 54




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Annex 54
Annex 55
UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, Address by His Highness Sheikh Tamim
bin Hamad Al-Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar (19 Sept. 2017)

Annex 55
Unofficial ·Translation
Address by
His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad AI-Thani
Amir of the State of Qatar
At
The General Debate of the 72nd Session
of the United Nations General Assembly
New York
19 September 2017
Annex 55
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful,
Honorable Audience,
It pleases me to congratulate His Excellency Mr. Miroslav Lajcak on assuming the tasks
of President of the 72nd Session of the General Assembly, wishing him every success in his
mission.
I wish also to express my appreciation to His Excellency Mr. Peter Thomson for his
valuable efforts in managing the affairs of the 71st Session of the General Assembly, and I take
this opportunity to commend the efforts of His Excellency the Secretary-General, Mr. Antonio
Guterres, to strengthen the role of the United Nations.
Mr. President,
Maintaining the regional and international peace and security is a priority in the State of
Qatar's foreign policy,'whose principles and objectives are based on the United Nations Charter
and the rules of international legality which calls for constructive cooperation among States,
mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs, good neighborliness, as well as
promoting peaceful coexistence and pursuing peaceful means to settle disputes.
The issue of settling of disputes by peaceful means is still being addressed as an episodic
and non-binding proposal. Perhaps the time has come to impose dialogue and negotiation as a basis
for resolving disputes through concluding an international convention on settling disputes between
States by peaceful means.
In this context, and after major events such as the Second World War, Rwanda & Burundi
and the Balkans in the last century, the danger of the impunity of perpetrators of crimes against
humanity and crimes of genocide has come back again to threaten humanity to become the rule
rather than the exception, because the international legitimacy is subjected to political pressures,
interests of the axes and dictations of force on the ground, which could be a harbinger that the law
of force may supersede the force of law.
In our view, the position of the major powers should not range between two extremes: the
direct occupation to impose the will and policy on other countries, or standing idly in a spectator's
position who refrain from doing anything vis-a-vis wars of genocide and crimes against humanity
perpetrated by a fascist despotic regime, or a continuous repression by an occupying state of people
under occupation.
Lately a feeling is spreading that peoples who are exposed to repression face their fate
alone, as if the international arena is governed by the law of the jungle, and that the countries under
Annex 55
threat have to stand on their own through their alliances and relations, in the absence of a system
to implement the provisions of international law, and the binding conventions and charters.
Mr. President,
We commend opting for the theme of this session: "Focusing on People: Striving for Peace
and a Decent Life for All on a Sustainable Planet."
In this context, I callupon the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and
the international community to assume their legal and moral responsibility to take the necessary
measures to stop the violence against Rohingya minority, provide them with protection, repatriate
the displaced to their homeland, prevent sectarian or ethnic discrimination against them, and ensure
that they have their full legitimate rights as full-fledged citizens, and we urge all States to provide
humanitarian assistance to them.
Mr. President,
Every time I stand here I speak in favor of constructive international cooperation, just
peace, the rights of peoples under occupation, as well as those who are subjected to crimes against
humanity and those who are under siege.
This time, I stand here while my country and my people are subjected to a continuing and
unjust blockade imposed since June 5th by neighboring countries. The blockade involves all
aspects oflife, including the intervention by these countries to sever family ties. Qatar is currently
managing successively its living, economy, development plans and its outreach to the outside
world, thanks to sea and air routes that these countries have no control over.
The blockade was imposed abruptly and without warning, prompting Qataris to consider it
as a kind of betrayal.
It seems that those who planned and implemented it had envisaged that their move would
cause a shocking and direct impact that will bring the State of Qatar to its knees and to capitulate
to a total tutelage to be imposed on it.
And what is worse, the blockade planners found it necessary to rely on fabricated quotes
attributed to me and posted on the website of Qatar News Agency after hacking it. The mobilized
and guided media of these countries was ready to launch an all-out campaign of incitement
prepared in advance in which all values, morals and norms were breached, and the truth was
infringed by a torrent of lies. Funds are still being spent unsparingly on the machine of faking and
disseminating fabrications in the hope of fooling people by distorting the truth with lies.
2
Annex 55
Despite the exposure of the hacking and falsification of quotes of the Amir of a sovereign
State, the blockading countries did not back down or apologize for lying, but rather intensified
their campaign, in the hope that the blockade would cause a cumulative effect on the economy and
the society of my country, after it failed to bring about any direct impact.
The perpetrators of the hacking and the falsification of the quotes have committed an
assault against a sovereign State. The crime was deliberately committed for political aims, and was
followed by a list of political dictations, which contravene sovereignty, and caused worldwide
astonishment.
This disgraceful act has once again raised international queries about digital security and
the unruliness in cybercrime and electronic piracy.
It also revealed the anxiety of a lot of public and official circles in the world over the
absence of clear-cut international legislations and institutions to organize this dangerous and vital
field and punish the perpetrators of transnational crimes.
It is time now to take steps in this regard, and we are ready to put our potentials to serve
such joint effort.
The countries who imposed the unjust blockade on Qatar have intervened in the internal
affairs of the State by putting pressure on its citizens through foodstuffs, medicine and ripping off
consanguineous relations to force them change their political affiliation to destabilize a sovereign
country. Isn't this one of the definitions of terrorism?
This illegal blockade was not confined to the economic aspect and the breach of the WTO
Agreement, but it exceeded that to violate the human rights conventions by the arbitrary measures
that have caused social, economic and religious harm to thousands of citizens and residents of the
GCC countries, due to the violation of the basic human rights to work, education, freedom of
movement and the right to dispose of private property.
However, things did not stop at this point, but the blockading countries went beyond that
to persecute their own citizens and residents of their territory and imposing penalties of
imprisonment and fines on them for the mere expression of their sympathy with Qatar, even if that
was on the social media, in a precedent never seen before in the world, in violation of the human
rights conventions and agreements that guarantee the right of everyone to freedom of opinion and
expression of ideas.
There are countries that permit themselves not only to attack a neighboring country to
dictate its foreign and media policy, but also believe that their possession of funds qualifies them
to put pressure and blackmail other countries to participate in their aggression, while they are
supposed to be held accountable internationally for what they have done.
3
Annex 55
The countries who imposed the blockade on the State of Qatar interfere in the internal
affairs of many countries, and accuse all those who oppose them domestically and abroad with
terrorism. By doing so, they are inflicting damage on the war on terror, while at the same time
opposing reform and supporting the tyrannical regimes in our region, in whose prisons terrorists
are initiated.
We were not alone to be taken by surprise by the imposition of the blockade, as many
countries whose leaders have questioned its motives and reasons were also taken by surprise. The
blockading countries have promised all those who asked them about the reasons of the blockade
-to prov1de-ihein with -evidence -of therr -antI~Qairu--absurd ailegations -andfabncations, wlnch -kept
changing according to the identity of the addressee. Everyone is still waiting for evidence that did
not and will not arrive, because it does not exist. In contrast, these allegations contradict a lot of
evidence about Qatar's contribution to the fight against terrorism, which is recognized by the entire
international community.
