I
InternatIonal court of JustIce
case concernIng
theapplIcatIon of the conventIon
on the preventIonand punIshment
of the crIme of genocIde
(croatIav.serBIa)
REPLY
OFTHE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
volume 5
anneXes 116-215
20 decemBer 2010II III
COUNTER-CLAIMANNEXES
annex 116: report on the shelling of civilian targets and the
victims of those shellings,april 1992 – July 1993 1
annex 117: letter from lieutenant general anton tus to
admiral sveto letica, 24 July 1992
5
annex 118: united nations security council resolution 871, 4
october 1993 6
annex 119: example of an Identity card Issued by the rsK, 26
november 1992 9
annex 120: rsK, minutes on the thematic session of the
government of the rsK, 6 July 1994 11
annex 121: sfrY, chief of personnel administration of the
federal secretariat for national defence, order
no. 2-77, 22april 1992
23
annex 122: rsK, 18th corps., command no. 7-214/1, 16april
1994 36
annex 123: minutes of the 19 session of the government of
the rsK, 31 december 1991 38
annex 124: rsK, state committee for cooperation with
unprofor, public announcement, 3 december
1992 43
annex 125: reportofthesecretary-generalpursuanttosecurity
council resolution 871, 16 march 1994 46
annex 126: final report of the united nations commission of
experts established pursuant to security council
resolution 780, annex vII, medak Investigation,
28 december 1994 59
annex 127: daruvaragreement, 18 february 1993
74 Iv
annex 128: Igor palija, “peacemaker”, Identitet, march 2008 76
annex 129: rsK, decision on the constitution of the national
assembly of the republic of serbian Krajina and
republic sprska, 24april 1993
80
annex 130: rsK, proposal of the assemblies of republika
srpska and the republic of serbian Krajina to the
assemblies of serbia and montenegro concerning
Unification in a Single State, 18August 1994 81
annex 131: rsK, minutes of the session of the assembly of
the republic of serbian Krajina which approved
the Decision on State Unification with Republika
srpska, 29 may 1995 83
annex 132: excerptfromtheInterviewwiththesvKlieutenant
General Mile Mrkšić, Vojska Krajine, 11 June 1995 84
annex 133: Excerpt from Franjo Tuđman, Zna se, HDZ u borbi
za samostalnost Hrvatske (It is known: hdZ in the
struggle for the Independence of croatia), Zagreb,
1993, pp. 190-195 85
annex 134: excerpt from Vjesnik, (croatian newspaper), 28
december 1993 94
annex 135: excerpt from Večernji list, (croatian newspaper), 28
august 1994
95
annex 136: Excerpt from Predrag Lucić (ed.), Stenogrami o
podjeli Bosne (shorthand notes on the division of
Bosnia), split, sarajevo, 2005, Book II, pp 399-448
98
annex 137: rsK,militarypost9138,submissionofInformation,
30 January 1995 101
annex 138: rsK, directive for the use of the serbian army of
Krajina, february 1995 102
annex 139: letter from colonel rade rašeta, 6 January 1995
122 v
annex 140: rsK, state fact-finding commission, report
onthecausesandmannerofthefallofWestern
slavonia, 11 July 1995 132
annex 141: rsK, report of the commission charged with
establishing responsibility of the military
organisation for the fall of Western slavonia,
13 July 1995 154
annex 142: Witness statement of Ivan Bačić 172
annex 143: unprofor, coded cable, meeting with
Babić: A Proposal for Western Slavonia, 10
may 1995
175
annex 144: council of europe, politicalaffairs committee,
memorandum on the visit to Zagreb and
Western slavonia, 23 June 1995 180
annex 145: minutes of the meeting between president
Franjo Truđman, Richard Holbrooke, General
Wesley clark and peter galbraith, 18 august
1995 185
annex 146: rsK,minutesofthersKassembly,8february
1995 206
annex 147: military frontier province Between the
habsburg and ottoman empires, ca. 1600-
1800, (vojna Krajina) 208
annex 148: rsKassembly, summary of the minutes of the
first extraordinary session of the rsK, Knin, 8
february 1996 211
annex 149: Excerpts from Mladić’s Diary, pp. 201, 203,
206, 239-240 213
annex 150: conclusions of the government of the republic
of serbian Krajina regarding the negotiations
ontheamendmentofthemandateoftheunited
nations protective force in the occupied parts
of croatia, Knin, 30 march 1995 227 vI
annex 151: letter from the secretary-general addressed to
the president of the security council, 7 august
1995 229
annex 152: rsK,commandofthe39 corps.,order:problems
in the military organisation and the elimination
of negative occurrences which are one of the
causes of defeat and losses of the rsK territory,
1 June 1995 238
annex 153: rsK, state Information agency, statement of
Ratko Mladić, Knin, 30 July 1995 241
annex 154: General Ratko Mladić Speaking to the Media in
Knin, 30 July 1995 242
annex 155: declaration on the Implementation of the
Washington agreement, Joint defense against
serbaggression and reaching a political solution
congruent with the efforts of the International
community, split, 22 July 1995 244
annex 156: RSK, Office of the President of the Republic,
minutes of the meeting between the president of
the RSK and Leaders of the Deputies’Groups, 19
June 1995 247
annex 157: rsK, supreme defence council, proclamation of
the state War throughout the rsK, 30 July 1995 254
annex 158: croatian Intelligence administration, situation
andactivities of the svK, 30 July 1995 255
annex 159: rsK, ministry of defence, military and civil
affairs sector, regular daily report, 31 July
1995 256
annex 160: svK, general staff, daily report, 3august 1995 259
annex 161: Milan Martić speaking in Ravni Kotari, 2 August
1995 263 vII
annex 162: excerpt from IctY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan
Milošević (It-02-54-t), Babic testimony,
thursday, 21 november 2002 264
annex 163: centre for electronic surveillance, excerpts of
Intercepts between Milan Martić and Ilija Prijić,
nos. 65 (3 august 1995, 08:50), 66 (3 august
1995, 12:23), 67 (3august 1995, 14:42) 266
annex 164: Dušan Viro, “Slobodan Milošević: The Anatomy
of Crime”, Profil, Zagreb, 2007, pp. 370-378 276
annex 165: rsK, operations report, 26august 1995 288
annex 166: RSK, Order of Lieutenant Mile Mrkšić, 29 July
1995 317
annex 167: republic of croatia, ministry of defence,
Intelligence report, 2august 1995 318
annex 168: rsK,securitydepartment,dailyreport,3august
1995
321
annex 169: agreement between the government of the
republic of croatia and the united nations peace
forces – uncro on temporary measures in the
areas formerly Known as “sector north” and
“sector south”, 6august 1995 326
annex 170: republicofcroatia,ministryofdefence,directive
op. no. 12-4/95, 26 June 1995 328
annex 171: republic of croatia, ministry of defence, order to
attack, 2august 1995 339
annex 172: minutes of the meetings held at the defence
ministry of the republic of croatia, 2 august
1995 343
annex 173: Witness Statement of Marko Rajčić 350
annex 174: operation storm 374 vIII
annex 175: excerpt from the speech of the president of the
Republic, Milan Martić, Given at the Briefing on
the combat readiness of the svK, 10 february
1995 375
annex 176: markovrcelj,“theWarfor serbianKrajina:1991-
1995”, Belgrade, 2002 383
annex 177: svK,Intelligencedepartment,Intelligencereport,
4august 1995 409
annex 178: military targets in the vicinity of Benkovac,
Gračac and Obrovac 411
annex 179: Death certificate of Dušan Korolija 417
annex 180: application for the Issuance of an Identity card for
Nikola Kresojević, 30 January 2008 420
annex 181: application for Issuance of an Identity card for
Marijana Poznanović, 30April 2008 422
annex 182: rsK, military post 9138, extraordinary event, 16
october 1993 424
annex 183: RSK, Police Department, Letter Confirming the
Death of Branko Bajić, 22 February 1995 426
annex 184: rsK, regional centre vrginmost, operational
report, 27august 1993 428
annex 185: rsK, command of the 7 thoperational group,
report about losses, 20 april 1992 429
th
annex 186: rsK, command of the 7 corps., Information for
subordinate units, 28april 1993 430
annex 187: rsK, Benkovac municipal court, on-site
Investigation record, 7 July 1993 431
annex 188: rsK, commission for the exchange of prisoners,
transfer of corpses, 13 July 1993 434
annex 189: rsK,ministryoftheInterior,reportonthesuicide
of Goran Panić, 18 July 1995 436 IX
annex 190: rsK, ministry of defence, order of the republican
civilian protection staff, 15 July 1995 437
annex 191: rsK,civildefenceheadquarters,orderconcerning
the Implementation of evacuation and relief plans,
29 July 1995 439
annex 192: rsK, lika regional civilian protection
Headquarters, Order of Mirko Poznanović, 30 July
1995 440
annex 193: rsK, drniš deptartment ministry of defence,
directorate on measures for the preparation of
evacuation, 31 July 1995 441
annex 194: rsK, ministry of the Interior, order signed by
Minister Tošo Paić, 31 July 1995 442
annex 195: rsK, serb army general staff, order on the
relocation of the gŠ svK, 1august 1995 444
annex 196: rsK, civil defence headquarters, order on the
Implementation of preparation for the evacuation
ofassets,archives, and records, 2august 1995 447
annex 197: rsK, civil defence headquarters, request on the
Implementation of civil defence plans, evacuation
and relief, 2august 1995 449
annex 198: rsK, supreme defence council, decision on
evacuation, 4august 1995 450
annex 199: rsK, military post 9139, Information to units, 8
January 1995 451
annex 200: savo Šrbac speaking from a tv studio in Banja
luka, 7august 1995
459
annex 201: appeal to croatian citizens of serb nationality
from President Franjo Tuđman, Zagreb, 4 August
1995 460
annex 202: agreement on the surrender of the 21st corps.,
glina, 8august 1995 462 X
annex 203: letter from colonel pettis to Brigadier pleština, 8
august 1995 464
annex 204: errors in status of persons in the chc report
(operation storm),attachment 2a 466
annex 205: errors in status of persons in the chc report
(operation storm),attachment 2B 467
annex 206: discrepancyregardingcircumstancesofsuffering,
attachment 3 468
annex 207: list of persons with Incorrect personal data
(operation storm),attachment Ia 469
annex 208: list of persons with Incomplete personal data
(operation storm),attachment IB 470
annex 209: UN, Coded Cable, Meeting with Mr Šarinić, 9
september 1995
471
annex 210: republic of croatia, ministry of defence, order
on the Work of the military police, cooperation
Between and Joint Work of the civilian and
military police, and obligations of the military
police towards detained members of para-military
and para-police formations, 3august 1995 474
annex 211: government of the republic of croatia, minutes
from the 257 closed session of the government
of croatia, 4august 1995 477
annex 212: split–dalmatiapoliceadministration,submission
of the report about the situation regarding the
sacral facilities of the serbian orthodox church in
the liberated territory, 22august 1995 497
annex 213: split–dalmatiapoliceadministration,submission
of the report on the establishment of the vrlika
Branch police station and others, 5august 1995 498
annex 214: un, coded cable from akashi to the secretary-
general, 7august 1995 499
annex 215: Letter from Minister Mate Granić to German
foreign minister Klaus Kinkel, 25 august 1995 502XIXII 1
Annex 116:
RepoRt on the Shelling of CiviliAn tARgetS And the
viCtimS of thoSe ShellingS, ApRil 1992 – July 1993
/coat-of-arms/
goveRnment of the RepuBliC of CRoAtiA
office for unpRofoR and pmeZ /European Community Monitoring
Mission/
Class: 004-01/93-01/01
File no: 50303-03-93-128
Phone: 469-262, fax 452-002
Zagreb, 26 July 1993
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Attn. Mr Mate Granić, Minister
Minister,
Please find attached a report on the persecutions of the Croats and
other non-Serbs in the temporarily occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia,
and a report on the shelling of civilian targets and victims of those shellings
carried out by the Serbs in the period between April 1992 and July 1993.
Yours sincerely,
HEAD OF OFFICE
Milivoj Tomaš
/ d e n g i s /
RepoRt
on the shelling of civilian targets and the victims of those shellings,
April 1992 – July 1993
The rebelled Serbs, assisted by the volunteers from Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, are shelling on a daily basis the towns, settlements and villages locat-
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 1 12/16/2010 2:36:49 PM 2
ed mainly in UNPA sectors South and North, from the temporarily occupied
areas of the Republic of Croatia (the UNPA zone and the „Pink Zone“). From
UNPA Sectors West and East the Serbs are firing from infantry weapons and
occasionally from mortars and heavy-machine guns.
The target of the Serb artillery, particularly in the recent period, is
Šibenik, Zadar, Gospić, Ogulin, Karlovac, Biograd, Vodice, Konavle, Sinj,
Pirovac, Duga Resa, and from time to time also the islands (e.g. the island of
Ugljan). The objective of those artillery attancks are only the civilian facili-
ties and the civilians, so that, apart from extensive destruction of the civilian
facilities, we also have a large number of killed and wounded civilians. The
fact is that, the more intense the peace talks under the auspices of the interna-
tional community are, the more intense is the shelling of Croatian towns, i.e.
civilian targets. The shelling of Karlovac, Ogulin and Duga Resa carried out
by the Serbs from the UNPA Sector North on 14/15 July 1993 from the terri-
tory, caused wounding of twelve persons and a severe damage to residential
and industrial facilities.
A very frequent target of the Serb artillery is the area south of Du-
brovnik and the area of Županja. The shelling of those areas is carried out by
the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The physical damage done to the towns,
settlements and villages /several words illegible/ being targeted by the Serb
artillery are most often sacral and residential facilities and children’s institu-
tions.
AN OVERVIEW OF CASUALTIES
BETWEEN APRIL 1992 AND JULY 1993
SECTOR KILLED CIVILIANS WOUNDED CIVILIANS
EAST 73 159
WEST 77 317
NORTH 8 29
SOUTH 29 123
TOTAL 187 628
REPORT
on established and documented cases o violation of human rights in the
territory of the Republic of Croatia under the protection of the UN (UNPA)
in the period between April 1992 and July 1993, with an emphasis on the
period from March to July 1993
(persecutions, killings, maltreatment)
Since the arrival of the UN forces and until 20 July 1993, a great num-
ber of cases of abuse and drastic violation of human rights were registered in
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 2 12/16/2010 2:36:49 PM 3
the temporarily occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia under the protection
of the UN forces (UNPROFOR) in UNPA zones and „Pink Zones“. Victims
are predominantly Croats, but also other non-Serb population living in UNPA
and „Pink Zone“. Maltreatment, abuse and persecution are committed by the
local Serb authorities, members of various “police forces” and other armed
formations that are active in UNPA and „Pink Zone“ in the Republic of Croa-
tia. In terms of security, the situation has not changed much since the arrival
of UNPROFOR; the rebelled Serbs assisted by the volunteers from Serbia
keep implementing the policy of ethnic cleansing and destroying everything
if there is the least proof that Croats or other peoples (non-Serbs) once lived
there.
The attacks on persons of non-Serb nationality and their property,
and even on Serbs who oppose to the abuse, maltreatment or persecution of
people, are carried out on a daily basis.
According to our records, since the arrival of the UN protection forc-
es (UNPROFOR):
- around 10,000 persons were expelled with the escort provided by
UNPROFOR, UNHCR or some other international organisation;
- 13,742 persons were expelled without any escort,
which totals around 23,472 persons. Among the refugees there are
also around 1,000 persons of the Serb nationality. Assisted by the UNHCR,
five Croats and eight persons of some other nationality have returned to the
occupied territory. At their own request, around 1,200 Serbs crossed form
over the free territory to the occupied territory.
Around 2,500 Serbs have returned to the UNPA West alone, to the
territory under the control of the authorities of the Republic of Croatia (the
municipalities of Grubišno Polje, Daruvar, Pakrac). Evidently, the migrations
that took place in 1992 and 1993 are far more frequent from the UNPA to the
free territory of the Republic of Croatia than in the opposite direction, and the
persecution of Croats and other non-Serb population continues regardless of
the presence of he UN protection forces in those areas.
The persecution of the people is always preceded by the burning of
farming facilities, family houses, unlawful and illegal arrests, seizure and
plunder of property. The Croats who live in the temporarily occupied ter-
ritory of the Republic of Croatia are being maltreated and humiliated on a
daily basis, and the Serb local authorities organize work brigades and engage
people as labourers –from farming and construction works to the building of
bunkers.
From January 1993 to 20 July 1993, some 500 persons were expelled
from the territory of UNPA East, both Croats and other non-Serbs. All our
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 3 12/16/2010 2:36:49 PM 4
efforts have failed to provide the citizens of the Republic of Croatia living in
the occupied areas with some security and protect them from maltreatment
and persecution.
The reason for the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR lies in the fact that
the UN protection forces tend to look for a solution to the security of the
citizens of the Republic of Croatia living in the occupied areas by commu-
nicating with the local Serb authorities, their police and judicial organs, and
the fact is that all organs in power just implement the policies of the Greater
Serbia and carry out ethnic cleansing in the temporarily occupied territory of
the Republic of Croatia.
We have registered camps – prisons in the temporarily occupied ter-
ritory of the Republic of Croatia, in Knin, Titova Korenica, Glina, where the
elderly people, women and children are maltreated on a daily basis, both men-
tally and physically.
Annex 1
A SUMMAR OF ESTABLISHED AND DOCUMENTED CASES
OF VIOLATION O HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNPA ZONES
IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN APRIL 1992 AND JULY 1993
SECTOR Civilians forc- Killed civil- Rapes Physical
ibly ians maltreat-
ment and
expelled,
escorted other forms
of violation
by UNPRO- of human
FOR rights
and UNHCR
EAST 2,950 132 5 572
WEST 28 2 - 24
NORTH 494 25 5 2
SOUTH 6,526 114 - 42
Total, from April 9,998 273 10 640
1992 to July 1993
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 4 12/16/2010 2:36:49 PM 5
Annex 117:
letteR fRom lieutenAnt geneRAl Anton tuS to
AdmiRAl Sveto letiCA, 24 July 1992
/Republic of Croatia Coat of Arms/
the RepuBliC of CRoAtiA
miniStRy of defenCe
mAin StAff of the hv /Croatian Army/
CLASS: 81/92-02/16
FILE NUMBER: 5120-01-92-10
Zagreb, 24 July 1992
TO: HRM /Croatian Navy/ COMMANDER
Admiral Sveto Letica
The latest incursions of the parts of the HV in the area of Unešić on 22 July
and the previous incident by Nos Kalik and Miljevac Plateau prove that the
actions are being launched without the knowledge and consent of the senior
commands – the OZ /?Military District/ and the HRM. Investigate this on a
commission level and determine which forces or persons have done that and
whether this was done on purpose with the aim of jeopardizing the plan of
the UN peace operation and inform me about it by 08:00 hrs on 26 July 1992.
There are certain indications that the HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/ has
been planning those actions.
Having learned the lesson from those events, establish a system of command
in order to prevent such incidents from happening again. After the obliga-
tions have been signed, the HV cannot enter the UNPA areas or other areas
outside the UNPA where the HV units should not find themselves.
C H I E F
Lieutenant General
Anton Tus
/illegible signature
/round stamp/: The Republic of Croatia
Ministry of Defence
Main Staff
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Annex 118:
united nAtionS SeCuRity CounCil ReSolution 871, 4
oCtoBeR 1993
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Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 7 12/16/2010 2:36:51 PM 8
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 8 12/16/2010 2:36:51 PM 9
Annex 119:
exAmple of An identity CARd iSSued By the RSK,
26 novemBeR 1992
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Office for UNPROFOR and ECMM
Cl. 004-01/93-01/01
Reg. No. 50303-03-93-206
Tel. 469-262, fax. 452-002
Zagreb, September 6th 1993
Mr. Cedric Thornberry, DCA
UNPROFOR HQ
Dear Mr. Thornberry,
We came into posession of personal documents issued by the local
authorities of the Serbs in the UNPA of the Republic of Croatia, which are ac-
tually the personal documents of the so-called RSK. It can be seen from those
documents that Serbia already includes the UNPA of the Republic of Croatia
into the composition of the so-called “SRJ”/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/.
The members of UNPROFOR should get an insight into such occurrences and
to profess upon the question.
We kindly ask you to investigate the events taking place in the village
of Petrovci near Vukovar which is populated mostly by Rusnaks and to inform
us urgently about the actual condition in that village.
Best regards,
HEAD OF THE OFFICE
Milivoj Tomaš
/on the image: „IDENTIFICATION CARD“/
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 9 12/16/2010 2:36:51 PM 10
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
Municipality: Vukovar
First name: Martin
Family name: Varga
Name of one of the parents: Valentin
Day, month and year of birth: 08.09.1933.
Divoš
Place of birth: Sremska Mitrovica
/ designation: PCK0019411 – note: probably RSK0019411/
Personal number:
Opatovac, SO Vukovar
I.L. Ribara 27
/text under line: illegible/: Permanent
Registration number: 1941
Date of issue: 26.11.92.
Signature of the authorised person
/Signature illegible/
/Round stamp over the signature/
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 10 12/16/2010 2:36:51 PM 11
Annex 120:
RSK, minuteS on the themAtiC SeSSion of the
goveRnment of the RSK, 6 July 1994
/hand-written/: HIC – A 157/4
THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
GOVERNMENT
MINUTES
of the Thematic Session of the Government of the RSK /Republic of Serbian
Krajina/ held on 06 July 1994 at 10:00 AM in the Government Building in
Knin
The list of those who were present at the Government session is attached and
it is a constituent part of the Minutes.
The following were absent: Dragutin Bolić and Borivoj Rašuo
The following attended the session at the invitation: Ljubomir Domazetović,
Neđo Krajnović, Milan Šuput, Mile Vignjević, Mirko Bjelanović, Sava
Milović, Branko Dobrijević, Dmitar Arula and Siniša Ćakić.
The Prime Minister Borislav Mikelić presided over the session.
The following
AGENDA
has been scheduled for the session.
1. PROBLEM AREAS OF THE MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
(The outlines are in the attachment)
2. THE PLACE AND ROLE OF THE SVK /Serbi-
an Krajina Army/ AND THE DEFENCE PREP-
ARATIONS OF THE RSK /Republic of Serbian
Krajina/ IN ENSURING THE SOVEREIGNTY
AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF
THE RSK
Minister Rade Tanjga – divided the political and security situation into
several segments.
1. Assessment of the situation and intentions of the RH /Republic of Croatia/
All the information indicates that we can expect a new aggression - it
is obvious from the Croatian mass media as well as from the additional prepa-
rations and training of the Croatian Army. There is a question of the form of
their aggression and the axis of their attack. Most probably the aggression will
take place on the local axis, not along the entire front line. The examples of
such aggression so far are Miljevac Plateau, Maslenica, Medak Pocket. The
aim of the aggression most probably would be cutting of the Corridor and an
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 11 12/16/2010 2:36:51 PM 12
attack along the entire front line
2. The assessment of the situation and the intentions of the AP /Autonomous
Province/ of Western Bosnia
Fikret Abdić is gradually becoming dependent on the Serbian help and his
area for
balancing between us and the Ustashas is becoming smaller. This gives us
opportunity to have a more active and efficient role in providing help to the
AP of Western Bosnia.
3. The assessment of possibilities of the help from the VRS /Army of Re-
publika Srpska/ and the VJ /Yugoslav Army/ in case of the aggression on the
Republic of Serbian Krajina
There is a large number of professional soldiers from Yugo-
slavia who are at the first line of the front while their families live in Serbia in
the barracks in terrible conditions.
The situation regarding the Civilian Defence
We will prepare the initial war plan by 08 August 1994, together with
the Ministry of Industry.
There are problems in the field – the infrastructure and the services that were
functioning in peacetime have not been developed, so the units of the Civilian
Protection took over that segment (water supply to the population, health care,
etc.). The Civilian Protection will have to be relieved of those duties and the
municipalities shall take them over.
The problems of the legal regulation of the defence
We have to bring into line the legal regulations with the SRJ /Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia/. It does not mean that we will blindly copy the legal
regulations of the SRJ. We will have to enact four important laws, namely the
following:
Law on Defence;
Law on the SVK;
Law on Military Courts; and
Law on Military Prosecutor’s Offices
We will change the following laws:
Law on Pension Insurance and Social Security; and
Law on Health Insurance
Problems with supply
It is necessary that the money is not taken out of the RSK (the little money
we have).
We have three types of suppliers from the SRJ, RS /Republika Srpska/ and
RSK.
From the Republika Srpska – 58 suppliers
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 12 12/16/2010 2:36:52 PM 13
From SR of Yugoslavia – 112 suppliers
From the Republic of Serbian Krajina – 257 suppliers
Totally – 427 suppliers.
The biggest debts are towards our suppliers such as the following
enterprises: VUPIK, PIK Okučani, Gavrilović, etc.
Problems regarding the financing of the defence
It is necessary to provide 280 million for the SVK in order to cover
the expenses for providing weapons and military equipment. There are sev-
eral proposals for the models of financing. One of the models is from the RSK
budget, from the Directorate of Commodity Reserves, then the tax of 3%
which has been voted, loans – maybe the foreign loan should be taken into
consideration. The rebalance of the budget shows that 80 million dinars are
required for the import of weapons and military equipment.
After the introductory speech of the Minister Tanjga, Colonel Lalić
took the floor and he speaks about four important segments, namely the fol-
lowing:
Characteristics of the theatre of war of the RSK;
Armed Forces of Croatia;
Purpose and the organisation of the SVK; and
Activities of the SVK
The theatre of war has an unfavourable geographic position and the size and
shape of
the SRK theatre of war falls into the category of small territories. In the relief
of the RSK we distinguish the highland and Karst terrain of Lika; territory for
the manoeuvres and lowlands.
The rivers in the RSK flow in the north-south direction which is an aggravat-
ing factor for the manoeuvre of the forces at the front.
The material capacities are poor. Economic potentials of the RSK have man-
aged to
produce for the minimal combat requirements.
In order to have a successful defence, it is necessary to bring the communica-
tions into the RSK. The railway network meets the requirements only partly.
It can be concluded that the Armed Forces of Croatia are probably
preparing for the war against the RSK. That will take place most probably on
a chosen and not on the entire axis. In the attack, they would have the support
of the artillery and aircraft. Even the chemical weapons can be used.
Possible axes of attack of the Croatian Armed Forces are the following:
Zadar – Benkovac – Knin;
Šibenik – Drniš – Knin;
Šibenik – Oklaj – Knin;
Sinj – Vrlika – Knin
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Colonel Lalić has pointed out that a detailed assessment of the theatre
of war
has been made within the framework of the purposes and organisations of the
SVK.
The activities of the SVK can be seen in the upgrade of the system
of command, repair of the material and technical equipment, removal of the
mine obstacles, etc.
After the expose of Colonel Lalić, Prime Minister Borislav Mikelić
asked several questions, purely military questions:
I do not see the reason why we do not know what the SVK has at its
disposal and how, if we already know what the HV /Croatian Army/ has at its
disposal. (What is our power and strength to defend ourselves?)
In your expose I have not heard how we are going to defend ourselves against
Croatia (method and our strength).
I have not heard about our connection with the SRJ and their obligation (Yu-
goslav Army) towards the RSK, either.
If there is no help from Yugoslavia, our prospects here are very weak.
Minister Perić, Funduk, Budić, Vojnović, Ratković, Bosnić and
Krička also asked questions.
Colonel Lalić – about the number of commanding officers from the
Yugoslav Army – We in the SVK have 1,227 professional officers and non-
commissioned officers who were sent from the Yugoslav Army and who were
born in the former territories of the RH. That is around 50% of the total num-
ber of officers and non-commissioned officers born in the former territories
of Croatia. Around 50% of them are still in the Yugoslav Army.
Many of them have not resolved the issues of the apartments.
A brief commentary about the Western Slavonia – It is a very sensi-
tive area. We have formed 2 brigades and we will rely on the Republika Srp-
ska as well.
Major General Mirko Bjelanović has talked about the current situa-
tion regarding the material and medical supplies.
We have minimum reserves of the basic means. The age structure of basic
resources is between 20 and 30 years.
The essential equipment that the SVK has at its disposal is the following:
Mortars;
Recoilless guns of 82 mm
Howitzers;
PA /anti-aircraft/ guns
Combat vehicles of all types;
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RV /Air Force/ and PVO /Anti-aircraft Defence/ equipment is the following:
“Jastreb J 21” aircrafts;
Helicopters of “Gazela” type;
“Jastreb J 20” aircrafts
“Jastreb” aircrafts have been in usage for 26 years. Their usage life is expir-
ing.
There are enough mines and explosives.
There is a shortage of ammunition for complex combat systems. The Yugo-
slav Army is in an identical situation.
Now briefly about the propellant:
The daily consumption is between 16 and 18 tons. That amounts to 480 to 500
tons per month, under the condition that there are no combat activities. If all
the corps were engaged in combat activities, the consumption would amount
to around 80 tons a day. The RSK has 21,300 tons of fuel in the warehouses.
The relocation after the agreement cost us around 700 to 800 tons of fuel.
Let me point out that we have not filled up the systems during this war, which
is a very serious problem.
With regard to the problem regarding the overhaul and the equipment, we
have to get out of the RSK borders.
At this moment, the SVK does not have a stable source of financing of medi-
cal and material supplies.
Conclusion: the SVK is the biggest consumer in the RSK, but it should have
a priority.
We need to have an economical approach to what we have at our disposal.
Lieutenant General Ljubo Domazetović:
He has pointed out that he is satisfied with the interest of the members of the
Government in the matters of defence. It is already a one step forward.
The inside enemy is only the Serbian disunity.
The defence must be united. The war production should be ensured. We have
to inform the population about all the important issues regarding the defence.
It is very important to organise the civilian structure of the population, which
has not been done so far.
In order to put this in practice, it is necessary to have the legal regulations.
He has proposed that the Ministry of Defence and the Army practically take
over the proposed Laws, copy them, then the Government should take its
position and after that they should be urgently referred into the Assembly
procedure and the Assembly should adopt them.
What is important with those laws is the complete separation of the function
of the Ministry of Defence and the Army. One country does not have two
masters.
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The Ministry of Defence has to work on the concept of organisation of the
development of social structure (Ministry of Defence has to tell the Govern-
ment which organisations should work; people of importance, experts should
be exempted from the military obligation).
Prime Minister Mikelić – Mister Domazetović has talked about a very impor-
tant issue of regulation the relations within the RSK.
It would be good that in the second part we open a discussion (although not
all of those who were scheduled for discussion took part in it) based on the
expose of the Major General Bjelanović, who has presented it in detail (he has
presented the whole picture of the SVK).
The discussion is opened after the exposes of Bjelanović, Lalić and
Domazetović.
Colonel Neđo Krajnović has briefly talked about the problems of fi-
nancing of the SVK.
He has pointed out that the following has been provided for in the
draft plan:
- for the peacetime alternative – 418 million dinars;
- for the wartime alternative – 624 million dinars
The plans have not been implemented and the obligations towards the SVK
have not been met. The reserves have been used up and we have found our-
selves in a very difficult situation. The solution must be found.
Discussion
Minister Veselinović – he has talked about the shortage of funds in the bud-
get. Efforts have been made to provide minimum funds for the Army of the
RSK. We have issued a bond in the monthly amount of 4,000,000 (2,000,000
Dinars and DM 2,000,000).
We plan to design a model regarding the supply of the Army with food in
order to resolve that problem.
We plan to ensure around 40,000,000 Dinars for the Army until the end of the
year. We think that even that amount would be insufficient.
We cannot bear the burden alone and the SRJ should get involved in order to
help us. We have to involve our Directorate of Commodity Reserves.
(We have a surplus of around 17,000 calves, 50,000 of small stock, we have
the surplus of certain agricultural products.)
We hope that, together with the Main Staff and the responsible Ministries,
we will try to alleviate the problems, however we will probably not be able to
resolve them.
Thereafter, a very important issue has been tackled – a problem regarding
the cooperation with UNPROFOR which was briefly dealt with by Colonel
Dmitar Arula, and after that Prime Minister Mikelić has drown the attention
to the important issues regarding UNPROFOR.
There was a big oversight in the Agreement:
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The CentralCommission and allmilitary persons haveomitted avery
important element which is to work out the details as to where the line of
separation would be drawn.
For example, there are villages in the Western Slavonia where they did not
talk with people in the field. Moving of the lines is to their detriment.
There is a buffer zone on the Serbian side, but there is no such zone on the
Croatian side.
The military structures must know that it is a very serious issue and it has
to be taken into consideration. Had the work been done professionally, this
would not have happened. Another thing, we have the text of the Agreement,
but we do not have maps.
Other problems are the following:
UNPROFOR has started with its deployment in the close vicinity of the cross-
roads, which is the place were they should be present the least.
In one word, UNPROFOR is on the Ustashas’ side. We have to stop that what
they are doing by exerting a big pressure, but it not so simple.
The responsibility of the Army, the police and the people is necessary.
Prime Minister Mikelić has pointed out that we will break the Agreement
with UNPROFOR. (they owed us 10 million dollars). Everything should be
under the control of the payment transactions of the RSK. We have informed
them about it in writing.
UNPROFOR represent a serious threat to us.
Mikelić has added that we should not be preparing only for the defence in case
of an attack. It is a mistake and we have lost a lot of our areas in such way
(Karlovac, Sisak, parts of Slavonia). If they opt for an aggression, we have
to attack Croats at certain locations and take our part of the territory from
them.
The closing speech of the Prime Minister Mikelić
From everything said today, it can be concluded that the position of
the Government is that the defence of the RSK is the task number one. We
have seen that a part of technical and material equipment being provided has
not been adequately treated by a part of the Department at the end of last and
beginning of this year.
Today, at the session, we have formed a picture which the ministers could use
in the field.
As for the legal regulations, a lot has been done in the past period, a disci-
pline was imposed in the area of tax policy, excise duties, customs duties -
the things that were previously unreachable (Our inspection in Vukovar has
found out that the liabilities towards the RSK in the amount 20 million Dinars
have not been covered in this year – excise duties, customs fees and turnover
tax). Therefore, we must know of every truck entering and exiting Krajina. In
that way the position of the municipalities will be improved.
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Likewise, we will not permit that everybody pays salaries as they wish (es-
pecially state organs, SDK /Public Auditing Service/, banks). That is why
we have taken a decision that nobody can have higher basic salary rate from
the one which has been defined, and that is how we will achieve the internal
unity.
When the strategic issues of the defence of the RSK are in question -
equipment, aircraft, rocket system – we will not be satisfied and we will not
accept the idea that the “Jastreb J 21” remain with us. We will request the ad-
ditional part of the equipment that is due to us from the SRJ, since the chances
of them attacking us and not SRJ are much bigger.
A strong defence is a guarantee for peace. A strong defence will enable a
counterattack. Gentlemen in Zagreb may now that we are growing stronger,
it is even desirable.
Something regarding the shortage of ammunition which Mr Bjelanović
mentioned:
We have to discuss that at the Federal level, in order to ensure that
part of the equipment urgently. If the aggression takes place, we must have
that.
When talking about mines, our position is that we have to provide support to
our own production in Teslingrad and also we should manufacture more of
them that we had before.
We have made an agreement with the Nikšić Iron Works /Željezara/ to give
them the propane butane in exchange for shells.
Propellant – fuel and bullets are the reasons why the Serbs got killed on Oz-
ren.
We have filled our stocks in the spring sowing (184,000 hectares of land) and
we have a surplus of food. That is important if they attack us.
We have entered into a business with Montenegro regarding the fuel. We will
transfer the received fuel to the Central Warehouse. We can buy additional
2,000 litres of oil. The oil should be provided to the most endangered ter-
ritories.
We have started with the overhaul of the Mirkovci NIK /?Oil and Industrial
Combine/. We are putting three oil-wells into working order and we will have
a crude oil.
I would like to stress that we will give a part of the timber to the SVK and
therefore the Army should be in the permanent contact with the Government.
A part of the fuel should be provided by Yugoslavia.
In the end, Prime Minister Mikelić voiced a protest because General Čeleketić,
Chief of Staff, was not present at the session. He has pointed out that it was a
serious discussion and that they were obliged to be present.
This expose of Prime Minister Mikelić was accepted as a conclusion of the
today’s session.
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The items from the yesterday’s session of the Government
have been discussed.
n the proposal of Minister Budić, the following
AGREEMENT
for the Coverage of the Professional Soldiers from the Republican Fund
(Attachment no. 1)
has been reached.
Item – 1
1.1 Minister Perić talked about the Decision on the amount
and method of
calculation of salaries in the RSK (Attachment no. 2). The discussion was
opened thereafter.
Following the request of Minister Ratković that the overtime
be paid, Minister Perić has proposed the following wording to be added under
Article 3 “as well as the compensation for the overtime”.
Minister Perić – we cannot incorporate everything into the Decision, every
single detail.
Minister Đurić – there is a difference between the overtime and the duty ser-
vice. There will be big problems in the health services.
Minister Ratković – accepts the Decision but requests that this issue be re-
solved since some employees have received compensation for the overtime
and some have not. It should be resolved.
Minister Veselinović – I am for this Decision, and if in the course of time
problems arise, we will pass the amendments.
The following
DECISION
on the Amount and Method of Calculation of Salaries in the RSK
(Attachment no. 2)
has been taken.
Item – 8
8.a. Mr Lopac delivered a report about the Rule Book on Organisa-
tion, Activities and Methods of the Agency for Business Relations with the
International Organisations (Attachment no. 3), after which a discussion was
opened.
Minister Tanjga has proposed that the Agency be adopted urgently since it is
necessary.
Minister Veselinović – /has said that/ Minister Funduk should do some more
work on the Rule Book, making a remark about 5% of services (Article 15),
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since he considers that to be too much. The textual part will be prepared for
the next session.
The following
CONCLUSION
has been reached that the textual part be prepared for the next session of the
Government.
Item – 4
1.1. Assistant Minister of Justice Radić has talked about the Pro-
posal of the Law on
Territorial Organisation of the RSK and the Local Self-government (Attach-
ment no. 4) and after that the discussion was opened in which the following
took part:
Minister Babić – a person who was preparing this Law has not been updated
with the recent events. He has made objections to Article 10, Article 3, Ar-
ticle 22, Article 7, Article 8, Article 13, etc. There are technical deficiencies.
