Declaration of Judge Robinson

Document Number
166-20191108-JUD-01-05-EN
Parent Document Number
166-20191108-JUD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

DECLARATION OF JUDGE ROBINSON
1. Although I have voted in favour of the operative paragraphs of the Judgment, I wish to comment on two aspects of the decision.
State responsibility
2. The first seven sentences of paragraph 59 of the Judgment read as follows:
“The ICSFT imposes obligations on States parties with respect to offences committed by a person when “that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out” acts of terrorism as described in Article 2, paragraph 1 (a) and (b). As stated in the preamble, the purpose of the Convention is to adopt “effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators”. The ICSFT addresses offences committed by individuals. In particular, Article 4 requires each State party to the Convention to establish the offences set forth in Article 2 as criminal offences under its domestic law and to make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties. The financing by a State of acts of terrorism is not addressed by the ICSFT. It lies outside the scope of the Convention. This is confirmed by the preparatory work of the Convention”.
3. There is nothing in the first four sentences to support the conclusion that “the financing by a State of acts of terrorism is not addressed by the ICSFT”. The first sentence simply reiterates that the offence is committed by a person, without undertaking any analysis of the meaning of the term “person”. The second sentence simply states that the preamble identifies the purpose of the Convention as the suppression of the financing of terrorism through the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of the offence; notably, it does this without indicating whether the term “perpetrators” includes public officials as well as private persons. The third sentence indicates that the Convention is devoted to offences committed by individuals. Since this conclusion is drawn from the first two sentences it reflects the failure to examine the meaning of the term “any person” in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Convention. The fourth sentence simply refers to the obligation imposed by the Convention on States parties to establish the offences as criminal offences under their domestic law. It is clear that States could establish offences committed by public officials, in which event it is at least arguable that the question of the responsibility of their States for their acts could arise.
4. Consequently there is nothing in these sentences to support the conclusion that State financing of terrorism is outside the scope of the Convention. The result is that when the Judgment goes on in the seventh sentence to cite the preparatory work of the Convention as confirming its earlier conclusion, it is in reality seeking to confirm a finding that has no basis in an analysis of the text of the Convention. Preparatory work may be used to confirm the meaning of a term that results from the application of the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter the “VCLT”). Since the relevant area of enquiry is the meaning of the term “any person”  and the Court had not at this stage of its reasoning established the meaning of that term in accordance with the general rule of interpretation in Article 31 of the VCLT  there is no basis for recourse to the preparatory work to confirm the Court’s conclusion that State financing of acts of terrorism is outside the scope of the Convention.
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5. Thus in arriving at the finding that State financing of acts of terrorism is outside the scope of the Convention the Court has not grappled with the real issue in the case, that is, the meaning of the term “any person”, and the impact, if any, that the resolution of this question has on the general rule of attribution to States of responsibility for the acts of their agents. One consequence of the Court’s approach is that it renders questionable the finding in paragraph 61 of the Judgment that “the commission by a State official of an offence described in Article 2 does not in itself engage the responsibility of the State concerned under the Convention”.
6. In adopting this line of reasoning the Court appears to have put the proverbial cart before the horse, given that  at this stage of its reasoning  it had not yet considered the meaning of the term “any person” in Article 2. When the Court does in fact analyse the meaning of that term, it correctly concludes that it covers both private individuals and State agents. Here the Court has interpreted the term “any person” in accordance with its ordinary meaning in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the Convention. But by that time it had already concluded that State financing was outside the scope of the Convention. By this approach the Court foreclosed itself from considering the impact that its conclusion  that State agents are covered by the term “any person”  has on its analysis of the question whether or not States are also covered by the Convention. In other words the determination that State financing was outside the scope of the Convention should not have been made without the Court profiting from an analysis of the meaning of the term “any person”.
7. In any event the preparatory work of the Convention is far from being unequivocal in supporting the conclusion that State financing is outside the scope of the Convention. While the Judgment cites the preparatory work to support its conclusion that the Convention does not cover State financing, it is noteworthy that there are aspects of that work that support the contrary view. Thus, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya stated that it
“welcomed the conclusion of the negotiations on the draft international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism, but wished to emphasize the responsibility of the States which financed terrorism and which protected terrorists and gave sanctuary to their leaders and their organizations. Those criminal acts should be condemned.” (United Nations, doc. A/C.6/54/SR.34, p. 3, para. 10.)
This statement is to be found in the same document cited in paragraph 59 of the Judgment and its existence points to the need for caution in relying on the preparatory work of a treaty, particularly when justification for recourse to such work has not been clearly established. In that regard there is a need to heed the admonition of Sir Humphrey Waldock (Special Rapporteur) in the “Third Report on the Law of Treaties”1. He stressed that travaux preparatoires were only a subsidiary means of interpretation, caution was needed in using them and that “their cogency depends on the extent to which they furnish proof of the common understanding of the parties as to the meaning attached to the terms of the treaty” (emphasis in original). In the circumstances of this case the conflicting statements in the preparatory work as to the application of the Convention to State financing of the acts constituting the offence under Article 2 cast doubt as to whether there was any common understanding of the Parties in relation to the question whether State financing is within the scope of the Convention. Consequently the preparatory work does not appear to shed any clear light on this question.
1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, Vol. II, p. 58.
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Conclusion
8. In conclusion, the Court has had recourse to the preparatory work of the Convention in circumstances not permitted by the customary rules of interpretation reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. Moreover the Court has adopted a line of reasoning that does not establish that the financing by a State of acts constituting the offence under Article 2 is outside the scope of the Convention.
