Annexes volume I

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO
CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND TO NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT

(Marshall IslavUnited Kingdom)

ANNEXES

TO

MEMORIAL
OF
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

Volume 1

16 March 2015 ANNEXl

ANNEX1- Hansard, HL Deb, 28 October 1996, vol. 575, col. 134,

http://hansard. millbanksystems. corn/]ords/1996/ oct/28/address-in-reply -to-her­
majestvs-most

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!hatm<eie"""!"''"'babeenocldŒlyby!làllms ilSln.>n;gefficienltl"'"l1lruJ><bieel>ld"""""' m
lh•la t«el>ln\ Trku~.aih~m &re.k·nofdmSovietUnloooodthacluail>l~ pn.-.Jlf.olnti<

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mrentioli'acddwtill """mgl><Scolonga-~il wl"apoae~ andŒltlllnltl><iprusse><iopom!ife_,,

!batriwillllnnlymtni!ll?utwillpml>abllyn<Iease. ANNEX2

ANNEX2- J.Rotblat, Science and Nuclear Weapons: Where Do We Go From Here?

(Ihe Blackaby Papers) (Abolition 2000 UK, No. 5 2004) p. 7,

http://www.abolition2000uk.org/Blackaby%205.pdf

The flawed doctrine of extended deterrence

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\.'V~ hny_>tht:t'l<' '".'rlbt;tg:i,~t. htdudiotudttl61-iii':i.

1 ANNEx3

ANNEx3-D. Blair, 'UN nuclear watchdog: Trident is hypocritical', Dai/y Telegraph,

20 February 2007
http:!lw>vw.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1543248/UN-nuclear-watchdog-call
s­

Trident-hypocritical.html

MahmalldAhmodmejadt.ho

L"'mlp."esü. blsni.t~i:! t:t~d
luommgliNdearllmlususpend

tit'.lcttth::hmetayi in~

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t:~activities:r

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fi\!>nè>>fnudŒr weap.,ruL

"Huwdo theyê"f'«thi~ysi oîmavt'!iundhave uotstu beSU;;i?uw ûoe1go !o

countrX andsay'y<mJiliok<epyouoblil!alnottlÙ.:\rdnuckat -puns\ wlwn

thehl~o'h>t:trnmkin{oopro~ü tuwardthc ubtigaûonfsordisarrt:aamenr!#

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p"'J'ô$éS,

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fuislo t!lkeplace,

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e•rtei)dscthatiitièWi!aportsrrtuneededinthtùn:rte'~.

Jtocontintra enrich·urnnium-JWOtesshlchcuuld"""'iàeemateriafinudear

homb ~in defi:mce<>fUrerolû!it>m.

Th~SecuritCo~m< hlilet a deadofntomarrolnrIronlobalt fuiswork,and Mr

E1Bamdé iduetomŒtA.iiLuija l&ir"c-.i'eifr::ti:'g.uor.1enn:udo:y; ANNEX4

ANNEX4- Statement by Hon. Mr. Phillip Muller, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republicof the Marshall Islands, UN High Leve! Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament

26 September 2013, ·
http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/nucleardisarmamenten.pdfH

\ p~rspe ulittv..èatù-ü.re \ù:-:-Xp;lùir-tr.\.lltl _~pi_rtJ.ii ou1PaSCilfl1~j.:O·i_n:wit_h
\ iiCii,dibürs.lnSll-rj~ütb.:ri_(-ù-c:1V~hapl~!~lcrneronsisterù with internatiôhiil
secufity;

Chair.

0b<>rt11aéollÇs\vipolicawill-and\\'eaffandwekon 1iateraprogreinthis regard,
indudinbetween tUnited SratesRussia. Weurgea!lnuclèar weapons intens ernst~·
to Uddr.css-thdr r.;-Spoi oving-tOwarddtèdivand sèCttfediSarlii:rii11è.1f

.ch_~-1~rs 1i:lk·h~o_uid,b~ -tf-r_üe:o-erth.U--e1ryttos'_oi_ür:dë~ptü:("'!)(l5~_
- th11nation anâ people shoulâ evbearwitnes> m Œeburâen of exptothçe
dè:\'ast:iniptOfnutle\ù.!ripoth~lJ.N-ca:~f:aniu:Sriùt.e-péatsùn11St vkt:S~-
musris10take--ut·ch.:lllengc·üfinten:foUt1lg~. ANNEX5
ANNEX5- Letter dated 22 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the

Marshall Islands to the United Nations, together with Written Statement of the
Government of the Marshall Islands, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8720.pdf

itself.Land is considered security in the Marshall Islands customs and mores;
in fact, a common saying: "'Without land a Marshallese is nobody-it is land

that makes a persan Marshallese" suggests the Bildnians and Ronglapese are
nobody as long as their lands are un-inhabitable. The severity of this assertion
can only be understood by the Bikinians particularly as severa! of their islands
were vaporized during the tests.

With a total of only 170 square kilometers of land, Marshall Islands views this
loss of lands as a severe renting of their cultural fabric. This will never be
compensated for by those responsible for their destruction. Mindful of this
land constraint of land for settlernent, Ronglapese and Bikinians have been
forced to reside in the two urban centers as weil. Tiùs in turn has cause a
major concern as Ebeye, on of these urban centers, a 66 acre island, housed a

population of 9500. Tiùs is a major increase from its original population of 16
persans.

Other social problems associated with the overcrowding in the urban centers
are major hurdles tc overcome today.

4. Marshall Islands interest in nuclear disarmament

Given its extensive first hand experience with adverse impacts of nuclear
weapons, Marshall Islands decision tc ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty this year is understandable. This objective of the treaty of "the

cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of ali their
existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nudear
weapons" is wholly consistent with Marshall Islands' foreign policy of
peaceful co-existence as well as with the cverarching goal cf the intemational
_,community to achieve global peace.

5. The need for a Court Opinion •

Given the legal and moral implications attached tc the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons, and owing to the international community's goal for
achieving global peace, this issue presses on the need to consider it in legal

terms to achieve total consîstency with ether legally binding agreements
which call on the international community to a common undertaking.

On this very issue, Marshall Islands is of the view that the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons îs not permitted under international law. Ithas been
clearlv documented in the Marshall Islands and elsewhere where nuclear

testing has been conducted that the severity such tests have onhealth and the
envirorunent are enormous.

Additionally, any use of nuclear weapons violate laws of war including the
Geneva and Hague Conventions and the United Nations Charter. Such laws ANNEX6

ANNEX 6- T. Ruff, "The health consequences ofnuclear explosions," in B. Fihn, ed.,
Unspeakable suffering- the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (Reaching

Critical Will, 2013),

[l_t1:p://www.reachingcriticalw.UL.org/images/documents/Publications!Unsp
eakablefi.Jns
peakable~p.cJJ

he health

consequencesof

nuclear explosions

Dr.lllman A. Ruff

fntroductlon and context: collected,or has beencovered-upordisregardedbygovernrnents
qfob ae~!th on a knife-édge insubserviencehemyths thatweap<eca~nsused
Xude<weponscomtitute the greatestimmediatethreat to globalityand servelegitimatemilitarypurpmes. The
surYi.val,health aild sustainability. \1/hilrelentlesstrend ofaccumulatingsdentîfic evidenceaboutthe
nudear weaporuhasbeen reducedfrom their 1986consequencesofwe ofnuclearweaponshasbeen that the stakes
t19,00now,theircapuity to produΠa globalcatareevenhightr than previouslyunderweknow;the more
jeopardizingthesurvivalofcornplex!ifeformsis uv-.orîlooks.
Retentionof nudear weaponsmakestheireventuaiuseinevitable.

A brief history of medical evidence
AfundamentalrequirementofresponsiblepubUcpolregarding nuclear weapon effects
tirmbasisln evidence;in thiscaseunderstanding thephysical,
biologica(and ecologiealconsequencesofnudearThefirstforeigndoctor to arrive in Hiroshîma after the nudear
Thephysicalrealitiesatthe heart:ofnudear danbombing wasICRCdelegateDr MarcelJunod,whosete1egroms
physicalprocessesî:nsideanaromîcweaponand a makechûling reading. On 30August 1945he reponed:
arefundamemailysimibôthincreasethe radioru:tivity
preseithesrortingmaterialsatleast1milliontimes,andtedHiroshfm{3;0thcondit. ity-.outpedC
thfissilematerials"'illbe both tt:ndcand weapo8iJalllw.spita/sdestroyedorseriouslydamagedinspected2
geologicalperiods thatmake thetimeframesofhumaemergencyhospitalsconditionsbey. ffictofbombnE
!rre!evant.Thereforea!icyapproachmustbebasedonmysteriouslyserious.Manyvictimsappasuddenlyovering
primary preventionand the inherentdangersofnudror weaponsrelapseduetodecompositionofwhitebloodcelband
andfissilematerials,and not the changi.ngcomp!orherinternalinjuriesnowdyingingreatnumbers.Estimateà
leaders,alliances,govemmenl'l,orsocietîes.ce sti/1over100,000waundedm eme:rgen'hyospitalslocated
oftheeffectsofnudear detonationsha~enrequent!ysum:mndingssadiy lackingbmrdagingmaterialsmedicines. ·~

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-~ rupturcd gas ptpes, downed electricity lincs, and le<lklunderestimates the destruction that would be cauoed byw1leashing
Within a distance of 4.7 km in every direction, ali Within half an hour, tboLJsandsupon thousands ofllres '\a large part of the availub!enuclear arsenais. Recent studies have

walesce into a giaJll/irestorm 45 km açrosswith temperatshown that in nudear terms "low" yield (Hiroshima si1.e)weapons, if
living things would die almost immediately-vapourised, more than 800"C, sucking in air creming wiù~; 320more targeted at cil:}'centres, clOOtùnes as many fatalitiesand

km/h, consuming ali aVlùlableoxygen. Whercver they were, cvcrymeas mud1 smoke frtirepcr kt of explosive yield as high
crushed, charred, irradiated. 7.5 km in every direction, living thingwodidrom burns and asphyxiation, Shelters \\}~elwedpons.'

beoomecrematoria.
essentially everyone would be killed or seriously injured. When thefres ignited b)'anudear explosion had<Ill}'out,

Still further out, windows would be shattered, buildingssLJrvivowh~1h injred or not, would lilŒlyface a city inhospitable
the air filled with broken debris hmled into missiles.1hbeyond recognition. Safewater, food, shelter,warmth, clectric!ty,
Stretching to out 22.6 km in every direction, everything
would be impas.sable.Therewould be no ambulances, fire eJ\Jel,basic goods, assistance, and information would be hnd to find.
or police, no power or communications. Pcoplewould be trMostof the lifc-supporting <111hdealth-enablù1g infrastructure <111d
flammable would ignite, and thousands upon thousands
under buildings, cars, and f<ùlendebris. Beyond the ragiserviçes of modern societies would be severely disrupted. S1ulitation
hundreds ofthousands of people would be seriously injuŒdbrcakdown,alnutritiosoc~ d'itlgration, profound meutal
of fires would coalesce into a giant firestorm. Wherever
injuries, fractuŒs, deep lacerations, and internat blecdtrauma, and the e>'er-prcscnt,ongoing, invisible, indiscrlmlnate, and
abound. Many would be deaf from ruptured eardrums; many iuescapab!c har,ard of radioactivity would combine to lltel increased
they were, most living thing would die from burns and
blinded bytinal burns aftcr having gl<111cerdetlexively vulnerability t~predofendemie and epidemie infeçtious
ftrebaAUwould be dceply traumatised. Manywould Jose all willases.
asphyxiation. Still further out, hundreds of thousands of
orcapadty to fi.uKtion. Evet)'l'.'herethe invisible, silent,lingering
dauger of radiation would persist. Hundreds ofthousands of people
would have severe second and third degree bLJrns,rcquiring theitarian response capacity
people would be seriously injured. And everywhere the
most intensive mt>dicalresources <11non~vwu hmled Healù1 professional staff, hospitals, and other he1ùthcare
available. Hospltals would have disappeared or be damageresources are concentr<ttedan centres, and would likely
invisible, silent, lingering danger of radiation would persist.
they were stiJlstanding they would likely have no power be disproportionally atfected by a nudeaUack. In
Laboratories, opcrating theJtres, sterilisers, ventilatoHiroshima, of300 doctors 270 wcre rcported dead, of 1780 nurses

1654were dead, at1dofl40 pharmacists 112 wcre dead; 42 of 45
• 50 J5,kt airbursts taaturbt z~nns in Within a distance of4.7 everdirection, winds of hospitals were non-functi111emost recent avallable US

differentcountrieswouldprodw:ellpto 17.6 750 kmlh ;u1da blast wave ovcr 140kPa would crush, The vast majority of Dcpartment ofHomelatld Security (DHS) assessmcnt of rcsponsc
million immediate deathsfrom blast and firescollapsor cxplodalbuildings including those oîsted pl<111ninfg.1ctorsfollowing a single 10-ltt nudear groundburst in

in the caseof airbursts,up tv 9.3million simand reinforced.conçrete and turn the debris into missiles injured people would die WashingtonDC demonstrates the wide gulfthat exists between the
deathswitltgrountlbursts,artdup to2.6 milliowith lethal velocity.Glass and steel would melt; concrete

shortlerm radillllondeatltsin the ca,;eof would explode. Wherever they were, allliving things
ground/mrsts.ThehiglŒsntumberofdeathsanwng wouldd1ealmost ilnmediurely-vapourcrushed, alone without so much ln Hiroshima, of 300

the 13couHtriesevahtatedocwrrer/in Chimt, charred, irradiatcd.
followedbylndia. Thetotalccmuûtiesfor CMna in as a human hand or
doctors 270 were
thecaseof50 15-kt airb!trstswasestimated al Out to about 7.5 ktn m everydireclion, winds of460 kt11/h
mi/lion20.6milliointhecaseofgroundbursts. and blast pressures of80 kPa would hreakapa1t wncrete voice to comfort them
The weapons itJYolvedwou/d comtitute bs thrmand stecl buildings and~mllhp wailrfloors, and reported dead, of 1780

0.04%of the totalexplosiveyield attd /e.s thceilings. Aluminium would be vapouri.led. Adultswould and without any relief
0.3%ofthenumberofweaponsin theglobal be hurled ovOOm1at high speed. Essen~"Vcryone nurses 1654 were dead,

twcleararsenal. would be kilied or scriously injured, including bycrush for their agonising pain
ù1juries,rupturedgs, transected spinal cords, severe and of 140 pharmacists

A 5-Mt nuclear explosion li<1emorrhage,1ddeep burns.
ln an attempt to make the unique destructive ptunps, cardiac monitors, andother equipmidcither be 112 were dead;

power of nudear weapons more comprehensible, As far as 12.3km ln every direction, winds of260 k.tn/h smashcd, h1.1rned,or not working from the electromagnctic pulse
the health-relatcffccts of a single 5-Mt nudear and hlast pressures of 35 kPa would crush woodcn and andJossof power. 11lefewwho wuld rho~pi lrdinss 42 of 45 hospitals were

weapon exploded ovcr a major cwillbe described. bricl<b. uildings indnding honses, schools, shops, and would fmd th at most of the doctors, nurses, and other health
Suçh a weapon is the larges! kuown to be currentlyanyfactories. Peoplewould be hurled 71ll.A1phalt professiona!sld be themselves dead or iujurdl. 111efew not 21
non-functional
deployed. The equivalent amount of TNT high would meltWind~w.·s bwraulented intomorc consumedwith their où~uri ]esss, or loved ones, who might
explosive would fil] a freight train 2414 km lonthan 4000 projectile gluossl1ardspcr square meler. Glass be aWeto assist, would qLJicklyrun out of any medical suppbcs they

Sufficient energy would be released by the explosionother debris would penp~ope!ieshrapnel. managed to s:ùvage.The >"Jstmajorit}'ofinjured peoplewoulpotential casualties of a siugle relatively small nudear explosion and
of such a bomb to turn 5 million~\ife to steam. Many people wouldhave rllptured cardrwm. ln Jessthan alonewithou1 souchas a hum an hand orvoice to comfort thethe health carc resources <l>"<ülabtloe respond to ils atiermath, even
10 soxondt;the city would be completely devastated
W1tbin a thousandtof a second, conditions akin <mdwithout<Illreliefforthagoni~ pin.g in one of the most resource-rich settings (Tl\ble).
to the centre of the sun would be produced-100
million "C and 100 million ntmospheres of pressuStretd1ing ont 22.6km in cvery direction, over an arca Most currennudear wcapons are smallerth<lll a 5-Mt bomb-t1l1e 2007 City of Hiroshima assessment of another nudear attack

in a fireball, which wou!d rapidly expand to 1.8of 1605km', everything flammable would ignite-wood, most nwnerous in the USarsen;ùare between 100- and 455-kton the dt}' condudes: «no n1aUer how govermnent bodies tried
across, releasing a massive burst of radiation, paper, doù1ing, plastics, petrol. and oil from ruptured mostnumeroLJs in the Rus.sianarsebetw~r1>0- nd 800-kt."' to deal with the situthel'fc(lwould be mcrdyreduce

light,nd blasL. tdnks and cars; all of this 1\'0uldhe fuelled further by Howcver, multiple smaller nudear weapon,; :u·emore dlkienthe casualties on a minute scaJC:'''T'hey note th at ifprior warning
delivcring destructiun ovcr a wider arca, so a single larcould be given to enable people to tak<·shelter indoors, acLJte

il fil·'h~Jitl,
llno'. 'In>~<'<:f"'"-tA,>I in1wr omwl" '"'1·'·'23"' Members of emergency services, other disaster

responders, health care professionals, other

National çS.pital-reglon:
Totallnjurèçl pei"soris: 1.6 mlll!on personnel providing essential services, and the
Persans sufferlng trauma: 343,000 AVallable hosPlta.lbeds: 2177
AvailableICU beds:
Moderate-severe trauma: 267,000 118 many who may be called to assist in responses to
Persan·ssuffering acute radl<ition sickness: Aval!able ventllators: 200

201,000 Unqccupled burn beds: 5
Avallable'staff: humanitarian emergencies would face unique dangers

· Nationwide: . and difficulties following any nuclear explosion, with
Unoccupied burn beds;·sao. of 1760

Unoccupled !CU beds: 9400 of J18,000 widespread and persistent radioactivity severely

Note: The affects of fires are not lncluded.
complicating and hampering access and relief efforts.

Conclusion: a need for evidence-based policy
casualties may be rcduced, anm arcas far removed from without medical attention of any kind {... ] When treatment is winter had a great influenhim~'a tnadwlthout IPPNW's
groundzero, evacuation mayefi"e icreluc~g casua!tles. indfective, the only solution availahk to the health professiom is Evidence of the wJacceptable, catastrophic corJsequenccs efforts,e abolition of USand Russian intermcdiate nu1ge

Exposure to early radioactive fallout could be reduccd by earlytion. Prevention is obviously the only possibility in case of for the healtb of the human populatcas of any use of nuclear missiles ru1dother disarmament initiatives "would
sheltering and delayed evacuat1onsfollowing a smallnumhera nudear war:' nuclear weapons is unassailablc.lncoutrovevidence of pwhably have been imposslble"." Physicians played a significant

of dispersed nudcar explosions, but the gulfbctwcen avaüable unacceptable humanitarian elfects has been key to the subrole in New Zealand's nudear free statuMinisimetavrd
medkal resourccs-evenifthey could be effecacce~y Lned Members of emergency services, othcr disaster responders, progress madeln banning the use of and elinünating other types saying at the 1986IPPNW World Congress: "You have

tinlC-tUJd nced, even in the United States following a single smallc professionals, other personnel providlng essential ofindiscri.Jnlnate, lnhumane weapons- biologlcal m1dcbemimade medicalrcality a part of politkal reality:''l
nudear explosion is salutary. services,d the many who may be called to assis! in responses weapons, anti"personnellandminand most recently cluster

to humanltarian emergendes would face unique dangers and munitions. Nuclear weapons are far more indiscriminately ln recent decades there has been widespread deliberate deniai of
1he Hiroshima Committee of Experts concludcd uuequivocally:fficultles following any nudear explosion, with widespread and de~truc tunvany ofthese. the daily exlotentia.lthreat to glob;tl health ru1dsurvival posed by

"lt isnot possible to protee\ civilians from a nudear weapersistent radioactivity severe!y compllcating and hampering nudear weapons. In the last generation, no national governmcnt
attadcTo protcct dvilians, there isno measure other than tocess and reliefefforts~ucanolcs are normallyvohmtary, As noted above, cvldencc"based advocacy has repeatedly beenr international ageney lms produced a comprehensive public

prevent a nudear weapons attack from occurring, whether and informed coment is requiŒd. Disaster response planning etfectivin rdation to nuclear wedpons. Public and health report on the effects of use of nudear weapons, addressing
it be dcliberatc or accidentai. Toprcvent the use of nuclshould not be based on unrcalistk or frankly fictional assumptions profcssional pressure ba.sedon evidence of the widespreadsquarelthe risks poscd to hum;ul and global security by

weapons, theres no way other thuabol l~dhar weapons about what ispossible following nuclear disaster, and responders presence of radioactive fallout includlng strontiwn-90 incurrent arsenals, or their continued modernisation. On the most
them selves:'" should not be expectcd to do the impossible or place themsclvcs at ùeciùuous teeth of children in the 1950s and 60s played a majortlueto human healtb identified by the World Health

unacceptable danger. role in the end of atmospheric nudear tests; in repemedlyOrganisationwc have notlüng like the Intergovernmental Panel
cxtended Soviet nudcar test moratoriwns during the l980s of Cllmate Change, whereby the world'sforemost sdentific
The suhstantial civildefence progrmnmes against nuclcar attacks
thal became '''idespreadl1950ewerc d!scredited m1d!argelyRecent assessments by senior experts of the Red Cross{ the eventua! near-complete cessation of nudear test exploexpertisi~harnessed to update ;u1danalyse the evolviag
Seriousdiscussion at the 1985 Geneva and 1986 Reykjavik ev,denee anpul il bMe the public and dcdsion-makers. 11ms
abandoned in the carly 1980s becausc of the work of physiRed Crescent movement, the wodd's larges! humanitarian
and sdeutists demonstratmgat these progrdmmcs were organisation, make clear that there are no international plans or summits between General Secretary Gorbachcv and Prcsidem far, only one government-tofSwitzerland-hasinvested,

inelfectual, dcceptlve and wasteful." capadty for assisting the victims of nuclear explosions"'""The 2011 Reagan on the complete abolition oftheir nuclear arsenalsmodestly, in exanüning, validating, und extending the extensively
resolution ofthe Council of DdegJtes, the highest governing body over a 15year timefmme owes much to the work of scientlstsublished and pcer"reviewed evidence, gencrated through

The secondWHO report {1987)" concluded ln relauon lo of the internatiR~dlCross/Cres cent movement, "VI'orking and physicinns in sprcading- awareness about the catastrotheinitiative and courage of a smali munber of independent
management of casualties following a nudear war: "0\wiouslywardsthe elimination of nudearwcapons», in its firsl opcrativc consequences of use of nudear weapons and the impossibiliscient in~htsanger of nudear famine following use of a

the hcalth services of the world could in no way cope witharagraph: "emphasizes the incalculable huma:n suffering that of any effective response short of prevention. This was reflectedctiof the world'snudear arsenaL This must change.
such a situation. In sum, in the event of a nudcar war trcan be expected to rcsult fr(>Illnny use of nudearwcapons, the in the joint statement by Gorbachev and Reagan at their 1985 biggcst challenges deservc the greatesl attention. P\1liciesou

v•muldat best be lnsignilicant, rescue work scarcdy other thauf adequate humanitarim1 response capadty und the absolute snmmit that "[a] nuclear war cannot be won and must never beear wcapons must be based on the best evidence regarding
makeslüft [... ] 1he great majority of casualties would bimpcratil'€to prevent such use»."' fought.»" Gorbachev wrole that the 1980s research on nudetheir actual clfects. Our survival depends on it.

