Volume V

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)
REPLY OF THE PLURINATIONAL
STATE OF BOLIVIA
21 March 2017
Volume 5 of 5
(Annexes 345 - 373)

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Annex 345
Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting, 29th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, 8 June 1999
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Organization of American States, General Assembly, 29th Regular Session,
1999, Various Documents, Vol. II, OEA/Ser.P/XXIX-O.2 (1999)
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MINUTES OF THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION8
Date: 8 June 1999
Time: 3:15 p.m.
Place: Camino Real Hotel
President: Mr. Ernesto Stein Barillas
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala
Present: Messrs.
Carlos Alberto Leite Barbosa (Brazil)
Peter M. Boehm (Canada)
Jose Miguel Insulza Salinas (Chile)
Guillermo Fernandez de Soto (Colombia)
Roberto Rojas Lopez (Costa Rica)
Edward A. Alexander (Dominica)
Eduardo Cabezas (Ecuador)
Mauricio Granillo Barrera (El Salvador)
Victor Marrero (United States)
Denis Antoine (Grenada)
Gabriel Aguilera (Guatemala)
Clement J. Rohee, M. P. (Guyana)
Max Morpeau (Haiti)
Policarpo Callejas Bonilla (Honduras)
Delrose Montague (Jamaica)
Claude Heller (Mexico)
Eduardo Montealegre R. (Nicaragua)
Edgar Spence Herrera (Panama)
Miguel Abdon Saguier (Paraguay)
Fernando de Trazegnies Granda (Peru)
Flavio Dario Espinal (Dominican Republic)
Osbert Liburd (Saint Kitts and Nevis)
George Odlum (Santa Lucia)
Cecily A. Norris (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)
Albert R. Ramdin (Suriname)
Ralph Maraj (Trinidad and Tobago)
Antonio Mercader (Uruguay)
Jose Vicente Rangel (Venezuela)
Lionel A. Hurst (Antigua and Barbuda)
Julio Cesar Araoz (Argentina)
Janet G. Bostwick (Bahamas)
Courtney Blackman (Barbados)
Florencio Marin (Belice)
Javier Murillo de la Rocha (Bolivia)
___________________________
8 Classified earlier as AG/ACTA 362/99.
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Cesar Gaviria Secretary General of the OAS
Christopher R. Thomas Assistant Secretary General
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[...]
3. Report on the Maritime Issue of Bolivia
The PRESIDENT: The next item in the agenda is the maritime issue of
Bolivia. To address this agenda item, I am pleased to give the floor to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Bolivian Delegation.
THE HEAD OF THE BOLIVIAN DELEGATION: Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. Secretary General, Messrs. Foreign Ministers and Heads of Delegation:
Latin America is a region of peace.
That is, perhaps, its main contribution to the international community
in the century that has just come to an end. It was not free from
armed confrontation, but these were limited in number and cannot be
compared with the degree of cruelty that devastated other continents.
What makes this region different in this century is its capacity to prevent
conflict and resolve them through the path of negotiations, with the support,
good offices and mediation of other countries of the Inter-American system.
The most remarkable and recent example of the extraordinary ductility of
the regional system are the Peace Agreements entered into by Ecuador and
Peru, as a result of a negotiation process that was supported and accompanied
by the Sponsoring Countries, Brazil, the United States, Argentina and Chile.
In these agreements, all the elements that characterize what could be regarded as
the Latin American quality come together. They put an end to a territorial dispute
the origins of which have to be searched for in the period when the national States
of the Continent were established; they bring to an end a longstanding chapter of
antagonism and distrust and open up a new path of friendship and cooperation.
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This result has been achieved owing to the fact that the friendly participation of the countries of the
Inter-American system has stopped this armed conflict and promoted diplomatic negotiation and
it has concretized, above all, because the Governments and Heads of State of both countries had
the stature and vision characteristic of statesmen that is necessary to break the restraints from the
past and resolve the problems resulting from the XIX Century looking into the next millennium.
Latin America is progressing towards integration, not only due to the imperative demands of
development or the globalization of world economy, which makes it also a historical necessity. It has
thus been written, so to speak, in the genetic inheritance of American peoples. We were born to unite.
That is how our founding fathers understood it, and that is the work we have been performing,
overcoming immense difficulties –as those imposed by the geography of any vast continent.
At the end of this century, the MERCOSUR and the Andean Community have ceased to be
mere postulates and have turned into concrete projects, and tangible realities in full swing.
The Latin American identity corresponding to this century must consolidate
within these two elements –the capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts
and the capability to articulate the economies and societies of our continent.
We could dare say, without hiding that we are proud of it, that Latin America was
not a scenario of the armed horror that stirred up humanity in this century with two
world wars, with the threat of nuclear holocaust, the clashes between fanatics in the
ideological conflict of the East-West, the dread of genocide and ethnic cleansing.
By summarizing these events, I must add –however–that the task is not over,
that there is still much to do, and there still are problems to resolve. One of these
conflicts is of direct concern to my country. More than a century ago, Bolivia was
deprived of a vast coastal territory and, as a result, of its direct access to the sea.
I will not take time here to recapitulate the economic and political consequences
that this disastrous event has caused to my country. In the report I submitted last year to
this very Assembly, I put forward certain statistics in an attempt to quantify that which,
if seen from another perspective, is unquantifiable because the damage is countless.
Today, I would rather underscore the consequences of this war within the
Inter-American system. Bolivia and Chile do not have diplomatic relations for more
than two decades. A couple of years ago, soon after the Government transferred
the administration of the National Railroad Enterprise to a Chilean firm, complex
popular reactions of rejection to this measure were experienced in La Paz city.
In other words, Mr. President, distinguished Foreign Ministers, the wounds
of 1879 have not healed yet and these two nations that ought to be united have
turned their backs against each other, and that this is happening at the end of
this century, in a continent of peace. I say this, Mr. President, with deep regret.
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I can affirm, in defense of Bolivia, that we have made all the attempts imaginable to
resolve this conflict. In the bilateral sphere, we have tried to carry out at least ten direct
negotiations to achieve the goal of a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean. All these
attempts, however, have been frustrated for reasons that cannot be attributed to my country.
Exactly, twenty years ago, in the historical General Assembly held in La Paz,
the Organization of American States listed to Bolivia’s claim and expressed its veracity
in unequivocal and clear terms. This Resolution proclaims in its texts that “it is of
permanent hemispheric interest to find an equitable solution whereby Bolivia could obtain
a sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean… to consolidate a stable peace…
which has been directly affected by the consequences of Bolivia’s landlocked condition.
It must be recalled, Mr. President, that this Resolution was not only based
in the historical justice behind my country’s claim. It was adopted with a view
towards the future, on the basis of the rationale that Bolivia’s landlocked condition
halted regional integration and was a cause of tension and potential conflicts.
These are the reasons that explain the interest of the other nations of the
Continent in the solution to this problem, interest that does not expire, as the ideals
of harmonious coexistence encouraged by our States and justice cannot expire.
This prolonged estrangement between Bolivia and Chile does not contribute
to improving the ample political and diplomatic relations on the coasts of the Pacific,
which proves the fact that Bolivia and Chile are the only countries in the Continent
which, I repeat, do not have diplomatic relations for more than two decades.
This very Resolution recommended “the States directly
concerned with this problem to commence negotiations directed toward
giving Bolivia a free and sovereign connection with the Pacific Ocean.”
So as not to leave any doubts in regard to what the nations of the hemispheric
community wished to state, these placed on record that, “These negotiations… might
consider, inter alia, the inclusion of a port area of integral multinational development
and, similarly, bear in mind the Bolivian proposal not include territorial compensations”.
I must hereby declare solemnly that since that Resolution was adopted, my country
has sought to concretize these purposes, through all channels. Among the many demarches
that were carried out, two correspond to a period subsequent to 1979: those of 1984, under
the aegis of the Government of Colombia, and the negotiations that counted on a particular
and Americanist support precisely in here, Guatemala, which has welcomed us again today.
Here, within the framework of the regular period of sessions of the OAS General
Assembly, in 1986, the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile expressed their willingness
to commence dialogue directed toward resolving Bolivia’s maritime issue. This is the
most recent precedent of the intentions that have been reiterated for more than a century.
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However, the situation has not changed. Unfortunately, the lack of understandings between the two
nations persists and continues to hinder and complicate Latin American Andean regional integration.
A hundred twenty years have passed since the War of the Pacific and two
decades since the hemispheric community recognized the extent of the problem and
issued one of the noblest Resolutions of its history. Many more years might pass,
but Bolivia will never renounce to its claim for reintegration with the sea. Never.
However, Mr. President, with this address I do not seek to place on record, before this noble
Assembly held in the beloved soil of Guatemala, ancient grievances. I would rather recall the holding
of this assembly as the beginning of a new journey towards peace and understanding in Latin America.
That is why, here and now, in the last Assembly held in this century, in the presence
of America as a whole, Bolivia proposes to immediately commence bilateral negotiations
with Chile, so that, within the framework of a remarkable agreement of political cooperation
and economic integration, all pending issues between the two nations be resolved, with no
exclusions, in keeping with the spirit and content of the often quoted Resolution of 1979.
We cannot enter the new millennium upholding positions of the XIX Century. Our
responsibility is great in relation to coming generation. We must aspire to reach an arrangement that
translates into benefits for our two nations, free from selfishness. However, an integral understanding
can only be the result of an integral diplomatic dialogue, without circumventing any substantial matter.
I am confident that the brother countries of America, the same ones that signed the
Resolution adopted in 1979, will be willing to offer their support to concretize this negotiation,
with the same spirit with which the Government of Venezuela, Motherland of Liberator Simon
Bolivar, demanded, in the recent Andean Presidential Summit, that the Continent ought to be
freed from one of the most severe concerns of the Inter-American agenda for the next century.
The expressions of solidarity towards Bolivia’s maritime claim cannot
be regarded as an unfriendly acts or provocations. That would be unacceptable
and would constitute an intolerant attitude, opposed to Americanist postulates.
Bolivia hereby declares its indeclinable determination to make all possible
efforts to crystalize the desire to commence the millennium laying the foundations
for a Bolivian-Chilean relations of true friendship and cooperation. We cannot leave
the future generations an inheritance of distrust between neighboring countries.
Certainly, the honorable Chilean Foreign Minister, and I say this with the utmost respect,
would tell us there are no pending problems with Bolivia. We have been told that before. In at least ten
opportunities –I have said this already– we carried out negotiations on basis of the cession to Bolivia
of an own access to the sea, and that commitment was formalized in eight solemn occasions. This is
irrefutable historical proof of the existence of a pending question that demands definitive solutions.
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We might be told that Bolivia does not put forward concrete proposals, nevertheless, the commitment
of 1950, ratified ten years thereafter, the content of the proposal of 1975 and the conversations
held in 1984 and 1986, not to go any further, contain essential elements to commence a negotiation.
Chile holds that dialogue must be reestablished without any conditions. We
agree with that, but we believe that conditions that guarantee the development of this dialogue
towards a true understanding must first be created. A dialogue that is not restricted
to resolving secondary aspects, but that it is rather resolved to face substantial matters.
Chile might also tell us that it is willing to consider facilities for sea access. That however only
entails free transit and is already part of the contractual obligations assumed by the two States. That is
only a port-oriented vision, but Bolivia needs a coast. It needs to regain its condition as a coastal State.
Chile might also hold that commerce and investments are developing in positive
terms, but the truth is that there is a marked asymmetry in detriment of Bolivia when exchanges
are concerned. Furthermore, productive investments have not increased. As a result,
there is a serious obstacle that prevents Bolivia from utilizing, as a shared benefit, the huge
potential of our complementation. Nature has connected us, but history has separated us.
It is true that we have established communication channels. This evidences
that, in spite of everything, Bolivia is always open to the path of understanding and
that, even in the midst of less favorable circumstances, it does not renounce dialogue.
Finally, it might also be said that the OAS is not competent to interfere in questions
that are of direct concern to the States. The Resolution adopted in 1979 and the
eleven Resolutions adopted thereafter cannot be regarded as interferences to sovereign
decisions, but, nevertheless, blinded by susceptibility, the organism cannot be deprived
of the permanent mandate that it has been granted to have an interests in and actively
support solutions that are directed toward improving Inter-American coexistence.
Yesterday, we supported, with deep affection, the Resolution that pays tribute
to the historical agreement entered into by Peru and Ecuador, as a result of generous
detachment and courageous willingness to overcome a past marked by antagonism
and replace it with a future forged in the community of interests.
We have also celebrated the entering into force of the agreements concluded between
Chile and Argentina in regard to continental ice. Very soon, we will be gladly attending the transcendental
act by which sovereignty over the Canal Zone will be restituted to the brother country
of Panama, owing to a decision that honors the United States and the Republic of Panama.
It is now Bolivia and Chile’s turn to face this challenge and begin the new century
with a relation that is based on a brotherly and true friendship between two
States that had the capacity to resolve their differences with dignity and courage.
This is the only way by which we will complete this task. Only then
will we be able to state that America is the geography of peace.
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Thank you Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister. I now give the floor to the Chilean Delegation.
The MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE: Thank you, Mr. President. The
address made by the Foreign Minister of Bolivia compels me to reiterate some considerations
that we have expressed earlier in regard to this matter; as it also forces me to repeat
some arguments that even the Bolivian Foreign Minister has put forward. I do this in
the understanding that this is an informative agenda item –the last item in the agenda–
because the Charter of the Organization of American States does not give this Organization
competence or mandate to consider questions that concern the sovereignty of Member States.
The Foreign Minister has stated that this alleged conflict could be resolved, particularly, owing
to the new atmosphere created by the Peace Agreement concluded by Peru and Ecuador,
in which Chile, Argentina, Brazil and the United States took part as sponsors. He said, in
proper terms, that this agreement puts an end to a territorial conflict and closes a chapter of
antagonism and distrust, with the friendly participation of other States. However, he failed
to point out that the basis for this Agreement between Peru and Ecuador was the respect for
valid treaties and that the participation of the sponsoring countries was precisely due to
the fact that this measure was enshrined in the Treaty in force between Peru and Ecuador.
That is why, this comparison, worries us, because a question that is completely different in
circumstances is being posed as a pending boundary conflict. There is a more than centenary
peace between Chile and Bolivia and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904 –which resolved
all boundary disputes between both countries– is in full force. As a result, yes, I will repeat it, there
is no pending boundary issue between Bolivia and Chile. The border between the two nations was
established solemnly and definitely by that Treaty, which was freely signed by the two countries in
1904 and was ratified by their Congresses. This happened 24 years after hostilities stopped in the armed
conflict they had engaged in. The boundary has been demarcated in all its extent. This situation is not
at all comparable with the question concerning the Southern Ice Field between Chile and Argentina,
in which the demarcation of their boundary, on basis of a valid Treaty, led to some difficulties.
I do not know which the pending issues that must be resolved in the border between
Chile and Bolivia are. Their border has been agreed to, I repeat, in 1904, under a
Treaty that was ratified by the two countries. The landmarks of the border have
been placed to their full extent and are, frankly, respected by both countries.
As a result, I believe that it must be understood, so we are well aware of what we are talking
about, Mr. President, that there is no boundary dispute resulting from an absence of agreements
or difficulties to demarcate the border. What there is, simply and plainly, a proposal to change
the existing border, which has been fixed and demarcated in accordance with International Law.
I would like to recall that an important part of the borders within our continent are the result
of similar agreements, many of which derived from painful conflict. To promote projects that
concern treaty revision would create, for our region, an unacceptable instability. Which border
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would we revise thereafter? If there are so many similar circumstances in the Americas, why should we revise
only one, the demarcation of which was the result of a conflict and thereafter of treaties? Besides, this situation
is stable and a substantial part of the regional peace which the Foreign Minister of Bolivia was right to praise.
Mr. President, during the General Assembly held in Caracas last year I informed you that,
since the new Presidential Administration took office in Bolivia, Chile did not receive any
request to discuss in direct terms the state of relations. This year, I am in position to inform this
Assembly that the situation is unfortunately the same, Bolivia only talks to Chile through
newspapers and takes its opinions and proposals to international organs, and no Presidential
or Ministerial meetings have been held to address this in the past twenty-two months.
Furthermore, a few days ago, we were informed through the press that the Bolivian Government is
not interested in discussing this question with the current Chilean Government because it will stay in
office for only nine months. Thus, it will wait for the new Chilean Government to take office so as to
discuss these questions. I wish to reiterate that when a new Government takes office in Chile, three
months after being established, it will be a year before a new Government is chosen in Bolivia, and
this situation could continue for many years without us being able to directly discuss these issues.
Thus, Mr. President, we must ask ourselves whether it is constructive to continue discussing
before international organs a policy of confrontation, with the only pretext of bringing to
the attention of the international community a dispute that is not being discussed directly.
Mr. President, despite the lack of diplomatic relations, which were unilaterally suspended by
the Bolivian Government more than two decades ago, I wish to place emphasis on the fact that
the Chilean-Bolivian boundary works perfectly and that the commerce and tourism influxes
and the bilateral cooperation mechanism operate in a fluent way and in growing proportions.
As irrefutable proof of this normality I can point that every month more than three
thousand Bolivian trucks circulate through Arica city only and that more than
five hundred tourists have visited the Arica and Iquique regions in the past years.
Our Political Consultations Mechanism have held numerous meetings to discuss matters such
as the collection of Bolivian zinc and lead in Arica and Antofagasta; energetic cooperation; the
programs in the veterinary and health sectors; the renewal of the maritime concession of the Sica
Sica-Arica oil-pipeline; air transportation; land transport of cargo and passengers; exchanges of
information in narcotics trafficking, energy and mining; coordination of international organs, etc.
We have created, together with the CEPAL, an Integrated Transit System the aim of which is to
facilitate the importation and exportation of Bolivian goods through the ports of Arica and
Antofagasta, and port authorities and representatives from the transportation, customs and private
sector of both countries have taken part in this. I wish to clearly state here that port facilities
granted to Bolivia exceed those recommended by the UNCTAD for landlocked countries.
The first meeting of the Bolivia-Chile Boundary Committee –created in 1997– was held in 1998, the intention
of which is boundary facilitation between both countries, both in terms of infrastructure as in terms of
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fiscal services involved. The agreements concluded in the First Meeting are in
full force and a covenant to recognize driver’s licenses will soon be entered into.
Similarly, covenants have been concluded between Universities, as well as cooperation
covenants between both countries’ Police and Armed Forces. The covenant
concluded between Police Forces take into account the participation of Bolivian
officers-students in the Chilean Escuela de Carabineros [Chile’s Police Academy].
In the cultural aspects, next September, historians from both countries will meet to
analyze the texts that are used in teaching history and social sciences in both countries.
We concluded a scientific and technical cooperation agreement in 1995.
In the ports of Arica and Antofagasta, an area of 30,000 square kilometers of the port area has
been assigned for the Bolivian importation goods in transit to that country to be freely stored for
a term of a year. Regarding Bolivian exports of zinc and lead minerals, despite the environmental
pollution problems they pose, with 350,000 tons per year, they enjoy sixty days of free storage
and have an additional 4 hectares of for their collection. Also in both ports, covered warehouses of
10,000 square meters and protected areas for the storage of dangerous cargo have been assigned.
Notwithstanding all this, with a good spirit of fellowship and in response to a request from
Bolivia, Chile has reiterated its willingness to expand the transit facilities that Bolivia
currently enjoys in Arica and Antofagasta towards other Chilean ports and increase the
efficiency and fluency of these facilities in order to respond in better terms to the growing
challenge of the increasing Bolivian foreign trade. In this context, in the last week
of May, we held a first meeting between the two countries to expand these facilities.
Bilateral trade is around the three hundred million dollars, and Chilean investments in Bolivia reach more
than three hundred and sixty-seven million dollars. We would like to highlight the fact that, last April,
the Agreement for the Protection and Promotion of Investments between the two countries was ratified.
It is true that trade is still unbalanced in favor of Chile. That is why I think it is eloquent to say
that last March, Chile offered Bolivia to exonerate to zero percent, immediately and without
reciprocity, 98.7% of the tariff universe of Bolivian products, and we do not ask Bolivia for
a symmetric reduction, but we are willing to accept much slower terms from the fifth year.
I believe that all this shows, Mr. President, that there is an obvious separation between the reality of
exchanges, integration, economic complementarity and concrete negotiations that characterize the
Chilean-Bolivian relations and the sadly distorted vision that is presented in this and other forums.
Mr. President, I think it is important to reiterate here that our willingness, in any case, is to maintain
normal relations with Bolivia. I would like to reiterate the willingness of my Government to
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resume the interrupted dialogue at any time. We have always said, and
we reiterate it, that we are ready to reestablish diplomatic relations with
Bolivia. We do not interrupt them. We are ready to resume them immediately
and without conditions, in the certainty that such normalization
would contribute to the creation of a better atmosphere in which
we can examine all our problems. The absence of diplomatic relations
is already an obsolete resource that serves no constructive purpose. I
say that we are willing to do so without conditions, because we are not
available to consider, in exchange for these relations, the transfer of
sovereignty over existing treaties or to accept the intervention of third
Parties in matters that, by their nature, are bilateral in nature.
We have said, Mr. President, and we reiterate it today, that there is a
constructive way to forge a true brotherhood between Chile and Bolivia.
That path involves economic integration, political dialogue and the
search for ever broader agreements to strengthen Bolivia’s full access
to the ocean. This is a path of peace and future. The attempt to change
borders and ignore existing treaties would only lead, instead, to frustration
and disagreement.
Thank you, Mr. President.
[…]
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Annex 346
Verbatim Record of the 20th Plenary Meeting, 54th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/54/PV.20, 1 October 1999
(Original in English)
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/PV.20
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Annex 347
R. Orias Arredondo, The International Law and Maritime Negotiations
with Chile
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
UDAPEX, Bolivia. Issues of the International Agenda (2000),
pp. 378 - 379 (extract)
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the signing of an Official Communiqué, whereby the Governments
assert that the meeting aimed at “knowing the positions of both
countries in relation to substantial problems that concern the
two nations, especially Bolivia’s proposal for a sovereign outlet
to Pacific Ocean...” Although the Joint Communiqué does not
specifically specify any commitment in relation to the maritime
issue, the Chilean Chancellor’s public statement uttered on that
occasion, after referring to the Charaña Act, which “expressly
enshrined the commitment to continue the dialogue, in order
to seek formulas to solve vital issues... such as that relating to
Bolivia’s landlocked condition,” expressed the wish that this new
process “could lead us to more decisive stages than the ones we
have achieved in previous negotiations.”
On the other hand, it is also worthy to recall –as a more recent
antecedent– the Joint Communiqué signed by the Foreign Ministers of both
countries, on occasion of the III Ibero-American Conference of Heads of
State held in Bahia, Brazil, on 16 July 1993, in which they pointed out
“that there are still differences in relation to certain specific issues” and that
“the improvement of bilateral relations creates the conditions conducive
to overcoming those differences by mutual understanding, always seeking
the interest of both peoples.” Although this document does not expressly
mention the maritime issue, it entails an acknowledgment to the effect that
there are pending issues that need to be solved, where there is obviously the
negotiation of an outlet to the sea.
Subsequently, since the beginning of the Administration of President
Frei, Chile did not make any formal pronouncement anticipating the
possibility and political willingness to negotiate a sovereign outlet to the
sea, stating emphatically that Chile carry out demarches with Bolivia to
improve economic complementation or free transit, but it will not engage in
dialogue on issues that concern its sovereignty. So when
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13 Public statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile at the meeting in Montevideo, 21-23 April 1987.
14 Chile recognizes that there are pending issues with Bolivia, “El Diario” Newspaper, La Paz, 20 July 1993, p. 1.
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Foreign Ministers Aranibar and Insulza wanted to address the issue,
an informal, unofficial and extra diplomatic channel was taken.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile was, however, changed in
the last stages of the Frei Administration. Its new Chancellor, Juan Gabriel
Valdes, who issued a statement advocating for “an unconditional dialogue on
any subject with Bolivia” , started building a new climate of rapprochement
and understanding between both countries in a series of preliminary meetings
with the Bolivian Foreign Minister, Javier Murillo. Thus, on occasion of the
IX Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State held in Havana, both Foreign
Ministers “agreed to resume an open and unconditional dialogue between
the two countries, which –among other issues– would include the access of
Bolivia to the sea.”
On 22 February 2000, both Foreign Ministers met in Algarve,
Portugal –on occasion of the Summit of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
the European Union and the Rio Group–, and formally resumed political
dialogue. On that occasion, the two countries agreed to “establish a work
agenda, incorporating without any exclusion, the essential issues of the
bilateral relationship,” ...in order “to overcome the differences that have
impeded a full integration between Bolivia and Chile, with the firm purpose
of seeking and reaching solutions to issues that affect their political and
economic relations.” This process continued with the signing of the Joint
Statement of Presidents Banzer and Lagos on 1 September 2000, on occasion
of the I Summit of Heads of State of South America, held in Brasilia, in
which both Governments reiterated their willingness to pursue a dialogue
on all issues of the bilateral relationship, without exclusions.
As seen in this chronological process, there is a consistency in the
Chilean foreign policy towards Bolivia, at the same time as Chile asserts
that the Treaty of 1904 is definitive and irrevocable, it has also offered the
possibility of negotiating a sovereign access to the sea through the north
of Arica, in exchange of compensations that take into account reciprocal
interests. This position […]
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15 “Presencia” Newspaper, La Paz, 10 November 1999.
16 Bolivia and Chile agreed to dialogue and without conditions, “El Diario” Newspaper, La Paz, 16 November 1999, p. 1.
17 Joint Press Release by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Chile, Algarve, Portugal, 22 February 2000.
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Annex 348
Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting, 30th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, 6 June 2000
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Organization of American States, General Assembly, 30th Regular
Session, OEA/Ser.P/XXX.-O.2 Vol. II (2000)
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ACT OF THE FOURTH PLENARY MEETING7
Date: 6 June 2000
Hour: 3:20 pm
Place: Cleary Centre
President: Mr. Lloyd Axworthy
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada
Attending: Messrs
Flavio Dario Espinal (Dominican Republic)
Sam Condor (Saint Kitts and Nevis)
Sonia M. Johnny (St. Lucia)
Kingsley C.A. Layne (St. Vincent and Grenadines)
Henry L. Mac-Donald (Surinam)
Michael A. Arneaud (Trinidad and Tobago)
Miguel Berthet (Uruguay)
Jose Vicente Rangel (Venezuela)
Lionel A. Hurst (Antigua and Barbuda)
Adalberto Rodriguez Giavarini (Argentina)
Harcourt Turnquest (Bahamas)
Billie A. Miller (Barbados)
James S. Murphy (Belize)
Javier Murillo de la Rocha (Bolivia)
Carlos Alberto Leite Barbosa (Brazil)
David Kilgour (Canada)
Maria Soledad Alvear Valenzuela (Chile)
Jairo Montoya Pedroza (Colombia)
Hernan Castro (Costa Rica)
George R.E. Bullen (Dominica)
Paulina Garcia de Larrea (Ecuador)
Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Avila (El Salvador)
Luis J. Lauredo (United States)
Denis Antoine (Granada)
Gabriel Orellana Rojas (Guatemala)
Odeen Ishmael (Guayana)
Fritz Longchamp (Haiti)
Roberto Flores Bermudez (Honduras)
Vilma McNish (Jamaica)
Claude Heller (Mexico)
Eduardo Montealegre R. (Nicaragua)
Jose Miguel Aleman (Panama)
Diego Abente Brun (Paraguay)
Fernando de Trazegnies Granda (Peru)
____________________
7 Previously published with the classification AG/ACTA 368/00
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6. Report on the maritime issue of Bolivia
The PRESIDENT: I’d now like to move to the report on the
maritime issue of Bolivia. I take pleasure in giving the floor to His
Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, to address the matter.
The HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF BOLIVIA: Thank you, Mr.
President. The Government of Bolivia has consistently and unhesitatingly
maintained that the path of negotiation and understanding is the most appropriate,
and certainly the only one, to truly solve the problems of relations between
the nations of the hemispheric community. That is for us a point of doctrine and
method of administration that we also apply in the sphere of domestic politics.
For this reason, the response of the Government of President Banzer to
the citizen mobilizations reported by the international press three months ago has
been to reinforce the national dialogue that was launched at the beginning of his
Administration to expand and strengthen the mechanisms of citizen participation.
Simultaneously, the President of the Republic has just had a fruitful meeting
with the head of the opposition [party], in order to consolidate and renew the
process of national consensus on which Bolivia’s democratic system rests.
These are expressions of the maturity of a political system that has
consolidated and opened the Bolivian democracy, and modernized and stabilized
the economy of my country, in a pluralistic exercise, sustained throughout five
governmental administrations for nearly twenty years. It cannot be said that the
problems have been solved with the implementation of these initiatives, but
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what can be said, without a doubt, is that it has changed the tone with which we debate,
substantively expanding the space of participation and deliberation of the Bolivian society
and, to that extent, facilitating the finding of solutions with the effort and contribution of all.
At the last General Assembly of the Organization, in Guatemala City, in June
1999, I began by highlighting the Latin American capacity to resolve their disputes
in a peaceful and negotiated manner. I mentioned then, with the feeling of pride that
we have, the peace accords signed between Ecuador and Peru, which were added
to those that had already concluded Chile and Argentina. In another regional area,
Honduras and Nicaragua used the same method to bring closer their points of view.
I also noted that, in spite all the progress, the task had not been completed, mentioning
the persistence of the problem that prevented my country from having access to the Pacific
Ocean for more than a century. I did not want to dwell on the already well-known account of
the consequences of that conflict on Bolivia’s economic, social and political development,
and I preferred to concentrate my approach on the need for a great framework of political
cooperation and economic integration between Bolivia and Chile, one that could definitely
resolve all pending issues between the two nations, without any exclusion, as a direct
responsibility of both Parties, in accordance with the spirit and content of the Resolutions
adopted by the General Assembly from the meeting held in October 1979 onwards.
