INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(CROATIA v. YUGOSLAVIA)
MEMORIAL
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
ANNEXES
GENERAL ANNEXES
VOLUME 4
1 MARCH 2001 CONTENTS
GENOCIDE CONVENTION 1
Annex 1: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide U.N.T.S. No. 1021, Vol. 78 (1951),
P. 277 3
APPLICATION BY THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND ORDERS
FROM THE COURT 7
Annex 2: Application by the Republic of Croatia Instituting
Proceedings Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 9
Annex 3: Orders for Extension of Time, Year 1999 19
UN RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER UN DOCUMENTS 23
Annex 4: General Assembly Resolution, 49/43, 9 December 1994 25
Annex 5: Relevant UN Resolutions and Reports on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
(from 1992 to 1994) 27
Annex 6: General Assembly Press Release, 1 November 2000 31
Annex 7: Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council, Dated 29 April 1997 33
RELEVANT LEGAL AND POLITICAL DOCUMENTS 37
Annex 8: Declaration on the Proclamation of the Sovereign and
Independent Republic of Croatia 39
Annex 9: Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and
Independence of the Republic of Croatia – 25 June 1991 42
Annex 10: Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the
Republic of Croatia, 8 October 1991 44
Annex 11: Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja and Western Sirmium, November 12, 1995 45
Annex 12: Agreement on Normalization of Relations Between the
Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, 23 August1996 47
Annex 13: Joint Statement by Ambassador Muhamed Šačirbey and
Ambassador Ivan Šimonović, 12 June 2000 50
Annex 14: the SANU “Memorandum” 51
Annex 15: Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 27
April 1992 86 IV
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PRESS COMMENT 87
Annex 16: Extracts fromPolitika (Serbian newspaper) 89
Annex 17: Extracts fromPolitika Express (Serbian newspaper) 91
Annex 18: Extracts from “Intervju” (Serbian magazine) 91
Annex 19: Extracts from “Duga” (Serbian magazine) 93
Annex 20: Extracts from “Večernje Novosti” (Serbian newspaper) 96
Annex 21: Extracts from “Borba” (Serbian newspaper) 97
Annex 22: Extracts from “Pobjeda” (Montenegrin press) 97
Annex 23: Extracts from “Vreme” (Serbian magazine) 98
Annex 24: Mark Thompson, Forging of War (Kovanje rata) Zagreb,
Croatia, 1995, pp. 52-53. 99
Annex 25: Media & War (Zagreb–Belgrade, 2000) citing Žarko
Puhovski, Hate Silence, Croatia, pp. 41-53. 99
Annex 26: Helmut Bauer,the Freedom of Media and Public Opinion
(Sloboda medija i javno mnijenje) (Osijek-Zagreb-Split,
1997), Croatia, p. 90. 99
Annex 27: “Serbian Politics Must Not be Defined in Washington”
(“Srpska politika se ne sme određivati u Vašingtonu”)
Tanjug Press (Serbian), 8 August 1991, p. 15. 100
Annex 28: Extracts from Stojan Cerović, “Bacchanalia: Patriotic
Trap” (“Bahanalije: U zamci rodoljublja”) Belgrade,
FRY, 1993. 100
Annex 29: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1990 101
Annex 30: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 17, 1991 102
Annex 31: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 18, 1991 103
Annex 32: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 24, 1991 104
Annex 33: Financial Times (London), 4 March 4 1991 105
Annex 34: Orlando Sentinel Tribune, March 17, 1991 106
Annex 35: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 18, 1991 107
Annex 36: The Guardian (London) July 2, 1991 109
Annex 37: United Press International, July 6, 1991 110
Annex 38: Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1991 111
Annex 39: The Guardian (London) October 4, 1991 113
Annex 40: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 5, 1991 114
Annex 41: United Press International November 21, 1991 115
Annex 42: The British Broadcasting Corporation, November 22,
1991 117
Annex 43: The British Broadcasting Corporation, November 23,
1991 117 V
Annex 44: The British Broadcasting Corporation, May 22, 1995 118
Annex 45: The Washington Post, July 4, 1995 119
Annex 46: Agence France Presse, January 20, 1998 122
MILITARY DOCUMENTS 125
Annex 47: Federal Secretariat for National Defence: Order of Chief
of Staff, SFRY 15 May 1990 127
Annex 48: Command of the 1st Military Region, 15 May 1990 130
Annex 49: Strategy of the National Defence and Social Self-
Protection of the SFRY Belgrade, 1987 132
Annex 50: Extract from “Development of the Armed Forces of the
SFRY, 1945-1985” 134
Annex 51: Command of the 30 Partisan Division 135
Annex 52: Order of the Presidency of the SFRY, 31 May 1990 137
Annex 53: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Order of 14 May
1990 139
th
Annex 54: Command of the 5 Military Region, 24 January 1991 140
th
Annex 55: Command of the 9 Corps of the Combat Air Force and
Anti-Aircraft Defence, 10 December 1990 141
Annex 56: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Information, 10
January 1991 143
Annex 57: Order of the SFRY Presidency, 9 January 1991 144
Annex 58: Federal Secretariat for National Defence: Completion and
Development of Leadership and Command in the Armed
Forces (Dissertation), 14 March 1989 145
th
Annex 59: Order of the 17 Corps, 14 May 1991 150
th
Annex 60: Command of the 10 Corps, 10 May 1991 153
Annex 61: [deleted] 155
Annex 62: Instruction of the Federal Secretariat for National
Defence, 28 June 1991 155
Annex 63: Command of the 17 Corps, 5 July 1991 157
Annex 64: Transcript of Conversation between Radovan Karadži ć
and Slobodan Milošević, 20 December 1991 159
Annex 65: Letter of Dušan Smiljanić, 16 October 1994 161
Annex 66: Order of Mobilisation, SAO Krajina, 11 July 1991 166
Annex 67: Operations Report of “RSK”, 10 April 1995 166
Annex 68: Transcript of Conversation between Milan Martić and
Goran Hadžić, 28 May 1993 167
Annex 69: Letter to Mr. Milošević from “RSK”, June 1993 168
Annex 70: Order of the Presidency of SFRY, 21 February 1992 169 VI
Annex 71: the Official Record of the Conversation of the
Representative of the Government of the Republic of the
Serbian Krajina with President Slobodan Milošević, 12
November 1992 170
Annex 72: Resolution of the National Assembly of the “RSK”, 18
August 1994 171
Annex 73: Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Instruction on
Accepting Volunteers into the Yugoslav People’s Army
(JNA), 13 September 1991 172
Annex 74: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Order 10
December 1991 175
Annex 75: the Commands of the First Military Region, 10 March
1992 178
Annex 76: Commands of the 1 Brigade of the Territorial Defence,
19 May 1992 179
Annex 77: Letter from the Republic of Serbia, 11 December 1991 180
Annex 78: Letter from the Republic of Serbia Regarding Funds, 8
February 1992 180
Annex 79: Decision of the Federal Ministry of Defence of the FRY,
30 September 1993 181
Annex 80: Request for Financial Support Made by the “RSK”, 22
November 1994 181
Annex 81: Request To FRY for fuel by the “RSK” 182
Annex 82: Letter of Consent for Arkan’s “Tigers” for the “Defence”
of Petrinja, 25 November 1991 183
Annex 83: Command of the 1 Operations Group, 19 October 1991 184
Annex 84: Order of Appointment of An JNA Officer As Commander
of the T.O. of Krajina, 17 January 1992 185
nd
Annex 85: the Command of the 2 Lika’s Brigade, 12 November
1991 185
Annex 86: Order of Federal Secretariat for National Defence, 30
November 1991 186
Annex 87: Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Order for
Mobilisation- Demobilisation, 12 March 1992 187
Annex 88: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Order 24 March
1992 192
Annex 89: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Order 28 April
1992 196
Annex 90: Headquarters of the Armed Forces of SFRY Order 11
May 1992 198
Annex 91: Extract of List of Yugoslav Army Personnel in the Army
of “RSK” in 1993 200 VII
Annex 92: Yugoslav Army Officers Seconded to the “RSK” in 1992 200
Annex 93: Yugoslav Army Officers Seconded to the “RSK” in 1993 201
Annex 94: Order for Transfer of Personnel 203
Annex 95: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Order Accepting
Conscript Soldiers, 27 January 1993 205
Annex 96: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Decision 24
November 1991 206
Annex 97: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Decision 24
November 1991 207
Annex 98: Report of “SAO Krajina”, 12 September 1991 208
Annex 99: Report of To the Command of the 329 tArmoured
Brigade 209
Annex 100: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Order 25 July
1991 211
Annex 101: Decision of Appointment by “SAO Krajina”, 30
September 1991 212
st
Annex 102: the Command of the 1 Proletarian Guard Mechanised
Division Order of 4 October 1991 213
Annex 103: Agreement between the JNA and Representatives of Ilok
14 October 1991 215
Annex 104: Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of
19 November 1991 217
Annex 105: Command of the 1 Operations Group, Order 19 October
1991 218
Annex 106: Command of the 9 corps, 23 September 1991 219
Annex 107: Agreement Between the Official Delegates of the
Republic of Croatia and the JNA, 22 November 1991 220
Annex 108: Order 224
Annex 109: Combat Report of the 8th Defence Garrison 31 March
1992 225
Annex 110: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Order 2 March
1991 226
Annex 111: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Order 12 March
1991 226
Annex 112: Federal Secretariat for National Defence Order 28 April
1992 232
Annex 113: Order of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, 7 May 1992 233
th
Annex 114: Command of the 18 Corps 13 April 1993 235
Annex 115: Status 236
Annex 116: Refusal 237
Annex 117: “RSK’s” Request for Pilots and Air Crew 14 May 1994 238 VIII
Annex 118: Letter from “RSK” to Mr. Milošević, June 1993 238
Annex 119: Report of the Work of the “RSK” 7 February 1995 240
Annex 120: Strategy of Armed Combat 241
Annex 121: Command of the 5 Army 242
Annex 122: Military Report, December 1988 243
Annex 123: Report on Romanija-90 245
th
Annex 124: Command of the 5 Military Region 12 May 1991 247
th
Annex 125: Command of the 5 Military Region 247
Annex 126: Formation of the command of battle-fields 248
Annex 127: Request for Ammunition by “RSK” 18 November 1991 250
Annex 128: Appointment to Western Slavonia 12 February 1993 255
Annex 129: Promotion to Major General by FRY June 1994 256
Annex 130: Promotion to Major General by “RSK” 22 February 1994 256
Annex 131: Promotion of Lončar Dušan 16 December 1994 257
rd
Annex 132: Bulletin of the 33 Infantry Brigade - Dvor Na Uni 257
Annex 133: Order for the Admission of Contract Soldiers to the JNA,
17 December 1991 258
Annex 134: Order for the Engagement of Volunteers to the JNA, 13
December 1991 260
Annex 135: Official Gazette of the SFRY 18 October 1991 262
Annex 136: Order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence 20
September 1991 263
Annex 137: Request for Equipment 264
th
Annex 138: Report on Combat Readiness of the 18 Corps, 13
October 1993 265
Annex 139: Request for Funds 10 February 1992 266
Annex 140: Payments by FRY 25 February 1994 267
Annex 141: Request of HQ of the Serbian Army of Krajina 30
December 1993 268
Annex 142: Conversation with Prisoners 7 September 1995 269
Annex 143: Activities and Membership of Paramilitary Groups 271
Annex 144: Military Report, 13 February 1992 275
th
Annex 145: Command of the 39 Corps 10 April 1995 276
Annex 146: Security Report 8 February 1993 283
Annex 146A: Letter from the Commander of the 21st Diversion
Detachment, Belgrade, 20 February 1994 284
Annex 146B: Extracts from the Notebooks 286
Annex 146C: Military Report 292 IX
Annex 146D: Document Regarding Serbs of Gorski Kotar (Part I) 293
Annex 146E: Document Regarding Serbs of Gorski Kotar (Part II) 298
Annex 146F: Letter of Federal Secretariat for National Defence 299
Annex 146G: Criminal Charge, 23 August 1994 300
MILITARY PRESS 301
Annex 147: Extracts from “Narodna Armija” (Official JNA gazette),
Belgrade, 1990 303
Annex 148: Extracts from “Narodna Armija” (Official JNA gazette),
Belgrade January-June 1991 305
Annex 149: Extracts from “Narodna Armija” (Official JNA gazette),
Belgrade, July-August1991 308
Annex 150: Extracts from “Narodna Armija” (Official JNA gazette),
Belgrade, September-December 1991 322
Annex 151: Extracts from “Narodna Armija” (Official JNA gazette),
Belgrade, 1992 332
Annex 152: Extracts from ”Srpska Vojska Krajine” and Other
Magazines, 1990-1995 333XGENOCIDE CONVENTION2 3
A NNEX 1:
C ONVENTION ON THE REPENTION AND UNISHMPNT OF THE C RIME OF G ENOCIDE
U.N.T.S. N . 1021, VOL . 78 (1951), P. 277
Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December
1948.
The Contracting Parties,
Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime
under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and
condemned by the civilised world;
Recognising that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on
humanity; and
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge,
international co-operation is required;
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided.
Article 1. The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent
and to punish.
Art. 2. In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Art. 3. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Art. 4. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall
be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals. 4
Art. 5. The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present
Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide
or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.
Art. 6. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall
be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed,
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
Art. 7. Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall not be considered as
political crimes for the purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance
with their laws and treaties in force.
Art. 8. Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to
take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
Article 3.
Art. 9. Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State
for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.
Art. 10. The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.
Art. 11. The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on
behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an
invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member
of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as
aforesaid.
Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Art. 12. Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or
any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is
responsible.
Art. 13. On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been
deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a process-verbal and transmit a copy of it to
each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in
Article 11.
The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of
deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession. 5
Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on
the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.
Art. 14. The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the
date of its coming into force.
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting
Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current
period.
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
Art. 15. If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the 3 present Convention
should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date
on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.
Art. 16. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by
any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-
General.
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such
request.
Art. 17. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United
Nations and the non-member States contemplated in Article 11 of the following:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Article
11;
(b) Notifications received in accordance with Article 12;
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance
with Article 13;
(d) Denunciations received in accordance with Article 14;
(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with Article 15;
(f) Notifications received in accordance with Article 16.
Art. 18. The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the
United Nations.
A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the United
Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.
Art. 19. The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations on the date of its coming into force.6 7
APPLICATION BY THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
AND ORDERS FROM THE COURT8 9
A NNEX 2:
A PPLICATION BY THE R EPUBLIC OFC ROATIA ISTITUTING P ROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF Y UGOSLAVIA
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION
BY
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide
2 July 1999
To the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, the undersigned, being duly
authorised by the Republic of Croatia, states as follows:
1. On behalf of the Republic of Croatia and in accordance with Article 40, 1, of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice and Article 38 of the Rules of Court, I respectfully
submit this Application instituting proceedings in the name of the Republic of Croatia
against the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for violations of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter called
the ‘‘Genocide Convention’’). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 36(1) of its
Statute and Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
PRELIMINARY TATEMENT
2. The Genocide Convention prohibits the destruction, in whole or in part, of a national,
ethnic, racial or religious group, including the elimination or displacement of members of
that group from a particular territory. Between 1991 and 1995, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia repeatedly violated the Genocide Convention. By directly controlling the
activity of its armed forces, intelligence agents, a1d various paramilitary detachments, on
the territory of the Republic of Croatia, in the Knineastern and western Slavonia,
and Dalmatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is liable for the “ethnic cleansing” of
Croatian citizens from these areas--a form of genocide which resulted in large numbers of
Croatian citizens being displaced, killed, tortured, or illegally detained, as well as extensive
property destruction--and is required to provide reparation for the resulting damages. In
addition, by directing, encouraging, and urging Croatian citizens of Serb ethnicity in the
1
At the instance and behest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Serb residents of this area
declared the ‘‘Republic of Serbian Krajina” in December,1990. This illegal declaration was not
recognised by the Republic of Croatia, and was uniformly rejected by the international
community. For ease of reference, the Republic of Croatia will hereinafter collectively refer to
the areas of Knin, portions of Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, and Banija as the “Knin region.” 10
Knin region to evacuate the area in 1995, as the Republic of Croatia reasserted its legitimate
governmental authority (and, in the face of clear reassurance emanating from the highest
level of the Croatian government, including the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr.
Franjo Tuđman, that the local Serbs had nothing to fear and should stay), the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia engaged in conduct amounting to a second round of ‘‘ethnic
cleansing,’’ in violation of the Genocide Convention.
I. STATEMENT OF ACTS
3. On 25 June 1991, based upon the results of a national plebiscite, the Croatian Sabor
voted overwhelmingly (94,5%) to declare Croatia’s independence. Democracy had been
restored officially to the Republic of Croatia on 30 May 1990, the date that the Sabor held
its first session following the first free, democratic, multiparty elections after almost 50
years under Communist rule. On 22 December 1990, the Sabor adopted a new constitution.
4. On 15 January 1992, members of the European Community recognised the Republic of
Croatia as a sovereign state, and the United States of America recognised Croatia on 7 April
1992. On 22 May 1992, Croatia was granted membership in the United Nations. Within a
year, Croatia was recognised by 102 countries, 78 of which have established formal
diplomatic relations with it.
5. Prior to its declaration of independence in 1991, the Croatian state had existed in one
form or another for at least 1000 years, dating back to the first Croatian king, Tomislav.
Over the next 1000 years, Croatia retained its legal status and autonomy within the
framework of the Hungarian kingdom, and the Habsburg Monarchy. On the disintegration
of Austria-Hungary in October1928, a Croatian National Council took power in Zagreb and
(without consulting the Croatian people) called for union with the Kingdom of Serbia and
other South Slavic parts of Austria-Hungary. In December, 1918, the so-called Kingdom of
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed in Belgrade under the Serb Kara đorđević
dynasty, without ratification by the Croatian parliament. In 1929, King Alexander
Karađorđević reorganised the boundaries of governance and established a dictatorship,
renaming the country Yugoslavia for the first time in history.
6. In 1943, the Communist-led partisan forces proclaimed a new Yugoslavia at Jajce, in
Bosnia, and, with their victory in 1945, set up a federal state of six republics. By 1987-
1988, the Yugoslav Federal Government, established under Marshal Josip Broz Tito, had
begun to disintegrate. Serbian leaders effected changes in the Serbian constitution that gave
the Socialist Republic of Serbia effective control of four of the eight votes in the collective
Yugoslav Presidency. These changes altered fundamentally the de facto organisation of
Yugoslavia as defined by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution.
7. On 28 February 1989, the Croatian Democratic Union was formed under the leadership
of Dr. Franjo Tu đman, who would lead Croatia to restore its political independence as a
sovereign state. Faced with the prospect of the imposition of Serb hegemony under
Milošević (then President of Serbia), Croatia and Slovenia each declared their
independence on 25 June 1991.
8. Previously, on 21 December 1990, Serbs living in the areas of Croatia bordering Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Vojvodina illegally declared the establishment of the so-called
“Republic of Serbian Krajina.” This declaration was the culmination of over a year’s worth
of efforts by the Belgrade government to subvert the lawful authority of the Republic of
Croatia, seeking to overthrow its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Belgrade used such 11
means as the distribution of nationalistic propaganda, conducting demonstrations of its
armed forces, putting these units into the highest degree of combat readiness, and providing
arms seized from territorial defence installations located in the Republic of Croatia to
subvert Croatian democracy.
9. On 28 February 1991, rebel leaders in the Knin region announced their intention to unite
with the Serbs in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These actions were
undertaken in order to realise the plan for creating a “Greater Serbia.” This plan, although it
was first conceived more than 150 years ago, has been consistently advocated by Mr.
Slobodan Milošević, now the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
10. On 31 March 1991, Serb terrorists, armed with weapons supplied by the so-called
“Yugoslav People’s Army” (“JNA”) blocked Croatian policemen in Plitvice and opened fire
on them from ambush, killing Josip Jović, the first Croatian policeman killed in the defence
of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia. Within Croatia, paramilitary groups
dominated by Serbs put themselves at the service of the so-called JNA and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. By the middle of 1991, 59 of the 102 municipalities within the
Republic of Croatia were engulfed by the destruction. Forty of these had sustained
considerable direct damage, and 19 others suffered limited destruction. The areas of eastern
and central Slavonia, Banovina and Lika, and parts of Dalmatia sustained most of the
damage.
11. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia carried out the aggression against the Republic of
Croatia by supporting, abetting, and directing the actions of various extremist rebel groups
within Croatia to rebel against the lawful and democratically elected government of the
Republic of Croatia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia directed and supported these
groups by providing military personnel, military supplies, and money to enable the
insurgent Serb rebels to oppose the work of regular and legitimate Croatian police. By July
1991, the so-called JNA had used 19,029 artillery and rocket pieces, including 1,799 anti-
tank guns, 4, 200 recoilless rifles, 6,400 mortars, and 2,000 anti-aircraft cannons against
Croatia included approximately 1,000 tanks, 900 armoured troop carriers, 250 war planes
90 helicopters, and 200 armed war vessels of the so-called JNA navy.
12. In July 1991, there were already 30,000 registered displaced persons in Croatia. The
long list of displaced persons started with the persecution of the Croats from Lika in the
spring of 1991, and intensified in the summer with the persecution of the Croats from the
territory of Banovina, Kordun, eastern Slavonia, western Slavonia, west Syrmium, Baranja,
Dalmatian hinterland, Drniš, and Knin. The peak of the refugee crisis occurred in November
1991, when 600,000 displaced persons were registered in Croatia, including 15,000
survivors of a massacre in Vukovar. The atrocities inflicted by the Serbs on Vukovar’s
people were brutal, and the resulting humanitarian crisis among displaced persons was
unprecedented. In fact, the City of Vukovar, including countless historic buildings, and
cultural and sacral artifacts, was completely destroyed by the so-called JNA.
13. So far, in the period of time following 1995, Croatia has discovered and registered at
least 120 mass graves, mostly in the eastern Slavonia, Banovina, Dalmatia, and Knin
regions. To date, the exhumation process has registered 2, 989 bodies in both mass and
individual graves. For example, in Ov čara, near Vukovar, a mass grave was discovered,
from which some 200 bodies were e xhumed. These were the bodies of wounded persons
and patients who had been taken from the Vukovar Hospital. At the mass grave at the New
Graveyard of Vukovar, 938 bodies were found, and in Ba čin, 56 bodies, mostly of elderly
victims, were discovered in a mass grave. In Škabrnja, near Zadar, another mass grave was 12
recently discovered to contain 27 bodies. Also, in Vila Gavrilovi ć, near Petrinja, a mass
grave was found that contained 17 bodies.
14. Prior to a cease-fire on 2 January 1992, the so-called JNA and the rebel Serbs were able
to seize control of about one third of Croatia. This occupied area stretched from Prevlaka in
the south to Baranja on the Hungarian border, and was controlled by officials of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. The Belgrade-backed Serbs occupied and established effective
control over the eastern Slavonia region of Croatia.
15. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in recruiting, training, arming, equipping,
financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military
and paramilitary actions in and against the Republic of Croatia directly, and by means of its
agents and surrogate, asserted de facto control over these areas in Croatia, such that it is
liable for violations of the Genocide Convention that occurred on the territory of the
Republic of Croatia.
16. The occupied territory was critical to Croatia. It included the land access routes to
Dalmatian coast tourist sites, most of Croatia’s petroleum resources, and a section cutting
the primary access route from Zagreb into Slavonia. Heavy and intensive Serb shelling
attacks against coastal and inland targets, especially the ancient, walled city of Dubrovnik,
killed hundreds of civilians, destroyed property and virtually eliminated the tourist trade in
central and southern Dalmatia.
17. As a result of the aggression waged by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its agents,
officials, and surrogates, Croatia and its citizens suffered the following damages:
1. In Croatia, there were 20,000 dead and 55,000 wounded, with over 3,000 people
still unaccounted for.
2. Out of the total number of victims, 303 children died, 35 children were taken
prisoner and disappeared, and 1,276 children were wounded.
3. 1,700 people were killed in Vukovar alone (1,100 of them were civilians), more
than 4,000people were wounded, between 3,000-5,000 taken prisoner, and 1,000
people are still unaccounted for.
4. In 1992, the humanitarian crisis in Croatia was at its peak, with approximately
800,000 displaced persons and refugees, which constituted more than 15% of the
total population of Croatia.
5. Several thousand Croat civilians were taken prisoner and forcibly transferred to
Serbia and other areas of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Of the 7,000
people later released, 60% had spent time in prisons or detention facilities in
Serbia.
6. According to estimates by the National Commission for the Registration and
Assessment of War Damages, 590 towns and villages suffered damage, 35 were
razed to the ground, with another 34 suffering significant damage.
7. 1,821 cultural monuments were destroyed or damaged, including about 651 in
the area of Dubrovnik-Neretva County and about 356 in the area of Osijek-
Baranja County.
8. Three national parks, five natural parks, 19 special reservations, 10 parks, and 19
park cultural monuments were damaged. 13
9. 323 historical sites and settlements were destroyed or damaged.
10. 171,000 housing units (constituting approximately 10% of the housing capacity
of Croatia) were destroyed, often by arson.
11. Approximately 450 Croatian Catholic churches were destroyed or severely
damaged, with lesser damage to over 250 others. In addition, approximately 151
rectories, 31 monasteries, and 57 cemeteries were destroyed or severely
damaged.
12. 210 libraries were destroyed or damaged (from school libraries to such famous
libraries as those in Dubrovnik).
13. 22 journalists were killed, many of whom were trying to reveal the truth about the
aggression against Croatia.
14. Estimates indicate that upwards of 3 million various explosive devices were
planted within Croatia, mostly anti-personnel and anti-tank devices. These mines
are, for the most part, uncharted, and block about 300,000 hectares of arable
land.
15. About 25% of Croatia’s total economic capacity, including such large facilities as
the Adriatic Pipeline, was damaged or destroyed during 1991-1992.
Approximately 10% of Croatia’s tourist facilities were damaged or destroyed by
the FRY-backed forces and agents.
18. In January 1992, in Sarajevo, Croatia and the JNA signed a cease-fire brokered by Mr.
Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State of the United States of America and a special envoy
of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In February 1992, the UN
Security Council passed a resolution announcing the deployment of a protective,
peacekeeping mission (hereinafter “UNPROFOR”) in Croatia. Pursuant to the plan,
UNPROFOR was stationed in four different sectors, designated as United Nations Protected
Areas (hereinafter “UNPA”).
19. The intervention of UN forces in February 1992, while it ended the armed conflict
within Croatia, froze a situation in which the aggressor retained control of the Croatian
territory it had seized illegally. This situation violated international law and the United
Nations Charter, and was unacceptable to Croatia. Virtually all Croats, other Croatian
citizens, and members of ethnic minorities (including Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs,
Germans, Roma and others) had either been killed or driven from their homes in these areas
in the very first instance of ethnic cleansing by Mr. Miloševi ć’s Serbia. Such conduct by
Serbian officials, backed by the Federal Republic o Yugoslavia, constitutes genocide, as
was recognised by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/121 (18 Dec. 1992).
Clearly, the conduct of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia violated the Genocide
Convention. In addition, the United Nations General Assembly declared illegal, null, and
void the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s “activities aimed at achieving the integration of
the occupied territories of Croatia into the administrative, military, educational,
transportation, and communications systems” of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, called
upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease providing military and logistic support to
the occupying Serbs, and specifically and forcefully condemned the ethnic cleansing by the
Serbs that had taken place in the UNPAs. United Nations General Assembly Resolution
49/630 (1995). 14
20. The Republic of Croatia, from the very beginning of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia’s aggression in 1991, tried to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the situation, but
was unsuccessful. In June 1995, in response to Serb violations of the 1992 cease-fire and
the killing of Croatian civilians, Croatia launched “Operation Flash,” swiftly liberating the
Serb-occupied area of western Slavonia, opening the main highway between Zagreb and
Lipovac, and restoring law and order in the region.
21. In August 1995, upon the recommendation of the international community, the Croatian
government and the Serbs from the occupied areas met in Geneva to try to reach a
settlement on the third stage of the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas. The Serbian
delegation turned down all Croatian proposals, insisting that the “Republic of Serbian
Krajina” was a state that wanted to be united only with other Serb lands. It was evident that
they wanted to be united only with other Serb lands. It was evident that they wanted to
secede from Croatia and become a part of a Greater Serbia built around the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. After all attempts to convince the Serbs to accept the settlement
proposed by Croatia and supported by the international community failed, the Croatian
Army and the police launched “Operation Storm,” which, in just eighty-four hours, restored
legitimate Croatian governmental authority, law, and order within the areas of Knin,
Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun and Banija. This left only the areas of eastern Slavonia (including
the town of Vukovar) and Baranja under illegal Serb control.
22. Immediately prior to the commencement of Operation storm, Serb officials, backed by
the federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ordered, directed, incited, and encouraged Serbs in the
Knin region to withdraw from the area, cynically professing their belief that the Serbs would
not be safe after Croatia restored its authority over the area.
23. These claims directly contravened assurances coming from the highest levels of the
Croatian governmental, including President Tuđman, that the Serb population was safe and
that all civilians should remain in their homes while law and order in the area was restored.
Indeed, the Croatian National Parliament, in the Charter on the Rights of the Serbs and
other Nationalities, emphasised that:
the Republic of Croatia guarantees to the Serbs in Croatia and to all national
minorities which live on its territory the respect of all human and civil rights,
and
especially the freedom of expression and fostering of national language and
culture,
as well as political organisation. The Republic of Croatia protects the rights
and interests of its citizens regardless of religion, ethnicity, or race....
Serbs in Croatia and all the nationalities have the right to proportional
participation in the local self-government bodies and respective bodies of
state authority, as well as to the provision of economic and social
development for the purpose of preservation of their identity and for the
purpose of protection from any attempt of assimilation....
These assurances notwithstanding, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its officials, agents,
and surrogates, undertook a campaign to effect the displacement of a large portion of the
ethnic Serb population from this region. Significantly, this behaviour by the authorities in
Belgrade did not constitute an isolated action, but was part and parcel of a consistent pattern 15
of conduct by the Milošević government, repeated in not just Croatia, but also in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and, most recently, in Kosovo.
24. In fact, this action is a deliberate and calculated program designed by the Belgrade
Government to clear an ethnic population, and constitutes “ethnic Cleansing” and genocide.
Milošević’s purpose, both in Kosovo today and in Croatia in 1995, was to avoid any
situation where Serbs would have enjoyed a normal and peaceful life in a multiethnic
society, because this would have fundamentally undermined the “justification” for
Belgrade’s plans to create a Greater Serbia. This pernicious doctrine is predicated upon, at
best, the mistaken belief and, at worst, the cynical and self-serving assertion, that Serbs
cannot enjoy security any state where they are not the dominant community. This conduct
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-backed Serbian officials (which, in the Kosovo
context has been colloquially referred to as “self-cleansing”) constitutes “ethnic cleansing”
and genocide in violation of the Genocide Convention.
25. The actions taken by Croatia to restore order in the territories seized by the Belgrad-
directed Serb rebels, coupled with joint Croat-Muslim offensives in Bosnian and
Herzegovina, as well as NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions, paved the way for
a diplomatic solution to the problems created by Serb aggression against Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In November 1995, an agreement was signed separately in Zagreb and in
Erdut (eastern Slavonia) by the Croatian Government and the Serbs from the remaining
occupied areas, stipulating that western Srijem, eastern Slavonia and Baranja would be
gradually and peacefully reintegrated with the rest of Croatia under the monitoring of the
international community.
26. These successful actions against the Serbs set the stage for the Bosnian peace accord
initialled in Dayton, Ohio (USA) on 21 November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on 14
December 1995.
27. Pursuant to the August 1996 Agreement on the Normalization of Relations between the
Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the two countries have been
conducting negotiations for nearly three years on compensation for destroyed, damaged or
missing property. However, these negotiations have been unsuccessful, because the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia has been acting in bad faith and has refused to provide
compensation for the damage that it caused on the territory of the Republic of Croatia which
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia effectively controlled during the 1991-1995 time
period.
II. URISDICTION OF THE C OURT
28. The Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Article 36(1) of its Statute, which
provides that the Court’s jurisdiction “comprises…all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.” Both the Republic of
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are successor States of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this regard, the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia signed the Genocide Convention on 11 December 1948, and deposited its
instrument of ratification on 29 August 1950. Under the general principles and rules of
international law, successor States continue to be bound by the treaty obligations of the
predecessor State.
29. Article IX of the Genocide Convention provides as follows: 16
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation application
or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in
Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute.
By committing the actions described in the “Statement of Facts” above, and many others
that will be detailed in later submissions, the Republic of Croatia submits that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia has violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention.
30. The Conduct of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the period referred to above
demonstrates clearly that there is a dispute between the Republic of Croatia and the federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, and that this dispute unquestionably relates to the interpretation
and application of the Genocide Convention. Therefore, based upon Article 36(1) of the
Court’s Statute, and Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the Republic of Croatia
submits that the Court has jurisdiction to hear its claims against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia arising under the Genocide Convention.
III THE C LAIMS OF THE EPUBLIC OF C ROATIA
31. The Republic of Croatia asserts in this Application the commission of repeated and
numerous violations by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its officials, agents and
surrogates, of the Genocide Convention. The Genocide Convention defines genocide as
follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as
such:
1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Conv. Art. 2. The Genocide Convention outlaws the following acts:
1. Genocide;
2. Conspiracy to commit genocide;
3. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
4. Attempt to commit genocide;
5. Complicity in genocide.
Id. at Art. 3.
32. As indicated in the “Statement of Facts,” and as will be demonstrated in future
submissions, the Republic of Croatia claims that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its
officials, agents, and surrogates, have violated Articles II(a)-(d) and III(a)-(e) of the 17
Genocide Convention with respect to the Republic of Croatia and its people. In particular,
the Republic of Croatia will demonstrate that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia violated
the Genocide Convention by seizing control of the Knin region and eastern Slavonia from
1991 to 1995, shelling and attacking portions of Dalmatia, and driving Croat (and other
non-Serb) citizens from these areas with the intent to “ethnically cleanse” these regions, and
to unit them with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to form a “greater” Serbian state.
33. The Republic of Croatia will also demonstrate that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
committed further violations of the Genocide Convention when, immediately prior to the
commencement of Operation Storm, it directed, instigated and coerced the Serb population
living in the Knin region to evacuate from the area, thus creating a second “ethnic
cleansing” of the area.
34. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s “abhorrent policy of ethnic cleansing” has, itself,
specifically been recognised as genocide by the United Nations General Assembly. See
A/Res/47/121 (18 Dec. 192). As will be established in later submissions to the Court, in
pursuit of this policy in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its
officials, agents and surrogates, engaged in killing members of the Croat and other ethnic
communities; causing serious bodily or mental harm to the Croat and other ethnic
communities; deliberately inflicted on the Croat and other ethnic communities conditions of
life calculated to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part; and in imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the Croat and other ethnic communities. All of
these actions were specifically and purposefully undertaken with the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.
35. Moreover, under Article IV of the Genocide Convention, individuals who commit
genocide, or who commit any of the acts described in Article III, must be punished,
regardless of their official or private status. In addition, under Article V, States parties must
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide, or any of the acts described in
Article III. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has not punished individuals who
committed acts of genocide, or other acts described in Article III, and it has not provided
for effective penalties for such persons. Indeed, it has on many occasions given refuge to
such persons within its territory. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has, therefore, also
violated its obligations under Article IV and Article V of the Genocide Convention.
IV. JUDGEMENT REQUESTED BY THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
36. While reserving the right to revise, supplement or amend this Application, and, subject
to the presentation to the Court of the relevant evidence and legal arguments, Croatia
requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:
1. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has breached its legal obligations
toward the People and Republic of Croatia under Articles I, II(a), II(b),
II(c), II(d), III(a), III(b), III(c), III(d), III(e), IV and V of the Genocide
Convention;
2. That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has an obligation to pay to the
Republic of Croatia, in its own right and as parens patriae for its citizens,
reparations for damages to persons and property, as well as to the Croatian
economy and environment caused by the foregoing violations of
international law in a sum to be determined by the Court. The Republic of 18
Croatia reserves the right to introduce to the Court at a future date a precise
evaluation of the damages caused by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
V. JUDGE ADH OC
37. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 31(3) of the Court’s Statute, and Article 35, 1 of
the Court’s Rules, the Republic of Croatia declares its intention to name a judge ad hoc.
VI. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
38. The Republic of Croatia reserves the right to modify and extend the terms of this
Application, as well as the grounds invoked.
I have the honour to assure the Court of my highest esteem and consideration.
David B. Rivkin, Jr.
The Agent of the Republic of Croatia
2 July 1999 19
ANNEX 3:
ORDERS FOR E XTENSION OF T IME, YEAR 1999
14 September 1999
General List
No. 118
CASE CONCERNING APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(CROATIA v. YUGOSLAVIA)
ORDER
Present: President Schwebel; Vice-President Weeramantry; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans, Rezek; Registrar Valencia-Ospina.
The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Articles 31, 44, 45 and 48 of
the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on 2 July 1999, whereby
the Republic of Croatia instituted proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
“for violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide”;
Whereas, on 2 July 1999, a certified copy of the Application was transmitted to the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia;
Whereas the Republic of Croatia has appointed as Agent Mr. David B. Rivkin, Jr.; and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has appointed as Agent Mr.Rodoljub Etinski, Principal
Legal Adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, and as Deputy-Agent
H. E. Mr. Milan Grubić, Ambassador of Yugoslavia to the Netherlands;
Taking account of the agreement of the Parties, as expressed by their Agents at a meeting
held with them by the President of the Court on 13 September 1999,
Fixes the following time-limits for the filing of the written pleadings:
14 March 2000 for the Memorial of the Republic of Croatia;
14September2000 for the Counter-Memorial of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia; and
Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace,
TheHague, this fourteenth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine,
in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others
transmitted to the Government of Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, respectively. 20
(Signed) Stephen M. Schwebel, President.
(Signed) Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Registrar.
* * *
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 2000
2000
10 March
General List
No. 118
10 March 2000
CASE CONCERNING APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(CROATIA v. YUGOSLAVIA)
ORDER
The President of the International Court of Justice,
Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Article 44, paragraphs 3 and
4, of the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the Order dated 14September1999, whereby the Court fixed
14March2000 and 14September2000 respectively as the time-limits for the filing of the
Memorial of the Republic of Croatia and the Counter-Memorial of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia;
Whereas, by a letter received in the Registry on 25February2000 under cover of a Note
Verbale dated 24February2000 from the Embassy of Croatia in the Netherlands, the
Croatian Minister of Justice, Administration and Local Self-Government requested the
Court to extend by six months the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial, and indicated
the reasons for that request; and whereas, on receipt of that letter, the Registrar, referring to
Article44, paragraph3, of the Rules of Court, transmitted a copy thereof to the Agent of
Yugoslavia;
Whereas, by letter dated6March2000 and received in the Registry on the same day by
facsimile, the Agent of Yugoslavia indicated that his Government was not opposed to the
extension of the time-limit requested by Croatia, provided that the time-limit fixed for the
filing of the Counter-Memorial be extended likewise,
Extends to 14 September 2000 the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of the Republic
of Croatia;
Extends to 14 September 2001 the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and
Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision. 21
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The
Hague, this tenth day of March two thousand, in three copies, one of which will be placed in
the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Republic of
Croatia and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, respectively.
(Signed) Gilbert Guillaume, President.
(Signed) Philippe Couvreur, Registrar.
* * *
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 2000
2000
27 June
General List
No. 118
27 June 2000
CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(CROATIA v. YUGOSLAVIA)
ORDER
Present: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Ranjeva,
Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Registrar Couvreur.
The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
After deliberation,
Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Article 44, paragraph 3, of the
Rules of Court,
Having regard to the Order dated 10 March 2000, whereby the Court extended until
14 September 2000 and 14 September 2001 respectively the time-limits for the filing of the
Memorial of the Republic of Croatia and the Counter-Memorial of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia;
Whereas, by a letter dated 26 May 2000 and received in the Registry on 29May2000,
under cover of a letter also dated 26May2000 from the Ambassador of the Republic of
Croatia to the Netherlands, the Agent of Croatia requested the Court to extend by a further
period of six months the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial, and indicated the reasons
for that request; and whereas, on receipt of that letter, the Registrar, referring to Article 44,
paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, transmitted a copy thereof to the Agent of Yugoslavia;
Whereas, by a letter dated6 June2000 and received in the Registry on the same day by
facsimile, the Agent of Yugoslavia indicated that “if the Court grants the Applicant the 22
extension of six months, the FR of Yugoslavia asks the Court the same time-limit for the
filing of the Counter-Memorial, which will be at the disposal of the Applicant, i.e., time-
limit of eighteen months”,
Extends to 14March2001 the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of the
Republic of Croatia;
Extends to 16September2002 the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-
Memorial of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and
Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace,
The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of June two thousand, in three copies, one of which will
be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the
Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
respectively.
(Signed) Gilbert Guillaume, President.
(Signed) Philippe Couvreur, Registrar. 23
UN RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER UN DOCUMENTS24 25
A NNEX 4:
G ENERAL A SSEMBLY R ESOLUTION , 49/43, 9 DCEMBER 1994
A/RES/49/43
83rd plenary meeting
9 December 1994
49/43. The situation in the occupied territories of Croatia
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular,
the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through the use of force,
Stressing the importance of efforts to restore peace in the entire territory of the Republic of
Croatia as well as to preserve its territorial integrity within the internationally recognised
borders, and emphasising in this regard that the territories comprising the United Nations
Protected Areas are integral parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia,
Alarmed and concerned by the fact that the ongoing situation in the Serbian-controlled parts
of Croatia is de facto allowing and promoting a state of occupation of parts of the sovereign
Croatian territory, and thus seriously jeopardising the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic of Croatia,
Rejecting the odious policies and practices of ethnic cleansing and their consequences, and
all other violations of international humanitarian law,
Emphasising that the Serbian-controlled territories of Croatia must be peacefully
reintegrated into the rest of the country, under the close supervision of the international
community,
Stressing the importance of the mutual recognition of the international borders by all States
in the region of the former Yugoslavia, and recalling all relevant Security Council
resolutions on this matter,
1. Expresses its commitment to ensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of Croatia;
2. Calls upon all parties and, in particular, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), to comply fully with all Security Council
resolutions regarding the situation in Croatia, and to respect strictly its
territorial integrity, and in this regard concludes that their activities aimed at
achieving the integration of the occupied territories of Croatia into the
administrative, military, educational, transportation and communication
systems of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are
illegal, null and void, and must cease immediately; 26
3. Requests the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
cease immediately any military and logistic support to the self-proclaimed
authorities in the Serbian-controlled parts of Croatia;
4. Strongly condemns the Serbian self-proclaimed authorities in the Serbian-
controlled territories of Croatia for their militant actions that have resulted in
ethnic cleansing of the United Nations Protected Areas, and for their constant
refusal to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions;
5. Reaffirms its support for the principle that all statements or commitments in
the Serbian-controlled parts of Croatia made under duress, particularly those
regarding land and property, are wholly null and void;
6. Reaffirms the right of all refugees and displaced persons from the area of the
former Yugoslavia to return voluntarily to their homes safely and with
dignity, with the assistance of the international community, and in this regard
notes that the 1991 census is the basis for defining the population structure of
the Republic of Croatia;
7. Urges the restoration of the authority of the Republic of Croatia in its entire
territory and urges also the utmost respect for human and minority rights in
the territory of Croatia, including the right to autonomy in accordance with
the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and established international
standards, and for efforts to achieve a political solution within the framework
of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia;
8. Calls for mutual recognition between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) within their existing
internationally recognised borders; 9. Commends the persistent efforts of the
United Nations Protection Force in performing its duties in the territory of the
Republic of Croatia, and in this regard emphasises the importance of its role
for the overall peace process and for the success of the peaceful reintegration
of Serbian- controlled territories of Croatia;
10.Also calls for full respect of the cease-fire agreements in the territory of
Croatia, and urges the resumption of direct negotiations in close cooperation
with the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia;
11.Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its
fiftieth session a comprehensive report on the implementation of the present
resolution. 27
ANNEX 5:
R ELEVANT UN R ESOLUTIONS AND R EPORTS ON THE STUATION
OF H UMAN R IGHTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE
FORMER Y UGOSLAVIA F(OM 1992TO 1994)
1. First special session of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human
rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, 13 and 14 August 1992
The Commission on Human Rights held its first special session at the United
Nations Office at Geneva on 13 and 14 August1992 and adopted resolution:
“The situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”, 1992/S-
1/1 of 14 August 1992.
Relevant paragraphs:
Pp.5. “Expressing its particular abhorrence at the concept and practice of “ethnic
cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which at a minimum entails deportations and forcible mass removal or expulsion
of persons from their homes in flagrant violations of their human rights, and
which is aimed at the dislocation or destruction of national, ethnic, racial or
religious groups;
Pp. 6. “Deeply concerned that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and deliberate
violations of human rights have resulted in the creation of more than two and half
million refugees and internally displaced persons and that conditions conductive
to their return in safety and dignity have not been achieved.”
Op. 12. “Requests its chairman to appoint a special Rapporteur to investigate
first-hand the human rights situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia…”
2. Second special session of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human
rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, 30 November and 1 December 1992
The Commission on Human Rights held its second special session at the United
Nations Office at Geneva on 30 November and 1 December 1992 and adopted
resolution:
“The situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”,1992/S-
2/1 of 1 December 1992. (Adopted by a roll-call vote of 45 votes to 1 /
Yugoslavia against /, with one abstention).
Relevant paragraphs:
Op. 3. “Categorically condemns the ethnic cleansing being carried out, in
particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognising that the Serbian leadership in
territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav Army and
the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear primary responsibility for
this reprehensible practice;”
Op.4. “Demands an immediate end to the practice of ethnic cleansing, and in
particular demands that the Republic of Serbia use its influence with the self- 28
proclaimed Serbian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to bring
the practice of ethnic cleansing to an immediate and to reverse the effects of that
practice, re-emphasising the rights of refugees, displaced persons and other
victims of ethnic cleansing to return to their homes and the invalidity of acts made
under duress”.
Op.7. “Condemns also the indiscriminate shelling of cities and civilian areas, the
systematic terrorisation and murder of non-combatants, the destruction of vital
services, the besieging of cites, the use of military force against civilian
populations and relief operations by all sides, recognising that the main
responsibility lies with Serbian forces;”
Op.11. “Reaffirms that all persons who perpetrate or authorise crimes against
humanity or other grave breaches of international humanitarian law are
individually responsible for those breaches…”
Op.12. “Calls upon all states to consider the extent to which the acts committed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia constitute genocide, in accordance with the
Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide.”
Op. 13. Urges the Commission of experts, with the assistance of the Center for
Human Rights, to arrange for an immediate and urgent investigation by qualified
experts of mass grave near Vukovar and others mass grave sites and places where
mass killings are reported to have taken place….”
3. General Assembly resolution A/RES/47/147 of 26 April 1993 on the situation of human
rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, adopted on 18 December 1992
Title: “Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”
adopted on 18 December 1992
Relevant paragraphs:
Op. 3. “Condemns in the strongest possible terms the abhorrent practice of “ethnic
cleansing”, and recognises that the Serbian leadership in territories under their
control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav People’s Army and the political
leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear primary responsibility for this
reprehensible practice, which flagrantly violates the most fundamental principles
of human rights;”
op.9. “Demands an immediate end to the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, and in
particular that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) use its influence with the self-proclaimed Serbian authorities in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to bring the practice of “ethnic cleansing” to
an immediate and to reverse the effects of that practice;”
op.16. “Endorses the resolution adopted by the commission on human Rights at
its second special session addressing the reports of the Special Rapporteur, in
particular its call for all States to consider the extent to which the acts committed
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia constitute genocide, in accordance with
the Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide.” 29
4. General Assembly resolution A/RES/48/153 of 7 February 1994 on the situation of
human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: violation of human rights in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), adopted on 20 December 1993
Title: “Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia:
violation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)”.
Relevant paragraphs:
Op. 4. “Condemns in the strongest possible terms all violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) by all sides to the
conflicts, recognising that the leadership in territories under control of Serbs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the commanders of Serb paramilitary forces
and political and military leaders in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) bear primary responsibility for most of those violations ;”
Op.10. “Urges that an immediate end be brought to the continuing practice of
“ethnic cleansing”, and in particular that the authorities of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) use their influence with the self-proclaimed
Serbian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to bring the practice of
“ethnic cleansing” to an immediate and to reverse the effects of that practice;”
5. General Assembly resolution A/RES/49/196 of 9 March 1995 on the situation of human
rights in the in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), adopted on of 23 December
1994
Op. 4. “Condemns in the strongest possible terms all violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) by all sides to the
conflicts, recognising that the leadership in territories under control of Serbs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, the commanders of Serb
paramilitary forces and political and military leaders in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) bear primary responsibility for most of those
violations ;”
Op. 17. “Expresses its serious concern at the prevalence of lawlessness in the
Serbian-controlled territories of Croatia and the lack of adequate protection for
Croatian and non-Serb populations remaining in the Serb-controlled
municipalities where these populations continue to experience physical violence
and insecurity, as reported by the Special Rapporteur; “ 30
6. Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
E/CN.4/1993/50 of 10. February 1993
Title: “Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeus Mazoowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14. August 1992”.
Page 23. Sub Title: “United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs)”
Paragraph 143. “The Special Rapporteur on extra judicial, summary or arbitrary
executions visited the sector from 15 to 20 December 1992. According to his
findings, the de facto authorities of the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of
Krajina (RSK) are vigorously pursuing a policy of ethnic cleansing. The local
militia has not been disarmed. ….”
7. Fifth periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, E/CN.4/1997/47 of 17. November 1993
Title: “Fifth periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeus Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commissions
resolution 1993/7 of 23. February 1993”.
Paragraph 161. “The armed forces of the so-called” Republic of Serbian Krajina”
have engaged in the deliberated and systematic shelling of civilian objects in
Croatia towns and villages. According to Croatian sources, between April 1992
and July 1993, Serbian shelling resulted in total of 187 civilian deaths and 628
civilian injuries. These sources also allege that during the period between 1991
and April 1993, an estimated total of
210 000 buildings outside UNPAs were either seriously damaged or destroyed,
primarily as a result of shelling”.
Paragraph 162. “In the Dalmatian coast area, Zadar, Sibenik, Biograd, Tribunj,
Filipjakov and surrounding areas have sustained particularly heavily damages. In
other areas, Gospi ć, Karlovac, Ogulin and surrounding areas have been heavily
affected. On certain days, some areas have sustained several hundreds impacts.
There have been numerous civilian deaths and injuries and extensive damage to
civilian objects including schools, hospitals and refugee camps, as well as houses
and apartments. “
Paragraph 163. “On 14 September 1993 the field staff of the Special Rapporteur
visited Karlovac to investigate damage from shelling. They observed that civilian
objects, including hospital and refugee camp which were apparently not situated
in the proximity of a military object, had been deliberately shelled from Serbian
positions within visual range of the targets. In the case of the “Gaza” refugee
camp, at least three civilians were killed as a result of such attacks. The field staff
also inspected the damage caused by a 500 kilogram “Frof-7”misile, which on 11
September had hit a residential areas in Lu čko, in the immediate vicinity of
Zagreb”. 31
8. Report Situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, A/49/641, S/1994/1252 of 4
November 1994
Title: “Situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia”
Sub Title: Security of the persons in the United Nations Protected Areas
Paragraph 135. “In his fifth and sixth periodic report (E/CN.4/1994/47 par 145,
and E/CN.4/1994110, para 108) the Special Rapporteur drew attention to the
prevalence of lawlessness in the UNPAs and the lack of adequate protection for
non-Serb populations remaining in the Serb-controlled municipalities…”
Paragraph 139. “Although the number of non-Serbs in the UNPAs has decreased,
owing to earlier and more intense campaigns of “ethnic cleansing”, the strategies
by which this process has been propelled remain in effect....”
A NNEX 6:
G ENERAL ASSEMBLY RPSS R ELEASE , 1 NOVEMBER 2000
GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT,
WELCOMING FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
URGES SUPPORT FROM MEMBER NATIONS
This is the text of a statement today by the President of the General Assembly, HARRI
HOLKERI (Finland) on the occasion of the admission of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to membership to the United Nations:
It is a great pleasure on this historic occasion to welcome, on behalf of the General
Assembly, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a member of the United Nations.
We have, at the Millennium Summit, reaffirmed our commitment to the purposes and
principles of the Charter. The admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the
family of nations is of great significance, as it strengthens the universality of the United
Nations and thus enhances its legitimacy and effectiveness.
Equally, I am confident, it strengthens the efforts by the international community to bring
stability to South East Europe, efforts in which the United Nations plays in many ways the
leading role.
The path leading to this moment has been long and troublesome. But today, we should look
to the future and welcome the admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a
promising new beginning. Today signals also the strength of the United Nations itself and
its decisions.
Less than a month ago, the whole world congratulated newly-elected President Koštunica
and the people of his country for their success in assuring a peaceful victory towards
democracy. We all held high regard for the people whose democratically expressed will
prevailed over many obstacles. Their voices have been heard around the world, and the
movement towards democracy has gained new strength. 32
Moreover, this change gave realistic hope for a solution to the remaining problems in the
region of South East Europe, based on the principles of peace, democracy, rule of law and
human rights.
The admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations signifies a new
era in cooperation between the new Member State and the other Members of the United
Nations, including its neighbours and other successor States of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. The resolutions of the General Assembly on the strengthening of
cooperation in the region of South East Europe will gain additional momentum. This will
also give new vigour to a number of regional initiatives.
Here we welcome the recent admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. We can also envisage a new era in fulfilling many
other goals of the United Nations Charter, including respect for human rights. All this will
contribute to the strengthening of regional stability, and international peace and security.
The United Nations and its Member States should be prepared to strengthen their support to
the region and to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in addressing the
many remaining problems that need to be solved.
Today we must look to the future while, at the same time, we remember that freedom carries
with it responsibilities, including those relating to the pursuit of justice. Cooperation with
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is of paramount importance
for all the countries concerned, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Finally, I wish the Government and people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia peace,
prosperity and every success for the future. 33
A NNEX 7:
LETTER FROM THE ECRSTARY -GENERAL TO THE P RESIDENT OF THE ESURITY
C OUNCIL , DATED 29 APRIL 1997
S/1997/343
29 April 1997
I have the honour to refer to the elections held on 13 and 14 April 1997 in the region of
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium placed under the transitional
administration of the United Nations and to bring to your attention the following
information, which was forwarded to me by the Transitional Administrator.
Local elections for 25 municipal councils and three city councils within the United Nations
Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
(UNTAES) region were conducted simultaneously with elections throughout Croatia on 13
April. In addition to these local elections, regional elections were held for two county
assemblies, and national elections were held for the Upper House of the Croatian
Parliament. Owing to technical difficulties, particularly the late delivery of electoral
materials, voting inside the region was extended to 14 April, and to 15 April in one polling
location. Nearly 500 international observers were deployed thro ughout Croatia to observe
the elections. Within the UNTAES region, over 150 UNTAES observers were deployed to
all polling stations as static monitors. In addition, 30 observer teams from the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as observers from the Council of Europe
and representatives of the diplomatic community visited numerous polling stations during
the elections. The Transitional Administrator has informed me that no intimidation, violence
or electoral improprieties were observed or reported before, during or after the elections.
The framework for the elections in the region was defined by the Joint Implementation
Committee (JIC) on Elections, which met on a regular basis from early October 1996. In
accordance with the Basic Agreement and under the agreed framework, voter eligibility was
defined to include the following four categories of persons for whom separate lists were
prepared:
(a) Residents of the region who were listed in the 1991 census and who stayed in
the region and collected their pre-printed Croatian documents (domovnica
and identity card). A total of 69,158 persons in the region were registered
under this category;
(b) Former residents of the region, mainly Croats, who left after the 1991 census
and registered as displaced persons with the Office for Displaced Persons and
Refugees. A total of 61,326 persons outside the region were registered under
this category;
(c) Residents of the region who entered the region after the 1991 census, who
applied for documents, filled out registration forms and chose to vote for
candidates to be elected to municipal or city councils within the region. A
total of 10,086 persons in the region were registered under this category;
(d) Residents of the region who entered the region after the 1991 census, applied
for documents, filled out registration forms, but chose to vote in absentia for
candidates to be elected to national, regional and local bodies in other parts of 34
Croatia. A total of 1,692 persons in the region were registered under this
category.
Persons currently living in the region voted at 193 polling stations in the region, including
30 locations for absentee voting for authorities outside the region. The displaced persons
elsewhere in Croatia cast absentee ballots at 645 polling stations in 75 polling locations.
The final number of voters inside the region was over 71,000, of whom fewer than 1,000
(out of the registered 1,692 persons) voted in absentia for the authorities to be elected in
their former places of residence. This included a significant number of residents of the
region whose names did not appear on the list of voters but who were able to cast their votes
owing to the special measures adopted by the Transitional Administrator on election day.
These special measures, which enabled all residents of the region with Croatian identity
cards to cast a vote, were assessed positively by all international observers. UNTAES and
the Croatian Government will identify the total number of voters who fall into this category
by verifying the number of voters recorded on the supplementary list of voters constructed
on the two election days. Over 56,000 persons cast their votes in absentia elsewhere in
Croatia for the local authorities of the region.
The 28 Local Electoral Commissions (LECs), which were appointed by the JIC on Elections
on a multi-ethnic basis, were the competent bodies that conducted the elections in the
region. Their main functions included receiving candidate nominations, selecting polling
sites, appointing polling station committees, amalgamating polling results and announcing
final results for their respective municipalities or cities. The LECs were assisted in their
work by UNTAES electoral officers who had been appointed as electoral advisers. As the
formal and final appointment of the LEC members was considerably delayed, most of the
preparatory work was carried out by the electoral officers.
An electoral code of conduct was developed by the JIC on Elections, which laid out
fundamental principles and rules to be followed by all participants in the electoral process.
On the recommendation of the JIC on Elections, the Transitional Administrator
promulgated the code of conduct on the occasion of the formal announcement of the
elections in the region on 11 March 1997. The JIC on Elections also appointed the Electoral
Appeals Commission (EAC), composed of Serb and Croat jurists and chaired by an
UNTAES-appointed international judge. The Media Experts commission (MEC) was
appointed with a similar composition to monitor, inter alia, equitable access for all
registered political parties and candidates.
As required by the code of conduct, both Commissions have presented their final reports on
the conduct of the elections. EAC reported that most complaints received were either
corrected by the special measures adopted by the Transitional Administrator on election day
or dismissed after due consideration. MEC reported that several infractions of the code of
conduct were corrected by informal intervention. Both Commissions concluded that the free
and fair character of the elections was not affected by these issues. Their final reports will
be considered by the JIC on Elections on 30 April.
Preliminary results of the elections prepared by the LECs were announced by UNTAES on
19 April (see annex). The elections held in the region were subsequently certified by the
Transitional Administrator on 22 April 1997. Official and final results will be formally
reported by the LECs to the JIC on Elections on Wednesday, 30 April. A 48-hour period for
political parties to appeal the results will come into effect immediately after the final
announcement. Following these procedures, and provided that the results of the elections 35
are finalised, the Transitional Administrator will be in a position to certify the final results,
in accordance with the UNTAES mandate.
The Transitional Administrator has indicated to me that the successful holding of elections
in the UNTAES-administered region has been an essential step for further progress in the
peaceful reintegration of the region. It marks an important milestone for the legitimate
representation of the local population in the Croatian constitutional and legal system. It also
opens the way for the two-way return of all displaced persons in Croatia. In this regard,
rapid progress has been made in this area with the adoption by the Croatian Government, on
24 April 1997, of the Agreed Procedures on Return.
I should be grateful if you would bring the above to the attention of the members of the
Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN
(…)
ANNEX: Preliminary election results from the party list in the region administered by the
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium.
(…)36 37
RELEVANT LEGAL AND POLITICAL DOCUMENTS38 39
A NNEX 8:
DECLARATION ON THE PROCLAMATION OF THE OVERSIGN AND NDEPENDINT
R EPUBLIC OF C ROATIA
Pursuant to Article 140. paragraph 1. of the Constitution of Republic of Croatia, the Sabor
of the Republic of Croatia passes hereby the
DECLARATION ON THE PROCLAMATION OF THE SOVEREIGN AND
INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
I
Proceeding from the thirteen centuries old state-law tradition on its territory between the
Adriatic Sea and the rivers of Drava and Mura, the Croatian nation has preserved the
consciousness of its identity and its right to identity and independence in the independent
and sovereign State of Croatia.
Due to the coincidence of historical circumstances and to its position on the dividing line
between Eastern and Western Christianity, of two frequently opposed civilisations and
cultures with differing political, economic: and other interests, the Croatian nation was
through centuries compelled to defend its national state, simultaneously defending the
nations living to the west of its territory. The Croatian nation was governed vigilant in
defending the identity and sovereignty of its state. Even under the most difficult historical
circumstances. Croatia succeeded in retaining part of its national territory and its capital
Zagreb, with all the features of Croatian sovereignty.
From the times of the Croatian rulers, the Croatian Sabor and the Croatian Ban (exercising
the authority of viceroy during state unions with other nations) took over the role of
guardians and proponents of Croatia’s sovereignty. The Croatian Sabor has preserved the
traditions of Croatian historical law and maintained the identity of Croatian statehood
through history, which makes the Croatian nation one of the oldest politically state-formed
nations of Europe.
II
The centralist, totalitarian system imposed by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
hindered the Republic of Croatia from promoting and protecting its political, economic,
cultural and other interests, which led to an increasing desire on the hart of the Croatian
people to disassociate themselves from the Yugoslav state.
Today we are confronted with attempts to destroy law and order and the integrity of the
Republic of Croatia by organised outlawry and terrorism instigated from outside the
Republic. This is aimed at obstructing the realisation of the will of the Croatian nation and
all citizens of the Republic of Croatia, expressed at the elections and sanctioned by the
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, particularly at the referendum on Croat’s
sovereignty and independence in relation to the remaining constituent Republics of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and other adjoining countries. 40
The Croatian nation together with all citizens who consider the Republic of Croatia as their
homeland is resolute in defending its independence and territorial integrity from any
aggression, no matter where it comes from.
III
The Republic of Croatia is a democratic, social state based on the rule of law, whose highest
constitutional values are: freedom, equal rights, national equality, love of peace, social
justice, respect for human rights, pluralism, inviolability of oil ownership, conservation of
nature, the rule of law and a democratic, multiparty system.
The Republic of Croatia guarantees to Serbs in Croatia and to all national minorities living
on its territory respect for all human and civil rights, particularly freedom of speech and the
cultivation of their own languages and promotion of their cultures, and freedom to form
political organisations.
The Republic of Croatia protects the rights and interests of its citizens regardless of their
religious or ethnic affiliation or race.
The Republic of Croatia in its capacity of the legal successor of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia guarantees to all states and international organisations that it will
fully and conscientiously exercise all rights and perform all obligations in the part relating
to the Republic of Croatia.
IV
The Constitutions of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia granted the Republic of Croatia the right to self-
determination and secession.
Being established as an independent and sovereign state, the Republic of Croatia, which has
up till now realised part of its sovereign rights together with the other constituent Republics
and Autonomous Provinces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is now
changing its status and its state-law relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and
agrees to take part in its individual institutions and functions of common interest conducive
to the disassociation process.
In the course of the disassociation process it is necessary to establish the rights and
obligations, i.e. the share of the Republic of Croatia in the total movable and immovable
property and in the rights of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
By proclaiming the Constitutional Decision on Independence, the Republic of Croatia has
started the process of disassociation from other republics of the SFRY, and wants to
terminate this process as soon as possible in a democratic and peaceful manner, respecting
the interests of all Republics and Autonomous Provinces making up the SFRY.
By proclaiming the Constitutional Decision on Independence, conditions have been created
for the recognition of the Republic of Croatia as an international legal entity, for which
purpose the President and the Government of the Republic of Croatia will take all the
necessary steps.
By the Constitutional Decision the present borders of the Republic of Croatia have become
state borders with other Republics and with the countries adjoining the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 41
Only laws which have been adopted by the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia shall apply on
the territory of the Republic of Croatia, with the exception of the federal regulations which
have not been repealed pending the termination of the disassociation process.
All questions that cannot be resolved immediately, such as the position of the Yugoslav
People’s Army, federal diplomacy, the division of mutual rights and obligations, shall be
regulated by special agreements/treaties between the Republic of Croatia and other federal
units and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the course of the disassociation
process. The Republic of Croatia will recognise only those federal institutions in which
decisions are reached on the basis of parity and agreement.
Federal agencies may not operate on the territory of the Republic of Croatia unless given
specific and temporary authority by the Government of the Republic of Croatia.
The Republic of Croatia shall withdraw its representatives from the Federal Chamber of the
SFRY Assembly, as its term expired and its existence rendered unnecessary in the process
of disassociation.
The Republic of Croatia considers that the Chamber of Republics and Provinces is an
appropriate forum for parliamentary debate on the problems involved in disassociation.
V
The Republic of Croatia recognises full sovereignty and subjectivity under international law
of the states which come into existence as a result of the disassociation from the SFRY with
the existing boundaries of the SFRY and within the boundaries among themselves, as laid
down in the present Constitution or as decided by democratic agreement among them.
In assuming independence and sovereignty, the Republic of Croatia does not wish to saver
relations with other republics, neither does it wish to cause disruption in economic, trade or
financial relations or activities.
The Republic of Croatia shall establish a special contractual relationship with the Republic
of Slovenia, thereby creating a union between the two independent sovereign states.
The Republic of Croatia calls upon other constituent Republics of the former SFRY to a
union of sovereign states based upon the following prerequisites; mutual recognition of state
sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual respect; acknowledgement of political pluralism
and democracy, ownership pluralism, arid of a market-oriented economy; effective
observance of human rights, of minority rights and of other values of the free world;
readiness to arrive at reciprocal agreement and accord on all outstanding issues existing
between individual republics in their capacity of sovereign states.
The Republic of Croatia proceeds from the position that a union of sovereign states with the
Republic of Slovenia, and with the other Republics, conceived as a contractual, voluntary
community based on common interests, could prove beneficial to all the republics that have
hitherto constituted the SFRY, provided that mutual interests are observed in accordance
with the prevailing rules of international law, especially those on which the European
Community is founded and being built, since these principles have proved to be viable and
effective, and can serve as guidelines ensuring peace, prosperity and international respect
for the future union of sovereign states, prior to their accession to the European Community.
Class: 010-03/91-02/5
Zagreb, June 25 1991 42
ANNEX 9:
C ONSTITUTIONAL DECISION ON THE OSEREIGNTY AND NDEPEIDENCE OF THE
R EPUBLIC OF CROATIA – 25 JUNE 1991
PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA (SABOR)
Pursuant to Article 140. paragraph 1. of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.
proceeding from the inalienable, inconsumable, indivisible and an transferable
right of the Croatian nation to self-determination, including the right of
disassociation and association with other nations and States, and from the
sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia rests in all its citizens,
executing the will of the people as expressed at the referendum of May 19, 1991,
in view of the fact that the SFRY does not function as a state in terms of a
constitutional and legal system, and that human rights, the rights of national
minorities and the rights of federal units are being severely violated,
bearing in mind that Yugoslavia’s federal system does not make it possible to
resolve the state-political and economic crisis, and that no agreement has been
reached among its constituent Republics that would make it possible to transform
the federal state into a union of sovereign states,
declaring that the Republic of Croatia respects the equal rights of the other
Republics of the present-day SFRY in the wish gradually to regulate with them
on an equal footing and by democratic and peaceful means all issues arising from
their common life to date; respecting their sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and expressing readiness to reach with them, as an autonomous and independent
State, agreement on economic, political, defence and other relations.
the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia is hereby enacting the
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION ON THE SOVEREIGNTY
AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
I
The Republic of Croatia is hereby proclaimed a sovereign and independent state.
II
By this act the Republic of Croatia initiates proceedings for disassociation from the other
republics and from the SFRY.
The Republic of Croatia is initiating proceedings for international recognition.
III
International agreements concluded and acceded to by the SFRY shall apply in the Republic
of Croatia provided they do not conflict with the Constitution and legal system of the
Republic of Croatia, on the basis of the rules of international law on state succession
relating to international agreements. 43
IV
On the territory of the Republic of Croatia only those laws shall be in force, which have
been passed by the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) and those federal laws, which have not been
repealed shall be enforced until the completion of disassociation.
The Republic of Croatia assumes all the rights and obligations that were transferred to the
SFRY by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and the Constitution of the SFRY.
Procedure for assuming these rights and duties shall be prescribed by the Constitutional Act.
V
The state boundaries of the Republic of Croatia are the internationally recognised state
boundaries of the present-day SFRY in part which relates to the Republic of Croatia, and
the boundaries between the Republic of Croatia and the Republics of Slovenia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro within the framework of the present-day SFRY.
VI
Accepting the principles of the Paris Charter, the Republic of Croatia guarantees to all its
citizens their national and all other fundamental rights and freedoms of human being and the
citizen, a democratic order, the rule of law and other greatest values of its constitutional
order and the international legal order.
VII
The present Constitutional Decision shall come into force upon promulgation by the
Parliament of the Republic of Croatia.
Class: 010-03/91-02/06
Zagreb, 25 June 1991 44
A NNEX 10:
DECISION ON THE OSEREIGNTY AND NDEPEIDENCE
OF THE R EPUBLIC OF CROATIA , 8 OTOBER 1991
In accordance with the inalienable right of the Republic of Croatia for self- determination.
1. starting from the will of citizens of the Republic of Croatia expressed on the
referendum from May 19, 1991.
2. starting from the Constitutional Decision on sovereignty and independence of
the Republic of Croatia and from the Declaration on the Proclamation of the
Independent and Sovereign Republic of Croatia which was proclaimed on the
session of the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia held on June 25, 1991.
3. stating that the three month term for the postponement of the application of
the Constitutional Decision ordered by the Brioni Declaration had expired on
October 7 1991.
4. stating that in the term ordered by the Brioni Declaration, aggressive actions
against towns and villages by the so-called JNA and Serbian terrorists have
increased, that hospitals, schools, churches, cultural monuments and other
civilian objects have been ruthlessly destroyed, which culminated with
attacking and bombing of the historical core of Zagreb, when the buildings of
the residence of the President of the Republic, of the Government and
Croatian Parliament during its session were damaged, with the assassination
attempt of the President of the Republic.
5. stating that Yugoslavia as a state union does not exist any more, the
Parliament of the Republic of Croatia on a joint session of all councils held
on October 8, 1991. proclaims the following
DECISION
1. From October 8, 1991, the Republic of Croatia is severing public law links on
the basis of which it is constituted together with other republics and
autonomous provinces, the former SFRY.
2. The Republic of Croatia denies legitimacy and legality to all bodies of the
former federation – SFRY.
3. The Republic of Croatia does not recognise as valid any legal statement from
anybody that acts in the name of the former Federation – SFRY.
4. The Republic of Croatia recognises independence and sovereignty of other
Republics of the former SFRY, based on the principle of reciprocity and is
ready to reinstate, maintain and develop friendly, political, economical,
cultural and other relations, with those Republics with which it is not in an
armed conflict.
5. The Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state, guaranteeing
and providing basic human rights and the right of national minorities, which
are guaranteed explicitly in the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final 45
Act, the OSCE documents and the Paris Charter, in the framework of
European integration courses, is ready to enter inter-state and inter-regional
associations with other democratic countries.
6. The Republic of Croatia will continue with the process of establishing mutual
rights and obligations in relation to other Republics of former SFRY and in
relation to the former Federation.
7. This decision is effective from the moment of its proclamation.
Class: 021-03/91-05/07
Zagreb, October 8, 1991
A NNEX 11:
BASIC A GREEMENT ON THE R EGION OF E ASTERN SAVONIA , BARANJA AND W ESTERN
SIRMIUM , NOVEMBER 12, 1995
B ASICAGREEMENT ON THE REGION OF EASTERN LAVONIA , BARANJA AND W ESTERN
S IRMIUM, NOVEMBER 12, 1995
The Parties agree as follows:
1. There shall be a transitional period of 12 months which may be extended at most to
another period of the same duration if so requested by one of the parties.
2. The U.N. Security Council is requested to establish a Transitional Administration,
which shall govern the Region during the transitional period in the interest of all
persons resident in or returning to the Region.
3. The U.N. Security Council is requested to authorise an international force to deploy
during the transitional period to maintain peace and security in the Region and
otherwise to assist in implementation of this Agreement. The Region shall be
demilitarised according to the schedule and procedures determined by the
international force. This demilitarisation shall be completed not later than 30 days
after deployment of the international force and shall include all military forces,
weapons, and police, except for the international force and for police operating
under the supervision of, or with the consent of, the Transitional Administration.
4. The Transitional Administration shall ensure the possibility for the return of refugees
and displaced persons to their homes of origin. All persons who have left the Region
or who have come to the Region with previous permanent residence in Croatia shall
enjoy the same rights as all other residents of the Region. The Transitional
Administration shall also take the steps necessary to re-establish the normal
functioning of all public services in the Region without delay.
5. The Transitional Administration shall help to establish and train temporary police
forces, to build professionalism among the police and confidence among all ethnic
communities.
6. The highest levels of internationally-recognised human rights and fundamental
freedoms shall be respected in the Region. 46
7. All persons have the right to return freely to their place of residence in the Region
and to live there in conditions of security. All persons who have left the Region or
who have come to the Region with previous permanent residence in Croatia have the
right to live in the Region.
8. All persons shall have the right to have restored to them any property that was taken
from them by unlawful acts or that they were forced to abandon and to just
compensation for property that cannot be restored to them.
9. The right to recover property, to receive compensation for property that cannot be
returned, and to receive assistance in reconstruction of damaged property shall be
equally available to all persons without regard to ethnicity.
10. Interested countries and organisations are requested to take appropriate steps to
promote the accomplishment of the commitments in this Agreement. After the
expiration of the transition period and consistent with established practice, the
international community shall monitor and report on respect for human rights in the
Region on a long-term basis.
11. In addition, interested countries and organisations are requested to establish a
commission, which will be authorised to monitor the implementation of this
Agreement, particularly its human rights and civil rights provisions, to investigate all
allegations of violations of this Agreement, and to make appropriate
recommendations.
12. Not later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period, elections for all local
government bodies, including for municipalities, districts and counties, as well as the
right of the Serbian community to appoint a joint Council of municipalities, shall be
organised by the Transitional Administration. International organisations and
institutions (e.g. the organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United
Nations) and interested states are requested to oversee the elections.
13. The Government of the Republic of Croatia shall cooperate fully with the
Transitional Administration and the international force. During the transitional
period the Croatian Government authorises the presence of international monitors
along the international border of the Region in order to facilitate free movement of
persons across existing border crossings.
14. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the adoption by the U.N. Security
Council of a resolution responding affirmatively to the requests made in this
Agreement.
DONE this Twelfth day of November, 1995.
SIGNED:
Hrvoje Šarinić
Head, Croatian Government Delegation
Milan Milanović
Head, Serb Negotiating Delegation
WITNESSED:
Peter W. Galbraith
United States Ambassador
Thorvald Stoltenberg
United Nations Mediator 47
ANNEX 12:
A GREEMENT ON NORMALIZATION OF R ELATIONS B ETWEEN THE R EPUBLIC OF
C ROATIA AND THE EFERAL R EPUBLIC OF Y UGOSLAVIA , 23 AUGUST 1996
The Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter “the
Contracting Parties”),
Aware of their responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of peace and
security in the region,
Desiring to contribute to that end through the normalisation of mutual relations,
Aiming at promoting relations between their peoples and citizens,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Contracting Parties shall respect each other as independent, sovereign and equal States
within their international frontiers.
Article 2
Each Contracting Party shall respect, in accordance with international law, the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence of the other Contracting Party. The Contracting
Parties affirm that they shall carry out the regulation of their frontiers and the delimitation
through mutual agreement only, that they shall settle disputes by peaceful means and refrain
from threat or use of force in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The
Contracting Parties shall seek to foster mutual confidence, good will and tolerance and shall
cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in the region.
Article 3
Within 15 days after the signing of this Agreement, the Contracting Parties shall establish
full diplomatic and consular relations. The Contracting Parties shall promptly upgrade their
existing representative offices to embassies and shall exchange ambassadors.
Article 4
1. The Contracting Parties are agreed to settle the disputed issue of Prevlaka through mutual
negotiations. Thereby, a contribution shall be made to the full security of the part of the
territory of the Republic of Croatia in the area of Dubrovnik and the part of the territory of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the area of Boka Kotorska Bay. The Contracting
Parties shall settle this important disputed issue through mutual negotiations in the spirit of
the Charter of the United Nations and good-neighbourliness.
2. Until mutual agreement on Prevlaka is reached, the Contracting Parties are agreed to
respect the existing security regime established during United Nations monitoring.
Article 5
1. Proceeding from the historical fact that Serbia and Montenegro existed as independent
States before the creation of Yugoslavia, and bearing in mind the fact that Yugoslavia has 48
prolonged the international legal personality of these States, the Republic of Croatia notes
the existence of state continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
2. Proceeding from the historical fact of the existence of the various forms of state
organisation of Croatia in the past, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia notes the existence
of the continuity of Croatian statehood.
3. The Contracting Parties are agreed to resolve the issue of the succession of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of the rules of international law on succession
of States and through agreement.
Article 6
The Contracting Parties undertake forthwith to speed up the process of solving the question
of missing persons, and both Contracting Parties shall immediately exchange all available
information about these persons.
Article 7
1. The Contracting Parties shall ensure conditions for the free and safe return of refugees
and displaced persons to their places of residence or other places that they freely choose.
The Contracting Parties shall ensure to these persons the return of their property or a just
compensation.
2. The Contracting Parties shall ensure full security to the refugees and displaced persons
who return. The Contracting Parties shall assist these persons to ensure the necessary
conditions for a normal and safe life.
3. The Contracting Parties shall declare a general amnesty for all acts committed in
connection with the armed conflicts, except for the gravest violations of humanitarian law
having the nature of war crimes.
4. The Contracting Parties shall encourage consistent and comprehensive implementation of
the Erdut Agreement on the Croatian Danube region.
5. Each Contracting Party shall guarantee the same legal protection to the property of
physical and legal persons having the citizenship of the other Party, that is, being seated in
the territory of the other Party, as the one enjoyed by its own citizens, that is, its legal
persons.
6. Within six months from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the
Contracting Parties shall conclude an agreement on compensation for all destroyed,
damaged or lost property. Such agreement shall define the procedures for the realisation of
the right to fair compensation, which shall not include court proceedings.
7. For the purpose of implementing the obligations under this article, a joint commission,
consisting of three representatives of each Contracting Party, shall be established within 30
days from the signing of this Agreement.
Article 8
The Contracting Parties shall guarantee the Serbs and Montenegrins in the Republic of
Croatia and the Croats in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia all the rights they are entitled
to under international law. 49
Article 9
The Contracting Parties shall conclude, within six months from the date of the entry into
force of the present Agreement, a separate agreement on social insurance, which shall
regulate disability, health and pension insurance, including the payment of pensions. The
Contracting Parties shall conclude, if necessary, other agreements as well concerning the
settlement of work- and status-related issues.
Article 10
The Contracting Parties shall continue to cooperate in normalising road, railway, air and
river traffic on the basis of the principle of reciprocity and good-neighbourliness.
Article 11
Internal regulations in force concerning the stay and movement of foreigners shall be
applied without discrimination to the entry, movement and stay of the citizens and vehicles
of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party.
Article 12
The Contracting Parties shall continue to promote post, telephone and other
telecommunications.
Article 13
1. The Contracting Parties shall proceed, without delay, to concluding mutual agreements in
the fields of economy, science, education and protection of the environment, as well as in
other fields of common interest to the Contracting Parties.
2. The Contracting Parties shall immediately conclude an agreement on cultural
cooperation, which shall include the preservation and restoration of cultural heritage.
Article 14
1. The present Agreement has been done in two original copies, in the Croatian and Serbian
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
2. The Agreement shall be provisionally applied from the day of signature and shall enter
into force after the two Contracting Parties notify each other through diplomatic channels
that it has been confirmed by their competent authorities.
Done at Belgrade on 23 August1996.
For the Republic of Croatia
Dr. Mate Granić
Vice-President of the Government
For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Milan Milutinović
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs 50
ANNEX 13:
JOINT SATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR M UHAMED AŠIRBEY AND AMBASSADOR VIN
ŠIMONOVIĆ , 12 JNE 2000
JOINT TATEMENT BY A MBASSADOR M UHAMED AČIRBEY AGENT FOR BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA AND AMBASSADOR VAN IMONOVIĆ , GENT FOR THE EPUBLIC OF
CROATIA IN ROCEEDINGS NSTIGATED UPON APPLICATIONS OF THE ENOCIDE
CONVENTION AGAINST THE EDERAL R EPUBLIC OFYUGOSLAVIA BEFORE THE
NTERNATIONAL COURT OF USTICE
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia have initiated proceedings against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before the International Court of Justice concerning
violations of the Genocide Convention. These proceedings were initiated with the aim to
ascertain both the full truth about the sufferings and loss of lives incurred in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, as well as the legal, political and historical
accountability for them. The proceedings are not directed against Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Rather, they
are directed against the State authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which are to
be held responsible for the aggression, suffering and loss of lives incurred and genocide
committed against the Croats and Bosniaks.