1111f>JIl,~.oiTh IJ1"'l.'ol'ldl•1-theP<1lo'>l1<l"~,'-','..,._"'"'l,2) 1. lnt<motloConun.J ofth,,edCross, Wo>rld!Migmrds t!oceUmlnrltiMofuuc(2011ICRC.NoCD/1J/4.l.thllp~/www.lcrc.org/cnglrosout<:<sl 31. BR. Budderneier,JE.Y:ù<,K Millageand ID. B«!ndt,NaNonalC<lpltaRl<glonKeyR«P""'"i'<lrMrf<or lh<T~mlrat(01pmL\wrcioee

do,untcntslœpm1/nu~-b~ckgronn<l-documem-2llll·ll·26.htm. U;~rmoNroeUonallabor U~tPoerpya,r~Etnrfy(Contr:>clNo.:LLNJ,.TR;51211l)
2. fl.jjugnlon, TlwInrornllt/mwCl ommit/""cftheRedCWe~poutnro;HlfoshlmJliUDawnofth<21>C~n~t ltyrUlfiollai.R.th•Redfw n. AL,DieariC.Maher)L.Hlck,D.H-'\flg,,Da!nlak.N.ChaoR~~ eN.,okmiul an<\DM.Weil\slodc,!Wdiarij !f'Nrou:.l<Daretmm/lon;
Cn>.<$(2005),no.859,pp.5ll-24 Mcdla>lonseq~ mumll<scedjorSwrceRe.<"""""AllocaN0(12o011· ..P~bltlitlfPre5,Suppl), pn-44

3•. l:lirosltNag.<~l aebak-SalgishiHensh<)IiniW,Hlrosh!;,,.u,rulNPl<)M<~e/dcaaladO<'ÛEoj{lw:'oetomlcBornl>ing(1•981),New 33. D,Wolfe,ond,ILHoiton,ANewEra ofNudearD/sannm,fl""'&"'<!lril)'(20l0)E, nslond, Lul\Œt,ppl.7.i-Ji4
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35. B.S.LiMd VictorW.Slde\\'""'JubliHe~ 2t0h).2nd ed,NewYork,OxfordUi>lvors\tyPre"
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Ro•earcR~dictu 1/mi·waliJl"'rJh:H•~~ )d Em-iromn~ Ejtc>lfNo«:lcalr\'«lpons1"-'l&Ida'-"'"theEart!l'A Rcpwtofthelppmv
37. K KoJ>1m1Kü=•· H. K.otaya, E.Shore,T.Okubi:>R,aeoff!en~ais J·k•l/1ollji<•pansrudy'<o!Jo(r2t012),Ro1d!Dos~uetry,ction
Imcrnarlo1wÇlomm/ssil"'wli tg~He•ltha11dE"v/n>nml ff«·f>ofNucl<urW<'ilJ'OP'r"oducrlo,,atiE•~<lu1llmY'lro>lmiRas<~r<h vol!01(4),pp.674·676..
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7. DG.Na!han, H).G<lg<i,YV.'S.B.Lown.Th ~edicalCo,><Jque"'o"f'TiumnM\\'<thoPhy•lclmùRcleiPvst-A Pclod(1c96New, 39. R DoUMd R,Wako:for, l.<okfChtldhoodCmocefrrom Fctallrmdiallon(1997),llr JRadio!70.pp.D0-9
~- Pijpe,N.Andri!JE11>stonK.<>.ml E.CanlnC.N,oguoM. G.iuthl- U!arru,xp.,surerODi<.glcad/ali""WskofBùast<:ancer'm11Mg
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1145-1119 41. E.Cirdls, M.YrljM.Blottner,E.GilbeH<>l< C,mUIG,Howe,RiskofCanc~ft LerDoses'loll ladatogl«trvsparlve Co~~twn 1y5

9. PH.LeJdormanand JH,Men<lclson,lJoeM<vl/c<Crlvrll!'IJU<>Io<f<1'h>e'nnom.,.;/t;(qWar:lv,S'"""P>y<:hlol(Progrm'(962, .,.softheD<jeme· Cotmrrl"-'(20ù5),BMJ33!, "" 7508,pp.77
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Health36,no. 4,pp.303-306 S6. D.Loyo•nd R.CouJ>land,iwnA<sisrtheVlcllm••ifll>•ofRadlol, BiglgccolC.hcrn Wenponia-ndHow:I'mmwrlonulRevi<w6f/loeRed
:w. G.Mu~U! k.,arnaby,P.TayloD.Sunmer,Çroul"Nu<lra"'l'<'r·fljOrntiounwltlie T<mor/sTlh,..ar(1996),IPPNWGlobalHealthWalclt,lnt<rnallomù Cou"89(2007M. 366pp.J29-3H

Physic fo"h<PwvcnUonofNudear War,Cambridge,MA,USA'lntornatlonal PhyslciruiSford>ePn:\'WartlonofNuclear 57. R.CouplonaruD.lA'I'flCn,t<rna//onaill»i>lanclJ.ofNudear.RadiologlcalB,l~ndCl~ew k fP""''71rn•fora R• he.-k'(2009),
2~. L.Forrow,BG.BlaiHd(;~ ndLewl<,1: Postol.V. SidelflAlmunsand C. ç,.Accidi•ntaNl wW<~rP"'I·ColdWarAsses<t1998), N Engl lOLtornattonaRlovlewofthe R<dCr= 9\l'329-340,

J1\-JJS,nolS,pp. 1326·133) ss. O.>imcUofDelegate•ofth<InternntionalRedCro" and RedCr«e<nt M<wement,WorJ.inTgmwordt,lwEllmlwotl211S),lnŒrnanonal(>
26. !Hdfand, L.l'orrowand). 'J1warl,Nucl«'r1h-rorln1.2no7333pp.J56-9 ContmillŒoftl1eCro":hnp://WWI~.!crc.orglcnglresnurco•/docunwnt•IJC$ o201\ttloo/council·dokgates-œ>Olutlon-

27. jlldf:uld, A.KMror,M.McC;illy,K.RoboTiwrulTheVsmodNuckfor1!-rrori<(m2006)Wosh!ng\<lnDC,Pbpldan< for SocMResponsibU!ty 59: R.R)wlos,Ar.<m<tolfsFol/y,Th<1&1/dnogfrheNude<oArnn.,R~-N•w York.All(odA.KMpl;
60. M.Hensg.u>nl.Mikl!nllGo!'l><"hh"p'l'nins WloarSRort,.,.1"Ru>'S(ia2ûOO)S.alon, http:l/dlr.•alon.com/otoryJnewslfoature/2000/09/07/go•·bnchev/in
d<:l:J,tml
28. M.V.Ramma, B<lltJbilBig<>m/!aE;J•?J..•c<t>iNf·uclearWeopoHypotloc Nttl•·~.plo,<("9?9)lntern.,tionolPh)"icla!ISfar the
Prcl'cnliunofNuW:\fCombridg,•,MA.USA 61. MS.Gorb~d> PcYestro!lwN.<w1hir,ki1igf6r0urCoutltr!'(!988NewYork,Harper& Row
Z9. C"nunltl<e ofExp<mon tlwS(en•riclSofC.t.Sualti<ls\osult!ngfmnHt Nucl<,rrWcap<:msR<eExpmfsntheScenflrÎfi ru:uoilles
62. D.Lange,Rejkcllom.0<11fh"F.11doonfgi!J<A"'" R<ICNt:ewZ<olmv/1E'xample(1986),paper pr<SOJI10a0t the SlxthWorldCongre" oflhe lnternotionaJl'hysiclonsfor
R«nllln&Jr1Nuâ<'ar\~ap APtuck(2007),Hirosh, Jro;hlCitCoun<:ÜfoClviProtection ~'"re,•entionofNuclear\-\\\r,Cologne,pp 15·21
3\1,PM.Sultt>nand RM.G"uNudeaar1Rlndiolo giec~o.(<20l2),lu TerrorlsmM<lPublicliebyBS.LevyandV\'l'.SlNcv;York,Oxfonl

Univcrsitj'Press,pp. Hi4·182

lmp,><:lh~.1ltlo un,.r' ctfi·•q-"tlh·,l-~i.Mi'n>p t0f1""1,;,,elJI.r"27 ANNEX7

ANNEx7- President Barack Obama, Prague speech, April 5, 2009,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama­

In-Prague-As-Delivered

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE April5,2009

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA
Hradcany Square

Prague, Czech Republic

10:21A.M. (local)

Now,understand,this matterstopeopleeverywhere.One nuclearweaponexptodedin one city - be iNewYorkor
Moscow,Islamabador Mumbai,TokyoorTelAviv,Parisor Prague- couldkilt hundredsof thousandsof people.

And no matterwhere ithappens,thereis no endto whatthe consequencesmightbe- for our global safety,our
security,our society,our economy,toour ultimatesurvival.

Someargue that thespreadof theseweaponscannetbestopped,cannatbechecked -th at we aredestinedto

live in a world wheremore nationsandmore peoplepossessthe ultimatetools of destruction,Such_fatalismisa
deadlyadversary,for iwe believethat the spread-ofnuclearweaponsis inevitable,thEmînsorneway we are

admittingto ourse!vesthat the useof nuclearweaponsis inevitable.

Justas we stoodfor freedom inthe 20th century,we muststandtogetherfor the right of peopleeverywhere tolive
freefrom fear in the 21stcentury.(Applause.)And as nucleapower~ asa nuclearpower,as the only nudear

power tohave useda nudearweapon,the UnitedStateshas a moralresponsibifityto act.Wecannat succeedin
this endeavoralone,butwe canlead it,we can start it. ANNEX8

ANNEx8- Report and Summary of Findings of the Conference presented under the

sole responsibility of Austria, Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of
NuclearWeapons, 8 to 9 December 2014,

http:lwww. bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/ Abruestung/Hl

NW14/HINW14 Chair s Summary.pdf

VtennC:oniêtf!ontheHw.nuitariatmpadef N:udm -WéaponS

8to !l..~. "...2014
a....,amllium"""fBff'm~ Bflh•coo.t.-•

jfrés' unmdtr.~surln~on~t yl~ii

ThéV1ttnèo?lfeterKetrnHum.;mitMiaInmp\iclof NUd<aa-rWùpons -~~mkal.Ke
to9 Oet.ember201tt:add~e te-h~~rian {.:tn;.seql.sny US!lnlf. rtuclear
-'l~ap tdudintèffecisoo hurneal-I,tJe:rwltt agnttlue,nd~mot~rt;r.

migr,atlrtnthé-ero~; M,Wt' asltê ~li snd rnt-efi<d~M fau!htm:ced-cv.
ur.atrtnouseofenMcleatw~a~!.n,t-èmatkr:!lflbi1:se~b::andtheappîkabli:!
normatifèi"rnj..Yt!J"k.

~legat~ iomnsng 15$Staies.théUrnŒl atiC.S,tnterM~ tmmitteêtlthe
~ ÙdSSt th-Rai .Cros:i~ed (:rè§.ctruiV!i d~fs;déry-t<taffisawm:afid
atlid~ pm$ltipatffi toofeenre.

TheUN -s~r! Gtear-ami Pillpè#rands oonwy~~s to the-Cnnfur;t.h~
Pr€S!dant~f JtRCaddres.stheparL~~a H:tas.:iü,-..ur->1orfst:he hiJdéar
e.ipiosîomln Hîr.nshJNa~tak a-ivlctlmscf tM âfecofnud-eates"'atro

partldpatttthe Co-nfŒerttea-nd-h~VerümonHs-iiliJipEr'?.rue.~..liiDœ
.andtantrîbutions:exemphe urupeaklMesufkrlnused tu ordlnial).'cbyitlaM
mtde-af weapctis.

the Vrennatonk:r-ente hUilt upcrn the fact-basestdthe Unt aM Sf!Cond

tr~nfur onnheeumanitariitIimpactofNtWeapom, :hiWesped:JvÎrOska.-<ID
Nayar•.antorüni l~a drepét-urtdersŒmofth~OOSequenceand tad:Uarfsb
pose.bynudear weapons_Mori!OVert,hfuMer-dis-cussnsd-alî-nedthe -extrei"f\re

chaiieng:af.orhumamtarlanresponse1ntf m.J"wreapo-e'l~p insmpulated
areas. Furthermare.-1t pras"biriteyevlaw" oo intematf.ortatnorms. and -the:
hu:manitarlanîmpad of rwdear wei(eycondusXJnsfiŒn me ruhstarrtivesessions

ln.du 1:~fcllowing::

-~The-impact of a.rlearweapdet:matlukr~-e of the :cause,·woo~lno-t
c-cns-i:rdynationb-:~t a.ddo,d.<rsreS'i ano~ên _g~h ao1equences,.

Œuslngde:stru..d,eth a..,d-ifuplacwetias.profcruruiong~t d-mage
w theemiron-ment.di-mat.:;hurnan hwei!-b-ndeJno~Jc.a~ di!oV~mce~
sodat arderandc-ouid-eventhreat-entherun<Wao!f homarJ.k1nd

• The:s-c:ope.-s:ndinterreia oftteohosantpr-o (on-sequencescaubyd
oodeat"-v.-e-det;:~na atr~cta.-ohic and mme crunple:x-±han Œmmonly'
undem:cod_lhese ronseq:u&"iŒcsanbe laandpoiïmnaiirre>~ersib!e.

• Theuse and t-estingof nude:ar)#ea:p>onhsavedemD-d-ev.aslngmmediata,

mid ~nd iong-termeffects.Nudear testfnglfl sathewortdhatclt a 1-egacy
ofseflc.usf--Sth :and-emrlat::omequen_a-dl~ cnntamlna-tîonfth~

1 ANNEX9

ANNEX 9- M.J Mills et al., "Multi-decadal Global Cooling and Unprecedented

Ozone Loss Following a Regional Nuclear Conflict", Earth 'sFuture Research Paper

2014, at p. 161,

http://climate.envsci.mtgers.edu/pdf/MillsNWeft224.p_df

~AGU

....a
Earth'sFuture ~-

RESEARCH ARTlCl.E Multidecadalglobal cooling and unprecedented ozone loss

following a regional nuclear confllct

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which two countries each used 50 Hiroshima-size (15 kt) nuclear weapons, creating such urban firestorms.

Using the global di mate model GISSModelE (Goddard lnstitute for Space Studies, New York), they cal­
culated that nearly alithe 5 Tgof smoke produced would rise to the stratosphere, wheitwouIdspread

globally, reducing the global average temperature by 1.25°( for 3-4 years and by more thao.soc for
a decade. Thiseffect was longer lasting than that found in previous "nuclear winter" studies, because

older models could not representthe rise of smoke into the stratospherMills et a[2008]then used
a chemistry-climate madel to calculate that the concurrent heating of the stratosphere by up oooc

would produce global ozone loss on a scale unprecedented in human history, lasting for up to a decade.

Recently, Stenkeet af. [2013] used a third independent model to confirm the major findings of these two

previous studies. That study used the chemistry-climate model SOCOL3to assessimpacts on di mate and
stratospheric ozone for a range of inputs and particle sizes.The study coupied a mixed-layer ocean with

a depth of 50 m and a thermodynamic sea ice module to a high-top atmospheric model, which calcu­
lated chemistry effects in agreement with Miffs et al. [2008}. Unlike Robock et al. [2007b], the study did not

consider active ocean dynamics, and hence could not incorporate the di mate effects of changing ocean
circulation. The inclusion of only the top 50 rn of ocean limits the thermal inertia effects that occur in the

presence of a deep ocean, making surface temperature responses too rapid, as the heat content of the
deeper ocean is not considered.

Here we present the first study of this scenario with an Earth system mode!, coupling a chemistry-climate

mode! to interactive ocean, sea ice, and land components.

2.Madel Description

2.1. CESM1(WACCM)

We revisit the scenario of nuclear war between lndia and Pakistan, each side using 50 Hiroshima-size
weapons in megacities on the subcontinent, using the first version of NCAR'sCommunity Earth System

Model {CESMn astate-of-the-art, fully coupied, global climate mode!, configured with fully interactive
ocean, land, sea ice, and atmospheric components [Hurrefl et al., 2013]. For the atmospheric component,

we use the Who le Atmosphere Community Climate Mode!, version 4 (WACCM4), which is a superset of
version 4 of the Community Atmospheric Model (CAM4), and includes ali the physical parameterizations

of that mode! [Neale et al., 2013]. WACCM is a "high-top" chemistry-climmodel that extends from the
surface to 5.1x 10- hPa (,...,140km). lt has 66 verticallevels and horizontal resolution of 1.9° latitude x 2.5°

longitude. WACCM includes interactive chemistry that is fully integrated into the model's dynamics and
physics. Heating the stratosphere, for example, feeds back onto chemical reaction rates. Photolysis rates

are calculated based on extinction of exoatmospheric flux from overhead ozone and molecular oxygen,
and are unaffected by aerosol extinction. WACCM uses a chemistry module based on version 3 of the

Mode! for Ozone and Related Chemical Tracers {MOZART) [Kinnison et al., 2007], tailored to the middle
and upper atmosphere. The chemical scheme includes 59 species contained in the Ox, NOx, HOx,CIOx,

and BrOxchemical families, along with CH4and its degradation products; 217 gas-phase chemical reac­
tions; and heterogeneous chemistry that can lead to the development of the ozone hole. For our simula­

tions, CESMl includes the active land, ocean, and sea ice components described by Lawrence etal. [2011],
Danabasoglu et al. [2012], and Holfand et al. [2012], respectively. The full ocean mode! extends up to

5500 m in depth, and includes interactive, prognostic ocean circulation. The nominal latitude-longitude

resolution of the ocean and sea ice components is 1°, the same as in CESMl (WACCM) simulations con­
ducted as part of phase 5 of the Coupled Modellntercomparison Project [Marsh et al., 2013].

2.2.CARMA
We have coupled WACCMwith version 3 of the Community Aerosol and Radiation Madel for Atmospheres

(CARMA3),a flexible three-dimensional bin microphysics package that we have adapted for the treat­
ment of black carbon (BC)aerosol. This allows the BCto experience gravitational settling, and obviates

the implementation of molecular diffusion, which the gas-phase tracers in WACCM experience at high
altitudes. CARMA originated from a one-dimensional stratospheric aerosol code developed by Turcoet al.

[1979] and Toon et al. [1979] that included both gas-phase sulfur chemistry and aerosol microphysics.
The mode! was improved and extended to three dimensions as described by Toonet al. [1988]. Extensive

updates of the numerics continue to be made. For this study, we limit BCto one size bin of fixed radius.

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 162 ~AGU Earth'sFuture 10.1002/2013EF000205

Asdescr.ibed below, we performed an ensemble of runs assuming a microphysical radius of 50 nm, ta be

consistent with the optical properties of BCassumed in the model's radiative code, which are derived from
the Optical Properties of Aerosols and Clouds (OPAC)software package [Hesset al., 1998]. Our previous
studies of BCin the stratosphere from nuclear war and space tourism used these same optical properties,

but with a radius for sedimentation that was twice as larg[Milisetal.2008; Rossetal., 2010]. Wealso con­
ducted one perturbation run using the same 100 nm radius for sedimentation asthose previous studies,

for comparison in the coup led madel.

We do not allow calculated particle populations to change radiatively or microphysically other than by
rainout, sedimentation, and transport. The particles are assumed to be completely hydrophilic from the
3
start, and hence are subject to rainout in the troposphere. Weassume a mass density of 1g cm- for each
BCparticle, consistent with measurements of atmospheric BCpartieles collected on filters, which are com­
posed of smaller, denser particles aggregated in fractal formations with spatial gap[Hesset al.1998].

As Toon et al[2007] point out, coagulation of BCislikely to form chains or sheets, which would have the
same or higher mass absorption coefficients as smaller BCparticles. Drag forces would decrease sedimen­

tation of such chains or sheets compared with aerosols that grow as simple spheres. Our neglect of coag­
ulation, assuming a monodisperse distribution of 50 nm radius spheres, should more accurately predict

stratospheric lifetime under conditions with fractals than a treatment of growth into larger spheres with
faster sedimentation.Toon et al.[2007] also indicate that the BCis likelyto become coated with sulfates,
organics,and other nonabsorbing materials, which couIdact as lenses, refracting light onto the BC.This

effect might increase absorption by ,._.50%l,eading to potentially greater impacts than those we modeled.

2.3. Model Setup

We have performed an ensemble of three "experiment" runs initialized with 5Tgof BCwith 50 nm radius
overthe lndian subcontinent. Afourth experiment run includes the same mass and spatial distribution

of BC,with 100 nm sedimentation radius. We compare these experiment runs to an ensemble of three
"control" runs without this additional BC.Each of these seven runs simulated the time period from 1Jan­

uary 2013 to 1January 2039, with concentrations of greenhouse gases and ether trans lent constituents
changing with time according to the specifications of the "medium-law emissions" Representative Con­

centration Pathway (RCP4.5)scenario [Meinshausen et al.,20111 a baseline for dimate projections. We
also tried starting the simulated conflict on 15 May,as was done byRobock et al.[2007b] and Stenke et al.
[2013],and found that the different season did not significantly affect the stratospheric distribution or di­

matie impact of the BC.Because of the prolonged surface cooling that we calculated, we extended our
runs beyond the 1Oyear span used in previous studies to 26 years.

ln the experiment runs, 5Tgof BCwas added to the initial atmospheric condition in a constant mass mix­
6
ing ratiof 1.38x 1o- kg/kg air between 300 and 150 hPa in a horizontal region spanning 50 adjacent
madel columns roughly covering lndia and Pakistan. The BCheats the atmosphere to extreme conditions,

requiring a reductionof the model's standard time step from 30 to 10min. Because this reduction in time
step produces a significant increase in cloudiness in the madel due to dependencies in the cloud param­
eterization, we reduced the time step consistently in the experiment and control runs. We aIso tried an

alternateapproach of increasing the dynamical substepping in the mode!, but found that the 16-fold
increasein the number of substeps required to produce a stable result produced a similar increase in

clouds to our original approach. Wediagnose the effects of reducing the madel time step in section 2.4.

The three members of each ensemble were configured with different initial conditions for the ocean, land,
and sea lee components, derived from the ensemble of three RCP4.5CESMl(WACCM)runs conducted

as part of CMIP5 [Marsh et al.2013]. These components interact with the atmosphere, producing a
representation of natural climate variability among the three runs in each ensemble. Aswe will show,
the variability that we calculate within each ensemble issmall compared to the differences between the

experiment and control ensemble averages, indicating that the effects we calculate are not attributable to
mode! internai variability.

2.4.Model Validation
To understand the effects of changing the mode! time step on our conclusions, we diagnosed the cH­

mate of one of our control runs for years 2023-2038, 16 years starting 10 years after the change intime

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 163 ~AGU_ Earth's Future 10.1002/2013EF000205

step,with reference to the climate of the same years from one of the CESMl(WACCM) CMIPS runs for
RCP4.5,the same forcing scenario used in our runs. The effect of increased low clouds isto change the
2
global shortwave (SW) cloud forcing from -55 to -62 W m- •Observations from Clouds and Earth's Radi­
ant Energy Systems (CERE$)Energy Balanced and Filied (EBAF)put this forcing near -51 W m- 2,so the

change produces a more reflective planet than is observed (A. Gettelman, persona! communication). This

may lead to an underestimation of the surface cooling anomaly in our calculations, because the effect
of extinction in the stratosphere would be reduced if less SWradiation reaches the surface in both our
2
control and experiment runs. At the same time, globallongwave cloud forcing increases from 30 W m-
in our CMIP5 run to 34 wm- 2•Observations from CERESEBAFput this forcing near 26-27 W m- 2,so the

change istoward more greenhouse warming from high clouds than is observed. This 4 W m- 2increase in
2
cloud forcing partially offsets the surface cooling effects of the 7 W m- decrease in the SW.The changes
in cloud forcing occur mostly in the tropics.

Because we started from an RCP4.5scenario in 2013, the initial atmosphere is not in radiative balance,

but is warming in response to anthropogenic greenhouse gases.The radiative imbalance at the top of the
2
madel is 0.977 wm- in ourCMIP5 run for years 2023-2038. The effect of increased clouds is to reduce
this by a factor of 10 to 0.092 W m- 2,bringing the madel close to the radiative balance that would be seen

in a steady state, such as the static conditions used for previous nuclear winter calculations. We ran an
additional case in which the 5Tg of BCis added in year 10 of the control run. These calculations confirm

that our calculated BCmass,and surface anomalies in SWflux, temperature, and precipitation are not

significantly affected by any transient adjustments after the initial change in ti me step.

We aIso diagnosed effects on stratospheric chemistry by comparing the ensemble average column ozone
from our control runs to the ensemble average from the CESM1(WACCM)CMIPS runs for the first 6 years

after we introduced the change intime step. We fou nd no significant differences in eitherthe global mean

or latitudinal distribution of column ozone due to the change in ti me step. The effects of changing the
model time step are relatively minor compared to those of 5Tg of BCin the stratosphere, which is the

focus of our study.

3. Results

3.1. BCRise and Meridional Transport

As in previous studies of this scenario [Robocket al., 2007b; Millset al.,2008], the BCaerosol absorbs
SWradiation, heating the ambient air, inducing a self-lofting that carries most of the BCweil above the

tropopause. CESMl (WACCM) has 66 verticallayers and a model top of rv145 km, compared to 231ayers

up to -80 km for the GISSModelE used by Robock et al.[2007b] and 39 layers up to -80 km for SOCOL3
used by Stenkeet al. [2013]. As Figure 1 shows, we calculate significantly higher lofting than Robocket al.

[2007b, compare to their Figure 1b], penetrating sîgnificantly into the mesosphere, with peak mass mixing
ratios reaching the stratopause (50-60 km) within 1month and persisting throughout the first year.

This higher lofting, in conjunction with effects on the circulation we discuss later, produces significantly
longer residence times for the BCthan those in previous studies. At the end of 10years, our calculated

visible-band optical depths from the BCpersist at 0.02-0.03, as shawn in Figure 2.1n contrast Robock

et al.[2007b] calculate optical depths near 0.01 only at high latitudes after 10 years, a leve! that our
calculations do not reach for 15years.

3.2. BCBurden, Rainout, and Lifetime

During thefirst 4 months, 1.2-1.6 of the STg ofBC is lost in our 50 nm experiment ensemble, and 1.6 Tg in
our 100 nm experiment, mostly due to rainout in the first few weeks as the plume initially rises through

the troposphere {Figure 3a). This is larger than the l.OTg initially lost in the study ofMil/setal. [2008],
which used a previous version of WACCM.This is likely due to the difference in our initial distribution of

BCcompared to that previous study, which injected 5Tg into a single column at a resolution four times

as coarse as ours. The more concentrated BCin the prevîous study likely produced faster heating and rise
into the stratosphere, mitigating rainout. Our calculated rainout contrasts with the lack of significant rain­

out calculated by the GISSModelE [Robocket al., 2007b], which assumes that BCis initially hydrophobie
and becomes hydrophilic with a 24 h e-folding ti me scale. The mass burden reaching the stratosphere and

impacts on global climate and chemistry in our calculations would doubtless be greater had we made

MILL$ ETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 164 ©JAGU. Earth'sFuture 10.1002/2013EF000205

0.001

0.01 80

70
<il 0.1
a. 60 Ê
-s 6
i" 50 :E
" 40 "';
i" I
a. 10 30

100 20

10

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Time (years since BC injection)
9
Figure 1. The time evolution of BCmass mixing ratio (kg BC/10 kg air) is shown for the average of the 50 nm experiment ensemble.
The horizontal axis shows time in years sinee the emission of 5 Tg BCat 150-300 hPa on 1 January.

BC Op1icalDep1h

90"N 0.15

60°N 0.13

0.11
30°N
"" 0.09
0 -~ 0.07
--'
30°8 ~ 0.05

:;: 0.04
60°8
. ~.0.
goos
0.02
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 0.01
Time (yearssinceBC injection)

Figure 2. The time evolution of zonal mean total column BCoptical depth in the visible part of the spectrum is shown for the SOnm
experiment ensemble average. The vertical axis shows latitude. The horizontal average shows time in years.

a similar assumption to the GISSModelStenkeetal[2013] calculate an initial rainout of .-v2Tg in their
interactive 5Tg simulations, which assumed BC radii of 50 and 100 nm in two separate runs. After initial
rainout,he mass e-folding time for our remaining BCis 8.7 years for the average of our 50 nm experiment

ensemble and 8.4 years for our 100 nm experiment, compared to the 6years reporRobocketal.
[2007b], ""6.5 yearsMillsetal[2008], 4-4.6yearreported byStenkeet a[2013], and 1year for strato­

spheric sulfate aerosolm typical volcanic eruptions [Oetnal., 2006]. Due to this longer lifetime,
after about 4.8 years the global mass burden of BCwe calculate in our ensemble is larger than that ca!­
culatedby the GISSModelE, despite the initial 28% rainout loss. After 10 years, we calculate that 1.1Tg of

BCremains in the atmosphere in our 50 nm experiment ensemble and 0.82 Tg in our 100 nm experiment,
compared to 0.54 Tg calculated by the GISSModelE and 0.07-0.14 Tg calculated by SOCOL3.