The State of Qatar has fought terrorism - the whole international community bears witness
to that - and it is still fighting it and will continue to do that. It stands in the camp of those who
are fighting by security means, and believes that it is necessary to fight it ideologically as well. It
goes beyond that to participate in draining its sources through providing education to seven million
children around the world, so that they do not fall prey to ignorance and radical ideas.
We have refused to yield to dictations by pressure and siege, and our people was not
satisfied by less than that. At the same time, we have taken an open attitude towards dialogue
without dictation, and have expressed our readiness to resolve differences through compromises
based on common undertakings. Resolving conflicts by peaceful means is actually one of the
priorities of our foreign policy. From here, I renew the call for an unconditional dialogue based on
mutual respect for sovereignty and I highly value the sincere and appreciated mediation that the
State of Qatar has supported since the beginning, and which was initiated by my brother, His
Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Amir of the sisterly State of Kuwait. I
also thank all the countries that have supported this mediation.
Allow me, on this occasion and from this podium, to express my pride in my Qatari people,
along with the multinational and multicultural residents in Qatar.
The people have withstood the conditions of siege, and rejected the dictations with resolve
and pride, and insisted on the independence of Qatar's sovereign decision, and strengthened its
unity and solidarity, and maintained their refined manners and their progress despite the fierceness
of the campaign against them and their country.
I reiterate my thanks to the sisterly and friendly countries which recognize the significance
of respecting the sovereignty of States and the rules of international law, for their appreciated
stances which were, and still are, supportive of the Qatari people during this crisis.
4
Annex 55
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Mr. President,
Terrorism and extremism are among the most serious challenges facing the world.
Countering them require us all to carry out a concerted action against terrorist organizations and
their extremist ideology in order to maintain security for humanity and stability for the world.
The governments of the world have no choice but to cooperate in the security confrontation
with terrorism, but halting the initiation of terrorism and extremism could be achieved by
addressing its social, political and cultural root causes.
We must also be careful not to make the fight against terrorism an umbrella for reprisals or
shelling of civilians.
The fight against terrorism and extremism was and will continue to be our highest priority.
This is affirmed by the effective participation of the State of Qatar in the regional and international
efforts through the implementation of the measures included in the United Nations strategy
adopted in 2006, and the implementation of all the Security Council resolutions and measures
related to the fight against terrorism and its financing and through the participation in the
International Coalition, regional organizations and bilateral relations with the United States and
many countries of the world. The State of Qatar will continue its regional and international efforts
in this regard and will develop them.
While reaffirming our condemnation of all forms of extremism and terrorism, we reject
tackling this phenomenon with double standards according to the identity of the perpetrators, or
by linking it with any particular religion, race, civilization, culture or society.
Mr. President,
The issues of the Middle East continue to pose the greatest threat to international peace and
security, due to the vital importance of this region to the world.
Israel still stands in the way of achieving a lasting, just and comprehensive peace and
rejects the Arab Peace initiative. The Israeli government continues its intransigent approach and
strategy to create facts on the ground through expanding settlement construction in the occupied
territories, Judaizing Jerusalem and restricting the performance of religious rituals in Al-Aqsa
Mosque, which is a serious provocative act, and continuing its blockade of the Gaza Strip.
The international community must give high priority to the resumption of pe,ace
negotiations on the basis of ending the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories within a specified
time frame and reaching a just, comprehensive and final settlement in accordance with the twostate
solution agreed upon by the international community, based on the resolutions of
international legitimacy and the Arab Peace initiative.
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This will only be achieved through the establishment of an independent Palestinian State
on the basis of 1967 borders , with Jerusalem as its capital.
I renew my appeal to the Palestinian brothers to complete national reconciliation and unify
positions and words in confronting the dangers and challenges facing the Palestinian cause and the
future of the Palestinian people.
Mr. President,
The international community remains unable to find a solution to the Syrian crisis despite
its consequences and serious repercussions on the region and the world. Political efforts continue
to falter due to the conflicting international and regional interests , this confliction is conducive to
protect those against whom we are supposed to stand united.
The international community relinquishes its legal and moral responsibilities, including the
implementation of its decisions, in submission to the logic of force. What is required is to work
seriously to reach a political solution to the Syrian crisis in a way that meets the aspirations of the
Syrian people for justice , dignity and freedom, and maintains the unity and sovereignty of Syria,
in accordance with the Geneva- I decisions.
Qatar will spare no effort in providing support and assistance to alleviate the humanitarian
suffering of our Syrian brothers and to implement our humanitarian pledges within the framework
of the United Nations.
The international community has given up the task of protecting civilians. Will it also
hesitate to hold war criminals accountable? Their impunity would have dire consequences on the
situation in Syria and the region, which would affect the behavior of future dictatorships towards
their peoples in the absence of any deterrent.
On the Libyan issue, Libya's national consensus - which would preserve Libya's unity,
sovereignty and social fabric, and restore its stability - could be achieved by means of combining
domestic and international efforts. We must all intensify efforts and support the Government of
National Accord , which has been established with the support of United Nations , in its efforts to
restore stability, counter terrorism and its grave consequences.
The State of Qatar has supported international mediation efforts and will support them in
the future to achieve the aspirations of the Libyan people.
Concerning the brotherly Iraq, we support the efforts of the Iraqi government in its
endeavor to achieve security, stability and unity of the territory and people of Iraq. We commend
its achievements in its fight against terrorism , and affirm the necessary support to it by the State
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of Qatar to complement these victories by realizing the aspirations of the people of Iraq to equality
among its citizens and restore its role at the regional and international levels.
Concerning Yemen, we affirm the importance of maintaining Yemen's unity, security and
stability, and ending the state of infighting and war and adopting dialogue, political solution and
national reconciliation as a basis for ending this crisis and implementing the Security Council
resolution 2216.
We call upon the international community to facilitate the access of humanitarian
assistance to various Yemeni regions. The State of Qatar supports the efforts of the UN envoy to
end this crisis and realize the aspirations of the brotherly Yemeni people in unity, security and
stability.
In order to achieve security and stability in the Gulf region, we renew the call that we have
already launched from this podium,. for conducting a constructive dialogue between the GCC
countries and Iran on the basis of common interests, the principle of good neighborliness, respect
for the sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs.
Mr. President,
Within the framework of the international efforts to tackle the humanitarian crises, the State
of Qatar has continued to contribute to the response to the growing humanitarian needs in the
world. We have increased our financial contributions to the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to enable the United Nations to implement UN
programs and provide humanitarian relief to those in need worldwide. Today the State of Qatar
ranks third on the list of major donors in 201 7 to the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs.
We have continued to provide support to countries facing challenges to help them
implement their development plans. It is worth mentioning here that the State of Qatar ranked first
in the Arab world and 33rd in the world in the field of human development. This proves the
effectiveness of our humanitarian and development policy. We look forward to achieving the goals
of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda, which we have all committed to realize.
In conclusion, we reiterate that the State of Qatar will spare no effort in working to
strengthen the role and efforts of the United Nations to achieve what the international community
seeks in regard to peace and security, and to promote human rights and advance development.
Qatar will remain, as is always the case, a safe haven for the oppressed, and will continue its
mediation efforts to find just solutions in conflict zones.
