Volume I

I
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATION TO NEGOCIATE ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)
REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PLURINATIONAL
STATE OF BOLIVIA
VOLUME I
21 MARCH 2017
II
III
IV
I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………….. 1
PART I
CHILE HAS MISINTERPRETED BOTH THE 2015 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AND BOLIVIA’S
CLAIM ...................................................................................................................................... 11
CHAPTER 1. CHILE’S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 24 SEPTEMBER OF 2015. ........ 11
A. Bolivia’s case is not a dispute about a right of sovereign access ........................................ 12
B. Bolivia’s case is not a dispute about the 1904 Treaty ......................................................... 14
1. Arrangements that are based on the right of transit constitute an issue independent of
sovereign access to the sea ............................................................................................. 15
2. The obligation to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea exists independently of the
1904 Treaty as recognised by the Court and by the practice of both Parties ................ 17
(i) The relevant context ................................................................................................... 18
(ii) Key examples ............................................................................................................ 21
CHAPTER 2. CHILE’S MISINTERPRETATION OF BOLIVIA’S CLAIM ................................................ 27
A. An obligation to negotiate ................................................................................................. 28
1. Chile’s obligation belongs to the category of obligations to negotiate under
international law ........................................................................................................ 28
2. Chile seeks to deny the legal nature of its obligation to negotiate ............................... 29
3. Contrary to Chile’s claims, Bolivia repeatedly invoked the existing obligation to
negotiate ....................................................................................................................... 33
B. An obligation to negotiate the specific outcome of the sovereign access of Bolivia to the
Pacific Ocean .................................................................................................................... 36
II
1. An obligation to negotiate a specific objective ............................................................. 38
2. Because of the precision of its objective, the obligation of Chile to negotiate may be
characterized as a qualified obligation ........................................................................ 41
C. The legal meaning of the expression “sovereign access to the sea” ................................ 44
1. The Parties’ replies to the question of Judge Owada ................................................... 44
2. The agreement of both Parties on the meaning of the expression “sovereign access to
the sea” ........................................................................................................................ 46
3. The notion of sovereign access to the sea in international law .................................... 48
PART II
LEGAL BASES OF THE OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE A SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC
OCEAN ................................................................................................................................................. 50
CHAPTER 3. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES ....................................................................... 52
A. Matters in dispute concerning the applicable legal principles ...................................... 52
B. The basis of Bolivia’s case ................................................................................................. 58
CHAPTER 4. THE OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW ............... 63
CHAPTER 5. ACTS AND CONDUCT EXPRESSING CHILE’S INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE SOVEREIGN
ACCESS TO THE SEA ................................................................................................................... 67
A. The consistent and continuous agreements, declarations (including unilateral acts)
and conduct expressing Chile’s intention to negotiate sovereign access to the sea ..... 69
B. The 1920 Act and the 1926 Matte Memorandum…………………………………...….79
1. The text of the 1920 Act ................................................................................................... 79
2. The correspondence preceding the adoption of the 1920 Act ......................................... 81
III
3. The subsequent practice, including the 1926 Matte Memorandum ................................. 82
4. The 1926 Matte Memorandum ........................................................................................ 85
C. The 1950 Exchange of Notes ............................................................................................. 89
1. The nature and content of the Notes ................................................................................ 89
2. The conduct of the Parties before the conclusion of the Notes ....................................... 94
3. The subsequent practice .................................................................................................. 95
D. The reiteration of the 1950 Agreement in the 1961 Trucco Memorandum ................. 102
E. The Charaña Joint Declarations .................................................................................... 103
1. The 1975 Joint Declaration ........................................................................................... 104
2. Confirmation and reiteration of the Agreement of Charaña ......................................... 106
F. The agreements and unilateral acts within the OAS .................................................... 112
G. The undertakings post-1990 ........................................................................................... 123
CHAPTER 6. ESTOPPEL AND LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS .......................................................... 126
A. The nature of estoppel and legitimate expectations ..................................................... 126
B. The conditions and effects of estoppel and legitimate expectations ............................ 129
C. Application of estoppel and legitimate expectations in the present case .................... 134
PART III
CHILE’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ITS OBLIGATION TO
NEGOTIATE A SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO PACIFIC OCEAN……………………………………..143
Chapter 7. CHILE’S LONG-STANDING AND REITERATED COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE A
SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE SEA .............................................................................................. 143
A. CHILE DENIES THE UNINTERRUPTED COURSE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE ...... 144
IV
1. The Process Leading to the Exchange of the 1950 Notes .................................................. 144
2. Events that followed the Agreement of 1950 ..................................................................... 147
3. The Alleged Period of ‘Silence’ between 1963 and 1974 .................................................. 152
B. CHILE MISINTERPRETS ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE OF CHARAÑA ................ 156
1. The obligation to negotiate a sovereign access has not terminated .................................. 157
2. Chile’s responsibility for the failure of the Charaña process ............................................ 161
1) Chile’s misleading description of the question of territorial compensation ......... 161
2) Chile’s lack of diligence to negotiate with Peru .................................................... 168
3) Bolivia’s efforts to negotiate during the Charaña process .................................... 171
C. CHILE’S COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE IN THE AFTERMATH .......................................... 177
1. The “Fresh Approach” (“enfoque fresco”) (1986-1987) ................................................. 177
2. The maritime issue and the Agenda without exclusions (Algarve Declaration, 2000) ..... 180
3. The 13-Point Agenda (2006) ............................................................................................. 184
4. The agreement to propose and reach “concrete, feasible and useful” solutions (2010)
……. ...................................................................................................................................... 187
D. FINAL REMARKS ................................................................................................................ 189
SUBMISSIONS AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................. 192
LIST OF ANNEXES .................................................................................................................... 193
1
2
3
1
INTRODUCTION
1. This case raises the important question of the extent to which a State is entitled to rely
upon promises and representations made by another State and, more specifically, of the
circumstances in which one may insist that the other does not arbitrarily and unilaterally close
down negotiations to which the two States have committed themselves to resolve a longstanding
matter between them.
2. Bolivia’s case concerns “the non-compliance by Chile with its obligation to negotiate
in good faith a sovereign access for Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean, and its repudiation of that
obligation.”1 Chile’s obligation arises under international law from a course of conduct over
more than a century, including agreements with Bolivia and also Chile’s own unilateral
declarations, expressly and repeatedly affirming that, notwithstanding Bolivia’s cession to
Chile of its coastal territories under the 1904 Treaty, Bolivia should not become perpetually
landlocked. Through this course of conduct, Chile bound itself to negotiate in order to grant
Bolivia its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
3. In its Counter-Memorial, Chile attempts to deny the reality that has guided relations
between the two States. The factual record demonstrates that throughout the past century
Chile and Bolivia have been in agreement on three essential points:
- The existence of an obligation to negotiate in order to grant Bolivia its own
sovereign access to the sea;
- The independence of that obligation from the 1904 Treaty; and
- A shared understanding of what a ‘sovereign access to the sea’ entails.
As was explained in Bolivia’s Memorial, it is the arbitrary and unilateral repudiation of this
position by Chile that led to the initiation of these proceedings.2
4. Chile’s Counter-Memorial fails to address Bolivia’s legal case. It pursues a combined
strategy of ignoring the applicable law, denying the historical continuity and cumulative
effect of the facts, and recycling Chile’s mischaracterization of Bolivia’s claim as an attempt
1 BM, para. 3.
2 BM, paras. 440-482.
2
to modify the 1904 Treaty, despite the express rejection of that argument by the Court in its
Judgment of 24 September 2015.
5. First, in regard to the applicable law, Chile does not adequately address the point that
obligations may result not only from express agreements, but also, as the International Law
Commission (ILC) has recognised, from the unilateral acts of a State3. While focusing on
whether the many agreements and joint declarations made by the Parties are legally binding or
not (it being Bolivia’s contention that they are binding), it is remarkable that Chile’s
voluminous Counter-Memorial does not discuss estoppel or any of the analogous doctrines in
international law. Chile simply asserts categorically that: “[t]he objective intention necessary
to create a legal obligation cannot be inferred from another State’s expectations, as Bolivia
suggests”4.
6. It is Bolivia’s position that Chile’s obligations in this case arise from agreements and
unilateral declarations expressing its intention to be bound. Further, the Court has recognized
that even without such express agreements and declarations, a mere course of conduct can
indicate an intention to be bound based on “an admission, recognition, acquiescence or other
form of tacit consent to the situation.”5 In this regard, Chile’s Counter-Memorial has failed to
refute Bolivia’s alternative argument that even if none of the multiple agreements and
declarations made by Chile expressed an intention to be bound, quod non, Chile’s repeated
representations over more than a century created legitimate expectations for Bolivia, on which
Bolivia relied, thus giving rise to legally binding obligations for Chile.
7. Second, in regard to the facts, Chile ignores the historical context and continuity of the
dispute, including Chile’s own express and repeated affirmations that Bolivia’s sovereign
access to the sea must be retained and resolved by negotiation. In a clear attempt to diminish
the cumulative effect of more than a century of its own consistent conduct, Chile portrays
3 See International Law Commission, Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable
of creating legal obligations, ILC Yearbook 2006 Vol. II, Part II.
4 CCM, para. 4.18.
5 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), I.C.J. Rep.
1992,
p. 350, para 364.
3
express and repeated agreements and unilateral declarations accepting an obligation to
negotiate as “sporadic” diplomatic exchanges that “punctuated longer periods of silence”. The
facts indicate the exact opposite.
8. Beginning in the nineteenth century, and extending throughout the twentieth century,
Bolivia and Chile consistently and continuously recognized their commitment to negotiate a
settlement to put an end to Bolivia’s landlocked status, which Chile had initially imposed by
force. This course of conduct was in furtherance of the Parties’ historical understanding
following Chile’s occupation of Bolivia’s coastal territories in the War of the Pacific in
1879. In the 1884 Truce Pact, Chile and Bolivia considered negotiations as a way to provide
Bolivia a sovereign access to the sea. This commitment was confirmed in the 1895 Transfer
Treaty by providing for sovereign access through the occupied Peruvian territories of Tacna
and Arica once their status was resolved as between Chile and Peru. The 1895 Transfer
Treaty did not ultimately enter into force. Similarly, the 1904 Treaty was concluded by Chile
and Bolivia at a time when the dispute between Chile and Peru concerning sovereignty over
those territories remained unsettled. In fact, whether in the 1920 Act, the 1926 Matte
Memorandum, or other exchanges between the Parties during this period, Chile and Bolivia
were in agreement that the question of sovereign access would be resolved only after the
status of Tacna and Arica determined. In anticipation, discussions continued between Bolivia
and Chile on a formula to provide a sovereign access to the sea.
9. This understanding was confirmed by the 1929 Treaty of Lima, which finally resolved
the question of sovereignty over Tacna and Arica between Chile and Peru. Although that
Treaty was res inter alios acta in regard to Bolivia, Chile and Peru specifically contemplated
in their agreement the cession of part of this territory in the future to a third party
(undoubtedly, Bolivia) and provided a mechanism applicable to such cession. In addition to
the significance of Chile’s own conduct, this recognition of Bolivia’s continued interest was
confirmed by Peru’s letter of 26 July 2016 to the Court, recognizing that negotiations on
sovereign access during the Charaña process (1975-78) – some fifty years after the Treaty of
Lima was concluded – reflected the “firm intention of finding a solution to Bolivia’s
4
landlocked situation” consistent with “the agreement stipulated in Article 1 of the
Supplementary Protocol to the 1929 Treaty”6.
10. Because of the devastating Chaco War (1932-35) between Bolivia and Paraguay the
question of sovereign access was not actively pursued again between the Parties until
1941. In 1950, this culminated in the conclusion of an agreement in an exchange of notes
between the Parties “to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a
formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean”.7 There is no doubt that this was a formal legally binding agreement. Chile’s own
1961 Trucco Memorandum reaffirmed the commitment made by Chile in the 1950 Exchange
of Notes. Chile attempts to dismiss the Memorandum as an inconsequential internal
document, although it was in fact submitted to Bolivia in the course of formal diplomatic
exchanges. In any event, the allegedly ‘internal’ character of the document could only give it
greater weight in confirming – that is, in Chile’s view, the Chilean Government placing its
position on record for its own reference – that Chile had in fact expressed its willingness to
negotiate sovereign access and thus had an intention to be bound.
11. Attempts to find a negotiated solution were formalised in 1975 through the conclusion
of a Joint Declaration by the Parties’ respective Heads of States. Chile accepts that what
followed in the Charaña process (1975-78) were “sustained negotiations on the possible
transfer from Chile to Bolivia of sovereignty over territory to grant Bolivia sovereign access
to the Pacific.” 8 It denies, however, that the Joint Declaration constitutes a binding
agreement, even if it was published in the Treaty Series of Chile, and was thus quite plainly
and publicly treated by Chile as a legally binding agreement rather than a mere political
commitment. In that agreement, the Parties “decided” to find a solution for “the landlocked
situation that affects Bolivia”9.
6 Note from the Ambassador of Peru to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Carlos Herrera, to the Registrar of the
International Court of Justice, 26 July 2006 para. 4.3, BR, Annex 370.
7 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, Horacio Walker Larrain, N° 529/21, 1 June 1950, BR, Annex 265.
8 CCM, para. 1.5.
9 BM, Annex 111 para. 4.
5
12. That shared resolution was reaffirmed in the same year, 1975, by a unanimous
Declaration of the Organisation of American States (OAS) on the 150th Anniversary of
Bolivia’s Independence. It affirmed that “[t]he landlocked situation which affects Bolivia is a
matter of continental concern.” The Chilean delegation to the OAS specifically indicated that
it “agrees with the approval of the Declaration” and “reiterates the spirit of the Joint
Declaration of Charaña”. This was a legal undertaking made by Chile before the entire OAS
membership to find a solution to Bolivia’s landlocked condition. The OAS remained seized of
the matter, and further declarations were made in the following years, notably in its 1983
resolution calling on the Parties to find “a formula for giving Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the
Pacific Ocean.”10
13. Against this background of a consistent and continuous course of conduct in fulfilment
of the clear historical understanding that Bolivia must not remain landlocked, Chile argues
that while the obligation to negotiate “is said to have arisen between the latter part of the
nineteenth century and 1989…Bolivia is unable to point to any specific date on which the
obligation it claims came into existence” 11 . The factual record does not support that
contention. At multiple points, Chile entered into agreements and made unilateral declarations
that individually and cumulatively created and affirmed the obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s
sovereign access to the sea. Chile also makes much of the fact that “in more than 20 years of
engagement following the restoration of democracy in Chile in 1990… Bolivia never once
alleged that Chile was under an obligation to negotiate with Bolivia over sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean.”12 The fact is that during this period, Bolivia recalled Chile’s commitment
on several occasions before Chile repudiated it in 2011 and refused to negotiate any
further. That is exactly why Bolivia finally decided to initiate proceedings before the Court in
2013.
14. Third, in regard to the characterization of the dispute, Chile misrepresents both
Bolivia’s case and the Court’s Judgment on Preliminary Objections in order to recycle its
arguments on jurisdiction. In particular, Chile persists in its view that an obligation to
negotiate sovereign access is inconsistent with the continued validity of the 1904 Treaty
10 See BM, pp. 72-79.
11 CCM, para. 1.5.
12 CCM, para. 1.5.
6
because that instrument ‘conclusively settled the matter’. That contention was the sole basis
of Chile’s invocation of Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá to object the Court’s jurisdiction,
which was squarely rejected by the Court in the following terms:
“The provisions of the 1904 Peace Treaty … do not expressly or impliedly
address the question of Chile’s alleged obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean. In the Court’s view, therefore, the matters in dispute
are matters neither “settled by arrangement between the Parties…” nor governed
by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the [Pact of
Bogotá]” [i.e. as at 30 April 1948]13.
15. Chile’s continuing refusal to distinguish between the obligation to negotiate a
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean and the independent obligations arising under the 1904
Treaty is the basis of its argument that none of the exchanges between the Parties could
constitute legally binding commitments because the Parties recognized that the negotiations
were without prejudice to the 1904 Treaty. Bolivia has consistently maintained, and the Court
has recognized, that reaffirmation of the validity of the 1904 Treaty in negotiations is wholly
consistent with the Parties’ consent to a distinct and separate obligation to negotiate the
sovereign access for which the 1904 Treaty had not provided.
16. Chile further claims that the outcome of negotiations on sovereign access would be
inconsistent with the 1904 Treaty. Both Bolivia’s case, and the Court’s conclusions,
however, are clear in this regard. It has been Bolivia’s consistent case from the outset that the
Court is only called upon to establish whether there is an obligation to negotiate in order to
give Bolivia a sovereign access to the sea, but not to determine the precise modality of such
access. Bolivia stated clearly in its Memorial that beyond that obligation, “[t]he two States
themselves will negotiate the exact terms of that sovereign access.”14 Similarly, the Court
held that:
“Even assuming arguendo that the Court were to find the existence of such an
obligation, it would not be for the Court to predetermine the outcome of any
negotiation that would take place in consequence of that obligation.”15
13 Judgment of 24 September 2015, para. 50.
14 BM, para. 3.
15 Judgment of 24 September 2015, para. 3.
7
17. The meaning of this obligation, like the meaning of every legal obligation, can be the
subject of detailed and precise analysis and exegesis; but one point is clear. The obligation
means that Chile may not refuse to include the question of Bolivia’s sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean on the agenda of negotiations with Bolivia: it cannot simply declare that there
is nothing to negotiate and completely refuse to discuss the matter in good faith.
18. This Reply consists of three Parts. Part I deals with Chile’s serious misinterpretations
of matters of principle, surprisingly including issues already settled by this Court. The first of
them refers to Chile’s biased reading of the Judgment of 24 September 2015, and the
consequences arising from the ruling (Chapter 1). Bolivia is unfortunately forced to clarify
that, contrary to Chile’s insistence, the dispute before the Court is neither a dispute based on a
right of sovereign access (A), nor a legal controversy that involves the 1904 Treaty (B). The
second misinterpretation concerns Chile’s new attempt to redefine Bolivia’s invocation of the
obligation to negotiate, which has been, again, seriously distorted (Chapter 2). Bolivia reestablishes
the legal framework of the obligation to negotiate as preliminary
clarification (A) before spelling out the precise content of the obligation as agreed upon by
the Parties, namely the materialization of the sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean (B), and
concludes with the meaning of the expression “sovereign access to the sea” (C).
19. Part II aims to clarify and complete Chile’s partial treatment of the legal framework of
the obligation to negotiate on sovereign access to the sea. As for the legal principles
applicable to the case (Chapter 3), Bolivia addresses a number of matters in dispute
concerning the expression of an intention to be bound and the obligation to negotiate in good
faith (A), as well as the precise legal basis that underpins Bolivia’s claim (B). Then, in view
of Chile’s efforts to undo its own acts and conduct and erase the legal implications arising
from them, Bolivia is obliged to bring them under review to demonstrate that each of them
establishes a clear obligation to negotiate, and that the said obligation results not only from
general international law (Chapter 4), but also from Chile’s specific and unequivocal intent
to negotiate sovereign access to the sea (Chapter 5). To this end, Bolivia demonstrates that,
contrary to the Counter-Memorial’s efforts to dilute them, Chile’s intention to negotiate a
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean is manifested through agreements, declarations,
unilateral acts, and consistent conduct (A). Because of Chile’s mistreatment of central events
in particular, Bolivia needs to clarify the meaning and scope of central instruments such as the
8
1920 Act and the 1926 Matte Memorandum (B); the 1950 Exchange of Notes (C); the
reiteration of the 1950 Agreement and the 1961 Trucco Memorandum (D); the Charaña Joint
Declaration (E); agreements and unilateral acts within the OAS, and the undertakings post-
1990 (F). Part II concludes with important considerations based on estoppel and legitimate
expectations as further legal bases of the obligation to negotiate (Chapter 6). After defining
their nature (A), and the conditions and effects arising from estoppel and legitimate
expectations (B), Bolivia demonstrates that, as consequence of Chile’s acts and conduct, both
constitute bases of Chile’s obligation to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean (C).
20. Part III sets out to unveil Chile’s attempt to create a fragmented and partial account of
the historical background and its legal consequences by showing that the obligation to
negotiate binding upon Chile is the result of a long-standing and consistent commitment
(Chapter 7). Bolivia demonstrates that Chile’s rejection of the uninterrupted and consistent
nature of its commitment is artificial and, more fundamentally, does not stand the factual
record (A), a historical backdrop which clearly denies and corrects Chile’s misrepresentation
of its own responsibility during crucial events such as the Charaña process (B), and its
aftermath, which clearly shows that, contrary to what has been submitted in the Counter-
Memorial, Chile’s own acts and conduct do not support the contention concerning the
termination of the obligation, as its own commitment to negotiate was consistently reaffirmed
since then (C). Part III concludes with a series of final remarks (D).
21. This Reply concludes with Bolivia’s formal submissions to the Court.
22. The Reply is accompanied by the annexes referred to in the footnotes throughout it,
including an index listing the annexes, which are organized, in chronological order,
in Volumes II to V. A number of the documents that Bolivia filed as annexes in the Memorial
remain relevant to the Reply and, except in cases necessary, Bolivia does not file them for a
second time. Bolivia begins the numbering of the annexes filed with this Reply at Annex 234.
11
PART I
CHILE HAS MISINTERPRETED BOTH
THE 2015 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AND BOLIVIA’S CLAIM
23. The Chilean Counter-Memorial reveals a misinterpretation of both the Judgment on
the preliminary objection issued by the Court on 24 September 2015 and the substantive
content of Bolivia’s case on the merits. In the following two chapters, Bolivia defines the true
scope, first of the judgment by the Court, and second, of Bolivia’s case on the merits.
CHAPTER 1
CHILE’S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 24 SEPTEMBER OF 2015
24. In its Judgment of 24 September 2015, the Court rejected Chile’s preliminary
objection. In doing so, it clarified a number of points regarding the scope of Bolivia’s case.
By raising once again arguments that were rejected by the Court16, Chile appears to have
profoundly misunderstood the consequences of the Court’s Judgment on jurisdiction.
25. Specifically, Chile maintains its assertion that Bolivia’s claim is a ploy designed to
bring before the Court a claim concerning its right to sovereign access to the sea; and Chile
reiterates its assertion that Bolivia’s true purpose is to revise the 1904 Treaty17 . These
assertions of a hidden agenda have already been rejected by the Court. It is therefore
necessary to clarify the conclusions of the Court’s Judgment on the preliminary objection,
namely that the dispute before the Court is not whether Bolivia has a right to sovereign access
as such18 and that the object of the dispute is not the revision of the 1904 Treaty19.
16 CCM, para. 1.17. to 1.19.
17 CCM, para. 1.4.
18 Judgment of 24 September, 2015, para. 32.
19 Judgment of 24 September, 2015, para. 33.
12
A. Bolivia’s case is not a dispute about a right of sovereign access
26. The Court confirmed that the dispute is not about a “right” of Bolivia to have access to
the sea. As demonstrated below, the case submitted by Bolivia to the Court concerns an
“obligation to negotiate”. The object of the negotiation is a “sovereign access” to the Pacific
Ocean for Bolivia, the outcome of those negotiations not being predetermined.
27. Bolivia does not claim that this sovereign access constitutes a “right”. Its claim is that
negotiations on this matter are required, and that this requirement to negotiate constitutes a
right for Bolivia and an obligation for Chile. This obligation has arisen as a result of a
consistent set of formal agreements, unilateral acts and other legal processes such as informal
agreements, tacit agreements, and acquiescence or estoppel stemming from a consistent
course of conduct and representations by Chile on which Bolivia has relied. In brief, the
obligation arises from a large variety of sources beyond formal treaties.
28. Bolivia’s position has been confirmed by the Court, which recalled that: “Bolivia does
not ask the Court to declare that it has a right to sovereign access”20.
29. The ultimate objective of the negotiations, namely Bolivia’s sovereign access to the
sea, has been repeatedly confirmed. By way of example, the Chilean Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Patricio Carvajal Prado, wrote to the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago, Guillermo
Gutiérrez Vea Murgía , on 19 December 1975 stating:
“3. Furthermore, Your Excellency expressed the gratitude of your Government for
the intentions expressed by the President of Chile to negotiate with Bolivia a
sovereign maritime coast linked to the Bolivian territory through an equally
sovereign strip of land.”
“4. c) As His Excellency President Banzer stated, the cession to Bolivia of a
sovereign maritime coastline, linked to Bolivian territory through an equally
sovereign territorial strip, would be considered.”
20 Judgment of 24 September, 2015, para. 33.
13
“4. d) Chile would be willing to negotiate with Bolivia the cession of a strip of
territory north of Arica up to the Concordia Line based on the following
delimitations:”21.
30. Further, on three separate occasions, Chile issued fully documented proposals for the
establishment of a corridor for Bolivia22. Notably, Chile has already recognized before the
Court that it engaged in negotiations regarding Bolivia’s access to the sea, stating in its
Rejoinder in the Peru v. Chile case that:
“1.43 [Peru] expressed no opposition to the notion that the boundary parallel with
Chile would become the maritime boundary between Peru and a then-envisaged
Bolivian corridor to the sea to be ceded by Chile… The existing Chile-Peru
maritime boundary would have become the Bolivia-Peru maritime boundary.”23
31. Chile even provided the Court with a map describing the proposed corridor24. Chile
further stated:
“3.17 One of the issues specifically mentioned in the Presidential joint
declaration, called the Act of Charaña, was Bolivia’s access to the sea. Following
this, Chile and Bolivia commenced negotiations on a set of arrangements to
provide Bolivia access to the sea. Negotiations had reached an advanced stage by
late-1975 and continued well into 1976.”25
32. Only new negotiations between the Parties can determine the modalities of Bolivia’s
sovereign access to the sea. The Court agrees with Bolivia’s position:
21 CCM, Annex 180. There are then thirteen paragraphs from (a) to (m), describing the envisaged corridor in
considerable detail, including its limits and geographical characteristics.
22 They are as follows: the proposal as initially made in the Treaty and protocols for the transfer of territories
(1895) the proposal made by Chilean President González Videla to Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez (1948-
1950); and the “Charaña proposal” under the Declaration signed by Presidents Banzer and Pinochet (1975).
23 Case concerning maritime dispute (Peru v. Chile), Chile’s Rejoinder, p. 28, para. 1.43. Chile devoted a full
section to “Peru’s Acknowledgement of the Maritime Boundary in the Context of a possible Access to the
Sea for Bolivia (1975-1976)”, see at 140-145.
24 The proposed maritime zone for Bolivia and its boundaries were depicted in Chile’s Rejoinder in the Case
concerning maritime dispute (Peru v. Chile). See figure 73: Diagram showing the Peruvian proposal of 1976.
25 Ibid., p. 141, para. 3.17.
14
“it would not be for the Court to predetermine the outcome of any negotiation that
would take place in consequence of that obligation.”26.
33. Contrary to Chile’s attempts to divert the Court’s attention27, the Court itself clarified:
“The subject-matter of the dispute is whether Chile is obligated to negotiate in
good faith Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and, if such an
obligation exists, whether Chile has breached it.”28
B. Bolivia’s case is not a dispute about the 1904 Treaty
34. In its Application of 24 April 2013, Bolivia requested the Court to rule that Chile was
subject to an obligation to negotiate in good faith Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea. This is
the main purpose of the Application. Bolivia does not seek to question the validity of the 1904
Treaty.
35. This was the conclusion of the Court in its Judgment of 24 September 2015, rejecting
Chile’s argument that a hidden agenda existed in the Bolivian claim29 . In reaching this
conclusion, the Court was careful to analyse the relevant provisions of this Treaty,30 deducing
that:
“The provisions of the 1904 Peace Treaty set forth at paragraph 40 do not
expressly or impliedly address the question of Chile’s alleged obligation to
negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.”31
36. However, Chile persists in asserting that the Bolivian claim is a reformulation of
Bolivia’s alleged “longstanding aspiration to change the settlement agreed in the 1904 Peace
Treaty”32 . Based on this assertion, Chile dedicates an important chapter of its Counter-
Memorial (Chapter 3 of Part I) to the significance it claims the 1904 Treaty would have with
respect to the present dispute. By doing so, Chile attempts to place before the Court two
26 Judgment of 24 September, 2015, para. 33.
27 CCM, para. 1.4.
28 Judgment of 24 September, 2015, para. 34 and 50.
29 Judgment of 24 September 2015, para. 33 and 34; cf CCM, 1.4.
30 Judgment of 24 September 2015, para. 40 and following paragraphs.
31 Judgment of 24 September 2015, para. 50.
32 CCM, para. 1.4. in fine
15
issues that are not related to the present claim: (i) the transit right that the 1904 Treaty grants
Bolivia through Chilean territory and ports, and (ii) Chile’s submission that the 1904 Treaty
entirely and definitively settled all points of dispute that might exist between the two States.
37. However, the Court’s decision as to its jurisdiction is final. As the Court stated in its
Judgment of 2007:
“The Court will however observe that the decision on questions of jurisdiction,
pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute, is given by a judgment, and
Article 60 of the Statute provides that “[t]he judgment is final and without
appeal”, without distinguishing between judgments on jurisdiction and
admissibility, and judgments on the merits.” 33
1) Arrangements that are based on the right of transit constitute an issue independent of
sovereign access to the sea
38. For a State, enjoying a transit right is factually and legally distinct from having a
sovereign access to the sea. In international law, this distinction is recognized in the
differentiation that is made between coastal States and land-locked States in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea34. The transit through its own territory granted by a
coastal State to another State deprived of a seacoast remains conditional on the consent of the
coastal State.
39. Chile refers to the alleged advantages enjoyed by Bolivia pursuant to the 1904 Treaty.
It cites Article VI of the 1904 Treaty by virtue of which Bolivia is granted a right of
commercial transit through Chilean territory and ports on the Pacific35, and Article VII of the
same Treaty, which allows Bolivia to set up its own customs agency in certain defined ports36.
40. Chile, however, refrains from mentioning serious difficulties that are widely known in
the region. In practice, the free-transit regime is severely restricted and limited and is far from
being observed by Chile. For the purposes of the present proceedings, Bolivia wishes only to
33 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, at p. 43, para. 117.
34 Part X, Articles 124 to 132 of the Convention, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3.
35 CCM, para. 3.21.
36 CCM, para. 3.27.
16
underline that the difficulties encountered by Bolivia illustrate perfectly the difference
between transit rights and sovereign access. Since it merely enjoys a transit right, Bolivia
depends on the solutions and approaches to implementation that Chile chooses to adopt37.
41. A sovereign access exists when a State does not depend on anything or anyone to
enjoy this access. Non-conditionality is a key requirement for the sovereign character of the
access. A transit right purportedly granted to Bolivia is not equivalent to a sovereign access.
The transit right is distinct from, and cannot undermine, Bolivia’s claim regarding Chile’s
obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea.
42. This is reflected in the Court’s Judgment of 24 September 2015, in which the Court
clearly accepted that the present dispute was not about the status of the 1904 Treaty38. The
Court recognized that it is a dispute of a different kind, namely the obligation upon Chile to
negotiate in good faith a sovereign access to the sea for the benefit of Bolivia.
37 To mention but a few struggles faced by Bolivia on a daily basis: discontinuity of operations of the Arica-La
Paz railway; the privatization of the Arica, Iquique and Antofagasta ports; the increase of port services;
storage and custom’s fees; endless controls of Bolivian cargo in transit; deteriorated motorways linking Arica
to the Bolivian frontier; regular strikes of the Chilean customs and port employees; unilateral tariff increases;
long waiting periods to access services; limited parking lots for drivers; serious violation of basic human
rights of truck drivers, etc. See Address by President Evo Morales Ayma, 33rd Period of Session of the
United Nations Human Rights Council Geneva, 23 September 2016, BR, Annex 371. And also see Note
from the Permanent Mission of the Plurinational State of Bolivia before the UN and other international
organizations, to the Presidency of the Human Rights Council, N° MBNU-370/41, 10 October 2016, BR,
Annex 372. Further, the diminishing competitiveness of the Bolivian economy as a consequence of the
elevated fees, reduced connectivity, and higher costs of access to global markets. See Improving Trade and
Transport for Landlocked Developing Countries: A Ten Years Review. World Bank-United Nations Report in
Preparation for the 2nd United Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs),
November 2014 (available at http://unohrlls.org/custom-content/uploads/2013/09/Improving-Trade-and-
Transport-for-Landlocked-Developing-Countries.pdf). For further analysis and details of the economic
impact, see BM Annex 180.
38 Judgment of 24 September 2015, para. 33.
17
2) The obligation to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea exists independently of the
1904 Treaty as recognised by the Court and by the practice of both Parties
43. For more than a century, the Parties agreed on the fact that the matter of Bolivia’s
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean had not been settled by the 1904 Treaty and that
negotiations on this matter did not undermine the Treaty. Chile itself proceeded on this basis
when agreeing to enter into negotiations with Bolivia. At the preliminary phase of the present
proceedings, Bolivia had the opportunity to underscore how, at various stages of this centuryold
negotiation, Chile expressed its opinion on this issue39.
44. In its Counter-Memorial, Chile seeks to gloss over the stance it repeatedly took and,
seeking to avoid its obligations, tries to present Bolivia’s claim as simply a new formulation
of Bolivia’s alleged desire to amend the 1904 Treaty40. Since such an amendment would not
be possible without Chile’s consent, Chile uses the 1904 Treaty to render any negotiation
aimed at granting Bolivia a sovereign access impossible. The Chilean stance, however, is
inconsistent.
45. On the one hand, Chile insists on the inviolability of treaties and is careful to remind
the Court that, pursuant to Article II of the 1904 Treaty, Bolivia recognized the Chilean claim
over its conquered territories41. Consequently, in Chile’s view, as of 1904 no negotiation is
possible on a Bolivian sovereign access to the sea. On the other hand, however, Chile
recognizes that, at different stages during the twentieth century, both States entered into
negotiations to provide Bolivia with “some form of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”42.
Chile goes so far as acknowledging that a binding obligation to negotiate might have existed
but then asserts that, were it to be the case, such an obligation would have already been
fulfilled as both States had negotiated in good faith and negotiations failed – so that the status
quo resulting from the provisions of the 1904 Treaty was maintained43.
39 CR 2015/19. See also Judgment of 24 September 2015, para. 23 and 47.
40 CCM, para. 1.4.
41 CCM, para. 3.11.
42 CCM, para. 1.13 (b).
43 CCM, ibid.
18
46. In a subsequent chapter of its Counter-Memorial, Chile again insists on the fact that
any question of sovereignty between both States was settled once and for all in 190444. In the
same paragraph however, Chile admits that diplomatic exchanges and political negotiations
could have brought about a change in the “allocation of sovereignty”.
47. A central question that arises in the present case is therefore very simple: if Chile
considers the 1904 Treaty to be an obstacle to any negotiation aimed at giving Bolivia a
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, why did Chile not stop all negotiations as soon as the
Treaty entered into force?. Why, on the contrary, did Chile repeatedly continue negotiating
and participating actively in them so frequently?
48. In the following paragraphs, (i) Bolivia recalls the context in which both Parties
adopted the formula according to which the search for Bolivian access to the Pacific Ocean
should occur “independently of the 1904 Treaty” and (ii) refers to a series of key examples
that leave no doubt as to the Parties shared position in this regard.
(i) The relevant context
49. As soon as the end of the Pacific War drew near, Chile’s most immediate interest was
to hold the natural resources Bolivian coastal territories45. In the longer term, however, it was
also in Chile’s own interest not to leave Bolivia landlocked46 because this would be a source
of both resentment and economic difficulties for Bolivia that could negatively impact the
stability of the region and Chile’s own interests. Different Chilean authorities subsequently
confirmed Chilean policy toward Bolivia. For example, the President of Chile, Aníbal Pinto,
stated to the Deputy Governor of Tacna on 2 July 1880 as follows:
“The bases for peace would be on the part of Bolivia: renunciation of its rights
over Antofagasta and the littoral that stretches up to Loa [River], and, in
44 CCM, para. 3.3.
45 BM, Annex 39. This was the recognized goal of the war as reflected in the 1884 Truce Pact. Chilean
Plenipotentiary Minister König cynically recalled it in the 1900 ultimatum and it is recorded under Article II
of the 1904 Treaty.
46 As expressed by Domingo Santa Maria (the Chilean President) in January 1884, five years after the start of
hostilities: “we must grant [Bolivia] an access of its own to the Pacific”. BM, Annex 36.
19
compensation, we would cede Bolivia the rights that the arms have given us over
the Departments of Tacna and Moquegua.”47
50. Two years later, as a peace treaty was being considered, the addressee of this letter
wrote to the President of Chile:
“There are two essential points in this Treaty: the incorporation into Chile of all
the former Bolivian littoral and the amendment of boundaries north of Camarones
for Bolivia to have an outlet to the Pacific and be located between Chile and
Peru”48
51. The same requirement was expressed by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a
communication to the National Congress of Chile in 1896 declaring that:
“The Government of Chile, believes that is in its interest to make all possible
efforts and do what is legally possible while observing commitments that have
been made, to fulfil the national aspiration of the Bolivian people, not only on
account of the benefit that Chile would gain bringing under its sovereignty and
dominion the coastline it currently occupies provisionally but also, in view of the
political interest in fulfilling an urgently felt need of its neighbour. The fulfilment
of that need is essential for its independence existence, as it is not only the
importation and exportation of goods that Bolivia seeks but also to end its
landlocked condition and to be able to communicate with the other nations as a
sovereign State to, conclude treaties of navigation and trade. Neighbouring
Bolivia, as Chile does, it cannot be indifferent to a nation perpetually upset by a
disorder that will last until it secures the fulfilment of its need, its independent and
economically effective international access to the Pacific Ocean. Within this
conviction, the Government, after detailed consideration, has resolved in Council
to adopt the policy to do everything possible, within the bounds of international
honour aforementioned, to satisfy that natural hope of Bolivia and the first step in
this regard would be, undoubtedly the completion of the treaties exchanged
already by approving the Additional and Explanatory Protocols submitted to the
National Congress today”49.
52. Official Chilean policy toward Bolivia was thus clearly stated, with a twofold
objective: i), taking possession of the Bolivian coastline and ii) giving Bolivia an outlet to the
sea located on the lands conquered from Peru. However, historical circumstances did not
47 J. M. Concha, Chilean Initiatives toward a strategic alliance with Bolivia (1979-1899), (2011), p. 69, BR,
Annex 365.
48 O. Pinochet de la Barra, Summary of the Pacific War - Gonzalo Bulnes (2001), p. 222, BR, Annex 350.
49 BM, Annex 189 (emphasis added).
20
allow the simultaneous achievement of both objectives. The peace agreement signed with
Peru by virtue of the 1883 Treaty of Ancón guaranteed the transfer of the Peruvian province
of Tarapaca to Chile. The result was that occupied Bolivian territories could not be returned to
Bolivia without disrupting the continuity of Chilean territory (which now included the
province of Tarapaca). Thus, sovereign access to the sea had to be secured on territories to
the north of Tarapaca.
53. A solution had been foreseen in the 1895 Treaties. These agreements were prepared
and negotiated over a long time, and duly ratified, although they did not ultimately enter into
force50. Chile is wrong in asserting that Bolivia bases its claim on the Transfer Treaty of 1895,
and erroneously claims that this Treaty did not enter into force “by agreement” of the
Parties51. These Treaties presented the solution to the two-fold objective mentioned above.
The Peace Treaty of 18 May 1895 established Chile’s continuing possession of the conquered
territories and deprived Bolivia of the 400 kilometre coastline52. The Treaty on the Transfer of
Territories of the same date anticipated putting an end to the landlocked situation of Bolivia53.
50 In its Counter-Memorial Chile focuses on only part of paragraph 16 of the Court’s Judgment. Chile notes
that, “As the Court has already observed, the 1985 Transfer Treaty ‘never entered into force’” (CCM, para
2.4). However, the Court stated in that same paragraph: “This Treaty included provisions for Bolivia to
regain access to the sea, subject to Chile acquiring sovereignty over certain specific territories”, See
Judgment, Preliminary Objections, 24 September 2015, para. 16.
51 CCM, para 1.8, 2.2, 2.4, 2.9 and 3.8. The entry into force of the 1895 Transfer Treaty was aborted in an
unorthodox manner. There was no agreement between Bolivia and Chile “to leave the 1895 Treaties without
effect”, as Chile contends. On the contrary, the exchange of ratifications of 30 April 1896 and the exchange
of notes of 29 and 30 April that year are the expression and evidence of the parties’ commitment to proceed
with the approval of the protocols that were still being processed. Final approval was left pending not with
Bolivia’s consent, but rather by Chile’s failure to comply with its commitments. Chile was warned by the
Bolivian Chancellery: “that Bolivia complied with its duty to sanction the stipulations agreed upon and that it
was the Government of Chile which, in the midst of constant hesitation, delayed their definitive sanction,
leaving to the present the approval of the aforementioned explanatory Protocols pending by its Congress.
Bolivia, however, persisted in its intention to uphold the stipulated arrangements and instructed its Legation
in Chile to continue taking the steps leading to the approval of the aforementioned Protocols.” Circular of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the Legations of Bolivia abroad, 25 January 1901, BR, Annex 234.
52 BM, Annex 99.
53 BM, Annex 98.
21
54. No return of conquered territories that were formerly Bolivian was contemplated. The
then-envisaged outlet to the sea was to be provided on what had previously been Peruvian
lands. These can be divided in two groups. First, the region of Tarapaca in the south
(previously Peruvian territory, then Chilean by virtue of the Treaty of Ancón in 1883)54.
Second, the regions of Tacna and Arica in the north - under Chilean administration, although
of an undecided status in 1895 because a referendum to decide whether they would be
returned to Peru or would become Chilean was then pending.
55. Preferably, the maritime outlet to be given to Bolivia would have been on the
territories located in the northern regions, Tacna and Arica. For Chile to dispose of them,
however, the scheduled referendum had to be in its favour. Chile undertook that if the result
of referendum was not in its favour, it would give Bolivia a less important sea outlet on what
had previously been Peruvian territory to the south, which was indisputably under Chile’s
possession55.
56. The unsuccessful event of 1895 is revealing of the objectives governing the position of
Chile. Two principles were established as a result of the new power relationship created at the
end of the 1879 military conflict: first, that Bolivia could not reclaim its coastal territories
occupied by Chile and, second, that Bolivia should not become a landlocked country.
57. In this context an agreed position emerged according to which the search for a
Bolivian access to the sea should occur “independently of the 1904 Treaty”. This formula
meant that the outlet granted to Bolivia could not be located on its former coastal territory but
elsewhere. Chile added a further requirement, namely that its territorial continuity could not
be interrupted. Consequently, any transfer of territory had to be located in the far north of
Chile along its boundary with Peru.
(ii) Key examples
58. This compatibility between respect for the 1904 Treaty and the negotiation of a
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean for Bolivia is explicitly recognized in the 1919
Memorandum:
54 BM, Annex 97.
55 BM, Annex 98.
22
“V. Independently of what was established in the Peace Treaty of 1904, Chile
accepts to initiate new negotiations aimed at satisfying the aspirations of the
friendly country, subject to Chile’s triumph in the plebiscite”56.
59. In 1923, this recognition was reiterated again in explicit terms by the Chilean
authorities when it was affirmed that:
“The revision of our treaty, furthermore, is not a necessary legal condition for
entering into negotiations to realise Bolivia’s desires: that Treaty does not contain
any other territorial stipulation than the one declaring Chile’s absolute and
perpetual dominion of the area of the former Littoral included in the Atacama
Desert, which had been the subject of a long dispute between the two countries.
[…] Chile will never recognize the obligation to give a port to Bolivia within that
zone, because it was ceded to us definitively and unconditionally in 1904, and
also, because, as I said in my note of the 6th of this month, such recognition
would interrupt the continuity of its own territory; however, without modifying
the Treaty and leaving its provisions intact and in full force and effect, there is no
reason to fear that the well intentioned efforts of the two Governments would not
find a way to satisfy Bolivia’s aspirations, provided that they are limited to
seeking free access to the sea and do not take the form of the maritime vindication
that Your Excellency’s note suggests.”57
60. The meaning of Chile’s position is clear; “maritime vindication” was only possible in
regard to territories other than those ceded by Bolivia under the 1904 Treaty. The above
explanation of its Foreign Minister was provided shortly after Bolivia approached the League
of Nations hoping to recover its lost territories. Chile did not want the issue of a possible
return of former Bolivian territories to be raised. However, it was willing to grant to Bolivia
its own access to the Pacific Ocean in northern territories on lands won by Chile (or that Chile
expected to obtain) from Peru58.
56 BM, Annex 19; CCM, Annex 117.
57 CCM, Annex 126 (emphasis added).
58 An apparent difficulty of a purely formal nature should be addressed. In 1904, the territories of Tacna and
Arica were not under Chilean sovereignty but merely under Chilean administration. However, when in 1904
Chile signed the Treaty with Bolivia delimiting their respective territories, it included that northern region of
Tacna and Arica. This Treaty therefore delimited the boundary between Bolivia on the one hand and, on the
other, regions with an ambiguous juridical status, Tacna and Arica. Once their status was decided in 1929,
Tacna was returned to Peru and Arica remained Chilean. Consequently, the boundary resulting from the 1904
Treaty signed between Bolivia and Chile remained the same boundary between those two States and, on the
23
61. The subsequent landmarks of the history of the negotiations, i.e. the Exchanges of
Notes of 1950 or the Agreement of 1975, confirm this interpretation and the agreement
existing between both States on this point. Replying to the Bolivian note of 1 June 1950, and
recalling the previous commitments of his country, the Foreign Minister of Chile declared
that:
“… together with safeguarding the legal situation established by the Treaty of
Peace of 1904, has been willing to study, through direct negotiations with Bolivia,
the possibility of satisfying the aspirations of the Government of Your
Excellency…”
“and that, motivated by a fraternal spirit of friendship towards Bolivia, is willing
to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that
could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean”59.
62. A proper analysis of the previous exchanges clearly shows the meaning of the
expression “together with safeguarding the legal situation established by the Treaty of Peace
of 1904” is clear. Chile would not accept any transfer that would return to Bolivia the
seacoast which was part of the Chilean territory by virtue of the 1904 Treaty. However,
another solution would be compatible with the Chilean requirement to comply with the 1904
Treaty.
63. The same analysis applies to the 1961 Trucco Memorandum (named after its author,
the Chilean Ambassador), and the exchanges between the two States that started in 1975 and
represented the most advanced stage of negotiations. Bolivia noted that no reversal of the
cession of territories secured in the 1904 Treaty was required: there would be no return to
Bolivia of the territories that had previously been under Bolivian possession. At the same
time, Chile made an offer to Bolivia of a territory located north of Arica to grant it sovereign
access to the sea. During these different stages of negotiations, Bolivia always demonstrated
its agreement with Chile’s interpretation of the requirement to negotiate.
other side, the boundary delimiting the Tacna region became the frontier between Peru and Bolivia. See the
map produced by Chile: CCM, page 39.
59 See Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Horacio Walker Larraín, to the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, N° 9, 20 June 1950, BR, Annex 266.
24
64. In the event that negotiations successfully led to the granting to Bolivia of a corridor in
the region of Arica, depending on the exact nature of the modalities of the sovereign access to
be agreed on by the Parties, a modification of the boundary established by the 1904 Treaty
may have been required. But neither State considered it as an obstacle as the 1919
Memorandum demonstrates in stating that:
“VI. It would be a matter of a prior agreement to determine the line to indicate the
boundary between the areas of Arica and Tacna that would come under the
dominion of Chile and Bolivia, respectively, as well as the other commercial
compensation or compensation of another kind that would be the basis for the
agreement”60.
65. During the most advanced negotiations, the Charaña negotiations started in 1975, the
written record makes clear that Chile considered the 1904 Treaty as an obstacle for former
Bolivian territories to be returned to Bolivia, but not to negotiations on a Bolivian sovereign
access to the sea involving territories located in the north. As confirmed by eminent Chilean
lawyers:
“Dans l'esprit du gouvernement de Santiago, les négociations avec la Bolivie
doivent aboutir à un accord autonome par rapport à toute autre pratique
conventionnelle antérieure entre les deux pays. Cela signifie que le Traité de Paix
de 1904, qui a consolidé les arrangements territoriaux entre les deux pays, n'est
d'aucune façon interprété, modifié ou révisé par le nouvel accord objet de la
négociation. De ce point de vue, l'accès souverain de la Bolivie à la mer serait
juridiquement entièrement indépendant des réclamations historiques relatives à la
perte du littoral maritime, et le principe Pacta sunt servanda serait donc
respecté”61.
66. In summary, the practice and conduct of both Parties over many decades demonstrates
that negotiations to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean were independent of
the 1904 Treaty. The Parties never contemplated the abrogation of Article II of the 1904
Treaty whereby Bolivia ceded its coastal territories to Chile. Both States accepted that the part
60 BM, Annex 19 and CCM, Annex 117.
61 R. Díaz Albonico, M. T. Infante Caffi, F. Orrego Vicuña, « Les négociations entre le Chili et la Bolivie
relatives à un accès souverain à la mer», -Annuaire français de droit international, vol. 23, No. 1 1977,
p.353, BR, Annex 313.