Indeed, the hemispheric community has consistently and explicitly
expressed its continuing interest in Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean,
calling on the Parties directly involved to initiate negotiations to find a solution
to the issue. By the way, my country has done and continues to do everything
in its power to comply with the recommendation of our brothers of America.
In that spirit, we entered into talks with Chile’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Juan Gabriel Valdes,
the most important of which took place in the city of Algarve, Portugal, on 22 February
this year, at which time the Foreign Ministers resolved to “create a working agenda,
which would be formalized in the next stages of the dialogue, incorporating, without
exclusion, the essential issues of their bilateral relationship.” It was explicitly stated that
“the development of this dialogue will be aimed at overcoming the differences that have
impeded a full integration between Bolivia and Chile, with the firm purpose of seeking
and reaching solutions to issues that affect their political and economic relations.”
Moreover, my country proposed an agenda and a procedure to organize that
dialogue. It suggested that three working modules be established to examine all the
problems of the bilateral, historical, political, commercial, economic and cultural
relationship. In this context, the implementation of a shared development program in
northern Chile and western Bolivia was particularly emphasized. But, moreover, it
pursues that the south of Peru will be associated with this undertaking, which involves
mobilizing resources and capacities of the three regions for the reconstruction of the
economic and cultural space that was ruptured by the armed conflict of the 19th century.
We are confident that this initiative would create the necessary conditions to facilitate
the consideration and solution of the other issues and problems of the bilateral agenda within a
contemporary view and a future-oriented perspective, but will also contribute to the articulation
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of the Atlantic and Pacific basins and would bring the economies and markets of
Bolivia, Chile and Peru closer to those of Brazil and other MERCOSUR countries.
With the same clarity and frankness with which it has always presented its points of
view, my country pointed out that this program should always be seen as a path and not as
a substitute for the effective solution of Bolivia’s claim for its restitution as a coastal State.
We have received positive signs from the new Government of President Lagos in regard to
his willingness to continue and project the important progress made in Algarve and we are hopeful
that the voices that recommend looking at and building the future will prevail in their spirit over
those who prefer to maintain a status quo that means, in practice, living in the past and dragging
the economic and political consequences that have been haunting us for over a hundred years.
Mr. President, we now highlight Canada’s ten years of constructive
participation in the regional Organization and congratulate you on the successful
manner in which you have conducted the discussions held within this thirtieth regular
session of the OAS General Assembly, as well as for the proposal on human security
as a framework for the integral development of men in the perspective of this new
millennium, which has deserved the enthusiastic consideration of all Member States.
Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for his presentation and for his very kind remarks. I now
open the floor for the comments of other Delegations. I give the floor to the Minister of Chile.
The HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF CHILE: Thank you. Mr. President and
Heads of Delegation, the Foreign Minister of Bolivia has presented a report on the
maritime issue of Bolivia to this General Assembly. I would now like to reiterate
my country’s position regarding the inclusion of this issue as an item of our agenda.
As is well know, the Delegation of Chile objected to the inclusion of the matter
at hand, since the OAS, as we have argued, lacks the competence to address an issue that
could compromise the integrity of the sovereign territory of one of its Member States.
There is no territorial dispute between Chile and Bolivia, since all matters of
territorial sovereignty were definitively settled with the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of
1904 –which is fully implemented– and the border, therefore, between our countries has been
definitely demarcated. The foregoing does not prevent bilateral aspects of bilateral relations,
and without the involvement of international organizations or the participation of third
countries, that we can consider practical aspects that concern bilateral relations and allow, in
a spirit of dialogue and integration, looking towards an auspicious and constructive future.
Mr. President, for information purposes only, I would like to refer to some
important matters in the Chilean-Bolivian relationship. I must point out that we
have progressed in the improvement and modernization of the free transit system. In
recent years, mineral collection centers have been implemented and discussions have
been held to enable new ports to facilitate the free transit system in favor of Bolivia.
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Our countries have also made progress in reciprocal investment. Foreign trade,
under the Economic Complementation Agreement, has seen a significant
increase in the last decade. A profitable horizontal technical cooperation
program is underway today and we have consulted on the possibility of signing
agreements in important areas such as mining, social security, double taxation
extension, among others. Several bilateral mechanisms focus on the bilateral
land transport regime and also coordinate investments in new highways.
Thus, Chile and Bolivia have an intense, rich and dynamic neighborly relationship.
The Chilean territory and its ports are open to bilateral and regional
integration. Chile has committed huge financial resources to improve the
integration of Bolivia and other South American countries into the Pacific.
We do this convinced that integration is a common development factor.
Mr. President, and my fellow Foreign Ministers, I have listened very carefully to
the words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia on the need to initiate and continue
a dialogue with our country to address all bilateral issues. Indeed, last year the Foreign
Ministers of Chile and Bolivia have held meetings in which progress has been made in
orienting us towards the possible materialization of a bilateral dialogue aimed at creating
the necessary conditions of trust to move forward in the normalization of our relations.
The Government of my country, guided by a constructive spirit, seeks to
improve its relations with Bolivia based on integration and good neighborliness.
We are confident that, despite existing difficulties, we have the capacity to
move forward in building an enabling environment to carry out this purpose.
With regard to access to the sea, together with reiterating our position, we would
like to point out that we are open to considering imaginative, modern, practical and
realistic formulas that can further perfect Bolivia’s access facilities to the sea. I reiterate,
Mr. President, that our Government is willing to ensure that dialogue and
integration are effectively efficient instruments in our relations and common development
objectives. Bolivia can count on the willingness of the Government of Chile in this regard.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: I’d like to thank the Minister for her presentation. Does anyone else wish
to comment on this item? I recognize the Head of the Delegation of Antigua and Barbuda.
The HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF ANTIGUA
AND BARBUDA: I thank you very kindly, Mr. President.
We are pleased to hear from the Ministers of both Bolivia and Chile. In
an era of economic partnership and collective security, we deem this intractable
disagreement between Bolivia and Chile an anachronism. It seems to my small,
peace-loving country that the past has to be shoved aside and that a future that
embraces reasonable solutions must be pursued. The American republic that bears
the name of one of this hemisphere’s greatest legends and the great country of Chile,
which has a long record of seeking to create a united continent, cannot commence
the new century and the new millennium with this millstone upon their necks.
1244
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Annex 349
Verbatim Record of the 25th Plenary Meeting, 55th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/55/PV.25,
20 September 2000
(Original in English)
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/650/23/PDF/
N0065023.pdf?OpenElement
1246
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1248
1249
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Annex 350
O. Pinochet de la Barra, Summary of the War of the Pacific - Gonzalo
Bulnes (2001) p. 222 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
1252
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[…]
Meetings held with Santa Maria and Lillo were fruitless
owing to the fact that what Camacho requested was a truce in the
course of which Chile would only obtain “military” occupation
of Bolivia’s coastal territory. This was unacceptable for Chile,
which demanded that Chilean law ought to prevail in that region.
On 12 December, Eusebio Lillo was sent to
Tacna, as a political leader, and by early January, he received Mariano
Baptista, on his way to Panama to a Congress meeting. Baptista carried
with him letters sent by General Campero, Vice-President Salinas and
Foreign Minister Zilveti. Proof of what discussed in that meeting can be
found in a letter sent by Lillo to President Santa Maria on 14 January 1882.
“I have spoken with Baptista about a Peace and Alliance Treaty.
There are two essential points in this Treaty: the incorporation
into Chile of all the former Bolivian littoral and the amendment
of boundaries north of Camarones for Bolivia to have an oulet
to the Pacific and be located between Chile and Peru, serving
as a barrier for the future, in the event that our enemy ever
manages to have the forces or opportunity to create difficulties.
In regard to the Bolivian coastal territory, Baptista wishes the
cession to Chile to be made as a war indemnification, and in
regard to the amendment of boundaries, he wishes that, as long
as Chile continues occupying Tacna and Arica, the transfer
should be made to Bolivia without being perceived as an act
of aggression against these towns. He believes, and so do I,
that these inhabitants have broken their ties of citizenship and
affection vis-à-vis the Government of Lima and that there
will soon be no difficulties to have them accept, with their
very consent, their being incorporated into another nation”.
I have quoted this piece of the letter for the reader to understand
how the Ancon Treaty came about –not as the result of a last minute
decision, but as the condensation of the ideas that had been put forward
in the negotiations that preceded that Treaty. Each of them had left a
sediment or material with which that instrument was elaborated.
[…]
222
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Annex 351
C. Bustos, Chile and Bolivia. A long road from independence to Monterrey
(2004), pp. 295 - 296 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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[...]
Although I do not have inside information, I presume that an
important part of the merit, due to the way in which the issue has been
handled, belongs to the President himself who, since his first meeting
with General Banzer in Brasilia, has shown objectivity along with a
positive willingness to implement an “agenda without exclusions...
with the purpose of generating a climate of mutual trust that will allow
them to deepen their mutual relations,” as stated in the Communiqué
of 1 September 2000.334 On the other hand, in those days when
speculations about what was occurring intensified in both countries, as
was often the case in international affairs in the early years of the Lagos
Administration, objective and realistic opinions were formulated by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heraldo Muñoz, who in an interview with
TV Station Canal 13 insisted that it was necessary to take constructive
steps, but stressed –at the same time– that it did not seem possible to
reach accurate conclusions. He emphasized that we should hold dialogue
“first,in regard to topics that are more immediate and that will favor,
eventually, facing the most complex issues.” He summarized the existing
atmosphere by stating that “a new stage is opening, there is a willingness
on the part of President Lagos’ Government for an open dialogue
________________________
334 “La Razon” Newspaper, La Paz, 24 March 2000.
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that includes all issues and seeks to create favorable conditions for an
understanding. This entails, in first instance, an atmosphere of trust, what
can it lead to? That remains to be seen.”335
.
[...]
______________________________________________
335 Version of the Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile regarding the interview of the Vice-Minister in
Telenoche, Channel 13, 6 September 2000.
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Annex 352
O. Pinochet de la Barra, Chile and Bolivia: How much longer! (2004),
pp. 38 - 40, 72 - 73, 95 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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[…]
He added that the Foreign Ministry of Bolivia was ready to propose “bases
and compensations”, but certainly noted something that he considered fundamental:
“Our purposes are based on aspirations and interests of such a magnitude that
nothing will ever make them disappear, neither in the present nor in the future”.
We had been taken back to ground zero, as some lawyers and judges say.
This memorandum did not produce any official effects in Santiago.
There was, however, certain awareness in regard to the fact that the port
problem prevailed over pecuniary compensations. Paulino Alfonso,
a renowned parliamentarian of those days, stated the following:45
“I believe, however, calm will not be possible in South America so long as
Bolivia does not have a port on the Pacific” –and continued– “Mr. Beltran
Mathieu told me that, acting as one of Chile’s Delegates to the Pan-American
Conference of Buenos Airesheld in 1910, his colleague and representative
from Peru, Mr. Jose Antonio Lavalle (signatory of the Ancon Treaty) told him
that in his view Peru could consent to an agreement that provides that both
countries renounce to their expectations over Tacna and Arica provinces for
the sake of Bolivia, on basis of sufficient territorial, –or of any other kind–
compensations”. Mr. Alonso ended saying, “Mr. Mathieu added that there
were Bolivian territories that were suitable as indemnification for Chile, and
referred to, if my memory does not fail, those located within Lipez province”.
The uneasiness raised by Santa Maria, Eusebio Lillo, Barros Borgoño
and others was also noticed when General Ismael Montes was in Santiago on his
way to La Paz to take office as President of the Republic of Bolivia. According to
El Mercurio newspaper, on 23 April 1913, he gathered a group of friends at Gran
Hotel and put forward his country’s enduring maritime problem. According to
that newspaper, in response and on behalf of the attendees, EliodoroYañez stated,
“that you would try to move your country’s public opinion, upon taking office of
the significant position you are about to assume, in relation to the compensations
that could be given to Chile so as to manage to have it sacrifice a part of its
territory was expected (and as a matter of fact, I had expected you to do so)”.
And in a visit to La Paz, Chile’s Ambassador Extraordinary,
Jose Miguel Echenique Gandarillas, said in August 1917,
at the presidential inauguration of Jose Gutierrez Guerra:46
____________________________________
45 Paulino Alfonso, In the face of the Tacna-Arica question, Nascimento editorial, Santiago, 1929.
46 See Note N° 32.
38
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“My Government is hoping to find, when the time comes, the means to fulfill the
most fundamental aspirations of the Bolivian and Chilean peoples”.
The problem, put in those terms, had connotations that called for the
comprehension and even sympathy of many Chileans. An article written by Agustin
Ross Edwards, Senator, diplomat and advisor of the State, in 1918 is worthy of
attention as one of those that translated the common views of certain Chileans who
saw the transfer of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia as a just solution, although there were
also those who opposed to this:47
“Would it be reasonable that Chile and Peru –he asked– take 25 years to dispute
the territory of Tacna and the port of Arica, which neither of them needs, while
Bolivia is still landlocked in the heart of the continent, lacking an access of its
own?”
He then commented, “a more reasonable attitude is needed from Chile, and
by saying reasonable this could be understood as more just towards Bolivia and more
prudent to us Chileans ourselves, inasmuch as if we manage to definitely settle the
disputes that exist among these three neighboring States, we would then be at peace
and free from complications…”
In 1919, at the margins of Mapocho River, the Bolivian Government
introduced an element that froze enthusiasm: treaty revision. This was an idea put
forward by Ismael Montes, itinerant public servant of Bolivia, in his capacities as
Minister Plenipotentiary to Paris that year, which was welcomed and materialized as
a circular by Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Gutierrez, to announce that a future
petition of revision of the 1904 Treaty would be requested, within the framework of
the ideas that had recently been transmitted by the League of Nations.
Chile sought to challenge those purposes with a Delegation that Foreign
Minister Barros sent to La Paz, headed by Emilio Bello Codesido –who had signed
the 1904 Treaty– which after eight months of meetings signed an Act on 10 January
1920; document which is not well known and that inspires to the present the Chilean
policies followed in relation to the Bolivian claims for a port in Arica.
“Bello Codesido’s brief mission –his secretary, Emilio Rodriguez Mendoza48,
would then write– was a period of appeasement and of deep and calm studies of the
questions that resulted from the war…”
This Act was signed by Bello Codesido and the new Bolivian Foreign Minister,
Carlos Gutierrez. It is not a treaty. It merely enumerates the bases for a future treaty
and records the considerations put forward by Chile and Bolivia in regard to the
matter.
______________________
47 Chilean magazine, September 1918, Santiago.
48 Emilio Rodriguez Mendoza, As if this had occurred now, Nascimentoeditorial, Santiago. 39
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The fundamental aspect, in my view, is the assurance that the Peace and
Friendship Treaty of 1904 does not oppose to Bolivia’s aspiration. The Treaty is not
revisable and the concession to Bolivia –outside from the scope of application of this
Treaty– must be compensated by that country.
“Chile has the best desire…to seek an agreement that allows Bolivia to satisfy
its aspiration to obtain an own outlet to the Pacific, independently of the definite
situation created by the stipulations of the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 20 October
1904”.49
I stated that Chile’s current policy is based on the said Act, the most important
points of which are the following: granting of an access to the sea to the north of Arica
port and compensation by Bolivia. The agreement bases IV and V refer to the first of
these aspects:
“IV: The situation created by the Treaty of 1904, the interests located in that
zone and the security of its northern frontier, required Chile to preserve the maritime
coast that is indispensable to it; however, for the purpose of founding the future union
of the two countries on solid ground, Chile is willing to seek that Bolivia acquires
its own access to the sea, ceding to it an important part of that zone in the north of
Arica and of the railway line which is within the territories subject to the plebiscite
stipulated in the Treaty of Ancon”.
More than a vague “seek[ing] that Bolivia acquires”, Chile assumed a
commitment under Article V:
“V. Independently of what was established in the Treaty of Peace of 1904, Chile
accepts to initiate new negotiations directed at satisfying the aspiration of the friendly
country, subject to the victory of Chile in the plebiscite”.
In regard to the compensation Bolivia would have to make –aspect which
evidently completely separates the negotiation from a revision of the 1904 Treaty–
there is a remarkable assertion made by Bolivian Minister Carlos Gutierrez in the Act:
“That the cession of Arica to Bolivia would not entail a unilateral advantage
in favor of this country, but a concession that should be compensated for, taking into
account the mutual interests and ensuring an even more stable situation iof cordiality”.
___________
49 Oscar Espinoza Moraga, Bolivia and the Sea, Nascimento editorial. Santiago, 1965.
40
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[...]
2. The Valdes-Alexander-Pinochet de la Barra talks of August 1965
Openness had been perceived on part of the recently appointed Barrientos
Administration in New York and President Frei Montalva instructed Minister Valdes,
in August 1965, to continue negotiating in Santiago.
Undersecretary Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, who had followed Bernstein in
office, and the Bolivian Ambassador to Madrid, Alfredo Alexander Jordan, who had
been sent to Santiago for these purposes, took part in the first stage of this process. In
the last part of this process, took part the Foreign Minister of Chile.
On Saturday 14 August, we were received by President Frei, who wished to
know which the points of disagreement were, inasmuch as relations between both
countries were of high importance to him. He heard us, got acquainted with the
difficulties that had still not been overcome and asked Minister Valdes to take part in
this process.
I do not forget the words uttered by the President when saying good-bye to
Alexander (who is actually my father-in-law): “we must resume relations the soonest
possible…” and after a brief pause, “Sir, if it were up to me, Bolivia should have a
sovereign access to the sea…”
With these words, President Frei Montalva seemed to agree with the view of
President Jorge Montt in 1895, Gabriel Gonzalez Videla in 1949 and General Augusto
Pinochet in 1977.
On 16, 17 and 18 August, the meetings were continued in the dining room of
my house, far from the eyes and ears of the press, and Ambassador Alexander sent to
La Paz the texts that had been agreed to which, with certain variations, addressed the
matters discussed in New
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York, with an emphasis on border integration, an idea that had encouraged Presidents
Ibañez and Paz Estenssoro, and which President Frei was increasingly pushing
forward towards the creation of a Development Pole.
The Minutes 1 and 2 drafted then were not approved by Barrientos
and were only accepted by Colonel Joaquin Zenteno –the Bolivian Minister
of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the Valdes-Alexander-Pinochet de la Barra
negotiation served to initially outline a solution to the Lauca River problem
and to promote the implementation of the Sica Sica-Arica oil pipeline.
3. The Valdes-Siles talks of October 1966
The limited outcomes achieved did not discourage the Government of
Chile and, taking advantage once again of the XXI UN General Assembly,
a new encounter took place in October 1966, at the seat of that international
organ, with the participation of, on the one hand, the Vice-President of Bolivia,
Luis Adolfo Siles, accompanied by Undersecretary Walter Montenegro, and,
on the other, Minister Valdes and Ambassador Guillermo Lagos.
While it is true that the Bolivian Government did not cease to take its
claim to international organs, an interest not to disregard regional integration,
especially through Arica –a complex issue for President Frei Montalva– could
be perceived.
Asides from Chile’s reiterated emphasis on resuming relations and
seeking a solution to the Lauca River question, the two Parties showed interest
in the establishment of a Joint Economic Cooperation Commission. Discussions
were held in regard to the importance of securing Peru’s cooperation in order
to achieve the amplest and most efficient realization of the objectives of
development and economic integration, mainly within the region.
4. The new demarches carried out by the Chilean Government from
1968 to 1970
Simultaneously to these confidential encounters, President Rene Barrientos
upheld a policy of denunciation and appeals to the United Nations and the
Organization of American States, in an attempt to raise the issue to the
international sphere.
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NEGOTIATIONS DURING
THE GOVERNMENTS OF LA CONCERTACION
The first Government of La Concertacion, initiated in 1990, is marked by a
Chilean-Peruvian rapprochement in order to resolve the pending points of the Treaty
of 1929. As will be recalled, these points are related to the Peruvian use of site seven
of the northern dock of Arica, the customs agency and the servitude of the Arica–
Tacna railway.
In the meantime, relations between Chile and Bolivia were still ruptured, which
did not prevent Presidents Patricio Aylwin and Jaime Paz Zamora from promoting
consular contacts and negotiating an important “economic complementation”
agreement, signed in Santa Cruz de la Sierra on 5 April 1993 by Foreign Ministers
Enrique Silva Cimma of Chile and Ronald MacLean of Bolivia, taking advantage of
the trip to the Summit Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Rio de Janeiro.
The Chilean Chancellor expressed to the journalists something that would be
repeated by our country during those Governments: there are no issues that cannot
be addressed between the two Governments and the case of [Bolivia’s] landlocked
condition is one of them. These are difficult issues that we do not avoid. Let us move
forward. When the time comes, they will be addressed with absolute sincerity. What
will then be called a “dialogue without exclusions” has begun. Chancellor MacLean
for his part addresses directly one issue: that of “territorial compensations” by
Bolivia, whose interpretation was not always clear, at least for the public opinion.
In an interview made by “El Mercurio” Newspaper on the eve of that meeting,
he declared “We have been willing to do it and we could be [willing].” And as for
enclaves without a corridor: “the definition of the problem is changing; the solution
must be functional, operative and useful for all.”101
[…]
__________________________________
101 El Mercurio Newspaper, 5 April 1993. El Deber Newspaper, Santa Cruz, 6 April 1993.
95
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Annex 353
L. Maira and J. Murillo de la Rocha, The Long-standing Conflict
between Chile and Bolivia. Two Perspectives (2004), pp. 138 - 139, 151
- 152 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
1276
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[...]
What’s more, President Banzer, in a gesture of particular consideration
towards Peru determined that the content of the Bolivian proposal be submitted
not only by a Special Envoy but also explained with as much detail as necessary
to the authorities of Torre Tagle. To that end –as described in Charaña book–
“As the Bolivian Ambassador to Santiago, Guillermo Gutierrez V. M.,
submitted, on 26 August, the Bolivian proposal to Foreign Minister Carvajal in
Santiago, Ambassador Javier Murillo de la Rocha, Under-Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, travelled to Lima in a confidential mission to request a meeting with
the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel de la Flor –meeting that was
held in the office occupied by the President of the Ministerial Conference of
the non-aligned movement, which had been inaugurated the day before”.
And continues, “The Peruvian Foreign Minister welcomed the
Bolivian Delegation integrated by Ambassador Murillo de la Rocha and
the Head of the Bolivian mission authorized in Peru, Ambassador Julio
Sanjines Goitia. A few minutes after their talks begun and when Murillo
was explaining the reason of his visit, he was interrupted by a public
official and, after talking with the Foreign Minister, the latter apologized to
Murillo and Sanjines and said he had to leave for the Government Palace
immediately and that he would meet with the diplomats in the afternoon”.
Clearly, Minister de La Flor Valle, seemed, from the beginning of
the meeting, prey of an unusual distraction and heard impatiently and with
an apparent lack of interest the information brought by the Ambassador
in special mission, who managed to transmit President Banzer’s message
and emphasize that, given the characteristics of the Bolivian proposal, the
consultation that Chile was to make to Peru –in compliance with the Protocol
of 1929– had already been scheduled and that, naturally, Bolivia was expecting
a positive response from Peru, by virtue of the deep ties of friendship and
solidarity that had always existed between the Bolivian and Peruvian peoples.
At almost the same time, the Bolivian Foreign
Minister gave Ambassador Llosa the document containing
the proposal. The Peruvian diplomat showed no surprise.
Ambassador Murillo, in view of the circumstances and after having
met senior officials of the Torre Tagle Administration, namely, Carlos
Garcia Bedoya and Luis Marchand, stayed in Lima until the next day,
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waiting to be able to meet the Peruvian Foreign Minister. No
call was made and Murillo de la Rocha returned to La Paz.
The tribulations of Foreign Minister de La Flor were justified
because, precisely on the day of the meeting, the coup d’état that overthrew
President Velasco Alvarado took place in Peru, and General Francisco
Morales Bermudez rose to power as the new Peruvian Head of State.
On the other hand, back in Santiago, Foreign Minister Carvajal’s
distress over the submission of the Bolivian proposal to his Peruvian
counterpart was unjustified, for that did not breach the Protocol of 1929,
bearing in mind that the Government of Chile had just received the guidelines
proposed by Bolivia and would take four months to utter a response.
In fact, the response was given on 19 December 1975. In the
substance, the Chilean Government expressed its williness to consider,
“the cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coast, connected to
Bolivian territory by a strip of equally sovereign territory”. The resulting
agreement had to be entered into within the framework of “mutual
advantages and the current reality, and would contain no innovation to
the Peace, Friendship and Commerce Treaty” signed on 20 October 1904.
The response went on to fix the delimitations from the north of
Arica to Concordia Line and included the maritime territory found within
the parallels of the terminal points of the coast that would be ceded
within its area (territorial sea, economic zone and continental platform).
The cession described would be “subject to the condition of a
simultaneous exchange of territories, that is, Chile would at the same time
receive in return for what it was handing, a compensation area equivalent
to at least the area of territory and sea ceded to Bolivia. The territory could
either be continuous or discontinuous. This exchange became the first edge
[point of disagreement].
“The Government of Bolivia would authorize Chile to utilize
the entirety of the Lauca River waters”. The second edge [point
of disagreement. The territory would be demilitarized. The third.
Enclaves, on the other hand, were ruled out, “inasmuch as the cession
of territory to the south of the boundary indicated, affecting in any
way the territorial continuity of our country, is unacceptable”.
The rest of the aspects entailed no difficulties; i.e. the purchase
of the existing constructions under a compensation cost, […]
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the complementation of our economies and societies. This analysis should not
be restricted to identifying the problems, but to, specially, discuss the ways to
overcome them”.
The Reply and corresponding Rejoinder were thereafter, as if could not
have been otherwise, submitted. The former insisted, as always, on the fact that
there were no pending issues between both countries, inasmuch as everything
had been resolved freely and satisfactorily under a Treaty, which is intangible.
The latter recalled the conditions in which the said treaty had been signed and
its consequences in regard to Bolivia.
In the following Assembly, held in Guatemala, the custom was repeated;
at night, however, at the invitation of Foreign Minister Insulza, a second meeting
was held between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at the headquarters of the
Colombian Embassy. This meeting was held in a more relaxed atmosphere. The
recriminations both countries’ representatives had made against each other in
the Margarita encounter were not repeated. More than a year had passed since
that encounter. In conciliating terms, the Chilean Foreign Minister offered to
transmit to his Bolivian counterpart some notes he himself would draft, putting
forward ideas on basis of which it could be possible to –perhaps– commence a
new stage.
The notes, however, never come into being. Foreign Minister Insulza
was appointed to a different Ministerial post. A young man, of a diplomatic
lineage, i.e. Juan Gabriel Valdes, –son of former Foreign Minister and Senator
Gabriel Valdes and who had always shown a favorable attitude towards
Bolivia– took office of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. A new perspective was
indeed being opened.
What was complex in reestablishing normal relations with Chile was
not only a matter of leaving behind past grievances, but to also amend the
present realities to open up a different future.
2000
Two analysis and assessment meetings were held between
the Foreign Ministers, in Rio de Janeiro and Havana. These resulted
in an agreement to –in beginning a new century– it was necessary
to seek for new ways to reestablish dialogue between Bolivia and
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Chile, directed towards resolving all the political and financial problems
that the two countries face, under the condition that they be discussed with
no exclusions.
This commitment was adopted and rehashed in the Murillo-Valdes
Joint Communique after two work sessions held in Algarve, Portugal, on 22
February 2000. The Communique highlighted that, “the Foreign Ministers
have resolved to establish a working agenda that incorporates, without any
exception, the questions that are essential to their bilateral relations, with
the intention to contribute to the establishment of an atmosphere of trust
that must govern their dialogue”. Emphasis is made, also, on the fact that
on this occasion, [the Foreign Minister]addressed with a clear constructive
will and with the intention above mentioned, all issues that are of interests
to both countries, without exclusions”.
The Algarve Document emphasizes also the fact that “the development
of this dialogue will be directed towards overcoming the differences that
have obstructed Bolivia and Chile’s full integration, with the firm intention
of seeking and reaching solutions to the questions that affect their political
and financial relations”.
After thirteen years (1987), the basis to reopen dialogue under the
terms that respond to a different vision were established. An agreement to
establish a common agenda to include in it issues of fundamental interest,
which –as it could not have been otherwise– the maritime issue, inasmuch
as there was no other important issue in the relations between Bolivia and
Chile. This idea was also put forward in the Algarve meeting, and the
Foreign Ministers agreed that a common agenda that excluded this vital
issue could not be established. They decided, furthermore, to confer the
all-inclusive dialogue a transcendental content: to settle the questions that
affect the political and financial relations between Bolivia and Chile, with
the purpose of reaching a full binational integration. Undoubtedly, all
elements to anticipate a more ample perspective.
Those who are familiarized with the negotiation process and
diplomatic language are aware that more has been said and agreed to than
what is recorded in public declarations.
In fact, the content of the Bolivian proposal put forward in Algarve,
coordinated with the Consul General in Santiago, Gustavo Fernandez […]
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Annex 354
A. Violand Alcazar, Sovereign Return to the Sea. A Frustrated Negotiation
(2004), pp. 286 - 287 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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[...]
The reactions of protest in Bolivia against Chile worsened from
the daily press, to the political parties, to professional societies and to
civic committees. Those who requested that the 1904 Treaty should
be denounced were not lacking, and neither those who demanded that
relations with Chile be broken off.
El Mercurio newspaper published two articles: one entitled
“Undesirable agitation” recorded that the exchange of territories was a
sine qua non condition of the negotiations with Bolivia, suggesting that
the Chilean Foreign Ministry should publish a white book on the course
of negotiations; the second article affirmed that former Ambassador
Gutierrez Vea Murguia was a supporter of the exchange of territories.