The States and Peoples of South-East Europe have all too frequently fallen victim of
prejudices and attempts by some international circles to equate responsibility for suffering
and losses incurred to all sides which thwarts progress in resolving a whole range of
outstanding issues. Significant differences do exist between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia on the one hand and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia on the
other, concerning both the level of responsibility for the suffering and losses caused by war
and the headiness to punish those responsible for war crimes committed. Unlike the federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia are
cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which has
jurisdiction to ascertain individual responsibility for crimes committed on the territory of
the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia
have and intend to, where appropriate, to try perpetrators of war crimes before their national
courts. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia expect from the proceedings
before the International Court of Justice, amongst other things, to shed light on the overall
framework of tragic events that occurred on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and to
establish responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in particular of its
leadership, for aggression, heavy suffering of all our citizens, as well as genocide committed
on the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia.
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia are of the belief that their cooperation
in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, shall ultimately contribute to democratisation, reconciliation and the
establishment of lasting peace and stability in the region.
New York, 12 June 2000. 51
ANNEX 14:
THE SANU “M EMORANDUM ”
There has been a growing concern in our country over the stagnation of social development,
economic difficulties, the growth of social tensions and open ethnic conflicts. Not only the
political and economic system, but the entire public order of the country has come into a
deep crisis. A lack of work discipline and irresponsibility at work, corruption and nepotism,
the absence of legal security, bureaucratic arbitrariness, non-abidance by the law, a growing
mistrust among the people and an increasingly reckless individual and group egoism are
daily occurrences. The erosion of moral values, the leading social institutions’ diminishing
prestige, as well as a mistrust in the capability of those who are supposed to make decisions,
go along with apathy and bitterness evident among the people and the alienation of the
individual from all the bearers and symbols of public order. An objective research into the
Yugoslav reality leaves open the possibility of the present crisis ending in social upheavals
of unpredictable consequences, even including the most disastrous outcome of all: the
disintegration of the Yugoslav state community. No one has the right to turn a blind eye to
what is happening and what may happen, least of all the oldest scientific and cultural
institution of this nation.
At this crucial moment, SANU sees it as their duty to present its perspective of the social
condition, believing it might contribute to the possible resolving of the present problems.
However, the nature of this document does not permit us to stray from the key issues of the
Yugoslav reality. Unfortunately, among these we have to consider the undefined and
difficult position of the Serbian people, which has been further aggravated by the latest
events.
Y UGOSLAV CONOMIC AND OCIALS C RISIS
1. We have had an economic crisis for five years, with no solution in sight. With a GNP
(gross national product) growth of only 0.6% in the period of 1981 – 1985, Yugoslavia was
listed among the economically least successful countries in the world. Other development
indicators are no more optimistic. The unemployment figure of over one million strips the
young generation on any hope of settling their existential problems in due time. The
employment rate was determined by social motives, but in the period of stagnation this led
to a decrease in productivity. Gross accumulation and personal incomes decreased by one
third. A balance of payment surplus, reached by policies of a realistic exchange rate and
restrictions on all aspects of consumption, has been the only positive result in the struggle to
get out of the crisis. However, the upholding of foreign trade solvency must be viewed in
the light of a high national debt, the loss of independence in deciding on economic as well
as development policies, in addition to the increasingly chaotic state of the economy, which
seems to be incapable of reaching effective economic conditions. This situation gives rise to
an uncontrollable inflation, which destroys all economic criteria and motivation, at the same
time demonstrating the inability of our society to harness its economy. It is becoming
increasingly clear that there cannot be a way out of the crisis without fundamental changes
in the economic and political system. Particularly concerning is the fact that official policy
has been avoiding to admit the real causes of the crisis, thus making it impossible to
undertake proper measures for the healing of the economy. Such hesitation is all the more
incomprehensible since economic analyses managed to clearly show these causes. They
pointed to the sixties as the time when the crisis began to germinate in the form of a
slackening of economic development, which led to its final halt in 1980, and not, as official 52
policy had had it, to blame the inadequate reactions of economic policy in the period of
1976-1080. The economic reform of that time had some good ideas, e.g. the de-
bureaucratisation of the economy, the opening of the market, the abolition of price disparity,
and the integration of Yugoslav economy into the world economy. Unfortunately, only one
of these ideas, the abolition of price disparity, was partly realised, while the others remained
only ideas. On the other hand, unfortunate improvisations in the development strategy and
unsuccessful solutions in the economic system remained, and took even less satisfactory
forms during the seventies. The economic development had already gone wrong in the
sixties, when in 1964 the 1961-1965 Five-year-plan was cancelled. Trying to avoid
bottlenecks, this plan had put as its priority the increase in the production of raw materials
and energy. It is well known that the mentioned bottlenecks have not been cleared away to
the present day. Circumstances were further worsened by two great failures of the
development strategy. First, it did not bear in mind the basic requirement of an optimal
economic development, i.e. the use of production factors relative to their availability.
Committing itself to an increased use of the national capital, which is our scarcest
commodity, the mentioned strategy at the same time spared the working force, which is our
most abundant production factor, thus preventing Yugoslavia to take its place in the
international work division with a factor which would give it comparative advantages.
Because of this, economic development was below optimum level, while at the same time
unemployment boomed. The other strategic failure was the expectation, modelled after
developed countries, that the growth of personal incomes alone would be a powerful
stimulus to the growth of productivity and production. However, the application of this
conception in Yugoslav circumstances soon proved to be a mistake with many economic
consequences.
There were particularly many failures in the choice of basic solutions in the economic
system. First of all, planning was completely destroyed. For the second half of the sixties
there was no five-year plan at all, and all the later five-year plans, without the indispensable
support of means and measures, were mere declarations which committed no one. The
abolishment of planning suppressed the co-coordinating functions of the federation, and the
suppression of market forces dampened economic initiatives. In other words, economy was
neither directed, nor left to be directed by its own laws. The attempt to substitute planning
and the market by agreement and co-operation proved totally unsuccessful. A system in
which everybody had to make an agreement with everybody about everything did not stand
a chance. Therefore it was necessary to appeal to “subjective forces” more than it could
have been effective, and to undertake political promotion campaigns in order to regulate
economic developments.
Decentralisation, originally meant to free the economy from bureaucracy, degenerated into
territorial and economic disintegration. Eight economic regions were formed, ideologically
based on national economies, thus destroying the integral Yugoslav market. The republics
and provinces increasingly closed off their economies. This “republicanisation” of the
economy was followed by a fragmentation of existing companies into basic organisations of
associated labour. This was one of the least expected steps. The fragmented companies
cried for integration, which would enable them to make use of large-scale economies, but as
the basic organisations of associated labour got more independent, they only suffered
further fragmentation instead. Thus the two aspects of disintegration led the economy off its
historical path of development, the worst thing that can happen to an economy.
Failures in the development strategy – and there are doubts whether it was an organised
strategy at all – along with the numerous defects of the economic system resulted not only in 53
the decrease of production and employment, but also of production quality, which the
economic reform greatly depended on. In the period of 1966-1979, when intensive
development was being promoted the rate of growth of individual labour productivity was
lower than in the period of extensive development from 1953 to 1965. Workers’ motivation
for a higher productivity did not grow, in spite of the rapid growth of personal incomes.
This unenvisioned tendency proved the untenability of the idea that an increase in personal
consumption alone would set into motion the entire development, at the same time revealing
the innate deficiencies of the officially accepted “agreement economy”, which lacked the
work stimulating economic forces.
The productivity of the national capital suffered an even worse fate. After 1965, investment
efficiency started falling rapidly. Economic system failures gave the wrong signals to
companies and socio-political communities resulting in their misjudged investment policies
and other decisions. The autarchy of the republic and province economies took into account
neither the optimal structure of Yugoslav economy, nor the dangers of creating superfluous
capacities. Investment credits, depreciated by inflation, were used broadly but were
insufficiently planned. The obligation to finance the general and collective consumption
from the profits of their own economies made municipalities rush headlong into new
investments. Thus superfluous production capacities were built, either because of the lack of
information, or because the basic investment structure had not been planned. Fragmentary
accumulation, tied to particular economic branches and regions, resulted in a wide range of
unfinished investments with a long building period. Fragmentary accumulation in dwarf
banks made investors try to gain the biggest possible profits and the highest employment as
they possibly could, investing as little as possible, which led to the building of superfluous
capacities in processing industries and a deficiency in production capacities for raw
materials and energy. Superficially researched projects were often the cause of big
investment failures. There were neither economic nor social sanctions for misinvestments;
politicians, usually responsible for such decisions, remained in the shadow. All the
mentioned factors of low investment efficiency were the result of economic and political
solutions. We can conclude that the failures in economic development and the economic
system, resulting in a decline in overall productivity (both labour and capital productivity),
are the main cause of the Yugoslav economic crisis.
The economic policy of the seventies, which did not use appropriate measures for later
adjustments, is also responsible for the crisis. The neutralisation of the influence of overall
productivity, as well as worsened exchange conditions due to the boom of oil prices, called
for a different distribution of the total income, in order to control the rate of inflation. The
absence of consumption affected the economy all the more as the decline of export was not
prevented by the oft-employed policy of a realistic exchange rate for the dinar along with
other measures. All these drawbacks, especially when resulting in foreign trade insolvency,
forced the economic policy to put belated restrictions on all aspects of consumption. These
restrictions could have put a stop to the deepening of the crisis, but could not prevent its
outbreak.
The causes of economic adversity are hard to understand without the influence of the
economic philosophy which inspired the economic system. The neglect of economic laws
and forces, relying on people’s consciousness rather than on their interests as motives of
their economic behaviour, recognising live labour as the sole income-producing factor,
partly ignoring realistic expenses and economic categories – these are all parts of the
officially accepted economic philosophy, as well as those institutional solutions which had
disastrous results in practice, because they enjoyed ideological support even when r unning 54
counter to the demands of economic rationality. This can also explain the tolerance
displayed towards distorted economic relations, economic pathology and wasteful social
expenditure, which has been going on too long not to affect the way of economic thinking
and behaviour. The huge losses our economy suffers show that four decades have not
sufficed to establish the principle of profit, and that there are no sanctions for bad business
management. Subsidising the economy through loans, the socialisation of deficits, a low rate
of amortisation, tolerating low product quality, a rate of growth of real personal incomes
which was for a long time well above the rate of labour productivity, all managed to create
quite leisurely economic conditions, resulting in a widespread range of various forms of
parasitism, both within and outside the economy. Such conditions were upheld by a growing
foreign debt, which is to be paid off not only by this but also by future generations.
Remuneration according to work performed could not be realised, due to the unsolved
question of primary distribution on the one hand, and, on the other, the fact that many
companies collect rent from public funds. Due to social differences not based on work,
workers’ motivation for a higher labour productivity was understandably low. Tolerating
idleness and other kinds of social demagogy are a high price to pay for social peace and
retaining the material privileges of the ruling classes. Bearing all this in mind, it is not
surprising that tightening the loose economic conditions is considered an attack on attained
rights, and that measures such as the introduction of economically positive interest rates and
the priority given to personal payments have been strongly opposed. One of the sound
reasons for such an opposition is the fact that businesses pay huge contributions for the
upkeep of a spawning administration, which is a hardly bearable burden for the economy.
The economic climate, full of irrationalities as it is, has naturally affected people’s
behaviour. Partly due to the foreign debt, people were able to raise their standard of living
rather fast until the crisis broke out. The sudden growth of personal consumption with
obvious elements of extravagance become rooted in people’s minds as being their well-
deserved award. The drop in personal incomes, and its forced levelling with the real
productivity level, is considered to be an unfair act of violence rather than an objective
necessity. The situation cannot be different after years of spending more than has been
earned. A considerable number of people were socially subsidised, by getting investment
and consumer loans, buying foreign goods at low prices, getting community-owned flats and
paying low rents. Economic irrationalities and perverted economic relations have existed for
a long time and can be easily seen everywhere. Therefore they are considered normal. Every
individual adjusted his economic behaviour according to his personal interests, which for
some groups even proved successful, but for the society and economy on the whole it
regularly proved disastrous. There has emerged the painful question of how to once again
assert work as the basis of a person’s existence and his social and economic position.
2. With the outbreak of the general social crisis, the responsibility for the future of
Yugoslavia demanded that the real dimensions and causes of the crisis be established, so as
to undertake measures to come out of recession and precarious circumstances. However,
this was not done. It took three years for the term “economic crisis” to find its way into
official documents. It was a gradual and hesitant confession. In the first two years there was
talk of “small”, “short-term”, “temporary” problems, and mainly about “problems of
growth”. In addition to that, it was maintained that basic changes in the economic system
were not necessary, and that the only important thing was to be consistent in its
implementation. When this claim became impossible to sustain, there emerged the thesis
that the Yugoslav crisis was greater than originally thought, but of an exclusively economic
nature, caused by foreign economic influence and an inadequate economic policy after 55
1976. Thus it was attempted to exempt politics as a possible cause of the economic crisis
and, by insisting on economic policy as the main culprit, to spare the economic system a
critical examination. After this attempt proved unsuccessful too, a concession was made by
finally attempting an analysis of the political system. Unfortunately, this analysis not only
avoided the key issues of the political system, but also opposed the concepts of the
“Stabilisation Programme”.
The step-by-step and unwilling recognition of the crisis followed by repeated denials, which
resulted in a loss of precious time, showed the official policy to be erratic, indecisive and
unprepared to introduce changes made necessary under the new circumstances. The
hesitation shown in making the right diagnosis and introducing timely measures, all
undermined the trust in the wisdom, political courage and sincere intentions of the people
holding public offices, as well as in their readiness to break with the delusions that had
brought their country to the brink of ruin. Reluctance to face the facts and take action was
also shown by the fact that only under the pressure of the International Monetary Fund were
certain economic measures taken, which, had they been taken much earlier, would have
caused less stress and been more effective. But nothing is as indicative of the opposition to
effective action than the fact that the government is not implementing the Stabilisation
Programme. Those who claimed that the document had been adopted only because it was
too general for anyone to feel committed, were proved right. It was predicted that the
document’s application would meet insurmountable difficulties in the conflict of interests of
the republics, provinces and economic groups. As the predictions came true, a doubt
emerged about whether the Stabilisation Programme had really been conceived as a basis
for economic salvation, or whether it had a mere political and propagandistic role aimed at
creating the impression that something serious was being done about the crisis, while at the
same time there was strong opposition to the necessary changes. The Stabilisation
Programme, which had a realistic approach to the economy, suffered its biggest blow from
the well-known Critical Analysis of the Functioning of the Political System, which
rehabilitated the rejected ideology of “agreement economy”, which, in its turn, had been
most responsible for the plight of Yugoslav economy. It also happened that two documents
with essentially different economic conceptions were officially adopted. This may be a
solution for keeping the status quo, but it cannot be a way out of the Yugoslav social crisis.
Limited knowledge about economics and disagreement on key issues among economists
have sometimes been blamed for the present state of our economy and the slow reaction to
the crisis. Economists will disagree in all countries, at all times, but it is up to the
government to choose which direction to give their trust to, and to assume responsibility for
its choice. The problem is, the help of economists was not really called for as it should have
been; it was welcome insofar as it purported the official attitudes. Responsible individuals
did not pay due attention to the timely warnings and valuable suggestions that come from
economists. The systematic neglect of knowledge during the post-war period is an
unfathomable and irrational phenomenon in a socialist society, which has always taken
science as the basis of its development. The systematic neglect of scientific achievements,
especially in the last two decades, is to be viewed as part of the campaign to subjugate the
economic development and economic realities to the strengthening and maintaining of
polycentrism and the social power monopoly of republic and regional leaders as the non-
declared goal with absolute social priority. This goal has stemmed from a symbiosis of
nationalisms, separatisms and power lust, and it is being realised through the struggle of
local politicians to increase their power, to be social and economic mediators and arbiters in
their regions. 56
The general public has only recently become aware of this aim, as the malign tendency of
social and economic disintegration has achieved alarming proportions. Back in 1950, Boris
Kidrič warned of the danger of the political system developing towards polycentrism unless
this tendency was prevented by creating workers’ councils for particular branches of
economy on the Yugoslav level. Unfortunately, his suggestions were not accepted, even
though he stressed that, in case the mentioned councils were not created, this would lead to
“several state capitalisms, particular in relation to the whole, and bureaucratically
centralistic in relation to the working collectives”. In Yugoslavia today we have those
conditions which Kidrič most abhorred.
These conditions are the result of an almost three-decade development. In the fifties and the
first half of the sixties, it seemed that the democratisation, the substitution of government
bodies by self-managed ones and the deprofessionalization of politics had attained a certain
level of social affirmation. The chances for the continuation of this development seemed
high, especially as a balanced investment structure and improved correlation between co-
ordination and initiative went along with a growth in production, employment, the quality of
products and export. Labour productivity grew fast, investment efficiency was high, and
economic relations with foreign countries almost balanced. It seemed that nothing stood in
the way of developing the political and economic system on a basis which had given such
convincing results. It is true that even in that period there clear indications of separatism and
nationalism, illustrated by the slogans “To each his due” or “Separate to reunite”, along
with a persistent campaign against an exaggerated and imaginary unitarianism.
The negative turn occurred in the mid-sixties then all these indications unexpectedly
become dominant tendencies, stopping the progressive momentum of political changes.
Certain almost forgotten relations resurfaced. Contrary to expectations, government and
state gained strength within the republics, provinces and municipalities. This resulted in an
underestimation of economic rationalities and efficiency as imperatives of a modern,
civilised society. True, politics had also dominated over economy before the economic
reform of the sixties, but then the economic development had priority. But from the moment
when politics became its own end, the focus in economy was shifted from economic
development to the economic system, from the producing of income to its distribution, from
production to consumption. All this shows how neglected economic development had been,
how spurred developed societies’ experiences and the achievements of economics. Such
attitudes were best expressed by the thesis that the requirements of self-management could
not be reconciled with an efficient economic activity.
The unsuccessful attempts to reintegrate the railway and other large systems proved that
even the most obvious economic rationalities were readily sacrificed if they diminished the
influence of republic and regional leaders. This also showed the force of political
voluntarist, which managed to clear all obstacles that came in its way. The biggest obstacles
would have been a plan, which would not permit any arbitrariness, not even for the ones
who created it, and the market, understood as the independence of economic agents in
making decisions. Because they represented obstacles to voluntarism, plans and the market
were neutralised in order to create room for an economy which did not rely on economic
laws and forces, but considered all relations arbitrary. Under these circumstances the
economic system’s basic aim is not to support economic development and take into account
economic rationalities, but to serve the strengthening of the political factor. Political
voluntarism even ignores the laws that it comes into conflict with. Ignorance and
irresponsibility are ill-matched in voluntarism, infusing the already subservient economy 57
with these qualities. The hold that politics has over the economy is an obvious fact, admitted
even by politicians themselves, as if they were not the incumbents of such a relationship.
Self-management did not put an end to political voluntarism. The reason is simple: self-
management was imposed by political leaders, who did not find it difficult to expand or
narrow its area of influence of maintain control within it. The thesis that self-management
best functions in BOALS is really only an excuse for not allowing it to control the essential
(macro-economic) domain, where vital decisions concerning the whole society are made.
This area is jealously guarded by politicians. Self-management was suppressed in the
sixties, and that was the start of our problems. It does not really exist on a global social
level, it has never been completed as a democratic system, nor have lessons been learned.
Thus it can be said that self-management is a mere decoration, and not the basis of the
society. The entire system is inconsistent. It comprises neither a real plan, nor a real market,
neither a real state, nor real self-management.
3. The disintegration of Yugoslav economy into economic branches and regions as an anti-
historical tendency is a direct result of an even wider and more important anti-historical
tendency, i.e. the transformation of the federation, as it was conceived at the second session
of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia and during the first post-war
decades, into a kind of confederation, which was institutionalised by the latest Constitution
of 1974. In history there have been several examples of the transformation of a
confederation into federation, as a natural consequence of a confederation’s drawbacks, but
no opposite developments are known of. The transformation of a federal state into a
federation of states in even less acceptable in view of the fact that, after frequent changes
during the post-war period, Yugoslavia now has a “firm” constitution, which is hard to
change. Eleven years has been more than enough to spot considerable problems, which are
all consequences of co-federalism in the social system, and because of which the
constitution necessarily became the target of criticism of the political system.
The most important element of confederalism is the fact that the consent of all the Republic
and Provincial Assemblies is indispensable in the making of even the smallest constitutional
change, as well as the demand that any decision in the Chamber of the Republics and
Provinces is approved by all delegations. In either case the opposition of even one member
has the character of a veto. This in itself is no reason for objection, because it prevents foul
play by a majority to impose decisions on minorities, as long as such decision-making
concerns essential issues of the social system as envisioned by the Constitution. However,
the problem is that, for no obvious reason, unanimous decision-making found its way out of
the constitution into many laws and regulations, a well as into the spheres of economy,
culture and sport.
By the affirmation of the republics’ and provinces’ sovereignty, which went side by side
with the fading of the original, co-ordinating functions of the federation, a wide range of
possibilities was opened for promoting particular interests at the expense of general ones.
True, there was a declarative statement in the constitution demanding from the republics to
promote Yugoslavia’s development as well as their own. However, considering their own
development a priority, the republics largely neglected the development of the state. A
balanced optimum development on to the republic and federation level was proved to be a
theoretically untenable and practically unviable concept. The national element suppressed
the class element, and the provinces insisted on being a constitutive part of the federation
rather than a part of Serbia. Balancing acts of this kind served, on the one hand, to reassure 58
those concerned for the state and economic unity of the country, and, on the other, to further
encourage all sorts of separatists in the realisation of their goals.
A further element of confederalism is the parity structure of the Presidency of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as other high-level government bodies. The
constitutional provision about federal laws being enforced by the republic and provincial
governments is also basically confederative, and in practice often leads to these laws not
being enforced at all. Another pronounced element of confederalism lies in the fact that the
republic and province constitutions need not be concordant with the federal constitution, as
long as they are not disparate. But there are no legal means to eliminate disparities that may
occur. Furthermore, in the case of disparities between the republic and province laws on the
one hand and the federal laws on the other, republic or province laws are being used until
the constitutional court decides otherwise.
The current Yugoslav political system is becoming increasingly controversial, dysfunctional
and expensive. It multiplies the bulky government mechanisms on three levels, enabling
mushrooming of a huge bureaucratic apparatus and a growth of general consumption. Both
the political and economic aspects of the system can serve as examples of inefficiency.
Decisions concerning the federation are made so slowly that even effective measures
become belated and consequently lose all effect. Frequent disagreements among decision-
makers often result in complete obstruction, not only on the level of the federation. The
Republic of Serbia has not been able to pass republic laws for ten years. There is
insufficient flexibility in both decision-making and the improvement of former solutions.
The system is incapable of quick adjustment to new situations. Its inertia does not allow for
simple quick changes if necessity should arise. Furthermore, federal bodies have often
proved unable to ensure the enforcing of federal laws. The social system is obviously in a
state of paralysis.
To implement the necessary changes, it is indispensable to get rid of the ideology which
gives priority to the concepts of nationality and territoriality. While in contemporary
civilised society integrative functions grow, along with full affirmation of civil and human
rights, the diminishing of authoritarian forms of government and the democratisation of
decision-making, in our political system disintegrative forces are increasing, together with
local, regional and national egoism and authoritarian arbitrary local governments, which on
all levels and on a large scale infringe on universally acknowledged human rights. The
tendency to divide and fragmentize, and the struggle against a modern, democratic and
integrative federation is masked by the false ideological slogan of the struggle against
“unitarianism” and “centralism”. But the real alternative to “unitarianism” and “centralism”
is certainly not national egoism and polycentrism with separate “national” (in fact republic
and provincial) economies, the forcible regional limiting of science, culture and education,
and the subordination of all forms of social life to the unlimited power of the republican and
provincial oligarchies. The real alternative is a democratic integrative federalism, where the
principle of the autonomy of the parts is in balance with the principle of co-ordination
within an integral whole, in which all the political institutions are consistently and
democratically constituted on all levels where decisions are made, through a free, rational
and public dialogue, and not through behind the scenes, “top secret” plotting by arbitrary
and self-appointed protectors of particular national interests.
Such an attitude towards state and nation has blocked the development of self-management.
Self-management is undeveloped and deformed not only because it has been limited to the
level of social micro-structure, but also because it is totally subordinated to alienated 59
governing bodies – from local communities to republics and provinces. The disintegrated
working class has been reduced to a conglomerate of companies fighting for the distribution
of income. There are no self-management bodies for groups of companies, economic
branches or the entire economy, which would organise production in a rational way and
give direction to economic development. Free decision-making of self-management bodies
has been severely limited by many legal regulations, and often suffers further limitations
imposed by the arbitrariness of local governments in alliance with the technocracy. It is a
paradox that in a society which calls itself socialist, the working class has no possibilities to
organise and be represented in the Federal Assembly. The domination of the national and
territorial principle is clearly shown by the determination with which the ideal of creating a
Chamber of Associated Labour in the Federal Assembly has been rejected.
To understand this present preference for the national in the Yugoslav League of
Communists, one has to consider the influence of the Comintern on the Yugoslav
Communist Party between the two wars. The strategy of the Comintern in that period was
based on the conclusion that, taken the absence of proletarian revolution in Western Europe,
the communist parties in Eastern, Middle and Southern Europe must rely on national
movements, even if those were pronouncedly anti-socialist and based on the idea of national
rather than class unity. Stalin took pains to break any resistance to this strategy (e.g. in the
case of one of the founders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Sima Markovi ć). The
solution to the national question was formulated and theoretically developed in this vein by
Sperans (Kardelj) in his book “Development of the Slovenian National Question”, which
served as the ideological basis of the development of Yugoslavia towards a confederation of
sovereign republics and provinces, which was finally realised by the 1974 Constitution.
The two most developed republics, which managed to realise their national programmes
through this Constitution, today assume the role of defenders of the system. Thanks to the
political positions of their leaders in the centres of political power, both before and after the
crucial sixties, they were able to take the initiative in all political and economic issues. They
tailored the Yugoslav social and economic system according to their needs and standards.
Thus it is understandable to see them defend the system that they have been building so
persistently for such a long time, the system in which they see the realisation of their
national programmes.
The ruling ideology in these two republics forces their leaders not to give in to the economic
interests of the whole country, and not even to their own economic interests, if this would
mean a limitation of their political autonomies.
Nobody needs to be told that separatism and nationalism interact on the social scene, but it
is not fully understood that such ideological orientations were made possible by the 1974
Constitution. The permanent strengthening and mutual stimulation of separatism and
nationalism alienated the nations from one another up to a critical point. Manipulations with
the language, driving the scientists and cultural workers into the republican and provincial
folds are the sad signs of the increased power of particularism. All new ethno geneses are as
much products of a science enwrapped in provincial confines and oppressed by regional
ideologies as they are symptomatic of an alienation not only from the common present and
future, but also from the common past. Each party seems to care about the quickest and the
farthest possible escape from the crumbling house. The state of minds warns that the
political crisis has reached the critical point of total destabilisation of Yugoslavia. Kosovo is
its most evident sign. International appearances, like the one at Slivnica, leaves no room
doubt that the claimants to the Yugoslav territory have already defined their interests. 60
The bureaucratic decentralisation that has been implemented by masters of political power
in this country in the last decades is at same time the obstacle to the development of
democratic relations. The political life in Yugoslavia was slowly, and not very successfully,
adjusting itself to peacetime and legal conditions. The Stalinist and the Comintern legacy is
powerful and active even today. Deep traces are still felt from the relations that existed
within the illegal movement, such as conspiracy, internal hierarchy, participation of very
few people in decision making, insistence on ideological and absolute acceptance and
execution of missions, severe labelling (“fractionalist”, “enemy”) for any disagreement or
objection to the established political line. All this, together with the resolution to defend the
power once gained, both by repression and by cultivating obedience, explains the reasons
why the ways to true democracy have been difficult to find.
Hopes in democratic development were strongly increased in the fifties when Yugoslavia
proclaimed debureaucratization of economy and society, offering simultaneously a
programme of socialist democracy in the form of social self-management. The well-known
provision from the Yugoslav Communist Party Programme “...that nothing is so sacred ...”
indicated an openness towards new ideas to which no dogmatism should bar the way. This
social programme was not elaborated enough to be completely clear, and neither were the
ways of its realisation, but it was still widely accepted as a chance for a democratic
development which would be sensitive to contemporary changes and resolute enough to
adjust itself promptly to these changes.
Such expectations, however, have proved futile, so far. In the mid-sixties,
debureaucratization tendencies, noticeable until then, suddenly dwindled, giving way to
decentralisation which in its essence was bureaucratic. The present Yugoslav political
system has none of the advantages of modern political systems. It is neither a liberal
democracy, nor a counsel democracy, or an enlightened bureaucratic system. It lacks both
the political freedom and direct participation of the citizens in political life and functioning
of the system according to predetermined principles and norms. The entire system is
constituted on the principle of activity of the top leaders in the political hierarchy and on the
hopeless political passivity of the people. The Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Federal
Assembly is federal by its name only. Even there it is republics and provinces that are
represented and not the citizens of the federal state, regardless of their republic or provincial
affiliation. In the Assembly of the SFRY there is no specific chamber (Chamber of
Associated Labour) in which the Yugoslav working class would be represented. Direct
elections, as a great civilizational achievement, have given way to indirect elections. The
introduction of the delegate system has proved ineffective. Political manipulation of the
citizens is successfully perpetrated. People are sometimes invited to hold a “plebiscite” and
thus confirm what has already been decided by the governing hierarchy behind the political
scene. The undemocratic electoral system brings the voters into a position where they do not
know they are electing, or rather who they are voting for and the elected delegates do not
answer for their work to their voters.
In fact, the political systems of Yugoslavia is a medley of the remains of the old political
state the authoritarian state inherited from the history of the so-called “real” socialism in the
East. This mixed state is incapable of creativity, of implementing indispensable changes and
of adjusting its institutions and aims to the ever-changing society. The impenetrable
political organisation becomes an organisation for preserving the status quo, for maintaining
unproductive, uninventive professional politics and for negative selection of loyal,
incompetent cadres. 61
Democratisation is an essential prerequisite both for a way out of the deep crisis and for an
indispensable social revival. Yugoslavia does not need a lip-service democracy, changing
nothing, but rather a democratisation of consciousness and of social relations. The demand
for an authentic democratic system is all the more significant just because our social
conscience is particularistic and fragmented. True democracy is difficult to envisage without
alternative concepts of development. It is only under the pressure of the prospect that an
abortive concept or unsuccessful work bring victory to another concept and its protagonists,
that the indispensable responsibility can be achieved. Democratic centralism is justified if
the minority, in the decision-making process, is an equal partner in the dialogue, if it is
defeated by arguments or outvoted after a truly democratic debate. This way was not taken.
Any other opinion was labelled factionary. Deeply rooted unreadiness for change is best
shown by resistance to proposals to put several candidates for one seat in the parliament,
although this could not endanger the predetermined political line if an alternative political
concept was missing. The importance of such a political move, however, is enormous if
viewed the political leaders view because they choose delegates who will in turn choose
them. Within the republics and provinces informal groups are being formed with the
purpose of gaining top power positions. Likewise, on the federal level, instead of a
principled and argumented clash of ideas, coalitions are being formed to satisfy republic
and provincial interests as well as those of political leaderships in those areas that have an
autonomous and monopolistic position.
However, there are, also, some other aspects of political restrictions imposed on the
citizens. Attempts to take such an indispensable move in the direction of liberating thought
and speech have given modest results so far. It is, indeed, beyond dispute that media is now
more open even to some topics which until recently have been taboo. In political circles
there has been some general talk about the need for dialogue, and that different opinions are
not to be regarded as strange. Unfortunately, this does not mean that a spoken word, uttered
in public, is in any way binding to the powerful. The word spoken in public has become
absolutely powerless and inefficient even when conveying very important truths. Public
opinion is neither a corrective nor a partner in the dialogue. Neither the scientific nor the
expert opinions can impose themselves with their well-argumented estimates and
suggestions if not coinciding with the established opinions and views of the political
leaders.
Reckless piling of foreign debts, together with a great number of unprofitable investments
prove best to what extent public opinion is insignificant. It is strange that there was no
knowledge of what countries Yugoslavia was indebted to and how big the debt was, so that
a foreign firm had to be engaged to establish the facts. It is a special issue why the total
amount of the debt was concealed from the public. At present, the debt to foreign creditors
is known, but the public has no evidence of how many loans Yugoslavia has given and
whether they are regularly paid off. Discussions about nuclear plants prove that the same
undemocratic practice continues both in investment policy decision making and in foreign
loan taking. However, it is not only the question of individual decisions but also of the
absence of basic democracy in solving the dilemma whether to maintain or transform the
political and economic system. There is no doubt that public and expert opinion resolutely
support radical changes, but that mood is not binding to the policy makers. It is the best
proof that democratic channels for transmitting binding messages to the political leaders
have not been developed yet. As for verbal offences and their arbitrary interpretations, no
society aiming at democracy can be proud of such compromising means of repression. 62
It is not only a democratic, but also a civilised request that those repressions should be done
away with. And how welcome such increased repression would be because of industrial
(economic) and other sorts of crime. The fact that there is too much repression where it is
not needed and too little where it is indispensable, is due to the fact that the state is driven
primarily by ideological motives and criteria. By being disorganised beyond all reasonable
limits, the state has degenerated into an institutionalised form of republic, provincial and
local voluntarism. A lot of troubles result from the absence of a well organised democratic
state with a professionally competent and responsible civil service implementing the
adopted policy. For the time being some of the economic functions of the state can be
successfully carried out by no other institution. It primarily applies to long-term planning,
fiscal and monetary policy as well as income policy. Such a state is necessary for the society
to get rid of a parallel decision-making. As things stand today, decisions are made by those
who formally do not have power, while those who have power do not make decisions. The
society will not establish social responsibility unless it gets rid of the informal decision-
making which is never available for the public inspection and control.
The very spine of the political system is the Yugoslav League of Communists whose
leadership has the absolute social power monopoly. There is reliable evidence that the
bearers of power have succumbed to the temptations of this monopoly, that the League of
Communists lives on revolutionary rent, that it has been privatised to a great extent, that
there exists, within the League, a hierarchical structure of professional cadres maintained by
personal loyalty and an absolute obedience to their superiors, that the democratic centralism
has been reduced to the situation in which the leaders make decisions and the citizens carry
them out without questioning. The Yugoslav League of Communists has become one with
the state. From the ideologically leading party, it has turned into the governing party. This
lack of democracy within the Yugoslav League of Communists is reflected in the society as
a whole. The Leagues claim to be social avant-garde and the state of chaos it is in obviously
do not correspond. Such a state could have been used as an immediate motive for a global
re-examination of all social relationships which was attempted in the Soviet Union and
China after the death of Stalin and Mao-Tse-Tung. However, this did not happen. The more
the general deterioration called for a thorough revision of social relationships, the more
contested it became. Even the majority of short-term measures with immediate effects was
not implemented. Instead of energetic activities, long and futile discussions are being held
which produce only the illusion of activity. The abundance of generalised recommendations
is taken no notice of any more. Whereas there exists a lack of concern for the matters which
admit no delay, some other questions were even more neglected, such as the one regarding
the extent of Yugoslavia’s presence in modern civilisation as well as the question whether it
is prepared enough to join the third technological revolution.
These questions would have never been asked if the revolutionary movement had not turned
into the establishment party, and if because of that, the Yugoslav governing forces view of
their own purpose had not became deeply conservative. The ideas about the structure of the
society and the working class deriving from the distant past are persistently being
maintained although they essentially diverge from contemporary society. This conservatism,
of course, is not only manifested in emphasising the position and role of unskilled workers,
who, by the way, society has not rewarded to the extent it should and could have, but is
mostly expressed in a great suspicion with which it looks upon experts and creators whose
numbers and creative contribution are getting more and more important in developed
countries. The working class cannot keep the position of the true avant-garde for much
longer if its intellectuals are regarded as an unreliable companion of the revolution. The 63
limited confidence granted to the intelligentsia is perhaps most fatefully seen in falling
behind technological progress. Deliberation on production relations, and decisions on
investments and the organisation and development, of production, are still within the scope
of thinking of the second technological revolution which is about to leave the stage of
history. The right moment for catching up with the third technological revolution seems to
have been missed.
The defects of this political system are so numerous and big that they represent the epicentre
of the upheavals in the entire Yugoslav society. The elimination of these defects must begin
with a thorough questioning of the Constitution without any prejudices of ideological
burden. The motives for such questioning do not lie in the weaknesses of the political
system only, but also in the essential economic defects of the Constitution, such as the
inadequate institutionalisation of social property, in the wrongfully established relations
between the whole and its parts, in the misfunctioning of the mechanism of self-
management, in the scientifically unfounded principles of income, in the insufficiently and
inconsistently developed concept of market-planning mechanisms, in the wrongfully
determined status and responsibility of the basic organisation of associated labour, etc.
In the legislative science there is a high degree of unanimity regarding the idea that the
Constitution of any state must be short, with clearly expressed basic principles of the social
system, precisely defined rights and responsibilities, so that every citizen can easily
understand and memorise them. Such a constitution reflects experience and scientific
achievements on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of citizens of a democratic and
civilised state to have such a constitution. Our 1974 Constitution did not fulfil these
principles. Constant attempts to prove originality in seeking social solutions, if not
intentionally dim, resulted in the thickest constitution in the world. Room was found in it
even for such minor issues like settling the housing problem of army officers of the
procedure for appointing shop managers, which o ught to be settled by statutory bills and
acts. Inappropriate phrasing makes the constitution incomprehensible for ordinary people,
and not only for them. The sentences contain over a hundred words, the articles are a few
pages long, the expressions used are inconsistent and incorrect, which points to an
intolerably low level of legislative technique. At the same time this shows that the
legislative science did not have sufficient influence on the text of the Constitution.
4. Along with the economic and political crisis, a moral crisis is also seriously oppressing
the Yugoslav society. Its numerous causes have deep historical roots. But in its essence, in
an ideological system like ours, the moral crisis has been caused by the ideological crisis, by
failures of the ideological project of the revolution, by aberrations from the proclaimed
socialist goals and principles, by the inconsistency between the words and actions of the
political leadership, by an insufficiently built legal system, by a bad and dependent juridical
system, by bureaucratic arbitrariness and privileges, by moral conformism and encouraged
careerism, by a lack of free and open critical judgement of phenomena, ideas, government
and public authorities, i.e. by lack of democratic public opinion, as an efficacious moral
consciousness of the society. The migrational flow from the village and all the temptations it
carried were not opposed by a policy of civilisation adaptation or with clearly defined
norms of behaviour and morals. The omnipresent fragmented peasant thinking, inspired by a
belief that all was allowed which was not explicitly forbidden, with a tendency to mind ones
own direct interests alone, while neglecting the indirect and more remote interests managed
to persist for a long time, to finally emerge in the conditions of crisis as the strength that
utterly destroys morals and creates vast opportunities for crime and similar phenomena that
can hardly be in line with the values of a socialist society. 64
Plunder of social property is omnipresent, while thefts, fraud and corruption have become a
part of regular extra income for such a large a number of citizens that this kind of income
must be taken into account when estimating the amount of per capita expenses. Also a
powerful example has been offered by frequent and overlooked violations of the law on the
part of work organisations, sometimes even of administrative institutions. Privileges are
persistently retained despite their unanimous public condemnation. The concept of honest
labour is almost non-existent. Very few people wonder how much work they have done for
the income they have received. Economic conditions are unequal, which leads to the
abandoning of the principle of remuneration by work performed. An employee’s salary
often depends less on his/her performance and more on the company management’s
skilfulness in procuring higher prices for their products or services and lower tax payments.
Regular covering of deficits of insolvent companies from the revenues earned by others has
a discouraging impact on both parties. A relatively large number of people became rich in a
legal way but not by work. Ever greater social discrepancies, resulting from the disorderly
conditions in the economic and social sphere, are economically less bearable and morally
less justifiable the deeper the crises in which they occur.
Unemployment, too, has a destructive impact on the morals of the masses. Nepotism is an
omnipresent phenomenon; giving priority to relatives has almost become common law.
Unemployment is a serious social problem not only because a host of young people are
without a living, but also because a large portion of the population, whose age and
qualifications are better than those of the employed, remain non-productive, although their
proper inclusion into production would improve the conditions. Equally painful are the
frustrations of these people and their families, the hopelessness of students whose
expectations of employment are practically non-existent, as well as the reasoning of those
who, once they finally get employed after years of waiting, regard the post as a way of
earning their daily bread, devoid of any ambition to significantly contribute with their own
endeavour, and whose lengthy waiting for employment has alienated them from their
profession and expertise. The effects of temporary employment in foreign countries is no
less fatal. There is an omnipresent belief among the people that a decent income or good life
cannot be secured by honest labour. People are losing faith not only in hard work, but also
in socialism, whose aureole is darkening faced with the reputation of the system in those
countries where “gastarbeiter” (guest workers) work.
Loss of confidence and motivation are clearly visible signs of the moral crisis. A general
mobilisation of all forces in resolving the existing social problems is not yet possible. The
wider masses lack a clear awareness of the necessity of efforts and self-sacrifice for
universal community goals. The official ideology which offers hollow political
proclamations instead of a truly socialist programme, has greatly exhausted its mobilising
capacities. The gap between the socialist principles and hard reality is so deep that it
produces large-scale indifference, privatisation and ever greater frustration. The reforms
which could today improve the social climate and perhaps even the trends of development
will not suffice tomorrow.
The destruction of the system of values, which deepened as time went by, does not apply to
moral norms only. The situation is such that a scale of values advocated by the Yugoslav
system is practically unknown. The range of needs has never been seriously opened to
democratic debate. This is why priorities of need have been formed spontaneously, mostly
under the influence of the consumer mentality. This psychology, combined with
unrestrained primitivism, has enormously increased the inclination for pulp in literature,
music, film and entertainment of all kinds. The growth of this inclination has even been 65
internationally and systematically encouraged by the press, radio and television. Under the
pressure of the aggressive pulp, which is the sovereign ruler of the stage, genuine cultural
values have been divested of a wider influence, in spite of numerous and significant works
by Yugoslav authors. There have been very few well thought-out efforts to bring these
works to a wider circle of citizens.
The cultural crisis is seen not only in the inability of true social values to compete with
pulp. Culture has become ever more regionalized, too; its Yugoslav and universal meaning
has been fragmented and it has largely been put in the service of republic and provincial
statehood aspirations in the same way as landed property. This universal provincialization
of culture lowers the criteria for its values and allows for a much higher social recognition
of less gifted creators. Deeply rooted in provincial culture, separatism and nationalism are
becoming more and more aggressive.
5. This universal and deep crisis of the Yugoslav society has raised many questions, of
which the following two are particularly striking: What has happened with the project of
building a new society for which so many lives were sacrificed? Where do we stand today
in relation to the modern European civilisation?
Objective scientific analysis, free of both ideological apologetics (which resist any changes
in the system) and ideological scepticism (which rejects the entire system and has done so
since its beginning) reveals all the discrepancies of the post-war development and explains
why the period of doubtless material growth, gradual democratisation and intellectual
emancipation was followed by social conflicts in the late 1960s, by a restoration of
authoritarianism in the early 1970s, by a loss of stability and structural proportions, by
material stagnation and culminated in a growing spiritual disorientation.
The collapse that occurred would not have been so serious and persistent had it been the
consequence of wrong policies alone. The new political strategy in the 1960s represented
not only the project on the economic reform but also the end of the process of political and
economic democratisation, of the alienation of politics, of the long-term planning of social
development, of building a uniform federation. The new social project for establishing
group and national egotisms led to an irreconcilable conflict with the previously recognised
moral values and to the growing demoralisation of the masses.
In order to explain why the successful growth of the period between 1953 and 1965 was
followed by the fatal turning point in 1965, numerous factors must be considered: giving
considerable priorities to individual and group interests over the general ones, the
materialistic aspirations of the new middle class, the domination of interests of the more
highly developed republics, the defence of politocratic monopoly of power against the
growing pressure for further democratic reforms, and fierce resistance to emancipation on
the part of patriarchal tradition. Among foreign factors, special stress should be put on the
pressures by world powers which supported authoritarianism in the political sphere while in
the economic sphere attempted and finally succeeded in bringing the state into an
unenviable technological and economic dependence on foreign countries.
Nevertheless, the explanation which would idealise the project of revolutionary changes and
the doubtless successes of the first two decades of the post-war growth and which regarded
later ups and downs merely as deviations from this project incurred by the governing
subjects would not be satisfactory. It is a scientific fact that the project itself had limitations
both in its initial vision, which (in spite of all its humanistic and emancipating ideas)
overemphasised the role of violence and dictatorship in the transitional period, and the 66
manner in which that vision was interpreted and applied in our country under the pressure of
Stalinism and the Comintern legacy.
The successful resistance to Stalinism mobilised significant social forces, which secured
national independence, industrialisation, enviable economic growth in the period between
1953 and 1965, initial forms of self-managing and spiritual liberation from the narrow
ideological frames in the field of culture. Nevertheless, the established hierarchical relations
could not be overcome. They proved to be an insurmountable barrier in the process of
democratisation. This process was tolerated and encouraged insofar as it was triggering
creative forces within the social micro-structure and in the activities outside politics. It was
strictly controlled when it tended to spread onto the political institutions – with its demand
for deprofessionalization and debureaucratization of politics; it was definitely halted when it
imperilled the centres of political power – with its demand for free elections and for
transformation of state into self-management organs. The economic reform of 1965 was
essentially a change in the fundamental strategic course of the social development: the
project of political democratisation was replaced by a project of economic liberalisation.
The idea of self-managerialism, whose essence lay in the non-alienation of politics, was
replaced by the idea of decentralisation which led to the establishment of regional centres of
alienated power. The ethics of solidarity and social justice was replaced by a spirit of selfish
individualism and an apology of group interests. Political voluntarism, bold and dynamic in
the first post-war decades, when it could count on large-scale public support, became static
and determined in its defence of the system, even when it became obvious that the system
was inconsistent and inefficient.
The basic problem of the Yugoslav society does not lie in the incomplete and distorted
realisation of the historical project, drafted in the liberation war. It has been the fate of all
the projects in history so far that their realisation has been accompanied by elements of
restoration which has ultimately led to various mixtures of the old and the new systems.
However, in spite of the fact that they never accomplished all the emancipational goals,
such hybrids always proved to be progressive civilizational achievements, which provided a
way out of the crisis and into an accelerated social development. An unprecedented gap
between proclamations and reality is an essential feature of Yugoslav society. According to
the official ideology, Yugoslav society has already exceeded all the achievements of
modern civilisation, both Western and Eastern; it has accomplished the highest from of
democracy, it has secured the rule of the working class by means of self-management, it has
achieved brotherhood and unity of Yugoslav peoples, it has abolished state rule, it was the
first in the world to prove that an efficient market economy was possible in socialism.
In reality our society is below the level of modern civilisation. In Yugoslavia basic human
rights can still be violated with impunity, elections of functionaries are a fiction, judicial
authority is dependent on executive authority and freedom of speech, organisation and
public manifestation is limited by bureaucratic arbitrariness and by legal regulations which
enable the prosecution of any opinion different from the official one. The working class
does not have a legal right of self-organisation and strike and has no real say in political
decision-making. The inter-national (inter-republic) relations are marked by conflicts
between opposing interests, by exploitation and slack cooperation among the autarchic
national (republic) economies. Almost every trace of the common policy of development
has disappeared and so has the common market. State rule has not been abolished but
transferred to the republic level where it is more irrational and more malignant. When the
undesired effect ensued as early as 1967-68, a combination of inflation, stagnation and
unemployment, the entirely wrongly designed “economic reform” was abandoned and a 67
modern market economy, regulated by instruments of a global policy of development, has
never been achieved. Unlike other contemporary mixed social system, the specific Yugoslav
mixture of elements of the pre-modern authoritarian system, of democracy and of socialism,
ultimately formulated by the 1974 Constitution, does not possess a minimum coherence
necessary to secure further social development.
Unless this Constitution is changed, together with the political and economic system built
on it, it is impossible to solve a single crucial problem of our society today, it is impossible
to halt the present process of disintegration and sinking into an ever deeper crisis. It is
necessary to seek solutions bearing in mind the following civilizational principles which are
unavoidable conditions for the growth of a modern society.
a) Sovereignty of the people. The foundation of modern civilisation holds the idea that the
people alone are the highest source of political power, that the only legitimate political
authority is the one originating from the freely expressed will of the people, and that
therefore there are no moral or legal bases for any elite (by Grace of God, by blood,
religion, race, class, ideological affiliation, historical merits or any other justification) to
usurp the right to speak, decide and use force in the name of the people. The people can
only transfer political power to their delegates for a time, with the right to elect, control and
remove them and if need be to overthrow them by force – if they disobey the “social
agreement” and instead of common national interests begin to follow their particular
interests. The principle of sovereignty of the people was established by the democratic
political philosophy and practice of the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century.
However, extremely radical consequences of this principle were established by the
socialistic theory. If monopoly of economic power is also one of the bases of elite
formation, which can impose themselves upon the society and achieve full control over its
political life, then any monopoly enabling institutions are incompatible with the principle of
sovereignty of the people, whether it be the capital or a bureaucratic state. Consequently,
full sovereignty of the people can be achieved only in a classless society in which political,
economic and cultural life is organised in a democratic way. The prerequisites for such
democracy (“democracy of councils” or “integral self-management”) are free elections and
rotation of functionaries, public control of their work, division of power and absence of
bureaucratic privileges. These preconditions have long been met in modern societies.
Yugoslavia has not achieved this level yet, although it proclaimed the principles of self-
management, debureaucratization and de-professionalization of politics long ago.
b) Self-determination of a nation. In modern society any political oppression or
discrimination on a national basis is civilizationally unacceptable. The Yugoslav solution of
the national question could initially be regarded as an example of a multi-national federation
in which the principle of indivisible state and state politics was successfully combined with
the principle of political and cultural autonomy of the nations and national minorities. In the
course of the last two decades the principle of unity has been weakening and too much
emphasis has been put on the principle of national autonomy which in practice grew into
sovereignty of the parts (republics, which, as a rule, are not nationally homogeneous). The
weaknesses that were present in the system from the beginning have become ever more
apparent. Not all nations are equal: the Serbian nation, for example, did not gain the right to
its own state. Parts of the Serbian people, who in considerable numbers live in the other
republics, do not have the right, unlike the national minorities, to use their own language
and alphabet, to get politically and culturally organised, to develop the unique culture of
their nation. The undetainable expulsion of the Serbs from Kosovo drastically demonstrates
that these principles, protecting the autonomy of a minority (Albanians) were not applied 68
when it came to a minority within a minority (Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, and Gypsies in
Kosovo). With regard to the existing forms of national discrimination today’s Yugoslavia
cannot be regarded as a modern and democratic state.
c) Human rights. The modern epoch begins with the establishment of human rights. Initially
these were the civil rights: freedom of thought, consciousness, speech, movement,
agreement, organisation, public manifestation, demonstrations, election of one’s delegates.
In our century these civil rights have been expanded by the socio-economic rights: right to
work, to a free choice of profession, to education, to equal labour, to social security. The
UN General Assembly formulated all these rights in its Universal Declaration on Human
Rights adopted on 10 thDecember 1948. Our country is one of the member states that have
ratified this declaration; Yugoslavia has also signed the Helsinki Agreement and all the
similar international documents. It is doubtless that there are many states in the world today
which are below Yugoslavia regarding the achieved level of human rights. But, “verbal
delicts” are still prosecuted in Yugoslavia, books are being banned and burned,
“ideologically unacceptable” theatre performances are removed from the programme, public
expression of opinion is fettered, organising, manifestations and demonstrations are
forbidden, the use of the constitutional right to send petitions to state organs is branded as
enemy acts, initiators of strikes are prosecuted, elections of functionaries are turned into a
farce of self-appointment. As long as all this is happening we cannot consider ourselves to
be a civilised and cultured society.
d) Rationality. Modern age is the age of rationality. Social institutions and the complete
system of organisation of social life must stand the test of reason. It is not always the
rationality of goals: a great weakness of our epoch is the separation of politics, ethics and
science. But instrumental rationality and the ability to devise adequate means for the
accepted goals and efficient realisation of a certain policy is the conditio sine qua of each
modern state. This also means that each modern state is a complex system whose parts are
uniformly regulated, coordinated and directed, that the rules of the game must be clear,
stable and changeable only after serious study and preparation, that state officials must be
elected primarily according to the criteria of competence and personal integrity, that
decision-making should be maximally based on confident information and on analysis of
costs and possible profits. None of these conditions of rational politics has been fulfilled in
Yugoslavia: our state is made up of eight separate and loosely connected systems, a
common policy of development does not exist; even if it existed on paper it would not be
realisable in practice; rules of the game are constantly being changed ad hoc, and can at best
be known only a year in advance; functionaries are elected primarily on the basis of their
obedience, so they are most frequently incompetent and easily swayed, decisions are made
hastily, arbitrarily and partially, without a prior public debate, on the basis of unreliable,
partial information and without taking into consideration possible alternatives. As long as
such an irrational style of work prevails in our politics, we cannot be considered a modern
society.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the political democratisation and a complete
changeover in some cadres, true self-determination and equality of all Yugoslav peoples,
including the Serbian people, full accomplishment of all human, civil and socio-economic
rights as well as consistent rationalisation of the Yugoslav political system and policy of
development are those necessary preconditions without which one cannot imagine any
solution of the present crisis of the Yugoslav society. 69
POSITION OF ERBIA AND THE ERBIAN EOPLEP
6. Many hardships which presently torment the Serbian people are a result of conditions
common to all Yugoslav peoples. However, the Serbian people have suffered other
hardships as well. The long-term lagging of Serbian economic development, imprecisely
defined state and legal relations with Yugoslavia and the Provinces, as well as the genocide
in Kosovo have made the Serbian situation extremely tense and created a highly charged
atmosphere. These three painful issues, resulting from a long-term policy towards Serbia,
are not only threatening the Serbian people but also the stability of Yugoslavia as a whole.
Therefore, attention should be focused on these three issues.
No extensive knowledge or data were needed to establish the fact of the long-term lagging
of the Serbian economy. Still, it was officially done only in the 1981-1985 Plan. The Plan
stated clearly that within the mentioned period measures would be taken in order to stop
such tendencies. However, that commitment was soon forgotten. That period just witnessed
other attempts to assess whether Srbia was still lagging behind in its development. The
results confirmed what had already been known – that according to all the relevant
indicators, the Serbian economy was constantly below the Yugoslav average, and the gap
was increasingly widening. Because of the slowed-down development Serbia could not
overcome economic undevelopment in the part of its territory with a population of 1,5
million and an income per capita 30% lower than in the three undeveloped republics.
Research proved beyond doubt that this relative backwardness of Serbia was the result of
reduced investments per capita, and not the result of reduced efficiency of investments.
According to official statistical data, the profitability of investments in post –war Serbia was
lower only compared to that of Slovenia and Vojvodina. From 1976 until 1983 it was the
highest in Yugoslavia. However, such efficiency could only partly make up for the loss of
national income caused by reduced investments. The value of assets per capita reached only
80.5% of the Yugoslav average, lower even than in Montenegro and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the two undeveloped republics.
The economy of Serbia was subject to unequal exchange in the post-war period. One
example of such unfavourable exchange was low-priced electric power delivered in large
quantities to other republics. The instruments of the current economic, credit and monetary
policy and especially budgetary contributions to the Federal government for the
development of the underdeveloped regions, have been major causes for the recent lagging
of the Serbian economy. In addition to this, the most developed republics invested their
capital in the Serbian economy (agriculture, food industry, trade and banking), which Serbia
could not finance. Thus the economy of Serbia was subordinated and neglected within
Yugoslavia.
Such consistent discrimination against the post-war Serbian economy cannot be fully
explained without taking into consideration relations among the Yugoslav nations between
the wars from the point of view of the Yugoslav Communist Party (KPJ). The authoritative
Communist International (Comintern) significantly influenced such views, and aimed at the
disintegration of Yugoslavia – in order to realise its strategic and tactical aims. Justifying its
ideology in confronting the Serbs as “tyrants” and other nations as “the tyrannised”, such a
policy is a drastic example of the Marxist theory of national class divisions giving way to
political pragmatism, which tried to take advantage of inter-ethnic conflicts, having
neglected class internationalism. This can partly explain the fact that The Yugoslav
Communist Party (KPJ) never attempted to find out the real truth about the economic aspect
of inter-ethnic relations by means of research. Their estimate of these relations, (which was 70
reduced to the claim that the political hegemony of the Serbian bourgeoisie was
accompanied by economic domination of Serbia) was taken over from separatist civil
parties. Neither before nor after the war was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ)
willing to assess the factual situation by means of direct fact-finding, or to accept any debate
which could endanger the estimates and views accepted long ago and persistently
maintained even today. This persistence was even more surprising as even without special
studies, on the basis of a mere insight into the basic indicators of the level of deveolpment
in the 1948 census year, it was possible to see that Serbia could not have an economically
privileged position between the two wars. The agricultural character of the Serbian
economy clearly pointed at the lagging behind of industrialisation. Participation of
agriculture was higher, while participation of industry in gross national product was lower
than the Yugoslav average. Not only did the KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) not, on
the basis of these facts, alter its view, but it paid no attention to publications of scientific
institutions, which in the early 1950s confirmed a significantly different economic status of
Serbia between the two wars. This constant repetition of the pre-war thesis, that has been
going on for 4 decades, points to significant political interest in sticking to such wrong
assessments. The objective was to make the Serbian people feel historical guilt in order to
prevent their resistance to the political and economic subordination they have constantly
been exposed to.
The post-war policy towards the Serbian economy was largely founded on the pre-war
approach. Such an approach can be clearly seen in the first 5-year Plan, according to which
Serbia was to follow the slowest pace of industrialisation after Slovenia. In practice, this
policy started with the removal of industrial plants for the production of aircraft, trucks and
weaponry to other republics. It was followed by a compulsory selling and by a pricing
policy unfavourable for raw materials and agricultural products suppliers, by reduced
investments per capita compared to the Yugoslav average, and by the contributions to
undeveloped regions. However, nothing could be better proof of the subordinated position
of Serbia than the fact that Serbia had no say in crucial issues connected with the political
and economic system. Therefore, the position of Serbia is to be judged in the context of the
political and economic domination of Slovenia and Croatia, the two republics that initiated
the changes in all the systems up to the present.
Slovenia and Croatia started out as the most developed republics and also had the fastest
development. With the improvement of their relative position the gap between them and the
rest of Yugoslavia increased considerably. This course of events, which was not in
accordance with the proclaimed policy of uniform development, would not have been
possible if the economic system had not been partial, if these two republics had not been in
the position to impose solutions suitable for their own economic interests. The secondary
sector, which takes a relatively larger part in their economic structures, has enjoyed more
favourable operating conditions throughout the whole post-war period, which was the result
of a parity and pricing policy and of protective tariffs. The increased importance of the
market in the 1960s was more favourable for the more developed republics. The suspension
of the 1961-1965 5-year Plan (which favoured the development of raw materials production
capacities and of energy production) should be regarded as an attempt of the two republics
to avoid investing in underdeveloped regions relatively rich in natural resources. Yugoslav
development at the time was based more on the production factors of these two developed
republics than on that of the rest of the country. This was the reason for which the work
force was not given adequate position in the development orientation, which affected Serbia
and the undeveloped regions. 71
The economic subordination of Serbia cannot be fully understood without taking into
account its inferior political position which also determined all the other relations. For the
KPJ, there was no doubt about the economic hegemony of the Serbian people between the
two wars regardless of the fact that the industrialisation of Serbia was slower than the
Yugoslav average. Opinions and behaviours were formed on this ideological platform,
which had a crucial effect on later political events and inter-ethnic relations. Both the
Slovenes and Croats formed their national communist parties before the war, and also
gained a decisive influence on the Central Committee of the KPJ. Their political leaders
became arbitrators in all political issues both during and after the war. These two
neighbouring republics shared a similar historical fate, they had the same religion and the
same desire for greater independence, and as the most developed republics, they had
common economic interests, which was reason enough for a permanent coalition in order to
establish political domination. That coalition was strengthened by the long-term cooperation
between Tito and Kardelj, the two most prominent political figures in post-war Yugoslavia
who enjoyed inviolable authority in the centres of power. Their monopoly of power enabled
them to have significant influence on the structure of the top political cadres in Yugoslavija
in all the Republics and Provinces. The contribution of Edvard Kardelj in preparing and
passing of the AVNOJ decisions as well as of all the post-war constitutions was enormous.
He was in a position to incorporate his own attitudes, which could not be disputed, into the
foundations of the social system. The determination which Slovenia and Croatia are
showing nowadays in opposing all constitutional changes shows how suitable the 1974
Constitution is for them. Any views of the social system different from those of Tito and
Kardelj had no chance of being accepted. Even after they died, nothing could be done, since
the possibility of veto protected the constitution from any possible changes. In regard to all
of this, there can be no doubt that Slovenia and Croatia have established their political and
economic domination, by which they have been carrying out their national programmes and
economic aspirations.
In such circumstances and by being constantly labelled as “tyrannical”, “unitaristic”,
“centralistic” and “gendarme”, the Serbian people could not establish equality in
Yugoslavia, for whose creation they had sacrificed most. The revengeful policy towards the
Serbs started before the war, with belief that the “tyrant” nation did not need the Communist
party. The Serbs were relatively insufficiently represented in the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, and some of them declared themselves as members of other nations,
probably in order to survive. During the war Serbia was not in the position to take an equal
part in decision making regarding future inter-ethnic relations and the Yugoslav social
system. The Anti-fascist Council of Serbia was founded in the second half of 1944, later
than in the other republics, and the Communist party of Serbia was founded only after the
war ended. The councillors for the second session of AVNOJ were chosen among the
Serbian military units and members of the Supreme Headquarters who were on the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, unlike the councillors of some other republics who
had come to the session from their own territories and who were supported by their national
political organisations with fully established standpoints and programmes.
These historical facts prove that during the war Serbia was not even formally equal when
decisions, extremely significant for the future social system, were made. This does not
imply that the Serbs would not have voluntarily opted for the federation as the most suitable
2
See note 259 72
system for a multi-national community, but that they found themselves in the position to
accept (without previous preparations or support from their political organisations and in
the conditions of war) the solution which opened wide possibilities for their future
disintegration. The position of the Serbs ought to have been considered in due time and
regulated in regard to their national integrity and undisturbed cultural development instead
of leaving this extraordinary issue open to solutions which affect the vital interests of the
Serbian people.
Serious social and economic consequences resulting from such post-war period relations
demand that the abuse of the thesis about “tyrant” and “tyrannised” nations be immediately
stopped, since it has bro ught Serbia into an unenviable economic position. Exempting
Serbia from contributions to the Federal fund, which would have enabled Serbia to reinforce
its capital-generating ability and to accelerate its economic development, was an
opportunity to announce the end of this policy. The political representatives of Serbia were
expected to come out with this demand and not to give in until it was accepted. But it came
as a great surprise when they accepted to pay full rates to the Federal fund under the
condition of a vague promise that this contribution would be materially compensated from
other sources.
Such an outcome was contrary to the findings of Serbia’s economic lag, and it was at the
same time a historically irresponsible act of the Serbian representatives towards their own
nation. The capitulation of the political representatives of Serbia calls into question their
right to take such steps. The question was who had the right to accept the decision by which
the Serbian economy was doomed to long-term lagging with inevitable political
consequences. The decision concerns enormous assets necessary to trigger the economic
development of Serbia and the settling of existential question of a large number of young,
unemployed people, a number higher than in any other republic. Without the plebiscite of
the Serbian people, who alone have the right to decide on their own future, nobody can
usurp the right to talk and make decisions behind closed doors and to accept serious
restrictions to the economic development of this nation.
With a clear conscience and with a feeling that it had fulfilled its duties, Serbia could have
required to be exempted from contributing to the Fund. True sacrifices for the development
of the three undeveloped republics and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo were made by
Serbia alone, the price of which was the3lagging behind of Serbia itself. This was not the
case with the three developed regions . Determining the contribution rate proportionally to
the gross national product did not follow the basic principle that contributions should be
determined according to the economic strength of a contributor. This proportional
contribution rate spared Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina from paying progressive
contribution rates, which enabled not only their normal development but also the
improvement of their relative position in comparison to the Yugoslav average. However,
such contribution rates presented an enormous burden for Serbia. The economy of Serbia
allocated half of its net accumulation to the undeveloped regions, thus bringing it closer to
the economies of the undeveloped republics.
3 i.e. Croatia, Slovenia and the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, which, along with Serbia,
had the status of developed regions, while Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia
and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo had the status of undeveloped or insufficiently
developed regions. 73
In spite of the fact that Serbia helped the undeveloped regions, Serbia’s retrogression gained
sympathy by neither the undeveloped nor developed republics. Both types of regions were
directed by their mutual interests towards a coalition aimed at keeping the status quo, which
satisfied the interests of both at the expense of Serbia. In the contribution rate issue the anti-
Serbian coalition was brought up more openly and with less political tact than ever before.
Unconcealed pressure forced Serbia to accept the global contribution rates policy. Such
pressure was a significant sign that the traditional discrimination against Serbia had not
weakened but perhaps even strengthened.
Bearing in mind all that happened in the post-war period, such pressure did not represent
anything new. Serbia’s resolute resistance to that pressure could have been something new.
Unfortunately, this did not happen. The resistance was somewhat bigger than before but still
far from being sufficiently big. The Serbian leaders did not even use all the legal means,
like the possibility of veto, which was the only solution left for them in the situation when
they found themselves isolated in their justified requirements. It seems they did not even
consider an appropriate response including the initiating of a political crisis, if that was the
only possibility left. The Serbian politicians proved to be unprepared for the historical task
imposed upon them by an extremely difficult state of relations within the Yugoslav
community. That historic moment demanded from them to resolutely make it clear that the
post-war practice was over – the practice of replacing politicians who dared to raise the
issue of equality of Serbia, the practice of discriminating against the economists,
sociologists, philosophers and writers from Serbia who had in due time pointed out the
socially malignant phenomena, as well as the practice of removing able managers by which
the Serbian economy was weakened in the conditions of strengthened competitiveness on
the market.
7. The attitude towards the economic lagging of Serbia shows that the revengeful policy
towards Serbia has not weakened as time went by. On the contrary, fed by its own success it
has strengthened, which has finally resulted in genocide. Discrimination against the Serbian
people is politically unsustainable. Because of the parity representation of the republics,
Serbia has less access than others to top federal positions and the Federal Assembly
delegate seats, and the vote of a Serbian voter is worth less than that of people from other
republics and provinces. In this light Yugoslavia is not a community made up of equal
citizens or of equal nations and ethnic groups, but a community consisting of eight equal
territories. Even such equality is not applied to Serbia because of its special legal-political
status, which reflects the aspirations to keep the Serbian people under permanent control.
The idea behind such a policy was “Weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia” which has grown into
the influential standpoint, i.e., if the Serbs, as the largest nation, were allowed a fast
economic development, it would present a danger for the other nations. Hence the reason
why every means was used to impose as big restrictions as possible on the economic
development and political consolidation of Serbia. One of the very critical restrictions today
is the present undefined and chaotic constitutional position of Serbia.
By the 1974 Constitution, Serbia was virtually divided into three parts. The autonomous
provinces were given the same status as the republics, except that they were not defined as
states and do not have the same number of representatives in some bodies of the Federal
government. They make up for this drawback by interfering in the internal affairs of Serbia
Proper via their members in the Republican Parliament, while their Provincial Parliaments
are absolutely autonomous. The political and legal status of Serbia Proper is not clearly
defined, it is neither a republic nor a province. Relations within the republic of Serbia are
chaotic. The Executive Council, which is a body of the republican Parliament, is really the 74
Executive Council of Serbia Proper. This is not the only inconsistency in determining
consequences. The too broad and institutionally firmly established autonomies of the
provinces cause new expatriations of the Serbian people. It has to be admitted that the
autonomous and separatist forces insisted on greater autonomy, but they would have hardly
achieved it had they not had a moral and political support from the republics in which
separatist tendencies have not vanished.
The demand for greater autonomy was justified under the pretext that it would lead to a
greater equality of rights among nations and an improvement in the performance of public
services. The Kosovo events of the late 1960s were a warning about what could happen if
the Provinces were given more autonomy. There were no reasons whatsoever for the
establishing of greater autonomy in Vojvodina. On the contrary, the result was bureaucratic
autonomism, serious occurrences of separatism, non-existent before, a self-sufficient
economy and political voluntarism. The factors from both within and without Vojvodina,
who were getting ever more influential, were trying to spread misinformation aimed at
dividing the Serbs into “Serbians” and the “other side Serbs” or the “other sider”. Ardently
supported by other republics, the provinces became constituent elements of the Federation,
which prodded them into feeling and behaving as federal units, neglecting the fact that they
were constituent parts of the Republic of Serbia. The balance in this sort of dualism could
not be sustained in this case either. The present attitude of the provinces shows that
separatist and autonomist forces have completely prevailed in practice. The republic of
Serbia has been deprived of the possibility to take a unanimous stand in vital issues and thus
act in the interest of the nation it belongs to.
The tangle of unsolved relations within the Republic of Serbia is a logical consequence of
its constitutional position and of the selection of separatist and autonomist cadres, who
owing to their political orientation enjoyed the favour of those who were holding the cadre-
policy monopoly in Yugoslavia. Without a suitable counterbalance in co-ordination,
regionalisation as a rule results in a provincial narrow-mindedness and blindness for wider
national interests.
Those who unselfishly supported the germs of internal conflicts to be sowed in the
Constitutions, today appear as arbitrators, of reconcilers, who, by applying the well-known
symmetry of equal guilts, are lecturing on Serbia and in the provinces, suggesting that the
solution be sought in the strict application of the same constitutions. In this way the
situation once complicated will remain unchanged, and Serbia will continue wasting its
social energies on attempts to overcome conflicts without a prospect of accomplishing full
success. This must have been the reason for giving the provinces greater autonomy, since
maintaining the conflicts within Serbia enables others to interfere in Serbia’s internal affairs
and thus continue to dominate over Serbia. After the federalisation of the KPJ (Communist
Party of Yugoslavia) such interference in the internal affairs of a republic was possible only
in Serbia.
The relations between Serbia and the provinces 4annot be reduced only to the formal and
legal interpretation of the two constitutions. . Here we deal with the problem of the Serbian
people and their state. The nation which, after long and bloody wars, managed to re-
establish its state, establish parliamentary democracy, and which lost 2.5 million people in
4 i.e. the Constitution of Serbia vs. the Constitution of Vojvodina or the Constitution of Serbia
vs. the Constitution of Kosovo. 75
the last two wars, is now the only nation in Yugoslavia without its own state, reduced to
such a status after four decades of the new Yugoslavia, by a Communist Party apparatchik
committee. A worse historical outcome in times of peace could hardly be imagined.
8. Banishment of the Serbian people from Kosovo is a spectacular proof of their historical
defeat. In the spring of 1981, a special, open and total war was decleared on the Serbian
people; the war had been prepared in various periods of administrative, political and legal
changes. Waged by the skilful application of different methods and tactics, with precisely
assigned tasks, aided by both hidden and open support of certain political centres in the
country (even more dangerous than the support from the neighbouring countries) this open
war, which has not been properly faced yet and which has not been given its true name, has
gone on for almost 5 years. Therefore it has gone on much longer than the whole Liberation
war (from 6 April 1941 until 9 May 1945). The Albanian nationalistic uprising in Kosovo
and Metohija, which occurred towards the end of the war, and was helped by Fascist units,
was militarily defeated in 1944-1945 but apparently not politically defeated. Its present
form, disguised in new clothing, is developing more successfully, and is approaching a
victorious outcome. A true showdown with the Neo-fascist aggression has not been
undertaken, all the measures undertaken so far only removed that open aggression from the
streets at the same time strengthening its awakened and irrevocable racist objectives, which
are to be fulfilled at any cost and by any means available. Even the calculated drastic
punishments pronounced to young offenders were aimed at provoking and deepening inter-
ethnic hatred.
The five-year long Albanian war in Kosovo convinced its leaders and supporters that they
were more powerful than they had believed, that they enjoyed greater support from various
centres of power within the country than the Kosovo Serbs did from the Republic of Serbia,
or this republic from other Yugoslav republics. The aggression was encouraged to the extent
that the most eminent representatives of the Province, as well as its scientists, are not only
arrogant but also cynical, claiming that the truth is really a slander, and that blackmail is
their long-lost right. Organised political forces within the country, which managed to carry
out the revolution in utterly unfavourable circumstances, fighting against the most powerful
enemy in the 20 thcentury, have all of a sudden proved to be not only inefficient, non-
freedom-loving but almost indifferent to stopping this open war in the only way possible –
by resolute defence of their people and territory. Once the aggression has been stopped,
political settlement should not be achieved by arrests, by differentiating or by false loyalty,
but by a true revolutionary struggle, open confrontations, and the right to express ideas
freely, even by expressing opposing views.
The physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and
Metohija is the worst defeat in the battles for liberation that Serbia waged from 1804
(Orašac) until the revolution in 1941. The Comintern legacy in the national policy of the
KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) and the Serbian Communists’ obedience to that
policy are responsible for that defeat, as well as ideological and political delusions,
ignorance, immaturity or deeply rooted opportunism of generations of Serbian politicians
after the war, who were always defensive, always more concerned about what the others
think of them and of their tentative questioning of the position of Serbia, rather than about
the facts which determine the future of the people they are governing.
Equality of national rights, which even in Kosovo and Metohija was mainly achieved by the
fighting of the Serbian people, is being reversed by the Albanian nationalists in the political
leadership of Kosovo through a very precise policy, which has been gradually carried out 76
and which has well-planned actions and a clear goal. The autonomous region, at an
appropriate moment, gains the status of an autonomous province, and later even the status
of a constituent part of the Federation thereby enjoying more privileges than the rest of the
republic to which it only formally belongs. The next step of the escalation, which appeared
in the form of albanization of Kosovo and Metohija, had been prepared openly. The
unification of a standard language, national names, flags, and text books, carried out in
accordance with instructions from Tirana, was totally open as was the border between the
two state territories. Plots, which are usually made secretly, were contrived in Kosovo not
only in full view but also defiantly. Therefore the large-scale riots in 1981 looked to many
more as hastiness than as a new phenomenon, dangerous for the whole country. In the same
way, any truth about the persecution of Serbs in Kosovo was regarded as “the Serbian gut-
raking”, and the “Belgrade press”, which carried on-the-spot reports from Kosovo, was
treated worse than the actual crimes, (arson, murder, rape, necrophilia) and many of these
crimes have not yet been identified or prosecuted.
A special weight can be put on the attitude of the responsible factors and authorities in
Kosovo towards the violence whose victims are the Serbian people. By failing to mention
and by hushing up those crimes, by avoiding exposing the truth, by prolonging investigation
and judicial procedure, the government only encourages the terror and projects a false
picture of the situation in Kosovo. Besides, there is an obvious tendency to find a political
alibi for the violence to which the Serbs are being exposed through the alleged mutual
hatred on both sides, through intolerance and retaliation and recently through imaginary
activities of “the outside enemy”, i.e. of Serbian nationalism “from Belgrade”. The
Martinović case in significant not only because of the unprecedented violence reminiscent
of the darkest period of Turkish impalement, but also because of the persistent refusal to
find out and admit the truth through regular court proceedings. Instead of being a motive for
confirming the highest values of law and human rights, that case was regarded in Kosovo as
a chance to emphasise the sovereignty of the province, (which it was not entitled to
according to the Constitution) and to impose upon the Socialist Republic of Serbia and
principle of “non-interference into internal affairs” of the province, as though it was a case
of international relations.
The Serbs in Kosovo not only have their own history, embodied in valuable cultural and
historical monuments, but also a living presence of their spiritual, cultural and moral values,
for it is their historical mother country. The violence which throughout centuries, had been
reducing the Serbian population of Kosovo and Metohija is now reaching its climax. The
emigration of Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija in Socialist Yugoslavia has assumed the
proportions greater than any previous large-scale expulsion of the Serbs from that area.
5
Jovan Cvijić estimated that in all the massive emigrations, from the one led by Arsenije
Čarnojević in 1690 until the beginning of this century over 500,000 Serbs were banished
from Kosovo, that 150,000 of them were forced to leave their homes in the period between
1876 and 1912, under cruel terror of the local privileged Albanians. During World War II,
over 60,000 Serbian colonists and natives were expelled form Kosovo, and after the war,
this wave of emigration turned into a flood, especially during the last two decades, when
about 200,000 Serbs emigrated from Kosovo. The remnant of the remnants of the Serbian
population are not only rapidly leaving their country but, are preparing for their final
exodus, driven by violence, physical, moral and psychological terror. In less than ten years
5
See note 20 77
from now, if things do not change, there will be no Serbs left in Kosovo, and the “ethnically
pure” Kosovo, as the openly expressed goal of the Great Albanian racists, established in the
programmes and actions of the Prizren League of 1878-81, will be fully accomplished.
The petition signed by 2,016 Serbs from Kosovo Polje and submitted to the Federal
Assembly and other public authorities was a legal consequence of this situation. No forum
ruling can deny the Serbian people the right to defend themselves by all legal instruments
from violence and annihilation. Should the Province authorities fail to protect this right, the
people should and must seek protection from the Republic of Federation. The visit of the
Kosovo citizens to the Federal Assembly was only an expression of their awareness of this
right. That step can be considered unacceptable and hostile only from an autonomist,
separatist and chauvinistic standpoint.
The present fate of Kosovo is no longer “complex”, nor can it any longer be reduced to
empty self-assessment, ambiguous and dull resolutions, generalised platforms. It is, simply,
a question of Yugoslav consequences! Between the ever increasing regional segregation and
federal arbitrage paralysing every genuine, often urgent, measure – a set of unresolved
situations turns into a vicious circle of insoluble ones. The fate of Kosovo remains a matter
of life and death for the Serbian people. Unless it is resolved through the only just outcome
of the imposed war, unless genuine security and unequivocal equality of all the nations
living in Kosovo is established, and objective and permanent conditions for the return of
emigrants created – that part of Serbia and Yugoslavia will turn into a European issue with
the gravest, unforeseeable consequences. Kosovo is one of the most important points in the
Balkan interior. The ethnic mix in many Balkan regions is in accordance with the ethnic
profile of the Balkan peninsula and the demand for an ethnically clean Kosovo (which is
being put into practice) is not only a direct and serious threat for the minority nations but, if
triggered off, this wave of expansionism will represent a genuine constant threat for all
Yugoslav peoples.
Kosovo is not the only region where Serbs are discriminated against. Not only relatively,
but in absolute numbers as well, the numbers of Serbs in Croatia is a sufficient proof for this
assertion. According to the census of 1948, there were 543,795t Serbs in Croatia or 14.48%.
In the 1981 census, this figure decreased to 531,502 or 11.5% of the total Croatian
population. In the 33 years of post-war peace, the number of Serbs in Croatia decreased
even if compared to the first post-war census when the consequences of the war for the
Serbian population were well known.
Lika, Kordun and Banija remained the least developed Croatian regions, which caused the
migration of Serbs to Serbia and other parts of Croatia, where they were to a great extent
subject to assimilation due to their position as newcomers and members of a minority and
socially inferior group. Serbs in Croatia have been exposed to other means of subtle and
effective assimilating policies. An integral part of these policies was the ban on all Serbian
associations and cultural institutions in Croatia, which had a rich tradition dating from
Austro-Hungary of Yugoslavia between the wars, accompanied by the imposition of an
official language carrying the name of another nation (Croatian), which was an expression
of national inequality. The use of that language was made obligatory for Serbs in Croatia by
means of a constitutional provision, while nationalistically biased Croatian linguists, in a
systematic and brilliantly organised action, made it more and more removed from the
language spoken in other republics where Serbo-Croatian is spoken, which has contributed
to a weakening of links between Serbs in Croatia and other Serbs. This effect is readily paid
for by a disruption of the language continuity of Croatians themselves. Also, international 78
idioms invaluable when communicating with other cultures, particularly in science and
engineering, were eliminated. However, not only are Serbian people in Croatia cut off from
their parent country, but the parent country has limited possibilities to obtain information
about their fate and their economic and cultural position, even more limited than some
Yugoslav nations have regarding their fellow countrymen in other countries. The integrity
of Serbian people and their culture throughout Yugoslavia has emerged as the crucial issue
of their survival and development.
The fate of the Serbian institutions established during and immediately after the war fits into
the general picture. During the national liberation war, the national life of Serbs in Croatia
was developing intensively in separate political, cultural and educational institutions. Thus
the Executive Council of ZAVNOH (Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia)
agreed on November 18 1943 to found (and on January 12 th1944 in liberated Oto čac, this
decision was acted upon) the Serbian Club of the ZAVNOH aldermenas the national and
political vanguard of Serbian people in Croatia. After the war, on September 30 th1945,
following an initiative of the Serbian Club, the first Congress of Serbs in Croatia was held
in Zagreb. Its 30,000 participants formed the Head council of Serbs in Croatia as “a broad
political organisation of the undivided Serbian people in Croatia” within the National Front.