Article 45 is unnecessary.
After those remarks, Minister Babić has proposed that the Law be withdrawn
and revised for the next session (Draft Law).
Minister Perić has added that the previous and this Law should be elaborated
(there are contradictions between them).
Upon finishing the discussion, the following
CONCLUSION
has been reached that a Draft Law together with the amendments
should be prepared for the next session of the Government.
1.2. Draft Law Amending the Law on the State Administration (At-
tachment no. 5)
will be discussed at the next session of the Government.
On the proposal of Minister Budić, the following
DECISION
on Granting Funds for the Construction of the Infrastructure for Prefabricated
Facilities at the Location of Senjak
(Attachment no. 6)
and
DECISION
on granting 40,000 Dinars for the JKP /Public Utility Enterprise/
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 20 12/16/2010 2:36:52 PM 21
(Attachment no. 7)
have been made.
The following
DECISION
on the Appointment of the Assistant Minister of Defence of the RSK
(Attachment no. 8)
has also been made.
Number:
Knin,
SECRETARY OF THE GOVERNMENT
PRIME MINISTER
Savo Štrbac
Borislav Mikelić
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LIST
OF THOSE PRESENT AT THE THEMATIC SESSION OF THE RSK
GOVERNMENT HELD ON 06 JULY 1994 IN KNIN
No. First and Last Name Function Signature Telephone no.
1. Mikelić Borislav Prime Minister /signed/
2. Tanjga Rade /signed/
D o m a z e t o v i ć
3. Ljubomir /signed/
4. Ratko Veselinović Minister of Finance /signed/ 62-093
5. Perić Slobodan Minister of Labour /signed/
MEP /expansion un-
6. Milivoj /?/Krička known/ /signed/ 719-034
7. Đurić Ljubiša Minister for Urban Plan- /signed/ 719-011
ning
Minister of Traffic and
8. Milan (/illegible/ ?Communications /signed/ 719-154
MUP /Ministry of the In-
9. Prijić Ilija /signed/ 62-063
terior/
10. Stevo Ratković Education /signed/
11. Bosnić Mile Commerce and /illegible/ /signed/
12. Petrović Branko /signed/ 719-172/078
13. Simo Šijan Minister of Agriculture /signed/ 719-147
14. Vojnović Milivoj Minister of Sport /signed/ 719-236
15. Đurić Stevan Minister of Health /signed/ 718-068
16. Funduk Uroš Justice /signed/ 60-017
17. Krajnović Neđo Head of Financial Service /signed/ 2102
18. Šuput Milan Minister of Defence /signed/ 60-145
19. Vignjević Mile /signed/
PKPo /Assistant Com-
20. Mirko Bjelanović mander for Logistics/ of /signed/ 62-601
the SVK
Chief of the CZ /Civilian
21. Milović Sava Protection/ in the MO / /signed/ 60-477
Ministry of Defence/
22. Dobrijević Branko Chief of the VPS /?Naval /signed/ 60-145
Sector/
Head of the Section in the
23. Arula Dmitar MO /signed/ 60-145
24. Ćakić Siniša Head of the Department in /signed/ 60-145
the MO
25. Milan Babić /signed/
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Annex 121:
SfRy, Chief of peRSonnel AdminiStRAtion of the
fedeRAl SeCRetARiAt foR nAtionAl defenCe,
oRdeR no. 2-77, 22 ApRil 1992
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Annex 122:
RSK, 18th CoRpS., CommAnd no. 7-214/1, 16 ApRil 1994
COMMAND OF THE 18 CORPS th
MILITARY SECRET
Confidential no. 7-214/1 CONFIDENTIAL
th
16 April 1994
Pers. /?Personnel/,
inform the AVS /?Active Military Service/
th
about this 17 April
Submission of the decisions regarding
the manpower and the Information
th
To: Command of the 54 pbr /Infantry Brigade/
We have received the Information, confidential no. 5/13-85/15 April 1994
from the GŠ /General Staff/ of the SVK /Serbian Krajina Army/ of the fol-
lowing contents:
“At the meeting of the Collegiate Body of the commanders of the SVK held
on 12 April 1994 that was attended by Colonel Medaković Stevan from the
Personnel Department of the 40 KG /sic, probably KC – Personnel Centre/,
certain positions regarding the solutions concerning the SVK manpower were
adopted and we are informing you herewith about the most important ones:
1. The professional officers and non-commissioned officers of the Serbian
nationality who
were born in the territory of the former Republic of Croatia and who have
been sent to the military schools from the municipality of that Republic shall
be transferred to the 40 KC..
2. The professional soldiers and the Cl /civilians/, the security organs, intel-
ligence organs, members of the information service, medical and legal units
shall be sent pursuant to Article 58 of the Law on Yugoslav Army.
3. The professional soldiers and civilians from the Novi Sad and Priština
Corps and the Special Units Corps, the persons on contract and the persons
whose exemption was requested by the commanders of the Armies, RV /Air
Force/ and PVO Anti-aircraft Defence/ and RM /Navy/ due to the require-
ments of the b/g /combat readiness/ of the units in which they serve, which
was approved by the Chief of the GS /Main Staff/ of the VJ.
4. All persons who have been transferred cannot request the return to the
VJ, only the transfer, while the persons who have been sent may get the re-
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turn. The position of the Collegiate Body is to approve the return only to the
persons who were not born in Krajina and those who really have justifiable
reasons (serious disease). The PU /Personnel Administration/ is responsible
for the transfer into the VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/, the GŠ of the SVK
is responsible for the transfer from one corps into another within the 40 th
KC, and within the Corps it is the Corps Command, which can be achieved
through a Proposal for deployment into another unit.
5. The transferred persons shall have the right for a compensation of the costs
of living separately from their families or a compensation for the increased
costs of accommodation, if they do not have the apartment, or other compen-
sations pursuant to the Rules of Procedure, as of the date of the transfer from
the Order.
The decisions on the number of transfers shall be made by the Personnel De-
partment of the 40 KC and other decisions the commanders of the units.
6. Proposals for regular promotions (except for the rank of Colonel) shall be
submittth by the Corps Commands directly to the Personnel Department of
the 40 KC and for the Colonels and exceptional promotions through the GS
of the SVK.
Authorised by the Commander
Colonel
Jovan Novaković”
: / P M A T S /
MILITARY POST
9165
Confidential no. 37-153
0 2 thApril 1994
I N A U K O
The Information is being submitted to you for your information, and you brief
the professional officers and non-commissioned officers, members of the VJ
on it.
MV/MM
Submitted to:
st th th
51 th54 and 98 pbr and
18 map /Mixed Artillery Regiment/
- a/a /Files/
PNS /expansion unknown/
OMPP /Organisation, mo-
bilisation and Personnel Af-
fairs/
Captain
Vujić Marko
stamp and signature
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Annex 123:
minuteS of the 19th SeSSion of the goveRnment of
the RSK, 31 deCemBeR 1991
/hand-written/: DAZ, NG RSK 35
MINUTES
of the 19 Session of the Government of Republic of Serbian Krajina held on
31 December 1991 in the Municipal building, Room number 51
The following were present at the session: Prime Minister Dr Milan
Babić, Risto Matković, Dr Vaso Ležajić, Milan Bauk, Veljko Stojisavljević,
Dušan Badža, Vukašin Babić, Dušan Vještica and Milan Martić.
Having established the presence of the majority of the Gov-
ernment members, Dr Milan Babić proposed the following:
AGENDA
1. Information by the Prime Minister regarding the engage-
ment of the Peace Forces of the UN;
2. Decision on the Re-engagement of the Krajina Territorial
Defence into the Reserve Rorce of the Krajina Police;
3. Decision on Obligatory Wearing of the Coat of Arms of
the Republic of Serbian Krajina by the Uniformed Of-
ficials.
4. Taking Decision on the territorial organisation of the Re-
public of Serbian Krajina /crossed-out in handwriting/;
5. Decision on Placing the Signposts on the Public Roads
with the Coat of Arms of the Republic of Serbian Kra-
jina and with the Inscription reading: Republic of Serbian
Krajina;
6. Decision on the Ban on the Export of Food, Livestock and
other Commodities from the Territory of the Republic of
Serbian Krajina;
7. Enacting the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina.
DISCUSSION ON THE AGENDA
Item 1
Dr Milan Babić has given the exposition on this Item pointing out that
he was present
at the session of the Presidency of Yugoslavia at which it was said that at the
tomorrow’s session the Presidency would adopt the Plan of the Cyrus Vance
on the deployment of the Peace Forces. He was furnished with that concept
of the engagement of the Peace Forces and it is basically the same as it was
before.
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According to that Plan, the military and police Forces of the UN shall
be engaged and four areas have been defined which will be demilitarised and
treated as the territories under the protection of the UN. The positive thing
compared to the former concept is that the regional police forces could be
formed and the weapons could be kept in the depots, under the control of the
UN.
The Prime Minister Babić has repeated the known positions of the
Government, with the explanation that such protection of the UN is uncertain
for us since it will be provided for six months and for every new extension of
the stay of the Peace Forces all permanent members of the Security Council
should give their consent.
The Prime Minister Babić has made a comment that some of the per-
manent members of the Security Council could impose veto over the exten-
sion of the stay of the Peace Forces.
The answer he has received to that is that the Army guarantees the
security and it will be staying by the border of Krajina. He has stressed then
that the offered concept is unacceptable, and one of the reasons being that the
territory which is being placed under protection is territorially split up.
He has mentioned the request to define Krajina integrally, that is, to
integrate Northern and Southern Krajina and join the territory of Jasenovac
and Okučani, and define the Eastern Slavonia as Eastern Krajina. He has
requested to officially keep the Army in the territory of Krajina for the pres-
ervation of the subjectivity of the Yugoslav territory and Krajina as a part of
Yugoslavia and also not to disband the units of the Territorial Defence.
Dr Milan Babić has stressed that he will not oppose the decisions of
the Presidency in connection with that disagreement with the concept, since
it would create chaos and complete destabilisation, but on behalf of the Gov-
ernment and the Assembly he will continue to support his concept. It has
been said at the level of the Presidency of Yugoslavia that it will bear all the
consequences for its decisions, but also it will give a guarantee on behalf of
the Presidency of Yugoslavia. The Plan of Cyrus Vance which contains the
concept of the system of the future Yugoslavia has been accepted at the level
of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, since it proposes a mixture of a federation
between Serbia and Montenegro, a confederation between Bosnia and Herze-
govina and Macedonia and an association between Croatia and Slovenia. That
Plan does not define the area of Krajina.
The Prime Minister Babić has stressed that every possible effort
should be made by our side in order to create conditions for security. First of
all, we have been given the possibility to establish the regional police force.
Secondly, we can keep as much equipment and military hardware as possible
and thirdly, we have to prepare the manpower to take over that equipment and
hardware. We have to aim at the deployment of the Peace Forces at the pe-
ripheral areas of Krajina and formally in the inner part of the territory, and to
reduce the internal control of the police monitors of the UN to the minimum.
Regardless of the fact that the UN troops are the Peace Forces, their engage-
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 39 12/16/2010 2:36:54 PM 40
ment is inclined towards one political solution since they define us as a special
territory.
Risto Matković has said that there is a danger that, when the Peace
Forces come, the Croatian side tells them to leave since it has been prepar-
ing the war operations - and what would happen then? He thinks that Croatia
should be at least partially disarmed since we can easily meet he same destiny
as all territories which were under the control of the UN. He has pointed out
that the Government should stand by the previously taken positions.
Milan Martić has stressed that we have to find a way how to keep the
military hardware and the manpower.
Risto Matković has said that, unlike Bosnian Krajina, for our Krajina
it is important that we have established our police and the authorities to pro-
tect our territory.
Dr Milan Babić has stressed that we can be satisfied with the special
status we have been offered by the UN since, in that way, we have been ex-
cluded from the Republic of Croatia.
Thepreviouslytakenpositions regardingtheengagementofthePeace
Forces of the UN have been unanimously supported.
Item 1) is attached to the Minutes and is considered as its constituent
part.
Item 2
The Prime Minister Babić has proposed that the Decision on the In-
crease of the Reserve Police Strength be adopted as of today’s date and that a
battalion is to be formed in every municipality and a brigade in the territories
under the security centres.
Nobody has asked to take part in the discussion, so the Draft Decision
has been put to the vote.
The Decision on the Re-engagement of the Territorial Defence of Kra-
jina into the Reserve Police Force of Krajina has been taken unanimously.
The said Decision is attached to the Minutes under 2) and it is consid-
ered as its constituent part.
Item 3
Milan Babić has presented the exposition on this Item of the Agenda
pointing out that all employees of the public enterprises should wear insignia
on the uniforms, namely the coat of arms of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
There were no other proposals or remarks, so the Draft Decision was
put to vote.
The Decision on Obligatory Wearing of the Coat of Arms of the Re-
public of Serbian Krajina for the Uniformed Officials has been taken unani-
mously.
The said Decision is attached to the Minutes under 3) and it is consid-
ered as its constituent part.
Item 4
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The exposition on this Item was provided by Dr Milan Babić who
has pointed out that, according to the Vance Plan it has been proposed that
the composition of the local police be proportional to the composition of the
population before the armed conflicts. He says that some problems will arise
regarding the Municipalities of Slunj, Drniš, partially Vrlika and Petrinja,
therefore his proposed solution is that, Sisak specifically be administratively
linked with the Municipality of Petrinja, thus increasing the percentage of the
Serbian population in Petrinja. It is reckoned that the Croatian authorities will
request the return of population.
Milan Martić has proposed that a decision be taken to ban the return
of those inhabitants who took part in the enemy armed information /sic, prob-
ably formations/ against the Serbian people.
Dušan Badža has given the example that the representative of the
Croatian Parliament /Sabor/ for the Municipality of Obrovac issued an indict-
ment against 120 people from Obrovac.
Risto Matković says that an atmosphere should be created in the pub-
lic to prosecute those persons who perpetrated the crime of participation in
the enemy forces
Nobody else has asked to take part in the discussion.
The Draft Decision has thereupon been put to vote.
The Decision on the Territorial Organisation of the Republic of Ser-
bian Krajina has been taken unanimously.
The Decision is attached to the Minutes under 4) and is considered as
its constituent part.
Item 5
The exposition on this Item of the Agenda was provided by Dr Milan
Babić who has stressed the need to put the border posts on all the roads enter-
ing into the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
There were no other proposals and the Draft Decision has been put to
vote.
The Decision on Placing the Signposts on the Public Roads with the
Coat of Arms of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and with the Inscription
reading Republic of Serbian Krajina has been unanimously taken.
The Decision is attached to the Minutes under 5) and it is considered
as its constituent part.
Item 6
The exposition on this Item of the Agenda was provided by Risto
Matković.
He has proposed that the exceptions to this Decision be authorised
based on the Government’s decision.
The Decision on the Ban of Export of Food, Livestock and other
Commodities from the Territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has been
taken unanimously.
The said Decision is attached to the Minutes under 6) and it is consid-
ered as its constituent part.
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Item 7
The exposition on this Item of the Agenda has been provided by Risto
Matković who has stressed that this Code is in keping with the general pro-
visions of the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia. This Code has provided for the
possibility to pronounce a death sentence for the aggravated forms of murder.
It is in keeping with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, since
it stipulates the provision that the death sentence may be exceptionally pro-
nounced for the aggravated crime against life and limb. Risto Matković has
provided the explanations of all the crimes as per the chapters pointing out
that they are identical to the Criminal Code of Serbia and in keeping with the
Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. He has enumerated some new
crimes in this Code. Risto Matković has appealed that the Criminal Code be
adopted pursuant to Article 87 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of
the Republic of Serbian Krajina and that it be filed to the Assembly for its next
regular session. He has also added that the Code contains the regular inter-
national standards as the comparative criminal legislature. In the Transitional
and Final Provisions of this Code it is said that it will enter into force on the
eight day from the date of its publishing in the “Krajina Gazette”. Because it
is not possible to publish it now, and since the Criminal Code is in question, it
is necessary to define the minimal “vacatio legis”, therefore he has proposed
that the Code enters into force on the day of its enactment.
Nobody else has asked to take part in the discussion and the Draft
Code has been put to vote.
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has been en-
acted unanimously.
The said Code is attached to the Minutes under 7) and it is considered
as its constituent part.
Risto Matković has said that he received an official letter about the
Una Railway Line and that we have to achieve an equal position as an enter-
prise at the Federal level, since Croatia has expressed the interests in the Una
Railway Line.
With this, the Agenda has been finished and the work of the session
has been finished.
Minutes taken by:
PRIME MINISTER
Borka Lalić
Dr Milan Babić
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Annex 124:
RSK, StAte Committee foR CoopeRAtion with
unpRofoR, puBliC AnnounCement, 3 deCemBeR 1992
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
G O V E R N M E N T
STATE COMMITTEE FOR COOPERATION
WITH UNPROFOR
Number: 04-05-28/92
Knin, 03 December 1992
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
The latest report of the Secretary-General of the UN Mr. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali was expected, but not in the form and with the contents as it
has been presented in the mass media.
We have expected that in the Report the responsibility for the block-
ade of the peace operation will be shared between our side and the Croatian
side - according to the criteria not known to us, though - but we have not ex-
pected that the Government of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ would
openly be called “the root cause for the impossibility of UNPROFOR’s fur-
ther operation”. We cannot accept such qualification of the situation in the
protected area, let alone the explanation which Mr. Boutros-Ghali provided in
his Report.
The problem of demilitarisation has not been adequately presented
in the said Report, since neither causes nor consequences have been defined
when this important segment of the Vance Plan is in question. On several oc-
casions it has been pointed to the essence of the Vance Plan and the overall
peace operation mentioned under Item 7 which specifies the role of the UN
forces to ensure that “the areas remain demilitarised and that all inhabitants
of those areas be protected from threats of armed attacks”. Despite constant
attacksoftheCroatianarmedforcesontheprotectedareaandtheopenthreats
that the question of the RSK would be resolved militarily and not politically,
we have fully implemented to a great extent Item 15 of the Plan, that is, we
have fully met the obligation under items a), b) and c), while the units men-
tioned under the item d) are outside the formations of our police units and they
are the subject of processing of our judicial organs.
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The UNPROFOR Commander, General Satish Nambiar and his Dep-
uty Mr. Thornberry were informed in detail about this case in writing in the
documents dated 4 November 1992, no. 04.5.20/92 and the document no. 04-
5-22/92 dated 10 November 1992. This second letter /sic/ was also sent to the
Security Council. This State Committee expresses its surprise that so far it
has not received any reply on the receipt of the mentioned documents and
that, instead, it has to prove again something which has been already proved
and that it has to state something which has been already stated, the thing
we consider completely unnecessary since it is obvious that there are also
communications blockades in presenting our positions and proofs. The best
example of the consequences it could have is the Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral. In addition to the information in writing, General Satish Nambiar was
also verbally informed in Knin on 2 November 1992 on everything and on 19
November 1992 apart from him also the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Confer-
ence. All the stated facts have been accepted, so obviously in the course of the
further processing of information it has been selected with the aim of putting
further pressure on our organs of authorities as the only ones to be blamed
for a stalemate in which the entire Plan was brought. Therefore, we cannot
accept such qualification about the demilitarisation from the Report, since it
has been given using a one-track approach.
Particularly surprising is the manner in which the problem of the re-
turn of refugees has been presented and for which again the RSK authorities
have been blamed. The general public knows that the Croatian side has tried
to manipulate with the refugees through so-called “peace marches”, and the
Croatian Government was sternly warned about that. It is also known that
the regulations of the RSK apply on this territory, which is in keeping with
the Report of the Secretary-General which is enclosed to the Plan. The RSK
authorities have enabled that the refugees return in a legal manner and the fact
that nobody has taken this opportunity so far does not represent a problem of
this Government but it is a result of the already mentioned manipulation. On
2 November 1992, our representatives, in the conversation with the Ambas-
sador Moor /?/ of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees clearly stated that
the scope of the Vance Plan in this segment has been /illegible/, and they gave
a concrete proposal as to how the problem could be comprehensively resolved.
Ambassador Moor accepted our reasons and promised a co-operation in the
implementation but nothing else has been done since then. Therefore, it is
obvious that our organs are offering solutions again but for the reasons not
known to us the said solutions are not being implemented or the implementa-
tion is very slow. So, this State Committee cannot accept this segment of the
qualification from the Report of the Secretary-General either.
A part of the Report which refers to the check-points mentioning that
the control of 5 bridges is not permitted was also dealt with in detail in the
previously mentioned documents. It is undisputable that in almost the entire
territory of the RSK our forces and the UNPROFOR forces have been sepa-
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 44 12/16/2010 2:36:54 PM 45
rated, but it was not possible to do it at those 5 disputable locations for purely
technical reasons, which have also been described in detail earlier. The most
important thing is that UNPROFOR forces, in cooperation with the regular
units of our regular police, really control the mentioned five bridges still.
Therefore, the State Committee does not accept this qualification either, be-
cause it does not think that this problem is of an essential nature, but obvi-
ously it has a completely different background related to the pressure of the
Croatian side about the problem of borders.
The State Committee clearly does not accept the qualification that
the entire situation could be considerably improved using the pressures of the
SR /Federal Republic/ of Yugoslavia (mentioned are persuasions by Presi-
dent Ćosić and Prime Minister Panić) since allegedly the RSK cannot survive
without SR of Yugoslavia. We ourselves decide on our destiny and we have
repeated that on the numerous occasions both in our verbal contacts and in
writing. Only the legal organs of the RSK can speak in the name of the people
of the RSK and nobody else, and nobody else can take decisions which are
of vital importance for the destiny of this nation, either. We would like to
point out in the end that it is our right, that is, it is the right of those people to
/choose/ the way how it will be organised and how it will call the territory on
which they live. Likewise, it is the right of those people to organise their or-
gans of authorities since, if it was not like that, it would be a protectorate. Due
to all that the State Committee expresses its regrets for the one-sided Report
of the Secretary-General, so the Secretary-General will be invited formally to
personally see how the peace operation is progressing in the territory of our
Republic. We hope that the things will be much clearer by that time and that
the UNPROFR operation will not come into question given the fact that it is
in the interest of all the parties in conflict so far. We exclude here the Croatian
side since their positions are very well known.
T N E D I S E R P
OF THE STATE COMMITTEE
FOR COOPERATION WITH UNPROFOR
/signed for/ Zdravko Zečević, MA
/illegible signature/
/round stamp/:
The Republic of Serbian Krajina
Government, Knin
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Annex 125:
RepoRt of the SeCRetARy-geneRAl puRSuAnt to
SeCuRity CounCil ReSolution 871, 16 mARCh 1994
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Annex 126:
finAl RepoRt of the united nAtionS CommiSSion of
expeRtS eStABliShed puRSuAnt to SeCuRity CounCil
ReSolution 780, Annex vii, medAK inveStigAtion, 28
deCemBeR 1994
UNITED
SNATIONS
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. III)
28 December 1994
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)
ANNEX VII
MEDAK INVESTIGATION
Under the Direction of:
William J. Fenrick
Member and Rapporteur on On-Site Investigations,
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)
Principal Legal Analyst:
Major J. C. Holland, Canadian Armed Forces; Member of
Canada's Contributed Personnel to the Commission of Experts
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S/1994/674/Annex VII
Page 2
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 - 3 3
II. OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 7 3
III. DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 68 3
IV. ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 - 106 10
V. RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 - 108 14
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S/1994/674/Annex VII
Page 3
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Medak Pocket Operation comprises the military operations of the
Republic of Croatia (Croat), United Nations Protection Force (UN or UNPROFOR)
and, to a lesser extent, the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (Serb) forces near
Medak, Croatia, in September 1993.
2. Sadly, it is only a typical example of how war is, and apparently always
has been, waged in the Balkans.
3. It is especially amenable to legal study for a variety of reasons. The
operation was confined in both time and geography. The units involved were
limited in number. UNPROFOR reported on the operation in a particularly
detailed and helpful manner. UN forces anticipated law of war violations and
gathered much relevant information during the operation. Lastly, it was a
recent event so evidence and witnesses were still available.
II. OVERVIEW
4. The operation took place just north of the town of Medak and just
outside the United Nations Protected Area designated as Sector South. Medak
is about 150 kilometres south-west of Zagreb.
5. Before 9 September 1993, the Medak Pocket was a collection of small
rural villages and hamlets forming a finger of Serb-controlled land jutting
into Croat territory.
6. On 9 September, at about 6:00 a.m., Croat forces attacked the Pocket.
An artillery, mortar and/or tank fire barrage preceded an infantry and tank
advance. Croats attacked from the north-east and quickly killed or routed the
few Serb defenders. Overrunning the Serb defences, the Croat forces soon
captured Divoselo (StruniBi), Citluk (LiDki), Donje Selo, and the surrounding
villages. By 10 September, the Croatian army was in charge of the area.
7. The rationale for the Croat attack is impossible to determine with
certainty. Speculation includes: a rehearsal by the Croats for a larger
operation, a test of their forces by the Croats, retaliation by the Croats for
Serb shelling of GospiB, a desire by the Croats to straighten their front, or
simply a Croat desire to seize territory.
III. DESCRIPTION
8. Evidence of events during the Medak Pocket Operation emerges from
various witnesses� experiences. The following is an extremely summarized
version of their experiences.
9. Captain "1" was in command of the Serb forces in the Divo Selo area. In
the face of the Croat attack, he ordered his soldiers to withdraw. This they
did along with many local civilians. Over the next days, this mixed group
made its way by foot to Serb territory. During the escape, an unidentified
Serb soldier escaping with the group told the Captain that Croat soldiers had
spared him. Indeed, the Croats told the unidentified soldier to escape when
they could easily have killed or captured him.
10. "2" was a soldier in the Serb army on 9 September. Upon the Captains
orders, he withdrew in the face of the Croat attack. During his escape to
Serb territory, he saw the Croats burn houses and steal livestock. He came
across a body. Someone had either badly mutilated it after death or had
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S/1994/674/Annex VII
Page 4
tortured the victim before death. During his escape, he entered Citluk to try
to find food. There he came within 10 to 15 metres of a group of Croat
soldiers. He heard instructions translated into German for some soldiers.
The apparent commander said in Croatian: "Those houses are Serbian houses and
you can do anything you wish."
11. "3" was a Serb soldier on the front line at the beginning of the Croat
attack. He retreated with his comrades but became separated from them. He
came across a female body with an eye, an ear, and all right-hand fingers cut
off. "3" saw Croat soldiers setting fire to houses and stealing sheep.
12. Three other Serb soldiers all fled the Croat attack. They all report
that the only Croat activity they saw was legitimate "soldier against soldier"
combat.
13. "4", a resident of "A", was in the local Serb militia. He fled the
Croat attack and immediately returned to his home. There he saw his elderly
sister-in-law dead. A search of the scene after UNPROFOR took control of the
area revealed only some clothing. She was wearing this clothing when "4" saw
her dead body. During "4�s" escape to Serb territory, he saw Croat soldiers
killing sheep belonging to local civilians and stealing five or six tractors
owned by the local populace.
14. "5", a resident of "A", was also a member of the Serb militia. On 9
September, he was on the front line. Upon the attack he fled, returned to his
home, and warned his family to flee. While he was in hiding, before he
reached safety, he saw his tractor being stolen by the Croats. Croat soldiers
wounded him during his escape.
15. Two persons, "6" and "7", witnessed the murder of an 83 year-old blind
woman.
16. "6" was a resident of "B". He left his home at the beginning of the
Croat attack. Upon leaving, he saw the victim and a younger unidentified
woman outside her home, from about 200 metres away. About 20 unidentified
Croat soldiers came up to the victims house and ordered the younger woman
away. Then, the soldiers gunned down the victim. After this, "6" fled to the
forest with relatives, where he eventually joined a mixed group of Serb
military and civilians. They walked to safety.
17. "7", a resident of "A", was hiding in the woods also near the victim�s
house. From the woods, she saw 10 unidentified Croat soldiers approach the
victim, who was standing alone outside her home, and simply kill her.
18. "8" was a resident of "B". During the early morning of 9 September, he
tried to evacuate two wounded Serb soldiers in his private vehicle. Croat
forces ambushed the vehicle, their gunfire hitting all three vehicle
occupants. "8" believed the gunfire killed both of his passengers. "8"
escaped and hid in bushes approximately 20 metres from the ambush site. Ten
to 15 unidentified soldiers approached the vehicle, dragged the two dead Serb
soldiers out, placed the bodies near a building and set the building on fire.
In "8�s" original statement, he said one of his passengers was alive when
taken from the vehicle by the Croats. He also said that they placed both the
wounded soldier and the body of the other dead soldier in the building before
setting it afire. The correction of the original statement was not placed in
all versions of the various reports compiled by UN organizations.
19. "9", a resident of "A", fled the initial attack with her family. When
shortly thereafter she returned to her house to get shoes, she was shot and
wounded by unidentified Croat soldiers. She heard the soldiers conversation
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Page 5
from 300 to 500 metres away. The conversation showed that the Croats
deliberately targeted her as a civilian. One soldier objected to shooting at
her with, "No, its a woman"; the other replied, "It does not matter".
20. "10" resided in "A". During the 9 September attack, she was in her home.
"10s" son fled the house at the start of the attack. He took his rifle with
him. No one has seen him since, and he is presumed to be dead. An
unidentified Croat soldier saw her through a window then threw a grenade into
her house. The subsequent explosion wounded her. The same soldier entered
the house and fired into the room in which she lay. This gunfire did not hit
her. Wounded but still in her house, "10" observed two Croat vehicles pull up
disguised as UN vehicles (i.e. white with "UN" lettering). These vehicles
carried Croat military forces. She heard instructions, translated between
German and Croatian, to slaughter everything and leave nothing. She saw
Croats killing her sheep and pigs. During her escape, she also saw Croats
killing domestic animals, burning houses and stealing roof tiles. She
eventually made her way to safety.
21. "11" lived between "B" and "A". He and his family escaped to the woods
at the beginning of the attack. He fled with his rifle. From hiding, he
returned to his house on 10 September. There he found all his possessions
destroyed, his animals mostly dead or injured and his house burning. During
the several days it took "11" to reach safety, he was shot at several times
and eventually wounded. A neighbour accompanied "11" during most of the time.
22. "12", a resident of "B", also fled during the attack carrying his rifle.
On 10 September, while still in the area, Croat soldiers discovered him and a
friend. The Croats arrested both and ordered them to turn over their weapons.
A Croat soldier then used his rifle to hit "12". "12" fled with the Croats
trying unsuccessfully to shoot him. His friend apparently did not escape, not
having been seen since. He spent the next several days hiding in various
houses and in the forest in the area. During this time, he discovered Croats
had taken the furniture and animals from his house. "12" observed the Croats
stealing sheep, cows, and horses belonging to others. He was shot at by
Croats twice and wounded in the leg on the second occasion.
23. "13", a resident of "A", fled the 9 September Croat attack. During his
escape, he saw civilian Croats stealing cattle, including his own cows and
calves.
24. "14" a resident of "A", escaped from her house on 9 September. During
the several days she spent in the woods before she made her way to safety in
Medak, she saw Croat soldiers burning houses and throwing grenades into
houses. Other Croats fired upon her while she was walking to Medak.
25. "15" lived in "C". She entered the Pocket on 26 September to look for
her sheep. While searching, she came across the body of a dead female, whose
fingers were cut off.
26. Many witnesses report joining up with groups of fleeing Serb soldiers or
mixed groups of fleeing Serb civilians and Serb soldiers.
27. Many male civilian residents of the area carried or fled with their
rifles.
28. There are many witnesses available who, while not seeing any illegal
activity by Croatian forces, can establish the general non-damaged nature of
the area prior to the attack and the non-military use of most of the civilian
houses.
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29. Within several days of their attack, Croatian authorities showed a
willingness to withdraw to their 8 September positions. Serb artillery
attacks on Karlovac and a Serb missile attack on Zagreb may have prompted this
willingness.
30. Negotiations took place, and the parties eventually agreed that the
Croats would withdraw to their 8 September positions, and UN forces would
occupy the territory vacated by the Croats. UN forces consisted of Canbat I,
the Canadian battalion of the Princess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry. It
was augmented by two companies of infantry from two separate French
battalions. The Croat withdrawal and insertion of UN forces started on 15
September and were originally to be completed by 6:00 p.m., 16 September.
31. During the evening of 15 September, UN and Croat authorities held a
meeting to iron out the implementing details of the original agreement.
32. As the UN forces began to deploy into the Pocket on 16 September, they
could hear tens of explosions and see new smoke rising from Croat-controlled
territory. There were no Serb forces in those areas nor had there been for
many days. Such explosions and smoke had not been seen before 15 September.
They also heard small arms fire from the same area. There are many witnesses
to this including nearly all Canbat I personnel, UNMOs, UNCIVPOLs, UN civilian
personnel, UN and Canadian Forces public affairs personnel and news reporters.
All suspected that the Croats were engaged in ethnic cleansing of the Pocket
before turning it over to the UN.
33. During the morning of 16 September, several more meetings took place
between Croat and UN authorities. As a result, the time by which UN forces
were to complete the takeover of territory evacuated by the Croats was delayed
24 hours until 17 September.
34. At noon, 16 September, Croat forces prevented Canbat I soldiers from
crossing into the Pocket. This was a violation of the agreement. UN public
affairs video and radio, plus Reuters news agency, videotaped this delay.
Additionally, there were numerous witnesses to this delay. UN personnel felt
the delay was a deliberate tactic used by the Croats to give them more time to
complete their ethnic cleansing of the Pocket. UNPROFOR pressed the Croats,
and after a delay of about two hours, they allowed UN forces to enter the
Pocket.
35. The explosions and smoke from fresh fires continued to be evident from
Croat-controlled parts of the Pocket throughout the Croat withdrawal. Again,
there are many witnesses to this, including all UN personnel involved in the
operation.
36. As UN forces entered the Pocket, they found every building burning or
demolished. There were hundreds of such buildings in the several villages and
hamlets, none of which were habitable. Special sweep teams assessed and
recorded damage, searched for survivors and collected bodies. The teams
included UNPROFOR medical officers, UNCIVPOLs, and soldiers.
37. On 16 September, in the Medak Pocket, "16" saw the crest of the Croat
Ninth Mechanized Brigade (Ninth) on several Croat army trucks. He also saw
the crest of the Croat 111th Home Defence (HD) Brigade (111th) on a Croat army
truck.
38. "17" noted Croat soldiers with the shoulder flashes of the Ninth
Brigade. On 16 September, he saw Croat police of the Special Police in the
Medak area. He witnessed the explosions and fires that preceded the Croat
withdrawal. He also saw the complete destruction throughout the Medak Pocket.
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39. "18" heard the explosions and saw the fires within Croat-controlled
territory on 16 September. He questioned a Croat liaison officer about these.
The Croat officer replied that maybe the Croats were destroying their own
homes in the area. "18" also observed that the Croat troops within the
territory did not react to the explosions as they would to incoming artillery.
He witnessed the total destruction and devastation throughout the area. He
saw no house undemolished and took photographs of the damage.
40. Also on 16 September, "19" saw about 15 Croat Special Police at Drjlei
in the Pocket. These Special Police appeared fresh, probably having recently
arrived in the area.
41. During a 16 September meeting held at 10:00 a.m. an UNPROFOR officer
specifically asked a Croatian officer to stop the explosions and fires in
Croat-controlled territory. The Croatian officer clearly ordered to ensure
his troops stopped those actions.
42. Two more representations to the same effect were made to the Croats that
day. The Croats said that Croat soldiers were firing into the houses, but
that Croat forces were causing the explosions by detonating mines to make the
area safe.
43. On 17 September, after personally viewing the destruction in the Pocket,
an UNPROFOR officer expressed his disappointment at this devastation to Croat
officers. The Croats offered no explanation, but said they would again warn
their troops.
44. Also on 17 September, during a dispute between UN forces and the
Croatian Army on the exact proper location of their respective forces, an
UNPROFOR officer met a Croatian officer in the Pocket. The Croatian officer
had a map and was plainly in charge of the Croat forces. The map had been
obviously and crudely altered, and it no longer represented the earlier agreed
upon placement of various forces.
45. On 19 September, Croatian and UNPROFOR officers met and discussed the
exact boundaries of the UN zone of responsibility in the Pocket.
46. On that same date, an UNPROFOR officer met Croatian officers. During
this meeting, a Croatian officer threatened to have his Croat forces fire on
UN forces, if he did not receive the cooperation he wanted.
47. On 22 September, a meeting was held to finalize the agreed upon
positions of Croat and UN forces in the Medak Pocket. A Croatian officer
signed a map depicting the agreed relative positions.
48. The Medak Pocket area falls within the area of responsibility of the
Croat OZ GospiB. Croat units involved were largely from OZ GospiB. Some
Special Police Forces from OZ Split were seen during the operation, but their
role seemed to be secondary.
49. The nominal OZ GospiB Commander was a particular Croatian officer.
However, during the relevant prelude to the attack and the attack itself, he
was not in command due to his absence on leave and to illness. The actual OZ
Commander was another officer.
50. The major Croat unit involved in the attack was the Ninth Mechanized
Brigade (Ninth), which is unofficially called the "Wolves". It had been
designated the 6th Mechanized Brigade until about July 1993. The Ninth was
directly responsible to OZ GospiB. Graffiti left on the walls of buildings in
the Pocket by Croat forces included the "Ninth" and "Wolves".
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51. The 111th also participated in the attack. Miscellaneous other Croat
army units formed a minor part of the attacking forces.
52. The UN Military Information (MI) Branch (at UNPROFOR headquarters and
elsewhere) compiles orders of battle (orbats) for all the protagonists in the
former Yugoslavia.
53. UNPROFOR units sweep teams recovered 18 bodies in the Pocket in the
immediate aftermath of the operation. Croat authorities turned over another
64 bodies they said they recovered in the Medak Pocket. These bodies were all
given to the Serb authorities. Of all the bodies recovered, 59 (71 per cent)
were probably those of soldiers and 23 (29 per cent) those of civilians.