Foreign Minister Adriazola, attending the UN General Assembly
held in New York, stated on 26 September that the delays in the achievement
of a solution to Bolivia’s maritime issue put the good faith of the
negotiations to the test and risked a denial of the “intended solidarities”,
and expressed his hope that Chile would obtain Peru’s consent to make
possible a solution that satisfies the expectations of the Bolivian nation
and the demands that justice imposes upon the contemporary world.
Adriazola and Foreign Minister Carvajal had lunch together at Waldorf
Astoria Hotel in an attempt to correct the situation.
But, on the next day, the ever-present Chilean newspaper criticized
the Bolivian Foreign Minister for “having complained before the United
Nations”, assuring that Chile does not consent to being taken to an
international forum to discuss the Bolivian maritime aspirations.
On 29 September, forcefully, the Foreign Ministers of Chile, Peru
and Bolivia, Patricio Carvajal, Jose de la Puente and Oscar Adriazola met
in New York and agreed to appoint special representatives to task them
with pushing forward
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the negotiations. El Mercurio intervened to publish that the tripartite
agreement to appoint special representatives “did not mean that the Chilean-
Bolivian negotiation has become a tripartite negotiation”. The Peruvian
Foreign Minister affirmed that “Bolivia and Chile must reach an agreement
on sea access before Peru considers the possibility of giving its consent”.
Meanwhile, General Pinochet, who was attending a social
reception to which I was also invited, looked for me to ask me to transmit
to General Banzer his desire to meet with him in the border, adding that
it would be a meeting intended to calm both countries’ public opinions,
although, obviously, such encounter did not entail substantial progress in
the negotiation itself. The reply was clear: if no substantial progress will
be made, there is no reason to hold a presidential encounter in the border.
Mario Gutierrez, Ambassador to the United Nations, spoke of the
two faces of La Moneda Government and Mario Rolon, Ambassador
to Venezuela held that “Chile’s international policy seemed incoherent,
inconsistent and it responds to colonialist desires”. La Moneda
Government complained.
On 15 October, Foreign Minister Adriazola made an
announcement to the press: “The decision has been made to restitute
our Ambassador to Santiago”. The Bolivian press received this
announcement as a reaction taken by the Bolivian Government in the face
of the unfortunate statements made by Foreign Minister Carvajal.
Although President Banzer declared in Cochabamba that having
Ambassador Violand return to Santiago did not hinder relations
between Chile and Bolivia, the instruction I received for a “hastened
return, but contemplating formal standards”, expressed the opposite.
A phrase uttered by the Chilean Foreign Minister at an
improper time, had hastened the termination of the negotiation. I
always had the impression that Admiral Carvajal hide an ailment
that tortured him, despite his direct and often harsh expressions
opposed to his kindness and perfect nobleman manners. In the […]
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Annex 355
Minutes of the I Meeting of the Bolivia-Chile Working Group on Bilateral
Affairs, 9 August 2005
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 116 to its Memorial)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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MINUTES OF THE I SESSION OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
BILATERAL AFFAIRS BOLIVIA – CHILE
As agreed at the meeting of Vice-Chancellors held last June, the Working
Group on Bilateral Affairs met in La Paz, Republic of Bolivia, on 8 and 9
August 2005, for the purpose of exchanging proposals and moving forward in
the establishment of a common and comprehensive agenda without exclusions.
The Delegation of Bolivia was presided by Minister William Torres
Armas, Director General of Boundaries and the Delegation of Chile was
presided by Ambassador Roberto Ibarra Garcia, Director of South America.
The list of Delegations of both countries is attached to these minutes.
The Bolivian Delegation welcomed the Chilean Delegation and reiterated
its interest in addressing the agenda without exclusions, highlighting
the search for coincidences with the Chilean Party in the same sense.
The Chilean Delegation thanked the warm welcome, highlighting
the great responsibility of relaunching the bilateral agenda at the level of
Presidents and Ministers, and coincided with Chile in the importance of this
work for the consideration for the future Governments of both countries.
Having agreed the program and the methodology
of work, the topics of the agenda were addressed.
Silala Issue
Both Delegations agreed to continue the work agreed upon within the
framework of the Working Group on the Silala issue, and to hold a next meeting
during the first half of September in Chile, in a place to be defined, coinciding
with the willingness of finding a satisfactory solution for both Parties.
Free transit
Enabling the Port of Iquique:
The Bolivian Delegation reiterated its interest in the improvement of
the enabling of the Port of Iquique for the free transit regime as soon
as possible. The Chilean Delegation noted that every effort is being
made to achieve this, in order to allow an optimal operation under
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this regime, taking into account the characteristics of the
port. Both Delegations highlighted the positive results
of the joint Customs exercise carried out last 3 August.
Pilot Plan to implement the agreed customs procedure:
During the month of August, Chile will confirm the date of completion
of a new customs exercise, continuous and prolonged, which as a
pilot plan was agreed to be carried out for a month in the Port of
Iquique, the coming October has been proposed as a tentative date.
Free transit of Bolivian cargo:
It was agreed that the Working Group on Free Transit should continue its work
on issues related to the development of free transit, to analyze, among other
matters, the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism and to renew the
petition to the SIT Board for the elaboration of the new Operational Manual,
in the terms in which the Working Group has been dealing with this topic.
With reference to IMO cargo, the Chilean Delegation proposed a seminar
and pointed out that for a better scheduling of dispatches in special cases,
negotiations will be carried out with its maritime and port authorities.
Physical Integration
It was agreed that the Joint Technical Group on Infrastructure (GTM
for its acronym in Spanish) should be convened to study its timely
approved agenda, regarding the transport infrastructure between the
two countries. It was also agreed that the GTM should include in its
agenda the topic of railway connections between Chile and Bolivia.
The Chilean Delegation will present an assessment
of the Arica-La Paz railroad at the next GTM meeting.
With regard to the Agreement on International Land Transport of the
Southern Cone Countries (ATIT for its acronym in Spanish), the Chilean Delegation
proposed resuming meetings of the competent enforcement Organisms.
The Bolivian Delegation indicated that it will consult the Vice
Ministry of Transport. It was agreed that appropriate consultations
should be held in order to establish an early meeting of those agencies.
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Regarding the authorization of Milestone LX, it was agreed that this topic
will be studied in the framework of the meeting of the Joint Technical
Group, taking into account the aspects of infrastructure and user demand.
Border Facilitation
Pilot Plan for the circulation of tourists with Identity Card:
The Chilean Delegation proposed to indefinitely extend the use of
the Identity Card for the circulation of tourists between both countries. For
its part, the Bolivian Delegation stated that it should conduct the respective
consultations with its institutions that operate at the border, stating
that it is important to carry out an evaluation at the end of the Pilot Plan.
The Bolivian Delegation undertook to study the possibility of applying this
exercise to all authorized border crossings, including entry from third countries.
Both Delegations welcomed the implementation of
the Pilot Plan for the use of the Identity Card for the transit
of tourists from Chile and Bolivia that began on August 1st.
Exclusive Immigration Card:
Both Delegations agreed to continue addressing this
issue at the next meeting of the Border Committee.
Integrated Border Controls:
The Chilean Delegation undertook to accelerate the
legislative approval of the Integrated Controls Agreement. There was
agreement to carry out new simulation exercises, if possible before
the next meeting of the Border Committee scheduled for the end of
September, preferably Ollagüe-Estacion Avaroa and Colchane-Pisiga.
The Bolivian Delegation requested that these exercises, which have been
carried out for several years, should become permanent exercises, even before the
ratification of the Agreement on Integrated Border Controls by both Congresses.
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The Chilean Delegation reported on the progress in the implementation
of the new border complexes in Chungara and Colchane, which will begin
construction in 2006. The Bolivian Delegation announced that the new border
complexes in Pisiga and Tambo Quemado will be completed by the end of 2005.
Consular Affairs:
Regarding the reduction of visa fees, the Bolivian Delegation carried
out internal consultations and pointed out that this matter is subject to studies.
On the other hand, the Chilean Delegation recalled the Note delivered
in due course to the Bolivian Foreign Ministry requesting the exemption,
based on reciprocity, of the collection of consular fees in the formalities for
legalization of Chilean documents already legalized by the Bolivian Consulates.
Border Cooperation
Border Surveillance:
With regard to cooperation on border surveillance, the two Delegations
agreed to promote a meeting between the top police officers of the Chilean
Regions and the Bolivian border departments, preferably in October 2005.
Control of illicit drug trafficking:
The Bolivian Delegation asked to wait for the next appointment
of the competent authority in the matter, in order to finalize the VII
Meeting of the Joint Commission of the Agreement on Control,
Supervision and Suppression of Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances and Essential Chemicals and Precursors.
The Chilean Delegation presented the draft Agreement
on the Exchange of Criminal Background Information for
Crimes of Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic
Substances and Money Laundering associated with these offenses.
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Border Development
Cooperation between border communities:
Both Delegations reported on the preliminary contacts between
representatives of the Social Investment Funds of both countries,
who will seek to carry out exploratory work aimed at building a
cooperation agenda in the area of border municipalities and communities.
The Chilean Delegation proposed the holding of a workshop with the support of
international cooperation, where common interests of the border communities
of both countries could be identified. They also said that in the coming weeks,
a Chilean expert will visit Bolivia to study a common agenda. The Bolivian
Delegation will make the respective consultations to participate in this event.
Health issues:
The Delegations agreed on the need to promote cooperation in
health matters, in accordance with the proposals that could be submitted
by the Ministries of Health and those already presented within the
framework of the Border Committee, and also proposed the holding of
a technical meeting regarding these matters. For its part, the Chilean
Delegation presented the Internship Program of the Ministry of Health
with the aim of encouraging the incorporation of Bolivian professionals.
Cooperation in Education, Culture, Science and Technology
Both Delegations agreed on the need to deepen cooperation
in the field of Education and Culture, as well as in the Scientific and
Technological field. To this end, the Working Group agreed to study the
establishment of a Joint Commission on Education, Culture, Science and
Technology, which could be installed in September on the occasion of
the visit to the city of La Paz by the Minister of Education of Chile. This
Committee would be composed of panels specialized in each of these
areas and would function under the Political Consultations Mechanism.
Agreement on Protection and Restoration of Cultural Heritage:
Both Delegations agreed to continue studies of the Draft Agreement
on the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Heritage Goods between
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Bolivia and Chile, for which purpose the Chilean
Delegation submitted a counterproposal on the subject.
The Bolivian Delegation expressed its interest in the establishment of a
specialized group dealing with the protection of the intangible cultural heritage.
Cooperation and exchange between cultural managers and/or museum
directors:
The Chilean Delegation expressed its interest in holding a meeting in the city
of Iquique with cultural managers and/or museum directors from both countries.
Both Delegations pointed out that this topic could be
addressed during the next meeting of Ministers of Education.
Audiovisual collaboration:
The Chilean Delegation reiterated its proposal to sign a Memorandum of
Understanding on Audiovisual Collaboration between CONACINE of Bolivia
and the Council of Arts and Audiovisual Industry of Chile with the purpose
of promoting the respective film industries. In this context, copies of the
Agreements signed with other countries shall be transmitted as soon as possible.
Cooperation between Diplomatic Academies:
The Chilean Delegation expressed its interest in deepening
the relationship between the Diplomatic Academies of both
countries, for which purpose it proposed, in a date to be agreed,
the visit of the Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Chile.
In this regard, it was noted that the respective Directors of Diplomatic
Academies will meet on the occasion of the meeting between Directors
of Diplomatic Academies scheduled for September 28th in Lima.
Meeting between Civil Aeronautical Authorities:
It was agreed that a meeting should be held between the civil aeronautical
authorities of both countries, for which it would first be necessary to
exchange information on the topics of interest to each of the Parties.
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Meeting of Ministers of Education:
Both Delegations expressed the importance of holding a technical meeting
prior to the end of August to prepare an Agenda to be discussed during the visit
of the Chilean Minister of Education to Bolivia, scheduled for the second half
of next September.
Meeting of Historians:
The annual frequency of the meeting of historians of Bolivia and Chile was
confirmed, being agreed that the next meeting will take place in the city of
Iquique in 2006, with date to be defined.
Bilingual intercultural education:
The Bolivian Delegation expressed its interest in including the indigenous
dimension in the educational and cultural aspects of the work of this Commission,
as well as the creation of a joint bilingual education program.
Work Program for the Deepening of the Agreement of Economic
Complementation Nº 22, Commercial, Economic, Investment and Tourism
Promotion.
In accordance with what has been agreed to with the Vice-Minister of Economic
Relations and Foreign Trade of Bolivia and the Director of International
Economic Relations of Chile, at the meeting held in Santiago on 19 July 2005,
both Delegations ratified the holding of the meeting on trade issues to deepen
the Economic Complementation Agreement Nº 22 between Bolivia and Chile.
The Chilean Delegation stated its intention to promote the complementarity of
both economies and establish a work plan for bilateral cooperation.
This meeting will be held on 17 and 18 August 2005, in the city of La Paz.
Both Delegations agreed that on this occasion the following working groups
will be established, which will have representatives from both countries and in
which they will discuss and define actions and mechanisms to develop, in the
future, the trade agenda based on the principles that might be eventually agreed
upon:
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• Commercial table: It will include trade of
goods, trade of services and agroforestry trade.
• Customs table: Will deal with the effective
implementation of the Agreement in force.
• Table on phyto-zoosanitary aspects: Conformed by SENASAG and SAG.
• Table on promotion that will include the treatment
of economic complementation and investment.
• Table on tourism and transportation: With the participation of the
Vice-Ministry of Tourism of Bolivia and the National Tourism Service.
• Table on cooperation: With the participation
of the responsible agencies of both countries.
Programmed Tourism:
The Delegation of Chile asked to consider the permit
modality for vehicles with lower capacity in closed circuits,
as proposed at the last meeting of the Border Committee.
Agreement to avoid Double Taxation:
Chile emphasized on the advisability of studying the feasibility
of establishing an agreement to avoid double taxation between
the two countries, for which the Chilean Delegation undertook to
submit a proposal at the meeting of August 17th and 18th in La Paz.
Business Advisory Committee (CASE):
Both Delegations reported on the contacts made with the
business sector with a view to bringing together the Business Advisory
Committee defined in the Economic Complementation Agreement – ACE
22 on the occasion of the meeting of August 17th and 18th in La Paz.
Customs Cooperation Agreement:
The Bolivian Delegation stated that although this Agreement is
in force, the exchange of information between the Customs of the
two countries has been discontinuous. Both Delegations expressed
their interest in the effective implementation of this Agreement, for
which they indicated that they will address this issue at the meeting
to deepen the Economic Complementation Agreement – ACE 22.
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Coordination of natural disasters and seminar on peace operations:
Both Delegations agreed to move forward in the
establishment of a coordination mechanism for natural disasters.
Regarding peace operations, the Chilean Delegation referred
to the possibility of holding a seminar on the subject. In this regard,
note was taken of the interest of the Delegation of Bolivia to analyze
in more depth the variable of the civil component in these activities.
Demining process at the border:
The beginning of the demining process in the Chilean-Bolivian border
area was highlighted on 21 July 2005, with the presence of the Defense Ministers
of Chile and Bolivia and the respective Commanders in Chief of the Army. The
Chilean Delegation reiterated its best disposition regarding this complex process,
which is being fulfilled in the context of the international commitments in force.
Information Exchange and Coordination in the prevention and control of
child and white-slave trafficking:
Regarding the prevention of child and white-slave trafficking, and
in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention,
the Delegation of Bolivia expressed its interest in addressing this
issue in order to analyze the possible signing of a Memorandum.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
The Bolivian Delegation issued some proposals and requested
joint studies with Chile to take advantage of the legal regime
established in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The Delegation of Chile undertook to carry out the respective
internal consultations and to respond as soon as possible.
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Other Topics
Coordination on the subject of Human Rights:
The Delegations agreed to coordinate positions between Bolivia
and Chile in the MERCOSUR Forum of Consultation and Political
Coordination, and establish a dialogue between the competent Departments
of both Foreign Ministries, in order to schedule a work agenda.
Convention on Social Security:
With regard to the Agreement on Social Security, the Delegations
agreed to coordinate through the Foreign Ministries the visit of a Chilean
specialist, as far as possible in October, to proceed with the exchange
of information on the subject, proposing a meeting on the matter.
Agreement to allow the Spouses of the Consular,
Administrative and Technical Personnel to work:
The Bolivian Delegation expressed its interest in signing
this Agreement, which could be done on the occasion of the next
meeting of the Political Consultations Mechanism, for which it
will submit a text for consideration by the Chilean Government.
Inter-parliamentarian contacts:
Both Delegations appreciated the importance of interparliamentarian
contacts. In this regard, the Chilean Delegation recalled
the invitation made in due course to the President of the Bolivian Senate.
Situation of the former AADAA workers:
Both Delegations agreed to hold a meeting of Legal Directors of both
Foreign Ministries, which will be held in La Paz, preferably in September,
to discuss the situation of the former Chilean workers of AADAA.
Air transport:
The Delegation of Chile reiterated its willingness to
negotiate a broad and deep bilateral agreement with Bolivia
regarding open skies. The Delegation of Bolivia, for its part,
agreed to encourage a meeting between the competent authorities.
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Next Meeting of the Political Consultations Mechanism:
Both Delegations agreed to hold the XIV Meeting of the
Political Consultations Mechanism, on 4 and 5 October 2005, in the
city of Iquique, preceded by a meeting of the Technical Delegations.
The Bolivian Delegation expressed its interest
in institutionalizing an intermediary body between the
Working Groups and the Political Consultations Mechanism.
The Bolivian Delegation said that the Action Plan agreed upon between
the two countries is a sign of both countries’ willingness to move forward
together and, from that perspective, it stated that this Plan is a positive step
in the process of consolidating an agenda without exclusions with Chile,
in which the Bolivian Delegation proposes to include the maritime issue.
Signed in the city of La Paz, on the 9th day of August, 2005.
[Signature] [Signature]
On behalf of Bolivia On behalf of Chile
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List of the Bolivian Delegation
1. William Torres Armas
Director General of Borders
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
2. Victor Rico Frontaura
Consul General of Bolivia in Santiago
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
3. Edgar Pinto Tapia
Director General
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
4. Marco Antonio Vidaurre Noriega
Director General of Bilateral Relations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
5. Isabel Cadima Paz
Director of America
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
6. Javier Jimenez
Director of Latin-American Integration
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
7. Yuri Arce
Chile’s Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
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List of the Chilean Delegation
1. Ambassador Roberto Ibarra Garcia
Director of South America
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2. Ambassador Francisco Perez Walker
Consul General of Chile in Bolivia
3. Ambassador Maria Teresa Infante
National Director of State Borders and Boundaries
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4. Mr. Anselmo Pommes
Director of Borders
National Office of State Borders and Boundaries
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5. Mr. Enrique Ceppi
Director of the ALADI Department
General Office of International Economic Relations
6. MC Patricio Victoriano
Deputy Consul General of Chile in La Paz
7. Economic MC Enrique Soler
Commercial Office Director
8. TS Andres Aguilar
Bolivia’s Office, South America Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Annex 356
Minutes of the XIV Meeting of the Political Consultations Mechanism,
6 October 2005
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 117 to its Memorial)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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MINUTES OF THE XIV MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS
MECHANISM CHILE-BOLIVIA
On this date, the XIV Meeting of the Political Consultations Mechanism
Chile-Bolivia was held, presided by Chile’s Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Cristian Barros and Vice-Chancellor of Bolivia, Mr. Hernando Velasco.
This meeting was preceded by a meeting of the Bilateral Affairs Group, held in
the same city the day before.
The list of Delegations and the agenda of the Political Consultations
Mechanism are attached to the present Minutes.
The Chilean Delegation welcomed the Bolivian Delegation and stressed the
interest of the Government of Chile in moving forward in the strengthening of
the bilateral relationship so as to leave a good base for the next Governments
of both countries.
The Bolivian Delegation thanked the warm welcome, highlighting
the recent bilateral meetings at the level of Presidents and Ministers, and the
coincidence with Chile in laying down the foundations of the relationship
between the two countries for future Governments.
Having agreed the program and the methodology of work, the topics of the
agenda were addressed.
Silala Issue
On this subject, both Delegations exchanged ideas on how to make
progress on shared water resources, the planned technical studies on the Silala
that will be detailed shortly, and on the scheme by which its utilization will be
agreed upon for mutual benefit.
Both Delegations agreed on the interest in finding a satisfactory framework for
both countries regarding this issue in a friendly spirit, in the context of what the
Presidents of both countries have talked about.
The results of the planned studies should be an important element for
governmental decision-making processes and for a definitive solution of the
issue.
Free transit
Enabling the Port of Iquique:
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The Bolivian Delegation reiterated its interest in the improvement of the
enabling of the Port of Iquique for the free transit regime as soon as possible.
The Chilean Delegation reiterated its Government’s willingness to enable it
for the free transit regime. Both Delegations highlighted the beginning of a
continuous and prolonged customs exercise that, as part of the Pilot Plan, was
agreed to take place in that port, in accordance with the agreements reached
at the V and VI Meetings of the Working Group on Free Transit and the
coordination carried out by Customs of both countries.
In order to complete the enabling of Iquique port, the Chilean Delegation
proposed to establish a timetable conducive to that end, so that the complex
internal situations presented by the process can be resolved in advance. The
Bolivian Delegation expressed its interest in knowing the scope and content
of this timetable as soon as possible, understanding that it will lead to the full
enabling of the Port of Iquique.
The Chilean Delegation also stressed the need to preserve the right of
option for the Bolivian user in terms of being able to benefit from the mode
of transportation in transit towards third countries, as provided for in the
Agreement on International Land Transport of the Southern Cone Countries
(ATIT for its acronym in Spanish).
For its part, the Bolivian Delegation stated that the improvement of the
enabling of the Port of Iquique should be governed by the Treaty of 1904 and
the Complementary Agreements that established the free transit regime and the
presence of the Bolivian Customs Agent in duly enabled Chilean ports. It also
reiterated that the mode of transport provided for in the ATIT is an instrument
compatible with that regime.
Free transit of Bolivian cargo:
Both Delegations agreed on the advisability of holding a new meeting of
the Working Group on Free Transit in the city of Arica, if possible in November,
in order to discuss various issues related to this matter. The Delegation of
Bolivia emphasized the desirability of establishing a Dispute Settlement
Mechanism within that Group. Both Delegations agreed to include in the
agenda of the meeting the renewal of the mandate of the ad hoc Commission
for the elaboration of the new Operational Manual and the handling of IMO
loads.
Physical Integration
It was agreed that this issue and that of the authorization of Landmark
LX be dealt with at the next meeting of the Border Committee scheduled for
October 17th and 18th in La Paz.
The Chilean Delegation will present at that meeting an evaluation of the
operation of the Arica-La Paz railway.
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Border Facilitation
Pilot Plan for the circulation of tourists with Identity Card:
Both Delegations agreed on the need to formalize bilaterally the
indefinite extension of the use of the Identity Card for the circulation of
tourists between both countries agreed by the Presidents of Bolivia and Chile
at the South American Summit of Nations. The Delegations agreed that this
formalization should be carried out as expeditiously as possible.
The evaluation of this initiative, in the Minutes of the I Meeting of the Chile-
Bolivia Bilateral Group, will be carried out at the next meeting of the Border
Committee.
Tourism
Both Delegations agreed to hold a Meeting of Tourist Operators, with
the participation of tourism, transport and public works authorities from both
countries, in the city of San Pedro de Atacama, on November 17th and 18th,
whose agenda will be detailed in the next meeting of the Border Committee.
Exclusive Immigration Card:
Both Delegations agreed to continue addressing this issue at the next meeting
of the Border Committee.
Integrated Border Controls:
Both Delegations reported on the status of legislative approval of the Integrated
Controls Convention in their respective countries.
The Delegation of Bolivia reiterated its interest in the implementation of
the long-term integrated control exercise, which it proposed at the Meeting
to Further the Complementary Agreement ACE 22, to be held in October,
November and December of this year, simultaneously at the Visviri-Charaña,
Chungara-Tambo Quemado, Conchane-Pisiga and Ollagüe-Avaroa border
crossings. The Chilean Delegation agreed on the importance of carrying out
long-term exercises. Therefore, it proposes that each country carries out twoweek
exercises in the different border crossings during the rest of this year, in
order to test the practical efficiency of the system.
Consular Affairs:
Regarding the reduction of visa fees, the Bolivian Delegation reported that
there are legal drawbacks for lowering consular fees in
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the legalization process of Chilean documents already legalized by the
Bolivian Consulates. This topic will be addressed in the Border Committee.
Likewise, the Bolivian Delegation expressed its willingness to analyze
mechanisms that allow the reduction of visa fees for the case of students.
Border Cooperation
Border Surveillance:
With regard to cooperation on border surveillance, both Delegations agreed
that this issue should be addressed in the next Border Committee [meeting].
The Delegation of Bolivia reported that it had already been
appointed the competent authority in the fight against drug
trafficking and that it would propose a date to hold the VII
Meeting of the Joint Commission of the Agreement on Control,
Inspection and Suppression of Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances and Essential Chemicals and Precursors.
Border Development
Cooperation between border communities:
Both Delegations learned that
preliminary contacts were made between
representatives of social investment funds in order to establish a
cooperation agenda in the area of border municipalities and communities.
Health issues:
The Chilean Delegation announced that a technical mission
will soon visit Bolivia to explain the progress of the Ministry of
Health Internship Program for Bolivian professionals in the area.
Cooperation in Education, Culture, Science and Technology
The Delegations of Chile and Bolivia expressed their satisfaction and
approval with the agreements reached at the Technical Meeting on
Education, held in La Paz on September 26th and 27th of this year, on the
occasion of the visit of the Chilean Minister of Education, Sergio Bitar.
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In particular, they expressed their satisfaction with the agreed
work program on quality of education; bilingual intercultural education;
science and technology and the internship and scholarship program.
Likewise, both Delegations expressed their appreciation and
encouragement for the initiative of Bolivian and Chilean historians to
develop the “Chile-Bolivia, Bolivia-Chile 1820-1930” project.
Agreement on Protection and Restoration of Cultural Heritage:
Both Delegations agreed to hold a technical meeting before the end of the
year to discuss this issue.
Cooperation and exchange between cultural managers and/or museum
directors:
The Chilean Delegation reported on carrying out a meeting of Cultural
Managers from both countries, to be held in Santiago on November 2nd
and 3rd. The Bolivian Delegation agreed to support this proposal.
Work Program for the Deepening of the Agreement of Economic
Complementation (ACE for its acronym in Spanish) Nº 22, Commercial,
Economic, Investment and Tourism Promotion.
The people in charge of the Administration of the ACE 22 of both
countries reported on the results of the Working Meeting to deepen this
agreement held in La Paz, Bolivia, on August 17th and 18th.
Both Delegations welcomed the progress made towards such deepening,
following the principle of asymmetry in favor of Bolivia, complemented
by cooperation agreements to facilitate the Bolivian export development.
The agreements that have been adopted based on the application
of an asymmetric treatment in favor of Bolivia, which, in addition to
the tariff issue, will include provisions for a comprehensive treatment
(sanitary, phytosanitary, cooperation, promotion, technical standards and
other disciplines to be agreed upon) that effectively promote the increase
of the bilateral trade.
On this occasion progress was made in a negotiation to deepen the
ACE 22 and a meeting was held on 12 October 2005, in Arica, Chile,
presided by the Vice Minister of Economic Relations and Foreign Trade
of Bolivia and the Director General of Economic Relations of Chile, in
order to move forward in this matter.
Education, Culture, Science and Technology:
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The Parties decided to establish a Bilateral Commission on Education, Science
and Technology and a Bilateral Culture Commission. These Commissions will
be presided by authorities of the respective Ministries and the coordination of
their activities will be carried out through their Chancelleries.
Institutional mechanisms of bilateral dialogue:
At the same time, the Parties decided to institutionalize the Working Group on
Bilateral Affairs, created last June, in view of the usefulness it has shown in the
process of preparation of the Political Consultations Mechanism established
between the two countries.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
In this regard, taking into consideration the interest expressed by Bolivia in
its participation in ocean scientific research activities, as well as surpluses in
the Exclusive Economic Zone of Chile, the Chilean Delegation expressed its
readiness to continue the internal consultations and assessments under the
provisions of that Convention.
Maritime Issue:
In the spirit of the Algarve Declaration, of a bilateral agenda without
exclusions, the Chilean Delegation took note of the proposals made by the
Delegation of Bolivia regarding the maritime issue and agreed on the importance
of maintaining this matter in the vision of an agenda of the future.
Other Issues
Agreements in matters of Social Security:
The Chilean Delegation presented for its analysis a draft Agreement on
Social Security.
Agreement to allow the Spouses of Consular, Administrative and Technical
Personnel to work:
The Parties expressed their satisfaction for the exchange of Notes that
formalizes this Agreement.
Inter-parliamentary contacts:
Both Delegations stressed the importance of the high level meeting to
be held by Parliamentarians from Chile and Bolivia, during next November in
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Situation of the former AADAA workers:
The Legal Directors of both countries will meet in Bolivia in the framework of the
next Border Committee.
This Act was signed in the city of Iquique, on the sixth day of October, 2005.
[Signature] [Signature]
Signed by CHILE Signed by BOLIVIA
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Agenda of the XIV Meeting of the Political Consultations Mechanism
Chile–Bolivia
Working Group on Bilateral Affairs
1. Agenda without exclusions Bolivia–Chile
2. Institutional mechanisms for bilateral dialogue
Free Transit
3. Port of Iquique (enabling for the free transit regime)
4. Port of Arica
5. Operational Manual for the Integrated Transit System
Border Committee
6. Elimination of Passports for the circulation of Tourists with Identity
Card between both countries.
7. Integrated Border Controls.
8. Customs Cooperation.
9. Joint Technical Group on GTM and ATIT Infrastructure
Education, Culture, Science and Technology
10. Analysis of the establishment of a Joint Commission on Education,
Culture, Science and Technology.