The long lifetime that we calculate results from both the very high inof SCto altitudes, where
removal from the stratosphere is slow, and the subsequent slowing down of the stratospheric residual cir­

culation. The Brewer-Dobson circulation is driven waves whose propagation is filtered by zonal winds,

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 165 ~AGU_ Earth'sFuture 10.1002/2013EF000205

-10

-15

0.0

-0.5

-1.0

-1.5

'o
E 0.0
g
c -0.1
0
-0.2
i
·~
o. -0.3

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26

Time (yearssince BCinjection)

Figure3. The monthly global mean time evolution is shawn for {a)the mass burden of black carbon {Tg),{b)the shortwave net flux
anomaly at the surface (W(c) the surface temperature anomaly (K),and (d} the precipitation anomaly (mm/day). The dark blue
dashed !ine and light blue shading show the average and range of our 50 nm experiment ensemble. The gold line shows our
simulation assuming a 100nm aerosol radius. The dark red dashed !ine and pink shading show the ensemble average and range for
Robock et al. [2007a, 2007b] (data courtesy L.Oman). The grey and green !ines show results from two 5 Tg BCsimulations from Stenke
et al[2013(data courtesy A.Stenke), wîth assumed aerosol radii of 50 and 100 nm, respectively. Ensemble anomalies are ca!cu!ated

with respect the mean of the respective control simulation ensembles. Time 0 corresponds to the date of the BCinjection (1
January in this study and 15 May in the ether studies).

which are modulated by temperature gradients [Garcia and Rondel, 2008]. As explained by Mifls et al.
[2008], the BCbath heats the stratosphere and cools the surface, reducing the strength of the strato­

spheric overturning circulation. Figure 4 shows the vertical winds in the lower stratosphere, which bring
new air up from the troposphere and drive the poleward circulation, for the control and BCruns.The

middle-atmosphere heating and surface cooling reduce the average velocity of tropical updrafts by more
than 50%. This effect persists more than twice as long asin Mills et al. [2008]. which did not include any

ocean caoling effects.

3.3. Global Mean Climate Anomalies

The global climate anomalies shawn in Figure 3 respond very similarly in our 50 nm experiment ensemble
and our 100 nm experiment; here we discuss the 50 nm calculations. The 3.6Tg of BCthat reaches the

middle atmosphere and spreads globally absorbs the incoming SWsolar radiation, reducing the net SW
flux at the surface by ,.2 /m1Winitially or about 8% (Figure 3b). This anomaly tracks the evolution of

the global mass burden of BCproportionally, simîlar to those calculated by GISSModelE and SOCOL3.
The SWflux in SOCOL3seems to be more sensitive to BCthan CESM1(WACCM),calculating comparable

initial flux reductionsh significantly lower BCburdens. ln contrast, GIS$ModelE and CESM1{WACCM)
have similar sensitivity, producing very comparable flux anomalies in years 5,when the global mass

burd ens match most closely for the two models. After 10years,our calculated SWflux anomaly persists at

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 166 ~AGU. Earth'sFuture 10.1002/2013EF000205

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

30 Ê
6
:E
·;;
I"'
20

30 Ê
6
:E

·"'
I 0.1
20

0.3

30 Ê 0.2
6
:E 0.1

·"'
I
20

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Time (years since BC injection)

Figure 4. The time evolution of the tropicallower stratospheric vertical wind (mm/s) is shown for (a)the control, (b) the 50 nm

experiment, and (c) and the experiment minus the control. Values are ensemble averages for latitudes 22"5 to 22•N. The horizontal
axis shows ti me in years. The left vertical axis shows pressure in hPa, and the right shows approximate pressure altitude in km.

-3.8 W/m 2,comparable to the maximum forcing of the 1991 Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption [Kirchner
etal.,1999]. This is 2.7 times that of the flux anomaly calculated by GISSModelE, with 2.0 times the mass

burden. SOCOL3fluxes have returned to normal after 10years as BCmass burdens become insignificant.
CESM1(WACCM)takes twice aslong (20 years)to do the same.

Our calculated global average surface temperatures drop by ....1....1K in the first year (Figure 3c).This
response is initially slower than that calculated by the GISSModelE, due to the large initial rainout, but

comparable to SOCOL3.The initial temperature anomalies for the three models correspond proportion­
ately to their initial SWanomalies. Our temperatures continue to decrease for 5years,however, reaching

a maximum cooling of 1.6Kin year 5, 2-2.5years after GIS$ModelE and SOCOL3begin warming from
their maximum cooling of comparable magnitude. After a decade, our calculated global average cooling

persists at "'1.1 K,two to four times that calculated by GIS$ModelE and SOCOL3.For CESMl(WACCM)
and GISSMadel E,this difference is roughly proportional with the ratio of massburdens calculated. Our

calculated cooling lags the recovery in mass burden and SWflux, however. Global average temperatures
remain 0.25-0.50 K below the control ensemble average in years 20-23, after SWfluxes have returned

to the control range. The thermal inertia of theoceans, which have experienced more than a decade of
prolonged cooling, is responsible for much of this lag.

Precipitation ratesdrop globally by "'"'0.18mm/day within the first year after the conflict. This 6% loss

in the global average persists for 5years,during which time our calculated response is not asstrong
asthat calculated by either GISSModelE or SOCOL3.The fairly constant precipitation anomaly that we

calculate over the first 5years is explained by the opposing trends in surface temperature and SWflux
over this period, which tend to cancel each other out. ln year 5, however, precipitation drops further as

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 167 10.1002/2013EF000205
~AGU_ Earth'sFuture

temperatures continue to faitreaching a maximum reduction of 9% in global precipitation while precip­

itation in the other two models is in their second year of recovery. Atthe end of a decade, our calculated
global precipitationsstill reduced by4.5%, and more than five times the reduction calculated at that time

by GISS ModelE or SOCOL3. After26 years, global average temperature and precipitation both remain
slightly below the control ensemble average.

3.4. Ocean and Sea lee Response
As Figure 5 shows, sea ice extent expands significantly over the first 5years in the Arctic, and the first

10 years inthe Antarctic. Sea ice extent is defined as the total area of alisurface grid points in the ocean
mode! with sea ice coverage greater

80 --------------------------------------------------------------·-·--
-------eres expe­
rience an earlier onset of sea ice for-
-SH mation in the autumn, as revealed
~ 60
Q) by the seasonal maxima, consistent
Ol -NH with Stenke et a[2013}.1nthe Arc­
c:
..ê 40 tic, sea ice extent increases peak at
Q 10%-25% in years 4-7. Antarctic sea
E
ice extent peaks at 20%-75% larger
~ 20 than the control ensemble in years

7-15, and remains 5%-10% larger
~ 0 throughout the years 20-26. These

vast expansions of sea ice affect not
only transfer of energy between the
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 atmosphere and the oceans but also

lime (years since BC injection) enhance planetary albedo, further
cooling the surface by retlecting more
Figure5. Change in sea ice (%)for the 50 nm experiment is shown
relative to control. Sea ice extent is defined as the area of ali sea surface gridxpanding sea ice
points with ice fraction greater than 15%.The red line shows the ensemble have large impacts on
average anoma!y for the Southern Hemisphere. The blue line shows the same for
ocean life,strongly impacting the
the Northern Hemisphere. Shading around each line shows the ranrange of organisms that are in equi­
experiment ensemble runs with respect to the control ensemble average. The
horizontal axis showsin years. The vertical axisshows relative change in icehe current climate [e.g.,
extent area, 1x0(experiment- control}/control. Harleyetal.,2006].

Wealso find that the upper layer of the ocean experiences a prolonged coolîng that penetrates to hun­

dreds of meters depth. Figure 6 shows the monthly global average ocean temperature anomalies at vari­
ous depths for the 50 nm experiment ensemble, including ensemble variability, compared to the control

ensemble average. Asthe figure shows, average cooling exceeding 0.5 Kextends to 100 m depth through
year 12.The upper 2.5 rn of the ocean has the same heat capacity per unit area as the whole depth of the
atmosphere [Gill1982]. Hence, this significant cooling down to 100 m depth creates a long-lived ther­

mal deficit that maintains reduced surface temperature for decades. The temperature response takes
longer to penetrate to deeper waters, with temperatures at 1000 m continuing to drop for ali 26 years

simulated.

3.5. Stratospheric Ozone loss

The absorbing BCnot only cools the surface but aIsoseverely heats the middle atmosphere (Figure 7).As
in Mills et [2008],we calculate initial global average temperature increases in excess of 80 Knear the

stratopause (50-60 km). As inRobocket al.[2007b], we calculate global average stratospheric heating in
excess of 30 Kfor the first 5 years. Figure 7 aIso reveals the surface cooling discussed above, as weil as a

cooling ofthe atmosphere above the BClayer,consistent with Robocket al.[2007b].

Asin Mills et a[2008],we calculate massive ozone loss as a consequence of these extreme stratospheric
temperatures (Figure 8). Consistent with that work, we calculate a global average column ozone loss of

20%-25% persisting from the second through the fifth year after the nudear war, and recoverîng to 8%
column loss at the end of 10 years. Throughout the first 5 years, column ozone is reduced by 30%-40% at

midlatitudes and by 50%-60% at northern high latitudes.

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 168 ~AGU Earth'sfuture 10.1002/2013EF000205

AsMills et al. [2008] discussed, this
ozone loss results primarily from two
0.00
temperature-sensitive catalytic Joss
cycles involving odd oxygen and odd
nitrogen, which accelerate at high
g -0.20
temperatures. ln addition, analysis of
il! our current results shows that heat-
'§
-0.40 ing of the tropical tropopausallows
"' up to 4.3 times as much water vapor
E
~ -0.60 to enter the lower stratosphere. The
enhanced water vapor has a twofold
effecton depleting ozone. Photolysis of

·0.80 water vapor produces bath odd hydro­
gen and excited-state atomic oxygen,

0(1D),depending on the wavelength of
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 dissociating sunlight. 0(1D} is responsi­
Time (years sinee BC injection)
ble for the production of odd nitrogen
in the stratospherevia reaction with
Figure 6. The time evolution of the global average ocean temperN 0. Odd hydrogen has its own cat­
anomaly at various depthshown. The !ines show the monthly average2of the
experiment ensemble temperatures minus the monthly average of talytic cycle destroying ozone. We calcu­
ensemble. Shading around each shows the range of the experimentlate that odd hydrogen in the tropical
ensemble runs with respect tontrol ensemble average. The horizontal
axis shows timeyears. The vertical axis shows temperature in K.lower stratosphere is enhanced by fac­
tors of3-5.5 over the first 2 years after

the nuclear war. Similarly, O(l D) is enhanced in the same region by factors of OC7D) is not the major
lossmechanism for N:zÜin the stratosphere, however, and N20 levels are initially slightly elevated in the

tropical stratospherelikely due to uplift by the initial rise of the plume, as described by Mills et al. [2008].
Subsequent slowing of the stratospheric circulation produces reduced 20 levels, as increased age of air
results in increasedhemicalloss.

Ozone production rates are highest in the Tropics, where !osses are dominateby transport of ozone to

higher latitudes. As air is transporpoleward, the chemicallosses accumulate, leading to higher col­
umn losses at higher latitudes. At southern high latitudes, ozone !osses are mitigated by the elimination

0.001
70

0.01 80 50

70
0.1 30
a. 60
"E. Ê 10
Π50 6
:E 7
"' 40 "'
a. '"
10 30 5

20 3
100
10

_,

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Time (years since SC injection)

Figure 7. The time evolution of the vertical profile of global average temperature anomaly is shown. Values are for the SOnm
experiment ensemble average minus the control ensemble average. The horizontal axisshows time in years. The left vertical axis
shows pressure in hPa, and the right vertical axis shows approximate pressure altitude in km. Contours show temperature anomalies
in K.

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors.
169 ~AGU. Earth'sFuture 10.1002/2013EF000205

0 Column change(%)
3
~
90°N 5

60°N 2
-2

30°N -5

""' -10
0
-' ·20
30°8 -30

-40
60'S
-50

goos -60

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 -70
Time (years since BC injection)

Figur8. The time evolution of the change(%) in zonal mean column ozone is shown. The change in the SOnm experiment
ensemble average shown relative to the control ensemble average: 100% x (experiment- control)/control. The horizontal axis
shows time in years. The vertical axis shows latitude.

of the seasonal Antarctic ozone hole, which normally results from heterogeneous chemistry occurring on

polar stratospheric clouds (PSCs)only at the extreme law temperatures present in the Antarctic strato­
sphere. We do not include effects of heterogeneous chemistry on BCaerosol, which is lessunderstood

than chemistry on sulfates andCs.

3.6. Changesin SurfaceUVRadiation

We used the TUV {tropospheric ultraviolet-visible) madel [Madronich and Flocke,1997] to calculate the
impacts of this massive ozone losson fluxes of damaging UVradiation reaching the Earth'ssurface. TUV

simulates the attenuation of sunlight on its journey through Earth'satmosphere. The madel has been
used to study a wide range of tapies including chemistry of the remote [Walegaet al., 1992] and urban

atmosphere [Castroet al., 2001], chemistry within snowpacks [Fisheret al., 2005], incidence of skin cancer
[Thomaset al., 2007], methane emissions from plants [Bioom et al., 2010], and potential changes to UV

resulting from asteroid impacts [Pierazzoet al., 2010] and geoengineering [Ti/meset al., 2012]. The method
used in this study is based on that described by Lee-Tayloret al. [2010].

We used TUVto calculate UVfluxes for clear sky conditions, based on the monthly average column ozone

and absorbing BCdistributions calculated for the control and experiment ensemble averages of our
CESM1{WACCM)runs.To reduce computational overhead, we precalculated lookup tables of UVvariation

with respect to ozone, solar zenith angle (8), and surface elevation, using the full80 km atmospheric
column considered by TUV.We then constructed global distributions of UVfrom the modeled WACCM

ozone distributions using Beer'slaw to account for the slant-path absorption by the stratospheric BC,
performing the calculation daily to account for vaa.We express the monthly averaged UVresults in

terms of the international UV Index (UVI) [WHO,WMO, UNEP,and ICNIRP,2002], which weights noontime
UVfluxes by an "action spectrum" to account for the wavelength dependence of the effectiveness of solar

radiation at causing skin damage [McKinlay andDiffey, 1987].

Figure 9 showsUVI in the peak summer months of June for the Northern Hemisphere and December for
the Southern Hemisphere. The World Health Organization recommends that sun protection measures be

taken for UVindices of 3 and above, and characterizes UVIvalues of 8-10 as"very high," warranting extra
protection measuresto avold exposure to sunlight during midday hours. UVIgreater than 11 is consid­

ered "extreme." We calculate UVI increases of 3-6 throughout the midlatitudes in summer, bringing peak
valuesoff the charts at 12-21 over the most populo us regions of North America and southern Europe in

June. We fnd similar increasesfor Australia, New Zealand, southern Africa, and South America in Decem­
ber. Skin damage variesith skin type, wîth burn times înversely proportional to UVI.Hence,a moderately

fair-skinned North American who experiences a painful, notîceable sunburn after 10 min in the sun at
noon in June for a UVIof 10 would receive an equivalent level of damage after6.25 min for a UVIof 16.

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 170 ~AGU. Earth'sFuture 10.1002/2013EF000205

i

so•w o· 90"E 180" 180° so·w o• 90"E 180"
Longüude Longitude
3 6 9-12 15 18 21 24 27
75"N
60"N!l_l.\il,$~~>'§"~~ ·~m-- .. -,.._..,~-~~
3i~ ·::>.>~>..-';;»."<'~'._.~"-""-""2@§~"" "LZO~~ 0"'P"&%"SJ'"~~~,"~"\;0,_~
. .
~ 15"N- ~
o·~~~~~~"'S'%:*"'" \.~,~.2""'till ""'"-" ,_"'G~S'fu"'.·<'-"".'~"~<';;"*"!kW
15"8 ~ ~- &~
30"S -~ "'
tao• so·w o• 90"E 180" 180° so·w o• 90"E
Long~ude Longitude

~

~

90"E 180° 90"W o• 90"E
longitude h",'<-,>i N longitude
-0.50.5 1.52.5 3.5 4.5 5.5

Figure 9. UVindex in June (left) and December (right) is shawn for th(cd), and the experimenteriment
minusthe controf)Values are ensemble averages for year 3.

Stenke et a[2013] calculate similarly dramatic increases in UV radiation due to ozone loss.They aIso
report that the attenuation of solar fluxes from BCabsorption was significant enough in high-latitude

winter to reduce UVlevels by 30% when they are most needed for vitamin D production. ln contrast, we
do not find that BCattenuation is sîgnificant enough to offset the UV increasesfrom ozone loss.

The calculations shown in Figure 9 include absorption of UV by the BC,but not scattering, which presents
an additional source of uncertainty. We performed a sensitivity test at 305 nm using a nominal single­

scattering albedo of 0.31 for a 1 km depth soot layer centered on 27 km and a total ozone column of
200 DU.We calculate that BCscattering produces small reductions in ground-level UVirradiance, rang­

ing from 4% for overhead sun and soot optical depth of 0.05 to 12%for() of 88" and soot optical depth

of 0.1. Hence, scattering would only marginally offset the 30%-100% increasesin UVirradiance that we
calculate for summer in the extratropics.

3.7. Effects on Vegetation and Agriculture

The severe increasesin UVradiation following a regional nuclear war would occur in conjunction with the
coldest average surface temperatures in the last 10[Mannetal.,1999]. Although global average

surface temperatures would drop by 1.5 K(Figure 3c), broad, populated regions of continental landmasses

would experience significantly larger cooling, asshown in Figure 10.Winters (JJA)in southern Africa and
South America would be up to 2.5 Kcooler on average for 5 years,compared to the same years (2-6) in

the control run. Most of North America, Asia,Europe, and the Middle Eastwould experience winters (DJF)
that are 2.5-6 Kcooler than the control ensemble, and summers (JJA)1-4 Kcooler.

Similarly, the 6% global average drop in precipitation that persists through years 2-6 {Figure 3d) trans­
lates into more significant regional drying (Figure 11).The most evident feature is over the Asian monsoon

region, including the Middle,the lndian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. Broad precipitation reduc­
tions of 0.5-1.5 mm/day would reduce annual rainfall by 20%-80%. Similarly, large relative reductions in

rainfall would occur in the Amazon region of South America, and southern Africa. The American South­

west and Western Australia would be 20%-60% drRobocketal.[2007b] predict a broadly wetter Sahel
region asa result of a weaker Hadley circuStenkeet a[2013] do not find such increased precipita­

tion, and nor do we, despite sorne increase in precipitation near Morocco.

FollowinRobocketal.[2007b], we have calculated the change in the frost-free growing season,defined

asthe number of consecutive days in a 1year period with minimum temperatures above O"C(Figure 12).

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 171 ~AGU_ Earth's Future 10.1002/2013EF000205

0.5

-0.5

-1

-1.5

-2
90°E 180°

-2.5

-3

-4

-5

-6

-8

Figure 10. Change in surface temperature (K)for (a)June to August and (b) December to February. Values are Syear seasona!

ensemble averages for years 2-6, experiment minus control.

Because our globally averaged surface temperatures continue to cool until year 6, we show the average
change in the growing season over years 2-6. The length ofthe average growing season is reduced by up

to 40 days throughout the world'sagricultural zones over these 5 years. This issimilar to the results that
Robock et al. [2007b] report for their first year, with significant regional differences. We find more signif­

icant decreases in Russia,North Africa, the Middle East and the Himalayas than the previous study, and
somewhat smaller effects in the American Midwest and South America.

The land component in CESMl (WACCM)is CLM4CN, acomprehensive land carbon cycle mode! [Lawrence
etal.,2011]. CLM4CN is prognostic with respect to carbon and nitrogen state variables in vegetation, litter,

and soil organic matter. Vegetation carbon is affected by temperature, precipitation, solar radiation (and
itspartitioning into direct and diffuse radiation), humidity, soil moisture, and nitrogen availability, among

other factors. We calculate an average loss of 11 Pg Cfrom vegetation (2% of the total), which equates
to an increase in atmospheric C0 of about 5 ppmv (Sx 10- molec/molec air). We also note a significant
2
(42%-46%) increase in C loss from fires in the Amazon over the first 8 years in two of our three 50 nm
experiment ensemble. The third run showed Amazon fire loss 13% higher than the control average, but

within the variabilîty of the control ensemble. Our runs do not account fort he atmospheric effects of C02
or smoke emissions from the land component, but the smoke from the Amazon-kindled fires would be a

positive feedback that would enhance the cooling we have found.

4. Discussion

Pierazzoetal. [2010] reviewed literature considering the effects of large and prolonged increases in
UV-B radiation, similar to those we calculate, on living organisms, including agriculture and marine

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 172 10.1002/2013EF000205
~AGU_Earth'sfuture

2

1.5

0.5

-1

-2

90°E 180°

80

60

40

Figure 11. Changes in (a)absolute (mm/day) and (b}(%}surface precipitation. Values are 5year seasonal ensemble averages
for June to August, years 2-6, experiment minus control.

30°N
-,
15°N
15°8

30°8

45°8 §]

60°8

75°8
180° 90°W o• 90"'E

Figure 12. Change in frost-free growing season in days for (a)January to December in the Northern Hemisphere and {b)July to June
in the Southern Hemisphere. Values are 5year seasonal ensemble averages for years 2-6, experiment minus control.

ecosystems. General effects on terrestrial plants have been found to include reduced height, shoot mass,
and foliage area [Caldwellet al.2007]. Walbot [1999] fou nd the DNA damage to maize crops from 33%

ozone depletion to accumulate proportionally to exposure time, being passed to successive generations,
and destabilizing genetic lnes. Researchindicates that UV-B exposure may alter the susceptibility of

plants to attack by insects, alter nutrient cyding in soils (induding nitrogen fixation by cyanobacteria),
and shift competitive balances among species [Caldwelfetal.,1998; Solheimetal., 2002; Mpoloka, 2008].

MILLSETAL. © 2014 The Authors. 173 ~AGU. Earth'sFuture 10.1002/2013EF000205

The ozone depletion we calculate couIdalso damage aquatic ecosystems, which supply more than 30%
of the animal protein consumed by humans. Hiideretal. [1995]estimate that 16%ozone depletion could

reduce phytoplankton, the basis of the marine food chain, by 5%, resulting in a Jossof 7 million tons of
fish harvest per year.They a!so report that elevated UVlevels damage the early developmental stages of

fish, shrimp, crab, amphibians, and other animais. The combined effects of elevated UVlevels alone on
terrestrial agriculture and marine ecosystems could put significant pressures on global food security.

The ozone loss would persist for a decade at the same time that growing seasons would be reduced by
killingfrosts, and regional precipitation patterns would shift. The combination of years of killingfrosts,

reductions in needed precipitation, and prolonged enhancement of UVradiation, in addition to impacts
on fisheries because of temperature and salinity changes, could exert significant pressures on food sup­

plies across many regions of the globe. Asthe January to May2008 global rice crisisdemonstrated, even
relativelysmall food priee pressures can be amplified by political reactions, such as the fearful restrictions

on food exports implemented by lndia and Vietnam, followed by Egypt, Pakistan, and Brazil,which pro­
duced severe shortages in the Philippines, Africa,and LatinAmerica [51ayton,2009]. lt isconceivable that

the global pressures on food supplies from a regional nuclear conflict could, directly or via ensuing panic,
significantly degrade global food security or even produce a global nuclear famine.

S.Summary

We present the first simulations of the chemistry-climate effects of smoke produced by a nuclear war
using an Earth system mode! that includes both stratospheric chemistry and feedbacks on sea lee

and deep ocean circulation. We calculate impacts on surface climate persisting significantly longer
than previous studies, as a result of severa! feedback mechanisms. First,BCabsorbs sunlight, heating

amblent air,and self-lofts to the upper stratosphere, a region treated with greater vertical resolution
in CESM1(WACCMt)han in the mode! used by Robock etal. [2007b]. Second, the BCspreads globally,

absorbing sunlight, which heats the stratosphere and cools the surface. This has the effect of reducing
the strength of the stratospheric circulation and increasing the lifetime of BCin the stratosphere. Third,

the reduction of surface temperatures cools the upper 100 m of the ocean by >0.5 Kfor 12 years, and
expands ice extent on sea and land. This lends inertia to the surface cooling due to both thermal mass

and enhanced albedo, causing recovery in surface temperatures to lag the recovery in BCby a decade or
more. Asa result, we calculate that surface temperatures remain below the control ensemble range even

26 years afterthe nuclear war.

Ao:::knowledgments The global average temperature increase in the stratosphere following the BCinjection initiallyexceeds
We thank Luke Oman and Andrea
Stenke for providing us With data 70 K,and persists above 30 Kfor 5 years, with full recovery taking two decades. Asin previous studies, this
from their simulations. We thank temperature increase produces global ozone Josson a scale never observed, as a result ofsevera! chemical
Jean-FrançoisLamarque, RyanNeely,
mechanisms. The resulting enhancements to UVradiation at the surface would be directly damaging to
Charles Bardeen, Andrew Gettel- human health, and would damage agricultural crops, as weil as ecosystems on land and in the oceans.
man, Anja Schmidt, an anonymous
reviewer, and associate editor for These results illustrate sorne of the severe negative consequences of the use of only 100 of the smallest
their constructiveut on this work.
Simulations conducted for this work nuclear weapons in modern megacities. Yet the United States, Russia,the United Kingdom, China, and
were conducted at NASAHigh End France each have stockpiles of much larger nuclear weapons that dwarf the 100 examined here [Robock
Computing Capability's Pleiades elus­
etal.,2007a; Toonetal., 2007]. Knowingthe perils to human society and other forms of !ifeon Earth of
ter, with computing time supported
by NASAgrant NNX09AK71G.Alan even small numbers of nuclear weapons, societies can better understand the urgent need to eliminate
Robock is supported by NSFgrant this danger worldwide.
AG5-1157525.The National Center for
Atmospherk Research is supported
by the U.S.National ScienceFounda­ References

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MILLSETAL. © 2014 TheAuthors. 176 ANNEX10

ANNEx10- House of Commons Defence Committee, 'The Future of the UK's

Nuclear Deterrent: the White Paper' (HC 225-1), Vol. 1, ch. 2

2 The UK'snuclear deterrent

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cm.tsp19 ANNEXll

ANNEx11- House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2005-06, Eighth

Report, para. 21

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986.pdf

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K!ng;i atmnnll.aftaliill:oh;p_bee~gh refit.a'

T!><iw;,rlwi!!Jd

22.-'I.ui:kr arht."'!itut~tip ilf;tridem lli:m-trw~4:-~~ Mdd
w..;;mufutetl:wUK.u.tAWmk-W-!!apc~l~eni àt At&fil~. Cl.l;~~.
~ p®1k infntma.tJimknfutlruJ :A~âOO:oUlC:iTrident U~-e­

iu~:rt «·ndŒdy rèaW tu tru.Amet\f'J\Vii:theada.,.-the:t~ad-iea
wJt1-yïdlfMUill!"fkû\216fiS.:.'~

23Dw:io .'l"''i~ï!wtJnît;Su~ inà.1a~. t;~ ar-&&-t.aL"15.M UK
cu'Uahoradacly olllidiwoo~ W thathct::aa rd 1:1('nu-r~ 1..~r
betw' te~US anâ the U\'w~ ~ tŒdlhMtf liieimrii'>-WWo"ffthe 1958

MuW:al&îi!...:gttt-ttllef~~"-'hkthi.;;cooper. ùuhlhë';;.':beth
pri nd.;cleh.:tutiun..