Thank you, and may Allah's peace, mercy and blessings be upon you.
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Annex 56
UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, Statement of H.E. Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi,
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt (19 Sept. 2017)

Annex 56
The Permanent Mission of Egypt
to the United Nations
New York
Unofficial Translation
Statement of
H.E. Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi
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President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
before the 72 nd session of the United Nations
General Assembly
New York, 19 September 2017
Please check against delivery
Annex 56
Mr. President Miroslav Lajcak, President of the General Assembly,
Allow me at the outset to congratulate you for assuming the
presidency of the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly. I
wish you all success in carrying out your duties. I also seize this opportunity
to express the utmost appreciation to Mr. Peter Thomson, the president of
the 71 st session of the General Assembly, who has most ably overseen the
work of the previous session.
Mr. President,
Each time we meet at this august body, we rekindle the hopes and
aspirations of the peoples whom we are honored to represent and serve, to
provide them with peace and development. New generations look up to us to
realize their dreams for a decent life within a just international order; a
global order that can face challenges, such as climate change, natural
disasters, diseases and epidemics, as well as other man-made crises such as
war, terrorism and the huge discrepancies in the distribution of resources and
development opportunities.
It is evident that the purposes and principles of the United Nations are
still valid as a basis for a world that offers everyone an opportunity to
benefit from the great strides in scientific advancement, economic
development, as well as the information revolution, which has brought
societies ever more closer in an unprecedented manner. These developments
offer great potential for establishing a just and secure international order;
one that is based on the right to development, freedom, progress and open
interactions between peoples.
In Egypt, we adamantly believe in the values of the United Nations
and the purposes of its Charter. We have great confidence that realizing such
values is not only possible, but rather an obligation and a necessity.
Egypt's longstanding involvement with the UN, both as a founding
member of the United Nations that has been elected to the Security Council
for six times, and the seventh largest contributor to peace keeping operations
world-wide, bears witness to our constant strive to build a world that is
worthy of the aspirations of our children and grandchildren to live in
freedom, dignity, security and prosperity.
The responsibility that we bear necessitates that we be frank in saying
that this world that we seek and is very possible to achieve remains
unfortunately far from reality. We are still unable to prevent armed conflict,
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confront terrorism, realize nuclear disarmament and address the major
structural imbalances in the international economic order, which have
widened the gap between the developed and developing worlds.
Based on the experiences of the African and Arab regions, I can state
with a clear conscience that these experiences summarize the current crisis
in the international order, and its inability to deliver on the goals of this
organization.
The Arab region, Egypt's civilizational and cultural milieu, has
today become an epicenter for some of the most vicious civil conflicts in
recent human history. It is the most prone region to the dangers posed by
terrorism. One out of every three refugees in the world today is an Arab,
and the Mediterranean Sea has became a conduit for irregular migrants
from Asian and African states, who are fleeing the scourge of civil strife,
as well as the despair of economic and social hardships, as reflected in the
Arab regional report on multi-dimensional poverty conducted by the
League of Arab States in collaboration with the United Nations.
As Egypt's geographical home, Africa lies at the heart of Egypt's
foreign policy, for it is in Africa that our historic roots lie, and it is from
Africa that we derive pride in our identity and our deep sense of belonging.
This continent has also become subject to the same security threats facing
the Arab region, and constitutes a major example of the crisis in the current
international economic order, which cements poverty and economic
disparity. This global order bears a major responsibility in the economic,
political and social crises that threaten international peace and stability,
rendering any discussion on sustainable development goals futile.
Mr. President,
Egypt is encircled by the most dangerous crises in the world. It is our destiny
to navigate confidently through these unprecedented dangers, relying on an
ambitious development strategy based on radical and bold economic
reforms. Such reforms aim at empowering the youth, who represent the
majority of the population, not only in Egypt but also in most of the societies
of the Arab countries and the developing world.
In a world that is interconnected, complex and full of challenges that
cannot be confronted by any country alone, regardless of its capabilities, it is
imperative for Egypt's ambitious development plans to correlate with an
active foreign policy strategy. Such a strategy is guided by the long
established moral principles ingrained in our heritage and culture, and abides
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by the legal principles of the international system, which Egypt has actively
participated in formulating. It is also based on a vision to address the
shortcomings that have prevented the realization of the objectives of the
United Nations.
Our v1s10n 1s based on the following five main principles and
priorities:
First: The only solution to the of the crises afflicting the Arab
region is through upholding the notion of the modern nation-state, which
is based on the principles of citizenship, equality, rule of law and human
rights, thereby defeating any attempts at retracting to doctrinal, sectarian,
ethnic or tribal loyalties. The path towards reform passes inevitably
through the realization of the nation-state, and cannot be built on its
demise.
This principle lies at the core of Egypt's foreign policy, and it is the
foundation on which we base our positions in addressing crises affecting our
region.
With regards to Syria, we believe that there would be no salvation for
Syria except through a consensual political solution amongst all Syrians at
the core of which is the preservation of the unity of the Syrian state, the
maintenance of its institutions and the broadening of their political and
social base to include all factions of the Syrian society, and to decisively
counter terrorism until it is defeated. The way to achieve this is through the
UN led negotiations process, supported by Egypt as stridently as we reject
any attempt to manipulate the tragedy in Syria to establish international or
regional zones of influence, or to carry out the subversive policies of some
regional parties, whose practices have caused great suffering to our region
over the past few years. It is now high time for a final and decisive
confrontation with these practices.
Similarly, we believe that a political settlement is the only viable
solution to the ongoing crisis in Libya. Libya continues to face attempts to
dismantle the state and to tum it into an open field for tribal conflicts, a field
of operations for terrorist organizations, and a theatre of activity for arms
and human traffickers. Here, I would like to emphasize very clearly, that
Egypt will not allow the continuation of attempts to tamper with the unity
and integrity of the Libyan state, or to undermine the capabilities of the
Libyan people. We will continue to work diligently with the United Nations
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to achieve a political settlement based on the "Sokhairat Agreement." This
political settlement is inspired by the recommendations agreed upon between
Libyans during their consecutive meetings in Cairo during the last months.
The aim is to end the current political stalemate, and to revive the settlement
process in the country.
The aforementioned same logic applies to the Egyptian strategy
regarding the crises in Iraq and Yemen. A unified, capable and just modem
nation-state is the only way to overcome the current crises, and to realize the
legitimate aspirations of Arab peoples.
Second: It is time for a comprehensive and final settlement to the
longest outstanding crisis in the Arab region, namely the Palestinian cause,
which is a clear depiction of the international community's inability to
implement a long series of United Nations and Security Council resolutions.
The closure of this chapter through a just settlement, based on established
international norms and principles, establishing an independent Palestinian
state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, is a necessary
precondition for the entire region transit into a new phase of stability and
development. This is also necessary to restore the credibility of the United
Nations and the international order. Undoubtedly, achieving peace will
eliminate one of the main excuses terrorism has been manipulating to justify
its proliferation in the region. It is time to permanently overcome the barrier
of hatred forever. I would like to underscore that the Arabs still extend their
hands in peace. Egypt's experience validates that peace is possible, and is
indeed a realistic objective that we should all continue seriously pursuing.