Prodded by these bodies, Serbs set up their cultural institutiond and commenced their work
on organising national education. Thus, on October 22 1944, within the ruins of the
church in Glina, which had witnessed horrible slaughtering by Ustashas, a Serbian singing
th
society, “Obilić”, was founded. Less than a month elapsed and on November 18 , again in
Glina, a Serbian cultural and educational society, “Prosvjeta” (education), was established.
Besides “Prosvjeta”, which also developed publishing and had its own printing works, the
Central Serbian Library and the Museum of Serbs in Croatia was founded in Zagreb on
January 4 th1948. And from September 10 th1943, the NOP (NLM) addressed Serbian
people in Croatia through a publication printed in Cyrillic, called “Srpska rije č” (Serbian
Word). Later “Srpska rije č” changed its name and became “Prosvjeta”. As early as the
school year of 1944/45, the NOP provided Serbian children in Croatia with Cyrillic primers,
th
while the ZAVNOH Presidency brought a decision on July 18 1944 to guarantee the
Cyrillic alphabet full equality with the Latin alphabet as well as its precedence in the
Croatian schools situated in regions with a majority Serbian population.
All this had for Serbs in Croatia a bigger and more profound significance than the mere
6
acknowledgement of its role in the NOB (PLW) . With a special proclamation entitled “To
Serbian people in Croatia” dated January 12 th1944, the Serbian Club of the ZAVNOH
aldermen defined its existence as “the sign of the equality of Serbs and Croatians” and “the
guarantee that the interests of Serbian people will be adequately represented in Croatia. “On
the occasion of its constitution, the Head Council of Serbs in Croatia was described as “a
political organisation of the undivided Serbian people in Croatia” whose task was to enable
“the development of the freedom of thought” and to represent “a sufficient guarantee that
Serbs in Croatia will continue to enjoy the benefits of a people on a par with other peoples”.
Serbs themselves felt these benefits, paid for with their own blood, as “clear reminders of
the equality of the Serbian and Croatian people in Croatia.”
Such was the situation during and immediately after the war, but then, everything changed.
It is not known whether Serbs at any time concluded that these institutions were
superfluous, that they should be abolished or replaced by different institutions which would
6 See note 284 79
be more in keeping with the spirit of the times. Nevertheless all these institutions were one
by one abolished during the fifties by edicts of the Croatian authorities. The last was the
rd
Serbian cultural society “Prosvjeta”. It was abolished n May 23 1980 by an edict of the
Croatian Republican SUP (Ministry of Interior Affairs). The republic’s conference of
Socialist Alliance was employed in justifying this fait accompli. The conclusions reached at
its convention held on October 2 nd1980, bespeak of a radical turn in comparison to the war
and the post-war period.
These conclusions in essence do not leave any room for the demands regarding separate
institutions of Serbian people in Croatia: “The care about the complex matters of culture,
history, life and creativity of the Croatian or Serbian nation in Croatia (SRH) cannot be
assigned to any separate national societies or organisations.” Such an attitude was
corroborated in the following way: “While it is justified that our ethnic groups
independently develop cultural institutions and clubs, it is not justified that such institutions
are set up by Serbs in Croatia or Croats in Croatia”. At the end it was stated: “We should
fight against Serbs being overlooked as a people and being called “newcomers” in some
schoolbooks. We have a common history, culture and la nguage, but distinctive features
should be taken into consideration. “It was also said that instruction in the Cyrillic alphabet
should be promoted in Croatia.
This attitude of the Republic conference of the Socialist Alliance was not opposed by any
political body in Croatia or outside it. It meant the virtual and publicly proclaimed end of all
aspects of the national life of Serbs in Croatia, achieved during the long history and the
PLW. The attitudes of the PLW concerning international affairs were radically revised,
while the issue and the constitutional guarantees of national rights and freedoms, as well as
civil rights, were brought into question. The practical meaning of the statements: “we should
look after”, “we should fight for”, “instructing the Cyrillic alphabet should be promoted”,
and so on can be assessed only when juxtaposed with the real language policy of Croatia.
The passionate zeal aimed at constituting a separate Croatian literary language and
opposing any idea of creating a common la nguage of Croats and Serbs does not, in the long
term, leave much hope to Serbian people in Croatia that they will preserve their national
identity.
But for the period of the existence of the NDH (the Independent State of Croatia), Serbs in
Croatia have never been as threatened as they are nowadays. The solution of their national
position has emerged as a top priority political issue. Unless solutions are found, the
consequences might prove harmful and manifold, not only within Croatia but within
Yugoslavia as a whole.
The main weight of the position of Serbian people is given by the fact that there is a great
number of Serbs living outside Serbia, particularly outside Serbia Proper, more than the
total populations of some other nations. According to the census of 1981, outside Serbia
there were 24% or 1,958,00 Serbs, which is much more than the number of Slovenes,
Albanians of Macedonians, taken individually, and almost as much as Muslims. Outside
Serbia Proper there are 3,285,000 Serbs or 40.3% of the total number. In the general
disintegrating process sweeping across Yugoslavia, the worst disintegration hit Serbs. The
present course taken by our society in Yugoslavia is entirely opposite to the one taken
during the decades and centuries prior to the creation of the common homeland. That
process is aimed at a complete break-up of the national unity of Serbian people. Such total
devotion to these aims can be best illustrated through the example of Vojvodina and its
autonomy. 80
Among other reasons, Vojvodina was given autonomy because the Serbian people living in
it within the Austro-Hungarian Empire strove for it since the end of the 17 thcentury.
Surrounded by more numerous Hungarians and Germans, Serbs in Austria and later in
Austro-Hungary strove for creating an autonomous province (dukedom or Vojvodina which
was, however, called Serbia) in order to preserve their national individuality and religious
adherence to Orthodoxy. By creating a separate autonomous province on foreign territory,
Serbs worked on weakening that state, the ultimate goal being an easy secession from it and
union with their fellow countrymen south of the Sava and the Danube.
Such was the past of Serbian Vojvodina, whose creation in the revolution of 1848/49 was
helped by the suffering of the Serbs from Serbia. Today everything is topsy-turvy.
Politicians from the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina do not work on linking and uniting
but on the biggest possible independence and separation from Serbia. Despite being
unnatural and contrary to the historical logic, this process is bringing visible results and
mightily contributes to the disintegration of the Serbian people.
9. Having been for more than fifty years marked with shame and disgrace and having
carried the burden of being accused as the jailer of Yugoslav nations, the Serbian people
were not able to find support in its history. Many aspects of this history were not able to
find support in its history. Many aspects of this history were bro ught into question. The
traditionally democratic bourgeoisie, formed in Serbia in the 19 thcentury, has remained
until recently completely overshadowed by the Serbian socialist and labour movement due
to the small mindedness and non objectivity of official historiography. Thus the historical
picture of the true contributions of the Serbian bourgeoisie in the areas of law, culture and
statesmanship has been so impoverished and narrowed that, thus distorted, it could not serve
as a spiritual and moral support or as a basis for preserving and reviving historical
awareness. The honourable and brave efforts of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
7
entire Yugoslav youth (including the Mlada Bosna movement ) met a similar fate and were
pushed into the background by the contributions of class ideology, whose partisans and
creators were Austro-Marxists, familiar opponents of national liberation movements.
Under the influence of the ruling ideology, the cultural achievements of the Serbian people
are misappropriated, usurped or not duly appreciated; they are neglected or impaired, the
language as well as the Cyrillic alphabet gradually fade into oblivion. Literature serves as
the playground for tyranny and lawlessness. No Yugoslav nation was so cruelly denied
cultural and spiritual integrity. No literary and artistic heritage has been so ruined,
ransacked or ravaged. The political norms of the ruling ideology are imposed upon Serbian
culture as being more valuable and stronger than the scientific and historical ones. While
the Slovenian, Croatian, Macedonian and Montenegrin culture and literature are being
integrated, only the Serbian literature and culture is being disintegrated. It is ideologically
7
Mlada bosna (Young Bosnia), a number of local, undercover political groups in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, active in the decade preceding the First World War, set up as parts of the Serbian
secret terrorist organisation “Black Hand”. Its members assassinated Austrian heir to the throne,
Prince F. Ferdinand, in Sarajevo (1914),when the Austro-Hungarian empire was undergoing a
transformation into a tripartite kingdom, Kingdom of Austria, Hungary and Croatia, which was
to bring Croatia on equal footing with the other two parts of the empire. This would have put an
end to Serbian aspirations to Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Boka Kotorska. To prevent
such a development the Greater-Serbists plotted and carried out the assassination, thus
triggering the First World War. 81
legitimate and in accordance with the policy of self-management to pursue an unrestrained
division and partitioning of Serbian literature into Vojvodian, Montenegrin or Bosnian
writers. Serbian literature is divested of the best writers and the most important works in
order to artificially establish new regional literatures. Misappropriating and partitioning of
the Serbian cultural heritage goes so far that in schools pupils are taught that Njegoš is not a
Serbian writer, that Laza Kostić and Veljko Petrović are Vojvodians, Petar Kočić and Jovan
Dučić Bosnian writers. Only yesterday Meša Selimovi ć was not allowed to declare himself
a Serbian writer. 8 Even today his wish to be a part of Serbian literature is not respected.
The Serbian culture has more unsuitable, banned, suppressed or undesirable writers and
intellectuals than any other Yugoslav literature; moreover, many of them have been erased
from literary memory.
Renowned Serbian writers are the only ones blacklisted on all Yugoslav mass media. The
list of set texts in schools has been largely composed at the expense of Serbian literature
because it is mechanically subjected to the administrative norm of republic and provincial
reciprocity, and not to the norm of quantity or quality. In the curriculum’s in some republics
and provinces, the history of the Serbian people is not only cruelly ideologically reduced
but exposed to chauvinist interpretations. Thus the Serbian cultural and spiritual heritage
seems smaller than it really is, while the Serbian people lose an important prop of their
moral and historical self-awareness.
The imposing and truly revolutionary cultural onrush of the first post-war decades,
expressed through the set-up of a broad network of educational institutions, from
elementary education to higher education, ebbed by the end of the sixties. A period of
stagnation and ever visible regression set in so that nowadays our education, with its school
and educational system, is very extensive and primitive and irreparably lags behind the
needs and aims of contemporary society and our civilisation. The educational system, based
on so-called comprehensive education and with a low quality of instruction, has failed
completely. A few generations have been spiritually crippled and impoverished: what we
now have is a hyperproduction of primitive semi-experts, unable to take their place in
industry and public services as a qualified work force, ill-prepared for creative and
intellectual development. There is no country on earth that has done away with its education
by means of such extensive legislation. The total number of laws dealing with various types
of education in Yugoslavia amounts to a hundred and ten: federal, republic and provincial.
Many of these have been rewritten many times, so that sometimes research is called for in
order to establish the original.
Despite this, education in Yugoslavia has never been as extensive and as bifurcated as it is
today. Judiciary law LEGALLY forms eight educational systems which are increasingly
coming apart and no AGREEMENTS about the common cores can stop this legally founded
trend. As of late, numerous sessions and negotiations about UNIFORMITY have taken
place, after fifteen years of the systemic alienation of the Yugoslav communities, which
8
Petar II Petrovi ć Njegoš (1813-1851), Montenegrin patriarch, sovereign and poet, one of the
Petrović dynasty that ruled Montenegro from 1697 to 1718, when the Kingdom of Montenegro
was occupied by Serbia, its First World War ally. The last prince and king, Nikola Petrović,
was forced to flee the country in 1918. Montenegro b ecame part of the Versailles creation
(Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes later Kingdom of Yugoslavia, under the Serbian king),
which erased Montenegrins as a nation (according to Greater-Serbists they are also “Serbs”).
The other authors mentioned here are ethnic Serbs living outside Serbia. 82
looks like a futile utopia. It is first necessary to eliminate the laws leading to disunity in
order to lengthen the line of uniformity and unity which people have tried to draw in this
region for more than a hundred and fifty years. Otherwise we are going to create, as we have
been doing up to now, generations that will be increasingly less Yugoslav, and more
dissatisfied national romantics and self-seeking nationalists. A country having no uniform
educational system cannot count on unity in the future.
From the time of humanism, from the 15 thto 16 thcenturies, there have been opinions that
school serve as a path of fulfilment for every man, of realisation of all the anthropological
and mental abilities that a man brings into the world through birth. The idea that school
should only serve work and professions and be conditioned by them is baleful. It is the
leftover of the proletarian culture sediments which, eventually, lead to the creation of a
servile and primitive consciousness. Channelling boys and girl from the age of 14 into one
profession means creating fundamental non-freedom.
The ideological fight against “elitism” had an unfortunate outcome: for at least twenty years
we have been humouring mediocrity in all public service areas and education. There is no
society that fights against the creation of an ELITE of knowledge, skill, science and
creativity. Fighting against such an elite, we have created a new one consisting of well-to-do
individuals who are able to create possibilities for their mediocre children to gain more
knowledge, which primary and secondary schools no longer can provide. The financial
problems of the schools have degraded their position on society, and the term ′moral and
political aptness ′, especially at University has tremendously stimulated conformism and
careerism, so that the University, especially some faculties of liberal arts, have been
deprived of the best intellectuals of our generation. No country in Europe has reduced its
educational system to such a stagnant material and social position.
At the time when money from the primary accumulation was being relentlessly wasted, a
restrictive policy was led towards University, which received less and less finance. For a
decade and a half the Faculties were not in a position to elect new assistants, so that at the
oldest Yugoslav Universities, especially Belgrade University, the average age of professors
and research staff has never been higher than today. What has been essential for the
development of all countries at the time of the technological and computer revolution,
University and science, has been completely neglected in our part of the world. University
“reforms” were mostly imposed through political force, and not through scholarly criteria
(three-degree educational system, formation of the basic political organisations at the
university etc.) and they were a total failure. The biggest harm was caused when they
separated science from the University with the formation of systemical and administrative
barriers between ′institutional′ and ′academic′ science, when the University lost its research
base, parallel curricula were made, science suffered staff disunity and the constant flow of
scholars from the University to Institutes and from Institutes to the University was
prevented.
Therefore, the educational system and its laws should be changed, the school curricula
should be modernised, vocational schools should be introduced, gifted students should be
given extra support, the whole unfavourable financial position of the educational system
should be changed, special attention should be paid to the spiritual and not only the
ideological profile of the teacher, the brightest minds should be attracted to Universities,
and the unity of the whole educational system in Serbia should be enforced by law. 83
At this difficult moment of crisis, we must without delay think about tomorrow, about the
21 century; though the social and economic conditions are not favourable, we have to
create a vision of tommorow’s world in which civilisation will be based on micro-
electronics, artificial intelligence, robots, computer science, artificial insemination and the
manipulation of genes. Because of all this the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts
suggests that right now and without any dogmatic or ideological burden or “self-
management” inertia, a meticulous reform of social and institutional basis of our science be
undertaken in the direction of modernisation and efficiency, with bigger investment, a
bigger care for young scholars, more freedom and independence for creative individuals and
their research. In short, it is necessary to integrate the entire scholarly potential in the
modern flow of world science as soon as possible.
After a dramatic inter-ethnic clashes of World War II, it seemed that nationalism suddenly
diminished, and that it was on the way to total disappearance. But that impression proved to
be illusive. It was not long before nationalism started its ascent, so that with every change in
the constitution it would complete the institutional requirements for its expansion.
Nationalism was created from above; its main initiators were politicians. The main cause of
the crisis lies in the ideological defeat which nationalism inflicted on socialism. The
consequence of the defeat are disintegrating processes of all kinds, which have brought the
Yugoslav community to the verge of destruction, together with the erosion of the system of
values. Its roots can be found in the ideology of the Committee and the national policy of
the Communist Party before the war. The policy includes retaliation against the Serbs as the
oppressors which has had far-reaching consequences for inter-ethnic relationships, the
socio-economic system, and the fate of moral and cultural values after World War II. The
Serbs were imposed the historical feeling of guilt, but, unlike other nations, they were the
only ones who did not solve their national problem or get their own country. Therefore the
first and the most important thing is to remove this historical guilt off the Serbian people
and to confute officially the claims that they had an economically privileged position
between the two wars, and that there would be no denying of their liberation role through
their history and their contribution in the creation of Yugoslavia.
It is the historical and democratic right of the Serbian people to establish their full national
and cultural integrity regardless of which republic or autonomous province they live in. To
gain equality and independent development has a deep historical meaning for the Serbian
nation. In less than 50 years, through two successive generations, twice exposed to physical
destruction, forced assimilation, christening, cultural genocide, ideological indoctrination,
underestimation and renouncement of their own tradition, under the imposed feeling of
guilt, intellectually and politically disarmed, the Serbian people have been exposed to too
difficult temptations which left traces on their mental frame of mind which, at the end of this
century of great technological advancement, should not be neglected. If it sees its failure in
the family of cultural and civilised nations of the world, the Serbian nation must gain the
opportunity to find itself and to become a historical subject, to regain awareness of its
historical and spiritual being, to clearly define its economic and cultural interests, to set up a
modern social and national programme which will inspire its present and future generations.
The present depressive condition of the Serbian people with the ever stronger
manifestations of chauvinism and serbophobia in some regions, is suitable for the
restoration and a more dramatic manifestation of the national sensitivity of the Serbian
people and their reactions which might be ‘inflammable’ and dangerous. It is our duty not to
overlook or underestimate these dangers under any circumstances and not for a moment.
But, in this principled struggle against Serbian nationalism, the ruling ideological and 84
political symmetry in historical guilt cannot be accepted. Rejection of this symmetry, with
its eternalised injustice and lies, is a condition for mobilising a democratic, Yugoslav,
humanistic awareness about the modern Serbian culture.
The fact that the citizens and the working class are not represented in the Federal Assembly
in adequate bodies cannot be attributed only to favouring the national, but also aspirations
to bring Serbia into an unequal position and in that way weaken its political influence.
However, the biggest trouble is that the Serbian people do not have a state, while all the
other nations do. The truth is that the first article of the constitution of SR Serbia stipulates
that Serbia is a state, but there is an inevitable question, what kind of a state it is since it has
no authority on its own territory and the means to enforce order on one part of its territory,
to protect the lives and property of its citizens, to prevent the genocide in Kosovo and to
stop the relocation of Serbs from their centuries old homes. Such a position shows political
discrimination against Serbia, especially if one takes into consideration that the Constitution
of SFRY has imposed the inner federalisation as a permanent source of clashes among
Serbia Proper and the autonomous provinces. The aggressive Albanian nationalism on
Kosovo cannot be repelled unless Serbia stops being the only republic whose inner
relationships are regulated by others.
The formally and constitutionally stipulated equality of all Yugoslav republics has been
invalidated by forcing Serbia to give up a part of its rights and authority in favour of the
autonomous provinces, whose status is in the great part regulated by the Federal
Constitution. Serbia must openly declare that such a regulation was imposed. This
especially applies to the position of the provinces, which have been promoted into republics
and which regard themselves more as constituent parts of the Federation than of the
Republic of Serbia. Apart from not taking care of the state of the Serbian people the
Constitution of SFRY created insurmountable difficulties for its formation. To satisfy the
legitimate interests of Serbia, a review of the Constitution is inevitable. The autonomous
provinces should become integral parts of the Republic of Serbia, where they would be
given a level of autonomy which would not impair the integrity of the Republic and which
would guarantee the accomplishment of general interests of the wider community.
The unsolved problem of Serbian statehood in not the only defect which should be removed
by Constitutional changes. With the Constitution of 1974, Yugoslavia became a very loose
state community where not only Yugoslav but other alternatives are possible, as can be seen
from the recent statements of Slovene delegates and from earlier attitudes of Macedonian
politicians. Such thinking and basic disintegration give every reason to believe that
Yugoslavia is threatened by being further worm-eaten. The Serbian people cannot
peacefully await their future in such uncertainty. Therefore, all nations in Yugoslavia should
be given the possibility to declare their intentions and aspirations, then Serbia could make
its choice and define its own national interest. Such negotiation and agreement should
precede the review of the Constitution. Serbia should not be passive in this case, awaiting
what the others will say, as it has done many times up to now.
Favouring the AVNOY (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia)
orientation, Serbia must know that it does not depend entirely on it, that others might have
other alternatives. Serbia’s task is to consider its economic and national interests so that it is
not surprised by events. By insisting on Federation, Serbia would not only contribute to the
equality of all the peoples in Yugoslavia but also to solving the political and economic
crisis. 85
The equal position for which Serbia must strive also includes an initiative in solving the
major political and economic problems to the same extent that others have. Four decades of
Serbia’s passive position have proved to be bad for the whole of Yugoslavia, which has
been deprived of ideas and criticism from the region with a longer tradition of statehood,
with refined feelings for national independence and rich experience in fighting against home
usurpers of political freedom. Without the equal participation of the Serbian people from
Serbia in the whole process of the enactment and realisation of all vital decisions,
Yugoslavia cannot be strong and the existence itself of Yugoslavia as a democratic and
socialistic community would be threatened.
One developmental époque of the Yugoslav community and of Serbia has obviously come
to an end with a historically worn-out ideology, general stagnation and increasing regression
in the economic, political, moral and cultural spheres. Such a condition imperatively
demands radical, deeply thought-out, scientifically based and energetic reforms of the entire
state structure and social organisation of the community of Yugoslav peoples in the sphere
of democratic socialism and a faster and fruitful integration into modern civilisation. Social
reforms should activate the biggest possible human potential of the whole country
transforming it into a productive, enlightened and democratic society capable of living from
its work and creativity, strong enough to give its contribution to the world community.
The first condition for our transformation and our renaissance is the democratic
mobilisation of all the intellectual and moral potential of the people, not only to carry out
the decisions of the political forums but also to create programmes and projects in a
democratic way, which would, for the first time in modern history, unite knowledge,
experience, conscience, courage, imagination and responsibility for the general national
sake, based on long-term programmes.
The Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, on this occasion too, expresses its readiness to
give its whole-hearted best and devote all its strength to these fateful and historic tasks of
our generation.
A 1986 paper by a group of members of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts on
topical social issues of Yugoslavia Translation taken from Naše teme (Our Topics), Zagreb,
1989, 33 (1-2), pp. 128-163
NOTE: All the footnotes accompanying this text (No. 316-322) are by the editor 86
A NNEX 15:
CONSTITUTION OF THE EDFRAL R EPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA , 27 ARIL 1992
(EXTRACTS)
Article 9
(1) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be founded on the rule of law.
(2) Laws must be in conformity with the Constitution.
(3) Executive and judicial powers shall be subject to law.
(4) The rights and freedoms of man and the citizen shall be restricted only by
equal rights and freedoms of others and in instances provided for in the
present Constitution.
Article 10
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall recognise and guarantee the rights and freedoms
of man and the citizen recognised under international law.
Article 11
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall recognise and guarantee the rights of national
minorities to preserve, foster and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and other
peculiarities, as well as to use their national symbols, in accordance with international law.
Article 135
(1) In wartime and peacetime, the Army of Yugoslavia shall be under the
command of the President of the Republic, pursuant to decisions by the
Supreme Defence Council.
(2) The Supreme Defence Council shall be made up of the President of the
Republic and presidents of the member republics.
(3) The President of the Republic shall preside over the Supreme Defence
Council. 87
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PRESS COMMENT88 89
A NNEX 16:
E XTRACTS FROM OLIPIKA (SERBIAN NEWSPAPER )
D.B. and Lj. C. “Yugoslavia is Our Common Concern” (“Jugoslavija nam je zajedni čka
briga”) Politika, 10 June 1989
“While I was reading the Memorandum I wondered why it caused such a big fuss,
since I found nothing nationalistic in it.”
“Kardelj was one of the creators of the Constitution, but I don’t know how much
he affected the solutions. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia was
created by the betrayers of Serbia and the Serbian people. According to that
Constitution, the Minister of Interior was able to order, in 1981, the units of the
SUP [police] to go to Kosovo, but the chief of police in Kosovo was able to
dispute his order under the very same Constitution. The historic victory of the
Serbian people [the stripping away of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina] is
that now, after six centuries, this republic has constitutional equality.”
Branko Đurica and Nikola Vidi ć, “Serbs are Aligning Because Serbian Nation is
Endangered” (“Srbi se povezuju zbog ugroženosti svoje nacije”) Politika, 10 July 1990, p.
9
“A retired JNA colonel from Novi Sad, Milan Kovačević, called us and as a result
of the rumours about the new police uniforms said that he kept a black Ustasha
police uniform, taken in 1942 in Slavonia in the foot of the Papuk Mountain, but
it had 4 bullet holes. What do you think?” asked the reader, a certain Colonel
Kovačević, ironically: “To whom can I give it as a specimen?”
Article from: Politika, 31 March 1991, The Declaration Will be Signed in the Middle of
April ( “Deklaracija će biti potpisana sredinom aprila”)
On the initiative of the Serbian cultural and scientific workers, at the beginning of
1991, Initiative board of the Serbian national counsel - “supreme Serbian national
institution which is going to represent the interests of all Serbs, regardless of
which party they belong to or where they live”. At the third conference of the
Initiative board of the Serbian national counsel present were: DobricaČosić, dr.
Miloš Macura, Matija Ve ćković, Slobodan Vu četić, dr. Jovan Raškovi ć, bishop
Amfilohije Radović, dr. Budimir Košuti ć, dr. Mihajlo Markovi ć, dr. Dragoljub
Mićunović, dr. Zoran Đinđić, dr. Vojislav Koštunica, Slobodan Rakiti ć, and dr.
Jovan Marjanović.
Jelena Đurić, Media and War (Zagreb-Belgrade, 2000) The Use of Myths for Creating and
Destroying a Society, Politika, 11 December 1991, p. 162
For example, an article in the journal Politika in December 1991 set out five
stereotypes related to the Serbs, as viewed by Dr. Aleksandar Milenkovi ć. The
first was that: “We must forgive, but not forget”; the second: “Defeats are Serbian
victories”; the third: “the heavenly kingdom belongs” to the Serbs; the fourth, that
the Serbs are “peaceful, and engage only in defensive wars”; and the fifth, that for
a Serb “Yugoslavia is destiny.” According to Dr. Milenkovi ć, Serbs should no
longer behave “as if they have nothing else left but to repeat the worn-out phrase 90
of “forgiving without forgetting,” but that they should “…either remain consistent
to the message of the New Testament to return good for bad, or else adopt another
formula of the Old Testament: “An eye for an eye - a tooth for a tooth.”
Radovan Kova čević, “Borders drawn by Guns” (“Granice crtane puškama”), Politika, 9
November 1993, p. 9
“As soon as the end of war can be foreseen, and the trumpets and drums fall
silent, the problem of borders emerges. The Military Geographic Institute, in
collaboration with several very important state and scientific institutions,
organised a two-day consulting session on the basic principles of boundary
determination between states, with clear emphasis on its contemporary and acute
aspect…
In that area, borders were always drawn by guns.
In spite of all, the Serbian people managed to hold out in the territorial, cultural
and religious continuity from Belgrade to Knin (Dr. Budimir Košutić). ….
The entire territory of Western Slavonia should de facto be annexed to the
territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, unless the results of the terrible
exodus and annihilation of 200 Serbian villages are not recognised officially. The
village of Grubisno Polje is among them. The village had no money to erect a
monument to the victims of the fascist terror 1941-1945, at which, 526 names
were to be inscribed on a marble stone. Unfortunately, the territory of Western
Slavonia is of great importance for Croatia, but also for the Serbs from the
Krajina.
According to all measures, Jasenovac remains within the borders of the Serbian
state. The border on the rivers of Sava and Kupa are natural ones (and the line of
war separation), and according to all evaluations, it should remain that way. The
boundary determination is basically possible in Northern Dalmatia and Southern
Lika, given that the Croatian side returns the territories it had taken in three small
steps.” 9
9
See map, Appendicies, vol 5, appendix 3 91
A NNEX 17:
EXTRACTS FROM OLPTIKA EXPRESS (SERBIAN NEWSPAPER )
Aleksandra Plavevski, “The Captain’s ‘Knin đas’” (“Kapetanove “Knin đe””) Politika
ekspres, 13 July 1991
“Point[ed] out that the aim of his units is to give maximum support to the
Yugoslav People’s Army, the legitimacy of which they recognise fully, and which
they are ready to defend if needed. The special units support the Army and the
police of the SAO Krajina, and their task is to neutralise the enemy and remove
him from the Territory of the SAO Krajina.”
F70
“Massacre of Serbs” (“Masakr Srba”), Politika ekspres, 2 December 1991
“‘After I had been wounded in my arm, the only person I trusted was Vesna
Bosanac [a Croatian doctor]. People said that she was impartial and that she
helped people. Later, Ustashe had exerted pressure upon her and she bowed to
pressure. Other people should also say what happened to her and in whose service
she worked’,” said Dimitrijević.
Our collocutor also said: ‘A special task was given to the surgeon Juraj Njavra
[Njavro]. Only he and his commanders and placers of orders, heartless Ustashe
and fascists, know what he did to the Serbs.’”
“According to our collocutor, the genitals of physically strong Serbs were
discovered, and as he allegedly found out, the organs were sent abroad under
separate cover, in the first place to Germany.”
A NNEX 18:
E XTRACTS FROM “INTERVJU ” (SRBIAN MAGAZINE )
Dragan Barjaktarevi ć, “Ustashe and Tu đman” (“Ustaše i Tu đman”) Intervju, 17 August
1990, p. 12
“Why and how do the current events in Croatia, in the relation Croats- Serbs
irresistibly remind of the times and events when Pavelić stepped on “holy
Croatian ground”….
When he took power in the Independent State of Croatia, Ante Paveli ć proclaimed
that “there is no Yugoslavia anymore”. Mr. Franjo Tuđman however said that
“Yugoslavia is dead”. The proclamation of the death of the “Serbian Yugoslavia”
was in both cases instantly followed by spitting on everything that is Serbian.”
Jovan Babić, “Let the Dead Rest in Peace” (“Pustite mrtve da po čivaju”) Intervju, 17
August 1990, p. 23 92
“The esteemed colleague Strem then mentioned “the notorious concentration
camp Jasenovac which was established by the then authorities in the Croatian
Ustasha State and where Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, Communists and other ‘enemies’
were kept and very often killed.” The Serbian side claims that the Croatian state
killed between 700,000 and 1,000,000 people in Jasenovac, however this figure is
strongly denied by the Croatian side: the Ustasha did not have the possibility to
kill so many people in the short period between 1941 and 1945, for “technical
reasons” merely. The Croats speculate with the number of 30,000 to 40,000
people killed in the camp. Currently
Belgrade and Zagreb are strongly arguing about this problem.”
Jovan Lakičević, ”Resistance of the Survivors” (“Otpor nedoklanog naroda”) Intervju, 12
October 1990, p. 8
“At the moment, the only unquestionable fact is the support and help of the
Vatican, which did not lack in the distant but so close 1941, when the “historic
predecessor” of the present Croatian state was formed.”
“Parliamentary Jasenovac” (“Saborski Jasenovac”) Intervju, 9 November 1990, p. 36
“And the true core of it is that the Croatian leadership intents to realise the
Ustasha dream of the Independent State of Croatia without Serbs in it. It is well
known how the leadership of Paveli ć achieved it. The leadership of Tu đman tries
to achieve it by the administrative annulment of the Serbian people.”
Milan Nikolić, “Unification or Disaster” (“Ujedinjenje ili propast”) Intervju, 19 July 1991,
p. 13
“We forged the Yugoslavian state twice, and each time we faced genocide
because we created a national state together with genocidal nations.
Not to mention the Croatians, the Slovenians today behave in a genocidal manner
towards the Serbs, as they did towards the Germans, Italians and Hungarians.”
“Who is Ante Marković [a popular (Croat) former Yugoslav Prime Minster of the
late 1980’s], with two members of his family killed wearing Ustasha uniforms at
Stalingrad? Who is Stipe Mesi ć [the current Croatian President] but a politician
convicted of genocide against the Serbs during the mass movement [of 1971 in
Croatia]? …In my opinion they carry a Cominternal-Ustasha stigma.”
“A genocidal nation cannot create a democratic politician. The Croatian separatist
oligarchy and the Kaptol [the seat of the Catholic Church in Zagreb] produced
Tuđman as a protagonist of such politics. But in a way, I am thankful to Tu đman.
Ivica Ra čan [the current Croatian Prime Minister, then leader of the Croatian
Communist Party] would have had all Serbs baptised step by step, while Tu đman
has endangered us and put a knife to our throats. But he does not know that our
national reflex dwells exactly there, behind the throat. If it were not for Tuđman
the Serbs would never be such an organised, mobilised or ‘Serbianised’ nation.”
“Slavoljub Kačarević, “Return of the Warriors” (“Povratak ratnika”) Intervju, 29 November
1991, p. 4 93
“We had the map of Vukovar, we knew exactly who was in which house at any
moment…
We even went to our artillery observers and guided missiles on a particular target.
We killed all the Ustashe that come upon us during the day, you understand…
Later, when the fighting was about to end, we came upon the big mass of captured
Ustashe. All those international organisations started to criticise us, and they only
paid attention to where the Ustashe were and wanted to save them. I wondered if
they had any other job to do or they came just to control me…
I respect that, there is no question about it, but they cannot tell me to disarm my
soldiers when they are dying near the hospital. Ustashe hid their weapons in the
hospital, even the most notorious Ustashe who were engaged in the battle.”
“Although we lost many soldiers, chiefs and volunteers, none of the soldiers or
militia under my command tried to take revenge upon an Ustasha when he
surrendered to us.”
ANNEX 19:
E XTRACTS FROM “D UGA ” (SERBIAN MAGAZINE )
Dragan Barjaktarević, “One’s Own Man in One’s Own Country” (“Svoji na svome”) Duga,
July 1990, p. 4
“For more than a century, the ghost of anti-Serbian attitude has raged in Croatia.
Fifty years ago, that ghost committed one of the worst crimes of genocide in
human history. And now, it is breeding again. Many analysts think that inter-
ethnic relations in the mixed communities in Croatia are worse today than they
were on the eve of the breakout of the Ustasha magnum crimen.”
Branislav Matić, “Serbs are not Croats’ Subtenants” (“Srbi nisu podstanari Hrvata”Duga,
4 August 1990, p.16
“Maybe this kind of view and determination have their background in my
education, my family life. I will tell you something that certainly influenced the
children in my family. On July 25 1940, the Ustasha village leader of that period
sent my neighbours to slaughter my family. Luckily, my family managed to escape
from the massacre, running away in time. The Ustashe searched, r obbed and
ruined everything… Along with everything else, they took a butcher’s ax. When
they were passing by, they made a cut on a young mulberry-tree. The scar can still
be seen on that tree. I was born in 1956. They always used to show me, and my
sisters, that mulberry-tree and they told us that story. Our godfathers of that time,
the Croatians, realising that the Ustasha liquidation is being planned, argued with
others, stating that they, as our godfathers, after the massacre have the right on our
land! I remember that after the mass movement my grandfather told me: ‘We have
Slanovac again!’ Slanovac was a meadow that the godfathers left for
themselves…
History shows that, when needed, the Serbian people are chivalrous and warrior-
like… 1941 will not and must not happen again. Any kind of monstrous politics
or fascist relation towards the Serbian people must not be accepted ever again.” 94
“The Man in Charge of Tension” (“Čovek zadužen za stresove”) Duga, 27 April 1991, p.13
“The Serbs from Turija are dangerous. Today we enjoy perfect relationship with
the Hungarians – because there are none in the village. It was the only way for the
friendship to survive and I think it will remain so. According to a tradition dating
from the time that Maria Theresa decided to defeat us, the village has defended
itself from the Hungarians. When someone intends to settle in the village, a
peasant first warns him nicely not to, and, if this does not help, the guys from the
village pummel him. If that does not help, they set his house on fire. The last
warning is a razor. Turija is famous for its long razors, two fingers wide.”
“The Last Bombing Process” (“Poslednji bombaški proces”)Duga, 19 July 1991
“Look, I told him, I am a grown man, not a child, and I know the consequences!
But you should know them too: Ustashas butchered a million Serbs. Every Serb
has four litres of blood. That is four millions litres of Serbian blood. That is
enough for a somewhat bigger lake! And if your Minister Brozović does not know
that, let him ask his dad, and he will hear that on May 13 th1941 Serbs rebelled
against the Ustashas in Lika (just as Draža in Serbia). They were led by the
Chetnik commander Cicvara in Gra čac, together with Bogdan Bolta and others.
They rebelled then, although they were not armed – they had pitchforks, scythes,
and clubs so they beat Ustashas. And now every Serb has a machine gun, you
Ustashe have them too, and we will exterminate each other! But you will not be
able to fulfil your intentions.”
Ljiljana Habjanović-Đurović, “He Who Fears Chetnik is Ustasha” (“Ko se boji četnika, taj
je ustaša”) Duga, 13 September 1991, p. 38
“Ante Marković is not a traitor because he works in the interest of the Croatian
people and the Ustasha regime in Croatia. Therefore he is not a traitor in relation
to his people nor can he be a traitor of the Serbs since the Serbs could not have
expected anything else of him.”
“The Croats are genetic cowards.”
“Return of the Warriors” (“Povratak ratnika”) Duga, 7 December 1991, p. 24
“I met a man, whose father, wife and child were killed by the Ustashas with a
hammer. They hit them on the head. Now, beside other weapons, he is carrying a
bloody knife. He kills every Croat he sees. He claims to have killed 47 people. …
More experienced reservists warned us not to get too close to the wounded child
on the street. It was a trap. Tightened in a grip, the defenders of Vukovar took
simulative drugs. That is no propaganda. We used to find needles and ampoules.
They used to wound children, and then throw them out on the street, waiting for
the “saviour“ to come. Then, a sniper shot followed. I wouldn’t believe it, if I did
not see it with my own eyes. …
In Vukovar, I met the commando group “Knin đa”, which was trained in street
fighting. Each of the members had a small radio-transmitter. In that period, only
one of them was wounded. They deal with children very simply: they shoot it so
that the children would not be in pain. The military logic says that it is the right
solution.” 95
“Before restoration and rebuilding” (“Uo či obnove i izgradnje) Duga, 7 December 1991, p.
72.
“When they were leaving Vukovar, certain volunteers, fighters, partisans,
Chetniks, and warriors generally, were in different moods. Some of them, with a
gloomy expression on their faces, talked, as if they were revealing a secret, about
the mass graves, that came into existence during the three months of slaughtering
in Vukovar in different locations, yards, in the Slavonian plain, on farms, thanks
to the efficiency of both sides. “Most of the mass graves were dug superficially. It
was raining, and the awful, yellow earth was sticky, we had no time to dig. And in
spring, when the gasses start to work, all the holes will return to us. How? By
explosions. Those gasses, concentrated in that way, come to a critical point and
then explode. The Slovenian farmers remember well what happened in the post-
war years in Kočevje, near Bleiburg…Human bones and organs were sticking out
of the earth. God will remind us for years of those poor people, whose names are
even not known.”
Other soldiers, under the influence of grappa served from the remaining
“representation” of the hotel “Dunav”, were saying that we would see each other
next time in the hotel “Intercontinental” in Zagreb. The more modest ones
mentioned Osijek, while the more realistic ones stopped in Virovitica.” 96
ANNEX 20:
EXTRACTS FROM “V EČERNJE N OVOSTI ” (SERBIAN NEWSPAPER )
B. Me đedović and M. Milinovi ć, “We Were Awakened by Tu đman” (“Nas je Tu đman
probudio”) Večernje novosti, 15 September 1991, p.16, PR/S-150991/IV-5-6.
“We must never play the part of, I don’t know, instruments of the Ustasha or an
Independent State of Croatia that will carry out the repression on its own people.”
“I found myself in all of that as a police inspector and I could take a position
paying two to three thousand Deutsche Marks in the Ministry of the Interior of the
Republic of Croatia, but we all knew that those were offers made with the
intention of tarnishing us. We stated it openly to Boljkovac [the first Croatian
Minister of Internal Affairs], at our meeting – he came to replace us, lock us up or
whatever he wanted to – we said that there are things that you cannot buy, and that
is our Serbian dignity that they cannot ever buy – and no money can buy it. We
prefer this dignity to everything they offered us – it is nice to have money, various
privileges, but we have something more valuable and that is our dignity.”
Miroslav Stefanovi ć,”Sovereign Commander” (“Komandant bez pogovora”) Večernje
novosti, 2 December 1991, p. 9
“The Ustasha forces must not be underestimated, and in order to be better, braver,
more courageous and to win in many battles we have to be trained. Even when
they dispute us, when they ‘forget’ that we are fighting in war, we are not angry
because the ones that fought on this territory know that we entered Lužac first,
that we were in Borovo Naselje, that we fought like lions to conquer Laslovo…
It is true that we, as well as the army, other members of Territorial Defence and
volunteers, entered the houses, not to rob them, but to “cleanse” it from Ustasha.
Arkan said: “The heroes are my volunteers, my “Tigers.” If it was not for them, I
would probably not be here in this area… Any army would want soldiers like
these: courageous, well trained, and extremely brave… That is why we get angry
when they “forget” us, because – there must not ever be oblivion. Wherever my
soldiers are the first to enter becomes famous. . These are the facts and finally this
is history.
The same interviewer went on to characterise him further as “a commander, a man
whose word had to be obeyed without objections.” 97
A NNEX 21:
E XTRACTS FROM “B ORBA ” (SERBIAN NEWSPAPER )
Slaviša Lekić, “Those On the Top Have Lost Their Compass” (“Oni gore izgubili kompas”)
Borba, 14 April 1990
“It is correct that Tuđman’s storm troopers are patrolling those villages which are
mainly populated by Croats, for example the villages of Plavna, Vajska, Bogujevo
and Subotica, and are trying to intimidate the population with different kinds of
extortion. There are attempts to recruitment but since I know this nation very well,
I can guarantee you that this nation will judge them. They are tired of divisions.”
Kertes is assuring you that none of Tu đman’s agents will be arrested, but they
have to count on going home as handicapped persons. The police has no right to
intervene.”
S.L., ”With Cockade Against Krško” (“Kokardom na ‘Krško’”), Borba, 20 May 1991
“If Ustashe attack the Serbian population, we will take retaliatory measures and
attack Ustasha Zagreb and the Krško nuclear power plant.”
“It Seems We Have to Go Against Zagreb” (“Mora ćemo, izgleda na Zagreb”) Borba, 31
December 1991, p.13
“Let Serbia call itself ‘Serboslavia’ if it wants to, but it has to be Serbia. But we
must not forget the brave people of Montenegro, the blue blood of Serbian-hood.
Montenegro cannot be called Serbia. All the Montenegro people should know that
they are the blue blood of Serbia.”
A NNEX 22:
EXTRACTS FROM “POBJEDA ” (MONTENEGRIN PRESS )
“Ustasha’s Enemy Number One” (“Ustaški neprijatelj broj jedan”) Pobjeda, 26 September
1991
“I am a Serbian patriot above all. I am a Serb from head to toes! I have Oćili
blood in me. That blood does not allow me to sit at home and watch as the
Ustasha knife butchers Serbian children and their mothers again.”
“Nuclear Bomb in Hand” (“Atomska bomba u ruci”) Pobjeda, 27 September 1991 citing
the article from the Montenegrin newspaper On
“The Serb Volunteer Guard was formed on 11 October 1990. We armed ourselves
slowly and prepared to resist the Ustasha army and majors. … There are Šešelj’s
radicals, there are many members of the SPO [Srpski pokret obnove-Serbian
Renewal Movement], the SPS [Socijalisti čka partija Srbije-Socialist Party of
Serbia]… So they are all here [i.e. composition of Arkan’s units].
10 “It Seems We Have to Attack Zagreb” (“Mora ćemo, izgleda na Zagreb”) Borba, 31 December
1991, p.13 98
“Don’t fool yourself into thinking that a truce of some kind can be signed and that
the Serbian people in Krajina can go through another genocide. There will be no
more Jasenovac! We will not be sheep. We will be, most of all, wolves!”
Pobjeda, January 13,1992, “Time of the warriors” (“Vrijeme ratnika”)
“There is one contradiction: The Serb Volunteer Guard is under the command of
the JNA, but its commandant has a negative opinion about it? We are currently
under the command of the Territorial Defence of the Serb Slavonia, Baranja, and
Western Sirmium Region, and they are under the command of the JNA.”
A NNEX 23:
EXTRACTS FROM “VREME ” (SERBIAN MAGAZINE )
“Knights’ Wrists” (“Viteški zglobovi”) Vreme, 9 December 1991
“The Ustashe were very good warriors. There were not naive at all as some
people said, but there were some drugged individuals. But however, when we
captured them, many of them cried and begged. Those bandages you see on their
joints...those are not from wounds, their joints swelled while I was beating them,
they are just ordinary cowards… Tell them [the readers] that our slogan was:
Serbia all over to Tokyo!”
Dejan Anastasijevi ć, “Plucking the Eagle’s Feather” (“Čerupanje orlova”) Vreme, 22
November 1993
“At that time [it] was a very powerful organisation. They informed us about how
many people were needed and where. We sent them to the front, and there the
Territorial Defence forces, which supplied them with weapons, awaited them. The
agreement (with the Association and other volunteer organisations) implied that
nobody should wear special signs and that all units should be under the direct
control of the Territorial Defence. Only Vuk’s [Draškovi ć] guard did not accept
it. They demanded that their headquarters be in Belgrade, which was not
accepted. Anyway, we no longer had direct control over our men from the
moment they were put under the control of the Territorial Defence.” 99
ANNEX 24:
M ARK T HOMPSON , FRGING OF W AR(KOVANJE RATA ) ZAGREB , COATIA , 1995,P. 52-
53.
Mark Thompson, Forging of War (Kovanje rata) Zagreb, 1995, pp. 52-53
“The first respectful heads rolled away between September and November 1987.
Dragiša Pavlovi ć, the chairman of the Belgrade League of Communists, was
among the political victims. He was relieved from office after he criticised the
growing nationalism of the daily papPolitika and Politika ekspres and the
popular magazines Duga and Intervju. All these papers, exceDuga, are
published by the Politika publishing house, which was the main supporter of this
campaign. Pavlović once told a group of editors that: “If the struggle against
Albanian nationalism is accompanied by the intolerance and hatred toward the
Albanian nation which can be found in some of our papers, then the struggle
violates socialistic principles and becomes nationalism as such…From this day
on, we have to criticise Serbian nationalism, because the Serbian nationalists pose
as the rescuers of the Serbian issue in Kosovo, but in fact are unable to solve a
single social problem.”
ANNEX 25:
M EDIA& W AR (ZAGREB –B ELGRADE , 2000)ITING ŽARKO PUHOVSKI , HATE SLENCE ,
CROATIA ,P . 41-53.
Media & War (Zagreb–Belgrade, 2000) citing Žarko Puhovski, Hate Silence, pp. 41-53
In conclusion, a combination of Communist-style propaganda promulgating a
nationalist ideology and the active support of the JNA was instrumental in
transforming long-entrenched “hate silence” into hate speech. Media campaigns
preceded military actions, and verbal violence created physical violence.
ANNEX 26:
H ELMUT B AUER,THE F REEDOM OF M EDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION (SLOBODA MEDIJA I
JAVNO MNIJENJE) (OSIJEK-ZAGREB -SPLIT, 1997), CATIA , . 90.
Helmut Bauer, The Freedom of Media and Public Opinion ( Sloboda medija i javno
mnijenje) (Osijek-Zagreb-Split, 1997) p. 90
More than any other form of mass media, however, journals allow each reader to
use them according to his/her taste and needs…the next advantage of the press is
in the fact that the media and citizens are closely related. Journals make the reader
directly aware of events in his surroundings, his town, his district or his region.
This advantage makes the press more powerful than any other form of media.”
11 Media & War (Zagreb–Belgrade, 2000) citing Žarko PuhoHate Silence , pp. 41-53.
B/000000/III-97. 100
ANNEX 27:
“SERBIAN P OLITICSM UST N OT BED EFINED INW ASHINGTON ” (“SPSKA POLITIKA SE
NE SME ODREĐIVATI U VAŠINGTONU ”) TNJUG PESS (SERBIAN ), 8 AGUST 1991, . 15.
“Serbian Politics must not be Defined in Washington” (“Srpska politika se ne sme
određivati u Vasingtonu”) Tanjug Press, 8 August 1991, p. 15.
“The Croats are not a historic nation. Take the Germans and Czechs, for example.
A Czech is a synonym for a coward, while the Germans are warriors. It is the
same with the Croats and Serbs. The Croats are spoiled people. I have never met a
decent Croat.”
“Just look how many Croats are being killed. They are cowards, and we are
stronger. At Borovo Selo 22 Serbs beat 300 Croats!”
ANNEX 28:
E XTRACTS FROM TSJAN C EROVIĆ , “BCCHANALIA : PTRIOTIC TRAP”
(“BAHANALIJE : UZAMCI RODOLJUBLJA ”) BELGRADE , FRY, 1993.
p. 18
“If in Vukovar the bodies of forty-one children really had been found, the young
photo-amateur G.M. would have been a lucky man. All the other scenes of the
tragedy in Vukovar would have faded, the attackers would have been the
liberators, the cause of the Serbian army would have been gained a great deal and
G.M. would have started a great career. Something was nevertheless achieved.
The report, although retracted the next day, left a definite impression and was
representative of the actions of large segments of the Serbian media at the time.”
p. 20
“The president of the SNO in an interview stated calmly: ‘I am for a genocide
against the Croats!’ Can anyone go further than this?”
pp. 128-130
The ‘cleansing’ of the Croatian village of Hrtkovci [in Vojvodina], where Kertes
was the main representative of Šešelj’s “patriots” who expelled the local Croats,
made abundantly clear the links between Miloševć, Kertes and Šešelj (i.e.
between the SPS, the SDB and the SRS).
p. 143
“The television news broadcast is an absolute priority of the regime, since
decisions on war or peace, on borders, elections, and world relations are made on
this program. Everybody knows that every evening at half past seven the majority
of the population sits down to listen to what he or she has to think. It is
understood that at this time the government is speaking, and many simple-minded
people believe that Slobodan Miloševi ć personally writes the news, which is not
far from the truth. These thirty minutes of the program are compiled and shaded
most carefully, in way that has nothing to do with journalism, so that the product
looks as if an expert team from the military police squad for strategy, security and
special war put it together in a bunker. This means thabody who resents 101
President Milošević for not addressing the public forgets that he is doing so every
evening.
ANNEX 29:
BBC S UMMARY OF W ORLD BROADCASTS , JLY 27, 1990
HEADLINE: Meeting in Srb Announces Serbian Autonomy
SOURCE: Tanjug in Serbo Croat, Text of report of 25th July meeting
At an all-Serbian assembly held in Srb, the centre of the Lika municipality of Lapac, with
about 100,000 people taking part, the Serbs in Croatia greeted with applause the declaration
of sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbian nation living, as the declaration states, ‘‘in the
historical territories united by the present borders of the SR of Croatia, and which gives
them the right to determine with whom and under what regime they will live, and how they
will integrate with the other nations in Yugoslavia’’.
The content of today’s proclaimed autonomy will depend on the federal, or co federal,
structure of Yugoslavia, and on the behaviour of the new government in Croatia, which up
until now has, with its insistence on the amendments to the Croatian Constitution, been
unacceptable to the Serbian nation. This is why today’s assembly has proclaimed as invalid
for the Serbian nation in Croatia all constitutional and legal changes which negate its
sovereignty and reduce its right to autonomy. The Assembly of Serbs in Srb is a direct reply
to the Croatian Assembly which is today proclaiming the amendments to the Croatian
Constitution, and the five Serbian deputies were today at the assembly in Srb instead of in
Zagreb.
Stressing several times that he will behave towards the Croatian state as it deserves, Dr
Jovan Rašković said that today’s assembly of Serbs is in fact an uprising of the Serbian
nation in Croatia, but without arms. Calling on the Croatian people to think carefully about
the kind of government they want, the Serbian national leader stresses that, if necessary, the
Serbs will fight the Ustashas, but not the Croatian people. In his view, this Serbian assembly
and the proclamation of autonomy is making Croatia stable, but destabilising Ustasha
Croatia.
‘‘We want the Serbian nation to be united on the entire territory which belongs to it, which
was fatally broken up by Josip Broz and Kardelj. Let Croatia create special detachments,
but let them never consider sending them against us. The Croatian leadership can see in Srb
today how solid is the fact which they want to erase - the Serbian nation in Croatia. It is a
curious logic which sees every gathering of Serbs as a gesture directed against Croats, with
whom we have no quarrel. We are only against the Ustashas and Ustasha ideology.
Jovo Opa čić demanded that the Croatian Assembly reject the amendments in order to
‘‘prevent the bloody drama of a confrontation of the Croatian and Serbian nations’’, since
otherwise ‘‘today’s proclaimed autonomy will be translated into political autonomy, and
that is the first phase of the creation of a Serbian state’’... 102
A NNEX 30:
BBC S UMMARY OF W ORLD BROADCASTS , JNUARY 17, 1991
HEADLINE: Slobodan Milošević insists Serbs want to live in single state
SOURCE: Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1939 gmt 15 Jan 91
‘The approach that Yugoslavia exists no more, i.e. that only republics exist and that possible
solutions could be found only through bilateral and multilateral talks, is unacceptable for
us.’’ According to unauthorised minutes from the SFRY Presidency session held on 10th
January, Slobodan Miloševi ć, the Serbian President, stated this in the course of the
discussion on the political future of the country. ‘‘On the contrary, Yugoslavia does exist. It
has its institutions and changes should be carried out in a legal manner, through Yugoslav
institutions in which republics are free to act in line with their stands. No sensible person
has ever questioned this.
‘Secondly, only Yugoslav nations can decide about the future of Yugoslavia, because
Yugoslavia was created only by Yugoslavs and not by republics, which did not exist in
either 1918 or 1943. Administrative republican borders cannot be simply proclaimed state
borders, and they do not represent boundaries within which Yugoslav nations live.
‘Thirdly, we hold that each nation has the equal right to decide freely about its destiny. Such
a right can be constrained solely by the same, equal right of other nations. As far as the
Serbian people are concerned, they want to live in one state. Hence, divisions into several
states which would separate Serbian people and force them to live in different sovereign
states is, from our point of view, unacceptable, that is - let me specify - out of the question.
The Serbian nation will live in one state and every nation wanting to live with the Serbian
people in the same state on an equal basis is welcome. For us, confederation is not a state.
‘Under the existing conditions, in our view, the only true solution is a modern, democratic
federation. We, of course, agree that we should discuss the functions of such a state, i.e.
such a federation. But, as far as the Serbian nation is concerned, a solution according to
which it would be separated into several states, cannot be discussed,’’ Slobodan Mićoševi
concluded. 103
A NNEX 31:
BBC S UMMARY OF W ORLD BROADCASTS , JNUARY 18, 1991
HEADLINE: Borisav Jović Rights of Nations Not Same as Those of Republics
SOURCE: Tanjug in Serbo Croat 1728 gmt 14 Jan 91 Excerpts from report
Dr Borisav Jović, President of the SFRY Presidency, in the framework of his one day visit
to southern Serbia spoke this afternoon to the economic and political activists of Vranje on
the current economic and political situation in the country, and on this occasion he
expressed the hope that the leadership of Serbia from now on and in the future would use its
new political position for an understanding on the future of Yugoslavia.
We accept, and this is generally known, that the constitutional solutions presently available
to us do not provide scope for the more lasting unfurling of the successful development of
our country and that the Constitution must be changed. ......... As a result we firmly take the
view that it is impossible to find a solution for the future of Yugoslavia through the
arbitrary, individual, partial annulment of federal regulations and the adoption of new laws,
regulations and constitutions which are valid in specific parts of Yugoslavia’s territory...
In an ordinary marriage it is known how the marriage is entered into and how the marriage
is brought to an end, so this should be known even better in a state. Accordingly, there is no
disputing the approach which also raises this question. However, this must be resolved in a
constitutional, legal way and in a way which suits everybody and in which all interests can
be protected, and also in a way which will ensure - for the nation which should adopt this
possible decision - that it is precisely and well informed about what this is a matter of and
why this is being done. In this process one of the key issues is to differentiate between the
right of a nation and the right of a republic. After all, the nations united into one state, whilst
the republics were created later. The republics have been given the right, in the name of the
citizens and peoples who now live in them, to decide, provided that they are within the
SFRY.
The right to leave Yugoslavia and to form some other new states can only be given to those
nations which decided to live within this country, and because more than one nation lives in
certain republics every nation must be given the opportunity to decide whether they want to
live in the same country or not. It is not permissible that one nation should make decisions
on the future of other nations by out-voting within one republic. These are very delicate
issues and if we do not reach an agreement on them large-scale international conflicts could
be caused. Hence, Jović stressed, we are endeavoring to avoid international conflicts which
constitute the biggest threat to our country.
I have to say that some multinational environments have witnessed arming on a national and
party basis and at some time in the future a disagreement on secession or any other solutions
which are not equally suitable for both sides and a failure to secure the democratic way of
decision-making could bring about a fratricidal war and bloodshed. Of course, we cannot
allow that to happen and hence we are taking preventive measures. These preventive
measures include the disarmament of all those who possess illegally obtained weapons, i.e.
all those other than the police force and the Territorial Defence of the JNA. It is very
malicious to say that today the real role of the JNA, which is obliged to defend the
constitutional order and to secure a democratic settlement of our crisis, is imposition of a
dictatorship or a military regime.
(…) 104
But, Jović added, this is not the issue now; the issue is that an inclination towards secession
and disintegration of the country still exists and these things should be discussed. We hold
that problems in our country developed to such an extent that it is impossible to postpone
dealing with them because it can only lead towards more serious economic and social
difficulties. Hence I maintain that an extremely big responsibility rests with the leaderships
of all republics and the top SFRY leadership, which now have to discuss in a rapid,
democratic and tolerant way and agree on a solution which will secure the stability of our
country and its international position - the SFRY Presidency President said in Vranje.
ANNEX 32:
BBC S UMMARY OF W ORLD BROADCASTS , JNUARY 24, 1991
HEADLINE: Slovene and Croatian Presidencies Protest against ‘‘Political Pressure’’ by
JNA
The Slovene Presidency, headed by President Milan Ku čan, and Croatian President Franjo
Tuđman today have discussed the political, security and military situation in Yugoslavia. A
joint, detailed statement reiterates the stand that both republics will continue in the future to
press for a peaceful and democratic resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, and stated that all
republics should determine through dialogue the future shape of the joint life of the
Yugoslav nations and states.
(…)
The statement notes that precisely now on the SFRY’s territory, especially in certain areas,
the JNA is undertaking activities which, as stated, ‘‘threaten a peaceful and democratic
resolution of the crisis’’.
Referring to the SFRY Presidency decree on the handing-in of arms and its interpretation,
the JNA, the statement says, ‘‘has introduced the highest degree of readiness in some units,
has been transferring heavy armament units, and showing an intention to take over certain
state functions, whereby it has encroached upon the integrity and sovereignty of republics’’.
‘‘The Slovene Presidency and Croatian President Franjo Tu đman assessed that certain JNA
activities on the SFRY’s territory are exerting obvious political and military pressure, which
would bring about the deployment of the JNA’s military might in the process of resolving
the political crisis. The practice of constant military threats, against which both republics
have already protested on several occasions, continues. The SFRY Presidency is obviously
allowing the JNA to interfere in the political, peaceful and democratic resolution of the
Yugoslav crisis’’, the statement notes, and goes on to add that such conduct ‘‘demands that
we reject such an army role and, thereby, prevent the violence which threatens the peaceful
life of our people, democracy and tolerant relations between our nations’’.
‘‘The SFRY Presidency was once more asked to put an end immediately to all JNA
activities which undermine the legal order established by republican constitutions and the
SFRY Constitution, and especially the exercise of a nation’s right to self-determination in
its republics.
‘‘If the JNA’s armed force is deployed, which would be at odds with the order and measures
imposed by legitimate republican authorities, the Slovene Presidency and the Croatian
President will undertake measures in line with their constitutional powers. Complete
agreement on this has been reached. The Slovene Presidency and the Croatian President will 105
inform the Slovene and Croatian Assemblies about all possible measures,’’ the statement
concludes.
A NNEX 33:
F INANCIAL T IMES (LONDON ), 4 MARCH 4 1991
HEADLINE: Presidency acts over Yugoslav ethnic clashes; Croatian commandos ordered
to withdraw from Serbian-dominated town
BYLINE: Laura Silber, Pakrac, Yugoslavia
Croatian commando units last night started to obey a Yugoslav state presidency order to
withdraw from the predominantly Serbian town of Pakrac in Croatia, following clashes at
the weekend between Yugoslavia’s two biggest ethnic groups.
Tanks, armoured personnel carriers and heavily armed police and military forces yesterday
stood guard in Pakrac, which is about 80 miles east of Zagreb, the Croatian capital. Armed
bands of Serbs used lorries to block traffic, checking identity papers of drivers entering the
town.
The fragile peace between Serbs and Croats in Pakrac collapsed at the weekend when local
police and Serbian reservists disarmed Croatian police units. The Serbian insurgents
declared their loyalty to the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Krajina, a mostly Serbian
region within the western republic of Croatia. Serbian leaders from Krajina threatened on
Friday to secede from Croatia, which has a 600,000-strong Serbian minority.
On Saturday morning, Croatia’s government deployed about 200 paramilitary police in
Pakrac. They arrested about 30 local police officials, while others fled to the nearby hills.
They were reported yesterday to be sniping at the Croatian police force; three policemen
were apparently wounded.
The state presidency, the country’s highest state body, has ordered the Croatian special
forces to withdraw simultaneously with federal army units. It said the withdrawal would
reduce tension in the region.
The swift deployment of the special forces by Croatia’s government may have circumvented
Serbian leaders’ plans to mobilize Croatia’s Serbs to undermine the republic’s centre-right
leadership.
Busloads of Serbs arrived in towns near Pakrac and throughout Serbia yesterday for rallies
protesting against Croatia’s government, which the Serbian press calls ‘fascist and
genocidal.’
(…) 106
A NNEX 34:
ORLANDO ESTINEL T RIBUNE , MARCH 17, 1991
HEADLINE: Serbian Leader Tries Power Play; Miloševi ć’s Speech Apparent Attempt to
Force Use of Army
Serbia’s hard-line Communist president declared Saturday that his republic would ignore
federal authority, complaining that the leadership had pushed Yugoslavia into “the final
stage of its agony.”
Slobodan Milošević’s televised speech was an apparent attempt to force the government to
call out the army. The hard-line leader is trying to hold Yugoslavia together with a strong
role for Serbia and for his Socialists, formerly the Communist Party.
Milošević’s ally, Borisav Jović, quit the eight-man federal presidency on Friday after other
presidency members refused to back his demand that a nationwide state of emergency be
declared in the fractious Balkan nation. The representatives from pro-Communist
Montenegro and from Vojvodina, a partially autonomous province of Serbia, announced
their resignations Saturday. The presidency is made up of one representative from each of
the six republics and from two provinces.
With troop movements reported around Belgrade and Zagreb, the Croatian capital, the
remaining five presidency members issued a statement urging more talks among the
republics on Yugoslavia’s future.
“The complex problems in the country can be solved only in a democratic manner,” it said.
But Miloševi ć declared earlier that the presidency’s unwillingness to declare a state of
emergency pushed Yugoslavia into “the final stage of its agony.”
“Under the existing conditions, the republic does not recognise the legitimacy of the federal
presidency,” he said. Milošević said that he had ordered the mobilization of reserve Interior
Ministry troops and the formation of more militia units for “protection of the interests of the
republic of Serbia and Serbian people.”
(…)
The Yugoslav presidency theoretically commands the military, but the army is dominated
by Serbian officers and is generally sympathetic to Milošević. 107
A NNEX 35:
BBC S UMMARY OF W ORLD BROADCASTS , MARCH 18, 1991
HEADLINE: Slobodan Milošević Supports Jović; Rejects Authority of SFRY Presidency
‘‘Last night Yugoslavia entered the final phase of its agony, Slobodan Miloševi ć, President
of Serbia, stated today [16th March] in an address to the public on Belgrade television. The
SFRY Presidency has not been functioning for a long time, and the illusion about the efforts
of the SFRY Presidency and its endeavors which in fact do not exist, as from last night is
definitively dead. This is not a step back but a step forward, because the crude truth is better
than illusion and deceit. Yugoslavia has been left without its Presidency, but it has not been
left without workers, without peasant-farmers, without millions of its citizens and people
who have been working honestly and diligently, preserved their own country and looked
after their own families. Millions of these honest and normal people will not give up their
own country.
As regards Serbia, it is always for Yugoslavia and it has never concealed this. It is saying
this publicly now, too, with deep conviction and pride. With the blockade of the function of
the SFRY Presidency by the exponents of the policy of the country’s disintegration, the plan
for the break-up of Yugoslavia has entered its final phase. This plan is being implemented
to the detriment of the vital interests of the Serbian people, both in Serbia and in
Yugoslavia.
This plan is realised at the expense of the vital interests of the Serbian people, both in
Serbia and the entire country. Instead of a democratic federation, which would enable the
Serbian and other nations to lead a peaceful life on the basis of equlity within a single state,
the forces of the anti-Serb coalition have planned and are now trying to realise the
disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia exists and it cannot be abolished by unilateral acts and a fait accompli policy,
because realistic interests, the freedoms achieved, the democratic achievements and the
power of its people, guarantee its survival and successful development.
By directly sabotaging its own order for the disarmament of para-military formations, the
Yugoslav Presidency has enabled the creation of republican armies which directly threaten
the security of the country, all its citizens and especially the republic of Serbia and the Serb
population outside the Republic of Serbia.
In the Yugoslav Presidency, which is also the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav armed
forces, after the order was made, evident was an organised blockade of the functions of the
JNA, whose duty and ability is to protect the people from a war, whether it be a civil or
aggressive one.
The Yugoslav Presidency has done everything to prevent its own orders from being
implemented and to enable the secession of certain republics and parts of Yugoslavia
through combined political maneuvers of obstruction and armed incidents, rather than
through peaceful means with the respect of the rights of all peoples to self-determination.
Having resigned from the post in the SFRY Presidency and in the Armed Forces’ Supreme
Command, Borisav Jovi ć refused to accept the blockade and obstruction of the state
leadership at the moment critical for the fate of the country. I think that in the given
circumstances Borisav Jović’s resignation is an act of a responsible man who refuses to take
part in the disintegration of his homeland, as well as an act of rebellion against the
obstruction of the state leadership. 108
Given such a situation, I wish to announce that Serbia will no longer recognise any decision
passed by the SFRY Presidency, because in present circumstances such a decision would be
illegitimate. Personally, I will not take any part in the work of a Presidency which has opted
for Yugoslavia’s disintegration, in the sense of any duties which may be transferred to me
after Borisav Jovi ć’s resignation and in accordance with the SFRY Constitution. I expect
that the citizens of Serbia, as well as both the Yugoslav and international public, would
understand that no patriot could accept the legitimacy of a collective head of state which
acts against the integrity of its country and the existing Constitution.
I demand that the Serbian Assembly pass a decision at its next session - in keeping with the
documents on taking over the functions of the Kosovo Assembly - to relieve Riza
Sapundžija of his function as member of the SFRY Presidency.
In the present circumstance, when attempts are being made to cause disturbances in Sandžak
and Kosovo and Metohija, I ordered the mobilisation of the reserve security forces of the
Serbian Interior Ministry and the urgent formation of additional police forces of the
Republic of Serbia.
I have asked the Serbian government to carry out all preparations for the formation of
additional forces whose volume and strength would guarantee the protection of the interests
of Serbia and the Serbian people.
I believe that, despite the conditions created in Yugoslavia, there is no need for imposing
emergency measures in the Republic of Serbia. The work of all institutions of the system
and the entire life in the republic should proceed normally. The citizens of Serbia can be
sure that the Republic of Serbia is capable of ensuring the protection of its own interests and
those of all its citizens and the entire Serbian people. The Republic of Serbia, the citizens of
Serbia and the Serbian people will resist any act of dismantling our homeland.
Today we must be firm and resolute in defending our country, as we have been on numerous
occasions before. I am convinced that the great spirit of freedom of the Serbian people will
defeat the forces of the anti-Serbian coalition hovering over Serbia and Yugoslavia. It is our
duty. Wisdom, courage and above all patriotism of the citizens of our republic and the
whole of Yugoslavia have been put to the test.
As of this moment, we are taking this test. I believe in the victory of peace in Yugoslavia. I
believe in the victory of unity in Serbia and the victory of forces which will bring calm to
the people, primarily mothers and our children. 109
A NNEX 36:
T HE G UARDIAN (LONDON ) JULY 2, 1991
HEADLINE: Black Shirt Extremist Riding on Serbian nationalist wave/Profile of a Serbian
nationalist
BYLINE: Ian Traynor
THE rhetoric is bloodcurdling, the alleged deeds even worse. But the antics of Vojislav
Šešelj - Serbian stunt-puller, gun-totter, and would-be guerrilla leader - carry him not into a
jail cell but from strength to strength.
It is one measure of the nationalist passions and communal hatreds pervading Yugoslavia
that Mr. Šešelj has just won a seat in the Serbian parliament, trouncing the Socialist Party’s
candidate in a Belgrade communist stronghold.
Mr. Šešelj, aged 37 and a lawyer, failed at his previous attempt in the December general
elections. But since then, as hatreds between Serbs and Croats have deepened, his support
has grown.
Always armed and usually sporting a black shirt, he sees himself as heir to the royalist
Serbian Chetnik guerrilla legacy of the 1940s civil war. He is leader of the extreme
nationalist Serbian Radical Party.
In recent months Mr. Šešelj’s talk of marching on Croatia to murder its ‘genocidal fascists’,
and his bragging of killing ‘cowardly’ Croats, has drawn large crowds to his rallies in the
Serbian capital, Belgrade.
Far from being hauled in and reprimanded for sowing racial hatred, Mr. Šešelj, it is
suspected, has the tacit approval of the Serbian president, Slobodan Miloševi ć, who is
believed to find his extremism useful in the current communal crisis.
Serb-Croat clashes erupted yesterday in the village of Borovo near the border between the
two republics. The last flare-up occurred on May 2, when 12 Croatian policemen wandered
into an ambush laid by Serb militants. The Croatian press carried page-size pictures of the
policemen with their eyes gouged out.
Mr. Šešelj boasted that he and his boys were responsible for the atrocity, describing the
killings as a triumph for Serbs and promising that more killings would follow in the quest to
expand Serbia’s borders and to avenge Croatian fascist killings of Serbs in the 1940s.
In Mr. Šešelj’s view, all of Yugoslavia’s 5 million Croats are ‘Ustashi’, the fascist
movement that ran the Nazi quisling state during the second world war.
Those ‘Ustashi’ include Stipe Mesić, the Croat who was finally elected Yugoslav President
the same day that Mr. Šešelj won his seat in parliament. Mr. Šešelj has talked recently of
having Mr. Mesić assassinated.
(Copyright 1991 Guardian Newspapers Limited, The Guardian (London)) 110
A NNEX 37:
UNITED PRESS NIERNATIONAL , JLY 6, 1991
HEADLINE: Serbia boasts strongest armed forces in Yugoslavia
BYLINE: Nešo Đurić
Serbian Communist President Slobodan Miloševi ć issued a thinly veiled threat Saturday
against rival Croatia, calling on Yugoslavia’s 8.5 million Serbs, including those in the
federal military, to prepare for ethnic war.
‘‘We are not afraid of a struggle, but we shall wage only one that is in the interest of the
people and the fatherland. But, before we are forced to begin a struggle, we shall advocate
peace and we shall do everything to preserve it,’’ said Milošević.
It was the first major statement by the uncompromising Serbian leader since a festering
dispute among political figures over Yugoslavia’s future exploded June 27 in combat
between the federal army and the Slovenian militia.
Milošević wants to preserve the federation, in which the Serbs are the largest ethnic group,
and has refused to compromise on declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia on
June 25 because of what they regard as Serbian efforts to gain economic and political
domination of the country.
His comments represented a thinly veiled warning to rival Croatia, which is confronting a
rebellion by members of its 600,000-strong Serbian community opposed to the republic’s
independence because of fears of persecution if their ties with Serbia are snapped.
‘‘All those who have in mind violence over the Serbian people, they should respect, in their
own interest, our pledge for peace. This is why even now, despite an already begun war, we
pledge to implement peace and freedom. Nobody wants his children to be killed. Therefore
we advocate for peace both in Serbia and outside Serbia,’’ Milošević said.
But, he added, his republic would act against ‘‘wherever and from whomever dangers may
threaten the interests and the peaceful life of Serbia and its citizens and the Serbian
people.’’
Serbia has ‘‘to be ready to protect itself,’’ he said. ‘‘Its readiness, for now, should be
expressed first within the Yugoslav Peoples Army, secondly within its own armed force,
which are composed of units of Serbia’s territorial units that are capable to undertake at any
time defensive tasks of the Republic of Serbia.’’
Milošević said the Serbian territorial defence units, made up of army reservists, are
‘‘modernly equipped, and in their number and training of personnel are superior and surpass
similar forces outside’ Serbia, including the so-called paramilitary formations.’’
Near daily clashes between Croatian security units and rebel Serbs have been overshadowed
by the crisis in Slovenia, but hold a greater potential for all-out civil war.
The extreme nationalist Croatian regime charges that the Serbian revolt is being provoked
by Milošević and pursued by armed groups infiltrated from the rival republic in a Serbian
plot to annex Croatia’s Serbian-dominated areas.
In his statement broadcast repeatedly over Belgrade Radio and Television networks,
Milošević appealed to ‘‘all citizens of Serbia to tell them first of all to be ready, all of them,
for the defence of their country.’’ 111
He said the Serb-dominated federal army should remain only in areas that wish to remain
part of Yugoslavia, a suggestion under which tr oops should be posted in Croatia’s Serbian
enclaves, allowing the secession of only Croatian-dominated parts of the rival republic.
‘‘I consider the Yugoslav Peoples Army should be posted on territories which are populated
with peoples who want to live in Yugoslavia together and in peace,’’ Miloševi ć said. ‘‘And,
those who do not want to remain in Yugoslavia and who consider the army occupation
soldiers should in future take care themselves about their defence and security.’’
A NNEX 38:
L OS ANGELES ITES , JLY 16, 1991
HEADLINE: On Carrying a Fierce Grudge for Half a Century; Few In Yugoslavia Have
Blagoje Adžić’s Power To Seek Revenge For The Murder Of His Family.
As a schoolboy, Blagoje Adži ć is said to have hidden and watched from a tree as Croatian
fascists rampaged through his village and slaughtered every member of his family in1941.
The unspeakable horrors committed during one of Europe’s bloodiest fratricides have
haunted Adžić for half a century. Frequent public references to the loss of his family
confirm that the emotional wounds have never healed.
Millions of Yugoslavs suffered similar atrocities during the internecine battles that raged
during World War II and share many of the same agonizing memories. But as the
commanding force behind the Yugoslav People’s Army, few have Adži ć’s power to seek
revenge for the loss of his family. Adžić, a three-star general, is the head of the military high
command and leader of the renegade faction fighting for Serbia as Yugoslavia edges closer
to civil war.
He is said to have a close relationship with Serbia’s nationalist president, Slobodan
Milošević, and he has been active with a new archconservative Communist splinter party
devoted to protecting and promoting Yugoslavia’s military might. He has steadily distanced
himself from the concept of federal unity espoused by the late Yugoslav strongman, Josip
Broz Tito, instead embracing “the necessity of Serbian domination,” according to Western
military attaches.
Little is known about the general’s military strategy for dealing with the frightening
instability now gripping the Balkans. Even less is known of his personal outlook, except that
he is a man of immense influence with an ax to grind. Adži ć has made no secret of his
hatred of Croats and has publicly sparred with federal President Stipe Mesi ć, the Croat who
is, at least officially, the army’s commander in chief.
Mesić also lost his family to Croatian fascism, which has made Adži ć’s public outbursts
look somewhat irrational.
“We fear he could tip the balance within the precarious military structure,” said one
European defence attaches in Belgrade, who believes Adži ć is at least partly motivated by a
will to settle the Serb-Croat score. Despite his unabashed bias, Adžć is not viewed as a
volatile loose cannon. A reclusive figure even within the closed circle of military society,
the 58-year-old general is seen as one who acts with cool deliberation rather than knee-jerk
emotion. 112
“Adžić is a question mark,” observed a senior envoy who has met the general. “He’s a
Serbian nationalist and a Communist. He’s certainly a hard-liner and has shown himself to
be disrespectful of civilian authority. But at the end of the day he hasn’t done anything, yet,
to put his forces to work clearly in the interest of Serbian expansionism.”
While Adžić appears to be the chief engineer of what many fear is a creeping military coup
d’etat, he actually ranks only second in the hierarchy behind Defence Minister Veljko
Kadijević.
Military analysts say Adžić and Kadijević are engaged in a power struggle. Adžić appeared
to take the initiative on July 2, when he delivered a fiery and menacing speech via
television, vowing to crush Slovenian “back-stabbers” who had humiliated federal troops
sent in to seize control of border crossings and airports in the breakaway republic.
There was no presidential authorization for Adži ć’s declaration that the federal army was at
war with Slovenia. The federal presidency was then still paralyzed by Serbian intransigence,
leaving the armed forces without a civilian commander. Adži ć’s threat to fight Slovenian
militants in a battle “to the end” was followed within hours by deployment of a massive
armoured column from the Belgrade-based First Army Region, for which there was also no
political authorization.
At a time when Adžić has stepped forward to flex Yugoslavia’s military muscle, Kadijevi ć,
66, has been reported to be gravely ill. The defence minister made a timely comeback last
week, promising that the Yugoslav crisis would be settled by peaceful means. But whether
his health is strong enough to counteract Adži ć and the pro-Serbia forces remains to be
seen.
The only other constitutional control over the high command, which has always been
overwhelmingly Serbian, is the country’s eight-man collective presidency, headed by Mesić.
The election of Mesi ć on June 30 resurrected the federal presidency after a six-week
deadlock. But the army appears to be directing the ruling body, instead of vice-versa.
Serbia controls four votes on the collective presidency, the Bosnian delegate is also a Serb
and Slovenia’s representative has refused to take part, leaving Mesi ć regularly outvoted by
the Serbs who see the military as “their” army. While the 110,000 recruits represent
Yugoslavia’s patchwork of nationalities, about 70% of the 70,000 officers and career
soldiers are Serbs.
Adžić rose through the military hierarchy in the First Army Region, which remains his
power base and his most dependable fighting force. It was from the First Army Region that
the armoured column set off without political authorization early July 3. Its formation in
Serbian-dominated regions of neighboring republics bolstered claims by Croatian
authorities that the troops were actually marking off the borders of an expanded Serbian
state. The district draws its strength from Serbia, the largest of Yugoslavia’s six republics,
which boasts a rich history as a warrior nation.
After more than 2,300 federal soldiers deserted during the failed mission to prevent
Slovenian secession, the First Army Region ordered a massive mobilization of “loyal
recruits” and the high command purged its ranks of most senior officers who were not
Serbs. Western defence experts say Adžić used the army’s debacle in Slovenia to put fellow
Serbian hard-liners in strategic positions and to militarily bolster Serbia’s front-line for the
encroaching war with Croatia. What remains to be seen is whether the army will take the
initiative in the fighting. 113
Fearing widespread desertion among the multiethnic rank-and-file, the army has so far been
reluctant to intervene and disarm the rival Serbian and Croatian forces clashing almost daily
in ethnically mixed regions of Croatia. But once the mobilization of Serbian recruits is
completed and dependable combat units have finished their training, many expect Adži ć to
exact revenge on Croatia by backing Serbian militants to prevent its secession.
Quote: “If we want Yugoslavia, we must fight for it. If we want peace, we must now
unfortunately win it by war.”
A NNEX 39:
THE G UARDIAN (LONDON ) O CTOBER 4, 1991
October 4, 1991
HEADLINE: Full-scale army invasion of Croatia ‘within days’
BYLINE: By David Hearst in Belgrade
A full-blown Yugoslav army invasion of Croatia is only days away, Western diplomatic
sources in Belgrade predict.
Such a move became more likely last night after Serbia and its allies declared they had the
right to take decisions on behalf of the entire Yugoslav federation, and unilaterally assumed
special powers freeing the federal army from constraints on its action in the breakaway
republic.
The federal president, Stipe Mesić, promptly accused Serbia and Montenegro - plus Kosovo
and Vojvodina, special provinces now fully incorporated into Serbia - of staging a coup.
The federal defence minister, General Veljko Kadijević, said last night the country faced an
immediate threat of war.
Accusing the leaders of Croatia of neo-nazism, Gen Kadijevi ć appealed to all ‘patriots’ to
defend the country from fascism and genocide, but he stopped short of ordering a
mobilisation and denied that the army planned to stage a coup.
Meanwhile, the presidents of Serbia and Croatia, and Gen Kadijević, are due to meet in The
Hague today. A spokesman for the Dutch foreign minister, Hans van den Broek, said the
three men had accepted an invitation to talks with Mr. Van den Broek and Lord Carrington,
the chairman of the European Community’s Yugoslav peace conference.
A senior Western diplomat in Belgrade said yesterday the army appeared determined to free
its soldiers, trapped in barracks besieged by Croat forces for over a month, at all costs.
This would mean using heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers and sustained air
bombardment against cities and towns deep inside Croatia.
However, the diplomat added, frantic diplomatic activity was under way to prevent such an
escalation.
