Declaration of Judge Bhandari

Document Number
154-20160317-JUD-01-06-EN
Parent Document Number
154-20160317-JUD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

204
108
DECLARATION OF JUDGE BHANDARI
1. In the present case, I have joined Vice‑President Yusuf, as well as
Judges Cançado Trindade, Xue, Gaja and Robinson in issuing a joint dissenting
opinion that concludes the Court ought to have allowed Colombia’s
third preliminary objection in the instant case, in so far as Nicaragua’s
continental shelf claim is clearly barred by res judicata. The rationales
underpinning that conclusion are fully canvassed in that joint dissenting
opinion and therefore I shall not reference them herein.
2. However, I also wish to take the present opportunity to provide
some brief comments with respect to Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection,
namely, that Nicaragua’s failure to obtain a binding recommendation
from the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS”)
prior to seeking relief before this Court in the present matter renders
Nicaragua’s claim inadmissible. While this conclusion may be somewhat
moot in view of the position I have taken with my fellow dissenting colleagues
regarding the doctrine of res judicata, I nevertheless feel compelled
to explain why, in my view, Nicaragua’s case should not proceed
to the merits phase without receiving the recommendations of the
Commission
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS).
3. Paragraph 8 of Article 76 of UNCLOS states :
“Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II
on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission
shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related
to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The
limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these
recommendations shall be final and binding.” (Emphasis added.)
4. Moreover, in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.
Colombia) case, at paragraph 126 of the Judgment rendered 19 November
2012, this Court stated in relevant part as follows :
“In the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Hondu-
205 delimitation of the continental shelf (decl. bhandari)
109
ras), the Court stated that ‘any claim of continental shelf rights
beyond 200 miles [by a State party to UNCLOS] must be in accordance
with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the [CLCS] established
thereunder’ (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 759, para. 319). The
Court recalls that UNCLOS, according to its Preamble, is intended
to establish ‘a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate
international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of
the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their
resources’. . . Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated
in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia is not a party thereto does not
relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76 of that Convention.”
(I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 668‑669, emphasis added.)
Nicaragua’s Case Should not Proceed Mainly
for the Following Reasons
5. First, as I understand the present state of affairs, there is no proof on
record in these proceedings that Nicaragua has in fact furnished complete
and sufficient information and documentation to the CLCS to issue its
recommendation. Thus, the possibility remains that at a future time the
CLCS could request Nicaragua to supply additional or complementary
evidence in support of its claim. Were this to be the case, the entire premise
of the majority’s conclusion that Nicaragua has now fully and faithfully
complied with its obligations for receiving a CLCS recommendation
would fail.
6. Second, even if I were to accept, arguendo, that the information supplied
by Nicaragua to the CLCS is suitable for that Commission to eventually
issue a recommendation, it is a plain and uncontested fact that the
CLCS has not, as of yet, issued any such recommendation and we as a
Court are not in a position to speculate as to when it might be in a position
to do so.
7. Third, I would recall that the CLCS is a United Nations body that
is specifically tasked with making binding recommendations on the very
issue that has been put before us. Therefore, as a matter of principle and
in keeping with my staunch belief in the need for interinstitutional comity
between United Nations institutions, I believe it would be imprudent and
disrespectful toward the CLCS to proceed toward the merits phase of
Nicaragua’s continental shelf claim without its recommendation.
8. Fourth, it is to be recalled that the CLCS is a specialized agency with
a specific mandate to investigate and pronounce upon continental shelf
206 delimitation of the continental shelf (decl. bhandari)
110
claims. The Commission consists of 21 members who are world‑renowned
experts in such relevant fields as geology, geophysics and hydrology. By
contrast, the judges of this Court can lay claim to no such expertise, and
consequently the Court would necessarily have to rely on the testimony of
expert witnesses in order to resolve Nicaragua’s continental shelf claim at
the merits phase of these proceedings. Not only would this constitute a
regrettably inefficient use of valuable Court resources, but the nature of
the adversarial process dictates that the Parties would bring witnesses
most likely to advance their respective and competing claims, whose opinions
could very well be at odds with those of the expert members of the
CLCS. This, in turn, could potentially lead to the uneasy situation
wherein the CLCS and the Court reach incompatible conclusions regarding
Nicaragua’s continental shelf claim. Thus, from a practical standpoint,
I am of the opinion that to allow Nicaragua’s claim to proceed to the
merits under these circumstances would be highly imprudent.