References to acts of terrorism in the Judgment
9. The history of multilateral efforts to combat terrorism is marked by the failure to adopt any global treaty on the question (a failure principally explained by the difficulty in reaching agreement on a definition of terrorism), the consequential piecemeal approach reflected in the many suppression of crime treaties adopted since 19702, and a spate of resolutions on the topic adopted by the United Nations General Assembly since 1972.
10. The only global treaty on terrorism to have been adopted is the League of Nations Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (1937), which received one ratification and never entered into force.
11. In 1972 the General Assembly adopted resolution 3034 (XXVII) which was devoted not only to measures to eliminate international terrorism but also to a study of its underlying causes3. The question of the balance between measures to control terrorism on the one hand and its causes and political motivations on the other is the most significant aspect of the modern history of efforts to combat international terrorism. In the debate at the United Nations in the 1970s and 1980s there were differing views as to whether a study of the underlying causes of international terrorism should be a precondition for taking effective action against terrorism; there was also the concern of many countries that in the absence of a definition of the phenomenon of terrorism, the struggle of peoples for national liberation and independence might be characterized as terrorism.
12. In 1991 the reference to the underlying causes of international terrorism, which up to that time had appeared in the title of all the General Assembly resolutions on terrorism, was removed and not inserted in subsequent resolutions. With the change in title came a change in focus: the resolutions concentrated almost exclusively on the identification of effective measures to eliminate international terrorism.
13. The failure to adopt a multilateral treaty on international terrorism is mainly due to the difficulties that are encountered in defining that phenomenon. On the one hand there are States whose approach is to concentrate only on the heinous nature of the acts which an international convention would proscribe. On the other hand there are those countries which want to ensure that the underlying causes of terrorism would not be ignored in the adoption of any international
2 1970 is the date that the first convention mentioned in the Annex of the ICSFT was adopted. However the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft was adopted in 1963.
3 United Nations, General Assembly, resolution 3034 (XXVII), 18 Dec. 1972, entitled “Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes”.
During the debate at the General Assembly on this item a number of States, including Jamaica and Syria, emphasized the importance of identifying the underlying causes of international terrorism.
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instrument. In the view of these countries a definition of terrorism should exclude from its ambit measures adopted by peoples in the struggle for national liberation, self-determination and independence. In the preparatory work of the ICSFT there are very revealing statements by the delegates of Bahrain and Libya. They both emphasized the need to distinguish between the legitimate struggle of peoples for self-determination and terrorism. (United Nations, doc. A/C.6/54/SR.33, p. 10, para. 58 and doc. A/C.6/54/SR.34, p. 2, para. 7.)
14. In light of the failure to adopt a multilateral treaty that defines international terrorism States have concluded a large number of treaties at the global level4, which take the simpler and less problematic approach of creating offences by identifying certain acts which are characterized as offences. All of these treaties carefully avoid using the term “terrorism” in defining the acts constituting the offences they create. An examination of the nine treaties in the Annex referred to in Article 2 (1) (a) of the Convention shows that none of them describes the acts constituting the offence under the relevant treaty as terrorism5. Rather, they, like the ICSFT, only prohibit specific acts. Significantly even though the preamble of two of these conventions contains references to terrorism, there is absent from their articles, including the article creating the offence, any reference to terrorism6. In that respect the ICSFT is similar to those conventions in that there is a reference to terrorism in the preamble but no such reference in the article creating the offence or in any other article. All the treaties in the Annex were concluded in the shadow cast by the failure of the international community to agree on a definition of international terrorism. As such, they isolate acts to be criminalized as offences. However in view of the failure to reach agreement on the definition of international terrorism, they avoid characterizing these acts as terrorism. For example, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970) criminalizes the act of seizing an aircraft (commonly called hijacking) but does not characterize the unlawful seizure as terrorism, even though in ordinary parlance it would be so described. In the same vein the (1979) Convention against the Taking of Hostages only criminalizes the act of taking hostages and does not characterize that act as terrorism, although in colloquial parlance it would be so described.
15. Moreover in the suppression of crime treaties7 adopted after the ICSFT a similar approach has been employed: the prohibited act is not described as terrorism; the conventions describe an offence that takes place when certain acts are carried out. Significantly, although the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005) has, like the ICSFT, a reference to terrorism in its title and in its preamble, there is no such reference in the article creating the offence.
4 In addition to the nine treaties listed in the Annex, the following suppression of crime treaties have been adopted: Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts committed on Board Aircraft, 1963; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005; and Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation, 2010.
5 The nine treaties that are in the Annex are: the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, 1988; and International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997.
6 In the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997, terrorism is referred to in the preamble but not in the articles creating the offence.
7 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005; and Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation, 2010.
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16. What this legal history shows is that it is no mere happenstance that the ICSFT does not describe the offence in Article 2 as terrorism, even though its title and preamble refer to the phenomenon of terrorism. If during the negotiations Article 2 had been formulated to read “any person commits the offence of terrorism within the meaning of this Convention”, rather than “[a]ny person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention”, the draft Convention would more than likely have met with serious objections from several countries which would have wanted to carve out an exception in respect of peoples struggling for liberation, self-determination and independence. It is for this reason that the Court’s finding in paragraph 63 of the Judgment is problematic. In that paragraph the Court finds that “[a]n element of an offence under Article 2, paragraph 1, of the ICSFT is that the person concerned has provided funds ‘with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used’ to commit an act of terrorism”. It is problematic because nowhere in any of the articles of the ICSFT  and in particular, nowhere in Article 2 which creates the offence  is there any reference to “an act of terrorism”. Of course it would be unobjectionable if the Judgment did not use terrorism as a term of art referring to the offence under Article 2. But here the reference to an “element of the offence”  that is, “the intention” (the mens rea) that is required by Article 2, paragraph 1, to establish the offence  makes it abundantly clear that by “an act of terrorism” what is meant is the offence established by the Convention. The Court should have followed the approach it took in the same paragraph when it referred to “an act fall[ing] within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 1 (a) or (b)”. This comment applies to other parts of the Judgment where “terrorism” is used as a term of art referring to the offence under Article 2. In any event if the phrase “act of terrorism” were to be retained in paragraph 63, the more appropriate formulation would be an act of financing terrorism.