11. Draft Agreement on the protection and restitution of cultural heritage
assets.
12. Meeting of Cultural Managers Chile–Bolivia
13. Memorandum of Cultural Understanding
Agreements
14. Convention for the paid work of family members of consular, administrative
and technical personnel
15. Agreement to Avoid Double Taxation
16. Air Services Agreement (1993)
Economic and Trade Issues
17. Deepening of the ACE 22
18. Tourism
Cooperation
Various issues
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*With regard to the Agreement for the remunerated work of family members of consular,
administrative and technical personnel, it is suggested to exchange Notes of the
findings of the meeting and signing the Act.
List of the Chilean Delegation
Amb. Cristian Barros
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Roberto Ibarra
Director of South America
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Maria Teresa Infante
National Director of Borders and Boundaries
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Francisco Perez Walker
Consul General in La Paz
Mr. Anselmo Pommes
Director of Borders
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Gustavo Vergara
Deputy Regional Director of Customs of Iquique
Mr. German Fibla A.
Head of the Customs Department
MC. Economic Enrique Soler
Director Commercial Office
C. Juan Pablo Crisostomo
In charge of the Bolivia’s Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Enrique Ceppi
Head of ALADI Department
Directorate-General for International Economic Relations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SS. Felipe Saez
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Cabinet Undersecretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Hernan Acuña
International Cooperation Agency
Mr. Patricio Campaña
General Manager
Arica Port Company
Mr. Sergio Retamal
Commercial Exploitation Manager
Antofagasta Port Company
Mr. Rolando Varas
Operations Manager TPA
Mr. Rodrigo Pinto
Arica Port Company
Mariela Fuentes
Press Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ts. Andres Aguilar
Bolivia’s Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
LIST OF THE BOLIVIAN DELEGATION
Amb. Hernando Velasco Tarraga
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
MC. William Torres Armas
Director General of Boundaries and Borders
Amb. Edgar Pinto Tapia
Director General of Multilateral Relations
MP. Marco Antonio Vidaurre Noriega
Director General of Bilateral Relations
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C. Isabel Cadima Paz
Director of America
MC. Mauricio Dorfler Ocampo
Director General of Integration and Commercial Affairs
Dr. Ramiro Prudencio Lizon
Foreign Policy Adviser
MC. Roberto Finot Pabon
Acting Consul General of Bolivia in Santiago
Regina Hennings
Deputy Consul of Bolivia in Santiago
Edgar Choque Armijo
Consul of Bolivia in Iquique
TS. Yuri Arce Navarro
In charge of Chile’s Office
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Annex 357
“President clarifies that she did not address the maritime issue with Evo
Morales”, La Nacion (Chile), 14 March 2006
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
La Nacion Newspaper (Chile)
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/presidenta-aclaro-que-con-evomoral…-
no-trato-cuestion-maritima/2006-03-13/213313.html
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PRESIDENT CLARIFIES THAT SHE DID NOT ADDRESS THE
MARITIME ISSUE WITH EVO MORALES
“Once trust has been generated between the two Governments on a firm basis, we
can set ourselves more ambitious objectives,” said Alejandro Foxley
Tuesday, 14 March 2006
Yesterday, President Michelle Bachelet defined an open agenda
without exclusions as the axes of the foreign policy with Bolivia. The
expression of this willingness is Chile’s willingness to reestablish diplomatic
relations, as proposed by Ricardo Lagos in 2004 at the Monterrey Summit
to former President Carlos Mesa. “Chile has always agreed to have
diplomatic relations with Bolivia and (we have) the best willingness
to continue building a future-oriented agenda without exclusions, and
we are clear about our basic principles on the treatment of international
affairs, which is the intangibility of international treaties,” Bachelet said.
This willingness was made explicit by Bachelet to the
President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, during the meeting they held
on Friday the 10th, in which –the President said yesterday–
they did not address the maritime claim of the Andean country.
“The word ‘sea’ was not present in the conversation between President
Morales and this President; we spoke of a very good willingness to work,
to cooperate in multiple areas and a great willingness and determination to
establish a frank, direct and transparent relationship, in order to continue
moving forward in issues that seem relevant to both countries,” she said.
In turn, Foreign Minister Alejandro Foxley explained that “there is a very
sincere spirit on both sides to establish an open agenda, without exclusions,
starting with simple and concrete goals –especially in economic terms– to make
gradual progress. Once trust has been generated between the two Governments
on a firm basis, we can set more ambitious objectives for ourselves.”
In La Paz, meanwhile, there is a different vision. In fact, Palacio Quemado
spokesman, Alex Contreras, said that before resuming diplomatic relations with
Chile, Bachelet must provide a solution to his country’s historic maritime claim.
“In the bilateral relations with Chile, this historic debt has to be
solved, which is the first demand of the Bolivian people,” Contreras said.
“We cannot establish (diplomatic) relations before this problem is solved.”
These words were endorsed by the Minister of the Presidency, Juan
Ramon Quintana, who accompanied Evo Morales during his visit to Chile,
who assured that the backbone of this approach is “the maritime issue”.
“Addressing this issue is a necessary condition to address the rest of the issues.”
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/presidenta-aclaro-que-con-evomoral…-
no-trato-cuestion-maritima/2006-03-13/213313.html
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Annex 358
Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting, 36th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, 6 June 2006
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Organization of American States, General Assembly, 36th Regular Session,
2006, Vol. II, OEA/Ser.P/XXXVI-O.2 (2006)
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-204-
[...]
If we continue with the policy implemented by previous Governments, if we want
to add to the agenda without exclusions, terms such as “without impositions” or “without
conditions”, our people will interpret this as an intention to dilute the significant progress that
can be achieved with the agreed adoption of that agenda without exclusions, in all its scope.
Bolivia and Chile must have a real willingness to seek a formula for a final
solution to this issue, prioritizing a bilateral scenario that projects our country and
the Parties involved towards a future of brotherhood, integration and development.
Chile must be aware that the Bolivian people will never renounce its claim for
maritime reintegration. I therefore invoke Chile’s ability to repair this historical injustice and
allow Bolivia to have a free, continuous, useful and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean.
The joint challenge and the Bolivian willingness are raised.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Minister.
The Head of the Delegation of Chile has requested the floor, Foreign Minister Dr. Alejandro
Foxley.
The HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF CHILE: Mr. President, I have listened very
carefully to what the Chancellor of the Republic of Bolivia has said.
I would like to begin by expressing our appreciation for the meeting between President
Michelle Bachelet and President Evo Morales: a desire for understanding between the two
Governments, between the two peoples, in an agenda that we have called “a broad agenda
without exclusions.”
I would also like to express the respect of the Government of my country for this new
Government of Bolivia and its vocation to respond to the needs of its people, as well as for
what it represents in terms of strengthening its democratic processes and broad participation.
That is why I want to say very clearly here that we wish Bolivia the best of success in this
endeavor.
However, I have to make some clarifications. My country, Chile, has clearly
demonstrated its willingness to work bilaterally with Bolivia on this broad agenda, without
exclusions, through the development of a set of programs that allow us to make gradual
progress towards the fundamental basis of an understanding of mutual trust and of cooperation
in the next phase.
It is clear to us that the mechanisms of political, economic and integration
cooperation with Bolivia have concrete results: several meetings of the Working
Group on Free Transit aimed at further improving Bolivia’s access to the Pacific
Ocean through Chilean ports –as established by the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Commerce of 1904–; the establishment and active functioning of the Working Group
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-205-
on Bilateral Affairs, to consider all items on the agenda; the XIV Meeting of the Bilateral
Political Consultations Mechanism, in which Chile stated its willingness to continue moving
forward and holding talks on the basis of the spirit of Algarve, and the IV Meeting of the Border
Committee, where agreements were concluded regarding border dynamics, which show a
common and well-oriented effort. We give some examples: the acceptance of the identity card
to facilitate the movement of people, trade negotiations with special benefits for Bolivia, and
active customs cooperation, which are elements of a positive path of understanding and progress.
In the same way, in coordination with Bolivia, we are developing a program
to build new frontier complexes in the borders that connect us. We are also developing
connection infrastructure works. President Michelle Bachelet, in her address to the
Congress on 21 May last year, reaffirmed her willingness to invest in infrastructure and
physical integration programs and to continue moving forward in these matters with
Bolivia, pointing out that we will consolidate the routes of Arica–Tambo Quemado,
and Iquique–Huara Colchane. Likewise, modernizations are being made on the Arica–
La Paz railway, so that it can provide a service in accordance with its current demands.
It is also worth noting that Chile is studying the possibility of enabling of the port of
Iquique for the free transit system that Bolivia already enjoys in the ports of Arica and Antofagasta.
On the other hand, we are actively cooperating between the entities
responsible for the promotion of foreign trade in both countries, as well as in
the phytosanitary and animal health and customs areas, designed to boost the
exportable supply of Bolivia. We call on Bolivia to perfect before the ALADI the
administrative procedures related to this agreement that has already been signed.
We have faith in these concrete achievements, which, if preserved, would
bode well for the continuity of our efforts and wills with clear benefits for our peoples.
The words we have heard from the Foreign Minister of Bolivia represent some comments that
we do not share, but at the same time we want to reaffirm the agreement of our Governments
to seek a permanent substantial understanding under this broad agenda, without exclusions.
Bolivia is aware of Chile’s willingness to carry out a work program that covers
the most varied areas of work, so as to go through a framework of an integration process.
This was also highlighted by the visits of President Ricardo Lagos to La Paz and
President Evo Morales to Santiago, united in the same spirit of understanding and fraternity.
All these activities that we have reviewed give life to
the spirit of dialogue that we want to maintain with Bolivia.
The Government of Chile is convinced that a gradual, bilateral, without
exclusions dialogue reaffirms the constructive life that marked the spirit, as I said
before, of Algarve and Brasilia of the year 2000, and the recent meeting in Vienna
between President Michelle Bachelet and President Evo Morales. In this context,
Chile and Bolivia will be projected towards a real and promising integration.
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Mr. President, these comments refer to issues on the agenda that we are pursuing
with Bolivia in a strictly bilateral context. The destinies of Chile and Bolivia are united.
Our dialogue, including some very recent meetings within the framework of this meeting
of the OAS, has been fruitful, has given rise to points of agreement and we are optimistic.
We ratify, through them, the path that leads to the prosperity and well-being of our peoples.
Thank you very much.
[Applauses.]
The PRESIDENT: The Delegates from both Peru and Paraguay
have requested the floor. I now give the floor to the Representative of Peru.
The REPRESENTATIVE OF PERU: Thank you, Mr. President.
The Delegation of Peru has also listened very carefully to the presentation made by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and has done so with the understanding and the positive and constructive
spirit that the State of Peru has always expressed in relation to Bolivia’s landlocked condition.
However, Peru must reiterate that, due to its origin and
nature, it is a strictly bilateral issue between Bolivia and Chile, as the
Foreign Ministers Choquehuanca and Foxley have just pointed out.
Peru reaffirms its historic ties with the sister Republic of Bolivia,
which will be updated soon after the Congress of my country approves the text
of the General Treaty of Integration and Economic and Social Cooperation
for the establishment of a common market between Peru and Bolivia.
Said Treaty, unique in its type, will create a free trade zone between both countries and will
represent the modern vision of the economic interrelations between the sister nations that
seek to share development with social cohesion. It also constitutes a concrete mechanism
for the profound integration that Peru aspires to secure in its relationship with Bolivia.
The Government of Peru also shares these integration visions of development
and mutual respect with the Government of Chile, within the framework of the spirit of
friendship and cooperation that guide our relations. This allows us to aim together at the goal
of sustained development of our respective border regions and a common vision of the future.
Thank you very much.
[The Presidency is held by the Head of the Delegation of Barbados.]
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. I give the floor now to the Vice-Minister of Paraguay.
The HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF PARAGUAY: Thank you, Madam President.
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Annex 359
Minutes of the III Meeting of the Working Group on Bilateral Affairs,
31 October 2006
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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MINUTES OF THE III MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON BILATERAL AFFAIRS CHILE–BOLIVIA
As agreed by both Governments, the Working Group
on Bilateral Affairs Chile–Bolivia met in Santiago, Chile, on
30 and 31 October 2006, with a view to moving forward in a
broad and comprehensive common agenda without exclusions.
The Delegation of Chile was presided by Ambassador
Juan Pablo Lira Bianchi, Director of South America, and the
Delegation of Bolivia was presided by Ambassador Edgar Pinto
Tapia, General Director of Multilateral Relations. The list of
Delegations of both countries is attached to the present Minutes.
The Head of the Chilean Delegation stated that the bilateral
agenda has made substantive progress in the three months since
the last meeting of this Working Group. For his part, the Head
of the Bolivian Delegation said that both countries are moving
forward in this transcendental path in a very positive way.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL TRUST
Both Delegations agreed that the development of
mutual trust is the foundation on which the treatment
of all the issues in the bilateral relationship rests.
The Delegations of Chile and Bolivia then reviewed all
developments since July 2006 that relate to mutual trust. Among them
were the presence in Sucre, on the occasion of the installation of the
Constituent Assembly, of an important Delegation headed by the
President of the Senate of Chile, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, who traveled
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together with the Minister Secretary General of the Government,
Ricardo Lagos Weber, and with Senator Jaime Gazmuri.
Likewise, in order to consolidate meeting points between the institutions
of the Armed Forces of both countries, it has been sought to establish links
that contribute to generate areas of greater relationship and cooperation
in their areas of work. In this context, the visit of the Commander General
of the Army of Bolivia, General Freddy Bersatti, and the next visit to
Bolivia of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Chile, General
Oscar Izurieta in November, is included. It is also worth mentioning the
invitation that the Minister of Defense of Chile, Mrs. Vivianne Blanlot,
addressed to her Bolivian counterpart, Minister Walker San Miguel, for
him to visit our country on November 14th. This invitation was accepted.
It is also necessary to emphasize the visit of the Vice-Minister of
International Economic Relations, Maria Luisa Ramos, accompanied
by an outstanding Delegation of Bolivian businessmen. During
her visit, Vice-Minister Ramos was received in audience by Her
Excellency the President of the Republic, Mrs. Michelle Bachelet Jeria.
Finally, it was particularly emphasized the significant agenda that the
Presidents and the Foreign Ministers of the two countries will carry
out in the next visit to Santiago of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Bolivia, Mr. David Choquehuanca Cespedes, on the occasion
of the preparatory meeting for the Second Summit of the South
American Community of Nations, as well as the confirmation of the
President of Chile’s attendance at that meeting, on 9 December 2006.
II. BORDER INTEGRATION
Both Delegations welcomed the holding of the VII Meeting of the Border
Committee on October 10th in the city of Arica, where the mandates of the
different Commissions and Subcommittees were renewed and important
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agreements were reached, which monitoring
should be active and efficient, including:
• Carrying out the Third Simultaneous Exercise of Integrated
Border Controls of this year, in the border crossings of
Charaña–Visviri, Tambo Quemado–Chungara and Pisiga–
Colchane, from 11 November to 11 December 2006.
• The meeting of the Technical Committee on Integrated Controls
will be held on November 9th and 10th in La Paz, where the
projects that both countries are developing in the border crossings
of Chungara–Tambo Quemado and Colchane–Pisiga will be
announced. This will allow to define orientations to implement
border complexes able to implement integrated controls.
• With regard to the situation of minors in the Bolivian-Chilean border
areas, both Delegations agreed on the need to establish expedited
channels of communication between the authorities of both countries.
• In the area of customs, both Delegations highlighted the
celebration of the meeting between the Presidents of the Customs
of Chile and Bolivia, held in La Paz, in July 2006. They also
pointed out the importance of holding an upcoming meeting
between these authorities, as well as the commitment of both
Governments to continue their efforts to combat smuggling.
• Regarding the meeting between border communities and
municipalities, it was agreed to hold a meeting, convened by the
Foreign Ministries of both countries, during the first quarter of next
year in La Paz. It was also noted that from 23 to 25 November
2006, a meeting will be held in the city of Putre, within the
framework of the Andean Fair and the Aymarás sin Fronteras
(Aymara people without frontiers) project, which will also include
Peruvian municipalities and representatives of the Chancelleries.
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III. FREE TRANSIT
The Bolivian Delegation proposed that the VIII Meeting of the
Working Group on Free Transit be held during the first quarter of 2007
in La Paz, for which it will propose a date and a draft agenda in due
course.
With regard to the holding of a seminar regarding dangerous
cargo (IMO) agreed at the previous meeting of the Working Group, it
was agreed that a meeting should be held to allow an active exchange of
information and experience regarding the agreements in this area applicable
in each country, and identification of enforcement agencies at the
domestic level. This meeting could be held prior to that of the Working
Group.
The Bolivian Delegation announced that the SIT Board meeting
was convened for November 16th in the city of La Paz with the following
Agenda proposal: change of the SIT Board; renewal of the mandate
of the Reviewing Commission of the Operational Manual and Tariffs.
The Chilean Delegation informed its counterpart in Bolivia that it
would respond promptly to this call.
The Chilean Delegation submitted the Diplomatic Note Nº 114,
subscribed by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, which reports that
the Government of Chile is processing a Supreme Decree to specify
the legal steps for the enabling of the port of Iquique for the free transit
regime; it reports on the scope of this determination and invites Bolivia
to designate the Customs Agent that will act in accordance with the current
treaties, in that port, and to establish the date of beginning of such
regime.
In this regard, the Bolivian Delegation took due note of the communication
and indicated that it would reply as soon as possible.
IV. PHYSICAL INTEGRATION
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It was confirmed the interest for this Joint Technical Group on Infrastructure
to meet and contribute to move forward in the area of physical integration,
and in this regard it was agreed that the Delegations of both countries
attending the next meeting of the Executive Management Committee of
IIRSA in Quito, Ecuador, in December, to exchange ideas in this regard
and propose a date and agenda for the meeting.
Both Delegations agreed on the importance of holding the Meeting of the
Implementing Agencies of the International Land Transport Agreement
(ATIT). To this end, the Bolivian Delegation stated that, as soon as
possible, it would announce a proposal for a date and agenda for the
meeting.
The Chilean Delegation confirmed that the fiscal budget for the restoration
of the railroad will be legally allocated by the State Railways Company
and that, with respect to railway management, the scheme is being
studied, which will ultimately be applied, recognizing the priority that
both countries assign to this route of communication and international
transportation.
The Bolivian Delegation took duly note of this information and emphasized
the importance of the early restoration of this railway section.
V. ECONOMIC COMPLEMENTATION
Both Delegations welcomed the XVII Meeting of the Administrative
Commission for the Chile-Bolivia Economic Complementation
Agreement (ACE Nº 22), on 23 and 24 October, the results of which are
recorded in the Minutes of that meeting (Annex II).
They emphasized that on that occasion, the terms of reference for the
functioning of the different Committees were agreed. Likewise, the
constitution of the Committee of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
was assessed.
They highlighted the agreements reached between Prochile and
CEPROBOL regarding the implementation of internships in Prochile’s
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offices in market intelligence and trade promotion in the Chilean market.
Both Delegations expressed their interest in holding the Meeting on Tourism
Integration, in the town of San Pedro de Atacama, during the current
year, which will include two activities: a Workshop to define the tourism
strategy, followed by a meeting of the Committee to approve such strategy
and to solve, within the framework of the strategy, the contingent
problems.
VI. MARITIME ISSUE
Under the broad agenda without exclusions, this issue will be considered
by the Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the XV Meeting of the Political
Consultations Mechanism.
VII. SILALA AND WATER RESOURCES
Both Delegations agreed that the III Meeting of the Working Group on
the issue of Silala will take place in Calama, with an agenda and date to
be defined soon.
VIII. INSTRUMENTS TO FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY
Following an analysis on the subject and taking into account the contacts
made by different institutions of both countries, the Delegation of
Bolivia indicated that it will soon present a draft Reversal Notes for the
establishment of a Cooperation Mechanism in the fight against Poverty,
establishing in particular the priorities in this field. The Chilean Delegation
expressed its agreement with this proposal.
IX. SECURITY AND DEFENSE
Both Delegations highlighted the future visit to this capital of Dr. Walker
San Miguel, Minister of National Defense of Bolivia, next 14 November
2006, an opportunity that will be favorable to discuss the issues related
to Security and Defense included in the bilateral agenda.
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In this context, the two Delegations analyzed issues related to border
demining, cooperation on natural disasters and the fight against transnational
crimes. They agreed to continue the dialogue on these issues in order to fulfill
the commitments assumed during the II Meeting of this Working Group.
With the purpose of defining an Agreement on cooperation in the
matter of natural disasters, the Chilean Delegation submitted the
Agreements that it has signed with Argentina and Peru in this matter.
The Bolivian Delegation stated that it proposed, through an
official Note, the meeting between the Border Commanders of the
Bolivian National Police and the Police Department of Chile, on
the occasion of the inauguration of the Third Exercise of Integrated
Border Controls – 2006. On this subject, the Delegation of Chile
thanked the initiative and promised to respond promptly to it.
X. COOPERATION FOR THE CONTROL OF ILLICIT
DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ESSENTIAL AND PRECURSOR
CHEMICALS
Both Delegations agreed that the VII Meeting of the Joint Commission of the
Agreement on Control, Supervision and Suppression of Illicit Trafficking
of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Essential Chemicals and
Precursors will take place in Cochabamba, on 9 and 10 November 2006.
XI. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Both Delegations agreed that the meeting of the Joint
Commission on Education, Science and Technology should
take place during the first quarter of 2007 in the city of Oruro.
They also highlighted the upcoming Meeting of Chilean–Bolivian
Historians, to be held from 8 December to 10 December 2006, in the
city of La Paz, as well as the Meeting of Media Directors and Opinion
Trainers from both countries to be held on 4 and 5 December in Santiago.
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XII. CULTURES
It was highlighted the next visit by Ms. Paulina Urrutia, Minister of
Culture of Chile, to the city of La Paz from 15 to 17 November, on the
occasion of the inauguration of the II Meeting between Cultural Managers
of both countries. This opportunity will also be conducive to agree the
date and agenda of the meeting of the Joint Commission on Culture.
In the same way, the negotiation of the Draft Agreement of
Restoration of Cultural and Heritage Goods will continue.
XIII. OTHER TOPICS
Both Delegations exchanged information on the analysis of progress in
their respective countries of the following agreements:
• Agreement on Integrated Border Controls.
• Agreement to allow the remunerated activity of spouses of consular,
administrative and technical personnel.
• Agreement to avoid double taxation.
• Agreement on Social Security.
In this regard, both Delegations committed themselves to
take the measures that allow their concretion and validity.
In order to strengthen and institutionalize the inter-parliamentary
contacts between the two countries, the Delegation of
Bolivia emphasized the visit that Senator Antonio Peredo
will make to Chile, between 13 and 19 November 2006.
The date and place of the IV Meeting of the Working
Group on Bilateral Affairs will be agreed upon at the
XV Meeting of the Political Consultations Mechanism.
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Signed in the city of Santiago, in the thirty-first day of the month of
October of the year 2006.
[ Signature] [Signature]
FOR CHILE FOR BOLIVIA
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ANNEX 1
LIST OF THE CHILEAN DELEGATION
1. AMB. JUAN PABLO LIRA,
DIRECTOR OF SOUTH AMERICA
2. AMB. MARIA TERESA INFANTE,
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF STATE BORDERS AND
LIMITS
3. AMB. ROBERTO IBARRA,
CONSUL GENERAL OF CHILE IN LA PAZ
4. AMB. PATRICIO POZO,
DIRECTOR OF BORDERS
5. MR. CRISTIAN FUENTES,
DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL COORDINATION
6. MC. JOSE MIGUEL GONZALEZ S.,
SUBDIRECTOR OF SOUTH AMERICA
7. MR. MANUEL VALENCIA,
PROCHILE DIRECTOR
8. MR. CAMILO NAVARRO,
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF LATIN AMERICA DIRECONBI
9. PS. RODRIGO OLSEN,
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UNDERSECRETARY’S OFFICE
10. P.S FRANK TRESSLER,
HEAD OF UN DEPARTMENT OF THE MULTILATERAL
POLICY DEPARTMENT
11. MR. ENRIQUE SOLER,
CHILE’S COMMERCIAL ATTACHÉ IN BOLIVIA
12. MR. CARLOS CRISOSTOMO.
LEGAL AFFAIRS OFFICE
13. MRS. GLADYS MUÑOZ,
SPECIAL POLICY OFFICE
14. MRS. TANIA SANTIS,
AGCI ADVISER
15. MRS. MARCELA QUEZADA,
AGCI PROJECTS COORDINATOR
16. SS. MARCELO FLORES,
PLANNING OFFICE
17. SS. CLAUDIO GARRIDO,
HEAD OF BOLIVIA’S OFFICE
SOUTH AMERICA DEPARTMENT
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LIST OF THE BOLIVIAN DELEGATION
1. AMB. EDGAR PINTO TAPIA,
DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MULTILATERAL
RELATIONS
2. AMB. JOSE ENRIQUE PINELO,
CONSUL GENERAL OF BOLIVIA IN SANTIAGO
3. MP. ROBERTO CALZADILLA SARMIENTO,
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF BILATERAL RELATIONS
4. MP. ROBERTO FINOT PABON,
DEPUTY CONSUL GENERAL OF BOLIVIA IN
SANTIAGO
5. MC. SRA. REGINA HENNINGS,
CONSUL OF BOLIVIA IN SANTIAGO
6. MC. SR. IVAN CAMARLINGHI
CONSUL OF BOLIVIA IN SANTIAGO
7. S.S. SR. YURI ARCE,
CHILE’S OFFICE DIRECTOR
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Annex 360
U. Figueroa Pla, The Bolivian Maritime Claim before International
Fora (2007), pp. 95-99, 208-215, 221-222 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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VI. THE LANDLOCKED CONDITION AS A PRESSURE ELEMENT TO
RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
THE OBSESSION FOR THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
FOR BOLIVIA, THE RESUMPTION of diplomatic relations with Chile,
suspended on 15 April 1962, became an element of pressure and conditioning against
Chile’s constant and permanent desire to find a way to normalize them. Initially it
was used as an element of pressure to try to obtain some kind of compensation for
the water catchment works carried out in the Lauca River. A few weeks later, Bolivia
began to refer to “the major problem”, the sovereign access to the Pacific, and,
gradually, a few years later, it abandoned all references to Lauca [River].
Undoubtedly, [Bolivia] obtained greater internal political dividends with the
mention of the landlocked condition rather than the Lauca [River], which shortly
showed the inexistence of the alleged damages it claimed for the diversion of part of
its waters.
From 1962 onwards, there were insistent talks to reestablish diplomatic relations.
Almost all of them were held at international meetings attended by Delegations from
both countries.
Sometimes apparent progress was made and temporary illusions were created
in Chile when “the major issue” was not immediately addressed. An optimistic
impression was conveyed. But it was only the result of talks held with an interlocutor
who had a genuine desire for rapprochement. However, that desire was undoubtedly
personal. When the time came for the adoption of the final political decision, the
confrontation of the Bolivian authorities with the reality of their public opinions
instructed by successive Governments appeared.
The inevitable conditioning always had to arise, even at the last moment. The
talks were paralyzed if there was no explicit promise by Chile to study a Bolivian
sovereign access to the Pacific.
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This scenario was repeated over and over again over the years.
The Government of La Paz consolidated over time its purpose of conditioning
the resumption of diplomatic relations with Chile with obtaining its “own and
sovereign” access to the Pacific Ocean or, at least, to obtain a formal promise by
Chile to enter into negotiations without delay, immediately after the resumption of
diplomatic relations.
Bolivian rulers, in spite of all the willingness they may individually have to
promote a strengthening of ties, do not have in Bolivia a comfortable political space
to conduct their relations with Chile. Their field of action has been reduced over
time by the actions and precedents that the previous Administrations have left for the
Government in power.
A rapprochement with Chile has a political cost in Bolivia. The greater the
rapprochement, the higher the cost. If we add the resumption of diplomatic relations
without port negotiations to the rapprochement, the political cost will not only be
very high for the Bolivian Government, but will disrupt the global relationship and
will undermine all attempts to build more friendly and constructive ties.
At times there was the impression that Chilean officials have closed their eyes to this
reality and have preferred to be carried away by the passing illusion produced by an
old friendship, a handshake, a hug, a Bolivian smile that is nothing more than good
manners.
Other times they have been carried away by the easy temptation to execute
personal policies or policies designed in small circles that end up crashing with the
relentless reality they did not want to see in the first place.
Foreign policy, in delicate areas, must be designed within the Ministry of
Foreign Relations and particularly in those areas classified as sensitive. The knowledge
accumulated by the Chancellery is vast and its experience is rich. It is in this Ministry
that we will find the best tool for the study of international politics that the President
of the Republic has and for the implementation of those policies in accordance with
the best interests of the country.
And if a conclusion could be allowed today before recalling some of the many
efforts that have been made to resume diplomatic relations, is that after these efforts
have been made, the experience is obtained that in a policy of rapprochement with
Bolivia, we cannot act as if nothing would have happened between the two countries
after the Treaty of 1904 was signed.
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FIRST EFFORTS TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1962 AND 1963)
As soon as the debate in the OAS Council ended regarding the Lauca River
issue, there were efforts within the Organization to seek a normalization of the
Chilean-Bolivian ties.
On the occasion of the annual UN General Assembly in October 1962, on a Bolivian
initiative, there were informal talks between Foreign Ministers Martinez Sotomayor
and Fellman Velarde to restore relations and seek a friendly and practical solution to
the Lauca River dispute. Bolivia proposed the following bases:
a) The resumption of diplomatic relations;
b) Renunciation of the Bolivian mediation proposal and the Chilean
arbitration proposal over the Lauca [River];
c) Bolivian withdrawal of the precondition of closure of Lauca floodgates.