Among other factors complicating the determination of military status is that
many civilians wear items of military clothing and many local military wear
items of civilian clothing.
54. Serb authorities have identified most of the bodies. There are no
reported witnesses to the deaths of any of the bodies identified.
55. Medical officers examined many of the 18 bodies recovered by UNPROFOR.
The preliminary field examinations and the circumstances in which the bodies
were found revealed:
(a) Some suspicious circumstances, e.g., two badly burned bodies were
found in a concrete chicken coop that could have been used as a jail, spent
casings found near bodies, one body tied up, etc.;
(b) Some bodies had injuries that might have occurred before death,
e.g., broken legs, a broken neck, a smashed face;
(c) Some evidence of either pre-death torture or post-death
mutilation, e.g., missing ears, eyes or fingers; and
(d) A perhaps higher portion of head and close range wounds than might
be expected.
56. These examinations led a medical officer to place the times of death
from 24 to over 96 hours before discovery of the bodies, with six having died
after 14 September.
57. Serbian authorities had a doctor conduct an examination of the bodies
turned over to them by the Croats and UNPROFOR. Only one full autopsy was
done. UNCIVPOL describes the rest of the examinations as "cursory". After
this, Serb authorities quickly turned over the bodies to relatives for burial.
58. The Serb authorities prepared a postmortem report and gave it to Major
Holland. He passed it on to Dr. Robert Kirschner, an experienced pathologist
with the independent group, Physicians for Human Rights. Dr. Kirschner's
report states that regarding the bodies recovered by UNPROFOR, "there is
insufficient evidence to document an execution style slaying". Of those
bodies turned over to the Serbs by the Croats, "I could find no evidence to
suggest a pattern of extra-judicial executions". His opinions regarding both
groups cannot exclude some murders and admit some suspicious circumstances,
but in summary the evidence is ambiguous.
59. Dr. Kirschner�s further verbal opinion was that the earlier preliminary
field examinations and those conducted by a Serbian doctor are not reliable.
This unreliability results from the necessarily rudimentary conditions of the
field examinations, e.g., the bodies could not be washed, no x-ray equipment
was available, etc. Additionally, the medical personnel involved
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understandably lacked forensic experience.
60. The Croats claimed in an 11 October statement to the UN in Geneva that
they did not violate the laws of war during the Medak battle. They
specifically cited the cases of two elderly but apparently still feisty women
killed during the attack. They said one was killed while operating anti-
aircraft artillery and another blew herself up with a grenade to avoid
capture.
61. Most Canbat I personnel entering the Pocket witnessed the total
destruction involved. Many buildings were still on fire on 16 September.
There may be others with equal experiences. A Canbat I photographer took
1,400 photographs recording the destruction and the 18 recovered bodies. Much
of this activity was video recorded by Canbat I personnel.
62. Besides the destruction of buildings, all witnesses saw that most
livestock was killed and most personal property, including vehicles and farm
equipment, was destroyed. They noted that haystacks were set on fire, and
wells were polluted. Croatian forces had discarded hundreds of surgical
gloves throughout the area.
63. Canbat I personnel think the bulk of the destruction in the Pocket was
done on 16 September.
64. The Canbat I reports state that firewood and other incendiary materials
were seen being brought into the area by the Croats. Unfortunately, the
report does not identify the specific witnesses to this.
65. UN civilian employees and UNCIVPOLs also witnessed the same destruction.
A UNCIVPOL team member made sketches of most buildings and detailed damage
assessments of over 100 representative buildings. These assessments confirm
the total devastation in the Pocket.
66. The Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) visited the area from
27 to 31 October and on 10 November 1993. The WCIT consisted of Major Holland
and Master Corporal T. McComb, both of the Canadian Forces. The team was
accompanied by Dr. Kirschner. The team took video and still photographs,
interviewed some witnesses and gathered further materials and reports. The
team also obtained the 1,400 photographs taken by the Canbat I photographer
and arranged and conducted the videotaped assessment by Major S. Laplante (a
combat engineer in the Canadian Forces serving as UNPA Sector South Engineer)
and Chief Warrant Officer Bastid (an explosive ordinance disposal expert in
the French Army serving with UNPROFOR HQ Zagreb) of the damage to civilian
buildings.
67. The examinations of the buildings by Major Laplante and Chief Warrant
Officer Bastid reveal that the buildings were either set on fire and/or
demolished by charges set inside the buildings. Artillery did not cause the
damage nor did tank fire, mortar shells, rocket propelled grenades, nor aerial
bombardment. Canbat I personnel believed that antitank mines were used to
demolish those buildings not burned. However, neither of the above witnesses
could be that certain of the type of explosives used.
68. Croat authorities say that the widespread destruction in the Medak
Pocket was necessitated by the Serbs using the civilian homes for barracks and
the storage of ammunition. What evidence there is of military use of the
civilian accommodation is ambiguous or point to its military use by Croat
forces. The type of garbage (Croat cigarettes, newspapers, etc.) and the
direction the builders pointed the defensive positions (towards Serb
controlled areas, etc.) support usage by Croat forces.
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IV. ANALYSIS
69. The preceding reveals several potential broad categories of "serious
violations of international humanitarian law" 1 or war crimes within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal. These are:
(a) Murder ("willful killing"--Article 2(a), "murder"--Article 5(a),
unlawful targeting of civilians causing their death being a general unlisted
violation of the laws of war--Article 3);
(b) Torture ("torture or inhuman treatment"--Article 2(b), willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury"--Article 2(c), "torture"--Article
5(f));
(c) Genocide by killing (Article 4(2)(a)) or by causing serious bodily
. . . harm (Article 4(2)(b));
(d) Wanton destruction ("extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly"--Article 2(d), "wanton destruction of . . . villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity"--Article 3(b)); and
(e) Plunder ("plunder of . . . private property"--Article 3(e)).
70. The war crimes have been analysed in a pragmatic narrow legal fashion.
The analysis will seek to decide who specifically, if anyone, can be held
criminally responsible for any given crime. Dealing with a war crime, no
matter how horrendous or how clear, is in this analysis a fruitless exercise
if specific legal responsibility cannot be attributed.
71. Such an analysis will deal with those directly responsible "who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted" the crime
(Article 7(1)). Also dealt with will be indirect (command) responsibility, as
referred to in Article 7(3), of a superior "if he knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."
72. The analysis of direct criminal responsibility for any of the disclosed
war crimes is very simple. At present, there is no evidence implicating any
specific identifiable individual in the direct planning, instigation,
ordering, commission, aiding or abetting of any of these crimes. Therefore,
this analysis will concentrate on indirect, i.e., command responsibility.
73. Proof of command responsibility for war crimes will often be largely
circumstantial. Absent capturing or obtaining written orders by the suspects
or having the testimony of witnesses to the issuing of these orders, such
responsibility can usually only be inferred. Inferences of such orders of a
sufficiently reliable nature to satisfy a criminal tribunal can only be
derived from clear and convincing patterns. Under the first head of criminal
command responsibility, the patterns must be so strong that the only
reasonable inference is that the suspect ordered the commission of the crimes.
Under the second head of criminal command responsibility, the pattern must be
so strong that the only reasonable inference is that the suspect knew of the
crimes and failed to control or punish his offending subordinates or that the
suspect criminally abandoned his command.
74. As mentioned, there is no evidence identifying any specific individuals
with any crimes, including any of the murders. The only first-hand evidence
of a murder is in the murder of the 83 year-old blind woman. However, even
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here, neither of the witnesses identified the responsible individuals beyond
being "Croat soldiers". In any event, there are serious discrepancies between
the two witnesses. "6" describes 20 soldiers, "7" describes 10. Furthermore,
"6" describes a second woman with the victim, but "7" omits this.
75. The reliability of these witnesses, particularly "6", is questionable.
"6" was 200 metres away. "7" was hiding to save her life and almost certainly
greatly upset. Their opportunity to reliably observe is moot.
76. There is no convincing general pattern in the deaths occurring in the
Pocket. It is suspicious that UN troops found virtually no survivors. It may
also be suspicious that there were more head wounds and close-range injuries
than might be expected. However, the majority (71%) of the located dead were
military. Although not strictly comparable, this was a higher percentage of
military casualties than the global figures in WWII, the Korean War, or the
Vietnam War.
77. Despite the importance of the presence of surgical gloves stressed in
the Canbat I report and elsewhere, their presence is ambiguous. The sinister
explanation is a possible one. However, surgical gloves may have simply been
ordinary precautions by the Croats to deal with the legitimate dead and
wounded anticipated in any attack. The photographs of Canbat I personnel show
them also using surgical gloves.
78. A prosecutor cannot use the postmortem examinations of the bodies, as
they are unsatisfactory from several points of view. The initial examinations
in the field were of necessity cursory, done without equipment and by doctors
without forensic pathology qualifications.
79. Further, the examinations done by the Serb authorities were
unsatisfactory. They were extremely undetailed and were conducted in an
unprofessional atmosphere, i.e., the supervising judge�s drunkenness and
corruptness.
80. Thus, conclusions reached in the preceding examinations are unreliable.
As earlier mentioned, an independent examination of what material remains
(Dr. Kirschner�s report) also fails to disclose any convincing pattern.
81. Care must be taken in relying upon local witnesses. They tend to be
unreliable due to their extremely emotional attachment to their own
community�s cause and their demonization of the enemy. Witness "9" has given
several versions of her experiences. While her versions are not inconsistent,
they do not cover the same material, some of which it is surprising not to
hear in all versions. Her testimony should be confirmed and carefully
considered before presentation.
82. The irrationality of the parties to this conflict is shown by the absurd
excuse given by the Croat authorities for the deaths of the two elderly women.
They say one was killed while operating anti-aircraft artillery and another
used a grenade to kill herself rather than face capture.
83. Therefore, any reliable prosecution should be based on objective
evidence, objective witnesses, or clear patterns. One or even two local
witnesses may be insufficiently reliable to obtain a conviction.
84. Yet, even using a stringent standard, it is obvious from the many
witnesses experiences that Croatian forces fired on fleeing civilians,
killing some. However, this action cannot be proved to be illegal.
85. Many civilians were fleeing in the company of retreating Serb soldiers,
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armed Serb civilians or were themselves armed. Thus, the actions of many
Croat soldiers were possibly lawful and, at least, ambiguous. Much of the
firing was at night. They may have believed they were firing on retreating
non-surrendering enemy forces, which remain lawful targets. The law of war
does not impose a standard of perfection on soldiers. It accepts that
unfortunately civilians near military objectives may be incidentally killed
without necessarily breaching the law of war. The inherent ambiguities
surrounding this aspect of the Medak Pocket Operation make building a
prosecution for unlawful targeting of civilians difficult. The evidence is
not sufficiently reliable or clear to obtain a conviction.
86. There is even a hint of contradictory evidence. The sparing of the Serb
soldier, as related to "1" is some, albeit second hand, evidence that either
there was no express policy to kill everyone, or at least any such policy was
not strictly observed. Additionally, the witnesses naturally would not be
aware of the possibly many times they were not fired upon by Croat forces.
87. All this being said, some dead were probably murdered. However, no
individual can be proved to be directly responsible. Further, there is no
strong unambiguous pattern of willful killing emerging from the evidence
available to this point. Without such a pattern, it is impossible to affix
criminal responsibility upon the Croat commanders.
"Clearly, assignment to command military troops is accompanied by broad
authority and heavy responsibility. This has been true of all armies
throughout recorded history. It is absurd, however, to consider a
commander a murdere2 or rapist because one of his soldiers commits a
murder or a rape."
What is required is something "extensive and widespread". No such pattern
emerges from the evidence. Many commentators have criticized the General
Yamashita prosecution, which was, at least, an aggressive use of the doctrine
of command responsibility. Even at that, the prosecutors of General Yamashita
could point to tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of victims
with 286 witnesses and 423 exhibits.
88. Unlike the deaths arising from the Medak Pocket Operation, there is a
clear, obvious and overwhelming pattern of wanton destruction. Hundreds of
homes were destroyed, virtually hundreds of other buildings were destroyed,
most animals were killed or taken, virtually all personal property was
destroyed or taken, all vehicles and farm equipment were destroyed or taken,
haystacks were fired, and many wells were polluted. Devastation was total.
89. The timing of the destruction is inconsistent with any legitimate
military conduct or of military necessity. The bulk of this destruction
occurred on 16 September, according to the many eyewitnesses. The sounds of
the explosions, the rising of the smoke from fires, and the fact many
buildings were still on fire as UN personnel entered the Pocket establish
this.
90. The destruction occurred well after all Serb resistance had ended.
There was no Serb resistance in the areas from which the explosions were heard
and the rising smoke seen. All effective Serb forces had fled the area at the
time of the bulk of the destruction. The devastation was wrought in an
unopposed withdrawal, not a contested advance or retreat. Even the Croat
liaison officer was forced to use an excuse not involving legitimate combat
activity by the opposing forces. The scattered nature of the buildings, with
the brief and desultory original Serb defence, does not explain this level of
destruction.
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91. The widespread destruction by demolition and fire is also generally
inconsistent with legitimate military operations. If buildings are contested,
then demolition charges cannot usually be placed inside them. Similarly,
absent incendiary weapons, of which there is no evidence, being able to set
fire to buildings implies an ability to approach and control them. That is
inconsistent with enemy forces being present in them.
92. Various contradictory excuses given by the Croats for the destruction
suggest the lack of any legitimate excuse for such widespread destruction.
93. The reports, if confirmed, of incendiary materials being brought into
the Medak Pocket by the Croats is some evidence of planning. However, this
evidence is ambiguous. Obviously lumber and even timber can be used to
construct defensive positions as well as be used to burn buildings.
94. The Canbat I report states that any antitank mines used in demolitions
would have been centrally controlled. This indicates that their use to
destroy civilian objects would have required high level approval. Such
control is usual in a regular well-run military. However, there is evidence
that this is not always the case with the forces involved in this conflict.
Some minefields in Sector South have overlapped, indicating a lack of such
central control. Additionally, all the forces display large measures of ill-
discipline, lack of control, and disorganization.
95. There are at least two defences to this charge offered or available to
the responsible Croat authorities. A Croat press release said that the level
of destruction in the Pocket was required by the Serbs� use of civilian
buildings as barracks and for ammunition storage. This is clearly an inept
excuse. The timing of the destruction, being after Serb resistance ended,
argues against it. The extent of the destruction also argues against this
excuse. If every destroyed building had contained Serb soldiers and
ammunition, the Croats would never have captured the Pocket. Destruction by
fire and demolition, as opposed to conventional military assault, also
suggests this Croat excuse is invalid.
96. Although not yet raised by the Croats, the second possible excuse is
that this destruction was a legitimate use of a "scorched earth" policy.
However, pointing out that this excuse was not what the Croats themselves have
claimed demolishes it. They chose to rely on the use of these buildings for
military purposes by the Serbs.
97. Further, this area was not being turned over or being re-occupied by
enemy forces. The UN was taking control of it to the exclusion of the Serb
military.
98. Lastly, as a party to the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions,
Croatia is bound by Part IV, Section I of Protocol I. That treaty prohibits
this tactic even if the Croats could otherwise claim they were entitled to lay
waste to their own territory as a legitimate defensive tactic.
99. It is not practical to prosecute anyone for any torture committed during
the Medak Pocket Operation. First, it is not clear anyone was tortured. In
each instance of suspected torture, it is possible the body was subjected to
post-death mutilation and not pre-death torture. However, mutilation of
bodies is itself a conventional war crime. It is not specifically covered in
Article 3, but it is perhaps within its general ambit. The determination of
this question turns on whether mutilation of corpses is a "serious violation
of international humanitarian law" (Article 1).
100. Second, as with the suspected murders, no specific individual can be
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identified as involved in any torture or mutilation. Again, assuming torture
or mutilation could be proved, the few cases do not form any convincing
pattern that could then be attributed to commanders.
101. A particular Croatian officer was clearly in charge of the operation for
the Croat forces. The evidence is clear and convincing that he was
responsible.
102. The thoroughness of the destruction, the open nature of the methods used
(the explosions could be heard and the smoke seen by all), the orders
overheard by civilian survivors, the inherent control a commander must or
should have, and the express concerns raised by all overwhelmingly point to
his responsibility. He, by his actions and by attending at various meetings,
was clearly the responsible OZ Commander.
103. Widespread use of roadblocks by all parties in the conflict,
particularly near front lines, means that the responsible commanders would or
should know about any large-scale movements of personnel or goods entering or
leaving an area of operations. Therefore, the commanders either did know or
should have known about demolition or incendiary materials entering the Pocket
and plundered goods leaving.
104. Can responsibility be found above that officer? Another officer was
clearly in charge of the withdrawal of the Croat forces. However, he was only
sent from the Zagreb general staff on about 15 September to oversee the
withdrawal. The Croats saw the withdrawal as extremely sensitive, requiring a
high level of supervision. His responsibility is therefore problematic due to
his limited time in the area.
105. There is no direct evidence of the commander of the Ninth�s role in the
wanton destruction. However, based solely on the orbat information, a prima
facie case can be made. As the commander of the major unit involved, he is
responsible for the destruction inflicted in the Pocket, which must have
involved his unit. Graffiti in some of the destroyed buildings implicate the
Ninth.
106. The OZ Commander was replaced shortly after this battle. This, plus his
reported Albanian ethnic background, suggests that the Croatian authorities
are perhaps more likely to turn him over to the International Criminal
Tribunal than another officer of Croat background and in more political
favour.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
107. It is recommended that two Croatian officers be charged with the
following war crimes, respectively:
(a) A grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, being
the extensive destruction and appropriation of property protected under the
provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention, such destruction and
appropriation not being justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly contrary to Article 2(d);
(b) A violation of the laws or customs of war, being the wanton
destruction of villages or devastation not justified by military necessity
contrary to Article 3(b); and
(c) A violation of the laws or customs of war, being plunder of
private property contrary to Article 3(e).
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The charges involve the wanton destruction and plunder which occurred during
the Medak Pocket Operation. While the case against one officer is stronger
than that against the other, it is believed that there is also a prima facie
case against the second officer.
108. It is also recommended that no one be charged with any murder (murder,
killing, unlawful targeting of civilians or genocide related deaths), torture
or mutilation occurring during the operation. No one has been identified as
being directly responsible for such crimes. There are some suspicious
circumstances and even some probable murders. However, no convincing pattern
can be proved such that a commander can be held indirectly criminally
responsible using the doctrine of command responsibility.
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Notes
1/ From the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (Statute) Article
1. All further references to articles are to those in the Statute, unless
stated otherwise. It is interesting that virtually all these provisions are
echoed in the Yugoslav constitution.
2/ "Trial of General Yamashita", 4 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals
35.
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Annex 127:
dARuvAR AgReement, 18 feBRuARy 1993
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Annex 128:
igoR pAliJA, “peACemAKeR”, identitet, mARCh 2008
peACemAKeR
dARuvAR AgReement wAS initiAlly ReveAled By
TUĐMAN WHEN HE COMMENDED ŽELJKO ĐŽAKULA AND HIS
ASSoCiAteS BefoRe ANDREAS KHOL, SECRETARY OF THE EU-
ROPEAN DEMOCRATIC UNION, AS LOYAL SERBS WILLING TO CO-
OPERATE UNLIKE THE REBLES IN KNIN.
Author: IGOR PALIJA
Slavko Degoricija, Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1991 and one of the clos-
est associates of Franjo Tuđman at the time, published a book on the pre-war
and war time events in Croatia. Everyone will perceive the book in their own
way. Regardless whether we are going to be thrilled or disappointed by the
book the fact remains that this book is a firsthand account of the events at the
beginning of the war in Croatia in 1991. Many things are discussed in this
book for the first time, matters regarding the relations between Croats and
Serbs at the very beginning of the war that had been shrouded in secrecy, ne-
gotiations and attempts to stop the madness as well as the attempts to keep the
madness going indefinitely. Despite this, even Degoricija sticks to a unified,
we could even say, officially proclaimed, view of the Homeland war. How-
ever, he crosses the Rubicon and speaks factually, openly and correctly about
certain events. In any case, what he says is different from what is written in
the school books that are supposed to help raise the young people in the spirit
of tolerance and understanding. Degoricija titled his book “It was not in vain”,
and this title seems important to me but for completely different reasons. It
would be hard and unnecessary to speak here about everything that is written
in the book. Those who wish to learn more can just read the book themselves.
Why I feel this book was not in vain is that it contains a story of one man.
peRSonAl: Slavko degoricija, a history professor and one of the found-
ers of the independent and sovereign Republic of Croatia. At the first con-
gress of theHDZhe was elected the Chairman of the Executive Committee
of the HDZ, and in 1990 multi-party elections for the parliament he was
elected as representative. He was a Deputy Minister of Interior, minister
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 76 12/16/2010 2:37:11 PM 77
without portfolio and minister of Reconstruction. he was the chief ne-
gotiatior for the Republic of Croatia during negotiations with the local
Serbian authorities in the Republic of Croatia.
A man hated by everyone, from sinners to saints. A controversial man and an
even more controversial politician. One of the greatest Serbian dissidents in
Croatia. A man Degoricija describes as sombre, and refers to him as the most
constructive and the most cooperative Serbian politician coming from Krajina
area. A man that Serbian authorities of then Krajina referred to as a traitor and
a Croatian spy. That man is Veljko Đžakula.
There is nothing that Degoricija writes about him that is new to me. We often
spoke about the war period in Krajina and what he went through in order to
prevent further killings and property devastation.
veljko, what you are trying to do is a good thing, but i am afraid that in
the end you will suffer a devastating political defeat. with your stress on
the peacemaking you will not be able to oppose the Serbian military and
police authorities. he did not listen to me, and my dark premonitions,
unfortunately, turned out to be true... Slavko degoricja writes in his book
nije bilo uzalud /It was not in vain/, Zagreb, february 2008.
Veljko was one of the few who said NO to his people, when such a thing could
have cost him his life. Was it courage, madness or honesty, I will leave to
others to judge as I am not an objective judge. Degoricija dedicates a whole
chapter to wartime events in Pakrac and peacemaking role of Veljko Đžakula.
He writes about numerous meetings, some 7 to 8 of them, that he had with
Đžakula since 1991, with a goal of ending the war and achieving normalisa-
tion. He also writes about the first meeting between the Serbs in Western
Slavonia and Franjo Tuđman, initiated by Đžakula. The epilogue of the peace-
th
making attempts was the signing of Daruvar Agreement on 18 of February
1993, with Ivan Milas signing for the Croatian side and Veljko Džakula for
the Serbian side. The Agreement envisaged the reopening of roads, return of
all refugees and normal functioning of the government in Daruvar, Grubišno
Polje, Nova Gradiška, Novska and Pakrac Municipality. Another important
thing was that this Agreement recognised the Croatian sovereignty over the
area of Western Slavonia. Soon after the signing of the Agreement Džakula
and his associates were removed from all political functions, never the less,
they continued to implement the Agreement. After this Džakula was arrested,
maltreated and imprisoned in Knin and Glina, accused of treason, he was also
abducted in Belgrade and suffered several assassination attempts.
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 77 12/16/2010 2:37:11 PM 78
Later on Džakula was one of the most constructive and the most coopera-
tive Serbian politicians in Krajina area, and one of the people that i pre-
ferred to negotiate with. he constantly emphasised that the conflict could
only be peacefully resolved and that his peacemaking efforts would bear
fruit sooner or later... Slavko degoricja writes in his book nije bilo uzalud
/It was not in vain/, Zagreb, february 2008.
For one side Veljko Džakula was a rebel and a criminal and for the other side
he was a traitor and a spy. This speaks enough of his altruism and peacemak-
ing efforts during the warm, as his efforts, as a rule, were misunderstood and
judged by the both of the opposing parties. Simply put, those who want to
play war games dislike those who prefer peace. For them peace is boring and
something they do not know how to do. Veljko Džakula was the first politi-
cian in this area during this last war who had to serve time sentenced “by his
people” only because he did not wish to converse over the barrel the “other
side”.
VELJKO DŽAKULA, AS A FOLLOWER OF RAŠKOVIĆ, WAS
AgAinSt the ReBellion in weSteRn SlAvoniA ClAiming
thAt theRe iS no SuppoRt foR SuCh ACtionS in thiS Re-
gion... SlAvKo degoRiCJA wRiteS in hiS BooK niJe BILO
UZALUD /IT WAS NOT IN VAIN/, ZAgReB, feBRuARy 2008.
After the Operation Storm he stayed in Croatia and did not, like so many other
Krajina politicians, bravely escape. He was used as a red rag in “Veliki Hrva-
ti”. He was attacked on the street, insulted and spit on. He suffered through
it all stoically, not only because he knew he was not guilty but also because
he was certain that he did more than most to achieve peace and normalisa-
tion of relations. This is why, if for no other reason, this book has its value. It
rehabilitates the man who, at the time when heads rolled easily, and war had
its own set of rules and a clear division between us and them, had the strength
and the courage to think and act differently. This book gives us hope that
there are people everywhere at all times that defy the stupidity of their fellow
men. People striving to achieve peace, agreement, coexistence and tolerance
during the time when such notions are more of an abstract noun instead of a
real category. And this is why It was not in vain.
on21 ofSeptemBeRAttheBReAKofdAwnSome20mem-
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BeRS of SpeCiAl poliCe foRCe of the miniStRy of inte-
RioR of the RepuBliC of KRAJinA, mAde A SpeCtACulAR
ARREST OF VELJKO DŽAKULA. THEY SURROUNDED A HOUSE
IN PAKRAC AND HANDCUFFED DŽAKULA, THIS TIME AS THE
pReSident of pAKRAC muniCipAlity ASSemBly
After these events Džakula went to Belgrade, where he was abducted and
exposed to new abuse. After that he lived in villages in the vicinity of
pakrac. his experience shows that there are people among the Serbs in
the occupied part of Croatia that openly disagree with Krajina regime
and truly wish for a change but are unable to oppose the military-police
leadership capable of anything... Slavko degoricja writes in his book nije
bilo uzalud /It was not in vain/, Zagreb, february 2008.
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 79 12/16/2010 2:37:11 PM 80
Annex 129:
RSK, deCiSion on the ConStitution of the nAtionAl
ASSemBly of the RepuBliC of SeRBiAn KRAJinA And
RepuBliC SpRSKA, 24 ApRil 1993
1993, 24 April
Banja Luka
Decision on the constitution of the joint assembly of the Republic of Serbian Kra-
jina and Republika Srpska
____________________
Pursuant to the Declaration (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska, No. 17, 1992),
the Assemblies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska as le-
gitimate representatives of the Serbian people in the Republic of Serbian Krajina
and Republika Srpska, at their joint session held on 24 April 1993, have adopted
the
D E C I S I O N
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA AND REPUBLIKA SRP-
SKA
I
The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska
(hereinafter: National Assembly) is hereby constituted as the joint body of the
Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska.
The National Assembly will meet in Banja Luka.
II
The National Assembly is being constituted on parity basis from deputies of the
Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska.
The National Assembly in the foregoing paragraph will be constituted with 82
deputies from the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and 82 deputies
from the National Assembly of Republika Srpska.
III
The National Assembly will harmonize and enact the constitution, laws and other
legislative provisions concerning areas pursuant to the authority granted it by
the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the National Assembly of
Republika Srpska.
The National Assembly shall harmonize legislative provisions in the fields of
foreign policy, defence and security, justice, regional and population planning,
the rights and status of companies and other organizations, the financial system,
credit-monetary policy, customs and payments system, veterans’ and disabled
persons welfare, education, science, culture and the protection of cultural assets,
information systems and other areas of activity pursuant to the authority granted
it by the assemblies of the Republics.
(...)
Chairman of the National Assembly
Prof. Milovan Milovanović, Ph.D.
____________________
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska, 28 April 1993,
No. 1
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Annex 130:
RSK, pRopoSAl of the ASSemBlieS of RepuBliKA
SRpSKA And the RepuBliC of SeRBiAn KRAJinA to the
ASSemBlieS of SeRBiA And montenegRo ConCeRning
unifiCAtion in A Single StAte, 18 AuguSt 1994
1994, 18 August
Proposal of the Assemblies of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian
Krajina to the Assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro concerning unification
in a single state
REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
ASSEMBLY
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF MONTENEGRO
(...)
Having established that the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srp-
ska are state entities emerged after the secessionistic fragmentation of the
SFRY through the materialization of the right to self-determination and of the
principle of permanent sovereignty of the people and the nation, and that they
are entitled to take decisions on their own state, the assemblies of Republika
Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina have decided to send the follow-
ing
P R O P O S A L
ON THE UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, THE REPUB-
LIC OF
MONTENEGRO, REPUBLIKA SRPSKA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SER-
BIAN
KRAJINA INTO ONE STATE
1.TheassembliesoftheRepublicofSerbiaandoftheRepublicofMontenegro
are hereby invited to accept the Proposal on Unification into One State, and
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 81 12/16/2010 2:37:11 PM 82
to consider the procedure and the conditions under which unification could
be effected.
2. The joint delegation of the assemblies of the Republic of Serbian Krajina
and Republika Srpska is entrusted with starting, as soon as possible, talks
with the representatives of the assemblies of the Republic of Serbia and the
Republic of Montenegro in order to prepare the declaration on unification and
the draft s of other relevant documents. (...)
President of the National Assembly President of the Assembly
Momčilo Krajišnik Branko Vojnica
(stamp) (stamp)
Republika Srpska Republic of
Serbian Krajina
National Assembly Assembly
of the Republic
Sarajevo Knin
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 82 12/16/2010 2:37:11 PM 83
Annex 131:
RSK, minuteS of the SeSSion of the ASSemBly of
the RepuBliC of SeRBiAn KRAJinA whiCh AppRoved
the deCiSion on StAte unifiCAtion with RepuBliKA
SRpSKA, 29 mAy 1995
1995, 29 May
Knin
Minutes of the session of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina
which approved the decision on state unification with Republika Srpska
(...)
AGREEMENT WITH THE DECISION ON STATE UNIFICATION OF
THE RSK AND THE RS
Minister MILAN BABIĆ presented the chronological sequence of the work
of the state commission, and the variants of the name of the future state. The
common position was that it ought to be called UNITED SERBIAN REPUB-
LIC.
Afterthedebate,theothermembersoftheAssemblyalsounanimouslyagreed
with the Decision.
AGREEMENT WITH THE DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ON INTERIM CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFICATION
Accepted unanimously along with the statement of reason
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Annex 132:
exCeRpt fRom the inteRview with the SvK
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILE MRKŠIĆ, VOJSKA KRAJINE,
11 June 1995
ExcerptfromtheinterviewwiththeSVKLieutenantGeneralMileMrkšić
on 11 June 1995 published in Vojska Krajine [the Army of Krajina]:
Commander of the Serb Army of Krajina Lieutenant General Mile Mrkšić
congratulated all fighters and senior officers of the SVK the largest Serbian
historical holiday – St. Vitus’ Day.
“Everything we have done in reorganizing the SVK and all we must do more
to strengthen the defense and protection of the state, expresses a firm commit-
ment for defending and commitment to defend RSK”
“I want for everyone to welcome the next St. Vitus’ Day in peace, freedom
and united – in the one Serbian state” said commander Mrksić at the end of
congratulations to soldiers and senior officers of SVK.
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Annex 133:
ExCERPT FROM FRANJO TUĐMAN, ZNA SE, HDZ U BORBI
ZA SAmoStAlnoSt hRvAtSKe (it iS Known: hdZ in the
StRuggle foR the independenCe of CRoAtiA), ZAgReB,
1993, pp. 190-195
Dr Franjo Tuđman
ZnA Se /it is known/
hdZ /Croatian democratic union/ in the StRuggle foR the
independenCe of CRoAtiA
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 85 12/16/2010 2:37:11 PM 86
Second Volume
ZAGREB, 1993
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 86 12/16/2010 2:37:11 PM 87
Prepared for printing by:
Anđelko Mijatović
On the occasion of the Second General Assembly of the Croatian Democratic
Union
Editor:
Ivan Bekavac, MA
Editorial Council:
Executive Board of the HDZ Headquarters
Publisher:
Executive Board of the HDZ Headquarters
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 87 12/16/2010 2:37:11 PM 88
offiCeR’S voCAtion -
1
voCAtion thAt BeARS the gReAteSt ReSponSiBility
Dear officers, ladies and gentlemen,
I said something about the vocation to everybody outside - you were prob-
ably listening - so I will not repeat it. In addition, I would like to particularly
appeal to you who got your diplomas, the members of the first generation of of-
ficers, commanding officers of the Croatian Army who finished their education at
the Croatian Educational Institution, Croatian Commanding Staff School to think
about your vocation day and night. Really, there is no vocation which bears such
responsibility as this one.
In this world, from the times immemorial to-date, there has actually been
nothing new in a person’s life, in the life of a nation, even in the warfare. Only
the combat equipment has changed – from the spear and arrow to all that we have
nowadays. However, a human being has remained the same.
Therefore, reach out for the old books – starting from the old Chinese and
ancient ones, to the past century - Klauzewitz and the others and then to all those
who wrote about the Second World War and about the wars thereafter.
You will learn all sorts of things from them, but do not follow blindly any
of those, but use your own brains to think about everything.
If any of you has come across my book “War against the War”, written
almost 40 years ago, you will see what kind of things I pursued then, what kind of
literature, etc.
But, let me tell you something – all that knowledge is really necessary. You
should cherish your personality, cherish the fact that each of you is an individual
and that you are a Croat, the member of this nation and think with the heart and
soul of your nation! Do not fall under somebody else’s influence of any kind! One
should have the knowledge, master one’s skills, but have one’s own judgements.
Had we not had our own judgements, we would have neither our Croatian
Army nor our independent Croatian state now.
Ladies and Gentlemen, please recall - less than four years ago who would
believe that we would create our Croatian state? Not even among the ranks of the
Croatian people there were not those who were involved in politics exactly because
they were reading but also they were falling under somebody else’s influence,
they trusted other services - analytical, intelligence, etc., all of which calculated
that they needed Yugoslavia, and they did not need Croatia, that Croatia could not
happen. Nevertheless, we have assessed the historic period using our own judge-
ments – that the time has come for the collapse of socialism and the collapse of
multiethnic states and that in such circumstances the Croatian people, if they knew
what they wanted and if they knew how to organise themselves, they could have its
sovereignty and its independence.
This is the look at the big picture. But, gentlemen, this happens in all the
aspects of a human life.
1 The speech of the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr Franjo Tuđman to the officers,
attendees of the High Staff School upon their graduation at the Croatian Military College in Zagre▯b
on 30th June 1993
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 88 12/16/2010 2:37:12 PM 89
Therefore, you should learn, you should develop your potentials, you should
know what is going on around you, but also you should perceive your personal place,
the one of your unit, of your nation in such circumstances!
Therefore, I call upon you to develop your potentials, to be responsible.
You are not aware as to what extent every step is being monitored, the be-
haviour, knowledge of every member of the Army. That runs in the blood of every
nation and in that is how people develop trust or distrust in their armed forces. With
regard to that, we are obviously still faced with a very complex task.
Let me tell you briefly about our present situation.
Gentlemen, do not fall under the influence of all sorts of scribblers, dilet-
tantes and the like who are saying that the destiny of the Croatian state is uncertain.
The position of the Croatian state is stable. It is not only internationally recognised,
but the most responsible factors of both the European and world politics count on
it as well, they count on the fact that Croatia is situated at the very important geo-
political location, that such system was set up in Croatia which is more stable and
democratic than in any other post-communist state.
If you look at the political situation in those countries in which a collapse of
socialism occurred and in which multiethnic states were formed, then you can see
that in the states which were created in the territory of the former Soviet Union, the
former Soviet army and its currency are still in place and the former Bolsheviks and
Communists and the new democratic forces still fight there, somewhere the com-
munists even prevail, even in the countries such as Baltic Lithuania or Azerbaijan.
It is still uncertain whether the communists or non-communists will gain power in
Bulgaria and Ukraine.
Croatia does not have that, and you probably know why. It is because we
achieved the unity of Croatian people based on one program the aim of which was
to unite the sons of those who fought against each others in the last war – starting
from the Home Guards-men and Ustashas to partisans and anti-fascists who fought
for Croatia under different flags.
Naturally, rejecting all that is negative, all the deceptions, disillusions and
crimes, but taking what was positive, what they aspired for, and that is an indepen-
dent state and democracy.
Gentlemen, soldiers!
You should be aware precisely of that fact! You should respect all those con-
stituent parts of the Croatian history and those ones who fought for the autonomous
and independent state of Croatia.
We have to be aware that we could not have created the present Croatian
state under such international circumstances. They would not have recognised us
unless we had respected that anti-fascism, the anti-fascist segment of the Croatian
people from the Second World War and unless we had incorporated it into the foun-
dations of our Croatian state. Those thing that were being created both through the
Partisan Army, ZAVNOH / Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Croa-
tia/ and the Constitution. Only on such foundations we could come to the indepen-
dent Croatia. For this reason particularly you who are in the Army should be aware
of the both.
Ergo, you should respect everything from the times immemorial – the seg-
ment that was positive in the Second World War and the segment that was for the au-
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 89 12/16/2010 2:37:12 PM 90
tonomous and independent state of Croatia; without that anti-fascist segment we would
not have come to you here.
Please, nobody has the right to forget that. Those are the historic experiences
and on that we are creating and we must create our state policy, the policy for building
the army. Do not allow that all sorts of people from their narrow mindedness, who can-
not understand it, do not let them deceive you and mislead you.
And one more thing – do not let that based on such radical national programs
and ideas the provokers emerge among our ranks.
You should pursue the state policy and be vigilant when doing that! The inci-
dent that happened the previous night when a driver took a dozen Croatian soldiers to
the enemy’s territory – that is the responsibility of our services and commanders, the
concrete ones, up and down the hierarchy. You should not permit such things.
Another thing, briefly:
- We are obviously faced with the task first of all how to achieve a full sover-
eignty, how to liberate the Croatian areas from the occupation. Our people, ordinary
men, you and other units of the Croatian Army are righteously wrathful and impatient.
Why do we tolerate that? Why don’t we go to Knin, Baranja?