Third: It is impossible to envisage a future for the regional or
international order without a definitive and comprehensive confrontation
with terrorism. This should be approached in a manner that eradicates
terrorism and eliminates its roots and causes, in addition to openly
challenging any party that supports or finances terrorism, or that grants it
political, media fora, or safe havens.
In all candidness, there is no room for any serious discussion on the
credibility of any international system that applies double standards. A
system that fights terrorism while tolerating its supporters, and
simultaneously engaging them in the discussions on how to eliminate a
threat they created in the first place. In order to be true and faithful to our
peoples, members of different international alliances should answer the
pertinent questions we are raising, for answers are usually avoided by those
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who prefer duplicity in order to attain narrow political interests at the demise
of states and at the expense of blood shed by their people, which we shall
not allow to be lost in vain under any circumstances.
We in the Muslim world need to face our reality and work together to
rectify misconstrued notions which have become an ideological pretext for
terrorism and their destructive discourse. As you may recall, Egypt has
launched an initiative to rectify religious discourse in order to revive the
moderate and tolerant values of Islam. Egypt's religious institutions are
currently engaged in this process in coordination with relevant international
entities worldwide.
Egypt, which is currently engaged in an unrelenting battle to eradicate
terrorism from its territory, is committed to track, confront, and eliminate
terrorism decisively wherever it exists. It is evident that confronting
terrorism has been at the forefront of Egypt's priorities during its
membership of the Security Council in 2016/2017, as well as its
chairmanship of the Counter Terrorism Committee. This was not only in
defense of Egypt's future, but also in defense of the future of the
international community as a whole.
Fourth: The elimination of the root causes of international crises
and sources of threat to international stability, necessitates the
operationalization of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities between members of the international community, in
order to narrow the economic and social gaps between developed and
developing countries.
How can the United Nations, Agenda 2030, and the sustainable
development goals have any credibility when the international economic
order is in itself responsible for augmenting disparities in a manner
inconsistent with the values of justice and equality?
And how can there be any opportunity for less developed countries to
implement fundamental economic reforms to rectify defects aimed at
managing their resources, without fundamentally addressing issues that are
no less foundational to international economic conditions? This requires
involving developing countries more in the international economic
governance structure and facilitating their access to easier financing, markets
and technology transfer.
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Fifth: Settling disputes in our world today can only be achieved
through respect for the principles of international law, and negotiation on the
basis of legal, historic, and moral principles, as well as the respect of the
sovereignty of states and of the principle of non-intervention in their internal
affairs.
After more than seven decades have elapsed since the establishment
of the United Nations, force and zero-sum games cannot remain as a means
to realize interests, especially in today's world, which is based on mutual
interdependence among nations, and where significant horizons for
cooperation and understanding exist to achieve the common interests for
everyone.
Based on the aforementioned principles, Egypt has been at the forefront
of countries that have been keen on initiating the Nile Basin Initiative in 1999.
It has also pursued the conclusion of a trilateral agreement between Egypt,
Sudan and Ethiopia to address the Renaissance Dam issue from a cooperative
perspective, in a manner that establishes a clear legal framework to manage
this issue in accordance with international law and established principles, as
well as the well established rules governing relations between states sharing
basins of trans-boundary rivers all over the world. This agreement remains as
the legal framework that can translate the logic of cooperation and sharing
between its three parties, as long as good faith persists and the parties apply
the agreement fully and with integrity. In this regard, it is of paramount
importance to carry out what has been previously agreed upon between the
parties in the context of this agreement, especially given the pressing time
factor, in order to avoid squandering the opportunity of presenting a
successful model for the management of relations between three sisterly
countries in the Nile basin.
Mr. President,
In conclusion, our meeting today in this august body, is an
opportunity for truthful self-reflection, where we should admit the several
deficiencies that hinder the international system from delivering on the noble
objectives and aspirations it was set up to realize. It is also an opportunity to
renew our commitment to establish a more equitable international order,
given that the attainment of justice globally remains a necessary condition to
confront the immense challenges impacting our world today, and
endangering the credibility of the international system.
6
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The humanitarian tragedy facing the Rohingya minority in Myanmar
represents another reason to remind the international community of its moral
obligations, let alone its legal responsibilities, as reflected in the UN Charter,
to promptly work towards a lasting solution that ends the plight of civilians
and addresses the root causes of the crisis, which has become a threat to
regional security and the stability of neigh boring countries.
Let us move together to empower the people of this world regain
control of their destinies, and to explore new horizons of cooperation
between members of the international community ... Let us transcend
together the vicious circle of narrow interests as well as the futile logic of
power politics to the broader horizons of common human interests and
cooperation among all .... Let us be true to ourselves and dispel the mentality
of polarizing policies ... For the world today is in dire need to uphold
common human interests. It is incumbent upon all states to strive to further
relations with all partners with malice to none.
This, Mr. President, was Egypt's message that I have conveyed to you
today ... explicitly and clearly. I am full of hope that our joint efforts during
the upcoming period will succeed in realizing a better world, which is more
secure, stable and prosperous.
Thank you ....
Long live Egypt. ... Long live Egypt .... Long live Egypt ....
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UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, Statement by His Highness Sheikh
Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the
United Arab Emirates (22 Sept. 2017)

Annex 57
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORI(
Statement by
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His Highness Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
of the United Arab Emirates
before
The General Debate of the 72nd session
of the United Nations General Assembly
New York, 22 September 2017
Please Check Against Delivery
Mr. President,
Let me begin by congratulating you on your presidency of this session of the General
Assembly. We are confident that your deep experience in international affairs will
contribute to its success, and we stand ready to provide you with all the support and
cooperation you need. I also wish to thank your predecessor, Mr. Peter Thompson, for his
stewardship of the last session.
Let me also take this opportunity to express my country's appreciation for the efforts of the
Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, to reform the United Nations' work in conflict
prevention and the achievement of peace and security. We fully support his vision, which
will require United Nations member states to cooperate more closely on both existing and
emerging global challenges.
The foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates is guided by principles consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations and international law: a spirit of partnership, support for the
rule of law, good-neighborliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.
These principles lead us to support a stronger role for the United Nations, and its reform, so
that it can fulfil its mandate to maintain international peace and security and to bring about
development and prosperity.
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PERMANENTM ISSIONO F THE
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TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK
Mr. President,
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The United Arab Emirates works hard and responsibly, both within its neighbourhood and
beyond it, to promote the stability and development of Arab countries and tackle the
destruction which our region's wars have left in their wake. We see security and stability as
the key to the advancement of nations and peoples, a promising future for younger
generations, and a decent life for all. Our collective priority must be to promote peace and
stability.
Despite serious regional and international efforts, our region continues to suffer from crises.
These have several causes: extremism and terrorismi continued interference by states in
each other's internal affairsi aggressive and expansionist policies driven by hegemonic
ambitionsi and regimes which seek influence by providing support to extremist and terrorist
groups to undermine legitimate governments and spread chaos and conflict throughout the
region and the world. These crises have killed many, displaced millions and destroyed
infrastructure. If this situation persists, it will only generate more violence, destruction and
depletion of economic, cultural and human resources not only in our region, but throughout
the world.