In return, Chile would commit to:
a) Deliver at the border a greater volume of water from the Lauca [River]
that would be obtained through additional water catchment works in the source
of the same river;
b) Possibility for Chile to sell electricity produced at the Chapiquiña
power plant with the water collected from the Lauca River;
c) Arrangement for the cancellation of overdue debts of the railroad from
Arica to La Paz, and
d) Look for development formulas in the border areas.
It was agreed that in Washington, both Parties would prepare a draft act to
be exchanged on October 31st, in order to resume relations. On November 3rd,
Chile submitted a draft act and three days later Bolivia claimed that the Chilean
document did not contain a solution to the Lauca [River] issue, for which Bolivia had
proposed two alternatives. Chile claimed to have drafted the Act on the basis of the
points discussed by the respective Foreign Ministers at the United Nations and also
consulting the elaboration of a Treaty that would establish the principles and norms
for the solution of any new problem that could arise in the future regarding the use of
international waters.
The two alternatives, which Bolivia later disclosed,
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concerned Chile’s restoration of the smallest flow of Lauca water currently entering
Bolivia, or that both countries recourse to an international organization requesting
the appointment of a technical commission to study whether the diversion of waters
from the Lauca River produced or not prejudice for Bolivia and, according to that,
discuss compensations.
Chile reiterated its desire to seek a friendly solution to the Lauca issue, and
Bolivia agreed to consider the draft Act of Resumption of Relations prepared by
Chile. Said Act would be signed at a special meeting of both Foreign Ministers with
the addition of the proposed alternatives.
Bolivia then suggested two additional amendments to the Act: one,
incorporating a phrase in the sense that Chile would seek a friendly solution to the
Lauca River issue. A second amendment was that among the matters to be considered
by both Foreign Ministers would be the beginning of direct negotiations regarding the
maritime issue in accordance with the Note of 20 June 1950 and the Memorandum of
10 July 1961. (It will be recalled that the aforementioned Note was issued in 1950 by
Chancellor Horacio Walker offering direct talks regarding maritime access).
Bolivia then took the opportunity to include in the talks the issue of its
landlocked condition. The negotiations of 1962 were halted at that point. Chancellor
Carlos Martinez Sotomayor did not accept the inclusion of the maritime issue and
ended the talks.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Jose Fellman Velarde,
on his return from Washington, in statements made to the press of his country on 30
December 1962, stated that “the Lauca River issue has been the vehicle that has
allowed Bolivia to bring into the consciousness of its people the problem of its
landlocked condition.”
These words of the Chancellor of Bolivia summarize with singular eloquence
the policy of that Government and place the Lauca issue in a very different dimension
from the one that the Representatives of that country tried to convey to it when they
went to the Council of the Organization of American States.
In parallel, the Chancellery of La Paz unleashed a campaign of propaganda
and provocation directed against Chile. Daily demonstrations by Senior Government
Officials, press comments, interviews and statements, fed that campaign. This strong
offensive culminated in the presentation before the Council of the OAS of a Bolivian
proposal to include on the agenda of the XI Inter-American Conference
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the subject “The port issue of Bolivia”. This Conference, which had not yet set a date,
was to be held sometime in the future.
To this end, the Bolivian representation sent to the Secretary General of the OAS,
Jose Antonio Mora, on 11 December 1962, the Note U.P. 29, which read as follows:
“Mr. Secretary General:
In accordance with the instructions received from my Government, I have
the honor to address Your Excellency to request that you convey to the Honorable
President of the Council of the Organization of American Statesthe request of
Bolivia to register in the corresponding part of the Agenda of the XI Inter-American
Conference to be held in Quito, Ecuador, the following item, in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Conference:
‘The port issue of Bolivia.’
With my appreciative thanks in advance, I reiterate to Your Excellency the
assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.
(Signed). Emilio Sarmiento Caruncho”.
It will be recalled that the XI International Conference of American States,
planned to be held in the city of Quito, Ecuador, was not held.
At the end of 1962 and early 1963, the President of the OAS Council, Ambassador
Gonzalo Facio, engaged in informal negotiations to achieve a resumption of relations
between Chile and Bolivia. He proposed to both countries a draft Act of Resumption
of Diplomatic Relations, very similar to the one presented by Chile on November 3rd
of the previous year.
Chile gave its approval, but Bolivia insisted on the maritime access clause.
In a conciliatory effort, Ambassador Facio made a trip to Bolivia, where he met with
the authorities of that country. In La Paz, Chancellor Fellman Velarde insisted on
linking the normalization of its diplomatic relations with Chile to the commitment
to grant Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific. On February 17th, he delivered
a Memorandum with an alternative proposal that consulted the granting of a port
enclave.
[…]
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[…]
THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1983
To this Assembly, any Bolivian strategy was aimed, as early as since the
preparatory months,when Ambassadors Crespo in Geneva and Salazar in Washington
held talks to this end, at creating an atmosphere of tranquility in Chile. There would
be no confrontation. The idea was to seek new paths and to deepen understandings.
According to Ambassador Salazar, a Bolivian draft resolution would not be
presented, although Ambassador Crespo affirmedthe contrary in Geneva. Colombia
had to be allowed to pursue its efforts and to formulate, before the General Assembly,
a call for the two countries to commence dialogue.
In his allocution during the general debate of the UN, the Bolivian Foreign
Minister gave proof of this withelevated references to the problem of his country’s
landlocked condition, and Chile did not reply to them at that time.
After the OAS General Assembly started in Washington, an informal meeting
was held between Representatives Pedro Daza, of Chile and Alfonso Crespo
(Bolivian Ambassador to Geneva), and it was chaired by Colombian Ambassador,
Francisco Posada. Ambassador Crespo announced Bolivia’s intention to submit a
draft resolution, causing surprise in both the Chilean Representative and Colombian
Ambassador. He stated that to the Bolivian public opinion the absence of such a
resolution would be incomprehensible, but that in any case, the resolution would
have to reflect the atmosphere created by the meetings held between the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs.
When Foreign Ministers Schweitzer from Chile, Ortiz Mercado from Bolivia
and Lloreda from Colombia were meeting, the Bolivian Foreign Minister recalled
the positive and lofty way in which the question of Bolivia’s landlocked condition
was being addressed. Consistently with that spirit, he pulled out from his pocket a
preliminary draft resolution he had outlined and that read:
“Having seen
Resolution AG/RES. 426, adopted by the ninth period of sessions, which
declared ‘that it is of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable
solution be found whereby Bolivia may obtain sovereign and useful
access to the Pacific Ocean’.
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Resolutions AG/RES. 481, AG/RES. 560 and AG/RES. 602, adopted by the
tenth, eleventh and twelfth General Assembly period of sessions, which ratify
Resolution 426.
That it is necessary to establish operative procedures for a negotiation leading to a
solution to the above said problem.
That Article 24 of the Charter prescribes the action of good offices as one of the
operative procedures.
Resolves
1. To reaffirm its support to the content of the above quoted resolutions.
2. To ratify the principle of peaceful dispute resolution, in accordance
with the OAS Charter, reiterating its decision to cooperate in the preservation
of international peace and security in the continent.
3. To appoint a Good Offices Commission integrated by Representatives
of the following countries…
4. That Commission shall call, jointly or separately, Representatives of
the Governments of Bolivia and Chile to study the current situation concerning
the absence of diplomatic relations between both States to then formulate the
proposals that it regards appropriate.
5. To urge the Governments of Bolivia and Chile to give their support to
the tasks entrusted to the Commission referred to in the preceding Article.
6. To authorize a Commission to, if it deems it advisable, establish
contacts with any other country involved in the Bolivian landlocked condition
problem.
7. To request the Commission appointed in Article 3 to present a report
on the progress or outcomes of its demarches before the XIV OAS General
Assembly meeting”.
Minister Ortiz Mercado explained that the purpose of the draft resolution,
as had been discussed with the two Foreign Ministers, was to amend the treatment
his country had been giving to the problem of landlocked Bolivia within the OAS
Assemblies and to take a step forward in both countries’ rapprochement, bearing in
mind the limitations and demands that a matter as delicate as this one had in both
countries’ public opinions.
Foreign Minister Schweitzer was categorical in expressing that the text
proposed by Bolivia was completely unacceptable to Chile
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and that he could not even consider it. If the intention was to promote a rapprochement,
however, he fully agreed with that purpose. To that end, an eventual draft resolution
could only urge the Parties to start a rapprochement process that might facilitate
the future reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Such a situation would allow
the two countries to address the matters that were of interest to them and, among
them, the issue of landlocked Bolivia.
A new conversation was held to discuss a new draft resolution. Bolivia proposed
the following text:
“Having seen,
Resolutions AG/RES. 426 (IX-0/79), of 31 October 1979; AG/RES. 481 (X-
0/80) of 27 November 1980; AG/RES. 560 (XI-0/81) of 10 December 1981 and AG/
RES. 602 (XII-0/82) of 20 November 1982, in which, respectively, it is declared and
reiterated that it is of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be
found whereby Bolivia may obtain sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean;
and
Considering:
That in a spirit of fraternity and with a view toward American integration,
it continues to be necessary to achieve the objective set forth in the preceding
declaration and consolidate a climate of peace and harmony to stimulate economic
and social progress in the area of the Americas directly affected by the consequences
Bolivia’s lack of its own access to the sea.
Resolves
1. To take note of the Report presented by the Government of Bolivia in
regard to Bolivia’s landlocked condition issue.
2. To reaffirm the Resolutions mentioned above.
3. To urge Bolivia and Chile to reestablish simultaneous diplomatic
relations to commence direct negotiations aimed at searching for the formula
that may make it possible to give Bolivia an own and sovereign outlet to
the Pacific Ocean, on bases that take into account both peoples’ reciprocal
advantages and true interests.
4. That either of the Parties is able to request that the item ‘Report on the
Bolivian maritime issue’ be included in the next regular period of sessions of
the General Assembly”.
Minister Schweitzer also opposed strongly to the second preliminary draft
resolution. Chile could not accept as the
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second operative paragraph the inclusion of Resolutions 426 and 602, to which it
opposed categorically. It had never accepted conditions for the reestablishment of
diplomatic relationsand neither that the latter should be connected to the problem of
landlocked Bolivia.
The three Foreign Ministers of Chile, Bolivia and Colombia prepared a
new text to replace the two first operative paragraphs. The new text included Peru’s
request to incorporate the word “rights”, putting it ahead of the word “interests”,
at the end of the second operative paragraph. The “having seen” and considering
opening preambles would remain the same. The operative part of the text agreed to
was the following:
“Resolves
1. To take note of the report of the Government of Bolivia concerning the
maritime issue of that country, of the observations made by the Governments of
Chile and Bolivia on the decisions adopted on the matter by this organization,
and of the constructive spirit that inspires the two countries.
2. To urge Bolivia and Chile, for the sake of American brotherhood,
to begin a process of rapprochement and strengthening of friendship ofthe
Bolivian and Chilean peoples, directed toward normalizing their relations and
overcoming the difficulties that separate them, including, especially, a formula
for giving Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, on bases that take
into account the reciprocal advantages and rights and interests of all Parties
concerned.
3. That either of the Parties may request the inclusion of the item‘Report
on the maritime issue of Bolivia’ at the next regular session of the General
Assembly”.
Within a spirit of cordiality, there was an agreement to address before the
General Commission of the Assembly the treatment of the matter, avoiding any
confrontation.
Foreign Minister Jose Ortiz Mercado would present the Bolivian report.
Foreign Minister Miguel Schweitzer would put forward Chile’s point of view.
Minister Rodrigo Lloreda would then urge them to commence dialogue, announcing
that the Colombian Government would invite the two Foreign Ministers to hold talks
in Bogota, and this invitation would be replied and welcomed in favorable terms
by both Ministers. Thereafter, Foreign Minister Lloreda would submit the draft
resolution requesting the General Assembly to approve it.
The Bolivian Foreign Minister, Jose Ortiz Mercado, presented the report on
the subject.
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This was the fifth report presented on that subject. This report was nothing but
a speech delivered at the discretion of the addresser. This year, the Resolutions
adopted earlier were recalled, avoiding to comment on those adopted in 1980 and
1981. The Minister deplored the fact that no progress had been made to achieve the
objectives of those Resolutions and, referring to the maritime issue, he stated that it
should be tackled with a forward-looking approach.
He said that access to the sea was not a mere aspiration but a vital question for the
future of Bolivia. He recalled that his country once had sovereign access to the Pacific
and that it was deprived of it by an unfair war and an imposed treaty. He urged
the Assembly to implement the Resolutions adopted and to put an end to the current
state of affairs that hindered the friendship that had to govern among nations of the
hemisphere.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, who took part on this occasion in the
debate within the General Commission and did not abandon it as he had done in the
preceding year, explained the Chilean position in regard to the subject discussed.
He stated that the border with Bolivia was demarcated and that the OAS was not
competent to issue opinions on territorial matters. Any negotiation with Bolivia was
aimed at fulfilling its longing and would have to be the result of a process of improvement
and normalization of their relations.
He added that Chile was willing to commence a rapprochement process and emphasized
that the fact that Bolivia had deplored that no progress had been made in
complying with the Resolutions adopted earlier in regard to this matter, placed on
record that these Resolutions had been rejected by Chile and that as a result could
not lead to any progress.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Rodrigo Lloreda presented the draft
resolution. Since this draft urged Bolivia and Chile to commence a rapprochement
process, he stated that if this decision was accepted by the two Parties, his Government
and particularly President Betancur, could concretize an invitation for Bolivia
and Chile to meet in a coming date in Bogota or somewhere else to commence talks
on the purposes formulated in the Resolution.
Minister Lloreda recalled in his address that the purpose was to commence a “process
of rapprochement seeking to normalize relations, overcome difficulties and
searchfor
____________________
1 The text of the address made by Bolivian Foreign Minister, Jose Ortiz Mercado, is found in Annex 23.
2. The text of the address made by Chilean Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Schweitzer, is found in Annex 24.
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the formula that makes both sister nations’ longings and expectationspossible”.
On the same occasion, the Foreign Ministers of Chile
and Bolivia accepted the invitation made by Colombia.
The Resolution was adopted by consensus and is
labelled AG/RES. 686 (XIII-0/83), of 18 November 1983.
When the Resolution was about to be adopted by the Plenary, Chile
formulated a reservation to the preamble because it mentioned Resolutions
in regard to which it had casted a negative vote when they were adopted.
Since the Resolution was adopted by consensus, it was even applauded by
the attending Representatives. The great majority of the Delegations competed
to make use of the most eloquent resources to express their satisfaction over the
agreement reached. Words and adjectives to describe the actions of the Colombian
Foreign Minister, Rodrigo Lloreda, were lacking in the Dictionary of the Royal
Academy of the Spanish Language. He had achieved what he had sought for so long.
The Resolution adopted, Resolution 686, in its “having seen” preamble was
identical to the ones adopted in preceding years. It recalled the decisions adopted earlier
and highlighted among them the declaration to the effect that finding an equitable
solution for Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean is of hemispheric interest.
The “considering” recital was exactly the same as the content of the
Resolution adopted the year before, in the sense that a stable peace would
consolidate if the objectives to give Bolivia sovereign access to the Pacific were
attained, promoting economic progress in the area directly affected by the lack of
Bolivia’s own access to the sea. The concept “enclaustramiento–confinement”
was eliminated and replaced for “lack of Bolivia’s own access” to the sea.
The first paragraph of the operative part took note of the Bolivian report and of
the observations formulated by both Chile and Bolivia in regard to the decisions adopted
by the Organization. This paragraph placed the Chilean and Bolivian contentions on
an equal footing and, mainly, recognized the validity of Chile’s position, inasmuch as
Chile’s observations in regard to not only the report presented on that occasion but also
“on the decisions adopted on the matter by the Organization” were taken into account.
The second operative paragraph urged “Bolivia and Chile
________________________________
3 The text of the improvised address made by Colombian Foreign Minister, Rodrigo Lloreda is found in Annex 25.
4The text of the Resolution is found in Annex 47.
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to… commence a rapprochement process and strengthening of friendship”. Chile’s
constant idea that any rapprochement between the two countries would need a
preexisting proper atmosphere was taken up. That said process would be aimed at
“normalizing their relations”. In a sense, the ideas contained in the Resolutions of 1980
and 1981, to the effect that dialogue had to be carried out “through the corresponding
channels”, were rehashed.
The rapprochement process and strengthening of friendship had to be aimed
at “overcoming the difficulties that separate them”, including “a formula for giving
Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean”. The new text alluded to the maritime
aspiration and labelled it as “difficulties”, while the title of the agenda item labelled
it as Bolivia’s “maritime problem”.
The formula that had to be sought to satisfy the sea access aspiration had to
take into account “reciprocal advantages” and the interests and rights of the Parties.
The concept of “reciprocal advantages” was new and, as a subjective and vague
element, made the whole paragraph complex.
The third operative paragraph was the same as the one adopted the preceding
year and it was nothing but a recognition of the faculty any Member State has to
request that a subject of its interest be included in the agenda.
The Resolution adopted was a success for the new Bolivian strategy
implemented in the Assembly of 1983. With it, Bolivia managed to obtain what it
sought, without the need to resort to strident or confrontational statements.
In the substance, the Resolution adopted was not much different from the
preceding ones. As can be seen, there are few new elements in it. It is repetitive to
present the same ideas with other words. The call to commence a rapprochement
process was incorporated in the Resolutions of 1980 and 1981, which also urged to
commence dialogue “through the corresponding channels”.
The disruptive element in the assessment of the OAS meeting of 1983 is the
unrequested Colombian interference, which would continue to be present after the
General Assembly ended and in the year that followed. In any case, its failure was
not attributable to Chile, which at all times was clear and categorical in its views
concerning the meaning, scope, and purpose of the demarche Colombia offered to
carry out.
On the same day in which the OAS General Assembly adopted Resolution 686, the
President of Colombia, Belisario Betancur,
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sent cables to the Presidents of Chile and Bolivia, General Augusto Pinochet and
Hernan Siles, inviting both Governments to hold a meeting in Bogota.
The invitation read:
In the referred invitation President Betancur expressed the following:
“So as to move forward in the purposes formulated, it would be a particular
honor for Colombia to serve as the seat for an encounter, in a coming date,
between the two Governments, represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
In this connection, I am pleased to invite your Government to participate in this
meeting, confident that this will contribute to both countries’ rapprochement
and constitute an admirable example of political maturity for the hemisphere
and the world”.
On 30 November, the President of Chile, replied in the affirmative to the invitation
formulated by President Betancur. President Pinochet stated :
“So as to move forward in the purposes formulated, Your Excellency has
had the courtesy to offer Colombia as the seat for a meeting between the two
Governments, represented by their Foreign Ministers. I have instructed Foreign
Minister Miguel Schweitzer to attend such meeting on the date that is deemed
appropriate”.
In this way, the demarche sought by Colombia was thus formalized at the highest
level.
[…]
__________________________
5The text of the cable sent by President Betancur is found in Annex 26.
6The text of the cable sent in response by President Pinochet is found in Annex 27.
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[…]
Both Foreign Ministers, at different meetings, developed basic tentative
guidelines for the Bogota meeting. Meetings were held in Montevideo (April), on
occasion of the second ministerial meeting of the ALADI; in Cartagena de Indias (21
June), on occasion of the ministerial meeting on the external debts of the main Latin
American debtors, and during the Mar del Plata Conference (13 September), held by
the Cartagena Consensus Group.
During the Montevideo talks, Minister Del Valle reiterated to Minister
Fernandez the Chilean Government’s best spirit to held rapprochement talks between
the two countries. For his part, Minister Fernandez stated that his Government was
making consultations at a representative level of the public opinion with the intention
to secure support in relation to the matter and that he thought this would take some
time.
Former President Walter Guevara Arce, on the other hand, who now
discharged functions as Ambassador to Venezuela and, also, presided the Bolivia
internal consultation group on the matter, declared to the press that “the Government
is studying a strategy to raise the maritime issue. Its analysis consists in implementing
a plan at the hemispheric level, not at a single occasion, and far less in the one to be
held this year (1984). On the contrary, it is necessary to develop a long-term strategy.
Thus, this study is currently being carried out and considered systematically.
Back from Cartagena de Indies, Minister Gustavo Fernandez declared to
the press that the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Chile was subject to
the solution to the maritime problem, which ought not to contemplate territorial
compensations.
In the talks held on occasion of the Mar del Plata Conference (13 September), on
the eve of the commencement of the UN General Assembly and two months before
the OAS General Assembly, Minister Fernandez informed that his Government had
concluded a process of internal consultation and that an internal concensus favorable
for the Bogota meeting was being achieved.
To that end, the Bolivian Foreign Minister proposed to a schedule that would
contemplate the following actions:
a) The holding of a Foreign Minister meeting to be held in New York
on occasion of the UN General Assembly, continuing the negotiations so as to
promote the basis for a rapprochement;
b) Establishment of a special joint commission tasked with eliminating
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the aspects that place obstacles to the dialogue and creating a proper
rapprochement atmosphere;
c) Appointment of a personality as Bolivia’s Consul General to Santiago;
d) Establishment of a team of advisers to launch negotiations on the
substantial matter.
The Chilean Government agreed to follow this procedure. Thereafter, Bolivia
announced that it would insert the maritime issue in the agenda of the OAS General
Assembly, as it had been doing for five years.
Chile asked Bolivia to abstain from inserting this item, inasmuch as it could
seriously affect the framework of the bilateral understanding. Aware of the Chilean
weakness, the Bolivian Foreign Minister did not heed the Chilean request. Chile was
not in the appropriate political conditions to adopt abrupt measures in the multilateral
sphere.
And things followed that course. Bolivia inserted the item and nothing happened. The
talks continued.
During the UN General Assembly held in 1984, Foreign Ministers Del Valle
and Fernandez held various work meetings, some of them with the presence of the
Colombian Foreign Minister. In these last meetings, an agreement was reached for
the purpose of signing a joint Chilean-Bolivian communique, reporting that, once
the different talks held, an agreement had been reached on fundamental, contextual
and procedure related aspects to implement Resolution 686 of the OAS General
Assembly adopted in November 1983. This joint communique would conclude
recording that, in this way, the Foreign Ministers believed that the preparatory stages
to hold the Bogota meeting –which would be held in the coming ninety days– had
been completed.
To that end, they agreed to hold a ceremony at Colombia’s Permanent Mission
before the UN on 3 October, at 12:00 am, where the Foreign Ministers of Chile
and Bolivia would sign a joint communique with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Colombia as witness.
A few hours before this document was signed, the Bolivian Foreign Minister,
Gustavo Fernandez, delivered a statement before the UN general debate. He devoted
four pages and a half to analyze the effects of the War of 1879. He dwelled on the
feelings of isolation and distrust resulting from this unjust war; Bolivia’s forced
landlocked condition; the economic losses that the natural found in the territories
ceded to Chile entailed for Bolivia’s development; and the underdevelopment Bolivia
experienced owing to not having a coast.
[…]
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Annex 361
Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting, 37th Regular Sesion of the OAS
General Assembly, 5 June 2007
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Organization of American States, General Assembly, 37th Regular
Session, Vol. II, OEA/Ser.P/XXXVII-O.2 (2007)
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[Applause.]
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. The Head of the
Delegation of Peru has requested the floor. You have the floor.
The HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF PERU: Thank you, Mr. President.
I would like to greet Chancellor Taiana and the Delegation of Argentina and express
our full agreement with the statements they uttered in this Assembly.
As has been traditional, Peru, in one and a thousand ways, has always supported
Argentina’s position in this matter. This is not only a matter of American solidarity
and between American countries, it is a matter of justice, of law and, of course,
of equity. We are in solidarity with Argentina and we hope that this problem can be
resolved in accordance with the Resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization
of American States, reiterating our vows that it can be resolved as soon as
possible and so we do not continue waiting for years for a logical solution in accordance
with Argentine rights and sovereignty.
Thank you Mr. President
[Applause]
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. The Representative of
Uruguay has requested the floor. You have the floor.
The REPRESENTATIVE OF URUGUAY: Thank you, Mr. President.
My Delegation would like to add to the support given to the draft declaration and
request that it be adopted by acclamation.
[Applause.]
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador. According to your
proposal and since there are not any other comments, we formally approve the Declaration
on the Question of the Falkland Islands. It has thus been approved.
[Applause.]
2. Report on the maritime issue of Bolivia
The PRESIDENT: We now turn to the next item in the agenda, the Report on the
Maritime Issue of Bolivia.
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As the Delegations are aware, Resolution AG/RES. 989 (XIX-O/89), adopted
in 1989, provided that consideration of this item should be open “for any forthcoming
regular sessions of the General Assembly” if requested by one of the Parties involved.
In this regard, the Government of Bolivia requested the inclusion of
this issue on the agenda of this General Assembly on 24 January 2007,
before the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Preparatory
Commission. In addition, the Chilean Representation to the OAS registered
its statement on this subject, which appears in document AG/doc.4650/07.
For his presentation, I am pleased to offer the floor to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Mr. David Choquehuanca Cespedes.
The HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF BOLIVIA: Thank
you very much, Mr. President. I salute you on behalf of my indigenous
brothers, the Bolivian people and my President, Evo Morales Ayma.
Mr. President, we are again gathered in this General Assembly to discuss the
agenda item labelled “Report on the maritime issue of Bolivia.” This is an issue that,
as you all know, was recorded through Resolution AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79), which
established as permanent interest in our hemisphere to find an equitable solution
through which Bolivia obtains sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean.
For this reason, the landlocked condition imposed on Bolivia is not only
a bilateral issue, which is exclusively for Chile and Bolivia, but a matter of
hemispheric interest that creates balance and the process of integration of the region.
Today, more than a decade after that Resolution was adopted and
more than forty years after the rupture of diplomatic relations between
Bolivia and Chile, we must regret that this issue has not yet been resolved.
In this regard, I must clearly state that the absence of diplomatic relations
between the two countries –the only ones suspended between two South
American States due to a territorial dispute– responds precisely to that
fact as hard and concrete as the unresolved Bolivian maritime claim.
Consequently, the resumption of diplomatic relations, from our perspective,
will be the culmination and not the beginning of the solution to our vital and urgent claim.
We also regret that this issue is one of the most longstanding ones in Latin America
and that, along with the claim of the Republic of Argentina over the Falkland Islands,
there is no other similar issue in our hemisphere. It should be noted that the substantial
difference between the two issues is that the Falkland Islands is not a controversy
with another American country, as is the case of the maritime reintegration of Bolivia.
This ungrateful situation is a permanent obstacle to making
concrete progress towards the integration of our hemisphere
and is a factor of discredit of the international image, since
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it shows the inability of our countries to give a definitive solution to our landlocked
condition, which already has more than a century since its unfortunate consummation.
In spite of this, and in the face of such adversity, my country has had and has an
invariable attitude in its relentless search for a satisfactory solution to its forced
landlocked condition and has made several attempts to approach the Republic of Chile.
In that sense, I will limit my references to only the efforts initiated in the last two years.
With the same effort with which Bolivia sought a solution to its maritime claim
during the last century, in June 2006, on the occasion of the thirty-sixth regular session of
the General Assembly of this Organization, held in the city of Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic, the Delegation of my country urged the Delegation of Chile to initiate a
process of bilateral dialogue and rapprochement, based on the principle of generating
mutual trust to seek a solution to our maritime claim, giving faithful compliance
to the other agreements reached by Presidents Evo Morales and Michelle Bachelet.
There is no doubt that the agreement reached by both nations at that time was
a positive and fundamental step in the new rapprochement process that we started.
In that sense, we agreed to define the methodology under which our bilateral
dialogue would work and fundamentally we defined a Bilateral Agenda
consisting of thirteen points, within which the maritime issue was included. This
agreement was reflected in the bilateral meeting held on 17 and 18 July 2006.
Since then, both countries have been committed to building an
environment of mutual trust with the objective and firm commitment
to arrive at a final solution to Bolivia’s landlocked condition.
As part of this bilateral rapprochement and convinced that the past of enmity can be
overcome by the willingness and sincere detachment of our peoples, official visits were
made from different sectors of civil society in both countries, such as the encounter
between opinion journalists, historians, meeting of university students, authorities
of border municipalities, meetings between senior officials of our Governments,
businessmen, as well as our military commanders and honorable Senators and Deputies.
I highlight among these activities the tribute ceremony that the Chilean Army
paid on 10 April 2007 to the Bolivian hero in the War of the Pacific, Mr. Eduardo Abaroa
Hidalgo, in the city of Calama, where the historic battle of the Topater took place.
Likewise, both countries met again in La Paz on 17 and 18 May this
year, to analyze and assess the progress made so far in our agenda of thirteen
points. In that context, our Governments were satisfied with the depth of the
dialogue and pointed out that there were important points of agreement in the
analysis of the different aspects of the maritime issue, having concluded that
progress was made in identifying points of common interest and shared criteria.
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It is in this new context and with a renewed spirit and a genuine Americanist vision
that I present before this General Assembly the report on the maritime issue of Bolivia.
I wish to express in a special way to you, Mr. President, and to you, Delegates, that
the Bolivian people reaffirm, through this Delegation, their confidence in the solidarity
and willingness placed in our hemispheric community, so that it can manifest its true
willingness and commitment to support and accompany the process of dialogue that both
countries, Bolivia and Chile, have initiated since last year, in order to find a definitive
solution and mutual satisfaction to the landlocked condition that my country still endures.
This is the clamorous request of social forces, indigenous peoples,
workers, intellectuals and all Bolivians as a whole, who demand for
reason and a right of justice that Bolivia ought to return to the sea.
Therefore, as has been replicated on other occasions in this
same multilateral forum, the Bolivian maritime reintegration is an issue
that must be understood in its legal, moral and economic dimension.
For Bolivia, the solution of its landlocked condition was not, is not, nor
will it be, a longing. The claim for a solution to its forced landlocked condition
lies beyond the considerations of “craving” or simple voluntarism, and much
less of a gift. It is the clear conscience of a whole people that did not accept,
nor will accept the unjust confinement that until now affects us all Bolivians.