9. Fifth, recalling the dictum contained at paragraph 126 of the 2012
Nicaragua v. Colombia Judgment that “any claim of continental shelf
rights beyond 200 miles . . . must be in accordance with Article 76 of
UNCLOS and reviewed by the [CLCS] thereunder” (emphasis added), it
is my considered opinion that for a claim to be “reviewed” by the CLCS
under Article 76 of UNCLOS in the manner intended by this Court in
that Judgment, the Commission must have issued its binding opinion. To
conclude otherwise would allow for a rather loose reading of the requirement
that claims be “reviewed” by the CLCS whereunder a party could
satisfy this criterion by merely completing the perfunctory act of submitting
certain paperwork to the CLCS before filing an application before
this Court. In my respectful view, such a superficial standard would
deprive the 2012 precedent that claims be “reviewed” by the CLCS of its
intended meaning and violate the spirit of this process as intended by
Article 76 (8) of UNCLOS.
10. Sixth, it is to be recalled that Nicaragua is signatory of the Convention
on the Law of the Sea, and thus bound by Article 76 (8) of that
treaty.
11. Seventh, it is to be recalled that under Article 60 of the Statute of
the ICJ, “[t]he judgment [of the Court] is final and without appeal. In the
event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court
shall construe it upon the request of any party.” Moreover, Article 61 (1)
of the Statute of the ICJ states that
“[a]n application for revision of a judgment may be made only when
it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be
a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given,
207 delimitation of the continental shelf (decl. bhandari)
111
unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always
provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence”.
Also, Article 61 (4) imposes the further procedural requirement that “[t]he
application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the
discovery of the new fact”. By attempting to relitigate the same claim
regarding its continental shelf entitlement that was denied by this Court
in the 2012 Judgment, Nicaragua is attempting to conduct a de facto
appeal or revision of that Judgment, contrary to the express terms of
Articles 60 and 61 of the Statute of the ICJ, which are intended to ensure
that judgments of this Court are binding and not susceptible to disruption
by being constantly reopened. I regret that the majority’s decision to
allow Nicaragua to attempt a de facto appeal or revision of the Court’s
2012 Judgment threatens the credibility of the World Court and hence
diminishes the sanctity and respect that will be afforded to its judgments
in the years to come. Once a court with competent jurisdiction, such as
the ICJ, decides a contentious matter, the principle of res judicata requires,
as a matter of public policy, that the proceedings must be deemed to be
finally resolved between the parties.
12. Eighth, allowing Nicaragua to approach this Court without a binding
recommendation from the CLCS would render that Commission
superfluous and without any true authority. Thus Nicaragua should be
required to wait for the outcome that is pending before the CLCS before
seising the Court. Only after receiving such an outcome should Nicaragua
be allowed to approach this Court in search of the relief it seeks.
13. In sum, I see no good reason to allow Nicaragua to circumvent the
review process of the CLCS that it is bound to comply with under
UNCLOS. Setting aside momentarily my strong opposition to the majority’s
reasoning on the issue of res judicata as it pertains to Colombia’s
third preliminary objection, Nicaragua’s claim should in any event be
deemed inadmissible for failure to adhere to its treaty obligations and I
would consequently find that Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection
ought to be upheld.
(Signed) Dalveer Bhandari.

Bilingual Content

204
108
DECLARATION OF JUDGE BHANDARI
1. In the present case, I have joined Vice‑President Yusuf, as well as
Judges Cançado Trindade, Xue, Gaja and Robinson in issuing a joint dissenting
opinion that concludes the Court ought to have allowed Colombia’s
third preliminary objection in the instant case, in so far as Nicaragua’s
continental shelf claim is clearly barred by res judicata. The rationales
underpinning that conclusion are fully canvassed in that joint dissenting
opinion and therefore I shall not reference them herein.
2. However, I also wish to take the present opportunity to provide
some brief comments with respect to Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection,
namely, that Nicaragua’s failure to obtain a binding recommendation
from the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS”)
prior to seeking relief before this Court in the present matter renders
Nicaragua’s claim inadmissible. While this conclusion may be somewhat
moot in view of the position I have taken with my fellow dissenting colleagues
regarding the doctrine of res judicata, I nevertheless feel compelled
to explain why, in my view, Nicaragua’s case should not proceed
to the merits phase without receiving the recommendations of the
Commission
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS).