There is no doubt that we, as an international community, have made progress in
confronting security and humanitarian threats. However, more can be done to restore
stability in the Arab world. The UAE believes that the initial steps to restore stability in the
region should be the following:
First: to protect the development progress that has been made, and prevent any party from
obstructing or wrecking collective efforts at peacebuilding. Otherwise we will be reduced
to managing these conflicts instead of being able to solve them. I refer in particular to Libya,
Syria, Yemen and Somalia. In those countries comprehensive political solutions can be
achieved. Stability can be restored. But this will only be possible if we put a stop to outside
interference in Arab affairs, and prevent any form of support from being given to extremist
and terrorist groups. In this regard, we support the efforts of the United Nations to bring
warring parties to the negotiating table and achieve comprehensive political solutions for
the crises in our region.
Second: to unite in a firm and sincere rejection of extremism and terrorism in all its
manifestations. There is no other way to confront and eradicate this scourge. My country
believes that the Riyadh Summit was historic by any standard. It attracted an
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PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
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TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORI(
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unprecedented breadth of attendance at the highest · levels, including the important
participation of the President of the United States. The outcomes of the Summit
demonstrated that the Arab and Islamic world stands firmly against terrorism and its
ideological roots.
We believe that the elimination of this threat from our Arab region is within our reach. The
liberation of ancient Arab cities with a rich history, such as Mosul in Iraq and Mukalla in
Yemen from the grip of terrorist organizations is proof of this. It shows what can be
achieved when we work together to combat extremism and terrorism.
Third: To take collective action to identify countries that support and finance terrorism, and
hold them accountable. This is why the UAE has taken measures in tandem with its close
allies the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Arab Republic of Egypt,
aimed at stopping Qatar's support for extremism and terrorism, and forcing it to abandon
policies which have destabilized our region.
We are committed to protecting our national interests, the security of the Arabian Gulf, and
the stability of our region. Some parties in our region are making alliances with
organisations that seek to undermine peace and security in the Arab region and the world.
This is a gamble that they will lose. It is behavior that we should not accept. Let us stand
united against those who finance, promote and justify extremism and terrorism.
We have a clear choice with no alternative: to stand against terrorism in all its
manifestations and to stand against all perpetrators without exception. We must
demonstrate zero tolerance to those who spread violence, fear and destruction among
innocent people, and those who provide support and safe haven to terrorist groups. The
sovereign measures taken by my country in cooperation with its close allies serve this
purpose. They are consistent with international law and are intended to protect Arab
national security and counter Qatar's support for terrorism.
Fourth: to promote compassion, tolerance and inclusion. Today more than ever, the Arab
region is in great need of these values to counter the misleading messages and ideologies
spread by extremist and terrorist groups, especially through social media platforms. My
country works with regional and international partners to put in place mechanisms which
remind our youth of our shared human values and counter the rhetoric of the terrorists.
Specifically, the UAE established and hosts specialized institutions such as the "Sawab"
Center, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism
"Hedayah", as well as the "Muslim Council of Elders" which aims to demonstrate the
peaceful nature of our Islamic religion, and the "Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim
3
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PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
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TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK
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Societies 11 which consolidates the principle of peace among Muslims. We have learned from
experience that we must expose extremist and terrorist rhetoric and defeat it intellectually,
and provide an alternative narrative based on the principle of peaceful coexistence and
tolerance.
While these institutions promote a culture of peaceful coexistence and tolerance, we regret
that some countries fund media platforms which call for violence, incite hatred and
sectarianism and provide a podium for the murderous ideology of terrorism. History has
repeatedly proven the catastrophic consequences that follow when media platforms incite
people to commit violence and justify it.
Mr. President,
Our international efforts to achieve peace in the region will not be successful without
ending the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories which has lasted over
seven decades. This situation makes young people vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist
groups who claim that they are the only choice through which they can achieve their
aspirations.
The common factor in all crises suffered in the region and the real obstacle to any concrete
progress in resolving these crises remains the hostile and expansionist policy of Iran in the
region. That policy is one of interference in the internal affairs of other states, and of arming
and supporting terrorist groups, such as the Houthis and Hezbollah, as well as terrorist
groups and cells in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom
of Bahrain and Kuwait. Iran has not only committed blatant violations of the principles of
sovereignty, but also continues to exploit the crises in the Arab world to undermine regional
security by inciting and fueling conflict. Iran must realize that peaceful co-existence based
on respect for sovereignty in the region is the best basis for a harmonious relationship with
the states of the Arabian Gulf.
We reaffirm from this podium the UAE1s firm position and its legitimate right to sovereignty
over its three islands: Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, which are occupied by Iran
in violation of the provisions of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. We
will not abandon our demand for Iran to return the occupied islands to their rightful owners,
either voluntarily or through the peaceful means that are available for the resolution of
international disputes, particularly through the International Court of Justice.
Two years have passed since lran 1s nuclear agreement, with no sign of change in its hostile
behavior in the region or any desire to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Instead, Iran
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PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
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TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK
continues to develop and conduct more ballistic missile tests in a deliberate violation of the
spirit of the nuclear agreement. Therefore 1 we support enhancing controls on Iran's nuclear
program and continued assessment of the agreement and its provisions.
We view the similarly provocative behavior of North Korea, through its continued
development of its nuclear program and ballistic missiles, as a part of the destructive efforts
of these states to pursue their nuclear ambitions and threaten global security and stability.
The aggressive policies of Iran and North Korea are inconsistent with their membership in
an international organization whose primary concern is the maintenance of international
peace and security.
Mr. President,
If we are to restore security in the region and protect its peoples from conflicts and
extremism 1 then we must make development, in both its human and strategic dimensions,
our top priority. We must create opportunities and hope for young generations looking to a
tomorrow with optimism and confidence. Therefore, my country is committed to achieving
economic and human progress, and to contribute to rehabilitation and reconstruction
projects in conflict-affected countries, in order to enable their national institutions to
undertake their role in restoring security and stability.
The UAE continues its humanitarian approach to alleviate the suffering of refugees. It
supports international and regional efforts to protect them and improve their conditions by
providing humanitarian and development assistance. However, the UAE stresses that
managing crises by providing only humanitarian and development assistance is not a
sustainable solution if we do not address the root causes of such crises.
In this regard, we reiterate the need for the United Nations to assume its responsibilities in
finding solutions to humanitarian and political crises and addressing their grave
implications 1 especially with regard to the recent violence and ethnic cleansing committed
against the Rohingya in Myanmar. The United Arab Emirates condemns the acts of
violence, and displacement and collective punishment, committed against the Rohingya
and affirms that it will continue to provide humanitarian assistance and support efforts
taken to reduce their suffering.
In this context also, we refer to the obstinate rejection by the Houthi rebels in Yemen of a
political settlement to the Yemeni crisis and of humanitarian initiatives there. We see this
clearly in their disruption and delay of numerous relief efforts and initiatives aimed at
responding effectively to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen. Despite this,
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PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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we will continue to work determinedly through the Arab coalition under the wise leadership
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the political and humanitarian processes with the utmost
vigour and determination. We will strive to address the humanitarian and development
needs of the Yemeni people, especially women and children, and restore stability.