25
of the boundary located further north in Tacna/Arica could be modified and that this would be
independent of the 1904 Treaty.
26
27
CHAPTER 2
CHILE’S MISINTERPRETATION OF BOLIVIA’S CLAIM
67. Bolivia has asked the Court to declare that Chile is under an obligation to negotiate in
good faith a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Bolivia dedicated an important part of its
Memorial to the nature of that obligation.62 The Court, in its Judgment on the Preliminary
Objection, defined the scope of the respective arguments:
“Moreover, should this case proceed to the merits, Bolivia’s claim would place
before the Court the Parties’ respective contentions about the existence, nature
and content of the alleged obligation to negotiate sovereign access63”.
68. Given that Chile has misinterpreted the Bolivian claim, Bolivia is forced to clarify it.
The nature and content of the obligation upon Chile to negotiate clearly derives from the
prolonged and continuous conduct of the Parties since the end of the Pacific War (Truce Pact
1884). Chile, however, asserts that the exchanges with Bolivia on this subject were purely
political and as such could not have created any legal obligation64. Basing its argument on a
distinction between obligation of means and obligation of result, Chile distorts and confuses
Bolivia’s claim.
69. In accordance with the Court’s expectations outlined above, in this Chapter Bolivia
will analyse in further detail the obligation binding upon Chile. First, Bolivia demonstrates
that such an obligation qualifies as an obligation to negotiate (A). Second, Bolivia shows that
this obligation to negotiate has a precise and defined content, namely an obligation to
negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean (B). And, to conclude, Bolivia spells out the
legal meaning of the terms “sovereign access to the sea” (C).
62 See Chapter II (p. 97) and Chapter III (p. 157) of Bolivia’s Memorial.
63 Judgment of 24 September 2015, para. 33.
64 CCM, para. 1.1.
28
A. An obligation to negotiate
1) In international law, the obligation of Chile belongs to the category of obligations to
negotiate
70. The obligation that Bolivia invokes is an obligation to negotiate. This category of
obligation is well known among the obligations that are identified under international law65.
Underpinned by the principle of good faith, the legal nature of such an obligation is
indisputable66.
71. In the present proceedings, the obligation to negotiate arises from a variety of sources
that will be presented in Part II, Chapter 5. To demonstrate the nature of this obligation,
Bolivia highlights the particular significance of the Joint Declaration of Charaña67, which
constitutes:
65 See further Part II, Chapter 4 below. The obligation may be defined as “l’obligation imposant aux partenaires
d’une relation internationale spécifique, l’engagement et la conduite de bonne foi de négociations” (J.
Salmon (dir.), Dictionnaire de droit international public, Brussels: Bruylant, 2001, at p. 767). The States
concerned must “régler avec sagesse un compromis d’intérêts” (P. Reuter, « De l’obligation de négocier », in
Il processso internazionale, Studi in onore di Gaetano Morelli, Milano: Giuffré, 1975, p. 714). The goal is to
reach an agreement and the “reconnaissance d’une marge dans laquelle les partenaires peuvent aller à la
rencontre l’un de l’autre” (Ibid.).
66 “En dépit du degré élevé d’appréciation subjective qu’elles comportent au profit de ceux qui y sont soumis et
du fait que leur mise en oeuvre nécessite habituellement l’intervention d’accords complémentaires (ou mieux
de discussions unilatérales discrétionnaires), les obligations de coopération, de négociation, de consultation et
même de simple considération (d’un événement futur éventuel en vue d’une action également éventuelle)
constituent des obligations juridiques, dont un tiers peut déterminer, dans certains limites, si elles sont
exécutées de bonne foi. Leur violation entraîne les mêmes conséquences que tout autre obligation juridique”,
See «La distinction entre textes internationaux de portée juridique et textes internationaux dépourvus de
portée juridique (à l’exception des textes émanant des organisations internationals): septième Commission:
rapport provisoire», Michel Virally, Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, vol. 60, issue 1, 1983 p.
255.
67 CCM, Annex 174.
29
“…l’affirmation solennelle par les parties d’un accord ou d’une série d’accords
entre elles, portant sur des points importants de leurs relations mutuelles ou sur
des principes – juridiques ou non – destinés à gouverner ces relations”68.
72. Chilean lawyers, commenting on the process of the Charaña negotiations in which the
two States engaged in 1975, clearly characterized them as the implementation of an obligation
to negotiate:
“La réponse du gouvernement chilien peut en fait être considérée comme une
promesse unilatérale, étant donnée qu'elle constitue l'acceptation d'une norme de
conduite, dont l'objectif est de commencer une négociation. En tout cas, la portée
de l'obligation est bien clairement limitée à une simple négociation, idée que le
texte chilien suggère en parlant de «...cadre pour une négociation destinée à
atteindre une solution... »”69.
73. The quote above highlights certain key elements. On the part of Chile, there was the
“acceptation d’une norme de conduite”. The word “norme” is unequivocal. Moreover the
same authors use the term “obligation”, which implies a binding requirement. The phrase
“portée de l’obligation” further underscores its characterisation as an obligation to negotiate.
It is also acknowledged that this is a “négociation destinée à atteindre une solution”.
2) Chile seeks to deny the legal nature of its obligation to negotiate
74. Before the Court, Chile seeks to deny that it is bound by an obligation to negotiate by
asserting the following: i) negotiations were never conducted; there were simply discussions
or diplomatic exchanges; ii) The willingness to negotiate expressed by Chile was merely a
political posture. There was no intention to create any legal obligation; iii) Subjective
declarations of intent cannot create an objective legally binding commitment. Each distortion
of the historical record is addressed in turn.
68 See «La distinction entre textes internationaux de portée juridique et textes internationaux dépourvus de
portée juridique (à l’exception des textes émanant des organisations internationals): septième Commission:
rapport definitive», Michel Virally, Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, vol. 60, issue 1, 1983, p.
198.
69 R. Díaz Albonico, M. T. Infante Caffi et F. Orrego Vicuña: « Les négociations entre le Chili et la Bolivie
relatives à un accès souverain à la mer », Annuaire français de droit international, vol. 23, No. 1, 1977, p.
353, BR, Annex 313.
30
75. The first distortion by Chile in its Counter-Memorial is to replace the term
“negotiations” (which has a legal content) with the vague term “discussions” or by the very
general expression “exchanges that were purely diplomatic and political”70. However, by
doing so, Chile ignores the string of documents that Chile itself produced recording its
commitment to enter into “negotiations” that in fact it pursued. It is worth dwelling on some
revealing examples to solve Chile’s lack of rigor.
76. On 18 January 1978, in a letter to the Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez, the
President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte stated:
“I reiterate my Government’s intention of promoting the ongoing negotiation
aimed at satisfying the longings of the brother country to obtain a sovereign outlet
to the Pacific Ocean. […] In order to locate the real prospects of the negotiations
that we are committed to, Your Excellency considered it appropriate to make a
brief review of what happened from August 1975 to date, when the Government
of Bolivia submitted its guidelines to commence it”71.
The Chilean Head of State does not refer simply to discussions but to “negotiations”,
reflecting the fact that he committed himself to engage in them and the “intention” of his
Government to promote them.
77. That Chile is in fact well aware that these are true negotiations (as opposed to
diplomatic and political exchanges), is reflected in the title of the book published by its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs “History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978”72.
78. The term “negotiations” was also used by Chile before the Court when, during the
proceedings against Peru regarding their maritime border, it mentioned a “possible access of
Bolivia to the sea”. Chile referred to “negotiations between Chile and Bolivia in 1975-1976,
which envisaged an exchange of territories”73.
79. The second distortion by Chile in its Counter-Memorial is its assertion that a State’s
expression of a “willingness” to do something (to negotiate with Bolivia regarding its
70 CCM, para. III 2.
71 BM, Annex 78; CCM, Annex 236 (emphasis added).
72 CCM, annex 189.
73 Case concerning maritime dispute (Peru v. Chile), Chile’s Rejoinder, para. 3.16.
31
sovereign access to the sea) cannot constitute a legal obligation for that State74. Chile cites a
note of 1923 from the Chilean Foreign Minister to the Ambassador of Bolivia as evidence that
no commitment exists. In this text the Minister states his “willingness to discuss the proposals
that the Bolivian Government wishes to present”. Chile concludes that:
“Chile’s expressed ‘willingness’ was not language capable of evidencing an intention
to create any legal obligation”75.
80. The historical record shows that Chile repeatedly used the term “willingness” to
characterize its position regarding the possibility of providing Bolivia with a sovereign access
to the sea. Chile seeks to restrict the scope of this word by suggesting that it always refers to a
political posture, distinguishing it from the term “intention”. However, this is a false
distinction76. In order to establish an obligation of a State, international law does indeed take
into account the intention expressed by this State. In the present case, and interpreting the
terms in good faith, there is no opposition between the terms “willingness” and “intention”;
the affirmation of one (the willingness) indicates the existence of the other (the intention). In
Part II of the present Reply, Bolivia will demonstrate how the various acts of Chile evidence
its intention to be bound.
81. The third distortion by Chile in its Counter-Memorial consists in drawing a distinction
between, on the one hand, subjective statements that would only commit their authors and, on
the other hand, objective actions binding the State77.
82. However, Chile cannot disregard the fact that the “objective” manifestation of an
intention occurs through:
“des aspects sociaux, c’est-à-dire dans les manifestations extérieures,
objectivement constatables, qui lui ont permis d’atteindre à l’efficacité dans la
création du droit”78.
74 CCM, para.1.28, 4.2 and 5.27. See further Part II, Chapter 5.
75 CCM, para. 5. 27.
76 See further Part II, Chapter 5.
77 CCM, para. 4.7.
78 See «La distinction entre textes internationaux de portée juridique et textes internationaux dépourvus de
portée juridique (à l’exception des textes émanant des organisations internationals): septième Commission:
32
83. Declarations and commitments made by State authorities are fundamental to
establishing a State’s objective intention. It is well established that when a Head of State or a
Minister of Foreign Affairs intervenes in the arena of international relations, he does not
speak on his own behalf but on behalf of his State.
84. The jurisprudence of the Court does not support the possibility that State
representatives who have made legally binding declarations79 on behalf of their Government
may withdraw from their statements and claim that they were mere political declarations. In
the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain Case, the
Court noted:
“The two Ministers signed a text recording commitments accepted by their
Governments, some of which were to be given immediate application. Having
signed such a text, the Foreign Minister of Bahrain is not in a position
subsequently to say that he intended to subscribe only to a ‘statement recording a
political understanding’, and not to an international agreement”80.
85. In accordance with the jurisprudence of this Court, Chile may not now dismiss as
words with merely political significance all declarations and exchanges by which they have
asserted their willingness to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean81, and
disregard the rules governing international relations conducted in good faith.
86. Indeed, even if it had made a merely political commitment, quod non, Chile cannot
deny that:
rapport provisoire», Michel Virally, Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, vol. 60, issue 1, 1983, p.
238.
79 As recalled by the ICJ in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, “in determining what was indeed the nature of the
act or transaction embodied in the Brussels Communiqué, the Court must have regard above all to its actual
terms and to the particular circumstances in which it was drawn up” (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1978, p. 3 at p. 39, para. 96).
80 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
Judgment I.C.J. Reports 1994. p.122.
81 CCM, para. 4.7 and 4.14.
33
“A State that has entered into a purely political commitment is subject to the
general obligation of good faith which governs the conduct of subjects of
international law in their mutual relations.
Consequently, it is subject to all legal obligations resulting from such a
commitment, in particular when it has created the appearances of a legal
commitment on which another person has relied and if the conditions required by
international law for the creation of such obligations are fulfilled”82.
3) Contrary to Chile’s claims, Bolivia repeatedly invoked the existing obligation to
negotiate
87. By seeking to single out certain events from an ongoing series of historical facts, Chile
tries to demonstrate that there has never been, at any time in more than one hundred years of
relations regarding this issue with Bolivia, any behaviour that could have the effect of
creating a legally binding obligation. According to Chile, throughout this long period, only
“sporadic diplomatic and political exchanges” are identified83, and Chile characterizes the
main instances of past negotiations as “discrete and very different periods”84. Chile now
claims that, prior to filing the case before the Court, Bolivia had not maintained that an
obligation to negotiate existed for Chile85.
88. However, this characterisation of the historical record is not supported by the facts.
Bolivia’s stance has remained consistent through the past decades. On numerous occasions
dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century, Bolivia referred to the fact that Chile
(which, from the time of the ratification of its territorial conquests onward, affirmed its
willingness to negotiate a solution to the landlocked situation of Bolivia) had committed itself
to negotiate and had, consequently, to deliver on this commitment. Admittedly, due to certain
periods of Bolivia’s history, phases of more intense negotiations were momentarily paused;
however, as soon as they were successfully overcome Bolivia continued raising its claim and
Chile, for its part, left the door open to negotiations until 2011, when it was abruptly closed.
82 “International documents with legal effect, and international documents that are lacking in legal effect”:
Conclusions du rapport définitif, Annuaire del Institut du Droit International, Vol. II, Tome II, Session de
Cambridge, 1983, p. 141.
83 CCM, para. 1.3.
84 CCM, para. III.2.
85 See CCM, para. 5.40, 6.8. and 9.10.
34
89. This is addressed in more detail below86, however, for present purposes, it is worth
highlighting some key examples:
a. In a note addressed to the League of Nations on 8 September 1922, reference is made
to “the promise contained in the speech of M. Edwards, the Chilean Delegate, during
the course of that meeting”87. The speech referred to was made before the Assembly
of the League of Nations during the session of 1921. By recalling the promise that
had then been made, Bolivia assumed that Chile would abide by that promise.
b. In 1929, in the Memorandum addressed by Bolivia to the US State Department,
Bolivia first recalled Peru’s stance (which was open to granting Bolivia an outlet to
the sea on its former provinces), and then the terms of the message by Peru’s
President Leguía in 1926 as follows:
“The Problem of the Pacific cannot be solved without invoking the right of Peru
and, in any case, our fraternal willingness to aid Bolivia in securing an exit to the
sea which she claims with such great need.”
Bolivia then underscored that these declarations committed their authors:
“Such eloquent and solemn declarations, coming from the Governments which
participated in the struggle of 1879, did not seem destined to be cast into
oblivion”88.
c. The 1950 Exchange of Notes was preceded by lengthy discussions that had been
initiated as early as 1941, reflecting the pending issue between the two States and
Bolivia’s concern to remind Chile of its commitment.
d. Bolivia reminded Chile that it was engaged on the path of negotiations and that it had
to pursue them, during a speech of the Foreign Minister of Bolivia on 3 April 1963,
when he said:
86 See below, Part III, Chapter 7 (A).
87 See CCM, Annex 122. The meeting referred to was held on 28 September 1921. The exchanges between
1921-22 need to be read in the light of the Bolivia-Chile meeting of 10 January 1920, CCM, Annex 118.
88 BM, Annex 23.
35
“The Exchange of Notes of 1 and 20 June 1950, according to the norms of
International Law, constitutes a formal commitment between Bolivia and Chile in
order to give Bolivia an own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean and to give
Chile, in return, an appropriate compensation that is not territorial in nature. This
commitment is inseparable from the legal regime governing the relations between
Bolivia and Chile and is guaranteed, as any other exchange of Notes, by the faith
of both States and their national honor”89.
When the Bolivian Minister speaks of “the juridical regime”, it is clear that he is referring to a
legal commitment90.
e. Similarly, in 1967 the Bolivian President Barrientos explicitly asked Chile to deliver
on its commitment made in the Notes of 1950:
“The unshakeable belief that the existing commitments must be fulfilled assign
meaning to the attitude adopted by Bolivia as to its claim that the obstacles to its
full development be overcome, thus seeking to ensure the peace and progress of
this part of the continent”91.
f. In 1977, the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile respectively made a joint
statement in which:
“…they indicate that…they initiated negotiations aimed at finding an effective
solution that allows Bolivia to count on a free and sovereign outlet to the Pacific
Ocean”92.
g. On 26 October 1979 while addressing the General Assembly of the OAS, the
Bolivian delegate publicly recalled the long list of commitments made by Chile,
according to which Chile offered Bolivia an access to the Pacific Ocean. This was
done in front of all of the States of the continent93.
89 BR, Annex 287.
90 CCM, Annexes 165 and 166.
91 CCM, para. 16, d) and Annex 170.
92 BM, Annex 165, CCM, Annex 222.
93 BM, Annex 203 and CR 2015/21; Organization of the American States, Minutes of the Second Session of the
General Commission of 26 October 1979, Bolivian delegate, Gonzalo Romero, pp. 360-361, CCM, Annex
248.
36
90. The obligation to negotiate established through such acts entails two consequences.
First, Chile cannot refuse to enter into negotiations on the sovereign access to the sea and
cannot rely upon any projected improvement of the free-transit regime to indefinitely
postpone the resumption of negotiations. Second, this legally binding obligation does not
require the Parties to engage only in general discussions; it imposes an obligation to negotiate
on a specific subject matter, as examined in turn.
B. An obligation to negotiate the specific outcome of the sovereign access of Bolivia
to the Pacific Ocean
91. The content of an obligation to negotiate results, on the one hand, from the general
applicable principle and, on the other, from more specific elements, depending on the
particular objective pursued through negotiation.
92. As set out in Part II of this Reply, the general principle applicable results from the
obligations upon all States laid down in Article 33 of the UN Charter. Any State having a
dispute with another State shall settle it by peaceful means listed in the Charter, the first of
which is negotiation. In the present case, however, this lex generalis is complemented by the
lex specialis that arises from the specific commitments made by Chile, according to which
Chile stated its willingness to negotiate with Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
This second source of the obligation arises from the specific subject matter in question. This
section of the Reply examines first the way in which this subject matter has been described;
and based on this description there will follow an analysis of the nature and scope of this
obligation.
1) An obligation to negotiate a specific objective
93. As stated by the Court:
“…the precise nature and limits of which [an obligation] must be understood in
accordance with the actual terms in which they have been publicly expressed”94.
94. In their exchanges, Bolivia and Chile consistently identified the subject matter of the
negotiations into which they were willing to enter, namely the granting to Bolivia of
94 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253, para. 51.
37
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. These negotiations have a specifically defined
objective that the Parties must pursue, namely to put an end to Bolivia’s situation as a State
without a seacoast. Many examples exist of exchanges between the two States in which Chile
commits itself on this subject matter. Some key examples are recalled in the following
paragraphs (emphasis added, in each case).
95. On 9 September 1919, Chile addressed a memorandum to Bolivia in which it stated:
“…Chile is willing to seek that Bolivia acquire its own outlet to the sea…”95.
96. On 2 March 1923, both the willingness of Chile to negotiate and the subject matter of
this negotiation (“facilitating the access of Bolivia to the sea through its own port”), were
expressed by the President of Chile Arturo Alessandri to the Ambassador of Bolivia, who
reported it in a note to his Minister96.
97. On 4 December 1926, the Matte Memorandum (the Chilean Foreign Minister),
recalled the negotiations conducted with the US State Department, and stated that:
“…the Government of Chile has not rejected the idea of granting a strip of
territory and a port to the Bolivian nation”97.
98. During the Exchange of Notes of 1950, the subject matter was formulated with clarity:
“[Chile] … motivated by a fraternal spirit of friendship towards Bolivia, is willing
to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that
could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial character which
effectively takes into account its interests”98.
99. When negotiations were resumed in 1975, the subject matter of the negotiations was
formulated by both Parties. The Charaña Joint Declaration dated 8 February 1975 stated that
both Head of States convened to search for a formula:
95 BM, Annex 19 and CCM, Annex 117.
96 BM, Annex 51.
97 BM, Annex 22 and CCM, Annex 129.
98 BR, Annex 266 and CCM, Annex 144. Additionally, the long preparation of this Exchange of Notes that
began as early as 1941, evidences that the consistent aim pursued by the negotiators is to put an end to the
landlocked situation of Bolivia. See BM, Annex 55 and CCM, Annex 135 and 160.
38
“for solving the vital matters that both countries face, such as the landlocked
situation that affects Bolivia, taking into account their reciprocal interests and
addressing the aspirations of the Bolivian and Chilean peoples”99.
100. In the following Exchange of Notes, the note coming from the Chilean Foreign
Minister on 19 December 1975 stipulated:100
“c) As His Excellency President Banzer stated, the cession to Bolivia of a
sovereign maritime coastline, linked to Bolivian territory through an equally
sovereign territorial strip, would be considered.
d) Chile would be willing to negotiate with Bolivia the cession of a strip of
territory north of Arica up to the Concordia Line based on the following
delimitations…”.
101. In 1977, with negotiations at a standstill, the Chilean President offered to redouble
efforts to reach the set objective. Confirming the subject matter of this objective, and
particularly its joint character, his Bolivian counterpart replied on 8 February 1977:
“Your Excellency’s expressions ratifying the will to advance in said negotiations
aimed at overcoming Bolivia’s geographical confinement, through a free and fully
sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, from the current state of this transcendental
diplomatic process, constitute, without a doubt, a powerful encouragement to
strengthen our effort intended to reach the most desired goal of all Bolivians”101.
102. Despite the difficulties faced, this goal was maintained and repeated that same year,
first in a Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the two States on 10 June 1977102,
again in September 1977 in a joint communiqué involving Chile, Bolivia and Peru,103 and
finally on 23 November in a note from the President of Chile to his Bolivian counterpart in
which he states:
99 BM, Annex 111 and CCM, Annex 174.
100 See BM Annex 73 and CCM Annex 180.
101 BM, Annex 75 and CCM, Annex 218.
102 BM, Annex 165 and CCM, Annex 222.
103 BM, Annex 129 and CCM, Annex 224.
39
“My Government appreciates the special importance that the current negotiations
to give Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean have in the context of our
relations. My Government maintains unchanged the political will that gave rise to
these negotiations and is willing to move ahead with them in accordance with the
desires and with the intensity that Your Excellency deems advisable”104.
103. The same objective was publicly recognized by Chile before the General Assembly of
the Organization of American States. On 24 October 1979, the head of the Chilean delegation
declared in this forum that it was only through dialogue that the path towards a sovereign
access to the sea would be open for Bolivia105. On 31 October, he again affirmed:
“Chile’s willingness to negotiate a solution with Bolivia to its aspiration to have
free and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”106.
104. The General Assembly of the Organization reaffirmed this objective in its resolution
No. 426 of 31 October 1979107, and again in its resolution AG/RES. 560 (XI-O/81) of 27
November 1980108.
105. Chile claimed its willingness to start a process once more in 1983, when the AG/RES.
686 (XIII-O-83) General Assembly adopted a resolution exhorting both countries:
“…to begin a process of rapprochement and strengthening of friendship of the
Bolivian and Chilean peoples, directed toward normalizing their relations and
overcoming the difficulties that separate them including, especially, a formula for
giving Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, on bases that take into
account mutual conveniences and the rights and interests of all parties
involved”109.
104 BM, Annex 76 and CCM, Annex 234.
105 Minutes of the 6th Plenary Meeting, 9th Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, 24 October 1979,
Vol. II, OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2, BR, Annex 319.
106 BM, Annex 204 and CCM, Annex 249.
107 BM, Annex 191 and CCM, Annex 250.
108 BM, Annex 192 and CCM, Annex 253.
109 BM, Annex 195 and CCM, Annex 266. While in its Counter-Memorial Chile tries to minimize the scope of
these resolutions, they nonetheless provide additional evidence of the agreement between the two States on
the subject matter of the negotiation that the Organization urged them to conduct. This point will be
discussed in more detail in Part II, Chapter 5(F).
40
106. In 1987, during a meeting held in Montevideo, the Chilean Foreign Minister, alluding
to the Charaña Joint Declaration, recalled that:
“…the commitment to move forward with the dialogue at different levels was
expressly enshrined in order to find a formula for the many vital issues both
countries faced, for instance, the one related to the landlocked status that affects
Bolivia, within the framework of reciprocal benefit and also taking into account
the aspirations of the Bolivian and Chilean people”110.
107. In the same year, anxious to see the issue settled, the OAS adopted a new resolution
which referred to: “an equitable solution… whereby Bolivia must obtain sovereign and useful
access to the Pacific Ocean”. The text continues as follows: “The objective indicated in the
preceding paragraph must be accomplished in the spirit of brotherhood and American
integration…”111. Significantly, in both paragraphs it is the verb “must” that is used.
108. It is apparent that, for more than a century, both Parties agreed that Chile had to
negotiate with Bolivia in order to achieve the objective of both States, namely granting
Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The Bolivian claim before the Court concerns
this specific obligation, which Chile now refuses to observe and comply with in good faith.
109. However, the specificity of the situation that evolved between the two States should
not be ignored. As observed by the Court in its Judgment of 24 September 2015, it represents
“a particular dispute that arises in the context of a broader disagreement between Parties”112.
As a consequence, the Court:
“considers that, while it may be assumed that sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean is, in the end, Bolivia’s goal, a distinction must be drawn between that goal
and the related but distinct dispute presented by the Application”113.
110. This obligation, which is the subject matter of the present dispute, is consequently
distinct, as emphasised by Bolivia114, from what would be an obligation to grant the said
110 BM, Annex 169.
111 BM, Annex 199 and CCM, Annex 300.
112 Judgment of 24 September 2015, para. 32.
113 Ibid.
114 BM, para. 497.
41
sovereign access to Bolivia. Bolivia will now address the scope of the obligation, resulting
from the Court’s definition.
2) Because of the precision of its objective, the obligation of Chile to negotiate may be
characterized as a qualified obligation
111. It follows from the historical record, as cited above, that Chile is subject to an
obligation to negotiate in relation to a specific subject matter. That clearly identified subject
matter permits the clarification of the scope of the obligation in question.
112. International law provides ample guidance on the conduct required once an obligation
to negotiate has arisen and its object has been defined by mutual agreement115. In the case of
the Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland116, the Permanent Court of International
Justice noted that the commitment to negotiate entails an obligation to pursue them as far as
possible, with a view to concluding an agreement117. The Court, in the Gulf of Maine Case
referred to:
“…the duty to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to do so in good
faith, with a genuine intention to achieve a positive result”118.
113. In the Lanoux Lake case of 1957, it was observed that even if the standards governing
negotiations are quite flexible, their very existence require that certain conditions are
respected:
“…la réalité des obligations ainsi souscrites ne saurait être contestée et peut être
sanctionnée, par exemple, en cas de rupture injustifiée des entretiens, de délais
anormaux, de mépris des procédures prévues, de refus systématiques de prendre
en considération les propositions ou les intérêts adverses, plus généralement en
cas d’infraction aux règles de la bonne foi (affaire de Tacna-Arica, Recueil des
sentences arbitrales, t. II, p. 921 et suiv.; affaire du trafic ferroviaire entre la
115 See further Part II, Chapter 4.
116 Railway traffic between Lithuania and Poland, PCIJ, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1931, Series A/B, No.
42, p. 116.
117 Ibid.
118 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246,
para. 87.
42
Lithuanie et la Pologne, Cour permanente de Justice internationale, A/B 42, p. 108
et suiv.)”119.
114. In its Judgment on the North Sea Continental Shelf, the Court observed that:
“(a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to
arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a forma1 process of
negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic application of a certain
method of delimitation in the absence of agreement; they are under an obligation
so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be
the case when either of them insists upon its own position without contemplating
any modification of it”120.
115. As an example of an unjustified refusal to negotiate and to consider the proposals or
interests of the other party, a fine illustration is Chile’s attitude in June 1987. Bolivia
submitted two memoranda, including alternative proposals on enclaves, for Chile’s
consideration, and Chile first agreed to examine them, but then suddenly rejected them. Chile
claimed that any transfer of territorial sovereignty was unacceptable, but the truth is that the
very subject matter of the obligation to negotiate, as defined several decades ago and pursued
over many years with Chile’s consent, had consistently referred to such transfers121.
116. In the present case, the obligation to behave so that negotiations are meaningful
required Chile to pursue them without moving away from the goal set for these negotiations,
i.e. granting Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Once the subject matter of
negotiations has been specifically defined, as in the present case, neither of the Parties may
modify nor abandon it unilaterally122. Yet, that is what Chile purported to do. The note
verbale of 8 November 2011, whereby Chile indicates its refusal to recognize any obligation
to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea, represents a blatant infringement of this
obligation123.
119 Affaire du lac Lanoux (Espagne, France), 16 November 1957, XII RIAA, Vol. XII pp. 306-307.
120 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p 47.
121 See further below, Part III, Chapter 7(C) (1).
122 Award in the matter of an arbitration between Kuwait and the Aminoil Company, 24 March 1982 (21 ILM
976) See also the ICJ Judgment on the North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969, quoted above.
123 BM, Annex 82.
43
117. The specific obligation to negotiate in the present case may be considered in relation
to the wide range of situations in which there is an obligation to negotiate. This wide range
does not divide neatly into two distinct categories (i.e., obligations of conduct, and obligations
of result), as Chile suggests124. More precisely, “sa portée est susceptible de degré”125.
118. At one end of the spectrum is a non-conditional obligation. This does not mean that
there is simply an obligation merely to enter into negotiations. It is also required, as indicated
by the Permanent Court of International Justice, that the States “… pursue them as far as
possible, with a view to concluding agreements126. There is also a large variety of conditional
obligations to negotiate. These are qualified obligations: that is, the obligation to negotiate is
entered into within a predetermined framework imposed upon the parties for the duration of
the negotiations. The precise result of the negotiations, however, is not predetermined,
because a wide margin of discretion is left to the Parties.
119. Between the mere obligation to enter into negotiations on the one hand, and the
obligation to conclude an agreement on the other, an obligation to negotiate will have varying
effects depending on the intentions of those who have created it. In the present case, the
framework for negotiations has been precisely demarcated by the Parties. It differs from an
obligation of result, but it is an obligation to negotiate with a view to reaching an agreement
regarding the objective that has been agreed upon by the Parties (a Bolivian sovereign access
to the sea) and to do so taking into account elements from previously drafted commitments. It
is this obligation that Bolivia asks the Court to recognize as falling upon Chile. Bolivia will
further explain the scope of this obligation by examining the exact definition of the expression
“sovereign access to the sea”.
124 CCM, para. 1.10.
125 P. Daillier, M. Forteau, A. Pellet, Droit international public, Paris: LGDJ, 2009, para. 504.
126 Railway traffic between Lithuania and Poland, PCIJ, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1931, Series A/B, No.
42, p. 116. This is confirmed by the ‘Principles and guidelines for international negotiations’ adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 1998, whereby the Assembly refers to “the importance of
conducting negotiations in accordance with international law in a manner compatible with and conducive to
the achievement of the stated objective of negotiations”, Doc. UNGA RES/53/101, 8 December 1998.
44
C. The legal meaning of the expression “sovereign access to the sea”
120. The expression “sovereign access to the sea” is a specific phrase that has historically
been used to refer to the subject matter of the negotiation between Chile and Bolivia. Asked
by Judge Owada about the meaning of this expression, Chile and Bolivia have respectively
provided answers. First, Bolivia recalls the content of those answers (1). Then, Bolivia
demonstrates how, over past decades, both States have agreed on the specific meaning of this
expression in the negotiations between them (2). Finally, Bolivia identifies the criteria that
characterizes a sovereign access to the sea in international law (3).
1) The Parties’ replies to the question of Judge Owada
121. Following the hearings on the Preliminary Objection raised by Chile, Judge Owada
put the following question to the Parties:
“In the course of the present oral proceedings, as well as in the written documents
submitted by the two sides, both the Applicant and the Respondent have been
referring to the expression ‘sovereign access to the sea’. This is not a term of art in
general international law, though the Applicant and the Respondent have been
referring to this expression in describing either their own position or the position
of the other side. I should appreciate it if both of the Parties would define the
meaning of that term as they understand it, and explain the specific contents of
that term as they use it for determining their position on jurisdiction of the
Court”127.
122. Both Parties submitted their replies in writing128. Subsequently, each Party submitted
written comments on the reply of the opposing Party129.
123. In its response, Bolivia emphasized, on the one hand, that an agreement with a view to
negotiating and the final outcome of such a negotiation are two different matters, and, on the
other hand, that both Parties had repeatedly agreed that granting Bolivia a sovereign access to
the sea was an issue independent from the 1904 Treaty. As a consequence, the case now
brought before the Court does not refer to the specific modalities or the content of this
sovereign access to the sea, but rather to the obligation to negotiate aimed at the establishment
127 CR 2015/21. 8 May 2015.
128 See the Parties’ answers submitted to the Court on 13 May 2015.
129 See the respective comments of the Parties submitted to the Court on 15 May 2015.
45
of such an access. Bolivia noted that the existence and specific content of a future agreement
between the Parties were not issues at stake in these proceedings. Bolivia clarified:
“The broad understanding of the parties as to the definition of ‘sovereign access to
the sea’, as reflected in their successive agreements to negotiate and the various
proposals to find a solution, is that Chile must grant Bolivia its own access to the
sea with sovereignty in conformity with international law”130.
124. Bolivia’s position faithfully reflects the historical record. As mentioned above, from
the end of the Pacific War until the breakdown of negotiations in 2011, both Parties agreed on
the objective of the negotiations, namely granting Bolivia a sovereign access to the sea. As
will be further demonstrated, there was agreement between the two States on another aspect
of the matter, namely the interpretation of the expression “sovereign access to the sea”.
125. Chile, in contrast, in its reply to the question of Judge Owada, insisted on the fact that
according to the meaning of that expression that Chile attributes to Bolivia, it necessarily
involves a territorial cession. Chile claimed that, in formulating its objection to jurisdiction, it
used the expression “sovereign access to the sea” with the same meaning as used by Bolivia
in its Application and its Memorial.
126. Misinterpreting Bolivia’s reply, Chile contended that Bolivia modified its
understanding of the expression “sovereign access to the sea” during the course of
proceedings, so as to be in a better position when faced with the plea of lack of jurisdiction131.
In its comments on Bolivia’s reply, Chile insisted that a sovereign access to the sea inevitably
demands a cession of territory and that this is impossible due to the inviolability of the 1904
Treaty. This is simply incorrect.
127. The discrepancy between the Parties’ positions on the definition of “sovereign access
to the sea” is recent. Chile cannot erase the fact that it shared with Bolivia a common
understanding of the expression until recently, when its position radically changed.
130 Written reply of Chile to the question put by Judge Owada at the public sitting held on the afternoon of 8
May 2015.
131 Comments in writing of Chile on the written reply of the Bolivian Government to the question put by Judge
Owada at the public sitting held on the afternoon of 8 May 2015 (15 May 2015).
46
2) The agreement of both Parties on the meaning of the expression “sovereign access to
the sea”
128. Both Parties agreed on the subject matter of the negotiation and on their understanding
of that subject matter. It is therefore surprising that Chile now attempts to distance itself from
the position it had maintained since the end of the nineteenth century.132
129. Both States considered that sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean could be granted
through a territorial strip exiting onto a sea coast area, either apt for the construction of a port
or already provided with one. Territories thus transferred would come under Bolivian
sovereignty. Some key examples of the Parties’ agreement in this regard are provided in turn.
130. The 1895 Treaty of Transfer of Territory 133 reflects Chile’s initial position: to
definitively take possession of the Bolivian seacoast, but without leaving Bolivia deprived of
an outlet to the sea134. Consequently, this Treaty anticipated the transfer to Bolivia, with full
sovereignty, of the territories of Tacna and Arica (insofar as they would be under Chilean
possession, depending on the outcome of the scheduled referendum on which Chile had
agreed with Peru). The sovereign access to the sea envisaged in this Treaty was to be
achieved through the transfer to Bolivia of territorial sovereignty over a large seacoast
territory135. In the event that the result of the scheduled referendum was to the disadvantage of
Chile, another formula, also in the form of a territorial cession, was envisaged.
131. After the signing of the 1904 Treaty, enshrining the conquest of the Bolivian territory
by Chile but leaving unresolved the issue of a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia, Chile
declared its willingness for the settlement of the sovereign access issue. In the Memorandum
of 9 September 1919, for example, the Chilean Foreign Minister declared that his country was
132 Comments in writing of Bolivia on the written reply of the Chilean Government to the question put by Judge
Owada at the public sitting held on the afternoon of 8 May 2015 (15 May 2015).
133 It is common ground that this did not come into force.
134 See II, 1, b, para. 17.
135 BM, Annex 98.
47
ready to make all necessary efforts for Bolivia to gain its own access to the sea: “…ceding to
it an important part of that area to the north of Arica and of the railway line…”136.
132. In other documents, the expression “own port” can be found, illustrating Chile’s
understanding of Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea. For example, in the message of the
President of the Republic of Chile to the Ambassador of Bolivia in Santiago, dated 2 March
1923, Chile asserts the willingness of its country to facilitate a Bolivian access to the sea
“through its own port”137. This understanding of a sovereign access still entails a territorial
cession.
133. The exchange of notes that took place in June 1950 is particularly relevant. The
subject matter of the negotiation to which Chile committed itself is the “sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean”138, and the meetings in preparation of this diplomatic exchange shed light
on the scope of the term. The Ambassador of Bolivia, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, reported on
24 December 1949 on his meeting with the Chilean President Gabriel González Videla. They
talked about providing a solution regarding the “Bolivia’s port problem”, it was reported that
the President of Chile did not require “any territory from Bolivia in exchange for the zone it
will cede Bolivia”139.
134. The sovereign access included a corridor and a port, both of which would be placed
under Bolivian sovereignty. In the Charaña process, in a note dated 19 December 1975 signed
by the Chilean Foreign Minister, Patricio Carvajal Prado, the notion of sovereign access is
specified in the following terms:
“…the cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coastline, linked to Bolivian
territory through an equally sovereign territorial strip, would be considered.
136 BM, Annex 19 and CCM, Annex 117.
137 BM, Annex 51.
138 Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Horacio Walker Larraín, to the Bolivian Ambassador to
Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, No 9, 20 June 1950: “….my Government will be consistent with that
position and that, motivated by a fraternal spirit of friendship towards Bolivia, is willing to enter into a direct
negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”, BR, Annex 266.
139 BM, Annex 64.
48
Chile would be willing to negotiate with Bolivia the cession of a strip of territory
north of Arica up to the Concordia Line based on the following
delimitations:…”140.
Once again, and here with a specific geographical location identified, the sovereign access
offered to Bolivia is defined as including a seacoast area linked to Bolivia by a strip of
territory.
135. In 1987, a new round of negotiations was initiated (the “enfoque fresco” or ‘fresh
approach’). While Chile submitted no specific proposal, Bolivia submitted to Chile two
memoranda offering various options, one including a port and a strip of territory for access
and another proposing enclaves141. “Sovereign access to the sea” was clearly understood in a
territorial sense.
136. The conduct of these past negotiations is crucial. They are inextricably linked with an
aspect considered above, which is the agreement of both Parties (until recently, when Chile
changed its mind) that negotiations were independent of the 1904 Treaty.
3) The notion of sovereign access to the sea in international law
137. There is no dispute between the Parties as regards the definition of sovereign access
(the modalities of which have yet to be agreed). Bolivia and Chile have consistently
considered that the purpose of negotiations on sovereign access to the sea is to put an end to
Bolivia’s landlocked status. Bolivia’s sovereign access is thus different from a mere right of
transit over Chilean territory.
138. Sovereign access exists when a State does not depend on anything or anyone to enjoy
this access. Whatever the practical solutions adopted, sovereign access is a regime that
secures the uninterrupted way of Bolivia to the sea – the conditions of this access falling
within the exclusive administration and control, both legal and physical, of Bolivia.
140 BM, Annex 73 and CCM, Annex 180.
141 BM, Annexes 27 and 28.
49
139. Bolivia has been consistent in its position in maintaining that Chile is subject to an
obligation to negotiate. While the outcome is not predetermined its framework is conditioned
by the nature of the agreed content of the negotiations and the criteria guiding its execution.
140. Finally, Bolivia reaffirms once again its intention that the granting of such sovereign
access to the sea will be the product of a bona fide negotiation, mindful of the interests of
both Parties.
50
PART II
THE LEGAL BASES OF THE OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE A SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE
PACIFIC OCEAN
141. This Part of the Reply addresses Chile’s contention that none of its numerous
promises, commitments, and negotiations with Bolivia on granting it sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean gave rise to a legal obligation. According to Chile, the consistent and
continuous conduct of the Parties over more than a century, including multiple agreements
with Bolivia, Chile’s own unilateral declarations, and other representations made by Chile to
Bolivia, expressing its willingness to negotiate in order to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to
the sea, was “all purely a matter of politics and diplomacy, not law”142.
142. Chile’s contention that its conduct did not give rise to any legal obligations is without
merit. First, the fundamental nineteenth century historical bargain whereby Bolivia ceded its
coastal territories in exchange for sovereign access to the sea on Chile’s then-undefined
northern boundary with Peru, and the long and unequivocal record of agreements and
promises by Chilean Presidents and Foreign Ministers to negotiate with Bolivia to grant it
such sovereign access in fulfilment of that historical bargain, demonstrates an intention to be
bound and not merely a series of empty political promises. Second, and irrespective of its
intention to be bound, it is notable that Chile does not seriously engage with legitimate
expectations as an additional basis for its legal obligations towards Bolivia143. Even assuming
arguendo that none of Chile’s agreements and promises gave rise to legal obligations, quod
non, Chile made repeated representations on which Bolivia relied, so that Bolivia’s legitimate
expectations gave rise to an obligation on the part of Chile.
143. As a matter of principle, Chile’s assumption that politics and law are mutually
exclusive is misplaced. It may be true that certain diplomatic exchanges do not as such give
rise to legal obligations; but this does not mean that in appropriate circumstances they cannot
constitute legally binding commitments. It is well-established that:
142 CCM, para. 8.31.
143 CCM, fn 204.
51
“[L]egal disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are likely to occur
in political contexts, and often form only one element in a wider and longstanding
political dispute between the States concerned. Yet never has the view
been put forward before that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is
only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the
parties the legal questions at issue between them.”144
144. In the present case, Chile’s denial of the existence of any legal commitment to
negotiate a sovereign access to the sea contradicts both the applicable international law on the
formation of obligations and the undisputed facts demonstrating that Chile expressed its full
consent to enter into negotiations to find an appropriate solution to grant Bolivia sovereign
access to the sea.
145. The applicable principles concerning the expression of an intention to be bound and
the obligation to negotiate in good faith will be addressed in the first chapter of the present
Part (Chapter 3). The following chapters will then establish that the evidence demonstrates
Chile’s undertaking to negotiate with Bolivia on granting it sovereign access to the sea. To
that end, and to answer Chile’s arguments put forward in the Counter-Memorial, Bolivia will
consider each of the legal sources of the obligation to negotiate sovereign access to the sea
and will show that the said obligation results from a number of different legal bases, each of
them being able on its own to establish the said obligation to negotiate. Chile’s obligation to
negotiate on sovereign access to the sea results not only from general international law
(Chapter 4) but also from Chile’s specific and unequivocal intent to negotiate sovereign
access to the sea (Chapter 5), as well as from the principle of estoppel and legitimate
expectations (Chapter 6).
144 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, 24 May 1980, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.20,
para. 37.
52
CHAPTER 3
THE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Matters in dispute concerning the applicable legal principles
146. Although there are many points of agreement between Bolivia and Chile as regards the
principles applicable to the formation of obligations in international law (in particular as
regards the regime applicable to the conclusion of treaties or agreements, and the binding
effects of unilateral acts)145, there are a number of statements in the Counter-Memorial which
mischaracterises Bolivia’s legal claim or the applicable principles of international law.
147. First, Chile claims that “[e]ntering into negotiations does not create an obligation to
negotiate again merely because one State becomes dissatisfied with the result”146. This is not,
however, Bolivia’s case. Bolivia’s case is that Chile is bound to negotiate sovereign access to
the sea not merely because it in fact entered into negotiations, but as a result of Chile’s own
agreements, unilateral promises, commitments, statements, and course of conduct over time.
Chile intended Bolivia to understand that it was making, and acting in accordance with, a
commitment to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia147.
148. Second, Chile relies on a subjective approach to establish the existence of international
obligations by arguing that “Bolivia never once alleged that Chile was under an obligation to
negotiate with Bolivia over sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean” 148 . This subjective
approach does not correspond to the well-established methodology according to which the
existence of an international obligation has to be established objectively149.
145 On which see BM, para. 291-334, and CCM, para. 4.2-4.22.
146 CCM, para. 1.2.
147 See Part I, Chapter 1(B)(2).
148 CCM, para. 1.5. See also para. 1.26.
149 See e.g. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, 1 July 1994, ICJ Report 1994, pp. 121-122, para. 27.
53
149. Further, it is not true to say that Bolivia never claimed that Chile consented and agreed
to negotiate sovereign access to the sea. This is addressed in more detail below150. To take
some recent examples151:
a. As Bolivia recalled during the oral proceedings on preliminary objections in May
2015 – without having been challenged by Chile on that point – “[m]ore than 30
years ago, in 1979, Bolivia made a statement before the General Assembly of the
Organization of American States [152 ] recalling the numerous promises made to
Bolivia by Chile to negotiate sovereign access to the sea”. Chile did not object at that
time to this statement;153
b. Bolivia also pointed out in May 2015 that:
“[T]he declaration made in 1984 by Bolivia on signing the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea is free of any ambiguity: according to Bolivia,
its sovereign access to the sea must be the product of negotiations — which was
accepted by Chile — and not of a unilateral denunciation of the 1904 Treaty. In
that declaration, Bolivia officially placed on record in that connection that ‘it will
assert all the rights of coastal States under the Convention once it recovers the
legal status in question as a consequence of negotiations on the restoration to
Bolivia of its own sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean’”154.
Once again, Chile did not object to that declaration, which has been duly communicated to the
depositary and thus to the signatory of the UNCLOS. In the declaration made upon signature
and confirmed upon ratification of UNCLOS, Chile considered it necessary to reserve its
rights with regard to Argentina only155.
c. Chile made the observation in its own Counter-Memorial that (i) in 1963 (that is to
say, more than 50 years ago) Bolivia contended “that the [1950] notes constituted a
150 See Chapter 7, section A. See also Chapter 2, section A(3).
151 See Chapter 2(C)(2) above and Chapter 5 below.
152 See BM, Annex 203.
153 See CR 2015/21, p. 18, para. 7. The same statement was publicly reiterated by Bolivia in 1987 (BM, Annex
210) and in 1988 (BM, Annex 213).
154 CR 2015/19 (Translation), pp. 15-16, para. 28-29 (fn. omitted).
155 Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declaratio…
Statement made upon signature (10 December 1982) and confirmed upon ratification (25 August 1997).
54
‘commitment’ and suggested that these established ‘legal rules’”, and that (ii) this
position of Bolivia was “reiterated by its President in 1967 (…)”156.
150. Third, Chile contends in relation to some of its key statements, that it “nowhere used
the language of legal obligation”157. Chile decides on its own definition of what ‘the language
of legal obligation’ must be and then decides that because a statement does not use it, the
statement cannot be legally binding, arguing that the words used by both Parties shows that no
obligation exists or were meant to exist158. Such an approach does not correspond to what
Chile acknowledges to be the applicable law: i.e. that intent to be bound has to be “objectively
construed”159 and that “careful analysis of all of the terms of the instrument is of course
necessary, together with consideration of the circumstances in which they were drawn up”160.
151. In the present case there is no doubt that, if relevant circumstances, in particular, the
fact that for more than a century Chile repeatedly and consistently expressed the view that
there was a need for, and Chile was willing to enter into, negotiations to put an end to the
landlocked situation of Bolivia and agreed to do so, are taken into account in good faith, Chile
can rightly be said to have undertaken to proceed with these negotiations.
152. As acknowledged by Chile, the words “promise” (promesa), “offer” (oferta),
“acceptance” (aceptación) or “agreement” (acuerdo) have been used by the Parties, and in
particular by Chile. These words clearly embodied a legal commitment. To take only one
example, in 1977, Chile stated that, referring to the negotiations on sovereign access to the
sea, “we have maintained our offer, accepted basically in December 1975, the terms of which
are well known to the international community, and we shall continue our efforts to find ways
and means which will enable these negotiations to come to a successful conclusion”161.
156 CCM, para. 6.16, letter d).
157 CCM, para. 5.36.
158 See for instance CCM, para. 6.5(b).
159 CCM, para. 4.1.
160 CCM, para. 4.8.
161 See CCM, para. 7.43, citing CCM, Annex 232. See Chapter 2(C)(2) above and Chapter 5 below.
55
153. Fourth, Chile alleges that as regards the standard of proof, on the basis in particular of
the Judgment of the Court in 1974 in Nuclear Tests,162 a distinction has to be made “between
an intention to create a legal obligation and a political expression of willingness to act in a
particular way”163. Chile also alleges that “[t]he burden for establishing the existence of a
legally binding obligation on the basis of a unilateral statement is high, and requires a clear
and specific statement evidencing an intention to be legally bound”164.