1-i.Thè Utes.Trtdent :})'Sttmis uly·.range:of ;mppctindusi ;.:n:.l~

manuf;.o;cru;.frastf'lli:tut<:.

25The~--nbm hlsn.~t'-intettl1.'Nil<iÎ~ .3l.F 3t:t:d.tisùP..M!

to the t,i-rh1enJ...Ulnf•.tlf.>l&im.fof ovtt 7,,1Ji5ah6 hûmeto­
i.:-Otl\'l.i :..b"iattit:en~:riy:hll:ù- .onbna1he-àll~­
d~ SSBN,souhmM acci.a.\~n~lttm.rlUlC5l:rW-.t D5mlsslatthett-ny.a!

N-avJlAnn.mlc·nq.atÇoW.jX!'!lFM.kine.

26.The-tlltÛlO.t'-1:.sconstrw:tian amaint-t' i'~..uitucl'This:

m.m_pries~e:ildiyarda~w-ID-Fum~ Cum,briil'ribyEAE Sy--i ~i~~
~ -t.:~p. aer:_aiM:ksup.or&1!teD~vMpor Pltn:Juthi.'l;d·oML (,a
ronrortiofwi-JdJlfty p-ce;:tttMle·nythUS fismHalli.b:utron1.i,fp1a1nilo

thdefmxeir:d'U!ia.lt'har-.J :cruntf~mda ttlgJîp«W~ atl;ÎM,-O.d
W'Otktt.end iarg..lk purp-ttse-.-builptin&asaUL---ra.gcth t~te\
n~-emen t.zp:r-i$W:at~0!$ ofÛ1iImda-r-pu-weredsubm.mns ie,f:wm

coru:eptdc;ügnthr.o~"'!a m aiio.nct .mdj~~- àüd .:~iûc;mtlevds:

l'~il:>'~!1i;.,l;ih.;;'>i;l;<.kU.~~'~.;;t.~)fttS:ro
;&ll;!i4.

:;:1 1~~ *>f'·!~l1~~,t'li~!',;,~_"l'f<i""*'..,Qw:tjj .rà'b ANNEX12

ANNEx12- J. Ainslie, "United Kingdom" in Assuring Destrnction Forever: Nuclear

WeaponModemization Around the World, Reaching Critical Will, 2012, p. 68.

Available online at

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents!Publications/modemi
zation!as

suring-destructi on-forever.pdf

ak~ f..w Mii'eacton a~cl -htRclt~

Wkn tk üK N.Om~m d.eddedtu~if' h.rire g~ lnOeclrthi:tUnŒm>l;i1~'\-:W. ~a$l
T;ridesy~~ _f;~:! thatt_wmddncid~Ig~ :mbm.lffll'--oDe•rUttp~ky,ml -cilfuyŒ
:n.ifk.;mt atudift~.hlhltoi"lhlgh~{j';~;-'*-tailaprut~ stlibnr Mr~Œ~J:HttMSltl~
rid::untnfu:{HEU)}"'-Piutaw:aproduŒd in Gm.Daon~ 'ta~nukt~t d~adawn this:_rin;;:±mi

theUK~H~l!wo3S~ :fu:th'UnitSW~.'l' in~ !rui!a-~q t-o-m.!''im:!tUJU.&
Ana~'l)';l:a-~ ufi~hl~ ph.iw.nmm. 1'htM~tt lrn-i."hlsi"'wM4W~ .tS~'
tl:mm_.\..~~bi tbt CaMerH.ili.trd:Chapet'"'.~eo'v1~-n~n .:nk::tllppTridmt.~

aoo pC'ifie[J 'Si-:.l~~nronoo'lltm:apon" tindud_t~..d. Cm""tt:fmnmuniea ui ­:T~
tr~ piutnn!tfur~ C.:!tnp i~.}Tbere
Tridenprttgr.amm>! be-· ~ th~ kq·f:ciîù:~

twj!m 11:}S~s,~Tn~d the:N~i:~ lt"ott
$tm:k_pcf mil.lllu.~ .;T;n-j~ Limtm. un->
ttrni'roStu3-.um-lie'& 1-knwiithth! MoM~tn

hf t~;_·whm the L'tt{ .8ur~- în-Wbitel:w!J.
~ptud~M:tronP. ~.~..akln1999-ih;:- ~n1;Jll:a-~nd~'rakF~:ntt(CT P<}!t~:­fS..at~
pht.eu,J~s of!IO~J*:: pnu..ihm eur~di;- li­nt lnhiH~iuJ-q_N u.uttêtot,..üdd-1.!~

~-ntetn ;.Q~tuaord;s,lgj -t:GQ_w~l_hn; .am-Ct~Oi éia:iitC~!nh_t-dieün-lcii-Wtmtl
nΠmbje.c~uth.i:-i!l<f 'Afiu~Uds}>h!!-!'Lfltbunk.:.\~ln>h thaet~~m 'i:hltll'K';;;::fu-e40:vntml
WDul dppw t,b~lad..m.ti> ~-le ~-tni~i-ti71tJand~~~*~- Uuncll llwtiw:ti&r.di-w-oul
pw.~bmM whlrn Stirulrjecltnt~Wiii Mlfè~-~ Wt:it®et.ûœi.tii t.ebl~&.fo;it~e-DémŒ

g~, inotd&itt-ti.nuh!rli® Wil:rk&t."""' -t'nmmunitM.iPb5Ytill'a;lr.iù CM~m-11'w
'bi:1.he6tipetnl:tN!pub.!~ _.:i: {!ai ~acy rn~ .l.'!aiti:b'tinkigtitttw-rornatt "A-'ith:uth­
thehlst~c i.tmruingfH.Elihi:t.epm~sharl JiMÛn ~m>e 'iny I..im'Frequ»ngtw'-tmn.~·

itndrt.sh.~stk.tt h:;al.amPUtii:ut''HEU'!4.f~<It-SkdmnMi kthaniinCumhria,.
t:füK hii~Uir-~ ediù-li<i:z-66n!i"J472. ThiiStr:t !ttpO!.~üur. ft.e_watPro.îeci
-~ of ibh:.h-.1dt~'t'd !,ewiDak!afu:l:" Tmurt(S'V\'itt.Abb\~fo i&dbtQ~dM kt.­

o-n.-6tunne 'Th~tJ'p:rodrub~~~n 4 and5- siiDah:~~ frtke Tridp~•rn.:.
~ oH·ŒV.lt ê4~tmt bet-""-J5.;1{i!JfÛ.a
Tbk hnpt~t!;tie \.~d .an.Addit~ î~Jiha~
tonne alHE.Uhum tvs·bt:~ :a~~ zft\l-j.-"" mtzF.TOI

Tlw~ri- ~ ~Mi:!ywkt. furmth~mA~ri;Ù lno~j~r- ~6 Pr~1> 14:Dnmiifup~
ii!kei. Lqlii<~ ~.H E!w -h.j;i;ttïrether M1n~- rfl.ligrffi~ ~orl: tÎBritish nuèl...:_;n
navat nm:brpropu~i ~.1mm<l" S!lrn.eothe w~ti pr-ut~· lftm:reièri:~ ~p$ 00.[:-­

Mrn:wil-~I hê ibrma-fU-_n.sulnn.u-A:~~~­ li~-~n)'Wt:kttto:m>lit!t:<U~ttiiz! t!~
n-lik anoontmAYlw!i.tr!(t;elce~-hi ~""t ti.K-oi.p:t•ftkl.J;ihth:lû-•rt::a:tn':J"
ten mnwvMdfr-e-ini>ühmarlnses;md-a~Ua.·"d

Mld. ·ho::eMdw: ~ ~JJ ftfru~:~emeacls
.utnewfuedfr-islik.m:<wn. 'l<l:~A:~m~_.;j1:Pmg::it--.1~71
l'he-ti-nnde-at~~ subm.:wffero~m:m-e Ttiï!llip.utnw-ntf.Œt%f.m~Û!w.N ':.e-t

.:n!..1Qfi.SOè'~g iin:'l\~np utt%~1gr;U Îe:p:ro~m -iupy_ild-teW~iMk{ w::.;~~
Thin~ ~ m~ 'b<ypl.ngW~rs. -withthit Unîrul rearttW]&lfMJ4A ~iji-b.ti ::Uth'wew.M.
~'the ti',Sm"-ff ,nl"'kJU~rap1t~l$t ~!iKp.Œ_fet.t1:etd'')j,f:r,:Juth~ po,.

-the-u-quisi!laoüuit5Trid<t'~~ p.ro~ ,sra:m n~nw"n'!pi:ttnm thDeknte Nudetti'
.&;vjtc-nmmi.;J'~~~·'âœn:l_tn~~~
toa_"W;ube-Mstd~fu: pigil:"l:.1-o-"r~
bh..i!!ùi.;«:t~U:'? p>jrt ~ihedthls:~1- p]m tŒdmoftùkatûtm*f

Nud~ waih~ arede'!.~ anapmd.:m-uih. h-n~u~r w.nbe>l{d.m:ipololM_~w .Af&up~
t'!!.!!hii A\1\'"tAMertmsro;nlmîkulf.~.&l~ d_)"" "rmM:&F bithAtmint, Ftmîng, Mtd Niin_g:
in: &rk.ihîeNwn& ,rt .Aide!~lnn~;:t ~~ !!.~ thom:m-ua. fuim-t-eti>.W.~pO"I$

JW-ml'!X.tt-plutm:.iEU.nd Beryl t._to­ Jttgt :t~k.sia-~omentimwdth<ffi;mdui;tk'!l
~bl:lil~-ôir ru-wathmà tksi;;n. Wàl'ht!.l.b are;pl>I«mM&F~,'il-
-MM"n~hl .B;dembde~is:~~hil.etd. futimcM~nin~ ~is. ~e .ltid john :b:id

\>'Jld ~iaat$d_~;u~ _tl~ i_rnmfada~ Hlîtd.dmd~ the ie.t:b.--be-Ml4Aup:StiUÎ!i
MidnQd--t";UWiltht< ûnl:nt..cwei.rtn~r~df<W-jec qu$M.~.-hf M~s~Pad'Qtil inci:
;ar!!flilru~e~1M ~m Sc.ru:land. .z:~- 'r.li'k· MaDm~1J.m' e"ds.r.ttWel)·

Stilnmi.t.lr-&S-3l:i;rmr.u:t: The~l. fuinll'i" UP!a."-td't.ttb ;:MhTrii~" ANNEX13

ANNEX 13- The Strategie Defence Review, published on 8 July 1998 Cm 3999

Tridentsubmarine.HM$ VICTOI'!tO,n !liais.

63. Similarly,we mustjudgeourweaponsrequirementsagainsllheWOts!circomstanŒsthal
wemlghtface OlieTrident'sRfe,ooweverremote!heymayseem loday.Thecredlhi!iof
deterrencealso dependson retalningan oplfonfor a limltedstrike!hatwoo!dnol aotomalicalty
lead to a fullscalenoclearexchange.UnlilŒPolatisand Chevaline,Tridentmus!a!sobe

capabléorperlorming!his 'sub-slrateglc'ro!e.

64.Againstthls background,laking intooocountTrident'sgreateraccoracy!han Polaris,!he
Revlew hasconc!uded!hatwe neadastockpifeof tess!hen 200operatfonallyavallab!e
wameads. Thisls a reduci!Onoflh!rfromlhe maximum of 300announéed by!he previous

governmentandrepresenlsareductionof mere!han 70% inthepotenllae~plos powverof
thedeterrentsinootheendof theCold War. ANNEX14

ANNEx 14- Ministry ofDefence, Statementon the DefenceEstimates 1995,Cm

2800 (HMSO: London, 1995),

https:/ww .gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/273324

/2800.pdf

re_~tü)'.~l_~~~t-~:~~{',:~œ~ra~{Î-~t-~:\pf~v~:f~_-~rit-~~s,:"n:~~:h'î)~:r_
-~~~-~-~~~-Tr<_ ~r.t---WfU:_fm."eh.
~'~~-:~-~1l(r~~~t!o~jf~~aid&_wt~_~y2%'
~~i>J!ti1ft:~\~1-"~:Wfi$-_'_Qriti~~w;~-ttJtt~~r;-l,'d~:~..h~
J~_en~:~' }..~~_3t1):mi~"m~at!ioo_-..:r.-._E~l~--<-~é<-_--_?:t:W'::-_1}
ill<"al1t{i:W:~V;a-!'.t.\-cl1~-Uti~:-_;i"~~;:~~'ctl_;L~<?~~-~-­
>tn~~i'.:r-_·_-!!_.t~r,·-_.f?.l1t-:~~t~~~:·,.-:._~­
et:.:·-~:)lf~_ =t:~~-~~~~~-tb:X~}·fiÎ!:~~-~-~::~~=-~W}':~~:
~~g~;~~'-~;,:~- ·_s._tti;Ü'.[j_~:j;~:ri~et1·.!ltt;id.:'St:itt'S-.=~w­
ioo.w·:n-:df.ct u_Etad,':h:::~-"Us-$hl:~

ïutaiSt(}i>kpStudpüi!'.ex~~~~ ~f'Yimwl-nfm..i1-"i!
numi:iel'54: pâW't!.t Ort~J:m~n;;-'"% pt}Wi!$ ANNEX15

ANNEX15- The Strategie Defence and Security Review, published on 19 October

2010 Cm 7948,

https://www.gov.uk/governmentluploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/62482/
strategic-defence-securitv-review.pdf

a.ss--;,i:eflO:app}}a't~ta:1-e:-.;: ;~-u~.r'3~~l4"Vi<.::urrer\r"delias-~w-

trtiaï t.hcn.~.;;r,-. prn00t~1-;·ed:':.,brJ;i ~nr"e-prt-.dfl,~~ t-o.
_in~ t~t~>t ~hrte;C..tYeû6tciéect bu!llëp~err .etTIlf";t;
thrttOfu\_ Kotts-•JS~.e- n.Usn4~.zs­
'.;:ur-~ t~MtiJSB~-Ctd\-=Ln.;;n±
d.ev~p T::g~ilmboÛ--"\Jelzoch~­ ,_deri-t)'ninaW}flnalg±c-~ëta~eè
dtiro- ~(n~-f"',~~p25e&~ b!t>ic;?h:ai,
'ih'!ii.te~rt.a fl!f -$,D~tmŒlf t~­ ,aœ;_% !rr.drs;in~turr!er-iO-f
'Sthmu, .aoü'.l:f; :
fub_cl-!r.~e>~i2l~ o.pfTif--tcJ:t
ti1~W~-OrlmiJtttne<:a!'<>W;i -,.·w.<h~Brlll~durlryl~.;: Ê-'t~iel~~;l

ar:op:t' f~-·y~Ji:ç;~rne>ac-e~~·taJ-'
buiida.'Sti~ s':1ti!V....§

.Üi1t~a:±: 10erthp~r~îo ÙC:>';rnmentAs:a re:ifurre:~~~d oft~matrc;,.~JD>
I'1E:t';-.equ!refnUrrèdi deœrr-e~œ
pubit: 'a,H.jrtl ffi!!-dl'rro.~Jll'T';s­
~_jt ~::::J\e;a\rih ~iet.r.)·n6~4)_ln
Ma::dl1.D07?arilll'me:ret:rW-~ùnlf'f',iJrf'i
<re-:îuttr;J!'fcf -.vachcr--.,rrM&{:
-nüé~dri#--.D~ed~n.h.t,IT§l''fh!."k.nt~t:!D! 'om>E3t--~-B
mi:!ElÎë~;~r·.- .nde!hep1r~!ÎoŒ
C-O\·ernl1lt.r.fui'nia p,rograren-rrton:od!Jc.-t.: ta(f..J,pet"litiet"~Ïy

~.;; lhaw:re.;Vng"U:aas::~u~-adn-€5 ~..~~ê '.?~;;f"om-+~~tr;al-itof'<i
vA~;!he'f-eair#kentJ":r2-0LOs.t~y m>~e t~,!1n

thisye~lrCaJiW,nm~ml"f freovern&J'd'..,.re:Ctiî""-fu.ide:ar'<\nt-O>:.~:pHeto
siatèdt!'<-wiiJ<lntnrl!ais'Kld~a.r
cte~n' a.dhNil-,gro'-d'1!r:!fl-ci'Jilir..rror'Ll-BOlo

-rrklrüibe~ucin:~ e:ch-va,*f.1'"' ~t"edu·~rurui c:c-~p~Jo n ~s:-I:o!n
mor;1L~<! Ù€.rt?:iNil'ont..m<êl""t~ eachsut1r:.a.rir,€{.

the caet~i;t~~ma-1t,,...mem.cs::y ·_r,:i~Ji'1fl:lt~e;;i->2dsentlV)!he'
rۥiNt hzs;e-<~1ctrr_ph:ie:d
-~4fu m.iè'tJ'e>'.t\>cil-led:--~ast~~~
"~T-~éGa.ernm.a\~. ;.!inaccntiï'OOUS Q;;,tbllîicr-kîpgrt:k !f.1bH~itno.oiy
rub.rn.arlned,;:::tldbeWn -tworkcl-­ .::k. .pendi-gfrpD tibl!if~- 1o;he

r~;;~ isi_iJ"1uh---r:ret.f.ithere:furer-tt))$2H'iexpe--dso.cf~ dBf~fTed
pr""~e. tedfEi>"1hlTH.~1:tdthE S~l$uritlrnt b.t-l'Uilm~o~e:jdi;<f:~r:gs
.:!niyOttI-.Îh'l::f_€Jt·s:JiU"r;WH'f'
_submarr~ffic;p errn~-~nte,_rorpcnhng
the:·:&aasd~il' :"tg.be!o~rr~:frrzt thirnrt;_;Jr-ediby:the nue%raritr~t.
in\<e. re5icn(tnfG~hYr~)1e?pj:::.rt:i".-::l; intenacf~""iti rt-Um:-cHJ'S

.arGthe.nextpel:tf!-ojed i::Cf'l.-d,nencf. .f.the:rdetaŒtouibei&:,.\<
!hêendothis:fe3t:

;,fThe l"'ll-!c':.'<~tla:hdŒera)!

cos!o~ subrnar;;"'wlreOrep!ar-€IT~if
p:rogrartme5znd ass-coei-a:\tuzrrer,ameci tmü·tm.Jr~ulrol o'.nif$"1Û'.l"ê
-wlttheL:îhl~~ esnn~ref atfe'17e~ .sr::-~!bf l.ve-~.eric iétha!irt-.alle;;

2f..l(2~){p:6s.h-:.drfv'$'-Ja!ufeor mi"tJdEEl·rwé.s,Jpa-,-viet~~-e-
'-\\<ill: c.Jttrra~lmn um"fioffHeiaA~~s

deter dEOsioruon a repto the:m onb-.. ~dac.'~lt'tbd;;;.rom:·~S-lU)_
·~o_ \J~:r*tt.~n.t~<:kiieriit"ca~ttrtt.
n;:rrt.v;v~ thiwinMuee ~J~t:fi.. !!;ÎmÊm!i;2n:ttk:~r81~r

·rwucme.::Œiof repl~eme :wbf a-'lir:.eqa .v-._~:fsm .f:.t-aA1:tcPi:J­
mls:Œ..e-pa.:i-rnent mcn th~ 20. V.viZfr-re.dtc~t'1Jmbé~
d cperail mirs-~-t"e~:i~-n,d:,:rd ANNEX16

ANNEx 16- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

http:1/www. sipri.org/research/ armaments/nuclear -forces

Read the fù11press nlease.

Ovcrall im'cntorics art cltdiuing, prinhlÙ1tUnited States ilild Russ:iatontinulng the drawdmm

of thcir nudear antn-als as a resultof tohMea:sttl"('f;oSr.the fu:dnçtÎOand Limitation of
Strategie OffcŒ_c rms (New STAKI) imd unilateral rcduction'i.,But the paçç-of rf-ductiom appt an to be

:Mowingtomplln'd v.a de-cadeago. Atht$1hlctimcalthenudt.>~1t $aacrn:tdmdernizing thcit­
remaîniug nudear fortes and appcar d(!tt:rmintd to tetaln .sizcablenuOrthet~t-ablcall"
fixture.

The USA and R.Itssiaconûnt6 rcQuç_tthcat's{':but at a slowt:rp⌠tfd•~t: aodand ha-,."t­
t..\.- modt~nzttoivp.togr-atm urtdcnva.y fw thcir rtmalningddi.,sr,y~.tewma~,hct nd l~

production fadliti-cs.The n~~lir ofthembcr s.mallrudear~ar smaedarcc;nmid~;;rahly
smailct, but aUare dther dcv-elopingor clcployingntw wcapous or havethei:intrntion to~o.

RrJiable infortnatioil on thufstht nudear anenah: and tap;thillties of tht uudstatrvr~es
nJnsidcrably: Tht USA ha.."diisrJoscl substanùal infortnation about its stockpile and furets, ârtd the UK aüd
France: have alm dcdartd wnu· infbrmaRus:. clmcs.to -dhdose the dt:tailcclbrt:akdown of hi;,forces

counted uüdtT the New ST.AKf trcaty (tnough it sharts theinformation with the USA.},•mdthe US
Gm'C.rilnltnt ha.'ii.itopptd releasing dctailcd infRus~-ioatdCnhintst nudear fOrces.

China, IndhinclPakistan an::the oi1lyil\"'eapùsi."ltcsthat arc -txp-andingthd-arstnab~
whih;L~r; a.ptdrs tlwwaiûng to:'$how the .situation ln Iran dc. hcre ist'inct :ns.ttirtg
in the -txptrt toîmrtt,mity that North Kon:a has pnxluccd a smaU numbct of nu_s distinct .....,a

from ruditnenta.ry nudear aplosivt deviees.

World nuclear f'orce•,January2014

/\lestima ac a.pt~.xirnate.

Year of :firstnuclear Deployed Other Total
Country lnventory
test warheads• warheads
United State-s 19·15 1920 5:!80 73(10

Rus.·ria 1949 160C 6400 80(Kl
Unit-cdKingdom 1952 16!l 65 225

France 196( 290 !() 300

China 1964 .. 25() 250
lndia 1974 .. 9\Hl(l 90-·!!0

Paklstan 1'99"8 -· HKH20 .. 1CWH20 ANNEx17

ANNEx17- Hansard, HC, 20 January 2015, col. 4WS (HCWS210),

http://www.publications. parliament.uk!palcm20 1415/cmhansrd/cm 150120/wmstext/1

50120m0001.htm#15012039000023

The Minista- for Ch·û S(~tRob-\''iî Thtâl)fetOfficw;~ lr~ thaa

-tashàdvâlli-efrom th<!C&ntsend~!rbŒnsou_ghftor Uk.SwL~. AutMrlty
(il:fetoIDthe Ststîss oorrtheSlmis:t~o;Re.jti.,.Sen.rk.et 2007).The
-liÎ'll·Cr~qusllr cdto~ttI!De~ttÎ.bircu'lari u"lnm~iintic reputkn~of

thy-t:endcrt:dibalance~

Plltliart.."yii.ufr:fd\<loites:~ of.ù-5,0w~i k scughtlJ.s:upptcmentru;

e.sti.mo-r tht:Stati$tlF.-c-nltaî~n~-:d .gcut-t-xpimdiest:imatcdat
!14.24,tlIMU~ metby repayi.:ihadv.am rùm.heCc,nt!n~P n.:dlts

(t!CWS20Sj

TREASUR.Y

Thef""IWUlrlçrela Ltyit~_Tn( arfDavidGauJuù:A doubleta:utinnagree:mcntand
p-roioloithrootiawas~d oo l5Jam:r:Mi;tTh!~xtofth!-.a~i:.f moiutrbaH!
bL"depŒitedlntheUbrmies-uf!xftüu andm:~dea•t::Ùloof.LR1cve:ma-ndCtt.'l•sn

website.'k~'w\~nhés:hedukd..dra(lOrdcinCuuru:Handtabdhre thHnus (1-f
Commuruln~ étlUJ:5e.

[HCWS2iJ9!

2lJanlllH 'Colmm! 4WS

DEFENCE

Th~Sttntary~ Sta tor-tnfen-(MichaelFalîon):fMi1flU$la~m rntn::ttakg!e
dd~nc aè s;..,"lyvie''('SD1.1t-9Oetober-10.,yrighthbn.Frl(!rPrimMîntskr

-.mnauncedU\\'nadre\'icws!door ntktèlT4.e ..:qWr~ Hn.CM .i.'lhrtWt:.eoofd
ddiv;;:-arcrtillbk:nudear dete~nwîiwnlr!1W!t-llpea:pai:»tdîW()uld
inc.arporat.reducti inilUé.emti.d-epfuyc~mty ami tbe futsu~r detcrr((ni

prov..u Thmrnmbetof dcployw.atbJtl!lrlosoélat:lùnbmarit<:Ûlfflom4~ o
MJthe uambe-rof qJttruio-nalmls.:!ik;;idass b::illmh-~aluc-arlncs (SSB_r...J
wouldhen:dilitu o'ffiIlidght; and w.c""'m.idr:e-numk.'fi~lli.':!naiiy

avaihtbkwarbeadstrfi-~t':nr60tnnoill!than i20.

11tethSem:bry ofSmte-torlkfuru::rigbbun.-Prithe.M~ forN·onnSo.tne'fSét

{LiaFol.)rumouo tche&use -o.-t>une-:0tOjjkiaRe-] hm-:um5s0-S:iW,hathe
progrn.mfnr.impiementin-2010SDSR W1.'1rhenrlr-ëboo..mlmmctH.:W. ANNEX18

ANNEx18- Hansard, HC Deb, 20 January 2015, col. 105,

http://www.publications. parliament. uk/pa/ cm201415/cmhansrd/cm 150120/debtext/15
0120-0002.htm

-det-ert-.ason,;;ontinoousa~:.m.mt a.dof,m.itsw:ewaniüprovi&ifi:thmost

.Cùst-(! w~yol"e~t~s~ebk v.henhéreadi

l\trehalalmru1rllltlliitRn.~ \\>'begrakfitotheMn.-Gentlema-f{c-iarl(,hai

he is Jilinoommiitl& ~onti:D:ool~snt.rle-h~ ~hah!\\1send a0..)'f Hms:e
Wi1:1ùÙtbèle>l~ idf~Ohp1:1:ithl.thal:thi!re-loogtheMY lin!e doobt D-~
S!:~n abauruhelè'Ofnruthls is a ctmti.auodderr-tnt.