Mr. President and Delegates, more than 128 years have passed since Bolivia lost
its free and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, with which it was born to its independent
life. This loss has been the result of an unbalanced war and consequent of the desperate
search for raw materials by the great powers of the nineteenth century, who ripped off
the natural wealth from countries that were just starting their independent lives. These
have been 128 years of a painful, suffocating and unsustainable landlocked condition.
We believe that this situation of anguish of my country will end up
being also the anguish of our hemisphere, because we must recognize it once
again, the non-satisfactory and definitive solution of this issue will be a factor
of disturbance and a threat to the stable peace and security of the region.
Hence, our community of American States, represented by these illustrious
Delegations, must understand that the facilities that Chile grants to Bolivia through
free transit in its ports in the Pacific and which is an obligation derived from the Treaty
of 1904, does not coincide nor is it a substantial part of the core of our maritime claim.
Moreover, this has meant in recent years a detriment to the foreign trade of
my country, as a negative consequence of the unilateral increase of tariffs. And I
reiterate once again before this Assembly that the policy of privatization of the ports of
Antofagasta and Arica, carried out by the Republic of Chile, continues to have a negative
effect on bilateral agreements, on the physical presence of the Bolivian State in Chilean
ports, as well as in the Bolivian rights of the broadest and most unrestricted free transit.
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Mr. President and Delegates, Bolivia believes that, in the same way that
the willingness expressed by the Government of President Evo Morales to seek all
possible means and scenarios in which the Representatives of our countries meet
to address the maritime issue and to find a solution to its landlocked condition, this
General Assembly must also make the necessary effort to ensure that the successive
Resolutions on this matter are effectively implemented within the framework
of inter-American dialogue and a spirit of fraternity and hemispheric integration.
We also urge all Member States of this Organization to
support the dialogue process that Bolivia and Chile have undertaken.
The mutual satisfaction to which Bolivia and Chile arrive at the moment
when our maritime claim is resolved, will surely be shared by this community, and
then we will be able to speak genuinely of hemispheric integration; an integration
based on solidarity, complementarity and balance, as is the day-to-day conception
and practice of all the indigenous peoples of our hemisphere; a true integration that
allows us to share experiences, initiatives, dreams and visions of a common future.
In this regard, and in view of the central matter agreed upon by
this General Assembly regarding Energy for Sustainable Development,
we believe that this is a catalyst for hemispheric integration.
In this sense, Bolivia is open to share its energy potential with a great spirit of solidarity, to
overcome the adversities and suffering caused by the shortcomings of our sister nations.
Mr. President and distinguished Delegates, the Bolivian people, together
with their Government, are determined to achieve a solution that will allow
my country to have a full, useful and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
With that firm purpose, we urge the Chilean Government and its people,
in a framework of mutual understanding and trust, as the one we are building,
to take every step to deepen the efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution.
We are aware of the difficulties and the effort required to solve an issue of
this magnitude. But it is our purpose, and I believe that it is the wish of all
of you, that at our next meeting in this same General Assembly, we are in a
position to express with great satisfaction that Bolivia has returned to the sea.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Minister.
In opening the forum to the participations of the Delegations that wish to do so, I am
pleased to offer the floor to the Chancellor of the Republic of Chile, Alejandro Foxley.
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The HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF CHILE: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
I have listened very carefully to the words of my dear friend, David
Choquehuanca, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bolivia.
I would like to briefly refer to a process in which we have been actors during the last year and
a half, a process of dialogue –I can say it from a personal point of view, and this is certainly
shared by all in my Government and, of course, by President Bachelet– a process of constructive
dialogue, in which, as David said a moment ago, an agenda was defined without exclusions with
thirteen points. Both Governments, I would say that with a high degree of goodwill, have been
carrying out a dialogue that has been reflected in the progress of the thirteen points of this agenda.
Of course we must recognize the obvious: that these processes are very complex
processes, with immediate progress in some areas. Other processes are slower. The important
thing is to maintain a good reciprocal spirit, persistence in the effort and good will to achieve results.
The spirit of the Government of President Bachelet is to share not only with the
Bolivian Government but also with its people, a path of neighborhood and regional integration
and a road of joint projection of Bolivia and Chile to the rest of the world. As we have stated
before this General Assembly on other occasions, the relationship with Bolivia is an important
priority in our foreign policy. This has been reflected in the meetings, which are already several,
between President Michelle Bachelet and President Evo Morales, and I must say –I have been
present in several of these meetings– with a very good reciprocal spirit and much empathy, in
the sense of effectively moving forward in this agenda that has been defined by both countries.
It is true, we have achieved in recent months non-rhetorical, but very concrete, points
of agreement that are based on an active process of generating mutual trust. There has been
a very intense exchange that is creating a very important cooperation network. There are
reciprocal visits by Ministers, Vice-Ministers of State, Senators, Deputies, very important
visits by senior Heads of the Armed Forces to one country and the other, by businessmen,
representatives of civil society and the world of culture. David also said recently that there were
very meaningful meetings with guests from Bolivia’s media in Chile. We had very thorough
discussions on all issues, especially with the idea that each country put itself in the place of
the other and understand the difficulties and try to overcome them and move forward together.
In this context, our various mechanisms of political and economic cooperation
and integration have achieved concrete results. Numerous meetings have been
held to further improve Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean through Chilean
ports, in accordance with the Peace, Friendship and Commerce Treaty of 1904.
We emphasize here, for example, that soon the enabling of the port of Iquique for
Bolivia will be perfected in order to integrate it into the Free Transit System, which that
country already enjoys in the ports of Arica and Antofagasta. It should be noted that, in the case
of Chile, the administration of these ports has been granted to the private sector. Significant
investments have been made to modernize these ports, to allow a more efficient use of these
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windows to the rest of the world and in some cases, of course that has meant some
increase in tariffs for these port services. This is part of a general policy of the Chilean
State; we have also done it in concessions in the internal infrastructure of the country,
with a tremendous modernization in infrastructure and anyone visiting Chile will notice it.
Therefore, in saying that we are moving forward in the facilitation of access to the port
of Iquique, we are trying to solve some practical problems as I have pointed out. The truth is that
the commitment that exists, and that we are going to comply with rigorously, is that a system of
free transit is in full operation and that it provides an extremely effective and efficient service
to those who use it for the transportation of cargo from Bolivia to other parts of the world.
I would also like to point out that the Working Group on Bilateral Affairs has
systematized an agenda. I would like to highlight the XVI Meeting of the Bilateral Policy
Consultations Mechanism of Vice-Chancellors, which was just held on 18 May, when our
Governments addressed the entirety of the agreed agenda, composed of thirteen points.
Also, perhaps simply for the knowledge of the fellow members of this OAS
Assembly, we would like to point out that under the Economic Complementation Agreement
Nº 22, Chile has granted Bolivia, asymmetrically, 100% tariff preference to imports of
any of its originating products, with the sole exception of sugar, wheat and wheat flour.
Today, in the morning, I mentioned that we have signed free trade agreements with
56 countries, some of them very demanding in the negotiations regarding opening markets.
I want to state with realism and also with modesty that the agreement that we have reached
with the Republic of Bolivia in trade matters means for the Chilean economy the greatest
degree of openness to any other economy in the world, because the tariff has been lowered
to zero in all, absolutely in all products, except these two or three that I just mentioned.
One sometimes hears in multilateral meetings in the region the need to
correct asymmetries. Well, at least this is a step, I think, that may also apply to other
situations of asymmetries in the region, whereby a country decides to entirely open
its economy with zero tariff to another country. And we have done it because we
believe it is very important for us to be able, in the medium and long term, to feel true
partners with the Republic of Bolivia and to work together towards the rest of the world.
In this context, Chile has also committed to cooperate with Bolivia in the
promotion of exports, not only to our country –Chile– but also to other destinations. In one
of the conversations we had with President Evo Morales, we saw the huge possibility of
complementation in exports, for example of fruit: our temperate tropical fruits from Bolivia
and the possibility of exporting together to the Asia Pacific to offer a complementary export
basket, non-competitive, where we could do the promotion together, inviting the small
peasant groupings of the two countries to become partners, perhaps in the context of the
Andean Community of Nations – CAN or other, in order for them to reach markets of the
Asia and thus work together in that process. Behind this, of course, jobs would be created
in relatively isolated peasant sectors, which could have an important economic significance.
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We have talked about creating market profiles of the products of both countries
and contrasting them with the demands in these new markets that are opening –China
and Japan, etc.– and another series of issues that include such specific and concrete
things such as people-level exchanges that are being formed in the diplomatic career,
exchanges of people working in the commercial offices of one and the other country,
that is, learning together from this projection of our economies to the rest of the world.
In addition, I think it is important to simply give you here as a piece of
information, to share it with you –our colleagues in the Government of Bolivia know all
this information– that we are very committed to carry out a series of bilateral cooperation
programs in many fields, for example, in the sectors of customs, tourism and infrastructure.
We are implementing an integrated border controls agreement, which shows a
process of close collaboration between the respective entities of the two countries. I could go
on illustrating this point with many examples. I want to say that this is a complex process,
which has many stages that have not been halted, that we are moving forward, that we
are having very frequent meetings, where we put on the table each one of the issues that
concern us and where each Party reports back on the progress of each one of the issues.
In fact, in her recent State-of-the-Nation message before Congress,
President Bachelet, referring to the neighborhood environment, clearly pointed out
once again that her Government will deepen the relations with Bolivia, a country
that we consider, truthfully, not rhetorically, a brotherly country, with whom
we can and must face, with a shared vision, the challenges of the 21st century.
These words that we are saying, truthfully and unequivocally, outline the meaning
of the dialogue we want to maintain with Bolivia. With mutual trust, strengthening the
cooperation mechanisms, acting jointly on issues of common interest to the region or the rest
of the world; we want to move forward at a compatible speed, and I want to stress this, in
building the necessary national consensus to support the further deepening of the relations.
These consensuses are not always there, they are not always freely given; these are tasks of
persuasion that must be carried out, showing in the meantime concrete results in many fields.
The Government of Chile is convinced that the gradual and unconditional
bilateral dialogue that President Bachelet and President Morales and their
Governments have been maintaining, is the right way to move towards a
cooperative relationship, effective integration and, above all, of friendship.
Mr. President, I would like to say that I have referred to this broad and constructive
bilateral agenda, but that we are convinced that we must continue to move forward, building
mutual trust and taking actions that progressively consolidate what has been achieved
and which have, above all, –as I have recently said– a positive impact on the public
opinion of both countries, until, in fact, our peoples feel that this common destiny means
deepening relations very strongly at all levels. The destinies of Chile and Bolivia have a
vocation of unity. We have had emblematic gestures of rapprochement and fraternity that
seem essential to us to look at the bilateral relationship with optimism. The dialogue has
been fruitful and shows important coincidences. We thus ratify a path that should lead
us, once the pending problems are resolved, to a better quality of life for our peoples.
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Annex 362
Content of the talks held between the Delegations of Chile and Bolivia
regarding point 6 of the Agenda of the 13 Points: Maritime Issue
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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CONTENT OF THE TALKS HELD BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS
OF CHILE AND BOLIVIA REGARDING POINT 6 OF
THE AGENDA OF THE 13 POINTS: MARITIME ISSUE
The Delegations of both Governments reviewed the issue since the recent
talks in 1975 in which Chile offered Bolivia a sovereign maritime
coast, linked to the Bolivian territory by an equally sovereign territorial
corridor, north of Arica, between Concordia Line and Gallinazos
ravine. This cession included a territorial compensation by Bolivia.
Analyzing the 1975 proposal, both Delegations agreed that, when referring
to territories subject to the Complementary Protocol to the 1929 Treaty
between Chile and Peru, it required a trilateral treatment or, at least, that
Chile discuss and previously agrees with Peru what it considered convenient
to offer. Only then could Bolivia seriously consider a similar proposal.
For this consideration and because addressing the maritime issue falls
within the scope of the bilateral Agenda of the 13 Points, both Delegations
agreed to exclude a closer analysis of the proposal of the corridor north of
Arica at the time of starting the talks. Subsequently, when Peru filed its claim
against Chile before the Tribunal of The Hague, regarding the subject of
the maritime limit, the convenience of that initial decision was confirmed.
In order to continue addressing the issue, both Delegations decided to
analyze other proposals that had been suggested as ways of solving the
maritime issue in the past. That is to say, the possibility of Chile’s cession
to Bolivia of one or more enclaves in any part of its territory, excluding
those subject to the provisions of the Complementary Protocol of 1929.
One objection that has always been presented against this possible solution
is that the Chilean territory would be divided into two parts. In
this regard, both Delegations agreed that, since it is an enclave, the territorial
continuity with Bolivia was excluded. There was, therefore, no
possibility that the Chilean territory be divided in two. However, it was
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clear that this proposal should contemplate the possibility of an
expedited transit from the Bolivian territory to that of the enclave,
within a framework of regulation of international traffic like that which
currently exists in several regions of the world and such as Brazil, Bolivia
and Chile are negotiating under the terms of the Interoceanic Corridor.
In order to reach points of agreement regarding the characteristics of the enclave,
Bolivia explained that its conception of a “maritime solution” includes access
to a proper port over the Pacific Ocean, but is not limited to this aspect. It
insisted that any solution should include other equally important aspects of the
maritime issue, for example, access to a beach wide enough for the development
of economic and recreational activities, access to marine resources, access to
the maritime platform under the same conditions and rights as its neighbors
although in a relatively much smaller space, etc. This also implies that, in the
medium term, and as long as it does not develop capacities to take advantage
of all the possibilities of the enclave, Bolivia will continue to make use of the
free transit facilities through Chilean ports granted by the existing treaties.
In considering the conditions under which Chile could cede part of its
territory to Bolivia as an enclave, both Parties took note of the restrictions and
limitations they must face in proposing a definitive solution to the maritime
issue. On the one hand, the Chilean Delegation mentioned the prohibition
of ceding territory to another country, established in its Constitution. For its
part, the Bolivian Delegation mentioned the declaration of the inalienable and
imprescriptible right over the territory that gives it access to the Pacific Ocean
and its maritime space and the full exercise of sovereignty over that territory
established in its new Constitution. Fort these reasons, both Delegations
agreed that a definitive solution to the maritime issue, which conclusively
includes sovereignty, cannot be a reason for discussion at this stage of the talks.
In this regard, Bolivia stated that, while making gradual progress towards the
attainment of sovereignty, Bolivia intends to enjoy, in the territory that Chile
may cede to it as an enclave, all the rights enjoyed by a sovereign State, that
is, the possibility to establish its own local Government, to legislate over it, to
establish and collect taxes, to regulate the private property of its inhabitants, etc.
The only exception being the impossibility of transferring it to a third country.
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In spite of this enormous difficulty, both Parties agreed that it was possible
to move forward in the discussion of the conditions under which Chile could
make a cession of its territory in the form of an enclave in favor of Bolivia
as a beginning of solution of the problem that separates them, seeking to
deepen the efforts of both Parties in concretizing a climate of mutual trust
that allows them to achieve the normalization of their relations in all areas,
that is to say, as a way of gradually moving forward in a broad process of
integration and possible complementarity to be achieved in the future.
In order to determine the time during which Chile could make the territorial
cession in the form of an enclave in favor of Bolivia, both Parties agreed that a 99-
year term would be reasonable and would allow sufficient time to verify not only
the practical feasibility of the solution but also its economic viability. The enclave
would only make sense when the investments necessary for its development have
been made. These investments require time for its evolution. This period would
also allow sufficient time for future generations of both Parties to be able to
adequately analyze the relevance of this solution and to perfect this agreement in
those aspects that still require additional attention, that is, Bolivia’s sovereignty.
Thus, having raised the issue and the beginning of a gradual solution to the
maritime issue, both Delegations considered it convenient to explore, on
the map of the Republic of Chile, the territories that could be the subject
to be ceded. Initially the Bolivian Delegation suggested that, for historical,
affective and symbolic reasons, to which it attaches importance, the area of
the Antofagasta Region in which the ruins of what was the port of Cobija
are found, could be appropriate. Subsequently, the Chilean Delegation
proposed a coastal zone in the Tarapaca Region which, because of its
proximity to Bolivia, considered that it was better suited for the enclave.
Both Parties then agreed to carry out technical work to determine whether
the territory offered satisfied Bolivia’s requirements. On 19 June 2009, a
joint visit was made to the territory suggested in the Tarapaca Region. The
visit had both air and ground movement and allowed the Bolivian Delegation
to make an in situ assessment of the potentially favorable aspects and
limitations of the area, as well as to estimate its development projections.
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Since then, the talks between the two Parties focused on the following
detailed aspects:
1. ACCURACY OF THE POSSIBLE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
1.1 North-South Longitude
Over the area of the initial proposal of the Chilean Delegation
(19°19’34,11’’ S., 70°15’53,25’’ W.), the Bolivian Delegation required
to extend it to Camarones ravine (19°11’51,30’’ S., 70°14’24’’ W.), border
between regions XV and I, thus considering the natural boundaries
between ravines and thus extending 17 km longitudinally to the north,
which added to the initial 28 would result in 45 km of length approximately.
The Chilean Delegation responded by proposing an extension from the
initial proposal (Chica Inlet) to Punta Gorda, thus extending the coast
in 2.8 km and in approximately 2.2 km North–South longitudinal. The
resulting proposal would have 28 km of length and approximately 34
km of coast.
Bolivia reiterated the importance of extending the coastal belt to the
Camarones Ravine due to three important reasons:
a) The possibility of access to a significant sub-surface source of
freshwater in the Camarones Ravine, which currently drains directly
into the ocean;
b) The possibility of accessing the esplanade located at coordinates
19°12’58.04” S. and 70°15’46.03” W.;
c) Access to the Camarones Ravine area through the A376 highway.
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1.2 East–West Longitude
In relation to the extension of the area of interest to the East, Chile
offered an extension of 8 km from the coastline, see Figure 1.
Figure l. Area offered by Chile from Punta Gorda to Tiliviche ravine and a length to
the East of 8 km.
Considering the space needs of Bolivia, the possibility of building an airport
and other facilities and the topographical variability of the upper area, the
Bolivian Delegation stated that it is essential to extend the length to the
East for at least 20 km. Such an area of land would allow Bolivia to have an
area of implementation and extension suitable for long-term development.
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The counterproposal presented by the Bolivian Delegation can be observed
in Figure 2. It extends 20 km to the East from the Camarones Ravine.
Figure 2. Area proposed by Bolivia with a length of 20 km to the East and up to the
Camarones Ravine to the North
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1.3 Extension over the ocean, territorial sea, contiguous zone and
economically exclusive zone.
The Chilean proposal comprises an extension to the ocean of 12 to 50
nautical miles, see Figure 3.
Figure 3. Proposal by Chile on the maritime zone of Bolivian dominion
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However, the Bolivian Delegation considers that this extension
should be extended to 200 nautical miles, which is the economically
exclusive zone under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 30 April 1982. See Figure 4.
Figure 4. Proposal of Bolivia regarding the Economically Exclusive Zone (EEZ)
With respect to this Bolivian counterproposal the following concerns
arose on the part of the Chilean Delegation:
a) If the 200 miles of EEZ were granted to Bolivia, the EEZ of
Chile would be divided in two, taking away continuity which would not
be acceptable. In this regard, the Bolivian Delegation commented that
the zone would not impede the free transit of Chile.
b) The dispute over maritime boundaries between Peru and Chile
would compromise Bolivia’s EEZ proposal at approximately 130 nautical
miles, so no definition could be made of this aspect until the conclusion
of the dispute. (See Figure 5).
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2. ACTIVITIES AND REGIME OF PEOPLE, ENVIRONMENTAL,
HEALTH AND OTHERS
2.1 Movement of people.
Both Parties consider that a system of transit facilitation or
crossing by Chile (country-country) should be developed from the
Bolivian border to the area of interest. There is road infrastructure
access to the area. However, it is necessary to study the possibility
of constructing an own road linking it to the Bolivian territory.
The existing linking roads are:
• Highway A55.- Huara–Kolchane, linking Pisiga
with Iquique and connects with the Pan-American Road
(Road 5) approximately 70 km south of the area of interest.
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• Highway 11.- Chungara–Arica, which links Tambo Quemado with Arica and
connects with the Pan-American Road (Road 5) approximately 100 km north of the
area of interest.
• Route A44.- That links the Pan-American Road with Pisagua, 5 km to the
South of the area of interest by Tilivichi Ravine.
• Route A376.- Linking the Pan-American Road with the North of the area of
interest by the Camarones Ravine.
2.2. Workers and residents.-
Chile would be willing to accept the application of Bolivian labor and pension legislation
within the area of interest to all workers whether Bolivian or Chilean. Chile
would propose that Bolivia authorize the presence of Chilean or foreign workers
residing in Chile. If a Bolivian entity hires them, the Bolivian legislation applies.
2.3 Public Regime.-
A set of standards should be developed.
2.3.1 Real State – Immovable Property.
Bolivia wishes to establish individual private rights in the territory of interest, which
implies agreeing on a regime applicable to real estate that must be developed.
2.3.2 Personal Property – Movable Property.
They would pass through Chile, coming or going to Bolivia. Chile proposes free
commercialization of imported and produced goods.
2.3.4 Transport.-
It will involve evaluating the rules for the country–country movement.
2.3.5 Maritime Authority.-
It implies reaching an agreement to define the Naval Authority in the oceanic domain
of Bolivia.
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2.3.6 Environment.-
The rules applied in the territory of interest could not be less effective
or demanding than the Chilean ones. Agreements on prevention of
transboundary impacts would be evaluated. Chile would not accept the
disposal of hazardous wastes in those areas.
2.3.7. Health.-
Similarly, the applicable rules could not be less effective or demanding
than the Chilean ones.
3. NEED FOR SECONDARY INFORMATION
In order to move forward in the possibility of a possible agreement,
Bolivia initially needs the following secondary information:
3.1 General
• Hydro-meteorological information, wind regime, rainfall,
solar radiation, relative humidity, temperatures, etc.
• Geographical charts at a scale of 1:50,000
• Satellite imagery
• Aerial photos
• Electricity network in the area, power and load capacity
• Availability of fresh water, water rights
3.2 Commercial and sports ports
• Type of seabed
• Depth of seabed
• Ocean currents
• Tidal regime
• Intensity of winds and directions of the possible areas of
installation of the commercial and sports ports
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Annex 363
“The Bolivian enclave that was frustrated by Piñera”, La Tercera (Chile),
5 December 2010
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
La Tercera Newspaper (Chile)
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THE BOLIVIAN ENCLAVE THAT WAS
FRUSTRATED BY PIÑERA
La Tercera Newspaper, Sunday 5 December 2010
Three Bolivian experts traveled to the Tarapaca Region in 2009 to inspect an enclave
offered by Bachelet’s Government. Maps were drawn up to the south of
Camarones Ravine, and in February an Act was being prepared to be signed. The
plan was rejected by Piñera, who is more in favor of granting a corridor without
sovereignty to the north of Lluta River.
By Francisco Artaza
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In December 2009, just days after Sebastian Piñera
won the presidential elections, the Government of Evo
Morales sent a reserved document to the Administration
of Michelle Bachelet. It was the draft of an official
Act intended to be signed by both countries, which
mentioned the process of the bilateral negotiations in the
last four years and where Chile assumed the commitment
to continue to move forward in the talks to resolve the
historic Bolivian maritime claim on the basis of what until
that moment had been worked by both Chancelleries.
The draft sent from La Paz was part of an agreement
reached in October by the Vice-Chancellor of Bolivia,
Hugo Fernandez, and the Vice-Chancellor of Chile,
Alberto van Klaveren. The Vice-Chancellors had led the
nine rounds of political consultations of the diplomatic
missions of both countries since July 2006 and at this
meeting, the last before Bachelet ended her term, they
spoke of agreeing on a common document. Bolivia was in
charge of drafting it and Chile would make the corrections.
At that point, the talks regarding the maritime issue
had progressed. Although the Bolivian Act did not include
dates or formulas, according to sources of the Government
of the time, by then Bachelet had in view three options to
grant a coastal enclave without sovereignty to Bolivia in
the province of Tarapaca. One of them was consolidated
during the negotiations: it was a point between the south
of the Camarones Ravine and the north of Iquique. The
formula without sovereignty circumvented the obligations
of the Treaty of 1929, which provides that Chile must
consult Peru for the cession of territories that belonged to it
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before the War of the Pacific.
During the first half of that year, a delegation
of three technicians from the Morales Government
traveled to the province of Tarapaca to see in situ the
characteristics of the location that had been defined to be
negotiated. Accompanied by three officials of the Chilean
Chancellery, some of them from the Border and Limits
Department, the experts moved directly to the location,
without passing through Santiago. They did not want to
leave footprints.
For three days, with maps and topographic and
legal documents, the Bolivian technicians verified the
characteristics of the terrain and the possibilities of
developing an enclave. The location they explored was
an uninhabited cove; it was one of the conditions on both
sides to agree on an enclave.
The sea of the area had enough depth for large
draft ships and a beach area. This was a key element.
There it was contemplated to build a port for the export
of iron and lithium minerals from Bolivia and a tourist
zone. Chile requested that the dock be exclusively for
the export of minerals and not be enabled for the transit
of general cargo: that way, it would not enter into
competition with the ports of Arica and Antofagasta. The
point was accepted by La Paz.
The Bolivian negotiators also raised conditions.
They asked that, in the enclave, Bolivia should be
authorized to build an urban axis, adjacent to the industrial
sector. Bolivia’s aspiration was somewhat larger than 400
square kilometers, which Chile did not accept.
In any case, the mechanism that was explored was
similar and even superior to the concession granted by
Peru to Bolivia in the port of Ilo. The agreement signed in
1992 by the then Presidents Alberto Fujimori and Jaime
Paz Zamora included the cession for 99 years of a coastal
enclave of five kilometers and 163 hectares for Bolivia.
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“It was not an ideal formula. But it was what was
possible as an alternative,” asserts a source of the Chilean
Foreign Ministry who knew of these talks.
Still, Morales was interested in it. The mechanism
did not satisfy the claim for a sovereign outlet with
territorial continuity, but the enclave did allow Bolivia to
regain its condition as a coastal State.
PIÑERA’S REFUSAL
Despite Eduardo Frei’s defeat at the polls, Bachelet kept
alive the interest of reaching an agreement with Bolivia
before finishing her term. The draft of the Bolivian Act
was being revised for its ratification as the transfer of
command to Piñera began. In the first days of February,
according to high diplomatic sources, the Chancellery
informed to the new
The enclave contemplated a port in the
northern part of Chile to transport
minerals from Bolivia and an urban radio
adjacent to the industrial sector.
Bachelet had three alternatives to grant
a coastal enclave without sovereignty
to the Morales Government. The plan
was the result of years of dialogue.
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authorities about the joint declaration that they intended
to sign with Evo Morales. The document was considered
“excessive” by the representatives of Piñera and it was
aborted shortly afterwards. Many saw it as an attempt to
leave the new Government “tied” to the mechanisms that
should continue in the talks with Morales.
In parallel, Piñera was aware that Bachelet was
considering three options to grant an enclave to Bolivia
and that the dialogue had reached an advanced stage. The
President rejected the initiative. He had a fundamental
reason: he did not share the idea of granting an enclave
to that country. In the opinion of the new Government,
the transfer in concession or in commodatum for 99
years to La Paz of a strip of coast in Chilean territory
would open in the future new sources of tension in the
bilateral relations. Problems of a migratory, free transit,
administrative and infrastructure nature, according to
the Executive, would arise from this mechanism. “The
President does not believe it is feasible to ‘divide’ the
territory in two,” according to someone close to the
President, adding that Piñera is more likely –in theory–
to grant a corridor without sovereignty to the north of the
Lluta River.
Piñera’s February decision overturned the
confidential negotiations of Bachelet and Morales.
In July 2006, they both agreed to establish an agenda
of 13 points, which included the maritime issue in the
sixth point of the agenda. Months later, in April 2007,
they began to talk about possible formulas among their
Governments.
Throughout that year, in the four meetings they
held behind closed doors, the Vice-Chancellors of
both countries addressed in general terms the possible
mechanisms for a solution to the maritime issue. On the
side of the Chilean Government it was Van Klaveren.
For the Bolivian side it was first Mauricio Dorfler and
then Hugo Fernandez. In those days, neither Bachelet
nor Morales gave specific instructions
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to their representatives on how they should proceed or what
should be discussed in the meetings.
Thus, the Vice-Chancellors started by reviewing the
different options that had been explored in different periods
of history and the limitations they had for each country to
carry them out. One of the first alternatives that was analyzed
was an eventual corridor to the north of Lluta River and
to the south of Concordia Line. The formula had already
been unsuccessfully promoted during the Governments
of Domingo Santa Maria, German Riesco, Jorge Montt,
Federico Errazuriz Echaurren and Gabriel Gonzalez Videla.
Secondly, the Vice-Chancellors addressed the idea of
establishing a development pole for Chile, Bolivia and Peru
in the port of Arica. The initiative was raised in 1926 by
the US and in 1976 it was raised again by Lima, in order to
block the negotiations that at that time Augusto Pinochet and
Hugo Banzer were carrying out.
The third alternative reviewed by the Vice-
Chancellors of Bachelet and Morales pointed to a Bolivian
enclave in northern Chile, which could be granted through
a long-term concession or commodatum (La Paz requested
99 years). The formula had also been considered by other
Governments. In 1968, former Chancellor Gabriel Valdes
explored it; in 1987 the Governments of Pinochet and Paz
Estenssoro did so also, and in 2001 it was explored again by
former President Ricardo Lagos, who offered an enclave in
the port of Patillo for the construction of a port to export gas.
At the end of the round of political consultations
in October 2007, Vice-Chancellors van Klaveren and
Fernandez said that they had exchanged “broad, frank and
realistic criteria.”