17. The Court’s reference to acts of terrorism in describing the offence under Article 2 may lead some States to question how the acts in Article 2 could be said to constitute terrorism without any exception being carved out when those acts are committed by peoples struggling for liberation, self-determination and independence. Notably, on acceding to the ICSFT, Kuwait made a declaration that distinguished between terrorism and the “legitimate national struggle against occupation”.
(Signed) Patrick L. ROBINSON.
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Bilingual Content

658
104
DECLARATION OF JUDGE ROBINSON
1. Although I have voted in favour of the operative paragraphs of the
Judgment, I wish to comment on two aspects of the decision.
State Responsibility
2. The first seven sentences of paragraph 59 of the Judgment read as
follows:
“The ICSFT imposes obligations on States parties with respect to
offences committed by a person when ‘that person by any means,
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects
funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge
that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out’ acts
of terrorism as described in Article 2, paragraph 1 (a) and (b). As
stated in the preamble, the purpose of the Convention is to adopt
‘effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as
well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment
of its perpetrators’. The ICSFT addresses offences committed by individuals.
In particular, Article 4 requires each State party to the Convention
to establish the offences set forth in Article 2 as criminal
offences under its domestic law and to make those offences punishable
by appropriate penalties. The financing by a State of acts of terrorism
is not addressed by the ICSFT. It lies outside the scope of the Convention.
This is confirmed by the preparatory work of the Convention.”
3. There is nothing in the first four sentences to support the conclusion
that “the financing by a State of acts of terrorism is not addressed by the
ICSFT”. The first sentence simply reiterates that the offence is committed
by a person, without undertaking any analysis of the meaning of the term
“person”. The second sentence simply states that the preamble identifies
the purpose of the Convention as the suppression of the financing of terrorism
through the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of the
offence ; notably, it does this without indicating whether the term “perpetrators”
includes public officials as well as private persons. The third sentence
indicates that the Convention is devoted to offences committed by
individuals. Since this conclusion is drawn from the first two sentences it
reflects the failure to examine the meaning of the term “any person” in
Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Convention. The fourth sentence simply
refers to the obligation imposed by the Convention on States parties to
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104
DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE ROBINSON
[Traduction]
1. Bien qu’ayant voté en faveur du dispositif de l’arrêt, je tiens à revenir
sur deux aspects de cette décision.
Responsabilité de l’État
2. Les sept premières phrases du paragraphe 59 de l’arrêt se lisent
comme suit :
« La CIRFT impose aux Etats parties des obligations s’agissant
d’infractions commises par une personne « qui, par quelque moyen
que ce soit, directement ou indirectement, illicitement et délibérément,
fournit ou réunit des fonds dans l’intention de les voir utilisés
ou en sachant qu’ils seront utilisés, en tout ou partie, en vue de commettre
» des actes de terrorisme au sens de l’alinéa a) ou b) du paragraphe
1 de l’article 2. Ainsi qu’il est indiqué dans son préambule, la
convention vise l’adoption de « mesures efficaces destinées à prévenir
le financement du terrorisme ainsi qu’à le réprimer en en poursuivant
et punissant les auteurs ». La CIRFT s’applique aux infractions commises
par des individus. L’article 4, en particulier, requiert que
chaque Etat partie à la convention érige en infractions pénales au
regard de son droit interne les infractions visées à l’article 2 et punisse
ces infractions de peines appropriées. Le financement par un Etat
d’actes de terrorisme n’est pas visé par la CIRFT. Un tel financement
n’entre pas dans le champ d’application de cet instrument. Confirmation
en est apportée par les travaux préparatoires de la convention. »
3. Les quatre premières phrases n’étayent en rien la conclusion selon
laquelle « le financement par un Etat d’actes de terrorisme n’est pas visé
par la CIRFT ». Dans la première, la Cour se contente de rappeler que
l’infraction est commise par une « personne », sans entreprendre aucune
analyse du sens de ce terme. Dans la deuxième, elle indique uniquement
que, selon le préambule de la convention, celle-ci a pour but d’assurer la
répression du financement du terrorisme en faisant en sorte que les
auteurs d’une telle infraction soient poursuivis et punis, sans préciser
— et c’est là un point important — si le terme « auteurs » désigne à la fois
les agents de l’Etat et les personnes privées. Dans la troisième phrase, la
Cour dit que la convention vise les infractions commises par des individus.
Simplement fondée sur les deux premières phrases, cette conclusion
reflète l’absence de tout examen du sens des termes « toute personne »
employés au paragraphe 1 de l’article 2. Dans la quatrième phrase, la
659 application of the icsft and cerd (decl. robinson)
105
establish the offences as criminal offences under their domestic law. It is
clear that States could establish offences committed by public officials, in
which event it is at least arguable that the question of the responsibility of
their States for their acts could arise.
4. Consequently there is nothing in these sentences to support the conclusion
that State financing of terrorism is outside the scope of the Convention.
The result is that when the Judgment goes on in the seventh
sentence to cite the preparatory work of the Convention as confirming its
earlier conclusion, it is in reality seeking to confirm a finding that has no
basis in an analysis of the text of the Convention. Preparatory work may
be used to confirm the meaning of a term that results from the application
of the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter the “VCLT”). Since the
relevant area of enquiry is the meaning of the term “any person” — and
the Court had not at this stage of its reasoning established the meaning of
that term in accordance with the general rule of interpretation in Article
31 of the VCLT — there is no basis for recourse to the preparatory
work to confirm the Court’s conclusion that State financing of acts of
terrorism is outside the scope of the Convention.