Mr. President,
The UAE believes that it is by looking to the future, promoting humane values and human
development, and responding to the aspirations of young people that peoples and nations
can best advance their own development and prosperity. Today, my country has moved
beyond the establishment of infrastructure and fulfillment of basic needs, including the
provision of health, nutrition and education services, and adopted a model which is based
on the principles of good governance and values of tolerance according to a vision for
building happy societies. In addition, my country has ensured the provision of a safe
environment to enable women and youth to fulfill their dreams and ambitions, and engage
in the development of their country. This has allowed the UAE to pioneer innovations and
ground-breaking achievements, and to become a beacon of hope for the younger
generation throughout the region. The UAE is cognizant that its greatest challenge is to
make its development sustainable and prepare itself for the post-oil era. This is a vital
endeavor and it is our goal in every action that we undertake.
The UAE considers these values and principles a human and historic legacy passed on and
celebrated by generations. Therefore, we have declared 2018 to be the "Year of Zayed" in
memory and recognition of the achievements of the founding father of the United Arab
Emirates, and to enshrine his values as we continue his journey to build and advance the
nation.
Mr. President, we stand before a historic juncture. On the one hand stand those who pursue
peace, development, modernity and the future. On the other, those who choose darkness,
destruction, sabotage and chaos. In this most necessary and just confrontation, we must
stand united. Our goal must be the eradication of extremism and terrorism and the
elimination of those forces that are tearing our Arab region apart. Our path will then be
clear, towards a future that is brighter and full of hope.
Thank you.
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UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, H.E. Mr. Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin
Mohamed Al Khalifa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bahrain (22 Sept. 2017)

Annex 58
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United Nations
STATEMENT
b_y
H.E. Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain
#UNGA72
Check against delivery
before the
United Nations General Assembly
72nd Session
New York City
23rd September 2017
Annex 58
Your Excellency Mr. Miroslav Lajcak,
President of the General Assembly,
I wish at the outset to congratulate you wholeheartedly, and your country Slovakia, on your
election as President of the current session of the General Assembly, and to pledge our full
cooperation in the discharge of the duties with which you are entrusted. We are fully confident
that, thanks to your insight and clear vision, you will successfully conduct the business of this
session.
I also wish to praise your choice of the theme of our session which is "Focusing on
People-Striving for Peace and a Decent Life for All on a Sustainable Planet". This important
theme meets the expectations of all countries and nations.
I avail myself of this opportunity to express my deep appreciation for your predecessor His
Excellency Mr. Peter Thomson for his able and competent presidency of the previous session.
I renew my congratulations to His Excellency Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and applaud
his tireless efforts as reflected in his valuable report on the work of the Organization in which he
demonstrated his resolve to reform its structure and management, to enhance its role in the
consolidation of international peace and security, and to support sustainable development in
response to the challenges and changing circumstances confronting us. In this respect, I also
applaud the efforts of His Excellency President Donald Trump, President of the United States of
America, to support the reform of the United Nations. The Kingdom of Bahrain was among the
first countries to sign the Political Declaration initiated by His Excellency in support of the
Secretary-General's reform plan for the United Nations.
I would be remiss not to express the heartfelt condolences of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the
United States of America, Mexico and the Caribbean nations on the natural disasters to which
they have been subjected to and which caused numerous fatalities and material damage. I
reiterate our solidarity with them and pray that they will soon recover from their impact.
Mr. President,
Under the leadership of His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, King of the Kingdom of
Bahrain; His Royal Highness Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, Prime Minister; and His
Royal Highness Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme
Commander and First Deputy Prime Minister, the Kingdom of Bahrain remains faithful to its
consistent policy of enhancing partnerships with the United Nations and its various bodies and
entities in expression of its firm belief in the role that our Organization is playing in achieving
a more stable and prosperous world.
Accordingly, this current year witnessed numerous initiative of fruitful cooperation, notably the
launching of King Hamad Youth Empowerment Award to Achieve the SDGs, aimed at
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consolidating the efforts of governmental and private entities to enhance the contribution of
young people to the process of sustainable development.
In March of this year, the Princess Sabeeka hint Ibrahim Al Khalifa Global Award for Women
Empowerment was officially launched. This award, named after the wife of His Majesty the
King and President of the Supreme Council for Women, is in full conformity with the objectives
of the United Nations in enhancing the role of women in development. It reflects the pioneering
experience ofBahraini women, nationally and internationally.
Similarly, the International Youth Conference to Achieve Sustainable Development was held
under the patronage of His Highness Shaikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Representative of His
Majesty the King for Charity Works and Youth Affairs, in collaboration with the UNDP Office,
with a focus on raising awareness amongst youth of the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) and enhancing the role of youth in achieving them.
In the context of Bahrain's keen interest to pursue its efforts aimed at achieving the SDGs, and to
maintain its leading position among countries with very high indicators in the field of human
development according to international sources, Bahrain looks forward to the forthcoming
signing of a strategic partnership framework with the United Nations for the period 2017-2020.
My country has also made strides towards the elimination of forced labour and human trafficking
and ratified the relevant international agreements and protocols. It further issued an act
prohibiting all forms of human trafficking, with severe sentences imposed on the perpetrators. It
also implemented the national referral system for the victims of trafficking, the first of its kind in
the region which provides a mechanism to monitor and redress this illegal practice.
Recently, the Kingdom of Bahrain issued the Unified Family Law, which constitutes a key
legislative tool for the consolidation of the family's stability and the preservation of all its rights
without exploitation or mistreatment. This is based on the noble teachings of Islam and the
principles enshrined in the Bahraini Constitution that the family is the foundation of society. This
act equally exemplifies Bahrain's commitment to international instruments related to the family
and women including most importantly: CEDA W.
In support of the United Nation's endeavors to address global warming and its implications in
the field of climate change, my country deposited in December 2016 its instrument of
ratification of the Paris Agreement, thereby renewing its commitment to this historic agreement
which we hope will consolidate international efforts to address this perilous phenomenon.
Mr. President,
The Kingdom of Bahrain firmly believes that maintenance of stability and security in the Middle
East and in the entire world requires a strong and common political will as well as serious
collective efforts to guarantee respect for the basic principles underlying relations among states,
such as good neighborliness, non - interference in the internal affairs and compliance with
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international conventions and instruments so that we can address the greatest challenge facing us,
namely terrorism, and deter those individuals or entities supporting and financing it.
All the more so now, that terrorism is no longer confmed to terrorist organizations that we can
confront and eliminate. Rather, it has become a tool in the hands of states determined to create
crises in other countries in pursuit of their own agenda. They thus become a full partner in the
terrorist acts and a factor of destabilization of international peace and security.
Considering the strategic importance of peace and security for our vital region, my country is
keen to establish strategic partnerships within its own region and with its allies. As partners, we
can work together to preserve the security of the Gulf region, to combat terrorism and to provide
protection for international navigation and commerce routes, notably through close cooperation
between the Bahrain Defense Force and the American Fifth Ffeet, based in the Kingdom of
Bahrain.