MrSptibr:".fkrighih"1nentlemant,,puffingSh."'fJguno~re te-theOovcrnment·~
pMitîooilnumyof hiBad-~-c ùllk~u knt'-:e:tikofe~alit :iH~>n'tittn.oo
wi!bthiM2us-\he Î:inanunboly.coaiiwiltheUber.a!Derrillt-.w.DrprevenrlngMm

fromiilldns;:actki:mskingag~ .showf.k.buLmthesays th;Ulsbele n~i eihlmr~
nowbe:deartu th.Housi':'~

Michad F'aJio·therighiOO.ent~- anticl}Ysme. ct.~1 tt-w<atinturn-imke d~
thinwcan naw w:rmn t:um-tothpo-siDoofthUkrul DemeçrJll:n nnebandtheLiber&!
lkm.ocrahâv W~d ihatheywifff.~nd hlnioot~

andt-il-lakeù"Ut-dct1!rrenpian tintalroc.ornmlttherosd'l<t'tcirmü6ireŒnt

oonfere:n atowit,nursllbm:arlng~slüs.eawioo~d P.ll:ss1;'.hw~lu bed
JH'fint5atr ondthaÎ.a pt:J:Însu~: deteruntpt11i. he.rc.areno ti:kl!JIW)crai'>
in theMinis!ryDd-en nd ~!t'ctthat the-yMv.:-OO:U~A:r.!cli::WSfaakly,

da~c:r. ~pwproatxp!:inswhy.

T'h cuntr~f.i.thethr--ofnuct.:arhhu:::kmitfirlsin~gI"lt-ct.efco-ntemp-t!hie

-fort&"mtùm nationai:l"tMLlbt-rniDemocr.tosuggestththemightuse-theuitimat'i!
~_antn ôfuur_fr«dom anin~!!tlc aiso~ kJOOt1bargaint.~. imlooxgrubby
'1!!"-tdealn.Topit:mors-hn -tsynlythCon~en< aayttatw-enl:!tgamb·v,1he

5ct:Urn.fthllti- tio~hte.

Dr.luli:Lewis'WbilcmoS="'ary ofStlltedeol ~ilhtheLlh:rall:ltmùcms-only two
üf\\'helseè~nt:h: bamf:.trtoday-~ioonfirmthiapùlkyilsendinsuuarmed

:Submar tisa.and'\\;till~serist<arl!thensendin_tg:b&L-futportrnhe-Œamled
\1.-1e ..:-ncs-tanidlyby,is-1tetyore-di:ingeulnnapofict.1fk:eepge:n-part
alal-n n the-also.cunfumthatthcrewillne-vera;:atnbea deathCcmsen1:1tiesd

theLiberi)..," n d{aytfemian~nrt-cd.eea,s~re~11 i52{)1{fiatili~thi:ng
withwhichhehlMilli14togdo,butwhi.sboul:11evhra-b«n aliuV t~;a'èm.

MJcliaelt•alltltfThas;s:e ybunFrlt nnre~ns ti:ifustpolnt thatarenot
piannin_tgom>fumrede-airanykîndwiththeHb~! a-tnUCF.ll. th~--rm w--ep:éy:~
berdumtd. in May with iin-.absoiutcm.ajo-Œ&tohn:fence pülky totM ba~l:f

Ctu ..->tv'overruncnLAsfor myhim. ANNEX19

ANNEx19- Hansard, HC Deb, 18 October 1993, col. 34,

http://www.nublications. parliament.uk!pa!cm 199293/cmhansrd/1993-1 0-18/Debate­

Z.html

Column34

by fJ billion whlle socialsecurityexpenditurehas increasedin real termsby ±:29billion?That is

more than the entire-defencebudget.

If the Chancellor must look (or areas ln t(eut exp$'1dltl..tte,shoufd not hèlook first at tofsoàai securlty?

Hr. Rt1kind: I do not Wlstncomment on what the appropria te leve.!of social Sêû!rltyexpenditure- sMuid be. One can point to tM effectlv.é
way inwhich tM Govemment have been teSponsible fot the defence of the realm during the past 14 years. Consei'V1'ltiveGcvètnments have
ne~ trèaied detente lîghtty, and I be!feve that they never wlU.

The Whlti!:Papérhas <!Isocontlrmed our commltment to ma!ntainlrrg an effective long-.terin sunt~deatecpab!iity. ! told tne House

soma montils ago that we werè conslder1ng how bet-provlde this onŒ thè WE177 free-fall homb is wlthdrawn from servfŒ. Our
considerations were; compfeted d!Jringn~ces sn,I am able to annoonce our eor.duslons today.

A sub·si:ratégh: tapablllty remalM necessary, beŒuse a poteadvers . ght-gambie, onder certain cln::umstanŒ01our reluctance to
laund1an <111-ousttratégienuc!eat strlkre:spo tn~his aggrnssïolt is vital, the.refo-re,tMt we ptheeabilitvto undertake more
llmited nuclear action, tObe abléto -de!lUru:Q:U hes~aXea!o an aggressor that he must cease hiSa;ggres!>lonand withdraw or faŒ

the rlsk of eVéf'gireater damage. A:sub·strategic capablllty forms an essèntial tink be.tween convention <Ilarld strategie f.orŒ:s,as part of our
de;n- demonstration that aggre:ss!Ooflf. any klnd l.s:not a ratlonal option.

The Unitedl<îngdorn's sub~str aataeiîilcs cUtrently providby the WE177 bomb arrled en Tornade dua·l~paa ibrai. 1n the mld
to tate 19SOs,we sawthéneed to enterlnto thearly development of a sophlsticastand-offweapon whlch wou!d be abletc-penetrate the

lncreaslngty effective War:pactdefenŒs, <!ndwhkh woutd replace thécummt bomb. Theotype of .$:';'TeI bégan to examine ls krtown
asa taci:ictll air·i:O-Smissile, TASM. The :sewrlty drCl.l~éS haVé dlang!XI fundamenta!!sirlte then. a consequence, we have
concl-uded th.at prevlou:requlrement for a new stafid'"<lffnùdear weapon capabJ:not a sufficiently h!gh prlodjtistlthe
prororement ofa new ~udea system !n the Ct.Jrrentdn:;umstances. lnsweadwilplan,after thWE1n eventually teaves service in the

!ol'term, on exploitlnthe fle;db!.!ity..::apabilityof the Trident system to provlde the vthédde.Hveryof Oùrsub-strategic
deterrent.

The Trident systemisill'ldei:éetable,reliah!e, and att\Jtate li'lar~ cn carry our sub-strategic we!las strategŒpacity at ilttle
addltionalost. That is set agalnst what would be the hlgh cest of develcping a new system. We have no doit wibe admirab!y sultéd:

to the Mdltlona! role.

Mr. John Wilkinson {Ruisi1p--Northwo0d): Myrlght bon. a11dlearned Frleisannoundng afl eltŒedfngiy important rleclslon, wwî!l
effective!y enthehlstorlc rotethe RDyalAir Force as thpMmatY instrument of alea:ssub-strai:eglc deterreoce.

Why have. !'hGovemment come to a different conclusion from the defence sttategist:S of FranŒ, the

12/031201519:14
2of7 ANNEX20
ANNEX20- Text ofLetters exchanged between the Prime Minister and the President
of the United States and between the Secretary of State for Defence and the US
Secretary of Defense. The letters are reproduced in 'Polaris Sales Agreement between

the United States and the United Kingdom' signed in Washington on 6 April1963,
www.nuclearinfo.org/sites/default/files/Polaris%20Sales%20Agreement%2019
63.pdf

'l'reaty Series No. 59 (1963)

PolarisSalesAgreement

betweenthe Government of tbe
United Kinl}dom of Great Britaîn and Northern Iteland

and the Government of the United States o( America

(>u.wYedlt>Po.rlimneby!theSrt:Yfllof StaiforF<!NfgnA/fair6
by OlmmtJ!l(lt>fHu Maje!JY
Arlgmt196.]

LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATJONERY (IFPTCE

CmmL2l08POLARIS SALES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Govemment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
lreland and the Govemment of the United States of America, recalling and
affirmîng the"Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems" (') included in the
joint communiqué issued on December 21. 1962, by the Prime Minister of Her
Majesty's Govemment in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem

lreland and .the President of the United States of America, have agreed as
follows:-

ARTICLE l

1. The Govemment of the United States shall provide and the Govem-
111entof the United Kingdom shall purchase from the Government of the
United States Polaris missiles (Jess warheads), equipment, and supporting
services in accordance witb the terms and conditions of this Agreement.

2. This Agreement shall be subject to the understandings concerning
British submarines equîpped with Polaris missiles (referred to in paragraphs
8 and 9 of the Nassau " Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems") agreed
by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister at their meet­
ingheld in the Bahamas between December 18and 21, 1962.

ARTICLE II

1. In recogmuon of the complexity of the effort provided for in this
Agreement and the need for close coordination between the contracting
Governments in giving effect to its terms, the two Govemments shall promptly
establish the organizational machinery provided for in the following para­
graphs of this Article.

2. The Department of Defense, acting througb the Department of the
Navy, and the Admiralty, or such other agency as the Govemment of the

United Kingdom shaH designate, will be the Executive Agenciesof theirre­
spective Governments in carrying out the terms of this Agreement.Appro­
priate representatives of the Executive Agencies are authorized to enter into
such·technical arrangements, consistent with this Agreement, as may be neces­
sary.

3. A Project Officer will be designated by each Government's Executive
Agency with direct responsibility and authority for the management of the
activities of that Government under this Agreement. Each Project Officer
will designate liaison representatives, in such numbers as may be agreed, who

willbe authorized to act on his behalf in capacities specified in technical
arrangements and who will be attached to the Office of the other Project
Officer.

( Cmnd. 1915

2 4. A Joint Steering Task Group will be established by the Project Officers
to advise them, inter alia, concerning the development of new or modified
equipment to meet specifie requirements of the Government of the United
Kingdom. and concerning interfaces between the equipment provided by the
two Governments respectively. The Joint Steering Task Group will com­
prise the J>rojectOfficers (or their representatives). and principal liaison re­
presentatives, and may include selected leaders from among the scientists,

industrialists and government executives of the United Kingdom and of the
United St.'ltes. The Joint Steering Task Group will meet approximately
every three months alternately in the United Kingdom and in the United
States under the chairmanship of the resident Project Officer.

ARTICLE III
L The Government of the Qnited States (acting through its Executive
Agency) shall provide, pursuant to Article 1 of this Agreement, Polaris mis­
siles (Jess warheads), equipment, and supporting services of such types and

marks and in such quantities as the Government of the United Kingdom
may from time to timt require. and in configurations and in accordance with
delivery programs or time tables to be agreed between the Project Officers.
In the first instance the missiles, equipment, and supporting services provided
by the Government of the United States shall be sufficient to meet the rc­
quirementsof a program drawn up by the Government of the United Kingdom
and communicated to the Government of the United States prior to the entry
into force ofthis Agreement.

2. The missiles. equipment, and supporting services referred to in para-
graph 1of this articleare the following:

a. Polaris missileslesswarheads but including guidance capsules) ;
b. missilelaunching and handling systems :

c. missilefirecontrol systems ;
d. ships navigation systems;

e. additional associated, support. test, and training equipment and ser­
vicesincluding,but not limited to:
(i)test and check-out equipment, specialized power supplies, power

distribution systems and ·support equipment associated with the
items enumerated in subparagraphs a. b. c. and d. of this çara­
graph and adequate in type and quantity to meet the requirements
of installations both aboard ship and ashore ;
(ii) specialized equipment including the types specified in subçara­
graphs a. b. c, d, and e.{i) of this paragraph for use in such sup­
port and training facilities as may be provided by the Government
of the United Kingdom ;

{iii)construction spares and·spare parts adequate in scope and quantily
. to ensure the continued maintenance of the equipmcnt specified in
subparagraph a. b. c. d. e.(i). and e.(ii)of this paragraph ;

3
2664 (iv) (;tlatest available United States technical documentation includiog
specifications, blueprints, and manuals covering the missiles
and equipment listed in subparagraphs a, b, c. d, e (i), e(ii)
and e (iii)of this paragraph in sufficient scope and quantity
to cover safety requirements and permit successful transport,
installation. operation, and maintenance by the Government
of the United Kingdom of ali equipment purchased under the
terms of this Agreement ;

(b) latcst available United States technical documentation. as
may be necessary from time to time in individual cases, to
permit manufacture by the Government of the United King­
dom to the extent necessary for the maintenance, repair, and
modification of the items listed in subparagraphs a. b, c. d,
e.(i). e.(ii) andlii) of this paragraph ;
(v) services, including:

(a) use, as appropriate, of existing support and missile range
facilities in the United States ;

(b) assistance in program management techniques and, in addition.
those engineering and lead shipyard services required to en­
sure proper system integration, installation, and check-outin
the United Kingdom ; ~o the extent required and available,
appropriate modification, maintenance, and overhaul of the
equipment listed in subparagraph a, b, c, d, e.(i), e.(ii).e.(iii)of
this paragraph ;
(c) research, design, development, production, test, or other

engineering services as may be required to meet speci!ic
United Kingdom requirements ;
(d) training of naval and civil personnel in the service of the
Government of the United Kingdom and United Kingdom con­
tractors to the extent to which they are involved in the inspec­
tion, installation, operation, maintenance, repair, and modifi­
cation of the equipment listed in subparagraphs a. b. c, d. e.(i)
e.(ii).and.{iii)of this paragraph.

ARTICLE lV

Future developments relating to the Polaris Weapon System, including
ail modifications made thereto. by the Government of the United Kîngdom
or the Government of the United States shaH, in the areas enumerated in
Article III, be made reciprocal!y available through their Executive Agencies
inaccordance with the terms of this Agreement, reciprocally applied.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the United Kingdom will provide the submarincs in
which will be installed the missiles and equipment to be provided under this
Agreement, and will provide the warheads for these missiles. Close coordina­
. tion between the Executive Ageni::iesof the contractingGov~rnmc nillbe
4maintained in order to assure compatibility of equipmenL Information con­
cerning the hull. auxiliary machinery, and equipment of United States sub­
marines transmitted under the authority of this Agreement will be such as is
necessary to obtain a satisfactory interface between the equipment provided
by the two Governments respectively. This Agreement does not. however,
authorize the sale of. or transmittal of information concernîng. the nuclear
propulsion plants ofUnited Statessubmarines.

ARTICLE VI

1. ln carrying out this Agreement. the-Government of the United States
will use, to the extent practicable. established Department of Defense con­
tracting procedures and existing Polaris contracts. ln any event contracts
for production or work for the Government of the United Kingdom will be
incorporated in or placed on the same terms as those for the Government of
the United States. When appropriate the United States Project Officer will
direct that amendments be sought to existing contracts and that terms be
incorporated in new contracts to safeguard any special requirements of the
Government of the United Kingdom in the contract subject matter which
may arise in connection with this Agreement, for example, to provide for any
alterations or any reduction of quantities which maybe necessary.

2. The missilesand equipment provided by the Government of the United
Statesunder this Agreement shaHbe fabricated to the same documentation and
quality standards as are the counterparts for the United States Polaris
Program.
3. The missilesand equipment provided by the Government of the United
States under this Agreement will be integrated with the scheduled United
States Polaris Program and will be fabricated on a schedule which will make
the most efficient and economical use of existing United States production
!ines. Deliveries wîllbe made upon a schedule to be defined by the Govern­
ment of the United Kingdom. but which is consonant with the above fabri­
cation schedule.

ARTICLE Vll

1.The Government of the United States shall ensure that ail supplies
(which term throughout this Article includes. but without limitation. raw
materials. components, intermediate assemblies and end items) which it will
provide under this Agreement are inspected to the same extent and in the
same manner (including the granting of waivers and deviations) as are the
counterparts for the United States Polaris Program. The United Kingdom
Project Officer or his designated representative may observe the inspection
process and offer his advice to the United States Government Inspector re­
garding the inspection, without delay to. or impairment of the finality of. the
inspection by the Government of the United States.
2. The United States Project Officer through appropriate procedures will
notify the United Kingdom Project Officer when final inspection of each
end item will take place. and will furnish a certificate or certificates upon
completion of eacb sucb inspectionstating that this inspection bas been made
and that such end item has been accepted as having met ali requirements of
the relevant acceptance documentation (subject to any appropriate waivers

·5and deviations). Copies of acceptance documentation and quality standards,
together with reports required thereby, will be fumished to the United King­
dom ProjectOfficeror hisdesignated representative.

3. The Government of the United Kingdom will take delivery of the
supplies as agreed pursuant to Article X followinginspection, acceptance and
certification·by the Government of the United States. Delivery to the
Government of the United Kingdom shall not relieve the Govemment of the
United States fr<lm continuing responsibility for using its best endeavors
thereafter to secure the correction or replacement of any items found not to
have been manufactured in strict accordance with the documentation and
quality standards referred to in Article VI or to be otherwise defective. Such
corrections or replacements will be at the expense of the Government of the
United Kingdom to the extent they are not covered by warranty or guaranty or
otherwiserecoverable by the Government ofthe United States.

4. The Government of the United States will use its best endeavors to ob·
tain for or extend to the Government of the United Kingdom the benefit of
any guarantees or warranties negotiated with United States contractors or
subcontractors.

ARTICLE VIII
The Government of the United Kingdom shall indemnify and hold harm­
less the Government of the United States against any Iiabilityor loss resulting

from·unusually bazardons risks attributable to Polaris missiles or equipment
identifiable,respective!y. as missiles or equipment supplied or to be supplied
to the Govemment of the United Kingdom under this Agreement. Unusually
bazardons risks, for the purposes of this Agreement, are those defined by ap­
plicablestatutes of the United States, or by any appropriate administrative act
under the authorlty of such statutes, or held to exist by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The Government of the United States shall give the Government
of the United Kingdom immediate notice of any suit or action filed or of any
c!aim made to which the provisions of this Article may be relevant. Repre·
sentatives of the United Kingdom may be associated with the defense, before
a court of competent jurisdiction. of any claim which may be borne in whole
or in part by the Government of the United Kingdom. In procurement con­
tracts for supplies and services made pursuant to this Agreement the Govem­
ment of the United States isauthorized to include·unusually bazardons risk
indemnification provisions substantially similar to those included in its own
corresponding contracts.

ARTICLE lX

1. The Govemment of the United States will follow its normal procure­
ment practices in securing ali rights it considers to be essential to cnaiteto
provide the missiles and equipment to be supplied to the Government of the
United Kingdom under this Agreement. In addition, the Government of the
United States shal.l notify the Govemment of the United Kingdom of any
daim asserted hereafter for compensation for unlicensed use of patent rights
alleged to be involved in the supply of such missiles and equipment t:otbe
Govemment of the United Kingdom, and the two Govemments will consult as
to the appropriate disposition of suchclaim.

6 2. The (Jovernment of the United Kingdom shall reimburse the Govcrn­
mcnt of the United States for any payments made by the Government of the
United States in seUlement of liability, including cost and expenses, for un­

licensed use of any patent rights in the manufacture or sale of the missiles
and equipment supplied or to be supplied to the Govemment of the United
Kingdom under this Agreement.

ARTICLE X

1. Delivery of equipment other than missiles to be provided under this
Agreement for installation in submarines or supporting facilities to be pro­

vided by the Govemment of the United Kîngdom shall be the responsibility of
the Govermnent of the United States and shaH be made to those locations
within the United Kingdom where the equipment is required. ln addition to
delivery of such equipment. the Government of the United States shall, sub­
ject to reimbursement for costs incurred, be responsible for providing such
technical installationnd testing services as are required by the Govemment of
the United Kingdom for the satisfactory installation, check-out and testing of
that equipment in submarines and supporting facilities of the United Kingdom.

2.Dellvery of ali missiles shall be made to appropriate carriers of the
United Kingdom or, if it.is agreed, of the United States, at such United
States supply points as are agreed by the Executive Agencies of both Govern­

ments. The Govemment of the United States shall be responsible for the
initiai check-out of ali missiles provided under this Agreement.

ARTICLE Xl

• 1. The charges to the Government of the United Kingdom for missiles,
equipment, and services provided by the Government of the United States
will be:

a. The rtormal cost of missiles and equipment provided under the joint
United States-United Kingdom production program integrated in
accordance witb Article VI. This will be based on common contract
priees togethcr with charges for work done in United States Govem­
ment establishments and appropriate allowance for use of capital

facilities and for overhead costs.
b. An addition of 5% to the common contract priees under subparagraph
l.a. of this Article for missiles and equipment provided to theUnited
Kingdom, as a participation in the expenditures incurred by the
Government of the United States after January 1,1963. for research

and development.
c. Replacement cost of items provided from United States Govemment
stock or, with respect to items not currently being procured. the most
_recentprocurement cost.

d. The actual cost of any research. design. development. production, test
or other engineering effort, or other services required in the execution of
this Agreement to meet specifie United Kingdom requirements.

e. The cost of packing, crating. handling and transportation.

7 f. The actual costs of any other services, not specified above, which the

Project Officersagree are properly attributable to this Agreement.

2. Payments by the Government of the United Kingdom in accordance
with paragraph 1. of this Article shall be made in United States dollars. Pay­
rnents to United States agencies and contractors shaH be made, as they become
due, from a trust fund which will be administered by the United States
Project Officer. Ail payments out of the Trust Fund shall be certified to be in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement. The Trust Fund will consist

initiallyof a sum to be paid as soon as possible after entry into force of this
agreement and to be equivalent to the payments estimated to fall due during
the first calendar quarter of programme operations. Before the end of that
quarter and of each succeeding quarter deposits shall be made by the
Government of the United Kingdom with the object of having sufficient money
in the Fund to mee! all the calls which will be made upon it in the succeeding
three months.

3. lf at àny lime, the unexpended balance in the Trust Fund established
pursuant to paragraph 2. of this Article falls short of the sums that will be
needed in a Particular quarter by the Government of the United States to
cover;

a. payrnent for the value of items to be furnished from the stocks of. or
services to be rendered by, the Government of th_eUnited States;

b. payrnent by the Government of the United States to its suppliers for
items and services to be procured for the Government of the United
Kingdorn ; and
•
c. estimated liability or costs that may fall to be met by the Government
of the United States as a result of termination of such procurement
contracts at the behest of the Government of the United Kingdom :

the Government of the United Kingdom will pay at such time to the Govem­
ment of the United States such additional sums as will be due. Should the
total payments received from the Govemment of the United Kingdom provc
to be in excess of the final total costs to the Government of the UnitedStates.
appropriate refund will be made to the Government of the United Kingdom

at the earliest opportunity with final adjustment being made within thirty days
after determination of said final costs.

4. The United States Project Officer will maintain a record of expenditures
under this Agreement in accordance with established Navy Special Projects
Office Accounting procedures which record will be available for audit an­
nually by representatives of the Govemment of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE Xll

L The provisions of this Article conceming proprietary rights shall apply

to the work referred to in subparagraph l.d. of Article XI of this Agreement
(hereinafter called in this Article " the work "). 2. The Government of the United States shall ensure that the Government
of the United Kingdoro will receive a royalty·free, non-exclusive, irrevocable
license foritsgovernmental purposes:
a. to practice or cause to be practiced tbroughout the world. ali inven­
tions conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance
of the work ; and

b. to use or cause to be used throughout the world, all technical informa­
tion first produced in the performance of the work.

3. In addition, the Government of the United States shaU take the following
steps to ensure the right of the Govemment of the United Kingdom to re­
produce, by manufacturers of its own choice, items developed in the per­
formance of the work. In respect of those elements of this right not included
in subparagraphs 2.a. and 2.b. of this Article. the Government of the United

States shaH:
a. to the e){tent that it owns or controls such elements, accord free user
rights to the Government of the United Kingdom ;

b. obtain the agreement of contractors and subcontractors performing
the work to make available to the Goverrunent of the United Kingdom.
on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, those elements which the
contracter or subcontractor owns or controls at the commencement of
the work or acquires during the performance of the work ;
c. use its best endeavors to obtain for the Government of the United

Kingdom or to assist the Government of the United Kingdom to obtain
directty or through its own manufacturers. on fair and reasonable terros
and conditions, elements of this righi not covered by subparagraphs
2.a. and 2.b. of this Article.

4. The Government of the United States shaH also ensure that the Govem­
ment of the United Kingdom will receive the sanie rights as those referred to
in paragraphs 2. and 3. of this Article in respect of any roaterial now or here­
after covered by copyright produced or delivered in the perfom1ance of the
work.

5. The Government of the United States shall furnish to the Government of
the United Kingdom, in such quantities as may beagreed ;

a. aU documentation obtained by the Government of the United States
under contracts placed for the performance of the work ;
b. ali documentation, owned or controlled by the Government of the
United States, necessary fo! reproduction, by or on behalf of the:
Government of the United Kîngdom. of items developed during the

performance of the work.
6. It is understood that the Goverrunent of the United States will obtain for
itself such of.the rights referred to in subparagraphs 2.a., 2.b., and 3. of this

Article as îtmay require for its governmental purposcs.

7. The term "owned or controlled "as used in this Article means the right
lo grant a licence without incurring liabilîty to any private owner of a pro·
prietary or other legal interest.

9 8. The Govemment of the United States will use its best endeavors to
ensure that there will be made available by United States manufacturees to
the Govemment of the United Kingdom, on fair and reasonable terms and
conditions, such technical assistance-for example, loan of engineers, or train­
ing-as the Government of the United Kingdom desires in order to permit
the production by manufacturers of its own choice of the items developed in
the performance of the work. ·

9. The Government of the United States will insert suitable provisions in
ail prime contracts for the work to ensure ·theavailability to the Govemment
of the United Kingdom of the rights, set forth in this Article. including a re­
quirement that similar provisions be placed in subcontracts.