3. Paragraph 8 of Article 76 of UNCLOS states :
“Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II
on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission
shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related
to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The
limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these
recommendations shall be final and binding.” (Emphasis added.)
4. Moreover, in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.
Colombia) case, at paragraph 126 of the Judgment rendered 19 November
2012, this Court stated in relevant part as follows :
“In the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Hondu-
204
108
DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE BHANDARI
[Traduction]
1. En l’espèce, je me suis associé au vice‑président Yusuf, ainsi qu’aux
juges Cançado Trindade, Xue, Gaja et Robinson, pour joindre à l’arrêt
une opinion dissidente commune, dans laquelle nous concluons que la
Cour aurait dû retenir la troisième exception préliminaire soulevée par la
Colombie, dans la mesure où la demande du Nicaragua relative au plateau
continental tombe clairement sous le coup de la chose jugée. Les
raisons qui fondent cette conclusion sont pleinement exposées dans ladite
opinion et je m’abstiendrai donc de les répéter ici.
2. Je voudrais cependant saisir la présente occasion pour formuler
aussi quelques brèves observations concernant la cinquième exception préliminaire
soulevée par la Colombie, selon laquelle la requête est irrecevable
parce que le Nicaragua n’a pas obtenu la recommandation requise
de la Commission des limites du plateau continental (ci‑après la « Commission
») avant d’en saisir la Cour. Même si l’exercice pourra paraître
quelque peu futile compte tenu de la position exprimée par mes collègues
et moi‑même dans notre opinion dissidente commune à propos du principe
de l’autorité de la chose jugée, il me semble nécessaire d’expliquer
pourquoi la Cour ne devrait pas, selon moi, connaître du fond de l’affaire
en l’absence des recommandations de la Commission visées par la convention
des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (ci‑après la « CNUDM »).
3. Le paragraphe 8 de l’article 76 de la CNUDM est libellé comme
suit :
« L’Etat côtier communique des informations sur les limites de
son plateau continental, lorsque celui‑ci s’étend au‑delà de
200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la
largeur de la mer territoriale, à la Commission des limites du plateau
continental constituée en vertu de l’annexe II sur la base d’une représentation
géographique équitable. La Commission adresse aux Etats
côtiers des recommandations sur les questions concernant la fixation
des limites extérieures de leur plateau continental. Les limites fixées
par un Etat côtier sur la base de ces recommandations sont définitives
et de caractère obligatoire. » (Les italiques sont de moi.)
4. Par ailleurs, au paragraphe 126 de l’arrêt rendu le 19 novembre 2012
en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie),
se lit ceci :
« Dans l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua
et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Hondu-
205 delimitation of the continental shelf (decl. bhandari)
109
ras), the Court stated that ‘any claim of continental shelf rights
beyond 200 miles [by a State party to UNCLOS] must be in accordance
with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the [CLCS] established
thereunder’ (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 759, para. 319). The
Court recalls that UNCLOS, according to its Preamble, is intended
to establish ‘a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate
international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of
the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their
resources’. . . Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated
in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia is not a party thereto does not
relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76 of that Convention.”
(I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 668‑669, emphasis added.)
Nicaragua’s Case Should not Proceed Mainly
for the Following Reasons
5. First, as I understand the present state of affairs, there is no proof on
record in these proceedings that Nicaragua has in fact furnished complete
and sufficient information and documentation to the CLCS to issue its
recommendation. Thus, the possibility remains that at a future time the
CLCS could request Nicaragua to supply additional or complementary
evidence in support of its claim. Were this to be the case, the entire premise
of the majority’s conclusion that Nicaragua has now fully and faithfully
complied with its obligations for receiving a CLCS recommendation
would fail.
6. Second, even if I were to accept, arguendo, that the information supplied
by Nicaragua to the CLCS is suitable for that Commission to eventually
issue a recommendation, it is a plain and uncontested fact that the
CLCS has not, as of yet, issued any such recommendation and we as a
Court are not in a position to speculate as to when it might be in a position
to do so.
7. Third, I would recall that the CLCS is a United Nations body that
is specifically tasked with making binding recommendations on the very
issue that has been put before us. Therefore, as a matter of principle and
in keeping with my staunch belief in the need for interinstitutional comity
between United Nations institutions, I believe it would be imprudent and
disrespectful toward the CLCS to proceed toward the merits phase of
Nicaragua’s continental shelf claim without its recommendation.