He said: ‘The logical thing to expect would be for the military to make an all-out attack to
de-block the barracks. They have got people who have been in there for a month and they
are getting quite hysterical.’ 114
The current attacks on the Dalmatian ports of Dubrovnik and Split were harbingers of what
was to come, and Franjo Tu đman, the Croatian president who appealed on Wednesday for
US aid, was getting ‘quite desperate’, according to the diplomatic source.
There are no reliable estimates on how many federal troops are besieged in Croatia. The
Croats claim they have captured 70 army installations of one size or another, seizing at least
150 tanks and more artillery pieces and rocket launchers. But the army commanders are
more concerned about the men inside.
There are indications that the federal army is now prepared to use heavier weapons and that
the political brakes are now off. ‘They are certainly using much more airpower in these
attacks and my impression is that they are operating with less restraint,’ the diplomat said.
His assessment came as the federal navy resumed its blockade of seven Adriatic ports. The
navy said: ‘Failure to observe this (blockade) will be resolved in accordance with the rules
of combat.’
Meanwhile Serbian and Montenegrin reservists backed by an air and artillery barrage closed
in on Dubrovnik. As its 50,000 inhabitants spent their third day without regular water,
electricity or telecommunications, Croatian units were on the retreat.
In Zagreb, General Andirija Rašeta, the second-in-command of the army Region which
includes Croatia, told the defenders of Dubrovnik to surrender.
(Copyright 1991 Guardian Newspapers Limited, The Guardian (London))
A NNEX 40:
BBC S UMMARY OF W ORLD B ROADCASTS , OCTOBER 5, 1991
HEADLINE: Yugoslav Defence Minister Calls for ‘‘Defeat of Ustasha forces’’
Speaking on Belgrade Television on 3rd October, Army General Veljko Kadijevi ć,
Yugoslav Secretary of Defence, rejected accusations that the Army leadership had carried
out a military coup, Tanjug reported the same evening. The Army’s aim was to establish
control of the crisis areas, protect the Serb population from genocide and free members of
the Army and their families blockaded in Croatia, Kadijević added. The precondition for
this was the ‘‘defeat of the Ustasha forces’’, he said. The Army had from the start acted on
the basis of the constitution and federal laws in trying to reach a peaceful solution to the
crisis, Kadijevi ć continued, but events had taken a completely different course, due to
‘‘internal destructive forces’’ and the influence of ‘‘certain foreign factors’’. Some members
of the Presidency had blocked decisions with the aim of ‘‘breaking up Yugoslavia by
inhibiting and breaking up the army’’ and had been joined in their ‘‘perfidious tricks’’ by
the Federal Premier, Tanjug reported the General as saying further. The public also now
knew ‘‘what sort of person we have as Supreme Commander’’.
Kadijević said the ‘‘well-intentioned help of the European Community’’ was welcome but
that any involvement of foreign troops was ‘‘absolutely unacceptable’’. Now that the
‘‘immediate danger of war’’ had been established, all the legal norms governing
mobilisation and other defence measures came into effect. The Yugoslav Defence Secretary
concluded his address by appealing to ‘‘the patriots of all nations and nationalities’’ to carry
out their duties of defence ‘‘against fascism and genocide’’ in the crisis areas, Tanjug
reported. 115
A NNEX 41:
U NITED PRESS ITERNATIONAL N OVEMBER 21, 1991
November 21, 1991, Thursday, BC cycle
HEADLINE: Army seeks to justify destruction of Vukovar
BYLINE: Nešo Đurić
DATELINE: Vukovar, Yugoslavia
For a Serbian officer of the communist- led Yugoslav army, the destruction of the eastern
Croatian town of Vukovar was a justifiable step to crush the ‘‘fascist’’ government of
secessionist Croatia.
For some 50,000 residents, a mix of Croats and Serbs, the siege that reduced the once-
sleepy provincial Danube River town to rubble has left them facing a desperate future, their
homes and possessions destroyed, their factories, offices and schools blasted to ruins.
Not a single building has escaped unscathed the almost three months of withering federal
bombardments. The town center on the Danube River is totally devastated, and scores of
bodies remained unburied Thursday, four days after federal troops and Serbian irregulars
took full control of Vukovar.
‘‘They are mostly Serbs, with some Croats,’’ said a non-commissioned army officer
pointing at some 80 corpses laying on concrete and grass courtyards opposite the shell-
savaged Vukovar Hospital.
‘‘All, all of them are Serbs,’’ insisted another officer accompanying Yugoslav and foreign
journalists on a tour of the ruined town. He argued that army experts had identified the
victims -- at least most of them.
When asked why the corpses, including those of two children and a Croatian National
Guardsman, had not been removed and buried, he replied: ‘‘We are being kept busy with
those living. We shall take care of the dead later.’’
Among the bodies was a corpse charred completely black, with almost half of its head
missing.
Officers accused Croatian authorities of refusing to bury Serbs who died in the hospital, and
placing them across the street from the facility along with a number of other Serbian dead.
Lt. Col. Miodrag Pani ć, who headed an elite motorized army unit sent from Belgrade,
sought to justify the destruction, saying: ‘‘Vukovar was a fortress which (Croatian President
Franjo) Tuđman said was defending Croatia. But fascism started here ... and that is why we
have come here to prevent genocide over Serbs.’’
‘‘Our next task will be one that the (high) command says. But now all of us are much more
experienced, now all of us know how big the danger is in front of us,’’ he said.
Col. Milan Gvero of the Yugoslav Federal Defence Ministry said: ‘‘Remember Vukovar as
reincarnation of fascism.’’ He then wondered ‘‘who in Europe needs to supports the outlets
of fascism,’’ a veiled reference to Serbian contentions that Croatia is cooperating in the
creation of a new German empire.
Gvero said the federal army ‘‘did not wish this war’’ but it was imposed on it. 116
‘‘The army will not permit that political solutions in Yugoslavia are being taken by force,’’
he said. ‘‘When Croatian separatists forces tried, then the army had to protect the people
that were jeopardized by Croatian forces and it was the Serbian people living in Croatia.’’
Gvero said Vukovar was one of the ‘‘hardest strongholds of Croatian fascism.’’
In a contention mirroring the many contradictions in the civil war, Maj. Adem Baji ć, a
commander in the Vukovar operations, said: ‘‘We have come here to liberate the people
from the fascist conquerors.’’
None of the officers could say how many people were killed in the battles for Vukovar, but
all agreed that ‘‘many’’ died.
‘‘The army could have captured Vukovar faster,’’ Maj. Veselin Šljivančanin said. ‘‘But we
wished to safeguard our soldiers and civilians that Croatian forces were holding as captives.
We wanted that people in Vukovar could live in peace.’’
Šljivančanin added: ‘‘We have saved some 10,000 citizens and gave them freedom to live
in peace and dignity.’’
Asked whether Vukovar would be rebuilt, Ljubinko Stojanovi ć, a refugee sheltering in an
army-run reception center, replied: ‘‘Yes, we are going to rebuild Vukovar, and we who
now live here will live in a new town.’’
As troops loosed intermittent volleys of automatic weapons nearby, an officer commented:
‘‘They are still celebrating the victory.’’
(Copyright 1991 U.P.I.) 117
A NNEX 42:
THE B RITISHB ROADCASTING C ORPORATION , NOVEMBER 22, 1991
November 22, 1991, Friday
HEADLINE: Reports on Vukovar in Brief; Croatian Minister JNA Threw Red Cross
Representatives Out of Vukovar Hospital
Croatian Radio, Zagreb 1200 gmt 20 Nov 91
Croatian Health Minister “Dr Andrija Hebrang told journalists during a break in the
negotiations at the Zagreb I [Intercontinental] Hotel between representatives of Croatia and
the Yugo army on establishing a humanitarian corridor for Vukovar and the move of the so-
called Yugoslav People’s Army barracks from Croatia, that the Yugo army is not complying
with yesterday’s [19th November] agreement on the evacuation of the wounded from
Vukovar. As is known, it was agreed yesterday that representatives of the International Red
Cross Committee would be able to enter Vukovar hospital and supervise the evacuation of
patients. However, at 2100 yesterday the Yugo army threw Red Cross representatives out of
Vukovar hospital. It refused telephone contact with the hospital throughout the night. Col
Agotić told journalists that without reference to anyone the Yugo army had started to load
the wounded on to lorries with no Red Cross representatives being present. It is not known
what happened during the night when the hospital was in the hands of the Yugoarmy, Col
Agotić said, and when the Vukovar hospital is telephoned a person answers who introduces
himself as an officer, we quote, of a liberation army.
(Copyright 1991 The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts)
A NNEX 43:
THE B RITISHB ROADCASTING C ORPORATION , NOVEMBER 23, 1991
November 23, 1991, Saturday
HEADLINE: After the Fall of Vukovar in Brief; Federal Defence Secretary Praises Soldiers
on Vukovar Victory
Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1449 gmt 21 Nov 91
Belgrade, 21st November Following the completion of combat activities in the Vukovar
area the Federal Secretary for National Defence, Army General Veljko Kadć, and his
aides today received Commander of the First Military Region Col-Gen Života Panić,
Commander of the ‘‘North’’ Operations Group Maj-Gen Andrija Bior čević, Commander of
the ‘‘South’’ Operations Group Col Milo Mrkšić and Commander of the First Flight Unit of
the First Air Force and Air Defence Corps Col Branislav Petrovi ć and congratulated them
on their victory. As the Federal Secretariat for National Defence reports, the reception was
also attended by a number of officers, soldiers and volunteers who had particularly
distinguished themselves in the fierce battles on the streets and in the catacombs of this
town which had been fortified for years.
In his long address on this occasion Gen Kadijevi ć paid tribute to all the participants in the
almost two-months-long clashes, during which the elite Ustasha forces and numerous
mercenaries from Yugoslavia and abroad had been thoroughly defeated and captured.
Stressing that the combat successes, fearlessness and stamina displayed by the officers, 118
soldiers and volunteers will be a powerful incentive and inspiration for all fighters and
officers of the JNA and the Territorial Defence in their battle with vampire-style fascism
and the revival of genocide against the Serbian people, Army General Veljko Kadii said
that ‘‘we shall remember with due respect all those officers, soldiers and volunteers who
invested their lives in this victory’’.
(Copyright 1991 The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts)
A NNEX 44:
THE B RITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION , M AY 22, 1995
May 22, 1995, Monday
HEADLINE: Military Affairs; ‘Politika’ profiles new Krajina army commander
SOURCE: Source: ‘Politika’, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat, p.16, 19 May 1995
On 18th May the assembly of the Krajina Serbs’ political representatives in eastern Croatia
elected Gen Mile Mrkši ć to replace Gen Milan Čeleketić as supreme commander of the
Krajina Serbs’ armed forces. The following is the text of an article by R. Pavlovi ć,
headlined: “The Arrival of a Warrior From Vukovar”, published on 19th May in ‘Politika’:
After two obviously unsuccessful solutions concerning the chief of the General Staff of the
Serb Army of Krajina (SVK), the Supreme Defence Council of the Republic of Serb
Krajina the day before yesterday [17th May] pulled out a new trump card. Lt-Gen Mile
Mrkšić was appointed new commander-in-chief of the Krajina Serbs.
The 48-year old general, who was born near Vrginmost, is a real enigma for the public as
almost nothing is known about this officer, who, according to some military analyses,
belongs to an “exclusive faction of hard-liners”, and because he has never promoted himself
in the media.
He is now the top man in the army of the RSK [Republic of Serb Krajina]. The first time he
appeared in the public’s eye was at the end of the operation to liberate Vukovar, at the end
of November 1991 . At that time a colonel, Mile Mrkši ć held the position of commander of
the Guard Brigade. From about the middle of September, when the siege of Vukovar
started, the colonel was in charge of the “Jug” operations group.
The Guard Brigade and Colonel Mrkši ć were credited with great merits for the successful
completion of the three-month Operation Vukovar, which, as not only domestic but also
foreign media claim, represented a major success for the Federal army, while the fall of
Vukovar represented the greatest loss for the Croatian Army.
“Continuous and fierce fighting lasted 50 days, at least as far as my unit was concerned. The
fighting was hand to hand, for every house, for every street. The enemy, who was well
armed, was determined to defend the town-fortress on the Danube. For the Croatian
separatists, Vukovar represented the foundation for some kind of independent state,”
commander Mrkšić said at the end of the fighting, saying that the battle for Vukovar would
be studied at military academies.
Of course, no one denied the merits of the Guard Brigade, its commander, and other officers
who participated in one of the biggest operations during the civil war in the SFRY [Socialist 119
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], but among the domestic public there were also very
conflicting interpretations and theses about the (un)success of the three-month siege of
Vukovar by the units of the JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army] and various volunteer groups.
One such criticism was that the JNA forces unnecessarily demolished the town, that they
literally razed it to the ground with excessive shelling, instead of using cleverer tactics and
strategy to avoid destruction and unnecessary casualties, which were not insignificant in the
Federal army.
Owing to his merits on the battlefields and, of course, unquestionable military virtues in
peacetime, Colonel Mrkšić was quickly promoted to general and appointed commander of
the Corps of Special Forces of the Army of Yugoslavia. In the middle of 1993, when major
staff changes took place in the Yugoslav Army’s leadership, the name of young General
Mile Mrkšić was found on the unofficial list of candidates for the chief of the General Staff.
With the election of General Mom čilo Perišić as chief of the General Staff of the Army of
Yugoslavia, General Mrkšić left the Corps of Special Forces for the General Staff, where he
was given the post of assistant chief of the General Staff. In other words, he performed the
duty of the chief of the sector for land forces.
(Copyright 1995 The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts)
A NNEX 45:
THE W ASHINGTON P OST, JLY 4, 1995
July 04, 1995, Tuesday, Final Edition
HEADLINE: Serbia Seen Still Aiding War Effort; Miloševi ć Role Cited As Contradicting
Peacemaking Pledge
BYLINE: John Pomfret, Washington Post Foreign Service
DATELINE: Zagreb, Croatia, July 3
The downing of U.S. Air Force pilot Capt. Scott F. O’Grady over Bosnia and a shake-up in
the rebel Serb command in Croatia have provided new indications that Serbian President
Slobodan Milošević is continuing control over, and assistance to, the war machines of his
Serb allies in Bosnia and Croatia, according to Western officials and military officers.
Milošević’s moves to ensure a strong role in Bosnia and Croatia have not been designed to
prepare the way for peace in the Balkans, as Western diplomats had hoped, but to guarantee
that most of the land conquered in Bosnia and Croatia by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav
army at the opening of the Balkan wars in 1991 and 1992 remains under Serb control, these
sources said.
The United States and its allies have courted Miloševć as a potential peacemaker in the
Balkans in the past year, eliciting promises to cut off aid to the secessionist Serbs in Bosnia
and Croatia and seek their participation in peace talks in return for an easing of international
sanctions imposed on Serbia and the Yugoslav federation because of its central role in the
war’s early months.
But Western officials said the downing of O’Grady on June 2 provided a rare illustration of
how closely Milošević’s Yugoslav army works with Serb forces in neighbouring Bosnia and
Croatia despite his assurances to the contrary. 120
[The Clinton administration has decided to support prolonging a mild sanctions relief
package for Yugoslavia, even though U.S. officials have evidence that Belgrade is
continuing to provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. Story on Page A18.]
O’Grady was shot down while flying an F-16 over territory controlled by Bosnian Serbs.
What was unusual about the shooting-down, NATO officials say, was that the SA-6
antiaircraft missile site that knocked O’Grady’s jet out of the sky “locked on” to his plane
only for several seconds, thereby making it all but impossible for him to defend himself by
firing a missile at the radar site.
The reason for this, the officials said, is that the SA-6 site and all other antiaircraft batteries
in Serb-held territory throughout the former Yugoslav republics are part of an integrated air
defence system that is headquartered in Belgrade and is under the command of the chief of
staff of the Yugoslav army. That man, Gen. Momčilo Perišić, reports to Milošević.
The system uses powerful radar based in Yugoslavia to locate the plane. Officers then relay
that information to Bosnian Serb soldiers manning specific antiaircraft batteries along the
flight path of the intruding plane, officials and officers said. Thus, the length of time the
radar will be turned on at the specific antiaircraft batteries to target intruding NATO jets
before firing on them is shortened drastically. This makes the antiaircraft batteries difficult
targets for the planes to hit.
“Without suggesting that the Yugoslav army was directly responsible for the shutdown, it is
certainly true that the plane could not have been shot down had there not been this system,”
a NATO official said.
The system has been improved over the last six months, even after Miloševi ć allegedly
stopped sending military equipment to his allies in Bosnia, officials said. New antiaircraft
batteries were observed in Bosnian Serb territory around the Muslim enclave of Biha ć last
fall, and new SA-6 batteries popped up in northern Bosnia this spring, military officers said.
The recent appointment of a senior Yugoslav officer as commander of the Serb army in
Krajina -- the secessionist zone of Croatia held by rebel Croatian Serbs -- is another
example of Milošević’s tightening grip on the forces of rebel Serbs, officials said.
Gen. Mile Mrkšić of the Yugoslav army, who at the time was serving as Periši ć’s deputy in
Belgrade, replaced Gen. Milan Čeleketić on May 18 as supreme commander of the Croatian
Serbs. Mrkšić took the post on Miloševi ć’s orders, Western officials said, because he was
viewed as a better fighter than Čeleketić, who presided over the worst Serb defeat since
Yugoslavia’s wars of secession began in 1991 -- the Croatian army’s capture of Western
Slavonia on May 1-2.
Mrkšić’s resume in these Balkan wars illustrates the degree to which the Yugoslav army,
which falls under Milošević’s control, has managed the conflict.
In November 1991, Mrkši ć, then a colonel, commanded a Yugoslav army brigade that
played a key role in the destruction of the Croatian city of Vukovar. He returned to
Yugoslavia and next appeared as a general commanding the Yugoslav army’s Corps of
Special Forces, which was active in the assault on Goražde, a Bosnian Muslim enclave, in
April 1994.
Mrkšić, 48, returned again to Belgrade, where he became assistant chief of the General
Staff, responsible for land forces. 121
In the past weeks, Mrkši ć has amassed a mobile defence group based in Slunj, a Croatian
Serb-held town. The force is built around two companies made up of 15 M-84 tanks, an
improved version of the Russian T-72 that was the best manufactured in the old Yugoslavia,
and mechanized, artillery and armoured engineering units. There are indications, officials
said, that some of the equipment recently has come from Yugoslavia.
Milošević also has helped Mrkši ć by providing Yugoslav army support in the defence of
Sector East -- one of three Serb-held parts of Croatia, officials said. That sector abuts Serbia
and will now be defended by Yugoslav army units from Novi Sad, officials said. That
decision has freed hundreds of troops to be used by Mrkši ć in the defence of Sectors North
and South, two other Serb-held chunks of Croatia farther from Belgrade.
A final indication of Miloševi ć’s control over the rebel Serb armies comes in the form of
pay records captured by Croatian army forces during their attack on Western Slavonia in
May. Western officials said the records showed that as many as 300 officers in Serb units
operating in Western Slavonia were being paid directly by Belgrade.
One officer, Col. Stevo Harambaši ć, fought in Bosnia before being promoted and sent to
Sector West. His promotion order, dated November-December 1994, came from Belgrade,
as did his January 1995 pay voucher, a Western official said.
“We are seeing similar patterns for the Bosnian Serb army,” said a senior military officer.
Western officials and military officers also are questioning Miloševi ć’s claim last August to
have cut off his Bosnian Serb allies from military aid.
Milošević’s alleged move prompted Western powers in October to loosen economic
sanctions slapped on Yugoslavia in 1992 because of his support of the Bosnian Serbs. The
October decision was part of a major shift by Western powers who previously had
attempted to isolate the Serbian president.
A series of Western envoys went to Belgrade attempting to persuade Milošević to follow up
his purported blockade by recognising either Croatia or Bosnia. So far, all of those
missions, including one by U.S. special envoy Robert Frasure that ended last month, have
failed.
International monitors issued a report June 28 that gave Miloševi ć’s regime good marks for
keeping his borders with Serb-held Bosnia closed. The report is one of the elements that the
U.N. Security Council will consider when it decides, by Wednesday, whether to continue
the loosened sanctions for the Serbian strongman, whose nationalist creed supplied much of
the fervour embraced by Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia at the beginning of their secessionist
conflicts.
Western officials and officers said, however, that the monitors are being duped by the
Serbian president, and one senior official called the operation “a sham.”
The sources said Milošević has recently closed the borders of his country to draft-age men
from both Serb-held Bosnia and Croatia as part of a policy to help the armies of those two
breakaway regions. Yugoslav police are rounding up thousands of Serb refugees in
Yugoslavia and sending them back to the battlefields in Croatia and Bosnia.
Milošević is also believed to be secretly supplying large amounts of fuel and ammunition to
the Bosnian Serbs via his allies in Serb-held Croatia, officials said. A senior NATO officer
said if Milošević had really cut the supply lines, within six months the Bosnian Serb army
would have suffered “a drastic reduction of capabilities.” 122
“We’re not seeing drastic reductions,” he said, “We’re seeing inconveniences.”
(Copyright 1995 The Washington Post, The Washington Post)
A NNEX 46:
AGENCE F RANCE PRESSE , JNUARY 20, 1998
January 20, 1998 17:23 GMT
HEADLINE: Survivors of Vukovar atrocity to testify against Croatian Serb
BYLINE: Nicolas Miletitch
DATELINE: The Hague, Jan 20 (AFP)
Serb paramilitaries and the Yugoslav army cooperated in the 1991 sacking of the Croatian
city of Vukovar that led to the massacre of more than 200 civilians, a British expert on
Yugoslavia testified Tuesday.
Professor Mark Wheeler of the University of Derby testified on the second day of the war
crimes trial of Croatian Serb Slavko Dokmanovi ć, former Vukovar mayor charged with
overseeing the massacre at the nearby hamlet of Ovčara.
Wheeler said the militias that cooperated in the massacre were the Chetniks led by Vojislav
Šešelj and the Tigers led by Željko Ražnjatović.
Šešelj is today a member of the Serb parliament and leader of the extreme right Serb
Radical Party, said Wheeler, and Ražnjatovi ć is a businessman and leader of the smaller
United Serb Party.
Neither man is on a list published by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) of defendants linked to the massacre. The indictment mentions the
participation of “Serb militia forces,” without elaboration.
Prosecutor Grant Niemann of Australia opened the trial on Monday with the accusation that
Dokmanović, 48, oversaw the evacuation of more than 200 people, mostly Croats, from
Vukovar hospital on November 20, 1991, by Serb forces and later organised and
participated in their beating and executions.
Witnesses Niemann promised to call were expected to say that they saw Dokmanovi ć in
Ovčara just before the massacre and earlier in Vukovar.
The witnesses included several survivors of the massacre, including the director of the
Vukovar hospital at the time, Vesna Bosanac, a woman who was freed at Ov čara after Serbs
on the scene intervened on her behalf, and another woman who jumped off a truck that was
taking her and others to their deaths.
As mayor of Vukovar until fighting erupted in 1991 between Croats and Serbs in Croatia,
Dokmanović should have intervened to protect the civilians, Niemann charged on Monday.
Dokmanović denied the accusations. His lawyers claimed they had 97 people lined up to
back up their side of the story.
The ICTY originally based its charges on the disappearance of 261 civilians and wounded
soldiers who had been sheltering at the Vukovar hospital. 123
This charge was changed when court investigators in 1996 discovered a mass grave at
Ovčara from which 200 bodies have been exhumed so far.
Attention also focused Tuesday on the ICTY’s most senior defendant, former Bosnian Croat
commander General Tihomir Blaškić who, according to Dutch radio, has faced attempts on
his life since his detention in the Netherlands in April 1996.
ICTY spokesman Christian Chartier denied the report, saying “the tribunal has never heard
of any risk to General Blaškić’s life.”
A top-ranking official at the Dutch Justice Ministry had claimed on Dutch radio earlier
Tuesday that Blaški ć’s transfer to a detention centre in Scheveningue was prompted by a
series of attacks.
Blaškić had been held in villa near The Hague in return for having given himself up to war
crimes investigators. He was later transferred to the Scheveningue centre in June 1997 to
facilitate travel to and from the court, after hearings began on June 23, Chartier stated.
Blaškić’s lawyer, Russell Hayman, also said he was unaware of any attempt on his client’s
life, and said he was not acquainted with the justice ministry official, G. Strijards.
The 36-year-old general, who commanded the central Bosnian division of the Bosnian
Croat HVO militia almost from the outset of the Bosnian war in 1992 until his elevation to
overall command in 1994, was the first person to be tried by the tribunal specifically for his
command responsibility.
(Copyright 1998 Agence France Presse, Agence France Presse)124 125
MILITARY DOCUMENTS126 127
A NNEX 47:
F EDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL D EFENCE :
O RDER OF C HIEF OF SAFF , SFRY
15 M AY 1990
NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT
“UNITY 3”
According to the attitudes and the tasks of the Federal Secretary for National Defence, at
the conference of the Military Council on 27 April 1990, and in connection with the
organisation-formation reinforcement of the JNA in terms of the plan “Unity 3”, I issue the
following
ORDER
1. In the 1 Military Region, the 10hMotorized Brigade must be classified from “B” to
“A” classification with the following composition:
st
a. the Command, Communications Platoon, 1 Motorized Battalion, Mechanized
Battalion, Armoured Battalion, and the Military Police Company “A”;
b. the Rear Base and the Command of the Headquarters classified “B”
c. 2ndMotorized Battalion, Howitzer Division, Combined Anti-armoured Artillery
Division, Light Artillery Division of the Anti-Aircraft Defence, Engineer
Battalion, “ič”, “CV” (Communications Platoon “A”), platoon of the “ABHO”
classified “R”. In the Engineer Battalion, there should be one company classified
“A”.
The personnel and the technical equipment for the Mechanized and
Armoured Battalion will be provided by the 1 stMilitary Region: the
th
Mechanized Battalion from the 506 Infantry Brigade Zrenjanin, without
the tank company, and the Armoured Battalion from the 395Motorized
Brigade Brčko.
The accommodation of the battalion must be secured in the garrison
Mostar.
The task must be completed by 31 May 1990.
th
The 329 Armoured Brigade – Banja Luka must be reorganised from
classified “B” to classified “A” with the following composition:
d. the Command, the Command of the Headquarters, “i č”, 1 and 2 ndArmoured
Battalion, Mechanized Battalion, Howitzer Division, Light Artillery Division of
the Anti-Aircraft Defence and the Rear Base classified “A”;
e. 3 Armoured Battalion, Engineer Battalion (Company “A”), Communications
Company (Communications Platoon “A”), Military Police Company, “VABHO”
classified “R” 128
The 2 nd Armoured Battalion must be established in the garrison Derventa.
th
The technical equipment is to be taken from the 327 Motorized Brigade,
and the personnel from the own composition.
2. In the Naval Region, (9 thCorps Knin), the 221 Motorized Brigade must be classified
“B” according to the following:
st
a. the Command, 1 Motorized Battalion, Mechanized Battalion, Armoured
Battalion and the Communications Platoon classified “B”;
b. the Rear Base and the Command of the Headquarters classified “B”
nd
c. 2 Mechanized Battalion, Howitzer Division, Combined Anti-armoured Artillery
Division, Light Artillery Division of the Anti-Aircraft Defence, Engineer
Battalion (with one Company classified “A”), Company of the Military Police,
“ič”, Communications Company (Communications Platoon “A”) and “VABHO”
classified “R”.
The personnel for the formation of the Armoured Battalion is to be provided by
the first Military Region, and for the formation of the Mechanized Brigade the
Naval Region from the Mechanized Battalion of the 139 thMotorized Brigade –
Pula.
The technical equipment for the formation of the Mechanized and Armoured
Battalion is to be provided by the 1 stand 5 thMilitary Region according to the
distribution order of the Command of the Armoured-Mechanized Units –
Appendix No. 1.
The technical equipment is to be distributed in the garrisons Benkovac and Knin
by 10 June 1990.
The accommodation of the Armoured Battalion is to be secured in the garrison
Benkovac.
Unit formation must be completed by 20 June 1990.
th
3. In the thMilitary Region, the defence of the city of Zagreb must be disbanded, while
the 10 Corps must be established, with the following composition:
a. Command, 4 Armoured Brigade, 140 thMechanized Brigade, 123 rdPontoon
Battalion classified “th. A body for garrison work must be included in the
Command of the 10 Corps.
b. Command of the Headquarters classified “B”
c. 622 nd Motorized Brigade (with a Mechanized Battalion “A”), 257 thMotorized
th th
Brigade, 6 Combined Artillery Regiment, 6 Combined Anti-armoured Artillery
Regiment, 613 thLight Artillery Regiment of the Anti-Aircraft Defence, 10 th
st st nd
Engineer Regiment, 671 Pontoon Battalion, 151 and 152 “ppoab”, “bvp”
(with a Company classified “A”), “ic”, “CABHO”, Department for report on the
situation in the air, Communications Battalion (with a Company classified “A”),
th
Vehicle Company, 60 Medical Company, Military Court and the Judge
Advocate’s Office II classified “R”. 129
The testing site for the training of the soldiers and the officers “SVETICE” and
the artillery range “Vrap čanski potok” must be incorporated in the composition
of the 10 Corps.
The accommodation of the 10 thCorps is to be secured in the building of the
Command of the defence of Zagreb.
The Republican Headquarters of the Territorial defence of the Socialist Republic
of Croatia has to organise Local Headquarters for the duties of commanding the
units of the Territorial Defence in Zagreb, and its accommodation will be
regulated by the Command of the 5 Military Region.
th th
The 140 Motorized Brigade classified “B” has to be reorganised into 140
Mechanized Brigade classified “A” with the following composition:
d. Command, Command of the Headquarters, “ic”, Communications Company, 1 st
nd st
and 2 Mechanized Battalion, 1 Armoured Battalion, Howitzer Division
120mm, Rear base classified “A”
e. 2nd Armoured Battalion, Light Artillery Division of the Anti-Aircraft Defence,
Engineer Battalion, Combined Anti-armoured Artillery Division, Company of the
Military Police and a Platoon “ABHO” classified “R”
The brigade has to be assigned in the garrisons Zagreb and Dugo Selo.
The personnel for the formation of the 140 th Mechanized Brigade is to be
th
provided by the Command of the 5 Military Region from its own composition.
The 2 ndMechanized Battalion classified “A” from the garrison Dugo Selo will
nd th
leave nde 32 Mechanized Brigade and join the 140 Mechanized Brigade, while st
the 2 Mechanized Battalion classified “R” from Varaždin will leave the 31
Mechanized Brigade and join the 32 ndMechanized Brigade as 2 ndMechanized
Battalion classified “A”
st
The 31 Mechanized Brigade classified “R” from Dugo Selo has to be disbanded
both in peace- and wartime, while the technical equipment will be given to the
th
140 Mechanized Brigade Zagreb.
The 4 Armoured Brigade from Jastrebarsko has to be reorganised, according to
the new formation, from classified “B” into classified “A” with the following
composition:
f. Command, Command of the Headquarters, 1 sand 2 nd Armoured Battalion,
Mechanized battalion, Combined Artillery Division, Light Artillery Division,
“ic” and the Rear Base classified “A”;
g. 3 Armoured Battalion, Engineer Battalion, Communications Company
(Communication Platoon “A”), Platoon of the Military Police and “VABHO”
classified “R”. The Mechanized Battalion has to be reassigned to the garrison
Karlovac. The formation of the Corps has to be completed by the end of June
1990.
4. III. Headquarters Administration of the Armed Forces, on the basis of the proposal of
th
the Command of the 5 Military Region, the Commands of the Armoured-Mechanized
Units and the Commands of the Engineering will assign the newly established and
reorganised units. 130
5. The Commands of the Military Regions will hand over reports on the establishment
and reorganisation of the un its as prescribed by this order.
Enclosure:
Order for Reassignment by the Administration of the Armoured-Mechanized Units
CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE SFRY
Lieutenant General Blagoje Adžić
A NNEX 48:
COMMAND OF THE ST 1 M ILITARY REGION , 15 MAY 1990
The Command of the 1 sMilitary Region
Page no. 1-29
15 May 1990
TO BE DELIVERED IMMEDIATELY
TO THE COMMAND _____
ON THE BASIS OF THE ORDER FROM
(illegible)
AND WITH AND AIM TO
(illegible)
THE AMMUNITION OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
I ORDER
1. To the Corps Command – illegible – in its zones of responsibility it will organise the
reception, accommodation and the keeping of the complete armament and the ammunition
of the Territorial Defence in the JNA warehouses.
In the course of the realisation of the task, the exact number, the sort and the quantity of the
armament and the ammunition that is now kept in the warehouses of the Territorial Defence
should be established, as well as the possibility of storage on the military facilities and the
dynamics of the realisation.
For the transport of the means the motorized vehicles from the JNA reserves should be
engaged whenever possible in the course of the realisation of other planned tasks in order to
decrease the expenses.
In the lack of the warehouse and storage space the most suitable rooms in the districts of
these warehouses and storing rooms should be used for storage. For the storage of the
st
material means, and authorised by the command of the Military Region the warehouses
outside the company districts can be used. The rooms in the barracks can possibly be used
according to the existing regulations.
2. Exceptionally, in the cases when the facilities of the Territorial Defence are remote and
when there are no conditions and possibilities to place that armament and the ammunition in
the JNA facilities – over 50 km away from the possible storage facilities – the armament
and the ammunition should be kept in the facilities of the Territorial Defence providing that
it is secured by the JNA units. 131
3. The taking over of the armament and the ammunition by the Staffs and units of the
Territorial Defence for the execution of the planned activities is authorised by the
st
Command of the 1 Military Region and on the proposition of the Corps Commands. The
Corps Commands regulate with special instructions the way entering, maintaining and
keeping as well as the way of the procedure during the taking and bringing back the
armament and the ammunition in the warehouses. Basically, in a way intended for the
material means of the JNA, the material means of the Territorial Defence are taken and
handled by the high officials that are in charge of the combat reserves of the units.
4. The taking over and the storage of the armament and the ammunition should be finished
till the 21 of May 1994.
5. The report on the realisation of the order with the exact list of the quantity and sort of
armament and the ammunition that is kept in the warehouses and storage facilities of the
JNA and exceptionally warehouses of the Territorial Defence should be delivered to the
st st
Command of the 1 Military Region till the 1 of June 1994.
st
6. The adequate bodies of the 1 Military Region should be addressed in order to any
resolve any unclear questions.
COMMANDER GENERAL –
COLONEL ALEKSANDAR SPIRKOVSKI personally 132
A NNEX 49:
STRATEGY OF THE N ATIONAL D EFENCE AND SCIAL ELS -PROTECTION OF THE SFRY
B ELGRADE , 1987
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
ARMED FORCES CENTRE FOR STRATEGY
RESEARCH AND STUDY CENTRE “MARŠAL TITO”
National Defence
Official Secrete
Internal
STRATEGY
OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SOCIAL SELF-PROTECTION
OF THE SFRY
Belgrade, 1987
The Armed Forces of the SFRY
The Armed Forces of the SFRY are a unique armed force of the working class and all
working people and citizens, the nation and all nationalities of Yugoslavia, as well as a
subject of nation-wide defence and social self-protection. They are framework and the
integral part of the system of national defence and social self-defence and the basic bearer
of armed combat in a nation-wide defence war. They are organised, meant for, equipped
and trained for any armed combat in a nation-wide defence war condition, as well as for
assignments of the social self-protection in peacetime, and in special circumstances also
during wartime.
Together with the other formations of the nation-wide defence and the social self-protection,
the armed forces of the SFRY secure and protect the actual and historic interests of all
nations and nationalities, all working people and citizens of the social self-government and
the non-aligned Yugoslavia. The armed forces of the SFRY have a national, socialist,
revolution, defensive and general-Yugoslav character.
The armed forces of the SFRY are made up of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the
Territorial Defence. The Yugoslav People’s Army is a common armed force of all nations
and nationalities, all working people and citizens of Yugoslavia. The territorial Defence is
the widest form of organising working people and citizens for armed combat and the
performing of certain assignments of social self-protection, the widest form of organising
armed nation-wide resistance.
The Yugoslav People’s Army and the Territorial Defence are part of the common armed
forces. The conditions for this unity are: a social-political system of socialist self-
government and a federal government; the character of the armed forces; the inviolability of
the Yugoslav territory as a common defence-protection area; a common aim and object of
defence and protection; a common doctrine of armed combat; common grounds of a
material and health assurance system; a common administration and command system as
well as a common supreme administration and command.
(…) 133
The Yugoslav People’s Army , as a common armed force and a commando part of the
common armed forces, is the framework of the defence system of SFRY and together with
the Territorial Defence the support of other forces of the nation-wide defence and social
self-protection in executing their defence and self-protection assignments. It was intended to
lead armed combat in the entire Yugoslav battlefield in all conditions of an aggression on
the SFRY. At peacetime, the Yugoslav People’s Army is a cohesive factor of Yugoslavia
and an important dam of all forces and appearances directed on weakening the unity of
Yugoslavia.
(…)
The Territorial Defence is organised on the entire territory and naval region of Yugoslavia
on a common ground in accordance with the needs and plans of the defence and protection
of the specific conditions of every part of SFRY.
The combat actions are performed in collaboration with the formations of the Yugoslav
People’s Army and independently, relying on the social-political communities, Local
Committees, joined labour organisations and other social structures. The condition for a
successful Territorial Defence, as well as the armed forces as a whole, are the population
and its support.
The Territorial Defence enables a mass involvement of the population in armed combat,
simultaneously leading an armed combat in all parts of the battlefield which the aggressor
forces could find themselves in, especially in the temporary occupied territory, as well as
securing combat control and the security of the entire territory of the SFRY. With the
combat actions of the entire armed forces, especially the Territorial Defence, necessary
conditions for the continuous functioning of our social-political system in the entire territory
and in all war conditions are created. 134
A NNEX 50:
EXTRACT FROM “D EVELOPMENT OF THE A RMED FORCES OF THE SFRY, 1945-1985”
MILITARY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
INTERNAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SFRY 1945 –1985
Federal Secretariat for the National Defence I
Contents of work
AUTHORS
Introduction, First, Second and Fourth Part, and Enclosure II
Đorđo NOVOSEL, Lieutenant Colonel General
Third Part and Enclosure I
Prof Ilija NIKEZIĆ, Major General
Belgrade, 1991
Studies of the experiences from exercises and checking’s of the military-war plan, that were
made during 1981 and 1982, pointed to the fact that a strategic level of leading an armed
clash would be lost in a number of operations that would be executed by armies and other
formation groups in case of war. It has been evaluated that at the whole war field up to 10
operations would be executed at the same time, having in mind only an attack of one group
of forces, either first or second block. And in case of “enhanced defence”, with the
engagement of military groups members of NATO on our territory, that is in the aggression
from the West, 5-6 more operations should be lead. Then, the joining of all these operations
in the Supreme Commands of the Armed Forces would be impossible to realise.
On the basis of such an evaluation it has come to conclusion that it is necessary to bring in
strategic levels of commanding and leading through battlefields. Fields were easily spotted,
either in geostrategic view and grouping of forces of both blocks in the directions leading to
our country, or through our country to some more inside targets on the European,
Mediterranean or Middle East battlefield. Over three years were spent in the HQ of the JNA
in working out of this idea, and the final decisions were reached only in 1987.
However, at the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the General Staff the solutions
were found even in 1985, but first the Presidency of the SFRY, the presidencies of the
Republics and Regions, the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,
especially the Commission of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia for the National Defence had to be persuaded in that and then the Military
Council, then the Council of the National defence and a part of retired generals from the
most responsible positions – to help us in dealing with the new structure of leadership and
commanding the Armed Forces, concrete requests in defending the country and other jobs.
The major problems were not military, but social-political ones. Questions were raised
whether with establishing commands of battlefields the rights and obligations of the
Republics and Regions are being taken away in defending the country, and whether with
joining two or three Republics and Regions into one battlefield it is being struck into
foundations of socially-political structure and made prerequisites for centralisation of the
defence already in peace, and especially in war, what meant for some opening the way
towards Unitarianism, before entering the constitutional changes, and the JNA has been 135
always accused by them as being an instrument of Unitarianism. Later, in the beginning of
1988, the problem will be again raised, especially by the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, that
will even ask for the revision of the decision.
With the decision of the Presidency of the SFRY about building up the organisation of the
Armed Forces and modernisation of leadership and commands in the Armed Forces, the
Republics’ and Regions’ General Staffs of the Territorial defence were being subordinated
to the commands of fields, and brigades of the Territorial defence, as partisan brigades and
divisions of the JNA to the commands of Corps. With this a unique partisan echelon was
created under the commands of the JNA and duality in strategic, operations and tactic
commanding has been avoided.
ANNEX 51:
COMMAND OF THE 30 THPARTISAN DIVISION
COMMAND OF THE
th
30 PARTISAN DIVISION
MILITARY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
No. 651-10
23 September 1991
ORDER
FOR THE MOBILISATION OF THE 5 thCORPS
-Extraction for the 30th Partisan Division
February 1991
1. INFLUENCE OF THE ENEMY ON THE MOBILISATION
In the aggression against SFRY from the west, the armed forces of the member countries of
the NATO, Austria and Albania would participate, with the possibility of the use of
territories of Hungary and Bulgaria and of their armed forces
PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY
strictly confidential no: 150/3-3/690
Belgrade, 31 May 1990
ENCODED
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
DELIVER NOW
To the Presidencies of the Socialist Republics and the Socialist Autonomous Regions
The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at the meeting held on 29
May 1990, has consider and adopted the information of the Federal Secretariat for National
defence about the measures which has this Secretariat has taken for the safer security of the
weapons of the Territorial defence on the territory of the entire Yugoslavia and concluded
to meet the Presidencies of the Republics and Autonomous regions with its evaluation.
The Presidency of the SFRY has been informed that until now, about 54 % weapons of the
Territorial defence was stored in warehouses and the facilities of the JNA, and 46 % in 136
1380 facilities outside the JNA. Out of 1380 facilities, 202 facilities of the Territorial
defence did not have any security for the extreme measures, and 948 facilities were
indirectly secured only with one guard at the entrance of the facility, and it was possible to
break into these facilities unnoticed or with the attack on the guard, and to come to the
weapons and ammunition.
With the massive development, the great dispersion of the weapons and ammunition has
happened and which was not followed by the building of the proper facilities for their
storage and adequate physical security, which lead, especially recently, to the raise in
stealing the weapons and ammunition from the facilities of the Territorial defence
throughout the country (in 1988 and 1989 and the first four months of 1990 there were 46
thefts of the weapons and ammunition). Besides that, because of not having physical
security 9 tanks were heavily damaged in a municipal HQ of the Territorial defence.
Together with this, there are indicators pointing to the possibility of organised robberies of
great amounts of weapons and ammunition by some groups and extreme organisations
foretelling the armed rebellion for realising of their own goals.
Bearing in mind this situation, the Federal Secretary for Nathonal Defence has given oral
order to the commanders of the military territories on 17 April 1990
The commanders of the Territorial defence of the Republics and Autonomous regions to
jointly evaluate all the facilities of the territorial defence in which weapons and ammunition
is stored, and in any concrete case where weapons and ammunition are not completely
secured, to take measures for its safe keeping in accordance with the existing regulations.
With a detail analysis and evaluation, it has been determined that most of the facilities of the
territorial defence do not comply with the basic technical conditions for proper storage and
maintenance of weapons and ammunition, and that not one facility has the requested
security (guards for the direct security, sentry unit with the right number of guards and a
unit that would, in case of a larger organised attack, intervene immediately), and which is
most important.
On the basis of determined situation and the proposition of the commanders of the military
territories and the commanders of the Territoriathdefence, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the JNA, has with its order from 14 May 1990, concretely regulated carrying out
of this task. The main thing is to weapons an ammunition from all the facilities that are not
secured in accordance with the regulations, should take over and store in the conditional
facilities of the JNA.
The Presidency of the SFRY has accepted the reasons of bringing out of these measures and
it has concluded that these are the measures coming out of the authority of the Federal
Secretariat for National Defence and which relate, exclusively, to the storage, keeping and
securing the weapons and ammunition of the Territorial defence and which only enlarges
the degree of its security and regulated technical maintenance. With the taken measures the
rights and the authorities of the commands and HQ of the Territorial defence are not being
changed or limited. That at the same time means that, after the regulated conditions and
criteria for the storage are fulfilled, the weapons and ammunition could be stored in the
facilities of the Territorial defence.
Coming from these conclusions, as from the circumstances that it is about the regular
activity of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence in the frames of the expected 137
authorities, the Presidency of the SFRY considers that all the speculations about the
political background of these measures are groundless.
General Secretary
Anton Stari
Delivered on 31 May 1990. at 14.00 hrs
Dr Franjo Tuđman
st
Given by: Predojelić 31 May 1990, Taken at 14.00 hrs
For the Socialist Republic of Croatia:
ANNEX 52:
O RDER OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY, 31 M AY 1990
PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY
strictly constdential No: 150/3-3/690
Belgrade, 31 May 1990
ENCODED
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
DELIVER NOW
To the Presidencies of the Socialist Republics and the Socialist Autonomous Regions
The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at the meeting held on 29
May 1990, has consider and adopted the information of the Federal Secretariat for National
Defence about the measures which has this Secretariat has taken for the safer security of the
weapons of the Territorial defence on the territory of the entire Yugoslavia and concluded
to meet the Presidencies of the Republics and Autonomous regions with its evaluation.
The Presidency of the SFRY has been informed that until now, about 54 % weapons of the
Territorial defence was stored in warehouses and the facilities of the JNA, and 46 % in
1380 facilities outside the JNA. Out of 1380 facilities, 202 facilities of the Territorial
defence did not have any security for the extreme measures, and 948 facilities were
indirectly secured only with one guard at the entrance of the facility, and it was possible to
break into these facilities unnoticed or with the attack on the guard, and to come to the
weapons and ammunition.
With the massive development, the great dispersion of the weapons and ammunition has
happened and which was not followed by the building of the proper facilities for their
storage and adequate physical security, which lead, especially recently, to the raise in
stealing the weapons and ammunition from the facilities of the Territorial defence
throughout the country ( in 1988 and 1989 and the first four months of 1990 there were 46
thefts of the weapons and ammunition). Besides that, because of not having physical
security 9 tanks were heavily damaged in a municipal HQ of the Territorial defence.
Together with this, there are indicators pointing to the possibility of organised robberies of
great amounts of weapons and ammunition by some groups and extreme organisations
foretelling the armed rebellion for realising of their own goals.
Bearing in mind this situation, the Federal Secretary thr the National defence has given oral
order to the commanders of the military territories on 17 April 1990 138
The commanders of the Territorial defence of the Republics and Autonomous regions to
jointly evaluate all the facilities of the Ter. defence in which weapons and ammunition is
stored, and in any concrete case where weapons and ammunition are not completely
secured, to take measures for its safe keeping in accordance with the existing regulations.
With a detail analysis and evaluation, it has been determined that most of the facilities of the
territorial defence do not comply with the basic technical conditions for proper storage and
maintenance of weapons and ammunition, and that not one facility has the requested
security (guards for the direct security, sentry unit with the right number of guards and a
unit that would, in case of a larger organised attack, intervene immediately), and which is
most important.
On the basis of determined situation and the proposition of the commanders of the military
territories and the commanders of the Territorial defence, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the JNA, has with its order from 14 thMay 1990, concretely regulated carrying out
of this task. The main thing is to weapons an ammunition from all the facilities that are not
secured in accordance with the regulations, should take over and store to the conditional
facilities of the JNA.
The Presidency of the SFRY has accepted the reasons of bringing out of these measures and
it has concluded that these are the measures coming out of the authority of the Federal
Secretariat for National Defence and which relate, exclusively, to the storage, keeping and
securing the weapons and ammunition of the Territorial defence and which only enlarges
the degree of its security and regulated technical maintenance. With the taken measures the
rights and the authorities of the commands and HQ of the Territorial defence are not being
changed or limited. That at the same time means that, after the regulated conditions and
criteria for the storage are fulfilled, the weapons and ammunition could be stored in the
facilities of the Territorial defence.
Coming from these conclusions, as from the circumstances that it is about the regular
activity of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence in the frames of the expected
authorities, the Presidency of the SFRY considers that all the speculations about the
political background of these measures are groundless.
General Secretary:
Anton Stari
Delivered on 31 May 1990. at 14.00 hrs
Dr Franjo Tuđman
st
Given by: Predojelić 31 May 1990, Taken at 14.00 hrs
For the Socialist Republic of Croatia: 139
A NNEX 53:
FEDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL DEFENCE
O RDER OF 14 M AY 1990
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY
Operations Centre
strictly confidential No: 19-1
14 May 1990
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
ENCODED
DELIVER NOW
To the commander
keeping of the weapons and ammunition of the Territorial defence – order
To the commands of the 1st, 3rd, and 5Military Region, Naval Region, Combat air force
and anti-aircraft defence
because of the safe keeping and storage of the weapons and ammunition of the territorial
defence and in accordance with the set tasks of the Federal Secretary for National Defence,
at the meeting of the military council held on 27 April 1990,
I ORDER
1. The commands of the military territories and combat air force and anti-aircraft defence
with the HQ of the territorial defence of “sn” and “sap”, will organise the take over, storage
and keeping of all the weapons and ammunition from the territorial defence in the
warehouses of the JNA. The commanders of the territorial defence in the frames of the
organisation formation building up and in accordance with the operations requests, will
consider the possibility of abolishment of several smaller units whose weapons and
ammunition cannot be stored in the warehouses of the JNA. When realising the task, the
exact number, sort and quantity of the weapons and ammunition that is now stored in the
warehouses of the territorial defence should be determined together with the concrete
possibilities of storage in military facilities and dynamics of the realisation.
In absence of space in the warehouses the best facilities in the area of those warehouses
should be used. If possible, the rooms in the barracks could be used for the storage in
accordance with the regulations.
2. Exclusively, where the facilities of the territorial defence are very far and there are no
conditions and possibilities for weapons and ammunition to be stored in the warehouses of
the JNA, the storage and keeping should be organised in the warehouses of the territorial
defence with the sentry from the units of the JNA.
3. Taking the weapons and ammunition by the units of the territorial defence and TO
headquarters, for use in carrying out the planned activities, will be approved by the
commands of the military territories. The commands of the military territories will regulate
the way of entrance, maintenance and storage with special directions as the procedure of
taking the weapons and ammunition and its return to the warehouses. 140
st
4. Taking over and storage of weapons and ammunition should be finished by 21May
1990.
The report on realisation of the order with the correct review of the quantity and sort of
weapons and ammunition stored in the warehouses of the JNA and, exclusively, in the
th
warehouses of the territorial defence, should be delivered bJune 1990 to the HQ of
the Armed Forces – 1 Administration.
For the unclear questions, turn to the chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY.
Chief of staff of the Armed Forces SFRY
Colonel General
Blagoje Adžić
ANNEX 54:
COMMAND OF THE 5 THM ILITARY REGION , 24 JNUARY 1991
NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
“UNITY –2 and 3”
Copy number 4
COMMAND OF
TH
THE 5 MILITARY REGION
DT No. 2-14
24 January 1991
Report on the realisation of the assignment from the “UNITY –2 and 3” plan
in 1990
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SFRY
I and III Administration –
According to the order of the Federal Secretary for National Defence (General Staff of the
Armed forces of SFRY, III Administration) DT no. 432-12 from 23 July 1990, on the
developing of the organisation-formation structure of the JNA, we send you the report on
the realisation of the assignment from the “UNITY – 2 and 3” plan, state of things as on 31
December 1990.
(…)
th
The 10 Corps
th
The formation of the 10Corps is regulated by a special order of the Federal Secretary for
National Defence, outside the regular activities in the organisation-formation changes
according to the “UNITY – 2 and 3” but it is included in the plan activities and the
developing of the organisation-formation structures of the JNA in 1990.
(…) 141
A NNEX 55:
TH
COMMAND OF THE 9 C ORPS OF THE C OMBAT AIR FORCE AND ANTI-A IRCRAFT
D EFENCE , 10 DCEMBER 1990
MILITARY CLASSIFIED DOC.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
COMMAND OF THE
9 CORPS OF THE
COMBAT AIR FORCE AND
THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE
10 December 1990
Situation on the terrain
Of Zadar and Knin,
Observations, delivered to the Security Agency of the Corps of the Combat Air Force and
the Anti-Aircraft Defence
We deliver you 2x “ZOPMR” of the Security Agency of the 84 thMilitary Base on the
observations of the collaborator “ ČEDO” with figures of the Security Agency (OB) of the
9 Corps’s land forces in connection with the situation and the relations on the terrain of the
Federal municipalities Zadar and Knin.
We agree with the evaluation and the opinion.
CHIEF
Colonel Imra Agotić
(…)
EXPLANATION
Situation on the terrain Knin
Through contacts with the OB of the Corps, figures on the situation on the terrain Knin
were obtained. The situation lately has been characterised by the following:
A split within the membership and the leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) is
observable. The branch in Kistanje, lead by ŠIMUN DUBAJIĆ, is trying to establish an
operations command and transfer the authorities from Knin to Kistanje.
Operations figures of the OB indicate possible conflicts between the leaders of the party on
this territory.
We have at our disposal the information that Head of the Federal Municipality Obrovac,
SERGEJ VESELINOVIĆ, after charges had been pressed against Dubaji ć, over “jataka”
established contact with Dubajić in the village Žegar in Veselinovi ć’s house. It is assumed
that he is now either in Belgrade or in Veselinović’s house. In that way, he is protected.
NIKOLA BRKLJAČ, a returned emigrant from Australia is staying at the territory of Knin.
The Australian authorities had sentenced him to 15 years prison for homicide. Now, he
freely moves about the territory, and in a confidential interview, he said that he returned
because he had to “perform a task”. He married in the village Kosovo. Members of his
wife’s family had participated in robberies of JNA weapons from the railway carriage.
Nikola was born in the village Malovan, Federal Municipality Gračac. 142
The source of the OB of the 9 th Corps, a member of the Ministry of the Interior (MUP)
/Secretary of the Interior Benkovac/, said that he knows the persons by name who had
murdered the policemen. The source claims that the committers were from the composition
of the Secretary of the Interior Benkovac, camouflaged for this operation, and with a
previously recorded speech, which was reproduced from a miniature tape recorder. He also
claims that behind the whole operation stays the Board of the National Resistance. The OB
of the9th Corps demands total secrecy of this information.
We also have at our disposal the information that lists for the liquidation of unwanted
officers was made, especially of those who were members of the OB.
The members of the Board of the National Resistance had made several trips and
established contacts with retired active military personnel of higher ranks. In that way, they
won to their side retired general from Titov Drvar, who accepted the duty and role of the
commander of the SDS forces at the stretch Knin – Bosansko Grahovo.
Contacts are being established hurriedly with retired active military personnel, for whom it
is assumed that they would accept commanding military duties on other stretches from Knin
(Šibenik – Sinj – Zadar).
The inhabitants are still being armed.
th
The pieces of information above result from the work of the OB of the 9 Corps, and they
were delivered to this OB with the aim of informing about the security situation at the
th
territory, where the objects of the 84 Military base are located. 143
ANNEX 56:
F EDERAL SCRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL D EFENCE
IFORMATION , 10 JUARY 1991
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION
No. 6-1
10 January 1991
MILITARY CLASSIFIED DOC.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
ENCODED
DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
Information on the unauthorised formation of the SFRY Armed Forces
COMMAND _____________________________________
(…)
In the area of the Knin Krajina armed groups were formed and the weapons were acquired
in different illegal ways. There are several thousand different rifles, pistols and even rocket
launchers in that area, and from the working organisations large amounts of explosive were
singled out and used to make improvised explosive devices.
Of the armed individuals of Serbian nationality, armed formations and headquarters were
formed, to be used at certain communication directions. These formations are used to stop
the communication, to control the movement and other for surveillance and informing
duties, and all of this is unified in an according centre in Knin. There have been several
sabotage-terrorist actions lately but the perpetrators have not been identified. Only the
robbers of the JNA weaponry have been discovered so far. An investigation of 16
individuals has been initiated by the military legal administration, because of the suspicion
that they have stolen weaponry from a military transporter on the railway station in Knin.
Although the weaponry was completely recovered, the investigation is still going on and
directed on revealing the mastermind behind this act.
Such a situation has been created in the entire area that the complete administration is made
up of local administrations independent of the republic bodies in Croatia; this enabled the
paramilitary organisation to act freely. At the same time, together with the formation of the
paramilitary organisation, the political party HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) was
illegally arming and organising the Croatian population in the surrounding villages, which
created conditions for a armed conflict in this area. 144
A NNEX 57:
O RDER OF THE SFRY P RESIDENCY , 9 JNUARY 1991
The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in accordance with its
constitutional obligations and authorities from Article 313 of the SFRY Constitution,
observing the situation in the region of protecting the constitutional system of SFRY and the
events that directly threaten the system, it came to the conclusion that in many parts of the
country, with the flagrant breaking of the SFRY Law, with the direct participation of some
organisations in foreign countries and the knowledge of their governmental bodies, secretly
imported weapons from certain neighbouring countries and other countries and handed them
to the citizens according to their nationality and political orientation. This way several
illegal paramilitary-armed formations are established within several political parties. These
formations and their planned terrorist activities represent a direct threat of a start of an
armed rebellion and international conflicts of wide ranges, with immeasurable consequences
for the security of the citizens, as well as the sovereignty and integrity of the country.
In order to stop such activities and to secure a peaceful democratic process in SFRY as well
as the execution of the already initiated reforms, on its session on 9 January 1991, the
Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, reached the following
ORDER
1. With the enactment of this decision in the territory the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, all armed formations have to be disarmed if they are not within the unified
armed forces of SFRY or the parts of the Ministry of the Interior, and if their
organisation is not established according to the Federal Regulations.
2. The weaponry and equipment of the armed forces from the item 1of this decision should
be handed over to the nearest units and administrations of the Yugoslav People’s Army,
independent of the fact if separate organs in the republics have collected it or it is in or
they are in the possession of different groups and individuals.
3. The individuals who possess military weapons, ammunition or other combat material,
have to deliver them to the nearest unit or administration of the Yugoslav People’s
Army, and they will be issued a receipt afterwards.
4. The activities from count 1 and 3 of this order have to be executed within ten days after
its making. The individuals who obey this order cannot be held responsible. Legal
actions will be applied against those individuals who do not fulfil their responsible.
5. In connection with the execution of this order, according to a special decision of the
Presidency of SFRY, the Yugoslav People’s Army will secure the citizens’ security in
the entire territory of SFRY, if other authorised organs are not capable of doing it.
6. The Federal Secretariat for National Defence has the authority for inspection tasks
according to the Law on Nation-wide Defence (“Official bulletin of SFRY”, no. 21/82),
and will control the execution of this order.
7. The units and administrations of the Yugoslav People’s Army, which will be appointed
by the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, will secure the execution of this order.
8. This order will be made public through the means of public media.
9. This order will become active after its issuing. 145
THE PRESIDENCY OF
THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
PRESIDENT
Dr. Borisav Jović
n. NO. 3
9 January 1991
Belgrade
A NNEX 58:
FEDERAL SCRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL D EFENCE :
COMPLETION AND D EVELOPMENT OF L EADERSHIP
AND COMMAND IN THE A RMED FORCES (DISSERTATION ),
14 M ARCH 1989
1. LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND ON THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
2.1. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces – (present solutions)
Solutions, which result from the Decision about modernisation of leadership and command,
on the highest level of leadership and command consistent application of 4 unities is
secured. They are: (1) Unity of the entire territory of Yugoslavia as battlefield; (2) Unity of
armed forces on the battlefield; (3) Unity of the armed combat and (4) Unity of leadership
and command.
The strategic level of the command has two levels now and they are: the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces and Military Region Commands, with what it has been
decentralised in practice. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has ceded its
authorities regarding preparations and conduct of strategic operations in the military region
and commanding all forces of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Territorial Defence in
the regions, to commands of the Military Regions, as strategic commands of the armed
forces. In keeping with that, the Supreme Command plays the role as institution of war
conduct, which directs the integrity of the war in all of its dimensions. When exercising that
essential function, in the war the Supreme Command is engaged in conducting the “ONOR”
in every part of social operating where the war is being conducted. Following obligations
belong here: towards the exterior surrounding and international position, relations with
allies, questions of interior economic and political relations, securing necessary materials,
demographic and other resources for conduct of the “ONOR” of long duration and, finally,
obligations from the sphere of military-defence problems, that is preparation and conduct of
strategic operations on the battlefield and directing the armed combat by the uniform
strategic conception towards realisation of the uniform strategic objective.
∗
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces consists of: the Presidency of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Staff of the Supreme Command – Federal Secretariat for the
National Defence 146
The Supreme Command realises all questions in connection with preparations and conduct
of operations on the battlefield and in the regions through the Staff of the Supreme
Command - Federal Secretariat for National Defence, through commands of the military
regions and, under certain conditions, through republic and provincial staff of the Territorial
Defence.
During peacetime, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can cede
certain affairs of leading and commanding Armed Forces to Federal Secretary for the
National Defence for which he answers to the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia in affairs of leading and commanding Armed Forces and in affairs of
executing documents and measures of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. In this connection, Federal Secretary for the National Defence can issue orders,
compulsory instructions and other official papers to commanders of the Territorial Defence.
In entirety in relation to leading and commanding Armed Forces during peacetime, the
Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has 9 direct links: Federal
Secretariat for National Defence, six republic staffs of the Territorial Defence, two
provincial staffs of the Territorial Defence (scheme no. 1). Commands of the military
regions are during peacetime directly subordinated to the Federal Secretariat for National
Defence.
By adopting the amendment to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia,
commanders of provincial staffs of the Territorial Defence would answer exclusively to the
commander of the Republic Staff of the Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic of
Serbia and they would be subordinated to him by the principle of the subordination.
According to that, the commander of the Republic Staff of the Territorial Defence of the
Socialist Republic of Serbia would directly answer to the Presidency of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia for the Territorial Defence on the entire territory of the Republic,
with what two direct links of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
diminish, what makes him more Operations.
In the war, commanders of the military regions, of the Combat Air Force and the Anti-
aircraft Defence and of the Navy are directly subordinated to the Presidency of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the highest organ of leading and commanding armed
forces. Commanders of the Territorial Defence of “SR” and “SAP” are Operationally
subordinated to commands of the military regions. Exceptionally, under conditions of
unfavourable development of the strategic situation on the battlefield and temporary
occupation of the larger part on that territory. In any case, the number of links of the
Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for commanding armed forces in
the war decreases to 5 direct links (scheme no. 2), with what conditions are made for it to
engage in questions of conduct of war in its entirety.
(…)
Only the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has the right to order
about the combat use of units of armed forces and president, in the name of the Presidency
and in keeping with decisions and stands of the Presidency, realises this right. Chief of Staff
of the Supreme Command can, by authorisation of the Presidency, lead armed combat and
set tasks to commands and staffs of directly subordinated units and structures during the
realisation of decision, order or directive of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia directly, for what commanders of territorial defence of socialist republics and
provinces are responsible as well. That means that, besides the direct responsibility towards 147
the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, commanders of the
Territorial Defence of “SR” and “SAP” also answer to the Federal Secretary for the
National Defence by those questions for which he was authorised by the Presidency of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
(…)
After forming commands of the military regions, their commanders are members of the
Military Council of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence. Commanders of republic
and provincial staffs of the Territorial Defence, by solutions so far, are regular members of
the Military Council. This kind of a solution would have to be corrected to a certain degree.
By changes in the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia that will take place after
adopting the amendment, commanding the Territorial Defence will be established in a
different manner. With this kind of solutions, the need for commanders of the Territorial
Defence of the “SAP” to participate in the work of the Military Council in principle stops.
However, we shouldn’t be “a priori” against their occasional participation in the work of the
Military Council if it is important. That practically means that they wouldn’t be regular but
periodical members of the Military Council and they would participate in its work only
when called.
c. Directions of further completion of commands of the military regions
On the strategic level of leadership and command, the emphasis of the work has to be on the
quick and high quality training of commands of the military regions as possible, because it
is the completely new level of leadership and command that has just started operating. The
fundamental thing is that tasks, which result from the plan “Unity”, are being executed
according to a plan and that they become concrete in all spheres of activities of leadership
and command.
2.6. Leadership and command in the Territorial Defence
According to the long-term development of the Armed Forces, the leadership and command
in the Territorial Defence should be further organisationally improved, equipped with
adequate means and trained for successful execution of specified-purpose tasks during
peacetime, in the state of emergency and in the war.
During peacetime, republic and provincial staffs are not subordinated to commands of the
regions but they are directly linked to the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, that if to the Supreme Command.
In the war, republic staffs of the Territorial Defence and provincial staffs of the Territorial
Defence are Operationsly connected to commands of the military regions to which they are
subordinated, as well as other organic units, what is natural because it is a question of staffs
of the Armed Forces. However, in one part of connections of republic staffs of the
Territorial Defence and provincial staffs of the Territorial Defence towards leaderships of
the “DPZ” regarding preparations, equipping and financing, nothing would be changed in
relation to solutions so far.
With regard to that territories of certain republics belongs to zones of responsibility of
several military regions, this asks for that staffs of the Territorial Defence of those republics
are Operationally subordinated to one command of a military region and republic staffs of
the Territorial Defence and provincial staffs of the Territorial Defence only co-operate with 148
those commands of military regions to whose zones a smaller part of territory of their
republics belongs to.
In the structural view, in the system of leading and commanding the Territorial Defence
there are no fundamental changes. Zone (district, provincial and county) staffs of the
Territorial Defence remain on the direct link to republic-provincial staffs of the Territorial
Defence and municipal staffs of the Territorial Defence to zone staffs.
Under circumstances of the temporary occupation of the larger part or the entire territory of
the “SR” and the “SAP”, by decision of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, republic and provincial staffs of the Territorial Defence can realise leading and
commanding all armed forces on that territory and under those circumstances, they would
be directly connected for the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
In connection with the long-term development and improving of leadership and command in
the Territorial Defence, until year 2000, the number of staffs of the Territorial Defence in
local committees and “OUR” should be reduced, as well as one part of regional staffs of the
Territorial Defence. The “DPZ” has to train staffs of the Territorial Defence and secretariats
for the national defence for taking over the function of military-territorial organs.
Further, for satisfying needs for observation of the state in the Territorial Defence, it is
necessary to work out in detail and to implement regular reporting and informing about
every relevant questions of the condition of the situation in the Territorial Defence in the
Federal Secretariat for National Defence, where a technical modernisation of the Leadership
and Command has an important role for their integration in the information system of the
Armed Forces.
…2. LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND ON THE OPERATIVE LEVEL
Modernising of the system of leading and commanding Armed Forces, the executive level
of leadership and command, by forming corps and connecting republic staffs of the
Territorial Defence – provincial staffs of the Territorial Defence for the command of
military regions, has developed in its entirety. The corps organisation of the brigade
structure is the contemporary type of military organisation that members of blocs, including
our neighbours, adopted or are adopting. Corps organisation in our armed forces has been
checked and tested for several years, and in this connection, important experiences in
leading and commanding those structures are learned.
Brigades of the Yugoslav People’s Army, partisan divisions and corresponding support and
security units make the structure of corps. In the war, partisan brigades of the Territorial
Defence are Operationally subordinated to corps, which includes implicitly the obligation
that during peace they influence the entire combat development and training of partisan
brigades of the Territorial Defence and in the war, according to the place and the role, they
make them stronger and they support them with adequate means of support.
In 1988, forming of all corps by the plan “Unity” was completed, so that there are now 16
corps of Land Forces and 3 corps of the Combat Air Force and the Anti-aircraft Defence in
the Yugoslav People’s Army. Republic-staffs of the Territorial Defence, 3 Naval Regions,
command of the fleet and commands of defence of the town Belgrade and Zagreb have
executive level of leadership and command. 31 commands, that is staffs of executive level,
are formed in the Armed Forces. 149
In the system of leadership and command, all commands of corps of Land Forces are
directly subordinated to commands of the regions and corps of the Combat Air Force and
the Anti-aircraft Defence to the Command of the Combat Air Force and the Anti-aircraft
Defence.
6. CONCLUSIONS
(…)
2) Modernising of the system of leading and commanding Armed Forces, the executive
level of leading and commanding Armed Forces by forming corps in the Yugoslav People’s
Army and connecting republic staffs of the Territorial Defence – provincial staffs of the
Territorial Defence for the command of military regions, with what those staffs obtained the
status of the operations command, has developed in its entirety. The corps organisation of
the brigade structure is the modern type of military organisation, many countries in the
world are adopting it and it has been approved in practice in our country. In the war,
partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence are being Operationally subordinated to corps,
which includes implicitly the obligation that during peace they influence the entire combat
development and training of partisan brigades of the Territorial Defence and that in the war,
according to the place and the role, they make them stronger and support them by adequate
means of support. In the following period, the co-ordination and co-operation with the
“DPZ” and “DPO”, regarding concrete tasks and obligations in zones of responsibility,
should be controlled by adequate documents and plans and it is important to include
commands of defence of large cities. 150
A NNEX 59:
TH
O RDER OF THE 17 C ORPS , 14 M AY 1991
TH
THE 17 CORPS COMMAND
NO. 11/1-73
14 May 1991
THE DEFENCE OF THE JNA FACILITIES
ORDER.-
th st th
TO THE COMMAND OF: the 12 infantry “M” brigade, the 51 GB, the 158 Combined
anti-armoured brigade, the 12 thCombined artillery regiment, to the 17 tlight artillery anti-
th th th
aircraft defence, to the 670 Pontoon Battalion, the 327 motorized brigade, to the 395
motorized brigade, the 38 “PARTD”, the 317 “PV”.h
I ORDER
1. The subordinate commands of the units, barracks, and garrisons will organise
the defence of the following JNA facilities: barracks, separated warehouses,
JNA centres, “RRC”, GA (if they are out of the barracks range), watchtowers
and the homes of the officers. The defence should be organised according to
the PS OS of the item 317-359 and with the engagement the units that are in
the condition of momentarily readiness, the command of the 12 thinfantry “m”
th st
brigade and the 12 Combined artillery regiment, engaging the units of the 1
motorised battalion of the 353 rdmotorized brigade and the 2 nd motorised
th
battalion of the 36 motorized brigade.
The troops intended for the defence should be trained on top level and in the
case of need they must act decisively and energetically according to the rules
of the combat use.
The level of combat readiness of the troops that are to be engaged on the
territory of Slavonia and Baranja must be in the condition of the momentarily
readiness and on the area south of the river Sava the political – security
situation will be regulated by the Corps Command according to the situation.
2. For the security of the separated and remote facilities (warehouses, “RRC”,
watchtowers, residential facilities) where there is not enough tr oops the
engagement of the units that are in the condition of momentarily readiness can
be brought in question and other troops can be used while taking into account
that there is some reserve of the ready troops left.
3. In case of the attack on more than one facility, besides the mentioned
measures the activity on institutions that organise these activities (municipal
assemblies, the stations of the Ministry of the Interior and of the Secretariat of
the Interior, the quarters for the training of the paramilitary units etc.) should
be foreseen. For this kind of activity the armoured mechanized units, the
artillery units and the units of the anti-aircraft defence should be engaged and
if necessary the use of the aviation must be demanded and in that case the
ultimatum with the deadline must be issued to the mentioned institutions and
after that the energetic activity must start. 151
4. The plans of the defence of the facilities must be made till 3 p.m. on the 18 th
of May 1991 when they have to be delivered by the commanders of the units
to the Corps Command. The transport of the commanders that will deliver the
plans will be regulated with the special order.
Two copies of the plan of the defence for every facility should be delivered to
the Corps Command.
The executors of the making of the plans are the commands of the barracks –
garrisons.
The plans of the defence should contain the following documents:
1. short evaluation of the condition of the territory and the facilities
2. the order for the organisation of the defence and the engagement of the
troops
3. the list of the direct security and the engagement of the units
4. the plan of the security and the engagement of the units according to their
variants (graphically)
5. On the basis of the evaluation for the separated facilities the engagement of the
special troops should be planned:
(a) for the watchtowers on the territory of Baranja: 3 “GC” for the training of
the border guards and the 39 th “COVPIP” and for the watchtowers in
nd
Slavonia; finished troops till “MC” from the 2 motorized battalion of
the 12 infantry “m” brigade.
th
(b) the 12 infantry “m” brigade will make the plan of the defence of the
“RRC” “Papuka” and besides the 17 th“RIV” it has to take into account
nd
the troops of the 2 motorized battalion, Našice garrison.
(c) the 158 Combined anti-armoured artillery brigade will make the plan of
the defence of the for the “Nabr đe” artillery range and besides the units
of the “Nabrđe” artillery range it has to take into account the troops from
th
the 158 Combined anti-armoured artillery brigade.
th
(d) the 112 Combined artillery regiment will make plan for the “Vrapačani”
th
facility and besides the troops of the 12 Combined artillery regiment
and the 17 light artillery regiment it has to take into account the troops
nd th
till MC from the 2 motorized battalion of the 36 motorized brigade.
th
6. For the defence of the “PCV PAR” – the village one platoon from the 17
“BV” must be engaged. The command of the 17 th“BV” will make the plan
of the defence with the help of the Corps Command.
7. The command of the 92 ndmotorized brigade will make plans for the defence
of: the “Husinska buna” barracks, the houses in the Skojevska district in the
October revolution district (in the district of the “Bra ća Ribar” “OS”) and in
the district Maršal Tito and “GA”. 152
For the defence the following units should be engaged: the units of the 92 nd
th th th
motorized brigade, the 904 rear base, the 497 engineer regiment, the 17
“BV”, the 17 artillery brigade and the 17 “CABHO”.
The command of the 497 thengineer regiment will make the plan for the
defence of the Kozlovac warehouse in cooperation with the command of the
nd
92 motorized brigade.
The Section for Operational-Instructional Affairs of the Corps Command in
cooperation with the Security Agency will make the plan for the defence of
the Corps Command, the JNA centre and the residential facilities in
Muharem Fizović Street. Why engage the troops of the 17 th“CVO” and the
th
17 “IC”
8. The 317 th“PV”ofthe1 stMilitary Region will make the plans for the
facilities in Bijeljina garrison and these plans will be delivered to the Corps
Command according to the item 4 of this order, if the Command of the 1 st
Military Region does not regulate it differently with its order.
9. After the plans are made the instructions for work of the bodies on duty
must be updated according to the plans for the defence.
10. Only specially selected commanders will be informed about this order and
they have to be engaged in making the plans for the defence. The plans must
be made in the offices for the war planning.
11. During the execution of this task the measures of the protection that were
established in the instruction for the making and the protection of the PU
must be abided.
COMMANDER
GENERAL-MAJOR
SAVO JANKOVIĆ
THE COMMAND
TH
OF THE 158 COMBINED ANTI-ARMOURED
ARTILLERY BRIGADE
No. 403-2
15 May 1991 153
A NNEX 60:
C OMMAND OF THE 10TH CORPS , 10 M AY 1991
Extract from: BOŽIDAR JAVOROVI Ć, National Defence of the city Zagreb in the
Croatian Liberation War, Defimi, Zagreb, 1999
Document 1.
STATE CLASS. DOCUMENT
ORDER OF DUŠAN UZELAC FOR PUTTING INTO COMBAT READINESS
THE 10 TH CORPS OF THE JNA
COMMAND OF THE 10 TH CORPS
DELIVERED PERSONALLY TO THE COMMANDER
10 May 1991
Putting the peacetime formation of the 10 Corps in total combat readiness.
On the basis of the Order of the Command of the 5 thMilitary Region, DT No. 23-1 in
th
connection with the responsibility of the 10Corps, and with the purpose of energetically
and flawlessly carrying out tasks and obligations determined by the Constitution of SFRY in
the protection of the integrity and sovereignty of SFRY and the prevention of an inter-ethnic
conflict, I am issuing the
ORDER
th
1. The complete peacetime formation of the Command of the 10 Corps and the
subordinated units (except for the 25Motorized Brigade, the 6thCombined
th
Artillery Regiment and the 10 “SNB”) has to be put into combat readiness,
with the task: prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts and civil war.
The discharge of the conscript soldiers of the May and June groups has to be
stopped. According to Article 71, paragraph 4, Item 1 and 2 of the
Conscription Law, all administrative procedures have to be done in order to
define the prolonged military service of the soldiers as military training, and
in accordance with Article 52, Paragraph 5 of the Conscription Law.
The civilians at service in the Armed Forces have to be engaged out of the
work-time, when requested by the commanders.
2. During the performance of the task, the manpower, the technical material
supplies, the military installations, the families and apartments of the
members of the JNA should be entirely secured. If the members of the JNA,
their family members or military installations should be attacked, fire should
be opened instantly and the aggressor destroyed and disabled. The march and
movements have to be done according to plans and procedures for the combat
engagement of the units in the approaching march, which includes implicitly
taking all measures of combat and march security (intelligence, security,
combat and reconnaissance), with the purpose of a safe and quick arriving at
the march destination and completion of the task. 154
3. Putting out flags and other symbols in the commands and the units in the
entire responsibility zone of the 10hCorps, except for the flags and symbols
decreed by the Regulation of the Armed Forces Service (item 565 “PSOS”
and item 20 of the Regulation on the changes and reinforcement of the
“PSOS” from 22 January 1991), has to be prohibited. The officers of the units
in combat readiness have to be armed and equipped according to war
formation.
4. All peacetime formations have to be ready for use, and all documents have to
be available at all levels of management and commanding for this matter.
(Item 32 of the Instruction for the work of the Commands and the
Headquarters of the Armed Forces of SFRY)
In the units, each one set of ammunition should be put at the disposal, and in
case of the use of the units, another set of ammunition in the transport of each
unit.
5. In the conditions of complete combat readiness, in all units and commands, a
planned, organised and intensive training should be carried out.
The focus of the training has to be:
Practical training of the officers and the commands in safe commanding of
their composition.
Training of the soldiers in handling with personal and common weapons, in
use of special chemicals, in securing the movement, in securing military
installations and technical material supplies, in searching and surprise attacks,
and in preventing destructive street riots.
Training of drivers of combat and non-combat vehicles in driving and
maintaining the vehicles
Carry out a correction of the working plans and task assignments in necessary
proportions, while the aforesaid operations and subjects have to be planned
and carried out as soon as possible.
6. All the previously, either in written or spoken form, issued orders are in force
until further notice.
COMMANDER
Lieutenant Colonel General
Dušan Uzelac
MILITARY MAIL
No. 4423
11 May 1991
VRAPČANSKI POTOK, ZAGREB 155
A NNEX 61:
[DELETED ]
A NNEX 62:
INSTRUCTION OF THE FEDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL D EFENCE , 28 JNE 1991
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMOURED MECHANIZED UNITS
28 June 1991
On the basis of the Instructions for the production and use of military technical literature –
IV Administration No. 1587 from 22 November 1982, in terms of item 34 c), I am lying
down the following
INSTRUCTION
ON THE USE OF ARMOURED AND MECHANIZED UNITS
IN EXTRAORDINATY SITUATIONS,
which comes into force immediately.
CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE SFRY Lieutenant General
Blagoje Adžić
INTRODUCTION
The instructions for the use of the armoured and mechanized units in extraordinary
situations is based on the decisions of the existing Instructions and on the examinations of
similar issues in international military Manuals, from which certain procedures were taken.
It presents the further examination of preparations, organisation and performance of
operations in extraordinary situations.
The Instructions is intended for the Commands of the Armoured mechanized Units and
presents the starting basis for the training of soldiers, officers and units.
The instructions contain short descriptions of the actions, which can be taken by riot
initiators. The procedures must be explained to the soldiers, so that they can confront them
as prepared as possible, and also in order they can prepare on time for the dignified and
resolute reaction in each of the mentioned and similar situations, that can be caused by riot
initiators.
Concrete tasks of the Armoured Mechanized Unit in extraordinary situations and the
manner of their performance represent a description of collected experiences of use of units
both in our country and abroad, when only the last method of suppressing extraordinary
situation can be used – fire.
We think that the Instruction represents a reminder, which during the training of the unit,
especially of the soldiers, has to be expanded by informing soldiers and the officer staff 156
about the legal decrees that regulate this issue – which, for objective reasons, could not be
explained here.
It means that, with regard to the specification of the task, the Instructions must be applied
creatively in every situation.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1. ACTIONS THAT CAN BE TAKEN BY RIOT INITIATORS
a. Verbal provocation
b. Setting up barricades
c. Direct attacks on the units engaged
d. Activation of vehicles and other mobile means
e. Causing fire
f. Use of explosive
g. Use of fire arms
h. Use of women, children and senior persons
i. Psychological and propaganda pressure
j. Threats and blackmail
2. TASKS OF THE ARMOURED MECHANIZED UNIT IN EXTRAORDINARY
SITUATIONS
a. Securing the borders
b. Enforced security of military objects
c. Participation in securing economic, common and other objects of importance
2.4 Blockade of the territory
2.4.1 Setting up barricades and barriers on the roads
2.4.2 Patrolling around the area
a. Demonstration of power
b. Suppression of destructive riots
c. Discovery, suppression and destruction of diversionist, rebel, terrorist
and other groups
2.7.1 Search of the terrain
2.7.2 Blockade and destruction of aggressor groups
2.7.3 Suppression and destruction of aggressor groups
a. Suppression of armed riots
b. Prevention of civil war
3. Actions of Individuals and Units in Performing Tasks in Extraordinary Situations
a. Examination and following the conducts in the unit
b. Break of the protesters into smaller groups
c. Keeping protesters in a specific room
d. Use of power 157
i. Use of special chemical means for the suppression of street riots
ii. Use of excellent riflemen and snipers
Measures for preventing protesters ascending combat vehicles
A NNEX 63:
TH
C OMMAND OF THE 17 C ORPS , 5 JLY 1991
TH
COMMAND OF THE 17 CORPS
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL NO. 1085-18
5 July 1991
TAKING ACTION CONSIDERING COMBAT READINESS
FOR THE MORE EFFECTIVE EXECUTING
OF TASKS
TO THE COMMAND
(illegible)
On the basis of the order of the Command of the 1 Military Region, strictly conf. no. 1438-
27 from 03 July 1991, as a consequence of more and more brutal attacks on the JNA in
Celina, its members and facilities and experience from the so-far engagement of the JNA
units and corps, with a purpose to execute tasks effectively I
ORDER
1. Make system more efficient and insure complete execution of these tasks by
direct and concrete engaging of the senior officers in units.