5. Thus, in arriving at the finding that State financing of acts of terrorism
is outside the scope of the Convention, the Court has not grappled
with the real issue in the case, that is, the meaning of the term “any person”,
and the impact, if any, that the resolution of this question has on
the general rule of attribution to States of responsibility for the acts of
their agents. One consequence of the Court’s approach is that it renders
questionable the finding in paragraph 61 of the Judgment that “the commission
by a State official of an offence described in Article 2 does not in
itself engage the responsibility of the State concerned under the Convention”.
6. In adopting this line of reasoning the Court appears to have put the
proverbial cart before the horse, given that — at this stage of its reasoning
— it had not yet considered the meaning of the term “any person” in
Article 2. When the Court does in fact analyse the meaning of that term,
it correctly concludes that it covers both private individuals and State
agents. Here the Court has interpreted the term “any person” in accordance
with its ordinary meaning in its context and in light of the object
and purpose of the Convention. But by that time it had already concluded
that State financing was outside the scope of the Convention. By this
approach the Court foreclosed itself from considering the impact that its
conclusion — that State agents are covered by the term “any person” —
has on its analysis of the question whether or not States are also covered
by the Convention. In other words, the determination that State financing
was outside the scope of the Convention should not have been made
application de la cirft et de la ciedr (décl. robinson) 659
105
Cour se borne à rappeler l’obligation que fait la convention aux Etats
parties d’ériger en infractions pénales au regard de leur droit interne les
infractions visées à l’article 2. Il est clair que les Etats pourraient ériger
comme telles les infractions commises par des agents publics, auquel cas
il serait à tout le moins permis de soulever la question de leur responsabilité
à l’égard de tels actes.
4. Rien dans ces quelques phrases ne permet en conséquence de
conclure que le financement par l’Etat du terrorisme n’entre pas dans le
champ de la convention. Il en résulte que, lorsqu’elle cite ensuite, à la
septième phrase, les travaux préparatoires de la convention à l’appui de
sa conclusion antérieure, la Cour cherche en réalité à corroborer une
conclusion qui ne repose sur aucune analyse du texte de la convention. Il
peut être recouru aux travaux préparatoires pour confirmer le sens d’un
mot qui découle de l’application de la règle générale d’interprétation
énoncée à l’article 31 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités
(ci-après, la « convention de Vienne »). Etant donné que, en l’espèce, c’est
l’expression « toute personne » qu’il s’agissait d’interpréter –– et que, à ce
stade de son raisonnement, elle n’avait pas établi l’interprétation qu’il
convenait d’en faire en application de la règle d’interprétation énoncée à
l’article 31 de la convention de Vienne ––, la Cour n’était pas fondée à
recourir aux travaux préparatoires pour corroborer sa conclusion selon
laquelle le financement par un Etat d’actes de terrorisme n’entre pas dans
le champ d’application de la convention.
5. En parvenant à cette conclusion, la Cour n’a donc pas traité la véritable
question qui se posait en l’affaire, à savoir le sens de l’expression
« toute personne », ni l’incidence que le règlement de cette question était
susceptible d’avoir sur la règle générale de l’attribution aux Etats de la
responsabilité à raison des faits de leurs agents. L’approche suivie par la
Cour a notamment pour conséquence de rendre contestable la conclusion
énoncée au paragraphe 61, selon laquelle « la commission par l’agent d’un
Etat d’une infraction visée à l’article 2 n’engage pas par elle-même la responsabilité
de l’Etat concerné au titre de la convention ».
6. En raisonnant de la sorte, la Cour semble avoir « mis la charrue
avant les boeufs », puisqu’elle ne s’était, à ce stade, pas encore penchée sur
le sens de l’expression « toute personne » employée à l’article 2. Lorsqu’elle
en analyse effectivement la signification, la Cour conclut à raison que ces
termes englobent tant les personnes privées que les agents de l’Etat. Elle
interprète alors l’expression « toute personne » conformément à son sens
ordinaire, dans son contexte et à la lumière de l’objet et du but de la
convention. Toutefois, à ce moment-là, elle a déjà conclu que le financement
étatique n’entrait pas dans le champ d’application de la convention.
En optant pour cette approche, la Cour s’est privée de la possibilité d’examiner
l’incidence que sa conclusion — tendant à englober les agents de
l’Etat dans l’expression « toute personne » — avait sur son analyse de la
question de savoir si les Etats étaient également visés par la convention.
Autrement dit, la Cour n’aurait pas dû déterminer que le financement éta-
660 application of the icsft and cerd (decl. robinson)
106
without the Court profiting from an analysis of the meaning of the term
“any person”.
7. In any event, the preparatory work of the Convention is far from
being unequivocal in supporting the conclusion that State financing is
outside the scope of the Convention. While the Judgment cites the preparatory
work to support its conclusion that the Convention does not cover
State financing, it is noteworthy that there are aspects of that work that
support the contrary view. Thus, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya stated that
it
“welcomed the conclusion of the negotiations on the draft international
convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism,
but wished to emphasize the responsibility of the States which
financed terrorism and which protected terrorists and gave sanctuary
to their leaders and their organizations. Those criminal acts should
be condemned.” (United Nations doc. A/C.6/54/SR.34, p. 3, para. 10.)