The GCC - US summit held in May of this year in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the ensuing
Memorandum of Understanding to establish a Centre charged with combatting the financing of
terrorism, as well as the Arab Islamic American Summit, all constitute an important landmark in
the war against terrorism in that they establish a strategic and effective partnership between the
US, the GCC and the other Arab Islamic countries. We reaffirm that the Global Center to Fight
Extremism known as J'itidal "moderation", inaugurated in the city of Riyadh on the sidelines of
the aforementioned Summit will contribute greatly to the fight against extremist ideologies and
will enhance the values of tolerance and co-existence in the world.
In this context, I commend the General Assembly's resolution establishing the United Nations
Office of Counter Terrorism which constitutes an important step towards the consolidation of
international efforts to address this scourge.
Mr. President,
It is no longer acceptable that among us, there are rogue countries occupying others' territories,
violating the sovereignty of states, threatening international peace and security, supporting
terrorism, and spreading hate and anarchy. It is no longer possible to allow these countries to
become parties to our efforts to bring an end to struggles, resolve conflicts and put an end to
complex humanitarian tragedies. Those countries were behind the aggravation of these
situations. We should not allow them the opportunity to be among us and to misuse their
presence among us to satisfy their ambitions and hostile objectives. Confronting these countries
is a duty and a responsibility that the entire international community must shoulder. Either they
respect their commitments and catch up with the collective international will to achieve peace,
development and welfare, or be held clearly accountable, and suffer isolation and the severe
consequences of international resolutions and laws.
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Against this backdrop, and to consolidate anti- terrorist and anti- extremist efforts, the Kingdom
of Bahrain, together with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Arab
Republic of Egypt, with the support of many other countries, availed themselves of their
sovereign right under international law to sever relations with Qatar after a lengthy period of
patience during which we exhausted all available means to halt Qatar's policies that violated all
brotherly relations of good neighborliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of states,
provided financial support and safe haven to terrorists and fugitives, and disseminated a
discourse of hate and extremism via its media and the individuals and institutions supporting it;
all of whom we have placed on a unified terrorist list, most of which are also included in
international terrorist lists, in order to make the situation clear to the entire world, after the
effects of this terrorism, spread to many countries, among them, my own. Qatar has supported
systematic terrorist acts which we have suffered from in the Kingdom of Bahrain and which have
cost us the lives of many innocent civilians and security personnel, with a view to undermining
national security and social peace and overthrowing the government system with the help of
parties associated with them.
It is therefore our collective responsibility to protect our states and nations against those who
seek to harm them, and to confront them firmly. If Qatar is serious, by act and not only through
words, to engage in a dialogue and reclaim its place among us, it must respond positively and
commit itself in all transparency to our just demands, based on the principles enshrined in the
declaration issued by the meeting of the four countries in Cairo on 5 July 2017, in full
conformity with international covenants and instruments. In this regard, we highly appreciate the
tireless efforts of the good offices of His Highness Shaikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah,
Amir of Kuwait.
We stress the fact that all actions taken against Qatar are directed neither against our peoples nor
the Qatari people for whom we have nothing but respect and affection and with whom we are
tied by religion, family relations and common history. We will continue to stand by the Qatari
people and support their security and stability and for that purpose, our countries have taken a
number of measures to accommodate humanitarian cases, notably family relations and health·
conditions as is amply demonstrated by the latest facilities provided to Qataris by the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia including for Hajj and Umra. This confirms the solid ties and refutes assertions
of blockade or violations of human rights.
I wish here to express my country's congratulations to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the
great success of the Hajj season, which has been widely praised by all those participating in this
major Islamic rite, and is a strong response to all those who seek to politicize the Hajj and make
it a season of conflict and sedition. The Saudi Government, consistent with its highest objective,
thus demonstrated its outstanding ability to protect the Two Holy Mosques and other sacred
sites as well as all the visitors performing Hajj or Urnra.
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Mr. President,
Those regimes that constantly seek to disseminate anarchy and evil are instruments of
destruction and will · be the biggest losers as they drift away from the values of collective
cooperation among nations. As is the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the people
suffer from oppression, misery, and poverty, while gallows are hoisted in the streets. Living
conditions are harsh and have taken this people, rich in history and civilization, tens of years
backward while wasting the people's resources to feed violence and undermine the region's
security, for the sake of realizing Iran's hegemonic and expansionist ambitions, through its
Revolutionary Guard and its satellite organizations such as the terrorist Hezbollah in Lebanon
and Syria and the militias in Yemen or the terrorist cells and groups in Bahrain, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq as well as other countries that have suffered at length from these
adversarial actions. We believe that the statement by His Excellency President Trump here
before the General Assembly of the United Nations presents an accurate interpretation that
clearly denounces the dangerous nature of the Iranian rogue regime that undermines peace in
the region. The world is obliged to confront this regime and to stop it from pursuing its policies
and its support of terrorism and obliging it to respect its neighbors' sovereignty.
And because we always aspire to peace, we affirm that establishing normal ties with Iran is
subject to the latter dropping its hegemonic, sectarian, and ideological policies. It must respect
the national values of peoples and refrain from exporting its revolution based on a theocratic
system or government. It must abide by the principles of good neighborliness and noninterference
in the internal affairs. We call on Iran also to end its occupation of the three Emirati
islands (Greater Tunb, Smaller Tunb and Abu Musa) and to respond favorably to the peaceful
demarches by the United Arab Emirates to recoup sovereignty over its territories either through
direct and serious negotiations or by referral to the International Court of Justice.
On the other hand, the Republic of Iraq, that has suffered for so long, and is still suffering , from
foreign interference, has recently achieved, with the means available to it, the liberation of Mosul
and Tal Afar from the grip of Daesh. This would not have been possible without the immense
sacrifices by the Iraqi armed forces and the determination of the Government under His
Excellency Dr. Haider Al Abadi, as well as the support provided by the international coalition
to combat Daesh of which Bahrain is an active member. We reaffirm our constant support for all
efforts aimed at restoring peace and security throughout Iraq and preserving its independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
As regards to the situation in the Republic of Yemen, we reiterate our firm position of support
for the legitimate government under the leadership of His Excellency President Abdrabuh
Mansour Hadi, President of the Republic of Yemen and we do so through our participation in the
"Arab Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen" and through our support for the measures
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taken by the legitimate government to extend its authority over the totality of the Yemeni
territory, to put an end to the coup d'etat militias supported by foreign powers, to reach a
comprehensive political solution on the basis of international mandates, notably the GCC
Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the National Dialogue, and
Security Council Resolution 2216. This will terminate all forms of foreign intervention and put
an end to the critical humanitarian situation of the Yemeni people. We reaffirm that we do not
side with any one Yemeni party against the other but rather, we oppose foreign interventions that
seek to harm this beloved country and we appreciate the efforts of Mr. Ismail Ould Cheikh
Ahmed, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen.