ARTICLE Xlii
l. The Government of the United States, to the extent that it can do so
without incurring Jiability to any private owner of a proprietary or other legal
interest, shaH grant to the Government of the United Kingdom: (1)the right
to reproduce and use, royalty-free, the technical documentation referred to in

subparagraph 2.e.(iv) of Article Ill for the purposes stated in that subpara­
graph ; and (ii)a non-exclusive,royalty-free licence to practice or cause to be
practicedany inventionfor these purposes.
2. ln respect of any part of the technical documentation referred in para­
graph l of this Article which the Government of the United States cannat
furnish to the Government of the United Kingdom without incurring a lia­
bility to a private owner of a proprietary or other legal interest, the Govern·
ment of the United States will use its best endeavours to assist the Govern­
ment of the United Kingdom in securing for the Government of the United

Kingdom on fair and reasonable terms and conditions the right to use such
documentation for the purposes stated in subparagraph 2.e.(iv)of Article Ill.
ARTICLE XIV

l. The Govemment of the United Kingdom shall not, without the prior
express consent of the Government of the United States, transfer, or permit
access to, or use of, the missiles, equipment. services. or documents or in­
formation relating thereto which are provided by the Government of the
United States under this Agreement. except to a United Kingdom officer.
employee•.national or firm engaged in the implementation of this Agreement.

2. The Government of the.United Kingdom shall undertake such sccurity
measures as are necessary to afford classified articles, services. documents or
information substantially the same degree of protection alforâed by the
Government of the United States in order to prevent unauthorized disclosure
or compromise.
ARTICLE XV

Annually, on or before the first ofJuly, ·thePtoject Officerswill prepare a
formai joint report to the contracting Governments of action taken and pro­
gress made under this Agreement and a forecast of schedules and costs for
completion. ln addition, other more frequent joint reports will be sub­
mitted, as agreed upon by the Project Officers. to the heads of the Executive
Agencies.

:10 ARTICLE XVI

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto
by their respective GovernmentS, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Washington thissixth dayof April, 1963.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland :

D. ORMSBY GORE

For the Government of the United States of America:

DEAN RUSK

11
1980~ 2664 Wt. 4.25/102 8[63 F.O.P. ANNEX21

ANNEX21- "The Alliance's Strategie Concept", NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65,

April24 1999,

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official texts 27433.htm

.iirl thc'outlti'iéSmày'pamdpate;"

-tLtP.overa!,e AtliarWlUi,n both thé and"longléftn and fofu!~e
range.phs missions.requ~$$ént oi€1atiantapabii skh aesn

è:ffectNeengagement..:apa_eplcyab .~ldiob1lrtys.urvivabîtitym
for..at- krfraSI:tur:t:utaen;d sustainab:iiityi,ntorporaoogl.ogîstksand _f.o:rce

rtltatitm ..To devêepcapabiii-Stheifu"potentiafar miJitinàtionai
operati-ointi?:tilp hduamgi~imay,factorttruse of apptopriate­

advanredt~c.,'t tnimai~ngye,nCninormationst.itèriotityrnminŒry
ap.atat aldo_nhf~Yualif.detrorniel wîtha bread,spec:001~of·
wm be jmportahLSuffi-denttapabîUti-esintofcommtmd,tohtfol­

aOOcttmtnunkattons.aswaSintefiig-and wmil!3:nce wSéNé a.-s
net.éSsafortemu)tipliel"~

~thatatanydméa MmiteclbUmmtarilsig."lffiCantptcpDrtion 1f grOtinif air
and se-afotŒMl beab~to react as Jras netessarto.Widerangeuf
-e-;~-en lkùatliasher-soiciattadonanyAlW.G.r.eit .imbers of

forcee~.eme wnmbiava~bb at.eapprop~ r~--of éadiné-s-sustaln
prorongecopetati woeth~t wlthino-rbeyoMl~an ertitor!rxlti-d~n,g

thtou ~oatiOnof de-pi-dfot é-aa:tS-*thét.thètoreEmUStals-o
be oi suffidqua~ îtat.y andt-eadinewsttlntnb-utetiJdeterrente

and 00def-e-ndagalnst 1imitedattaotk:so-n the Aliiatlti:!
ftt<,the Nlia.t.remusab~tebui-üp 1-a-r.frort-esîtres_p-O-teo
any?.indamentalchanges jnSe-tlirlty-étlYitandfo-rUmit-ed

ri!t;uftéme. y Ti!inforc-Bment.by ffi:S.atV,r~ r&onstitutln~
fO:ttwhen née-es Sfis.bH~lmustbein propOrtio-nto pob?:htial

thteats toAmanse.t: itudi,gpot:enti.al!tfng-ternide"JPelapments.lt
must take into&CGUtttpossib i.snbs;ntlat împrovernentsinth-e

r'ii!Bclinecapabi~ of tiarSforteon thep.mphery-f~ At1iàrn:e.
Capabi!îtJe:tirh2r.e:dnfoi'car.td r-e_syethwi'thînand fr-om
fur-upend No-rAmé:dcaw~irem;Unofaitkaimpo!l' tftnaeeuitlng

n$d futà rngdegre-qfdeptoyabUl,ymoll àndnîtxJm*-ty:
gthatapptG}iri-tte $ir~Jè ndtiroeeures. lnduditho-sthat

wou1dpn..."anabiUtyto boiup ~epkland dTaw--dowfures qufdtly
and select arv.e~.essaotpemtfmea:suredf.texi: ndtimely

tésponséS:urder to teduŒ an-ddetet~sî Thnssarran@;éménts
must_heexe~dse rdgular~pea-Œtlme;
h.that thfi Alltdefentposwre must have the tapability'to addtess

àppropri:at-el-effec thi~lkyasz:Odat-with the prolffe,ra-i:loh.Of
NBC wea-ponsnd them~ns oftl~iv e:îr)aOOp.os-apoteneathreat.

t-thè~lt- pepu•atlOn.-èrr lndft-es.~hataru:èdb~of.f-utees.
reSpOnSè.capabmttndsstrengtnenedefences. is needed;

LtMt the AfJiatfor'tandinfrastructrtliJbe _ptotedag-.ainst
tétror-istartacks. ANNEX22

ANN:Ex 22- Hansard, HC, 22 May 2006, col. 1331W,

http: //www. publications.parliament uk/pal cm2005 06/cmhansrd/vo060522/text/60 522

w0014.htm#06052325000141

NuclearWeapons

Norman Baker.Tias~m..~ry llf Stirt-~œ,:;rwh-;:;tflerit l!:his P!ll1cyi:h~~~~0!usW'll<nlelt.;e'against a
noo-,~arstai 7~'942}

22May 2006: Column 1.331 W

De5 8rowne-: 'Th;sU, nited ifpolkyMs not dl>!ng.a-d:Sil'l<r~.-tl.Mn. Me! ile~ pa!'agJ'3:P~f S>.JWortingEs;t<;·s

tl'»! 1"»8 Stratagio; Oevif!W.::l>t:<

Norman BakerT~oJ:~tusSk~œt;n yf Stai:a f<:.rDefuno:!wI!J<playlli :o!the ·rrkiwam-ead. {719431

Des :Brcwn e~m \'lttht,oid\inf~pn reqL~ b;;ouse it rolwŒnabnnM sacurity and -defen.:-l!of ilia tiK.

Norman Baker. T,. ask th<!Secr<!tary of State w~>rDefUK n...cto<arSCRr>t!<J.atsre itw~fdlw.iwrl dav!!klprti'"ni: of
new liS nudBar W!2aporn;,.Wlt-11particular refEP-rn:e m t,l;e ReJi<!hlerepjaŒmeni: w.i!J'head.{7l944]

.De!l!BI'Ownel:'he Re~~cement v.arhead pr<Jjart is a p~>oai:yrvgrmiwse.

~n Baktln To as!>me :S!!.t:r<!hw/ofState fur D<!fenm i5tt>~tilloott-() pre:":-:nt.a,nd(b)ne~lll'Trlde.ît, with

Pilrttcure~nce~n m,.~entia dev,el<'lpmtf~Jow yield wame-P1945J

be$ Browne: Th;:;Go'RnL<n<!nt'sP--DilCofn i'lt>r~mahwa>sset~t lnth~1'99:lliat ~afm:c:Revlew {SOR_l{c30l~ n-j
tht2002:SD>ftiew CMpt<!r {Cm 5566}. Th<lllids~;!apoosna..-.. a cnntina..a means of deterrii'IQ majOf ::Uitarygi<m

thr~a~tl5tIdy have ~trtng fi:llingua~ntê< hintlitq!fl'Uti'ttthe uK. We W;Juldoev~ r01"itrunl<!irtl'!ïn~i!mé
dn:urnstances~f·d~nce.

The Momie lJkapMSe<l:<~bh is~1t~"a~dt m_&Je~v.ei'oc opny.'I!Ww<lfh.eWs.

Nomtan Baker. T,;::h<!5eo"Btaof StaOOf~nΠwllmlet it is Govemment policfirsim(!us<>ct Ul{nocl<!i.irw,;,apons f!iruled

out.[71989]

Des Browt~ Th<:l:lnill!d Kfn;goom6n'l<\rnm.wt would bta\;Se fl<lwea~ oof\m ~tœma d!'CI.unstam:<!llof self·1fefenc;:. We
Ml<.lidnot use~apons, wtl;;,ther wt!VAAtw'nude<!'t, CO!ürin~matio: lv.

Ap<>licctoo flrst usnu~of w!!:apcru:wC1J!dbe inc;{lrop.ahbffwi !th ~finendofdlat~rr eeœh'1emade dear, anil'~!:
"u-r !>I"rAo amas, tC:--r;;ur ir~tl!Eany~ of nuclewe~ns nuç:ht havi!.tomb=mpta~ am a:rlremely l"tto~r:>t!'!.

O>lerastntegyiW e."l!uan!cT~~rt.the mind o~y agwes:so~eut t±!-er.o<actr.atut;:; 00'our r;:;stcl'n3inteif.xi:i">!
<;tet~ce.

Norman B<tk~ lo ask me S!!.CtyiStat<f~r O<>..fŒwhD-wiong he estimate:s the UKTridaf\~pabŒt-yet~ rtralnd
-!lj)<! r mna ltedlnu:-alrup-p:artMthdrawn. [7t99t}

Des Brown.eW~e hihre Mt tmrl""l'Ùdeta~l:sdessm;mt~fth'hypDt:il ~fatfn, a:scwe hiwè no

l:lMay 1006 :C:alumn1332W
t~an to belleve ttnwiihdrawa! of US tsmnical Sl..lpportW"T1id.snt !s remitcly likruy. 1-iowe'te",we l!ntiàpate tiia!,. m tt.is hi9f\ty umilo;ely

3 -o5 I:2!0312üi520:37 ANNEx23

ANNEx23- Hansard, HC Deb, 4 December 1997, cols. 576-577,

http://www.publications.parliamentuk/palcml99798/cmhansrd/vo971204/debte
xt/71

204-27.htm

4 ~ 1997 : Column 576

encouragement to believe that responsible nations have Iost :interesi or lack the political will to

respondtotheirtransgressions.

On a more spedfie~eve arm,s control agreements deariy halle .an Important -eontr!hution in maidng proilferatiofl .bothharder to achleve and
hard et to com:ea!. We welc:omethe agreement this year of increase<l powers for the International Aromle Energy Agency--~93 so·called

plus 2" programme. That wiil effectitméthehaies lf1which 5addam Hussein was abfe to hide hls ntP~«Jtarme and make it more
dlrficult for him or any sucŒt-odo so agaln. We are worldng fet~rimpfementatloi"ofthal: agreetnènt.

The miSSîletechnology ccmtrol u:g!me--to whlch the.light hon. Member referre.d··tl'!e.nudear non-proliferation treaty, the c-hem!<:ail'!leapons
conventionand the hiclogical weapons convention at! have a part IDplay. It is in <lUr<nterests tthewldest possible support: for

those agreements, and tdo wnat ~ can tostrenqthenth€cmeans avaUable formonitoring, verlfying and enfon:ing r:ompilance.

Next year, we wmhe uslng Oti' res!de.ncy of the Etiftii:)éanUniento press for early pragress, partlCtJ!arlyon verltkation thêangéments: for
blologital weapons conventioItwoo!d be optlml.stit to !magthatarms cootrol wiHcomp!etely e;adîcate the problbutlt willadd to the
obstades facad hy the would-be proHferator.

The rlght hon. Mèmbétwi!l knowthatintelllger.m sUdl weapOM hasea crlttcapartto play. The HotiSéwur niJi:expea togo Jnio details
on !:hmatter,bùt-Oh th!! basis that forewam!s-forearmed--is VItal that gatheras ml,leinformation-aspossiblOr'proliferation
act!v~ .nd particu!aroo-the intf>'.ntioMand capabilîtlés of potenthll advIftM re ls théslfghtest chance tBritisarmed fortes

mJght ha'll!to deploy to a partk:ular regfuturrl~ .efenceofBritisnatl~ :ntrests or maintenance of intematloMI peace and
seOJtitywe want and nee< t:knowas much as possible about the thréats t..iat they may have to faŒ.

We must, however, accept that we will ne.ve;;~et<ibe surethat we know al! ththeféis tok~Ww .ur approach rtM issue must take
accOtJntofthat iMYltable.unŒrtaimy.

WhénWédohave good lnte!ligenŒ of capabitities an!ntM~lo;1n 11addlti o1em eil-itn our response may be théofçounter-fort:e
measUri!S,i:ostrike at the -agg:ressor'scapabilities befJ')rehe cli~velop-mém. n'psecision guide<~l tand-off weapons may
make that an lncreaslng!y viable option. Weatso havean exc:eptional asset in our spétiai forces. Howéver,the appliŒbility of'e:ot.mter-forŒ
measures obvïously depends on waming of the aggressor's intentions and the availabitity of'good lfortarg.etlng purpose!l.

Th-erole of deterre nee, to Whkh the- ri9ht hon. Memberreferred, mvst not be overloo-iadpot~ot a1grlssor- has developed missiles
wlth thérange to strike at the UnKlngdom, and nudear, biologie.;.chemlcatwarheads t'tl he deHvérby thosemeat~ sewou!-dnave
tocol'lsider,.he woudowe!l tu coMlder .. tne posSible consequences of st.«:han ati:ack.

There is sometïmes a tendenctosvppuse that the conŒpt of deterrence 1-srelevant otiltransati coate~t,knd that dlctatorlai
reg-i!'l'le:SouEuropeare somehow incapable othiking ln such term-s. We wootd be wise tomake such suppositionsAlt.~o ud'h

4 Dec 1997 : Columl\ 577

despotsoftenappearindifferentto thesufferingoftheirown peoples,I seenosignthal theyare

indifferentto the survivalof thcirregimesandthepreservationof tbeirpersonalpositions.

Deterrencebasa bearingonboththosernatiers.

ltseems uniikety th.adldator-who was wlillntostrlke anothef country with weapoM of mass destruction wcubeso trustîng as to fetol
-entlre!y sure that th-at country woilld not respond wlth tatits:disposai. Asta~ tontemplatlng such an assau!t on a NAmember
wou!d hailétoCôrtslder the impHcarions very careful!y.

We must reaHse, hoWèVer,that deterrèlicinthat sense might: not catry the samè weight frt ali drcurrtstances. Thèrefon:!, we neêdto be able
W prollide our forees wlth adequate protection for deployed operatOisen-e-itherdeterrence nor counter•fotte measuréS:could be relfed
on tonumty the threat. Such protectiOI'icould lndude both act!ve and passive demeasure ectve defehce, as the rl9ht hon.
Gentleman wel! kflow">i,s gene;raUy usé<!to refer to anti·missîleS'fstem-!S!lcflas the Patriot system and varloos othe.- systems be1og

developed by the United Statas, togethw!ththe !'leŒssary early warn!ng and command, <:ontral and .:omtnunlcatlons capabilltle!>.

We malntaln dose links w!th Qtir Ameritan aJt!es on-this wbjectc!Qse, itactThe r\ght hon. Gentleman perhaps has no idea quite ho-w
close. Were 1 not addré:sslng thé Chamber on this important subject, 1 would be at a dhmer wlth J')urS.ecretary of State a-ndthe United StatéS

DefenŒ Secret:ary. The British Go-vemment wlll continué dose linkSwlth our Amer!cM al'lnave aIso played-fullp.1rln di$Cu$slons in
NATO,-and wm keep dolng ~o.

At the national leve!, a consortiumhyeSrltish AerŒp-ace has Œndu-ctM a pre-feasibifity study investthe-various technlcai options

that may become avaUable ln theye<~ atead. While the study l'è!ïlaiMdassifled, I am g!ad to tell the rlght hon. GêntlerMnthat my offictals
aréworking to produŒ a dedaSSifled version of a report on the methodo!ogy and find!ngs of the Wldef pre-feasihi!lty programmé, of which the
study form~ the laryer part. Twork hM been part of the background to consideration of the issue undestrategiedefenΠreview.

There ls a contJnufty of alntemplatand purpose onthisIssue whkh doe-s Mt s-quarwiththe lriaccurate reportJng that formed part of tM

basls oftherlght hon. Gentleman's speech. I cann«. yet tell the House ANNEX24

ANNEX24- Strategie Defence Review, New Chapter, 18 July 2002, Vol.l, para. 22,

http://www.publications.parliam ent uk!palcm200203/ cmselect/cmdfence/93 /93 .pdf

22.Britain'snudear weaponswereidentifiedas havinga continuinguseas a meansof

deterringamajorstrategie military threatand in guarantecing theuitimateserorltyofthe
UK,butatthesametimeallUKAnnedForcescouldbeexpectedtocontributeindifferent

l~ H<: eb,1July200c.e-1460.

ll SORNt Volt, paraS.
l~ SORNtVo11, para11-
,~ SeechartontheMolYscon.c&ptlproaih'tocounteiingterrn<::hap5rbelow.
>7 SORNCVoi1.para21.

waysto thefullspectrumofdeterrence.TheNewChapterdidnot announceîn advance
howBritaiomîghtrespondto varticularthreaisbutmerelystatedthattheresponsewould

beappropriateandproportionate-"lt shouldbedear thailegallytherightioselfdefence
îndudesthepossibilityofactioniothefaceofanimminentattacl:.." "' ANNEX25
AN:NEX25- The Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent: the White Paper, Ninth

Reportof Session 2006-07,

Https:!/www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-of-the-united-king
doms­
nuclear-deterrent -defence- white-paper- 2006-cm -6994

'#~:~.~;ijff'té h: : ';!~tn~i~~~~~~~=,:'~i.~';r!.~ti~':;;-·~-üst~ê

tD<":l-'iêtis'~iYB:è21.0-a

;-;;:.t1\'1ih~~reC;'~,,,.,.•,,,,
ifi~f;;J~t_vj

kt .s:nf-Jo: t'.fG'&""'v"''"J~'
>\i'é!2tt~Oüt- -iTZf}~'(}--~J.SQ

~ut~4n UiJ'"i'"1a5ê!
r'\~} .21Lr:~hB:l_Vùftl<>j'lltr1<1. ANNEx26

ANNEx26- House of Commons Defence Committee, The Future of the UK's

Nuclear Deterrent: the White Paper, Ninth Report of Session 2006-07 Vol. I
http:1/w>v.ublications.parliament.ulc/pa/cm200607/cmselectlcmdfence/225/225i.pdf

Costs and funding

Tabig,TheŒsŒ ofnnmving'ldelllm!nt

hiride=f.ot-tai"ü..'Hw-iio:Ouned
f6r titfklilmî_l)flÎ:

135.be CV!i<>r~n,.. !e UK'~strategnt~<: Πlemmatr<tl th~<:t>Sts.,(:

m~ndll ibn_tufthe currtV~d-clas tbll!!Mide$igningand.manu:liilnurinjj
anll'l.aŒmmtSSl:miripatiJnth ~sTridll:otmwile!ifeellemip~~nuru1:
pare-t.ipan a futul\\1Trident 05 ruphcemem proç.unme; mod, re!OifiiD!ns.

rephcintheUK's oude:awalt~d T"h~rweila~ bi.:œ~ ~St"l'< wiliahero
w.ainta {J{oscoe infr~ruc ru!urde!ormt.llsainningu•ubm<~ tid.!:w.>
W\\rh~ .asweia~ th~pcnmmd rom:s ocft'>p<!.'>system and l!> suptortinjj

mfrastructurt.

W!.The \\'Ïl'ilfrstintates!hat •McnewJl"t>fS.sBNœmesln >e<t<l.t
~tlhat the in-«mi<:eco;;tsof lÎl!tllK's nud.,-Mdctur<tnt, wh.idl win mdude AWE'•

ws:bwillbesîrrrt<~<- 'amund$-6%ofthtdd'e ncd~•tr'lt alropledtbat
"the inves.tr~uir timtdintain dt-"i -\~rO<m:meat~h~ix!p~ of dht

Ctl!t'J>.'lalpabioutirThZdo>:JSee '""~

l~(m~~ $-F:~-1i,

m ilitfi_ ANNEX27

ANNEx27- Hansard, HL, 7 June 2010, coL WA28,

http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld20 1011/ldhansrd/text/1 00607w0004 .htm#

10060710000742

7 Jun 2010: Column WA28

12/03!2015 21:07

Ask!iid tord Luce

iG ask Her-Maj.asty':sUovièmmentwrnrt IDsa;ssfu.nst-hah:<l"'ith the Mican Unlonabout the -Unf-pciky oth~recognition
of S<lmaU!an.das MI ine-ep.;i!ntlent swhat;was-the !}utcame thès.edisws!M-ns.{Ht.74]

LordHuweU of Guildford;Thi!Gt>vern<T'lhtave JWhad any d1s~:us sihooh>Afrkan-Unkm fJ:<gardU!gthe recngnitf1fSomamam::l:s

<lilnd~rv.:l s<ta.

TQBik tler MajeSty's <:-ov,.mrnent whe.ther they are.:~bserngIvwe:tass the pnr.Jdentelectioln :Somali!and ln
Juru!:.[Hi7S}

t.Md »owell of Guildfnrd! TheGw$Th'!l .r~no:tsendirlg .nbwrv;w wli:nestM pr.ffidooti-aie!ectkms in S®na-lila."td.However, we ani

,e:ng~ wltha UK T'.ort•I}OV«mmentalO!Wlnisatlon l'hat fs Ie<!IDngon the O:Hlnfinai:!on ef inta.rnaW~lwiîŒntinue to wor'..:
OOs;rtywlt.hth-em txb~ore Md afŒr me i!hocth:msiJun~ .iw Govemmani: wutcontinuettsupport actlve!y ts:tagl.of dema.:;ratk
eieo!on:s:.

To as:H~ Ma~H -Govemment wl)ether th;w will re.;;ognlse Somahlend as an indepêr-AentSst'ê-if thprssid~

-efadloln Juootsfree <lfuif.{Hl76}

-ltml Howell of Guildford: Reccgnitb-n .ofSomalîfarnfimiepe~: stad.isnt-otunn&tad tn the hoiding fTèiand fair pr-es!dantia!
el«.tkkns:. How-eve-, GO'.'emm;mt w\.1-1tonttnsupp&rt:ad:lvely ltle.rtaglng of demc-cratK electkms.

f'.r-eeand fair slecti:ons am an!ystnmgthtn the r;;;putatlo-n'OfStlm.all!and ln the mtematienal wmmunity.

The tritllrappl~ by the UkfDrrecc-gnititm -llfa state remaln as; liescribe!l tn the Writt.an Aru;wi!rdated :16Nnvember 1989 (OffldaJReport,

mt 494} by the then J>.arll.am$Urd~r~Secr- aftatty forFor,sJgn:ant:::ommonw~ Afenrs.

Trident

Question

Asla:d bLonJTretga-me

The Pariiamentary Under-Set:retary of state, Mfnïstry of l)efence {LoAstor of Hever):Armua! expendlrura fur apiand tunnfng
QJ:Si'Sof the l'li.d~nt,e.uwhld'l inrludes the Tridenmissiles-, is around 5 to 6 p;:;rcent:-ofthb;,~è9d-. ANNEX28

ANNEX28- HC, 20 December 2012, col. 908W,

http://vvww.publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm20 1213/cmhansrd/cm 121220/text/12122

Ow0002.htm# 12122061000 114

Mr Dtmnt!:NoBAESytaemi\employeeshav~n seŒndedtftheMlnisifyttfDefentuv.~ik

ontheSut~r Stibmi:lProgramme.

One'BabcnçkMlll'fuU~t indewuparMimee.mptoyeeandoneRoll R:ns~ employeeOOve
~"' ttrlkd towmkon thprogrJmn-w.

Jolm Wu•Jd-k: Ti>a.lhoSetretacyufSMeforDet\mcewhate.ûmahe b$ modeoflherost
-ofoperationcontinu ait~-ute.rterepiat..-eytstemovcthetikdHf~ ofsuclla

syllteB3S33)

~h'Dunnefholding at:Uwer18DtN::er011},'Asstntédin theWhite·,he-Futureofthé
UnitedKingdonfsNucle"'Detem:m(Cm69'1pub!l'hedlnD<cembet2006.w<:<pe!hato11<-e

thnew $Ut:ce5:IDJ'

lOD«: lOU :Column OOSW

nuclear<kte:r; bnwrinCOUleint-oS;crvkein~ser tsksclW UK'snucieatdeterrent,
whichwiUincludeAtomicWeaponfutablbbnç tesnt~~be slmittoroday(aroundS%to
6% of the defobud~'et).

John\Voodmtkt Tt>askthe SeçrctaryofStak futDefeneewhathistnot!$thnais(pt
iheo5tofdesignandbuildfora repl.ae-eme.nctü't·,un~cleardeterrentsystem,
{1338:!4} .