8. Fourth, it is to be recalled that the CLCS is a specialized agency with
a specific mandate to investigate and pronounce upon continental shelf
délimitation du plateau continental (décl. bandhari) 205
109
ras), la Cour a déclaré que « toute prétention [d’un Etat partie à la
CNUDM] relative à des droits sur le plateau continental au‑delà de
200 milles d[evait] être conforme à l’article 76 de la CNUDM et examinée
par la Commission des limites du plateau continental constituée
en vertu de ce traité » (C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 759, par. 319). La
Cour rappelle que, aux termes de son préambule, la CNUDM a pour
objet d’établir « un ordre juridique pour les mers et les océans qui
facilite les communications internationales et favorise les utilisations
pacifiques des mers et des océans [ainsi que] l’utilisation équitable et
efficace de leurs ressources »… Eu égard à l’objet et au but de la
CNUDM, tels qu’exposés dans son préambule, le fait que la Colombie
n’y soit pas partie n’exonère pas le Nicaragua des obligations qu’il
tient de l’article 76 de cet instrument. » (C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II),
p. 668‑669, les italiques sont de moi.)
La Cour ne devrait pas examiner au fond les moyens
du Nicaragua, et ce, essentiellement pour les raisons suivantes
5. Premièrement, sauf erreur de ma part, il n’est nullement avéré que le
Nicaragua ait effectivement fourni à la Commission des limites du plateau
continental les informations et la documentation complètes qui lui étaient
nécessaires pour pouvoir formuler sa recommandation. Il n’est donc pas
exclu que la Commission soit amenée à inviter le Nicaragua à étayer sa
demande à l’aide d’éléments additionnels ou complémentaires. La prémisse
même sur laquelle la majorité fonde sa conclusion, à savoir que le
Nicaragua se serait d’ores et déjà loyalement acquitté de l’ensemble des
obligations qu’il lui fallait honorer pour pouvoir obtenir une recommandation
de la Commission, se révélerait alors infondée.
6. Deuxièmement, quand bien même j’admettrais, pour les besoins de
l’argumentation, que les informations soumises par le Nicaragua à la
Commission sont de nature à lui permettre, à terme, de formuler une
recommandation, le fait est que la Commission n’a encore jamais émis de
recommandations de ce type et que nous ne sommes pas en mesure de
prédire quand elle pourra être à même de le faire.
7. Troisièmement, je rappellerai que la Commission des limites du plateau
continental est un organisme des Nations Unies qui a précisément
pour mission de formuler des recommandations de caractère obligatoire
sur la question même qui nous a été posée. Dès lors, par principe, et
en accord avec la ferme conviction qui est la mienne que les organes
des Nations Unies se doivent une courtoisie mutuelle, je considère
que ce serait manquer de prudence et de déférence envers la Commission
que de procéder, en l’absence de toute recommandation de sa part,
à l’examen au fond de la demande du Nicaragua relative au plateau
continental.
8. Quatrièmement, la Commission des limites du plateau continental
est une institution spécialisée dont le mandat exprès est de réaliser des
206 delimitation of the continental shelf (decl. bhandari)
110
claims. The Commission consists of 21 members who are world‑renowned
experts in such relevant fields as geology, geophysics and hydrology. By
contrast, the judges of this Court can lay claim to no such expertise, and
consequently the Court would necessarily have to rely on the testimony of
expert witnesses in order to resolve Nicaragua’s continental shelf claim at
the merits phase of these proceedings. Not only would this constitute a
regrettably inefficient use of valuable Court resources, but the nature of
the adversarial process dictates that the Parties would bring witnesses
most likely to advance their respective and competing claims, whose opinions
could very well be at odds with those of the expert members of the
CLCS. This, in turn, could potentially lead to the uneasy situation
wherein the CLCS and the Court reach incompatible conclusions regarding
Nicaragua’s continental shelf claim. Thus, from a practical standpoint,
I am of the opinion that to allow Nicaragua’s claim to proceed to the
merits under these circumstances would be highly imprudent.