This statement is to be found in the same document cited in paragraph 59
of the Judgment and its existence points to the need for caution in relying
on the preparatory work of a treaty, particularly when justification for
recourse to such work has not been clearly established. In that regard,
there is a need to heed the admonition of Sir Humphrey Waldock (Special
Rapporteur) in the “Third Report on the Law of Treaties” 1. He stressed
that travaux preparatoires were only a subsidiary means of interpretation,
caution was needed in using them and that “their cogency depends on the
extent to which they furnish proof of the common understanding of the
parties as to the meaning attached to the terms of the treaty” (emphasis
in original). In the circumstances of this case, the conflicting statements in
the preparatory work as to the application of the Convention to State
financing of the acts constituting the offence under Article 2 cast doubt as
to whether there was any common understanding of the Parties in relation
to the question whether State financing is within the scope of the
Convention. Consequently the preparatory work does not appear to shed
any clear light on this question.
Conclusion
8. In conclusion, the Court has had recourse to the preparatory work
of the Convention in circumstances not permitted by the customary rules
of interpretation reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. Moreover
the Court has adopted a line of reasoning that does not establish that the
financing by a State of acts constituting the offence under Article 2 is
outside the scope of the Convention.
1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, Vol. II, p. 58.
application de la cirft et de la ciedr (décl. robinson) 660
106
tique n’entrait pas dans le champ d’application de la convention sans s’appuyer
sur une analyse du sens de l’expression « toute personne ».
7. En tout état de cause, les travaux préparatoires de la convention
sont loin de confirmer sans équivoque la conclusion selon laquelle le
financement étatique n’entre pas dans le champ d’application de la
convention. Bien que la Cour les cite pour étayer cette conclusion, il
convient de noter que les travaux préparatoires militent tout autant, par
certains aspects, en faveur de la conclusion inverse. La Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne avait ainsi déclaré qu’elle
« se félicit[ait] de la conclusion des négociations sur le projet de
convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme,
mais souhait[ait] souligner la responsabilité qui rev[enait]
aux Etats qui finan[çaient] le terrorisme, qui prot[égeaient] les terroristes
et offr[aient] un asile à leurs dirigeants et à leurs organisations.
Ces actes criminels devraient être condamnés. » (Nations Unies,
doc. A/C.6/54/SR.34, p. 3-4, par. 10.)
Cette déclaration, qui figure dans le document précisément cité au paragraphe
59 de l’arrêt, met en évidence la prudence qui est de mise lorsqu’il
s’agit d’avoir recours aux travaux préparatoires d’un traité, en particulier
lorsque la nécessité d’un tel recours n’est pas clairement établie. Il convient
à cet égard de garder à l’esprit la mise en garde formulée par sir Humphrey
Waldock, rapporteur spécial, dans le « troisième rapport sur le droit
des traités » 1, à savoir que les travaux préparatoires ne constituent qu’un
moyen subsidiaire d’interprétation, qu’ils doivent être utilisés avec prudence
et que leur « force dépend de la mesure dans laquelle ils témoignent
de l’accord commun des parties sur le sens attaché aux termes du traité »
(les italiques sont dans l’original). Dans les circonstances de la présente
affaire, il est permis de douter, au vu des déclarations contradictoires qui
ont été faites lors des travaux préparatoires quant à l’application de la
convention au financement par un Etat d’actes constituant une infraction
au sens de l’article 2, qu’une quelconque communauté de vues se soit fait
jour entre les parties à cet égard. Les travaux préparatoires de la convention
ne semblent donc apporter aucun éclaircissement sur ce point.
Conclusion
8. En conclusion, la Cour a eu recours aux travaux préparatoires de la
convention dans des circonstances qui ne sont pas admises par les règles
coutumières d’interprétation reflétées aux articles 31 et 32 de la convention
de Vienne. Elle a en outre suivi un raisonnement qui n’établit pas que
le financement par un Etat de faits constitutifs de l’infraction visée à l’article
2 n’entre pas dans le champ d’application de la CIRFT.
1 Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1964, vol. II, p. 59-60.
661 application of the icsft and cerd (decl. robinson)
107
References to Acts of Terrorism in the Judgment
9. The history of multilateral efforts to combat terrorism is marked by
the failure to adopt any global treaty on the question (a failure principally
explained by the difficulty in reaching agreement on a definition of terrorism),
the consequential piecemeal approach reflected in the many
suppression of crime treaties adopted since 1970 2, and a spate of resolutions
on the topic adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
since 1972.
10. The only global treaty on terrorism to have been adopted is the
League of Nations Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (1937),
which received one ratification and never entered into force.
11. In 1972 the General Assembly adopted resolution 3034 (XXVII)
which was devoted not only to measures to eliminate international terrorism
but also to a study of its underlying causes 3. The question of the balance
between measures to control terrorism on the one hand and its
causes and political motivations on the other is the most significant aspect
of the modern history of efforts to combat international terrorism. In the
debate at the United Nations in the 1970s and 1980s, there were differing
views as to whether a study of the underlying causes of international terrorism
should be a precondition for taking effective action against terrorism
; there was also the concern of many countries that in the absence of
a definition of the phenomenon of terrorism, the struggle of peoples
for national liberation and independence might be characterized as terrorism.
12. In 1991, the reference to the underlying causes of international
terrorism, which up to that time had appeared in the title of all the
General Assembly resolutions on terrorism, was removed and not inserted
in subsequent resolutions. With the change in title came a change in
focus : the resolutions concentrated almost exclusively on the identification
of effective measures to eliminate international terrorism.
2 Nineteen-seventy is the date that the first convention mentioned in the Annex of
the ICSFT was adopted. However, the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft was adopted in 1963.
3 United Nations, General Assembly, resolution 3034 (XXVII), 18 December 1972,
entitled “Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent
human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of
those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and
despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an
attempt to effect radical changes”.