Build strong moral state of mind. Insure order and discipline (especially in
mobilised units) and whole high combat readiness.
2. All the units which are deployed at positions, should hurry up in preparing
senior officers and Commands concerning knowledge of the area and
possible directions of actions.
3. In executing given tasks, have in mind engaging of forces … (illegible)
4. All commands in deciding and engaging of forces have to have a solution
for the execution of a task in more possible ways and adjusted to given
conditions. While making decisions, initiatives of individuals, senior
officers, as well of soldiers should be heard.
5. Do all preparations necessary for overcoming obstacles of all kinds. While
doing it use tactic procedures. Insure effective support of armoured-
mechanized motorized units with all available means of support.
6. If units are attacked with fire, energetically, with all means, respond with a
powerful attack, so that the enemy is destroyed. While doing that have in
mind that men and “MS” have to be as protected as possible. 158
7. In performing “BOIV” develop even more initiative in courage and
firmness of each individual.
8. While executing a task, except in special cases, units have to be grouped in
dense formations, in order to more powerfully attack and prevent the enemy
to make the individual means an easy plunder.
9. Inform all senior officers about this order and train the soldiers and make
them capable of executing tasks in case they are attacked by the enemy fire.
“RR/ZM”
COMMANDER GENERAL-MAJOR SAVO JANKOVIĆ
TH
COMMAND OF THE 158 COMBINED
ANTI-ARMOURED ARTILLERY BRIGADE
CONF., NO. 1057-5
05 JULY 1991
Deliver in a form of a telegram: 12 “PMBR”, 51. 93, 12 thCombined artillery regiment, 17 th
th
“LAP” of the Anti-Aircraft Defence, 158 Combined anti-armoured artillery brigade, 670
Pontoon Battalion, 17 th“RIV”, artillery range “Nabr đe”, 327 thmotorized brigade, 395 th
th th
motorized brigade, 11 “PARTD”, 38 “MAPRTD” 159
A NNEX 64:
TRANSCRIPT OF C ONVERSATION BETWEEN R ADOVAN K ARADŽIĆ AND LSBODAN
M ILOŠEVIĆ , 20 DECEMBER 1991
Date: 20 December 1991
Conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević
R- This is what is going on. My fools in the Krajina wanted to make a decision today on the
annexation of the Krajina and the SAO Krajina and then I remembered what happened to
me at the assembly once. We had a majority and all of suddĐuda came, some idiot, and
the decision by facsimile they took over initiative.
th
S- They always do that. I was just checking something. Banija’s 7 wants to assault
Kostajnica. I said go to hell, tomorrow is a peace conference and you want to assault
Kostajnica.
R- I saw that they wanted to. I had a vision that a facsimile was coming and hđmanu
rejoices and accuses you of preparing this so that the peace conference would fail. Because
this is exactly how it would be.
S- Yes, sure.
R- Yes, it would happen that way.
S- And we have to introduce discipline.
R- Yes, total discipline.
S- I see that those Americans here have many comments. Those were even in Zagreb and
elsewhere. They say that Yugoslavia will obviously end up with only three Republics, plus
the Serbs in Croatia. We ask for nothing more.
R- We do not, indeed. Let them adjust to it.
S- We ask for nothing more, indeed. We will go down on vacation to…
R- …play cards (laughter). The Americans have so-called social acceptance of ideas, but
they first have to be exposed to them so they can get used to them and then they become
natural. We are with Alija now, I chased him into a corner and now he is playing games
with me and he expects a lot from Europe, but I will not let him to change his mind. We said
that no nation would assault another.
S- I know. I am the one at the end, you know what I say at the end. At the end I say: (in
English “Mr. chairman, I am using this opportunity to inform you that at the meeting in
Belgrade not long ago, the meeting of top representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia, and Montenegro the initiative was launched on the terrain and principals for a
peaceful and democratic solution to the Yugoslav crisis and the adoption of a new Yugoslav
constitution as a common state of equal republics, nations and citizens.”)
R- Excellent!!!
S- (Continues in English) “I would like to assure you that for the majority of Yugoslav
citizens Yugoslavia is the common state of equal nations and republics. Even though, the
present were all top representatives of three Republics we have not adopted acts on the
secession from Yugoslavia. The Belgrade initiative is absolutely open to all Yugoslav
nations and Republics.” 160
R- A-ha, if Alija opposes we need to say that he used to be the president of the Assembly.
S- He will say that he was not and that they are not, but I will say “top-representative”. “I
consider the president of the Parliament to be a top representative.” Ha, ha, ha.
R- Yes, yes. Excellent!!! Ha, ha, ha
S- So, he will not have an answer again. He will not.
R- That’s excellent. I brought him into these waters and now we will see who will swim the
furthest, but we are not getting out of the water. We said that no nation would assault
another, all right. We will not impose our opinion, all right. What will we do if a solution is
found that is acceptable for two nations, but not acceptable for the third? Therefore, it must
be an asymmetrical solution. We will either have a common solution for Bosnia and
Herzegovina or a twofold or threefold solution. That means if all three nations have
different views then the solution has to be threefold.
S- Absolutely.
R- He accepted that and we are already going tomorrow, we are leaving. I have a big
session. Tomorrow at 4.00 o’clock, all my men in charge. I was in Trebinje and replaced
some idiots. I spent nine hours there. Members of the SPO (the Serbian Revival Movement)
sucked up to me.
S- He functions through them, since he collected money and those idiots listen to him,
because they do not know that he was paid.
R- He is there, Komen čić goes to him every ten days. They wanted to replace my man,
Bozo Vučurević, over there. However, I prevented that last night and the Executive Council
agreed with me today and I threw them out, put other people in the party and so on. I
returned that guy and municipal government collapsed. That was the only blow coming
from Komenečić. The only blow to the party, however, I won last night.
S- OK, please call Miro to give you Adžić and tell him all this. I am going to sleep, ‘cause I
have to get up at 5.30 am.
R- Fine, good luck and I will be thinking of you.
S- Thanks a lot, Radovan.
R- Hold on. Good night.
S- Good night, Radovan. 161
A NNEX 65:
L ETTER OF D UŠAN MSLJANIĆ , 15 OCTOBER 1994
Dušan Smiljanić, Colonel
Assistant Commander of
the Security Intelligence Service
of the SVK (the Serbian Army of Krajina) HQ
Knin, 15 October 1994
The Request for Verification of Information and Interview
HQ OF THE SERBIAN ARMY
-for General R. Mladić, personally-
Mister General, from what I know you gave a very negative evaluation about me at the
meeting in Novi Grad, on 13 October 1994, where among others the Commander of the
SVK HQ and the rest of the senior officers at the highest position of authority of the SVK
were also present. I do not know a possible source of the information you had received, but
I believe they do not come from your Security Intelligence Service. I suppose who could be
the possible sources, because they had already tried to launch such and similar information
to the authorities of the RSK.
Mister General, since it was you who gave such evaluation and if you still believe in its
accuracy, I as a commissioned officer of the SVK suggest the following solution:
1. If that evaluation is accurate I will not be able to perform the present duty any longer, at
the first place for the sake of the Service itself, as well as because of the cooperation, to
which I incline, with the other related services of the Republic of Serbia Army (VRS).
2. You should order a verification of the figures from the received information, because I
am strongly convinced that there is something much deeper behind the scenes, where
Smiljanic is the least important, and if it is not going to be carried out, the consequences
will be quite profound for the Service I am in charge of.
Since the given evaluation comes from you, I, as a human being and a Serbian officer find it
very difficult, for I am not just a casual passer-by in this war and I am very familiar with the
genesis of the war happenings in this region as well as with the positions and roles of
particular units and with the conduct and behaviour of a larger number of the former JNA
senior officers, now the members of the SVK, VRS and VJ (Yugoslav Army).
In the barest outline I am going to inform you about my position and role in the war
happenings and because the necessity for the information verification:
th
Before the beginning of the war I was the Head of the Security Sector of the 10 Corps in
Zagreb, where I was very well informed about the early beginnings of an Ustasha
government establishment. After the war broke out in Plitvica on 31 March 1991, on my
own request a group of the senior officers and I were sent to Plitvica. I stayed there, in the
areas of the RSK until July 1992.
Some approaches used by the members of the MUP (the Ministry of the Interior), politics
that was in effect at that time, particularly attitudes and behaviour of those who held the
nd
highest military positions and of other officers on the positions of authority in the 2
Military Region have solved all dilemmas about my commitment and things I was supposed
to do. 162
I got in touch, illegally with the leaders of the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) from the
areas of Lika, Banija, Kordun and Banja Luka and with a group from the OB (Security
Agency) and VP (the Military Mail) (16). At the end of April and the beginning of May I
started with the illegal arming of the Serbian people from then our warehouses, now
Ustashas’ (in Otočac, Perušić, Gospić, Sveti Rok, and Skradnik) persuading our Serbs, the
managers of these warehouses.
This action lasted until the beginning of July 1991, and around 15,000 pieces of various
infantry weapons, grenade launchers, PA (antiaircraft) 20 mm guns, and a large number of
munitions have been distributed. According to our estimate it was a crucial factor for the
defence of Lika, Kordun and Banija, taking into account the number and conditions of the
Operations units, which were in the areas of Lika, Kordun and Banija. Then, I requested
that the artillery of the 35hPartisan Division be pulled out from Gospi ć and Otočac and be
assigned to the front, but it was refused by the commanding senior officers, who could not
or did not want to see the further development of events.
In July 1991, I left to the area of Novi Grad and Banja Luka where I got in touch with
Stojan Župljanin, Brdanin and other individuals. During the month I have organised the
transport of the weapons from the warehouse Skradnik to the SO Čelinac and Drvar. There
were more than 20,000 various pieces of weapons including howitzers, bombs, and rocket
launchers with two sets of munitions. One of the members involved in this action was Milan
Skondruc, now in the Republic of Serbia. Together with the above mentioned persons from
the Republic of Serbia, an under covered mobilization of around 600 members of the SDS
and VES tank corpsmen was organised. The plan was that they were to be brought illegally
to the warehthse Cerkezovac and later to be trantherred to Jastrebarsko, Zagreb and Dugo
Selo (the 4 Armoured Brigade and the 140 Mechanized Brigade), so that the armoured
vehicles from the mentioned units could be stationed by the river of Kupa. For the
realisation of this plath at the warehouse Čerkezovac I called a meeting between the
commander of the 10 Corps and the individuals, Br đanin was among them, from the SDS.
However, afterwards General Uzelac informed me from Zagreb that General Avramovi ć
had refused the plan. General Avramović asked for the realisation of this plan in September,
but it was no longer executable.
Mister General, General Kelečević Boško is very well informed about all this and there are
also the written proofs.
During the realisation of these tasks, some individuals from the Military structure regarded
me as an extremist and Chetnik, saying that I have deviated from the Leadership and
Command (RiK).
The various structures at the field looked upon me as a creator of the Yugoslav movement.
The decisions on my liquidation were made there, but the execution was delayed until the
whole nation was provided with arms. I have experienced a series of other inconveniences.
At the same time with this task we also performed the intelligence and security tasks and I
was acquainted with the behaviour of those in charge of the various social structures as well
as of those who deserted leaving these people at the mercy of the war. Unfortunately, now
the individuals are in the position to give the evaluation about me and to interpret the events
in a way to serve their politics.
At the beginning of August 1991, the Operations team “PROBOJ-2” was formed requested
by the Security Administration and under my commanding. It was composed of the Security
Department of the various branches with the following task: 163
-arming of the Serbian people
-the central task: the help and participation in the military organisation
-resisting the Croatian service in the areas of Lika, Banija and Kordun
This team worked until the end of 1991. I was a subordindte to the Security Administration,
and I used to submit a report to the Head of the 2 Military Region, Air Force and Anti-
Aircraft Defence Security Service. Beside that I was connected with the Ministry of
Defence of the Republic of Serbia, concerning the role of that Ministry in the war
conducting at the time.
During the period from August to October 1991, we distributed, or to say pulled out from
the Ustashas’ warehouses around 20,000 pieces of various weapons. General Kelecevic is
very well acquainted with our participation in the military organisation and successful
executions of security tasks. All that can be documented by reports.
Because of the great resistance and problems we came across in forming the brigades,
particularly in the area of Lika and part of Banija, in September 1991 I called the meetings
between the reserve officers and representatives of the Gračac and Vrhovina establishments.
The present President of the RSK, Milan Marti ć also attended the meetings. After these
meetings brigades were formed in Gračac, Udbina, Vrhovina and Plaško. In the afternoon of
the same day Milan Marti ć and I went to Novi Grad aiming at the solution of some
questions about the final occupation of Kostajnica.
As you already know, on our way back from Novi Grad, we were arrested in S. Otoci.
In January 1992, I was appointed the Head of the Security Service of the 10 thCorps where
the Operations Groups-6, 7 and 8 were included. My superiors and then senior officers from
the 10 Corps are well acquainted with the work of the Service, the conditions (interior)
under which it performed its duties and with the tasks it performed together with the police.
They can give an accurate estimate about it, if it is not to their disadvantage now.
th
Estimating the events I focused myself to the formation and growth of the 10 Military
Police Battalion which was the most promising force, and which besides the police actions
also executed the military ones. Since I had already known some persons from the SDS
Bihać, our cooperation continued here. The larger number of senior officers, especially
those who came from the encirclement were extremely demoralized and disoriented. Some
of them were unsatisfied with their position and rank, which resulted in total passivity and
lack of any initiative (apart of some individuals among whom was Colonel Kršić, I think his
name was, now in the 2 nd KK). By arrangement with the Security Agency (OB), I organised
OB and with some senior officers from the police we organised the arming of the Serbs
from the town. I do not remember but I think that around 5,000 pieces of the Infantry
weapons were issued. The source of the supplies was the rear base, commanded by Colonel
Škondrić.
Since the formation of units began, the senior officers from these areas were asked to get
employed in the units’ formation. Then I had an interview with some individuals from these
areas who refused it finding different excuses.
At the beginning of May 1992, I got in touch with General Tolimir who was in Knin.
Concerning the development of events, with General Tolimir, and with the consent of the
Corps Commander, I arranged that a part of the devices and police equipment be
transported to the RSK, because a specialised unit was about to be formed there. Of 9 pieces 164
of the “BOV M-84”, I issued 4 to General Tolimir in Korenica on 12 May 1992. There is
still a list of all this equipment issued at the time.
Then the famous telegram arrived which said that all senior officers and soldiers, who were
born in the territory of the FRY, were supposed to retreat (70 per cent of the Battalion was
composed of the active soldiers). The senior officers born in the territory of FRY were
supposed to go into the Yugoslav Army, and those born in BiH to the Republic of Serbia.
We Palestinians from the RSK together with the Corps could go to Niš or wherever we
pleased. Being a Palestinian I went to Knin, but I did not escaped as some individuals now
claim. Before leaving I warned the senior officers who stayed that Second Lieutenant Kliko,
a Muslim, might escape to his people and that they should pay their attention to it, but
unfortunately it is exactly what happened. He escaped and took one “BOV” with him.
Those days you and Tolimir also went to the Republic of Serbia, and I was assigned on the
function previously preformed by Tolimir in Knin.
On 15 May 1992, I went to Belgrade and at the HQ I met with you and Tolimir. You asked
for my assessment and opinion about some senior officers of the 10 thCorps and the
condition in Biha ć. After that you made a decision on the assignment of the 2 ndK.K.
Commander.
th
Around the 20 of May, I came back to Knin to take the duty of the State Security Service
Head, as it had been previously arranged. These days the Command in Knin received a
telegram from the Security Intelligence Service of the RS (I still have it) that I had stolen
th
some devices from the 10 Corps (the “BOV” and equipment) and some other insinuations.
Receiving the telegram I replied to General Tolimir, assuming that he had known nothing
about it, since his signature was on the telegram and since he was present during the take-
over of these devices. I still have not received an answer.
I am really unable to understand the whole situation now. There is documentation for all
this, and I am ready to confront with any one, so that all things can be solved, although I
was convinced it had already been solved.
The political movements those days in Knin, or to say in the RSK, at the first place in
regard to the active military personnel, neutralised their duty and the work in general. With
the transformation of the Army into the Police, practically the whole Serbian Army was
crashed. Than the political games and various insinuations were directed against me all
aimed at my departure from the RSK, which I found out afterward.
In July 1992, I went to the Yugoslav Army where I experienced a lot of inconveniences as
well, and all because of the previous happenings within the VJ.
The attacks, coming from the specific political structures and individuals and against the
Serbian Army of Krajina and the Service are still unfortunately very sharp and rude. As in
the past some seasoned methods are applied just the appliers and times are different. The
enemies of the RSK are classified as follows:
-the remaining communism and JNA on the territory of RSK
-the Yugoslav Army
-the Bosnian and Herzegovina Army and the 5 Corpsth
-the Croatian Army 165
I came back to the RSK on 15 October 1993, altho ugh I asked to return in January of that
year, but the HQ refused my request.
Mister General, before the war I was given two-bedroom apartment and a garage in Zagreb.
My wife is a teacher and had worked for 22 years, now unemployed. My daughter has
completed the Medical School, married, unemployed. My son is a student of the third year
at the Veterinary College. In Belgrade I was given a small apartment with one room (little
bit more than 30 square meters) where my family lives.
A part of my possessions, the clothes, shoes and some technical equipment I got out in July
1991. The furniture and the rest of my things I got out by the “Unatrans” from Biha ć in
November 1991. Crossing the border in Bosanski Šamac all my things were destroyed and
broken, and the driver (a Muslim) was kept in prison for three days until it was ascertained
to whom the things belonged. My things were placed in a basement in Mirijevo in Belgrade.
Because of the mentioned activities I was proclaimed a war criminal by a legal proceeding
by the Ustasha’s government in October 1991, and I was stripped of my whole possession.
Mister General, I am proud of all things I have done together with my fellow-soldiers and
because I remained honourable in all this. I have never been a poltroon and I will never be. I
am trying to be extremely principled and persistent to all my stands and things I committed
myself to, especially when it is about the fight for the Serbian advantage, regardless to the
consequences my family and I might suffer of.
I share my fate with the large number of homeless people who live at subsistence level,
although I believe to having the right to at least two-bedroom apartment concerning my
position and role in this war. However I will not and I do not want to give up my stands and
principles, no matter I am very often helpless in such developments.
I hope you will consider my request and order a detailed verification of the information you
have about me. I would like if you could invite me to an interview and I am ready to come
face to face with any one so this whole thing can be solved at last. I am also ready to
support with the facts everything above mentioned.
COLONEL
Dušan Smiljanić 166
A NNEX 66:
O RDER OF M OBILISATION, SAO KRAJINA, 11 JLY 1991
On the basis of Article 6 of the Law on the Ministries of the Serbian Autonomous Region
Krajina, the Prime Minister of the Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina and the Minister of
Defence of the Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina issued the following
ORDER
On the mobilization of all headquarters and units of the Territorial Defence on the territory
of the Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina.
I
I order the mobilization of all headquarters and units of the Territorial defence on the
territory of the Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina.
II
This order is effective immediately.
Number: 142/91-3
Knin, 11 July 1991
PRIME MINISTER
MINISTER OF DEFENCE
Dr. Milan Savić
A NNEX 67:
O PERATIONS REPORT OF “RSK”, 10 APRIL 1995
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF SERBIAN ARMY
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL NO. 3-171
10 April 1995
REGULAR OPERATIONS REPORT TO THE HEADQUARTERS
OF THE SERBIAN ARMY OF KRAJINA
CABINET OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
(attn. Slobodan Milošević)
CABINET OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
(attn. Milan Martić)
HEAD OF HEADQUARTERS OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY
(attn. General Momčilo Perišić)
1. Enemy forces (...)
2. Our forces (....)
3. Relations with UNPROFOR
4. Decision
(...)
COMMANDER
General Milan Čeleketić 167
ANNEX 68:
TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN M ILAN M ARTIĆ
AND G ORAN H ADŽIĆ, 28 MAY 1993
th
28 of May 1993
We send you the conversation between M. Martić and Hadžić:
Hadžić : Give me Martić!
Secretary Mara: He’s (Mile) just having a conversation, just a minute.
H: Tell him to stop!
M: He won’t stop.
H: Hello, Mile!
M: Hello, president!
H: What’s new?
M: I don’t know about here, I don’t know what to do. I canĐoko (Đorđe Bjegović)
here, neither does he.
H: Listen, Šajin just called me, Slobo and Radovan are waiting for me, I must urgently go to
Belgrade, I’ll report everything to you at about two, at latest half past two, from Belgrade.
M: Can you do it a bit earlier, because I must settle some situations here for myself, I must
decide quickly.
H: Now it’s 11:00 o’clock, I’m in Erdut, I don’t now when I’m going to arrive, but I’ll have
to spent at least half an hour with them.
M: Can’t you arrange anything on the phone with them?
H: I can’t do it on the phone, Slobo calls me to Belgrade, to come quickly, but most
probably we won’t go.
M: I have my share of business here and in Western Slavonia, which I have to deal with
quickly.
H: I’ll leave a message for Bjegović, and Jarčević as well, and ….
M: If it’s possible, even earlier, please.
H: As soon as I manage.
M: Because of my plans.
H: I’ll send you a message whether we’ll go or not. Goodbye.
The consultations are probably about the topic “what and how to continue” (in Belgrade)
before the meeting in Bijeljina. 168
A NNEX 69:
LETTER TO M . M ILOŠEVIĆ FROM “RSK”, J UNE 1993
CODED
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
CABINET OF THE PRESIDENT
03-9-171/1-93
Realisation of orders of the commandant of the Serbian Army of Krajina
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
Dear Mr. Milošević,
We want to draw your attention to certain problems which we are not able to solve by
ourselves and which represent the urgent problems of the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK).
The SVK is asking for military personnel procurement especially for those who are
descended from the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Junior officers are
particularly demanded for performing duties of commanders and commandants. Officers
majoring in law are needed for military judges and prosecutors because we are establishing
court martial and military prosecutor’s offices.
We need help in technical maintenance of weapons and acquisition of ammunition, grease
and petrol. All weapons and ammunition we get from the Yugoslav Army, although we are
trying very hard to be economical, are not sufficient for normal rear fire supports. Spare
parts for damaged materiel are scarce. We are not financially in position to make up for
medium and general service which may be done by the institutions of the Yugoslav Army.
The amount of artillery ammunition is minimal, and fuel and grease are sufficient only for
fire engagement for a short period of time.
Representatives of the SVK Headquarters together with their commandant presented these
problems at the last meeting with the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, on 24 May,
1993.
We ask you to try to exercise your authority and influence the realisation of our requests
presented to the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army as soon as possible.
We believe that you will understand reasons of our reaction, particularly at the moment
when we are expecting the expansion of the Croatian aggression for which we already have
reliable information.
Yours sincerely,
PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC
Goran Hadžić (signature)
RECEIVED: 24 June, 1993 at 1720 hrs (illegible)
(illegible)
PROCESSED (illegible) 169
ANNEX 70:
O RDER OF THE PRESIDENCY OF SFRY, 21 F EBRUARY 1992
THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE FRY
No. sp 20
Milan Martić
The Secretary for the Interior of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, Knin
21 February 1992
Belgrade
We inform you that the vice-president of the Chairmanship of the FRY, Dr. Branko Kosti ć,
on the basis of the article 328, thesubsection of the FRY Constitution and act 3, the 2
subsection of the Proceedings of the work of the SFRY Chairmanship, called a meeting of
the FRY Chairmanship at Thursday, 27 February 1992.
For the meeting he proposes the following
AGENDA:
Information about the process and the realisation of the plan of accepting and engaging the
peace forces of the UN in Yugoslavia
Information about the consideration of the Bill for the Law on realisation of the right of the
nation to be self-determined
Consideration of the basis of the social system and functioning of Yugoslavia as a joint state
On the meeting, in enlarged composition, besides the Chairmanship of the FRY the
following people were invited:
- Dr. Slobodan Gligorijevi ć, Bogdana Glumac Levakov, Dragomir Raki ć,
Aleksandar Mitrovi ć, Petar Gra čanin, General Colonel Blagoje Adži ć and
Milivoje Maksić,
- Slobodan Miloševi ć, Aleksandar Bako čević and Radoman Bozovi ć, Dr.
Nikola Koljević, Dr. Biljana Plavši ć, Dr. M. A. Mom čilo Krajišnik and Dr.
Radovan Karadžić
- Mile Paspalj, Milan Marti ć, Veljko Vukeli ć, Veljko Džakula, Ilija
Končarević and Goran Hadžić (…)
GENERAL SECRETARY
Anđelko Maslić
(signature) 170
A NNEX 71:
THE O FFICIALR ECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE R EPRESENTATIVE OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SRBIAN KRAJINA WITH PESIDENT
S LOBODAN M ILOŠEVIĆ, 12 NVEMBER 1992
THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
THE REPRESENTATIVE BODY OF THE GOVERNMENT
BELGRADE – TERAZIJE 3/I
PHONE NO. 327-346, 326-778, 321-325, FAX NO. 324-573
THE OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA WITH THE
PRESIDENT SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ
TO THE MINISTRY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
th
On the 12 of November 1991 at the office of the President of the Republic of Serbia, the
meeting of the representatives of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina and the Government
of the Republic of Serbia was held. The following persons were present at the meeting: from
the Republic of Serbia, the president Slobodan Milć, the Prime Minister, Radoman
Bozović and the National Bank Governor of Serbia, coming from the Republic of the
Serbian Krajina, the president Goran Hadži ć, the president of the Government, Zdravko
Zečević, the Minister of the Interior, Mile ć, the Minister of the Defence, Stojan
Španović, the Minister of Finance, Lejrača Vojin and the vice-president of the Government,
Božanić Boško.
The way of financial help to the Krajina till the end of this year was established at the
meeting.
From the domain of the defence, the question of outlining the organisation of the Army of
the Republic of the Serbian Krajina and the question of financing were set in motion.
The president, Mr. Miloševi ć accepted the concept of forming the defence system of
Krajina and the basis of this system should consist of 23 000 people in the police and 5 000
out of them should be in the regular composition and 18 000 out of them should be in the
composition of the brigades that should form the peacetime basis of the army and that
should provide the security on the border of Krajina. The general attitude is that this number
must not be decreased and that the way and the system of financing must be found so that
this number of people stays in the constant formation as a professional part of the Army.
The resolution to immediately start the planning of the means for the needs of the Army and
the police, the way it was in 1992, was accepted. This will be accomplisugh theo
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina and the Ministry of Defence of
the Republic of Serbia.
The president Miloševi ć stated his attitude that the means for the maintenance of the
technical devices should be planned via the Yugoslav Army and he said that he will help in
realising it and that he will initiate the Yugoslav Army to finance the active officers and the
civil personnel that stayed in Krajina. All other needs for financing the defence should be
planned through the Ministry of Defence. It was agreed that they would immediately start to
plan the means in order to finish this process in time.
The problem of the ensuring of the planned means for this year was brought up because the
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia does not have enough money inflow. 171
The president of the Government of the Republic of Serbia was asked to intervene so this
means could be delivered and he accepted it.
Based on the above mentioned requests I ask the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of
Serbia to plan the necessary means for financing the defence of the Republic of the Serbian
Krajina in 1993 and to ensure the inflow of the means in this year, and that would be 200
millions till the end of the month and 150 till the 5 of December 1992.
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE
STOJAN ŠPANOVIĆ (signature)
A NNEX 72:
R ESOLUTION OF THE N ATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE “RSK”, 18 A UGUST 1994
Date: 18 August 1994
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO
Considering that the right of the nation to the self-determination, that is, the right of the
nation to freely determine its political status, is historical, natural and inalienable,
Confirming that the principle of continuous sovereignty of the populations and the nations
over the territories where the guarantee of the national, social, cultural and economical
process exists,
Establishing that that right and the principle were legalised in numerous documents of the
Organisation of the United Nations, of the OSCE and of the Conference about the former
Yugoslavia,
Establishing that the Republic of the Serbian Krajina and the Republic of Serbia are entities
that are, after the secessionist falling apart of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
formed on the basis of the right to be self-determined and on the basis of the principle of the
permanent sovereignty of the people and the nation and on their right to decide about their
own state, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the Assembly of the Republic of the
Serbian Krajina decided to offer
PROPOSITION
FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA,
THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO, THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA INTO ONE STATE
1. We ask the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and of the Republic of Montenegro to
accept the Proposition for the integration into one state and to reconsider the procedure and
the conditions under which this union would be performed.
2. The joint delegation of the Assembly of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina and of the
Serbian Republic have been assigned a duty to start the negotiations with representatives of
the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and of the Republic of Montenegro in order to form
the declaration of the unification as well as the plans of other relevant documents. 172
3. The joint delegation has a deadline of one month to perform its tasks and after that to
inform the Assemblies about the results of the negotiations.
The National assembly President
Momčilo Krajišnik
(signature)
The Assembly President
Branko Vojnica
(signature)
ANNEX 73:
F EDERAL SCRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE , ISTRUCTION ON ACCEPTING
V OLUNTEERS INTO THE Y UGOSLAV EPPLE S ’ ARMY (JNA), 13SEPTEMBER 1991
MILITARY POST
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
SFRY ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
III HEAD OFFICE
406 NO. 2391-1
13September 1991
According to Article 80, Section 2 concerning Section 1 item 2 of the same Article of the
Nation Wide Defence Law (“The official paper of the SFRY”, no. 21/8 and 11/91)
INSTRUCTION
ON ACCEPTING VOLUNTEERS INTO THE
YUGOSLAV PEOPLE’S ARMY (JNA)
1. This instruction regulates the acceptance of volunteers into the units and
establishments of the Yugoslav People’s Army.
2. By volunteer, this instruction means an individual who files a written request for the
admittance into a unit – establishment of the JNA, if he is capable of performing the
according military duty.
The volunteer can be an individual (male) from any part of the SFRY, under the
condition that he is the age of 18 to 60. If the individual from Section 1 of this count
is younger than 27 and has not served his military service yet, he will be sent to
military service if he is capable of serving it.
3. The command and the senior officers of the units and establishments of the JNA will
accept and assign the volunteers from item 2 of this direction to their units –
establishments according to the peace or wartime formation, depending on the
degree of filled personnel slots, the state in the zone of responsibility and the task of
the unit – establishment. 173
The individuals from the reserve forces – volunteers who are assigned to units will
be assigned to duties and formation slots that are set during the formation of the
combat units.
The individuals from the reserve forces – volunteers who are assigned to other war
units, will be sent the headquarter units when possible, and when this is impossible,
they will be assigned to vacant duty positions, i.e. formation places within their units
according to peace or wartime formation, depending on their military occupational
speciality. The commands and senior officers will accept and assign the individuals
from the reserve forces who have no unit assignment as the individuals from item 2
of this direction, to vacant formation slots of the peace or wartime formation of their
units according to their occupational specialty in their military records, i.e. their
occupation, knowledge and skills acquired as citizens.
4. The JNA units based on the applications that the volunteers fill out at the units
conduct the recruiting of volunteers into the JNA. The registration form is regulated
by this direction and is its constituent part. The submitted application cannot be
revoked.
5. The volunteers are accepted to duties and formation slots they qualify for, and if this
is impossible, they are assigned to vacant formation slots, with completion of prior
most essential training for performing tasks and duties of this formation slot.
6. The volunteers are accepted after their identity and other necessary data of interest
for the Yugoslav People’s Army are checked. The identity is proven on the basis of
identification cards, the data in the application, their unit record, their military card,
through the authorities of social-political associations where possible etc. On the
basis of the established identity, a respective military record is made up for each
volunteer accepted into the unit.
7. During the acceptance into the units of the Yugoslav People’s Army the physical
ability of the volunteer for the duty, from item 5 of this instruction, is established.
The physical ability is established, whenever possible, by the nearest military health
institution. If this is impossible the physical ability is established by the company
physician on the basis of a medical examination and when necessary a consultation
with a specialist from a military or civilian medical institution.
8. The security check during the acceptance and observation of the volunteers is
conducted according to security service regulations, which should be strictly
followed.
9. The volunteers will either complete military training, additional training, or
retraining for particular duties in the unit-establishment. The type and duration of the
training depend on the volunteers’ prior knowledge. The training is essentially
accompanied by work in the base unit-establishment.
10. The volunteers are by law and duties equal to military individuals, i.e. military
conscripts and are by law entitled to according compensation.
11. The senior officers of the units and establishments of the brigade, regiment,
independent battalion, and equal units decide about the acceptance of volunteers into
the Yugoslav People’s Army. A report on the acceptance of volunteers is regularly
submitted to a superior command. 174
12. The military service of the individual (volunteer) can end if he is not needed in his
unit anymore or at his request: in case of justified lawful reasons according to
Articles 32 and 33 of the Military Conscript Law, or if he has spent maximum time
in the unit according to Article 52 of this law.
13. The instruction comes into operation with the day of signing.
14. In case of any abstruseness, the superior commands and authorised organisational
units of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence must be contacted.
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR
NATIONAL DEFENCE
Field Marshall
Veljko Kadijević (signature)
REGISTRATION FORM
FOR RECRUITING VOLUNTEERS INTO THE
YUGOSLAV PEOPLE’S ARMY
I _____________, born _________ 19____ in
(Place)
(Municipality)
(Republic)
(Residence and address)
____________________ am – am not military
________________(Identity card number)_______________(Issued by)
assigned in ______________, am registering as a volunteer with the
____________
(Military_______________________________Post office and garrison)
I declare to perform the set tasks responsibly and disciplined and to follow the
existing federal laws and other Acts and Orders that regulate the relations, life
and work in the Yugoslav People’s Army.
My application is irrevocable.
In
19
(Signature) 175
ANNEX 74:
F EDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL D EFENCE
ORDER 10 D ECEMBER 1991
MILITARY SECRET
HIGHLY CLASSIFIED
Copy number 25
Federal Secretariat for National Defence
SstY Armed Forces Headquarters
1 Administration
10 December 1991
DIRECTIVE
on the use of the Armed Forces in the forthcoming period
for the preparation and execution of the combat actions
I
1.The Yugoslav crisis has been internationalised and is a subject of consideration of many
world institutions, primarily EC and the Security Council of the UN. The attitude of many
European countries regarding the Yugoslav question has significantly changed, varying
from well intentional to malicious. Supporting the later are all the threats and pressures, as
well as abuse of the positions and roles in the international community. These reasons make
it hard to foresee the outcome.
2. In the past period the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia have, although increasing
in number and organisation, suffered great losses on the entire front, especially after the fall
of Vukovar, which has significantly influenced the outcome of the political plan. But, in
spite of that, the enemy strives to regain the lost territory with continuous combat activities.
That is the reason why we must expect that they will try to keep the level of the conflict,
with the use of fire attacks and attacks and actions by diversionist-terrorist groups, in order
to: continually inflict losses to our Armed Forces; improve it’s position on the front and
influence the political solutions of the Yugoslav crisis, first of all, via institutions of EC and
the Security Council of the UN. That points to the conclusion that the war could last longer.
3. Besides the specific starting weaknesses that were the consequence of insufficient
reinforcement, disintegration of the personal, treachery, difficulties in handling and
commanding, the Yugoslav People’s Army with TO (Territorial Defence), has managed to
execute all the given tasks, and in doing that it has strengthened its combat spirit and moral,
stabilised the condition and kept its integrity and the Yugoslav character. That had a
significant influence on the daglocking of our forces in the Croatian Republic and on the
accepting of the SFRY Presidency’s initiative to engage UN peace forces in Yugoslavia.
Valuable experience was gained during past combat activities.
This has ended a very significant period in realisation of the given war goals.
II
Our Armed Forces are entering an extremely important period in the realisation of ultimate
goals of the war: protection of the Serbian population, peaceful solution of the Yugoslav 176
crisis and realising the conditions for the preservation of Yugoslavia for those nations that
wish to live in it. That is the reason why preserving combat readiness of the JNA and Armed
Forces as a whole is still a basic duty of all the levels of management and command and its
members, until the political solution to the Yugoslav crisis is found.
Taking into consideration the complexity of the situation, the experience so far and the need
to strengthen combat readiness I set for all management and command levels the following
TASKS
1. To provide for all the necessary measures for continuous improvement of the
management and command system. To ensure that orders, decisions and tasks are executed
completely, with utmost responsibility and discipline.
2. To ensure with consistent use of the principle of subordination that every level of
management and command is dealing with the tasks within their own authority. Every
higher level of management and command has a duty to reach decisions in time and to set
tasks, on the basis of the given task and its evaluations. To prevent the practice in which
orders and tasks are just assigned to the executors, and by doing that also renouncing one’s
responsibility.
3. Depending on the reached decisions, every level of management and command must
ensure that all subordinates will realise the essence and the meaning of the given tasks and
issued orders, and upon that they must demand their consistent execution.
To prevent despotism of an individual in all conditions of executing combat and other tasks.
4. To ensure the use of the personal contact principles using better co-ordination of duties
and tasks. For this reason orders and tasks should be given from the command position of
the subordinate whenever it is possible. To ensure planned and rational attendance of
subordinate units and to display influence on their work with personal engagement.
Therefore to analyse the arrangement of management and command through the levels and
to establish the order which ensures the constant insight into the condition at the front.
5. To intensify political work with people and to provide for a greater quality of information
in the forthcoming period. At the same time to prevent inaccurate and malicious reporting
by the units or from the front. For that reason to take necessary precautions against
reporting lies and evaluations that damage the reputation of the JNA, and at the same time
are the consequence of the anti-army propaganda. Connected with that, to analyse the public
informing so far on all the levels of management and command and to suggest the necessary
precautions. The bearers of the work on these tasks so far must be the most responsible
officers. At the same time to prevent various informers, who have no necessary permission
from the military authorities in question, from moving and freewill acting in zones of
combat activities.
6. To put under the command of the eldest JNA officer all the JNA units and TO
(Territorial Defence), as well as all the volunteer units that accept to be under that command
and that accept to wear the JNA and TO insignia. That is to be done in all the areas of
combat activities. All other armed troops are to be considered paramilitary and should be
disarmed and removed from the zones of combat activities.
To prevent robbery and genocide (vindictive) behaviour with all measures. For that reason
to establish the necessary control by engaging the military police authorities and units
specified for that purpose, as well as the authorities for the criminal pursuit. 177
7. To establish contacts with various party leaders only according to valid regulations and
with previous consent and consultations with higher authority. To take all the necessary
precautions and to prevent all compromising meetings with individuals and representatives
of the anti-army propaganda; unless dealing with the negotiators of the opposite side.
8. To pay great attention to security measures for the combat actions, especially the
prevention of surprises and actions of reconnaissance-diversion and terrorist groups. That is
to be specially demanded in the period of ordered cease-fires and in the period of executing
defensive combat activities when it often comes to the lack of attention and increased
losses. Therefore the people and the material and technical supplies should be protected
from sudden actions and losses by using engineering employments at the positions (attained
lines so far), organisation of the firing system, observing, lying undercover and by the
complete control of the interspaces.
9. To execute immediately a planned control of the readiness of the units for the
forthcoming winter period. On top of that bear in mind the basic principles of combat
organisation and life during winter conditions. Always keep in mind that the units must be
in complete combat readiness, so that, depending on the command, directives and concrete
situations, they can quickly and effectively go into combat, defend the attack or execute the
attack themselves.
10. To deal with the questions of personnel more quickly and boldly in the forthcoming
period. The basic principle must be the selection of the bravest and the fittest men for the
most responsible duties. To remove more quickly incapable and indecisive men from the
command and other important formation positions.
11. JNA Armed Forces General Staff and sectors of Federal Secretariat for National
Defence will analyse the work so far and will undertake measures for the improvement of
the organisation of the work, for the collecting, processing and distribution of information.
To suggest for that purpose measures for the improvement of the system of reporting from
the units, the work of the Information Centre and teams on duty and for the exchange of
information.
At the same time to work out the plans for the engagement of the General Staff and Federal
Secretariat for National Defence in the control and help to subordinate commands.
To work out the necessary documents and ensure more stable reinforcement of Republic of
Yugoslavia with men.
12. The rear sector of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence in collaboration with the
Military-Economy Sector and the Armed Forces General Staff will continually monitor the
functioning of the “PoOb” system, will undertake and suggest measures for stable material
security and supply of the units, where the units at the front have a priority. To reinforce the
units at the front that have insufficient quantities of material supplies with the existing
reserves and material supplies from the war units of “R” classification from the garrison
where there are no conditions for the mobilization.
To consider the problems of repairing the necessary military equipment and suggest suitable
solutions.
13. The Military-Economy Sector will make an analysis and suggest the most rational
solutions for the accelerated production and supply of the deficit resources of the necessary
military equipment. 178
FEDERAL SECRETARY
FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENCE
Army General
Veljko Kadijević (signature)
ANNEX 75:
THE C OMMANDS OF THE F IRSTM ILITARY R EGION, 10 MARCH 1992
THE COMMANDS OF
THE FIRST MILITARY REGION
Strictly confidential No 157-2
10 March 1992
MILITARY TOP SECRET
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
Installation of the tanks T-34 into
the structures of the units of the Territorial
Defence, proposition
HQ of the Territorial Defence
of the Republic of Krajina
With the reorganisation of JNA, the tanks T-34 would no longer be in the operative use in
JNA.
With consideration of this issue the tactical bearer (the department of the Armoured
Mechanized Units) thinks that these tanks should be installed into the organisational-
formation structure of the units of the Territorial Defence, taking into consideration their
firing possibilities.
We consider that the tanks T-34 should be through companies (10 tanks) be installed into
the structures of the brigades of the Territorial Defence in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Srem, as into the brigades of the Territorial defence, defending the airports and in
the positions of important roads.
The tanks should be given in good condition with 2 sets of ammunition, with the present
quantity of the spare parts and 1 full reservoir of fuel.
The technical maintenance and the repairs of this machinery would be done by the units of
the Territorial Defence, with the support of the repair capacities of JNA.
We ask you to deliver your request for the needs of the number of tanks to this commands
so that it could consider and forward it to the tactical bearer for realisation as soon as
possible.
COMMANDER
Lieutenant Colonel General
Vladimir Stojanović
DELIVERED TO:
Republic HQ of the Territorial Defence of Serbia
Province HQ of the Territorial Defence of Vojvodina
Zone HQ of the Territorial Defence of Slavonija, 179
Baranja and Western Sirmium
HQ of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Krajina
the Department of Armoured Mechanized Units – to be informed
The Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
HQ of the Territorial Defence
No 75/92
04 April 1992, KNIN
A NNEX 76:
C OMMANDS OF THE 1 BT RIGADE OF THE T ERRITORIAL DEFENCE , 19 MAY 1992
MILITARY TOP SECRET
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
EXEMPLAR NO /
Armed Forces SFRY of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
st
Commands of the 1 Brigade of the Territorial defence
Strictly confidential No: 02-311/1
19 May 1992
Explanatthn in connection to the Formation
of the 24 Brigade of the Territorial defence, asking
to the Commands of
of the Terr. Defence Zone General Staff
BANIJA
With the departure of the JNA units from the territory of Banija, a significant amount of
nd
weaponry and military equipment has been taken from the Motorized Brigade…..
COMMANDER
Colonel
Marko Vrcelj 180
ANNEX 77:
L ETTER FROM THE R EPUBLIC OF SRBIA , 11 DCEMBER 1991
THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
No. 88-1089/91-02
11 December 1991
BELGRADE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KRAJINA
To the commander personally-
The quarters of the territorial defence for Lika addressed us to ask us to ensure them certain
means. In order to ensure them what they asked it is necessary to send this request to you
and to continually insist on executing this request.
ASSISTANT TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS
GENERAL-MAJOR BRANISLAV KUZMANOVIĆ, S.R.
(signature)
ANNEX 78:
LETTER FROM THE REPUBLIC OF SRBIA REGARDING UFDS , 8 FBRUARY 1992
SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KRAJINA
No 24/92
8 February 1992
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
strictly confidential No: 400-103/92-06
BELGRADE
TO THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE STAFF OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS
REGION OF KRAJINA FOR THE TERRITORIES OF KNIN AND LIKA
On the basis of the article 74 issue 4 of the Law on the state department (“Službeni glasnik
of the Socialist republic of Serbia” No: 52/89, 55/89, 24/90, 37/90 and “Službeni glasnik
RS” No: 6/90) and in connection with the conclusions of the Government of the Republic of
th
Serbia from 05November 1992 and the request of the Staff of the Territorial defence of
the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, No: 94/92 I bring a resolution on the transfer of
the resources
1. The resources are transferred to the HQ of the Territorial defence for the territory of Knin
and Lika in the amount of 500 000 (fihundred thousand) dinars for the purchase of
building material needed for the adaptation of the facilities for the commands and (illegible)
units of the Operations Zone in Korenica.
Minister
Lieutenant Colonel General
Marko Negovanović 181
ANNEX 79:
DECISION OF THEFEDERAL M INISTRY OFD EFENCE OF THEFRY, 30 SEPTEMBER 1993
MILITARY SECRET
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ADMINISTRATION FOR FINANCES AND BUDGET
CONFIDENTIAL
(illegible) No. 986-1
30 September 1993
Notice about the height of approved means for the aid for the
Republic of Serbian Krajina
MILITARY PUBLISHING AND PRESS CENTER
BELGRADE
We inform you that according to the II. reprogramming of the Federal budget, by official
decision of the Federal Ministry for Defence, conf. No. 901-1 fof September
1993, the amount of 480.259 Billion Dinars has been approved, according to task 649 for
the aid for the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
In the context of these financial means are also those means included which are meant for
the printing of the newspaper “Vojska Krajine”, organ of the Headquarters of the SVK.
HEAD Colonel Borivoje Jovanović (signature)
ANNEX 80:
REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL SPPORT M ADE BY THE“RSK”, 22 N OVEMBER 1994
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Phone: 60-145, fax: 011-235-1179
Transfer account: 7110-637-309
Knin, 22 November 1994
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
to the Federal Ministry of Defence
BELGRADE
For The Minister Of Defence
Subject: Demand for financing of Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK)
(…)
We ask the Minister to assent the financial and material resources in amount of 100.000,000
– din for the needs of material security of the SVK in 1995.
With the mentioned amount the needs of 22.500 persons will be secured (20 000 soldiers, 2
000 policemen and 500 civilians) in food, clothes and salaries according to the criteria of
the Army of Yugoslavia decreased for 25%. 182
The mentioned amount could be partly realised with material resources with which the
Yugoslav Army regularly regenerates material war reserves.
MINISTER
Colonel Dr Rade Tanjga
A NNEX 81:
R EQUEST T FRY FOR FUEL BY THE “RSK”
THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
Knin, 28 May 1992
Number: 04-5-88/92
“JUGOPETROL”
SUBJECT: Request for the supply with the fuel, delivered to
On the basis of the oral agreement between the president of the Governmentčević Ze
and Mr. Nenadić, it was agreed that the certain amount of fuel should be delivered on the
territory of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina in order to reduce the Shortage of fuel that
has been lasting for longer period of time on the territory of the Republic.
According to the reached agreement we ask you to deliver the fuel for the needs of our
Republic, and as the transport of the fuel is, due to the war happenings, almost impossible,
we think that the fuel should be transported by air. In other to realise all that we ask you to
send the request for the approval of the use of the airplane, “Boing” brand that would
transport the fuel, that is, we ask Mr. ć to contact and lead conversations in that
direction and all this should be done according to the reached agreement with the president
of the Government of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina.
PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
Mr. Zdravko Zečević (signature)
MILITARY SECRET
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Number: 1742-1
Knin, 02 August 1994
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
TO THE PREMIER OF THE RSK GOVERNMENT
Information on supplying the Serbian Army of Krajina with petroleum products,
Dear Mr. President!
Situation is dramatically deteriorating each day and from approximately 1 000 000 litres
which we were given in January of this year, in July we only got 291 000 litres of D - 2. 183
These amounts are not even sufficient for the current needs of the SVK (Serbian army of
Krajina) /supplying units with food and other material supplies/ and regarding engineer
arrangement of the territory nothing can be done.
During 1993 the petroleum refinery in Pančevo delivered to the SVK
7 580 00 l of D - 2 or 631 600 litres a month
2 363 000 l of MB - 86 or 196 916 litres a month
Stated amounts were spent for every day performances and for carrying out combat actions
which were much more intensive during last year.
From the shown data it is obvious that monthly quotas are decreasing, and that makes the
functioning of the SVK hard and directly endangers combat readiness of the units.
MINISTER
colonel
Dr. Rade Tanjga
A NNEX 82:
L ETTER OF C ONSENT FOR A RKAN ’ “T IGERS”
FOR THE “D EFENCE ”F P ETRINJA, 25 NOVEMBER 1991
SOCIALIST FEDERATIVE
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION KRAJINA
PETRINJA MUNICIPALITY
Number: 2-110/91
Petrinja, 25 November 1991
Ražnjatović Željko - Arkan
BELGRADE
CASE: Agreement with the participation of Ž. Ražnjatović’s unit in the defence of Petrinja
We agree with the proposition that members of Željko Ražnjatovi ć - Arkan’s unit
participate in fighting’s on the JNA and Territorial Defence positions in the municipality of
Petrinja. The unit will be commanded by a senior officer, and the unit will be a part of and
nd nd
under the command of the commander of the 2Motorised Battalion of the 62motoriznd
brigade, Bogdan Ercegovac. Arming and food supplies are responsibility of the 2
Motorised Battalion.
The time of arrival and acceptance of the unit will be agreed on afterwards, in agreement
with “AG” and “DM”.
For the Municipal assembly of Petrinja
President
dr. Radovan Maljković
(signature) 184
A NNEX 83:
ST
C OMMAND OF THE 1 O PERATIONS G ROUP , 19 OCTOBER 1991
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC CROATIA
MUNICIPALITY VOJNIC
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
Vojnić, 20 October 1991
ST
COMMAND OF THE 1 OPERATIONS GROUP
19 October 1991
Subordination of the Units of the Territorial Defence
To the units of the JNA – Command of the 1 Operations Group
I AM ISSUING THE ORDER:
th nd th
17 Pthtisan Brigade, 622 thotorized Brigade, 544 Motorized Brigade, Tactthal Group-
1, 9 Motorized Brigade, 6 Combined Anti-Armoured Artillery Regiment, 6 Combined
Artillery Regiment, 58tCombined Artillery Brigade, 389 th“rabr”, Zone Headquarters of
the Territorial Defence (TO) of Banija and Kordun, Municipality Headquarters of the TO of
Dvor na Uni, Municipality Headquarters of the TO Kostajnica, Municipality Headquarters
of the TO Sisak, Municipality Headquarters of the TO Petrinja, Municipality Headquarters
of the TO Glina, Municipality Headquarters of the TO Vrginmost and the Municipality
Headquarters of the TO Vojnić.
All units of the TO and the Zone Headquarters of Banija and Kstdun and (illegible)
mentioned above, will be subordinated to the Command of the 1 Operations Group on 19
October 1991, and in further operations will be engaged as composition of JNA units in the
combat operation zones the JNA units are located.
COMMANDER
Major General
Špiro Niković 185
A NNEX 84:
ORDER OF A PPOINTMENT OF A JNA O FFICER A C OMMANDER OF THE TO OF
K RAJINA, 17 JNUARY 1992
ORDER no. 695-17
((illegible))
of the COMMANDING OFFICER of the 6 tOperations Group
(…)
CVJETIČANIN Bogdan MILOŠ, major
personal military occupational speciality 31325
born on January 9 1956
IS APPOINTED (temporarily)
TO THE COMMAND of the 6 tOPERATIONS GROUP
GARRISON IN PLITVICE
for the COMMANDER OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE in Korenica (…)
Commanding officer
general major SLOBODAN ĐORĐEVIĆ
NDA NNEX 85:
THE COMMAND OF THE 2 L IKA’ BRIGADE , 12 NVEMBER 1991
THE COMMAND OF THE 2 NDLIKA’S BRIGADE
Strictly confidentiathno. 1/10
Vrhovine, November 12 1991
To: THE MINISTRY OF THE SAO KRAJINA
Milan Martić
Comrade Martić,
The Federal Secretariat for National Defence ordered me to come, together with a group of
nd
superiors, on the specific day to Vrhovine and to make preparations for establishing the 2
Lika’s brigade of the Lika’s division that will take over the commanding from the
Territorial Defence and that will combine activities of all structures on this territory.
Commanding officer
Colonel PETAR TRBOVIĆ
Signet: COMMAND OF THE 2 NDBRIGADE 186
ANNEX 86:
ORDER OF FEDERAL SCRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL D EFENCE , 30 NVEMBER 1991
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
ENCODED – URGENT
DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION
THE OPERATIONS CENTRE
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL NO. 164-2
30 November 1991
TO: THE COMMANDING OFFICER
st rd th
of commands of 1 , 3 and 5 Military Region, of the Naval Region, of the Combat Air
Force and of the Anti-aircraft Defence, of 5 and 9 corps and oOperations Group
On the basis of the work plan and the need, on December 1991, the meeting of the
Serbian Army of Krajina will be held and commanding officers of subordinate units will
attend that meeting.
(…)
Commanding officers of units are in duty bound to perform the analysis and to prepare
themselves for the participation in discussion. Written reports with a map (1:100.000) of the
strength and of the disposition of forces (1 copy) hand over to the First Administration of
the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
(…)
CHIEF
of the I Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia
Lieutenant-Colonel General
DRAGOLJUB SIMONOVIĆ 187
ANNEX 87:
FEDERAL SCRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL DEFENCE , ODER FOR M OBILISATION-
D EMOBILISATION, 12 MARCH 1992
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
SFRY ARMED FORCES HQ
III ADMINISTRATION
Top secret No 116-1
12th March 1992
40/1-1 /92
MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET
Copy No 3
SOP documents for TO headquarters and units in the mobilization- demobilisation of the
units.
Enclosed are the instructional SOPs of TO headquarters and units in the course of
mobilization and demobilisation of headquarters - units.
Enclosure:
- Instructional SOP for TO headquarters and units in preparing demobilisation
and repeated mobilization;
- Memorandum for executing immediate preparation of the headquarters and
commanding officers command in the preparations for reorganisation and
mobilization and demobilisation of the headquarters and TO unit commands.
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
TO ZONE HQ
WESTERN SLAVONIA
Top secret No 40/1-1
24th March 1992
OKUČANI
(on behalf of) HEAD
Lt Gen Ljubomir Domazetović
(SIGNATURE ILLEGIBLE)
FEDERAL NATIONAL DEFENCE SECRETARIAT
SFRY ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS - III ADMINISTRATION
MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET
Copy No 2 188
MEMORANDUM
FOR EXECUTING THE IMMEDIATE PREPARATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS
AND COMMANDING OFFICERS COMMAND FOR THE EXECUTION OF
REORGANISATION AND MOBILISATION AND DEMOBILISATION OF THE
HEADQUARTERS AND TO UNITS COMMANDS IN THE AREA OF KRAJINA.
12th of March 1992
2. PREPARATION FOR DEMOBILISATION AND REPEATED MOBILISATION:
2.1. Studying the reorganisation and unit demobilisation orders, books on unit formation
and mobilization order and excerpt from the mobilization document of the
subordinate command - headquarters’ Mobilisation plan.
2.2. Planning the execution of tasks facing the headquarters and unit command.
2.3. Creating a plan for performing tasks ( contents of activities, task performers, location
and time deadlines etc.)
2.4. Familiarisation of subordinate commands and commanding officers with obligations,
tasks and the performance dynamics.
2.5. Execution of appropriate immediate and practical preparations for task (training)
execution and planning and securing the appropriate forces and means for task
execution.
2.6. Appointing the manager and unit mobilization plan trustee (making the appropriate
order).
2.7. Appointing the mobilization executor and deputy mob. executor.
2.8. Designating the mobilization location for each unit.
2.9. Selecting the mobilization gathering-place and lower units deployment areas, making
the proposal for the gathering place and approval of the same.
2.10. Designating the duration time for the mobilization (depending on location and unit’s
role).
2.11. Analysis, selection and designation of storage - depo area and distribution in units.
Making and delivery of the distribution sheets to subordinate headquarters and units
commands.
2.12. Creating the Plan for withdrawing units from present areas and deployment in new
areas.
2.13. Analysis of the war units manning and materiel capabilities from the territory list.
2.14. Creating the proposal of the manning and materiel Plan from the list.
2.15. Creating, approving and delivering the war units manning Plan (Plan to be made in 2
copies).
2.16. Selection of personnel for unit manning according to priorities and expert military,
work, moral, character and other standards. Personnel selection to be mainly done
from the present unit personnel, and if short, from the territory. 189
2.17. Selection and deployment of commanding officers ( active and reserve) to formation
duties and making orders for duty appointments.
2.18. Updating the personal, individual and alphabetical file-cards.
2.19. Determining the war deployment of the entire structure.
2.20. Creating personnel lists according to basic units, with basic personnel data.
2.21. Creating and updating military personnel and materiel providers summons.
2.22. Organising and executing certain territory reconnaissance.
2.23. Organising and working on creating documents of Mobilisation plan (Enclosure No
1).
2.24. Creating certain stationary liaison systems (repairing the existent and, if possible,
creating new ones).
2.25. Co-ordinating mobilization preparation and execution.
2.26. Arranging the depo area, construction work, making props, shelves, pads etc.
2.27. Informing on war deployment and excluding extra personnel.
2.28 Materialisation of co-ordination plans and concretising war unit’s needs and
activities.
2.29. Perform the review of armament, military equipment and ammunition. Determine
flaws and damages and come to appropriate solutions.
2.30. Inform the personnel on the new situation and familiarise them with unit tasks.
2.31. Determine the type of equipment to be handed to the military person himself (to
keep).
3. EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILISATION
3.1. Dislocating - withdrawing units from the present area, transportation and deployment
in the area of the newly-determined mobilization gathering place (transportation and
marching).
3.2. Allocating deployment areas to lower and basic units.
3.3. Issuing tasks and organising work.
3.4. Unit line-up according to predetermined lists and summons and updating
mobilization summons.
3.5. Excluding «extra» personnel (according to the predetermined formation) and
organising work with that particular group.
3.6. Make the personnel familiar with the mobilization gathering place - reporting place
in case of mobilization.
3.7. Inform on the war deployment:
- War unit, lower and basic unit
- Duty 190
- Mobilisation place
- Mobilisation gathering place and reporting place in case of mobilization - Station
of embarkation / disembarkation (if transport is necessary)
- Reporting time for the mobilization call
- What to do when informed of mobilization
- Obligations regarding registering - unregistering, caused by health situation and
changes of residence
- Obligations of provider in case of damage, theft and checking-out materiel, and
cases of cattle sickness and death
- Obligations of keeping given information secret
- Obligations of keeping, maintaining and using the assigned equipment.
Commanding officers performing duties of squad - independent platoon commander
and higher commanding duties, when informed of war deployment, are also to be
made familiar with:
- Organisational-formational unit structure
- Mobilisation gathering place and its unit deployment
- Duration of mobilization
- Sources of manning and its quantity and quality
- War stocks depos
- Documents of Mobilisation plan (duties and tasks to be executed in mobilization)
- Obligations in preparation and execution of mobilization
3.8. Organise and rehearse the summoning system based on one’s own summoning
system.
3.9. Organise and perform checks of armament and military equipment after use, as well
as materiel overhaul.
3.10. Update the technical documentation.
3.11. Remove all malfunctions (even the smallest ones) of the materiel, review and
resupply the materiel with spare parts, tools, kits and other necessary means.
3.12. Provide means for cleaning the armament and equipment . Cleaning is to be done in
an organised manner.
3.13. After cleaning, all materiel is to be stored for a short term, and other materiel is to be
protected in an appropriate manner.
3.14. Tour the whole storage area (storage places, garages, eaves, shelters etc.) and
regulate in detail the way of storing means by types and units.
3.15. Wash, lubricate and park mechanized vehicles in each unit. Vehicles are to be stored
for a short term and lifted on support pads. Batteries to be stored separately.
Maintenance and re-supply plan to be made. 191
3.16. Gradually and in an organised way check in the armament and military equipment by
types and units.
3.17. Pack the armament and equipment in cases and put them on props shelves.
3.18. Make plans and determine and clearly mark the means of all transport in the course
of mobilization. Regulate and organise traffic control (plans and training) in
cooperation with the Ministry of Interior.
3.19. Provide the cleaning aids, put out of storage and activate the materiel, all kinds of
fuelling sources and their maintenance, and store them in units as planned.
3.20. All designated teams, temporary mobilization organs are to be trained to take over
and transport materiel ( put out of storage and activated).
3.21. Regulate and train through practice all measures and procedures of materiel supply.
3.22. Make appropriate checks, plans for storing and taking materiel from the storage.
3.23. Store the means in depos, so that they be prepared to be taken out quickly if need be.
Means are to be classified according to types, in many smaller depos, taking care of
the regulated measures for materiel keeping.
3.24. Mark and label according to basic units and types of means.
3.25. Make a statement of the security situation on the territory (update the existing) and
based on conclusions realise the needs for necessary and immediate securing and
provide planned engagement of the forces. (Make a Plan of immediate securing of
the storage - depo).
3.26. Training of the mobilization executors and all subjects closely involved in
performing particular tasks is to be done in a planned and organised manner. (Plan
for the mobilization execution training is to be made).
3.27. After checking in and storing materiel (a part of personnel can be kept until the final
storing), an analysis of the whole work is to be done, lessons learned and obligations
of each individual once again determined at the meetings of military teams.
3.28. Orders are to be read out - decrees on promotions, decorations and other stimulation
measures.
3.29. Update the lists, personal and individual file-cards, summons system, military cards,
pay lists etc.
3.30. Organise the transport of military persons from more distant areas and discharge
reserve forces, one part of which to be kept in the unit (storing, marking, materiel re-
supply etc.).
3.31. All commands and headquarters are to create the Plan for control, training and
improving the mobilization system and are to continually work on it.
NOTE: All the above-mentioned activities need to be done in a planned manner, and the
realisation period can be simultaneous (Plan of activities according to location and time). 192
ANNEX 88:
FEDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL D EFENCE
O RDER 24 M ARCH 1992
MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
SFRY ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF
3rd ADMINISTRATION
TO GENERAL STAFF OF REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
Find enclosed the order of Federal Secretary for National Defence; top secret n. 1349-1, of
24 March 1992.
ENCLOSED: Order of Federal Secretariat for National Defence, and Mobilisation
Development of Territorial defence (TO) units, pages 1-82, copy n. 4.
Authorised by Head of Department
Colonel Vladimir Milenković
(Seal in Cyrillic alphabet)
Autonomous District of Serbian Krajina
TO Headquarters
No. 67/92
30. 03. 1992.
Knin
(…)
2. To form in war 70th combined anti-armoured artillery division by the formation No. T-
512.001. Benkovac mobilization site. Numerical name T-2783. War military post T16061.
Mobilisation plan to be headed by TO Zone HQ Command. Duration of mobilization 12
hours.
Subjected to North Dalmatia TO Zone HQ Command.
3. To form in war 31St Air Defence light artillery division 20/3 mm by formation No. T-
513.001. Knin mobilization site. Numerical name T-2784. Mobilisation plan to be headed
by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16062. Duration of mobilization 12
hours.
Division subjected to North Dalmatia TO Zone Command.
4. To form in peace 77th TO Rear Base by formation No. 260.329/02, or in war by
formation No. T-535.001. Knin to be peacetime and mobilization site. Peacetime military
post T-7915. Numerical name T-2702. Mobilisation plan to be headed by 77th Rear Base
Command. War military post T-16073. Duration of mobilization 12 hours.
In peace and war subjected to North Dalmatia TO Zone HQ Command.
C- LIKA TO ZONE HQ
1. To form in peace 7th TO brigade (of Gra čac), by formation No. 260.328/05, or in war by
formation No. T-511.040. Gračac to be peacetime and mobilization site. Peacetime Military 193
Post No. 7907. Numerical name T1980. Mobilisation plan to be headed by 7th TO brigade
Command. War military post No. T-16010. Duration of mobilization 12 hours.
In peace and war subjected to Lika TO Zone HQ Command.
2. To form in war 73rd TO unit (Vrhovine) by formation No. T-511.044. Numerical name
T-2382. Mobilisation plan to be headed by Lika TO Zone HQ Command. War military post
No. T-16033. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to Lika TO Zone HQ Command.
3. To form in war 51St howitzer artillery division 105 mm by formation No. T512.002.
Udbine mobilization site. Numerical name T-2785. Mobilisation plan to be headed by TO
Zone HQ Command. War military post T-16064. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to Lika TO Zone HQ Command.
4. To form in war 73rd combined anti-armoured artillery division by formation No. T-
512.003. Gračac mobilization site. Numerical name T-2786. Mobilisation plan to be headed
by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post T-16065. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to Lika TO Zone HQ Command.
5. To form in war 34th Air Defence light artillery battery 20/3 mm, by formation No. T-
513.002. Korenica mobilization site. Numerical name T-2787. Mobilisation plan to be
headed by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16066. Duration of
mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to Lika TO Zone HQ Command.
6. To form in peace 81St TO Rear Base by formation 260.329/03, or in war by formation
No. T-535.002. Korenica mobilization site. Peacetime military post No. T-7919. Numerical
name T-2703. Mobilisation plan to be headed by 81St Rear Base Command. War military
post No. T-16067. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
In peace and war subjected to Lika TO Zone HQ Command.
D.- KORDUN TO ZONE HQ
1. To form in war 53rd howitzer artillery division 105 mm by formation No. T-512.004.
Vojnić mobilization site. Numerical name T-2788. Mobilisation plan to be headed by TO
Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16068. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to Kordun TO Zone HQ Command.
2. To form in war 75th combined anti-armoured artillery division by formation No. T-
512.005. Vrginmost mobilization site. Numerical name T-2789. Mobilisation plan to be
headed by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16069. Duration of
mobilization 12 hrs. Subjected to Kordun TO Zone HQ Command.
3. To form in war 36th Air Defence light artillery battery 20/3 mm by formation No. T-
513.003. Vojnić mobilization site. Numerical name T2790. Mobilisation plan to be headed
by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16070. Duration of mobilization 12
hrs.
Subjected to Kordun TO Zone HQ Command. 194
4. To form in peace 85th TO Rear Base by formation No. 260.329/04, or in war by
formation No. T-535.003. Vojni ć peacetime and mobilization site. Peacetime military post
No. T-7921. Numerical name T-2704. Mobilisation plan to be headed by 85th Rear Base
Command. War military post No. T-16071. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to Kordun TO Zone HQ Command.
E.-BANIJA TO ZONE HQ
1. To form in war 56th howitzer artillery division 105 mm by formation No. T-512.006.
Glina mobilization site. Numerical name T-2791. Mobilisation plan to be headed by TO
Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16072. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to Banija TO Zone HQ Command.
2. To form in war 77th combined anti-armoured artillery division by formation No. T-
512.007. Petrinja mobilization site. Numerical name T2792. Mobilisation plan to be headed
by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16073. Duration of mobilization 12
hrs.
Subjected to Banija TO Zone HQ Command.
3. To form in war 39th Air Defence light artillery battery 20/3 mm by formation No. T-
513.004. Glina mobilization site. Numerical name T2193. Mobilisation plan to be headed
by 87th Rear Base Command. War military post No. T-16074. Duration of mobilization 12
hrs. Subjected to Banija TO Zone HQ Command.
4. To form in peace 87th TO Rear Base by formation No. 260.329/05, or in war by
formation No. T-535.004. Glina peacetime and mobilization site. Peacetime military post
No. T-7926. Numerical name T-2705.
Mobilisation plan to be headed by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16043.
Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to Banija TO Zone HQ Command in war and peace.
F.-EAST SLAVONIA, WEST SREM AND BARANJA TO ZONE HQ
1. To form in war 58th howitzer artillery division 105 mm by formation No. T512.008.
Mirkovci mobilization site. Numerical name T-2794. Mobilisation plan to be headed by TO
Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T16075. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to East Slavonia, West Sirmium and Baranja TO Zone HQ Command.
2. To form in war 81st combined anti-armoured artillery division by formation No. T-
512.009. Beli Manastir mobilization site. Numerical name T-2795. Mobilisation plan to be
headed by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16076. Duration of
mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to East Slavonia, West Sirmium and Baranja TO Zone HQ Command.
3. To form in war 41stAir defence light artillery battery 20/3 mm by formation No. T-
513.005. Vukovar mobilization site. Numerical name T-2796. Mobilisation plan to be
headed by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16077. Duration of
mobilization 12 hrs. 195
Subjected to East Slavonia, West Sirmium and Baranja TO Zone HQ Command.
4. To form in peace 89th TO Rear Base by formation No. 260.329/06, or in war by
formation No. T-535.005. Vukovar peacetime and mobilization site. Peacetime military
post No. T-7928. Numerical name T-2706. Mobilisation plan to be headed by 89th Rear
Zone Command. War military post No. T16031. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to East Slavonia, West Sirmium and Baranja TO Zone HQ Command.
G.-WEST SLAVONIA TO ZONE HQ
To form in war 61St howitzer artillery division 105 mm by formation No. T-512.010.
Pakrac mobilization site. Numerical name T-2797. Mobilisation plan to be headed by TO
Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16078. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to West Slavonia TO Zone HQ Command.
2. To form in war 83rd combined anti-armoured artillery division by formation No. T-
512.011. Oku čani mobilization site. Numerical name T2798. Mobilisation plan to be
headed by TO Zone HQ Command. War military post No. T-16079. Duration of
mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to West Slavonia TO Zone HQ Command.
3. To form in war 45th Air Defence light artillery battery 20/3 mm by formation No. T-
513.006. Okučani to be the mobilization site. Numerical name T-2799. Mobilisation plan to
be headed by TO Zone HQ
Command. War military post No. T-16080. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to West Slavonia TO Zone HQ Command.
4. To form in peace 91St TO Rear Base by formation No. 260.329/07, or in war by
formation No. T-535.006. Okučani peacetime and mobilization site. Peacetime military post
No. T-7930. Numerical name T-2707. Mobilisation plan to be headed by 91St Rear Base
Command. War military post No. T-16012. Duration of mobilization 12 hrs.
Subjected to West Slavonia TO Zone HQ Command.
FINAL ORDERS
1. Formation, reorganisation and other organisational-mobilization changes to be performed
immediately. The report on realisation of this order to be delivered by the end of April
1992.
2. This order is a part of State Secret Order No. 892 of the year 1992.
3. Changes and additions to the mobilization development to be made by referring to this
order, whereas changes and additions to units to be made according to the list of changes
and additions No. 6 of the year 1992.
ACTING ON BEHALF OF FEDERAL SECRETARY
FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
CHIEF OF SFRY
ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL 196
Blagoje Adžić, personal signature
Accuracy of the copy verified by Colonel (name illegible) Živković.
( seal)
SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
SFRY ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF
3rd ADMINISTRATION
ANNEX 89:
F EDERAL SCRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL DEFENCE
O RDER 28 APRIL1992
MILIT. CLASS. DOC.
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
III. ADMINISTRATION
28 April 1992
TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE (TO)
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
Enclosed, you can find the Order of the Federal Secretary for National Defence, No. 1943-1
from 28 April 1992.
ENCLOSURE: Pages for exchange in the mobilization process:
1. 1,55-85
IN AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHIEF
Colonel
Nedeljko Ribić
REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TO
6 May 1992
ORDER OF THE
FEDERAL SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
28 April 1992
Organisation-formation changes
On the basis of Article 108, Paragraph 3 of the Law on the National Defence (Službeni list
SFRJ, No. 21/82 and 35/91) and item 1, paragraph 2 of the Order on the transfer of certain
duties of the management and commanding in the Armed Forces of the SFRY (Službeni
vojni list, No. 15/83 and 11/91) to the Federal Secretary for National Defence.
I issue the 197
ORDER
I. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES
IN THE TO OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
1.
2.
(...)
10. A Board of special police units of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina have to be
organised in peace, according to the list of duties that will be reinforced with Active Duty
Personnel, No. 270.308. The Board will be subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of the
Republic of the Serbian Krajina.
(...)
III. I ISSUE THE ORDER FOR ORGANISATION
(…)
a) Merging (peace-war):
1. of the brigades of the police “R”, No. T-590.000 – T-590-007
(…)
DEPUTY OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SFRY
Colonel General
Blagoje Adžić 198
A NNEX 90:
H EADQUARTERS OF THE A RMED F ORCES OF SFRY
O RDER 11 M AY 1992
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SFRY
I. ADMINISTRATION
OPERATIONS CENTER
11 May 1992
TO THE COMMAND OF THE 5 TH, 10 TH, 13TH AND 17 THCORPS AND THE 4 TH
ND
MILITARY REGION (AND INFORM THE 2 MILITARY REGION)
On the basis of the entire situation on the territory of the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and in accordance with the Decision of SFRY on the transfer of members of the JNA –
citizens of FRY from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the territory of FRY, and
vice versa,
I AM ISSUING THE ORDER
1. Carry out all the necessary preparations and transfer the following:
th
a. 9 Motorized Brigade from Vojnić to the garrison in Zaječar
nd
b. 592 Motorized Brigade from Glina to the garrison in Vranje
c. 19 Motorized Brigade from Višegrad to the garrison in Požega
d. 46 Partisan Brigade/51 stPartisan Division from Oku čani to the
garrison in Čačak
e. Armoured Battalion/5 thMotorized Brigade from Hutovo to the
garrison in Podgorica
rd
f. Armoured Battalion/453 Mechanized Brigade from Živinice to the
garrison Sremska Mitrovica
nd rd
g. 2 Armoured Battalion/243 Armoured Brigade from Bosanski Brod
to the garrison Uroševac
h. 1 Armoured Battalion/51 Mechanized Brigade from Topusko to the
garrison Novi Sad
i. Motorized Battalion/4 Motorized Brigade from Tuzla to the garrison
Pirot.
th
j. Motorized Battalion/39 Motorized Brigade from Bosanski Brod to
the garrison Vranje
th
k. Motorized Battalion/84 Motorized Brigade from Oku čani to the
garrison Zaječar
th
l. Motorized Battalion/549 Motorized Brigade from Bosanski Novi to
the garrison in Prizren
m. Motorized Battalion/592 ndMotorized Brigade from Knin to the
garrison in Vranje 199
th
n. Howitzer Division/208 Combined Artillery Regiment from Mostar to
the garrison in Valjevo
o. Howitzer Division/102 ndCombined Anti-Armoured Artillery Brigade
from Plitvice to the garrison in Gnjilane
th
p. Howitzer Division/164 Motorized Brigade from Oku čani to the
garrison Negotin
q. Multi-Barreled Rocket Launcher Division/150 thCombined Artillery
Brigade from Okučani to the garrison in Vranje
th
r. 485 Pontoon Battalion from Podnovlje to the garrison in Smederevo
The units have to be transferred with the complete manpower, equipment and combat
technique means until 19 May 1992.
In case that the entire combat technique means cannot be transferred for any reason, then
the manpower with personal weapons and equipment has to be transferred, and the
remaining combat technique means have to be handed over to the unit determined by the
Command of the Military Region.
In that case, the transport of the manpower has to be done by air from the airport
Mahovljani (Banja Luka) and the airport Biha ć to the airport Niš, Priština, La đevci and
Belgrade.
1. The officers, soldiers and civilians from the aforesaid units born in the
territory of the Serbian Republic Krajina, that is, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or
according to the plan of the Personnel Department of the Federal Secretariat
for National Defence are determined for the reinforcement of the TO and the
police of the Serbian Republic Krajina or the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, will stay in the territory.
2. According to the elaboration of the plan for the transfer, one copy has to be
sent to the Headquarters of the Armed Forces, I. Administration, at least two
days before the planned transfer.
Deadline for the realisation of the plan: 15 May 1992.
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
(illegible) 200
A NNEX 91:
E XTRACT OF L IST OFY UGOSLAV A RMY PERSONNEL IN THE A RMY OF “RSK” IN1993
LIST
Yugoslav Active Duty Personnel who were in SVK (Serb Army of Krajina)
Seq. First Name Rank Military Reg.No. Date Of Corps To Date Of Comments
No. Father’s Name Occupational Arrival Which Departure
Last Name Speciality Assigned
t s r i 1 F 31503 LRD000000 19.06.93. ...
Lieutenant
2 Đorđe Lieutenant 32239 ASĐ020440 30.01.93. Lika 22.07.93
Save Colonel
Alagić
(…)
261 Vlado Sergeant 22101 VĐV100851 26.01.93. 75th Rear 25.02.93.
Đure Base
Vukić
LIST
Yugoslav Army Active Duty Personnel who were found on 19 May 1992 and directed to
SVK (Serb Army of Krajina)
1., ADAMOVIĆ MILE ĐURO, SENIOR, 22205, AM Đ010858, 19.05.1992, 105 THAur
force brigade, Signal Company, Commander of the SARGEANT department.
(…)
942., MILAN DUŠKO ŽUTI Ć, SECOND, 32157, ŽD2071070, 29.01.1993, KORDUN,
75TH Combined Commander of the LIEUTENANT Artillery Brigade signal platoon
A NNEX 92:
YUGOSLAV ARMY O FFICERS SCONDED TO THE “RSK” IN 1992
MILITARY TOP SECRET
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
ORDER NO: 1-763
COMMANDS OF THE COMBAT
AIRFORCE AND ANTIAIRCRAFT
DEFENCE
from 01stApril 1992
On the basis of the article 271 of the Law on service in the armed forces (“Službeni list
SFRJ”, No: 7/85 and 20/89),
The following persons are directed to the work according to the needs of the service to the
Ministry of the Interior of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
to the helicopter squadron
Garrison in Udbina 201
(…)
COMMANDER
Lieutenant Colonel General
Božidar Stevanović
A NNEX 93:
Y UGOSLAV ARMY O FFICERSSECONDED TO THE “RSK” IN1993
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
THE COMMAND OF THE 18 TH CORPS
Strictly confidential 15-141
th
April 13 1993
The analysis of the personnel
the report, is delivered
TO: General Staff of the Serbian Army of Krajina in Knin
- the personnel organ -
nd
Concerning your telegram strictly confidential no. 45-79 from A1993, we deliver to
you the following report:
1. We have 40 persons of the Active Duty Personnel, directed from the Army of Yugoslavia
on the basis of the article 271 of the Law on the Armed Forces Service, in service in the 18
corps, as well as 3 civilians (civiliać Milenko, appointed senior: an officer in the
security-intelligence affairs organ, directed from the Security Administration of the General
Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia).
All seniors and civilians discharge duty thoroughly and responsibly.
We have 4 persons of the Active Duty Personnel that ask for the consent for a transfer to the
Army of Yugoslavia due to solving the status in the service, as well as other questions of
life, that are on the territory of the West Slavonia over a year and, according to the article
271 of the Law on the Armed Forces Service, whose term of temporary engagement has
expired.
(...)
Commanding officer
Colonel MILAN ČELEKETIĆ
MILITARY TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Excerpt
To Colonel Medaković
ORDER No 2-231
OF THE HEAD OF THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
OF THE HQ OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY
FROM 20 THNOVEMBER 1992
On the basis of the article 37, issue 1 of the Law on the service in the armed forces
(“Službeni list SFRJ”, No 7/85, 20/89, 40/89, and 26/90) and the item 8/a and 18 of the 202
Order on determing the responsibility and authority of senior officers for dealing with the
relations in the service of the members of the armed forces (“Službeni vojni list”, No 5/87)
THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE ARE TAKEN INTO THE ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE
IN THE RANK OF SERGEANT FIRST CLASS OF THE TECHNICAL SERVICE OF
THE LAND FORCES
56. LJESKOVAC Petar DUŠAN, presently a commander (and the operator) of the Section
for the technical supply Rear battalion “B” 221 Motorized Brigade “A” Ninth Corps of the
Naval Region, garrison in Knin.
Born on 21 August 1964
He is given the personal military occupational speciality 22115.
He is taken into the active military service as a younger officer of an intermediate
specialist’s training.
He has started working as a sergeant first class with the day of the acceptance in the active
military service.
He is disposed to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
A senior officer in charge will appoint him to the right formation position in peaceful and
war formation.
He is accepted in the active military service on 1 April 1991.