154. That is not an accurate description of the 1974 Judgment of the Court:
a. As a matter of principle, the Court considered in 1974 that “When it is the intention
of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its
terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking,
the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent
with the declaration”165. The Court made thus a reference to the intention as the core
criterion without qualifying the said intention.
b. What, according to the Court, must be clear and specific is the statement (the Court
“recalls that a statement of this kind can create legal obligations only if it is made in
clear and specific terms)”166. In the present case, agreements and declarations of
Chile are very clear and specific: they concern a commitment to negotiation on
modalities to materialize a specific agreed outcome (Bolivia’s sovereign access to
the sea, to put an end to Bolivia’s landlocked situation).
c. The Court did not rule out in 1974 the possibility that the willingness to do
something can result in a legal undertaking, nor did it require that the relevant
statements expressly contain the words “legal obligation”, as Chile asserts. To the
contrary, the Court relied on the existence of “a number of consistent public
162 CCM, para. 4.15 ff.
163 CCM, para. 4.3, as well as para. 6.11.
164 CCM, para. 4.20.
165 I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 267, para. 43 (Australia v. France).
166 See ibid.; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application : 2002) (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6 at
p. 28, para. 50.
56
statements concerning future tests” 167 through which “France made public its
intention to cease the conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests”168 to conclude that the
said statements, taken “as a whole”, “must be held to constitute an engagement of the
State, having regard to their intention and to the circumstances in which they were
made”169. The mere fact that France announced that it would adopt a certain course
of conduct (i.e., cease the tests) was considered by the Court as meaning that France
must “be held to” having committed itself not to pursue any new test. Following the
general approach according to which “to assess the intentions of the author of a
unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in which the act
occurred”,170 the Court considered indeed that when France announced its intention
to cease the tests “[i]t was bound to assume that other States might take note of these
statements and rely on their being effective”171.
e. The same applies a fortiori in the present case, in light of the context and the
circumstances in which Chile consistently expressed the same position and agreed on
the principle of negotiations to put an end to Bolivia’s landlocked situation. As Chile
acknowledged in the course of the present proceedings, “Chile has expressed
willingness to consider Bolivia’s political aspiration to gain sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean”172 and “the Parties were willing to, and did, discuss the issue of
access to the sea (…)” 173 . By announcing in a number of consistent, public
statements that there was a need to find a solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation
through negotiations between Chile and Bolivia on sovereign access to the sea, Chile
was clearly “bound to assume that” Bolivia “might take note of these statements and
rely on their being effective.”
167 Ibid., p. 264, para. 32.
168 Ibid., p. 267, para. 41.
169 Ibid., p. 269, para. 49.
170 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554 para. 40.
171 Ibid., p. 269, para. 51.
172 See Chile’s Preliminary Objection, para. 4.10-4.11 (emphasis added).
173 CR 2015/18, pp. 60-61, para... 55-56 (emphasis added).
57
f. It must be stressed moreover that in 1974 the Court deduced the obligation binding
upon France from a few statements only, made public over a very short period of
time (some months). By contrast, in the present case, (i) there is a greater number of
statements; (ii) accompanied by agreements between the two countries; (iii) which
were reiterated for a century. There is thus no doubt that the 1974 ruling of the Court
applies a fortiori in the present case.
155. Fifth, Chile focuses in the Counter-Memorial on a limited number of “episodes” and
fails to address a large part of Bolivia’s claim, which is based not only on the existence of
specific, individual bilateral agreements (such as those made in 1950 and 1975, which do
exist, and which bind Chile), but also of a large number of unilateral declarations and
promises which, in and by themselves, but also taken together as a course of conduct or
otherwise, constitute a distinct legal basis of the obligation to negotiate, based either on
Chile’s intent or on the doctrines of estoppel and legitimate expectations.
156. As already stressed by Bolivia174, Chile’s strategy in the Counter-Memorial consists in
trying to hide the forest behind the trees. To circumvent the fact that over time, for many
decades, Chile concluded a number of agreements and repeatedly made consistent
declarations expressing its intent to negotiate in order to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to
the sea, Chile adopts a selective approach consisting in, first, arbitrarily disconnecting
agreements, declarations or conduct which are intertwined and, second, arbitrarily focusing
on a few instances, leaving unmentioned a large number of others which are both legally
relevant and significant175.
174 See supra, Chapter 2(A) (3).
175 Chile expressed its strategy in particular in the following paragraphs of its Counter-Memorial: para. 1.3:
“Bolivia is seeking to knit together into an ongoing legal obligation to negotiate what are in fact sporadic
diplomatic and political exchanges and, occasionally, actual negotiations (…)”; para. 1.11: “Bolivia seeks
incorrectly to portray a picture of continuity from what in reality were different incidents of political
dialogue, arising in different contexts, and separated in time”; para. 1.24: “Each aspect of the practice on
which Bolivia relies had a different context and content, and Chile therefore deals with each of them
individually”; para. III.2: “Bolivia seeks to portray a continual process of creating and confirming a legal
obligation to negotiate throughout the course of the last century. In fact there are five discrete and very
58
B. The basis of Bolivia’s case
157. Chile’s selective approach and failure to address the whole claim of Bolivia is
surprising given that Bolivia made it clear, on various occasions in the course of the present
proceedings, that the obligation to negotiate on sovereign access to the sea rests on several
(both alternative and cumulative) legal bases.
158. In its Application instituting proceedings, Bolivia stated that:
“The facts provided above (Section III) show that, beyond its general obligations
under international law, Chile has committed itself, more specifically through
agreements, diplomatic practice and a series of declarations attributable to its
highest level representatives, to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for
Bolivia”.176
159. In its Memorial, Bolivia specified that:
a. “The binding effect of unilateral declarations is based on good faith. States
are entitled to expect and require that such commitments, once made, will be
adhered to. The principle is manifested in various specific legal doctrines,
such as estoppel, preclusion, and legitimate expectations”177;
b. “Each episode set out in Chapter I and highlighted below, meets the criteria
for a binding legal commitment. An isolated commitment would suffice to
create the obligation. But in the present case there is an accumulation of
successive acts by Chile, which serves only to strengthen Bolivia’s case.
Those successive acts of Chile must be viewed in their proper context. They
reiterated Chile’s commitment to the obligation, and kept alive the legitimate
expectation of Bolivia over the years that Chile would, in good faith,
negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean for Bolivia”178;
c. “When Chile remained silent in the face of Bolivia’s declarations, made in
connection with its signature of the 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of
Land-Locked Countries and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, that it is not a naturally land-locked country, but a State
temporarily deprived of access to the sea as a result of war, Bolivia
different periods (…). Each of them was the product of its own particular political and historical context
(…)”, see CCM, para. 1.3, 1.11, 1.24 (emphasis added).
176 Application, para. 31 (emphasis added). See also, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 24 September 2015,
para. 19, 31 and 51.
177 BM, para. 332 (fn. omitted).
178 Ibid., para. 337.
59
considered that Chile was recognising a situation that it had long promised to
correct. (…) Chile’s statements created legitimate and reasonable
expectations, and a perception for Bolivia that Chile would fulfil its word.
Bolivia has trusted its neighbour to observe its commitments in good
faith”179;
In 1979, while the Chile representative at the OAS:
d. “emphasized that ‘[o]n repeated occasions, I have indicated Chile’s
willingness to negotiate with Bolivia a solution to its aspiration to have a free
and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean’”,180 it is remarkable that “Chile
did not at any point object to Bolivia’s citation of the several agreements
between the Parties, including the 1895 Transfer Treaty, the 1920 Act, the
1950 Exchange of Notes, the 1961 Truco Memorandum, and the 1975 Joint
Declaration of Charaña”181;
e. “Chile has frequently repeated its agreement to negotiate, and thereby kept
alive Bolivia’s legitimate expectation that these negotiations would
succeed”182.
160. In the course of the oral proceedings in May 2015, Bolivia made clear once again that
its claim was based on several legal bases, which are mutually reinforcing:
“[Chile] suggests that unless a specific agreement is concluded on a specific date
that a course of conduct or consistent practice cannot create obligations. But that
is not what this Court has held on many occasions. To give but one recent
example, Maritime Delimitation (Peru v. Chile) characterized the parties’ “tacit
agreement” as “an evolving understanding between [them] concerning their
maritime boundary”. (…) Bolivia’s theory (…) is that there are several instances
of agreement with Chile. Paragraph 337 of the Memorial states clearly that
“[e]ach episode set out … meets the criteria for a binding legal commitment. An
isolated commitment would suffice to create the obligation. But in the present
case there is an accumulation of successive acts by Chile, which serves only to
strengthen Bolivia’s case.” The facts are all there. They demonstrate that on many
occasions, Chile promised to negotiate sovereign access to the sea. (…) As a
matter of law (…), a promise is a promise, whether in isolation, or in repetition. It
is really as simple as that. (…) This consistent course of conduct gives rise to
obligations, both before and after 1948, both in isolation and cumulatively.”183
179 Ibid., para. 396.
180 Ibid., para. 167, quoting Annex 204.
181 Ibid., para. 167.
182 Ibid., para. 409. See also para. 436.
183 CR 2015/21, pp. 33-34, para.. 9-11; see also ibid., pp. 12-13, para. 12.
60
161. Bolivia also made an express reference to acquiescence, with regard to the absence in
particular of any protest from Chile to the 1979 statement by Bolivia listing the agreements in
force between the Parties on the negotiations on sovereign access to the sea184.
162. Chile clearly understood, upon the submission of Bolivia’s Memorial, that the case
concerns not only the existence of specific, formal agreements, but also the frustration of
legitimate expectations 185 . It cannot deny it today. It is indeed Bolivia’s case that an
obligation to negotiate results not only from the continuing binding effect of each of the
individual bilateral agreements and unilateral declarations of Chile setting out its commitment
to engage in negotiations over a sovereign access, but also from Chile’s cumulative course of
conduct over time186.
163. Chile’s reply in its Counter-Memorial to these elements consists in bluntly asserting,
without any further elaboration, that “[a]n accumulation of interactions, none of which created
or confirmed a legal obligation, does not create such an obligation by accretion”187. Chile also
claims that “[t]he objective intention necessary to create a legal obligation cannot be inferred
from another State’s expectations”188, and that the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of the
OAS would have no legal effect of any kind because, according to Chile, “[t]he issue was
political, not legal” and these resolutions were only recommendations189.
164. Chile’s assertions do not address the criteria that are applicable in international law to
the formation of obligations. Contrary to what Chile contends, it is well established in
international law that obligations can result not only from individual, formal agreements –
which exist in the present case – but also from sources and legal processes, such as informal
184 See CR 2015/21, p. 18, para. 7.
185 See CR 2015/19, p. 24, para. 31 (quoting a statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile).
186 See Chapter 6, below.
187 CCM, para. 10.3.
188 CCM, para. 4.18; see also CCM, fn. 204.
189 CCM, para. 8.3. As to the legal effect of such resolutions, see Part II, Chapter 5(F) below.
61
agreements, tacit agreements, acquiescence, unilateral acts, and doctrines such as estoppel
based on clear and consistent courses of conduct190.
165. To take just a few examples, international courts and tribunals have consistently held
that obligations in international law can arise from a variety of sources beyond formal treaties:
a. According to the ITLOS:
“in the ‘Hoshinmaru’ case it recognized the possibility that agreed minutes may
constitute an agreement when it stated that ‘[t]he Protocol or minutes of a joint
commission such as the Russian-Japanese Commission on Fisheries may well be
the source of rights and obligations between Parties’ (‘Hoshinmaru’ (Japan v.
Russian Federation), Prompt Release, Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2007, p. 18, at p.
46, para. 86). The Tribunal also recalls that in the case concerning Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, the ICJ
observed that ‘international agreements may take a number of forms and be given
a diversity of names’ and that agreed minutes may constitute a binding agreement.
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 112, at p. 120,
para. 23)”191.
b. The ICJ held in 2014 that:
“The 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement does not indicate when and
by what means that boundary was agreed upon. The Parties’ express
190 See J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012: “States are corporate entities that necessarily operate under a regime of representation. In order to hold
them bound by consensual obligations, the normal rules of authorization under treaty law apply; (….) In
addition to these normal rules, there are another cases where States’ consent is given, assumed or implied”
(p. 415); “Even though they are both rooted in the principle of good faith, unilateral acts are in their essence
statements or representations intended to be binding and publicly manifested as such, whereas estoppel is a
more general category, consisting of statements or representations not intended as binding nor amounting to a
promise, whose binding force crystallizes depending on the circumstances” (p. 421).
191 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment of 14 March
2012, ITLOS Reports, para. 90. According to the ILC, “Although the term ‘treaty’ in one sense connotes
only the single formal instrument, there also exist international agreements, such as exchanges of notes,
which are not a single formal instrument, and yet are certainly agreements to which the law of treaties
applies. Similarly, very many single instruments in daily use, such as an ‘agreed minute’ or a ‘memorandum
of understanding’, could not appropriately be called formal instruments, but they are undoubtedly
international agreements subject to the law of treaties” (Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, para. 2) of the
commentary of Article 2, Yearbook of the ILC, 1966, p. 188).
62
acknowledgment of its existence can only reflect a tacit agreement which they had
reached earlier. (…) In this case, the Court has before it an Agreement which
makes clear that the maritime boundary along a parallel already existed between
the Parties. The 1954 Agreement is decisive in this respect. That Agreement
cements the tacit agreement”192;
c. The ICJ also considered that in appropriate circumstances, conduct can reveal
“an admission, recognition, acquiescence or other form of tacit consent to the
situation”, which is binding on the relevant State193;
d. Arbitral Tribunals have also admitted the possibility of tacit agreements
resulting from a course of conduct over time194.
166. In the present case, there exist a great number of agreements, diplomatic practice, and
a series of declarations attributable to the highest level representatives of Chile over the
course of a century, which embody or reflect (i) a clear acknowledgment by Chile that the
landlocked situation of Bolivia was a pending issue, and (ii) a clear intention to find a
definitive solution to this issue through negotiations 195 . This acknowledgment and this
intention have been expressed on many occasions and in various ways, and have created an
obligation binding on Chile. As will be elaborated below, they are, beyond the obligation to
negotiate under general international law (see infra, Chapter 4), legally attributable to Chile
either as treaties, agreements or unilateral acts (see infra, Chapter 5). Furthermore, regardless
of Chile’s intentions, it is bound by these statements on the basis of the doctrines of estoppel
and legitimate expectations (see infra, Chapter 6).
192 Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 3 at para. 91.
193 ICJ, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, Judgment, 11 September 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 577,
para. 364. See also Air Transport Services Agreement, Award, 22 December 1963, RIAA, Vol. XVI, p. 63:
tacit consent means a certain course of conduct consisting of certain actions or certain attitudes having “the
same effects on the resulting juridical situation between the Parties as consent properly speaking would
have.” See also ICJ, Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906
(Honduras v. Nicaragua), Judgment, 18 November 1960, p. 213; Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 13 December 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 832
at para.. 79-80.
194 See the Award in the arbitration regarding the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Guyana and
Suriname, Award of 17 September 2007, RIAA, Vol. XXX, para. 282, 285, 285, 299 and 306-307.
195 Said intention was acknowledged by Peru: see letter sent by Peru to the International Court of Justice on 26
July 2016, which refers: “the firm intention of finding a definitive solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation”.
para. 4.3, BR, Annex 370.
63
CHAPTER 4
THE OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
167. As Bolivia made clear in the Application instituting proceedings, its claim is based on
specific commitments that Chile undertook “beyond its general obligations under
international law”196. In the Memorial, Bolivia reaffirmed that Chile’s obligation to negotiate
sovereign access to the sea “is more exacting than a general obligation to negotiate under
international law”197. This is the reason why, in the Memorial, Bolivia elaborated both “the
basic principles underlying every duty to negotiate under international law” and the “more
specific aspects of the obligation to negotiate which are applicable in the present case”198.
168. The general obligation to seek the settlement of disputes, primarily by negotiation, is a
fundamental rule of international law199. “[N]egotiations are discussions held with a view to
reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of some matter in issue between two (or more)
states”200. This obligation applies to any pending issue between two (or more) countries which
needs to be settled. It is a fortiori applicable when both parties agree that there is a pending
issue between them which needs to be settled through negotiations.
169. In the present case, on many occasions both States called for negotiations on sovereign
access to the sea and there is no doubt that, from the late nineteenth century up to the present
day, Bolivia’s claim has been acknowledged by Bolivia and Chile as constituting a pending
issue between the two countries201. This is why, in particular, they entered into negotiations to
find a formula for Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea and why, on a more general level,
196 Application instituting proceedings, para. 31.
197 BM, para. 221-226.
198 BM, para. 229.
199 See UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. See also, inter alia, P. Daillier, M. Forteau, A. Pellet,
Droit international public, LDGJ, 2009, p. 925: “L’obligation de négocier s’impose d’abord en soi dès que
deux sujets du droit international sont en litige, parce qu’elle constitue le minimum de ce qui est attendu
d’eux pour régler pacifiquement tout différend. A ce titre, la négociation directe entre Etats en conflit
constitue la technique de droit commun : elle trouve à s’appliquer en toutes circonstances, même sans texte.”.
See also Part I, Chapter 2(A 1).
200 R. Jennings, A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, Longman, London, 1996, p. 1182.
201 See in particular CR 2015/19, 6 May 2015, pp. 27-36, para. 5-30.
64
they consistently kept the issue on their bilateral agenda. As Chile put it in 1983, Chile “again
stressed that any relationship between both countries necessarily involved addressing the
maritime problem” 202 . Moreover, this pending issue has been considered by the OAS
Permanent Council in 1975 and then by the OAS Assembly as “a matter of Continental
concern” which calls for an “equitable solution (…) whereby Bolivia will obtain appropriate
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”203.
170. The general obligation to negotiate which applies in such circumstances is reflected in
Article 2, paragraph 3, and Article 33 of the UN Charter. It has been reaffirmed on many
occasions, in particular in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law and the
1982 Manila Declaration. The obligation also applies to Bolivia and Chile by virtue of
Articles 24 and 25 of the OAS Charter of 30 April 1948.
171. In previous judgments, the ICJ has stressed that respect for the principle enshrined in
Article 33 of the UN Charter is “essential in the world of today”204 and that negotiation
“merely constitutes a special application of a principle which underlies all international
relations, and which is moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations
as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes”205. According to
the Court, “[t]here is no need to insist upon the fundamental character of this method of
settlement”206.
172. According to the relevant provisions, the maintenance of peace is not the only goal
that negotiations must pursue. According to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the UN Charter,
international disputes must be settled by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security “and justice” are not endangered. In a similar vein, the 1970 Declaration
on Principles of International Law provides that States shall “seek early and just settlement”
of their disputes.
202 CCM, Annex 262, p. 1747.
203 See BM, Annexes 190 to 201.
204 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States of America).
Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 at p.145, para. 290.
205 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.3 at p. 47, para. 86.
206 Ibid.
65
173. In addition, the obligation to negotiate under general international law is not a mere
procedural formality. It is a legal obligation, which must be undertaken in good faith and
which consists of a number of requirements which have been identified in Bolivia’s Memorial
and that Chile did not challenge in the Counter-Memorial207. The obligation to negotiate
requires in particular:
“que les Etats cherchent rapidement une solution en s’abstenant d’invoquer des
moyens dilatoires ; qu’ils ne se découragent pas de l’échec d’une première
tentative et qu’ils persévèrent en recherchant d’autres modes de règlement ; qu’il
s’abstiennent pendant toute la durée de la procédure ou des procédures, non
seulement de recourir à la force, mais d’aggraver la situation ; qu’ils recherchent
une solution ‘équitable’, c’est-à-dire qu’ils respectent la souveraineté de
l’adversaire, essaient loyalement de comprendre sa position et acceptent de
renoncer à la satisfaction de certains intérêts en contrepartie des sacrifices
acceptés par l’autre.”208
174. This obligation clearly applies in the present case. Bolivia gave up its maritime
territory to Chile in the expectation that it would have a sovereign access to the sea restored to
it. Since the nineteenth century, the “maritime issue” has been at the heart of both States’
foreign policy and has remained a pending issue between the Parties, which has not been
settled yet.
175. In the Principles and Guidelines for International Negotiations adopted in 1998209, the
United Nations General Assembly stressed that negotiations shall be conducted in a manner
“conducive to the achievement of the stated objective of negotiations”, that “States should
adhere to the mutually agreed framework for conducting negotiations” and that they should
remain “focused throughout on the main objectives of the negotiations”210. These general
requirements have been given a specific content in the present case since Bolivia and Chile
have agreed, beyond their obligations under general international law, to negotiate on a
specific agreed outcome (to put an end to Bolivia’s landlocked status). This lex specialis is
207 See BM, para.. 229-237. See Part I, Chapter 2 (B 2).
208 V. J.-P. Cot, A. Pellet (ed.), La Charte des Nations Unies. Commentaire article par article, Economica,
Paris, 3rd ed., 2005, p. 429.
209 See Resolution 53/101.
210 Ibid., para. 2.
66
based both on acts and conduct expressing an intention to be bound and on estoppel and
legitimate expectations, as will be shown in the following chapters.
67
CHAPTER 5
ACTS AND CONDUCT EXPRESSING
CHILE’S INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE SEA
176. This chapter summarizes the evidence supporting Bolivia’s submission that Chile
intentionally undertook a binding commitment to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea. That
binding commitment emerges from the whole course of conduct between Bolivia and Chile
on this matter. Within that course of conduct are clear examples of commitments resulting
from bilateral agreements – notably those that occurred in 1950 and 1975 – and from
unilateral declarations made by Chile.
177. In disregard of the Parties’ consistent and continuous course of conduct, the Counter-
Memorial asserts that there have been only “sporadic”, “historical diplomatic exchanges and
political discussions”, which did not constitute an undertaking, promise, representation or any
other commitment under international law211. In Chile’s words, “Chile’s position is simple:
historical willingness to negotiate creates no legal obligation”212. This argument however
disregards the specific historical context within which the question of sovereign access
emerged and the clear intention of the Parties to give effect to a historical understanding and
agreement between them that Bolivia should not remain landlocked as a result of the 1879
War of the Pacific.
178. In light of this historical context and course of conduct, there can be no doubt that the
Parties’ intention throughout these years was to resolve the outstanding matter of Bolivia’s
sovereign access to the sea by means of a negotiated settlement. The formation of a legal
obligation does not depend on some abstract, clear-cut distinction between “political
expressions of willingness” and “legal obligations”, as Chile contends213. It depends on the
circumstances in which there is an expression of a commitment to do something in particular.
211 See CCM, in particular para.. 1.1-1.3.
212 CCM, para. 1.28.
213 See for instance CCM, para. 4.3.
68
179. Of course, Chile adits, as it must, that in some circumstances, an expression of
willingness does in fact create legal obligations, namely when there is “an identifiable
international agreement or some other recognized source of international legal obligation”214.
Chile also acknowledges that “drawing the line between [the display of political goodwill and
legal undertakings] is often difficult in practice”215.
180. The Parties are generally in agreement concerning the principles applicable to the
identification of agreements or unilateral acts in international law216. As Chile rightly put it,
“a legal obligation to negotiate can only arise if, objectively construed, that is the intention of
the States concerned”217. Accordingly, it is Bolivia’s case that, when “objectively construed”,
Chile’s agreements, declarations and conduct since the nineteenth century unequivocally
reflect a commitment by Chile to negotiate sovereign access to the sea.
181. Chile’s main argument is to caution the Court that political and diplomatic exchanges
should not be considered as undertakings because “States must feel free to explore in good
faith potential compromise solutions through political and diplomatic exchanges”218. Bolivia
does not challenge the fact that mere diplomatic exchanges do not necessarily give rise to
legal obligations. That is exactly why Chile’s willingness to enter into formal negotiations
with Bolivia, on a matter as exceptional and consequential as sovereign access to the sea,
expresses a commitment rather than a mere offer to talk. Obviously Chile had the sovereign
right not to make any promise, undertaking, or representation to grant Bolivia sovereign
access to the sea. In the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives however, Chile did in fact
commit itself to finding such a solution on multiple occasions.
182. Following the 1879 War of the Pacific and subsequent to the 1904 Treaty, Chile could
have made it clear that having occupied Bolivia’s coastal territories, it would not negotiate
sovereign access to the sea across territories to the north, and that Bolivia must resign itself to
being a landlocked State. But that is not what Chile did: it entered into negotiations on
214 CCM, para. 1.28.
215 CCM, para. 4.3, fn. 182.
216 Bolivia’s position on applicable law has been set out in the Memorial at para.291-334.
217 CCM, para. 4.1 and para. 4.5. See also in particular para. 4.7.
218 CCM, para. 4.23.
69
“potential compromise solutions through political and diplomatic exchanges” pursuant to
agreements and declarations that recognized its historical undertaking and commitment to
granting Bolivia sovereign access to the sea. In fact, it is difficult to find any parallel in
international law for such an unusual and consequential undertaking by a State to agree
expressly and repeatedly that it is willing to negotiate sovereign access across its territory
pursuant to a historical compromise. It is this exceptional character of the undertaking that
underscores Chile’s consent to bind itself to finding a solution, rather than making empty
political promises as the Counter-Memorial suggests.
A. The consistent and continuous agreements, declarations (including unilateral
acts) and conduct expressing Chile’s intention to negotiate sovereign access to the sea
183. As a preliminary matter, it is noted that many elements in Chile’s past conduct,
including facts invoked in the Counter-Memorial, contradict Chile’s new legal thesis that its
“political and diplomatic exchanges” were devoid of any legal effect.
184. First, a number of statements in the Counter-Memorial reflect Chile’s recognition that
it has agreed to negotiate sovereign access to the sea. In other words, it has not been willing
merely to entertain the possibility of such access, but has in fact committed itself to finding a
solution to Bolivia’s landlocked status.
185. Chile acknowledges in the Counter-Memorial that on many occasions it expressed its
“willingness” to enter into negotiations in order to grant Bolivia sovereign access to the sea. It
relies on a quotation of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht to establish that there is an “important
distinction between an intention to create a legal obligation and a political expression of
willingness to act in a particular way”219 or between “statements of policy” and “instruments
intended to lay down legal rights and obligations”220. Chile however, did not limit itself to
political expressions of a mere willingness to discuss sovereign access to the sea; rather, it
expressed its willingness to satisfy that objective through negotiations, consistent with an
intention to be bound.
219 CCM, para. 4.3.
220 Ibid.
70
186. In this context, Chile’s historical willingness to negotiate constitutes a legal
commitment. In particular, the Counter-Memorial contains a number of specific admissions,
such as the following:
a. In the 1940s, “Chile is recorded as stating that it was open to consider and study
Bolivia’s proposals, and indeed that it was open to negotiation”221;
b. By adopting the 1950 Notes, Chile was “open to entering into a negotiation aimed at
finding a formula that could make it possible to give to Bolivia a sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean”222;
c. “In stating [in these notes] that it would act consistently with its prior position, Chile
was confirming that it would study Bolivia’s proposals in a negotiation (…)”223;
d. “The aim of Chile’s note of 20 June 1950 was to stand by and give effect to those
prior statements of policy, i.e. by way of proposing formal negotiations”224;
e. Chile also admits that in the course of the Charaña process, there have been
“guidelines for negotiation that were expressly accepted”225 and that the “core of the
proposal” presented by Chile in 1975, which was “accepted”, was that “a cession of
coastal territory from Chile to Bolivia ‘would be considered’”226;
f.In 1978, Chile’s view was that “[n]egotiations had then continued, and in all the
discussions, including most recently in September 1977 in New York, there was a
consensus to continue negotiations” on sovereign access to the sea227;
g. In 2006, the Presidents of Bolivia and Chile “have expressed their intention to
develop a comprehensive and constructive dialogue, without exclusions, between
221 CCM, para. 6.5.
222 CCM, para. 6.2, letter b).
223 CCM, para. 6.10, letter c).
224 CCM, para. 6.11 in fine (emphasis added).
225 CCM, para. 7.7, letter a).
226 CCM, para.. 7.16-7.17.
227 CCM, para. 7.45, letter b).
71
Bolivia and Chile” and “[i]n this context, they agreed that the agenda comprised all
issues relevant to the bilateral relationship, highlighting (…) the maritime issue” as a
separate item from “free transit”228.
187. It is also noted that Chile does not dispute that there have been several
“recommendations” issued by the OAS to Bolivia and Chile to negotiate sovereign access to
the sea229. Although these are not binding as such, it does not mean that they are without any
legal effect230. As considered in further detail below, Chile must consider these resolutions in
good faith in regard to negotiating Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea231.
188. Second, Chile’s declarations, statements and agreements regarding sovereign access to
the sea, as to be detailed further below, were not made in a vacuum or without a clear
understanding of the importance of the issues at stake. They came as a reply to specific,
unequivocal requests, publicly made by Bolivia, to have a sovereign access to the sea
consistent with the historical understanding between the Parties that Bolivia must not remain
landlocked. These exceptional requests were accepted and duly considered by Chile, at the
highest levels of State authority. If Chile did not have the intention to satisfy Bolivia’s
request through negotiations, it could easily have refused to consider such an exceptional
matter, or at least it could have remained silent. But, on the contrary, Chile’s Heads of State
and Foreign Ministers repeatedly told Bolivia in clear and specific terms that they were
willing and committed to finding a way to grant Bolivia sovereign access to the sea.
228 CCM, para. 9.13-9.14.
229 See CCM, para. 8.7.
230 The Court has recognized that resolutions which are not binding can still have “normative value” (Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226 at p. 254, para. 70) and
that, “when they are adopted by consensus or by a unanimous vote, … [they] … may be relevant for the
interpretation of” existing agreements (Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 226 at p. 248, para. 46). More generally, it is “incontestable que l’exécution ou
le refus d’exécution d’une recommandation n’est pas juridiquement indifférent. L’une et l’autre attitudes sont, au
contraire, susceptibles de produire des effets de droit”,M. Virally, “La valeur juridique des recommandations des
organisations internationales”, AFDI, 1956, p. 87. See further Part II, Chapter 5 section F.
231 See Part II, Chapter 5, section F.
72
189. Third, Chile’s conduct confirms that it recognized the existence of an obligation to
negotiate. As recalled in the Memorial, on 26 October 1979, Bolivia “referred to several
specific agreements to negotiate sovereign access to the sea” embodying “commitments” of
the Parties as agreed in 1920, 1923, 1950, 1956, 1961 and 1975232. Far from objecting to
Bolivia’s assertions, the reaction of the Chilean representative to the OAS a few days later, on
31 October 1979, was to emphasize that “[o]n repeated occasions, I have indicated Chile’s
willingness to negotiate with Bolivia a solution to its aspiration to have a free and sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean”233.
190. Fourth, contrary to Chile’s suggestion that there has been no undertaking between
Bolivia and Chile on sovereign access to the sea, it is significant to note that statements made
or agreements concluded by the two countries referred to previous statements and agreements
on the same matter, confirming a long-standing understanding between the Parties that they
must negotiate in order to end Bolivia’s landlocked status234.
232 See BM, para. 166.
233 See BM, para. 167.
234 For example, see (i) the Exchange of Notes of 1950 (BM, para. 127-129 and BR, Annexes 265 and 266). It
recognized that both Parties had “accepted the cession to [Bolivia] of its own access to the Pacific Ocean”.
Chile stated that, “with these precedents”, “[f]rom the quotes contained in the note I answer, it follows that
the Government of Chile, together with safeguarding the legal situation established by the Treaty of Peace of
1904, has been willing to study, through direct negotiations with Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying the
aspirations of the Government of your Excellency and the interests of Chile.” Chile stated that “my
Government will be consistent with that position and (…) is willing to formally enter into a direct negotiation
aimed at searching for a formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean (…)” (ii) the Trucco Memorandum in 1961 (BR, Annex 284 (emphasis added)). Chile
pointed out that it “has been willing, together with safeguarding the legal situation established in the Treaty
of Peace of 1904, to study through direct efforts with Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying the aspirations of
the latter and the interests of Chile” and that “Note No. 9 of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated in
Santiago on 20 June 1950, is clear testimony of those purposes” (iii) in 1987, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Chile stated that “the minutes subscribed, on that occasion [the 1975 Joint Declaration of Charaña], by the
President of Chile and Bolivia embodied the commitment to move forward with the dialogue at different
levels (….) in order to find a formula for the many vital issues both countries faced, for instance, the one
related to the landlocked status that affects Bolivia (…)” (BM, Annex 169 (emphasis added).
73
191. Fifth, Chile does not seriously engage in the Counter-Memorial with Bolivia's
arguments that a great number of Chilean statements constitute unilateral acts and promises
that are binding in international law235. Some of these declarations were directly in response
to requests from Bolivia, and can therefore be viewed either as bilateral agreements or
unilateral acts. Others were statements and undertakings made at Chile’s own initiative.
192. These solemn declarations and commitments are attributable to the highest level
representatives of Chile 236 , and were made known to and accepted by the Bolivian
authorities237. Taking into account the context and circumstances in which they were made,
there was an intention to make a formal commitment to negotiations on sovereign access to
the sea, as is clear from their unequivocal wording. The following examples, from times both
before and after the status of Tacna/Arica was resolved in the 1929 Treaty of Lima, leave no
doubt as to Chile’s intentions.
235 On these unilateral acts, see BM, para. 392-396. There is no doubt that unilateral acts can create rights and
obligations under international law. See BM, para. 304-334.
236 i.e. Presidents of Chile (Alessandri, González Videla, Pinochet, or Lagos), several Ministers of Foreign
Affairs (Matte, Izquierdo, Mathieu, Walker Larraín, Carvajal Prado and Del Valle) and Vice-Ministers (Van
Kleveren), who undoubtedly represented Chile. Others are attributable to Ambassadors of Chile (such as the
Ambassador of Chile in La Paz, Trucco), authorized by the competent Minister.
237 The intention to negotiate sovereign access to the sea was expressed by these authorized State representatives
in various forms, including memoranda (BM, Annex 22 (Matte Memorandum) and BR, Annex 284 (Trucco
Memorandum), diplomatic notes (BM, Annex 48 and Annex 72) and verbal statements later registered in the
official correspondence of the ambassador of Bolivia in Santiago and in the Chancellery in La Paz, (See in
particular the declaration made by President González Videla on the 8th of November, 1946, before the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Aniceto Solares, and the Ambassador of Bolivia in Santiago, Ostria
Gutiérrez (BM Annex 56); and the declarations made by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Del Valle in April 1984
(see Aide Memoire “Meeting held with Chancellor Jaime del Valle”, 26 April 1984, BR, Annex 325) and on
the 12th of November, 1986, at the opening of the negotiations of Montevideo (see Note from the Permanent
Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations, Jorge Gumucio, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Guillermo Bedregal, 20 Novermber 1986, BR, Annex 334) as well as public declarations (BM,
Annex 125; and the declarations of 11 July and 3 August 1950, of Chancellor Walker Larraín (BM Annexes
66 and 68) to put an end to journalistic speculations regarding the agreements concluded with Bolivia in
June; and the declaration made by President González Videla on 19 July of that same year (Annex 66).
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193. Chile made the following commitments before the 1929 Treaty:
a. “Chile is willing to seek that Bolivia acquire its own access to the sea, ceding
to it an important part of that zone in the north of Arica and of the railway
line…”
«Chile está dispuesto a procurar que Bolivia adquiera una salida propia al
mar, cediéndole una parte importante de esa zona al norte de Arica y de la
línea del ferrocarril…»
(Chilean Ambassador at La Paz Bello Codesido, Act of 10 January 1920, Basis
IV)238;
b. “Independently of what was established in the Treaty of Peace of 1904, Chile
accepts to initiate new negotiations directed at satisfying the aspiration of the
friendly country, subject to the victory of Chile in the plebiscite.”
«Independientemente de lo establecido en el Tratado de Paz de 1904, Chile
acepta iniciar nuevas gestiones encaminadas a satisfacer la aspiración del
país amigo, subordinada al triunfo de Chile en el plebiscito.»
(Chilean Ambassador at La Paz Bello Codesido, Act of 10 January 1920, Basis
V);
c. “my Government maintains its purpose to listen, with the utmost spirit of
conciliation and equity, to the proposals that Your Excellency’s Government
wishes to submit in order to celebrate a new Pact regarding Bolivia’s situation,
but without modifying the Peace Treaty and without interrupting the continuity
of the Chilean territory.… in light of the concrete proposals that Bolivia
submits and when appropriate, the bases of direct negotiations leading, through
mutual compensation and without detriment to inalienable rights, to the
fulfilment of this longing [the sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean].”
«mi Gobierno mantiene el propósito de oír, con el más elevado espíritu de
conciliación y de equidad, las proposiciones que quiera someterle el Gobierno
de V.E. para celebrar un nuevo Pacto que consulte la situación de Bolivia, sin
modificar el Tratado de Paz y sin interrumpir la continuidad del territorio
chileno… en vista de las proposiciones concretas que Bolivia presente y en
hora oportuna, las bases de una negociación directa que conduzca, mediante
compensaciones mutuas y sin desmedro de derechos irrenunciables, a la
realización de aquel anhelo.»
(Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis Izquierdo, 6 February 1923)239;
238 CCM, Annex 118.
239 CCM, Annex 125.
75
d. “When the situation of Tacna-Arica is resolved, we will be able to give
Bolivia a port in return through compensations”
«Cuando resuélvase situación Tacna Arica podemos dar puerto mediante
compensaciones.»
(Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis Izquierdo, 7 February 1923)240;
Bolivia
e. “(…) will always find Chile willing to start new negotiations with the aim of
facilitating the access of Bolivia to the sea through its own port.”
«(…) encontrará siempre dispuesto al de Chile para emprender nuevas
negociaciones, a fin de facilitar el acceso de nuestra Republica al mar por
puerto propio.»
(Statement of President Arturo Alessandri, 27 February 1923)241;
f.“in the course of the negotiations conducted [with Peru]… and within the
formula of territorial division, the Government of Chile has not rejected the
idea of granting a strip of territory and a port to the Bolivian nation… the
Chilean Government would honour its declarations in regard to the
consideration of Bolivian aspirations.”
(Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge Matte, 4 December 1926)242;
194. Furthermore, after the status of Tacna/Arica was resolved in the 1929 Treaty of Lima,
Chile once again confirmed the commitment it had made in the 1920s:
a. “I keep my word with regard to what I have told you (the Ambassador of
Bolivia in Santiago, Ostria Gutiérrez) on former occasions. What has been
verbally agreed is as if it were already written.”
«mantengo mi palabra acerca de lo que en anteriores oportunidades he
expresado a Ud. Lo acordado verbalmente es como si estuviera ya escrito.»
(President González Videla, 28 July 1948)243;
b. Chile is “willing to engage in conversations with Bolivia on the issue referred
to.”
240 BM Annex 49.
241 Cited in BM, Annex 51.
242 BM Annex 22.
243 Cited in BM, Annex 63, BR Annex 259.
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«está llano a entrar en conversaciones con Bolivia acerca del problema en
referencia.»
(Minister of Foreign Relations, Walker Larraín, 11 July 1950)244;
c. “It is my duty, indeed, to inform my people that the President of Chile is
willing to initiate the aforementioned conversations”
«Me hago un deber, sí, en declarar a los ciudadanos de mi patria que el
Presidente de Chile está llano a abrir esas conversaciones»
(President González Videla, 19 July 1950)245;
d. “Furthermore, I reiterate what Chile has expressed on different occasions: its
willingness to give an ear, through direct negotiations, to the proposals that
Bolivia may put forward”
«Reitero, además, lo que Chile ha manifestado en diversas oportunidades: su
buena disposición para oir, en gestiones directas, las proposiciones que
Bolivia pueda formularle.»
(Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walker Larraín, 3 August 1950)246;
e. “The Government of Chile shall be willing to negotiate with the Bolivian
Government on regard to the referred proposition [cession of a strip of territory
north of Arica]…”
«El Gobierno de Chile estará dispuesto a negociar con el de Bolivia respecto
de la proposición referida...»
(Minister for Foreign Affairs Carvajal Prado, note of 19 December 1975)247;
f. “[W]e initiated negotiations aimed at satisfying the aspiration of Bolivia to
have a sovereign coast without interruption in continuity with the current
Bolivian territory.”
«iniciamos negociaciones tendientes a satisfacer la aspiración de Bolivia de
tener una costa soberana sin solución de continuidad con el actual territorio
boliviano.»
(President Pinochet, 8 February 1977)248;
244 BM Annex 66.
245 BR, Annex 269.
246 Cited in BM Annex 68.
247 BM Annex 72.
248 CCM, Annex 217.
77
g. “My Government maintains unchanged the political will that gave rise to these
negotiations [to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific]…”
«Mi Gobierno mantiene inalterable la voluntad política que dio origen a esas
negociaciones…»
(President Pinochet, 23 November 1977)249;
h. “I reiterate my Government’s intention of promoting the ongoing negotiation
aimed at satisfying the longings of the brother country to obtain a sovereign
outlet to the Pacific Ocean.”
«le reiteré la intención de mi Gobierno de impulsar la negociación en curso
destinada a satisfacer los anhelos de ese país hermano en el sentido de obtener
una salida soberana al Océano Pacifico.»
(President Pinochet, 18 January 1978)250;
i. “We would like to talk about the maritime issue with Bolivia. We know how
relevant it is for Bolivia… [the claim for an access to a maritime coast] is also
an important issue… What we are saying is that we are willing to hold this
dialogue [and adding that the Chilean Government was] fully aware of the
commitment undertaken many years ago to engage in negotiations over an
Agenda without exclusions”
«Queremos hablar del tema marítimo con Bolivia. Sabemos la relevancia que
asume para Bolivia…Lo que estamos diciendo es que estamos disponibles para
este dialogo…plenamente consciente del compromiso asumido hace ya varios
años atrás de hablar con una agenda sin exclusiones»
(Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Van Klaveren, 18 July 2006)251.
195. As the Court held in Nuclear Tests, it is well recognised that declarations made by
way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating
legal obligations252.
196. Chile maintains that in the present case, unilateral acts should be interpreted
restrictively because they took place “in a bilateral context”253. It relies on Burkina Faso/Mali
249 CCM, Annex 234.
250 CCM, Annex 236.
251 Cited in BM Annex 135.
252 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 457 at p. 472, para. 46. See Part
II, Chapter, 4 above.
253 CCM, para. 4.21.
78
where the Court took the view that because “there was nothing to hinder the Parties from
manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the
Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal
agreement on the basis of reciprocity”, a unilateral declaration could not be interpreted “as a
unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case”254. But the present case
may be clearly distinguished from the facts in Burkina Faso/Mali: first, there are many
consistent statements and declarations, extending over a prolonged period of time; second,
these statements and declarations have generated or reaffirmed bilateral agreements between
Bolivia and Chile (in particular the 1950 Exchange of Notes and the Joint Declarations of
1975 and 1977)255.
197. In this regard, these consistent statements and declarations made over the course of a
century also serve to contradict Chile’s assertion in the Counter-Memorial that the events
subsequent to the 1904 Treaty may be characterized as “five discrete and very different
periods”, each of them being “a product of its own particular political and historical
context”256, or as “sporadic diplomatic and political exchanges, and, occasionally, actual
negotiations”257. There is in effect a unity between the bilateral agreements and unilateral
declarations insofar as they cumulatively reinforce Chile’s commitment to resolve Bolivia’s
landlocked status by means of a negotiated settlement. Chile cannot now so bluntly refashion
the facts, which clearly establish: (i) the continuity of Chile’s undertakings to negotiate
sovereign access to the sea since the nineteenth century; and (ii) the existence of numerous
consistent agreements and unilateral declarations expressing its commitment to negotiate.
198. It is against this factual and legal background of a consistent and continuous course of
conduct that Bolivia will respond in the following sections to Chile’s arguments on specific
agreements and statements that it attempts to fragment into “five periods”, but all of which are
linked to the original historical bargain and the commitment that it generated on the part of
Chile.
254 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554 at p. 574, para. 40.
255 Part III, Chapter 5(C) and (E) below.
256 CCM, para. III.2 (p. 81).
257 CCM, para. 1.3.
79
B. The 1920 Act and the 1926 Matte Memorandum
199. The Memorial set forth the reasons why both the 1920 Act and the 1926 Matte
Memorandum constitute agreements to negotiate sovereign access to the sea258. Chile objects
to this assertion in the Counter-Memorial on three grounds: namely, that (i) the 1920 Act
contains a reservation stating that it is not binding; (ii) its text does not reflect a commitment
regarding sovereign access to the sea; and (iii) the subsequent practice, in particular the Matte
Memorandum, does not confirm Bolivia’s interpretation of the 1920 Act259. As set forth
below, these three assertions are not supported by the facts.
1. The text of the 1920 Act
200. Chile argues that the 1920 Act contains “an explicit statement of the intention not to
create rights or obligations”260. Chile relies on the penultimate paragraph of the Act which
states that “(…) the present declarations do not contain provisions that create rights, or
obligations for the States whose representatives make them (…)”261.
201. First, if Chile is correct that such a clause was included to prevent the creation of any
rights or obligations, it suggests a contrario that in the absence of such a clause, Chile’s other
agreements or statements should be interpreted as giving rise to rights and obligations to
negotiate sovereign access to the sea. In fact, such a clause is not included in any of the
subsequent agreements or statements of Chile, including the 1950 Exchange of Notes and the
1975 and 1977 Joint Declarations of Charaña.
202. Second, the said clause should not be read in isolation. Read with regard to the full
text and context of the 1920 Act, it is clear that the reservation refers to the modality of
sovereign access rather than the agreement to negotiate such access. Contrary to Chile’s
assertions, there is no doubt as to the agreement that the Parties negotiate Bolivia’s own
access to the sea. The only disagreement is in regard to the specific modalities of the access.
As reflected in the 1920 Act, Bolivia had invited Chile to negotiate on the concrete modalities
258 BM, para. 346-357.
259 See CCM, Ch. 5.
260 CCM, para. 5.8., as well as para.. 5.4-5.7.
261 BM, Annex 101.
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and conditions of sovereign access, including the compensation to be given to Chile. It was
clear that this “should be the subject of a prior agreement, to avoid disagreements over details
delaying the application of the core matter”. That is why, in the following paragraph of the
Act, Bolivia pointed out that because of the distinction between the “core of the matter” and
the “details” thereof, “the present declarations do not contain provisions that create rights, or
obligations for the States whose representatives make them”. In other words, any proposals on
the specific modalities of sovereign access would not be binding until the conclusion of a
formal agreement, and such an agreement would obviously require prior negotiations that
Chile agreed to undertake. This is clearly expressed by the statement that “Chile is willing to
make all efforts for Bolivia to acquire an access to the sea of its own”262.
203. This interpretation is confirmed by the statements made before the League of Nations
one year later. In 1921, Chile recalled that “Bolivia can seek satisfaction through the medium
of direct negotiations”263 and that, by doing so, Bolivia will “exercise the only right it can
assert: namely, the right of negotiations with Chile”264. Chile categorically recognized an
obligation to negotiate sovereign access with Bolivia.
204. Contrary to Chile’s assertion265 furthermore, the substance of the exchanges confirms
the understanding of the Parties as to the objective of the agreed negotiations. Following the
conclusion of the 1920 Act, Chile made the following statements:
a. “[the Chilean Envoy] repeats the terms which were submitted in general terms
to the Honourable Mr Dario Gutiérrez last September to procure an agreement
which would allow Bolivia to satisfy its aspiration of obtaining its own exit to
the Pacific (…)”;
b. “Chile is willing to make all efforts for Bolivia to acquire an access to the sea
of its own, by ceding a significant part of the area to the north of Arica as well
as the railway line that is located within the territories subject to the plebiscite
established by the Treaty of Ancón” and “accepts opening new negotiations
262 BM, Annex 101, p. 394.
263 BM, Annex 160.
264 BM, Annex 161 (emphasis added).
265 CCM, para. 5.10.
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aimed at fulfilling the aspiration of its friend and neighbour, subject to Chile’s
victory in the plebiscite” 266;
c. “These considerations explain and justify the terms in which the representative
of Chile has framed the terms it proposes as a practical means of offering
Bolivia, within what is possible, all that could effectively lead to the fulfilment
of its legitimate expectation (…)”, “thus leaving behind its landlocked
status.”267
2. The correspondence preceding the adoption of the 1920 Act
205. The intention behind the 1920 Act is confirmed by the correspondence preceding its
conclusion. In the Counter-Memorial, Chile glosses over the statements that are invoked in
Bolivia’s Memorial, and asserts that Bolivia has represented one document “as having been
authored by Chile’s Minister” and that that document “does not support the assertion that
Bolivia makes” in paragraph 98 of the Memorial268.
206. In paragraph 98 of the Memorial, Bolivia stated that “In May 1919, [the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile] stated that Bolivia’s claim for its own port on the Pacific Ocean on
terms aligned with the 1895 settlement was legitimate and just, and that Chile could fulfil that
wish on the basis of sufficient and fair compensation”269. In support, Bolivia relied on an
internal contemporaneous Bolivian note, which reported the said statement by the Chilean
representative270 and clearly supported Bolivia’s assertion271. Bolivia did not claim that the
note itself was a Chilean document. Chile does not challenge the veracity of the Bolivian
note.