Gentlemen, the very moment when we will have to go, if we will have to go,
we will go, regardless of the victims. But, until that moment comes we have to get pre-
pared, individually, prepare all our units, all combat arms, all branches of service of the
Armed Forces, the entire Army, even the population, but also be aware that at the state
leadership level - and we are – we will return those areas from Knin, Baranja, Vukovar
to Ilok in a peaceful manner. Why? There are two reasons:
to have as less victims as possible. In the Maslenica operation our opponents had 600,
800 dead, according to what is said, and we had one hundred dead and two hundred
wounded.
So, we want to save, if possible, every Croatian life, every drop of Croatian
blood. We know that no nation in its history, more or less, managed to achieve full
freedom without victims.
So, we will not be deceived, and if those sacrifices are necessary, we will have
to bore them as well. The second reason, apart from saving the lives, is also the inter-
national community which was not inclined to the independent Croatia, they ask us to
give up the use of armed force. What if we get started today? The world would be pre-
pared to impose sanctions against Croatia as well, in addition to many other reasons.
Thus, we have to coordinate our state interests with the international circum-
stances. You and every individual, the Croatian Army as a whole, must be the interpret-
er of such Croatian state policy which cares for the interests of Croatia as a whole and
the interests of every Croatian man, Croatian area, etc. There should be no dilemmas
among the ranks of the Croatian Army.
Between you and me, as I have said there, you have to be politically active to
educate the Croatian and reserve soldiers and to act among the population as the citi-
zens of Croatia. The less you, as Croatian soldiers, are present in the press, on the radio
and television the better, except when it is necessary. And, of course, when you appear
there it should be solely and exclusively with the aim of interpreting the Croatian state
policy.
Our second task, in addition to the liberation of those areas, is to provide all-
embracing help to our fellow-countrymen, Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order
to preserve their subsistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to defend the areas
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 90 12/16/2010 2:37:12 PM 91
where they live, thus defending the strategic interests of the Croatian state. Since, if we
allowed, had we not provided help, had we not pursued such policy, Bosnia and Herze-
govina would have become a part of the Greater Serbia or their Yugoslavia a long time
ago if it was for the policy of the official Bosnian and Herzegovinian leadership. The
Croatian policy would lost its way under those who wished such order which would en-
sure majority and the hegemony of the Muslims and, according to the statistics, there are
44 percent of them, while Alija Izetbegović told me personally that there were already
more than half of them.
Hence, gentlemen, we have pursued such policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina
which was realistic from the point of view of the interests of the Croatian people and the
Croatian state. We did not have the illusions that that Bosnia and Herzegovina could be
Croatian up to the Drina River. And, speaking among ourselves, do not impute - if the
journalists are present - that and I do not know what else on me.
I am asking you, if somebody gave you such Croatian state, what kind of Croa-
tian state it would be - up to the Drina River - in which there would be two million Serbs
and two million Muslims? Would that be a Croatian state? Would it be worth getting
killed for such Croatian state? And how many of us would be killed and what would hap-
pen then?
There are such would-be wise men, do you know what I mean, among our sol-
diers,andcombatants,youngmentoo,whoadvocatedsuchideasfromthebeginning,We
have done everything possible for the cooperation with the Muslims. Alija Izetbegović
did not want to sign the military agreement with Croatia, from the very beginning of
the war. When the war was waged only against Croatia, he was saying that it was not
the war and that it was not their war. Later on, when they were attacked, not event then
did he want to sign the military agreement. We only managed to /sign/ the one about the
cooperation and border areas. It was constantly the tendency to proclaim also Croatia as
the aggressors in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
You have to be aware that what we have achieved with such policy – preserved
the territories in which the Croatian people live there, in Bosnia and Herzegovina – that
in that confederate plan for the resolution of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian crises the
Croatian interests have been protected to such an extent that one of the deputies, and
even one of the prominent, our Croatian men, said in a discussion: “Gentlemen, look!
Does it even happen in the history, from the times of Tomislav and Krešimir to the pres-
ent days, that the Croatian weapons and Croatian people control such a big territory as
they do today? (Applause).
Therefore, despite the resistance to the creation of the independent Croatia, de-
spite the fact that in 1991, at the end of 1991, even the most important international
factors wished we were defeated, when they wanted to deprive Croatia of its leader by
bombing the Presidential Palace /Banski dvori/ and when the consulates of foreign
countries left Zagreb the same day.
Despite that, we in Croatia have won both militarily and politically, we have
managed to preserve the interests of the Croatian people, the Croatian state and Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
We should be well aware of that historical achievement, so let us not challenge
those achievements. You, as a commanding officers, be aware of that and pass that to the
soldiers.
There is a possibility to bring the entire war to an end without further armed
complications. A new resolution will be passed in the Security Council today. You know
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 91 12/16/2010 2:37:12 PM 92
that the Secretary-General of the United Nations proposed the extension of the man-
date for three months without any changes. While he is proposing the extension of
the mandate without any changes, at the same time those European and world pow-
ers that are inclined to us - and there are not many of them - sent me an explicit and
personal advice not to undertake anything and to be patient.
However, you probably know that, I have sent a request to the Secretary-
General that we do not agree to the simple extension of that mandate, that we agree
that the mandate be extended for one month, actually that within those three months
but in the period of one month it needs to be seen whether those Serbs in Croatia,
from Knin further, will agree for the normalisation of relations. We have proposed
the opening of the road and the railway line between Split and Zagreb, Zagreb and
Županja and Okučani, power-transmission lines and oil pipelines. We put that as a
request. If within that month, the next month, Serbs agree to that then we can agree
to the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia.
So, if that is not proved in the next month, then we will call it off, we will
not agree to the extension of the UNPROFOR /mandate/. Of course, from the point
of view of the European and world politics that consider not only Croatia but Bosnia
as well and the area of the entire former Yugoslavia /sic, unfinished sentence/. But I
still think that they will have to take into consideration those requests of ours, and
that what has been said in the Resolution 815 will be confirmed, that the United
Nations will recognise the territorial integrity of Croatia and that they call for the
implementation of the Vance Plan.
I hope that the in the resolution of the Security Council – I cannot be posi-
tive but I judge that the Security Council will pass such resolution in which our
requests will be accepted. It means that they will call Serbs to accept the normalisa-
tion regarding those specific matters, which is of the crucial importance for us. So,
we have to be prepared that, if that does not happen, that is, if the Serbs from Knin
and the others do not agree to that within that month, we will be ready to provide
for the constitutional and legal system of Croatia in the entire state territory with all
possible means.
That is why we have to get prepared instead of making noise. We would not
like that, but if we have to do that then we will do that.
I am positive that it is clear to you what our policy is like, what our situation
is like and the reasons we pursue such policy.
We have been and we still are in a very delicate position when Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina are concerned. But, please, we nevertheless have the Croa-
tian state which is recognised, we have the Croatian state which is recognised not
only by Germany which is not in a position to help us efficiently for many reasons.
However, as you could see, on Monday even the American Ambassador stated that
the United States of America, as the biggest world power, not only recognised the
territorial integrity of Croatia, but the United States of America would, for their
part, do everything in order that all the territories be returned into the composition
of Croatia as soon as possible.
You have to bear in mind and to understand that when a country like China
signs contracts with Croatia, the biggest we have had so far – it is the most populated
country in the world, not only from the inhabitants point of view/sic/, with the popu-
lation of billion and 165 million. It possesses nuclear weapons too. That is a country
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 92 12/16/2010 2:37:12 PM 93
that already today has a role of second world power and it will have that role
in the future too. And when the power like that is ready to cooperate with
Croatia, then it speaks about the stability of Croatia.
Nevertheless, within those international factors who recognise us, ac-
tive are those who do not forget to tell us that we are the main culprits for the
dissolution of their flavour – Yugoslavia and who would like, because of their
spheres of influence, to make all sorts of arrangements and creations.
So, gentlemen, those are the circumstances under which the Croatian
state and the Croatian Army are. The Croatian Army has to be prepared to
ensure the implementation of that Croatian policy, that is, if we did not have
the support of the Croatian Army then we would not be able to carry out that
policy.
Therefore I appeal to you, gentlemen, officers, all of whom are the
members of the Croatian Army, to bear in mind the entire history of the Croa-
tian people when performing your officers and senior duties, from that you
can derive the perception of what we have achieved. You have to bear in mind
the overall international situation and you have to be proud of being the mem-
bers of a nation that knew how to create its state with its own potentials, its
judgements, its sacrifices, its wisdom, its prudence but also its resoluteness.,
how to create conditions for you to be the officers of your army and not of
somebody else’s.
So, let us continue our job in the same way as we have done so far.
Have trust in yourselves, in the Croatian people, in the Croatian state.
We have created it and it has been inscribed into the world’s history at
one point in time when the civilisation integration occurred, the technological
and national individualisation. There are larger or smaller nations than the
Croatian nation who did not have that courage, who did not have a capabil-
ity to put itself on a firm footing and to become a subject of the international
politics.
The Croatian nation has got that awareness, those perceptions and
those potentials. You are the constituent part, moreover, one armed part of
those nation and you have an important task, regardless of how those circum-
stances will develop this year and in the future.
Congratulations once again for completing your schooling, for per-
forming your honourable and senior duty in the interests of our Croatian
homeland.
Thank you.
(Applause)
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Annex 134:
exCeRpt fRom vJeSniK, (CRoAtiAn newSpApeR),
28 deCemBeR 1993
VJESNIK
Croatian political daily
Zagreb, Tuesday, 28 December 1993
/image/: Function for the highest military officials at the Presidential Pal-
ace
President Tuđman organised a function for the representatives of the MOD
and CAF
we rely on the peaceful way, but also on the Croatian Army
The Croatian Army must not depart from the Croatian state policy, says dr.
Tuđman
ZAGREB - On the occasion of Christmas and New Year's holidays,
President of the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo Tuđman hosted on Monday at
the Presidential Palace a function for the highest officials of the Ministry of
Defence of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Armed Forces.
In his speech, President Tuđman pointed out that international cir-
cumstances still do not allow for a definite incorporation of the Croatian terri-
tories under the supervision of the peacekeeping forces into the Croatian legal
and economic system. "We are trying", said President Tuđman, " to achieve
this by peaceful political means, in cooperation with the international com-
munity, but it is also our obligation to have the Croatian Armed forces trained
so that any given moment, if need be, they are able to liberate on their own
every centimetre of the Croatian territory."
Furthermore, President Tuđman said that the Croatian Army
cannot and must not depart from the Croatian state policy in any way. "This
must be the task of not only the Political administration, but of all the factors
in all organisational units of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croa-
tia and the Croatian Armed Forces", said President Tuđman.
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 94 12/16/2010 2:37:12 PM 95
Annex 135:
ExCERPT FROM VEčERNJI LIST, (CROATIAN NEWSPAPER),
28 AuguSt 1994
Večernji list,
Sunday, 28 August 1994
Excerpt from an interview with President of the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo
Tuđman given to the Croatian Radio Television
patience will bring the solution
we have to hold back with our army and we even have to convince our
citizens that we really must be patient so that our policy could contribute
to solving the conflict without further escalation of hostilities
ZAGREB - last night, the Croatian Radio Television broadcast a 30-
minute interview with President of the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo Tuđman,
which he gave on Brijuni to the Croatian Radio Television journalist Jozo
Ćurić. We selected several most interesting questions and replies from the
interview with dr. Tuđman.
Croatia is entering an important period regarding a decision on
the unpRofoR mandate. in terms of this mandate, what are you cur-
rently willing to accept?
This issue is clearly not only our, Croatian problem, but the problem
of the international community and the European Union, because the problem
of the occupied Croatian territories is connected with the crisis in the terri-
tory of the former Yugoslavia in general, meaning it is also connected with
the war crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If it were not for this correlation,
Croatia would be in a much more favourable position. As things are now, we
will have to coordinate our policy and our decisions with the international
factors, although it goes without saying that we will resolutely defend the
Croatian state interests in this process. With respect to this, it is my pleasure
to say that Croatia and the important international factors fully agree that
maintaining the current situation is out of the question, or this situation be-
coming permanent, which would turn Croatia into a sort of Cyprus.
Thus, in the situation as it is today, we seek and we were granted ap-
proval to start solving the problem in the UNPA area. The process of peaceful
solution to this problem has to commence with international assistance; how-
ever, we have made it clear that should the process of reintegration of these
areas into the Croatian constitutional and legal system with international as-
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 95 12/16/2010 2:37:12 PM 96
sistance fail, then Croatia would be compelled, as any other internationally
recognised state, to use all other means at its disposal.
guarantees to the Serbs
during the summer, statements could be heard in Croatia, even
from some officials, that their governments supported the integral
Croatia, within which, they said, a sort of partial federation would be
formed, whereby the local Serbs would even get the right of self-determi-
nation; this was repeated by some Croatian politicians and so on. Can you
comment on this?
Well, I am very well informed about all the opinions and proposals
coming from the official circles of the European countries and worldwide. I
firmly declare that I have not heard such proposals to solve the Serbian issue
in Croatia from any diplomatic representatives or political leaders. No one has
ever mentioned the word federation.
Therefore, the problem of occupied Croatian territories can be solved
by incorporating these areas back into the Croatian constitutional system,
while the Serbs in general, and as an ethnic community, would be granted all
civil and ethnic rights, and autonomy to the local Serbs in the two districts -
Knin and Glina - where they were in the majority before the war started. What
is envisaged in our Constitutional Act. We are willing to establish a court of
human rights pursuant to the Constitutional Act, consisting also of the Euro-
pean Union representatives.
This would make it obvious that Croatia is truly willing to guarantee
to the Serbs all the rights included in the Constitution and the Constitutional
Act, and that is what we offer them as a political solution. They will have to
accept that.
in the situation as it is today, we seek and we were granted approval to
start solving the problem in the unpA area. the process of peaceful so-
lution to this problem has to commence with international assistance;
however, we have made it clear that should the process of reintegration
of these areas into the Croatian constitutional and legal system with in-
ternational assistance fail, then Croatia would be compelled, as any other
internationally recognised state, to use all other means at its disposal
we have a prepared army
A statement could be heard that the Croatian Army is weak, not
strong enough, and that this is the reason why Croatia insists on a peace-
ful solution. is this true?
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 96 12/16/2010 2:37:12 PM 97
Where did you hear that? From Knin or Banja Luka? The Croatian
Army they mention fought and resisted the Serbian assault when the Serbian
aggressors had on their side, against Croatia, the entire Yugoslav communist
army, which really was one of the strongest in Europe. This Yugoslav commu-
nist army no longer exists, while Croatia, which was at the time only starting
to form its army, was able to resist the aggression and today we have our own
armed forces.
Today we have our ground forces, the aviation, the navy, we have an
army that is prepared, if necessary, to go to arms in order to return the occu-
pied territories and stand at the Croatian borders.
However, due to the circumstances I spoke about, because Europe
and the international community are requesting that we opt for the political
solution, and, as far as our side is concerned, we will not give cause for the
escalation of the situation so that it turns into a conflict. This is not a separate
issue just in Croatia but, as I said, it is connected to Bosnia, and many things
converge in Bosnia. Not just the direct Serbian and Muslim-Croatian conflict
and because many international factors are involved, 1914 could be repeated
there, when the First World War started. The clash of civilisations could break
out there if the world does not contain the war.
Because of the above, the Croatian army has to hold back and we even
have to convince our citizens, not just the Croatian people but all citizens of
Croatia, that we must be patient so that our policy can contribute to the ef-
forts of democratic European and international forces to resolve this conflict
without further escalation of hostilities, and in order to create the precondi-
tions for establishing a new international order on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, in South-eastern Europe, to which Croatia belongs as a Mediter-
ranean and Central European state, as well as on the territory of Balkans that
is constantly in turmoil - concluded President Tuđman.
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 97 12/16/2010 2:37:13 PM 98
Annex 136:
ExCERPT FROM PREDRAG LUCIĆ (ED.), STENOGRAMI O
podJeli BoSne (ShoRthAnd noteS on the diviSion of
BoSniA), Split, SARAJevo, 2005, BooK ii, pp 399-448
Večernji list,
Sunday, 28 August 1994
Excerpt from an interview with President of the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo
Tuđman given to the Croatian Radio Television
patience will bring the solution
we have to hold back with our army and we even have to convince our
citizens that we really must be patient so that our policy could contribute
to solving the conflict without further escalation of hostilities
ZAGREB - last night, the Croatian Radio Television broadcast a 30-
minute interview with President of the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo Tuđman,
which he gave on Brijuni to the Croatian Radio Television journalist Jozo
Ćurić. We selected several most interesting questions and replies from the
interview with dr. Tuđman.
Croatia is entering an important period regarding a decision on
the unpRofoR mandate. in terms of this mandate, what are you cur-
rently willing to accept?
This issue is clearly not only our, Croatian problem, but the problem
of the international community and the European Union, because the problem
of the occupied Croatian territories is connected with the crisis in the terri-
tory of the former Yugoslavia in general, meaning it is also connected with
the war crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If it were not for this correlation,
Croatia would be in a much more favourable position. As things are now, we
will have to coordinate our policy and our decisions with the international
factors, although it goes without saying that we will resolutely defend the
Croatian state interests in this process. With respect to this, it is my pleasure
to say that Croatia and the important international factors fully agree that
maintaining the current situation is out of the question, or this situation be-
coming permanent, which would turn Croatia into a sort of Cyprus.
Thus, in the situation as it is today, we seek and we were granted ap-
proval to start solving the problem in the UNPA area. The process of peaceful
solution to this problem has to commence with international assistance; how-
ever, we have made it clear that should the process of reintegration of these
areas into the Croatian constitutional and legal system with international as-
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 98 12/16/2010 2:37:13 PM 99
sistance fail, then Croatia would be compelled, as any other internationally
recognised state, to use all other means at its disposal.
guarantees to the Serbs
during the summer, statements could be heard in Croatia, even
from some officials, that their governments supported the integral
Croatia, within which, they said, a sort of partial federation would be
formed, whereby the local Serbs would even get the right of self-determi-
nation; this was repeated by some Croatian politicians and so on. Can you
comment on this?
Well, I am very well informed about all the opinions and proposals
coming from the official circles of the European countries and worldwide. I
firmly declare that I have not heard such proposals to solve the Serbian issue
in Croatia from any diplomatic representatives or political leaders. No one has
ever mentioned the word federation.
Therefore, the problem of occupied Croatian territories can be solved
by incorporating these areas back into the Croatian constitutional system,
while the Serbs in general, and as an ethnic community, would be granted all
civil and ethnic rights, and autonomy to the local Serbs in the two districts -
Knin and Glina - where they were in the majority before the war started. What
is envisaged in our Constitutional Act. We are willing to establish a court of
human rights pursuant to the Constitutional Act, consisting also of the Euro-
pean Union representatives.
This would make it obvious that Croatia is truly willing to guarantee
to the Serbs all the rights included in the Constitution and the Constitutional
Act, and that is what we offer them as a political solution. They will have to
accept that.
in the situation as it is today, we seek and we were granted approval to
start solving the problem in the unpA area. the process of peaceful so-
lution to this problem has to commence with international assistance;
however, we have made it clear that should the process of reintegration
of these areas into the Croatian constitutional and legal system with in-
ternational assistance fail, then Croatia would be compelled, as any other
internationally recognised state, to use all other means at its disposal
we have a prepared army
A statement could be heard that the Croatian Army is weak, not
strong enough, and that this is the reason why Croatia insists on a peace-
ful solution. is this true?
Where did you hear that? From Knin or Banja Luka? The Croatian
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 99 12/16/2010 2:37:13 PM 100
Army they mention fought and resisted the Serbian assault when the Serbian
aggressors had on their side, against Croatia, the entire Yugoslav communist
army, which really was one of the strongest in Europe. This Yugoslav commu-
nist army no longer exists, while Croatia, which was at the time only starting
to form its army, was able to resist the aggression and today we have our own
armed forces.
Today we have our ground forces, the aviation, the navy, we have an
army that is prepared, if necessary, to go to arms in order to return the occu-
pied territories and stand at the Croatian borders.
However, due to the circumstances I spoke about, because Europe
and the international community are requesting that we opt for the political
solution, and, as far as our side is concerned, we will not give cause for the
escalation of the situation so that it turns into a conflict. This is not a separate
issue just in Croatia but, as I said, it is connected to Bosnia, and many things
converge in Bosnia. Not just the direct Serbian and Muslim-Croatian conflict
and because many international factors are involved, 1914 could be repeated
there, when the First World War started. The clash of civilisations could break
out there if the world does not contain the war.
Because of the above, the Croatian army has to hold back and we even
have to convince our citizens, not just the Croatian people but all citizens of
Croatia, that we must be patient so that our policy can contribute to the ef-
forts of democratic European and international forces to resolve this conflict
without further escalation of hostilities, and in order to create the precondi-
tions for establishing a new international order on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, in South-eastern Europe, to which Croatia belongs as a Mediter-
ranean and Central European state, as well as on the territory of Balkans that
is constantly in turmoil - concluded President Tuđman.
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 100 12/16/2010 2:37:13 PM 101
Annex 137:
RSK, MilitARy PoSt 9138, SubMiSSion of infoRMAtion,
30 JAnuARy 1995
MILITARY POST 9138
Confidential number: 32-14
MILITARY SECRET
Glina, 30 January 1995 CONFIDENATIAL
Submission of the Information To: Command: a/a /files/
The Decision of the RH to bring the question of the political resolution for
the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ to a head before the expiry of the UN-
PROFOR mandate is considered to be a measure of pressure and it is viewed
as utterly wrong and harmful.
Since the possible conflict could escalate into the war on a wider scale in the
Balkans, it could be expected that the U.S.A. and particularly Europe take all
necessary measures in order to prevent it. The world expresses a special inter-
est in a potential reaction of the SRJ /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/.
A Mini-Contact Group, at the head of which is the American Ambassador
Peter Galbraith, will try to impose the “Z-4” Plan as a foundation for political
negotiations between the RH /Republic of Croatia/ and the RSK.
The Plan has been drawn up in cooperation with the RH and at the expense of
the RSK. The Plan anticipates the annulment of the Vance Plan, thus the RSK,
by accepting the status of the autonomy, will lose its political and economic
sovereignty as a state.
It is the opinion of the RSK that the Plan should be rejected, stating that it
has not been drawn up with the consent to favour the interests of the RH. It is
expected that the “Mini-Contact Group” will release the contents of the Plan
for the political solution between the RH and the RSK in the course of the 30
or 31 January 1995.
/
illegible title/
/illegible
last name/ Jovo
/
signed/
/round stamp/: Military Post 9138, Glina
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 101 12/16/2010 2:38:36 PM 102
Annex 138:
RSK, DiRective foR the uSe of the SeRbiAn ARMy of
KRAJinA, febRuARy 1995
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Annex 139:
letteR fRoM colonel RADe RAšetA, 6 JAnuARy 1995
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Annex 140:
RSK, StAte fAct-finDing coMMiSSion, RePoRt on the
cAuSeS AnD MAnneR of the fAll of WeSteRn SlAvoniA,
11 July 1995
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Annex 141:
RSK, RePoRt of the coMMiSSion chARgeD With
eStAbliShing ReSPonSibility of the MilitARy
oRgAniSAtion foR the fAll of WeSteRn SlAvoniA,
13 July 1995
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Annex 142:
Witness statement of ivan Bačić
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
BROD-POSAVINA POLICE ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL POLICE
number: 511-11-13-2 10.
Okučani, November 5th 2010
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
on the premises of PP1 OKUČANI, on 05.11.2010 , from Bačić Ivan, retired
police officer from Dubovac no. 39 about the events in May 1995 in the area
of Okučani and Stara Gradiška; started at 08.15h.
I hereby state that before the Croatian War of Independence I lived in the
place Dubovac and I was employed in the police forces in Nova Gradiška and
later in Okučani. At the beginning of the Croatian War of Independence I was
already retired.
Since my wife is Serbian, it was uncomfortable and unnecessary for me to
flee from Okučani when the problems began in August 1990. I did, however,
flee to Bosanska Gradiška for about 40 days, until the situation settled. The
Serbs from Bosnia killed the officers on Bijela stijena and that is how it all
started. I was retired from the police on 01.01.1990; most of the time I had
been working in the traffic. During the Croatian War of Independence I lived
in Dubovac, I haven't been integrated in any forces since the Serbs probably
had certain reserves regarding my loyalty due to the fact that I am Croat and a
retired police officer. I think it was in 1993 when Međački Džep was liberated
and Drago Drača (an administrator) called me and said that I had to join the
army: "I cannot protect you any longer; you have to join the army."
My unit was a communications company; we were next to the veterinarian
station, in the house of Tunja, the veterinarian. There were about 20 of us, sol-
diers, and 5-6 officers. Drago did me a favour and did not assign me to a com-
bat unit. Major Grkinić was my commander. I think he was Slavonian. I was
entrusted with a truck, headquarters' vehicle with communications system
for possible work on the terrain. I may have left the backyard with it twice, to
fill up fuel and to the service in Rudi Čajavec in Banja Luka. The rest of the
time we organised the IKM (improvised command post) in Čage – we made
1 PP – Police station
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 172 12/16/2010 2:40:35 PM 173
dugouts and shelters. Lončar Mihajlo from Okučani and mile Ostrolučan were
our signalmen. Lončar is a further relative of my wife and I sometimes con-
versed with him and entered the communications room.
I think that it was 2 – 3 days before May First when a dispatch arrived, prob-
ably from the Banja Luka Corps, the point is – from Banja Luka, stating that
an attack to Western Slavonia is underway. It was a coded dispatch and I
think Lončar decoded it. He himself was surprised by the contents and said
that Banja Luka is notifying us on an upcoming attack. I left the room so
Lončar would not have problems due to the fact that I heard the contents of the
dispatch. I suppose that Lončar then took that message to the headquarters.
Grkinić had already left, another officer had replaced him, from the area of
Pakrac or Čaglić, married in Okučani2.
I did not notice any particular activities the next day, related to possible with-
drawal or fleeing. Personally, I did not tell anything to my family because I
did not believe that an action should be undertaken. I call attention to the fact
that it was not until the early evening of 01.05. that my family left Dubovac.
When the fights began and it became obvious that the Croatian army was at-
tacking, I went home by bicycle and prepared my family for departure. My
wife knew how to drive tractor so she left with the children towards Bosnia. I
had to go back to the headquarters, but I also saw that I needed to escape.
Early in the evening, warrant officer Đumić and I also left with my commu-
nications truck towards Stara Gradiška. Warrant officer Đumić's mother was
killed in Medari that day and he had left his automatic rifle at home in Medari
that morning, not even assuming that he might need it. Đumić's vehicle did
not have an accumulator so I tried to persuade him to haul it so it could start
and so we could go to Bosnia. Later he agreed. I went first and he followed
me.
In Novi Varoš I caught up with two tanks and further continued to drive be-
hind them. Near Strug I waited for a while for the shooting to quieten. I did
not see many vehicles on the road, except for our two vehicles and the tanks
I mentioned, and my father-in-law on a bicycle. I did not pay too much atten-
tion, but I did not see any damaged or abandoned vehicles along the road.
In Novi Varoš I saw Lovrenac (or Lovrenović) Ostoja who was a barber in
Čage - dead. There were some other people by the tractor, alive, and I think
that the tractor had a puncture. During the driving, there was constant shoot-
ing, but I think that we were not hit, not once. In Okučani I gave a lift to a
military police officer, he used to live in Okučani, his father was a forester
and I also gave a lift to Miro and Petra, a married couple from Ciglane.
Soon after we had crossed Sava, I decided to go back to Bogićevci where
2 transl.not. – probably meaning: married with a woman from Okuča-
ni
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my son stayed. I came to the restaurant Šeik in Nova Varoš, I saw launcher's
flares, I drove with my headlights off. I decided to turn and return to Bosnia
because it was too dangerous to continue. Passing through Varoš and Dobo-
vac I saw barely anyone, I only met Ilija Ribić from Poljane. He was walking
down the road and he seemed drunk to me, so I offered to give him a ride
towards Bosnia which he refused.
The unit called "Garavi" from the Pakrac area (maybe some 12 people, one or
two women) was set up in the Malić houses, at the exit from Novi Varoš and
eastwards. They had sidearms and maybe a launcher or two. They were not
firing as I was passing through because the Croatian army could not be seen.
They were in some sort of a commotion.
There was an anti-aircraft vehicle on the channel of Strug which the Serbs
took over from the UN, they did fire towards Prašnik and Pivare. I don't know
who they fired at. The Serbian tanks that were under UN's supervision in
Stara Gradiška had arrived to Okučani and its environs before the noon, in
order to assist in the defence. It is possible that it was those tanks I met in the
course of my escapade.
I heard that Nišević Mirko from Dubovac was somewhere on Pustara with
a launcher and on 02.05. he was still trying to cover the withdrawal of the
refugees.
In Bosanska Gradiška we gathered near the fire department. The next day
we went to Urije and tried to get in contact with the units which remained
in Slavonia. The contact was established by RUPs3, but the connection was
weak and we had nothing to communicate. The Command was trying to ob-
tain some information from the units that were in Slavonia. My family stayed
with Barač Nedeljko, native of Donji Varoš, director of the elementary school
in Bosanska Gradiška. I assumed that it would be the case so I easily found
them.
I give this statement willingly, as I had given the previous one. While giving
this statement, I was not threatened nor instigated to state anything that I do
not personally recall. I have no objections to the Notice, and I sign this state-
ment personally.
Ended at 10.00 hrs
Supervisor of the official procedure Citizen
Đuro Šarić Bačić Ivan
3 mobile radio transmitters; mobile radio sets
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Annex 143:
UnPRofoR, Coded CaBle, meeting With BaBić: a
PRoPoSAl foR WeSteRn SlAvoniA, 10 MAy 1995
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Annex 144:
council of euRoPe, PoliticAl AffAiRS coMMittee,
MeMoRAnDuM on the viSit to ZAgReb AnD WeSteRn
SlAvoniA, 23 June 1995
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Annex 145:
MinuteS of the Meeting betWeen PReSiDent fRAnJo
tRUđman, RiChaRd holBRooke, geneRal Wesley
clARK AnD PeteR gAlbRAith, 18 AuguSt 1995
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Annex 146:
RSK, MinuteS of the RSK ASSeMbly, 8 febRuARy 1995
1995, 8 February
Knin
Speeches by Milan Martić, Borislav Mikelić and Milan Babić at the session of
the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina which discussed the process
of negotiation with the Republic of Croatia and Plan Z-4
____________________
(...)
The first and the only item on the agenda:
THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION WITH CROATIA
IN THE LIGHT OF THE CROATIAN DEMAND FOR THE
CANCELLATION OF
THE UNPROFOR MANDATE AND THE POLITICAL&SECURITY
CONDITIONS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
(...)
MILAN MARTIĆ (RSK president):
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the assembly,
Just as many times so far, and that will also frequently be the case in the
future, the Serbian people and the Republic of Serbian Krajina are finding
themselves in the position, against their will and wish, to say a determined
“no” to the international mediators and to their attempts to force us to accept
an international peace plan which does not meet even a minimum of our na-
tional and human rights and interests. As you know quite well, the Republic of
Serbian Krajina did not even consider the plan of the Z-4 group29
(...)
The possible estimate of certain international subjects and of Croatia accord-
ing to which the threat of cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate is an ideal
situation for deceiving the scared Serbs is just a mistaken estimate and noth-
ing else. The Serbs are not scared by the possible departure of the peacekeep-
ing force and they cannot be tricked.
(...)
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As for accepting the concept of so-called peaceful reintegration of Krajina
into Croatia, can we accept that? Can we defame all the victims of this war?
Can we agree to our own death? Life in Croatia would be worse than any
death. Life in Croatia - would that be any life?
[...]
BORISLAV MIKELIĆ ((RSK prime minister)
[...] To put it simply, the peacekeeping force arrived in this area which was
proclaimed a protected zone until a solution is found between the two warring
sides. We have not yet come up with a solution or initiated talks about possible
political solutions with which we can also disagree, but we can start talking.
Therefore, to say the least, the decision of the Z-4 group, which was also in-
volved in the cease-fire agreement and economic negotiations, is provocative
for our side, for the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Their decision to deliver this
officially to us prompted consultations of our leadership at all levels; thus, the
president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina officially informed them that we
cannot even consider such a document before the definition of the position
of the United Nations and the Security Council, that is, before their decision
whether or not UNPROFOR, the peacekeeping force, will remain in the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and whether Krajina will remain a
protected zone [...]
MILAN BABIĆ (foreign minister in the RSK government)
[...] As regards Republika Srpska, I had the opportunity to visit Pale [seat of
the Serbian para-state in Bosnia&Herzegovina] with the state delegation, and
they promised us that the plans which have been agreed will be realized if we
are militarily threatened. As regards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I
did not get any guarantees of that kind - maybe some other people in the state
leadership have some information - other than the promise that we shall get I
don’t know how many tons of food and ammunition.
What other intervention is possible? In our public appearances we even tried,
gently, in this period of crisis set off by UNPROFOR, to draw attention to
our situation, and to prompt a greater response of the leaderships of Serbia
and Yugoslavia. The refusal of the president of Serbia [Slobodan Milošević]
to accept the Z-4 plan of the mini-contact group was a great encouragement
for everyone. However, I would also like to see a real relation and not just a
political possibility. [...]
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Annex 147:
MilitARy fRontieR PRovince between the hAbSbuRg And
ottoMAn eMPiReS, cA. 1600-1800, (vojnA KRAjinA)
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Annex 148:
RSK ASSeMbly, SuMMARy of the MinuteS of the fiRSt
extRAoRdinARy SeSSion of the RSK, Knin, 8 febRuARy 1996
A SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES
of the first extraordinary session of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/
Assembly,
held in Knin on 8 February 1995, starting at 12:40 p.m.
A total of 75 deputies responded to the first call.
The extraordinary session was convened at the written request of 30 deputies
with only one item on its agenda.
1. Negotiation process with the Republic of Croatia in the light of the
request for termination of the UNPROFOR mandate submitted on the
part of Croatia, and the political and security related situation in the
Republic of Serbian Krajina.
Further to the decision voted for by 39 deputies, the session was declared
closed for public. The following deputies participated in the discussion on
whether or not to allow broadcasting of the session: Milan Kresojević, Ranko
Vujić, Radovan Maljković, Stanko Vujanović, Drago Kovačević, Đuro Podu-
navac. /handwritten: and S. /?Krnić/
The RSK President Milan Martić gave the introductory speech concerning
the item on the agenda. In his lengthy speech he said that with their plan,
known as “Z-4”, the international community denied the right of the Serbian
people in the RSK to live in one state. He pointed out that the “Z-4” plan is
unacceptable to the RSK, however, further talks should be accepted on an
equal foot.
He addressed in particular the functioning of the RSK government, express-
ing his disagreement regarding the issue of the place of residence of some
of the ministers who live outside Knin. In his speech he also accentuated the
position of conscript in view of their low salaries.
After Mr Martić, the next to take the floor was Prime Minister Mr Borislav
Mikelić who dwelt in detail on the course of the negotiation process con-
ducted with the Republic of Croatia. On behalf of the Government he made
the following proposals to the Assembly:
- in addition to the letter already sent to Butros Ghali, the unified RSK
leadership should request UNPROFOR to maintain its mandate in the
territory of the RSK, and to see that the RSK remain under protec-
tion;
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- secondly, that the Assembly give its support to the decision of the
RSK leadership not to accept any kind of document on a political so-
lution as long as the issue of UNPROFOR mandate is not addressed,
in other words until the Security Council issues a decision on the
extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR;
- thirdly, the Government proposes to the Assembly to postpone all
further activities regarding the economic aspects of the negotiations
until the United Nations and the Security Council declare themselves
about this problem;
Minister of Defence, Mr Rade Tanjga, made a proposal to the Assembly
to pass a decision to proclaim the imminent threat of war and render in-
valid the decision of the RSK President in 1992, no. 03-4-18/2.
The following deputies participated in the discussion on the subject: Drago
Kovačević, Milan Kresojević, Lazar Macura, Milorad Višić, Bramko Perić,
Marko Atlagić, Miroslav Grozdanić, and others /handwritten: /?S. Krnić/
After the discussion, the Assembly accepted the proposals of the Government
and unanimously adopted the following conclusions:
1. The Assembly has accepted the Government's proposal regarding the
continuance of negotiations with the Republic of Croatia on economic
issues, and it has decided to cancel and postpone the talks with the
Republic of Croatia on economic issues, including political issues,
until Croatia withdrew its request to cancel the mandate of the UN
peacekeeping forces, or until the Security Council issued a decision
on the extension of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping forces in
the protected zones withinin the territory of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina.
2. The Assembly has accepted the Government's proposal and decided
to proclaim the state of imminent war threat throughout the territory
of the RSK, thus rendering invalid the Decision of the President of the
Republic no. 03-3-20-/1-53 and Order no. 03-418/2/92.
The session ended at 9 p.m..
NOTE:
The integral minutes of the session are filed at the Assembly Registry, and all
leadres of the deputies clubs received a copy..
RECORDING CLERK: MINUTES COMPOSED BY:
Neda Dondur /stamp/ Mirjana Rodić
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Annex 149:
ExcErpts from mladić’s diary, pp. 201, 203, 206, 239-240
0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
* I will see the High Commissioner and insist that these convoys pass! I hope he will
understand me.
* I cannot give a date…
* Goražde: I will resolve the rotation of 60 men after the convoy passes.-
Bgd, 29 June 1995
2110 hours –
MEETING
with President MILOŠEVIû, BULATOVIû, PERIŠIû and MRKŠIû-
SM:
- Now you have stopped the H/M /Croatian-Muslim/ offensive, we helped you, but we
are at our last gasp –
- RS /Republika Srpska/ is ensured, we must seal it and place emphasis on the RSK
/Republic of Serbian Krajina/ and defend it.
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
- I said last year that you would cause most damage to the RSK, which is what
happened.-
* We must abandon the war rhetoric – from there it was recorded with SM’s consent.-
* Do you care about RS? Yes!
* PLAN:
A. – BH will be a union of the “H-M” Federation and “Republika Srpska”. It
makes RS official.