Head
Major General
Risto Matović 203
ANNEX 94:
ORDER FOR TRANSFER OF PRSONNEL
(illegible) PERMANENTLY
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
TO MINISTRY OF REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
NATIONAL DEFENCE
ORDER number 2-16
OF HEAD OF PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
OF FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
DATED 24TH JANUARY 1992
ASS.CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ORGANISATION
MOBILIZATION AND PERSONNEL
- issue the order of assigning to duty (for “NB”)
(signature illegible)
Based on paragraph 18 of the Order on determining responsibilities and authorities of COs
for solving AOR issues for military personnel («Official military gazette, No 5/87),
regarding Article 271 of the Law on service in the armed forces («SFRY official gazette, No
7/85, 20/89, 40/89 and 26/90), the following COs are
SENT
TO 2nd MILITARY REGION, 9th CORPS, TO HQ OPERATIONS ZONE «LIKA»
To Korenica garrison
1. DUŠAN (Dušan) GRAHOVAC, Lt Colonel of armoured and mechanized units, personal
MOS 31401, born on 10th April 1945.
Currently assigned to formation position: Federal National Defence Secretariat, Security
Department, formation rank of Lt Colonel, pay grade 12 since 31st August 1988, Belgrade
garrison
The abovementioned is to report to the unit-institution Command in title on 28th January
1992, by 2000 hrs.
The abovementioned is to remain in the unit-institution in title, as needed and in accordance
with Article 271 regulations of the Law on service in the armed forces, after which he is to
return immediately to the unit-institution he was sent from. Report on the task
accomplishment and other changes in personal status of the abovementioned while at task as
ordered, are to be delivered to the Federal National Defence Secretariat, Personnel
Department by the unit-institution Command in title, immediately.
TO 2ND MILITARY REGION, 9TH CORPS, TO HQ OPERATIONS ZONE «BANIJA I
KORDUN»
To Glina garrison
2. MILOJE (Radovan) KOSTI Ć, Lt Colonel of armoured and mechanized units, personal
MOS 31401, born on 8th February 1944. 204
Currently assigned to formation position: Federal National Defence Secretariat, Military-
economy sector, Military-technical institute, formation rank of Lt Colonel, pay grade 12
since 20th August 1991, Belgrade garrison.
The abovementioned is to report to unit-institution Command in title on 28th January 1992,
by 2000 hrs.
The abovementioned is to remain in the unit-institution in title, as needed and in accordance
with Article 271 regulations of the Law on service in the armed forces, after which he is to
return immediately to the unit-institution he was sent from. Report on the task
accomplishment and other changes in personal status of the abovementioned while at task as
ordered, are to be delivered to the Federal National Defence Secretariat, Personnel
Department by the unit-institution Command in title, immediately.
TO 2nd MILITARY REGION, 9th CORPS, TO HQ OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN
KRAJINA
To Knin garrison
3. - JOVO (Jovan) MARI Ć, Lt Colonel of engineering, personal MOS 31739, born on 7th
November 1944.
Currently assigned to formation position: Military College Centre of the Armed Forces
«Maršal Tito», formation rank of Colonel, pay grade 10 since 15th June 1990, Belgrade
garrison.
The abovementioned is to report to the unit-institution Command in title on 28th January
1992, by 2000 hrs.
The abovementioned is to remain in the unit-institution in title, as needed and in accordance
with Article 271 regulations of the Law on service in the armed forces, after which he is to
return immediately to the unit-institution he was sent from. Report on the task
accomplishment and other changes in personal status of the abovementioned while at task as
ordered, are to be delivered to the Federal National Defence Secretariat, Personnel
Department by the unit-institution Command in title, immediately.
HEAD
Major General
Gojko Krstić,
(signed by G. Krstić himself)
Contents of the copy verified by:
Colonel Dušan Zorić 205
ANNEX 95:
F EDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL D EFENCE
O RDER A CCEPTING CONSCRIPT OSDIERS , 27 JNUARY 1993
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
YUGOSLAV PEOPLE’S ARMY
No. 193-1
27 January 1993
Accepting and initiating conscript soldiers in the Army of the Republic of the Serbian
Krajina-
On account of the aggression of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia on the territory
of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, the government of the Republic of the Serbian
Krajina has declared state of war and issued general mobilization, on the basis of which all
conscripts of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina are obliged to report to their war units as
soon as possible, or to the departments of the Ministry of Defence in their town.
For the purpose of organising the acceptance and initiation of the conscript soldiers to the
Army of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, who stay in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, I issue the
ORDER
1. The commands of the armies will, through the commands of the military regions,
organise the acceptance and initiation of the conscript soldiers, who, answering to
the appeal of the government of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, report to the
Army of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina.
2. The acceptance and accommodation of the conscripts must be performed in the
following way:
a. From the territory of central Serbia to Education Center “Bubanj Potok”
in Belgrade and to the Barracks “Stevan Sinđelić” in Niš.
b. From the territory of the Vojvodina Autonomous Province to the Barracks
“Majevica” in Novi Sad.
c. From the territory of the Republic of Montenegro to the Barracks
“Masline” in Podgorica.
st nd rd
3. The commands of the 1 , 2 , and 3 Army will through their subordinated
commands control that in the named barracks an organised acceptance,
accommodation and nourishment of the conscript soldiers be performed until their
assignments to the Republic of the Serbian Krajina.
4. The assignments of the conscript soldiers will be performed by the Government’s
Office of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina in Belgrade (Moša Pijade Street 8,
tel. 011/324-573), and cooperation must be established with them.
5. The conscript soldiers must be issued with personal weapons when assigned to the
Republic of the Serbian Krajina, i.e. with a set of ammunition, one dry meal and a
uniform. The commands of the armies will make the weapons available, in
cooperation with the Rear Sector of the Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army. The 206
commands of the armies will also make sure that the names and the addresses of
the persons be recorded, while giving them weapons.
6. The Government’s Office of the Serbian Krajina will make sure that the conscript
soldiers are given their personal weapons and equipment and that they are
recorded.
7. The Administration for the organisation, mobilization and reinforcement of the
Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army must report the number of the registered and
initiated conscript soldiers regularly.
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
YUGOSLAV ARMY
Colonel General Života Panić
Delivered:
-Command of the 1 , 2dand 3 Army
-Records office
-Rear Sector of the Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army
ANNEX 96:
FEDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL D EFENCE
DECISION 24 N OVEMBER 1991
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
DECISION 24 NOVEMBER 1991
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Int. No. 10/19-58
th
24 Nov. 1991
Based upon point 3 of the Order about the daily compensation for the time of performing
combat activities (Personnel Department SSNO (Federal Secretariat of National Defence),
th
confid. No. 7-152 from the 12of Nov. 1991) the vice secretary in the Federal Secretariat
for National Defence brings this
CONCLUSION
ABOUT THE DAILY ALLOWANCE
FOR THE TIME OF PERFOMING COMBAT ACTIVITIES
1. According to the Order about daily allowance during the performance of combat
activities, the allowance amounts to:
a. for active soldiers, contract soldiers, civilians in office of JNA and reserve
officers:
st
- from the 1 of December 1991 580 dinars;
b. for conscripts and reserve soldiers: 207
- from the 1 of December 1991 400 dinars.
2. This conclusion is valid from the day of its acceptance, and the Conclusion about daily
allowance for the time of performing combat activities (Personnel Dept. of the SSNO,
confid. No. 10/19-53 from the 12 of Nov. 1991) is invalid.
Vice secretary
Major General
Aleksandar Spirkovski
A NNEX 97:
F EDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL DEFENCE
DECISION 24 N OVEMBER 1991
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
Int. No. 10/19-57
th
24 Nov. 1991
Based upon article 61 subsection 1 of the Regulations about refunding travel- and other
expenses in the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) (“Službeni vojni list”, No. 13/91 and
21/91), the vice secretary of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence announces this
D E C I S I O N
ABOUT THE CHANGES IN THE DECISION ON THE AMOUNT OF THE
TRAVELING ALLOWANCE, COMPENSATION FOR LIVING WITHOUT FAMILY,
COMPENSATION OF PART OF THE ALLIMENTATION COSTS DURING THE TIME
OF WORK AND PARTICIPATING IN TRAVELING COSTS TO THE PLACE OF
OFFICE
1. In the decision about determining the amount of the travelling allowance, compensation
for living without family, compensation of part of the alimentation costs during the
working time and participation in part of the travelling costs to the place of office
(“Službeni vojni list”, No. 15/91, 16/91, 19/91, 21/91 and 25/91), No. 1 to 3 are
changed and now run as follows:
“1. Travelling allowance amounts to 600 dinars from the 1 of December 1991.
2. Compensation for living without the family amounts, from the 1of November
1991, to 5,310 dinars.
3. The daily compensation for thstalimentation costs during the working time
amounts to 65 dinars from the 1 of November 1991.”
4. This decision is valid from the day it is published in the “Službeni vojni list”.
Vice secretary
Major General
Aleksandar Spirkovski 208
A NNEX 98:
R EPORT OF “SAO K RAJINA ”, 12 SEPTEMBER 1991
THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KRAJINA
THE DVOR MUNICIPALITY
THE TERNDTORIAL DEFENCE QUARTERS
THE 2 BATTALION
No. 1411-91
Dvor, 12 September 1991
TO THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE QUARTERS
- to the commander Duško Kovačević personally
DVOR NA UNI
st rd nd
On the meeting of the 1 and the 3 company of the 2 battalion that was held on
September 8, 1991 and after the consultations with the commander of the 2 ndcompany of
nd
the 2 battalion performed on September 9, 1991 we adopted the following
RESOLUTION
nd
4. Starting from the established factual circumstances that the most of the soldiers of the 2
battalion, especially the ones from the 1 company, formed the volunteer defence formation
till September 12, 1991 and as such the battalion had losses and the majority of the
wounded soldiers during the liberation of the enemy bases of Zamlača, Struga and other.
As the consequence of it the analysis of the of the work and the activity of the units of the
battalion was made – the realisation of the discipline and of the subordination in command
process and some omissions made in the process of
reinforcement of the 2ndbattalion with the personnel were noticed, so therefore the decision
nd
to relieve the commander of the 2 battalion so far, MIRKO RADOJČIĆ, of his duty and to
appoint the engineer ĐURO VUJ ČIĆ from Dvor as the commander was unanimously
reached.
The soldiers of the 2ndbattalion explain that decision with the fact that the engineeĐuro
Vujčić joined among the first people the battle against the Ustasha – state terror that is
being conducted by the supreme authorities of the Republic of Croatia against the Serbian
people in Croatia.
As such he also took part in the battles for the liberation and the persecution of the Ustaša –
phalanx gang in Zamlača and Struga.
5. Because of the special courage of the soldiers and their will to take part in the defence of
the territory of the Dvor municipality, especially in the period before the declaration of the
emergency war state (25 June 1991) on the territory of the Dvor municipality, the decisive
request was made to rename the 2 ndbattalion in the 1 battalion.
6. The possible responsibility should be sttablished and the way of command and
subordination of the commanders of the 1 battalion with the command and the units of the
2ndbattalion, connected with the liberation of Zamlača and Struga, should be checked.
7. In case some commanders of platoons, companies, the commander of the battalion and
the political commissar of the battalion do not have the adequate ranks according to the 209
formation and the duty that they perform, or will perform, the special promotion should be
made, only in case that it is necessary.
8. The financial list of the most jeopardized volunteers should be made in order to offer
them the one-shot help.
9. The battalion clinic should be formed and the medical personnel of the company should
be organised.
POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE BATTALION
M. A. Svetozar BINČIĆ, lawyer
(signature)
A NNEX 99:
TH
R EPORT OF TO THE C OMMAND OF THE 329 A RMOURED B RIGADE
THE VISIT TO THE MECHANIZED COMPANY/MECHANIZED BATTALION IN
THE REGION OF DVOR NA UNI,
REPORT.
TO THE COMMAND OF THE 329 THARMOURED BRIGADE
On the basis of the Plan of work of the command in the period from July 26 and July 27,
1991 the whole day tour and the stay in the enforced mechanized company from the
mechanized battalion that is accomplishing its mission in the wider rayon of Dvor na Uni
was conducted. The team consisted of: Lieutenant Colonel Novica Simić, Ensign Nikola
Prostrog, Reserve Captain Željko Deli ć with his 7 reserve soldiers from the Military Police
platoon. The tour was conducted with the use of two motorized vehicles: Pincgauer and the
travelling vehicle from the “PF” Lada. (…)
In the course of the tour the following facts were established:
- The fire preparation of the attack on the village of Zamla ča bththe forces of
the Krajina Territorial Defence began at exactly 10 a.m. on the 2of July
1991 with the activity of the 120 mm mortar of the 1sand the 2 ndplatoon
from the wider rayon of Javoranj. The correction lasted almost for an hour
and we got the impression that the personnel is not sufficiently qualified,
moreover in the course of the group shooting the deviations of the shots,
vertically and horizontally, were evident. With the transfer of fire on the
village of Struga the activity from the infantry armament at the set targets in
the village of Struga began.
- Around 1 p.m. we found out that that the village of Zamlča was occupied
and it was evident from the transfer of the infantry fire towards the village of
Struga. In the village of Zamla ča itself two cowsheds and one house were on
fire. 210
- At 3 p.m. one wounded person from the composition of the Territorial
Defence that was wounded in the leg was transported in the vehicle of TV
Belgrade.
- At 4 p.m. a big mass people gathered on the exit of Dvor. They did not wear
uniforms but most of them were armed. Those were the members of the so-
called guards that commented the battle on the barricades, but they did not
show any wish to participate in the battle itself.
- Around 5 p.m. the news was spread among the people that the units met with
the strong resistance and that allegedly, without the help of the JNA they
could not continue to attack. The people started to gather around our vehicles
and they expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that we were waiting so
long and they said that it was time for us to say on whose side we were and
they even made comments saying that they refused to obey Tu đman so we
could refuse to obey Mesić because only the Serbs are in the Army. I ordered
the units to be prepare themselves for the complete combat readiness and I
ordered the civilians to go away from our vehicles and I also ordered the
officers and the soldiers not to comment anything.
- At 5:30 p.m. the commander of the company, First Lieutenant Vukovi ć
informed me that the president of the Executive Committee of the Dvor
municipality issued to permission to attack. That was the note, about half of a
page long, and the following text was typed on it:
- “ The tank unit in Dvor na Uni is given the permission to start the attack and
help in the occupation of Struga.” Pulji ć signed the permission. As the
commander of the company refused to do anything according to that
information, the person who signed the permission came personally to
convince him, because allegedly his people would die without our help. The
commander sent him to me, but I refused to talk with him and I went to our
observation post that was located in the attic of some house in order to see
what is going on. On my way there I found out from one of the villagers that
two sides are commanding with the units, that they did not stick to the plan
and that parts of the Territorial Defence troops in Struga found themselves in
the middle of the crossfire and they could not go forward nor back. I reported
this to the Intelligence Command and they told me that the pressure is made
on them too, but that they ordered the part of the units to go through the
valley of the river Una, in the direction of Dvor and they said that the
Ministry of the Interior troops gave consent to that.
“PNSONP” Lieutenant Colonel
Novica Simić
(signature) 211
A NNEX 100:
FEDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL DEFENCE
ORDER 25 JULY 1991
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SFRY
ADMINISTRATION
Transfer of forces and military equipment
From the territory of the Republic of Slovenia – order –
On the basis of the resolution of the Presidency of SFRY from 18 July 1991, and with the
purpose of timely and planned organisation of the transfer of the Commands, units,
institutions and the Motorized Composition of the JNA from the territory of the Republic of
Slovenia, I issue the following
ORDER
1. The Commands, units, institutions and complete mobile property of the JNA has to be
transferred from the territory of the Republic of Sstvenia to the territory of the Republic
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The forces of theCorps, a part of the forces of the
Combat Air force, the Anti-Aircraft Defence and the institutions of the Federal Secretary for
the National Defence (SSNO) have to be transferred to the territory: Šabac – Valjevo –
Gornji Miholjac – Zemun, while the 14Corps with a part of the Combat Air force and the
Anti-Aircraft Defence and the SSNO have to be transferred to the territory: Prijedor –
th st
Derventa- Zenica. The forces of the and 31 Corps are to be put under the Command of
the 1 Military region after their transfer.
FEDERAL SECRETARY
FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENCE
General of the Army
Veljko Kadijević 212
A NNEX 101:
DECISION OF APPOINTMENT BY “SAO K RAJINA ”, 30 SPTEMBER 1991
SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION KRAJINA
GOVERNMENT OF SAO KRAJINA
PRESIDENT
Number: 1/1-91
Knin, 30 September 1991
Based on the Decision by the Government of the SAO Krajina from 1 August 1991 on the
application of the Law for the Defence of the Republic of Serbia on the territory of SAO
Krajina, and Article 6, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the cited Law, the President of the
Government of SAO Krajina, brings a
DECISION
On the appointment of the Commandant of the Territorial Defence
of the Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina
4. ILIJA ĐUJIĆ, retired Lt. Colonel General, is appointed to Commandant of the Territorial
Defence of the Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina.
5. This decision is effective immediately.
PRESIDENT
Dr. Milan Babić
(signature)
Seal:
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina
Government of Krajina 213
A NNEX 102:
THE COMMAND OF THE 1 P ROLETARIAN G UARD M ECHANISED D IVISION
O RDER OF 4 OCTOBER 1991
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
ST
THE COMMAND OF THE 1 PROLETARIAN GUARD
MECHANISED DIVISION
No. 58/18
4 October 1991
to 252ndArmoured Brigade Command
Command Place in the region Šid
During 4 October 1991,the units of the division have to be engaged on the execution of the
following assignments:
rd
1. The 3 Proletarian Guard Motorised Brigade: With the forces control the
communication lines Vinkovci – Nuštar, enforce the scouting and the collection of
the data on the enemy forces western of Vinkovci. Finish the combat deployment and
secure the left flank of the brigade. Establish collaboration with thArmoured
Brigade. Send the POOd-3 to the region of the village Mirkovci with the assignment
to be ready for the Rear Base and collaboration with the Armoured Battalion.
st
The 1 Engineer Brigade will carry out the mining according to the decision of the
Commander of the 3 Proletarian Guard Motorised Brigade.
2. The 252 ndArmoured Brigade with the unit “Šumadija” will continue cleaning the
region Zidina and the village Marinci, and with fire control the communication lines
Nuštar – Vukovar, organise deployment and establish closer collaboration with the
rd
3 Proletarian Guard Motorised Brigade.
In the region Zidine establish a tank and one mechanised company, entrench them
and decisively defend the object.
3. The detachment “Šumadija” is superior to the 252 Armoured Brigade.
The Commander of the unit will inform the Commander of the 252 nd Armoured
Brigade in the region Negar.
nd
4. The 2 Proletarian Guard Motorised Brigade: will continue to form and
reinforcement of the brigade and continue to secure Tovarnik.
With one armoured battalion, Howitzer Division – 122, Light Artillery Division
Anti-Aircraft Defence and collaboration with the special forces of Territorial
Defence (TO) occupy the village of Bapska and the village of Šarengrad. The
nd
execution of the assignment is administered by the Commander of the Proletarian
Guard Mechanised Brigade.
5. The 1 “lap” Anti-Aircraft Defence: continues to secure the village of Ilača.
6. The 1 Combined Artillery Regiment with the current “VP” has to be ready to open
fire according to “NA” plan. 214
7. The 1 Engineer Battalion is transferred to the village of Slakovci, establishes the
command of the village secures a direct communication lines and secures the
battlefield.
rd
With one pioneer and the necessary “MES” reinforce the 3 Proletarian Guard
Mechanised Brigade for mining according to the decision of the Commander of the
Brigade, and later stops the mine groups in the region forest Deonica in the region of
the field paths and channels.
The GOP has to be engaged on the securing of the passage Mirkovci – Orolik.
The documentation on the completed “MEP” have to be made in four copies and
delivered to: the Local Committee (MZ) Mirkovci, the Command of the 3 rd
st
Proletarian Guard Mechanised Brigade, the Command of the 1 Proletarian Guard
Mechanised Division, and one copy must be saved at their offices.
8. The 1 sCombined Anti-Armour Artillery Battery: has to continue the
systematisation of the VP and continue to scout and well as the systematisation of the
direction of arrival and the POR according to the already issued assignments of the
NA.
9. The 1 stProletarian Guard Mechanised Brigade has to continue reinforcing and
forming its units.
10. The unit “Lepenica” have to occupy the village of Đeletovci and secure the left side
of the division from the direction of the village of Nijemci.
11. The Rear Deputy Commander has to continue to reinforce the units with supplies,
fill the food supplies and organise a pulling out of the weapons from the battlefield
and has to repair the faulty weaponry.
GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS
1. All soldiers and senior officers have to start wearing winter clothes.
2. In the deployment region the combat vehicles and men have to be counted.
3. A special effort has to be put into the building of a soldier image, order and the
discipline in the unit.
4. With a direct involvement of the moral authority and all subjects of the unit, the
military collective and the moral units have to be strengthened.
5. The movement of citizens, individuals, groups and units has to be forbidden on the
deployment region of the unit from 20:00 until 6:00. Stronger patrol units have to
sent to the deployment region, they have to set traps which will without warning
open fire on individuals who do not respect the movement curfew.
6. Intensify the activities of the scout units in order to collect data on the enemy with a
stress on the OMJ and the backup means.
7. Organise daily cleaning and oiling of the common weaponry.
8. The Military police units have to be engaged on tasks of organising the units.
DR/BC
COMMANDER Major-General 215
Dragoljub Aranđelović
ANNEX 103:
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JNA AND R EPRESENTATIVES OF LOKI 14 OCTOBER 1991
Military Commands of the unit JNA (illegible) which is represented by Major General
Dragoljub Aranđelović and the authorised representatives of the towns of Ilok, Šarengrad,
(illegible) that are represented by Ivan Mrkšć, the mayor of Ilok, Mate (illegible), the
commander of the police department in Ilok, Stipan Kraljevi ć, the president of the
commission for negotiations and others(illegible), with the presence of the representatives
th
of the Mission of the European Community Hugh Cunningham and Petr (illegible), on 14
October 1991 in Šid have signed:
AGREEMENT
Article 1
On the basis of the requests of the citizens of Ilok, (illegible) and Šarengrad, and after the
completion of the referendum, it is made possible for all the citizens of this inhabited places
and also for the refugees that found themselves in these places, to move out with the
members of their family if they want to.
Article 2
It is the obligation of all citizens to, before they move out and immediately before forming a
convoy, hand over their weapons and (illegible), in front of the bridge “25 Maj” in the
house-workshop if Ivan Zec. The objects will be handed over to the unit of JNA, stationed
on the bridge “25 Maj” in the presence of the officials from the Ministry of the Interior in
Ilok and the members of the Mission of the European Community.
Article 3
The Ministry of the Interior and the units of the Territorial defence are obliged to
immediately begin removing all mine-explosive and other obstacles that were set in the
th
above mentioned inhabited places and to finish these actions until 17 October 1991 at
07.00hrs.
Article 4
During the preparations for moving out, and at the period of moving out, both sides, the
signatories of the agreement, are bound to secure the absolute peace, that is, to place the ban
on all actions and opening fire.
Article 5
At the moment of moving out of citizens from the above mentioned places, and before the
forming of a convoy, the members of JNA with the presence of the officials from the
Ministry of the Interior and the members of the Mission of EC will make an inspection
(raid) of all the objects, if that would be needed. 216
Article 6
The members of JNA bind themselves to secure the personal and property safety of the
citizens that are staying in the inhabited places, together with the other property of the
citizens that lived in these places.
Article 7
The members of JNA and those from the Ministry of the Interior from Ilok will secure the
safety of the convoy on its way.
The officials from the Ministry of the Interior from Ilok (about 60 of them) who possess
official weapons are to keep it with themselves.
Article 8
th
The time of the departure of the convoy is 17 October 1991. at 1300hrs in front of the
bridge “25 Maj” and it will be going from:Ilok – Principovac – Šid – Adaševci – Lipovac.
From Lipovac on, the Ministry of the Interior of Croatia will take over the security of the
convoy.
Article 9
Before the departure of the convoy, the officials of the Military police together with the
officials of the Ministry of the Interior will make a detailed inspection of the vehicles and
the persons embarking in those vehicles, in order to prevent the loading and transporting
weapons, munitions and other explosive devices.
Article 10
Citizens, who are rightfully suspected to have done some criminal deed, cannot leave the
above mentioned places, or embark in a vehicle.
All representatives, that is, members of the National Guard must leave the above mentioned
places and go with the convoy if they have not done any criminal deed, and they will be
guaranteed safety, the same as the other citizens.
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE TOWN OF ILOK
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE YUGOSLAV FEDERAL
ARMY 217
A NNEX 104:
O RDER OF THE C HIEF OF SAFF OF THE UPSEME C OMMAND
OF 19 NOVEMBER 1991
ORDER No. 1023-1
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
th
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRY FROM Nov. 19 , 1991
By performing the tasks of suppressing attacks on the units and facilities of the Yugoslav
People’s Army (JNA) and of preventing the repetition of genocide and other consequences
of inter-ethnic armed conflicts, the armed forces of Yugoslavia have achieved a significant
success in combat operations in the area of Vukovar. In long and hard combats, elite
Ustasha-formations and many murderers from the country and from abroad were beaten and
captured.
The victorious operation was carried out by the Operations group “north” and “south” from
the 1 military region with the direct support of tcorps of the combat air force and the
anti aircraft defence.
For moral toughness, persistence, courage and resoluteness shown in combat operations in
Vukovar, I
Award commendation to
st
1. Lieutenant Colonel General Života Panić, Commander of the 1 Military Region.
2. The Operations group “north” and its Commander Major General Andrija
Biorčević.
3. The Operations group “south” and its Commander Colonel Mile Mrkšić.
4. The Air Force unit of the 1 Air Corps of the combat air force and the anti-aircraft
defence and its Commander Colonel Branislav Petrović.
The order must be announced to all members of the armed forces of Yugoslavia
Let the accomplishments, courage and devotedness of the senior officers, soldiers and
volunteers engaged in the operation in Vukovar be a sacred example to all soldiers and
officers of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the territorial defence.
May the fallen soldiers and officers in Vukovar enjoy eternal glory.
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
SUPREME COMMAND
GENERAL OF THE ARMY
VELJKO KADIJEVIĆ 218
A NNEX 105:
ST
C OMMAND OF THE 1 O PERATIONS G ROUP ,
ORDER 19 O CTOBER 1991
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC CROATIA
MUNICIPALITY VOJNIĆ
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
Vojnić, 20 October 1991
COMMAND OF THE 1 ST OPERATIONS GROUP
19 October 1991
Subordination of the Units of the Territorial Defence
st
To the units of the JNA – Command of the 1 Operations Group
I AM ISSUING THE ORDER:
th nd th
17 Partisan Brigade, 622 Motorized Brigade, 544 Motorized Brigade, Tactics Group-1,
9 Motorized Brigade, 6 thCombined Anti-Armoured Artillery Regiment, 6 tCombined
th th
Artillery Regiment, 58 Combined Artillery Brigade, 389 Rocket Brigade, Zone
Headquarters of the Territorial Defence (TO) of Banovina and Kordun, Municipality
Headquarters of the TO of Dvor na Uni, Municipality Headquarters of the TO Kostajnica,
Municipality Headquarters of the TO Sisak, Municipality Headquarters of the TO Petrinja,
Municipality Headquarters of the TO Glina, Municipality Headquarters of the TO
Vrginmost and the Municipality Headquarters of the TO Vojnić.
All units of the TO and the Zone Headquarters of Banija and Kordun and (illegible)
mentioned above, will be subordinated to the Command of the 1tOperations Group on 19
October 1991, and in further operations will be engaged as composition of JNA units in the
combat operation zones the JNA units are located.
COMMANDER
Major General
Špiro Niković 219
ANNEX 106:
TH
C OMMAND OF THE 9 CORPS , 23 SPTEMBER 1991
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
VERY URGENT
TO THE COMMAND OF THE 180 MOTORISED BRIGADE 13:00, 23 Sept 1991
KM (COMMAND PLACE) – KNIN
COMMAND OF THE 180 Motorised Brigade, 557 (illegible)
ORDER FOR REGROUPING Op. no. 1
Section 1:100000 Zadar, Gračac, T.Drvar,Glamoč, Biograd n/m, Šibenik, Split (…)
3. Neighbours:
3.1. 13/5.VO with a part of their forces are involved in the high-plains of Lika and have to
secure the side and the rear of the Corps as well as the directions of the supply of forces
from within the land.
th
3.2. The 8 Naval Sector with a important defence of the objects – in the town of Sibenik
and the military objects from their jurisdiction outside the town joins with one of the forces
of the National Guard Corps (ZNG) and the Ministry of the Interior (MUP) of the Republic
of Croatia, and stops their counterattacks and their spreading.
th
3.3. The 37 Corps is supplied with new forces via Herzegovina, into the most suitable
regions for offensive actions.
COMMANDER
Major General Vladimir Vuković 220
ANNEX 107:
AGREEMENT B ETWEEN THE O FFICIAL D ELEGATES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE JNA, 22 NOVEMBER 1991
In accordance with the conclusions of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague,
the decisions of the Croatian Government on the reassignment from the territory of the
Republic Croatia of Yugoslav People’s Army (in further text JNA) units, and the order of
the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of SFR Yugoslavia, on 22
November 1991,Authorized representatives of the Croatian Government and the JNA
reached in Zagreb the following
AGREEMENT
I
The Government of the Republic Croatia guarantees free and secure leave, outside the
territory of the Republic Croatia, of all members of military units, institutions and
commands of the JNA mentioned in the Overview of units, commands and institutions of
the JNA, which will be reassigned from the area of the Republic Croatia (numbers from 1 to
15), which is a constitutional part of this Agreement. Under the notion of units, institutions
and commands of the JNA we understand the officers, junior officers, military officials,
civilian personnel at duty in the JNA, soldiers, cadets and students of military secondary
school. The same guarantee is made to the members of the families of the mentioned
categories of the members of the JNA.
II
The units, institutions and commands of the JNA (mentioned in the Overview under items
from 1 to 15) will be reassigned from the territory of the Republic Croatia with the
weaponry, ammunition, equipment and other moveable property that the units, institutions
and commands are able to transport with their own transport means, as well as with
supplementary transport means that will be given at their disposal by the JNA from the
territory of the Republic Croatia or from other parts of SFR Yugoslavia. The Government of
the Republic Croatia will make possible for the means engaged, the accompanying
personnel and unarmed drivers to enter the territory of the Republic Croatia.
It will be made possible to the technical groups of the JNA to repair the damaged combat
technical equipment and material-technical means on the spot during the transport, and to
later join the march column. This will be done in collaboration and under the supervision of
the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic Croatia.
III
The units, institutions and commands of the JNA, which will be reassigned from the
territory of the Republic Croatia on the basis of this Agreement, will carry out the
reassignment within at least 5 (five) days and 15 days at most from the day the Agreement
was signed, which is determined in the Overview that is the constitutional part of the
Agreement. In case of a higher force, the deadline will be prolonged. The board will
determine any case of higher force, as it is said in Article XV of this Agreement. 221
IV
The Government of the Republic Croatia guarantees personal safety, inviolability of private
property and the right to undisturbed usage of apartments to the members of the units,
institutions and commands of the JNA who do not want to leave the area of Zagreb or the
territory of the Republic Croatia after their time of duty in the JNA has run out, and to the
members of their families.
The same guarantee is made to the members of the families of the members of the units,
institutions and commands of the JNA, mentioned in the Overview (from 1 to 15), which
together with the units, institutions and commands leave the territory of the Republic
Croatia, but, after the time of duty in the JNA has run out, intend to return to the Republic
Croatia.
V
In accordance with the aforesaid agreement, the Government of the Republic Croatia will
not hinder the members of the JNA to visit their families on the territory of the Republic
Croatia, and the members of the families to visit the JNA members in their new residences.
The joint commission for property and legal business, which will be determined by the
Government of the Republic Croatia and the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, will
solve the question of the exchange of apartments of those JNA members, who intend to do
it.
The Government of the Republic Croatia will make certain that the JNA members will be
able to, without hindrance, sent to their families on the territory of the Republic Croatia
money and other deliveries by the post, by railway, by ship or plane, so that the families of
the JNA members would not become a social problem of the Republic Croatia.
VI
The private vehicles of the JNA members and their families with the movable property
(furniture, etc.) will be joined to the motorized columns of the units, institutions and
commands of the JNA, and it will not be hindered by the governmental bodies of the
Republic Croatia.
The members of the JNA, who, for any reason whatsoever, cannot leave the Republic
Croatia with the units, institutions and commands of the JNA, will be given the possibility
to leave when they ask for it, without any hindrance.
VII
The units, institutions and commands of the JNA, which are to be reassigned from the
territory of the Republic Croatia, on the basis of this agreement, will hand over to the
authorised bodies of the Republic Croatia all building structures that were used as they are,
together with the equipment, installations, ground, with defective and intact military
technical equipment, as well as with intact equipment, which is not to be transferred, for
which each unit, institution and command of the JNA has to keep a special record. The
moveable and immovable property that is handed over in such a way will be taken into
consideration during the determination of the distribution balance. The units of the JNA
guarantee that it will not damage the objects on purpose and other means that will be
handed over. Possible damages will be kept in records. 222
The European Monitor Mission will supervise the departure, location and non-use of the
reassigned units of the JNA against the Republic Croatia.
VIII
The handover of the military hospital at the disposal of the Republic Croatia will be
executed on the basis of a specially reached Agreement. This agreement will regulate the
specific quality of this institution. All decrees of this Agreement will be applied at the
Agreement on the military hospital. The Agreement on the handover of the military hospital
will be reached within seven (7) days from the day this Agreement was signed.
A part of the Centre of the Military Technical School “I. Gošnjak” in Zagreb will be handed
over, by commission, at the disposal of the bodies of the Republic Croatia within five (5)
days from the days this Agreement becomes effective.
The status of the “VZ” “Zmaj” will be regulated by the annex enclosed in this Agreement.
IX
The units, institutions and commands of the JNA that will be reassigned from the territory
of the Republic Croatia on the basis of this Agreement, will, during the process of
reassignment, return to the bodies of the Republic Croatia the entire weaponry, equipment
and devices of the Territorial Defence of the Republic Croatia, which they kept or used
according to the decision of the former headquarters of the Territorial Defence.
X
The units, institutions and commands of the JNA will be reassigned from the territory of the
Republic Croatia to locations at least 20 km from the border of the Republic Croatia. These
units, institutions and commands of the JNA will not be engaged in combat operations
against the Republic Croatia. The European Monitor Mission (PMEZ) in accordance with
the guidelines of the PMEZ, which are a constitutional part of this Agreement, will control
this process.
XI
The units, institutions and commands of the JNA that will be reassigned from the territory
of the Republic Croatia on the basis of this Agreement will commit themselves to clear of
mines from all minefields that were set for securing military objects. The Transfer
Commission will carry out the control, while the PMEZ will supervise it.
XII
The Government of the Republic Croatia will make possible that the units, institutions and
commands of the Combat Air force and the Anti-Aircraft Defence that will be reassigned on
the basis of this Agreement use transport aviation (with previous notification to the bodies
of Republic Croatia).
XIII
The Government of the Republic Croatia will guarantee that the units, institutions and
commands of the JNA will not be attacked during the transport, and specially, that
motorized members of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic Croatia who will prevent 223
from any armed provocation will accompany the columns. The bodies of the Ministry of the
Interior will accompany the march columns to the separation lines with the armed
formations of the Republic Croatia.
At the head, in the middle and at the end of the column of the JNA there will be patrols of
the military police of the JNA, which will collaborate with the bodies of the Ministry of the
Interior and the monitor teams of the PMEZ.
XIV
Both parties will organise one or more commission for solving technical problems during
the transfer of the objects at the level of individual barracks.
XV
A board will be established for the realisation of this Agreement, in the way that both
parties will name two (2) members, while the fifth member will be a representative from the
European Monitor Mission. The decisions in the board will be made by majority of votes.
XVI
The monitor team of the European Union will supervise the realisation of the Agreement,
take part in the work of the board in Article 15 and be the cosignatory of this Agreement.
XVII
This Agreement is effective from the day it is signed, and the realisation will start the day
after it was signed.
In Zagreb, 22 November 1991
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC CROATIA
(signature illegible)
COMMISSIONER OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF SFRY
Lieutenant Colonel General
Andrija Rašeta
COSIGNATORY OF THE PMEZ
(signature illegible) 224
A NNEX 108:
O RDER
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
TH
COMMAND OF THE 8 OPERATIONS GROUP
Conf. No. 2-264
th
16 of March 1992
Report about executed task, delivering to
Personnel administration of the SSNO (Federal Secretariat for National Defence)
Based on the order of the Head of the Personnel Administration of the SSNO, No. 2 from
th
the 14 of January 1992, we report to you that the officers executed their task for which
they had been sent to the 8 Operations Group, which are the following:
1. RADOJE, Miodrag TRIFUNOVI Ć infantry lieutenant-colonel, personal MOS 31139,
th
born on the 24 of December 1952
His present formation position: duty in the Guards Brigade’s garrison in Belgrade.
The above mentioned took up his duty in the 8 thOperations Group garrison Vrgin Most on
th
the 4 of January 19th. After having finished his task, he returned to his unit in the garrison
Belgrade on the 19 of January 1992.
Please, take this time into account as participation in war.
2. MILOŠ Milan MAČEŠIĆ, infantry lieutenant-colonel, personal MOS 31101, born on the
rd
3 of January 1969.
His present formation position: on duty in the Guards Brigade, garrison Belgrade.
The above mentioned took up his duty in the 8 thOperations Group garrison Vrginmost on
th
the 4 st January 1992. He had the duty as psttoon commander of the militath police until
the 21 of January 1992, and from the 21 of January 1992 to the 16 of March 1992 he
was on duty as commander of the 1 battalion of the 3 Kordun Brigade of the TO.
th
On the 18 of March 1992, he finished the task he had been sent for, and returned to his
unit to the garrison Belgrade.
Please, take this time into account as participation in war.
TŽ/KM
COMMANDER
General-Major
Mile Mrkšić 225
A NNEX 109:
COMBAT REPORT OF THE T8 D EFENCE G ARRISON
31 M ARCH 1992
THE 8 TH OPERATIONS GROUP COMMAND
PAGE NO. 2-302
31 March 1992
THE REGULAR COMBAT REPORT
DELIVERTH TO.-
THE 10 CORPS COMMAND
Section: 1:100 000, Novo Mesto, Zagreb, Ivanić-grad, Ogulin, Karlovac, Sisak, Gospić,
Bihać, Bosanska Krupa.
1. On the 30 thof March 1992 at 11:20 a.m. the enemy, the group of 7 to 8
Ustashas, barged into the first houses near the Mekušje barracks. At 1 p.m. on
the 31 of March 1992 the fire was opened from the semi-automatic machine
guns and the shooting armament from Šišljavice at Banska Selnica and from
Rečice at Bro đani, the provocation lasted periodically till 2:45 p.m. On the
other parts of the responsibility zone the truce was not broken. The units of
the 8 Operations Group did not respond to the provocation.
2. The units of the 8 defence garrison performed regular planned activities. The
forming of the Territorial Defence brigades, the border units and the brigades
of the Secretariat of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Krajina are in
final stage. During the day the OUN forces checked the facilities for
accommodation in the rayon of the deployment of the 4 thbrigade of the
Territorial Defence.
3. The moral condition is favourable.
4. The condition of the security is good.
5. The forming of the mentioned units and the activities of the security of the
responsibility zone will be continued the next day.
6. We have no losses.
7. We have no requests.
Commander
General-Major Mile Mrkšić 226
ANNEX 110:
F EDERAL SCRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
O RDER 2 MARCH 1991
NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE. CLASS. DOC.
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SFRY
III. ADMINISTRATION
2 March 1992
TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
Enclosed, find the Order of the Federal secretary for National Defence (SSNO), State
Classified Document No. 892-1 from 27 February 1992.
ENCLOSED: Order of the SSNO
CHIEF
Lieutenant Colonel general
Ljubomir Domazetović
SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
Knin, 4 March 1992
ANNEX 111:
F EDERAL SCRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
ORDER 12 MARCH 1991
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
SFRY ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF
III ADMINISTRATION
Top secret No 116-1
12th March 1992
40/1-1 /92
MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET
Copy No 3
SOP documents for TO headquarters
and units in the mobilization- demobilisation
of the units.
Enclosed are the instructional SOPs of TO headquarters and units in the course of
mobilization and demobilisation of headquarters - units.
Enclosure:
- Instructional SOP for TO headquarters and units in preparing demobilisation
and repeated mobilization; 227
- Memorandum for executing immediate preparation of the headquarters and
commanding officers command in the preparations for reorganisation and
mobilization and demobilisation of the headquarters and TO units command.
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
TO ZONE HQ
WESTERN SLAVONIA
Top secret No 40/1-1
24th March 1992
OKUČANI
(on behalf of) HEAD
Lt Gen Ljubomir Domazetović
(SIGNATURE ILLEGIBLE)
FEDERAL NATIONAL DEFENCE SECRETARIAT
SFRY ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS - III ADMINISTRATION
MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET
Copy No 2
MEMORANDUM
FOR EXECUTING THE IMMEDIATE PREPARATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS
AND COMMANDING OFFICERS COMMAND FOR THE EXECUTION OF
REORGANISATION AND MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILISATION OF THE
HEADQUARTERS AND TO UNITS COMMANDS IN THE AREA OF KRAJINA.
12th of March 1992
(…)
2. PREPARATION FOR DEMOBILISATION AND REPEATED MOBILIZATION:
2.1. Studying the reorganisation and unit demobilisation orders, books on unit formation
and mobilization order and excerpt from the mobilization document of the subordinate
command - headquarters’ Mobilization plan.
2.2. Planning the execution of tasks facing the headquarters and unit command.
2.3. Creating a plan for performing tasks (contents of activities, task performers, location
and time deadlines etc.)
2.4. Familiarisation of subordinate commands and commanding officers with obligations,
tasks and the performance dynamics.
2.5. Execution of appropriate immediate and practical preparations for task (training)
execution and planning and securing the appropriate forces and means for task execution.
2.6. Appointing the manager and unit mobilization plan trustee (making the appropriate
order).
2.7. Appointing the mobilization executor and deputy mob. executor. 228
2.8. Designating the mobilization location for each unit.
2.9. Selecting the mobilization gathering-place and lower units deployment areas, making
the proposal for the gathering place and approval of the same.
2.10. Designating the duration time for the mobilization (depending on location and unit’s
role).
2.11. Analysis, selection and designation of storage - depo area and distribution in units.
Making and delivery of the distribution sheets to subordinate headquarters and units
commands.
2.12. Creating the Plan for withdrawing units from present areas and deployment in new
areas.
2.13. Analysis of the war units manning and materiel capabilities from the territory list.
2.14. Creating the proposal of the manning and materiel Plan from the list.
2.15. Creating, approving and delivering the war units manning Plan (Plan to be made in 2
copies).
2.16. Selection of personnel for unit manning according to priorities and expert military,
work, moral, character and other standards. Personnel selection to be mainly done from the
present unit personnel, and if short, from the territory.
2.17. Selection and deployment of commanding officers ( active and reserve) to formation
duties and making orders for duty appointments.
2.18. Updating the personal, individual and alphabetical file-cards.
2.19. Determining the war deployment of the entire structure.
2.20. Creating personnel lists according to basic units, with basic personnel data.
2.21. Creating and updating military personnel and materiel providers summons. 2.22.
Organising and executing certain territory reconnaissance.
2.23. Organising and working on creating documents of Mobilization plan (Enclosure No
1).
2.24. Creating certain stationary liaison systems (repairing the existent and, if possible,
creating new ones).
2.25. Co-ordinating mobilization preparation and execution.
2.26. Arranging the depo area, construction work, making props, shelves, pads etc.
2.27. Informing on war deployment and excluding extra personnel.
2.28. Materialisation of co-ordination plans and concretising war unit’s needs and activities.
2.29. Perform the review of armament, military equipment and ammunition. Determine
flaws and damages and come to appropriate solutions.
2.30. Inform the personnel on the new situation and familiarise them with unit tasks.
2.31. Determine the type of equipment to be handed to the military person himself (to keep). 229
3. EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILISATION
3.1. Dislocating - withdrawing units from the present area, transportation and deployment in
the area of the newly-determined mobilization gathering place (transportation and
marching).
3.2. Allocating deployment areas to lower and basic units.
3.3. Issuing tasks and organising work.
3.4. Unit line-up according to predetermined lists and summons and updating mobilization
summons.
3.5. Excluding «extra» personnel (according to the predetermined formation) and organising
work with that particular group.
3.6. Make the personnel familiar with the mobilization gathering place - reporting place in
case of mobilization.
3.7. Inform on the war deployment:
- War unit, lower and basic unit
yt-D
- Mobilization place
- Mobilization gathering place and reporting place in case of mobilization -
Station of embarkation / disembarkation (if transport is necessary)
- Reporting time for the mobilization call
- What to do when informed of mobilization
- Obligations regarding registering - unregistering, caused by health situation
and changes of residence
- Obligations of provider in case of damage, theft and checking-out materiel,
and cases of cattle sickness and death
- Obligations of keeping given information secret
- Obligations of keeping, maintaining and using the assigned equipment.
Commanding officers performing duties of squad - independent platoon commander and
higher commanding duties, when informed of war deployment, are also to be made familiar
with:
- Organisational-formational unit structure
- Mobilization gathering place and its unit deployment - Duration of
mobilization
- Sources of manning and its quantity and quality - War stocks depos
- Documents of Mobilization plan (duties and tasks to be executed in
mobilization)
- Obligations in preparation and execution of mobilization 230
3.8. Organise and rehearse the summoning system based on one’s own summoning system.
3.9. Organise and perform checks of armament and military equipment after use, as well as
materiel overhaul.
3.10. Update the technical documentation.
3.11. Remove all malfunctions (even the smallest ones) of the materiel, review and resupply
the materiel with spare parts, tools, kits and other necessary means.
3.12. Provide means for cleaning the armament and equipment . Cleaning is to be done in
an organised manner.
3.13. After cleaning, all materiel is to be stored for a short term, and other materiel is to be
protected in an appropriate manner.
3.14. Tour the whole storage area (storage places, garages, eaves, shelters etc.) and regulate
in detail the way of storing means by types and units.
3.15. Wash, lubricate and park mechanized vehicles in each unit. Vehicles are to be stored
for a short term and lifted on support pads. Batteries to be stored separately. Maintenance
and resupply plan to be made.
3.16. Gradually and in an organised way check in the armament and military equipment by
types and units.
3.17. Pack the armament and equipment in cases and put them on props shelves.
3.18. Make plans and determine and clearly mark the means of all transport in the course of
mobilization. Regulate and organise traffic control (plans and training) in cooperation with
the Ministry of Interior.
3.19. Provide the cleaning aids, put out of storage and activate the materiel, all kinds of
fuelling sources and their maintenance, and store them in units as planned.
3.20. All designated teams, temporary mobilization organs are to be trained to take over and
transport materiel ( put out of storage and activated).
3.21. Regulate and train through practice all measures and procedures of materiel supply.
3.22. Make appropriate checks, plans for storing and taking materiel from the storage.
3.23. Store the means in depos, so that they be prepared to be taken out quickie if need be.
Means are to be classified according to types, in many smaller depos, taking care of the
regulated measures for materiel keeping.
3.24. Mark and label according to basic units and types of means.
3.25. Make a statement of the security situation on the territory (update the existing) and
based on conclusions realise the needs for necessary and immediate securing and provide
planned engagement of the forces. (Make a Plan of immediate securing of the storage -
depo).
3.26. Training of the mobilization executors and all subjects closely involved in performing
particular tasks is to be done in a planned and organised manner. (Plan for the mobilization
execution training is to be made). 231
3.27. After checking in and storing materiel (a part of personnel can be kept until the final
storing), an analysis of the whole work is to be done, lessons learned and obligations of
each individual once again determined at the meetings of military teams.
3.28. Orders are to be read out - decrees on promotions, decorations and other stimulation
measures.
3.29. Update the lists, personal and individual file-cards, summons system, military cards,
pay lists etc.
3.30. Organise the transport of military persons from more distant areas and discharge
reserve forces, one part of which to be kept in the unit (storing, marking, materiel resupply
etc.).
3.31. All commands and headquarters are to create the Plan for control, training and
improving the mobilization system and are to continually work on it.
NOTE: All the above-mentioned activities need to be done in a planned manner, and the
realisation period can be simultaneous (Plan of activities according to location and time). 232
A NNEX 112:
FEDERAL ESRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL D EFENCE
O RDER 28 APRIL1992
MILIT. CLASS. DOC.
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
III. ADMINISTRATION
28 April 1992
TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE (TO)
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
Enclosed, you can find the Order of the Federal Secretary for the National Defence, No.
1943-1 from 28 April 1992.
ENCLOSURE: Pages for exchange in the mobilization process:
1. 1,55-85
IN AUTHORIZATION OF THE CHIEF
Colonel
Nedeljko Ribić
ORDER OF THE
FEDERAL SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
28 April 1992
Organisation-formation changes
On the basis of Article 108, Paragraph 3 of the Law on the National Defence (Službeni list
SFRJ, No. 21/82 and 35/91) and item 1, paragraph 2 of the Order on the transfer of certain
duties of the management and commanding in the Armed Forces of the SFRY (Službeni
vojni list, No. 15/83 and 11/91) to the Federal Secretary for National Defence.
I issue the
ORDER
I. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES
IN THE TO OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
1.
2.
(...)
10. A Board of special police units of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina have to be
organised in peace, according to the list of duties that will be reinforced with Active Duty
Personnel, No. 270.308. The Board will be subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of the
Republic of the Serbian Krajina.
(...)
III. I ISSUE THE ORDER FOR ORGANISATION
a) Merging (peace-war): 233
of the brigades of the police “R”, No. T-590.000 – T-590-007
(…)
DEPUTY OF THE
FEDERAL SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SFRY
Colonel General Blagoje Adžić
ANNEX 113:
O RDER OF THE R EPUBLIC OF THE SRBIAN KRAJINA ,
7 MAY 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, NO. 303/92
Knin, 07 May 1992
09
93/175
TO Zone Staff “Western Slavonia”
Discarding of weapons in staffs and units of the Territorial Defence. -
On the basis of the plan to take over the responsibility for the protection of the territory of
the Republic of the Serbian Krajina by the UNPROFOR forces
ORDER
1. Reform the already existing and form new staffs and units of the Territorial Defence
of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina. According to the order, highly confidential,
no. 892-1 from 27 February 1992. The reforming of already existing and new staffs
and units finish by 10 May 1992.
2. Disband from staffs and units of the Territorial Defence those conscript soldiers who
are to be taken off from the combat schedule by 15 May 1992.
3. All staffs, units, and individual conscript soldiers are to be explained about what
their duties are and procedures for the quick conducting of mobilization.
4. Do all necessary preparations and co-ordination for taking over units of the
Territorial Defence and zone of responsibility under the authority of the JNA
Commands.
5. Do all preparations and necessary coordination’s for planned taking over of
responsibility for control and protection of the territory by the police of the Republic
of the Serbian Krajina and UNPROFOR units. Be ready for the beginning of giving
over the zone of responsibility. 15 May 1992. And the beginning of the taking over
will be decided on afterwards. 234
6. After the taking over of the zone of responsibility by the Police of the Republic of
the Serbian Krajina and UNPROFOR units is finished, organise the discarding of
weapons into dumps, taking care that each fighter knows where his weapons is.
7. Disband from combat staffs and units of the Territorial Defence those conscript
soldiers who are not engaged according to peace-time formation.
8. After the discarding of weapons and disbanding of conscript soldiers, TO Zone Staff,
TO Municipal Staff, commands of the brigades of the Territorial Defence,
detachments of the Territorial Defence, battalions - divisions of the Territorial
Defence, commanders of troops by the time documentation is taken care of, and
necessary military equipment continue working.
9. On the basis of this order, TO Zone Staff ought to write down order to those under
their command and the plan concerning the execution of tasks. The copy of the order
and plan deliver to Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of the
Serbian Krajina by 12 May 1992.
10. “DK/LJB”
COMMANDER
GENERAL - LIEUTENANT-COLONEL
MILAN TORBICA 235
A NNEX 114:
TH
C OMMAND OF THE 18 C ORPS
13 APRIL 1993
TH
18 CORPS COMMAND
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 15-141
13 April 1993
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONNEL ANALYSIS
REPORT, DELIVER,-
General Staff Serbian Army Krajina Knin
Personnel department-
In regard to your telegram, strictly confidential no. 45-79 from 2 April 1993, we deliver you
the following report:
th
1. In the 18 Corps we have on duty 40 active duty members from the Yugoslav Army
based on the Article 271 of the Law on Armed Forces Service, as well as three civilians
(civilian Milenko Niki ć, placed in a senior officer slot: desk officer in the security
department-intelligence affairs, directed from the Security Administration of the
Yugoslav Army General Staff).
All senior officers and civilians perform their duties conscientiously and responsibly.
We have four active duty members who request consent to be transferred to the
Yugoslav Army for the resolution of their service status and other existential issues, but
they have been on the territory of Western Slavonia for more than one year and
according to Article 271 of the Law on Armed Forces Service their deadline for
temporary engagement has expired.
(…)
Commander
Colonel
Milan Čeleketić
Seal: Military Post Office 9162, Okučani
Seal: 15 April 1993
Republic of Serbian Krajina
Serbian Army HQ
(illegible), no.45-79 236
A NNEX 115:
STATUS
Army Post 4001 Belgrade
Int. No: 15/18-116-84
05 May 1994
UCRN:1111950710349
On the basis of the article 156 Law on the Yugoslav Army (“Službeni list SRJ” No:67) and
the articles 24, 25 and 26 of the Statute on payment of travelling and other costs in the
Yugoslav Army, and in connection with a decision of Chief of Staff of the HQ of the
Yugoslav Army on determining tasks and territories on which the service is held under
difficult (special) conditions, brings a
DECISION
1. ĐURAĐ Milan DRAGAŠ, Lieutenant Colonel, at service in Army Post 4001 Belgrade,
at service in Army Post 9000 Knin
the right on payment for the service under difficult (special) conditions is approved, as
follows:
a) 20% from the basic salary (article 24, issue 1)
b) % from the basic salary (article, issue and decision of the HQ 40, “KC” Charter No.
th
5/13-45 brought on 05 March 1994)
c) % from the basic salary (article 24, issue 3)
st
He has the right on his payment from 01 January 1994 in the overall amount of 20 % of his
basic salary which is _____ points.
EXPLANATION
Đurađ Dragaš, Lieutenant Colonel at service in this Army Post on a duty Army Post 9000
Knin has a right for a payment for service in difficult (special) conditions because he serves
his duty on a territory determined with a decision of the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav
Army.
Payment from item 1 b) of this decision will be given to him in the mentioned amount, and
he serves his duty in a unit that is in direct contact with tth enemy in accordance with a
decision of the HQ 40 KC Charter No: 5/13-45 brought on 05 March 1994.
Right on the payment from item 1 c) of this decision is acknowledged in the amount
mentioned in disposition because he is still on the territory determined by the decision of
the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army where he has spent overall __/___ years, and in
accordance with the article 24, issue 3 of the statute.
On the basis of the above mentioned, and in accordance with the regulations of the articles
24, 25 and 26 of the Statute on the payments of travelling and other costs, I have decided as
in the disposition of the decision.
Against this decision a complaint can be sent to the Personnel Department of the HQ of the
Yugoslav Army 15 days from the day of getting the decision. A complaint is delivered
through this Army Post.
Delivered to : 237
Personnel Department – 40 KC
RC Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
the above addressed
archive
Senior Officer in Charge
Major General
Milan Čeleketić
A NNEX 116:
REFUSAL
Republic of the Serbian Krajina
General Staff of the Serbian Army
No. 5/1-135
22 September 1994
Opinion in regard to the reassignment of Colonel Špiro Nenadić, delivers.-
General Staff of the Yugoslav Army – Sector for Communications, Informatics and
Electronic Operations-
(give notice to 40 Personnel Centre)
In regard to your request on consent for the reassignment of Colonel Šprio Petar Nenadi ć to
th
the 398 Communications Regiment of the Yugoslav Army; we deliver our opinion and
standpoint:
The above mentioned is assigned to the key position in the Serbian Army of Krajina and we
DO NOT consent to this reassignment to the 398 thCommunications Regiment of the
Yugoslav Army.
“LM/MB”
Commander Major General
Milan Čeleketić
Seal:
Republic of the Serbian Krajina General Staff of the Serbian Army
Seal:
Received: 22 Sep 1994, at 1330 hrs., illegible signature, illegible secrete name, no. of
telegram 4586
Processed: 22 Sep 1994, at 1400 hrs.
Submitted: 22 Sep 1994, at 1545 hrs., illegible signature
MILITARY SECRET
VERY CONFIDENTIAL 238
A NNEX 117:
“RSK’ S” REQUEST FOR PILOTS ANDA IRCREW
14 MAY 1994
THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE SERBIAN ARMY OF KRAJINA
THE BODY OF THE COMBAT AIR FORCE
AND THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE
Page no. 41-326
Knin, 14 May 1994
The needed chiefs for the reinforcement of the Combat Air Force and the Anti-aircraft
defence of the Serbian Army of Krajina, request.-
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY
With an aim to reinforce the aviation units of the Serbian Army of Krajina
the following chiefs are necessary:
PILOTS
AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL COMPOSITION AND THE ROCKET-MEN
COMMANDER
General-Major
Milan Čeleketić
(signature)
A NNEX 118:
L ETTER FROM “RSK” TO M . M ILOŠEVIĆ, JNE 1993
CODED
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
CABINET OF THE PRESIDENT
03-9-171/1-93
Realisation of orders of the
commandant of
the Serbian Army of Krajina.-
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
Dear Mr. Milošević,
We want to draw your attention to the certain problems which we are not able to solve by
ourselves and which represent the urgent problems of the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK).
The SVK is asking for military personnel procurement especially for those who are
descended from the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Junior officers are
particularly demanded for performing duties of commanders and commandants. Officers
majoring in law are needed for military judges and prosecutors because we are establishing
court martial and military prosecutor’s offices. 239
We need help in technical maintenance of weapons and acquisition of ammunition, grease
and petrol. All weapons and ammunition we get from the Yugoslav Army, although we are
trying very hard to be economical, are not sufficient for normal rear fire supports. Spare
parts for damaged materiel are scarce. We are not financially in position to make up for
medium and general service which may be done by the institutions of the Yugoslav Army.
The amount of artillery ammunition is minimal, and fuel and grease are sufficient only for
fire engagement for a short period of time.
Representatives of the SVK Headquarters together with their commandant presented these
problems at the last meeting with the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, on 24 May,
1993.
We ask you to try to exercise your authority and influence the realisation of our requests
presented to the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army as soon as possible.
We believe that you will understand reasons of our reaction, particularly at the moment
when we are expecting the expansion of the Croatian aggression for which we already have
reliable information.
Your sincerely,
PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC
Goran Hadžić
RECEIVED: 24 June, 1993 at 1720 hrs (illegible)
(illegible)
PROCESSED (illegible) 240
A NNEX 119:
REPORT OF THE W ORK OF THE “RSK”
7 FEBRUARY 1995
DEFENCE
STATE SECRET
COPY NUMBER
REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MINISTER 1
“DT”, no. /95.
Knin, 07 February 1995
Report on the work of the Ministry of defence in 1994
Government of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina - Knin
Significant amount of material-technical means were obtained in the Serbian Republic and
in the FRY, primarily those means and production materials which are not produced in the
Republic of the Serbian Krajina.
For the Serbian Army of Krajina, regarding supply service necessities, the following
acquisition is insured:
13 500 tons of food products,
50 000 cubic meters of firewood,
19 000 camouflage uniforms,
10 700 camouflage shirts, and
25 000 military boots
Technical goods obtained:
6 215 000 l of D-2
1 521 000 l of MB-86
502 000 l of MB-98
162 00 kg of different types of lubricants
10 000 pieces of 120mmm mines, and
1 000 000 pieces of 7.62mm bullets
Built objects from the area of construction works and arrangement of the territory:
1 shelter for planes made of reinforced concrete
2 ground shelters for planes, and
90 shelters, in type, made of reinforced concrete for “z/s”
From the total of 51 782 292 dinars, provided from the budget of the Republic of the
Serbian Krajina, the following amounts of money were spent in 1994:
24 396 123 for material expenses,
27 369 089 for the wages of high officers and professional personnel
Provided amount of money in the structure of the material expenses:
16 000 000 dinars for supply service
7 000 000 dinars for the technical material supplies
Supplying the Serbian Army of Krajina with petroleum products also significantly
deteriorated in 1994. According to information of the General staff, Serbian Army of 241
Krajina has approximately 5000 motor vehicles, and to fill the tanks of all vehicles it needs
approximately 600 000 l of D-2. The sufficient amount of petroleum for a month in war:
D-2 1 800 000 litres
MB-86 600 000 litres
GM-1 200 000 litres
Reserves of ammunition and mining-explosive devices are used up because of defence
actions in 1994, and there aren’t certain types of ammunition, because it is not possible to
produce them in the FRY and the Serbian republic, so they have to be imported.
Acquisition of critical items of ammunition is an imperative task and we think that the
financial means for producing and obtaining these items must be found URGENTLY. In the
proposal of the financial plan for 1995 this subsection is approximately 30% of the rest of
the funds.
MINISTER
Colonel Dr. Rade Tanjga
ANNEX 120:
S TRATEGY OF A RMED COMBAT
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH OF THE JNA GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
STRATEGY OF THE ARMED COMBAT
1983
(...)
Purpose and main tasks of the Territorial Defence
The Territorial Defence, as the broadest form of the organised armed resistance and part of
the unified armed forces, is organised in the entire territory and the maritime zone of
Yugoslavia on a unique basis, and in accordance with the needs and plans of defence and
protection.
The Territorial Defence, together with the Yugoslav People’s Army and other forces of the
all-national defence and social self-protection, makes possible participation on a massive
scale of the population in armed conflicts, simultaneous armed conflicts in all areas of the
battlefield, where the aggressor forces happen to be, combat control, securing the entire
territory of Yugoslavia, maximum engagement and usage of all available power and means,
and leading even a long-term all-people’s defence war. The territorial Defence makes
possible the most consistent application of the constitutional principles on absolute and
inalienable right and the duty of the working people and citizens to take part in defence and
protection, and on repudiation of capitulation and occupation.
By being well organised on the entire territory, by being numerous, with high mobilization
and combat readiness, and with its purpose and tasks in war and other states of emergency,
the Territorial Defence operates in peace as a very important factor of deterring from armed
aggression and other forms of endangering.
(…) 242
The Territorial Defence is qualified to, together with the forces of the Yugoslav People’s
Army and other forces of the all-people’s defence and social self-protection, execute
combat operations on the entire territory and maritime zone of Yugoslavia – at the front, on
the temporary occupied territory and in its own rear, in accordance with its purpose and
possibilities. It is being particularly trained for combat operations on the temporary
occupied territory and for combat control and securing the territory.
The Territorial Defence carries out combat operations in collaboration with the forces of the
Yugoslav People’s Army.
(…)
A NNEX 121:
TH
COMMAND OF THE 5 A RMY
Federal Secretariat for National Defence National Defence
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY State Secret
I Division “Jedinstvo”
DT No. 374 – 184/87 Copy No. 19
10 November 1988
Annex to the Order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence to the
Command of the 5 Army
Reference: Order of the Federal Secretary for National Defence – DT No. 374-172/87 of 31
October 1988
In order to organise and prepare formation of the command for battle-fields and the
transition to the new system of leadership and command,
I ORDER
The leadership and command of battle-fields is to be overtaken on 25 December 1988 at
24h, and settling into routine of the command organs is to be provided from 26 to 31
December 1988.
Until the new plan for using battlefields in both versions is elaborated, the plans for using
corps are to be used. Command is to elaborate plans for battle-field units by 25 December
1988, as a provisional solution.
st rd th
Command of the 1 , 3 and the 5 army and the Naval Region (battle-field command) will
issue a unique order on particular measures on permanent and increased combat readiness
and a plan for preventing the creation and the elimination of extraordinary circumstances, as
a provisional solution. The order and the plan are to be elaborated in accordance with the
Directive (DT No. 729-1 from 7 May 1986), amendments to the Directive (DT No. 729-
72/86 of 24 December 1987 and 729-97/86 of 2 November 1988), Instruction (DT No. 729-
2 of 9 May 1986) and amendments to the Instruction (DT No. 729-73/86 of 24 December
1987)
One copy of the order and the plan for extraordinary circumstances is to be forwarded to the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (I Division) by 25 December 1988. 243
Sectors and divisions of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence are to issue an
instruction within their competence, which is to regulate all necessary issues concerning
formation, organisation and the work of the command of battle-fields, according to the new
system of leadership and command, as a provisional solution.
The Instruction is to be forwarded to the commands of armies, the Naval Region, the
Combat Air Force, the Anti-aircraft Defence and tCommand by 20 November 1988.
One copy is to be forwarded to the I Division of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
the SFRY.
TH
COMMAND OF THE 5 ARMY
DT No. 17-3
15 November 1988
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE SFRY
Colonel General Stevan Mirković
A NNEX 122:
M ILITARY REPORT , DECEMBER 1988
th
COMMAND OF THE 5 ARMY
NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE CLASSIFIED
REPORT
ON THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE 5 ARMY th
FOR 1988
December, 1988
th
COMMAND OF THE 5 ARMY
No. 7-1
23 January 1988
NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT
Report on Combat Readiness for 1988
b) Evaluation of executive organisation-formation changes
In 1988, all tasks from the plan “Unity” (“Jedinstvo”) were realised.
th
Within the scope of the organisation-formation changes in Army, and according to
new formations and the overview of the development of the mobilization progress, the
following tasks were carried out:
Established were
th nd
the 13 and 32 Corps
Reorganised were 244
the 6 th“ppd”; 4 thArmoured Brigade; 580 th Combined Artillery Regiment “A”; 580 th
th th
Combined Artillery Brigade “B”; 288 Combined Anti-armoured Artillery Brigade; 513
Engineer -Regiment; 149 th“ssr” of the Anti-Aircraft Defence; 367 thAnti-Aircraft Defence;
th th th th th
284 /6 Military Police; 315 “bei”; 374 “atb”; 5 “do”; Section for Measuring Starting
Artillery Zones; Centre for Underwater Training and the Military Orchestra Zagreb.
Disbanded were
nd th
Command of the 32 Motorized Division; Command of the 7 Infantry Division in
peacetime and Command of the 7 thInfantry Division in wartime; 32 nd Combined Anti-
nd
armoured Artillery Division; 32 Light Artillery Division (basis for the formation of the
31 Light Artillery Regiment of the Anti-Aircraft Defence); 32 nd Engineer Battalion (basis
nd th th
for the formation of the 32 Engineer Regiment; 7 Brigade; Rear Unit of the 7 Infantry
Division; Military Court; Judge Advocate’s Office and the Military Orchestra of the 7 th
th rd th
Infantry Division; 610 “SABHO” (basis for the formation of the 593 paBHO); and 336
Instrumental Battery;
Transformed into the organisation composition of other commands and units:
In the Naval Region:
Infantry Battalion (Umag), Armoured Battalion (Pazin), Engineer Battalion (Pula) of the
25 Motorized Brigade; 2 nd “partbr” (Pazin) of the 43 rd“partd”; the JNA Centre in Pazin
and Military Economics Pazin and Umag
In the Engineer Education Centre: 540 thPontoon Battalion of the 5 Army;h
In the 32 nd Corps: 671 Pontoon Battalion “R” of the 5 Army th
Changes in classification, peace- and wartime formation and the reorganisation were carried
out according to Appendix No. xxxxxxxx
All central tasks of organisation-formation changes were carried out within the required
deadline, which had a positive impact on the maintenance of the required level of combat
readiness and on further progress.
th
The Command of the 5 Army was disbanded on 25 December 1988, and since then, the
Command of the 5 thMilitary Region is on duty in peacetime, and the Command of the
th
Northwest Battlefield in wartime. Until 31 December 1988, the Command of the 5
Military Region took over the lead and command in the commands, units and the
th th th
institutions of the 5 and 9 Army. The planned work on establishing the 5 Military
Region, establishing staff units in peace- and wartime, as well as the introduction of the
th
command and the units into the organisation composition of the 5 Military Region, is
carried out according to the plan and corresponding to the dynamics of the performance of
the tasks without any difficulties. 245
ANNEX 123:
R EPORT ON ROMANIJA -90
NATIONAL DEFENCE
STATE SECRET
“ROMANIJA-90”
Copy No. 7
APPROVED BY
Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the SFRY
Colonel General
Blagoje Adžić
REPORT
on following and evaluation of “KŠVR Romanija 90”
of the Command of the 5 Military Region
Based on the order of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the SRFY strictly
confidential No. 821-1 of 23 April 1990, the team of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
followed the work of the leadership at “KŠVR Romanija-90” done by the Command of the
5th Military Region from 17 to 18 May 1990.
Type of exercise: One stage two-sided
Topic:
a) “Red”: “Strategic offensive at the battlefield in the final stage of war”
b) “Blue”: “Strategic defence at the battlefield in the final stage of war”
THE GOAL OF THE EXERCISE:
to upgrade and perfect the level of training of commanders for making decisions and
leading operations, and of command and their organs in their joint work at preparing data
for making decisions, planning, organisation and leading operations in the final stage of
war;
verify and analyse operational and strategic propositions and practical solutions for war
skills on the preparation and leading operations at operational and strategic levels in the
final stage of war at “SZV”. Gained experience in further work is to be used in war planning
and in the training of superiors and the command.
TEACHING QUESTIONS:
“Red”:
1. Preparation for the offensive
repelling of the counter-coup of the “blue”,
regrouping of forces,
reinforcement of units and rear-security,
organisation of leadership and command, activities with CV, JPV and co-operation with CS.
2. Execution of the offensive
introduction of forces of the 1st combat echelon,
encirclement of the “blue” south of Zagreb, 246
creation of conditions to continue activities towards Ljubljana and Postojna
3. Execution of mass combat activities at PZT
“Blue”
Prevention of preparations of the “red” for the offensive
continuation of the counter-coup south of Zagreb and break through from the encirclement
prevention of regrouping and the introduction of the reserves of the “red”
Defence and breaking down of offensive of the “red” and the creation of conditions to
continue the attack
Securing the traffic, supply, providing food for forces at the front and functioning of the
system of occupation authorities.
I
PREPARATIONS FOR “KŠRV”
Drawing up of report
The report is drawn up in accordance with instructions, orders and the essentials of KŠRV
and approved by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the SRFY.
It is complete and elaborated for all structures that participated in the exercise (Yugoslav
Army and RŠTO). Documents are substantial and well arranged; its drawbacks did not
affect the performance of KŠRV. It enabled the planned performance, preparation and
dynamics of KŠRV, as well as training of subordinate command and headquarters in
accordance with the goals of the exercise.
(...)
7. Lessons and experience of KŠRV, as a special material, is to be forwarded to the I
Division and to be published in the Bulletin of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
Brigadier General
Rade Polić 247
ANNEX 124:
TH
COMMAND OF THE 5 M ILITARY R EGION
12 M AY 1991
Report on the visit and control of
The 622nd Motorized Brigade and the
th
4 Armoured Brigade
th
The condition in the 4 Armoured Brigade as found:
the Mechanised Battalion of the composition, the Command, the Communication section,
two mechanized companies with each 10 “OT-m-60” and 10 tanks T-55 are located at the
Plitvice Lakes
COMMANDER
Lieutenant General Konrad Kolšek
ANNEX 125:
TH
COMMAND OF THE 5 M ILITARY R EGION
th
COMMAND OF THE 5 MILITARY REGION
12 May 1991
Report on the visit and control of the 622dMotorized Brigade and the 4 tArmoured
Brigade
th th
On 12 May 1991, the team of the 5 Military Region, lead by the Commander of the 5
MR, Lieutenant General Konrad Kolšek, Colonel Predarski, Colonel Kosanovi ć and Šego
th
Nikola, in the presence of Commander of the 1Corps, Lieutenath General Uzelac Dušan,
conducted a control visit in the 6Motorized Brigade and the 4 Armoured Brigade.
Aim: examination of the life and working conditions in the unit, its reinforcement and
combat readiness.
nd
The condition in the 622Motorized Brigade as found:
1/51 Armoured Brigade is very well accepted and all conditions for life and work as central
unit are secured. It is assigned because of tasks in two barracks, but this does not influence
negatively the commanding competence of it.
The battalion is trained for independent life and work in terms of performing tasks on
terrain. Its rear bodies are operating together with the bodies of the brigade, which has been
successfully arranged. The soldiers and the officers have all the necessary equipment, and
the motorized means are all intact and fuelled, lubricated and filled with ammunition. 248
ANNEX 126:
FORMATION OF THE COMMAND OF BATTLE FIELDS -
National Defence
State Secret
“Jedinstvo”
Copy No. 19
Federal Secretariat for National Defence
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY
I Division
DT No. 374 – 172/87
31 November 1988
Formation of the command of battle-fields
COMMAND OF THE 5 TH ARMY
Pursuant to the decision by the Presidency of the SRFY on the upgrading of the
organisation of the Armed Forces and the system of leadership and command of the Armed
Forces of the SFRY, DT No. 48/5-1 of 9 February 1987, and pursuant to para 1, subpara 2
of the Order on delegating certain tasks of leadership and command of the Armed Forces of
the SFRY to the Federal Secretary for National Defence (Official Military Journal, No.
15/83),
ORDER
Command of the north-western, central and south-eastern battle-fields and the Adriatic
naval battle-field are to be formed by 1 January 1989, when the work of the command of the
armies, the Naval Region and the current function of the 2ndcorps will cease
Peace-time formations and provisional Rule Book on the competence of the command of
st rd th
battle-fields are to be elaborated and forwarded to the commands of the 1 , 3 and 5
Army, the Command of the Naval Region and competent units of the Federal Secretariat of
National Defence by 15 November 1988.
Commands of the armies and the Command of the Naval Region, within deadlines specified
in this order, are to disband the command of armies and the Naval Region, and the
Command of the 1 , 3 and 5 Army and the Command of the Naval Region are to form the
commands of battle-fields. In order to pass to the new organisation and to continue material
and financial transactions, the command of armies and the Naval Region will establish
commissions and other organs for the realisations of these tasks. Commands of battle-fields
will determine deadlines for finalising the work of these commissions, and material and
financial transactions are to be settled by 31 December 1989.
Command of battle-fields with competent “RŠTO” and “PŠTO” will regulate all issues
related to the elaboration of plans for the usage of units and headquarters of territorial
defence in the zone of responsibility, according to the Instruction on the elaboration and the
protection of war plans in the Armed Forces of the SFRY.
The plan for rear security of the Armed Forces in peacetime will be elaborated and adapted
to the new organisation. The scheme for rear security is to include all units, and institutions
which are not in the composition of battle-fields. The functioning of rear security according
to this order is to start on 1 January 1989. 249
The proposition of the plan of tasks and financing of units and institutions of the Yugoslav
Army is to be done according to battle-fields, by 10 November 1988.
Accounting centres for the command of battle-fields are to be formed and trained so that
they might overtake material and financial transactions by 31 December 1988, and the
Accounting Centres of the 2 , 7 and 9 Army and the 2 ndCommand will cease their work
by 31 January 1989.
For the realisation of tasks from para 6 and 7 above, the Division for Planing of
Development and Finances is to issue a necessary instruction to the command of armies by
21 November 1988.
BN/MP
FEDERAL SECRETARY FOR
NATIONAL DEFENCE
Colonel General Veljko Kadijević
TH
COMMAND OF THE 5 ARMY
STATE SECRET No. 17-1
4 November 1988 250
A NNEX 127:
R EQUEST FOR A MMUNITION BY “RSK”
18 NOVEMBER 1991
OFFICIAL SECRET
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION (SAO)
KRAJINA
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
Knin, 18 November 1991
Request for our needs for ammunition and other military equipment
deliver.-
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE – BELGRADE
( to the minister, general – lieutenant-colonel
Tomislav Simović)
In relation to your telegram conf. no. 5-259 from 12 September 1991, we deliver you a list
of our necessities for the SAO Krajina. We made the list of necessary ammunition on the
basis of the armament which is at our disposal, supposing that for each piece of armament
there should be 4 sets of ammunition. Besides that many Staffs wrote down their request for
armament and we deliver you these official requests. Besides the above mentioned we
demand from you other necessary military equipment.
I – KNIN TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
NECESSARY 4 sets of ammunition on the basis of the available armament:
1. Bullet, 7.62mm for pistol and machine pistol
(packing – 3150 bullets) (51 trunks) 160.650 pieces
16. Bullet, 7.62mm for machine-gun M-84 (packing –900) . 30.600 (34 trunks)
OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT
1. Helmet … 1.000 pieces
(…)
17. Winter camouflage uniform 1.000 ensembles
II – BENKOVAC TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
NECESSARY 4 sets of ammunition on the basis of the available armament:
1. Bullet, 7.62mm for pistol and machine pistol (packing –
pieces 3150) 148.050
(47 trunks)
(…)
12. Anti-infantry mines 200 pieces 251
OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT
1. Military uniforms (ensembles) 2000 pieces
(…)
5. Cutlery (knife, fork, spoon, porc. canteen) 500 pieces
NECESSARY ARMAMENT FOR THE BENKOVAC TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
1. Pistol, 7.62mm “TT” 60 pieces
(…)
11. Mortar, 120mm 2 pieces
Stated items deliver to the Benkovac Territorial Defence Staff.
III – OBROVAC TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
NECESSARY 4 sets of ammunition on the basis of the available armament
1. Bullet, 7.62 for semi-automatic rifle (packing – 1120) with
pieces clips 117.600
(105 trunks)
12. Hand defence bombs M-75 (packing 60) 1800 pieces
(30 trunks)
OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT
1. Helmets 550 pieces
(…)
9. Battery for “RUP-33” 30 pieces
The above stated material means deliver to the Obrovac Staff of
Territorial Defence
IV – GRAČAC TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
NECESSARY 4 sets of ammunition on the basis of the available armament
1. Bullet, 7.62 for pistol and machine pistol (packing 315135.450 pieces
(43 trunks)
(…)
10. Bullet, 25mm “TZO” (packing – 50) 400 pieces
OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT
1. Helmets 1000 pieces
(…)
20. Field vehicles 10 vehicles 252
Gračac municipality covers a wide territory which stretches
from Gospić to Obrovac and a great number of local
committees from other municipalities, which are inhabited with
Serbs, joined, that is, became a part of Gračac municipality.
Stated means deliver to the Gračac Territorial Defence Staff.
V – VRGINMOST TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
NECESSARY 4 sets of ammunition on the basis of the available armament
1. Bullet, 26mm for signal pistol 2400 pieces
(…)
19. Hand defence bomb M-75 (packing – 60) 1800 pieces
OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT
1. Helmets 500 pieces
(…)
5. Field vehicle 1 vehicle
NECESSARY ARMAMENT FOR THE VRGINMOST TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
1. Signal pistol 50 pieces
(…)
12. Tank, M-84 … 18 pieces
Stated means deliver to the Vrginmost Territorial Defence
Staff.
(…)
VI – VOJNIC TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
THE NECESSARY 4 sets of ammunition on the basis of the armament in possession
Bullet 26 mm for the signal gun 3500 pieces
(…)
S. Hand defence bomb M-75 (p.60) 1 800 pieces
OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT
Passive target……………... 6 pieces
30. Olive-drab coloured wool socks 4 000 pairs
THE NECESSARY ARMAMENT FOR THE VOJNIC TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
S. Mortar 60 mm 20 pieces
(…)
S. Automatic gun 7,65 mm M-84 20 pieces 253
The mentioned means must be delivered at the Vojnić
Territorial Defence Quarters.
VII – DVOR TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
THE NECESSARY 4 sets of ammunition on the basis of the armament in possession
S. Bullet 7,62 mm for guns and submachine guns (p.3150) 107 100 pieces
(…)
16. Hand defence bomb M-75 (p. 60) 1 800 pieces
OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT
1. Military uniform 1 000 sets
(…)
S. PTK-56 20 pieces
The mentioned means must be delivered at the Dvor Territorial
Defence Quarters, 6 Maršal Tito Square.
VIII – GLINA TERRITORIAL DEFENCE
THE NECESSARY 4 sets of ammunition for the armament in possession
S. Bullet 7,62 mm for guns and submachine guns (p.3150) 15 750 pieces
(…)
S. Hand defence bomb M-75 (p.60) 1 800 pieces
OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT
S. Helmets .500 pieces
(…)
S. Protecting overcoats 500 pieces
The mentioned means must be delivered at the Glina Territorial Defence Quarters.
All the requests for the necessary military equipment and the ammunition of the eight
municipalities of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina that we mentioned in this act
were written on the basis of their claims.
In the attachment we deliver to you the request for the medical material.