207. In addition, Chile does not seriously engage with the other documents preceding the
1920 Act which Bolivia relied upon in its Memorial and which also confirm its interpretation
266 The respected Chilean diplomat and historian Oscar Pinochet de la Barra acknowledges: “Chile assumed a
commitment under Article V [of the 1920 Act]” O. Pinochet de la Barra, Chile and Bolivia ¡How much
longer! 2004 p. 40, BR, Annex 352.
267 BM, Annex 101 and CCM, Annex 118.
268 CCM, para. 5.11, regarding BM, Annex 42.
269 BM, para. 98.
270 BM, Annex 42.
271 See BM, Annex 42, pp. 179-180.
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of the Act272. This is true in particular of the Chilean Memorandum of 9 September 1919, the
terms and intention of which are clear and specific273.
3. The subsequent practice, including the 1926 Matte Memorandum
208. Chile’s claim that the subsequent practice does not establish any commitment on its
part to negotiate on sovereign access to the sea274 is wrong.
209. Chile maintains that Bolivia failed to cite a passage from Chilean Delegate Rivas-
Vicuña’s letter275 stating that the President of Chile informed a Bolivian representative “that
he did not recognize the right of the Bolivian Government to claim a port on the Pacific
Ocean, since Bolivia abandoned that aspiration when it signed the Treaty of Peace of 1904,”
adding that “the aspirations of Bolivia might be satisfied by other means, and that his
Government was quite ready to enter into negotiations on this subject in a sincere spirit of
peace and conciliation”276. According to Chile, this statement that it was “quite ready” to
negotiate on practical means to improve Bolivia’s access to the sea, without granting it a port,
“is not a basis on which Bolivia can claim that Chile expressed an intention to undertake a
legal commitment to negotiate concerning sovereign access”277.
272 See BM, para. 95-98.
273 See BM, Annex 19. The next month, Bello Codesido told the US Charge d'Affaires in Bolivia that “Chile has
formally promised Bolivia a port, the grant to take place upon the settlement of the controversy between
Chile and Peru”. See Telegram 723.2515/503 from the Chargé d’Affaires of the United States in Bolivia
Goold to the Secretary of State, 6 October 1919, BR, Annex 235. Conrado Ríos Gallardo, who would in turn
become Foreign Minister of Chile, described the objectives of Bello Codesido’s mission in Bolivia in the
following terms: “[Chile] has never refused to listen to the aspiration of Bolivia… on the contrary, has
promised to satisfy it in the field of mutual compensations”, adding that “When Chile settled its difficulties
with Peru… This is indeed the only moment that Chile expected to satisfy in the realm of reality, not of
fantasy, the port aspirations of Bolivia. Mr. Bello Codesido had the mission to say that this time was coming,
that Bolivia had to rely on Chile’s word and that it should wait for the events to come”. See C. Rios Gallardo,
After the Peace… The Chilean-Bolivian Relations (1926), pp. 132 and 215, BR, Annex 241.
274 See CCM, para. 5.21-5.29.
275 CCM, para. 5.20.
276 Letter from Manuel Rivas Vicuña, Chilean Delegate to the General Assembly of the League of Nations, 19
September 1922, BM Annex 46, CCM, Annex 123.
277 CCM, para. 5.20
83
210. In fact the expression “was quite ready to enter into negotiations” does demonstrate
Chile’s agreement to enter into direct negotiations with Bolivia278. This statement followed
the other declarations of this period, rejecting the revision of the 1904 Treaty while at the
same time promising to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation through direct negotiations279.
The historical context in which these declarations were formulated demonstrates that they
referred to the question of sovereign access.
211. In the absence of the plebiscite on the status of Tacna and Arica as envisaged by the
1883 Treaty of Ancón, Chile and Peru resumed direct negotiations in December 1921 to
resolve the dispute regarding sovereignty over these territories. In that context, on 20
December 1921, the Bolivian Foreign Minister Alberto Gutiérrez requested the Chilean
Government “to hold an international conference composed of representatives of nations
directly concerned on this serious issue of the Pacific”280.
212. Although Chile rejected this request, it recalled that the Bolivian Government had
“...been publicly and solemnly invited in Geneva, and later in La Paz and in Santiago, to
express directly to Chile their views on their aspirations for a port in the Pacific,” 281
reiterating once again its intention to negotiate directly with Bolivia.
278 It should be recalled that in the case of the Nuclear Tests, the ICJ stated that France had assumed a binding
unilateral commitment based on several declarations of the aforementioned country, including one in which it
indicated that “it was ready to proceed to underground tests”. Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 457 at p. 266, para. 40.
279 This is confirmed by considering Alessandri’s own account of his conversation with Pinilla: “I told him that
if he came to ask me for a revision of the Treaty of 1904, it was preferable that he not waste his time and not
make me waste mine, because I, on behalf of Chile, would never accept the revision of the Treaty, without
prejudice to hearing in a new negotiation something about the aspirations of Bolivia, based on
compensations.” See A. Alessandri Palma, Memories of Government, Volume I, 1967, pp. 76-77, BR, Annex
294.
280 See Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Alberto Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Chile, Ernesto Barros Jarpa, 20 December 1921, BR, Annex 236.
281 Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Ernesto Barros Jarpa, to the Minister Plenipotentiary of
Bolivia to Chile, Macario Pinilla, N° 1725, 21 December 1921, BR, Annex 237. In January 1922, the
Chilean Foreign Minister, Ernesto Barros Jarpa, told the Bolivian Chargé d’Affaires in Santiago, Salinas
Lozada, that once Tacna and Arica were definitely transferred to Chile, the proposals made to Bolivia by
84
213. Bolivia subsequently requested the Government of Uruguay to interpose good offices
with Chile and Peru so that it could be included in the Conference held in Washington in
1922. After carrying out the corresponding negotiations, Uruguay forwarded a Memorandum
to Bolivia stating that: “Chile believes that it is not appropriate to discuss this issue jointly
with Peru at the Washington meeting because of the legal nature of the issue to be addressed
there; but reiterates that it is willing, in this case, to consider solutions directly with
Bolivia”282.
214. Chile describes the Note of 6 February 1923, as a simple “invitation” to submit
proposals 283 . However, when the Chilean Foreign Minister stated that his Government
“maintains its purpose to listen” to Bolivia’s proposals “to celebrate a new Pact” on sovereign
access “without modifying the Peace Treaty and without interrupting the continuity of the
Chilean territory”, it is evident that it is assuring the Bolivian Government that it agrees to
initiate negotiations to address Bolivia’s landlocked situation284.
215. The same can be said of the excerpt from that Note, in which the Chilean Chancellor
states that his Government “will devote great efforts to consult... the bases of direct
negotiations leading, through mutual compensation and without detriment to inalienable
rights, to the fulfilment of this longing”285. The use of the simple future tense denotes the
commitment to pursue a course of conduct towards the resolution of this matter.
Bello Codesido could be extended to fulfill Bolivia’s aspiration. See Note from the Chargé d’Affaires of the
Bolivian Legation to Chile, Juan Salinas Lozada, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Alberto
Gutiérrez, N° 117, 27 January 1922, BR, Annex 239.
282 Also, the Chilean Foreign Minister expressed to the Minister of Uruguay in Santiago that: “...the good
disposition of Chile gave Bolivia high hopes for success in its aspirations, as long as it seeks the satisfaction
of these aspirations within an environment of cordiality, friendly bonding and reciprocal concessions.” See
Information Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Chile and the Aspiration of Bolivia for a
Port in the Pacific (1922), pp. 155-157, BR, Annex 238.
283 CCM, para. 5.25.
284 Note Nº 20 from the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs of 6 February 1923 to the Minister Plenipotentiary
of Bolivia in Chile, Ricardo Jaimes Freyre, BM Annex 48, CCM, Annex 125.
285 Note Nº 20 from the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs of 6 February 1923 to the Minister Plenipotentiary
of Bolivia in Chile, Ricardo Jaimes Freyre, BM Annex 48, CCM, Annex 125.
85
216. As to the Chilean Note of 22 February 1923, Chile considers that the expression “my
Government’s willingness to discuss the proposals that the Bolivian Government wishes to
present in this regard” does not demonstrate the intention to create a legal obligation286. The
expression of “willingness” however, may clearly constitute a legally binding commitment287.
In the present case, the said willingness reflects Chile’s agreement to enter into direct
negotiations with Bolivia to satisfy its claim for a sovereign access to the sea, provided, as the
Note made clear, that the access is not located in the former Bolivian territories which were
ceded under the 1904 Treaty288.
217. Regarding the press statement of Chile’s President dated April 1923289, it is clear that
when the President of Chile pointed out that nothing was legally owed to Bolivia, he
specifically referred to the revision of the 1904 Treaty, which Bolivia pursued at that time,
and not to the question of the Chilean commitments to negotiate sovereign access to the sea.
In fact, the President of Chile reiterated his country’s willingness to negotiate with Bolivia “in
the form and terms clearly and frequently posed in the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Chile, addressed to the Bolivian Minister in Chile, on 6 February [1923]”290.
4. The 1926 Matte Memorandum
218. Similarly Chile’s assertion that the Matte Memorandum does not support Bolivia’s
claim291 , and that Bolivia’s acceptance of the offer it contains cannot be viewed as an
agreement292, is unsupported by the facts.
286 See CCM, para. 5.27.
287 In its Eighth Report to the ILC on unilateral acts of States, Special Rapporteur Rodriguez Cedeño analyzed
for instance “a declaration whereby Cuba expressed its willingness to supply the requested vaccines and to
send them immediately”, without rejecting its status as a binding unilateral act by the mere fact that it was an
expression of willingness. Eighth Report on Unilateral Acts of States, by Mr. Victor Rodriguez Cedeño,
Special Rapporteur, Document A/CN.4/557, 26 May 2005, p. 35, para. 38.
288 Note Nº 435 from the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs of 22 February 1923, CCM, Annex 126.
289 See CCM, para. 5.28.
290 “President Alessandri exposes the guidelines of Chile’s international policy”, El Mercurio newspaper,
Wednesday, 4 April 1923, BM Annex 125, CCM, Annex 127.
291 CCM, para. 5.32-5.36.
292 CCM, para. 5.37-5.38.
86
219. The chain of events that preceded the Matte Memorandum demonstrates that both (i)
the proposal of US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg293, which was consistent with the
repeated declarations made by Chile concerning Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea, and (ii)
the Chilean acts that preceded the Kellogg proposal, are part of a clear course of conduct by
Chile aimed at satisfying Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
220. By 1926, Bolivia and Chile had resumed bilateral talks concerning sovereign access,
on the understanding that Bolivia would support Chile to prevail in the Tacna/Arica plebiscite
required by the 1883 Treaty of Ancón294. However, the plebiscite could not be carried out;
and given that Chile and Peru were unable to reach an agreement on the said provinces, on 11
April 1926, the Ambassador of the United States of America in Chile suggested that the
Secretary of State propose to Chile and Peru the “cession to Bolivia, in fulfillment of
assurances made repeatedly and publicly since the beginning of the plebiscitary proceedings
by spokesmen of both countries that Bolivian aspirations for a port on the Pacific would be
considered sympathetically”295. This is a third party affirmation of Chile’s “repeated” and
“public” “assurances” during this period to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea.
221. On 15 April 1926, the US Secretary of State proposed to Chile and Peru to transfer the
provinces of Tacna and Arica “to a South American State not a party to these negotiations”296,
293 BM, para. 115-118.
294 See Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Alberto Gutiérrez, to the Minister Plenipotentiary
of Bolivia to Chile, Eduardo Diez de Medina, N° 200, 31 March 1926, BR, Annex 240.
295 See Telegram 723.2515/2124 of the U.S. Ambassador in Chile, W. Miller Collier, to the U.S. Secretary of
State, Frank B. Kellogg, 11 April 1926, BR, Annex 244 (emphasis added). Chile had expressed on several
occasions to the United States its intention to solve the Bolivian maritime problem once the dispute regarding
Tacna and Arica was over. On a meeting held on 19 February 1926, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile
told the US Ambassador in Santiago that: “at once after acquiring definite title to Arica, it would negotiate
with Bolivia to give that country a port”. See Telegram 723.2515/1952 from the Ambassador of the United
States in Chile, W. Miller Collier, to the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, 20 February 1926, BR,
Annex 242. In April 1926, the Chilean delegate to the Tacna and Arica Plebiscitary Commission told the US
Delegate “that Chile will surelly (sic) win plebiscite and that then she will consider doing something for
Bolivia”. See Telegram 723.2515/2118 from the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, to the
Ambassador of the United States in Chile, W. Miller Collier, 10 April 1926, BR, Annex 243.
296 See Telegram 723.2515/2143a from the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, to the U.S. Consul at
Arica, Von Tresckow, 15 April 1926, pp. 384-385, BR, Annex 245. Bolivia was aware of the diplomatic
87
and, on 4 June 1926, the cession of a corridor to the sea for Bolivia, the delimitation and
extension of which would be subject to the Parties’ agreement297.
222. The evidence demonstrates that Chile agreed with the United States about its specific
proposals to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to the sea,298 and later made this known to
Bolivia299.
223. Against this background, on 30 November 1926, US Secretary of State Kellogg
proposed once again to Chile and Peru to transfer Tacna and Arica to Bolivia300.
224. As explained in the Memorial, Chile and Bolivia both accepted the 1926 Kellogg
proposal301 . It constituted an offer by Chile to negotiate sovereign access to the sea302 .
Regarding the “idea of granting a strip of territory and a port to the Bolivian nation”, Chile
affirmed that:
“Chile has always been disposed to listen to all propositions for settlement which
might contribute toward such lofty aims and at the same time might offer
exchanges between the United States, Chile and Peru and thus sought to take part in these negotiations. To
this end, the President of Bolivia sent a letter to the President of the U.S. on 19 April 1926, in which it
informed that the proposal made by the Secretary of State of the U.S. to Chile and Peru “agrees with the offer
made to my Government by the Government of Chile of the port of Arica, or some other port under Chilean
sovereignty”. See Letter from the President of Bolivia, Hernando Siles, to the President of the United States,
Calvin Coolidge, 19 April 1926, BR, Annex 246.
297 Minutes of the Meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of Peru and Chile, Under the Extension of Good Offices of
the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, 4 June 1926, BR, Annex 247.
298 In June 1926, Chile presented to the United States specific proposals for settlement, including a “Bolivian
corridor four kilometers wide extending from Bolivian boundary to Village of Palos on the Pacific Ocean,
this corridor to follow present boundary between Departments of Tacna and Arica so that one-half of the
corridor strip would be on each side of it.” See Telegram 723.2515/2415 from the U.S. Secretary of State,
Frank B. Kellogg, to the Ambassador of the United States in Chile, W. Miller Collier, 9 June 1926, p. 476.
BR Annex 248.
299 Chilean Memorandum of 23 June 1926, BM Annex 20, p. 21.
300 Memorandum from the US Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, of 30 November 1926, BM Annex 21. pp.
505-509.
301 BM, para. 119-120.
302 See BM, para. 104-120 and para. 350-357.
88
compensation proportionate to the sacrifice of that part of its legitimate rights
which such proposals import”.303
225. As in the preceding instances, Chile agreed to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked condition
and pursued a course of conduct consistent with that objective. On the one hand, the terms of
Chile’s response demonstrates its consent to negotiate a formula that makes Bolivia’s
sovereign access to the sea possible, by way of a “strip of territory”. On the other hand, Chile
confirmed that it had followed a course of conduct consistent with that objective by stating
that “[it] has always been disposed to listen to all propositions for settlement which might
contribute toward such lofty aims”. Bolivia thus expected Chile to negotiate sovereign access,
independently of whether the modality of such access involved “a strip of territory and a port”
or some other practical solution.
226. Chile argues that the language of the Memorandum “was without prejudice to Chile’s
legal rights”304. This however is fully compatible with an undertaking to negotiate, that is to
say to negotiate the possible terms of a future agreement. The following extract of the
Memorandum that Chile emphasizes in the Counter-Memorial305 is clear in that regard. Chile
stated that it
“now desires to attest, once more, that in discussing such propositions she does
not abandon those rights, but solely has considered the possibility of sacrificing
them freely and voluntarily on the altar of a superior national or American
interest. In this sense the Chilean Government agrees to consider, in principle, the
proposal, thereby giving a new and eloquent demonstration of its aims of peace
and cordiality”306.
227. Chile also asserts that Bolivia’s acceptance of the Chilean offer a few days later, on 7
December 1926, 307 cannot constitute an agreement because the Memorandum was not
addressed to Bolivia but to Secretary of State Kellogg308. This is not correct. It should be
noted that the Memorandum was officially conveyed by Chile through diplomatic channels
303 BM, Annex 22.
304 CCM, para. 5.36.
305 CCM, para. 5.35.
306 BM, Annex 22, p. 109.
307 See BM, Annex 53.
308 CCM, para. 5.38.
89
to Bolivia,309 and constitutes at least a unilateral promise and representation of Chile’s
position. In fact, in the Note dated 7 December 1926, which is expressly addressed to Chile,
Bolivia stated that it had “the honour to acknowledge receipt of the note addressed by Your
Excellency on 5 December … along with which I have received the Memorandum that His
Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile has drafted (…)”.310 In the same Note,
Bolivia concurred with Chile’s Memorandum that negotiations were required and that the
agreed objective was “to recover its maritime sovereignty elements, through pacts or
conventional agreements or diplomatic covenants freely consented with neighbouring
nations”.
C. The 1950 Exchanges of Notes
1. The nature and content of the Notes
228. As Bolivia demonstrated in the Memorial, the 1950 Exchange of Notes constitutes a
treaty under international law, the terms of which are clear and unequivocal311. The Bolivian
note, after recalling “different occasions” in which Chile “accepted the cession to (Bolivia)
of its own access to the Pacific Ocean”, proposed that:
“the Governments of Bolivia and Chile formally enter into a direct negotiation to
satisfy the fundamental need of Bolivia to obtain its own and sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean, thus solving the problem of the landlocked condition of Bolivia
on bases that take into account the mutual benefits and true interests of both
peoples”312.
229. The Chilean Note in response, confirms previous commitments to negotiate sovereign
access to the sea and concludes as follows:
“… it follows that the Government of Chile, together with safeguarding the legal
situation established by the Treaty of Peace of 1904, has been willing to study,
through direct negotiations with Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying the
aspirations of the Government of Your Excellency and the interests of Chile.
309 BM, Annex 53.
310 BM, Annex 53.
311 See BM, para. 123-135 and para. 358-369.
312 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, Horacio Walker Larrain, N° 529/21, 1st June 1950, BR, Annex 265.
90
At the present opportunity, I have the honor of expressing to Your Excellency that
my Government will be consistent with that position and that, motivated by a
fraternal spirit of friendship towards Bolivia, is willing to formally enter into a
direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that could make it possible to
give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to
obtain compensation of a non-territorial character that effectively takes into
account its interests”313.
230. Three elements of this Exchange of Notes are particularly important:
a. First, they confirm a “consistent” and pre-existent position on the part of Chile on
this matter, which flows from the precedents which are listed in the first substantive
paragraph of the Note, and according to which Chile “has been willing to study,
through direct negotiations with Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying” its aspirations;
b. Second, by exchanging the Notes, Chile clearly expressed that it “is willing to
formally enter into a direct negotiation” and thus its intention to be bound in a formal
instrument;
c. Third, it is agreed that the negotiations have a specific objective: namely, they are
“aimed at searching for a formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own
and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”.
231. Chile attempts to discredit the legal value, and the very existence, of the agreement
arising from the Exchange of Notes314. It tries to blur the direct connection between the
Bolivian Note of 1 June 1950 and its own Note of 20 June 1950. The title of Chapter 6
(“Chile’s statement of openness to negotiate of 20 June 1950”) only mentions the Chilean
Note, seemingly to avoid the suggestion that it was in fact a response to the antecedent
Bolivian Note. According to Chile “The notes are different in terms, and Chile’s note of 20
June could in no sense be taken as agreeing to Bolivia’s note of 1 June”315. In addition, Chile
maintains that “the language used by Chile is not that of legal obligation, but is markedly
313 Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Horacio Walker Larrain, to the Bolivian Ambassador to
Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, N° 9, 20 June 1950, BR, Annex 266.
314 CCM, I, para. 1.24 b.
315 CCM, I, para. 1.24 b.
91
tentative in nature […] Openness to negotiations does not transform into a legal obligation
when neither side manifests an intent to be bound”.
232. Chile’s claim that there was no agreement because Bolivia did not reply to the
“counter-proposal” of the Chilean Note of 20 June 1950316 does not withstand scrutiny in light
of the facts. It is simply not true to suggest that Bolivia made a “proposal” before Chile
presented a “counter-proposal”. The travaux préparatoires of the Notes clearly demonstrate
that the two Notes were prepared and negotiated together and that the draft Notes were
exchanged between the two States before final approval317. This was considered an exchange
of mutual commitments demonstrating a clear intention to be bound.
233. As set out in the Memorial, by June 1948, Chilean President González Videla and
Bolivian Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez had already agreed to initiate negotiations on sovereign
access and to formalize that agreement through an exchange of notes318. To this end, the
Bolivian Ambassador submitted the draft of the Bolivian note to the Chilean Minister of
Foreign Affairs Vergara Donoso319.
316 CCM, I, para. 6.12.
317 BM, I, para. 123-126.
318 On 1 June 1948, the President of Chile, during a meeting held with the Bolivian Ambassador, stated that they
had no trouble in formalizing the negotiations that had been commenced. On that day, Chilean Chancellor
Vergara Donoso declared “his full agreement” to “formalizing the negotiations, opening that stage by means
of exchange of notes”. Note Nº 455/325 from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to
the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adolfo Costa Du Rels, 2 June 1948, BR, Annex 256. On 17 June
1948, the Bolivian Ambassador and the Chilean Foreign Minister agreed on “the advisability of specifying,
by means of notes, the result of the negotiation carried out with the president of the Republic” of Chile. On
this basis, the Bolivian Ambassador proposed “two stages: one to agree upon, in principles, the transfer to
Bolivia of an own access to the sea, and another one to specify the territorial aspect.” Note Nº 515/375 from
the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
Adolfo Costa Du Rels, of 28 June 1948, BR, Annex 257.
319 Note Nº 515/375 from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Adolfo Costa Du Rels, BR, Annex 257. In July 1948, the President of Chile
proposed to delay the negotiations owing to internal policy circumstances in Chile, stating however that he
was not looking for a pretext “to get out of my commitment (…) My unwavering determination to reach the
goal verbally agreed with you”. Note Nº 598/424 from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria
Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Adolfo Costa Du Rels, 15 July 1948, BR, Annex
92
234. On 24 May 1950, the Bolivian Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez, sent to the Chilean
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walker Larraín, a draft note identical to that sent on 28 June 1948
to his predecessor, Vergara Donoso320 . That draft was accepted by Chile. Likewise, the
Chilean draft note in reply was sent to Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez on 9 June 1950321. A
minor modification suggested by Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez was accepted by the Chilean
Minister322. Although dated 1 June 1950, the Bolivian Note was formally sent to the Chilean
Minister on 20 June 1950, that is, the exact date of the Chilean Note, which was formally
delivered to the Bolivian Ambassador.323 This cannot be qualified as an offer and a counteroffer
as suggested by Chile, because the content of both notes was previously agreed by both
Chile and Bolivia. The two Notes constitute a single instrument, an international agreement
arrived at after considerable deliberation between the parties.
235. Further, so far as the subject-matter of the present case is concerned, the two Notes
embody the same commitment and, as such, constitute a treaty:
a. In the first paragraphs of its Note, Bolivia recalls the previous statements or
agreements of the Parties on the question of the sovereign access to the sea (in 1895,
1920, 1922, 1923, 1946 or 1949); similarly, in the first paragraph of its Note, Chile
recalls the terms of the acts and declarations which Bolivia referred to in its note;
258. Later that month the Chilean President told the Bolivian Ambassador that he “keep my word with regard
to what I have told you on former occasions. What has been verbally agreed is as if it were already written.”
See Note Nº 648/460 from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Adolfo Costa Du Rels, 28 July 1948, BR, Annex 259.
320 See Note Nº 457/310 from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, 25 May 1950, BR, Annex 260.
321 See Note Nº 510/349 from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, 10 June 1950, BR, Annex 262.
322 After the word “compensaciones” (compensation) it was added “que no tengan carácter territorial” (of a nonterritorial
character). A. Ostria Gutiérrez, Apuntaciones sobre negociaciones portuarias con Chile, 1998, p.
55, BR Annex 342. See also Note Nº 544/371 from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria
Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, 17 June 1950, BR, Annex 263.
323 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, N° 550/374, 20 June 1950, BR, Annex 264. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, N°
559/381, 20 June 1950, BR, Annex 267.
93
b. Bolivia then refers to “such important precedents” and Chile to “these precedents”;
c. On the basis of these precedents, Bolivia made the following proposal, which Bolivia
submitted to the “acceptance” of the Government of Chile:
“that the Governments of Bolivia and Chile formally enter into direct negotiation
to satisfy the fundamental need of Bolivia to obtain its own and sovereign access
to the Pacific Ocean, thus solving the problem of the landlocked condition of
Bolivia on bases that take into account the mutual benefits and true interests of
both peoples”324.
d. Similarly, Chile, states that “[w]ith these precedents”,
“I have the honor of expressing to Your Excellency that my Government will be
consistent with that position and (…) is willing to formally enter into a direct
negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that could make it possible to give
Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain
compensation of a non-territorial character that effectively takes into account its
interests”325.
236. Chile also claims that in its Note, Chile stated that it will have, “opportunely”, “to
consult Peru, in compliance with the Treaties concluded with that country”326. Once again, it
is not a “counter-proposal”, but only a statement of fact. In addition, Chile did not say in the
1950 Note that its undertaking to negotiate was made upon Peru’s approval, or that “in
accordance with the Supplementary Protocol to the 1929 Treaty, Peru’s consent would be
necessary” as it alleges in the Counter-Memorial327. The only thing Chile said in the 1950
Note is that, “opportunely”, it will have “to consult” the Government of Peru. It is clear,
therefore, that Chile’s undertaking “to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at
searching for a formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign
access” was unconditional and fully met the initial proposal made by Bolivia. The 1950
Exchange of Notes thus constitute an agreement for the purpose of the present case. In that
324 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, Horacio Walker Larrain, N° 529/21, 1st June 1950, BR, Annex 265.
325 Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Horacio Walker Larrain, to the Bolivian Ambassador to
Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, N° 9, 20 June 1950, BR, Annex 266.
326 CCM, para. 6.9 and 6.10, letter f).
327 CCM, para. 6.2, letter c).
94
agreement, Bolivia and Chile undertook (i) to negotiate and (ii) to do so on the basis of an
agreed outcome, namely the sovereign access to the sea.
237. Chile alleges that the Notes are nothing more than a statement of policy or a “political
expression of willingness”328. This is in plain contradiction with the terms of the Notes which
state that Chile “will be consistent with that position and (…) is willing to formally enter into
a direct negotiation”. This is a clear intent to act in a certain way, which has been formalized
in an exchange of notes carefully negotiated and drafted by the highest authorities of the two
countries.
2. The conduct of the Parties before the conclusion of the Notes
238. The binding character of the 1950 Notes is further confirmed by the circumstances
leading to their formation. The record of discussions and contacts held at the highest level
between the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago, Ostria Gutiérrez, and the Chilean President,
González Videla, and the successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs329, reveals the detailed and
prolonged process of formation of an agreement to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean, which was formalized in the Exchange of Notes in 1950330 . These Notes even
included a series of bases for the negotiation, for example that the Bolivian compensation
would not have a territorial character.
239. Chile has questioned the value of the statements formulated by Chilean President
González Videla, noting that the documentary record “merely” shows that on several
occasions, Chile was open to considering and studying Bolivia’s proposals and that it was
indeed open to negotiation331. But the records of the talks between Bolivia and Chile in this
period show that Chile did not merely express a simple desire, but expressed its acceptance to
negotiate on Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea. It was actually in the course of the
328 CCM, para. 6.11.
329 Germán Vergara Donoso, then Germán Ignacio Riesco and, finally, Horacio Walker Larraín.
330 For these negotiations, see BM, Annexes 57-65 and 126.
331 CCM, para. 6.5–6.6.
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negotiation of the Notes of 1950 that the exclusion of territorial compensation was determined
by the parties.332
3. The subsequent practice
240. Contrary to Chile’s assertions in its Counter-Memorial333, the agreement of 1950 was
confirmed as such by the subsequent conduct of the Parties. Both Chile and Bolivia
acknowledged after 1950 that the Exchange of Notes constituted an agreement entailing legal
effects. A fine illustration is that Bolivia registered the Exchange of Notes in the Department
of International Treaties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 334 Bolivia and Chile, on multiple
occasions, expressed that the Notes of 1950 reflected an “agreement”. The understanding of
the Parties as to the object and purpose, content and implications of the Notes is the same.
241. Gabriel González Videla himself, Chile’s President when the agreement of 1950 was
negotiated, left a valuable testimony with regard to the note of 20 June and the final goal of a
negotiation on Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea:
“The Chilean note translates my state of mind with regard to the attitude I
followed when I accepted to hold direct talks with the Government of Bolivia to
study the way to satisfy its port aspirations. […] The idea of the “corridor” was
not intended to solve a pending territorial question, as was the case of Peru with
regard to Tacna and Arica provinces, but to find a formula that could satisfy
Bolivia’s aspiration for an own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”335.
332 See Note Nº 457/310 of 25 May 1950, from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, BR, Annex 260; Note from the Bolivian
Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti
Arce, Nº 470/322, 27 May 1950, BR, Annex 261; Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto
Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº 510/349, 10 June 1950,
BR, Annex 262. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº 544/371, 17 June 1950, BR, Annex 263.
333 CCM, paras. 6.7-6.16.
334 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº 646/433, 13 July 1950. BR, Annex 268.
335 G. González Videla, Memoirs, Santiago, Gabriela Mistral, 1975, p. 902, BR, Annex 299.
96
242. Further,336 the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in an interview on 17 July
1950 that:
“I hereby declare that has been an invariable rule of the Foreign Ministry to
declare that, even though it is true that we have no pending problem whatsoever
with Bolivia, we are willing to hold friendly conversations regarding its port
aspiration. These are not my words – adds Mr. Walker. These are the statements
that all my predecessors have made, namely, Mr. Luis Izquierdo, Mr. Jorge Matte,
President Alessandri and Mr. Agustín Edwards. The Chilean thesis has been more
or less the following: ‘Chile does not accept that the Bolivian aspiration for a port
on the Pacific should be taken to International Congresses or Conferences, but
Chile is willing to study in direct and friendly negotiations with that country the
possibility of satisfying its longings on basis of compensations for Chile.”337
243. The Minister added, with regard to the agreement of 1950, that: “Yes. We have agreed
to initiate conversations”.338
244. Both countries agreed to publish the Notes of June 1950 by late August that year to
clarify their scope339. To this end, both countries’ negotiators made lengthy statements, both
in Chile and Bolivia.
245. On 30 August 1950, the Bolivian negotiator declared with regard to what had been
agreed to that, on the one hand, it was necessary to “formalize the direct negotiation; i.e. that
Bolivia proposed Chile the need to resolve, through a friendly understanding, its fundamental
336 Some other statements of Chile’s President and Foreign Minister were already submitted to the Court in the
Memorial. BM para. 132-134; BM Annexes 66, 67 and 68.
337 See “The Foreign Minister Asserts: Chile is willing to study the Bolivian longing on bases of reciprocal
compensations”, VEA magazine, 19 July 1950, BR, Annex 270.
338 See “The Foreign Minister Asserts: Chile is willing to study the Bolivian longing on bases of reciprocal
compensations”, VEA magazine, 19 July 1950, BR, Annex 270. See also VEA magazine, 19 July 1950,
“González Videla declares: All that has been agreed is to initiate conversations with Bolivia, Arica will
always remain free”, BR, Annex 269.
339 After the publication of the Notes in the press, the British Embassy in La Paz reported to the Foreign office
that the Notes “contain the formal agreement” of the Government of Chile to “enter into negotiations with
Bolivia to find a means of satisfying Bolivia’s ‘Pacific’ aspirations” and that the Chilean Note constituted an
“undertaking”. Note from the British Embassy in La Paz to the American Department of the Foreign Office,
1 September 1950, BR, Annex 272.
97
need for an own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean”340 and, on the other, “it was
essential that the Government of Chile accept to formalize that direct negotiation intended to
resolve the problem of Bolivia’s landlocked condition”.341 He then affirmed “that is what was
done and what was obtained with the exchange of notes between the Governments of Bolivia
and Chile in June this year”.342
246. In that same statement, the Bolivian Ambassador interpreted the Notes of 1950 as
shaping an agreement by stating that:
“The importance of those notes flows from their own text and can be easily
synthesized from their main paragraphs, namely: 1) in the Bolivian note, by
proposing: ‘that the Governments of Bolivia and Chile formally enter into a direct
negotiation to satisfy the fundamental need of Bolivia to obtain its own and
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean’; 2) in the Chilean note, by accepting to
‘formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that
could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean’”343
247. He also emphasized with regard to the Notes that “That is all that has been agreed to
between Bolivia and Chile. Nothing more than what those notes record”344.
248. In the same vein, on 1 September, Chile’s Chancellor reiterated the scope and nature
of the agreement of 1950 in a new Note addressed to the President of the Commission of
Foreign Affairs of the Chilean Senate. That information was made public in the press on the
following day: “In the press and in both Chambers’ commissions, I informed and reiterated
that I had accepted to open negotiations with Bolivia, which is precisely what the notes that
have been published record”345.
340 Statements made to the press by the Ambassador of Bolivia to Santiago, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, 30 August
1950, BR, Annex 271.
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
345 Note from the Chargé d’Affairs of Bolivia to Chile, Jorge de la Barra, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº 832/505, 4 September 1950, BR, Annex 273.
98
249. Just a few days later, Minister Walker Larrain stated: “I have consented to opening
negotiations in the terms that are recorded in the note I have had published […]”, noting:
“I must add that draft notes sent by the Bolivian Embassy and the Minister on
opening negotiations are archived in the Foreign Ministry, and that I have even
been informed in the Ministry that the most recent one had been drafted by Mr.
Riesco himself. From inquiries I have made today, it turns out that their wording
corresponds to his predecessor.
As far as I am concerned, this aspect bears no importance, for the only thing I am
concerned with proving is that this is not a demarche that was started while I
served as Foreign Minister, but that it had been sorted out earlier. And this is
recorded in [specific] documents.”346
250. Finally, with regard to journalistic speculations in Chile related to possible
compensation from Bolivia, he stated that “in any case, it is too early to talk about projects on
utilization of electrical energy to collect ground water and foster industry or others, because
we have only agreed to enter into conversations with Bolivia and no proposal authorizing a
consideration on compensations that Chile would accept has been received yet”347.
251. In their written pleadings, Bolivia and Chile agree that after 1950, “no further progress
was made in the negotiations”348. In the Counter-Memorial, Chile argues that a reason for the
absence of negotiations after 1950 was “Bolivia’s change in position”349 . However, the
documents invoked by Chile to support its allegation (press articles and a Chilean internal
report) do not show that Bolivia considered that the 1950 Notes were no longer in force or
that they do not constitute an undertaking to negotiate. These documents show that the new
Government of Bolivia was facing urgent domestic matters at that time, which made it more
difficult to give priority to the negotiations on sovereign access to the sea350.
346 See “Chancellor maintains statements made with regard to Bolivia”, La Nación (Chile), 5 September 1950,
BR, Annex 274. See also “Let us not divide ourselves by political parties in resolving our foreign affairs”, El
Imparcial (Chile), 13 September 1950, BR, Annex 276.
347 Ibid.
348 See BM, para. 135; CCM, para. 6.17.
349 See CCM, para. 6.18-6.21.
350 See CCM, Annexes 148, 149, 152 and 169.
99
252. In any event, the media speculation on the details of the agreement of 1950 made its
immediate enforcement more difficult. After a meeting held on 6 September 1950 by the
Chancellor of Chile and the Ambassador of Bolivia, the latter informed the Bolivian
Chancellery that the former “was supportive of entering into a waiting period” before
proceeding with the negotiation351. Agreeing to the request made by the Chilean Chancellor,
the Bolivian negotiator declared in January 1951 that:
“A brief break followed the exchange of notes, but this does not mean that
negotiations have been interrupted, inasmuch as ideas are still being exchanged
with the Chilean Government, which retains a favourable position that has been
officially expressed in the note of June 1950”352.
253. In spite of that, both States held firm to their understanding with regard to the binding
nature of the notes of 1950. In March 1951, the statement delivered by US President Harry
Truman referred to a formula for the question of Bolivia’s access to the sea which had been
discussed with the President of Chile, Gabriel González Videla353.
254. On 29 March 1951, the President of Chile referred both to the statement of the US
President and to the negotiations with Bolivia, which had resulted in the agreement of June
1950. With regard to the first he stated that, “President Truman referred to our conversation
and highlighted my suggestion as one of the examples that can clearly and objectively
exemplify the benefits that can be expected from the cooperation of the peoples of
America”354. With regard to the second matter, he recounted some of the events that have
already been addressed in Bolivia’s Memorial355, stating that:
351 See Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº 844/513, 9 September 1950, BR Annex 275.
352 “Ambassador Ostria spoke of the Chilean-Bolivian port problem in La Paz”, El Diario Ilustrado (Chile), 6
January 1951, BR, Annex 277. By late 1951, while he was in La Paz, Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez made the
following statements to “El Diario” newspaper: “The negotiations - the initial phase of which was formalized
with the notes of 1 and 20 June 1950 - have entered a waiting period. Naturally, international affairs cannot
be resolved in a single day, as is the case of private questions.” A. Ostria Gutiérrez, Apuntaciones sobre las
Negociaciones Portuarias con Chile (Notes on port negotiations with Chile), 1998, p. 202, BR, Annex 342.
353 Available at: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=269&st=Bolivia&…
354 Statement by the President of Chile, H. E. Mr. Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, regarding the port negotiations, 29
March 1951, BR, Annex 278.
100
“Emphasizing the Americanist feelings that inspire us, as well as the deep
affection we have towards the Bolivian people and the loyalty we owe to its
democratic Government, we placed on record in our response that Chile was
willing to enter into a direct negotiation aimed at seeking a formula that may
make it possible to give Bolivia an own outlet to the Pacific Ocean”.356
255. The Chilean President ended his statement by asserting:
“I am entirely responsible, legally and constitutionally, for the demarche the
precedents of which I have just explained. I have the deep conviction that it will
lead us to highly advantageous results”357.
256. The Bolivian Chancellery clarified in the Communiqué of 30 March 1951:
“4º.- That the only thing that has been agreed to so far between Bolivia and Chile
is contained in the notes exchanged in Santiago between the Bolivian
Ambassador, Mr. Alberto Ostria Gutierrez and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, Mr. Horacio Walker Larrain, on 1 and 20 June 1950, which were published
past 31 August and in which our country proposes that the Governments of
Bolivia and Chile formally enter into a direct negotiation to satisfy the
fundamental need of Bolivia to obtain its own and sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean, thus solving the problem of the landlocked condition of Bolivia” and Chile
accepts “to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a
formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access
to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensations of a non-territorial
character that effectively takes into account its interests.”358
257. In the same vein, in May 1951, the President of Chile affirmed in an annual address to
his country that:
“For many years and whenever it saw a favourable opportunity to do so, Bolivia
has expressed its aspiration to obtain an outlet to the Pacific and, invariably, Chile
has responded that, without modifying our unbreakable doctrine of respect for
treaties, it was willing to give an ear to any concrete proposal by that country,
provided that it is made in a direct manner.
355 BM paras. 106-107, 110, 111, 119, 123-125.
356 Statement by the President of Chile, H. E. Mr. Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, regarding the port negotiations, 29
March 1951, BR, Annex 278.
357 Ibid.
358 Communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia regarding the statement made by the President of
Chile, 30 March 1951, BR, Annex 279.
101
My government, consistent with that policy and inspired in an effective Pan-
Americanist spirit, responded, in the Note of 20 July 1950, to the communication
that, on 1st of that month, was made on behalf of his country by the Bolivian
Ambassador in Chile, His Excellency Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, stating that ‘[it] is
willing to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a
formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access
to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial
character that effectively takes into account its interests”359.
258. In 1958, during the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Bolivia sent the agreement
of 1950 as additional information to the Conference, under the label “Treaties between
Bolivia and Chile”. The official records of that Conference note that Bolivia informed that:
“On 1 and 2 June 1950, Mr. Walter Larrain, the Chilean Chancellor, and Mr.
Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, Ambassador at Santiago, exchanged Notes in which –
after referring to the orientation of Chile’s international policy with respect to
Bolivia’s desire to obtain its own outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and recalling the
terms of the Treaty of 18 May 1895 and the instrument of 10 January 1920, signed
but not ratified by the legislatures; and the statements made by Mr Agustin
Edwards, Chilean delegate to the League of Nations, in 1920, by President Arturo
Alessandri in 1922, and by Mr. Luis Izquierdo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in
1923; and also the reply by Mr. Jorge Matte to Mr. Secretary of State Kellogg’s
proposal of 15 April 1926 that Chile and Peru should cede Tacna and Arica to
Bolivia – Mr. Walter Larrain stated that his Government, bearing this situation in
mind, and imbued with fraternal sentiments towards Bolivia, ‘is prepared formally
to enter into direct negotiations with a view to seeking a formula whereby Bolivia
can be given its own sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and Chile can obtain
compensation not of a territorial character but in a form which effectively meets
its interests’”360.
359 Report by Chilean President, H.E. Gabriel González Videla, to the National Congress inaugurating the
regular period of sessions, 21 May 1951, p. 56, BR, Annex 280 (emphasis added).
360 The documents submitted by Bolivia were distributed as document UN Doc. A/CONF.13/29/Add.1 of 3
March 1958. (p. 329), BR, Annex 283. Bolivia also referred before the OAS to the agreement reached in
1950 and Chile did not object (BM, Annex 203). On 12 November 1987, before the OAS, Bolivia referred to
“the commitments of 1950, through the formal exchange of notes of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in which
Chile undertook to effectively ‘look for a formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia access to the
Pacific Ocean (…)’” and stated that “This agreement that commits the trust of the Chilean State in its relation
with Bolivia, as well as the whole of the international community, bestows upon Chile the obligation to
engage in negotiations already settled on searching for solutions to this geographical confinement, under the
conditions agreed upon in the 1950 Notes” (BM, Annex 210).
102
Chile did not object to Bolivia’s characterization of the legal nature of the agreement of 1950.
D. The reiteration of the agreement reached in 1950 in the 1961 “Trucco
Memorandum”
259. As early as July 1961, Chile had reiterated in the “Trucco Memorandum” its
commitment to negotiate sovereign access to the sea resulting from the 1950 Notes361.
260. In the Memorial, Bolivia pointed out that Ambassador Trucco was well qualified to
acknowledge the undertakings resulting from the 1950 Notes since “he had been Undersecretary
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when the aforementioned Note was signed”362. It
is not surprising then that in this Memorandum, Chile stated again that:
“Chile has always been willing, together with safeguarding the legal situation
established in the Treaty of Peace of 1904, to study, through direct efforts with
Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying the aspirations of the latter and the interests of
Chile”.
“Note Nº 9 of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated in Santiago on 20 June 1950,
is a clear testimony of those purposes. Through it, Chile states that it is ‘willing to
formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that could
make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean,
and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial character that effectively
takes into account its interests’”363.
261. In February 1962, after having “carefully considered” this Memorandum, Bolivia took
“note of the Chilean viewpoint” expressed in the Memorandum as regards Chile’s preference
for direct negotiations, rather than recourse to “international organizations”; and on that basis
Bolivia expressed “its full agreement to initiate, as soon as possible, direct negotiations aimed
at satisfying the fundamental need of the Nation for its own and sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean, on the basis of compensation that, without having territorial character, takes
into account the reciprocal conveniences and effective interests of both countries”364.
361 See BM, paras. 136-137.
362 BM, para. 370.
363 BR, Annex 284.
364 See Memorandum from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the Chilean Embassy in La Paz, G.M. 9-
62/127 9 February 1962, BR, Annex 285 and CCM, Annex 159.
103
262. Chile alleges in the Counter-Memorial that the Trucco Memorandum “was not an
official note, that it was unsigned, and that it only contained an exposition of Chile’s view at
that time”365. Chile relies on a speech that the Foreign Minister of Chile delivered in March
1963366. However, in that speech the Minister mischaracterized the memorandum as being
nothing more than “a document widely used in Foreign Ministries” which “serves to record
something, so much so that in the diplomatic jargon they are called ‘Aide Mémoires’”367.
263. It is clear that the Trucco Memorandum was more than an internal document. First, it
was, according to Chile, “provided (…) to Bolivia at a bilateral meeting in July 1961”368.
Second, the items contained in the Memorandum “had been approved by Minister of Foreign
Affairs [of Chile]” and Ambassador Trucco communicated them to the Bolivian Foreign
Minister under “express instructions” from his Chancellery369. Third, Bolivia replied to it
through another memorandum which was communicated to Chile and whose terms show that
Bolivia “expresses its full agreement” to the offer made by Chile. Accordingly, the Trucco
Memorandum cannot be considered as an “internal document” or an “Aide Mémoire”. It is an
international act, which reflects an agreement between the two countries providing for direct
negotiations on sovereign access to the sea.
E. The Charaña Joint Declarations
264. In 1975 and in 1977, Bolivia and Chile jointly adopted declarations which, once again,
reaffirmed, in precise and unequivocal terms, their intention to negotiate sovereign access to
the sea370. Chile contends that these declarations, and more largely “the Charaña process of
1975 to 1978 (…) at no time created or confirmed any legal obligation to negotiate”371. This
assertion, again, stands in marked contrast with the terms of the said declarations. The process
of Charaña was the consequence of a freely agreed obligation to negotiate. The text of the
365 CCM, para. 6.25.
366 CCM, para. 6.25 at fn 378.
367 BM, Annex 171.
368 See CCM, para. 6.23 in fine.
369 Note from the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 15 February 1962,
CCM Annex 160, pp 33-35.
370 See BM, I, para. 376-382. See also BM, para. 138 in fine; and infra, d
371 CCM, para. 7.55.
104
1975 Joint Declaration and the circumstances surrounding its conclusion, coupled with the
subsequent exchange of notes and declarations and the conduct of the Parties, demonstrate the
legal character of the agreement.
1. The 1975 Joint Declaration
265. The first Joint Declaration, dated 8 February 1975 372 , signed by the respective
Presidents of the two countries, contains two substantial legal provisions, namely, a) to seek
formulas to solve Bolivia’s landlocked condition, and b) to resume diplomatic relations.
266. It states that the meeting between them “made it possible to identify important points
of agreement (…)” and that:
“Both Heads of State, within a spirit of mutual understanding and constructive
intent, have decided to continue the dialogue, at different levels, in order to search
for formulas to solve the vital issues that both countries face, such as the
landlocked situation that affects Bolivia, taking into account the mutual interests
and aspirations of the Bolivian and Chilean peoples.”
It is striking that the only substantive issue mentioned in the Declaration among the “vital
issues that both countries face” is “the landlocked situation that affects Bolivia.”
267. Contrary to Chile’s assertion that Bolivia’s landlocked situation “is one which could
be addressed by a variety of means, including by augmentation of Bolivia’s right of access to
the sea”373 , the reference to the landlocked situation of Bolivia in the Joint Declaration
obviously refers to the issue of Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea. The Charaña process
that immediately followed that Declaration focused accordingly on the possible modalities
with respect to that sovereign access. At no stage during the Charaña process did Chile give
any indication that it considered that the objective of the negotiations was to find formulas for
a non-sovereign access374.
268. The wording of the Joint Declaration is clear. First, the intention to be bound follows
from the use of the terms “have decided” (“resuelto”). These words mean that “[they have]
372 See BM, Annex 111.
373 CCM, para. 7.11, letter a) in fine.
374 See BM, para. 144.
105
agreed” to continue the dialogue with the firm purpose to “search for formulas to solve the
vital issues that both countries face, such as the landlocked situation that affects Bolivia”.
Second, the Parties reproduced a phrase which Chile used to define the scope of the obligation
to negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific in 1950 and 1961, namely, “search for formulas to
solve”. This indicates that the negotiation under the terms of the Declaration required
whatever might be necessary to find a solution for Bolivia’s landlocked condition. Third, the
insertion of the words “landlocked situation that affects Bolivia” are a clear recognition of the
pending question concerning Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. This formula
had already been referred to by Bolivia in 1950, and had not been rejected by Chile.
269. In addition, in the Joint Declaration the Parties decided to normalize diplomatic
relations. According to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and customary
international law, “the establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent
diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent”375.
270. The fact that the expression “have decided to” has been used in the Declaration both
for the normalization of diplomatic relations and for the negotiations on sovereign access to
the sea, show that the intention of Bolivia and Chile was to consent to and to agree on the
content of the Declaration. It would be unacceptable that the terms “have decided” be given a
legal meaning only for the resumption of diplomatic relations, but a political meaning for the
question concerning the search for “formulas to solve” the “landlocked situation that affects
Bolivia”.