During the debate at the General Assembly on this item, a number of States, including
Jamaica and Syria, emphasized the importance of identifying the underlying causes of
international terrorism.
application de la cirft et de la ciedr (décl. robinson) 661
107
Références faites dans l’arrêt à des actes de terrorisme
9. L’histoire des efforts multilatéraux qui ont été déployés pour lutter
contre le terrorisme est marquée par l’incapacité des Etats de conclure un
quelconque traité mondial sur la question (ce qui s’explique avant tout
par la difficulté qu’ils éprouvent à se mettre d’accord sur une définition du
terrorisme), par l’approche en conséquence fragmentaire qui ressort des
nombreux traités de répression conclus à partir de 1970 2, et par une multitude
de résolutions adoptées sur le sujet par l’Assemblée générale des
Nations Unies depuis 1972.
10. Le seul instrument mondial qui ait été adopté sur la question est la
convention de la Société des Nations pour la prévention et la répression
du terrorisme (1937). Ratifiée par un seul Etat, cette convention n’est
jamais entrée en vigueur.
11. En 1972, l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies a adopté la résolution
3034 (XXVII) qui visait non seulement l’adoption de mesures pour
éliminer le terrorisme international, mais également l’étude des causes
sous-jacentes 3. La recherche d’un juste milieu entre, d’une part, l’adoption
de mesures de répression du terrorisme et, de l’autre, la prise en
considération des causes et motivations politiques de ce phénomène a
constitué l’aspect le plus important des tentatives faites dans l’histoire
moderne pour lutter contre le terrorisme international. Lors des discussions
tenues à l’ONU dans les années 1970 et 1980, des divergences de
vues se sont fait jour sur la question de savoir s’il y avait lieu, préalablement
à la mise en oeuvre de mesures concrètes de répression, de procéder
à une étude des causes du terrorisme international ; de nombreux Etats
s’inquiétaient en outre de ce que, en l’absence de toute définition du phénomène
de terrorisme, la lutte des peuples pour la libération et l’indépendance
nationales pût être perçue comme relevant du terrorisme.
12. A compter de 1991, les résolutions de l’Assemblée générale sur le
terrorisme ont cessé de faire référence, dans leur intitulé, aux causes sousjacentes
du terrorisme international. Ce changement d’intitulé traduisait
un changement d’orientation, les résolutions visant dès lors presque
exclusivement à définir des mesures effectives pour éliminer le terrorisme
international.
2 C’est en 1970 qu’a été adoptée la première convention mentionnée dans l’annexe de la
CIRFT. La convention relative aux infractions et à certains autres actes survenant à bord
des aéronefs avait toutefois été adoptée en 1963.
3 Nations Unies, Assemblée générale, résolution 3034 (XXVII) du 18 décembre 1972,
intitulée « Mesures visant à prévenir le terrorisme international qui met en danger ou
anéantit d’innocentes vies humaines, ou compromet les libertés fondamentales, et étude
des causes sous- jacentes des formes de terrorisme et d’actes de violence qui ont leur origine
dans la misère, les déceptions, les griefs et le désespoir, et qui poussent certaines personnes
à sacrifier des vies humaines, y compris la leur, pour tenter d’apporter des changements
radicaux ».
Lors du débat qui a eu lieu sur la question à l’Assemblée générale, un certain nombre
d’Etats, dont la Jamaïque et la Syrie, ont souligné l’importance de reconnaître les causes
sous- jacentes du terrorisme international.
662 application of the icsft and cerd (decl. robinson)
108
13. The failure to adopt a multilateral treaty on international terrorism
is mainly due to the difficulties that are encountered in defining that phenomenon.
On the one hand, there are States whose approach is to concentrate
only on the heinous nature of the acts which an international
convention would proscribe. On the other hand, there are those countries
which want to ensure that the underlying causes of terrorism would not
be ignored in the adoption of any international instrument. In the view of
these countries a definition of terrorism should exclude from its ambit
measures adopted by peoples in the struggle for national liberation,
self-determination and independence. In the preparatory work of the
ICSFT, there are very revealing statements by the delegates of Bahrain
and Libya. They both emphasized the need to distinguish between the
legitimate struggle of peoples for self-determination and terrorism.
(United Nations doc. A/C.6/54/SR.33, p. 10, para. 58 and United Nations
doc. A/C.6/54/SR.34, p. 2, para. 7.)
14. In light of the failure to adopt a multilateral treaty that defines
international terrorism, States have concluded a large number of treaties
at the global level 4, which take the simpler and less problematic approach
of creating offences by identifying certain acts which are characterized as
offences. All of these treaties carefully avoid using the term “terrorism” in
defining the acts constituting the offences they create. An examination of
the nine treaties in the Annex referred to in Article 2 (1) (a) of the Convention
shows that none of them describes the acts constituting the
offence under the relevant treaty as terrorism 5. Rather, they, like the
ICSFT, only prohibit specific acts. Significantly even though the preamble
of two of these conventions contains references to terrorism, there is
absent from their articles, including the article creating the offence, any
reference to terrorism 6. In that respect, the ICSFT is similar to those conventions
in that there is a reference to terrorism in the preamble but no
4 In addition to the nine treaties listed in the Annex, the following suppression of crime
treaties have been adopted: Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft, 1963; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, 2005; and Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International
Civil Aviation, 2010.
5 The nine treaties that are in the Annex are: the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
1973; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979; Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980; Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
1988; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, 1988; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988; and International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997.