SECRETARY
Milan Martić
(signature)
Territorial Defence Commander
Major
Savo Radulović
(signature) 254
THE MOST NECESSARY MEDICATIONS
AND THE MEDICAL MATERIAL
1. Parentheral solution (glucose 5% and10%, physiological, Ringer, glucose-saline,
Hemodex, Hemocel, Manit 10% and 20%)
2. Analgesics (Analgin or Novalgetol ampoules 50x5 ml, Trodon ampoules 50 and 100
mg, Moradol ampoules, Fortral ampoules, Dolantin ampoules)
3. Local anesthetics (Xylocain ampoules 2% and 2 ml and 20 ml, Cystocain 2 % and 10
ml)
4. Antibiotics (Pentrexyl injections, 500 mg and 1 g, Tolycar, 1 and 2 g. Longaceph, 1
g and 250 mg, Chloramphenicol injections, Amikacin ampoules, Nebacetin spray)
5. Anxiolitics and anti-depressives (Apaurin ampoules, Ladiomil ampoules, Anafranil
ampoules)
6. Various other medications (B1 ampoule, B6 ampoule, OHB12 ampoule, glucose in
ampoules – 25 %, 37%, Oikamid ampoules, crystal insulin and Lenta, Tetabulin 250
injections, Aminophylin ampoules 10 ml, Ranisan ampoules, Synopen ampoules)
7. Medical and other usable material (medical cotton, cellulose, bandages of different
sizes, needles and syringes for intravenous injection of different sizes, systems for
the infusion and transfusion, gauze and compress bandages of different sizes,
cannula – Braunila, surgical gloves no. 8 and 8,5, surgical suture, various
disinfecting medicines – Asepsol, Cetavlon, Osvjezin, Polifen F, Povidon iodide –
solution and foam, Desderman, Esemtan)
8. 15 medical vehicles
9. 30 000 first bandages
(…)
22 (…)
The needs mentioned in the first 7 points refer to the medications and medical material that
is asked by the dispensary in Knin, from where the supply for the whole territory of the
Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina is conducted and those needs are not quantitatively
specified so you can send how much you can. We specified the quantity for the rest of the
needs that are now necessary and as far as our expectations are concerned, you can send as
much as you can.
We mention the fact that it would be best if all the help in medical material and instruments
was sent in Knin, from where it would be distributed all over the territory of the Serbian
Autonomous Region of Krajina.
THE ASSISTANT TO THE HEAD OF THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL
OF THE SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KRAJINA
Dr. Mažibrada Marko
(signature) 255
A NNEX 128:
A PPOINTMENT TO W ESTERN SAVONIA
12 FEBRUARY 1993
ORDER no. 45-25
of the Commander of the Headquarters of the Serbian Army
Republic of the Serbian Krajina
th
Date: February 12 1993
KNIN
On the basis of the article 37 of the Law on Defence of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina
(“Službeni glasnik RSK” br. 6/92 – “Official Herald of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina”
no. 6/92) and articles 270, 271 and 284 of the Law on Armed Forces Service (“Službeni list
SFRJ” broj 7/85, 20/89, 40/89 I 26/90 – “Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia” no. 7/85, 20/89, 40/89 and 26/90),
1. ČELEKETIĆ Petar MILAN
colonel of the Armoured Mechanised Units,
personal military occupational speciality 31435
th
born August 12 1948
IS APPOINTED DEPUTY BY PEACETIME FORMATION
TO THE COMMAND OF THE WEST-SLAVONIA CORPS
Official duties: Commanding officer of the corps
th
By formation: General-major, “PG” 6 (sixth)
Garrison: Okučani
Until now by the “MF”: on duty in the “CVVS”, garrison Beograd
The named person is appointed deputy to the unoccupied work place in the formation, in
concordance with regulations of the article 270 of the Law on Armed Forces Service,
th
beginning with February 12 1993.
This order is to be executed immediately.
“HJ/ZZ”
Commander
General-Major MILE NOVAKOVIĆ 256
A NNEX 129:
P ROMOTION TO M AJOR G ENERAL BYFRY
JUNE 1994
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
This is to confirm by the Army Post Office 1790 – Belgrade ČELEKETIĆ Pere
MILAN, colonel, was promoted to the rank of Major-General on 16 June 1994.
This attestation is issued to the above mentioned person at his own request with a view to
resolving material and financial matters and cannot be used in any other purpose.
Belgrade, 21 December 1994
Head
Major-General Dušan Zorić
A NNEX 130:
P ROMOTION TO M AJOR G ENERAL BY“RSK”
22 FEBRUARY 1994
THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
Cabinet of the President of the Republic
Subject: Promotion
Connection:
No: 03-3- 53/94
Place: Knin
nd
Date: 22 February 1994
According to the Article 78, issue 1, clause 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina (“Službeni glasnik RSK” No 1/93) and the Article 46, issue 1, the Article 153, issue
1, clause 2 of the Law on Defence (“Službeni glasnik RSK” No 2/93) the President of the
Republic of Serbian Krajina, issues a
DECREE
ON A SPECIAL PROMOTION
th
of ČELEKETIĆ (Pero) MILAN, Colonel of the Serbian Army of Krajina, born on 12
August 1946, the Commander of the Western Slavonian Corps of the Serbian Army of
Krajina.
HE IS SPECIALLY PROMOTED
into a rank of Major General of the Serbian Army of KrajiFebruary 1994
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
Milan Martić 257
A NNEX 131:
PROMOTION OF L ONČAR DUŠAN
16 DECEMBER 1994
ORDER No.01/1-1279/94
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
FROM Dec. 16 , 1994
On the basis of Article 153, Section 2 of the Law on the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK),
and in accordance with the proposal of the Supreme Council of Defence of the Republic of
Serbian Krajina
AN EXCEPTIONAL PROMOTION
To the rank of major General of the SVK
For Colonel of the Armoured Mechanized Unit
1. LONČAR DUŠAN, son of Mitar Lon čar, Chief of Staff in the Headquarters
of the SVK
Born on March 4 , 1943 LMD 0403431
The promotion is in effect from Dec. 16 , 1994
“BR/BR”
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
MILAN MARTIĆ
Official seal of the President of the Republic
of Serbian Krajina
A NNEX 132:
B ULLETIN OF THE33RDINFANTRY BRIGADE - DVOR N U NI
BULLETIN OF THE 33 RDINFANTRY BRIGADE - DVOR NA UNI
BIOGRAPHY OF UNITS
THE FIRST INFANTRY BATTALION 258
The first infantry battalion was formed on 02 December 1991 as a part of “ll” infantry
st
brigade. The basis for forming the unit was the 1 Drvarski detachment, existing at the time,
which forming was a result of a spontaneous resistance to Ustasha authorities in June 1991.
The detachment was made of volunteers who were armed with their personal hunting
armament, but also there were many of them who weren’t armed; their most important
weapons was courage and firmness, and enormous will power to not, at any price, let the
neo-fascist HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) authorities to seize power over the Serbian
ethnic areas on the territory of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia. The main task of
the detachment was to protect the Dvor municipality, which it executed successfully, and on
26 July 1991 it was sent together with other detachments to completely free the
municipality. The following men died for the freedom of the fatherland during the fights:
Joka Rade, Sunda ć Tošo, Vin čić Stevo, Bara ć Goran, Samardžija Gojko, and Pero
Pribičević died from the consequences of wounds.
A NNEX 133:
O RDER FOR THE A DMISSION OF C ONTRACT OLSIERS TO THE JNA,
17 D ECEMBER 1991
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
Top secret No. 01/146-1
17 of December 1991
Based on item 2. of the Order about establishing the formation positions of temporary
contract soldiers in JNA peace-time formations (special editionthf the General Staff of the
Armed Forces - III. Administration, conf. No. 3489-1 from the 9 of December 1991), I
hereby
ORDER
1. IMMEDIATELY begin the admission of temporary contract soldiers in soldier
formation positions in peace-time formations of the JNA, with the purpose of the
manning with this category of military persons. Besides, also execute the manning of
other soldier formation positions, in accordance to the number of candidates, and
report about this to the General Staff of the Armed Forces - III. Administration
which will execute the corrections in the formations.
The advantage regarding the manning have those units which are engaged in combat
activities and reserve units.
2. Admit temporary contract soldiers, without waiting for the official formation
decisions, to the duties mentioned in supplement No. 1 of the Order about
establishing the formation positions of temporary contract soldiers in JNA peace-
time formations, and hold on to the following criteria:
a. The formation position in: motorized brigades, the units of the Military Police,
the units of the Air defence (duty on combat systems), crews of the Tank M-84,
commanders of the T-54, T-55 and armoured transporters (soldier’s duties) and
unmanned formation positions of commander of tanks (duties of active military
persons) and permanent parts of the crews of BVP and BOV (infantry combat
vehicles and armoured combat vehicles) are to be manned completely, 259
b. Other permanent parts of the crews of tanks T-54 and T-55 and armoured
transporters are to be manned to the level of 50%.
c. All other duties in combat parts of the units are to be manned according to the
number of registered candidates, regardless of their official formation decisions
and established numeral size, which is to be solved afterwards, based on reports
about admitted number of men according to duties and specialities.
3. The admission of temporary contract soldiers is to be conducted in the way and
procedure according to the Regulations about admittance of persons to temporary
service.
4. The senior officers, who are accepting temporary contract soldiers, and the officers
of the commands, in whose structure those units are, will undertake every measure to
realise the planned manning, and they are to report about the number of admitted
persons to the Personnel Administration of the Federal Secretariat of National
Defence in regular operations reports.
5. The commands of the JNA units are to inform the soldiers and the conscripts of their
unit about the possibilities of direct admission to the duty which they perform or to
the duty in other units after the legal obligation in the unit, in which they serve, has
expired.
6. The commands of the units, where more than needed candidates apply for the
competition or for direct admittance, will report to the superior command about the
number and specialties of these persons, and the superior command then will direct
them to admittance in units where the number of candidates is insufficient.
7. In agreement with the number of admitted temporary contract soldiers, the III.
Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces will harmonise the plans of
manning the units which manned certain formation positions with temporary contract
soldiers.
8. The manning of JNA units with temporary contract soldiers is a permanent task
where every authorities and senior officers in the commands of the units must engage
themselves.
9. This order is to be delivered to all units’ commands who are authorised for the
admission of temporary contract soldiers.
HEAD OF THE GENERAL STAFF
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SFRY
General-Colonel Blagoje Adžić
(signature)
(stamp illegible) 260
A NNEX 134:
ORDER FOR THE E NGAGEMENT OF V OLUNTEERS TO THE JNA,
13 D ECEMBER 1991
OFFICIAL PAPER
OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
Friday, 13 December 1991
Belgrade
th
No: 89 year: the 47
According to Article 316 of the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and Article 106, Paragraph 1, Item 6 and Subsection 2 of the Civil Defence Law
(The SFRY Official Paper no: 21/82 and 11/91) at the meeting held on 10 December 1991,
the SFRY Presidency issued the following:
O R D E R
ON THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE VOLUNTEERS IN THE SFRY
ARMED FORCES DURING WAR DANGER
1. According to the provisions of Article 119 of the Civil Defence Law during war
danger the Yugoslav People’s Army and Territorial Defence are reinforced by
volunteers, who after joining the units and establishments of the SFRY armed forces
become equal with the military personnel, or to say, conscript soldiers.
2. Volunteers are accepted into the SFRY armed forces according to the same
procedure introduced for acceptance of conscript soldiers, given that a person who
wants to join the SFRY armed forces have to report himself to a military-territorial
body that covers the area where a conscript soldier lives.
3. A volunteer can be assigned to a unit or establishment of the SFRY armed forces for
a specific duty or task according to the needs of a SFRY armed forces service.
4. After joining a unit or SFRY armed forces establishment, a volunteer who has not
previously taken an oath according to the regulations of a service in the SFRY armed
forces have to take an oath before his/her superior officer. Only a volunteer that has
taken an oath and undergone a specific training course can be assigned a duty that
involves using the weapons.
5. A volunteer who according to the provisions of this order joins a unit or SFRY
armed forces establishment becomes a soldier, wears a military uniform, and
insignias of the SFRY armed forces and has all rights and performs all duties as a
person in service in the SFRY armed forces.
6. A volunteer is off duty in the armed forces in the following cases:
a) If it is established by evaluation and results of the military-medical institution
that a volunteer is unfit for military service or more precisely for the duty one
performs.
b) When a volunteer himself requests to leave military service and there are legal
reasons for a volunteer to leave or postpone military service.
c) When a volunteer is no longer needed in the SFRY armed forces 261
A volunteer can leave military service in the SFRY armed forces on his own
request only if the service allows it.
7. A volunteers formation now engaged out of the SFRY armed forces for the execution
of specific military tasks and the volunteers now in the units or establishments of the
SFRY armed forces are obliged to co-ordinate their position in the SFRY armed
forces with the provisions of this order ten days after this order becomes effective at
the latest.
Within the same deadline, from the territory controlled by the commands, units, and
establishments of the SFRY armed forces all individuals and volunteers formations
that fail to join the SFRY armed forces will be removed in the way determined by
this order.
The provision of Subsection 2 of this item is also applied to the volunteers in the
SFRY armed forces who fail to follow the provisions of this order.
8. After this order becomes effective, if an individual is found wearing a military
uniform and insignias of the SFRY armed forces but has neither joined the SFRY
armed forces according to legal provision nor regulated his position according to this
order the legal measures will be applied against him.
9. The Federal National Defence Secretariat is authorised to draft the instructions for
the implementation of this order
10. The order has to be published in the SFRY Official Paper.
11. The order is effective the day it is published.
The Presidency of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
The President
Dr. Branko Kostić
No: 73
10 December 1991
Belgrade 262
ANNEX 135:
O FFICIALGAZETTE OF THE SFRY
18 OCTOBER 1991
OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
Friday, October 11991
BELGRADE
NUMBER 75
YEAR XLVII
…
765
On the ground of the article 316 subsection 1 of the Constitution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the article 6 of the National Defence Law (“Službeni list SFRJ”
br. 21/82 i 35/91 – “Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” no.
21/82 and 35/91), the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has, on
the meeting held on October 1 1991, estimating the present political and security situation
in the country,
ESTABLISHED
THE EXISTENCE OF THE IMMEDIATE WAR DANGER IN
THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
This document will be published in the “Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia”.
Vice-President
Dr. BRANKO KOSTIĆ
(signature)
No. 190
October 1 1991
Belgrade
(…) 263
ANNEX 136:
O RDER OF THE FEDERAL ECSETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
20 SEPTEMBER 1991
TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN
AUTONOMOUS REGION KRAJINA
ORDER: Number 24-175
OF THE CHIEF OF THE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
FROM 20 SEPTEMBER 1991
On the basis of the article 18 of the Order on determining authorities of the senior officers
in dealing with relations in the service of military officials (“Službeni vojni list” /Official
military journal/ number 5/87), in relation to the article 271 of the Law on service in armed
forces (“Službeni list SFRJ” /Official journal of the SFRY/, number 7/85, 20/89, 40/89, and
26/90),
IS SENT
TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE SERBIAN
AUTONOMOUS REGION KRAJINA
To the Knin garrison
1. Kasum Dušan of Obrad, Communications Colonel, Military Occupational Speciality
st
(MOS) 31840, born on 19 Jan 1938; on duty at the 1 Administration of the SFRY
Armed Forces HQ, Colonel, “PG”8 from 3 Jan 1991, Belgrade garrison
2. Maksić Radoslav of Slavomir, Infantry Colonel, MOS 31140, born on 27 Aug 1939; on
st
duty at the Belgrade Defence Command of the 1 Military Region, Colonel, “PG”8
from 31 Aug 1988, Belgrade garrison
3. Pupovac Miloš of Božo, Artillery Colonel, MOS 31240, born on 28 Dec 1935; on duty
at the Belgrade Defence Command of the 1 sMilitary Region, Colonel, “PG”7 from 31
Aug 1988, Belgrade garrison
4. Vuletić Aleksandar of Dragomir, Communications Lt. Colonel, MOS 31839, born on 6
Jul 1944; on duty at the SFRY Armed Forces HQ Deputy Head for Electronics and
Communications, Lt. Colonel, “PG”11 from 30 Jun 1990, Belgrade garrison
st
5. Korolija Dušan of Stevan, Land Forces Technical Dept. Captain 1 Class, MOS 32157,
born on 26 Nov 1956; on duty at the National Defence Federal Secretariat (SSNO)
Technical Dept., Captain 1 Class, “PG”15 from 27 Aug 1990, Belgrade garrison
6. Pamučar Veselko of Petar, Communications 2 ndLieutenant, MOS 31888, born on 2
th
Apr 1959; on duty at the 398 Communications Brigade’s Head Deputy of SFRY
Armed Forces HQ for Electronics and Communications, 2 ndLieutenant, “PG”19 from
20 Kul 1991, Belgrade garrison
st
7. Čuturić Simeun of Tomo, Communications Captain 1 Class, MOS 31801, born on 19
May 1957; on duty at the Deputy Head of the Communications Education Center,
SFRY Armed Forces HQ for Electronics and Communications, Captain 1 stClass,
“PG”17 from 3 Jul 1986, Belgrade garrison
8. Bjeljac Zoran of Petar, Communications Staff Sergeant, MOS 21813, born on 10 Jun
1961; on duty at the 398 tCommunications Brigade’s Head Deputy of SFRY Armed 264
Forces HQ for Electronics and Communications, Staff Sergeant, “PG”20 from 1 Jul
1988, Belgrade garrison
Named persons are obliged to immediately report to the above stated command of the unit.
Named persons are to stay in the above stated unit, if necessary, in keeping with the order of
the article 271 of the Law on service in armed forces, and after that they have to
immediately return to a unit from which they were sent. Report on accomplished task and
other changes of the personal rank of the above mentioned persons during accomplishing of
the task given by this order, the stated command of the unit to which they were sent is
obliged to immediately send to the Personnel administration of the Federal Secretariat of
National Defence.
CHIEF
general-major Gojko Krstić
(written in person)
The accuracy of the transcript is verified by: Ensign first class
AM
Damljan Nikolić
(signature)
ANNEX 137:
REQUEST FOR E QUIPMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL, NO. 95-49
Date (illegible)
Equipping of the special units, demand.-
GENERAL STAFF OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY
(Infantry administration)
With a purpose to equip special assignment units (Military police platoon and
Reconnaissance platoon) TO Zone Staff of Western Slavonia, and due to lack of requested
supplies provided through regular supplying procedure, we ask from you to approve to us
the following amount of armament and equipment:
1. Pistol, 7.65mm, semi-automatic 20 pieces
2. Bullet, 7.65mm for pistol 3 trunks
3. Bullet, 7.9mm, sniper, for silencers 3 trunks
4. Portable radar detector - PRD-1 3 pieces
5. Passive sight 5x80 for 7.62mm automatic rifle 6 pieces
6. Hand reflector … 2 pieces
7. Rubber stick ……… 10 pieces
8. Handcuffs …………… 10 pairs
9. Chains for binding ……………….. 2 pieces
The last item is under number 9. 265
“MV/MV”
COMMANDER
Colonel Jovan Čubrić
(signature)
A NNEX 138:
R EPORT ON C OMBAT R EADINESS OF THE 18THC ORPS, 13 OCTOBER 1993
MILITARY SECRET
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
MILITARY POST
9162
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL NO. 18-982
General Staff of the Serbian
Army of Krajina (SVK) -
Knin - to the body in charge
of “ONP” -
13 October 1993
Okučani
Report on the level of th
combat readiness of the Corps
deliver. -
On the basis of the document written by the General Staff of the SVK, confidential no. 804-
th
1 from 12 October 1993, the Command of the 18 Corps analysed combat readiness
according to the given questions.
(…)
Through the Ministry of defence of the FRY - Personnel administration -
insure requested number of officers and non-commissioned officers.
Together with the Connection administration of the Yugoslav army solve the
problems regarding protection of all types of connections (radio-relay
connections towards the direction of the General staff of the SVK and “VF”
connections in the direction of brigades and detachments.)
We also ask from you to provide us with 30 km of the “PTK” cable and 30 field phones for
the organisation of the wire connection of the units on the front line.
COMMANDER
Colonel Milan Čeleketić
(signature) 266
A NNEX 139:
R EQUEST FOR FNDS
10 FEBRUARY 1992
THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
THE MINISTER’S CABINET
TO THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
TO MINISTER SOKOLOVIĆ
Comrade Minister,
I ask you to influence Minister Zebić to stop the practice of providing resources through the
“SDK” (Federal Book-keeping Service) to the Territorial Defence of the Krajina, since the
resources are not financing the Ministry of the Interior. We were informed that the request
for the provision of resources for the Territorial Defence of the Krajina had been submitted,
although it is established according to the Peace Agreement of the UN that the Territorial
Defence be suspended, and for the police of the Krajina to remain as the only incumbent of
the duties in regard to the protection of peace and order on the territory of RSK.
I inform you that there is an amount of 380 000 000 dinars in the “SDK” in Glina. These
resources were earlier deposited for the Territorial defence, but since the major part of the
defence, the defenders that is, were financed from the army budget, the above-mentioned
resources have not been spent for some time. We ask you to influence for these resources to
be transferred to the account of the Ministry of the Interior RSK No. 60-815-637-9422.
Sincerely, comrade Milan.
Knin, 10 February 1992.
MINISTER
Milan Martić 267
ANNEX 140:
PAYMENTS BY FRY
25 FEBRUARY 1994
18th CORPS COMMAND
WESTERN SLAVONIA
CONFIDENTIAL NO 11-41
25th February 1994
Information of daily allowance payments for active and civilian personnel
for January and February 1994
delivered to. -
54th Infantry Brigade
Yugoslav Army MOD Military Accounting Centre made personal daily allowances
payments (the final statement of accounts)for active and civilian personnel. These were
made for January 1994 on 25th February 1994 as follows:
- one point amounts to 0,060 dinars on 1st January 1994
- compensation for separation from family is 35,00 dinars
- daily allowance for official trip is 2,80 dinars......50% = 1,40 ND for each day
- account to be decreased by 74% deposit, 0,045 dinar per point.
Payment has been completely made through current account.
Personal daily allowance deposit for February 1994 will be done according to the point
value of 0,060 dinars and will be paid on 1st March 1994.
Units are to submit data by 1200hrs, 26th February 1994, for all active and civilian
personnel who want the money to be delivered to Okučani, this being:
Name and surname, current account number and amount (whole or partial, of which the
exact amount).
All persons are cautioned to pay extra attention not to make double withdrawals.
Data to be submitted to 18th Corps Finance Department.
54th INFANTRY BRIGADE COMMAND
Conf. No 21-42
25 February 1994
Head of Finance Department
Captain I Class
(illegible) 268
A NNEX 141:
R EQUEST OF HQ OF THE SRBIAN ARMY OF KRAJINA
30 D ECEMBER 1993
HQ of the Serbian Army of Krajina
strictly confidential No:944-1
th
30 December 1993
Securing of phone lines for
the needs of the Security Agency
of the Serbian Army of Krajina
ORDER
Aiming at the timely organisation and normal, fast and safe functioning of the modem
information system for the needs of the Security Agency of the Serbian Army of Krajina,
that is, their connection into a unique system, I
Order
1. Chief of communications of the HQ will deal with the current condition and by
redistribution or in some other way, for the needs of the Security Agency of the Serbian
Army of Krajina will secure the Belgrade (011) post number, code, which he will
install at the premises of the Security Agency of the HQ in arrangement with the Chief
of the Security Agency of the HQ.
2. To the Commands of the Corps, through Chief of connections Corps, the same way
they will secure the Belgrade post lines for the needs of their Security Agency. If they
cannot manage to secure the lines soon, they should find a proper replacement, through
installing the Novi Sad, Banja Luka or some other post number/code.
3. This task should be a priority, and all the possibilities for its fastest realisation should
be used, and not later than 15 January 1994.
th
I should be personally informed about the realisation of this order until 15 January 1994.
Commander of the Serbian Army of Krajina
Major General
Mile Novaković
Delivered to: th th st th th th
Commander of 7 , 15 , 21 , 39 ,18 , 11 Corps
Received on 30 December at 10.15 hrs
2156 400 0 31 269
A NNEX 142:
C ONVERSATION WITH RISOPERS
7 SEPTEMBER 1995
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
CENTER ZAGREB
Date 7 September 1995
INFORMATION
SUBJECT: informative conversation with prisoners
We deliver you information about informative conversations conducted with imprisoned
members of the Serbian para-army. We will deliver you in this information a short summary
of the five conducted conversations.
1. DAVOR BAI Ć, the son of Dragomir, mother Aleksandra (born Venus), born on 13
November 1956, Croat, worker, permanent address: Dvor, Bratstva i jedinstva 18.
- married to DAJANA (Croat), a father of two children, Korana (1984) and
Tanja (1985).
- mobilised in February 1994, until then he worked in “Dvorkom” since he, as -
a Croat, had a work obligation.
- he was on the position in Gornji Žirovac, on the line with the 5th Corps of the
Bosnia and Herzegovina army, and he used to stay there for 7 or 8 times a
week. He stayed there until the 5 August 1995.
- he was the member of the 1st Dvor company, the 1st battalion, 33rd brigade.
- he surrendered to the Croatian army in Dvor on 8 August1995.
- his aunt and uncle live in the Republic of Croatia.
(...)
5. NIKOLA LUKAC, the son of Mi ćo, mother Milka (born Ma đarec), born on 20 May
1940 in Dabrnja, Glina, driver, permanent address: unknown.
- divorced, his ex-wife is NADA POSTOLKA and his son ANDREJ live in
Sesvete, Luka 17.
- his last job was a job of a driver in “Čazmatrans” in Kutina, he has been
retired since 1991.
- his brother ILIJA was born on 20 May 1945 in Dabrnja, he lived in Velika
Gorica until 1991, Cvijetni trg 8 when he went to Dabrnja, and then to Bosnia
and Herzegovina (he was a signal corps man in the 24th brigade).
- in April 1991 Nikola Lukac came to Dabrnja and joined the 24th brigade, 3rd
battalion, 1st company, 1st platoon.
- from 26 June 1991 until 25 December 1991 he kept watches in Dabrnja. 270
- from 25 December 1991 until the end of March 1992 he was in Gra čanica,
Glina.
- from the end of March 1992 until 17 July 1992 he was in Bučica, Glina.
- from 25 January 1993 until the end of April 1923 he was in Taborište and he
spent 13 days in Maslenica, the village of Pridraga.
- he was demobilised at the end of April 1993 and he returns to Dabrnja.
* officers
MARKO VRCELJ, Lieutenant Colonel, commander of the 24th brigade,
approximately 45 years old, from Benkovac
MIKA MILANKOVIĆ, Captain, commander of the 1st battalion, approximately
45 years old, from V. Grac, Glina
MILAN MA ĐARAC, Second Lieutenant, commander of the 1st company,
approximately 35 years old, from Glina
MILAN VIN ČIĆ, Second Lieutenant, deputy commander of the 1st company,
approximately 30 years old, from Glina
PECI, Captain, commander of the 2nd company, approximately 40 years old,
from V. Grac
DRAGAN LIKAR, Lieutenant, deputy commander of the 2nd company,
approximately 40 years old, from v. Grac
DJURO ĆUPOVIĆ, Captain, commander of the 3rd company, approximately 45
years old, from Roviska
DJURO KOLUNDŽIJA, deputy commander of the 3rd company, approximately
40 years old, from Majske Poljane
RADE JEREMIJA, Seargent Senior, commander of the 1st platoon,1st company,
3rd battalion, approximately 45 years old
*other members of the para-army
ILIJA LUKAC, signal corps man in the 24th brigade (the brother of Nikola
Lukac)
VELJKO VUKIČEVIĆ, signal corps man in the 24th brigade, approximately 45
years old, from Dragotin
BRANKO MILETI Ć, signal corps man, approximately 35 years old, from
Dabrnja
* “bezbednjaci” (security men)
MILAN VINČIĆ, in the command of the 24th brigade
ILIJA BJELAJAC, in the command of the 24th brigade, approximately 45 years
old, from Glina
MILAN TODOROVIĆ, in the 1st battalion, approximately 40 to 45 years old,
from Dabrnja 271
STEVO JELIĆ, in the 3rd battalion, approximately 45 years old, from Dragotin.
A NNEX 143:
ACTIVITIES ANDM EMBERSHIP OF PARAMILITARY GROUPS
- JOVAN ŠIKANJA
- MEHMED PUZIĆ
- NEBOJŠA PREČANICA
- VASO RAJŠIĆ
- RADE TARBUK
- DRAGAN KONJIĆ
- MILAN DROBNJAK-PRELAC
- RANKO BOGDANIĆ
- ĆEDOMIR STEFANOVIĆ
- ŽELJKO PRILJEVIĆ
- ŽELJKO ČAVIĆ
- MIRKO BJELIĆ
- MARKO ILIŠEVIĆ
- PERO MIOČINOVIĆ
* “Stiv’s group”
Stevan Bunčić,aka Stiv, was the leader of the group, which operated on the territory of
Petrinja.
We identified the following members of the group:
- Stevo Bunčić, aka Stiv, the leader of the group
- Đuro Galijan
- Pero Radovanović, aka Perika
- Aleksa Vojnović
- Slavko Malobabić, aka Sivko
* “Šilt” group
The group was formed before 26 June 1991 (the day when Chetniks and JA
attacked the Glina police station) and was under direct patronage of Dr. Dušan
Jović, the president of the Glina municipality.
The majority of the members of the gang finished the course in Gć and
Gruška near Knin and they were paid from the Glina “municipal budget”. They
had the right to share among themselves the plundered property of the expelled or
killed Croats and later on some of them were engaged in the illegal trade (fuel,
cigarettes, drugs, and so on). After 26 June 1991, Dr. Duško Jovi ć gives over the
group to Colonel Begovi ć who gives them the specific tasks such as “searching
the terrain” and discovering “the infiltrated Ustasha formations”. 272
When executing those and similar tasks, the group committed the following war
crimes in the places inhabited by Croats:
the genocide in the villages of Gornje and Donje Jame
killed Croatian civilians together with the JA after the occupation of the
villages of Viduševac, Stankovac, Mala and Velika Solina, Ha đer, and
Dvorišće
ĐURO LONČAR, aka Đuka and Žuti, born on 7 April 1961 in Glina, the Glina
municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, resided in
Glina, Radnička Street 9. He is serving a prison sentence in a prison in Sombor,
Serbia, at this moment (transferred from the Beli Manastir prison). He was
convicted for killing 9 persons of Serbian nationality.
ZORAN PONEDILJAK, aka Sova, son of Ivan, JMBG (Unique Citizen’s
Registry Number) 1812965370402, Glina, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the
Republic of Croatia, nationality unknown, citizen of the Republic of Croatia
(Vinkovci 7777777 AOP); his address unknown, occupation unknown, resided in
Glina, S. and A. Radić Street. His identity card number is 13085576, undelivered,
issued in the 4 thpolice station in Beli Manastir on 7 February 1997. He is
allegedly in Bulgaria at this moment.
GORAN PONEDILJAK, son of Ivan, born on 29 December 1966 in Glina, the
Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, resided
in Glina, S. and A. Radić Street.
ANĐELKO HOTI, son of Ljimon, JMBG: 1906970370407, Glina, the Sisak-
Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, an Albanian, unknown, resided in
Glina, the street of 11 Sije čanj 1944. According to our information, he is in
Belgrade, Serbia, where he is connected with the underground and he makes his
living by smuggling and other criminal acts.
MILAN KUKOLEČA, aka Kuki and Sikirica, born on 6 August 1967 in Bijele
Vode, the Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of
Croatia, a Serb, resided in Bijele Vode.
DAMIR BILIĆ, son of Blaž, born on 8 July 1964 in Glina, the Glina municipality,
the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Croat. According to our
information, he is on the territory of Vinkovci at this moment. Later on, (we do
not know when exactly) he was a member of the “IDG” Joso Kovačević.
NEBOJŠA VIGNJEVI Ć, son of Dušan, JMBG: 1402969370403, Glina, the
Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb, unknown, unknown,
unknown, resided in Glina, the street of the 11Siječanj 1944.
MIODRAG JOVI Ć, son of Dušan, born on 4 July 1968 in Glina, the Sisak-
Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb, resided in Glina, Nikola Tesla
Street 14.
MILJENKO CREVAR, aka Bljutavi, born on 28 October 1969, Glina, the Glina
municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
resided in Glina, V.Gačeše Street 35. 273
DRAGOSLAV MALOBABIĆ, son of Milan, JMBG: 0406972370408, Glina, the
Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Glina, Ivo Andri ć Street. Committed suicide on 16
September 1994.
SLOBODAN TAMBIĆ, born on 19 April 1966, Glina, the Glina municipality, the
Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb, resided in Taborište
94a.
DRAGIŠA BOGUNOVI Ć, son of Milan, JMBG: 1105969370409, Glina, the
Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Glina, Žrtava Domovinskog Rata Street 56.
ŽARKO TAMBIĆ, son of Nedeljko, JMBG: 1906971370419, Glina, the Glina
municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Glina, Kolodvorska Street.
MIROSLAV JOVIĆ, aka Čiča and Struja, son Milan, JMBG: 2005969370408,
Glina, the Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of
Croatia, a Serb, unknown, resided in Gornje Taborište 94. Wanted by the Zagreb
police department under the number 026-930-07 from 26 January 1994. Registry
number: 511-19-02/3-1-394/94. Wanted for endangering the integrity of the
territory according to the “KZ HRV” 231.1.
MILAN HALER, aka Vaso, son of Vasilj, JMBG: 3004973370428, Glina, the
Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Glina, Vukovarska Street 12.
ZORAN IVANIĆ, aka Po čo, son of Mirko, JMBG: 1212966370417, Glina, the
Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Glina, Zlatko Šulentić Street 3.
ZORAN BOROMISA, aka Ljamo, son of Božo, born on 17 September 1970 in
Glina, the Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of
Croatia, a Serb, unknown, resided in Glina, S. and A. Radić Street.
DRAGAN SLADOJEVIĆ, son of Dušan, JMBG: 0406972371005, Glina, the
Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Petrinja, Dr. Rudolf Horvat Street 11 or Brezovo Polje 78,
the Glina municipality.
ĐURO BOGUNOVI Ć, aka Đukica, son of Živko, born on 27 October 1967,
Glina, the Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of
Croatia, a Serb, resides in Majske Poljane 103, the Glina municipality.
DJORDJE RAJŠIĆ, aka Đorđe, son of Djuro, born on 21 December 1967, a Serb,
resided in Glina, Vinogradska Street.
STEVO JELIĆ, son of Milan, born on 20 February 1963, a Serb, resided in Bijele
Vode 149, the Glina municipality.
JOVO TARBUK, a Serb, other information is unknown.
SINIŠA GAVRANIĆ, aka Gari, son of Boško, born on 21 June 1973, a Serb,
resided in Glina, A. and S. Radić Street. 274
JOVO MOMI Ć, son of Marica, born on 7 February 1972 in Savski Venac,
Belgrade, Serbia; a Serb, elementary school education, resided in Glina, Kralja
Tomislava Street 47.
NIKOLA KRKOVIĆ, son of Aleksa, born on 25 September 1967, a Serb, resided
in Glina, Vinogradska Street.
MIĆO ŠKILJO, son of Đuro, born on 2 July 1968, a Serb, resided in Glina, the
street of 11 Siječanj 1944.
STEVO JANDRIĆ, son of Dušan, born on 12 September 1949, resided in Šibine
5, the Glina municipality. The person died, but we have no information on when
and how.
ĐURO ŠIMUNOVIĆ, son of Mara, born on 6 March 1953, a Croat, resided in
Glina, Zlatko Šulentić Street 5.
BORISLAV VUJAKLIJA, son of Branko, JMBG: 1311974370408, Glina, the
Glina municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Glina, Pere Pogledića Street.
DUŠAN ČUČKOVIĆ, son of Dragan, JMBG: 0901957370427, Balinac, the G.
Klasnić municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a
Serb, unknown, resided in Balinac 48, the G. Klasnić municipality.
ŽELJKO DEMIĆ, son of Milka, JMBG: 2103953370418, Petrinja, the Petrinja
municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Glina, Vinogradska Street. Registered in the “KE” of the
Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia.
GORAN KORICA, son of Stevo, JMBG: 0703974370418, Glina, the Glina
municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Glina, A. Kovačić Street 3.
DJURO SOLAR, son of Nedeljko, JMBG: 2811966370403, Glina, the Glina
municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in G. Selište 5, the G. Klasnić municipality.
MIĆO VUJAKOVI Ć, son of Milan, JMBG: 1001949370453, Šibine, the G.
Klasnić municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a
Serb, Croatian, elementary school education, a worker, resides in Šibine 26, the
G. Klasnić municipality.
SINIŠA ŠEOVI Ć, son of Dušan, JMBG: 1812966370406, Glina, the Glina
municipality, the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Republic of Croatia, a Serb,
unknown, resided in Glina, Vinogradska Street.
* Reconnaissance Diversionist Group “Joso Kovačević”
The group was organised for reconnaissance and execution of diversionist actions
against the legal authorities of the Republic of Croatia and was never larger than
one platoon. From the day, it was formed, it was commthded by the Glina th
Territorial Defence headquarters and later by the 24 Infantry Brigade of the 39
Corps of the so-called VRSK. The Commander of the group was Josip Kova čević,
son of Franjo, and the commanders inside the group were Bogdan Jednak, Branko
Bulat, and Siniša Šeović. 275
A NNEX 144:
M ILITARY R EPORT , 13 FBRUARY 1992
ARMED FORCES OF SAO KRAJINA
COMMAND OF THE (illegible) TO BRIGADE
GLINA
Conf. No. 01-119/1
13 February 1992
Information on the tasks of the special units in Glina:
The following special units are located on the territory of the municipality Glina:
Special unit of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of the Serbian
Krajina or the so-called “Šilt” group consisting of 75 fighters.
Police unit – active and reserve composition. Around 60 members active, and
40 members in the reserve.
Reconnaissance commando group of the TO municipal HQ, 15 members.
st
Military police unit: 14 members in the 1 TO Brigade, 16 members in the
TO municipal HQ.
In Glina there is also a prison secured by 17 people.
The tasks of the units are: Tasks within their authority, which are:
The units securing the prison take care of the prisoners who are imprisoned for criminal acts
as well as imprisoned members of the Croatian Defence Forces.
The units of the military police execute police tasks within their area (1 TO Brigade for the
needs of the brigade in the responsibility zone of the brigade and for the municipal TO HQ
for the needs in the territory in the municipality Glina, and according to requests also for the
needs of the 1 TO Brigade).
Reconnaissance commando group (IDG) executes reconnaissance tasks for the needs of the
st
municipal TO Hstand according to request of the commander of the 1 TO Brigade and the
needs of the 1 TO Brigade as they have done up to now.
The police units, reserve and regular, execute police tasks in the territory of the municipality
and if requested by the commander of the 1 stTO Brigade also tasks for the needs of the
brigade (interventions in the endangered parts of the front, which they have done up to
now).
The “Šilt” group is a special task unit of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of the
th
Serbian Krajina and is under its command. It is used for combat actions istthe 7
Operations Group. According to requests of the commander of the 1 TO Brigade, it
executes special tasks in the responsibility zone of the brigade and participates in
interventions in the endangered parts of the front. It is also used for cleaning the terrain of
infiltrated reconnaissance, commando and terrorist groups. All of these units are reserve
units, which can be used in special circumstances by the commander of the 1 sTO Brigade
for interventions in endangered directions.
COMMANDER 276
Lieutenant Colonel Marko Vrcelj
(signature)
ANNEX 145: TH
C OMMAND OF THE 39 CORPS
10 A PRIL1995
MILITARY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
TH
COMMAND OF THE 39 CORPS
SECURITY SERVICE
Conf. No. 6-16
10 April 1995
th
Security Service: 24 Infantry Brigade
Authorised officer: Captain Tihomir Banjeglav
8 April 1995
Two copies
Delivered to:
Security service of the 39 Corps
Security service of 24 Infantry Brigade
RECORD
APPLICATION OF METHODS
a) proposal
b) request
c) report
METHOD:
1. Personal observations of the senior officer
2. Collaboration with the source
3. Data processing and establishing
4. Informative interviews
5. Surveillance and bugging
6. Secret search
7. Secret recording
8. Secret control of post and other deliveries
9. Misinformation
10.Other
COMBINED APPLICATION OF METHODS:
1. “POR”
2. “POO”
3. “OPO”
4. “OK” 277
5. “OA”
6. “KOZ”
OBJECT OF METHOD APPLICATION:
th
Counter-intelligence evaluation of the 24 Infantry Brigade
SUBJECT OF METHOD:
1. Foreign intelligence services
2. Extremism and terrorism
3. Crime
4. Unknown
TIME OF APPLICATION: 4 August1995
EXPLANATION
Counter-intelligence evaluation of the 24 Infantry Brigade
The 24 Infantry Brigade is stationed in the territory of the municipality Glina and is mainly
(with the exception of conscripts from the village of Bos. Bojna) made up of conscripts
from the territory of the municipality Glina. The unit has a complex operative tactical
position, since it is has to secure the part of the border of the RSK towards Croatia (mouth
of the river Trepče into the river Kupa – river Kupa – mouth of the river Glina into the river
Kupa – the village of Donje Jame – Glinsko Novo Selo) and the part of the border of the
th
RSK towards the 5 Corps of the so-called Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (village of Glinica
– Bukovlje – Bos. Bojna – Kobiljak). The brigade has 2,460 members (3,250 per
formation), of which 108 are officers (234 per formation), 149 commissioned officers (116
per formation) and 2,215 soldiers (2,901 per formation) who are deployed in the command
of the brigade, in the command of the headquarters, the 4 thInfantry Battalion, combined
artillery division, combined anti armoured artillery division, light artillery division of the
Anti aircraft, 2 independent companies, intervention company, tank company, rear
company, “SIS” battery, reconnaissance platoon, military police platoon, communications
platoon and pioneer platoon, and the reinforcement is 76%. The specific location and
national structure of the municipality Glina have reflected on the situation of security in the
unit. Due to the economic migration of the population and their orientation toward regional
centres Sisak and Karlovac, even Zagreb, as well as the national structure of the population
before the war and the establishment of RSK, there are many mixed marriages and a
relatively large percent of non-Serbian members of the 24 thInfantry Brigade. Within the
execution of the Vance plan, several UN missions have been stationed in the territory of the
municipality Glina (military monitors, civilian police, UNHCR, EU), as well as commands
and logistic support of UKRBAT and JORBAT.
After examining the registry of the “Vod” Glina, it was established that 138 non-Serbian
conscripts live in the municipality Glina (73 Croats, 53 Yugoslavs, 6 Muslims, 4 with no
ethnic affiliation, 1 Albanian, 1 Russian), of which 99 are under the mobilisation list of the
th
24 Infantry Brigade (48 Yugoslavs, 42 Croats, 4 Muslims, 4 with no ethnic affiliation).
From the territory of the municipality Glina 26 conscripts are employed in various UN
missions and 17 of them are on the mobilisation list of the 24 thInfantry Brigade. By
examining other areas from which we could expect enemy actions, according to the reports
of the deputy commander of the battalion of the Security service ((PkOBP) and the personal
th
operative engagement, it was established that there are 17 members of the 24 Infantry
Brigade who are in mixed marriages (wives of non-Serbian nationality), that 25 members 278
have relatives abroad, and that 15 members, according to the Security service participated
in criminal acts. These data are not far from accurate due to weak knowledge of the PkOBP
about the “KO” situation in the battalions, which is partly objective (2 of the 4 PkOBPs
were appointed to duty in January 1995), but also due to previous unprofessional approach
as well as the inability of the new Security service of the 24 thInfantry Brigade to examine
the “KO” situation in the brigade and on the territory without appropriate collaboration
network (since there was non). Certain results were achieved so that 13 candidates will be
included in the (illegible), who are currently in the operative communications.
Counter-intelligence evaluation singles out 19 persons who are considered to be worth of
the examining of the Security Service and who are suggested to be inspected in “POR”, 4 of
them are officers, 1 is non-commissioned officer, and 14 of them are soldiers. Regarded
according to the Security Service procedures, it is obvious that 13 persons are members of
foreign Intelligence services, 2 are engaged in the terrorist activities, and 4 are engaged in
criminal activities. These are the following persons:
1. Foreign Intelligence services
a) Croatian intelligence service (HOS)
- TOMIĆ, Pero, ŽELJKO, Captain, “PkPO” in the command of the 24th infantry brigade,
born on 9 April 1965 in Sisak, Yugoslav, UCRN: 0904965370419, permanent address:
Glina, A. Kovačić.
Tomič comes from mixed marriage (his mother Marija is a Croat from the surroundings of
Split), and his brother stayed in Zagreb, where he studied medicine. Tomi ć’s mother
travelled to Croatia to visit her son and according to the latest operative information they
keep in touch by phone, through the mission of the EC. According to the information so far,
Tomić does not show hostile behaviour but it is considered that because of the responsible
function in the 24th infantry brigade he is to be surveyed by the Security Service. There is
no record of any close friendship at his work place and so-far there are no good conditions
for his surveillance.
- LAZIĆ, Dušan, ADAM, Captain, commander of the 3rd infantry battalion, born on 6
January 1962, Glina, Serb, economic technician, permanent address: the village of Hajetic,
no. 4, Glina Municipal Assembly.
Lazić is married to a Croat woman, whose relatives are all in Croatia, also Lazi ć’s brother
Slavko moved to Zagreb together with his family at the beginning of the war.
We have the substantiated information at our disposal that the members of Lazić’s family, at
the 1991 elections, voted for HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), so even today his father
Dušan is sometimes called the HDZ man. There are no information that Lazi ć is in touch
with his brother and his wife’s relatives.
- BENIĆ, Slavko, MIRKO, conscript in the 4th infantry battalion, born on 24 December
1951 in Glina, Croat, metallurgist, permanent address: D. Selište 45, Glina Municipal
Assembly.
Benić’s brother Slavko was a pilot of a helicopter in the former JNA and was serving his
time in Bihać, from where, during the war he transferred to the Pleso airport in Zagreb and
stayed in the Croatian Army. Beni ć’s uncle, Ivo Klobu čar, conducted himself in a very 279
extreme manner before the war, and in the beginning of the war he escaped to Croatia, and
he left his car, an “Opel kadet” to Benćc, which contributes to the fact that they were close.
OGNJENOVIĆ, Dragan, DAMIR, conscript in the 1st infantry battalion, born on 4 January
1960 in Sisak, Serb, chemical technician, permanent address: Glina, V. Karadži ć 92.
Ognjenovic comes from a mixed marriage and his parents stayed in Sisak. During the attack
of the Muslim troops on M. Budrinji ć he was wounded and captured, and during his stay in
a hospital in Bihać he gave a statement for the Muslim television. We have unsubstantiated
information at our disposal that during his imprisonment in Biha ć his mother from Sisak (a
Croat woman) came to visit him. Ognjenovi ć is a friend to Mrakovi ć Đuro, from the
criminal service of the “ČVP” of the 39th Corps, whom we plan to engage in surveillance of
Ognjenović Damir.
- VILIĆ, Pero, ZORAN, conscript in the 1st infantry battalion, born on 19 November 1973
in Glina, Yugoslav, machine technician, permanent address: Ul. 29 November 21, Glina.
Villić comes from a mixed marriage, (his mother is a Croat woman), his sister was married
to a Croat whose surname is Cerjak, and they escaped to Germany. Vili ć’s aunt escaped to
Croatia together with her two sons, one of them is a member of the Ministry of the Interior
of the Republic of Croatia. Vili ć’s uncle is Mari čković Vlado, former car-mechanic in the
village of Gredjani, who was wounded while fighting for Ustashas, and it is believed that he
committed criminal offences against the Serbian population. The Vili ć’s family is in touch,
through Germany, with Croatia and there are some indications that they keep in touch
through UNPROFOR. However, on more that one occasion, at Maričković Mirko’s (Vilić’s
grandfather - his mother’s father) house, Ul. C. Topli čka 22, an UNPROFOR vehicle was
spotted, and the neighbours think that they are keeping in touch with Croatia in that way
(they send food and receive money for it).
MAJSTOROVIĆ, Nikola, MILUTIN, conscript, born on 26 October 1952 in Dubica,
Kostajnica Municipal Assembly, Serb, traffic technician, permanent address: Glina. V.
Karadžić 57.
Majstorović came from Croatia to the Republic of Serbian Krajina in October and there is
no other information about him. We think that the Security Service should survey him, as a
part of the operative action “Povratnik” (returnee). We will share our information about this
person with the Secretariat of the Interior Glina - “DB” department.
MAJSTOROVIĆ, Ivan, PETAR, conscript in rear company of the 24th infantry brigade
(work group), born on 12 October 1949 in Glina, Croat, butcher, permanent address: the
village of Prijeka 12, Glina.
Majstorović’s negative comments on military agreement between Muslims and Croats are
registered, and we have at our disposal information that he is one of the more influential
people among Croatian population in the villages of Dolnjaci and Prijeka. By surveying him
we would have insight into the situation in these Croatian enclaves.
B) Muslim Intelligence Service, MOS
ČUĆKOVIĆ, Ljubo, MILE, called “Runjac”, conscript in the 4th infantry battalion, born on
17 June 1967 in Glina, Serb, farmer, permanent address: M. Obljaj 87, Glina Municipal
Assembly. 280
Čućković is married to a Muslim, who was in touch with Dizdarević Enes, who was arrested
after the fall of “APZB” (5 September 1994), and he was suspected of committing crimes
against Serbian population in the villages of Glinica and Bosanska Bojna, and as such he
was handed over to the army of the Serb Republic. According to unsubstantiated
information, Čućković’s wife supplied Dizdarevi ć with ammunition and was his source of
information. We have no new information aboutČućković and his wife.
C) UNPROFOR
GALIĆ, Mile, DRAGIŠA, Lieutenant, referent for “ONP” in the command of the 24th
infantry brigade, born on 19 illegible 1963 in Glina, Serbs, graduated from “ONO”
university, permanent address: Ul. A. Kovačić 2a.
Throughout longer period of time Galic was the officer (OZV) in the command of the 24th
infantry brigade for the communication with UNPROFOR and through official contacts he
became close to some members of the military observers, stationed in Glina. Somehow
Galic always used to find his “soul mate” and make friends in every newly arrived group of
military observers. Particularly interesting are the relations with two Norwegians, a man
called Jon, who was supposed to be Galic’s best man, and the other one who is now the
Chief of military observers, Gejr Svendsen, who gave Gali ć an expensive CD made of 24
carat gold. Galić was also used as an operative connection and as such he was warned about
the profession of the people he is in contact with, but we think that he does not pay attention
to the warnings. At the initiative of the Security Service he was relieved from his duty of
connection officer, but he continues to keep personal contacts with members of the military
observers’ team.
KLOBUČAR, Pero, MILAN, conscript in the 4th infantry battalion, born on 24 August
1953 in Glina, Croat, he was employed as clerk in “Sisa čka banka”, permanent address:
Glina, Ul. Joso Marjanović 56.
According to the available information, Klobu čar (called “Blejo”) stayed in Glina because
of his wife, Serb woman, although, according to unsubstantiated information, back in 1971,
he displayed signs of Croatian chauvinism. Two officers from UNPROFOR connection
team are accommodated in his house. According to unsubstantiated information he is on
good terms with them.
BAZDAR, Jovo, DJURO, Captain 1st Class in reserve, now he is performing the duty of
sanitary inspector in Glina Municipal Assembly, as a part as his work obligation, born on 2
January 1947 in Glina, Serb, permanent address: Ul. N. Saki ć 19.
Bazdar is married to a Croat woman named Vera, employed in Medical Center in Glina as a
visiting nurse. We have at our disposal information that she is “active” among women of
Croatian nationality and that she is surveyed according to the measures taken by “DB”, so
she was brought in Secretariat of the Interior in Glina, but without any results. Vera is the
boss in the house, and according to some pieces of information she is woman of
questionable morals and she is a materialist. In the new house of the Bazdar family
members of the UN military observers’ team are accommodated and Vera is intimate with
them and possibly she has affairs with them. As a part of the plan of surveying the members
of the UN military observers’ we contacted Bazdar Djuro and at the same time we will
survey him according to our measures, and he will work as our operative connection. 281
LUKAČ, Zorka, MILAN, driver in the command of the quarters of the 24th infantry
brigade, born on 1 February 1948 in Glina, Serb, truck operator, permanent address: Glina,
J. Marjanović 57a.
There is no compromising information about Lukač, and we plan to survey him in order to
fulfil the aim of the “OUS” and to get insight into the activities of the UNCIPOL members
who have their office in his house.
KRAGULJAC, Svetozar, MILAN, Sergeant, on duty in battery of “ZIS”, born on 2
February 1959 in Glina, car mechanic, permanent address: Glina, Vinogradska 9.
Kraguljac lived in the USA for 16 years and his parents are still there. He returned to Glina
just before the war started. He is employed as a translator for UNPROFOR. According to
some pieces of information Kraguljac returned from the USA because of a narcotic affair he
was involved in, another sources tell that he is homosexual which makes a suitable target for
“AmOS”.
2. Terrorism
VUJASINOVIĆ, Živko, BRANKO, a cook in the rear platoon of the 4th infantry battalion,
born on 13 March 1948 in Glina, Croat, cook, permanent address: Glina, Ul. Stevan
Nemanja bb.
On two occasions, while Vujasinovi ć was on duty, metal spoons for cleaning dishes were
found in food which points out to the possibility that other dangerous substances could be
thrown into food. He is nationally “conscious”, which is indicated by the information that he
celebrated Catholic Christmas in his unit.
BILIĆ, Blaž, DAMIR, conscript in the 1st infantry battalion, born on 8 July 1964, Croat,
worker, permanent address: Glina, Ul. Žrtava fašizma bb.
For a period of time Bili ć was the member of the so-called “Šiltova grupa” (Šilt’s group),
and after the conflict with Marti ć Siniša (“Šilt”), he transferred to reconnoitres under the
command of J. Kova čević. After the disbanding of this paramilitary formation, he was
assigned to the 24th infantry brigade. There are indications that Bili ć participated in some
terrorist acts on the territory of Glina, most of all in planting the “MES” on the railway track
Petrinja - Topusko. It is evident that his mother, A Serb woman, poisoned herself two days
after that terrorist action.
3. Criminal
CULE, Ljuban, DRAGAN, conscript in the 4th infantry battalion, born on 27 February
1947 in Glina, Serb, farmer, permanent address: the village of Krajiška Bojna 18, Glina
Municipal Assembly.
We have at our disposal information that on more than one occasion Cule participated in
illegal trade with Muslims (during the “APZB”) and on one occasion he was even
sentenced. According to the latest operative information Cule did business with members of
the 5th Corps of the so called army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
KUKOLECA, Dragutin, MILAN, conscript in the 4th infantry battalion, born on 6 August
1967 in Glina, Serb, car mechanic, permanent address: Glina, U. M. Saki ć.
According to the available operative information Kukoleca established good relations with
member of “UKRBAT” stationed in Žirovac and through them illegally traded with 282
members of the 5th Corps of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He tends to engage in
criminal activities but so far he was not sentenced.
EREMIJA (illegible), Pero, DRAGAN, conscript in the 4th infantry battalion, born on 25
April 1964 in Glina, Serb, agricultural technician, permanent address: the village of Obljaj
63, Glina Municipal Assembly.
This person first established connection with the Muslim side with the purpose of illegal
trade in the period of “APZB” and now he is in contact with Kukoleca Milan and there are
indications that two of them together, through UNPROFOR, trade with Muslims.
MILOŠEVIĆ, Djuro, VLADO, conscript in the 4th infantry battalion, born in 1960 in
Glina, Serb, permanent address: the village of Krajiška Bojna 17, Glina Municipal
Assembly.
Milošević was caught on more than one occasion when he tried to trade illegally with the
Muslims. Because of selling weapons to the Muslims he was sentenced to prison by the
order of the commander of the 39th Corps. Miloševi ć is free at the time and it is to be
expected that he will continue to engage in illegal (criminal) activities.
4. Opposing measures
Security Service of the 24th infantry brigade have 13 operative connections (5 officers, 1
non-commissioned officer, 4 conscripts and 3 civilians) that are engaged in the following
activities. “KOZ-6”, “SOS-6”, “K-2”, “T-1” (two operative connections have two lines of
work). Seven operative connections are practically considered associates, but formally, the
organised co-operation is not established. This number is not final, considering that we do
not have information about the number of operative connections of the “PkOBP” in
battalions (“PkOBP” do not want to report them), and this is solved by gaining trust of
“PkOBP” in the “NOB” of the 24th infantry brigade.
The number and structure of operative connections and especially their organisation in the
subordinate units do not fulfil the operative needs of the Security Service, especially when it
comes to surveillance of the above mentioned military personnel, so we will try to improve
that in the forthcoming period.
TB/TB 283
A NNEX 146:
SECURITY R EPORT
8 F EBRUARY 1993
TH
COMMAND OF THE 39 CORPS
-Intelligence-security Department
Conf. No. 07/1-76
8 February 1993
Regular intelligence-security report
- From UNPROFOR sources we found out about a great concentration of forces of the
Croatian Army (HV) in the broader area of Slunj. About 100 tanks and 10,000 soldiers
are in combat readiness. The attack is planned to start in two or three days.
- Today at 4.20 pm in Žirovac, Major Johanson, member of the DANBAT, in a white
van with registry number UN 8212 took pictures of our posts in the village of Blinja.
- The “Šilt” group was disbanded by intervention of this command. Out of 46 members,
26 were put at the disposal of the Command of the 24tInfantry Brigade-the others are
still calculating. Repressive measures will have to be taken.
- The action against the members of the “Šilt” group and the bringing in of some persons
met at approval of the inhabitants of Banija and especially of fighters from our units.
Powerful people from Glina are preparing escape of their families, and the families of
any of them are already in Belgrade.
- Our reconnaissance commando group discovered a enemy mine field during the search
of the terrain around 1,5 km north of the Regional waterworks Petrinja. Several mines
were removed, and our men set several mines in suitable position. Three Ustashas were
discovered in this area. Our patrol was seen and it retreated to the base without
incidents.
CHIEF
Colonel Stevan Janjanin
(signature) 284
A NNEX 146A:
L ETTER FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE 21ST D IVERSION D ETACHMENT , BELGRADE ,
20 F EBRUARY 1994
st
LETTER FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE 21 DIVERSION DETACHMENT
nd
On 22 January 1993 the Croatian attacks on Maslenica started. Since we were, as the
Defence Headquarters of Gorski Kotar, equipped by the Yugoslav Army and trained as
diversionists in Training center in Pan čevo, I thought it to be immoral for us to sit in
Belgrade, while Krajina was in jeopardy and thousands of Serbs were signing up as
volunteers.
That is why I decided to come help out together with other men using the equipment and
weapons that were being safeguarded by the security in Pan čevo. I thought that this would
offer a real opportunity for an action against Gorski Kotar, and I was also counting on the
support of the Army and the Government of Krajina for such an idea.
st
On 31 January, the 27 of us set off fully equipped, and we took all the necessary food and
fuel for the period of two months.
We came to Slunj, the worst and least protected position in Krajina, and we settled in
Technical School Center; there were absolutely no conditions for normal work and living
(no electricity, water, etc.).
After exactly a year of great investments, work and sacrifice, we succeeded to create the
following:
1. A professional diversion detachment of 220 men; 60 of them have become top class
diversionists. Among them there were 9 Yugoslavian martial arts champions in
different disciplines. They have all been highly trained and equipped, since 31
members of the 72nd Brigade held the training.
2. The barracks, located on the area of 6 hectares, with 12 facilities, were completely
rearranged and equipped. They have been secured with 3500-meter long wire, 40 dogs
and mine fields.
3. Medical Corps – 3 doctors, 6 nurses, 4 vehicles – small operating room – with all the
medicines and equipment necessary for war conditions.
4. Wiretap Center and the Signal-Corps Center with 18 men, professionals, 71 radio
devices for different purposes, including 4 repeaters – all of foreign production
5. Two photo-labs for coloured photographs and for black and white ones with 14
devices, from cameras to the automatic machines for developing coloured films.
6. A separate kitchen with 18 workers – all soldiers, every day for lunch, among other
things, they were getting 300 grams of meat, fruit or dessert.
7. In total 57 vehicles: 18 military trucks, 20 jeeps, 3 fuel-carrying vehicles, 7 vans, 5
passenger and 4 ambulances.
8. Artillery devices – all maintained:
- 5 bomb rocket launchers on 5 vehicles TAM-150 with the total of 18 ramps
- 2 jeeps UVAZA with the installed double honeycomb launchers 57 mm (one with
32 rockets, the other with 24)
- 2 trucks TAM-110 with installed armoured Anti-Aircraft Defence cannons 20/3 285
- 3 jeeps UVAZA with installed Brownings 12,7 mm
The total of 12 vehicles have been transformed into artillery devices.
st
Seen overall, 21 Diversion Detachment of the Kordun Corps under the command of
Colonel Čedomir Bulat is a small unit capable of functioning on its own, and ready to
perform any task in the range of its purpose anywhere in the former Yugoslavia.
21 Diversion Detachment, its members that is, participated in 57 actions on the territories
of Gorski Kotar, Krajina and the Republic of Serbia.
5 soldiers have died, 14 have been wounded; 4 of them are handicapped, but only one was
killed in action.
We were at war against the Croats, Muslims, together with the Croats against Muslims, and
together with the Muslims against Muslims.
The most important thing we accomplished was to organise, realise and confirm in the field
the use of artillery in a diversionist manner – which was invented during this war. We have
the honour to deserve credit for the first realisation and combat use of the bomb rocket
launcher.
Considering the numbers and the present war conditions, I declare that we are, undoubtedly,
the most powerful artillery firing unit in all three Serbian armies. We are the only ones who
can fire 18 250 kg bombs in 5 seconds and 152 57 mm rockets in one burst. This is
confirmed in our actions, all 12 of them were 100% successful. We are capable to clear, that
is destroy 1000 m, of any however well reinforced enemy line and there is no reinforced hill
that we cannot take.
Since forming the unit 4.600.000 DM were spent, of which 600.000 DM were borrowed,
and all the resources were provided by the firm “Albatros”, of which 50% is in my
ownership.
We have been formed, equipped and trained by the JNA and VJ (Yugoslav Army), with a
clearly defined task and goal – fight exclusively for the Serbs of Gorski Kotar – and it
turned out that we were fighting everywhere and were holding the worst position in Krajina.
- We do not belong to any party and we are absolutely apolitical
- We have not corroborated with anyone except with VJ
- We are the official unit of SV (Serbian Army) of the Republic of Serbian Krajina
- All the given tasks we have executed without any objection and remark
- We have done nothing, absolutely nothing, without an order, agreement or
understanding
- At the same time we have been preparing the facilities, trained and executed our
missions – all simultaneously
As a reward we got the following:
1. We have been pronounced a group of murderers sent by Service for State Security
(SDB) from Serbia.
2. We are the secret army of the SK (Serbian Krajina) movement for Yugoslavia.
3. Paramilitary army.
4. Private army.
5. A gang of adventurers and criminals.
6. A unit of mercenaries paid for fighting, who go on a mission only when they get
paid. 286
7. I, as a commander of the unit, have ambitions to conquer the whole Gorski Kotar
all by myself.
8. We are a unit that does not execute and avoids all tasks – we are just showing off
and do not leave cafes.
9. The commander of the corps cannot control us and we are on bad terms with him.
10. Finally – we are the Ustasha unit, which came to attack Gorski Kotar in order to
secure an excuse for Croatia to attack Krajina.
COMMANDER
Božo Rajnović
ANNEX 146B:
E XTRACTS FROM THE N OTEBOOKS
First Notebook
(…)
16 March 1993 M. Polje
Co-ordination
- Order for Belgrade:
1. 3 pcs. Batteries for “Fićo” (car model), external dimensions may. 24x13 cm
2. vaccine for the veterinarian
3. tires for “TAM 125” T-10, 12 pcs.
- Urgently 20 pcs. of wooden beds
- a total of 100 pcs. for the unit
- organise the delivery of aggregates from Kozara for the needs of “TSC” and “JOS”,
one aggregate AG-16 for the mechanic
- find in the service a qualified electrician for installation of elect. Net
(…)
22 March 1993 M. Polje
Co-ordination
5:30 p.m.
- information on the arrival of volunteers from the Republic of Serbia and Russia
(Cossacks)
- 10 T 56, 7 “ACH”, “ATK” 56
(…)
Tasks for 28 May 1993
BOŽO RAJNOVIĆ 287
th
- Arrange a conversation with the commander of the 15 Corps, Colonel Milan Šuput
(organise that by contacting Bulat by phone)
- control of covering-up near the kitchen
- the cook reports his opinion of people
- at Đuro’s secure 40 prisoners
- at Bulat’s status of Slobodan Bučić
- the control of material and technical supplies in Brebornica
- take care of paperwork on 2 dogs from Kozara (pick them up at the kennel)
(…)
9:45 a.m.
28 May 1993 “TSC”
Co-ordination
- reception at the border (Dvor-Novi) convoy with special cargo
- urgent! accommodation of the “prisoners” at the “A” complex in agreement with Relić
- 29 May 1993 from 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. motel “Stari Krovovi” in Gra čac 878 218
food for birds
- 29 May 1993 at 6:00 a.m. 5+1 take off
- tent for 40-50 soldiers Colonel Relić
- phone line for Belgrade Colonel Relić
- the doctor is appointed to his duty
- make waterworks functional (internalwaterworks) => Peđa
- reserve 25 seats on the bus for Belgrade for Monday
- forming of the commission for the selection
- call Pančevo Captain Dundić
(…)
- tech. Major ČELEKETIĆ approved of using the 21 “dog” st
(…)
Second Notebook
5 December 1993
Co-ordination
1. Commander Rajnović (…)
2. “ZK” Branislav Ćuk 288
3. “PK OŠP” Milić I. Martinović
4. “ PK BP ” Maksimović (Macut)
5. “ PK OP ” Marić
6. “PKPO” Sveto Malešević
7. Coor. Instructor
8. Secretary Senka
9. Courier Limeni
10. Courier
11. Commander’s escort Nikola Rumenović
Security
1. Lt.Col. Nikola Marić
From Communications and “PC”
1. Neško Obradović
Military Police Platoon
1. Raduško (Raki) Marković
Object Security Platoon
1. Slobodan Stojanović
2. Borojević
Reconnaissance Platoon
1. not formed
Diversion Platoon I
1. Dragan Golubović
Diversion Platoon II
1. Dušan Vučinić (Mrkva)
2. Radivoje Bujanić
Rear Platoon
1. Sveto Malešević
2. Golub Marić
Work Platoon
1. Predrag Vukmirović
2. Željko Mudrić
Medical
1. Nebojša Milošević 289
“Krab”
1. Nebojša Obradović
2. Darko Rac
8 December 1993 “TŠC”
Co-ordination
(…)
- issue rifles to the soldiers from Pančevo immediately
(…)
Thursday
5 May 1994, Belgrade
- Lt. General Momčilo Perišić
- Assistant to the General for land forces, Major General Mile Mrkšić
- SR Yugoslavia Defence Minister Pavle Bulatović
- Head of the Security Administration of the Yugoslav Army, Major General Aleksandar
Dimitrijević
- RSK Defence Minister, Lt. Col. Rade Tanjga
- Commander of the RSK Serbian Army, Major General Milan Čeleketić
- 21 “kk” Commander RSK Serbian Army, Lt. Colonel Veljko Bosanac
- Admiral of the Fleet Branko Mamula
- Lt. General Ljubo Domazetović
- Lt. Colonel Milorad Stupar
- Lt. Colonel Nikola Zečar
- the tape with the documentation turned over, 32 minutes
1. Mile Martić 5 May 1994
2. Borisav Mikelić 5 May 1994
3. Čedomir Bulat 5 May 1994
(…)
1 June 1994
ST
COPY OF THE REQUEST FOR THE USE OF THE 21 “DOG” IN THE ZONE OF THE
OPERATIONS GROUP - DOBOJ
COMMAND OF THE OPERATIONS GROUP
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL, NO. 2641-1
Date, 28 May 1994
Doboj 290
Approval for the use of the special unit.-
TO THE GENERAL STAFF
OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY
to General Mile Mrkšić
General,
We ask you to approve and help realise the use of the special diversion unit from the “21 st
Kordun Corps”, with the means necessary for conducting a particular mission. The unit
would be used in the zone of the Operations group Doboj on a special mission of a strategic
importance to our combat actions which will follow, and immediately.
We hope for your understanding and help and we thank you in advance.
Sincerely!
Chief of Staff
Lieutenant Colonel
Novak Đukić
(signature)
(…)
Friday
16 September 1994, Belgrade
- change some information in the report on larger actions at Kordun
- date of foray (of its attempt!) into Turanj, 28 December or 28 November
- names of the Defence Group commanders – Doboj
1. Major Milovan Stanković – commander of the Territorial Group – Ozren
2. Colonel Gojko Kojić
st
3. Luka Nikolić – commissariat – officer in the 1 “OL” Infantry Brigade
4. Colonel Kondić
st
Lieutenant Colonel Mladen Karan – Head of the 21 Corps Command Security
Colonel Božo Bjelić –19 Infantry Brigade Commander
Major Milovan Stanković –Territorial Group Ozren Commander
Lieutenant Colonel Dragan Kovačić –11 Infantry Brigade Commander
Lieutenant Colonel Branko Kozlina –13 Infantry Brigade Commander
Lieutenant Colonel NovakĐukic – Chief of Staff of the Defence Group Doboj
st
Colonel Veljko Bosanac –21 Corps Command Commander
Colonel Milan Šuput
th
Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Škrebić –15 Infantry Brigade Commander
Colonel Gojko Kojić – Commander of the “OM5” of the Defence Group Doboj 291
st
Colonel Petar Ivković – Head of the 21 Corps Command
Colonel Milan Smiljanić – Head of the Security in (illegible)
Inspector Miladin Relić – Head of the Ministry of the Interior – Vojnić
Colonel Dragan Beara – Head of the Security in the Army of the Serbian Republic
First Lieutenant Branko Momčilović – Military Post Deputy Commander
134-81E Belgrade
Carnijević arsenal group 146, position (illegible)
th
(illegible) Dragan Karina – Commander of the 8 Ministry of the Interior police station
Knin
Colonel Dušan Lončar – Chief of Staff of the Serbian Army of the Republic of the Serbian
Krajina
th
Colonel Lazo Babić –18 “SK” Commander
st
General “illegible” Colonel Momir Talić –1 Corps Command Commander
Jovica Stanišić – chief of the D5 in Serbia
General Major Mićo Vonsavljević –2 ndKrajina Corps Commander
Colonel Rajko Balac – Head of the “ort” of the Army of the Serbian Republic (died on
illegible)
(Illegible)
st
Development on 21 “Dod” and mistakes that were made during the spreading of the task
force formation, mistakes regarding the organisational point of view
13 December 1994, Belgrade
Co-ordination
- 16 Nov 1994, Božo requested from General Domazetovi ć (...) 200 pcs. for the
detachment
30 engines “GRAD” 128mm (...)
- 17 Nov 1994, according to the statement of General Domazetovi ć he agrees to issue
200 sets of gear, but J. Stanišić needs to agree with it (...)
(…) 292
A NNEX 146C:
M ILITARY R EPORT
MILITARY TOP SECRET
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
ST
COMMANDS OF THE 21
DIVERSIONIST DETACHMENT
strictly confidential No: 130-1
05 February 1995
REPORT
delivered to
st
Commander of the 21
Diversionist detachment
(…)
With the development of the situation in the operation “PAUK” in which the forces of the
st th th
21 Kordun Corps are largely engaged, together with the 39 «B» Corps and the 15 «L»
Corps, a significant number of forces have been pulled up towards the lines of clash with
th
the 5 Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(…)
th
Johovo, 6 February 1995
Recording secretary:
Snežana Mitić
Reported:
Captain Milić I. Martinović
HQ of the defence of Gorski Kotar
Noth130-1
08 February 1995 293
ANNEX 146D:
DOCUMENT REGARDING SRBS OF G ORSKIK OTAR
(PART I)
DEFENCE HQ OF GORSKI KOTAR
REPRESENTATIVE BODY OF SERBS OF GORSKI KOTAR
WHAT TO DO WITH THE SERBS OF GORSKI KOTAR
PART 1
Belgrade, April 1794
WHAT TO DO WITH THE SERBS OF GORSKI KOTAR
1. THE SERB PEOPLE HAVE LIVED FOR THE LAST 400 YEARS IN THE AREA
OF THE EASTERN PART OF GORSKI KOTAR, AT THE AREA OF
APPROXIMATELY 600 KM2, IN 175 TOWNS ORGANISED IN 8 LOCAL
COMMITTEES, ON THEIR OWN LAND PURCHASED FROM THE AUSTRO-
HUNGARIAN MONARCHY. THIS AREA IS KNOWN IN HISTORY BY THE
NAME OF KAMENSKO.
2. WITH THE VICTORY OF TU ĐMAN’S CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION
(HDZ) A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS ESTABLISHED WHICH HAS, WITH ITS
EUPHORIC BEHAVIOUR AND SUDDEN REGULATION CHANGES,
ALLUDED TO THE FORMATION OF A NEW INDEPENDENT STATE OF
CROATIA (NDH), INTIMIDATED THE SERBS, WHO FEARED THAT THE
GENOCIDE OF 1941 WILL BE REPEATED. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE OF
GENERAL, COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED, FEAR, NO ONE HAS TRIED TO
ORGANISE THE PEOPLE FOR SELF-DEFENCE, I E TO PREPARE THEM FOR
RESISTANCE IN CASE OF ATTEMPTED DESTRUCTION.
Regardless of the existence of the JNA and Yugoslavia, these people expected help
from a number of retired generals and high-ranking officers who originally come
from this area, but who this was missing.
IN THIS FIRST PHASE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW CROATIA,
WHEN IT WAS IN THE POLITIC EUPHORIA OF REESTABLISHING A
“THOUSAND-YEAR-OLD CROATIA”, BUT MILITARY STILL
UNORGANIZED – IN GORSKI KOTAR, IN THE LOCAL COMMITTEES OF
SRPSKA MORAVICA IN GOMIRJA, THE PEOPLE ORGANISED
THEMSELVES WITH THE HELP OF A RETIRED COLONEL,.
4.A EVERYBODY WAS INFORMED NOT TO RESPOND TO CALLS OF THE
CROATIAN GOVERNMENT – THAT IN CASE OF AN ATTACK THEY
WOULD EVACUATE THE VILLAGE AND GO TO PREARRANGED PLACES
AND OFFER RESISTANCE WITH HUNTING-WEAPONS – SINCE THEY DO
NOT HAVE ANY THING ELSE.
5. At the same time the following was happening in the higher ranks of the JNA: the
official JNA is, for the preservation of Yugoslavia, served as a guarantee for peace,
and unofficially the admiral of the fleet Branko Mamula succeeded in persuading 294
Veljko Kadijević and several other Serb generals that the Serbs in Croatia should be
secretly equipped with arms in order to avoid a genocide – and took on the
responsibility to lead this. The organisation was such that the admiral and a group of
retired generals called high ranking officers in retirement from the Serb parts of
Croatia, who, in their own area, would organise the delivery of weapons and
organise the people into secret military formations. The weapons were obtained
supplied from military magazines, through the Serbs in the secret service, behind the
lines. This action was supported by the secret service of the Federal Secretariat of
National Defence (FDND).
6. OWING TO CONNECTIONS TO THE ADMIRAL WE, THE SERBS OF
GORSKI KOTAR, SUCCEEDED IN JULY 1991 TO ILLEGALLY BRING IN
THOUSANDS OF GUNS. THE MOST CREDIT FOR THIS ACTION GOES TO
THE RETIRED COLONEL AND THE ACTIVELY SERVING CAPTAIN OF
THE SECRET SERVICE. THE COLONEL HAS PROVED TO BE A
COORDINATOR WHO CANNOT BE INTIMIDATED BY ANYTHING, AND IT
WOULD BE TO LITTLE TO CALL THE CAPTAIN BRAVE.
7. SINCE A LARGE NUMBER OF MODERN WEAPONS WERE ATTAINED, THE
SERBS ORGANISED THEMSELVES INTO CLASSIC MILITARY
FORMATIONS. TASK FORCES WERE FORMED, THE COMMANDING
OFFICERS WERE ELECTED BY SECRET VOTING, FORTS WERE BUILT IN
ALL VILLAGES, FOOD WAS COLLECTED AND BARRACKS BUILT, CAVES
WERE MADE READY AS SHELTERS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN. A
SYSTEM OF GENERAL ALERTS CAME INTO OPERATION IN CASE OF
ATTACK ON ANY VILLAGE. THE MAIN COMMUNICATION LINES WERE
UNDER CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE, AND THE SECONDARY AND
REMOTE ONES WERE DISREGARDED. ON FIRST GLANCE THE
SITUATION SEEMED NORMAL, BUT IN FACT, GUARDS AND AMBUSHES
COULD BE FOUND IN EVERY VILLAGE AT NIGHT, THERE WAS
CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE, BASIC TRAINING WAS CARRIED OUT, AND
THE MOVEMENT OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL WAS MONITORED. A GROUP
OF THE YOUNGEST AND MOST CAPABLE WERE SENT TO DEMOLITION-
TRAINING TO SERBIA, “OBSC” PAN ČEVO (AS SOON AS SEPTEMBER
1991) IN ORDER TO FORM A DEMOLITION CORE GROUP AND TO
IMPROVE THE BASIC TRAINING.
7.A IN JASENKA – THE MOST MODERN SKIING RESORT, IN THE HEART OF
CROATIA, THE YUGOSLAV FLAG WAS PUT UP, THE ROADS WERE
BLOCKED AND THESE WERE TO BE THE BASE OF THE DEFENCE STAFF
GORSKI KOTAR, WHICH WAS ALSO OFFICIALLY FORMED.
8. At that time the Croats were still insufficiently military formed. The Serbs are a
narrow pocket which cuts through Croatia and generally they are surrounded by an
incomparably superior enemy, but they are a compact unit and are a majority within
the pocket and its margin-areas.
8.A In such a situation – the Croats were informed that we possessed weaponry (it was
overstated so that they were convinced, for a long time, that there was a brigade
artillery weapons in Jasenka) and they were told that the police patrols couldn’t enter
a village without prior notice. No Serbs were to be called for questioning, no Serbs
were to be mobilised into their army. They were told that we would not attack first 295
nor interfere, but that we would defend ourselves to the end in case of an attack. We
were aware that we would be greatly damaged in case of a general attack, but those
who live with us and around us were even more aware that not one of them would
survive.
9. GENERALLY LOOKING, OUR TERRITORIES CUT THROUGH CROATIA
AND WITH THIS THREATENED THE VITAL FUNCTIONS OF THE
REESTABLISHED CROATIA, THERE WERE BATTLES IN MANY AREAS –
IT WAS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST TO OPEN ANOTHER BATTLEFIELD.
OWING TO OUR GOOD ORGANISATION AND THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
SITUATION THE SERBS GOT, AT THAT TIME, SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
MIDDLE OF CROATIA – WITHOUT WARFARE. THIS SITUATION LASTED
AN ENTIRE YEAR, FROM JULY 1991 TO JULY 1992.
10. WHAT HAPPENED DURING THIS YEAR?
10.A DURING THIS YEAR THERE WAS THE RULE OF: TREASON,
COWARDNESS, INCOMPETENCE, PETTY POLITICS, STUPIDITY,
ARROGANCE, LACK OF ORGANISATION BY THE “POWERFUL” JNA.
DURING THIS PERIOD, THE JNA WITH: FAILED PLANS, UNFULFILLED
PROMISES, CONSPIRACIES, INABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE SIMPLEST
ORDERS – MANAGED TO COMPLETELY DESTROY EVERYTHING THAT
WAS ACHIEVED UP TO THEN AND TO SIMPLY LEAVE THE PEOPLE AT
THE MERCY OF THE “NEW DEMOCRACY” OF THE NEW CROATIA THAT
SUCCEEDED IN MAKING A GHETTO, OR TO PUT IT BETTER, A CAMP
WITHOUT A FENCE, FOR THE SERBS OF GORSKI KOTAR, AND TO
PRESENT ALL OF THIS AS A HIGH ACHIEVEMENT OF DEMOCRACY.
11. During October 1991, the Federal secretary of National Defence, Veljko Kadć,evi
brought the decision that the Defence Staff of Gorski Kotar should be granted
weapons and equipment to form brigades and to issue orders for the Combat Air
Force and the Anti-Aircraft Defence to transfer to the territory of Gorski Kotar, more
specifically, in Jasenak.
11.A The equipment that was gathered slowly, in Bihać it was entirely stolen by high- rank
officer of the JNA ... days were lost in establishing who was stealing and what
happened to the equipment... when everything was discovered the equipment was
partially returned.... When all data was collected the Combat Air Force Biha ć – with
one of the most powerful airports in Europe – had to transport the equipment 50
kilometers, but into Croatia.... how to transport 44 trucks with equipment – when it is
not possible to transfer three people as an advance guard. A pilot and the three
passengers flew up to the border of Krajina and declared – shoot me, but I will not
fly to Gorski Kotar. How powerful was the JNA if it could not execute such an order
received from the Minister of Defence. There was no air warfare, and the Croats did
not have an airforce at that time. Which means that the Minister’s orders were not
executed.
12. At the same time the completely formed task forces of the Defence Staff Gorski
Kotar were waiting for the all of the equipment for a brigade, which included
everything from missiles to field hospitals to army coats – but it never arrives. 296
12.A Winter stared, we did not have anything apart from bare rifles and the militia, not
one, literally not even one special unit (and a lot of them existed), was capable of
securing even one scout who could enable a passage through Croatian lines.