271. The Joint Declaration is very similar to the minutes in Qatar v. Bahrain that the Court
qualified as being a treaty. It is “not a simple record of a meeting” and does not “merely give
an account of discussions and summarize points of agreement and disagreement”. By
identifying important “points of agreement” between the parties and by deciding (“decided”)
to continue the dialogue on an agreed objective, the declaration “enumerate[s] the
375 Article 2, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) 500 UNTS 95.
106
commitments to which the Parties have consented” and “thus create[s] rights and obligations
in international law for the Parties”. As such, it “constitute[s] an international agreement”376.
272. After the Joint Declaration was signed in February 1975, the Press Secretary of the
Government of Chile, Federico Willoughby, declared during a visit to Bolivia that Chile had
“a commitment with Bolivia after the Charaña meeting”377. A few days later, referring to the
Joint Declaration, the same Chilean representative stated that Bolivia and Chile were studying
a solution to Bolivia’s landlocked condition, and that one of the fundamental tasks of the
diplomatic missions was to start “from the premise that international agreements recently
entered into will be complied with”378.
2. Confirmation and reiteration of the Agreement of Charaña
273. Consistent with the mutual understanding of 1975, the Bolivian Ambassador in
Santiago, Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguía, declared on 8 April 1975 that his diplomatic
mission would try to comply “in the most efficient way possible, with the spirit of Charaña,
which is reflected in the agreement that gave place to a resumption of relations”379 between
the two countries. Thereafter, the adoption of Resolution Nº 157 of the OAS Permanent
Council confirmed the purpose of the Joint Declaration of Charaña380.
274. The negotiation carried out between 1975 and 1978 reflected the object of the
agreements on sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The Bolivian proposal of 26 August
1975 and Chile’s response of 19 December 1975 both contemplated that the object of the
negotiation was the “cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coast”381.
376 See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, 1st July 1994, ICJ Reports 1994, p. 121, para. 25.
377 “Chile is determined to face the landlocked condition problem with frankness”, Ultima Hora (Bolivia), 1
March 1975, pp. 8-9, BR, Annex 300.
378 “Bolivia and Chile work together to solve the landlocked condition problem”, Hoy (Bolivia), 4 March 1975,
BR, Annex 301.
379 “Bolivia and Chile will try to materialize the spirit of Charaña, said Gutiérrez”, Hoy (Bolivia), 9 April 1975,
BR, Annex 302.
380 BM, para. 142 and 143.
381 BM, Annexes 174 and 73.
107
275. Similarly, and consistent with the purpose of the agreement to negotiate sovereign
access, the Bolivian proposal was submitted to “carry on the negotiation aimed at giving a
solution to the Bolivian Landlocked condition”. Chile’s response recognized the goal of the
understanding by stating that “the territorial cession that permits the sovereign access to the
sea represents the full and definite solution to the landlocked situation of Bolivia”, thus
confirming that the object and goal of the negotiation was sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean.
276. Chile’s position during the Maritime Dispute case confirms that the negotiations
between Bolivia and Chile in the period extending from 1975 to 1978 addressed the object of
the agreement to negotiate, that is, the sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. During the oral
proceedings of the present case, Chile’s representative referred to the “negotiations in 1975-
1976, for the grant of a corridor to the sea for Bolivia”382, referring to Chile’s specific
proposal in December 1975 for a land corridor. This proposal also involved “‘a territorial sea,
economic zone and continental shelf’ for Bolivia. Peru was consulted by Chile, because
Peru’s prior agreement was required by the Protocol to the 1929 Treaty of Lima for territorial
cessions” 383 . These negotiations were inextricably linked to the Joint Declaration of 8
February 1975.
277. While negotiations were being carried out, several statements and bilateral instruments
confirmed the object and goal of the negotiations384. In 1976, the Chilean Representative, in
his intervention before the General Assembly of the United Nations, asserted that “we have
initiated negotiations on mutually agreed and public bases with this sister nation [Bolivia],
with a view to finding a permanent solution to the problem posed by Bolivia’s wish to have a
sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean”385.
382 See Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Public sitting held on Friday 7 December 2012, declaration made by
Mr. Georgios Petrochilos on behalf of Chile, para. 12.
383 See Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Public sitting held on Friday 7 December 2012, declaration made by
Mr. Georgios Petrochilos on behalf of Chile, para. 12.
384 BM, para. 155-159.
385 Verbatim Record of the 18th Plenary Meeting, 31st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc.
A/31/PV.18, 5 October 1976, para. 190 (emphasis added), BR, Annex 311.
108
278. On 10 June 1977, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries adopted
another joint declaration, which is of particular importance386. This declaration constitutes an
additional commitment to negotiate a sovereign access. In the 1977 Joint Declaration, they
“accorded the following”:
- “The dialogue established through the Declaration of Charaña” was aimed at
“seeking of concrete solutions for their respective issues, especially the one
regarding the Bolivian landlocked situation”;
- “In this connection, they note that pursuant to that spirit, negotiations have been
engaged aiming at finding an effective solution that allows Bolivia to access the
Pacific Ocean freely and with sovereignty”;
- “(…) they resolve to deepen and activate dialogue, committing themselves to
making everything possible so as to take this negotiation to a happy conclusion, as
soon as possible”;
- “Consequently, they reaffirm the need of continuing with the negotiations from
their current status, aiming at reaching the objective they have undertaken
(…).”387
279. Given that negotiations did not result in a solution to Bolivia’s landlocked
condition388, soon after the rupture of diplomatic relations the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Chile published a document which, referring to the Charaña meeting, affirmed:
“At the conclusion of this meeting, an Act was subscribed to which established
the commitment to continue ‘the discussion at various levels in order to find
solutions for the vital matters confronting both countries, such as the question of
the landlocked position of Bolivia, on the basis of reciprocal agreement and
attending to the aspirations of the Bolivian and Chilean people’”389.
280. Several years later, when the Joint Declaration was concluded and the Charaña
negotiation was carried out, Mr. Patricio Carvajal, Chile’s Chancellor, placed on record that
386 BM, Annex 165.
387 BM, Annex 165.
388 For the reasons for the failure of the negotiations of Charaña, see Part III Chapter 7(B)(2).
389 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, History of the Chilean-Bolivian negotiations 1975-1978, Santiago, 1978
p. 6, BR, Annex 316.
109
this instrument was a “General Agreement for an outlet to the sea for this country
[Bolivia]”390.
281. The two Declarations confirm the undertaking resulting from the 1950 Notes. Chile
asserts that the Joint Declarations and the 1950 Notes are “inconsistent” because the Charaña
process was conditioned on compensation for Chile in the form of an exchange of territories
while the 1950 Notes were limited to compensations of a non-territorial character391. But the
1975 and 1977 Joint Declarations do not specify the nature of possible compensations, what
they do contain, like the 1950 Notes, is the commitment to negotiate in order to find formulas
for a sovereign access to the sea.
282. Chile has subsequently regarded the 1975 Joint Declaration as an international
agreement. First, Chile included it in its official publication entitled “Treaties, Conventions
and International Agreements of Chile 1810-1976, Bilateral Treaties, Chile-Bolivia” 392 .
Second, Chile annexed the Declaration in its Rejoinder in the Maritime Dispute with Peru
under the label “International Treaties and Inter-State Acts” 393 . Chile responds that the
Declaration was not ratified or otherwise treated as a treaty by Chile and Bolivia under their
domestic law. But unless provided otherwise, an agreement does not need require ratification;
and, in any event, the inclusion of the Declaration on the Treaty Series is a clear testimony of
the importance of that Declaration.
283. The same is true as regards the resolutions of the OAS and the Statement of Chile of
August 1975 reaffirming “the spirit of the Joint Declaration of Charaña”394. In September
1975, the President of Chile informed the President of Bolivia that he “knows of the repeated
declarations I have made of the sincere and unchanging purpose of my Government to
390 P. Carvajal Prado, Charaña: An agreement between Chile and Bolivia and the third party at odds, Valparaiso,
Arquen ed., 1994, p. 27, BR, Annex 340.
391 CCM, para. 7.22.
392 BM, para. 141 (and fn. 198) and para. 378.
393 See Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Rejoinder of the Government of Chile of 11 July 2011, Vol. II, Annex
4.
394 See BM, para. 143, and CCM, para. 7.12-7.13.
110
examine with yours a positive and lasting solution for the issue of Bolivia’s landlocked
condition”395.
284. Chile considers that the statement of the President of Bolivia of December 1975
according to which “the Act of Charaña does not include a categorical commitment by Chile
to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation” shows that the Act cannot be viewed as binding
upon Chile396. However, in the context of the said statement the adjective “categorical” does
not mean “binding” but rather “unconditional”. The context shows that what the Bolivian
President meant is that the agreement reached in Charaña was not, as such, to grant a
sovereign access to the sea, but to enter into negotiations aiming at finding formulas for a
sovereign access to the sea. The statement of the President of Bolivia accordingly constitutes
a confirmation of Chile’s undertaking to negotiate such an issue:
“My first encounter with General Pinochet was in Brazil, and there, at one point
during the protocol proceedings that we were invited to, I spoke to him about
Bolivia's maritime problem, and he told me: ‘General, believe me, I will do
everything, everything possible so that we can arrive at a solution, an agreement
between the two countries.’ Then, in Charaña; the Act of Charaña does not
include a categorical commitment by Chile to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked
situation, but once again, Gen. Pinochet told me that he had a strong personal
interest in finding a solution to this problem because he could see that the Chilean
people and the Bolivian people could very well develop brotherly relations from
the time they complemented each other economically and geographically. So
personally, I am grateful to President Pinochet because he has kept his word”397.
285. In a letter sent in February 1977 to the President of Bolivia, the President of Chile
stressed again the importance of the agreement reached in Charaña in 1975, in the following
unequivocal terms:
395 BM, Annex 70.
396 CCM, para. 7.11, letter c).
397 CCM, Annex 184, at p. 1026. . On 23 March 1978, six days after the rupture of diplomatic relations,
President Banzer referred to “fulfillment of the word committed” and added that “the word and the
commitment that others assumed with Bolivia was always taken for granted.” Address by the President of
Bolivia, Hugo Banzer, 23 March 1978, BR, Annex 317. See also the Public Explanation made by President
Banzer in regard to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Chile on 30 March 1978, BR, Annex 318.
111
“In celebrating today, 8 February, the second anniversary of our meeting in
Charaña, I have wanted to send a sincere greeting to the Bolivian sister nation and
especially to Your Excellency.
The memory of an event as important to the history of our relations must be a
motive for reflection, so that in the light of what has happened, we can analyse the
results obtained and seek to secure the achievements reached for the sake of
sacred duty of serving our people”.
(…)
Inspired in the most profound americanist spirit, we initiated negotiations aimed at
satisfying the aspiration of Bolivia to have a sovereign coast without interruption
in continuity with the current Bolivian territory.
(…)
Your Excellency knows the dedication I have devoted to this important matter and
the effort I have employed to advance it as quickly as possible to a solution of the
problems that have been arising, after having reached an agreement on the general
terms of the negotiation”398.
286. Furthermore, on 9 September 1977, the Presidents of Bolivia, Chile and Peru issued a
further joint declaration stating that “they agreed to instruct their respective Ministries of
Foreign Affairs to continue their efforts aimed at reaching a solution to this problem”, i.e. “the
progress of the negotiations aimed at solving the problem of Bolivia's landlocked
situation”399. At the OAS General Assembly, on 24 October 1979, the Chilean representative
affirmed that in 1975 the Government of Chile had committed itself seriously and in the best
of faith to negotiate in order to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean400. Also,
in April 1987, the Chilean Foreign Minister, Jaime del Valle, acknowledged that the Act of
Charaña constituted a “commitment”401. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile also
characterized the Joint Declaration of 1975 as a “commitment” in 1986402.
398 CCM, Annex 217 (emphasis added).
399 CCM, Annex 224.
400 Minutes of the 6th Plenary Meeting, 9th Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, 24 October 1979,
Vol. II, OEA/SER.P.IX.0.2., BR, Annex 319.
401 See BM, Annex 169.
402 H. Muñoz, The Foreign Relations of the Chilean Military Government, Santiago, Prospel‐Cerc, 1986, p. 142,
BR, Annex 327.
112
287. Lastly, it is recalled that between 1962 and 1975, Bolivia conditioned resumption of
diplomatic relations upon Chile’s compliance of its promise to negotiate sovereign access to
the sea403. This is exactly the object and purpose of the 1975 Joint Declaration, in which the
Presidents of the two States, on the one hand, decided to “continue the dialogue, at different
levels, in order to search for formulas to solve the vital issues that both countries face, such as
the landlocked situation that affects Bolivia” and, on the other hand, “in order to achieve the
objectives noted in this Joint Declaration, … decided to normalize diplomatic relations
between their two countries at the ambassadorial level”404. The fact that Chile accepted to
restore diplomatic relations necessarily implies that it accepted to undertake negotiations on
sovereign access to the sea.
F. The agreements and unilateral acts within the OAS
288. In the Counter-Memorial, Chile downplays the significance and legal relevance of the
conduct of the Parties within, and the resolutions adopted by, the OAS by arguing that “[t]he
issue was political, not legal” and that the said resolutions are not binding405.
289. Bolivia does not dispute that resolutions of the Assembly of the OAS are not, as such,
binding406. As Chile put it, the resolutions of the OAS Assembly are not binding “in and of
themselves”407. The reason is that the Assembly of the OAS has no competence to create legal
obligations408: hence the Assembly did not take a decision but only recommended to both
States that they negotiate sovereign access to the sea. But the fact that the Assembly cannot
oblige States to adopt a specific course of conduct does not mean that its resolutions have no
legal effect at all.
403 See BM, para. 138; CCM, para. 6.27. This is clearly underscored in the Speech of the President of Bolivia,
Hugo Banzer Suarez, before the 1975 UN General Assembly. See Verbatim Record of the 2379th Plenary
Meeting, 30th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/PV.2379, 8 October 1975, Paras.
77-78, BR, Annex 303.
404 BM, Annex 111.
405 See CCM, Ch. 8, in particular para. 8.3. and 8.18.
406 See CCM, para. 8.18-8.22.
407 CCM, para. 8.20 (quoting CCM, Annex 357).
408 See CCM, para. 8.19.
113
290. First, it is recalled that the legal effect of international organizations’ resolutions
cannot depend on “generalizations covering all resolutions.” On the contrary, “one must
consider all the circumstances with respect to a particular resolution before an evaluation can
be made”409.
291. Second, the resolutions of the OAS are at least in the present case recommendations
addressed to Bolivia and Chile, which have to be taken into account in good faith410, in
particular for the purpose of assessing and interpreting existing agreements or unilateral acts
of the Parties411:
“(…) as Judge Hersch Lauterpacht lucidly put it in his separate opinion appended
to the Court’s 1955 Advisory Opinion on the Voting Procedure on Questions
Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa:
It is one thing to affirm the somewhat obvious principle that the recommendations
of the General Assembly… addressed to the Members of the United Nations are
not legally binding upon them in the sense that full effect must be given to them.
It is another thing to give currency to the view that they have no force at all
whether legal or other [fn. 240: I.C.J. Reports (1955), pp. 90, 118].
And, indeed, as part of ‘international soft law’, recommendations produce legal
effects, not only as part of the customary process, but also in and by themselves.
(…) as Judge Lauterpacht noted, ‘while not bound to accept the recommendation,
[the addressee] is bound to give it due consideration in good faith. If… it decides
to disregard it, it is bound to explain the reasons for its decision’ [fn. 242: I.C.J.
Reports (1955), pp. 90, 119. Cf. also ibid., p. 120: ‘Whatever may be the content
of the recommendation and whatever maybe the nature and the circumstances of
the majority by which it has been reached, it is nevertheless a legal act of the
principal organ of the United Nations which Members of the United Nations are
under a duty to treat with a degree of respect appropriate to a Resolution of the
409 B. Sloan, “General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later)”, British Yearbook of International
Law, Vol. 58 (1987), at p. 42.
410 Ibid., at pp. 121-123.
411 See Part II, Chapter 3; see also B. Sloan, op. cit. at p. 43: “(…) it is still quite a different thing to say that
resolutions are recommendations and therefore not legally binding and to say that they are merely
recommendations and may therefore be ignored. The latter is clearly in violation of obligations under the
Charter of good faith and duty to co-operate.”
114
General Assembly’ – especially so when a series of recommendations point at the
same conclusions.]”412.
A fortiori, repeated resolutions framed in the same terms which call for a specific course of
action cannot lack any legal effect413. This is particularly true in the present case where, as
shown below, the Assembly of the OAS not only “recommended”, but also “urged” Bolivia
and Chile to negotiate, which is stronger language.
292. Third, the conduct of the Parties related to the drafting and adoption of the said
resolutions can reflect, crystallize or generate an agreement between the two parties. In that
regard, Chile’s proposition that the vote in favour of the adoption of a resolution “cannot
transform that resolution into a legally binding instrument for States that vote in favour of
it”414 is far too absolute. As the ICJ pointed out in a similar context, everything depends on
the circumstances in which the vote was cast, “particularly where statements were made by
way of explanation of vote”415. The wording of the resolution and the votes or patterns of
voting on resolutions on the same subject-matter are equally relevant to assess the legal effect
to be attributed to conduct of the parties in relation to the adoption, and reiteration, of
recommendations adopted by an international organization416.
293. Fourth,
“There may (…) be circumstances in which, in the absence of intent, a State
may still, as a result of its affirmative vote or even its acquiescence, be
bound by a resolution. If an affirmative vote gives rise to reasonable
412 A. Pellet, “Article 38”, in A. Zimmermann and others (ed.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice:
a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, at pp. 712-713. The same applies, mutatis mutandis,
to OAS resolutions.
413 According to B. Sloan, “Generally speaking recommendations in Pan-American practice have not been
considered binding. Declarations and resolutions on the other hand ‘have in many cases been regarded de
facto as creating binding obligations, so that a state neglecting to comply with them may be called to account
by the other parties to the declaration’” (“The Binding Force of a “Recommendation’ of the General
Assembly of the United Nations”, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 25 (1948), at p. 8).
414 CCM, para. 8.23.
415 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Judgment, 5 October 2016, para. 56.
416 Ibid.
115
expectations on the part of other States concerning a course of conduct, or if
actions following the adoption of a resolution give rise to such expectations,
and if the other States have acted upon these expectations, a State may be
estopped or precluded from denying an obligation.”417
294. In such a case, the recommendatory nature of a resolution does not preclude legitimate
expectations: “while the character of a resolution has some relevancy, it is not the principal
factor. It is the conduct of States that is important. (…) even sponsorship or strong advocacy
of a recommendation may give rise to expectations that those who strongly support the
recommendatory resolution will act accordingly”418. In that regard, the following elements are
particularly important: the terms and intent of the resolution, especially the fact that it is
worded in precise legal language; the “voting patterns (degree of support)”; and the
“cumulative factor – repetition and recitation”419.
295. In the present case, as Chile points out in the Counter-Memorial, from 1979 to 1989,
“the OAS adopted eleven resolutions on the ‘maritime problem’ of Bolivia, one each year”420.
The wording of the resolutions is clear, specific and unequivocal as regards the necessity of
having negotiations in order to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to the sea. The resolutions
adopted by the Assembly of the OAS (a body representing, today, 35 sovereign States, which
is according to the Charter of the OAS “the supreme organ of the Organization of American
States”) contain the following relevant elements:
a. “it is of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be found
whereby Bolivia will obtain appropriate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”421;
417 B. Sloan, “General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later)”, British Yearbook of International
Law, Vol. 58 (1987), at p. 65. On estoppel, see infra, Chapter 6.
418 Ibid., at p. 123.
419 Ibid., at pp. 128-129; p. 130; and p. 132.
420 CCM, para. 8.1. See BM, Annexes 191 to 201; and CCM, Annexes 250, 254, 257, 259, 266, 272, 282, 287,
300, 304 and 306.
421 AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79), Access by Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean, 31 October 1979 (BM, Annex 191); See
also AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80), The Bolivian Maritime Problem, 27 November 1980 (BM, Annex 192);
AG/RES.560 (XI-O/81), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 10 December 1981 (BM, Annex 193);
AG/RES.602 (XII-O/82), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 20 November 1982 (BM, Annex 194);
AG/RES.686 (XIII-O/83), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 18 November 1983 (BM, Annex
116
b. “it is necessary to achieve the foregoing objective”422;
c. “the need persists to attain the foregoing objective”423;
d. “it continues to be necessary to achieve the objective set forth in the preceding
declaration”424;
e. The Assembly resolves “[t]o recommend to the states most directly concerned
with this problem that they open negotiations for the purpose of providing Bolivia
with a free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean”425;
f. The Assembly resolves “[t]o urge those states most directly concerned with the
problem of Bolivia’s access to the sea to initiate a dialogue, through the
appropriate channels, to find the most satisfactory solution”426;
g. The Assembly resolves “[t]o urge Bolivia and Chile (…) to begin a process of
rapprochement (…) directed toward (…) overcoming the difficulties that separate
them – including, especially, a formula for giving Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the
Pacific Ocean (…)”427;
195); AG/RES.701 (XIV-O/84), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 17 November 1984 (BM,
Annex 196); AG/RES.766 (XV-O/85), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 9 December 1985 (BM,
Annex 197); AG/RES.873 (XVII-O/87) Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 14 November 1987
(BM, Annex 199); AG/RES.930 (XVIII-O/88), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 19 November
1988 (BM, Annex 200); and AG/RES.989 (XIX-O/89), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 18
November 1989 (BM, Annex 201).
422 AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79), Access by Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean, 31 October 1979 (BM, Annex 191).
423 AG/RES.602 (XII-O/82), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 20 November 1982 (BM, Annex 194).
424 AG/RES.686 (XIII-O/83), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 18 November 1983 (BM, Annex
195).
425 AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79), Access by Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean, 31 October 1979 (BM, Annex 191);
AG/RES.602 (XII-O/82), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 20 November 1982 (BM, Annex 194).
426 AG/RES. 481 (X-O/80), The Bolivian Maritime Problem, 27 November 1980 (BM, Annex 192);
AG/RES.560 (XI-O/81), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 10 December 1981 (BM, Annex 193).
427 AG/RES.686 (XIII-O/83), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 18 November 1983 (BM, Annex
195); AG/RES.766 (XV-O/85), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 9 December 1985 (BM, Annex
117
h. The Assembly resolves to “again urge the states directly involved in this
problem to resume negotiations in an effort to find a means of making it possible
to give Bolivia an outlet to the Pacific Ocean (…)”428;
i. The Assembly reiterates “its interest in the success of the negotiations aimed at
solving the maritime problem of Bolivia”, i.e. the finding of “a formula that will
give Bolivia a free and sovereign territorial outlet to the Pacific Ocean”429;
j. The Assembly resolves “[t]o reaffirm the importance of finding a solution to
the maritime problem of Bolivia”430;
k. “[T]he objective indicated in the abovementioned resolutions must be achieved
(…)” or “must be accomplished (…)”431.
296. Chile objects that when the first resolution was adopted in 1979, “[n]either Bolivia nor
any other Member State suggested that Chile had previously assumed any legal obligation to
negotiate with Bolivia”432. This assertion is wrong. The first resolution (No. 426) was adopted
on October 31, 1979433. Five days earlier, on 26 October 1979, Bolivia made clear to the
General Commission of the General Assembly of the OAS that “in so many occasions Chile
agreed on negotiating that issue” (i.e. “finding a solution that would grant Bolivia its own
197); AG/RES.873 (XVII-O/87) Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 14 November 1987 (BM,
Annex 199).
428 AG/RES.930 (XVIII-O/88), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 19 November 1988 (BM, Annex
200).
429 AG/RES.701 (XIV-O/84), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 17 November 1984 (BM, Annex
196).
430 AG/RES.989 (XIX-O/89), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 18 November 1989 (BM, Annex
201).
431 AG/RES.816 (XVI-O/86), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 15 November 1986 (BM, Annex
198); AG/RES.873 (XVII-O/87) Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 14 November 1987 (BM,
Annex 199); AG/RES.930 (XVIII-O/88), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 19 November 1988
(BM, Annex 200); AG/RES.989 (XIX-O/89), Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia, 18 November
1989 (BM, Annex 201).
432 CCM, para. 8.5.
433 BM, Annex 191.
118
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”) and referred for that purpose to a long list of
agreements and undertakings of Chile (1895, 1920, 1923, 1950, 1956, 1961, and 1975)434.
This statement is highly relevant to interpreting the resolution adopted five days later by the
Assembly, according to which “it is necessary to achieve the foregoing objective”, and
containing a recommendation to “open negotiations for the purpose of providing Bolivia with
a free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean”435. Through this resolution,
the Assembly gave all the support it was able to provide (i.e. to recommend, as is its
competence) to Bolivia’s request.
297. Similarly, Chile alleges that the sponsor of the resolution “insisted that the problem
was ‘political in its origin and political in its consequences… and political must be the
resolution’”436. This statement (i) does not mean that there is no right to have negotiations on
sovereign access to the sea (the modalities of which require to be negotiated and agreed upon
by competent political authorities) and (ii) in any event Chile fails to mention that the sponsor
of the resolution (Venezuela) also stated that “[f]or the past 100 years, [it has] supported
Bolivia’s Right to the Sea”437. Peru also supported the resolution.438 The draft resolution was
eventually adopted by the General Committee as follows: “25 votes in favour; no votes
against, no abstentions”439.
298. Bolivia established in the Memorial that, in addition to the legal effect that OAS
resolutions have on their own, the conduct of Bolivia and Chile upon the adoption of the said
resolutions is constitutive of an agreement440. Chile’s answer in the Counter-Memorial is that
it “never voted in favour of any of the eleven recommendatory resolutions” (it “voted against
seven of the resolutions”, “refused to participate in the vote concerning Resolution 602 of
1982” and “on three occasions, Chile did not oppose consensus”)441. This claim is ill-founded.
434 See BM, Annex 203.
435 BM, Annex 191.
436 CCM, para. 8.5.
437 CCM, Annex 248, p. 1643 (emphasis added).
438 CCM, Annex 248, pp. 1644-1645. See also CCM, Annex 264, p. 1772.
439 CCM, Annex 248, p. 1648.
440 BM, para. 164-197 and 383-387, in particular para. 167, 173-174 and 385-386.
441 CCM, para. 8.24.
119
299. It is clear from Chile’s statements before the Assembly that Chile did not vote for the
resolutions because it was against negotiations on the sovereign access to the sea, but because
it considered that it was an issue for direct bilateral negotiations only. Chile’s objection was
procedural, not substantial. Chile’s statements before the OAS are unequivocal. Chile:
a. objected to some resolutions or did not participate to the vote because it did not
accept the competence of the OAS to deal with this issue442;
b. at the same time Chile reiterated that it was willing and had the intention to satisfy
Bolivia’s aspiration through bilateral negotiations443.
300. On 31 October 1979, Chile’s representative stated for instance that
“On repeated occasions I have indicated Chile’s willingness to negotiate a
solution with Bolivia a solution to its aspiration to have a free and sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean. The means to achieve that purpose is direct
negotiation, conducted in the field of seriousness and mutual respect, without
influence, suggestions or instructions imparted by others”444.
301. On 18 November 1986, Chile equally stated that:
“even on the substantive issue, we have repeatedly stated that we want to enter
into dialogue with our brothers from Bolivia. That is why by mutual agreement,
we have initiated a phase of rapprochement. Where we disagree is the issue of this
Organization’s competence to handle this matter, which is exclusively within the
competence of Bolivia and Chile, because there is a treaty between them, and we
maintain that this treaty is in full force and effect.”445
302. Chile’s conduct within the OAS is thus a clear confirmation of its undertaking to
negotiate sovereign access to the sea. In addition, in some instances, Chile directly
442 See CCM, Annex 259, p. 1705, which Chile quotes only partially at para. 8.12 of the Counter-Memorial; or
CCM, Annex 281, p. 1868: “the Chilean Delegation requests that the record in the minutes show that its
negative vote is because this organization lacks jurisdiction to handle this matter.” See also CCM,
Annex 248, p. 1629; Annex 252; Annex 258, p. 1699; or Annex 259, p. 1705.
443 See in particular CCM, Annex 249, pp. 1653-1654; Annex 260, point 7; Annex 261, p. 1729 (last paragraph);
Annex 264, pp. 1765-1766; Annex 267, p. 1783 (point C); or Annex 285, pp. 1914-1915 and 1916-1917.
444 BM, Annex 204, p. 746.
445 CCM, Annex 285, pp. 1916-1917.
120
participated in the drafting of the resolution and joined the consensus upon its adoption. This
shows that Chile agreed on the terms of the resolution and the recommendations it contains.
In international law, nothing prevents States from accepting a recommendation with the effect
of giving rise to rights and obligations446. More generally, the conduct of the parties in
relation to a recommendation can qualify as an agreement on its own447. This is particularly
true so far as OAS Resolution 686 of 1983 is concerned, which is now considered in more
detail.
303. OAS Resolution Nº 686 of 1983 was approved by consensus and negotiated with great
care by Bolivia and Chile through the good offices of Colombia448. It was considered to be an
agreement by the Secretary General of the OAS, Alejandro Orfila449. Chile limits itself to
noting that it did not vote in favour of the Resolution, and that it simply “did not oppose
consensus within the OAS General Assembly, but joined declarations or explanations with
respect to the content and the legal status of the resolutions adopted”450. Likewise, it contends,
in relation to the process emerging from Resolution Nº 686, that “[t]his was all purely a
matter of politics and diplomacy, not law, and both States acted accordingly”451.
304. While Chile submitted a reservation to its preamble, the rest of the content of the
Resolution was approved. The context in which that Resolution was formulated, coupled with
the subsequent conduct of the Parties, are both clear evidence that this instrument was the
means by which Bolivia and Chile agreed anew to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the
446 See (as regards the acceptance of a recommendation to negotiate giving rise to rights and obligations) PCIJ,
Case of the railway traffic between Lithuania and Poland, PCIJ, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1931, Série
A/B, No. 42, p. 116. See also ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. United States of America). Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 at pp. 99-100, para. 188; C.F.
Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, Cambridge University
Press, 2005, pp. 181-182.
447 See J. Castañeda, «Valeur juridique des résolutions des Nations Unies », Recueil des cours, Vol. 129 (1970-
I), at pp. 302-312.
448 See BM, para. 174 and para. 385.
449 See “Orfila praises Colombia’s initiative in regard to Bolivia’s landlocked condition”, Ultima Hora (Bolivia),
21 November 1983, BR, Annex 321.
450 CCM, para 8.24.
451 CCM, para 8.31.
121
Pacific Ocean. As a result, the binding nature of that Resolution emerges from the Parties’
consent.
305. On 1 October 1983, the Chancellors of Bolivia and Chile held a meeting in which
Bolivia submitted a proposal to reach an agreement at the coming OAS General Assembly. It
proposed that a third country submit a declaration inviting the Parties to start a frank dialogue,
and that “Bolivia and Chile reply favourably to this invitation, solemnly affirming their
commitment to seek solutions”. Chile’s Chancellor declared that it agreed with Bolivia’s
proposal and that, through this channel, satisfactory solutions to the maritime issue would be
explored452.
306. Between 16 and 18 November 1983, the delegations of Bolivia and Chile to the OAS
met to negotiate a draft that became Resolution 686. Even the reservation made by Chile with
regard to the preamble was negotiated so as to reach an agreement between the Parties453. The
manner in which the Resolution would be presented and accepted by the Parties was also
agreed upon454. This procedure that was agreed to beforehand, took place at the fourth session
of the General Commission. The resolution was adopted by the OAS General Assembly455
and Chile submitted a reservation on the preamble, as agreed by the Parties in advance.
307. In the Counter-Memorial, Chile concedes that it “expressed its support for the draft
resolution” but argues that it had “some reservations” and joined the consensus “precisely
because it understood the aim and effect of the resolution to be circumscribed”456. This is not
452 Report of Jorge Gumucio Granier, Permanent of Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations, regarding
the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Chile, Ortiz Mercado and Schweitzer, 1
October 1983, pp. 3-4 (emphasis added) BM Annex 178, CCM, Annex 262.
453 Note from the Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations, Jorge Gumucio, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, José Ortiz Mercado, MRB 58/84, 16 February 1984, BR, Annex 324. See also, U.
Figueroa Pla, The Bolivian maritime claim before international fora, RIL Editorial, Santiago, 2007, pp. 208-
211, BR, Annex 360.
454 Ibid., p.211.
455 Minutes of the Fourth Session of the General Commission of the OAS, allocution by Chile’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Miguel Schweitzer, 18 November 1983, p. 368, pp. 371, BM Annex 206, CCM, Annex 265.
Minutes of the Fourth Session of the General Commission of the OAS, allocution by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Chile, Miguel Schweitzer, 18 November 1983, p. 368, pp. 372, BM Annex 205, CCM, Annex 264.
456 CCM, para. 8.13.
122
an accurate picture of Chile’s statement before the OAS. Chile had, indeed, one reservation;
but beyond that reservation, it did not qualify its support for the Resolution:
“(…) the proposed resolution submitted to us by our distinguished friend, the
Foreign Minister of Colombia, has the support of my Government, although we
must state our objection to the preamble, because of the principles that we have
repeated in these Assemblies, as we find that it alludes to resolutions that my
Government has never accepted. (…) my Delegation, faced with Bolivia’s
aspiration and our position, in order to replace eloquence and rhetoric, so common
among us, would like to replace it with tangible demonstrations of good will,
good neighborliness, and we welcome the Colombian suggestion set forth in this
resolution, with the objection mentioned earlier”457.
Contemporary Chilean records of the process of adoption of the 1983 Resolution confirm that
Chile agreed on the core of the Resolution, i.e. negotiations on sovereign access to the sea458.
308. The Parties were well aware that a commitment had been reached, although there
would be disagreements on its execution. While Bolivia considered that, by virtue of
Resolution 686, the negotiations on sovereign access should have commenced simultaneously
to the rapprochement process, Chile considered that the Resolution had to be implemented in
three stages: rapprochement, normalization of relations, and negotiation on sovereign access.
309. This is clear from a letter of 15 December 1983, sent to Colombia’s Chancellor,
Rodrigo Lloreda, in which the Chilean Chancellor, Schweitzer, rejected some of the criteria
formulated by the President of Bolivia:
“I do not need to point out to you that this interpretation moves away from the
commitment adopted by the Foreign Ministers of Chile and Bolivia. As expressed
explicitly in the respective resolution of OAS, the first thing to be sought is the
rapprochement and diplomatic normality between the two countries and then
consider the pending disputes”459.
457 CCM, Annex 264, p. 1769.
458 See CCM, Annex 267, p. 1785, points E and F.
459 Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Miguel Schweitzer, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Colombia, Rodrigo Lloreda, 15 December 1983, BR, Annex 322.
123
310. In any event, the Parties continued their contacts to implement Resolution 686. To this
end, the Foreign Ministers of both countries held several meetings460.At this last meeting in
New York on 2 October 1984, in the presence of the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
both Parties agreed to issue a Joint Communiqué stating that “they reached an agreement on
the main aspects of context and procedure for carrying out Resolution No. 686”, and that the
meeting of Bogota would be held within 90 days461. The conduct of the Parties is clear
evidence that they had accepted the Resolution and that they considered it binding.
311. To conclude, the OAS resolutions and the related conduct of the Parties (i) resulted in
another agreement to negotiate sovereign access to the sea, and (ii) confirm and support
existing commitments to negotiate sovereign access to the sea.
G. The undertakings post-1990
312. So far as the period post-1990, and in particular the 2006 ‘13-Point Agenda’,462 are
concerned, Chile considers that none of the relevant statements or declarations made
throughout this period are relevant to establish the existence of an undertaking to negotiate
sovereign access to the sea463.
460 U. Figueroa, Bolivia’s maritime claim before international fora, 2007, BR, Annex 360. p. 221-222. See also
See also Aide Memoire “Meeting held with Chancellor Jaime del Valle”, 26 April 1984, BR, Annex 325.
461 The Draft Joint Communiqué is reproduced in CCM, Annex 261, Annex A, Summary of Chilean-Bolivian
Discussions. The draft Joint Communiqué itself did not specify the procedural agreements reached, but they
are recorded in an internal report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia. Among other points, it was
agreed that: a) the negotiations to solve pending issues, in particular to find a formula for giving Bolivia a
sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, would begin with a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Bogotá; b)
Simultaneously, the Foreign Ministers would approve a list and schedule for rapprochement actions to
eliminate factors that could eventually disturb the bilateral dialogue; c) Peru would be invited to join the
conversations in the event that the proposals concerning sovereign access involved a territory falling within
the scope of the Additional Protocol to the 1929 Treaty. See Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia concerning the Bolivian-Chilean negotiations between 1983 and 1984, 9 November 1984, BR,
Annex 326.
462 BM, Annex 118.
463 CCM, Chapter 9.
124
313. At the same time, however, Chile acknowledges in the Counter-Memorial that it
“accepted to prepare an agenda without exclusions in the 2000 Algarve Declaration” and
“included the ‘maritime issue’ in the 13-Point Agenda in 2006”464.
314. According to Chile the sixth point in the Agenda, “the maritime issue”, was
deliberately described “extremely broadly, and did not include any reference to ‘sovereign
access’”465.
315. However, “the maritime issue” clearly refers to “sovereign access”, as opposed to nonsovereign
access, i.e. the improvement of the transit regime under the 1904 Treaty. It was
understood by both Parties that the “maritime issue” was an umbrella term that included the
pending issue of the sovereign access to the sea, as illustrated by declarations of the
Presidents of the two countries of December 2005466 and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile in June 2007,467 and by the fact that Point 6 of the Agenda entitled “Maritime issue” is
distinct from Point 3 on “Free transit”468. In addition, within the OAS, the terminology used
has been “the Maritime Problem of Bolivia”469 or “Bolivia’s maritime issue”470. The formula
used in the 13-Point Agenda echoes these formulas.
316. The relevant elements and documents that Bolivia presented in the Memorial
establishing that both Parties agreed in the 2000 Algarve Declaration to negotiate sovereign
access471 are not discussed by Chile in Chapter 9 of its Counter-Memorial. These elements
include the statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile in April 2006 that Chile does
not exclude the possibility to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to the sea472, and the statement
of July 2006 of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile who, referring to Bolivia’s claim for
an access to the maritime coast, underlined that his Government “is fully aware of the
464 CCM, para. 9.3.
465 CCM, para. 9.15.
466 See BM, Annexes 80 and 81.
467 See BM, Annex 136.
468 BM, Annex 118.
469 See for instance BM, Annexes 194 to 201.
470 See for instance BM, Annexes 203 and 206.
471 See BM, para. 199-214.
472 BM, Annex 132.
125
commitment undertaken many years ago to engage in negotiations over an Agenda without
exclusions” with its Trans Andean neighbour473.
317. To conclude, throughout the past century Chile has repeatedly and consistently
asserted that it has undertaken a commitment to negotiate with Bolivia on sovereign access to
the sea. This commitment results from multiple legal sources, either explicit agreements (in
particular the 1950 Notes and the 1975 and 1977 Joint Declarations) or tacit agreements or
acquiescence (in particular the absence of any protest from Chile against the declarations
made by Bolivia before the OAS in 1979, the information submitted by Bolivia to the 1958
Conference on the Law of the Sea or the declaration made by Bolivia upon the signature of
the UNCLOS474), unilateral acts, and a combination of declarations and recommendations of
the General Assembly of the OAS.
318. Chile’s mantra is that this impressive array of declarations, agreements and conduct is
purely “political”. This assertion is not only wrong in legal terms, as was demonstrated above;
it is also not credible. Chile fails to answer a simple, decisive question: if Chile’s declarations
were supposed to have no effect at all, why for so many decades did Chile’s highest
authorities repeatedly say that Chile was willing to enter into negotiations on sovereign access
to the sea, and why did they repeatedly say that there is a need for Bolivia to have a sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean? Chile’s highest authorities (presumably acting in good faith) took
the sovereign decision to make these declarations, to enter into these agreements, and to
reiterate them on a number of occasions. This necessarily indicates that they were supposed to
mean something and to be given effect. As such, they express Chile’s intent to negotiate on
sovereign access to the sea, which created rights for Bolivia.
473 BM, Annex 135 (emphasis added).
474 See supra, paras. 149 and 258 fn. 359.
126
CHAPTER 6
ESTOPPEL AND LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
319. As demonstrated above, the obligation to negotiate sovereign access to the sea results
from a number of agreements or unilateral acts attributable to Chile evidencing its intention.
But even if, quod non, these commitments did not exist, Bolivia would be in a position to
invoke estoppel as an alternative legal basis for the said obligation. Chile’s repeated
declarations constitute a representation on which Bolivia can legitimately rely, and Chile’s
abrupt denial of the existence of the obligation since 2011 frustrates Bolivia’s legitimate
expectations resulting from this representation.
A. The nature of estoppel and legitimate expectations
320. As has been recently recalled,
“Estoppel is a general principle of law that serves to ensure, in the words of
Lord McNair, ‘that international jurisprudence has a place for some
recognition of the principle that a State cannot blow hot and cold – allegans
contraria non audiendus est.’ 475 The principle stems from the general
requirement that States act in their mutual relations in good faith and is
designed to protect the legitimate expectations of a State that acts in reliance
upon the representations of another.”476
321. Chile, after more than a century of official statements, declarations and agreements
attributable to its highest authorities, stating that there was a need to engage in negotiations
regarding Bolivia’s landlocked status, suddenly denied the very existence of these
commitments. In those circumstances, Bolivia reasonably invoked in its Memorial estoppel
and legitimate expectations477.
322. Chile devotes only one footnote in the Counter-Memorial to estoppel and legitimate
expectations. According to this footnote, Chile contends that:
475 A.D. McNair, “The Legality of the Occupation of the Ruhr”, 5 British Year Book of International Law 17, 35
(1924), Fn. 548
476 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award, 18 March 2015 (162 ILR
1), para. 435.
477 See in particular BM, para. 332, 334, 396 and 436.
127
“For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that (…) Bolivia has not developed
this assertion by reference to any relevant legal authority; and (…) the weight of
authority, discussed above, emphasizes that what is crucial is the intention of the
declaring State, objectively assessed, and does not suggest that such intention can
be deduced from any expectation of another State.”478
323. Both assertions are incorrect. As regards the first one, Bolivia has provided relevant
legal authority in the Memorial479. As regards the second one, it clearly makes no sense to
refer to the rules applicable to the identification of the intention of the declaring States when
estoppel or legitimate expectations are at stake, since the purpose of estoppel and legitimate
expectations is precisely to provide a basis for obligations other than the intention to be
bound. This element has been reiterated on many occasions.
324. In this regard, in 1962, Judge Fitzmaurice pointed out that:
“(…) in those cases where it can be shown that a party has, by conduct or
otherwise, undertaken, or become bound by, an obligation, it is strictly not
necessary or appropriate to invoke any rule of preclusion or estoppel, although the
language of that rule is, in practice, often employed to describe the situation. (…)
The real field of operation, therefore, of the rule of preclusion or estoppel, stricto
sensu, in the present context, is where it is possible that the party concerned did
not give the undertaking or accept the obligation in question (or there is room for
doubt whether it did), but where that party’s subsequent conduct has been such,
and has had such consequences, that it cannot be allowed to deny the existence of
an undertaking, or that it is bound”480.
325. In 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal in the Chagos arbitration held accordingly that it:
“does not consider that a representation must take the form of a binding unilateral
declaration before a State may legitimately rely on it. To consider otherwise
would be to erase any distinction between estoppel and the doctrine on binding
unilateral acts. (…) The sphere of estoppel (…) is not that of unequivocally
binding commitments (for which a finding of estoppel would in any event be
unnecessary (see Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment of
15 June 1962, Separate Opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 52 at p. 63), but is instead concerned with the grey area of representations and
commitments whose original legal intent may be ambiguous or obscure, but
478 CCM, p. 63, fn. 204.
479 See BM, p. 135, fn. 407.
480 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, p. 63.
128
which, in light of the reliance placed upon them, warrant recognition in
international law”.481
326. The fact that an obligation can arise on the basis of estoppel from declarations or
conduct, even in cases where the said declarations or conduct did not express an intention to
be bound or where there is room for doubt in that regard, is reflected in the decision of the
Tribunal in the Chagos arbitration, which concluded that the commitments were binding on
the United Kingdom because of estoppel:
“The Tribunal, therefore, holds that the United Kingdom is estopped from
denying the binding effect of these commitments, which the Tribunal will treat as
binding on the United Kingdom in view of their repeated reaffirmation after
1968”482.
327. In the present case, the obligation to negotiate results both from general international
law, treaties, agreements, and unilateral acts, 483 and from the operation of estoppel and
legitimate expectations. It is not necessary to adjudge that Chile is estopped, since there are
agreements and binding unilateral declarations. For the sake of completeness, however,
Bolivia will show in this section that, even if there were no such agreements and binding
unilateral acts, quod non, estoppel, as defined in international law (B), would in any case
apply in the present case (C).
481 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award, 18 March 2015 (162
ILR 1), para. 445-446. See also S. Carbone, “Promise in International Law: A Confirmation of its Binding
Force”, Italian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 1 (1975), at 167 and 169; H. Das, “L’estoppel et
l’acquiescement: assimilations pragmatiques et divergences conceptuelles”, Revue belge de droit
international, 1997-2, at 608 (fn. 3) and 609-610.
482 Ibid., para. 448. See also M. Virally, « Rapport provisoire sur la distinction entre textes internationaux de
portée juridique et textes internationaux dépourvus de portée obligatoire », Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit
international, 1983, Vol. 60-I, pp. 182-183 : « (…) la Commission n’a pas à s’occuper de la question de
savoir si le principe de la bonne foi ou l’estoppel peut faire produire certains effets de droit à des textes qui,
par ailleurs sont dépourvus de portée juridique, puisque cela ne change pas leur nature. C’est aussi mon
sentiment en ce qui concerne l’estoppel, dont le jeu tient aux apparences qui ont été créées et auxquelles un
tiers a pu se fier de bonne foi et qui sert à protéger ce dernier (…). Il s’agit donc d’un mécanisme qui ‘greffe’
en quelque sorte un effet juridique sur un acte qui n’était pas destiné à le produire ».
483 See supra, Chapters 2 and 3.
129
B. The conditions and effects of estoppel and legitimate expectations
328. International law is well-established as regards the existence of estoppel and legitimate
expectations, and their main components. The fact that creating legitimate expectations and
then frustrating them can give rise to legal obligations under international law has been
acknowledged by a number of international courts or tribunals.
329. For example, more than a century ago, the Mixed Claims Commission Italy-Venezuela
decided in the Affaire Aboilard (France/Haïti) that:
“(…) il y a eu, tout au moins, faute grave de la part du gouvernement haïtien
d’alors (…) à créer des attentes légitimes qui, ayant été trompées par le fait du
gouvernement lui-même, ont entraîné un préjudice dont réparation est due”484.
330. Subsequently, international courts and tribunals have referred to estoppel as a
general principle of international law and, today:
“A considerable weight of authority supports the view that estoppel is a general
principle of international law, resting on principles of good faith and
consistency.”485
484 Award, 26 July 1905, RIAA, Vol. XI, p. 80. See also the Corvaïa Case, RIAA, Vol. X, 1903, p. 633.
(Unofficial translation: “There has been, however, a serious fault on the part of the Haitian government … in
creating legal expectations which, having been disappointed by the government itself, have led to prejudice
which requires compensation”)
485 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed. Oxford University Press, 2012,
p. 420. See also, among many others, Separate Opinion of Judge Ajibola, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, 3 February 1994, I.C.J. Reports 1994, pp. 96-114; Chevron Corporation and
Texaco Petroleum Company v. Ecuador, Partial Award on the Merits, PCA Case No. 34877, 30 March 2010,
para. 348-353; European Court of Justice, Opinion of Advocate General Mazák delivered on 8 May 2008,
Case C203/07 P, Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities, para. 81 (fn. omitted):
“What seems to be most relevant to the case before the Court is that good faith requires that the intention
expressed be consistent with the real intention, and, more generally, that the legal reality be consistent with
the legal appearance (that is to say, consistent with the appearances created by statements or conduct on the
part of the legal actors). This effect of the principle of good faith seems to coincide with the principle
‘allegans contraria non est audiendus’, commonly known as the principle of estoppel under international
law.”