B. – Both entities, the “HM Federation” and “RS”, have a balanced and equal
treatment.-
C. – Both entities, RS and the Federation, have the right to enter into a
confederation with the neighbouring states.-
D. – In the event that
OTP138556/ak,h`,vb,mr 202
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
…a reorientation occurs in one entity, this has no effect on the other entity.
* The 49:51 parameter of the KG /Contact Group/ remains the basis which can be
altered based on negotiations –
* Movement will be carried out in the end when the final political solution is
achieved.-
* We must install RS and then defend the RSK.-
* What would you give them, I ask him:
SM: - I would give Vogošüa and Ilijaš. They need a link with Sarajevo, Zenica and
Tuzla… /?We/ would enlarge on account of Fikret, I would not touch the enclaves,
they are islands which will run out.
* You are rampant – you just keep screaming that you are a divine nation…
* SM: I, LILIû and BULATOVIû will bring the negotiations to an end and proclaim
fait accompli.
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
* Come on, if you can, if we need your position regarding the negotiations – let it be
away from the spotlight.-
* Sanctions will be lifted by resolving Bosnia.-
* It is my conviction that not more than half of Bosnia belongs to us, if we get more,
we are digging graves for our grandchildren.-
* I don’t want our grandchildren to die in order to take what belongs to others… Let
us defend what is ours.
* My request is:
“If I achieve what I dictated, if I fix something, they lift the sanctions against us and I
say ’I believe that MLADIû will accept – if not, then I will keep quiet about it…
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
* Don’t tell me you will help, and not do it, it’s better if you say “I won’t”, and I’ll do
it alone.-
* /?FRASER/ is the top US man for negotiations – he resolved Estonia, South Africa,
negotiated with CASTRO, and he ardently hates Germans. – The US v wants to help
us, they see us and Greeks as a barrier against Germany.-
* I beg you in the name of God, it is our crucial interest – don’t think that I am not for
the Serbian people – that I am a traitor and if you think that, I will give you a pistol,
kill me.-
* PERIŠIû, Ratko has a terrible influence on you.-
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
Belgrade
Friday
30 June 1995
MEETING
with President MILOŠEVIû at the GŠ VJ /Yugoslav Army General Staff/
* President MILOŠEVIû
- I called FA /Fikret ABDIû/ to tell us what is new in the Bihaü Pocket, that is a very
important point for us, we must do something so he can take Cazin, and then it will be
easier later!
*FA:
- That we should insist that the Banija Corps take up positions on the line on the left,
it is more dangerous –
- We should go in more systematically and make raids because the men who would
come over to us cannot due to frontal fighting.-
- We have enough, even too many men for assault operations.
- The greatest danger is of morale falling.
- Our best unit is the 3Brigade, men are 10 km from their homes, and they haven’t
been doing anything for seven months.
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- We need 1,500 men for 15 days…
th
- They (5 K /Corps/) are mobilising 60-year-old women, leaving Bužim, probably
withdrawing civilian population to form a human shield around Bihaü.-
- Irfan LJUBIJANKIû says in the report that at least 20 of 48 assemblymen must be
dismissed, and that not a single MZ /local commune/ president supports them.-
- We just had a meeting of 2,000 people in Ljubljana. They are pressuring our people
in Germany.-
* We should start a bigger offensive and call on men to join us.
- Smuggling has been reduced, we must bring in police from outside and it will
disappear.-
- Legija and BOŽOVIû is had contact with NANIû through a Motorola.-
- We could take Cazin in two weeks if we had 1,500 men.-
* JS /expansion unknown/: which forces can General MRKŠIû engage:
- What about the police from Banja Luka
- Who will provide the men –
- There is no oil there.-
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
th
- The 5 K knows precisely about our attack –
- The whole operation cannot be finished so quickly, everything must be well
planned.-
- Neither oil nor men came.-
- The Muslim offensive toward Sarajevo will continue.-
- We must make a decision to act quickly.-
- We have been supplying 100,000 men for six months, there is poor organisation in
RS, they plundered us.-
SM:
- I think it is important to resolve the 5 K as soon as possible, and then later
to try cutting off near Livno.
- Nothing should be added of Krupa, because that can be taken as a
provocation for the MZ /?international community/ and they might use air force
against FA too.
- General MRKŠIû is here and as soon as
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
he left we made a decision to subordinate the “PAUK” /Spider/ Command to him.
- Let RS give something to General MRKŠIû if it can.-
- Jovica should resolve logistics problems, and let RS resolve this problem of holding
up convoys.-
* JS: My men should be fully considered when an operation is planned.
- I don’t trust Mile NOVAKOVIû, at least in terms of professionalism…
- Corps Commanders haven’t provided help for six months and I must se ask that they
be considered.-
- They told my men the first day that they were a paramilitary.-
- PEûANAC must be taken out with 400 men, let them rest for seven days and give to
General MRKŠIû.-
FA:
- 15 months ago we talked about coming to Cazin in 15 days.-
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
- * We must have units which will hold the line.-
FA:
- I have 9,400 under arms, and around 1,200-1,300 wounded.-
- We should not attack Bihaü and we should not try to drive them from the right bank
of the Una – that would be counterproductive because the MZ would accuse me that I
am responsible for the fall of Bihaü.-
SM:
- We should not conduct operations that are counterproductive for FA.-
JS:
- I can find 120 perfect men who would come there in seven days. They would be
from the eastern sector. – That is support.
JS: They should not be engaged (we gave 80 from Erdut, we gave 80 from
Ĉeletovci…
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JS – Proposal:
- Let MLADIû arrange it with the 1 sand 2 KK and find men to replace the 400 of
PEûANAC’s men and give them to MRKŠIû.
- That we form a battalion of volunteers and engaged them in ten days. – That General
PERIŠIû equips them.-
- There are 58, from Kragujevac, Niš, Ljubiškovo
* MRKŠIû:
- Let us pay this corps. Four million came, but I don’t know where four is. JS:
Everyone knows where they are, the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ is holding it.
(KOZIû and MRGUD) – They want to pay the MUP – it must go through the SDK
/Public Auditing Service/.-
- Mobilisation – 2,400 from Serbia.-
General MLADIû
Request:
1. – 7.62 mm ammunition = 20,000,000
2. – 7.9 mm “ = 5,000,000
3. – 12.7 mm rounds = 4,000,000
4. – Rounds for PKT /7.62 mm machine-gun/ = 3,500,000
5. – Shell for ZIS /76 mm field gun/ = 10,000
6. – “ for T-34 tank = 6,000
7. – “ for T-55 tank = 5,000
8. – “ M-84 t. /tank/ = 3,000
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9. – Shell for 105 mm howitzer = 6,000
10. - 122 mm = 4,000 –
11. – Shell for 130 mm gun = 2,500
12. – Shell for 152 mm howitzer = 2,000
13. – Shell for 155 mm howitzer = 3,500
14. – Shell for 60 mm MB /mortar/ = 7,000
15. - 82 mm MB = 10,000
16. 120 mm MB = 10,000
17. Fuel air bomb = 50
18. Zolja – rocket = 6,000
19. Rocket – Kub = 4,000 tons
20. Fuel
21. Food upon request
22. – Equipment upon request.-
23. – 12.7 mm sniper rifles = 50
Han Pijesak
Saturday, 1 June 1995
MEETING
with Mrs MILENTIJEVIû
Mrs MILENTIJEVIû
- There are positive developments in the US.-
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
Knin, 30 July 1995
1600 – 1700 hours
MEETING
with the Main Staff of the Serbian Krajina Army.-
* Further operations arranged and coordinated
Mrkonjiü Grad
31 July 1995
MEETING
with representatives of municipal governments of Glamoþ, Mrkonjiü Grad, Šipovo,
Jajce, Kljuþ, Srbobran, Kupres.-
Mrkonjiü Grad
31 July 1995
1430 hours –
MEETING
with General SMITH.-
1. * I informed him about the offensive of the OS /Armed Forces/ of Croatia against
RS.-
2. * In response to the question as to what he can do to stop the H /Croatian/ offensive
– he just rambles.
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0649-0326-0649-0657-EDT/Draft translation
SMITH:
* The justification for the attack on Udbine airfield is that it has a concept of a safe
area.-
* The M used the charter to ask Croatia for help and Article 51 of the charter makes it
possible for one side to ask the other for help.-
* Žepa – (Meeting on 5 August 1995)
* Sarajevo –
* Offering assistance for provision of care for refugees from Glamoþ and Grahovo
(meeting tomorrow at 1200 hours at Balkana).-
Drvar, 1 August 1995
1800 hours – 2 August 1995
JOINT
Session of the Supreme Defence Council of RS and the RSK –
Present: KARADŽIû, KRAJIŠNIK, PLAVŠIû, KOZIû, T. KOVAý, NINKOVIû,
KIJAC, ŽUPLJANIN, SUBOTIû, KRNJAJIû, TOMANIû, TOLIMIR, G.
MILOVANOVIû, MARTIû, BABIû, MILOJEVIû, PEJIû, MRKŠIû, ŠUPUT,
MLADIû …
Agenda:
1. – Reviewing the newly developed situation
2. – Further coordination of operations
3. – Supplying the troops with everything needed to continue fighting the war.-
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Annex 150:
concluSionS of the goveRnMent of the RePublic of
SeRbiAn KRAjinA RegARding the negotiAtionS on the
AMendMent of the MAndAte of the united nAtionS
PRotective foRce in the occuPied PARtS of cRoAtiA, Knin,
30 march 1995
1995, 30 March
Knin
conclusions of the government of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” re-
garding the negotiations on the amendment of the mandate of the united
nations Protective force in the occupied parts of the Republic of croa-
tia
In accordance with its constitutional powers, the Government of the Republic
of Serbian Krajina, at its extraordinary session held on 30 March 1995, has
considered the draft of the UN Security Council Resolution suggested to the
Security Council by the Contact Group, and adopted the following positions:
(...)
The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina estimates that there is
no reason to terminate the current mandate of the United Nations Protective
Force laid down by the UN Security Council in Resolution No. 743 of 21
February 1992, and expects the UN Security Council to extend the current
mandate of the protective force.
The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina considers that the newly
proposed UN operation (UNCRO) can contribute to the stabilization of peace
if it is determined as the continuation and extension of the UN peacekeeping
operation as established by Resolution 743 of the UN Security Council, i.e.,
in line with the principles and basic terms of the current protective force man-
date in the Republic of Serbian Krajina and zones under UN protection.
The proposal according to which the UN operation, pursuant to paragraph 5
of the proposed draft of the Resolution, ought to be “a provisional arrange-
ment for the creation of conditions leading to an agreed solution which will
be in accordance with the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia” is
absolutely unacceptable if it refers to the territory of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina.
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The Republic of Serbian Krajina, the sovereign state of the Serbian people and
of all its citizens, is not part of any Croatian state, and it will not accept any
UN arrangement which would bring it into such a position against its will.
TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofSerbianKrajinaconsiderstheengagement
of UN peacekeeping forces in its territory unacceptable if their name implies
prejudiced political solutions to the disadvantage of the Serbian people and
the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina cannot permit the block-
ade of the borders of the Republic of Serbian Krajina by any armed forces
which would be contrary to the principles of the current mandate of the UN
protective force.
The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina has decided to inform the
UN Security Council about its foregoing conclusions. (...)
Copy, typewritten, Cyrillic script
HR- HMDCDR, 4, 06-5-340/95
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Annex 151:
letteR fRoM the SecRetARy-geneRAl AddReSSed to the
PReSident of the SecuRity council, 7 AuguSt 1995
UNNITEDD
NAATIONNS S
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/1995/666
7 August 1995
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 7 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
I have the honour to convey to you, and through you to the members of the
Security Council, information about the latest developments in Croatia and about
United Nations activities before and since the recent outbreak of hostilities
there. It covers events up to midnight New York time on 6 August.
Following the Croatian Army’s takeover of Sector West in May 1995, tensions
have remained high in the area of operations of the United Nations Confidence
Restoration Operation (UNCRO).Croatian Army mobilization, troop movements and
live-firing exercises increased throughout June and JulIn the meantime, the
local Serb authorities failed to extend the necessary cooperation to UNCRO to
permit it to implement the mandate granted to it by the Security Council in its
resolution 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995.
On 19 July, the "Krajina Serb" army ("ARSK") and the forces loyal to
Mr. Fikret Abdic launched offensives against the Bosnian Army V Corps in the
Bihac pocket. The attacks were supported by Bosnian Serb shell fire along the
southern confrontation line and were alleged to be in response to earlier
military actions by the Bosnian ArmyThe following day, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Croatia warned the Security Council that "the displacement of
the population of Bihac ... would be considered a serious threat to the security
and stability of Croatia ... [and] Croatia may be compelled to undertake
necessary measures to secure its status and territory".
In an effort to stabilize the deteriorating military situation, the United
Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) finally succeeded in arranging a meeting between the
military leaders of the Croatian Army and "ARSKThe local Serb authorities
subsequently cancelled the military meeting after they had accepted an
invitation by the United Nations Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, to
participate in a preliminary round of political talks at Geneva in early August.
The pace of events gathered momentum after 22 July, when the Presidents of
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Split Declaration, which committed
the Croatian Government to assist the Bosnian forces militarily in the Bihac
pocket. The Croatian Government maintained the position, already conveyed by
95-23454 (E) 070895 /...
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Page 2
its Foreign Minister to the Security Council, that the fall of the Bihac pocket
would threaten its national security interests.
On 28 July, the combined forces of the Croatian Army (HV) and Croat Defence
Council (HVO) succeeded in capturing Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc in Western
Bosnia and Herzegovina, severing the Krajina Serbs’ main supply road from Banja
Luka to Knin. In response, the Krajina Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs declared
states of war against the Croats and mobilized their respective armies.
Within Croatia, the Croatian Army continued a major build-up of troops
around Sectors North and South. The Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, meanwhile,
convened a session of their joint Supreme Defence Council on 1 August at Drvar
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The meeting resulted in an appeal to all Serbs,
including the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), to assist in the defence of Serb territory.
Meanwhile, on 29 July, my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, had
met with President Tudjman to forestall what appeared to be an imminent military
confrontation. President Tudjman expressed his Government’s willingness to
participate in political and military talks with Knin, but stressed that
progress on the ground must necessarily follow. If such progress was not
achieved in a matter of days, Croatia would take whatever measures it deemed
necessary to redress the situation. Specifically the President insisted on the
reopening of the Adriatic oil pipeline within 24 hours, rapid agreement on the
opening of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway and immediate progress on political
re-integration of the Serbs on the basis of Croatia’s Constitution and Law on
Minorities. President Tudjman did, however, agree to send representatives to
Geneva for the meeting sponsored by the International Conference on 3 August.
My Special Representative held emergency talks on 30 July with the local
Serb authorities in Knin. He secured a six-point commitment that their forces
would withdraw fully from the Bihac pocket and desist from further cross-border
interference (see annex I). However, the Croatian Government considered these
commitments insufficient. In a written reply, President Tudjman rejected the
agreement, on the grounds that it did not meet the terms he had presented to my
Special Representative (see annex II). The Croatian Government did, however,
reaffirm its readiness to participate in the talks at Geneva.
On 3 August, at Geneva, Mr. Stoltenberg duly chaired the meeting of the
representatives of the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs. The former
took the position that the Croatian Serb leadership must immediately accept
reintegration under the Croatian Constitution and Laws. The Croatian Serb
delegation proceeded from the starting-point that there should be a cessation of
hostilities, following which other issues could be discussed. After a series of
bilateral meetings, the Co-Chairman presented to the two delegations a list of
seven points covering, inter alia , the reopening of the oil pipeline, the
reopening of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway and negotiations on a final
settlement on the basis of the "Zagreb-4" plan. The Croatian Serb delegation
was inclined to accept the paper as a useful basis for progress, subject to
clearance by its political leadership, but the Croatian Government delegation’s
view was that the paper did not address its fundamental concern for the Krajina
Serbs to be reintegrated under the Croatian Constitution and Laws.
/...
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Following the Croatian Government’s rejection of the paper prepared at
Geneva, I telephoned President Tudjman on the evening of 3 August and urged the
utmost restraint. At the same time, I instructed Mr. Stoltenberg to proceed to
Zagreb the next morning and to continue to work closely with Mr. Akashi in
trying to prevent an outbreak of hostilities.
Despite these United Nations efforts and similar efforts by various Member
States, at 0500 hours on 4 August the Croatian Army launched a major offensive
against the Krajina region (Sectors North and South). I immediately issued a
statement expressing my regret at the outbreak of hostilities in Croatia, and
urging the parties to respect international humanitarian law and the human
rights of the affected population.
At the start of the Croatian offensive, a significant number of United
Nations observation posts were overrun by the Croatian Army, and some came under
indirect and direct fire. UNPF reported to me that on two occasions United
Nations troops and Serb prisoners were used as human shields by Croatian Army
units as they conducted their attacks. These incidents have been vigorously
protested by the United Nations and the troop-contributing Governments
concerned.
On the first day of the Croatian offensive, my Special Representative met
with Mr. Hrvoje Sarinic, the Head of the Croatian Commission for Relations with
UNCRO, to seek assurances for the safety of all United Nations personnel. The
Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier, took similar action with
the Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army, General Cervenko. I regret to have to
report that, these efforts notwithstanding, the United Nations has suffered a
total of 18 casualties, all of which have also been protested. Three of these
casualties (a Danish soldier and two Czech soldiers) were fatal and two other
soldiers are in serious condition. I should like to take this occasion to
convey to the Government and people of the Czech Republic and Denmark my
condolences at their loss.
On 5 and 6 August, my Special Representative held a number of meetings with
Mr. Sarinic to discuss temporary arrangements that would allow the United
Nations, together with other international organizations, to cope with the major
humanitarian difficulties caused by the Croatian offensive and to monitor the
human rights situation on the ground. These discussions resulted in a nine-
point agreement that was signed on 6 August (see annex III).
On 6 August in Geneva, the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference’s
Steering Committee, Mr. Carl Bildt and Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, along with the
Foreign Minister of Spain, representing the Presidency of the European Union
(EU), and the External Relations Commissioner of EU, met the Foreign Minister of
Croatia, Mr. Mate Granic, to discuss the political consequences of the Croatian
offensive. The Co-Chairmen of the International Conference and the
representatives of EU strongly condemned the shelling of civilians and the
attacks on United Nations personnel and expressed great concern at the
humanitarian crisis which was unfolding. Foreign Minister Granic, who expressed
confidence that the Croatian military operation would be completed within 24
hours, indicated that Croatia would investigate incidents in which United
/...
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Page 4
Nations troops had been attacked and gave assurances about access for
humanitarian organizations to civilians displaced by the fighting.
In the meantime, the Force Commander’s representatives have been in contact
with the military authorities of the Croatian Army and "ARSK". They have
discussed the medical evacuation of United Nations personnel, and the need to
alleviate the consequences of the military operations for the civilian
population. A refugee crisis of major proportions has already started.
Tensions remain high and the possibility of continuing hostilities cannot be
ruled out.
I should be grateful if you would bring the above information to the
attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI
/...
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Annex I
Following the visit to Knin by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and
General Bernard Janvier, the Force Commander of the United Nations Peace Forces
(UNPF), and the important discussions held with the leadership in Knin, led by
Mr. Martic and in which Mr. Babic and General Mrksic participated, and in the
light of assessing the extreme seriousness of the situation in the area, the
Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) leadership reiterated their commitment to the
peaceful solution of the conflict and for that purpose agree to the following:
1. That there are, and there will be, no troops or individual soldiers of the
ARSK in the area known as the Bihac pocket.
2. That the ARSK forces will refrain entirely from directing any kind of fire
(shell, mortar, tank, etc.) into the Bihac pocket from territory that they
control, and expect that the V Corps shall in reciprocity refrain from any
offensive action against that territory.
3. That troops and Military Observers of the United Nations deployed in
territory under RSK control will be allowed unhindered access to the area
bordering the Bihac pocket to monitor any crossing of the border in either
direction by any forces.
4. That the military commander of the ARSK, General Mrksic, is prepared to
have the first meeting with the commander of the Croatian army at any time
under UNPF auspices at the Turanj crossing, including as early as
31 July 1995 at 1400 hours.
5. Reaffirming their commitment not to carry out cross-border activities, RSK
reiterates its support for, and willingness to continue the talks with UNPF
regarding the establishment of appropriate observation posts in the area of
Mount Dinara, and to facilitate the implementation of the border-crossing
points under the mandate of UNPF.
6. That no impediments will be placed in the way of delivery of humanitarian
assistance to the Bihac pocket, based on the principle of assessed need,
and with the understanding that humanitarian aid will be delivered to the
Krajina region based on the same principle, as applied by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
30 July 1995
Knin
/...
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Annex II
Letter dated 30 July 1995 from the President of the Republic
of Croatia addressed to the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General
In response to your fax which I received today, at 2130 hours, together
with the enclosed proposals from the Knin rebels, I would like to state the
following:
1. It is surprising that in your letter you never mention UNCRO - the United
Nations peace forces which were under this name given the mandate to act in
Croatia by a Security Council resolution and, in contrast, you do mention the
Knin leadership and RSK.
2. It is unacceptable for us to have UNCRO troops deployed only on the border
towards the Bihac pocket. Our request was and remains that UNCRO forces
undertake the monitoring of internationally recognized borders between the
Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but at the same time also
between the Republic of Croatia and Serbia, that is SRY, which is particularly
significant because in these last few days new formations and equipment of the
Yugoslav army have been transferred across the Danube.
3. In regard to what was stated under point 2 there can be no question of
deploying United Nations border-crossing monitors only in the region of Dinara.
4. Serb rebel leaders again want to outwit United Nations Representatives and
UNCRO for their own benefit. That is apparent from their proposal to allow
humanitarian aid for Bihac under the condition that it is at the same time
delivered to them.
5. Such proposals do not represent any basis for peaceful reintegration and do
not contain a response to any of the conditions which I put forward in
discussions with you on Saturday, 29 July 1995, when I expressly indicated that
negotiations on a peaceful reintegration with Croatian Serbs from the occupied
areas can commence under the following conditions:
(a) That Croatian authorities will not negotiate with Milan Martic ´, who
has been placed on the list of war criminals by the International Court in the
Hague or with anyone else representing him;
(b) That negotiations can commence if the oil pipeline passing through the
occupied areas is operational in a period of 24 hours;
(c) That direct discussions commence immediately concerning the opening of
all communication lines through the occupied areas, and in particular the
railway line Zagreb-Split via Knin;
(d) That discussions are simultaneously undertaken concerning the
immediate implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in the
/...
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occupied areas as well as the provisions of the Constitutional Law concerning
the rights of the Serb ethnic community.
6. Only on the basis of this can we reach a peaceful solution and with this
aim I propose discussion between military and civilian representatives of
Croatian authorities and the rebel Croatian Serbs from the occupied areas.
The President of the Republic of Croatia
Dr. Franjo Tudjman
(Original signed - sealed)
/...
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Annex III
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia
and the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF)-United Nations
Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) on temporary
measures in the areas formerly known as "Sector North" and
"Sector South"
We the undersigned,
Concerned by the effects of the hostilities on the lives of civilians in
the areas formerly known as "Sector North" and "Sector South" (hereinafter
referred to as the Areas),
Committed to minimizing the loss of civilian life from hostilities,
Dedicated to ensuring to the maximum extent possible the full protection of
civilians and of their human rights,
Committed to providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian
population affected by the hostilities in the Areas,
Recognizing the need to ensure full respect for international human rights
and humanitarian law,
Agree to the following:
1. That Croatia expresses its complete and unequivocal commitment to the full
respect for the human rights of all individuals in the Areas concerned, and
guarantees that those rights will be respected by all Croatian authorities.
2. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia concurs that the United Nations
Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), together with the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) where appropriate, will monitor and
report on the human rights situation in the Areas, and intervene with the
Croatian authorities on human rights matters when appropriate.
3. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia encourages all those previous
inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia who so wish to remain peacefully in
the areas over which Croatian authority is exercised. However, Croatia
will allow, with full guarantees for security, the departure from those
areas of all those who express their desire to do so, except those who
committed violations of international criminal law. In the event of any
such departures, Croatia pledges to allow UNCRO and humanitarian
organizations, particularly UNHCR and ICRC, to assist and coordinate such
departures in conformity with recognized international standards.
4. That full access by UNCRO and by humanitarian organizations, particularly
UNHCR and ICRC, to the civilian population, for the purpose of providing
for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population, will be assured by
/...
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Page 9
the authorities of Croatia, to the extent allowed by objective security
considerations.
5. That United Nations military observers and human rights monitoring elements
of UNCRO will carry out surveillance immediately in all areas except where,
in the opinion of the local UNCRO military commanders after consulting
Croatian army commanders, the security situation does not permit for such
surveillance.
6. That Croatia, and in particular its military authorities, will make every
effort to ensure that civilian areas are not targeted by direct or indirect
military fire as long as the hostilities continue.
7. That, if UNCRO commanders become aware that local military personnel have
departed from a specific location where only non-combatants are present,
and that the location is under fire by Croatian forces, this information
will be immediately passed to the Headquarters of the Croatian Army for
appropriate action.
8. That, in conformity with its international obligations, Croatia reiterates
the inviolability of United Nations premises and establishments, and its
vehicles, and all those therein, and thus commits all Croatian authorities
to fully respect such inviolability. Croatia further emphasizes that none
of its authorities will seek to remove any person or persons from such
United Nations premises, establishments or vehicles.
9. That the future relations of the two parties in this matter will be defined
as soon as possible.
(Signed) Hrvoje SARINIC (Signed) Yasushi AKASHI
Republic of Croatia United Nations Peace Forces
Zagreb
6 August 1995
-----
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annEx 152:
rsK, command of thE 39 thcoRPS., oRdeR: PRobleMS in the
MilitARy oRgAniSAtion And the eliMinAtion of negAtive
occuRRenceS which ARe one of the cAuSeS of defeAt And
loSSeS of the RSK teRRitoRy, 1 june 1995
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annEx 153:
RSK, StAte infoRMAtion Agency, StAteMent of RAtKo
mladić, Knin, 30 July 1995
1995, 30 July
Knin
Communication of the RSK State Information Agency Iskra on the visit of
Ratko Mladić,
CRS commander, to Knin and on his statement concerning the assault on
Knin
__________________
(...)
Knin, 30 July (Iskra) -The Commander of the General Staff of the Army of
Republika Srpska,
Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Mladić, today stated in Knin that Serbian forces
would quickly regain
Grahovo and Glamoč, and other occupied territories.
Stressing that Croatian aggression is aimed at cutting of the Republic of Ser-
bian Krajina (RSK), in which effort the Croats are supported by their political
brokers, General Mladić said that the Croats had made, with this move, the
decisive mistake in this war, a mistake which will cost
them dearly.
Referring to the situation in the so-called Bihać pocket, he said that the Mus-
lims would continue to provoke until they were defeated as in Srebrenica and
Žepa, and those provocations would have stopped a long time ago, he added,
but for their helpers in our own ranks.
“The time has come for our people to grasp fully the fact that the war is
not over yet, a fact which was clear to some people a long time ago. Let me
give our people the following message: be determined in the defence of your
homes and don’t fall for any propaganda”, said General Mladić, adding that
he hoped the people would find the strength to repel this Croatian aggression
as well.
“We must put in extra effort and hold out until the end of this war”, concluded
the
commander of the RS Army. (...)
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Annex 154:
GEnEral ratKo mladić spEaKinG to thE mEdia in
Knin, 30 July 1995
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Annex 155:
declARAtion on the iMPleMentAtion of the wAShington
AgReeMent, joint defenSe AgAinSt SeRb AggReSSion And
ReAching A PoliticAl Solution congRuent with the
effoRtS of the inteRnAtionAl coMMunity,
split, 22 July 1995
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Annex 156:
RSK, office of the PReSident of the RePublic, MinuteS
of the Meeting between the PReSident of the RSK And
lEadErs of thE dEputiEs’ Groups, 19 JunE 1995
/handwritten: a/a /files//
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
/
handwritten: 123/
No: 020/4-2-623-2/95.
Knin, 19 June 1995
NOTE
On 30 May 1995 the President of the RSK /Republic of Serbian Kraji-
na/ had a working meeting with leaders of the RSK Assembly deputies’ clubs,
the topic of which was – appointment of the PM /Prime Minister/ designate.
The minutes of the meeting are attached.
ADVISOR TO STATE OFFICIAL
Dušan Pralica, professor
/signed/
/handwritten: HMDCDR /expansion unknown/ OFFICE OF THE RSK
PRESIDENT Nut. /expansion unknown/ 1/
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
No: 120/4-2-623/95
Knin, 19 June 1995
MINUTES
of the meeting held by the President of the RSK
with leaders of the deputies’ groups
PRESENT: Ranko Bakić, Ranko Vujić, Marko Dobrijević, Drago Kovačević,
Milorad Višić and Đorđe Bjegović.
Beginning of the meeting: 12:15 hours
Date: 30 May 1995
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The President made a remark that, given the gravity of the situation, Babić
should have attended.
ViŠić: It’s time to start resolving problems jointly rather than individually.
prEsidEnt martić: Is it possible to temporarily freeze activities of the
parties and go for a patriotic bloc?
Dobrijević made a remark about political activities of the trade unions.
BaKić, defends the existence and activities of the parties.
„Political pluralism is essential because it keeps democracy alive. The West
also insists on that.”
prEsidEnt martić: That is what I recommend, my viewpoint. Any-
way, it is you who decide.
There is no cooperation between me and the trade unions, no contact. They
act as an institution and I have no intention of interfering. As for the unifica-
tion, what I find of utmost importance now is to buy some time in order to
consolidate our defence, and only then go for a formal unification. If Karadžić
could send couple of thousands soldiers, we could unite tomorrow. Once we
establish a professional army, the military goals ahead of us are as follows:
th
- ultimate crushing of the 5 Corps
- liberation of Mt. Dinara
- resolving of Balijas’ /derogatory term for Muslims/ pockets
- rectification of eastern borders
- liberation of Western Slavonia
All we have at present is armed population. Their parade was staged just to in-
timidate us Serbs, and especially us in the RSK. I visited President Milošević.
What he offers is a peaceful way, a peaceful solution to the problems. He has
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 248 12/16/2010 2:46:38 PM 249
no intention of going to war because of us, however, he offers assistance in
terms of logistics, professional personnel and financial support to the profes-
sional units. He promised to see that deserters are gathered and sent over
here. Also, he will not stand in the way of volunteers coming from Serbia. I
told him that the people have lost trust in all of us and that it is you who will
eventually be the guilty one.
So, he will help us, but he will not go in war or unification. As for the situa-
tion in Eastern Slavonia, he and Hadžić are the guilty parties. It is my opinion
that in the transitional period it is crucial to establish a wartime government
of national rescue, but the PM designate should live in Knin. An extensive
cooperation of the most responsible high officials of the RSK is imperative. A
meeting will be held tomorrow with the leaders of the RS /Republika Srpska/
in Bijeljina. We will go there.
KoVaČEVić: I have a feeling that things will change for the better. The
parties are not to be blamed for the situation. We need a consensus as regards
the appointment of the PM designate. There are some practical reasons why
it is impossible to freeze activities of the parties. Some parties, such as the
SPS /Socialist Party of Serbia/, the SRS /Serbian Radical Party/ and the SDS /
Serbian Democratic Party/, have their headquarters outside the RSK.
I am satisfied with yesterday’s work. There is no need to sign off anyone. I
would be careful about Slavonia. I find encouraging the logistic support from
the SRO /expansion unknown/. A small step forward is already felt within the
units. The collective state of depression is over. It is important that children
do not leave the RSK after the end of the school year. Whatever you, the most
responsible officials, agree upon with regard to the unification of the RS and
the RSK, you will be supported. However, problems arise where they should
not arise – radio and television, and also the Decree that was rejected by the
RSK Assembly. As for the PM designate, I think it should be Milan Babić. We
plan to have a word with him.
VuJić:The political strategy of the RSK was shaped without meeting essen-
tial conditions. I am glad I did not participate in the government. The govern-
ment was led poorly. It was based on two concepts that tended to neglect the
reality. Trust is slowly being lost. The initiative for unification brings hope.
The RS has many problems. Together we will be stronger. There has been no
logistic support so far. They have been playing around the bush, offering no
standpoint. I refuse to believe that this is a general policy of Serbia – a policy
accepted by the Serbian people. I was pleasantly surprised by Bakić in the
Assembly (voting against Mikelić). We in the eastern part of the RSK are in
the worst situation. Mikelić still holds the position of the Government’s PM.
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We must speed up the process of establishing a new government because this
is the only way to stop Mikelić and his backroom deals. Without its eastern
part the RSK is not a whole. Under what conditions does Babić accept the role
of the PM designate? The one that we accept and appoint here will be the one,
and he will have all our support. Will Drago please tell us how extensive is
their mandate to nominate Babić as the PM designate?
KoVaČEVić: We think that the PM designate should be appointed by con-
sensus. The presumption (condition) of Babić’s nomination is the functioning
of the defence.
prEsidEnt martić: It is important to me that the problem of the PM
designate be taken care of as soon as possible. We must prevent secession.
The people there, and especially here, are not for it. President Milošević has
slackened. He is giving in. Maybe that’s why the PM designate from the east-
ern area cannot be one of the radicals. I’ve been considering Višić. But, I’ll
go along with Milan as the PM designate. It would be good if we include few
radicals from the eastern area in the government.
doBriJEVić: We will reach an agreement about the government. This
situation is not good for anybody. Whoever will be appointed president of the
government, he will not be successful without our support, neither him nor
the RSK as a whole. If institutions will not function we’ve done nothing. It is
imperative that we regain the trust of people as soon as possible and now is the
right moment. We should not create problems in the state policy. The Croats
keep quarrelling, but it does not reflect on the running of the state.
To freeze the parties might be counterproductive. If we act responsibly the
parties should not represent an obstacle.
What we should do is strengthen up the army. We hold all the keys in our
hands. No one is allowed to act to our own detriment. Problems must be re-
solved right here.
As for your problem with the interview, Mr President, the problem with the
Television, you should have called and we would have solved it.
We have to strengthen up the state. You won’t have any problems with us. We
will pursue that concept.
BJEGoVić: Personally, I think that the state institutions have failed to start
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functioning. We have to put labels on things – who does what. A chaos and
lack of tolerance are all around us. The Serbia – RS – RSK relations need to
be clarified as soon as possible. Our problem of defence cannot be resolved
without 20,000 professional soldiers and officers. The formation of a profes-
sional army is going to take a while. We need 5,000 families to move in the
abandoned areas. The programme of revival of the economy will not succeed
without the support of Serbia. In commercial terms, we are unable to survive
the blockade.
If that is not going to work, we’ll have to join Europe all by ourselves; we have
an exit via the Danube. Why don’t we establish information system network
with the RS right away?
We must talk to Milošević.
Unification – yes. How?
We are through with the coupons. (Coupons instead of banknotes in the RS).
Why isn’t the RS with us in the same payment system?
PM designate?
The Krajina SDS should give the PM designate, because they won the elec-
tions.
The East is our problem and our failure, too. There was no Law on territo-
rial organisation. There are just a few people there who would dare to stick
their neck out and get to grips with the secession under such circumstances.
Dalmatia and Lika have usurped all high positions. In Knin you have nothing
but quarrels. Let the SDS produce a PM designate. We must be aware of the
fact that we can hardly move forward without the RS and the SRJ /Socialist
Republic of Serbia/. The leading figures must work together. Without an army
all of this means nothing. We could have at least installed special units in the
camps by now.
We must help the President of the state, the President of the Assembly, the
President of the Government, the VRSK /Army of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina/ Commander.
To be just obedient to Serbia is no solution, either.
We know what we do not want. But, how can we achieve what we want? Ser-
bia will recognize us when we become strong.
KOVAČEVI:ĆTerritorial organisation is essential.
BAKIĆ: The situation is alarming. Krajina is dissolving. Secession is under
way.ThesituationintheeasternpartoftheRSKishardtoresolve.Thepeople
in Banija are scared too.
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There are three issues that we need to address right away:
- consolidation of power
- establishment of government as soon as possible (but why, if we are
to unite soon?)
- unification will restore people’s trust
PM designate?
Babić is the best solution. Will the relations with Martić be good? I fear divi-
sions. I am to blame for Mikelić. I took hard the separation, the divisions.
Let us not have any illusions that we will soon have a professional army. Con-
solidation of government is also an aspect of defence. Party leaders should be
better used in the talks, Mr President.
VIŠIĆ: We are waking up. The reality has forced us to wake up. We should
assume more responsibility rather than shift it to others. The regime in Bel-
grade is shaking. It was unable to evade the responsibility.
To build up a state from the top is an illusion. We must build it up from the
bottom. People are fleeing RSK. We should at least stop people from leav-
ing.
And what has led to all that?
- fleeing is in our nature;
- we can’t expect Serbia to help us move people to Banija while Kosovo
is empty;
- we should not seek wisdom in Serbia at any cost;
- the role of media in the SRJ – they are bombarding us - the healthy
forces of the RSK;
- RS – taking hostages;
- negative selection of personnel;
- Mikelić is our rude awakening;
- reliance on the people from Krajina;
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Milan Babić is the best solution; however, what we need is redistribution
within the Government. We must agree on each man, member of the Gov-
ernment. President Martić should talk openly with Milošević. Secession
was encouraged by forming the cadre with the people from Knin. What
we need is the most honourable and capable people rather than strictly
party people. In order to nominate Babić it is necessary to amend the part
of the Constitution referring to the powers of the President. We should
not insist on leadership. In that sense particular responsibility rests on the
Krajina SDS.
DOBRIJEVIĆ: Leadership was created artificially. That was done by
some other people. I am not in favour of shutting the door for Serbia. We
are aware of what Milošević meant when he spoke his mind. It is the help
of the official Serbian policy that we should win over. I am against con-
flicts. What we need is political stabilisation.
VIŠIĆ: The President is the one who should go to Serbia instead of what
we have now – that every citizen has his Daddy over there.