6 In the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979 and the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997, terrorism is referred
to in the preamble but not in the articles creating the offence.
application de la cirft et de la ciedr (décl. robinson) 662
108
13. L’incapacité d’adopter un traité multilatéral sur le terrorisme international
est essentiellement due aux difficultés que soulève la définition de
ce phénomène. D’une part, il est des Etats qui préconisent de ne mettre
l’accent que sur la nature odieuse des faits que proscrirait une convention
internationale. D’autre part, il en est qui entendent veiller à ce qu’il soit
tenu compte des causes sous- jacentes du terrorisme dans le cadre de
l’adoption d’un instrument international. Les pays en question considèrent
qu’il faudrait exclure de la définition du terrorisme les mesures
prises par les peuples dans leur lutte pour la libération, l’autodétermination
et l’indépendance nationales. Lors des travaux préparatoires de la
CIRFT, des déclarations fort révélatrices ont ainsi été faites par les représentants
du Bahreïn et de la Libye, qui ont l’un et l’autre souligné la
nécessité de faire une distinction entre la lutte légitime des peuples pour
l’autodétermination et le terrorisme (Nations Unies, doc. A/C.6/54/SR.33,
p. 10, par. 58, et doc. A/C.6/54/SR.34, p. 2, par. 7).
14. Ne parvenant pas à adopter un traité multilatéral qui définisse le
terrorisme international, les Etats ont conclu au niveau mondial nombre
de traités 4 fondés sur l’approche, plus simple et moins problématique,
consistant à ériger en infractions certains faits qualifiés comme tels. Les
rédacteurs de ces instruments se sont tous bien gardés d’employer le mot
« terrorisme » pour définir les faits constitutifs des infractions en question.
Il ressort d’un examen des neuf traités figurant dans l’annexe visée à l’alinéa
a) du paragraphe 1 de l’article 2 de la convention que, dans aucun
d’eux, les faits constitutifs des infractions respectives ne sont qualifiés
d’actes de terrorisme 5. A l’instar de la CIRFT, ces traités ne font qu’interdire
des faits spécifiques. Il est significatif que, bien que le préambule
de deux de ces instruments contienne des références au terrorisme, il n’en
est pas fait mention dans leurs articles, pas même dans ceux qui établissent
l’infraction 6. A cet égard, la CIRFT est semblable à ces traités, en
4 Outre les neuf traités énumérés dans l’annexe, les instruments de répression suivants
ont été adoptés : convention relative aux infractions et à certains autres actes survenant à
bord des aéronefs (1963), convention internationale pour la répression des actes de terrorisme
nucléaire (2005) et convention sur la répression des actes illicites dirigés contre l’aviation
civile internationale (2010).
5 Les neuf instruments énumérés à l’annexe sont les suivants : convention pour la répression
de la capture illicite d’aéronefs (1970), convention pour la répression d’actes illicites
dirigés contre la sécurité de l’aviation civile (1971), convention sur la prévention et la
répression des infractions contre les personnes jouissant d’une protection internationale, y
compris les agents diplomatiques (1973), convention internationale contre la prise d’otages
(1979), convention internationale sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires (1980),
protocole pour la répression d’actes illicites de violence dans les aéroports servant à l’aviation
civile internationale, complémentaire à la convention pour la répression d’actes illicites
dirigés contre la sécurité de l’aviation civile (1988), convention pour la répression d’actes illicites
contre la sécurité de la navigation maritime (1988), protocole pour la répression d’actes
illicites contre la sécurité des plates- formes fixes situées sur le plateau continental (1988)
et convention internationale pour la répression des attentats terroristes à l’explosif (1997).
6 Dans la convention internationale contre la prise d’otages (1979) et la convention
internationale pour la répression des attentats terroristes à l’explosif (1997), le terrorisme
est mentionné dans le préambule mais non dans les articles établissant l’infraction.
663 application of the icsft and cerd (decl. robinson)
109
such reference in the article creating the offence or in any other article.
All the treaties in the Annex were concluded in the shadow cast by the
failure of the international community to agree on a definition of international
terrorism. As such, they isolate acts to be criminalized as offences.
However, in view of the failure to reach agreement on the definition
of international terrorism, they avoid characterizing these acts as terrorism.
For example, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (1970) criminalizes the act of seizing an aircraft (commonly
called hijacking) but does not characterize the unlawful seizure as
terrorism, even though in ordinary parlance it would be so described.
In the same vein, the (1979) Convention against the Taking of Hostages
only criminalizes the act of taking hostages and does not characterize
that act as terrorism, although in colloquial parlance it would be so
described.
15. Moreover, in the suppression of crime treaties 7 adopted after the
ICSFT, a similar approach has been employed : the prohibited act is not
described as terrorism ; the conventions describe an offence that takes
place when certain acts are carried out. Significantly, although the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
(2005) has, like the ICSFT, a reference to terrorism in its title and in its
preamble, there is no such reference in the article creating the offence.
16. What this legal history shows is that it is no mere happenstance
that the ICSFT does not describe the offence in Article 2 as terrorism,
even though its title and preamble refer to the phenomenon of terrorism.
If during the negotiations Article 2 had been formulated to read “any
person commits the offence of terrorism within the meaning of this Convention”,
rather than “[a]ny person commits an offence within the meaning
of this Convention”, the draft Convention would more than likely
have met with serious objections from several countries which would have
wanted to carve out an exception in respect of peoples struggling for liberation,
self-determination and independence. It is for this reason that the
Court’s finding in paragraph 63 of the Judgment is problematic. In that
paragraph, the Court finds that “[a]n element of an offence under Article
2, paragraph 1, of the ICSFT is that the person concerned has provided
funds ‘with the intention that they should be used or in the
knowledge that they are to be used’ to commit an act of terrorism”. It is
problematic because nowhere in any of the articles of the ICSFT — and
in particular, nowhere in Article 2 which creates the offence — is there
any reference to “an act of terrorism”. Of course it would be unobjectionable
if the Judgment did not use terrorism as a term of art referring to the
offence under Article 2. But here the reference to an “element of the
offence” — that is, “the intention” (the mens rea) that is required by Arti-
7 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005;
and Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation,
2010.