“To the Chilean Government there were two nonnegotiable
conditions: the solution had to be without granting
sovereignty and could not divide the Chilean territory,”
emphasized a former
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Minister of Bachelet.
In early May 2008, Bolivian
Ambassador to Peru, Franz Solano, polled the
position of Lima before an eventual settlement
between La Paz and Santiago through a
corridor to the north of Arica. Peru’s response
discouraged the Morales Government, which
considered that Peru’s instituting proceedings
before The Hague was an attempt to block
a possible agreement between Chile and
Bolivia.
Shortly afterwards, the Bolivian
Vice-Chancellor surprised van Klaveren by
announcing –for the first time– the availability
of La Paz to move forward in the negotiation
of an enclave in the north of Chile. In those
days, in an official act of a meeting held in La
Paz it was recorded that “in the analysis of the
various options available to solve the maritime
issue, those that offer greater viability in the
short term were deepened.”
The text, signed by both authorities,
announced that a number of “technical studies”
would be commissioned. Although the talks
focused on the discussion of an enclave,
Bolivia drafted, in
December 2009, an Act
that compromised Chile
to continue working on
the path established by
Bachelet.
During the presidential
inauguration, the new
authorities distanced
from the plan and saw in
it a way to “tie” the new
Government.
The The formula established an enclave
without sovereignty in the coastal sector
located to the south of Camarones Ravine
and to the north of Iquique. Initially, three
options were analyzed. By mid-2019,
however, a reference point was located
in an inhabited inlet, which has not been
declassified by the Governments of that
time. Bolivia sought a 400 km2 territory
and a dock to export minerals.
THE ALTERNATIVE THAT DID NOT PROSPER
[GRAPHIC]
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La Paz bet on not closing a sovereign corridor in the future.
On 14 June of that year, in Tarija, Morales gave
a similar message to Bachelet. During their private
conversation, the Bolivian President urged her to hurry.
“So far we have built trust.
We must move to the second phase,” said Morales,
indicating that he was willing to explore a formula without
sovereignty.
At that time, according to sources from the Bachelet
Government, the President asked to explain in detail what
Chile meant by proposing an enclave.
“After the meeting of the Presidents, maps, nautical
charts, and detailed planimetries were drawn up in relation
to possible locations,” according to a source of Carrera
building. The Department of Borders and Boundaries of
the Chilean Chancellery was entrusted with a sweeping
of the mining belongings and the owners of each of the
zones in order to detect possible future legal conflicts. The
Chancellery also polled the position of the Armed Forces.
In that context, Bachelet met in the middle of that
year with former Foreign Minister Alejandro Foxley and
Van Klaveren to discuss alternatives to solve the maritime
issue. “They brought her the folders with maps of three
places located between the First and Second Regions,”
according to officials of the time. The order of the former
President was to explore the alternatives with La Paz in a
reserved manner.
Chile’s proposal was well received in Bolivia,
which, in turn, sent to Santiago its own maps to locate the
enclave. “There was not much difference in the locations
that we had proposed; there were differences, however,
in the dimensions, which were bigger in the Bolivian
counterproposal,” adds an official who knew about the
negotiations.
The talks would continue in the following months.
There was nothing to foresee that the maritime negotiations
would remain at a standstill.
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The formula that is most
suitable for the President
Piñera wants to conclude an agreement with Bolivia and make it
a milestone of his Administration, after Peru’s claim before The
Hague is resolved in 2012. The President spoke about the issue with
Morales and has focused on consolidating the bilateral agenda.
La Tercera newspaper, Sunday, 5 December 2010
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“President Piñera was very sincere, very direct and we
are determined together to build a deep friendship of
confidence to address the issues of importance for the
two countries, including Bolivia’s maritime claim,” said
Evo Morales last August, at the end of the meeting he
held with the Chilean President in San Juan, Argentina,
within the framework of a MERCOSUR summit.
In his speech, Morales also said that Piñera
had informed him of the limitations that the Chilean
Government had with respect to the formulas to give
a solution to the Bolivian maritime claim. It was a way
of reducing the expectations that had been generated
in La Paz a month before, after the resumption of the
rounds of political consultations between Chile and
Bolivia. On that occasion, after a long and difficult
four-day negotiation in the Bolivian capital, the official
declaration included the commitment to “propose and
reach concrete, feasible and useful solutions” in the
maritime issue.
Piñera was also careful in keeping the
expectations. Earlier that week, the second meeting of
political consultations between the Vice-Chancellors of
both countries was to be held in Santiago. The Chilean
Government, however, canceled the meeting: there was
no progress on the maritime issue and the meeting could
have ended up opening a possible source of conflict.
The President’s decision was part of a long-term
strategic decision. The President has closely monitored
the issue and believes that any rapprochement with La
Paz must be built step
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by step. Not only that. In La Moneda, they point out that
Piñera has the intention of turning an agreement with
Bolivia into one of the milestones of his Administration,
after Peru’s claim before the Court of The Hague is
resolved in 2012 and Chile eventually overcomes that
dispute in good terms, which he trusts will happen.
According to people close to him, Piñera believes
that the only solution to solve someday the maritime
issue is to grant Bolivia a corridor without sovereignty in
Lluta town, in an area located almost 10 kilometers from
the First Region.
A survey of “La Tercera” newspaper in October
showed that 59% of the people refuse to grant an outlet to
the sea to Bolivia by way of a corridor without sovereignty,
that alternative was the one that had the most support;
that of a corridor with sovereignty had a 64% of rejection
and the one concerning the enclave, 63%.
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The President has talked on several occasions with Morales
regarding the maritime issue. He has always said the same thing: it is
not about granting a sovereign corridor to Bolivia or an enclave, which,
in his opinion, would mean dividing the Chilean territory and causing
serious problems, such as the free transit of trucks. The validity of the
Treaty of 1904 has been his argument in many conversations, as well as
his reference to cases of other countries that have border problems.
Once this point with Morales is clarified, the President intends to
build trust based on concrete progress in the rest of the Agenda of the
13 Points with La Paz. Several points are already underway, because,
according to Chile, the Governments of Ricardo Lagos and Michelle
Bachelet did not move forward sufficiently in the matter. The President
has ordered the
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Chancellery to move forward in the construction of
the Arica-La Paz railway, which would be operational
in 2012, and would provide facilities in the ports of
Arica and Antofagasta. He is even ready to facilitate
warehouses in the port of Valparaiso and to redouble
the economic cooperation agreements through ProChile,
as well as to move forward in border integration, free
transit and cooperation for the control of drug trafficking
at the borders, among others.
“Our attitude is that there is a problem here and
we want to help to find a solution,” is the message that
Piñera has transmitted to the Morales Government.
Piñera wants to avoid a break in the talks, at a time
when Bolivian authorities have increased the pressure
for Chile to present “concrete, feasible and useful
proposals.” Not only because he believes Morales is his
best interlocutor, but also because of his internal support.
On the horizon, the Government looks with concern on
what may happen in 2012. That year, Cochabamba will
host the OAS General Assembly and what happened
in 1979 has not been forgotten in Chile, the last time
the hemispheric organism met in a Bolivian city. At
that time, La Paz introduced its maritime claim into an
OAS Resolution. In addition, the term established by the
Transitory Article 9 of its Constitution expires in 2012,
which would force Bolivia to evict the Treaty of 1929
(sic) with Chile.
If relations are tense, it is said in La Moneda,
Chile could be in trouble: the Bolivian claim has several
allies in the region. Piñera, however, also knows that a
solution will never completely convince the Chileans or
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Annex 364
“Moreno and the enclave: ‘Alternatives that divide the country are not
beneficial’”, La Tercera (Chile), 6 December 2010
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
La Tercera Newspaper (Chile)
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MORENO AND ENCLAVE: “ALTERNATIVES THAT DIVIDE
THE COUNTRY ARE NOT BENEFICIAL”
“La Tercera” newspaper, Monday, 6 December 2010
_________________________________________
• The Chancellor explained why Bachelet’s proposal for an enclave
formula for Bolivia was discarded.
• Five Senators travelled to La Paz yesterday to address the sea access
issue with local authorities.
_________________________________________________________
“In our view, the alternatives that entail dividing the country in two,
are not alternatives that are in Chile’s benefit,” said Foreign Minister Alfredo
Moreno yesterday when explaining the reasons why the Government of Sebastian
Piñera had to discard, at the beginning of the year, the formula of a coastal
enclave for Bolivia, on which Bachelet and Evo Morales had made progress.
Yesterday, when consulted on the mechanisms explored by the Government,
Foreign Minister Moreno said in an interview with TVN (Chilean National
Television) that “we want to find all solutions that cooperate with a better access
from Bolivia to the sea, but always looking out for Chile’s interests, and the
interest of Chile will never be something that divides the country in two.”
Since mid-2007, as “La Tercera” newspaper reported yesterday, Vice-Chancellors
Alberto van Klaveren and Hugo Fernandez worked on the possibility of a Bolivian enclave
on the coast of the First Region, more precisely south of Camarones ravine and north of
Iquique. In mid-2009, Bolivia sent a technical team to the area to see the conditions of
this enclave on the ground, showing their interest in progressing in this mechanism. The
Bolivian Government requested about 400 square kilometers of territory, a dock for the
export of minerals and the possibility of building an urban and tourist area on the site.
In October 2009, and in the face of the imminent change of Government in
Chile, La Paz urged the Chilean Foreign Ministry to sign an act in which
the proof of the progress made during the talks regarding the sea issue be
recorded and that establishes the steps to be taken in the coming years.
The act arrived in Santiago at the end of December, after the first Presidential
round. In that context, Bachelet’s Government chose not to sign the document and
wait for the arrival of the new authorities. In February, the then Foreign Minister
Mariano Fernandez showed the act to the Foreign Affairs team of the incoming
Government, which halted the talks. The document, according to sources of the
current Government, was considered excessive. According to people close to
Piñera, the President believed that the formula of an enclave is not the definitive
solution to the Bolivian maritime aspiration and that, on the contrary, it could
become a new nuisance. For Piñera, the ideal solution to the Bolivian maritime
issue is still a corridor north of Lluta River –one that does not divide Chile.
In this regard, the Head of the Chilean diplomacy, although he refused to give details,
stressed that a formula with sovereignty for Bolivia is not on the table. “What we are
looking for is to improve their access to the sea and find all the solutions that are possible
for us, concrete for them and, a very important thing, that are useful,” Moreno said.
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Annex 365
J. M. Concha, Chilean Initiatives Towards a Strategic Alliance with
Bolivia (1879-1899) (2011), pp. 68 - 70 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
1488
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68
Despite Arce’s exile and Campero’s anti-Chilean speech, the Bolivian
Government did not completely rule out establishing channels for dialogue
with Chile.
Among those who actively supported the commencement of these negotiations
was the hero of the battle of Tacna, Colonel Heliodoro Camacho
who, while being held prisoner in Chile, was able to witness the Chilean
Army’s favorable state-of-mind in relation to Bolivia. On more than one
occasion, Camacho asked Campero to start negotiations separately with
Chile, in order to obtain some advantages, which would be impossible
to achieve if he remained faithful to a defeated ally, which could take
the same initiative and also approach Chile for an agreement separately.
d) The Arica Conference and other attempts for peace. Lillo, the
Representative of the “Bolivian Policy” in the north
While the main Bolivian officials were discussing the course of action
in relation to the war in 1880, the Chilean Government sought
to strengthen contacts with the intention of consolidating the bases to
reach an understanding with Bolivia. In that sense, President Pinto appointed
Eusebio Lillo during the second half of 1880 as a Government
Delegate in the Army and Navy based in Tacna. Lillo had resigned to
the War and Navy Department earlier, despite the efforts of Pinto and
Santa Maria to have a man of their confidence in that position. In spite
of this, Chile was not willing to do without this person andappointed
him toa new position of prominence in the north. Lillo’s role in Tacna
was more political than administrative in nature, since from the moment
in which he took office, he consolidated as the advocate of the “Bolivian
Policy,” which was being pursued in Santiago with much eagerness.
Pinto gave precise instructions to Lillo regarding the tasks he would discharge
in the city of Tacna. For instance, in a letter dated 2 July 1880,
he stated the following:
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The bases for peace would beon part of Bolivia: renunciation of its
rights over Antofagasta and the littoral that stretches up to Loa [River],
and, in compensation, we would cede Bolivia the rights that the
arms have given us over the Departments of Tacna and Moquegua.
Bolivia’s trade activities, both for imports as for exports, through the
ports found within the littoral extending from Antofagasta to Camarones,
would be free, in the same way that is granted to the Argentinean
Republic. These bases can only be communicated to the Bolivians
unofficially and confidentially: could the peace arrangements
not be initiated by an armistice? With the hostilities suspended and
trade relations activated, peace is likely to be strengthened in Bolivia.
In the months that followed, Lillo, both by personal attitude and following
an official mandate, devoted himself, with all his body and spirit,
to builddialogue channels to achieve a final understanding between
Chile and Bolivia–a country he considered his second homeland owing
to the years hehad lived there, the businesses he had established
and friendships he had consolidated. In fact, in the years that Lillo
stayed in Tacna, this city became the spotlight of the“Bolivian Policy.”
By July 1880, Chile was in possession of Moquegua, Tacna and Arica,
which made it feel strong enough to negotiate peace with the allies, without
losing sight of the possibility of encouraging, through bilateral talks, a satisfactory
solution for Bolivia. In that scenario, Lillo, prior to the search for a
trilateral peace negotiation, tried to establish reserved meetings with some
influential Bolivian authorities, among which his friend Mariano Baptista
stood out. These meetings were not successful because Campero ruled
out any solution proposed that entailed leaving Peru alone in the conflict.
Regarding these meetings, the Chilean Delegate in Tacna expressed
in a letter dated 28 October 1880 to Luis Salinas Vega (a Bolivian
who lived in Santiago and that had, at the request of the Government
_____________________
20 Letter dated 2 July 1880, from Anibal Pinto to Lillo. In Bulnes, op. cit., Volume II, p. 157.
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70
of Anibal Pinto, been tasked, at the outset of 1879, with carrying out
the first political contacts between his country and Chile, with a view to
having Bolivia withdraw from its alliance with Peru) the following:
I have held plenty of talks with Bolivian friends who have been
in contact with me daily. All of them admit that withdrawing from
the alliance with Peru will result in Bolivia’s salvation and aggrandizement,
but they do not have the moral energy that statesmen
develop to reject the considerations of sentimentalism and push
forward a change for salvation. For this, time is still favorable.
Bolivia can still achieve great and desirable advantages. At a later
stage, as Chile’s sacrifices and fortune increase, it will no longer
grant [Bolivia] what it is willing to grant now.21
In his efforts, and perhaps with the consensus of Pinto and Santa Maria,
Lillo came to informally raise the possibility that Bolivia ought not only
to abandon the conflict and its ally, but also join the Chilean forces,
with which it could fight together to expand the Bolivian borders at the
expense of Peru, both in the province of Arequipa and in that of Puno.
Three official meetings were held in this state of affairs in search of
putting an end to the war, on 22, 25 and 27 October 1880, in Arica port.
History would refer to these as the “Arica Conferences”.
In a first attempt to reach a definitive peace agreement, the Plenipotentiaries
of the three belligerent countries met with the Representatives
of the United States that had been authorized in their countries. The
sessions were presided over by the dean of the American diplomats,
Mr. Osborn, with the participation of Messrs. Baptista and Carrillo on
behalf of Bolivia; Arenas and Garcia y Garcia on behalf of Peru; and
Vergara, Altamirano and Lillo on behalf of Chile.
_______________________________
21 Letter dated 28 October 1880, from Lillo to Luis Salinas Vega. In Bulnes, op. cit., Volume II, p. 161.
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Annex 366
R. Prudencio Lizon, History of the Charaña Negotiation (2011),
pp. 143 - 144, 192, 345 - 347 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
v
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1497
143
4. The Bolivian public opinion in the face of the negotiation
Despite the resentment against Chile, maintained by those who could be
regarded as the “Lauca River generation”, the average Bolivian citizen wanted
the negotiation to be successful. For instance, a poll made by Bolivian El Diario
newspaper on 4 January 1976 showed the following remarkable outcomes:
“– Do you believe that a geographical compensation should be given to Chile
in the event an outlet to the sea is materialized? 1,941 people replied in the
affirmative; 591 in the negative (In this question, the rest of the respondents
abstained).
– Do you believe it is convenient for the interests of the State to have a
corridor on the Pacific, in the Chilean-Peruvian border? 5,102 responded in the
affirmative; 6 in the negative and 121 said they had doubts.
– In the event that Peru also requested a compensation of any kind, would you
believe that to be correct? 404 affirmed it would, 4,201 said no, and 624 said
they had doubts.
– If Chile refuses to give Bolivia an outlet to the sea, do you think we should
break off diplomatic relations with that country and continue living without sea
access? 921 people responded in the affirmative; 105 said no; 4,142 said they
had doubts.
– Do you think the current position of the Chilean Government with regard to
our solution to the problem of our landlocked condition is sincere? 3,985 said
yes; 632 said no; and 612 said they had doubts.
– Do you think the Bolivian Government is acting patriotically in the maritime
issue? 5,012 readers replied in the affirmative; 197 said not; and 20 said they
had doubts.
– Do you think that positive progress has been made in the negotiations between
Bolivia and Chile since the Charaña encounter? 4,988 replied in the affirmative;
115 said no; and 126 said they had doubts.
While the national public opinion supported the negotiation, the professional
politicians that were ousted by the Banzer regime were working hard to make it
fail. Chilean magazine “Qué Pasa”, which had sent its press officer, Alejandro
Pino, to La Paz who stayed in the capital for five days, wrote in that regard: “in
Bolivia, as always, the arrangement is complicated by the internal policy of the High
Plateau: the fact that President Banzer might be able to obtain that arrangement and
highlight his image is a bitter drink for his enemies, such as former Presidents Paz
Estenssoro and Siles (referring to Luis Adolfo Siles), the latter affirms that during
the FreiAdministration he had been offered a “corridor”, similar to that offered to
Banzer, but without any territorial or monetary compensations in favor of Chile. The
anti-Banzer politicians are determined to undertake the contradictory–yet common of
professional politicians– task of discrediting Banzer… but without relinquishing the
corridor alternative”.7
__________________________________
7 Qué Pasa magazine (Santiago - Chile, Nº 247, 15 January 1976).
v
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144
But Dr. Luis Adolfo Siles also nobly recognized that the negotiation started in Charaña
had important virtues. And this was reported by the above mentioned magazine,
“With the Chilean counterproposal, our diplomacy has managed to have the Chilean
Government recognize the legitimacy of the Bolivian proposals with regard to its need
for sovereign access to the sea, by offering to cede part of its territory to that end,
ruling out the contention of its Foreign Ministry to the effect that Bolivia, with the
port facilities and free transit granted to it, did not need a port”.
This magazine reported also that, asides from Mr. Luis Adolfo Siles, “former Presidents
Juan Jose Torres, Hernan Siles Suazo and Victor Paz Estenssoro have also pronounced
themselves against the exchange of territories”.
The reporters of “Qué Pasa?” magazine took advantage of their stay in La Paz to
interview President Banzer and discuss several issues related to the international
policy followed by Bolivia, but then they focused on the Bolivian-Chilean relations.
In regard to the maritime issue, Banzer informed of how the contacts with President
Pinochet started: “I met President Pinochet in Brasilia, where we both had attended
the presidential inauguration. We discussed the maritime problem and he promised
me that he would go to great lengths to solve our problem. I was impressed by his
sincerity and that is how the Charaña encounter came into being”.
President Banzer also talked to Qué Pasa magazine about the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Chile. He said with regard to that specific
matter that: “The specific purpose of the resumption of relations with Chile was to
find a solution to our landlocked condition problem. Before that, we had normal
commercial relations. It would not have had any sense to reestablish diplomatic
relations to only continue in the same status quo”.
But in relation to the negotiation being carried out, Banzer was careful. He only stated
the following: “Global acceptance means that we accept the Chilean proposition
of granting us an outlet to the sea, by means of a strip of land that has territorial
continuity from our border to the coast, and where we can fully exercise sovereignty.
Everything else is subject to negotiation”.
As can be seen, Banzer avoids talking of territorial compensation. Apparently, his
Government has already started to go backwards in terms oftheacceptance of this
compensation and sought the means to have Chile understand that no one agreed
with him in Bolivia. That said, if neither the national Foreign Ministry nor any
internationalist befriended with the Government explained the compensation issue,
it was quite improbable that the public opinion of the country agreed with it. The only
information that was available in regard to it were inscriptions on the walls reading,
“Sea at whatever cost”. And as could have been expected, that motto only served to
infuriate the people and to have it oppose to not only the territorial exchange but also
the negotiation as a whole.
v
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192
[...]
d) Press statements by Ambassador Gutierrez
For his part, Gutierrez delivered to the Santiago press, a written statement
clarifying the statements of Foreign Minister Guzman Soriano issued in La
Paz, as they had given rise to alarmist headlines that could create misunderstandings
about the negotiation process.
In that communiqué, he indicated that it was appropriate to recall that, as
had been repeatedly expressed, the Government of Bolivia had not assumed
definitive commitments. “It has been categorically stated –he said– that the
global negotiation bases that take into account both countries’ reciprocal
interests have been accepted, especially in regard to the issues on which there
are points of agreement, and that all other aspects have been left for a future
stage in the negotiation.” “Consequently –he continued– it must be placed
on record that Bolivia has not accepted the demilitarization of the Corridor,
the use of the entirety of the Lauca River waters, or the condition for an exchange
of territories in return for patrimonial sea.”
He then stated that “this position reflects the legitimate sentiments of the
Bolivian Government and people.” He reiterated that “these points, as several
others of interest to Bolivia and Chile, are subject to dynamic negotiations
between the two countries.” He concluded by stating that “both the interpretations
and comments as regards suspension or rupture of those negotiations
are totally unfounded.”
14. The Project Concerning the Creation of the Joint Boundary Commission
a) Submission of the Verbal Note proposal
Attached to a Note dated 19 March 1976, Ambassador Gutierrez sent to the
National Chancellery the original Note Nº 4086 of 11 March, by which the
Chilean Government proposed the updating of the Joint Boundary Commission,
created by the Protocol on Restoration and Conservation of Landmarks,
of 10 August 1942. 60
_____________
59 “La Tercera” Newspaper (15 March 1976).
60 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia - Embassy of Bolivia in Chile; Confidential archive, years 1975-76. (Note Nº 204/136/76 of 19 March 1976).
v
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THE END OF THE NEGOTIATION 345
6. Confidential Envoy to Chile
Instead of replying to the preceding letter sent by Pinochet, the Banzer Administration
decided to unexpectedly send a Confidential Envoy to Chile in order to propose some
sort of a “halfway solution”, mainly, to please the internal opposition in the country.
On 8 March, the mission in Santiago received an encrypted cable informing that
Willy Vargas Vacaflor, Secretary of Integration of the National Foreign Ministry was
traveling to the Chilean capital. The cable did not explain the reasons for his visit and thus the
members of the mission believed the intention was to discuss issues of economic integration.
The intention was other, however. Vargas had been sent to meet Carvajal
and analyze the maritime issue with him. As a result, Charge d’Affaires Augustin
Saavedra Weise requested the corresponding meeting on 9 March, and the Chilean
Foreign Ministry, in spite of its surprise over such a sudden request for a meeting,
accepted to hold it on the next day, after Vargas arrived to Santiago, i.e. on 10 March.
Detailed reference to the meeting held between Willy Vargas and Carvajal is
found in the book entitled “Banzer, the fate of a soldier”, written by Alfonso Crespo.
As recorded by Mr. Crespo, Vargas travelled on 10 March, seven days before
the rupture of relations, because the intention was other than the continuation of
negotiations. “What was actually sought was to find an excuse to justify the rupture”22.
According to Crespo, from the beginning, Vargas “proposed ipso facto
the elimination of the territorial exchange”. As expected, Carvajal replied that
“this was an essential requirement of the Chilean proposal of 19 December 1975”.
Thereafter, the Bolivian negotiator mentioned the three edges (points of
disagreement), which, it should be recalled, were the following: demilitarization of
the Corridor; territorial compensation for the maritime area; and the use by Chile of
the waters of Lauca River, which originated in Chile. In this regard, Carvajal replied
that, “these maritime areas are negotiable; that the Lauca issue could be studied
by an ad hoc commission; and that Chile would be satisfied if the Bolivian military
forces in the corridor were for monitoring purposes only, to fight contraband”.
Then came about the central part of the meeting, namely, the true
objective of the visit made by the Bolivian Delegate. The latter proposed
Carvajal a “halfway solution”, labelled by Crespo as “intermediate solutions”.
The halfway solution consisted in the following: 1) Autonomy
in Arica port, namely, cession of a dock with all its components
_____________________
22 CRESPO ALFONSO, “Banzer, the fate of a soldier”, op. cit. pp. 243-244.
v
1504
1505
346
in the port of Arica, similar to what Chile was preparing for Peru under the 1929
Treaty. 2) Utilization of the Corridor as a free zone for Bolivia, but maintaining Chilean
sovereignty. 3) Transfer of the Chilean section of the Arica-La Paz railroad to Bolivia”23.
Minister Carvajal, in first instance, considered that these Bolivian proposals
were quite positive. He said that he would consult his advisers and President Pinochet
to give a prompt response. He then asked when Vargas would be back to continue the
negotiation, and it was at this point where he was astounded: Vargas told him that he
needed to receive an answer on that very day, given that he had been instructed by
President Banzer to return to Bolivia on the next day, to submit his respective report.
As Crespo comments, this demand put forward by Vargas was a real ultimatum.
What was Vargas’ intention with that rude attitude? Clearly, there was a
devious interest in the Bolivian Foreign Ministry and in some officials surrounding
Banzer to have Vargas’ mission fail so there would be a justification for the
planned rupture of foreign relations. And naturally they achieved their purpose.
The Chilean Foreign Minister was astonished by such unbelievable demand
and said he did not understand that attitude. “Many months in which no progress
has been made in the negotiation have passed, better said, the Government of
Banzer himself had requested a break because he believed there was too much
criticism against the negotiation inside the country and now he wishes to solve the
problem in a single day. That is incomprehensible”, he reiterated several times.
Upon Vargas’ insistence, the Chilean Minister said he would talk
with Pinochet the soonest possible and would call the Bolivian Embassy to
schedule the meeting that would be held in the afternoon of that day, Friday.
And that was exactly what happened. The Chilean Foreign Ministry informed
the national mission that the meeting would be held at six p.m. that afternoon.
When the time arrived, Vargas and Carvajal’s conversation was resumed. But
then, it was Carvajal who changed his attitude now. He showed no sympathy for
the negotiation, and not even for Vargas’ presence in Chile. He began by saying
that of all the national proposals the only one that could be concretized quickly
was the transfer of the Chilean section of the railroad. But he emphasized that
this could be done only after an assessment of the costs is made for the railroad
and for its components, and mainly for the Chilean ordnance workers in Arica.
In regard to the cession of the Corridor as a free zone, the Chilean
Minister noted that this proposal was impossible, because Peru could
see it as a concealed (reserved) cession to Bolivia, and Chile could be
accused of breaching the 1929 Treaty. Concerning autonomy in the port
____________
23 PRUDENCIO RAMIRO, personal documents (DP3). (Information provided to the members of the Embassy by Mr. Augustin Saavedra Weise).
v
1506
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347
of Arica, he commented that this proposal was pointless, given that that area
could not be divided further, because a part of it had to be given to Peru. He
also considered that it lacked any practical utility because Arica port already
fully satisfied the needs of Bolivia’s foreign trade.
In view of that position, Vargas began to exasperate and become
aggressive. He rose his voice and said that if Chile did not accept the proposal,
it would mean that in the three years of negotiation only the problem concerning
the three edges (points of disagreement) had been solved. But Carvajal replied
that these were not totally overcome and that they were still being negotiated.
Vargas then said, irritated, that everything got back to point zero. Carvajal
undeterred responded that all matters were being negotiated because no
document had been signed.24
After a break, the Bolivian Agent changed the subject and referred
to the Peruvian veto. He said that the latter was the fundamental cause of
the opposition of the Bolivian public opinion to the negotiation with Chile.
And something unprecedented occurred at this point: Vargas, undisturbed,
demanded the Chilean Foreign Minister to return war vessel Huascar to Peru,
and, furthermore, “that the Peruvian flag be hoisted in Arica”.
Despite being a moderate man, Carvajal lost his temper. According to
Crespo, he replied: “The Huascar will not be returned to Peru because we
seized it in combat. Likewise, our flag is placed on Arica’s soil because we
fought for that. There is nothing that can be discussed in that regard”.
Mr. Crespo writes in his book that in a meeting he held with Banzer in
1993, the latter told him that he was not aware of Vargas’ proposal related to
the Huascar.
This suggestion made by Vargas confirmed the interest some government
officials had in causing the rupture of diplomatic relations with Chile to put an
end to a negotiation that tormented them.
On the next day, as scheduled, Vargas returned to La Paz and informed
President Banzer of the conversations he had had with Carvajal. He certainly
told him that the whole negotiation had been a complete failure given that the
Chilean Minister did not recognize there was anything positive in so many
years of effort and sacrifice. In this way, he managed to have Banzer break off
dialogue with Chile.
But the Vargas issue did not end with his mission in Santiago, because
he also decided to travel to Peru.
______________
24 PRUDENCIO RAMIRO, personal documents (DP3). (Information provided to the members of the Embassy by Mr. Agustin Saavedra Weise).
v
1508
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Annex 367
“Silva Cimma’s disclosure on Aylwin, Pinochet and boundary issues”,
El Mercurio (Chile), 21 July 2012
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Mercurio Newspaper (Chile)
http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={75697542-b6cd-
49aa-8fff-74ccbf42616e}
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Unpublished passages of his last interview, which was conducted in “El Mercurio” Newspaper:
SILVA CIMMA DISCLOSES INFORMATION REGARDING AYLWIN, PINOCHET
AND BORDERING ISSUES
El Mercurio newspaper, 21 July 2012
An enclave for Bolivia; a petition to former Argentine President Raul Alfonsin to intervene
in favor of Chile for Campo de Hielo Sur (South Ice Field), or “save” Patricio
Aylwin for valuable Christian Democracy (DC) issues that clashed with the rest
of La Concertación [Political Party]. Here are the stories of the former Chancellor.