PRESIDENT MARTIĆ: I’ve revealed to you all dilemmas up there. The
moves in the eastern part of the RSK are made by Serbia and they are
aimed at hindering the unification of the RS and the RSK.
As for Western Slavonia, I am the most responsible for it. But, who is to
blame? It’s a clash of two concepts. Mine and Mikelić’s concept, and he
was dragging us to Croatia. As for me and my concept, there is no life for
us with the Croats in Croatia.
It was agreed with the delegation of the Krajina SDS that Babić would
come the same day for a conversation with the President.
At 15:00 hours the President talked with Babić over the phone and the
latter announced his visit at 16:00 hours. They were waiting for him until
18:00 hours but he never showed up.
ADVISOR TO THE OFFICIALS:
Dušan Pralica, professor
/ signed/
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ANNEx 157:
RSK, SuPREME DEfENcE cOuNcIl, PROclAMATION Of ThE
STATE WAR ThROughOuT ThE RSK, 30 July 1995
1995, 30 July
Knin
From the decision of the Supreme Defence Council of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” on the
proclamation of the state of war
___________________
Decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council
STATE OF WAR PROCLAIMED THROUGHOUT THE RSK
Knin, 30 July. At its meeting held on Friday evening the RSK Supreme Defence Council has decided,
considering the latest developments after the occupation of Grahovo and possible Croatian aggression
against the RSK, to proclaim the state of war throughout the RSK in accordance with Article 102 of
the Constitution.
[...]
The government has heard and accepted the information of the minister of defence Milan Šuput on the
steps taken with regard to the defence of the borders and civil defence activities. RSK President Milan
Martić visited yesterday the area of the shelled village of Strumica, some twenty kilometres north of
Knin towards Grahovo together with the SVK commander Lieutenant General Mile Mrkšić, and stated
on RSK Radio&TV that the Krajina defence lines in the area were stabilized.
“We cannot believe that Croatia could decide to carry out an insane venture such as the attack on
Knin”, said he, but added that the possibility was not to be excluded.
According to his words, the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, with whom he spoke yesterday on
the phone, assured him that Serbia could no longer be indifferent.
Speaking about the alliance with Republika Srpska, President Martić said that the RSK and the RS
would act jointly, and that the presidents of the two states and the their military commanders were in
continuous contact.
“We have the strength to recoup what the Croatian army has seized”, stressed Martić, and urged
citizens to be disciplined and comply with the instructions of the authorities.
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ANNEx 158:
cROATIAN INTEllIgENcE ADMINISTRATION, SITuATION AND
AcTIVITIES Of ThE SVK, 30 July 1995
1995, 30 July
Knin
From the decision of the Supreme Defence Council of the “Republic of Ser-
bian Krajina” on the proclamation of the state of war
___________________
Decision of the RSK Supreme Defence Council
STATE OF WAR PROCLAIMED THROUGHOUT THE RSK
Knin, 30 July. At its meeting held on Friday evening the RSK Supreme De-
fence Council has decided, considering the latest developments after the oc-
cupation of Grahovo and possible Croatian aggression against the RSK, to
proclaim the state of war throughout the RSK in accordance with Article 102
of the Constitution.
[...]
The government has heard and accepted the information of the minister of de-
fence Milan Šuput on the steps taken with regard to the defence of the borders
and civil defence activities. RSK President Milan Martić visited yesterday the
area of the shelled village of Strumica, some twenty kilometres north of Knin
towardsGrahovotogetherwiththeSVK commanderLieutenantGeneralMile
Mrkšić, and stated on RSK Radio&TV that the Krajina defence lines in the
area were stabilized.
“We cannot believe that Croatia could decide to carry out an insane venture
such as the attack on Knin”, said he, but added that the possibility was not to
be excluded.
According to his words, the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, with
whom he spoke yesterday on the phone, assured him that Serbia could no
longer be indifferent.
Speaking about the alliance with Republika Srpska, President Martić said that
the RSK and the RS would act jointly, and that the presidents of the two states
and the their military commanders were in continuous contact.
“We have the strength to recoup what the Croatian army has seized”, stressed
Martić, and urged citizens to be disciplined and comply with the instructions
of the authorities.
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ANNEx 159:
RSK, MINISTRy Of DEfENcE, MIlITARy AND cIVIl AffAIRS
SEcTOR, REgulAR DAIly REPORT, 31 July 1995
1995, 31 July
Knin
Report of the Military and Civil Aff airs Sector of the RSK Ministry of
Defence concerning mobilization and bringing of the units to full wartime
complement, and spontaneous evacuation of the population aft er the news
that Croatian forces had broken through the defence lines at Strmica
______________________
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Military and Civil Aff airs Sector
Official secret
Strictly confidential
No. 403-201/95
Knin, 31 July 1995
Regular daily report
1. Mobilization and wartime complement
During general public mobilization focus was placed on achieving full
strength in SVK war units with conscripts and materiel. Mobilization is car-
ried with the assistance of the military police and the conscripts are imme-
diately transferred to war units. Since there are no conscripts without specifi
c assignments, the conscripts transferred to war units are those who most
frequently abandon the units. Between 17 July and today 2,850 conscripts
were transferred from compulsory work order status to war units. By order
of the Ministry of Defence 51 employees of the Ministry were transferred to
SVK war units.
In the Knin area 30 motor vehicles are being requisitioned for the require-
ments of the SVK General Staff . Also in the Knin area, 4 pack horses were
requisitioned for the requirements of the 7th Rear Base. Nine doctors have
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returned from specialization in the SRJ, and will be assigned to war units and
to the Sveti Sava Hospital in Knin.
317
In the lika area mobilization is completed, and motor vehicles, tractors etc.
are being requisitioned as required by war units. Both are proceeding smooth-
ly. In the Plaški area 6 tractors have been mobilized for the howitzer battal-
ion. Six nurses were mobilized for the medical unit of the Plaški brigade. Six
trucks were requisitioned at Plaški for the 103rd light infantry brigade.
Kordun
Eight trucks were requisitioned for SVK requirements.
Banija
Seventeen volunteers, persons declared unfit for military service, applied to
SVK units.
Second recruitment and peacetime complement
The following persons were recruited for military service:
- Northern Dalmatia 38 conscripts
- Lika 61 “
- Kordun 23 “
- Banija 68 “
Total 90 “
civil defence
Civil defence units, staff s and wardens are updating plans for protection,
rescue, evacuation, relief and shelter. During aggression on Grahovo civil de-
fence staff s in Northern Dalmatia and Lika provided relief to 220 refugees.
Civil defence wardens were particularly involved in preventing movements of
the population caused by rumours.
Last night someone in Strmica spread the rumour that the ustashi had broken
through defence lines and were entering Strmica, causing panic and uncon-
trolled movement. Panic was dealt with and the population remained in their
homes aft er the timely intervention of the head of the municipal civil defence
staff in Knin and civil defence wardens.
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4. Defence preparations
Activities focused on continued downsizing of the number of persons tempo-
rarily employed in government bodies through compulsory work orders. Th
us, the persons under compulsory work orders in the ministries include the
ministers, their assistants and one driver per ministry. Other administrative
personnel are persons not eligible for military service (women and persons
unfit for combat duty).
Compulsory work order units are being formed at brigade level in order to
prepare the territory for combat operations. So far four such units, 30-50 per-
son strong, have been established in the Knin area.
5. Surveillance and reporting service
The service monitors the situation on the front, on land and in the air space,
and is on alert status in order to inform the population about imminent danger
and respond to orders by competent officials.
Copy to:
- Ministry records
- Ministry of defence
- SVK General staff, general Sekulić
ASSISTANT MINISTER
Colonel Duško Babić
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ANNEx 160:
SVK, gENERAl STAff, DAIly REPORT, 3 AuguST 1995
1995, 3 August
Knin
Daily report of the Security Dept. of the SVK General Staff to the Security
Directorate of the VJ General Staff concerning the request of the General
Staff to have the SVK air force bombard Split because of the attack on Drvar,
the spreading of rumours about the HV attack on the RSK, the situation in
SVK units, the situation in the Grahovo-Glamoč theatre, and prevailing pub-
lic opinion that the SVK could not defend itself, and that it would be better for
the people to move out than to become encircled and perish.
SVK GENERAL STAFF
Security Department
Str. conf. no. 37-616
3 August 1995
Daily report to:
SECURITY DIRECTORATE OF THE VJ GENERAL STAFF
Att. General Aleksandar Dimitrijević
During the day our units have kept their positions, with the engagement of the
air force and artillery, and there has been no major shift of the front line from
Mandići – Dubrave - Mount Brežine - Koščica hill - Ograci hill - Javorov
Vrh - Veliki Mračaj- Mali Mračaj - Javorova Glava - Samar, - Igla - Bezdan -
Grgić - Suvi Vrh - Dinara- Razvale -Unište – the large cave right.
During the day the chief of the SVK General Staff visited the forward com-
mand post of the VRS General Staff in order to arrange cooperation and fur-
ther offensive action at Grahovo - Livanjsko Polje. Specific tasks were agreed,
but we do not know when they will be accomplished because the impression
is that in the western part the RS has hardly any forces capable of offensive
action. The VRS is concealing this fact. At the meeting of the chief of the
SVK General Staff at the forward command post of the VRS General Staff
the SVK was requested to carry out air raids on Split as a reprisal for the
shelling if Drvar.
During the meeting the SVK was also blamed for the fall of Grahovo and
Glamoč.
1. Foreign factor
The analysis of information obtained from different sources on HV aggres-
sion on the SVK warrants the following conclusions.
The Croatian Intelligence Service or Western intelligence services (certainly
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within the scope of their global policy towards Krajina) have been spreading,
several times a day and from different sources, misinformation about the un-
conditional HV aggression on the RSK.
As established, more than 80% of misinformation has been spread through
UNPROFOR, in most cases through liaison officers or friends, always taking
into account that such misinformation should reach the highest levels (brigade
and corps commanders, and senior officers in the SVK General Staff). False
and misinforming written material was given to persons believed that they
would pass it on to such officers.
Thesecondcategoryofsourcesusedbyforeignintelligenceservicestolaunch
misinformation were telephone communications between intelligence agen-
cies and the republican state security officers abroad.
The third channel used by the Croatian Intelligence Service were radio com-
munications intercepted and recorded by the radio tapping service.
The fourth group of misinformation - or half-truths - includes data obtained
from sources sent by different services to the Republic of Croatia or the 5th
Corps, not qualified for proper appraisal of what they saw or heard.
Finally, intelligence services in the units do not function at all, and our units
do not have any tactical depth information about hostile forces and do not
monitor the situation.
The foregoing considerations obviously show how realistic and timely are the
decisions made from the highest down to the lowest echelon.
Yesterday (2 August) the European Community RC and teams in the RSK
were ordered by the UN High Command in Zagreb to establish the follow-
ing:
- Air raids on Mount Dinara and facilities in the Grahovo area: did the planes
takeofffromtheUdbinaairstriporfromMahovljaninearBanjaLuka?Iffrom
Udbina, are the planes and pilots from the air force of Republika Srpska?
- Number of SVK troops killed and wounded? On which sites and where are
they taken care of? Can the ICRC visit them and talk to them?
- Artillery and rocket positions? Did the VRS take part in artillery support?
- Response of the military and state leadership to the negotiations in Geneva?
What is the response of the citizens?
2. Situation in the units
After the proclamation of the state of war, alcohol abuse among the troops
is on the rise, resulting in ever more frequent injuries, killings, verbal and
physical quarrels, obstruction of commands and serious disruption of combat
readiness.
After the decision of the SVK High Command to launch an offensive at Gra-
hovo - Livanjsko Polje, parts of the Special Unit Corps, MUP units and part of
the special “Captain Dragan’s” (Dragan Vasiljković) unit were committed to
the operation. In our assessment, the units did not accomplish the mission; the
authority of certain persons had to be saved and, accordingly, the units were
withdrawn from action.
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The fact is that the 2nd brigade under the command of “colonel” MILOŠ
CVJETIČANIN did not accomplish the mission except some minor opera-
tions of no significance for further action. MUP units which were included
into the Special Unit Corps after the “Vidovdan [St. Vitus] parade” not only
failed to accomplish their mission but even abandoned their positions. They
were returned to their positions but refused to remain within the Special Unit
Corps. “Captain Dragan”, supposed to be responsible for deep reconnaissance
of enemy deployment, reconnoitred instead the positions of our forces.
What is only true is that military police units at all levels, including the mili-
tary police battalion, are fighting properly, with no hesitation or fear, and have
not abandoned a single position.
In connection with the current situation the commander has made the follow-
ing moves:
On 2 August he recalled “general” Stupar from the Grahovo theatre, formed a
strategic reserve out of the uncommitted forces of the Special Unit Corps and
attached units in Kordun.
During the day the 2nd brigade was pulled out of combat and redeployed to
Bruvno (municipality of Gračac) to be in readiness for “special action” in all
directions.
During the day “captain Dragan” left the SVK, disgruntled because he had
requested to be appointed commander of the 92dn motorized brigade of the
7th Corps and promised that he would bring it to full combat readiness within
a month. When the SVK commander disagreed, Dragan demonstratively left
Krajina.
Let me note that “captain Dragan” was ‘nominated’ commander of the
92nd brigade by the Republican State Security Service of Serbia (MILAN
KNEŽEVIĆ, aka “Nedo”) because they persistently tried to present the cur-
rent commander of the 92nd motorized brigade, lieutenant colonel JANKO
ĐURICA, as incapable of commanding the unit.
This has become a fairly complex internal problem with, so far, an uncertain
outcome.
If our internal political and the external environments are added, the case is
more than serious.
As reliably verified there is other than lip service no practical cooperation
with the VRS.
Untruths and lies are paid with human lives.
As offensive operations against the 5th Corps have come to a standstill, illicit
trade is flourishing and threatens to assume uncontrollable dimensions.
The security system at all levels is geared to the same function as the leader-
ship and command system. However, in spite of all problems, the counterin-
telligence service is functioning and unity within the service is still at a high
level.
An attempt to disrupt the system was made in the Special Unit Corps and
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in the 15th Corps. Lieutenant colonel PETAR BORIĆ has totally identified
himself with “general” STEVO ŠEVO, who has no tolerance for the security
service. Together they oft en exert pressure on specific security departments
and brigades. However, the counterintelligence service has remained func-
tional thanks exclusively to the sound, professional and responsible efforts
of the 15th Corps security department (captain POTKONJAK and lieutenant
LONČAR), with whom I am in continuous contact.
Ref.; your information str. conf. no. 33-226 of 26 July 1995.
The sum of 37,000 DEM is mentioned on page three (3), paragraph four. Addi-
tionally we received the information that the sum involved was 190,000 DEM,
which he received subsequently.
3. Situation in the territory
On 3 August 1995 the impression was gained, in contact with citizens, of
elements of panic, although still controlled. Citizens are mainly accusing the
authorities, i.e., the political leaders of the SVK, and believe that the situation
is due to their carelessness and negligence. They hope that we have not been
betrayed and believe, as the last resort, that the SRJ will help.
Furthermore, citizens think that we are not able to defend ourselves and that,
if no substantial help is provided by the SRJ, it is better for the people to move
elsewhere rather than to be encircled and perish.
According to reliable information received during the day, RSK prime min-
ister M. Babić told the ministers to pack up and be ready for moving to Donji
Lapac. He asked Nikola Štrbac, secretary of the government, whether he was
sure that those in Knin would defend Knin in the event of an attack. Štrbac
replied that he (Babić) should know the answer having spent some time there.
Babić did not continue the conversation on the subject.
ASSISTANT COMMANDER
for security affairs
Colonel Rade Rašeta
(stamp)
text illegible
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ANNEx 161:
MIlAN MARTIĆ SPEAKINg IN RAVNI KOTARI, 2 AuguST 1995
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_A.indd 263 12/16/2010 2:47:49 PM 264
ANNEx 162:
ExcERPT fROM IcTy, PROSEcuTOR V. SlOBODAN MIlOŠEVIĆ (IT-
02-54-T), BABIc TESTIMONy, ThuRSDAy, 21 NOVEMBER 2002
EXTRACT
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević (IT-02-54-T)
Babic Testimony
Thursday, 21 November 2002
Page 13256
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I don’t think we need to
put it
2 all to the witness. It’s tabs 98, 99, 100, and 101 of Exhibit 352. They
3 all deal with General Celeketic, his promotion and his release.
4 Q. But I would like to put to you tab 102, and it’s 102 of that same
5 exhibit, 352. And that is actually a document by Dusan Zoric, the
6 military post 1740 -- 90, Belgrade, from 21st December, 1994, regard-
ing
7 the promotion of Colonel Milan Celeketic to the rank of Major General.
8 Can you tell us who this person Dusan Zoric is, what position did he
have?
9 A. He was head of the personnel department of the General Staff of
10 the army of Yugoslavia, or was the acting head.
11 Q. Yes. Thank you.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we have to go into pri-
vate
13 session, and I’m dealing now with paragraph 293 and the following two
in
14 the proofing summary.
15 [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]
16 THE REGISTRAR: We’re in private session.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
18 Q. Witness, did you have a conversation with Mr. Milosevic on the
Z-4
19 plan in August 1995?
20 A. Yes, a telephone conversation.
21 Q. At that time, had you discussed the Z-4 plan with Mr. Galbraith?
22 A. Yes, with Ambassador Peter Galbraith, on several occasions,
23 several times before that.
24 Q. And immediately before you had this telephone conversation,
what
25 was the option given to you by Mr. Galbraith?
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Page 13257
1 A. He offered that we should accept and adopt the Z-4 plan and the
2 disengagement of the armed forces of Krajina in the Bihac pocket. He
said
3 that we should accept a new mandate for the UN peacekeepers, which
was
4 known as the UNCRO mandate, United Nations Croatia, and that
5 communications and roads be opened in Croatia.
6 Q. At that time, were you the president of the RSK?
7 A. I was the Prime Minister of the government of the Republic of
8 Serbian Krajina. Martic was the president, in fact.
9 Q. Why did you not simply accept it?
10 A. I accepted in my capacity as Prime Minister, but I informed
11 Ambassador Galbraith that this could not be put into practice without
the
12 will and acquiescence of President Milosevic.
13 Q. How -- and did you then -- you said you had a telephone
14 conversation with Mr. Milosevic on the 3rd of August, 1995. How did
you
15 reach him? Did anyone help you?
16 A. Yes. Jovica Stanisic did, from Jovica Stanisic’s cabinet or
17 offices.
18 Q. Did you go to his office, and where was it?
19 A. I did go to see Stanisic in his office, which was located in the
20 building of the Federal Internal Affairs Ministry.
21 Q. Who was present? Who else was present when you saw him?
22 A. Radovan Stojicic, nicknamed Badza was there, and so was the
head
23 of the counter-intelligence service of State Security of Serbia, a man
24 whose name I don’t remember, but he resembled Frenki.
25 Q. Is that the same man you mentioned earlier on to have seen in
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ANNEx 163:
cENTRE fOR ElEcTRONIc SuRVEIllANcE, ExcERPTS Of
INTERcEPTS BETWEEN MIlAN MARTIĆ AND IlIJA PRIJIĆ, NOS. 65
(3 AuguST 1995, 08:50), 66 (3 AuguST 1995, 12:23), 67
(3 AuguST 1995, 14:42)
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ANNEx 164:
DuŠAN VIRO, “SlOBODAN MIlOŠEVIĆ: ThE ANATOMy Of cRIME”,
PROfIl, ZAgREB, 2007, PP. 370-378
Dušan Viro
SlOBODAN MIlOŠEVIĆ
ThEANATOMy Of cRIME
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Publisher
Profil International, Kaptol no. 25, Zagreb
Representing Publisher
Daniel Žderić
Main Editor
Drago Glamuzina
Editors:
Stjepan Ravić
Tvrtko Jakovina
Language Editing and Proofreading
Tanja Konforta
Table of contents and names prepared y:
Ana Jurjević
Consulting Editor
Dušan Bilandžić
Graphic design:
Renata Puki
Graphic design of the book jacket
Studio 2M
Published by:
Profil, Zagreb, May 2007
ISBN 978-953-12-0559-7
Chip record available in the computer catalogue of the National and
University Library in Zagreb
under the number 633479
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Ćosić: Yes, yes, by all means. We will be in touch and you don’t
give up. Thank you very much.
Martić: Cheers, Ćosić, bye.
03August 1995 08:50AM
The conversation between Milan Martić and the Minister of the
Interior of the so-called Krajina, Ilija Prijić who is calling him from Geneva.
Martić is trying to find out about the progress of the negotiations with the
Croatian side and he is convincing his collocutor that the CroatianArmy,
which is at the border of the so-called Krajina, is almost in a state of disarray.
Martić: Where are you?
Prijić: Here we are!
Martić: When did you arrive? Last night, didn’t you.
Prijić: Yes, last night.
Martić: How was the journey?
Prijić: Well, good, the journey was good.
Martić: Is it good, the place where you are accommodated there?
Prijić: Yes.
Martić:Aha, aha.
Prijić: Everything is okay…
Martić: Hey, this Pavičević is a hell1of a fellow.
Prijić: Have you talked with Milan ?
Martić: Not this morning, but yesterday I did. He went up there
yesterday.
Prijić: He has also talked with the one we talked about.
Martić: I know, but he did not call last night. I was expecting him to
call. He will call me now, around 10 o’clock. But don’t give a penny for that,
I know roughly what that one is requesting.
Prijić: I know, I know, he said exactly that, that one, that’s why he is
here.
Martić: Well he, what Tuđman publicly said about what he
requested, we wouldn’t even think of it.
Prijić: Naturally.
Martić: Railway line, oil pipeline, this and that.
Prijić: Yes, yes.
Martić: You know what the concept is - withdrawal from here, from
up there and then we can talk.
Prijić: But otherwise, there around Drvar and the reset, that we can.
Martić: Nothing, look, nothing. It is only, they were doing
something around Drvar but from a distance, but here we have rushed them▯
properly. Let me tell you, they have a lot of casualties, riots are everywhere, ▯
their men don’t want to go to those infantry breakthroughs, they are
1 He is referring to Milan Martić
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frightened because they have been losing so far, they have a lot of loses.
Prijić: Good.
Martić: Karina also visited me yesterday.And he says that they have
been holding out very well, the guys have been holding out excellently.
Prijić: Good.
Martić: Eh, it’s getting better and better in here. They have had a
few drinks, they have had quite a lot of drinks. Then they were rumbling
around the houses here the whole day yesterday and also around those
civilian villages and that is what you can threaten with. They can pound,
pound at the civilian villages, but then we will do something.Anyway, that
one, it is a lie, we were not pounding at anything and that one is clear.▯
Prijić: …
Martić: You should use that at the press conference there to say that
it was the way how to mount tensions. I have seen that the CNN and the
BBC repeated that. They say that we were pounding at Karlovac, Gospić and
the rest in order to get the approval for an attack.
Prijić: Yes, yes.
Martić: Well, this should be said there, please.
Prijić: What is their situation like, over there, in the region?
Martić: The same, they have been amassing on the left and on the
right, it is their theory that we are attacking them, but it does not ma▯tter.
They themselves have been causing some explosions, but we do not pound
at all, really. They themselves have been causing some explosions and that
should be resolved at the Conference, you know.
Prijić:All right.
Martić: So, you should stand by it. Well then, when do you have it,
at what time?
Prijić:At 10 o’clock.
Martić:At 10 o’clock; will you, are you returning tonight or
tomorrow?
Prijić: I do not know whether tonight or tomorrow, it depends on…
somebody says tonight, somebody tomorrow.
Martić: Look, it would be good that someone calls Radio Knin later,
someone should call here, 60-410.
Prijić:All right.
Martić: Yes, and you should say how...
Prijić: We cannot get through the lines over there, this is the other
one.
Martić:Aha, all right, if not, then we will convey something from
here, from the Cabinet. Then good, you just continue to hold out as you
should.
Prijić:All right.
Martić: Well Ićo, cheers.
Prijić: Bye.
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03August 1995 12:23 PM
The conversation between Milan Martić and Ilija Prijić, in which
Prijić informs Martić about the details of the talks. On that occasion they
also comment the news about the mobilisation of 100,000 people on the
Croatian side and Martić is convinced that “the mobilisation will start in
Serbia and Yugoslavia today and they will absolutely come in here,” Martić
presumes that their conversation is being wiretapped…
Prijić: Well, we have a break, so I wanted to get in touch.
Martić: How is it going?
Prijić: We have had no concrete talks with the other side so far…we
2
had a joint meeting at 10 o’clock…Stoltenberg said that the main thing was
to establish and prepare for the negotiating activities.
Martić: Yes, yes.
Prijić:And we have not…… talked about anything else, in
particular
Martić: Yes, yes!
Prijić: Thereafter, he had talks for about 15 to 30 minutes with
the Croats…requests, after that we had /talks/ lasting 10 minutes wit▯h that
group. We communicated our statement that we were for the resolution of
conflicts in a peaceful way.
Martić: Excellent!
Prijić: First of all, we have to resolve the issue of cessation of
hostilities, the agreement on a ceasefire.
Martić: Yes, yes!
Prijić:And after that we are now having a break again. They will
talk again with the Croats. They have been conferring among themselves.
Martić: Oh, I see.
3
Prijić: Meaning Stoltenberg andArens and De la Presle …we
should continue with the talks.
Martić: With Stoltenberg particularly regarding the ceasefire.
Prijić:All right.
Martić: Do not forget that, it is very important.
Prijić: He has got the information, through Tanjug – I don’t know
what you have in that regard - that Babić and Galbraith talked….and what
they have agreed over there.
2 Thorvald Stoltengerg, a Norwegian politician, at that time he was
a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for the form▯er
Yugoslavia and one of the participants in the Geneva talks.
3 This probably refers to the participants in the negotiations Gert
Arens and Bernard de La Presle. It says „Arensi Delaprel” in the o▯riginal.
4 Peter Galbraith, U.S.A. Ambassador in Zagreb from June 1993 until
January 1998. In the original transcripts, Galbraith is always referred ▯to as
„Galbrajt“
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Martić: Nothing, Milan has not got in touch with me. I have
told you that the meeting was held in our “MIP” /Ministry of the F▯oreign
Affairs/5 up there. It was more of a Galbraith’s private visit. But Milan has
not called me yet.
Prijić: It seems that Tanjug released it.
Martić: Well, let them, let them, that is why I said – Do not go; they
wanted him to go to theAmerican Embassy, then I said – Do not go to the
American Embassy but to our “MIP”, here, and it should be a privat▯e visit.
Prijić: Stoltenberg has mentioned here thatAkashi 6 takes part in the
negotiation process, he and Galbraith.
Martić: Well, no, um, all right, all right, actually it is only Galbraith
as far as I know, but I am waiting for Milan to call me any minute now.
Prijić: Yes, yes!
Martić:And you should not forget to see with Stoltenberg about this
flow of goods.
Prijić: No, I won’t, I won’t.
Martić:And this, stand by that position – we are for the peaceful
resolution, we are for the resolution of the problem in a peaceful way.
Request a withdrawal of the forces, on the left and on the right and so.▯
Prijić:All right!
Martić:Actually, you can schedule new meetings, you can do all
that, there are no problems.
Prijić: What is the situation like?
Martić: Everything is OK, everything is under control. We have
resisted the infantry attacks again and everything, and we have inflicted loses
on them. They do not have, they are building up tensions up there, they are
fabricating, you should lodge a protest regarding that, they are fabrica▯ting
that we are attacking them, which has nothing to do with anything.
Prijić: Was there some ultimatum of theirs, in the newspapers or
what, I don’t know where, as if they have mobilized 100,000 men or that
they will do that?
Martić: They have already done that, they have mobilized over
100,000 men and Ganes and Kristofer announced that last night here and
this Ganes from UNPROFOR, I do not know, they have done that, I don’t
know. But you should not be perplexed by that.All our men have occupied
the positions, both in depth and in the forward lines of defence, and we▯ are
waiting for them, if it comes to that.
Prijić: Regarding those talks you held when we were going up there.
Martić: Eh, eh.
5 He is referring to the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Krajina.
6 YasushiAkashi, UN diplomat and the special envoy of the Secre-
tary-General of the UN for the Peace Operations.
7 UN Spokespearson
8 He is referring to Waren Christofer,American Secretary of State
(1993 – 1997)
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Prijić: Have they produced some results?
Martić: Well, I know, I know, it will be, it will be better, I think.
Prijić: Good.
Martić: I think that those ones will start with a mobilisation in
Serbia and Yugoslavia today and that they are absolutely coming in here.
Prijić: Good!
Martić: Yes, well, I don’t know, all this is being wiretapped, maybe
I shouldn’t have said this to you, but, um, it’s okay. You should hold out, we
are good, we are firm like soldiers and there are no problems.
Prijić: Good!
Martić: Listen, can you /say/ something for the Radio or Pero will
convey something from our conversation, that they have informed that …▯
Prijić: Well, here it is – we will talk about it later, and we will give
a statement for the radio, some of the journalists should come over ther▯e, to
the studio, there to our offices.
Martić: Good, they can come in here, to the Mara’s /office/, when
you call. Mara can put you directly through to that one up there, throug▯h this
83. She can /do that/ directly up there…
Prijić: Yes!
Martić: It will not be bad, Ilija, to call on that direct line up there, to
say basically that we have been accepted as an equal party. Everything is OK
here, I am telling you, things stand good with us militarily and there a▯re no
problems, but you should stress…
Prijić: …in the beginning, so that it will not….further on.
Martić:All right, all right, you just continue. Regarding this other
call, Pero will prepare brief information and broadcast it on the Radio ▯and
then you will call directly into the Radio /program/.
Prijić: Good!
Martić: Sometime around 4 o’clock then, maybe you can get into
the Radio /program/ directly.
Prijić: Yes, we will…
Martić: It’s a deal Ićo, my greetings to all those men there and you
hold out.
Prijić: I am leaving from here tomorrow morning.
Martić: Greetings to all who are there - Lazar, Milivoj and Mile -
give my regards and you hold out. There are no problems here, whatsoever.
Prijić: Talk to you.
Martić: Okay, all the best.
03August 1995 14:16 PM
The conversation between Milan Martić and Ilija Prijić.
Martić: What’s new up there?
Prijić: Look, the mobilisation is to the full and it is a wait-and-see
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situation.
Martić:Aha, aha, all right, you should be ready to go over there, if
necessary.
Prijić: I think that everything is completely ready.
Martić: Eh, that’s good, that’s good, and here we are holding well,
no cracks whatsoever. Wherever they tried to advance, they got it in the
neck.
Prijić: Good, good,
Martić: Um, that meeting which I planned to /?organise/, I
cannot do that now. When the commander judges that he can call the corps
commanders as well, then we will /organise/ it here where I am.
Prijić:All right.
Martić: You will be in touch with Tošo, are you there with Tošo
now?
Prijić: Yes, yes, I spoke with him when they came.
Martić: He is over there, at the Joco’s somewhere, you should meet
with him and discuss with him thoroughly, but tell him that the meeting will
be dependant on the Commander’s opportunity to gather corps commanders,
they are now in the field and they are not available. Eh, then you will come
from up there, you and the secretaries. So, hold out up there, be ready ▯and if
need be - on Zagreb, fuck it.
Prijić: No problem.
Martić: That’s right, Ićo. Bye, sport, push on, cheers.
03August 1995 14:42 PM
The conversation between Milan Martić and Ilija Prijić who is
telling him not very optimistic news about the outcome of the talks with▯
the Croatian side so far. However, Mile Martić, not even suspecting what is
going to happen the next morning, is still taking a firm stand.
Martić: Oh, hello Ićo, have you finished?
Prijić: No, we haven’t, it is still going on, we have a very difficult
problem in front of us regarding the outcome of this situation. It is no▯t
favourable for us, I will tell you and you…
Martić: Yes, yes.
Prijić: The following has been said: that based on theAgreement,
the today’s one, the delegations of the Croatian Government and the
Serbian representative of the authorities from Knin have decided that al▯l the
hostilities and military operations should cease at 12 o’clock on Fri▯day. It
means that pursuant to thisAgreement the following has been decided: 1.
that in accordance with theAgreement of 19 December 1994, the oil pipeline
will be opened on Monday, 07August 1995.
Martić: Nothing else?
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Prijić: Nothing else, only – unless the technical reasons prove to the
contrary. The meeting regarding the oil pipeline for Petrinja would be held at
Pleso on 08August.
Martić: That is also out of the question!
Prijić: Under 2: the meeting will be organised in (VENZEI?!) 9on
Friday, 09August in Knin in order to define the modalities and methods as
how to open and control the railway line between Zagreb and Split via Kn▯in.
Martić: God forbid!
Prijić: Thirdly: there is a tendency of including the political issue of
the Serbian Krajina in the talks that will start based on the Z-4 Plan.
Martić: That, neither!
Prijić: The first meeting will be held at Pleso on 10August and the
second in Knin on 17August.
Martić: First of all, you should request that all those meetings be
held outside Krajina and outside Croatia. Let them be held in Geneva!
Prijić:All right.
Martić: That we agree that the talks be held on an equal footing.
Prijić: …and the forth, that the normal flow of humanitarian aid be
ensured for Bihać.
Martić:All right, that is okay.
Prijić: The forth: that the border crossing, that is, that the
international forces check the border crossing towards Bihać - it is okay. The
fifth: that the full implementation is ensured, that means the implementation
of the agreement on the mandate, on the deployment of the forces on the ▯
borders.
Martić: On the internationally-recognised borders?
Prijić: It does not say here – on the internationally-recognised
borders, but it is written in the Resolution 981, it is that part, and the seventh:
in order to define the segments of this political agreement, that is, in order
to specifically define them regarding the ceasefire, the meeting will be held
between the military leadership of Krajina and Croatia under the auspice▯s of
10
General Janvier on Friday and Saturday.
Martić: I agree with that, but on the line.
Prijić: Well now, this is what we think here, but of course we don’t
know what the situation is like. It will depend on the situation. But we▯ opine
that, as for the oil pipeline, we have to accept that in one segment.
Martić:All right.
Prijić:As for the railway line, we have agreed that we should
formulate our request.
Martić: No, first and foremost – the unconditional withdrawal of
forces.
Prijić: Of course, just let me say – that part as you said it now, in the
9 It is not clear which place is in question.
10 General Bernanrd Janvier, the then Commander of UNPROFOR for
the former Yugoslavia. In the original it says „generala Žanvijea“.
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end.As for the oil pipeline, we can be resolving that.
Martić: Yes.
Prijić: Secondly, as for the railway line, let us not put it that way,
but that we will be able…not in Knin, but outside, to…
Martić: It can be neither Pleso nor Knin.
Prijić: Then, under number three, as for the political negotiations,
we are of the opinion that the political negotiations can take place, bu▯t
without the Z-4 Plan.
Martić: Without the plan, political talks, but without conditioning.
Prijić: Yes, we agree that the process of political talks starts.
Martić: That’s right, without, and nothing else.
Prijić:About this, they have proposed the date – 10August.
Martić: Not 10August.
Prijić: We will make it conditional - after the withdrawal of the
Croatian forces.
Martić: That date will be additionally fixed after the withdrawal, in
order to adhere to theAgreement on the ceasefire.
Prijić: Shall we put – during the month ofAugust.
Martić: Yes, yes.
Prijić: It gives us much more time, all right, those other issues as
well, starting from Bihać and other things, no problem about that.
Martić: Yes, yes, have you called Radio Knin?
Prijić: We do not make, I do not know how it will end.
Martić: He expects you to call. Listen, I will go out, I am going in
the field and you stick to what we have agreed, there is no retreat. In any
case do not accept that regarding the railway line and I will…
Prijić: …talks.
Martić: Eh, well, all right. But to condition it by the withdrawal of
the forces to the line of separation, meaning that we want a demobilisat▯ion.
You should request a demobilisation of the forces, that is, to the line o▯f
separation, to the previously determined line of separation.
Prijić: (keeps yelling) Yes, yes, yes!
Martić: You should request that and then all the negotiations and
political /?talks/, without conditioning it by the Z-4, you should reque▯st
the political /?talks/ there, it should be outside Croatia and outside K▯rajina.
Request again that Geneva be the place to hold negotiations.
Prijić:All right.
Martić: For the political talks it should be Geneva.
Prijić:All right.
Martić: Do not let them trick you, because they also want to bring
that down, we should insist on the military plan, don’t you get scared, our
position is good. We are now in a better position and they are now in a
situation…
Prijić: Here, the comments of De la Presle 11 and the others, yes, and
11 In the original transcript „De la Prel“
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12
also ofArens .
Martić: …Well, all right, they want to give you the feeling that we
are almost ruined. They would certainly do something, only if they could.
They have been trying up there but they suffer loses everywhere.
Prijić:All right.
Martić: The situation is good, there are no problems. Listen, you
need to say there – as equal forces, and see to it that you are not t▯reated as
the local authorities but – the Croatian and the Serbian side, the Se▯rbian side.
If there is the Croatian /side/, then /there is/ - the RSK and if they a▯re the
Croatian /side/ then - the Serbian side. So, you should fight for the equality
to be applied.And, no chance that we, bre /Serbian colloquialism/, agree to
the negotiations under blackmail, without ultimatum, we go for the optio▯n to
request the resolution in a peaceful manner, all that should be our…Do not
allow them to foist Stoltenberg upon you and the internationally recognised
borders and the mandate of UNCRO, because as soon as you accept the
UNCRO mandate, you have accepted everything.
Prijić:And that’s the end.
Martić: Yes, yes.
Prijić: Normally, they have been deployed there, but we should not
accept the Z-4.
13
Martić: No chance, no chance. The Vance Plan is out of the
question, and so is the Z-4.
Prijić: …political talks, as we….the political negotiations after the
month ofAugust, actually immediately after the Croatian forces withdraw
to the line of separation. It means that there should be a demobilisatio▯n and
they should reduce war tensions, then we can start immediately with the ▯
political negotiations. Good.
Martić: That’s it, and then we will decide, if they reduce the crap,
then we will start, and they shouldn’t blackmail us. Pleso is out of the
question, it shouldn’t be an internal problem, but Geneva. Well, that’s it,
good, Ićo.