130
331. As the then Vice-President of the ICJ, Judge Alfaro, noted in 1962:
“The principle, not infrequently called a doctrine, has been referred to by the
terms of ‘estoppel’, ‘preclusion’, ‘forclusion’, ‘acquiescence’. I abstain from
adopting any of these particular designations, as I do not believe that any of them
fits exactly to the principle or doctrine as applied in international cases”;486
“Judge Basdevant has given a definition of estoppel in his ‘Dictionnaire de la
terminologie du droit international’ which is doubtless very accurate. Here it is:
‘Terme de procédure emprunté à la langue anglaise qui désigne l’objection
péremptoire qui s’oppose à ce qu’une partie à un procès prenne une position qui
contredit soit ce qu’elle a antérieurement admis expressément ou tacitement, soit
ce qu’elle prétend soutenir dans la même instance”;487
“Whatever term or terms be employed to designate this principle such as it has
been applied in the international sphere, its substance is always the same:
inconsistency between claims or allegations put forward by a State, and its
previous conduct in connection therewith, is not admissible (allegans contraria
non audiendus est). Its purpose is always the same: a State must not be permitted
to benefit by its own inconsistency to the prejudice of another State (nemo potest
mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam). (…) (…) The acts or attitude of a
State previous to and in relation with rights in dispute with another State may take
the form of an express written agreement, declaration, representation or
recognition, or else that of a conduct which implies consent to or agreement with a
determined factual or juridical situation”;488
“The primary foundation of this principle is the good faith that must prevail in
international relations, inasmuch as inconsistency of conduct or opinion on the
part of a State to the prejudice of another is incompatible with good faith. Again, I
submit that such inconsistency is especially inadmissible when the dispute arises
from bilateral treaty relations”489.
332. To some extent, estoppel in international law is less refined than in some domestic
legal systems. As the Arbitral Tribunal stressed in the Chagos case,
486 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, Separation Opinion of Vice-President Alfaro, p. 39.
487 Idem.
488 Ibid., p. 40.
489 Ibid., p. 42.
131
“in contrast to at least some forms of estoppel in municipal law – the principle in
international law does not distinguish between representations as to existing facts
and those regarding promises of future action or declarations of law”490.
333. In addition, estoppel in international law does not have a procedural character only; it
also has a substantive one. Vice-President Alfaro in 1962 noted that:
“The principle that condemns contradiction between previous acts and subsequent
claims is not to be regarded as a mere rule of evidence or procedure. The
substantive character of the rule finds support in the writings of several
authors”491.
334. Similarly, Judge Fitzmaurice considered in 1962 that:
“The principle of preclusion is the nearest equivalent in the field of international
law to the common-law rule of estoppel, though perhaps not applied under such
strict limiting conditions (and it is certainly applied as a rule of substance and not
merely as one of evidence or procedure)”492.
335. In the Argentine-Chile Frontier Case, the Court of Arbitration also considered that:
“It seems clear from the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (…) and especially from the learned
Separate Opinion of Vice-President Alfaro in that case, that there is in
international law a principle, which is moreover a principle of substantive law and
not just a technical rule of evidence, according to which ‘a State party to an
international litigation is bound by its previous acts or attitude when they are in
contradiction with its claims in the litigation’ (…). This principle is designated by
a number of different terms, of which ‘estoppel’ and ‘preclusion’ are the most
common. But it is also clear that these terms are not to be understood in quite the
same sense as they are in municipal law”493.
490 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award, 18 March 2015 (162 ILR
1), para. 437.
491 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, Separation Opinion of Vice-President Alfaro, p. 41.
492 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, p. 62
493 Report of the Court of Arbitration, 24 November 1966, RIAA, Vol. XVI, p. 164. See also, expressing the
same idea, Decision regarding delimitation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Decision of 13 April
2002, RIAA, Vol. XXV, p. 111, para. 3.9.
132
336. The conditions of estoppel are also well-established today:
a) “(…) some essential elements required by estoppel: a statement or
representation made by one party to another and reliance upon it by that other
party to his detriment or to the advantage of the party making it”;494
b) “An estoppel would only arise if by its acts or declarations Cameroon had
consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle the boundary dispute
submitted to the Court by bilateral avenues alone. It would further be necessary
that, by relying on such an attitude, Nigeria had changed position to its own
detriment or had suffered some prejudice (…)”;495
c) “estoppel may be invoked where (a) a State has made clear and consistent
representations, by word, conduct, or silence; (b) such representations were made
through an agent authorized to speak for the State with respect to the matter in
question; (c) the State invoking estoppel was induced by such representations to
act to its detriment, to suffer a prejudice, or to convey a benefit upon the
representing State; and d) such reliance was legitimate, as the representation was
one on which that State was entitled to rely.”496
337. In addition, it is important to note that estoppel does not require or presuppose that the
representations made by a State are fraudulent. Contrary to fraud, which consists in “any false
statements, misrepresentations or other deceitful proceedings”497, estoppel is based on the
mere existence of representations made by a State, where good faith “must be presumed”.498 It
494 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application by Nicaragua for
Permission to Intervene, Judgment, 13 September 1990, I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 118, para. 63.
495 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 11 June
1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 303-304, para. 57.
496 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award, 18 March 2015 (162 ILR
1), para. 438.
497 See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook, 1966, Vol. II, p. 245, para. (3) of the
commentary of Draft Article 46 on “Fraud”.
498 See on the principle that “good faith must be presumed”: Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p.213 at p. 267, para. 150; Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14 at p. 105, para. 278; Application of
the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment
of 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 644 at pp. 692-693, para. 168; Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99 at p. 154, para. 138; see
also The Philippines v. China, Award, 12 July 2016, para. 1200; Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration
133
is precisely because the good faith of the State making representations must be presumed that
the said representations are capable of creating legitimate expectations.
338. As regards the legal effects of estoppel (or similar principle such as preclusion),
international courts and tribunals have consistently held that a State is precluded from
claiming that a right, an obligation or a situation does not exist, if there is a change of attitude
of the said State and if its past conduct is not consistent with the new claim. It has been
decided indeed that:
“(…) only the existence of a situation of estoppel could suffice to lend substance
to this contention, – that is to say if the Federal Republic were now precluded
from denying the applicability of the conventional régime, by reason of past
conduct, declarations, etc., which not only clearly and consistently evinced
acceptance of that régime, but also had caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in
reliance on such conduct, detrimentally to change position or suffer some
prejudice”;499
Or that
“The effect of the notion of estoppel is that a State is precluded, by its conduct,
from asserting that it did not agree to, or recognize, a certain situation”500.
339. While estoppel focuses on the position of the State taking up a stance, and holds it to
its commitments, the doctrine of legitimate expectations focuses on the position of States that
have relied upon the views taken up by another State, and treats them as entitled to rely upon
commitments made by the other State. The doctrine of legitimate expectations has been
widely applied by arbitral tribunals in the context of investment protection, For instance, the
tribunal in Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela501 concluded, after a survey
of national laws, that the doctrine is part of international law.
(Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award, 18 March 2015, para. 447; Lac Lanoux (Spain/France), Award, 16
November 1957, RIAA, Vol. XII, p. 305.
499 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 26, para. 30
(emphasis added).
500 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal, Judgment,
14 March 2012, ITLOS Reports, Case No. 16, para. 124.
501 ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, Sept. 22, 2014, para. 570-576, 662. Cf. R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer,
Principles of International Investment Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: University Press, 2012, pp. 148-149.
134
C. Application of estoppel and legitimate expectations in the present case
340. The attitude of Chile as regards the issue of negotiations on sovereign access to the sea
is a clear example of estoppel. Before changing its attitude in 2011 Chile made, over a long
period of time, a great number of statements which, whatever their form and own legal
binding nature, 502 and given their content and the context in which they were made503 ,
constitute clear and consistent representations which created legitimate expectations for
Bolivia.
341. Numerous examples of statements or declarations that make clear that Chile agrees
that negotiations have to take place to achieve a specific goal, i.e. to find a formula to grant
Bolivia a sovereign access to the sea, can be provided. Since these statements and declarations
also constitute binding undertakings, as demonstrated above, 504 a fortiori they constitute
probative elements for the purpose of estoppel:
a. Chile admits in the Counter-Memorial that the 1950 Notes shows at least that Chile
was “open to entering into a negotiation aimed at finding a formula that could make
it possible to give to Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean (…)”505. Chile
adds that “[i]t will be important for the Court to read carefully the documentary
record, which merely shows that on various occasions Chile is recorded as stating
that it was open to consider and study Bolivia’s proposals, and indeed that it was
open to negotiation”506. Chile also insists on Chile’s President “desire to reach an
agreement that would gradually please Bolivia’s aspirations”;507
b. In 1917, the Government of Chile expressed to the newly elected President of
Bolivia the following: “My Government is hoping to find, when the time comes, the
502 See supra, Chapter 3
503 Bolivia’s core national interest in having a sovereign access to the sea was expressed by Bolivia, publicly and
widely, as early as 1884 when the Truce Pact was concluded between Bolivia and Chile. See BM, para. 65,
and BM, Annex 103.
504 See supra, Chapter 3
505 CCM, para. 6.2, letter b).
506 CCM, para. 6.5.
507 CCM, para. 6.5, letter b). See also para. 6.10, letter d).
135
means to fulfil the most fundamental aspirations of the Bolivian and Chilean
peoples”;508
c. In the Chilean Memorandum of 9 September 1919, Chile stated unequivocally that,
“[i]ndependently of what was established in the Peace Treaty of 1904” and “subject
to Chile’s triumph in the plebiscite”, “Chile accepts to initiate new negotiations
aimed at satisfying the aspirations of the friendly country”. More precisely, echoing
promises already made at the end of the nineteenth century,509 Chile stated in the
memorandum that:
“The situation created by the Treaty of 1904, the interests in that zone and the
security of its northern border impose on Chile the need to retain the maritime
coast that is indispensable to it; but, with the intention of laying a solid foundation
for the future union of the two countries, Chile is willing to seek that Bolivia
acquire its own outlet to the sea, ceding to it an important part of that area to the
north of Arica and of the railway line within the territories submitted to the
plebiscite stipulated in the Treaty of Ancón”;510
d. In the 1920 Act dated 10 January 1920,
“The Minister of Chile stated that, as he had already had the opportunity to express
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia by fulfilling the agreeable and
honourable mission that has been entrusted to him before this Government, there
exists on the part of the Government of Chile the best wish to favour a policy of
sincere and closer rapprochement with Bolivia; that for this purpose he reproduces
the bases that he submitted, in general terms, to the Honourable Mr. Darío
Gutiérrez last September, to search for an agreement that would allow Bolivia to
satisfy its aspiration of obtaining its own outlet to the Pacific, independently of the
definitive situation created by the provisions of the Treaty of Peace and Amity of
20 October 1904.
(…)
Bolivia, which is not a direct party to the dispute of the Pacific, could, by means of
an agreement with Chile, which would naturally and logically derive from the
existing ties between the two countries, acquire the expectation of integrating to its
508 O. Pinochet de la Barra, Chile and Bolivia: How Much Longer! Santiago, LOM Editions, 2004, pp. 38‐39,
BR, Annex 352.
509 See for instance BM, Annex 189.
510 CCM, Annex 117 (emphasis added); BM, Annex 19.
136
territory an important and extensive maritime province, escaping its landlocked
situation”.511
In the same Act, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia was careful to state that:
“maintaining the freedom of both Governments to direct their diplomatic efforts in
a way which best takes into account their respective interests and addresses, if
necessary, the powers or other entities that may cooperate most effectively in the
achievement of their wishes, it is the duty of his country to reiterate to Chile what
was previously stated, persuaded that in case Bolivia had the expectation of
acquiring the Port of Arica an agreement could be executed that would take into
account the common purpose of further consolidating the friendship between the
two nations”.512
e. In the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile dated 20 June 1950, he
declared that:
“From the quotes contained in the note I answer, it flows that the Government of
Chile, together with safeguarding the legal situation established by the Treaty of
Peace of 1904, has been willing to study, through direct negotiations with Bolivia,
the possibility of satisfying the aspirations of the Government of Your Excellency
and the interests of Chile.
At the present opportunity, I have the honor of expressing to Your Excellency that
my Government will be consistent with that position and that, motivated by a
fraternal spirit of friendship towards Bolivia, is willing to formally enter into a
direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that could make it possible to
give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to
obtain compensation of a non-territorial character that effectively takes into
account its interests”.513
f.In the Memorandum dated 10 July 1961, Chile reasserted that:
“Chile has always been willing, together with safeguarding the legal situation
established in the Treaty of Peace of 1904, to study, through direct efforts with
Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying the aspirations of the latter and the interests of
Chile. (…) Note Nº 9 of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated in Santiago on 20
June 1950, is a clear testimony of those purposes. Through it, Chile states that it is
‘willing to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a
formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access
511 CCM, Annex 118 (emphasis added); BM, Annex 101.
512 CCM, Annex 118; BM, Annex 101.
513BR, Annex 266.
137
to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial
character that effectively takes into account its interests’”514.
g. In the Memorandum of 26 November 1976, Chile stated that it was taking
appropriate steps:
“In order to reach a successful conclusion in the ongoing negotiation with Bolivia,
which satisfies the aspiration of that country to have a sovereign maritime coast
linked to the Bolivian territory through a strip of equally sovereign territory”;515
h. In the Joint Declaration of Charaña of 8 February 1975,
“Both heads of state, in that spirit of mutual understanding and constructive
motivation, have resolved to continue the dialogue at various levels, to seek
formulas for solving the vital matters that both countries face, such as the
landlocked situation that affects Bolivia, taking into account their reciprocal
interests and addressing the aspirations of the Bolivian and Chilean peoples”.516
i.In the Note of the President of Chile of 30 September 1975, the President mentioned
“the need to find an immediate, satisfactory, and fair solution for the Bolivian
proposal” and stated that Bolivia “knows of the repeated declarations I have made of
the sincere and unchanging purpose of my Government to examine with yours a
positive and lasting solution for the issue of Bolivia’s landlocked condition”;517
j.The President of Chile reiterated in his Note dated 8 February 1977 that:
“Inspired in the most profound americanist spirit, we initiated negotiations aimed
at satisfying the aspiration of Bolivia to have a sovereign coast without
interruption in continuity with the current Bolivian territory.
(…)
In face of these difficulties, I deem convenient to redouble our efforts and our
goodwill, to move forward from the current state of the negotiations and reach the
goal we have set”.518
514 BR, Annex 284.
515 CCM, Annex 212; BM, Annex 26.
516 CCM, Annex 174; BM, Annex 111.
517 BM, Annex 70.
518 CCM, Annex 217; BM, Annex 74.
138
k. In the Joint Declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 10 June 1977, “the two
Ministers agreed to the following”:
“They emphasize that the dialogue established via the Declaration of Charaña
reflects the endeavouring of the two governments to deepen and strengthen the
bilateral relations between Chile and Bolivia by seeking concrete solutions to their
respective problems, especially with regard to Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
Along these lines, they indicate that, consistently with this spirit, they initiated
negotiations aimed at finding an effective solution that allows Bolivia to count on
a free and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean.
Taking as a basis both Ministers’ constructive analysis of the course of
negotiations regarding Bolivia's vital problem, they resolve to deepen and activate
their dialogue, committing to do their part to bring this negotiation to a happy end
as soon as possible.
Consequently, they reaffirmed the need to pursue the negotiations from their
current status, seeking to reach their proposed objective, in order to consolidate
peaceful coexistence and broad comprehension that promotes understanding, as
well as coordinated development in the zone”.519
l.In the Note of the President of Chile of 23 November 1977, Chile stated that:
“My Government appreciates the special importance that the current negotiations
to give Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean have in the context of our
relations. My Government maintains unchanged the political will that gave rise to
these negotiations and is willing to move ahead with them in accordance with the
desires and with the intensity that Your Excellency deems advisable”.520
m. The President of Chile “reiterated” in his Note of 18 January 1978 “my
Government’s intention of promoting the ongoing negotiation aimed at satisfying the
longings of the brother country to obtain a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean”,
stressing that they were “negotiations that we are committed to”, and he concluded
his note by stating that:
“The negotiation in which we are engaged is not easy. It will demand patience and
reciprocal goodwill, as we knew when we started it. The importance of the final
519 CCM, Annex 222 (emphasis added); BM, Annex 165.
520 CCM, Annex 234 (emphasis added); BM, Annex 76.
139
result will compensate the time we devote to clarify doubts and difficulties which
are inherent to diplomatic efforts of this magnitude”.521
n. In his statement before the General Assembly of the OAS on 24 October 1979, the
representative of Chile declared:
“That Bolivia has an aspiration and not a right; that Chile has been willing to
satisfy that aspiration”.522
o. In his statement before the General Assembly of the OAS on 31 October 1979, the
representative of Chile stated once again that:
“In the operative part [of the resolution] there is a recommendation that the States
concerned with this problem open negotiations for the purpose of providing
Bolivia with a free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean.
My country has always been willing to negotiate with Bolivia.”
“On repeated occasions I have indicated Chile’s willingness to negotiate a
solution with Bolivia to its aspiration to have free and sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean. The way to reach that goal is direct negotiation, conducted at a
level of professionalism and mutual respect, without any interference, suggestions
or dictates from anyone”.523
p. Similarly, in his statement before the General Assembly of the OAS on 18 November
1983, the representative of Chile stated that:
“Any negotiations with Bolivia aimed at satisfying Bolivia’s longing for a
sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean through Chilean territory is a matter for
solution directly between Bolivia and Chile, and might possibly require the
participation of Peru, if it involves the territories included in the Treaty of 1929,
which Chile signed with Peru. Any negotiations of this type must also be the
result of a process; a process that involves improving and normalizing the
relations between our two countries and that permits us to create the positive
political environment that facilitates an action of this nature. My country is and
has always been willing to make a contribution to the beginning of this
process”524.
521 CCM, Annex 236 (emphasis added); BM, Annex 78.
522 Minutes of the 6th Plenary Meeting, 9th Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, 24 October 1979, BR,
Annex 319.
523 CCM, Annex 249 (emphasis added); BM, Annex 204.
524 CCM, Annex 264 (emphasis added); BM, Annex 205.
140
342. In light of the above, the present case is very different from cases where there is no
estoppel because the claimant relies only on “a brief silence”525 or on “a mere failure to
mention a matter at a particular point in somewhat desultory diplomatic exchanges”526. The
present case is far from being based on a ‘brief silence’ or ‘desultory exchanges’: it is based
on a great number of consistent statements, declarations, agreements, over the course of more
than a century, according to which Chile made publicly known to Bolivia that there was a
need to find a solution to Bolivia’s landlocked status, and that Chile was willing to do so and
for negotiations to be held in order to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
343. The present case bears in that regard a number of similarities to the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case where the Court held that:
“The United Kingdom Government has argued that the Norwegian system of
delimitation was not known to it and that the system therefore lacked the notoriety
essential to provide the basis of an historic title enforceable against it. The Court
is unable to accept this view. As a coastal State on the North Sea, greatly
interested in the fisheries in this area, as a maritime Power traditionally concerned
with the law of the sea and concerned particularly to defend the freedom of the
seas, the United Kingdom could not have been ignorant of the Decree of 1869
which had at once provoked a request for explanations by the French Government.
Nor, knowing of it, could it have been under any misapprehension as to the
significance of its terms, which clearly described it as constituting the application
of a system. (…)
The Court notes that in respect of a situation which could only be strengthened
with the passage of time, the United Kingdom Government refrained from
formulating reservations.
The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international community,
Great Britain’s position in the North Sea, her own interest in the question, and her
prolonged abstention would in any case warrant Norway’s enforcement of her
system against the United Kingdom”527.
525 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America),
Judgment, 12 October 1984, 1.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246 at p. 308, para. 140.
526 See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, 20 July 1989, I.C.J.
Reports 1989, p.15 at p. 44, para. 54.
527 Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of December 18th 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p.116 at
pp. 138-139.
141
344. In the present case, since the end of the nineteenth century, both Bolivia and Chile
were “greatly interested” in the issue of sovereign access to the sea and were “concerned
particularly” by this issue, which was and still is notorious. In addition, Chile “could not have
been ignorant” of the effect its declarations and promises would have for Bolivia in terms of
legitimate expectations, nor, “knowing of it, could it have been under any misapprehension as
to the significance of its terms”. The situation “could only be strengthened with the passage of
time”.
345. In the Chagos arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal considered that the United Kingdom
was bound because it “made repeated representations (…) over the course of over 40 years”
and because these representations “were made in statements by the Prime Minister and
Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, who were unequivocally authorized to speak for it
on this matter.”528 The same conclusion applies a fortiori in the present case.
346. Given the unambiguous nature of Chile’s repeated statements, declarations and
promises, there is no doubt that they were representations on which Bolivia was entitled to
rely and did rely. For more than a century Bolivia has, with the deliberate encouragement of
Chile, adhered to the agreement to negotiate a solution to its land-locked status. This “brought
about a change in the relative positions of the parties, worsening that of the one, or improving
that of the other, or both”, thus creating a situation of estoppel529. Chile consolidated its
position, and drew back from its commitment to negotiate a solution, finally repudiating it in
2011. Since that date, Chile has refused to hold any negotiations on sovereign access.
347. That position could equally well be framed in terms of legitimate expectations. Chile
induced Bolivia to continue, year after year, pursuing the promise of a solution to its landlocked
status. Bolivia believed that Chile would act in accordance with its promises; but Chile
now says that there can be no such solution. Chile has declared that the legitimate
expectations of Bolivia will not be fulfilled: there will not even be negotiations on a sovereign
access.
528 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award, 18 March 2015 (162 ILR
1), para. 439.
529 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, p. 63.
142
348. For Chile to refuse today (as it has since 2011) any negotiation with Bolivia on
sovereign access to the sea is a clear breach of Chile’s commitments and a clear frustration of
Bolivia’s legitimate expectations, which is very detrimental to Bolivia. For many years,
Bolivia has put a great deal of effort into these negotiations, and sovereign access to the sea
has been put at the heart of its foreign policy with Chile, on the basis of Chile’s promises.
Moreover, the absence, so far, of any sovereign access to the sea means that Bolivia still
suffers from its landlocked condition. This situation stands in marked contrast with Chile’s
repeated assertion that Bolivia needs a sovereign access to the sea and that negotiations are
required in order to put an end to Bolivia’s landlocked situation. Chile must be considered as
being in breach of its promises to negotiate on a sovereign access to the sea.
349. For all the reasons set forth in the present Part of Bolivia’s Reply, Bolivia respectfully
requests the Court to declare that, by refusing since 2011 any negotiation on sovereign access
to the Pacific Ocean530, Chile is in breach of the obligation to negotiate on sovereign access to
the sea, that it has repeatedly and consistently agreed to fulfil, whether by bilateral treaties,
tacit agreements, acquiescence or unilateral acts, or resulting from the application of the
principle of estoppel and the creation of legitimate expectations that has been frustrated by
Chile. Chile must, therefore, be declared by the Court under the obligation to comply with the
said obligation to negotiate.
530 See BM, para. 215-219.
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PART III
CHILE’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ITS OBLIGATION TO
NEGOTIATE A SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
CHAPTER 7
CHILE’S LONG-STANDING AND REITERATED
COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE A SOVEREIGN ACCESS TO THE SEA
350. In the Counter-Memorial Chile’s defence on the merits consists in arguing that, even if
there were commitments or agreements to negotiate on sovereign access to the sea, there have
been only “sporadic diplomatic and political exchanges, and, occasionally, actual negotiations
(…)”531 , in “five discrete and very different periods (…)”532 , which were “separated in
time”533. Chile also argues that on many occasions Bolivia remained silent on the issue of
sovereign access to the sea, and that, in any event, after the Charaña process in 1978, which
failure is attributed to Bolivia in the Counter-Memorial, negotiations on sovereign access to
the sea were no longer an issue between the two countries. According to Chile, the result is
that there is no possibility to argue today that there is an obligation to negotiate on sovereign
access to the sea.
351. Chile’s new narrative is unconvincing both as a matter of law and as matter of fact. As
a matter of law, the failure of negotiations at some point in time does not, and cannot, entail
the termination of the obligation to negotiate534. The obligation to negotiate or to settle a
dispute does not disappear by the mere failure – even the repeated failure – of rounds of
negotiations. In the present case Chile and Bolivia specifically agreed, on many occasions,
throughout a century, to have negotiations aimed at finding a formula to grant Bolivia a
sovereign access to the sea. These agreements, promises, unilateral commitments and
representations are binding upon Chile 535 , whatever the result of specific rounds of
531 CCM, para. 1.3.
532 CCM, para. III.2.
533 CCM, para. 1.11.
534 See supra, Part I, Chapter 2.
535 See supra, Part II, Chapter 5.
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negotiations on the modalities of the sovereign access to the sea. Ups and downs in a
negotiating process do not terminate the obligation to negotiate, a fortiori when the need for
negotiations has been consistently held by both negotiating parties.
352. Chile’s historical presentation blatantly mischaracterizes the relevant facts536, which
clearly shows that Chile’s promises have not been “discrete” or “sporadic”. As it has been
already shown, they date back to the end of the nineteenth century as a direct consequence of
the War of the Pacific which resulted in a major territorial loss for Bolivia; and have been
reiterated by Chilean highest authorities on many occasions throughout the twentieth
century537. In addition, as Bolivia will show in this Chapter, there have been no “silences”,
nor any conduct, from Bolivia in the twentieth century which could have had the effect of
terminating its claims and its right to have negotiations on sovereign access to the sea (A); the
failure of the Charaña process is not attributable to Bolivia (B); and, the conduct of the parties
after failure of the Charaña process shows indeed that negotiations on sovereign access to the
sea remained an issue between the two parties after 1979 (C) before the change of position of
Chile which repudiated in 2011 all its previous agreements, commitments and promises in
breach of its own undertakings (D).
A. Chile denies the uninterrupted course of its commitment to negotiate
353. Chile argues in the Counter-Memorial that there have been periods of silence from
Bolivia before (1) and after (2) the adoption of the 1950 Exchange of Notes, and between
1963 and 1974 (3). Chile’s argument is not entirely clear. Even if such periods of silence
would have existed, they did not relinquish the right of Bolivia to rely on Chile’s
commitments, especially because Chile’s undertaking to negotiate a sovereign access to the
sea has been systematically reiterated, in 1950 and 1975 in particular.
1. The Process Leading to the Exchange of the 1950 Notes
354. Chile accuses Bolivia of not having raised its claim for an “extended period of
silence”538 after 1929, with “intermittent discussions” occurring only in the late 1940s539. This
536 Historical clarifications concerning the origin of the dispute between Bolivia and Chile, See BR, Annex 373.
537 See supra Part II, See in particular Chapter 5 (Sections B to G).
538 CCM, para 6.2.
145
statement, however, deliberately ignores a fundamental historical event. From 1932 to 1935,
Bolivia was in the midst of a war with Paraguay (Chaco War). This conflict came to a formal
end with the signature of a Peace Treaty on 21 July 1938 after three years of intense
negotiations540 following the armistice of 1935. This international situation demanded the
greatest diplomatic efforts of Bolivia during most of the decade of the thirties.541
355. Despite the complex internal situations, Bolivia continued to persist in its claim.
Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, Bolivian Minister in Lima, presented to Peruvian Foreign Minister,
Alberto Ulloa, a Memorandum on 11 June 1936, in which he sought to prepare the ground for
obtaining Peru’s consent for future negotiations between Chile and Bolivia for the Bolivian
access to the Pacific Ocean via Arica. 542 At the same time, during the Inter-American
Conference on Peacebuilding, held in Buenos Aires in 1936, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Bolivia, Enrique Finot, stated his duty to call the conference's attention to Bolivia's
landlocked position which was for Bolivia the cause of a deep and continuous discomfort, of
restlessness and permanent longings, that translate into the necessities of broad life and full
sovereignty.543
356. Chile claims that Bolivia remained silent during the 1940s. This contention is simply
untrue. In April 1941, the Chilean Foreign Minister, Manuel Bianchi, visited La Paz. On that
occasion, the Bolivian Chancellor proposed to initiate negotiations on the issue of the port,
proposal that was not rejected by the Chilean Chancellor, who stated that in order to achieve
this purpose it would be necessary to create a suitable atmosphere in the Chilean public
opinion and carry out a rapprochement process between the two States544.
539 CCM, para 6.6.
540 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries between Bolivia and Paraguay, signed at Buenos Aires on 21
July, 1938, BR, Annex 250.
541 J. Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-82, 1984, BR, Annex 323.
542 Note from the Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Peru, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Enrique Baldivieso, N° 169, 11 June 1936, BR, Annex 249.
543 Emmett J. Holland, A Historical Study of Bolivia Foreign Relations 1935-1946, The American University,
Washington D.C., 1967, BR, Annex 295.
544 See A. Ostria Gutiérrez, A work and a destiny, Bolivia’s international policy after the Chaco War, 1953, pp.
65-67, BR, Annex 281.
146
357. Once both Parties secured that the circumstances of the Second World War should not
become a destabilizing factor in their bilateral relations, Bolivia, taking advantage of its
belligerent status against the Axe tried to resort to the good offices of the U. Administration to
relaunch the negotiation of a sovereign access with Chile.545 Chile’s first reaction was not to
accept Bolivia’s proposal546; the Bolivian Government then clarified that it respected and
complied with the 1904 Treaty, however, with independence of the latter, Chile had promised
and had committed itself to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.547 A year later,
on 26 December 1944, the President of Chile, Juan Antonio Ríos, declared to the Bolivian
545 During a visit paid by the President of Bolivia, Enrique Peñaranda, to President Roosevelt, on 13 April 1943,
the Bolivian ambassador, Luis Fernando Guachalla, submitted a Memorandum to the Secretary of State,
Summer Welles, in relation to Bolivia’s landlocked condition and the need to secure an “own port on the
coast of the Pacific.” A. Ostria Gutiérrez, Notes on port negotiations with Chile, 1998, p. 4, BR, Annex 342.
546 On 6 May 1943, the Chilean Chancellor, Joaquín Fernández, publicly stated that “there are no pending
territorial issues between Chile and Bolivia, which were definitely settled in the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship of 1904”. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, N° 280, 7 May 1943, BR, Annex 251. Thereafter,
however, the Chilean Chancellor proposed the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago on several occasions to
initiate direct negotiations intended to solve the Bolivian port problem independently of the 1904 Treaty.
Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, N° 386, 18 June 1943, BR, Annex 253. In June 1943, the Bolivian Ambassador
proposed “to formalize through notes” the proposal repeatedly formulated by the Chancellor of Chile, to
“initiate direct talks independently of the Treaty of 1904”. However, Chile delayed the discussion of the
matter. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, N° 403, 25 June 1943, BR, Annex 254. Note from the Bolivian
Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti
Arce, N° 369, 11 June 1943, BR, Annex 252.
547 On 15 September 1943, Bolivian Ambassador, Luis Fernando Guachalla, submitted to U.S. Secretary of
State, Cordell Hull, a new Memorandum requesting him to send a copy to the Chilean Chancellor, who
would soon visit Washington. The following was affirmed in that Memorandum: “Bolivia, faithful to its
tradition of respect for international pacts, does not disown the legality of the territorial dominion which
Chile exercises over the Pacific coast, in accordance with the public treaties it has entered into” but that it
“fosters a direct understanding with Chile on basis that take into account both countries advantages and high
interests, and does not wish to disturb continental harmony in its pursuit for a sovereign outlet to the sea”.
Memorandum of the Bolivian Ambassador to the United States, Luis Fernando Guachalla, submitted to the
U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, 15 September 1943, BR, Annex 255.
147
Ambassador, Fernando Campero, that his Government was open to consider a direct proposal
to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation.548
2. Events that followed the Agreement of 1950
358. Bolivia did not remain passive after the conclusion of the Exchange of Notes of 1950,
and it cannot be said to have relinquished its rights. To the contrary, the conduct of both
Bolivia and Chile during that period confirms their agreement to have negotiations on
sovereign access to the sea, even if the negotiations could not materialize immediately. On 11
April 1952, the national revolution in Bolivia led the Movimiento Nacionalista
Revolucionario (MNR) to the power, and its priorities entailed an additional extension of the
postponement of negotiations. Notwithstanding this, a rigorous examination of the
declarations by the Bolivian President, Victor Paz Estenssoro, shows that the Government of
the MNR did not renounce to the agreed negotiations, and only postponed their execution so
as to negotiate “on an equal footing” with Chile once collected the fruits of policies of
development, including good neighbourhood and cooperation.
359. The Counter-Memorial itself refers to words of Paz Estenssoro in his letter to Siles
Zuazo, dated 25 September 1950, before becoming President of Bolivia: “over the course of
some fifteen or twenty years, we will have turned our Homeland into a nation much more
powerful than it is today…We will then be able to approach negotiations with Chile in a
peaceful and cordial manner but on an equal footing and for our mutual benefit.
Paradoxically, it is not in our best interest to have the port issue immediately resolved but,
rather, postpone it to some future point in time” 549 . Indeed, it was during subsequent
presidencies Paz Estenssoro that clear exigencies to execute the obligation contracted in June
1950, and confirmed in 1961, were expressed. Before dwelling on them, it is worth recalling
that in 1952 the President of Chile, Ibáñez del Campo, instructed his Ambassadors in La Paz
548 See Embassy of Bolivia´s Note Nº 242/44 of 29 December 1944, MB, II, Annex 55; CCM, Annex 135.
Bolivia’s Chancellor, Gustavo Chacon, referred to this statements, recalling that the concern over Bolivia’s
putting forward its claim before the Mexico and San Francisco Conferences, lead the President of Chile to
suggest Bolivia not to do so inasmuch as: “the Bolivian port issue could be solved by mutual agreement…
we would give you Arica, what would you give us?”. J. Gumucio Granier, The landlocked condition of
Bolivia in the World Fora, 1993, pp. 94-95, BR, Annex 337.
549 CCM, 6.18, fn. 366.
148
not to abandon “the willingness to listen to Bolivia” regarding the direct proposals that it
could formulate about its port issue.550
360. In 1953 Bolivia sent a Special Envoy, Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui, to Santiago. On 10
November 1953, in an interview with the Chilean Foreign Minister, Oscar Fenner Marín, the
Bolivian Special Envoy proposed that the Presidents of both States sign a joint declaration in
which Bolivia and Chile “reiterated their intention to settle through direct negotiations and on
bases that take into account the interests of the two Republics, the Bolivian issue of obtaining
a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean.” He further said that through the joint declaration
Chile would only reiterate “a commitment made between Bolivia and Chile in the Notes
exchanged in Santiago on 1 June 1950 and 20 June 1950.”551 Faced with these requirement,
the Chilean Foreign Minister Oscar Fenner stated that:
“his Government was sincerely willing to assist in the solution of the Bolivian
issue, but that in order to reconcile the concurrent interest of both countries in
their purpose of studying the basis for an arrangement, strictly confidential
negotiations could be initiated, which –he stressed– should in no way be disclosed
until the two Governments consider it convenient and suitable. Previously –he
added– it would be necessary to find harmony in the internal environments of
Chile and Bolivia.”552
361. At a second meeting, held three days later, the Chilean Minister stated that “his
Government had the broad purpose of assisting in the solution of the port issue of Bolivia”,
but that difficulties in the Chilean-Peruvian relations, as well as domestic policy problems,
prevent this matter from being addressed. In any case, he added that:
“…did not want Bolivia to interpret his response as a demonstration of
indifference towards the Bolivian maritime aspiration, or as a ‘step back’ from the
Chilean Government in the negotiations regarding the port, but that he had the
550 Note from the Ambassador of Chile in Bolivia, Manuel Trucco, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
of 15 February 1962, CCM, Annex 160, p. 19.
551 Report entitled “Declaration regarding the port issue,” from the Special Envoy of Bolivia to Chile, Jorge
Escobari Cusicanqui, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arce, of 31 December
1953, p. 3, BR, Annex 282.
552 Report entitled “Declaration regarding the port issue,” from the Special Envoy of Bolivia to Chile, Jorge
Escobari Cusicanqui, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arce, of 31 December
1953, p. 7, BR, Annex 282.
149
confidence that once that adverse environment dissipated, Bolivia and Chile could
resume these negotiations in order to satisfy the Bolivian claim”553.
362. That same day, the Bolivian Special Envoy met with Chilean President, Carlos Ibáñez
del Campo, who reiterated that it was not convenient to address the port issue of Bolivia at
that time. However, in line with what Foreign Minister Fenner stated, Ibáñez del Campo
affirmed: “This is a question –he said– that is also of concern to the Government of Chile,
which is willing to consider it with due attention in due course.”554 These statements clearly
show the agreement existing between Chile and Bolivia to have negotiations on sovereign
access to the sea, and to resume them when it would prove possible.
363. On 17 February 1963, Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Fellman Velarde,
delivered a memorandum to the OAS Council President, Gonzalo Facio, who at the time was
working out solutions to resume diplomatic relations between the Parties.555 The first point
reiterated that Bolivia did not seek to modify the legal regime of the 1904 Treaty, and
proposed the cession by Chile of “A port enclave, with the attributes of sovereignty
recognized by international law, connected or easy to connect to the Antofagasta-La Paz
railway.” In exchange, Bolivia would be willing to “facilitate to Chile, to the extent that this
553 Report entitled “Declaration regarding the port issue,” from the Special Envoy of Bolivia to Chile, Jorge
Escobari Cusicanqui, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arce, of 31 December
1953, p. 9, BR, Annex 282.
554 He added that “in order to solve this problem, the cooperation of international entities such as the United
Nations and the Organization of American States should be taken into account, and that specially the
countries bordering Bolivia could also participate in an Americanist settlement.” Report entitled “Declaration
regarding the port issue,” from the Special Envoy of Bolivia to Chile, Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui, to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arce, of 31 December 1953, p. 10, BR, Annex 282.
555 In October 1962, the Chancellors of Bolivia and Chile, Jose Fellman Velarde and Carlos Martinez
Sotomayor, respectively, initiated informal talks on the resumption of diplomatic relations and agreed that
the parties would prepare minute drafts on the matter. Chile submitted its draft minutes on 3 November 1962.
Bolivia for its part proposed to insert into the text of the minutes a clause establishing that direct negotiations
on the maritime problem, under the terms of the Note of 20 June 1950 and the Memorandum of 10 July 1961,
should be included among the questions that would be considered after diplomatic relations are resumed. U.
Figueroa Pla, The Bolivian Maritime Claim before International Fora, 2007, pp. 97-98, BR, Annex 360.
150
does not mean serious prejudice, the use of waters of those international courses that are
common dominion to both countries.”556
364. On 27 March 1963, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs denied the legal value of
the Memorandum Trucco of 1961557. As a reaction, the Bolivian Minister Fellman Velarde, in
a public address on 3 April 1963 stated:
“The exchange of Notes of 1 and 20 June 1950, according to the norms of
International Law, constitutes a formal commitment between Bolivia and Chile in
order to give Bolivia an own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean and to give
Chile, in return, an appropriate compensation that is not territorial in nature. This
commitment is inseparable from the legal regime governing the relations between
Bolivia and Chile and is guaranteed, as any other exchange of Notes, by the faith
of both States and their national honor.”
Fellman Velarde continued:
“What the Bolivian Government is doing now therefore is not artificially bringing
up the issue of its landlocked condition, but calling on the Chilean government to
comply with these commitments…
What the Bolivian government wants, in accordance with the solemn commitment
that the notes of June 1950 signifies, is to sit down with Chile’s representatives at
the negotiating table and negotiate an agreement taking into account their mutual
interests, an agreement that will be of benefit to Bolivia and of benefit of
Chile.”558
556 Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, José Fellman Velarde, to the President of the OAS
Permanent Council, Gonzalo Facio, 17 February 1963, BR, Annex 286.
557 Speech of the Minister Foreign Affairs of Chile, 27 March 1963, CMC Annex 164.
558 Speech of the Foreign Minister of Bolivia, Jose Fellman Velarde, in response to the statements made by the
Foreign Minister of Chile, Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, 3 April 1963, BR, Annex 287. An official
publication entitled “Towards the sea: Transcendental documents” prepared by the Press Office of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia in 1963 published, together with the speeches made by both Foreign
Ministers, the Notes of June 1950 and the Trucco Memorandum, stating in its introduction that Bolivia “does
not request a revision of the 1904 Treaties”, but rather “the fulfillment of commitments. And the Note of the
Chilean Chancellery of 20 June and the Memorandum of 10 July 1961 are commitments… In international
politics, documents bear witness of the word pledged, although these are often overlooked.” Press Office of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Towards the Sea, transcendental documents (1963), p. 8, BR,
Annex 288.
151
365. A comuniqué by the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 14 June 1963, stated
in its first point the decision to not resume diplomatic relations with Chile “until it complies
with the commitments made to Bolivia through the exchange of Notes of June 1950.”559
366. On 6 August 1963, President Paz Estenssoro, in his intervention before the Bolivian
Congress stated―“in regard to the matter of its reintegration with the sea, [Bolivia] demands
the fulfillment of the promises made by the Government of Chile in June 1950 and July 1961
[…]; when the Government of that country expresses its willingness to comply with the
commitments assumed in June 1950, Bolivia will not refuse to resume diplomatic relations
between the two countries, with a view to seeking a friendly and fair solution to the Lauca
River issue, and to contribute to the creation of a climate conducive to an understanding of
mutual coexistence in the port issue.”560
367. It is incorrect to contend, as the Counter-Memorial does, that Chile rejected in official
and clear terms the proposal of Fellman Velarde; at best, there was an informal contact, “una
gestión oficiosa” (in the words of Conrado Ríos)561, initiated when Fellman and Ríos had the
opportunity to meet in Asunción where they attended as chiefs of their respective special
missions to the investiture of General Stroessner, as the new President of Paraguay.562 After
this meeting, private letters were exchanged.563 In any event, it should be noted that Conrado
559 “Bolivia firmly maintains its decision not to resume relations with Chile”, El Diario (Bolivia), 15 June 1963,
BR, Annex 289.
560 Message from the President of the Republic of Bolivia, Dr. Victor Paz Estenssoro, to the Honorable
Congress, 6 August 1963, p. 101, BR, Annex 290.
561 C. Rios Gallardo, An informal Chilean-Bolivian contact, 1966, BR, Annex 293.
562 In a meeting held by Fellman Velarde and Rios Gallardo, the former stated that “the note sent by Foreign
Minister Walker and the Trucco Memorandum have opened the door to a port negotiation and I have
requested that a statement be made in regard to both documents, but I have not obtained it.” C. Rios Gallardo,
An informal Chilean-Bolivian contact, 1966, p. 37, BR Annex 293.
563 In the Letter of 25 September 1963, sent by Fellman Velarde to Conrado Ríos, the former told the latter that
“no Bolivian Government would ever renounce, in the substance more than in the formal aspects, the
commitments made by Chile in 1950 and in 1961”, BR, Annex 291. See also Letter of 4 November 1963,
reproduced in CMC, Annex 166). In Letter of 13 January 1964, Fellman Velarde stated that he understood
that “the Government of Chile does not want to renounce the rights provided by the 1904 Treaty and I am
152
Ríos was not member of the Government at that time, nor did he act on its behalf. No other
source is provided by Chile to support its contentions in this respect.
3. The Alleged Period of ‘Silence’ between 1963 and 1974
368. Chile claims that Bolivia’s Memorial “says nothing at all about the period from 1963
to 1974”.564 The diplomatic relations had been suspended on 15 April 1962 (due to Chile’s
execution of its plans to divert waters of Lauca River), and Bolivia had subjected the
resumption of those relations to the start of the negotiation of its sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean. However, this would not be a period of “silence” between Chile and Bolivia,
as Chile claims. In 1963, the Bolivian Government subjected the resumption of diplomatic
relations to the start of direct negotiations on the sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean in
conformity with the agreement resulting from the notes of 1950 and the memorandum Trucco
of 1961.565
369. Despite the difficult circumstances, dominated by an absence of diplomatic relations,
the obligation to negotiate expressly invoked by Bolivia in 1962 and 1963, as mentioned
above, was reiterated in 1964 and 1967. This shows the selective omissions and loopholes that
Chile seeks to create.
370. There were informal contacts, such as the conversations held on 14 August 1965,
between the President of Chile, Eduardo Frei Montalva, and Alfredo Alexander Jordán,
Bolivia’s Ambassador to Spain, requested by the President of Bolivia, Rene Barrientos.
According to Pinochet de la Barra, Under-secretary of Foreign Affairs who attended this
meeting, the Chilean President stated, when saying good-bye to Ambassador Alexander, that
“we must resume relations the soonest possible…” and added “Sir, if it were up to me,
Bolivia should have a sovereign access to the sea…”566
confident –he added– that you will also understand that the Bolivian Government does not want to renounce
the expectations raised by the Note of June 1950”, BR, Annex 292.
564 CCM, para 6.30.
565 U. Figueroa Pla, The Bolivian Maritime Claim before International Fora, 2007, pp. 95-99, BR, Annex 360
566 O. Pinochet de la Barra, Chile and Bolivia: How much longer! 2004, p. 72, BR, Annex 352.
153
371. On 8 April 1967, René Barrientos, already acting as Constitutional President of
Bolivia, addressed a letter to his Uruguayan counterpart, Oscar Gestido, to explain the other
Presidents in the region his absence in the summit in Punta del Este because the issue of the
landlocked situation of Bolivia had not been included in the agenda. In this letter the President
of Bolivia referred to every antecedent of Chile’s undertakings to negotiate, stating―
“Finally, in the year 1950, in direct negotiations and through an exchange of notes, Bolivia
and Chile sealed an express commitment to ‘searching for a formula that would make it
possible to give Bolivia its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain
compensation of a non-territorial character which effectively takes into account its interests.’”
And he added: “The unshakeable belief that the existing commitments must be fulfilled assign
meaning to the attitude adopted by Bolivia as to its claim that the obstacles to its full
development be overcome, thus seeking to ensure the peace and progress of this part of the
continent.”567
372. The letter was replied to by the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 29 May 1967,
in regard to the Notes of 1950, he affirmed: “…Negotiations did not even start…”; in regard
to the Trucco Memorandum he affirmed: “it is a document by which Chile reaffirmed once
more that it was open to listen to Bolivia in direct talks and rejected the intervention of
international organizations in the dispute. The memorandum did not entail any commitment
and even if it did, it should be voided, since the first attitude of Bolivia in 1962, after breaking
off diplomatic relations with Chile, was resorting to the Organizations of American States”
568.
373. Chile cannot credibly claim that there were periods of silence. Concerning the first
point, the fact that negotiations had not even started did not entail the annulment of the
obligation to negotiate; the parties’ representatives understood that they were entering a
waiting period569. In 1953, when Bolivia believed that the negotiations could be commenced
567 Note from the President of Bolivia to the President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay entitled “Why is
Bolivia not present in Punta del Este?”, 8 April 1967, CCM, Annex 170.
568 CCM, Annex 171.
569 See Note Nº 844/513 of 9 September 1950, from the Bolivian Ambassador in Chile, Alberto Ostria
Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pedro Zilveti Arce, BR, Annex 275. See also “Ambassador
Ostria spoke of the Chilean-Bolivian port problem in La Paz”, El Diario Ilustrado (Chile), 6 January 1951,
154
it found that Chile believed that they should wait for “the proper time”570. In 1961, Chile
reinserted this question into the bilateral agenda with the Trucco Memorandum. Ostria
Gutiérrez, Walker Larrrain and President González Videla, far from affirming that there was
no commitment, as asserted by Valdes, stated the opposite, i.e. that there was an “agreement”
to negotiate, although the negotiation was pending and nothing had been concretized on its
content. Furthermore, the rupture of diplomatic relations and appealing to international organs
cannot entail a termination of the agreements entered into by the parties. The conclusion that
Bolivia did not rebut the affirmations made by the Chilean Minister “and its failure to do so
has probative value”571, cannot however be accepted. As the Parties had already made known
their respective positions, there was no point insisting, and place the other presidents in an
endless cross-fire of exchanges.
374. The above mentioned documents clearly demonstrate that, following the
Memorandum Trucco, and even in the absence of diplomatic relations, Bolivia, through the
highest representatives of the State, kept the Notes of 1950 and the Memorandum Trucco of
1961 as existing commitments, in force and legally binding under international law.
Eventually, Bolivia’s position will be supported by the conclusion of the 1975 Joint
Declaration.
375. During the mandates of Eduardo Frei Montalva and Salvador Allende, Bolivia and
Chile carried out confidential démarches to resume diplomatic relations on the basis of
reactivating negotiations related to Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. In
November 1970, the Consul General of Bolivia in Santiago, Franz Rück Uriburu, informed
the Bolivian Chancellery of the progress made in the negotiation with the Government of
President Eduardo Frei. In that report, the procedural agreements entered into to resume
diplomatic relations and the negotiation on sovereign access are both described. The first step
had to be a “simultaneous statement …by the two Governments to the effect that they are
BR, Annex 277, and A. Ostria Gutiérrez, Apuntaciones sobre las Negociaciones Portuarias con Chile (Notes
on port negotiations with Chile), 1998, p. 202, BR, Annex 342.
570 Report entitled “Declaration regarding the port issue” from the Special Envoy of Bolivia to Chile, Jorge
Escobari Cusicanqui, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arze, 31 December 1953,
BR, Annex 282.