By Carlos Saldivia
In his last interview, former Foreign Minister Enrique Silva Cimma spoke
with “El Mercurio” Newspaper in February this year about several events related
to his administration as Foreign Minister of former President Patricio Aylwin;
the always delicate relationship with Peru, Bolivia and Argentina; his relationship
with the former President –and his friend– and General Augusto Pinochet.
A week after his death, we published unpublished statements by
the prominent leader of the Radical Party. One of the last of his generation.
“There were never treaty-related problems with Peru”, he said that, “in the four years
in which I was Chancellor, we addressed the fishing and boundary issues with the greatest
cordiality with Peru. That never ceased to be linked to the Treaties of 52 and 54. I do not
remember a single discussion in which the Peruvians raised problems regarding international
treaties. Boundary issues with Peru were never an issue for us. They never raised
problems that were related to the treaties, hence there were no doubts about the treaties.”
“Since relations were very good at the time, the Peruvian Chancellor proposed to give us
the Peruvian land of Chinchorro, in Arica. The purpose was to create a large park on a Peruvian site in
the center of Arica, which had only caused problems until that time; nobody knew what to do with it.”
“The park was built, but it was a failure. The Peruvians asked that the
name of the park be allusive to Peru. They wanted something like the “Peruvian
Park for Peace”; we wanted to put the name of Javier Perez de Cuellar.”
Bolivians did not care for the offer of Pisagua as an enclave. “At an OAS Assembly
in Paraguay, the President of Bolivia, Jaime Paz Zamora, once again put forward the (maritime)
thesis. I replied that I was absolutely certain that if this problem had been discussed
through a diplomatic dialogue, it could have been resolved in another way, but that it was not
a diplomatic problem, but of treaties, and that the Treaty of 1904 with Bolivia was definite.”
“However, (I said) we could be willing to establish an enclave for Bolivia, and
this would be based on a port of our own. We would give it to them and they could even
exercise sovereignty over that port. We would establish a direct link by sea and they
would have the right to go out and enter freely; we would give them the air way, so that
they could arrive by air to that port, and we would allow them to have by land the servitude
over that road. We refer to the port of Pisagua, which is in the Chilean part that
once corresponded to Peru. Aylwin, who was with me, confirmed the position.”
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The next day, Jaime Paz called me early, and asked me where the port was.
I told him that “Pisagua was a well-known port, in the middle of Iquique, where it
won’t be needed the prior consent from another country. They did not care for it.”
“Desert Lagoon had a psychological importance”. Border issues
with Argentina. “In the matter of Campo de Hielo Sur (South Ice Field),
the Argentine Radical Party supported us for some time, I spoke with Raul
Alfonsin, with whom we were very close friends, and we had fought together
for the democratic recovery in both countries. He said that he would support
me. Then, as President he told me that his party would by no means support
him, and the thesis remained in discussion until today. (Jose Miguel) Insulza,
who was an undersecretary, defended the thesis, but it was not possible.
“The Desert Lagoon had a more psychological significance, because
a police officer was killed there. Lieutenant (Hernan) Merino died (in
1965) in the disputed area and that was occupied by Argentinean troops.”
“We came with Patricio (Aylwin) from Galapagos and I found a newspaper:
the news was that the problems of Desert Lagoon were solved, and in favor of
Argentina. I told Patricio that this was the news that we were going to find out.
Patricio was angry, he said that he was betting that the first question that journalists
would ask would have to do with this, he was very angry. (Upon our arrival) a
journalist approached and asked him, and he replied ’they are going to start asking
about that piece of land’, that was the phrase they fished. They took his head out”
His solution to the dilemma of Aylwin as a candidate. The Law of
Divorce: “When Patricio (Aylwin) was chosen candidate, he assumed the
government program of La Concertación party. And he made a request that is
very important to me: he told us that the [political] parties of La Concertación,
except for the Christian Democracy (DC), seemed to proclaim the Law of
Divorce. ‘They are creating a very difficult situation, because as president
of the Christian Democracy (DC), I cannot proclaim this’, he told us.”
“The Humanist Party pointed out that (Aylwin) could not ask for
something like that, that this project was part of La Concertación. This is how
very big differences began to emerge; some argued that we should not have
started with a project that was against the position of our candidate. I proposed a
solution: I told Patricio that as a candidate for the Presidency, he should not take
over the draft Divorce Law: ‘Leave it to the parliamentarians who are laypeople,
do not proclaim it; otherwise we are going to kill it,’ I said, and it was accepted.
Officially, in relation to La Concertación, the project was not supported.”
http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={75697542-b6cd-49aa-
8fff-74ccbf42616e}
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Annex 368
Debate between Presidents Morales and Piñera, CELAC 2013,
28 January 2013
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Dia Newspaper (Bolivia)
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CELAC SUMMIT
MONDAY, 28 JANUARY 2013 EVO OFFERS GAS IN RETURN FOR SEA AND PIÑERA
RESPONDS THAT CHILE WILL NOT NEGOTIATE
SOVEREIGNTY
The President of Chile, Sebastian Piñera, affirmed on Monday that his country is not willing to cut or divide its
territory, in connection with Bolivia’s request for a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, responding in this way
to President Evo Morales, who had proposed that Chile could benefit from Bolivian natural gas in return for sea
access.
Piñera asked Morales to speak clearly and truthfully in relation
to compliance with the 1904 Treaty, which was entered into
by both States 20 years after the armed conflict of the War
of the Pacific 1879-1833, agreed to by the governments
and ratified by the congresses of Bolivia and Chile.
“Chile is willing to provide facilities for a gas pipeline, for an
industrial pole; to give tributary exemptions for Bolivia to make
the best use it itself regards fitting for its gas, but there is an aspect which I do not want you to
misunderstand President Morales: matters of sovereignty are not negotiable, except for economic
interests. To Chile and to an immense majority of the world, matters of sovereignty are sensitive
issues”, said Piñera who was applauded by the attending Presidents when he concluded his address
before the first summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC, for its
acronyms in Spanish) and the European Union.
“I wish to tell you what I already told you during the campaign to run for candidate, which is what
I have already told you several times: Chile is not willing to cut or divide its territory and I do not
believe any State in the world can be asked for a situation of such a nature. We are indeed willing
and have always been willing, through dialogue, good will and cooperation, to find facilities”, said
Piñera recalling that he had asked Morales to appeal to specialized committees and working groups
to address free transit, ports and railroads, but that “Bolivia did not attend any meeting”, he added.
He held that his country supports Argentina’s claim over the Falkland Islands, because no treaty was
concluded by the former with England. The situation is different between Bolivia and Chile, however,
inasmuch the 1904 Treaty, which guarantees free perpetual transit and tax exemptions for Bolivian
commerce, is in force and complied with by the Chilean Government in spite of the privatization of
Arica and Antofagasta ports.
He invited President Morales to seek out better solutions within the specialized working groups that
had been established to tackle the Agenda of the Thirteen Points. He recalled that the 1904 Treaty has
been in force for more than a hundred years, providing stability in the borders and allowing Bolivia
and
Chile to have both good and bad relations, which is why he asked Morales Ayma to comply with that
international covenant that is perfectly valid and in force.
He stated also that, if land-based trade with bordering countries is excluded, more than 70 percent of
Bolivian commerce leaves, or enters, through Chilean ports,
“This is the best proof of the fact that the conditions offered by Chilean ports
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are favorable, because Bolivia has other alternatives of which you yourself have
reminded us plenty of times… The Chilean Government has the best willingness –
you are aware of this and I have been able to experience it myself on many occasions–
to provide faithful compliance to what established under the 1904 Treaty and to
even surpass it beyond what established under international covenants concerning
treatment for landlocked countries… Chile wants to have the best of relations with
Bolivia. But I also want you to know that this president will defend our country’s
sovereignty, because it is not only my right but also my duty, and thus if you wish to
find solutions within due respect for the international treaties our two countries have
entered into as well as within the framework of international law, you will always find
the best willingness and openness in our country. But if you seek solutions outside
respect for the 1904 Treaty, Chile will naturally, as a signatory of that treaty and since
it complies with all its treaties, take the necessary measures within international law
to have that treaty complied with”, he stated.
He asked, in that connection, the Bolivian Head of State to put an end to this
“dialogue of the deaf” that is often established between both countries and to wait
for the CELAC Summit to find paths for the future, within the solidarity, friendship
and brotherhood that must prevail between two neighboring and brother countries,
as is the case of Bolivia and Chile: “And, naturally, within respect for treaties and
international law, Chile’s position is clear, sincere and constructive, but also firm”.
Similarly, he noted that treaties can be perfected, just as Chile did in 1907, by common
agreement with Bolivia, inasmuch as he believes that it is not possible to amend an
international covenant by the unilateral will of one of the parties, which could result
in boundary problems.
http://www.eldia.com.bo/index.php?cat=1&pla=3&id_articulo=109124
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Annex 369
“The Unknown offer from Piñera to Bolivia”,
La Tercera (Chile), 11 January 2015
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
La Tercera Newspaper (Chile)
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PIÑERA’S UNKNOWN OFFER TO BOLIVIA
La Tercera newspaper, 11 January 2015
AN ENCLAVE without sovereignty at
the northern end of Las Machas beach
in Arica –where a pole of tourism and
industrial real estate development could be
built– was offered in February 2011 by the
Government of Sebastian Piñera to Bolivia.
The unknown proposal was negotiated
by the Head of the Office, Jorge Bunster,
as Special Representative of Chancellor
Alfredo Moreno, and the Bolivian Vice-
Chancellor Monica Soriano, who traveled to
Arica to inspect the lands. The “high level
exploratory talks” were always informal and
ended abruptly on March 23rd of the same
year, when Evo Morales demanded that Chile
deliver a written solution formula. In response
to the Chilean refusal, President Morales
announced the filing of the claim before the
International Court of Justice in The Hague.
Those who knew about these reserved
talks describe that the idea of this nonsovereign
enclave emerged as an alternative
to the formula that Chile and Bolivia had
been discussing at the end of the Bachelet
Government. Piñera was not in favor of
a corridor without sovereignty up to the
Pisagua inlet and the Tiliviche Ravine, in the
community of Huara, since he considered
that it divided the Chilean territory.
It was in December 2010, during a
bilateral meeting in Foz de Iguazu, in the
framework of a Mercosur Summit, that
Piñera and Evo Morales agreed to create a
special commission, headed by the Foreign
Ministers, aimed at accelerating the Agenda
of the 13 Points, “honoring what was agreed
to by the two countries at the last meeting
of Vice-Chancellors, to seek concrete, useful
and feasible solutions that will benefit both
peoples,” Piñera said after a more than two
hours meeting with the Bolivian President.
A few weeks after that meeting, the
Foreign Ministers David Choquehuanca
and Alfredo Moreno met in Santiago. They
agreed to appoint a special delegate to
carry out the negotiations. On the Chilean
side, it was already expected that the
commercial engineer and former general
manager of Copec, Jorge Bunster, who
would later become Energy Minister,
would be appointed as special delegate.
Bolivia, however, postponed the appointment
of its representative, encouraging a strong
competition for the position between the
then Bolivian Consul-General in Chile,
Walker San Miguel, and Vice-Chancellor
Monica Soriano. San Miguel even resigned
the Consulate with the hope of being the
representative of La Paz in these negotiations.
On 7 February 2011, Moreno traveled to
Bolivia to continue the negotiations. It was
the first visit of a Chilean Chancellor to La
Paz in more than 60 years. Bunster was also
in the Delegation. It was at that meeting in
La Paz that the Chilean Delegation raised for
the first time the idea of exploring territories
without sovereignty for Bolivia in Arica.
At the end of February, Bunster met in
Arica with Vice-Chancellor Soriano and
some Bolivian technicians, with whom they
went to see the areas of Las Machas beach
that could be granted as a gratuitous loan.
By that time, Soriano warned him that there
was little time left and that if there was no
concrete progress, Morales would bang his
fist on the table [and leave the negotiations].
According to a Chilean official who intervened
in these exploratory rounds, it was not clear
in the talks the specific regime that would
be given to the territory offered to Bolivia.
Bunster met meet at least twice with Vice-
Chancellor Soriano to move forward on this
issue. But the talks suffered a heavy blow on
1 March 2001 (SIC), when President Morales
dismissed Soriano. Shortly thereafter,
Bunster met with the new Vice-Chancellor,
Juan Carlos Alurralde, the same one who had
headed, back in 2009, the technical visit of
Bolivian officials to Pisagua and Tiliviche
to review the enclave offered by Bachelet.
By then, the Bolivian Government demanded
a written proposal from Chile. Chile argued
that an agreement had to be reached first and
then a proposal could be formally submitted,
otherwise, what was left in writing by Chile
would be claimed in the future by La Paz.
Without a formal and written proposal,
on March 23rd, in the speech of the Day
of the Sea, Morales announced the filing
of the claim before The Hague. The
time for Chile and Bolivia to explore
solutions, apparently, was closed.
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Annex 370
Note from the Ambassador of Peru to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Carlos Herrera, to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice,
Philippe Couvreur, 26 July 2016
(Original in English)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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Annex 371
Address by the President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Evo
Morales Ayma, to the 33rd Period of Sessions of the United Nations
Human Rights Council Geneva, 23 September 2016
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA
ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT EVO MORALES AYMA
33rd Period of Sessions of the Human Rights Council
Geneva, 23 September 2016
Brother President of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations. Greetings to
the sisters and brothers, Members of the Human Rights Council, to all institutions
and Member Governments of this great Assembly for Human Rights in the world.
Many years ago I came to this important Organization in Geneva, Switzerland as
a union leader and to defend the human rights of the native indigenous peasant
movement, especially the so-called coca leaf producers, to defend our identity,
to defend the coca leaf in its natural state. Now again I come before you, to this
Organization, this time as President of the Plurinational State [of Bolivia], to defend
the rights of my people, the Bolivian people. There could be no better place to express
the voice of more than 10 million Bolivians.
Brothers and Sisters,
On this occasion, with great respect and admiration, I congratulate the Human Rights
Council for its ten years since its creation and its work at the service of humanity.
To highlight some of the positive contributions of the Council, such as the adoption
of the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. I want to say,
Bolivia has been the first country to constitutionalize all the rights recognized in this
Declaration.
I would also like to emphasize the inclusion of several resolutions that include Mother
Earth and its relation to human rights in the General Assembly, as well as the Right
to Food.
Another issue of high importance for my country is the human right to water, which
for us is a fundamental human right, water must be a public service and not a
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private business. Similarly, basic services should be considered as a human right
throughout the world.
It is also important to highlight the Bolivian-led group charged with negotiating a
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and other People Working in
Rural Areas.
I also take this opportunity, brothers and sisters, [to indicate] that there are pending
issues, to work from here collective rights and especially the right of Mother Earth.
From the native indigenous peasant movement, from our experience in Bolivia, we
have convinced ourselves that human beings cannot exist without Mother Earth, and
Mother Earth can exist better without human beings. That is why it is important to
accelerate, and approve here, the development of Mother Earth’s right.
Brothers and sisters of the Council
We have taken important steps to concretize the protection and full realization of
human rights, yet we still have many challenges to face.
A very sensitive problem that motivates my presence in this Council is the one my
country, Bolivia, faces in relation to the human rights violations suffered by women,
men and children, entire families who live off the work of transporting goods and
people from Bolivia to the maritime coasts, crossing through Chilean territory in
order to reach the ports of the Pacific.
The International Community is well aware that my country lost its condition as a
coastal State as a result of a military invasion carried out by the Republic of Chile
in 1879, with the participation of English transnational companies. Because of this
dispossession, Bolivia was forced to subscribe the Treaty of 1904, an imposed treaty,
an unjust treaty and an unfulfilled treaty, which in theory should guarantee the free
transit of my country’s commerce.
Due to this forced landlocked condition, around 1,600 Bolivian vehicles cross the
borders of Chile, of which 70% correspond to cargo transportation.
80% of Bolivian exports and 50% of Bolivian imports are carried out through roads
and Chilean ports.
Article 6 of the 1904 Treaty establishes two fundamental commitments on the part of
Chile in favor of Bolivia:
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a) It recognizes: “in perpetuity the amplest and freest right of commercial transit
in its territory and its Pacific ports .”
b) The obligation to agree “in special acts upon the method suitable for securing”
the broadest and freest transit right.
These obligations were regulated by complementary agreements such as: the 1912
Commercial Traffic Convention, the 1937 Convention on Transit, the 1953 Arica
Declaration, the 1955 Cochabamba Act, and the 1996 Viña del Mar Act, among others.
In this context, the right of Bolivia must be of the broadest, freest and unrestricted,
perpetual, non-reciprocal transit through Chilean territory and its ports in the Pacific,
for persons and all kinds of cargo, at all times and in all circumstances, without exception;
exempt from internal controls by the Chilean authorities and payment of
storage, and also the cargo from overseas must be of the exclusive jurisdiction and
competence of the Bolivian authorities.
However, sisters and brothers, this right is not complied with, nor respected by the
Chilean Government, and even worse, it is systematically and premeditatedly denied
to the Bolivian people.
Hundreds of testimonies of Bolivians affected, mistreated and victims of recurrent
violations of their human rights account for racist and discriminatory practices based
on nationality. Every day on the border with Chile and in Chilean ports, as well as on
transit routes, Chile exercises confiscatory, restrictive and aggressive actions against
the rights of our compatriots. It is not a question of isolated events, but of regular
practices by Chilean authorities, which account for a government policy of siege and
permanent strangulation.
Sisters and brothers of the Council,
In order to know in more detail this crude reality, we have here the presence of Bolivian
transporters who face every day and first-handed this situation.
Now I want to tell you some of the facts, by way of example, that we daily face in our
forced transit from our landlocked country towards the ports of the Pacific in Chile.
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1. There are restrictions and limitations on the transit of goods from Bolivia
at the border and human rights violations of transporters and their families on
the road.
> The controls, demands and measures unilaterally imposed by Chile, cause
hundreds of trucks to be forced to wait for days at the border, making long lines to
enter that country, and forcing transporters to withstand the extremely cold climate of
the area –up to 15 degrees Celsius below zero, at a height of more than four thousand
five hundred meters above sea level– enduring a lack of medical care in the area and
a lack of food and basic services.
> Due to the lack of access to food in the waiting, control and inspection places,
the transporters must prepare or carry their own food, hiding it from the officials
responsible for control, since they impose high fines for porting and preparing food
on the road, in their own vehicles, undermining the elementary right to food and their
survival, trying to justify these restrictions with sanitary measures.
> There have been numerous cases of transporters traveling with their families,
because the wives assist the drivers in their journey accompanied by their children,
who have not been allowed to prepare or, even worse, consume their food prepared
on the road.
> Likewise, along the extensive route of more than 190 kilometers there is a
lack of sanitary services for the transporters to bathe and satisfy their physiological
needs in a dignified way. Nor is there access to water for personal consumption, which
denigrates and assaults their human condition. Despite these dramatic circumstances,
border police authorities in Chilean territory persecute, intimidate and even punish
transporters who satisfy their physiological needs in the open or on the road.
> In addition to the obstacles imposed to enter Chile and showing an absolute
lack of sensitivity, the Chilean officials work in shifts of few hours and with very
little personnel, forcing the families to sleep at the border, under extreme conditions.
> The situation is much more critical when the border is closed due to constant
strikes or work stoppages of Chilean institutions, and the transporters along with their
families must wait for weeks in order for them to resolve their internal conflicts.
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> Added to this is the fact that the main road connecting the border with the
Chilean port is in poor conditions and without maintenance, as corresponds to an
international route. It is because of this situation that a route of no more than 190 kilometers,
which should not take more than 3 hours of travel, takes more than 7 hours of
travel. All this clearly reveals the absolute disinterest of the Chilean Government to
fulfill its bilateral commitments.
Another clear example of the failure of the Government of Chile to comply with
international standards is reflected in the imposition of phytosanitary controls on our
overseas cargo by the Agricultural and Livestock Service (SAG), in clear violation
of international and bilateral agreements, which stipulates that these controls should
not be carried out in cargo that is in transit through third countries, and that the certificates
of the country of origin must be respected.
Moreover, Chile hinders Bolivian foreign trade by opening containers and scanning
cargo that does not have as its final destination Chile, breaching the Treaty of 1904,
the Arica Declaration of 1953 and even Article 5 of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) of the World Trade Organization.
These actions of the Chilean Government breach several international norms, among
which I would like to point out the following:
1. The Convention of Commercial Traffic of 1912, which establishes the following:
Article 2. Goods are declared: “exempt from all controls other than external”, “...
controls to be carried out by Chilean and Bolivian employees appointed by the heads
of Chilean Customs and the Bolivian Customs Agency.”
2. The Arica Declaration of 1953:
Point 1: “All types of cargo, without exception, in transit through Chilean territory,
from or to Bolivia, are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and competence of the
Bolivian customs authorities.”
3. Article 5 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of the WTO: Goods
in transit: “shall not be subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions and shall be
exempt from customs duties and from any transit duties or other charges imposed in
respect of transit.”
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Likewise, the Government of Chile does not comply with international land transport
agreements that mention that transit countries must respect the vehicular inspections
of the countries of origin. The Chilean authorities impose unilateral inspections on
Bolivian vehicles anywhere along the transportation route and often without legal
basis or support, stopping the commercial flow of our country.
Sisters and brothers of the Council,
Due to this inadmissible situation, our brother Chancellor, David Choquehuanca
Cespedes, on 19 July of this year, together with the authorities of the Plurinational
Legislative Assembly of my country, conducted a personal and direct verification of
the conditions and treatment of transporters in Chilean territory.
The visit of Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca and his Delegation to the ports
of Antofagasta and Arica was framed in the spirit of friendship and brotherhood that
guides the relations of the Government of Bolivia with the peoples and nations of the
world, with the objective of learning about the difficulties and providing solutions to
the various problems facing the Bolivian Foreign Trade in its transit through Chile.
The Chancellor and his Delegation were able to confirm the abuses at first hand, since
they had to wait for more than 6 hours, standing and in a space of 3 square meters
–without the slightest courtesy or consideration by the officials of the Terminal Port
of Arica– to be able to enter that port.
The delay to allow entry to the Delegation led by the Foreign Minister of Bolivia also
reveals the intention of the Government of Chile to conceal the serious violations to
the broadest and freest right of transit that Bolivia should enjoy, which is enshrined
in the Treaty of 1904 and subsequent agreements.
Sadly, brothers and sisters, the response we received to this visit, in retaliation, was
the denunciation of an agreement that allowed the entry of authorities from both
countries without the need for visas.
Despite this hostile attitude from Chile, Bolivia does not require, nor will it require
visas from Chilean authorities wishing to visit Bolivia.
Our brother Chancellor Choquehuanca and his Delegation were prevented from
accessing the ports.
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2. Maritime Ports have been privatized, and in them Bolivian goods and
transporters are mistreated:
> Although more than 80% of the cargo that the port of Arica handles is Bolivian,
Chile unilaterally has delegated the fulfillment of its commitments to private
companies, who take advantage of Bolivia’s unjust landlocked condition in order to
obtain millionaire profits.
> These companies, far from complying with Chile’s commitments, only prioritize
profit and do not make the necessary investment to meet the demand of the
Bolivian foreign trade.
> Garages have recently been closed down, forcing transporters and their
families to sleep for weeks on the road, inside their vehicles, in inhuman conditions,
without access to hygienic services, victims of crime and intolerance.
3. Bolivians suffer denigrating and discriminatory treatment
In a systematic and institutionalized way, actions, measures and norms of conduct
are carried out by officials of the Chilean State, who violate the human rights of
Bolivians.
> Transporters are victims of discriminatory and racist treatment by the Chilean
Government and Chilean border service providers, who continually abuse their
power to denigrate our Bolivian compatriots. Allow me to mention some examples
that are expressed in painful testimonies of my compatriots:
o Imposition of sanctions on transporters that include sweeping the road and
border points.
o Intimidation and threats to prevent our compatriots from protesting for having
to wash themselves with water from the radiators of their trucks.
o The personal safety of transporters and their families is threatened, who
must take care of their cargo and spend the night on the road and are often victims
of destruction of their goods and means of transportation.
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4. Chilean Authorities encourage Racial Discrimination
The various statements by Chilean authorities encourage discrimination against the
Bolivian people. An example of this is the public call of the Mayor of Antofagasta on
18 July this year, encouraging racism, publicly calling to act in a “hostile” manner
against Bolivian authorities and people. All this is registered in the media.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Chilean Government and authorities
systematically violate the human rights of Bolivian transporters in Chilean territory.
Some of the rights violated are the following:
1. Declaration of Human Rights: Article 5 – No one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment..
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Article
11, paragraph “1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions.”
3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Article 5. 3. (b) The right to security of person and protection by
the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials
or by any individual group or institution;
Brothers and sisters, members of this important Institution of the peoples of the world,
Despite this reality that defies the basic principles of the Fundamental Charter of
Human Rights, other international instruments and the multilateral institutions
responsible for guaranteeing them, Bolivia always trusts to abide by the path of
dialogue, conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes between States.
We ask that this Council pay attention and accompany us in this noble purpose of
protecting those who suffer from the violation of their fundamental rights, so that
workers and transporters of landlocked countries can
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have decent working conditions in their transit towards the ports, as well as the
protection of the most basic rights for their human condition.
I want to tell you, sisters and brothers, after Chancellor Choquehuanca’s visit to
Antofagasta and Arica, we have officially requested a meeting with Chilean State
authorities, in order to bilaterally resolve these issues. I am very sorry to say that we
have never been answered or listened to, in order to implement a bilateral dialogue
to solve the problems we have. I hope it will not be a nuisance for this Council, for
me to bring a problem, a fundamental claim, in order to request the protection of the
human rights of my people, Bolivia.
Thank you.
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Annex 372
Note from the Permanent Mission of the Plurinational State of Bolivia
before the United Nations and other International Organizations, to the
Presidency of the Human Rights Council, N° MBNU-370/41,
10 October 2016
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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Permanent Mission of the Plurinational State of Bolivia
Geneva
Ama Sua, Ama Llulla, Ama Quella
(Do not be a thief, do not be a liar and do not be idle)
MBNU – 370/41
The Permanent Mission of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations and
other International Organizations, based in Geneva, presents its compliments to the
Presidency of the Human Rights Council and has the honor to transmit herewith the
address given by His Excellency Evo Morales Ayma, President of the Plurinational
State of Bolivia, during the 33rd Session of the Human Rights Council.
Nothing the President of Bolivia has expressed in the framework of the 33rd Session
of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations can be described as aggressive and
much less as insidious. President Evo Morales made known to the UN Human Rights
Council an extremely sensitive problem that has to do with a reality of permanent and
systematic violations of human rights suffered by Bolivians who live off the work of
transporting goods from Bolivia to Chilean ports in the Pacific Ocean.
In that sense, President Morales’ call for attention to the members of the Council was
not unsubstantially made. On the contrary, these fundaments are based on testimonies
of Bolivians affected, ill-treated and victims of recurrent human rights violations
that account for racist and discriminatory practices carried out by Chilean authorities
in the ports of their country, as well as in the border area, which both States share.
Therefore, these allegations are based on objective situations regarding the violation
of Human Rights.
The protest manifested by the Government of Bolivia does not represent in any way
the intention to antagonize two sister nations and much less to generate hatred among
them. Bolivia is a country that recognizes itself as a people of the culture of peace,
of tolerance between men and women regardless of their origin, economic status or
nationality.
Bolivia attended the 33rd Session of the Human Rights Council because it is an
open forum to address human rights issues and to assist governments by formulating
recommendations, which is why it is precisely the place where the problems that
affect the peoples of the world –in the field of human rights violations– are discussed,
and is the body responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights.
The Chilean Government is wrong to point out that Bolivia brought an issue completely
beyond the competence of this Council, since the Secretary-General of the United
Nations – Ban Ki-moon said at the opening of the 4th Session of the Human Rights
Council, on 12 March 2007, that: “All victims of human rights violations
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should be able to consider the Human Rights Council as a forum for action.”
In the intervention of President Morales there are details of human rights violated by
the Chilean authorities. The lack of dignified conditions, degrading treatment, lack
of security against acts of violence constitute Human Rights violations, since they
go against the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
We regret, however, that the Delegation of Chile has responded with pejorative adjectives
not appropriate for the Human Rights Council, rather than explaining to the
international community the human rights violations committed in its territory. It is
again a sign of Chile’s lack of interest in dialogue and the resolution of pending issues.
We understand that these are times of dialogue, of working together in solutions that
allow us to resolve pending issues in a peaceful way and within the framework of the
true integration of our peoples. The solution to this conflict will not only benefit the
Bolivian people, but will also benefit the Chilean people and the integration of Latin
America.
The Plurinational State of Bolivia relies on the Human Rights Council and will continue
to make use of the appropriate forums, where the Bolivian human rights defense
is required.
The Permanent Mission of Bolivia cordially requests the Presidency of the Human
Rights Council to send copies of this note to the coordinators of the Regional Groups
so that they can distribute its content to their members.
The Permanent Mission of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations
and other International Organizations, based in Geneva, avails itself of the opportunity
to renew to the Presidency of the Human Rights Council the assurances of its
highest consideration.
Geneva, 10 October 2016
Plurinational State of Bolivia
Permanent Mission to Geneva
I enclose what is indicated.
To the Honorable:
Presidency of the Human Rights Council
Geneve.-
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Annex 373
Historical Clarifications Concerning the Origin of the Dispute Between
Bolivia and Chile
(Original in English)
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