~f rw:me[ltt1klinganswerDeumbe-t20121:Cuttet-oŒt-->i Dhtc%.~ingplatmed
SubmarinEutcrp Pcif~nuanŒProgrammeeffidencmea.~r lediatethà-"rt~am
\\1ththe::!006WhiteP.&pcçrstJsf!ll bill1o!l4 billluo(at2()0prie<>folhe

SuteesstJrphltcostsiass·umbiga four:lcet),

TridentMissiles ANNEX29

ANNEX29- Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis 2011, Departmental Budgets,

HM Treasury, table 1.3a, available at http://w>vw.hm-

treasury.gov.uk/d/pesa 2011 chapterl.pdf

!i:~:« MlukS$l<.ki)ré"t'!<ul~nM group
f!lb~!irm 42.0':114A!ltî3 46-,ài 49:5!:!-~t.-41s4-u~J Si:,S~S 5],ÙJi 5JJ)l)S

NH$~i!h{' fSJl99 SU3$ SB,OJJ !M,611 ;;}'.]SS101,62$ ~ù4,Ml iil7.Jlli:W~til.M
h!Wr'l5-;~ :r~-t(i.;'Jth)l i.TiO UQ7 !,.VS l,}93 ~.ill 0
•
ftJn~~t 6}.iC3 f_ù:'.i!l!,40~ S,JW s.no s.iS·l 'S,dtl Uô5" 4A!1'

t& CtflL*i.inill~~ 3)1/i 3,9:::1 4,05-f! 4,1H 1.D32 2',gi4 l,]~t 1,63û 1,2-H
QGlN& Gc--'-•m!lf<!lr:t 1154{} liJ:i\} i_,j,ti:1S,515 25-.%6 26,-t<C-1::3,11-i,t~ n.sso

aus\r&;,rmil~ ~cSlifuln HJS 15J!63 H},'.l@ 17.531 run H)]11 i5;S<S J4,M>i B,1ID9
l-;,:,weéffiŒ 8,4S9 S}C-f <;,Ù'B :U4.1 3.-&t.'iB;!l-BT ll',SS-1ll,J:37 1,26~

JUf!1<2 1J>E9 S.S.M .S,W3 BSM :U-lil 3,31-t 1;Sü6 1,4-:H Ui9
t;;w~t":Dè?irirl'~li 687 1Œl i'il 6~! 6--:!S 644 6i4 5-SO ssz

D~%r,..-.e i::J}i2f24,6i3 l~AiH i15% _z?,p;_,é113-!3 i$,16B 1t;,•;0;514.145
1.11--21
forffg~MÜH!l?.'~.i&A'81i!~Thi:'-'i 1,6:39 l.BS r,:l4:6 i,Dll ~/A7 i,4&1 1,4i:\ U6?
ht>tr.< ~~n;~l@br;_"'!fAnt 4.098 ,t_,t.,\4)42 5,23-i 5,:3!5 -6.-JM- 't,ilfi !:!33-t !}AU
qJ;
f.tli!riDi-ll'l!"m!'c1?lG 671 1~-S :.:m l,l->E >.Sô3 u~~ î.J4l
tttélci1M,«nH~:~\td..t4;lli'.a-~s: 1,159 1.356 l.ii'J i,i-&5 1,1SD 2.i0î tOS9 !,SU

C<Jftli.'.,:.dia;>t>ûSfl-* U56 1395 1.435- tlSl U-10 l.->!48 1.00:1: 1,22& !,Hi
·No-lrkf'<lll&~re; i,6H ])l~ J.7S.J1 z:s-n B.-MA 7,%1 7,31'1 1A!i 7,605

SŒl.!atd lJA]) 1~.905 ll552 14/.$-5 î5,2.H ?.4,&19 2:S.IS2. lS.N-1 lS,i51
11,955 11,!}74 B,JS5 lHiO 13,5-<\5
W<~.lé lU&i 11.41d" HJSS HJ-&7
li•;l ilamhi~fl 3-Yli 8.635 $,-:îJl i3:JS S.6"J7 9,455 :9,45-Z 9.$1~ 9,5-52:

Ci'iMlt-.Jt$0m<!i7t> 4,441 4,14t> 4.312 4115 3.1'21 3,94~ ,3,B.m ~.165- 3,589:
Glb!!t~Dffki! i,$14 1,621 l,ÏS'4 ~,3S}- l.C19 1,103 i,WO 1.9&1 2Y~t.i

Jl'dejm1dellt i:li).(jk'; fdfr- ti€1 J4ti JtlV iW t-}2 m: ns ng
H!!:WMi' 0 (} 0 0 0 2.~2l. liü(l 1,-i:li)Ül.5tl(l

~{;4 ~wL,.1,-~ fi 0- \) 0 0 iCù ~.00 3,000 :Z.S!Jù
Ollil.N!mv;;,m,"!;;r·y,.,;:;dill! !? 1) l} 0 0 o 0 i.OOù o

!Jf.il~jjii:J~ili!!f-'l'\'il'!ll&.~0;J1li:.'i71~1iii~m~Si~3;!1f9~t.!W~~!I,Wt'~'MMi1î?®iîl'<'$>li1@1!

'-'!_<\>li '1:-predîngRe1010 OElwa:pt~* l~<~<.l<-i;;tTliilM tintif:dttta:~êto .o<m~lariwr:.
·••MHS(Hw-t!N:.~f.uutS-an>srè. Ag;m5~,J\!'!M)!'B. ANNEx30
ANNEx30- UK nuclear weapons R&D spending: Addendum AAJ to Offensive

Jnsecurity, February 2014, available at http://www.sgr.org.uk/publications/uk­
nuclear-weapons-rd-spending

AddendumAALUKnuclearwaapons MD spending

ln this addendumw the SGR report,Dflemlvelnsew.rity{Septem 2~1r-},we present "''

estimai<! of total LIKg1l\ler!lment spending on m•dear W<s &D,dravtingoo the data
ootaln<!dfor the report via fre<!doof information requests, and on !Urther pub!idy
avai!able informationoot the dîl!'erent R&Dspenmng s.treams,

The analysisrevealsthat tl>e UKspent an average of f327m per year """' tl>e y<!<!fs
from 2008 t<:~l T0hs i1uded fl06m/y on 11&0relatedto Trident nucleawarheads,

f.127m/v on R&Dfor Œt'l'sue<:<>sr'rllmarinecto ~arr Britain's nudel>t wm>p<ll,m:l
!.94m/y "" 1!&0for a new mldeâpropulsicnsystem for these submarlnes,

·We .alsommpare the total annual spem:lîng nudecar"""aptlns Witl>otl>er areasiJI(

public spendlng on se<:urîty-tf!lated R&llowr thl$ period, indudfl1g tl>ose that he>lpt<ltat!<le
drivè·rsof rurrent and futu:re oonl\iict,$Uchas dimate chang.,, t:ffle ootable>Œmpartsnn îs
that UKpublic R&Dspending for nudeor """apilns tecl!nof<>gieswas m<tl>anfuo'limé$

th at "" renewable energytechooingîes d<iringthis period.

Abreakdown of the R&Dspendi"g data retwant to nud,..\\Y1!\il-tobtaine:\fitreedor!l
oflnfarmationrequestSto the ll.t<for ththree-yearperiod 2008-11, and $ummarlsed in

the 1'!lllinrep~r;s giV<!riin tablMU-1.3. (The data proVided hère fo'!.on;g-range
5Ubmarines' is a more detailed bteakdmtlunthatgî\lei'l in appetufixthetreport.)

There aret'Il>ey areas of ambiguity in the spending ligures: 'long-range subrnarine$' and
'Nuc!ear prOj>1llsi, s disc1lssed in chapter four of the main report, the !1&0 programme
for bot!> thes!! areas se<>_mtso lndude workbnm t<lllventîonally armed and nudeill'­

-ed submalines.

/Mr;D,1012;2012bl (Œsiltermsl

iName Abbr~iati _oo~- ,- Ce<}e. pf!.!!ndi~J~
!.ong-rnn;geliubmarlne future SubmarlneslFSM!PT 1 8367 ' 743
Stratei1k Or;tiom<:~up '
(nudeat and corwentionally '
atmedi 5\W-lPT ~ -1 1.3
IPT- orpedoes l!ll!l~ Hf
OJ)
UWS JUndetwater Warfare 6321
Systems
IPT-Astute 8140 {1.5

Nuclearpropul!iion Nudear propulsion 8151 65.6
i{fonubmar',nes)
iNutlearwea(l>!l!'ls!v.--arhena;l na 1{);$;()

1 ANNEX31
ANNEx31- Ministry ofDefence (2011) Initial Gate Parliamentary Report (London:
Ministry of Defence),
https://www.google_nl/url?sa=t&rct=j&g=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=OCCE

QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.uk%2F government%2Fuploads%2Fsyste
m%2Fuploads%2Fattachment data%2Ffile%2F27399%2Fsubmarine initial gate.pdf
&ei=bD4BVZnWOYb7PMCOgdgB&usg=AFQjCNHLD OML9ovvtYhgZu4 Hxt7
H6-6g&sig2=9DdXQijRIKRUXK8S31-oBw&bvm=bv.87920726,d.ZWU ANNEX32

ANNEx32- Hansard, HC Deb, 14 March 2007, cols. 298-407,

http :/ww-w . ub1ications.parliam ent uk/pa/ cm20060 71 cmhansrd/ cm070314/ debtext/70

314-0004.htm#07031475000005

You are here: Pnrliamenthomepa!!:e > Parliamentarvbusiness> Publicr.ations andRecords> Han.<:ard

> Cotmtl(insDebates > D-.ùlyHansard- Debate

Pr~v.i Socutisn HomePage

That tiHcn.. spl~rts th;;;GoViml.tmmt's decls!oos.a;fi~êtWhtŒ f'aper"l'~of the United KJngdom'sN:uciear
DEternmt (Cm 6W4),totak h;;.;shln~ry t* mruntain the l..ik:'smirllmum strati<gk: nudear deterrent.:rf~nd the ük

exls!:lngsysU!m antalofurther .steps ttwr.mistmw.ting t-dtsarmams ~s!tlnsiblitii;S unrlsr Artith;;I of
NnrH'mllferaticnTrnato;,

!must-&-<- ~d-nœaarenteni:ial interast,the j:iropl>lsfon system N:lrthe.$Ubm-;irl;'I(>S>s-tnanufaci~tumq.d ln my

LEtm-eset o\.1the r.atl!ffl ofthededori!lf'ls mat tM-Hous.l!i5bèng asïcedtThe'MéP<wh~todaornotto take tnesteps
m:-casruy rma!ntain minimum stra!alg'll~~rde<êrre!ftlr tUK-a :!Mglesyst-dromi'li s.n!lmarlMs,tmssiles l!i<~rheads--and

to-take fufthst~s tcwan:lrne&lt ougdisarmam~ r;t.msihilitles under artide Vlnon~p,ra.fi Jeayation

Sp,OOfi ~layw,ilm~n a d«!stonw bi!glilPf1,lŒto doJStgbuikand co,.--nmissionsubmafMorepla.:.:':tna -exlstingcVanguard-da$
llo-at:>.This wi!inecé1ôsarsnm~17 years. Thilt is a calcu$tkmon~<ieGWn ~oarlsn< and-bat of oth!;r aiL;,d nW.W:fXI!'l

stat.es, M-or'OO'ter,we must .a!J;odeciweewm joln the .À/ffl:rlt:an progmmme tu eictend lil4tth<:lifa of Tr!d.mt 05
llallistk missw.h&clls-e \fal'lgs..ll::m cUrl>.tta>y, and whetherw-ewm n!.dua!' tne m.:mte:Uf :J~ratiorav!alla~
wm"he;Ws w faveJ" thar>,l 00 by th"<.;y,!!<w.is

flfr.Gw'donPrentiΠ(Pendle} (LAb}: ThUnitedStam iiudear pcsiure n!View tffiit Wt!ni:t.oCOngressin De:est~mae2rhetGlt

woukl take U yeersM.t17 YB~, to fap!ace a 'f!irlsubmarine.

14 Mar 2007 ; Column 299

fotiH"g.ie~ett: Tha Unke.d .StaOOss\lhma:rines an=-dîlfei'Wli:from our .rlifflfti!sg~td~>he·have a dlff.ereni: !lfu.gn
and so -oThatmay ha'lfi! be~heccnduslorl A-~.ca nŒt:;ltinet thecondu~ d tt!<! w~tllat Ms been fll}thi.COW'ltrf.

Dr. Nkk Palmer (Brt!xttlwe) {Lab): Oues the S«re<JState acŒpt that th.: ssu,;J-5must .w subjer>Wiew;:;y.:ayru~f al>,

t of-4 BJOJ/20!5 08:28 ANNEX33

ANNEX33- Briefings on Nuclear Security, 'Trident: The Initial Gate Decision',
http://www.britishpugwash. org/documents/Briefing%203%20-

%20Initial%20Gate.pdf

Trident The InitialGate Decision

if dm~<1mf.""N~m S<;,;,lfçum~"dl~! tmno aM><t'1fl!>/ ~!fhoo(~
!I lill <iol<iun ft.idl.-o »<~J""'a If121111.

Wh•t 1th"'lnkl.-l.,di>dti0<1t

On 11'* 142"07 f\t.rli!l~d!<~ri$ç m.inltm'C<>ntphae ofth~rl!i<m<
"'l>Ô>~ <·~~mPJ'.~~<""'x•f!lii lwt>n••th1~1' 1a1.<.·!ff w~in•!li~u.
""""" tt~~'A.l~$tm p><lt,!ilfvli>lflrl..,i.eli!! t>tè<tm(~

<>!'<I~ ~e •~I~< ofÏ~t,t>M ~1\ll f!.el"!#"'""~h!WUh t"!Ï!d>lti~l
llàfd.:< i>~orlll2~11Th~ hi»bit..l$i<tt> ""~"til'0,.0!<> lt<l ->~ll.m
~'brnul !a~lioth14;>\llGof.Od!\'W"""~" ~t lill!> (<l>dmllll4""'
Ot~nb lol). Tlut•!il>l"<l.Œ!Ilkey'*"~l<> ~l>"f' <1>l"'~11b0~f~Qrit<~

d""_"« ~<i<> ~1n~tra<cd<lititn..b~u ·""~ l<!nd •~dbilli-"''"~
P""nd•WillIN!l.tr.)-tnlablo~"""'<N<t<•1~"_"'''' .t"o~"lW""<poi'à

Tl»lni !it!noport pu<<o1ho>~~pia !l;Tri~ *1'tlli>H:il•'itlllmarino>,

w~rhé: i>ft~.IJJr.d'inis<il"").,. !2!~turniprl<sptk'willp~~~
""'l!~ •<:.,l.<:.;v?rltl î~,>Wi~N eut,p ilMlntl>o~fd"*'"(~1'1)
hl>>t~l~ ta brlitinojt'!ulpn.t.rof<o: iM •ol\dth~dg ant'"_S""t "
pro<w.>:mènt.« <lot<~Cl& blUi<>n.l

T~ IMJ.dGoŒ"'l'pv<t"!>~ fillu~r'l>" ndtopt<>iO.,.lintÎit»d11te,
tl>C~t phalè1.1. <on•umed:l!~ill<nd n,di!! Mij_>A>~- plu<!!
•Wt""'"dbythefnlt\>or!ed<iawill """"a furtherbillin értl>e nu• ~l'ft
y.eararw..tlmi!!iHam~ dt<ti<·~r<:JK mI:>lt"!'f>N>~ IS%".t.m~!yal
pf"l!rii<ŒilwilM'>'!em speMirnd~ diàld €500 millionort!o!ti!fot!l

ffiouhmàrirtèr,o~<tad>jtnplil.,_, Md ""~t Iy>tem•.

Thi•>pelilcmm:icluwAm:tjOf.m<lrn:c<hottfalilluwre equll"bll!Îalei
u~t»·l36 billioti.,M:<10 y.-.lu hu!Îi<illèlngby13% <!Nethtttrrl!tlt
Porlio um~>r!he 2010 C-prel>w5p~hrlR~iWi"!hi,bll~ a item t~j<>t

cumclu"'~""'"" D"'ènl<lrOS~~~l-bol& 200'1.The iStl'a Oéf.nc.:mil
S~éll 1.iliW(SO:s~mdl:nUicl>erà!'atll'><dtto<:lmetequll"filvJ<l&"t.
iri<lute~g the Nirn~MoHàtn"r!lee'ThéM<>D""<utr""dunde~ an..w
!llr.,._,ooth. •tUdy, NJul'{}11to è<>n>irow e'fen mor" porwnMl "'""
e~IOn~ tmu éo<!m .:<lOd'" "i'~Neun>llllion.l

fn2006 l'rimeMin!SŒrlll:•<atd l!l<pli<ld!yhat me Trident"''*""'"'"m
~ "nolmot tl>eexp-aî W.""""<l<tl.ap:31>lliouf~rmèlfno. fii,"!d
G~ will>•.:S<:<!p11;ho tilllé.d!at <:.new"''P~unt bl>.l'<>ilowmg
tl>~rtm.mtem ijny.Ol0!>Chl>i>eGne'ôrp O!d>!itiliMoDWillhaveto !wtd ANNEX34

ANNEX34- "The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent: The Submarine Initial
Gate Parliarnentary Report'' (May 2011),
https:lwww. gov.uklgovemmenJ!uploads/system/uploads/ attachment data/file/27399/
submarine initial gate.pdf ANNEX35
ANN:Ex35- Hansard, HC Deb, 18May 2011, col. 352,

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201 011/cmhansrd/cm 110518/debtext/11

0518-000Lhtm#11051871001523

18May 211'1:1Coluum 3Sl

thça.'fM alternativAs.S...~ üetttrf,1Meni;_ 1ameab.salutdy ck!haa minimum
nudeardet-erre- on_fuT_rldtn!nûssîk ddivery s_andi'Ontlo a·~t.":;l.dotiem

rightnrthe United Kîngdom thaiish-ûute rnain!a aidtead~em~[ on~)Vernrnem.
pollcybuto:ass:tiwl.lhctallkmocrafu~the Casfuraltc~ma 1t:ivl~.l:s-,
annllO Ooda.he initiatioàstudytù rcvJtthetü. sclsi~iland cr~dib -f fuy

altc:r S.simisv~dpcsture~. study wibetoibyCabinet ùffite oftk-nven ;;t~en
-Min-ïsftth<~ F'i- m-inp:~Ï';emons:'!Jrfe.fc'ceheostudwlilw ,ptu în'hi..~d
H.auscùl Common.I.Jbr.ny

•A1hâve aWdttheG.lvem:rrhtaYappmv-edtheIniti$3.1D!me nUckardetentr.~UC1..~$i)f
prognUn WrDha~venow,agreehe ht&.ouilinedt.<softhtii.tibnwfmade~- nf tbi!

-designcJroies.-sintthepmpul:.m ~m aodthe:cnmnmnUS-tJKml!ii't-ik
:emn_pmil'ntand:thp!rus;ran\~wcrk,,..neetost&rbsUdingme ftrstsubn:u:iriDaeft-er
2-t\ Utha~eealsa~re eeam-duntnfmat-erialandpartsw-ewlU-ncçùtu huyln ad.'tet-he

We i:!Xpt.hncxtphascf 'fhWk_.::osttM~km of:€3hinioo.Thisa_si~ni su:mcutnt
am-oonftrleta-Ît~t>'i\-1ÛUèf~i)n'm1!forthtta-xpayM, cvcr-~t t"Hthprogrunmw

hasht: ~aduUy revlll!\\'MOD~yTrt:"..Wud Cab-inet Oîik:è offu:iïlis.lt will fund tbe
prug:rnmmfilu,oil!etncundui;tmu:ke"Sme1hiwct(:<:iDbrt~esuh!nàrinWt1san·k'oo

titt-veriillli!Ssesst:btttthe subm:ii.ri<tthe~rMtmh! v..-11Uoost within tht El
bûiSüto:Elh:lU esimaitetootlnth.2006Whltt P.~t1butth;a;JStl~'!!estit.ru--d.
[email protected]"'-, fcilllJ*ddidno;acCtlUforInfiatrîh~ «U:Yaii.t:m tooayi!20 b111il.n

!:15biUWnaout~r bUmt.isimpo;riwt recflsnlsetrurttiwrebar~bJ"O_gm~ inmt
programmesin th:H~ocsc:fiC-t'l'tl:he:..tln.dithi\VhltePap.e:r.

Bd:w~e Dn'\and fl'llÛ:Wi:e~-·-td-spcnaMut. 15% nme otai\':llue uprngrunmc:.

11taÜcntir!.i'1.1D:t.~tNie(~c pt'L1<Cnr.!let ancTt~ Cttliiongkl'!..itrs.-
expei .1~U:ntdHla.t'lllOSnùll.n,butilitnotrltnuy tlhl~~ ·panof~ bulid

ptüSiammewillhaveho.!ncamph!-dymaingate.Alt:htmg\Vlareordèrl5-{!0ofthe
s_p~cc hotlpli-im ~natz~,snt mi!anthatweue..lŒkedlnto:anypa:rtirntarstrawgybe-tim
maingau-in201&. ANNEX36
ANNEX 36 - http://vvww.number1O.gov.uk/news/uk-france-summit-press-conference/

Second,wewiDcooperateon airerai!carriers.Thelasgovernmentorderedcarriersthetwouldbe
unableto workeffecnvelywitheitharof okey defancapartners,Franceor the UnitedStates.This

wasmadness.Asa resullof thedecisions we havelaken,w;;.will adaptournewcarriercapabîlity
sowe'reabletooperatewithFranceandthe UnitedStates.And asour new carriercomasinto
servicetowardstheendof thisdecade,we willdeveloptheabilityto deploya UK-Frenchintegrated

carrierstoîkegroup,ensuring!hateitaeBritishoa Frenchcarrieisalwaysavailabfefor
operations.

Third,wewillwork togather oequîpmentandcapabilitiesWe arebothprocurlng the A400M
militarytransportaireraitandwill integraleourlogisticalsupportfor!hat airerait.Wewillwork

togetheronthe nextgenerationof unmannedaerialvehlcles.Wewillworktogetheronlechnology
forcybersecurity.

Andlourth,whilewewill alwaysretainan independantnucleardeterren~is righi thalwe lookfor
efficienciînthe infrastructurerequiredtodevelopand.sustainoursaperatedeterrents.So rather

thenbothcountriesbUildingldenticalandexpansive!acilitiestoensurethesafetyof ournuclear
weapons,wewill buildtogetherajoint facilily,jointlyownedand jointlymanaged,sharingour
knowledgeand expertise ansavingmillionsofpounds.

BoîtainandFrancehavea sharedhistorythroughtwo WorldWars.Ourbravetroopsare!lghting

togethereverydayin Afghanistan.Butlet mefinishby sayingthisis a Treatybasedon pragmatism
notjust sentimentand1wouldllketo !hankNicolasfor joiningmein takingthesebold andimportant
steps,whichl believewlllmakeoursovereignnationssaler.

Thankyou,Nicolas. ANNEX37
ANmx 37- http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament­

fora/npt/prepcom 12/statements/3pril UK pdf

5.The UK Vllln!<>bridgetper>e<:Îd:vid""andhelp t" buîld a shared
umkrstamlmg ofwhatwc cinalgain fromthNJ:'·'Thehnred suce-oî'20Hi
;thov.'!hat""' arenu:.in !herij;htdirecliun;theUi( tootwemusi
c<>ntinuct<>buon !baiposirivc ffiOilri,ght!waywougb to thoR.:vC"nÎn
lOiS.

L 20!l Wa>lheS<>-Œlkd'!à!l:r~ ntheeyd.:, l!lldy.:t wths.:ŒndP5

Coofer ~nnars,<el~t by theP5 and ASEANiltheP$f'mt<le<othe
SouthEastMoiNud<:arWea,pooFree Zooe,'\\1wewill<ii~ n lls"~~atteùrl
av« !henext twe~k pr;nisingsi.:fonwaron theMiddl·Éas\VMDFrce

Zone c.,nforu:nc.;and a momrotousl'ro!helAEA on the mitltaryd>nW!lSiotl$
ofîr~ u ùdeMpr-ogrammi;]_

7.th! !~'r~pa ramm.ite yru <r~ng!'ro<:edurmit,being ttrn;.ltn!hi>
revkw cyelü!mtwemust also look10lmildnn ~<>n~ from::zoma.dth"
posi!hi~wlopmen tatv.'saw r20l!, ~ UI<s~e sis fiPr.:pC a.an~m

<>!"P"rttmor s!atcparties10coll<lreafl:l~ir un<mnditi!>nalsnpporther
Nl't md !hel; ~"mmlm1 lm'ti"n pllim!'lcm.cntali.:~n.

8. ~ a nucle""""P "at,, the United Kingdtu!lyll!Waretih~ partieull'lr
r""Poosil>ilwtîullit TheUKremai:n!;~ e<l<mmkr udthe l""!.t4eooof a
woridwithoutnucleawe~tp onnwse l>clievew<:havea mang ttadt n:<:ooiln
n>JOctluurdisarmamcncofllll'.ittndmobtil!llrtmd.theNPT.

9. As kmg as il>t';!lllU'$tnalW"<!1udrimàJnlnd>hUrSiufkmN:loar
prctifc!'l'oontinuel}lJK'sjll<ÎJ!"ms!hat oolya credinndear capabi!lty

Cl!pruvide!hellé<'-l>\ll!l!guarlllltuo1rnational-mil)'TheUK
Governmmt isthe:refnrecmnmittedtu mai:ntaininga mnation:nu~lear
dclerrem.ao!(proc;:>odiJlth!her<!ll.,wa"lfTrlrlllnilllldthcJ<ui>llll!fine
n.-plaeem..Ttill!fl'!IU>lè.

!0Wehave takenamnnbcr "f addltl..-1 impar!l!lltdiSlttcps,durmgand since
!he10Hlll.evicw C;mfer.,ncew~nwilgi~ îr"hr ~la!ofihe$emC'i! Snllr<e~
siatemcnund.ePilla1.Hm, În!l<n.oerm;;!hcseimpertân!"""nfulenŒbnlld>n$

measure•incluooincreas~ngUK'si:mn,;parenhyonMuncil\!ffortfirsiin1~
the<w~m szl!of ourwllÙ!cadstoekand!'Uhlishingtnwstd!lmîiedSecurliy
lln<O.:ii!Rleviewmeur bistozy,rcducing tbcnun!hw~d.~' onunr
rubmarinl!t~UCi l>u$uclcaW<tttpost~O: pnddmJ:ingnp an updat<d

n"l!"tiS<!curîa;,surancetn noo-!Wweapon :;tateWc bavea!read~~art..ed
théitnplcmeno t~~tiomncJt<~ and oow star t<>ddwe eur w11rhŒd
numben !5 ye-arsailesd nîa.,beduic.

!L Wealsn J:<<>n11w1"rdoscly with our 1'5partnt:n>oo in>piCunfth1'<1'1'
ActlnnPlllll. Cc-operationwÙl<1'ha;eom.:a klll$wayLetusMt lÙI",;tath
ilthe heigof~ CoidWar, which many<~f un!hisroom canrenl<!m\\'tll!.
lhese samcstates!hatnaw mectrecurrtc ta!aboutdlsarmam.:mcooildmc.: ANNEX38

ANN:Ex38 - http://w-ww.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament­

fora/cd/2013/Statements/SMarch UK.pdf

K--ucleai~rmarr è>awer;~ortart no~ utthe United JotintdotbeiCo-ni~n onblmmarn-en i-t

tM- ~minimt fptut~ whicli th~U.trurtt l~OOii!:yt·i:~d:: nJrti;ooi~l'U.iJmetrt,kt t.il1eieh
mUcltID~- intt...eîclfQIthrte_t.-cniuae tll.enti~ch hJt YJnlrnWt!-.keypt:in:t3aatly.