9. Fifth, recalling the dictum contained at paragraph 126 of the 2012
Nicaragua v. Colombia Judgment that “any claim of continental shelf
rights beyond 200 miles . . . must be in accordance with Article 76 of
UNCLOS and reviewed by the [CLCS] thereunder” (emphasis added), it
is my considered opinion that for a claim to be “reviewed” by the CLCS
under Article 76 of UNCLOS in the manner intended by this Court in
that Judgment, the Commission must have issued its binding opinion. To
conclude otherwise would allow for a rather loose reading of the requirement
that claims be “reviewed” by the CLCS whereunder a party could
satisfy this criterion by merely completing the perfunctory act of submitting
certain paperwork to the CLCS before filing an application before
this Court. In my respectful view, such a superficial standard would
deprive the 2012 precedent that claims be “reviewed” by the CLCS of its
intended meaning and violate the spirit of this process as intended by
Article 76 (8) of UNCLOS.
10. Sixth, it is to be recalled that Nicaragua is signatory of the Convention
on the Law of the Sea, and thus bound by Article 76 (8) of that
treaty.
11. Seventh, it is to be recalled that under Article 60 of the Statute of
the ICJ, “[t]he judgment [of the Court] is final and without appeal. In the
event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court
shall construe it upon the request of any party.” Moreover, Article 61 (1)
of the Statute of the ICJ states that
“[a]n application for revision of a judgment may be made only when
it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be
a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given,
délimitation du plateau continental (décl. bandhari) 206
110
recherches et de se prononcer sur les demandes relatives au plateau continental.
Elle se compose de 21 membres qui sont des experts de renommée
mondiale dans les domaines concernés, tels que la géologie, la géophysique
ou l’hydrologie. Les juges composant la Cour ne peuvent, quant à
eux, prétendre à pareille expertise, et ils devront donc nécessairement
s’appuyer sur les dépositions de témoins‑experts pour se prononcer au
fond sur la demande du Nicaragua relative au plateau continental. Outre
qu’il y aurait dès lors à déplorer un gaspillage des précieuses ressources de
la Cour, la nature de la procédure contradictoire veut que les parties présentent
chacune les témoins qu’elles s’attendent à voir déposer dans leur
sens, et dont les avis peuvent donc fort bien être tout à fait différents de
ceux des experts de la Commission. La Commission et la Cour pourraient
ainsi parvenir à des conclusions incompatibles quant à la demande du
Nicaragua relative au plateau continental, situation qui serait pour le
moins inconfortable. J’estime donc, d’un point de vue pratique, aussi très
imprudent, dans de telles circonstances, de permettre l’examen au fond de
cette demande.
9. Cinquièmement, je rappellerai que la Cour a dit, au paragraphe 126
de son arrêt de 2012 en l’affaire Nicaragua c. Colombie, que « toute prétention
… relative à des droits sur le plateau continental au‑delà de
200 milles d[oit] être conforme à l’article 76 de la CNUDM et examinée
par la Commission des limites du plateau continental constituée en vertu de
ce traité » (les italiques sont de moi) ; or, d’après mon analyse, l’« examen
» d’une telle prétention prévu à l’article 76 de la CNUDM, au sens
où l’entendait la Cour dans cet arrêt, suppose que la Commission ait formulé
un avis de caractère obligatoire. Conclure autrement reviendrait à
souffrir une lecture pour le moins laxiste de cette exigence, en ce sens qu’il
suffirait à une partie, pour s’en acquitter, de soumettre pour la forme certains
documents à la Commission avant de saisir la Cour. Avec tout le
respect que je porte à la majorité, je suis d’avis qu’une obligation aussi
superficielle priverait du sens qui devait être le sien le précédent par lequel
la Cour, en 2012, a jugé que les demandes devaient être « examinées » par
la Commission des limites du plateau continental, et irait à l’encontre de
l’esprit dans lequel ce processus était conçu au paragraphe 8 de l’article 76
de la CNUDM.
10. Sixièmement, le Nicaragua a signé la convention sur le droit de
la mer et il est donc lié par le paragraphe 8 de l’article 76 de cet instrument.
11. Septièmement, en vertu de l’article 60 du Statut, « [l]’arrêt [de la
Cour] est définitif et sans recours. En cas de contestation sur le sens et la
portée de l’arrêt, il appartient à [celle‑ci] de l’interpréter, à la demande de
toute partie ». En outre, le paragraphe 1 de l’article 61 du Statut stipule que
« [l]a revision de l’arrêt ne peut être éventuellement demandée à la
Cour qu’en raison de la découverte d’un fait de nature à exercer une
influence décisive et qui, avant le prononcé de l’arrêt, était inconnu
207 delimitation of the continental shelf (decl. bhandari)
111
unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always
provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence”.