571 CCM, para 6.16 d, in fine.
155
thereby resuming their diplomatic relations” and simultaneously both “Governments will
make the statements they regard appropriate on the resumption of relations”572. The next step
in the negotiation on sovereign access was communicated in the following terms:
“Once relations are re-established, the Bolivian diplomatic agent to Santiago will
sent a note to the Foreign Minister of Chile, requesting: a) a meeting or b) a
written response ‘to continue the negotiations specified in the Notes exchanged by
the two Governments on 1 and 20 June 1950, signed by the Bolivian Ambassador,
Mr. Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez and Chilean Foreign Minister, Mr. Horacio Walker
Larraín, to secure a sovereign port for Bolivia on the Pacific Ocean’”.573
376. In April 1971, at the OAS General Assembly held in San Jose de Costa Rica, the
Chancellors of Bolivia and Chile, Huascar Taborga and Clodomiro Almeyda, held talks on
the steps to resume diplomatic relations and the question of sovereign access to the sea. To
this end, the procedure to be followed was discussed and an agreement was reached to issue
“a joint declaration and two subsequent and simultaneous declarations by both Presidents, the
wording of which would be alike and would address the negotiations, thus updating the Notes
exchanged by both Governments in 1950”.574 In a meeting held on 13 August 1971, between
Bolivia’s Consul General, Franz Rück Uriburu, and Chilean Chancellor, Clodomiro Almeyda,
the former submitted a draft of joint declaration to resume diplomatic relations; point two of
the draft read as follows:
“The Governments of Bolivia and Chile have resolved to continue the
negotiations agreed to in the Notes exchanged by both Governments on 1 and 20
June 1950 and signed by the Foreign Minister of Chile. Mr. Horacio Walker
Larraín and the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Mr. Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to
which end the two Governments hereby declare that these documents are in full
force”575.
572 Report by Bolivia’s Consul General in Santiago, Chile, Frank Rück Uriburu, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Emilio Molina Pizarro, of 19 November 1970, BR, Annex 296.
573 Report by Bolivia’s Consul General in Santiago, Chile, Frank Rück Uriburu, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Emilio Molina Pizarro, of 19 November 1970, BR, Annex 296.
574 See the Minutes of the meeting held between the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile in San Jose, Costa
Rica, drafted by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Fernando Laredo, 14 April 1971, BR,
Annex 297.
575 Draft of the Joint Declaration submitted by the General Consul of Bolivia in Santiago to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile, 13 August 1971, BR, Annex 298.
156
377. Chile had once again accepted to negotiate with Bolivia a sovereign access to the sea,
however, the subscription of the joint declaration was brought to a halt due to the change of
Government in Bolivia. Nonetheless, soon after the new Bolivian Government, headed by
President Hugo Banzer Suárez, renewed conversations on sovereign access with the
Government of Chilean President Salvador Allende. These new talks were carried out by the
Directors of the Integration Offices of both countries, Juan Pereira Fiorilo on behalf of
Bolivia and Juan Somavía on behalf of Chile. In a confidential report sent to the Bolivian
Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 1973576, Pereira Fiorilo informed that an agreement
had been reached with the Chilean representative to discuss in the following meeting of the
Bolivian-Chilean Commission:
“[T]he possibility that Chile gives a corridor between the border with Peru and
part of the territory Arica Department (to the north of Arica city) but with the
utilization of the Chilean port system in that city, with the following alternatives:
a) Cession of the corridor with full Bolivian sovereignty.
b) In the event that Peru opposes to this, cession of the corridor with the right to
utilization, in perpetuity, in accordance with the thesis put forward by Chilean
former Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdez Larraín.”577
378. Unfortunately, the following meeting could not be held, as the Government of
President Allende was overthrown by a coup d’Etat on 11 September 1973. Two years later,
the 1975 Joint Declaration of Charaña made possible to resume negotiations.
B. Chile misinterprets its responsibility for the failure of Charaña
379. Chile concludes Chapter VII of its Counter-Memorial, on the Charaña process, (1975-
1978) stating that: “The discussions ultimately failed because Peru was unwilling to consent
to the proposal and Bolivia changed its position on the condition of territorial exchange and
then brought the negotiations to an abrupt halt […]”, According to Chile, Bolivia withdrew
from negotiations. Chile also claims that “any legal obligation that could be said to have
576 Classified Report STI – Nº 3303 – 73 of 11 September 1973, was published by Juan Pereira Fiorilo himself
in 1983. “Reserved report on port negotiations with Allende”, Hoy (Bolivia), 3 December 1983, BR, Annex
320.
577 “Reserved report on port negotiations with Allende”, Hoy (Bolivia), 3 December 1983, BR, Annex 320.
157
arisen for Chile through the Charaña process would have been discharged by the fact that over
a sustained period the two States engaged in meaningful negotiations. No obligation would
have survived the termination of discussions by Bolivia”578. This is simply incorrect, and it
does not stand the scrutiny of the facts.
380. The Parties established the basis for a negotiation with concrete proposals.579 Bolivia
accepted to negotiate in “general terms” motivated by the conviction that Chile would
eventually adjust its position over the course of that process, extended for a period of three
years. The finding that the exchange of territories had become a rigid prerequisite for the
Chilean Military Junta led to the failure of the negotiations. To the extent that the resumption
of diplomatic relations had been conditioned to this process, this failure led to their
suspension.
381. However, even if Bolivia were to be responsible for the failure of the round of
negotiations of Charaña, this could not terminate the obligation to negotiate. This obligation
remains alive so long as no settlement or agreement is reached (1). The conduct of the Parties
after 1978 confirms that they still considered negotiations as needed. Even if the
responsibility of the failure of a round of negotiations were to be relevant, quod non, it is not
true to claim that Bolivia is responsible for the failure of the Charaña process (2).
1. The Obligation to Negotiate has not terminated
382. Chile claims that Bolivia is unable to indicate on which date the obligation upon Chile
to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea would have emerged580. Though continuously
denying the existence of such an obligation, Chile assures that, supposing it had ever existed,
it would merely have been an obligation “of limited scope and duration”581, and states that it
would be extinguished today. Chile’s construct is incorrect. The obligation to negotiate arose
at the time that the first unilateral Chilean commitments were made. While Bolivia accepts
578 CMC, para. 7.56.
579 The Bolivian proposal in BM, II, Annex 174 (CCM, Annex 178); Banzer demanded a response (ibid. Annex
69); Pinochet responded to Banzer (ibid., Annex 70); Chile’s counterproposal, (ibid., Annex 73); Bolivia’s
acceptance (ibid., Annex 71).
580 CMC, para. 1.5. and 4.27.
581 CMC, para. 4.25.
158
that questions of inter-temporal law or of precise terminology might be raised in respect of a
particular early pledge, the critical question before the Court, however, is not when the
obligation first arose, but whether Chile is at the present time bound by the obligation. The
accumulated evidence of more than a century of dealings between the Parties leaves no room
for doubt that the obligation existed, was periodically acted upon, and was reaffirmed, up to
the time until its repudiation by Chile led to the institution of these proceedings.
383. As the Bolivian Counsel explained in his reply to the question of Judge Greenwood
during the pleadings on the preliminary objection582, this obligation emerged as early as the
first unilateral Chilean pledges were made, each of them having committed Chile as it will be
demonstrated with more details below. Afterwards, this obligation was consolidated following
a long cumulative process583. What is at stake here is the alleged extinguishment of the
obligation to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia.
384. Chile, well aware that it will prove difficult to deny an obligation that it has so many
times recognized and began to comply with, claims that this obligation cannot possibly have
been “unlimited in time”584. Stuck in a deep misinterpretation on what is an obligation to
negotiate and on how it emerges, Chile argues that “Where there have been good faith,
meaningful efforts to negotiate over a period of time that is reasonable in the circumstance, an
obligation of conduct will be discharged”585.
385. To demonstrate that it is thus released from any obligation, Chile tries to take
advantage from the Case of the Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, affirming
that:
“In Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, in holding that there was no
obligation to reach a result, the Permanent Court considered that negotiations need
only be pursued ‘as far as possible’”586.
582 CR 2015/21, pp.33-34.
583 See infra. Section C.
584 CMC, para. 4.25.
585 CMC, para. 4.39.
586 CMC, para. 4.39.
159
386. However, the exact terms used by the Permanent Court were the following:
“The Court is indeed justified in considering that the engagement incumbent on
the two Governments in conformity with the Council’s Resolution is not only to
enter into negotiations, but also to pursue them as far as possible, with a view to
concluding agreements”587.
The word “only” added by Chile enables it to introduce a restriction which is absent. The
Court considers that the commitment of the parties is to pursue negotiations “as far as
possible”. For Chile, negotiations shall only be pursued as far as possible. The nuance is
significant.
387. Having embarked upon a process aimed at rejecting any obligation upon itself, Chile
cannot but distort the fact-based reality of the long history of its relations with Bolivia to try
to convince the Court that, against all evidences, in the case that such an obligation had
existed, it would be extinguished today. Chile wrongly believes it can to this end interpret the
fact that negotiations were interrupted or suspended during two certain periods of time, in
1950 and 1975. According to Chile, these situations would represent definitive failures and
these would be imputable to Bolivia, which would confirm the extinguishment of any
obligation upon Chile. This does not correspond to the reality, neither after the Exchange of
Notes in 1950588 nor after the so-called Charaña process that included a Joint Declaration
followed by an exchange of letters589.
388. There are no arguments to support the conclusion that the absence of negotiations
following the Exchange of Notes in 1950 may be interpreted as leading to the extinguishment
of the obligation to negotiate. These Notes had been long prepared at diplomatic level and did
not set any delay to conduct negotiations until final achievement, nor did they in any way
prohibit the parties to resume them whatever the duration of the delay.
587 Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1931, Series A/B, N° 42, p.
116.
588 See Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Chile, Horacio Walker Larraín, N° 591/21, 1st June 1950, BR, Annex 265, and Note from the Bolivian
Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Horacio Walker
Larraín, N° 9, 20 June 1950, BR, Annex 266.
589 See BM, Annexes 111, 71 and 73.
160
389. Furthermore, Chile fails to tackle the central argument in this respect: if there had been
no obligation to negotiate entered into in 1950 and maintained afterwards, why would Chile
on 10 July 1961, through its Ambassador in La Paz, Manuel Trucco, have reconfirmed its
willingness to examine again a way to provide Bolivia with a sovereign access to the sea?.
And why would Chile have accepted again to enter into negotiations on this subject matter in
the 70s?
390. The same analysis applies to the statements of Chile regarding the failure of the
Charaña process, the responsibility of which it blames on Bolivia. As evidenced below, this
thesis was clearly erroneous 590 . The failure of these negotiations resulted from the
uncompromising attitude of Chile regarding an exchange of territories and also from the way
Chile had interpreted the obligation it had to consult Peru on the issue. This failure cannot
have terminated the obligation to negotiate. The Chilean Foreign Minister in its note of 19
December 1975, in reply to the note of his Bolivian counterpart (and as such part of an
exchange of letters committing both States) himself establishes a connection between the end
of the obligation to negotiate and the conclusion of an agreement:
“Once the final agreement has been reached, a solemn testimony will be made
mentioning that the territorial cession that permits the sovereign access to the sea
represents the full and definite solution to the landlocked situation of Bolivia”591.
391. In reality, the Charaña negotiations were as such the evidence of the continuity of the
negotiations process in the common understanding of both States, as well as of the nonextinguishment
of the obligation following the 1950 Exchange of Notes. Likewise, Chile
entering a new phase of negotiations in the 1980s is further evidence that neither Chile nor
Bolivia considered the obligation to negotiate extinguished.592.
392. All elements regarding the resumption of negotiations as well as the Bolivian concrete
proposals then submitted to Chile in 1986 and 1987 can be found in Chile’s Counter
590 For the detailed analysis of these negotiations, see Section B (2).
591 BM, Annex 73, CMC, Annex 180.
592 See CMC, Annex 291.
161
Memorial.593 Accepting meetings, receiving proposals, and announcing their consideration,
does that not mean negotiating?
393. Further, both the resolutions of the General Assembly of the OAS from 1979 onward,
declaring the landlocked situation of Bolivia as of “hemispherical interest”, and the
declarations by the Chilean representatives shortly after the failure of the Charaña process, are
not compatible with the assertion according to which the obligation to negotiate would be
extinguished. The Chilean delegate himself declares the opposite and affirms the continuous
character of its country’s commitment and of its respective subject matter in its declaration of
31 October 1979:
“On repeated occasions I have indicated Chile’s willingness to negotiate with
Bolivia a solution to its aspiration to have a free and sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean”594.
2. Chile’s responsibility for the failure of the Charaña process
394. Bolivia will devote the present section to prove that the failure of the Charaña process
was not attributable to Bolivia. For this purpose, Bolivia will address: Chile’s mistaken
description of the question of the territorial exchange (1); then, Chile`s lack of diligence to
negotiate with Peru (2); and, finally, Bolivia`s efforts to push forward the negotiation (3).
1) Chile’s misleading description of the question of territorial compensation
395. Given the legal nature of the Joint Declaration of Charaña, it is clear that the
negotiations between 1975 and 1978 were conducted as a legal consequence of the agreement
“to seek formulas for solving the vital matters that both countries face, such as the landlocked
situation that affects Bolivia”. 595 In this context, Bolivia and Chile presented bases of
negotiation in August and December 1975, whose main coincidence was to grant Bolivia
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
593 CMC, para. 8.38. and 8.39.
594 BM, Annex 204.
595 CCM, Annex 174.
162
396. Contrary to the facts, Chile submits that in the months that followed its reply of 19
December 1975 (submitted orally on the 12th of the same month) “Bolivia repeatedly
reaffirmed its acceptance of these guidelines, including the condition of territorial
exchange”.596 Bolivia therefore emphasizes that the two relevant issues in this instance are, on
the one hand, the parties’ agreement for Bolivia to obtain sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean and, on the other hand, the question concerning “compensations” that Bolivia would
make to meet the interests of Chile.
397. As for the first issue, it should be noted that there was no discrepancy during the entire
negotiation. The terms of the February 1975 Joint Declaration, of Bolivia’s August proposal
and Chile’s December response, and of the numerous statements by the authorities of both
parties, and even those of Peru, in the years that followed, are unequivocal proof that there
was a firm intention to grant Bolivia sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
398. However, the question concerning the compensations that Chile would receive in
exchange for granting Bolivia sovereign access to the sea was not the subject of a definitive
agreement. Although Bolivia was willing to negotiate all the proposals made by Chile,
including the condition of territorial exchange, this could not mean an automatic acceptance;
Bolivia stated in due course that this condition was subject to the clarification of other
elements introduced by Chile in its reply of 19 December 1975.
399. As has already been described in the Memorial597, Bolivia submitted a proposal to
Chile on 26 August 1975 which was consistent with the agreements, commitments and prior
conduct to negotiate a sovereign access. In that document, Bolivia did not propose territorial
compensations because they were never provided for in the agreements or commitments on
sovereign access. However, given the mutually convenient nature of finding a solution for
Bolivia’s landlocked condition, Bolivia informed Chile that:
“The Government of Bolivia will be willing to consider, as a fundamental affair
of the negotiation, the contributions that may correspond, as an integral part of an
understanding that consults mutual interests.”598
596 CCM, para 7.20.
597 BM, para. 144-146.
598 BM, Annex 174.
163
400. Chile’s response to Bolivia’s proposal was not immediate. Before giving it, Chile used
the press to introduce to the negotiating table and public opinion the condition of territorial
exchange. Thus, due to an editorial published in the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio, which
referred to territorial compensation in exchange for Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea, the
Ambassador of Bolivia was forced to clarify, on 18 November 1975, to the Bolivian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, that “at no time, since I started discharging my functions, have I referred
to territorial compensations; what’s more, I am totally against that form of compensation”.599
That editorial was not an isolated event.
401. Chile began to introduce the question of territorial exchange into the bilateral
negotiation in November 1975. The Bolivian Ambassador informed his Foreign Ministry once
again that in the two meetings with the Chilean Foreign Minister, Patricio Carvajal, on 13
November and 9 December 1975, the latter introduced the requirement of territorial exchange
as a condition to solve the problem of Bolivia’s landlocked condition. The terms of the report
of 9 December 1975 are as follows:
“3 .- In regard to the formula of compensation via barter, or exchange of
territories, I told the Chilean Foreign Minister that the mere mention of this
condition had caused a strong negative reaction and a feeling of frustration and
discouragement in the Government and that it might give place to strong
opposition. I stated that we believed we had already made way too many
sacrifices in the past, not only in 1879 but also in 1904 and that to the Bolivian
Government, this proposal was sudden and even unjust and contrary to equity. ‘To
the Government of my motherland’, I stated ‘it is too much of a high price and too
hard to explain to our people’”600
402. However, far from definitively ruling out the Chilean condition, the Bolivian
Ambassador told the Chilean Foreign Minister:
599 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguia, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Alberto Guzman Soriano, N° 625/244/75, 18 November 1975, BR, Annex
304. See also Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguia, to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Alberto Guzman Soriano, N° 674/259/75, 9 December
1975, BR, Annex 305.
600 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguia, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Alberto Guzman Soriano, N° 674/259/75, 9 December 1975, BR, Annex
305.
164
“[I]n Bolivia, the possibility of a territorial exchange has found strong opposition
and Chile’s proposal is not regarded as a generous solution, but, in any case,
within very fast-paced negotiations and the general context of an agreement
between the two countries, it is not Bolivia’s intention to prematurely close any
path to a possible understanding.”601
403. Shortly thereafter, on 12 December 1975, the Chilean Foreign Minister, Patricio
Carvajal, verbally explained his country’s response to the Bolivian Ambassador, including the
condition of territorial exchange. The representative of Bolivia replied on 16 December 1975,
stating that he accepted:
“[T]he general terms of the Chilean Government’s response to the proposal
presented by means of the Aide Memoire of 26 August of this year, regarding the
framework for the negotiation that enables reaching an adequate solution to
Bolivia’s landlocked situation”.602
404. Therefore, Bolivia’s acceptance was based on the points of agreement that emerged
from both proposals, the common denominator of which was the negotiation related to
sovereign access. This fact was evidenced by the concrete and specific gratitude of the
Bolivian government to that of Chile’s for its decision to “grant to Bolivia a sovereign
maritime coastline, linked to Bolivian territory by an equally sovereign strip of territory”603; it
was further reported that:
“the other proposals set forth in the Aide Memoire of 26 August, and those
expressed by Your Excellency, will be subject to negotiations that contemplate
the satisfaction of mutual interests”604.
405. Three days later, on 19 December 1975, at the request of Bolivia, Chile reiterated its
oral reply of 12 December 1975 in writing. Chile has referred to statements by Bolivian
authorities, contending that Bolivia had accepted the exchange of territories without
601 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguia, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Alberto Guzman Soriano, N° 674/259/75, 9 December 1975, BR, Annex
305. (emphasis in the original).
602 Note Nº 681/108/75 of 16 December 1975, BM Annex 71, CCM, Annex 178.
603 Note Nº 681/108/75 of 16 December 1975, BM Annex 71, CCM, Annex 178.
604 Note Nº 681/108/75 of 16 December 1975, BM Annex 71, CCM, Annex 178.
165
conditions.605 However, these statements only confirm Bolivia’s position on the condition of
the territorial exchange in the terms laid down in the note of 16 December 1975.
406. On 21 December 1975, the President of Bolivia, Hugo Banzer, stated that “the
Government of Chile accepted to grant Bolivia a maritime coastline to the north of Arica with
a connecting territory, with a transfer of sovereignty. Such acceptance, which addresses a vital
issue raised in the Bolivian proposal, has been agreed to by the National Government”.
Regarding the question of territorial exchange, he pointed out that his Government “is
responsibly considering this proposal, and procuring that whichever the outcome, it does not
limit the development of our country”. 606 The President of Bolivia, confirmed this
understanding stating that:
“Global acceptance means that we accept the Chilean proposition of granting us
an outlet to the sea, by means of a strip of land that has territorial continuity from
our border to the coast, and where we can fully exercise sovereignty. Everything
else is subject to negotiation”607.
407. The Bolivian Foreign Minister also detailed in an interview published on 1 January
1976 that:
“The Bolivian proposal, itself having many points, has been responded by Chile
in great detail, but it must be said that both countries are relying on the
assumption that none of these items predetermine any solution of our vital
problem. These are subject to negotiation, and I repeat, they are not required
conditions in order for obtaining our outlet to the sea.
There has been a lot of talk in the Chilean press, lately, about the matter of
demilitarization. In any matter of this nature, these would be proposals to be
negotiated. What is essential here is that Chile has already made the commitment
to cede territory.
605 CCM, para. 7.20-7.21.
606 “Government ‘globally accepts Chilean response’”, Los Tiempos (Bolivia), 22 December 1975, CCM, Annex
183. A few days later, President Banzer stated that “it would not be him or his cabinet who decide on Chile’s
response to the proposal for an exchange of territory as a solution to Bolivia’s geographical confinement.
“Banzer: It will be the people who decide on the agreement with Chile”, Presencia (Bolivia), 30 December
1975, CCM, Annex 185.
607 Que Pasa Magazine (Chile), Nº 257, 15 January 1976, extract quoted in, R. Prudencio Lizon, History of the
Charaña Negotiation (2011), pp 143-144, BR, Annex 366.
166
Bolivia has accepted everything that is consistent with its proposal but has left the
rest to negotiations. Evidently, there is no expectation that everything has been so
coordinated and so closely meshed that the Chilean response will match our
proposal”608.
408. Consistent with that position, the Bolivian Foreign Ministry published a communiqué
on 5 January 1976 stating that acceptance of territorial exchange was subject to “clarification”
regarding the maritime area:
“3. The acceptance of simultaneous exchange of territories is subject to a
clarification regarding the maritime area, in view of the fact that the extent of
jurisdictional waters, territorial sea and patrimonial sea has not yet been defined
by the International Community”609.
409. On 17 February 1976, the Bolivian Ambassador held a meeting with Chile’s
Chancellor, informing him that it was unacceptable for Bolivia to give compensations for
jurisdictional and patrimonial waters, because there was no legal precedent on the Chilean
demand for compensation for two hundred miles610.
410. In this regard, on 10 March 1976, Foreign Minister Guzman Soriano told the press:
“We have categorically declared that we accept global bases of negotiation that
take into account the reciprocal interests of our two countries, particularly as
regards those matters on which there is common ground between us. All other
matters contained in the documents forming the background to the negotiations,
i.e. Bolivia's proposal and the Government of Chile's response, would be
addressed at a later stage of the negotiations. [...]”611.
411. Against this background, the course of the negotiations in 1976 was devoted to the
prior solution of questions in which there was no agreement between the parties (known as
608 “Foreign Minister Guzman Soriano: We will give compensation that does not compromise our
development”, Presencia (Bolivia), 1 January 1976, CCM, Annex 187.
609 “Basic documents that substantiate the Bolivian-Chilean agreement in regard to the maritime issue”, El Diario
(Bolivia), 6 January 1976, BR, Annex 306.
610 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguía, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Alberto Guzmán Soriano, No 130/85/76, 19 February 1976, BR, Annex 307.
611 “Bolivia has not assumed definitive commitments with the Chilean Government”, El Diario (Bolivia), 11
March 1976, CCM, Annex 195.
167
the “edges”, aristas). Thus, on 15 March 1976, the Bolivian Ambassador to Santiago,
Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguía, declared:
“It has been categorically stated [-he said–] that the global negotiation bases that
take into account both countries’ reciprocal interests have been accepted,
especially in regard to the issues on which there are points of agreement, and that
all other aspects have been left for a future stage in the negotiation”612.
412. On 19 March 1976, Bolivian Ambassador Gutiérrez Vea Murguía informed the
Bolivian Foreign Ministry that, upon receiving a proposal from the Chilean Chancellor to
reactivate the Mixed Boundary Commission, he had made clear that Bolivia:
“[B]efore entering into negotiations on the technical aspects of the cession of
territory that Chile would make and the resulting Bolivian compensation, wished
to clarify the three points that are regarded as unacceptable. I referred again to the
territorial compensation for patrimonial sea, to the use of the total flow of Lauca
River and to the demilitarization of the ‘corridor’”.613
413. In this context, in order to clarify the question of territorial exchange, the Bolivian
Foreign Ministry issued a public clarification on 19 April 1976, stating:
“3. The process of a prompt sovereign return to the Pacific Ocean is currently at a
time in which both the Bolivian proposal and the response of the Government of
Chile are in force and constitute the global basis for future negotiations. All
aspects related to the proposed solution are at the negotiating table. Consequently,
no definitive or irreversible agreements have yet been made”.614
414. The progress of the negotiation on the points of disagreement was conditioned to the
Peruvian response to the consultation made by Chile. It was not possible to proceed with the
negotiations on the exchange of territories while Bolivia and Chile were not informed of
Peru’s position. The new Bolivian Ambassador, Adalberto Violand, was instructed to pace the
612 La Tercera (Chile). 15 March 1976, reproduced in R. Prudencio Lizon, History of the Charaña negotiation,
La Paz, Plural editorial, 2011 p. 192, BR, Annex 366.
613 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguia, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Alberto Guzmán Soriano, N° 204/136/76, 19 March 1976, BR, Annex 308.
614 Clarification of the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 April 1976, BR, Annex 309.
168
negotiations with Chile on the progress of the Chilean Peruvian talks.615 The Peruvian reply
occurred only on 19 November 1976 and its implications are explained in the following
section.
2. Chile’s lack of diligence to negotiate with Peru
415. Chile consulted Peru on 19 December 1975 according to Article 1 of the Additional
Protocol to the 1929 Treaty of Lima.616 Eleven months later, on 19 November 1976, Peru
expressed its assent to the fundamental basis of negotiations between Bolivia and Chile:
“sovereign cession to Bolivia of a corridor through the north of the province of Arica”.617
Although Chile submits that Peru’s response was fundamentally different from the
negotiating guidelines adopted by Bolivia and Chile618, and that its acceptance was a nonnegotiable
condition to give its consent619, it fails to mention that, in its reply, Peru expressed
a sufficiently ample flexibility for negotiating it:
“[T]he proposal that the Peruvian Government formulates to the Chilean
Government shall serve as a basis for arriving, at the appropriate time, to the prior
agreement, set forth in Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of
1929”.620
The Peruvian Government added that its proposal:
“also takes into account the spirit of understanding that has motivated our country
in relation to Bolivia’s landlocked situation, as expressed both in the Declaration
of Ayacucho, adopted on 9 December 1974, and in reiterated official
declarations”.621
615 Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Oscar Adriazola Valda, to the Bolivian
Ambassador to Chile, Adalberto Violand, 3 May 1976, BR, Annex 310.
616 Note sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile on 19 December 1975, BM Annex 72, CCM, Annex
179.
617 BM Annex 155
618 BM Annex 155.
619 CCM, para 7.30
620 CCM, Annex 207.
621 CCM, Annex 207.
169
Adding further that its proposal
“has been presented with the firm intention of finding a definitive solution to
Bolivia’s landlocked situation”.622
416. Under that understanding, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, Jose de la Puente,
confirmed the negotiability of the proposal to the Peruvian press:
“there must always be a dialogue in face of a Peruvian proposal. The difference is
that the rounds of discussions are already complete. If dialogue occurs, it will take
place at the level of the Foreign Ministers, and we Foreign Ministers can discuss
it. This is the basis for the agreement with Chile that I mentioned a few minutes
ago. In other words, by giving our answer, we have provided the basis for
reaching that prior agreement, which we must have for Chile to be able to
negotiate with Bolivia”.623
417. Despite Peru’s flexibility, on 26 November 1976 Chile simply rejected the Peruvian
proposal without even considering it, expressing its position in the following terms:
“In the opinion of the Government of Chile, such proposal affects matters within
its exclusive national sovereignty, and bears no relationship to the general terms
of the negotiation between Chile and Bolivia that were approved by both
countries. This proposal also entails a clear and manifest modification of the
clauses of the 1929 Treaty which definitively established Chilean sovereignty
over Arica. For these fundamental reasons, the Government, faithful to the
Chilean tradition of respecting Treaties and safeguarding national sovereignty,
declines to consider the referred proposal”.624
418. The Chilean note was replied to by a Memorandum of 26 November 1976. In that
document, Peru emphasized that:
“In view of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of 1929 between Peru and
Chile, and the fact that a consultation was made to obtain the bases for the prior
agreement referred to in article one of the Supplementary Protocol, which gave
the broadest powers to the Government of Peru, including for exercising a Right
of Veto, it is hard for the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Peru to understand and
accept that Chile does not accept to consider, without prior dialogue at the level of
622 CCM, Annex 207.
623 “Complete version of the Explanations by the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose de la Puente”, El
Mercurio (Chile), 26 November 1976, CCM, Annex 213.
624 Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 26 November 1976, CCM, Annex 212.
170
Foreign Ministers, Peru’s response consisting of a proposal that protects the high
interests of the Peruvian nation”.625
419. In the same communication, Peru clarified that its proposal was not a rejection of the
Chilean consultation; it constituted a different formula accepting Bolivia’s sovereign access to
the sea, establishing the following:
“6. […] Added to this is Peru’s will to constructively perform the faculty granted
to it by article one of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of 1929, not to
veto the possible cession but to agree to the cession of the corridor through the
establishment of an area under shared sovereignty among Peru, Bolivia and
Chile”.626
420. Finally, consistent with the agreements and commitments to negotiate a sovereign
access between Bolivia and Chile, Peru added that “it will continue to make all necessary
efforts to assist in achieving the aspiration of its sister Republic of Bolivia to access the
Pacific Ocean”627. Peru did not change its position in the months that followed. The Peruvian
Chancellor De la Puente declared before the General Assembly of the United Nations that
Peru’s proposal was “a proposal which ensured Bolivia's access to the sea”. He added that the
Peruvian proposal was not “a final and definitive formula, but rather as a basis for
negotiations” that “should be inspired by a determination to achieve an over-all solution of the
problems”.628
421. Paradoxically, while Chile did not engage in any effort to have Peru modify its
position, it simultaneously recognized the negotiable nature of the latter. As Chilean President
Augusto Pinochet himself acknowledged in a letter to his Bolivian counterpart, Hugo Banzer,
dated 18 January 1978:
625 “Response by the Peruvian Foreign Ministry to information provided to the Ambassador of Peru by the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Chile”, El Diario (Bolivia), 26 November 1976, CCM, Annex 211.
626 “Response by the Peruvian Foreign Ministry to information provided to the Ambassador of Peru by the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Chile”, El Diario (Bolivia), 26 November 1976, CCM, Annex 211.
627 “Response by the Peruvian Foreign Ministry to information provided to the Ambassador of Peru by the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Chile”, El Diario (Bolivia), 26 November 1976, CCM, Annex 211.
628 Verbatim Record of the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting of the Thirty-Second Session of the United Nations
General Assembly, UN Doc. A/32/PV.13, 29 September 1977, CCM, Annex 230.
171
“The view of my Government is that the bases of the Chilean proposal and
accepted in general terms by Bolivia, are the only viable and realistic way to
satisfy the longing of the brother country. I could not, therefore, propose a
different alternative. But I am confident that on these bases it would be possible
to achieve an agreement capable of being accepted by Peru. I rely on the
statements of the Foreign Minister of such brother and friend country, who has
declared twice that the November 1975 proposals ‘are not necessarily a final
solution formula but an alternative, an element of dialogue’”.629
422. It is worth recalling that Peru’s position has not changed and has been made known to
the Court by Peru itself in a letter of 26 July 2016630. The negotiation of the Parties within the
framework provided by the 1929 treaty and its additional protocol concerning the Peruvian
memorandum of 19 November 1976 was a logic course of action, especially considering that
Peru had not received a text previously agreed by Bolivia and Chile, but the bases of
negotiation proposed by them. On the other hand, Chile had offered a territory whose cession
was subjected to the prior consent of Peru; it was Chile that, as ‘offeror’, should have made an
effort to obtain Peru’s agreement.
423. The responsibility for acquiring Peru’s consent, in order to comply with the obligation
to negotiate sovereign access to the ocean, rested exclusively with Chile. Bolivia is not part
of the 1929 agreements, and the obligation to negotiate sovereign access implies that Chile
makes the necessary efforts to obtain Peru’s consent when, as it was the case, Chile is offering
a territory whose cession implied the agreement of Peru.
3) Bolivia’s efforts to negotiate during the Charaña process
424. The engagement of Bolivia to foster the negotiation with both Chile and Peru is
undeniable, in particular following the message forwarded by the Bolivian President, Hugo
Banzer, on 24 December 1976631 —and renewed on various occasions in 1977 through direct
exchanges with his Chilean counter-part, Augusto Pinochet.632 The sterility of these efforts to
change Chile’s new condition on the territorial exchange, on the one hand, and Chile’s
629 Letter from the President of Chile to the President of Bolivia, 18 January 1978, CCM, Annex 236.
630 Note from the Ambassador of Peru to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Carlos Herrera, to the Registrar of the
International Court of Justice, Philippe Couvreur, 26 July 2016, BR, Annex 370.
631 BM, Annex 173.
632 BM, Annexes, 74-78. See also, the Joint Communiqué of 3 September 1977 (ibid., Annex 129).
172
rejection to discuss the Memorandum submitted by Peru on 19 November 1976, on the other,
led Bolivia to consider that under these circumstances, maintaining diplomatic relations —
resumed with this specific purpose, and with the spirit of Charaña in mind—, was pointless.
However, it did not mean that Bolivia closed the door to a new round of negotiations. The
President of Bolivia expressed indeed hope that Chile could reconsider its position in the
future and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia made statements to the same effect.633
425. The record of the Charaña process shows that Bolivia has been actively pursuing
negotiations in good faith during the said process and that, even though it is not bound by the
1929 Treaty between Chile and Peru, Bolivia helped Chile in framing possible solutions
acceptable to Peru and adopted a constructive approach. These efforts date back to 1975.
While the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago, Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguía, delivered the
Bolivian proposal to the Chilean Chancellor in Santiago on 26 August 1975, Under-secretary
of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Javier Murillo, travelled to Lima to give the Peruvian
Chancellor, Miguel Angel de la Flor Valle, President Banzer’s message hoping a positive
response from Peru to the Chilean consultation634.
426. Despite its position in the present proceedings, during the Charaña negotiation Chile
informed Bolivia that the question of Peru’s consent was a bilateral matter between Peru and
633 See Letter from the President of Bolivia to the President of Chile, 17 March 1978, para. 5, CCM, Annex
239. See also the official Statement by the Bolivian Foreign Minister, made on the same date, BM, Annex
147, CCM, Annex 241. Chile proposed in the VI Plenary Meeting of the Extraordinary Period of Sessions of
the UN General Assembly, held on 26 March 1978, to resume bilateral dialogue under the same
circumstances that preceded the rupture of diplomatic relations. For his part, the Bolivian Foreign Minister
stated that: “we shall not lose faith the possibilities of a dialogue, when new and more favorable
circumstances open the way”, leaving open the possibility of resuming dialogue in the future (Verbatim
Record of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly,
UN Doc. A/S-10/PV.5, 26 May 1978, paras. 33-35, CCM, Annex 243. Verbatim Record of the Sixth Plenary
Meeting of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/S-10/PV.6, 26
May 1978, para. 328, CCM, Annex 244; Verbatim Record of the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Tenth
Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/S-10/PV.9, 30 May 1978, paras. 275-
287, CCM, Annex 245).
634 L. Maira and J. Murillo, The Long-standing Conflict between Chile and Bolivia. Two Perspectives, Taurus
editions, Santiago, 2004, pp. 138-139, BR, Annex 353.
173
Chile. During a meeting held on 7 December 1976, following the presentation of the Peruvian
response, the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago, Adalberto Violand, told the Chilean Foreign
Minister, Patricio Carvajal, that Bolivia had repeatedly been told that “the Santiago-Lima
talks were bilateral and that, on basis of this premise, we await a Chilean explanation on the
fate of our maritime negotiation, for it is also bilateral”.635
427. Notwithstanding the bilateral character of the negotiations between Peru and Chile,
Bolivia proposed alternative solutions to the stagnation of the negotiation. In a public message
of 24 December 1976, President Hugo Banzer sought to reconcile the positions of Chile and
Peru, asking Chile to withdraw its condition for territorial exchange and Peru to abandon its
shared sovereignty proposal in order to find a new understanding formula.636 In addition,
Bolivia proposed to make “contributions that are necessary, in equitable terms, for the
establishment of a great pole of tri-party development on the coastal zones which will be
transferred to Bolivian sovereignty, from which reciprocal benefits for Bolivia, Chile and
Peru derive.”637
428. Given the stagnation of the negotiations in 1977 and the evident lack of diligence on
the part of Chile, Bolivia began to analyse a sovereign access alternative, other than those
proposed in August and in December 1975. During a meeting held on 1 April 1977 between
the Chilean Foreign Minister, Patricio Carvajal, and the Bolivian Ambassador, Adalberto
Violand, the latter informed that there were two alternatives: “either Chile obtains the
agreement with Peru to continue negotiating the proposed territory or, solutions will have to
be sought in a perimeter exogenous to the one delimited by the Treaty of 1929. In the first
case, the negotiation must be Chilean-Peruvian, since Bolivia was not a Party in 1929.”638
429. Although Chile remained inflexible in its position, Bolivia continued to promote
exchanges in order to achieve the object of the agreement to negotiate sovereign access to the
635 Note from Bolivia’s Ambassador to Chile, Adalberto Violand, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Worship of Bolivia, Oscar Adriazola, N° 1093/481/79, 7 December 1976, BR, Annex 312.
636 BM, Annex 173.
637 BM, Annex 173.
638 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Adalberto Violand, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Worship of Bolivia, Oscar Adriazola, N° 281/140/77, 7 April 1977, BR, Annex 314.
174
sea. Thus, the Bolivian Foreign Minister, Oscar Adriazola, signed a Joint Declaration with the
Peruvian Foreign Minister, Jose de la Puente, in June 1977, with the aim of redirecting the
negotiations. In this instrument, these authorities:
“Within the framework of the traditional friendship that unites the two countries,
both Foreign Ministers constructively analysed the problem of Bolivia’s
landlocked condition, in respect to its solution Peru reiterated its broadest
understanding. In that sense, they agree on the desirability that, in the form and
opportunity required, the best efforts should be made, taking into account the
respective national interests, in order to concretize an effective and permanent
solution for that problem.”639
430. Bolivia also promoted the meeting of the Presidents of the three countries held in
Washington in September 1977 to analyse the progress of negotiations, which resulted in a
Joint Declaration wherein the three countries agreed to continue making efforts to solve
Bolivia’s landlocked condition.640 This initiative also led to the meeting of the Chancellors
held by the end of that month641.
431. Considering Bolivia’s genuine will to push forward the negotiation and Peru’s
sufficient openness to negotiate its proposal, the President of Bolivia recalled to the President
of Chile, in a letter dated 23 November 1977, that Chile rejected the Peruvian proposal
without taking further steps. The text in question indicated:
“Your Government, Mr. President, limited itself to decline to consider the
Peruvian proposal, arguing that it impacted on matters within the exclusive
sovereignty of Chile. However, Bolivia was expecting Chile to make subsequent
efforts to establish such situation; clarification which is critical, as demonstrated,
for the Government of Chile to be able to give Bolivia a territory which is the
specific and legal subject of the negotiation”642.
639 Joint Declaration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Peru, 7 June 1977, BR, Annex 315.
640 BM, Annex 129, CCM, Annex 224.
641 CCM, Annex 229.
642 BM, Annex 77, CCM, Annex 235.
175
432. In the same note, the Bolivian President referred to the appointment of special
representatives and their possible impracticability, given the circumstances. 643 President
Banzer asserted:
“I repeat, it is necessary that new factors are included into our dialogue to
overcome the current stage, factors that must necessarily embody a spirit of
widening of the conditions required for the settlement under which the unanimous
decision of my Country can be reached.
The establishment of new conditions to overcome the current stage and lead us to
the aims we set at the meeting of Charaña is not in the hands of Bolivia. Only
under these new circumstances would the meeting of Special Representatives
make sense, and such circumstances will determine the rhythm and intensification
of the negotiations”.644
433. Bolivia adjusted its position to the terms of the agreement by suggesting studying
alternative formulas. However, Chile rejected that possibility because it continued to maintain
the condition of territorial exchange with respect to Bolivia and did not make the necessary
efforts to obtain Peru’s consent and in fact even refused to consider Peru’s proposals.
434. In this context, in order to explore Chile’s willingness to negotiate sovereign access
and the possibility of studying alternative approaches to tackle the problem of Bolivia’s
landlocked condition, Bolivia carried out a diplomatic démarche by sending a special
representative to Chile. The Bolivian delegate Willy Vargas, held a meeting with Chile’s
Foreign Minister, Patricio Carvajal, in early March 1978. During the meeting, the Bolivian
representative proposed a transitory solution to Chile in order to pursue the negotiation, which
was considered positive by the Chilean Minister.645 When the talks between Vargas and
Carvajal were resumed, the latter said that the only proposals that could be materialized
quickly would be the transfer of the Chilean section of the railway.
643 On 29 September the Chancellors of Bolivia, Chile and Peru held a meeting in New York and agreed to
appoint special representatives to push forward negotiations, CCM, Annex 229. See also A. Violand
Alcazar, Sovereign return to the sea. A frustrated negotiation (2004), p. 286, BR, Annex 354.
644 BM, Annex 77, CCM, Annex 235.
645 BM, Annex 177, CCM Annex 237.
176
435. In the face of Chile’s new position, the confidential emissary pointed out that in the
three years of negotiations only the question of the three points of disagreement646 (edges) had
been solved, upon which Chancellor Carvajal replied that they were not completely overcome
and that all matters were still under negotiation, given that no document had been signed.647
These facts led to the assumption that, after three years of diplomatic exchanges, the
negotiated formula had not made any progress, because of both Chile’s refusal to adopt a
constructive approach and its lack of diligence in negotiating Peru’s consent.
436. As a result of the meeting between the Bolivian delegate and the Chilean Minister, the
former presented an official report648, in which he informed that the questions concerning the
territorial exchange and Peru’s counterproposal were the factors that froze the negotiation and
that they had no prospect of being resolved at that time. Consequently, Bolivia issued a press
release on 17 March 1978, stating that:
“In fact, far from finding the required receptivity for identifying new factors that
would provide an effective projection to the Special Representatives level, the
confidential enterprise confirmed highly disappointing positions and concepts,
such as that Chile, in addition to maintaining all their demands contained in the
December 19, 1975 document without any modification, had not exerted any
efforts aimed at obtaining a previous agreement with Peru, neither did it consider
it should exert any efforts for that purpose, within the framework of the 1929
Protocol”.649
437. The stagnation of the negotiation resulting from Chile’s rigid position forced Bolivia
to suspend diplomatic relations. In the same communiqué, Bolivia reproached Chile for its
failure to comply with the agreement to negotiate in the following terms:
“5.- Recent endeavors carried out at the initiative of Bolivia, by means of sending
an Ambassador on Special Mission to Santiago, provide additional evidence that
the Government of Chile has abandoned the essential commitment that provides a
historical explanation for resuming dialogue that was justified by the decision to
646 The three points of disagreement interposed by Chile in the negotiation were the following: a)
demilitarization of the corridor, b) territorial compensation for the maritime area, c) Use by Chile of the
waters of Lauca River. See BM, para. 151 and 425.
647 R. Prudencio Lizón, History of the Charaña negotiation (2011), p. 347, BR, Annex 366.
648 BM, Annex 177, CCM Annex 237.
649 BM, Annex 147, CCM, Annex 241.
177
place it at the fundamental service of our sovereign return to the sea, thus leaving
it totally devoid of a raison d’être.”650
438. The Charaña process thus shows that the failure of the rounds of negotiations which
took place between 1975 and 1978 is eventually attributable to Chile. In spite of Bolivia’s
continuous manifestations to continue negotiating the points of divergence and of Peru’s
openness to negotiate its proposition, Chile chose to stay inflexible in its position with respect
to its condition for territorial exchange and its rejection to try to obtain Peru’s consent.
C. Chile’s commitment to negotiate in the aftermath of the Charaña process
439. Independently of the responsibility for this failure, the commitment of Chile to
negotiate with Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean did not terminate this
obligation. The conduct of the parties after 1979 reflects their consistent willingness and
efforts to have negotiations on sovereign access to the sea.
1. The “Fresh Approach” (“enfoque fresco”) (1986-1987)
440. On 22 February 1986, President Paz Estenssoro announced that Bolivia would seek to
resolve its landlocked situation by means of a “fresh approach”651 . Two days later, the
Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guillermo Bedregal, stated that Bolivia had shown a
“conciliating attitude vis-à-vis Chile: which is suitable to hold dialogue and is firmly based on
the interests of the country, without relinquishing the fundamental objective of our foreign
policy, i.e. to have our sovereignty over the Pacific Ocean restituted.”652 It is clear that the socalled
“fresh approach” mentioned by the Bolivian President referred to the willingness to
facilitate a rapprochement between the two States in order to pave the road for a negotiation
on the sovereign access to the sea.653
650 BM, Annex 147, CCM Annex 241.
651 CCM, Annex 283.
652 “G. Bedregal. Conciliatory attitude with Chile does not mean renouncing the sea”, Presencia (Bolivia), 25
February 1986, BR, Annex 328.
653 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bolivia, Tricolor. History and Projections of Peace,
Development and Integration of the Bolivian – Chilean dispute (1998), pp. 50 y 52, BR, Annex 335.
178
441. Bolivia’s Consul General in Chile, Jorge Siles Salinas, held talks with Chilean
Chancellor, Jaime del Valle, from April 1986 onwards with regard to what was denominated
as “the substantial matter”, the sovereign access.654 During the XVI OAS General Assembly
of the same year, Del Valle and Bolivia’s representative, Jorge Gumucio Granier, held a
meeting to formalize negotiations on the “substantial matter”.655
442. As a consequence of the agreement reached in Guatemala, the Chancellors of Bolivia
and Chile issued separate communiqués. Bolivia’s communiqué indicated that: “The aspects
related to the maritime issue of Bolivia, which is regarded as a matter of substance, and those
related to it, shall be formally considered at a forthcoming meeting to be held in April 1987 in
the Oriental Republic of Uruguay”.656 Chile, for its part, recorded: “We have agreed with the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia that, without prejudice to the important and fruitful
talks and tasks that the Rapprochement Binational Commission will continue to carry out,
both Foreign Ministers will meet in Montevideo at the end of April, in order to discuss
matters of substance that are of interest to both Governments.”657
443. The communiqués were formulated in different terms, however, there can be little
doubt that both recorded the existence of an agreement to start formal negotiations with
regard to “matters of substance”. The Bolivian communiqué indisputably identifies “the
maritime issue of Bolivia” as the substantial matter to be treated. Chile did not reject this. It
must be noted that the expression “matters of substance” corresponds to the “vital matters”
referred to earlier in the Joint Declaration of Charaña of 1975.
654 Note from the Consul General of Bolivia to Chile, Jorge Siles Salinas, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Valentin Abecia, CGB N° 190–066/86, 30 April 1986, BR, Annex 329. Note from the Consul
General of Bolivia in Chile, Jorge Siles Salinas, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Guillermo
Bedregal, 13 June 1986, BR, Annex 330.
655 Note from the Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations, Jorge Gumucio Granier, to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Guillermo Bedregal, 20 November 1986, BR, Annex 334. See also,
Note from the Consul General in Chile, Jorge Siles Salinas, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
Guillermo Bedregal, CGB N° 586/240/86, 2 November 1986, BR, Annex 331.
656 Communiqué of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Guillermo Bedregal, 13 November 1986, BR,
Annex 332.
657 Communiqué of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Jaime del Valle, 13 November 1986, BR, Annex
333. (emphasis added)
179
444. The events that followed, which have been submitted in the Memorial, 658 and
particularly, the declaration by the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaime del Valle, at the
beginning of the meeting in Montevideo, are revealing not only for the purposes of a tacit
agreement659; they constitute an informal undertaking:
“[…] The commitment of Your Excellency the President of the Republic to
American interests led you to carry out the negotiations that commenced in the
Act of Charaña of February 1975. As shall be remembered, in the act signed at
that time, the Presidents of Chile and Bolivia expressly stated the commitment to
continue the dialogue, at different levels, to seek solutions to key issues faced by
both countries, such as the landlocked status that affects Bolivia, within the
framework of reciprocal convenience and taking into consideration the aspirations
of the Bolivian and Chilean nations. […] We have gone through the subsequent
stages together, establishing a friendly and fraternal contact in different scenarios
that made it possible to arrive precisely at this meeting, which is aimed at
initiating what could be – and that is our desire – a mature and sincere dialogue
which, if adequately conducted, may lead us to more decisive stages than the ones
we could reach in previous negotiations […].”660
445. Chile was well aware that Bolivia conceived the negotiations with a specific purpose,
namely to obtain sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, the substantial issue (el asunto de
fondo). This explains that the proposals, previously announced, were submitted to the Chilean
Minister, Del Valle, in Montevideo, making it impossible to present them as a surprise.661 It is
in this precise context that the declarations by Del Valle must be interpreted. The Minister
himself did not reject the treatment of the issue; on the contrary, the Minister posed questions
that were duly answered by Bolivia, and Chile recognized that the dossier was being
658 BM paras.183-188 and Annexes 130, 170, 169, 27 and 28.
659 It has been suggested the existence of a ‘tacit’ agreement, a formula examined in Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (ICJ Reports 2007 (II), p. 735, para. 25.3),
and applied by the Court in the Maritime Dispute between Peru and Chile in favor of Chile (I.C.J. Reports
2014, p. 38, para. 91), despite that the latter sought to avoid referring to a “tacit agreement” as fundament of
its position.