The tïntrkjngdorn'hakng: hoemr~umi~ t-tne g_Œli~ w-trtwit~J r.uckM d.:ifXm!<.Wcorrtiinue
tt>play-a:i:ct!!tem'tl~tn to_bui1d an lnternationa.! certsiro-nment5-t~w:f~ltsaneed m

~ms nu-~f wea~!. s.;m y~,arnot men ycl:.There 3fif.;ub:rtartJutû!ar~rt th-num.ber
of nt.fcleat·3~~,-.ehiiffi.t. -athethan~.as.ed .irid-t'ne,a ~rufiit :i~mnMtW m..ideiJt.
JJt.rr:ii-feme~ Sef.N!bP'Utr !h.til.e~-fMn'-uclt!ai!.'riSt an:!-ttt-ittqt:ttwm are

fnn:gîœ t~a: :sufft-mWI013 ÎM~~il «"tre5Ujbje« to .ific:règltint:enst -oJti'n:r:ruU~;twe
pcten~ foraneYi t~ -thtuatW-emergedesi:Jltet-he tondofW:s:t.ald

Whf!e--tOOt::mùnu-mhe-!igrii:fienroff~,;~k .-f'f~thai!n:r hîle-otb~Mes r~n mUr:h~r

ritidNwe~:iD~l'rw .ihl$~ beende~ rh-nH·~IJ.n,.clin-gdnillret-nina minimumcredn~ar­
clet.err tetuhtif:~.;!zt~e-ofou!s-eturity',

ln 2001th~United k:tngdfi<k.~m .d:e~ltlnd!i,prciVedh)' ti é'--e>fthei~on_;;io CO-n'tit!:U-e­

Wth the ptilgram;.'Thft!o- Mm_IJllucle.adeterr-eTh-eGov-emment~ _outfitM lfi10~bigk
deient-e ast!Cu reve: '!la~& Ut \'itlrn~~ a c-ontirH.WJt$a1ak:nnudni-PhW..eddib~er·rmt Dnd

H·~i-f.-o~~eplat:its i!-11sabmai=ne•wh~ $'ed® UJ';caveWiVi:cii!lO~, thi!r-e::n'!.lUe
Gi.WC:rrim1!r&--f.t5

A ~Udy kr~ni.lthe trirkAi't~tf S:W.cl:;r-..g.ruij1:0ltore-p-.nGtM .UKPrime MM&.ti!t,'.;nd

OleÇ~ iUin:M'mf-stimthefusthali-of_20.~1mo -i!att) ;p!tidate- abbtlt-tmm.tOi TM TxJJ:kont
Altt:om.aÜ't.>d..nUnclaS:$ηq.çUrft-iitb!! T."'idtmAtfteStu-d' ibep-ui:d iidu.~ .:uJm.

This.tt-~our_polk.!a{rtn-tic d~~œtrent. rle~Gk MWàbo-'o.1t i!r.i.t ie:-nmnme~n~m-mk-

the Uâ.'"tKmg:do-mu.bk-e-iiu:.-Gmatett .n\'((: lberreord cShttwstila;t we Zaire:aê'-ftabn
~nffica ,;i'tcniieb,m!,~d from li'>linisn a world othru.J~Q-oOO'su::;.'ln.trbeàd;..Stlinrll.m_g,
tP fire.1fl:J<lnl~se; dtirithet'oiW~t•to 3 WOrldî·~kh Uremajor tü.tde:ar-WUp.~il~i~!i

~~"fidht rltfut:l!dtne-anemlr i~ st~-pe m,dl!'!J-tnemi'J.anyoneandhaw r-eduŒrl-t.l'teir
a-perutkiŒ;r-Ji!iJS:ki:tet:-: :ènt:l~!bS3W ili~rdn_ Ofthénev.rSfld\~ment b~een tM

Un~ :Stat8 _a:RU$3 hÎier~of thetat,gefo.-ilstock~ by farilnOOlli trat:yboth i::tiilntrte
<Jg<reld redute thnum:~r of :strnt-rtucl9ml!IS:ileeunctt-eB hy haf.f.amdtm:-nn,Tdit.~..f

depl-t;-.eti:s.îOclt!warnoŒ toafJgu nem~;·i:-w-h D:~irt'niili~tee rll!I§L

ln 'thi~ 'fe:lw..~w 'ifueagr:ffrlt>t!n--ctfthe f-its.tevei Nude-att.tŒ--~nolifpl-:~n.rTnr.!a.ty
\Vbil:-ai1l9 !îi$,nil.1.0rielntt..ecDrnrtütmwt Ut thtre.-iMid titni-wJtted to makin_gtanFble

pi~~S -toW,JJosursb-~i gOe~t'-3~ without hude:at Wi!aj:-tui:th-.tlanR~~at Wè-~porii
$Ut-aS~ ttmurùtt-ed tiil maklfl8 a::rrnt:ro Me step.lmding to nud-e&zarm.moent,~ch.o.ding
t>i'dtn;:.itnhge-W.e.ttrl:«kP-anr-e-d fugnhe- th~ and .YgnifkarOft>iid w~n;i:iSinŒlt

mm~ dodrit le:~ye.v-at thethir?APTPrep.aratoCornm&tteei-New-1O:'liwin3ètoL"tpi.iibfu:l)!"
l:' we-NiWemadePr%"'rei>tût.5action _pi<:m. ANNEX39

ANNEX39- http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/ingramcommentary-tar­

jul2013.pdf

P<u. dngram,

Bmil>n·~~q BASIC Executive Dir~tor

tnfoon~ Qk®,~ 16Ju&y10U

Commentary on the UKTrident

Alternatives Review

Ti>;!,~!lffnme ~ntn!"!'btll$l1>.edrl'I~I-ls "" li\'<)<tonitl !b!l>li<m
R~;l" );f;~llirTI>I>habri~g i"vll<\ :!>Ub<!;b itl~a!lft>e:>tsmlflf!>rmati<if\

lm~atJ !e>f)<>n•e.l( ll~til>r<'ti' lnthe pl><iomlll!\thanewuon theoj:rtkll'l•4t!d
publ$llingt'!>o!t;; tride~ammisslon, dem<ir' ~e"th'~'l>'ia~~lJ>eiitf

eonsld,..~~~ ~uel tl.<lrmtt.e ~,-,_! Jt.ow' tf.<il'w!>.s""~ et
t:ontetf'thededston~ !imita tilU!Cf~iffiTthiï11$$UMpt~ftS
-.:le.!t~J ad~i;:is;
fod•v't»d>~ o•,mm.,t Wtiewliashighry

po!ltltM!Slfthdés! by~ber~lll<: tmooat; N:oi'Hl~o-p®rtartrt:ffiléte
..~iWo~l!i\t'r~tp~liai)·Qtie!i!ioos• bas!<"""'!loo:<ldll!lnh•\>1!

r""'l-w;rapl;lnsln the 21"centti!'y?
1) "'"the~hl; qpi'lts'"'
"~nta a~nr~dimbb:Îm:·;\ucl-ear li) Theev'<)Mnneiltureofthè"""""IY
deti!ITM!cap>bll!tyappr<>pliateta the <»fitfe'n;~uestionwh~

eha~~ cCOOI$tlfi.efeS21" ftUcleaf'-d-efJts~ce~ a!'ld
~l!PIWI)'? illsotherefurêonemui>l'l'f"SI>Dn

...; t onadl!llua"""' t'e"~<
11) arethe"!'lioth&oîfeJ!l'»at.."< ~ion of whatl'Jlin t~n<!mrent
flexl!ùy>l!n~lhllnt<re<pood ""<l!d))a:.
mfuture dewJDp..,..,tslnthe sttJ!te!!l<

l!'Milront'l,e~t,anllt'itainto theopportun<lSt>-thth<>i<e5
hâv~red: itgDetlat~tioftat fMeg<Wli!lmpactao_..,!!y

-MtiUtwemultilatlw-~ment bacau"aflrn~es plmegetsntn
lll!lks. nucle~rweap tnves~.

D"""'Ale:.andspelliat~uS "the r<!p<>artt Thêinterllalpo~tl-<oodlng

lunehtlmetoday, m;nthtepenwppottedhl~ lltit"001'ri:lllfe.,ndthe
vlw1tbere w~eredl!lleai!ŒrlnvoMngthe epp.ortunit""!hiitaln~œ

eonstrualM f ee subml>fland.ru.>1; <>thesrtates and .,...,.., Pn>J!I'­
oalleahlgteadi~ f«used detem!n<e ""der !be nonilfill<~me.tioo

pasture, retaiJ>lng!he abilltyto t.etum.to
eondnuousl"!l:rols;, limeof<rislslm! not'qtia~Mporte ter!ilw<OO!.ai'.l.tsllmtt
otherwl>!qulfing<ontlnpl>trol!.ésai<! ~l isum'ptl""lrlellm!sarnlfl1l!>t"'"'"t,
- whl!>tnl>tJ>ttl!<laGon!inuousot-
that~ would rea!saIn~sln<i1têm~nS
"'""' i:4bli-cr.ofwhl<hwou!dlandlnL"" 5.-deterr"~run tasturlsJ>Welth~dose
te it~e~~ Cllpabillty",totlefM!r•t
laie 20201. $1'1not-"l'>deartt~iik<i1lla>l!lf ~re emill~ng !hat t(-uff»tuatlan
tl>! ~""<!\l'l>lrs<ll!n>flth'lehi!lh d~M~O a<bermanent <WJatte~seri!fit,Jij>

{~nfld emc:emlln"l<l>SapJ>'!>»lfur nee<t<beln poSlt~ &ll!tsll<' ""~tl!
""t" pldid.th is~WIJ!hi q"""" ll"t, gl®otobieol!'.id~""~ ~>~ti!
ru'*<"">li!fllf1rW;r~loos ln!>ilir<>l•
teq\ilre>a@<:1!!<>ll!el>i!h~-<>
;m{re!>!lif!<$001d~l--"" c!l<llsil>le seemwlll!w.:ooteml)l~!e.
<Dul;lherw!;p!<Wli!Ut"!tButi>ow
lfoon-e •~ ~zt116lti'ldtbe
--1'11• tl',lsro<t.olt~W~>wth!d;~rhé
g<>vemme ~n~,.,-t ph~~~ of~hé l~lidutol)mltloo~r~and
-'ll\'!ntGlawateg:nu.;i.,.,;ùate-b~ If!hetW<>-Va~ullnl~ot lelltell
~tllettru~-~~thoii!I!Ol!le180thb$W,
thrl!'a>e~ll!f aowole,eWi>lla•~•tr<Jl\11
md h~th vlliànce!'1fliition•hjp$? tblif; fttU<I'-fle <Ot;lié~ ·bY
.~ "" l$!Jdlsl-m ye~~tS, a l!I\Jil>llna
Ti>l\lplaeeNATOatthelll'!tt~>att<mal
1\liledi<l!le10Ile l'$l.1~!i!;~11!1
""""~ 'n"c''l~!'·W><ti>"lality(>~ fl!~(ilf S~!M{!oaNv-~tlli!S)lti'ld
A!Ha~ np~;l<>aTtniequlfŒ-t fqr r~œcl nmnl!n~su.t1N<II$d f!P1IIP"

lncl"!len®nt opelli.th$<D<mnAylex3n1JerdesiralllelleoÎ'th«till:~.~~·
açfm~ I Mll -f{}fe$UlSiRilSp~ftt!~ <:har!Jf'l t-a. Th!> 1lhl"f''"'

quest!Of~« "'atRUS<e..-1\;;"l"-'"''' $hJ>i>tl""""oora~p!o m<m>eT<ltepgrt
littleflnrtllo~ltmg~lm w capablll!ie'l
<~lt All,.!Md sen&theralhi!<stf<l<lll Mû<Îl;>the a!>:tt thf<>Jre''"";,r;>ufid
assump!W<>belllndthe l1hti-ltWi>Uid
~· !l>temaooMlly!attheIlan~l'f:l.lo
ll!'Îlth\c~ry p!!litli>nstr~k•l!y taltthe Ukta .,<l'lepwarl>IW'"th"
el""etlthemostpoweriul>t11the..,,!d, Tr!l" d'~m~{J vearl;tanewwam.,.dlor
anynewdell\lei"'fSiltimm~ m~SS!iej.;;n
®ii>nothl>f~Jtf>"i1>11~ etrnr~lltll~ti!ral
aliliaf'l!!atron.hatd-!hî&do fur adclotlolyear<o~1l Th)<ll!d·tlm'>10~r
<Mildifll!teinir>teme!l!-,w lot !Il« .1ru!<~um~n y!Jtol>tie):>t~;ta~lla>is
thatmer ..-ufflclent!!l ~~~ t!>e
UK'si\On·Pf"ilfepill!iey~
wameadfil!ll:Meltematlv.efo<"theculfl'!nt
Iilnti.dao>noY"'!lavet<OO!ld 1ete~;<> ..,b,mrinteiOlhe e><l<>f!lstefullife

ll'll:iilma' il>al'el'Îecpru1ear arŒn<2l 0ao.
wèa~J M!>ir"l:r,fee!; SOOtWatlt hO>
fl'!spoosiha>ltNA!Pa!IÎwf>houll~fhé lith>l«leadet,.-r'"'"l'lh"""Mal a<!t<!t
that1'1\l'fim,theselead•thnedtit.!;~>
nudi>alt>urdenv.lAmerk- a>v~.r~h,
theni<JlU""'"'l>l>Sft ool~.Ses~ fadut,;dslgrllft.Jwt~· Ull~<Jffil>lV
as'lewitlu NAtOpal11!a.dens"'"arol!d v.ith1Mw•.rle;p!l!itims!îranŒji>.all!lîtis
toflel~m;o:bwre~po• (jlnl$ff001>~
andreliablet1ll'lst-se~tett·T i!lfi<e.
wouldt.ealisesubst:!fi1iasltlowlhil<ellb~cWlltho~Il.T hldl'lêt~< shlMd!lalil>
m~ olme!<'t!klent"""!!h""dsçecil.ithi<l<v
n-tiooed lu-,,I\'><>Îhéwll(er.
l!·arelhéyreallyul1\#tl!lthe<>sharte
Wb!r<l>ehllvti<ll"l!othe~"'!. eigleaf ;~sYelo ofhe!fulllte aJr4aUerli!lse
that'teriti"""lea~s 1<splofmt!<>oallymisc>le:arheS'thus?

lndependeritenwel:nowthath..-e.areno
!l"lltiu~bleysŒnaliesw1>etnhewoul<ie 1<><1<iiew wll! !&<\fmfl'dell!>etallon;"'
firlllnu<l""Wl!llP<gain>'telJ<h<>Î e ~h él>mmi>>li>,d1:!>do<.~ si$;!U!dj>la)!

Amerkan>?tho>la!ctoreinreductÎllïaw! ~"in>portanttlnthf<>r!il<:Jebit"!-""
]umped<mat~ysugg ~lneduc pJ>tla>s ti>llfut<;'r~t.

rreatin'port-t!medewrent'Jsn'ttllat
"'"'cwllat""need~. ~ometn tleli g
flel<la>vipor(lf!e the threatswefaa<...

2 ANNEX40
ANNEX40- T. Fenwick, "Retiring Trident: an alternative proposai for UK nuclear
deterrence", CentreForum, (2015),
http:/www.centreforum. org/assets/pubs/retiri ng-trident.pdf

~ 3 - Critiquing the Trident Alternatives

Review

Pub!lshedin Ju!y2:013,the Ttîdent AlternativesRev!ew {TAI\c}onsîd­
ereda tange ofalternativestoJike..for-replateffiftof CASùTriderrt:"

The;;elnçludedchanges to the warbead <lhdeiiveryS}'Stcé(te.l'épiat­
ing Trident witânother nudeat system} and thé readlness state (ie.
movingawayfrom acôntînuous readlness S'tateeithéwith Trident ur
withaMther nudear system}.

The most usefui element of the TAR lsîtsretonsîdemtlon ofthe "un­
acceptablelos. not~n atthe heart ofdeterrence theory,by atŒptlng
that the absoluteleve!of dâmage ro deti,'erunâtceptablelosswltlwry
from advêtsaryto adverury. lndoing so, !tat.ceptsthatthe MMostô>ll

Criterlondoes not prescribe<111bsolutelevel orl.est.ructtapab1!îty.
Furth eucléâtweapoos are explh::ité5el'\lêdutoociearstates'tar­
Bétsthattannot be held at ri.byUl<canventiooal t:apahl!it.érut.iat!y,
this means that deterrlng non-PSstates' !ess well--defendedtargets, a

lowerleve!oftapah!Uty than Trîdentofferswoulds'tptuvide.asuffttlènt
threat thathe deterrent elfectwou!dbé âthieved.

Giventhat amajorreasonfu.rmnsiderlng alternativeto Tridentlsto re­
ducethe tosts,the "Costs"Séctîonof·thefARîstrll:îca"'As pubi!shed,

fouranalytk:alfaî!!nfundamentallyundermlnetrns ~on of the TM's
analysîs.

Fitst,the JS1 môdern!Sêd wt..1T1free,falMmh option fuat ·lr.efer­
él1tedelsewhereîntM fAR îsexcludedfrom thé costtôffiparatorChad

A'""t;he on!y.lSfoptioshownîs forJSftatry!nga yet-to-bedevelope.d
supersonk crulse missile.lt isassessedthat thisturioamrssîtm lsbe­
causea JSFl môdernîsedWE.177 free-fallbomb option woùld bé avail­
ablebefore the Vanguatd-tlasSs.S.Soutof ;;e.tvldate {050},meanîng

32 ANNEX41

ANNEX41- Hansard, HC Deb, 6 March 2014, cols. 1077-1078,

http://w-ww.publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm20 1314/cmhansrd/cm 140306/debtext/14

03060002.htm# 14030652000003

6 Mar 2014 : Column 1077

Nuclear Submarines

12.22pm

The SecreillrYofStatefor Defence ()\PhilipHanunond): 'Before1m<ikemy s.tateme.nam

sure that the Ho-use\"ill t-join me in s.endingcortdoleto-the family and friendsof the
sapperfrom 32 EngineerRegimentwhosadlydiedwhi1eondutyin Hehnandprovincey-ester-day
asa tesu1tof non-battlerelat:edinjuriessrn>iainedin Camp Bastion.The incident is not believedto

haveinvolvedany enemyaction.Theservicema.n'snextof kin have beeninforme.dandhave
requested thcu~'tôm 2ahour delay before furthet deiaib are released.

With.permissionMr Speaker..I wish to infotrnthe Housethat I ha·vedecided to renude.are

reactorin Ht\4SVanguard,one of the UK·sfour billistic missilesubrnarines,during its pkmned
deepmaintenance period. which begins ln 2015. It will bethe second tiilléthat Vangu:mi'sreactor
ha.'i eenrefuelledsinitenteredservicein 1993.wm ê.ll.plan theHouseilOW why l have

l3of4ù 13!03/2015M:09

Hou.sofCommoru Hans::trdDehates ~fa02014 (pl0002) http:JÎWviw.publlcations.pariiam.;:2014/crnhansr...

reached the decision to conduci a second refneUing.

Asmany hon. ~-Iemb wil snow,alongsidethe oper.:uionalrèactùnsboardour ballistit
nù.ssilesubmarines, aprototype reactot of the same cla.'\sbas been runilingat the naval reactor test

establishmentat Doumeay in Scotllliidsince 2002. Its pur-tohelp us assesshow the-reactor
tores withîn our submarinwillperf-onove-rtitne.lt bas iherefore beenrun fot sig:nilîeantly
longerperiodsand at a signifkantly higherintensity than the core-softype in our

submarines.toallowusto identifyearlyârijage-oru..-..e-relatiesdsuesthat mayariseItherin
lives-oftheopemtiortalteactor core.s.

ht Janua.ry2012, lowlevels of radîoactWerey-detectedin the cooJingwaret Suttot.tndingthe
prototype-core. Low Jevels.of radioactivityare a normalprorluctof the nuclearreatak-es:hat
place\Vithinthefuel.buttheywouldnot norrnallyeniethecoolingwarer.The watetis<.:-ontaine-d

\vîthithesealedreactor circuit. and I can reassurethe House thatthere has been no deteclable
radîaiionleak.from tbat sea.leddt-cuit.The irtdependentDefence Nudear SafetyRe-rnd the
ScottishEnvir-onmentProte<:tionAgency hav-ebeen keptinfonned.

Whenthe coolant radioo.cûvirywas firstdetected, the reactor was shut down as a precaution.
Followinginvestigation:5and a series of trials-,and with the agreementof the relevant regu1ator.the

reactowasrestarte.dinNovember2012.1tcontinuestooperatesafety.Bothmdiation èXpPSUrefor
wo-rkersat the site and discharges from the site bave remainedweil insidethe strictly prescribed
lirnitsset by ihe re_gulatots.Indeed, agairu."ttheInternationalAtomic Ener_gyAgency's:

rneasurementscale for nudear-related events, !his-issueisa.llve! teto, which is described
bythe agency as

"below scille- no safety significâlice".

The naval reactor test establishmentis. and temains:.a very-safeand low-Howevertthe
factthat low levels of radioactivîty have been detected in the cootant \\-'alerdearly means that the

reactot i-.noper<~ exi:n:days plàlllled.As one ·wou!dexpect,·wehave ronrlucted extensive
investig tadteeomnie.h~w the radioactivitybasentered thecooJingwaier.Webe-lievethatit
is due to a microscopie breach in a stnall

6 Mar 2014: Column 1078~'-Pi thea·t~nowhave tocoru-iderthpossib io·witvyetil(lthat thnsefulopernûng
lifru thiparticulardesi1fooremay not beas long as previou:siyexpeAs are." Ihlv-~
decidedthar,as ap.recàUtio-cyeasure,wsbould refuellThlS Vanguard, the olddt dass

andthe one v.ith the hlghesi i:llikage.as il \reacroWmhenshe enters her -sèheduled
Jeep maintenanceperiOO. 2015.Thîs therespons.ibleoption:replacthà)re ona
precautioiDibasisar.thenexarisingQpportt:mrathethan waitintoseeif thŒre needsto

he repla t.a1aredat ehich woukime&l retuming \1wguatd for a period of nnscbeduled
deep.ilUÙnte.fiape,tenffiyuttingarist thresilienceofouhaliis:miss:ilesubmarlne
operations.

Thè-refueUinwillincrea.Outèùnfidenc-e!hVan~um dHlhè abletoopemteeffettiveland
safelyuntitheplannedlleel ofSuccessocsubmarinesbeginsbedeliverefrom2028.The
refuellingwill be tonducred vâtbin the currentdrydockmlÙ!lierul!periodfor

\\n>guanl, whicruntinlate 2015 and will 1ast fot!breeaada half y.-.m;.lt is therefore
expeeted to have ùnpacton deretreoperat ioeàdditional tost of tefudling \4misanl
t-Stimatedtbeabout!.120millionovethenextsixye-.il:S_

A déCisiononwhetherto refud the next olsuhmari m nesV~îcrorioos+when she-.entersbe.r
nextplann<ddeepmainle!lllllŒp<ridŒs notneed to bmade nalil2!H8. willbeinformed by
fU:rthrnalysis of the datafrom the ratDounteay and eXamination of the coretheter

reactotis dectnnmissioned.t decld egdi~on a pre-c-.tutiyasis._tbat in the meant.ime
we \Viitake-thtteŒs...s.tepto keep openthe option of refuening Victorious.l'bat will involve
inv.<e-3imattDevoport anat thereaetorplantai Raynes\in Demy topreservô-U.abilito

conductnudear refuelliThe t-oial-ctfthatitt'.r"estiststbcingscoped,butîise:xpectOO
tobe of the order of !!50 million.

Tho.seL~is-peth 270snu1liortin totwillbe metfromexisûngprovisionfor finànéialrlsk

in the sub:marineprogrammebudget.Threpre. suhs:àùtiallyJethan10%-of thàri.<d:
provisio-nand win not imp.othemorethan .t-billiofrontingencythat\\'are holdingthe
ow:rnlldafeneeequîpmentplan. ANNEX42

ANNEX42- Hansard, HC Deb, 20 January 2015, col. 183,

http://vvww.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm20 1415/cmhansrd/cm 150120/debtext/15
0120-0003 .htm

Ml' ÎlURiEve. sudytbirl hà'!~o-ked-S:far:bao;:îdt'ours.ot;-héw:e:eilm,nd

1bop thâth ~oo_fit.m~ -Ûe>to.

-i<[ otanwithe positadvnca b~my hon.Frièndth~kmbc fr~rurt-fil !lr~ki:
Hllfie)'),whnm,we!oonddandng-cheadof-apiintclklngaboutab_lznt.Libùem

policyespinttion.Far:nrinlmumnude--rktcrrentt-JtP:ylive-redwit\\--nboat
-1Jp1for dual use.he-lus devd·newpolkflntM boof-noa:pari-t&,:J~ but--nt

kit-padet~mA partfromth!acttha.tneidt.<:ot)flWmssa-cvi!cnun-iidcrti--~
alternat:rt:"s h~sb_~d.::moru;ttateddut the:Ubcr.upunyffi-t

Pet W~JSbart.t:1tflttW'thit:.f.fWJN (StOnnr.,o.6).

MrSpe-.dŒ:Jrv:,nrukrw&'"rtMlli;1tft.h&tay-b: hMbee.n1mlnut tus far-~
Sfljl."ttt Arnts mÎD\'~s tedday f~boiL.mhm.-. ANNEX43

A:NNEX 43- Hansard, HC, 20 January 2015, col. 4WS (HCWS210),
http :/lw~ pu-bli-ations.parliamentuk!palcm20 1415/cmhansrd/cm 150120/wmstext/1

50120m0001.htm#15012039000001

20 Jan2015 : Colmnn 4WS

DEFENCE

Nucl-earDeterrent

The Secreta:ryof State f-orDefence(l\UchaelFallon): As pan of his st.atementon the strategie

defen-ceàndsec-uri!yreview(SDSR)on 19Oètober2010,myrighthon. Friend thePrime Minister
annourttedthat webadreviewedournudear detetrertcetequirements.He tonèludedthaiwe could
deliver a credible nudeat deterrent with a smallet nuclear weapons capability and would
incorporate these reductions into the current deployed câpabîlity and the future roccess.Qtdete.rrenl
programme.The numberof dep1oyerl\\.iirheadson eath submarinewouldbe.reduted from48 to

40;thenumberofoper.ttîonalmissiintheVanguatdclass ballisticilsubm:uines(SSBN)
would be reduceù to no more tharteight; and we wouid reduce the number of operationaJly
âv'ailablewarheadsfromfewerthân 160to no more than 120.

The then Sectetary of State for Defence.honFriend th~femb eorNnrth Somerset
{LîâniFox),announcedtotheHouseon 29June2011Official Repocolurn.S0-51WS, thathe

progtarrtrfotîrnplementing the 2010 SDSR warhead reduèrions had commem:ed.

Iam pleasedtoînfonn theBouse that thisGovernmenthavenow met theit ctmtrnîtme-ntto

2ofJ 13/03/201509:18