Also, Article 61 (4) imposes the further procedural requirement that “[t]he
application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the
discovery of the new fact”. By attempting to relitigate the same claim
regarding its continental shelf entitlement that was denied by this Court
in the 2012 Judgment, Nicaragua is attempting to conduct a de facto
appeal or revision of that Judgment, contrary to the express terms of
Articles 60 and 61 of the Statute of the ICJ, which are intended to ensure
that judgments of this Court are binding and not susceptible to disruption
by being constantly reopened. I regret that the majority’s decision to
allow Nicaragua to attempt a de facto appeal or revision of the Court’s
2012 Judgment threatens the credibility of the World Court and hence
diminishes the sanctity and respect that will be afforded to its judgments
in the years to come. Once a court with competent jurisdiction, such as
the ICJ, decides a contentious matter, the principle of res judicata requires,
as a matter of public policy, that the proceedings must be deemed to be
finally resolved between the parties.
12. Eighth, allowing Nicaragua to approach this Court without a binding
recommendation from the CLCS would render that Commission
superfluous and without any true authority. Thus Nicaragua should be
required to wait for the outcome that is pending before the CLCS before
seising the Court. Only after receiving such an outcome should Nicaragua
be allowed to approach this Court in search of the relief it seeks.
13. In sum, I see no good reason to allow Nicaragua to circumvent the
review process of the CLCS that it is bound to comply with under
UNCLOS. Setting aside momentarily my strong opposition to the majority’s
reasoning on the issue of res judicata as it pertains to Colombia’s
third preliminary objection, Nicaragua’s claim should in any event be
deemed inadmissible for failure to adhere to its treaty obligations and I
would consequently find that Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection
ought to be upheld.
(Signed) Dalveer Bhandari.
délimitation du plateau continental (décl. bandhari) 207
111
de la Cour et de la partie qui demande la revision, sans qu’il y ait, de
sa part, faute à l’ignorer ».
Par ailleurs, le paragraphe 4 de ce même article impose une autre condition
de nature procédurale, « [l]a demande en revision dev[ant] être formée
au plus tard dans le délai de six mois après la découverte du fait
nouveau ». En s’efforçant de la saisir derechef d’une demande relative à
son droit à un plateau continental que la Cour avait déjà rejetée dans son
arrêt de 2012, le Nicaragua tente de fait d’interjeter appel ou d’obtenir la
revision de celui‑ci. Or, pareille démarche va à l’encontre des termes
exprès des articles 60 et 61 du Statut, qui visent à garantir le caractère
obligatoire des arrêts de la Cour et à éviter leur remise en question par
une constante réouverture de la procédure. La décision de la majorité, qui
revient à autoriser cette démarche, met à mal la crédibilité de la Cour
mondiale ; l’intangibilité de ses arrêts et le respect qu’ils inspireront à
l’avenir s’en trouveront entamés, et je le déplore. Lorsqu’une question
contentieuse est tranchée par une juridiction compétente pour en
connaître, telle que la Cour internationale de Justice, le différend doit,
conformément au principe de l’autorité de la chose jugée, et dans l’intérêt
général, être tenu pour définitivement réglé entre les parties.
12. Huitièmement, permettre au Nicaragua d’ester devant la Cour sans
avoir obtenu la recommandation requise de la Commission des limites du
plateau continental reviendrait à priver celle‑ci de toute utilité et de tout
pouvoir véritable. Le Nicaragua devrait donc avoir l’obligation d’attendre
le résultat de sa démarche devant la Commission avant de saisir la Cour,
et ne devrait être autorisé à venir chercher devant celle‑ci le remède qu’il
sollicite qu’après avoir pris connaissance du sort qui lui aura été réservé.
13. En résumé, je ne vois aucune raison valable de laisser le Nicaragua
se soustraire à la procédure d’examen par la Commission à laquelle il est
tenu de se plier en vertu de la CNUDM. Indépendamment même de ma
vive opposition à l’égard du raisonnement suivi par la majorité sur la
question de l’autorité de la chose jugée, qui intéresse la troisième exception
préliminaire soulevée par la Colombie, j’estime que la demande du
Nicaragua devrait en tout état de cause être jugée irrecevable parce que
celui‑ci a manqué à ses obligations conventionnelles, et je conclurai en
conséquence que la cinquième exception préliminaire de la Colombie
devrait être retenue.
(Signé) Dalveer Bhandari.

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Declaration of Judge Bhandari

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