04August 1995 07:20AM
The report of Milan Martić to an unknown individual only two hours
after the “Oluja” /Storm/ started in which the embittered Martić sends a
message to Slobodan Milošević.
Martić: They have been pounding at Knin since 05:00AM
incessantly. Look, they have been pounding at Knin for one or two hours.
They have been pounding at Knin, but they have been pounding everywhere.▯
Look, I and /unintelligible word/ are here. They are pounding at everything!
12 He refers to GertArens, in the text „Jarens“.
13 In the original it says „in Vens Plan“
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No, they have not broken through anywhere so far. They have launched
now an infantry attack up there, toward Kušica, that is, towards Slun▯j, but
they are pounding at all this, they are pounding at the towns, bombardin▯g,
for instance Knin continuously. The Udbina airport also, they are pounding
at everything, fuck it, Petrovac. With what can they reach Petrovac, yes,
yes, yes! That’s it! They will, they will, as soon as we refused yesterday,
it was already their intention, they have planned that. They have received
the support from the Germans,Americans and that’s it. They’ve got
the assurances, they’ve got the assurances from Serbia that it wouldn▯’t
get involved. Last night they repeated it and they quoted him 14that he
condemned Karadžić and me and so. Call him and inform him, so that he is
glad, tell him that. Bye now!
04August 1995 14:10 PM
The conversation between Milan Martić and an unknown collocutor,
presumably a journalist, Mile Martić continues to delude the public…
Martić: …the shelling of all towns and civilian facilities has started,
including also Knin. It has not stopped until now. Look, practically there has
been no break until now, not even for 2 minutes.As for our lines, I can say
and praise our fighters who are holding out courageously and the officers
who are doing their job extremely well. Our lines have not been broken
anywhere so far, but the Croats…
14 Obviously he refers to Slobodan Milošević
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ANNEx 165:
RSK, OPERATIONS REPORT, 26 AuguST 1995
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Annex 166:
RSK, ORdeR Of Lieutenant MiLe MRKšić, 29 JuLy 1995
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Annex 167:
RepubLic Of cROatia, MiniStRy Of defence, inteLLigence
RepORt, 2 auguSt 1995
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A NNEX 168:
RSK, SEcuRity DEpARtmENt, DAily REpoRt, 3 AuguSt 1995
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A NNEX 169:
AgREEmENt bEtwEEN thE govERNmENt of thE REpublic of cRoA-
tiA AND thE uNitED NAtioNS pEAcE foRcES – uNcRo oN tEmpoRARy
mEASuRES iN thE AREAS foRmERly KNowN AS “SEctoR NoRth” AND
“SEctoR South”, 6 AuguSt 1995
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A NNEX 170:
REpublic of cRoAtiA, miNiStRy of DEfENcE, DiREctivE op. No. 12-
4/95, 26 JuNE 1995
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A NNEX 171:
REpublic of cRoAtiA, miNiStRy of DEfENcE, oRDER to AttAcK,
2 AuguSt 1995
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ANNEX 172:
miNutES of thE mEEtiNgS hElD At thE DEfENcE miNiStRy of thE
REpublic of cRoAtiA, 2 AuguSt 1995
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A NNEX 173:
Witness statement of marko rajčić
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A NNEX 174:
opERAtioN StoRm
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ANNEX 175:
EXcERpt fRom thE SpEEch of thE pRESiDENt of thE REpublic, mi-
lan martić, Given at the BriefinG on the ComBat readiness of
thE SvK, 10 fEbRuARy 1995
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A NNEX 176:
mARKo vRcElJ, “thE wAR foR SERbiAN KRAJiNA: 1991-1995”, bEl-
gRADE, 2002
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A NNEX 177:
SVK, INtEllIgENcE DEpArtmENt, INtEllIgENcE rEport,
4 AuguSt 1995
Serbian document on the shelling of Knin, 4 August 1995
SVK General Staff
Intelligence Department
Str. conf. No. 2/31/3110-1
4 August 1995
Intelligence report
TheattackoftheCroatianArmyontheRSKstartedon4August1995at05.00
with the shelling of the towns of Knin, Drniš, Benkovac, Karin, Obrovac,
Gračac, Korenica, the Udbina airstrip, Vojnić, Vrginmost and Petrinja. The
artillery preparation lasted until 05.30, followed by engagement of individual
weapons of 130, 152 and 152 mm calibre and multiple rocket launchers.
The ustaše infantry attack started at about 06.00 from Sunja towards Kosta-
jnica, with the engagement of tanks, but units of the 39th Corps successfully
repelled the attack. Another infantry attack was mounted from the village of
Brlog (Otočac) - Drenov Klanac - village of Glavace, but it was also success-
fully beaten back. Knin was shelled from Livanjsko Polje and from several
directions, and by the time of this report the town has been hit by 200 to 300
projectiles of different types and calibres.
The target of the first strike was the building of the General Staff of the Ser-
bian Army of Krajina, which sustained considerable damage and the almost
complete loss of the motor pool. Subsequently the fire was focused on the
‘1300 Corporals’ barracks, the TVIK plant, the railway junction and housing
below the Knin fortress [area of the residence of the “RSK president” Mile
Martić - author’s note] and other targets.
At 10.00, as this report is being written, hostile forces continue to attack Knin
alternately with guns and multiple rocket launchers, shell the Udbina airstrip
continuously, and occasionally open fi re on other settlements in the RSK.
By monitoring the radio links of the Croatian Army and their mobile tele-
phones we have been able to
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establish that the ustaše are sustaining considerable losses at Dubrovnik, Bi-
ograd-na-Moru, Gospić, Otočac, Sisak ad Sunja. You will be duly informed
of all the latest information.
Head of Department
Lieutenant Colonel Mihajlo Knežević
Copy to:
7th, 11th, 21st, 39th Corps, Special Unit Corps
General Staff of the Yugoslav Army - Second Directorate
General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska in Bosnia
and Herzegovina - Intelligence Directorate
Command of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska
in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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ANNEX 178:
mIlItAry tArgEtS IN thE VIcINIty of BENKoVAc,
Gračac and ObrOvac
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A NNEX 179:
DEAth cErtIfIcAtE of DušAN KorolIjA
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
STATE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE
ŠIBENIK KNIN COUNTY / w a t e r -
mark: DM RH/
REGISTRY OFFICE KNIN
free of charge pursuant to
to Article 6 Item 1 of the
Administrative Fees Act.
DEATH CERTIFICATE
On 27 April 2009, the entry of the fact of death was performed into the death
registry for the area of Kistanjefor the year 2009 under ordinal number 27:
Personal identification number (OIB): 48865168991
Date, month, year and hour of death:12 (twelfth) April 2009 at 18:30
a.m.
Place of death: Ivoševci
Name: DUŠAN
Surname: KOROLIJA
Sex: male
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Date, month and year of birth: 20 (twentieth) January 1949
Place of birth: Ivoševci
Nationality: Serbian
Citizenship: Croatian
Name and surname of spouse and Marija Korolija
surname before marriage: Vukša
Parents’ names and surnames: Father: deceased Đuro Korolija
Mother: Ružica
Notes and subsequent entries:
L. S. /Stamp: REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
ŠIBENIK KNIN COUNTY
STATE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE
K I N E B I Š
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Numerical designation:
Registrar:
CLASS: 223-04/10-03/970 /handwritten signature/
REG.NO: 2182-07-02-10-1
Vedrana Požar
In Knin, 10 November 2010
Narodne novine d.d. Zagreb - (48) 040293
Order code: UT-IV-205
Form No. 10
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ANNEX 180:
ApplIcAtIoN for thE ISSuANcE of AN IDENtIty cArD for NIKolA
KresOjević, 30 january 2008
FORM 2
ApplIcAtIoN for ISSuANcE of IDENtIty cArD
1. Citizen Identification number 0404961340709
2 Surname KRESOJEVIĆ
3. Given name NIKOLA
4 Surname and given name(s) of KRESOJEVIĆ DUŠAN AND
parents ZORA nee ŽGELA
5. Day, month and year of 04 April 1961
birth
6. Place and country of D. Furjan 14, Croatia
birth
7. Place of residence and address D. Furjan 59
In
Slunj,10 January 2008
/handwritten -illegible KD Slunj 2250
Illegible 13403714/98
signature-Nikola Kresojević
(signature of the applicant)
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PD SLUNJ
POLICE DEPARTMENT / POLICE STATION
/photography of the applicant/ /dactylogram /
-------------------------------------------
Surname: KRESOJEVIĆline crosscut
Name:
NIKOLA
Identification number: 0404961340709
Serial number of the Identification card 103141341
Mark of the Identification Card HR
Date of 04 April 1961
birth
Sex Male
Citizenship Croatian
Permanent Residence DONJI FURJAN
Address
DONJI FURJAN 59
Issue date 10 January 2008
Valid until 10 January 2018
Identification by insight into ID Card 13403714 /98
Identity Card form
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A NNEX 181:
ApplIcAtIoN for ISSuANcE of AN IDENtIty cArD for mArIjANA
POznanOvić, 30 aPril 2008
FORM 2
ApplIcAtIoN for ISSuANcE of IDENtIty cArD
1. Citizen Identification number 0401978375027
2 Surname POZNANOVIĆ
3. Given name MARIJANA
4 Surname and given name(s) of BRANKO
parents
5. Day, month and year of 04 January 1978
birth
6. Place and country of Sisak, Croatia
birth
7. Place of residence and address Četvrtkovac 72b
In
Sisak,30 April 2008
signature-Poznanović Marijana
(signature of the applicant)
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1943 Form 4
SISAK-MOSLAVINA PD
POLICE DEPARTMENT / POLICE STATION
/photography of the applicant/ /dactylogram /
-------------------------------------------
papillary line crosscut
Surname: POZNANOVIĆ
Name: MARIJANA
Identification number: 0401978375027
Serial number of the Identification card 103278081
Mark of the Identification Card HR
Date of 04 January 1978
birth
Sex Female
Citizenship Croatian
Permanent Residence ČETVRTKOVAC 72b
Address ČETVRTKOVAC 72b
Issue date 30 April 2008
Valid until 30 April 2018
Identification by insight into ID Card 10033259 /illegible/
Identity Card form
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A NNEX 182:
rsK, Military POst 9138, extraOrdinary event, 16 OctOber 1993
v.p. (military post) 9138
Glina
o.b.
Conf. nr. 15-1-31
Date: 16.10.1993
Extraordinary event, delivered by -
Command of 39th corps -
On 16.10.1993, at undetermined time between 00.30 and 01.00 hours in Glina, in Ciril and Metodije street, in
front of “Bolji život” tavern, Rajšić Mirko, born in 1943, with permanent residence in Vinogradska bb, Glina,
member of ODTO (territorial defense) Glina, was killed.
He was killed in a traffic accident while driving his bicycle.
The scene of the accident was investigated by Glina traffic police and investigative judge Milošić.
In the vicinity of the traffic accident personal vehicle Zastava 101, number plates VN 44-06 was found, the
vehicle was damaged on the right front side, the damage occurred when the vehicle skidded off the roadway into
a ditch and hit the ground; the vehicle was driven by Slijepčević Ilija from Hajtica 37.
The inspection at the accident scene did not provide any evidence that Slijepčević had caused this serious
accident with his car, although he does acknowledge hitting the front wheel of a bicycle with his right front
wheel, which, according to his statement, had already been lying down on the road.
bn. -
RECEIVED 16-10 15,50 illegible
(day&month) (hour & minute)
Chief o. b, Ljiljak (signature)
Djuro
k i k (secret code) 452 (illegible)
Cable nr.
PROCESSED xx -10 15,55 illegible
(day&month) (hour & minute) (signature)
SUBMITTED ___________
(day&month) (hour & (signature)
minute)
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MILITARY POST 9138 MILITARY SECRET
Confident. nr: 43-6 CONFIDENTIAL
Glina, 20.05.1994
Further to the request from the family of deceased RAJŠIĆ MIRKO, on the basis of Article 98(3) of the
Act on Basic Rights of Disabled Veterans and Fallen Soldiers’ Families ("Official Gazette of SFRJ" nr
31/85, 44/89, 87/89 and 20/90), and duly implemented procedure, issues the following
cErtIfIcAtE:
This is to confirm that RAJŠIĆ MIRKO; son of STOJAN, born in 1948, residing in Glina, Vinogradska bb,
th
married, father of two, was killed on 16.10.1993 as a member of the Squad I of 24 pbr. Glina.
He was killed in a traffic accident at the time he was not on duty in his unit.
In the procedure leading to the issuance of this Certificate the statement given by the commanding officer
of the Squad I was used.
This Certificate has been issued for the purpose of obtaining rights to which families of the fallen are
entitled and cannot be used for other purposes.
COMMANDING OFFICER
Lieutenant-colonel
Jovo Mamula
illegible, signed
(Military Post 9138 GLINA) stamp
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A NNEX 183:
rSK, polIcE DEpArtmENt, lEttEr coNfIrmINg thE DEAth of
branKO bajić, 22 February 1995
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
SECRETARIAT OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS VOJNIĆ
POLICE DEPARTMENT
No: 08-03/1-1-12-282/2-95
Vojnić, 22 February 1995
MILITARY POSTAL ADDRESS 9104
PETROVA GORA
Liaison: Your letter no.: 41/2 of 16 February 1995
In regard with your letter referring to the above mentioned number and date, we
inform you that on 18 October 1994 around 18.50 hrs in the place Široka Rijeka, near the
house owned by Vergaš Mile, there was an accident in which a driver in an agricultural
vehicle, Bajić Branko, son of Vasa, born on 21 February 1955 in Vojnić, with the residence in
Široka Rijeka No. 32, suffered severe physical injuries. He died after a short time in the
hospital "St. Georgia" in Vojnić, due to injuries.
The accident was caused as follows:
The driver in an agricultural vehicle, registration mark "IMT 539", reg. no. VOJNIĆ
934, operated by Vučetić Milan, son of Dušan, born on 14 June 1956 in Široka Rijeka, living
in Široka Rijeka no. 35, SO (Serbian Region) Vojnić, was driving down the motorway,
without using the lights from the direction of Maljevac to Krstinje. At the time of arriving in
front of the house owned by Vergaš Mile in Široka Rijeka no. 1, in a sharp right curve he
crossed to the middle of the road and hit the front left part of the wheel into the agricultural
vehicle, mark "IMT 539" with no registration plate, operated by Bajić Branko, who was
coming from the opposite direction, also without using the lights. Due to the crash both
agricultural vehicles rotated around its axis and Bajić Branko dropped out of the vehicle and
hit his head against the asphalt, since his vehicle had no cabin. He had injuries in the front
part of his head.
Regarding this car accident the workers of the (SUP) Secretariat of Interior Vojnić
filed a criminal complaint to OJT Glina against Vučetić Milan.
M A Y O R
Nikola Vuletić
/handwritten signature illegible/
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/written by hand: “282”)
MILITARY POSTAL ADDRESS 03/1-1-12
9104
No. 41/2 21 February 1995
16 February 1995 /stamp illegible containing the following:/
PETROVA GORA 08-03/1-12-282/1-95
Secretariat of Interior VOJNIĆ
Records from on-site inspection,
r e q u e s t e d –
This Military Postal Address was approached by Bajić Dragica, the widow of the remained
Bajić Vaso Branko, requesting the entitlement to one-time financial assistance.
Since Branko died in the agricultural vehicle accident and the request was not accompanied
with all the relevant data which could describe whether the the deceased person was guilty in
charge or not, which would affect the acknowledgment of the entitlement.
The crash in which the late Branko died took place in Široka Rijeka on 18 October 1994.
We kindly ask you that, in case you have made an inspection or you have any information
about this crash, provide us with the relevant data in order to bring the final decision about
this request.
Delivered to:
- Secretariat of Interior Vojnić COMMANDER
- ad acta Lieutenant Colonel
Veljko Bosanac
/handwritten signature illegible/
round stamp with the following text:
MILITARY POSTAL OFFICE
Petrova Gora
/written by hand:/
a/a 22.47
23 February 1995
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A NNEX 184:
rsK, reGiOnal centre vrGinMOst, OPeratiOnal rePOrt, 27 auGust
1993
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
REGIONAL CENTRE VRGINMOST
On 27 August 1993
Republic Centre
K n i n
Subject: Operational Report
1. At the Kordun part of the fight it is peaceful
2. In Zagorje, the municipality of Krnjak, there was a severe accident of the car Golf
with our registry plate and the vehicle of the United Nations. In the accident three
persons died as follows: Bolić Željko from Donji Bidački Skrad, Kosjer Dragan and
Blagojević Marko from Krnjak. The accident occurred today around twelve. The
police authorities are still performing an on-site inspection.
4. In the municipalities of Krnjak and Slunj the traffic is difficult.
5. The supply of electricity and drinking water in city water supply line is difficult.
6. OSSCZ (General Service of Serbian Civil Protection): Vrginmost, Vojnić, Krnjak
and Slunj – are working according to the plan.
OFFICER IN CHARGE
Pavlović Milan
voarrbl
submitted at 18.30 hrs
Republic of Serbia krzip +?+
I have nothing more and should there be something, we will inform you accordingly
ok ok +?
Bye bye my colleague
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 428 12/16/2010 2:55:33 PM 429
A NNEX 185:
rSK, commAND of thE 7th opErAtIoNAl group, rEport ABout
lOsses, 20 aPril 1992
C O M M A N D of 7th Operational Group (OG) MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential number 11-48-1 STRICTLY ONFIDENTIAL
20 April 1992
Report about losses,
to be delivered - TO THE COMMAND OF 10th CORPUS
In the attachment of this file, we hereby provide you with the report about losses for 7th
Operational Group, in accordance with the standard forms.
Herewith we provide you with the difference, losses after 10 March 1992 respectfully, as well
as for individuals for which we had no information about, but have collected in the
meanwhile.
Enclosure: Filled in forms.
AUTHORISED BY THE COMMANDER
Lieutenant Colonel
Miloš Malidžan
/handwritten signature illegible/
round stamp with the following text:
/stamp 11 May 1992/ Command of 7Operational Group
MILITARY POSTAL ADDRESS
No. 5431
No. 11/22 –
BIHAĆ
Page no. 2.
LIST OF LOSSES BY NAMES
COMMAND Glina starting with 199_ year S-2
No. Deed and Last name, father's Date, month Place of Address of
Profession name and name and year of birth birth residence,
1 military officerBanda Branko Živko
Date of admittance to Circumstances of killing, injuries Nationality Unit Remarks
Yugoslav National or missing (date and hour)
Army
died on 29 March 1992 due to
falling down the stairs, being drunk serbian
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 429 12/16/2010 2:55:33 PM 430
A NNEX 186:
rSK, commAND of thE 7th corpS., INformAtIoN for SuBorDINAtE
units, 28 aPril 1993
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
C O M M A N D of 7th CORPUS mIlItAry SEcrEt
Strictly confidential number 30-3056 StrIctly oNfIDENtIAl
28 April 1993
ENCRIPTED
Information for subordinate units
To be delivered-
TO THE COMMANDS: 75 thmotorised brigade, 92 motorised brigade, Operating Group-1,
st nd th th
Tactic Group-th 1 Light Brigade, 2 Infantry Brigade, 4 Light Brigade, 7 Mixed Artillery
Battalion, 7 Mixed Antitank Artillery Battalion
1. Yesterday in the area of responsibility of the North Dalmatian Corpus the attacks were
continued at the positions of the Ustasha army and the villages along the front line.
The Ustasha opened the fiercest artillery and tank fire along the villages of Smilčić and
Biljane Donje.
From the direction of Gaćeleza the mortar fire was opened to our positions in the region of
Zelene Glavice.
The forces of Serbian army returned the fire to the enemy.
The NATO aircraft conducted a flight over the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
At 14.15 there was an explosion over Knin, caused by a sound wave.
In the responsibility area of Lički corpus, the Ustasha opened the fire few times over the
region Ostrvica and M. Alan with the mortars.
In the region of Banijski corpus the sporadic mortar and artillery fire was opened in the region
of Kruška-Čorkovača, but our forces did not turn the fire.
2. Outstanding event:
On 26 April 1993 around 13.00 hrs there was an accident in the village Struga in the
th
responsibility zone of 39 Corpus. The accident occurred when the trurd driver of
UNPROFOR bumped into the bicycle driven by the member of 33 infantry brigade Dobrić
Dragan on his way from Unčana to Dvor. Dobrić Dragan died caused by severe injuries. The
investigation is still in progress.
Assistant Commander
First Class Captain
Slavko Ožegović
/handwritten signature illegible/ stamp with the following text
RECEIVED 28 April 93 at 17.15.
/round stamp with the text: Cezar,, Telegraph no. 119, no. of group 300
At 18.20,29-4 at 11.00
Republic of Serbian Krajina
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A NNEX 187:
rSK, BENKoVAc muNIcIpAl court, oN-SItE INVEStIgAtIoN rEcorD, 7
july 1993
THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
BENKOVAC MUNICIPAL COURT Reference number Kri /criminal investigation/
50/93
To: PUBLIC SECURITY STATION
BENKOVAC
Please find enclosed, for further use, two copies of the On-site Investigation Record
dated 7 July 1993, with the above-mentioned reference number, which has been made by the
Investigating Judge of this Court.
It is to be noted that a copy of the Record, which refers to the death of Paravinja Olga, wife of
Milan, from Smoković, presently in Podlug, has not been submitted to the competent Prosecutor’s
Office.
Benkovac, 14 July 1993
Investigating Judge
Milica Dražić
/illegible signature/
/added in handwriting/
th
/illegible/ 15 July 1993
/illegible signature/
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 431 12/16/2010 2:55:33 PM 432
THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
BENKOVAC MUNICIPAL COURT Reference number Kri /criminal investigation/
50/93
ON-SITE INVESTIGATION RECORD
Made on 7 July 1993 by the Investigating Judge of the Benkovac Municipal Court at the
house of Ante Zelić, from Popovići, in Podlug in which house the family of Paravinja Milan from
Smoković presently resides, on the occasion of the death of Paravinja Olga from Smoković.
PRESENT ARE THE FOLLOWING:
On behalf of the Court:
1. Investigating Judge: Milica Dražić
2. Recording Clerk: Marija Žarković
/mirror image of the stamp in Cyrillic/:
THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
BENKOVAC MUNICIPAL COURT
On behalf of the Benkovac SJB /Public Security Station/:
Inspector: Đuro Babić
Forensic Technician: Gromiko Višić
Started at11:30 hrs.
The on-site investigation was also attended by the Dr Libuša Pantović, expert
physician, who is otherwisethe employee of the 92 Brigade of RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/
Army, Benkovac.
On 7 July 1993 the Duty Service of the Benkovac SJB informed this Court about the death of
Paravinja Olga in Podgrađe, that is, in Podlug, therefore the on-site investigation team in the aforesaid
composition went immediately to the scene in order to carry out the on-site investigation.
The scene has not been secured by the members of the Benkovac SJB.
Upon the arrival at the scene it has been established through the relatives that the person in
question was Paravinja Olga, the wife of Milan, from Smoković, born in 1954 with the residence in
Podlug.
The body has been found in the house mentioned above, on the upper floor of the house, in the
bedroom that is 6 x 4 m in size.
On the southern part of the wall there is one window that is 120 x 120 cm in size, which is 1 m
above the floor level, while by the western wall, to the right of the window, there is a bed in the size of
2 m x 1.50 m, on which bed the body of a woman has been found.
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Further on along the western wall, from that bed in the northern direction, located are two
wardrobes in the total length of 3.80 m and 1.50 m in height and across from the wardrobes there is a
second bed that is 2 x 0.80 m in size.
By the mentioned bed, on the northern part of the wall and across from the above-mentioned
window, located is the entrance door of the room in the size of 2 x 0.80 m.
As it has been stated, the body has been found on the bed, laid on the back, and the length of
the body is 1.72 m.
It is to be added to the aforesaid that the expert physician who was present conducted the
external examination of the body, which physician has stated that Paravinja Olga died of natural
causes, also stating that the livores mortis were visible on the body, the rigor mortis was present, and
the death occurred some five to six hours prior to the conducted examination.
Also, the physician who conducted the external examination of the body will, to that effect,
prepare a separate death report which he will subsequently submit to the Benkovac Public Security
Station.
For the reasons stated above, that is, since the death of natural causes is in question, no further
investigative measures were taken, while the forensic technician has made the sketch of the scene and
took photographs and the inspector who was present conducted the interviews with the relatives who
were present in relation to the aforesaid, of which interviews he will make the official authority
records.
Recording Clerk: /stamp in Cyrillic/ InvestigatingJudge :
Marija Žarković THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN Milica Dražić
/illegible signature/ KRAJINA /illegible signature/
BENKOVAC MUNICIPAL COURT
/added in handwriting/:
/illegible/ 15 July 1993
/illegible signature/
/Over the first half of the 2 page and the entire 3 page of the original document there is a mirror
image copy, probably of some pages of the same document./
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A NNEX 188:
rSK, commISSIoN for thE EXchANgE of prISoNErS, trANSfEr of
cOrPses, 13 july 1993
REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
G O V E R N M E N T
Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners
No: 06-5-725/93
Knin, 13 July 1993
President of the Government
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Justice and Public Administration
Ministry of Interior
Headquarters of Serbian Army Krajina
- K N I N –
Subject: Transfer of corpses
At the meeting of the Commission for the exchange of prisoners of the (RSK) Republic of Srpska
Krajina and the Republic of Croatia held in Otočac on 12 July 1993 it was agreed to transfer corpses in
both directions.
First transfer was agreed for 16 July 1993 and was scheduled to be held in Otočac.
Our side will take over the following corpses:
1. Milosavljević Nenad, born in 1961in Belgrade
2. Milanko Dušan, born in 1966 in Karin
3. Sinobad Draško, born in 1968 in Knin
4. Vujić Sava, born in 1965 in Čoka
5. Vitaz Petar, born in 1950 in Brgud
6. Ljubičić-Mijić Boško, born in 1952 in Obrovac
7. Pešelj Obrad, born in 1950 in Bilišane – Obrovac
8. Paravinja Milan, born in 1946 in Smoković
9. Bađa Živko, born in 1956 in Bilišane
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 434 12/16/2010 2:55:34 PM 435
10. Novković Stevka, born in 1905 in Islam Grčki
11. Gagić Marta, born in 1915 in Islam Grčki
12. Prostran Petar, born in 1958 in Smoković
13. Popović Dragija, born in 1939 in Mokro polje (died of natural causes in Zadar, his family
lives in Knin).
At the same time we will provide the Croatian side with the 6 corpses buried in Benkovac (group
„Podgradina“) and 5 corpses buried in Glibodolski križ in Lika and one corpse found in Umce.
At the principle of reprocity both sides will place corpses into galvanized boxes and the
galvanized boxes into the wooden boxes.
After the transfer of the firsts group of corpses, it will be continued with the transfer of
the corpses selected by groups.
Since there are 10 corpses of soldiers in the first group, ie. policemen, the commission
suggests to GŠSVK to prepare the protocol of their funeral.
President of the Commission
Savo Štrbac
/signature illegible/
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A NNEX 189:
rSK, mINIStry of thE INtErIor, rEport oN thE SuIcIDE of gorAN
Panić, 18 july 1995
REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
POLICE AUTHORITY VOJNIĆ
PUBLIC SECURITY AUTHORITY(SJB) SLUNJ
Nr. 08-03/1-2-1299/95
Slunj, 18.07.1995
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
VOJNIĆ
Reference: Panić Goran, suicide
Report
On 18.07.1995, around 02.00 hours, in the convenience store “RID”, Grabovac bb, xx
Slunj, owned by Bjelobrk Mile from Plitvice, Panić Goran, son of Ratko, born on 07.06.1972 in
Sisak, Republic of Croatia, residing in Belgrade, Jovana Avakumovića nr. 1, employee of Police
Authority Belgrade, committed suicide.
He committed suicide with his service handgun “CZ” M-99, cal. 9 mm, long barrel, serial
number 23534, by putting it against his right temple and firing one round, all under heavy
influence of alcohol; the bullet entered through the right temporal bone and exited on the left side
of the skull, causing instant death.
The scene was investigated by officers from Police Station Slunj, who also interviewed
witnesses; the protocol and official notes thereof have been delivered to you, as per enclosures 1
– 4.
The body of Panić Goran, as well as his personal effects, was released to Pavković Stevo,
commander of the Serbian Ministry of Interior police troop whose member Panić Goran was, and
the handgun with which the suicide was committed, bullet case and bullet jacket were seized by
the officers of SJB Slunj.
Enclosures: x 7
CHIEF
Vujaklija Veljko
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 436 12/16/2010 2:55:34 PM rSK, mINIStry of DEfENcE, orDEr of thE rEpuBlIcAN cIVIlIAN pro-
REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
POLICE AUTHORITY VOJNIĆ
PUBLIC SECURITY AUTHORITY(SJB) SLUNJ
Nr. 08-03/1-2-1299/95
Slunj, 18.07.1995
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
VOJNIĆ
Reference: Panić Goran, suicide
Report
On 18.07.1995, around 02.00 hours, in the convenience store “RID”, Grabovac bb, xx
Slunj, owned by Bjelobrk Mile from Plitvice, Panić Goran, son of Ratko, born on 07.06.1972 in
Sisak, Republic of Croatia, residing in Belgrade, Jovana Avakumovića nr. 1, employee of Police
Authority Belgrade, committed suicide.
He committed suicide with his service handgun “CZ” M-99, cal. 9 mm, long barrel, serial
number 23534, by putting it against his right temple and firing one round, all under heavy
influence of alcohol; the bullet entered through the right temporal bone and exited on the left side
of the skull, causing instant death.
The scene was investigated by officers from Police Station Slunj, who also interviewed
witnesses; the protocol and official notes thereof have been delivered to you, as per enclosures 1
– 4.
The body of Panić Goran, as well as his personal effects, was released to Pavković Stevo,
commander of the Serbian Ministry of Interior police troop whose member Panić Goran was, and
the handgun with which the suicide was committed, bullet case and bullet jacket were seized by
the officers of SJB Slunj.
Enclosures: x 7
CHIEF
Vujaklija Veljko
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A NNEX 191:
rSK, cIVIl DEfENcE hEADquArtErS, orDEr coNcErNINg thE ImplE-
MentatiOn OF evacuatiOn and relieF Plans, 29 july 1995
1995, 29 July
Knin
Order of the RSK Civil Defence Headquarters to regional civil defence staffs concerning the
implementation of evacuation and relief plans
________________________
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
REPUBLICAN CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
No. nov. 01-78/95
Knin, 29 June 1995
DEFENCE
OFFICIAL SECRET
REGIONAL CIVIL
DEFENCE STAFFS
To whom it may concern
Pursuant to the Decision on the proclamation of a state of war, and in accordance with the latest
situation, the Republican Civil Defence Headquarters hereby issues the following
O R D E R
1. Regional Civil Defence Staffs need to be activated immediately, a continuous tour of duty
established and, as required, some staff members kept continuously available on call.
2. Municipal civil defence staffs shall be ordered to:
- organize a continuous tour of duty and staff member activity with respect to evacuation and relief;
- update relief and evacuation plans, including the putting of persons responsible for specific
assignments on standby;
- put organized civil defence units on standby;
- through civil defence wardens animate citizens to prepare relief facilities and implement other
measures and procedures for personal and collective protection;
- determine the potential of enterprises considering integration into the implementation of protection
and rescue measures.
3. Monitor the situation through SVK commands and take the necessary steps.
4. Monitor the activities of municipal civil defence staffs, and offer professional and other assistance
in developing appropriate solutions.
5. Daily report all measures and activities, and possible problems, to this Headquarters as of 30 July
1995 at 13.00 hours.
Copy to:
1. Regional civil defence staff s in Northern Dalmatia, by messenger
2. Lika, Kordun, Banija, Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, by fax
3. Records, here
(stamp)
RSK
Republican Civil Defence Headquarters
Knin
HQ Head
Duško Babić
Memo to
1. Ministry of defence
2. Chief of the SVK General Staff
3. Prime minister
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 439 12/16/2010 2:55:35 PM 440
A NNEX 192:
rSK, lIKA rEgIoNAl cIVIlIAN protEctIoN hEADquArtErS, orDEr of
MirKO POznanOvić, 30 july 1995
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 440 12/16/2010 2:55:36 PM 441
A NNEX 193:
rSK, DrNIš DEptArtmENt mINIStry of DEfENcE, DIrEctorAtE oN
Measures FOr the PreParatiOn OF evacuatiOn, 31 july 1995
1995, 31 July
Drniš
Report of the Drniš Dept. of the Ministry of Defence to the Northern Dalmatia
Directorate on measures for the preparation of evacuation
_______________________
Republic of Serbian Krajina
Municipality of Drniš
Ministry of defence
Drniš Dept.
No. str. conf. 01-10/95
Drniš, 31 July 1995
Ministry of defence
“Northern Dalmatia” Directorate
K N I N
Re: Report on steps taken with regard to the new situation
In line with the new situation, the Municipal Civil Defence Staff (MCDS) has taken the following
steps:
- Continuous duty of the MCDS has been introduced for the civil defence staff members and
employees of the Ministry of Defence Dept.
- The wardens of all local communities in the territory of the municipality of Drniš were visited except
the warden in the local community of Baljci, with whom we are in continuous contact.
We are planning to visit Baljci on 1 August 2009. We informed the wardens about the new situation,
and about the measures and steps they were supposed to take. Particular focus was placed on shelters
and evacuation related preparations. The wardens completed their assignments and reports from all
local communities arrived at the MCDS during the day. Lists of persons envisaged for evacuation
were updated, and fuel issued in November 1994 and vehicles were checked. Apart from problems in
the town of Drniš, where two vehicles (one tractor and one truck) were found to be malfunctioning,
throughout the municipality there were no problems either with vehicles or with fuel. The
unserviceable vehicles will be replaced as soon as possible in agreement with the manager of DP
Drništrans.
- Branka Ćakić, member of the MCDS, shall organize as soon as possible a first aid course, this being
one of our top priorities.
You will be duly and timely informed about all changes.
Respectfully yours,
(stamp)
RSK
Municipal Civil Defence Staff
Drniš
Head of the Municipal Civil
Defence staff
Ana Mirković
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 441 12/16/2010 2:55:36 PM 442
A NNEX 194:
rSK, mINIStry of thE INtErIor, orDEr SIgNED By mINIStEr tošo
Paić, 31 july 1995
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A NNEX 195:
rSK, SErB Army gENErAl StAff, orDEr oN thE rElocAtIoN of thE
gš SVK, 1 AuguSt 1995
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Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 445 12/16/2010 2:55:37 PM 446
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 446 12/16/2010 2:55:37 PM 447
A NNEX 196:
rSK, cIVIl DEfENcE hEADquArtErS, orDEr oN thE ImplEmENtAtIoN
of prEpArAtIoN for thE EVAcuAtIoN of ASSEtS, ArchIVES, AND rE-
cOrds, 2 auGust 1995
1995, 2 August
Order of the RSK Republican Civil Defence Headquarters to regional civil defence
staff s to proceed immediately to the implementation of evacuation plans
___________________
rEpuBlIc of SErBIAN KrAjINA
REPUBLICAN CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
No. str. conf. 01-92/95
Knin, 2 August 1995
DEfENcE
OFFICIAL SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
ENcoDED
To
rEgIoNAl cIVIl DEfENcE StAffS
To Whom It May Concern
Preparation for the evacuation
of material, cultural and other
assets
Order ImmEDIAtEly, through municipal civil defence staffs, bodies and organizations,
enterprises and other juridical persons, the implementation of preparations for the evacuation of
- material assets,
- archives, civil registers, records and confidential papers,
- movable cultural assets,
- money, securities and respective records.
In preparing evacuation the responsible entities are required to
- prepare lists - reviews of material assets in terms of type and quantity, and prepare such assets for
evacuation;
- determine the sites - facilities for their storage on the new location (in cooperation with Ministry of
Defence directorates and departments);
- provide vehicles for transport (if short of requirements, try to obtain vehicles through Ministry of
Defence bodies);
- form (un)loading teams;
- form commissions responsible for implementation.
As a rule, the evacuation of material assets should not be carried out simultaneously with
the evacuation of specific categories of the population (if ordered in time), exception
being made for articles, means and equipment used for relief purposes.
The course of preparations must be reported daily to this Headquarters starting from 4
August 1995 by 20.00 hours.
HQ Head
Duško Babić
(stamp)
RS
Republican Civil
Defence Headquarters
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 447 12/16/2010 2:55:37 PM 448
Copy to:
1. “Northern Dalmatia” regional civil defence
staff, by messenger
2. Regional civil defence staff s “Lika”,
“Kordun”, “Banija” and “Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem”,
encoded
3. Records
Memo to:
1. Minister of defence
2. Chief of SVK General Staff
3. Prime minister
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 448 12/16/2010 2:55:38 PM 449
A NNEX 197:
rSK, cIVIl DEfENcE hEADquArtErS, rEquESt oN thE ImplEmENtA-
tiOn OF civil deFence Plans, evacuatiOn and relieF, 2 auGust 1995
1995, 2 August
Knin
The RSK Republican Civil Defence Headquarters requests from the regional staffs
reports on the implementation of civil defence plans, evacuation and relief
rEpuBlIc of SErBIAN KrAjINA
REPUBLICAN CIVIL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
No. conf. 01-82/95
Knin, 2 August 1995
DEfENcE
OFFICIAL SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
To
REGIONAL CIVIL DEFENCE
STAFFS
to Whom it May concern
Pursuant to order conf. no. 01-78/95 of 29 July 1995, IMMEDIATELY, and not later than
3 August 1995 by 19.00 hours, forward r e p o r t s as follows:
1. Shelters (plan update, preparation of facilities, animation of the population).
2. Evacuation (plan update, material support, preparation of persons in charge, formation of
committees/teams for reception, distribution etc.).
3. Relief (accommodation facilities; provision of equipment and material, food, personal and general
hygiene agents).
4. Preparation and organization of protection and rescue steps (individually; steps taken and organized
activities including possible integration of enterprises into protection and rescue operations).