In the Arab Republic of Syria, we urge the international community to exert greater efforts
towards protecting civilians and saving their lives, compelling all parties to abide by the cease
fire decision and the establishment of de-escalation zones, guaranteeing access to besieged areas
for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and intensifying support to countries hosting large
numbers of our Syrian brethren, most notably the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In addition to
pushing forward all efforts aimed at achieving a political solution that would preserve Syria's
unity and territorial integrity while ending foreign intervention in its internal affairs. The solution
should also see the abolition of all terrorist organizations and provide peace and security to all
Syrians so that they are enabled to actively participate in the determination of their own future
on the basis of the communique of the First Geneva Conference and Security Council resolutions
2254 and 2268. We reaffirm our support for the Astana talks and the action of the Special
Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffon de Mistura in the hope that they will
contribute to the resolution of this protracted crisis.
In Libya, we applaud the liberation of a number of major cities from the hands of terrorist
groups. We reaffirm our full support to the efforts· exerted by all actors to achieve consensus
among all Libyan parties and the implementation of the political agreement signed in Skhirat.
Among these efforts are those deployed by Libya's neighboring countries, the meetings held in
UAE and France between Mr. Faiez Serraj, President of the Presidency Council of the
Government of National Accord of Libya and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Commander -inChief
of the Libyan army. We hope that such efforts shall continue with a view to preserving
Libya's unity and territorial integrity consistent with the aspirations of the people for
development and progress. We welcome the appointment of Mr. Ghassan Salame as Special
Representative in Libya and wish him every success.
As regards to the question of the Moroccan Sahara, the Kingdom of Bahrain reaffirms the need
to support the negotiations aimed at achieving a consensual and final political solution to this
problem in the context of Moroccan national sovereignty and on the basis of relevant Security
Council resolutions that confirm the seriousness of Morocco's self-government initiative. We
urge all parties to fully cooperate with the United Nations in this respect.
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,- - I - __ - --
We reiterate our total objection to the plight of Muslims in Myanmar as a result of excessive use
of force and we call on the Myanmar Government to assume its responsibilities in protecting the
Rohingya Muslims and facilitate their access to all forms of relief and assistance so as to put an
end to this human tragedy.
Mr. President,
The Palestinian question comes on top of foreign policy priorities of the Kingdom of Bahrain
which has always stood with the Palestinian people in their legitimate aspirations to enjoy all
their legitimate rights, including an independent state, with East Jerusalem as its capital and
within the borders of 4 June 1967, in conformity with the relevant international resolutions, the
Arab Peace Initiative and the two states solution.
In welcoming the positive steps lately taken by Palestinian factions to end their divisions in favor
of the vital Palestinian interests through political work and non-violence, we commend the
pivotal role played by His Excellency President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi of the Arab Republic of
Egypt in this respect. This confirms the central role of Egypt in the support of causes related to
the Arab nation of which it constitutes the strategic depth and the main pillar of peace and
security.
The Palestinian question is not a religious issue. Palestine is the cradle of religions on which all
lived in perfect harmony. Rather, it is a political issue par excellence , an issue of territorial
occupation that must end, and the return of a people to their homeland. Rights confiscated must
be returned to their owners and this precisely is what Israel, notwithstanding all its security
concerns, should understand, for it will achieve peace for its people, and for itself, only when it
abandons all forms of violence against Palestinians, and refrains from confiscating rights and
property. It should halt its settlement activities and stop violating the sanctity of religious sites,
especially what is happening in the blessed Al Aqsa mosque in the form of repeated aggressions
and provocative acts that enrage Muslims all over the world and impede the resumption of the
peace process and all supporting regional and international initiatives.
We wish to express at this juncture our sincere appreciation for the commendable work of
UNRWA and the substantial assistance it provides the Palestinians inside the territory and in the
neighboring countries.
Mr. President,
The Kingdom of Bahrain stresses the need to achieve the universality of adherence to the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, taking into account the right of all peoples to use
nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Israel should implement the resolution issued by the
Review Conference of the Parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of 1995
pertaining to the Nuclear-free Middle East. Equally, we stress the need for Iran to implement
Security Council Resolution 2231(2015) pertaining to the nuclear deal including those parts
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concerning ballistic and related weapons or else face severe sanctions should it violate in any
manner its commitments by virtue of this resolution and the international safeguards system
under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We welcome in this respect
Security Council Resolution 2375 pertaining to new sanctions on DPRK in view of its continued
nuclear and ballistic tests that threaten its neighbors and international peace and security.
Mr. President,
Since its inception as an Arab and Islamic entity in 1783, the Kingdom of Bahrain firmly
believes in the importance of collective action in the pursuit of security, development and
prosperity. It orients all means towards the service of its people, its region and the world at large,
since time immemorial. Allah has blessed it with wise leadership that has inherited an acute
sense of responsibility for the achievement of the ultimate objectives of ideal relationships with
its neighbors. It perseveres in following this path and will never go astray. It shall remain an
effective member of the international community, a trusted partner in its Arab and Islamic
setting and shall hold tight to this approach as the solid foundation of our foreign relations. We
will remain open to all cultures and peoples in the spirit of tolerance and moderation and shall
pursue the path to progress and development with determination and perseverance to safeguard
our achievements, development and prosperity.
I thank you Mr. President.
8

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UN General Assembly, 72nd Session, General Debate, H.E. Mr. Adel Ahmed Al-Jubeir, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Summary of Statement (23 Sept. 2017)

Annex 59
SaudAi rabia
H.E.M r. AdelA hmedA I-JubeiMr, inistefro r Foreign
Affairs
23 September 2017 (72th Session)
UN Photo/ Download
Annex 59
Statement Summary:
ADEL AHMED AL-JUBEIR, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, said the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was
the most protracted in the region's history and had led to a great deal of human suffering. Nothing could
justify the continuation of that conflict, particularly when there was wides-pread agreement over the twoState
solution. International determination was needed to make that solution a reality.
On Yemen, he said his country was attempting to save the Yemeni people so they could recover their State.
That undertaking had only come following sustained political efforts to preserve the safety and stability of
Yemen, as well as its territorial integrity and independence. Saudi Arabia fully supported the political process
in Yemen, he said, and would stand by the United Nations and its Special Envoy to arrive at a political
solution, in line with resolution 2216 (2015). Saudi Arabia was aware of the scope of the humanitarian
suffering in Yemen and had spared no effort to help Yemen is, having contributed $8 billion in humanitarian
and medical assistance.
Strongly condemning the policy of repression and forced displacement that Myanmar was carrying out
against the Rohingya, he said that tragedy required an urgent response to bring it to an immediate end. Saudi
Arabia continued to provide humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya minorities, he said, adding that his
country also hosted more than half a million of those refugees. Furthermore, the King had personally
intervened with neighbouring States and worked with Bangladesh to help ensure safe passage and decent
living conditions for those refugees.
The threat of terrorism was among the most serious challenges facing the international community, he said.
Saudi Arabia would continue to work to counter terrorism and extremism in all forms and manifestations.
The crisis in Qatar had jeopardized his country's policy of cutting off funding to terrorists and extremists.
Doha's financial support of terrorism, dissemination of violent hate speech, was unacceptable, as was its
policy of providing safe haven to those who violated the law. The position taken by the four States was
meant to demand that Qatar follow the principles of international law in fighting terrorism.
Source
Right of Reply (23 September 2017)
Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of Qatar responded to Saudi Arabia.
Right of Reply (25 September 2017)
Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of Iran responded to Saudi Arabia.