660 See CCM, Annex 291.
661 During the 41st session of the UN General Assembly (1986), the Bolivian Minister handed out to his Chilean
counterpart a letter which recorded possible solutions to address Bolivia’s landlocked condition problem and
certain guidelines to discuss the issue in subsequent meetings. Ministry of Foreign of the Republic of Bolivia,
Tricolor. History and Projections of Peace, Development and Integration of the Bolivian–Chilean maritime
Dispute (1988), p. 52, BR, Annex 335. See also BM Annex 131.
180
examined. It is therefore surprising that Chile decided to shelve abruptly the question, and
revert to its old strategy based on the 1904 Treaty662.
446. To mention the “inflexible insistence” of Bolivia submitting proposals that involved a
transfer of territorial sovereignty663 as justification is to ignore the historical record. Bolivia
had engaged in the negotiations with the legitimate trust that the Chilean regime, the same
that formulated the proposals in Charaña, would be consistent with its previous position. The
Montevideo negotiation entailed continuity with the line agreed upon in 1950, confirmed in
1961 and applied, not yet successfully, in 1975. It was about looking for “formulas for
solving” the landlocked status of Bolivia. As noted by Chilean diplomat, Pinochet de la
Barra, Minister Del Valle: “with the same tranquillity with which he explained the
Government plans to “calmly and seriously” study the corridor proposal, he revealed the
reasons for his abrupt rejection”.664
447. As is well known, the OAS General Assembly adopted the resolution 873, on 14
November 1987, regretting that the talks have broken off, and urged Chile and Bolivia to
resume negotiations to find a means of solving the maritime problem of Bolivia665.
2) The maritime issue and the Agenda without exclusions (Algarve Declaration, 2000)666
448. In June 1990, Chile’s Chancellor, Enrique Silva Cimma, told the Bolivian President,
Jaime Paz Zamora, within the framework of the OAS General Assembly held in Paraguay that
he was willing to cede to Bolivia an enclave in Pisagua. This access to the sea would be
located in the Chilean port, where Bolivia would be able to exert sovereignty. Bolivia, he
662 See the allocution made by the Chilean Representative, Mr. Illanes, before the OAS Permanent Council on 17
June 1987 (BM, Annex 211).
663 CMC, I, para. 1.24 d.
664 Ministry of Foreign of the Republic of Bolivia, Tricolor. History and Projections of Peace, Development and
Integration of the Bolivian–Chilean maritime Dispute (1988), p. 193, BR, Annex 335.
665 See BM, Annex 199.
666 BM, I, paras. 198-219, 441-442 y 450-477; II, Annexes 80-86, 117-124, 132-139, 141, 145, 146, 150, 151,
159, 164, 166, 186, 231, 232.
181
added, would be directly connected with this port by sea, air, and land. This position was
ratified by Chilean President Patricio Aylwin.667
449. The Chilean-Bolivian rapprochement amounted to the Agreement on Economic
Complementation (ACE Nº 22), signed on 6 April 1993. 668 On that occasion, Chile’s
Chancellor, Enrique Silva Cimma, declared that: “there are no issues that cannot be addressed
between the two Governments and the case of [Bolivia’s] landlocked condition is one of
them”.669
450. Months later, the Chancellors of Bolivia and Chile signed a Joint Communiqué on 16
July 1993, in which the progress made in the rapprochement process was reproduced,
underscoring the improvement of bilateral relations and communications between the two
Governments. 670 Bolivian Chancellor, Ronald MacLean, referred to this communiqué
stressing that “we talk about pending issues”, noting that Chile had acknowledged “the
existence of pending issues that must be addressed and tackled”, adding that “all the points on
the bilateral agenda, of course, include the maritime issue, and I think this is a substantial step
forward that must be highlighted”.671
451. The intention not to exclude the issue of the sovereign access from the bilateral agenda
was further corroborated the following year. Chile’s President, Eduardo Frei Ruíz Tagle,
stated on 10 March 1994 that he was “open to addressing” all “the issues with Bolivia,
including that of its landlocked condition”, and added that “this pending problem must be
addressed in the light of the current international treaties”.672
452. Between 1996 and 1997, special delegates from Bolivia and Chile started contacts to
grant Bolivia a port with all the customs facilities and legal provisions necessary to enable it
667 “Silva Cimma discloses information regarding Aylwin, Pinochet and boundary issues”, El Mercurio (Chile),
21 July 2012, BR, Annex 367.
668 CPO, Annex 45 (B).
669 O. Pinochet de la Barra, Chile and Bolivia: how much longer! (2004), p. 95, BR, Annex 352.
670 CCM, Annex 309.
671 “Chile is willing to solve pending problems with Bolivia”, La Razón (Bolivia), 20 July 1993. BR, Annex
339.
672 J. Escobari Cusicanqui, Diplomatic History of Bolivia, Vol. II, (1999), p. 174, BR, Annex 344.
182
to connect with the Pacific Ocean. These negotiations were carried out, confidentially, by
non-governmental representatives designated by the chancelleries of both countries. For Chile
Enrique Correa, former Minister Secretary General in the Government of Patricio Aylwin,
and for Bolivia, Horst Grebe. The meetings of both emissaries were held in La Paz, Iquique,
Santiago, and Buenos Aires. These negotiations reached a draft agreement, but were left in an
impasse when Bolivia attempted to address the issue of sovereign access.673
453. In 1999 Bolivia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier Murillo de la Rocha, invoked
Chile’s commitments to negotiate before the OAS General Assembly: “[in] at least ten
opportunities […] we carried out negotiations on basis of the cession to Bolivia of an own
access to the sea, and that commitment was formalized in eight solemn occasions” referring in
particular to “the commitment of 1950, ratified ten years thereafter, the content of the
proposal of 1975 and the conversations held in 1984 and 1986.”674 Chile’s assertion that “in
more than 20 years of engagement following the restoration of democracy in Chile in 1990…
Bolivia never once alleged that Chile was under an obligation to negotiate with Bolivia over
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”675 is plainly false.
454. Bolivia formulated a new approach to deal with the issue of the obligation of
sovereign access. A first meeting was held between the Chancellors of Bolivia and Chile in
Rio de Janeiro in 1999, where it was agreed that it was necessary to resolve pending bilateral
673 Joint Notes issued by Enrique Correa and Horts Grebe, 28 May 1996, BR, Annex 341.
674 Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting, 29th Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, 8 June 1999, BR,
Annex 345. Previously, Bolivia had invoked the 1950 notes before the OAS General Assemblies of 1992 and
1993: Minutes of the 2nd Plenary Meeting, 22nd Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, 19 May
1992, p. 301, BR, Annex 336; and, Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the General Commission, 23rd Regular
Session of the OAS General Assembly, 9 June 1993, p. 345, BR, Annex 338. See also the statements of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, before the 1998 and 1999 UN General Assembly. See Verbatim
Record of the 21st Plenary Meeting, 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc.
A/53/PV.21, 30 September 1998, p. 17, BR, Annex 343, and Verbatim Record of the 20th Plenary Meeting,
54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc. A/54/PV.20, 1 October 1999, p. 10, BR,
Annex 346.
675 CCM, para. 1.5.
183
issues without exclusions.676 The substance of that meeting was reiterated in the IX Ibero-
American Summit of Heads of State held in Havana in 1999, where the Chancellors of
Bolivia and Chile, Javier Murillo and Juan Gabriel Valdés, respectively, “agreed to resume an
open and unconditional dialogue between the two countries, which –among other issues–
would include the access of Bolivia to the sea.”677
455. With this background, the parties issued the Joint Communiqué of Algarve on 22
February 2000, and later, the Joint Communiqué of Brasilia, on 1 September 2000,
formalizing the Agenda “with no exclusions”.678 The common understanding was to conduct
relations in an “all-inclusive” framework. It was clear for both Chile and Bolivia that this
process could not exclude the question of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.679
456. In September 2000, the Chilean Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Heraldo Muñoz
himself, referred to the process of bilateral dialogue emphasizing the will of the Chilean
Government to develop an “open dialogue that includes all issues and seeks to create
676 L. Maira, and J. Murillo de la Rocha, The long-standing conflict between Chile and Bolivia. Two
Perspectives (2004), pp. 151-152, BM, Annex 353.
677 R. Orías Arredondo, International Law and the Maritime Negotiations with Chile (2000), BR, Annex 347.
(emphasis added)
678 BM paras. 199-200, Annexes 150 and 159.
679 The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Javier Murillo de la Rocha, noted before the OAS General
Assembly held in 2000 that: “With the same clarity and frankness with which it has always submitted its
view, my country noted that this program had to always be seen as a path and not as a replacement for the
effective solution to the proposal for restoration of Bolivia’s condition as a coastal State. We have received
positive signs from the new Government of President Lagos on his willingness to continue and project the
important progress made in Algarve”. Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting, 30th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, 6 June 2000, p. 168, BR, Annex 348. See also, the statement made by the Bolivian
representative, Fernando Messmer Trigo, before the UN General Assembly in 2000. Verbatim record of the
25th Plenary Meeting, 55th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/55/PV.25, 20
September 2000, p. 12, BR, Annex 349.
184
favorable conditions for an understanding”. Likewise, he noted that the most immediate topics
would first be addressed to “eventually, facing the most complex issues”.680
457. In Bolivia’s Memorial681 and Chile’s Counter-Memorial,682 detailed information was
given on the facts related to the negotiations, between 2001 and 2004, on a possible
concession for a special economic zone, which was ultimately not concluded. During this
period the parties did not exclude sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean from the bilateral
agenda, and its distinctive character was manifestly evident at the XIV Political Consultations
Mechanism (PCM) held in 2005, during the mandates of Presidents Eduardo Rodríguez
Veltzé and Ricardo Lagos. In the corresponding minutes, the representatives of Bolivia and
Chile made a clear distinction between the item labelled “free transit” and the one concerning
the “maritime issue”.683
3. The 13-Point Agenda (2006)
458. The “maritime issue” was discussed in the meetings of the Working Group of Bilateral
Matters 684 and then, within the framework of the PCM. The Counter-Memorial itself
recognizes that “[t]he maritime issue was also discussed at XV meeting on 25 November
2006 and subsequently”685. Also the minutes of the PCM meetings —eight between 2006 and
2010 (XV to XXII), refer “to progress being made on the ‘maritime issue’”686 . It was
680 Version of Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Press Direction on the interview to the Deputy Minister in
Telenoche TV show on Chanel 13, of 6 September 2000, reproduced in C. Bustos, Chile and Bolivia. A long
road from Independence to Monterrey (2004), pp. 295-296, BR, Annex 351.
681 BM para. 201.
682 CCM, paras. 9.10-9.12.
683 Minutes of the XIV Meeting of the Political Consultations Mechanism, 6 October 2005, BR, Annex 356.
684 Minutes of the I Working Group Meeting regarding the Bolivian-Chilean Bilateral Issues of 9 August 2005
(BR, Annex 355); Minutes of the III Meeting of the Chile-Bolivia Working Group on Bilateral Affairs, 31
October 2006 (BR, Annex 359); Minutes of the XV Meeting of the Political Consultations Mechanism
Bolivia-Chile, 25 November 2006 (BM, Annex 118).
685 CMC, I, para. 9.17.
686 CMC, I, para. 9.18. In the XVIIIth meeting of the Mechanism (17 June 2008) ideas and criteria were
exchanged on specific ways to negotiate and reach concrete solutions to the problem. Chile recognized that it
had analyzed different options and deepened those viable in the short term with Bolivia. The Minutes read:
“The Vice-Chancellors reiterated their conviction that through this dialogue process, with a realistic and
185
therefore well assumed by both Parties that this new terminology – (Plan de Acción and 13-
point Agenda) referred to the long-standing problem of the sovereign access. Point 6
(“Maritime Issue”) is clearly different from Point 3 (“Free Transit”).687
459. Consistent with the spirit of the Algarve Declaration, in February 2006, before the
mandate of Chilean President Ricardo Lagos ended, Chilean Chancellor, Ignacio Walker,
expressed, after a meeting held with his Bolivian counterpart, “the desire of the Government
of Chile to build a future agenda to face past issues which are a result of the last five
meetings, [he also] noted the necessity of dialogue continuity using an agenda without
exclusions”.688
460. In March, the new Chilean Chancellor Alejandro Foxley stated that there was “a very
sincere spirit on both sides to establish an open agenda, without exclusions, starting with
simple and concrete goals –especially in economic terms– to make gradual progress. Once
trust has been generated between the two Governments on a firm basis, we can set more
ambitious objectives for ourselves”.689
461. As a result, the understanding concerning the binding and comprehensive character of
the “agenda without exclusions” established in 2000 was not unintended. At the OAS General
Assembly held in June 2006, it was recorded that Chile’s Chancellor, Alejandro Foxley,
reaffirmed the “agreement of our Governments to seek a permanent substantial understanding
under this broad agenda, without exclusions”.690
future approach the necessary agreements will be reached. The Vice-Chancellors agreed to give continuity to
the dialogue, to which end the considered appealing to their respective teams of technicians” (See BM,
Annex 120, CCM, Annex 341). Minutes of the meetings that followed are found in BM, Annexes, 121-124.
687 The terminology used on the agenda of the OAS General Assembly from 1979 to present has included ‘the
Maritime Problem of Bolivia’. See OAS Resolutions on the “Maritime Problem” between 1979 to 1989 (BM,
Annexes 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201).
688 BM Annex 151.
689 “President clarifies that she did not address the maritime issue with Evo Morales”, La Nación (Chile), 14
March 2006, BR, Annex 357.
690 Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting, 36th Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, 6 June 2006, BR,
Annex 358.
186
462. At the OAS General Assembly held in 2007, Bolivian Chancellor, David
Choquehuanca, confirmed the binding nature of the “agenda of thirteen points” in a
framework “without exclusions”, by declaring that: “This agreement was reflected in the
bilateral meeting held on 17 and 18 July 2006. Since then, both countries have been
committed to building an environment of mutual trust with the objective and firm
commitment to arrive at a final solution to Bolivia’s landlocked condition”. 691 Chile’s
Chancellor, Alejandro Foxley, far from rejecting the position held by his Bolivian
counterpart, confirmed it, acknowledging that “an agenda was defined without exclusions
with thirteen points”692, and that these topics had made different degrees of progress.
463. In its Memorial, Bolivia stated that by 2009 both countries were discussing the
possibility of creating a Bolivian enclave on the Chilean coast.693 The Counter Memorial
minimizes this process by stating that “[t]he Vice-Ministers of both States exchanged ideas
concerning the establishment of a non-sovereign coastal area for Bolivia in the zone of
Tiviliche, north of the town of Pisagua and south of the Quebrada de Camarones, with a
special status to be negotiated between both States”694. Nonetheless, it was more than a simple
exchange of ideas. The talks concerning the enclave had begun in 2007 and, as Chile itself
recognizes, together, they made a visit to the potential site in a Chilean helicopter695.
464. Chile’s claim that “Bolivia did not then assert that there was any obligation underlying
this diplomatic dialogue”696 , is not correct. The conversations regarding the enclave in
Tiviliche were being developed within the “13-point Agenda”, which included the “maritime
issue” (Point VI). During the negotiations both Parties considered that a definitive solution to
the “maritime issue” that would include sovereignty should not be discussed at an early stage.
Nonetheless, Bolivia manifested that, in the meantime, it would enjoy sovereign rights,
691 Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting, 37th Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, 5 June 2007, BR,
Annex 361.
692 Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting, 37th Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, 5 June 2007, BR,
Annex 361.
693 BM para. 213.
694 CCM, para. 9.19 (emphasis added).
695 Content of talks between the Delegations of Chile and Bolivia regarding Point 6 of the Agenda of the 13 -
points: The Maritime Issue, BR, Annex 362.
696 CCM, para. 9.19.
187
including legislative and judicial attributions, and administration and executive power in the
area of the enclave. 697 There was every reason to believe that, at the end of the Presidency of
Michelle Bachelet in late 2009, it would be possible to reach an agreement.
465. As agreed by both States, Bolivia sent Chile a reserved minute in December 2009 in
which the negotiations carried out were placed on record. However, the Government of
President Bachelet decided not to sign this document, and left the decision for the coming
government. Sebastián Piñera, new President of Chile, rejected the formula that had been
previously negotiated between the Governments of Presidents Morales and Bachelet.698
4. The agreement to propose and reach “concrete, feasible and useful” solutions (2010)
466. Chile submits that “Bolivia’s statement in its Memorial that Chile ‘suddenly
cancelled’ the PCM meeting planned to take place in November 2010 and ‘pulled out of
further negotiations’ is […] misleading”.699 Chile adds that “[a]s the discussions between the
two States were elevated to the ministerial level, the meeting of the PCM […] were
suspended”, and this is how it was explained by the Minister of Foreign Affairs before the
OAS in June 2011.700 This is not an accurate description of the facts. The meeting of
Presidents Piñera and Morales on 17 December 2010, and the joint press release dated 17
January 2011, were the consequence of the sudden cancellation by Chile of the PCM meeting
of November 2010.
697 Content of the talks between the Delegations of Chile and Bolivia regarding point 6 of the 13 Points: The
Maritime Issue, BR, Annex 362. See also “Moreno and the enclave: ‘Alternatives that divide the country
are not beneficial’”, La Tercera (Chile), 5 December 2010, BR, Annex 364.
698 “The Bolivian enclave that was frustrated by Piñera”, La Tercera (Chile), 5 December 2010, BR, Annex
363.
699 CMC, I, para. 9.21.
700 However, before the OAS (XIL General Assembly) the Chilean Foreign Minister Alfredo Moreno assured
that “Chile has indicated very clearly that it is not in a position to grant Bolivia sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean, much less without any [territorial] compensation” which meant that the discussion concerned
sovereign access and the acceptance of the future negotiation would be subject to the condition of territorial
exchange. Minutes of the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Organization of American States General Assembly,
7 June 2011. CCM, Annex 359, p. 166.
188
467. The Presidents of Bolivia and Chile, Evo Morales and Sebastian Piñera, decided to
create a High Level Bi-national Commission to generate and exchange concrete, useful and
feasible proposals that could be negotiated. Morales and Piñera agreed to design a framework
for the negotiations, and the Chancellors would lead a Commission to progress in every issue,
especially in the maritime negotiations701.
468. This Joint Declaration of 17 January 2011 reported that the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs agreed to seek to “achieve concrete, feasible and useful solutions, for the benefit of
both countries and their peoples”. Similar terms were used in the Joint Communiqué of 7
February 2011.702 All of them were virtually identical to those used in the minutes of the
XXII Meeting of the PCM of 14 July 2010.
469. Although the so-called “concrete, feasible and useful solutions” for resolving Bolivian
maritime landlocked condition were not submitted under the PCM, in February 2011, Chile
held informal talks with Bolivia, related to an access to the sea without sovereignty through
an enclave located on the beach of Las Machas, on the northern front of Arica703.
470. In view of Chile’s failure to submit a written proposal, Bolivian President, Evo
Morales, respectfully requested Chile to submit a concrete proposal before 23 March
(Bolivian Day of the Sea).704 Chile limited itself to recall that Chilean frontiers with Bolivia
were already settled by the 1904 Treaty.705 It was under these circumstances that, on 7 June
2011, the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs asked his Chilean counterpart, before the OAS
General Assembly, “for immediate establishment, today, of a process of bilateral and formal
negotiations on the basis of a written proposal, specific, feasible and useful, with all Member
States of the Organization of American States as witnesses”.706
701 Ibid.
702 BM, Annex 166.
703 See CCM, Annex 360 and “The unknown offer from Pinera to Bolivia”, La Tercera (Chile), 11 January
2015, BR, Annex 369.
704 BM, Annex 145.
705 BM, Annex 164.
706 BM, Annex 231.
189
471. Bolivia interpreted that elevating the “maritime issue” to a ministerial level would
provide the opportunity for Chile to reconsider its new position. However, becoming aware of
the rigidity shown by President Piñera and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bolivia concluded
that it was virtually impossible to make any progress with that Administration, decided to
dilute, or directly bury, the “maritime issue”. The matter of sovereignty was not absent, on the
contrary, controversial manifestations were made707.
472. To conclude, the factual record of the case demonstrates that it was Chile that in 2011,
arbitrarily, decided to modify its position and to reject to negotiate a sovereign access of
Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean, 708 referred Chile’s decision to deny the existence of the
commitment to negotiate forced Bolivia to resort to the Court to obtain a judgment that
acknowledges the existence of the obligation, its breach by Chile and to compel Chile to
resume negotiations.
D. Final Remarks
473. It is well-established that, once an obligation to negotiate arises, there exists a
requirement not only to enter into negotiations, but also to pursue them as far as possible709.
And it would not be the first time that States have been ordered to return to the negotiating
table, demonstrating that failure in the negotiation process does not have any effect nor does it
undermine the obligation, which remains alive and opposable710.
474. The meaning of the expression “pursue them as far as possible” is enshrined in the
general theory on obligations according to which every obligation is based on a cause. As
long as this cause does not disappear, the obligation persists711. In international law this
707 See. El Dia (Bolivia) 28 January 2013 BR, Annex 368.
708 BM, Annexes 218, 226 and 228.
709 Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 42, 1931, at p. 116. See also Chapter
2 (Sections A and B) and Chapter 7 (B) of the Reply.
710 North Sea continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark, Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47, para. 87.
711 For this theory developed in civil law see, for instance, J. Carbonnier, Droit civil, Tome 4, Les obligations,
Paris, Presses universitaires de France, p. 119.
190
relation between the obligation to negotiate and its cause has been authoritatively captured in
the following terms:
“Lorsqu’une obligation à laquelle des États s’étaient obligés se solde par un échec,
l’obligation est-elle éteinte ? se maintient-elle ? subsiste-t-elle d’une manière
permanente ?....On pourrait répondre….qu’à défaut d’autres indications tirées des
circonstances, une telle obligation subsiste tant qu’il existe raisonnablement des
chances d’aboutir, car une obligation cesse d’exister quand elle a perdu sa
cause…”712
475. The cause of today’s Chilean obligation to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean arose more than a century ago from a common interest between the Parties. Bolivia’s
interest has always been inextricably linked with the urgent necessity to overcome the
obstacles resulting from its landlocked condition and the serious consequences that this
situation entails in socio-economic or regional development terms. Chile’s reasons are not
different, as it has recognized since the beginning of this now too long of a journey. The
words of President Domingo Santa María could not be more revealing when, as early as 1884,
he declared that:
“Bolivia cannot remain as it is, as it cannot either hand over its trading only to our
customs. No people can live and develop in such conditions. We, as to support
Bolivia, on one hand, so we cannot share it among the neighbours, and so we can
take over its wealth and unite our interests, on the other hand, we must grant it an
access of its own to the Pacific, where our influence would be always efficient,
and take the territory to the south, where borates and mines among others can be
found, which remunerate our work and would give the occasion to the
consumption of our products. There is a problem that needs a solution here… I
repeat, we cannot and we must not kill Bolivia that is not our interest”713.
476. The same motivation led Chile, shortly after the end of the Pacific War, to negotiate
with Bolivia and to conclude the 1895 Treaty on Territory Transfer714. Half a century later,
similar reasons guided the visit of Chilean President, González Videla, to the United States in
April 1950. Chile and Bolivia resumed negotiations in 1975, again in 1986, and again
712 P. Reuter, « De l’obligation de négocier », in Il processso internazionale, Studi in onore di Gaetano
Morelli, Milano: Giuffré, 1975, p. 727 (emphasis added).
713 BM, Annex 36 (emphasis added).
714 BM, Annex 98.
191
between 2000 and 2011 for the exact same reasons. These negotiations persisted during all
these decades because the desired objective resulted from the mutual interest of both parties
and it was firmly believed that a solution was always attainable and feasible.
477. It was in the full exercise of its sovereignty that Chile committed itself to negotiate a
sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia. How can Chile now reasonably explain to this Court
that its interests are no longer compatible with the negotiation of a sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean, (as Chile did in 1895, in 1920, in 1950, in 1961, in 1975 etc., all dates
corresponding to very clear statements declaring its “willingness” to negotiate)? How do these
intentions suddenly become fatally irreconcilable with the promised solution to Bolivia’s
landlocked condition? The answer is simple: Chile cannot.
192
SUBMISSIONS AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the reasons given above, Bolivia requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:
(a) Chile has the obligation to negotiate with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement
granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean;
(b) Chile has breached the said obligation; and
(c) Chile must perform the said obligation in good faith, promptly, formally, within a
reasonable time and effectively, to grant Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean.
21 March 2017
Eduardo RODRÍGUEZ VELTZÉ
Agent of the Plurinational State of Bolivia
193
LIST OF ANNEXES TO THE REPLY
VOLUMES 2 TO 5
ANNEX
Nº
TITLE SOURCE PAGE
Nº
VOLUME 2
ANNEXES 234 – 277
234. Circular of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia to the Legations of
Bolivia Abroad, 25 January 1901
(extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Report from the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the
Regular Congress of 1901 (1902),
pp. 97 – 101
1
235. Telegram 723.2515/503 from the
Chargé d’Affaires of the United
States in Bolivia Goold to the
Secretary of State, 6 October 1919
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United
States, Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United
States, (1919) Volume I, p. 160.
15
236. Note from Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Alberto Gutierrez,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, Ernesto Barros Jarpa, 20
December 1921
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Information Service of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Chile
and the Aspiration of Bolivia for a
Port in the Pacific (1922), pp. 135 –
138
19
237. Note from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Chile, Ernesto Barros
Jarpa, to the Minister Plenipotentiary
of Bolivia to Chile, Macario Pinilla,
Nº 1.725, 21 December 1921
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
29
238. Information Service of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Chile
and the Aspiration of Bolivia for a
Port in the Pacific (1922), pp. 155 –
157 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
39
194
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
239. Note from the Chargé d’Affaires of
the Bolivia Legation to Chile, Juan
Salinas Lozada, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Alberto
Gutierrez, Nº 117, 27 January 1922
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
47
240. Note from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Alberto Gutierrez,
to the Minister Plenipotentiary of
Bolivia to Chile, Eduardo Diez de
Medina, Nº 200, 31 March 1926
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
71
241. C. Rios Gallardo, After the Peace…
The Chilean-Bolivian Relations
(1926), pp. 132 - 133, 214 – 215
(extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
83
242. Telegram 723.2515/1952 from the
Ambassador of the United States in
Chile, W. Miller Collier, to the U.S.
Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg,
20 February 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United
States, Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1926, Volume I, pp. 306 –
308
93
243. Telegram 723.2515/2118 from the
U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B.
Kellogg, to the Ambassador of the
United States in Chile, W. Miller
Collier, 10 April 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United
States, Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1926, Volume I, pp. 374 –
375
97
244. Telegram 723.2515/2124 from the
U.S. Ambassador in Chile, W. Miller
Collier, to the U.S. Secretary of
State, Frank B. Kellogg, 11 April
Department of State of the United
States, Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1926, Volume I, pp. 376 –
101
195
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
1926
(Original in English)
377
245. Telegram 723.2515/2143a from the
U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B.
Kellogg, to the U.S. Consul at Arica,
Von Tresckow, 15 April 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United
States, Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1926, Volume I, pp. 384 –
385
105
246. Letter from the President of Bolivia,
Hernando Siles, to the President of
the United States, Calvin Coolidge,
19 April 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United
States, Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1926, Volume I, p. 396 109
247. Minutes of the Meeting of the
Plenipotentiaries of Peru and Chile,
Under the Extension of Good Offices
of the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank
B. Kellogg, 4 June 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United
States, Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1926, Volume I, pp. 462 –
465
113
248. Telegram 723.2515/2415 from the
U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B.
Kellogg, to the Ambassador of the
United States in Chile, W. Miller
Collier, 9 June 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United
States, Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1926, Volume I, pp. 475 –
476 119
249. Note from the Minister
Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Peru,
Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Enrique Baldivieso, Nº 169,
11 June 1936
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
123
196
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
250. Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Boundaries between Bolivia and
Paraguay, signed at Buenos Aires on
21 July 1938 (Ratifications
exchanged on 29 August 1938)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
www.latinamericanstudies.org/parag
uay/chaco-treaty.pdf
131
251. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº 280,
7 May 1943
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
135
252. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº 369,
11 June 1943
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
145
253. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº 386,
18 June 1943
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
149
254. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº 403,
25 June 1943
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
157
197
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
255. Memorandum of the Bolivian
Ambassador to the United States,
Luis Fernando Guachalla, submitted
to the U.S. Secretary of State,
Cordell Hull, 15 September 1943
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
163
256. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Adolfo Costa Du Rels, Nº
455/325, 2 June 1948
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 61
to its Memorial)
167
257. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Adolfo Costa du Rels, Nº
515/375, 28 June 1948
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 62
to its Memorial) 179
258. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Adolfo Costa du Rels, Nº
598/424, 15 July 1948
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
199
259. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Adolfo Costa du Rels, Nº
648/460, 28 July 1948
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 63
to its Memorial) 209
198
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
260. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº
457/310, 25 May 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
217
261. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº
470/322, 27 May 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
227
262. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº
510/349, 10 June 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
233
263. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº
544/371, 17 June 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
251
264. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº
550/374, 20 June 1950
(Original in English, Spanish
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
263
199
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
265. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, Horacio Walker Larraín, Nº
529/21, 1st June 1950
(Original in English, Spanish
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex
109A to its Memorial)
269
266. Note from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Chile, Horacio Walker
Larraín, to the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, Nº
9, 20 June 1950
(Original in English, Spanish
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex
109B to its Memorial) 277
267. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº
559/381, 20 June 1950
(Original in English, Spanish
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
285
268. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº
646/433, 13 July 1950
(Original in English, Spanish
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
293
269. “Gonzalez Videla declares: All that
has been agreed is to initiate
conversations with Bolivia, Arica
will always remain free”, VEA
(Chile), 19 July 1950
(Original in English, Spanish
translation)
VEA Magazine (Chile)
297
270. “The Foreign Minister Asserts:
'Chile is willing to study the Bolivian
Longing on basis of reciprocal
VEA Magazine (Chile)
307
200
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
compensations'”, VEA (Chile), 19
July 1950
(Original in English, Spanish
translation)
271. Statements made to the press by the
Ambassador of Bolivia to Santiago,
Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, 30 August
1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Newsletter of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, No 21 (July –
December 1950), pp. 14-20 315
272. Note from the British Embassy in La
Paz to the American Department of
the Foreign Office, 1 September
1950
(Original in English, English
transcription)
Archives of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland 331
273. Note from the Chargé d’Affaires of
Bolivia to Chile, Jorge de la Barra, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº
832/505, 4 September 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
335
274. “Chancellor maintains statements
made with regard to Bolivia”, La
Nacion (Chile), 5 September 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
La Nacion Newspaper (Chile)
351
275. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, Nº
844/513, 9 September 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
355
276. “Let us not divide ourselves by
political parties in resolving our
foreign affairs”, El Imparcial
El Imparcial Newspaper (Chile)
361
201
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
(Chile), 13 September 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
277. “Ambassador Ostria spoke of the
Chilean-Bolivian port problem in La
Paz”, El Diario Ilustrado (Chile), 6
January 1951
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
El Diario Ilustrado Newspaper
(Chile)
407
VOLUME 3
ANNEXES 278 – 313
278. Statement by the President of Chile,
H. E. Mr. Gabriel Gonzalez Videla,
regarding the port negotiations, 29
March 1951
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Newsletter of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Nº 22 (January-June
1951), pp. 18 – 24
411
279. Communiqué of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia regarding
the statement made by the President
of Chile, 30 March 1951
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Newsletter of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Nº 22 (January-June
1951), pp. 24 – 25
427
280. Report by the Chilean President, H.
E. Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, to the
National Congress inaugurating the
Regular Period of Sessions, 21 May
1951, p. 56 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
433
281. A. Ostria Gutierrez, A Work and a
Destiny, Bolivia's International
Policy after the Chaco War (1953),
pp. 65 – 67 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
437
202
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
translation)
282. Report entitled “Declaration
regarding the port issue” from the
Special Envoy of Bolivia to Chile,
Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui, to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arze, 31
December 1953
(Original in Spanish, Spanish
transcription, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
445
283. UN Doc A/CONF.13/29/Add.1, 3
March 1958 (extract)
(Original in English)
United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, Official Records,
Volume I, Preparatory Documents,
24 February – 27 April 1958, pp. 328
– 330
http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconfere
nces/lawofthesea-
1958/vol/english/PrepDocs_vol_I_e.
pdf
503
284. Memorandum from the Chilean
Embassy in La Paz to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 10 July
1961
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 24
to its Memorial)
507
285. Memorandum from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the
Chilean Embassy in La Paz, Nº G.M.
9-62/127, 9 February 1962
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 25
to its Memorial)
511
286. Note from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Jose Fellman
Velarde, to the President of the OAS
Permanent Council, Gonzalo Facio,
17 February 1963
(Original in Spanish, English
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
515
203
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
translation)
287. Speech of the Foreign Minister of
Bolivia, Jose Fellman Velarde, in
response to the statements made by
the Foreign Minister of Chile, Carlos
Martinez Sotomayor, 3 April 1963
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Press Office of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Towards
the Sea - Transcendental Documents
(1963), pp. 45 – 76
(Submitted by Chile as Annex 165 to
its Counter-Memorial)
521
288. Press Office of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Towards
the Sea - Transcendental Documents
(1963), pp. 7 – 8 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
587
289. “Bolivia firmly maintains its
decision not to resume relations with
Chile”, El Diario (Bolivia), 15 June
1963
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
El Diario Newspaper (Bolivia)
593
290. Message from the President of the
Republic of Bolivia, Dr. Victor Paz
Estenssoro, to the Honorable
National Congress, 6 August 1963,
p. 101 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
National Information Office of the
Presidency of Bolivia
597
291. Letter from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Jose Fellman
Velarde, to former Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile, Conrado
Rios Gallardo, 25 September 1963
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
C. Rios Gallardo, An Informal
Chilean-Bolivian Contact (1966), pp.
46 – 48
601
204
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
292. Letter from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Jose Fellman
Velarde, to former Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile, Conrado
Rios Gallardo, 13 January 1964
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
C. Rios Gallardo, An informal
Chilean-Bolivian Contact (1966), pp.
66 – 72
609
293. C. Rios Gallardo, An informal
Chilean-Bolivian Contact (1966), pp.
35 – 39 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
625
294. A. Alessandri Palma, Memoirs of my
Government, Volume I, (1967), pp.
76 – 77 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
637
295. E. J. Holland, A Historical Study of
Bolivia´s Foreign Relations 1935-
1946 (1967), pp. 228 – 232 (extract)
(Original in English)
643
296. Report from the Consul General of
Bolivia in Chile, Franz Rück
Uriburu, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Emilio Molina
Pizarro, 19 November 1970
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
649
297. Meeting held between the Foreign
Ministers of Bolivia and Chile in San
Jose, Costa Rica, drafted by the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia Fernando Laredo, 14 April
1971
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
663
298. Draft of the Joint Declaration Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 671
205
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
submitted by the Consul General of
Bolivia to Chile, Franz Rück
Uriburu, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Chile, 13 August 1971
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Affairs of Bolivia
299. G. Gonzalez Videla, Memoirs
(1975), pp. 892 – 907 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
677
300. “Chile is determined to face the
landlocked condition problem with
frankness”, Ultima Hora (Bolivia), 1
March 1975
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Ultima Hora Newspaper (Bolivia)
709
301. “Bolivia and Chile work together to
solve the landlocked condition
problem”, Hoy (Bolivia), 4 March
1975
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Hoy Newspaper (Bolivia)
713
302. “Bolivia and Chile will try to
materialize ‘the spirit of Charaña’,
said Gutierrez”, Hoy (Bolivia), 9
April 1975
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Hoy Newspaper (Bolivia)
717
303. Verbatim Record of the 2379th
Plenary Meeting, 30th Session of the
United Nations General Assembly,
UN Doc A/PV.2379, 8 October 1975
(extract)
(Original in English)
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view
_doc.asp?symbol=A/PV.2379
721
304. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Guillermo Gutierrez Vea
Murguia, to the Minister of Foreign
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia 729
206
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia,
Alberto Guzman Soriano, Nº
625/244/75, 18 November 1975
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
305. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Guillermo Gutierrez Vea
Murguia, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia,
Alberto Guzman Soriano, Nº
674/259/75, 9 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
733
306. “Basic documents that substantiate
the Bolivian-Chilean agreement in
regard to the maritime issue”, El
Diario (Bolivia), 6 January 1976
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
L. F. Guachalla, Bolivia-Chile: The
Maritime negotiation 1975-1978
(1982), pp. 92 – 95
745
307. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Guillermo Gutierrez Vea
Murguia, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia,
Alberto Guzman Soriano, Nº
130/85/76, 19 February 1976
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
755
308. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Guillermo Gutierrez Vea
Murguia, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia
Alberto Guzman Soriano, Nº
204/136/76, 19 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
765
309. Clarification of the Bolivian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 19 April 1976
L. F. Guachalla, Bolivia-Chile: The
Maritime Negotiation, 1975-1978
773
207
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
(1982), pp. 96 – 97
310. Note from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Bolivia,
Oscar Adriazola Valda, to the
Bolivian Ambassador to Chile,
Adalberto Violand,
3 May 1976
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
779
311. Verbatim Record of the 18th Plenary
Meeting, 31st Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, UN Doc
A/31/PV. 18, 5 October 1976
(extract)
(Original in English)
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_d
oc.asp?symbol=A/31/PV.18
789
312. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Adalberto Violand, to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Worship of Bolivia, Oscar Adriazola,
Nº 1093/481/76, 7 December 1976
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
797
313. R. Diaz Albonico, M. T. Infante
Caffi and F. Orrego Vicuña, Les
négociations entre le Chili et la
Bolivie relatives à un accès
souverain à la mer (1977)
(Original in French)
Annuaire Français de Droit
International, volume 23, 1977, pp.
343 – 356
http://www.persse.fr/doc/afdi_0066-
3085_1977_num_23_1_2043 807
VOLUME 4
ANNEXES 314 – 344
314. Note from the Bolivian Ambassador
to Chile, Adalberto Violand, to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Oscar Adriazola, Nº
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
823
208
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
281/140/77, 7 April 1977
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
315. Joint Declaration by the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Peru,
7 June 1977
(extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
833
316. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
History of the Chilean-Bolivian
Negotiations 1975-1978, [1978], pp.
5 – 9 (extract)
(Original in English)
847
317. Address by the President of Bolivia,
Hugo Banzer, 23 March 1978
(extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
General Secretariat of Information of
the Presidency of the Republic of
Bolivia, The Outlet to the Sea: An
Imperative Need (1978), pp. 30 – 36 853
318. Public explanation made by the
President of Bolivia, Hugo Banzer,
in regard to the rupture of diplomatic
relations with Chile, 30 March 1978
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
General Secretariat of Information of
the Presidency of the Republic of
Bolivia, The Outlet to the Sea: An
Imperative Need (1978), p. 37 – 49
869
319. Minutes of the 6th Plenary Meeting,
9th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, 24 October 1979
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Organization of American States,
General Assembly, 9th Regular
Session, 1979, Vol. II,
OEA/Ser.P/IX.O.2 (1980)
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 202
to its Memorial)
897
320. “Reserved Report on Port
Negotiations with Allende”, Hoy
(Bolivia), 3 December 1983
Hoy Newspaper (Bolivia)
933
209
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
321. “Orfila praises Colombia´s initiative
in regard to Bolivia’s landlocked
condition”, Ultima Hora (Bolivia),
21 November 1983
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Ultima Hora Newspaper (Bolivia)
949
322. Letter from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Chile, Miguel Alex
Schweitzer, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Colombia,
Rodrigo Lloreda, 15 December 1983
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
U. Figueroa Pla, The Bolivian
Maritime Claim before International
Fora (2007), pp. 502 – 503
953
323. J. Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins,
Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-
82 (1984), pp. 10 – 13 (extract)
(Original in English)
959
324. Note from the Permanent
Representative of Bolivia to the
United Nations, Jorge Gumucio
Granier, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Jose Ortiz
Mercado, MRB 58/84, 16 February
1984
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
967
325. Aide Memoire “Meeting held with
Chancellor Jaime del Valle”, 26
April 1984
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
999
326. Report from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia concerning the
Bolivian-Chilean negotiations
between 1983 and 1984, 9 November
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1009
210
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
1984
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
327. H. Muñoz, The Foreign Relations of
the Chilean Military Government
(1986), pp. 142 – 143 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1021
328. “Guillermo Bedregal – Conciliatory
attitude with Chile does not mean
renouncing the sea”, Presencia
(Bolivia), 25 February 1986
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Presencia Newspaper (Bolivia)
1027
329. Note from the Consul General of
Bolivia to Chile, Jorge Siles Salinas,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Valentin Abecia, CGB Nº
190-066/86, 30 April 1986
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1031
330. Note from the Consul General of
Bolivia in Chile, Jorge Siles Salinas,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Guillermo Bedregal, CGB
Nº 279-115/86, 13 June 1986
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1047
331. Note from the Consul General of
Bolivia in Chile, Jorge Siles Salinas,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, Guillermo Bedregal, CGB
Nº 586-240/86, 2 November 1986
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1053
211
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
332. Communiqué of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
Guillermo Bedregal, 13 November
1986
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Press and Information Direction of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Worship of Bolivia, Informative
Newsletter, Nº 032, 15 – 30
November 1986, pp. 23 – 24
1061
333. Communiqué of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile, Jaime del
Valle, 13 November 1986
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Press and Information Direction of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Worship of Bolivia, Informative
Newsletter, Nº 032, 15 – 30
November 1986, p. 24
1067
334. Note from the Permanent
Representative of Bolivia to the
United Nations, Jorge Gumucio
Granier, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Guillermo
Bedregal, 20 November 1986
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1071
335. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Bolivia, Tricolor.
History and Projections of Peace,
Development and Integration of the
Bolivian – Chilean Maritime Dispute
(1988), pp. 49 – 54, 192 – 194
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1079
336. Minutes of the 2nd Meeting, 22nd
Regular Session of the OAS General
Assembly, 19 May 1992
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Organization of American States,
General Assembly, 22nd Regular
Session, 1992, Vol. II,
OEA/Ser.P/XXII.O.2 (1993)
1099
337. J. Gumucio Granier, The Landlocked
Condition of Bolivia in the World
Fora (1993), pp. 94 – 95 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1125
212
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
338. Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the
General Commission, 23rd Regular
Session of the OAS General
Assembly, 9 June 1993
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Organization of American States,
General Assembly, 23rd Regular
Session, 1993, Vol. II,
OEA/Ser.P/XXIII.O.93 (1994), 1131
339. “Chile is willing to solve pending
problems with Bolivia”, La Razon
(Bolivia), 20 July 1993
(Original in Spanish, transcription in
Spanish, English translation)
La Razon Newspaper (Bolivia)
1157
340. P. Carvajal Prado, Charaña – An
Agreement between Chile and
Bolivia and the third party at odds
(1994), p. 27 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1163
341. Joint notes issued by Enrique Correa
and Horst Grebe, 28 May 1996
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1167
342. A. Ostria Gutierrez, Notes on Port
Negotiations with Chile (1998), pp.
4, 55 – 56, 201 – 202 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1173
343. Verbatim Record of the 21st Plenary
Meeting, 50th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, UN Doc
A/53/PV.21, 30 September 1998
(Original in English)
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view
_doc.asp?symbol=A/53/PV.21
1185
344. J. Escobari Cusicanqui, Diplomatic
History of Bolivia, Vol. II, (1999), p.
174 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1191
213
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
VOLUME 5
ANNEXES 345 – 373
345. Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting,
29th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, 8 June 1999
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Organization of American States,
General Assembly, 29th Regular
Session, 1999, Various Documents,
Vol. II, OEA/Ser.P/XXIX-O.2
(1999)
1195
346. Verbatim Record of the 20th Plenary
Meeting, 54th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, UN Doc
A/54/PV.20, 1 October 1999
(Original in English)
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view
_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/PV.20
1221
347. R. Orias Arredondo, The
International Law and the Maritime
Negotiations with Chile
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
UDAPEX, Bolivia. Issues of the
International Agenda (2000), pp.
378-379 (extract)
1227
348. Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting,
30th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, 6 June 2000
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Organization of American States,
General Assembly, 30th Regular
Session, 2000, Vol. II, OEA/ Ser.
P/XXX.-O.2 (2000)
1233
349. Verbatim Record of the 25th Plenary
Meeting, 55th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, UN Doc
A/55/PV.25 20 September 2000,
(extract)
(Original in English)
https://documents-ddsny.
un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/65
0/23/PDF/N0065023.pdf?OpenElem
ent 1245
350. O. Pinochet de la Barra, Summary of
the War of the Pacific – Gonzalo
Bulnes (2001), p. 222 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1251
214
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
351. C. Bustos, Chile and Bolivia. A long
road from Independence to
Monterrey (2004), pp. 295 – 296
(extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1255
352. O. Pinochet de la Barra, Chile and
Bolivia: How much longer! (2004),
pp. 38 – 40, 72 – 73, 95 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1261
353. L. Maira and J. Murillo de La Rocha,
The long-standing conflict between
Chile and Bolivia. Two Perspectives,
(2004), pp. 138 – 139, 151 – 152
(extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1275
354. A. Violand Alcazar, Sovereign
Return to the Sea. A Frustrated
Negotiation, (2004), p. 286 – 287
(extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1285
355. Minutes of the I Meeting of the
Bolivia-Chile Working Group on
Bilateral Affairs, 9 August 2005
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 116
to its Memorial)
1291
356. Minutes of the XIV Meeting of the
Political Consultations Mechanism, 6
October 2005
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 117
to its Memorial)
1319
215
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
357. “President clarifies that she did not
address the maritime issue with Evo
Morales”, La Nacion (Chile), 14
March 2006
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
La Nacion Newspaper (Chile)
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/
presidenta-aclaro-que-con-evomorales-
no-trato-cuestionmaritima/
2006-03-13/213313.html
1343
358. Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting,
36th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, 6 June 2006
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Organization of American States,
General Assembly, 36th Regular
Session, 2006, Vol. II,
OEA/Ser.P/XXXVI-O.2 (2006)
1347
359. Minutes of the III Meeting of the
Chile-Bolivia Working Group on
Bilateral Affairs, 31 October 2006
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1355
360. U. Figueroa Pla, The Bolivian
Maritime Claim before International
Fora (2007), pp. 95 – 99, 208 – 215,
221 – 222, (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1381
361. Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting,
37th Regular Session of the OAS
General Assembly, 5 June 2007
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Organization of American States,
General Assembly, 37th Regular
Session, 2007, Vol. II,
OEA/Ser.P/XXXVII-O.2 (2007) 1413
362. Content of the talks held between the
Delegations of Chile and Bolivia
regarding point 6 of the Agenda of
the 13 Points: The Maritime Issue
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1431
363. “The Bolivian enclave that was
frustrated by Piñera”, La Tercera
(Chile), 5 December 2010
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
La Tercera Newspaper (Chile)
1455
216
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
364. “Moreno and the enclave:
‘Alternatives that divide the country
are not beneficial’”, La Tercera
(Chile), 6 December 2010
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
La Tercera Newspaper (Chile)
1483
365. J. M. Concha, Chilean Initiatives
Towards a Strategic Alliance with
Bolivia (1879-1899) (2011), pp. 68 –
70 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1487
366. R. Prudencio Lizon, History of the
Charaña Negotiation, (2011), pp.
143 – 144, 192, 345 – 347 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
1495
367. “Silva Cimma discloses information
regarding Aylwin, Pinochet and
bordering issues”, El Mercurio
(Chile), 21 July 2012
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
El Mercurio Newspaper (Chile)
http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/i
ndex.asp?id={75697542-b6cd-49aa-
8fff-74ccbf42616e}
1509
368. Debate between Presidents Morales
and Piñera, CELAC 2013, 28
January 2013
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
El Dia Newspaper (Bolivia)
1515
369. “The unknown offer from Piñera to
Bolivia”, La Tercera (Chile), 11
January 2015
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
La Tercera Newspaper (Chile)
1521
217
ANNEX
Nº TITLE SOURCE
PAGE
Nº
370. Note from The Ambassador of Peru
to The Kingdom of The Netherlands,
Carlos Herrera, to the Registrar of
the International Court of Justice,
Philippe Couvreur, 26 July 2016
(Original in English)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1525
371. Address by the President of the
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Evo
Morales Ayma, to the 33rd Period of
Sessions of the United Nations
Human Rights Council
Geneva, 23 September 2016
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1533
372. Note from the Permanent Mission of
the Plurinational State of Bolivia
before the United Nations and other
International Organizations, to the
Presidency of the Human Rights
Council, Nº MBNU-370/41, 10
October 2016
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia
1553
373. Historical Clarifications Concerning
the Origin of the Dispute Between
Bolivia and Chile
(Original in English)
1559
218
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the 373 annexes filed with this Reply are true copies of the documents
reproduced and that the translations provided are accurate.
Eduardo RODRÍGUEZ VELTZÉ
Agent of the Plurinational State of Bolivia