5. Presence of hazardous materials and protection steps taken.
6. Activated protection and rescue forces, and forces on alert.
7. Problems: functioning, material supply.
Copy to:
1. “Northern Dalmatia” regional civil defence staff, by messenger
2. “Lika”, “Kordun”, “Banija”, and “Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem”, by fax
3. Records
Memo to:
1. Minister of defence
2. Chief of SVK General Staff
3. Prime minister
(stamp)
RS
Republican Civil
Defence Headquarters
HQ Head
Duško Babić
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A NNEX 198:
rSK, SuprEmE DEfENcE couNcIl, DEcISIoN oN EVAcuAtIoN, 4 AuguSt
1995
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A NNEX 199:
RSK, MilitARy PoSt 9139, iNfoRMAtioN to UNitS, 8 JANUARy 1995
/handwritten:/ DAS /expansion unknown/,
SACP /expansion unknown/, 26 PBR /Infantry
Brigade/, NUI S. /expansion unknown/
MILITARY POST 9139
KOSTAJNICA
Confidential number 1841-2
8 January 1995
nd th
Information to units 2/4 pb /2 Company, 4 Infantry Battalion/
1. MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA:
Characteristics:
- The RH /Republic of Croatia/ with Franjo Tuđman and the HDZ /Croatian Democratic
Union/ in power has not given up the military option in addressing the issue of the
reintegration of the RSK /Republic o Serbian Krajina/ into the RH.
- It plays a double game before the international community and its forums, with an intention
to present itself as a democratic country willing to find a peaceful solution to the
reintegration of the RSK and the question of the Serbs in RH in general. Meanwhile, before
the public at home, via the mass media, and through the statements of certain extremist
leaders, it continues with wartime tensions with an aim to cover up its own incompetence.
– Through the structures of international organisations, they managed to have some
resolutions adopted which work to their advantage.
– Through the countries in Europe and on other continents that support them, and also the
large numbers of emigrants abroad, they have managed to ensure solid financial
support. They are receiving equipment with modern combat technology, and ensuring
positive propaganda through influential international agencies.
– With great humility and by concluding military treaties and offering parts of their territory,
they are trying to curry favour with NATO, in order to gain protection in their efforts to
achieve their goals concerning the RSK.
– Through continuous grouping and re-grouping, and by participating in operations in the
territory of the RSK on Dinara and on the territory of the RS /Republika Srpska/, as well as
through constant declarations of a “general alert” for places along the border with the RSK,
they are demonstrating that only in this way can they keep up wartime tensions and
“patriotism” among the Croatian people, and thereby also maintain those in power;
- signing an agreement with the RSK, whose second “economic” phase is about to start right
now (opening roads etc.), is no guarantee that the RH will not intervene against the RSK and
it can stop it whenever it wishes.
– The RH is the primary initiator, instigator, and implementer of the campaign to destroy the
Serbian people in the RSK and beyond, and this is its sole and primary goal.
– Alija Izetbegović’s Muslims and the Croats in BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ have the
same goal and they are trying to achieve it through mutual cooperation, arming, a loose
confederation, daily fighting against the RSK and the RS.
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– Through the support of major Muslim countries and the U.S., Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ is
managing to maintain the wartime tension that is based on lies (Jihad), and so is Franjo
Tuđman.
– The occupation of Velika Kladuša by Fikret Abdić’s NO ZB /National Defence of Western
Bosnia/ members, and the ongoing fighting among the Muslims indicate that peace will not
be achieved anytime soon in these parts.
– The imposition of Contact Group plans in BiH and the pressure on the Serbs to accept
them, and the visits of numerous peace envoys have not and will not give the desired results,
regardless of the signed truce.
– The daily flights of NATO aircraft over the RSK territory to control the airspace over BIH,
and firing at targets in the RSK clearly demonstrate that NATO is on the side of the enemies
of the Serbian people, and that it places itself in a position equal to that of the UN forces.
– Most UNPROFOR members favour the Croatian and Muslim side, while their chiefs of GS
/?general staffs/ are working out withdrawal plans in the case of danger, or figuring out how
to make them more effective than they are now.
– The signed agreement on ceasefire in BiH affects the Muslims rather than the HVO
/Croatian Defence Council/ which, together with the HV /Croatian Army/, is attacking and
taking RS territory, thus also sending a warning to the RSK.
2. Situation in the RSK
– The RSK still does not fully function as an organised state with all the institutions that a
state should have.
– The elected representatives of political government in their respective institutions are not
rising to the tasks and times in which they are working (a state of war), as there are inter-
party duels both within and outside parliament, primarily in the media, which confuses the
average citizen or soldier.
– The economy and economic potential of the RSK, partly owing to factors beyond its
control, and partly owing to human factors, have not been sufficiently encouraged to give
their proper contribution to the development of the RSK.
– The RSK leadership wants to address all problems with neighbours through negotiations
and peaceful means in the spirit of preserving and ensuring the survival of the Serbian people
in these parts, and in a state that they desire.
– Having monitored the situation immediately surrounding them, the grouping of forces
along the whole border with the RSK, the mobilisation throughout Croatia, the daily
provocations and threats, and the conduct and actions of Muslim forces and attacks on parts
of the RSK, the RSK leadership had to take the decision to conduct a general mobilisation of
the RSK army. The aim of the mobilisation was to prevent being taken by surprise in any
way, and to deter the Ustashas from attempts at aggression, and this has succeeded.
– The current situation still demands that most of the men be retained in the units, while a
certain number have started to return to the economic activities. Experience so far has shown
that the defence of the Serbian people of the RSK and RS cannot be conducted separately, it
has to be done jointly.
– The legal documents which regulate issues of the RSK, which has celebrated its third
anniversary of the formation and preservation of its territory.
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3. The state of morale in the RSK units
– Some members of the SVK /Supreme Command Staff/ are still not aware that Serbian
cause is being defended throughout the territory of the RSK and beyond, that is in the places
where the Serbian people are most threatened.
– Thinking that the RSK and the Serbian people will be defended just on one’s own doorstep
and that someone else will defend the territory is a hugely erroneous, and both the commands
and the political leadership of the country must abolish that concept.
– It must be clear to every soldier that we do not have any other soldiers or any other
territory, and this is precisely why we must endure and be persistent in defending the people
and the territory.
– Experience has shown that the morale, level of training, and firmness in defence are far
greater among units that have carried out combat activities than among those that are static in
holding the lines.
– The overall situation in the RSK, the poverty, the non-functioning of production, the
general impoverishment of soldiers and their families, the length of the war, and many other
system issues in the state are having a great impact on the weakening of morale among the
soldiers. All structures have to make efforts to eliminate these weaknesses.
– The morale of troops is being largely affected by the slow pace at which status matters are
addressed, by uncertainty, and by the impossibility of getting full logistical support,
especially in quartermaster supplies, financial support, and fuel supplies, which is nothing
but a reflection of the economic situation in the state which some individuals often fail to
understand and instead blame their commands for the crisis.
– The inconsistent criteria in admitting back the trained officers from the RSK have a
negative effect on the officers who have stayed with their units the whole time.
– The large number of deserters in some of the units has had a very negative effect on the
execution of combat tasks, and this problem has to be addressed at all levels in the future.
– Regardless of the above-mentioned shortcomings – some of them for reasons beyond
control and some of subjective nature – we assess that the troops are aware of the situation
they are in and that they will complete their tasks of defending the Serbian people and the
RSK.
4. Failures and shortcomings in conducting previous and current combat activities
In the course of previous and current combat activities in which our units have been
participating, shortcomings and failures have been observed, and that impedes the
performance of tasks assigned by the superior command. Here are some of the shortcomings
and failures: th
– On the Lika section of the front some of the 39 Corps units refused to engage in the attack
because their officer informed them that they were to be engaged just in order to hold the
line.
– In the sector of Glinica village some soldiers tried to steal (various technical devices,
machines, machine parts, etc.), but were stopped by a military police unit. There were also
some attempts of rape, and an investigation and proceedings are still in progress.
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– Defence lines are being willfully abandonedthand that puts in jeopardy the performance of
tasks assigned to the Command of the 39 Corps and its subordinate units.
– Units are rotated without authorisation and without notifying the Command of the 39 th
th st
Corps (some of the scouts from the 26 pbr /Infantry Brigade/ and 31 pbr, and the
independent pč /infantry company/ from the 31 pbr).st
Within the units there have been many other shortcomings and failures which could largely
affect the performance of a unit’s combat task and have negative consequences, but which
could be avoided and prevented with additional efforts made by the responsible officers.
More intensive work should be done with the troops in order to improve command and
control at all levels.
5. Examples of responsibility and dedication of the SVK members and the 26 thpbr.
th th
On 28 December 1994 members of the 5 pč from Živaja proposed to the 26 pbr
Commander to commend, pay special tribute, promote to a higher rank, give a financial
th
reward, or grant exemplary service leave to the Commander of the 5 pč Lieutenant Branko
Pralić for selfless dedication, self-sacrifice, initiative and courage shown.
This proposal was signed by 34 soldiers of the 5 pč. As rationale to support this proposal,
the men stated that with such a commander any task can and must be accomplished. There is
no greater recognition for an officer than when his soldiers and subordinates elevate him to a
throne of honour for the virtues and courage he has demonstrated.
On 27 December 1994, Đuro Đuro Kosjer, a specialist in general medicine (Lieutenant th
Colonel by rank) wrote to the Chief of the SnSl /Medical Service/ at the 39 Corps
Command that he would stay at the front from 26 December 1994 to 25 January 1995
because it was no problem for him, unlike the physithans at the Petrinja Health Centre who
are refuse to cooperate with the SnSl of the 39 Corps Command and the Commander of the
31 stpbr, and some have even rejected mobilisation call-up and participation in war units. In
th
his letter to the N /Chief/ of the SnSl of the 26 pbr, Dr Đuro Kosjer expressed ths gratitude
to Dr Kordić and the major of the SnSl, Svetozar Ljuština from the 26 pbr, for their help
and understanding.
This is another example of selflessness and dedication to the call demonstrated by
professional members of the SVK.
6. At a tavern in the village of Crkveni Bok at around 08:00 PM on 4 January 1995,
following a verbal fight (argument) between 2 nd Lieutenant Milenko Vučenović, the
commander of the 5/3 pb /5 Company, 3 Battalion/, and Private Petar Čikota, regarding
nd
the latter’s failure to report to his post in the unit, 2 Lieutenant Milenko Vučenović killed
Petar Čikota in the tavern yard.
Right upon receipt of the information on the VRDg /unusual incident/, a team from the 26 th
pbr Command and Kostajnica SJB /Public Security Station/ went out to conduct an on-site
investigation.
Petar Čikota’s body was transferred to the mortuary of Kostajnica Health Centre, and
Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Vucenovic was taken into custody at the Kostajnica SJB for
investigative proceedings, and then to the remand prison in Glina. More detailed
circumstances of the VRDg will be available when the investigative proceedings are
complete.
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7. On 7 January 1995, Sergeant Milan Zorić wounded himself. He was disassembling an
explosive device when he activated detonator number 8 and, as a result, his left hand was
injured. He was taken to hospital in Banja Luka, where he underwent surgery and his left
hand had to be amputated. He is still in hospital. The Command of the 26 pbr organised a
visit to the wounded officer together with his relatives.
8. During the Christmas holidays a number of accidents took place in the 39 Corps zone of
responsibility, which could have been prevented if greater and better efforts had been made
by all parties in command and control.
In Dvor na Uni, in the midst of general good atmosphere and high spirits to welcome
Christmas, a grenade was thrown, seriously injuring two people and lightly injuring one.
Shortly before 09:00 rd on 7 January 1995, istPetrinja at the checkpoint known as Japan
held by the 3/31 /3 Battalion of the 31 / pbr, after a gambling and drinking session, v/o
/conscript/ Ljuban Graorac shot dead Miroslav Zgonjanin with an AP /automatic rifle/.
In the sector of Glinice at 11:30 AM on 7 January 1995, v/o Slavko Rušić, a member of the
th
24 pbr, was killed by enemy fire. He suffered an entry-and-exit wound through the lungs.
It can be clearly seen that some of these incidents could have been prevented, and that they
were caused by negligence, irresponsible behaviour, lack of discipline, and excessive
consumption of alcohol. Out of several casualties, only one was caused by direct contact
with the enemy. These tragedies should serve as a final warning to all responsible parties in
command and control, that they must invest far more efforts in their work with the troops.
The lack of initiative in the work of people in positions of responsibility and their inadequate
attitude toward working with the troops in the field and within units is slowly taking a bloody
toll, and this works to the advantage of our enemies.
th
9. In the course of 9 January 1995 we received another two reports from the 39 Corps
Command, which we are forwarding in full:
th
The state of morale in the 39 Corps units
Generally, the state of morale in the units of the 39 Corps meets the demands of current
combat and defence activities. In the interests of fostering understanding of the need to
strengthen and develop the Serbian army as one of the requirements for the survival of the
Serbs in our centuries-old areas, we will highlight some negative factors in certain units
which have the most direct impact on weakening combat morale:
– Too frequent, uncontrolled and excessive consumption of alcohol among a certain number
of v/o in the units.
– A lack of professional staff for working with troops in lower-level units and failure to
respect the principles of subordination (unity of command).
– A whole range of vague statements or lethargy of the actual state institutions, from the
RSK Assembly downwards, to round off a tangled web of legal instruments and actions
needed for the proper functioning of the rule of law and, subsequently, the military
organisation of the SV /Serbian Army/.
– Frequent incidents of theft and profiteering, which the present military and civilian judicial
organs are unable to sanction, and criminality which is becoming a general occurrence, and
that, in the view of experts, is more dangerous for a people than a plague.
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These negative factors exist in almost all units all the time, and have a direct impact on the
escalation of a number of problems which, among other things, lead to the weakening of
morale among the men.
The checkpoints/intact or semi-destroyed houses on the forward defence line and in contact
with the enemy, where sometimes 10 or more /illegible/ are staying, have cast a pall over
many a mother in Banija.
Due to the cold, a false sense of security if there are more of us, partial or excessive
intoxication, and the incompetence of many people in lower-level units to command and take
decisions on people’s fates; the soldiers are crowded together in large groups without proper
guarding and combat security, and are thus easy prey for the enemy who behaves like a
wounded beast.
th
This is particularly obvious in the units that are in contact with forces of the 5 Corps of the
Muslim army, whose soldiers are to a large extent intoxicated with the spread of Islam and
openly state that they are on Allah’s path, that this is the only true path, and that they do not
care if they die as long as they take at least three Serbs with them.
th
In some of our units in contact with the 5 Corps of the Muslim army, signs, countersigns
and passwords are not registered at all in the order of the day to the units, and in some cases
are not even conveyed at all or are the subject of tasteless jokes made by arrogant
individuals.
In some units, thefts committed in the course of combat operations have escalated to the
extreme limits of ethics and morality in the negative sense, so that drastic measures had to be
taken by the highest level of command.
st
For example, 20 members of the smc /expansion unknown/ from the 31 pbr who were
deployed in action to assist forces of the AP ZB /Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia/
in the general sector of Velika Kladuša were more involved in gathering “war booty” than in
combat activities.
th
In the disciplinary proceedings for the 20 of them, the Commander of the 39 Corps imposed
disciplinary prison sentences as follows: one officer – 180 days; seven v/o – 180 days each;
three v/o – 120 days each; two v/o – 60 days each. They are already serving their prison
sentences in Gradiška. st
The Commander of the 31 pbr imposed the disciplinary measure of detention for seven v/o
for 20-30 days.
The uncontrolled /several words illegible/ while going to or returning from the Krajina front
costs /illegible/ and casts a shadow on the SV of the RSK as a dull-witted organisation with
an incompetent commanding /illegible/.
All these occurrences directly or indirectly result in too relaxed behaviour of the troops, and
that ends up in fatal and needless casualties.
When contacts are made with the men in the units, the more intellectual among them raise
burning, vital questions to which unfortunately, without approval from higher levels of
command and the authorities, we are unable to clearly respond. Here are just the more
important questions:
– Why are the military courts still not working, or why are the civilian courts not handling
military matters but following decrees on the state of war, as it is abundantly clear that
civilian justice does not meet the demands of the times and needs of the military
organisation?
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– Why do not all officers in the RSK have the same status and income while the war is going
on? Three categories of officers are in command (active-service officers from the VJ
/Yugoslav Army/, reserve officers, and contract officers), and there is a great deal of
animosity among them, which affects the morale in general.
/several words illegible/ that it would be useful if Serbia and Montenegro /illegible/ measures
to coerce all people of Krajina to return to Krajina. This particularly refers to Serbia. There
is a fear that if Milošević gives away Krajina to Croatia, the Serbs in the Balkans will suffer
the same fate as the North American Indians over the next 50 years.
– Why is it that at the Mošćenica border crossing a classic /illegible/ has not been set up yet,
/illegible/ just a checkpoint?
– Why does the RSK Government not address the issue of the use of the Vojnić–Petrinja
railway line and the issue of securing it, as was the case after the Second World War?
Major problems which are directly affecting the state of morale in units are also being
created by the inability to reach an agreement in the negotiations with the Muslim Army 5 th
Corps over the exchange of prisoners of war and the handover of bodies. During December
1994, in fighting with the Muslim army 5 thCorps, two soldiers from the 24 pbr were killed
and four went missing; from the 31 pbr two were killed and one was taken prisoner; one
th
soldier from the 39 IDO /Reconnaissance and Sabotage Detachment/ was killed.
Despite the aforementioned problems, we assess that the large majority of members of the
SV of the RSK and citizens of Banija are exclusivists when it comes to the option of the so-
called reintegration of Krajina into Croatia. Anyone who plays that card is certainly risking a
civil war among the Serbs. Some soldiers in the units feel that coexistence with the Croats is
possible and that they can repay that by recognizing and accepting the RSK as a sovereign
state and homeland. Any other option is viewed as:
Continuance of the genocidal policy which has been pursued against the Serbs in these parts
for over 200 years; driving the Serbs into an exodus from our centuries-old areas and
extinguishing Serbdom entirely; the Vatican is seen as the greatest enemy of the Serbs, and
the Croats are merely the dirty executors of the monstrous plans of their Jesuitical order.
This encourages the conscience of our soldiers and citizens, and also their determination to
endure in the battle for the freedom and independence of the RSK, and the integration of
Krajina into the body of Serbdom in the Balkans, even though a certain section of waverers
and defectors are expressing doubt in the SVK and everyone else, and see an utter betrayal of
the Serbs and Serbian interests.
th
Failures and shortcomings observed in 39 Corps units
On the basis of reports /about the incidents/ that happened over the New Year and Christmas
holidays alone, we must present a tragic and shocking fact:
Two people were killed, and two were luckily only lightly wounded.
To make the tragedy even greater, the cause of these terrible incidents was alcohol.
– A member of our unit opened fire on an UNPROFOR vehicle. Within our units we had
previously pointed out the disastrous consequences of drinking alcohol, but evidently it was
not taken seriously. These incidents do, however, confirm this fact. Accordingly, in order to
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prevent unfortunate incidents in the future, and especially during Serbian New Year, take the
following measures:
– In all units, from the level of section commanders upwards, monitor the state of v/o with
regard to alcohol consumption. Prevent drunkenness within the units and do not allow v/o to
handle firearms whilst drunk.
– Make sure that the transfer of duties is conducted in accordance with the rules of service in
the SO /?OS – Armed Forces/ of the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/.
– Forbid any movement of civilians in places or zones where they are not allowed.
– Forbid any abandonment of combat positions while on duty.
Otherwise, any v/o who does not abide by this should be reported to the Military Police.
– Strictly forbid alcohol from being brought into barracks, to units’ positions, and during
rotation of units at positions on the front. We have received a report from the Pauk
Command that renewed black marketeering with Muslims has been observed, even with
members of the 5 th Corps. Inform all soldiers that anyone caught will have all his
possessions confiscated, and some will even pay with their lives for such improper actions.
The border between the RSK and Western Bosnia is being guarded by members of TG-2
/Tactical Group 2/ and TG-7, in addition to our own units. Warn all members of your units
and take all necessary measures to prevent black marketeering and drinking.
The entire composition of your units is to be briefed on this report, including those at the
positions and those on leave, absent, or on sick leave.
10. The first issue of the Informativni Glasnik, the 26thpbr newsletter, has been published,
dated 7 January 1995. We plan to publish the next issue by 7 February 1995. In order to
improve the quality and number of contributions from the front lines, we again take this
opportunity to call on the relevant parties to work with us on this, and also to enable soldiers
to collaborate with the newsletter’s editorial team.
Go through this report with all commands of battalions/artillery battalions, commanders of
companies, platoons and sections, and use extracts from it to brief the soldiers and highlight
lessons to be learned.
GM/BM ASSISTANT COMMANDER
Major
Milan Grnović/
/signed and stamped/
TO:
– all units
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A NNEX 200:
SAvo ŠRbAc SPEAKiNg fRoM A tv StUdio iN bANJA lUKA, 7 AUgUSt 1995
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ANNEX 201:
APPEAl to cRoAtiAN citizENS of SERb NAtioNAlity fRoM PRESi-
dent Franjo tuđman, Zagreb, 4 august 1995
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Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 461 12/16/2010 2:56:48 PM 462
A NNEX 202:
AgREEMENt oN thE SURRENdER of thE 21St coRPS., gliNA, 8 AUgUSt
1995
/handwritten and encircled: 41/
Attachment 4-154
AGREEMENT
ON THE SURRENDER OF THE 21 ST CORPS
Pursuant to the agreement on cease-fire and surrender of the weapons and military
equipment by the Serb rebels and the conclusions of the meeting of the military delegations held
on 8 August 1995 in the headquarters of UNCRO in Glina, General Zvonimr ČERVENKO, Chief
of the Main Staff of the Croatian Army, and General Janvier, Commander of UNCRO /United
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation/, have reached the following
AGREEMENT
on the surrender of the 21 Kordun Corps as follows:
1. Surrender of weapons, ammunition, combat and non-combat m/v /motor vehicles/ and
other military equipment
1.1. 21. On 9 August 1995, between 07:00 AM and 02:00 PM, the Kordun Corps shall
surrender all its weapons and ammunition, combat and non-combat m/v and other military
equipment to the Croatian Army.
1. 2. Short personal weapons shall be exempt from Item 1.1. of this Agreement, in particular:
- 100 pieces for persons in the police;
- short personal weapons belonging to officers and non-commissioned officers whose number
shall be agreed by the representatives of a military commission.
1.3. The surrender of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment shall be carried out
at the following two locations:
- Location no. 1 – the Brijuni Motel
- Location no. 2 – Topusko
1.4. Prior to the commencement of the surrender, a military commission shall determine the
type of equipment to be taken over at specific locations and the time dynamics and manner of the
surrender, taking into account that the majority of the weapons and equipment is to be
surrendered at location number 1.
st
1.5. Within the framework of the surrender of weapons of the 21 Kordun Corps, other
persons in possession of weapons (police, hunters and civilians) shall surrender all their
weapons.
1.6. Representatives of UNCRO shall be present at the surrender of weapons in order to
secure the area and protect persons carrying out the handover, and both parties shall
mutually guarantee safety and protection of such persons.
2. Personnel evacuation has been agreed as follows:
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2.1. The movement route is Topusko – Glina – Sisak – Lipovac – the Lipovac motorway and
- Glina – Žirovac – Dvor na Uni.
2.2. The Croatian authorities shall ensure unhindered and safe passage along the stated
routes.
2.3. Fuel, food, medical help, etc. shall be provided for those voluntarily departing from the
Republic of Croatia, with UNCRO, the EM /European Mission/ and the international
humanitarian organizations assisting.
2.4. The trucks belonging to the military program, which are to be used for the transportation
of people, must be left at the border of the Republic of Croatia.
SERBIAN SIDE REPRESENTATIVES: CROATIAN ARMY REPRESENTATIVES:
1. Commander of the 21 Kordun Corps 1. Colonel General Petar Stipetić
Colonel Čedo Bulat
/signed/ /signed/
2. Tošo Pajić 2. Brigadier Vlado Hodalj
/signed/ /signed/
3. Commander of the 11 Brigade 3. Lieutenant Miroslav Vidović
st
of the 21 Kordun Corps
Lieutenant Colonel Dragan Kovačić
/signed/ /signed/
WITNESSED BY
COMMANDER OF UNCRO SECTOR NORTH
Colonel Mokrents
/signed/
Glina, 8 August 1995
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A NNEX 203:
lEttER fRoM coloNEl PEttiS to bRigAdiER PlEŠtiNA, 8 AUgUSt 1995
/handwritten and encircled: 158./
/coat-of-arms/
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ZAGREB
Class: sp 018-04/95-151/02
File no: 512-01-04/95-73
Zagreb, 8 August 1995
Dear Sir,
Please find attached the translation and the original of the letter by Colonel Pettis from
UNCRO /United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation/ regarding the conduct of the
members of the 5 Corps of the ABiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ in the village of
Ostojić, situated two kilometres from the border with BiH.
OFFICE OF THE MORH
/Ministry of Defence of the
Republic of Croatia/ for the UN
/United Nations/ and the EZ
/European Community/
/signed and stamped/
Brigadier Budimir Pleština
Head of the Office
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UNCRO
ZAGREB HEADQUARTERS
No. 1000-2 (MA)
8 August 1995 (02:47 PM)
To: Brigadier Pleština
SUBJECT: Activities in Ostojići on 7 August 1994 /as printed/ at 07:40 PM
At 07:40 PM on 7 August 1995, we received information from one of our observation posts in
Sector North that members of the BiH 5 thCorps were setting on fire civilian houses in the
town of Ostojići (WL 8600). In addition, the UN personnel heard shooting from sidearms and
screams.
We hereby appeal to you to request from the BiH 5 thCorps to stop this flagrant violation of
the international laws committed in the Croatian territory against the innocent civilians. The
operations of the Bosnian troops are breaching the confidence that your Government has been
trying to build amongst the population of the Serbs in Croatia.
Colonel Pettis
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A NNEX 204:
ERRoRS iN StAtUS of PERSoNS iN thE chc REPoRt (oPERAtioN
StoRM), AttAchMENt 2A
.
01)
- -1)
AttAchMENt 2 -90074) -90639/01)-91038 090618
-
ormation
StAtUS
jelovima vojne uniform
nja, Cemetery Sv. Nikole, NN 11
Petri Petrinja, Ceteijav,.koelteNv.62ikole, NN 164
- - t
nt missing/found in military uniform
weSnotrci•es/fuorci•ieW/iferci•eilinorcisenfound in military uniformh ( no. ICRC: HRZ
dAo tfbiRth 18.11.1939 19.11.1974 27.12.197201.11.1972
NAo M cA NIKOLA DUŠAN STOJAN MARKO
Exists documentation that they are Members of Military f
NAME
ĐO(ĐUERO) NEBOJŠA MILOŠ STEVAN
hom
SURNAM GERBA LONČAR BEKIĆ VORKAPIĆ
No.chc 16 36 57 76
list of Persons for w
- 1 2 3 4
No..
A
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A NNEX 205:
ERRoRS iN StAtUS of PERSoNS iN thE chc REPoRt (oPERAtioN
StoRM), AttAchMENt 2b
N N
ID ID
.
tatement of the
AttAchMENt 2
090362/01090208/01 090206/01
-90175 - - -90713/01 - -90311
n basis of the S
StAtUS
earch (o
the request for search (no. icRc: hRz
weSnotrDci:sgoe•rcesiloe•asfs:lco•ierm:Scosrres:ftr•issm1feest.,scibotts.acniCysaetmitbr:aadsifryrcfrrcsf,nseoIrclend. CKRaCr:mHyRZ
01.1943
dAo tfbiRth 14.10.193502.05.19670.04.19453.06.19535.01.19537. 12.2.194911.11.1952
NAo McEA MILE MILAN RADOJICRAADE ILIJA ĐURO DRAGANPETAR
NAME
PETAR DRAGIĆMILE DRAGANĐURO MILE DMITARDRAGAN
SURNAME MILOŠEV MIILJUŠETVEIĆAVAICVANOVM IĆARTINC ORVEIVARKROŠNJA MRADŽARAC
amilies)
list of Persons for whom Military Status is Stated in the Request for S 59 65 67
- No.chc
b
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No..
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A NNEX 206:
diScREPANcy REgARdiNg ciRcUMStANcES of SUffERiNg, AttAch-
MENt 3
3.
01 from March 2003. )
-
circums-91040 -90401 from March 2002. )
Beograd, in Spačva forest.
-
ee. Since then, there's no information
AttAchMENt According to reecsforisnegartqu.est for search (no.
ons ICRPerenawoithhiepilZnrtoetitjoasssghn.eiseofs.nsgghparysons.
pers
Name MILOŠ NIKOLA
LJILJAK
Surname MIRILOVIĆ
According to documentation of directorate for detained and misssing
Dvor. Last time
-
Went missing at seen near Dvor
circumstancesujevca 6WencoGlinadown the road
MILE
Name NIKOLA
According to chc report
LJILJAK MIRILOVIĆ
Surname
51 70
No.
chc
1 2
Personscivilians Mistakes or disparities in the description of the circumstances of the Suffering were Established
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 468 12/16/2010 2:56:50 PM 469
A NNEX 207:
liSt of PERSoNS with iNcoRREct PERSoNAl dAtA (oPERAtioN
StoRM), AttAchMENt iA
. 3
A
.193 .1933.1947
30.01.911.91.901.91.901.91.901.91.91.90555.1922.01.90282.1931.91.901.91.91216.1972
date of birth
AttAchMENt 1
oN
iME
fatMer'silAIKOMLLMILASINSO SiMNIKODLUATNEvASoADOESTSJANKIKdLRAgAdPEEPRTARAdMEARKO
missing persons
Name
DRAMGILĐĆORPĐEDRAlGJĆMoIOARADARNKEOOJIŠOSŠMJIAOIŠLJUBSITDMNTAIRDRAĐGANĐICSTEVAN
Surname
According to documentation of directorate for detained and
KRAPNEČERVIĆILMŠLJSŠIVIMAHRSKIĆILONČĆAROVŽIJIĆJAKDŽNJKOMKARDNAJMRlJŽILĆACIVOVKAPIĆ
1937193119381936. 196019561911196574.g1957194765.g19461924193019581938195. 2 g.9292
date of birth
O
ata (oPERAtioN "StoRM") OJA
fatMer'sANNIKOMLLMILASINSiMo NIKOLASTEVANRADO ESTSTANKIKOOLA PERPERO MARK
O
Name
EBOJŠA
DRAMGILĐĆURPOEoRAlgJUMAINANADARNKO MIŠOOSTMJiA(IOJLIJNU)DMNTAIRDRAĐGANĐIKSTEVO
According to chc report
SurKRAPNEČERVIĆILMŠLJSŠIVIMAHRSKIĆILONČĆAROVŽIJIĆJAKĐARKIOMKARDNAJMRlJAILĆCIRIOVKAPIĆ
No.
7 12 16 19 20 23 26 33 35 36 39 42 51 52 61 63 65 66 67 69 70 76
chc
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
list of Persons with incorrect Personal d
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A NNEX 208:
liSt of PERSoNS with iNcoMPlEtE PERSoNAl dAtA (oPERAtioN
StoRM), AttAchMENt ib
.1938.1933
01.05.196123.06.195315.10.0522.1952
.
b date of birth
AttAchMENt 1
fathJerDsnaGIeĆADJEOVMIRJOVOĐURAĐ
missing persons
Name
ĐURFĐLIPMIDRAPGEAMILBOGLDUNBICAA
AccordinSurnamecumentation of directorate for detained and
KRAMNJLĐAĆIVAKORNJAJALLJMJLIĆ
38
35.G1909191240.G1193319521952
date of birth
father's name RADE
incomplete Personal data (oPERAtioN"StoRM")
Name
ĐURFĐLIPMIDRAPGEAMILBOGLDUNBICAA
According to chc report
ersons with
Surname
KRAMNJLĐAĆIVAKORNJAJALLJMJLIĆ
list of P
No. 8 21 22 34 50 56 62 68
chc
list of persons s incomplete personal data (8)
- o. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
N
b
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A NNEX 209:
un, Coded Cable, meeting with mr Šarinić, 9 september 1995
Volumen 5 Anex_116_215_B.indd 471 12/16/2010 2:56:52 PM 472
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A NNEX 210:
REPUblic of cRoAtiA, MiNiStRy of dEfENcE, oRdER oN thE
woRK of thE MilitARy PolicE, cooPERAtioN bEtwEEN ANd JoiNt
woRK of thE civiliAN ANd MilitARy PolicE, ANd obligAtioNS
of thE MilitARy PolicE towARdS dEtAiNEd MEMbERS of PARA-
MilitARy ANd PARA-PolicE foRMAtioNS, 3 AUgUSt 1995woRK of thE
civiliAN ANd MilitARy PolicE, ANd obligAtioNS of thE MilitARy
PolicE towARdS dEtAiNEd MEMbERS of PARA-MilitARy ANd PARA-
PolicE foRMAtioNS, 3 AUgUSt 1995
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ANNEX 211:
govERNMENt of thE REPUblic of cRoAtiA, MiNUtES fRoM
the 257th Closed session oF the government oF Croatia, 4
AUgUSt 1995
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A NNEX 212:
SPlit – dAlMAtiA PolicE AdMiNiStRAtioN, SUbMiSSioN of thE RE-
PoRt AboUt thE SitUAtioN REgARdiNg thE SAcRAl fAcilitiES of
thE SERbiAN oRthodoX chURch iN thE libERAtEd tERRitoRy, 22
AUgUSt 1995
10 POLICE STATION “CODED – VH”
NUMBER: 511-12-74103-32/95 “POVRATAK” /Return/
SINJ, 22 AUGUST 1995 OA /Operative Action/
- TOP SECRET -
SPLIT – DALMATIA PU /Police Administration/stamp/: thE REPUblic of cRoAtiA
- To the “POVRATAK” OA STAFF 511-12 – MiNiStRy of thE iNtERioR
S P L I T
Received on: 22 August 1995
Classification no.: Org. unit
01
File number: /illegible/
SUBJECT: SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT ABOUT THE SITUATION REGARDING
THE SACRAL FACILITIES OF THE S.P.C. /Serbian Orthodox Church/ IN
THE LIBERATED TERRITORY
WITH REGARD TO YOUR CABLE REQUEST NO.: 511-12-01-VT-127/139-95, DATED
21 AUGUST 1995, WE CAN INFORM YOU THAT THE SITUATION REGARDING THE
SACRAL FACILITIES, THAT IS, THE MEASURES OF PROTECTION OF THE SAID
FACILITIES, IS THE FOLLOWING:
1. IN THE PLACE OF JEŽEVIĆ, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF “SV. SPASA”
/”Ascension Day”/ HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE MINEDAND COMPLETELY DAMAGED
DURING 1992 AND 1993.
2. IN THE PLACE OF MAOVICE, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF “SV. JURE” /”St.
George”/ - CHURCH BELLS WERE TAKEN FROM THE SAID CHURCH AND THE
INTERIOR OF THE CHURCH HAS BEEN DEMOLISHED.
3. IN MALJKOVO, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF “SV. JOSIP” /”St. Joseph”/ HAS
BEEN DAMAGED, IT WAS HIT WITH TWO ARTILLERY MISSILES AND THEN SET
ON FIRE IN THE AUTUMN OF 1991.
4. IN VRLIKA, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH “GOSPA OD ROŽARIJA” /”Madonna of the
Rosary”/ HAS BEEN DEVASTATED.
5. IN THE PLACE OF ZASIOK, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF “SV. IVAN” /”St. John”/
HAS BEEN SET ON FIRE IN THE AUTUMN OF 1991.
6. IN THE PLACE OF DRAGOVIĆ, THE S.P.C. MONASTERY HAS NOT BEEN
DAMAGED AND IT IS BEING GUARDED BY THE POLICE.
7. IN VRLIKA, THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF “SV. NIKOLA” /”St. Nicholas”/ IS
BEING GUARDED BY THE POLICE. IT HAS NOT BEEN DAMAGED.
8. IN THE PLACE OF MAOVICE, THE ORTHODOX CHAPEL OF “SV. NEDJELJA”
/”Holy Sunday”/, WHICH ISA PART OF THE CEMETERY, HAS NOT BEEN
DAMAGED. IT HAS REGULARLY BEEN COVERED BY THE POLICE PATROL.
9. IN THE PLACE OF OTIŠIĆ, THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF “SV. ARHANĐEO” /”St.
Archangel”/ HAS NOT BEEN DAMAGED. THE SAID CHURCH IS BEING GUARDED
BY THE POLICE MEMBERS.
COMMANDER :
MARKO BILOBRK
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A NNEX 213:
SPlit – dAlMAtiA PolicE AdMiNiStRAtioN, SUbMiSSioN of thE RE-
PoRt oN thE EStAbliShMENt of thE vRliKA bRANch PolicE StA-
tioN ANd othERS, 5 AUgUSt 1995
thE REPUblic of cRoAtiA CODED “VH”
MiNiStRy of thE iNtERioR oA /Operative Action/
SPlit – dAlMAtiA PU /Police “POVRATAK” /Return/
Administration/ “Top Secret”
Number: 511-12-01-VT-127/23-95
Split, 05 August 1995
To: MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
OPERATIONS STAFF OF THE OA “POVRATAK”
ZAGREB
SUBJECT: Submission of the Report on the Establishment of the Vrlika PI /Branch Police
Station/ and others
We herewith inform you that as of 16:00 PM on 05 August 1995, the Vrlika PI
has been established as a constituent part of the 10 Sinj PP /Police Station/, as well as the
Otišić and Koljani sub-branches and also that the entire territory of this PU, which was
temporarily occupied until now, is now under control.
One military policeman was slightly wounded during the action, while one of the
members of this PU fell sick.
chiEf of AdMiNiStRAtioN
/signed for/ ivo cipci
/illegible signature/
/round stamp/: The Republic of Croatia
Ministry of the Interior
Split – Dalmatia Police Administration
Split
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A NNEX 214:
UN, codEd cAblE fRoM AKAShi to thE SEcREtARy-gENERAl, 7
AUgUSt 1995
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A NNEX 215:
letter From minister mate granić to german Foreign minister
KlAUS KiNKEl, 25 AUgUSt 1995
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volume V