application de la cirft et de la ciedr (décl. robinson) 663
109
ce que son préambule comporte une référence au terrorisme, mais qu’il
n’en est fait mention ni dans l’article établissant l’infraction ni dans aucun
autre article. Tous les traités figurant dans l’annexe ont été conclus dans
la zone d’ombre engendrée par l’incapacité de la communauté internationale
de s’entendre sur une définition du terrorisme international. Ainsi, ils
circonscrivent certains faits à incriminer. Toutefois, faute d’accord sur
une telle définition, leurs auteurs ont évité de qualifier ces faits d’actes de
terrorisme. Par exemple, la convention de 1970 pour la répression de la
capture illicite d’aéronefs érige en infraction le fait de s’emparer d’un
appareil (ce que l’on appelle couramment « détournement »), mais ne le
qualifie pas d’acte de terrorisme, contrairement à ce que l’on dirait dans
la langue ordinaire. De même, la convention internationale de 1979 contre
la prise d’otages ne fait qu’incriminer pareil acte et ne le qualifie pas
d’acte de terrorisme, bien que ce soit l’expression que l’on emploierait en
langage familier.
15. Une démarche analogue se retrouve dans les traités de répression
adoptés après la CIRFT 7 : l’acte prohibé n’y est pas qualifié de terroriste ;
l’infraction y est définie comme étant constituée par la commission de
certains faits. Il est à noter que, comme la CIRFT, la convention internationale
de 2005 pour la répression des actes de terrorisme nucléaire fait
référence au terrorisme dans son intitulé et son préambule, mais n’en fait
aucune mention dans son article établissant l’infraction.
16. Cet historique du droit montre que ce n’est pas un simple hasard si
la CIRFT ne décrit pas l’infraction visée en son article 2 comme un acte
terroriste, alors même que son titre et son préambule évoquent le phénomène
du terrorisme. Si, au cours des négociations, il avait été décidé de
retenir à l’article 2 la formulation « [c]ommet l’infraction de terrorisme
au sens de la présente Convention toute personne », au lieu de « [c]ommet
une infraction au sens de la présente Convention toute personne », le projet
de convention se serait à n’en pas douter heurté à de graves objections
de la part de plusieurs pays désireux de créer une exception destinée aux
peuples luttant pour la libération, l’autodétermination et l’indépendance.
C’est pour cette raison que la conclusion formulée par la Cour au paragraphe
63 est problématique. Il s’agit du dictum suivant : « Un élément
constitutif d’une infraction visée au paragraphe 1 de l’article 2 de la
CIRFT est que le pourvoyeur doit fournir les fonds « dans l’intention de
les voir utilisés ou en sachant qu’ils seront utilisés » en vue de commettre
un acte de terrorisme. » Cette conclusion pose problème parce qu’aucun
des articles de la CIRFT — pas même l’article 2, qui établit l’infraction —
ne contient la moindre référence à « un acte de terrorisme ». Cela ne prêterait
bien évidemment pas à contestation si, dans l’arrêt, le mot terrorisme
n’était pas employé comme un terme technique désignant l’infraction
visée à l’article 2. Toutefois, la mention faite ici de l’« élément constitutif
7 Convention internationale pour la répression des actes de terrorisme nucléaire (2005)
et convention sur la répression des actes illicites dirigés contre l’aviation civile internationale
(2010).
664 application of the icsft and cerd (decl. robinson)
110
cle 2, paragraph 1, to establish the offence — makes it abundantly clear
that by “an act of terrorism” what is meant is the offence established by
the Convention. The Court should have followed the approach it took in
the same paragraph when it referred to “an act fall[ing] within the meaning
of Article 2, paragraph 1 (a) or (b)”. This comment applies to other
parts of the Judgment where “terrorism” is used as a term of art referring
to the offence under Article 2. In any event, if the phrase “act of terrorism”
were to be retained in paragraph 63, the more appropriate formulation
would be an act of financing terrorism.
17. The Court’s reference to acts of terrorism in describing the offence
under Article 2 may lead some States to question how the acts in Article 2
could be said to constitute terrorism without any exception being carved
out when those acts are committed by peoples struggling for liberation,
self-determination and independence. Notably, on acceding to the ICSFT,
Kuwait made a declaration that distinguished between terrorism and the
“legitimate national struggle against occupation”.
(Signed) Patrick L. Robinson.
application de la cirft et de la ciedr (décl. robinson) 664
110
d’une infraction », c’est-à-dire « l’intention » (la mens rea) requise par le
paragraphe 1 de l’article 2 pour que l’infraction soit constituée, indique
très clairement que, par « un acte de terrorisme », l’on entend l’infraction
établie par la convention. La Cour aurait dû s’en tenir à l’approche qu’elle
a adoptée dans ce même paragraphe lorsqu’elle évoquait « un acte particulier
entr[ant] dans les prévisions de l’alinéa a) ou b) du paragraphe 1 de
l’article 2 ». Cette observation s’applique à d’autres parties de l’arrêt où le
mot « terrorisme » est utilisé comme un terme technique désignant l’infraction
visée à l’article 2. En tout état de cause, si l’expression « acte de
terrorisme » devait être retenue au paragraphe 63, il serait plus approprié
de parler d’acte de financement du terrorisme.
17. La référence que fait la Cour à des « actes de terrorisme » pour
désigner l’infraction établie à l’article 2 risque de conduire certains Etats
à se demander comment les actes visés dans cette disposition peuvent être
considérés comme constitutifs de terrorisme sans qu’aucune exception
n’ait été ménagée pour les cas où de tels actes seraient commis par des
peuples luttant pour la libération, l’autodétermination et l’indépendance.
Il y a lieu de relever que, en adhérant à la CIRFT, le Koweït a fait une
déclaration dans laquelle il distinguait le terrorisme de la « lutte nationale
légitime contre l’occupation ».
(Signé) Patrick L. Robinson.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Declaration of Judge Robinson

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