12.B Croatia became military stronger and organised quickly. In the beginning the Serbs
were facing weak and later stronger, pressures, threats and ultimatums to return
weapons or they would be attacked. There were even three cases of forced
mobilizations. Brežak, Boljkovac, Štajduhar and others were constantly coming to
Gorski Kotar in order to lobby and negotiate.
12.C On our side – people were demoralized, units were disintegrating and intimidated.
Ambushes and other organisations were weakening. In this situation, under so much
pressure, within a year we were forced to sign an “agreement” on the return of
weapons (in this case only 20% was returned and declared the entire amount).
12.D After this the entire organisation practically disintegrated – only small groups of
fanatic individuals remained. No watches, no surveillance anymore, the fortification
objects were covered up, no units were left. The Croats moved into Jasenak, settling
it with their refugees – there is no Yugoslav flag anymore.
13. IN THIS SITUATION ALL WE COULD DO IS ORGANISE A POLITICAL
BODY WHICH WOULD CONTINUE THE FIGHT. THIS LED TO THE
FORMATION OF THE SERB REPRESENTATIVE BODY GORSKI KOTAR IN
BELGRADE, IN MARCH 1992, BY INDIVIDUALS FROM GORSKI KOTAR
WHO WERE ORDERED TO RETURN FROM THE TERRAIN TO BELGRADE
BY THE DEFENCE STAFF GORSKI KOTAR (D.F.G..K.).
14. THE REPRESENTATIVE BODY OF THE SOCIAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (SFRY) IS COOPERATIVE, SUPPORTS AND HELPS US
WITHOUT INTERFERENCE – THEY HAVE OFFERED US AN OFFICE IN
THE FEDERATION BUILDING AND GIVEN TO US PROFESSIONAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL HELP.
14.A WE SUCCEEDED IN MAKING A “MEMORANDUM” - WHICH BECAME AN
OFFICIAL “UN” DOCUMENT – THAT WAS HANDED IN TO BHUTROS
GHALI –WE ACQUAINTED THE HOME AND WORLD PUBLIC WITH THE
FACT THAT WE EXIST. ALL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE
“DKP” (diplomatic-consular representative bodies) IN BELGRADE ARE
REGULARLY INFORMED ABOUT ALL THE PROBLEMS OF THE SERBS IN
GORSKI KOTAR AND WE ASK THEM TO INTERVENE AND HELP. IN THIS
WAY, WE SUCCEEDED IN STOPPING THREE MOBILIZATIONS AND
AFTER MANY INTERVENTIONS TO GET E.C. MONITORS ON OUR
TERRITORY.
14.B THE WORK OF THE REPRESENTATIVE BODY REDUCED THE TRAGEDY
WE HAVE GONE THROUGH, BUT IN REALITY WE ARE LOSING.
14.C WHY?
15. BECAUSE WE WERE MILITARILY BETRAYED.
15.A IF THE EQUIPMENT FOR FORMING BRIGADES HAD BEEN DELIVERED,
WE WOULD HAVE SURELY SUCCEEDED IN SECURING THE SITUATION
WE HAD SINCE JULY 1991. WITH A COMPLETELY EQUIPPED BRIGADE 297
WE WOULD STILL BE A RESPECTED FORCE, WHICH WOULD PARRY THE
CROATIAN PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING A COUNTRY. THIS WOULD
ENABLE US TO KEEP OUR INTEGRITY UP TO NOW WHEN THE
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN CROATIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
SERBIAN KRAJINA (R.S.K.) HAVE STARTED, SO THAT THEY WOULD
HAVE TO COUNT ON US.
15.B IN THIS WAY WE DO NOT FORM A PROBLEM FOR ANYONE – NOT FOR
YUGOSLAVIA, NOR FOR THE R.S.K., AND CROATIA IS PROVING ITS
“DEMOCRATIC NOTIONS” BY KEEPING US IN THIS FENCELESS CAMP.
15. THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST PART OF THE ABRIDGED AND SIMPLIFIED
STORY OF THE DEFENCE STAFF AND THE SERB REPRESENTATIVE
BODY GORSKI KOTAR – SINCE WE ARE NOT GIVING UP THAT EASILY –
THERE IS ANOTHER PART TO THIS STORY, WHICH STARTS WITH
CROATIA’S ATTACK ON THE R.S.K. IN JANUARY 1993, WITH THE
ATTACK AT MASLENICA.
16.A IN PART TWO WE EXPLAIN OUR COLLABORATION AND WORK WITH
THE “S.V. R.S.K.” AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE R.S.K. 298
A NNEX 146E:
D OCUMENT R EGARDING ESBS OF G ORSKI K OTAR
(PART II)
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
EXCLUSIVELY TO:
DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS OF THE GORSKI KOTAR and
REPRESENTATIVE BODY OF SERBS OF GORSKI KOTAR
WHAT WITH SERBS FROM GORSKI KOTAR
PART 2
Belgrade, 17 April 1994
INTRODUCTION
17) Since we could not form a brigade, due to the known reasons, because of what we were
prevented to operate in Gorski Kotar. The equipment and weapons which stay inć,iha
after two relocations (the Slunj military range and the airport Biha ć) we give to soldiers of
Krupa and Petrovac in April 1992 when in (ILLEGIBLE) the armed conflict began. We
keep only a part for the needs of diversionists, we return to Belgrade and give it over to the
Security Service, (ILLEGIBLE) Pančevo.
(...)
19b) 27 of us picked up the weaponry and equipment and went for Kordun. We arrived on
31 January 1993 and reported to the Commander of the 21st Kordun Corps, with whom we
officially co-operated from November 1991. We agreed that we should go to the most
critical position, so we met at the Slunj military range and settled in the objects of the
former Technical School. By the order of our Commander, Colonel Čedomir Bulat, and by
approval of General Staff of the SV RSK, we formed the 21st Demolition Unit of the
Kordun Corps on 10 March 1993.
(...)
We came with our own weapons and equipment, 90% of manpower is from Serbia and
Gorski Kotar, we used our own funds - we did not burden you financially at all, we were
formed, equipped, and trained by the Yugoslav Army and at the end, of all 57 combat
actions that we executed, 33 were executed on the territory of the Krajina by to the order of
the Commander of 21st “K.” Corps, ColoneČedomir Bulat and approval of the General
Staff of the SV RSK.
(...)
To the Representative Body
of the Serbs from Gorski Kotar:
DUŠAN ZLOKAS
To the Defence Headquarters of Gorski Kotar:
BOŽO RAJNOVIĆ 299
ANNEX 146F:
L ETTER OFF EDERAL SCRETARIAT FOR N ATIONAL DEFENCE
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
TO THE COMMAND OF THE 8 THOperations Group - for your information
ASSISTANT TO THE FEDERAL
SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
Stric. Con. 158-1
25. 2. 1992.
TO THE COMMAND OF THE 530 TH
REAR BASE BOSANSKI PETROVAC -
THE COMMANDER, COLONEL ŠKONDRIĆ
PROTECTING THE GORSKI KOTAR
NECESSARY MILITARY EQUIPMENT
HEADQUARTERS. -
According to the decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, highly
confidential, no. 1992, from 30 October 1992, the Gorski Kotar defence headquarters was
given a certain amount of necessary military equipment - (supplement no. 1). The
th
equipment was delivered to the rear base Bihać, and the Command of the Combat Air
Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence couldn’t transfer it by air to the rayon’s of the
detachments, because of objective reasons, so, during December 1991, it was dislocated to
dumps on the Slunj artillery range (approved by colonel Bulat). Necessary military
equipment is placed in a special building of the dump which is secured by a JNA unit.
ASSISTANT TO THE FEDERAL
SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE
General-Lieutenant-Colonel
Mr Vladan Šljivić, Graduate Engineer
(signature) 300
A NNEX 146G:
C RIMINAL CHARGE , 23 AGUST 1994
THE REPUBLIC OF THE SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
SECRETERIAT OF THE INTERIOR
SLUNJ PUBLIC SECURITY STATION
no. 08-03/1-2-1-K-50/94
Date: 23 August 1994
TO THE MUNICIPAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN VOJNIĆ
On the basis of the article 51, subsection 6 of the Law on Criminal Procedure
CRIMINAL CHARGE
is brought against
1. ARSENIJE VUČEVAC, called “Bućo”, son Velimir and Radmila (born Aksentijevic),
was born on 13 August 1970 in Nova Varoš, Nova Varoš municipality, the Republic of
Serbia. His permanent address is: Nova Varoš, Bistrica bb, Nova Varoš municipality.
He is a Serb, citizen of FRY, secondary education, a machine technician, he is not
married.
Due to reasonable doubt that he committeed a crminal offence of:
bringing false charges from the article 202, subsection 4 of the Criminal Law of the
Republic of the Serbian Krajina. 301
MILITARY PRESS302 303
ANNEX 147:
E XTRACTS FROM “N ARODNA A RMIJA ” (OFFICIAL JNA GAZETTE ), BELGRADE , 1990
23 August 1990
Public Announcement, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (SSNO)
THE ARMY HAS TO PREVENT A FRATRICIDAL WAR
The very conflict and for its possible consequences extremely dangerous situation
can be and must be overcome only by unconditional respect for the SFRY
Constitution, which means democratically, not by the models imposed by Ustasha,
Chetnik, and the other nationalistic and anti-Yugoslav’s forces
On the occasion of the latest developments in the Republic of Croatia, a number
of incorrect and tendentious information about JNA have been published.
Incorrect are the statements by the Croatian authorities, Franjo Tu đman and Stipe
Mesić, who said that the Air-force aircrafts had intercepted three helicopters of
the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and forced them to land on the Lu čko
Airport. The helicopter flew without a previously announced and approved route,
therefore, the flight control following the regulations forced them to return to the
staging airport.
It is a grossly insinuation and manipulation that the army was anyhow involved in
the ostensible scenario on the destabilisation of the situation in Croatia. Lying
claim to the army by some self-appointed nationalistic leaders, e.g. Jovan
Rašković and some alike him is also intolerable as well as manipulating with the
possible engagement of the army. The army firmly follows the politics of the
brotherhood and unity and its constitutionally determined function and
responsibility.
11 October 1990, P. 4-5, 15
THE ARMY EMBRACED THE PEOPLE
…According to the witnesses of the events, the crisis situation reached its
culmination in the moment when the special police began searching the weapons
seized from the public security station and perpetrators of that deed. They
searched the houses and arrested the people. They also used the other methods for
the investigational proceeding. The heaviest burden was borne by the residents of
one part of Petrinja with a Serbian majority. When the special police appeared,
afraid of the beatings and arrests the women, children, and elderly persons fled to
the nearby barracks “Vasilj Gaćeša” because they were afraid of being beaten and
arrested. Facing the non everyday situation, the members of the barracks
command tried to persuade the residents to go back home. All attempts and
promises for the security measures implementation by the municipal authorities
did not help to calm down the people. The feelings of panic and fear experienced
by the people were stronger than all promises; therefore, the barracks command
authorised by the superiors reached the decision on accepting and helping the
people regardless of the crisis situation scenario. 304
The fact that this truth has the various faces in our informative medias has been
proven again. However, the events in Petrinja have been interpreted in the various
ways. Some …
(Page 15)
CAPTURED ARMS
According to figures of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior, after examinations in
the stations of public security in Glina, Dvor na Uni, Petrinja and Obrovac, the
following amounts of arms were captured: 200 rifles and automatic rifles, 150
pistols of different calibre, 24 machine-guns and around 110,000 rounds of
ammunition.
It has been found that in the mine Modrino Selo, municipality Knin, 400 kg of
explosive was captured.
6 December 1990, P. 5-9
Federal Secretary for the National Defence, Field Marshall Veljko Kadijević
ALL ARMED FORMATIONS ESTABLISHED OUTSIDE UNIQUE AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFINED ARMED FORCES WILL BE DISARMED
Federal Secretary for the National Defence Field Marshall Veljko Kadijevi ć gave
an interview to military-political news analyst Miroslav Lazanski. We bring the
whole interview.
(…)
Territorial defence, as it was made by the end of the sixties and the beginning of
the seventies, is objectively a great fraud. Pleaders of such Territorial defence
justified their intervention by the need that the organisation of the armed forces
should be adapted to the requests of the political system of socialist self-
management.
Now that this system has been practically abandoned, they keep on insisting on
the former concept. With this it is undoubtedly confirmed that the Territorial
defence has been from the very beginning built up not as an expression of socialist
self-management, but as a base and skeleton of the Republics’ armies.
For combined form of clashes, which is dominant in our conditions, a completely
different Territorial defence is needed – as for its purpose, and for its size and
organisation. It should not be developed as a parallel, second army. 305
ANNEX 148:
EXTRACTS FROM “NARODNA A RMIJA ” (OFFICIAL JNA GAZETTE ), BLGRADE
JANUARY -JUNE 1991
26 January 1991 (Special Issue)
THE TRUTH ABOUT ARMING OF THE
TERRORIST FORMATIONS IN CROATIA
THE DEFENCE MINISTER, MARTIN ŠPEGELJ:
I said: Listen to me Commander. First, your entire Command will be defeated, no
one will survive, no family, we will spare no one. Give up all illusions on rising
alarm...
28 February 1991
THE TRUTH ABOUT ARMING OF THE HDZ
(THE CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION)
TERRORIST FORMATIONS IN CROATIA
7 March 1991
THE NATION PROTECTED FROM VIOLENCE
On Saturday, 2 March, the Pakrac tragedy began early in the morning. At 6.00
am, from the direction of Zagreb and Bjelovar, hundreds of members of the
Croatian Ministry of the Interior (MUP) special units, aka special police, got into
Pakrac by busses and combat police vehicles. According to a precisely developed
scenario, in no time they got into the municipal station of the Secretary of the
Interior, the Executive Council house, the Municipal Assembly house, the
Orthodox Church, and many other dominating objects in the centre of the town.
According to the witnesses after that they broke into the apartments, arrested the
civilians, searched and asked for the residents’ papers, beat them without previous
warnings.
PEOPLE GAVE THE JNA UNITS A BIG HAND
In the most dramatic situation and on the proposal of the Federal National
Defence Secretariat and approval of the SFRY Presidency President, at 8.45 am,
the armoured transporters from Rajko Kova čević’s unit of the Bjelovar garrison
led by Rajko Kova čević’s deputy Lieutenant Colonel Milan Čeleketić appeared
on the streets of Pakrac. Another military armoured combat vehicles convoys kept
coming into the town and at the accesses to the town. When they appeared in the
town the groups of people who already began gathering filled the town with
applause. These groups of people enlarged every minute. The people expressed
their happiness and felt secured because the army had arrived.
When the JNA units appeared, the special police retreated to the buildings in the
center of the town, the Orthodox Church, and on the Calvary, hill on the
northwest of the town. Some of them stayed at the gates, buildings entrances. In
the meantime, the armoured-mechanized units’ vehicles, reconnaissance and
police units, and garrisons with full combat gear took positions at the crossroads,
the access roads to Pakrac, in the center of the town where was the core of the
MUP special police, around the region hospital and the other strategic objects. 306
The members of the army showing determination and dignity, acting
professionally and consistently made a kind of security zone between the MUP
members and defenseless people. It was a guarantee that bloodshed would not
occur and that the authorised constitutional institutes would carry out their duties,
bring the order, and secure the lives and properties of the residents.
-It was the most important task for the engaged units, small formations from the
garrisons in Bjelovar, Koprivnica, Virovitica and Zagreb-Lieutenant Colonel
th
General Dobrašin Praš čević, the Chief-of-Staff of the 5 Military Region
headquarters, said. –So, we came to prevent a breakout of interethnic conflict, to
show the people that they will not be left at the mercy of the specialists, and to
show them our determination to prevent savagery and bloodshed.
The soldiers and officers from that task force behaved seriously. The
Commanders, Omiljen Stanić, Đoko Vasiljević, Miljko Vasić…
PROTECTION FOR EVERYONE
Tomorrow, on Sunday, a Commission composed of the members of the Federal
Secretariat of the Interior, the Croatian MUP, and the 5 tMilitary Region came to
the scene. The investigation results we could not get at the scene place. Firings
and other provocations stopped, and began the realisation of the SFRY Presidency
conclusions on easing tensions and bringing the situation in Pakrac to its previous
form before the incidents. The unfavourable developments during 4 March
showed that it all went on slower and harder then anticipated, therefore, the Vice
President and two members of the SFRY Presidency interfered. The interethnic
trust, order and peace, and security of the people are so dramatically shaken and
tightened that it will take a lot of wisdom, patience, tolerations, mutual
understanding, confidence, and above all determination to ease tensions.
The army remains in Pakrac to provide the conditions for the normal work of
proper authorities according to the SFRY conclusions and to guarantee the
security and protection of all local residents who want peace and freedom in this
tame town at the foot of Papuk in their own country-Yugoslavia.
M. Pantelić
M. Marjanović
M. Božić
4 April 1991
JNA units at the Plitvice Lakes
THE ARMY BRINGS BACK PEACE
The Plitvice Lakes seem very gloomy. The chaos on the roads and crossroads
reminds of TV reports from battlefields. The members of the Army are present
there. They are resolute to prevent any further bloodshed and to consistently
realise the resolution of the Presidency of the SFRY on complete and
unconditional ceasefire and the respect of it. The armoured vehicles with
machine-guns barrels protruding out of it and the solemn-faced soldiers guarantee
that the conflict will not repeat. 307
We went to the Headquarters of Major General Ivan Štimac, the officer
responsible for the co-ordination of all operations that take place between the
th
members of the 5 Miliatry Region and the parties in conflict.
9 May 1991, p. 5
COMBAT ALERT OF THE JNA IS TO BE HEIGHTENED
In the evening of 6 May, the Federal Secretary for the National Defence, General
of the Army Veljko Kadijević, …., concerning the condition in the state informed
President of the SFRY Presidency Borisav Jović about the following:
- Because the SFRY Presidency and other federal bodies had not taken into
consideration the evaluations and suggestions in regard to the conditions in the
country presented by the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (the Supreme
Command headquarters), the Yugoslav society has already entered a civil war.
- The way in which the Yugoslav People’s Army had been used for the
prevention of interethnic conflicts can no longer be efficacious.
- Every attack against the JNA units and objects, which have already been
mounted and the first victims have fell, will be returned according to the combat
regulations, which also include fire. The Supreme Command headquarters will
not allow the Yugoslav People’s Army to suffer the extreme behaviour of the
parties in conflict.
- Since the Constitutional responsibility of the armed forces is to secure the state,
the Supreme Command headquarters demands from all federal and republican
bodies that could influence the condition in the state to secure peace and normal
conditions for overcoming the Yugoslav crisis.
- The Supreme Command headquarters has ordered the increase of the combat
alert of the Yugoslav People’s Army and mobilization of the specific units, so
the JNA can provide peace according to its constitutional role, and
responsibility in the case that federal and republics bodies fail to do so.
It has been demanded that all federal and republican bodies be informed about the
presented viewpoints. 308
A NNEX 149:
EXTRACTS FROM “N ARODNA A RMIJA ” (OFFICIAL JNA GAZETTE ), BLGRADE ,
J ULY-A UGUST 1991
6 July 1991, P. 3
IMPOSING A WAR
...The JNA units engaged along the border by the Conclusions of the Yugoslav
Federal Assembly Council (25 June) and Decisions of the Federal Executive
Council (26 June) have been called into action to protect the integrity of the state
and make the conditions for re-establishing the shaken control on the SFRY
border according to the Constitution and Federal Laws. Their task was, in the
military term, to occupy 137 points along the SFRY border in the territory of
“disunited” Slovenia and make conditions for the Federal Secretariat of the
Interior and Federal Custom Office members to perform their legal functions on
the international border crossings. In the first 24 hours the JNA units managed to
occupy 133 out of 137 points. In that way, they have practically fulfilled their
task. During the actions, the units faced some obstacles and ambushes as well as
resistance of the Slovenian armed task forces, but they managed to reach the
planned targets with the minimal losses...
6 July 1991, P. 4
NEW APPOINTMENTS
TH
THE COMMANDER OF THE 5 MILITARY REGION
rd
The former Commander of 3 Military Region, Lieutentht General Života
Avramović, has been appointed the Commander of 5 Military Region.
Lieutenant General Života Avramović was born on 30 August 1934 in the village
of Kotešica, Valjevo municipality. During the war, he completed elementary
school in his birthplace, and grammar school in Valjevo, where he became a
member of the National Youth. As a member of the National Youth, he took part
in the various organised working actions. So, during the action of Brotherhood
Unity Highway construction, he enrolled in the Tank Military College in Banja
Luka. He completed the highest military schools in the JNA. He was promoted to
the rank of lieutenant general on 22 December 1989.
Lieutenant General Života Avramovi ć performed a series of responsible duties.
He was the Commander of Tank Division, the Head of General Tactics Program
of the Land Forces Commanding-headquarters acrdemy, the Chief of Staff of the
First Army command, the Commander of the 3 Military Region, and now, the
Commander of the 5 Military Region.
Lieutenant General Života Avramović has received the highest official marks for
his performance of the above-mentioned duties.
THE COMMANDER OF THE COMBAT AIR FORCE AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT
DEFENCE
On 14 June, the former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Combat Air Force and Anti-
aircraft Defence headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel General Zvonko Jurjevi ć has
been appointed the Commander of Combat Air Force and Anti-aircraft Defence. 309
Lieutenant Colonel General Zvonko Jurjevi ć was born on 1 march 1934 in
Slavonski Brod. He completed the Piloting School in 1954. In his rich military
career, he performed many duties. He was a pilot, a flight trainer, the Commander
of department, squadron, the Commander of the Air Force Regiment, the Chief of
Staff of Air Force Corps headquarters, the Commander of the Combat Air Force
and Anti-aircraft Defence Corps, the Commander of the Air Force Military
Academy, the Chief of Stuff of headquarters in the Command of Combat Air
Force and Anti-aircraft Defence.
General Zvonko Jurjević completed the highest military schools in the JNA, and
he is a holder of the Golden Flight Insignia.
All the above-mentioned duties Lieutenant Colonel General Zvonko Jurjevi ć has
performed with the highest efficiency, for which he received the highest official
marks. *
COLONEL LJUBOMIR BAJIĆ
THE COMMANDER OF THE 5 TH CORPS
The former Chief of Staff of the 5 thCombat Air Force and Anti-aircraft Defence
Corps, Colonel-pilot Ljubomir Baji ć, has been appointed the Commander of the
named Corps. Colonel Ljubomir Baji ć was born on 24 August 1939 in Banja
Luka. He completed the Air Force Military Academy in 1964, as an honour
graduate of his class. With a great success, he performed the duties as a pilot,
flight trainer. He was the Commander of department, squadron, the Commander
of fighter aviation regiment, the Head of department for the Anti-aircraft Defence,
as well as the Chief of Staff of Combat Air Force and Anti-aircraft Defence
Corps.
He is a holder of the Golden Flight Insignia and a numerous high military
decorations. He has received the highest official marks for his performance of the
above-mentioned duties.
6 July 1991, P. 6
th
From a press conference held in the Command of the 5 Military Region
EVERYTHING YUGOSLAVIAN IS ATTACKED
...On our insisting on publishing the figures about the national members
composition of the JNA in Croatia and Slovenia, Colonel Đuro Vrandečić stated
that the officer personnel in the 5Military Region is composed of 57 percent of
Serbs, 12 percent of Croats, 6 percent of Slovenians, 5 percent of Montenegrins, 4
percent of Yugoslavians, and 16 percent of members of the other nationalities. It
has been reported that the figures about the national composition of the soldiers
are not constant because of the regular reinforcements that take place every two
months. In the recent time, that composition has also been influenced by the
decisions of the republics to complicate or avoid the recruitment of soldiers into
the JNA...
6 July 1991, P. 42
Mobilization of the Titograd Corps Units
WILL SHALL DEFEND THE UNIFIED YUGOSLAVIA 310
Conscripts ready and determined to keep up the fight against the rebels and
traitors, the breakers and disintegrators, in order to defend the country whose
foundations were built on great victims
(…)
A large number of conscripts responded to the mobilization call in one part of the
Titograd Corps. There are also many volunteers.
(…)
th
Most volunteers are in the unit that is continuing the tradition of the 5 Proletarian
Montenegrin Brigade, under the command of senior officer Sima Kri čak. All
collectives took the tasks and obligations seriously and executed them
conscientiously. The conscripts are aware of the situation the country was in and
the necessity to defend Yugoslavia from renegades and traitors, breakers and
disintegrators, who do not chose their means and ways to persist in their dark
intentions and fulfil their separation aims.
(…)
From the Priština corps
DETERMINATION TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY
With the conducted additional mobilisation the war units of the Priština Corps
were a 100% full * Many cases of patriotism and determination to use all forces
and means to defend Yugoslavia were noticed
The newest development of the events in the country and the scruples resistance
of the Slovene authorities and the Republic SUP (Secretariat of the Interior) and
the units of the Territorial Defence to the “JNA” Units which were executing the
decisions of the Assembly of the SFRY and Federal Executive Council, during
which a large number of members of the Army were wounded and killed, has
forced the Supreme Command Headquarters to additionally mobilise several war
units of the armed forces.
According to that decision the Priština Corps war Units were mobilised, as soon
as the height grade of combat readiness of the Army in that area was secured.
13 July 1991, pp. 20-21
At the positions of the Armoured Mechanized
Units in Srijem
BETRAYAL OPENED OUR EYES
“Events which took place in Slovenia resulted in completely opposite effect from
that wished for by the betrayers of Yugoslavia. It shook us all up, our famous
“obstinacy” came to life, fighting moral increased, real patriots proved themselves
once again”, says colonel Milorad Vučić
For the last ten days or so, at the so-called administrative borders of Croatia and
Serbia, in Srijem, Armoured Mechanized Units of the JNA are stationed with a
purpose to prevent fratricidal war and protect the border-lines of Yugoslavia, but 311
also to join the fight against para-military formations which are in increase in that
area.
These units were reinforced and widen by reservists. On this occasion they
responded to the call of military authorities in a number that exceeded the
necessary quota. Therefore, all rumors about their, alleged, weak response, went
to the dogs.
These people, after the events in Slovenia, lived for the movement of units. When
we left with entire technology and formed a column, they were thrilled. Betrayal
in Slovenia resulted in completely opposite effect from that wished for by the
betrayers of Yugoslavia. It shook us all up. Our famous “obstinacy” came to life,
fighting moral increased, real patriots proved themselves once again - says the
commander of the armoured mechanized unit from Sremska Mitrovica, colonel
Milorad Vučić.
(…)
Stationed, in the area surrounding Sid, is a mixed unit under the command of
colonel Božidar Lunov, who, with his attitude and authority, unmistakably shows
that he has a complete control over the situation.
When we set off for our positions, we caught a encoded message: “Lion one -
Lion two - The sheep are coming”. We’ll see who will turn out to be a sheep and
who a lion.
13 July 1991, p. 15
With the defenders of the “25. Maj” bridge
MEMBERS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (MUP)
DAILY PROVOKE SOLDIERS
The events that took place, lasting only for 10 minutes or so, in the night between
8 and 9 July, in the area just before the bridge that connects Bačka Palanka and
Ilok, warn all those, who, so far, have attacked or plan to attack the members of
the JNA again, that it is time for them to understand that officers and soldiers
can’t, because everything they went through in Slovenia, respond with “peaceful
and dignified attitude” to armed attacks and cruel provocations.
(…)
Commander of the Novi Sad Corps, General-Major Mladen Brati ć, known as an
energetic senior officer decisively denies such statements. Soldiers from the
regular composition were the only ones who responded to the fire of the MUP
members. Commander of the composition thinks that the members of the unit that
secures the “25. Maj” bridge were patient and tolerant enough during the last two
months.
So far we heard some of the extremists announcing that they would knock the
bridge down and in that way prevent us from executing the task of preventing
international conflicts. That’s the reason why both sides of bridges between
Vojvodina and Croatia are under our control. These bridges are in Batina,
Bogojevo, and the one between Ba čka Palanka and Ilok. So far we haven’t had
some particular problems in Batina and Bogojevo, but the situation in Ilok is 312
completely different. The members of the MUP of Croatia for the last two months
almost daily provoke our soldiers. They threaten to kill them, and by saying that
they have thousands of armed civilians who will blow the bridge and the JNA
members up. The major contributor to such situation is the commander of the Ilok
police station, Jozo Puškarić (introduces himself as Dragan).
(…)
13 July 1991, p. 44
Together with the members of the Titogradski Corps at their position
THE DEFENCE OF FATHERLAND IS A HOLY DUTY
(…)
The increase in combat readiness of the units of the Titogradski Corps was
conducted gradually and in an organised way. The compositions have been
reinforced in number and combat performances with reservists, people with
different qualifications and educational background, but the majority of them are
workers. When talking to them the same mood prevails, and the same words are
uttered. These people show determination, strength, and will to defend homeland
and not to give anyone not even the smallest piece of the country where nations
which want to live together in Yugoslavia are.
Freedom-loving traditions of the Montenegro people, heroic spirit of ancestors to
defend honour and reputation, and the most important, place of their birth, inspire
conscript soldiers, reservists. A lot of them responded to mobilization without
being called-up.
However, there were also those who wavered and left units, which resulted in
revolt and contempt of others.
17 July 1991, p. 10
In colonel Drago Romić’s unit
ONE AND ALL FOR FATHERLAND
Complete response of conscript soldiers Failure of party and enemy
propagandaThe example of the president of the Subotica
municipalityPsychophysical readiness and experience of men and functional
technology guarantee execution of all tasks
Prevention of international conflicts in Slavonia and insuring border line on the
north of Bačka and Baranja is the primary task of the unit under the command of
colonel Drago Romić which, year after year, is one of the JNA top units because
of its combat readiness. Recently, the unit is deployed in a wide area of Baranja
and Ba čka - in Beli Manastir, Vinkovci, on the bridge between Bezdan and
Batina, in Subotica and Ba čka Topola, totally ready for the execution of all,
including war tasks.
(…)
20 July 1991, p. 23
JNA units in a peace mission 313
MILITARY BRIDGES KEEP EXISTING
Serbian and Hungarian people in Baranja welcomed combined armoured-
mechanized unit under the command of lieutenant-colonel Stojan Mladenovi ć
with joy.
From the unit under the command of colonel Drago Romić, a combined unit under
the command of lieutenant-colonel Stojan Mladenović was formed with a purpose
to protect the bridge over the Danube river between Bezdan and Batina and area
between the Danube and Drava river and Hungarian border-line. Situation in
Baranja, according to lieutenant-colonel Mladenovi ć, is different from the one in
other parts of Slavonia. Serbs are majority, there is approximately 70% of them,
and there is less provocation of the army and less persecutions of Serbs from these
areas. In that area the army can rely on inhabitants with 100% confidence, which
is proved by the variety of cooperation that was established in spite of the
complicated circumstances. Inhabitants of Darda, Beli Manastir, Jagodnjak and
other nearby villages, daily come to visit units and supply them with almost all
necessities.
And the units of that composition are completely full with men and they are in
possession of powerful armoured and mechanized technology and armament.
Waiting for the concrete measures and tasks while being at the positions,
according to the commander, are a sort of a preparation and testing of
psychophysical and military-expert capability to execute the tasks to come.
(…)
31 July 1991
FIRST WAR EXPERIENCE
Members of the JNA returned heavy fire after the artillery attack of the Ustasha
forces from the area of Erdut – No casualties in the Army – Great support of the
inhabitants of Bačka to the soldiers – Conscript soldiers from Pan čevo realised
their role and the gravity of the situation
In the night between 24 and 25 July, in the area of Erdut, the members of the
MUP and the so-called National Guard Corps and the armed civilians opened fire
from infantry weaponry and from mortars at the unit of the JNA, which is securing
the bridge “Bratstvo i jedistvo” over the Danube near Bogojevo. Members of the
JNA from the joint composition under the command of Colonel Enes Taso,
returned heavy fire. They had no casualties. They had no information about the
situation on the other side, and they were not interested in it.
That night, around 11.00pm, the Ustasha formations from the right side of the
Danube started firing rifle shots from infantry weaponry at the JNA posts on the
left riverbank. The soldiers did not react instantly. Sporadic firing continued until
1.40am, when the artillery fire culminated. Behind the military posts and beside
them, mortar shells started falling. Already since the first rifle shot by the enemy,
the unit was assigned to posts ready to return fire.
The order for opening fire at the Ustasha posts was issued at 2.00am. All units at
the posts carried out the order. At the same time, fire was opened from mortars,
artillery weapons, tanks, personnel carriers, anti-aircraft self-propelled guns, 314
multi-barrelled rocket launchers and from other weapons. The firing lasted for 20
minutes. The fire from the other side stopped soon, and after the order for
ceasefire was issued, the JNA did not fire one shot.
That night, the mortar unit of Captain Željko Naglić was at the post. He spent the
night, as many other nights before, at the observation posts. The first moment,
when the guards had informed him about the assault, he did not believe it, but
very soon, he convinced himself very soon. After the order for opening fire was
issued, he passed the order to Second Lieutenant Bor četa Nakev and to other
commanders at the firing post. They immediately opened fire at the targets
determined few days before, which could be seen from the observation post at
night. The rain, that was falling the whole night, could not interfere with the
execution of the firing task, in which the mortar unit of Private First Class Žarko
Stojanović, and his soldiers Asmir Osmi čević and Robert Hajduk, stood out. The
first minutes, the soldiers were naturally a little bit frightened, because it was their
first combat experience, which is rather different from the “baptism of fire” at the
beginning of the regular military training. Already ten minutes later, they were
skilfully performing their job. The part of the unit that was assigned in the rear,
and the superior officers, Lieutenant Colonel Mirko Bro ćeta and Major Gustav
Valenček, who did not participate in the combat, could see only flashes in the sky.
SEVERE ANSWER TO THE PROVOCATIONS
Near the mortar unit, more close to the bridge, there was the unit of Sergeant First
Class Zvonko Boškovi ć, with double-barrelled self-propelling guns. They were
also ready to open fire. As soon as the order arrived, they did so. In short time,
they fired many shells. Since they fired at previously determined and visible
targets, the result was extremely successful. The mortar missiles fired by the
enemy did not once directly hit their posts. Private Goran Arsi ć from Surdulica
did not try to conceal the fact that it was very difficult that night, but he did not
falter. With the support of the Commander, the entire unit overcame the fear. To
private Dragan Nikoli ć from the area of Petrovac na Mlavi, this combat was a
lesson to respect more his life and the life of his comrades, with whom he
performed this task, so that all efforts were not a problem to him.
The tank unit of Second Lieutenant Mišo Grbi ć also participated in the combat.
Their fire was also heavy. The targets they aimed at did not reappear. The next
day, a body of delegates from Prigrevica came to the unit, a settlement near
Apatin, from the wood plant “Dunav”-Apatin. At the head of the body were the
manager Dušan Novaković and the president of the labour union Aljoša Baši ć. As
reward, they brought lunch for all members of the unit. But what they brought in
their hearts was much more important and valuable. It was, as they said, their
unreserved devotion and love towards the Yugoslav People’s Army. In that way,
they once more assured the soldiers that the people in that area would not let them
down, as the people in Slovenia and Croatia did. Manager Novakovi ć said on this
matter:
“We will support the JNA, because our ancestors commit us, who were colonised
in these areas as fighters and reminders. We are glad that we found the soldiers in
good spirit, although their heads were aimed at from the other side of the Danube.
Around fifteen workers came with us, and now we are returning in optimistic 315
mood and safe, and we want to say to the soldiers that we will be here when the
hard times come and when we will have to die with them.”
That night, multi-barrelled rocket launchers could be heard and many other
weapons that were at the disposal of the units that were protecting the bridge
“Bratstvo i jedinstvo”, the importance of which is obviously much different now.
VALUABLE EXPERIENCES
The unit of Colonel Taso came to the posts in Odžaci, Bogojevo and around the
bridge a month ago. Its task, as the task of all the other units in the area of the
Corps from Novi Sad, was already known. In the first line, it was the prevention
of multi-ethnic conflicts, which threatened to develop into war in the area of
Eastern Slavonia, as well as in other areas. Commander Taso said that he had
confidence in his unit and that he believed that it can perform any task
successfully. It is a armoured mechanized unit, reinforced with other units,
capable of performing every war task, and now, after the Ustasha assault, it is
allegedly morally stronger.
Most of the manpower was mobilised from the reserve. Half of it was from
Pančevo. Although they were mobilised over night, without any previous
preparation, they behaved like true soldiers until their first free weekend. The men
from Pan čevo were therefore the first who were sent home over weekend.
However, the more extreme members of the Serbian Restoration Movement and
the Democratic Party made use of it and organised the well-known rallies in
Pančevo, in front of the municipal building. The organisers could be recognised
by paroles, which dominated at those rallies, and by requests directed to the
authorised bodies.
Fortunately, the reservists soon realised their situation and who in fact
manipulates them, so they returned to their units. It was not only 5% of them,
which indicates that the reputation of the party anti-Yugoslav involvement in
military questions.
After the events in Slovenia, the present situation in Croatia and after the first
armed conflict, according to Lieutenant Colonel Milan Uzelac, the unit learned a
lesson, so that the mistakes would not appear again. In the beginning, the reserve
officers acted similar to the soldier conscripts, but when they saw that there was
nobody else who could perform their job, that the situation was getting more
serious and that ignorance would be punished, they got down to work. In order to
assure the soldiers that the weaponry was intact, they organised combat shootings,
while their assured themselves that the technical equipment was intact when they
marched from the garrison to their posts. After that, many paroles and requests of
the extremists that organised the rallies lost their importance. They were proven
the opposite: intact weaponry and technical equipment, ammunition, safe
commanding and other things.
After the conscript soldiers had gone home for weekend, the number of visits
decreased, and after the requests to the municipal authorities that for everybody
who has to be released from the unit a substitution had to be found and sent to the
unit, the number of requests for certificates and evaluations for a grant to leave
decreased, too. 316
After these events, most of them truly realised that the situation was getting
serious, and Commander Taso had confidence in his men with reason.
31 July 1991, p. 14
Celebration of the 50 anniversary of insurrection in Srb
RESISTANCE TO THE VIOLENCE
The celebration of the 50 thanniversary of the insurrection in Srb began with
putting wreaths under the monument which, being placed on the Subotin hill,
dominates in the insurrection Srb.
National convention was opened by the retired general-major, Danilo Žeželj, the
president of the Committee for the celebration of jubilee of the insurrection of
Serbs in Croatia against the Ustaša terror.
After the national anthem - “Hej Sloveni”- had been struck up, national hero,
retired general-colonel Đoko Jovanić, the organiser and leader of the insurrection
in Serb, spoke. Speaking to the gathered people, he said that “not even one
Serbian soul would existed today in this area if there hadn’t been insurrection in
Srb and Lika, as well as in other parts of Croatia”. After that, bringing back from
memory hard and glory insurrection days in 1941, he said:
“On today’s day, 50 years ago, it was warm and sunny Sunday. We, who were
fighters at the time, young as dew, and lush as flame, freed, on that day, the
Serbian municipality and on Serbian klanac, near Kaldrma and Tiskovac, on
Dabina strana, in cooperation with the Krajina fighters, hold tight our military
guns, old pistols, “duplice”, axes, pitch-forks, and plain poles, and waited for the
beasts in human form, Ustashas and fascists, ready and determined - and the stake
was our life - not to let them pass over to the free territory and slaughter and kill
innocent people, women, children, and the old. The events showed quickly
enough that nation which fights for the true cause - its freedom and existence and
better and more righteous society - is invincible and indestructible.”
General Jovanić asked from the gathered people to form the 6 thLička division
once again and “finally complete the job that they had started - freeing from the
vampired Ustaša movement.”
(…)
7 August 1991, p. 4
The chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
of the SFRY in Srijemska Mitrovica
REASONS FOR SATISFACTION
The visit paid to the powerful armoured mechanized guard brigade which is under
the command of the colonel, Milorad Vu čić, was full of direct and spontaneous
encounters of general Blagoje Adži ć and Aleksandar Spirkovski with soldiers,
senior officers, and members of the reserve unit, and showed their readiness and
determination to execute all fight tasks.
Your guard mechanized brigade is a powerful unit, with a great fire power, well
trained, and, what is most important, it is trained to execute all tasks, and, if 317
necessary, even on the battlefield - the chief of the General staff of the Armed
forces of the SFRY, general-colonel, Blagoje Adžić said after he had left Sremska
Mitrovica, where he visited units of the First Military Region.
Soldiers and members of the reservists’ part of the unit, under the command of
colonel Milorad Vučić, showed their skills in executing some of military tasks and
handling complex military technology.
(…)
7 August 1991, p. 5
Comments on the Conclusions by the Croatian Parliament
TERROR UPON THE TRUTH
…According to the personal estimate that “the Croatian nation and all other
Croatian citizens should strongly resist the Great Serbian Chetnik outlaw and
occupation of the Yugoslav People’s Army” – the Parliament called all Croatian
citizens to join with all means and might the fight against JNA, which supported
by the “terrorist rebel formations” takes direct or indirect part in the allege
aggression against Croatia…
….Presenting itself as a spokesman for the entire Croatian nation, the Parliament
“demands that JNA immediately retreats to the barracks and that in an appropriate
time, during the process of separation, retreats from the territory of the Republic
of Croatia”. They condemned the army for violating the constitutional system
(what an irony after everything that the Croatian authorities have committed
against the SFRY Constitution!) and claimed that “some JNA senior officers have
not given up adventurous plans on the attack against Croatia” and that “the
Croatian citizens see the Yugoslav People’s Army as an occupying force”...
Ivan Matović
7 AUGUST 1991, p. 7
Some moves of those (un) authorised in the Socialist Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SR BIH)
IN FAVOUR OF THEIR OWN DETRIMENT
The Presidency of the SR BIH and Ministry for national defence of that republic,
on more and more occasions, makes strange conclusions, recommendation and
announcements, which, to say at least, makes many citizens hesitate.
Let us start with a fact that the Presidency of the SR BIH, at the conference held
on 31 July, once again - for the fourth time- postponed the department of the July
party of recruits intended to serve their time in army in the JNA units placed
outside the territory of the BIH. It postponed it for seven more days, that is, until
09 August of this year, waiting for something of a crucial importance to happen
and change the situation.
Ministry for national defence of the SR BIH, on 03 August, announced, besides
other things, that in the past two days some commanders of the combat units of
the JNA behave arbitrarily - mobilize, allegedly, avoiding prescribed procedure
and without the order coming from the superior bodies. Such situation, according 318
to the announcement of the BIH Ministry for national defence, is especially
present in the JNA unit which is being formed in Han-Pijesak, and is made of
conscript soldiers from the territory of more municipalities of the north-eastern
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Such conclusions and announcements provoke in many, or to say majority of the
BIH citizens, especially in conscript soldiers, astonishment, distrust, and lack of
understanding.
Moreover, because of the fact that, it is known, that the mobilization of the unit in
Han-Pijesak was carried out completely legally. The procedure of call-ups
through mediation of authorised bodies, that is, municipal secretariats for national
defence, wasn’t, whatsoever, violated. On the contrary, illegal are the actions in
which Ministry for national defence of the SR BIH participated together with
some bodies in preventing undisturbed carrying out of mobilization
7 August 1991, p. 11
Down the Danube from Dalj to Ilok on ships
of the River Combat Flotilla
Echoes of some other song
Two months ago even the River Combat Flotilla was, with part of its force,
engaged at the glowing area between Slavonia and Vojvodina. Its task was to
secure crossings and bridges and secure inland navigation down the Danube from
Bezdan to Ilok and to support joint formations that are preventing, in this part of
our country, international clashes and secure vital facilities.
We visited sailors on the Danube at the beginning of August, a day after the
severe bloodshed in Dalj, Borovo Selo and opening fire at the members of the
JNA. That is, the morning before, the JNA units were attacked at the mentioned
area, but this time they fiercely answered the fire. It was not the first time the
members of the River Combat Flotilla had to defend their lives and military
equipment with weapons and against terrible attacks of the unrestrained Croatian
soldiers. They are ready to do this in future in any moment.
10 August 1991, p. 11
YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE SPOT
Units from Vrhnika in the new garrison
WARM WELCOME IN BANJA LUKA
Banjaluka’s garrison readily welcomed first units from Vrhnika ∗ People of
Bosnia didn’t hide their enthusiasm because they are a balm on a wound for
members of the Yugoslav People’s Army after passing through Slovenia and
Croatia ∗ There are problems regarding changing residence of families
The decision of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
about shifting units of the Yugoslav People’s Army from the Republic of Slovenia
has already been carried out. The unit from Vrhnika that is commanded by
lieutenant-colonel Miodrag Jovanović started evacuating people and technology.
One part of that unit arrived in the new garrison in Banjaluka ten days ago. It is 319
the armoured unit commanded by lieutenant-colonel Živan Popovi ć and many of
its superiors know Banja Luka from school or early days of service. However, it is
a poor comfort for many big problems that quickly developed, especially those
connected to families of military personnel, flats and schooling of children.
…
The armoured unit that arrived was placed in the “Krajina brigade” Barracks in
Zalužani, where the Instructional Centre for training drivers of armoured vehicles
is…
…
Mladen Marjanović
14 August 1991, p. 13
Political games concerning reservists and recruits
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH)
SERVICE IN ARMY ONLY IN BIH AND MACEDONIA
Authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be aware of the fact that they are
responsible for everything done in spreading anti-army mood, as well as for the
consequences which might affect combat readiness of the JNA units, and in that
way the whole security of Yugoslavia.
More than a month passed since the mobilization, which is mainly brought to end,
of some units of the Sarajevski Corps began. Never before, as today, there weren’t
problems with the respond of reservists. The best example is Dragomir
Milošević’s unit which is being formed in Han-Pijesak and is made of men from
the territories of the municipalities of Sokolac, Vlasenica, Rogatica, Han-Pijesak,
Sarajevo …
(…)
It is obvious that some bodies of national defence, working as ordered by the
Ministry of national defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did everything to make
mobilization as hard as possible. With their announcements and recommendations
they openly spoke out against mobilization, and because, allegedly, no approval
from the republic bodies and party leaders wasn’t asked for. It is know that such
method is not written down in federal regulations, and that the mobilization of the
JNA units is carried out in keeping with federal laws and regulations.
We tried to hear the opinion of the opposite side, first of all of the Minstar for
national defence of the Socialist Republic BIH, Jerko Đoko. But unfortunately the
minister is, allegedly, on vacation, and no one else is authorised to make public
statements. Except through announcements. And the announcements made by the
BIH Ministry for national defence, at least, confuse conscript soldiers, that is,
reservists.
The same is with recruits. Because many of young men form our central republic,
who are to start serving their time in army any of these days now - are not sure as
how to behave. Because after four postponements, the Presidency of the SR BIH
decided that the departure of the July party of recruits planed to serve their time in
army, should be carried out as instructed, but only to the territories of Bosnia and 320
Herzegovina and Macedonia. Therefore, young men from Bosnia and
Herzegovina won’t go to the barracks of the JNA located on the territories of
Croatia, Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro.
To what extent is the Presidency of the SR BIH aware that by reaching such a
decision it commits a criminal offence?
(…)
22 August 1991, p. 6-7
About the decision to prolong the military service of the “September conscripts”
SUPPORT AND TRUST IN THE ARMY
With the decision to keep the September generation of conscripts in the JNA an
additional twenty days due to the exceptionally complex situation in the country
and the need to maintain a certain level of combat readiness of the Army, the
editorial board of the Narodna armija has with the help of its reporters conducted
a poll in order to hear the reaction of a variety of people to this decision. The poll
was conducted according to a random sample.
“September” Conscripts: The Decision Necessary And Expected”
Among the conscripts to who are directly affected by this decision we came upon
different disapproval. However the general opinion of the majority is, in
accordance with the political situation in the country, that this was a necessary and
just move.
(…)
22 August 1991, p. 13
In eastern Slavonia and Baranja: Disarmament or war
Middle of the month was proclaimed by Croatian leaders, as it is well known, as
the day of the general attack of the JNA at Croatia. Nothing like that, of course,
never happened, nor did any reasonable man turned to work and the future,
believed in that in any moment. The people, where they could, tried to pick up as
much as they could the record quantity of wheat, and the members of the joint
formation, under the command of Colonel Enes Taso, who have been here a
month and a half to prevent a bloodshed and wider international clashes, had one
of the peaceful days during their stay in the area between the villages of Bogojevo
and Bijelo Brdo.
(…)
In Erdut also, the village from that side of the Danube, in which you enter as soon
as you pass the bridge “Bratstvo i Jedinstvo” from Bogojevo, was much more
tolerable than in the days in the beginning of July. Commander of this part of a
th
unit is Lieutenant Colonel Mirko Broćeta. To his men this day, 16 August, as the
days after the decision on cease fire, was a day when they could breathe more
easily. And in the village itself in which live about 1500 people (about 70 % of
them are Croats, the rest are Serbs),the life seems to come together since the
police, National Guard, armed and unarmed members of the HDZ left the village. 321
The wider public is probably familiar with the fact that Erdut was until recently
one of the most stronger outposts of the Croatian soldiers of all kinds and
uniforms and a centre for their specialising in all crimes and means against
Serbian people and the members of the JNA. However, it is unknown that in this
village one of the most monstrous and morbid plans should have been realised and
that the sick Ustasha mind could ever think about: anything that is alive, and
which is Serbian, should be, in groups, positions and detailed lists, firstly
squeezed out the blood into little bottles and destroyed all traces about that. A
man, who should be trusted, collected the information about this brutality and
genocide disproportional to human race, at the very spot: he discovered the lists in
the rooms of the Local Community in Erdut, and a large quantity of the
hermetically closed bottles for the transportation of blood in several Croatian
houses. This “democracy” gives creeps even to a demon!
After this information, although I believe that it will be the same without them,
says Lieutenant Colonel Bu ćeta, Croatian soldiers are asking us not to release
them to their homes, and their wishes are confirmed by their parents in their
letters and personal contacts. They understood the leader’s “democracy” and “the
rightful fight for the historic borders of Croatia”.
18 September 1991, p. 11
Vukovar and Borovo Selo
STILL UNDER THE RAIN OF GRENADES
(…)
Residents of Borovo Selo consider that, with the support of the Combat Air Force
and the Antiaircraft Defence that on Sunday, 15 thSeptember, several times flew
over and shelled the positions of the Ustashe black legion, they will soon separate
Borovo Naselje and with this greatly contribute to the final liberation of Vukovar,
for which a decisive fight is being fought.
(…) 322
A NNEX 150:
EXTRACTS FROM “N ARODNA A RMIJA ” (OFFICIAL JNA GAZETTE ), BELGRADE ,
S EPTEMBER -D ECEMBER 1991
2 October 1991, P. 4
An Interview with Major-General Dragoljub Aran đelović, on the occasion of the
49thanniversary of the 1 Proletarian Division
AS ONCE UNDER THE UNFURLED WAR FLAG
* Comrade General, what is the situation like at the moment in western Srijem and
Eastern Slavonija, i.e. in the territory your unit is stationed in?
- The division carried out all assignments its superior command had ordered it to
and has trained the according free forces, which can accept new tasks. It has
cleared and has fortified itself the area between the Danube and Bosut. The
administrative bodies have also begun to for in that region. The people are
returning to their houses, which they had left during the combat actions. We are
using all powers at our disposal to secure them normal living and working
conditions: the telecommunications network has come into service in all villages,
and the local power network is currently in repair, and have to be ready for use in
two or three days. This will secure the conditions for continuing a normal life in
this territory. The command has also secured the bringing of the harvest and the
cultivation of the fields, and also tried to secure building material in order to
repair the destroyed houses.
(....)
*What was the moral of the men and will the reserve soldiers be replaced after 45
days of war?
- The statement of the official representative of the Serbian government on the
replacement of the reserve soldiers after 45 days caused us a big problem. I
consider this statement as well as this action an inappropriate action, because it
directly negatively influences the combat readiness of the unit. The thing is, that
the men of the units have overcome all the beginning weaknesses, which are
normal considering the radical change of their way of life and putting them into a
combat situation, when there is also a possibility of losing their lives, and after
they have gained some experience, we must send them back and have to accept
inexperienced men and go through all of this again. If it were not for this decision,
the unit would have much better results considering their combat formation, the
firing and attack force as well as the earlier mentioned experience. A special
problem exists in replacing and finding men for the armoured and mechanized
units, where a special and professional training is required. But we will have to
deal with this problem with a quick additional training of the new men.
2 October 1991, P. 7
YUGOSLAVIA
Announcement of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
THE LAST WARNING 323
The Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia issued in the night between September 30 thand October
st
1 1991 the following announcement:
To:
President of the Republic of Croatia
Government of the Republic of Croatia
Headquarters of the Croatian Army
The leadership and armed formations of the Republic of Croatia completely
ignore all agreements on the cease-fire made until now. Arranged truces are used
for concentration of forces and execution of attacks on military objects and units.
Barracks and other military objects are attacked with manifold stronger forces.
Instead of being cancelled, the blockade of military units gets stronger. Members
of the Army are being deprived of water and food what has to be secured,
according to international conventions, even to prisoners of war. It is, practically,
the case of some kind of genocide.
Many ruthless crimes were committed on members of the Yugoslav People’s
Army. National and world public know about some of them. Families of members
of the Yugoslav People’s Army are abused and in every possible way harassed
persecuted and destroyed. That can not be tolerated any more. That is why we
WARN YOU
1. For every attacked and captured object of the Yugoslav People’s Army – one
object of the vital importance to the Republic of Croatia will be destroyed
immediately.
2. For every garrison that is attacked and captured – vital objects of the town,
where the garrison is, will be destroyed. That is, at the same time, warning to
civilians to withdraw from those inhabited places in time.
As the military response to capturing several barracks and other military objects
after the last agreement on the cease-fire – we will take attack actions and
operations on one part of the Republic of Croatia.
If you want to avoid further bloodshed and destroying, let local authorities
IMMEDIATELY contact authorised commands of the Yugoslav People’s Army
due to making possible the completely safe pulling out of units with entire
technology and movable property, as well as family members of members of the
Army from imperilled garrisons. Observers of the international mission can be
engaged in that.
…
2 October 1991, P. 22
A MYTH ABOUT MITNICA BROKEN
Among the soldiers of mortar battery 120 mm
In cooperation with other artillery units, sremsko - mitrova čka mortar battery
fiercely responds these days to the provocations from the Ustashe outpost Mitnica
whose fall is soon expected 324
Numerous artillery weapons of middle and large caliber is used in the operation
for liberation of Vukovar in the last months. The members of the Territorial
defence from Sremska Mitrovica, who replaced the men from In đija on their
positions, serve in one of the mortar batteries of 120 mm caliber. During that
time, endlessly being at the mortar, the fired over 1 000 projectiles, fiercely
responding to all the Ustashe provocations.
(…)
5 October 1991, P. 3
YUGOSLAVIA
Dr. Branko Kosti ć made known decisions of the meeting of the Presidency of
Yugoslavia from October 3 1991
IMMEDIATE WAR DANGER CONDITIONS THE WORK
The Supreme Government Body stated that conditions for work are secured in the
way that it is stipulated in the Constitution of Yugoslavia in circumstances of
immediate war danger ∗ Presidency eliminates the possibility of blockade of its
work and it takes upon itself certain interference of the Assembly of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ∗ Deciding by the majority of votes of present
members of the Presidency ∗ Representative of Slovenia in the Presidency does
not have the right to command armed forces ∗ Work of the Staff of the Supreme
Command and Federal Secretary for the national defence so far has been
approved
rd
On October 3 , the meeting of the Presidency of Yugoslavia was held in Belgrade
and vice-premier Dr. Branko Kosti ć presided over it. Federal Secretary for the
national defence general of the army Veljko Kadijević, chief of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia general-
colonel Blagoje Adži ć and deputy Federal Secretary for the national defence
admiral Stane Brovet participated in the meeting.
The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as Dr. Kosti ć
announced, concluded that conditions are secured for that the Collective
Presidency works and operates as it was stipulated in the Constitution of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in circumstances of the immediate war
danger and in keeping with the decision of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia no. 36 from November 21 st1984, which hasn’t been
changed till this day.
Going over to conditions of the work during the immediate war danger – Dr.
Kostić continued, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
eliminates the possibility of blockade of its work and it takes upon itself certain
interference of the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that
can not meet. The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
made a decision about the work and the way of its work under conditions of
immediate war danger and the continuity of the work of the Presidency of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is secured by that decision. According
to that decision, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 325
decides by majority of votes of present members of the Presidency of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
…
…immediate danger of the general civil war. Dr. Kosti ć explained that dramatic
decision of the Presidency in the following way:
…
5. The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will not use
its military force to impose its will upon any nation in Yugoslavia. Every nation
could freely decide on its future on the ground of the application of the principle
of the self-determination, including the right to the separation.
…
5 October 1991, P., 5
General of the Army Veljko Kadijević:
NEO-NAZISM RULES IN CROATIA
…At this moment, the army does not want anything more but to establish control
in the crisis areas, to protect the Serbian people from expulsions and devastations
and to set free the JNA members and their families. The only way to do this is to
defeat the Ustasha forces…
9 October 1991, p. 11
JNA units at the combat positions in Baranja
DOWN THE LINE THAT CONNECTS AND SEPARATES
Batina and its bridge – as a facility of extreme strategic significance for both sides
in the clashes, is secured by the units of the JNA in cooperation with police and
territorial defence soldiers. On that relatively small area “units of almost all kinds
of army are stationed – here are infantry, artillery, connection, engineers,
armoured units, Combat Air Force and Antiaircraft Defence and River War
flotilla. In the formation of the units of the JNA are active soldiers, volunteers and
reserve soldiers of all nationalities from almost the entire Yugoslavia.
(…)
Captain Sead Dautović says that when entering Beli Manastir there were victims
on the side of the Ministry of the Interior when two of their vehicles were
destroyed, and also a number of them were killed in further clashes inside the
town, in which the initiators were the units of the Territorial defence of Beli
Manastir and on whose call responded the units of the JNA that were directed
there. In further actions in Darda and Bilje, the losses on the side of the Ministry
of Interior and the National Guard were much more numerous, while only one
Army tank was destroyed in which a soldier Janoš Farago was hurt, and who is
successfully cured and insisting that he should be directed back there. Major Đuro
Kljajić could tell us something more about that, states Dautć, and the most
significant event for him was one connected to the evacuation of the refugees
from the village Uglješa. 326
(…)
It is remembered here for good that the members of the JNA in Darda and Bilje
were met as liberators, with drinks, food and flowers.
(…)
The line of Serbian villages of Uglješ, Jagodnjak, Boban and Novo Nevesinje is
free thanks to the offensive and sacrificed action of the members of the Territorial
defence.
(…)
9 October 1991, P. 35
The operations for unblocking the Zadar barracks
THE STRONG ATTACKS OF THE ARMY
During the whole night, Zadar and its surrounding areas have been attacked with
artillery shells from the land and sea. That lethal cannon fire was heavily
accompanied by aircraft bombs and machine-gun bursts. The shots and explosions
were heard in Velebit and in whole Bukovica. The units of the Knin Corps
commanded by Major General Vladimir Vukovi ć did it all. They ran out of
patience and decided to settle accounts with the brutal enemy.
LET’S DEFEND YUGOSLAVIA
Thousands of the reservists from Serbia mostly from Šumadija arrived in the Knin
Corps that holds the widest front-line against Franjo Tuđman’s Ustashas.
These robust guys responded to the first call from the army and with a joy came to
replace much younger soldiers who have resisted the Ustashas’ assaults for two
months.
The fight for unblocking the military objects was so strong that the Ustashas
bandits were afraid to face. They were simply paralyzed. The army as usually took
care not to destroy the important objects in the town but only the Ustashas’ nests
which caused many deaths in the blockaded barracks.
19 October 1991
Among the members of the JNA near Vinkovci
NO PEACE IN MIRKOVCI
3 Guard’s Armoured Mechanized Brigade at posts around the village Mirkovci,
resisting constant provocations of the Ustasha artillery from Vinkovci
Daily infiltration of members of the MUP and National Guard’s Corps and
attempts to surprise members of the JNA in the rear
Extraordinary bravery of the reservists, with dishonourable exceptions
(…)
The most difficult thing to us was to talk to the members of the National Guard’s
Corps, with people who wanted nothing else but war. Therefore, we had to make
use of force, stressed Lieutenant Colonel Antoni ć. After a whole day’s march of 327
300 km, when we realised the situation on the terrain and all the crimes committed
by the Ustasha, it was not difficult to engage in the combat instantly. In only three
days, we liberated all villages between Sid and Mirkovci. The last 50 km we
passed in constant combat. Supported by the artillery from Vinkovci, the Ustashas
and the members of the MUP offered hard resistance in every village. We had
greatest difficulties in the village Ceri ći, which, although it was attacked with
heavy artillery, was liberated after three days of cleansing and battle for every
house.
(…)
2 November 1991
AN EXAMPLE OF LOYALTY AND COURAGE
(…)
The Croatian television (HTV) keeps emphasising that the armoured brigade was
a special unit, which was trained for a long time in the areas of Srem and
Slavonija.
(…)
However, already around 5.30 am, the first shell hit the post, and then a real
artillery and mortar fireworks lasted for four hours.
After they had estimated that much was already destroyed, the Croatian infantry
and tanks started an energetic attack. They informed me, said Major Delić, that
there were between 10 and 15 tanks and that they were approaching from three
directions. Two tanks managed to approach as close as 300 meters. Fortunately,
they were knocked out in last minute. Three further tanks were hit and destroyed,
while the remaining tanks were forced to withdraw.
(…)
9 November 1991
War path of the 3 Armoured Battalion
TRUST IN PEOPLE AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT
Reservists from Kraljevo, Čačak, Trstenik and Vrnjačka Banja fought hard battles
in the area of Srem and Slavonija in the last two months.
(…)
All started with the battle for Tovarnik. The battalion was given the task to attack
the village with one part of its forces.
(…)
After that, the unit was supposed to carry out o march and meet the JNA forces
near the village Orolik.
(…) 328
The battalion spent two days near the village Orolik. There, it was reinforced with
manpower and technical equipment and then moved on to occupy the area for the
defence of the villages Bogdanovci and Marinci.
(…)
13 November 1991
DESERTERS COMING BACK, TOO
(…)
The unit from Valjevo, under the command of Officer Jovan Vu čković, only in
the last month performed several responsible tasks. It secured the communication
line Tovarnik-Ilača and eliminated the enemy in those villages.
(…)
20 November 1991, p. 3
AFTER 86 DAYS OF EXHAUSTING FIGHTS VUKOVAR IS LIBERATED
Vukovar is liberated. After 86 days and that many nights of struggling with the
Croatian police, the so-called National guard, black-shirt legia formed mostly
from the offspring’s of the Ustashe from western Herzegovina remembered by the
greatest crimes, but also from the “Dogs of war” coming from all around the
world, who here healed their complexes and earned money for crime, bloodthirsty
and raged with human blood.
By declaring Vukovar “Croatian Stalingrad”, official Croatia refused to give up
the town, stop its devastation and misery of the people, and the defence, formed of
the criminals, coming from rat canals, attacked the people, their property. Only
now, when the defenders of the most senseless regime in the world had to give up,
the Croatian government, in its “Report”, worried about the destiny of the
civilians, pledging for “taking humanitarian actions”, so they threat, summon,
warn…
Liberators, the units of the JNA and the Territorial defence and volunteers’
formations, conquered house by house, guarding the lives of its own people and
citizens, showing ingenuity in fights in villages, confirming their humanity,
showing their courage.
Now, a numerous politicians, more or less known and influential, who, until
yesterday, did their best to deny the rightfulness of the fights for Vukovar and
weaken the strengths that attacked it, will hurl there, or give their messages,
congratulations and medallions to the liberators, taking for themselves part of
soldiers’, reserve soldiers’, territorial soldiers’ and volunteers’ merits.
However, nobody could diminish the role of Colonel Mile Mrkši ć, his soldiers
and officers, all the special force soldiers, territorial soldiers and volunteers, to
deny their merits in liberation of the town on the river of Vuka. The journalists of
“National Army” that daily reported from the first combat line in the town on the
coast of Vuka and Danube, and witnessed their patriotism, decisiveness and
courage – congratulate them on their great victory. At the same time, they bow to
the greatness of the victim of all those killed for the liberation of Vukovar, for the
future of Yugoslavia. 329
Until recently the beautiful building on the coast of Vuka and Danube, now
reminds at the haunted town. This “Cosmic disgrace” to humanity, brought by the
invasion of neo-nazism will surely be removed by the people. The wounds will
heal. But the memory should last as a dam to the senselessness. Forever.
23 NOVEMBER 1991, P. 15
Vukovar – liberated town
SACRIFICED FOR SEPARATISM
Successfully finished operation
Vukovar is not an occupied town. That town is liberated from the blackest
neofascism and Ustashe ideology. Because of that there is no place for the
question whether the devastation could be avoided. As much as the neofaschism
was stubborn and persistent, so much the use of available forces and means was
necessary for its destruction. There was no choice.
(…)
Crimes accuse
The hell of Vukovar contains only one message – the Ustashe seed can be
destroyed only by destruction. Leadership, who tried to carry out its plans of
becoming again an independent state of Croatia by force, could not expect
anything else. They sacrificed in advance the innocent Serbian people of Vukovar,
but – as it seems – the Croatians also. Isn’t it confirmed by a fact that the refugees
that decided to go in the direction of Zagreb are not accepted by the authorities,
but are brought back in the buses, firing at them!
28 November 1991
THE NAME THAT IS REMEMBERED FOR LIBERTY
(…)
Statement by Mile Mrkšić
NEW HEROES TO COME
“We seized Vukovar, the most difficult and fortified Ustasha fort, thanks to the
courage and the ability of the members of the motorised guards unit of the JNA
from Belgrade, the volunteers and the members of the Territorial Defence, many
of whom come from that town”, said Colonel Mile Mrkši ć for the Yugoslav
Intelligence service “Tanjug”.
“The operation Vukovar”, as Mrkši ć recalls, “started on 30 September. Those
were face-to-face battles for every house and every street.”
“The breaking point, as the Ustashas admitted, was the arrival of the guard’s units.
The heroism of the members of our units was more than an example for the other
forces to go into the crucial battle together with the members of the Territorial
Defence and the volunteer units”, said Mrkšić. 330
Mrkšić also said: “The Croatian soldiers had the latest guns, rockets and other
weaponry, as we could convince ourselves, and the fights lasted for the next three
or four months”.
Mrkšić pointed out that the volunteers were a great help to the guard’s units. In
this war, Yugoslavia won new national heroes, which has to be legalised by the
Assembly of Yugoslavia and other state institutions.
(…)
PR/S-041291/XI-8-90
4 December 1991
INFINITE FAITH IN COMMANDER ANTONIĆ
(…)
On 18 September, after the third mobilization, the brigade set out for the second
war path, hard and uncertain.
(…)
Only a few hours later, it got involved into the battle for Tovarnik. (…) We can
say that the Guardsmen liberated village after village without difficulties and with
minor losses, and credit is in great part due to the young and energetic
Commander Antonić.
(…)
7 December 1991, p. 21
GIVING LIFE TO A TOWN
(…)
The soldiers and senior officers of the Second battalion, and others from the 80
Motorized brigade situated in the town on the rivers of Vuka and Danube,
contribute to the liveliness of the town.
(…)
A military department has been temporarily established in Vukovar and Borovo
naselje. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Milorad Vojinović, settled in the well
known Vukovar barracks, is daily pressed by the citizens, his subordinates and
superiors, to solve numerous, and sometimes, insoluble problems. Vojinovi ć
looks more like a caring host, pressed with a burden of worries how and what will
he do first, than the old commander whose orders are being executed without a
word.
(…)
They intensively work on covering out the nameless mass graves and
identification of the murdered. About 500 cases are definitely done by now.
Relatives of the deceased are daily summoned to help in identification of the
dead, to take them over and bury them. Their response is significantly lesser from
what was expected. And there is nothing else than to bury most of the dead from
the Identification Centre in Vukovar brickyard in the mass graves. 331
They all want that the death scenes should be gone and to begin living a worthily
life.
22 December 1991
The warpath of Colonel Milan Čeleketić
MAN FROM THE CRISIS SPOT
Although, as Chief of Staff, Čeleketić already then saw that in Pakrac and
Bjelovar something against his wish would happen, as a professional soldier he
had to carry out the order and set out with his combat unit to Oku čani. On 16
August, he started for a new crisis spot with 350 soldiers and 25 combat vehicles.
Once again and similar to the task in Pakrac, they had to establish a buffer zone.
22 December 1991
THOSE WONDERFUL MEN, BRAVE YOUNG WARRIORS
(…)
Ilok remained in the territory, which was already controlled by our forces. In
st
connection with that, the brigade, or more precisely its 1Mechanised Battalion,
artillery division, anti-armoured division and the territorial task force from Užice
(that was added to the brigade) was given the order to block Ilok from south.
(…) 332
A NNEX 151:
EXTRACTS FROM “N ARODNA ARMIJA ” (OFFICIAL JNA GAZETTE ),
BELGRADE , 1992
4 January 1992, p. 4
The notification of the Intelligence service
of the Command of the Fifth Miltary Region
THE TRANSFER COMPLETELY EXECUTED
th
The Intelligence service of the Command of the 5 Military Region was
authorised to inform us that on the 30 of December 1991 the transfer of the units,
commands, institutions, combat technique and other mobile properties of the
Yugoslav People’s Army from territory of the Republic of Slovenia and from the
blocked garrisons in the Republic of Croatia was completed.
The transfer was performed according to the Brijuni and Haag agreement, as well
as, according to the decisions of the Supreme command of the Armed Forces of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The dislocated units, armament and the
equipment were deployed on the territories of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.
(…)
9 JANUARY 1992, p. 14
Lieutenant Colonel General Jevrem Cokić,
first Commander of the South Front
TRUTH BROKE THROUGH ALL BARRIERS
On the eve of the Army Day, Lieutenant Colonel General Jevrem Coki ć, the first
Commander of the Operations Team for Southern Herzegovina and Dalmatia has
been decorated with the Gallantry Medal that was presented by Colonel General
Blagoje Adžić, the Chief-of-Staff of the SFRY Armed Forces headquarters.
…I have been reassigned from the function of the Chief Inspector of the SFRY
Armed Forces to the function of the Commander of the Operations Team for
Southern Herzegovina and Dalmatia at the middle of September. It was clear
much earlier that the war would spread to the other areas; therefore, we had been
prepared for such development of events so, of course, we were not surprised.
The Command of the Operations Team was first in Kifino Selo near Nevesinje
where I also spent a certain time. That place was the best location to observe the
whole territory where we expected the actions…
…The combat actions on that territory began at the beginning of October; first the
Croatian smaller paramilitary groups executed the sporadic skirmishes and later,
the more serious engagements, which we readily faced according to our plan – to
reach the Adriatic Highway in the broad area from Neum to Prevlaka. We had the
worst problems in the broader area of Stolac, where our units, according to the
residents’ statements, allegedly disturbed the people that live there, caused arming
of the civilians, and their leaving from the village… 333
…Some principles of the nation-wide defence concept that we have theoretically
learned in this war backfired at us: we had enemies at every step-in front and
behind us, on every side. It was particularly hard to establish order on the territory
under our control since the various groups trained for the special engagements
kept appearing and the people needed a certain degree of security. I was offered a
great deal of support from the Republic of Montenegro, which put its police at our
disposal for protecting the liberated territory…
ANNEX 152:
EXTRACTS FROM ”SRPSKA V OJSKA K RAJINE”
AND OTHER M AGAZINES , 1990-1995
12 March 1989: “ Nin”, Belgrade, (Serbian Magazine), pp. 30-31 (Interview with Simo
Dubajić)
KNIN PORTRAYED WITH TEA
Someone thought that “Secretary”’s speech had Great-Serbian overtone, because
you said - “Brother Serbs!”?
I admit it myself, once I said it at the beginning of a speech (usually I say it when
Serbian interests are endangered as it was the case on that occasion). But later on
I continued with “male and female comrades”. I acted like that whenever I called
people to rise up in arms: for the first time in the period between 1941 and 1945,
the second time from 1966 to 1970, and now in 1989.
1992: Petrinjski Bilten (Bulletin of the “31 TO RSK Brigade”)
Interview with the Commander of the Brigade of the Territorial Defence Petrinja,
Republic of the Serbian Krajina
Last month, the Federal Republic Yugoslavia was established. Serbia and
Montenegro joined the new, third Yugoslavia, and by the Constitution, chance is
given to all other republics to join it, too, if they want to. We know that in this
country, there is no place for breakers of Yugoslavia, the aggressors who gave rise
to the war. They wanted to destroy our Armed Forces and also aimed that it would
lead to the disappearance of the former Yugoslavia. They did not realise their
idea, and the JNA experienced only certain changes that were necessary.
When the army left from our territories of Banija, material means and technical
equipment remained in the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, which were then
taken over by the armed forces, that means the Territorial Defence and the police.
It is important to point out that the defence was not disturbed, moreover, a certain
quality was gained, which was obvious in the positive attitude of the men towards
the means they were given.
The reorganisation of the Territorial defence was necessary and it was conducted
in the following way:
Officers and soldiers who came from the area of Banija stayed in the composition
of the Territorial defence. 334
Officers, who were transferred to the FRY due to reorganisation, were substituted
by experienced
officers from Banija, who up to then were on duty on different battlefields.
16 July 1992: “Srpska Vojska Krajine” (Serbian” RSK Army” gazette)
TRIUMPH WITH A BITTER TASTE
(…)
The powerful armoured mechanised unit happened to be in Osijek, at the time of
the conflict in Croatia, where a part of it and its command was deployed. A part of
it was located in Vukovar and Našice. Following the events in the republic, in
which, in front of the whole world, the Ustasha movement grew, they prepared
themselves for being surprised, surrounded, defeated and captured, which already
had happened to some units of the former JNA and to some it happened right
now. First, they deployed a part of the unit from Osijek in the surrounding villages
under the pretext that it was part of a military exercise.
(…)
July 1993: “Krajiški Vojnik”(“Serbian Republic Army” gazette), p. 32
REPORTAGE
With the fighters of the 43 rdPrijedor Motorized Brigade on the frontline near
Gradačac
HEROES AND KNIGHTS
rd
It has been a year now, since our fighters of the 43 Prijedor Motorized Brigade
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Radmil Zeljaja have resisted the attacks of the
Muslim forces from Grada čac. They never retreated a single step. The enemy
attempts to crash the defence line of the Serbian fighters were especially strong
during July. The goal is set-our corridor toward Orašje...
rd
...The 43 Prijedor Motorized Brigade had a very successful war path before it
came to the frontline toward Grada čac. It was among the first units of then Banja
st
Luka now the 1 Krajiski Corps to go to Western Slavonia already in 1991.
Solving of the problems followed in Prijedor...
Mehmed Dizdar
Krajiški Vojnik, July 1993
July 1993: “Službeni Glasnik RSK” (Official Press Of The” RSK”)
SITUATION ON BANIJA AND KORDUN
ZAMLAČA AND STRUGA UNDER THE JNA CONTROL
Four soldiers from Banija died, ten of them wounded. – Heavy losses of mortars
and guardsmen. – Civilians also hurt.
th
Dvor na Uni, the 27 July – It is calm today in Dvor na Uni and surrounding
villages. The JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) armoured units that arrived from
Petrinja yesterday formed a buffer-zone between the two belligerent sides and
except for the couple of mortar explosions, there was no shooting. 335
9 M AY 1994: “SRPSKA VOJSKA”( Serbian” RSK Army” gazette), p. 14
THE WAR PATH PAVED WITH VICTORIES
The Krajina Corps already in April marked the third year of the war. The Krajina
Corps war path, from Plitvice in 1991 until today will go down in history as a path
from a victory to victory. Just a sound of the name of the Krajina Corps makes the
enemy blood freeze.
…Recently we had an occasion to brought back the memory of March 31 and
April 1 1991, of the bloody Easter when the 329 thArmoured Brigade commanded
by Ratomir Simić came to Plitvice and making a buffer-zone disabled the blood
hungry Ustashas from the Croatian Ministry of Interior to attack the Serbian
people.
Shortly afterward, the soldiers from the same brigade helped in defending
Kostajnica, ancient Serbian town. Although there were still some poor attempts to
calm the increasing conflicts in Yugoslavia, on 17 August 1991, then the 329 ,h
today the 1 stArmoured Brigade crossed the bridge on the Sava River near
Gradiška and with fierce attacks managed to link itself with the parts of the
Varaždin Corps...
20 April 1995: “Zadarski List” (Croatian newspaper)
THEY KILLED THEM SINGING
Writer: Ivica Marijačić
JASENICE
The Serbs launched the first shells against Jasenice on 16 July 1991, and in that
way announced conquering raid toward the west...
...Early in the morning, the Serbs launched four-five mortar shells at the village.
All of them fell on a rocky ground above the village and did not cause any
damages beside the psychological ones...
...Soon after, the Serbs hit not only a rocky ground but also inhabited areas even
the Maslenica Bridge...
...At the beginning of September that year, the occupying Yugoslav army and
local Chetniks launched an operation of conquering Jasenovac from one and
Kruševo from other side. The area at the foot of Velebit was under the heavy
explosions on 10 and 11 September...
...Like in Jasenice, the huge enemy war technology won over...
...Late afternoon of the same day, the defenders left like the civilians did long
before. That and the following day, Jasenice were occupied and everything that
happened was the picture already seen in all other occupied villages. In the
scattered hamlets of the occupied village, only seven-eight elderly Croats stayed
to continue with their lives there, and who at all cost decided to stay in their
houses reckoning they did no harm to anyone therefore nothing bad could happen
to them... 336
...In the morning, on 18 December 1991, around 9.00 am, a group of Obrovac
Chetniks set out along the old road from the direction of the former company
toward Velebit...
...While they were driving along a winding, dusty Velebit road, they were singing
their folk, primitive tunes full of ideological, Great Serbian, violent rimes: “Tko
to kaže, tko to laže, Srbija je mala (translation: Who is saying, who is lying that
Serbia is small)” they also prized Draža Mihajlovi ć, Slobodan Miloševi ć and the
other creators of the occupying project of Serbia against the other, neighboring,
nations. Exactly in that mood, cheerful Chetniks came across a flock of sheep and
goats and a man who looked after the flock while it grazed poor, mountain grass.
It was Luka Modrić from Zaton Obrovački, village that adjoins Jasenice, located
above Obrovac. The Chetniks pulled the car at once, got out of the car, and ran at
the innocent shepherd still singing the song with their coarse throats, “Who are
you, what are you doing here? This is a Serbian land”, they snap at Luka. They
pushed him, beat with the legs, and yelled at him, “Move forward, move”. The
terrified shepherd made a couple of unsteady steps “forward” and after he made a
couple of steps, Velebit echoed with the terrifying shoots, and after that with
bursts. Luka Modrić fell, shot down...
...Whatsoever, the killers, Chetniks, after killing Luka Modri ć, continued toward
Meke Doce to finish with a bloody job...
Stipe Zubak was looking after his sheep near the hamlet...
...Ivan Maruna who also did not want to leave his birthplace was with Stipo...
...As soon as the bandits came, they jumped out of the car, surrounded the two
men and began with the famous rhetoric prelude, “What are you doing on the
Serbian land? Do you know that all this belongs to Serbia...” . They shouted, push
them, slap in the faces, cursed as always their Ustashas’ mothers...
...The killers moved step or two away from them and opened the fire...
...Then, they went back home to Meke Doce...
...Stipo’s wife Zorka Zubak, Manda Maruna and her sister Božica Juri čević, who
came from Jasenice to Velebit believing she was more safe here, and Martin
Buzonja who came to stay at Stipe Zubak’s place were hiding in those houses.
The Chetniks came in and searched every house and every corner. When they
came across the poor old persons, they killed them...
July 1995: “Vojska Krajine” (Serbian “RSK Army” gazette), No. I,, p. 18
SECURITY DAY
The policemen from Knin refused to obey the MUP of the republic Croatia on 3
July 1991, and stood beside their people
It was the beginning of a heavy resistance to the intentions of the Croatian
leadership to place the Serbian people in its authority and in that way deny its
rights that were granted for centuries. Members of the Security Service of the
Republic of the Serbian Krajina (RSK) proclaimed the 5 thJuly as their holiday.
The government of the RSK brought the decision on the proclamation of this day
as the Security Service Day, in order to celebrate the events that occurred in Knin 337
in the beginning of July 1990. Then, the policemen of the Police Station in Knin
refused to obey the “HDZ-government” (Croatian Democratic Union) and to
accept the Ustasha insignia and symbols on their uniforms. Already then, the
Serbian policemen were aware of the danger represented by the “new
democracy”. The Serbian people could not accept that on Serbian ethnic territory
banners and symbols were attached, under which during World War Two the
Ustasha government in the Independent Croatian State (NDH) carried out
genocide against the Serbian people.
Those days, the policemen from Knin, and soon the policemen from other Serbian
areas, refused to accept the “Croatian Coat of Arms” attached on their caps,
because they knew that imposing those symbols on the Serbian people would
precede new assaults on the Serbs. Therefore, on 3 July 1990, the policemen from
Knin decided to refuse obedience to the MUP of the Republic Croatia and stand
beside their people and together with them resist the new Ustasha government.
After this decision, on 5 July 1990, the then Minister Boljkovac went to Knin to
bring order with his commando policemen. Around 5,000 Serbs gathered in front
of the Police Station, who wanted to support their policemen.338
volume IV